SECURITY COMMUNITY IN AND THROUGH PRACTICE:
THE POWER POLITICS OF RUSSIA-NATO DIPLOMACY

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

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SECURITY COMMUNITY IN AND THROUGH PRACTICE:
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By Vincent Pouliot
PhD
Department of Political Science
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2008

How do security communities develop in and through practice? For more than forty years, security relations between Russia and NATO member states were structured by the spectre of mutual assured destruction as symbolized by thousands of nuclear missiles targeted at each other. Less than a generation after the end of the Cold War, the possibility of military confrontation between these former enemies has considerably receded. Taking inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu, this dissertation develops a theory of practice of security communities that argues that on the ground of international politics, the social fact of peace emerges when security practitioners come to debate with diplomacy—the non-violent settlement of disputes—instead of about diplomacy. It is doxa, a relationship of immediate adherence to the order of things, that makes such a peaceful practical sense possible. In the empirical analysis, the dissertation reveals an intriguing paradox in the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship. On the one hand, over the last fifteen years Russia and NATO member states have solved each and every one of their disputes, including fierce ones over the double enlargement, by non-violent means. Such a track record of peaceful change is testimony to security-community-building processes. But on the other hand, diplomatic success was often bought at the price of a growing mistrust on the Russian side. As the Russian Great Power habitus resurfaced, hysteresis—a disconnect between players’ dispositions and their positions in the game—steadily increased to the point of inconclusive symbolic power struggles over the rules of the international security game and the roles that each player should play. A decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, Russian-Atlantic relations have left the terrain of military confrontation but have yet to settle on that of mature peace. Building on several dozen interviews with Russian and NATO security practitioners, the dissertation discovers that diplomacy has become a normal though not a self-evident practice in Russian-Atlantic dealings.
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-ballistic Missile (treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDPSp</td>
<td>Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe (treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU COM</td>
<td>European Command (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Federal Security Service (in Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCMN</td>
<td>High Commissioner for National Minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMEMO</td>
<td>Institute of World Economy and International Relations (in Russian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISKRAN</td>
<td>Institute for the Study of Canada and the US (in Russian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Committee for the Security of the State (in Russian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGIMO</td>
<td>Moscow State Institute of International Relations (in Russian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>NATO-Russia Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PIPA</td>
<td>Program on International Policy Attitudes</td>
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<td>PJC</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALIS</td>
<td>Strategic Airlift Interim Solution</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SORT</td>
<td>Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defense</td>
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<td>ToPoSC</td>
<td>Theory of Practice of Security Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Transatlantic Security Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCK</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America (also USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>American dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTsIOM</td>
<td>All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (in Russian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Diplomacy is letting someone else have your way.

- Lester B. Pearson, Nobel Peace Prize (1956)
Chapter I: Introduction

PACIFICATION WITHOUT COLLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION: RUSSIA AND THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA*

How do security communities develop in and through practice? For more than forty years, security relations between Russia and the transatlantic security community (TSC)\(^1\) were structured by the spectre of mutual assured destruction (MAD) as symbolized by thousands of nuclear missiles targeted at each other. Less than a generation after the end of the Cold War, the possibility of military confrontation between those two former enemies has considerably receded. To be sure, post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations have been and remain uneasy on many accounts. Bones of contention abound, startling differences in international outlook keep surfacing, and legacies of mistrust endure. Russia has clearly not “integrated” into the West and today’s many heated disputes keep that prospect fairly remote. That said, by contrast with the Cold War era, the relationship now takes place against an interactional background that is mostly demilitarized. Moscow and the TSC have come to solve their disputes through power struggles which, as intense as they may be, do not hinge anymore on the possibility of using military force against one another. Russia-NATO power politics, which certainly continue to this day, now belong to the realm of diplomacy not war. This swift reversal of history constitutes a fascinating puzzle for the discipline of International Relations (IR).

In this study, I argue that diplomacy has become a normal though not a self-evident practice in Russian-Atlantic dealings, mainly due to persisting symbolic power struggles over the new rules of the international security game and the roles that each player should play in the post-Cold War era. By bringing together two notions that are usually construed as antithetical—power politics and diplomacy—I demonstrate that international pacification may unfold, in and through practice, \textit{despite} the perpetuation of conflicts, so long as these are solved through a diplomatic routine sustained by strong patterns of social order. The theory of practice of security communities (ToPoSC) outlined below argues that on the ground of international politics, the

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* This chapter is a revised and extended version of an article by the author published in \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 45(5): 605-622 (2007), reproduced here by permission of Sage.

\(^{1}\) The TSC is the transnational region comprised of North America and Western Europe which has historically developed highly dependable expectations of peaceful change. Although the TSC and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partly intersect geographically, the former is a socio-political community bound by a collective identity whereas the later is first and foremost an organization based on the principle of collective defence. Because of their lingering military rivalry, Greece and Turkey cannot be considered fully part of the TSC.
social fact of peace emerges when security practitioners come to debate *with* diplomacy and not *about* diplomacy. It is doxa, a relationship of immediate adherence to the order of things, that makes such a peaceful practical sense possible. In my empirical analysis, I discover an intriguing paradox in the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship. On the one hand, over the last fifteen years Russia and NATO member states have solved each and every one of their disputes, including fierce ones over the double enlargement, by non-violent means. But on the other hand, I find that peaceful change was often bought at the price of a growing mistrust on the Russian side. As the Russian Great Power habitus resurfaced, hysteresis—a disconnect between players’ dispositions and their positions in the game—steadily increased to the point of inconclusive symbolic power struggles over the rules of the international security game and the roles that each player should play. Russian-Atlantic relations have left the terrain of military confrontation but have yet to settle on that of mature peace. This striking fluidity is what makes the Russia-NATO case so interesting for a study of international pacification.

In this introduction, I set the stage for the dissertation by tackling what I call the Russian-Atlantic puzzle. On the one hand, the post-Cold War track record of peaceful settlement of disputes provides evidence of what IR scholars call a “security community.” As Karl Deutsch *et al.* conceptualized fifty years ago, a security community at the international level is a group of peoples among which there is a “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”² By Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s empirical indicators,³ everything takes place as if a nascent Russian-Atlantic security community were currently emerging. On the other hand, the lack of any significant level of collective identification demonstrates that what many theorists conceive as the cement of security communities remains absent from the Russian-Atlantic pacification process. Deutsch *et al.* presumed that “we-ness” fosters dependable expectations of peaceful change among countries because transnational interactions instill a sense of community that leads statesmen to solve their disputes “without resort to large-scale physical force.”⁴ For Adler and Barnett, mutual identification is one of two “necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change.”⁵ Similarly, in Alexander Wendt’s famous book, collective identity formation is the key sociopolitical process behind interstate pacification.⁶ Yet as this

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² Deutsch *et al.* 1957, 5.
³ Adler and Barnett 1998.
⁴ Deutsch *et al.*, 1957, 5.
⁵ Adler and Barnett 1998, 39. The other necessary condition of security community is trust.
⁶ Wendt 1999.
introduction demonstrates, this theoretical model partly fails to account for the current pacification process between Russia and the TSC. My empirical analysis rather suggests that the emergence of a security community can possibly happen in the absence of any genuine sense of we-ness. From this Russian-Atlantic puzzle, I will then draw out the two crucial implications— theoretical and methodological—upon which this study is built.

The introduction contains five parts. The first part reviews the constructivist literature on security communities and provides a set of empirical indicators to assess their development. The second part applies Adler and Barnett’s framework to the current Russian-Atlantic rapprochement and finds that a nascent security community can be said to be emerging. The third part of the introduction demonstrates that this pacification process is taking place without simultaneous collective identity formation. In the fourth part, the theoretical and methodological lessons of this case study are driven home by making the case for a “practice turn” in the study of security communities as well as for a “sobjectivist” methodology. Both of these moves intend to restore the practical logic of international peace. The final part of the introduction briefly surveys the chapters that comprise this study.

A. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST RESEARCH PROGRAM ON SECURITY COMMUNITIES

Already fifty years old, the notion of security community was coined by Deutsch et al. in the context of the North Atlantic area. With the recent constructivist turn in IR theory, Adler and Barnett seized the opportunity to tailor Deutsch’s ideas to current-day theoretical and empirical puzzles. In opposition to the view that the international system is invariably based on rivalry and self-help because of anarchy, these authors contend that states can achieve a variety of intersubjective forms of order, one of which is that of security community. A security community is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change”—where peaceful change means “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes.”

Contrary to a widespread view, then, security communities are not characterized by the absence of disputes but rather by the fact that disputes are systematically solved peacefully.

Although it is not limited to democratic zones of peace, the security-community theoretical framework is often associated with democratic peace theory. For instance, Harvey

7 Adler and Barnett 1998, 30 and 34.
Starr builds on expected utility theory to argue that democracy and security community go hand in hand because “the social integration process provides decision-makers with overwhelming information” about whether other states share an aversion to using force. From a constructivist perspective, however, democracy fosters peace primarily because it facilitates collective identity formation. In other words, the foundation of security communities lies not in regime type but in the identity/security nexus. In democratic settings, “the structures of Kantian liberalism constitute subtle yet powerful processes of identity construction, [playing] constitutive and disciplining roles in the development of political relations between liberals.” That said, mutual identification is not the preserve of liberal democracies. Collective identity formation—“a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether”—can occur in any kind of relationship so long as the redefinition of Self and Other creates a common in-group identity. In security communities, this sense of community or we-ness leads to the shared belief “that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change.’”

Constructivists do not conceive of collective identity as the cause of security community in a “positivist sense.” Instead, mutual identification plays a constitutive role by redefining states’ interests and instilling a pacific disposition. We-ness, the cement of security community, becomes part of states’ self-understandings and practices, then making peaceful change dependably expectable. In response to the rationalist view that it is common interests that foster cooperation and eventually pacification, constructivists argue that such common interests are not simply “read off” from international structures of material power but rather are socially constructed through interaction. Thanks to collective identification and the blurring of Self and Other, a state’s interests merge with the collective interests of the community. In a sense, then, it is correct to say that common interests breed peace: but since interests are not simply

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8 Starr 1992, 211.
9 Williams 2001, 526.
12 Deutsch et al. 1957, 5. Yet inclusion for some could mean exclusion for others: is collective identification then dangerous for non-members of a security community? In a book devoted to this question, Alex Bellamy discovers that “the greater the maturity and more tightly-coupled the security community, the less likely it is to be a regional fortress.” This tendency is explained by the lasting socialization in new ways of thinking endured by members of mature security communities: the elimination of realpolitik from mutual relations spills over to foreign relations; Bellamy 2004, 178. For an exploration of this issue with respect to the TSC, cf. Pouliot and Lachmann 2004.
13 Adler and Barnett 2000, 324.
14 On constitutive analysis in IR, cf. Wendt 1998. I will return to this notion in chapter III.
“exogenously given,” an inquiry into collective identification as the source of shared interests is necessary to explain peace.

Security communities emerge along three tiers that are each comprised of a set of conditions generative of dependable expectations of peaceful change. First are precipitating conditions such as changes in technology or the development of new interpretations of reality. At the time of their advent, precipitating conditions may apparently have nothing to do with peace. They are permissive variables: neither necessary nor sufficient causes which simply orient states toward one another. The second and most important tier of security-community emergence relates to the structural context and the processes that transform the nature of interstate relationships into a communitarian one. Power, understood as “the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the ‘we-feeling’ and practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community,” plays a central role here. The social construction of knowledge, especially new interpretations of Self and Other, is also crucial in defining a collective identity. In order to lead to peaceful change, power and knowledge depend on social processes of interaction, institutionalization and social learning. As sites of socialization, international organizations facilitate community-building. Overall, it is through social learning—“an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality”—that actors come to develop shared understandings and think of themselves as part of the same community.

Finally, the third tier of security-community emergence is that of mutual trust and collective identity, the two “necessary conditions” for dependable expectations of peaceful change. Once they have reached this tier, security communities are empirically observable through a set of indicators:

1- multilateralism: decision-making and conflict-resolution procedures handled through consensual, non-hierarchical mechanisms;

2- unfortified borders: border checks may persist but not to secure states against organized military invasion;

3- changes in military planning: community members do not plan organized violence (offence or defence) against one another;

16 Ibid., 39.
17 Ibid., 43.
18 Ibid., 55-56. Adler and Barnett also provide more demanding indicators for tightly coupled security communities: collective security mechanisms, high level of military integration, cooperation on internal security, free movements of population, internationalization of authority, and a multiperspectival polity.
4- common definition of threat: similar security cultures;
5- discourse and language of community: state elites publicly represent each others as members of the same group.

High scores on these indicators are characteristic of “mature” security communities such as the West European community, the North American community or the TSC. Lower scores indicate earlier phases of development—nascent or ascendant. Roughly, a nascent security community should score on a majority of indicators (three or four) at medium force, whereas the same level of performance on all five indicators would attest to an ascendant security community.

B. THE EMERGENCE OF A NASCENT RUSSIAN-ATLANTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY?

In this section, I argue that by Adler and Barnett’s five indicators, a nascent Russian-Atlantic security community is currently emerging. The empirical analysis shows that the contemporary relationship between Moscow and the TSC scores at either medium or low-to-medium levels on each of the indicators. To be sure, such a mixed performance invites careful judgments. True, over the last fifteen years the possibility of a military confrontation between Russia and the TSC has only surfaced once, and rather fleetingly, during the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the Pristina airport incident (cf. chapter VI). All other disputes, including fierce ones such as those over NATO enlargements, have been solved “by means short of war,” as Deutsch et al. would put it. This certainly makes for a shared track record of peaceful change—the essence of security communities. That being said, the following empirical analysis suggests that the emerging Russian-Atlantic security community is barely nascent.

The first indicator of security community is multilateralism: have Russia and the TSC developed decision-making and conflict-resolution procedures that are based on consensual mechanisms? Generally speaking, there has been a significant “multilateralization” of the relationship but the process is still fragile. In terms of achievements, Russia and the TSC have created a variety of multilateral channels in which to interact and reach agreement. Four such multilateral forums particularly stand out. First, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been turned into a permanent organization that has developed a variety of political mechanisms as well as multilateral institutions. Although the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is increasingly marginalized, it retains a number of specific

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19 On phases of security-community development, cf. ibid., 49-57.
and exclusive functions. Second, Russia and the European Union (EU) have formalized their institutional ties in the form of biannual high-level summits, monthly consultations between the Political and Security Committee troika and Russian representatives, the strengthening of Russia’s mission to the EU as well as the installation of a Russian officer within the EU’s Military staff. Tangible results remain few but the cooperative framework is at least there. Third, after a few years as an invited participant, in 2002 Russia became a full member of the Group of Eight (G8) and became its host for the first time in 2006 in St. Petersburg. Fourth, NATO and Russia interact through multilateral mechanisms such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). In addition, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) between Russia and NATO was launched in 1997, later replaced with the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. Chapter IV below contains a detailed micro-analysis of security practices at the NRC. Suffice it to say here that the NRC, which prides itself on “meeting at 27” (instead of 26+1), comes closest to an institutionalized form of multilateralism between Russia and the TSC.

That being said, three aspects of the Russian-Atlantic “multilateralization” come to balance this optimistic assessment. First, Russia’s preferred multilateral forum in the 1990s—although not anymore—has been systematically downplayed by the core states of the TSC. As the OSCE gives an equal voice to Russia in pan-European security matters, the organization has never featured prominently in American security planning, especially. Second, though flourishing, the rather recent institutionalization of different channels of multilateralism remains young and fragile. One only has to think about the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the ensuing rupture of relations between Russia and NATO to recall that formal forums can only do so much in the absence of entrenched norms of cooperation and shared security cultures (cf. chapter VI). Third, despite the multilateral “meeting-at-27” formula of the NRC, the decades-old, primordial solidarity among NATO allies works a reminder that there are two political entities that meet there—NATO and Russia—instead of a genuine multilateralism at 27 “equal” countries (cf. chapter IV).

Adler and Barnett’s second and third indicators are *unfortified borders* and *changes in military planning*. Again, evidence of a Russian-Atlantic security community is observable but at a limited level. Clearly, throughout the last fifteen years there has been a marked demilitarization on both sides as the military build-up prompted by Cold War confrontation came to an end. In terms of American commitment on the European frontline, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) had 102,000 soldiers under its command in 2003, down from
210,000 in 1992. On the Russian side, the evacuation of 177,000 soldiers from Germany, 20,000 from Poland and 106,000 from the Baltic states was completed during the first half of the 1990s. Since then, however, military cuts have resurfaced as a contentious issue between Moscow and the TSC as deadlocked negotiations on the revised CFE Treaty and the 1999 Istanbul commitments demonstrate (cf. chapter VI).

At the level of military planning, the respective national security strategies of all three major players (Russia, the United States and the EU) significantly downplay the possibility of a mutual confrontation. Russia’s most recent Foreign Policy Concept argues that “constructive interaction” is desired with NATO, a sentiment echoed by Russian president Vladimir Putin who declared in 2000 that “it is hard for me to visualize NATO as an enemy.” On the transatlantic side, the U.S. National Security Strategy talks about “a central reality of the 21st century: the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries.” The EU’s “Wider Europe” strategy also puts great emphasis on integrating Russia into Europe’s “ring of friends,” a vision that paved the way to the launch of a new “common space of external security.” And yet, these optimistic declarations often go side by side with polite but strong reservations regarding mutual security. The 2000 Russian Concept underscores that “on a number of parameters, NATO’s present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally directly contradict them.”

For its part, the U.S. National Security Strategy insists that “[l]ingering distrust of our motives and policies by key Russian elites slows improvement in our relations.” Today’s fierce row over the American Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) project in Central Europe is a stark

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20 All numbers are taken from IISS 1992; 2003. Note, however, that some Russian troops have remained in other post-Soviet countries such as Moldova and Georgia.
22 Quoted in Herspring 2003, 245.
reminder that the notion of nuclear deterrence has not fully disappeared from Russia-NATO politics (cf. chapter VII).

At the operational level, finally, from 1996 to 2003 Russian and NATO soldiers fought side by side during NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans (Stabilization Force, SFOR, and Kosovo Force, KFOR). Russia was the largest non-NATO contributor to the Alliance-led missions. Despite tough negotiations to formalize the arrangement (cf. chapters V and VI), the joint commandment of Russian and NATO troops demonstrates a political willingness to move beyond military secrecy and build trust. Moreover, recently Russia and NATO approved a comprehensive action plan against terrorism and started collaborating on the operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean—an article-5 mission to which Russia contributes two ships. Just as striking is the fact that Moscow finally signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO that will ease movements of troops on each others’ soil (cf. chapter IV). But in spite of such progress, seasoned experts such as Alexei Arbatov continue to doubt that the Russian-Atlantic military rivalry has come to an end, particularly because of insuperable military inertia:

Russia’s revised foreign policy and doctrines, however, are not echoed in its established military policy and organization. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Russia’s armed forces—with a troop strength projected to be more than 1 million by 2004—are 70-80 percent oriented toward a war with the West (as well as Turkey and Japan). At least 90 percent of Russia’s strategic and tactical nuclear forces and its command and control and early warning complex, three largest military districts out of six, and three of the four fleets are aimed at war against the West.28

Furthermore, in the last decade a number of military exercises conducted by each side suggest that military planning still takes the possibility of mutual aggression seriously.29 In his 2006 presidential address, Putin even declared that “it is too early to speak of an end to the arms race.”30 In sum, despite a marked demilitarization of the relationship, the second and third indicators of security-community emergence provide very mixed evidence of a mature peace between Russia and the TSC.

The fourth indicator of security community is the common definition of threats. On issues of nuclear proliferation and international terrorism, 9/11 arguably prompted the emergence of a “common security culture”—a shared system of intersubjective meanings about

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28 Arbatov 2004, 106.
29 One can think of Russia’s Zapad-99 exercise, which simulated an attack from the west on Kaliningrad (and, worryingly, entailed a limited use of nuclear weapons by Russia), or of a NATO-Ukraine joint exercise in Crimea called See Breeze 97, which Russia considered a provocation.
international threats—between Russia and the TSC.\textsuperscript{31} This is not to deny that Moscow and Western capitals still hold clashing views on what legitimizes the use of force in international politics and what constitutes an appropriate response to terrorism. What is underscored here is not unanimity of viewpoints but convergence. To be sure, at the time of writing the 9/11 honeymoon had already dissipated (cf. chapter VI). But in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Russian and TSC security elites moved closer than ever in terms of threat perception, as their similar assessment of the Taliban menace suggests. This convergence was especially salient between Russia and the United States with continental Europe partly on the sideline. A militarized understanding of the “war on terrorism,” the belief in the legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes, as well as the aggravated fear from nuclear proliferation are all topics of agreement between Putin and U.S. president George W. Bush while Europeans and Canadians are more reserved. In the aftermath of the Iraqi crisis, the intersubjective basis of the TSC was (and still is) being renegotiated, including its security culture. Against this backdrop of “power politics of peace,”\textsuperscript{32} the most remarkable development was Russia’s emergence as an (almost) “insider” in transatlantic debates. Lilia Shevtsova is right that “Moscow—and not Paris, as many felt—played the determining role in deepening the schism in NATO by its choice in early 2003.”\textsuperscript{33} In sum, while it would be an exaggeration to talk of a substantive Russian-Atlantic security culture, it is nonetheless clear that Russia has gained some influence in transatlantic political dynamics and social construction of threats. The Iranian nuclear saga is a case in point that Russian views complicate transatlantic dealings.

Finally, Adler and Barnett’s fifth indicator of security community is a discourse and the language of community. Although there have been many instances of community discourse between Russia and the TSC over the last decade or so, they were neither systematic nor normalized. In other words, the language of we-ness remains dependent on the ups and downs of the relationship. On the one hand, as Iver Neumann observes, it is striking that no one in the Western press questioned the fact that Russia’s Europeanness was the baseline of Putin’s speech before the Bundestag in the aftermath of 9/11.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, the EU’s 1999 common strategy “welcomes Russia’s return to its rightful place in the European family in the spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined

\textsuperscript{31} Pouliot 2003.
\textsuperscript{32} Pouliot 2006.
\textsuperscript{33} Shevtsova 2005, 265.
\textsuperscript{34} Neumann 2005b, 27 fn. 23.
in the common heritage of European civilization.”

The United States and Russia consider themselves “allies” in the struggle against terrorism and more generally “partners” who “cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration.” All this cannot be discounted as mere cheap talk because community discourse has constitutive effects on intersubjective dynamics between Moscow and the TSC. On a number of issues, Russia and the TSC now view themselves on the same side of international politics. That being said, there remains a disturbing discrepancy between the language of community often used at the international level and the bickering discourse sometimes held domestically. Whether it is about the Chechnya quagmire or Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s politicized trial, Western statesmen are keen to mark their distance from Russia’s non-democratic manners. This critical trend is once again on the rise after the silencing effect of 9/11. For their part, “romantic realists” abound among Russian elites who denounce Western “double standards” on human rights. Moscow’s foreign policy discourse is quickly gaining in assertiveness as the country is recovering from economic difficulties (cf. chapter VI). In sum, the language of community between Russia and the TSC has yet to be normalized.

On the whole, three medium and two low-to-medium scores on the indicators mean that the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship is best categorized as a nascent security community (cf. table 1.1). Indeed, Adler and Barnett’s theoretical definition of this early pacification phase fits very well the case at hand:

In this initial phase, governments do not explicitly seek to create a security community. Instead, they begin to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to: increase their mutual security, lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges; and/or encourage further exchanges and interactions. Accordingly, we expect to see various diplomatic, bilateral, multilateral exchanges, something akin to ‘search’ missions, that are designed to determine the level and extent of cooperation that might be achieved.

No doubt “search missions” have abounded between Russia and the TSC since the end of the Cold War with the result of a trend toward pacification despite a sometimes bumpy road. Today, Russia and the TSC share more and more threat perceptions, they increasingly talk of themselves as being on the same side in international politics, they interact a lot in multilateral

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37 Morozov 2002.
38 Adler and Barnett 1998, 50.
forums, and they have at least partly moved away from scenarios of military confrontation. In addition, a track record of sensitive disputes solved peacefully—if at times painfully—reinforces the evidence of a security community. But just how solid is this trend? Are the conditions conducive to dependable expectations of peaceful change fulfilled in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations?

Table 1.1: Indicators of a Russian-Atlantic security community in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Many new forums created with some tangible results; but the process is still fragile and unequal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfortified borders</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Significant demilitarization; yet military inertia sometimes perpetuates confrontational thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in military planning</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Revised military doctrines downplay the possibility of mutual confrontation; joint exercises/operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common definition of threat</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Convergence in terms of threat perceptions but lingering disagreements about the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse of community</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Community discourse at international level clashes with a sometimes bickering language domestically</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. A SECURITY COMMUNITY WITHOUT COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

In this section, I contend that the current pacification process between Russia and the TSC is neither preceded nor accompanied by collective identity formation. As the previous section showed, there is empirical evidence that a nascent security community is currently emerging. According to Adler and Barnett’s framework, a necessary condition for this to happen would be for Russian and TSC peoples to mutually identify with one another—to share a sense of we-ness. But survey data indicate that this is not the case: collective identification between Russia and the TSC remains at rather low levels (cf. below). Just as tellingly, qualitative studies demonstrate that the two entities still construe each other as political “Others.” Ted Hopf contends that the West remains the main “External Other” in Russian foreign-policy making39 whereas Neumann observes that Europe has built and still builds itself using Russia as its “Eastern Other.”40 Generally speaking, the lack of a Russian-Atlantic collective identity helps explain the many ups and downs in the relationship.

It is beyond doubt that precipitating conditions (tier 1) obtained years ago, around the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There were four main precipitating conditions for the emergence of a Russian-Atlantic security community, which are interactive and mutually reinforcing: (1) three decades of learning on nuclear confrontation and its dangerous hazards; (2) the widening economic and technological gap between the Western and the Eastern blocs; (3) the development of a new concept of security as mutual and cooperative born out of the CSCE process and bolstered by Europe starting in the early 1980s; and (4) the fall of communism, first in Eastern Europe and then in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) itself. The first condition supplied a stepping stone for more intersubjective agreement; the second gave the West a “magnetic pull” over the USSR/Russia; the third condition downplayed the idea of military confrontation in favour of common security; and the fourth paved the way for collective identification at the domestic level. None of these precipitating conditions was bound to lead to a Russian-Atlantic rapprochement, however: they are strictly permissive variables that make the security community possible without determining it.

The second tier consists of a variety of processes that potentially help transform the political context of the Russian-Atlantic relationship from rivalry to community. In terms of organization, the many steps taken to create forums of positive interaction among Russian and TSC security practitioners have already been specified above. NATO has been especially salient as an organization fostering new and peaceful Russian-Atlantic dynamics (cf. chapters IV, V and VI). Forums such as the NRC allow the multiplication of transactions among security elites and social learning, which is necessary for dependable expectations of peaceful change to emerge. Through its “seminar diplomacy,” organizations such as the OSCE also played an important role in changing “the way people in the OSCE region define security.”

Organization and transactions are all well and good, but they are not sufficient for peaceful change. All social relationships are fundamentally imbued with power, including peaceful ones. This is not a normative argument in defense of the pervasiveness of domination but an ontological assumption—that power can never be transcended, not even via peace (cf. chapter II). There is, of course, the issue of material resources. Economic well-being exerts a magnetic pull over poorer countries and may prompt learning and imitation. No doubt the huge gap between socioeconomic levels in Russia and in the TSC favored convergence. The unrestrictedly pro-Western twist of Russian foreign policy in 1992-93 is testimony to that:

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42 Deutsch et al. 1957, 38.
minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei “Kozyrev regarded his main task as easy street: just follow the American lead.”\textsuperscript{43} But while this pro-Western fad quickly passed by 1994 (cf. chapter V), the difference in socioeconomic well-being remained and indeed aggravated for a time. This time lag suggests that power is based on much more than material resources. In chapter II, I will develop a theory of symbolic domination which I later apply in chapters V and VI, to NATO-Russia relations after the end of the Cold War. The main conclusion that I will reach is that starting in 1994, the Alliance’s power over Russia slowly but surely declined. While for a time in the 1990s NATO “had the power to define the roles which Russia could adopt in its evolving security relations with NATO [and] was able drastically to narrow the field of politically viable options available to Russian policy-makers,”\textsuperscript{44} its authority steadily weakened over the post-Cold War era. There are many reasons for this evolution, including domestic politics and the troubles of transition.\textsuperscript{45} In chapter V and VI, I will demonstrate how NATO’s “double enlargement” undermined its new authority in Russian eyes.

In the meantime, this analysis demonstrates that a key tier-2 condition for the emergence of a Russian-Atlantic security community, which Adler and Barnett call magnetic pull through social power, has been declining over the last fifteen years. Consequently, one would expect the third tier (mutual trust and collective identity) to be problematic in the Russian-Atlantic case. Indeed, polls recently conducted in Russia, the United States and Europe all tend to show that there is no meaningful sense of we-ness among transatlantic and Russian populations. A good way to assess Western peoples’ identification with Russia is through the Program on International Policy Attitudes’ (PIPA) “thermometer of nations.” In the 2002 poll, at a time when Russian-Atlantic relations were the warmest ever, Russians obtained a “cool” feeling from Europeans (47 degrees) and a barely “warm”—indeed, lukewarm—one from Americans (55 degrees). These results are a far cry from the considerably warmer feelings that Europeans had for Americans and reciprocally.\textsuperscript{46} Just as significant is the fact that political turmoil in Russia was considered “an extremely important threat” by 14 percent of Europeans and 27 percent of Americans.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{43} Plekhanov 1999, 175.
\textsuperscript{44} Williams and Neumann 2000, 372.
\textsuperscript{45} Given that this study is pitched at the international level (that is, at the systemic level of analysis), I acknowledge the role of internal factors but cannot analyze them in detail. On the role played by internal factors in the making of Russian foreign policy during the early 1990s, cf. among others Malcolm \textit{et al.} 1996.
\textsuperscript{46} PIPA 2002, 8.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, 23.
The absence of collective identification is even more acute on the Russian side. The Moscow-based Levada Center supplies telling data on that matter. In a 2006 poll, Russians believed that their country should come closer to Europe and the United States in proportions of barely 24 percent and 8 percent respectively. In comparison, the “near abroad” and China obtained 39 percent and 13 percent. Strikingly, 15 percent of Russians perceived the most important threats to Russia to be the United States and NATO, while 46 percent judged that any collaboration with NATO would go against the country’s interest.\textsuperscript{48} These numbers illustrate a significant darkening of Russians’ perceptions about the transatlantic community since the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{49} As Bobo Lo summarizes: “Notwithstanding the liberal inclinations of a minority within the elite, there has always been a gulf between many of the political and social beliefs Russians understand and/or cherish and those taken for granted in Western countries.”\textsuperscript{50} Even the common Other of international terrorism has been insufficient to foster we-ness.

Combined with the analyses of Hopf and Neumann,\textsuperscript{51} these polling data suggests that there is a low level of collective identification between Russia and the TSC. This finding puts into question the dependability of mutual expectations of peaceful change. After all, by Adler and Barnett’s framework, a nascent security community that has not fulfilled the third set of conditions should be rather unstable: collective identity is theorized as the constitutive foundation and necessary condition of security community. Two conclusions are in order here. First, the lack of a Russian-Atlantic collective identity certainly implies a weaker and far less stable pacification process. In fact, it surely explains the striking inconsistency of the relationship from one year to another (more on this in chapter VII). In the absence of collective identification, the social construction of a security community cannot proceed smoothly because two steps forward are often followed by one step backward. This is precisely the kind of turbulent political dynamic that characterizes relations Russia and the TSC: although disputes keep being solved peacefully, political rhetoric erratically switches from laudation to recrimination.

Second, an essential theoretical lesson to be drawn from the Russian-Atlantic pacification process is that it is possible for a nascent security community to emerge even in the

\textsuperscript{49} For a detailed analysis of Russians’ attitudes on foreign policy matters throughout the 1990s, cf. Zimmerman 2002. Other recent polling data can be found in Allison 2006; and White, Light and McAllister 2005.
\textsuperscript{50} Lo 2003, 100.
\textsuperscript{51} Hopf 2002; Neumann 1999.
absence of collective identification. While it is certainly true that we-ness solidifies and eases peace, it is not a necessary condition. Since the relationship between collective identity and security community is multidirectional and interactive, collective identity formation would better be conceptualized as a facilitating and stabilizing factor of interstate peace. Deutsch et al. introduced an important distinction between “essential” and “helpful” background conditions for security communities.\footnote{Deutsch et al. 1957.} Although Adler and Barnett conceive of collective identity as part of the former, there is empirical leverage to question that assertion. Collective identification certainly reinforces security communities but it is not an essential condition. This conclusion is hardly unique to the Russian-Atlantic case. Another example of emerging security community that does not rest on especially high levels of collective identification could be the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which comprehends highly disparate peoples with contrasting religious, political, and sociocultural backgrounds.\footnote{Cf. Acharya 2001.} In a related fashion, the TSC has also suffered a loss of collective identity over the last few years without, for that matter, losing its unique capacity to systematically solve its most sensitive disputes by peaceful means—witness Iraq.

All in all, the constructivist hypothesis that a security community always rests on a collective identity is in need for theoretical refinement. Peoples and states do not have to think of themselves as the same to develop dependable expectations of peaceful change, that is, a reasonable certitude that disputes can and will be solved by means short of war. In fact, the notion that stable interstate peace always rests on some form of consensus about a collective identity appears misguided. Communities of whatever type always experience disputes, including about their own identities. The “power politics of peace” are irreducibly part of any security community. Ultimately, interstate peace does not imply perpetual agreement about collective identity. Instead, it emerges out of shared practices regarding the management of disagreements. Security communities are first and foremost “communities of practice.”\footnote{Adler 2005.}

In this spirit, in the remainder of this study I take a “practice turn”\footnote{Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and Von Savigny 2001.} in the study of security communities. This entails two main moves, at the theoretical and methodological levels. As for theory, instead of focusing on how people represent one another (collective identity), a practice turn in the study of security communities concentrates on what practitioners actually do when they interact. This is the object of chapter II. Recovering the practical logics of
peace raises important methodological challenges, however. The strict and scrupulous application of Adler and Barnett’s framework presented in this introductory chapter offers a look at security communities from above, as an *opus operatum*. In order to understand the *modus operandi* of interstate pacification, in chapter III I devise a “sobjectivist” methodology specifically geared toward the recovery of the logic of practicality in international politics.

**D. PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION**

This study contains a total of seven chapters including the introduction and the conclusion. The five core chapters are organized in two parts: first comes “Restoring the Practical Logic of Peace” (chapters II and III), which contains the theoretical and methodological frameworks that inform the study; followed with a second part entitled “The Power Politics of Russia-NATO Diplomacy” (chapters IV, V and VI), which together constitute an in-depth case study. The overall thread is an inquiry into the practicality of the interstate process of pacification between the TSC and Russia in the post-Cold War era.

The key theoretical implication drawn from the Russian-Atlantic puzzle is the need to take a practice turn in the study of security communities. Chapter II, which forms the theoretical core of the study, develops a theory of practice of security communities. I begin by showing how many social and IR theories suffer from a representational bias that precludes them from grasping the practical logics of international life. Taking inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu, I make the case for a fourth logic of social action in addition to consequentiality, appropriateness and argument: the logic of practicality. Most social practices do not derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection but rather are the result of inarticulate, practical knowledge which makes what is to be done appear self-evident. I apply this insight to the issue of international peace and argue that security communities exist in and through practice when security practitioners resort to diplomacy—the non-violent settlement of disputes—as a self-evident, everyday practice to solve disputes. The doxic dimension of practical sense rests on a domination pattern based on a homology between dispositions in habitus and positions in the field.

In chapter III, I take up the methodological question that flows from the Russian-Atlantic puzzle and the ToPoSC outlined in chapter II: just how does one proceed to recover practical logics in international politics? I introduce a “sobjectivist” methodology that is specifically geared toward overcoming the representational bias. I argue that constructivist inquiries need to
develop not only objectified (or experience-distant) but also subjective (experience-near) knowledge in order to produce incisive narratives about international life. This requirement derives from the fact that constructivism is a postfoundationalist style of reasoning that emphasizes the mutually constitutive dialectics between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality. By implication, a constructivist methodology should be inductive, interpretive, and historical. The methodical practice of subjectivism follows a three-step logic from the recovery of subjective meanings to their objectification thanks to contextualization and historicization. I close this methodological chapter with a brief discussion of the specifics of my case study, which is the topic of the second part of the study.

The three chapters that comprise part II unfold along the objectivist steps devised in chapter III. In chapter IV, I take the first step (and touch on the second) in order to reconstruct the logic of practicality at the NRC in 2006. Building on sixty-nine interviews conducted with officials in Moscow, Brussels, Washington, Berlin, London and Ottawa, I take the practitioners’ point of view and reconstruct the average Russian and transatlantic habitus with regards to mutual dealings. In order to operationalize my ToPoSC, I abductively devise a set of three empirical indicators of the embodiment of diplomacy: the disappearance of the possibility of using force, the normalization of disputes, and daily cooperation on the ground. Overall, the subjective evidence is mixed. While diplomacy was the normal practice in solving NATO-Russia relations in 2006, it was not self-evident to the point of fully dislodging other practical logics. In lieu of a conclusion, I discuss a crucial finding—at the NRC table, there are two masters but no apprentice. As a result, fierce symbolic power struggles characterize Russian-Atlantic politics at the practical level.

Chapters V and VI starts from these findings and historicizes them by looking back to the post-Cold War era, with a focus on NATO-Russia dealings over the double enlargement. My analytical narrative reveals an intriguing paradox in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic security relations. On the one hand, the unremitting disputes that have characterized Russia-NATO dealings have all been solved non-violently. But on the other hand, the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic track record of peaceful change was not sufficient for a solid security community to emerge in and through practice. For one thing, oftentimes Russian-Atlantic non-violent settlement of disputes was bought at the expense of trust-building. For another, the homology between positions in the field and dispositions in habitus, which is necessary for diplomacy to turn into a doxic practice, started to crumble in the mid-1990s. In reaction to NATO’s double
enlargement, Russian dispositions toward Great Power-ness resurfaced and gradually consolidated after the Kosovo intervention.

Chapter V focuses on the “early steps” (1992-1997) while chapter VI studies their “fallout” (1998-2006). In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, NATO promoted the internal mode of pursuing security while Russia seemed happy to play the junior partner. Yet the 1994 decision to enlarge functionally and geographically put an end to this pattern of domination and seriously thwarted the development of trust in Russia-NATO dealings. In Russian eyes, the Alliance’s practices undermined the new rules of the international security game. The revival of the Great Power habitus in Moscow created intense hysteresis effects that were compounded in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. Despite a short hiatus in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, which led to another short-lived honeymoon in Russian-Atlantic relations, the Great Power habitus further consolidated in Moscow as NATO’s double enlargement continued to go about into the new millennium.

Finally, the seventh and concluding chapter takes stock of the contribution that this study makes to IR scholarship and to our understanding of the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship. I return to the ToPoSC and highlight two new avenues for research that it opens. I first draw a topography of practices in the contemporary field of international security that shows how practice theory can help organize interparadigmatic conversations in IR. Second, I call on constructivist theory to better account for the materiality of practices—the fact that it is not only people who attach meanings to things, but also things that attach meanings to people. I use the case of the current row over the American BMD project in Central Europe to illustrate this argument and conclude on the prospects of Russian-Atlantic politics.
PART I

RESTORING THE PRACTICAL LOGIC OF PEACE
Chapter II

THE LOGIC OF PRACTICALITY: A THEORY OF PRACTICE OF SECURITY COMMUNITIES

Most theories of social action focus on what agents think about at the expense of what they think from. In IR, empiricist rational choice theorists primarily emphasize representations and reflexive knowledge in explaining political action. In the rationalist equation (desire + belief = action), ideas factor in an individual calculation informed by intentionality. Agents deliberately reflect on the most efficient means to achieve their ends. For their part, several constructivists theorize that norms and collective identities reflexively inform action. Intersubjective representations of reality, morality, or individuality determine socially embedded cognition and action. In a related fashion, Habermasian constructivists concentrate on collective deliberation and truth-seeking as a form of communicative action. Overall, the three logics of social action that have the most currency in contemporary IR theory—the logic of consequences, of appropriateness, and of arguing—are all suffer from a similar bias toward representational knowledge. Conscious representations are emphasized to the detriment of background knowledge—the inarticulate know-how from which reflexive and intentional deliberation becomes possible.

In and of itself, this focus on representational knowledge is not necessarily a problem: the logics of consequences, appropriateness, and arguing cover a wide array of social action, as a special issue of International Organization about socialization in Europe recently demonstrated. The problem rests with the many practices that neither rational choice nor rule-based and communicative action theories can explain properly. Take the case of diplomacy, perhaps the most fundamental practice in international politics. For most IR theorists, diplomacy is primarily about strategic action, instrumental rationality and cost-benefit calculations. Yet this scholarly understanding is at odds with that of practitioners, who rather emphasize the very practical and inarticulate nature of diplomacy. A former diplomat turned professor argues that diplomacy is “not a matter of mathematical calculation; it is not an exact science; it remains a matter of human skills and judgments.”  

In fact, seasoned diplomats are at pains to explain their craft in abstract, social scientific terms: Harold Nicolson contends that “commonsense” is the

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1 March and Olsen 1998; Risse 2000.
2 Watson 1991, 52.

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* This chapter is a revised and extended version of an article by the author published in International Organization 62(2): 257-288 (2008), reproduced here by permission of Cambridge University Press.
essence of diplomacy, while Lord Satow defines it as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states.”\(^3\) Clearly, commonsense, intelligence, and tact cannot be learned in books through formal schemes; nor are they strictly the result of conscious deliberation or reflection. The diplomatic skills identified by practitioners and that constitute the social fabric of international politics are background dispositions acquired in and through practice.\(^4\)

This chapter starts from the premise that most of what people do, in world politics as in any other social field, does not derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection—instrumental, rule-based, communicative, or otherwise. Instead, practices are the result of inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes appear what is to be done “self-evident” or commonsensical. This is the logic of practicality, a fundamental feature of social life that is often overlooked by social scientists. In so arguing, this chapter joins a larger trend advocating a “practice turn” in social theory.\(^5\) To simplify a bit, practice theorists seek “to do justice to the practical nature of action by rooting human activity in a non-representational stratum.”\(^6\) Against the representational bias that pervades most theories of social action, practice theory brings background knowledge to the foreground of analysis. In IR, a few pioneering scholars are already part of this theoretical movement. Neumann urges students of world politics to move away from the “armchair analysis” of discourse to study social action as enacted in and on the world.\(^7\) Hopf suggests that social identities (and foreign policies) thrive on a “logic of habit” that generates unreflexive action.\(^8\) Adler uses the concept of “community of practice” to theorize the background knowledge that cements constellations of agents across borders.\(^9\) Michael Williams takes inspiration from Bourdieu to reconceptualize security practices as cultural strategies in the international field.\(^10\) And Jennifer Mitzen emphasizes routine and unthinking action in the international drive for ontological security.\(^11\)

Building on these works, I pursue two main objectives in this chapter. First, I seek to bolster the practice turn in IR theory by offering an in-depth discussion of the logic of

\(^3\) Nicolson 1963, 43; Satow 1979, 3.
\(^6\) Schatzki 2005, 177.
\(^7\) Neumann 2002a.
\(^8\) Hopf 2002.
\(^9\) Adler 2005.
\(^10\) Williams 2007.
\(^11\) Mitzen 2006.
practicality. Second, I demonstrate the analytical pregnancy of the logic of practicality with a crucial case in world politics: international peace. The argumentation unfolds as follows. The first part levels a theoretical critique at the dominant strands of social and IR theory. I argue that both rationalism and constructivism suffer from a representational bias whose epistemological roots run deep into Modernity. The second section takes inspiration from other human and social sciences that have already taken the practice turn. Insights from philosophy, psychology, and sociology not only reinforce the call for a practice turn in IR theory, but also provide important clues as to how to conceptualize the logic of practicality in world politics. In the third part of the chapter, I define practical knowledge and distinguish it from representational knowledge. Using Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus, I assert the ontological priority of the logic of practicality in relation to the mutually constitutive dynamics between agency and structure. Overall, the relationship between practicality, consequences, appropriateness and arguing is one of complementarity. The fourth section seeks to illustrate this point with the case of security communities. I argue that peace exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way of solving interstate disputes. Finally, the concluding section discusses the peculiar methodological challenges raised by the study of the logic of practicality in world politics.

A. THE REPRESENTATIONAL BIAS

This first section levels a critique at contemporary theories of social action for their inability to account for non-representational practices. The logics of consequences, appropriateness, and arguing all tend to focus on what agents think about (reflexive and conscious knowledge) at the expense of what they think from (the background of know-how that informs practice in an inarticulate fashion). This representational bias, which pervades both modern and postmodern social theory, finds its epistemological roots in the evolution of Western thinking since the Enlightenment and the scientific revolution. In an illuminating book, Stephen Toulmin laments that the epistemic revolution of Modernity gave birth to an imbalance between universal Rationality and contextual Reasonableness. Local knowledge that makes sense in particular contexts is dismissed in favor of generalizable and abstract precepts; so much so that nowadays

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12 Though inspired by Bourdieu’s “logic of practice,” the notion of practicality is meant to theorize a more specific dimension of social action, namely, non-representational practices. To Bourdieu, the “logic of practice” covers both representational and non-representational action; Bourdieu 1990a.
“the human values of Reasonableness are expected to justify themselves in the Court of Rationality.” Against this powerful tide, Toulmin advocates everyday experience as the necessary complement to “desituated” and “disembedded” logic.

The epistemic shift that led Western thinkers away from practical knowledge over the last few centuries is well illustrated with the practice of map-making. During the Middle Ages, “maps” consisted of rectilinear routes from an origin to a destination, comprising the different steps to go through (places to eat, to shelter, to pray, and so on) and walking distances in days between them. In other words, medieval maps were performative itineraries that reproduced the knowledge learned in and through practice. Starting in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, maps began to evolve into the geographical representations from above that still exist today. This epistemic transformation, of course, took place over centuries. For a while, maps conveyed both practical and representational knowledge: in premodern maps, for instance, “ships drawn on the sea convey the maritime expedition that made representations of the coast possible.” But progressively the god-like posture of modern science, which looks at the world from above, triumphed over practical knowledge. As “totalizing representations,” contemporary maps do not convey the practical operations that made them possible. The entire modern scientific enterprise can be interpreted as a similar movement away from practical knowledge and toward formal and abstract representations of the world.

The representational bias in modern thinking is reinforced by the logic of scientific practice and its institutional environment. In trying to see the world from a detached perspective, social scientists put themselves “in a state of social weightlessness.” Looking at the world from above and usually backward in time implies that one is not directly involved in social action and does not feel the same proximity and urgency as agents do. In contrast to practitioners, who act in and on the world, social scientists spend careers and lives thinking about ideas, deliberating about theories and representing knowledge. As a result, they are enticed “to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically.” The epistemological consequences of such a contemplative eye are tremendous: what scientists see from their ivory tower is often miles away from the practical logics enacted on the ground. For instance, what may appear to be the

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14 De Certeau 1990, 177-179.
15 De Certeau 1990, 178.
16 Bourdieu 2003, 28. Cf. Bourdieu 1990b; and 2001c. This and further translations from French are the author’s.
17 Wacquant 1992, 39.
result of rational calculus in (academic) hindsight may just as well have derived from practical hunches under time pressure. This “ethnocentrism of the scientist” leads to substituting the practical relation to the world for the observer’s (theoretical) relation to practice—or, to use Bourdieu’s formula, “to take the model of reality for the reality of the model.”

To return to diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, whose career spanned the divide between the academic and the policy worlds, concurs that “there is a vast difference between the perspective of an analyst and that of a statesman”: “The analyst can choose which problem he wishes to study, whereas the statesman’s problems are imposed on him. The analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the overwhelming challenge to the statesman is the pressure of time. … The analyst has available to him all the facts. … The statesman must act on assessments that cannot be proved at the time that he is making them.” As a result, diplomacy is an art not a science. It is a practice enacted in and on the world, in real time and with actual consequences for the practitioner. As such, the practicality of diplomacy cannot be fully captured by detached, representational observation.

From this perspective, the epitome of the representational bias is rational choice theory and its tendency to deduce from the enacted practice (opus operatum) its mode of operating (modus operandi). The problem is deeper than the well-known tautology of revealed preferences. By mistaking the outcome of practice for its process, rational choice “project[s] into the minds of agents a (scholastic) vision of their practice that, paradoxically, it could only uncover because it methodically set aside the experience agents have of it.” While social scientists have all the necessary time to rationalize action post hoc, agents are confronted with practical problems that they must urgently solve. One cannot reduce practice to the execution of a theoretical model. For one thing, social action is not necessarily preceded by a premeditated design. A practice can be oriented toward a goal without being consciously informed by it. For another, in the heat of practice, hunches take precedence over rational calculations. In picturing

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20 Kissinger 1994, 27.
21 Kissinger 1973, 2, 326.
22 Here I am primarily going after empiricist rational choice theorists who argue that their cost-benefit model “is a legitimate approximation of real processes”; Tsebelis 1990, 38. However, even those theorists who follow Milton Friedman’s “as if” instrumentalism (the model may not be realistic, but it nonetheless helps explain social outcomes) fall victim to the representational bias in that they overlook the process of practice—which is modelized regardless of “reality”—to instead focus on its outcome—as congruent with what the model expects; cf. Friedman 1953. Like postmodernism, instrumentalist rational choice suffers from a bias toward representation at the level of observation; whereas empiricist rational choice, like much of constructivism, is biased toward representations at the level of action.
practitioners in the image of the theorist, rational choice theory produces “a sort of monster with the head of the thinker thinking his practice in reflexive and logical fashion mounted on the body of a man of action engaged in action.”\(^2\) In IR, the literature on the rational design of international institutions best exemplifies this representational bias.\(^3\) It is correct that states seek to mould international institutions to further their goals; but it does not follow that this design is instrumentally rational. The outcome of political struggles over institutions and the process of struggling over institutions follow two different logics—observational vs. practical. One cannot impute to practitioners a theoretical perspective that is made possible by looking at social action backward and from above.

In IR, the representational bias is not the preserve of rational choice theory, however: most constructivist’ interpretations of rule-based behaviour also fall victim to it. In James March and Johan Olsen’s seminal formulation, the logic of appropriateness deals with norm- and rule-based action conceived “as a matching of a situation to the demands of a position.”\(^4\) This definition, however, encompasses two distinct modes of social action.\(^5\) On the one hand, the logic of appropriateness deals with rules that are so profoundly internalized that they become taken for granted. On the other hand, the logic of appropriateness is a reflexive process whereby agents need to figure out what behaviour is appropriate to a situation.\(^6\) Ole Jacob Sending calls these two possible interpretations “motivationally internalist” vs. “motivationally externalist,”\(^7\) a distinction that hinges on whether agents reflect before putting a norm into practice. Problematically from a practice theory perspective, a vast majority of constructivist works fall in the latter camp, according to which norm-based actions stem from a process of reflexive cognition based either on instrumental calculations, reasoned persuasion, or the psychology of compliance. Here the representational bias shows very clearly. But even those few constructivists who theorize appropriate action as non-reflexive assimilate it to the output of a structural logic of social action or a habit resulting from a process of reflexive internalization. Nowhere in these interpretations is there room for properly theorizing practical knowledge.

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\(^2\) Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 123.
\(^3\) Cf., e.g., Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.
\(^4\) March and Olsen 1989, 23.
\(^5\) Risse 2000, 6.
\(^6\) March and Olsen lean toward this second interpretation when they write that in order to enact appropriate behavior, actors pose questions such as “Who am I?” or “What kind of situation is this?”; March and Olsen 1989, 23.
\(^7\) Sending 2002.
Table 2.1: Constructivist Interpretations of the Logic of Appropriateness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic of Appropriateness</th>
<th>1) Externalism</th>
<th>2) Internalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Thin rationality within normative environments</td>
<td>b) Communicative action/persuasion</td>
<td>a) Structural logic of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Communicative action/persuasion</td>
<td>c) Psychological mechanisms of compliance</td>
<td>b) Habituation through reflexive internalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three main strands of constructivist research construe appropriateness as a motivationally externalist logic of social action (1). A first possibility is to introduce “thin” instrumental rationality in the context of a community, that is, a norm-rich environment (a). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s “boomerang model” is one of the best known frameworks of this genre: state elites’ compliance with transnational norms first comes through strategic calculations under normative pressure; only at a later stage do preferences change.30 Frank Schimmelfennig’s notion of rhetorical action—“the strategic use of norm-based arguments”31—follows a similar logic of limited strategic action constrained by constitutive communitarian norms and rules. A second possibility is to conceive of appropriateness as a logic that relies on reasoned persuasion (b). Building on Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action, several constructivists theorize that the “logic of arguing” leads actors to collectively deliberate “whether norms of appropriate behavior can be justified, and which norms apply under given circumstances.”32 Other constructivists build on the notion of “social learning” to explain the workings of argumentative persuasion in social context.33 Finally, a third externalist interpretation of appropriateness emphasizes cognitive processes that take place at the level of the human mind. Relying on psychological notions such as acceptability heuristic, omission bias and images, Vaughn Shannon argues that “[a]ctors must feel justified to violate a norm to satisfy themselves and the need for a positive self-image, by interpreting the norm and the situation in a way that makes them feel exempt.”34

Meanwhile, a few constructivists take the externalist route and prefer to emphasize the non-deliberative nature of the logic of appropriateness (2). Yet, even though this understanding seems better in tune with the practice turn I advocate in this chapter, it fails to capture the

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30 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
31 Schimmelfennig 2001, 62.
32 Risse 2000, 7.
34 Shannon 2000, 300. As Shannon explains, acceptability heuristic introduces a bias in favour of continuity; omission bias leads agents to prefer the status quo; and images are cognitive devices that have an “ego-defensive” function. Cf. also Johnston 2001 on social identity theory.
practicality of social life because internalist constructivists construe appropriateness either as a structural logic devoid of agency (a) or as a form of habituation that is reflexive in its earlier stages (b). To begin with the former, some constructivists claim that the internalist logic of appropriateness is plagued with a “structuralist bias” that renders it “untenable as a theory of individual action.”35 In this account, the essence of agency rests with choice and the capacity to deliberate among options before acting: “If the [logic of appropriateness] is to be individualistic in structure, the individual actor must be left with a reasonable degree of choice (or agency).”36 But this restrictive notion of agency seems unwarranted within the structurationist ontology that characterizes constructivism. Agency is not simply about “defying” structures by making choices independently of them. It is a matter of instantiating structures in and through practice. Without practice intersubjective realities would falter; thus agency (or the enactment of practice) is what makes social reality possible in the first place. In introducing contingency, agency need not be reflexive; and thoughtlessness does not logically imply structural determination.

Taking a different tack, a number of constructivists equate the logic of appropriateness with the internalization of taken-for-granted norms (b). For instance, Jeffrey Checkel seeks to understand how norm compliance moves from “conscious instrumental calculation” to “taken-for-grantedness.” In what he calls “type II socialization,” agents switch “from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness.”37 A similar view can be found in Wendt’s discussion of internalization, from “First Degree” to “Third.” This process essentially consists of certain practices getting “pushed into the shared cognitive background, becoming taken for granted rather than objects of calculation.”38 Norms begin as explicit “ought to” prescriptions but progressively fade from consciousness and become taken-for-granted. Significantly, then, this internalist interpretation remains embroiled in the representational bias that plagues externalism: the taken-for-granted knowledge that informs appropriateness necessarily begins as representational and conscious.

In distinguishing the “logic of habit” from that of appropriateness, Hopf comes closest to accounting for practical knowledge in IR. As he perceptively argues: “Significant features distinguish habitual action from normative compliance. Generally, norms have the form ‘in

36 Ibid., 451. Sending writes that “[i]t is thus a central feature of structuration theory, which is a key building block of constructivist theory, that the actor is always in a position to evaluate, reflect upon and choose regarding what rules to follow and how to act”; Ibid., 458. On a closer look, however, there is nothing in Anthony Giddens’ definition that restricts agency to choice: “Agency concerns events of which the individual is the perpetrator”; Giddens 1984, 9.
37 Checkel 2005, 804.
38 Wendt 1999, 310-311.
circumstance X, you should do Y,’ whereas habits have a general form more like ‘in circumstance X, action Y follows.’ This all-important distinction, upon which this chapter builds, represents a significant step toward a practice turn in IR theory. That said, this chapter seeks to fix three main limitations in Hopf’s framework. First, it remains partly embroiled in an internalization scheme not so distant from Checkel’s or Wendt’s. In using the language of norm selection vs. norm compliance, Hopf implies that the internalist logic of habit follows from the externalist logic of appropriateness. By contrast, this chapter theorizes practical knowledge as unreflexive and inarticulate through and through. Second, while both logics of habit and practicality build on past experiences, the latter does so contingently while the former is strictly iterative (more on this below). Third, Hopf insists his is only a methodological distinction between the logic of habit and the logic of appropriateness, which entices researchers to look for evidence of norm compliance in the unsaid instead of explicit invocations. Though an important piece of methodological advice, this point falls short of granting practicality the full ontological status it deserves in social theory.

Before concluding this critique of IR literature, it is necessary to address the “stronger program” in IR constructivism located closer to postmodernism. By its very epistemological standpoint, postmodernism epitomizes the representational bias: detached from, and in fact indifferent to, the social urgency of practices, many postmodernists intellectualize discourse to the point of distorting its practical logic and meaning. In addition, postmodernist works often embody the “armchair analysis” that Neumann urges to overcome in taking a practice turn. Against this tendency, a number of IR constructivists move closer to Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse as practice. But several analyses still fall short of accounting for the practicality of discourse—that is, discourse as a practice enacted in and one the world. Karin Fierke’s works on “language games,” for instance, usefully emphasize background knowledge but does not take the materiality of practices seriously. In a similar fashion, the Copenhagen school asserts that security is practice; but in restricting its focus to traditional discourse analysis, it overlooks the practical logics that make the securitizing discourse possible. Taking

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40 Ibid., 11 fn. 44.
41 Neumann 2002a.
42 E.g., Ashley 1987.
43 Fierke 1998.
44 Hansen 2006.
45 CASE Collective 2006.
a practice turn promises to help overcome the representational bias in IR theory, whether rationalist, constructivist or postmodernist.

**B. PRACTICE TURNS**

Still a recent development in IR, the practice turn has also been promoted in a number of other disciplines. This section briefly reviews relevant literatures in philosophy, psychology and sociology. This survey not only suggests that practice theory is starting to attract increasing attention, it also provides useful insights for theorizing practical knowledge in world politics.

The philosophical interest in practical knowledge dates back at least to Aristotle. In his discussion of practical reasoning (that is, reasoning oriented toward action), Aristotle highlighted the importance of “topoi” or the “seat of argument.” These commonplaces are tacit in nature: one discusses or acts with them but not about them. However, this Aristotelian insight was later overshadowed by Plato’s and others’ fascination with representational knowledge. With René Descartes, centuries later, the representational bias entrenched itself within Western philosophical thought, a situation that lasts to this day. In an illuminating critique of this philosophical evolution, Toulmin equates this disciplinary tendency to favor the universal to the detriment of the contextual with “the behavior of an intellectual ostrich.” Toulmin’s critique is inspired by the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, probably the most prominent figure in opposing the representational bias in philosophy. Most famously, Wittgenstein denounced his colleagues for studying language as a theoretical system of signs and representations whereas it is primarily a practice whose meanings are determined not in abstracto but in and through its context and use. In his Wittgensteinian interpretation of rule-following, Charles Taylor best summarizes the case for practice theory in philosophy and more largely in social science:

> To situate our understanding in practices is to see it as implicit in our activity, and hence as going well beyond what we manage to frame representations of. We do frame representations: we explicitly formulate what our world is like, what we aim at, what we are doing. But much of our intelligent action in the world, sensitive as it usually is to our situation and goals, is carried on unformulated. It flows from an understanding which is largely inarticulate. … Rather than representations being the primary locus of understanding, they are similarly islands in the sea of our unformulated practical grasp on the world.  

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48 Toulmin 2001, 168  
49 Wittgenstein 1958. Other philosophers who also argued in a similar direction include the American pragmatists (e.g., John Dewey, Charles Peirce) as well as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  
50 Taylor 1993, 50.
Three other disciples of Wittgenstein—Gilbert Ryle, Michael Polanyi and John Searle—have also been instrumental in advocating a practice turn in philosophy. The former convincingly derides the doctrine of the “ghost in the machine” that pervades Western philosophy, according to which a chef has to recite his recipes to himself before cooking.\(^{51}\) On the contrary, argues Ryle, “[e]fficient practice precedes the theory of it.”\(^ {52}\) His distinction between “knowing-that” and “knowing-how” remains fundamental to the practice turn. For instance, Polanyi argues that one may know how to use a machine without knowing that doing so requires the operation of such and such mechanisms.\(^ {53}\) This know-how Polanyi calls “tacit knowing,” which consists of attending from something (e.g., the machine’s internal mechanisms) to something else (e.g., using the machine).\(^ {54}\) Tacit knowing primarily rests on bodily experience and practice: it is knowledge within the practice instead of behind the practice. This is obviously not to say that the brain plays no role in tacit knowing. A professor of chemistry, Polanyi recalls that “mathematical theory can be learned only by practicing its application: its true knowledge lies in our ability to use it.”\(^ {55}\) One may know the theorems by heart but their application must be learned in and through practice as a form of tacit knowing. It is a similar insight that informs Searle’s (Wittgensteinian) notion of Background. As he explains, “the general thesis of the Background … is that all of our intentional states, all of our particular beliefs, hopes, fears, and so on, only function in the way they do—that is, they only determine their conditions of satisfaction—against a Background of know-how that enables me to cope with the world.”\(^ {56}\) This pre-intentional knowledge is non-representational and pre-reflexive: it is only activated in and through practice.

The philosophical metaphysics of the practice turn find solid empirical support in the latest strands of psychological research.\(^ {57}\) In his Nobel Prize Lecture in 2002, Daniel Kahneman argues that there are “two generic modes of cognitive function: an intuitive mode in which judgments and decisions are made automatically and rapidly, and a controlled mode, which is deliberate and slower.”\(^ {58}\) These two modes of cognition coexist and complement each other. But

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\(^ {52}\) Ibid., 30.
\(^ {53}\) Polanyi 1983, 19.
\(^ {54}\) Ibid., 10.
\(^ {55}\) Ibid., 17.
\(^ {56}\) Searle 1998, 108.
\(^ {57}\) The parallels that are drawn here with the notion of a practice turn are not explicitly invoked in the psychology literature.
\(^ {58}\) Kahneman 2003, 449.
intuitive judgments are not mere perceptions although both are equally fast: contrary to the latter, the former “deal with concepts” and “can be evoked by language.”

Psychologists usually refer to these two ways of knowing as “System 1” and “System 2.” The theoretical revolution here regards automatic cognition: with the exception of the Freudian tradition, psychology has traditionally spent most of its attention on conscious cognition. More recently, thanks to several experiments, psychologists have found “evidence from everyday life of the existence of an automatic, intuitive mode of information processing that operates by different rules from that of a rational mode.”

From that perspective, cognition falls into two ideal-typical categories, as Table 2.2 shows.

Table 2.2: Two Ways of Knowing in Psychological Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiential Way of Knowing (System 1)</th>
<th>Rational Way of Knowing (System 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Holistic</td>
<td>1. Analytic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What feels good</td>
<td>2. What is sensible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Associative</td>
<td>3. Logical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Behavior mediated by “vibes” from past experiences; automatic</td>
<td>4. Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of events; controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Encodes reality in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives</td>
<td>5. Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, and numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Slower to change: changes with repetitive or intense experience</td>
<td>7. Changes more rapidly: changes with speed of though</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Experienced passively and preconsciously; tacit thought processes</td>
<td>9. Experienced actively and consciously; explicit thought processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Self-evidently valid</td>
<td>10. Requires justification via logic and evidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though interactive, System 1 and System 2 present different characteristics. A form of cognitive unconscious, System 1 is “a fundamentally adaptive system that automatically, effortlessly, and intuitively organizes experience and directs behavior.” Empirical data suggests that this is the natural mode of operation and that it is a lot more efficient than reflexive cognition. A pioneer in this strand of psychological theory, Arthur Reber builds on decades of

59 Ibid., 451.
60 Stanovich and West 2000.
61 Epstein 1994, 710.
62 Adapted from Epstein 1994, 711; and Stanovich and West 2000, 659.
63 Ibid.
empirical studies to establish the pervasiveness of “implicit learning” in cognitive processes. As he argues: “Implicit learning is the acquisition of knowledge that takes place largely independently of conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowledge about what was acquired.”64 Importantly, Reber insists, acting on the basis of such tacit knowledge does not make individuals irrational. Their practices, which are informed by past experiences and exposure to environmental demands, should rather be conceived as “arational,”65 that is, based on non-representational knowledge and thought processes.

Philosophical and psychological arguments in favor of a practice turn have spilled over to social sciences. For instance, Roy D’Andrade’s “cognitive anthropology” intends, among other things, to counter the representational bias in social theory. As he argues, “social scientists sometimes ascribe rules to the actor when it is only the actor’s behavior that is being described. In many cases in which behavior is described as following rules, there may be in fact no rules inside the actor.”66 In sociology, Eviatar Zerubavel emphasizes the social aspects of cognition as well as the tacit dimension of socialization, for instance in the process of learning a language.67 In becoming part of collectives, human beings learn how to think socially, a skill that rests on inarticulate knowledge first and foremost. A similar premise gave birth to Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology and to Giddens’ structuration theory.68

More recently, a number of social theorists have advocated taking a “practice turn” in social theory.69 Among the theoretical innovations advanced is an attempt to overcome the representational bias in sociological theorizing. The key argument put forward is that social action stems from practical logics that are fundamentally non-representational. Practical logics cannot readily be verbalized or explicited by the agents themselves because “practice does not account for its own production and reproduction.”70 In sociology, this theoretical strand has been best developed by Bourdieu, whose works have the rare advantage of being systematically applied to various empirical investigations. In general, the rich concepts developed in Bourdieu’s dozens of books and hundreds of articles serve no other purpose than their application—an approach in line with the notion of a practice turn. In IR, a handful of scholars have already demonstrated how Bourdieu’s sociology could enrich our understanding of

64 Reber 1993, 5.
65 Ibid., 13.
66 D’Andrade 1995, 144 (emphasis original).
69 Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and Von Savigny 2001.
70 Barnes 2001, 19.
security,71 power,72 integration73 or political economy.74 This chapter adds to this burgeoning literature by focusing on Bourdieu’s attempt to reach at the inarticulate in social life—the huge body of background knowledge that every social being carries and uses constantly, if unconsciously, in daily practices. Many practices appear self-evident without our having to reflect on them; how can that be? Bourdieu’s conceptual triad of habitus, field and practical sense offers a useful apparatus to theorize the logic of practicality.

C. THE LOGIC OF PRACTICALITY

Practice theory seeks to save practical know-how from the “nocturnal abyss” of social activities in order to put it at the centre of social scientific inquiries.75 The objective, ultimately, is to bring the background to the foreground. By countering the representational bias, practice theory opens a whole new domain of inquiry traditionally excluded from modern theories of social action: the logic of practicality. This section defines what practical knowledge consists of and then establishes the ontological priority of the logic of practicality over the logics of consequences, appropriateness and arguing. Throughout this theoretical discussion, I use Bourdieu’s theory of practice as the linchpin of my argument for a practice turn in IR.

An interesting starting point to understand the logic of practicality is James Scott’s Seeing Like a State, a rare study, in political science, that takes practical knowledge seriously.76 To explain the failure of certain states’ grand schemes for social engineering, Scott argues that state projects of societal legibility and simplification usually fail because they ignore what the Greeks used to call mètis, “a rudimentary kind of knowledge that can be acquired only by practice and that all but defies being communicated in written or oral form apart from actual practice.”77 This practical knowledge is absolutely necessary for the implementation of any policy because it is on it, and not on bureaucratic models, that constituents’ everyday lives thrive. Contrary to the abstract schemes produced by technocrats and social scientists, mètis presents three main characteristics. First, it is local and situated. Mètis is knowledge-in-context and derives from concrete applications. Second, mètis is plastic and decentralized: there is no

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72 Guzzini 2000.
73 Kauppi 2003.
75 De Certeau 1990, xxxv.
77 Scott 1998, 315.
core doctrine since it is continually changing with the practices it informs. Third, *métis* knowledge is extremely difficult to convey apart from putting it in practice. In Scott’s words, “[*m*]étis knowledge is often so implicit and automatic that its bearer is at a loss to explain it.”

It resists being translated into the deductive and abstract models required by states’ social engineering initiatives.

Whether called *métis*, tacit knowing, background, experiential way of knowing, or something else, this stock of unspoken know-how learned in and through practice that make conscious deliberation and action possible can conveniently be called *practical knowledge*. Table 2.3 captures, in a heuristic (if oversimplified) way, the main differences between practical and representational knowledge. While representational knowledge is conscious, verbalizable, and intentional, practical knowledge is tacit, inarticulate and automatic. The former type of knowledge is acquired through formal schemes whereas the latter is learned experientially, in and through practice, and remains bound up in it. Representational knowledge is rational and abstract; practical knowledge is reasonable and contextual. Thus the inferences drawn from each type are respectively explicit and justified vs. implicit and self-evident. Representational knowledge factors in reflexive cognition (in situation X, you should do Y—whether for instrumental or normative reasons) whereas practical knowledge remains unsaid (in situation X, Y follows).

In fact, it is precisely because it is thoughtless and inarticulate that the Background is forgotten as knowledge. It is located within practices instead of behind them. Practical knowledge is unconscious because it appears self-evident to its bearer: “This is simply what I do,” as Wittgenstein quipped. Thus a defining feature of the practices informed by the background is that their rules are not thought but simply enacted. Inarticulate, concrete and local, practical knowledge is learned from experience and can hardly be expressed apart from practice. It is “thoughtless”—what popular parlance calls commonsense, experience, intuition, knack, skill, or practical mastery.

Another useful way to grasp the distinction between representational and practical knowledge is what Searle (after John Austin and G.E.M. Anscombe) calls the “direction of fit” between the mind and the world. As Searle explains, when a man goes to the grocery store and buys items on his shopping list, the direction of fit is from world to the mind: the man alters the

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79 Hopf 2002, 12. Contrary to Hopf’s “logic of habit,” however, practical knowledge does not merely lead to the repetition of past action: the logic of practicality stems from the contingent encounter of dispositions (habitus) and positions (field). More on this below.
80 Wittgenstein 1958, § 217.
81 Searle 1998, 100-102.
world to fit his mind (here materialized in the list). But imagine now that a detective investigates what groceries this man buys and notes them on a list as they are being placed in the cart. Now the direction of fit is reversed, from the mind (the detective’s list) to the world. The list is trying to match the world as it is being acted upon. A similar difference arises between practical knowledge, which is oriented toward action (world-to-mind direction of fit), and representational knowledge, which seeks to capture in words or other representations practices enacted in an on the world (mind-to-world direction of fit). Doing and observing, in sum, are two distinct ways of relating to the world.

Table 2.3: Two Idealtypes of Knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Representational knowledge (knowing-that)</th>
<th>Practical knowledge (knowing-how)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive status</td>
<td>Conscious, verbalizable, intentional</td>
<td>Tacit, inarticulate, automatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of learning</td>
<td>Acquired through formal schemes; reflexive</td>
<td>Learned experientially, in and through practice; unsaid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to practice</td>
<td>“Behind” the practice; knowledge precedes practice</td>
<td>Bound up in the practice; knowledge is in the execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of inferences</td>
<td>Explicit and prone to justification</td>
<td>Implicit and self-evident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction of fit</td>
<td>Mind-to-world (observing)</td>
<td>World-to-mind (doing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of reasoning</td>
<td>“In situation X, you should do Y” (instrumental or normative reasons)</td>
<td>“In situation X, Y follows” (thoughtlessness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular categories</td>
<td>Scheme, theory, model, calculation, reasoning</td>
<td>Commonsense, experience, intuition, knack, skill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that although all practical knowledge is taken-for-granted or unreflexive, not all taken-for-granted knowledge is practical. In Hopf’s logic of habit, for instance, taken-for-granted knowledge was once reflected upon before becoming internalized; whereas practical knowledge is learned tacitly. But just how could a minimally complex practice be learned without ever being explicitly taught? Building on decades of experiments, psychologist Reber asserts the “primacy of the implicit”: “other things being equal, implicit learning is the default mode for the acquisition of complex information about the environment.” Babies learning the complex syntactic rules of their mother tongue is the obvious example of such non-representational competence-building. In Ryle’s example, even the game of chess need not be explicitly taught for a boy to be able to play by the rules: “By

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watching the moves made by others and by noticing which of his own moves were conceded and which were rejected, he could pick up the art of playing correctly while still quite unable to propound the regulations in terms of which ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ are defined. … We learn how by practice, schooled indeed by criticism and example, but often quite unaided by any lessons in the theory.”

Though often imperceptible, implicit learning is the rule not the exception.

In world politics, for instance, state elites come to master the international rules of sovereignty and non-intervention in part through implicit learning. In effect, most of them never got trained in the formal schemes of international law. Statespersons simply replicate, in and through practice, the done things in the international society (or else they may face social or political sanctions). In fact, most of the complex workings of diplomatic practice rest on a stock of practical knowledge that is tacitly learned. Reviewing dozens of classics on diplomacy, G.R. Berridge observes that there is “an overwhelmingly strong sentiment that practical knowledge could be acquired only at the elbow of a master, that is to say, by apprenticeship.” This inarticulate mode of learning differs significantly from the dominant model of norm internalization advocated by several IR constructivists.

As a “knowledge that does not know itself,” practical knowledge does not lend itself easily to scientific inquiry. In this endeavour, Bourdieu’s theory of practice appears especially helpful because his conceptual triad of habitus, field and practical sense has been empirically operationalized time and again—it works in practice. To begin with, habitus is a “system of durable, transposable dispositions, which integrates past experiences and functions at every moment as a matrix of perception, appreciation and action, making possible the accomplishment of infinitely differentiated tasks.” For instance, one could argue that there exists a “diplomatic habitus” in world politics—a set of regular traits which dispose its bearers to act in a certain way—that makes international diplomatic interaction possible. Four main dimensions of the concept need to be emphasized. First, habitus is historical. The dispositions that comprise it are the sediment of individual and collective trajectories. It turns history (and its intersubjectivity) into a second nature; as a result the past is actualized into the present. In Bourdieu’s theory of practice, people do what they do because “this is how things are” according to the collective and

83 Ryle 1984, 41.
84 Berridge 2004, 6.
85 De Certeau 1990, 110.
86 Bourdieu 2001a, 261.
87 Neumann 2002b, 23.
individual experiences embodied in their habitus. These dispositions are acquired through socialization, exposure, imitation and symbolic power relationships (more on this below). Though “ever-changing” as history unfolds, the habitus instills path dependency in social action, for revisions take place on the basis of prior dispositions (cf. chapter V).

Second, habitus is made up of inarticulate, practical knowledge. It is learned by doing, from direct experience in and on the world: “The core modus operandi that defines practice is transmitted through practice, in practice, without acceding to the discursive level.” This is not to say that individuals form no representations; but they do so on the basis of the habitus’ unreflexive dispositions. Without reflection or deliberation, habitus tends to generate “‘reasonable,’ ‘common-sense,’ behaviours” that agents may have difficulty explaining. In that sense, it is a form of “learned ignorance” [docte ignorance].

Borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu contends that the inarticulate nature of habitus is due to the fact that it is it is comprised of “corporeal knowledge” [connaissance par corps], a practical mastery of the world that profoundly differs from representational knowledge. Whether one rides a bicycle or plays flute, these practices express an unspoken, bodily knowledge that is learned and deployed corporeally: “Our body is not just the executant of the goals we frame or just the locus of the causal factors which shape our representations. Our understanding itself is embodied.” Being a female or a male, to take a general example, is a bodily form of knowledge that informs most of our practices without conscious reflection about it. People behave in gendered manners often without any explicit teaching; their masculine or feminine behavior is not something they can readily express in words. In world politics, meetings among statespersons similarly involve the bodily knowledge of habitus as a “sense of one’s place” and of the others’ place.

As Bourdieu explains: “What is ‘learned by body’ is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is.” In this sense, practice theory de-emphasizes what is going on in people’s heads—what they think—to focus instead on what they do. This is not to say that the mind plays no role in social action: the point rather is that more often than not,
mental processes are so inarticulate that the brain should be treated as just another part of the body among others.\footnote{One example of a thoughtless practice that nevertheless goes through the brain is verb conjugation. When one conjugates a verb in one’s mother tongue, one usually applies grammatical rules thoughtlessly: practical mastery is based on background knowledge derived from experience. This is starkly different from conjugating verbs in a foreign language, an action that cannot be undertaken without reference to formal and explicit representations such as conjugation tables.}

Third, habitus is \textit{relational}: its dispositions are embodied traces of intersubjective interactions. In tune with the view that agents are the products of social relations,\footnote{Jackson and Nexon 1999.} Bourdieu calls this process “the internalization of externality.”\footnote{Bourdieu 2001a, 262.} Though located at the subjective level, habitus constitutes the intersection of structure and agency. Thus what may seem to be a set of individual dispositions is in fact profoundly social. Social psychologist Lev Vygotsky similarly supports the view that “[a]ny higher mental function [is] external because it was social at some point before becoming an internal, truly mental function.”\footnote{Quoted in Marti 1996, 67; cf. Vygotsky 1978.} More recently, an increasing body of psychological theory postulates “the dynamic mutual constitution of culture and the psyche.”\footnote{Fiske \textit{et al.} 1998, 915.} As “socialized subjectivity,”\footnote{Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 126.} the concept of habitus paves the way to a relational ontology of practice.

Fourth and finally, habitus is \textit{dispositional}. Far from automatically or deterministically leading to a specific practice, habitus simply inclines or disposes actors to do certain things. It generates inclinations, propensities, and tendencies. One could compare habitus to legal custom: both work on the basis a small number of schemes that generate a limited number of possible responses or “regulated improvisations.”\footnote{Bourdieu 2001a, 301.} Habitus is not habit, for the former is fundamentally generative while the latter is strictly iterative. Habitus is an “art of inventing” that introduces contingency in social action: the same disposition could potentially lead to different practices depending on the social context. That said, habitus also negates complete free will or fully-fledged creativity: agents “improvize” within the bounds of historically constituted practical knowledge. Habitus is a grammar that provides a basis for the generation of practices; but it does so only in relation to a social configuration, or field.

The concept of \textit{field} is the second key notion in Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Basically, a field is a social configuration structured along three main dimensions: relations of power, objects of struggle and taken-for-granted rules. First, fields are comprised of unequal positions,
where some agents are dominant and others are dominated. It is the control of a variety of historically constructed capitals, from economic through social to symbolic, that defines the structure of power relations in the field and the positions that result. To think in terms of fields, then, is to think relationally. The concept also opens the way to positional analysis (more on this below). Second, fields “are defined by the stakes which are at stake.” Fields are relatively autonomous from one another because they are characterized by certain struggles that have been socially and historically constituted. All contestants agree on what it is they are seeking—political authority, artistic prestige, economic profit, academic reputation, and so on. Thus the field is a kind of social game, with the specificity that it is a game “in itself” and not “for itself”: “one does not embark on the game by a conscious act, one is born into the game, with the game.” Hence the third characteristic of fields, which is that they are structured by taken-for-granted rules. This “doxa” is comprised of “all that is accepted as obvious, in particular the classifying schemes which determine what deserves attention and what does not.” As a form of immediate adherence, a field’s doxa is obeyed not only by dominant agents who benefit from it but also by the dominated ones who clearly do not. Hence the importance of symbolic power relationships (more on this below).

From the interplay between habitus and field results practical sense, “a socially constituted ‘sense of the game.’” As the intersection of embodied dispositions and structured positions, practical sense makes certain practices appear “sensible, that is, informed by a common sense.” Of course, agents are not all equally endowed with this social skill. In order to have the feel for the game, agents need to have embodied specific dispositions (habitus) in the past and face a social context (field) that triggers them. It is through the actualization of the past in the present that agents know what is to be done in the future, often without conscious reflection or reference to explicit and codified knowledge. In this sense, practical sense is fundamentally dialectic—it is a sort of synthesis between the social stuff within people (habitus) and within social contexts (field). Thanks to practical sense, agents do what they could instead of what they should. Practice is “the done thing … because one cannot do otherwise.” Contrary to normative compliance in the logic of appropriateness, practical sense thoughtlessly aims at the commonsensical given a peculiar set of dispositions and positions.

101 Jenkins 2002, 84.
102 Bourdieu 1990a, 67.
103 Bourdieu 1980, 83.
104 Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 120-121.
105 Bourdieu 1990a, 69.
106 Ibid., 18.
The notion of practical sense offers a promising way to tease out the mutually constitutive dynamics between agency and structure. Social action derived from the feel for the game follows neither a structural nor an individualistic logic, but a relational dialectic of “the internalization of exteriority and the externalization of interiority.” Habitus is embodied at the subjective level but it is comprised of intersubjective dispositions. The field is a bundle of structured relations within which agents are variously positioned. In intersecting, habitus and field trigger practice in a non-representational way, as an intuition that more or less fits a social pattern. Given a social configuration and agents’ trajectories, action X follows somewhat unreflexively from situation Y. Suspended in between structure and agency, in other words, practical sense is a “prereflexive, infraconscious mastery that agents acquire of their social world by way of durable immersion within it.” This view is akin to what Erving Goffman calls the “sense of one’s place”—the seemingly natural feeling people usually have about how to behave in a given social situation. It is the practical sense and not interests, norms or truth-seeking that allows people to thoughtlessly comport themselves in tune with commonsense. In Bourdieu’s sociology, then, social action is neither structural nor agentic, but relational.

One important implication of this line of argument is that the logic of practicality is ontologically prior to the three other logics of social action often referred to in IR theory. To put it simply, it is thanks to their practical sense that agents feel whether a given social context calls for instrumental rationality, norm compliance, or communicative action. The intersection of a particular set of embodied dispositions (constituted by a historical trajectory of subjectivized intersubjectivity) and a specific field of positions (comprised of power relations, objects of struggle and taken-for-granted rules) is the engine of social action—be it rational, rule-based, communicative, or unreflexive throughout. For instance, while it makes sense for a Westerner to be instrumentally rational when planning investments in the economic field, it is quite nonsensical (and socially reprehensible) to constantly calculate means and ends with family and friends. In certain social contexts but not others, instrumental rationality is the “arational” way to go thanks to the logic of practicality. Practicality is ontologically prior to instrumental rationality since the latter is not a priori inscribed in human beings’ minds but historically constituted in habitus and fields.

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107 Bourdieu 2001a, 256.
109 Goffman 1959. Of course, the practical sense is not infallible as dispositions can be out of touch with positions (what Bourdieu calls the “Don Quixote effect” or hysteresis). More on this below.
The same logic applies to rule-governed behaviour: in that case, the practical sense reads from context and embodied dispositions the need for socially appropriate or norm-based action. This thoughtless feeling differs from the externalist interpretation of the logic of appropriateness in which agents reflexively match the demands of a situation with their identity in order to decide on the course to be taken. To return to the example above, a Westerner would not instrumentally calculate costs and benefits within family because this is not “appropriate.” But one need not reflect to “know” this since it is an unspoken disposition learned in and through practice. Even when the logic of appropriateness requires reflexivity, prior to intentional deliberation the agent must feel from practical sense that rule-based reasoning is the way to go given habitus and the field. In other words, contrary to norm compliance, the logic of practicality is not based on a “should” but instead on a “could”: “The practical sense is what allows one to behave appropriately without posing or executing a ‘should.’”

There is no explicit ought-to because “practice does not imply—or rather excludes—mastery of the logic that is expressed within it.” If one feels from practical sense that the way to go is to comply with a norm, one may be able to verbalize what that norm is, but one probably cannot explain why she figured she had to follow a norm in the first place. Although it is inarticulate and thoughtless, the logic of practicality is ontologically prior: as the dynamic intersection of structure and agency, it determines which further logic of social action applies given positions and dispositions.

A second important implication is that the relationship among the four logics of social action is one of complementarity instead of mutual exclusion. The ontological priority of the logic of practicality means that it informs any and all conscious and reflexive action, whether it stems from the logic of consequences, appropriateness, or arguing. For instance, Adler notes that “the capacity for rational thought and behaviour is above all a background capacity.” The same could be said of normative compliance and communicative action. Contrary to practicality, these three logics of social action share the same representational bias: instrumental rationality is premised on calculated interests; appropriateness derives from normative judgment; and communicative action is informed by explicit notions of truth and deliberation. In practice, however, the four logics are necessarily interwoven because any reflexive action stems from the practical sense. When Western statespeople are involved in a deterrence situation, for instance,

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110 Bourdieu 2003, 201.
111 Bourdieu 1990a, 11.
112 Adler 2002, 103.
their practical sense generally tells them to calculate the costs and benefits of their policy options. In the field of military strategy, comparing means and ends is inscribed in agents’ dispositions as well as in the rules of the game. When the same statespeople face close allies on a disagreement about core values, their practical sense makes them abide by shared norms. Within NATO, for instance, cold calculations do not always make sense in view of the embodied shared identity of the community. When, finally, the statespeople seek to reach an agreement on new international customs of intervention, they feel from their practical sense that reasoned dialogue is the way to reach a compromise. Which logic of reflexive social action is to be followed depends on an unreflexive practical mastery of the world.

In order to further illustrate the analytical pregnancy and empirical pervasiveness of the logic of practicality in world politics, the final section applies it to a foremost issue: international peace.

D. OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE OF SECURITY COMMUNITIES

As with many other social theories, both Deutsch’s and Adler and Barnett’s frameworks on security communities are biased toward the study of representational knowledge (cf. chapter I). In Deutsch’s scheme, a crucial test of “integration” consists of the “subjective” representations that elites share about themselves: “Did influential people in all parts of the wider area believe that a firm sense of community existed throughout its territories?”

The focus here is on what people think about one another, that is, how they represent each other. Similarly, Adler and Barnett’s revamped framework asserts that collective identity—the blurring of the Self-Other distinction—is a “necessary condition for dependable expectations of peaceful change.”

Mutually encompassing representations are theorized as the constitutive foundation of peace. No doubt these representations are important for the social construction of peaceful realities: Deutsch’s subjective beliefs factor in rational decision-making, while Adler and Barnett’s collective identity informs socially appropriate behavior. The logics of consequences, appropriateness, and arguing all play an important role in security communities.

Yet there is more to peace than representations. Peace also is a very practical relation to the world characterized, among other things, by non-violent dealings. While it is primarily mutual representations that strike the eye of the social scientist, on the ground the practicality of

113 Deutsch et al. 1957, 32.
peace entails several non-representational dimensions. Security communities thrive on a practical modus operandi that has a different logic than its objectified opus operatum. Take, for instance, the key role played by trust, correctly theorized by Adler and Barnett as the second constitutive foundation of security communities. Trust (defined as “believing despite uncertainty”) is the perfect example of an inarticulate feeling derived from practical sense. Based on personal and collective history (habitus) and faced with a particular social context (field), security practitioners “feel” (practical sense) that they could believe despite uncertainty—that is, they trust their security community counterparts. As a background feeling, trust does not derive from instrumental calculations, norm compliance, or reasoned consensus: it is informed by the logic of practicality. The reasons why an agent trusts another are not readily verbalizable; they derive from tacit experience and an embodied history of social relations. Trust is practical sense. Given its central role in interstate peace and, for that matter, in almost any aspect of world politics and social relations, the logic of practicality needs to be integrated to the security-communities framework and to IR theory in general.

How does peace exist in and through practice? The first conceptual challenge is to identify the constitutive practice of security communities. A constitutive practice is a social action endowed with intersubjective meanings that are shared by a given community and that cement its practitioners. In this connection, Adler suggests that “peace is the practice of a security community.” But this formulation needs to be refined because peace is better categorized as a social fact (such as money) than as a practice (such as purchasing groceries). In the everyday life of the current interstate system, security communities rather are about the practice of diplomacy, defined as “[t]he conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.” As a dialogue of states “by means short of war,” therefore, the diplomatic practice constitutes peace in the current Westphalian system. Critics may find this claim tautological. Yet it is no more tautological than saying that H₂O constitutes water: atoms constitute molecules in the natural realm in a way analogous to how practices constitute social facts in the social world. Without atoms there cannot be molecules; without practice there cannot be any social reality. The

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115 Ibid., 38.
116 Ibid., 46. I will return to this definition in chapters V, VI and VII.
118 Adler 2005, 17.
119 Bull 1995, 156.
120 Watson 1991, 11. Limited to the Westphalian context, this historical observation does not rule out that peace may be constituted by other practices in political orders other than the current interstate system, nor is it a normative stance in favor of the international status quo.
semblance of tautology here stems from the very logic of constitutive analysis.\textsuperscript{121} One would hardly dispute that the discovery of the atomic structure of water was no tautology but an all-important step forward for humankind. The same arguably goes for the search of the constitutive practices of the social fact of international peace.

Of course, the simple occurrence of the diplomatic practice does not mean that peace is waiting around the corner. Diplomacy may be observed in highly turbulent relationships and insecurity communities, from the contemporary Middle East to the East-West rivalry during the Cold War. No doubt diplomacy is not the preserve of security communities. The key distinction lies in the \textit{self-evidence} of the practice. Inside a mature security community, diplomacy is the only thinkable way to solve disputes, to the exclusion of all others (including violent ones). As peace settles in, diplomacy becomes a second nature. Thus my theory of practice of security communities (ToPoSC) argues that peace exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way of solving interstate disputes. Diplomacy is the constitutive practice of security community insofar, and only insofar, as it is the “natural” practice, to the exclusion of violent ones. When diplomacy is doxa, states do not live under the shadow of war anymore: diplomacy is the commonsensical way to go.\textsuperscript{122}

Interestingly, my ToPoSC leads to a positive notion of peace, defined as an international relationship in which security practitioners think \textit{from}, instead of about, diplomacy. Peace is more than simply non-war; it is self-evident diplomacy. By opposition, an insecurity community is characterized by the fact that resorting to diplomacy to solve disputes is far from obvious (though still possible). In between these two political constellations, one finds what Ole Waever (after Hakan Wiberg) calls a “non-war community,”\textsuperscript{123} which is characterized by normal though not self-evident diplomacy. Figure 4.1 below illustrates how different degrees of diplomacy embodiment lead to a variety of interstate relations in and through practice. In mature peaceful interstate relations, the non-violent settlement of disputes forms the background against which all further interactions take place. Officials continue to think \textit{about} a variety of policies, either instrumentally or normatively; but they take for granted that all possible options for solving mutual disputes start from the diplomatic practice. They think \textit{from} diplomacy and not \textit{about} its opportunity. The scenario of violence (or threats thereof) recedes from their horizon of

\textsuperscript{121} Wendt 1998.
\textsuperscript{122} Cf. also the Elias-inspired notion of “habitus of restraint” in Bjola and Komprobst 2007.
\textsuperscript{123} Waever 1998.
possibility, which is narrowed down to a set of diplomatic possibilities. This is peace in and through practice.

Figure 2.1: Diplomacy in Interstate Relations

By way of illustration, take the case of the transatlantic security community.\textsuperscript{124} Innumerable pundits have announced its demise over the last five years. Most famously, Robert Kagan argued that “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.”\textsuperscript{125} Thanks in part to all this expert talk, the transatlantic rift in security cultures and identities may become a new intersubjective reality. That said, while the Iraqi crisis revealed important differences in international outlook among certain NATO members, it has made equally obvious that even deep disagreements over sensitive issues of defence cannot distract allies from what they have come to routinely do together: diplomacy, that is, the peaceful resolution of mutual disputes. That a security community such as NATO is inhabited by disagreements and identity struggles should hardly come as a surprise: politics and conflict never recede, not even from tightly-knit rings of friends. But so long as diplomacy remains the only thinkable or self-evident practice in mutual dealings, one has to conclude that the security community is alive and well. Recent strains over the Atlantic, all solved peacefully if at times painfully, empirically demonstrate just that. In practice, even disagreements over the most sensitive issues of security and defence have not prompted anything like a veiled threat of possible violent retaliation among community members. Insofar as the non-violent settlement of

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\textsuperscript{124} Cf. Pouliot 2006.
\textsuperscript{125} Kagan 2003, 3.
disputes remains the self-evident practice among security officials, or better put, insofar as practitioners think from diplomacy instead of about it, then the transatlantic security community is a social reality to be reckoned with.

When this self-evidently peaceful logic of practicality settles in, it takes on a dimension of habit or routine. The security officials’ practical sense leads them to go on diplomatically without reflexive action, that is, without triggering instrumental calculation, deliberate rule-following, or communicative action about the opportunity of settling disputes non-violently. Although routine is an important part of practicality, however, practical sense cannot be reduced to habit. Routinized diplomacy is more than habitual repetition because practical sense results from the necessarily contingent intersection of a set of dispositions (habitus) and positions (field). For instance, Frédéric Mérand shows that the diplomatic practices behind the design of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) followed neither a rational nor structural, but haphazard, creative, and combinatorial pattern. Dozens of interviews with practitioners indicate that to build tools, they try materials that work and discard others that do not, following their inspiration to change the shape of the object incrementally. Eventually, security officials end up with something completely different from what they had planned (a “bricolage”).

Similarly, another study of the European diplomatic corps concludes that its autonomy depends not so much on the institutions and explicit rules of the game that formally define and constrain it. Instead, the room for maneuver rests with what diplomats do with these constraints in and through practice. Even when routinized as in security communities, then, the diplomatic practice retains a crucial element of contingency. To paraphrase Ryle, practitioners attend from diplomacy to the contingent matters at hand.

The crucial question is, obviously, how do we get there? What are the sociopolitical processes that turn diplomacy into the self-evident way of solving interstate disputes? The conventional constructivist take on the matter would centre on norm internalization. In this scheme, the peaceful settlement of disputes begins as an explicit norm with which security elites at first comply out of instrumental rationality. With iteration, the practice becomes internalized as legitimate or taken-for-granted. In this connection, Checkel envisions three “modes of rationality” whereby deep socialization occurs: instrumental (strategic calculation), bounded (role-playing) and communicative (normative suasion). Though useful, this internalization
framework suffers from two main shortcomings. First, it remains embroiled in the representational bias: taken-for-granted knowledge necessarily began as explicit representations upon which agents once reflected intentionally. A ToPoSC, by contrast, emphasizes tacit learning, a cognitive mechanism that accounts for the transmission of practices without explicit teaching or reflexive compliance. For example, the concept of “communities of practice” allows for the theorization of “learning as social participation.” Collective learning occurs in and through practice, within communities of doers.

Second, the norm internalization framework is sociologically thin: the social context that makes the logic of practicality possible is barely theorized. Especially lacking is a theorization of the power relations that constitute self-evident practices such as diplomacy within security communities. Contrary to widespread liberal views, peace is more than the result of the “arrangement of differences” or a “win-win compromise.” Peace originates from the imposition of meanings through power relations, as barely perceptible as they may be. As Foucault argues: “What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.” Just like any social fact, peace or security communities never simply happen to be there: they necessarily are the result of past struggles among agents to define reality. As Barnett and Adler observe, “the ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to be able to get other actors to commit to these rules because they are now part of their self-understandings is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of power.” Symbolic power—the imposition of meanings (including legitimacy) through social relations—turns a zero-sum struggle for defining reality and morality into something that has all the attributes of a win-win relationship: interstate peace.

Therefore, a crucial implication of my Bourdieu-inspired ToPoSC is that it is more than a theory of practice; it is also a theory of domination. Power relations make the embodiment of diplomacy possible. Thanks to the contingent nexus of habitus and field, dominant players’ practices tend to carve out dispositions in those who are socially exposed. The order of things is

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established through the iterated practices performed by capital-endowed agents, 132 because their doing something in a certain way makes the implicit but powerful claim that “this is how things are.” Power is exerted at the level of inarticulate knowledge: meanings are thoughtlessly imposed in and through practice. This “practical mimesis,” as Bourdieu notes, differs from imitation, which requires “a conscious effort.” 133 The archetype of a power relation in and through practice is apprenticeship, in which the master’s competence is felt by the apprentice as a relation of immediate adherence to the very nature of things. As Polanyi put it:

To learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyse and account in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another. 134

From this perspective, patterns of domination (i.e., self-evident practices) stem from doxa—“the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense.” 135

A given practice becomes doxic—or, put differently, a pattern of social order settles in—when there exists a “homology” between positions in the field and dispositions in habitus. In this situation, habitus becomes a self-regulating mechanism whereby inclinations are in perfect tune with the structure of positions and the rules of the game (Goffman’s sense of one’s place). Under conditions of homology, necessity makes virtue, so to speak. The (objectively) impossible is (subjectively) unthinkable and the (objectively) plausible is (subjectively) inevitable. 136 Note that this “orchestra without a conductor” is at the very root of social order and domination. A habitus that is homologous to the field’s structure basically reproduces it as

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132 Specific to a field, capital refers to any type of resources that are recognized as such in a given social context and that allow a player to play the game more or less successfully. In Bourdieu’s words, “capital is accumulated labour”: “It is what makes the games of society … something other than simple games of chance offering at every moment the possibility of a miracle”; Bourdieu 1986, 241. Note that the value and form of capital evolve over time and space because they are themselves objects of struggles in the field. Generally, dominant players have a vested interest in preserving the doxic rules of the game (including the conversion rate between forms of capital) by turning them into social things—institutions, norms, procedures. In this endeavour, symbolic capital (resources that allow one to change or maintain the rules of the game, and to endow these rules with a doxic aura of naturalness and legitimacy) becomes a “meta-capital” because it potentially presides over the definition of other capital conversion rates; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 114.

133 Bourdieu 1990a, 73.

134 Quoted in Lynch 1997, 339.

135 Bourdieu 1990a, 68.

part of the order of things. As Bourdieu notes: “It is the pre-reflexive fit between the objective and the embodied structures … that explains the ease (which in the end really is amazing) with which, throughout history but for a few crisis situations, dominant agents impose their domination.” When habitus is perfectly attuned to the field’s distribution of positions and rules of the game, dominant players become masters whose higher position in the game and control over its rules are self-reinforcing assets. On the dominated players’ side, a habitus perfectly homologous to the field’s structure is the ultimate vehicle of domination. A player disposed to take a social configuration for granted, as part of the natural order of things, is one who becomes fundamentally complicit in maintaining the domination pattern. Despite the clear disadvantage conferred by their positions in the distribution of capitals and especially by the rules of the game (including the capital forms conversion rate), dominated players partake in their domination because they wilfully (though not necessarily consciously) play the game of their own exploitation. In this context, domination becomes invisible to the dominated: it is self-evident, as part of the natural order of things.

However, when the homology between history-made things (field) and history-made bodies (habitus) is broken, the domination pattern weakens. Bourdieu calls the possible disconnect between positions and dispositions “hysteresis.” In physics, the concept of hysteresis refers to the lag that may occur between the cause and its effects on the behaviour of a particle subject to a physical force. Comparing a social field with a magnetic field (where the magnet is the stake at stake), Bourdieu defines hysteresis as “cases in which dispositions function out of phase and practices are objectively ill-adapted to the present conditions because they are objectively adjusted to conditions that no longer obtain.” In any type of social configuration, one always finds agents who exhibit awkward practices and who behave out of place. These “Don Quixote effects” are captured by the notion of hysteresis. The practical sense (i.e., the

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137 Bourdieu 2003, 256-257.
138 This is what Bourdieu calls “misrecognition”—“the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such”; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 168; cf. Bourdieu 2001b, 210. Put differently, misrecognition renders domination invisible as part of the order of things: mis/recognized power is recognized as authoritative but misconceived as the source of domination.
139 Bourdieu 1990a, 62.
140 In international politics, Williams uses a trivial yet telling example of hysteresis when General Lebed from Russia visited President Clinton in the 1990s, which prompted negative reactions inside the White House. Williams comments: “What was ‘shocking’ was that Lebed clearly did not appear to be the ‘kind of man’ that he was supposed to be, that in significant ways it appeared he did not ‘belong.’ That he didn’t know where to stand, and could not ‘look you in the eye,’ reflects a series of judgements emerging out of the habitus of the American official and the field of accepted practice in which it operates. This is then directly and evaluatively applied in an appreciation of Lebed’s personal and political stature via an evaluation of his own bodily hexis”; Williams 2007, 30.
interplay between habitus and field) of quixotic agents appears socially maladapted to a concrete situation and as a result they do not behave in tune with commonsense. Given one’s historical exposition to struggles in other fields, for instance, one may be inclined to mistake one’s own place in a social configuration. In Bourdieu’s words: “Habitus is a principle of invention which, generated by history, is somewhat dragged away from history: since dispositions are durable, they spark all sorts of hysteresis effects (of lag, gap, discrepancy).”  

Oftentimes, the subjectivized imprint of habitus is not homologous to intersubjective rules of the game and positions in the field, a disconnect that weakens social order and domination patterns and opens the door to social change.

In Bourdieu’s theory, therefore, domination rests not only with the possession of valuable resources (capital) as mediated by the rules of the game. While power is a social distance founded on structural and relational properties, it also hinges on the ways these are reflected within agents’ bodies. A power relation is, in other words, necessarily “subjective”—both objective and subjective (cf. chapter III). As Bourdieu correctly argues, conceiving power in symbolic terms (that is, as relating to the meaning of the world) “does remind us that social science is not a social physics; that the acts of cognition that are implied in misrecognition and recognition are part of social reality and that the socially constituted subjectivity that produces them belongs to objective reality.” One cannot understand domination patterns unless one inquires into the embodied dispositions of the involved players—the dominant but especially the dominated ones. In social life, domination can only work if it is (mis)recognized as such. As Bourdieu liked to say: “One only preaches to the converted.”

Interestingly, this dispositional view generates a different understanding of social causality than usual. For instance, Ryle recalls that it is not correct to say that the glass broke because a stone hit it. Instead, we should say that the glass broke, when the stone hit it, because it is breakable. In other words, we cannot say that one specific event has had a determinant effect on behaviours in and of itself; instead, it is dispositions that, being susceptible to such a determinant effect, gave the event its historical efficacy. In terms of social practice, Searle

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142 For instance, Bourdieu writes that “[g]enerational conflicts oppose not age-classes separated by natural properties, but habitus which have been produced by different modes of generation, that is, by conditions of existence which, by imposing different definitions of the impossible, the possible and the probable, cause one group to experience practices or aspirations that another group finds unthinkable or scandalous as natural or reasonable, and vice versa”; ibid., 292 fn. 11.
143 Ibíd., 122.
144 Bourdieu 2001b, 186.
145 Quoted in Bourdieu 2003, 214.
similarly notes that “we should not say that the experienced baseball player runs to first base because he wants to follow the rules of baseball, but we should say that because the rules require that he run to first base, he acquires a set of Background habits, skills, dispositions that are such that when he hits the ball, he runs to first base.” It is habitus that makes social patterns possible, not free-floating structures.

All in all, applying Bourdieu to security communities leads to two key theoretical innovations upon which this study’s case study is built. First, it defines self-evident diplomacy as the constitutive practice of security community. When a practice is so fully part of everyday routine that it is thoughtlessly but commonsensically enacted, it forms the background knowledge against which all social interaction takes place. When this embodiment takes place among states’ officials, diplomacy becomes the shared background against which they interact. They think from diplomacy not about its opportunity. As a result, peaceful change can be dependably expected; the orchestra can play without a conductor. Second, the doxic nature of diplomacy inside security communities is part of patterns of domination. Wielding power in and through practice endows diplomacy with a doxic aura of self-evidence and naturalness. This peaceful commonsense is established through a homology of positions in the field and dispositions in habitus. Under such a political pattern, the practicality or self-evidence of diplomacy makes the social fact of international peace possible.

**CONCLUSION**

The logic of practicality is meant to be an epistemic bridge between the practical and the theoretical relation to the world. In fact, the very notion is an oxymoron: practice is logical to the point that being logical ceases to be practical, as Bourdieu liked to say. This chapter has made the case for a practice turn in IR theory in four steps. First, most IR theories suffer from a representational bias that entices social scientists to construe the world as a spectacle and to mistake the *opus operatum* of practices for their *modus operandi*. Second, selected literatures from philosophy, psychology, and sociology bolster the need for a practice turn in world politics and provide helpful insights to do so. Third, building especially on Bourdieu’s theory of

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146 Searle 1995, 144. As Searle further notes, a dispositional conceptualization of causality and power is in fact akin to Darwin’s evolution theory, which basically turned conventional wisdom on its head. Instead of “The fish has the shape that it does in order to survive in water,” Darwin professed that “The fish that have that shape (thanks to their genes in reaction to environment) are more likely to survive than fish that do not.”

147 Bourdieu 1987, 97-98.
practice, the chapter established the ontological priority of the logic of practicality in relation to other logics of social action. Fourth and finally, a ToPoSC illustrates the empirical and analytical value of practicality in world politics. Peace exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way of solving interstate disputes.

To conclude this exploration of the logic of practicality in world politics, it is crucial to acknowledge the thorny challenges that it raises at the methodological level. The representational bias that plagues modern social theory probably originates from the fact that norms, ideas or identities usually lend themselves to empirical scrutiny more easily than background knowledge does. Representations such as norms are part of discourse and debates; they often are explicitly invoked in political life and objects of open contestation. Background knowledge, by contrast, is unsaid and unthought. It is almost never explicitly mentioned by agents although it is part of each and every one of their practices. Practical knowledge is everywhere but always concealed in practices. Consequently, it must be interpreted from contexts and practices as well as through agents’ dispositions and subjective meanings. Even so, gaining knowledge about background knowledge is often like asking fish (if they could speak) to describe the water in which they swim.\textsuperscript{148}

In his critique of practice theory, Turner calls this predicament the “Mauss problem.”\textsuperscript{149} In order to decipher the meanings of a practice, the practice must be both alien and native to the interpreter’s own system of meanings. On the one hand, if the meanings of a practice are too deeply embodied by the interpreter, chances are they will remain invisible as a second nature. If, on the other hand, the meanings of a practice are completely alien to the interpreter, then they may not be properly understood within their context. The Mauss problem is a huge methodological challenge for practice theorists as well as for interpretivists. The next chapter takes it up by devising a “sobjectivist” methodology in tune with practice theory.

\textsuperscript{148} Rubin and Rubin 1995, 20.
\textsuperscript{149} Turner 1994, 19-24.
Chapter III
“OBJECTIVISM”: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVIST METHODOLOGY*

This chapter seeks to map out the main lines of a methodology that is specifically geared toward the constructivist approach in IR. In keeping with the argument put forward in the preceding chapter, the objective is to overcome the representational bias by methodically restoring the practical logics of international politics and social life in general. The “subjectivist” label intends to convey the central idea that constructivist inquiries need to develop not only objectified, but also subjective knowledge about social and international life. As Bourdieu famously explained, both forms of knowledge “are equally indispensable to a science of the social world that cannot be reduced either to a social phenomenology or to a social physics.”

The methodology outlined below offers practical guidance as to how to achieve such a subjectivist-with-an-O social science.

Methodology is, according to one prominent observer, “the major missing link in constructivist theory and research.” Another leading scholar concurs that “the time is ripe for further debate about best practices for those working with discourse and texts.” Indeed, constructivists have yet to devise a distinct modus operandi designed for the study of the social construction of meaningful realities. This is not to deny the commonly held view that “constructivist analysis is compatible with many research methods currently used in social science and political science.”

Constructivism does not require the development of brand new methods. That being said, confronted with accusations of being “not a well-defined sociological approach,” constructivism would certainly benefit from engaging more systematically and coherently with pressing methodological issues. In addition, the consolidation of constructivist methodology would facilitate dialogue with other IR theoretical approaches by making its standards of validity more explicit and amenable to non-constructivist ways of doing research.

In this regard, a central plank of this chapter is to foster methodological conversations across the spectrum of IR approaches, particularly by allowing for the comparative assessment of constructivist works and more mainstream research. By showing how scholars with arguably

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* This chapter is a revised and extended version of an article by the author published in International Studies Quarterly 51(2): 359-384 (2007), reproduced here by permission of Blackwell.
1 Bourdieu 1990a, 25.
3 Checkel 2004, 239.
4 Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 392
5 Palan, 2000, 578
unbridgeable ontological and epistemological differences can still share some methods and use a similar language, I aim to help ground abstract debates and avoid all-too-common dialogues of the deaf. There is no pretense here that positivism and interpretivism can ultimately be reconciled—they most probably cannot. Nevertheless, there is much to be gained from learning how to make constructivist and mainstream works speak to each others on fundamental issues of validity, falsifiability and generalizability. Although conversions are unlikely, academic conversations across metatheoretical divides often are at the source of promising new ways of thinking.

Following others, I distinguish between research methods, which consist of concrete tools of inquiry, and methodology—an encompassing term referring “to those basic assumptions about the world we study, which are prior to the specific techniques adopted by the scholar undertaking research.”\(^6\) Put differently, while the same methods may be shared by various methodologies, a methodology comprises a set of epistemological and ontological requirements that formulates its own scientific standards and truth conditions. Research methods, in other words, should be aligned with the researcher’s style of reasoning—ontology and epistemology.\(^7\) There is no quibble that methodological choices need to be problem-driven—that research questions should come first and methods second. But at a deeper level, the horizon of thinkable (or what is deemed interesting or relevant) research questions is circumscribed by one’s style of reasoning.

The chapter contains three parts. The first part discusses the peculiarities of the constructivist style of reasoning as I conceive of it. I begin by introducing the notion of style of reasoning as conceived by philosopher of science Ian Hacking. Then I characterize the constructivist style of reasoning as a postfoundationalist ontology/epistemology premised on the mutual constitution of reality and knowledge. The second part of the chapter draws the methodological consequences of this characterization. I argue that a constructivist methodology needs to be inductive, interpretive, and historical in order to develop not only objectified but also subjective knowledge about social and international life. Combining “experience-distant” and “experience-near” concepts,\(^8\) to use Clifford Geertz’s words (after Heinz Kohut), is what objectivism-with-an-O is all about. The third part delves into the practice of objectivism by outlining a three-step methodology that moves along a subjectivist-objectivist continuum. The

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\(^6\) Fierke 2004, 36.
\(^7\) Cf. Hall 2003.
\(^8\) Geertz 1987.
first step uses induction in order to recover subjective meanings. The second step aims at the
objectification of meanings in their intersubjective context. Finally, the third step sets meanings
in motion through historicization. For each of these steps, I suggest a number of specific
 techniques and discuss their merits and limits. A short section then illustrates what subjectivism
looks like in practice with the case of the study of security communities, followed with an
engagement with mainstream methodology that specifies where constructivism falls on
scientific standards such as validity, falsifiability, and generalizability. Enhancing
methodological legibility hopefully makes clear that a subjectivist social science is every bit as
rigorous as the canons of mainstream positivism claim to be. Finally, the chapter concludes with
a methodological discussion about the case study I will tackle in the second part of this study.

Two cautionary notes about the purpose of the chapter are in order. First, I do not claim
to develop the constructivist methodology but a constructivist methodology. The goal is
certainly not to force anyone into a methodological straightjacket but simply to offer one view
about “how to go on” with constructivist research. No doubt methodological pluralism remains a
valuable state of affairs in IR. Second, in the following pages I neither claim to survey the entire
constructivist literature of the last decade nor do I intend to reinvent the constructivist wheel. I
take inspiration from existing works and seek to systematize, under the subjectivist umbrella, a
variety of methodological insights that remain scattered to this day. Ultimately, the objective is
to foster debate about best research practices, not only among constructivists but also with IR
scholars of all tendencies.

A. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST STYLE OF REASONING

The central claim of this first part is that constructivism constitutes a “style of reasoning” of its
own in social science, a claim that has crucial methodological implications. Following Stefano
Guzzini, I conceive of constructivism as a “metatheoretical commitment” based on three tenets:
first, that knowledge is socially constructed (an epistemological claim); second, that social
reality is constructed (an ontological claim); and third, that knowledge and reality are mutually
constitutive (a reflexive claim). Accordingly, the social construction of knowledge and the
construction of social reality are two sides of the same coin.

The notion of “style of reasoning” was coined by philosopher of science Ian Hacking in the early 1980s. Reminiscent of Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigms,” the concept underscores that, throughout history, there have been “new modes of reasoning that have specific beginnings and trajectories of development.” But contrary to Kuhn, what preoccupies Hacking about styles of reasoning is not so much their incommensurability—the fact that different paradigms are not mutually expressible—but rather their capability to define new worlds as well as the very meanings of truth and falsehood. For Hacking, styles of reasoning are historically constituted epistemes. Some have vanished over time: alchemy and witchcraft, dominant during the Middle Ages, or Renaissance medicine are examples of disappeared styles of reasoning that are almost impenetrable to the 21st century mind. In the natural sciences, Hacking documents the historical emergence of the “laboratory style” (“which does not observe the workings of nature but intervenes in them”) and later of the “probabilistic style” (which envisions “a world in which everything is cloaked in probabilities”).

A style of reasoning is defined by “a new domain of objects to study” (an ontology), a new kind of “truth conditions” (an epistemology), as well as “its own criteria of proof and demonstration” (a methodology). First, “[e]very style of reasoning is associated with an ontological debate about a new type of object.” For instance, today’s scientific realists argue that unobservable theoretical entities in the laboratory style really exist; empiricists deny this. Second, styles of reasoning “introduce new ways of being a candidate for truth or for falsehood.” To return to the example of statistics, Hacking argues that this style contains within itself all the epistemological standards for “self-authentification.” The objective truth of a sentence depends on reasoning along a style that recognizes such truth; hence the relative stability of scientific styles of reasoning, which internally define their standards of validity.

Third and relatedly, a style of reasoning rests on a number of techniques and methods that produce a specific type of evidence. Methodology settles “what it is to be objective (truths of certain sorts are what we obtain by conducting certain sorts of investigations, answering to certain standards).” People in laboratories do not use the same research techniques as

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10 Hacking 1982; reprinted in Hacking 2002a:159-177.
11 Kuhn 1996.
12 Hacking 2002a, 162.
14 Hacking 2002b, 4.
15 Hacking 2002a, 189.
16 Ibid., 190.
18 Hacking 2002a, 181.
statisticians to arrive at truth. Consequently, the validity of their findings is assessed in fundamentally different ways. This is the crucial lesson to be drawn from Hacking’s philosophy of science: any style of reasoning rests on a particular methodology comprised of a set of methods that are specifically geared toward tackling a particular kind of object (ontology) and arriving at a characteristic notion of truth (epistemology).

Hacking does not venture very far in identifying styles of reasoning in social sciences; this is not, after all, his home domain of philosophical inquiry. In keeping with the insight that each new style “brings with it new sentences, things that we quite literally never said before,” one can guess at a few social scientific styles of reasoning. Though it has fallen into disrepute, structuro-functionalism and its talk of systems, equilibria and structures can be considered an autonomous style with its own structural ontology and functionalist epistemology. In contemporary political science and IR, the dominant style of reasoning remains rationalism or rational choice. This style possesses its own language (e.g., cost-benefit calculations, expected utility, etc.), its own ontology (a world comprised of pre-given, calculating individuals), as well as its own epistemology (positivism). It has been argued that the main contender of the rationalist style of reasoning in current IR scholarship is constructivism. No doubt constructivism too has its own dialect, full of social constructions, norms, and identities. Admittedly, however, there is no common front in terms of ontology and epistemology. While a few scientific realists advocate a naturalistic version of constructivism in tune with positivism, others exhibit strong postmodernist leanings. In between these two extremes can be found the great majority of constructivists whose ontology/epistemology can conveniently be labeled “postfoundationalist.”

A slash divides ontology and epistemology because more and more constructivists argue that “the nature of being (ontology) cannot be separated from ways of knowing (epistemology).” Developing knowledge about ontology is an activity firmly grounded in epistemology. This argument derives from Guzzini’s three tenets of constructivism. First, constructivism holds that knowledge and meaning in general are socially constructed. This epistemological claim is far-reaching for it also includes scientific knowledge: “The principal

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19 Ibid., 190.
20 Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998.
21 Pouliot, 2004. Postfoundationalism is a metatheoretical commitment to the notion that, in the absence of ontological foundations of knowledge, the best way forward for social science is to build on the social facts that are already reified by agents. Thanks to Daniel Nexon who suggested the term “postfoundationalism.” More on this below.
22 Fierke, 2005, 7.
characteristic of constructivism is its view that knowledge, both everyday and scientific, is a construction shaped by its context. Second, constructivism posits that social reality is constructed instead of exogenously given. Our world is intersubjectively real because others agree it is. Third, constructivism stresses “the reflexive relationship between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality.” In other words, many constructivists postulate that knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive, mostly through linguistic feedbacks such as “looping effects” and self-fulfilling prophecies. There is no meaningful reality prior to knowledge and vice versa.

In sum, postfoundationalist constructivism is just as much a science of knowing as it is a science of being. Neither ontology nor epistemology should have priority over one another for they are two sides of the same coin. Importantly, to say that reality and knowledge are mutually constitutive is not to give in to pure Idealism. As Friedrich Kratochwil explains, “hardly anyone—even among the most ardent constructivists or pragmatists—doubts that the ‘world’ exists ‘independent’ from our minds. The question is rather whether we can recognise it in a pure and direct fashion, i.e., without any ‘description,’ or whether what we recognise is always already organised and formed by certain categorical and theoretical elements.” For constructivists, the phenomenal world cannot be known outside of our socially constructed representations of it—language most prominently. One simply cannot know the world apart from meaningful realities. The world (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology) are mutually constitutive processes.

Contrary to scientific realism, which gives precedence to ontology over epistemology, postfoundationalism remains agnostic as to what is “really real” and what is not. There are three related reasons for such agnosticism that taken together suggest that postfoundationalism is a more coherent metatheory for constructivism than is scientific realism. First, assuming an a priori reality in the way of Wendt’s “rump materialism” carries political consequences that

26 Hacking 1995.
27 Thanks to David Welch for this language.
28 Kratochwil 2000, 91.
29 Pouliot 2004. However important a difference this is, it does not imply methodological incommensurability. Take the case of “causal mechanisms”: while scientific realists give them the ontological status of real processes out there, postfoundationalists conceive of mechanisms as heuristic constructs that help make sense of the social world (see part 3, section 3 below). In the end, whether causal mechanisms are real out there or part of the realm of knowledge, a methodology such as subjectivism will bear fruits for all. Klotz and Lynch’s discussion of constructivist methodology, for instance, rests on a tacit form of realism that gives precedence to ontology over epistemology. Although they harness methods to ontological categories such as agents and structures, they end up looking for what this article would call subjective and objectified knowledge. Cf. Klotz and Lynch 2007.
basically contradict constructivist tenets: material conditions need to be politically construed as limitations instead of scientifically assumed.\textsuperscript{30} In fact, assuming the world prior to knowledge leads to reifying one’s commonsensical and/or scientific representations as natural and universal. Second, claiming with realists that what our models depict is “really real” or “out there” amounts to scientific hubris. History shows that scientific concepts are just that—concepts, not Reality—and that they will be superseded by others as new theories surface. Third, the positivist notion that science should aim at defining big-R reality—grasping its essence, so to speak—runs counter to the critical disposition that constructivism endorses by its very logic. As Hacking recalls, to say that $X$ is socially constructed aims to show that $X$ is neither “natural” nor “inevitable.”\textsuperscript{31} Instead of seeking to establish the ontology of Reality, I argue that constructivism needs to problematize what is held to be real by looking into the constitutive effects of knowledge.

A principled refusal to assume Reality means that for postfoundationalist constructivism, there are no such things as ontological foundations of knowledge. A correspondence theory of truth is therefore impossible. Yet postfoundationalism certainly does not embrace epistemological relativism either. Inside a style of reasoning, there exist criteria for validity that are not transcendental but intersubjective (cf. the conclusion below). In this context, the way forward consists of building on the social facts\textsuperscript{32} that are naturalized by social agents. Already reified by agents, social facts provide constructivists with “epistemic foundations”\textsuperscript{33} that allow them to develop knowledge about social life while remaining agnostic about reality. The focus is on what it is that social agents, as opposed to analysts, take to be real. In this epistemological sense, social facts are “the essence of constructivism.”\textsuperscript{34} They are knowledge that makes social worlds come into being. Ultimately, to know whether a social fact is “really real” makes no analytical difference; the whole point is to observe whether agents take it to be real and to draw the social and political implications that follow. In so doing, postfoundationalism steers a middle course between scientific realism (which rests on allegedly natural foundations) and antifoundationalism (which denies the possibility of foundations for knowledge altogether).

\textsuperscript{30} Zehfuss 2002.
\textsuperscript{31} Hacking 1999, 6.
\textsuperscript{32} According to John Ruggie, social facts are “those facts that are produced by virtue of all the relevant actors agreeing that they exist”; Ruggie 1998, 12. The classic example used by Searle is that of money; Searle 1995.
\textsuperscript{33} Adler 2005.
\textsuperscript{34} Pouliot 2004.
B. METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Three main methodological implications follow from characterizing the constructivist style of reasoning as postfoundationalist social science. First, induction is the primary mode of knowing because social facts constitute the essence of constructivism. Research must begin with what it is that social agents, as opposed to analysts, believe to be real. Second, interpretation constitutes the central methodological task since constructivism takes knowledge very seriously. To use Geertz’s famous words, it is first and foremost a science “in search of meaning.” And third, the constructivist style of reasoning is inherently historical for it “sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being.” The mutual constitution of knowledge and reality begs for a process-centered approach.

1. An Inductive Methodology

Inductive analysis—a research strategy that moves from the local to the general—is the necessary starting point for any constructivist inquiry. This is because theorization destroys meanings as they exist for social agents. Deductive theory, for instance, deliberately imposes scientific categories upon practical ones. Yet I contended that constructivism’s foundations of knowledge rest not on a set of a priori assumptions but on agents’ taken-for-granted realities. In order to recover such meanings, the analyst must avoid superseding them with theoretical constructs. In addition, since the construction of social reality hinges on the social construction of knowledge, analysts also need to refrain (within the realms of possibility) from imposing their own taken-for-granted world onto their object of study. In sociology, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss famously dubbed this inductive enterprise “grounded theory.” The premise is that “a firsthand immersion in a sphere of life and action—a social world—different from one’s own yields important dividends. The field worker who has observed closely in this social world has had, in a profound sense, to live there. He has been sufficiently immersed in this world to know it, and at the same time has retained enough detachment to think theoretically about what he has seen and lived through.” Induction allows constructivists to recover the meanings of the world as it exists for the actual agents of international politics.

An inductive methodology acts as a safeguard against two especially harmful fallacies in social science. The first fallacy, well-known since Émile Durkheim’s exhortation to fight against “preconceptions,” results from the socially constructed world inside of which the analyst happens to live, with all its taken-for-granted realities. Of course, it is impossible to fully evade one’s world and its meanings. Because of the “Rashomon effect” (Heider, 1988), different researchers never recover exactly the same practical meanings. But that does not mean it is not worth trying to be as faithful and accurate as possible. The second fallacy countered by induction, which is by far the most pernicious, is what I called the representational bias in chapter II. Most social scientists have the reflex to take the point of view of an external spectator: not involved in the social situation under study, they try to stand back from it in order to grasp the larger picture. This god-like posture has huge epistemological consequences because the theoretical relation to the world is fundamentally different from the practical one, if only in the distance from which the action is played out. As Bourdieu’s aphorism goes, a practice is logical up to the point where to be logical ceases to be practical. Thanks to induction, researchers avoid imposing a scholastic and alien logic on practices that are fundamentally defined by their practical urgency and embeddedness in a social context.

But this plea in favor of induction does not amount to saying that social science should rely exclusively on subjective knowledge. Contra Schütz’s “postulate of adequacy,” a study that narrowly sticks to the meanings held by actors lacks the detachment required for their historicization (where meanings come from and how they came to be) and their contextualization (how meanings relate to others and to patterns of domination). Interpretation also requires objectification.

2. An Interpretive Methodology

According to Adler, constructivism rests on “an epistemology in which interpretation is an intrinsic part of the social sciences.” Constructivism’s interpretive methodology seeks to comprehend meanings so as to explain social life. Geertz convincingly exposed decades ago why interpretation must be part of any social scientific inquiry: a twitch is not a wink, a

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38 Durkheim 1950.
39 Bourdieu 1987, 97-98.
40 Schütz 1967.
41 Adler 2005, 12.
difference that hinges on intersubjective meanings and nothing else.\textsuperscript{43} Interested in understanding meaningful realities, constructivists just “cannot escape the interpretivist moment.”\textsuperscript{44} By contrast with other styles of reasoning, however, in constructivism this interpretivist moment is \textit{double}. Interpretation means not only drawing inferences from data, as even diehard positivists do, but also recognizing (and taking advantage of) the fact that “an important part of the subject matter of social science is itself an interpretation—the self-interpretation of the human beings under study.”\textsuperscript{45} A constructivist social science develops meanings about meanings.

How do these double hermeneutics transform the meanings that are being interpreted? In a famous article, Paul Ricoeur described the process of interpretation as the “objectification” of meanings.\textsuperscript{46} Ricoeur builds on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s understanding of interpretation as a “fusion of horizons,” that is, a meaningful dialogue with an “Other.”\textsuperscript{47} A central claim of Ricoeur’s interpretivism is that meanings need to be objectified in order to be not only understood but also explained. Building on speech act theory, he argues that moving from discourse to text transforms meanings in four objectifying ways. First, discourse loses its perlocutionary effect (what one does \textit{by} saying) and to some extent its illocution too (what one does \textit{in} saying). What remains is the locutionary dimension of discourse inscribed in the text (the act \textit{of} saying). Second, contrary to discourse, in a text “the author’s intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide.”\textsuperscript{48} Intentionality loses its salience in favor of intertextuality. Third, a text is free from “ostensive references,” that is, the immediate references drawn from the context shared with the audience. And fourth, whereas discourse is addressed to someone, a text creates its own (and changing) audience. Objectifed meanings lose their temporality and locality to become open to timeless, universal interpretation.

The crucial implication of this line of argument is that through interpretation, subjective meanings become objectified as part of an intersubjective context. To objectify meanings is to inquire into what something means not for a specific agent but in a larger context of intersubjectivity. This is precisely what the hermeneutic circle is all about: interpretation proceeds by relating the parts in terms of the whole and reciprocally. To illustrate this idea, Ricoeur uses the example of a proverb. In order to interpret the meaning of a proverb, one has to

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Geertz1973} Geertz 1973, 6.
\bibitem{Neufeld1993} Neufeld 1993, 43-44. On the “double hermeneutics,” cf. also Giddens 1984; and Jackson 2006a.
\bibitem{Gadamer2004} Gadamer 2004.
\bibitem{Ricoeur1977} Ricoeur 1977, 320.
\end{thebibliography}
put it in the wider context of a culture, a language, and a set of related practices. Proverbs are proverbs because uttering them in a certain context means more than they say. This surplus of meaning is to be found outside of the specific words contained in the proverb. Reciprocally, a culture cannot be appropriately interpreted apart from its particular expressions such as proverbs. In interpretation, the whole and the parts cannot be analyzed separately.

Another important implication of Ricoeur’s “model of the text” is that interpretation targets more than discourse and language; it deals with practices in general, understood as actions endowed with intersubjective meaning (cf. chapter II). As he puts it: “Meaningful action is an object for science only under the condition of a kind of objectification which is equivalent to the fixation of a discourse by writing.”

The idea simply is to detach the meaning of a practice from its advent through the four objectifying transformations outlined above. Just like a text, any action then becomes amenable not only to Understanding—the subjective interpretation of the reasons and beliefs that inform it—but also to Explaining—the objectifying interpretation of its intersubjective context. Interpretivist constructivism is not exhausted by discourse. Practice is its main object of study.

3. A Historical Methodology

An inductive and interpretive methodology amounts to something similar to Geertz’s “thick description,” which consists of “sorting out the structures of signification”—both subjective and objectified. Yet meanings are never fixed or static but always part of a dialectical process between knowledge and reality. Meanings constantly evolve over time. As a consequence, constructivism is a profoundly historical science. In Adler’s words, “rather than using history as a descriptive method, constructivism has history ‘built in’ as part of theories. Historicity, therefore, shows up as part of the contexts that make possible social reality.” In addition, the path dependence and feedback loops that characterize the dialectics of knowledge and reality further reinforce the need to study the social construction of international politics in time. As Paul Pierson recalls, one can stir jam into pudding but one cannot stir it out. Process and sequence matter because social life is fundamentally temporal.

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49 Ibid., 322.
51 Of course, meanings may also “petrify” for a while or at least remain stable long enough to create the impression of immutability. But even under such circumstances, it should be recalled that the re-instantiation of meanings is just as much a process as is their transformation.
52 Adler 2002, 102.
Such a historicized understanding of social life is in tune with constructivism’s denaturalizing disposition. Recall that to say that \( X \) is socially constructed means that \( X \) is neither natural nor inevitable: \( X \) is historical. \( X \) can be shown to be socially constructed in part because it has a history of its own and results from social processes that are traceable over time. The historicization of \( X \) leads to its denaturalization: \( X \) needs not be, for it has not always been (or has not always been as it is). As a result, historicization adds a dimension of “emancipatory empiricism” to constructivism.\(^{54}\) In Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, historicization “neutralizes, at least theoretically, the effects of naturalization and in particular the amnesia of the individual and collective genesis of a given world that presents itself under all the guises of nature.”\(^{55}\)

A historical methodology is concerned with the genesis of its object of study, that is, with the historical processes that make possible the constitution of specific social contexts. Since no social realities are natural, they are all the result of political and social processes that are rooted in history. To trace them, the analyst needs to build a narrative—a dynamic account that tells the story of a variety of historical processes as they unfold over time. As Donald Polkinghorne explains: “Narrative explanations are retrospective. … They draw together the various episodes and actions into a story that leads through a sequence of events to an ending.”\(^{56}\) In IR, Ruggie takes inspiration from Max Weber to similarly advocate the building of “narrative explanatory protocols” that show “why things are historically so and not otherwise.”\(^{57}\)

Narrative-building is different from causal analysis as understood by positivists.\(^{58}\) Instead of searching for constant antecedent, the researcher traces contingent practices that have historically made a given social fact possible. The small vs. large \( N \) controversy is thus irrelevant. From this perspective, explaining causality is subordinate to understanding meaning. Narrative causality traces the historical evolution of meanings (both subjective and intersubjective) in order to explain how they brought about, or made possible, a given social context. Causes are not ontological substances to be isolated “out there” but heuristic focal points used by the researcher to make sense of social life. Explanatory narratives order variegated meanings and practices in time around a number of “plots” or causal stories. Like counterfactual analysis, causal narratives reason backwards in order to understand why the branching tree of history has taken one direction instead of others. Inside the constructivist style

\(^{55}\) Bourdieu 2003, 262.  
\(^{56}\) Polkinghorne 1988, 170.  
\(^{57}\) Ruggie 1998, 32 (emphasis original).  
\(^{58}\) Ruggie 1995.
of reasoning, then, historical analysis and interpretation go hand in hand. Because it implies temporally standing back from current meanings, historicization leads to further objectification.

4. Summary: Beyond the Subjectivist-Objectivist Dichotomy

To tie the three strings together, a constructivist methodology that is inductive, interpretive, and historical is able to develop both subjective knowledge (from the meanings that social agents attribute to their own reality) and objectified knowledge (which derives from “standing back” from a given situation by contextualizing and historicizing it). While inductive interpretation is necessary for recovering subjective meanings and practical logics, contextual and historical interpretation is required for their objectification. A subjectivist-with-an-O methodology aims at overcoming the epistemological duality of subjectivism and objectivism. It should be noted that it is a similar tension between subjectivism and objectivism that informs Weber’s interpretive sociology. Since then, subjectivism-like methodology has been promoted by social scientists as diverse as Bourdieu and Geertz.

Geertz’s useful distinction between “experience-near” and “experience-distant” concepts, which he borrows from Kohut, will conclusively drive the main point of subjectivism home. Experience-near concepts are developed through phenomenological inquiry with the goal of grasping as accurately as possible a reality that is known by the agents under study. By contrast, an experience-distant concept is constructed by the scientist in order to break with commonsensical experience and provide an outsider viewpoint, different from the ones that are practically engaged in the situation at hand. As Geertz explains: “Confinement to experience-near concepts leaves an ethnographer awash in immediacies, as well as entangled in vernacular. Confinement to experience-distant ones leaves him stranded in abstractions and smothered in jargon.”

Striking a fine balance between subjectivism (experience-near concepts) and objectivism (experience-distant concepts) is the main task of a methodology that is inductive, interpretive and historical. In practical terms, as Geertz continues, “[t]he real question is how ought one to deploy [experience-near and experience-distant concepts] so as to produce an interpretation of the way a people lives which is neither imprisoned within their mental

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60 Although Bourdieu and Geertz both made the case for combining subjectivism and objectivism, they did so for slightly different reasons. Bourdieu was preoccupied by the contrast between the theoretical relation to the world and the practical one; while Geertz centred his attention on the cultural distance that separates the researcher from agents’ worlds. In the end, though, the rationale for transcending the epistemological dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism is the same: overcoming the epistemeric gap between the world of research and that of actual practice.
61 Geertz 1987, 135.
C. THE METHODICAL PRACTICE OF SOBJECTIVISM

Sobjectivism is a three-step methodology that moves along a continuum bordered at one end by subjective knowledge (experience-near concepts) and at the other by objectified knowledge (experience-distant concepts). One begins with the inductive recovery of agents’ realities, then objectifies them through the interpretation of intersubjective contexts and thereafter pursues further objectification through historicization. In the spirit of grounded theory and abduction, however, these three steps should not be conceived as a linear pathway. As research unfolds, chances are that the analyst will feel the need to move back and forth between subjective, contextualized and historicized knowledge. In practice, induction, interpretation and historicization should always be put in close dialogue.

1. Recovering Subjective Meanings

The first step consists of recovering as faithfully as possible the meanings that agents attribute to their reality. Social action is understood from within. This is the most inductive step of all as it shies away from theorization. As Hopf notes: “Theorizing is a form of interpretation, and it destroys meaning. As soon as we begin to impose categories on evidence, that evidence stops meaning what it meant in its earlier context.”

From this perspective, he continues, “[t]he backbone of an interpretivist epistemology is phenomenology and induction. Phenomenology implies letting the subjects speak [while] Induction involves the recording of these identities as atheoretically as possible.” By immersing oneself in practical life-worlds, the knowledge that is sought at this first step needs to be as close as possible to the subjective meanings held by agents so as to develop a form of “cultural competence.”

Interestingly, this turn to phenomenology runs counter to dominant strands of IR theory, including constructivism. Indeed, over the last fifteen years most constructivists have been

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62 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 23.
primarily concerned with “epistemically objective” realities such as norms, epistemes, institutions or collective identities. Such a focus is all good so long as it is supplemented with an equivalent consideration for agent-level ideations. After all, only practices and the subjective dispositions that inform them can make the social construction of epistemically objective realities possible. In Adler’s apt formulation: “Background knowledge is Janus-faced because, in addition to being intersubjective knowledge embedded in practices, it is also the subjective representations of intersubjectivity.” For instance, Neumann’s research on the practice of diplomacy poses the under-researched question of what it means to be a diplomat. Through his recollection of meanings from practitioners’ point of view, he supplies a sophisticated hermeneutics of a central practice in IR, diplomacy.

There are many ethnographic methods allowing the development of subjective knowledge through the recovery of agents’ meanings. One method well-known among sociologists is ethnomethodology as pioneered by Garfinkel. Basically, ethnomethodology seeks to reach at the commonsensical and the taken-for-granted of daily life in order to report as faithfully as possible agents’ ways of being in the world. Another effective ethnographic method is participant observation, which involves the researcher’s direct participation inside of a social setting in order to understand it from the subjects’ point of view. Geertz’ rendition of Balinese cockfights is a famous model of that method but one can also find a few examples of participant observation in IR scholarship. Thanks to his posting at the U.S. Mission to the UN in 1993 and 1994, Barnett supplies an illuminating “empathetic reconstruction” of the UN organizational culture in order to understand the body’s (lack of) response to the Rwandan genocide. Unfortunately, however, more often than not ethnographic methods are hardly amenable to empirical research in IR because of secrecy and the size and geographical distribution of practice communities.

Such practical difficulties in recovering subjective meanings in world politics can be ameliorated by using another inductive method—the qualitative interview. Kvale defines

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66 Epistemically objective realities do not depend on points of view to exist, whereas the reverse is true of epistemically subjective ones. Examples could be, respectively, “Rembrandt lived in Amsterdam during the year 1632” vs. “Rembrandt is a better artist than Rubens.” On this distinction and example, cf. Searle 1995, 8. I will return to this issue in chapter VII.
67 Adler forthcoming.
69 Garfinkel 1967.
71 This method assumes that relevant agents are alive and willing to discuss their experience with the researcher. This, of course, is not always the case. Other sources that can convey subjective meanings without requiring living subjects are personal diaries, memoirs, correspondence, interview and press conference transcripts, or tapes.
interviews as “attempts to understand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover their lived world to scientific explanations.” Qualitative interviews are specifically devised to develop subjective knowledge, prior to further objectification through interpretation and historicization. According to Rubin and Rubin, the “philosophy” that informs interviews is the following: “Find out what others think and know, and avoid dominating your interviewees by imposing your world on theirs.” Induction or the generation of situated, insider knowledge is the key principle behind interviews. As conversations generative of subjective knowledge, qualitative interviews provide researchers with an efficient means to penetrate more or less alien life-worlds.

Despite its inductive strengths, interviewing also present important methodological limits or challenges. First, in order to genuinely communicate, the interviewee and the researcher must come to share a similar language and a commonsensical world. “The researcher has to figure out the special new vocabulary and the taken-for-granted understandings within the setting. … Part of becoming a qualitative interviewer is learning to recognise and then explore words that have rich connotative or symbolic meanings for the people being studied.” A second difficulty stems from the fact that through interviews the researcher often seeks to gain knowledge of which interviewees are not consciously aware—the taken-for-granted culture and social facts that constitute their world. Third and related, the very act of posing questions to someone may impose a scholastic logic on a given practice. According to Bourdieu, “as soon as he reflects on his practice, adopting a quasi-theoretical posture, the agent loses any chance of expressing the truth of his practice, and especially the truth of the practical relation to the practice.” This suggests a fourth limitation to interviews, which is that they are susceptible to deception (voluntary or not) and misleading accounts.

These four challenges point to a crucial aspect of subjectivism’s first step (the recovery of subjective meanings): the need for triangulation. Insider perspectives are especially hard to elicit because of the epistemic distance between the subjects and the researcher, the inarticulate nature of background knowledge, and the possibility of self-delusion or voluntary deception. This is not to talk about the peculiar optic inevitably introduced by the researcher’s own background. It is therefore necessary to combine a variety of inductive methods in order to check against possible problems of interpretation. Furthermore, the recovery of subjective

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72 Kvale 1996, 1.
73 Rubin and Rubin 1995, 5.
74 Rubin and Rubin 1995, 8 and 21.
75 Bourdieu 1990a, 91.
meanings should always be supplemented with objectifying methods, both intersubjectively and historically. As two political ethnographers contend, “good research does not merely mimic [insiders’] viewpoints, but neither should it be out of sync.”\textsuperscript{76} Most problematically, inductive methods that exclusively centre on recovering subjective meanings are usually not attentive enough to the larger picture (context and history) and tend to miss crucial social structures such as distributions of power. Experience-near concepts need to be put under the light of experience-distant contextualization.

2. Putting Meanings in Context

The second step of sobjectivism seeks to objectify meanings by putting them in their wider intersubjective context. In accordance with the hermeneutic circle, the goal here is to understand specific bits of intersubjectivity in terms of a larger whole. Poststructuralists usually refer to this as “intertextuality”—the fact that any text (or meaning) stands only in reference to others. There cannot be isolated meanings, only webs of them. Webs of meaning are usually interpreted through discourse analysis, a broad methodological category that in fact encompasses a variety of more specific methods (cf. below). In general terms, by putting meanings in their wider context, discourse analysis takes them out of people’s heads to place them inside of an intersubjective structure. In an important article that maps out the main parameters of sobjectivism’s second step, Jennifer Milliken explains that discourse analysis rests on three analytical principles.\textsuperscript{77} First, discourses are systems of significations that construct social realities. This tenet emphasizes the dialectic between meaning and reality. Second, discourses are productive of the social realities they define. They construct legitimate speakers, authorized practices, as well as common sense. Third and finally, discourses are articulated through the play of practice. Discursive intersubjective structures falter unless constantly instantiated and re-instantiated through agents’ practices.

There exist a number of specific methods of discourse analysis, some being more formal than others. “Graphical argument analysis,” for instance, models structures of inferences, that is, how people structure their argumentation in terms of clashing positions.\textsuperscript{78} A similar method called “dialogical analysis” formalizes the Wittgensteinian notion of “language games.”\textsuperscript{79} On the less formal side, one of the most popular methods in IR is metaphorical analysis. Inspired by

\textsuperscript{76} Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004, 268.
\textsuperscript{77} Milliken 1999.
\textsuperscript{78} Alker 1996, 23-63.
\textsuperscript{79} Duffy, Frederking and Tucker 1998.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s landmark study, this method conceives of “metaphors (conventional ways of conceptualizing one domain in terms of another) as structuring possibilities for human reasoning and action.” Metaphors are micro-instances of the hermeneutic circle as they put one meaning in the context of a larger discourse, culture, and set of practices. In IR, metaphorical analysis has helped interpret crucibles of intersubjectivity such as globalization. For Habermasian constructivists who study communicative action, Crawford’s method of “informal argument analysis” seems especially well-suited. The method contains five steps. The researcher first identifies the arguments that are on the table and second seeks to grasp the topoi or commonplaces that inform them. Third, the researcher maps background beliefs. The fourth step consists of tracing the “form and fate” of arguments, especially whether they are replacing dominant beliefs and becoming institutionalized. The fifth stage assesses the causal force of arguments. Crawford suggests a set of “tests” of argumentative causal efficacy such as temporal ordering, congruence between beliefs and behavior, the justification or sanction of deviation, and the reframing of interests.

On the poststructuralist side of discourse analysis, however, Lene Hansen questions the possibility of discursive causality and instead develops research models centred on intertextuality. Her four models are based on an increasingly large pool of intertextual references, from official discourse narrowly conceived to wider political debates, media, corporate institutions and marginal voices. Hansen efficiently puts to work poststructuralist discourse analysis by outlining a variety of possible research designs that draw attention to central issues of temporal perspective and comparative focus. A similar rigor informs Mattern’s mapping of language-power utterances inside security communities in crisis. Fierke’s work on Wittgensteinian language games also insightfully highlights the intertextuality of international “grammars.” From a more normative view, critical theorists propose discourse analysis as an emancipatory tool in world politics.

As the second subjectivist step following the inductive acquisition of cultural competence, discourse analysis needs to overcome a thorny methodological dilemma to which there is no clear-cut answer: what are the boundaries of relevant discourses? On the basis of her research

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82 Crawford 2002.
84 Mattern 2005.
85 Fierke 1998.
86 E.g., Fairclough 2001.
questions, notes Crawford, “the analyst must make choices about the kind of discourse they will focus on and the boundaries of the discourse—both temporal and genre—that they will examine.”\textsuperscript{87} In addition to time and genre, one could also add geographical scope and authorship as delimiting criteria of discourse. In fact, some discourse analysts go even further by looking for specific linguistic practices (predicates, metaphors, commonplaces, arguments, etc.). The “Copenhagen School,” for instance, looks for “securitizing moves” in official discourse.\textsuperscript{88} The general point here is that a discourse analysis needs to be focused on a number of specific elements rather than trying to explain everything at a time. To be sure, it would be nonsense to abstractly establish uniform criteria for what (and how much) needs to be read. Such criteria should derive from the context, that is, from examining the political and analytical pregnancy of any given discourse. Ultimately, however, the key to discourse selection is that the reasons behind specific boundaries need to be made explicit and justified by the researcher. The quality of a discourse analysis partly hinges on its empirical breadth.

Beyond discourse in strict textual form, the analysis of practices as meaningful actions is another way to put meanings in context. Building on Bourdieu’s social theory, Anna Leander offers much needed guidance as to how to methodically analyze the meanings of practice thanks to what she dubs the “FiHP method.”\textsuperscript{89} Williams also takes inspiration from Bourdieu to trace cultural strategies in the field of international security, while Neumann studies the evolution of diplomacy from a centralized to a multibased practice.\textsuperscript{90} These works share a similar concern for putting practices and their meanings in their intersubjective context. In so doing, they move beyond the search for subjective reasons to an objectified form of interpretation. As in discourse analysis, meanings do not belong to a subject anymore; they become truly intersubjective. That being said, objectifying meanings in their context produces a fairly static form of knowledge. How is it possible, methodologically, to account for the dialectics of the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality?

3. Setting Meanings in Motion

The third step of soobjectivism aims at setting meanings in motion, that is, at further objectifying meanings by introducing time and history. The point is not only to study “politics in

\textsuperscript{87} Crawford 2004, 22.
\textsuperscript{88} Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998.
\textsuperscript{89} Leander 2008.
\textsuperscript{90} Williams 2007; Neumann 2002.
time” and to take path-dependencies seriously. Supposing in the present, and future. Historical analysis reveals these dynamics, especially the political contestation that necessarily surrounds any form of knowledge that makes claims to reality. Because constructivism adheres with historical sociology to a constitutive (as opposed to instrumental) reading of history, both approaches have a “federated future.” Subjectivism, in other words, is a methodology that fully takes the “historic turn” in human sciences.

Constructivists make use of a variety of methods that allow for diachronic interpretation. On the more formal side, Lars-Erik Cederman’s pioneering work on “complex adaptive systems” is based on sophisticated computer simulation that introduces notions such as path dependence and contingency. It then becomes possible to “re-run” the tape of history thousands of time in order to model intersubjective evolution over time. Similarly, Matthew Hoffmann develops a methodology of agent-based modeling which provides a “social laboratory” for understanding how structures such as norms emerge from agency. On the more posty side, Jens Bartelson’s study of sovereignty is based on Foucault’s genealogical method—“a history of logical spaces and their succession in time.” Thanks to the same method, Richard Price historicizes moral meanings about chemical weapons in order to understand how current taboos have been made possible through the past. As a historicizing method, genealogy is especially efficient in demonstrating ruptures and leaps in the evolution of meanings.

The construction of narratives is another historicizing method that is widely used by IR constructivists. Erik Ringmar, for instance, builds a historical account of Sweden’s changing identities and interests in the 17th century on the premise that “[t]he past is no longer fixed and no longer stable, but instead at the mercy of the stories historians tell. The events of the past are nothing in themselves and only something when inserted into the context of a narrative.” Historicization, in other words, brings about a new, objectified form of knowledge about the past and the present. Christian Reus-Smit’s “constitutional history” of the international

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92 Barnett 2002b.
93 MacDonald 1996.
94 Cederman 1997. Computer-modeling is of limited help in terms of interpreting meanings, however.
95 Hoffmann 2008.
society, society, Rodney Hall’s recollection of collective-identity change, and Martha Finnmere’s study of changing norms of humanitarian intervention are other examples of historicizing narratives. Alternatively, other constructivists build dialogical narratives in which it is the evolution of debates that is traced in history. Barnett’s “dialogues in Arab politics” or Steven Bernstein’s “compromise of liberal environmentalism” exemplify this approach to contested meanings over time. Analyses based on the Self-Other distinction and its changing boundaries build on a similar historical logic.

A more mainstream historicizing method popularized by the school of comparative historical sociology is process-tracing. According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, process-tracing “attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes.”

How does $X$ cause $Y$? The focus is on chains of cause-effect relations, that is, on the causal mechanisms that lead from $X$ to $Y$. For mainstream social science, the ascendancy of process-tracing has led to something of a methodological revolution because the method is informed by a processual (instead of correlational) understanding of causality. As Checkel admits, however, in its positivistic conceptualization, process-tracing is incompatible with interpretivism. That being said, process-tracing is arguably amenable to the constructivist style of reasoning with two amendments. First, the exclusive focus on causation needs to be enlarged to what can be called constitutive mechanisms. And second, the scientific realist assumption that mechanisms exist “out there” should be replaced with the postfoundationalist notion that mechanisms are theoretical constructs or heuristic devices which we apply to our observations in order to classify them.

Constitutive analysis—the study of how social facts come into being—is the research domain where constructivism is the most innovative, if only because it is left unaddressed by contending styles of reasoning such as rationalism. The point is not that causality is wholly irrelevant for constructivists; causal narratives and counterfactual analysis surely help understand how a given social context is historically brought about and not others. But

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100 Hall 1999.
101 Finnmere 2003.
102 E.g. Thérien and Poulion 2006.
105 Neumann 1999.
106 George and Bennett 2005, 6.
whenever the object of inquiry is a social fact, causality should give way to constitutive theorization. The causal analysis of social facts is scientifically uninteresting and redundant because each and every of them is “caused” by the same variable: collective intentionality.\textsuperscript{109} Put differently, any social fact is brought about by the fact that relevant actors believe it to be real. For example, certain bits of paper are socially constructed as money because we all believe this to be true. The interesting question is what intersubjective context makes such a social fact possible.

According to Searle, a constitutive relation works along the following formula: $X$ counts as $Y$ in context $C$. For example: “Bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing ($X$) count as money ($Y$) in the United States ($C$).”\textsuperscript{110} Contrary to Wendt, the crucial variable here is $C$, the intersubjective context that makes the constitution of $Y$ through $X$ possible.\textsuperscript{111} $C$ stands for the evolving context that makes it possible for social facts to be socially constructed. In order to provide a dynamic account of the social processes that lead to $C$, one must identify constitutive mechanisms—heuristic devices about the social processes that lead to the constitution of $Y$ by $X$. Constitutive mechanisms help understand what brings about context $C$, rendering possible the constitutive relation. Theorizing constitutive mechanisms allows for a better understanding of how the historical conditions of possibility of any social fact are generated and allows for analogies across cases.

But contrary to scientific realism, and partly against Searle, from a postfoundationalist perspective mechanisms are not “real” or existing “out there.” Instead, they are mental constructs devised to make sense of our interpretations that belong to the realm of social scientific knowledge. As I argued above, language (vernacular and scientific) cannot simply mirror reality; one cannot stand behind concepts and words in order to know what is there.\textsuperscript{112} As a result, theoretical notions such as mechanisms are part of a socially constructed interpretation that further constructs reality. Narratives, categories, concepts, and theories are not “out there” as part of an external Reality, but “in there”—inside the web of scientific constructs that is collectively developed in order to make sense of our interpretations. Just like causes, mechanisms are heuristic devices, nothing more. They make sense of history but do not drive it.

\textsuperscript{109} Searle 1995.
\textsuperscript{110} Searle 1995, 28.
\textsuperscript{111} Because he exclusively focuses on $X$ and $Y$ at the expense of $C$, Wendt concludes that constitutive theorisation is inherently “static”; Wendt 1999, 185. This view is wrong because by looking at how $C$ brings about $Y$ from $X$, constitutive analysis offers a fundamentally dynamic research strategy.
\textsuperscript{112} Fierke 2002.
4. Summary and Illustration:

Studying Security Communities along the Subjectivist-Objectivist Continuum

The methodical practice of subjectivism entices the analyst to do research moving along an induction-deduction continuum, with an explicit awareness of the gains and trade-offs associated with each movement. In its first phase, research is conducted as inductively as possible, bearing in mind of course that perfect induction is impossible. The objective is to recover agents’ understandings in order to obtain an insider perspective on social life. At this point, practical logics are especially well recovered and meanings are interpreted bottom-up. But inductive analysis is often embroiled in commonsense and misses the larger picture of social life, both intersubjectively and historically. In a second step, research moves away from subjective knowledge in an attempt to objectify it. The goal is to put meanings in their intersubjective context—cultural, intertextual, and practical. While this interpretive operation inevitably distorts practical logics, it also offers tremendous gains: meanings do not belong to anyone anymore but become part of an intersubjective web inside of which every text or practice refers and stands in relation to others. The “whole” of meanings begins to make sense.

Third, research introduces time in order to historicize meanings. The theoretical narratives and conceptual categories that are used to make sense of history yield a certain degree of abstraction and even generalization (cf. section D below). At this point, practical logics have been rationalized and sometimes even bent out of shape. But such is the price to pay for standing back from commonsense and denaturalize it. Although objectified knowledge is partly out of sync with agents’ worlds, it allows the researcher to learn something other than what agents already know by connecting subjective meanings with context and history.

The methodical practice of subjectivism does not necessitate following the three steps in strict order. Instead, each step should mutually enlighten the others, leading the researcher to move back and forth between them. For instance, while recovering subjective meanings (step 1) clearly helps putting them in context (step 2), it can be just as useful to put meanings in motion (step 3) to recover a number of subjective meanings (step 1) that may have first gone unnoticed. Subjectivism combines, in an abductive and systematic manner, subjective meanings with contextualizing and historicizing interpretations so as to develop subjectivist-with-an-O knowledge about social and international life.

Yet doing academic research is by nature a practice that cannot be fully grasped by reading methodology textbooks or stylized exposés like this one. Ultimately, it has to be learned
in and through practice, as a form of “scientific habitus,” by going to the village and putting the methods to work. Given this limitation, it seems useful to briefly illustrate what a sobjectivist methodology would look like in practice with the case of the study of security communities. Security communities are groups of states whose peoples have developed dependable expectations of peaceful change, that is, neither the expectation of, nor the preparation for mutual military violence. In other words, a security community is the scientific name for the social fact that laymen would call, quite simply, interstate peace. Interestingly, as a social fact a security community exists in the form of subjective meanings (dependable expectations of peaceful change), of an intersubjective context of interstate relations (a discourse of community), as well as in motion in time (a shared track record of non-violent settlement of disputes). Here is how sobjectivism and its plurality of methods can illuminate the study of international peace.

First, a security community exists in the form of subjective meanings held by actors. As Adler and Barnett argue, such meanings take the form of dependable expectations of peaceful change, that is, reasonable beliefs that interstates disputes will be resolved without (threats to) resort to war. Here the added value of sobjectivism for the research program appears most clearly since many (if not all) students of security communities have paid very little attention to agents’ subjective understandings of the social fact of peace. This is problematic; if a social fact such as peace exists, it is because many people think and act accordingly. As I argued above, different methods can help recover subjective meanings. On the one hand, if one follows Adler and Barnett’s elite-centered framework, qualitative interviewing probably holds the best prospects (the sensitivity of security and defense matters usually precludes the researcher from being able to attend, let alone participate in, high-level meetings of diplomats and government officials). Interviews help recover how security practitioners think about their relationship with their counterparts from other states. They also allow a better understanding of the policy options that security elites examine in front of a dispute. Government officials and diplomats from foreign affairs and defense departments as well as senior servants from international organizations are possible interviewees who can provide an insider perspective. In case such people have died, subjective meanings can also be recovered from primary materials such as cables, meeting notes, memoranda, and records of governmental meetings. This is the path taken by Milliken to study the social construction of an insecurity community on the Korean
peninsula. Starting from the premise that “a strategy of interpretive research is required to study in detail how the subjects in question constructed understandings of their interactions,” she inductively recovers how the meanings of the Korean War were constructed by American and Chinese policymakers.

On the other hand, if one prefers Deutsch’s transnational focus to Adler and Barnett’s elitism, then more ethnographic methods can be put to work to recover the subjective meanings of a security community. For instance, participant observation can be performed inside intergovernmental networks, NGOs, transnational technical cooperation programs, business organizations, cultural associations, etc. Ordinary everyday transborder interactions also lend themselves to some form of ethnomethodological inquiry. Compared to interviews, these methods have the advantage of inquiring into not only what people think but also what they do. Practices convey subjective meanings that clearly deserve to be analyzed in order to better understand security communities. In this connection, Adler studies OSCE and NATO practices to understand how they foster the “spread” of the Euro-Atlantic security community.

Second, a security community exists in the form of an intersubjective context of interstate interaction grounded in a collective identity. The subjective meanings held by actors do not come out of thin air but stand in reference to a larger discourse of community. Thanks to discourse analysis, collective identification can be traced in a variety of texts such as official speeches, political debates, the media, literature and cinema. The objective is to understand the various collective representations that are circulated inside societies and state structures. As Deutsch et al. put it: “Did influential people in all parts of the wider area believe that a firm sense of community existed throughout its territories?” Of course, identities are never consensual but always contested. It may thus be useful for the discourse analyst to “map” this intersubjective field thanks to objectifying categories that discern political dynamics.

The intersubjective context of a security community is comprised of more than a collective identity, however. Other webs of meanings play a crucial role in sustaining a discourse of community. For instance, a common security culture—an intersubjective system of meanings about international threats and their required solutions—provides a shared language to

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115 That being said, a subjectivist inquiry needs to take seriously the double hermeneutics, something Deutsch’s behavioralism did not allow. For instance, his crude quantification of mail flows among countries of the North Atlantic area does not go very far in recovering subjective meanings.
117 Deutsch et al. 1957, 32.
118 E.g., Hopf 2002.
deal with the world external to the security community. In this connection, Wæver looks at specific speech acts of “securitization” to explain shifts from one identity narrative to another in Western Europe and how they transformed insecurity into “asecurity.”119 In addition, the compatibility of major values supplies a basis upon which to make like-minded political decisions. Similar economic and political institutions also facilitate interactions and mutual recognition. Finally, there are reasons to believe that cultural, social and religious proximity may catalyze a discourse of community such as “the ASEAN way.”120 The analysis of these intersubjective structures helps objectify the subjective meanings held by practitioners as well as the discourse of community that sets the background to their interaction. Finally, discursive formations can also be put in the context of more “material” practices such as the allocation of defense resources, military planning and institutionalized procedures of collective decision-making.

Third, a security community is comprised of intersubjective meanings that are deeply historical. The social fact of peace, in other words, rests on a set of meanings whose evolution in time can be traced. Of course, chances are that a variety of narratives are already circulated as part of political discourse. For instance, Fierke documents how the metaphor of a “transatlantic family” was repeatedly used to surmount the many crises inside the security community.121 Sobjectivism’s third step entices the researcher to build an explanatory narrative that organizes a sequence of discourses and practices around a plot—constitutive, causal, or otherwise. For example, Milliken historicizes the social construction of the Korean War as a temporal sequence of rounds of interaction and meaning-making.122 Her empirical demonstration shows American and Chinese policymakers “speaking” to one another in real historical time. In a similar fashion, Janice Bially Mattern conceptualizes the Suez crisis as a series of linguistic narratives whereby representational force fastened Anglo-American identity.123 Episodes of “Terror” and “Exile” (forceful linguistic practices) successively force order back onto the unsettled security community. More conventionally, Acharya supplies a historical examination of the development of interstate norms in Southeast Asia on the premise that “[t]he most important question about norms is not only what they are but also where do they come from.”124

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120 Acharya 2001.
121 Fierke 1997.
123 Mattern 2005.
124 Acharya 2001, 47.
Although they do not use the notion of constitutive mechanisms, two students of security communities come close to the reworked version of process-tracing advocated above. First, Adler develops a narrative of the OSCE as a security-community-building institution based on the practice of cooperative security as constitutive of peace.\textsuperscript{125} It is the extension of this practice to new statespeople that comes to constitute we-feeling. Second, Wæver builds on his securitization theory to argue that desecuritizing speech acts in post-1945 Western Europe led to a situation of “asecurity” that proved particularly conducive to security community.\textsuperscript{126} These two objectifying narratives present the important advantage of yielding a few concepts which can possibly travel to other cases.

This short illustration intends to show what a sobjectivist methodology would look like in practice. While a number of students of security communities have fruitfully applied its second and third steps, to date none has grounded the analysis in the subjective meanings held by practitioners. As a result, the research program suffers from a representational bias that entices the researcher to look at security communities “from above,” as an \textit{opus operatum} instead of a \textit{modus operandi} (cf. chapter II). The practical logic of a security community—what it means for a political agent to be part of security community, and how these meanings inform her practices—is thereby lost. By combining subjective and objectifying knowledge, sobjectivism promises to throw a new light on security communities, or any matter of interest in IR and political sociology in general.

\textbf{D. ON VALIDITY: ENGAGING MAINSTREAM METHODOLOGY}

In developing a methodology specifically geared toward the constructivist style of reasoning, the objective is not only to systematize and lend coherence to the practice of constructivist research but also to foster methodological dialogue with other IR perspectives. Arguably, the development of a consistent research \textit{modus operandi} is a necessary preliminary step for constructivism to be able to engage mainstream IR works. This chapter sought to clarify constructivism’s methodological requirements—induction, interpretation and historicization—in order to make comparative assessment with non-constructivist studies easier. To be sure, there will always remain an element of incommensurability in interparadigmatic conversations: positivism and its subject-object distinction, for instance, cannot accommodate the

\textsuperscript{125} Adler 1998.
\textsuperscript{126} Waever 1998.
postfoundationalist premise that reality and knowledge are mutually constitutive. And yet, methodology and the actual practice of research offer promising ways to move beyond metaphysical debates in IR in order to attain not synthesis but “mutual epistemic legibility.”

Mutual epistemic legibility can be enhanced by contrasting the meanings that constructivists and mainstream social scientists generally attribute to shared methodological standards, the most important of which is validity. What makes a given social scientific work more valid than others? Many positivists rely on a correspondence theory of truth according to which the validity of an explanation derives from matching reality in words. However, this mirror view of social science is unacceptable from a constructivist perspective: if reality and the knowledge that constitutes it are both socially constructed, then it makes no sense to contrast a supposedly independent reality with scientific knowledge. Instead, several constructivists conceive of validity as an intersubjective category defined and contested inside a style of reasoning without the arbitration of Nature or Reality. As a result, validity in social sciences is assessed in a similar way to establishing “truth” and “facts” in a courtroom. This understanding of validity is at the very heart of interpretivism, as Ricoeur explains: “Validation is an argumentative discipline comparable to the juridical procedures of legal interpretation. It is a logic of uncertainty and of qualitative probability.”

Now positivists may be inclined to reply that in a court, “objective facts” ultimately settle the truth from false accounts. But that is precisely the point: what counts as an objective fact, and what does not, depends very much upon reasoning along the legalistic style into which lawyers and judges are socialized. Objectivity and validity are not the primordial properties of certain facts or theories: they are socially devised criteria upon which an epistemic community happens to agree.

Positivists also link validity to the issue of falsification. In Karl Popper’s famous argument, a theoretical statement is valid insofar as it can be shown wrong. The assertion “all swans are white,” for instance, can be falsified by the discovery of a black swan. But this stylized model idealizes the practice of academic research. In the IR discipline, very few theories (if any at all) have been discarded in the face of discrepant evidence. This is due to what Willard Quine dubbed the under-determination of theory by facts: “Since theory is involved in deciding what the facts are, there is room for choice when deciding whether the

127 Rudolph 2004.
130 Popper 1989.
theory at stake is consistent with them.”\textsuperscript{131} Whether one deals with discourses or with coefficients, interpretation and inference are irreducibly part of social science, rendering Popperian falsification impossible. Nonetheless, many constructivists still believe that a scientific explanation can be shown wrong (in relative terms) thanks to academic debate and reinterpretation. The Rashomon effect notwithstanding, constructivist studies are “replicable” since the data that is used for research (interview transcripts, policy documents, official speeches, etc.) can and should be made available for reinterpretation by others.\textsuperscript{132} It is academic competition, not dialogue with nature, that helps refine our knowledge about the world: “The fact that scientific producers have as their only clients their most rigorous and vigorous competitors—and hence those most inclined and able to lend to their critique their full strength—is the one Archimedean point upon which scientifically to see reason in scientific reason, to rescue scientific reason from relativistic reduction without having to call in a founding miracle.”\textsuperscript{133}

Another traditional way to assess validity is \textit{generalizability}: can the findings travel from one case to another? From a constructivist perspective, the time is ripe to abandon the old dream of discovering nomothetic laws in social sciences: human beings are reflexive and intentional creatures who do not simply obey external laws. Nonetheless, there exist certain patterns and regularities in social life that many constructivists are keen to analyze. As Price and Reus-Smit correctly point out, “rejecting the pursuit of law-like generalizations does not entail a simultaneous rejection of more contingent generalizations.”\textsuperscript{134} Such contingent generalizations usually derive from the abstracting power of concepts: by simplifying reality through idealization, concepts such as constitutive mechanisms, for example, allow for analogies across cases. Conceptual analogies are by definition under-specified as they cannot fully put up with contingency. Consequently, the crucial point while drawing contingent generalizations is to be explicit about their boundaries of applicability.\textsuperscript{135} Inside these boundaries, subjectivism may even yield to some small-scale, quasi-predictions through one of two paths. On the one hand, “forward reasoning” and the development of plausible scenarios helps narrow down the set of future possibilities.\textsuperscript{136} On the other hand, by focusing on explaining \textit{change} inside a delimited

\textsuperscript{131} Hollis and Smith 1990, 55.
\textsuperscript{132} Hopf 2002, 27.
\textsuperscript{133} Bourdieu 2001, 108.
\textsuperscript{134} Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 275.
\textsuperscript{135} Hopf 2002, 30.
\textsuperscript{136} Bernstein, Lebow, Stein, and Weber 2000.
social situation, one needs not predict every single development, but only those that are likely to deviate from an observed pattern.\footnote{Welch 2005, 28.}

Contrary to positivism, from a constructivist point of view there cannot be such a thing as the valid interpretation or theory. Since there is no transcendental way to adjudicate among competing interpretations, validity never is a black-or-white matter; it is all shades of gray. Inside a style of reasoning, validation is a deliberative activity whereby judgments evolve in combination with (though on a different level than) their own criteria. In order to convey the historicity of scientific reason, the best criterion to assess the relative validity of an interpretation is its incisiveness, that is, its capacity to “see further” than previous interpretations. As Geertz explains: “A study is an advance if it is more incisive—whatever that may mean—than those that preceded it; but it less stands on their shoulders than, challenged and challenging, runs by their side.”\footnote{Geertz 1973, 25.} Obvious from this quotation is that incisiveness is neither a primordial nor a universal criterion; it is both space- and time-dependent. Indeed, the degree of incisiveness of an interpretation hinges not only on its substance but also on its audience. In this regard, this chapter argues that it is the appropriate combination of experience-near and experience-distant concepts that generates interpretations that not only make sense to people, scientists and laymen alike, but also “add sense” to already held interpretations. It is this supplementary meaning, due to the objectification of subjective meanings, that leads to an increased degree of incisiveness. An interpretation is all the more incisive (and therefore valid) that it strikes a fine balance between subjective and objectified knowledge.

Overall, the constructivist style of reasoning and subjectivism in particular are animated by a quite similar logic of discovery as the one that drives positivistic methodologies. In Imre Lakatos’ famous argument, progressive research programs are those that lead to the discovery of “novel facts.”\footnote{Lakatos 1970.} Like a good positivist, Lakatos probably had in mind hard facts that lead to universal Truth. I propose to adopt a more down-to-earth, low-key attitude with regards to scientific discovery. What a refined level of incisiveness and the methodical practice of subjectivism help discover is, quite simply, a combination of subjective and objectified knowledge that makes more sense of international politics than previous interpretations. That incisiveness, however, is situated intersubjectively speaking. Social science is not as universal
as eulogists of the Enlightenment would like it to be, but it is no less worth pursuing to better understand the pressing matters of world politics. It is precisely to that world that I now turn.

E. THE CASE STUDY: METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS

In the second part of this study, I will apply the theoretical and methodological frameworks elaborated in chapters II and III to the case of Russia-NATO relations after the end of the Cold War. Chapter IV seeks to recover practical logics (the first sobjectivist step) and begins a micro-analysis of security practices (step 2). Chapters V and VI further contextualize the meanings of NATO-Russia interactions (step 2) and set them in motion over the post-Cold War era (step 3). In my sobjectivist research design, the former chapter leans toward the subjective and synchronic side of social life, whereas the latter belongs to objectification and diachrony. In the spirit of abduction, however, in both chapters I put practical logics in dialogue with objectified knowledge. For instance, my discussion of hysteresis effects in chapters V and VI should be read as an objectification exercise based in part on dispositions and other subjective meanings.

A key premise of sobjectivism and practice theory in general is that in order to understand a different lifeworld, one must “go to the village” so as to immerse oneself directly and interact with those who inhabit this world. Induction and the recovery of practical logics (or background knowledge) is thus the required first step in social scientific research. In an ideal world, my research design would have relied on participant observation in order to recover practical logics at the NRC. Unfortunately, the field of international security retains a rather unique aura of secrecy that is nowhere else matched in social life. Diplomacy may have gone public since the days of Metternich, but most decisions related to “high politics” are still taken behind closed (and usually well guarded) doors. NATO’s military committee, for instance, is not ready to welcome a participant observer in its ranks. And yet, my first intent was precisely to be able to integrate myself into the NATO organization for a few months and attend the key meetings with Russian diplomats. Since the content of NRC meetings is scrupulously kept secret, however, I quickly realized that this road was not practicable.

\[140\] The issue of corporate agency is a very thorny one which I cannot fully address here. In this study, I refer to states (e.g., Russia) or IOs (e.g., NATO) as corporate agents in the narrow sense that their institutional existence gives birth to similar habitus across officials and practitioners who work within/for them. In other words, states are not people—but as social configurations they produce dispositional similarities that tend to give the illusion of corporate agency.
As an alternative, I had to resort to a second-best (and only partly ethnographic) method: qualitative interviewing. This method is obviously excellent for recovering subjective meanings and reconstructing the world as it exists from the practitioners’ point of view. As I already explained in this chapter, however, interviews can only take practice theory some distance because they mostly convey representational knowledge. By definition, they put the interviewee in an observer position (of their own practices) instead of that of a doer. As I showed in chapter II, chefs do not explain their recipes the same way they perform them. For that reason, background knowledge (dispositions) must be distilled from verbal accounts. Throughout my interviews I accomplished this task by using two main “tricks.” First, I devised my semi-directed questionnaire so as to indirectly “unearth” the background knowledge of Russia-NATO relations. For instance, I would submit various scenarios to interviewees and ask them how they would react to such a situation. From their answers, I could often infer tacit assumptions and practical logics. Second, in my interviews I devoted much attention to the practical activities performed on an everyday basis by my interviewees. I would subtly entice them to thickly describe daily interactions with their Russian or Atlantic counterparts, NRC diplomatic negotiations, military-to-military cooperation, and all sorts of innocuous activities that fill their daily life as a security practitioner. This way, I was able to learn a lot about what NRC practitioners do, in and through practice, even though I could not attend their meetings. In other words, I supplemented interview data with a micro-analysis of security practices at the NRC.

My interview questionnaire was semi-directed in the sense that although I had a list of issues I wanted to touch on, I was prepared to follow interviewees in whatever direction they might want to take. Most of the time, interviews consisted of informal conversations articulated around a set of core questions. These questions slightly evolved through the interview process, which stretched over fifteen months. Although the subject area remained exactly the same, I obviously built on experience to improve my interviewing skills. In and through practice, I learned better ways to phrase my points and react to my interviewees’. Prior to conducting key interviews, I had first tested my questionnaire during a preliminary visit to Canadian Foreign Affairs in Ottawa. My cultural competence, to borrow Neumann’s phrase, was obviously best with fellow citizens. There I discovered how unsettling interviews can be for a beginner, because it is difficult to translate academic problems in practical language but also because officials often respond with unexpected things, do not construe questions the way they were meant, or simply look unimpressed by the research. Interviewing really is a practical skill and I can confidently say I improved a lot in and through the process.
In total, I conducted sixty-nine interviews with security officials and experts in Moscow, Brussels, Washington, London, Berlin and Ottawa between February 2006 and May 2007. Weeks prior to departure, I would usually skim official websites and documents searching for names to contact for interviews. I would then write request letters and, upon receiving a positive reply, set appointments via email. Once on the spot, I would ask interviewees whether they could give me a few names among their colleagues whom I should also meet. This is what ethnographers call the snowball effect and it generally worked quite well in Western institutions. Overall, Western practitioners seemed quite happy to talk with researchers as they appreciated getting academic attention on their job. I ran into a very different situation in Russia. In preparation for my two-month stay during the summer of 2006, I had taken Russian language classes that allowed me to read simple texts and conduct basic conversations. My skills were insufficient to conduct interviews only in Russian, however, so I mailed bilingual request letters. Contrary to my expectations, however, my difficulty in getting to talk with Russian officials did not stem primarily from language—elites have a thorough knowledge of foreign languages in Moscow—but from cultural differences. Without falling victim to Western stereotypes about Russia, the notion that Russian organizational ways are somewhat “Byzantine” —secretive and mysterious—held true in my limited experience. Trivial steps such as finding civil servants’ names and phone numbers proved extremely arduous tasks in Russia. Those few Russian officials whom I was able to contact often turned down my requests out of unease or fear for their career. I was relieved to learn from Russian experts that they routinely encounter similar problems.

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In view of this hurdle, I resorted to a number of “proxies” of Russian officials, in the form of think tank directors, academic institute members, and senior consultants who take part in Russian foreign policy-making at some distance. This is only a second-best solution and it certainly constitutes a serious limitation in a study that focuses on practicality. But given the

141 To borrow an expression used by a Russian interviewee.

142 As the deputy director of the Institute for the Study of Canada and the US (ISKRAN) told me bluntly: “They will not talk to you. They will not talk to you! Because from the point of view of communications with the West, we are back almost in the Soviet times. I’m free because I’m not a government officer. But they [Foreign Affairs officials] fear it. People from my staff need to communicate with Foreign Affairs, and it’s always very, very hard.” Equally telling, political scientists describe in an academic journal the peculiar difficulties of interviewing political elites in Russia: “First, the simple process of locating respondents and agreeing on a time for an interview is complicated by the fluidity of the political environment and the newness of various political institutions. For example, deputies in the Russian Duma often worked without receptionists and/or answering machines. Second, some respondents may be less familiar with the interview process than elites in advanced industrial democracies. This no doubt contributed to the greater apprehension about the interviews that we observed among the civil servants. Third, respondents in more politically unstable environments may be a good deal more suspicious about the goals and purposes of the research project. Hence, the process of gaining access to respondents in Russia and then winning their confidence requires some special attention”; Rivera, Kozyreva and Sarovskii 2002, 684.
peculiar difficulties of reaching Russian practitioners, I can only acknowledge (and regret) that in what follows, the Russian practical perspective is not as represented as I had wished it would be.

In deciding the number of interviews that I should do, I used two main methods. First, on the Western side I selected a representative sample of countries and organizations. To begin with, I centred on the four core NATO countries whose voices are louder than any other at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) table: the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany. These countries’ heightened authority stems from a number of reasons, including their expansive military reach, their economic strength, as well as their political history. In this spirit I visited the foreign ministries and defense departments in Washington, London and Berlin (I had to cancel my trip to Paris at the last minute for family reasons). I also wanted to include other countries: I picked Canada as representative of smaller founding members, and Poland and Lithuania as newer members big and small. I visited Ottawa and arranged interviews with members of the Polish and Lithuanian delegations to NATO in Brussels. At the Alliance headquarters (HQ), I also met with several international civil servants and military officers so as to better understand the institutional perspective. The officials I met (both junior and senior) worked in a variety of NATO sections, including operations, partnership, policy, and public outreach. Finally, in order to grasp the specificities of the NATO point of view, I also met with a few international civil servants from the EU (on EU-Russia relations) and State Department (on U.S.-Russia cooperation in disarmament). Although this sample is far from covering all the political agents involved in NATO-Russia dealings, it can be considered fairly representative because it includes a variety of countries and organizations.

In order to get as exhaustive a picture as possible, I employed a second method based on what ethnographers call the “saturation point”—basically, the moment when the interviewer gets “bored” because additional interviews do not add significantly new insights to what has been discussed in previous meetings. After a number of interviews, I would usually conclude that I had grasped an important chunk of the shared background knowledge I was looking for. Of course, as will become clear in chapter IV, in doing interviews I was not looking for truth but for practical logics. My objective was to reconstruct NATO-Russia dealings as they exist from the practitioners’ point of view—not from some god’s-eye perspective. This raises a different kind of validity issues than in positivism. Generally speaking, I tried to probe discrepant views across my interviews but did not discount any as simply false. I do emphasize those story lines that I heard more often than others, but I also note more heterodox views. In fact, at times I
would even hear fairly different versions from inside the same building, just walking from one
door to the next. Such, indeed, is the messiness and fluidity of intersubjectivity in social and
political life.

Given that my focus in this study is on background knowledge, however, it is clear that
my interviews served to record shared assumptions more than idiosyncratic opinions. This is not
a study of partisan politics in which I would interview politicians from opposing factions to
understand ideological debates. As interesting as this approach would be, in this research I
attempt to study the unsaid and the tacit—the “ground swell” of Russian-Atlantic relations, that
is, the deeper trends that inform its evolution underneath the “sea foam” of high politics and
rhetorical skirmishes. This approach derives from my focus on the logic of practicality. In that
context, interviewing international organization (IO) and foreign ministry officials as well as
defence officers appeared the best way to capture the practical logics that cement practitioners
across the board. After all, it is the gist of this research project to reconstruct a common stock of
background knowledge from which differences become possible.

Let us now turn to chapters V and VI (steps 2 and 3 of my subjectivist methodology) and
the peculiar methodological challenges that they raise. In my attempt to historicize Russian-
Atlantic relations, I had to narrow down my research and pick a specific issue area of
interaction. Because it constitutes one of the key structuring axes of contemporary world
politics, the post-Cold War relationship between Russia and the TSC is too vast and
multidimensional to be entirely covered in one single study. Even after the end of the Cold War,
this relationship remains unique in ranging from the G8’s nuclear disarmament program to
World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations through global governance at the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). Be it the Middle East peace process or the Kyoto protocol, Russian-
Atlantic political dynamics are parts and parcel of almost any issue of interest on the global
stage. Consequently, the researcher has no choice but to narrow down the domain of inquiry
without, of course, losing sight of the larger picture. The challenge is to select an issue-area that
is both theoretically and empirically pregnant.

Divided along a chronological logic, chapters V and VI trace the evolution of practices
among Russian and NATO security elites around the question of the Alliance’s “double
enlargement.”143 Starting in 1994, faced with demands from democratizing central European
governments and with the bloodshed in Yugoslavia, NATO undertook a series of unprecedented

143 The expression was first used in Asmus 1997.
institutional transformations that were to expand both its membership (geographical enlargement) and its missions (functional enlargement). Significantly, over the last fifteen years, NATO’s double enlargement has consistently been the most difficult bone of contention between Russia and the Alliance. It has never left the agenda and has been the key driving force behind the many ups and downs of the relationship. At the time of writing, the double enlargement remained one of the thorniest problems among the former enemies. In other words, having occupied the centre stage of the relationship, the selected issue is empirically very salient for understanding larger political dynamics. Given its continued presence in the news, understanding Russian-Atlantic dealings over the double enlargement also proves to be particularly policy-relevant.

In terms of research design, Russian-Atlantic dealings over NATO’s double enlargement constitute a “hard case” for the ToPoSC I outlined in chapter II. Similar to Harry Eckstein’s notion of “least-likely case,” a hard case is a series of interconnected practices that should, in principle, be difficult to account for within the rubric of a given theoretical narrative. While Eckstein and others conceive of least-likely cases as means to validate theories, however, in my non-positivistic research design selecting a hard case is simply meant to demonstrate the incisiveness of the theory as convincingly as possible. Put differently, by selecting a case study on the basis of its counterintuitiveness, the researcher can illuminate new or at least under-researched aspects of world politics. In the Russian-Atlantic case, my attempt to recover practical logics in 2006 makes for a hard case because so many thorny disagreements plagued the relationship at the time. One can think of the fallout from the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, the colour revolutions in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (especially in Georgia and Ukraine, but also in Central Asia), the American BMD project in Central Europe, the row over the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, the disputes about Kosovo’s future, and the clashing views on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear facilities. To ascertain the self-evidence of diplomacy in such a difficult political context is, I hope, more convincing than picking an easy case.

Concretely, in chapters V and VI I combine discourse and practice analysis to analyse the evolution of Russian-Atlantic power relations over the post-Cold War era. In the Foucaultian tradition, I treat discourse as practice, that is, as a social performance. Since I am primarily interested in intersubjectivity (sobjectivism’s step 2), the beliefs or intentions behind discourse

144 Eckstein 1975.
145 Cf. Brady and Collier 2004; George and Bennett 2005.
are less important, analytically, than the public utterance itself. In addition to discourse as practice, I also centre my analytical focus on the various actions taken by NATO (and its member states) and Russia with regards to the double enlargement. I interpret these practices at the intersubjective level, that is, as part of a larger web of meaningful action that is spun over time by the agents involved. Since I am interested in official diplomatic interaction between the Russian state and the NATO organization, I circumscribed my analysis to high-level officials (i.e., senior government or organization members). Because my analysis focuses on Russian reactions, I supplemented these data with a discourse analysis of the most important op-ed pieces by foreign policy experts and opinion-makers in Moscow. To access the data, I used official portals on the Internet as well as the search engines of key newspapers’ archives. In the West, I used the New York Times and, subsidiarily, the Guardian. For the Russian side, I primarily used the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (CDPSP) and, subsidiarily, the Moscow Times. Note that CDPSP contains exhaustive digests of Russian-language newspapers translated in English by Eastview experts. It covers all the most important Russian publications, including Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Izvestia, Kommersant, Sevodnia, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Moskovskiy Novostei, Trud, etc. Overall, I collected a few thousand Russian articles in order to get as incisive a grasp as possible of Russian practical and discursive reactions to NATO’s double enlargement.

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146 In Hansen’s useful terminology, my discourse analysis conforms to model 1 (analytical focus: official discourse; object of analysis: official texts and direct and secondary intertextual links); Hansen 2006, 64.

147 Most of the official documentation has been accessed through the following websites: NATO (www.nato.int), the Kremlin (www.kremlin.ru), the Russian Foreign Ministry (www.mid.ru), the American State Department (www.state.gov) and White House (www.whitehouse.gov), and to a lesser extent from British, French, German, Canadian national websites, as well as from the UN portal.
PART II

THE POWER POLITICS OF RUSSIA-NATO DIPLOMACY
Chapter IV

THE LOGIC OF PRACTICALITY AT THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL

This chapter approaches Russian-Atlantic security relations from the practitioners’ point of view. To this end, it reconstructs insider knowledge at the NRC and its surroundings in 2006. By grasping the practical logics as they play themselves out during Russian-Atlantic security interactions on the ground, the chapter counters the representational bias. In terms of my sobjectivist methodology, I perform the first step, which consists of the recovery of subjective meanings. This I do mainly thanks to two methods. First, the chapter builds on sixty-nine qualitative interviews with security practitioners and experts in Ottawa, Brussels, Moscow, Washington, London and Berlin. These very rich data, comprised of hundreds of transcript pages and ethnographic notes, are complemented with a second method that can conveniently be called practice analysis. In the spirit of participant observation (which could not be performed due to secrecy constraints), I use a micro focus on what Russian and NATO security officials do together at the NRC, in order to distil background knowledge from joint actions and respective practices. Where warranted, I also consider official declarations as discursive practices and add them to the subjective data gathered on the field and through practice analysis. In fine, this chapter not only takes the first sobjectivist step in full, it also begins to take the second step by contextualizing 2006 meanings at the NRC.

In order to evaluate the extent to which diplomacy was embodied by 2006 security practitioners at the NRC, I devise a set of three empirical indicators. Note that these indicators were developed abductively, by putting in dialogue preliminary empirical findings and early interview data with the theoretical framework put forward in chapter II. In my sobjectivist research design, empirical and theoretical materials mutually enlighten one another. Although I obviously began my fieldwork with some notions of what it may mean, in practice, to be at peace, as well as with an outline of a theoretical framework, in the course of the interview process I did revise my understanding based on the practical logics collected from interviewees. At the epistemological level, then, the indicators are located between the conceptual abstraction yielded by my ToPoSC and the inductive content of interview data. In terms of substance, the three indicators cannot be said to be “mutually exclusive” in the sense that they intersect in many ways. Their heuristic value is in organizing the vast amount of information collected across my several dozen interviews. Taken together, the indicators reveal the degree of self-evidence of the non-violent settlement of disputes.
Table 4.1 Three Indicators of the Embodiment of Diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Assessment Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Disappearance of the possibility of using force</td>
<td>How present is military violence in the security practitioners’ horizon of possibility? Do practitioners entertain scenarios of mutual confrontation? Are there mutual perceptions of threat? What means could practitioners conceivably use to alter the other party’s course?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Normalization of disputes</td>
<td>What is the nature of mutual disputes? Do practitioners have dependable expectations that future disagreements can be solved peacefully? What lessons do practitioners draw from past and present disputes? How do practitioners handle disagreements and search for their resolution?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Daily cooperation on the ground</td>
<td>What is the nature and focus of practitioners’ daily interactions? What kind of background knowledge do routine practices embody? Do enacted practices foreclose certain courses of interaction? What institutional forms or routines do daily interactions take?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chapter’s main finding is that in 2006, diplomacy was the normal but not the self-evident way to solve disputes in Russian-Atlantic dealings. In other words, security practitioners on both sides had embodied the non-violent settlement of disputes as “the way to go”—although not the only way to go. In terms of a security community in and through practice, then, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, most of the time security officials at (and around) the NRC think from diplomacy and not about its opportunity. This is congruent with the empirical analysis that I presented in chapter I, according to which, by Adler and Barnett’s indicators, a nascent security community seems to be emerging. No doubt my practical data confirm that there has been a sea change since the Cold War era, clearly in the direction of pacification. I provide ample evidence that diplomacy was something of a normal or ordinary practice in Russia-NATO relations in the sense that it did not stand out as unusual in any way. But on the other hand, a number of dispositions mitigate the embodiment of the non-violent settlement of disputes. Applying the three indicators in turn, I discover that the disappearance of the possibility of mutual force was countered by a latent mistrust; the normalization of disputes was stymied by the elusiveness of the NRC diplomatic momentum; and daily cooperation on the ground was thwarted by clashing organizational cultures. All in all, although Russia and NATO have undeniably moved away from the insecurity community of the Cold War, my analysis shows that the 2006 Russian-Atlantic relationship still fell short of genuinely meeting the criterion of a security community in and through practice. Though normalized, the diplomatic practice was not self-evident at the NRC in 2006.
The NRC was created in May 2002 to succeed the PJC, a Russia-NATO multilateral forum established in 1997 by the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. The NRC is based at NATO headquarters in Brussels and gathers “as equals” the 26 NATO allies and Russia. Its activities fall along two main dimensions. First, the NRC hosts a standing, multi-sided political dialogue between NATO and Russia on topics as diverse as the fight against terrorism, crisis management, or defence reform. Second, the NRC steers a program of practical activities of military-to-military cooperation, including joint exercises, peacekeeping operations, and seminars on doctrine. At the institutional level, the NRC is supported by a Russian Mission to NATO, including military representatives at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), as well as by a NATO civil and military liaison in Moscow. The NRC meets twice yearly at the minister level, monthly at the ambassadorial level and is supported by regular meetings of its preparatory committee and a host of experts working groups.1

I should try to preempt two potential criticisms from the outset. First, it is true that the very existence of the NRC already indicates that both Russia and NATO member states have at least a willingness to manage their relationship through diplomatic means. It does not, however, demonstrate in and of itself how diplomacy is becoming an ordinary practice in NATO-Russia dealings. After all, innumerable international forums have evolved into empty shells that fail to advance peace in any significant way. Alternatively, organizations such the United Nations (UN) host a diplomatic dialogue that sometimes does not preclude the eruption of violent conflicts among its members. During the 1999 Kosovo conflict, for instance, the PJC was grossly sidelined (cf. chapter VI). The existence of a multilateral forum does not normalize diplomacy in and of itself. Formal diplomatic channels such as the NRC cannot be presumed to rest on the embodiment of diplomacy: this political process must be empirically demonstrated, as this chapter does.

Second, one could argue that diplomacy had already been normalized between the East and the West during the Cold War. I contend that although its roots can be traced back in history, the routinization of diplomacy in NATO-Russia relations is a relatively new phenomenon. Of course, NATO countries and the Soviet Union repeatedly relied on diplomacy

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1 To be sure, Russian-Atlantic security relations are much more complex than what diplomatic interaction at the NRC may ever cover. Therefore, in this chapter I make no claim to present an exhaustive portrait of the relationship between Moscow and the TSC. For one thing, NATO and the TSC are different kinds of entities although they intersect geographically (cf. chapter 1). For another, dealings at the NRC are not fully representative of overall Russian-Atlantic relations because central issues such as Iran, Iraq or North Korea, for example, are not really addressed there. In a study on the logic of practicality inside security communities, however, picking the NRC seems warranted because it is a “security-community-building institution” where Russian and Atlantic practitioners daily interact.
to resolve their disputes during the Cold War. There were even attempts at institutionalizing the practice, for instance through the CSCE process. The existence of a “Soviet-American condominium” based on a shared preference in Washington and Moscow for the bipolar status quo, also created fertile grounds for diplomatic negotiations. But contrary to the current era, during the Cold War decades diplomacy took place in the shadow of nuclear and conventional deterrence. In the back of the minds of the negotiating diplomats loomed the very real possibility of a violent confrontation, a possibility that never really receded for forty years. Threats of force were regularly issued on both sides even as diplomacy was practiced. The agreements that were reached may have been peaceful in nature but the political processes that made them possible, despite the diplomatic semblance, remained grounded in a fundamentally violent pattern of interaction. Such was not the case in 2006, as the following pages demonstrate.

A. INDICATOR 1: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF USING FORCE

Both interview data and practice analysis demonstrate that in 2006, the possibility of violent confrontation was not part of Russian and Atlantic security practitioners’ habitus. This is certainly one of the most important findings of this chapter because it points in a particularly clear fashion to a partial embodiment of the diplomatic practice at the NRC. Generally speaking, security practitioners were not inclined toward the use of force, or threats thereof, in mutual dealings. They did not entertain scenarios of mutual violence either. That said, this peaceful habitus often coexisted with a fairly widespread mistrust on both the Russian and the NATO sides. One Turkish admiral at NATO, for example, insisted that “the capabilities are still there,” unwilling to presume of Russian intentions or actual cooperation.2 Such suspicions suggest that fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the possibility of force had not completely disappeared from Russian-Atlantic dealings.

2 Senior Officer D, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06. Also Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06; and Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
1. “Gone Are the Days of Nuclear Threats and Blackmail” 3

Out of sixty-nine interviews with Atlantic and Russian security practitioners and experts, I heard only four officials affirm that they could not fully exclude the possibility of physical violence in Russian-Atlantic dealings. The overwhelming majority simply ruled out the possibility of a Russian-Atlantic military confrontation, whether asked explicitly or implicitly. “Not a possibility,”⁴ “completely” or “categorically inconceivable,”⁵ “never,”⁶ “absolutely impossible”⁷; these are some of the ways to put it that I have heard most frequently from national delegations and international civil servants. “I can’t see a rise of military violence at all at the moment,” confidently asserted one top-level NATO official.⁸ “We have proceeded from the assumption that we don’t have anything to fear from the Russian side,” concurred a senior German diplomat.⁹ In several interviews, in fact, my feeling was that the question of whether a Russian-Atlantic military clash could still be possible was perceived to be out of place if not close to irrelevant. The interviewees seemed to wonder why I was asking about Russian-Atlantic military violence in the first place; it seemed as though the issue was not even worth considering. As Garfinkel showed, certain questions are simply out of place in terms of practical meanings.¹⁰ That the notion of Russian-Atlantic violence could appear as a displaced question speaks volumes about the embodiment of diplomatic background knowledge at the NRC.

Most practitioners with insider knowledge confidently asserted that scenarios of mutual violence were simply “not part of military and strategic planning and thinking anymore.”¹¹ On the Atlantic side, a senior NATO policymaker with direct connections to the Secretary General (SG) assured me that “[t]here is no planning in NATO, of any kind, that engages Russia as a threat. … We don’t get along with the Russians all that well, but it’s not a problem.” On the Russian side, he added, “I’m quite sure that none of their planning involves defending against a

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3 These words were uttered in 2006 by the State Department chief for Russian affairs; U.S. Department of State (2006), “Discussion on Russia/G8 issues,” Washington, 19 April (www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/65206.htm, accessed 26 September 2006). Note that this chapter focuses on the situation in 2006 and therefore does not cover the return of nuclear deterrence to the fore during the spring of 2007. There is more on this in chapter VII.

4 Official, UK Delegation to NATO, London, 31.03.06.

5 Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06. Also Official, US Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.

6 Senior Official B, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06. Also Senior Official C, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.

7 Expert D, MGIMO, Moscow, 22.06.06.

8 Senior Official F, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.

9 Senior Official, German Foreign Office, Berlin, 14.05.07.

10 Garfinkel’s example is the routine question “How do you feel?” When asked what that question means, subjects in an ethnomethodological experiment appeared at serious loss: the meaning is so taken-for-granted that being interrogated about it is puzzling and even destabilizing. Cf. Garfinkel 1967, 42-43.

11 Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
NATO attack.” To be sure, since the early 1990s the Alliance’s forces have been converted into deployable brigades (for peacekeeping, mainly) that would be of limited use in case of a Russian conventional attack. This practice suggests that the Russian threat has receded from military planning. One State Department official observed a similar move on the Russian side: “Look at their military forces. If they thought the United States was a military threat, they wouldn’t be focusing their military forces on how to win the Chechen war. ... From our perspective, the relationship is demilitarized.” Throughout my interviews in Brussels, I was struck by how widespread this confidence was in the highest echelons of the NATO hierarchy. For instance, national delegates ruled out any sort of military planning targeted against Russia, as did the second general in rank at the NATO military committee. Most strikingly, the chief of the SG’s office went as far as to say that “Russia nowadays looks to the West rather the same way that the United States looks to Mexico or Canada. There are some issues, like soft lumber trade, but it’s basically a very predictable environment.”

Some Atlantic policymakers could still associate a number of potential threats with Russia but none of a military nature. In Washington, a senior policymaker could imagine Russia turning into a threat in any of three ways: by “using energy as a political weapon”; by giving rise to “instability and chaos should the government implode”; and through acts of mischief—“Russia’s newly found assertiveness and post-imperial angst means it can cause a lot of problems as we try to solve things in the international community.” As he concluded: “Notice that military aggression or conflict is not one of the threats. I think Russians would be shocked if they could see inside our minds and NATO planning and realize how little we think about Russia.” A member of the French delegation to NATO similarly affirmed that the only threat he could see coming from Moscow is the implosion of the state. According to the chief of NATO’s Moscow bureau, talk of military confrontation is nothing but “hogwash.”

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12 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06. Also Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06; and Officer, British Ministry of Defence, London, 11.05.07.
13 Senior Official, German Foreign Office, Berlin, 14.05.07; and MacFarlane 2001, 283.
14 Official B, US State Department, Washington, 25.10.06. Notably, however, one top-level Russian diplomat had a different view, affirming that during a visit to the Pentagon in the late 1990s, he was shown maps with American nuclear targets in Russia. Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07.
15 E.g., Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
16 Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
17 Senior Official F, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
18 Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06; also Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
19 Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
20 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06.
Atlantic side, it seems as though the possibility of a military confrontation with Russia was simply not part of the options examined on a daily basis by 2006 security practitioners.

A similar picture emerged from Moscow. For instance, one former military officer asserted that “Russia’s relations with its NATO neighbours are becoming demilitarized. A war between Russia and Germany is as unthinkable today as one between Germany and France.”

In the words of a foremost Russian academic, “negative feelings with respect to the Atlantic community are generated not by apprehensions of hostility or big conflict or nuclear war or whatever. There is nothing or almost nothing of this kind nowadays.”

Especially interesting was the recourse to Russian history to explain this certainty: “There could never be a return to confrontation. Historical experience shows it doesn’t work. Russia has learned the lesson.”

In order to illustrate the impossibility of military confrontation, one senior Russian diplomat used the example of the very serious row over the American project to deploy BMD components on Czech and Polish territory (more on this in chapter VII). During the Cold War, he argued, similar initiatives such as the American deployment of cruise missiles in the early 1980s used to cause further confrontation; but not anymore in 2006. “Now we will sit down, next week, and discuss the issue,” the Russian official said. “We may disagree. We may get sore, both sides, but we are not afraid of war. Nobody’s afraid. If somebody tells you he’s afraid, he’s either lying or he needs to see a head shrink. [Laughter.] I am dead serious. It was my business to know my guys on the left and my guys on the right.”

But if this is indeed the case, why do certain segments of the military establishment still use confrontational language at times? A Russian expert proposed that military officers “don’t perceive NATO as a threat, they just say it. They make scandals and declarations and noise.”

With her voice lowered, she continued that the Russian Chief of General staff had recently confided to her: “Of course, I understand that no threat is coming from the West. But how could we explain this to our population?” Atlantic practitioners agreed that remnants of confrontational rhetoric among the Russian military are to be explained by organizational logics instead of genuine apprehensions. A senior NATO official posted in Moscow opined that “[r]emaining suspicions on the Russian side are rhetorical. It is a discourse that aims to value the

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21 Expert, Carnegie Foundation Russia, Moscow, 13.06.06.
22 Expert A, IMEMO, Moscow, 23.06.06.
23 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06. Note that Putin also made references to this idea in various speeches.
24 Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07. This top-level diplomat had been overseeing Russia’s foreign policy toward the United States for the last two decades.
25 Expert, Centre for European Security, Moscow, 30.06.06.
army, just as it is the case in the United States with the military-industrial complex. Fundamentally a conflict with the West is inconceivable.” For Atlantic practitioners, sticking to the traditional enemy is easier and more efficient in a dramatically underfunded military. Russia’s continuing preoccupation with NATO is “a matter of political convenience. They focus on the familiar, old threat … the boogeyman. It marshals political support among society and justifies expensive weapons procurement.” There was a dependable belief that the possibility of using of force is not actually entertained in military planning. For example, a German colonel who spent years in Moscow confirmed that “the Russian military is not considering having a clash with NATO. They excluded it for the time being.” This view was confirmed by a prominent Russian expert: “Even the most conservative, backward-oriented political forces in Russia could hardly consider ‘Western aggression’ a viable aggression, at least for the immediate and medium-term future.” All in all, it is safe to conclude that in 2006, the possibility of a military clash with NATO member states had considerably receded from Russian practitioners’ horizon of possibility.

Because background knowledge must be read between the lines, I also ascertained whether mutual confrontation was part of the Russian-Atlantic habitus through a variety of indirect means. For instance, I would submit the scenario (very much topical in 2006) that a new colour revolution had taken place in Belarus following the elections: could Russia possibly intervene military to defend the Lukashenko regime, and if so, would NATO take steps to defend demonstrators? Interestingly, a number of officials were convinced that Russia would not use force in such a case in order to avoid confronting the West. A Canadian official was a little more careful: “I think you can never dismiss the Russian potential for the use of force, but the parameters, the limits of Russian policy options are much narrower than they used to be,

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26 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06. Also Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
27 Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06; Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07. This view was confirmed by a top-level Russian diplomat, who pointed out the non-competitive nature of the military-industrial complexes (both Russian and Atlantic) as a factor in prolonging Russian-Atlantic rivalries; Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07.
28 Senior Officer B, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06. The exclusion of force towards NATO was also confirmed by a senior policymaker in Washington with privileged connections to top-level decision-makers in Moscow; Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
29 Baranovsky 2003, 270. Although one cannot look at Russia’s defence plans to ascertain this view, a declaration from General Yuri Baluyevsky, Russia’s Chief of Staff, go in this direction: “We have long since stopped preparing for large-scale nuclear or conventional war”; quoted in Blank 2006, 1; or, “We see no threat from the West”; Andrei Denisov (2002), “What NATO Is,” Vremya Novostei, 29 May, translated in CDPSP 54(22).
30 Senior Officer E, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06; Official, UK Delegation to NATO, London, 31.03.06.
which is a good thing.”

According to another practitioner, even if Russia were to make a move, force would not be used in such a case. But wouldn’t NATO intervene to stop Russia in the event of external mingling? “No. Frankly, no.” Other solutions would be found outside the realm of military threats or violence. More ambivalent, however, was a senior NATO policymaker who declared: “what the reaction would have been I don’t know, but it would have been negative and concrete. Nobody would have let this go.” Noticeably, even this more forceful response remains miles from raising the possibility of a military clash.

On the Russian side, I probed the receding of military scenarios from practitioners’ background knowledge by asking a number of observers what policies could their state implement in reaction to NATO’s open-door policy toward Ukraine—clearly the most serious disagreement at the time of interview (cf. chapter VI for further discussion). A rather hardcore Russian expert who was fiercely opposed to the policy listed a variety of possible reactions, from anti-NATO demonstrations to energy pressures through meddling with Iran. Never did he come close to mentioning threats of force; this seemed to be just beyond his (otherwise edgy) mind. Even pondering such a fundamental dispute, which reaches extremely deep in the Russian psyche, Russian practitioners started their reflection from the assumption of non-violence. Similarly, when asked what tools Russia possesses to oppose the Alliance’s decisions that go against his country’s interest, a Russian official posted in Brussels responded “political dialogue” and “being a reliable partner.” In his mind, “[t]he only way for Russia to influence NATO is to be within [the NRC].”

Overall, then, diplomatic practice seemed on the way to embodiment.

This process finds its roots in the fifteen year-long post-Cold War era, which was characterized by the absence of military confrontation between Russia and NATO. The one episode during which conditions were met for a potential clash—the Pristina airport incident, in June 1999 (cf. chapter VI)—was dismissed as insignificant by one senior Russian diplomat who was directly involved: “That can happen, I don’t know, between Great Britain and France. It wasn’t anything dramatic. … You shouldn’t disregard us if you want us to play along, like with Belgrade and others, like today with Kosovo. But we weren’t close to war over Pristina.

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31 Senior Official A, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.
32 Senior official, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 03.04.06.
33 Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
34 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
35 Expert C, IMEMO, Moscow, 30.06.06
36 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.
wasn’t the best point in our relationship, but it wasn’t dangerous.”\textsuperscript{37} When asked whether the spectre of force ever floated during that period, a Canadian official responded straightforwardly: “No, never; never threats of force. No; never even contemplated. … I think that the pattern has now been set with Russia—that you deal with each other through negotiation. You deal with each other through bringing the Russians into a system of rules and regulations and laws. … That’s the way you deal with it and so, force, that’s pretty well out of the question.”\textsuperscript{38} An American policymaker concurred that “[t]here’s no perception that there’s been any threat to use force on either side.”\textsuperscript{39} One senior British official in charge of defence policy put the matter in a very telling way:

If you want a really good idea of how in my view the world has changed for the better, it is that my predecessors would’ve spent one way or another somewhere in the 70 percent of their time thinking about Russia. I spend less than 5 percent of my time thinking about Russia. That’s 65 percent different—it’s representative of energy put to providing security goods in a more proactive way, in a more beneficial way and not in a senseless way. … I do not spend my time by and large worrying about a Russian threat.\textsuperscript{40}

On the Russian side, Lo similarly concludes that since the end of the Cold War, “[a]t no stage did [Russian foreign policy] countenance armed conflict with the West.”\textsuperscript{41} By 2006 the possibility of mutual force had considerably receded from the practitioners’ point of view.

\section*{2. A Latent Mistrust}

That the possibility of using force (or threats of force) had mostly disappeared from Russian and Atlantic practitioners’ horizon of possibility by 2006 is a huge achievement that cannot be dismissed. Just fifteen years ago, the latent threat of the use of force was the main parameter of Moscow’s relations with NATO. However, interview data and practice analysis also reveal that a non-negligible level of latent mistrust of mutual intentions remains in Russian-Atlantic relations. For instance, one German colonel believed that through its participation in Operation Active Endeavour (more on this below), Russia primarily “wants to gain intelligence”\textsuperscript{42} on NATO. Another Alliance official concurred: “Let’s face it: it gives them a great insight into how we do business, a great intelligence gathering. They now have NATO secret communications on their ships, they see our standard operating procedures, they have our

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\textsuperscript{37} Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07.\\
\textsuperscript{38} Senior Official C, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.\\
\textsuperscript{39} Senior Official B, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.\\
\textsuperscript{40} Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.\\
\textsuperscript{41} Lo 2002, 154.\\
\textsuperscript{42} Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07.
\end{flushright}
doctrine… That’s good stuff if you’re Russia!” Note that this mistrust is undoubtedly reciprocal. For instance, one American officer confided that “in private, many Russian officials ask about hidden motives behind NATO’s willingness to cooperate.” Trust, which is fundamentally a practical sense, formed a thin intersubjective basis for interaction at the 2006 NRC (cf. the concluding section in chapter V).

According to interview data, there seems to be four main sources of mistrust at the NRC. First (and not limited to this case), it is an inherent part of the military habitus to plan for the worst contingencies. Generally speaking, the military officers I interviewed were more careful than civilians in their assessment of the possibility of force in Russian-Atlantic relations. Entertaining worst-case scenarios, after all, is a habit that comes with their job. As a result, they were less prone to forget about the possibility of military confrontation. Here is how a British military officer, now a speechwriter at NATO HQ, put the matter:

I think one has to differentiate between what is a threat and what is a risk. If you say a threat is more immediate, a threat is a combination of capability and intent. Now I would argue that at the moment, Russia still has the capability but not the intent. That is not to say that changes within the Russian Federation, in the future years, might not change this and that the intent would be there as well. But I reckon we would get enough indicators of that to be able to reorient ourselves as necessary. … If the threat is capability and intent, we are not there at the moment. I would say we are at a risk, which is where the capability exists, but the intent—there’s always the potential for it to be re-instantiated, to reappear. But I do not think it will happen and I hope it won’t happen, but as long as there’s the possibility there, one has to protect.

Obvious from this quote is a lower proclivity, from a military point of view, to take anything for granted beyond material capabilities. For the military officers with whom I met, there was no problem whatsoever in acknowledging that in the short term, Russian-Atlantic relations looked all right; but what about the long term? As a consequence of this professional disposition, the embodiment of diplomacy in military circles cannot but be slower. This is not to say that

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43 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06. Another NATO official would recognize the situation but without taking offence: “[The Russians] use NATO simply to know what’s happening. So they’re here, they’re everywhere. They are represented with a lot of diplomats. They try to proliferate meetings. They meet with a lot of people. So what? This is basically information and intelligence gathering that they’re doing here. Which is fine.” Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.

44 Official B, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06.

45 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06. A similar view was also heard at the British Foreign Office: “At the end of the day you always have to ask yourself to what extent will the Russian reaction matter? What can they do to you? I think one of the things I’m trying to say to you is I think people’s appreciation of what Russia can do to us is changing, in terms of causing less pain across a series of issues that do matter to us. It’s just not strategically [significant].” Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.03.07.

46 Officer, British Ministry of Defence, London, 11.05.07.
military officers do not actively cooperate on the ground. In fact, as will become clear in the third section of this chapter, in practice oftentimes officers’ pragmatic minds lead them to develop working relations more easily than do civil servants. Military officers dislike the ups and downs of politics and consequently their approach is usually much more down-to-earth. In this vein, one American NATO official turned my question about the possibility of violence on its head in an attempt to temper his mistrust: “On the possibility of Cold War-like confrontation, one needs to be cautious. But what really is unthinkable is the fact that Russia is now at NATO HQ!”

A second source of Russian-Atlantic latent mistrust is, quite obviously, the decades of Cold War confrontation. To be sure, decades of confrontation cannot but leave stigmas in habitus. These stigmas are especially pronounced among Eastern European security practitioners: “we still struggle with the question of whether Russia and the Soviet Union are two different terms or not.” But remnants of confrontation are also widespread in other NATO countries: “Old habits die hard,” as one State Department practitioner readily conceded. One of his colleagues was equally realistic: “I was brought up during the Cold War so I’m still sceptical of the Russians. Russia wants to influence NATO, and the NRC makes mischief-making easier. Russia looks for opportunities to exploit differences among allies.”

Significantly, on the Alliance’s side, this fear that Moscow could “exploit cracks” prolongs the most pervasive concern that NATO members expressed throughout the Cold War. For instance, the CSCE process was long considered with suspicion because engaging Moscow was seen as threatening for NATO’s consensus. According to Ira Strauss, in the post-Cold War era this fear for Alliance consensus has been the foremost stumbling block in creating a new NATO-Russia relationship. My interview data suggest he has got a point.

Reciprocally, Russian practitioners also inherited deeply ingrained dispositions of mistrust towards NATO. A middle-aged professor from one of the most prestigious schools of international relations told me, as if stating the obvious: “Of course NATO’s main duty is to plan war against Russia. This is a well-known fact.” A more reflexive security official

47 Senior Official E, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06.
48 Senior Official A, European Commission, Brussels, 05.04.06.
49 Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
50 Senior Official B, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
51 Officer, British Ministry of Defence, London, 11.05.07.
52 Straus 2003, 234.
53 Expert C, IMEMO, Moscow, 30.06.06.
depicted Cold War stereotypes in Russia “like dead holding the living.” To be sure, Russia’s history of invasions from its western borders has left an important imprint on strategic thinking. On both sides, accusations of “outdated, Cold War-like thinking” abound (a practice that will be discussed below as part of symbolic power struggles). During his tenure as U.S. permanent representative to NATO, Nicholas Burns regretted that “[o]ne abiding legacy of the Cold War has been a deeply entrenched suspicion of NATO’s intentions, especially as the alliance has expanded eastward and struggled to redefine its mission in the post-Soviet world. This feeling of distrust might be best summed up by the idea that, if it is good for NATO, it must be bad for Russia.” Although distrustful dispositions were found in about a third of my interviews, they nonetheless nuance the finding that the possibility of resorting to force is receding from practitioners’ horizon of possibility.

Third, and contrary to what is often assumed, contemporary mistrust among NATO and Russian practitioners is not simply a remnant of the Cold War but also the result of post-Cold War interactions. As chapter V will make clear in ample detail, a number of respective practices have played a major role in thwarting confidence-building. In effect, today’s mistrust in many ways runs deeper than during most of the 1990s. Throughout the post-Cold War era, both NATO and Russia have conducted a number of military interventions or deployments that have heavily affected the quality of the relationship. These practices sparked fears on both sides that the relationship might not be as demilitarized it had been thought. On the Russian side, two such NATO practices have especially curbed the embodiment of diplomacy. First are the two waves of enlargement, with a third still looming (cf. chapters V and VI). For most Russians, NATO’s advances towards the East constitute at least an indirect threat: “without the enlargements the relations would be much better.” Importantly, most Russians believe that enlarging NATO broke a promise made to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 over Germany reunification. An official from the Russian Mission to NATO in Brussels insisted that “Russia assesses capabilities, not intentions. If there is a deployment to the East, it arouses suspicions.” These suspicions have been tamed neither by NATO’s promise not to deploy major military infrastructures on new member states’ territory nor by the normalization of Russia’s relations with the Baltic countries

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54 Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07.
55 Rühl 1997.
57 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
58 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.
and Poland after they joined the Alliance. Quite the contrary: the United States’ announcement in 2005 of a deployment in Bulgaria and Romania was seen as another broken promise,\(^{59}\) as was the air policing of the Baltic countries’ border on the very next day they became members.\(^{60}\) The possibility that Georgia and Ukraine might follow in their steps sparks in Russia intense feelings of exclusion, humiliation, and incomprehension (cf. chapter VI).

Second, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo gave a huge blow to Russians’ confidence in the demilitarization of the NATO-Russia relationship.\(^{61}\) Operation Allied Force convinced most Russian practitioners that the Alliance was still ready to use force to solve international conflicts, and that Russia could eventually become the next target. In the words of a very moderate Russian expert:

> Before Kosovo, ideas of confrontation were considered “vestige,” remnants of Soviet propaganda. … In 1998, there opened an ideological struggle within the Russian society and those who predominated were anti-Western views and mentality. They were able to say: “Listen, you were telling us that the West is so nice and unable to do anything wrong. Now, look at Yugoslavia! … They’re delivering bombs on peaceful people!” This was a very serious fracture of Russian mentality. It reversed the burden of proof.\(^{62}\)

Among other things, NATO’s intervention convinced the Russian military of the continuing relevance of a nuclear deterrent: “The difference between Russia and Serbia is that it doesn’t have nuclear weapons.”\(^{63}\) For many Russians, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo proved that the Alliance still considers force as a useful policy tool in international relations—a tool that could just as well be applied to Russia should the relationship deteriorate (cf. chapter V). This trend was even furthered by the American-led intervention in Iraq: “recently we discovered that [in the United States] war is considered a rational tool in promoting home interests. It considerably undermined the authority of the West.”\(^{64}\) In 2006, 40 to 45 percent of the Russian population harboured negative feelings toward NATO, primarily because of its perceived aggressiveness.\(^{65}\)

On the Atlantic side, two sets of Russian military practices left practitioners under the impression that the new Russia may not be that much different from the Soviet Union as regards

\(^{59}\) Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07.
\(^{60}\) Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
\(^{61}\) Expert C, ISKRAN, Moscow, 28.06.06; Expert D, MGIMO, Moscow, 22.06.06; Expert, Carnegie Foundation Russia, Moscow, 13.06.06.
\(^{62}\) Expert A, IMEMO, Moscow, 23.06.06.
\(^{63}\) Expert, Carnegie Foundation Russia, Moscow, 13.06.06.
\(^{64}\) Expert C, IMEMO, Moscow, 30.06.06.
the use of force. First, from the Western perspective the Chechen wars confirmed as early as 1994 (and again in 1999) that the Russian military retains a lot of influence over the Kremlin’s policies. According to a Russian observer, the speeding up of the enlargement process beginning in 1994 was a direct reaction to the first invasion of Chechnya: “For people suspicious of Russia’s developments, this was a signal: Russia has not changed. It still prefers military solutions to political problems.”\(^{66}\) Similarly, Atlantic practitioners have been discouraged by Russia’s continuing use of arm-twisting tactics (often bordering on the outright force) in its “near abroad”: “Russia does have a more aggressive policy toward its neighbours, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova; and it’s inclined to think in military terms to preserve its influence and status in that part of the world.”\(^{67}\) For instance, NATO is concerned that Russian troops remain stationed in both Moldova and Georgia despite repeated demands by these countries that they withdraw (cf. chapter VI).\(^{68}\) More recently, officials have become worried about Russia’s forceful tactics in dealing with Georgia. While the odds of Russia using force against NATO members are judged inexistent, the opposite is true when it comes to the ex-Soviet republics. As an American policy-maker remarked, “can we completely rule out that Russia can use force? Of course not: look at what they’re doing in Georgia.”\(^{69}\) Other officials also raised the possibility that force was still considered by Moscow in its “near abroad.”\(^{70}\) All in all, a number of military practices on both sides have significantly thwarted pacification in and through practice by raising doubts about the demilitarization of future mutual dealings.

A fourth crucial factor in sparking mistrust and slowing down the embodiment of diplomacy at the NRC is the arrival of a dozen new NATO members that were formerly Soviet satellites. In hindsight, it appears obvious that enlarging the Alliance to post-communist states would put a brake on the NATO-Russia pacification process: how could the possibility of using military force recede from practitioners’ mindsets when the newcomers join NATO precisely out of a fear of Russia? Understandably, Eastern European and Baltic countries have an unhappy history of relations with Moscow, including military occupation, that leads them to stay on guards if not to be outrightly anti-Russians. In fact, these countries joined NATO precisely so as not to have to deal with the Russians—not to be told, as they now are by older

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\(^{66}\) Expert B, ISKRAN, Moscow, 20.06.06. As I will demonstrate in chapter V, however, this assessment is contradicted by a close historical scrutiny: the decision to enlarge was publicly announced (to Russia’s surprise) about two weeks prior to the invasion of Chechnya, in December 1994.

\(^{67}\) Senior Official C, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.

\(^{68}\) Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.

\(^{69}\) Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06. This is also recognized by some Russian experts: e.g., Expert B, ISKRAN, Moscow, 20.06.06.

\(^{70}\) Senior Official C, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.
Allies, that they must cooperate with Russia almost on a daily basis. The net result, in 2006, was that NATO’s Russia policy was “frozen”: “There is no consensus inside NATO as to the future of the relationship with Russia. As a consensual organization it cannot move.”

Former Soviet satellites’ practitioners bring a lot of mistrust of the Russians in their background knowledge. A Polish representative bluntly recognized that her country’s willingness to join NATO was out of fear of another Russian invasion. As a result, Eastern Europeans tend to focus on article 5, the provision of collective defence. Once inside, she conceded, Poles have become “less allergic to Russia.” Nonetheless, “[n]ot to take what Russians say at face value is a Polish habit.” Officials from the Baltic countries shared a similar level of mistrust. Freshly confirmed as the new commander in chief of Estonia, Major General Ants Laaneots declared that “relations with Russia are indeed our biggest security problem.” Among NATO’s international military personnel, for instance, I met a Lithuanian colonel who was a Red Army conscript in 1987! His dispositions were obviously heavily influenced by that experience. In a meeting with a Lithuanian delegate, I was told that “Lithuanians can read through the Russian mind.” In general, the Balts feel that they are the ones inside NATO who can provide the most accurate picture of the Russians. It is clear to them that “Russia doesn’t cooperate genuinely; they are just manoeuvring.” As understandable as they may be, such dispositions make the embodiment of diplomacy extremely difficult at the NRC.

NATO staff and older members’ delegations were acutely aware of this problem. A senior policymaker bluntly admitted that “the Balts and the Poles were less enthusiastic. They bring with them knowledge and a suspicion of Russian motives. ... They don’t get along: they bicker and fight all the time.” A top military officer concurred that the Balts put “no trust at all” in the Russians, while a policy-maker observed that they “instinctively applaud everything, every signal, every move coming from the United States that takes a critical view on

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71 Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
72 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06; also Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
73 Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
74 Official, Polish Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06.
76 Officer, Lithuanian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
77 Officer, Lithuanian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
78 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
79 Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
Russia.”

In fact, a number of delegations from founding members insisted that “new members have to evolve” because “their arrival in NATO has put a brake on NATO-Russia cooperation.”

Worse, argued a Canadian delegate, “upon their arrival new members such as Poland and the Baltic countries openly questioned the opportunity of a NATO-Russia dialogue.”

In view of this fundamental difference in approach, a German delegate conceived of his country’s role as that of “a bridge between these new members and the Russians.”

That said, it is very hard for new member states to get rid of their Soviet-era military establishment—“to weed out hardliners,” as one top NATO military officer put it.

Against that inertia, older European members “have to have [the new members] mature and go beyond that. This will play a very important part in the future” of Russian-Atlantic relations.

In the meantime, because the new members’ suspicion is often echoed by the United States, NATO’s policy towards Russia boils down to the lowest common denominator—which is currently pretty low. As one NATO official summarized, “the span of policies toward Russia has enlarged. There was a time where the ease to reach a consensus was better. [But now] we don’t really have an active Russian policy. We do things with Russia, we cooperate, but in terms of steering a course, it is very difficult because the span has widened so much. [It was] absolutely easier in the 1990s.”

On that basis, it is appropriate to conclude that the entry into NATO of former Soviet satellites has been a very important brake on the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic pacification process. So much so, in fact, that “[i]t’s hard to characterize NATO’s approach to the Russians on a continuum because the change in membership has changed the character of the Alliance.”

Several practitioners reported that generally speaking, there were “two factions inside NATO” as far as Russia policy is concerned: on one side, one finds countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Norway and Belgium, which exhibit a higher level of trust toward Russia; and on the other side cluster the United States, the UK, Poland, and the Baltic countries, which

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80 Senior Official, German Foreign Office, Berlin, 14.05.07.
81 Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
82 Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06.
83 Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
84 Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
85 Official, US Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
86 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
87 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06; also Senior Official, German Foreign Office, Berlin, 14.05.07.
remain more mistrustful of Moscow. On the whole, I myself could ascertain this vision, although there are of course individual exceptions here and there. Interestingly, I observed a particularly high level of variance with American and British practitioners, among whom I often found strong advocates of partnership in an office right next door to that of a cold-warrior. In practice, however, London and Washington took a more cautious stance toward Moscow than did other Western European capitals. Another confirmation of this split in the Allies’ approach toward Russia came from a Russian delegate who had been posted to Brussels for more than a decade. For him, the new NATO members “simply do what ‘Master’ says,” while countries from Old Europe are “more reasonable.” Interestingly, in 2006 everything took place as if relations with Russia divided NATO member states a lot more than they cemented them.

B. INDICATOR 2: THE NORMALIZATION OF DISPUTES

The interview data gathered in the field reveal that in 2006, both parties to the NRC relationship appeared inclined to treat mutual disputes almost as business-as-usual. An American policymaker summarized this feeling well: “Yes, we still have disagreements, quite a few, but certainly nothing like the Cold War.” A Russian counterpart reciprocated: “We do have disagreements today, all countries have. But we’re not in the confrontational situation as prior to 1991.” No doubt heads of state and government sometimes use abrasive language: U.S. vice president Dick Cheney’s harsh criticisms of the Kremlin in Vilnius or Putin’s strong words about the United States in Munich are not isolated events (cf. chapters V and VI). But in contrast with this political discourse, security practitioners adopt a more down-to-earth attitude and tend to de-dramatize the relationship. This normalization of conflicts reinforces the embodiment of diplomacy because it turns disputes into matters of routine. According to a seasoned American diplomat whose career spanned both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras:

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88 Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07; Official, UK Delegation to NATO, London, 31.03.06.; Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06; Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06; Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
89 For instance, one NATO officer told me that in 2003, Russia proposed a fully-fledged exchange of intelligence on terrorism. The proposal was turned down by the American delegation: Senior Officer B, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
90 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.
91 Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
92 Expert, Carnegie Foundation Russia, Moscow, 13.06.06.
“Disagreements civil in nature and tone are far more possible. They don’t put us on the brink of war.”

1. Of Cycles and Sine Waves

It is undeniable that Russian-Atlantic relations have gone through a series of highs and lows over the last decade and a half, in which honeymoons (e.g., 1992-1993, 2001-2003) have often been followed by rough patches (e.g., 1998-1999, 2004-2006). But contrary to some Cassandras, practitioners tend to understand this evolution in “cycles,” an appraisal that leads them to entertain dependable expectations that a low will inevitably give way to another high, and so forth. As one American policymaker put it: “The long term is not bleak; it’s just we’re in a rough patch now.” From a larger perspective, one NATO official in charge of Russia policy stated that “the relationship has become much more stable and pragmatic. If I take a fifteen-year window, that was obviously a period of dramatic highs and lows. We got to know each other to an extent where we managed to rein that in a little bit and keep expectations real, maintain a level of transparency to ensure that nobody gets surprised by what the other side does.”

In fact, from the practitioners’ point of view, it seemed like the inconsistent quality of Russian-Atlantic cooperation was quite normal in the everyday life of international security. As one NATO official put it:

You have these honeymoon periods where you ask, “how are you going to do this together?” I’d actually—let’s be honest: after about six months you decide you’ve done as much as you can in that particular field and you sit back and twiddle your thumbs. And say “what else can we do?” You hit another sort of flat period where nothing is happening—then something else will happen and you’ll say, “oh, we can do that together,” and you go off again another of your honeymoon periods where everything is hunky-dory and you’re working closely together.

From the practitioners’ point of view, then, a slowdown in cooperation is no drama but rather normal—the inevitable consequence of a past surge.

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94 Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
95 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06. Some other expressions I heard include “stages” or “periods” or “waves”; Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04; Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06; Expert, Centre for European Security, Moscow, 30.06.06.
97 Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
98 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
In the same spirit, a number of NATO officials described the relationship with Russia as a “sine wave.” Despite highs and lows, they found that the relationship was becoming more stable over time. Engagement persists in rough patches, so that overall the lows are decreasingly low, so to speak. In fact, because the sine wave’s amplitude decreased over the post-Cold War era, “a complete cut-off of relations is now less possible.” Overall, the practitioners’ understanding of the relationship as a cycle allows them to normalize the “succession of upsurge and downsurge” in the relationship. Just like a “wave” on the seashore, argued one NATO official, “sometimes it’s getting better, sometimes it’s getting worse.” The important point here is that solving disputes peacefully had entered the realm of practical sense: “We spent a lot of time in negotiations that set up the NRC, trying to imagine scenarios, and what we would do under this and that circumstance. In practice it’s been very pragmatic—we just know what it is when we see it, when a specific question comes up.” Solving disputes at the NRC had become a routine matter.

In order to probe this view, I asked several officials whether they thought another rupture of NATO-Russia relations (such as during and after Operation Allied Force in 1999, cf. chapter VI) was currently possible. The general feeling was optimistic. For example, one NATO official replied that “that sort of spontaneous move is less likely today. You wouldn’t hype a crisis into a rupture of NATO-Russia relations.” His colleague was equally convinced that today a rupture of relations “would be much more difficult to imagine.” The capacity of the NRC forum to de-dramatize disputes—to provide a “safety valve”—has been proven in practice. Since 2002 NRC participants have discussed a number of contentious issues, including the Balkans, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, the Middle East, NATO’s transformation, energy security, and missile defence. These issues are reportedly put on the
agenda in a tit-for-tat fashion—Russia accepts an NRC discussion on Georgia as long as the United States assents to discuss Iraq, and so on.\textsuperscript{109} As a result, “[t]he dialogue at the NRC has become more entrenched. We’ve moved from all-out enthusiasm to more concrete progress. … There are no routines yet, but cooperation principles are emerging. Before we would not discuss controversial topics; now there is a willingness to do so.”\textsuperscript{110} The same viewpoint could be heard on the Russian side: “The balance of the relationship is positive. We’re now discussing things for which there was no will to discuss before. The political dialogue touches on any issues except internal matters.”\textsuperscript{111} Significantly, a German delegate told me that in the spring of 2006 that the possibility of an NRC peacekeeping mission in the South Caucasus had even been raised—something the Russians had always refused to consider in the past. All in all, concludes the chairman of the NRC preparatory committee, “the NRC has evolved into a forum for serious dialogue on those issues where we do not see eye-to-eye.”\textsuperscript{112} The NRC chairman, SG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, argues in the same direction: “That is what the NRC is for, not only to say how much we agree with each other, it also to conclude [sic] where we disagree and continue the open and frank discussions.”\textsuperscript{113}

By far “the biggest gap the NRC managed to bridge”\textsuperscript{114} had to do with the fall 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine. Significantly, in the post-Cold War era this event presented the highest risk of “evolv[ing] into a West vs. Russia, proxy type of conflict.”\textsuperscript{115} Yet the NRC managed to solve the issue peacefully with a joint communiqué, on December 9\textsuperscript{th}, 2004, which “appeal[ed] to all parties to continue to avoid the use or instigation of violence, to refrain from intimidation of voters, and to work to ensure a free, fair electoral process that reflects the will of the Ukrainian people.”\textsuperscript{116} Given the stakes at play, this dispute constitutes a compelling counterfactual (if not \textit{X}, then \textit{Y}) that diplomacy had previously been normalized at the NRC. But

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{109} Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06.
\bibitem{110} Official, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
\bibitem{111} Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.
\bibitem{112} Fritch 2007, 2 (html version). One the most striking examples (to which I will return in the concluding chapter) is the BMD project: when the Russians expressed their strong opposition, they immediately forwarded the topic to the NRC for further discussion. For instance, during the spring of 2007, General Baluyevsky aired a list of complaints on the matter at the NRC but concluded his speech by saying: “We need to talk.” Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07.
\bibitem{114} Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
\bibitem{115} Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06. The Ukrainian crisis, as well as the Iraq war, can be considered as successful “tests” of the NRC’s capacity to smooth Russian-Atlantic disagreements: Forsberg 2005, 342.
\end{thebibliography}
for the prior embodiment of the peaceful resolution of disputes (X), the Orange revolution could have led to a military standoff (or threats thereof) between Russia and NATO’s member states (Y). At the NRC (and notably, neither at the OSCE nor through the EU-Russia mechanism), Russia and NATO member states de-dramatized this deep-rooted conflict so as to agree to disagree. That event demonstrated the NRC’s “potential in responding to major ‘East-West’ controversies in Europe,” concluded some experts. From the practitioners’ point of view, what mattered was not so much the substance of the communiqué but “the fact that they actually managed to deal with” that issue. “We came to a common language, which proves that this framework works.”

The head of NATO’s Russia policy explained this success by the fact that the NRC has turned Russia into a “stakeholder”:

Look at the agenda of that meeting [9 December 2004]: we agreed not only on that, but also on a very ambitious NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism and the three big elements of prevention, combating, and consequence management; and we agreed on an exchange of letters for Russian participation in operation Active Endeavour. These were deliverables that Russia was very interested in. We’ve managed to be successful, when we have, when we maintained enough substance to keep Russia engaged. It’s not as easy as in Spring 99 to say: “the hell with all of you, we’re walking away.”

Clearly, the Russians “have a very vested interest in making [the NRC] work. … they’d never go along and do something like that unless they felt it was in their best interest to engage on such a difficult topic. So I think [the communiqué above is] a very revealing incident.” In 2006, the NRC was Russia’s “favourite forum” and its officials “work[ed] seriously” there.

As one British official put it: “Russia actually likes its position of preference in relation to NATO. They like to have these discussions. They like to have this engagement and they like to be involved. [The relationship] has been wading through very, very deep mud and we’re getting things out of the way [thanks to the NRC].” In most (though not all) of my interviews, I had the feeling that practitioners strongly believed in the virtue of talking, whether it leads to an agreement or not. Dialogue does not necessarily lead to a change of mind but it is worthy

117 Sceptics may respond that Russia could simply not do anything because it is so weak. But knowing how strongly the Russians feel towards Ukraine, it would not have been the first time in history that a weaker countries use force against all odds in a similar situation.
118 White et al. 2006, 169; Forsberg 2005.
119 Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
120 Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
121 Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
122 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06; Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
123 Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
nonetheless: “does it mean that having that forum with them is going to sway their mind on certain issues? Any country is going to say, ‘No, we have our national interests and we’re going to stick with them.’ But the chances are you’re going to see it coming. You can work to get around it and talk to them about it but at the end of the day … you’re not going to sway them from that.”

Talking eases the everyday life of security officials—and not only when it leads to policy changes. In the blunt words of a seasoned Canadian diplomat: “The idea that you always solve differences of views is dead wrong. Very often you paper over differences.” This facet of Russian-Atlantic diplomatic interaction will be explored in more historical depth in the next two chapters.

Contrary to the Cold War era when both sides had to permanently live on the brink of nuclear confrontation, in 2006 disputes had become at least de-dramatized and at best normalized. Russian and Atlantic officials felt much freer to discuss a variety of topics and express frank opinions: “There are disagreements, obviously, because we’re talking about more things,” confirmed the head of the SG’s office. “Both sides are much freer to talk about what’s on their mind. In the Cold War it was simply impossible to go there.”

Behind this evolution, Alliance practitioners perceived a new “degree of honesty” as well an unprecedented “familiarity” in the relationship. Russian practitioners also believed that disputes are inevitable: “the common thing in international politics is not to be able to agree on everything. It’s normal to disagree.”

Russian-Atlantic divergences, according to one Russian expert, were in that sense no different from intra-Alliance disagreements. In this context, practitioners valued the possibility of sitting together around the same table and “talk, talk, talk” because “talking gets into habit.”

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125 Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04.
126 Senior Official D, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06; also Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
127 Senior Official D, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
128 Senior Official F, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
129 Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04; Official B, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06.
130 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.
131 Expert C, MGIMO, Moscow, 29.06.06.
132 Senior official, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 03.04.06.
133 Official, UK Delegation to NATO, London, 31.03.06.
Figure 4.1: The Formal Structure of the NATO-Russia Council in 2006


(Reproduced under permission from NATO)
Of course, numerous conflicts continued to surface and significant differences of international outlook remained. But a number of security officials emphasized that it often was just the same between France and the UK, for instance. The important thing, from the practitioners’ point of view, was to be able to “air” differences and “talk [them] through.” Thus it is the way in which these differences were bridged that made the relationship qualitatively different, not their number: “It doesn’t always go very well, but at least we talk about it,” summed up a senior NATO policy-maker. To be sure, because the NRC was often used to “air the dirty laundry,” there was a dramatic element to it—but it was judged useful as a sort of therapy: “it’s actually useful that we have a forum to have these arguments. If we weren’t having these arguments in the NATO-Russia Council, where would we be having them? If we didn’t have a means of Russia airing its concerns, what would we have instead? So it does feel difficult and destructive a lot of the time, but I think it’s important for everyone that actually it’s constructive to have these debates and it’s constructive to air these problems.” In addition, several practitioners stressed the importance of the “boring” aspects of the NRC, such as a firm “timetable and a regular meeting schedule,” which force NATO and Russia to confront tough issues regularly. The NRC “provides a structure” to the diplomatic resolution of disputes (cf. chapter VII).

At the institutional level, in 2006 the NRC comprised more than 25 working groups carrying forward concrete projects of security cooperation (cf. figure 4.1 above). Such a wide array of issue areas led the NATO bureaucracy to develop ties not only with the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign ministry, but also with the Russian ministry of emergency situations, the border guards, the Interior ministry, the Academy of sciences, etc. “There are probably ten to fifteen thousand people within various parts of the Russian bureaucracy who are involved in one way or another in some NATO-Russia cooperative effort,” reported one NATO official. “That’s a

134 Official B, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06; Senior Official A, European Commission, Brussels, 05.04.06. The “value element” that cements NATO allies, however, was deemed “not present to that extent” with the Russians. In addition, the key difference in dealing with Russia is “NATO solidarity”: “we can’t hand them out our documents; we can’t tell them we discussed Russia this morning at the NAC. There are limits because there are secrets at NATO. They’re at the table but they’re not members.” Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06. Also Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06; and Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04.
135 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
136 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
137 Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
138 Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04.
139 Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04.
140 Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
As they widen in scope and depth, relations between Moscow and the Alliance cannot be disrupted as easily as in the past, he thought. Conflicts must get to be solved through “normal” diplomatic channels. NATO prides itself with the fact that “[h]ardly a day goes by without an NRC meeting at one level or another, which has led to an unprecedented intensity of contacts and informal consultations in many different fields.” As they daily interact with foreign counterparts, practitioners bear in mind that conflicts will not wither away overnight and that disputes cannot be solved instantly. One NATO military officer who spent years working with the Russians insisted that “[w]e need to continue and temper our expectations. We can only reach through a step-by-step approach. It will take a long time. It’s better than doing nothing.”

As they were going through cycles and advancing with small steps, practitioners valued the NRC structure especially because it “[froze] in time one of the high periods and institutionalize[d] enough of the cooperative atmosphere that we can ride out the lows. We’ll continue in the behind-the-scene, low-profile way that doesn’t always make the headlines.”

Clearly, pacification in and through practice has a different logic than what an exclusive focus on high politics would suggest. From the practitioners’ point of view, what matters is that “[t]here is a de-dramatization of the whole Russia-NATO relationship,” assessed a policymaker in Brussels; “Considerably.”

Thanks in part to the NRC, the Russian-Atlantic diplomatic dialogue has gained a certain momentum of its own—at least to an extent. Though one should not overstate this evolution (cf. below), the NRC’s working atmosphere appeared less at the mercy of the overall quality of Russia-West relations than it used to be during the 1990s. In the words of an American official, “[t]he NRC is a hugely valuable tool to keep engaging the Russians in dialogue, to keep working on practical projects where our interests coincide, to keep a certain degree of momentum and practical cooperation regardless of what is going on in the bilateral political relation.” These joint projects, according to a British diplomat, “progress quite well … regardless of the difficulties we’re having in our strategic dialogue with Russia.”

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141 Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06. This view was not shared by a number of NATO practitioners who regretted that the Alliance’s programs could not reach out to more than a handful of Russian officials; e.g., Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
143 Senior Officer B, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06; Official, US Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
144 Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
145 Senior Official D, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
146 Official, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
147 Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
of the Canadian delegation to NATO similarly believed that “among the things that were gained is that is has become impossible to lose the entire relationship all of a sudden. Sometimes the relationship is so banal and normal that it looks just like relations with any other country.”

This trivialization of Russian-Atlantic cooperation is very significant in terms of pacification in and through practice—but so are the limits it faced in 2006.

2. An Elusive Momentum

As considerable as it may look from interview data, the normalization of disputes at the NRC was severely thwarted in 2006 by the fact that it remained partly hostage to the larger political relationship between Moscow and the West. In other words, the momentum alluded to by a handful of practitioners appeared quite elusive to others. As a NATO military officer posted in Moscow described the NRC diplomacy: “It’s not a process that’s self-propelling, with its own momentum. We really have to be creative … you always need new impetus.”

Relatedly, certain practitioners expressed scepticism as to the capacity of the NRC to work in the absence of political will. While in 2006 the NRC still benefited from the “highest support” of key governments, it remained to be seen how much momentum the NRC practitioners’ could keep going, and for how long, would political will come to falter. One imaginative interviewee elaborated: “I don’t think one ever assumes that institutions and mechanisms can weather any and all storms. … You try to build the building to withstand the force of the vast majority of storms, but the exception may blow it down.”

The two upcoming presidential elections in the United States and Russia in 2008, for instance, were perceived as “clouding” the relationship. Change in political leadership, especially in the main countries represented at the NRC, mattered a lot from the practitioners’ point of view. One NATO official usefully recalled, for instance, that “you will see a particular country that is particularly pro-Russia one day after a set of elections and particularly anti the next—Germany being one.”

In addition, practitioners pointed out two other factors that determined from the outside the quality of the NRC relationship. The first one was NATO’s own process of transformation,

148 Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06.
149 Senior Officer C, NATO International Military Staff, Moscow, 28.06.06.
150 Senior Official B, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06; Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06; Senior Official A, European Commission, Brussels, 05.04.06.
151 Official, US Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
152 Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
153 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06.
154 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06; Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06.
which has been unfolding for a decade and a half now and whose endpoint remained far from clear to its own civil servants. When asked where they think the NATO-Russia relationship will be in twenty years, several Alliance officials answered that the main difficulty was predicting NATO’s future: “it’s difficult to say what NATO will be in ten or twenty years.”¹⁵⁵ In terms of membership, “[i]t’s hard to characterize NATO’s approach to the Russians on a continuum because the change in membership has changed the character of the Alliance,”¹⁵⁶ argued a senior diplomat in Brussels. Because of its ever-changing mission, “NATO can’t do that much [with Moscow] because it is so absorbed in its own crisis. NATO will not do anything because it lacks the capacity to institutionalize the relationship with Russia beyond what it already is. NATO considers that if Russia is interested, it is up to them to do something;”¹⁵⁷ thought a senior official posted in Moscow. The second factor upon which the NRC diplomatic process depends is the future of Russia itself. In 2006, almost all practitioners would not venture predicting how democratic Moscow would be in the middle term. This created difficulties in the day-to-day interaction, because the Russians “haven’t found an equilibrium in which they could say, ‘OK, this is not Russia becoming something, this is Russia that is.’”¹⁵⁸

In terms of practical logics, the chair of the NRC prep com evaluated that “we still don’t have that inherent feel for political partnership.”¹⁵⁹ A number of NATO practitioners blamed the politicization of the NRC on the Russians, who reportedly “hold the practical agenda hostage to the strategic agenda.”¹⁶⁰ According to a senior official at State Department: “The Russians make the NRC political. They want it to be a foreign ministry- and policy-driven thing. They’re reluctant to let the military cooperation go. When they talk about [the NRC] and measure it, it’s always in terms of the political relationship.”¹⁶¹ The official illustrated his point with the discussions that were held in 2006 on the future status of Kosovo. In view of the difficulty to reach an agreement, he lamented: “Half of what motivates the Russians on Kosovo—if the international community [meaning, NATO] says Kosovo is going to be independent, then why not Abkhazia and Transdniestria? This is a self-interested concern we’re not going to agree on. We won’t solve that at the NRC. It hasn’t gained any momentum of its own. It would be very

¹⁵⁵ Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07; Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06.
¹⁵⁶ Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
¹⁵⁷ Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06.
¹⁵⁸ Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
¹⁵⁹ Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
¹⁶⁰ Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
¹⁶¹ Senior Official C, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
nice it did!"162 Another example of the politicized nature of Russia’s cooperation with NATO, supplied by a British officer from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), was an NRC exercise that was supposed to be held in the UK but was later moved to France, allegedly because of soured relations between London and Moscow at the time.163 Of course, the many Russo-British bilateral problems in 2006, from Aleksander Litvinenko’s death to Boris Berezovsky’s activism, had nothing to do with the NRC in any direct way.164

In this context, practitioners regretted the inflammatory rhetoric too often uttered at the highest political levels. One NATO official complained that “[o]ne of the problems that I find from a policy professional who’s been dealing with Russia for several years is that Western policy toward Russia tends to swing widely between unrealistic euphoria and utter desperation. Those wide mood swings are not justified by facts.”165 Similarly, on the Russian side, the political rhetoric about NATO was often not representative of the actual cooperation that takes place on the ground at the NRC, according to a diplomat posted in Moscow: “The language that Russian authorities use at NATO and here is not coherent, which gives a completely schizophrenic impression. I live this daily. Whether this double language will continue depends on the overall relationship Russia has with the West.”166 In her opinion, while NATO allies can make the difference between Alliance issues and larger transatlantic or EU relations, Moscow cannot: “For Russia the relationship with NATO is completely dependent—hence the schizophrenia—on the relationship with the United States and the West in general. It’s not a different corridor: it’s completely intertwined. It makes the relationship very vulnerable.”167

In order to give momentum to NATO-Russia relations, one senior Russian diplomat emphasized the need to give concrete substance to NRC discussions by tackling “real challenges, not old myths about Russia attacking Washington with missiles.” Using the scenario of a terrorist attack on the London or Moscow subway, he continued: “This is something to deal with together. When we will resume this very serious and central dialogue, then I think we will have a certain security against rupture of relations.”168 This view was confirmed when the NRC

162 Senior Official C, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
163 Officer, British Ministry of Defence, London, 11.05.07.
164 A former KGB officer turned an outspoken critic of Russia’s current regime, Litvinenko was mysteriously poisoned to death in London during the fall of 2007. One of the most powerful oligarchs under president Boris Yeltsin, Berezovsky fled to the UK in late 2001 under corruption charges in Russia; he has since become one the main figures opposing Putin.
165 Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
166 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06; Senior Official F, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
167 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06.
168 Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07.
was able to deal with the Orange revolution because of all the important matters that were also on the agenda at the point (cf. above). However, the same Russian practitioners argued that what ultimately prevents the NRC from gaining momentum was the fact that Russia remains excluded from NATO. Asked to explain why three years after France’s and Russia’s staunch opposition to the American invasion of Iraq, trust was back between Washington and Paris but not with Moscow, he lucidly answered: “They’re inside the tent and we’re outside. Yes, we have a mechanism with NATO, but it doesn’t compensate for the feeling that you belong to the collective people.”¹⁶⁹ This profound feeling of exclusion, which was generalized across my interviews with Russian practitioners, will be further discussed in chapters V and VI.

The politicized nature of the NRC becomes especially obvious when it is compared to another example of institutionalized U.S.-Russia cooperation: the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (also known as the Global Partnership after the 2002 G8 summit, and previously called the Nunn-Lugar program in the United States). Basically, this multi-year program aims to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in former Soviet Union states. Beyond its success, what is particularly striking about CTR is its complete depoliticization: the quality of diplomatic interaction and military cooperation does not follow the overall mood of Russian-Western relations. As one State Department official stressed, his team worked on the program “non-stop through the ’1990s. It survived all of that disruption. In fact, I would say that in general, the disruption and the instability, at least as a practitioner, drove us harder.”¹⁷⁰ In effect, he insisted that during crises such as Bosnia or Kosovo, the level of CTR cooperation counterintuitively “went up.” The CTR cooperation was “insulated” from other problems and consistently “dealt with in a very workmanlike way.”¹⁷¹ The chief Canadian negotiator of the Global Partnership similarly assessed that negotiations with the Russians went “extraordinarily well” despite the fact that the issues were “extremely complex” and “most sensitive.”¹⁷² This disconnect between day-to-day interaction and overall politics was not as strong at the NRC in 2006, according to practitioners. This important finding leads us to the third indicator of the embodiment of diplomacy: daily cooperation on the ground.

¹⁶⁹ Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07.
¹⁷⁰ Official B, US State Department, Washington, 25.10.06.
¹⁷¹ Official B, US State Department, Washington, 25.10.06.
¹⁷² Senior Official D, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 17.02.06.
C. INDICATOR 3: DAILY COOPERATION ON THE GROUND

Daily cooperation on the ground is an indicator of the embodiment of diplomacy because the logic of practicality is constituted in and through practice (cf. chapter II). Within a stable social configuration, the practical sense reads the way to go in the present and the future from past relations and practices. Of course, social contexts always are in flux, hence the constant change in practices and the impossibility to predict them. Nonetheless, routines on the ground partly constitute the overall relationship (and reciprocally). In the Russian-Atlantic case, there is one area in which cooperation has become more self-propelling: practical military-to-military cooperation. In fact, while the Russia-NATO relationship was at a post-Cold War low at the time of interview, an American lieutenant-general posted at NATO insisted that practical cooperation was “the best ever.”\textsuperscript{173} A Canadian delegate agreed that the military-to-military dimension was clearly the NRC’s “main added value.”\textsuperscript{174} On the Russian side, military cooperation was similarly considered “the fundamental thing”—that which supports political dialogue.\textsuperscript{175} According to a NATO representative in Moscow, practical cooperation such as counter-narcotics training in Central Asia—a Russian idea—worked very well because it is precisely what meets Russians’ expectations. It commits them to the NRC forum, which is good news for the Alliance. “The only way you’re going to share a strategic perspective is if you do stuff together,”\textsuperscript{176} observed a NATO policymaker. That said, in 2006 Russian and Atlantic security practices embodied contrasting organizational cultures.

1. Doing Stuff Together

The very first practical cooperation between Russia and NATO began in October 1995, when a group of Russian General Staff officers arrived at SHAPE in order to prepare Russia’s participation in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and later SFOR.\textsuperscript{177} In total, 1,500 Russian troops with 300 pieces of heavy weapons went on duty in early February 1996, officially under the command of the American General George Joulwan (who also happened to be NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe or SACEUR). Although not formally integrated, Russian

\textsuperscript{173} Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
\textsuperscript{174} Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06.
\textsuperscript{175} Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.
\textsuperscript{176} Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
\textsuperscript{177} Note that starting in 1992, Russia also committed up to 1,500 in the UNPROFOR missions in Croatia and Bosnia. These troops were not in direct interaction with NATO, however.
and NATO troops entered in joint patrolling, combat training, reconnaissance, etc.\textsuperscript{178} In the course of day-to-day work, several mechanisms were developed to ease communication and interaction on the ground.\textsuperscript{179} General Leonti Shevtsov, who commanded the Russian contingent, assessed the cooperation the following way: “It has not been a smooth ride throughout, of course, but as a result of our joint work at SHAPE we are gradually learning to work together.”\textsuperscript{180} A detailed Russian-American assessment of IFOR gave “high marks” to cooperation on the ground, while also noting the need for improvement in operational coordination, decision-making procedures and planning process.\textsuperscript{181} Interoperability—the ability of systems, units and forces to work effectively with others—was also flagged as an area for further improvement. For example, one military officer who had been posted in Bosnia regretted that Russian and NATO peacekeepers fought side by side for several years but with very limited interoperability. Despite day-to-day interactions at the tactical level, the peacekeeping operations were not ran jointly as the operational space had been divided between Russian and Allied forces.\textsuperscript{182}

KFOR, to which the Russians also contributed 1,500 soldiers (the largest non-NATO contingent), received a similar mix of plaudits and reservations in terms of Russian-Atlantic cooperation on the ground. As Roy Allison reports: “At the operational level, issues of control in planning and coordination between Russia and other NATO participants arose periodically, although tactical-level cooperation appeared to be excellent, at least between Russian and U.S. forces. NATO and Russian troops took part in joint training, joint patrolling, and joint demining tasks. Liaison functions developed on the tactical and strategic levels.”\textsuperscript{183} However, Moscow decided to pull out its contingents—both SFOR and KFOR—in the summer of 2003, thereby losing the opportunity for ground-level, day-to-day cooperation with NATO. But throughout the nine years of operational interaction, Russian and Atlantic practitioners were able to turn attention away from mutual disputes toward common fate and joint ventures. In this context, military officers were “able to find a common language when faced with a common

\textsuperscript{178} Officer C, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06; Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06. On the negotiation of this arrangement and its complex chain of command, cf. chapter V.

\textsuperscript{179} Cf. Nikitin 2004.

\textsuperscript{180} Shevtsov 1997, 4 (html version)

\textsuperscript{181} Kipp et al. 2000, 56-59.

\textsuperscript{182} Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06; also Official B, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06.

mission.” So much so, in fact, that in 2006 many NATO officials I interviewed were actively looking for new peacekeeping opportunities with the Russians.

Despite the lack of any active Russian-Atlantic peacekeeping operation in 2006, the NRC worked on a number of initiatives in preparation for an eventual mission. As early as September 2002, the NRC approved a document entitled “Political Aspects of a Generic Concept for Joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations.” Then in September 2004, the NRC held a three day-long procedural exercise on peacekeeping, in which the 27 member states were confronted with a fictional international crisis situation that required the generation of a joint peacekeeping force to enforce an UN-sponsored peace agreement. In early 2005, Moscow announced the creation of a peacekeeping brigade comprised of 2,000 soldiers dispatched in three motorized rifle battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, and various support units. The brigade is now fully autonomous and has been involved in the NRC’s operational compatibility program. Although not officially a peacekeeping operation, in 2006 NATO and Russia performed small-scale intelligence- and defence cooperation with regards to Afghanistan (cf. also chapter VI). Overall, Russia’s cooperation with NATO was judged “very good, constructive and supportive.”

Moscow was seen to have been “actively helpful in Afghanistan, not least in arranging American basing arrangements.” In effect, a number of Allied nations such as France, for instance, flew their ISAF troops or equipment using Russian airplanes and enjoying transit agreements with Moscow. Also, the NRC’s Counter-narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel was initiated in December 2005 as a pilot project to train 350 officers to police Afghanistan’s borders.

In 2006, Russia and NATO were also participating in Operation Active Endeavour, a naval counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea launched by NATO in the aftermath of 9/11. In September 2006, under its own initiative, Russia took part in this mission with a ship that was fully integrated under NATO command (another frigate, the Ladnyi, took its turn of duty in September 2007). Note that Russia’s participation in Active Endeavour is all the more remarkable because it is an article-5 mission: that is, it stems from the collective defence provision that had historically been targeted against Moscow. This is highly symbolic. In

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185 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06. One high-level NATO military officer downplayed the extent of Russian cooperation in Afghanistan, however: “It’s a limited range of cooperation. Russia offered support by air transport and rail transport. That’s basically what they’ve done. There’s been exchange of intelligence and information. The issue of opium has been discussed at high level.” Senior Officer C, NATO International Military Staff, Moscow, 28.06.06.
186 Senior Official D, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.
preparation for joining the operation, starting in 2005 the Russian Navy participated in a number of training sessions with NATO members’ fleets. The military integration required by the operation implied sharing secret communication codes, standard operating procedures, doctrines, and other information normally restricted to allies only. As an American delegate noted: “We’ve already done things we had never done before, such as exchanging officers between naval commands and sharing photographic equipment to put on board of Russian vessels.” From a practice analysis perspective, military cooperation on such sensitive issues indicates that the possibility of a mutual attack is definitely not an overwhelming preoccupation on either side. In and through practice, the focus is on a common struggle.

Figure 4.2 The Russian Frigate Pytlivy Cruising in the Mediterranean Sea under the NATO Flag

The NRC is in charge of a large menu of practical activities and exercises. For instance, three consequence-management exercises have been organized by the NRC in order to develop joint responses to terrorist attacks: Bogorodsk 2002, Kaliningrad 2004, and Lazio 2006. The same number of theatre missile defence command post exercises (CPX3) have taken place since 2004 in the United States, the Netherlands as well as in Russia (Moscow, March 2006). Russia

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187 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
188 Official, US Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
also took part in an exercise called Sorbet Royal in 2005 that featured submarine rescue manoeuvres. Together with NATO nuclear states, Moscow sent observers to CAPEX06, a nuclear weapons accident response exercise held by the United States in June 2006 (Russia had held a similar exercise in 2004). Other examples of military-to-military cooperation include the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, one of the very first programs the NRC undertook in 2002 and which fosters NRC cooperation on airspace surveillance and airspace traffic management with the objective of countering terrorist threats to civil aviation. A live exercise with military transport aviation was held in Ramstein in July 2006 and a system of reciprocal exchange of air traffic data was implemented in March. Other noteworthy initiatives include SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), a joint Russian-Ukrainian venture to give NATO access to six Antonov aircrafts; as well as the launch of a NATO-Russia Information, Consultation and Training Centre for the Resettlement of Military Personnel Discharged from the Russian Armed Forces, which was expanded in 2003 to six regional branches across Russia in addition to its main office in Moscow. These are clear tangibles that demonstrate a considerable level of daily interaction on the ground.

In a similar fashion, Russia and NATO have been working for years on fostering interoperability among their militaries, which also points toward the gradual receding of confrontational thinking on both sides. As a retired American pilot now part of NATO’s international staff optimistically described it, “the very willingness to develop interoperable forces suggests that mutual armed conflicts are no more possible.” A German military officer agreed that “[i]t would not be fair to deal together in these operations and at the same time think about confrontation in the future. The two cannot go along.” In June 2005, for instance, the NRC defence ministers adopted the “Political-Military Guidance towards Enhanced Interoperability between Forces of Russia and NATO Nations,” whose objective is to ensure that the forces of all services at the three levels of military command and operation (strategic, operational, and tactical) develop the ability to operate in synergy. This initiative is part of the NATO-Russia interoperability framework program, a “very robust” military-to-military

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189 In the weeks following this exercise, Moscow requested help from the British navy in the rescue of one of its submarine crew near the Kamchatka peninsula. This success is often hailed by NATO officers as a concrete NRC deliverable from which Russia unambiguously benefited.
190 Two other exercises part of that series and to which Russia participated include SENATOR 2005 in the UK and DENUX 07 in France.
191 Official B, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06.
192 Officer, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
program which is run by NATO as part of its PfP but with specific parameters for Russia. The program led Russia and NATO to finally sign a SOFA in 2005 (ratified by the Duma in May 2007) which establishes a legal framework for reciprocal military transit over one another’s territory, free from visa regimes and related restrictions. These practical initiatives require fairly high levels of military transparency. In a similar vein, in June 2005 all NATO member states together with Russia published a “NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence” listing defence expenditures of NRC countries since 1980.194

In addition to military-to-military cooperation, in 2006 the NRC also hosted a few dozen workshops, roundtables, and seminars on a variety of topics, ranging from fuels interoperability, terrorist tactics, defence reform, and peacekeeping, to logistics, defence budgeting, area surveillance, and maritime support. Academic exchanges were also organized at the NATO Defence College in Rome, where a group of Russian military officers taught for the very first time. 2006 also saw the successful conclusion of the first academic year of a military-based defence reform course for active-duty military officers serving at the Russian Ministry of Defence. The course, approved by the NRC in 2004, had been developed jointly by NATO and the Moscow ISKRAN. During the same year, “Mobile Education Training Teams” took part in more than forty events, including another premiere: Russian military teaching at NATO school in Oberammergau.195 The NRC’s many working groups of experts also developed half a dozen detailed glossaries on matters of special operations force (2006), maritime terminology (2006), peacekeeping (2006), combating terrorism (2006), defence reform (2005), and nuclear terminology (2004). This linguistic bridge-building is very important in fostering interoperability, as will become clear below.

The NRC provides a physical locus of face-to-face, daily interaction among Russian and Atlantic security practitioners. In addition to its mission inside the Alliance’s headquarters, since 2004 Moscow also has a liaison branch office in Mons as well as a small team within the Partnership Coordination Cell at SHAPE. As a senior NATO policy-maker put it: “We now have a structural forum … where they meet all the time on all issues and talk. … You start to cycle through officials who know you, you don’t have such an ignorance of NATO and

194 NATO (2005), “NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence,” Brussels, 9-10 June (www.nato.int/docu/docu/pr/2005/p050609e.htm, accessed 24 October 2007). Data on Soviet/Russian military forces is available from 1995 on. Note that a few key numbers have not been made public by Moscow, including absolute figures of its military as well as the proportion of labour force.

195 Reciprocally, in October 2003 NATO officers participated for the first time in a Russian military training program (the course was focused on air crew survival techniques).
suspicion because they know how it works.” The ongoing presence of Russian officials at NATO HQ in Brussels and their almost daily meetings with NATO counterparts account for an important dimension of the NRC institutionalization. For instance, I was genuinely astonished to hear a Russian official express the view that “Russia sits around the table like any other country. It is a member of the family.” He added that “there is this glue” at the NRC. Interpersonal bonds seem to work both ways. A British delegate admitted that in preparation for NRC meetings, she would approach her Russian counterparts the same way she does her French or American ones. A French official told me a similar story, insisting that he calls his Russian colleagues in preparation for a prepcom, asks for support or draws limits in a similar fashion as he would inside the NAC.

Institutionalization at NATO HQ finds its echo in Russia, though on a much smaller scale. The NRC is represented in Moscow through an Information Office and a Military Liaison hosted by the Belgian embassy. A “hotline” was also established in late 2003 between NATO HQ and the Russian Defence Minister. On the civil side, NATO now has a website in Russian in order to reach directly that public. In Spring 2006, a “NATO-Russia Rally” was organized across Russia to promote cooperation with the Alliance as a key foreign policy interest of the country. With stops in nine cities from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad, the objective of the rally was to heighten public awareness of the NRC’s goals and achievements. When I met with the head of the project upon her return to Moscow in May 2006, she said that although the project would not change Russians’ (very negative) perception of NATO overnight, at least it was the first initiative of public diplomacy run jointly by NATO and the Russian bureaucracy on the Kremlin’s soil. On the military side, the head of the Military Liaison revealed that in 2005 about 200 events had been organized in Moscow alone. NATO military representatives regularly meet with their counterparts at the Russian ministry of Defence, at least twice a month. In these

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196 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06. This interviewee told me a telling anecdote on that matter: Upon leaving his NATO tenure, a Russian ambassador came to then-Secretary General Lord Robertson and confessed that after a few years in Brussels, he had come to admit that contrary to a widespread belief in Moscow, there was no secret war room in the basement of NATO HQ!

197 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.

198 Official, UK Delegation to NATO, London, 31.03.06.

199 Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.


201 A public blog was also set up for the occasion: http://www.natorussiarally.blogspot.com/ (accessed 12 May 2006).

202 In 2003, 95 percent of 68 planned activities were achieved; in 2004, it was 185 of 188 activities that were implemented.
meetings, officers discuss all sorts of military issues, including “contentious ones.” Overall, these NRC mechanisms are perceived by practitioners as “a bridge to Russia”—“the proof that this Alliance is no longer directed toward Russia.”

Thanks to the NRC joint programs, hundreds and even thousands of civil and military personnel from Russia and allied countries are gathered to work together on a day-to-day basis. An American delegate judged these interactions on the ground “very valuable, because they put us together and we go to the field together with real scenarios. … We’re building trust, which is the fundamental thing. … It needs to be built both in my government and on the Russian side.” From the practitioners’ point of view, the main gain earned from joint exercises and similar initiatives is reassurance about intentions. A German official confirmed this view: “we’re coming together. The more we do it, in working groups etc., the more we work together on military-to-military level, have joint exercises on different levels, then the better it works. People stop thinking about the possible threat of Russian army.” On the Russian side, an analyst made a similar evaluation:

When I started in the middle of the 1990s, I couldn’t have imagined that so soon, in seven to eight years—a very short historical period—NATO-Russia relations would be characterized by the Russian embassy as the most successful of all the directions of Russian foreign policy. With NATO we cooperate. Of course it’s not sufficient, I would like to see more on the table. But this military-to-military cooperation, joint exercises, special status of forces, interoperability, all this is very important. These small steps create a new atmosphere in our relationship.

The net result is, to use the words of another observer in Moscow, the emergence of a “zdravyi smysl” (здравый смысл) or “commonsense” that the current NATO-Russia relationship is safe from mutual violence. This is obviously a sea change from the Cold War: joint practical activities train the militaries to work together on the field not to attack each other.

For NATO practitioners, engaging the Russian army aims to debunk certain enduring myths about the Alliance so as to foster a workmanlike atmosphere: “We made some progress in the Russian military. They are still much more friendly to us and much more constructive than they were, I don’t know, ten years ago. … You can’t compare [Russia’s Chief of Staff General

203 Senior Officer C, NATO International Military Staff, Moscow, 03.07.06.
204 Official, US Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
205 Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04.
206 Official, US Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
207 Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
208 Officer, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
209 Expert, Centre for European Security, Moscow, 30.06.06.
210 Expert C, ISKRAN, Moscow, 28.06.06.
Yuri] Baluyevsky with his predecessors, for instance—he’s much better. Also the guys here at the Russian mission are different from the previous staff. They’re ready to cooperate.”

According to an American policymaker, the NRC contributed to changing Russia’s perception of the Alliance: “They’ve been too much around,” as he saw it. Judging from high-level declarations on Russia’s side, there seems to be some truth to these assessments. Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov declared, for instance, that “the Russia-NATO cooperation has outgrown the ‘adolescence’ age,” hailing practical achievements on theatre missile defence (TMD) and others. Putin corroborated this view, arguing that “in just a very short time we have taken a gigantic step from past confrontation to working together and from mutual accusations and stereotypes to creating modern instruments for cooperation.”

Although these optimistic statements often are balanced by harsh criticisms of the Alliance, they represent a significant departure from those made by the otherwise more pro-Western Kremlin in the 1990s.

Equally striking is the fact that discussions at the NRC create a “variable geometry” of political coalitions, with Russia sometimes siding with certain allies, sometimes with others depending on the issue: “You come to a point at the NRC where we have lively discussions not only 26+1, but also among allies!” This is a very important departure from the politics of the PJC, in which the NATO members’ positions were “pre-cooked” in a prior NAC meeting. These allied positions were then presented “en bloc” to the Russians, thereby creating a bit of confrontation. At the NRC, argues a British delegate, there is “very little coordination among allies.” The NRC prep com, according to its chair, “has become one of the hardest working and most collegial bodies at NATO Headquarters.” That said, there should be no doubt that very nature of the Alliance creates a very clear limit to the notion that the NRC comprises 27 equal partners. In a German delegate’s soft formulation, “solidarity inside the Alliance is a value

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211 Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06; also Senior Official A, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.
212 Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
215 Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
216 Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
217 However, one Canadian official reported that in G8 meetings of political directors, more often than not “what you find is that seven of them are on one side of the issue and one of them [Russia] is on the other side and that happens almost on every issue.” Senior Official C, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.
218 Official, UK Delegation to NATO, London, 31.03.06.
219 Fritch 2003, 3 (html version).
The partnership with Russia remains subsidiary to collective defence. There are clear “red lines with Russia.” Ultimately we are held to allied solidarity. I cannot embarrass my American colleague in order to support the Russians. Just the same, I can’t say all I want to the Russians in front of my allied colleagues. Some things need to be dealt with in private.”

Another important effect of day-to-day cooperation on the ground is the narrowing of NATO’s and Russia’s respective positions on a number of conflicts in the world. One NATO official insisted that cooperation on the ground breeds common interests. As an example, he listed all the ongoing operations that NATO was conducting at the time of interview (in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Darfur, Iraq, and the Mediterranean Sea). Then he added: “Russia in one way or another is not only smiling benevolently and kiss goodbye, they’re explicitly supporting every single one of them to various degrees.” After 9/11, the convergence became especially significant (cf. chapter VI). The event itself led Russia and NATO to realize that they now faced a “common threat” or a “common enemy”: terrorism. Interestingly, this convergence was a rare instance of NATO moving in Russia’s direction and not the other way around. Having advocated a more muscular fight against terrorism for years, the Russians were obviously happy about this turn of events. In 2006, S. Ivanov celebrated the fact that “[n]owadays Russia and NATO have the same approach to estimation of transnational threats in the field of security.” That satisfaction seemed to be shared, at least to some extent, by NATO practitioners: “In general, they’re a Western country in terms of thinking, in terms of approaching solutions. Especially after 9/11, they’re on the same side as we are.” That said, a number of officials insisted on some remaining differences, for instance that “we will never get

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220 Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
221 Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06; also Official, UK Delegation to NATO, London, 31.03.06.
222 Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06. According to a State Department official, “in theory the NRC works at 27 and not 26+1. But in practice, Russia is not part of NATO. There exists allied solidarity. We can’t let Russia too much in.” Senior Official B, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06. The same point of view is expressed by Robert Hunter, former U.S. representative to NATO: Hunter 2003, 42-43.
224 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
225 Trenin 2005b, 105.
226 Senior Official D, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.
228 Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06.
them to agree that you cannot solve terrorism in purely military terms.”

For a British official, deep differences in threat perceptions largely explain contemporary Russian-Atlantic distrust: “The Russians see the war on terrorism and the American definition as an excuse for American power to intervene where major oil reserves are.”

Reciprocally, many Atlantic practitioners remained suspicious of “anti-terrorist operations” in Chechnya. All in all, then, in 2006 NATO and Russia were doing a lot of stuff together, oftentimes their respective practices came from contrasting organizational cultures.

2. Contrasting Organizational Cultures

As much as NATO and Russia may have come to do together in 2006, their prior common experience at working together on the ground remained extremely limited. As a result, the NRC institutionalization ran into two main obstacles at the practical level: a lack of substance and a clash of organizational ways. To begin with the first problem, a number of officials were not convinced that the NRC was bringing about any tangible results in terms of Russian-Atlantic cooperation. One senior NATO policymaker put the matter this way:

My frank and honest feeling is that we’ve quadrupled the amount of bureaucracy, we’ve probably made the working level of meetings a bit more informal and relaxed, but in terms of actual effect on the ground—more cooperation and trust—my own feeling is that I haven’t seen any improvement. … What I do see is a group of people who spend a lot of time with the Russians. People call them the Russian mafia—they’re really into it. … But if you get past the meetings to see what the effect is, maybe they get along better and have beers, but I still don’t see this great improvement in terms of more cooperation.

A similar scepticism could be felt on the Russian side, even from experts who very much valued cooperation with NATO: “Russians doubt the sincerity of NATO in engaging Russia. And they are sceptical about the results. Are we really doing something serious in this cooperative framework? Lots of words and discussions, working groups, symposia, and so forth; words, words, words. What about something serious and tangible? I’m not sure we have that.”

In his memoirs, former Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov similarly reproached the “tendency to turn the PJC into a discussion club, which was unacceptable to us.” For another expert, NATO’s engagement with Russia is nothing but damage-control or, as he put it, “the medicine

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229 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
230 Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
231 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06; Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
232 Expert A, IMEMO, Moscow, 23.06.06.
233 Primakov 2004, 162.
for the Russians against NATO enlargement.” The result, he insisted, is that few Russians believe in the sincerity of NATO friendship: “There are suspicions.”234 In effect, most Russians doubt that the Alliance is willing to do anything concrete with them beyond keeping the conversation going.

Related, a familiar complaint on the Atlantic side was that the Russians are so focused on procedure that it often comes at the expense of substance.235 According to a Canadian delegate, the NRC has not delivered as much as expected because too many discussions are embroiled in procedure to be productive. For instance, during the spring of 2006, the NRC was conducting a stock-taking exercise in order to decide on its next priorities: “it has quickly turned into a fastidious exercise, without good news. It was reduced to a wording negotiation.”236 As a NATO senior military officer summed up, “rhetoric often trumps substance,” adding that NRC activities belonged as much, if not more, to public diplomacy than to concrete achievements.237 “Events are showpiece, without real benefits,” said a German colonel. “Take Active Endeavour: three years of talk for one frigate one week.”238 Similarly, a senior American policymaker regretted that Russia asks the Allies to do many things in the NRC “but in the end you don’t see Russia pursuing all of them. They’re floating but never put together … I think the Russians would be happy to say they’re doing something without in fact doing anything.”239 This interest in formalism also finds its expression in the multiplication of ad hoc committees under the NRC, whose added value is not always clear from NATO practitioners’ point of view. “The Russians produce more papers than practices,” complained a Lithuanian official.240 Anecdotally, I was told of an Estonian joke that the NRC was becoming Soviet-like because too many people were pretending to go through a lot of work but actually were only happy to get paid.241

234 Expert C, IMEMO, Moscow, 30.06.06; Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07.
235 Senior Official B, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06; also Senior Official D, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06. The Russia-EU relationship seemed plagued with the same problem: Senior Official C, European Commission, Brussels, 05.04.06.
236 Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06; Senior Official B, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06. The main priorities that were identified for future NRC work are the following: reinforcing political dialogue; further development of interoperability and cooperation on defence reform; cooperation against terrorism; further development of mutual trust, confidence and transparency; and cooperation on crisis management. NATO (2006), “NATO and Russia Set Priorities for Cooperation,” Sofia, 28 April (www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/04-april/e0428b.htm, accessed 22 August 2006).
237 Senior Official B, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
238 Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07.
239 Senior Official C, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
240 Officer, Lithuanian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
241 Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06; Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
In 2006, the institutionalization of Russian-Atlantic relations at the NRC left certain officials with an impression of purposelessness. Some practitioners agreed that what was most direly lacking in the relationship was a genuine “finalité” or long-term goal. At the time, they felt that “staying engaged is the goal.” Contrary to many other states that cooperate(d) with NATO through the PfP and the EAPC, the possibility that Russia could or would join NATO remains extremely remote. As a result, NATO’s attitude toward Russia (probably reciprocated) boils down to “hold to engagement, for engagement’s own sake.” While institutionalizing engagement certainly has great value in pacifying in and through practice, several practitioners wondered to what extent such a strategy is sustainable over the long run in the absence of any larger vision for the future. A Canadian delegate, for instance, proposed that “what’s missing is still this notion of what’s the long term plan.” One of his colleagues opined that “the NRC doesn’t produce that much because the Russians are happy with the status quo. They use the forum to better understand and eventually influence NATO.” As I mentioned above, many Alliance officials harboured suspicions that Russia’s goal at the NRC was first and foremost to penetrate the organization from the inside. For instance, one State Department official assessed that the NRC has made “mischief-making easier. Russia looks for opportunities to exploit differences among allies.”

In order to explain the persistence of Russian Soviet-like ways and their difficulties in establishing transgovernmental relations between Russia and NATO, most Atlantic practitioners pointed to the fact that there had been no bureaucratic “purge” at the end of the Cold War. After the implosion of the USSR, Russia president Boris Yeltsin quickly embraced the former Soviet MoD and General Staff as the institutions of the new Russia. In so doing, he “subscribed to the old military-bureaucratic culture” and left in power the very same people who had run the USSR. Fifteen years later, the Russian MoD had preserved an “organizational ethos” that “continues to stress a threatening external security environment and the importance of military

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242 Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
243 Official B, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06; also Officer, British Ministry of Defence, London, 11.05.07.
244 Senior Official A, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06. This opinion is shared by Russian experts alike, e.g., Karaganov 2005.
245 Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06.
246 Senior Official B, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
248 Baev 2002, 135; Ponsard 2007, 54. This point was also made by Expert B, ISKRAN, Moscow, 20.06.06; and Senior Officer B, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06. Recall that in Yeltsin’s fierce struggle to stay in power in Moscow, from the summer 1991 coup to the October 1993 constitutional crisis, the Army has been one of his staunchest allies.
For the same reasons, their procedures of decision-making remained profoundly opaque. As a result, the average habitus within the Russian state apparatus is comprised of some dispositions that were carved in times of confrontation. As one Russian interviewee revealed:

Many of these people are anti-Western by nature, by profession and career. They made their career out of it. These old stereotypes of Cold War are still alive. I graduated from MGIMO and many of my former colleagues are now diplomats in the world. [At that point, the interviewee insists that the conversation remains between the two of us as we both lower our voice.] When we meet in private, they say: “In our mind, we know that you’re right with your stance on cooperation, because Russia has no alternative. But by our heart, our soul, we cannot accept it.”

Significantly, the very same logic of ingrained dispositions is evident on NATO’s side, where an equal number of officials were trained in Cold War thinking for decades. There was no bureaucratic purge in the Alliance either, and a number of the officials I met had begun their careers during the Cold War years. As a result, many of them were also disposed in ways often reminiscent of confrontation: for example, the widespread fear of Moscow exploiting cracks in the Alliance, just mentioned, was clearly inherited from decades of enmity. As pundit Sergei Karaganov correctly observes: “Traditional thinking bureaucracies [both in Russia and in the United States] have often ‘stifled,’ and even torpedoed, agreements reached by the two leaders through bureaucratic procedures.”

One may be tempted to assume that mechanisms of generational change will progressively fix this problem. Based on poll data, Michael McFaul affirms that “[t]he age cohort that will come to power in Russia in the next two decades is pro-Western, and pro-American.” While I do not have numbers to contradict this claim, my interviews suggested that it may turn out to be overly optimistic. For instance, a Russian researcher who had taken part in the NATO rally conferences expressed her puzzlement about Russian students’ aggressiveness toward the Alliance. For the younger generations, the post-Cold War period has been one of chaos and humiliation. Contrary to their parents, several of whom had wanted (and acted in favour of) perestroika, younger Russians only know of democratic turmoil, of Russia’s international weakness and of (what they perceive as) Western arrogance. A German

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249 Checkel 1997, 112.
251 Expert, Centre for European Security, Moscow, 30.06.06.
254 Expert B, IMEMO, Moscow, 23.06.06.
senior officer who had been dealing with the Russians for many years explained: “I’m not sure this [generational change] will happen. There is no big difference in attitudes, because Russians have not broken with their past. Younger people speak English, but that doesn’t change their minds. They still feel we don’t understand, we don’t like whatever they do. They feel not respected. They have an outright problem facing reality and a very strong feeling of humiliation.” Among Russian students, the objective of returning Russia to its past greatness on the international stage seemed consensually shared. At least conjecturally, we might say that generational change may not be the beacon of hope one might have thought.

The second main obstacle to interaction on the ground is that Russian and Atlantic bureaucracies do not do things the same way when it comes to security-related matters. Today’s contrast in organizational cultures is obviously the extension of age-old differences on both sides. Interestingly, however, it is mostly Atlantic officials who raised concerns about the Russian bureaucratic habitus, which they perceived as overly “top-down” and “rigid.” To begin with the former complaint, an American diplomat who had negotiated with the Russians for decades noted that they usually strive for a top-level agreement whereas Westerners privilege low-level interactions and trust-building. For instance, the German officer who was tasked with opening the NATO Information Office in Moscow in 2001 recounted that his team was given only one single contact point and telephone number inside the entire state apparatus. That contact was a Russian official in charge of the MoD’s entire directorate for international treaties and had to assume the liaison with NATO on top of his other responsibilities. As the German colonel recalled: “We told them from the beginning that this is not the way we are working, that we’d like to talk to the different project officers [in charge of specific joint programs with NATO]. But they have a different system: they still want to control all.”

The same story was heard from the current NATO military representative in Moscow:

In the military, we have [here in Moscow] a mentality different from what we normally experience in Western countries. There is a tendency to control events closely, to centralize everything. They still have a different attitude toward classification of information, taking decisions on the highest possible level. … There is a strong tendency

255 Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07; Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
256 Expert C, ISKRAN, Moscow, 28.06.06.
260 Senior Officer B, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06; cf. Williams 2005, 46.
to keep everything under control. I wouldn’t talk of an obsession, but it’s a very strong attitude inside the Russian military to execute central control over cooperation activities.261

Even the second highest military officer in the NATO hierarchy complained that he could barely have contacts with the Russian General Staff.262

In this context, NATO practitioners perceived that the real engine (or brake!) of NATO-Russia relations was located not in Brussels but in Moscow. Instructions are sent directly from the highest echelons and implemented on the ground, often against the will of diplomats. In the words of a Canadian diplomat:

NATO officials get the impressions that the Russians don’t give it their best energy. They’re very rigid in meetings and negotiations. We get the feeling that we’re dealing with an ancient mindset. It is probably instructions directly from Moscow, where certain people want certain messages through. But it does not belong to the dialogue we’ve been having over the last few years. They sometimes come out of the blue with some confrontational language.263

In theory, however, this top-down chain of command can also have positive effects for cooperation. For instance, while the Russian mission to NATO opposed Russian participation in Operation Active Endeavour, a decree from the President was enough to get the initiative going.264 As one Russian expert summed up: “if Putin orders, they will do it!”265 This obviously leaves little room for informal compromises and exchanges at the NRC. For instance, one senior military officer complained that during NRC meetings, the Russians strictly present national positions but refuse to exchange ideas in a casual way. Informal discussions are kept to a minimum. As one British officer illustrated: “Relations are always cordial. We smile and drink vodka. … But the relationship finishes right after the meeting.”266

Top-down control of Russia-NATO interaction seriously stymies practical cooperation on the ground. Even a Russian professor admitted that “[w]e have a very Byzantine organization. Routines are not possible! All decisions are taken in the Kremlin and then sent to

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261 Senior Officer C, NATO International Military Staff, Moscow, 03.07.06.
262 Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06. One NATO official offered a dissenting view on this, arguing that he felt free to email “four or five people” and insisting that “it’s a normal hierarchy that everything [should go through the NATO mission]. They’re here everyday so we can meet them, discuss, have a coffee together.” Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
263 Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06.
264 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.
265 Expert B, ISKRAN, Moscow, 20.06.06.
266 Officer, British Ministry of Defence, London, 11.05.07.
the administrative level. [Bureaucrats] cannot push initiatives, only follow guidelines."²⁶⁷ For one thing, NATO is unable to reach a large number of Russian civil servants and militaries, especially at lower echelons: “Russia’s military still considers that the ability of senior officials to understand NATO policy and tactics could be sufficient to establish interoperability between our forces. We have a different view. We think it’s necessary that to develop interoperability, we require an extended understanding within the officers’ corps.”²⁶⁸ This is especially problematic because NATO officials “expect a snowball effect. … The more people get involved, the more it will become normality.”²⁶⁹ The rigidity of the Russian bureaucratic culture, in the mind of NATO practitioners, cannot allow this normalization to take place. This is all the more problematic in that it is a central trait of Russian culture that personal, friendly contacts are often necessary for anything to be solved.²⁷⁰ Contrary to institutionalized Western rapports, within the Russian bureaucracy many things happen na levo—on the side, through informal relations.²⁷¹ Only a handful of Atlantic practitioners reported such interpersonal relations.

The second difference in organizational culture deplored by Atlantic practitioners regards formalism and secrecy. A French delegate admitted that “on tough topics Russians get rigid and closed. It’s not informal. They don’t discuss freely because their system is still very controlled.” He believed that a key to improving the relationship would be to make it more informal by organizing luncheons without note-takers so that ambassadors could open up their book and show flexibility. “This is not the case with the Russians,”²⁷² he deplored. A Canadian diplomat concurred that NRC meetings “are not so open and free. It’s very scripted.”²⁷³ Rigidity also creates problems of attitude, according to one NATO official: “Russia is still seen as a major headache. In my view it’s a country that denies rather than creates, that tries to thwart

²⁶⁷ Expert, Centre for European Security, Moscow, 30.06.06. According to one practitioner, there was reportedly more transparency prior to Putin’s arrival at the country’s helm. Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
²⁶⁸ Senior Officer C, NATO International Military Staff, Moscow, 03.07.06. This interviewee added that “[w]e get the impression that people who have taken courses at NATO school or some Western institutes have not succeeded in their military as we expected.”
²⁶⁹ Senior Officer C, NATO International Military Staff, Moscow, 03.07.06.
²⁷⁰ Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06.
²⁷¹ Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06. Litterally, the idiom means “on the left-hand side.”
²⁷² Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06. This French official continued: “I tried once to do something of an informal prep com. I invited two or three Russians and five to six allies and we discussed the topics that ambassadors could negotiate in a near future. It was very difficult.” Several experts, Russian and Western alike, concur on the need for more interactive engagement on the ground; e.g., Hunter and Rogov 2004, viii, 8-10; Blagovoline 2000, 133.
²⁷³ Senior Official A, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.
what others are doing rather than coming with new good ideas. … Russia has the power to deny, but not the imagination and the power to create.” This, he insisted, is “not the way to make friends.”

A State Department official agreed that “[t]he Russians haven’t made it easy. They always take the opposite point of view on security issues.”

A British official similarly conceived of Russia as a “nuisance.” While the NATO organizational culture is perceived to rest on informal exchange, transparency, and non-confrontation, “Russia hasn’t really used the NRC in a way that would generate understanding. It has been more a vehicle for complaining than a vehicle for engaging.”

Russian and Atlantic practitioners perceive their respective negotiating cultures as quite different. Generally speaking, the Western way of doing things is more entrepreneurial whereas the Russians like to have signed documents to rely on. One American official who had been negotiating with the Russians for decades thought that “the only language the Russians understand is that of strength. Respect comes with strength.”

For a NATO official posted in Moscow, another trait of the Russian culture was especially striking: “This is a country of opposites, which never gives in suppleness. … It doesn’t support the middle—it’s all or nothing. This is a socio-cultural trait but it affects external policies. Russian reactions are generated through this: always very strong reactions, in favour or not.”

Lionel Ponsard supplies a telling example, which also touches on the importance of language in diplomatic interaction:

_Nyet_ is a simple Russian word that is often misunderstood. _Nyet_ seems to be an almost automatic response by officials when asked if something can be done; what, in the West, is usually perceived as an obvious sign of unwillingness. One should know that an initial “no” in Russia is never definite. This is rather a simple—but effective—tactic aimed at

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274 Senior Official D, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
276 Senior Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07.
277 Senior Official C, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06; Senior Official, German Foreign Office, Berlin, 14.05.07.
278 Official B, US State Department, Washington, 25.10.06.
279 Senior official A, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
280 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06. Another official minimized these differences: “Yeah, the Russians are maybe a little different, but we’re treating them as a Westernizing, if not Westernized, democracy. … There are times when you speak a little differently when the Russians are in the room than when they’re not, but frankly that’s the case with a lot of other circumstances. … I mean, when we [Canadians] and the Americans and the Brits, we don’t always speak the same language when the French are there. Or sometimes, it’s North Americans and the Europeans, the Japanese sometimes have to be given some special consideration or treatment. It’s in the nature of international diplomacy that we’re not just copycats of each other. We’re not clones. Every country comes there with its own history and its own interest and its own sensitivities. … I don’t think we take any special measures to avoid discussing certain things ‘cause the Russians are there or we purposely want to discuss something ‘cause the Russians. I think that used to be the case; it’s not the case now.” Senior Official A, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06.
gradually coercing the interlocutor to alter his position until the latter finally meets the Russians’ satisfaction. This practice is very much stamped with the Russian culture.281

Yet few NATO servants have a working knowledge of the Russian language and culture, as surprising as this may seem. One officer regrets that there has been “a marked reluctance by individual Allies to provide suitably qualified Russophone liaison officers.”282 The problem is compounded by the fact that Moscow obstinately persists in posting to Brussels ambassadors that have no knowledge of either French or English. Coming from a particularly polyglot Foreign Service such as Russia’s, this situation sounded like bad faith to many NATO practitioners. At the time of interview, any conversation with the Russian ambassador, General Konstantin Totsky, had to be mediated by an interpreter, which obviously creates serious barriers to communication and the free exchange of ideas.283

Several practitioners on the Alliance side were under the impression that the main stumbling block in developing informal ties with their Russian counterparts had to do with career prospects. As one German officer put it: “There’s no informality with the Russians, because getting informal with NATO officials means you’re burnt within the Russian administration. We’ve tracked officers with whom we’ve been in touch: they’re burnt. The Cold War is not over.”284 A number of NATO officials were not comfortable in addressing this sensitive topic but they could not deny that they too had had that impression.285 Oksana Antonenko cites the example of General Shevtsov, who led the Russian contingent in the Balkans and was widely hailed for his success in cooperating with NATO’s SACEUR. Upon his return to Russia, he was met with very little cooperation at the MoD and was ultimately moved to the Interior ministry.286

Finally, Atlantic practitioners also regret a culture of secrecy inside the Russian bureaucratic apparatus. A particularly telling example is Operation Active Endeavour, which gives the Russians “a great insight into how we do business, a great intelligence gathering. They

281 Ponsard 2007, 155.
282 Williams 2005, 47 fn. 18. Major General Peter Williams was the first Head of the NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow from 2002 to 2005.
283 Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07; Official, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 09.05.07. As notes Major General Williams, “on the Russian side the number of Anglophone generals and officers who can work in English and who understand NATO and Russia’s policy towards the Alliance is very small.” Williams 2005, 47 fn. 18.
284 Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07; Senior Official, German Foreign Office, Berlin, 14.05.07.
285 Senior Officer C, NATO International Military Staff, Moscow, 28.06.06. NATO officials also regret that those Russian officers who were trained by NATO in English did not come back in the military cooperation business; cf. Farwick 2004, 38.
286 Antonenko 2007, 94.
now have NATO secret communications on their ships, they see our standard operating procedures, they see our doctrines.” Yet this openness is not reciprocated, according to a senior NATO officer: “They have a big access. Now the flip side is we get access to theirs too. It hasn’t been the case yet.” This view is echoed by a NATO military commander, who estimated that “we don’t get back from Russia the openness we give. NATO is more forward.” Another example is that Russian practitioners at NATO HQ have access to the entire organization’s directory, whereas NATO officials in Moscow do not benefit from similar conditions. In the same vein, a British officer from MoD described the Russian reaction when given a tour of the building in London: “They’re amazed. This doesn’t happen in Moscow.”

But Russian practitioners were not outdone when it comes to criticizing the other party’s organizational culture. The generalized feeling in Moscow was that NATO bureaucratic practices betrayed an insuperable hubris—a conviction that the Alliance is right and that Russia can only admit this. A Russian official dispatched to NATO HQ put it bluntly: “NATO puts a lot of pressure on Russia and puts her on the defensive. The United States keeps lecturing Russia. This is not welcome. It looks like diktats for losing the Cold War. But Russia didn’t lose the Cold War: it was an internal choice. Russia has no complex of inferiority: it hasn’t lost anything.” Another expert described the American approach in equally harsh words: “If you only dictate and criticize, you don’t have friends. You’re lonely.” Under the current NATO approach, she argued, Russia is “rejected” and subjected to “double standards.” It is worth noting that similar words were used by S. Ivanov to criticize NATO’s policy with regards to terrorism, for instance. In 2006, this feeling of being unfairly treated was generalized among Moscow elites. One MGIMO professor described the Russian perception of NATO’s practices very aptly:

The West’s main fault is that, for its own good, it has imposed a choice on Russia: either the West or the East. … I don’t think the West is being sincere in forcing this choice. …

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288 Senior Official A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06. According to one American policymaker, NATO allies are decreasingly willing to share sensitive intelligence and technology with the Russians; Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
289 Senior officer, NATO Military Liaison; Moscow, 03.07.06.
290 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06. Interestingly, Russians do not perceive that it is treated as an equal by the EU either. They believe Europe “just keeps exporting its values”; Senior official, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 03.04.06.
291 Expert C, ISKRAN, Moscow, 28.06.06.
292 Ivanov 2005; also Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06
293 Expert, Carnegie Foundation Russia, Moscow, 13.06.06.
The West likes to think of itself as the keeper of values and as a ruler. It wants everybody to act like it, like a steamroller. … Yeltsin thought of himself as a pupil, but the government and the citizens felt insulted to be treated as such. … The West wants to be a tutor: why? … If one wants an effective neighbourhood policy, one needs a totally different model from that of the EU and NATO. Whereas the candidates were treated like objects, the new neighbours are subjects. This is the crucial difference: the object is passive while the subject is active. … What the West mainly lacks is the willingness to understand. It knows how to impose its own values but it doesn’t want to understand that they are different in Western and Eastern Europe.  

For the Russians, Atlantic diplomats are either unable or unwilling to take the legitimate interests of their interlocutors into account.

Exaggerated or not, these complaints about respective bureaucratic practices indicate not only differences in bureaucratic cultures, but also a kind of mutual resistance to adapt to the other’s organizational ways. As will become clear in the final section below as well as in chapters V and VI, much of the diplomatic difficulties in Russian-Atlantic dealings find their origins in the intense and persistent symbolic power struggles between Moscow and Brussels.

Take, for instance, this description by a French delegate of a typical negotiation at the NRC:

On many issues it works the same. They begin by saying they want to do this and that with us. We respond that such programs already exist in the larger framework of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. They answer that they don’t want to do it with the Georgians and everyone. They want an exclusive relationship with us, so we need to come up with a new document. We tell them we already have established this document and we offer it to Russia so that they can apply it. They reply that they’re not NATO applicants and that they want a joint programs of equals. They come from the Warsaw Pact where they were the kings. They don’t want to work with NATO concepts, they want to add something Russian. But we say no. They are progressively getting to it and mindsets are evolving. They need time: one does not catch flies with vinegar.

What this quotation reveals is that well-founded or not, Atlantic and Russian complaints about one another’s ways of doing stuff are not absolute but relational—they derive from a deeper struggle over who is going to define the rules of the game at the NRC.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: TWO MASTERS IN SEARCH OF AN APPRENTICE

In her important book, Alexandra Gheciu explains the success of NATO’s socialization strategies towards Eastern European countries in part by the parties’ mutual recognition of their respective roles as “teachers” and “students.” Based on extensive fieldwork, Gheciu discovers

294 Expert C, MGIMO, Moscow, 29.06.06.
295 Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
that “many pro-liberal elites in the former Communist bloc recognized NATO as a key institution of the Western community with which they identified, and, as such, as an authoritative, trustworthy source of expertise in the area of security.” As a result, the Alliance was successful in imposing its practices on Czech Republic and Romania. In Gheciu’s Bourdieuan “competence model of power,” which is close to that which I outlined in chapter II, “the ability to exercise social influence is not inherently attributed to the resources possessed by a given entity. Rather, the power of actors depends on the recognition of their role of influence by other participants in social interactions.” Power is more than the possession of resources; it requires some sort of recognition by the dominated. For example, the power relation linking a master to his apprentice entails that the practices of the former are reproduced by the latter simply because “this is the way the world goes round.” The master’s competence is felt by the apprentice, in and through practice, as a relation of immediate adherence to the nature of things.

The main argument of this concluding section is that such was not the case between Russia and NATO in 2006. Apart from a short-lived honeymoon during which Russia accepted playing the role of the junior partner (from 1992 to 1994), neither NATO nor Russia regarded the other as a master or a model to emulate. The next two chapters will explain the origins of this complex politics by analyzing NATO-Russia relations historically, from 1992 to the day. In keeping with the logic of practicality, the remainder of this chapter seeks to document, with interview data, the awkward situation in which Russian and NATO practitioners found themselves in 2006: there were two masters but no apprentices around the NRC table. To summarize the evidence, in 2006 the notion of Russia as a Great Power was the most widespread disposition across the Russian experts and practitioners I interviewed. Among NATO officials, equally pervasive were the equation of the Alliance with the international community and the naturalization of Western values and policies as universal. As a result, both Moscow and Brussels took their teaching (and non-teachable) role for granted. Throughout my interviews, NATO practitioners were tired of Russia’s insistence on Great Power status while

296 Gheciu 2005b, 13; Gheciu 2005a, 973.
297 The major difference between Russia and the Czech Republic in their relationship with NATO concerns medium-term objectives: Prague was invited to join NATO as early as 1997 and became a full member in 1999, whereas Russia joining NATO remains a distant hope at this point. The prospect of becoming a member of NATO, doubled with the full strength of the EU’s own socialization policies and promise of enlargement, have certainly provided huge incentives to reform. This prospect was absent with regards to Russia, where engagement was promoted for its own sake. However, in Gheciu’s second case, Romania did not receive “any guarantee that [it] would receive the reward of membership.” As a result, the (non-)prospect of enlargement cannot explain alone why NATO failed to socialize Russia. Gheciu 2005a, 974.
298 Gheciu 2005b, 16.
Russian officials took offence at the Alliance’s condescending approach. The result was unremitting symbolic struggles over the very terms of the relationship—as well as an ineffectual power relation precluding the embodiment of diplomacy as the self-evident way to go at the NRC.

According to Neumann, “[s]ince the early 1990s, Russia has struggled to find its role in the novel realities of international relations. In the various dimensions of Russian security policy, the concept of a Great Power stands out as a unifying formula for the conduct of affairs.”299 In effect, the narrative of Great Power-ness has become the knowledge basis from which all of the security elites think in Moscow. Chapter V will explain how this came to be; suffice it to show here that such was the case in 2006. One Russian expert made the presence of this disposition quite obvious in the Russian habitus, arguing that Russia “used to be a crucial player in international relations and so long as it exists, it will continue a grand strategy, not like small countries. It’s traditional because Russia is unique. It’s genetic in Russia. Most students— 90 percent, even more—are supportive of big politics and active involvement of Russia in world politics.” Crucially, she pursue, the narrative of Great Power-ness brought continuity in times of deep identity crisis in the 1990s: “there was a lot of criticism of everything Soviet. After that, there was a vacuum. Nothing meaningful was given to people, a substitute for the lost country, dignity, history, pride. … From the beginning of the 1990s, people understood we gave up everything but got nothing.”300 In this context, the return to Great Power-ness became the new buzzword in Russian foreign policy discourse, building on a long-embodied disposition among security practitioners in Moscow (cf. chapter V).301 In 2006, Primakov, who was instrumental in the mid-1990s in giving substance in policy to the Russian disposition of Great Power-ness, expressed the notion clearly:

Considering Russia’s history, intellectual resources, size, huge natural resources and, finally, the level of development of its Armed Forces, this country will not agree to the status of a state that is “led”; it will seek to establish itself as an independent center of a multipolar world. … Washington, relying on its present superiority, proceeds from the assumption that the United States will hold the central position in a future world system,

300 Expert C, ISKRAN, Moscow, 28.06.06; also Expert, Centre for European Security, Moscow, 30.06.06.
301 Expert, Carnegie Foundation Russia, Moscow, 13.06.06. For instance, here is how Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov put the matter in early 2007: “The foreign policy sovereignty of Russia is an absolute imperative. … Our country is not one that or its foreign policy could be directed from the outside. We are not out to be likable to everyone—we simply proceed from our own, understandable pragmatic interest. Let us recall that our country particularly strove to be ‘likable’ in the era of Nicholas I and in the last Soviet years: we know where that led us.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2007), “The Foreign Policy Sovereignty of Russia—An Absolute Imperative,” article by Sergey Lavrov,” 18 January (www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005cbff3/4a94acbef393c22, accessed 3 June 2007).
while the rest of the world will have to follow the “rules of behavior” dictated by the Americans.\textsuperscript{302}

Across my interviews with Russian practitioners and experts, it was a generally taken-for-granted “fact of life” that Russia belongs to this small clubs of nations that are bound to lead in international relations.\textsuperscript{303} Such is the destiny of a Great Power.

On the Atlantic side, the end of the Cold War sparked a widespread belief that the time had come for the West and its institutions (NATO, the EU, etc.) to export their values to the rest of the world. NATO’s undeniable success in socializing Eastern Europe obviously bolstered this self-understanding as the role-model of democracy, freedom and civilization. This “triumph” fostered a pre-existing Western disposition towards universalism and comforted institutions such as NATO in their role of teacher. In my interviews, I was struck by the extent to which Atlantic practitioners tend to equate (unconsciously, for the most part) the peculiar policies advocated by NATO with the consensus forged in the “international community.”\textsuperscript{304} In a preface to a book on the Kosovo war, former U.S. deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott goes as far as to write that “[t]o the extent that there is such a thing as an international community, it owes much to NATO.”\textsuperscript{305} As the embodiment of the international community, the Alliance should mould Russia to become a part of it: “The long-term objective has to be Russia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, the international community, on all levels, based on shared values; joining the international club of democratic, market-oriented countries. There is no competing model for organizing political and economic life in the international community aside from liberal democracy, rule of law and market economics.”\textsuperscript{306} The background assumption here, which has informed the Alliance’s political discourse since the end of the Cold War, is that NATO cannot but be the teacher. It is not Brussels that has to evolve or change but Moscow.\textsuperscript{307}

With Russia-as-a-great-power and NATO-as-the-international-community, there are two masters but no apprentices at the NRC. The Atlantic complex of superiority shows in a number

\textsuperscript{302} Primakov 2006, 2 (html version).
\textsuperscript{303} The only exception I met in Moscow proved the rule: “It is impossible for Russian leaders and the public alike not to see their country as a Great Power, but it is extremely difficult for them to come to terms with the huge and growing discrepancy between the country’s geographical size and its currently negligible economic and trade weight and the low ‘social status’ among the nations of the world”; Trenin 2002, 11.
\textsuperscript{304} E.g., Senior official E, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06; Senior Official C, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06; Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
\textsuperscript{305} Quoted in Norris 2005, ix.
\textsuperscript{306} Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
\textsuperscript{307} Senior Official E, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 31.03.06.
of tacit ways in practitioners’ understanding of Russian-Atlantic relations. For instance, one NATO official told me that “Russia still hasn’t fully grasped the situation the world and Russia are in.”308 Another policymaker in Washington regretted that “Russia has gone pre-Cold War in its mindset, in a kind of survival of the fittest.” He continued with a particularly telling analogy picturing Russia as “this huge, 17-year old male football player. He’s big and strong and no adult would presume to force him to do anything. … The problem for everyone around him is that you want him to be a good neighbour and a productive member of society. You wanna talk him through all this anger and aggression and resentment. But everything you do and say, he just turns against you. … You have to wait for him to grow.”309 The implicit assumption here clearly is that NATO embodies what Russia should strive to become. Another common premise sounded like “if only the Russians could understand…”—a clear instance of symbolic power struggles to impose the meanings of reality. On many occasions during my interviews, Atlantic practitioners would depict Russian attitudes as “archaic”310 or “outdated,”311 implying that Western thinking had “moved beyond” that. Some officials affirmed that Russians’ “expectations are not in tune with facts and reality”;312 others claimed they “are not able to make the conceptual leap.”313 “Zero-sum thinking,” for instance, was characterized as a “19th-century view of the world” characteristic of Moscow; “But if you look at the experience of the European Union and the United States, as we start in the 21st century, this has been flipped.”314 An EU policy-maker similarly believed that political elites in Russia and Europe “live in different time zones,” with Moscow striving “to join the Old World of fifty or a hundred years ago.”315

At the time of interviews, NATO officials were having quite a hard time coming to grips with Russia’s unrelenting quest for specificity in its dealings with Brussels. The equality status, for instance, was construed as “both unmerited and illogical.”316 Russia’s self-understanding as a Great Power was deemed “irrational and emotional.”317 Another officer expressed puzzlement that at the NRC “the Russians took a lot of time to understand they had a voice, not a vote. Their
feeling was that NAC decided everything without them.”

Across my interviews in Brussels and other Western capitals, there seemed to be a widespread fear that granting Moscow a special status would only reinforce its quest for Great Power-ness. One NATO speechwriter insisted that Russia should “be treated in a *slightly* different manner from the way we treat Albania, Azerbaijan.” This is unlikely to satisfy Russia’s great-power dispositions; but it looks like it is the furthest NATO practitioners think they should go.

I think one trend that emerged very early on, and which hasn’t changed at all, is that the Russians have constantly tried to differentiate themselves from the other partners. You know, they’ve never ever wanted to be viewed as being one of the others, I guess for many reasons but very heavy psychological reasons. It was a painful process for them. We all understand that. They didn’t want to be viewed on the same, you know, on the same platform as the others. They absolutely felt that, you know, “we’re a case alone. We deserve to be treated differently.” So from the very beginning we always made a very big effort to give them a relationship, which was not only—not quantitatively different, but qualitatively very different.

In actuality, however, chapters V and VI will show that the Alliance’s accommodations with Russia were often cosmetic not substantive. As one German official put it, NATO is “not willing to really change but to pay respect.” From the Atlantic practitioners’ point of view, Moscow is just not worthy of equal consideration: “What the Russians are doing is creating the image of trying to play in a game where they’re not players anymore.”

Dozens of interviews with Atlantic practitioners left no doubt that in 2006, NATO member states did not consider Russia as an equal but were instead consistently trying, with limited success, to steer Russia’s behaviour in NATO’s preferred direction. No one expressed it better than the director of the SG’s office:

“We want a Russia bound to the international system, that plays by the rules, that has an interest in upholding the system, not calling it into question. We want it to be a conservative power in the best sense, that wants to conserve the order, rather than a power that feels in jeopardy as it felt before the First World War. It’s not in our interest: we want to uproot this and have Russia bounded to a network and allow it to express it Great Power status instead of trying to subvert the Western… [here the interviewee had a slip of the tongue] not Western anymore—the international democratic order.”

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318 Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07
319 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06 (emphasis added).
320 Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04; Senior Officer A, NATO International Military Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
321 Official, German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 04.04.06. This preoccupation not to appear too pliant with the Russians in front of NATO allies was shared by all the German officials and officers I met.
322 Senior Official F, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
From this perspective, he added, the NRC “puts limits on how independent its actions can be because it has to go through these multilateral frameworks. We want to make those stronger to get Russia totally embedded.” One Alliance official posted in Moscow was just as blunt: “It may be true we impose some stuff, but we do it with their consent. Otherwise, nothing gets done.” In this interviewee’s opinion, it is not only NATO that influences Russia, but also the other way around: “if not of Russia, enlargement would have been done in a single shot, a big bang. This means Russia has had some influence. … Some facts demonstrate their influence: otherwise, why am I here in Moscow?” This view was not shared by a German official who negotiated with the Russians in NATO’s name throughout the 1990s: “from their point of view, they have lots of reasons to complain and to say: ‘Well, you do listen to us, but you don’t take into account our argument.’ That’s what you continuously hear from them.” Commenting on Russia’s influence over NATO, he assessed it has “[v]ery little, so objectively they have a point. There is very little that we’ve done in the past to accommodate Russian concerns.”

In their relationship with NATO counterparts, however, the Russians did not suffer from any kind of reciprocal inferiority complex. In 2006, the dominant narrative of Great Power-ness in Moscow meant that the partnership should be among “equals.” As a result, NATO’s self-attributed role as a teacher was not recognized by the Russians—in fact, it was rather despised. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO tried extremely hard to impose its views and steer Russia’s course, with some success during the 1990s. But these attempts also fed a backlash as resentment steadily (if quietly) built up in Moscow. The general feeling in 2006 resounded a bit like: “no more jostling, NATO.” The Russian practitioners I met consensually asked for “mutual respect and parity,” “all-round mutual account of interests and inadmissibility of double standards.” In the words of the Russian ambassador to the EU: “Russia has full rights and counts on participation in European affairs as an equal partner. It should not be isolated from the remaining part of the continent by new dividing lines and should not be the object of ‘civilizing influence’ on the part of other countries or their unions but should be equal among equals.” Yet this is apparently not the approach that is taken on the ground. In this context, it should not come as a surprise that in 2006, the main role model in Moscow was Aleksandr Gorchakov,

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324 Senior Official B, NATO International Staff, Moscow, 06.06.06.
325 Senior Official, German Foreign Office, Berlin, 14.05.07.
327 Quoted in Blank 2006, 24.
Foreign minister to tsar Aleksandr II in the aftermath of the Russian defeat in Crimea (1856). Gorchakov’s main principle, as one NATO official caricatured it, was: “Act big even when you’re small if you’re Russia, because eventually your natural power will reassert itself.”

As I showed above, NATO’s domineering approach did not go unnoticed in Moscow and my interviews showed how embittered Russian security elites had become by 2006. As one expert observed: “The strong attitude in Moscow is that Russia was humiliated in the 1990s many times.” For the Russians, the main policy that the Alliance imposed against Russia’s opposition was NATO enlargements (cf. chapters V and VI): “Russia’s opinions were not taken into account. Here, actions mean more than words: NATO puts forward a number of arguments but acts otherwise. This is not a question of putting soft words in people’s ears. The question is: why is NATO pushing?” In the words of one of the most pro-Western experts I met in Moscow, “the West tried to press Russia, to show that ‘your game is over.” The result was, according to an eminent Russian expert, that ideological confrontation has given way to a new kind of competition, full of mistrust and suspicion, based on a feeling that “Russia is considered as an element of the international community which should be downplayed and pushed, not allowed to become a strong international actor.”

In 2006, Russia’s strong rejection of NATO’s didacticism entailed a very limited power relation in and through practice. So much so, in fact, that in my interviews several Russian elites insisted on the need to stay clear from a number of Alliance practices. The emphasis rather was put on sovereignty and strategic independence. In the words of an EU official, Russia “wants to be very much like the West, but at the same time wants to stress its special identity.” In a noted *Foreign Affairs* piece, Dmitri Trenin put the new general mood in very clear words:

The Kremlin’s new approach to foreign policy assumes that as a big country, Russia is essentially friendless; no Great Power wants a strong Russia, which would be a formidable competitor, and many want a weak Russia that they could exploit and manipulate. Accordingly, Russia has a choice between accepting subservience and reasserting its status as a Great Power … The United States and Europe can protest this change in

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329 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
330 Senior Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
331 Official, Russian Mission to NATO, Brussels, 11.04.06.
332 Expert, Centre for European Security, Moscow, 30.06.06.
333 Expert A, IMEMO, Moscow, 23.06.06. Note that Vladimir has expressed similar concerns; e.g., President of Russia (2006), “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly,” 10 May (www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566, accessed 12 May 2006).
334 Senior Official A, European Commission, Brussels, 05.04.06.
Russia’s foreign policy all they want, but it will not make any difference. They must recognize that the terms of Western-Russian interaction, conceptualized at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse 15 years ago and more or less unchanged since, have shifted fundamentally. The old paradigm is lost, and it is time to start looking for a new one.\footnote{335}

In this new context, most Russian experts advocate a policy that retains maximum freedom of action by avoiding formal alliances: “Russia should adopt a policy that has as its slogan: ‘Together with the West but going our own way.’”\footnote{336} Because of this desire for independence, obtaining recognition from NATO takes on far less importance. As one expert put it, “now that we are strong, the West has to accommodate us. Now we are ready to competition with the Western states; we will not concede anymore.”\footnote{337} Interestingly, in 2006 a high-level panel of American experts and politicians took note of this fundamental shift: “Urging Russia to take a more democratic direction must be done with great care. America will not succeed if it is seen to be hypercritical, hypocritical, or excessively meddlesome. … The United States and its allies should not belittle Russia by subjecting it to double standards, but show respect by holding it to high ones.”\footnote{338}

In 2006, several Atlantic practitioners were taking note of their increasing incapacity to exert authority over Russia’s foreign policy. One Alliance official expressed his feeling of impotence openly:

[Compared to other partners, Russia] is a tough case because, for instance, in terms of defence reform, the Russians stated that “of course Russia is a great country so we are doing our own defence reform. We will not simply copy what you’re doing because of course we have our own ideas. Of course we will learn what we want to learn from you but not everything.” In case of for instance Ukraine and Georgia or those countries who become members it’s much easier because we have our standards and we say, “if you want to become members of NATO you have to do this, this, and this” and they don’t have a choice. They have a choice but the other choice is not really an option for them. But there is no leverage basically on Russia. [… All that NATO can use is] well, logic, pure logic. We try to convince them that the way we are doing it is much more effective, much more efficient, actually affordable, etc. It’s pure logic I think.\footnote{339}

In this context, he regretted that “[w]hen Russia was weak they were much more friendly, frankly, and it was much easier to deal with them. [During the Kosovo crisis] I don’t think it was very difficult to deal with them anyway. We simply ignored their views. That wasn’t really

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\footnote{335}{Trenin 2006, 1 (html version).}
\footnote{336}{Karaganov 2005, 40.}
\footnote{337}{Expert C, IMEMO, Moscow, 30.06.06.}
\footnote{338}{Council on Foreign Relations 2006, 8; Senior Official A, European Commission, Brussels, 05.04.06.}
\footnote{339}{Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.}
very difficult.” On the NATO side, interminable struggles with Russia eventually yielded to a kind of “Russia-fatigue”—“a culture of disappointment and resignation” that Russia might never see reason, so to speak. In the words of an American policy-maker: “There is a certain feeling of impotence among allies when it comes to influencing Russian policy.” One Canadian diplomat even compared Russia to “those big dump trucks [with] a sign at the back [that reads:] ‘Do Not Push.’ … You can’t push Russia.” In 2006, it looked as if Russia and NATO did not inhabit the same world: “Taking a Russian point of view, their objective is to be a great country. They feel this status was robbed from them by the West at the end of the Cold War and they need to restore that. … Our objective is for Russia to be a normal country, like any other countries. … It’s always frustrating that we’re not mentally in the same place. Because the rest of the world is: China is in many ways more ready to act like that than Russia.”

In terms of the embodiment of diplomacy, the fierce struggle between NATO and Russia over their respective status had negative consequences. The fact that there were two masters in search of an apprentice at the NRC rendered any power relation there ineffectual. As far as the normalization of disputes is concerned, the rise of Russia’s Great Power dispositions sparks perception of assertiveness, if not aggressiveness, among NATO’s officials: “Now we deal already with an emerging power, which is much more assertive, which also changes the nature of our potential disagreements, so I feel that the question is that when we have disagreements with Russia, or have issues to discuss, that it is different from, for example, when the European countries have issues with the United States, or France has issues with the UK.” With two masters at the table, it is not clear how disagreements will be solved or finessed.

Furthermore, the ever fastidious NATO-Russia negotiations over things as simple and banal as technical rules of military cooperation thwarted plans for joint exercises or missions between Moscow and Brussels. For instance, one NATO official lamented that “even the Swedes take NATO standards, they see their advantage in using it. The Russians don’t think

340 Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
342 Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
343 Senior Official A, Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 28.02.06; official D, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.06.
344 Senior Official C, US State Department, Washington, 26.10.06.
345 Senior Official A, European Commission, Brussels, 05.04.06; Official C, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 04.04.06.
they need it. They were already like that in the early 1990s.”

Even crucial matters such as peacekeeping have had to be put off the agenda for lack of a working relationship:

The Russians said they wanted to develop new joint procedures for peacekeeping. The United States and other allies said: “Enough! We draw different lessons and we can do this without these new procedures but by associating you when there is a need.” There was reluctance so the debate stopped. We don’t talk about this anymore. The issue is not dead but it’s on ice. That’s the problem with Russia: everything that was easy to do, we’ve done. We’ve eaten all the meat on the bone, and now that we’re at the bone we feel we’ve eaten enough.

In its opposition to what it perceives as Atlantic arrogance, Allison reports that “Russia has insisted that its military forces will no longer join ‘NATO-led’ operations.” All in all, what best characterized the Russian-Atlantic relationship in 2006 from the practitioners’ point of view was its intense power politics of diplomacy (cf. chapter I). The key question then becomes: what are the historical origins of 2006 Russian-Atlantic symbolic power politics? The next two chapters supply an answer by looking back at the evolution of the relationship over the post-Cold War era.

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346 Senior Official A, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 03.04.06.
347 Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06; Official, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 12.04.06; Senior Official A, US State Department, Washington, 24.10.06.
348 Allison 2006, 112.
Chapter V
THE EARLY STEPS:
RUSSIA, NATO AND THE DOUBLE ENLARGEMENT, 1992-1997

In the next two chapters (V and VI), I look back into history and seek to explain the main finding of chapter IV—that in 2006, NRC practitioners had embodied diplomacy as a normal though not a self-evident practice in solving Russian-Atlantic disputes. This snapshot picture intended to present, in a synchronic way, the politics of Russia-NATO diplomacy from the practitioners’ point of view. In taking the first and part of the second steps of my subjectivist methodology, I supplied a highly inductive and interpretive analysis of practical logics which remained, admittedly, quite static. Recovering the subjective meanings at the 2006 NRC begs the question of just how have we got there? Since all socially constructed meanings—including practical logics—emerge from past social struggles, one must add a diachronic dimension to the analysis and set meanings in motion (cf. chapter III). In accordance with the second and third steps of my subjectivist methodology, the objective of this and the next chapters is to objectify knowledge by locating the 2006 subjective and practical meanings into their larger intersubjective and historical context. To do so, I analyze the evolution of the diplomatic practice along the last decade and a half of Russia-NATO interactions with regards to the double enlargement.

My analytical narrative reveals an intriguing paradox in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic security relations. On the one hand, the unremitting disputes that have characterized Russia-NATO dealings over the double enlargement have all been solved non-violently, a process that is in keeping with security-community emergence and the empirical analysis I presented in chapter I. It is particularly striking that Moscow and Allied capitals were able to establish such a track record of peaceful change despite the depth of their disagreements over the future of the Alliance. Given its profoundly contentious nature, the double enlargement constitutes a particularly tough test for the emergence of a Russian-Atlantic security community. Insofar as the essence of a security community is peaceful change, the test was passed, most clearly during the 1990s but also into the new millennium. My historical analysis of Russian-Atlantic practices over the double enlargement demonstrates the strong and consistent prevalence of the non-violent settlement of disputes in the post-Cold War era.

But on the other hand, the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic track record of peaceful change is not sufficient for a solid security community to emerge in and through practice. For
one thing, oftentimes Russian-Atlantic non-violent settlement of disputes was bought at the expense of trust-building. NATO’s double enlargement policy led the Russians to feel that their interests would not be taken into account by the Alliance. Trust, a practical sense that Adler and Barnett conceptualize as a necessary condition for security community, paradoxically declined as Russia and NATO successfully solved their mutual disputes peacefully. For another, the homology between positions in the field and dispositions in habitus, which is necessary for diplomacy to turn into a doxic practice, started to crumble in the mid-1990s. In reaction to NATO’s double enlargement, Russian dispositions toward Great Power-ness resurfaced and gradually consolidated after the Kosovo intervention (cf. chapter VI). This helps understand how and why there are two masters and no apprentice at the NRC table (cf. chapter IV), as well as the deleterious effects that this pattern of relation has on the emergence of a Russian-Atlantic security community.

In this chapter, I essentially tell the following story. In the first section, I explain what the new, post-Cold War rules of the international security game were, how they were imposed by NATO, and how they were zealously implemented by the Russians until late 1994. In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, NATO promoted the internal mode of pursuing security while Russia seemed happy to play the junior partner. The second section then shows how the decision to enlarge functionally and geographically put an end to this pattern of domination and seriously thwarted the development of trust in Russia-NATO dealings. In Russian eyes, these practices undermined the new rules of the international security game. As a result, while disputes kept being solved non-violently, the level of trust in Russia-NATO diplomatic dealings went down. In the third section, I illustrate the change in Russian attitudes with the revival of the Great Power habitus in Moscow, which created strong hysteresis effects during the tense negotiations over the Founding Act signed in 1997. Chapter VI will complete this historicization of Russia-NATO dealings over the double enlargement by focusing on the period ranging from 1998 to this day. Overall, in the post-Cold War era NATO did succeed in “disciplining” Russia and keeping it more or less “in its place” by making the non-violent settlement of disputes the normal way to go in mutual dealings. But contrary to Williams and Neumann’s claim that NATO was able to steer Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era,¹ I argue that such was decreasingly the case starting in the mid-1990s.

¹ Williams and Neumann 2000.
A. THE NEW RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY GAME

In this first section I make two related arguments. First, I describe the nature of the new rules of the international security game in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and characterize them as a shift from the external to the internal mode of pursuing security. NATO and its member states were the main proponents and beneficers of this evolution because it consolidated their dominant position in the field. Second, I demonstrate that from 1992 until mid-1994, Russia very zealously adhered to the new rules of the game, in its foreign policy discourse as well as in deeds. During that sort-lived period, the strong homology between positions in the field and dispositions in habitus created fertile conditions for doxa and the self-evident practice of diplomacy in Russia-NATO dealings.

1. NATO Order/s: Security from the Inside Out

The end of the Cold War constituted a watershed in the history of the field of international security. After decades of bipolar confrontation, the whole structure of political interaction underwent radical changes prompted in large part by the demise of the USSR. At the intersubjective level, the rules of the game of international security underwent significant changes. As Gheciu insightfully argues, the principle of sovereignty, which forms the normative basis of the contemporary international society, enables two distinct modes of pursuing security: an inside mode and an outside mode.2 The outside mode, which was prevalent during the Cold War (and forms the traditional focus of security studies), is based on geostrategic arrangements such as alliance-making and power-balancing. In this scheme, the military instrument is the main tool to enhance security. Throughout the Cold War, NATO’s doctrine relied for the most part on this approach, emphasizing conventional and nuclear deterrence of the Soviet threat. By contrast, the inside mode of pursuing security proposes that stability in world politics relies on states’ domestic institutions and order. In the Kantian tradition, for instance, democratic regimes are valued as efficient means to achieve international security. To be sure, given its liberal origins NATO has always espoused this view in its discourse. However, in the post-Cold War world, security-from-the-inside-out gained an “unprecedented importance” in the field of international security.3 Traditional realpolitik became second to democratic peace as a means to achieving security.

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2 Gheciu 2005b, 4-9.
3 Ibid., 9.
This intersubjective change became evident in the early 1990s when the principles that had given birth to the CSCE in the mid-1970s were consolidated and extended. Mostly under the initiative of Western countries, the CSCE had been an early proponent of the inside mode of pursuing security. Its agreed-upon political principles enshrined several of the basic ideas that still underpin the security-from-the-inside-out paradigm. Most importantly, the CSCE process is based on a comprehensive approach to security in which politico-military issues (basket I) are only one dimension along with human rights and freedoms (basket II) and economic and environmental well-being (basket III). These various dimensions of security are construed as interconnected and interdependent. Furthermore, in the CSCE spirit security is indivisible, mutual, and it must be pursued by cooperative means. The means of cooperative security, including mutual transparency, accountability and confidence-building, have to do not only with foreign policy but also, and in fact primarily, with domestic politics. Human rights and freedoms, traditionally a domestic concern, become part of the international security game. In this sense, the CSCE approach constitutes the opposite of deterrence and balancing—that is, the external mode of pursuing security.

With the end of the Cold War, the inside mode of pursuing security gained even more political prominence within the CSCE/OSCE process. The Paris Charter, signed in 1990, proclaimed that democracy had become the only legitimate form of government in Europe and promulgated the protection of human rights as the only way to organize the relationship between member states and their citizens. This was a watershed in the history of the international security field, argue Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell:

The recognition of democracy as the only legitimate form of governance in Europe had profound implications for the conception of sovereignty. For most of the history of the modern state system, the external sovereignty of a state has been deemed independent of where sovereignty resides within the state. … The Charter of Paris modified this understanding. Where sovereignty resides within the state became central to the interstate order that was being created and thereby of concern to others states.4

In addition, an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was set up and a High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCMN) was nominated with mandates to monitor the internal political situation of the OSCE states. Other similar initiatives were taken in the following years, including the establishment of a Code of Conduct on the role of the armed forces in democratic societies (1994, amended in 1999) or the designation of a Representative on Freedom of the Media (1997). The Istanbul Charter for European Security, adopted in 1999,

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went as far as to recognize human rights not as an end in itself, but as a means to strengthen member states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty. The OSCE’s *droit de regard* in domestic affairs, accompanied with proper means to follow up, certainly constitutes the ultimate political expression of the rise of the inside mode of pursuing security in post-Cold War international politics.

The OSCE’s practices and its approach to security from the inside out quickly diffused to other international institutions in the post-Cold War era. They inform, for instance, the agenda of “human security” that has been promoted by a number of countries, especially Canada, as well as by some UN agencies. The internal mode of pursuing security is also a central component of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, which puts democracy and human rights front and centre of its external relations. As the 2003 European Security Strategy states: “The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.” Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the internal mode of pursuing security came to constitute the basic rationale for the political processes that are the focus of this chapter—NATO’s functional and geographical enlargements. As Gheciu notes, “at the end of the Cold War, the international promotion of Western-based liberal democratic norms in Central/Eastern Europe was regarded within NATO as both an important recipe for enhancing Euro-Atlantic security and as a viable project.” NATO’s double enlargement was—and still is—designed as part and parcel of the new rules of the game in the post-Cold War international security field.

NATO was particularly instrumental in effecting this intersubjective transformation toward security-from-the-inside-out. In fact, not only was the shift promoted by the Alliance, it also contributed a lot to consolidate NATO’s new dominance in the field. For one thing, the demise of communism (not only in the USSR but also on the world scale) directly benefited NATO by opening a window of opportunity to change the rules of the game toward the internal mode of pursuing security. In contrast to free-falling post-Soviet countries, the Alliance stood as an island of stability in amidst the structural shifts of the end of the Cold War. Given its successful history, NATO imposed itself as a “locus of accumulated [capital]”: “The alliance provided a uniquely powerful venue in which the new situation could be defined, policies

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7 Gheciu 2005b, 5; interview with Anthony Lake, Washington, October 2006.
pronounced, forces mobilized.”

First, despite important military cuts at the end of the Cold War, NATO benefited from a growing military superiority while retaining a unique institutional strength as a tightly-knit alliance that had triumphed, in Western eyes, over a decades-long rivalry. Second, the Alliance boasted a new civilizational identity as the spearhead of democracy and human rights on the international stage. As Williams explains, “the West appropriated the claim to represent democratic values, and asserted its own inherent peacefulness. In short, the idea of the democratic peace allowed the military conflict of the Cold War to be transformed into a cultural struggle, thus contributing to the exercise of specific strategies and forms of cultural power.”

Third and relatedly, in reifying democracy and human rights as natural and universal, the Alliance concealed its own domination as a disinterested advocate of universal values. As a result, in the new internal mode of pursuing security, NATO enjoyed a strong position of preeminence.

In the new rules of the international security game, promoted in large part by NATO itself, talk about power balancing became passé and illegitimate. It was replaced with the promotion of democracy and human rights as the best means of ensuring security. As Williams continues: “Through an appeal to the centrality of culture in the new security context—by invoking the triumph of Western culture, the universality of liberal ideals, values and institutions, and even the end of history—a new set of power relations became dominant.”

In this context, the Alliance legitimated its transformation with the principles of cooperative security and human rights embodied by the CSCE process. With the USSR still alive, NATO’s SG Manfred Wörner promoted “a more diffuse concept of security in which economic integration and assistance and the internal democratization of states become as important as traditional military defence in maintaining security.”

As David Yost explains, after the end of the Cold War the Alliance repositioned itself from a collective defense organization (territorial defense) to one concerned with collective security (security and peace enforcement). The first push toward transforming NATO came at the London summit (1990), where Allies explicitly embraced the idea of indivisible security by recognizing that “in the new Europe, the security of

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8 Williams 2007, 41.
9 Ibid., 40-41.
10 Ibid., 43.
11 Ibid., 40.
12 Woerner 1991, 8.
13 Yost 1998a.
every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours.”

The Alliance also enunciated for the first time what would become one of its fundamental tasks in the post-Cold War era—partnership: “The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.” At the Rome summit, one year later, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Designed “as an explicit outgrowth of NATO practices,” the NACC sought to partner with former enemies and foster transparency, confidence and inclusiveness.

After the demise of the USSR, several American pundits and politicians went on to chant a new slogan: “NATO must go out of area or it will go out of business.” In 1993, the geographical dimension of enlargement was only beginning to receive public scrutiny. At the time, attention was on the Alliance’s mandate, which some proposed to expand in two main directions: partnership and peacekeeping. As for partnerships, noticeable initiatives include the NACC, the PfP launched in 1994, as well as the EAPC, founded in 1997 to replace the NACC. Interestingly, some of the PfP’s objectives are in direct line with the internal mode of pursuing security, such as increasing transparency in defence planning and budgeting or fostering democratic control of the military. The second dimension of NATO’s functional enlargement concerned peacekeeping. During the Rome summit in 1991, Allied member states mentioned for the first time the possibility of deploying forces for “crisis management” in addition to collective defence missions. Six months later, in Oslo, the NAC formalized this functional turn by stating its readiness “to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making

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15 Ibid., par. 4 and 8.
17 Wallander 2000, 720.
available Alliance resources and expertise.” Within a year after the Soviet threat was gone, NATO had already taken a new lease on life while progressively imposing itself as the dominant IO in the field of international security.

2. The Junior Partner: Russia’s Early Embrace of the New Rules of the Game

In its first years as an independent country, Russia enthusiastically embraced the internal mode of pursuing security, even to the point of supporting NATO’s transformation in that direction. When the Alliance proposed to establish military contacts with former Warsaw Pact countries, in 1992, reactions in Moscow were generally positive. In a similar way, at first the Russians were quite supportive of NATO’s functional transformation toward peacekeeping. For instance, the Charter of Russian-American Partnership and Friendship, signed in October 1992, asserted that Russia and the United States support “the creation of a rather strong Euro-Atlantic peacekeeping potential, based on the CSCE’s political authority, that would allow for use of the possibilities of the [NACC].” It is true that a few Russian officials expressed concern that the Oslo summit “could mean that one day NATO soldiers might turn up somewhere in Nagorno-Karabakh or the Dnestr region.” But these fears concerned NATO per se, not the internal mode of pursuing security that the organization had come to profess. Clearly, the new Russian elites who came to power in 1992 arrived at the Kremlin with strong dispositions to support the new rules of the international security game.

These liberal dispositions were largely inherited from Gorbachev’s “New Thinking.” Heavily inspired by the CSCE process, the New Thinking rested on three core ideas. First, security must be mutual or common. The existence of the security dilemma means that security cannot be pursued unilaterally. Second, resort to force is neither legitimate nor effective as a means of solving international disputes. Reassurance is as important as deterrence. Third, universal values such as human rights trump class struggles and ideological rivalries. Each of

these three principles conforms, in one way or another, to the internal mode of pursuing security by repudiating force and encouraging domestic reforms. Several actions taken by Moscow in the late 1980s, including asymmetric and unilateral reductions in nuclear and conventional forces as well as the surrender of the Soviet glacis in Eastern Europe, were in direct line with these ideas. This is not to say that Gorbachev was an idealist politician who weakly surrendered to the West. There should be no doubt that the New Thinking was an attempt to renew communism in a time of severe domestic and international crisis and give Moscow higher moral ground vis-à-vis the West. Breaking with the Cold War logic, Gorbachev and his team began pursuing security by other means—eventually losing control over the new dynamic they had unleashed.

After the implosion of the USSR, in December 1991, the new ruling elites in Moscow essentially followed the precepts of New Thinking and the internal mode of pursuing security. In an article published during the summer of 1992, then Foreign minister Kozyrev explained how the notion of human rights had become the backbone of Russia’s foreign policy:

The realization of human rights in our country is inseparable from our policy to integrate Russia into the global family of democratic states. We will combine our efforts with those taken by all states which recognize that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential component of peace, justice and well being. This principle has become one of the mainstays of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation ... The supremacy of human rights is indeed the basis on which states should seek to discover a common language, a sort of “humanitarian Esperanto.”

Kozyrev took special pride in the fact that in a recent meeting in Moscow, the CSCE’s Commission on the Human Dimension had approved a provision to the effect that concern for human rights was not interference in the internal affairs of states. He also recalled that in January 1992, the CSCE had taken as its main objectives the protection of human rights and democracy and the promulgation of the rule of law. In order to show that this policy was being implemented, the Russian Foreign minister explained how the Russian delegation advocated more effective mechanisms for introducing democratic human rights standards into the internal political life of individual states during the 48th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. “Progress in human rights is a precondition for creating an atmosphere of stability, justice, security, cooperation and lasting peace,” concluded Kozyrev passionately.

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26 Welch Larson and Shevchenko 2003.
27 Kozyrev 1992, 289. I should emphasize that in quoting this (and any other) speech, I do not presume that its author necessarily believed all that was said; there is no way to see what is between peoples’ earlobes. However, the very performance of this discourse, in public, speaks volumes about the Russian elites’ “sense of their place” in the early 1990s.
28 Ibid., 290.
In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, Russian statespeople spoke and behaved like very strong advocates of the internal mode of pursuing security. The team in power at the Kremlin, personified by Yeltsin and Kozyrev, was disposed to recognize the new order of things imposed by NATO. The empowered habitus in Moscow was somewhat homologous to the new doxa of the international security field. In the post-Cold War era, democratization was to replace power balancing as the primary means of achieving security. According to Robert English’s in-depth study of the origins of the end of the Cold War, these dispositions had historically formed in Russia during the Nikita Khrushchev “thaw” in the 1960s, when a group a young apparatchiks was socialized into a different way of looking at the world.\(^{29}\) Clearly, these democratic inclinations remained the preserve of a small elite in Moscow under Gorbachev, although an increasing portion of the Russian population seemed disposed toward them in the early 1990s. Institutionally empowered in the new Russia, it is this liberal habitus that led to a striking homology between Russian dispositions and the country’s position in the new field of international security.

In the absence of hysteresis effects, NATO’s domination over Moscow went unchecked. Because of the homology of their habitus to the field’s new doxa, the Russian elites became complicit of their own domination as they were disposed to play the Alliance’s game of security-from-the-inside-out. For almost two years, from 1992 to mid-1994, the Alliance was able to steer Russian foreign policy in a way reminiscent of the archetypical master-apprentice case. Two sets of issues show especially clearly how much the Russians emulated NATO practices in a consistent way. The first was already mentioned above and concerned the Alliance’s functional transformation from collective defence \textit{stricto sensu} to collective security. In fact, the Russians were so supportive that at first they even showed interest in joining the organization. At the very first meeting of the NACC, in late December 1991, president Yeltsin wrote a letter declaring that “today we are raising the question of Russia’s membership of NATO [as a] long-term political aim.”\(^{30}\) Because NATO officials never responded to this gesture, Moscow had to retract and claim that Yeltsin’s letter had been mistranslated.\(^{31}\) But throughout 1992 and on to the first half of 1993, several Russian officials informally tested the grounds for membership again. The NATO answer, however, was negative (reportedly under

\(^{29}\) English 2000; interview with Georgi Arbatov, Moscow, July 2006.  
\(^{30}\) Quoted in Smith 2006, 51.  
\(^{31}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 140 fn. 3.
That did not prevent several pundits from arguing that in the post-Cold War era, Russia firmly belonged to NATO—its “natural ally” and even “the only guarantee of our security.” Even when the difficulties of integrating Russia into the Alliance became obvious, the ultimate objective was not discarded by specialists. Writing in the NATO Review in early 1993, Kozyrev argued that his main foreign policy guideline was to “join the club of recognized democratic states.” Clearly, serious consideration was given in Moscow to bidding for membership in NATO.

Equally striking is the fact that Russia’s sanguine attitude toward NATO’s functional transformation did not darken when it became obvious that by taking up new functions of partnership and peacekeeping, the Alliance was giving itself a new lease on life. Of course, most Russian specialists and politicians had first expected NATO to disband just like the Warsaw Pact had and be replaced with the OSCE as a pan-European security institution. The Alliance dissipated all doubts, however, when in 1991 it stated its objective to remain “the essential forum for consultation among the Allies.” While this should have logically tempered Moscow’s enthusiasm, for a time the enlargement of NATO’s functions to peacekeeping and partnership was still considered by the new Russian elite as fitting the security-from-the-inside-out approach. For instance, the inclusive and cooperative spirit of the NACC was in line with the CSCE’s cooperative security approach and seemed to suit Russian interests quite well. Still in October 1993, when the Americans first floated the idea of the PfP with the Russians, the initial reaction was quite favourable. Yeltsin was reported to approve the outreach initiative toward the post-communist world insofar as it included Russia too. It seemed as though the Russian apprentice would nod in response to whatever the Atlantic master said.

Second, NATO’s domination over Russia was also obvious in Moscow’s early actions with respect to the civil war in Yugoslavia. The Alliance did not lose much time before putting its new peacekeeping function into practice. The Bosnian civil war, which raged from 1992 to

32 Ibid., 141 fn. 17.
36 Kozyrev 1993, 3.
1995, provided Brussels with its first test-case of the collective security doctrine. NATO became involved in the conflict very gradually. During the summer of 1992, presidential candidate Bill Clinton was the first to mention the possibility of allied air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in combination with the lifting of UN sanctions against the Bosnian government (the “lift and strike” strategy). European allies, however, were not convinced and rather favoured the UN-sponsored Vance-Owen plan, which finally faltered in mid-1993. NATO then undertook two operations (codenamed Operation Deny Flight and Operation Sharp Guard) intended to support UNSC resolutions on the deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. In July 1993, SG Wörner in turn called for air strikes, later to retract and reaffirm the need for UN approval before any such action. Finally, after the bombing of Sarajevo’s market in February 1994, the UN SG asked the Security Council to mandate NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions. Starting in April, Alliance forces led by the Americans intensified their bombing of Bosnian Serb forces until the Srebrenica massacre, during the summer of 1995, which led to Operation Deliberate Force and about 3,500 sorties in total. The Dayton Accord was finally concluded later that fall under strong American leadership.

Looking at NATO-Russia dealings over involving the Alliance in the Bosnian civil war, the most striking aspect is the explicit support the Russian government offered in the beginnings.39 Until February 1994, Russia shared “the predominant Western interpretation of events in Bosnia: that Serb expansionism and aggressive ethnic nationalism was directed against the legitimate government of a sovereign and independent state.”40 Significantly, this supportive approach was translated into deeds, as demonstrated by Russia’s alignment with the Western members of the UNSC. Recall that in September 1991, Gorbachev’s Soviet Union had voted in favour of resolution 713 imposing an arms embargo on all warring parties. That was already a tangible demonstration of the new strength of cooperative security. In the first months of 1992, the new Russian government pursued this alignment by supporting resolutions 727 (on the Sarajevo cease-fire signed in November 1991), 740 (on the political settlement of the conflict) and 743 (establishing the UNPROFOR). The Russians also supported the Vance-Owen plan, whose key effect would have been the partition of Yugoslavia against the Serbians’ will.41

In May 1992, Kozyrev went further in supporting resolution 757, which imposed sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It is noteworthy that

39 Tsygankov 2006, 71.
40 Headley 2003, 211.
Russia voted in favour while China and Zimbabwe both abstained. The extraordinary nature of this move must be appreciated in light of the historical and cultural ties between the Russians and the Serbs. In September, Russia also approved resolution 776, which extended the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission to Bosnia. In April 1993, however, Russia preferred to abstain (as did China) on resolutions 820 and 821, respectively strengthening measures against Yugoslavia and expelling Belgrade from the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The most significant gesture demonstrating Moscow’s support for the Atlantic approach came in early June, when Russia agreed to UNSC resolution 836, authorizing the deployment of peacekeepers to protect Bosnian safe areas and threatening Serbia with “tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.” This crucial vote implicitly supported NATO’s repeated threats to strike if violations continued. In total, throughout 1992 and 1993, more than fifty resolutions on Yugoslavia were jointly adopted by Russia and the NATO countries at the UNSC. To be sure, Russia’s support was not unequivocal and some differences remained: for instance, Moscow systematically opposed the use of force and was critical, at times, of what it perceived as the West’s anti-Serb bias. But overall, in practice the alignment remains striking.

In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there was a very strong homology between Russia’s position in the new field of international security and the empowered dispositions at the Kremlin. The new elites’ disposition toward the internal mode of pursuing security and their readiness to play the junior partner were in tune with Russia’s decreased status in the NATO-imposed order of things. Russia’s position in the newly defined field of international security had severely weakened in the early post-Cold War era. For one thing, with its economy in total disarray and its industrial basis almost evaporated, the country went through one of the most dramatic material declines in human history. The entire institutional network built by the USSR also crumbled within a few years, which placed Moscow in a friendless situation in the early 1990s. Its army was also left to decay for at least ten years and the Russian nuclear deterrent was actually the only significant “hard” resource remaining. More to the point, however, is the fact that in the new game of international security premised on democracy, human rights, etc., Russia could not but be a pupil given its communist past. The new Russian government had everything to prove and it did not benefit from any

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42 Russia did not join abstainers on a number of other resolutions dealing with the Balkans: on resolutions 770, 776 and 777, China, India and Zimbabwe abstained; on resolution 787, China and Zimbabwe abstained; and on resolutions 781, 816 and 855, China alone abstained while Russia voted in favour.

significant symbolic resources to legitimize its practices; instead it had to look for external legitimacy. Kozyrev’s disposition to play the junior partner was thus in tune with the country’s position in the field, which favoured the doxic enactment of diplomacy. Until early 1994, the Alliance symbolically dominated Russia to the point of obtaining its support on a number of practices that should have otherwise roused frustration. This pattern was to change rather abruptly with the critical juncture of 1994.

B. CRITICAL JUNCTURE: THE RUSSIAN PUPIL GOES AWRY

This section argues that the year of 1994 was a critical juncture in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic security relations: from thereon, they embarked on the uneasy path that continues to this day. The window of opportunity opened by NATO’s unprecedented domination and Russia’s acquiescence, between 1992 and 1994, was abruptly shut when the Alliance launched its geographical enlargement and implemented its new collective security functions in Bosnia. In the next section (C), I will show how these practices helped revive Russian Great Power dispositions and spark hysteresis effects in the relationship. At the moment, I want to return to the concept of security community in order to analyze a very intriguing paradox in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic security relations: the successful resolution of disputes over the double enlargement bred not trust but mistrust. Taking the Russian perspective, I demonstrate that NATO’s unilateral decisions to bomb Yugoslavia and to take on new members were received as contradicting the professed new rules of the international security game. These Alliance practices seemed to renege on the promises of inclusiveness that the Russians had counted on.

1. The Double Enlargement Takes Off

The first major crisis in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations occurred in February 1994, after a Sarajevo market was shelled, presumably by Bosnian Serb forces. In reaction, the UN SG called for NATO air strikes, a move that was outwardly rejected by the Russians. When NATO officially accepted the request, the Russians expressed outrage at being ignored and refused to accept the Alliance’s interpretation of UNSC resolution 836, which had

44 Headley 2003.
threatened “tougher measures.” They also warned that they would veto any further resolution at the UNSC.\(^{47}\) In a phone call to Clinton, Yeltsin reportedly said that the crisis could worsen to the point of involving nuclear weapons\(^{48}\) —a clear signal that Moscow would not stand being sidelined. Indeed, when the UNPROFOR command ordered a Russian battalion to move into Bosnia, on 14 February, the MoD in Moscow refused the order on the grounds that Russia had not been consulted in the management of the crisis.\(^{49}\) In order for Russia to recover its position in Balkans diplomacy, Yeltsin finally proposed to Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw as requested by NATO in order to let the Russian battalion in.\(^{50}\) When the crisis finally defused, the Russians celebrated a diplomatic victory, while NATO saw the proof that the threat of force had been decisive in obtaining the Serbian pullout.\(^{51}\)

In pursuit of inclusion, in April 1994 Yeltsin pushed for the creation of the Contact Group with France, Germany, the UK, the United States and later Italy. Although coldly received at first, the initiative eventually guaranteed Moscow’s inclusion in key diplomatic negotiations. Noticeably, this format temporarily softened tensions over Bosnia and boasted a few diplomatic successes. For instance, Russia did not formally protest when NATO bombed a Serb airfield in Croatia in November 1994. In fact, on that occasion Yeltsin went as far as calling the Krajina Serbs’ bombing of Bihac “impermissible,” while instructing his representative at the UNSC to vote with NATO countries.\(^{52}\) And yet, evidence suggests that the idea of the Contact Group had been accepted by NATO countries because it conveniently provided a façade of inclusion. As then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Talbott reveals: “its real purpose, in the mind of the allied foreign ministers, was to keep Russia, as they variously put it, inside the tent, on the reservation or, in Chris’s phrase, sullen but not obstructionist.”\(^{53}\) Ultimately, then, including Russia worked only to the point that effective decision-making remained firmly in the Alliance’s hands. For instance, when Serbian forces surrounded the town of Gorazde in early April 1994, NATO carried out its threats and used force for the very first


\(^{48}\) Talbott 2002, 122.

\(^{49}\) Headley 2003, 219.


\(^{53}\) Talbott 2002, 123. Equally telling is the conclusion drawn by Goldgeier and McFaul on the basis of dozens of interviews with American officials: “On Bosnia, most officials in the U.S. government just did not want to have to worry about the Russian angle”; Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 199.
time in its history. Alliance members justified the bombing on the grounds of resolution 836, to which Russia had previously acquiesced. Informed after the fact, Russia protested loudly but in vain.\textsuperscript{54}

After a year-long lull, in July 1995 the Bosnian civil war came back to haunt NATO-Russia relations when Bosnian Serb forces took Dutch peacekeepers hostage and encircled Srebrenica. At a London meeting of the Contact Group, Russian Defence minister Pavel Grachev signed on to an American proposal to give NATO the authority to bomb Serbs if they attacked Gorazde again, while Kozyrev declared that Russia would not veto a resolution reinforcing the UNPROFOR.\textsuperscript{55} As Talbott remembers: “Key to Perry’s argument was a promise that Russia would have a ‘dignified and meaningful’ role in the peacekeeping operation that would take over once NATO had forced the Serbs into negotiations.”\textsuperscript{56} But during the negotiations with the warring parties, the Americans insisted that the Alliance, not the UN, would lead the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Russia’s opposition could only deliver a minor concession: by a complex command chain arrangement, the Russian troops in Bosnia would be put under the orders of American General George Joulwan, acting not as NATO’s SACEUR, but as the American commander in chief in Europe (he formally wore both hats).\textsuperscript{57} “On matters of peacekeeping and virtually everything else,” concluded Talbott, “Russia wanted inclusion but not subordination.”\textsuperscript{58} At the time, though, the Russians felt they were given the latter, not the former. As I will show below, these feelings continued to grow in the wake of Operation Deliberate Force during the summer of 1995.

Turning to geographical enlargement, the impetus originally came from a number of former members of the Warsaw Pact. In mid-October 1992, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland formed the Visegrad Group with the aim of speeding up their integration in Western institutions, including NATO. At the time, however, the Bush Sr. administration made it clear that it had no intention to move NATO eastward.\textsuperscript{59} In December 1992, the NAC closed the door to Eastern enlargement by praising the NACC as a “valuable forum for consultations on

\textsuperscript{55} Vladimir Abarinov (1995), “Andrei Kozyrev Promises Not to Block Dispatch of Rapid-reaction Forces to Bosnia,” Sevodnya, 8 June, translated in CDPSP 47(23).
\textsuperscript{56} Talbott 2002, 170.
\textsuperscript{58} Talbott 2002, 186.
\textsuperscript{59} Nye and Keohane 1993, 120.
security.” Consequently, at first NATO officials remained careful in reaching out to Eastern European countries. In Moscow, the Russian press coverage celebrated the “very reserved view” taken by the Alliance. But the mere fact that the possibility of enlarging NATO had been raised was enough to spark doubts. When officials from the Baltic countries joined the fray in the ensuing weeks, the Kremlin expressed concerns. Sergei Stankevich, a political adviser to Yeltsin, wrote that “maintaining the status of Western outpost called upon to restrain Russia’s ‘aggressive aspirations’ would enable the architects of a Baltic ‘cordon sanitaire’ to count on substantial long-term aid from the Atlantic community.” For the Russians, enlarging NATO would revive Cold War logics of confrontation and represent a step backward from the internal mode of pursuing security heralded in the early 1990s.

As early as the spring of 1993, a number of high-profile politicians in the West, including U.S. Secretary of Defence Les Aspin and German Defence Minister Volker Rühe, began to publicly advocate NATO’s enlargement to the Visegrad states. Within the newly elected Clinton team, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake quickly emerged as the main advocate of enlargement as part of his philosophy of democracy promotion. The proponents of enlargement couched the issue as one of “survival” for NATO. The Alliance was portrayed as a community of states bound by a liberal identity, values and norms, which “naturally” had to expand to like-minded countries. As Schimmelfennig observes: “By presenting the policy of enlargement as a policy that was based on the fundamental values of NATO member states and on the membership rules of the Alliance, the proponents of enlargement made difficult for the ‘brakemen’ to openly oppose this policy without harming their credibility as community members.” For some months, the debate was fierce as a number of officials in the United States and abroad harboured reservations about the policy. In late 1993, Clinton decided to put

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61 Weitz 1993, 343.
66 Asmus, Blackwill and Larrabee 1996.
67 Schimmelfennig 2003, 244 (emphasis original); cf. also Fierke 1999a.
68 Asmus 2002, 33. Until 1994, one could find skeptics in all of the main NATO governments. In the US, the Pentagon was especially unenthused. In Europe, the British government feared that enlargement would dilute the Alliance and the US commitment in Europe; Germany was generally supportive although Chancellor Helmut Kohl feared alienating Russia; and France was concerned by the possibility that enlargement might strengthen NATO at the expense of the Western European Union (WEU) and the EU; Asmus 2002, 46-47.
enlargement on temporary hold to instead launch the PfP in order to reach out to potential future candidates.

On their side, the Russians consistently opposed the Alliance’s expansion except on one single occasion, when Yeltsin declared during an official visit to Poland in late August 1993 that Warsaw’s joining the Alliance “would not be in conflict with the process of European integration, including the interests of Russia.”\(^69\) In the next few days, the Russian Foreign ministry tempered the president’s declaration, adding that expanding NATO would be counterproductive while acknowledging the “sovereign right of every state to choose means of ensuring its security.”\(^70\) In an obvious act of retraction, in October, Yeltsin wrote a letter to the main Western capitals warning against a “mechanical expansion of the North Atlantic bloc” and instead proposing that NATO and Moscow jointly guarantee the security of Eastern European countries.\(^71\) The Russian president also argued that enlargement would be illegal in view of the terms of German unification and that relations between Russia and NATO should always be “a few degrees warmer” than those between Brussels and ex-Soviet satellites.\(^72\) Yet it seemed as though the damage was already done: Yeltsin’s declaration in Warsaw had opened a window of opportunity for the proponents of enlargement. SG Wörner, for instance, who had been a timid supporter until then, began to endorse the policy more openly.\(^73\)

Russian diplomats tried hard to back-pedal and state as clearly as possible Moscow’s strong opposition to the Alliance’s expansion. In November 1993, the Federal Security Service (FSB, successor to the KGB) released an important report on NATO enlargement. Written under Primakov’s leadership, it epitomized the dominant thinking in ruling circles at the time. First, the report noted that “many of Russia’s apprehensions associated with NATO’s entry into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would be removed or eased if there were guarantees either of priority development for the process of changing the alliance’s functions.” Yet no such guarantees had been given; and in fact the Alliance’s out-of-area intervention in the Bosnian civil war only added to the Russian concerns about NATO’s functional evolution. Second, the report regretted the “fixed nature of stereotypes of bloc thinking, which is especially


\(^{71}\) Vladimir Lapsky (1993), “Russian Federation President Urges West Not to Expand NATO by Admitting East European Countries,” Izvestia, 2 October, translated in CDSP 45(40).

\(^{72}\) Ponsard 2007, 88.

\(^{73}\) Asmus 2002, 37-42. Note that the last Russian troops left Polish territory at about the same time, in September 1993 (they had left Hungary and Czechoslovakia by the end of 1991).
characteristic of a number of representatives of the military leadership in the Western countries.” Third, while acknowledging that it would be “incorrect to proceed from [the premise] that NATO’s geographic expansion would serve to create a staging ground for inflicting a strike on Russia,” the report emphasized the “objective necessity” for Russia to review its defence posture as a result of it and “regardless of the fact that in a political sense NATO is no longer regarded as an adversary.” Fourth, the report alluded to the possibility that enlargement could play in the hands of anti-Western forces inside Russia and curb democratic reforms. Fifth and finally, Primakov’s report acknowledged that “Russia has no right to dictate to the sovereign states of Central and Eastern Europe whether or not they should join NATO.” All in all, while many NATO officials construed Russia’s opposition as “outdated Cold War thinking,” for the Russians it was rather premised on a rejection of such a confrontational mentality.

In late 1993 and early 1994, NATO’s stance with respect to enlargement was left ambiguous. When enlargement was officially put off the agenda in favour of the PfP, in December 1993, Kozyrev and his team celebrated the launch of this vast program of partnership and cooperation. To be sure, his claim that the idea had been “buried” was far too hasty. Only days later, Germany’s Defence minister Rühe declared at the outset of a meeting of a NATO Defence Planning Committee: “There is no question as to the advisability of expanding NATO. We have only to determine when this will happen and whom it will involve.” A similar ambiguity surrounded the Brussels summit of January 1994, where heads of state and government agreed “to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries.” The bulk of the summit, however, was devoted to the PfP, “a major initiative” enticing partners to “work alongside the Alliance.” For the Russians, expansion and the PfP were irreconcilable initiatives because one was exclusive and the other, inclusive. NATO could take one or the other direction, but not both at a time. In a press conference with Clinton, Yeltsin made this interpretation obvious:

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The integration of former communist countries into the structures of the West was a fine objective, he said, and Russia looked forward to being part of that process. But all those countries must be integrated together, in just one package. This will make everyone more secure. If, however, you try to dismember us, accepting us and admitting us one by one—that will be no good. I’m against that; I’m absolutely opposed to it. That’s why I support the president’s initiative for Partnership for Peace.\(^{79}\)

In this spirit, Kozyrev signed the PfP framework document in June 1994 and agreed with NATO member states to engage in reflection on a special partnership with Russia “corresponding to its size, importance, capabilities and willingness to contribute to the pursuit of shared objectives.”\(^{80}\)

When the U.S. and Russian armies held their first ever joint peacekeeping exercises on Russian soil, in September, it really looked as if a Russian-Atlantic \textit{modus vivendi} were taking shape.

And yet, a series of events in December 1994 showed this to be a cruel illusion. On the first day of that month, the NAC issued a communiqué initiating “a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership.”\(^{81}\) This decision, which took by surprise many senior officials including the American Secretary of Defence,\(^{82}\) came as a huge blow to the Russians. For one thing, Clinton had promised Yeltsin that U.S. policy with respect to enlargement would be guided by three no’s: no surprises, no rush, and no exclusion.\(^{83}\) For another, the internal deliberations and turgiversations inside the Alliance had led most observers to conclude that enlargement was still off the agenda: the “Russians had good reasons to be confused about America’s real intentions,” conclude Goldgeier and McFaul.\(^{84}\) Coincidentally or not, on the day of NATO’s announcement, Kozyrev was in Brussels to sign an Individual Partnership Program (as part of the PfP) as well as a document fostering Russia-NATO dialogue. Claiming that no one in Brussels had forewarned Moscow of this upcoming decision, he finally declined to sign any document and, under Yeltsin’s direct instructions, froze all further progress in institutionalizing cooperation with the Alliance.\(^{85}\) For the Russians, the unilateral decision to

\(^{79}\) Talbott 2002, 115.
\(^{82}\) As James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul reveal, “the U.S. secretary of defense did not even believe that NATO enlargement was administration policy until after a meeting with President Clinton and other top officials in late December 1994, that is, after the announcement of the NATO study.” Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 184.
\(^{83}\) Talbott 2002, 136.
\(^{84}\) Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 195.
\(^{85}\) Leonid Velekhov (1994), “Russia-NATO Betrothal Didn’t Happen,” Sevodnya, 3 December, translated in CDPSP 46(48). In a late December letter to Clinton, Yeltsin explained the Russian reaction: “I proceeded from the assumption that we had agreed in Washington [in September 1994] not to act hastily, but rather to achieve, in the
expand reflected a NATO pattern “to offer Russia a fait accompli, a final position of the ‘take it or leave it’ type.”

Within a few days, this about-face led to one of the most emblematic moments of the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations: the Budapest C/OSCE summit. The Russians had hoped that this summit would consecrate an inclusive European security architecture based on a strong pan-European institution—the strengthened OSCE. Their hopes had just been shattered by NATO’s December 1st communiqué. The new security order premised on the Alliance’s functional and geographical enlargement relegated Russia to the margins of Europe. Despite all the NATO talk of cooperative security and partnership, Atlantic practices in late 1994 plainly seemed, to Moscow, to go against the professed cooperative security order of the post-Cold War era. Lamenting the rise of a “cold peace,” in Budapest Yeltsin denounced the exclusionary consequences of the Alliance’s double enlargement:

Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace. … NATO was created in Cold War times. Today, it is trying to find its place in Europe, not without difficulty. It is important that this search not create new divisions, but promote European unity. We believe that the plans of expanding NATO are contrary to this logic. Why sow the seeds of distrust? After all, we are no longer adversaries, we are partners. Some explanations that we hear imply that this is “expansion of stability,” just in case developments in Russia go the undesirable way. If this is the reason why some want to move the NATO area of responsibility closer to the Russian borders, let me say this: it is too early to give up on democracy in Russia!

For the first time, the Russian frustration with the Alliance’s activities was bluntly aired at the highest level. Everything took place as if something fundamental in Russian-Atlantic relations broke for good in December 1994. On the plane to Washington from Budapest, the Clinton team tried “to figure out if [Yeltsin’s speech] was a long-term change or a brief interruption in what had been a very close and friendly relations between Washington and Moscow.” My contention, with the benefit of hindsight, is that December 1994 constitutes the crucial turning
point from which Russian-Atlantic relations became a lot more uneasy (more on this below). Recall that only days after the OSCE summit, Russian troops began invading Chechnya…

2. A Nascent Security Community with Declining Trust

NATO’s practices of double enlargement sparked a most intriguing paradox in post-Cold War Russia-NATO relations: the successfully non-violent resolution of this particularly tough dispute, from late 1994 to this day, did not breed trust but mistrust among the former enemies. How can this be? Logically, diplomatic success should have led to a betterment of the relationship. Security communities, after all, rest on a shared track record of peaceful change. In and through practice, however, the opposite dynamic took place starting in late 1994. Russian-Atlantic negotiations over the double enlargement, though consistently peaceful, led to a backlash on the Russian side. In effect, NATO’s practices were not received in Russia the same way they were enacted by Brussels. For the Alliance, geographical and functional enlargement was in line with the new rules of the game it was imposing after the end of the Cold War—the security-from-the-inside-out paradigm. For the Russians, however, NATO’s dual expansion meant exclusion and humiliation; such practices were reminiscent of Cold War realpolitik far more than of a new world order allegedly premised on cooperative security.

For the Russians, NATO’s February 1994 ultimatum to Bosnian Serbs contradicted the very essence of the new rules of the international security game premised on inclusiveness and mutuality. For instance, one official from the Ministry of Defence wrote in Kraznaya Zvezda: “Russia has a right to ask why it was included in the [NACC] and why it should approve the [PfP] initiative if, when an ultimatum was prepared—in a matter that affects it directly—Moscow was ignored. This is the main flaw in the ultimatum, a serious flaw, and from now on the alliance should maintain close contacts with Moscow on all questions concerning the former Yugoslavia.” 89 From the Russian point of view, in so doing the Alliance contradicted in deeds the new order premised on cooperative security that it had been preaching in words. Gorbachev, certainly no hawk, expressed a similar complaint: “Russia was confronted with a fait accompli. It was treated as a junior partner that is expected only to nod its head and support the choice made by others, contenting itself with a pat on the shoulder.” 90 While NATO thought it had a free hand in the Balkans, the Russians could not countenance being sidelined from solving a

problem of European security when they felt they had been promised just the opposite with the NACC, the PfP and other “inclusive” Atlantic initiatives.

It thus came as a shock to the Russians that NATO’s functional enlargement to embrace peacekeeping, which they had been supporting in 1992 and 1993, in fact turned out to be conducive to Moscow’s exclusion from the management of European security. The new rules of the international security game, heralded by the Alliance and the Russians alike, were supposedly premised on inclusion and cooperation. Starting in February 1994, however, NATO’s own practices in the Balkans did not seem to match the internal mode of pursuing security to which the new Russia had subscribed. As one expert observes, “the operations in Yugoslavia had seriously affected the Alliance’s image in Russia. In particular, its failure to consult with Russia over its actions and the conclusive evidence that it had ceased in practice to subscribe to its proclaimed purely defensive functions stood as worrying developments for Moscow.”

No one has better expressed the attitudinal change in Moscow than Kozyrev in a spring 1994 article in Foreign Affairs. It is worth quoting him at length in order to compare with the views he had defended in 1992 (cf. above):

If a partnership is built on mutual trust, then it is natural to recognize other rules as well: the need not only to inform one another of decisions made, but also to agree on approaches beforehand. It would be hard to accept an interpretation of partnership in which one side demands that the other coordinate its every step with it while the former retains complete freedom for itself. Partners must have mutual respect for each other’s interests and concerns.

This is a key lesson from the decision-making process that led to the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo in February. NATO’s threat to bomb Bosnian Serb positions if the siege was not lifted by a certain date was made without Russian participation. It immediately became apparent that Russia could not and should be excluded from the common efforts to regulate the conflict in the Balkans, a region where Russia has longtime interests and influence. Ultimately the advantages of partnership were illustrated when Russia and the West coordinated their efforts to persuade the warring parties to make pace. But the initial lack of consultation and coordination meant that first both sides had to run the risk of returning to the old benefactor-client relationship that had played such a pernicious role in the regional conflicts of the Cold War era.

For the Russians, the fact that NATO took it upon itself to decide on the use of force in Bosnia went against the grain of the new rules of the international security game based on inclusive partnership.

In late August 1995, when NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force began, Russian practitioners similarly decried their exclusion from prior consultations. As one Russian senior practitioner

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91 Ponsard 2007, 89.
92 Kozyrev 1994, 66.
diplomat put it: “In the existing situation, Moscow has no possibility of influencing the course of events. All decisions are being made at NATO headquarters.”

Yeltsin went further, denouncing the Alliance for breaking with the cooperative security discourse it was simultaneously preaching: “In proclaiming its ‘peacekeeping mission,’ the North Atlantic alliance has essentially taken upon itself the role of both judge and jury.” For the Russians, NATO was guilty of duplicity: while claiming to include Russia in diplomatic talks through the Contact Group, it was simultaneously making unilateral decisions to use force without Russia’s participation. As a result, many in Moscow came to construe NATO’s functional enlargement not in terms of the internal mode of pursuing security, but as a very cold-blooded strategy intended to strengthen the Alliance’s profile in the post-Cold War era. Even the father of New Thinking protested “a desire to expand de facto NATO’s sphere of operation far beyond its historical borders. All this has very little in common with humanitarian ideals of restoring peace in Bosnia.”

Remarkably, a number of declarations on the Atlantic side suggests that this view was not unfounded. As Clinton declared in January 1994: “What is at stake is not only the safety of the people in Sarajevo and any possibility of bringing this terrible conflict to an end, but the credibility of the Alliance itself.” All in all, the military intervention in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995 sparked a general feeling in Moscow that the Alliance was “looking for excuses to demonstrate its continued relevance after the Cold War.” Doubts about NATO’s promise of an inclusive security order began to emerge—to be compounded by NATO’s decision to enlarge.

Despite all the Alliance talk to the contrary, the December 1994 decision to enlarge seemed to Moscow to breach the three basic CSCE principles that had been so fundamental after the end of the Cold War—that security is indivisible, mutual, and cooperative. It looked as though the NATO-professed rules of the post-Cold War international security game were scorned by the Alliance itself, whose actions, as Moscow understood them, smacked more of realpolitik than cooperative security. First, from a Russian perspective expanding NATO created new dividing lines in the European security system. NATO’s claim that “an enlarged NATO

96 Quoted in Headley 2003, 216.
97 Ibid., 215.
will not lead to new dividing lines in Europe."98 made very little sense for Moscow: one is either inside the tent, or outside. So long as Russia remained on the margins of a tightly-knit alliance that arrogated to itself the central role in European security, it could not but lead to its exclusion. The Russians felt they were unfairly excluded from a place they thought they belonged to:

The new Russia, which parted decisively from the USSR’s domestic and foreign policy heritage, strongly believes that it has every right to comprehensive inclusion in modern Europe—economically, politically, and with regard to its security dimensions as well. What Russia seeks is an arrangement that would assure its full participation in European affairs, rather than its isolation from, or marginalization in, Europe. This is the crux of the matter.99

Seen from Moscow, the geographical enlargement of the Alliance necessarily led to “the creation of a buffer zone in reverse, a means to isolate the new Russia from continental Europe.”100 As their country was relegated to the sidelines, the NATO discourse of inclusiveness sounded increasingly hollow to Russian ears.

In addition, expansion seriously undermined the chances of developing a pan-European security institution with teeth in which Russia could exert influence. To counter this view, many Atlantic officials insisted that the door would always remain open for Russia to eventually join NATO. Most remarkably, Clinton made sure that Yeltsin understood that enlargement could, in theory, also embrace Russia.101 And yet, there are grounds to doubt that such a policy could have been implemented, if only because all of Moscow’s declarations of interest—in 1992, in 1996, in 2002—were quietly but firmly turned down by Brussels. A more accurate expression of the dominant view in the Atlantic world was offered by the German Defense minister in September 1994: “Russia cannot be integrated, neither into the European Union nor in NATO … if Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart … It would be like the United Nations of Europe—it wouldn’t work.”102 Inside the Alliance, most member states feared that involving Russia could only mean the end of the transatlantic consensus. In any event, Russian officials concluded that their country was excluded from NATO’s geographical enlargement in contravention of the oft-cited indivisibility of security.

Second and related, the Alliance’s expansion defeated the principle of mutual security. For the Russians, the move sparked new security dilemmas regardless of the overall quality of

100 Black 2000, 8; cf. Polikanov 2004, 480.
102 Rühe quoted in Yost 1998b, 139.
their relationship with member states. These security dilemmas derived from feelings of exclusion: “Not including [Russia] would amount to demonstrating that NATO is directed against Russia.”

If Moscow is not part of the Alliance, then it is inevitably relegated to its external periphery. At the simplest level, “[f]or obvious reasons, the image of a new version of Drang nach Osten—German Drive to the East—comes quickly and readily to the Russian mind.” But a NATO invasion was never the primary concern in post-communist Moscow. As Primakov explained, Russians “are not such primitive people as to think that this move is designed to launch an immediate strike against Russia.” Instead, the main fear was that in gaining even more strength, NATO could become able to force any and all policies on Russia. In then Defence minister Igor Rodionov’s words: “I do not think that NATO is expanding to start a war, but it is becoming a military alliance whose power cannot be matched by anybody. We fear that as it gains strength and moves closer to Russian borders, NATO will try to impose on us its conditions—political, economic and others.”

Mutual security implies that one’s security cannot be enhanced at the expense of others’. For the Russians, NATO’s unilateral decision to enlarge plainly contravened this principle. As Primakov’s explained: “I don’t think [that] the West would applaud an increase in our fleet of missiles, even if they were not targeted on it. Why, then, does the West want us to applaud an expansion of NATO, even if the military alliance isn’t directed against Russia?” At issue were not intentions but the sheer fact that increasing one side’s forces necessarily has consequences for the other: “we don’t need to be convinced that NATO is not preparing to attack us. We do not intend to attack the United States, either. But let us suppose, purely hypothetically, that we were to conclude a military alliance with Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba. Surely that would elicit a negative reaction from the United States.” If security is mutual, the Alliance cannot be strengthened without affecting the security of its neighbours. As pundit Vyacheslav Nikonov summed up, “any politico-military alliance that approaches your borders

103 Arbatov 1995, 143.
106 Quoted in Ian Black (1997), “Albright to Offer Arms Cuts as Russia Digs In on NATO,” Guardian 20 February.
and doesn’t invite you to join it does not strengthen your country’s position or the level of trust between that alliance and your country.”\textsuperscript{109} This is a textbook case of the security dilemma.

Despite all NATO claims to the contrary, for Moscow expansion retained an insuperable anti-Russian flavour. In fact, many officials in Washington did not try to hide their suspicions about the new Russia under Yeltsin. In a 1995 op-ed, Talbott wrote that “among the contingencies for which NATO must be prepared is that Russia will abandon democracy and return to the threatening patterns of international behavior that have sometimes characterized its history.”\textsuperscript{110} Turning NATO into the “central security pillar of the new architecture”\textsuperscript{111} appeared an efficient means to block any return to Russia’s past imperialism. This rationale also informed the strong Republican support for enlargement in the United States: Senator Richard Lugar, for instance, “was convinced that the West had to lock in the gain of the end of the Cold War before they were frittered away.”\textsuperscript{112} In a similar vein, the main reason why post-communist countries were so eagerly begging for admission was indubitably their fears of Russia. Fully aware of this, the Russians tried to convince Atlantic officials that “[i]f the Central Europe fears the rebirth of Russian aggression, then to take such serious steps on the basis of hypothetical forecasts would amount to setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy.”\textsuperscript{113} As I demonstrated in chapter IV, the Russian concern that East European NATO members would erect “a new cordon sanitaire”\textsuperscript{114} on Russia’s western border turned out to be quite well-founded.

Third, in Russian eyes NATO’s expansion contradicted the very principle of cooperative security by which international order can only be achieved through negotiated settlement. Russian officials felt that the decision to enlarge was imposed on them and that the policy failed to take their country’s legitimate security interests into account. Most strikingly, the 1995 Study on Enlargement appeared “deliberately provocative in offering almost no concessions to Russian interests. Enlargement was confirmed as an open-ended process; nothing but full membership was countenanced for applicant countries; and these applicants were also expected not to ‘foreclose the option’ of foreign troops and nuclear weapons being stationed on their territory.”\textsuperscript{115} Seen from Moscow, the Alliance’s refusal to alter its policy based on Russian concerns meant that “a new world order was emerging while their country stood by as helpless

\textsuperscript{109} Vyacheslav Nikonov (1994), “Russia and NATO—Cooperation, Neutrality, or Confrontation?” Nezamismaya Gazeta, 14 September, translated in CDPSP 46(35).
\textsuperscript{110} Talbott 1995, 6 (html version).
\textsuperscript{111} Holbrooke 1995, 3 (html version).
\textsuperscript{112} Asmus 2002, 32.
\textsuperscript{113} Arbatov 1995, 143.
\textsuperscript{114} Trenin 2000, 14.
\textsuperscript{115} Danreuther 1999-2000, 152.
In his memoirs, Primakov recounts a one-on-one conversation with Warren Christopher in early 1996: “My discussion with Christopher left no doubt that our opinion would be ignored during the expansion of NATO. It was not the process of expansion that would have to take Russia’s position into account but Russia that would have to adapt to the process.”

It appears that NATO’s heavy-handed approach was driven in large part by the conviction that any concession to the Russians on the issue of enlargement would amount to showing weakness. As Talbott recalls, “if the Russians knew that the prospect of a collision would cause us to hit the brakes on enlargement, they’d have no incentive to acquiesce in our going forward.” Contrary to the spirit of cooperative security, then, any substantive compromise with Russia to accommodate its concerns was excluded from the outset. The net result was that throughout the enlargement row, Russia basically “faced the facts.” It should not come as a surprise that NATO’s expansion came “to symbolize and dramatize defeat” in Russian politics. As a consequence, resentment against allied countries increased sharply among Russian elites. Andranik Migranyan, a Yeltsin advisor, regretted that “Russia’s reward for destroying the totalitarian Soviet empire is not a return to civilization as a respected and equal partner, but the isolation and serious weakening of the country.” Instead of cooperating, NATO appeared to be exploiting its partners’ difficulties to secure gains.

How do these political struggles play out in terms of security-community building? It is useful to understand the effects of NATO’s double enlargement practices on the relationship with Russia in terms of trust. As I argued in chapter II, trust is a practical sense, a “feeling” based on a personal and collective history (habitus) and a particular social context (field). Adler and Barnett, who theorize that trust is one of two constitutive foundations of security

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120 Plekhanov 1999, 170.
121 Andranik Migranyan (1994), “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Disastrous Results of Three Years,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 December, translated in CDPSP 46(50). Baranovsky’s analysis goes in the same direction: “Justified or not, this complex of resentment does exist in Russia’s thinking about Europe. It is reinforced by the increasingly uncomfortable feeling that Russia is being relegated to the sidelines of European developments. The debate over NATO enlargement has given additional weight to such a proposition. Even analysts without a hint of anti-Western feeling focused upon the argument that while NATO is gradually turning into the central element in the overall organization of the European political space, Russia is denied access to this structure. … The rhetorical cordiality of the West is often overlaid on a watchfulness, suspicion and reluctance to take Russia’s view into account”; Baranovsky 2000, 450.
community, define it as “believing despite uncertainty.” This definition, however, runs into a crucial problem: it fails to distinguish between a rivalry based on deterrence and a genuine security community. Take the Russian-Atlantic case, for example. Even under the Cold War nuclear deterrence, Soviet and American diplomats “believed despite uncertainty” that MAD would render nuclear strikes irrational and thus highly improbable lest an accidental launch. Thanks to this “trust,” both sides were ready to take some risks in presuming non-(nuclearly)-violent settlement of disputes. Is this really what a security community is all about? Of course not: deterrence creates non-war at best; security community leads to peace.

In his analysis of trust in IR, Aaron Hoffman correctly points out that “[d]efinitions of trust that focus solely on predictability are flawed because they cannot distinguish between trust and factors, such as coercion, that also encourage actors to take risks.” In order to differentiate trust from the broader category of risk, Hoffman advocates a “fiduciary approach” that adds a sense of obligation. As he continues: “Trust involves more than predicting the behavior of others. It includes trustors’ perceptions that their trustees have a responsibility to fulfill the trust placed in them even if it means sacrificing some of their own benefits.” Contrary to Adler and Barnett’s negative definition of trust (trust as the non-fear to take a risk), Hoffman puts forward a positive notion of trust: A trusts B because A believes despite uncertainty that B is, to a variable extent, obliged to A’s interests. I contend that a security community implies a positive notion of trust, while the risk-based, negative conceptualization advocated by Adler and Barnett better fits non-war communities. The nuance is similar to that which I introduced in chapter II: normal diplomacy (the consistent practising of the non-violent settlement of disputes) characterizes non-war communities, whereas self-evident diplomacy (thinking from the peaceful settlement of disputes) is the preserve of security communities.

My analysis of Russian reactions amply demonstrates that in the early steps of the post-Cold War Russia-NATO relationship, dealings over the double enlargement seriously thwarted the emergence of trust in the fiduciary sense. As the ideological confrontation waned, the willingness to take some risks certainly increased on both sides, which seriously undercut, if not eliminate, the possibility of mutual force. In that sense, there were indeed developing trends toward the emergence of a security community as a track record of non-violent settlement of

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122 Adler and Barnett 1998, 46.
124 Ibid., 381.
125 Ibid., 379.
126 Note that this second definition, which better fits the security-community framework than the first, seems to imply some sense of we-ness; more on this in chapter VII.
disputes was being built. Yet because NATO’s practice undermined, in Russian eyes, the new rules of the international security game, they worked against the establishment of a mutual sense of obligation. For Moscow, the expansion of the Alliance’s functions and membership was decided despite, and in fact against Russian interests; no serious compromise was made to alleviate the concerns that were repeatedly aired (cf. section C below). In other words, for Russia NATO’s practices demonstrated in spades that Brussels felt no obligation whatsoever to accommodate the interests of other parties to European security. On the contrary, the expansion appeared duplicitous in taking advantage of the country’s weakness. As a result, starting in 1994 Russian practitioners increasingly trusted that their Alliance counterparts were, to an extent at least, obliged to Moscow’s interests. This trend, which was further accentuated in the coming years, worked against the emergence of a Russian-Atlantic security community.

It must be stressed that elites in Moscow have always rejected the notion (particularly popular in Western conservative circles) that NATO had “won” the Cold War. The Russians did not feel defeated because it is their own rulers who brought the USSR down: “Revising Russian history, rejecting the communist ideology, reconsidering our relations with the West, withdrawing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, agreeing to German reunification, and even dissolving the Soviet Union—all of this is the result of independent and internal decisions instead of the terms of a capitulation dictated by the winners.”¹²⁷ Most Russians of all political stripes construed the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s that way. As Kozyrev wrote in March 1994: “Victory in the cold war was won not by NATO’s military machine but by the CSCE’s democratic principles.”¹²⁸ In a similar fashion, Primakov affirmed in 1996: “Peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain rid themselves of the policy of confrontation through joint efforts.”¹²⁹ Consequently, post-communist elites expected to be welcome to the Atlantic family. The expansion of NATO sent the exact opposite message, reminiscent of the Cold War’s containment policy.¹³⁰ The promises of cooperative security were left unfulfilled, trust declined, and the promise of a security community started to unravel.

All in all, seen from Moscow, NATO’s double enlargement seemed to contradict the very premises by which the Alliance was seeking to justify it. On that matter, it is interesting to

¹²⁷ Konovalov 2000, 172.
¹³⁰ In Kozyrev’s words, “NATO’s advance toward Russia’s borders cannot but be seen as a continuation, though by inertia, of a policy aimed at containment of Russia.” Kozyrev 1995, 13.
note that several Western pundits echoed Russian criticisms of the exclusionary dynamics engendered by NATO’s enlargement. In an open letter to Clinton in June 1997, fifty former U.S. senators, cabinet secretaries, ambassadors and foreign policy specialists denounced “a policy error of historic importance.”131 The process is plagued with a “central contradiction,” argued one pundit, because it “emphasize[s] cooperative security in Europe as a whole, but insist[s] on the right to enlarge an organization designed for the collective defence of one part of Europe against the other.”132 In actuality, expansion would “resurrect Europe’s dividing lines” and bypass the “chance to build a European security community that included Russia.”133 By way of consequence, expanding the Alliance would create a severe security dilemma for Russia and force it to balance or bandwagon.134 A New York Times editorial went so far as to call for Russian membership in NATO in order to avoid such a stalemate in European security.135

But NATO did not alter its course—quite the contrary. In September 1995, the Study on NATO Enlargement confirmed the “open door” policy and stressed that “[n]o country outside the Alliance should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process” of enlargement.136 Coincidentally, the study was published at about the same time as NATO was conducting its air strikes over Bosnia. Starting from 1994, NATO’s double enlargement practices were to leave an indelible mark on the Russian habitus to this day.

C. HYSTERESIS: NATO AND THE RUSSIAN “GREAT POWER”

This section demonstrates that starting in the mid-1990s, age-old Russian dispositions of Great Power-ness resurfaced among policymakers in Moscow. While in 1992-1994, Yeltsin, Kozyrev and other members of the Russian government had incorporated the new rules of the international security game, the situation began to change afterwards in part as a result of NATO’s practices of double enlargement. I demonstrated in the preceding section that in Russian eyes, the Alliance’s actions in 1994 resembled less cooperative security than the realpolitik game that had been prevalent in more confrontational times. Despite its verbal promotion of the internal mode of pursuing security, in practice NATO appeared to follow a

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132 Ibid., 34-35.
134 Russett and Stam 1998.
different logic, especially because of the exclusionary consequences of the double enlargement for Russia. As a result, mistrust developed while the Russian habitus that had recognized the Alliance’s power in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War gradually gave way to deeply embodied dispositions of Great Power-ness.

To be sure, the Russian habitus of Great Power was never too far from the surface even during the 1992-1994 honeymoon. For more than forty years, Moscow was the centre of a huge empire and entertained a privileged dialogue with its superpower counterpart in Washington. Such an enduring position of domination in the international security field left deeply ingrained dispositions among Russian policymakers that the next paragraphs will describe in detail. Despite New Thinking policies and post-communist Russia’s early embrace of the NATO order, then, the habitus of Great Power had deeper historical roots than any other in the Russian political soil. Nonetheless, this should not overshadow the fact that for a little less than a decade, Great Power dispositions were remarkably muted inside the Kremlin, to the benefit of what could be dubbed a cooperative security habitus, from Gorbachev to Kozyrev. The crucial question thus becomes, what explains why in the mid-1990s, the dispositional balance in Moscow was tipped in favour of the Great Power habitus? In this section I argue that NATO’s self-defeating practices with regards to the double enlargement played an important role in this change.

This is not to say that the Alliance bears the sole responsibility for the revival of Great Power attitudes in Russia. Several factors obviously contributed to this evolution. First, as I just explained, for historical reasons the Russian soil is uniquely fertile for such a habitus of grandeur. Second, NATO is only one among many international interlocutors for Russia (although it is a particularly important one for identity reasons). Furthermore, NATO-Russia relations are heavily influenced by the larger dynamics between the West and “the rest” at the systemic level. Finally, domestic politics—both in Russia as well as inside NATO countries—have certainly played an important role.¹³⁷ Throughout the 1990s, the Russian society went through unprecedented economic and political turmoil and its political institutions were often captured by corrupt elites. In sum, several factors combined in an interactive way to prompt the revival of the Russian habitus of Great Power-ness. My goal here is certainly not to artificially weigh one factor against another—that would be a profoundly mistaken take on social causation. Instead, I want to analyze the role of one specific set of factors while bearing in mind

that such an analysis cannot be exhaustive. I therefore contend that NATO-Russia dealings with regards to the double enlargement significantly contributed to tipping the dispositional balance in favour of Great Power-ness in Moscow. The following pages will present evidence in support of this argument.

Critics may retort that the brunt of the change was of domestic origins—especially the consecutive victories of nationalistic forces in the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections. To be sure, new elites came to power in Moscow in the mid-1990s: in foreign policy, for instance, Primakov came to typify the Russian habitus of Great Power-ness. That said, a closer look at timing and the precise sequence of events in the mid-1990s suggests that much of Russian domestic change was a consequence (instead of a cause) of international dealings. I should recall that throughout the post-Cold War era Russian foreign policy has been essentially “reactive and ad hoc.”138 Two examples should drive this point home. First, Moscow did not become more assertive immediately after the 1993 elections and the arrival in force of nationalistic deputies at the Duma. During the first half of 1994, Russian officials were still taking a conciliatory tone toward NATO, supporting much of its diplomacy in the Balkans as well as its partnership initiatives. The real change in Russian foreign policy came only after December 1994, once NATO had announced its enlargement and as it prepared for its large-scale military intervention in Bosnia. The second example that demonstrates that elite change in Moscow was in part a reaction to Russian-Atlantic dealings is the Russian invasion of Chechnya—the first genuinely praetorian practice enacted by the post-communist Kremlin. Again, Moscow’s decision was taken only after the Alliance officially kicked off the enlargement process. While there is no doubt that Moscow’s behaviour in the Caucasus sparked fears in the West, it cannot be said to have been the catalyser of the enlargement process because military orders were given after NATO’s decision had been taken.

Another related criticism is that by looking at the double enlargement from Russia’s perspective, I wrongfully neglect Atlantic circumstances. For instance, a number of Russian practices, from Yeltsin’s shelling of the White House in October 1993 to the invasion of Chechnya in December 1994, revived Western fears that Russia’s democratic transition might be very fragile after all. In this context, enlarging NATO appeared a sound policy. Such may very well have been the case indeed. In this section, however, I mainly focus on the Russian perspective because it is the best way to trace the origins of hysteresis in post-Cold War
Russian-Atlantic security relations. I leave it to others to focus on the Atlantic point of view. At the end of the day, my bias toward the Russian perspective is justified on analytical not normative grounds. My objective is not to lay the political blame on the Alliance alone nor is it to exonerate the Russians. More to the point, looking at the double enlargement through Moscow’s eyes allows me to better understand how and why NATO’s own practices have been particularly deleterious to its dominant position in relation to Russia. The real source of tensions, as always, lies with the international relation not with the political entities per se (cf. chapter VI).

1. Russia’s Great Power Habitus

In concluding chapter four, I argued that in 2006, Russian practitioners took for granted the Great Power status of their country. At the intersubjective level, the foreign policy discourse similarly assumed Moscow’s belonging to a small club of the most powerful nations. Across the political spectrum, Russian elites generally thought from their country’s Great Power status: Great Power-ness was a Russian commonplace. To be sure, this disposition is primarily a historical substrate. For the last three centuries at least, Russia has constituted a pole of power in international politics. From Peter the Great’s arrival in the European society to the Soviet superpower, the Russian habitus is imprinted with a sense of belonging to the restricted circle of Great Powers. Until the end of 1991, Moscow remained the premier centre of the communist world. Remarkably, this disposition survived the fall of the USSR. As Vladislav Zubok explains, “Russians linked their identity to the USSR. When it collapsed, not only Russia, but also Russians, had to be reinvented. Russians’ attachment to their great past, however, prevents them from reinventing themselves. They seem to wallow in imperial nostalgia.”139 This disconnect between Russian dispositions and the country’s position in the post-Cold War field of international security (defined along democracy, human rights, etc.) is evidence of hysteresis effects. Starting in the mid-1990s and increasingly so to this day, the Russian habitus appeared more attuned to the dominant position occupied in the past than to the post-Cold War configuration. This lag is very much characteristic of fallen empires. In addition, the Russian political culture is informed by a “Third Rome assumption”—“a strongly anchored conviction within the Russian mind that it is a ‘chosen people’ with a universal spiritual mission.”140

139 Zubok 2005, 187.
140 Ponsard 2007, 32. For instance, one Russian thinker wrote in 1996 that “the historical mission of Russians (their supermission) primarily affects spiritual life and is aimed at the creation of interculture, and interreligion. The
sum, the Great Power habitus that I observed in Russian practitioners is an echo of Russia’s peculiar history.

That said, I showed in the first section of this chapter that references to Russia’s Great Power-ness had been mostly absent from foreign policy discourse in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. It is only in the ensuing years that they made a progressive comeback. In March 1994, for example, Kozyrev adopted a new tone with NATO member states: “Some people in the West have actually succumbed to the fantasy that a partnership can be built with Russia on the principle of ‘if the Russians are good guys now, they should follow us in every way.’ […] But the Russian Federation is doomed to being a Great Power. … it can only be an equal partner, not a junior one.”

Starting in the mid-1990s, the assertion and reassertion of the country’s Great Power status became a sort of mantra among Moscow’s elites—so much so, in fact, that observers came to read in this obsessive need to verbalize one’s status a lack of self-confidence in its being deserved: “the very persistence of the Russian authors and speakers in making this assertion demonstrates that the fact of Russia’s belonging to Europe is perceived by society as very problematic. Indeed, the most stable of the social phenomena are those which most people take for granted … If any fact is constantly in need of being postulated as indisputable, the very indisputability of the fact has to be put in doubt.”

In a similar vein, Lo describes “the Potemkinization of Russian foreign policy,” arguing that the Great Power discourse was part of Moscow’s “mythmaking” after the end of the Cold War.

Nothing better illustrates the revival of Russia’s age-old disposition of Great Power-ness than the nomination, in January 1996, of Primakov as Foreign minister in replacement of Kozyrev. At his very first press conference in his new capacity, Primakov summarized the disposition quite clearly: “Despite the current difficulties, Russia has been and remains a Great Power, and its policy toward the outside world should correspond to that status.” He also insisted on the need for equitable partnership with the West and reasserted that there was no victor of the Cold War because overcoming it had been a joint victory. Starting with Primakov, Russian foreign policymakers appealed to the historical notion of “derzhava,” which


Morozov 2004, 3.


Andrei Tsygankov translates as “the holder of international equilibrium of power.”\textsuperscript{145} Accordingly, the main constitutive elements of the Russian narrative of Great Power-ness are calls for equality, multipolarity, spheres of interest and balance of power.\textsuperscript{146} In the next section, I will illustrate the effects that the revival of the Russian habitus of Great Power-ness has had on foreign policy by analyzing the tense negotiations leading up to the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997.

The Russian Great Power habitus is attuned to the external mode of pursuing security—that is, the traditional rules of the game in the field of international security centred on power-balancing and alliance-making. These dispositions were carved in Russian bodies during the Cold War and well before that after the consolidation of the Moscovite empire and its arrival on the European scene. As such, the habitus mirrored the rules of a confrontational game that had allegedly passed by the mid-1990s. In 1995, then, the Russian Great Power habitus was out of place in the new rules of the international security game imposed by NATO and premised on democracy and human rights promotion; hence the hysterisis effects in the relationship. In effect, the re-emergence of dispositions inherited from the Cold War led Russian officials to decreasingly recognize the order to international security things imposed by NATO in the early 1990s. Russian dispositions lost touch with the country’s position, an evolution that severely weakened the Alliance’s domination.

The gist of my argument consists of linking the revival of Great Power dispositions in Russia to NATO’s practices with regards to the double enlargement. I want to substantiate this correlation with four interrelated arguments. First, NATO’s double enlargement led to an unprecedented foreign policy consensus in post-communist Russia around 1995. In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there had been a lot of debate on Russia’s new identity. Starting in 1994, however, this heterogeneity in foreign policy opinions gave way to a broad-based agreement based on the notion of derzhava. From then on, the Russian elite struck a position that repudiated much of the New Thinking of the early 1990s to instead integrate several items from the age-old Russian disposition of Great Power-ness. An insider to these debates, Trenin confirms that “the turning point came in 1994 with the decision in principle by NATO to admit new members. Most groups within the Russian elite, otherwise deeply divided on the issues of policy, were suddenly united in portraying this decision as essentially anti-

\textsuperscript{145} Tsygankov 2004, 93.
\textsuperscript{146} Lo 2002, 98 ff.
Russian.” Crucially, the consensus around the notion of Great Power emerged after NATO’s official launch of the process of geographical enlargement.

Second, NATO’s practices with regards to its double enlargement played a significant role in disempowering those elites that had been disposed to follow Western leadership and recognize its cultural-symbolic superiority. As Tsygankov notes:

The [Russian] opposition’s pressures on Russia’s foreign policy in the Balkans further intensified in 1994 when NATO launched air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. In this increasingly politicized context, NATO made a decision to expand eastward by incorporating members of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. The decision provided domestic nationalist opposition with additional arguments and resources to mobilize against the Westernist course.  

Epitomized by Primakov’s nomination as Foreign Minister, the institutional empowerment of the Great Power habitus that took place in the mid-1990s was not accompanied by any significant changes in the material conditions of the Russian population. “What changed, however, was the behavior of the West toward Russia and its local conditions; this contributed to an altered domestic perception and brought to power the identity coalition of Statists.”

Quantitative studies confirm these insights. In a detailed study of elite and mass opinions about foreign policy in Russia, William Zimmerman observes that “Russia’s orientation to the world had changed considerably in the two years between 1993 and 1995. The era dominated by those sometimes termed the Atlanticists in Russian foreign policy had passed.” Further, the author makes a link between this finding and NATO’s enlargement, arguing that “NATO expansion both in numbers and in role has very likely deterred those Russian elites who from a Western perspective warranted being deterred and has disabused Russian elites who would have been likely to respond favorably to policies designed to reassure.”

Evidence that NATO’s double enlargement contributed to reviving Great Power dispositions can also be found on the Atlantic side in some officials’ recollection of events. For instance, one insider to the Clinton White House believes that the policy has been “the real culprit” in the deterioration of Russian-Atlantic relations. Building on dozens of interviews with American diplomats and politicians, Goldgeier and McFaul similarly conclude that although “it is hard to measure the negative impact of NATO enlargement for U.S.-Russian

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147 Trenin 2000, 13-14.
148 Tsygankov 2006, 74-75.
149 Ibid., 96.
150 Zimmerman 2002, 93.
151 Ibid., 206.
152 Blacker 1998, 179.
relations on other security concerns … it is true that the cooperative pattern of problem solving on issues like Baltic troop withdrawal and the India rocket deal established in 1993-94 were not repeated after the NATO enlargement process began to move forward for subjects like Iran or START [Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty] on which the United States needed Russian cooperation."¹⁵³ At the diplomatic level and with the benefit of hindsight, then, practitioners on the NATO side felt that something had changed in Russian dispositions after 1994; and they identified enlargement as the probable trigger of that change.

Third, the Alliance’s double enlargement contributed to a return to Russia’s Great Power narrative because of its humiliating consequences. As Talbott was selling the case for a NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Kozyrev responded: “it’s bad enough having you people tell us what you’re going to do whether we like it or not. Don’t add insult to injury by also telling us that it’s in our interests to obey your orders.”¹⁵⁴ Playing the junior partner turned out to be unbearable for Moscow given NATO’s inclination to take advantage of every available opportunity. One spokesperson from the Russian Foreign ministry lamented, for instance, that “Russian elites perceive Western policies to be based on the premise that the Soviet Union was defeated in the Cold War and that Russia, as its successor, should be closely monitored and limited in its foreign policy until it proves that it is a responsible state.”¹⁵⁵ Such a treatment was a blow to Russian pride, already gripped with a “bitter sense of loss of superpower status.”¹⁵⁶ As Vladimir Baranovsky continues: “The predominant feeling is that even if Russia could not retain its position in Europe, it certainly did not deserve to be forced out ruthlessly and treated as a defeated country.”¹⁵⁷ To make matters worse, the Russians felt that as soon as they did not agree with allied member states’ policies, they were accused of reverting to Russia’s imperial past. In 1995, Kozyrev expressed his irritation:

the firm, sometimes tough protection of [national] interests by Russian diplomacy should not be seen as an exercise in superpower rhetoric. When the United States and its allies in Western Europe or Japan have political differences or even trade wars, no one thinks of accusing this or that country of having imperial ambitions or of giving up on democracy. Why is it, then, that when Russia disagrees on something with its Western partners, the alarm is immediately sounded and partnership with the West is declared to be either falling apart or totally impossible?¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ Quoted in Talbott 2002, 76 (italics original).
¹⁵⁵ Quoted in Kozhemiakin 1998, 54.
¹⁵⁶ Ponsard 2007, 93.
¹⁵⁷ Baranovsky 2000, 449.
¹⁵⁸ Kozyrev 1995, 8.
All in all, playing by the new rules of the international security game quickly turned out to be the naïve thing to do for the Russians since NATO appeared to take advantage of the situation.

Fourth and related, from the Russian point of view NATO’s practices of functional and geographical enlargement were reminiscent of the Cold War game. Many Russian elites felt that NATO’s discourse of democracy and cooperative security was in fact a cover-up for “collecting its geopolitical trophies.”\(^{159}\) In contrast to Russia, complained one Russian pundit, “the United States kept acting in clear line with geopolitical logics”\(^{160}\) after the end of the Cold War. In other words, the Alliance seemed to use a double language, advocating idealpolitik in words but implementing realpolitik in deeds.\(^{161}\) As a result, ingrained dispositions of realpolitik took precedence over the weaker habitus that had flourished from New Thinking to Kozyrev. The game of the double enlargement, in other words, triggered great-power dispositions at the expense of those that had informed Russia’s foreign policy in 1992-1993. Baranovsky put that point in eloquent terms:

Russia is no longer a military threat—but from a Russian perspective NATO intends to continue as the military alliance against an eventual re-emergence of threat emanating from Russia. The enlargement of NATO should not antagonize Russia—but Russia’s involvement in this process is not considered even as a hypothetical possibility. … Russia’s peacekeepers are welcomed to participate in KFOR—but, unlike leading Western countries, they do not get their own sector of responsibility. By and large the Cold War logic of “keeping Russians out” seems to many of them to have mutated into a double-track task: how to prevent Russians from becoming disengaged, without however actually letting them in.\(^{162}\)

In such a context, Great Power dispositions were better adapted to playing the game of international security with NATO member states. “Overwhelmingly,” concludes Tsygankov, “the Russian foreign policy community perceived the expansion as a violation of the norm of reciprocity and the very spirit of the post-Cold War transformation.”\(^{163}\)

The revival of the Russian Great Power habitus was gradual throughout the 1990s. It was only with the Kosovo crisis and the ensuing resignation of Yeltsin that it became wholly dominant among decision-makers (cf chapter VI). In the meantime, the coexistence of dispositions of Great Power-ness and of cooperative security inclinations created intriguing

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159 Trenin 2000, 14.
161 As one observer notes, “in the Russian view, Western leaders, although seeking cooperative arrangements with Russia, had de facto decided to reduce the power of any security institution in which Russia had equal status, while at the same time strengthening NATO and the EU in which Russia did not enjoy full equity and was unlikely to do so”; Ponsard 2007, 65.
162 Baranovsky 2000, 446.
tensions in Russian foreign policy, between the desire to integrate Atlantic structures and a drive to retain as much independence as possible. On the one hand, as a Great Power Russia should be an autonomous pole in the international system; on the other hand, as a player in the post-Cold War international security game, the country valued democratic norms as means of pursuing security. Positional and dispositional effects pushed practice in different directions. Note that this ambivalence characterizes Russia’s external relations with the West to this day. In the next section, I show how these hysteresis effects played out in the tense negotiations leading up to the institutionalization of Russian-Atlantic relations in the mid-1990s.

2. Mind the Gap? Institutionalizing Russia-NATO Ties

The intense hysteresis effects that started to grip Russian-Atlantic relations in the mid-1990s are best illustrated with the diplomatic interactions that led to signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997. Throughout the negotiations, NATO practitioners considered Russia’s assumption of Great Power-ness nonsensical, while Russian officials could hardly bear the Alliance’s condescending approach. The disconnect between positions in the field (as defined by the Alliance) and each party’s dispositions was striking—as much as it was at the NRC in 2006 (cf. chapter IV). The following pages flag two concrete hysteresis effects on Russian-Atlantic interactions. First, the negotiations turned out to be much more tense and difficult than they had been earlier in the post-Cold War era. On both sides’ accounts, the dialogue was characterized by fierce symbolic power struggles. In particular, the Russians turned out to be far more difficult partners because they consistently insisted on the need for equality. Second and related, given its disconnect from the structure of the international security field, the Russian habitus of Great Power-ness sparked “Don Quixote effects” in the form of a series of diplomatic initiatives that seemed “out of touch” with the “reality” of Russian-Atlantic relations.

To put it simply, starting in the mid-1990s hysteresis effects showed up in Russia’s determined quest for NATO’s recognition of its “equality” and the Alliance’s blunt dismissal of that claim. Viewed from Brussels, Moscow’s weakness was very sharp; as a result, Atlantic diplomats expected the Russians to be happy to deferring to NATO’s lead in the field of international security. Such was not the Russian perspective after the habitus of Great Power had resurfaced in the mid-1990s. As Trenin notes, Moscow’s objective in institutionalizing relations with the Alliance was crystal clear: it never aspired to be a normal partner and not even a normal ally, but rather to be “first among equals, with the only possible exception of the
This was plainly out of the question for NATO officials. As prominent observers regretted in 1996, “the demand for special treatment which would demonstrate that Russia was not only a Great Power, but was recognized as such by the rest of the world, became something of an idée fixe.” The Russians had simply lost the sense of their place, it appeared, and this rendered them impossible interlocutors. Officials in Moscow harboured reciprocal feelings about their NATO counterparts.

Already in 1994, when NATO invited Russia to join the PfP, the Duma Committee on Defence recommended joining “only if consideration is given to its special status.” According to Sergei Yushenkov, then chairman of the Committee, “Russia would simply join a program devised without its involvement, and this does a certain amount of damage to the country’s prestige.” As a Great Power, Russia deserved more equality than that. President Yeltsin quickly joined his voice to the chorus, declaring that “by virtue of its scope and substance,” Russia deserved a partnership with NATO “different from relationships with other countries. The idea is to conclude a special agreement with NATO in keeping with Russia’s place and role in world and European affairs and with our country’s military power and nuclear status.”

During the very first ministerial meeting at 16+1, in May 1994, then Defence minister Pavel Grachev handed to his NATO counterparts a list of proposals for institutionalizing their ties, including a consultation mechanism. But in his private meeting with the American Secretary of Defence William Perry, he was told that no special conditions would be given to Russia. Put back in his place, Grachev reportedly answered that “[i]t wouldn’t be correct for Russia to set forth special conditions [or ask for] a warmer place in the sun. A civilized nation would never set such conditions.” In 1994, Russia was still willing to play the junior partner although dispositions of Great Power-ness were clearly on the rise.

It is essential to recall that the Russian-Atlantic negotiations over the Founding Act took place against the background of NATO’s geographical enlargement. For the Russians, then, it was a damage-limitation exercise, while for the Alliance it was a way to soften the initiative

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164 Trenin 2005a, 282.
with the Kremlin. In Talbott’s words: “Working with the Russians meant finding a way to coax them into being part of an outcome that they would regard as something other than a strategic defeat.”

The main strategy adopted by the Alliance was to grant Russia the symbolic pomp of equality but without the substance. After much hesitation, and only once it became clear that Moscow would not sign the PfP without that gesture, the Alliance finally accepted in June 1994 to “develop an extensive individual Partnership Programme corresponding to Russia’s size, importance and capabilities.”

In January 1995, negotiations on a NATO-Russia accord began through the Strategic Stability Group, a communication channel between Talbott in Washington and Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov in Moscow. In May, NATO and Russia agreed on a document called “Areas for Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO/Russia Dialogue and Cooperation,” which envisioned “dialogue through ad hoc 16+1 meetings” on matters of peacekeeping, nuclear weapons, and crisis management.

At the first meeting at “16+1” between then Foreign minister Primakov and his NATO counterparts, held in Berlin in early June 1996, the Alliance made its first significant concession by granting Russia a further three years in meeting the CFE flank limits.

That said, throughout the negotiations NATO officials were willing to concede some ground to the Russians, but never at the expense of their own freedom. More often than not, accommodations were symbolic or non-binding. In Talbott’s recollection:

As early as the spring of 1996, Primakov began dropping hints about three conditions that, if accepted by NATO, might make enlargement palatable to Russia: a prohibition against stationing nuclear weaponry on the territory of new member-states; a requirement for “co-decision-making” between Russia and NATO on any issue of European security; and codification of these and other restrictions on NATO and rights for Russia in a legally binding treaty.

What first strikes the eye in this list is that none of these conditions were fulfilled by the Founding Act, except perhaps the first one, which the Alliance conceded in a unilateral declaration. Given hysteresis effects, NATO officials considered these demands “out of place”; for the Russians they were simply the logical consequence of their country’s status. At the end

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170 Talbott 2002, 146.
of the day, in the mid-1990s the Alliance enjoyed enough authority over Russia to discipline its expectations and grant it seeming concessions that in fact only reinforced domination. This is especially clear when one examines the fate of Primakov’s three demands in the negotiating process of the Founding Act.

First, as regards nuclear weaponry, one of the key accommodations granted to Russia was a NATO declaration made at the outset of a 16+1 Defence ministers meeting in December 1996. On that occasion, U.S. Secretary of Defence Christopher declared that “in today’s Europe, NATO has no intention, no plan, and no need to station nuclear weapons on the territory of any new members, and we are affirming that no NATO nuclear forces are presently on alert.”\(^\text{175}\) This political commitment had obviously no legal force. In addition to its non-binding character, the Alliance’s declaration was seriously restricted by the contextual clause “in today’s Europe.” The implicit restriction here is that any change in current circumstances would licence NATO to renege on its pledge if needed. The move was all the more dubious for the Russians that they had had their fingers burnt after Gorbachev was similarly promised in 1990 that NATO would not enlarge to the east. In an op-ed in mid-March, Russian expert Aleksei Pushkov quoted at length four official transcripts in which James Baker, Kohl, John Major and Douglas Hurd had in turn made commitments to Gorbachev that NATO would not expand after Germany’s reunification. Pushkov noted:

> The problem with verbal promises is not that the person making the promises is lying but that the promises, never having been spelled out explicitly in appropriate treaties or agreements, inevitably fall victim to time. In this context, the assurances of six years ago that NATO would not expand are excellent confirmation of the obvious but sometimes forgotten truth that on major policy questions you should never take anyone at his word—if you do, of course, you will be acting to your own detriment. If the European system now taking shape is not codified in a legally binding document, we run the risk, a couple of years from now, of finding ourselves in a serious conflict with the North Atlantic alliance, contrary to the good intentions that both sides have at this time.\(^\text{176}\)

With the benefit of hindsight, Pushkov was obviously right: the American BMD project recently put forward clearly violated the spirit, if not the letter, of NATO’s 1996 pledge on nuclear weaponry (cf. chapter VII).

\(^\text{175}\) Quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 203. The official Defence ministers’ communiqué read like this: “Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’s current nuclear posture and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s unclear posture or nuclear policy—and we do not foresee any future need to do so”; NATO (1996), “Final Communiqué,” press communiqué M-NAC-2 (96)165, Brussels, 10 December (www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-165e.htm, accessed 26 September 2007).

The Alliance dealt with Primakov’s second request (co-decisionmaking) in a similar way. During a tour of Europe’s main capitals including Moscow, in February 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright finally agreed to the creation of a consultative council with Russia.\textsuperscript{177} She made clear from the outset, however, that this mechanism would provide Moscow with a voice not a veto. Recall that throughout the post-Cold War era, NATO’s worst fear in dealing with the Russians was a weakening of the transatlantic consensus. Created by the Founding Act, the PJC provided for consultation and, “where appropriate,” for joint decisions. In practice, however, the PJC allowed any member at the table to withdraw any topic from discussion. Consequently, even NATO’s pledge to consult with Russia was seriously blunted by restrictive clauses. This limit was illuminated less than two years later, when the PJC proved incapable of hosting effective negotiations between NATO and Russia in the run-up to the Kosovo crisis.

Primakov’s third demand—that the content of the Russia-NATO agreement be codified in a legally binding treaty—proved to be the toughest one. For reasons already mentioned, the Russians were not willing to rely only upon the Alliance’s political guarantees. From January to May 1997, no less than six rounds of talks were held between NATO SG Javier Solana and Primakov (not to mention the many deputies’ meetings) during which the issue of legal codification was front and centre. At the January meeting in Moscow, Primakov insisted on the necessity of a “legally binding document.”\textsuperscript{178} President Yeltsin was even more explicit: “A document on the parameters of Russia-NATO relations must be binding. We intend to submit it for ratification, since we cannot, in view of past experience, be content with nonbinding assurances.”\textsuperscript{179} NATO diplomats proved imperturbable, however: time was on their side since Russia had been put on notice in December 1996 that the enlargement would proceed with or without a prior agreement with Moscow. By mid-March, with Primakov in Washington to prepare the coming summit between Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki, Russia was reported to having dropped several of its key demands in light of NATO’s inflexibility, including political membership for new members and the legally binding nature of the agreement.\textsuperscript{180} In exchange, NATO offered a fourth “no,” to the effect that “NATO had no intention, plan or need to introduce substantial forces onto the territory of the new members.”\textsuperscript{181} As with earlier

\textsuperscript{181} Goldgeier and McFaul 2003,205. The exact communiqué read as follows: “In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary
commitments, the Alliance limited its application to “the current and foreseeable security environment.” Again, the pledge would be valid only so long as member states would want it to be. In the colourful words of Migranyan: “The West made a firm commitment to just one thing: not to make, on any question, any commitments that in the future might tie its hands in relations with Russia.”

At the Helsinki summit between Yeltsin and Clinton in March 1997, the Russian president took note of Brussels’ (i.e., Washington’s) staunch refusal to legally commit but tried nonetheless to push the binding character of the agreement. In an evocative twist of the tongue, Yeltsin declared that “we agreed that this treaty will be binding on everyone. It will be signed by the heads of all 16 NATO countries.” Since the Alliance was not going to accommodate Moscow’s demands, at least Russia would interpret its commitments in its own way! During Solana’s next visit to Moscow, in mid-April, Primakov insisted on his demand that NATO not expand infrastructures, including lines of communication, airfields, military bases and stockpiles of weapons, onto new members’ territories. With Albright in the Russian capital, Primakov proposed placing limits on the numbers of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery that an expanded NATO would be allowed to possess. The proposal was once again turned down by Alliance officials, who also rejected Russia’s demand for a ban on force deployment on new member states’ territories and of limitations on military infrastructure. Two more rounds of negotiations in Luxembourg and Moscow did not bear fruits and Russia withdrew its demands when told by NATO that there would be no more concessions. Interestingly, this issue of armament ceilings for new members still haunts Russian-Atlantic relations ten years later, as it lays behind Moscow’s moratorium on the implementation of the CFE treaty (cf. chapter VI).

The negotiation of the Founding Act illustrates hysteresis effects in international relations particularly well. From the Alliance point of view, Russia was attempting to punch interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” NATO (1997) “Statement by the North Atlantic Council,” press release 97(27), Brussels, 14 March (www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-027e.htm, accessed 1 November 2007). Note that this pledge was broken in 2005 when the US announced its plans to relocate military bases in Romania and Bulgaria (cf. chapter VI).

well above its weight with its extensive and legally binding demands. Moscow was in no position to dictate any provision and should have been happy that NATO would open a diplomatic negotiation with it in the first place. As I showed, the Atlantic compromises granted to the Russians were mostly symbolic in nature and they did not restrict the Alliance’s freedom whatsoever. From the Russian perspective, as a Great Power what mattered most was to be treated as NATO’s “equal.” This imperative at times appeared even more important than obtaining genuine concessions from Brussels. Particularly striking is the emphasis that Russian elites consistently put on the imperative of “saving face.”

For instance, Primakov had to regularly defend himself against accusations of “watering down” Russia’s position in the hope of achieving an agreement with NATO. Dismissing such claims as “nonsense,” the Foreign minister insisted that Russia was not backing down whatsoever but rather holding the ground of its firm positions. Even after the last round of negotiations, when it became clear that Russia’s demands had been essentially rejected, one senior member of the Russian Foreign ministry nonetheless stated: “Everything is fine. We got everything we wanted.” More than anything else, for Moscow the Founding Act was meant to get Russia’s Great Power status publicly recognized.

Second, the Founding Act negotiations gave birth to a number of quixotic practices on Russia’s part. Because of hysteresis, the Russians had to publicly show their status and avoid as much as possible backing down in front of NATO. The Russian stance was all the more difficult that diplomatic interactions were taking place against the background of the Alliance’s enlargement. Even before the negotiations formally opened in December 1996, the Russian government had listed five countermeasures that it was prepared to implement should enlargement proceed: (1) revision of the military doctrine; (2) creation of defensive alliance, within and beyond the CIS framework; (3) significant build-up of the southern, western and northwestern groups of force, the CFE treaty notwithstanding; (4) build-up of new tactical nuclear weapons and retargeting against new NATO members; (5) withdrawal from START I and II. Then, after the first formal meeting between Primakov and the NATO Defence

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189 Stanislav Kondrashov (1997), “We Are Prepared to Coexist with an Expanded Alliance, but on Our Own Terms,” Izvestia, 16 May, translated in CDPSP 49(20).
ministers, Yeltsin convened his advisors to work out a series of retaliatory measures. There was an obvious tension—very much characteristic of hysteresis—between this very tough approach and the negotiations that were taking place on the ground, where Russia was playing with a losing hand. In order to “best the West,” Russia undertook four main sets of practices that were doomed to fail: counterproposals, hindrance, soft balancing, and veiled threats.

Throughout the negotiation process, the Russians made a number of counterproposals so as to keep the initiative and obtain concessions from NATO. For example, in March 1996 Primakov proposed to Poland that NATO give it “security guarantees” that would stop short of full-fledged membership. In April, the Kremlin suggested the establishment of a Baltic-Black Sea Nuclear-Free Zone, to be codified legally and comprised of the Baltic states, the Visegrad four, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria. Shortly thereafter, Yeltsin put forward a “French scenario” providing for the admission of new members only to the bloc’s political structures without their joining its military structures. Primakov even visited Norway and Denmark to demonstrate how some established NATO member states did not allow bases or troops deployments on their territories. In July 1996, Yeltsin wrote a letter to Clinton consenting to NATO enlarging to Poland on the condition that Baltic states would be excluded from any future enlargement. Several months later, in his summit with Clinton in Helsinki, the Russian President tried that line again as part of a “gentlemen agreement.” At the end of the day, none of these Russian counterproposals was approved by NATO and its member states.

The second strategy that Russia followed was one of hindrance, at times bordering on obstruction. Under Kozyrev, Moscow had often sought NATO member states’ cooperation by highlighting Russia’s political and economic weakness as a potential threat. In the mid-1990s, the Russians went further and took measures destined to hinder certain Allied member states’ initiatives. In January 1996, for instance, the Duma delayed ratification of START II, invoking

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191 Black 2000, 23.  
192 Fierke 1999b.  
the problem of NATO expansion. In September 1996, at the very last minute, Russia refused to participate in PfP Black Sea Exercises with Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. In October 1996, the Duma adopted one of many resolutions against NATO expansion, warning that an enlarged NATO would undermine the validity of the CFE Treaty. Again in February 1997, the Duma refused to ratify START II because of enlargement. Even after Yeltsin had confirmed he would sign the Founding Act at the Paris Summit in May, the Duma passed two forceful resolutions, condemning NATO’s planned expansion for it would “detract from efforts to construct a new global security system in Europe” and pose “the greatest military threat to our country over the last 50 years.”

In this connection, the new National Security Concept adopted in early May 1997 registered a fundamental change of tone in Russian foreign policy doctrine toward NATO. In the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia was faced with only internal threats, from separatism to drug trafficking. The document downplayed military factors and assumed “the end of the East-West confrontation.” Where NATO was mentioned, it was only in the positive context of setting objectives for cooperation. By 1997, Russia’s official security doctrines incorporated two new long-term threats absent from the previous document: interference in internal Russian affairs (a reference to Western criticism of the Chechnya intervention, certainly, but also, possibly, to NATO’s functional enlargement); and expansion of military blocs and alliances (a clear reference to NATO’s geographical enlargement). In fact, the 1997 document stated that “the NATO expansion to the east and its becoming a dominant military and political force in Europe [is] extremely dangerous.” Significantly, the first four threats to Russian security listed in the Concept were all directly related to NATO’s practices with regards to the double enlargement: the marginalization of the UN and the OSCE, the weakening of Russia’s influence in the world, the strengthening of military blocs, and the appearance of military bases on Russia’s borders.

201 Black 2000, 18.
202 Felkay 2002, 163; Black 2000, 43.
203 Kassianova 2001, 830.
204 De Haas 2002, 52.
205 Kassianova 2001, 832.
206 Ambrosio 2005, 115. Note also that the 1997 Concept persistently invoked the need for equality in Russia’s relationship with “other Great Powers”; Kassianova 2001, 831.
Third, Russia also took a number of foreign policy initiatives akin to what a number of realist authors have called “soft balancing”—limited and indirect balancing strategies of coalition-building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions, short of formal alliances.\(^{207}\) Despite its limits, the concept is useful to make sense of a number of Russian initiatives concomitant with the negotiations over the Founding Act. In April 1996, during a Sino-Russian Summit in Beijing, the parties adopted a declaration premised on the notion of “strategic partnership.” A year later, Moscow and Beijing adopted a “Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration about a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New World Order.”\(^{208}\) Interestingly, the text emphasized sovereignty and non-intervention as the key principles of international relations, while dismissing universal human rights standards.\(^{209}\) At the time, that was the very first time that Moscow openly contested the NATO rules of the international security game—a trend that accentuated sharply in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. In addition to China, Russia also joined with Belarus to contest the Alliance’s practices. In March 1997, the two countries declared themselves “united in the unwillingness to accept NATO’s plans to advance eastward”\(^{210}\) and even took steps to plan joint military exercises.\(^{211}\) In yet another display of hysteresis, these manoeuvres were immediately “dismissed as not credible” by NATO officials.\(^{212}\)

Fourth and finally, Russian officials also issued a handful of “veiled” threats—in the sense that these were not explicitly issued by the highest authorities but rather looked uncoordinated so as to leave just enough doubt about their seriousness. They may have been, in other words, nothing but trial balloons (again, a typical behaviour from agents that attempt to punch above their weight). For example, in February 1996 an unidentified official from the Ministry of Atomic Energy Russia was quoted as saying that Russia could target nuclear weapons against NATO military bases set up on the territory of East European countries.\(^{213}\) That possibility was ambiguously touched upon by Defence Minister Rodionov a few months later.\(^{214}\)


In a similar equivocation, at the very same time that Albright was meeting with Yeltsin at the Kremlin in February 1997, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was inspecting the combat potential of the Strategic Missile Forces at the Central Command Post near Odintsovo. As a Russian journalist reported:

The Prime Minister was supposed to find out if SMF divisions are capable of accomplishing their assigned mission – destroying the US in less than an hour after receiving an order to do so. The SMF passed the inspection with flying colors. Staff exercises were conducted, Mr. Chernomyrdin personally gave the order to launch, and dozens of simulated intercontinental ballistic missiles on computer screens streamed over the Arctic Ocean and North Pole toward their targets—American military bases and cities.

In a similar bullying tactic, Primakov threatened to cut off all relations with NATO if any country from the former Soviet Union was invited to join.\textsuperscript{216} Again, at the time none of this could have deterred NATO from proceeding with enlargement as planned because Moscow’s moves appeared simply out of place. What must be emphasized, however, is that Russia’s newly found assertiveness—at the time in words if not in deeds—was the first testimony to the revival of the habitus of Great Power and the resulting decline in Atlantic domination of the international security field. This new dynamic, however, came in full display only a few years later in the wake of the Kosovo crisis.

In the meantime, in Paris in late May 1997, NATO member states and Russia gathered with much pomp to sign the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.” By the agreement, the parties solemnly pledge to “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security. NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation.”\textsuperscript{217} Despite the symbolic talk and ceremony, hints of hysteresis could be glanced here and there. In his declaration, Yeltsin emphatically insisted on the need to act “as equals” at the PJC that had just been created.\textsuperscript{218} On their part, NATO leaders took great pain to show how much of a gain the agreement was for Russia. Clinton stressed his determination “to create a future in which European security is not a

\textsuperscript{216}Pavel Bogomolov (1997), “In the Absence of Firm Guarantees from the West, Moscow Will Have to Curtail Relations with NATO’s Brussels Headquarters,” Pravda-5, 4 March, translated in CDSP 49(9).
\textsuperscript{218}No author (1997), “New Commitments to Europe,” Rossiiskiye Vesti, 28 May, translated in CDSP 49(21).
zero-sum game—where NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss, and Russia’s strength is our alliance’s weakness. That is old thinking.”

Similarly, NATO SG Solana asserted that “[t]hrough the Founding Act, Russia cannot be isolated, and cannot consider herself to be isolated. Her views will be heard. And the potential for common action is there.” The performative social magic that allowed this celebration to happen quickly ceased to operate, however, when Kosovo took the centre stage of Russian-Atlantic relations.

CONCLUSION: A STILLBORN SECURITY COMMUNITY?

A key implication of this chapter’s argument is that today’s uncertainties about the possibility of a Russian-Atlantic security community owe much to the critical juncture of late 1994, when NATO launched its double enlargement policy. Given the dire effects that this turn of events had on the development of trust, the probability that a genuine pacification process could take place, in and through practice, was seriously undermined. Starting in the mid-1990s, Russian elites stopped being well-disposed toward the NATO-professed order of international security things. With the revival of the Great Power habitus in Moscow, the domination pattern that is necessary to turn diplomacy into a doxic practice started to crumble. To be sure, disputes continued to be solved peacefully; but in the longer term, even “successful” diplomacy had deleterious effects on trust-building as well as on the homology between Russian dispositions and the country’s position in the new field of international security. Self-evident diplomacy gave way to strong hysteresis effects, with two masters but no apprentice in the relationship.

In using the language of “critical juncture,” I want to emphasize the path-dependent nature of social and political relations, whose future depends on their past because history unfolds like a branching tree. The theoretical argument according to which early steps in a socio-political relationship are crucial applies unequivocally to the Russian-Atlantic case. As Pierson explains:

the key mechanism at work in these path-dependent sequences is some form of self-reinforcement or positive feedback loop. Initial steps in a particular direction may encourage further movement along the same path. Over time, “roads not chosen” may become increasingly distant, increasingly unreachable alternatives. Relatively modest perturbations at early stages may have a large influence on these processes. In many cases,

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221 Collier and Collier 1991.
the significance of early events or processes in the sequence may be amplified, while that of later events or processes is dampened.\textsuperscript{222}

Arguably, the end of the Cold War was one of those rare historical instances in which the world found itself at an intersection from which several directions were available. As Kissinger writes: “When an international order first comes into being, many choices may be open to it. But each choice constricts the universe of remaining options. Because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices are especially crucial.”\textsuperscript{223}

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that for a short time span, between 1992 and 1994, everything took place as if Russia were to integrate with the new NATO world order. At that point, “[t]he ideas of Russian messianism and the pursuit of an independent role in line with its Great Power heritage were either understated or even denied.”\textsuperscript{224} Many paths were therefore possible, with that of security community wide open. Things abruptly changed in 1994 when NATO took two initiatives that set its relations with Russia on the bumpy track that continues to this day. For the Russians, the double enlargement amounted to NATO reneging, in practice, on its own discourse of inclusive, mutual, and cooperative security. Because the move was reminiscent of realpolitik more than of the professed internal mode of pursuing security, Russian dispositions of Great Power-ness gradually resurfaced. With its strongly negative effects on trust-building, the policy almost amounted to signing the nascent security community’s death warrant.

Using a Bourdieu-inspired theoretical framework has an important edge in matters of critical junctures and early steps because it supplies an agent-level mechanism for path dependence. As a historical distillate of embodied dispositions, habitus explains self-reinforcing practices. The historical constitution of habitus, in effect, is characterized by a “relative irreversibility”: “all the external stimuli and conditioning experiences are, at every moment, perceived through categories already constructed by prior experiences. From that follows an inevitable priority of originary experiences and consequently a relative closure of the system of dispositions that constitute habitus.”\textsuperscript{225} The practical sense, as a result, builds on past experiences to feel what is to be done. The dispositions comprised in the habitus, constituted by past experiences subjective and intersubjective, in part constitute future practices. As a result, the path taken at certain historical junctures may preclude others in the future. Such has been the

\textsuperscript{222} Pierson 2004, 64.
\textsuperscript{223} Kissinger 1994, 26-27.
\textsuperscript{224} Ponsard 2007, 62.
\textsuperscript{225} Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 133.
case in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations: partly because of the resiliency of Russia’s Great Power habitus, which was reactivated by NATO’s double enlargement, today’s tough politics are nothing but the fallout from the early steps of 1992-1997.
Chapter VI
THE FallOUT: RUSSIA AND NATO
FROM KOSOVO TO AFGHANISTAN, 1998-2006

This chapter follows directly from the previous one. In chapter V, I showed how the launch of the double enlargement policy, in late 1994, led to the revival of the Russian habitus of Great Power-ness. As a result, the Russian-Atlantic relationship moved from a situation of homology between dispositions and positions (with NATO ordering and Russia obeying) to one of growing hysteresis (as Moscow seemingly began to attempt to punch above its weight). I also found that despite their successfully non-violent dealings, Moscow and the Alliance did not develop any significant sense of trust and obligation—quite the contrary. In this chapter, I demonstrate how these somewhat opposite political dynamics—toward and away from security-community-building—further consolidated with the turn of the millennium. Pursuing my objectification enterprise, I contextualize the meanings and practices of Russia-NATO security relations and set them in motion by focusing on the recent period stretching from NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to that in Afghanistan (1998-2006). In this short time span, the Alliance pursued its double enlargement policy by conducting a range of new military operations outside the Euro-Atlantic zone and admitting about a dozen new member states.

Essentially, the key trends that had emerged in the early steps of post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations continued into the new millennium. First, Russia and NATO member states have successfully dealt with their fierce disagreements over the double enlargement in a non-violent manner. Despite much contention, until 2006 the possibility of mutual force remained off the radar (with the possible exception of the Pristina airport incident, in 1999, which I will discuss below). True, this track record of peaceful change was undermined when the BMD row erupted in 2007, a topic to which I will return in the concluding chapter (VII). Nonetheless, until then Russia and NATO had been able to deal with extremely serious disagreements without sliding back into military confrontation. Second, the paradoxical effects of these dealings on the development of trust were further consolidated. After the Kosovo crisis, a consensus emerged among the Moscow foreign policy elites that the Alliance would never be willing to accommodate Russian interests and, therefore, was not trustworthy (section A). Third and finally, hysteresis effects were compounded as the disconnect between positions and dispositions grew. Despite a short hiatus in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, which led to a short-lived honeymoon in Russian-Atlantic relations, the Great Power habitus further
consolidated in Moscow as NATO’s double enlargement continued to go about (section B). Consequently, the prospects of NATO-Russia relations are somewhat *déjà vu*: with a third wave of geographical enlargement looming and the globalization of the Alliance’s role, the contradictory dynamics that go toward non-war community but away from security-community show no signs of abating in current Russia-NATO politics (section C).

A. HITTING ROCK BOTTOM: THE KOSOVO CRISIS

The Kosovo crisis was the lowest point in Russian-Atlantic post-Cold War relations. It was also at that time that hysteresis effects reached their highest point. For Atlantic officials, there was simply no question of letting Russia distract the Alliance from its new collective security tasks. If Moscow did not like NATO’s practices, it simply had to learn to live with them. On the Russian side, the habitus of Great Power-ness informed its practices more than ever. In effect, NATO’s double enlargement culminated in the Kosovo crisis. In geographical terms, the Alliance formally admitted three new members—Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic—amidst its bombing campaign over Serbia. At the functional level, Operation Allied Force constituted the first attempt by NATO to exert its new collective security mandate despite external and internal opposition. In addition, the Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept enshrining its new tasks at the Washington summit in March 1999. All in all, the Kosovo crisis lay at the confluence of many acrimonious aspects of Russian-Atlantic dealings in the post-Cold War era.

In this first section I make two main arguments. First, Russian-Atlantic diplomacy during the Kosovo crisis was one of brinkmanship. On top of particularly acrimonious language and an official cut-off of NATO-Russia relations, the events also led to the only moment that the possibility of violent confrontation surfaced, when Russian paratroopers seized the Pristina airport in a dash to beat NATO peacekeepers (more on this below). In terms of domination patterns, this suggests that hysteresis effects gained more strength in 1999 compared to the mid-1990s. In the second part of the section I seek to explain this evolution. I argue that NATO’s practices in and around the Kosovo crisis led the Russians not only to question the doxic rules of the post-Cold War international security game, but increasingly to reject them outright. Trust-building was further thwarted as Great Power dispositions consolidated in Moscow. A key thread of this section, therefore, is that the Kosovo crisis was both constituted by, and constitutive of, the increasing hysteresis effects in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations.
1. Worlds Apart: NATO-Russia Diplomatic Brinkmanship over Kosovo

Although Kosovo had been considered a potential hot spot for years, armed clashes between the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) and Serbian forces erupted only in March 1998. On 31 March, the UNSC voted (with Moscow’s support) Resolution 1160, condemning Serbia’s excessive force and imposing an arms embargo on Belgrade.¹ By the end of May, the NAC had seized itself of the question and discussions were held on the opportunity of sending peacekeepers to Kosovo.² At that point, the Germans and French were reportedly seeking to involve the Russians while the Americans insisted that NATO first sort out its own position before bringing Moscow in the discussion.³ At a PJC session held on the matter in late May 1998, Russia was confronted with the fait accompli of a NAC position issued on the previous day. Even at that early point, the Russian-Atlantic clash to come was already discernible in Primakov’s ensuing press conference statement:

We believe that any forcible methods that NATO might employ outside its zone of responsibility must without fail be authorized by the UN Security Council. We cannot create a kind of situation or precedent that could be cited in the future. … It is absolutely clear to me as Foreign Minister that we must not set a precedent in which NATO acts outside the territory of the NATO countries without a decision by the UN Security Council.⁴

When, in late June, NATO sent aircrafts to Macedonia and (despite Moscow’s objection) organized a one-day military exercise on the Kosovo border, Russia recalled its representative to the Alliance, Lieutenant General Viktor Zavarzin.⁵ In Moscow, the main Defence ministry officer in charge of cooperation with NATO, General Leonid Ivashov, warned that a military intervention without a UNSC resolution would amount to “unleashing a new cold war in Europe”: “NATO not only is not listening to the views of its partners, it is unwilling to put the resolution of crisis situations in Europe into anyone else’s hands.”⁶ Russia’s uneasiness with the Alliance’s position of strength was plainly obvious.

In August 1998, when Moscow agreed to join a NATO exercise in Albania, it insisted that simulated air strikes be removed from the scenario. But the Alliance’s plan was no less

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⁴ Dmitri Gornostayev and Vladimir Katin (1998), “‘We Shouldn’t Set a Precedent for NATO,’” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 May, translated in CDPSP 50(22).
clear, with Germany’s minister Rühe calling for “early NATO military intervention in Kosovo, even if this means acting against Russia’s will.” In September, then Foreign minister Igor Ivanov delivered to the White House a personal message from president Yeltsin, threatening that Russia would “not countenance” air strikes—“a phrase that in diplomacy goes beyond disapproval and carries with it the option of reprisal.” In October, Russia nonetheless joined the NATO members of the UNSC (with China abstaining) in calling for the international monitoring of an immediate ceasefire as well as in threatening “to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region.” In an official comment on that vote, the Russian representative to the UNSC (and future Foreign minister) Lavrov declared that “there are no provisions in [resolution 1199] that would directly or indirectly sanction the automatic use of force.”

A few days later, however, NATO representative argued during a PJC meeting that the latest UNSC resolution had described the situation in Kosovo as a threat to regional peace and stability, thus opening the way to military action based on chapter VII of the UN Charter. In a strong rebuff, Foreign minister Ivanov declared that Moscow would “undoubtedly exercise its veto” while Defence minister Igor Sergeyev warned that a NATO operation in Kosovo would signal the start of a cold war. Sergeyev also threatened to break relations with NATO and freeze the process of START II ratification. Unshaken, NATO issued a new ultimatum to Belgrade in mid-October, prompting Moscow to recall its ambassador once again. Vladimir Lukin, then chairman of the State Duma’s International Affairs Committee, went as far as to float the idea that Russia might be tempted to offer military support to Yugoslavia in case of an Alliance military operation. With the Alliance systematically dismissing Russia’s objections, political discourse in Moscow reached new levels of harshness.

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Looking for ways to regain the initiative, Russian diplomats supported an agreement between Serbia’s president Slobodan Milosevic and the Contact Group on establishing the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. This mission proved a double-edged sword, however, when in mid-January 1999, the discovery of the Racak massacre confirmed Atlantic suspicions against Belgrade. In a quixotic burst, Yeltsin bluntly declared: “We won’t let anyone touch Kosovo.” Nonetheless, Moscow pushed the Contact Group to organize a conference in Rambouillet in mid-February. But because of hysteresis, diplomatic accommodation appeared out of reach: Talbott depicted the role played by the Russians as “obstruction” while Moscow’s diplomats accused NATO countries of actively seeking a diplomatic failure so as to justify their strikes. According to one Russian insider,

all Western attempts to establish within the Contact Group a common understanding of the concrete parameters of the agreement met with a kind of slack resistance on the part of Russia. The foreign ministry considered it a success whenever the Russian delegation at a Contact Group meeting was able to “suspend” the draft agreement, postponing its discussion for further meetings.

This obstructionist approach may well have been a reaction to Moscow’s plain incapacity to soften NATO’s approach. Despite I. Ivanov’s last-minute push in Belgrade in mid-March, the Milosevic regime finally rejected the Rambouillet agreement. The road was opened to NATO’s bombing campaign, which formally began on March 24.

Upon learning the news as he was flying over the Atlantic en route to Washington, Prime minister Primakov ordered his plane to turn back to Moscow. The Russian government immediately recalled its ambassador to NATO, froze all NATO-Russia cooperation under the PfP, discontinued PJC activities, expelled two NATO information officers posted in Moscow,

17 “A squad of Russian diplomats hovered around Rambouillet with the aim of protecting the principle of Belgrade’s sovereignty over Kosovo, minimizing NATO’s role in enforcing the settlement and discrediting the Kosovars as little better than terrorists”; Talbott 2002, 303.
18 “One important bone of contention between the Russian representatives and their western counterparts was over the Russian perception that, not only was NATO biased against the Serbs, but it was also now actively seeking to engineer a situation whereby the talks would fail, with the Serbs being blamed. NATO members would then, the Russians felt, have their pretext to begin bombing”; Smith 2006, 79.
and allegedly retargeted its nuclear weapons at the NATO members that were taking part in the air strikes. In a televised statement, Yeltsin fumed with anger:

> Russia is deeply outraged by NATO’s military action against sovereign Yugoslavia, an action that is nothing short of undisguised aggression. … Not only the UN Charter, but also the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between Russia and NATO, have been violated. A dangerous precedent for reviving the policy of diktat based on the use of force has been set, and the entire modern-day system of international law and order has been threatened. This essentially amounts to an attempt by NATO to enter the 21st century wearing the uniform of world policeman. Russia will never consent to this.

In a dramatic fashion, Yeltsin added that Russia “has extreme measures it could take but we have decided not to take them.” As he pursued threateningly: “War in Kosovo means war in Europe, and perhaps even more than that.” That language was unequivocally the harshest ever used in Moscow with regards to the Alliance.

On 26 March, Russia introduced at the UNSC (with the support of India and Belarus) a draft resolution calling for “an immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The result of the vote was a complete disaster for Moscow’s diplomacy: only three states (Russia, China, and Namibia) supported the text while twelve voted against. A few days later, Moscow sent to Belgrade a high-profile delegation comprised of Prime minister Primakov, Foreign minister Ivanov, Defence minister Sergeyev, as well as the Head of Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Vyacheslav Trubnikov. As a former aide to Talbott writes: “The fact that the Russian defense minister and the head of the intelligence services were included in the delegation raised the troubling possibility that Moscow was also contemplating direct intelligence and military assistance to Belgrade if peace overtures fell through.” This concern was all the more acute that Russia had just decided to send an intelligence-gathering ship, the Liman, to the Adriatic Sea. Finally, the peace plan that the Russian delegation

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21 Talbott 2002, 306; Ponsard 2007, 74. The last measures about nuclear missile retargeting was the object of conflicting versions in Russia’s highest echelons of power: Norris 2005, 36-37.


23 Maksim Yusin (1999), “Balkan War’s Russian Echo,” Izvestia, 26 March, translated in CDPSP 51(12). In another statement, Yeltsin also added that “in the event that the military conflict worsens, Russia retains the right to take adequate measures, including military ones, to defend itself and the overall security of Europe” quoted in Norris 2005, 5. Recall that at that time, Yeltsin was threatened with an impeachment procedure at the Duma. The measure was defeated on 15 May.


negotiated with Milosevic during the trip was quickly rejected by NATO. On 7 April the Duma adopted a resolution urging Yeltsin to supply Belgrade with weapons (279-34), followed with another one on 16 April approving the political union of Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia (293-54). Other brinkmanship initiatives on Russia’s part included a special (Russian) Security Council session to discuss the country’s nuclear-technical complex; a review of military doctrine; the planning of the largest military exercises ever since the Soviet times; and the reinforcement of the defensive alliance with Minsk, including the proposed establishment of a single defence space.

Unprecedented in the post-Cold War era, these Russian gestures signalled an increasing assertiveness as well as the decline of NATO’s position of force in relation to Moscow. But one should not overstate Moscow’s reaction, as one pundit correctly observes:

Equally important, however, was what the Russian government did not do. It resisted calls from the Communist Party to terminate Russia’s military presence in Bosnia, now as part of the ongoing NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). On the wider diplomatic front, the Russian government maintained normal diplomatic relations with all NATO governments, including the United States, despite the latter being vilified in some quarters of the political and military establishment as the “chief aggressor.” The Yeltsin government was clear from the start—and explicitly so—that its practical response to the NATO “aggression” would be circumscribed. In addition, Russia opened multilateral diplomatic channels through the Contact Group. On 7 April, a senior Foreign ministry officials meeting was held in Brussels, and then in Dresden, at the political directors level, on the next two days. On 14 April, Yeltsin named former Prime minister Chernomyrdin as his presidential envoy—a clear rebuff to the nationalistic opposition in Moscow as well as to Primakov, the then Prime minister. Everything was taking place as if conflicting dispositions were simultaneously informing Russian foreign policy.

Chernomyrdin immediately began a diplomatic shuttle that strongly contributed to ending the conflict and moving Russia and NATO closer. In Oslo, Albright had communicated to I. Ivanov NATO’s three non-negotiable conditions to terminate bombings: the end of violence

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in Kosovo, the withdrawal of Serbian forces, and the return of refugees. In preparation for the G8 meeting of Foreign ministers, Talbott and Chernomyrdin travelled between Moscow and Washington to find a common ground. In Bonn, the G8 agreed on seven principles for a political settlement that were to serve as a basis for a future UNSC resolution. One unsolved stumbling block, however, regarded the composition of the peacekeeping force and whether it would be under NATO or UN leadership. A few days later, the diplomatic process made headway thanks to the Russian suggestion to involve a neutral third party in the negotiations with Belgrade. The Americans proposed president Martti Ahtisaari from Finland, whom Moscow quickly endorsed. From there came the diplomacy of “Hammer and Anvil”: “Chernomyrdin would pound away on Milosevic; Ahtisaari would provide the backing so that Milosevic would be pummelled into acceptance of NATO’s conditions.” The first trilateral Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari-Talbott talks were held in Helsinki in mid-May (a few days after Yeltsin had fired Primakov as Prime minister). As with the Bonn G8 meeting, the main difficulty was settling NATO’s role in the future peacekeeping force. The United States would not accept anything but primary command for the Alliance. Flying from Belgrade to Moscow to meet again with Talbott and Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin finally had no choice but to concede NATO’s demand to be “at the core” of the peacekeeping force. That deal, extracted against the will of many members of the Russian delegation, basically put off the most problematic aspects of the negotiations. In the meantime, however, Milosevic had come to accept the G8 broad principles and on 3 June, the Serb parliament voted in favour of the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari-Talbott agreement.

Hysteresis did not wane for all that. When the G8 Foreign ministers gathered in early June, I. Ivanov complained that the proposed draft for the UNSC resolution gave the central floor to NATO. In reaction he submitted some twenty objections to a draft text that was thirty-three paragraphs long. After two days of intense negotiations, Moscow finally caved in to most NATO demands, including a Chapter VII mandate authorizing the use of force by peacekeepers. These negotiations paved the way for resolution 1244, which the UNSC voted (with China abstaining but Moscow approving) on 10 June 1999. At the operational level, however, a wide rift still separated NATO’s military command from Russia’s. As one Talbott

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34 Talbott 2002, 314.
35 The Defence ministry formally dissociated itself from the agreement: Andrei Smirnov (1999), “Chernomyrdin’s Contribution to the Cause of Peace Has Been Frozen,” Sevodnya, 8 June, translated in CDPSP 51(23).
aide recalls: “The Russians repeatedly objected to the notion that their forces would have to
serve under NATO command and pushed for their own peacekeeping sector, ‘just as is proposed
for the big NATO powers.’” The Americans, for their part, favoured the Bosnian model by
which Russian contingents operated under indirect Allied command—basically a technical
arrangement that in actuality kept the Russians at bay. This disagreement quickly took on a
symbolic dimension, with the Alliance unwilling to budge and the Russians decided to have
their way for once. As Talbott recounts: “Ivashov reacted to that attempt to save Russian face
the same way he had in the Petersberg talks: It was insulting and unacceptable. Russia would
not ‘take orders’ from NATO; it would not settle for anything less than its own sector and
certainly would not ‘beg for scraps from NATO’s table.’” For Atlantic officials, such demands
were simply out of place.

The following day would see the ultimate demonstration of hysteresis in Russian-
Atlantic relations—as well as the most dangerous episode in the post-Cold War era. In a
stunning move, a Russian contingent of 175 SFOR peacekeepers secretly rushed through Serbia
during the night of 11 June en route to the Pristina airport in Kosovo. At the same time, about
800 Russian paratroopers were scheduled to land there. In so doing, the Russians beat NATO
forces in entering Kosovo. At the time, conflicting accounts emerged from Moscow, with
Foreign minister Ivanov assuring NATO that the deployment was a “colossal mistake” and
would be reversed. But reports from the theatre said otherwise. During the night, NATO
SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark asked and received permission from the Pentagon “to explore
possible military responses to the Russian move.” When he ordered British General Michael
Jackson, who was commanding the KFOR’s planned deployment, to prepare to seize the airport,
a serious row erupted between the two generals. With the support of the British Defence
ministry, Jackson bluntly refused to execute the Alliance’s Supreme Commander’s order: “Sir,
I’m not starting World War III for you.” Meanwhile, the Americans applied enough political
pressure on Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine to ensure that they did not clear
overflight requests from Moscow (six IL-76 transport planes with a hundred troops and
equipment each were scheduled to land in Kosovo through Eastern Europe). As a result, within

38 Norris 2005, 144; cf. Andrei Smirnov (1999), “Second Balkan Front Opens Up in Moscow,” Sevodnya, 5 June,
translated in CDPSP 51(22).
42 Quoted in Norris 2005, 250, 278.
43 Ibid., 251-252.
a few days, the Russian contingent was left without a supply line of food, water, or anything else: “drama had largely given way to farce at the Slatina airfield.”

It later became known that Operation Trojan Horse (as it had been codenamed by the Russians) had been planned in the utmost secrecy by the Russian military with Yeltsin’s approval. Its main objective was for Russia to “be able to negotiate its roles within KFOR after having already created new facts on the ground.” Ruffled by NATO’s intransigence throughout the crisis, the Russian habitus of Great Power-ness made any further capitulation unthinkable. Amidst flurries of celebration throughout Russia, Duma member Lukin commented on the Pristina stunt: “The action is also valuable from the standpoint that the West has finally started to realize that it can’t treat Russia like some lackey. We’re partners, not lackeys.”

Clark had reportedly understood the strategy as soon as he heard early reports that the Russian SFOR contingent was packing to leave: “The danger was that if the Russians got in first, they would claim their sector and then we would have lost NATO control over the mission.” Recall that the Pristina dash happened simultaneously with the extremely tense negotiations on KFOR between Talbott and his team of American generals and Sergeyev, Ivashov and Chief of General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin. The Russians were pleading for obtaining “equal rights” in the operation as those enjoyed by NATO members and a veto over military operations. At one point, Sergeyev and Ivanov left to report to Yeltsin on the negotiations. Upon their return, they said: “We just had a long conversation with the president. He is very concerned. He wants a Russian sector with a Russian commander. He thinks that is equitable participation.” In a pattern that still persists to this day, Russian diplomats stubbornly refused to concede anymore to a NATO obstinately unwilling to even consider granting Moscow the slightest decision-making capability.

With the G8 summit upcoming in Cologne, however, the Russians needed to reach an agreement with the Alliance. As declining as NATO’s domination over Moscow may have been, it had certainly not waned completely. Russia’s desire for Western recognition was still strong, particularly with the country’s president. In a phone call to Clinton, Yeltsin finally

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44 Ibid., 289.
48 Quoted in Norris 2005, 237-238.
agreed that Russian troops would serve under the Bosnia model in Kosovo (with slight modifications). During a William Cohen-Albright-Sergeyev-Ivanov meeting in Helsinki, a few days later, an agreement was reached to the effect that Russian troops would be scattered across four sectors and would share control of the Pristina airport with NATO. According to senior Alliance officials, “Russia would have gotten even less favourable command and control arrangement without a presence on the ground in Kosovo. The Russians were correct in believing that NATO wanted to deploy its troops first and then discuss KFOR’s structure with Russia second.” Once again, despite weeks of unprecedented outcry, diplomatic brinkmanship and dangerous military moves, Moscow ultimately had to largely cave in to NATO and accept a formula that gave it “only a paper-thin guise of military independence.” All was now in place for Yeltsin’s joining the G8 summit in Cologne in a celebration intended to symbolically demonstrate the importance of Russia in the world. Days after ordering a military stunt that could have degenerated into full-scale confrontation, Yeltsin hugged his “friends” from NATO more vigorously than ever.

2. Growing Hysteresis, Withering Trust

In this subsection, I demonstrate how the Kosovo crisis further compounded hysteresis effects and thwarted the development of trust in Russia-NATO relations. In making this argument, I put the events in the perspective of security-community-building processes. Although the crisis was solved peacefully, it led to unprecedented brinkmanship and came close

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50 Ibid., 278.
51 Russia had its 3,250 peacekeepers deployed in the US-led Multinational Brigade East, the French-led Multinational Brigade North and the German-led Multinational Brigade South, in addition to sharing responsibilities for Pristina inside the British sector. A Russian General posted at SHAPE acted as deputy to SACEUR. It is interesting to note that the arrival of Russian forces in Kosovo was further delayed, in July, by Hungary’s, Romania’s, and Bulgaria’s repeated refusal to grant overflight clearance, most probably under Washington’s request.
52 Norris 2005, 312.
53 Ibid., 290. As one expert writes: “The 3,000-strong Russian contingent did not actually provide any leverage over NATO policies in the region. Russia had to renounce to a special sector in Kosovo, independent of NATO’s chain of command. Furthermore, Russian troops were not granted control over heavily Serb-populated areas. Besides, Russian contingents were separated from each other and, except for one unit, they were not near the border with the rest of Serbia, and located in areas mainly populated by Albanians. Likewise, keeping control over Slatina airport had poor significance since all air traffic, as well as ground communications in all sectors, was commanded by NATO”; Ponsard 2007, 76.
54 Talbott makes a very eloquent comment on this episode: “A pattern was developing in Yeltsin’s handling of these meetings: in the plenary sessions, with a large audience on both sides of the table, he played the decisive, even peremptory leader who knew what he wanted and insisted on getting it; in the private meetings, he switched from assertive to receptive, becoming susceptible to Clinton’s blandishments and suasion; then, in the wrap-up press conference, he went over the top in a way designed, in his own mind, to project self-confidence and to disguise how pliant he had been behind closed doors”; Talbott 2002, 137.
to provoke a military stand-off at the Slatina airport. In 1999 the Russian-Atlantic track record of non-violent settlement of disputes was shaken for the first time in the post-Cold War era, largely as a result of hysteresis and the quixotic practices it sparked. I describe the deleterious effects of the Kosovo intervention on the emergence of a Russian-Atlantic security community thanks to two main analytical lenses. First, I explain how the events compounded hysteresis and therefore weakened domination patterns in the relationship. Second, I show how the Kosovo diplomatic brinkmanship reinforced mistrust among Russian security elites. After the Kosovo intervention, Russia progressively turned into an insubordinate player in the international game defined by NATO-imposed rules.

First, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo severely strengthened hysteresis effects in the relationship with Russia because the Kosovo crisis further consolidated the Russian habitus of Great Power. In his in-depth study of Russian identity in 1999, Hopf shows how the Kosovo crisis altered the balance among competing narratives in Moscow. Basically, the westernizing discourse was once and for all discredited, giving way to a “liberal essentialist” discourse which remains the predominant Russian identity to this day. According to Hopf, this identity does not rest on any external others (such as the West or China, for instance) because its basic premise is that Russia is “unique and hence not comparable, or opposable, to any other state.”55 The habitus of Great Power-ness is front and centre in this narrative.56 Morozov similarly argues that the key factor in the rise of “romantic realism” in Moscow is “the interpretation of NATO’s Kosovo campaign as a cynical geopolitical enterprise, the real aims of which had nothing in common with the proclaimed wish to protect the Albanian minority.”57 All in all, after Kosovo it became impossible for the Russians to look at NATO with the same eyes as in the early 1990s:

NATO’s campaign to convince Moscow that it was no longer a military organization designed to protect others against Russia but rather a political organization eager to take account of Russia’s interests now fell on deaf ears. Any notion that the Permanent Joint Council could operate in a major European crisis seemed absurd to the Russians. Moscow foreign policy elites—liberal, communist, and nationalist—rejected the Wilsonian explanation for NATO action, instead seeing the bombing campaign through a realist lens—that is, a lens that framed the outcome as a win for the United States and a loss for Russia.58

With the consolidation of great-power dispositions, Russian officials became increasingly recalcitrant to the Alliance-imposed rules of the international security game.

56 Ibid., 223.
57 Morozov 2002, 411.
58 Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 265.
Apprehended from Moscow, the Alliance’s actions during the Kosovo crisis confirmed many of the dispositions that had resurfaced in the mid-1990s. Basically, despite all talk to the contrary NATO’s practices appeared closer to realpolitik than the internal mode of pursuing security. As one expert notes, Operation Allied Force “may be at odds with the principles of mutual confidence building inherent to this [post-Cold War] order [and] has prompted Russia to question some of the assumptions upon which it rests.”59 By way of consequence, Russian officials and experts concluded that NATO’s very appealing discourse of democracy and human rights was in fact a convenient façade for cold-blooded, self-interested realpolitik.60 In this spirit, the main objective of the air campaign was to consolidate the Alliance’s position at the very top of the international security field.61 Here is how, in the wake of the Kosovo crisis, Karaganov narrated the post-Cold War initiatives taken by the Alliance:

A quiet search began for a new mission for the alliance. In the early 1990s, a new slogan was trotted out: “Venture outside the zone of responsibility or die.” The hunt was on for terrorists and ayatollahs, but no real and credible enemy outside the zone was found. Then another slogan was tried: “Enlarge or die.” NATO began its process of expansion, establishing a new division of Europe and sowing mistrust. Most recently, with its 50th anniversary approaching, NATO decided to prove its viability once more by launching the Yugoslav adventure—having finally found an artificial enemy to expand against. … The alliance is thus transforming into a strange breed of organism that, in order to sustain itself, has to sustain an external threat—or else to simply have blood. In the process NATO has also trampled upon its own moral credo. It has launched a large-scale, aggressive and offensive war. And so we see that unless contained by external forces, an alliance of democratic states quickly degenerates. We too share the blame for that degeneration by having essentially legitimized, through the Russia-NATO agreement, the expansion of the alliance and contributed to NATO’s feeling that it can do as it pleases with impunity. … NATO is not our enemy, but it could become our enemy unless we stop its degeneration into an international policeman operating outside the law—in other words, into a peculiar variety of international rogue.”62

It appears clearly from this quotation that the Alliance’s authority over Russia, which had been so strong in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, had considerably vanished by 1999—even in the eyes of traditionally pro-Western experts. As Tsygankov concludes: “The

59 Webber 2000, 12.
60 Tsygankov 2006, 105.
61 For instance, Gorbachev wrote that “the war provided evidence that the United States, which plays a commanding role in NATO, is willing not only to disregard the norms of international law but also to impose on the world its own agenda in international relations and, in fact, to be guided in these relations solely by its own ‘national interests.’” To him, the Kosovo intervention confirmed that the Alliance places “primary emphasis on military power—the threat and actual use of military force”; Mikhail Gorbachev (1999), “No, No, NATO,” Boston Globe, 16 July, A19.
irony of the Western intervention in Yugoslavia is that by trying to solidify the influence of the West in the world, it in fact undermined their influence.\textsuperscript{63}

Operation Allied Force durably undermined the liberal elites in Moscow and marginalized for good dispositions in favour of the internal mode of pursuing security. As Baranovsky explains, it reversed the burden of proof: “if the thesis of Russia’s opponents to NATO about its ‘aggressive character’ had looked either like pure propaganda or something inherited from the cold war, the war against Yugoslavia became an impressive manifestation of its validity. Any possible arguments that NATO might play the role of a stability provider for Europe (e.g., with respect to the issue of Transylvania) seemed to have lost their relevance and become absolutely inappropriate.”\textsuperscript{64} In that sense, NATO bears some responsibility for Russia’s identity shift toward Great Power-ness. Starting in 1994, the Alliance’s practices with regards to the double enlargement had sparked fears and aroused doubts in Moscow, gradually tipping the balance in favour of the Great Power habitus. The Kosovo intervention made any return to the obedient dispositions of 1992-1994 impossible. This time, virtually the entire Russian foreign policy elite reverted to Great Power-ness, a dispositional evolution that lasts to this day.

On their side, however, NATO practitioners continued to expect Moscow to more or less behave in tune with Atlantic policies. It is particularly revealing that throughout the Kosovo crisis, Alliance officials construed the NATO stance as self-evident or “natural.” In that context, all they could hope for was that Russia would “come to understand.” As an aide to Talbott puts it:

Russia’s choices during the Kosovo conflict demonstrate that Moscow is still grappling to shed a dominantly Cold War mindset as it expands its ties to the West. Too often, and particularly within its power ministries, Russia continues to view regional security developments as a zero-sum game …. “I feel that we overestimated Russia’s strategic competence,” a senior U.S. diplomat contended. “It was like playing chess with somebody who doesn’t know the rules.”\textsuperscript{65}

From the Alliance point of view, it was quite obvious that Russia’s behaviour during the conflict was out of place—so much so, in fact, that it was not even worthy of full consideration. As Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg put it, speaking of Kosovo: “The whole security of Europe would be thrown into question if Russia’s sense of its interest precluded the international community addressing this serious question.”\textsuperscript{66} Because the Alliance embodies the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[63] Tsygankov 2001, 142.  
\item[64] Baranovsky 2005, 279.  
\item[65] Norris 2005, 308.  
\item[66] Quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 251. 
\end{footnotes}
international community in the post-Cold War field of international security—i.e., it occupies the hegemonic position of a dominant player able to impose the rules of the game—it “naturally” promoted the only vision that made sense. The Russians had to abide by it just like any other state.

Second, and even more dramatically for security-community-building processes, NATO’s Kosovo intervention came as a huge blow to Russia’s already shaken trust that its interests would be taken into account in Brussels. For the Russians, NATO’s actions in Kosovo “exposed the legal fiction”67 of the Founding Act agreed two years earlier. Recall than in 1997, Alliance member states and Russia had pledged to “[refrain] from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter.” They had also agreed that “[i]f disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.”68 On both accounts, the feeling in Moscow was that NATO practices had been duplicitous. One American scholar stresses how they contravened the “three compensating assurances” that NATO had offered to Russia for enlarging:

that NATO was transforming itself into a largely political organization for the promotion of democracy and free markets; that insofar as NATO retained a military mission, it was strictly a defensive one; and that Russia, although not a NATO member, would be a full participant in European security affairs. The war in Yugoslavia gave the lie to all three: NATO initiated a war against a sovereign state that had attacked none of its members, a war to which Russia objected but that Moscow could not prevent.69

In addition, the Kosovo crisis embodied everything the Russians may have feared about the doubly enlarged Alliance. In the days that followed the outbreak of the bombings, the head of NATO-Russia relations at the Defence Ministry published an op-ed that captured quite accurately the general feeling in Moscow:

Look how this process of NATO expansion, of expanding NATO’s sphere of responsibility and of NATO arrogating the functions of a world policeman developed. At first there was talk about Partnership for Peace. This was an effort to attract attention, to prepare future candidates and so on. Then the process of NATO expansion was announced. Then NATO tried to arrogate the right to conduct operations as it sees fit an in circumvention of the Security Council. Now they are including in their new strategic

69 Mandelbaum 1999, 7.
concept also the possibility of expanding their zone of responsibility without indicating any geographical limitations of this zone.\textsuperscript{70}

In effect, during Operation Allied Force, the Alliance adopted a new strategic concept at the Washington summit. I will return to this issue below. Suffice it to note that “[a]ll of Russia’s worst strategic fears converged in Kosovo.”\textsuperscript{71} For one thing, it threw in a very stark light Moscow’s powerlessness compared to the Alliance in the field of international security. Foreign policy elites converged on the recognition that the operation constituted a “symbol of the weakness and humiliation of the late Yeltsin era.”\textsuperscript{72} Despite hysterical gestures Russian officials just could not influence Brussels’s (and Washington’s) policy to the barest degree. As pundit Pushkov put it: “What we see is a kind of standard arrangement for dealing with situations in which we disagree with the US and its NATO allies. First they admonish us, then they pretend they’re going to compromise, making some pathetically symbolic concessions to us, and then they simply stop paying attention to us.”\textsuperscript{73} On the NATO side, many officials (especially inside the White House) had counted precisely on Russia’s weakness and impotence to contain and manage a possible backlash over Kosovo. For the Russians, however, this heavy-handed strategy was not only “wilfully ignoring” but “indeed subverting” Russia’s quest for Great Power status.\textsuperscript{74}

In this connection, the NATO intervention in Kosovo without UN mandate sparked fears in Moscow that Russia could in theory be the next target. As violence was gaining strength in Chechnya, many Russians—politicians, generals, commentators—speculated that the campaign against Serbia could soon be waged against their country. The newly appointed Prime minister Putin commented in 1999: “I was convinced that if we didn’t stop the extremists right away, we’d be facing a second Yugoslavia on the entire territory of the Russian Federation—the

\textsuperscript{70} Quoted in Ambrosio 2005, 116.
\textsuperscript{71} Norris 2005, 15. Norries continues: “NATO, their old and recently expanded nemesis, was bombing orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, and area that Russia had once firmly dominated. NATO had gone forward with its air strikes without a UN Security Council resolution. NATO military superiority was vast and it was using sophisticated high-tech weapons while incurring zero casualties. Russia was already weak and dependent on Western financial aid. Russia’s political system was in disarray, the army and intelligence services were shells of their former feared selves, and the Russian people were filled with searing bitterness from painful years of transition. From the Kremlin, the air war looked like American expansionism plain and simple. The view from Russia—and many other quarters—was that the United States and its allies were now committed to an ambitious new program of humanitarian intervention with NATO serving as the world’s policeman. There were fears that the Pentagon would interceded everywhere from Chechnya to Tibet.”
\textsuperscript{72} Antonenko 2007, 95.
\textsuperscript{74} Smith 2006, 79-80.
Yugoslavization of Russia.”75 Seen from Moscow, the Alliance’s air campaign “buried the notion of NATO as a defensive alliance.”76 As a result, new security dilemmas of an Atlantic intervention in or around Russia were aroused. Several practices attest to the new fears sparked in Moscow. Most striking is the revived interest in nuclear deterrence. During a Security Council meeting on 27 April 1999, Yeltsin decided to accelerate a number of nuclear programs, including the development of tactical missiles (Iskander) up to an arsenal of 10,000 and the deployment of a new generation of strategic arms (SS-27).77 Emphasizing the need for an “asymmetrical response” to NATO’s build-up, a draft of Russia’s military doctrine circulated in October 1999 explicitly raised the possible use of nuclear weapons to deal with the potential threat of direct military aggression against Russia.78 In the official security doctrines that were adopted by Russia after the Kosovo crisis, three new threats surfaced that had never been mentioned in the previous documents: attempts to ignore (or infringe on) Russian interests in resolving international security problems; attempts to oppose strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centres; and the introduction of foreign troops (without UN Security Council sanction) to the territory of contiguous states friendly with Russia.79 Clearly, each and every one of these elements was in reaction to NATO’s double enlargement and its intervention in Kosovo. The same goes for the destabilizing factors of the military-political situation that the three documents identify: the dominance in the international community of developed Western states led by the United States; the applying of military force as a means of humanitarian intervention without UN Security Council sanction; and unilateral actions.80 For the Russians, the aggressiveness of the Alliance made no doubt anymore.

The Russian army put this new approach in practice shortly after the conclusion of NATO’s Operation Allied Force. In late June 1999, the largest military exercises ever organized since the outbreak of the USSR were organized and codenamed Zapad-99 (“Zapad” means

75 Quoted in Evangelista 2002, 2.
76 Trenin 2000, 7.
77 Pavel Felgengauer (1999), “Limited Nuclear War? Why Not!” Sevodnya, 6 May, translated in CDPSP 51(21). As one military expert reports: “Following the Kosovo conflict, which took place in the first half of 1999, a radical change occurred in Russian security policy. Army-General Makmut Gareyev, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, … stated that NATO’s strategy, following the security policy of the United States, was no longer directed at defensive but at pre-emptive use of force, including possibly deploying forces outside the territory of the alliance’s treaty. The emphasis was more on the use of military force rather than on diplomatic and other non-violent policies. The United States and other influential Western countries were aiming at a unipolar system of international relations at global level under their authority. According to Gareyev, the aggression of NATO against the former Yugoslavia was a clear example of its policy to ignore the United Nations (UN) and the standards of international law”; De Haas 2004, 41; cf. Isakov 2000.
78 Ponsard 2007, 74.
79 De Haas 2002, 52.
80 Ibid., 84.
West). The scenario envisioned an aerial attack “from the West” on the Kaliningrad exclave to which Russian and Belarussian forces reacted with strikes on Poland, the Baltic states, Norway, and Turkey. A land invasion of the Baltic states was also simulated, as well as a series of preventive nuclear strikes to deter the aggressor.\footnote{Igor Korotchenko (1999), “Russian Army Preparing to Repulse Aggression,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 June, translated in CD PSP 51(25); and Yury Golotyuk (1999), “Military Won’t Admit Who It Hit with Simulated Nuclear Strike,” Izvestia, 29 June, translated in CD PSP 51(26).} Other smaller-scale but similar exercises were organized during the summer in the Baltic, Barents, and North Pacific areas. These military rehearsals were a tangible demonstration of new security dilemmas in Moscow. The possibility that the Baltic states could fall victim to a paratrooper dash similar to the one the Russian army executed in Pristina suddenly seemed far less remote in the summer of 1999.

In confirming and, in fact, worsening Moscow’s fears that its interests could not be accommodated in the NATO-dominated field of international security, the Kosovo crisis had one key effect that lasts to this day: it helped turn Russia into an insubordinate player of the post-Cold War rules of the game. In chapter V, I argued that Moscow has been a strong supporter of the internal mode of pursuing security in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. This support mollified starting in 1994; by 1999 it had evaporated altogether. Basically, the Kosovo crisis confronted the Russians with the emergence of a NATO-centric world in which they had been relegated to the sidelines.\footnote{Baranovsky 2000, 455. In the run-up to the Kosovo crisis, NATO also undertook a number of practices that had the consequence of pushing Russia aside, including several PfP exercises in Central Asia, American heightened military support to Georgia, the creation of the EAPC, the creation of six PfP Training Centres in the post-communist states, etc. Most importantly, the US and the UK had unilaterally launched air strikes on Iraq in December 1998—an operation that provoked ire in Moscow.} In a prescient op-ed published months before the bombings, the founder of the Politika Foundation expressed this feeling quite aptly:

A new European order, including a new European order in the Balkans, took shape without Russia and, in many respects, contrary to its interests. The North Atlantic bloc essentially became the only policymaker on the continent. … we hardly want to see a precedent set for the use of NATO military forces against a sovereign UN member country at NATO’s own discretion and without the sanction of the Security Council, especially after the expanding alliance has moved right up to our borders. … Solana stated recently that the [new Strategic Concept to be adopted in Washington] will, among other things, close a “gap” in the UN Charter, which makes no provision for “military intervention for humanitarian reasons.” And since such matters are outside the UN’s purview, no Security Council resolution is necessary. The upshot is that NATO has sufficient grounds to bomb whomever it wants “for humanitarian reasons.” That logic is as dangerous as it is questionable, for it undermines the foundations of the world order in which the UN plays the vital role of making it possible to resolve numerous conflicts either by peaceful means or through coordinated action on the part of the entire world community. Now a military bloc is assuming the world community’s role. What great progress in the era of globalization! The “NATO-centric” model of the new European
and world architecture is being taken to its logical conclusion. And there is no place for Russia in that model.83

In addition to being marginalized, the Russians were also concerned about the attack on the sovereignty principle as embodied by the UN Charter. Viewed from Moscow, the Kosovo intervention endangered the international order built after the Second World War in which, contrary to the internal mode of pursuing security, Moscow had occupied a dominant position. In a striking reversal from the Kozyrev doctrine, the Russian elite began to argue in favour of non-intervention and especially of an international security system based on the UNSC.84 Given the new fears sparked by the Kosovo campaign, the Russians became staunch advocates of the status quo in international relations and put their weight behind those institutions that may help preserve it, including that of sovereignty. In a speech pronounced just after the Kosovo bombings had begun, Foreign minister Ivanov expressed the notion that Russia had to actively defend the world against the hypocrisy of the internal mode of pursuing security: “while defending today Yugoslavia’s right to sovereignty, we are also defending the future of the world and of Europe against the most recent form of colonialism—the so-called natocolonialism.”85

As a Great Power, Russia harkened back to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention as the key rules of the international security game.

Opposite to this view was the new NATO strategic concept adopted during the Washington summit, which contained a number of revolutionary provisions in line with the internal mode of pursuing security, including an emphasis on democracy, human rights, and the rule or law; the characterization of Euro-Atlantic security as based on democratic institutions; a broad approach to security; and a call for wide-ranging partnerships.86 Even more shockingly for the Russians, the Concept opened the door to out-of-area missions, insisting that “Alliance security must also take account of the global context.”87 No geographical limits were placed on NATO’s competence, and further waves of enlargement were called upon.88 As Ponsard correctly observes, “the April 1999 revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept to enable the

84 Tsygankov 2001.
85 Quoted in Morozov 2002, 412.
87 Ibid., par. 24.
88 Ibid., par. 39.
Alliance to intervene in out-of-area situations beyond the borders of member states, such as in Kosovo, heightened Moscow’s concern that this new strategic focus would establish the basis for possible intervention in Russia’s near abroad or even in Russian territory.89 From the Kosovo crisis on, what the Alliance saw as a legitimate ground for intervention, Moscow officials construed “as a flagrant violation of international law, as a heavy blow against the existing UN-based international system, as an attempt to establish a ‘new world order’ by force, allowing arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of states (on ‘humanitarian’ or any other grounds).”90

For the Russians, the Kosovo episode blatantly exposed the extent to which NATO had come to dominate and overlook Russia in the post-Cold War era, especially by preaching the universal virtues of the internal mode of pursuing security in a very self-interested manner. The respected scholar Sergei Rogov denounced in December 1999 that “[h]ard pressure put upon Russia aims at making it accept the Western rules of the game, agree for a role of secondary importance.”91 Given the strong hysteresis that characterized the relationship after the Kosovo crisis, this situation was not sustainable anymore as Russian officials now unanimously rejected the NATO-imposed order of things. In this connection Lo observes a growing resentment that the West, while using the discourse of shared human values and positive-sum outcomes, was simultaneously taking advantage of Russian incapacity in the finest classical realist traditions of “might is right.” While in the first two years of the Yeltsin era such sentiments were relatively restrained, the emergence of NATO enlargement as a live issue in the autumn of 1993, together with mounting policy disagreements over the former Yugoslavia, engendered a feeling that Russia needed to take active measures in response to geopolitical encroachment from the West.92

Until the end of 1999, the presence of Yeltsin at the helm seemed to partly hold in check Great Power dispositions. As strong as they were during the Kosovo crisis, hysteresis effects were insufficient to decisively drive Russia from NATO’s diplomatic orbit. The turn of the century, however, brought with it a new political context for Russian-Atlantic relations.

89 Ponsard 2007, 73.
90 Baranovsky 2000, 454-455.
91 Quoted in Morozov 2002, 412.
B. WELCOME TO THE 21ST CENTURY: NATO-RUSSIA DIPLOMACY AFTER 9/11

The objective of this section is twofold. First, I briefly analyze the structural shifts that 9/11 caused in the field of international security. To put it simply, 9/11 has been socially and politically constructed in such a way that the internal and external modes of pursuing security were brought together: democratic peace remains key but the use of force is redeemed as a legitimate means to achieve that end. This change in the rules of the game (temporarily) played to Russia’s advantage, whose status was upgraded via the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. The honeymoon was short-lived, however. The second subsection summarizes the latest stage of contentious Russian-Atlantic dealings with regards to the double enlargement, from 2002 to 2006. Over that period of time, the Alliance admitted seven new member states while simultaneously expanding its functional scope to the global scale. Repeating dynamics similar to those of the 1990s, NATO’s practices have revived, in Russia, hysteresis effects that had waned in the aftermath of 9/11. Consequently, hysteresis effects were again on the rise after a short hiatus in 2002. All in all, but for the doxic shifts incurred by the exogenous shock of 9/11, the political fabric of Russian-Atlantic relations has basically stayed the same after the turn of the millennium.

1. Russian-Atlantic Honeymoon, Take Two

The terrorist attacks on the United States that took place on 11 September 2001 will surely have long-lasting effects on the field of international security. With only a few years of hindsight, it is too early to take stocks of those changes comprehensively. Such is not the purpose of this study anyways. My more limited objective here is to propose an interim assessment of some of the structural shifts incurred by 9/11 on the field of international security. My assessment is not exhaustive on two main counts. First, for space constraints I treat the terrorist attacks as an exogenous shock and I do not inquire into their causes. Second, I look at how 9/11 altered the international security field from the standpoint of interstate relations, and more specifically of the Russian-Atlantic relationship. My basic argument is that dominant players in the field interpreted 9/11 in a way that led to a transformation in the rules of the international security game. As the agenda shifted toward “hard security,” the relative value of force increased as a means to reach “soft” ends.

The post-9/11 era is an era of war—the infamous “war on terrorism.” This is, at least, how the dominant player in the field—the United States—has come to construe it. As president
Bush repeatedly declared, America is at war. For Washington, the contemporary war on terror is a different kind of war—protracted, unconventional—but a war nonetheless. As usual, language is not innocent. As Robert Jervis notes: “The label ‘war’ implies the primary use of military force. Other instruments like diplomacy and intelligence may be used, but they are in service of the deployment of armed force.”\(^{93}\) In the United States but also in the rest of the world, the re-emergence of hard security issues—matters of surviving in front of organized violence—led to the revaluation of the military instrument. After 9/11, the world partly moved away from the security-from-the-inside-out paradigm. This is not to say that the democratization agenda has been buried—witness Iraq. But a new balance between the internal and the external mode of pursuing security was imposed by dominant players in the field of international security. In this hybrid set of rules of the game, the means of the external mode (especially military force) are privileged to achieve the goals of the internal mode (particularly regime change). As Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay argue, the belief that the use of force can help bring about a new world order is at the very core of the Bush Doctrine.\(^{94}\)

In this new set of rules of the international security game, the role of NATO shifted accordingly. The day after 9/11, the Alliance activated its collective-defence clause (Article 5) for the very first time in its history.\(^{95}\) Since then, NATO remains an alliance at war: for instance, the only Article-5 mission that was launched after the terrorist attacks, *Operation Active Endeavour*, is still ongoing at the time of writing. The Alliance’s military operations in Afghanistan also flow directly from the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing American invasion of that country. At the Prague summit in November 2002, NATO adopted a “Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism” that has become a cornerstone of its planning and strategy to defeat the terrorist enemy. While it is true that the Alliance plays “a largely supportive role in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism,”\(^{96}\) its focus has nonetheless changed significantly because of 9/11. As one pundit correctly observes: “The new post-11 September security agenda has also submerged many of the issues that were central to NATO’s transformation in the 1990s. Enlargement, relations with Russia and peacekeeping in the Balkans already appear to be

yesterday’s challenges.” As a dominant player in the field of international security, the Alliance “naturally” embodies the new terrorism-centred doxa.

This reorientation has not gone entirely smoothly, however. In effect, conflicting interpretations of 9/11 have emerged on each side of the Atlantic. Several pundits contend that 9/11 created (or widened) a transatlantic gap in strategic cultures. More specifically, many continental European countries did not buy the militarized response to the terrorist threat advocated by Washington. Instead of pre-emption, deterrence, and retribution, they preferred a softer approach based on regulations, legal and judicial means, as well as civil-police cooperation. To be sure, in relative terms Europe and America still remained closer than any other parts of the world. In addition, even confronted with a profound rift on defence issue, NATO diplomats never stopped thinking from diplomacy in solving their disputes. That said, there can be no doubt that so long as the Alliance is inhabited by struggles over its own internal rules of the game, its capacity to impose doxa in the field of international security is proportionally hampered.

On their side, starting in late 2001 the Russians have on the whole espoused the post-9/11 rules of the game in the international security field imposed by the United States and, to a lesser extent, by NATO. In an interesting analysis of the political consequences of the terrorist attacks, the eminent professor Baranovsky underlined a key trend: “Gradually, the fight against terrorism will become the priority tasks for states. … One can expect that the political and psychological barriers against using force will be lowered. Force will probably appear ‘less unacceptable’ than before.” This vision, shared across Russian elites, happened to be quite similar to the reactions to 9/11 in Washington and Brussels (NATO). Note that this homology between the field’s doxa as imposed by the dominant players and the Russian habitus was something new in the aftermath of 9/11. From the mid-1990s on, fast-amplifying hysteresis effects had erupted from the growing misfit between the security-from-the-inside-out doxa and the Russian dispositions of Great Power-ness. Interestingly, when he took power in January 2000, the new Russian president Vladimir Putin embodied the Great Power habitus too. In an open-letter in early 2000, for instance, he repeatedly characterized Russia as a Great Power. In addition, though he arrived at the helm of the country after the Kosovo crisis, Putin publicly

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97 Cottey 2004, 394.
98 E.g., Kagan 2003; and Cox 2005.
100 Pouliot 2006.
admitted being annoyed by NATO’s domineering practices. In his March 2000 address to the nation, he singled out the Alliance as an “organization that all too often ignores international opinion and the terms of international agreements when reaching its decisions.” In that context, the following question arises: if the new Moscow administration was disposed toward Great Power-ness, why did Russia embody so easily the post-9/11 rules of the international security game imposed by the United States and, to a lesser extent, by the Alliance?

Essentially, the new rules of the game after 9/11 converged toward many dispositions that were already part and parcel of the Russian habitus as it re-emerged during the 1990s. In other words, thanks to this exogenous shock, Moscow was met on its own ground by dominant players. Three such dispositions stand out. First, the new order of things rested on a conservative understanding of national security. The resulting pattern of positions in the field was based on an “alliance between states for the protection of states.” This evolution made the Russians feel more comfortable than they used to be with the human-rights doxa during the 1990s. As former Secretary of the (Russian) Security Council Andrei Kokoshin put it: “Real sovereignty means that the state is free to independently determine its domestic, foreign, and defense policies.”

Second and related, the post-9/11 doxa revalued the form of capital that Moscow has traditionally preferred: material resources, especially military. As Kokoshin continued: “The place of a state in the world hierarchy is determined by … the GDP, population strength, the size of the territory, the numerical strength of its armed forces (and the number of nuclear weapons and delivery means first and foremost).”

Third, the securitization of terrorism upon which the post-9/11 doxa came to rest replicated the political discourse inside Russia. In the preceding years, using Chechnya as an example the Russians had tried to raise the issue of international terrorism as one of the main threats to international security. Yet the Atlantic reaction was sceptical. After 9/11, Russian officials were able to portray themselves as being “ahead of the game, divining the true nature of the threat long before anyone else.”

Significantly, officials from NATO member states quickly changed their discourse on the Russian operation in the Caucasus: “Regarding Chechnya, there will be and must be a more

104 Lieven 2002, 249.
106 Ibid., 4 (html version).
107 Neumann 2005b, 18.
108 Lo 2003, 85.
differentiated evaluation in world opinion,” declared Germany’s Gerhard Schröder.\textsuperscript{109} After 9/11, the real shift in the security discourse thus came not from Russia but from the United States and, by extension, from NATO.

Compared to 1999, the dominant habitus in Moscow was better in tune with the post-9/11 rules of the international security game. In 2002, there seemed to be a fairly strong homology between Russia’s position in the field and its elites’ dispositions. On that matter, it is particularly striking that in the weeks following 9/11, the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (a loose network comprised of Moscow’s most influential security elites) published an opinion in favour of Russia’s playing a junior role in relation to the Alliance. Urging their country to accept a NATO-based security system, the report argued that “multipolarity games, especially rhetorical ones, which are understood by most of the world as resistance to the United States and indeed to the West, are too expensive and unpragmatic.”\textsuperscript{110} Strikingly, the Russian habitus could better withstand a domination based on hard-security rules than on the internal mode of pursuing security. I should note that this collective report was signed by dozens of Kremlin-connected officials and specialists including Primakov, A. Arbatov, Lukin, and Dmitri Rogozin.

Because NATO is the dominant player in the post-Cold War field of international security, the Atlantic habitus is “naturally” in tune with the order of things (cf. chapter II). In other words, there is homology between the Alliance’s position in the field and the dispositions that are embodied by its officials. In the post-9/11 rules of the game, in which hard security often takes precedence over the soft agenda of security-from-the-inside-out, Washington and Brussels officials have been inclined to recognize Russia’s improved position. As Neumann correctly explains:

One of the reasons why Russia’s visibility was so low during the 1990s was that the security agenda was to a high degree dominated by developments in sectors where Russia was peripheral. The “soft security” debate presupposed a way of framing questions to do with power, and particularly with appositeness of “soft power,” that did not easily fit in with traditional Russian ways of framing these questions. … The Afghan campaign, on the other hand, meant that conventional warfare was back at the centre of the security agenda. … Russia has simply harvested what has come its way.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109} Quoted in Evangelista 2002, 180.
\textsuperscript{111} Neumann 2005b, 18-19.
From the Atlantic perspective, the structural shifts of 9/11 were, on the whole, to Russia’s advantage. Moscow’s position in the field could only improve from the new rules of the international security game. As Lo imaginatively puts it, “11 September is the wand that transforms Russia from its former ugly duckling condition into, if not a swan, then at least a fully-fledged member of the community of civilized nations.”\footnote{Lo 2003, 116.} This fundamental shift, crucially, came without any major changes taking place in Moscow.

The evolution toward homology of positions and dispositions in Russian-Atlantic relations gave birth to a honeymoon almost as intense as that of 1992. In its first ever extraordinary session on 13 September 2001, the PJC “expressed its anger and indignation at the barbaric acts committed against the people of the United States of America. … NATO and Russia will intensify their cooperation under the Founding Act to defeat this scourge.”\footnote{NATO (2001), “Press Statement, Meeting in Extraordinary Session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council at Ambassadorial Level,” Brussels, 13 September (www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p010913e.htm, accessed 18 October 2007); cf. Suzanne Daley (2001), “Russia Condemns Attack on U.S. and Vows to Aid NATO Actions,” New York Times, 14 September.} Within a few weeks, Moscow took several steps to implement this new agreement. First, Russia voted in favour of UNSC resolution 1373, which effectively endorsed the U.S. military action against the Taliban. Second, on national television Putin made a multi-pronged offer of assistance, including intelligence-sharing, the opening of Russian airspace for U.S. planes supplying humanitarian assistance, help in search-and-rescue operations in Afghanistan, and enhanced military assistance to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.\footnote{Kommersant (2001), “Televised Address by Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Kommersant, 25 September, translated in CDPSP 39(53).} Third, Russia tacitly endorsed American requests to several Central Asian states for military-basing rights. Within days after Bush’s 20\textsuperscript{th} September speech, which announced the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States had secured flying and basing rights in all of Central Asian states.\footnote{Natalya Airapetova (2002), “How Russia ‘Withdrew’ From the CIS,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 December, translated in CDPSP 54(1); and Aleksandr Grigoryev (2002), “America Will Build Military Bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,” Izvestia, 16 January, translated in CDPSP 54(3).} Despite much domestic criticisms, the Kremlin’s goodwill was later enlarged to Georgia, where U.S. forces also landed in 2002.

The honeymoon quickly translated to NATO-Russia relations, which acquired a new meaning in the restructured rules of the international security game. As NATO SG Lord Robertson declared,

[9/11] brought NATO and Russia firmly onto the same side in the fight against international terrorism. … From that moment, Russia was a staunch partner in the
international response to the attacks. Russia offered to open its airspace to US war planes for the campaign to topple the Taliban and rout Al-Qaeda. Moscow also demonstrated its openness by having US and other Western troops based in the Central Asian Republics, an area Russia had considered until recently to be her exclusive area of influence. And Moscow was willing to share the most sensitive intelligence on terrorism itself, and on the region around Afghanistan—an area they know well, through grim experience. This was more than just cooperation. It demonstrated a sea change in the relationship between Russia and the West.\textsuperscript{116}

In the weeks following the attacks and under the leadership of British Prime minister Tony Blair, the Alliance set about strengthening its institutional ties with Russia. Although the PJC had resumed its work in 2000, it was still widely considered to have failed to deliver on expectations. In October and November 2001, Putin and Robertson met twice. In Moscow, Robertson announced that there were discussions of a new council between NATO and Russia that “would involve Russia having an equality with the NATO countries in terms of the subject matter and would be part of the same compromising trade-offs, give and take, that is involved in day-to-day NATO business. That is how we do business at 19.”\textsuperscript{117} In December, the NAC formally endorsed the proposal “to give new impetus and substance to our partnership” through a NATO-Russia Council.\textsuperscript{118} The proposal was also discussed at the PJC in Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers meetings later that same month. At that point, however, a few member states started to air concerns about embracing Russia too quickly and even tried to oppose the formula “NATO at 20.”\textsuperscript{119}

In its early version (sponsored especially by the UK, Italy, and Canada), the NRC was to give Russia a “right of equality.” Reportedly, a few member states such as France even assumed that it would imply a Russian veto over certain NATO decisions.\textsuperscript{120} But the original proposal was seriously watered down in the early months of 2002, primarily under pressure from

\textsuperscript{120} Black 2004, 153-154.
In effect, a number of high-level officials within the Bush administration (centred on Donald Rumsfeld) began expressing serious doubts about the initiative. The United States was joined by Turkey, the Netherlands, as well as the three new member states in its more reserved mood. Czech president Vaclav Havel, for instance, criticized this “bureaucratic exercise” and warned that it could make the Alliance “just as spineless as the UN or the [OSCE].” The negotiations became increasingly difficult to the point that by winter 2002 they “seemed to be going nowhere.” In a replay of the 1996-1997 negotiations over the Founding Act, the main bone of contention was NATO’s enlargement to the Baltic states. Finally, at the Rome summit, in May 2002, Russia and NATO adopted a declaration stating their “determination to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security and the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible. [... The NRC] will operate on the principle of consensus.” The British Foreign minister went as far as to declare: “This is the last rites, the funeral of the cold war… Fifteen years ago, Russia was the enemy, now Russia becomes our friend and ally.” Despite that language, the issue of enlargement had been brushed under the carpet while Russia’s association with NATO had been considerably diluted.

In terms of the NRC structure (cf. chapter IV), the most important change from the original proposal was the addition of a retrieval or safeguard mechanism allowing participants to withdraw an issue from discussion. In practice, such a mechanism means that Russia’s inclusion in the settlement of any security issue remains conditional on the goodwill of all NRC member states. Vilnius could then withdraw from the NRC agenda a discussion on NATO forces in Lithuania, for instance. This obviously poses severe limits on Russia’s capability to be associated with NATO on contentious issues. Nonetheless, Russian officials appeared quite happy with the results of the Rome summit. For instance, Foreign minister Ivanov insisted the

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122 Clément-Noguier 2005, 246 and 258 fn. 9. Reportedly, Germany also feared that involving Russia could hamper NATO’s decision-making process. France, the UK, Italy, and Canada were more enthusiastic about granting a major role for Russia.


124 Black 2004, 166.

125 Black 2004, 173. The issue was finally brushed under the carpet through a vague agreement to involve Russia more closely in European security would Baltic countries enter the Alliance.


new Council was “not a consultative body, it’s an executive body [in which] NATO and Russia must stand side by side.”128 At the same time, however, Danish Foreign minister Per Stig Moeller was holding a fairly different discourse: “the text of the agreement with Moscow includes a provision stating that all of the 19 NATO member countries have veto power. If a single country disagrees on some issues, the matter will be taken off the agenda for subsequent discussion.”129 Even after the structural shifts of 9/11 and the window of opportunity they opened, ambiguity remained very strong in defining Russia-NATO institutional ties.

Moscow’s enthusiasm over the watered-down NRC illustrates the fact that during the short-lived honeymoon that immediately followed 9/11, Russia was ready to play a lessened role and let the Alliance take forceful steps to maintain its domination. Despite NATO’s change of tone in the NRC negotiations, Putin declared at the Rome summit that “Russia is returning to the family of civilized nations … For a long time a situation existed in which there was Russia and there was the rest of the world and we got nothing good out of that confrontation.”130 In the previous months, he had also taken several initiatives that demonstrated his readiness to tone down Russia’s great-power quest: for instance, he did not blink when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in December 2001; he shut down Russian military bases in Cuba and Vietnam; and he came to accept the American reluctance to consent to verification measures in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed in Moscow at spring 2002. Interestingly, Clifford Kupchan dubbed that meeting “the first asymmetrical summit … the first time the Russians accepted they’re not equal … They want to be France. They want to be ally who’s a pain.”131 That was obviously a sea change from the obstructive approach that the Russians had come to adopt in the late 1990s. Russia’s readiness to tolerate American and Atlantic bold practices was also demonstrated in the wake of NATO’s “Strong Resolve” exercises, the biggest in twenty years for the Alliance (25,000 servicemen participated). Organized in the background of the NRC negotiations in March 2002, the scenario puzzlingly involved an invasion “from the North” of NATO member states and partner countries.132 That was certainly an ambiguous sign on NATO’s part to the Russian “partner,” which nevertheless did not blink at the time. But when the Alliance returned to its

128 Quoted in ibid.
131 Quoted in Ambrosio 2005, 136.
double enlargement practices as if 9/11 had never happened, the same hysteresis effects that had plagued the relationship during the 1990s put an abrupt end to the honeymoon.

2. NATO Goes Global

In this subsection, I argue that the Russian-Atlantic honeymoon dissipated around 2003 mostly because NATO moved on with its double enlargement process pretty much as if nothing had changed after 9/11. From the Russian perspective, Alliance officials continued with their heavy-handed approach of the 1990s in which no genuine consideration was given to Moscow’s opinion. At the geographical level, seven new member states entered the Alliance in 2004 after a process that appeared just as exclusionary to Moscow, if not more, than it had in the 1990s. In functional terms, NATO undertook an expansion toward a global role that generated growing suspicions among Russian officials in line with those sparked by the two Balkans interventions some years before. These practices made little sense for the Russians, who had reacted to the doxic changes of 9/11 with expectations of a closer integration with NATO (cf. the preceding section). In a striking replay of the 1990s, Russian Great Power dispositions resurfaced again, provoking further hysteresis effects and seriously complicating security-community-building processes.

A few months after taking office, president Bush firmly committed to a further wave of NATO enlargement. In Warsaw, he put the matter in a way very reminiscent of Clinton’s discourse during the 1990s:

Our goal is to erase the false lines that have divided Europe for too long. The future of every European nation must be determined by the progress of internal reform, not the interests of outside powers. … The question of “when” may be still up for debate within NATO. The question of “whether” should not be. As we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agendas of others. We will not trade away the fate of free European peoples. No more Munichs, no more Yaltas.  

The American determination to take in new members was not shaken by 9/11 but rather bolstered. At the Prague summit in November 2002, the Russian-Atlantic honeymoon was not over yet when NATO announced its decision to enlarge to six new member states by 2004. Consistent with its reaction to the American withdrawal from the ABM treaty, at the time Moscow remained calm and circumspect. 9/11 significantly contributed to this new Russian

attitude: while in June 2001, Russia was still making clear its rigid opposition to enlargement, in October of the same year Putin confessed he could revise his opinion on the matter should NATO become a more political than military organization. Prior to the Prague summit, Foreign minister Ivanov explained that although he considered expansion “a mistake,” “Russia is not planning to get overly dramatic about the situation.”135 The harsh resistance that had characterized the Yeltsin era seemed to be gone.

As for NATO’s functional enlargement, it continued after 9/11 on a broader basis than during the 1990s. Recall that at the Washington summit in 1999, NATO had adopted a new Concept providing for out-of-area missions. With its interventions in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, the Alliance had moved from collective defence to collective security. That trend deepened in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks. At the Prague summit in 2002, NATO created the Response Force, a body of approximately 20,000 troops to be available on short notice for deployment around the world and across the full spectrum of military operations.136 By October 2006, the Force was operational with 25,000 troops ready for operations of up to thirty days virtually anywhere on the planet (more if resupplied). As far as functional expansion is concerned, however, the real headway took place at the Istanbul summit in June of 2004. There, the Alliance unambiguously affirmed that “[w]e are determined to address effectively the threats our territory, forces and populations face from wherever they may come.”137 For the first time, NATO was explicitly granting itself the right and even the duty to intervene anywhere on the global scale.

In addition, it was also in Istanbul that the Alliance took the decision to expand its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to the whole of Afghanistan. NATO took control of the ISAF in August 2003. At the time, it created up to thirteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which gradually expanded the mission beyond the confines of Kabul. Since 2004, the Alliance has launched a four-stage expansion into the different regions of the country. Often deemed the “most militarily challenging mission since the alliance was formed in 1949,”138 the NATO-led ISAF counted 31,000 troops in October 2006, taken in unequal proportions from the 26 member states as well as from ten partner countries. The

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138 De Nevers 2007, 54.
significance of the Afghan mission for NATO’s functional enlargement is not only that the country is located far away from the collective defence theatre (i.e., the North Atlantic area). It is also that the operation has a clear preventive dimension (“providing a security environment to alleviate threats”\textsuperscript{139}) that was not historically characteristic of the Alliance’s mandate. The largest deployment ever made by the Alliance is in line with its new, expanded function to address menaces wherever they surface in the world.

In this context, a new narrative emerged among Atlantic officials and experts to the effect that NATO is now “going global,” as Daalder and Goldgeier put it.\textsuperscript{140} Since the turn of the millennium, the Alliance has lent logistical support to the African Union’s mission in Darfur; assisted tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia; ferried supplies to victims of hurricane Katrina in the United States; as well as airlifted food after a massive earthquake in Kashmir. For many experts, the next logical step would be to enlarge membership to any democratic state in the world. This conclusion, however, is not shared by all officials. SG de Hoop Scheffer instead opined that “NATO doesn’t need to become a ‘gendarme du monde.’ What we need is an increasingly global approach to security, with organisations, including NATO, playing their respective roles.”\textsuperscript{141} At the time of writing, the issue of the globalization of the Alliance is one of the most hotly debated in the Alliance. That said, since the Istanbul summit there seems to be a consensus that as transatlantic as the organization may be in membership, the issues it has to address now play themselves out on a global scale. In actuality, NATO has already gone global, as the ISAF illustrates.

In sum, NATO’s double enlargement after 9/11 is in many respects reminiscent of the events that unfolded in the second half of the 1990s. In admitting seven more Eastern European countries and in expanding its collective-security mission from the European to the global stage, the Alliance pursued the same path it had set itself at the critical juncture of 1994. Unsurprisingly, this new wave of double enlargement also sparked similar reactions on the Russian side. Once again, NATO’s practices appeared to contradict the security-from-the-inside-out agenda that the Alliance had ostensibly continued to advocate after 9/11. From the Russian point of view, integrating seven more post-communist states in the Alliance meant not the consolidation of the democratic community, but the drawing of new divisions to Russia’s

\textsuperscript{139} Yost 2007.
\textsuperscript{140} Daalder and Goldgeier 2006.
exclusion. Similarly, the globalization of NATO’s security mandate did not appear to yield more security for Moscow. After the Kosovo precedent, it rather seemed to undermine Russia’s capacity to control its fate and exert influence in world politics. In enlarging its security mandate as well as its membership, then, the Alliance played a game with Russia that resembled realpolitik first and foremost. As a result, when the 9/11 honeymoon dissipated, deeply ingrained dispositions of Great Power-ness were triggered anew among Russian elites. In a replay of the late twentieth century, junior partnering gave way to power balancing.

When the Alliance tried to sell a further round of enlargement to the Russians, it essentially used a similar line as during the 1990s—hence the revival of Russian dispositions of Great Power-ness. As Secretary General Robertson put it during a speech at MGIMO in Moscow:

> it is difficult to understand the nature of Russian concerns. I do try, but I still do not understand. If, to quote the Founding Act, the Alliance is no longer considered an adversary by Russia and if Russia has entered into a privileged partnership with that Alliance, then how could its enlargement be deemed a threat to Russian national security, as maintained in the new National Security Concept? If, to reiterate numerous OSCE documents signed by Russia, every sovereign nation in Europe has the equal right to freely choose its security alignments, then how can the implementation of this principle violate Russia’s security interests? … Enlargement is not—as outdated perceptions have it—a zero-sum game where NATO wins and Russia loses. … We are aiming at including, not excluding Russia.  

Given the resurgence of Great Power dispositions, the notion that expansion would be a win-win or that it was meant to include Russia could only fall on deaf ears in Moscow. That said, when NATO announced its decision to enlarge to seven new member states in late 2002, the Russian reaction was calm. The policy was still opposed but it did not create the fuss it did in the 1990s. At the time, Russian officials in Putin’s inner circle were ready to concede to the Alliance as a result of the doxic shifts of 9/11. And yet, the Russian reaction became much more critical as the honeymoon dissipated in the ensuing years. A particularly telling incident took place in early 2004, when the NATO Allied Command Europe began patrolling the Baltic states’ airspace and policing their border with Russia.  

This zealous and somewhat provocative operation profoundly irritated the Russians, who had been promised that no allied forces would be permanently deployed on new members’ territories. Moscow responded in kind by sending

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airplanes on similar reconnaissance missions along its borders with the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{144} Even before these states formally entered the Alliance, in late March 2004, Brussels had dispatched six F-16 fighters from Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{145} This gesture, considered “unfriendly” by Moscow,\textsuperscript{146} obviously confirmed doubts about the “win-win” and “inclusive” nature of NATO’s expansion for Russia.\textsuperscript{147}

In addition, in the aftermath of 9/11 the Alliance subtly turned down offers from the Russian side for a far-reaching rapprochement. Recall that already in March 2000, Putin had surprised the world in responding “Why not?” to a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) journalist who was inquiring into the possibility that Russia one day enter NATO.\textsuperscript{148} At the time, the NATO SG had unambiguously replied that Russian membership was not on the agenda.\textsuperscript{149} In late September 2001, Putin was reported as calling on NATO to admit his country, an offer that was welcomed very coldly at the Alliance’s HQ.\textsuperscript{150} A number of Western officials, including British Defense minister Geoff Hoon, U.S. ambassador Alexander Vershbow, and Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski apparently toyed with the idea for a time.\textsuperscript{151} In Washington, Putin reiterated his desire to go “as far as the Atlantic Alliance itself is ready to go and as far as it will be able, of course, to take into account the legitimate interests of Russia.”\textsuperscript{152} The offer fell on deaf ears on the Atlantic side. According to Strauss, throughout the NRC negotiations in late 2001 and early 2002, Robertson made a deliberate effort to deny Russia’s

\begin{footnotes}
\item[147] As A. Arbatov analyzed: “The planned patrolling of the Baltic states’ airspace by NATO planes is real confirmation that the alliance’s expansion is directed against Russia. This is clear, because the Baltic countries’ other neighbors—specifically Poland and Germany—are members of NATO. … To alleviate such sentiments in Russia, NATO should, it seems, do just the opposite and refrain from any military actions close to our borders. But what’s happening in reality is just the reverse. As a result, Russian critics of NATO expansion are being handed real trump cards to strengthen their position.” Quoted in Vitaly Strugovets (2004), “Closed Skies,” Russky Kuryer, 25 March, translated in CDPSP 56(12).
\item[150] Smith 2006, 93.
\item[151] Black 2004, 145.
\end{footnotes}
interest in membership so as to redirect political attention away from the issue.\textsuperscript{153} Associating Moscow with the Alliance was acceptable only so long as it stayed at arms’ length.\textsuperscript{154}

Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, NATO’s functional enlargement was prudently tolerated in Moscow. As one expert observes, “Putin’s public demeanor in the face of the presence of American troops in Georgia and the buildup of American and NATO bases in Kyrgyzstan was still nonchalant” in 2002.\textsuperscript{155} Several practices on the part of certain NATO member states contributed to harden that reaction in the following months. Obviously, the American invasion of Iraq (which I do not discuss in detail in this study, as it is not directly related to the Alliance’s double enlargement) was a case in point. The main problem for the Russians was the infringement on the principle of state sovereignty, which the Russians had come to interpret as the best safeguard against interference in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. As President Putin declared on the very first day of combat: “If we allow international law to be replaced by ‘the law of the fist,’ whereby the strong is always right, has the right to do anything, then one of the basic principles of international law will be put into question and that is the principle of immutable sovereignty of a state. And then no one, not a single country in the world, will feel itself secure.”\textsuperscript{156}

In addition, the Americans made a series of announcements that increasingly irritated the Russians. First, in early 2002 the Pentagon’s \textit{Nuclear Posture Review} was leaked in the American media, counting Russia as one of seven states on which nuclear weapons could or should be targeted.\textsuperscript{157} Second, during the spring of 2002 the Bush administration announced that the Transcaucasus and Central Asia had become areas of interest for the Alliance while showing little inclination to remove its newly acquired bases in Central Asia. Finally, starting in early 2003, persistent rumours that the Pentagon was working on plans to deploy U.S. forces in Bulgaria and Romania—in contravention of NATO’s 1997 unilateral pledges—further alarmed the Russians. The United States also stationed approximately 15,000 servicemen in Azerbaijan.

\textsuperscript{153} Straus 2003, 266-267 fn. 24.
\textsuperscript{154} Another telling example is NATO’s repeated refusal to formally establish ties with the CSTO. Under Russia’s initiative, this was proposed several times in NRC meetings as well as high-level communications starting in 2004 through December 2006. Cooperation in drug trafficking and the establishment of a “security belt” around Afghanistan was proposed, among other things. The Alliance did not answer for a year, before politely declining the offer.
\textsuperscript{155} Black 2004, 169.
\textsuperscript{156} Quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 328.
in March 2004.\textsuperscript{158} For the Russians, these deployments were further proof of NATO’s hostile attitude.

The post-9/11, more cooperative tide definitely turned in the wake of the “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet space: the Rose revolution in Georgia, November 2003; the Orange revolution in Ukraine, December 2004; and the Yellow or Purple or Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan, October 2005.\textsuperscript{159} From the outset, Moscow suspected some shadowy involvement on the part of Western countries, particularly in financing opposition parties as well as in setting up demonstrations.\textsuperscript{160} Many high-level politicians denounced American and other allied countries’ meddling on behalf of democratization in the CIS area.\textsuperscript{161} Starting in 2003, officials in Moscow did not buy “democratic messianism”\textsuperscript{162} anymore but rather saw behind it a cold-minded attempt to enlarge the Alliance’s zone of influence. Pundit Pushkov expressed a widespread sentiment:

What we are dealing with in Ukraine is a continuation of the West’s strategic line of a staging a political takeover of the post-Soviet space. The US and Western Europe aren’t content with the two waves of NATO expansion and the two enlargements of the European Union that have taken place since the collapse of the USSR. After the Baltic countries were incorporated into Euro-Atlantic structures, attention shifted to other former Soviet countries. Georgia was the first to be targeted. Ukraine is the second in line, and it is unquestionably the most important country in this regard. Meanwhile, slogans about fighting for democracy have, alas, served mainly as a cover to advance this strategy.\textsuperscript{163}

For instance, the new president of Ukraine, Viktor Yuschenko, had clearly stated his intention to move the country closer to, and eventually inside NATO prior to obtaining the West’s support. In March 2004, NATO and Ukraine signed a memorandum by which allied armed


\textsuperscript{159} One could also add to this list the failed attempt in Uzbekistan in May 2005 when an unknown number of demonstrators were violently cracked down in Andijan. On the Russian reaction, cf. Arkady Dubnov (2005), “Andizhan of Contention,” \textit{Vremya Novostei}, 10 June, translated in \textit{CDPSP} 57(23).

\textsuperscript{160} Tsygankov 2006, 152.

\textsuperscript{161} In the words of Foreign minister Lavrov: “Any attempt to speed up natural social processes, especially from the outside, leads to destabilization without making the road to democracy any straighter. [Democracy] is not something that can be exported, and methods of commercial advertising and political spin-doctoring are impermissible in advancing it. … It’s strange when demonstrators appeal to heads of foreign states instead of fellow countrymen”; quoted in Associated Press (2005), “Lavrov Lashes Out at West,” \textit{Moscow Times}, 6 December.

\textsuperscript{162} Karaganov 2006.

\textsuperscript{163} Aleksei Pushkov (2004), “The Aim Is Not to Divide Ukraine, But to Break It Away from Russia,” \textit{Trud}, 1 December, translated in \textit{CDPSP} 56(48). As Lynch analyzes: “Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community interpreted the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia very differently. In Washington and European capitals, the events that followed the November elections were unanimously supported as a peaceful, if anti-constitutional, victory for democracy, featuring the spontaneous rejection of the regime then led by Eduard Shevardnadze. Russia’s then Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov … painted a different picture. For him, the uprising was not a revolution so much as an organised coup against an elected leadership that had succeeded only thanks to the support of ‘outside forces’”; Lynch 2005, 12.
forces were granted the right of rapid access to the country’s territory “should this become necessary in order to implement the common policy of the alliance.” A similar situation happened in Georgia with Mikhail Saakashvili, who quickly opened the country’s doors to American and NATO militaries after his rise to power. In May 2006, the GUAM—a loose group of post-Soviet states sponsored by the United States—was enlarged and renamed the “Organization for Democracy and Economic Development.”

Faced with NATO’s realpolitik in its near abroad, Russia reverted to a number of Great Power tactics, especially that of soft balancing. In October 2002, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created to institutionalize the alliance contracted back in 1992 and with a Russian general as its head. In September 2003, Russia signed a deal with Kyrgyzstan to establish a new air base in Kant, in the vicinity of an American contingent. A CSTO Rapid Deployment Force for Central Asia funded by Moscow was deployed there. Moscow also supported Uzbekistan in its decision to evict American forces from the Khanabad base during the summer of 2005. At the Minsk summit in June 2006, Bordyuzha declared that “[t]he CSTO leadership is concerned about the NATO military infrastructure being created around Russia and Belarus. We are concerned that countries will be admitted to NATO wholesale, without completion of the necessary military procedures.” The key objective of the Minsk meeting was to expand the collective forces’ zone of operation beyond the member states’ territories. In order to balance NATO’s influence in the CIS, Russia also employed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which comprises China, Russia and the four Central Asian states. In August 2005, the SCO organized its first joint maneuvers intended to rout hypothetical terrorists, extremists and separatists entrenched in the Shandong peninsula. Further exercises were organized since. One expert accurately sums up the contemporary Russian-Atlantic dynamics in the CIS:

Russians view the American military presence in Central Asia, a projection of power onto Russia’s doorstep, within a broader strategic context, not as a single event. It is, to them, part of a pattern that includes the expansion of NATO (which has even

168 Nikolai Poroskov (2005), “‘No Military Blocs,’” Vremya Novostei, 26 August, translated in CDPSP 57(33).
incorporated the Baltic state), moves to turn Caspian energy pipelines westward and thus away from Russia, and the Bush administration’s determination to build strategic missile defense (with or without Russian consent) if need be by opting out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. One need not be a Russian given to conspiracy theories to wonder whether there is a larger design at play. Therefore no amount of verbal assurances about the well-meaning and constructive intent guiding Western policy in Central Asia will cut ice with Moscow. The effects of the Western emplacement in Central Asia on Russian politics and foreign policy will depend not on what is said by Washington, but on what is done.\footnote{Menon 2005, 214-215.}

To conclude this section, the latest round of NATO’s double enlargement clearly pushed Russia further away from the internal mode of pursuing security. In 1994, in the wake of Brussels’ decision to expand and following its first operations in Bosnia, the Great Power habitus had started to resurface, causing officials in Moscow to increasingly question the Alliance-imposed doxa of OSCE-like cooperative security. Then in 1999, the Kosovo crisis had reinforced these Russian dispositions to the point of openly contesting the post-Cold War rules of the international security game. After 2003, as NATO was taking in former Soviet states while going global, Russia’s insubordination went one step further with the public rejection of the democratization and human rights agenda advocated by allied member states. Nothing better illustrates this change than mounting Russian criticisms of the OSCE over the last few years. As Lynch writes: “The OSCE has moved in Russian policy from being perceived as a potential solution to becoming a problem.”\footnote{Lynch 2005, 9.} In July 2004, the CIS countries (under Russia’s strong leadership) distributed a statement to the OSCE’s Permanent Council in Vienna to the effect that the organization was “often failing to observe such fundamental Helsinki principles as non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the sovereignty of states.”\footnote{Fyodor Lukyanov (2004), “Final Act,” Vremya Novostei, 9 July, translated in CDPSP 56(27). Criticisms went on for several months: e.g., Associated Press (2005), “Lavrov Seeks OSCE Reform,” Moscow Times, 6 December.} At a Foreign ministers Council in December 2006, Lavrov went further and declared: “The OSCE, by virtue of the comprehensive approach to security taken by the organization, cannot and must not deal exclusively with the human dimension.”\footnote{Quoted in Gennady Sysoyev (2006), “Defrosted Conflict,” Kommersant, 6 December, translated in CDPSP 58(49); and Gennady Sysoyev (2006), “Sergei Lavrov Questions Russian Membership in OSCE,” Kommersant, 6 December, translated in CDPSP 58(49). President Putin later reinforced Lavrov’s point: “It is time for us to give the OSCE real substance and have it address the issues of genuine concern to the peoples of Europe rather than just hunting for fleas in the post-Soviet area”; President of Russia (2007), “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly,” Moscow, 26 April (www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/1007/04/26/1209_tpe70029_125494.shtml, accessed 27 April 2007).} For the first time in the post-Cold War era, a group of states led by Moscow mounted an objection opposing the very principles of the OSCE.
Clearly, the domination pattern that had given NATO so much authority over Moscow had waned.

C. RUSSIAN-ATLANTIC PROSPECTS: DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN?

At the time of writing in late 2007, the future of Russian-Atlantic dealings over the double enlargement looked pretty much like the past: a new wave of geographical enlargement was under consideration, including countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, further bolstering the Russian habitus of Great Power-ness. The Alliance publicly declared its “open-door policy”174: “In 2009 I would like to see more countries in NATO,” said SG De Hoop Scheffer. “I would like to see a NATO of 26 plus. I would like to see Serbia firmly on the road to NATO and I would like to see us coming closer to honouring the ambitions of Ukraine and Georgia.”175 In the absence of an exogenous shock of significant proportions, therefore, one can safely make the “local prediction” (cf. chapter III) that Russian-Atlantic relations will not get any better in the near future. NATO’s double enlargement practices, which have significantly contributed to the reemergence, sustenance and consolidation of Great Power dispositions in Moscow, have not changed whatsoever since 1994. In this context I see no reason why Russian-Atlantic relations would not follow the same path of increasing difficulty in the near future.

Since the colour revolutions in Tbilisi and Kyiv in November 2003 and 2004, the NATO bureaucracy has taken several steps to actively court Ukraine and Georgia despite Russia’s strong reservations. As for the former, the Alliance offered an Intensified Dialogue process in April 2005 in order to prepare the country for eventual membership. When Kyiv held joint exercises with the Alliance in June 2006, however, major popular demonstrations took place for seven days in the Crimea seaport of Feodosia.176 As a result, Prime minister Viktor Yanukovych told NATO in September 2006 that membership would be put on hold in Ukraine.177 At the time of writing, the Ukrainian membership remained a hotly debated topic inside the Alliance. On the Russian side, S. Ivanov had already warned that if and when Ukraine joins NATO, there would be “an inevitable impact one way or another on our relations, particularly on cooperation in the

military-industrial sector and some other spheres.” Given the very close historical and cultural ties with Ukrainians, this issue is probably the toughest that ever sprung between Russia and the Alliance since the end of the Cold War.

Russian feelings are also intense as regards Georgia, as the dramatic crisis of September 2006 recalled. U.S. president Bush has long declared his intention to invite Tbilisi inside the Alliance: “I’m a believer in the expansion of NATO. I think it’s in the world’s interest. Georgia has got work to do, but we’ll do all we can to make it easier for it to become a member of NATO.” Given the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, the situation remains extremely tense. As with Ukraine, there is no consensus inside NATO about admitting Georgia. Nonetheless, the Alliance offered an Intensified Dialogue on Georgia’s membership aspirations in September 2006—that is, only days before Tbilisi expelled several Russian officials on spying accusations. The diplomatic row that ensued between the two countries was dramatic and triggered hostile reactions on both sides. For Russia’s Foreign minister, Georgia’s “provocation” was the direct consequence of NATO’s expression of interest in its candidacy: “The latest escapade involving the seizure of our officers occurred immediately after NATO’s decision to adopt a plan for intensified cooperation with Georgia and after the visit that Mikhail Nikolayevich paid to the US. … Here’s how it all unfolded in chronological order: the trip to Washington, the NATO decision, the taking of hostages.” As NATO’s open-door policy reaches the post-Soviet space up to its very borders, Moscow is growing increasingly nervous and rigid in its opposition. In 2007, Foreign minister Lavrov publicly compared NATO’s limitless expansion to Cold War containment.

182 As one member of the Federation Council Defense and Security Committee put it: “The Russian position is immutable: We are against CIS states being admitted to the military bloc. For some reason, the alliance does not respond to Russia’s concerns about the situation in the post-Soviet area. This is part of a general policy trend—to isolate Russia from its allies in the military sphere”; Voronin 2006, 22.
183 As Lavrov explained: “various attempts are being made to contain Russia, including through the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Organization in violation of previous assurances given to Moscow. Today, supports
The Russians are no more heartened by the Alliance’s apparently limitless expansion at the functional level. After the November 2006 Riga summit, the new name of the game for the Alliance is functional security—meaning that geography is no more a constraint on its action. Russian officials fear that in becoming a global policeman, NATO could eventually meddle in conflicts that are of direct concern for (and in close vicinity of) their country. Foreign minister Lavrov put this feeling clearly:

The parameters of our interaction largely depend on how the alliance’s transformation will proceed. There are a number of aspects in this regard that evoke our concern. For example, it was agreed at the NATO Riga Summit in what cases military force could be used. The number of such hypothetical scenarios is increasing. But there is no clarity as to how this is going to correlate with the rules of international law, in particular, whether NATO will ask for permission from the United Nations, as it should be done under the Charter of the Organization. We cannot, of course, watch impartially the military structure of the alliance moving ever closer to our borders. It is worrying that since 1999 nothing has been done to advance arms control and military restraint. These tasks have a fundamental significance for our relations with the alliance.\(^\text{184}\)

Since there are no signs that NATO’s political willingness to take missions anywhere in the world is abating, it seems safe to conclude that Russia’s concerns will not wither anytime soon. As the Great Power habitus further consolidates, Moscow will decreasingly accept the Alliance’s self-attributed agenda on the global scale.

It is interesting to conclude on the latest (and maybe most damaging) Russian-Atlantic row, which also illustrates with clarity how much NATO’s double enlargement has contributed to jeopardize even the strongest _acquis_ of the end of the Cold War. The CFE treaty was signed in late 1990 by the NATO and Warsaw pact countries. The treaty basically set limits on armaments systems on the European continent, with solid verification and information exchange mechanisms. Under Russia’s request, an adapted version was agreed upon in 1999 in order to allow more flexibility in Moscow’s deployments in the Caucasus, notably. In the 1999 Istanbul Final Act, Russia also agreed to withdraw its military from bases in Georgia and Moldova. In the ensuing weeks, NATO countries conditioned the ratification of the Adapted CFE treaty on

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Moscow’s fulfilment of what has come to be known as the “Istanbul commitments.” On its part, the Russian Duma ratified the treaty in June 2004 while urging those new NATO member states not covered by the original CFE to sign the treaty. In April 2004, at their very first NRC meeting, Slovenia and the Baltic states stated their intention to join the arms control regime. That was never done, however, and Moscow did not fully withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova either. In his presidential address in April 2007, president Putin proposed to suspend Russia’s commitments under CFE, a decision that came into effect in December that year. At the time of writing, the most far-reaching symbol of the end of the Cold War seemed doomed to oblivion.

How did we get there? The stalemate has two main origins. One is Russia’s failure to fulfill the Istanbul commitments. One must remember the context in which the Adapted CFE deal was signed: on the verge of leaving office, president Yeltsin had to work hard to obtain NATO’s favours after the Kosovo crisis and a second invasion of Chechnya earlier in 1999. Under the Putin administration, however, Russia contested NATO’s conditioning of CFE ratification to the 1999 pledge as an “artificial linkage.” As Lavrov put it in 2004: “There is no legal connection between these issues [of CFE ratification and Istanbul commitments.] From a legal standpoint, these demands are improper, since the agreements on resolving the situation with respect to the bases in Georgia and withdrawing military equipment from the Dnestr region were political, rather than legal, in nature; they are being fulfilled and are not bound by any strict deadlines.” In effect, Moscow and Tblisi signed several agreements since 2000 and the latest one, concluded in March 2006, sets the deadline for complete Russian withdrawal at the end of 2008. The situation in Moldova is more difficult as Moscow considers its troops stationed there as “peacekeepers” who defend ethnic Russians. Whatever reasons Russian officials may give for their failure to withdraw on time, however, it is essential to put this policy in perspective of NATO’s double enlargement. Georgia has become the main focus of NATO’s political seduction over the last few years and its possible membership is a source of deep

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concern and irritation in Moscow. So long as secessionist tensions remain high (fuelled in part by Russian troops in Abkhazia), Tblisi’s prospects of entering the Alliance remain limited. A similar trade-off is also happening in Chisinau, although at this point it is mostly the EU that has courted the country. The Russians are still very acerbic that the Europeans coldly rejected the Kozak peace plan in 2003, and they are now determined not to let go yet another former Soviet constituent to a colour revolution of sort.

NATO’s double enlargement is also related to the second source of the Russian-Atlantic stalemate over the CFE treaty. Among the ten new Allies, six were part of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia). The remaining four (the three Baltic states and Slovenia) were not independent states in 1990 and are thus not covered by the CFE arms limitations. General Baluyevsky expressed Moscow’s exasperation quite clearly: “the expansion of NATO, the changed military and political status of six CFE signatory countries and the resulting changes in the structure and composition of the groupings—all these things supposedly have nothing to do with the CFE Treaty, while Russia’s bilateral relations with Moldova and Georgia have a direct bearing on the treaty and are preventing its ratification!”

To be sure, the planned American deployments in Romania and Bulgaria would cause NATO to surpass its flank limits. In addition, armies stationed in the Baltic countries are not covered so long as these countries do not sign the treaty. For these reasons, Russia sees no interest in maintaining the CFE regime. The links between the moratorium and NATO’s double enlargement was explicitly made by Putin in early 2007:

But what is happening at the same time [that NATO waits for Moscow to fulfil the Istanbul commitments]? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the [CFE] treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all. I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: ‘the fact the we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.’ Where are these guarantees? … And now they

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are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us—these walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent.\footnote{President of Russia (2007), “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Munich, 10 February (www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/10/0138, accessed 4 April 2007). In announcing the moratorium, Putin further explained his thought: “the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO signed the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in 1990. This treaty would have made sense if the Warsaw Pact had continued to exist. But today all that this treaty means is that we face restrictions on deploying conventional forces on our own territory. It is difficult to imagine a situation where the United States, for example, would accept restrictions on such a basis on the deployment of troops on its own territory. However, not only did Russia sign and ratify this treaty, but it has also observed its provisions in practice. We have carried out considerable troop reductions. We no longer have any groups in the northwest of army or corps size. Practically types of heavy arms have been withdrawn from the European part of the country. We are essentially the only country facing so-called ‘flank restrictions’ in the south and north. … But what about our partners? They have not even ratified the adapted treaty, citing the Istanbul Agreements providing for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Trans-Dniester. … our partners are not displaying correct behaviour, to say the least, in their attempts to gain unilateral advantages. While making use of an invented pretext for not ratifying the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, they are taking advantage of the situation to build up their own system of military bases along our borders. Furthermore, they plan to deploy elements of a missile defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland. New NATO members such as Slovenia and the Baltic states, despite the preliminary agreements reached with NATO, have not signed the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty at all. This creates a real threat and an unpredictable situation for Russia. In this context, I believe that the right course of action is for Russia to declare a moratorium on its observance of this treaty until such time as all NATO members without exception ratify it and start strictly observing its provisions, as Russia has been doing so far on a unilateral basis.” President of Russia (2007), “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly,” Moscow, April 26 (www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029_125494, accessed 27 April 2007).}

Russia’s suspension of its CFE commitments seemed to take NATO by surprise, although the idea had been floated many times since 2004. In another fascinating hysteresis effect, it appears that Atlantic officials have greatly overestimated their capacity to force Russia into complying with the Istanbul agreement by withholding ratification of the amended CFE treaty. They apparently could not see that since the mid-1990s the double enlargement had left marks in the Russian habitus that seriously undermined NATO’s power and authority. Even after Putin’s speech, NATO countries refused to compromise during an extraordinary conference in Vienna.\footnote{Associated Press (2007), “Arms Pact Talks End in Deadlock in Vienna,” Moscow Times, 18 June.} The Alliance’s calls for more talks, after Putin had signed a decree suspending the country’s CFE commitment, did not succeed to in getting the Russians to budge this time.\footnote{Moscow Times (2007), “NATO Calls for Talks on CFE Treaty,” Moscow Times, 17 July.} In an unprecedented show of impotence, NATO announced that its decision “not to respond in kind at this stage to the Russian Federation’s political decision to ‘suspend’ its legal obligations [while] NATO Allies will continue to meet theirs, without prejudice to any future action they might take.”\footnote{NATO (2007), “Alliance’s Statement on the Russian Federation’s ‘Suspension’ of Its CFE Obligations,” press release (2007) 139, 12 December (www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-139e.html, accessed 14 December 2007).} In the meantime, it is now Moscow that makes the implementation of the CFE treaty conditional upon its ratification by all NATO members. As the domination
pattern that had resulted from the end of the Cold War shifts, one of the landmark achievements of an era has been put in jeopardy.

**CONCLUSION: DRAWING A LESSON**

The story that I told in this and the preceding chapters is the story of a missed opportunity. With the collapse of the USSR, in the early 1990s, many new paths opened for Moscow and its former Atlantic enemy in building peace in and through practice. In 1992-1993, everything was taking place as if a new security community was in the making. All the precipitating conditions were in place, including NATO’s strong domination of the field of international security, to make diplomacy the self-evident practice of Russian-Atlantic relations. That window of opportunity abruptly shut in 1994, when the Alliance decided to enlarge to new members and to implement its functional expansion in Bosnia. Since then, the exclusionary consequences of the double enlargement for Moscow have led to a reemergence of realpolitik dispositions among Russian officials. This Great Power habitus later consolidated over the Kosovo crisis, the globalization of NATO and a second wave of enlargement. Today, as the CFE controversy demonstrates, the Russian-Atlantic relationship has embarked upon a path of mild rivalry that, as non-violent as it may remain, appears conducive to security dilemmas more than community. All in all, the promises of the end of the Cold War not only failed to materialize—a decade and a half later they also seem to be withering away.

Of course, while making this sobering observation one should also appreciate the considerable changes in Russian-Atlantic relations after the end of the Cold War. At least until the recent BMD row (cf. chapter VII), scenarios of mutual military confrontation had mostly faded from the intersubjective background. I showed in chapter IV that in 2006, the practice of diplomacy had indeed normalized at the NRC, although it stopped short of being self-evident. In and through practice, Russia and NATO cannot be said to form a fully-fledged security community yet they have certainly moved away from the insecurity community of the Cold War. In the face of this evolution, one might think it was to be expected from two former enemies who pointed nuclear missiles at one another for decades that they not overcome all their mutual animosity in a mere decade and a half. To be sure, one should not hope for miracles in such a short time span. But even with this caveat in mind, the pace of Russian-Atlantic pacification pales in comparison to other historical cases, such as Franco-German reconciliation. Having waged three extremely deadly wars in seventy years, Paris and Bonn united their
strategic industrial sectors of coal and atomic energy less than ten years after the end of the Second World War and agreed on a common agricultural policy and customs union within a dozen years. What is more, barely nine years after the fall of the Third Reich, Bonn integrated the military alliance of its vainquors. Of course, Russia was not defeated nor occupied by the Allies the way Germany was. The political contexts were surely different. However imperfect, this analogy nonetheless suggests that an opportunity was missed in the 1990s to construct a durable peace, in and through practice, between the Alliance and Russia. That this possibility now appears remoter and remoter only stresses the pressing need for IR scholars to understand what went wrong so as to avoid replicating the same mistakes in the future.

The key policy lesson is contained in chapters V and VI: in hindsight, the policy of NATO’s double enlargement was self-defeating as far as pacification with Russia was concerned. Of course, keeping alive the “most successful military alliance in history” or “welcoming back to the European family” countries that had been brutally occupied for decades cannot be said to be wrong in intent. Nor can Alliance officials be completely blamed for being prudent with their former enemies in Moscow. My criticism of the double enlargement policy rests not with its intent but with its effects, which were definitely not properly assessed with regards to Russia. As much as expansion made sense from the NATO point of view, it made no sense to Moscow: exclusionary and delusionary, the policy fit better with the old realpolitik game of the Cold War than with the new rules of security-from-the-inside-out professed by the Alliance. As a result, Atlantic leaders and practitioners are guilty of two main mistakes. First, they failed to understand how the double enlargement would spark exclusion feelings in Russia and rehabilitate Great Power dispositions among Moscow officials. The seeds of today’s aggravating problems were planted back in 1994 because habitus is a durable matrix of action. Second and related, NATO decision-makers did not realize how the double enlargement policy would seriously contribute to the decline of NATO’s position of strength compared to Moscow in the post-Cold War field of international security. There seemed to be a naïve but widespread conviction that whatever policies NATO could impose, ultimately Moscow officials would always back down without hard feelings. The pervasive feeling that “the Alliance is right and that Russia cannot but come to realize that” precluded compromise and genuine diplomacy, to Russia’s growing alienation. Everything took place as if the Alliance was systematically justified in imposing its decisions on its former Russian enemy.

One of the net results of NATO’s heavy-handed approach was to thwart the development of trust in its relationship with the new Russia. As I argued in chapter V, a security community
rests on a more demanding kind of trust than simply “believing despite uncertainty.” After all, the MAD paradigm of the Cold War led Moscow and Western capitals to take some risks and assume (“trust”) that the other side would not use nuclear weapons to solve disputes. Beyond prediction, trust in security communities entails a certain sense of obligation: trusting parties believe despite uncertainty that their interests will be, to a certain extent, mutually taken into account. Largely because of the Alliance’s double enlargement policy, I contend, this kind of trust never developed in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations. To the contrary, Russian practitioners increasingly came to agree that NATO would systematically take advantage of their country’s weakness and collect its geopolitical trophies. Whether this perception was on or off the mark is not the important issue here: what matters is that this mistrust of the Alliance’s intentions and policies is now so widespread among Russian foreign policy elites that one must conclude that a fundamental condition of peace—one that has to do with practice sense—has failed to materialize.

But for NATO’s double enlargement, would the development of a Russian-Atlantic security community have been so difficult? Asking counterfactual questions is always a bit tricky because social life is non-linear, path dependent, and multiply realizable. A macro-pattern such as the nature of Russia-NATO relations may be caused, alternatively, by several different factors and through various processes, always with the same effect. Similarly, a slight and apparently unrelated change in early conditions—for instance, higher oil prices in the early 1990s—might have changed the whole story of post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations. In this context my counterfactual strategy is dual. On the one hand, I assert that the development of a Russian-Atlantic security community would not have slowed down as early and to the same extent had NATO not decided to enlarge in the mid-1990s. In chapter V, I showed that the Alliance took its crucial decisions before Moscow reverted to a more difficult foreign policy. In addition, late 1994 coincided with a new consensus among Russian security elites (as poll data shows clearly) and with the disempowerment of Westernizing elites à la Kozyrev. But on the other hand, I concede that the historical roots of Great Power dispositions as well as the upheaval of Russian transition, both of which have nothing to do with the double enlargement, constituted particularly fertile soil for Moscow to lapse into quixotic practices with NATO. Even without the double enlargement, chances are that many of the Bush administration’s policies would have been just as badly received in Russia, to take an obvious example.
At the time of writing, Russia’s increasing assertiveness in relation to NATO led a number of Western experts to link today’s problems with the double enlargement policy pursued since 1994. As the President of the Nixon Center put it in *Foreign Affairs*:

Underlying the United States’ mishandling of Russia is the conventional wisdom in Washington, which holds that the Reagan administration won the Cold War largely on its own. But this is not what happened, and it is certainly not the way most Russians view the demise of the Soviet state. Washington’s self-congratulatory historical narrative lies at the core of its subsequent failures in dealing with Moscow in the post-Cold War era. … The Clinton administration’s greatest failure was its decision to take advantage of Russia’s weakness. The administration tried to get as much as possible for the United States politically, economically, and in terms of security in Europe and the former Soviet Union before Russia recovered from the tumultuous transition. … Behind the façade of friendship, Clinton administration officials expected the Kremlin to accept the United States’ definition of Russia’s national interests. They believed that Moscow’s preferences could be safely ignored if they did not align with Washington’s goals.\(^{195}\)

Simes goes on to list the many policies that were imposed on Russia, including the two waves of enlargement, Bosnia and Kosovo, antiballistic missile defense, and competition in the CIS. In concluding this study, I cannot overstate how policy-relevant this argument remains in the new century, as one can still hear the same kind of NATO discourse along the HQ corridors in Brussels: “if only the Russians could understand how right we are…”

To conclude, my point is *not* that NATO officials were wrong throughout and that the Russians have been the poor victims of the bad guys in Brussels. For all their mistakes, Atlantic decision-makers did try to reach out to Russia, most visibly by granting it a voice through the PJC and later the NRC. A lot of time and money was spent on establishing ties with the Russians and several practitioners I met seemed genuinely committed to the task. Quite often, their Russian counterparts proved to be extremely difficult partners. Inflexibility and brinkmanship remain key negotiating tactics in Moscow. In addition, shadowy power struggles at the Kremlin and forceful interventions in the near abroad have understandably muted NATO’s enthusiasm for the new Russia. At the end of the day, the real culprit of the missed opportunity of Russian-Atlantic pacification after the end of the Cold War is not individual but relational. In chapter IV, I captured the problem in practical terms with the notion that there are two masters but no apprentice at the NRC table. Given the structure of the international security field (positions and doxa), NATO officials consistently behave as if all their policies were right and unrequired to compromise; which has led Russia to reject and openly contest the post-Cold

\(^{195}\) Simes 2007, 36, 39-40
War international security order. As I shall conclude below, the development of a security community is seriously complicated by such persisting and intense hysteresis effects.
Chapter VII: Conclusion

Practice, Security Communities, and Russian-Atlantic Relations

In this conclusion, I begin by returning to the two main contributions that this study intends to make to IR scholarship, both theoretically and empirically. First, I outline a ToPoSC that defines self-evident diplomacy as the constitutive practice of security communities. Second, I develop a subjective narrative of post-Cold War Russia-NATO relations that, in blending practicality, intersubjectivity and historicity, supplies an incisive take on a fundamental axis of contemporary world politics. In the latter part of the chapter, I also propose two avenues for future research. First, I draw a topography of practices in the contemporary field of international security, which helps understand the connections among variegated practices and locate the practical space of political configurations such as security communities. Second, I call on IR constructivist thinkers to better account for the materiality of practices. My basic argument is that it is not only people who attach meanings to things, but also things that attach meanings to people. I illustrate this point with the current Russian-Atlantic row over the American BMD project in Central Europe.

A. The Incisiveness of a Theory of Practice of Security Communities

Bringing practice theory à la Bourdieu to the study of security community yields two main theoretical and conceptual gains. First, it directs attention toward what practitioners do differently when they are at peace. The answer is not, I argued, that they start seeing each other as “one” or that they quibble less and agree more. Instead, what changes is the background knowledge that tacitly informs their practices. Inside mature security community, diplomacy—the non-violent settlement of disputes—is the practical starting point of any and all interaction. When they tackle their disagreements, practitioners who belong to a security community think (talk, judge, reason, act) from diplomacy instead of about its opportunity. The self-evidence of diplomacy is what differentiates, in a positive way, security community from other interstate configurations. For instance, a non-war community is characterized by normal diplomacy, a practical relation with far less immediate adherence to the non-violent settlement of disputes as the “natural” order of things.
Second, for a practice to be self-evident—that is, for it to belong to the doxic and unthought order of things—it must be part of a social pattern of domination. A Bourdieu-inspired ToPoSC therefore brings symbolic power struggles back to the fore. Doxa stems from a homology between the dispositions that are embodied by agents in their habitus and the positions they occupy in the field. Under such circumstances, the orchestra can play without a conductor: both dominant and dominated players behave in tune with commonsense. When habitus loses touch with the structure of the field, however, hysteresis effects emerge and agents appear to forget their sense of one’s place. Quixotic practices weaken the doxic pattern of domination and action, opening its self-evidence to question. Because of hysteresis, the different agents’ practical sense clashes with one another’s. In sum, the ToPoSC suggests that all other things equal, the stronger the security community members’ sense of one’s place, the more chances that the diplomatic practice becomes self-evident.

These two key insights derived from my ToPoSC can be illustrated with the recent rift inside the TSC in the wake of the Iraqi war. As I argued above, despite very intense disputes over sensitive matters of defence, security practitioners inside the TSC never stopped practising diplomacy as if it were the self-evident practice to solve mutual disputes. A profound identity crisis, in other words, was not enough to shake the practical foundation of the security community. As such, the background knowledge that gives birth to the diplomatic practical sense inside the TSC is part of a deeper social pattern of order by which “things fall in their place” even in case of an identity struggle. On that matter, it is striking that the transatlantic rift provoked fairly strong hysteresis effects in the relationship. To many Europeans, the United States lost its sense of one’s place in the run-up to the Iraqi crisis: arrogant and bully, it overstepped its dominant position within the security community. Reciprocally, most Americans perceived the actions of several of their European allies as out of touch with the structure of positions inside the TSC. With Eastern European apprentices acquiescing to their new master, it seemed to Washington that Paris, Berlin, and others were unduly trying to punch above their weight. Here, the deleterious effects of hysteresis on security community show very clearly.

In this study, I applied the ToPoSC to the post-Cold War relationship between Russia and NATO. My main conclusion is that it is best characterized as a non-war community. I have put forward different types of argument to substantiate this claim. First, in chapter I, I applied Adler and Barnett’s indicators to Russian-Atlantic relations. I discovered that low to medium scores suggest that a nascent security community is emerging. I qualified this finding, however, by showing how little collective identification there is between Russian and Western peoples.
Second, in chapter IV I used three practical indicators of the self-evidence of diplomacy to reach a nuanced conclusion: diplomacy is a normal though not a self-evident practice in NRC dealings. A practice-centric approach to security community, in other words, leads to a slightly more careful assessment than in chapter I. As practitioners embody somewhat contradictory dispositions, it is hard to determine the net effects of background knowledge on interstate relations. This ambiguity, I concluded, suggests that Russian-Atlantic relations stop short of a fully-fledged security community in and through practice. Normal diplomacy rather indicates a non-war community.

Third, in chapters V and VI, I presented an intriguing paradox in the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship, which further reinforces the mixed conclusion I reached otherwise. On the one hand, over the last fifteen years Russia and NATO member states have solved each and every one of their disputes, including fierce ones over the double enlargement, by non-violent means. Such a track record of peaceful change is a sea change from the Cold War era, when force and threats of force were consistently looming over East-West interactions. Instead, the post-Cold War era was characterized by “non-wars”—“conflicts about issues that would typically lead to war, but [that] were peacefully resolved.”\footnote{Wiberg quoted in Waever 1998, 72.} Under the conditions that prevailed for four decades, with thousands of nuclear missiles on hair trigger and hundreds of thousands of soldiers standing on both sides of the Iron curtain and in other proxy theatres, chances are that the Kosovo intervention, for example, might have led to threats of force by one side or the other. But on the other hand, I also identified two political processes that severely stymie security-community-building processes. First, the peaceful resolution of disputes was often bought at the price of a growing mistrust on the Russian side. NATO’s domineering practices have left acerbic marks on the Russian habitus, which was already prone to Great Powerness. Second, as this Russian habitus resurfaced, hysteresis steadily increased to the point of inconclusive symbolic power struggles over the rules of the international security game and the roles that each player should play.

In chapter IV, I gave ample evidence of the deleterious effects that such a symbolic stalemate can have on the non-violent settlement of disputes and the normalization of diplomacy. When it comes to organizing joint peacekeeping operations, for instance, Russian and Atlantic practitioners have a very hard time finding a working compromise on standards and rules of interaction. NATO cannot imagine having to negotiate its ways of doing things with
anybody and especially not with the Russians. On their side, Russia’s practitioners take for granted that as a Great Power they will not adopt others’ procedures without at least a fair amount of negotiation. As a result, the prospects of a joint, Russia-NATO peacekeeping operation are remoter and remoter. When it did happen, during the 1990s, it caused stigmas that have yet to heal today. In the extremely tense negotiations over the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, for example, Russia would not sign on anything short of its own sector, whereas NATO refused to share commandment with anybody else. The symbolic struggle, which lasted several days, reached unprecedented levels of intensity and even led to one of the most dramatic episode of the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship—the Pristina airport incident. Under such high hysteresis, it is doubtful that any pattern of social order can emerge so as to turn diplomacy into a self-evident, doxic practice. A disconnect between dispositions in habitus and positions in the field, hysteresis trumps practical sense. People cannot behave in tune with commonsense if they do not agree on what commonsense is in the first place.

Hysteresis also has deleterious effects on trust-building, as I showed in chapters V and VI. Because it conceived of itself as the undisputed ruler of the field of international security, NATO felt it was only normal course that it impose its double enlargement and that Russia adapt to it. As a result, the Alliance refused any substantive accommodation and often acted rudely with its former enemy. Seen from Moscow, Atlantic practices appeared heavy-handed and uncompromising. Starting in late 1994, Russian practitioners became increasingly mistrustful of NATO because it did not seem that any of their interests would be taken into account by the Alliance. Recall that trust, in the fiduciary sense, entails not only risk-taking but also a sense of obligation. Because of hysteresis, Russia felt that Atlantic practitioners failed to show the obligation it should have received given its Great Power status. To this day, because Russia and NATO do not cast each other in the roles they actually play together, both sides perceive the other as trying to punch above its weight. This obviously makes for difficult and tense diplomacy, and it impedes the development of trust.

A particularly interesting implication of the fiduciary concept of trust (i.e., trust with a sense of obligation) is that it is akin to a practical sense premised on we-ness: $A$ trusts $B$ because $A$ believes despite uncertainty that $B$ is, to a variable extent, obliged to $A$’s interests. This view implies a certain degree of mutual identification in and through practice. A sense of joint venture is enacted on the ground: $A$ trusts $B$ because $B$’s practices convey a sense of obligation toward $A$. This leads me to revisit my critique of the security-community research program levelled in chapter I. I still believe that a focus on mutual representations is not the best way to
approach peace because, among other things, it pays insufficient attention to the practical knowledge that makes the social fact possible. That said, collective identification appears to play a role, in and through practice, that escaped my attention. It matters not as a representation, as for Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett, but as something that agents do. For a practical sense such as trust to develop, practices must carry a certain degree of shared destiny and of mutual obligation. Without we-ness in and through practice, chances are that security-community development will be seriously hampered.

This is precisely what my analysis of the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship demonstrates. For the last decade and a half, the consistently peaceful resolution of disputes did not carry a mutual sense of obligation. On the contrary, more often than not NATO was happy to impose its decisions no matter what effects they had for Russia. In and through practice, Russia-NATO diplomacy typically conveyed a problematically small sense of shared destiny. We now know how this process hampered the development of a security community. As I argued in chapter I, “the lack of a Russian-Atlantic collective identity certainly implies a weaker and far less stable pacification process.” Building on my empirical analysis, I would add that we-ness in and through practice reinforces trust and security-community development. After researching the case for so long, I feel comfortable speculating that a bit more of Russian-Atlantic collective identification would have considerably eased the pacification process. Note that this point has not to do with representations: peoples (or elites) do not need to conceive of themselves as “one” to entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Their actions, however, must express some sense of joint venture. For a security community to develop in and through practice, it would seem, diplomacy must not only be self-evident, it also ought to convey a minimal sense of obligation, that is, of “enacted we-ness.”

In fact, the common element that unites all the practices of security community is that, bound up in them is a certain feeling of enacted we-ness. In figure 2.1 below, I draw a topography of international security practices, on which I locate the practical space of security community. By this topography, a security community occupies the practical space that leans toward sameness away from difference, as expressed in and through practice. Interestingly, the practice of diplomacy, on which my ToPoSC centres, is located at the pivotal point between sameness and difference. When diplomacy becomes self-evident, an international relationship enters the terrain of peace in and through practice. In the emergence of a security community, then, it is the practice of diplomacy that can, if sustained by a symbolic domination pattern, turn rivalry into peace. Overall, what distinguishes peaceful social activities from others is their
conveying a varying degree of common purpose, of jointness, or of shared destiny. I have already mentioned trusting, which embodies a mutual sense of obligation. Although it is in the formal sense, alliance-making similarly entails an obligation to look after one another. In a related fashion, bandwagoning may well be a cold-blooded practice; yet it necessarily involves, for a given period of time and only to a limited extent, that the bandwagonee and the bandwagoner face a similar destiny. Defence-pooling is the ultimate expression of we-ness in and through practice, given its profoundly material and less reversible nature: whatever happens, it will happen to all members of the security community together.

Figure 6.1 A Topography of Practices in the Contemporary Field of International Security (with the Practical Space of Security Community)

[\(X\) axis: degree of symbolism mobilized by the practice; \(Y\) axis: level of differentiation inherent in the practice]
My topography of international security practices fits very nicely with Adler’s recent argument that security communities are practice communities of self-restraint. Self-restraint—the abstention from the use of force—is a clear expression of we-ness in and through practice. It is an unambiguous signal that one is willing to eliminate the forceful imposition of one’s will from one’s repertoire of action. Such a practice is especially helpful during the early phases of security-community development, as Wendt argues: “Self-binding tries to allay Alter’s anxiety about Ego’s intentions through unilateral initiatives, with no expectation of specific reciprocity.” Clearly, Gorbachev’s self-restraint starting in the late 1980s considerably contributed to ending the Cold War, for example. What was lacking, however, was reciprocity. With the double enlargement, the Russians felt they were alone practising self-restraint. On the contrary, argues Adler, for a practice to foster collective identification, it must be shared by all members of the community: “their engagement in a common practice makes them share an identity and feel they are a ‘we.’” At the end of the day, therefore, the point is not only that certain types of practices are infused with collective identity; it is also that the joint enactment of certain practices endows agents with a sense of we-ness.

One additional advantage of my topography of international security practices is that it helps foster interparadigmatic dialogue in IR. Taking a practice turn could turn out to be a promising way forward for the subfield of security studies. My basic orientation—that is, the arch that supports the bridge across theories—is a very basic but often overlooked question: what do practitioners do in the field of international security? The main benefit of this mapping is that it supplies a different understanding of how practices traditionally theorized by neorealists, such as bandwagoning, connect with the symbolic practices typically studied by constructivists, like identity-policing. The common thread is the actual use of resources in and through practice, whether symbolic or not. Though it oversimplifies complex theoretical issues, figure 6.1 allows the comparison of several practices that to this day have been compartmentally studied in IR. Certain practices have become the turf of constructivism, others are the preserve of neorealism; etc. Such theoretical parochialism makes very little sense: just what do all international security practices have in common? Figure 6.1 spatially organizes practices in the field of international security along two key dimensions: the degree of symbolism mobilized by the practice and the level of differentiation inherent in the practice (is the practice oriented

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2 Adler forthcoming.
4 Adler forthcoming, 10 (manuscript); cf. Wenger 1998.
toward its target or against it?). One could certainly think of other interesting ways to compare practices; the two axes that I use here flow respectively from my ToPoSC as well as from earlier works on security communities. As such, it offers an interesting take on the similarities and differences between contemporary practices of international security.

**B. THE MATERIALITY OF PRACTICES**

In this final section, I want to suggest a second and final way forward that weaves together a key lesson from my case study and a promising theoretical opening reaped from taking a practice turn in IR. Empirically, I look at the recent (and ongoing at the time of writing) Russian-Atlantic row over the American BMD project in Central Europe. This episode reveals that more than fifteen years after the implosion of the USSR, the relationship remains structured by certain “things” inherited from past rivalry—in this case, the rhetorical commonplace of “Cold War,” which is still the main yardstick by which Russia-NATO dynamics are approached, as well as thousands of nuclear warheads, which fuel a deterrence game even in the absence of enmity. These “things” make intersubjective change much more difficult than what a purely ideational framework would suggest. This argument leads me to sobering conclusions as to the future prospects of Russian-Atlantic security politics.

Prior to returning to my case study one last time, I want to open with a theoretical discussion of what I call the materiality of practices. I should clarify from the outset that I am not using the word “materiality” to refer to a physical world independent of our thoughts. Such a world may well exist—in fact, everything in my own life happens as if it existed—but my scientific posture is to remain ontologically agnostic about it (cf. chapter III). From this postfoundationalist perspective, the physicality meaning of materiality is not all that interesting. What matters is the fact that even intersubjective reality is material in the sense that it is non-plastic. Although it is comprised of meanings, a social fact such as money does not depend on the point of view for existing. A dollar is worth a dollar whatever I personally think and despite the fact that on Mars it would not be worth anything. To use Searle’s categories, intersubjective realities are ontologically subjective but epistemically objective.⁵ My point here is similar to Wendt’s when he contends that “the extent to which the ‘material base’ is constituted by ideas is an important question that has been largely ignored in mainstream IR.”⁶

⁵ Searle 1995, 7-8.
⁶ Wendt 1999, 95.
find that Wendt vitiates his point with his argument on “rump materialism” (which mistakenly reduces materiality to physicality, at least in its first part) and, more largely, with his defense of scientific realism.

In fact, it may be precisely because constructivism came to IR via scientific realism that it has not been particularly successful in theorizing the materiality of practices. At the ontological level, scientific realism rests on a firm divide between physical and social kinds. Searle, for instance, asserts that “[i]nstitutional facts exist, so to speak, on top of brute physical facts.” In IR, Adler’s early definition of constructivism also makes that dichotomy very clear: “Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” Similarly, Finnemore writes that “[m]aterial facts do not speak for themselves” but instead “acquire meaning only through human cognition and social interaction.” In other words, early constructivists espoused a scientific realist point of view whose main added value primarily rests with the notion that the physical world affects our lives through the mediation of intersubjective meanings. This is certainly an all-important insight and it has given rise to a vibrant set of studies in IR. As Wendt notes, “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings.” Building on that logic of meaning-attachment, constructivists have looked into the social construction of a wide variety of intersubjective phenomena and contributed a great deal to the advancement of IR scholarship.

Despite its clear added value, however, the meaning-attachment logic of constructivism runs into a crucial problem to which I already alluded in chapter II: the representational bias. In separating the material (physical) from the ideational, constructivism reduces materiality to the role of an object to be interpreted, that is, the (physical) support on which meanings are attached. As Andreas Reckwitz correctly notices, in this scheme “[t]he material world exists only insofar as it becomes an object of interpretation within collective meaning structures. … Material entities exist as carriers of meaning, as ‘objects of knowledge.’” I contend that this contemplative understanding of materiality is disconnected from practical logics. In social life,

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8 Adler 1997, 322. It seems safe to conclude that in this quote, by “material” Adler refers to the physical world.
10 Wendt 1995, 73.
material things are not, first and foremost, to be interpreted but to be used. In other words, materiality is not primarily about representation but about practice. In fact, it could be argued that the meaning-attachment logic of constructivism suffers from textualism in a way similar to postmodernism. In chapter II, I contended that postmodernism typifies the representational bias by willfully distorting practical logics as if social life could be “read” from a disembedded position. While objectification may certainly yield scientific advances, it also mistakes the things of logic for the logic of things, to paraphrase Bourdieu. In reducing materiality to the role of physical support for ideas, many constructivists commit the same textualist mistake. By contrast, I argue that “things” are not simply objects of interpretation but primarily tools to be handled. They must be used within certain practical limits.

Taking a practice turn in IR constructivism entails rehabilitating the notion of materiality in the sense of non-plasticity, or epistemic objectivity. To repeat, that materiality (non-plasticity) often involves materiality (physicality) may well be the case, but it is somewhat beyond the point since I stay agnostic about the latter. But whether it is material (physical) or not, material (non-plastic) things abound in international politics and they should receive their due attention from constructivists. Students of IR need to observe and analyze all those little things that agents cannot but grapple with on the world stage. In fact, in this endeavour constructivists have an edge over most other IR theories because they take meanings and their interpretation seriously. Even though many theories already claim to look at “material” factors, they take materiality as self-evident—that is, as the immanent property of certain “things.” In this scheme, materiality needs no interpretation because it is conceived as the opposite of meanings or ideas. By contrast, I am not advocating theorizing material (physical) factors that (allegedly) have an immanent meaning, but the materiality (non-plasticity) of meanings—regardless of their physicality but rather as the epistemically objective context of social struggles. In order to do this, interpretation remains the methodological backbone.

My argument should not be located on the traditional material-ideational divide, which informs the scientific realist brand of constructivism. The notion that meanings can be material belongs to a different kind of ontology. Here I am in full agreement with Dessler:

there is a logical problem with the social/material dualism. The problem results from mixing two quite different schemes for classifying the elements of social life. In one scheme, we categorize social factors according to whether they obey physical laws or not. Factors that obey such laws are termed “material”; those that don’t are labelled “immaterial.” Gold, for example, is a material object. It has a melting point and it falls under the force of gravity when dropped. The norm of sovereignty, by contrast, is subject to no such physical laws, and hence is considered immaterial. In a second scheme, we
determine the degree to which the conception of a material object suggests that existence of the social relationships that give the object its social meaning and significance. Gold can be given a relatively “desocialized” or naturalistic description (“the element with an atomic number of 79”) or a more thickly social one (“a commodity worth several hundred dollars an ounce”). The second of these conceptions implies the existence of many more social relationship, practices, and knowledge (such as markets, prices, and supply and demand) than does the first. … Note that gold is equally material under these two descriptions; what varies is the social “loading” of the concepts.12

My argument operates along the second scheme, in which materiality is a social not a physical property. In fact, the usefulness of the first scheme is limited in social science. Even variables that look material (physical) often have a social loading that actually matters much more in explaining social life. For example, any resource, as natural as it may be, is value-less unless it is used in and through a human-built system of meanings and relations to exploit it. The same goes for technologies, for example, whose social loading and use matter much more, in explaining social life, than their physical underpinnings. For social scientists, materiality matters because in being used and put in practice, the meanings of technologies become less plastic. As Reckwitz aptly puts it: “When human agents have developed certain forms of know-how concerning certain things, these things ‘materialize’ or ‘incorporate’ this knowledge within the practice. … Things are ‘materialized understanding.’”13

Taking a practice turn in constructivist theorizing has a simple but profound implication: it is not only people who attach meanings to things—things also attach meanings to people! The non-plastic things of social and international life often acquire an epistemic life of their own that may affect in turn the very people that constructed them. The social world may be the creature of human beings, but it also escapes their control. This is because “things” inscribe meanings beyond minds, going through the flow of history more or less independently of those who crafted them. In IR, William Walters takes inspiration from Bruno Latour to theorize what he calls “inscription”—“the material practices of making distant events and processes visible, mobile and calculable in terms of documents, charts, forms, reports, signs and graphs.”14 Things are inscribed with meanings that are non-plastic because they are not located in people’s minds. As Walters asserts: “Our agency is not just a product of the ideas that influence us, for ideas are not always strong enough or persistent enough. We need to consider the myriad, banal ways in

12 Dessler 1999, 127.
13 Reckwitz 2002, 212.
Once inscribed in things, ideas can become "symbolic technologies"—that is, non-plastic meanings that drive thought more than they derive from it. From that perspective, material (non-plastic) determination stems not from physicality but from practice, which congeals meanings through iteration.

Bourdieu offers conceptual tools to better understand the materiality of meanings in social life. In his theory of practice, the social "lives on" in two different states: in habitus—"history-made bodies"—and in field—"history-made things." It is the dialectics between these two modes of existence that explain the materiality of practices. History-made things—"instruments, monuments, artworks, techniques"—become "living history" through the embodied dispositions of the agents that encounter them. In chapter V, I explained that the notion of habitus supplies a micro-mechanism to better understand path dependence on a macro scale. As Bourdieu writes, "a product of history, habitus produces practices, individual and collective—that is, history—in accordance with the schemes engendered by history." At the macro-level, Bourdieu argues that history survives in "things." Institutions are the most obvious forms whereby meanings congeal and survive a complete turnover of players in the game. But rules are also inscribed in little, apparently innocuous things. In chapter IV, I showed how this process is (slowly) taking place at the NRC in Brussels. Several interviewees felt that the many meetings, the common glossaries, the joint website, the daily coffees at the cafeteria, etc., formed the "real substance" of Russian-Atlantic relations. In and through practice, the materiality of things means that "they are not arbitrarily interchangeable." Even at the deepest of a crisis, coffee time retains the meaning of rapprochement. Of course, this will not be enough for a security community to emerge. My claim here simply is that the materiality of coffee time makes it harder for practitioners to suddenly hate one another when a crisis erupts. It will not constitute peace on its own, but it will give an epistemically objective dimension to the peaceful meanings under construction. And yet, the contemporary relationship between Russia and NATO is populated by far more things that recall confrontation than the opposite, a feature that certainly thwart the embodiment of the diplomatic practice.

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15 Walters 2002, 92. Some postmodernist authors in Foucault’s tradition have explored this avenue. Beyond text and discourse, for instance, Foucault paid attention to architecture in prisons or to biotechnologies in governmentality. Cf. Reckwitz 2002 206. I should note that although my argument bears some resemblance to Latour’s, I do not go as far as to grant agency to non-humans.

16 Laffey and Weldes 1997.

17 Bourdieu 2003, 221.

18 Bourdieu 2001a, 277.

19 Reckwitz 2002, 208.
Closing this study on the ongoing row over the American BMD project in Central Europe not only has the advantage of illustrating the materiality of practices in international politics; it also allows me to complete my case study on a prospective note. In May 2006, the Bush administration announced plans to deploy a limited set of missile interceptors as well as a radar station on the territory of Poland and of the Czech Republic by 2011. The declared rationale for this Central European location was to intercept eventual Iranian missiles on their way to the United States and Europe. The new interceptors would add to those already built at Fort Greely (Alaska) and the Vanderberg Air Force Base in California, while the proposed radar station would complement the modernized facilities in Fylingdales (UK) and the American Thule air base in Greenland. Should the negotiations with Warsaw and Prague succeed, the BMD project would give way to the first permanent American deployment on Polish and Czech soil. The Russian reaction was harsh and immediate. The chief of the Armed Forces General Staff declared that “plans to make Eastern Europe a forward region in the U.S. missile defense system are intended to neutralize Russia’s strategic potential.” Defence minister Ivanov similarly claimed that “the choice of location for the deployment of those systems is dubious, to put it mildly.” From the outset, then, the Russians rejected the American plan as threatening their nuclear deterrent, as if the Cold War had never ended. How can we make sense of this seemingly abrupt return to the logic of deterrence?

Throughout the 1990s, everything took place as if nuclear deterrence was disappearing from the political discursive background of Russian-Atlantic relations. For several years, the only nuclear talk one could hear or read about was related to disarmament (START I, START II and SORT, for instance) or to the cooperative management of old stockpiles (e.g., CTR, CIS denuclearization). In 1994, in a symbolic gesture, Clinton and Yeltsin pledged to re-target all

24 As two Russian experts write: “Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States had been receding into the background in terms of day-to-day foreign policy and official public relations”; Arbatov and Dvorkin 2006, 3.
25 According to experts’ calculations, the total reductions in American and Russian nuclear arsenals will amount to at least 80 percent over the twenty years following the end of the Cold War; cf. ibid., 3.
their nuclear forces away from their mutual territories. Even after 9/11, the major financial commitment of the 2002 Global Partnership (USD 20 billions over 10 years) to help Russia manage its nuclear arsenal took place in this generally cooperative climate in which nuclear deterrence did not seem the primary preoccupation on neither side. This may well have been an illusion, however. In fact, in both American and Russian defense strategy, nuclear deterrence has always remained a central component after the end of the Cold War. Russia’s first defence doctrine, adopted in November 1993, emphasized deterrence as the core component of the country’s security. Given the rapid degradation of its conventional armed forces, this was justified as the least expensive policy to ensure an efficient defence of Russian territory. The 2000 version of the doctrine confirmed the central importance of nuclear weapons and added specific references to Atlantic aggressive policies. On the American side, the Nuclear Posture Review published in 1994 similarly considered strategic nuclear forces as a “hedge” against the “uncertainty” of the epoch. It is true that none of these documents specifically mentioned the Russo-American axis of deterrence at the time. In the 2002 Review, however, Russia was specifically named as one of seven states on which nuclear weapons could or should be targeted. In view of those contradictory policies—detargeting and disarmament on the one hand and confirmation of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence on the other—one cannot help but have a certain feeling of dissociation.

I contend that these contradictory dynamics stem from the materiality of nuclear deterrence: the existence of all those nuclear stockpiles prolongs the intersubjective structure of deterrence beyond the political context that gave it birth. They are like pieces on a

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26 Talbott 2002, 451 fn. 22. This pledge was reconfirmed by Yeltsin on the signing day of the Founding Act in 1997; Dmitry Gornostayev (1997), “Boris Yeltsin Announces that Warheads Will Be Removed from Missiles Targeted at NATO Countries,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 May, translated in CDPSP 49(21).
28 Gottemoeller 2006.
32 Although this is beyond the scope of this study, I should also note that the Cold War arms race cannot be explained simply by the distribution of material power and the need to balance one another’s arsenals. There was a profoundly symbolic dimension to it, as Ringmar notes: “it was always the symbolic value of the nuclear weapons that really mattered. The superpowers armed themselves for the simple reason that nuclear armaments were what defined a superpower as such. If you wanted to be recognized in this capacity this was what you had to do. … The competition did not primarily concern ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD), but rather what perhaps could be called ‘mutually assured recognition’ (MAR, for short)”; Ringmar 2002, 128.
chessboard—they inscribe the rules of the game in things which then acquire an existence of their own. The practical materiality of moving the tower along the chessboard sustains the very rules that prescribe its movement. The same logic applies with nuclear warheads and deterrence: while stockpiles were created out of the Cold War deterrence structure, once out there they embody that structure and prolong its existence in and through practice. Interestingly, insiders seem to realize this problem—that material things become self-fulfilling prophecies. One of the main Russian negotiators on nuclear issues over the past few decades put the matter the following way: “It’s like a dead body. If you don’t bury it, it will cause ailments.” In his mind, NATO and Russia had come a long way since the end of the Cold War toward more cooperation. “But,” he added, “one thing remained: infrastructure.” Material things seemed to drive politics in his mind: “Politically, psychologically, the type of deterrence is no longer with us. We achieved that. [But] the infrastructure of deterrence is not destroyed yet. All these nuclear targets for all the missiles are still there, so we need to go back to the tables to finish the job.”

Two of the most prominent Russian thinkers on strategic matters similarly observe that the sheer existence of nuclear warheads precludes Washington and Moscow from moving beyond the deterrence logic of the Cold War. In an interesting essay, they regret that mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union (and now Russia) has quietly outlived the two states’ global rivalry and confrontation. … These inexorable dynamics of mutual nuclear deterrence have acquired a growing and negative “feedback effect” on political relations between former opponents, sustaining muted though multifarious fears: of the supposed evil intentions of the “strategic partner”; of inadvertent or accidental nuclear attack; of possible loss of control over nuclear weapons leading to their acquisition by rebel groups or terrorists; of the one’s plans to gain control over the other’s nuclear weapons or to deliver a disarming strikes against nuclear sites—all this in the absence of any real political basis for suspecting such horrific scenarios or actions.

In these experts’ opinion, cooperative projects “are impossible to imagine while the United States and Russia still aim thousands of nuclear warheads at each other, keep missiles on hair-trigger alert, and modernize nuclear forces to preserve robust retaliatory capabilities against each other.” Here one can clearly see how the reverted meaning-attachment logic plays out: it is material things that attach meanings to people. The rules of the deterrence game are inscribed in the Russian and American nuclear arsenals; as a result they thwart non-confrontational

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33 Senior Official, Russian Foreign Ministry, Ottawa, 04.04.07.
34 Arbatov and Dvorkin 2006, 6.
35 Ibid., 8.
political dynamics. As it is often the case in social life, the gist of the material problem is relational (i.e., it relates to the security dilemma): nuclear warheads are necessary for one state because nuclear warheads exist in another. To compound the problem, note Arbatov and Dvorkin, “there is no such thing as just ‘maintaining nuclear capabilities—maintenance is accompanied by a constant search for new technologies and force employment concepts.” Materiality takes on a life of its own: by its sheer existence nuclear stockpiles force new thinking, new research that will further prolong their material effects.

The current row over the American BMD project in Central Europe has highlighted another material thing in Russian-Atlantic relations: the rhetorical commonplace of “Cold War.” More than fifteen years after its end, the Cold War remains the most common yardstick by which politicians, experts and journalists discuss Russian-Atlantic relations. The way IR students name our time—the post-Cold War era—is in itself very revealing of how non-plastic the commonplace of “Cold War” remains to this day. It appears impossible to analyze our current epoch without referring to the preceding one (hence the “scientific” denomination of post-Cold War era). I myself used the Cold War commonplace several dozen times in the preceding pages and the case’s temporal limits are cast in those terms. As contested as their meanings may be, then, two short words used 

ad nauseam contribute to perpetuate the intersubjective structures of the past. This became especially obvious in the 2006-2007 row over the BMD project. In May 2006, for instance, the well-known pundit Nikonov wondered whether we were entering “a new cold war.” When Cheney and Putin escalated their mutual criticisms, during spring 2006, it was construed as a return to “Cold War talk.” Putin’s speech at the Munich conference in early 2007 was similarly considered reminiscent of the Cold War by high-profile politicians such as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Democratic Senator Joseph

36 Ibid., 92. This shows clearly in the vast modernization programs undertaken by the United States as well by Russia over the last few years, for instance in the development of low-yield nuclear weapons and the improvement of ballistic missile technology.

37 I borrow the concept of “rhetorical commonplace” from Jackson 2006b. In his book Patrick Jackson traces the construction of “the West” and shows how this rhetorical commonplace can be stretched, contested, vague and multifaceted. This point is surely of great interest to understand the social construction of reality (i.e., the traditional constructivist logic of meaning-attachment). In line with my theoretical argument on the materiality of practices, however, in what follows I want to turn Jackson’s logic on its head and show how rhetorical commonplaces can become “things” and provide agents with ready-at-hand tools to be handled in political contests. The meaning of “Cold War” is certainly stretched and multifaceted, but the very formula has become a kind of material yardstick that is consistently applied to Russian-Atlantic relations even several years after the implosion of the USSR.


Lieberman. Paul Kennedy spoke of a “nostalgia” of the clarity and stability of the Cold War. When Russia resumed long-range bomber sorties at the end of the summer 2007, the Western press quickly evoked old spectres and spoke of “Cold War patrols.” Variations on the Cold War theme also yielded a number of neologisms, including “silent Cold War” or “chilly war.” Interestingly, the latter formula was coined by Andrei Illarionov, a former Kremlin advisor, in the run-up to Russia’s first-ever hosting of the G8 summit. The political contradiction between the Cold War commonplace and the tightly-knit group of most industrialized nations could not be more glaring. These social dynamics belong to two very different intersubjective planets, one would think.

In becoming “things”—that is, non-plastic entities handled in and through practice—rhetorical commonplaces such as “Cold War” can capture the evolving intersubjective dynamics of Russian-Atlantic relations and lock them into the past background of interaction. Of course, it is not the rhetorical commonplace per se that “causes” confrontation; yet it supplies an efficient vehicle that can be handled very easily, in all sorts of contexts and with different intents. Whatever meanings are so mobilized (and they obviously widely vary), the end result is the same: contemporary Russian-Atlantic dynamics are evaluated by the yardstick of past confrontation. As one key architect of the NATO policy toward Russia laments: “In Russia and the West, journalists, political scientists and all too many senior politicians thrive on confrontation, both actual and potential. Nothing sells newspapers like the declaration of a ‘new Cold War.’” Although it strictly belongs to the realm of ideas, the Cold War rhetorical commonplace has become material (non-plastic) to the point that one simply cannot talk about the current relationship between Moscow and the Alliance without using it in one way or another.

In front of the materiality of nuclear deterrence and of the Cold War rhetorical commonplace, it would seem that the routinization of diplomacy at the NRC is no match. To be sure, the material dimension of the diplomatic practice has started to develop at the NRC, as

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43 Furman 2006.
46 Fritch 2007, 1 (html version).
chapter IV exposed in detail. The sheer physical presence of Russian diplomats at the NATO HQ is sufficient to provide a non-plastic basis for the diplomatic exchange. Throughout my interviews, several practitioners stressed the importance of the “boring” aspects of the NRC, such as a firm “timetable and a regular meeting schedule,” which force NATO and Russia to confront tough issues regularly.\(^{47}\) There are about 25 working groups attached to the NRC, with their meetings rooms, their schedules and their agendas. In addition, Russian-Atlantic diplomacy is structured by agreed-upon glossaries of terminology which embody certain rules of interaction and discussion procedures. The existence of internal phone lines also creates an intersubjective dynamic, among Atlantic and Russian officials, that is reminiscent of internal NATO diplomacy, in which preparation for a prepcom entails informal fishing for support among colleagues.\(^{48}\) Russia-NATO diplomacy has indeed started inscribe in “things,” an evolution that renders it less plastic and thus susceptible to political hazards.

Yet, as of now the materiality of the diplomatic practice at the NRC is not enough for a security community to develop. This is especially true in the Russian-Atlantic context, with thousands of nuclear warheads remaining and sticking rhetorical commonplaces of past enmity. Everyday coffee breaks will only take the relationship so far. When it comes to those meetings where real NATO decisions are made, Russian practitioners have no seats at the table. Inside the Brussels HQ, they are not allowed to go to certain wings; at the cafeteria they still tend to sit together, on their own and in a compact formation. Although they are allowed inside the NATO HQ, at the end of the day the Russians are not inside the NATO tent—they are not part of the prime institution of the transatlantic security community, with the solidarity and all the “things” that this implies. So long as Russia’s association with NATO remains so limited, material practices reminiscent of rivalry risk being enacted because they are as non-plastic, if not more, than diplomatic routines.

NRC coffee time seems to belong to a different world than the Cold War rhetorical commonplace and the deterrence game embodied in nuclear weapons. And yet, Moscow and the Alliance have decided to conduct talks on nuclear deterrence at the NRC. In a typical performance of Russia-NATO relations, during the spring of 2007, General Baryulevsky angrily aired at the NRC a list of complaints against the BMD project, just to conclude his speech by saying: “We need to talk.”\(^{49}\) In a similar way, Foreign minister Lavrov enticed European

\(^{47}\) Senior Official G, NATO International Staff, Brussels, 06.04.04.
\(^{48}\) Official, French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, 06.04.06.
\(^{49}\) Senior Officer, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 15.05.07.
capitals to cooperate on developing a joint defense missile on the very same day that president
Putin threatened to point Russian nuclear weapons at EU countries anew. After expressing his
anger to the NRC in a 10-minute monologue, in April 2007, Lavrov declared: “Naturally, we
reaffirmed our readiness to continue discussion [about the shield], both with the US and in the
NRC framework.” That the NRC dialogue would be “natural” while talk of nuclear deterrence
is mounting is just the latest demonstration that fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, there
is nothing straightforward in Russian-Atlantic security relations. Since April 2007, different
levels of officials have been regularly meeting in order to find a diplomatic solution to the
dispute. Talks have been held in Moscow, Washington, and several concrete proposals have
been discussed at the highest levels. At the same time, both the United States and Russia are
testing new models of missiles and bombs in a mounting atmosphere of “arms race.”

In this context, letting the situation go on would be a costly non-decision. As I showed in
chapter VI, there are many political processes at work right now that are much more resilient
than the materiality of NRC diplomacy. First, the Russian habitus of Great Power and Atlantic
dispositions of universality are too ingrained to possibly change overnight. As a result, the fierce
(and inconclusive) symbolic struggles over the rules of the game and the role that each player
should play will continue. Second, with the ongoing globalization of NATO and a looming third
wave of enlargement (possibly to Georgia and Ukraine), there are no reasons why Russia’s
staunch opposition to the Alliance should soften. Third, mistrust today is more intense and
reciprocal than it has ever been since the end of the Cold War: there is a consensus in Moscow
that NATO consistently overlooks (and in fact infringes on) Russia’s interests, while the TSC
grows more and more dubious about the possibility of democracy to its east (not to speak of

51 NATO-Russia Council (2007), “Transcript of Remarks and Replies to Media Questions by Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Following Ministerial Meeting of Russia-NATO Council,” Oslo, 26 April
day, Putin announced a Russian moratorium on the CFE treaty (cf. chapter 5).
52 BBC (2007), “US Set for Russia Missile Talks,” 19 April (news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/europe/6570533.stm,
April; Lada Yevgrashina (2007), “U.S. Military Mum after Radar Visit,” Moscow Times, 19 September; Thom
October.
53 Putin proposed Bush to share a Russian radar station in Azerbaijan during the G8 summit in Heiligendamm
New York Times, 3 July. Within ten days, however, NATO had decided to move forward with the original plan:
the new members’ contagious mistrust of anything Russian). Fourth, since the United States announced its plans for a BMD system in Central Europe, nuclear deterrence is back in the game as a defining axis of the Russian-Atlantic relationship. In sum, left to themselves, there are too many negative, deep trends for the materiality of NRC diplomacy to lead to security-community-building on its own.

The eternal Russian question resounds: *shto delat’*—what is to be done? Reflecting on the matter is all the more urgent that the year of 2008 may well turn out to be a window of opportunity in NATO-Russia relations. In effect, two new presidents will come to power in Moscow and Washington over the coming months. Though not a structural change, the election of new executive teams in the two most important capitals carries the potential of giving a new life to Russian-Atlantic pacification processes. It cannot alter deep trends on its own—for instance, the extent of Great Power dispositions in Moscow—but it certainly can infuse renewed political will to effect certain changes on both sides. My policy orientation is that NATO should state openly and unambiguously that it is ready to examine Russia’s candidacy for membership. This is not to say that the country is ready—far from that: for anything to happen, the Russian democracy will first need to consolidate far more than at present. Great Power dispositions will also have to be toned down in Moscow (while the Alliance simultaneously kicks its teaching habit). The rule of law, the freedom of media, executive transparency and accountability, to name but a few, are fundamental requirements that are not satisfied in Russia at the time of writing. But since letting the situation deteriorate on its own is not an option anymore, a strong signal on NATO’s part that it is ready to take concrete steps toward including Russia appears the most appropriate policy. While membership would probably not happen for at least a decade, possibly two, the deeper institutional ties that would develop in the meantime, including joint decision-making and common defence initiatives, would considerably reinforce the materiality of NRC diplomacy and perhaps tip the balance away from nuclear deterrence. In addition, offering to open talks on eventual membership would be an unprecedented gesture of goodwill, inclusion, and consideration on NATO’s part, which would seriously help dampen symbolic power struggles and rein in Great Power dispositions in Moscow. A clear *finalité* combined with an operational roadmap is something that has been direly lacking in post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relations.

The main trade-off of opening the Alliance’s door to Moscow’s membership is the potential weakening of the “transatlantic consensus.” No doubt the integration of Russia into NATO structures would provoke headaches and make diplomatic give-and-take among allies
much harder (at least for a time). The Russians are tough negotiators who have yet to embody the allied sense of one’s place. Chances are that an Alliance comprising Russia could turn out to be ineffectual because of the difficulty to reach consensual decisions and take joint action. This danger cannot and should not be minimized. But the risk is well worth taking in the currently deteriorating situation and with a political window of opportunity opening in 2008. In effect, preserving the “transatlantic consensus” at all costs would be profoundly misguided. After the end of the Cold War, NATO kept Russia at arm’s length precisely for that reason and we now know the results: leaving Russia on the margins of Alliance diplomacy turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. At the end of the day, the “transatlantic consensus” is useless, and in fact harmful, if it leads the Alliance to exclude certain states outright and precludes it from meaningfully engaging with its former enemies. Especially in the wake of the Iraqi crisis, it is worth taking the risk of weakening the “consensus” in order to avoid NATO and Russia retargeting thousands of nuclear missiles at one another. This, it would seem, is the worst possible scenario for the TSC: lapsing into yet another deadly (and in a sense ludicrous) confrontation with the Russian bear.

The risk is all the more worthy of taking that NATO has historically been a coalition of former enemies. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Italy joined with France, the UK and the United States in common defence. The same happened to the Federal Republic of Germany a few years later. The Alliance also admitted Greece and Turkey, who would probably entertain an active military rivalry but for NATO. Beyond its operational effectiveness and its resilient solidarity, therefore, NATO has also proven very successful in dampening conflicts among its members. A few decades ago, diplomacy was far from self-evident inside the Alliance, even among its core founders such as France, the UK and the United States, who had a troubled history of mutual relations until the 20th century. The materiality of NATO solidarity, combined with a strong pattern of social order in which each ally strongly feels its sense of one’s place, have rendered the Alliance an exceptionally effective vehicle for the self-evidently non-violent settlement of mutual disputes. Few people would have predicted this success fifty years ago and it took a lot of political will and perceptiveness to embark on so difficult a path. Yet no one today would deny that it was well worth it and that overall it worked out very well. It is time for NATO countries to pluck up the courage to sacrifice certitudes in order to decidedly turn the page on Russian-Atlantic rivalry.
List of Interviewees

Keith ANDERTON
First Secretary
U.S. Delegation to NATO

Jorgan K. ANDREWS
Deputy Director, Office of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus
U.S. Department of State

James APPATHURAI
NATO Spokesman
Public Diplomacy Division

Georgii ARBATOV
Deputy Director
ISKRAN

Gill ATKINSON
First Secretary (Russia and Ukraine)
UK Delegation to NATO

Thomas L. BAPTISTE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee

Vladimir BARANOVSKY
Deputy Director
IMEMO

Sylvain BERGER
Conseiller politique et porte-parole
Délégation permanente de la France au Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord

Ulrich BRANDENBURG
Deputy Political Director
Federal Foreign Office (Germany)

Paul CHAPIN
Director General, International Security Bureau
Foreign Affairs Canada

Col. Herbert DANZER
Branch Chief, Russia-Ukraine, Co-operation and Regional Security Division
NATO International Military Staff
Philip R. DOLIFF
Deputy Director, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction
U.S. Department of State

Paul DUBOIS
Ambassador
Canadian Embassy to the Federal Republic of Germany

Mark ENTIN
Professor
MGIMO

Nadia ERNZER
Policy Unit Officer, Directorate-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs
Council of the European Union

Isabelle FRANÇOIS
Director
NATO Information Office Moscow

Paul FRITCH
Section Head, Russia and Ukraine Relations
Political Affairs and Security Policy Division
NATO International Staff

Lucina GOLC
Desk Officer
Polish Delegation to NATO

Andrew L.A. GOODMAN
Director, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction
U.S. Department of State

Pierre GUIMOND
Director, Eastern Europe and Balkans Division
Foreign Affairs Canada

Carl HALLERGÅRD
Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs
Council of the European Union

Brent HARTLEY
Deputy Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs
Department of State

Janos HERMAN
Principal Adviser for Regional Cooperation, External Relations Directorate-General
European Commission
Maj. Gen. Kurt HERRMANN
Head
NATO Military Liaison Mission (Moscow)

Dave JOHNSON
Defence Cooperation Officer, Defence Policy and Planning Division
NATO International Staff

Irina KOBRINSKAYA
Leading research fellow
IME

Viktor KOCHUKOV
Senior Councilor
Permanent Mission of Russia to NATO

Péter KOVACZ
Partnership for Peace and Cooperation Programmes Officer
Political Affairs and Security Policy Division
NATO International Staff

Victor A. KREMENYUK
Deputy Director
ISKRAN

RAdm Deniz KUTLUZ,
Assistant director, Co-operation and Regional Security Division
NATO International Military Staff

Anthony LAKE
Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Relations
Georgetown University

Vladimir LEBEDENKO
Deputy Director, Department of External Relations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

René LERAY
Senior Advisor, External Relations Directorate-General
European Commission

Jukka LESKELÄ
Head of Division, Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs
Council of the European Union

Daniel LIVERMORE
Director General, Security and Intelligence
Foreign Affairs Canada
Petr LUNAK  
Russia and Ukraine Information Officer  
NATO Public Diplomacy Division  

David MALONE  
Deputy Minister, Global Affairs  
Foreign Affairs Canada  

Georgiy MAMEDOV  
Ambassador  
Russian Embassy to Canada  

Karin MARSHALL  
Desk Officer, Defence and Security Policy Division  
Federal Foreign Office  

Major Alan MASON  
Russia and Central Asia Desk Officer, Directorate of Policy and Defence Relations (North)  
British Ministry of Defence  

Matthew MAYER  
Third Secretary  
Embassy of Canada  

Danae MEACOCKBASHIR  
Desk Officer  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  

LtCol. P. MONTVILA  
Russia/Ukraine Branch, Co-operation and Regional Security Division  
NATO International Military Staff  

Gaël MOULLEC  
Russia and Ukraine Relations Officer, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division  
NATO International Staff  

Fergal O’REILLY  
Analyst for Europe, Intelligence Assessment Secretariat  
Privy Council Office  

Tatyana PARHKALINA  
Director  
Centre for European Security  

Jonathan PARISH  
Senior Planning Officer, Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section  
NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division
Andrei PIKAЕV  
Professor  
IMEMO

Hugh POWELL  
Head, Security Policy Group  
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Patrick RECHNER  
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Michael RUHLE  
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Diego A. RUIZ PALMER  
Head, Planning Section  
NATO Operations Division

Eric SANDAHL  
Operations Section,  
NATO Operations Division

Robertas SAPRONAS  
Defence Adviser  
Republic of Lithuania Permanent Delegation to NATO

Colonel Bernhard SCHULTE-BERGE  
Head, Politico-Military Affairs NATO  
German Defence Ministry

Tatiana SHAKLEINA  
Professor  
ISKRAN

Jamie SHEA  
Head of the Secretary General’s Office  
NATO International Staff

Gary SOROKA  
Senior Policy Advisor  
Foreign Affairs Canada

Dmitri TRENIN  
Deputy Director  
Carnegie Foundation (Moscow Office)
Kurt D. VOLKER  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  

Lev VORONKOV  
Director of European Studies  
MGIMO  

Detlef WAECHTER  
First Secretary  
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