Male domination is one part of a complex of power relations fundamental to the maintenance of a class society; the other two parts are social inequality and militarism. These three closely interrelated phenomena exist on a large scale in all state societies, including our own. The question is how we account for the pervasiveness of these institutions. There are two explanations among anthropologists, each with a large number of adherents.

1) The first argument maintains that these forms of power have always existed, that it is, de facto, the way of the world, a question of human nature. This position transforms what we would call a historical and cultural question into a question of biology, innateness, and universality. An example of this approach is Steven Goldberg's *The Inevitability of Patriarchy*. Goldberg looks to a physiological explanation for what he terms the universality of male dominance:

The anthropological evidence would force us to postulate a physiologically-engendered emotional and behavioral differentiation. . . . Male physiology is . . . such that the environmental presence of a hierarchy or member of the other sex motivates the male more strongly—makes him feel the need more strongly and more readily—to manifest whatever behavior is, in any given situation the behavior that is required for attainment of dominance in a hierarchy of male-female relationship.1

This approach argues that women have always been subordinate to men. It proposes the concept of universal female subordination, of "man the hunter," and "woman the nurturer." Although not all proponents of this view would necessarily subscribe to a sociobiological interpretation, they do deal with the question in an essentialist and ahistorical manner.2

In criticizing the biological determinist view of men's and women's status, Eleanor Leacock argues that this position not only ignores history but also "transmutes the totality of tribal decision-making
structures into the power terms of our own society.” She goes on to say,

Lewis Henry Morgan had a marvellous phrase for such practice. He used it when talking of the term “instinct” but it is generally apt. Such a term, he wrote, is “a system of philosophy in a definition, an installation of the supernatural which silences at once all inquiry into facts.” In this instance women are conveniently allocated to their place and the whole inquiry into the structure of the primitive collective is stunted. The primitive collective emerges with no structure, no contradictions of its own; it is merely our society minus, so to speak.3

2) The second explanatory approach to this question—and the approach adopted here—argues that in order to explain this complex of power relation we have to look at it as an aspect of history and not of biology. This view states the matter as follows: male dominance—and for this we could well substitute militarism or social inequality—varies from society to society. It points out that male dominance is strong in some, while it is weak or non-existent in others. If the degree of male domination varies to such a degree, then it cannot properly be considered to be a product of physiology, hormones, or unchanging human nature. We must look elsewhere for an adequate explanation, to history itself.

To begin this inquiry we might ask whether there was any period of human history when the present hierarchical structure of male-female relations was weaker or even non-existent. The answer is a qualified yes. If we look at the rise and fall of male dominance and female subordination against the backdrop of evolving world history, the movement from bands and tribes, to chiefdoms and states, we find much less sexual inequality in the simplest societies, bands and tribes than in the later agrarian societies.

Modern states vary considerably: in some, women may be better off than in traditional states; in others they may be worse off. For example, the position of women has improved in some contemporary industrial societies but has actually declined in the Third World owing in no small part to the consequences of the expansion of the world capitalist system. Etienne and Leacock make the very important point in Women and Colonization that the status of women in the Third World suffers acutely under imperialism. Case studies from Peru to the Ivory Coast to the Tonga Islands of the South Pacific show that women who enjoyed considerable status under precolonial conditions lost ground when their societies came under the domination of colonialism.4 At the same time it would not be correct to romanticize the position of women in traditional societies before the advent
of capitalism, for some of the most brutal, exploitative examples of male dominance are found in the traditional agrarian states—whether feudal or slave, European or Asiatic—such as Greece, India, China, and the Middle Eastern countries. In attempting to explain the origin of male domination we shall have to beware of simplistic or romantic assumptions of an unspoiled past, or alternatively, of primitive brutality.

Most definitions of the term equality emphasize equality of access to socially valued resources. In hierarchical societies there is differential access to resources, whereas in simpler societies access to resources is more or less equal, though at the individual level it may vary somewhat.

The question of sexual equality is considerably more complicated because, when a husband and wife form a household, both live from the same estate based on lands or herds, and therefore both have similar access to resources. In these situations the question of equal access must be carefully studied and analyzed.

Obviously, women and men are different biologically, and in all societies there is a socially formulated gender division of labor. In no society are men and women equivalent, but in some they enjoy social equality. In primitive communal societies men and women differ not only biologically, but also in rigorous definitions of their respective daily pursuits. However, in spite of being separate they are equal. Without their own social identities and autonomy and their equal access to socially valued resources, they would have no sound basis for the reciprocal relations that bind the sexes and generations together. For example, among the tribally organized Iroquois of pre-colonial times (in what is now upper New York State and southern Ontario) there were, in effect, sex-specific estates: not only were the economic pursuits of the men (hunting and trading) and women (gardening and foraging) separate sectors of the subsistence of the house groupings, but men and women also reciprocated in giving their labor power to the seasonal pursuits of the other sex. The men would lop trees, burn the women's fields, and fence them, as well as construct the houses (which were owned by the women), and the women would assist the men in the hunt by driving game, dressing carcasses, and preparing hides. This was seen by the people as part of the reciprocal relations of the society, the relations that tended to balance over the long term. It can be argued that the reciprocity between men and women was necessitated by their social differences, and that the balancing was made possible by their general equal access to resources by sex.
Thus many scholars argue that in the simplest societies there is a kind of complementarity of roles. This undermines the attempt by others who want to demonstrate the universality of female subordination by setting up, and then shooting down, the straw man of an impossibly pure, abstract equality, which living, breathing societies are unable to achieve.

MALE AND FEMALE IN A FORAGING SOCIETY

A necessary methodological problem is the question of measurement; that is, how can we say convincingly that women and men are equal, or that women and men are more equal in society A than they are in society B? This is indeed a thorny problem and no matter how unfashionable empiricism is today, we approach this question in a social scientific, almost positivistic way.

If we are to make sense of the real substance of male-female relations we have to leave the abstract level and get down to cases. We will examine the relations between men and women in one society, the !Kung San of Botswana. (One of us did extensive fieldwork among them between 1963 and 1986.) The !Kung, who are, or were until recently, hunter gatherers, display a remarkable sense of gender equality in their daily behavior, a sense that is found in few other societies.5

If you ask the !Kung "who really has the power and the strength in their society," many men will say, "Oh, the women have the strength. The women are the strong ones, we're the weak ones." And the women will say, "Oh, no, the men have the strength. Not us!" That is their story and they stick to it. Rather than give a global assessment of male-female relations in !Kung society, we prefer to discuss in turn the various spheres in which men and women interact to show that dominance of one sex in one sphere does not necessarily lead to dominance in another.

In the important area of subsistence, one immediately encounters a marked disparity. !Kung men hunt and !Kung women gather, and gathering provides about two-thirds of the diet. But the men also gather some of the food, and when this contribution is added, the men produce 45 percent, and the women 55 percent, of the total foods.6 Thus the women have a clear dominance in food production.

Turning to the subjective criteria, it is curious in light of the importance of plant foods that men and women alike agree that meat is a more desirable food than vegetables. They simply say, we want meat. This is a central theme in !Kung consciousness.7 When meat is
scarce in the camp everyone craves it, even when vegetable foods are abundant. And the killing of large animals is usually marked by feasting, dancing, and the giving of gifts of meat. Since game animals are scarce and unpredictable compared to plant foods, it is perhaps not so surprising that hunting is invested with more symbolic significance than gathering.

Adrienne Zihlmann and Nancy Tanner have proposed that in human evolution vegetable foods gathered by women were primary and that hunting was basically a cultural invention to give the men something to do. On the other hand, we should not lose sight of the fact that meat provides high-quality protein. Even if meat only constitutes 30 percent of the diet, it is nutritionally essential for the !Kung.

Aside from nutritional value, meat has a ceremonial importance for hunters and gatherers, for it is shared more widely and more publicly than vegetable food. Coming in a block of a hundred to four hundred pounds, a kill is a windfall and makes quite a feast. Everybody can take the day off to eat. If a woman were to throw a feast like that, she would have to go out five days in a row and build up a stockpile of plant food.

The second area to assess is marriage and reproductive rights. Who chooses whom at the time of marriage? Is it by mutual agreement, or does the man choose and is the woman chosen? Or do the parents do the choosing? The !Kung have an interesting combination of both ascription and choice in this matter. Most !Kung marriages are arranged by the parents at the instigation of the future husband (who is usually much older than his wife-to-be). Although the girl has very little say in the original choice, many of these marriages fail because the girl is less than enthusiastic about the husband chosen for her. Yet the institution of arranged marriages continues, as a feature of the corporative inter-family nature of marriage in a foraging, kinship-organized society. At marriage, the girl’s people insist that the young couple live with them. The reasons given are of three kinds: they say, first, that it must be seen that the man treats the daughter well; second, that he must prove his hunting ability by providing meat; and, third, that the girl is too young to leave her mother. In the majority of cases, the husband leaves his own group and takes up residence with the wife’s group, a stay that may last three, five, or ten years, or even a lifetime. This is an area where women exercise power. Furthermore, when we come to the question of divorce, the data we have show that women initiate divorce in !Kung society far more frequently than men.
The question of child care and how it should be divided among mother, father, and others is a controversial issue today in the West. In arguing for a more equitable distribution of household labor, feminists have turned to data on non-Western societies. In some ways the !Kung data offer little support for this view, since over 90 percent of the work involved in directly caring for young children is borne by the mother aided by the other women. This is not to say that !Kung fathers ignore their children; on the contrary, they are attentive and loving and spend part of their leisure hours playing with the young infants and holding them. But the !Kung father rarely takes sole responsibility for the child while the mother is absent, whereas the opposite occurs every day.

For their part the mothers do not consider themselves to be oppressed by this state of affairs. They keenly desire children, are excellent mothers, and often complain that they do not have as many children as they would like.

In interpreting these attitudes one should avoid projecting the disadvantages we associate with child care on an entirely different culture. !Kung women consider childbirth and child care as their sphere of responsibility, and they take steps to guard that prerogative. For example, many !Kung women give birth alone. They go into the bush and insist on excluding men from the childbirth site. The underlying explanation seems to be that it simplifies matters if the woman decides in favor of infanticide. Since the woman will commit a considerable amount of her energy to raising each child, she examines the newborn carefully for evidence of defects; if she finds any, the child is not allowed to live. By excluding men from the childbed, women can report to the camp that the child was born dead without fear of contradiction. But if the child is healthy and wanted by the woman she accepts the major responsibility for raising it. In this way the women exercise control over their own reproduction.

Another important reason why the !Kung woman’s share of the child care is not oppressive is that she is not isolated from the community in the same way that modern urban mothers are. She helps and is helped by all the other women in the camp, and there is no necessity to separate her productive work from her child care work. When she gathers and prepares food, her child is on her hip, not at home with babysitters. Moreover, men do participate in the non-child-care aspects of housework: about 20–40 percent of the housework of a four-person household is done by men. For those reasons it does not seem accurate to say that !Kung women are oppressed by the burden of caring for children.
Does the women's predominant role in production, their leverage in marriage and child rearing lead to power in the political arena as well? The answer in a broad sense is yes: !Kung women's participation in group discussions and decision making is probably greater than that of women in most tribal, peasant, and industrial societies. But their participation is not equal to that of the men, who appear to do about two-thirds of the talking in discussions involving both sexes, and to act as group spokespersons far more frequently than women.

This disparity between men and women comes into sharper relief when discussions and arguments turn to violence. In 34 fights occurring in the period 1963–9, a man attacked a woman 14 times, whereas a woman attacked a man only once. Since 11 of these 15 cases involved husbands and wives, it is clear that in domestic scraps the wife is the victim in the great majority of cases. Similarly in cases of homicide there were 25 male killers but no female killers (though it is worth noting that 19 of the 22 victims were males as well).

It is remarkable that one major form of violence against women, rape, is rare among the !Kung. This kind of sexual violence so common in many state societies has been reported to be extremely rare or nonexistent among the !Kung.

In summarizing the evidence for male-female relations, we see that women predominate in some spheres of behavior and men in others, while the overall sense of the relations between the sexes is one of give and take. Both sexes contribute to subsistence. Since women's subsistence work is more efficient and productive than men's, they provide more of the food. In marriage arrangements women exercise some control and they initiate divorce far more frequently than men.

In the political sphere men do more of the talking than women, and it is our impression that their overall influence in "public" matters is greater, though we cannot present any data to confirm this point. Men behave more violently than women, though women are rarely the victims in serious conflicts; and rape, a primary form of violence against women in many societies, is rare among the !Kung.

On balance, the evidence shows a fairly equal role in society for the two sexes, and there is certainly no support in the !Kung data for the view that women in a "state of nature" are oppressed, dominated or sexually exploited by men. However, the comparative evidence suggests that the status of !Kung women may be higher than that enjoyed by women in some other foraging societies such as the Inuit, at least in modern times, and the Australian Aborigines. In hunter-gatherer societies of the historic period and in the primit—
tive communal societies that predated them, men and women were members of autonomous, self-directed social groups and economies. It should be borne in mind that gender relations were not simply between individuals but between whole corporate kin groupings. Both men and women gained their identity and security from their kin groups. Individual gender roles involved individual decision making by their incumbents, in their areas of competence, for the good of their kinsmen and in-laws. Group decisions were arrived at by seeking unanimity. This feature of corporate kin relations reflected on the individual actors and the relations between specific men and women. Any "measuring" of male dominance or gender inequality must reckon with this inter-corporate social reality.

THE ORIGINS OF MALE DOMINATION

It would be foolhardy to argue that the ancestors of all of us were like the !Kung and that early men and women enjoyed a life of gender equality and bliss. However, because of the nature of their productive systems and the widespread evidence of similarities among all or most hunter-gatherer societies, we can argue that the gender relations of our ancestors probably resembled those of contemporary hunter-gatherers more than they did the gender relations of our class-stratified patriarchal industrial societies.

The question can now be asked: How did we get from there to here? How, in the course of social evolution, did men come to dominate women? What happened in history, and why?

In responding to these questions it will be useful to distinguish three broad stages of human history before capitalism: first, primitive communism, found in hunting and gathering bands; second, tribal society and chiefdoms; and third, early agrarian states. Speaking generally, two important transformations propelled history from the first stage to the third: (1) the Neolithic revolution and the rise of agriculture, and (2) the rise of the state. This is the basic historical framework in which male domination develops.

Phase One: Primitive Communism

In the first stage of human history people lived by hunting and gathering, without domesticated plants or animals; they directly appropriated their subsistence from nature. There was no rich or poor, political leadership was minimal, and the population density was low. Along with Engels, we would argue that in this period men and women were relatively equal. The general conditions of low produc-
tion coupled with the absence of private property and a minimal production of commodities make possible the relative equality of the sexes. We do not concur, however, with the many nineteenth-century theorists who argued that in the beginning, women dominated men in a matriarchy. There simply is no anthropological evidence for such a view.

It is also important to make the qualification that there is no evidence for primitive promiscuity in the anthropological literature, although this was an important aspect of Morgan's and Engels' view of primitive society. However, primitive communism itself is a valid construct: land was "owned" collectively or communally, political leadership was minimal, the population density was relatively low, and inequality of status or wealth was minimal. Both men and women contributed to the food supply, and warfare was nonexistent or very modest in scale.

This view of primitive communism and the relative equality between the sexes contrasts sharply with a number of bourgeois ideological constructs in anthropology such as the view of Claude Lévi-Strauss in *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*. In the beginning, he argues, human society was formed by men agreeing to give away a sister in order to receive someone else's sister, the origin of society being exchange of women by men. He called women the original scarce good, the original medium of exchange. In our view this is an ethnocentric and ideological projection on the material that cannot be convincingly demonstrated from the ethnographic evidence.

It should be added that there is variation among hunter-gatherers. The !Kung, and a dozen or so societies like them, seem to represent one pole of sexual egalitarianism. There is another group of hunter-gatherer societies which, while far more egalitarian than we are, nevertheless do display some signs of female subordination, to a greater degree than is found among the !Kung.

**Phase Two: Tribal Society**

Tribal society is a product of the first great transformation of human history, the establishment of agriculture, which V. Gordon Childe called the Neolithic Revolution. Here we see three important changes, all of which have implications for the status of men in relation to women.

First of all, we find a change in the mode of production, from a very diffuse direct appropriation from nature to improvement of the land and/or domestication of animals: group livelihood then becomes
dependent on the control of a resource, a resource that has been improved by humans—land or livestock. And here we see the germs of the origin of property.

Second, in the tribal society, the population gets larger, a change that has important effects. There is a need for a centralized system of leadership or management. We see, for example the advent of the "Big Man" system in which the Big Man acts as a political catalyst, as spokesperson for the group, and as redistributor of surplus food.

Third, agriculture, in changing the mode of production, increases both the production ceiling of the society, and its need for labor power and economic organization. Land formerly a non-limited component of a hunting and gathering economy now becomes, in arable regions, a subject of dispute. The new mode becomes increasingly successful at the expense of the old. The population grows and the new mode flourishes. Owing to the finite amount of arable land (given the level of Neolithic technology), agricultural peoples come into conflict, not only with one another, concerning the ownership and control of land and resources, but also with peoples who do not embrace the new mode of production. Their object is to obtain both land and labor—by intermarriage, as in earlier times, as well as by trade and warfare. We observe that there is far more warfare in simple horticultural societies around the world than among hunter-gatherers.

As a consequence of these important changes, women's status seems to decline, and the men's to rise, although again there is considerable variation. At this point it is useful to review several arguments.

Eleanor Leacock, following leads given by Engels and other Marxist theorists, argues that the origin of women's oppression is to be found in commodity production: production for exchange instead of production for use. When commodities are being produced for trade outside the local community, women's labor is of critical importance. This means that the control of women's labor becomes an area of contestation. Women's freedom of action in divorce and marriage becomes circumscribed. Bride price replaces bride service: that is to say, upon marriage a man no longer provides his labor and skills to his wife and in-laws. The relationship ceased to be one of reciprocal exchange of goods, services, and personnel. Now he and his kin provided a payment to obtain rights over the woman's labor, sexuality and reproduction.

A second argument, and one that has considerable empirical basis, is the study by Patricia Draper of the !Kung San in the process of settling down and adopting agriculture and stock raising. Draper
found that when !Kung settled down and took up agricultural practices, certain subtle changes took place in women’s and men’s lives that led to the subordination of the former. While men continued to travel widely, women became home-bound. Instead of going out and meeting the “public” in the course of gathering, they were confined to their homestead. Their work became more socially isolated and more private, whereas the men, in going out to herd cattle, continued to meet the public and had a wider view of the world. Draper notes also the development of segregation of children by sex in tasks. Girls helped their mothers with their work, and boys helped their fathers and older brothers with the livestock.24

A third view is the position of Marvin Harris that neolithic warfare is the root cause of women’s subordination.25 He delineates the complex of warfare and male supremacy of early horticultural societies: males became expendable but also dominant. Female infanticide was practiced and women were given to men survivors as a reward for bravery in battle. This argument has received a good deal of justified criticism in feminist circles, since female infanticide is not nearly as widespread in horticultural societies as warfare is, and there are warlike tribal societies, such as the Iroquois, in which women had a high status.26 On the other hand, among the Yanamamo, for example, a very warlike society (at least in colonial times) in South America, women had low status.27 We cannot discount warfare as one of the causes of women’s subordination and male domination. But it seems that the existence of warfare alone does not in itself account for the subordination of women.

In tribal society we find the phenomenon of social ranking, and we can no longer make simple statements—which we have been making so far—about the status of women, because there are high-ranking men and women, low-ranking men and women, and slaves; we have to look at the situation of men and women of each status.

One cannot leave this discussion without considering the whole question of matriarchy, the rule or domination of women over men, which has been widely discussed by feminists. We accept the prevalent informed view: that matriarchy as far as we know has never existed. But the question then becomes why the legend of matriarchy was so persistent and why it appeared in so many mythologies around the world. The most useful approach to this problem may be the work of Paula Webster and Esther Newton on matriarchy as a vision of power for women—a vision of what could be.28 It has also been suggested that matriarchy was a scurrilous invention of men to justify
found that when !Kung settled down and took up agricultural practices, certain subtle changes took place in women's and men's lives that led to the subordination of the former. While men continued to travel widely, women became home-bound. Instead of going out and meeting the "public" in the course of gathering, they were confined to their homestead. Their work became more socially isolated and more private, whereas the men, in going out to herd cattle, continued to meet the public and had a wider view of the world. Draper notes also the development of segregation of children by sex in tasks. Girls helped their mothers with their work, and boys helped their fathers and older brothers with the livestock.24

A third view is the position of Marvin Harris that neolithic warfare is the root cause of women's subordination.25 He delineates the complex of warfare and male supremacy of early horticultural societies: males became expendable but also dominant. Female infanticide was practiced and women were given to men survivors as a reward for bravery in battle. This argument has received a good deal of justified criticism in feminist circles, since female infanticide is not nearly as widespread in horticultural societies as warfare is, and there are warlike tribal societies, such as the Iroquois, in which women had a high status.26 On the other hand, among the Yanamamo, for example, a very warlike society (at least in colonial times) in South America, women had low status.27 We cannot discount warfare as one of the causes of women's subordination and male domination. But it seems that the existence of warfare alone does not in itself account for the subordination of women.

In tribal society we find the phenomenon of social ranking, and we can no longer make simple statements—which we have been making so far—about the status of women, because there are high-ranking men and women, low-ranking men and women, and slaves; we have to look at the situation of men and women of each status.

One cannot leave this discussion without considering the whole question of matriarchy, the rule or domination of women over men, which has been widely discussed by feminists. We accept the prevalent informed view: that matriarchy as far as we know has never existed. But the question then becomes why the legend of matriarchy was so persistent and why it appeared in so many mythologies around the world. The most useful approach to this problem may be the work of Paula Webster and Esther Newton on matriarchy as a vision of power for women—a vision of what could be.28 It has also been suggested that matriarchy was a scurrilous invention of men to justify
stroyed the kin group and, in so doing, destroyed the bases of women’s power. The mechanism at work here seems to be that with the destruction of the kinship base women lost their communal autonomy and became isolated and, in a sense, “privatized.” In this condition women became more vulnerable to domination or brutalization by husband or fathers. In other words, the extended kin group was a protective device for women.

In conclusion, we might say that women’s labor is essential to the reproduction of state power and state organization in a variety of ways, and thus the subordination of women in these early states, which has continued to the present, is essential to the reproduction of state power. Hence, in challenging patriarchy we challenge one of the cornerstones of the state in contemporary capitalist and post-capitalist societies.

It is our contention that male domination arose, not from human biology, but with the evolution of human society, together with institutional inequalities and hierarchies. It gains its full force with the development of state power and the socially sanctioned alienation of women from access to resources and direct production. The question of male dominance is a sociological and cultural question, a product not of animal instincts, but rather, of human history.

NOTES


2Those who argue from a sociobiological perspective tend to ignore these complexities of the biological, and particularly, the primate data, which do not support their arguments. For instance, a considerable body of material has come to light, largely as a result of feminist research, on the ability of females to provide for the family’s subsistence and of males to play a significant nurturing role with regard to the young. Cf. L. Leibowitz, *Females, Males, Families: A Biosocial Approach* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978); R. Rohrich-Leavitt, “Peaceful Primates and Gentle People,” in Barbara B. Watson, ed., *Women’s Studies: The Social Realities* (New York: Harper’s College Press, 1976); and Jane Lancaster, *Primate Behavior and the Emergence of Human Culture* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975).


5This ethnographic case of a twentieth-century foraging society illustrates not only the contrasts with our own unequal, class-divided society, but also indicates a process of social evolution. While the !Kung are in general an example of a certain evolutionary stage, it must be remembered that they are by no means primitives, in the sense of being a primal, pristine human society. Within the evolutionary stage that they have occupied well into the present century, they have experienced many generations of social variation, development, and change. In a word, they too have a history and heritage as long as our own. Part of this unwritten history, which is virtually impossible to
verify, may well have been a certain degree of moral and ideological influence exerted, by
diffusion, on foraging peoples by politically more dominant societies. (The exclamation mark
in the word "!Kung" is used to indicate the click sound in their language.) See Richard Lee, The
!Kung San: Men, Women and Work in a Foraging Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University

6Lee, op. cit., ch. 9.


12Lee, op. cit., 277-80.

13Lee, op. cit., ch. 13.


15Marshall, op. cit., 279.


17Long out of favor, the concept of primitive communism appears to be undergoing a revival. See, for example, A. Testart, Le Communisme primitif. Économie et Idéologie (Paris: Editions MSH, 1985).


22See, for example, I. Bern, "Inequality and Australian Aboriginal Society," paper delivered at Symposium on Egalitarian and Hierarchical Tendencies in Aboriginal Social Life, Institute of Aboriginal Studies Conference, Canberra, May 1986.

23To some degree a form of tribal society has also developed on a base of fishing where, again, a regular, secure subsistence resource allowed for settled village life. This is discussed by David Aberle, for example, in relation to the distribution and frequency of matriliney. See D. Aberle, "Matrilineal Descent in Cross-cultural perspective," in D.M. Schneider and K. Gough, eds., Matrilineal Kinship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 655-727.

24Leacock op. cit., and Draper, op. cit.


26George S. Snyderman, "Behind the Tree of Peace: A Sociological Analysis of Iroquois Warfare," Pennsylvania Archaeologist 18, no. 3-4 (1948), 3-93; and George T. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois:
A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940).


28Webster, in R. Reiter, op. cit.
