GILES OF ROME'S THEORY OF THE WILL

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Centre for Medieval Studies
University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Giles of Rome's theory of the will. Regent Master in Theology from 1285-1291, Giles was one of the leading figures at the University of Paris in the period between Aquinas and Scotus. He not only witnessed, but also was deeply involved in the debates out of which the notion of the will as a free power emerged.

I examine Giles's contribution to this debate in an effort to determine whether his moral psychology is, at root, voluntarist or intellectualist. Against the accepted view that Giles was a follower of Aquinas and therefore intellectualist, I argue that this claim must be qualified. Specifically, I establish that although Giles inherits several key principles from Aquinas's moral psychology, he ultimately develops them in a voluntarist direction.

On the self-motion of the will I show how Giles adopts Aquinas's distinction between specification and exercise and develops it into a defense of a voluntarism of specification, that is, a defense of the claim that the will can determine itself independently of the intellect. I then show how Giles's theory of self-motion governs his account of the Socratic Paradox such that, although wrongdoing involves ignorance at some level, it is nonetheless seen by him to be a voluntary
ignorance. In this way, the will rather than the intellect becomes the source of wrongdoing.

In the final two chapters I take up the issues of the primacy of the will and the foundations of freedom, respectively. I show that Giles, along with the voluntarists of the period, defends the nobility of the will over the intellect and the related claim that happiness consists in a union with God that is achieved primarily through the will's act of love. Finally, I examine Giles's discussion of the foundations of freedom, showing the way in which Giles incorporates the moderate voluntarism of thinkers such as Aquinas's contemporary Walter of Bruges in order to defend the view that the will, rather than the intellect, is the formally free power.

I conclude that, overall, Giles's theory of the will, although drawing on several sources, including Aquinas, must ultimately be regarded as a voluntaristic moral psychology.
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<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>AfGdP</em></td>
<td>Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>AHDL</em></td>
<td>Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>An. Aug.</em></td>
<td>Analecta Augustiniana</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>CHLMP</em></td>
<td>The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CUP</em></td>
<td>Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>FS</em></td>
<td>Franciscan Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>FZP</em></td>
<td>Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie</td>
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<td><em>FS</em></td>
<td>Franziskanische Studien</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>JHP</em></td>
<td>Journal of the History of Philosophy</td>
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<td><em>JMRS</em></td>
<td>Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies</td>
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<td><em>Mod. Sch.</em></td>
<td>The Modern Schoolman</td>
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<td><em>MPAT</em></td>
<td>Medieval Philosophy and Theology</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>MS</em></td>
<td>Medieval Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>MM</em></td>
<td>Miscellanea Mediaevalia</td>
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<td><em>NS</em></td>
<td>The New Scholasticism</td>
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<td><em>PB</em></td>
<td>Les Philosophes Belges</td>
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<td><em>PM</em></td>
<td>Philosophes Médiévaux</td>
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<td><em>RTAM</em></td>
<td>Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale</td>
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<td><em>RTPM</em></td>
<td>Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In the late thirteenth century the philosophical career of the will took a striking turn. Prior to the condemnations of 1277 it was acceptable to define the will as a determined power. After 1277, the defense of such a notion became, in theory at least, heretical. Accordingly, it is possible to trace, in the philosophical and theological writings of the last quarter of the thirteenth century, the emergence of the concept of free will that was to reach its full development in the writings of Scotus and Ockham.

The foregoing assessment is not intended to suggest that medieval thinkers prior to 1277 denied the existence of human freedom. Between the reception of Aristotle into the west in the middle of the twelfth century and the condemnations of 1277, however, most thinkers did not attribute freedom, formally speaking, to the will. Rather, they viewed it as the outcome of rationality alone or of the intellect and the will working in conjunction with one another.1 Specifically, they were apt to discuss free agency in connection with the concept of "free decision" (liberum arbitrium) rather than in terms of the "freedom of the will" (libertas

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1 B. Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, 1995), 98-110
voluntatis), broadly understood as the ability to act, to some degree anyway, in an autonomous fashion.

Precisely why such a conceptual transformation emerged when it did can be explained by the dissemination of cognitive determinism, one of the features of Latin Averroism to which the conservative theologians who drafted the syllabus of condemned articles particularly objected. It was felt that if the will were determined — even by factors internal to the agent, such as the intellect — then moral responsibility would fall by the wayside. Amongst the issues surrounding the human will in this period, then, that of cognitive determinism was arguably the most central.

But cognitive determinism was also crucial because it governed several other concerns. How one understood the scope and nature of the will’s autonomy in relation to the intellect, for instance, additionally affected one’s approach to such questions as whether wrongdoing is the result of ignorance or malice, and whether the source of human freedom is to be found in the will or the intellect. Finally, one’s attitude toward cognitive determinism appeared to govern one’s outlook on the question of whether the final end for man is achieved by an act of the will or an act of the intellect. For the sake of convenience we may divide the thinkers of the period into two camps, voluntarists and intellectualists, according to their stand on whether the will or the intellect was fundamentally free and held primacy.

The present study explores the debates that emerged in connection with the freedom of the will in the late thirteenth century, and especially as they touched on
the moral psychology of Giles of Rome (1243/7-1316). One of the leading theologians at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, Giles was deeply involved in the quarrels out of which the concept libertas voluntatis emerged. As yet, however, there has been no systematic treatment of Giles's theory of the will. The present study attempts to remedy this deficiency.

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Generally speaking, it is fair to say that scholars are some distance from being able fully to appreciate Giles's contribution to medieval philosophy. This undoubtedly has something to do with the fact that his works are only now being edited, a striking fact given Giles's outstanding reputation during his own lifetime.²

Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles's colleague and opponent at the University of Paris, for instance, remarked that he was "better than anyone at the entire University,"³ while his reputation even outside of academic circles is attested by the fact that his De regimine principum, his so-called "mirror of princes", was widely read by rulers

² It is only in the last fifteen years or so that scholars at the University of Pisa, under the direction of Francesco del Punta and Gianfranco Fioraventi, have undertaken to edit Giles's works. Unfortunately, the philosophical and theological writings have yet to be critically edited, which leaves the scholar working on anything other than his Sermoni (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1990) and Apologia (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1985) at the mercy of manuscripts and early printed editions.

and clerics.\textsuperscript{4} Finally, it was while Giles was still a relatively young man that he was made the official spokesman for his order, a tribute of notable significance.\textsuperscript{5}

Just why it is that scholars have yet to edit Giles’s corpus is puzzling, particularly given that the works of less influential thinkers such as Godfrey of Fontaines \textit{have} been critically edited, and for some time now. Whatever the reasons, it remains that modern scholars are far from having reached a consensus on how best to characterize his philosophical system.

It was once thought, for instance, that Giles was an orthodox follower of Aquinas, a view principally derived from a fifteenth-century misattribution to him of the pro-Thomist \textit{Correctorium “Quare”}.\textsuperscript{6} Having once been a pupil of Aquinas’s at the University of Paris, it was supposed that Giles was also his faithful disciple. In a seminal article published in 1930, however, Hoceze demonstrated that at certain points in his career and on several key issues, Giles had departed, and oftentimes radically, from his former master.\textsuperscript{7} This naturally led to the question of not only how to characterize Giles’s thought, but also whether it had evolved, and if so, in what direction.

William Courtenay, for one, advanced the view that Giles’s philosophical career demonstrates a shift away from Aquinas’s teachings towards those of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For an account of the popularity of this work in the middle ages, see C.F. Briggs’s \textit{Giles of Rome’s “De regimine principum”} (Cambridge: 1999), 3.
\item In a statute of a Chapter General in 1287 it was resolved that Giles’s teachings, both past and future, were to be followed by the members of the Augustinian Hermits. \textit{CUP}, 2: 542.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Augustinianism. Copleston, on the other hand, has drawn attention to the fact that Giles actually moved away from Augustinianism toward Thomism, at least on the central issue of the plurality of forms. In actual fact, Copleston is only partially right. For while it is true that Giles did move from the Franciscan to the Thomistic position early in his career, in his later writings he declines to settle the truth of the matter, leaving his position open to interpretation. Similarly, on the question of the eternity of the world, Giles appears early on to have adhered to Aquinas’s view that, philosophically speaking, one has to remain agnostic on the issue of whether the world had a beginning in time. Such a view, of course, was in direct contrast to Bonaventure, who had taught that the world’s non-eternity could be philosophically demonstrated. In Giles’s later writings, he again modifies his earlier position, now arguing that, although it has yet to be done, it is at least theoretically possible to prove that the world had a beginning, casting his lot now on the side of the Franciscans who were in ascendancy.

8 Speaking of Giles’s influence on his order’s English School, Courtenay writes: “The hegemony of Giles of Rome over the theology of the Augustinian Hermits at Oxford lasted longer than that of Thomas over the Dominicans. Its demise came from internal apathy and the arrival of a new type of Augustinianism, that of Gregory of Rimini, imported into Oxford at mid-century. But Aegidianism was an easier burden than Thomism because it was not a fixed set of doctrines but took different forms. Giles himself in the years of 1275 to 1300 had moved from dependence on Thomas, his master, to a more independent Augustinianism. Thus those who followed the teaching of Giles had much to choose from.” Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (New Jersey: 1987), 183-84.
11 Ibid., 75.
Giles's moral psychology is equally complex. However, the present study aims to challenge the dominant interpretation which infers that, because Giles had been a pupil of Aquinas, he fundamentally remained an an intellectualist throughout his career. It is not the intention of this study to deny that Aquinas influenced Giles. Indeed we will claim that in several important respects, although he ultimately rejects the thomistic understanding of the will, Giles builds on his former master. This debt is especially apparent, as we will see in Chapter 1, in Giles's theory of self-determination, which forms the backbone of his theory of volitional self-motion, his approach to the Socratic Paradox and his understanding of the foundations of freedom. In the final analysis, however, he develops his overall theory of the will, I want to claim, in a voluntaristic direction.

The overall strategy of the present study will be to examine Giles of Rome's theories of human action in context, which is to say in comparison to other thinkers of the period, notably Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and his immediate predecessors Aquinas and Walter of Bruges. Such a contextual approach is vital to understanding Giles properly due to the fact that some of the main sources for his moral psychology remain his important Quodlibetal Questions. Given that such disputations were effectively conversations with one's

contemporaries and immediate predecessors, it would be virtually impossible to understand with which side of a particular philosophical problem Giles is allying himself unless we take into account what his contemporaries were arguing. By examining Giles's moral psychology in this way it is hoped that we will be in a better position to understand his prevailing concerns and the solutions that he offered to them.

Will in the Late Thirteenth Century," Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 3, 2 (1992), 578-79.
CHAPTER 1
THE SELF-MOTION OF THE WILL

In his Quodlibet III, disputed in 1288, Giles of Rome asked *ex professo* whether the will could move itself.\(^1\) The question itself was a significant one, for it reflected a concern that had come to occupy a prominent place in the philosophical debates of the late thirteenth century. Prior to the condemnations of 1277, when Aquinas had addressed the issue, it was still possible to argue without recrimination that although the will can move itself with respect to the means, it is nonetheless determined by the intellect as regards the act of specification.\(^2\) Although the will is the efficient cause of its own act and those of the other powers of the soul, Aquinas had argued, it is nonetheless in the first instance a passive potency, a moved mover (*movens motum*) subject to the determining action of the intellect.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Giles of Rome, *Quod.* III, q. 15: "Utrum voluntas possit movere seipsum" (Louvain ed., 1646, 176).

\(^2\) Cf. *ST* I-II, q. 9, a. 3: "...voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem."

\(^3\) *ST* I-II, q. 9, a. 4: "...voluntas movetur ab objecto, manifestum est quod moveri potest ab aliquo exteriori. Sed eo modo quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, adhuc nesses est ponere voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori moveri. Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non veller.
After 1277 it was considered heretical to endorse cognitive determinism at the University of Paris. Of the 219 “manifest and damnable errors” (manifesti et execrabiles errores) condemned as contrary to the faith by Stephen Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, and his commission of theologians, the passivity of the will was a particular worry. Broadly conceived, the theological authorities were concerned with whether the foundations of morality could be preserved if the will were not considered a free power, by which they meant one that is capable of acting autonomously. In an effort to stem the tide of heterodox views being taught in the arts faculty they therefore condemned a series of propositions, several of which touched on the human will.

Nesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum. Et quidem, sicut dictum est, ipsa movet seipsum, inquantum per hoc quod vult finem reduct seipsum ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.” Aquinas’s claim that the will is a “moved mover” (movens motum) was derived from Aristotle’s characterization of the appetite in De anima III (433b16) and Metaphysics XI (1072a26), and applied to the will. Cf. JT I, q. 80, a. 2, corp.


5 Some of the articles touching on the will were: (134) “Quod appetitus, cessantisus impedimentis, necessario movetur ab appetibili. – Error est de intellectivo;” (135) “Quod voluntas secundum se est indeterminata ad opposita sicut materia; determinatur autem ab appetibili, sicut materia ab agenti;” (163) “Quod voluntas necessario prosequitur, quod firmiter creditum est a ratione; et quod non potest abstinere ab eo, quod ratio dictat. Haec autem necessitatio non est coactus, sed natura voluntatis;” (159) “Quod voluntas hominis necessitatur per suam cognitionem, sicut appetitus bruti.” I follow David Piché’s edition of the articles in La condamnation parisienne de 1277: texte lain, traduction et commentaire (Paris: 1999).
In particular, the condemned articles were aimed at suppressing the claim that the will was a power that necessarily followed, or was determined by the conclusions of practical reason. Such teachings were inspired by Aristotle and endorsed in varying degrees by contemporaries such as Aquinas and Siger of Brabant. The view approved by the condemnations, on the other hand, encapsulated the Neo-Augustinian, or voluntarist understanding of human action associated with such theologians as the secular master Henry of Ghent. For such thinkers any real influence assigned to the intellect over the will represented a threat to received notions of ethical responsibility. On their reckoning, if the will were passively determined then it would not be free, and if it were not free then

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6 Although Siger was hardly an extreme determinist, as C. Ryan has argued in “Man’s Free Will in Siger of Brabant,” M. 45 (1985), 155-199, he clearly assigned to right reason the dominant role in human action and moral responsibility. Cf. Siger’s Impossibilita V: “…sciendum quod rectae rationis humanae est ordinaire actiones humanas in bonum humanum” (Bazán ed., PM XIV, 87); and “…sciendum quod ad rectam rationem humanam pertinet ordinaire punitionem actibus humanis malis. Cum enim recta ratio tendat ad hoc quod actiones humane sic fiant quod homines bene vivant, punitio autem quorumdam actuum humanorum in hoc ordinem habet, hinc est quod rectae rationis humanae est punitionem actibus humanis malis ordinare” (Bazán ed., PM XIV, 88). On the determination of the will by the intellect see, e.g., Quæst. in Meta. Bk. VII, q. 1: “Planum enim est quod oportet, antequam voluntas velit aliquid vel non velit, quod ipsa moveatur ab aliquo vel ex apprehensione alcius, et ita, ut ipsa moveatur, vel velit, vel non velit. Quandocumque vult sine aliqua apprehensione precedente, in hoc voluntas non est libera” (Dunphy ed., PM XXIV, 386). For a recent overview of Siger’s theory of human action, cf. M.W.F. Stone, “Moral Psychology After 1277: Did the Parisian Condemnation Make a Difference to Philosophical Discussions of Human Agency?” In MM 28: After the Condemnations of 1277 – Theology and Philosophy at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century, (Berlin: 2000), 797-801.

7 Kent, Virtues of the Will, 77-78. Cf. also Henry of Ghent’s Quod. IX, q. 5: “Alii vero dicunt quod voluntas movetur a bino cognito sicut a suo proprio objecto proprium possible, quemadmodum a vero cognoscibili movetur intellectus, sed naturaliter, non violenter. Quod non potest stare, quoniam tunc, sicut intellectus præsentè intelligibili non potest non moveri ab ipso ad actum intelligendi, sic voluntas praesente bino cognito volibili non potest non moveri ad actum volendi. Et sic petitetur liberum arbitriu, et per
moral responsibility would fall by the wayside. Perceived to be at stake, then, was the preservation of human moral responsibility from the putative determinism of Aristotelian, and by extension Thomistic, cognitive determinism. When Giles of Rome asked whether the will could move itself he was therefore responding to a debate that had far-reaching consequences.

It would be reasonable to suppose that after 1277 most thinkers abandoned the claim that the will is a passive power given the relatively harsh penalties for defending such a view. In point of fact this is not what happened. That the intellectualist position continued to hold currency well after Tempier issued his syllabus can be attested by the fact that Godfrey of Fontaines offered with apparent impunity rigorous defenses for cognitive determinism, and in a form that even Aquinas might have found extreme. On the other hand, Godfrey was quick to allow that, although the will cannot move itself, it ought nonetheless to be considered “free” owing to the fact that it is located in the immaterial soul. This

consequens omnis ratio meriti et demeriti et suasionis ac deliberationis et consiliationis et ceterorum huismodi, quae necessaria ad virtutes” (Macken ed., XIII, 121).
8 Tempier threatened to solemnly excommunicate any member of the university who continued to teach or even listen to his list of condemned theses. CUP, I, 542.
9 Godfrey’s most sustained offensive against the voluntarist position of Henry of Ghent can be found in his Quod. VI, q. 7 (PB III, 148-172).
10 Cf. Quod. VIII, q. 16: “Nunc autem in universitate entium quanto aliquid magis accedit ad esse materiale et magis materiae est mixtum et immersum, tanto magis est determinatum et ex hoc etiam magis servum et minus liberum; et quanto magis aliquid accedit ad esse abstractissimum, scilicet Deum per ampliorum recessum a dicta immixtione et immersione materiae, tanto minus est servum, immo magis liberum” (PB IV, 145-46). Here Godfrey is appealing to an ancient notion, going back to the early middle ages, which held that the more bound up with matter a thing is, the less free and more determined it is by material forces. Since the human soul is immaterial owing to it’s rationality, it can therefore be considered “free”. On this topic, see J.B. Korolec’s “Free
issue will be taken up in Chapter Five. For the time being, it may be inferred from this that not all thinkers of the late thirteenth century equated self-motion with freedom, although they clearly perceived an obligation to defend the freedom of the will (libertas voluntatis) in some form or another. This in itself marks, as Kent has shown, a radical departure from the intellectualism of pre-condemnation figures such as Aquinas, to that of the post-condemnation school.\footnote{According to Kent, prior to 1270 the language in which most thinkers discussed human freedom was couched in terms of liberum arbitrium or "free decision." After 1277, however, "free will" or libertas voluntatis becomes the central issue. Needless to say, this represents not merely a change in terminology, but a transformation of the philosophical concept of the will. For her discussion on this issue, cf. Virtues of the Will, 98-109.}

In his Quodlibet III Giles of Rome attempted to defend, in line with the condemnations, the self-motion of the will. Unlike Henry of Ghent, however, who placed tight restrictions on the act-potency axiom in order to detach the will from the determination of the intellect, Giles incorporates the Aristotelian principle into his theory.\footnote{I take this expression from Wippel, who has devised it to refer to the Aristotelian principle that whatever is moved is moved by something extrinsic to it. This is found in Aristotle's Physics 241b34-245b2. See Wippel's "Godfrey of Fontaines and the ACT-
Ghent, the preeminent voluntarist of the period, and Godfrey of Fontaines, the leading intellectualist. His attempt to argue that the will could move itself seemed to place him in the voluntarist camp, and for this Godfrey attacked him. That he additionally argued that the will was a passive potency that required the intellect to reduce it from potency to act, on the other hand, was found objectionable to Henry. On Henry’s account, as we shall see presently, if the will is not considered active in every respect, both as regards determination and actuation, then its freedom will be jeopardized.

To the extent that modern scholars have examined Giles’s moral psychology at all the standard view has been that Quodlibet III, q. 15 is redolent of Aquinas. And although most recognize that Giles attempted to incorporate voluntarist elements into his thesis, they still regard his position as fundamentally an


13 Cf. Quod. VIII, q. 16. (PB IV, 140-76).


15 The first modern scholar to examine Giles’s action theory was Lottin, in his Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, 6 Vols. (Louvain-Gembloux: 1942), I, 315-18. Others have merely followed Lottin’s lead in seeing him as more or less a faithful follower of Aquinas. Cf. Korolec “Free Will and Free Choice,” 630; B. Kent, Aristotle and the Franciscans: Gerald Odonis’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1984), 137-138; F.X. Putallaz, Insoiiente liberté (Fribourg: 1995), 235-36. The exception to this interpretation is San Cristóbal Sebastián, Controversias acerca de la voluntad desde 1270 a 1300 (Madrid: 1958), 171. According to him, Giles is not influenced by Aquinas at all. Rather, his theory incorporates features of the moderate voluntarism of Richard of Middleton, and the extreme intellectualism of an anonymous commentary on the Ethics contained in ms. Vat. lat. 2173. For a discussion of the contents of this ms. written by an anonymous arts master at the University of Paris in the late thirteenth century, and transcriptions of key portions of the text, see Lottin’s Psychologie et morale, III: 630-50; and R.A. Gauthier,
intellectualist one, seeing it by and large as a post-condemnation species of thomistic intellectualism. Such a thesis is not an entirely implausible one. To the contrary, it has an old and distinguished provenance going back to Henry of Ghent who was the first to notice Aquinas’s influence on Giles’s action theory. Given that the two positions represent efforts to demonstrate that the will can both move itself and be moved, and that Giles was a former pupil of Aquinas, it seems reasonable to suppose that *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 is merely an updated attempt to chart a course of moderate intellectualism. Such a view is particularly convincing when considered in isolation.

The trouble with the standard interpretation is that it fails to coalesce with the other claims that Giles makes for the will in the *Quodlibeta* Questions. One finds him, for instance, adhering to the following unmistakable voluntarist positions: that the will is a nobler power than the intellect and that the foundations of freedom are to be found intrinsically in the will. He additionally rejects the Socratic Paradox – i.e. the claim that rational beings never act against their own better judgement – in arguing that the error of reason is simultaneous with the malice of the will, a position that Henry of Ghent himself defended. We will address these and other issues in subsequent chapters. For the time being, it will be sufficient to note that such positions give us reason to be, at the very least, open to a more voluntarist interpretation of *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 than has been supposed.

I want to take issue, then, with the claim that Giles was merely defending a species of thomistic intellectualism. However, I do not wish to deny that Aquinas influenced Giles. Rather, I want to argue that Giles’s theory should be seen as an attempt to develop a type of moderate voluntarism that builds on Aquinas’s moderate intellectualism. Giles’s aim, I want to argue, was to preserve the act-potency axiom while developing a form of voluntarism that could defend the will against cognitive determinism. The moderate intellectualism of Aquinas, which regards the will as a moved mover, is well suited to this task. For although Thomas’s theory is intellectualist as it stands, with certain adjustments it can be made into a voluntarist account of human action. Indeed, recent developments in the interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory have attempted to present it in just this light.17 The problem with such voluntarist readings of Thomas is that the textual evidence does not support them. To the contrary, a close reading of Aquinas suggests that he was a thoroughgoing intellectualist. The idea that a moderate voluntarism can be read into Aquinas at all, however, suggests that his theory is at the very least amenable to voluntarist revision, which would explain why Giles chose it as his starting point.

Before proceeding to examine the background to Giles’s theory of self-motion, it is necessary to clarify the terminology we will be using. Following

16 See in particular Korolec, “Free Will and Free Choice,” 637; and Kent, Aristotle and the Franciscans, 137.
Hause, I define an intellectualist as someone who maintains that the activities of
the will are under the control of the intellect such that the will can in no way act
independently of a prior determination of reason. By the term voluntarist I
understand one who maintains that the will can act independently of the intellect
and, to some extent at least, control its own activities. Voluntarism may further
be divided into two categories: (1) voluntarism of exercise and (2) voluntarism of
specification. The first is associated with the theory that the will has control over
its own acts so that when it moves towards specific objects, this is the result of the
will moving itself. According to this theory, whether or not the will exercises its act
is entirely within its control. The second is associated with the theory that it is
not the intellect that ultimately determines or specifies the will's act but rather the
will itself. The two forms of voluntarism are closely related in that (2) quite
obviously presupposes (1) to the extent that if the will is going to specify its own
act in a voluntaristic fashion, it must possess the ability to exercise itself
autonomously.

The crucial feature of both forms of voluntarism, however, is that the
theory is voluntarist if and only if the will is able to act independently of the intellect
according to an innate capacity for freedom. If one holds that the will can specify
its own act, directly or indirectly, or move itself to exercise, but argues that this can

Aquinas," *AjGdP* 76 (1994), 247-77; Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann,
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 171.
occur only by a prior determination of reason, then one is not advancing a voluntarist account of human action, but rather an intellectualist one.

1.1. The Philosophical Background

Although Aquinas admits that the will can move itself in a qualified sense he nonetheless regards it in the first instance as a passive potency, a moved mover. As such, it requires a specific object to reduce it from potency to act. In this respect the will is like any other power of the soul which remains in potency until a mover actualizes it.

The actualization of a power can happen in two ways: (1) with respect to the "exercise" of the act (exercitium actus) and (2) with respect to its "specification" (specificatio actus). On Aquinas's account, (1) signifies the ability to act or not act and has its principle or source within the subject. As regards (2), the ability to perform one action or another, the principle derives from the object. In the case of vision, for example, we can either see or not see and, if the latter, then we can see either white or black depending on the color of the object. The act of either

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21 Ibid., 176.
22 ST I-II, q. 9, a. 4, corp.: "...secundum quod voluntas movetur ab obiecto, manifestum est, quod moveri potest ab aliquo exteriori: sed eo modo, quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, adhuc necesse est ponere voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori moveri...Ipsa movet seipsam, inquantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem: hoc autem non potest facere, nisi consilio mediate..." For Aquinas's claim that the will is a "moved mover" see ST I, q. 80, a. 2, corp. For some recent treatments of Aquinas's theory of action, cf. D. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science (Washington: 1997); A. Donagan, "Thomas Aquinas on Human Action," in CHLMP, 642-654; J. Hause, Thomas
seeing or not seeing is under the control of the agent. What exactly one sees if one chooses to do so, however, depends on the object. If the object is white in all respects I obviously cannot choose to see it as black. But I do have control over whether I want to exercise my sight in the first place, that is, over whether I want to look at this white object or not. In both cases the power requires an external mover to reduce it from potency to act.23 Bear in mind that when Aquinas alludes to exercise and specification he is not referring to distinct stages in the process of the human act, like intention or consent. Rather, he is referring to the two potentialities within any power of the human soul that are actualized insofar as any potency acts.

As far as this distinction applies to the intellect and the will, the two powers stand in a relationship of reciprocal causality. The will, for example, is the efficient cause of the intellect and the other powers of the soul.24 Accordingly, it moves itself and the intellect to their exercise. The explanation for this is that the principle of motion is derived from the end, which is the good. Now the good is the object of the will. To the extent that the powers of the soul strive for their


23 ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, corp.: "...intantum aliquid indiget moveri ab aliquo, inquantum est in potentia ad plura; oportet enim ut id quod est in potentia, reducatur in actum per aliquid quod est in actu; et hoc est movere. Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa: uno modo, quantum ad agere vel non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud...Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens; aliud autem est ex parte objecti, secundum quod specificatur actus."

24 ST I, q. 82, a. 4, corp.
own perfection and goodness, therefore, their acts are subsumed under the will's direction.  

Although the will has a general inclination to the good, with respect to choosing particular objects Aquinas maintains that it must be preceded by a specifying act of the intellect. According to Aquinas, while the will moves the intellect to its exercise, the intellect moves the will as a specifying, or formal cause. Because the will is the rational appetite, an appetite for the good as apprehended by reason, it requires the intellect to present it with specific objects to desire. Once the intellect has presented an object to the will and moved it as a formal cause, then, the will moves itself as an efficient cause.

Whether a given object necessitates the will depends upon the object's nature. As was mentioned, the good is the object of the will. In order that a specific object be chosen, then, it must be seen as good in some respect, if not in all respects.

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25 ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, corp.: “Motio autem ipsius subjecti est ex agente aliquo. Et cum omne agens agat propter finem...principium huic motionis est ex fine. ...Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est objectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus; utiamur enim aliis potentis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona...”

26 ST I-II, q. 9, a. 3, ad. 3: “...voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continentur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte objecti, intellectus movet voluntatem; quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam speciale rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri.”

27 De malo, q. 6, corp.: “Si autem consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte objecti determinantis actum voluntatis ad hoc vel illud volendum, considerandum est, quod objectum movens voluntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum; unde si aliqua bonum proponatur quod apprehendatur in ratione boni, non autem in ratione conveniens, non movebit voluntatem. Cum autem consilia et electiones sint circa particularia, quorum est actus, requiritur ut id quod apprehenditur ut bonum et conveniens in particulari, et non in universali tantum.” See also ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad. 3.
Now if the object as apprehended by the intellect is good in every respect — *bonum et secundum omnem considerationem* — then according to Aquinas the will must necessarily choose that object. This is because the object will have no aspect under which it can be considered deficient and therefore rejected. In line with the Christian and Aristotelian traditions Aquinas explains that such a good is happiness (*beatitudo*).

However, if the object is a mixed good, or one that is not perfectly good in every respect, then insofar as it is lacking in goodness it can be rejected by the will. This is because the object can be seen from various points of view, or what Aquinas calls "diverse considerations" (*diversas considerationes*). It can be judged good or bad and therefore, depending on how the intellect apprehends the object, either accepted or rejected by the will.

Although Aquinas maintains that the will relies on the intellect as a formal cause, he also defends the will's ability to move itself. Once reduced to act by the end, Aquinas believes that the will can move itself toward willing the means to that

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28 *ST* I-II., q. 10, a. 2, corp: "...si proponatur aliquod objectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendit, si aliquid velit; non enim poterit velle oppositum. ...ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle; quod est beatitudo."

29 Ibid.: "Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod objectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas furtur in illud. ...quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona; et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes."
end.\textsuperscript{30} That is, once we have reason for pursuing some object \(a\), we need provide no further justification for taking the steps to achieve \(a\). This is because our initial willing of \(a\) provides the reason for action, both as regards the end and the relevant means. Aquinas seems to be right on this score, for if the intellect has already determined a specific object to be good or desirable, then it would seem superfluous to require another act of the intellect determining that the means to this object are also good.

Aquinas's contention that the will can move itself in a qualified sense forms part and parcel of his characterization of the will as a moved mover. Because he assigns to the will the ability to move itself and the other powers of the soul as an efficient cause he obviously cannot be considered an extreme intellectualist. Still, for Aquinas the will can never act independently of a prior judgement of reason, both as regards specification and as regards exercise. That is, if the will desires one object over another this is because reason has apprehended it as better and specified or determined the will's act accordingly. Furthermore, whether or not the will exercises its act or the other powers of the soul is also determined by a prior act of the intellect. Aquinas therefore rejects both a voluntarism of specification and a voluntarism of exercise. The objects that the will desires are always in the

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{ST} I-II, q. 9, a. 3, corp.: "...ad voluntatem pertinet movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis objectum. Sed...hoc modo se habet finis in appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus. Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actu, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum; et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem."
first instance determined by the intellect, as is whether the will proceeds to act or not.31

Such views as the foregoing preclude Aquinas from defending the claim, essential to any voluntarist account of human action, that the will can move itself spontaneously from some innate perfection or formal capacity for freedom. Indeed, Aquinas explicitly rejects the notion that the will is formally free. Rather, he notes, “the whole formal character (ratio) of freedom depends upon the mode of cognition.”32 We will take up Aquinas’s understanding of the foundations of freedom in 4.1. For the time being it is sufficient to note that, on Aquinas’s account, the will lacks the sort of autonomy and independence from the determination of the intellect that is an essential feature of any sort of voluntarism. Aquinas must therefore be considered, as Hause has shown, a thoroughgoing intellectualist.33

Aquinas’s contemporary Walter of Bruges, Franciscan regent master at Paris from 1267-1269, was arguably the most influential representative of voluntarism in the period just prior to the condemnations of 1277. Although Bonaventure was undoubtedly the better known of the two Franciscans, Walter appears to have had a deeper and more proximate influence on the development of the voluntarist

31 ST I-II, q. 13, a. 6, corp.: “Potest enim homo velle et non velle, agere et non agere; potest etiam velle hoc aut illud. Cuius ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis accipitur. Quidquid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum, in hoc voluntas tendere potest. Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere; sed hoc etiam quod est non velle et non agere.”
32 De ver. q. 24, a. 2, corp.: “...tota ratio libertatis ex modo cognitionis dependet.”
understanding of the will.34 Indeed, Decorte has established that Walter was particularly crucial to the development of Henry of Ghent's moral psychology.35 Walter is particularly interesting because at first sight he appears to share much in common with Aquinas. Like Thomas, for instance, he regards the will as a partially passive, partially active potency; that is, as a moved mover.36 He even accepts the notion that the intellect moves the will as a final cause, much as Thomas had maintained in the Prima pars.37 As Walter puts it, "the will is not only active, but <also> passive; it is moved by the understood desirable object, as is

34 San Cristóbal-Sebastián, Controversias acerca de la voluntad, 247-69, has established that the most important authorities for the voluntarism of the post-condemnation period were Bernard of Clairvaux, Anselm and John Damascene. Kent, however, has shown how Walter inherited the seeds of Bonaventure's voluntarism and developed them. Cf. Virtues of the Will, 117.
37 Ibid., q. 6, ad. 18 (PB X, 53). For Aquinas's view that the intellect moves the will as a final cause, cf. ST I, q. 82, a. 4, corp. There has been some debate in the literature over the question of whether Aquinas changed his mind on the will to such an extent that it represents a departure from intellectualism to voluntarism. Lottin was the first to argue that Aquinas's understanding of the free act in De malo and the Prima secundae is a radical departure from intellectualism towards voluntarism. In the later works it is the will that provides the efficient and final cause of will, while the intellect acts merely as a formal cause whose function it is to specify the act. Cf. Psychologie et morale, I, 252-62. In agreement with Lottin are K. Riesenhuber, "The Bases and Meaning of Freedom in Thomas Aquinas," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 48 (1974), 100-04; and J. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 192 n. Lottin's view, however, has not gained universal acceptance. For those who argue that no real shift occurred in Aquinas's view of the will, see Kent, Virtues of the Will, 121; R. Macken, "La volonté humaine, faculté plus élevée que l'intelligence selon Henri de Gand," RTAM 42 (1971), 43-44; D. Westberg, Right Practical Reason, 90 and "Did Aquinas Change his Mind about the Will?" Thomist 58 (1994), 41-60
maintained in *De anima III*, and is consequently a moved mover, as is defended in the same work."

Walter clearly shows a great deal of respect and sympathy for Aristotle in his acceptance of the passivity of the will. He is concerned at the same time, however, to ensure that the will is free from cognitive determinism. Following Christian authorities such as Bernard of Clairvaux—who insisted that "wherever there is will, there is freedom" (*ubi voluntas, ibi libertas*)—Walter maintains that the will is also a "lordly power," (*dominativa potestas*) that reigns over the "kingdom of the powers of the soul" (*regnum virium animae*). The idea that the soul is a kingdom over which the will rules is a standard metaphor in medieval voluntarist literature, and can be found in the writings of such figures as Peter Olivi, John Peckham and Henry of Ghent. And while William of Auvergne (*ca. 1190-1249*) appears to

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38 Walter of Bruges, *Quaest. disp.*, q. 3, ad 10: "Ad decimum dicendum quod voluntas activa non tantum, sed passiva; movetur autem ab appetibili intellecto, ut habetur III *De anima*, et ideo est movens motum, ut ibidem habetur" (PB X, 31).
40 Walter of Bruges, *Quaest. disp.*, q. 4, ad 8 (PB X, 44).
have been the originator of this theory, the proximate source for later thinkers is generally agreed to have been Walter of Bruges.\textsuperscript{43}

Because there is no final determination on the part of the intellect, all its judgements being tentative, Walter implies that the will can specify or determine its own act, at least indirectly.\textsuperscript{44} This follows from the fact that the will is the ruling power in the soul, and one that is formally free.\textsuperscript{45} Accordingly, although it is passive in the first instance, the will does not have to accept the conclusions of practical reason. Indeed, the will can accept or reject such conclusions, and even command the intellect to focus on some other conception of the good. For Walter, then, although the will must depend on the object to some degree, it nonetheless possesses a large measure of independence from the intellect. Walter therefore defends a voluntarism of specification, which is what probably differentiates his otherwise similar theory from that of Aquinas.

Next to the Franciscan William de la Mare, whose polemics against Aquinas are well known to students of the period, perhaps the most vocal critic of

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 62-64.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Quaest. disp.}, q. 5, corp.: "...ratio habet plenam libertatem secundum actionem acceptam; postquam enim ratio praecedens, conferens alterum esse faciendum judicaverit, remanet indifferens in omni rationali potentia et etiam in voluntate, puta: judicatum est a esse volendum ut melius vel b ut minus bonum; voluntas autem nec a nec b vult adhuc cum effectu, sed imperat rationem arbitram esse voldendum et tunc cum et probequitur, dimissis a, b, licet judicata essent esse meliora quam c. Arbitrium autem est actus rationis ad nutum voluntatis, sed judicare est secundum regulas veritatis et legis, propter quod voluntas a Sanctis melius vocatur liberum arbitrium quam liberum judicium. Potest tamen dici judicium sequens voluntatis nutum;..." (PB X, 52). See also, Cf. Kent, \textit{Virtues of the Will}, 120.
\textsuperscript{45} Walter of Bruges, \textit{Quaest. disp.} q. 5: "...voluntas habet libertatem proprie dictam et perfectam, non a ratione nec formaliter nec effective, sed a se vel a propria forma sibi ingenita et concreata" (PB X, 52).
the thomistic account of human action in the late thirteenth century was Henry of Ghent. As early as Henry's first *Quodlibet*, which was disputed in 1276 and comprises part of his ongoing critique of Aquinas, Henry addressed the question of volitional self-motion. In order to preserve the autonomy of the will from what he perceived as Aquinas's cognitive determinism, Henry argued that the will could move itself.

Henry of Ghent's chief concern was how to account for the influence of the intellect on the will without compromising the latter's autonomy. For even Henry had to concede, following authorities such as Augustine and Bernard of Clairvaux, that it is impossible for the will to act without some sort of prior knowledge. Intellectualists claimed that this priority amounted to some form of causation: formal, final or efficient. Henry could not accept that true causality exists between the will and the intellect since this would make the will too passive. He therefore argued that the form of motion that the intellect exerts over the will is solely metaphorical (*metaphorice*), a notion he derives from the Parisian secular master Gerard of Abbeville. For Henry, the intellect moves the will only insofar as it shows it the apprehended good.

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46 William de la Mare's critiques of Aquinas can be found in his *Correctorium fratri Thomas*. In *Les premières polémiques thomistes, I: Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare."* Ed. P. Glorieux (Kain: 1927).


48 Henry of Ghent, *Quod*. I, q. 14: "Neque adhuc propri ratio movet, sed ipsum objectum movens per se rationem ad cognoscendum et per hoc se ostendendo tamquam bonum, metaphorice movet volentem ad appetendum" (Macken ed., V, 89). For Henry's theory
Henry remained content with the *metaphorice* formulation until Godfrey of Fontaines, the leading representative of intellectualism in the period between Aquinas and Scotus, became regent master of theology in 1285. When Henry next contributed to the debate over the manner in which the intellect moves the will in *Quodlibet IX*, q. 5 of Lent 1286, such motion becomes that of a *conditio sine qua non*. In this *Quodlibet* Henry is forced by Godfrey to address the issue of precisely how the will can move itself without violating the act-potency axiom. His solution involves arguing that while the principle applies strictly to material beings, spiritual beings such as the will are in an important sense exempt.

According to Henry, in the case of immaterial substances it is not necessary that there be a real distinction between mover and moved, as Godfrey had claimed, since spiritual beings have the ability to reflect on themselves. The distinction that obtains, therefore, is merely an “intentional” one. By this Henry means that the difference between mover and moved is neither a real nor merely rational one. Rather, it is a distinction between various aspects of the same power, neither of which can be reduced to the other. As receptive of the act of volition the will is passive, but as agent and cause of volition, it is active. Mover and

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50 Ibid: “Ut voluntatem, in quantum est potentia, intelligamus passivum, et in potentia ad actum volitionis, sicut est intellectus in potentia ad actum intellectionis. Quod necessarium est ponere, a quocumque movente voluntas ponatur moveri quando de non volente fit volens: est enim velle in ea accidens et operatio, in qua consistit sua perfectio in bene esse” (Macken ed., XIII, 131).
moved on this account are sufficiently distinct to avoid doing violence to the act-
potency axiom, yet related closely enough so as to permit of self-motion.

As Teske and Macken have shown, Henry was forced to revise this theory
on several different occasions as a result of Godfrey's criticisms.\textsuperscript{51} He never
rejected, however, the view that the intellect acts simply as a \textit{conditio sine qua non} of
volition. He did have to refine in successive \textit{Quodlibets}, however, his position on
exactly how the will moves itself.

Now Henry's main target in \textit{Quodlibet} IX, q. 5 is the distinction Thomas had
drawn between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. He sees this
distinction as an altogether unclear, and probably unnecessary one. Aquinas had
argued that while the will is moved by the intellect with regard to the specification
or determination of its act, it is free with respect to exercise, that is, with respect to
choosing the means to the end.\textsuperscript{52} As one might expect, Henry's analysis focuses

\textsuperscript{51} For Henry's theory of the self-motion of the will, and his evolution on various points,
see Macken's "Heinrich von Gent," 125-82; and "La liberté humaine dans la philosophie
Internationalis, 2 vols. (Padova, 1976), I, 577-84; and Teske's "Henry of Gent's
Rejection of the Principle Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur," in \textit{Henry of Ghent: Proceedings
of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death}, ed. W.
Vanhameel (Leuven, 1996), 279-308.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{ST} I-II, q. 10, a. 2, corp.: "...voluntas movetur dupliciter: uno modo, quantum ad
exercitium actus; alio modo quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex obiecto. Primo
ergo modo voluntas a nullo obiecto ex necessitate movetur; potest enim aliquis de
quocumque objecto non cogitare et per consequens neque actu velle illud...Sed quantum
ad secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, ab
aliquo autem non. ...Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo
illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas
non potest non velle; quod est beatitudo. Alia autem quae]libetur particularia bona,
inquantum deficient ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona; et secundum hanc
considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri
secundum diversas considerationes."
on the nature of Thomas’s theory of specification, for it is at this juncture that the determination of the will is most obvious. Henry’s strategy is rhetorical: he argues that Aquinas’s understanding of specification can be interpreted in one of two ways, both of which obviate the need to posit a distinction between the will as self-moving and the will as moved.

According to Henry, Aquinas’s analysis of specification can mean one of two things: (1) either the intellect merely performs a “showing or an offering” (ostensio sive oblatio) of the understood good to the will, or (2) it produces some “inclination” (inclinatio) in it. If (1) then the intellect acts merely as a sine qua non cause, and the will must therefore move itself both as regards its exercise and its specification, since the object exercises merely metaphorical causality over it. This is, of course, Henry’s own position.

Because Aquinas does not subscribe to a theory of sine qua non causality it may be inferred that he regards specification as some sort of inclination. Henry argues that such an inclinatio can be understood in one of two ways. Either it is (i) some impression such as a weight that merely inclines the will like a habit, or it is (ii) the act of willing. If (i) then the will remains capable of acting either against this impression or in conformity with it, in which case it follows that the will retains...

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54 Ibid: “Si primo modo, tunc voluntas nec a bono intellecto nec ab ipso intellectu movetur, quia nihil movetur ab aliquo nisi aliqua impressione facta in se ab illo, et ideo, si movetur ipsa voluntas, a se ipsa movetur, et hoc sive moveatur determinando sibi suum actum et suum objectum, sive exercendo aut exsequendo suum actum. Ita quod utroque modo maneat plena libertas voluntatis respectu sui actus, nec operatur intellectus ad hoc.
full freedom, that is, the power to move itself both as regards its *specificatio* and its *exercitium.* If (ii) however, then the will is necessarily moved by the object. If this is the case, then it is nonsense to attribute to the will freedom of exercise. As Henry puts it: “if the will were moved by the object of the intellect even slightly (*modice*), there could be no act of rejection with regard to it. On the contrary, it would be necessary to execute the act or to pursue the object to attain it.”

For Henry, then, there can be no compromise when it comes to the freedom of the will. If one argues that intellect moves the will in a real sense “even slightly” then the latter cannot be said to move itself at all. If, on the contrary, one wishes to argue that the will *can* move itself, then he has to hold that is does so in every respect, both as regards specification and exercise, and therefore that the intellect acts on the will merely in a metaphorical sense. Aquinas’s distinction between *exercitium* and *specificatio* is therefore superfluous at best and incoherent at worst.

The leading intellectualist and defender of the act-potency axiom at the University of Paris in the period just following the condemnations of 1277 was undoubtedly Godfrey of Fontaines. For Godfrey the principle *omne quod moveretur ab quod fiat in suum actum ipsa voluntas, nisi ostendendo sive offerendo ipsum objectum, et hoc non nisi sicut causa per accidens et sine qua non*” (Macken ed., XIII, 122-23).

*alio movetur* is the foundation that supports the fundamental passivity of the will.\(^\text{57}\)

To argue that the will can move itself one would have to posit that it could be in act and potency at the same time: in potency as recipient of motion, and in act as cause. It would require being in act and not in act in the same respect, which, as Aristotle had made clear, is impossible if the principle of non-contradiction is to be respected.\(^\text{58}\)

If, therefore, everything that is moved is moved by another, and the will, being a non-cognitive potency, requires the direction of the intellect, then it would seem that the will must be moved by the object whenever a choice is made. For Godfrey of Fontaines, in contrast to Henry of Ghent, the act-potency axiom is absolute: it is a metaphysical principle that applies to all beings, immaterial as well as material.\(^\text{59}\) Following as it does from the principle of non-contradiction, moreover, it is a logical principle that does not admit of exception. The intellect

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\(^\text{59}\) Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quod. VI*, q. 7: "...quia ex metaphysica hoc scire debemus quod unum et idem non potest esse in actu et potentia et quod illud quod est in potentia ad aliquid non potest se reducere ad actum secundum illud et hoc pertinet ad metaphysicam, quia est commune omni enti, ideo hoc debemus supponere circa angilos et circa animam..." (PB III, 170). Although this *Quodlibet* of Godfrey's was disputed in 1289, that is, a year after Giles's *Quodlibet* III, q. 15, it is nonetheless reasonable to assume that such views, being a central feature of any intellectualist theory, would have circulated prior to Giles's own defense of self-motion. For a discussion of Godfrey's theories on this point
and the will are as equally subject to it as are material beings. If the will is to be
moved from a state of potentially wanting some good to a state of actually wanting
it, according to Godfrey, it therefore requires the intellect to reduce it from
potency to act.

1.2. Giles of Rome's Theory of Self-Motion

Giles of Rome's Quodlibet III, q. 15 was his first effort to defend the self-motion of
the will while attempting to negotiate the restrictions of working within an
Aristotelian framework that requires fidelity to the act-potency axiom. Giles seems
to have been somewhat more optimistic than Henry of Ghent that he could
defend the autonomy of the will without having to pay so high a price as to
jettison this important physical, and indeed logical notion. He accomplished this
project by adopting several features of Aquinas's action theory and developing
them in accordance with a voluntarism of specification.

The question at issue is whether the will can move itself. Now to attribute
self-motion to the will is at the same time to assign agency to it. An agent can act
on a patient in one of thee ways. It activates (activat) the patient when it reduces it
from potency to act, and it determines (determinat) or necessitates (necessitat) it when
it causes the patient to act in a specific way. Lastly, an agent brings violence to
bear upon (violentat) a patient when it uses compulsion to cause it to act in a way
that is contrary to the patient's nature. Because the will cannot be compelled to

see Wippel's "Godfrey of Fontaines and the Act-Potency Axiom," 299-317 and The
act, the only two types of motion that obtain between the will and the intellect are activation and determination.60

Like Aquinas, Giles argues that there are two types of goods that attract the will: the ab. clute good, or happiness (beatitudine), and mixed or contingent goods, which are associated with the means to happiness.61 Because the absolute good has no undesirable aspect under which it can be rejected by the will it necessarily causes a volition when apprehended. That is, when the apprehended object is good from all points of view (sub omni ratione boni), the will is necessitated or determined by it since the intellect can only present it to the will under a desirable description, there being no undesirable aspect by which it can be rejected.62 With respect to happiness, therefore, the will is both actuated and determined.

Metaphysical Thought.

60 Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 15: “Activat quidem, quando agens est tale in actu quale est patiens in potentia. Tunc hoc quidem potest agere: illud vero pati, ut ex 1. De generatione in cap. De activis et passivis haberi potest. Eo enim ipso quod agens sit tale in actu quale est patiens in potentia, assimilat sibi passum et activat ipsum faciendo ipsum actu tale. Secundo agens non solum activat passum sed etiam necessitat et determinat passum quia approximatis sibi ad invicem agente et patiente necesse est agens agere, et patiens pati. Determinate ergo, et cum quadram necessitate comparatur patiens ad agens. Rursus violentatur patiens per agens quia actiones et passiones in istis naturalibus non possunt nisi ex contrariis in contraria. Patiens ergo quod agenti in fine est simile in principio est naturaliter contrarium, ita quod passio sit a disimili et de contrario in principio de simili autem et de convenienti in fine. Et quia patiens in principio naturaliter est contrarium agenti, non potest fieri simile nisi expolietur ab eo quod est ei secundum naturam contrarium et quia hoc non potest fieri sine violentia, ideo bene dictum est, quod agens violentat patiens” (Louvain ed., 1646, 177).

61 Cf. ST I-II, q. 10, a. 2, corp. See, e.g., n. 32 and 33 above.

62 Ibid: “...possumus respondere ad quaestionem propitam de ipsa voluntate prout comparatur ad finem, nam voluntas comparatur ad finem et ad ea quae sunt ad finem. A fine autem et ab eo quod apprehenditur sub omni ratione boni activatur et necessitatur. Ab his autem quae sunt ad finem et ab his quae non apprehenditur sub ratione omni boni, potest actuari sed non necessitari; a nullo autem potest violentari.” (Louvain ed., 1646, 177). “Sic ergo imaginabimur voluntatem seipsam determinare ut quando intellectus
Now the will's necessitation by the final end was something that virtually all late-thirteenth century thinkers, voluntarists and intellectualists alike, accepted.\textsuperscript{63} The prominent voluntarist Richard of Middleton, for example, concedes this, as does Henry of Ghent.\textsuperscript{64} This is because such a claim was not only considered an Aristotelian position, but one that had been defended by Christian authorities. Voluntarists such as Henry of Ghent differed only in that they regarded the necessary orientation of the will towards the final end as a free act deriving from an intrinsic perfection in the will itself.\textsuperscript{65} Aquinas, by contrast, holds that the will necessarily desires the final end because there is no defect according to which it can be rejected by the will. That is, Aquinas maintains that there is a perfection in the object itself, rather than in the will, that accounts for why the latter necessarily


\textsuperscript{63} Scotus of course is the famous exception to this. He granted that we could not will misery per se, but he did think that we could fail to will happiness. Cf. \textit{Ord. IV, d. 49, q. 9-10} (Vivès ed., 21, 332-333).

\textsuperscript{64} Richard of Middleton, \textit{Quaest. disp.}: "Et ad hoc primo primo quod voluntas de necessitate vult finem; quia finis est in operabilibus sicut pricipium in speculabilibus, 6 Ethic. cap. 6; 3 Phys. versus finem; finis autem est voluntatis. Sed intellectus de necessitate assentit primis principiis. Ergo voluntas de necessitate vult finem" (Lottin ed., \textit{Psychologie et morale}, I, 296). For a general discussion of Richard's views on the will, see E. Hoccedez, \textit{Richard de Middleton: sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine} (Louvain-Paris, 1925), 212-19; Kent, \textit{Virtues of the Will}, 137-40; and Lottin, \textit{Psychologie et morale}, I, 293-99. For Henry's view of the matter, see, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Quodlibet IX}, q. 5: "Solum enim finale bonum cognitum per intellectum aperta visione tantum habet ponderis inclinantis, alliciendo, non violentando voluntatem, ut libere velit illud, quod tamen quadam immutabili necessitate non potest non velle illud" (Macken ed., XIII, 135).

\textsuperscript{65} See n. 61 above for Henry's view that \textit{voluntas} wills the final end "freely" (\textit{libere}), albeit by a "certain immutable necessity" (\textit{quadam immutabili necessitate}).
tends toward the absolute good.\textsuperscript{66} Giles appears to line up with Aquinas on this matter, even if he does choose as his source Augustine's \textit{De trinitate} — \textit{necassario volumus esse boni, et non volumus esse miser} — in support of his position.\textsuperscript{67}

That the will is determined to choose the final end as apprehended by the intellect, then, was not a claim to which voluntarists particularly objected. They parted company most radically with Aquinas regarding the relationship between the will and the intellect over the means to happiness, that is, with regard to those mixed goods over which rational agents can make choices. Intellectualists such as Aquinas argued that the will, being the rational appetite, is entirely dependent on the intellect for all of its acts. Voluntarists, on the other hand, argued that the will must be able to act independently of the intellect, whether as regards its exercise or its specification, if freedom is to be preserved.

Because Giles of Rome wishes to observe the act-potency axiom, he constructs a theory of human action that involves, much like Aquinas, reciprocal causality between the will and the intellect.\textsuperscript{68} In the first instance, the will requires actualization by the intellect, for "unless the intellect were previously in act, the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Cf. n. 32 above.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Cf. n. 62 above. It should be noted that Giles is not quoting Augustine verbatim here. At \textit{De trinitate} 13,3, Augustine's exact words are "Omnes beati esse vultis, miseris esse non vultis" (PL 42, 1018). In other words, Giles essentially substitutes \textit{boni} for \textit{beati}. Presumably, Giles does this because he is thinking like a thirteenth-century Aristotelian, for whom the terms "happiness" and "goodness" are effectively coextensive when applied to rational agents.
\item \textsuperscript{68} On the reciprocal relationship between the will and the intellect in Aquinas see \textit{ST} I-II, q. 17, a. 1, corp: "...actus voluntatis et rationis supra se invicem possunt ferri, prout scilicet ratio ratiocinatur de volendo, et voluntas vult ratiocinari; contingit actum voluntatis praeveneri ab actu rationis, et e converso." On Aquinas's view that the will
\end{itemize}
will would never be in act."\(^6\) Now if the object is happiness, as we indicated, then it will necessarily determine the will. As we saw, the will cannot fail to desire, or be moved by, the absolute good. Such an object when apprehended therefore both actuates and determines it. With respect to mixed goods, by contrast, the will must determine itself.

We must be careful not to confuse actuation with determination on Giles’s scheme, even if Godfrey and Henry will later argue that they amount to the same thing. They do not. The will requires the intellect to actuate it in the first instance regardless of what good, mixed or absolute, is under consideration since the will requires an object.\(^7\) Actualization by the intellect is also necessary if Giles is to avoid violating the act-potency axiom for, as he says, “if something were to cause an actuation in itself on its own, then it would be in act and in potency in the same respect, and that is impossible.”\(^7\) What Giles completely rejects is the claim that the intellect can determine the will’s act, can cause a volition in the will for a specific object. He therefore draws a very clear distinction between actuation and

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\(^6\) Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 15: “…nisi intellectus fieret prius in actu numquam voluntas fieret in actu…” (Louvain ed., 1646, 177).

\(^7\) Ibid: “…numquam enim voluntas per se et directe actuat seipsam sed bonum apprehensum est quod causat volitionem in voluntate, et quod actuat eam” (Louvain ed., 1646, 177).

\(^7\) Ibid: “…si enim aliquid in seipso secundum seipsum causaret actuacionem, tunc illud secundum idem esset actus et potentia, quod est impossible. Propter quod secundum hunc modum movendi vera est propositio 7. Physicorum, quod omne quod movetur etc.” (Louvain ed., 1646, 177).
determination: the former is associated in the first instance with a simple 
presentation of the object, while the latter is identified with specification.

Giles constructs, then, the following picture of the stages of the human act 
with regard to mixed objects. In the first instance the understood object must 
actuate the will.\textsuperscript{72} This initial actualization cannot be a proper desire for the object 
since this would amount to a determination of the will's act such that its autonomy 
would be compromised. The first act of the intellect that reduces the will from 
potency to act, then, must be a very weak sort of actualization. It is a simple 
stimulation of the will, as it were, merely to \textit{consider} whether the object should be 
regarded as good or bad, and accordingly chosen or rejected at a later stage in the 
deliberative process. Indeed Giles calls this initial volition that the intellect causes 
in the will a “volition of consideration” (\textit{volitio considerationis}), and it amounts to a 
nutral presentation of the mixed object under both its aspects: good and bad.\textsuperscript{73}

It is crucial to bear in mind that at this initial stage the will's act has not yet 
been specified, that is, its choice has not yet been determined in relation to the 
object under consideration. Why is it that the intellect, if it can actuate the will, 
cannot in the first instance determine it as well? Because in order for the intellect 
to specify the will's act it would have to regard the object as specifically good. 
However the intellect is incapable of doing this, Giles reasons, because “with

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid: “...sed bonum apprehensum causet volitionem in voluntate et activet eam” 
(Louvain ed., 1646, 178).

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid: “Res ergo apprehensa prius causat in voluntate volitionem considerationis: quod si 
ista consideratio sit determinata ad bonum tantum necessitatur ut velit, si ad malum
respect to all of its first acts it is moved naturally, or quasi-naturally, so that what comes to us at first in the mind is not in our power, but from a presentation of sensible things." Given that the intellect is a natural power it cannot specify the object as good or bad in the first instance, but can only present it in a state of indifference or neutrality. Therefore, since mixed goods by definition have desirable as well as undesirable aspects, and since the intellect is incapable of ranking these it follows that what the intellect presents to the will in its first actuation is the object under both its aspects.

Consider, for instance, the act of fornication (*fornicatio*). Such an act is considered in the first instance as both good since pleasurable, and as bad since disordered. Giles calls this state of neutrality a "forked consideration" (*consideratio bifurcata*). The only way to resolve this indetermination, according to Giles, is for the will, which has control over how the object is to be considered, to determine itself. It does this by willing to rest in (*sistere*) or refrain from (*desistere*) the forked consideration, or by willing to think more about the pleasure attached to sexual intercourse than the disordered nature of the act, or vice versa. In other words, it determines the intellect to take a specific stance towards this mixed object by

tantum, tunc necessitatur ut nolit. Si sub ratione utriusque, tunc voluntas se potest determinare...” (Louvain ed., 1646, 179).

74 Ibid: “...intellectus enim, quantum ad omnem suum primum actum, movetur naturaliter, vel quasi naturaliter: ita ut non sit in potestate nostra, quid nobis veniat primo in mente, sed ex oblatione sensibilium” (Louvain ed., 1646, 178).
focusing on one aspect more than the other. Depending on how it determines the intellect, it allows itself either to be moved by the object, or not.\textsuperscript{75}

Now the mechanism of \textit{consideratio} that Giles employs has its source in Aquinas. Thomas introduced it in the \textit{Summa contra gentiles} in order to account for the control that the will is able to exercise over the intellect in the deliberative process.\textsuperscript{76} In that work Aquinas makes it clear that the will is able to move the intellect to its exercise and even as to its specification. This bears a striking resemblance to Giles's own theory. To see the influence of Aquinas here it is worth comparing the two accounts:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textsc{aquinas} & \textsc{giles of rome} \\
\textit{JGG III 10} (Leonine ed., 14, 27) & \textit{Quod. III, q. 15} (Louvain ed., 1646, 178) \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{quote}
\begin{flushleft}
\textit{[\ldots] nam in potestate ipsius voluntatis est velle et non velle. Itaque in potestate ipsius quod ratio actu consideret, vel a consideratione desistat; aut quod hoc vel illud consideret.} \\
\end{flushleft}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\begin{flushleft}
\textit{[\ldots] et quia voluntas est domina sui actus, in potestate eius est sistere in hac consideratione bifurcata vel sistere in una et desistere ab alia, vel magis sistere in una quam in alia, potest enim omnino desistere velle cogitare de inordinacione et solum velle cogitare de delectatione [\ldots]} \\
\end{flushleft}
\end{quote}

Leaving aside the minor differences, both Giles and Aquinas seem to be suggesting the same thing in the foregoing passages, namely, that the will can

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid: "\ldots cum apprehenditur id quod est ad finem vel cum apprehenditur quod non habet omnem rationem boni, ut puta cum intellectus apprehendit poisionem, apprehendit eam ut bonum quia inductiva sanitatis et ut malam ratione amaritudinis, vel dum apprehendit fornicationem, eam apprehendit ut bonum ratione delectationis et ut malam ratione inordinationis. Et quia voluntas est domina sui actus in potestate eius est sistere in hac consideratione bifurcata vel sistere in una et desistere ab alia, vel magis sistere in una quam in alia. Potest enim omnino desistere velle cogitare de inordinacione et solum velle cogitare de delectatione" (Louvain ed., 1646, 178).
control not only its own acts, but also those of the intellect. The language used is even strikingly similar. The will controls the intellect over whether "to consider" (considerere) anything at all, or to "desist" (desistere) from such a consideration. It even has the power to direct the intellect to consider one thing or another. That is, the will has power over not only whether the intellect exercises its act or not, but also over how the intellect exercises its act. Aquinas, of course, does not posit a "forked consideration," for that is Giles's own development. Furthermore, the text illustrating Aquinas's point is innocent of specific examples such as Giles's use of fornication as an object of the will. Nonetheless, the notion of consideratio seems to be used in a very similar way: to explain the will's control over the intellect.

Considered in isolation, the foregoing text from Aquinas is undoubtedly open to a voluntarist reading. Indeed, it is precisely to such texts that scholars like Gallagher allude in order to depict Thomas as defending a voluntarism of specification.\(^{77}\) As we have already indicated, however, Aquinas does not in the final analysis defend voluntarism of any kind. To do so he would have to maintain not only that the will is able to control the intellect's exercise and direct its attention to this or that, but that such influence could occur independently of a prior judgement of the reason. That is, he would have to hold that the will has some power over its own act by an intrinsic freedom. Of course, this is the sort of move that Giles will have to make if he is going to transform Aquinas's action theory

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\(^{77}\) Ibid.
into a voluntarist one. As for Aquinas himself, he posits no such formal freedom in the will. Indeed, as we saw in 1.1, Aquinas believes that every act of the will must be preceded and indeed determined by a prior judgement of the intellect.

Before proceeding to examine what exactly Giles means by the concept of self-determination, i.e., whether it amounts to a spontaneous act of the will or not, it is perhaps necessary to bring his understanding of actuation into sharper focus. According to Giles, as we have just seen, the will determines itself to will to consider the object, and in doing so determines the intellect either to remain in the forked consideration or to give more attention either to the desirable or undesirable aspect. However, once the will has determined the intellect, Giles insists that it does not have the power to act against this determination. That is, once the will has directed the intellect to focus on, e.g., the pleasure involved in fornication rather than the disordered nature of the act, it will necessarily be activated by a desire to fornicate. This seems to follow, for if the will has already determined itself in favour of the object it stands to reason that it will necessarily be activated by it.

Actuation seems therefore to be of two types. In the first instance, it is associated with a weak, indeterminate volition of consideration for the object, that

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78 Ibid: "...<voluntas> potest enim omnino desistere velle cogitare de inordinatione et solum velle cogitare de delectatione et curn hoc facit, quia non habet rethahens, allicitur ad delectationem et causatur in ea volitio fornicationis. In hoc autem voluntas non activabit seipsam sed determinabit, nam nisi prius se determinasset ut vellet considerare de fornicatione ratione delectationis et desistere cogitare de ea ratione inordinationis, fornicatio non potuisset activare voluntatem nec causare volitionem sui ipsius in ea" (Louvain ed., 1646, 178).
is, with a mere presentation of the object under both of its aspects. Activation in
the second instance, however, refers to a full-blown volition or nolition for the
object itself based on a prior determination of the will. Once the intellect has been
determined by the will to regard the object as good or bad, the intellect focuses on
this consideration and actuates the will accordingly, this time causing in the will
either a volition or a nolition for the object itself.

With respect to mixed goods, then, there exists in the first instance a native
indeterminacy in the intellect such that the will, if it is to act at all, must determine
itself. For if it is the case that the intellect cannot determine the will then it would
seem that it is the will's responsibility to do so itself. As Giles puts it, "if the will is
not necessitated by the means, and they cannot determinately (determinate) move
the will, then in order to be moved by the means, it is necessary that the will
determine itself."79

Now it is crucial to have a clear idea of what precisely Giles means by the
term self-determination. Does he mean simply that the will can determine itself
based on a prior determination of the intellect, like Aquinas, or is this self-
determining act of the will a truly spontaneous one? How this question is
answered will settle whether Giles is ultimately defending a voluntarist account of
human action or an intellectualist one, as Aquinas does.

79 Giles of Rome, *Quod. III*, q. 15: "Voluntas ergo, si non necessitetur ab his quae sunt ad
finem non possunt determinate movere voluntatem, oportet quod voluntas determinet
seipsam ad hoc ut moveatur ab his quae sunt ad finem" (Louvain ed., 1646, 177).
Although Giles takes the act-potency axiom very seriously, he does in the final analysis maintain that the will’s act of self-determination is spontaneous. Indeed, Giles insists that, once reduced to act, the will possesses in the first instance a certain control (dominium) over its own acts and the other potencies of the soul prior to any determination of the intellect. In Giles’s next *Quodlibet* this is further clarified. There we discover that the will’s dominium over itself and the other powers of the soul amounts to an intrinsic, formal freedom: an ability to determine itself to acting or not acting, albeit presupposing a presentation of the apprehended form. Giles’s understanding of foundations of freedom will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter 4.

While Giles adopts several important principles from Aquinas, his insistence that the will can exercise itself independently of a determination of the intellect is the point at which the two thinkers diverge. Giles, as we have established, was indebted to Aquinas’s formulation that the will is a moved mover, reduced from potency to act by the object. He incorporated this notion into his own action theory undoubtedly in order to preserve the act-potency axiom. He

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80 Ibid: “...voluntas...prius determinet seipsum et postea determinet intellectum vel aliam potentiam quan tumque, nam primo determinat se ut velit considerare de hoc et nolit considerare illud vel ut magis velit considerare hoc quam illud. Et secundum quod determinatum est velle in voluntate sic sit executio in intellectu...Istud ergo dominium posse sistere in uno et desistere in alio vel posse sistere et attendere plus ad unum quam ad aliud voluntati est attribuendum quae dominium prius habet in operationem propriam et per eam habet dominium in operationes alias causat enim in se ipsam volitionem...” (Louvain ed., 1646, 179).

81 Giles of Rome, *Quod.* IV, q. 21: “Dicamus ergo quod hoc sit esse liberii arbitrii: formaliter posse determinare seipsum ad agendum vel non agendum. Unde dictum est quod voluntati insit libertas ex immaterialitate naturae in qua fundatur radicaliter et
additionally adopted the latter's notion of *consideratio* in order to explain how the will can influence the intellect's decisions. But he had to develop this notion in order to make his theory an actual voluntarism of specification. He therefore introduced the innovation of the *consideratio bifurcata* and then proceeded to defend in the will an intrinsic ability to determine itself.

The formal freedom of the will, then, is precisely where Giles parts company with Aquinas. For Aquinas, as we saw, every new act of the will must be preceded by a determination of the intellect. On Giles's account, however, the will's determination of the intellect after it has been reduced to first act, i.e., after it has been presented with an object for consideration, is spontaneous. The will derives this capacity from the fact that it is the "ruler in the kingdom of the soul" (*domina in regno animae*), a prominent voluntarist metaphor that can be found in Henry of Ghent and, we have seen, Walter of Bruges.\(^2\) Moreover, it is Giles's conviction not only that the will has the intrinsic power to determine itself, but that if it did *not* do so, then no specification of the will's act could occur. The explanation for this is that the intellect does not have sufficient power in the first instance to determine the will. Hence "the form existing in the intellect is undetermined to this or to the opposite and because it is undetermined, insofar as

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\(^{2}\) See n. 41 above.
it is such, it does not act nor does it ever proceed to act unless it is determined by the will.\footnote{Giles of Rome, \textit{Quod} IV, q. 21: "...forma existens in intellectu est indeterminata ad hoc vel ad oppositum et quia indeterminatum secundum quod huiusmodi non agit nec umquam procedit in opus nisi determinetur per voluntatem..." (Louvain ed., 1646, 258).}

To sum up, then: according to Giles, prior to being presented with the appetible object, the will is completely passive or entirely (omnino) in potency. Once the object has been presented, the will is actuated such that a volition of consideration is caused in it. At this stage the will is no longer entirely in potency, but neither has the content of its act been specified as yet for the mixed object. Rather, it is actuated in the sense that it now has the power to consider the alternative aspects of the object that the intellect is indifferently placing before it. Once reduced to act by the end, in other words, "it does not entirely exist as a passive potency, but exists in a certain way as a ruling (dominativa) one insofar as it can determine itself in the way mentioned."\footnote{Giles of Rome, \textit{Quod} III, q. 15: "facta autem in actu per finem et volendo considerare de his quae sunt ad finem, non se habet omnino ut potentia passiva sed se habet aliquo modo ut dominativa in quantum potest se determinare modo quo dictum est." (Louvain ed., 1646, 180).} Presented by the intellect with the mixed object under both its aspects, the will then has the intrinsic power to determine whether to direct the intellect to placing more weight on its good or bad aspect. Depending on whether the will has determined the intellect to focus on the object's good or bad aspect, the intellect will specify the will's act accordingly.

Since Giles thinks that ultimately it is the will that spontaneously controls how the
object will be regarded by the intellect, the conclusion is inescapable that he is defending a voluntarism of specification.

1.3. The Voluntarist Reaction

It did not take long for Giles's position on voluntary self-motion to come under attack. He had defended the theory contained in *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 in Lent of 1288. Henry attacked it in Advent. The trouble with Giles's theory, on Henry's account, is that it lacks coherence. He agrees with Giles's understanding of how the will determines itself, but accuses him of not taking the theory to its logical conclusion. And although Henry says that he prefers Giles's formulation to Aquinas's, he nonetheless rightly sees Giles's theory as being very similar to that of Aquinas, and attacks him on these grounds.

The question of *Quodlibet* XII, q. 26 could not be more pointed: "Whether the will can be actuated (actuari) or reduced to act and nonetheless not determined (determinari) by the object." Henry's sustained analysis is obviously and principally directed at the distinction Giles had drawn between *activare* and *determinare*, though there is an additional digression on John of Murro's theory, borrowed from St. Anselm, that the will moves itself by means of its affections. The latter theory need not detain us.

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85 Henry of Ghent, *Quod.* XII, q. 26: "Utrum voluntas possit actuari sive reduci in actum, et tamen non determinari ab illo a quo actuatur" (Macken ed., XVI, 136).
At the outset of his *Quodlibet*, Henry leaves little doubt that he thinks that Giles is merely trying to defend, with some minor revisions, the distinction Aquinas had drawn in the *Prima secundae* and *De malo.* Specifically, Henry reduces Giles’s distinction between *activare* and *determinare* to the thomistic distinction between *specificatio* and *exercitium*, respectively. According to Henry, although Giles holds that the intellect merely causes a volition of consideration in the will with respect to actuation, while Aquinas holds that the intellect specifies the will’s act with respect to determination, nonetheless for both thinkers the principle of motion comes from the intellect. ³⁷

Henry does admit that he finds Giles’s position preferable because Giles recognizes, unlike Aquinas, the will’s indifference once it has been actuated. Nonetheless it still troubles Henry that, on Giles’s account, there is nonetheless a definite volition that is caused in the will by the intellect, that is, a volition of consideration. He therefore regards both Giles and Aquinas as arguing the same

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³⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Quod.* XII, q. 26: “Et sic, ut dicunt, res apprehensa primo causat in voluntate, et hoc ex necessitate, volitionem considerationis sive intellectus. Et talem volitionem causari ab intellectu in voluntate appellant aliqui activare sive actuare voluntatem, quia hoc facit eam de volente in potentia volentem in actu. Alii autem respicientes ad voluntatis indeterminationem praedictam appellant hoc determinare voluntatem. Et ambo concordant in hoc, quod sic velle primo secundum actu non est a voluntate neque a libero arbitrio voluntatis, quia primi dicunt quod voluntas non est liberi arbitrii quoad actuationem, alii autem dicunt quod non est liberi arbitrii quoad actus determinationem. Et id ipsum quod illi appellant actuationem, alii appellant actus determinationem. (Decorte ed., XVI, 138-39).
thing insofar as they assert the necessity of the will's being reduced to act in the first instance by the intellect.88

As regards Giles's notion of determinare, Henry sees this is being effectively equivalent to Aquinas's exercitium. Once reduced to act by the end, or actuated/determined, the will is able to move itself toward the means. The capacity for self-motion Giles calls "determination" while Aquinas calls it "exercise."

Whatever the term, Henry sees them as amounting to the same thing.89

Henry's main objection to the foregoing positions is their adherence to the claim that the object as presented by the intellect exercises any real motion over the will. He objects, in short, to any view that advances the claim that the principle of motion comes from anything but the will itself. Aquinas and Giles, as we have just seen, regard the presentation of the object by the intellect as necessary in order to reduce it from potency to act. Henry objects, as we recall, to any movement by the object of the will. If the object holds even the slightest causality over the will, then the will cannot be free, either with respect to specification/actuation or to exercise/determination.

88 Ibid: "Sed qui illorum magis proprie loquuntur? Dico quod primi, qui hoc appellant voluntatis actuationem, quia licet voluntas ex se sit ab initio quasi indifferentes ad velle et ad volle, proprie tamen secundum utrosque non debet dici indifferentes ad volendum et non volendum in comparazione ad actum considerationis sive intellectionis, quia, ut dictum est, secundum illos res primo apprehensa, quaequeque sit illa et sit illa et sub quacumque ratione apprehendatur, ex necessitate primo causat in voluntate volitionem considerationis" (Decorte ed., XVI, 139).

89 Ibid: "Dicunt ergo isti quod voluntas quoad determinationem actus, quam alii appellant quoad exercitium actus, quia se ipsam per liberum arbitrium determinat et exercitat, secundum dictum modum bene dicitur voluntas movere se ipsam, quia potest se ipsam ad actum volendi dicto modo determinare in volendo" (Decorte ed., XVI, 143).
Against both Giles and Thomas, then, Henry maintains that the will is entirely free. It proceeds to its own act of willing entirely of its own accord (per se ipsum). That is, for Henry the principle of the will’s motion, both as regards exercise and specification, and as regards absolute and mixed goods, comes from the will itself.

Now Henry concedes that there is a distinction between the means and the end in the act of willing (actus volendi), for whereas the will has the ability to accept or reject a mixed good, it cannot similarly act with respect to the absolute good. However its relation to every object is the same: it is never moved by it. Rather, it proceeds to every object of its own accord, either through its innate freedom of decision (ex se libertate arbitri) in the case of mixed goods, or through its intrinsic freedom (ex se libertate) with respect to the absolute good. As was the case with

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90 Ibid: “Sic ergo voluntas se ipsa per se ipsam exit in actu volendi tam finem quam ea quae sunt ad finem absque omni alia dispositione seu motione existente sive praecedente in ea” (Decorte ed., XVI, 155).

91 Ibid: “Quare, cum secundum utrosque non est distinctio inter illos modos actionum volendi, nisi quia diversimode voluntas se habet ad illos secundum dictum modum, dico ergo quod ex parte rei nulla est differentia ex diverso ordine et modo se habendi ad voluntatem, inter voluntatis actionem, determinationem et exercitum. Licet enim differenti modo se habet voluntas ad actu volendi finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, in hoc videlicet quod finem sub omni ratione boni apprehensum necesse habet velle, et non potest ipsum non velle nec diversi ab illo, nec ab illis quae ipsum circumstant, et hoc etiam manente apprehensione talium, omne autem quod est ad finem apprehensum, etiam manente apprehensione, potest non velle et velle indifferenter, et similiter ea quae illud circumstant; tamen ad finem sub omni ratione boni et ad ea quae circumstant ipsum, nullo differenti modo se habet. Sicut enim finem talem apprehensum necesse est voluntatem velle, similiter necesse est ipsam velle intellectum intelligere finem et persistere in actu intelligendi ipsum. Similiter ad ea quae sunt ad finem et ad ea quae circumstant illa, nullo differenti modo se habet” (Decorte ed., XVI, 150-51).

92 Ibid: “Quod autem ad confirmationem dicti sui arguunt ibidem, quod ‘voluntas nihil potest velle nisi sub ratione boni, nec nolle sive respuere nisi sub ratione mali,’ dico quod verum est. Non tamem oportet quod in isto velle vel nolle ab alio moveatur quam a se,
Aquinas, therefore, Henry accuses Giles of making an unnecessary distinction between the will as moved by the end, albeit self-moving as regards the means. According to Henry, either the will is active with regard to every good, or it is passive.

In order to buttress the essential autonomy of the will, Henry reintroduces in this *Quodlibet* his notion that the intellect acts merely as a *conditio sine qua non* of volition. Against the view that the will has in some sense to be passive if the act-potency axiom is to be preserved, Henry once again argues that the will is “active without qualification” (*simpliciter activa*).

Henry is undoubtedly right to see the influence of Aquinas on Giles’s theory of action. Because Giles wishes to defend the act-potency axiom, he adopts from Aquinas the view that the will is initially a passive power, but that once reduced to act, the will can move itself in some form or another. According to the

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licet diversimodo, secundum quod est diversa ratio boni. Si enim est ratio boni in aliquo omnimodo perfecta, ut est perfecta in bono quod in se habet omnem rationem boni et nullam rationem mali sibi coniunctam, qualis est in eo quod est finis simpliciter, in illo movetur ex se libertate et immutabili necessitate, licet non libero arbitrio. Si vero sit ratio boni in aliquo diminuta, cuiusmodi est ratio boni in omni eo quod est ad finem vel coniuncta cum ratione mali, cuiusmodi est ratio delectabilis cum praeentatur in fornicatione cum ratione deordinati, in illo movetur ex se libertate arbitrii, et potest ab illo resilire, non solum propter malum inordinationis sibi coniunctum, sed propter suam imperfectionem, etiam si sola ratio boni comprehendatur” (Decorte ed., XVI, 153).

93 Ibid: “Quod autem addunt talem volitionem causari ab intellectu in voluntate etc., dico quod hoc falsum est, quoniam, secundum quod saepe dixi, licet principium voluntatis sit ab intellectu et volitio causatur a bono apprehenso, non tamen hoc est sicut ex causa propter quam sic, sed solummodo sicut ex causa sine qua non, quia ut a causa propter quam sic non movetur voluntas a aliquo ad actum volendi neque actuatur, nisi a se ipsa...” (Decorte ed., XVI, 152).

94 Ibid: “Verum est tamen quod intellectus existens in actu praecedat omnem actum voluntatis ut causa sine qua non. Unde quod dicunt ex parte intellectus respectu
two accounts, the intellect and the will exercise a form of reciprocal causality over one another. The trouble with Henry's assessment is that the adjustments that Giles makes to Aquinas's theory ultimately lead him away from Aquinas, so that their theories of actuation/specification and determination/exercise, while similar in broad outline, are really quite different in essentials.

The difference between Giles and Thomas is that, for Thomas, specification really does mean that the intellect has evaluated the object by means of deliberation and determined it to be either good or bad. For Giles, however, although actuation is an act of the intellect, it is an act of the intellect that is prior to any determination of the object as either good or bad. In fact, actuation in the first instance is simply a forked consideration, the object as both good and bad. On Giles's account, determination therefore takes place at the level of the will due to an intrinsic freedom or perfection in the will itself. This is not what Aquinas means by exercise. For Aquinas, even the exercise of the will, the fact that it can make choices over the means to the end, is still determined by a prior specifying act of the intellect. Both what it wills and, indeed, whether it wills at all is preceded by an act of the intellect, for Aquinas rejects the claim that the will is formally free.

Before proceeding to answer the question of whether Henry's criticisms of Giles's position are fatal to the view that Quodlibet III, q. 15 is closer to voluntarism than to intellectualism, it is first necessary to see how Giles's position was received

voluntatis de movendo se per alid, non est simile, quia intellectus est potentia simpliciter passive, voluntas autem est potentia simpliciter activa" (Decorte ed., XVI, 156-7).
on the intellectualist side. Accordingly, it is to Godfrey of Fontaines’s *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 16 that we now turn our attention.

**1.4. The Intellectualist Reaction**

Disputed in 1292 or 1293, Godfrey’s *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 16 was by no means his first discussion on the nature of the human will, yet it is in some respects one of his more comprehensive and extensive defenses of the thoroughgoing intellectualism for which he is well known. It is in this *Quodlibet*, for instance, that Godfrey claims that the will can never act against the conclusions of practical deliberation and that certain types of necessity are compatible with freedom.

As with Henry of Ghent’s *Quodlibet* XII, q. 26, however, the principal target of Godfrey’s own *Quodlibet* is the distinction Giles had drawn between *activare* and *determinare*. In agreement with Henry, Godfrey insists that any attempt to argue that the will is a power that is both moved and self-moving is incoherent. But whereas the focus of Henry’s attack against Giles was on the latter’s theory of actuation, Godfrey’s focus, as might be expected, is on his theory of volitional self-determination.

In essence, Godfrey claims that the distinction between actuation and determination is merely an apparent one. His aim is to show that if the two acts are in fact the same, then if Giles denies that the will can actuate itself – as he does in order to avoid violating the act-potency axiom – then he must also concede that
it cannot determine itself. Godfrey's strategy is to hoist Giles, as it were, on his own petards.

Recall that for Giles actuation and determination are two separate acts of the intellect and the will, respectively. Actuation – in the first instance, anyway – is the reduction of the will from a state in which it was entirely in potency, to one in which it has the power to determine itself since it now has an object to consider. Now Giles must allow that some sort of volition, however diminished, is caused by the intellect if the act-potency axiom is to be observed. On the other hand, such an act cannot be a full-blown volition or nolition for the object, since this would compromise the will's ability to determine itself. Giles therefore argues that the sort of volition that is caused in the will when it is actuated in the first instance is a mere *volitio considerationis* to choose between the two aspects that the intellect has indifferently presented to it. In short, it is the will that must direct the intellect to focus on the object's good or bad aspect if the content of its act is to be specified and it is to actually choose the object. Since the specification of the act devolves upon the will, at least indirectly, this permits Giles to claim that it therefore determines itself.

Godfrey regards this distinction between *activare* and *determinare* as a false one. If the will is the rational appetite, an appetite for the good as apprehended by reason, then it can only be moved by its own proper object: the good. Actuation and determination are therefore one and the same act according to Godfrey, for to

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95 I follow Wippel's dating of this *Quodlibet*, in contrast to Glorieux, who places it in 1291.
be actuated is simply to be reduced from potency to act by an object that the intellect has determined to be, or evaluated as, good. Giles had argued that since the intellect is a natural power it remains in a state of indetermination with regard to mixed objects such that the will must determine it. On Godfrey's account, if the intellect is in a state of indetermination, then so is the will. To argue that the two acts are discrete therefore amounts to a distinction without a difference. If an object actuates the will, then it likewise determines it. To separate the two acts such that one is subject to the act-potency axiom while the other is immune to it is entirely arbitrary.

Intellectualists such as Godfrey of Fontaines, then, agreed that the intellect is in the first instance an indeterminate power that is open to various possibilities. Once it has finished deliberating, however, it is then reduced to act by the object and becomes the efficient cause of volition. On Godfrey's account, the will is just

Cf. The Metaphysical Thought, xxviii.

96 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quod. VIII, q. 16: "Ex hoc ergo non debet dici quod, quia voluntas non determinatur ab intellectu sic apprehendente id quod est ad finem, quod ipsa voluntas determinet se; sed requiritur quod fiat processus secundum operationem intellectus practici quosque occurrat apprehensio eius quod est ad finem determinate sub ista ratione sub qua naturam est movere voluntatem; et tunc voluntas determinatur ab eo quod est ad finem virtute etiam determinationis factae ad volendum ipsum finem. Quando ergo obiectum voluntatis apprehenditur sub illa ratione sub qua naturam est actuare voluntatem, tunc et ipsam simul actuat et determinat; quia nihil aliud est voluntatem determinare quam ipsam facere volentem in actu determinatum obiectum hoc vel illud. Sicut ergo obiectum voluntatis voluntatem actuat, secundum modum secundum quem apprehenditur a ratione sub illa ratione sub qua naturam est movere voluntatem, ita etiam obiectum voluntatis voluntatem determinat, non ipsa se ipsam; voluntatem enim determinari nihil aliud est quam ipsam velle aliquod obiectum determinatum determinare; et indeterminationi intellectus apprehendentis obiectum indeterminate est causa indeterminationis voluntatis in volendo; et determinatio intellectus in apprehendendo sive determinata apprehensio intellectus est etiam determinatio voluntatis vel causa determinationis voluntatis indeterminate volendo" (PB IV, 153).
as contingent or undetermined in the first instance as the intellect: it can want one object or another, or simply refrain from acting altogether.\textsuperscript{97} Since it is contingent and entirely in potency it is completely dependent on the object as presented by the intellect to determine it, otherwise it would remain in a state of neutrality.\textsuperscript{98} Giles does not wish to concede that the will is entirely passive, as it is on Godfrey’s view, otherwise it would be incapable of determining itself.

Having shown that Giles’s distinction between \textit{activare} and \textit{determinare} is incoherent Godfrey proceeds to examine Giles’s understanding of the act of the latter in its own right. In order to account for volitional self-determination Giles had to assign to the will the ability to direct the intellect to focus on one aspect of the intellect’s neutral presentation (\textit{consideratio bifurcata}). This is because the will has a certain \textit{dominium} over its own acts and over those of the other powers of the soul, an ability that the intellect lacks. Godfrey attacks this view. If the will directs the reason to focus on one aspect of an object rather than another, this can only

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\textsuperscript{97} Godfrey of Fontaines, \textit{Quod}. VI, q. 7: “Cum ergo voluntas de se sit indifferens ad duas volitiones secundum duo volita, vel ad volendum vel ad nolendum aliquid unum, et in hoc habeat rationem materiae secundum Commentatorem, oportet quod per aliquid determinatum fiat in actu secundum alterum horum” (PB III, 158).

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid: “Ita etiam videmus in voluntate quod prae sente obiecto fit in actu de necessitate respectu finalis obiecti, non de necessitate respectu aliorum; nec unquam fit in actu nisi secundum modum et formam rationis; quia nihil fugit nisi iudicet illud esse nocivum, nihil etiam prosequitur nisi iudicet illud esse conveniens; quia non est in actu nisi prae sente obiecto, obiectum autem fugere non est nisi id quod sub ratione mali et nocii apprehenditur, obiectum autem prosecutionis est id quod sub ratione boni et convenientis apprehenditur. Non videtur ergo ratio per quam probari possit quod aliquid ens sit activum respectu alterius per quod non possit etiam probari de obiecto respectu voluntatis. Non videtur ergo esse negandum quin voluntas vere ab obiecto moveatur quantum ad actus volitionis” (PB III, 158-59).
happen on account of a preceding judgement of the reason. Giles's claim that the will can determine itself autonomously is therefore an illusion, since every act of the will must be preceded by a determination of the intellect.

Giles's defense of a voluntarism of specification, that is, of the notion that the will can act independently of a prior determination of the intellect, is precisely where he parted company with Aquinas. Indeed, it is where Giles parts company with the whole intellectualist tradition. Of course, from the intellectualist perspective to defend such a view is "to subvert the relation of potencies and their acts, since the intellect is always prior to the will."  

1.5. Epilogue to the Debate

To defend himself against Godfrey's criticisms, Giles returned to the question of whether the will can move itself in the ordinatio of his commentary on the Sentences, the terminus a quo of which has been dated to 1309. Although his treatment here falls outside the scope, chronologically speaking, of his debate with Godfrey and Henry, we will examine it briefly for the sake of thoroughness.

99 Ibid: "Quando apprehenditur fornicatio sub ratione boni et mali, ad hoc quod voluntas determinet intellectum ad considerandum determinate circa delectationem fornicationis ut bona, et non circa inordinationem eius, oportet iam intellectum ipsam fornicationem apprehendere aliquo modo determinate sub ratione boni et convenientis ratione delectationis et iudicare considerationi eius sic insistendum, et ex hoc voluntas fit in actu ut velit intellectum circa hoc insistere" (PB IV, 154).

100 Ibid: "Quod enim voluntas prius velit intellectum insistere determinate circa considerationem fornicationis et deinde ex hoc postea intellectus iudicet huic esse insistendum, hoc esse non potest; hoc enim esset pervertere ordinem potentiarum et actus earum, cum semper intellectus sit prior voluntate" (PB IV, 154).
In the commentary on the Sentences Giles takes himself simply to be restating the earlier position of Quodlibet III, q. 15. However, there is little doubt that the later work is very different in tenor to the earlier one. There is no mention, for instance, of such notions as that the will is the “ruler in the whole kingdom of the soul,” or that the “forked consideration” that the intellect presents to the will in the case of mixed objects merely causes a “volition of consideration” rather than a determinate desire for the object itself. Nonetheless, the ostensible purpose of the discussion in the commentary on the Sentences is to clarify Giles’s earlier position on volitional self-determination.

In Quodlibet VIII, q. 16 Godfrey had accused Giles of defending a contradictory position in simultaneously defending both the validity of the act-potency axiom and the theory that determination is a proper act of the will independent of the intellect. According to Godfrey, as we recall, nothing can reduce itself from potency to act. Giles of course had agreed with this in Quodlibet III, q. 15, and this was precisely his reason for defending the notion that actuation must come from the intellect. Giles did, however, argue that the will could determine itself to will to think only about one aspect of the object independent of the determination of the intellect. The trouble with this, as Godfrey sees it, is that if such a determination is really an act, and not merely a desisting from act, then, since nothing can move itself, such a determination by the will has to have been caused by a prior act of the intellect. Needless to say, this would destroy the will’s

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101 F. del Punta, S. Donati and C. Luna, “Egidio Romano,” in Dizionario Biografico degli
ability to determine itself. On Godfrey's account, one cannot hold, as Giles wants
to, both that nothing can reduce itself from potency to act, and that a power can
determine itself without having previously been determined. According to
Godfrey:

If, then, to-determine-itself is to be in some way in act, insofar as the will is
posited to determine itself, <then> it is posited to actuate itself. If, however, to-
determine-itself or to-be-determined is nothing real, it is not necessary to be
troubled by anything. And they seem to say that it is a real act of the will, because they
say that the will so determines itself that, once an apprehension has been made
about fornication under the good description of 'pleasure' <and> the bad
description of 'immorality,' the will can desist from willing to think about the
immoral side and will to insist only to think about 'pleasure'. Now, although to desist
to think about something without qualification is not some act - although it can follow some act
- nonetheless to will to think about something is a real act of the will, and similarly to will to
persist to think about something. Therefore it can be inquired by what agent the
will comes into act according to those two acts of willing. If from itself, then the
unsuitable thing which they wish to avoid follows [emphasis mine].

Giles takes this criticism seriously enough to devote an extensive reprise to it
in the commentary on the Sentences, remarking that "many men fault our theory,
since this expression 'to determine' seems to imply some act." In point of fact,


102 Godfrey of Fontaines, _Quod_. VIII, q. 16: "Si ergo hoc, quod est determinare se, est esse
aliquo modo in actu, in hoc quod voluntas ponitur se ipsam determinare, ponitur se
ipsam actuare; si autem determinare se vel determinatum esse nihil reale est, de nihilo non
oporet es sollicitum. Et quod sit verus actus voluntatis videntur isti dicere, quia dicunt
quod voluntas sic se determinat quod, facta apprehensione de fornicatione bona ratione
deactationis, mala ratione inordinationis, potest voluntas desistere velle cogitare de
inordinatione et solum velle insistere cogitare de deactatione. Nunc autem licet desistere
cogitare de aliquo simpliciter non sit aliquis actus, licet ad aliquem actum possit consequi,
tamen velle cogitare de aliquo est verus actus voluntatis; et similiter velle insistere cogitare
de aliquo. Potest ergo quarei quo agente voluntas fiat in actum secundum hos duos actus
volendi; et si se ipsa, sequitur inconveniens quod volunt evitare" (PB IV, 151-52.)

103 Giles of Rome, _Sent_. II, d. 25, a. III, q. 1: "...determinavimus in quodam nostro
Quolibet, quod voluntas movet se determinando non activando se. Dicendum quod
dictum nostrum multi calumniat, quia istud determinare, videtur dicere aliquem
actum" (Venice ed., 1581, II.2, 298).
Godfrey has not misrepresented the theory contained in *Quodlibet* III, q. 15. His assessment in the excerpt quoted above is an accurate reflection of the argument Giles advances for volitional self-determination in the earlier work. If Giles is going to respond to this criticism successfully, then, he will have to modify the earlier position, and this is precisely what he does.

As in the *Quodlibetal Questions*, Giles begins his treatment of self-motion in the commentary on the *Sentences* by restating the view that, with respect to the absolute good, the will is moved necessarily since such an object can only be offered to it under a single description. With respect to mixed goods, however, Giles retreats from his earlier position. In *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 he had argued, recall, that the mixed object is presented to the will under its “good” and its “bad” description. In the case of fornication, for instance, the intellect offers such an object under the aspect of the good insofar as it is pleasurable, and bad insofar as it is disordered. The will then has to determine itself to direct the intellect to focus on one or the other aspect: if the good aspect, then volition follows, if the bad then nolition. As Godfrey pointed out, such a determination of the intellect is a positive act of the will. As such, it is incompatible with the act-potency axiom.

In the commentary on the *Sentences*, by contrast, a revision of the action theory that was developed in the *Quodlibets* has taken place. The intellect still offers the will an object under two aspects, but instead of the aspects being “pleasurable” and “disordered,” or good and bad, it now offers it two conflicting goods. When

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104 Ibid.
presented with the object of fornication, for instance, there are two things that can attract the will: the spiritual good, which consists in following the law of God and rejecting intercourse, and the carnal good, which consists in pursuing pleasure and therefore sexual gratification. Under the new formulation, voluntary self-determination amounts to a mere desisting from act such that when the will refrains from willing the pleasurable aspect of fornication, it negatively determines itself to following the good of observing God's law, and vice versa. The rejection of one necessarily implies acceptance of the other on Giles's new scheme.

But the difficulty of this question still remains, <namely> whether this determining of itself is some sort of act. To which it can be said that it is not necessary that it be an act, but suffices that it be a desisting from act. Two things are offered to the will, both of which are seemingly (tamquam) good: one is to follow the law of God and reject fornication, and the other is to follow the pleasurable good and reject the law of God. And it can choose any of these and be moved and activated by either. And as long as it remains undetermined, it will not be moved sufficiently, neither by this nor by that. By desisting from one, therefore, it will determine itself to the other and will be moved by the other. If therefore it desist from fornication, as it is the pleasurable good, it will determine itself to the other object, which is to follow the law of God. What is this "determining"? It is to desist from one thing, which by so doing, will determine itself to the other [emphasis mine].

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105 see n. 98 above.
106 Giles of Rome, Sent. II, d. 25, a. 3, q. 1: "Sed adhuc stat quaestionis difficutas: utrum istud 'determinare se' sit aliquis actus. Ad quod dici potest quod non oportet quod sit actus sed sufficit quod sit disistere ab actu. Duo ergo offeruntur voluntati et quodlibet tamquam bonum. Unum est sequi legem Dei et praetermittere fornicationem, alid est sequi bonum delectabile et praetermittere legem Dei. Et quodlibet eorum potest eligere et a quolibet eorum potest moveri et activari et quandiu stat indeterminata non movebitur sifficienter nec ab hoc nec ab illo. Desistendo ergo ab uno determinabit se ad alid et movebitur ab alio. Si ergo desistat a fornicatione ut est bonum delectabile determinabit se ad objectum alid quod est sequi legem Dei. Quid est ergo istud 'determinare? Est desistere ab uno quod faciendo determinabit se ad alid" (Venice ed., 1581, II.2, 298).
The advantage of this new formulation is that it allows the will to determine itself by default, as it were. When it desists from one of the goods that the intellect offers to it, there is always some other good that it implicitly chooses in the act of rejection. There is no longer any positive act of the will directing the intellect to focus on the good or the bad aspect of the object which, as Godfrey had pointed out, can only occur from a prior determination of the intellect. Determination now consists in desisting from one aspect, in doing which the will can be said to determine itself to the other. If the self-determination of the will is merely a desisting from act, therefore, rather than a positive act, Giles avoids the danger of violating the act-potency axiom, and is able to meet Godfrey's criticism.

It is difficult to know how Godfrey would have responded to this new position, for he did not have a chance to reply to it, his last Quodlibet most likely having been disputed in 1303/04. It is certain, however, that although Giles tried to salvage his theory of volitional self-determination in the commentary on Sentences, the revised theory is substantially weakened. Although the will still seems able to assist in the process of determination, because there is no independent, positive act of the will specifying itself in the later theory, it is doubtful that Giles is actually defending a voluntarist position any longer.

107 I follow Wippel's dating of Quodlibet XV, in contrast to San Cristóbal-Sebastián who dates it significantly earlier, that is, to 1286. Cf. "Godfrey of Fontaines: The Date of Quodlibet 15," FS 31 (1971), 300-369. For San Cristóbal-Sebastián's dating, see Controversias acerca de la voluntad, 109-118.
1.6. Concluding Remarks

The strongest evidence that Giles was defending a voluntarist account of human action in *Quodlibet* III, q. 15 is, of course, his view that the intellect is powerless in the first instance to specify the will's act. Because it is a natural power the intellect can only present the object in the first instance under *both* its aspects: good and bad. This is what Giles means by actuation in the first instance: a forked consideration that elicits a further volition of consideration in the will. If the agent is to be moved by the object, however, the will must determine itself: it must direct the intellect to specify the object in a determinate fashion, that is, as either good or bad. It achieves such determination by means of a certain intrinsic *dominium* or formal freedom. The very idea that the will can act on its own independently of a determining act of the intellect is a sign that Giles's theory, though derived from Aquinas, is a development of Thomas in an unmistakably voluntarist direction.

Thomas's theory stands in contrast to this. The task of specification, according to Aquinas, is an act of the intellect. Such freedom as the human agent has with respect to specification is the result of the intellect's ability to weigh the relative goodness of any mixed object. Of course, Aquinas too believes that the will is the efficient cause of intellection. But this has to be understood correctly. According to Aquinas, we only deliberate about something because we want to. Once the intellect has commenced its deliberations at the bidding of the will, however, there must always be a specification or determination on the part of the
intellect that precedes any further act of the will. To this extent Aquinas is a good intellectualist. There is no notion that the will is responsible for specification or that it can act independently of the intellect. Indeed for Aquinas, every act of the will, both as regards specification and exercise, must be preceded by an act of the intellect determining that its object or action is good.

That Giles defends the passivity of the will, however, raises a potential difficulty. If the will is a passive power, can Giles really be defending a form of voluntarism? Henry of Ghent certainly did not think so. If Giles was indeed defending a voluntarism of specification in the Quodlibets, as we are suggesting, then it may confidently be said that it was not a brand that was appealing to Henry.

As we saw, Henry’s disagreement with Giles was principally over the latter’s understanding of the way in which the intellect moves the will, which is to say as a real cause (causa propter quam sic) rather than a metaphorical one (causa sine qua non). Now according to Henry, if the object moves the will “even slightly,” then the will cannot be said to move itself at all. To avoid this problem, the object as understood by the intellect can only function, on Henry’s view, as an occasional or metaphorical cause of volition.

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108 Henry of Ghent, Quod. XII, q. 26: “Quod autem addunt talem volitionem causari ab intellectu in voluntate etc., dico quod falsum est, quoniam, secundum quod saepe dixi, licet principium voluntatis sit ab intellectu et volitio causatur a bono apprehenso, non tamen hoc est sicut ex causa propter quam sic, sed solummodo sicut ex causa sine qua non, quia ut a causa propter quam sic non movetur voluntas ab aliquo ad actum volendi neque actuatur, nisi a se ipsa[...]” (Decorte ed., XIV, 152). For Henry’s contrast between propter quam sic causality, that is, any sort of real causality, be it formal, final or efficient, and sine qua non causality, cf. his Quod. XIII, q. 11 (Decorte ed., XVIII, 88).
It is tempting to suppose that the central hallmark of voluntarism is the notion that if the intellect moves the will, it does so only as a *conditio sine qua non*. We have come to think of this sort of causality as a defining feature of voluntarism no doubt because this was the theory that Duns Scotus, the most distinguished voluntarist of the high middle ages, defended in his mature writings.\(^{109}\) And it is beyond dispute that many voluntarists in addition to Henry and Scotus did subscribe to the theory of *sine qua non* causality. Among these we may number the Oxford Franciscan Roger Marston,\(^{110}\) Peter of Falco,\(^{111}\) and Gerard of Abbeville,\(^{112}\) to name a few. Clearly this was seen by some as a compelling way to argue for the freedom of the will.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that this was the only theory that was thought to be compatible with voluntarism. Several thinkers who defended the intrinsic freedom of the will subscribed to a theory of *propter quam sic* motion of one form or another. Scotus himself, for instance, at least in his early Oxford *Lectura*, had argued that the object, along with the will, functioned as the partial

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\(^{109}\) For a persuasive account of the view that this was the position that Scotus likely defended in his later works see S. Dumont’s “Did Scotus Change his Mind about the Will?" in *MM 29: After the Condemnations of 1277 – Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century* (Berlin, 2000), 719-94.


\(^{111}\) Ibid., 289.

\(^{112}\) Gerard does not actually employ the phrase *causa sine qua non* to explain how the intellect moves the will. Instead, he argues that the intellect acts on the will merely as a “metaphorical” mover, which I take to be equivalent to a *sine qua non* cause. Cf. his *Quod.* XIV, q. 4: “Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum quod obicit de intellectu, quia intellectus movet voluntatem secundum metaphoram, et non secundum veritatem, quia per modum cognitionis et ostensionis movet affectum; sed non movet secundum impetum operationis” (Lottin ed., *Psychologie et morale*, I, 250).
efficient cause of volition. Furthermore Peter Olivi, perhaps the most extreme voluntarist of the late thirteenth century, and William de la Mare, the most outspoken critic of Aquinas within the Franciscan order, accepted the view that the intellect acts as the final cause of the will.

That final causality was thought to be compatible with the freedom of the will did not originate with of Olivi or William. Rather, it can be traced to the earlier voluntarism of Walter of Bruges. Since Walter was regent master at Paris during the period in which Giles was a Bachelor of Theology, or just prior, it seems likely that Giles would have been exposed to his theories on the will when he was a student. Indeed, of all the voluntarist permutations of the period, the broad

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113 Dumont, “Did Scotus Change His Mind,” 634.
115 The general consensus in the literature is that Giles began his studies at the University of Paris in 1260, probably attended the lectures of Aquinas from 1269 to 1272, and then commenced his studies as Bachelor of Theology in 1270. He completed his commentaries on the four books of Peter Lombard’s Sentences in 1277. Cf. P. Mandonnet, “La carrière scolaire de Gilles de Rome,” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 4 (1910), 482; F. del Punta, S. Donati and C. Luna, “Egidio Romano,” 319-20 and “Giles of Rome,” 73. There has been some disagreement, however, on the dating of Walter’s Disputed Questions. Longpré argued, in his edition of the Quaestiones disputatae du B. Gauthier de Bruges (PB X, 1928), that they had been composed in the period of Walter’s regency at Paris, that is, from 1269-72. Glorieux later confirmed that Walter was regent master during this period in Repertaire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1934), 84-85. Graf, however, argued that they had to have been composed between 1270 or 1271 since Question 5 is clearly a response to Aquinas’s De virtutibus in communi which was disputed between 1269 and 1272. Cf. his De subjecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV. 2 vols, (Rome, 1935), I, 130. In his Controversias aceca de la voluntad, 33-46, however, San Cristóbal-Sebastián dated these questions from 1274/5 to 1276. If this is true, then Walter was might not have been the author since he became
outline of Giles's voluntarism of specification is very redolent of Walter, who
defends a similar account of human action. For Walter, although the will is a
moved mover – part passive and part active – it can nonetheless specify its own
act, as we saw in 1.1. That is, it can act independently of the intellect, to some
extent anyway, because it is intrinsically free. These are all claims that Giles himself
defends.

Taken together, then, the essential features of Giles's theory of motion in
Quodlibet III, q. 15 are entirely compatible, if not with Henry of Ghent's more
extreme voluntarism, then certainly with Walter of Bruges's moderate voluntarism
of specification. In the final analysis, even if the will is passive in the first instance,
so long as it has the power to control how an object is understood independently of a
prior determination of the intellect, then it is the will that ultimately explains
human action. And although the claim that the will can be both active and passive
is subject to the charge of inconsistency, it does at least provide a way out of
cognitive determinism by severing the chain of causality between the intellect and
the will at the level of specification. This is a radical departure from Aquinas's
account of human action.

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provincial minister of France in 1272. I follow Kent in assuming that these questions
were disputed sometime between 1269 or 1270, and that they are therefore the work of
Walter of Bruges, or at least of a Franciscan voluntarist writing prior to 1277. See her
Virtues of the Will, 59-62.
CHAPTER 2

THE SOCRATIC PARADOX

Having seen how Giles of Rome conceives the relationship between the will and the intellect as regards motion in general, we turn now to his view of the will's relation to the intellect where specifically wrong or immoral choices are concerned. Our analysis of Giles's theory of the will in the previous chapter concluded that, on balance, his theory of volitional self-motion ought to be considered a species of moderate voluntarism. Evaluating Giles's position on the will's role in immoral action and the sources of sin, however, is rather more complicated.

In the mature *Quodlibetales Questions* (1286-91) Giles endorses the Aristotelian idea that every wrongdoer, at the time that he acts wrongly, can be said to lack knowledge: that every immoral agent acts either from ignorance or in ignorance.¹ Indeed as early as his commentary on Book I of the *Sentences*, the *ordinatio* of which has been dated to 1271-73,² Giles even appears to have defended the view that

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there is never malice in the will unless there is some error in the intellect.\(^3\)

Ordinarily, this theory is taken to mean that the intellect is the cause of depravity in the will.

Such views have unsurprisingly led certain modern scholars to interpret Giles as an adherent of the Socratic Paradox, that is, of the extreme intellectualist theory that rational agents never act or make choices against their own better judgement. Rather, according to this view, they sin as a result of ignorance. Indeed, as far as the literature is concerned, this should probably be considered the majority interpretation.\(^4\)

Against the prima facie evidence, however, I am going to argue that Giles adopts a voluntarist position on the Socratic Paradox in the Quodlibetal Questions. Does this mean that his position evolved from an endorsement of intellectualism in the early commentary on the Sentences to a defense of voluntarism in the Quodlibet? If one assumes that the theory defended in the commentary on the Sentences, later dubbed the proposito magistralis, is a defense of intellectualism — as Stephen Tempier, among other contemporaries, did — then one would have to conclude that Giles did in fact revise his outlook over the course of his career. But then it becomes difficult to explain why none other than the leading voluntarist of

\(^3\) Ibid., Sent. I, d.17, p. 1, q. 1 (Venice ed. 1521, fol. 89vM); and Sent. I, d. 47, p. 2, q. 1 (Venice ed. 1521, fol. 237rG).

the period, Henry of Ghent, approved the notion that there cannot be malice in the will without some error in the intellect when he was charged by Tempier to examine Giles’s commentary on the Sentences in 1277.

The fact of the matter is that the contexts in which Giles advances the propositio magistralis in the commentary on the Sentences provide little indication, one way or another, as to whether he was actually defending the Socratic Paradox or not. When it is mentioned at distinction 17, for instance, Giles is asking whether an act of love is elicited in us directly by God or through a mediating habit. In the course of showing that such a medium is needed, he draws a comparison between the will and the intellect, arguing that they are disanalogous to the extent that the intellect requires the intelligible species, along with the “light of reason” (lumen rationis), to reduce it to act. The will, on the other hand, does not require a species of its own to act. Rather, it relies on the intelligible species as present in the intellect. Because the two powers have one and the same medium, that of the intellect, it follows that there cannot be malice in the will unless there is an error in the reason. In other words, the propositio magistralis follows from the connection of the two powers in the intelligible species.5 Interestingly, this is the only apparent argument Giles gives for the magisterial proposition.

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5 Giles of Rome, Sent I, d. 17, p. 1, q. 1: “Ut autem hoc apparet sciendum: quod in intellectu est duplex medium in intelligendo: unum est species intellectum informans, et aliud est lumen rationis quod intellectum confortat; quod lumen Philosophus appellat intellectum agentem. Iste autem medio quod est species ex parte affective non respondet medium, quia per illam eandem speciem per quam intellectus moveretur ad intelligendum voluntas inclinatur ad volendum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod non est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error in ratione propter connexionem intellectus ad appetitum. Unum igitur et idem est...
At distinction 47 Giles is asking whether anything happens contrary to (praeter) the divine will. He concludes that everything evil that happens is thus contrary. He explains that the human will can only be motivated by the good or the apparent good. He is expressing, in other words, the received opinion, held by all medieval thinkers until Ockham, that evil is beyond the scope of the will. Therefore, when rational agents commit a wrong action, this is because they are mistaking it for a good one. In this context Giles suggests that there cannot be malice in the will unless there is error or some form of ignorance (nescientia) in the intellect. The context here is admittedly more directly related to the issue of incontinent behaviour than at distinction 17. Even so, the text does not make it altogether clear that Giles is defending the Socratic Paradox, that is, the view that all wrongdoing is caused by ignorance.

Now the fact that Henry of Ghent conceded a thesis that seemed to be directly opposed to the deeply voluntaristic syllabus of condemned articles – a syllabus that he himself had helped to draft – meant, of course, that he clearly did not regard the propositio magistralis as by definition an intellectualist thesis. Henry's

tale medium quod est primo et per se medium in actu intellectus et ex consequenti in actu voluntatis” (Venice ed. 1581, fol. 89vL-M).

6 Ibid., Sent. I, d. 47, p. 2, q. 1: “Respondeo dicendum quod quicquid voluntatem movet semper est bonum vel simpliciter vel secundum apparentiam, quia secundum Philosophum, tertio De anima, quod est motivum appetitus non refert utrum sit bonum vel apparentis bonum. Et quia si non apprehenditur aliquid sub ratione boni non potest movere voluntatem, numquam est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error vel saltem aliqua nescentia in ratione. Unde tertio Ethicorum scribitur quod omnis malus ignorans. Nam secundum Dionysium, quarto EDivinis nominibus, nullus aspiciens ad malum facit quod facit, quia secundum eum semper malum est praeter voluntatem et praeter intentionem. Unde nec habet finem neque principium” (Venice ed. 1521, fol. 237G).
adversaries did not share this belief, however, and accordingly called upon him to demonstrate that he had not in fact contradicted himself in 1277. He would be required, in other words, to show that the syllabus and the magisterial proposition were not, despite appearances, incommensurable.

The historical circumstances surrounding Giles of Rome's early approach to the Socratic Paradox, then, furnished the occasion for the debate over the sources of sin in the late thirteenth century. Still, it would be fair to say that Henry of Ghent, who was mainly reacting to the teachings of Aquinas, was the driving force behind the development of the debate, and almost certainly a source for Giles's own resolution of the problem. If this is true, as we will establish, then Giles of Rome's attitude to the Socratic Paradox in the Quodlibetal Questions will only be comprehensible in light of Henry's attempts to reconcile the propositio magistralis with the Parisian condemnations. To achieve clarification on Giles's mature view of the matter will therefore require some preliminary remarks. It is hoped that a discussion of the historical and philosophical background to Giles's own theory will serve to provide a context in which to evaluate it correctly.

2.1. The Background: Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Condemnation of 1277

Among the 219 propositions condemned as contrary to the faith by Stephen Tempier in 1277, two in particular concerned the Socratic Paradox, at least as the scholastics construed it. Framed in its ancient context, the issue was whether human agents can act akratically, that is, can act against their own better
judgement. Socrates, of course, famously held that they could not. He thought that it would be “strange if such a fine thing as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) were nothing other than a slave that could be dragged about by all the other affections” (Protagoras 352B). He concluded that if the immoral person knew better, he would do better. All wrongdoing is therefore, according to Socrates, the result of ignorance (Protagoras 352 A-358D; Meno 77C-79D; Gorgias 468A-469A).

Aristotle held a rather more equivocal view of moral weakness (ἀμαρτία). Accordingly, little consensus has been achieved over whether he was in fundamental agreement with the Socratic position or not. Scholars divide into two camps over this issue. First, there are those who claim that, as one recent exegete has put it, “Aristotle manages to find an explanation of moral weakness that disturbs the Socratic position as little as possible.”7 We may call this the traditional interpretation.8 On this reading, Aristotle rejects the possibility that rational agents can act akratically, arguing that seemingly weak-willed actions are ultimately due to ignorance at some level.9 An alternative reading attributes to Aristotle acceptance

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of the possibility that rational agents can indeed act against their own better judgement. The latter should be considered the minority view.\textsuperscript{10}

A detailed treatment of the modern debate over whether Aristotle ultimately endorsed the Socratic position is beyond the scope of the present study.\textsuperscript{11} Our aim will therefore be to present the so-called traditional interpretation, or a version of it, in as generic a way as possible to serve as a background to the medieval debate. This will suffice for our purposes since our immediate concern has less to do with the historical Aristotle than with how the medievals received him.

A useful way to approach Aristotle’s theory of \(\alpha\nu\xi\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha\) is to appreciate the distinction he draws between the two most common conditions of the soul that lead to wrongdoing. One of these is, of course, moral weakness, and the other is intemperance (\(\alpha\nu\omega\lambda\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha\)). The akratic or morally weak man has correct principles, but his emotions are improperly adjusted. The intemperate, by contrast, has altogether wrong principles in addition to possessing irrational, incorrectly adjusted emotions. Now whereas both perform actions that are contrary to reason, the intemperate acts in accordance with his perverse principles while the akratic does not (NE 1150b29-1151a28).

The foregoing suggests that the intemperate man acts from choice (\(\pi\rho\omega\alpha\iota\iota\gamma\sigma\omega\iota\iota\)), defined as the desire for what reason has determined to be good (NE

\textsuperscript{10} Cf. D. Charles, \textit{Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action} (London, 1984), 146; N. Dahl, \textit{Practical Reason, Aristotle and Weakness of Will} (Minneapolis, 1984), 218.\textsuperscript{.}
The akratic man, by contrast, holds correct principles but fails to apply them to the particular situation in which he finds himself. He therefore acts against his choice (NE 1151a5-7). The traditional explanation for this occurrence is that something throws the akratic’s deliberations off course. The cause of such interference is generally held to be passion, which leads to a sort of temporary ignorance. There is therefore a sense in which the akratic man does wrong due to ignorance, on Aristotle’s account, yet also knowingly since he acts against his choice or purpose.

Now to understand exactly how passion derails the process of choice we need to understand how reason is put at the disposal of human action. Deliberate actions, according to Aristotle, are ordinarily preceded by a practical syllogism containing three premises. The major premise asserts some abstract judgement of value, arrived at by deliberation, and the minor describes the concrete facts of the particular situation in which the agent finds himself. When desire is present and the premises are connected, according to Aristotle, action follows necessarily and immediately as the conclusion of the syllogism (NE 1113a31-32; 1114a33-b22; 1147a25-31).

Now as regards akratic action, Aristotle seems to agree with Socrates that all wrongdoing is the result of ignorance at some level. Yet he also recognizes the difficulty associated with claiming that rational agents never do wrong knowingly, stating that such a denial seems to be “glaringly inconsistent with the observed

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11 For a useful summary of the details of the debate, cf. R. Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in
facts” (NE 1145b31-32). He solves this dilemma by arguing that the weak-willed person deliberates differently from well-adjusted moral agent.

Instead of employing a single value judgement as his major premise, the akratic's desires lead him to insert an additional universal premise. One premise asserts that the object in question is pleasurable, and the other that it should be avoided. The minor premise, as is the case with ordinary practical reasoning, is taken from sense perception and is therefore subject to the passions of the body. It asserts that the pleasurable object is available to the agent. Now since the akratic person has a desire for such objects, his passion leads him to attend to the pleasurable aspect of the object and to ignore the value judgement forbidding it. This causes the incontinent to conclude that the object in question should be pursued. Action, in turn, follows (NE 1147a24-1147b5).

There is a sense, then, in which ἀκρανία is the result of ignorance since passion interferes with the minor premise, throwing rational deliberation off track. On the other hand, because the akratic suffers post-factum regret, passion cannot have completely deprived him of knowledge of what is universally good. In a sense, then, the akratic can be said both to act against his knowledge, and out of ignorance. In the final analysis, Aristotle is in fundamental agreement with Socrates that the incontinent's universal, moral values are not affected by passion; rather, only his particular knowledge is so affected (NE 1147b15-17).
In general terms, the Aristotelian view can be detected in the medieval intellectualist notion that the will can never act against a correct, particular judgement of practical reason.12 Because the will is the rational appetite, an appetite for the good as apprehended by reason, it necessarily follows where the intellect leads it. When the will does desire the opposite of right reason, this is because of an antecedent error in practical deliberation. All wrongdoing, in short, is a result of ignorance. Pre-condemnation intellectualists such as Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas notoriously defended, or were taken to defend this position.13

In 1277 Stephen Tempier and his commission of theologians condemned as contrary to the faith the intellectualist view that the will necessarily follows the intellect and is therefore incapable of acting out of malice. Articles 129 and 130, in particular, reflect this clear opposition to the notion that rational agents never do wrong knowingly or deliberately.14 Specifically, these articles reject the intellectualist view “that the will, while desire and particular knowledge remain in act, cannot act contrary to that knowledge,” and “that if reason is correct, then the will is correct.”15

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13 Siger of Brabant, De necessitate et contingentia causarum. (Duin ed., PM 3, 12). For a detailed account of Siger’s theory of the will, see C.J. Ryan’s “Man’s Free Will in the Works of Siger of Brabant,” MS 45 (1983), 155-199; also A. Maurer, “Siger of Brabant’s De Necessitate et Contingentia Causarum and Ms Peterhouse 152” MS 14 (1952), 50-52. For Aquinas’s view, see ST I-II, q. 19, a. 5, corp.
14 Cf. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles, 257-60; 262.
15 “(129) Quod voluntas manente passione et scientia particulari in actu non potest agere contra eam”; “(130) Quod, si ratio recta, et voluntas recta. — Error; quia contra glossam
We have it on the testimony of Godfrey of Fontaines that Aquinas was implicated, in the minds of many contemporaries, with articles 129 and 130. This fact is corroborated by John of Naples who, in 1315/16, was still defending Thomas from his putative association with the condemnations of 1277. John informs us that article 129 in particular was thought to be reminiscent of Aquinas's discussion of moral weakness in STI-II q. 77, a 2.

In the abovementioned text, Aquinas is discussing whether reason can be overcome by passion against its knowledge (scientia). As in De malo q. 3, a 2, Thomas follows the traditional Aristotelian view, presented above, that the incontinent reasons in syllogisms that consist of four propositions (propositiones) rather than the usual three. Specifically, the incontinent employs two universal propositions, one which is derived from reason, e.g., that 'No fornication is lawful' and another that comes from passion, asserting that 'Pleasure is to be pursued.'

Augustini super illud psalmi: 'Concupivit anima mea desiderare,' etc., et quia secundum hoc, ad rectitudinem voluntatis non esset necessaria gratia, sed scientia solum, quod est error Pelagii.” (Piché ed., La condamnation parisienne, 118).

16 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quadr. XII, q. 5: “Item in dictis articulis continentur hi: quod voluntas manente passione et scientia particuli in actu non potest agere contra eam; error. Item si ration recta et voluntas recta; error. […] Sunt etiam in detrimentum non modicum doctrinae studentibus perutilis reverendissimi et excellentissimi doctoris, scilicet Fratris Thomae, quae ex praeditis articulis minus iuste aliquiliter diffamatur” (Hoffmans ed., V, 102). See also, L. Bianchi, Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e l'evoluzione dell'aristotelismo scolastico (Bergamo, 1990), 168-169; R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles, 257-263; Hocedez, “La condannation de Gilles de Rome,” RTAM 4 (1932), 34; and J. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277,” Mod. Sch. 72 (1995), 257-260.

17 This is contained in John's “Quaestio Magistri Ioannis de Neapoli O. Pr. 'Utrum licite possit doceri Parisius doctrina fratris Thomae quantum ad omnes conclusiones eius' hic primum in lucem edita,” by C. Jellouschek, in Xenia Thomistica, 3 vols. (Rome, 1925), 3, 73-104. See also R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles, 262 and J. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277,” 259.
The third and fourth propositions consist of a minor premise, and a conclusion. Now because passion is quite strongly present in the incontinent, it "binds the reason so that it cannot deduce (assumat) and conclude under the first proposition; with the result that as long as the passion lasts, reason deduces and concludes under the second."19

In De malo q. 3, a. 2, where he is addressing the same question, Aquinas clarifies his position. Here, he makes it clear that the incontinent sins from an ignorance of the correct minor premise.20 In this respect Aquinas follows Aristotle's apparent view that ignorance of the minor premise is what accounts for moral weakness. Thomas's fidelity to Aristotle on this matter would explain why he might have been implicated by article 129.

A striking feature of ST I-II, q. 77, a. 2 is the inclusion of what appears to be a proto-version of the propositio magistralis. Here Aquinas concedes that Socrates was "somewhat correct" (aliqualiter recte) to regard sin as a kind of ignorance. Because the will can only desire the good, real or apparent, Aquinas claims that when it is moved to something evil, this must be due to the object appearing good in some form or another. The result, Aquinas remarks, is that "the will would

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19 ST I-II, q. 77, a. 2, ad. 4: "...ille qui habet scientiam in universali, propter passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad conclusionem pervenire; sed assumit sub alia universalis, quam suggerit inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde Philosophus dicit in VII Eth., quod syllogismus incontinentis habet quatuor propositiones, duas universales: quaram una est rationis, puta nullam fationem esse committendam; alia est passionis, puta delectionem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima; unde ea durante, assumit et concludit sub secunda."
never tend toward the bad unless there were some error or lack of knowledge in the reason.”

This, of course, is very close in phrasing of the *propositio magistralis*:

**AQUINAS**  
*ST* I-II, q. 77, a. 2, corp.

**GILES OF ROME**  
*In Sent.* I, d. 47, p. 2, q. 1

Voluntas numquam in malum tenderet, nisi sit aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis.  
Numquam est malitia in voluntate, nisi sit error vel saltem aliqua nescientia in ratione.

Yet Aquinas was hardly an extreme intellectualist on the question of moral weakness. First, as we will see presently, the claim that there is never any malice in the will unless there is error in the intellect need not be taken as an intellectualist thesis, for it does not have to signify that ignorance is the cause of malice. Rather, it can mean that ignorance is merely *associated* with malice, that is, that error always accompanies sin.

Second, although Aquinas endorses the claim that the will always follows reason, he also maintains that rational agents can sin from deliberate malice (*ex certa malitia*), that is, knowingly or on purpose. This occurs when a perverse will desires some apparent good, such as pleasure or wealth, more than it does what is really perfective of the self.  

Although Aquinas does not say so expressly, it

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20 *De malo*, q. 3, a. 6, ad. 7. For a useful discussion of this text, along with *ST* I-II, q. 77, a. 2, see Saarinen, *Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought*, 121-125.

21 *ST* I-II, q. 77, a. 2, corp: “...opinio Socratis fuit, ut Philosophus dicit in VII Eth., quod scientia nunquam posset superari a passione. Unde ponebat omnes virtutes esse scientias, et omnia peccata esse ignorantias. In quo quidem aliquiliter recte sapiebat. Quia cum voluntas sit bona vel apparentis boni, nunquam voluntas in malum moveretur, nisi id quod non est bonum, aliquiliter rationi bonum appareat; et propter hoc voluntas nunquam in malum tenderet, nisi cum aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis.”

22 Ibid., q. 78, a. 1, corp: “...quando aliqua inordinata voluntas aliquod bonum temporale plus amat, puta divitias vel voluptatem, quam ordinem rationis vel legis divinae, vel caritatem Dei, vel aliquid huiusmodi, sequitur quod velit dispendium pati in aliquo
would appear to follow from this particular teaching that the will can choose the lesser object over the superior. Clearly this is a very Augustinian account of wrongdoing. Unsurprisingly, John of Naples would later use this very claim to defend Aquinas against detractors who viewed him as a defender of the Socratic Paradox.

Finally, it has been observed that Thomas, in contrast to Aristotle, regards the incontinent, qua incontinent, as having the ability to act in accordance with his choice. Because the will can only desire an object sub ratione boni, it follows that when rational agents make a bad decision, the object of the choice must have been regarded as somehow good. Passion, on Thomas’s account, does not merely hinder the recognition that the act in question is bad. It actually produces the mistaken belief that the action is good, permitting the akратic to choose it. On such an account, incontinence resembles vice, albeit a “transitory” one.

The foregoing teaching represents a divergence from Aristotle’s own theory of akратic behavior, and indeed from that of any pure intellectualist. Granted that there are difficulties associated with interpreting Aristotle’s theory of incontinen-
tinence, it is quite clear that, on this point anyway, he does not draw the same conclusion as Aquinas. Rather, he maintains that the incontinent acts against his choice or purpose, which is precisely why he said to suffer post factum regret. The source of this divergence between Thomas and Aristotle has been attributed to the fact that the former accords a role to the will in every human act, while the latter does not. For Aristotle, action can spring directly from passion, whereas for Thomas all human action springs from the will. Aquinas, then, was hardly an extreme intellectualist on the question of the sources of sin.

That rational agents can sin from deliberate malice, and that the incontinent chooses the act that he does are positions that would have been perfectly acceptable to any voluntarist of the period. On the other hand, as we have just seen, Thomas frequently emphasized the intellectualist notion that the will always follows what is firmly held by reason. His endorsement of the latter position would explain, of course, why articles 129 and 130 of the condemnations were often associated with his teachings.

2.2. Henry of Ghent and the Propositio Magistralis

It is now generally recognized that Henry of Ghent had a profound influence on the condemnations of 1277, providing a source for several of the condemned

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26 EN 1146b22-24, 1148a9-10, 1151a5-7.
28 ST I-II, q. 77, a.1, corp: “Unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi, et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est semper sequi iudicium racionis.” (Ottawa ed., 1136a; the Leonine edition excludes *semper* citing it only as a variant reading – Leonine ed., VII, 61).
articles, and particularly those concerning the will. This should come as no surprise, given that Henry was one of the sixteen theologians who helped to draft Tempier’s syllabus. Articles 129 and 130, then, almost certainly had their source in Henry’s first set of Quodlibetal Questions, dated by dated by Gómez Caffarena to Christmas 1276.

Henry of Ghent’s main goal in Quodlibet I, qqs. 16 and 17, is to demonstrate, against intellectualist explanations for incontinence, that rational agents can in fact sin voluntarily. He attempts to show that if there is ignorance involved in sin, then it nonetheless amounts to a voluntary ignorance. He regards the claim that rational agents can sin deliberately as crucial, since it is the only philosophical position that can make sense of Catholic teaching on Adam’s sin. According to Henry, if the intellectualist teaching is correct then it would have been impossible for Adam to have fallen from grace, since his intellect would have been in a state of rectitude, error being a punishment for sin. Thus, if the will always follows right reason, Adam, whose intellect was in a state of complete rectitude prior to the fall, would not have sinned. In short, man has to be able to act against right reason, according to Henry, in order to account for original sin and therefore the need for grace.

30 Henry explicitly tells us that he was involved in the Parisian condemnations in his Quod. II, q. 9: “In hoc concordabant omnes magistri theologiae congregati super hoc, quorum ego eram unus” (Wielocks ed., VI, 67).
31 José Gómez Caffarena, Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante (Rome, 1958), 270.
32 Henry of Ghent, Quod. I, q. 17: “...homo in statu innocentiae ante peccatum per judicium rationis fuerit in certa et determinata scientia agendorum, nec potuerit errare
Furthermore, although our post-lapsarian freedom (libertas) has been weakened by sin, nonetheless our wills are in essence the same powers now as they were in the state of innocence since our specific nature is the same. If Adam could act against his own better judgement and sin deliberately in the state of innocence, Henry argues, then so can we.33

Henry additionally accuses those who argue that the will always follows the conclusion of practical deliberation, as Thomas does, of reducing the will to the level of the animal appetite. For just as the sense appetite is compelled by the desirable object, so if the will cannot act against the intellect it will be no freer than the animal appetite. Nor can intellectualists escape this dilemma and account for freedom by arguing that, although the will follows the intellect, nonetheless the intellect itself is free since it can deliberate about alternative possibilities. On Henry’s account, the intellect is not in fact free since it is compelled by the truth. When it does possess the freedom to consider alternative possibilities, it derives this contingency from the will.34

33 Ibid: “Quod ex eo maxime patet, quod eadem erat natura liberis arbitrii hominis in statu innocentiae et modo. Licet enim libertas eis per peccatum modo sit debilitata, hoc nihil facit ad variationem naturae speciei” (Macken ed., V, 128).
34 Ibid., q. 16: “Unde et si proprie et stricte velimus loqui de electionis libertate, ipsa in sola voluntate est et nullo modo in ratione, nisi quatenus libere movetur ad diversa
Freedom of choice (libertas electionis), then, belongs exclusively to the will according to Henry of Ghent. When two objects are proposed to it by the intellect, it is the will alone that is responsible for choosing one good over another, and indeed for choosing, if it so desires, the inferior good over the superior. Henry accepts the Aristotelian view that the will always desires the good, real or apparent. He is not willing to concede, however, the intellectualist claim that the will always desires the good that is more perfective of the self. Since the will has an innate freedom and is its own cause, it can choose the apparent good over the real good entirely at its own discretion.35

Given such views, it is not difficult to see how articles 129 and 130 came to be included on Tempier’s syllabus. In Quodlibet I, q. 16, Henry of Ghent provides a theoretical model to explain the manner in which the will is capable of acting against right reason. This clearly represents an effort to preserve the freedom of the will from the psychological determinism of Aristotelian and Thomistic models of practical reasoning. Since Henry was a member of the commission responsible

investiganda, a voluntate. Ratio enim cognitiva inquantum huismodi, libera non est. Necessario enim movetur simplicibus apprehensis nec est in eius potestate ea non apprehendere, similiter nec connexioni primorum principiorum per se notorum neque connexioni conclusionum non assentire, quia si conclusio apparent ei medio necessario, assentit de necessitate, si medio apparenti, valde de necessitate assentit opinando, si debilitet apparenti, necessario assentit dubitando, nisi sit medium probabilis in contrarium, ut omnis sententia rationis de connexo necessitate syllogistica concludatur” (Macken ed., V, 107-08).

35 Ibid: “Et ex tali principio defectivo potest, malo et bono proposito, praecelgere malum, sub ratione tamen aliquus apparentis boni (quia nihil omnino potest eligere, sive bona sive mala electione, neque omnino velle, nisi sub ratione alius boni), et maiori bono et minori proposito, praeeclere minus bonum, et aequalibus bonis propositis alterum praefere eo modo quo in exemplo Augustini duorum aequaliter dispositorum unus potest idem eis propositum eligere, alter vero respuere” (Macken ed., V, 110).
for drawing up the list of condemned theses, it may be inferred that articles 129 and 130 had their source in this very *Quodlibet*, disputed as it was just a few months prior to the condemnations.

In the same year, Henry was called upon to serve on another commission: that which Tempier gathered together to investigate the teachings of Giles of Rome. Less than a month after he had issued the syllabus of March 7th, Tempier reassembled the very same theologians for the purpose of carrying out a doctrinal investigation of Giles's commentary on the *Sentences*.36 Just why it is that Giles of Rome, merely a Bachelor lecturing on the *Sentences* at the time, should have been singled out for special attention remains a matter for conjecture.37 What is certain is that Tempier, for one reason or another, took a very keen interest in the case

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36 John of Pouilly's *Quod* II, q. 11 is the source for this: "Idem magistri fuerunt assessores episcopi Stephani in condendo articulos et in concedendo predicam propositionem" (*Paris Nat. lat. 14565*, fol. 111Ra; *Paris Nat. lat. 15372*, fol. 54Rb; quoted in Wielockx, *Aegidii Romani Opera omnia* III. 1: *Apologia*, Firenze: 1985, 98 n.6).

37 Competing interpretations can be found for why Giles was targetted by the theological authorities. Hocedez contended that Giles himself provoked the investigation by teaching theses that appeared on the list of condemned Parisian articles, suggesting that he forced Tempier's hand in the matter. Wielockx, by contrast, argues that Tempier initiated the investigation against Giles. Since the condemnations of 1277 were directed principally against members of the Arts Faculty, the process against Giles, on Wielockx's account, was intended as a warning to members of the Theology Faculty. Thijssen, on the other hand, contends that Giles was likely either denounced by one of his colleagues or else the process against him was the result of a routine examination of the sort that was customary before the publication of a Bachelor's commentary on the *Sentences*. Cf. Hocedez, "La condamnation de Gilles de Rome," *RTAM* 4 (1932), 58; Wielockx, *Apologia*, 114-118; Thijssen, "1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome," *Viterium* 34 (1997), 100.
against Giles, for not only did he ask sixteen masters in the Faculty of Theology to investigate the latter’s commentary on the *Sentences*, but examined it himself.\(^{38}\)

That Tempier evaluated Giles’s commentary on the *Sentences* independently of, rather than in collaboration with, his commission, and indeed disregarded some of its findings, is attested by the fact that in at least one case the masters approved a proposition of Giles’s that Tempier, by contrast, found heretical.\(^{39}\) This, of course, is the infamous “proposition conceded by the masters,” or *propositio magistralis* (=PM), which appears in Wielockx’s edition of Giles’s *Apologia* as articles 24 and 51.\(^{40}\) The PM declares that “there is never any malice in the will unless there is some error in the reason” (*non est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error in ratione*).\(^{41}\)

For obvious reasons, Tempier regarded this as an intellectualist thesis that contravened the Parisian articles, and therefore included it as one of the *articuli* that Giles would have to retract if he wanted to be granted his license to teach. Since

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\(^{38}\) Honorius IV tells us that Tempier personally examined Giles Sentences in the letter of 1285 that he sent to the bishop of Paris asking that Giles’s case be re-opened. “Venerabili fratri...episcopo Parisiens. Licet dilectus filius frater Egidius Romanus de Ordine fratrum Heremitarum sancti Augustini olim Parisius vacans studio aliqua sicut intellexerimus dixerit et redegerit in scripturam, que bone memorie Stephanus Parisiensis episcopus predecessor tuus per se ipsum examinans, et per cancellarium Parisiensem ejus temporis ac per alios theologice facultatis magistros examinari faciens, censuit revocanda, et ea minime revocavit, quin potius variis rationibus nisius fuerit confirmare” (*CUP* 1: 633).


\(^{40}\) Tempier’s list of *articuli* are found in the margins of a single ms. that belonged to Godfrey of Fontaines (*Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. lat. 15848*). Wielockx’s edition is reconstructed from this manuscript.

\(^{41}\) The *propositio magistralis* can be found, as mentioned in n. 3 above, twice in Giles’s commentary on Book I of the *Sentences*, once at d. 17, p. 1, q. 1, fol. 89vM, and again, in a slightly different form, at d. 47, p. 2, q. 1, fol. 237rG. For various treatments of the PM, other than Wielockx, Thijszen and Hocedez, see Dumont, “Time, Contradiction and
Giles refused to retract any of his theses “even slightly” (minime), but instead chose to defend them, he was sent down from the university and denied his degree. He was finally rehabilitated eight years later owing to the intervention of Pope Honorius IV, finally becoming a master of theology in 1287.

There is a lack of consensus over exactly when the PM occurred. Hocedez, who was the first to examine the process against Giles, assumed that it was conceded at the 1285 meeting requested by Honorius.42 Wielockx, on the other hand, argues that it occurred at the original meeting called by Tempier, that is, sometime between March 7th and March 28th of 1277.43

It is fair to say that Wielockx’s general reconstruction of dates and events surrounding the process against Giles has gained wide acceptance in the literature.44 Recently, however, some of his theories have been challenged. Hödl, for one, has questioned Wielockx’s dating, and Thijssen his interpretation of events.45 We need not detain ourselves over these recent debates. It is sufficient,
for our purposes, that the PM was conceded sometime before Henry of Ghent's reconciliation of it with articles 129 and 130 in his Quodlibet X of Christmas 1286, a fact over which there is unanimous agreement. To achieve clarification on why Henry conceded the PM, we must return to his first Quodlibet, disputed, recall, just a few months prior to its approval, at least on Wielockx's dating.

In Quodlibet I, q. 17, Henry investigates the question of whether malice is caused by intellectual error, or vice versa.46 Granted that the wrongdoer is ignorant on some level by the time action occurs, Henry seeks to discover whether ignorance is the cause or rather the effect of a malicious will. His target in this particular Quodlibet is generally held to be Aquinas.47

Now according to Henry, some men hold that every disorder (deordinatio) of the will is the result of a disorder in the intellect. This is because, on their view, the action of the intellect always precedes and determines that of the will. The result is that when a particular judgement has been reached by practical reason, the will becomes "immobilized" (immobilitatur) to such an extent that, at the time at which the judgement stands, it cannot act against that which the intellect has "dictated"

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46 Henry of Ghent, Quad. I, q. 17: "utrum deordinatio voluntatis causetur a deordinatione rationis vel e converso" (Macken ed., V, 115).
(dictaverit) or determined to be best.\footnote{Cf. Kent, \textit{Virtues of the Will}, 178; Macken, \textit{"Henrich von Gent,"} 129-39.} When wrongdoing occurs, at least in the case of the weak willed as opposed to the intemperate person, this is because passion temporarily clouds reason's apprehension of the minor premise, causing it to err. Since the will always follows reason, an erring intellect, i.e., an intellect that has misjudged what is really perfective of the self, will cause a desire for what is perverse or harmful in the will.\footnote{Henry of Ghent, \textit{Quod I}, q. 17: \textit{\textquotedblleft Sed hic variatur opinio, quia deficit Philosophi determinatio. Opinio enim superius exposita et improbata dicit quod forma intellectus qua concipiatur bonum cognitum sub ratione veri, sic determinat et specificat motum voluntatis, ut per consilium finito iudicio et conclusa sententia rationis de agendis, pro puncto et hora qua stat eius iudicium, sive fuerit rectum sive erroneum, immittatur voluntas et immutabili necessitate astringitur ut non possit aliter velle aut eligere quam ratio dictaverit\textquotedblright} (Macken ed., V, 123).\footnote{Ibid. (Macken ed., V, 124).} On such a model of akratic action, reason stands between the will and the sense appetite.\footnote{\textit{\textquotedblleft Rationis autem deordinationem dicunt in incontinenti incipere a passione appetitus sensitivi qua obnubilatur et cadit a sua recta opinione in erroneam, quam necesse est sequi, ut dicunt, appetitum voluntatis, ut sic secundum eos ratio sit media inter duos appetitus, sensitivum scilicet et rationalem\textquotedblright} (Macken ed., V, 124).} The theory also implies that wrongdoers never act against their own better judgement. Rather, their wills become malicious as the result of intellectual error. To Henry's mind such a claim is, mistakenly, a reduction of Aristotle's theory to that of Socrates.\footnote{\textit{\textquotedblleft Sed hic variatur opinio, quia deficit Philosophi determinatio. Opinio enim superius exposita et improbata dicit quod forma intellectus qua concipiatur bonum cognitum sub ratione veri, sic determinat et specificat motum voluntatis, ut per consilium finito iudicio et conclusa sententia rationis de agendis, pro puncto et hora qua stat eius iudicium, sive fuerit rectum sive erroneum, immittatur voluntas et immutabili necessitate astringitur ut non possit aliter velle aut eligere quam ratio dictaverit\textquotedblright} (Macken ed., V, 123).\footnote{Ibid. (Macken ed., V, 124).} Henry wants to show that rational agents can in fact sin deliberately, and that even if there is ignorance involved, as Henry admits there is, then it is nonetheless a voluntary ignorance. He achieves this by arguing that if passion distorts the judgement of the intellect, this is only because the will has consented to such a perverse desire. Passion is not so strong, on
Henry's account, that it can cloud the reason all on its own. In contrast to his adversaries who argue that passion can obscure reason directly, Henry maintains that it does so only with the will's consent. In this way Henry makes the ignorance that always accompanies wrongdoing voluntary. On Henry's account, every erroneous act of the intellect causally proceeds, in the first instance, from a perverse affection in the will. When the will does consent to passion, the result is the corruption of a correct judgement of the intellect such that a perverse or irrational choice occurs. It is in this way that the will can be said to act against right reason.

It is important to note Henry's insistence that rational agents can only desire what they regard as good in one way or another. But does this not gainsay the notion that rational beings can sin voluntarily, that we can sin with the full knowledge that we are sinning? Is it not tantamount to admitting that human beings do in fact sin, after all, from a prior ignorance? In fact, Henry does concede that ignorance precedes the sinful act, denying that rational agents can sin with full knowledge that they are sinning. As might be expected, however, he makes an important qualification. In the case of the incontinent person, although the sinful

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52 Ibid: "Immo si deordinatio vitiosa fiat in voluntate, hoc est ex sua prava delectatione vel consensu in fruiione boni apparentis cum sensu, ut ipsamet sit prima causa suae deordinationis, sicut dictum est supra, non aliqua ignorantia vel deordinatio rationis" (Macken ed., V, 140).
act does in fact proceed from ignorance, it is Henry's contention that such ignorance was itself caused in the first instance by a perverse will.  

Henry concludes by arguing that the error of the reason and the malice of the will occur in fact at the same time (simul). Such a view might appear to contradict his earlier contention that the malice of the will is the cause of, and therefore temporally prior to, error in the intellect. According to this distinction, although the error of the intellect and the malice of the will occur simultaneously, the will nonetheless remains the cause of intellectual error. Henry will refine and elaborate on this distinction when he revisits the question of the sources of sin in *Quodlibet X*. It is to this disputation that we now turn our attention.

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53 Ibid: “Et omnis sic peccans est ignorans ignorantia quae precedit et est causa peccati sequentis; ipsa tamen sequitur aliud peccatum primae voluntatis malae” (Macken ed., V, 146); “Deceptio, inquit <Philosophus>, propter delectionem videtur fieri. Non enim existens bonum videtur. Desiderant igitur delectabile ut bonum. Hoc non est nobis contrarium sed continent nostrum intentum. Re vera propter delectionem fit deceptio, sed primo ex parte eius quod practicum est, deinde ex parte eius quod cognitivum est, ut dictum est. Et sic videtur penes cognitivam eis bonum quod non est bonum, et propter huiusmodi ignorantiam desiderant per voluntatem delectabile, ut circa ipsum in opere vel interiori vel exteriori compleant suum desiderium, cui in prima voluntatis deordinatione consentiebant, ex qua rationis deceptio est consecuta, ut dictum est. Vel potest dici quod cum dicit: propter delectionem fit deceptio, non stat ibi 'delectionem' solum pro delectione appetitus sensitivi, sed et voluntatis; propter voluntatis enim delectionem, qua condelectatur sensui et vincitur ut cadat in consensum delectandi vel delectabile exteriore perficiendi, decipitur ratio, ut videatur ei bonum quod non est bonum; propter quam deceptionem desiderant delectabile ut bonum, sicut dictum est” (Macken ed., V, 150).

54 Ibid: “Quod autem ex parte voluntatis qua debet homo esse practicus, prius deordinetur incontinentis (prius, dico, non duratione sed causalitate: simul enim fuit error rationis et deordinatio voluntatis), quam ex parte rationis qua debet homo esse sciens, aperte patet ex determinatione Philosophi, <cap. 7.> circa rationis deordinationem ex passione” (Macken ed., V, 147).
2.2. Henry of Ghent’s Reconciliation of the PM and Article 129

As early as 1276 Henry had made provision for incorporating intellectual error into wrongdoing without sacrificing the priority of the will. His *Quodlibet* I, q. 17 explains, accordingly, how he could have approved the *propositio magistralis* without seeing himself as having compromised the condemnations of 1277. For taken in its literal sense the PM does not have to mean that error is necessarily the cause of malice. Rather, it can assert that ignorance merely accompanies a deviant will. Since the simultaneity interpretation leaves room for viewing malice, and therefore the will, as the cause of error, the condemned articles can coexist with the PM.

Although Henry had provided, in his first *Quodlibet*, a framework for reconciling the *propositio magistralis* with the condemnations, he was nonetheless forced to revisit the issue ten years later. It is notable that he seldom disputes the topic of the will, much less the compatibility of the PM and the condemnations, in the interim. Accordingly, we may assume that Henry’s theories on the will went unchallenged during this period. In his *Quodlibet* IX of Lent 1286, however, we find Henry beginning to advance extensive *ex professo* arguments for the self-motion of the will and its ability to command the intellect.55 In the very next set of *Quodlibets*, disputed in Advent of 1286, Henry returns to the question of whether the PM and the condemnations are compatible after all, discussing it three

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separate times in three separate questions. He addresses the issue a final time in *Quodlibet XI* of Advent 1287. In every *Quodlibet* after 1286, with the exception of his last, Henry of Ghent discusses the topic of the will in one form or another.

How does one account for the advent of this sudden cluster of questions on the will in 1286? Why Henry's sudden interest, in particular, in the PM and the condemnations, events that occurred, according to some scholars, almost a decade earlier? If one assumes with Hocedez and Hõdl that the *propositio magistralis* was conceded in 1285, then Henry's interest in it in 1286 can be explained by its novelty. Still, this alone cannot account for his sudden interest in defending, in separate and self-contained *Quodlibets*, issues that were only indirectly related to the PM, such as the self-motion of the will and its ability to command the intellect. A more likely explanation is that, regardless of whether the PM was conceded in 1277 or 1285, Henry's revitalized interest in all questions concerning the will is the result of the appointments of Godfrey of Fontaines, a radical intellectualist, and Giles of Rome, a former pupil of Thomas Aquinas, to the theology faculty in 1285.

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56 Ibid., *Quod. X*, q. 9 (Macken ed., XIV, 245-48); q. 10 (Macken ed., XIV, 258-71); q. 13 (Macken ed., XIV, 286-91).
Although we do not have Godfrey's Quodlibets from the years 1285 to 1287, there is good reason to suspect that Henry's attempts in Quodlibet X to reconcile the PM and the condemnations are, at least partially, a result of Godfrey's criticisms. Indeed Godfrey will remark in a later Quodlibet that the PM and articles 129 and 130, as they stand, are contradictory, and therefore require reconciliation (concordent) and further explanation (exponendi). Since Henry of Ghent was one of the masters responsible both for compiling the syllabus of condemned articles and for approving the PM, it is not surprising that he should have been called upon to show how the two could be reconciled.


Godfrey's first four Quodlibets are either abridgements or students' reports. For a detailed discussion of this cf. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, xxviii.

Godfrey of Fontaines, Quod. VIII, q. 16: "Et hoc patet ex hoc quod ab omnibus doctoribus in theologica concessum est quod haec propositio est vera et tenenda secundum quod verba eius sonant et praetendunt, scilicet quod non est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error vel nescientia in ratione. Haec enim propositio non posset habere veritatem si contra iudicium rationis posset esse electio voluntatis. Proper quod etiam quidam articuli ab episcopo reprobati, ante approbationem tamen huius propositionis, qui videntur contrariar in ratione, sunt sic exponendi quod huic propositioni, prout fieri potest, concordent" (PB IV, 165-66). That this issue continued to attract attention well into the fourteenth century is attested by the fact that John of Poilly, a student of Godfrey's, remarks in his Quod. II, q. 11 of 1308 that unless articles 129 were explained, the sixteen masters who conceded the PM and drew up the syllabus of condemned articles would not merely have contradicted themselves, but would even have "incurred the punishment of excommunication": "Iadem magistri fuerunt assessores episcopi Stephani in conendo articulos et in concedendo praedictam propositionem. Et ideo cum praedicta magistralis propositio interimat articulum praedicto modo intellectum, si praedicto modo deboeret articulus intelligi, illi magistri sibi ipsi contradixissent, omnes etiam xvi magistri qui illam propositionem conceuerunt excommunicationis sententiam incurrerent, quae omnia non sunt dicenda" (quoted in Wielockx, Apologia, 79-80 and 98, n. 6). For a discussion and edition of John's Quod. II, q. 11 in its entirety, cf. L. Hödl, "Die Diskussion des Johannes de Polliaco," AHDLMA 66 (1999), 246-97.
One of the central goals of Henry's *Quodlibet X*, at least as regards the pertinent *quaestiones*, is to provide an interpretation of articles 129 and, to a lesser extent, 130 that will bring them into line with the *propositio magistralis* without implying that the latter reverses the former. In addition to Godfrey's criticisms, it is likely that Henry was responding to a contemporary intellectualist argument that attempted the use the PM in order to undermine the voluntarist nature of articles 129 and 130. The argument is *ad hominem*, and is expressed by an anonymous annotator of Henry's *Quodlibet X*. It is found in the margins of ms. *Vat. lat. 853* and proceeds as follows. The theologians who conceded the PM agree that it has nothing to say about the causal relationship between the intellect and the will. Now since the PM is posterior to the condemnations of 1277, and since it is improbable that "so many" (*tot*) theologians at Paris could have contradicted themselves by approving two incommensurable positions, the masters must now be leaving the causal relationship between the will and the intellect open to interpretation. That is, coming as it does *after* the condemnations, the annotator argues that the PM should now function as the norm of interpretation. Since the PM neither condemns the causality of the will over the intellect nor the opposite, and since it has to be compatible with the condemnations, it may further be assumed that articles 129 and 130 do not condemn the causality of the reason over

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the will nor vice versa. In short, the author of ms. *Vat. lat.* 853 argues that the existence of the PM must now mean that it is permissible to hold intellectualist theses regarding the Socratic Paradox. Henry, by contrast, needs to show that intellectualist interpretations of articles 129 and 130 are out of the question.

Now article 130 — "that if reason is correct, then the will is correct" — is less problematic than 129 because it can more easily be reconciled with the *propositio magistralis.* That is, since the PM does not take a stand on the causal relationship between the will and the intellect, but merely asserts something about their temporal relationship, one need only read this article without reference to causality to see that the two are commensurable.

Article 129 — "that the will, while desire and particular knowledge remain in act, cannot act contrary to that knowledge" — is rather more problematic since it admits of several complex temporal interpretations. Henry recognizes, for instance, that it can be read in either a composite or a divided sense. We need not detain ourselves with Henry's involved discussion of the various temporal interpretations of the articles. Cf. his "Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will," 581-591.

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43 *Ms. Vat. lat.* 853 (fol. 222): "Est etiam alia via solvendi ad predicta ex parte illius propositionis magistralis: non est malicia etc. quia cum fuisset illa propositio inter magistros discussa dictum fuit ex quo alii opinantur quod error intellectus oritur ab obliquacione voluntatis, aliqui autem e converso, et ista propositio neutrum dicit sed simultatem notat, in quo nulli contrariantur sibi invicem, concedatur vera prout iacet. Non est autem verisimile quod tot magistri in theologia reliquisserint utramque partem esse opinabilem si altera illarum fuisset contra articulum..." (quoted in Hocedez, "La condamnation de Gilles de Rome," 43).


meanings of article 129 since they play no role whatsoever in Giles's own
discussion of the Socratic Paradox.\textsuperscript{66} It is necessary, however, to say something
about its causal meaning.

As far as Henry is concerned, article 129 is unequivocal in its meaning of
the causal relationship between the will and the intellect. As might be expected –
and particularly in light of his views on the sources of sin expressed in \textit{Quodlibet} I –
Henry argues that the reason article 129 was included on the syllabus of 1277 was
to deny that an erroneous intellect can be the cause of a malicious will. This seems
to be a direct criticism of the intellectualist view expressed in \textit{Vat. lat.} 853. To
argue that intellectual error can be the cause of an error in the will is, according to
Henry, "entirely" (\textit{omnino}) against the spirit of the article, since if it were
interpreted in this way, then the "freedom of free decision" (\textit{libertas liberi arbitrii})
would be destroyed.\textsuperscript{67} Rather, the inclusion of article 129 was intended to uphold
the view that the malice of the will is the cause of the error or darkening (\textit{obscuration})
of the reason. This is because the intellect never precedes the will where
wrongdoing is concerned.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{66} For a detailed discussion of Henry's attempted reconciliation of article 169 and the
\textit{propositio magistralis}, see Dumont's "Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will," 581-
91. For a less extensive and slightly conflicting presentation of this issue in Henry, see
\textsuperscript{67} Henry of Ghent, \textit{Quod} X, q. 9: "Sed ponendo causalitatem semper in ratione, omnino
contrariantur articulo: propterena enim damnatus est ille articulus, quia sic daretur rationi
quod sic pro hora necessitaret et determinaret voluntatem ut ad errorem unius sequeretur
error alterius. Per hoc enim in tali actu tollitur libertas liberi arbitrii in eo, quod
non potest contraire" (Macken ed., XIV, 248).
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., q. 10: "Sic ergo stante ratione recta, pro hora in qua stat, potest voluntas ei
contrariari, et generari prius malitia in voluntate quam error in ratione proprie dictus
Now since the PM asserts that the malice of the will and the error of the intellect are simultaneous, whereas article 129 holds that malice is causally prior to an erring intellect, it might appear that the two positions are incommensurable after all. In order to reconcile the two, Henry devises a solution that has led to his being credited with providing the sources for the fourteenth-century theory of change known as "quasi-Aristotelianism". In order to account for how error and malice can exist in the same temporal instant while defending the latter's causal priority over the former, Henry posits dividing the temporal instant into two signs (signa) in the order of nature (secundum naturam/rem): prior and posterior. The prior sign is characterized by a malicious will, the latter by an erroneous intellect. When malice enters the will in the prior sign, it then clouds the reason, causing it to fall from rectitude. The posterior sign can therefore be characterized by an erroneous intellect. Because such a causal sequence happens in the same temporal instant,

\[ \text{generetur, ita quod nullo modo praecedat, neque ut causa propter quam sic, neque ut causa sine qua non... Sed ista malitia, sive fuerit peccati mortalis sive venalis, necessario est statim causa erroris aliquid sive obscurationis in ratione} \] (Macken ed., XIV, 259).

Dumont has traced the sources of this fourteenth-century view that contradictories can be true at the same instant of time to Henry's attempts to reconcile the PM and article 129. Cf. his "Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will in the Late Thirteenth Century," 561-97.

\[ \text{Henry of Ghent, Quod X, q. 13: "Sed non psycho sic intelligi articulum, propter praedictas auctoritates Psalmi et earum expositiones, ut voluntate agente contra scientiam per tempus praecedens omnino rectam absque omni obnubilatione, ipsa scientia maneat in apice illius rectitudinis in hora qua voluntas agit contrarium, sed quod ipsa maneat non corrupta contraria opinione, licet offuscat. Quam offuscationem, quia largo nomine secundum praedicta error potest dici, - nisi forte dicamus quod illud instans in quo primo est malitia in voluntate dividatur in duo signa, ita quod in posteriore sequatur aliqua obnubilatio rationis et in priore fiat malitia in voluntate, et simul in illo signo maneat recta ratio absque omni obscuratione, sicut et per totum tempus praecedens, quia ipsa non repugnat omnino voluntati contrariae nisi quatenus obscuratio rationis necessario sequitur malitiam voluntatis ut effectus suam per se causam, et sic articulus intelligatur quod} \]
the PM, which asserts the concomitance of error and malice, is satisfied. On the other hand, given that malice enters the will in the prior sign secundum naturam/rem, it can be said to cause right reason to be darkened in the posterior sign. In this way, article 129, in turn, is observed.

Henry's solution of the divided instant did not satisfy his adversaries, for well into the fourteenth century one can still find intellectualists such as John of Pouilly criticizing it. Even voluntarists such Gonsalvus of Spain were left unpersuaded by his theory. Henry did find an ally, however, in Giles of Rome.

2.3. Giles of Rome and the Socratic Paradox

Giles explicitly addresses the issue of the propositio magistralis, and the philosophical problems associated with it, twice in the Quodlibetal Questions: once in Quodlibet I, q. 19, and a second time in Quodlibet III, q. 16. The first has been dated to 1286, and

manente scientia in apice rectitudinis pro signo priore, sciens potest velle contrarium pro eodem signo, propositio vero magistrorum intelligatur quod si est malitia in voluntate, pro eodem instante, secundum rem, licet pro signo posteriori, est error in ratione, scilicet alicuius obscurationis causatae a malitia voluntatis, et sic aestimo intellexisse magistros nomine error quando in iudicabant quod illa propositio potest concedi sicut ictet: 'Non est malitia in voluntate, nisi sit error in ratione' (Macken ed., XIV, 288-89). See also Quod. X, q. 10 (Macken ed., XIV, 261).

71 John of Pouilly's Quod. II, q. 11, contains an extended attack on Henry's attempted reconciliation of the propositio magistralis and the condemnations. This has recently been edited by Hödl. Cf. his "Die Diskussion des Johannes de Polliaco über die Lehrentcheidung", 267-97.

72 As Kent observes, almost a generation after Henry, Gonsalvus of Spain was still relying on the condemnations of 1277 to justify the will's ability to act against the intellect. Curiously, however, he makes no attempt to reconcile this with the PM. Kent implies that this is because Gonsalvus was not convinced by Henry's solution. Cf. Virtues of the Will, 192-93.
the second to 1288. They claim to address the same question—whether there can be malice in the will without some error in the reason—but because there are differences between the two treatments, it will serve as a basis of comparison to discuss them in turn.

Giles's *Quodlibet* I, q. 19 represents an effort to address the question of whether there can be malice in the will with no error in the intellect, without making a firm commitment to either side of the issue. That is, instead of endorsing the view that error precedes malice, or vice versa, Giles merely argues for their concomitance without further interpretation. Referring specifically to the *propositio magistralis*, he writes:

> But when the *<Socratic Paradox>* was discussed at Paris, the Doctors there agreed that it was not necessary that there precede error in the intellect in order that there be malice in the will. They did concede, however, that some degree of blindness in the intellect always accompanies a malicious will.

Since Giles makes no reference whatever to article 129 in this context, much less to how the PM can be reconciled with it, his attitude in this particular disputation may be characterized by a certain reticence. This absence of candor has led to varying interpretations in the literature. San Cristóbal-Sebastián has argued that Giles's lack of commitment in *Quodlibet* I is merely a disguised attempt to defend an intellectualist reading of moral weakness. In fundamental agreement,

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73 Glorieux, *La litterature quodlibetique*, 141-143.
75 San Cristóbal-Sebastián, *Controversias acerca de la voluntad*, 139.
De Blic views the concomitance theory as Giles presents it as a "tentative, historically interesting mitigation of the intellectualist thesis." Putallaz, by contrast, sees Giles in this *Quodlibet* as "subtly underscoring the primacy of the will." A close examination of the textual evidence, however, supports neither of these interpretations. To the contrary, it suggests that Giles is being deliberately ambiguous in order to side-step, as it were, a delicate issue.

Consider, for instance, the terminology Giles uses to defend the concomitance theory. In order to illustrate the manner in which ignorance and malice are connected, Giles argues that "just as, when the tongue is corrupted, taste judges flavors poorly, so when the appetite (*appetitus*) is corrupted, the intellect judges what should be done poorly." The use of the generic term *appetitus* is significant. For if Giles is referring here to the corruption of the intellect by the *sense* appetite, then he is endorsing the Aristotelian, or intellectualist view of *akrasia*. If, on the other hand, it is the *rational* appetite, or the will, that Giles is arguing derails the intellect, then this is clearly the voluntarist view.

One might think that Giles settles the issue when he argues that "everyone experiences in himself that, whenever he is inflamed with lust, so his judgement is...

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76 De Blic, "L'intellectualisme moral chez deux aristotéliens," 63.
78 Giles of Rome, *Quod*. I, q. 19: "Respondeo dicendum ignorantiam intellectus aliquo modo connexam esse malitiae voluntatis. Nam sicut cum lingua est infecta, gustus male judicat de saporibus, sic infecto appetitu intellectus male iudicat de agendis..." (Louvain ed., 1646, 40).
In such a context, it is clearly the sense appetite to which Giles is referring. A little further on, however, Giles explicitly endorses, as do virtually all thinkers of the period, the Aristotelian idea that the end appears to the agent in a form that reflects to the sort of person he is. The appetite to which he is referring here, however, is explicitly the will, for "the type of will (voluntas) you have <determines> how the end appears to you and so it seems good to you." In this he departs from Aquinas who maintains that the sense appetite influences how the end appears to us.

Based on the foregoing ambiguities, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Giles was exercising considerable caution in this Quodlibet. This is understandable in light of the fact that when this question was disputed he had only recently been rehabilitated. It was, moreover, as yet unclear as to how the PM could be reconciled with the condemnations of 1277, if at all. Such a reconciliation would come with Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet X, disputed in 1286, the same year as Giles's Quodlibet I.

Two years later the situation had changed. When Giles addressed the Socratic Paradox for a second time in 1288 he now had Henry's theory of the divided

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79 Ibid: "...quilibet enim in seipso expieritur quod sicut aliquis in amore carnali afficitur, sic in judicio pervertatur" (Louvain ed., 1646, 40).
80 Ibid: "Propter hoc dictum est tertio Ethicorum, 'Quod qualis unusquisque est, talis ei finis esse videatur'; qualem emim linguam habes, talis videtur sapor; ut verbi gratia, si linguam habeas infectam cholera, quae est amara, omnis sapor videtur tibi amar s. Et sic etiam qualem habes voluntatem, talis videtur finis et tale videtur tibi bonum; ut verbi gratia, si habeas appetitum infectum concupiscencia videtur tibi quod omnino bonum sit uti veneres. Ergo coelestis intellectus et malitia voluntatis quandam connexionem habent" (Louvain ed. 1646, 40).
instant at his disposal. Accordingly, Giles’s *Quodlibet* III, q. 16 should be seen as a decisive effort to settle the problem of the Socratic Paradox in a way that will explicitly take into account both the *propositio magistralis* and the condemnations of 1277. The central question here is whether, assuming that ignorance and malice are always connected with respect to the immoral act, one precedes the other.

In his only objection to this question, Giles rehearses the intellectualist teaching on incontinence. According to intellectualists, because the will always requires an act of the intellect to reduce it to act, it follows that the intellect exerts a determining action on the will. According to this view, if there is no error in the intellect, neither can there be error in the will. It follows from this that any malice that exists in the will must be preceded by a mistake in the reason.82

Although the foregoing sketch appears to be a caricature of the intellectualist position, it adequately captures the teachings of thinkers such as Godfrey of Fontaines for whom the will is, in the first instance, a passive potency. In his *Quodlibet* VI, disputed the year after Giles’s *Quodlibet* III, Godfrey posited the following position. To argue that the will can determine the intellect is to reverse the relation between the two potencies.83 Because the will is a rational appetite it can only desire what is presented to it as somehow good. But this requires a prior act of the intellect. On Godfrey’s account, therefore, the condition (*conditio*) and

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81 See n. 25 above.
82 Giles of Rome, *Quod.* III, q. 16 (Louvain ed. 1646, 180).
83 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quod.* VI, q. 11: “Ergo cum per se et directe intellectus determinet voluntatem, non potest esse quod voluntas per se et directe determinet
worth (dignitas) of the object determine the value of the act. On such a view the error of the intellect is what determines, and therefore precedes, the malice of the will.

After rehearsing the intellectualist position Giles proceeds, in the sed contra, to cite articles 129 and 130 of Parisian condemnations. Given the scholastic practice of employing objections to capture the position one will argue against, and the sed contra as the authority for supporting one's own view, it may be inferred from Giles's procedure here that his intention is to endorse the voluntarist teaching on incontinence.

Giles follows Aristotle in claiming that ignorance is always associated with wrongdoing. As interpreted by the medievals such a notion is expressed in the claim, which Giles endorses, that only the good or the apparent good can move the will. On this view, when rational agents commit a wrong action, this is due to a bad object appearing as somehow good.

Now bad objects can appear good to us from one of two sources. First, they can appear good either from an error on the part of reason, or from

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intellectum. Hoc enim esset quidam circulus, nec esset ordo inter istas potentias et earum actus” (PB III, 221).
64 Ibid: “...ut secundum condicionem et dignitatem obiecti sit etiam condicio et dignitas actus” (PB III, 221).
65 Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 16: “In contrarium est quia articulus est...'si ratio est recta, et voluntas et recta.' Nam ut alius articulus dicit 'manente passione et scientia particulari in actu, potest voluntas non agere contra eam'” (Louvain ed., 1646, 180).
66 Ibid: “...bonum apprehensum sit motivum voluntatis...Si ergo voluntas sit mala, hoc est quia tendit in aliquid ut bonum quod non est nisi apparentis. Si ergo ex huiusmodi apparentia ista mala contingant, videamus, quid faciat nobis apparere aliquid” (Louvain ed., 1646, 180).
concupiscence (concupiscentia). In the first way, reason errs by presenting the objects in a false way, that is, by presenting them as good when they are not actually but only apparently so. Concupiscence, on the other hand, conforms us to the object, causing it to seem good to us. Now if you sin from reason "badly showing" (male ostendens), then Giles argues that you sin "due to ignorance" (per ignorantiam). If however, you sin from concupiscence badly fashioning you (male conformans) to a pleasurable object, then you sin "in ignorance" (ignorans).

Consequently, "whoever sins, sins either through ignorance or sins in ignorance, which is what the Philosopher seems to mean in Ethics III [1110b19-31]."87

Aristotle's distinction between acting "due to ignorance" and acting "in ignorance" forms part of his larger inquiry into the conditions of moral responsibility.88 In general terms, he defines voluntary (ἐκουσιον) or morally responsible behaviour as that which both has its source within the agent, and is performed knowingly (NE 1110a1-4). Involuntary actions, or actions for which one might be excused, on the other hand, include those that arise from compulsion, and those that arise from ignorance.

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Now not all types of actions that are associated with ignorance are involuntary (ἀξοντατον). Actions performed "due to ignorance" may be divided into two categories. If, although the agent was ignorant of the circumstances, the action subsequently causes him pain and regret, then his action was involuntary. If, however, although his action was due to ignorance yet he does not feel regret, then his action was done non-voluntarily or unwillingly, but not involuntarily (NE 1110b17-24). Actions performed in ignorance, by contrast, are described as those that arise not from ignorance, but from some other cause. But because the cause interferes with reason, as when someone is drunk or in a blind rage, the agent is said to act in a state of, although not due to ignorance (NE 1110b25-27).

Although Aristotle does not mention the Socratic Paradox in connection with his discussion of voluntary behavior in Book 3 of the Ethics, it is quite clear, as Hardie has pointed out, that Aristotle has it in mind. Recall that in Book 7, when discussing ἀγάθεια, Aristotle agreed with Socrates that ignorance of particulars, rather than ignorance of universal principles, is what accounts for moral weakness. In Book 3 he similarly explains that actions are excusable or considered involuntary when one is ignorant of the particular facts of the situation. One is not excused, however, if one is ignorant of the principles (NE 1110b28-1111a2). That is, an agent can be excused for killing his father if, intending merely to offer him a drink, he unwittingly serves him poison. One is not excused,

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89 Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 156.
however, if intending to kill one's father, one claims ignorance of the universal principle forbidding patricide.

Now based on Aristotle's definition of the involuntary, does it follow that he regards akratic actions as excusable? After all, the akratic appears, as we saw, to act from ignorance of particulars. Are the akratic's actions, then, similarly involuntary and therefore excusable? Although the akratic man does not act from choice but rather from passion, nonetheless he does, according to Aristotle, act voluntarily. On Aristotle's account, it would be absurd to think that we are not responsible when we act out of desire (NE 1111a24-1111b3). The akratic is therefore, although ignorant in some sense, responsible for his actions.

We should avoid jumping to the conclusion that Giles's association of ignorance and wrongdoing means that he is advocating an intellectualist position here. It is true that Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines argue that whenever we will anything, we do so under the aspect of the good. They also maintain that wrongdoing, for the most part, results from ignorance. But Henry of Ghent also concedes that rational agents always will sub ratione boni and that every sinner is an ignorant man. In and of itself, accordingly, the thesis that ignorance is always associated with malice was endorsed by every thinker who took Aristotle seriously. The real issue here is not whether ignorance is associated with malice, but whether it precedes malice. Giles admits that this is a "problematic" question (habet quandam

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90 Henry of Ghent, *Quod.* I, q. 16 (Macken ed., V, 114); I, 17 (Macken ed., V, 146).
difficultatem), which is presumably a reference to the difficulty of reconciling the PM with articles 129 and 130.91

Now if one sins "due to ignorance" (per ignorantiam), according to Giles, then clearly ignorance here has to precede malice.92 Because everyone who endorses Aristotelian moral psychology would agree with such a claim, Giles more or less passes over it without further justification. By far the majority of his attention is devoted to the sort of ignorance that occurs when one sins in ignorance, which he interprets as acting from concupiscence, for this is where he locates the problematic of the propositio magistralis.

Adverting to the PM, Giles argues that when agents sin in a state of ignorance the error involved seems to "accompany" (concomitare) malice. In this context, the ignorance of the akratic person does not precede his perverse will causing him to sin. Rather, ignorance and malice appear to happen at the same time. The weak-willed person may therefore be characterized as "one who sins while in a state of ignorance" (ignorans peccans), that is, someone who sins and is ignorant.93

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91 Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 16 (Louvain ed., 1646, 181).
92 Ibid: "...cum peccamus per ignorantiam certum est quod ignorantia in ratione praecedat malitiam in voluntate quia ratio quare peccamus est ignorantia. Sic stantibus ergo conditionibus ignorantia praecedet peccatum, sive malitiam" (Louvain ed. 1646, 182).
93 Putallaz, Insolente liberté, 251. Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 16: "Sed cum peccamus ignorantes, ignorantia videtur concomitari malitiam. Sic enim imaginamur quod peccans ignorans non ignoret in universali et quod ratio secundum se sit recta; obliquitatem autem, si quam habeat, habeat ex connexione ad appetitum" (Louvain ed. 1646, 182).
In order to account for how this can happen, Giles explicitly resorts to his theory of volitional self-motion as defended in *Quodlibet* III, q. 15. According to this theory, as we saw in the previous chapter, the will is able to determine itself in the sense that it can indirectly specify its own act. It has to do this since, according to Giles, the intellect is neutral with respect to judgments about the relative goodness of objects. The function of the intellect, therefore, at least as regards mixed goods, is to present them to the will in the first instance under both their aspects: good and bad. When the intellect apprehends fornication (*fornicatio*) as an object of potential interest to the will, for example, it considers it, in the first instance, as something that is both good and bad: good as pleasurable, and bad as immoral. It would consider fornication, in other words, under the description:

"fornication is an immoral pleasure."\(^94\)

Giles is in agreement with virtually all of his contemporaries, voluntarist and intellectualist alike, in insisting that the will can only choose an object that is regarded as somehow good.\(^95\) But since the intellect alone cannot determine value, according to Giles, it requires the direction of the will, otherwise both powers will remain in a state of neutrality with respect to the object. In order, accordingly, for

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\(^95\) Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 174-82.
the intellect to leave this state of indetermination and regard the object as either
good and therefore an object of volition, or bad and therefore an object of
nolition, the will has to determine it to give preference to one aspect over the
other. Once the will has determined the intellect to focus, say, on the good or
pleasurable aspect of sexual intercourse, an act of volition for this object follows in
the will. Should the will direct the intellect to give preference to the immoral
aspect, on the other hand, the intellect will present this object to the will under its
bad, or undesirable aspect, and hence it will be nilled. On such a theory, although
the intellect reduces the will to act as a proximate cause, the will itself is the
ultimate cause of specifying its own act. It is in this sense that it can be said to
determine itself.

This theory is rooted, to a large extent, in Giles's theory of command
(imperare), the ability of which belongs to the will. According to Giles, although the
intellect is necessary for articulating the desires of the will, it is the will that
ultimately has power (dominium) and command (imperium) over the other potencies
of the soul, the intellect included. Giles likens the relationship between the intellect
and the will in this context to that of an "advisor" (consiliarius) to a "king." Just as

96 Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 16: "Cum ergo ratio totam istam propositionem
apprehendit et cum voluntas fertur in hoc totum, ut patet ex quaestione praecedenti,
potest se determinare ut velit considerare alterum tantum. Cum enim intelligimus totam
hanc propositionem 'fornicatio est delectatio inordinata' consideramus fornicationem sub
duplici ratione. Sed voluntas potest se determinare ut velit considerare fornicationem sub
altera ratione tantum: potest enim desistere velle considerare fornicationem quia
inordinata, et insistere velle considerare ipsam quia delectabilis. Et cum hoc facit facile
allicitur. Si autem e contrario facit, abominatur. In potestate autem eius est facere hoc
an advisor articulates the wishes of the king, so too does the intellect articulate the desires of the will. The relationship can also, according to Giles, be viewed as that of a servant who carries a lamp (lucerna) before his master. In such a relationship the will relies on the intellect to illuminate the direction it wants to take. The intellect, however, proceeds only in the direction the will commands it.

The foregoing are very common voluntarist metaphors. They can be found, with minor variations, in thinkers such as Walter of Bruges, Henry of Ghent, and Richard of Middleton.

vel illud, potest enim esse magis facile vel magis difficile secundum quod magis vel minus consuevimus ad opera contraria” (Louvain ed., 1646, 182).

97 Giles of Rome, Sent. II, d. 24, q. 1, a.1: “Sed si dicatur quod imperare non est voluntas sed rationis, et quia cujus est imperare, eius est dominari. Ideo si imperare est rationis, dominari erit rationis. Dicemus quod formare verba imperii vel formare verba dominii est rationis, et est proferre huiusmodi verba intrinsecus est rationis quia nulla potentia animae format vel profert verba intrinsecas nisi intellectus vel ratio. Tamen hoc non obstante, imperare et dominari est voluntatis. Habebit enim se in hoc casu intellectus ad voluntatem sicut consiliarius ad regem. Consiliarius quidem sciens voluntatem regis secundum voluntatem illam potest formare et proferre verba imperii et dominii. Illud tamen imperium et dominium secundum quod verba proferuntur et formantur non est consiliarii sed regis. Et Rex dicitur esse Praeceptor et Imperator et Dominus non consiliarius” (Venice ed., 1681, 243).

98 Ibid: “Est enim consiliarius quidam serviens regi portans lucernam ante regem et ostendens sibi vias per quas debet rex incedere. Sic et intellectus est quidam serviens voluntati et portans lucernam ante voluntatem, iudicans de via hac vel de illa secundum quam debet incedere voluntas. Quo iudicio facto, remanet actio in voluntate ut eligat ex illo iudicio viam quam placet sibi. Imperium et dominium secundum se pertinent ad voluntatem, licet formare et proferre verba illius dominii vel imperii possint pertinere ad intellectum” (Venice ed., 1681, 243).

99 Cf. Walter of Bruges, Quaest. disp. VI: “Respondeo. Imperare est actus voluntatis eliciitum, rationis autem ut praecedentis voluntatis actum consultive, rationis vero actum quendam voluntatis sequentis est denominativi; et quia actus proprie est illius potentiae quae elicit illum, dico imperare est proprius actus voluntatis, non rationis. Ad cujus evidentiam nota quod, quia in agentibus mutuo unum agens imprimit suam virtutem in alio, contingit error aliquibus quod actum unius attribunt (1) ali ut e converso. Verbi gratia: Rex non imperat vel non dat mandata nisi prius habito consilio cum consiliariis suis; quidquid scitur regis exprimunt (2); rex vero, si vult sequi consilium sibi datum, factit statutum et praeipit praeposito ut statutum…” (PB X, 60). See Henry of Ghent, Quod. I,
As might be expected, Giles's theory of how the will determines the intellect, and thus indirectly determines itself, governs his account akratic behavior. For if the will determines the intellect with regard to specification, it stands to reason that when the intellect presents to the will a good that is merely apparent, this is because the will has commanded it to do so. Clearly then, it is not the case that ignorance causes the malice of the will in the first instance. Rather, according to Giles, it is the reverse, for "in the person who sins in ignorance, and not through ignorance, the corruption of the will precedes the deception of the reason; but the deception of reason precedes the carrying out of the deed."100

As we saw, when the intellect presents an apparent good to the will, it does so under the description of the immoral and the pleasurable. If the will is not attracted by the pleasurable aspect, it will command the intellect to describe the object as immoral. If the will is attracted to the pleasurable aspect, on the other

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14: "...quod dirigens superius est directo, dicendum quod est dirigens auctoritate, sicut dominus servum: ille est superior: sic voluntas dirigit intellectum; vel ministerialiter sicut servus dominum, praeterendo lucernam de nocte ne dominus offendat: tale dirigens est inferius et sic intellectus dirigit voluntatem, unde a dirigendo et intelligendo potest ipsum voluntas retrahere quando vult, sicut dominus servum" (Macken ed., V, 90). See also, Richard of Middleton, Quaest. disp: "Ratio ergo se habet ad voluntatem sicut serviens qui portat lucernam ante dominum suum...dominus imperat quod valeat quo vult...InteIIecus movet voluntatem ostendendo et suadendo; hoc non est proprle movere voluntatem, sed disponere ad motum voluntatis; sed voluntas movet seipsam per modum efficientis et intellectus per modum imperii" (Lottin ed., Psychologie et morale, I, 298).

100 Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 16: "In eo ergo qui peccat ignorans, et non per ignorantiam, infectio voluntatis praecedit deceptionem rationis, sed deceptive rationis praecedit perpetrationem operis" (Louvain ed., 1646, 182).
hand, it becomes corrupted, and once corrupted it infects the reason, causing it to err and view the object as good. 101

Now once the will has been corrupted, all would admit that it blinds \((\textit{excaecet})\) the reason. The crux of the matter is what sort of act \textit{precedes} such corruption. The intellectualist, of course, will respond that a prior error of the reason was the cause of the will’s corruption, while the voluntarist will assert that it is some sort of malice inherent in the will itself. Giles’s solution encapsulates the following distinction: if reason \textit{errs} with regard to moral principles, that is, if there is ignorance of the universal premise, then error clearly \textit{precedes} malice, with the result that the will “falls into sin \((\textit{ruat in peccatum})\).” However, if reason does \textit{not err} at the level of universal principles and offers the will the object under both its aspects – pleasurable and disordered – then the will is corrupted first and accounts for the deception of the reason.\textsuperscript{102} This picture of causal priority between the will

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid: “\textit{Et si in potestate eius est ut attendat circa fornicationem, vel quia delectabilis vel quia inordinata, in potestate eius est ut alliciatur ad fornicationem vel abhominetur eam. Et si allicitur, ipsa iam allecta et quasi infecta, infectit rationem, ut male iudicet circa fornicationem apprehensam ut scilicet iudicet fornicationem faciendam esse quae non est facienda. Infectio enim voluntatis pervertit iudicium rationis circa agilibia sicut infectio linguae pervertit iudicium eius iuxta gustabilia. Ergo in eo qui sic peccat, nisi praeecedet allectio et infectio in voluntate, non communicaretur deceptio rationis. Erit ergo in sic peccantibus hic ordo: ut prius ratio apprehendat aliquid sub duplici ratione, et hoc sine peccato non tamen sine periculo. Secundo voluntas determinet se ut velit desistere considerare de fornicatione sub hac ratione et insistere sub alia. Et prout voluntas se determinat, ratio sic exequitur ut voluntas vult, et sic considerat. Quo facto, voluntas allicitur vel abhominatur; et sic si alliciatur, allecta iudicium rationis pervertit. Quo perverso, progredimur in placitum opus. In eo ergo qui peccat ignorans, et non per ignorantiam, infectio voluntatis praecedit deceptionem rationis, sed deceptio rationis praecedit perpetrationem operis}” (Louvain ed., 1646, 182).

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.: “\textit{Sed de hoc quaecumque non est quia postquam iam infecta est, certum est quod infectio voluntatis excaecet rationem. Sed quaecumque est: antequam esset voluntas infecta, quid praecesserit? An error rationis? An malitia voluntatis? Respondetur si ratio ignoret in
and the intellect is consistent with the theory of self-motion presented in *Quodlibet* III, q. 15, as we saw in the previous chapter.

That malice causes error, then, is grounded in the claim that the will has control over the manner in which the intellect presents objects to the will. Interestingly, Giles gives no indication that the will has to be perverse in order for it to be attracted initially to the pleasurable aspect. It only becomes perverse after it has opted for the immoral over the moral, hence his use of the ablative absolute *voluntate infecta*. It may be inferred, therefore, that the will can choose one option over the other entirely at its own discretion, simply, as it were, from a spontaneous freedom prior to any goodness or malice as might exist in it, and certainly prior to any determination of the intellect.

Giles emphasizes the will’s independence from the intellect in his following *Quodlibet* III, q. 17. There he remarks that not only does the perversion of the will precede the error of the intellect when sinning “in ignorance”, but that the will can even act against the conclusions of a correct intellect. That is, when the intellect judges correctly that fornication is pleasurable but that it is also to be avoided, the will can still opt to pursue fornication, after which it corrupts the reason. Such a claim follows from the voluntarism of specification that he

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universali vel non ostendat de re quidquid est ostendendum, certum esse quod ex tali ignorantia possit sequi infectio voluntatis ut propter huiusmodi defectum ruat voluntas in peccatum. Sed si ratio non erret in universalis et sit solum intenta ad considerandum in re quae sint ea’ ut si ad considerandum de fornicatione dicat ratio quod licet sit delectabilis, sit tamen inordinata et contra mandatum Dei, oportet quod etsi non tempore saltem natura prius voluntas alliciatur per delectationem et sic infectiatur; et voluntate infecta sequatur deceptio rationis.” (Louvain ed., 1646, 183)
defended in his previous *Quodlibet*. At times Giles even makes the stronger claim that when reason judges absolutely (*simpliciter*) that something should not be done, the will is nonetheless able *simpliciter* to will that thing, “so that the judgment of reason is not the cause of the depraved will, but rather the reverse.”\(^{103}\) This last claim is very close to the views that contemporary voluntarists such as Henry of Ghent would have made for the freedom of the will.

According to Giles, then, the malice of the will both precedes and is the cause of error in the intellect where *peccans ignorans* is concerned. To this extent he is faithful to articles 129 and 130 of the Parisian condemnations. But Giles had also argued, recall, that the error of the intellect and the malice of the will were concomitant. How does he reconcile the two? Henry had appealed to a divided instant in order to account for how the malice of the will could be the cause of the error of the intellect while insisting that they occur simultaneously. According to Henry, although error and malice occur in the same temporal instant, the instant

\(^{103}\) Ibid., *Quod. III*, q. 17: “...quo ratio iudicat non agendum simpliciter potest velle voluntas simpliciter, ita quod iudicium pravum rationis non ist causa pravae voluntatis sed magis e converso. Intellectu enim non prave iudicante de fornicatione potest voluntas prave velle, semper enim ad malitiam voluntatis relinquitur aliqua caecitas in intellectu. Itaque hoc non potest esse quod alicuius sit malus et non sit ignorans. Concedimus tamen quod intellectu non ignorante et non existente caeco, possit voluntas prave velle, in quibus verbis non separamus caecitatem a malitia secundum esse, ut sit malitia sine caecitate sed secundum qualitatem, quia potest esse malitia absque eo quod sit a caecitate causata, sed magis sit caecitatis causa. Dicente enim intellectu quod fornicatio sit detectabilis tamen sit simpliciter fugienda, verum dicit. Voluntas tamen potest allici ex eo quod fornicatio sit detectabilis quia allecta infict rationem ut iudicet hanc fornicationem in particulari, prout est in hac materia detectabili esse faciendum quam iudicabat fugiendum. Hoc ergo modo potest voluntas prave facere, quod intellectus iudicat non faciendum, quia potest caecare rationem, quia potest se sic determinare ut alliciatur ab aliquo vomo sensibili apprehenso, quae allecta inficitur et infecta, inficit rationem, et eius pervertit iudicum” (Louvain ed., 1646, 180).
itself can be divided into prior and posterior signs "according to nature" (secundum naturam). In the prior sign, malice arises in the will alongside a correct intellect, while in the posterior sign the intellect, as the result of malice in the prior sign, falls away from rectitude.\textsuperscript{104}

Giles employs Henry's identical strategy to account for how articles 129 and 130 can be reconciled with the praposition magistralis. Although he mentions it only in passing, the presence of the divided instant is unmistakable in Quodlibet III, q. 16, when he remarks that, "if therefore, regarding sexual intercourse, reason dictates that although it is pleasurable, it is nonetheless immoral and against the command of God, it is necessary that, if not in time (tempore), at least in nature (natura), the will first be attracted by pleasure and therefore corrupted; and the deception of reason follows once the will has been corrupted."\textsuperscript{105}

Admittedly, this is a very superficial treatment of the divided instant. The reasons for this must remain a matter for conjecture. It is possible that Giles — like Gonsalvus of Spain and John of Pouilly — was not entirely convinced by Henry's account, yet was unable to produce a better explanation of how to reconcile the condemnations with the PM. Or perhaps Giles thought that Henry had said everything there was to say on the topic in the four disputations in which the latter had defended it. Whatever the case, it seems necessary to conclude from the textual evidence that Giles was indebted to Henry of Ghent for his own resolution of the Socratic Paradox.

\textsuperscript{104} Henry of Ghent, Quod. X, q. 10 (Macken ed., XIV, 261).
2.4. Concluding Remarks

Elements of Giles of Rome's presentation of the sources of sin unquestionably bear certain similarities to Aquinas. For instance Giles argues, in apparent agreement with Aquinas, that rational agents can only will what they regard as good, and that every wrongdoer is therefore ignorant on some level at the time that they do wrong. Giles further agrees with Aquinas that the akratic person acts in accordance with his choice, that is, that he chooses the act that he does. This is in contrast to Aristotle who sees the akratic as acting against his choice or purpose.

Having said this, we should avoid jumping to the conclusion that the foregoing are specifically Thomistic, or even intellectualist positions. Henry of Ghent himself, as we have seen, concedes them, as do Richard of Middleton and Walter of Bruges. This serves to illustrate that if the sources of Giles's theories on incontinence are derived from Aquinas, then such sources will have to established by demonstrating other points of contact.

But the similarities between Giles and Aquinas end here. Indeed in those instances where Giles does in fact part company with Aquinas, he tends to do so, as we have seen, in the direction of Henry of Ghent. In addition to his adoption of the divided instant, something that he clearly derived from Henry, Giles can be seen, for instance, to advance a voluntarist reading of the act of command. On

\(^{105}\) Giles of Rome, *Quod. III*, q. 16: (Louvain ed., 1646, 183). See n. 103 above.
Aquinas's account, command (imperare) is an "act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will."\textsuperscript{107} That is, although Aquinas regards the will as the first mover in the powers of the soul, he nonetheless argues that command is "essentially" (essentialiter) an act of the reason. For Henry of Ghent, by contrast, command is unqualifiedly an act of the will.\textsuperscript{108} As we saw in 2.3, Giles of Rome is in agreement with Henry on this matter. According to Giles, the will is likened to a king, the intellect to its advisor. The function of the latter is merely to articulate the desires of the former and follow its commands. In short, one can say that "command and control pertain intrinsically (secundum se) to the will, although to fashion and produce words of control or command can pertain to the intellect."\textsuperscript{109}

The foregoing interpretation of the act of command allows Giles to defend the will's ability to specify its own act. Indeed, it is because the will possesses such an ability that it can direct the intellect to focus on the good or bad aspect of any

\textsuperscript{106} See B. Kent, \textit{Virtues of the Will}, 175-82; 189-93. For further discussions on Richard's theory of the will, Cf. Hocedez, \textit{Richard de Middleton}, 212-222; and Lottin \textit{Psychologie et morale}, 1, 293-299.

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{ST} I-II, q. 17, a. 1, corp.

\textsuperscript{108} Henry of Ghent, \textit{Quod.}, IX, q. 6: "...dico quod, quantum est ex parte superioritatis, potius ponendum quod voluntatis est imperare, et intellectus et omnium aliarum potentiarum oboedire atque imperium voluntatis suscipere. Voluntas enim et velle contra dictamen rationis potest, et ipsum rationem cogere ut recedat a suo iudicio, et per hoc ipsum ad consentingiendum sibi, et omnes alias potientias suo imperio constringere..." (Macken ed., XIII, 142); "...nullo ergo modo pondendum est quod intellectus habet imperare voluntati, sed alterum eorum necessario habet alteri imperare, cuibus est imperare simpliciter. Simpliciter est ergo voluntatis imperare, non autem intellectus" (Macken ed., XIII, 149).

\textsuperscript{109} Giles of Rome, \textit{Sent.}, II, q. 1, p. 1, a.1: "Sic et intellectus est quidam serviens voluntati et portans lucernam ante voluntatem iudicans de via hac, vel de illa, secundum quam debet incedere voluntas. Quo iudicio facto, remanet actio in voluntate ut eligat ex illo iudicio viam quae placet sibi. Imperium et dominium secundum se pertinent ad voluntatem, licet
mixed object. When it commands the intellect to focus on the goodness of some merely apparent, pleasurable good such as fornication, a bad choice ensues. Therefore, although it is an intellectual error that allows the will to choose the pleasurable option by describing it as "good", nonetheless Giles, in strict agreement with Henry, insists that it is the malice of the will that causes the intellect to make this erroneous determination in the first place. And although malice and error occur simultaneously whenever rational agents do wrong, Giles insists, malice is nonetheless the cause of intellectual error.

It is true that Giles’s account of the freedom of the will in *Quodlibet III*, qqs. 15 and 16 differ somewhat from that of Henry. As we saw in the previous chapter, the freedom and self-determination of the will derives, according to Giles, from its ability to specify its own act. Once it has commanded the intellect to specify the object as good or bad, the will appears to follow the conclusion of the intellect. But since it is the will that causes the intellect, in the first instance, to determine the aspect under which the object is regarded, it can be said to determine itself, even if its final choice is necessitated. Henry holds a different account. The intellect, for him, merely makes recommendations to the will. If the will is upright or "earnest" (*voluntas studiosa*) then it will likely follow what right reason has determined to be best; if not, it will likely act against it.110 However, it is never

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necessitated to do either, owing to its intrinsic freedom to choose any option it likes.

While Giles's general account of how the will moves or determines itself differs in certain respects from Henry's theory, his understanding of the sources and dynamics of wrongdoing, on the other, is very similar. At times, for instance, he implies that once the intellect has concluded its deliberations, the will still retains the freedom to decide either in accordance with right reason or contrary to it. This is because "once a judgement (judicium) has been made, action remains on the part of the will to choose a way from that judgement that is pleasing to it." At other times, Giles does not merely imply that the will has the ability to act against right reason. Rather, he expressly argues that even when the intellect is in a state of complete rectitude and judges that something ought not to be done without qualification (simpliciter), the will still has the unqualified ability to choose it. 

Note that while Giles is broadly consistent with Henry of Ghent on the sources of sin, he is also faithful, to the extent that a scholastic philosopher can be, to Aristotle's theory of the dynamics of incontinence. Giles agrees with Aristotle, for instance, that the practical syllogism of the akratic person involves four

\[\textit{apparet. Talis est voluntas continentium, secundum quod dicitur VII\textsuperscript{o} Ethicorum...} \] (Macken ed., V, 108)

111 Giles of Rome, Sent. II, d. 24, par. 1, q. 1, a. 1: "...quo iudicio facto, remanet actio in voluntate ut eligat ex illo iudicio viam quae placet sibi" (Venice ed., 1581, 243).

112 Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 17: "Sed si loquiris de intellectu practico operabili, illud quod ratio judicat non agendum simpliciter potest velle voluntas simpliciter, ita quod
premises rather than three: two major premises – one asserting the pleasurable aspect of the object, the other that it is illicit – a minor premise and a conclusion. The chief difference between the two theories is that, on Aristotle's account, what permits practical deliberation to be derailed is the craving of the sense appetite for the pleasurable, albeit depraved, option. The result is that the intellect is led to attend to it more than the forbidden aspect, and hence a conclusion permitting the perverse object to be chosen ensues. For Giles, on the other hand, it is not the sense appetite, but the will, by its own innate freedom prior to any malice that directs the intellect to focus on the pleasurable aspect.

In summary, then, Giles of Rome's account of the Socratic Paradox contains more features in common with that of Henry of Ghent than Aquinas. All are in fundamental accord in arguing that there is ignorance associated with malice in akratic behavior and that the will can only desire what the intellect has described as good. Moreover, they all agree, in contrast to Aristotle, that the incontinent acts in accordance with his choice. On the other hand, Aquinas argues that incontinence has its origin in concupiscence. When the rational agent is overcome with passion, the intellect errs. Giles and Henry, on the other hand, argue that the source of akratic behavior is always the malice of the will. Granted that the wrongdoer is ignorant on some level, this is the result, not of passion, but of a perverse will directing the intellect to see the illicit act as good. Given such

judicium pravum rationis non sit causa pravae voluntatis, sed magis e converso..."  
(Louvain ed., 1646, 186).
similarities with Henry of Ghent the conclusion is inescapable that Giles is presenting a voluntarist account of incontinence in the mature works.
CHAPTER 3

THE PRIMACY OF THE WILL

In 1934, Jean Hoffmans brought to light a manuscript that should hold considerable interest to any student of late thirteenth-century philosophy.¹ Written in “very crude Latin” by an “ardent disciple” of Godfrey of Fontaines, it contains an extensive list, or tabula, of the salient points of philosophical and theological disagreement (discordantia) between Godfrey and his contemporaries.² The pattern of the tabula serves to summarize, item by item and in accordance with the order of his Quodlibets, the position that Godfrey was defending in a given quaestio. Frequently, and perhaps more interestingly, it states who his targets were. Those mentioned by name include Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, the Augustinian Hermit James of Viterbo, the Oxford Dominican Thomas Sutton, and Giles of Rome.

While the manuscript is undoubtedly important as a testimony to the prestige that Godfrey enjoyed during his lifetime, it is even more important, from the

¹ The edited ms., along with an introduction, can be found in Jean Hoffmans, “La Table des divergences et innovations doctrinales de Godefroid de Fontaines,” RNP 36 (1934), 412-436.
² Hoffmans, “La Table des divergences,” 419.
perspective of the present study, for the light it sheds on the way in which contemporary intellectualists characterized Giles of Rome. One is left with little doubt that the author of the *tabula*, for instance, regarded Giles as a voluntarist. Evidence of this is his tendency to identify Giles with Henry of Ghent as a common target of Godfrey's on issues related to the primacy of the will. In particular, the author of the *tabula* describes Godfrey as holding that beatitude is in no way located in the will, a view, we are told, he argued "contra Henricum et Aegidium." We additionally discover that Godfrey "extensively and convincingly proves" that the intellect, rather than the will, is the nobler potency; again, Godfrey's explicit targets are Henry and Giles. Clearly, then, at least some contemporary intellectualists identified Giles as a voluntarist.

This chapter will establish that the author of the *tabula discordantiarum* is correct in associating Giles with Henry on several questions associated with the primacy of the will. Both thinkers endorse, as the author of the *tabula* correctly asserts, the voluntarist view that the will is a "nobler" or "more perfect" potency than the intellect. They are also in agreement – though here they diverge from other voluntarists – in uniquely severing the will's nobility from the psychic location of beatitude. That is, while contemporary voluntarists typically argued that beatitude consists principally in an act of the will, Henry and Giles prefer to locate

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3 "Item, quaestione octava, contra Henricum et Aegidium, quod beatitudo nullo modo in voluntate," (Hoffmans ed., "La Table des divergences," 427)
4 "Item, quaestione decima, contra Henricum et Aegidium, quod actus intellectus est nobilior actu voluntatis; quod probat multipliciter et valde bene..." (Hoffmans ed., "La Table des divergences," 427).
beatitude primarily in God as the object of the will. That said, Henry and Giles have distinctly opposing views on another issue related to the priority of the will: the question of how the habit of theology contributes to the final end. On this question Giles charts a course that is more akin to the Franciscans Bonaventure and the Parisian teacher of Duns Scotus, Gonsalvus of Spain.

3.1. The Will’s Priority over the Intellect

As with most theories advanced in his Quodlibets, Giles’s views on the priority of the will must be seen in relation to those of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors. And as with many questions on the will that were debated in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, his views on its primacy should be seen as part of an ongoing debate that began with Henry of Ghent’s reactions to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas.

In the Summa theologiae Aquinas famously addresses the question of whether the will is a “higher” (altior) power than the intellect. Later thinkers will ask whether it is “greater” (superior), “nobler” (nobilior), or “more perfect” (perfectior). Whatever the terminology, at issue was whether the intellect is dependent on, and therefore subordinate to the will, or vice versa.

In addressing this question Aquinas draws a distinction between that which is absolutely higher (simpliciter) and that which is higher in a qualified sense (secundum

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5 ST I, q. 82, a. 3: “Utrum voluntas sit altior potentia quam intellectus.”
6 Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quod. I, q. 14 (Macken ed., V, 83); Godfrey of Fontaines, Quod. VI, q. 10 (PB III, 182).
He defines the former as taken in itself, and the latter in relation to something else. This distinction permits him to show that, although the intellect must be considered, in the final analysis, as the intrinsically higher power, the will also has nobility.

According to Aquinas the intellect is the higher potency without qualification because its object is simpler and more abstract than that of the will. That is, since the object of the will is the desirable thing itself, which is a composite of matter and form, while that of the intellect is only the form or ratio of the desirable thing, it follows that the latter is more simple and abstract than the former. Since the more abstract, or detached from matter a thing is, the higher it is, it stands to reason that the object of the intellect is higher without qualification than that of the will. Now according to Aquinas, the nature of a potency is determined by the manner in which it is related to its object. Thus, if the object of the intellect is higher than that of the will, it follows that the intellect itself will possess a nobler nature than that of the will.

7 ST I, q. 82, a. 3, corp: “Respondeo dicendum quod eminentia alcuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale; secundum quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum.”
8 Ibid: “Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc appareat ex comparatione objectorum ad invicem. Objectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam objectum voluntatis; nam objectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibile; bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est objectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilior et altius. Et ideo objectum intellectus est altius quam objectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad objectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit alior et nobilior voluntate.”
Although Aquinas clearly endorses an intellectualist position on this question, he is prepared to concede that in some instances the will is higher than the intellect. Adverting to Aristotle, he admits that the objects of the will, good and bad, are in things, while the objects of the intellect, truth and error, are in the mind. From this it follows that when an object is higher than the soul and therefore incapable of being understood as fully as it is capable of being loved, it is better to love such an object than to know it. Material objects, on the other hand, are lower than the immaterial soul; it is therefore better to know such objects than to love them. Although the will may be nobler in relation to certain objects such as God, Aquinas nonetheless insists that the intellect is unqualifiedly the nobler of the two potencies.\(^9\)

Notice that Aquinas's claims for the superiority of the intellect are consistent with the notion that the will is inferior because it relies on the intellect for its determination.\(^{10}\) Indeed, such superiority as Aquinas assigns to the intellect will in

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\(^9\) Ibid: "Secundum quid autem, et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas invenitur interdum altior intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod objectum voluntatis in altiori re invenitur quam objectum intellectus. Sicut si dicerem audirem esse secundum quid nobiliorem visu, inquantum res aliqua cuius est sonus, nobilior est aliqua re cuius est color, quamvis color sit nobilior et simplicior sono. Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perfectur ex eo quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est. Et ideo Philosophus dicit, in VI Metaph., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt objecta voluntatis, sunt in rebus; verum et falsum, quae sunt objecta intellectus, sunt in mente. Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam; tunc etiam in comparatione ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio; e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas."

\(^{10}\) Ibid, ad 2: "Dicendum quod illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est imperfectius; quia in uno eodemque potentia tempore praecedit actum, et imperfectio
turn provide the foundation, as we shall see, for his claim that the final end
consists principally in an act of the rational potency.¹¹

As with several of his other theories, Thomas’s view of the primacy of the will
was first challenged by Henry of Ghent. Disputed in 1276, two years after
Aquinas’s death, Henry’s Quodlibet I contains a sustained defense of the claim that
the will is a superior potency to the intellect.¹² Given that prior to Aquinas there is
no evidence of such a question being discussed, it is reasonable to suppose that
Henry’s disputation is a direct response to his Dominican predecessor.¹³

However, whereas Aquinas based his claim that the intellect is nobler than the will
on the superiority of its object alone, Henry bases his conclusion not only on an
investigation of their respective objects, but also of their acts and habits as well
since “the power whose habit, act and object are superior to the habit act and
object of another is without qualification superior to that other power.”¹⁴

First, the habit of the will, charity, is superior to the habit of the intellect,
wisdom, because through charity we arrive at a love of God and neighbour. Henry
does not explain, on philosophical grounds, why love of God should be superior

perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est
perfectius; sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate,
sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo; bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem.”
¹¹ ST I-II, q. 3, a. 6, corp.
¹² For discussions of this Quodlibet, cf. R. Macken, “La doctrine de S. Thomas concernant
la volonté et les critiques d’Henri de Gand,” in Tommaso d’Aquino nella storia del pensiero
(Roma-Napoli, 1974), 84-91; and his “La volonté humaine, faculté plus élevée que
l’intelligence selon Henri de Gand,” RTAM 42 (1975), 5-51.
¹³ Kent, Virtues of the Will, 102.
to the wisdom through which we contemplate God and "things eternal."  

Because this was a standard claim, Henry simply asserts it, citing as his evidence the authority of Augustine and St. Paul.

Having compared intellect and will with respect to their habits, Henry proceeds to explain how it is that the act of the will, which is to love, is superior to that of the intellect, which is to know. He argues that willing is superior to knowing both in comparison to their respective acts and insofar as they perfect their subjects. Central to his view that the act of the will is superior to that of the intellect is the claim that the will is the commanding power, or motive force within the soul. From Walter of Bruges he inherits the notion that the will is the "universal and first mover in the whole kingdom of the soul." From Aristotle, he derives the view that whatever moves is nobler than that which undergoes

14 Henry of Ghent, Quod. I, q. 14: "Et dicendum est simpliciter quod illa potentia praeminet alteri, cujus habitus, actus et obiectum praeminet habitui, actui et objecto alterius" (Macken ed., V, 86).
15 Ibid: "Et patet assumptum quoniam proprius habitus voluntatis quo fertur in bonum actu veri amoris, est habitus caritatis, quo secundum Augustinum per se diligimus Deum et proximum in Deo et propter Deum. Habitus autem supremus intellectus est sapientia, qua Deum et aeterna speculamur secundum Augustinum XIV De Trinitate. Quantum autem praeminent habitus caritatis omni habitu sapiential et cognitivo, bene exprimit Apostolus cum cum dicit Ia <ad> Corinthios, XIII: Si linguis hominum loquar et angelorum, caritatem autem non habeam, etc" (Macken ed., V, 84-85).
16 Ibid: "Quantum autem supereminet actus voluntatis qui est velle sive diligere, actu intellectus qui est scire sive cognoscere, patet ex duplici comparatione: primo ex comparatione unius actus ad alterum, secundo ex comparatione utriusque ad suum subjiciendum per fistendium per obiectum" (Macken ed., V, 85).
17 Ibid: "Voluntas autem est universalis et primus motor in toto regno animae, et superior, et primus movens omnia alia ad finem suum, ut infra videbitur" (Macken ed., V, 85). We saw in 2.1 that the metaphor for the will as a ruler over the "kingdom" of the soul was a common voluntarist metaphor used to illustrate the will's ability to command the other powers of the soul. Cf. R. Teske, "The Will as Ruler over the Powers of the Soul: Uses and Sources of an Image in the Thirteenth Century," Vivarium 32 (1994), 62-71.
motion. It is worth pointing out that Aquinas had employed the same text from the *De anima* as evidence for the superiority of the *intellec*. Given Henry's use of this identical text in defense of the voluntarist position, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Henry is taking direct aim at Thomas here.

In comparing the act of the will with that of the intellect insofar as they perfect the subjects in which they inhere, Henry employs an argument which he derives from Dionysius Areopagite, and which Giles of Rome will make a focal point of his own theory. Because the will is inclined toward the object as it exists in reality, it transforms (*transformat*) itself into the object willed. The intellect, on the other hand, merely apprehends a likeness of the reality that is known. That is, by the act of loving the will is perfected by becoming like the object itself, whereas in knowing the intellect is perfected simply by a representation of the thing. As regards objects such as God, it is clearly better, according to Henry, to become like God as He is in Himself than merely to possess a likeness of Him in accordance with our mode of knowing. Aquinas, recall, had argued the same thing. Where an object is higher than the soul, it is better to love such an object; where it is lower, it

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18 Ibid. For Aristotle's text, see *De anima* III, 5, 430a18-19.
19 *STI*, q. 82, a. 3, ad. 2.
20 Henry of Ghent, *Quod. I*, 14: "Ex secunda comparatione similiter patet intentum, quoniam actione voluntatis perficitur voluntas ipsa re dilecta ut in se habet esse, quia voluntas actione sua inclinatur in ipsam rem, actione autem intellectus perficitur ipse intellectus ipsa re intellecta ut habet esse in intellectu, quia intellectus actione sua trahit in se ipsam rem intellectam, voluntas autem actione sua transfert se in ipsum volitum propter se ut eo frutatur, et per hoc, ut dicit Dionysius 4o capitulo De divinis nominibus, intellectus actione sua assimilat se rei intellectae, voluntas vero transformat se in ipsum volitum. Cum ergo multo perfectius et altius est transformati in ipsum bonum ut in se est secundum suam naturam, quam assimilari ipsi vero ut est in intelligenti per modum
is better to know it. However according to Aquinas this relation entails that the will is only higher in a certain respect (*secundum quid*). Henry turns the tables against Aquinas. He implies that on Aquinas's own reasoning, if the will is higher with respect to its act of loving God, this entails that it must be higher, not *secundum quid*, but rather *simpliciter*. This is because the nobility of a power is judged absolutely according to the absolutely highest object. When God is the object, then, the act of loving such an object must be considered higher than the act of knowing it.\(^2\)

Finally, as to the relative superiority of their objects, Henry maintains that the good in general is superior to the true. He bases this argument on the notion that the object of the will, the good without qualification, encompasses and includes the object of the intellect. On this account, the true is reducible to a relative sort of goodness, the good of the intellect. Furthermore, the true is merely a particular good that serves happiness, which is the object of the will. The object of the intellect, on Henry's account, is therefore subordinate to that of the will.\(^3\)

\(^{2}\) Ibid: "Etsi enim respectu eorum quae sunt infra animam contingit e converso quod intellectus actio sit altior voluntate, quia altior et nobilior est in anima cognitio rerum corporalium quam eorum amor, hoc facit secundum quid intellectum esse nobiliorem voluntate..." (Macken ed., V, 87).

\(^{3}\) Ibid: "Quod autem objectum voluntatis supereminet objecto intellectus, patet, quia objectum voluntatis quod est bonum simpliciter, habet rationem finis simpliciter et ulterior finis, objectum autem intellectus quod est verum, habet rationem boni alcius ut intellectus, et ita ut finis sub fine et ordinatum ad aliud ut ad ultimum finem" (Macken ed., V, 88).
Godfrey of Fontaines answered Henry’s attack on the intellectualism of Aquinas in his *Quodlibet* VI, q. 10 of 1289. Here Godfrey defends, as might be expected, the claim that the intellect’s act is more perfect than that of the will.\(^{23}\) Although Godfrey restricts his attention to the respective acts and objects of the two potencies, altogether ignoring the comparison Henry had drawn between their habits, it is nonetheless clear that Henry is the target of this *Quodlibet*.\(^{24}\) That this disputation formed the backdrop against which Giles would address the question in the following year makes it additionally worthy of attention.

According to Godfrey, the potency whose act is sought for its own sake (*propter se*) rather than one whose fulfillment is ordered to some end or perfection outside of itself is the more eminent.\(^{25}\) From such a premise, it must follow that the intellect is superior to any appetite, whether natural, animal or rational. This is a direct challenge to Henry’s claim that the act of loving is more perfective of the will than the act of knowing is perfective of the intellect. Godfrey thinks this is impossible for the simple reason that appetites do not exist for the sake of perfecting the appetitive potency itself. Rather, they exist for the attainment of the object of the potency, for the attainment of some good outside of the appetite itself, whether this is the perfection of some other potency of the soul, or the agent


\(^{25}\) Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quod* VI, q. 10: “Ex his autem propositum declarari sic; quia illa potentia est eminentior et etiam eius actus cujus actus principaliter et propter se quaeritur, et cujus actus ad perfectionem alterius potentiae per se et principaliter non ordinatur,
The reason the animal has sense desires is not for the purpose of perfecting the sense appetite itself but in order to satisfy some good that is extrinsic to the appetite. The desire for food, for instance, exists not for the purpose of its own perfection, but for the extrinsic purpose of keeping the body in existence. Appetites and their acts, in short, are merely inclinations to some goal; they are means toward an end rather than ends in themselves.

That appetites are orientations toward the perfection of some extrinsic power holds equally true of the will. As with natural appetite, or gravity, and sense appetite, the will too is an inclination toward the perfection of the agent. In what, then, does specifically human perfection consist? It cannot consist in self-preservation, according to Godfrey, for this is the goal of the sense appetite, which is common to both humans and animals. Nor can it consist in an act of the will

quam illa potentia cuius operatio propter se et principaliter non quaeeritur sed ad perfectionem alterius potentiae ordinatur" (PB III, 187).

Ibid: "...universalter omnis virtus appetitiva et motiva data est rebus ut per illas potentias et actus earum inclinetur et tendant res ad suas perfectiones consequendas, quibus tamen non perfectiuntur secundum ipsam potentiam appetitivam, sed secundum aliam. Sed sic appetitus inditus est propter actum appetendi aliquod objectum quo formaliter et inhaeenter perficiatur appetens et sic est datus propter huiusmodi bonum quod est objectum ipsius appetitus et non actus eius neque bonum et perfectio eius. Ex quo statim patet quod in nullo actu appetitus potest consistere rei perfectio principalis. Et hoc patet in omnibus" (PB III, 187).

Ibid: "...actus appetitus animalis non est inditus animali propter hoc quod perfectio animalis consistit in aliquo actu talis appetitus, sed ob hoc quod per huiusmodi appetitum inclinetur in suam principalem perfectionem quae est conservatio sui in esse secundum ipsum in proprio individuo, quod fit per nutritionem et ciborum sumptionem, et in esse vel conservatione sui ipsius in conservatione suae speciei in alio individuo, quod fit per generationem...Unde appetitus animalis non est in animali ut animal in actu aliquo secundum appetitum, scilicet secundum appetere vel secundum quemcumque alium, ipsum animal perficiatur, sed in eo quod est objectum talis actus ipsius appetitus, scilicet in eo quod est talibus vel talibus secundum tales vel tales actus aliquorum sensuum principaliter uti et ad talem finem" (PB III, 188).
since, as an appetite, it is merely an inclination toward perfection. Godfrey therefore concludes that the perfection of rational agents consists in an act of the intellect, which is peculiar, or “appropriate” (conveniens) to man. The will’s act is therefore instrumental to the perfection of the intellect. The desire to know, by contrast, is not instrumentally good. Rather, it is intrinsically so because, being peculiar to man, it is the feature that comprises human perfection.28

The will’s subordination to the intellect can also be seen in relation to their respective objects. Henry, recall, had argued that the object of the will was more perfect than that of the intellect since the true is merely a form of the good. For this reason, the object of the intellect must be considered subordinate to the object of the will. Godfrey refutes this claim on the grounds that the object of the will is nothing other than the object of the practical intellect. As such, the practical intellect is nobler than the will. Nobler still, however, is the speculative intellect because it has being as such (ens secundum quod ens) as its object. The object of the practical intellect, by contrast, is a less universal form of being (ens contractum), that is, being insofar as it is suitable (conveniens) to the agent. Now if the object of the

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28 Ibid: “...similiter etiam videtur dicendum in appetitu rationali. Quia non videtur esse inditus homini propter hoc quod perfectio eius consistat in actu talis appetitus, quo scilicet inclinatur in aliquid apprehensum a ratione, sed ob hoc quod per huiusmodi appetitum et eius actum inclinetur in suam principalem perfectionem. Quae non consistit in conservatione sui in esse in se ipso vel in alio et in usu actu secundum gustum et tactum, quia hoc habet per alium appetitum, scilicet sensitivum, in quantum est communis homini et bruto; sed est aliqua sua perfecta operatio conveniens homini secundum quod homo, sive naturae rationali secundum quod rationalis. Hoc autem non est nisi operatio secundum intellectum. Appetitus ergo rationalis sive voluntas principaliter, sive primo et per se, non est in homine ut in aliquo actu ipsius voluntatis
speculative intellect is nobler than that of the practical intellect, it follows that it must be superior to the will. This is because the object of the will is merely the object that has been apprehended as suitable by the practical intellect. The practical intellect is superior to the will, in short, because the will is regulated (regulatur) and measured (mensuratur) by it. The will is therefore less noble not only in relation to the speculative intellect, but to the practical as well.29

Although Giles of Rome, unlike Aquinas, Henry, and Godfrey, supplies no ex professo treatment of whether the will as such is higher than the intellect, the superiority of the former is asserted in his Quodlibet III, q. 18. In the course of discussing whether beatitude consists in an act of the will or the intellect – a topic we will take up in 3.2 – Giles asserts that the will is nobler than the intellect since the will moves the intellect by commanding (imperando) it. The intellect, on the other hand, merely (solum) moves the will by “showing” (ostendendo) it the end. The

ipse homo perficiatur; sed ut perficiatur in eo quod est objectum per se ipsius voluntatis, silicet in eo quod est esse in actu perfecto secundum intellectum” (PB III, 189-190).

29 Ibid: “Quod ergo dicitur ab aliis quod actus voluntatis est perfectior quia est nobilioris objecti, dicendum quod non est verum; quia objectum intellectus, praecipue speculativi, est ens secundum quod ens, id est secundum omnem eius rationem ad suam entitatem et perfectionem pertinentem; objectum autem voluntatis et intellectus practici est ens contractum, non quidem per aliquam condicionem quasi additam ad perfectionem eius pertinentem, sed ut ad aliquod ens determinatum comparatur, quia est ens sub ratione convenientis ipsi amanti vel volenti. Loquimur enim nunc de actu voluntatis quo volens fertur in voluntatem amore amicitiae vel concupiscentiae. Sic enim bonum videtur importare rationem magis determinatam sub ente; quia non omne ens hoc modo est bonum proprie loquendo. Et secundum hoc patet quod sub nobiliiori ratione est aliquid objectum intellectus praecipue speculativi quam voluntatis. Item, licet, ut supradictum est, id quod est objectum voluntatis et intellectus practici sub eadem ratione sit objectum utriusque in quantum sub ratione convenientis, quia tamen, ut est objectum voluntatis, plus includit quam ut est objectum intellectus practici, et sic magis est contractum; quia etiam, ut dictum est, ipse actus voluntatis ab actu intellectu regulatur et mensuratur, ideo etiam actus practici intellectus est perfectior actu voluntatis” (PB III, 210).
will is therefore the higher (*altior*) power, according to Giles, because it commands the other potencies of the soul.  

Henry of Ghent had employed an identical argument in support of the view that the act of the will is better than that of the intellect since the will is the ruler of the kingdom of the soul.

That superiority of the will is further implied in Giles’s *Quodlibet* V, q. 5, which addresses whether the rational creature is united to God more through the act of loving or the act of knowing.  

Here Giles does not specifically address the issue of the relative superiority between intellect and will. Still, his view of the matter can be inferred from his answer to the question, in which he treats the relative perfection of the acts of intellect and will.

Now while it is true that Giles is not concerned here to settle the question of which power is higher, he nonetheless shows little hesitation in adjudicating which act, love or knowledge, achieves union with God in the “better and greater” (*potior et maior*) way. That love unites us more to God than knowing is asserted immediately, and is mainly grounded in the two standard authorities: Dionysius Areopagite and Hugh of St. Victor. Relying on chapter four of the *De divinis nominibus*, which asserts that love is a unitive force, Giles explains how the love of God achieves greater union with God for the agent than does intellection.

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30 Giles of Rome, *Quod* III, q. 18: “...dicendum quod intellectus nec dirigat nec moveat voluntatem imperando, sed solum ei finem ostendendo. Sed voluntas movet intellectum imperando, et omnia nostra opera sunt subjecta voluntati et eius imperio. Ideo ex hoc non habetur quod intellectus sit altior potentia quam voluntas, imo magis est e contrario” (Louvain ed., 1646, 193).

31 Giles of Rome, *Quod* V, q. 5: “Utrum creatura rationalis magis uniatur Deo per amare, quam intelligere” (Louvain ed., 1646, 276).
Intellection is inferior to loving because it merely perfects the intellect. Love, by contrast, perfects the entire agent, or “lover” (aman), since it transforms him into the beloved object itself. When the intellect “desires” (vult) the presence of the intelligible object this is for the sake of its own perfection.\(^{32}\) This is not true of love, for “the lover, such as he is, does not will the presence of the beloved only on account of love itself, but indeed for the sake of the beloved thing itself, to which, as far as he is able, he wills to join himself.”\(^{33}\) Giles goes so far as to add approvingly that love, when it has God as its object, permits a sort of self-transcendence to occur, for “divine love, which is to say the love by which we love God, causes extasy (extasim), that is, places lovers beyond themselves.”\(^{34}\)

Giles marshals two further arguments to support the position that union through loving is better than union through knowing. First, if it is true that even in heaven we will know God as he is in us, but will love him as he is in himself, it follows that union to God through intellection will occur in a merely human manner, while union through loving will occur in a divine one. Because it is better to be united to God as he is in himself rather than as he is in us, i.e., as a mere

\(^{32}\) Ibid: “Si ergo intellectus, secundum quod huiusmodi, vult praesentiam intelligibilis, hoc est propter ipsum intelligendum, ut quia forte non potest id intelligere plene nisi per praesentiam eius” (Louvain ed., 1646, 277).

\(^{33}\) Ibid: “…sed amans, secundum quod huiusmodi, non vult praesentiam amati solum propter ipsum amorem, enim vero propter ipsum rem amatam cui, quantum potest, vult se coniungere; imo, secundum quod huiusmodi quantum posset, vellet seipsam in ipsam transformare. Ideoque est quod unire et transformare amori appropriaturn, ut patet per Dionysium, 4. cap. De divinis nominibus, recitant verba Hierochea, ‘quod omnis amor est quaedam virtus unitiva’…” (Louvain ed., 1646, 277).

\(^{34}\) Ibid: “Divinus ergo amor, id est amor quo diligimus Deum, est faciens extasim, id est ponens amantes extra seipsos, non permittens eos amare sive ipsos amantes esse sui
likeness, it is necessary to conclude that union through love is better than union through knowing.35

Giles’s second argument relies on the standard distinction between priority in origin and perfection. It asserts that while the informing principle may be temporally prior to the formed object, it is often the case that the latter is prior in perfection. For instance, although the seed is prior to the flower in origin, the flower itself has priority in perfection. This principle applies equally to the relation between knowing and loving. Giles, like all thinkers of the period, voluntarist and intellectualist alike, concession that we must know an object before we can love it. Accordingly, the act of the intellect must be considered prior in origin. However, union through knowing is merely inchoate; it achieves perfection, according to Giles, only once the known object is loved. On Giles’s account, then, union through love is more perfect, since it has priority in perfection.36
Giles of Rome's solution to whether rational agents are united to God more through the act of loving than through knowing exhibits unmistakable affinity with, and possibly even reliance on Henry of Ghent, particularly his conclusion that loving is better than knowing since it unites us more closely to God. On the other hand, *Quodlibet* V, q. 5, also shows several differences. For one thing, in this *Quodlibet* Giles focuses exclusively on the acts of the will and the intellect; for another, his concern is strictly with the relation of these acts to God. Henry, by contrast, had compared the will and the intellect in terms not only of their acts, but of their habits and objects as well. Moreover, Henry did not restrict his investigation to the relation of the respective acts to God, but also compared them in relation to one another.

The foregoing, of course, are relatively minor differences. The crucial point is Giles's defense of the idea that love, which is an act of the will, unites the rational creature to God more closely than knowledge, which is an act of the intellect. Implied in this argument is the notion that the will is superior to the intellect, a claim that Giles had made explicitly, as we saw, in *Quodlibet* III, q. 18.

### 3.2. The Scope and Nature of Beatitude

Connected to the issue of whether intellect or will is the nobler potency is the question of whether the final end for man consists in an act of knowledge or an

origine praecedit unio per intelligere, sed perfectione praecedit unio per amare. Potior est ergo unio per amorem, quam per intelligere, sicut consummatum est potius quam inchoatum” (Louvain ed., 1646, 278).
act of love. To the theologians of the thirteenth century, following Aristotle, it stood to reason that if human happiness (beatitudo) consists in an activity, then it had to be an activity of our highest power. As an intellectualist, for instance, Aquinas maintains that, to the extent that happiness is an activity of the soul, then it must be connected to man’s best power, which he associates with the intellect.

On the voluntarist side, John Peckham (ca. 1225-1292), Aquinas’s Franciscan contemporary, argued the reverse. On Peckham’s account, it is the will that is the highest (altissimo) power in the soul; accordingly, beatitude consists primarily in an act of love.

Unlike Peckham, voluntarists sometimes argued that although the will was the higher potency in the soul, and that the final end consisted principally in an act of love, beatitude was nonetheless to be achieved in a certain cooperation between the intellect and the will. Richard of Middleton argued this, and so did Henry of Ghent. Giles of Rome ultimately endorses Henry’s view, in the mature Quodlibetal

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37 ST I-II, q. 3, a. 5, corp.: "...si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quae est optimae potentiae respectu optimi objecti. Optima autem potentia est intellectus, cuius objectum optimum est bonum divinum, quod quidem non est objectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi."

38 John Peckham, Quod. I, q. 5: “Dico quod beatitudo consistit principalius in actu voluntatis...Primo dico consideringo proportionem meriti et praemii. Certum est enim quod praecipue meritum pro sui perfectione, et etiam praemium - nisi caritas cadit ad perfectione. Unde Augustinus, XII Super Genesi. 'Una ibi et tota virtus est amare quod videas, et summa felicitas est habere quod amat.' Si igitur tota virtus est ibi amare, ergo tota beatitudo et felicitas est ibi amare quia felicitas est virtus consummata” (Etzkorn ed., XXV, 10). Ibid, q. 6: “Ad sextum dicendum per interemptionem, quia voluntas est altissima et finis animae absentis a sensu usque ad summum animae” (Delorme ed., XXV, 19).

39 Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV, d. 49, a. 1, q. 6: “Videntur mihi dicendum quod beatitudo consistit in actu intellectus et voluntatis simul, cuius ratio est quia esse beatitudinis vitae humanæ consistit in perfecta unione animae rationalis cum Deo. Haec autem unio
Questions anyway, although the influence of Aquinas is undeniable. To appreciate the way in which Giles develops Aquinas's account of happiness in the direction of Henry of Ghent, it will be necessary to discuss their theories first.

On Aquinas's account, beatitudo is the universal end or "perfect good that wholly brings desire to rest." It is also the object of the will. Because the object of the will is universal, it cannot be completely satisfied with any created good since such objects are by definition limited. Such an account, of course, necessarily excludes goods such as pleasure, wealth, power and honors from being identified with the final end, for if some good is really to bring desire to rest, it must be infinite. Aquinas identifies such an object with God.

Having associated the source of human happiness with God, who is obviously outside of the created soul, what then does Thomas make of Aristotle's claim that happiness (eudaimonia) is an activity of the soul? For Aristotle, the source of human happiness is not some external good; rather, it is associated with an internal

inquidit animae unionem cum Deo secundum omnem sui potentiam...<id> est intellectus et voluntas" (Brescia ed., 1591, IV, 652)


41 Ibid: "Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum; alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetite humanus, est universale bonum; sicut objectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere
operation of the soul (EN 1098a16-18). Indeed, Aristotle explicitly rejected the notion that happiness can be external to the soul when he rejects the Platonic identification of happiness with the subsistent Form of the Good (EN 1096b31-34).

Aquinas is aware of the discrepancy between his account of happiness and Aristotle’s, and takes pains to ensure that he does not entirely deviate from the latter. Accordingly, he distinguishes between happiness as “created” and happiness as “uncreated,” a distinction he inherited from William of Auxerre (ca. 1140/50-1231).42

Now according to Aquinas, the term “end” (finis) has a twofold signification. It can represent either the external object toward which the rational agent is striving, or it can signify the possession of the appetible object. In the first sense, the final end refers to God, the infinite object that fulfills all human aspirations. In the second sense, it signifies an activity of the human soul. Insofar as the final end represents God as the source of happiness, it is uncreated. Insofar as it signifies the subjective attainment of God, however, it refers to human, and therefore created activity.43 In identifying the source of happiness with God as an uncreated

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42 William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, III, tr. 20: “Tamen dicimus quod cum dicitur ‘Deus diligitur quia bonus,’ haec dictio ‘bonus’ praeter divinam essentiam, quam signat, connotat aliquid creatum, scilicet suavitatem vel dilectionem vel beatitudinem creatam, quae est finis quo quiescit in Deo; Deus autem est finis in quo quiescit” (Ribaillier ed., XVII, 663). Cf. also Wieland’s “Happiness: the Perfection of Man,” in CHLMP, 675.
43 ST I-II, q. 3, a. 1, corp: “…finis dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut
object, Aquinas remains true to the Christian theological tradition; in associating created happiness with an activity of the soul, on the other hand, Aquinas is faithful to Aristotle.

Having seen that uncreated happiness consists in God who is the objective end of rational beings, and having established that created happiness is an activity of the soul, Aquinas proceeds to address the question of whether the latter consists essentially (essentialiter) in an act of the will or the intellect. He concludes that uncreated happiness consists essentially in an act of the intellect.44

Now it is impossible that beatitude consist in an act of the will. Happiness is defined as the attainment of the ultimate end. Will, however, is merely an inclination towards the ultimate end when it is absent, and an enjoyment of it when present. That is, in relation to the final end the will acts in one of two ways: it is either merely an inclination toward perfection, or a delight in perfection once achieved. In neither case does it comprise perfection itself, and therefore cannot constitute happiness.45

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44 ST I-II, q. 3, a. 4, corp.
It would be inaccurate to conclude from this that Aquinas entirely excludes the will from the activity of created happiness. He acknowledges that once the intellect attains the essence of God in the beatific vision, the glorified soul will experience what he calls delight (delectatio). Aquinas even acknowledges that such an act of the will accompanies the beatific vision. Still, he is emphatic in rejecting the notion that the will can play an essential role in happiness. Instead, he assigns it merely an accidental, secondary role. Created happiness for Aquinas, then, essentially consists in the beatific vision, which is an act of the intellect. Only when

consecutio finis, sed est motum ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod finis est praesens; non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit finis ipse praesens voluntati...Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit...”


47 ST I-II, q. 4, a. 1, corp: “Respondeo dicendum quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo, sicut praecambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans extrinsecus, sicut anima requiritur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto. Unde cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante.”

rational creatures know the essence of God will their desires come to rest and their intellects be fully perfected.\textsuperscript{49} 

In his \textit{Summa quaestionum ordinaria} (1275-93) Henry of Ghent challenged the thomistic understanding of beatitude. He took issue with Aquinas on two accounts: (1) for claiming that happiness consists, at least partly, in human activity, and (2) for excluding the will from the attainment of beatitude by assigning it a merely accidental role.\textsuperscript{50}

Henry of Ghent is opposed to the thomistic implication that man can contribute to his own salvation.\textsuperscript{51} He accordingly rejects the claim that happiness consists essentially in an activity of the soul, intellectual or otherwise. He suggests that while it is understandable that happiness should be denominated as an activity by some, this is nonetheless inaccurate. On Henry's view, it is not the act of the intellect or even that of the will that constitutes the happiness of the blessed; rather, it is God, who is the ultimate end. The source of beatitude therefore

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, q. 3, a. 8: "Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiecmum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit...."

\textsuperscript{50} For discussions of Henry's theory of beatitude, see A. Celano, "Act of the Intellect or Act of the Will: The Critical Reception of Aristotle's Idea of Human Perfection in the 13\textsuperscript{th} and Early 14\textsuperscript{th} Centuries," \textit{AHDLMA} 57 (1990), 103-109; and J. Rovira Bellos, \textit{La visión de Dios según Enrique de Gante} (Barcelona, 1960), 113-153.

\textsuperscript{51} A. Celano, "Act of the Intellect or Act of the Will," 108.
consists principally (*principaliter*), on Henry’s account, in the object of the will and
the intellect rather than in any of their acts.  

Recall that Thomas, like Henry, had associated the source of beatitude with
God. However, Aquinas also attempted to remain true to Aristotle’s claim that
happiness consisted in an activity of the soul, specifically in the perfection of the
intellect. Thomas therefore posited a twofold aspect to the final end: God, the
object of the will, and the human subjective response to this object, or the beatific
vision. He termed these two aspects created and uncreated happiness, respectively.

Henry of Ghent resists such an incorporation of Aristotle into Christian
conceptions of beatitude. To claim that happiness consists in an activity of the
soul, for Henry, is to argue that acts can be equivalent to ends. Henry here adopts
the argument that Aquinas and Godfrey had used to exclude the act of the will
from constituting beatitude and, as it were, turns it against them. That is, while
Thomas and Godfrey had excluded the act of the will from comprising happiness
on the grounds that it is merely a means toward the end, Henry argues that by this
reasoning the act of the intellect must also be excluded from comprising

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52 Henry of Ghent, *SQQ*, a. 49, q. 5: “Quare quamvis in proposito aliqut potest
denominari beatus et ab operatione qua tendit in finem et ab ipso fine quem adipiscitur
illa operatione, quia tamen a fine principaliter denominatur beatus tamquam ab illo quod
principaliter intendit, et ab operatione tamquam ab illo quod intendit propter finem et ita
secundario, inquantum scilicet ipso finis adipiscitur — quia si praescribat finis a
substantia actionis, non propter illam posset dici beatus — cum quaeritur absolute quid sit
illud a quo iste dictur beatus, etsi quoque modo bene dictur quod sit operatio eius quod
tendit in finem, melius tamen dictur quod sit ipse finis sive operationis objectum” (Paris
1520, fol. 37rO-P).
beatitude. Both the act of love and the act of knowing are interior ends toward the exterior end that is God. For Henry, they are "ends under an end," or means toward the ultimate end of being united with God. The question now becomes, for Henry, which act accomplishes such a goal most efficaciously. Put otherwise, assuming that our end is God, which instrumental activity will get us closest to union with the divine: the act of loving, or the act of knowing?

Unsurprisingly Henry concludes that it is an act of the will that unites the rational soul more closely to God than an act of the intellect. He offers three reasons for this. First, the will is the more active potency, for while it transfers itself to the object "by means of its own action" (sua actione seipsum transferat), the intellect can only elicit an act of understanding once it has passively received the form of the object. Second, the intellect merely unites itself to God as if to an

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53 Ibid: "Sic ergo operatio sive intellectus sive voluntatis non potest esse ultimus finis eius secundum quod praecise sumitur, ut ideo nullo modo potest in ipsa principaliter consistere beatitudo, ut aperte iam patebit" (fol. 37v). "Eo ipso quod beatitudo est finis ultimus et primum objectum voluntatis et intellectus et per hoc principium omnium actionum et operationum quae in beatitudine sunt tamquam quedam ordinata in finem, igitur neque actus intellectus neque actus voluntatis possunt esse essentia beatitudo quae debet esse finis ultimus beatus nec pertinet ad ipsam ut objectum intellectum aut volitum in quo consistit. Nec tamen sequitur ex hoc quod non pertinet ad ipsam ut actus eius, per quem attingit finem illum ut objectum beatificans. Vanum est ergo quod aliqui nuntur excludere actum voluntatis a beatitudine, quia non potest esse primum volitum. Eadem enim ratione excluditur actus intellectus, quia nec potest esse primum intellectum aut volitum" (Paris ed., 1520, fol. 40v).

54 Henry of Ghent, SQO, a. 49, q. 6: “Non possunt esse fines ulterior...Si ergo in ipsis consistat aliqua ratio beatitudinis oportet ut illa sit tamquam finis sub fine. Actio autem vel operatio, non est sicut finis sub fine nisi quia est sicut finis interior contingens exteriori vel secundum rem, vel secundum rationem, primum propter beatitudinem creatorum, secundum propter beatitudinem Dei” (Paris ed., 1520, fol. 40v).

55 Ibid: “Finis ille seipsum facit in intellectum creatum...et per hoc quod finis sub ratione veri existit in intellectu, ipsa intellectus, quasi unum existens ex intellectu in intelligibili, elicit actum intelligendi ex intellectu per intelligibile tamquam per formale principium.
assimilating form. The will, by contrast, unites itself to God as to an “end” and as “good” through an act of love. Because love has the power to transform and convert the lover into the beloved, such an act unites us more closely to God, who is our end, than that of the intellect. Finally, a thing is perfected more, according to Henry, when it possesses its object under the aspect of the good than when it does so under the aspect of the true.

Central to Henry’s insistence that the will unites us to God more than the intellect is the Dionysian idea that “love, whether divine or angelic, intellectual, animal or natural, is a certain unitive and continuative power.” Perfect beatitude, in a subjective sense, consists in the will, by its own act of love, converting itself to the known good. After this initial act of desire, a “nobler” act of the will is

existens in eo, ut ordine quodam rationis quasi primo existit illud in intellectu sicut forma et quasi secundo elicitur ex intellectu actus intelligendi...Econverso autem contingit in actione voluntatis. Voluntas enim primo allecta sua actione seipsam transfert in ipsum objectum sibi praesens, primo in intellectu, et per actum suum facit quod illud idem sit sibi praesens secundo, verius quam sit sibi aut intellectui praesens in intellectu, et verius existens in ipsa voluntate quam in ipso intellectu maxime sub ratione finis beatificantis, ut iam patebit” (Paris ed., 1520, fol. 42rP).

56 Ibid: “Ex quo sequitur secunda differentia: quod licet illud ultimum uniatur quodammodo intellectui et pertingat intellectus ad ipsum, atque ipsum adipiscatur, licet non actione sua, sed ipso seipso illabendo intellectui creato vel naturaliter in divino intellectu existendio perfectus tamen illud adipiscitur voluntas sua operatione, et unitur eidem illo cooperante, quam intellectui uniat seipsum; quia intellectui non unitur seipso nisi ut forma quaedam intellectus non inhaerens, sed expressa in ipso, et assimilans quodammodo sibi intellectum, secundum quod intellectus secundum actum est intellecta secundum actum...Voluntas autem unit se illi, non ut formae assimilanti, sed ut fini et bono, quasi sese, vi amoris, per actum suum, in illud quasi transubstantiando, sive transformando et convertendo. Amor enim sive actus amoris, qui est actus voluntatis, vim quodam conversivam habet amantis in amatum...” (Paris ed., 1520, fol. 42rP).

engendered by which the will impresses (imprimit) itself on the end, “immerses itself in it, adheres to it, and enjoys it.” For Henry of Ghent, the act of love, and particularly what he calls “divine ecstatic love,” allows the lover to become the beloved. When God is the object of such love Henry argues that the agent becomes God-like through a certain participation. He follows Dionysius Areopagite in referring to such a process as “deification” (deificatio).

The careful reader will notice that at root there is a very different goal for Henry than for Thomas. For Thomas the goal is the perfection of the self by means of the intellect. For Henry, by contrast, the goal is not the perfection of the self but the transference of the self into God, which occurs by an autonomous conversion of the will.

58 Henry of Ghent, SQQ, a. 46, q. 3 (Hödl ed., XXIX, 145).
59 Henry of Ghent, SQQ, a. 49, q. 6: “Ex ipso tamquam ex bono cognito emanat actus amatorius in voluntate: quo, iam cessante desiderio, convertit se in ipsum altero actu voluntatis perfectioni et nobilibi, quo se fini imprimit, et immersit atque inhaeret et ipso fruitor. In quo perfectio beatitudinis consistit’’ (Paris ed., 1520, fol. 43r5).
60 Henry of Ghent, SQQ, a. 46, q. 4: “Est autem exstaticus divinus amor, non sinens seipsum esse amantes sed amandum, ut sollicit amans non maneat ipse amans, sed fiat quodammodo ipse amatus secundum quod declarat per illud quod dicit Paulus: ‘Vivo ego; iam non ego, vivet autem in me Christus,’ dicens: Ut vere amator et mente excedens sic inquit Deo, non ipsam sui vivens sed amati vitam ut nimir dilectissimam’’ (Hödl ed., XXIX, 154).
62 Henry of Ghent, SQQ, a. 48, q. 2: “Magis autem perfectur voluntas in Deo actu suo transferendo se in ipsum, quam recipiendus ipsum in se, eo quod transferendo se in Deum sub ratione boni per actum voluntatis, convertitur quodammodo in ipsum secundum quod habet esse in ipsum (Paris ed., 1520, fol. 30vL). Celano makes the observation that the goal, for Henry, is an overcoming of human nature rather than self-perfection. Cf. his “Act of the Intellect or Act of the Will,” 109.
Henry understands the final end for rational agents, then, to consist principally in God. The acts of the will and the intellect certainly contribute to beatitude, but they do not constitute it, for they are merely means toward union with God, which is the end toward which rational agents are striving. There is, then, a sort of hierarchy with respect to beatitude. At the summit is God, in union with whom beatitude essentially consists, after which follow acts of the will and the intellect, the former of which is nobler than the latter because the act of love joins the rational agent to God more nearly than the act of knowledge. Aquinas, by contrast, sees no such hierarchy: both God and the intellect are essential partners in the final end for man. But the chief point to bear in mind is that, unlike Thomas for whom the final end consists in perfection of the self, for Henry the final end is characterized by an immersion of the self in God.

Giles of Rome’s understanding of the will’s contribution to beatitude evolved over the course of his career. In his early commentary on the Sentences, for instance, he maintains that beatitude consists in an act of the will, thus evidently siding with voluntarists such as John Peckham against Aquinas. In the later Quodlibetal

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63 Ibid: “Amor enim, qui est ratio volendi, est virtus conversiva et unitiva transformans amantem in amatum...Recipiend autem in se Deum sub ratione veri per actum intellectus, assimilatur quodammodo intellectus intellecto secundum quod habet intellectum esse in ipso intelligente. Notitia enim quae est ratio intelligendi, non est nisi virtus assimilativa. Maius autem et nobius est converti in deum et fieri unum quodammodo cum ipso secundum quod habet esse in seipso quam assimilari quodammodo ipsi secundum quod est intelligente. Idcirco dicendum est quod simpliciter in volente quocumque et intelligente deum nobilior et principalior est voluntas et actus volendi quam intellectus et actus intelligendi. Et sic propter idem dicendum est quod simpliciter et absolute principalior est voluntas seu actus volendi quem intellectus seu actus intelligendi” (Paris ed., 1520, fol. 30vL-M).
Quartium, on the other hand, he presents a theory that, although it ultimately resembles Henry of Ghent's, nonetheless takes certain principles from Aquinas.

The first of Giles's discussions on the will's contribution to beatitude can be found in his commentary on book IV of the Sentences, the reportatio of which has been dated by Concetta Luna to 1269. Here Giles rehearses what he takes to be the intellectualist position, or the position of the "philosophers" (philosophi), and defines himself in opposition to it.

He explains that beatitude has a double component: one that is outside of the self, and one that is within. The first is identified with God, and the second with an act of the blessed by which we are united to God. The trouble with the "philosophers" is that they limited their investigations about the final end for man to natural phenomena. They excluded God from their theories and so could not identify him as the object of beatitude. Accordingly, they mistakenly believed that beatitude had to consist in the perfection of something natural, concluding that this had to be an act of the intellect. In contrast to the philosophers, however, the blessed are joined (coniunguntur) to the essence of God and as such know that beatitude consists in Him.

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65 Giles of Rome, Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 24: "Duplex est beatitudo: quaedam est extra, et hoc est finale objectum, quod est summum bonum, scilicet deus. Alia est beatitudo que consistit in actu beati, quo unitur illi summum bono. Et quia philosophi non viderunt illud summum bonum per essentiam, ideo non posuerunt beatitudinem in eo, sed solum in aliquo actu intelligendi, quia intelligere naturale hominis non se extendit ad essentiam divinam, sed ad effectus divinos. Et quia nullum intelligibile naturaliter a nobis est ita perfectum sicut actus intelligendi illius, propter hoc non posuerunt beatitudinem in aliqua
Against the intellectualists, Giles argues that if beatitude is identified with the operation by which we are most nearly joined to God, then we must conclude that this is achieved in an act of the will rather than the intellect. His conclusion is grounded in the standard voluntarist argument that was inspired by Dionysius Areopagite and later employed extensively by Henry of Ghent. The argument asserts that whereas the act of knowing merely receives the intelligible species of the object according to the limited mode of a rational agent, an active motion of the soul towards the object characterizes the act of willing. That is, while intellection is characterized by the passive reception of a representation of the object, the act of love actively extends toward the object itself. But the chief point to bear in the mind is that, through love, the agent is transformed into the beloved object for, as Giles puts it, "in knowing, God is in the blessed soul, <but> in willing, the blessed soul is in God." According to Giles, then, the mode of union...[continues]
that occurs through love is more perfect than that which occurs through intellection.

Finally, Giles advances an argument that we have already encountered in Henry of Ghent. It is grounded in the identification of beatitude defined as the “end” or the “good” rather than as, for example, the “true.” It asserts that since the highest good is the end of all things, the act that unites us to such an object under the aspect of an “end” is that in which beatitude ought to consist. Like Henry, Giles argues that such an act accrues to the will. The intellect, by contrast, apprehends objects, God included, under the aspect of the true. Beatitude must therefore consist, subjectively speaking, in an act of the will rather than the intellect.⁶⁸

The foregoing discussion serves to underscore Giles’s firm commitment to the primacy of the will and its principal role in beatitude. That it differs in certain crucial respects from Henry’s discussion should come as no surprise given that the reportatio of Book IV of Giles’s commentary on the Sentences predates Henry’s Summa quaestionum ordinarium by well over ten years.⁶⁹ But perhaps the most striking difference between the two works is Giles’s conclusion that beatitude

⁶⁸ Ibid: “…beatitudo nostra attendenda est per comparationem ad beatitudinem extra, scilicet ad summum bonum, quod est finis omnium, non sic beatitudo philosophorum, sed solum actu anime. Ex his patet quod beatitudo debet consistere in illo actu qui magis nos unit illi fini sub ratione qua finis. Hoc autem est actus voluntatis, quia intellectus respicit in deum in eo quod verum, sed voluntas inclinatur ad deum ut bonum et ut finis, quia proprium obiectum est ratio boni sive finis. Propter hoc beatitudo magis consistit in actu voluntatis” (Luna ed., “La lecture de Gilles de Rome,” 250-51).
consists, at least partially, in an act of the will. Henry, recall, claims that beatitude consists primarily in God, and that the acts of the will and the intellect are merely means to beatitude or to union with God. He accordingly argues for a hierarchy involving the uncreated object of the will, i.e. God, and the created acts of the soul, of which the will is higher than the intellect since it unites us more closely to our end. No such hierarchy of means and ends is endorsed by Giles in the commentary on the Sentences. In this work Giles merely posits God as the object of beatitude, and the will’s love for God as the subjective response to this object, both of which are equal partners in the achievement of beatitude. In this respect Giles resembles Thomas Aquinas, although, in line with the voluntarists of the period, he substitutes the act of love for the act of intellection.

Still, the commentary on the Sentences is not entirely at odds with Henry of Ghent’s discussion of beatitude in article 49 of his Summa. The most obvious similarity is the vital role played by the Dionysian understanding of love as a transformative power. It is perhaps this aspect more than any other that represents the most significant departure from Aquinas, or indeed from any theory that associates the final end for rational agents with self-perfection rather than with a transference of the self into God.70

69 Henry’s Summa was composed between 1277 and 1293. For the dating of specific articles, cf. Gómez Caffarena’s Ser partícipado y der subsistente, 270, which dates article 49 to Christmas 1282.

70 This is not meant to imply that Aquinas rejects the existence of ecstasy—the experience of being placed outside of oneself—for he explicitly mentions it as an effect of love at STI-I-II, 28, a. 3, resp. Aquinas does not, however, discuss it in the context of happiness, and
In the *Quodlibet Questions* Giles draws substantially closer to Henry of Ghent's understanding of beatitude, although elements of his account are almost certainly drawn from Aquinas. The most striking feature of *Quodlibet* III, q. 18 is Giles's rejection of his earlier conclusion that beatitude consists in an act of the will. Beatitude is now "nothing other than that towards which the will tends as its final cause (finaliter)." On this account, the will cannot incline toward its own act; rather, it must tend toward that which has the character of an "end." Accordingly, beatitude must principally consist in the object of the will rather than its act.

Although Giles locates beatitude principally in the object of the will, this does not prevent him from recognizing that there is also a subjective element to happiness. For this reason he distinguishes between beatitude as a final cause and beatitude as a formal cause. As a final cause, beatitude can be considered either without qualification (finaliter simpliciter), or in a certain genus (finaliter in aliquo certo genere). As a final cause without qualification beatitude consists, as we have seen, in God who is our "repose" (quies), a claim he Giles derives from Augustine. Beatitude considered as a final cause in a certain genus, however, consists in the

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72 Ibid: "...beatitudo sit magis in ipso objecto voluntatis quam in actu quia ratio finis magis est in objecto voluntatis quam in actu. Ex hoc etiam apparet quod omnino principaliter beatitudo non possit esse in actu voluntatis quia voluntas principaliter non tendit in actum suum, sed principaliter tendit in aliud" (Louvain ed., 1646, 187).

73 Ibid: "...distinguemus de beatitudine finaliter et de beatitudine formaliter, ut semper beatitudo finaliter sit voluntatis objectum et beatitudo formaliter sit voluntatis actus, per quem voluntas formaliter tendit in objectum" (Louvain ed., 1646, 187).
vision of God (*visio Dei*). The explanation for this is that the will cannot tend to its own act as an object directly, but can only do so reflexively. As such, the highest object to which it can tend in the created order (*in genere creaturarum*) is the *visio Dei*, which is an act of the intellect. The will, then, is able to tend *finaliter* to two things: God as the “uncreated good” (*bonum increatum*), and the vision of God as a good in the genus of created things.

Now as regards the subjective element of beatitude, *beatitudo formaliter*, Giles understands this to be an act of the will. As with beatitude *finaliter*, beatitude *formaliter* is considered in a twofold way: (1) without qualification, and (2) in a certain genus. Beatitude in the first sense is identified as an act of the will tending directly to God, in the second it is associated with an act of the will that tends, not to God Himself, but to the vision of God.

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74 Ibid: “Dicemus etiam quod beatitudo finaliter possit esse dupliciter: vel finaliter simpliciter vel finaliter in aliquo certo genere. Finaliter simpliciter est in ipso Deo, quia ipse Deus tamquam summum bonum est principalis finis noster et est illud in quo constat consummante quies nostra, iuxta illud Augustini I. Confess. circa principium: ’Ad te nos fecisti Domine et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requescat in te.’ In ipso ergo Deo erit ultima quies cordis nostri. Proprius quod ipse Deus est illud, in quo finaliter stat beatitudo nostra. Finaliter tamen, non simpliciter, sed in certo genere stat beatitudo nostra in visione Dei...nam in genere creaturarum potissimum bonum vel ponimus actum intellectus, vel actum voluntatis. Ipse autem actus nostrae voluntatis non est proprius objectum eius. Infra Deum ergo non ponimus objectum voluntatis in quod directe tendat nisi visionem Dei, quia in nihil aliud maius potest voluntas directe tendere quam in visionem Dei. In actum autem sumum voluntas directe numquam tendit, sed semper per reflexionem” (Louvain ed., 1646, 188).

75 Ibid: “Et sic damus duo in quibus est beatitudo finaliter iuxta duobus objectis voluntatis in quod potest directe tendere: unum in quod est beatitudo finaliter simpliciter ut bonum increatum, videlicet ipsum Deum; et unum in quod beatitudo est finaliter in certo genere ut visionem Dei” (Louvain ed., 1646, 188).

76 Ibid: “Sic oportet dare duo in quibus sit beatitudo formaliter: unum in quo beatitudo sit formaliter simpliciter et aliud quod sit formaliter beatitudo in certo genere. Damus autem duplicem actum voluntatis: unum per quem formaliter tendit in Deum tamquam in
Despite Giles's claim that beatitude consists in some way in the vision of God, it is worth bearing in mind that he places a rather strict qualification on this claim. Specifically, he maintains that happiness is only found in the vision of God to the extent that such an act of the intellect is associated with the will. The explanation for this is that felicity is the object of the will rather than the intellect and therefore must be identified with the former faculty if it is to count as a form of beatitude. Accordingly, he precludes the intellect from having an intrinsic role to play in happiness, attributing to it a merely ancillary one, for "felicity is nothing other than the object of the will or an act of the will."

Giles, then, recognizes four types of beatitude: (1) God, (2) an act of the will tending to God, (3) the vision of God, and (4) an act of the will tending toward the vision of God. How precisely are we to interpret this taxonomy? In positing four types of beatitude, does Giles mean to say that rational agents have four different ends? In point of fact, Giles thinks that rational agents have only one

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obiectum voluntatis finale simpliciter, et alium per quem tendit formaliter in visionem Dei, tamquam in obiectum finale eius, non simpliciter, sed in certo genere. Actus ergo voluntatis formaliter coniungens nos Deo, qui est noster finis simpliciter, est beatitudo formaliter simpliciter. Sed actus voluntatis per quem voluntas tendit in visionem Dei, non tamquam in finem simpliciter sed tamquam finem in certo genere, est beatitudo formaliter non simpliciter, sed in certo genere" (Louvain ed., 1646, 188).

Ibid: "Visio ergo potest esse beatitudo modo quo dictum est, non quia est aliquid intellectus nec quia est ad intellectum pertinens, sed quia est obiectum voluntatis. ...Si ergo felicitas habet rationem finis et finis rationem boni, et sit voluntatis in bonum tendere, solum per comparationem ad voluntatem, nullo autem modo per comparationem ad intellectum secundum se est accipianda felicitas" (Louvain ed., 1646, 188).


Ibid: "Possimus autem, si velimus, assignare quatuor felicitates se habentes per ordinem: videlicet ipsum Deum; actum voluntatis per quem tendimus in Deum; visionem
principal and final end, and that is God himself. The vision of God, though a final
cause, is merely the object of the will in the created order; it is an "end under the
end" (finis sub fine). Indeed, even the acts of the will are merely means toward the
goal of being united with God.

Although the will and the intellect, then, are merely means toward union with
God, it may still be asked whether one act unites us to God more closely than the
other. Given the voluntarist framework of this Quodlibet, it is not surprising to find
Giles endorsing the claim that it is the will's act that joins us to God more closely
than the intellect's. The vision of God merely joins us to God mediately (mediate).
The explanation for this is that any act of the intellect, no matter how exalted, is
merely the object of the will as a created good. The will's act, however, is able to
surpass any created good - the vision of God included - and tend immediately
toward God himself, who is, of course, uncreated. Moreover it is Giles's view, as

Dei; et actum voluntatis per quem tendimus in huiusmodi visionem” (Louvain ed., 1646,
190).

80 Ibid (Louvain ed., 1646, 189).
81 Ibid: “Hoc etiam idem patet: nam si visio est beatitudo, hoc est prout est objectum
voluntatis et prout est est finis, non autem finis simpliciter, sed est finis sub fine; unde est
finis ordinatus ad alium finem, id est, ad Deum. Hoc ergo modo erit in visione felicitas
prout voluntas per actum suum tendit in visionem Dei et per visionem Dei tendit in
Deum. Numquam autem sic voluntas coniungitur Deo prout per actum suum tendit in
visionem, et per visionem tendit in Deum sicut per actum suum immediate tendit in Deum”
(Louvain ed., 1646, 189).
82 Ibid: “Si visio ergo sit felicitas, hoc est prout voluntas per visione tendit in Deum,
silicet prout per eam voluntas coniungitur Deo mediate. Sed ipse actus voluntatis est
felicitas prout per huiusmodi actum voluntas tendit in Deum immediate. Ideo huiusmodi
actus voluntatis principalis est felicitas, quia immediate nos coniungit Deo ut in eo
felicitatem ponimus quam actus intellectus” (Louvain ed., 1646, 189). “Visio ergo est tota
merces creata, sed est alia merces multo excellentior: ut ipse Deus, in eo autem est
principalis beatitudo quod magis coniungit voluntatem ipsi principali mercedi, sive ipsi
Deo” (Louvain ed., 1646, 191-92).
we saw in 3.1, that the will is a nobler power than the intellect. It is united to God as He is in himself, while the intellect is united to God merely as he exists in the intellect.\(^3\)

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is safe to conclude that Giles's presentation of beatitude in the *Quodlibets* represents a species to voluntarism. The discussion acquires additional significance however, once it is recognized that the particular form of voluntarism being advanced bears a striking resemblance to that of Henry of Ghent. For one thing, Giles establishes, as we have seen, a hierarchy of "created beatitudes" (*beatitudines creatas*) under the final end, much as Henry did. These created beatitudes are means toward God, in whom beatitude essentially consists. Not all of these grades of beatitude are equal, however, for some unite the rational agent to God more closely than others. Thus, as Giles explains, "amongst created beatitudes the most principal will be beatitude as an act of the will tending to God, because through such an act the will is more immediately united to God. Afterward there will be beatitude in the vision of God itself, and finally there will be felicity in an act of the will to the extent that it tends to the vision of God."\(^4\) But perhaps the most obvious and significant similarity to Henry of Ghent is the claim that, although beatitude is achieved by means of the

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\(^3\) Ibid: "Credimus enim quod plus et nobiliori modo coniungatur voluntas Deo per suum actum quam per actum intellectus, quia per suum actum coniungitur voluntas Deo ut Deus est aliquid in se, sed intellectus per suum actum coniungitur Deo ut est aliquid in nobis..." (Louvain ed., 1646, 190).

\(^4\) Ibid: "Ergo inter beatitudines creatas principalior erit beatitudo actus voluntatis tendens in Deum quia per huiusmodi actum immediatus voluntas coniungitur Deo. Postea erit
intellect and the will, it does not consist in the act of either. Rather, beatitude consists principally in the object of the will: God himself.

What does Giles's theory owe, if anything, to Aquinas? Recall that Thomas, in order to reconcile Aristotle with the Christian theological tradition, had drawn a distinction between happiness as a created good and happiness as an uncreated one. The former he identified with the attainment or vision of God, and the latter with God himself. Giles adopts this distinction as his starting point. The created good or the vision of God Giles designates as the final cause of the will in a certain genus (finaliter in certo genere). Happiness as an uncreated good, or God himself, on the other hand, is termed the final cause of the will without qualification (finaliter simpliciter).

Now although Aquinas maintains that happiness consists essentially in the beatific vision, which is an act of the intellect, he rejects the notion that happiness is the object of the intellect. Rather, it is the object of the will. To Giles's mind, such a claim demonstrates that happiness must always be understood in reference to the will. He accordingly develops Aquinas's distinction between God and the visio Dei as the final causes of the will by introducing the further distinction

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beautudo in ipsa visione Dei, ultimo autem erit felicitas in actu voluntatis prout tendit in visionem Dei" (Louvain ed., 1646, 191).

85 See n. 43 above.
86 See n. 73 above.
87 ST I-II, q. 3, a. 4, corp.
88 Ibid. ad. 2.
89 Giles of Rome, Quod. III, q. 18: "Si ergo felicitas habet rationem finis et finis rationem boni et sit voluntatis in bonum tendere, solum per comparationem ad voluntatem, nullo
between the will's act as it tends to God himself and its act as it tends to the vision of God. Both acts are formal causes of the will: the first is the formal cause of the will without qualification (formaliter simpliciter) and the second its formal cause in a certain genus (formaliter in certo genere). Giles ranks these created beatitudes — i.e. the will's act of tending to God, the vision of God, and the will's act of tending to the vision of God — according to the degree to which they are capable of uniting the rational creature to God. He concludes, recall, that will's act of tending to God himself is nobler than the intellect's act of the visio Dei in the achievement of beatitude because it joins us to God as he is in himself rather than merely as he is in us, which is what the visio Dei achieves. Giles therefore develops Aquinas's position in the direction of Henry of Ghent.

In the final analysis, Giles of Rome departs from Aquinas because he thinks, as Henry does, that Thomas's intellectualist argument does not ultimately achieve what it sets out to. Aquinas's position, as Giles reports it in his reply to an objection, purports to show that the intellect is higher than the will because its nobility is intrinsic to it, that is, “because in knowing there is a motion of things to the soul.” The will's nobility, by contrast, is relative to its object.

autem modo per comparationem ad intellectum secundum se est accipienda felicitas” (Louvain ed., 1646, 188).

90 Ibid: “Credimus enim quod plus et nobiliori modo coniungatur voluntas Deo per suum actum quam per actum intellectus quia per suum coniungitur voluntas Deo ut Deus est aliquid in se, sed intellectus per suum actum coniungitur Deo ut est aliquid in nobis...” (Louvain ed., 1646, 190).

91 Ibid: “Dato tamen quod intellectus esset altior potentia quam voluntas, adhuc non haberetur intentum, nam ponentes intellectum esse altiorum potentiam dicunt quod intellectus sit altior potentia si consideretur in se et nobilior nam nobilitas intellectus est
Now although Aquinas regards the intellect as the nobler power *simpliciter*, he thinks that in regard to divine things the will is higher since it is better to love God than to know him. Relative to things that are beneath the soul, however, it is better to know than to love since “the cognition of natural things is more noble than the things themselves.” According to Giles, this does not demonstrate that the intellect is higher; rather, it shows the opposite. That is, if the will is higher with respect to God as its object, then as far as beatitude is concerned, willing must be considered more noble than knowing. Our beatitude principally must consist in loving God rather than in knowing him, then, chiefly because, as was indicated above, the act of loving conjoins the rational soul more closely to God than knowing does.

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92 Ibid: “Sed si intellectus et voluntas et actus eorum, ut aitunt, non considerentur secundum se sed in ordine ad objectum, vel hoc erit ad res naturales vel ad res divinas, si ad res naturales sic adhuc, ut aitunt, nobilior est intelligere quam velle, quia res sunt intellectae ut sunt in anima, sunt volitae ut sunt seipser. Nobilior autem habetur esse in anima quam in seipser, nobilior est enim cognitione naturalium quam ipsae sint res naturales. Sed si intelligere et velle comparantur ad res divinas sic dicunt quod velle sit nobilior quam intelligere quia divina bonitas perfectus habet esse ut est in seipser et ut a voluntate desideratur quam prout ab intellectu concipitur et nobilior res est ipsa Deus in se quam cognitione quam habet creatura deo” (Louvain ed., 1646, 193).

93 Ibid: “Ponentes igitur quod intellectus simpliciter sit altior potentia quam voluntas ponunt quod respectu rerum divinarum velle sit nobilior et altius quam intelligere et quia respectu rerum divinarum ponimus beatitudinem in anima, dicere debemus quod respectu felicitatis et beatitudinis velle sit nobilior quam intelligere. Beatitudo ergo nostra principalis est in amare vel in velle quam intelligere et in actu voluntatis quam intellectus quia per huiusmodi actum magis coniungimur ipsi Deo...” (Louvain ed., 1646, 193).
The theory advanced in the *Quodlibets*, then, is significantly more redolent of Henry of Ghent than that advanced in the commentary on the *Sentences*. Perhaps the chief point to bear in mind, however, is that both works differ in the final analysis from Aquinas’s view. First, on Thomas’s account, created and uncreated beatitude are essentially equal partners in the final end for rational agents. Second, Aquinas thinks that the will’s act, delight, is merely an accidental feature, a by-product of human beatitude, which consists essentially in the perfection of the intellect. For Giles, although the final end cannot *consist* in an act of the will, the will nonetheless has an essential, rather than merely accidental, role to play in its achievement.

3.3. Theology as an Affective Science

Also connected to the issue of the will’s contribution to the final end is the question of the nature or function of theology. Is theology a speculative science that somehow prefigures the beatific vision, or is it a practical one whose goal is to assist or direct rational agents in making sound moral decisions? We are not here concerned so much with issues surrounding the scope of theology as with the various ways in which Giles of Rome and his contemporaries understood its nature. Accordingly, related issues such as Scotus’s later distinction between theology-in-itself (*theologia in se*) and theology-in-relation-to-us (*theologia nostra*), for example, will play little role in the present discussion. Instead, attention will be focused on Giles’s conception of theology as an affective science, the function of
which is to lead rational agents to the love of God in this life and to union with him in the next.

Now virtually all thinkers between Aquinas and Scotus took it for granted that theology was a "science." Following Aristotle, they defined *scientia* as a system of axioms and theorems capable of yielding definite knowledge. In contrast to other sciences that take their axioms from self-evident principles or in light of a higher science, however, the science of theology, they held, proceeded from principles that have their source in revelation. Giles of Rome is within this tradition.

The relevance of theology as a science to the final end for rational agents is made explicit in *Quodlibet* III, q. 2. There, Giles contends that theology serves the crucial function of contributing to beatitude. On his view, theology is a sort of instrument (*organum*) for acquiring happiness. This is because it supplies knowledge of God in his capacity as the beatifier and glorifier of rational creatures.

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94 Ibid., 8. The exception to this rule was Godfrey of Fontaines, who denied that theology was a true science in the Aristotelian sense. For a discussion of the debate over the scope of theology in the late thirteenth century, see S. Dumont’s "Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition," *Speculum* 64 (1989), 579-99.


96 Cf. Aquinas, *ST* I, q 1., a. 2, corp: "Dicendum sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed scientiam est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huissmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis per arithmetam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo."

97 Giles of Rome, *Quod*. III, q. 2: "...est enim haec scientia [e.g. sacra pagina] quasi organum ad felicitatem et ad hunc finem data est homini propter beatitudinem adipiscendam...et quia haec scientia est organum ad beatitudinem sive ad felicitatem,
claim that theology considers God under such limited and special aspects rather than in his capacity as an infinite being are beyond the scope of this study and, in any case, have been exhaustively examined by Nash. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that his view of theology as an instrument for happiness reflects his belief that theology is an affective science. Before considering how Giles understands such a characterization, however, it will be helpful, in the interests of placing it in context, to consider briefly the contemporary positions against which Giles's theory was competing.

The majority of theologians of the late thirteenth century defined theology as both a speculative and a practical science. That is, they regarded the function of sacra pagina as serving both the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake, and for the sake of leading to good works. Most of them, however, emphasized one of these descriptions over the other.

St. Thomas is notable for holding that, although theology (sacra doctrina) comprises the speculative and the practical, its principal function is the former. His conclusion is grounded in the claim that theology is primarily concerned with divine matters rather than with human action. Indeed, although theology does concern itself with human action, according to Aquinas, it does so only insofar as this is ordered to the knowledge of God, the perfection of which comprises beatitude. Accordingly, theology should principally be considered a speculative

quicquid considerat de Deo, considerat sub hac ratione et sub hac conditione ut est glorificator et beatificator noster” (Louvain ed., 1646, 128-29).

science. Aquinas therefore links the habit of theology to the final end for rational agents. That is, he thinks that scientific knowledge of the divine in this life somehow anticipates, albeit imperfectly, the beatific vision in which our final end consists. Giles of Rome also understands theology to prefigure beatitude. But since he regards our final end as consisting in loving union with God, he sees theology as serving a rather different function from that suggested by Aquinas.

In contrast to St. Thomas, the majority view amongst the Franciscans was that the habit of theology was principally, if not purely, a practical science. Thinkers such as John Peckham, Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Middleton and Peter of Trabibus generally conceded that theology had a speculative aspect, but held that such knowledge as was derived from this science served the further end of leading to good works. Unlike the purely speculative sciences of mathematics or logic that yield knowledge for its own sake, the knowledge acquired by theology serves the further goal of leading to action. On the other hand, unlike a purely practical science such as morality, theology leads to internal, rather than external, action: namely, the act of loving God. Accordingly, these Franciscan authors

99 Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 1, a. 4, corp: “Dicendum quod sacra doctrina...una existens se extendit ad ea quae pertinent ad diversas scientias philosophicas, propter rationem formalem quam in diversis attendit, scilicet prout sunt divino lumine cognoscibilia. Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque, sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica, quia principalius agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis; de quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua eterna beatitudo consistit.”

100 For a review of the Franciscan positions on theology as a practical science, see P. Amorós, “La teologia como ciencia practica en la escuela franciscana en los tiempos que preceden a Escoto,” *AHDLMA* 9 (1934), 261-303.
viewed the science of theology as a mean (medium) between the purely speculative and the purely practical, but nonetheless held that it should principally be included in the practical sciences.101

Giles of Rome, as we have indicated, regarded theology as neither principally a practical nor a theoretical science, but rather an "affective" one. He defended this view as early as in his commentary on Book I of the Sentences when he was still a bachelor, and as late as in his ordinatio of Book II, his last work.102 While this theory had several illustrious defenders, as we shall see presently, it also had numerous detractors, both voluntarist and intellectualist.

According to Giles of Rome, the science of theology (sacra pagina) serves several ends. One of its goals is moral action, and it is therefore said to comprise practical science. Another function of theology concerns contemplation of divine matters. Accordingly, speculative science falls within its orbit. Finally, since

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101 John Peckham, Sent. I, d. 1, q. 5: "Scientia est perfectio animae humanae secundum intellectum; sed quaedam scientiae perficiunt intellectum secundum se, quaedam secundum quod ad effectum ordinatur... Primo modo perficitur intellectus ab habitu pure speculativo. Secundo modo perficitur ab habitu pure practico, cuius est scientia moralis agens de virtute consuetudinali, quam actum frequentatione acquirimus. Ista enim scientia tractat verum ut operabile. Bonum tertio modo perficitur ab habitu quodammodo medium inter habitum pure speculativum et pure practicum, qui dicitur 'sapientia,' cuius primum subiectum non est operabile, sed regulae et finis operandorum; et dicitur 'sapientia' quia ad utrumque se extendit, scilicet ad intellectus illuminationem et affectus inflammationem per amorem. Theologia igitur nec est habitus pure speculativus nec pure practicus, sed inter utrumque medius, scilicet sapientia continens quidquid perfectionis est in habitu pure speculativo et pure practico. Unde haec scientia includit quidquid est animae humanae necessarium, tam secundum intellectum quam secundum affectum. Principaliter tamen inter practicas debet computari" (Amorós ed., "La teología como ciencia," 282-83).

theology is concerned with divine commands whose end is the love of God *(charitai)*, theology may also be considered an affective science.

Of these diverse ends, only love of God is intended for its own sake and is accordingly the end to which both speculation and moral action are ordered. That is, although rational agents can perform good works and can speculate about the divine for the sake of some further goal, the love of God that emerges from practicing the science of theology is always an end in itself. According to Giles, then, theology should principally be considered an affective science. It therefore comes as a surprise to find him conceding that, "if it is asked whether it is more practical than speculative, or vice versa, it should be said that it is more speculative than practical."103

Giles's concession that theology is more a speculative science than a practical one is at first sight puzzling. Given his emphasis on love as the principal end of the habit of theology, one would expect him to follow in the Franciscan tradition

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103 Giles of Rome, *I Sent.* prol., d. 4 q. 1: "...non est inconveniens eiusdem rei diversos esse fines si unus ad alium ordinatur, sicut si bellum ordinatur ad victoriam, potest homo intendere ad bellum et victoriam. Quando autem ita est quod in una re diversos fines aspicimus, oportet unum illorum ad alium ordinar i et ille ad quem alii ordinantur dici tur 'finis ultimus' qui ab alius sic distinguitur quia omnia alia moventur in virtute eius et in omnibus alius ipse intenditur. Ipse autem non movet in virtute aliorum nec alia intenduntur in ipso...Et quia videmus sacra pagina plura intendere, oportet diversos esse fines scripture sacre. Intenditur enim per eam bonam operatio, nam finis moralis ut dicebatur est actio. Ipsa autem potissime de moribus determinat. Rursum, in ea intenditur speculatio quia de summe speculabilibus tractat. Intendit in ea dilectio quia finis precepti charitas. Igitur cum diversi fines in ea intendatur, oportet unum istorum ad alium ordinari et unum illorum principales esse finis principalis ut dicebatur ab alius distinguitur quia ipse ubique intenditur, alii autem non. Et quia dilectio et charitas in tota sacra pagina intenditur quia in ea pendet lex et propheti. Principalis enim finis in sacra pagina intentus est inducere homines ad dei et proximi dilectionem" (Venice ed., 1581, fol. 7vP-Q).
that sees theology as more a practical science than a speculative one. But he rejects this view on the grounds that practical knowledge is ordered to good works, while the speculative knowledge that is derived from theology ultimately anticipates, or is ordered to the beatific vision. Since the latter comprises beatitude more closely than good works, theology, which contributes to beatitude, ought to be considered more a speculative science than a practical one.105

The claim that theology is an affective science is one that Giles shares with Albert the Great and St. Bonaventure.106 Gonsalvus of Spain was also sympathetic to defining theology as an affective science. Unlike philosophy, whose business is the subtle and impartial investigation of universal objects, the purpose of theology, Gonsalvus thinks, is to arouse in rational creatures a desire (affectus) for God.107 To this extent it may be called "affective." But Gonsalvus is also clear that such a description should not be considered some separate category, as Giles thinks it is, above and beyond those outlined by Aristotle. In the final analysis, there are only

104 Ibid.: "Si tamen quereretur utrum sit magis practica quam speculativa vel e contrario, responderi debet quod magis speculativa quam practica" (Venice ed., 1581, fol. 8rB).
105 Ibid: "...visio divina magis principaliter respicit beatitudinem ad quam ordinatur omnis nostra cognition et potissime sacra pagina quam facit operatio" (Venice ed., 1581, fol. 8rB).
106 Albert the Great, Sent. I, d. 1, a. 4: "...et ideo ista scientia [e.g. theologica] proprie est affectiva, id est veritatis quae non sequestratur a ratione boni, et ideo perficit et intellectum et affectum" (Borgnet ed., XXV, 18); Bonaventure, Sent. I, proem., q. 3. See also, L. Amorós, "La teología como ciencia," 268-69.
107 Gonsalvus of Spain, Quaest. disp.: "Quia contemplatio theologicae ordinatur ad inflammationem affectus et non ad sublem considerationem vel investigationem consideratorum. E converso est de contemplatione philosophiae, quae ordinatur ad sublem inquisitionem et considerationem consideratorum, et non ad inflammationem affectus" (Amorós ed., BFS, 79).
two types of sciences, the practical and the speculative, and theology should be considered as falling into the former category.108

Scotus agreed with this assessment, as did Godfrey of Fontaines. Of course Scotus, in agreement with Gonsalvus, thinks that theology is practical.109 Godfrey, by contrast, to the extent that he sees theology as a science at all, thinks that it is primarily speculative.110 All the same, they agree in holding that if it is true that theology's goal is the love of God, then it must ultimately be considered a practical science.111

In his commentary on Book II of the Sentences, Giles responded to the charge that if theology is an affective science then it should be considered practical rather than speculative. In this work, he reiterates his earlier view that theology is affective, and further explains why such a description cannot be reduced — as Scotus, Godfrey and Gonsalvus think it can — to the level of the practical. Giles's critics, recall, had argued that if the end of theology is love, and love is an act, then


110 For a discussion of Godfrey's understanding of theology as a science, see S.D. Dumont, “Theology as a Science,” 588.

it follows that theology ought to be considered a practical science. Giles rejects this on the following grounds. To argue that a science is practical solely on the basis that it is ordered towards action, as his critics think, is wrongheaded. Rather, it is necessary to draw a distinction between internal and external action, otherwise we will have to concede the absurd claim that speculation belongs to practical science since it is ordered toward the action of knowing. That is, according to Giles, to call a science "practical" it is necessary that it be ordered to external action. Since the act of love is an internal act, theology must be considered an affective science.¹¹²

Giles's understanding of theology as a science faced pointed criticism from another of Scotus's teachers, William of Ware (fl. 1267-1300). After rehearsing Giles's position almost verbatim in his commentary on the Sentences, William proceeds to supply three reasons against considering theology an affective science. First, if Giles's distinction between the internal and the external is right, then we would have to conclude that moral science is not practical owing to the fact that

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¹¹² Giles of Rome, Sent. II, d. 21, q. 1, a. 1: "Oportet ergo ulteriorum finem dare theologiae quam scire, et iste finis est diligere et caritatem habere...Sed dices ipsum diligere est aliqua actio et aliqua operatio, ut ex hoc theologa debat dici 'practica.' Dicemus quod si sic vellemus appellare scientiam practicam, cum ipsa speculatio sit aliqua actio, scientia speculativa dicetur 'practica.' Propter quod oportet nos dicere quod est actio exterior et interior ex actione autem exteriori potest vocari scientia practica...sed sicut est actio exterior et actio interior, et hic est duplex quia vel respicit intellectum et hic est spectulator et scientia hoc intendens ut finem est speculativa, vel respicit effectum et voluntatem et haec actio est diletio et scientia hoc intendens ut finem debet dici diletiva vel affectiva" (Venice ed., 1581, 172).
the act of virtue remains within the agent. This is clearly nonsense.\footnote{William of Ware, \textit{Sent.} I, proem., q. 4: "Hoc quod dicitur quod haec est magis speculativa quam practica, quia practica est circa aliquod operabile extra, sed actio huius scientiae manet intra, ex hoc sequeretur quod scientia moralis non esset practica, quia actio virtutis manet in agente" (Amorós ed., \textit{"La teología como ciencia,"} 296).} Second, according to William, science is said only of things about which it is possible to err. But since we can only err about thoughts and the rectitude of actions, we are only entitled to posit two types of science: the speculative and the practical. Furthermore, it is not possible to err with regard to emotions, and therefore the "affective" is not a category that is applicable to science.\footnote{Ibid: "Item, quod non sit affectiva probatur, quia scientia non ponitur in nobis nisi ut actus dirigat circa quos convenit errare, et propter hoc in viribus naturalibus, ut in potentiss sensitivis, non ponitur scientia. Cum igitur non contingit nisi dupliciter errare, scilicet interius verum speculando et externus operando, non erit ponere nisi duplicem habitum: speculativum et practicum" (Amorós ed., \textit{"La teología como ciencia,"} 296).} Finally, if theology is a "science" then it must be in the intellect. But since Giles does not think that theology is reducible to the practical or the speculative, but rather is affective, then it is necessary to posit a third category of intellect independent of the speculative and the practical: the "affective intellect" (\textit{intellectus affectivus}). Needless to say, Aristotle never posited any such category of intellect.\footnote{Ibid: "Item, si ponitur habitus affectivus et iste habitus sit in intellectu, cum sit habitus scientificus, necesse est ponere intellectum affectivum, qui nec esset practicus nec} 

Giles's concession that theology is more a speculative science than a practical one should be seen as consistent with the understanding of theology defended by Henry of Ghent. Granted, Henry rejects the claim that theology is an affective
science. On Henry's view, even assuming that speculation about divine matters
does in fact lead to love of God over and above knowledge for its own sake,
nonetheless this does not make it an affective science. This is because, according
to Henry, a science ought to be denominated by its intrinsic purpose (fine suo intra).
That is, even if love is a consequence of theological speculation, as Giles claims it
is, nonetheless this is merely an accidental rather than intrinsic feature of the
science of theology. Nonetheless, Henry's view that theology should be considered
a speculative science without qualification permits us to see that such a position
was not necessarily associated with intellectualism.116

Whatever the shortcomings of Giles's understanding of theology as an
affective science, he defended it throughout his career, undeterred by its numerous
detractors. His emphasis on love as the central motif and goal toward which this
science is ordered, places him in the Augustinian tradition. And although many
Franciscans criticized Giles for his view of theology as an affective science, in
many respects he is closer to the Franciscan tradition in this regard than, for
example, a thinker like Henry of Ghent.

speculativus, quem numquam posuit Philosopbus” (Amorós ed., “La teología como
ciencia,” 296).
116 Henry of Ghent, SQQ a. 8, q. 3: “Unde et quia huius scientiae speculatio sicut et vitae
futurae perficitur in affectione dilectionis et fruitionis, dicitur a quibusdam quod ista
scientia debet dici potius ‘affectiva’ quam ‘speculativa’; sed non est ita. Denominatio enim
scientiae debet esse a fine suo intra in quo stat ipsa cognitione intra limites suas. Nunc
autem illud quod est in affectione sequens huius scientiae speculatiorum finis extra se est.
Ipsa speculatio quae stat in cognitione veri in intellectu est finis eius intra se ut scientia est
et ideo simpliciter et absolute verius debet dici ‘speculativa’ quam ‘practica’ aut ‘affectiva’
(Venice ed., 1521, fol. 66rZ).
3.4. Concluding Remarks

On the cluster of issues associated with the primacy of the will, then, Giles can be seen to be squarely in the voluntarist camp. On the question of whether the will or the intellect is the nobler power, for example, we saw Giles arguing that the will is the higher power. And although Giles changed his position on whether beatitude is an act of the will or the intellect, defending the view that beatitude consists in an act of the will in the early works, while defending the view that it is in the object in the later Quodlibetal Questions, nonetheless both of these are voluntarist positions. John Peckham, for one, defended the first position, and Henry of Ghent the latter. Finally, the view that theology is an affective science, though seen as problematic by several of Giles’s contemporaries, both voluntarist and intellectualist, is nonetheless consistent essentially with the Franciscan understanding of the purpose of theology.

Perhaps the most significant feature of Giles’s theory of the primacy of the will is the strong emphasis on love as a transformative power. In the final analysis, this represents a rather significant departure from the standard Aristotelian account of the final end, which is associated with the perfection of the self. On Giles view, the final end for rational agents is not actually the perfection of the self or any of its powers, which are just means to the final end; rather, the *sumnum bonum* for rational agents consists in the transference of the soul into God. Such a
theory, though indebted to Aquinas in certain respects, is far more redolent of Henry of Ghent than of Thomas.
CHAPTER 4
THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM

The vast majority of medieval thinkers in the Latin west regarded freedom from constraint as necessary to account for moral responsibility. Only if actions are specifically under an agent's control and therefore open to more than one possibility, they thought, could he or she be held responsible for them. Broadly speaking, however, medieval thinkers often disagreed over the scope and nature of such freedom. The latter part of the thirteenth century was a particularly fruitful period in the history of this debate, as thinkers attempted to discover whether the basis of freedom was to be found in the will, the intellect or some other feature of rational agents such as the immateriality of the soul. The present chapter is concerned with the answers that Giles of Rome and his contemporaries gave to this question. Giles's position is unique in harmonizing older traditions with the more recent concerns of the period.

Before examining Giles's account of freedom, it will be helpful to assess Aquinas's understanding of contingent action and the reaction that this elicited in the commission that drew up the condemnations of 1277. Needless to say,
Aquinas in no way denied the freedom of the person. He did, however, regard reason as the cause of the freedom, a notion that was found objectionable to the voluntarists of the period. Aquinas therefore formed part of the backdrop against which thinkers such as Giles of Rome were forced to develop their respective accounts of the freedom of the will. Furthermore, if, as some modern scholars such as Kent and Putallaz have assumed, Aquinas in fact influences Giles’s account of freedom and moral responsibility, then we will need to look at Aquinas’s understanding of freedom in order to serve as a basis for comparison.¹

It is to Aquinas, then, that we must first turn our attention.

4.1. The Philosophical Background

In contrast to many voluntarists — who admit the necessitation of the will only implicitly — Aquinas overtly accepts the compatibility of necessity and volition.²

Because he is aware that necessity (necessitas) is considered by some to be a threat to human freedom, however, he finds it crucial to distinguish between the forms of causation that are compatible with voluntary action, and those that are not.³

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² Although voluntarists will seldom use the term “necessity” in association with the will, most agree — up until Scotus, at any rate — that the will cannot reject God when it is in his presence, and that rational agents can only will what they regard as good. I take it that such assertions amount to a necessitation of the will by God and the good. Cf Henry of Ghent, *Quod. IX*, q. 5. See also our discussion in chapter 1.
³ *ST* I, q. 82, a. 1, obj. 3: “Secundum voluntatem sumus domini nostrorum actuum. Sed eius quod ex necessitate est, non sumus domini. Ergo actus voluntatis non potest de necessitate esse.”
There are four types of necessitation, and they correspond to Aristotle's four causes. Two of these are intrinsic, and two extrinsic. Intrinsic necessity includes material causality and formal causality, or what Aquinas calls "natural" and "absolute" necessity. Extrinsic necessity, on the other hand, is associated with final and efficient causality. Aquinas calls these "necessity of the end" or "utility," and "necessity of coercion," respectively.

Of the foregoing principles, only efficient causality, or the necessity of coercion is "altogether repugnant to the will" (omnino repugnat voluntati). This is due to the fact that violence cannot coexist in the same nature with that which is voluntary. In short, "just as it is impossible for a thing to be simultaneously violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced, or violent, and voluntary."

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4 Ibid., corp.: "...necessitas dicitur multipliciter. Necesse est enim quod non potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit aliqui, uno modo ex principio intrinsec: sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta. Alio modo convenit aliqui quod non posit non esse, ex aliquo extrinsec, vel fine vel agente. Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem; ut cibus dicitur necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter. Et haec vocatur necessitas finis, quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. Ex agente autem hoc aliqui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis."

5 Ibid., corp: "Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat voluntati."

6 Ibid., corp: "Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclination quaedam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid naturale quia est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossible est quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale; ita impossible est quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum sive violentum, et voluntarium."
Natural necessity, then, refers to the will’s general inclination towards perfection or happiness. By this Aquinas does not mean that human beings necessarily desire all goods or that the will cannot reject certain goods, for it is his contention that only objects that are good in all respects must necessarily be willed. Rather, he means simply that whenever we desire some good or contemplate performing some action, we do so because we think that the attainment of that good or the performance of that action will contribute to our flourishing as human beings. Since in this life there is no object of choice that cannot be regarded as deficient in some respect, we can always view any mixed good as either contributing to our happiness or detracting from it, and on such grounds either desire it or reject it. Only God is truly identified with happiness and therefore cannot be rejected. But until the rational agent experiences the beatific vision and makes the explicit connection between happiness and God, Aquinas argues that there is no good that is so perfect in the present life that it cannot be rejected. Such a picture leaves ample scope, to Thomas’s mind, for choice and therefore freedom.

7 *ST* I, q. 82, a. 2, corp: “Sunt enim quaedam particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quia sine his potest alius esse beatus; et huiusmodi voluntas non de necessitate inhaeret. Sunt autem quaedam habentia necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quibus scilicet homo Deo inhaeret, in quo solo vera beatitudo consistit. Sed tamen antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas huiusmodi connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret, nec his quae Dei sunt. Sed voluntas videtis Deum per essentiam de necessitate inhaeret Deo, sicut nunc ex necessitate volumus esse beati. Patet ergo quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult.”
It is in relation to the choice of mixed goods, or the means to happiness, then, that rational agents are free. About happiness (beatitudo) or the final end itself, human beings do not deliberate. Strictly speaking, the human capacity for freedom or contingent action is due to "free decision" (liberum arbitrium). It is because rational agents possess liberum arbitrium that they have control over the limited goals they select, and can accordingly be held morally responsible for their choices. As Aquinas puts it, if rational agents did not have liberum arbitrium, then "deliberations, encouragements, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be pointless."9

Aquinas therefore rejects the claim that rational agents are determined in their particular choices or actions. However he does admit, as we have seen, that the will is determined to the good in its capacity as an inclination, or as he calls it in an early work, in its capacity as voluntas ut natura.10 For Aquinas, simple willing is distinct from the act of selecting the means to happiness. He can therefore allow for the determination of the will to the universal end without this fact compromising human freedom.

9 ST I, q. 83, a. 1, corp.
10 Sent. II, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "Unde illud quod finis est hominis est naturaliter in ratione cognitum esse bonum et appetendum, et voluntas consequens istam cognitionem dicitur voluntas ut natura" (Mandonnet ed., 994).
According to Aquinas, then, rational beings escape from the determinism of matter because they have intellects that can deliberate and wills that can choose what the intellect has determined to be best. Rational agents are, in short, planning agents whose actions are ultimately in their control to the extent that they are the outcome of reasoned or deliberate choice. Freedom therefore has two "roots" (radices) or sources according to Aquinas: the will, which serves as the subject of freedom, and the intellect, which is its cause.

Notice that although the will plays an important role in the act of choice, it is the intellect to which St Thomas accords the crucial role in the production of the free act. On Aquinas's view, human beings escape the web of determinism to which animals are subjected because they are rational, that is, because they can act on the basis of free judgement (liberum judicium) rather than by natural instinct.

According to Aquinas, the act of judgement is free due to the human capacity to evaluate, or compare alternative courses of action. This is not true of the lower animals. When the sheep sees the wolf it is hardwired, as it were, to apprehend it as something dangerous and therefore to be avoided. The rational being, on the

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11 ST I, q. 83, a. 3, corp: "...proprium liberii arbitrii est electio; ex hoc enim liberii arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possimus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberii arbitrii ex electione considerare oportet. Ad electionem autem concurrunt aliquid ex parte cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae: ex parte autem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur quod appetendo acceptetur quod per consilium diiudicatur."

12 ST I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad. 2: "... radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa feri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi dixissent liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione judicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis."
other hand, can weigh the reasons in favour of fleeing a dangerous situation or against it, and choose in accordance with a consideration that is entirely independent of the instinct for self-preservation. The intellect, in short, has the freedom to specify the will’s act and regard any act or object under its desirable or undesirable description. The will is then free to choose or reject what the intellect has proposed to it, but only after a prior determination on the part of the intellect.

It is in this sense that reason is said to be the cause of freedom. This is a view that he held as early as in the *De Veritate*, where he asserted that “the whole formal character of freedom depends upon the manner of knowing.” He furthers this account by asserting that “free choice does not refer to the will absolutely but in subordination to reason.”

Although Aquinas clearly maintains that the will is the subject of freedom since it inclines to rationally apprehended goods, his claim that reason is its cause

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13 *ST* I, q. 83, a. 1, corp: “Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero, sicut animalia bruta. Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero; quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa feri. Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita...Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia; et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.”

14 *ST* I-II, q. 13, a. 6, corp: “Potest enim homo velle et non velle, agere et non agere; potest etiam velle hoc aut illud. Cuius ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis accipitur. Quidquid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum, in hoc voluntas tendere potest. Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere; sed hoc etiam quod est non velle et non agere. Et tursum in omnibus particularibus bons potest considerare rationem boni aliquius, et defectum aliquius boni, quod habet rationem mali; et secundum hoc, potest unumquodque huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile.”

15 *De ver.*, q. 24, a. 2, corp.
quite clearly resembles article 173 of the condemnations of 1277, which asserted as
heretical the notion that "knowledge (scientia) of contraries is the sole cause why
the rational soul is capable of opposites." 17 Although scholars such as Hissette
have questioned whether this article accurately represents St Thomas's teaching,
Aquinas's adversaries nonetheless seized upon his contention that reason is the
cause of freedom. Undoubtedly, they thought it bore too close a resemblance to
the condemned proposition to be passed over in silence. 18

Perhaps the most vocal critic of Aquinas's understanding of freedom in the
period subsequent to the condemnations was the Franciscan William de la Mare.
According to William, if freedom is merely the outcome of having diverse
conceptions of the good, then there can be no freedom of the will prior to
deliberation. This would make the good actions of virtuous men and the bad
actions of vicious men unfree, since they are committed habitually or without
deliberation. 19 To preserve moral responsibility, therefore, it is necessary to assert
that freedom belongs to the will by virtue of some innate property -- sua naturalis
proprietas -- that the will is free of its very nature. Indeed, not only does the will not
derive its freedom from the intellect, according to William, but quite the contrary:

16 DV 24, a. 6, ad. 1.
17 173. "Quod scientia contrariorum solum est causa quare anima rationalis potest in
opposita;..." (Piché ed., 132). Cf. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, I, 286; Putallaz,
Insolente liberté, 67-82 and Hocedez, "La condamnation de Gilles de Rome," 34.
18 Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles, 254-255.
19 William de la Mare, Corr., 58: "Illud autem reputamus falsum, quia ex hoc sequitur quod
voluntas nihil facit libere antequam ratio diversas conceptiones boni habuerit; et ita viri
perfecti qui sequuntur prius primum appetitum boni quam huiusmodi varias conceptiones
any such freedom that is possessed by the intellect or the other powers of the soul is derived from the will.  

William’s view that the will is free ex sua naturali proprietate is related to a similar claim that was originally made for the will just prior to the condemnations: that it is free formaliter. This claim – that the will is free of its very form or nature – can be traced to William’s Franciscan predecessors at Paris, among whom should be included John of la Rochelle (c. 1238-1245), Franciscan regent master at Paris in the generation just prior to Aquinas, and Walter of Bruges, Aquinas’s own contemporary. Because the term formaliter became the most common term in which to express the freedom of the will by Giles of Rome and his contemporaries, it is worth pausing to consider its lineage.

According to John of La Rochelle, will and reason are different acts of the same potency: free decision (liberum arbitrium), or what he occasionally refers to as “the rational power” (vis rationalis). The will denotes free decision in its capacity as active and self-moving. The reason, by contrast, is part active, part passive: it is

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20 Ibid: “...libertas est in voluntate ex sua naturali proprietate, non a ratione; immo secundum quod libertas est in ratione et in aliis viribus potius est a voluntate...” (Glorieux ed., 237).
22 John of la Rochelle, Summa de vitis: “…liberum arbitrium est vis rationalis que inquantum est cognitiva ratio, inquantum motiva voluntas dictur. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus: coniugate sunt cogitativa et vitales virtutes in eodem, scilicet in libero arbitrio...Notandum tamen quod ratio, voluntas nomina sunt actus et etiam potentie. Similiter liberum arbitrium. Secundum quod sunt nomina potentie, idem est ratio et voluntas: sunt enim nomen unius potentie, scilicet liberis arbitrii vel vis rationalis. Secundum quod sunt nomen actus, non sunt idem: sicut enim alius est velle, alius est iudicare, sic ratio et voluntas” (Lottin ed., Psychologie et morale, I, 130-131).
active insofar as it performs the act of understanding or abstraction, but passive in its capacity as apprehensive or receptive (susceptiva) of forms.

The degree to which a potency is abstracted from matter is the crucial factor in determining whether it is free or not. Because the will is entirely immaterial it can move itself and is accordingly exempt from coercion. This is not true of the reason. Rather, since as "receptive" (susceptiva) reason has a "material mode" (modum materiae), it is passively determined. Now because the will is totally abstracted from matter and therefore capable of self-motion, John argues that it supplies the formal element in free decision. The explanation for this is that the will alone is intrinsically (per se) free. Reason, on the other hand, supplies the decision or judgement, that is, the material element.

St Thomas's contemporary Walter of Bruges seems to have been inspired, at least partially, by John's doctrine that the will is "formally" free. According to Walter, the foundations of freedom cannot be grounded formally in the reason because the intellect is only "partially" (semiplene) free. It is free to the extent that it is abstracted from matter and not tied to a bodily organ. Its act of deliberation

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23 Ibid: "Ipsa vero vis rationalis, quia immaterialis, ideo libera; quod patet ex actu suo potissimo, scilicet intelligere, qui non fit <nisi> per abstractionem a materia. Tamen ipsa vis rationalis secundum quod apprehensiva, modum habet materie; est enim passiva quodammodo secundum quod susceptible; unde quantum ad hoc non est penitus absoluta a materia et modo materiali, cum materialem retineat modum. Sed secundum quod motiva, activa est, non habens modum materialem, sed formalem, et sic voluntas est; idcirco secundum quod est voluntas, est penitus absoluta a materia et modo materiali, et ideo secundum quod voluntas est vis seipsam movens, non potens cogi" (Lottin ed., Psychologie et morale, I, 133).
(collationem) is also indeterminate. On the other hand, Walter insists that the act of judgement (judicium) is not similarly free since it is restricted by the rules of truth.25

Walter therefore rejects the view that freedom can be exclusively associated with rationality on the grounds that the contingency of the intellect alone cannot provide an adequate foundation for free agency. Although he concedes that the rational capacity for opposites represents freedom of a certain kind, he nonetheless insists that it is only an imperfect form of freedom. The explanation for this lies in the fact that rational activity on its own cannot result in a free choice. Of itself, the intellect’s ability to conceive of opposite states of affairs results not in perfect freedom, according to Walter, but rather indifference (indifferentia). To escape from this state of neutrality, a spontaneous choice or preference (praevaptatio) is required. This latter act is performed by the will.26

Walter concludes that the completely free act consists of the intellect showing the will its various options and thereby providing the “matter” (materia) for choice. Because matter represents potentiality or passivity, this stage is characterized by a certain indifference, which merely represents the beginning (inchoatio) of freedom.

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24 Ibid: “Ideo in libero arbitrio, materiale est arbitrium rationis, scilicet judicium faciendi et non faciendi; formale, voluntas cuius per se est libertas” (Lottin ed., Psychologie et morale, I, 134).


26 Ibid: “...ratio est libera, sed imperfecta; ratio enim coexistens voluntati, ut genus speciei, est ratio quae est essentia; omnis autem ratio et secundum ipsam rationalis potentia habet indifferentiam ad opposita, quae est libertas aliqua, quia non est ad unum per alienum sui actum vel differentiam actata, sed non est libertas perfecta, quia non
Its "completion" (*consummatio*) occurs only once the will emerges from this state of indifference by making a choice.\(^{27}\) Freedom is therefore derived not from the intellect, but formally from the will itself.\(^{28}\)

According to Walter then, three things "concur" (*concurrunt*) for freedom: (1) several goods or options from which the will can choose, (2) an indifference to these options, and (3) a choice or preference for one of these goods over the others. Walter argues that (1) and (2) are the business of the intellect, and (3) is an act of the will. Notice that, although Walter does not explicitly assert that reason causes freedom, he concedes that it is one of the factors that must necessarily concur with the formal freedom of the will if free action is to occur. Moreover it is quite clear that reason contributes to freedom in more than a merely metaphorical sense as later voluntarists assert; indeed, according to Walter, it moves the will as a final cause.\(^{29}\)

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\(^{27}\) Ibid. ad 1: "... dic quod ex eo quod est rationalis, est arbitrio libera et in eo active, non completive: indifferentia enim quam habet, eo quod rationalis, est libertatis quaedam inchoatio, sed per voluntatem, eo quod vult, fit alterius praepatio et libertatis consummatio" (PB X, 51-52).

\(^{28}\) Ibid. ad 1: "... possunt tamen primae tres positiones teneri alioquo modo et concordari sic: Ad libertatem tria concurrunt, scilicet quod duo vel plura diversa proponantur et quod in eligiente indifferentia quaedam ad illa habeatur et quod unum altero vel alis praepotatur. Primum habet voluntas a ratione ut potestia conferens et proponens voluntati quid volendit; secundum habet a ratione ut est essentia quae est in eo quod ratio habet indifferentiam ad utrum libet horum; tertium habet a seipsa, scilicet voluntate, scilicet unius illorum praepotationem, et quia in hoc consummatur libertas, ideo propri et quasi formali a se, vel per illud quod habet in se est libera; sed ratio, ut potestia, ostendit sibi libertatis materiam, sed ratio, ut essentia, dat sibi quamdam quasi generis indifferentiam" (PB X, 52-53).

\(^{29}\) Ibid, ad. 3: "... dic quod tripexus est movens, scilicet per modum efficientis, [finis] et [consulentis]. Primo modo voluntas movet intellectum ut sibi et alis dominans; secundo..."
The framework in which to discuss the foundations of human freedom had been established by the time of Giles of Rome. The topic was most commonly discussed in connection with the Aristotelian terminology of matter and form. To assert of a power that it was formally free was intended to demonstrate that it was free of its very nature. Voluntarists such as Walter of Bruges and John of la Rochelle in particular associated formal freedom with some form of self-motion. They located this ability in the will. Giles of Rome inherits, at least in part, this position.

4.2. Giles of Rome and the Foundations of Freedom

It is a general feature of the period after the condemnations of 1277 that both voluntarists and intellectualists more or less universally accepted the freedom of the will, undoubtedly because the condemnations themselves made it heretical to teach otherwise. Giles of Rome is no exception, for in accordance with the general tenor of the period he takes it for granted that the will is free. However, unlike most of his contemporaries, who attribute to the will freedom from a single source, Giles takes a different approach. For rather than seeing freedom as exclusively derived from some formal feature of the will itself, as voluntarists do, or derivatively from the nature of the soul or intellect, as intellectualists do, Giles argues that the freedom of the will has multiple sources.

modo movet intellectus voluntatem sibi bonum ostendens; tertio modo movet ipsi ut velit consulens” (PB X, 53).
The "principal" or "radical" source of the will's freedom is the immaterial nature of the soul, a claim related to that of John of la Rochelle. Immateriality ensures that an agent is self-reflexive (supra se conversiva) and can therefore direct itself to some goal outside of itself. This is a feature of intellectual beings.

Natural agents (agentes per naturam) are be distinguished from intellectual agents (agentes per intellectum) in accordance with the following principle: that while the latter can order themselves, the former are ordered to a single end by an innate, natural principle.

Unlike material beings, then, which are determined to one outcome given the right conditions, the immaterial nature is abstracted from matter and can therefore reflect upon itself. Accordingly, such natures "can freely act or not act." For this reason, Giles concludes that the will has freedom from the soul principaliter or radicaliter.

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30 See n. 27.
31 Giles of Rome, Quod. IV, 21: "Sed licet sic sit quod aliqua non possint seipsa ordinare in aliquid sicut sunt agentia per naturam, aliqua tamen seipsa possunt in aliud ordinare, sicut sunt agentia per intellectum. Talia sunt enim sunt immaterialia, et hoc est de ratione rei immaterialis, quod sit supra se conversiva. Illud autem quod est supra se conversivum etiam habet actionem redeuntem ad seipsum, et consequens est quod si seipsum possit movere etiam possit seipsum in aliquid ordinare et hoc est liber arbitrii: esse dominum suorum actuum et posse seipsum in aliquid ordinare" (Louvain ed., 1646, 257).
32 Ibid: "Inde est ergo quod aliqua dicantur agere ex necessitate naturae quia necessitantur ut sic agant et non alter. Aliqua autem ex libero arbitrio in quorum potestate est seipsa ordinare in aliquid. Cum igitur sic posse ordinare competat rebus quae sunt supra se conversivae - nam ordinare seipsum est habere actionem est habere actionem ad seipsum redeuntem, quod idem est ac se supra se convertere - et quia quod res sint supra se conversivae, habent ex immaterialitate suae essentiae vel naturae, bene dictum est quod radicaliter libertas arbitrii competat rebus ex immaterialitate suae essentiae vel naturae, quia talia possunt se supra se convertere et possunt libere agere vel non agere" (Louvain ed., 1646, 257).
A second source of the will's freedom is the intellect. Because the will requires the intellect for its act, the intellect acts as the proximate (ex proxima) source of its freedom. The intellect is capable of contributing to the freedom of the will because it is undetermined or open to more than one possibility. It owes such indeterminacy to its immateriality. For just as the will is self-reflexive and can order itself due to its location in the immaterial soul, so too can the intellect "convert itself upon the intelligible species, upon which, by converting itself, it understands the thing and its opposite."33 Giles derives this theory from the Topics (142a23-32a). Elsewhere, he makes a similar point, namely, that we understand certain things only when we have a grasp of their opposites, so that "slanted", for example, is only really understood in relation to "straight."34 Thus, Giles concludes, to know a single form is implicitly and simultaneously also to know its contrary.

Now while the intellect may be able to know a single form, and by extension its opposite, it would be an error to infer from this that the intellect can determine the will. As we saw in 1.3 and 2.3 the intellect only apprehends mixed goods in an indeterminate way, that is, under their desirable and undesirable aspects, or what Giles calls a consideratio bifurcata. The explanation for this is that the intellect is

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33 Ibid: "Et quia intellectus est immaterialis potest seipsum convertere supra speciem intelligibilem quam apud se habet, supra quam se convertendo, intelligit illud et oppositum. Ideo agens per intellectum non determinatur ad alterum tantum, sed potest agere hoc et oppositum" (Louvain ed., 1646, 257).
34 Giles of Rome, Quodlibet III, q. 17: "...patet ex eo quod unum oppositorum intelligatur per alium, nam per rectum intelligitur obliquum; simul ergo possuimus intelligere rectum et obliquum..." (Louvain ed., 1646, 185).
merely an “advisor” (*consiliarius*) to the will. It is its job merely to pick out, as it were, the good and the bad aspects that by definition inhere in any mixed or contingent object and show (*attendit*) them to the will.

Because the intellect cannot make a determinate choice between the various alternatives under consideration, it is necessary that the will do so. According to Giles, this means that the will is free *formaliter*, that it has the intrinsic ability to control how the object will be presented by the intellect and therefore whether it will ultimately be chosen or not. Once the will has determined the intellect to focus on one aspect over the other, the intellect, following the determination of the will, in turn determines the will in accordance with the latter’s wishes or commands. Since the intellect’s subsequent determination of the will is in accordance with the will’s initial determination of it, the will can be said to determine itself. This is the third source of freedom.

Why does Giles impose this complicated reciprocal process onto his account of human action? Why not simply assert that the will can determine itself directly, that is, after the intellect’s act of simple presentation? Because for this to happen the will would have to be in act and potency at the same time and in the same respect, and this would be a violation of the act-potency axiom, and ultimately, of the principle of non-contradiction.\(^{35}\)

Notice that the will’s capacity for self-determination is spontaneous. It is prior to any act of the intellect because insofar as the intellect remains

\(^{35}\) Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quod.* III, q. 15. See also chapters 1.3 and 2.3.
undetermined "it does not act, nor does it ever proceed to act unless it is determined by the will." This claim is consistent with the voluntarism of specification that Giles defends in *Quodlibet* III, q. 15, his disputation on self-motion.

Formal freedom, then, signifies an ability to determine oneself to acting or not acting. This capacity belongs to the will. However, if the will were not located in an immaterial nature which has the ability for self-reflection, nor had an intellect to present the appetible form in a twofold way, the will's innate ability to determine itself would be impossible. For Giles, then, the will has three sources of freedom: (1) its location in the immaterial soul, (2) the intellect's act of presenting appetible objects to it under a bifurcated consideration, and (3) its spontaneous ability to determine itself. All three causes are necessary conditions for the freedom of the will, but none are sufficient of themselves.

It is important to stress that the will does not derive its freedom from the *freedom* of the intellect, for only the will is formally free. In fact, given Giles's identification of freedom with self-determination, it is doubtful whether he would

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36 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 21: "Omne ergo agens per libertatem arbitrii tria de necessitate in se habet, videlicet, naturam et immateriæm potentiam cognitivam supra se conversivam et apprehensivam; formam per quam potest cognoscere hoc et oppositum. Et tertia est potentia per quam se determinat ut possit agere hoc vel oppositum, et huiusmodi potestia est voluntas. Ideo dicimus quod quia forma existens in intellectu est indeterminata ad hoc vel ad oppositum, et quia indeterminatum secundum quod huiusmodi, non agit nec unquam procedit in opus nisi determinetur per voluntatem. Voluntas sit illa potentia per quam agens per intellectum seipsum determinet ad agendum, vel non agendum" (Louvain ed., 1646, 258).

37 Ibid., (Louvain ed., 1646, 258).
even admit that the intellect can be free. Accordingly, "we should not argue that the intellect is freer than the will, but <only> that it is more indeterminate than the will." The distinction between "freedom" and "indeterminacy" is found in Giles's reply to an intellectualist objection which stated that the reason for the will's freedom is the fact that it follows a free potency, namely the intellect.

In drawing this distinction, Giles is clearly distancing himself from the schools of Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant, both of whom held that the will's freedom derives from the possession of rationality, that is, from the intellect's capacity to conceive alternative possibilities. For Giles, although the indeterminacy of the intellect contributes to free agency, formal freedom itself

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38 Ibid: "...quod voluntati insit libertas ex immaterialitate naturae, in qua fundatur radicaliter et primordialiter; ex forma apprehensa tamquam ex proximo, et ex seipsa formaliter" (Louvain ed., 1646, 258).

39 Ibid: "Ad argumentum autem in oppositum, dicendum quod voluntas habeat libertatem non ex libertate intellectus sed ex indeterminatione intellectus, ut quia intellectus per formam apprehensam non determinatur ad hoc vel ad oppositum, sed utrumque apprehendit et hoc et oppositum. Sed per voluntatem fiat huissusmodi determinatio, ut determinate fiat hoc vel oppositum. Non igitur debemus arguere ex hoc, quod intellectus sit liberior quam voluntas, sed quod sit indeterminatio quam voluntas, quod concedimus..." (Louvain ed., 1646, 258-59).

40 Ibid: "Ultimo quaerebatur de voluntate unde sit libertas in voluntate? Et arguebatur quod ab intellectu quia, ut dicebatur, tota inclinatione deorsum est in gravi a forma gravis, ergo tota inclinatione appetitus nostri est a forma apprehensa, quia igitur appetitus in nobis ad formam apprehensam sicut se habet inclinationis gravis ad formam gravis. Si ergo tota causa quare sic vel sic inclinetur voluntas sit forma apprehensa in intellectu cum ipsa inclinetur libere, tota libertas voluntatis erit ab intellectu" (Louvain ed., 1646, 256).

41 For Aquinas's view that the will's freedom devolves upon the intellect's contingent nature, see e.g. ST I-II, q. 13, a. 6, corp. On Siger cf. Quaes. in Meta., V, q. 8: "Dico quod voluntas hominis libera est, quamvis non appetitus brutorum. Per oppositam causam quam in brutis est hoc videre. Quia appetitus brutorum est non liber, quia nec iudicium, cum nascantur cum iudicio determinato ad delectabile et triste. Unde non erat liber appetitus; immo a natura determinatur. Per oppositam causam homo habet appetitus, quia non nascitur cum determinato iudicio de bonis vel malis; immo possibile est iudicium humanum esse indifferens de aliquo quod sit bonum vel malum; et ideo
does not consist in indeterminacy per se, but rather in the capacity for self-determination. Because the intellect is incapable of self-determination, it may be inferred that it is not free; indeed, it is merely undetermined. This move represents a departure from the thomistic position, as San Cristóbal Sebastián has rightly observed.42

Before turning to consider the intellectualist reaction to Giles's understanding of freedom, it is necessary to consider very briefly whether his claim that the will is formally free is consistent with another claim he makes in his moral psychology, namely, his endorsement of the connection of the virtues. For when Giles claims that freedom is a formal characteristic of the will, associating such freedom with self-determination, he is clearly siding with the voluntarists of the period. Not only do pre-condemnation voluntarists such as John of la Rochelle and Walter of Bruges defend this claim, as we saw, but so do many in the post-condemnation period. We will see this presently in 4.4.

However, Giles also defends the classic Aristotelian view that the moral virtues are connected to the intellectual virtue of prudence so that when you have one virtue, you have them all. For Aristotle, the possession of prudence is crucial to the rational agent's ability to make the correct choices that will inculcate the moral virtues. But in order to know what it is best to do, and therefore what choices to make, one has to be a virtuous person; that is, a person with the right goals. The

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42 San Cristóbal Sebastián, Controversias acerca de la voluntad, 214.
intellectual virtue of prudence, on Aristotle's account, is therefore inextricably linked to moral virtue (NE 1144a7-1145a6). Giles accepts this position.43

Because Aristotle does not make any claims for the formal freedom of the will, but rather holds that choice is the outcome of practical deliberation, there would appear to be little problem of reconciling the determination of desire with the connection of the virtues. For Aristotle, the prudent man is necessarily a virtuous person whose desires are in harmony with his values. As such, he effortlessly chooses that which is in accordance with his moral principles. In medieval terms, his will follows the conclusions of practical deliberation.

If one holds that the will is intrinsically free and that the moral virtues are located in it, however, then it seems necessary to sever the connection between prudence and moral virtue. This is because medieval voluntarists tend to associate the will's freedom, at least in part, with its ability to act against a correct intellect. If there is a necessary connection between prudence and moral virtue then it would follow that when one has correct principles one is necessitated to choose in accordance with them. Giles's younger contemporary Duns Scotus rejected the

43 Giles of Rome, Quod. II, q. 19: "...non possimus ponere prudentiam in intellectu, nisi ponamus virtutes in appetitu..." (Louvain ed., 1646, 99); "...prudentia in intellectu esse non possit sine virtutibus in appetitu..." (Louvain ed., 1646, 100); "Nam sine virtutibus in appetitu non potest esse prudentia in intellectu" (Louvain ed., 1646, 100). Although Giles Quodlibet II was disputed in 1289, his acceptance of the connection of prudence to the moral virtues is evident even in the reportatio of Book III of his Sententiae commentary, which is dated just prior to 1271, and is therefore an extremely early work. Cf. his Sent. III, d. 36, q. 45 (Luna ed., "La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano," 221-223).
connection between prudence and virtue for precisely this reason. According to Scotus, although the morally virtuous man will necessarily possess the intellectual virtue of prudence, the reverse is not necessarily the case. That prudence can exist without moral virtue follows from Scotus's belief that one can know what it is right to do, but still choose the contrary owing to the autonomy of the will.

Is Giles's defense of the formal freedom of the will compromised, then, by his adherence to the connection of the virtues? First, although Scotus's position seems to follow logically from the claim that the will is formally free, most voluntarists prior to Scotus in fact did not defend the necessity of severing prudence from the moral virtues. As Lottin's studies have shown, voluntarists from William de la Mare to Richard of Middleton defended the notion that prudence was connected to moral virtue. Clearly it was thought, up until Scotus at any rate, that the formal freedom of the will could co-exist with the connection of the virtues. To sever the connection of the virtues was not seen at the time to be a necessary feature of voluntarism.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Giles's defense of the freedom of the will does not depend primarily, as it does for most voluntarists, on the will's ability to act against right reason. Instead, the formal freedom of the will is grounded in the will's ability indirectly to determine itself by controlling or determining the intellect. Giles's belief that there cannot be prudence in the intellect without the

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existence of virtues in the appetite is fully consistent, then, with his defense of the will's formal freedom.

4.3. The Intellectualist Reaction

The intellectualist response to Giles's theory of the foundations of freedom came from Godfrey of Fontaines. His *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 16 of 1291 is a response not only to Giles's theory of self-motion as found in *Quodlibet* III, q. 15, as we saw in 1.3, but also to Giles's *Quodlibet* IV, q. 21. In the latter disputation, recall, Giles implied that the intellect is not formally free. In response to this Godfrey sets out to show that if freedom formally resides in the will, as Giles claims it does, then by his own reasoning it must also reside in the intellect.

Following Aristotle, Godfrey defines freedom in terms of autonomy. The free man is the person who exists for his own sake and not for the sake of another, as Aristotle indicates in the *Metaphysics* (982b27-28). In developing this definition so as to make it applicable to his psychology of human action, Godfrey contrasts the free man as defined in the *Metaphysics* with the definition of the slavish man as found in the *Politics* (1254b21-22).

Now, although freedom (ἐλευθερία) is mainly a political concept for Aristotle, it is connected to his psychology insofar as he identifies the free man with rationality; and specifically with the capacity for deliberation.45 Indeed, it is

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45 For a useful account of how Aristotle connects his understanding of political freedom to the possession of rationality, see M. Walsh, "Aristotle's Conception of Freedom," *JHP* 35 (1997), 495-507.
precisely the slave's inability to deliberate about means and ends that makes him irrational and therefore naturally slavish, that is, naturally suited to be directed by another rather than autonomous and self-directed.46

Aristotle's tacit identification of freedom with rationality does not escape the notice of Godfrey. In Godfrey's hands, however, what is in fact a political definition of the free citizen becomes a definition of free agency per se, such that the capacity for deliberation, which Aristotle restricted to the few, is now identified with the sort of psychological freedom that all human beings enjoy. On Godfrey's account, it is by virtue of the fact that rational agents can connect means to ends and see the end under the description of an end that they are free beings, beings that can rule themselves. Presumably even animals can perform means-end cognition, but it is only humans, who possess language and reason, that can apprehend them under such descriptions and therefore provide a rational account of their actions.47

Why do humans, rather than animals, have the capacity for recognizing ends as such, and as a result are able to rule themselves? Because rational beings have a form that is immaterial. Non-rational animals are "mixed and immersed in matter"

46 Ibid., 504.
47 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quod VIII, q. 16: "...sciendum quod, prout dicitur primo Metaphysicae, sicut homo dicitur liber qui suimet et non alterius causa est, ita generaliter dicitur liberum illud quod suimet et non alterius causa est. Sic et ille dicitur servus, secundum Philosophum, primo Politicum, qui non sui ipsius gratia est, sed alterius, qui se ipsum nescit regere nec faciens aliqua habet plene notitiam rationis eorum quae facit et propter quae fact, nec se ipsum in illis dirigit, sed dirigitur et movetur principaliter ab alio; ita ille liber est qui se ipsum regere scit, cognoscens finem et rationem finis et eorum quae ad finem et proportionem illorum ad ipsum finem..." (PB X, 145).
and are therefore tied to a material form. This means that their specific form
determines their functions and range of abilities. It stands to reason that when its
form determines a thing, it is ruled or directed by it and therefore lacks freedom.
But to have an immaterial form, such as rational beings possess, is to possess a
certain "universality" (*universalitas*), such that it is not tied to any particular form
but has the forms of all things in the intellect. This gives rational beings a certain
indeterminacy.

That rational beings have the ability to apprehend the forms of all beings
permits them a further capacity: to incline towards the many particular goods that
can fall under the universal description of the good. Because animals do not
possess self-reflexivity, they cannot know the character of the end or the relation
of the means to the end. They cannot, in short, make rational choices; rather, they
are said to act from impulse, to be acted upon rather than to act. Rational beings,
by contrast, can connect the means to the end and give an account of their actions,
and this permits them to make choices. They may be said therefore to "have

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48 Ibid., (PB X, 145).
49 Ibid: "...ergo omnia entia materialia, scilicet elementa, mixta, vegetabilia, irrationabilia,
qua scilicet habent formam sic a materia dependentem et illi immersam...sunt
determinata et quasi coarctata quod etiam bruta quae aliquo modo finem cognoscent,
tamen finem sub ratione finis non apprehendunt, nec ordinem eorum quae sunt ad finem;
et ideo licet sint quaedam animalia quae agunt operentur propter finem, respectu illius
tamen libertatem habere non possunt, sed quasi servinum, in quantum scilicet respectu
illius se non agunt sed aguntur....talia enim ratione suae materialitatis praedictae sive
potentialitatis et imperfectionis materiale determinatur ut modo materiali sive naturali et
determinato tendant in suos fines..." (PB X, 146).
50 Ibid. (PB X, 146).
51 Ibid: "Entia vero rationalia et intellectualia, quia ratione suae formae non sunt materiae
immixta et immersa dicto modo, ideo ista sunt in natura sua et operatione quasi quandam
universalitatem et indeterminationem importantia in virtute" (PB X, 146).
freedom both in knowing and desiring." In short, they may be said to order themselves where actions are concerned.

Human beings are radically free, then, owing to the immateriality of their form or nature. Godfrey agrees with Giles on this point. But if the will has radical freedom for this reason, then why deny such freedom to the intellect? Presumably, any potencies that are located in a free nature will also be free, as will any acts emanating from such a potency. But the intellect, no less than the will, is located in the rational soul. That Giles ascribes formal freedom to the will but denies it to the intellect — to which he attributes mere indeterminacy — is therefore inconsistent. According to Godfrey, if the will is formally free because it is rooted in an abstract and immaterial nature, then so is the intellect.

Now although both the will and the intellect are formally free, Godfrey asserts that the intellect holds a certain causal priority over the will. As we saw in Chapter

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52 Ibid: "Sed rationabilia, quia ratione suae abstractionis et immaterialitatis non ordinantur ad aliquod ens aut bonum particulare, sed ad omne ens et bonum universaliter se extendunt, universalem rationem entis et boni apprehendentia et etiam appetentia, possunt cognoscere unumquodque et rationem uniuscumqueque et in se et in ordine et habitudine unius ad alterum; et ideo libertatem habent et in cognoscendo et in appetendo" (PB X, 146-47). "...immaterialia, quia ratione suae abstractionis sunt conversiva supra se ipsa et possunt cognoscere finem et rationem finis et ea quae sunt ad finem et proportionem eorum ad ipsum finem, ideo talia possunt se ipsa ordinare in aliud et habere dominium suorum actuum" (PB X, 147).

53 Ibid: "Cum enim liberum possit referri ad naturam, potentiam et actum, actus liber est qui egreditur a libera potentia; et potentia libera est quae est naturae libere. Cum ergo essentia in qua radicatur intellectus et voluntas sit natura libera ratione suae immaterialitatis, quicquid ab illa secundum huiusmodi condicionem immaterialitatis procedit liberum oportet esse, et primo potentiam et deinde operationem. Sicut ergo huiusmodi natura est natura libera formaliter ex se ipsa ita oportet quamlibet eius potentiam esse formaliter liberam ex se ipsa. Oportet ergo intellectum formaliter liberum esse se ipso, ut est potentia talis naturae; et hoc habet ab illa natura in qua radicatur originaliter. Et similiter dicendum de voluntate" (PB X, 150).
1.3, the will is entirely passive for Godfrey: it can only desires what the intellect has presented to it as somehow good or choiceworthy. And although there is a mutual interaction between the two potencies, it is nonetheless false to suppose that the will can determine itself unless it has previously been determined by the intellect. Accordingly, although both powers are formally free, the intellect has a certain priority over the will. Moreover, it is Godfrey’s view that the freedom of the person derives primarily from the freedom of the reason.

If there is a mutual interaction between intellect and will in the production of the free act, then why, Godfrey inquires, is it common to refer to human freedom in terms of the “freedom of the will” (libertas voluntatis) exclusively? Because the will is the most immediate source of human action and therefore of moral responsibility. Of course, the fact that Godfrey raises this rhetorical question at all suggests that the issue was, as Kent has shown, a contemporary concern. It is a sign that the libertas voluntatis was now a central topic of debate in the period after the condemnations, and one that most thinkers of the period, whether voluntarist or intellectualist, had to address. This feature may be distinguished from that of

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54 Ibid., (PB X, 156).
55 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, I., 319.
56 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quod. VIII, q. 16: “...voluntas ipsa est ultimum et immediatum principium huiusmodi operationum nostrae facultati subiectarum, secundum quas laudamur vel vituperamus, in quantum tamen semper coexigit actum intellectus; talium enim actuum, quantum ad exercitium actus, est voluntas principium activum sive impulsivum. Potest esse ratio quare attribuuntur specialiter libertas et dominium actuum voluntati. Hoc tamen non obstante, aeque liber est intellectus modo suo, quia tota pars rationalis per se est libera” (PB X, 157).
57 Kent, Virtues of the Will, 94.
the pre-condemnation period, where human freedom was discussed primarily in
terms of *liberum arbitrium* rather than *libertas voluntatis*.

Godfrey's defense of the formal freedom of the will along with that of the
intellect is therefore, given the context, less surprising than might at first be
thought. It would have been curious for a pre-condemnation intellectualist such as
Aquinas to defend the formal freedom of the will. But in the post-condemnation
period this seems to be something of a commonplace. Indeed even post-
condemnation thomists sometimes attributed to Aquinas *himselt* a defense of the
formal freedom of the will.

In the *Correctorium corruptorii "Quare"* commonly attributed to the thomist
Richard Knapwell, for instance, one finds the Oxford theologian defending
Aquinas against the Franciscan claim that Aquinas's teachings cannot sufficiently
account for the freedom of the will.\(^{58}\) In particular, William de la Mare had
criticized Aquinas, as we saw in 4.1, for defending the claim that the will's freedom
derives from the intellect's ability to conceive opposite states of affairs. His
argument was that if Aquinas is right, then it would follow that the actions of both
virtuous and vicious men, who act from force of habit, would be unfree and
therefore exempt from moral responsibility. The correct view to hold is rather that
"freedom is in the will from its own natural property" (*ex sua naturali proprietate*).\(^{59}\)

\(^{58}\) Although the *Correctorium corruptorii "Quare"* was originally attributed to Giles of Rome, it
is now generally recognized to be the product of an Oxford Dominican, most likely
Richard Knapwell (d. 1288). It is dated at no later than 1282 or 1283. Cf. D.A. Callus,

\(^{59}\) See n. 21 above.
Although William does not use the term *formaliter* to signify the innate freedom of the will, the expression *ex sua naturali proprietate* clearly carries the same meaning.

Knapwell addresses this charge by arguing that William has misunderstood Aquinas. In addition to his criticism that the contingency of the intellect cannot account for freedom, William had charged Aquinas with reducing the will to the level of the sense appetite. Just as sense desire follows necessarily from sense apprehension, so too if the will derives its freedom from the intellect, then it is dependent on the intellect in the same way as the sense appetite is dependent on sense cognition. In St Thomas’s defense Knapwell responds that, unlike the sense appetite which must necessarily follow sense cognition, the will is free either to act or not to act on the conclusions of the intellect. 60 Knapwell concludes by asserting that it is clear to anyone who considers the matter carefully that Aquinas teaches that “freedom is formally (formaliter) in the will alone.”61

Of course, Aquinas never defended the claim that the will is formally free. What Aquinas says is that the will is the subject of freedom because it inclines to goals that are rationally apprehended as good. One may therefore say that freedom is located in the act of choosing. However it is Aquinas’s contention, as we mentioned above, that reason is the cause of freedom.62

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62 *ST* I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad. 2: “...radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subjectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere
It seems to have been something of a common characteristic of the post-condemnation period, then, to defend the formal freedom of the will. Even intellectualists such as Godfrey of Fontaines endorsed this view alongside the freedom of the intellect. And although it is difficult to see how Godfrey can defend such a claim given his complete endorsement of the will’s passivity, he does so just the same. Nor was he alone amongst intellectualists in holding this position, as we have just seen in Richard Knapwell. What was originally a voluntarist view of how to explain the will’s freedom, which had its origins in the early voluntarist writings of John of La Rochelle and Walter of Bruges, then, seems to have become central to the discussions, amongst both voluntarists and intellectualists, over the foundations of freedom.

4.4. The Voluntarist Position

Henry of Ghent’s final attempt to address the question of human freedom came in either Advent of 1290, or Lent of 1291. After having devoted no less than seventeen, intermittent Quodlibetal Questions to the nature of the will and human freedom, Henry turns one last time in Quodlibet XIV, q. 5 to consider whether the intellect and the will are equally free potencies. Beyond its general relevance to the present discussion, this Quodlibet is particularly germane because it is Macken’s

diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt librum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione judicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.”

Gómez Caffarena fixes the date of Quodlibet XIV, question 5 to Christmas 1290 in Ser participado y ser subsistente, 270, while Paulus dates it to Lent of 1291. See the latter’s Henri de Gand: Essai sur les tendences de sa métaphysique (Paris, 1938), xvi.
contention that Giles of Rome is its target. Contrary to Macken, we will establish that Henry is not in fact targeting Giles of Rome, but rather what appears to be a composite picture of Godfrey of Fontaines and Thomas Aquinas, that is, a caricature of the intellectualist position.

After discussing the different ways in which freedom might accrue to a subject, Henry proceeds to draw the following sketch of his adversaries. Some hold, Henry says, that although the will is free in its initial act, once it has commenced acting, it cannot cease from doing so. The explanation for this is that the will necessarily follows the judgement of reason. However, such necessitation of the will does not exclude its nonetheless being free — *voluntas secundum se sit libera* — since to be determined in such a way is part of its nature. Although, on this view, the will is determined, it is not coerced, since its receptivity to being moved by the intellect comes from an internal principle. Henry cites the example of a servant who moves both freely and necessarily: necessarily because he is commanded by his master, freely because he wants to be moved in this fashion, that is, because he is happy to obey his master.

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66 Ibid.: “Quod aliqui quantum apparat ex suo dicto concedunt de voluntate quantum ad actus sui ingressum, licet negent hoc quantum ad actus sui cessationem, dicentes quod voluntas sequitur necessario iudicium rationis quia, ut dicunt, etsi necessario moveatur ad aliquid volendum adhuc non excludit libertas. Non enim sequitur: hoc est necessarium, ergo non est voluntarium sive liberum, quia enim actus activorum sunt in patienle et dispositive. Ideo cum voluntas secundum se sit libera recipit motionem volitionis secundum modum naturae sue, scilicet, libere quamvis necessario. Et est exemplum de servo, qui inquantum movetur ad praeceptum domini sui quoddammodo movetur necessario et tamen libere quia complacenter illud exequitur” (Badius ed., fol. 564vA).
From the claim that freedom of the will is compatible with its necessitation – since it is in the nature of the will to be moved by the intellect – it follows that the will is both mover and moved. Accordingly, the will can be said to move itself. On this account, although the will is free, it nonetheless derives such freedom from the intellect, which is indeterminate due to its ability to weigh alternative courses of action. As a result, “they also say that the intellect is, on these grounds, freer than the will.”

Against this sketch, Henry argues that although the intellect is free in some respects, the will is much freer (multo magis libera). The reason for this is that the intellect has always to be determined in its first act of simple intelligence by the object, while the will undergoes no similar determination in first act. Rather, it moves itself and the other powers of the soul as a result of a spontaneous principle (principium ultroneum) that does not require the causal influence of anything extrinsic to it. Although Henry does not use the term formaliter to express the freedom of

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67 Ibid.: “Et sic in voluntate est ratio moventis et ratio moti in eodem simplici, et sic movet seipsam. Et tamen necessario sequitur iudicium rationis sive intellectus qui pensat rem in suis principiis, et per seipsum iudicat libere. Et ex hac libertate, ut dicunt, est libertas in voluntate et ideo movetur liberaliter secundum ipsam rationem. Et secundum hoc dicunt quod voluntas si non moveretur secundum rationem non moveretur libere, et sic libertas voluntatis non est nisi a libertate intellectus. Et quod idcirco intellectus magis liber est quam voluntas” (Badius ed., fol. 564vA-565rB).

68 Ibid.: “Et cum hoc etiam multum deficit intellectus a libertate voluntatis quia intellectus non moveretur ad exercitium actus nisi prius motus ad actum intelligentiae simplicis per actus primi intelligendi determinationem ab objecto... Voluntas autem movetur ad actum primum nec mota nec determinata ab alio et etiam ad omnem exercitium actus atque ad imperium actum aliarum virium. Idcirco igitur simpliciter dico quod licet intellectus quodammodo sit liber prout iam patebit, multo magis tamen libera est voluntas quam intellectus... et dicere quod libertas voluntatis est facultas qua potest in suum actum quo acquirit bonum suum ex principio intra se ultroneo et absque omni impulsionem et retractione ab altero” (Badius ed., fol. 565rB).
the will, his use of the term *principium ultronem* is clearly an effort to express the same idea, namely, that the will possesses a certain intrinsic freedom.

That Henry is not in fact targeting Giles here, contrary to what Macken contends, is clear from the following considerations. In the first place, the metaphor Giles uses to express the relationship between the intellect and the will is not intended to serve as an illustration of the compatibility of necessity with freedom. Recall that Henry's opponents "appeal to the example of the servant who, insofar as he moves at the order of his master, in a sense moves necessarily and yet freely because he is pleased to carry out the order."\(^6^9\) This metaphor conveys the following idea: the will is to the intellect as a servant is to its master. Now although it is true that Giles of Rome does employ the master/servant metaphor in order to convey some idea of the relationship between the will and the intellect, he clearly asserts the reverse of Henry's example. As Giles uses this metaphor, the will is the master or the king (*rex*) and the intellect is the servant. However, the example is not used to illustrate the possibility that freedom can coexist with necessity in the same substance. Rather, it is employed to illustrate the relationship between the will and the intellect as regards the act of command.

According to Giles, the will is like a king who commands his servant, the intellect,

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\(^{69}\) *Ibid.*: "...ideo cum voluntas secundum se sit libera recipit motionem volitionis secundum modum naturae suae, scilicet, libere quamvis necessario. Et est exemplum de servo, qui inquantum movetur ad praeceptum domini sui quodammodo movetur necessario et tamen libere quia complacenter illud exequitur* (Badius ed., fol. 564vA).
to carry a lamp and direct the former where it pleases. This is a very common voluntarist metaphor, as we saw in Chapter 2.3, and indeed one that Henry himself uses in precisely the same way.

In the second place, although Giles does argue that the will both moves itself and is a moved mover, he completely rejects the view that the intellect "freely judges by itself," and that "from this freedom, as they say, there is freedom in the will." Indeed, although Giles allows that the intellect is the proximate source of the will's freedom, he denies that the will derives its freedom from the freedom of the intellect. The intellect's indeterminate, bifurcated consideration is merely a necessary condition for the will to exercise its formal freedom by determining itself. Freedom on Giles's account involves the capacity for self-determination. Because the intellect cannot make any determinations without the command of the will, we may infer that Giles does not consider it an intrinsically free potency.

It seems more likely, then, that Godfrey and Aquinas are the targets of Henry's caricature of the intellectualist position. This is not to assert that Godfrey

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70 Giles of Rome, Sent. II, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1: "Est enim consiliarius quidam serviens regi portans lucernam ante regem et ostendens sibi vias per quas debet rex incedere. Sic et intellectus est quidam serviens voluntati et portans lucernam ante voluntatem, iudicans de via hac vel de illa secundum quam debet incedere voluntas. Quo iudicio facto, remanet actio in voluntate ut eligat ex illo iudicio viam quae placet sibi. Imperium et dominium secundum se pertinent ad voluntatem, licet formare et proferre verba illius dominii vel imperii possint pertinere ad intellectum" (Venice 1681, 243).

71 Henry of Ghent, Quod. I, q. 14: "Ad quintum, quod dirigens superius est directo, dicendum quod est dirigens auctoritate, sicut dominus servum: ille est superior: sic voluntas dirigat intellectum; vel ministerialiter sicut servus dominum, praeferendo lucernam de nocte ne dominus offendat: tale dirigens est inferius et sic intellectus dirigat voluntatem, unde a dirigendo et intelligendo potest ipsum voluntas retrahere quando vult, sicut dominus servum" (Macken ed., V, 90).

72 Henry of Ghent, Quod. XIV, q. 5 (Badius ed., fol. 564vA).
and Aquinas share a common position, for they disagree in several crucial respects, as will become apparent below. Nonetheless, Henry's characterization contains elements of both Aquinas and Godfrey, and would therefore appear to be a composite picture of the two intellectualists.

First, recall that Henry accuses his opponent(s) of asserting that the will is free from compulsion at the beginning of its act, but deprived of freedom to cease from acting. Furthermore, Henry accuses his opponents of arguing that although the will is free in itself (secundum se) a certain necessity exists alongside it to the extent that it necessarily follows the judgement of reason. Necessity and freedom can therefore exist within the will.

Now although Aquinas holds that certain forms of necessity are compatible with freedom, he does not defend the claim that the will is formally free. Moreover, it is not Aquinas's view that the will is free in first act, and unfree in second act. Rather, for Aquinas, the contrary is true. At the beginning of its act, the will requires the intellect to present it with something to desire. This is the freedom of specification that Aquinas speaks of in the mature writings, and is an act that is performed by the intellect. Once reduced to act, however, it is Aquinas's belief that the will can always cease from acting, that it can cease from willing the object in question due to its freedom of exercise.73

Now unlike Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines does defend the formal freedom of the will. Because freedom derives from a power's location in the immaterial
soul Godfrey argues that the will must be considered free of its very nature, though of course he extends this claim to the intellect, something that a voluntarist, or Giles of Rome, for that matter, does not concede. We saw this in 4.3 above. Needless to say, Godfrey's defense of the formal freedom of the will sets him apart from pre-condemnation intellectualists such as Aquinas.

Again, in contrast to Aquinas, Godfrey defends the notion that the will is free at the beginning of its act, but not free to cease from acting. According to Godfrey, once the intellect has concluded its deliberations, the will is not free to reject such a good; rather, it necessarily follows the conclusion of practical reason. Nonetheless, "let it be said that <the will> wills freely and laudably and meritoriously...because even in willing this it is the autonomous cause of the willing to the extent that the willing of the aforesaid end was the reason (causa) for deliberating about it, and also the reason for choosing it."74

On the other hand, Henry characterizes his opponent as defending the view that the will can move itself. This is a claim that Aquinas famously defends, in a qualified sense anyway, and that Godfrey famously rejects. Godfrey takes very seriously the act-potency axiom that whatever is moved is moved by another. If the will were both mover and moved, on Godfrey's account, it would be both in

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73 Aquinas famously makes the distinction between specificatio and exercitium in the Quaestiones disputatae de malo, q. 6, corp., and in ST I-II, q. 10, a. 2, corp.
74 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quod. VIII, q. 16: "...deliberando de eo quod est volendum propter finem, facta conclusione et stante tali apprehensione, voluntas non potest illud non velle; et tamen dicetur quod illud velit libere et laudabiliter et meritorie, non obstante tali immutabilitate voluntatis. Et hoc etiam quia volens hoc, est sibi causa volendi hoc in
act and potency at the same time and in the same respect, and this would be a violation of the principle of non-contradiction. Aquinas likewise respects the act-potency axiom, but nonetheless holds that once the will has been moved by the intellect with respect to the object, it can move itself to willing the means. By this Aquinas means that once we have reason to pursue a given end, we need give no further reasons for pursuing the means to that end.

That Henry is not in fact targeting Giles here, then, should be fairly clear. However, our theory that he is targeting Godfrey, at least in part, is not without its problems. Our evidence that Godfrey is one of Henry's targets is based on the evidence of Quodlibet VIII, q. 16. However, if Wippel is correct in his dating, then Godfrey did not dispute his eighth Quodlibet until Advent of 1292 or Lent of 1293, that is, at least two years before Henry's Quodlibet XIV, q. 5 on Gómez Caffarena's dating. If this is the case then clearly Henry cannot have had Godfrey's Quodlibet VIII, question 16 in mind. Therefore, either the date of one of these Quodlibets needs to be reconsidered, or Henry is not in fact targeting Godfrey but someone else.

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quantum volens praedictum finem fuit causa deliberandi de isto, et sic etiam electionis eius...” (PB IV, 164).

75 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quod. VI, q. 7: “Universaliter igitur tam in voluntate quam in alia dicendum est quod nihil movet se ipsum...” (PB III, 161).

76 ST I-II, q. 9, a. 3, corp: “...ad voluntatem pertinent movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis objectum. Sed sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in appetibilitibus, sicut principium in intelligibilitibus. Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum; et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsum ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.”
But there is a third option. Although this must ultimately remain a matter for conjecture, it is possible that Henry's *Quodlibet XIV*, q. 5, though not a reaction to Godfrey's *Quodlibet VIII*, q. 16, in fact targets an earlier *Quodlibet* of Godfrey's, namely his *Quodlibet III*, q. 15, dated to 1287. Although this solves the problem of chronology, however, it also raises other difficulties, notably the fact that this *Quodlibet* exists only as a partial student report. Nonetheless, it should be possible to infer, assuming that Godfrey did not radically change his mind on the question of the foundations of freedom over the course of five years, what he might have said in the earlier *Quodlibet*.

First, that Henry might be responding to Godfrey's *Quodlibet III*, q. 15 is suggested by the *ex professo* title of the question. The title of Henry's *Quodlibet XIV*, q. 5, recall, was "whether the will and the intellect are equally free potencies."

Similarly, Godfrey asks "whether the will is a freer potency than the intellect" (*Utrum voluntas sit magis libera potentia quam intellectus*). Unfortunately, all that is extant of Godfrey's disputation are the objections and the *contra*. Still, these are very informative.

The only objection Godfrey rehearse is the extreme intellectualist position that the will is less free than the intellect because it can be compelled. The intellect, by contrast, cannot. Because compulsion is repugnant to freedom, it follows that

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the intellect is freer than the will.\textsuperscript{80} The contra, on the other hand, rehearses the opposite extreme position, taken from Bernard, that the will is principally free since it is due to the will that we are masters of our actions.\textsuperscript{81}

Now, although nothing remains of Godfrey's own responsio, it is possible to infer several things from the foregoing evidence. First, judging by the contents of the titulus quæstionis, we can assume that Godfrey argued one of three positions: (1) either that the will is freer than the intellect, (2) that the intellect is freer than the will, or (3) that they are equally free. Now given the scholastic practice of arguing against the objections one presents, we may assume that Godfrey did not defend the claim, rehearsed in his only objection, that the intellect is the only free power. Further, given that the contra defends the claim that the will is the principally (\textit{maxime}) free power, we may assume that in fact Godfrey argued something along these lines, though it is almost certain that he would have qualified such a voluntarist claim given his commitment to intellectualism. Based on such evidence the conclusion seems likely that Godfrey took a similar stand in this Quodlibet as he did in his later one, arguing, namely, that both the intellect and the will are intrinsically free.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid: "Ad primum praedictorum sic proceditur, et arguitur quod voluntas sit minus libera quam intellectus, quia potentia quae aliquo modo cogi potest est minus libera quam illa quae nullo modo cogi potest, cum libertas coactioni repugnet. Sed intellectus cogi potest nullo modo; voluntas autem aliquo modo cogi potest. Quare et cetera" (PB II, 227).

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid: "Contra. Illa potentia ratione cuius homo est dominus suorum actuum, maxime est libera. Sed haec est voluntas, quia secundum Bernardum de libero arbitrio, universa quae sunt hominis libera sunt et propter voluntatem" (PB II, 227).
Needless to say, the foregoing is conjectural. But if it is correct, then to the extent that Henry's criticisms resemble those found in Godfrey's *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 16, we may surmise that — although Henry could not have been targeting Godfrey's later *Quodlibet* for chronological reasons — nonetheless he might very well have been directing them against the earlier one.

Whatever the merits of Henry's position, and whoever his targets were, his *Quodlibet* XIV, q. 5 appears to be fairly typical of the voluntarist position as found in the period just subsequent to the condemnations. The will is freer than the intellect because it can move itself by an intrinsic principle. Henry characterizes such freedom as belongs to the will alone as "the faculty by which <the will> can proceed to its act by which it acquires its own good from a spontaneous (ultroneus) principle within itself, and without any impulse or interference from another."\(^\text{82}\)

Unlike the intellect, then, that is compelled by the object in the first act of simple intelligence, the will undergoes no such compulsion. Furthermore, by its intrinsic freedom, the will controls the intellect, either moving it efficiently to the exercise of its act or to the cessation of act.\(^\text{83}\) For Henry, then, self-motion is the defining characteristic of the will's freedom.

Henry's concession of the freedom of the intellect — albeit in a lesser degree than that of the will — at first sight seems to represent a divergence from the voluntarist position that was typically defended in the post-condemnation period.

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\(^{82}\) Henry of Ghent, *Quod. XIV*, q. 5: "...libertas voluntatis est facultas qua potest in suum actum quo acquirit bonum suum ex principio intra se ultroneo et absque omni impulsum et retractione ab altero" (Badius ed., fol. 565rB).
It also appears to be a repudiation of earlier views expressed in his first *Quodlibet* of 1276.

A typical example of the voluntarist attitude toward the freedom of the intellect occurs in the works of Peter of Falco, Franciscan regent master at Paris from 1280 to 1282. Because the intellect is compelled by the truth, it cannot be considered an essentially free power. To the extent that the intellect is capable of deliberating freely, it receives such contingency from the will, which is endowed with an innate freedom by God.84 Gonsalvus of Spain, the teacher of Duns Scotus, later endorsed this very position in the 1290's.85 The voluntarist denial of freedom to the intellect clearly represents an effort to ensure the autonomy of the will, to insulate the will from any suggestion that it might receive its freedom from the freedom of the intellect.

Henry held a similar view in his first *Quodlibet*. There he had argued that “if we wish to speak about freedom of choice (*electionis libertas*) properly and strictly, then <this> is in the will alone and in no way in the reason, except insofar as it is

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83 See n. 68 above.
84 Peter of Falco, *Quaest. disp.* q. XV: “...intellectus cogi, id est necessitari, a veritate potest, unde per se non habet libertatem; habet ergo a voluntate quae libere movet omnes potentias...” (Gondras ed., 543). “...quidquid habet creatura spiritualis, et substantiam et potentias et libertatem, habet a principio creante, qui totum creavit et libertatem indidit...” (Gondras ed., 542).
85 Gonsalvus of Spain, *Quaest. disp.* q. 12: “Alio opinio est quod voluntas est formaliter libera et non intellectus, et quod hoc effective habet a Deo, et si potentia esset alius ab essentia tunc originaliter haberet eam ab essentia animae; et ponunt modum libertatis ipsius voluntatis per hoc quod voluntas elicit actum suum in seipsa, et facit de non volente seipsam formaliter volentem, et haec opinio videtur mihi probabilior quae ad praesens tenenda est...” (Amorós ed., 230).
moved freely by the will to investigating diverse matters." Notice, then, that
Henry rejects the intrinsic freedom of the intellect. Here, it is Henry's contention
as it is Peter of Falco's, that the intellect is not essentially free, but only accidentally
so, namely, to the extent that it is moved by the will to deliberate about alternative
possibilities. In and of itself, the intellect is not a free power because it has no
choice but to assent to axioms and the conclusions that necessarily follow from
them.\footnote{Henry of Ghent, Quod. I, q. 16: "Unde et si proprie et stricte velimus loqui de electionis
libertate, ipsa in sola voluntate est et nullo modo in ratione, nisi quatenus libere movetur
ad diversa investiganda, a voluntate" (Macken, V, 107).}

It would be natural to suppose that, in granting freedom to the intellect as he
does in the \textit{Quodlibet XIV}, q. 5, Henry ended up revising his earlier position which
denied freedom to the intellect. But this is not Henry's intention. Indeed, in the
later \textit{Quodlibet}, Henry continues to insist that the intellect plays no essential role in
free choice, nor indeed can it if free choice is defined as the will's ability to act in
accordance with or against the judgements of the intellect. As Henry makes clear
in \textit{Quodlibet XIV}, q. 5, the "freedom of the will is so great concerning the means to
an end that not only does it proceed toward them freely, but also by free choice,
while the intellect, even if it can act freely, still cannot act by means of free

\footnote{Ibid: "Ratio enim cognitiva inquantum huissus, libera non est. Necessario enim
movetur simplicibus apprehensis nec est in eius potestate ea non apprehendere, similiter
nec connexioni primorum principiorum per se notorum neque connexioni conclusionum
non assentire, quia si conclusio apparat ei medio necessario, assentit de necessitate, si
medio apparenti, valde de necessitate assentit opinando, si debiliter apparenti, necessario
assentit dubitando, nisi sit medium probabilius in contrarium, ut omnis sententia rationis
de connexion necessitate syllogistica concludatur. Nullo ergo modo voluntas principium}
choice." Henry therefore draws a distinction between "freedom" (libertas) and "free choice" (liberum arbitrium). The former belongs both to the will and the intellect, although to a greater degree in the will, and the later belongs, in a real sense, only to the will.

Henry's main concern in denying the intellect more than the role of a sine qua non cause in free choice forms part and parcel of his effort to preserve the moral autonomy of the will. For if the will is not free to move itself independently of the directives of practical reason then moral responsibility, to Henry's mind, at any rate, will be compromised.

4.5. Concluding Remarks

The axis around which the mainstream debate over the foundations of freedom occurred in the thirteenth century, and particularly in the period just after the condemnations of 1277, was the concept of formal freedom. From as early as John of la Rochelle, the concept signified the innate freedom of a power. On John's account, formal freedom is associated with the capacity for self-determination, which is a function of the will. Walter of Bruges adopted this understanding of freedom and developed it.

libertatis a ratione habet sed a se ipsa primo, et sic electio libera" (Macken ed., V, 107-108).

88 Henry of Ghent, Quod XIV, q. 5: "Et est talis libertas voluntatis tanta circa ea quae sunt ad finem quod non solum potest in ista libere sed etiam libero arbitrio cum tamen intellectus et se aliquid possit agere libere nihil tamen potest agere libero arbitrio" (Badius ed., fol. 565rB).
Giles of Rome defends a unique position in the post-condemnation period. Unlike contemporary voluntarists, he rejects the claim that the will has to be a completely active power in order to be free. For Giles, the will need not be active for it to determine itself, though it does require a spontaneous principle — formal freedom — to make a selection from the options that the intellect presents to it in first act. In second act, however, the will appears to have a spontaneous ability to determine the intellect. Giles therefore identifies formal freedom with the will's innate capacity for self-motion, but distances his theory from the post-condemnation voluntarist view that the will is completely active.

Moreover, unlike voluntarists such as Henry of Ghent and Peter of Falco who reject the intrinsic indeterminacy of the intellect, Giles accepts this claim. Without such indeterminacy, according to Giles, the will would have no options from which to select and would therefore lack occasion to determine the intellect. Unlike Aquinas, however, who had identified such contingency with freedom, Giles, like Walter of Bruges, does not regard mere contingency as sufficient to account for complete human freedom. Contingency on its own cannot result in action, only the determination of the intellect by the will can ensure this. Formal freedom, then, consists precisely in this: that the will indirectly determines itself by directly determining the intellect.

To the extent that Giles ascribes several sources to the freedom of the will, he seems to have been rather unique in the period just subsequent to the condemnations. Most thinkers attributed freedom to a single source: either to the
will itself for voluntarists, or to the intellect or some other feature of rational beings, such as the possession of an immaterial soul, for intellectualists. However, Giles’s theory is redolent of the earlier voluntarism of Walter of Bruges. For both Giles and Walter, although the indeterminacy or *indifferentia* of the intellect is crucial to the act of choice, its indeterminacy alone cannot account for free agency. A determination on the part of the will is required for this. The foundations of freedom for both thinkers resides, then, essentially in the capacity for spontaneous self-determination. This is a property of the will.
CONCLUSION

On the central issues dividing voluntarists and intellectualists in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, Giles of Rome quite consistently lines up with the voluntarists. His singular contribution is derived from his development of Aquinas’s intellectualist theory of the will into a voluntaristic moral psychology.

Perhaps Giles’s largest debt to Aquinas was his adoption of the latter’s famous distinction between exercitum and specificatio. According to Aquinas, although the will is the efficient cause of itself and of the powers of the soul, it necessarily requires a prior, specifying act of the intellect to determine it. Giles adopts this distinction and adjusts it. In observance of the act-potency axiom, the intellect is needed to actuate (actuare) the will. However, it is Giles’s contention that the will can, once reduced to act, determine (determinare) itself, at least as regards mixed goods. This is because the intellect, being a natural power, can only present a mixed good to the will under a dual aspect: the good and the bad. Because the will can only be moved by the good, it must determine the intellect to focus on the good aspect if a choice or volition is to occur. This act of self-determination is a spontaneous act of the will. Accordingly, Giles defends a voluntarism of
specification as regards self-motion, at least as far as the *Quodlibetal Questions* are concerned.

Giles’s theory of volitional self-motion or -determination governs two other issues connected to his theory of the will: his understanding of the Socratic Paradox and his conception of the foundations of freedom. In the first place, because Giles holds that the will controls how the intellect regards any object of choice, this permits him to allow that, although there is ignorance associated with wrongdoing, it is nonetheless a voluntary ignorance. The source of wrongdoing therefore derives from the will. This claim is very close, as we saw, to that made by Henry of Ghent. Aquinas, of course, also maintains that ignorance is connected to wrongdoing. He maintains, however that the ignorance that derails the intellect from making correct choices in akratic action is not derived from the will; rather, it is derived from the sense appetite.

Although Giles rejects the thomistic claim that the intellect is the cause of freedom, he likewise incorporates his voluntarism of specification into his view of the foundations of freedom. According to Giles, the will's freedom has three sources: its location in the immaterial soul, its proximity to the intellect, which presents it with objects from which to choose, and its ability to specify, at least indirectly, its own act of choice. Although his theory of self-determination derives its starting points from Aquinas, however, his conclusion that such self-determination amounts to formal freedom, along with the view that freedom has
several sources, is ultimately more redolent of the moderate voluntarism of Walter of Bruges than of Aquinas.

Finally, on the question of the final end, Giles's again shows traces of Aquinas. He adopts the distinction Aquinas had drawn between created and uncreated beatitude – the visio Dei and God himself, respectively – but uses it to show that happiness is achieved through an act of the will. According to Giles, in contrast to Thomas, it is the will, rather than the intellect, that is the superior power. This is because, through the will's act of love, rational agents are joined to God more closely than through the intellectual act of vision. The Thomistic view that the final end for man consists in the perfection of the intellect in the visio Dei, then, is ultimately rejected in favour of Henry of Ghent's position. On the related issue of the nature of theology, Giles regards this habit as an affective science, a view that is redolent of Bonaventure. On this issue he lines up with neither contemporary voluntarists, who regarded theology as a practical science, nor contemporary intellectualists who saw it as a speculative one.

Overall, Giles of Rome's theory of the will represents a species of moderate voluntarism. His firm belief in the formal freedom of the will to explain wrongdoing and his defense of the claim that beatitude is achieved through love rather than knowledge demonstrate his firm commitment to voluntarism. However, because of his respect for Aristotle, and in particular the act-potency axiom, Giles was forced to develop an action theory that incorporated the partial passivity of the will. In this respect, at least, Aquinas was a very useful source.
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