Washburn emphasized the provisionality of ideas and of knowledge about human evolution. He frequently revised his assessment of the state of our understanding of human origins, treating each version as a work in progress. He was also very concerned about the psychology of science: what makes scientists select one theory over its competitor or hold on to theories in the face of contradictory evidence. Lee addresses the current controversy about science in anthropology caused by the rise of postmodernism. Constructivism, as Lee calls the position that knowledge is socially constructed, is the foundation of the postmodernist critique of cultural, social, and biological anthropology. Lee explores the challenges of constructivism using the study of hunter-gatherers. His critique of deconstructionism ends with a proposal for the reconciliation of the radically different cultures now embedded in anthropology in which the claims of the constructivists can be subjected to investigation using sound methods, thereby making constructivism a useful complement to science. The answer to the controversy, according to Lee, is to continue the search for methods that can assess the merits of competing explanations both of human evolution and of anthropology. In the process, we will enlarge our sphere of knowledge by creating an anthropology that is both critical and empirical, an agenda that Washburn would recognize and support.

17 Science and Constructivism: Notes Toward a Reconciliation

Richard B. Lee  University of Toronto

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the centrality and legitimacy of science have come under increasing scrutiny in the discipline of anthropology. The current soul-searching is symptomatic of a much broader series of social, political, and technological shock waves that are transforming human society. To say we are living in an age of crisis is to state the obvious. Far more difficult to comprehend is how the crisis manifests itself across the academic disciplines. Cultural and social anthropology have been particularly hard-hit by the epochal and cataclysmic events of the late twentieth century. With the accelerating expansion of the capitalist world system into the remotest corners of the globe, anthropology has had to witness its traditional objects of study—non-Western, pre-class societies—disappearing with the speed of light, as one after another has been "pacified," settled, and put to work in the farms and factories of the new world order. As a result, the question of what constitutes knowledge of the "other" and how it is produced has become particularly troubling for social anthropologists.

In anthropology these current trends have brought to the surface long-standing ambiguities lying at the very root of the discipline, not the least of which revolves around the much debated concept of the "primitive," the rubric under which non-Western, pre-class societies have long been lumped. Many would agree with the late Stanley Diamond (1974: 118) that the "search for the primitive" is the heart of anthropology's unique role in the human sciences. Much of the history of anthropology is linked to our multifaceted understandings of the primitive in Diamond's sense, as the quest for origins and fundamentals, or in what Levi-Strauss terms anthropology's deeper purpose "to bear testimony to future generations of the ingenuity, diversity, and imagination of our species" (1968: 349).

For evolutionary anthropologists the quest for origins and fundamentals is a given, but for some contemporary cultural anthropologists this focus is regarded as anachronism. In a world where all work for wages and watch the same TV programs what constitutes the primitive? For some critics the primitive is
thus an illusion, an arbitrary construction of the dis-
embodied "other" divorced from history and context
(e.g., Clifford 1983; Sperber 1985; Wagner 1981). Of
these, some "postmodernists" would even find anthrop-
ology's preoccupation with the primitive an embar-
rassment, and as a consequence one raison d'etre of
anthropological inquiry becomes moot (Wilmsen 1989; xi–xviii; 1–6).

This period of soul-searching in social anthropology
arises in tandem with the ascendance of one of the
most influential current theories in the human sciences: the
view that knowledge is socially constructed. Within this framework, theories are seen as "master
narratives" arising from "discourses" that are them-

The impact of constructivism has been both positive
and negative. The constructivist position has had a
number of salutary effects on the disciplines of anthro-

The continuing necessity for some form of science? possible explaniatory frameworks. Whereas evolution-
ary anthropologists have adhered in the main to the lat-
ter vision, the founders of "modernist" social and
cultural anthropology—all of whom did important re-
search on hunters and gatherers—had vigorous adher-
ents of both tendencies, with Boas (1936, 1966) and
Kroeber (1925) exemplifying the first, and Steward
(1936, 1938) and Radcliffe-Brown (1922, 1931) the sec-
ond (see also Harris 1979). If we are to understand con-
structivism, we have to look at the deeper roots in
classical anthropology.
TWO CULTURES, OR THREE, OR FOUR?

As a starting point it might be helpful to recall C. P. Snow's famous essay "The Two Cultures" (1959) in which he explored the eternal conflict between two irreconcilable academic subcultures: the humanistic and the scientific. In the first, scholarship was devoted to the study of meanings and interpretations in great works of art and literature. In the second, research was dedicated to systematic and rigorous investigation of the laws and general principles governing the natural and human worlds.

Anthropology is an apt example of a discipline that finds itself straddling the boundaries of Snow's two cultures. Within the discipline today there is a powerful current moving toward the view of anthropology as essentially a humanistic, even literary, discipline, where truth, apart from the poetic variety, is unattainable. It is here that constructivism has been most influential. But an equally strong current moves in the opposite direction, embracing the promise and moral authority of science, and strengthening its commitment to improved techniques of data collection and measurement, coupled with more (not less) rigorous application of theory. The first sees itself as modeled after literature and literary criticism; and the second draws its inspiration from theoretical biology and evolutionary ecology as well as an updated and recharged structural functionalism.

In ethnography, the struggles and contradictions between the humanistic and scientific cultures are played out in a number of ways. While the scientists are gathering data for the construction of mathematical models of predator-prey behavior, the humanists, working sometimes among the same people, are collecting life histories of elders and recording and interpreting cosmologies and religious beliefs.

But there is a third culture embedded in current anthropological practice. This school sees neither humanistic nor scientific discourses as adequate to account for the past, present, and future of anthropological subjects. Raising issues of context and history, and placing societies in regional systems, some scholars focus on the overriding issue of the relations of the "other" with the world system. I will call this the "culture" of political economy.

The first anthropological perspective draws its inspiration from the interpretivist, structuralist, and hermeneutic traditions of Clifford Geertz (1973), Claude Levi-Strauss (1961), Mary Douglas (1966), Victor Turner (1969), and James Clifford (1988; Clifford and Marcus 1986); the second from the positivist and adaptationist current of Julian Steward (1936, 1938), Lew Binford (1980), and others (e.g., Harris 1979), and the third from the critical Marxist tradition in which Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz are situated (Wolf 1982; Mintz 1985; Leacock 1981; see also Patterson and Gailey 1987; Roseberry 1988). Each approach has a distinctive methodological stance and each has made important contributions to contemporary anthropology. In fact, however much one may profess allegiance to one or another of the three cultures, in practice most of us employ elements of all three approaches in our work (for a classic example of synthesis directed to a key argument about hunter-gatherers, see Sahlins 1968).

However, before one can evaluate the contributions to the production of knowledge from each of the anthropological traditions, a prior question must be addressed, an issue that poses a challenge to the entire collective enterprise so fundamental that to ignore it would be to fiddle while Rome burns. Following the lead of Foucault, Derrida, and the French poststructuralists, several anthropologists have carried constructivism to the nth degree and have declared primitive societies a non-category, a construction of observers mired in one or another brand of romantic idealism. The claims of this group are so far-reaching and so ill-contained within the paradigm space of the three cultures that they could be said to constitute a fourth culture rendering irrelevant large parts of the other three.

One manifestation of this fourth culture has been called "revisionism," an expression of constructivism that has been particularly active in hunter-gatherer studies (Wilmsen 1989; cf. Solway and Lee 1990). Combining some elements of political economy with some elements of poststructuralism, revisionism presents a fundamental challenge to the way that anthropologists have looked at hunters and gatherers for the past 30 years. It posits that they are not what they appear to be; and it proposes a drastic rethinking of our subject.

There are two strands to the revisionist critique: what I will call the historical and the poststructuralist. The first argues (see, e.g., Headland and Reid 1989; Myers 1988: 262–264) that past ethnographers have treated societies as more bounded, more isolated, and more pristine than they actually were. They counter that foraging societies have been integrated into larger regional or even international structures of power and exchange for so long that they can tell us nothing about the antecedent ways of life (Flanagan 1989; Price and Brown 1985; Le Gros 1985). These critiques raise important issues, yet in terms of method, the argument remains on familiar terrain: One examines the historical, archaeological, or other data and tests the merits of competing hypotheses against these data. Were the peoples in question isolated? What does archaeology reveal? What is the most parsimonious explanation for the observed facts?
Elsewhere I have considered historical revisionism in greater depth (Lee 1992). Here I wish only to examine that branch of revisionism that arises directly from constructivism. And for that we need to address the radical skepticism that lies at the heart of poststructuralist criticism. This view argues that there is no truth, only regimes of truth and power, and that all anthropology is powerfully shaped by the cultural constructions of the observer. Thus ethnographic writing has more in common with the historical novel and other works of fiction than it has with a scientific treatise. The task of ethnography then becomes immeasurably more problematic; truth is at best partial, flawed, obscured, and above all relative.7

This argument has radical implications for methodology. The production of knowledge has left the realm of empirical investigation, and analytical methods of the past can no longer be relied upon. One can no longer utilize, for example, the etic/emic distinction because science, after all, is really only “Western emic” (Marcus and Fischer 1986: 180–181). The use of Ockham’s razor or the law of parsimony to choose between the merits of two competing explanations is no longer admissible because all are “true” at some level.

What are the specific impacts of this strand of revisionism on the study of the hunters and gatherers and other pre-class, non-Western societies? Poststructuralists have argued the extraordinary proposition that the natives are “us” and have put into question the assumption that the “primitives,” whatever they may be, represent the “other.” They argue that because anthropologists, like everyone else, are prisoners of their own ideology, as a consequence they can see in the “other” only a flawed perception of themselves. The “other” is thus declared a noncategory.

Practically speaking, this declaration of “non-otherness” has the effect of cutting away large portions of what had been anthropological subject matter. For example the category “indigenous people” disappears, because in some versions of revisionism, no one is any more “indigenous” than anyone else.

One would expect that acceptance of this position would bring empirical investigation to a crashing halt. But this has not happened; in effect, there has been a reprieve. Investigation continues, but it is now the scientists, their times and social milieux that become the objects of study. What led them to write what they did is sought in the social conditions under which the knowledge was produced, and not in the nature of the phenomena under study.

There are a number of ironies in the revisionist stance. First, closer examination reveals that even while declaring the inadequacies of empiricism, revisionist scholars make liberal use of conventional empirical evidence, a point we return to later. Second, its practitioners tend to apply their critical perspective to all theoretical positions but their own. But the beauty of social constructivism is that it cuts both ways; revisionism can be subjected to the same type of analysis to which it subjects others.

What does constructivism look like under the lens of a constructivist analysis? I see the extreme form of constructivism and its close cousin, anthropological revisionism, both as peculiar expressions of the intellectual culture of “late capitalism.” Both spring from a major tenet of contemporary Western thought: the proposition that nothing is real.

NOTHING IS REAL

We live in an era in which the line between real and nonreal has become dangerously blurred. What is real has become a scarce commodity, and the pursuit of the “real” sometimes becomes a desperate search. Under capitalism, as Marshall Berman (quoting Marx) titles his book, “all that is solid melts into air” (1983). We don’t have to search far for evidence of this proposition. The Disney corporation produces and disseminates in a single fiscal year, perhaps in a single week, more fantasy material to more people than entire archaic civilizations could produce in a century. States of the left, right, and center and their bureaucracies also produce prodigious volumes of fantasy, and through advertising and other media, elites deploy enormous manipulative power (Anderson 1991; Ewen 1976). A recent ad for Winston’s cigarettes (typical of the thousands that bombard North Americans daily) has a picture of a carefully posed professional model, turned out as a fashion photographer, pretending to photograph another professional model herself posing, surrounded by other posed models in postures of forced gaiety. The caption: “Real People/Real Taste.”

To protect the psyche from this type of assault, consumers and citizens in the West (and East) can be forgiven for erecting a shell of cynicism as a survival strategy under conditions of extreme debasement of the currency of reality. In fact, it is hard to imagine keeping one’s sanity by any other means. This position of cool detachment and ironic distanciation has been considered the hallmark of the “postmodern condition” (Jameson 1984; Lyotard 1984; Sloterdijk 1987).

The world of scholarship has not escaped these massive social and psychological forces. In The Invention of Tradition (1983), Hobsbawm and Ranger and others show how allegedly hallowed customs handed down from the past are in fact the product of recent history. In his method of deconstruction, Derrida has argued that
history is akin to a literary text and like all texts is ultimately unknowable (1976, 1978). It seems a short step to transposing a critical and debunking discourse to all anthropological subjects.

But along the way there has been a slippage. The tools of deconstruction, developed to debunk and call into question the high and mighty, are now being applied to the powerless. Where the invention of tradition perspective was initially deployed to deconstruct the public rituals of the nineteenth-century British monarchy or pomp and circumstance in colonial India, it was now being generalized to question the claims to authenticity of small peoples. In his influential work “The Predicament of Culture,” James Clifford (1988) shows how the Mashpee Indians construct their identity de novo in order to meet the exigencies of a court case. Similar arguments, but with less sympathy for the subalterns, have been made for the Maori by Hanson (1989) and for the ancient Hawaiians by Bergendorff, Hasager, and Henriches (1988; see also the reply by Sahlins 1989).8

The situation within anthropology is paralleled by the impact of poststructuralism on the broad front of the social sciences. Foucault’s famous dictum (1976a,b) that there is no truth, only regimes of truth and power, was originally intended as a critique of arbitrary power, but by showing the fragility of all truth-claims it has had the effect of undermining the legitimacy as well of oppositional movements for justice against these same powers (Habermas 1987; Taylor 1984).

Of course there is a kernel of validity to the idea that all societies in the world are products of interaction with other societies and world society. Modern ethnography grew out of the Enlightenment and is a form of practice in which members of our academic subculture observe the other; and as the late Kathleen Gough (1968, 1993) reminded us, anthropology is a child of imperialism. And then there are cases like the Philippine Tasaday, where a perfectly reasonable Southeast Asian semi-hunter-gatherer group, of which many examples exist, was seized on by the National Geographic and other media and popularized as the “Lost Stone Age” find of the century. Their recent exposure and the media circus surrounding them certainly fuels the cynicism that is itself the source of postmodernist sensibilities (Lee 1992b; see also Berreman 1991; Duhaylnsod and Hyndman 1992; Dumont 1988).

Nevertheless to succumb to the enticements of the poststructuralist/revisionists would be a disaster. Where I part company with the poststructuralists is the view that our knowledge of the other, being filtered through perceptions, language, and culture, is so suspect that subjects can only be provisionally and arbitrarily constructed.9 I do not believe that anthropologists are nearly so powerless before the awesome task of representing the other’s reality, or that the ethnography of the 1960s or 1970s was so flawed that it has to be discarded. Adam Kuper, in a recent critique of postmodernism, points out that the methodologies of the 1960s were not so very different from those of the present,10 and that their results were subjected to the critical scrutiny of peer review and comparative evidence. Kuper argues, and I would agree, that the view that ethnographic writing is more akin to fiction than it is to science does not accord with the history of the discipline. If the ethnographers of that not-so-distant era had passed their fiction off as science, their readership and their peers would not have stood for it (Kuper 1993). (For other critiques of “postmodernism” that attempt to reconstruct the “realist” foundations of social science epistemologies, see Gellner 1988; Lovibond 1989; Mascia-Lees, Sharpe, and Cohen 1989; Roth 1989; Sangren 1988; Soper 1991; see also Bhashkar 1979, 1986).

NOTES TOWARD A RECONCILIATION

How can we sort out the conflicting claims of the poststructuralist/revisionists and those whose views they criticize? One of the most useful of the recent discussions of constructivism in anthropology and archaeology is by the Canadian philosopher of science Alison Wylie, based at the University of Western Ontario. In a series of important papers (1992a, 1992b, in press), Wylie presents a sympathetic account of the constructivist position, documenting its salutary influence in exposing the ideological assumptions underlying archaeological research, particularly in the area of gender. Her sympathies, however, are neither unqualified nor unlimited. In important ways, she argues, empirical evidence remains crucial, undermining the constructivist position, because it is a property of certain kinds of evidence to resist appropriation:

No matter how irresistible these [constructivist] arguments may seem in the abstract, they are often subverted by the very contingencies that they mean to bring into view. However much a construct archaeological evidence may be, however inextricable from the power relations that constitute the thoroughly cultural enterprise of its production, it does routinely resist appropriation;... In fact, this is a feature of archaeological practice that the critics of ethnocentric, androcentric and nationalistic bias in archaeology regularly exploit. Time and again they make good use of recalcitrant evidence—evidence that resists appropriation in any of the terms compatible with dominant views or assumptions about the past—to expose the deeply political nature of the discipline (in press, p. 12; emphasis added)

How is it possible for certain knowledge sets to resist appropriation? The answers Wylie offers are

Basically, Wylie argues, all constructivists are (and must be) empiricists; all address data; all sift and weigh evidence. After they have placed an interpretation in its social context, how else can they demonstrate its constructedness except by evaluating how well it accounts or fails to account for a body of evidence? And by presenting alternate (and better) interpretations, the constructivist critic lays bare the arbitrariness of the earlier interpretation. Looked at it this way, the constructivist project functions in ways rather similar to the methods of the very object of its criticism: conventional science!

A case in point is North American archaeology’s conventional views of the origin of agriculture. Wylie notes that scenarios of male centrality in the process of domestication of plants and animals have dominated theories for decades in spite of considerable collateral evidence for the importance of women’s contributions. She illustrates this point by referring to Watson and Kennedy’s feminist critique (1991) of male-centered arguments for the transition from foraging to agriculture in the eastern woodlands of North America.

Critical theorists like Watson and Kennedy are able to carry out these analyses because, as Wylie asserts, though the conduct of research can be constrained in many ways, at least some empirical findings do “resist theoretical appropriation”; and this property is used by even the most ardent constructionists to counter/refute/expose arguments that they see as politically inspired or shaped by the prevailing ethos.

Given the enormous load of ideology in anthropology, along with other branches of scholarship, the work of Wylie and others does offer some relief from the bleak vision of the poststructuralists that knowledge is simply what the powerful say it is. Therefore it is worthwhile to reiterate a plea for the importance of empirical evidence; I am as much opposed to mindless empiricism as anyone, but without the constraints imposed by empirical evidence, constructivism could disintegrate into an ideological parlor-game for cynics (Palmer 1990; Sloterdijk 1987).

What is urgently needed in this era of disillusionment is the middle path: a working discipline that sees science, humanism, and critical reflection as three components of a single field; scholars need empiricism tempered by reflexivity and a dialectic between the two. All of this should be framed within a sense of history and political economy to ensure that a scholar’s situated history and the relationship between scholar and subject are not lost. Scholars must interrogate assumptions as the poststructuralists suggest, but after that I for one would like to get on with it.

To return to the question originally posed: What is the status of the claim that the so-called primitive peoples are simply like the rest of us, their cultures shaped and molded, as are ours, by the titanic forces of late capitalism? There is an ample body of evidence to evaluate that proposition. If sound methods demonstrate, for example, that hunter-gatherers or pastoralists are historically serfs or proletarians, then so be it. But the current crop of revisionist arguments are dubious, to say the least. The task of situating the hundreds of non-Western, pre-state societies historically has barely begun and there remains a great deal of scope for archaeological, ethnographic, and ethnohistoric investigations to resolve the questions raised by the revisionists. I also suggest that answering these questions will motivate the production of the kinds of knowledge that will be used by future generations, sifted and resifted long after the debates of this decade fade into the past.

Donna Haraway (1989), a noted constructivist, makes the case that one of the master narratives constructed (in part) from anthropological data has been the story of human nature and life in the “state of nature”—who we are as a species, our past, and by implication our future. But herein lies the rub: The poststructuralist project focuses our attention so exclusively on the “constructedness” of these narratives that we lose sight of another equally valid dimension. Just because they are constructed doesn’t mean that they have no claim to empirical validity or that the search for knowledge of the past is an illegitimate enterprise. Haraway herself does not deny the possibility of “objective knowledge,” but she would insist that it be a “situated objectivity,” reflexively aware of the circumstances of its making.

All this highlights the critical need for maintaining and enlarging the sphere of knowledge—in both archaeology and ethnography—that transcends the ideological battles of each era: the need for a version of anthropology that is both critical and empirical (cf. Carrithers 1990; O’Meara 1989).

Perhaps the most significant contribution to this development in social anthropology is the emergence of indigenous peoples speaking to us in their own voices, for example, the Canadian Innu, Lubicon, and Teme-Augama, among others (see Richardson 1989). The Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en people of British Columbia are good examples of indigenous peoples who have made excellent use of anthropological knowledge, generated by sympathetic scholars to address the larger public directly in a variety of voices including the courts (People of ‘Ksan 1980; Sterritt 1989; Wa and Uukw 1989).

On this new and expanded political terrain an interesting question is how the former subjects of anthropological inquiry themselves regard anthropology. In a
minority of situations, the anthropologist is seen as part of the problem, an appropriator of culture. But this is by no means the only scenario. There is a growing sensitivity on the part, for example, of archaeologists to the legitimate concerns of indigenous peoples, particularly on the issue of repatriation of cultural materials and human remains. Another manifestation is the cultural renaissance underway in many native communities; it has generated considerable interest in native language, "traditional" ethos and worldview, governance, subsistence, arts, crafts, ethnobotany, and healing. For these and other spheres of knowledge, the elders are the primary sources; however, anthropological texts have played and continue to play a significant role as sources of information.13

CONCLUSION

This essay has delineated the crisis of representation in the anthropology of pre-class societies and has attempted to comprehend its underlying epistemological and ideological roots. The field has been undergoing a series of transformations, and the original raison d'être has required reassessment. Yet despite the fundamental challenges of the "revisionists," it can be argued that a core of relevance to both scholarly and indigenous peoples' agendas remains. That the field is responding to this challenge is indicated by the shift away from simplistic evolutionary arguments toward more nuanced, historically sensitized, and critical understandings. In this respect the altered contours of anthropological studies of the "primitive" represent a successful "incursion" by humanists and political economists on a terrain that had been largely dominated by natural science–oriented methods and philosophies.

Almost all of humanity lives today in highly organized bureaucratized societies of enormous scale and systematic inequalities. Hunters and gatherers, in spite of the inducements (or threats?) to become incorporated, choose for whatever reasons to resist and to live lives very different from that of the majority. The pace is slower, technology simpler, numbers smaller, inequality less, and the relationship to land and resources—the sense of place—is on a radically different basis.

If indigenous peoples want to adopt a Western (or Russian) way of life, the door is open; in fact, the pressures to conform are immense. The fact that this has not happened, that some foragers still pursue alternative lifeways not in isolation but in full awareness of the wider world, is a persuasive argument that the "system" is not all-powerful and that Western-capitalist reality is not the only reality. Pockets of resistance persist and show us that even in this hard-bitten "postmodern" age other ways of being are possible. These alternate ways exist; they are not simply constructions of Western social scientists' fertile imaginations.

Despite its complex history of involvement with the colonial order, anthropology has produced much knowledge that counters the interests of the established order and which has in Wylie's terms resisted theoretical appropriation. The commitment to reflect reality as accurately as possible and in ways that are sympathetic to the subaltern marks the best research in anthropology for most of its hundred-year history. Although they at times appear to imply it, the practitioners of social constructionism did not invent the moral high ground, nor do they hold a monopoly on it today. Although its impact has been profound, social constructionism is better viewed as one important tool of social analysis among several rather than as a paradigm that overthrows all existing understandings. If anthropology is not to fall into a hyperrelativist universe, the search for methods for resolving the merits of competing explanations will continue to be an essential component of our work.

NOTES

1. As a social anthropologist, I hesitated to join a project that would bring together so many distinguished physical anthropologists and evolutionists. Hopefully this modest contribution can be encompassed under the expanded and generous umbrella that has been Sherry Washburn's view of science. Portions of this paper are adapted from Lee 1992. I would like to thank Victor Barac, Irv DeVore, Peter Fitting, Fred Jameson, Michael Lambek, Gavin Smith, Ted Chamberlin, Alison Wylie, and students at the University of Toronto graduate anthropology seminar on research methods (1992–1994) for useful input on earlier versions of this paper. None of the above would necessarily endorse the positions adopted here.

2. Washburn's intellectual relativism may have anticipated postmodernism, but in other ways he was resolutely (and refreshingly) modernist—for example, in his uncompromising stand against theories he regarded as racist (Washburn 1965).

3. Malinowski's enduring popularity within the discipline may have something to do with the fact that he sat on the fence in the nomothetic/ideographic debate.

4. Snow's position in turn can be traced back to a nineteenth-century critical Romanticism that saw science as providing an ideological basis for the spread and destructive effects of capitalism. (I thank Victor Barac for this observation.)

5. For a thoughtful and balanced discussion of this issue, see Paynter 1989.

6. This is what Jacqueline Solway and I did in a Current Anthropology article titled "Foragers, Genuine or Spurious" (1990), meeting the issues raised by revisionists with empirical data that refuted their position (see also Lee and Guenther 1993).

7. For a late conversion to relativism, see Leach 1989; on the fallacy of "hyperrelativism," see Trigger 1989.


