LEARNING HOW TO BE UKRAINIAN: UKRAINIAN SCHOOLS IN TORONTO AND THE FORMATION OF IDENTITY, 1947-2009

by

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A thesis submitted with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
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Abstract

This thesis follows the development of the Ukrainian identity in Toronto since World War II. It explores the formation of collective memory by the Third Wave of Ukrainian immigration who arrived in Toronto in the early 1950s and the crystallization of a particular Ukrainian identity within this community. In particular, it looks at the role of the Ukrainian schooling system as an important institution shaping the community’s understanding of Ukrainian identity. It also discusses the challenges to that identity since the arrival of the Fourth Wave of Ukrainian immigration which began in 1991. It charts the intra-group tensions which arose in the community due to different understandings of what it means to be Ukrainian and describes how competing Ukrainian identities found within the Fourth Wave of immigration have shifted the dynamic in the Ukrainian community, explaining low involvement of Fourth Wave members within community institutions such as the Ukrainian school.
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My husband Taras, himself from Ukraine, is a special part of this thesis. Because of him, I lived, volunteered, attended school and was married in Ukraine. This experience undoubtedly gave me insights into contemporary Ukrainian culture which I would have never had without our having met. Our daily interactions, debates, agreements and disagreements all helped shape my ideas about the interaction of Fourth Wave immigrants with the existing Ukrainian community in Toronto. Our experience proves that harmony in the community and its institutions is possible. But like any relationship, it will only work as long as we make an effort to understand, listen and make concessions that work for both groups. For the sake of our future children, I do hope this will be the case with the Ukrainian community in Toronto.

To all those involved in the creation of this thesis, I respectfully offer my deepest heartfelt appreciation. I am obliged to all who participated in the study and who offered their advice and comments. The reader should be aware that I alone am responsible for any error contained herein.

Anastasia Baczynskyj
Toronto, Ontario
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Dedication

To the Past, Present and Future Generations of Ukrainian Canadians,

Where there is no vision, the people parish.

- Proverbs 29:18

Divided, we fall.
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Introduction

Since 1991, the Ukrainian community in Toronto has been facing an identity crisis. The collapse of the Soviet Union, not only brought the independence of Ukraine, but also brought the arrival of a new wave of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada. These two events in combination challenged a long held status quo in the Ukrainian community in Toronto. The desire for a liberated Ukraine was the basis of Ukrainian identity within the mainstream community, and all ‘official’ organizations were devoutly attached to this goal. With Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991, the organized Ukrainian community happily saw the realization of this goal, but as a result, lost its collective purpose and focus. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian community’s definition of ‘Ukrainian’ was slowly being challenged by different versions of Ukrainian identity brought into the community by a new wave of post-1991 immigration. Much to the chagrin of the existing Ukrainian community, the influx of immigration did not translate into high rates of participation in community structures, including the Ukrainian schools, membership to which was regarded as an important marker of Ukrainian identity attachment in Toronto. How can this have happened? How was it that those Ukrainians arriving in Canada after 1991 were not joining, in large numbers, the institutions and organizations which were the cornerstones of Ukrainian community identity for over forty years? This thesis looks at the development of Ukrainian identity within the Ukrainian community in Toronto since the early 1950s. It shows how narratives of community history are important in the construction of group identity and how differing narratives have the force to repel people from the same ethnic group away from each other.

But what exactly is identity? The term ‘identity’ is widely used although its meaning remains
vague and intangible to many. In his work *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge and History*, Frederick Cooper has argued that the word ‘identity’ is used so imprecisely that it becomes impossible to understand what it really means. In a chapter entitled “Identity” written with Rogers Brubaker, Cooper suggests that a series of other terms be used which may signify more precise meanings. In particular, he suggests that the word ‘groupness’ be used to signify levels of group awareness. Exclusivist and strong emotional ties to a particular groups of people are distinguished by the word ‘connectedness’ if there is a definite awareness of similarities and a positive appreciation of those similarities. Looser group awareness is signified by the word ‘commonality,’ where there may be an understanding of similarities, but no sense of connected purpose with the group. He also suggests that personal identity can be divided similarly. The word ‘identification,’ he explains, can convey a process by which one identifies emotionally with another person, collective or group. The word ‘self understanding’ may replace ‘identity’ if there is no connection to other entities but only personal understanding of oneself. All these terms are distinctions which help to speak precisely about ‘identity.’ They help define specific feelings which are present in various groups and individuals researched in this work and are helpful in explaining how identity is malleable and inconstant, potentially changing over time.

It is important to understand that identity is fashioned – no one is born with a pre-determined identity. Identity is created or develops within a complex system of contexts throughout a person’s life. Identities can be personal or in union with a larger group. Group identities are especially important as political tools. People with political aspirations can fashion a group identity in order to support a particular political framework. They can utilize memories, or a specific version of history, to explain how individuals belong to a certain
group and why they should support a certain political view. The history selected creates a collective memory for the group which makes them ‘remember’ past wrongs suffered by their ancestors and the moments of glory, giving them a sense of connectedness both to the group and its ‘past.’ John Gillis explains that identity and memory are inseparably linked as “the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa.” He also explains that “the core meaning of an individual or group identity, namely a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity.”

Thus, a group or community’s history is important in shaping how the group remembers particular events and thus defines its identity (groupness) around those events. Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld focus on this particular concept in their work *Old Wounds*, as they discuss the differing versions of history which the Jewish and Ukrainian communities in Canada use to shape their identification and connectedness to their respective group. They state that

for [a] community, history is not neutral or without purpose. It is the shared heritage of past events. It encourages group members to find common cause and reinforce loyalties. It bonds individuals to the group and gives the group a sense of continuity with the past and a shared stake in the future.

Chapter 1 of this thesis, attempts to describe and explore the *narrative* which produced a specific version of Ukrainian identity. It is an attempt to describe the *process* by which a particular group, namely Displaced Ukrainians who arrived in Canada during the period from 1947 to 1953, constructed their identity or, more specifically, a sense of connectedness, through specific memories and a particular narrative of Ukrainian history. The chapter is not ‘neutral’ history, but an attempt to understand how collective memory developed and how it
became the basis of Ukrainian identification and connectedness in Toronto.

Many of the Ukrainian Displaced Persons had a specific understanding of their personal and ethno-national history which defined and created borders around their identity. The version of history which was prominent in the narratives of many if not most of these immigrants was developed during their time in Displaced Persons camps and constructed sense of connectedness among them, a sense of purpose. Haunted by the ravages of civil and World War, political unrest and the Holodomor, the Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons camps possessed a deep sense of pain and loss. This pain gave many of Ukrainians a sense of ‘commonality’ which became politically important. United by their pain, the Ukrainian Displaced Persons sought to assign blame for their dispossession, forced movement and the loss of loved ones. Nationalist groups in the camps laid primary blame on the Soviet regime, the policies of which had foreclosed Ukrainian independence. Thus Ukrainian nationalist groups focused on the Soviet destruction of nationalistic ethnic and religious institutions in Ukraine as a way to prove the threat of the Soviet government for the Ukrainian territory and its people. To many of these immigrants, the Soviet regime was intent on the total destruction of their religious and ethnic uniqueness. Most of the Displaced Ukrainians were influenced by nationalist party members who had also taken refuge in the camps and were thoroughly convinced that the Soviet Union needed to be destroyed and dismantled in order that Ukraine could be liberated from the Soviet yoke. The detached commonality which Ukrainians shared prior to the camps bloomed into a sense of connectedness in the camps. They shared similar stories and a united cause. When Ukrainian Displaced Persons arrived in Canada, their numeric strength and zealous endorsement of their version of events overran differing interpretations, and as a result, was proclaimed the basis for the ‘true’ Ukrainian identity in
the regions where they settled. Those that did not suit or agree with their narrative were considered beyond group boundaries and labelled not ‘really’ Ukrainian.

Chapter 2 describes how the arrival of the Displaced Persons, commonly called the Third Wave of Ukrainian Canadian immigration, shaped organizational life in the Ukrainian community. Unlike previous waves of Ukrainian immigration to Canada which settled mostly in the prairie provinces, the Displaced Ukrainians settled mostly in Ontario, making Toronto their hub. Upon arrival, they immediately started to look for ways to accomplish their collective goal, the liberation of Ukraine and the installation of a nationally oriented government. While they struggled to accomplish this, they understood that their children should also learn about the Ukrainian cause and culture, which according to them, was under Soviet attack and could be lost forever. Accordingly, it was imperative that their children learned about the culture in Ukraine. Dutifully then, they established or took over Ukrainian community schools where they could teach their children about a country they had never seen. The Ukrainian schools taught the language, literature, geography, history, religion and culture of Ukraine, while imbuing them with a sound appreciation of the traumas Ukrainians endured as a consequence of the ongoing Sovietisation and Russification of Ukraine. Schooling in Toronto was thus an act of resistance to Soviet silencing of Ukrainian religious and cultural institutions in the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian schools in Toronto began to formalize the version of events and the collective memory which the Displaced Ukrainians brought with them. This in turn helped to solidify and define the borders of groupness; defining who was a ‘real’ Ukrainian in Toronto and who was not.

The borders of Ukrainian groupness, according to many of the Ukrainians from the Displaced Persons camps, was based on the trauma of Russification and Sovietisation of
Ukraine. These borders became the defining element of connectedness in the community and became the dominant interpretation of Ukrainian identity in Toronto for the next forty years. However, in spite of all community efforts, by the 1980s, the community was starting to lose membership and vitality due to ‘slippage.’ Assimilation, or integration, was slowly claiming Ukrainian language usage as well as Ukrainian community involvement. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, immigration of Ukrainians from Ukraine began. Once again, Toronto became an important terminus for Ukrainian immigrants. Many Ukrainians in Toronto hoped that renewed immigration would renew vitality to the community and were ready to meet their compatriots with open arms. However, these new arrivals, now commonly called the Fourth Wave, were not at all what the existing community expected. Similarly, the post-1991 Ukrainian immigrants did not expect or understand the complex, strongly nationalist and political Ukrainian community they encountered in Toronto. Chapter 3 outlines the events surrounding the fall of the Soviet Union which affected Fourth Wave immigrants before their arrival. Fourth Wave immigrants were party to vastly different experiences and brought with them memories of a different Ukraine. Different contexts created different notions of Ukrainian identity, ones that were not necessarily grounded in a sense of strong Ukrainian identification or connectedness, but rather individual self-understanding and loose commonality with other Ukrainians. In short, the extremely heterogeneous group of identities which Fourth Wave Ukrainian immigrants brought with them in 1991, did not entirely correspond with the more homogeneous notions developed by those Ukrainians who arrived in the 1950s and transferred to their descendants. Because the notions of Ukrainian identity were so different between members of the Third Wave and members of the Fourth Wave, expectations of co-operation and mutual understanding were deflated. An acute awareness of
the differences between the groups was evident in rates of participation in community life in Toronto, particularly in rates of registration at Ukrainian schools.

One of the frequent complaints within the older established Ukrainian community today is that the post 1991 wave of immigration is not ‘really’ Ukrainian. This accusation is ‘justified’ by several factors, one of which is the low level of individual participation of the post 1991 group in the Ukrainian community and its schooling system. A research study done by Victor Satzewich, Wsevolod Isajiw and Eugene Duvalko state that post 1991 immigrants are uninterested in participating in existing community structures in Toronto. Chapter 4 explores why this is the case by investigating aspects of identity of Ukrainian immigrants arriving after 1991. Through a series of eleven interviews with Ukrainian-born informants from various regional, linguistic and religious backgrounds, the chapter examines attitudes and behaviour towards organizational life in Toronto, in particular towards the Ukrainian schools. It exposes variations of identity between some post 1991 immigrants and the organized community. It also suggests that the low participation in Ukrainian structures can be partially explained in terms of identity conflict. Those that agree with the Ukrainian identity supported by the organized community developed by the Third Wave, join Ukrainian schools. Those that do not, prove less likely to do so.

This work strives to outline the process by which the Third Wave created their sense of commonality as Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons camps and how that identity was re-enforced in the Ukrainian schooling system after they arrived in Toronto. It also strives to show that the changing context in Ukraine after 1947 affected the identity of those Ukrainians arriving in Toronto after 1991. In short, it seeks to explore how different contexts influenced different narratives of history and interpretations of events, creating different
identities in the two respective waves and partially explaining why many post 1991 immigrants do not participate in existing Ukrainian community structures, including Ukrainian schools. The Ukrainian schooling system has been a key institution within the Ukrainian community in Toronto and mere attendance is regarded a mark of membership within the ‘proper’ Ukrainian community. For many of the Third Wave and their descendents Ukrainian school is vital community institution, for many members of the Fourth Wave, it simply is not.


4 This term is used by Harold Troper and means the loss of ethnic markers or community orientation. Wsevolod Isajiw calls it ‘ethnic retention.’ See Wsevolod Isajiw and Tomako Makabe, “Socialization As a Factor in Ethnic Identity Retention” (Paper in Pluralism and Ethnicity Studies No.7, Department of Sociology. University of Toronto, 1982).

5 See Appendix F for discussion of Ukrainian immigration from Poland in the 1980s.

6 There is at least one organization which has been established by and caters to Fourth Wave members called the Fourth Wave Organization. It belongs to the organized community in Toronto. However, this discussion will focus on the involvement of the Fourth Wave in existing Ukrainian Canadian institutions since the arrival of this wave of immigration since 1991.

7 According to the results of the study, only 9% of Ukrainian immigrants participate in community institutions. Vic Satzewich, Wsevolod Isajiw and Eugene Duvalko. “Social Networks and the Occupational Settlement Experiences of Recent Immigrants from Ukraine in Toronto,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 31, nos.1-2 (Summer-Winter 2006), 18.
Chapter 1

Collective Memory and Identity in Displaced Persons Camps

The end of World War II left millions of people displaced across Europe; among them approximately two million Ukrainians.¹ People from all over Ukraine were gathered into Displaced Persons camps in Germany, Austria and Italy and waited for these host countries and international agencies to decide what must be done with them. Although the memories which the Displaced Ukrainians brought with them into the camps were varied, many harboured painful and horrific images. The brutality of occupation and civil upheaval, the terror of concentration and forced labour camps, the devastation of the Famine of 1932-1933 and feelings of loss, were still vivid in the minds of Ukrainians in the camps.² Through the efforts of Ukrainian nationalist groups at work in the Displaced Persons camps, these scaring memories became the building blocks for a specific Ukrainian identity, which the Displaced Persons brought with them across the Atlantic.³ Although the nationalist groups were deeply divided among themselves, the Ukrainian identity which they espoused rested on two overarching principles: anti-Soviet ideology and Ukrainian nationalism. They expressed outrage at the Soviet government and its policies, reinforcing negative memories about the Soviet Union and promoting Ukrainian nationalist and anti-Soviet feelings. This identity, nurtured in the camps, manifested itself zealously and became the dominant spirit of Ukrainian connectedness. It was this version of Ukrainian identity which was eventually promoted by the Ukrainian schooling system in Toronto. To understand the curricula of the Ukrainian schools and their role in identity formation in Toronto, one must understand how the construction of memory shaped the identity of the Ukrainian Displaced Persons.
Creating an Identity – Understanding History and Historiography

The history of the Ukrainian people and what is now the territory of Ukraine is complex and highly contested. However, historiography is important in the formation of Ukrainian identity. Ukrainocentric historians claim that Ukrainians have a history of autonomous nationhood because of the existence of Kyivan-Rus, a state which lasted from approximately the seventh century CE until it fell to the Mongol Horde in 1240 CE. This territory stretched across much of what is considered Ukraine today with Kyiv as its capital. The importance of this state, and specifically its capital Kyiv, is echoed in other Slavic Peoples’ historiographies and is often referred to as the ‘Cradle of the Slavs’ and the ‘Mother of All Russian Cities.’

After the fall of this state, its territory was carved up and people of Kyivan-Rus lived under the control of various neighbouring rulers. These rulers frequently competed to dominate all of the fertile territory, not only Kyiv. Consequently, over the centuries, the people of the territory experienced a number of different political regimes and socialization pressures, often dividing one part of what is now Ukraine from another. The fractious and turbulent history of Ukraine and the respective identity formation processes during various governments are important in understanding the differences that later arose in eastern and western Ukrainians.

The history of the formation of Ukrainian identity has been complex. Different regions of Ukraine developed their own identities under the rule of the particular neighbour who controlled the area at the time. The formation of Ukrainian connectedness in post-World War II Displaced Persons camps, however, is a distinct phenomenon. Unlike the earlier political socialization, where the processes of identity formation were dictated by the policies of various non-Ukrainian governments, the identity forged in the Displaced Persons camps
pulled together historical memories from all over Ukraine and without restriction. The memories selected by members of nationalist groups to re-enforce the group identity of those Ukrainians in the camps focused mostly on the policies of the Soviet government, in particular the policies in place during Stalin’s regime, which created a pro-nationalist and anti-communist orientation, suiting a nationalist Ukrainian agenda for Ukraine.

The Displaced Persons shared the experience of being forced to leave a war-torn land and being gathered together after World War II in large camps in Germany, Italy and Austria. In these camps, they had a chance to share their experiences and contemplate their futures. Three factors helped shape a sense of connectedness for many Ukrainians in the camps: the painful experiences of eastern Ukrainians, the painful experiences of western Ukrainians and the activist presence of nationalist organizations. The eastern Ukrainians had seen the Holodomor of 1932-1933, caused by the collectivization policies of the Five Year Plan, along with massive purges of Ukrainian intelligentsia and the destruction of Ukrainian religious institutions under Stalin. The western Ukrainians had endured an attack on their ethnic and religious institutions along with a subsequent push for Russification during Stalin’s regime. Nationalist groups systematically solidified these memories into a cause – the liberation of Ukraine from Soviet governance and the installation of a sovereign Ukrainian, nationalist government.

The Ukrainian nationalist movement in the camps was internally fractious. There were a number of Ukrainian nationalist groups in exile in Europe. Re-enforcing a sense of national consciousness in the Displaced Persons camps, one which promoted sovereignty for Ukraine, was in the best interests of these varied groups as it could be manoeuvred to promote their installation as the ruling government if achieved. While the territory the nationalist groups
called ‘Ukraine’ had seen its fair share of devastation at the hands of Nazi Germany, because the territory was dominated by the Soviet government after World War II, the nationalist groups focused not on memories of German occupation, but on those of ongoing Soviet occupation. John Gillis states that “[n]ational memory is shared by people who have never seen or heard one another, yet regard themselves as having a common history” and that these people “are bound together as much by forgetting as by remembering.” Because the Soviets, and not the Nazis, stood in the way of Ukrainian liberation at the time, the Nazis did not figure as prominently in the narrative of nationalist groups. Nationalist groups, seeing the USSR as the enemy, placed recruiters in the camps to nurture the painful memories of Russification and Sovietisation, in order to create a unifying collective memory in the camps. As a result, Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons camps remembered Soviet occupation vividly, while pushing the memories of Nazi occupation into the background. The memories selected fused anti-Russification and anti-Soviet sentiments, so as to unify Ukrainians behind a struggle for the independence of Ukraine. Thus feelings of dispossession by Soviet occupation and passion for Ukrainian national liberation became the core marker of groupness for the majority of Ukrainian Displaced Persons and gave them a sense of national purpose which they imported with them into the lands of their resettlement – including Canada.

The Memories Selected

In order to contextualize the anti-Soviet feelings on which many of the Displaced Ukrainians based their identification and connectedness, one must examine the particular memories which were selected to formulate their identity. Eastern Ukraine had different experiences under Soviet control than did western Ukraine and thus they warrant separate discussion. In
both cases, however, the memories selected focused on Soviet destruction of the unique
Ukrainian ethnic and religious institutions through a deliberate policy of Sovietisation and
Russification. In essence, systematic destruction of Ukrainian cultural and religious
institutions by the Soviet Union was seen as an attack on the Ukrainian nation and its people.
The attacks on the respective religious institutions in both eastern and western Ukraine were
particularly significant as these institutions were, in fact, ethnic institutions which played a
critical role in the formation of Ukrainian nationhood. The destruction of these religious
institutions, in turn, helped to enforce a religious zeal in those Ukrainian Displaced Persons
who came to Canada.

**Eastern Ukrainians**

The growth of nationalism and nationhood in eastern Ukraine is a complicated story of
support and suppression. Ukrainian identity was encouraged and then suppressed depending
on the priorities of the Russian imperial government which, until 1917, dominated most of
the area called ‘eastern Ukraine.’ However, Ukrainians had a special place in the Russian
Empire. They were called *Little Russians*, brothers of the Great Russians (Russians) and
White Russians (Byelorussians) and their language was considered a quaint peasant dialect,
not officially supported, but not outlawed. By the 1800s however, rumblings of Ukrainian
nationalism and liberal ideals began threatening the Tsar’s control. The linguistic and cultural
differences between Russians and Ukrainians were downplayed. According to historian
Stephen Velychenko, Russian historians long maintained that the Ukrainian language was a
dialect of Russian, and that the territory of Ukraine was an historical and indivisible part of
Russia. Due to the imperial needs of the Russian state, this “interpretation of Ukrainian
history became systematic and monolithic.” The Ukrainian language, as marker of separate
ethnicity, became a political issue. Several decrees, such as the Valuev Circular (1863) and the Ems Ukase (1876), placed severe restrictions on Ukrainian language publications in order to discourage its use in favour of Russian.

This changed when the 1917 Revolution threw the former imperial Russian controlled territories of Ukraine into turmoil and civil strife. The period after 1917 was marked by constant political unrest in Ukrainian territories and even a brief period of self-declared Ukrainian independence as Ukrainians in the former imperial Russian lands sought to legitimize their right to autonomous territory. Politicians supporting independence for Ukrainian lands stressed the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture and used ethnicity as a tool to solidify claims to national autonomy. The independence movement failed. In 1922, former Russian territories in eastern Ukraine were incorporated into the USSR as one of its founding republics. The fledging Soviet government in Ukraine courted support in order to solidify its power and in so doing allowed Ukrainian self-expression to win over the people of the territory. Gerhard Simon notes that all Soviet nationalities policies, including those in Ukraine, were grounded in two basic assumptions:

1. Support for non-Russian peoples occurred only on the condition and in the expectation of stabilizing or establishing the Party’s rule. In this respect nation building was a tool of Sovietization.

2. The long term goal of nation-building was not differentiation of nations but a “merger” of nations [...] nationalism and the national question were characteristics of bourgeois society and would lose all political significance under socialism

Thus, during the early days of Soviet government, Lenin granted a series of concessions to the republics in order to gain stability and acceptance. One of these concessions was the korenizatsiia policy installed in 1923. This policy ensured that the many nationalities of the
USSR were educated in their own languages, and ethnic cultures and traditions were encouraged in order to counteract what was called ‘Russian chauvinism.’ Thus Ukrainianization was encouraged in the early years of the USSR and helped develop a sense of Ukrainian peoplehood with official state support and financing. However, this period was also short lived. When Stalin succeeded Lenin, the policies on ethnic groups changed dramatically. Russification became order of the day.

Stalin’s regime became the lightning rod for anti-Soviet sentiment in eastern Ukraine -- a sentiment that was dominant among many eastern Ukrainians who arrived in Toronto after World War II. They remembered how Stalin first restricted the korenizatsiia policy, then and eventually reversed it entirely, focusing instead on the elimination of Ukrainian cultural and religious institutions. According to the dominant interpretation of these events by eastern Ukrainians settling in Toronto, Stalin was focused on destroying the Ukrainian people.¹⁹

According to Simon, Stalin feared that the republics and their respective ethnicities too empowered.²⁰ The ideological incompatibility of nationalism with Marxist-Leninist thought were aggravated by the costly korenizatsiia program.²¹ Stalin believed that the nationalities policies divided rather than strengthened the USSR. The ‘nationalities problem,’ as he described it, was corrected by dramatic methods. Korenizatsiia was to be crushed. Stalin ordered several purges of nationally conscious leaders and intelligentsia who he believed were untrustworthy. Any mention of national pride was condemned as counter-revolutionary and ‘bourgeois nationalism’ became illegal. Korenizatsiia became a taboo subject and a centralized Russian Soviet orientation began to emerge.²² After the great purges, language, hiring and educational policies also followed a path of Russification.²³ As a result, those Ukrainians coming to Canada sincerely regarded the Ukrainian identity as under threat, and it
was their duty to defend it.

Although the reversal of korenizatsiia and the great purges of intelligentsia were a terrifying shock, nothing so exemplified Soviet brutality as the Great Famine of 1932-1933 also known as the Holodomor. This famine was the greatest atrocity that eastern Ukrainians ever experienced.24 Most of those who experienced the Holodomor believe that there was a clearly intentional Soviet programme to use famine as a genocidal tool to exterminate the Ukrainian people. One contemporary account described how soldiers

would surround [a village], make a thorough search, carry away all
the food and isolate the village, prohibiting people from leaving or
entering it. The villagers lived on whatever food they had hidden;
then they ate dogs, cats and mice; then they died. The whole village
would die, and the army would proceed to the next unyielding village
on the list.25

Accounts of people forced to cannibalism were not uncommon.26 Conservative estimates indicate that there was a loss of 4.5 million people between the years 1932-1933, however some estimates claim a death toll as high as 10 million. Most historians now estimate between 5 and 6 million people died due to famine during these years.27 The Great Famine, the Famine-Genocide, the Holodomor, became the single major symbol of the terror of Sovietisation and the proof to the Ukrainian Displaced Persons that Stalin was consciously trying to eradicate the Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian people.28

Furthermore, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was also under attack by the Soviet regime. To those in the Displaced Persons camps, the destruction of this national religious institution was of particular significance as this Church played a key role in the development of Ukrainian identity and nationhood. The Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox
Church in Ukraine was organized as an ethnically based religious institution; one that supported the goal of Ukrainian self-government and a nationally conscious people. It fused the ideas of Ukrainian ethnicity and Autocephalous Orthodoxy into an indivisible national identity. The Soviet effort to destroy the Church were interpreted as an attack on the Ukrainian nation.

In the post-revolutionary turmoil that soon led to the formation of the USSR, the small, formerly repressed Ukrainian national movement began to discard the relics of Russian imperial domination, including imperial control over Ukrainian religious structures. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine had been under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow since 1686. According to historian Bohdan Bociurkiw, the urban priests, military chaplains, and lay intellectuals who made up the movement’s leadership, thought that the Russian Orthodox Church appeared to represent a major obstacle to the national and social emancipation of the Ukrainian people; the Church’s past role as a legitimizer of autocracy, imperial unity, and the old social order, its hostility to the “Ukrainian separatism,” its contempt for the Ukrainian language, its employment of religious sanctions against rebels, [...] all these features of the old religio-political system have contributed to the alienation of the large majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia from the established church prior to World War I.²⁹

The leaders of the nationalist movement decided the country needed a new church that would reflect and promote Ukrainian national aspirations.³⁰

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was rooted in three principles, autocephaly, Ukrainianization and conciliarism. Autocephaly meant that the new Church was to be self governing without interference from any other church body. This principle was the
“ecclesiastical equivalent of the ideal of national independence from Russia” and
Ukrainianization, meant that the “once ridiculed [Ukrainian] language was given new dignity
and respect when it replaced Old Church Slavonic or Russian in the services.” Conciliarism
meant the democratization of church governance and an end to independent decision making
for the church hierarchy. The new Church “repudiated the seventeenth century annexation of
the Kiev metropolitanate by the Moscow patriarchate as an ‘immoral,’ ‘anti-canonical,’ and
‘illegitimate act of violence’” and decreed that the Church should use Ukrainian folk art,
music and old traditions that were previously deemed unworthy.

The national message to the people was clear. In effect, the new Church was a pillar in
the Ukrainian national liberation struggle against Russian dominance. The Church sought to
weld the peasantry into a nationally conscious body by preaching Ukrainian liberation and
offering the peasantry their first taste of political power through the democratically elected
Church councils (rady). This worked well. Because the movement was attractive to the
peasantry, the Church quickly gained a following estimated to be anywhere from three to six
million. According to contemporaries, what drew the largest amount of people to the
Church was its usage of the Ukrainian vernacular; the people enjoyed hearing their language
and felt a sense of pride that it was used in a house of worship.

The Church helped to fuse the ideas of Ukrainian ethnic identity and Autocephalous
Orthodoxy making them inseparable. It did this by assuring the people that “[t]he
Russification, centralization, and bureaucratization of the Orthodox Church [...] had alienated
the Ukrainian people, denying them the full satisfaction of their religious needs.”
Russification was rejected as an ethnic-political process, an obstacle to the religious needs of
Ukrainians. Russian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian Orthodoxy were declared mismatched. The
Ukrainian ethnic and Orthodox religious identities were considered fused and inseparable. Thus, when the Soviet attack on the Church began, it was condemned not just as an attack on spirituality, but also on the Ukrainian nation itself.

Although its canonicity is hotly debated, the first Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was officially established by the Ukrainian Rada in May 1920. Ironically, the Church initially received support from the Bolsheviks when it signed a decree stating that it should not play a role in education. If this denied the Church a direct role in education, it did allow the Church to exist. However when the Church developed a considerably large following, and the national message became incompatible with Stalin’s new direction for ethnicities, the Soviet government became extremely hostile and began a full scale attack on the Church. By the time the attack began, however, many Ukrainians had already embraced the Church and its nationalist message. Thus the attacks on the Church were viewed by many Ukrainians as attacks on the Ukrainian people and their national identity, an injustice which would not be forgotten by those eastern Ukrainians who later came to Canada.

Although the policies of the Church seemed at first in-line with the official korenizatsiya policies of the Leninist regime, their overtly nationalistic characteristics made the Soviet officials extremely wary. As early as 1922, the government started to impose sanctions on the young Church and by 1929 it was under full scale attack. In November 1929 the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was issued a death sentence: it was accused of collaboration with the fictional counter-revolutionary organ, Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. Repressive measures imposed on the Church included the closing of parishes, the imprisonment and exile of priests and the exiling and execution of the Church’s Metropolitan. The Church was officially dissolved by the Soviet government at an
extraordinary meeting (Sobor) in January 1930. In the wake of the 1930 Sobor, wholesale purges of Ukrainian intelligentsia, both lay and clergymen, began. Many clergymen who were not exiled or incarcerated perished in the “bloodbath of the great purges” under Stalin. The faithful were also not immune. According to Ilarion, Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada from 1951 to 1972, “[d]uring this purge hundreds of thousands of the faithful [...] were liquidated, deposed and exiled into forced labour camps of Russia.” Contemporary accounts state that the repression was horrific and widespread. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was liquidated and the newly re-instated, state controlled Russian Orthodox Church began to re-install Moscow’s control. The efforts of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to promote a unique religious structure independent of Moscow were crushed – but the memories of the Church and its role in nation building were not lost among those Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons camps.

The Soviet policies during Stalin’s regime which focused on Sovietisation and the Russification of cultural and religious institutions in eastern Ukraine left an legacy of attack, loss and sense of pain among those who left the region during World War II. These feelings were used as ideological tools by nationalist groups, present in the Displaced Persons camps in the wake of the war, to breed contempt and defiance for the Soviet Union and Soviet ideology.

Western Ukrainians

Western Ukraine underwent processes of nation building separate from that of eastern Ukrainians throughout its history. Importantly, this area was annexed to the Soviet Union at the close of World War II after a solid sense of ‘Ukrainianess’ was already present in the population. The area had been historically dominated by different foreign powers but
profundely influenced by the Polish and Austro-Hungarian regimes. Their policies before World War II were critical in the development of a Ukrainian ethnos in the region. Western Ukraine had been under Polish rule for the longest period of all and indeed the use of the term *Ukrajina* -- designating a name for a specific area -- was first used by Polish sources in the sixteenth century. Polonocentric versions of Ukrainian identity never became deeply rooted in Ukrainian self-identification, in large part because the Polish overlords showed greater desire for national not ethnic unification of Ukrainian territory with the Polish kingdom, a fact which would be critical in identity politics later on.

The foundation myths of Polish presence in Ukraine stem from medieval and early modern writings which stated that the Polish King Boleslaw I captured Kyiv temporarily in 1018 CE and several other times in various wars. Therefore, in the Polish narrative, Rus was Polish land by right of conquest. Ethnically, however, “the noble, virtuous Poles were contrasted with the coarse arrogant, servile, and treacherous Rus nation. This interpretation of Polish-Rus relations echoed through Polish historiography for years.”

The question of religion also deeply separated the Poles from Rus. After the schism of Byzantium and Rome, the Polish and Rus were juxtaposed by Polish chroniclers “in terms of good Catholic Poles versus bad schismatic Rus” a view which became the basis for all but two schools of Polish historians. The poor treatment of Ukrainian clergy by Polish clergy ultimately lead to the creation of the most powerful institutions within Ukrainian identity formation in western Ukraine – The Ukrainian Catholic Church.

However, although the formation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church happened under Polish rule, the formation of a Ukrainian identity did not happen on a large scale in the region until the Partitions of Poland, when the former Polish dominated Ukrainian territories fell
under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. When the Austrians gained Ukrainian lands previously under Poland, they called the people east of the San river by a distinct name which was used until the fall of the Austrian Empire in 1918: *Ruthenian.* It was a stroke of political luck for ethnic Ukrainians that Poland lost its territory during a time of Romantic thought in the Habsburg Empire. The Romantic thinkers, with their love of folklore and all things ‘of the people,’ greatly influenced the Habsburg Empress Maria-Theresa (1717-1780). Through her initiative, the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) were officially designated as a distinct people within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, in an era of national awakening, grew into a strongly self-conscious group. They acquired their own schooling systems, complete with textbooks in Ruthenian, at the village level in 1777. Schooling became compulsory in 1781 under Maria Theresa’s son Joseph II (1741-1790). Also a special seminary school, named St. Barbara, was created in Vienna in 1775. It accepted Ruthenian seminarians, exposing them to western-European intellectual life. This had “a great impact in promoting an awareness of Slavic culture” in the area.

Although the Ruthenian movement declined after the death of Joseph II, the intellectual elite did not sleep. In the 1830s, Ruthenian national sentiment grew. By 1848, Ruthenian identity was once more supported during the so called ‘springtime of nations.’ Urged on by Count Franz Stadion (1806-1853), the Governor of Galicia, the Ruthenians elected deputies to the national parliament, created a department of Ruthenian Language and Literature at the University of L’viv, had their own political organization called the Supreme Ruthenian Council and their own cultural organization called the Congress of Ruthenian Scholars. By 1944, when Stalin incorporated the western Ukrainian lands into the Ukrainian SSR, western Ukrainians had a full set of ethnic cultural and religious institutions. The subsequent Soviet
policy of destruction and Russification of these institutions was to the western Ukrainians an attack on their very nationhood.

Although western Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons camps never experienced the horrors of the *Holodomor*, nationalist groups reassured them of the threat of Russification and Sovietisation. Western Ukrainians were reminded that the Soviets briefly captured western Ukrainian territory at the beginning of the 1920s and again in 1939, losing it for a brief period to Nazi Germany before they regained it in 1944. Long past the days of the cosmopolitan *korenizatsiia* policy, Ukrainian Displaced Persons were made aware of anti-nationalist Soviet governmental policies, which included prioritizing Russian language use and the primacy of (Russian) Soviet identity. The establishment of Soviet institutions to replace Ukrainian institutions included “political parties, cultural societies,...cooperatives and newspapers.”58 All this was seen as a direct assault on the Ukrainian nation, made worse by the Soviet deportation of Ukrainian cultural leaders to prison camps in eastern regions of the Soviet Union.59

However, it was the destruction of the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church which truly made those from western Ukraine feel that their very essence as a people was under attacked.60 The Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church had played a critical role in the development of Ukrainian identity and nationalism during Austro-Hungarian rule. The western Ukrainian territories (Eastern Galicia) first came under Austrian rule in the first partition of Poland in 1772. Higher education and official status were given to Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic priests. Seminaries were founded to train Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic priests. With this education, these priests “became the first Ruthenian national awokeners in Galicia and the leaders of the Ruthenian political movement in 1848; their children became
the secular intelligentsia that comprised the leadership of the Ruthenian national
movement.61 Indeed, clergy headed the national movement until the 1880s when the secular
intelligentsia took a distinctly anti-clerical turn.62 However, at the dawn of World War I the
clergy, under the leadership of a revered Metropolitan who gained a reputation as one of the
principle heroes of the Ukrainian struggle for statehood, once again took command of the
nationalist movement. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi (Metropolitan of Halych,
Archbishop of L’viv 1900-1944) provided Church connection with and support for Ukrainian
nationalism and helped to fuse Ukrainian ethnic identity with Ukrainian religious tradition.
When the Soviets took over western Ukraine permanently in 1944, it was this fusion of
Ukrainian nationalist and religious identities which they confronted. For many if not all
western Ukrainians who were Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic, any Soviet attack on either the
Ukrainian nation or attack on their Church, was an attack on both.

Sheptyts’kyi helped to fuse Ukrainian ethnic and Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic
consciousness in a number of ways. Among other things, he planned to change the name of
the faith from ‘Greek Catholic,’ the official name given to the faith during the reign of
Empress Maria Theresa, to ‘Ukrainian Catholic.’ He also wished to create a Ukrainian
patriarchate and introduce vernacular Ukrainian into church services. He died before all his
goals were achieved but his successor, Josyf Cardinal Slipyj did eventually accomplish most
of them.63 Sheptyts’kyi was also adamant in rejecting Soviet atheism directed at Ukrainian
youth. In a pastoral letter in December 1939, he stated that “just as treason against your
Fatherland is an abominable crime, so too is the betrayal of the Holy Church, our Mother...”64
In this construction, the Ukrainian Fatherland and the Mother Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic
Church are pictured as two halves of a whole, inseparable from one another. This idea, that
faith and Ukrainian ethnicity were the essence of Ukrainian identity, was also impressed on Displaced Persons in the camps from western Ukraine. They came to regard it a holy duty to save Ukraine from the atheistic and Russian USSR which sought to undermine the power of the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church as a way to destroy Ukrainian national sentiment.

The Soviet attack on the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church was a more cautious and delicate operation than was the Soviet attack on the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church because the Soviets appreciated the deep and historic popularity of the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church and, equally important, the strength of its protector, the Vatican. However the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church’s anti-communist position, its support of Ukrainian national aspirations and its ties to the powerful Vatican all made it suspect to Soviet authorities. During Soviet occupation of western Ukraine from 1939 to 1941, tentative yet significant steps were taken against the Church in order to weaken its hold on the Ukrainian population. The Soviets did not ban the Church but removed its means of sustenance and support. Printing and publishing facilities were confiscated so that the Church had no means of mass producing and distributing religious literature. All religious books and pamphlets were removed from bookstores, public and school libraries. Church property, including seminaries and theological academies, were nationalized so that no future clergy could be trained in Ukraine. The Soviet government also discontinued state payment for the upkeep of priests, forcing them to find secular jobs and imposed punitive taxes on those who did not find work. Soviet authorities also tried to undermine the Church’s influence over the youth by banning all religious ceremonies and symbols from schools and bombarding university students with lectures and public talks in support of atheism. Sunday observance was allowed, but all other feast days were designated regular work days. The Soviets were
driven out by the Nazis in 1941 but these anti-Church restrictions were reinstated and
tightened when the Soviets retook western Ukraine after the Battle of Brody in July 1944.69

The death of the popular Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi in November 1944, the flight of
Ukrainian nationalists out of the newly re-occupied Soviet territory, an exodus of at least ten
percent of the clergy, the recent memory of the western Ukrainian military insurgency, and
especially the existence of the S.S. unit *Galizien*, no doubt left the Soviets feeling that their
punitive policies were warranted when they re-took western Ukraine from the German
forces.70 Measures against the Church were soon much harsher than those in place between
1939 and 1941 and the process of the liquidation of the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church
accelerated. Firstly, there was a psychological undermining of the illegitimacy of the faith.
In the official press, the creation of Greek (Ukrainian) Catholicism was recognized as
necessary during a period of hostile Roman Catholic Polish rule. However, now because they
were sheltered from these influences by the Soviet Union, Ukrainians should ‘re-join’ the
Russian Orthodox faith which was their true historical Church.71 Ukrainian priests and
church leaders who objected were declared treasonous by the Soviet authorities, arrested and
deported. This created a void in Church leadership which was filled by a Soviet-approved
‘patriotic’ leadership who officially steered Church policy towards a ‘reunion’ with the
Russian Orthodox Church.72 The person chosen to head this task was the outspoken Greek
(Ukrainian) Catholic priest, Father Havryil Kostel’nyk, who had previously voiced distrust of
the Vatican.73 The next step was the announcement of the Russian Orthodox Church that it
welcomed the prospect of ‘re-uniting’ the Ukrainian people of western Ukraine with their
‘original’ faith and subsequently re-educating the clergy. The high point of the re-unification
process was the so-called Reunion *Sobor* held in L’viv on March 8 to 10, 1946 during which
the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church ‘voluntarily’ gave up its union with Rome and reunited with the Russian Orthodox Church. The final phase was the liquidation of any of those deemed to be heretics, of which there were many.

On March 10, 1946 the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church officially ceased to exist. However, the Church did continue clandestine operations. What is more, nationalist groups at work in the Displaced Persons camps used the persecution of western Ukrainian ethnic and religious institutions to inspire Displaced Ukrainians to a cause – the defence of God and Country.

**Organizing Memories in the Displaced Persons Camps**

There seemed to be no end of painful memories to choose from creating a sense of Ukrainian group identity, or connectedness, within the Displaced Persons camps; but the memories that formed the basis of a nationalist group narrative focused on the violent Sovietisation and Russification processes imposed by Stalin on Ukrainian cultural and religious structures. Using these memories and the sense of victimization they produced, Ukrainian nationalist factions worked to recruit support for their specific programs, each intending to oust the Soviet government from Ukraine. Focusing on the most horrific memories of the Sovietisation process, the recruiters and faction members turned pain and trauma into anger, and anger into a purpose.

If Ukrainian Displaced Persons were not already sympathetic to a particular political faction before their arrival in the camps, many certainly were after. It was in the camps that the Displaced Ukrainians had time to regroup and reflect on what had occurred in their lives. Here east met west and shared the sense of dispossession. And there were nationalist
leaders ready to focus and use those painful memories. Up to twelve different political groups were active in the camps. They were divided by issues of leadership and politics. All hoped to win support for their particular faction.\textsuperscript{77} The major nationalist groups at work were the two factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - OUN(M), known as the Melnykites (Melnykivtsi), and OUN(B), known as the Banderites (Banderivtsi).\textsuperscript{78} These two groups were of western Ukrainian origin but found support among some easterners as well. Another group which later became relevant in Toronto, albeit by another name, was the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP), lead by writer Ivan Bahrainej. It had a central- eastern Ukrainian and Orthodox support base. Although all these groups focused on the same goal, the liberation of Ukraine, they were at odds and fought among themselves. This created deep divisions within the camps, turning Ukrainian against Ukrainian. Recruiters within the camps sought out members for their particular faction and were absolutist in their mandates, often precluding cooperation with each other. The bulk of political control fell to the OUN(B) who dominated camp elections and forced other groups into alliances as a means of survival.\textsuperscript{79} Parties of all stripes tried to “directly influence the composition of the camp administration and to use DP self-government for partisan purposes.”\textsuperscript{80} As much as the political groups fought and bickered with each other incessantly over details, according to historian Vasyl Markus:

\begin{quote}
[I]he ideal of Ukrainian independence became a foregone conclusion for all Ukrainians [in the camps]. The question arose how that independence could be achieved, not whether it was desirable.

[In the Displaced Persons camps] parties had their options and were ready to popularize them among their constituents. \textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

Their nationalist message was disseminated in several ways. Firstly, the nationalist
groups printed an array of newspapers and pamphlets to propagate their ideas. Secondly, they organized a school system where the nationalist message was emphasized. According to historian Daria Markus, schooling in the camps flourished because a large part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia fled the Soviets and provided a large number of teachers for the camp schools. There was also “a patriotic commitment on the part of the teachers to educate Ukrainian youth. This was sustained by a belief that only through education could the nation regain its independence.” This assumption was of critical importance later, when Ukrainian Displaced Persons began settling in Canada. Lastly, the nationalist message was spread by word of mouth. The principle of self-government applied in the camps encouraged political discussion. Despite their bickering, by using the memories of ethnic and religious repression under Stalin to promote their cause, the nationalist political groups were able to create a sense of Ukrainian connectedness in the camps; one that joined eastern Ukrainians’ vehement anti-Soviet passion with the nationalistic fervour of western Ukrainians. In this nationalist narrative, all Ukrainians suffered at the hands of the Soviet authorities and thus were bonded together in duty and purpose as a people.

When the Displaced Ukrainians arrived in Toronto, they commemorated the suffering that they endured, and this pain became a salient marker of continuing group connectedness. They saw that the only way to heal their wounds was to vow never to forget the atrocities inflicted upon them by the Soviets. They vowed to remain a separate and distinct people; one with a proud history, beautiful living language and rich folk culture; one that supported an independent Ukraine. It was imperative to commemorate the pain they had endured, but also celebrate their status as a separate ethnicity, in order to distance themselves from any form of comparison with their Russified Soviet oppressors. The Ukrainian Displaced Persons who
arrived in Toronto brought with them a script, written by nationalist groups in the camps and grounded in the experience of painful memories. This script laid out the way the community was, or should be organized, educated, and the way a ‘true’ Ukrainian acted. It bespoke a version of Ukrainian identity which was glorious yet victimized, suppressed but assertive. Those who did not conform to this script were deemed not ‘true’ Ukrainians, or worse, traitors. This view almost immediately caused tensions between the Displaced Ukrainians and the previously existing Ukrainian community in Toronto.

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1 This number is however, not necessarily the only estimate. Historians Gerus and Rea state that the number of Displaced Ukrainians stood at approximately 2.5 million. Vasyl Markus estimates 2 million. Historian Luciuk states that the number was much higher, upwards of 3.5 million. O.W. Gerus and J.E Rea, *The Ukrainians in Canada* (Saint John: Canadian Historical Association, 1985); Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties in the DP Camps,” in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*, ed. Wsevolod. W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk and Roman Senkus (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992), 115-116; Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 64.

2 This famine will be henceforth called by its name in Ukrainian, the Holodomor.

3 The term ‘identity’ in this chapter has several connotations as explored by Frederick Cooper and explained in the Introduction to this thesis.

4 The spelling of the word ‘Rus’ with a prime and not an apostrophe is to indicate its palatal pronunciation and is standard practice in contemporary Ukrainian scholarship. Andrij Makuch, in discussion with author, June 29, 2009.

5 The territory of what is now Ukraine was united officially in 1944, with the Soviet defeat of the Nazis at the Battle of Brody. The Crimea was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. It was not a part of the historic lands of Kyivan-Rus. The term ‘eastern Ukraine’ is a linguistic shorthand referring to the territories long dominated by the Russian Empire, although this territory stretches into the vast majority of central Ukraine and at times parts of western Ukraine as well. The historically Russian dominated territory is sometimes referred to as Velyka Ukraiina (Greater Ukraine), Left Bank Ukraine, Little Russia or Dnieper Ukraine. ‘Western Ukraine’ in this work is also a linguistic shortcut and refers to the rest of Ukrainian territory. The Zbruch River was a historical territorial border.


7 Some historians believe this is because of sympathetic feelings towards the Nazis, as they claim is evidenced by the existence of the S.S. Division Galizen (also known as Divizia Halychyna.) However, S.S. Galizen was formed much the shock and dismay of both factions of the insurgent military organization, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), who believed that the division would stain the reputation of the Ukrainian cause for liberation (which it did). Both factions of the OUN (OUN(M) and OUN(B)) officially rejected fascist ideology in 1942 and 1943 respectively due to the poor treatment of Ukrainians by the Nazi forces – Ukrainians were Slavs and thus ‘sub-human.’ Many Ukrainians who
helped Nazi forces were sent to concentration camps or exterminated after Nazi control had been established in L’viv in 1941. However, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine believed that the division could serve as a nucleus for a national army, should Germany fall to the Soviets, and gave the division his seal of approval. It is clear from Sheptyts’kyi’s letters that he was most certainly not a Nazi sympathizer and had ulterior motives for the division. For the nationalists in the camps, focusing anger at the Nazis would not help the cause for liberation, as the Nazis had been defeated and only the Soviets stood in the way of the nationalist groups. Therefore, although the Ukrainians did have two enemies during World War II, the suffering of Ukrainians at the hands of Nazi troops were not a prominent theme of nationalist groups in the battle for liberation in comparison with the anti-Soviet theme. Bohdan Budurowycz “Sheptyts’kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914,” in Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, ed. Paul Robert Magocsi (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1989),63, 64; Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties in the DP Camps,”128; Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada Ltd, 1988), 14-24.


9 An anti-Russification and not anti-Russian mentality was stressed within the camps by various nationalist groups after they had been in operation for a few years but seemingly did not come soon enough to be effective. It is noted by historians Troper and Weinfeld that Ukrainians also suffered at the hands of the Nazis. As Nazi ideology held that Slavs were little better than Jews, Ukrainians may have eventually suffered the same fate as was intended for the Jewish population in the Third Reich. Myroslav Yurkevych, “Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics,” in The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II, ed. Wsevolod. W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk and Roman Senkus, 138; Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada, 15-17.

10 See note 5 this chapter.

11 It is interesting to note that the Russian imperial government did support Ukrainian ethnic institutions when it was convenient. Ukrainian identity was supported as a means to de-Polonize Polish dominated Ukrainian areas which Russia had conquered. However, the language was never elevated past a colloquial dialect and never taught as an official language under Russian control. Alexei Miller, The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century (Budapest: Central European University Share Company, 2003), 24.

12 Stephen Velychenko, National History as a Cultural Process (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992),134.

13 Stephen Velychenko, National History as a Cultural Process, 134.

14 There was a brief period in 1905 when restrictions were lifted somewhat in the disorientation of the 1905 Revolution, but had returned again by 1910. Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 381.

15 One only has to read the works of historian and leader of the Central Rada, Mykhailo Hrushevsky to understand this.


17 Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities in the Soviet Union.
This policy is also called the ‘indigenization’ policy or programme in the literature.

One of the key issues in Ukrainian historiography is the issue whether the Holodomor (1932-1933) was an intentional policy devised by Stalin or whether it was unintentional. There is even outright denial of the occurrence of this event. However, most if not all of the eastern Ukrainians who arrived in Toronto after 1947 held that the Holodomor was intentional and especially devised to destroy the people of the territory to make way for ethnic Russian cadres, more efficient mechanized collection of grain, and to boost quota numbers. The collection of every single grain would mean that there would be more grain to sell in order to purchase updated machinery for grain production. It also would mean that the people of the territory would perish, clearing the land for more efficient use and, as the narrative goes, to make way for the re-settlement of the territory by ethnic Russians who would uphold the Russification policy which Stalin undertook in the 1930s.


Indeed to have documents and education systems in many official languages was a costly undertaking and became unsupportable. See Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities in the Soviet Union*.

For an excellent explanation of this process, see Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities in the Soviet Union*.


Roma Chumak Horbach states that the western Ukrainians were nationalists, while the eastern Ukrainians were anti-communist. When these two elements combined in Toronto the result was a very political, extremely anti-communist and highly nationalistic Ukrainian identity. “The Ukrainian Language in Canada,” in *Heritage Languages and Education: The Canadian Experience*, ed. Marcel Danesi, Keith McLeod and Sonia Morris (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1993), 101.


Accounts of the Holodomor by survivors in Canada are carefully documented by the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Centre at 620 Spadina Ave, Toronto Ontario, Canada. They were initially called the Ukrainian Famine Research Center and released an award winning documentary film on the subject called “The Harvest of Despair.” See Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Center. [www.ucrdc.org](http://www.ucrdc.org) (accessed August 20, 2009).


The Holodomor was officially recognized as a genocide against the Ukrainian people by the Ukrainian government. Canada was the first country to recognize it internationally by unanimously passing Private Member’s Bill C-459 on May 29, 2008.


It should be noted that there was a large and strong component of the lay intelligentsia who was vehemently atheistic, however the creation of a new Church with all ties cut from Moscow, persuaded these individuals to return. Also, although Orthodoxy was prominent in what is called ‘eastern’ in this
discussed, it also was present in western Ukraine. There was an Autocephalous movement in western Ukraine as well after the initial movement. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, “The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, 1920-1930: A Study in Religious Modernization.”


42 Metropolitan Bohdan Lypkivs’kyi was executed after he was no longer ‘officially’ a Metropolitan in 1937. Yurij (Archbishop of the Eastern Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada), interview by Anastasia Baczynskyyj, April 28, 2009. Mississauga, Ontario.


44 Ilarion (Ohienko), The Ukrainian Church: Outlines of History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada (Winnipeg: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada, 1986), 302.

45 For more details see The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book.

46 The Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet government reached an agreement’ in 1943 effectively becoming the only officially supported religious institution in the USSR. Frank E. Sysyn, “Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR,” in Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2003), 82.

47 There was another Autocephalous movement in eastern Ukraine in 1942 under German occupation, however this was also crushed when Soviets re-gained control in the region.
Again this term is a short hand for the territories which were called ‘Eastern Galicia’ during the Austro-Hungarian period. It is the territory historically controlled by Poland, and later, Austria-Hungary but not Russia. See note 5 this chapter.


Empress Maria Theresa renamed the Church, the Greek Catholic Church. Prior to her re-naming, it was called the Uniate Church. Maria Theresa, believed the name would give the clergy more distinction. John-Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900* (Montreal: Queen’s-McGill University Press, 1999), 6. See note 58.


Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 398

As with all official policies, this support of Ruthenian identity was not all for the sake of non-interested philanthropy. All political policies are created for a reason. The creation of a Ruthenian identity ensured that Ukrainians would not join the Polish in any sort of ethnic alliance. This proved to be a successful strategy as the Ukrainians finally had a sense of worth next to their haughty former overlords. The Austrians promoted Ukrainian identity vis-a-vis Polish identity because the later was rebelling against Austrian governance in the 1830’s. Thus the Austro-Hungarian government promoted Ukrainian identity because it increased their political stronghold in the region. Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia: 1815-1849* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 212; Paul Robert Magocsi, *An Illustrated History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 182, 183.


This Church is called by a variety of names in the literature. It is sometimes referred to as the Uniate Church, the Byzantine Rite Catholic Church, The Greek Catholic Church or the Ukrainian Catholic Church. For this paper it shall be referred to as the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church as its official name was ‘Greek Catholic’ at the time in question, but because of the consecration of Josyf Cardinal Slipyj as an official Cardinal in 1965 and his desire for a Ukrainian Patriarchate, the name changed to Ukrainian Catholic in Canada. In Toronto it is mostly referred to as the Ukrainian Catholic Church but historically in Ukraine at the time in question it was officially called the Greek Catholic Church. Thus the use of Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic is used to accommodate both historic and contemporary distinctions. There is a wide variety of literature on the development of the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church, and due to space will not be explored here. For more details see John-Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*.


63 Although the question of the legality of the role of ‘Patriarch’ played by Josyf Cardinal Slipyj is hotly debated, he did make vernacular Ukrainian a standard in the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Churches. The Church is called the ‘Ukrainian Catholic Church’ in Canada. Andrij Makuch, in discussion with author, June 29, 2009; Bohdan R. Budurowycz, “Sheptyts’kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914,” 53, 67.


65 In pastoral letters Sheptyts’kyi officially denounced communism in general (24 July 1933), the Holodomor (17 October, 1933), and told his flock that communists were enemies to the Ukrainian people because they were aimed at destroying them. Bohdan Budurowycz, “Sheptyts’kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914,” 57.


69 The reader may notice that there is no discussion of the German occupation of western Ukraine. This is due to the fact that the focus of the discussion is an attempt to show the anti-communist and anti-Russification sentiments found in the Ukrainian Canadian Diaspora after World War II. See note 7.

70 In contemporary Ukraine, regional political differences between eastern Ukrainians and western Ukrainians are simplified in terms of eastern Ukrainians being Russian and pro-Soviet and the western Ukrainians being fascist Ukrainian nationalists; a simplification of the situation encountered at the Battle of Brody where western and eastern Ukrainians fought on Nazi and Soviet sides respectively. The simplifications have turned into deeply etched caricatures which plague Ukrainian politics in modern Ukraine.


72 The Russian Orthodox church became a tool for Russification in the Soviet regime after Stalin pushed for the end of the korenizatsiia and a back to Russia policy. See Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, eds. Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine.


76 It must be said that there was considerable tension between eastern and western Ukrainians as well as between Greek (Ukrainian) Catholics and Orthodox.
There were at least twelve political groups at work in the camps, but the discussion will focus on those groups which became relevant later on in Toronto. For more details on the process see Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory*; Wsevolod Isajiw; Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus, eds. *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*.

The OUN was developed in 1929 as a liberation movement against Polish dominance and became extremely organized militarily. It organized insurgency with the help of the military group, Ukrainian Povstans'ka Armia (UPA). Although the OUN was mostly active in western Ukraine (at the time under the control of Poland) the Soviet government was weary enough of its activities to arrange the assassination of its leader, Evhen Konovalets in Rotterdam in 1938. This led to a succession crisis as a large, extremely militant and right wing contingent believed in a nation-state led by one supreme ruler. This group, led by Stephan Bandera, rejected the election of the less hard-line Andrij Melnyk as the new ruler of the OUN in 1939. Thus the group was fissured on account of political expectations and military methods. The UPA was associated with the *Banderite* faction OUN(B) and not the *Melnykite* faction, OUN(M).


Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties in the DP Camps,” 115.

Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties in the DP Camps,” 115.


For more detailed discussion see *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*.

This is not to say that eastern and western Ukrainians were connected in a friendly way. They were connected by a sense of purpose and understanding of who their enemies were. However, there were serious disagreements between eastern and western Ukrainians and between Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic and Orthodox faithful. For more discussion see Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory*. 
Chapter 2

The Arrival of the Third Wave and Its Effect on Community Life in Toronto

While Ukrainian Displaced Persons organized themselves overseas, Canadian Ukrainians were lobbied for their admission to Canada as refugees. The Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen’s Association (UCSA), an organization based in London for the Ukrainian Canadians serving in the Canadian military during World War II, created a special fund called the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF). Several members of the UCSA visited the various Displaced Persons camps and concluded that the need for Ukrainian relief was enormous. They estimated that the camps contained large numbers of Ukrainians -- 1,650,000 slave labourers from Germany, 2,500,000 forcibly evacuated persons and 250,000 political refugees.

The notion of bringing Ukrainian Displaced Persons to Canada was seen not only as a rescue of a kindred group, but as a way to help renew the Ukrainian community in Canada. Pressure from the Ukrainian ethnic community for a reopening of immigration was intense but less successful than they imagined. In opening the immigration door to Ukrainian and other Displaced Persons in 1946, Canada was not responding solely to ethnic lobbying pressures but to the lobbying of Canadian labour intensive industries, which were demanding workers to fill a huge domestic labour shortage after World War II. As part of the labour importation scheme, thirty five thousand Ukrainians were evacuated to Canada. These Ukrainian immigrants came to be known as the ‘Third Wave.’

Canada had already experienced two previous waves of Ukrainian immigration. The First Wave consisted of some 180,000 people mostly from the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Galicia and Bukovyna. They arrived between 1890 and 1914. Most settled in the western
regions of Canada. The Second Wave was smaller but still considerable. Some 68,000 Ukrainians, arrived between the early 1920s and 1926, before Canadian borders closed to immigration due to the Depression. This Second Wave also came mostly from western regions of what is now Ukraine and in the main settled in western Canada. While the First and Second Waves were concentrated in western Canada, there was a small community in Toronto in 1947 when the first members of the Third Wave arrived.

The Third Wave, consisting of approximately 35,000 Ukrainian Displaced Persons, arrived in Canada from 1947 to 1953. Many Third Wavers were from western regions of Ukraine. However, there was also an eastern Ukrainian presence in the Third Wave population as well. It is estimated that 80% of the Third Wave settled in Ontario and the majority was “decidedly urban.” Toronto became the cultural hub for this wave, and soon started to challenge Winnipeg as being the center of Ukrainian Canadian activity.

The highly political nature of the Third Wave, their experience with organizational life in the Displaced Persons camps, and their generally high level of education quickly made them a powerful force in the Ukrainian organizational scene in Toronto. Third Wavers joined existing Torontonian Ukrainian organizations and church congregations but also imported or created new organizational structures as met their needs. Before long, Third Wavers came to dominate organizational life in Toronto much to the annoyance of members of previous waves. With their dominance of organizational life, an exuberantly nationalistic and vehemently anti-communist identity came to define the borders of Ukrainian identity in Toronto. The anti-Soviet and nationalistic orientation of the Third Wave also came to dominate the Ukrainian school curricula in Toronto. Thus, the new Third Wave dynamic in the community dictated the differences between ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ Ukrainian behaviour,
exacerbating tensions between themselves and Ukrainians from other waves, who were not nearly so oriented towards homeland politics or viscerally anti-communist.

Many Ukrainian Identities – Organizations Before the Arrival of the Third Wave

Toronto was not void of Ukrainians when the first members of the Third Wave arrived. It had a small and vibrant Ukrainian community which had its own cultural and religious institutions, including several Ukrainian schools. The community however, was not without its problems. Religiously and politically, the members of the Second and First Wave in Toronto had their differences and, thus, created different organizations to satisfy varying perspectives. It was in this mix of different organizations that the members of the Third Wave encountered in Toronto.

Ukrainians first began settling in Toronto at the beginning of the 1900s. Most came from the Austro-Hungarian lands of eastern Galicia and Bukovyna, in the western territory of what is now Ukraine. Some also originated from the central regions around Kyiv. They were mostly farmers and labourers. Although religiously diversified - Orthodox, Greek Catholic or Roman Catholic – they spoke the same language and shared similar cultural traditions. Ukrainian-Canadian geographer Lubomyr Luciuk explains that it was in their new land that they began to identify themselves not by their regions, but by a common name: Ruthenian or Ukrainian. An early organization was the Ruthenian National Benefit Society, founded in 1906 and renamed the Taras Shevchenko Society in 1914. Its stated goal was “to unite in brotherly love all Ruthenians living Canada and to spread enlightenment in Ruthenian and English languages among the members,” as well as to provide material and spiritual aid, and “provide a meeting place for young members.” This group had a choir and a theatre troop
(1914), a library and reading club (1917), a children’s after school Ukrainian school (1919), and hired the ‘Father of Ukrainian Dance,’ Vasyly Avramenko, to be the choreographer of their dance group in 1925. Soon, other Ukrainian organizations were also created to satisfy differing political and religious needs. Some developed locally in Toronto and others were branches of national organizations, mostly headquartered in western Canada.

The organizations in Toronto before World War I were varied. They included the Baptist and Protestant Ukrainian churches, which generally serviced congregations where no Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox Church had yet been established, local Prosvita societies (reading rooms with reading clubs) and Ukrainian community centres. Some of these organizations sponsored schools and cultural arts groups. One Canada-wide group with a branch in Toronto was the socialist-oriented Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA). Founded in western Canada, it had branches all across Canada. Regardless of their different organizational or religious affiliations all these organizations were Ukrainian and proudly so. However, when World War I broke out, their predominantly Galician (Austro-Hungarian) origins made Canadian Ukrainians suspect to Canadian authorities, who considered all those from Austro-Hungary as enemy aliens. In the hysteria of war, Ukrainian Canadian concern for the wellbeing of those left in the homeland was suspected as support for the enemy. The Canadian government decided to round up and intern enemy aliens – including Ukrainians. It is estimated that “just over 5,000 Ukrainians were interned, while a further 80,000 people were registered as enemy aliens” and that “when internment operations were finally concluded [in 1920] Ukrainians and other eastern European immigrants in Canada, among them many naturalized Canadian citizens, were also subjected to disenfranchisement, confiscation of their property and other valuables, and various other
discriminatory measures.” Some Ukrainians were even deported during the ‘Red Scare’ in 1917.

Memories of internment produced a very negative effect and the fear of internment was the great defining memory of the pre-1914 group. Ukrainian Canadians who lived through this period were “still in fear of the barbed wire fence” as late as World War II. Some chose to stay afraid, while there were others who still engaged in political and patriotic Ukrainian organizations. In the new organizations which sprung up after the internment, some First Wave Canadian Ukrainians, those who preferred to stay clear of politics, tried to fuse undivided loyalty to Canada into their Ukrainian identity. To them, the script was Ukrainian but also distinctly Canadian. They wished never again to be accused of divided loyalty and tried to define themselves through a Ukrainian cultural, not political, frame. One such organization intent on this portrayal was the Ukrainian Self Reliance League (USRL), along with its women’s league (So-use Ukraiinok) and youth faction (SUMK), which was affiliated strongly with the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada. The USRL tended to represent a rather ‘liberal’ political perspective but refused to become publically involved with Ukrainian homeland politics. A similar group was the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (BUC).

However, not everyone steered clear of homeland politics, much to the chagrin of those who internalized their internment experience by refusing to offend Canadian authorities. There were organizations that commemorated their Ukrainian identity through engagement in Ukrainian politics. The left-leaning ULFTA, organized before the war, had suffered during the ‘Red Scare’ following the Bolshevik revolution, but regained popularity and membership during the Depression. The ULFTA always engaged by homeland and Canadian politics,
even though its leftist leanings caused the Canadian government to be suspicious.

Ukrainian interwar immigrants, commonly called the Second Wave, came with their own distinct memories and created even more organizations of their own, bringing a whole new dynamic to the Ukrainian organizational scene in Toronto. The combination of Bolshevism, the Polish re-occupation of Galicia in 1920 and the ensuing civil war, the instability of various Ukrainian governments, all in the shadow of the Great War groomed many Second Wave immigrants for continuing involvement and discussion of homeland politics. This is precisely what some in the First Wave, living with memories of the internment, saw as dangerous. However, despite the fear of some, politically active Second Wave organizations began to appear. The Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) along with its women’s group (OUK) and youth faction (MUNO) was created in 1932 with a political mandate for the homeland. This group was militantly nationalistic and defined it their duty to work towards a liberated Ukraine. Many Second Wave immigrants, especially former members of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and the Ukrainian Galician Army joined the UNF as its militantly nationalistic mandate complimented their own views. Another important interwar group was the Hetmantsi group (OHN) which supported a radically conservative and independent Ukraine lead by descendents of magnates and big land owners.

Such a diverse collection of First and Second Wave groups in the same community caused quite a bit of disharmony and tensions ran deep. Ironically, most of the time, these groups were not arguing about the idea of what ‘Ukrainian’ meant culturally. They were arguing about the way a Ukrainian state ought to be ideologically aligned and governed, and whether change could be influenced from their new home in Canada. In 1940, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) was founded at the instigation of the Canadian government. The
UCC was to be a committee of all the ‘official’ Ukrainian organizations in Canada. This was done, purportedly, in order to redirect Ukrainians from bickering over homeland politics and to unite them behind the national war effort. The only group that did not join the UCC was the ULFTA (later named the AUUC), the organizational home of most of the left-leaning Ukrainians in the community, because they represented political leanings similar to Canada’s enemies, the Soviets, in the war at the time. Although the course of the war changed, making the Soviets a Canadian ally and re-instating ULFTA as a legal organization, it was nevertheless mistrusted by the groups in the UCC and was never admitted as a member.

Many Ukrainian Canadians, their internment memories still vivid, understood the UCC’s message clearly – Canada first. Many Ukrainian Canadians joined the war effort and even founded their own association, Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen’s Association. The UCSA supported Ukrainian Canadians in the military, and after World War II had ended, helped organize the arrival of Ukrainian Displaced Persons to Canada.

Arriving in Toronto – Conflicts with Previous Waves

When Ukrainian Displaced Persons began arriving in Toronto after World War II, tensions flared with those Ukrainians already established in the city. Histories and memories and thus ideas about Ukrainian identity were different. Nationalist and anti-communist Third Wavers were soon at odds with Toronto’s left-leaning ULFTA with its sizable membership.25

Furthermore, many First Wave Ukrainians were haunted by their experiences in Canadian internment camps and strove to model themselves as Canadian Ukrainian. That is, in order to reduce the appearance of having ‘divided loyalties,’ many organizations stressed Ukrainian culture, not politics. They avoided dabbling in homeland politics. Of course these two elements ran directly against the needs of many if not most of the members of the Third
Wave were nothing if not political. Members of the Third Wave had a choice - they could either join existing organizations and attempt to impose their version of Ukrainian identity upon them, or, alternatively, set up their own organizations to suit their own purposes. They did both. In Toronto, because the numbers of Third Wave immigration quickly overwhelmed the existing Ukrainian population in Toronto, many longstanding organizations were takeover by members of the Third Wave. Other organizations were transplanted from Europe or set up anew. Many of these organizations, in turn, developed schools which sought to instil the young with the goals of their parents.

Many of the Third Wave were committed nationalists and were determined to let nothing stand in the way of their goal. To them, no ‘true’ Ukrainian could abide their beloved land to continue to suffer under the heel of Soviet oppressors or watch as the culture, language and religious traditions of the Ukrainians were being crushed by Soviet policies. Some, including most of the Melnikites, found an organizational home in the militantly nationalistic UNF. Others, created new organizations because “they considered the [existing] Ukrainian Canadians artless and unsophisticated, out of touch with contemporary Ukrainian realities, and so thoroughly assimilated, that they were almost useless to the cause of Ukraine’s liberation.” In 1949, the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (CLLU) was created in Toronto which was comprised of many loyal to the OUN(B). The CLLU also had a women’s league and sent their children in large numbers to the Ukrainian Youth Association (UYA). The UYA is better known by its Ukrainian acronym ‘SUM,’ a pre-existing youth group that had been active in the Displaced Persons camps. The aim of this group was to train Ukrainian youth to join the struggle for a liberated Ukraine. In the beginning, the CLLU was extremely hostile to all pre-existing Ukrainian organizations in
Canada save for the extremely conservative OHN. The CLLU did not join the UCC until 1959 when tensions cooled.\textsuperscript{30} Another major youth group to arrive in Toronto in 1949 was \textit{Plast}, a Ukrainian scout group which was originally organized in L’\textsuperscript{v}iv, Ukraine in 1911 but also functional in the Displaced Persons camps. This organization was officially non partisan, yet had a patriotic Ukrainian mandate – it only accepted Ukrainian speaking children and supported democratic politics.\textsuperscript{31} The new or imported organizations were predominantly formed by Greek Catholic, western Ukrainian Displaced Persons. However, Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox and eastern Ukrainian Third Wavers, had their own distinct experiences. They created an organization called the Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Terror, or SUZhERO, in Toronto in 1950. Like the CLLU, it too was organized by nationalists active in the Displaced Persons camps. Led by Semen Pidhainy from the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP), SUZhERO was an integrated women’s and men’s organization. It also had a youth wing (ODUM) which called for a sovereign and democratic Ukrainian government.\textsuperscript{32}

Ukrainian organizations in Toronto, First, Second or Third Wave, all competed with each other for members. As their numbers grew, the Third Wave’s mix of nationalism and anti-Soviet ideology on came to dominate Ukrainian organizational life in Toronto. Third Wavers defined what ‘real’ Ukrainian acted like, in particular his or her political views. Members of the Third Wave were so staunchly anti-communist that they decided to crush the Ukrainian Left, the ULFTA, renamed the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC) by 1947. In Toronto in 1950, there were several violent encounters between AUUC members and those from nationalist-oriented groups in Alexandria Park on Bathurst Street. On October 8, 1950 at 9:30 in the morning, a bomb exploded at the AUUC Temple at 300 Bathurst Street
Toronto, causing major damage to the exterior.\(^{33}\) Although no one was hurt, it unnerved AUUC members. Threatened with physical violence, not to mention growing anti-left sentiments caused by the advent of the Cold War, the AUUC began a sharp decline.\(^{34}\) With the AUUC marginalized, the dominant political orientation in the official Ukrainian community was decidedly center-right.

Religiously too, Third Wave members soon dominated the Ukrainian community in Toronto. Although the UCC did have a place on its Executive for the Ukrainian Evangelical Alliance, the religious dynamic in the Ukrainian community in Toronto was extremely ‘traditional.’ The vast majority of the Third Wavers was Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic or Ukrainian Orthodox. There was only a very small percentage of immigrants who did not belong to these ‘national’ Churches.\(^{35}\) Because of the important religious component of the Third Wave identity, membership lists of the ‘traditional’ Ukrainian Churches in Toronto grew. New churches were built in areas of Ukrainian residential concentration. The traditional religious character of Toronto’s new Ukrainian immigrants could be surmised from the number of new golden cupolas mushrooming in and around the city.\(^{36}\)

These organizations and religious institutions were infused with the message which the Third Wave brought with them. Ukrainian schools, supported by these institutions and organizations, were similarly influenced. Reverent of the historical memory of horrors which their parents and grandparents experienced, children in Ukrainian schools were trained not only in Ukrainian language, literature, history, geography, culture, art and religion, they were also taught passion for a free and independent Ukraine. At the same time, school curricula taught contempt for anything identified as Soviet, including Russian language and left-leaning politics. Schools were regarded as centers of nationalist resistance. To remember the
past and to honour Ukrainian cultural and religious traditions, to speak Ukrainian and to maintain the faith, were critical in ensuring the next generation would continue to oppose Soviet Russification. To survive as Ukrainians in Canada and keep alive the hope of an independent Ukraine, was an act of collective defiance. Ukrainian children in Toronto learned that a ‘real’ Ukrainian was either Ukrainian (Autocephalous) Orthodox or Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic, despised Soviet ideology and never let go of a passion for an independent Ukraine. This orientation permeated the organized Ukrainian community and its schooling system.

The Ukrainian Schooling System in Toronto Post 1947

Ukrainian schooling was very much a part of Ukrainian community life in Toronto before the arrival of the Third Wave. In the early days of Ukrainian immigration to Toronto, Ukrainian schools were organized mostly by the Prosvita (cultural) societies. By the interwar period organizations and parish churches had begun to build their own schools. Schools taught the Ukrainian language and cultural traditions to their pupils. However, after arrival of the Third Wave, Ukrainian schooling took on another level of importance. Because the majority of the Third Wave believed that the Soviet Union was actively Russifying and destroying Ukrainian cultural and religious traditions, it was considered imperative to preserve those cultural and religious traditions in Canada. The schooling system and the education of Ukrainian children became critical. However, in the opinion of the pedagogues who were a part of the Third Wave, if the pre-1947 Ukrainian schooling system was to meet the needs of the Third Wave, it needed major changes.

The Third Wave was heavily composed of educated individuals. Never before had
When Canada seen so many available and certified Ukrainian teachers -- 6% of Third Wavers were pedagogues. However, despite their credentials, finding a comfortable place in the existing schooling system was a challenge. Many felt unwelcomed by members of the First and Second Wave. “They called us ‘Dipisty,’” one original Third Wave pedagogue recounts “and they did not want us [in the schools.]” Not that many of the Third Wave pedagogues thought the schooling system was adequate for their purposes. Far from it. Many Third Wave parents were appalled at the poor level of Ukrainian language used by the Ukrainian school teachers in Toronto. By way of example, one Third Wave parent explained how her child came home from Ukrainian school with a report card full of grammar errors, “These people were teaching my child how to speak and they themselves couldn’t speak!” Due to the perceived low level of program quality, as well as being out of date, new pedagogical committees and even new courses and schools were established by the Third Wave to ensure that Ukrainian children received ‘proper’ education.

One such committee was the Organization of Ukrainian Pedagogues of Canada or OPUK. Organized in 1949 by Third Wave pedagogue Zenon Zelenij, its purpose was to unite curricula of the Ukrainian Schools in Canada so as to provide a uniformly solid and controlled education. It was unsuccessful in this aim, presumably because of heated differences between organizations and their respective schools. However, OPUK published a journal entitled Our School which did have some influence in Toronto.

Another organization which had more success was the The Council of Ukrainian Schools in Eastern Canada. This council focused on the education programs of Orthodox Ukrainian schools and established curricula.
guidelines for these schools. Because the Council spoke with authority granted by the eastern eparchy of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, its guidelines were more strictly followed. The guides published by the Council of Ukrainian Schools, clearly reflected the priorities of many Third Wavers, and reinforced their narrative. For example, the Orthodox Ukrainian schools were expected to have a course every year entitled, ‘History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’ (Istoria Ukraiins’koj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvy), each part demanding a year of study. The course covered the development of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine even as the country and Church suffered under the rule of various neighbouring states. In the final year, emphasis was placed on the liquidation of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church by the Soviet Union. Teaching children about the Soviet destruction of the Church served to instil in the children a sense of urgency regarding the need to hold fast to their religious traditions and to contextualize hostility to the USSR.

Another important Ukrainian educational institution was founded in 1963. The mandate of the Shkil’na Rada (also known as the Ukrainian School Board of Toronto), was to facilitate the work of all the schools, courses and kindergartens of the city of Toronto and to unite them. It was under the jurisdiction of the UCC, Toronto Branch. All schools which conformed to standards set by the UCC joined the Shkil’na Rada and thereby became ‘official’ Ukrainian community schools. Interestingly and significantly, all the schools which joined the Shkil’na Rada were either Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic or Ukrainian Orthodox in orientation, and those who were ‘officially’ neither, had religious components drawn from the traditional churches. However, no other denominational schools were ever represented on the council, underlining, and perhaps reinforcing, the importance of the ‘traditional’ religious orientation of the new community. Importantly, as was mentioned, the socialist-oriented
AUUC was never admitted to the UCC. Thus, though the AUUC did have a Ukrainian school, it was never admitted to the *Shkil’na Rada* and dismissed as a non-official school. In this way, by keeping the members of the socialist AUUC marginalized, members of the Third Wave ensured that their memories and identity dominated and that their nationalist and anti-left curriculum remained unchallenged.

Another major pedagogical development of the 1950s was the development of advanced ‘Ukrainiology’ courses (*Kursy Ukraiinoznavstva*). In 1951, Oleksandra Kopach developed what were, in effect, the first Ukrainian High School level courses in Ontario. Until then, Ukrainian school in Toronto ended in eighth grade. Kopach’s courses, *Kursy Ukraiinoznavstva imenni Hryhorija Skovorody* (Hryhorij Skovoroda Ukrainiology Courses), became the first secondary school and had an important impact on the community. Kopach’s program ensured advanced Ukrainian training through the twelfth grade and included advanced literature, art and drama analysis, complex history and social studies components and even archaeology. Significantly, although it was not a parochial school, it also taught Christian religion, focusing on ethics and spirituality. Furthermore, the history curriculum in the last two years of study focused on the Soviet liquidation of the traditional Churches, the New Economic Plan and its effects, and the ongoing struggle for Ukrainian independence. The *Kursy Ukraiinoznavstva* model was instantly copied by other Ukrainian schools in Toronto and became an important part of the ‘official’ Ukrainian schooling system. Before long, the ‘official’ Ukrainian community in Toronto included no less than seven schools which offered their own *Kursy* (Ukrainiology courses). In the 1970s, the Toronto District School Board agreed to allow students to earn an OAC (grade 13) level credit if they passed ministry authorized exams. Completion of *Kursy* became an important step towards the
successful completion these exams. Ukrainiology courses, with their inclusion of religious and historical-political components, helped to instil in many Ukrainian youth a passion for Ukrainian continuity and love of the homeland.

With the large influx of post-war immigrants, new parishes and new organizations were established. They, in turn, founded new schools. The Third Wave also established a new school format -- the independent Ukrainian school. Independent Ukrainian schools were schools which were not affiliated with any particular parish or organization and were exclusively tied to the Shkil’na Rada. The development of this type of institution was a product of several factors, including that some pedagogues were unimpressed by political tensions within and between parishes and organizations. These schools followed the same pattern as the rest of the schools: they taught their pupils about the religious component of the Ukrainian identity and were center to center right politically, as they were under the auspices of the UCC, but they remained organizationally unaffiliated.

Whether children attended independent, parochial or organizational schools, by 1970 the majority of Ukrainian youth in Ukrainian schools in Toronto were receiving an education of ‘resistance.’ In 1969-1970, there were twenty four Ukrainian schools in Toronto, only one of which was under the control of the leftist AUUC. In 1970, mainstream Ukrainian parochial, organizational and independent schools enrolled 3271 students whereas the left-leaning AUUC school had only 15 students. Percentage wise, 99.54% of Ukrainian school students were receiving a UCC approved curriculum in Toronto; the kind of schooling many of the Third Wave believed their children needed in order to know what it meant to be a ‘real’ Ukrainian.

At least 1747 students receiving education in parochial schools, meaning that 53% of
Ukrainian students in Toronto were receiving ‘traditional’ religious instruction by parish priests from either the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic or Ukrainian (Autocephalous) Orthodox Churches. However, this does not mean that religion or Christian ethics based on the traditional Churches was not taught in organizational or independent schools. The CLLU based schools and courses often had the priest from the nearby Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church on Leeds Avenue teach religion class.\textsuperscript{55} Myhailo Hrushevsky Saturday school also taught religion.\textsuperscript{56} At an independent school developed in 1972, \textit{Ukrainska Shkola imenni Tsiopy Palijiw}, religion class was also taught by a Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic priest.\textsuperscript{57} If a Ukrainian school did not offer a religion class \textit{per se}, the religio-cultural ethic of the traditional Churches was present. Many schools had a year-end ceremony with a \textit{Moleben’} (religious service) served by a priest.\textsuperscript{58} At Lesia Ukrainka School, pamphlets were distributed to parents advising their most important role as Ukrainian parents was “to raise their children with a love for God and a love for their nation.”\textsuperscript{59} In all schools under the UCC in Toronto, cultural displays and concerts honoured the religious season. Christmas (or St. Nicholas Day) were occasions for concerts and every concert contained a vibrant display of Ukrainian costume and had elements of Ukrainian folk culture, religion, rhetoric, poetry, song and dance. Thus if a school did not have a formal religion class, it was infused with religio-cultural elements found in the traditional churches. Thus, whether formal or informal in delivery, Christian religious identity was regarded as inseparable from the ethnic identity and needed to be protected in defiance of Soviet efforts to crush the traditional churches in the USSR.
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Table 1 List of Ukrainian Schools and their Orientation (1969-1970)

Although both Greek (Ukrainian) Catholics and Ukrainian (Autocephalous) Orthodox worked to preserve their identity from eradication, the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholics were particularly advantaged. The public funding of Catholic schooling in Ontario led to the inclusion of Ukrainian Catholic all-day schools within the provincial Catholic Schooling System. Importantly, the schools which opened under the auspices of the Metropolitan Separate School Board remained strictly Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic in orientation and not
Roman Catholic, bespeaking the importance of this orientation to the Ukrainian identity. In 1961, the first all day Ukrainian Catholic School, St. Josephat’s, opened next to its founding parish. The next to open was St. Demetrius, which opened in 1975, also next to its founding parish. The third Ukrainian Catholic all day school, Josyf Cardinal Slipyj, opened in 1984. Although this school was not a parish school *per se*, it was affiliated with St. Nicholas parish on Bellwoods Avenue at Queen Street. The founding of these specifically Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic schools reflected the importance accorded to preserving a religious and cultural heritage which many of the Third Wave immigrants believed was being lost in the Ukrainian SSR.

Thus, with the arrival of the Third Wave in Toronto, a sense of connectedness, grounded in traumatic memories of the Sovietisation and Russification policies of USSR and the intense desire for a liberated Ukraine, increasingly defined the borders of community life in Toronto. This sense of identity was nurtured in the Displaced Persons camps where a blending of Ukrainian religious traditions, nationalistic narrative and organizational structures took shape. Community life of Third Wave Ukrainians in Toronto became centered around the churches, nationalist organizations and Ukrainian schools, each playing an important part in solidifying an activist agenda for the liberation of Ukraine. To be a ‘real’ Ukrainian, one was expected to join a ‘traditional’ parish, to belong to an ‘official’ organization, and sent their children to an ‘official’ Ukrainian school. To do otherwise was to remove oneself from the Ukrainian mainstream in Toronto.

Since the arrival of the Third Wave in Toronto, two generations of Ukrainian Canadian children have gone through Ukrainian schools. In 1991, however, the Third Wave and their schools began to face a new and serious challenge – the arrival of the Fourth Wave.
The name was changed from “Ukrainian Canadian Refugee Fund” because of the international ramifications as the USSR was then an ally. Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory*, 67.

2 Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 67. Again, this number is not the only estimate. To repeat what was mentioned in Chapter 1, historians Gerus and Rea state that the number of Displaced Ukrainians was smaller, approximately 2.5 million. O.W. Gerus and J.E Rea, *The Ukrainians in Canada* (Saint John: Canadian Historical Association, 1985).

3 The push for the immigration of ethnic Ukrainians by the Ukrainian Canadian community was attributed to the need to revitalize the cultural and linguistic of the previous two waves of Ukrainian immigration. Many felt that the culture and its language was being lost and so ‘fresh’ Ukrainian immigration was a way to deal with this issue. Ethnic retention loss, meaning the loss of an ethnic culture overtime, is used by Makabe and Isajiw. The concept of ethnic retention, as explained by Isajiw and Makabe, is the relative ‘strength’ with which a Diaspora community identifies itself with the homeland culture by means of language use, ethnic organizations and other ‘markers.’ According to Isajiw and Makabe, the ethnic retention of many communities start to weaken after the third generation of any wave of immigration. See Wsevolod Isajiw and Tomako Makabe, “Socialization As a Factor in Ethnic Identity Retention” (Paper in Pluralism and Ethnicity Studies No.7, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, 1982).

4 Because of the Yalta repatriation agreement which organized the removal and forced movement of ethnic populations to their ‘original’ homeland, and restrictions on the type of Ukrainian that were permitted, approximately 35,000 Displaced Ukrainians were admitted to Canada. Former SS-Galizien members, Ukrainian Partisan Army members and Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN(B) members) were excluded from the offer of re-settlement. Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory*, 107.

5 Galicia and Bukovyna are located in the western territories of what is now Ukraine.


7 Jars Balan estimates the eastern Ukrainian population influx at 40%. Salt and Braided Bread: Ukrainian Life in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1984), 12.


10 See Appendix A for a discussion on Women’s Organizations in Toronto. See Appendix B and C for a List of Abbreviations and Political and Religious Orientations respectively.


13 Lubomyr Luciuk, “Ukrainians and the Internment Operations in Ontario during the First World War,” *Polyphony*, (vol 10, 1988), 27. The terms ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Ruthenian’ are interchangeable in this context. However, the idea that Ukrainians (Ruthenians) started identifying as such at their arrival in Canada is at odds with what was mentioned in Chapter 1 above. If Western Ukrainians already had been trained by the Ukraino-centric, intelligentsia inspired schooling system to be Ukrainian or Ruthenian, they would call themselves this unequivocally. However, this being said, Emperor Franz
Joseph (1848-1916) had changed the policies of national education to appease his Polish and Hungarian constituencies, which had an effect on Ukrainian/Ruthenian education and status. Therefore, although Western Ukrainian intelligentsia was nationally oriented well before the First World War, the common western Ukrainian went through this process later, possibly in Canada. Michael Marunchak, The Ukrainian Canadians: A History (Yorkton, Redeemer’s Voice Press, 1970). Also it may be that these terms are not interchangeable as Paul Robert Magocsi suggests ‘Rysyny’ and Ukrainians are related yet distinct ethnicities. Paul Robert Magocsi, The People from Nowhere: An illustrated history of Carpatho-Rysyns (Uzhorod: V.Padiak Publishers, 2006).


16 Those who had heard the teachings of Drahomanov were predisposed to the Protestant Churches. Orest T. Martynowych, Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Period, 1891-1924 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991), 174, 206.

17 It is interesting to note that the character of these groups was distinctly Ukrainian. In particular, ULFTA was closely linked with the Communist Party of Canada and when the later complained about the former’s over focused attention on Ukrainian affairs in the homeland and tried to censure them, ULFTA voted down censure of their “Ukrainianness” with a vote of eighty to six. Lubomyr Luciuk. Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory, 32.


21 This Church is autocephalous and completely unrelated to the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. For a discussion on origins of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, see Paul Yuzyk, The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, 1918-1951 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1981).

22 Although URSL stated that it would stay clear from in fighting in Ukrainian homeland politics, some of its founders made it clear that the program also consisted of opposing all and any occupation of Ukrainian territory. Lubomyr Luciuk, Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory, 34.


24 These were military contingents which fought in western Ukrainian territory and were the official army of the Ukrainian National Rada, a political council which asked for self-determination for the Ukrainian lands that were part of former Austro-Hungarian territory.

25 The ULFTA (renamed the AUUC) was a Western Canadian organization which was imported to Toronto.

26 It must be said that some Third Wavers did not participate in the community at all because of various reasons, but the dramatic increase in the intensity of the activity in Toronto’s Ukrainian community at the time, in terms of church attendance, number of organizations and their memberships, number of political rallies and demonstrations, can attest to the fact that a great many were involved in the community at some level.


36 It is important to note that the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church is independent from the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. It was founded in Canada in 1918 and became officially canonical in 1990 by the Patriarch of Constantinople, a decision which was ratified at the Church’s next meeting (Sobor) by a vote of 75%. Yurij (Archbishop of the Eastern Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada), interview by Anastasia Baczynskyj, April 28, 2009. Mississauga, Ontario

37 Some Protestant churches also held Ukrainian classes before the ‘national’ or ‘traditional’ Churches established themselves in Toronto.

38 The schools at work in the Displaced Persons camps followed this ideology and thus Ukrainian parents preferred to send their children to Ukrainian schools in the Displaced Persons camps rather than to the schools outside the camps. According to Daria Markus, the children in these schools were told that they were all of the same nation and that they were future national elites. Also there was a religious element to the curriculum in the schools in the camps. Religion was a subject and attendance at church was taken by the school teacher on Sundays. Furthermore, Confession and Communion were mandatory at least three times a year for a student. These national and religious elements underline the fear of erasure felt by those organized in the camps. Daria Markus, “Education in the DP Camps,” in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*, ed. Wsevolod Isajiw; Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992), 192 - 194.


40 ‘Dipysty’ is a Ukrainianized version of the English term ‘DPs’ (Displaced Person). The term is meant to be used as a slur or as a negative label.

41 Maria, interview by Anastasia Baczynskyj, April 9, 2009. Toronto, Ontario.
As mentioned before, the differences between the nationalist groups were based on differences regarding leadership and tactics and not large goals or ideas about the Soviet Union. Most, if not all, Third Wave institutions were geared to preserve the memories of oppression as an act of political resistance to the Soviet Union which they thought they needed to preserve the Ukrainian culture and nation from destruction. The differences between the groups lay in how Ukrainian liberation should be accomplished, who or what organization would lead Ukraine out of its oppression, and what kind of policies this new state should have. For more information see O.W. Gerus and L.E Rea, *The Ukrainians in Canada*.

This is the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada (Autocephalous) mentioned above. See note 36.

Yurij (Archbishop of the Eastern Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada), interview by Anastasia Baczynskyj, April 28, 2009. Mississauga, Ontario.


Shkil'na Rada, “Shkil’na Rada Kongressy Ukraiintsiv Kanady Viddil Toronto” (Internal Document, Ukrainian School Board of Toronto, n.d.).

This could be due to the fact that the size of other religious communities were very small in comparison. However there may be other reasons. In a limited way the Soviet Union tolerated the Evangelist movement and even legalized it in 1944 by allowing the creation and official recognition of the All Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists which had its seat in Moscow. In 1966, this group was joined by the Mennonites. Wasyl Markus, “Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine,” *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine after 1945* (Cambridge: Ukrainian Studies Fund Harvard University, 1985), 66. This fact, along with the mostly apolitical, non-nationalistic character of these sects that may be why the Ukrainian cause was not as important and thus, the creation of Ukrainian schools, irrelevant.


The word *kursy* simply means “courses” but began to signify Ukrainiology in the format started by Alexandra Kopach. In order to graduate from these courses, one needed to pass a series of notoriously difficult oral examinations. The process is called ‘Matura’ and if the candidate is successful, he or she passes the requirements to be a ‘Maturant’ or debutante. This honour is presented at a lavish ball where all Maturanty and their families are invited for the presentation of certificates as well as for dinner and dancing. Matura became a Torontonian Ukrainian tradition and was a highlight of the ‘official’ community yearly cycle.

This is still continuing. Although grade 13 no longer exists in Ontario, a grade 12 credit is earned. However the exam is extremely difficult to pass without the preparation of attending *Kursy*.

The Churches were also affected by the politics of their congregations, and some were split on organizational lines, affecting schooling. For example, St. Volodymyr’s Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Cathedral at 406 Bathurst Street was split along who belonged to ODUM and who belonged to SUMK, both Orthodox Ukrainian organizations; the former apolitical for the most part, and the latter a specifically political nationalist organization. St. Demetrius Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church on Lakeshore Boulevard was plagued by inter-wave tensions as well. Yurij (Archbishop of the Eastern Eparchy of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada), interview by Anastasia Baczymskyy, April 28, 2009. Mississauga, Ontario.

54 Data and figures for Table 1 (List of Ukrainian Schools and Their Orientations 1969-70) were compiled from Eugene Masney, A Report on Ukrainians in Metro Toronto (Report prepared for the Citizenship Branch of the Ontario Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, September 1971).

55 Interview with administrator at Yuri Lypa School, April 28, 2009. Toronto, Ontario.


57 It no longer does so but continues to have Christian religious influences, like praying before parent teacher committee meetings and celebrating Christmas concerts. Interview with administrator at Tsiopy Palijiw School, April 27, 2009. Toronto, Ontario.

58 Lesia Ukrainka school, which does not teach religion as a class, has this religious element. A Ukrainian (Autocephalous) Orthodox priest was asked to perform the Moleben’ service at the end of the year. Administrator at Lesia Ukrainka School. Interview by Anastasia Baczymskyy (April 9, 2009, Toronto, Ontario). A year beginning or year-end Moleben’ (service) is a habitual practice in most schools. The ‘official’ nature of prayer in schooling is underlined by the Shkil’na Rada, which starts and ends all of its meetings with versions of prayers used specifically in the two ‘traditional’ churches.

59 Pamphlet for parents (Lesia Ukrainka School, private circulation, n.d.). Translation from Ukrainian by author.

60 See Appendix D for the discussion of the role of Ukrainian-Canadians in the policy of Multiculturalism.

61 It has moved to Pelham Ave since this time.

62 St. Sophia in Mississauga also is an all day Ukrainian Catholic School and belongs to the Shkil’na Rada of Toronto but is beyond the confinements of this study which places its borders around the city of Toronto.

63 These schools were not unique in Canada, but present an interesting component of the desire of the Ukrainians in Toronto to preserve their ethnic and religious heritage. See Appendix E for a contemporary comparison of Ukrainian Catholic systems between provinces.
Chapter 3

Ukraine: Contextualizing the Fourth Wave

In 1991, the organized Ukrainian community in Toronto was euphoric. The hope of many members of the Third Wave had been realized. The USSR, struggling with growing discontent in various republics and a failing economy, was collapsing. On August 24, 1991, in reaction to an attempted coup, the Ukrainian parliament declared independence from the USSR. The Soviet collapse unlocked gates to the west and set off a wave of emigration, some of which flowed to Toronto. The Ukrainian community in Toronto had reasons to hope for new immigration. The Third Wave produced two Canadian born generations and by 1991, the Ukrainian population in the city was over 80% Canadian-born. In spite of their best efforts, many worried that the continuing vitality of the Ukrainian Canadian community and the retention of Ukrainian identity were slowly being eroded through intermarriage and assimilation. When immigration from Ukraine began in 1991, committed Ukrainian Torontonians were initially hopeful that the new influx would revitalize the community and its institutions. However, instead of revitalization, there was conflict and disappointment. The new arrivals, soon labelled the Fourth Wave, were in the main, not what members of the Third Wave considered ‘real’ Ukrainians. To the confusion of many of the Third Wave whose identity had been shaped by ideas brought from the Displaced Persons camps of post-war Europe, the new immigrants spoke differently, had different ideas about political and social institutions and did not particularly care to affiliate with existing community structures.

Many Third Wavers were shocked by the ‘un-Ukrainian’ or ‘Soviet’ nature of the new Canadians. The new arrivals were not particularly nationalist and appeared indifferent if not
hostile to the bedrock anti-communism of the Third Wave. As far as Third Wave community activists were concerned, those who did not support Ukrainian nationalism and involve themselves in the ‘official’ Ukrainian community in Toronto were not ‘really’ Ukrainian. In short, the Ukrainian organized community in Toronto understood a version of identity that demanded active engagement in the community. Membership in ‘official’ organizations and parishes was seen as proof of political orientation and acceptance. When the Fourth Wave did not meet these expectations, the response from many in the Third Wave was distrust, and even rejection of the new arrivals, exacerbating disincentives for cooperation in the community.

Underlying this distrust and disappointment was Third Wave misunderstanding or dismissal of the context out of which the Fourth Wave came. The Fourth Wavers were former Soviet citizens and arrived from all over Ukraine. What was not understood by many of the Third Wavers was that the identities which Fourth Wave Ukrainians brought with them were forged in the Soviet Union, not in Displaced Persons camps. The Ukrainian immigrants who started to arrive in Toronto in 1991 had different understandings of what it ‘meant’ to be Ukrainian – if they gave the Ukrainian label much thought in the first place. To Fourth Wave Ukrainians, their Ukrainian identity was influenced by regional evaluations of history, language, culture, politics and also by religion and their economic situation. Many reflected lack of trust and experience with an open civil society. These factors, products of both Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine, affected how members of the Fourth Wave located themselves, and continue to locate themselves, as Ukrainians influencing their engagement in or rejection of the Ukrainian community’s existing structures, including their Ukrainian schools.
Ukraine changed drastically after World War II. Before the Battle of Brody in 1944, the regions making up present-day Ukraine had been separated since the middle ages. However, it proved easier to unite the territory than to create a sense of singular Ukrainian national identity. Though both Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian Soviets wished to join Ukrainian ethnographic territory into one political entity, the Battle of Brody was interpreted differently on different sides of the Dnieper River. The Battle of Brody was interpreted as a monumental loss for Ukrainian nationalists and an ideological and territorial triumph for Ukrainian Soviets. Because western Ukrainians were in general supportive of UPA and OUN insurgent activities, and because the SS Galizien unit had western Ukrainian origins, western Ukrainian nationalists were labelled Nazi collaborators in Soviet historical narratives. The force of this label in the regions could be seen as late as October 2005, when Ukraine saw violent clashes between supporters of the nationalistic OUN-UPA and pro-socialist groups. The clashes occurred at a march in Kyiv on October 15, 2005 commemorating OUN(B) leader Stephan Bandera’s 96th Birthday followed by a requiem mass for fallen OUN-UPA members. There was sizable opposition to the march, with opponents coming from all over Ukraine carrying banners in Russian saying, among other things, “OUN – UPA: The Shame of Our Nation.” There were violent confrontations between the two groups and arrests were made.

Regionalism and ideological divisions continued long after the Battle of Brody. Hostile feelings have not yet subsided and the two sides of that battle remain at odds in their respective accounts of World War II. Although many western Ukrainians arrivals in Toronto after 1991 may agree with the nationalistic narrative of history which the Ukrainian community in Toronto supports, not all Fourth Wave members are from western regions.

Although politically Ukraine was tied together politically and territorially after the Battle
of Brody, differing regions continued to have differing visions about the value of Ukrainian culture and language. Third Wave identity in Toronto gave high priority to maintaining the Ukrainian language and a religiously-infused culture. However, this priority may mean little to some members of the Fourth Wave, particularly among those from eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as those from urban areas. The Ukrainian language and culture was viewed as a ‘village’ or ‘peasant’ language and culture in areas controlled by the Russian Empire. Increasingly, Russian language and culture in areas dominated by Tsarist rule were regarded modern and represented high culture. This view became ever more pronounced in these areas during almost fifty years of Soviet government. As Laada Bilaniuk explains, in contemporary Ukraine

there is an association of the Ukrainian language and culture with the rural sphere, ... provincialism, lower education, unculturedness, and weakness versus Russian with centrality, better and higher education and strength. These associations exemplify the process of iconization through which linguistic features particular social groups come to represent them.8

However, because this view of Ukrainian language and culture were present in eastern and southern Ukraine for a longer period of time, the association of Russian language with status is stronger in these regions. Eastern and southern Ukraine had a longer history of Russian influence, including population integration.9 This is in contrast to much of western Ukraine where no lasting Russification policies existed until 1944. These differences proved to be critical in identity formation in both areas. According to Keith Darden, governmental institutions such as public schools, control identity formation in a population. Once a government creates public schooling and teaches a population ethnic self-awareness, it is the
state sanctioned identity which will become embedded in collective memory and becomes nearly impossible to erase. The idea that Russian culture is higher in status than Ukrainian culture began during Tsarist Russia in eastern and southern regions. According to the Tsarist Russian historiographical narrative, Ukrainians were brothers to the Russians ethnically, but the Ukrainians and their language were considered quaint, not elegant. In contrast, in western Ukraine under Austria, when widespread education of the populace began, public education was meant to counteract Polish aspirations. Thus Ukrainian schools taught Ukrainian language, history and culture, as a shield against Polish influence. Western Ukraine became the ‘piedmont’ of Ukrainian identity and the spring of Ukrainian nationalism. When in 1944 the Soviets absorbed western Ukraine and instituted a policy of linguistic and cultural Russification demanded by Stalin, it met resistance. It may have met less resistance in eastern regions Ukraine where the ideas was familiar and which also had a larger population of ethnic Russians and mixed Ukrainian-Russian marriages.

The acceptance and prestige of Russian language use in daily life can be seen by the distribution and patterns of language use found in present day Ukraine. (Table below). The eastern and southern oblasty (provinces), those which were historically under the jurisdiction of the Russian Empire, primarily speak Russian whereas the areas formerly under Austrian rule speak primarily Ukrainian. Those areas which changed hands more frequently (central Ukraine), the percentage of Russian use is higher than in the western regions but lower than in eastern and southern regions. The Soviet Union put its full weight behind the idea that not only was Russian the language of the Soviet Union (albeit unofficially), it was also a more cultured language, essential to civic life in the Ukrainian SSR. This being said, an
understanding grew in eastern regions that Ukrainian and Russian language identities are not
incompatible, meaning that language was not the only marker of Ukrainian identity.

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<th>Percentage of People Who Support Making Russian a State Language</th>
<th>Average for the Area of Ukraine</th>
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<td>Odes’ka Oblast’</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka Oblast’</td>
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</tr>
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Table 2 Percentage of People Who Support Making Russian a State Language (2005)
According to Louise Jackson, some parents in eastern Ukraine do not oppose their children learning both Ukrainian and Russian, as they feel both are necessary to fully function in Ukraine. However in contrast, the regions in western Ukraine remain more impassioned about Ukrainian language identity and opposed to Russian language use.

So it may be that Fourth Wave immigrants coming from different regions of Ukraine may have different feelings about the role of Ukrainian school. Western Ukrainians may be more apt to send their children to Ukrainian schooling, because they are more familiar and comfortable with the nationalistic Ukrainian narrative and its valuing of the Ukrainian language. Those from areas longer under Russian language and culture influence may find little value in Ukrainian language and cultural preservation because of its perceived lower status in their regions of origin. They may even prefer to send their children to Russian school. It also may be, that some parents, especially from regions which changed hands frequently, may wish to send their children to both Russian and Ukrainian school and see no contradiction – an anathema to the Third Wave.

Because of the competing historical narratives and ideas about the status of Ukrainian language and culture, regional variants may also be reflected in political opinions of Fourth Wave members. Nationalism, as an ideology, was not condoned in the USSR and long years of socialist narrative may have impacted on the political orientation of many Ukrainians leaving Ukraine after 1991. According to Louise Jackson, nationalist political parties receive very little support in eastern Ukrainian territory because of attitudes established by Soviet campaigns which long portrayed Ukrainian nationalists as “fascist collaborators.” She states that “such images are difficult to eradicate.” As a result, some Fourth Wave Ukrainians are not interested in the nationalistic narrative, or even hostile to it. These Ukrainians have little
room in the organized community in Toronto let alone in its schooling system. Taught that the UPA and the OUN were tools of the Nazis, some Fourth Wavers may decry the nationalist narrative supported in the official Ukrainian community and taught in the Ukrainian schools. Thus the very nationalistic nature of the established Ukrainian community may run against the grain of many Fourth Wave Ukrainians and their version of what it means to be Ukrainian.

The political instability in Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been well documented and may be yet another reason why many Fourth Wavers may stay away from politically inspired Third Wave institutions. The issue of nationalism, so important in Third Wave institutions, may be wearily viewed as a source of instability by many of the Fourth Wave. Due to the way nationalism was used as a political tool during the collapse of the Soviet Union, some Fourth Wavers may regard nationalists as a source of disquiet and even opportunists. In the mid 1980s, due to the collapse of Soviet infrastructure and a corresponding growth in nationalism in most republics, including Ukraine, many former Soviet politicians re-baptised themselves nationalists in order to hold onto or gain political power. However, when Ukraine gained its independence, little changed for the better after the election of ‘nationalist’ leaders. Despite their promises, the economy crashed and corruption grew worse. As a result, for many Ukrainians nationalism became synonymous with economic catastrophe and political manipulation that encouraged them to leave Ukraine. Andrew Wilson notes that many viewed nationalist politicians as “blue and yellow on the outside, but red on the inside.” In the end, the failure of nationalist politicians to provide needed improvements to standards of life in the late 1980s and early 1990s, affected the way the Fourth Wave immigrants looked at politics – people who are political stand something to
gain from being so. Because of this disillusionment, Fourth Wavers may be distrustful and perhaps even hostile to the nationalistic narrative that underpins the organized Ukrainian community.

Religion is another issue which may be significant in determining whether members of the Fourth Wave decide to send their children to Ukrainian schools in Toronto. Officially the USSR was atheistic and this may have shaped how many coming from Ukraine view religion. The fact that the official Ukrainian community in Toronto is very ‘traditional’ in its religious identity, and that membership to one of the two ‘traditional’ churches is a seen as an important marker of community membership, may pose a problem for some Fourth Wavers who are non-believers or have non-traditional in their religious beliefs. Because all schools have religious components in their curricula and consider the Christian religious identity of Ukrainians inseparable from ethnic identity, this may be a strong deterrent for some parents who are atheist or who belong to different, ‘non-traditional’ sects of Christianity.

What is more, although the USSR was officially atheist, certain religious groups were privileged and allowed to function. As mentioned, the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church as well as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were illegal in the Ukrainian SSR. However, in 1943, Stalin came to an agreement with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church and its affiliate in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Excharchate of the Moscow Patriarchate, were officially supported. If one chose to attend a church in Ukraine after 1943, it would be under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. Many believing Fourth Wave Ukrainians were socialized within a church controlled by the Patriarch in Moscow. Thus the Russian Orthodox, its services being most familiar, may continue to attract many Fourth Wavers in Canada.
However, by the late 1980s religious life in Ukraine became more difficult to navigate, especially for those who were Orthodox by faith. During the period of Glasnost and Perestroika, the Soviet controlled Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian SSR faced a serious challenge in the form of a resurgent Ukrainian Autocephalous movement. The desire for a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church re-emerged in 1989 in response to a revival of nationalist sentiment in the crumbling USSR. Faced with this challenge, in July 1990 the Ukrainian exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate rebranded itself. The Church was re-named the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and declared ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’ from the Russian Orthodox Church. According to historian Frank E. Sysyn, because the Church’s superiors wished to ride the rising tide of national sentiment developing in Ukraine they repositioned the Church as Ukrainian and separate from Russian control. However, the changes were largely cosmetic as important bureaucratic decisions still lay with the Patriarchate in Moscow. Things became even more religiously complicated when a second Autocephalous Orthodox Church emerged in 1992 calling itself the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchy) under the jurisdiction of the former Metropolitan of Kyiv, Filaret. The desire for a national church in the 1990s brought forth the creation of several Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. To date none of these churches are canonical (Apostolic). They are accused by other Orthodox Churches as created by non-recognized ecclesiastical methods, and thus have no recognition in the Orthodox world. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchy) remains the largest Orthodox religious institution in Ukraine and harbours deep distrust and dislike for the Autocephalous movement for its non-canonicity as well as for its relations with the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic community. Because the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada is also autocephalous, this likely has caused
some confusion among Fourth Wave Ukrainians. They may see the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada as an affiliate of one of the non-canonical autocephalous Churches in Ukraine. As a consequence, some may avoid it and consequently its respective Ukrainian schools. Thus, because of the comfort and habit of attending a Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the confusing political divisions within the Autocephalous movement, and potentially, the belief that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchy) is the only canonical option for Ukrainian Orthodox believers, some Fourth Wavers may prefer attending Russian Orthodox churches rather than those under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada and the schools they support.

As confusing and disorienting as the profound shifts in politics, religion and ideology were during the collapse of the USSR, the economic situation faired far worse. Unlike most members of the Third Wave who left or were forced from Ukraine for political reasons, the economic situation facing Ukrainians in 1991 was the key motivation for emigration. Nora Dudwick, Elizabeth Gomart and Alexandre Marc discuss the dire straits in which many Ukrainians found themselves after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They describe a Ukraine where families of up to three generations lived together because of the lack of means, where abortions were increasingly common and where “children [had become] a luxury.” To illustrate the dire straits in which many Ukrainians found themselves, they note that in 1988 the number of people that lived on $2.15 USD a day soared from one in twenty-five, or four percent (4%) in 1988, to one in five, or twenty percent (20%) in 1998. Natalia Kharchenko and Vladimir Paniotto estimate that “by the time independence was proclaimed, 15 to 25 percent [(15-25%)] of Ukraine’s population could be categorized as poor.” Dudwick et al. also describe the crumbling infrastructure, high fees and informal payments
for services and the rollercoaster economy which caused a “deepening and persistence of poverty” and which “contributed to a profound shift in values and in people’s perceptions about economic and social reality.” Poverty even hit those with relatively high levels of education and those who were already well integrated into society. People struggled to make ends meet and developed individual strategies to cope with economic decay. Immigration was one of them.

A desire for economic stability undoubtedly characterized the immigration of Ukrainians to Canada after 1991. Many who came to Canada came out of a Ukraine in which getting along meant going along. It was understood that one needed to adjust and integrate in order to survive in the Soviet Union. Russian language use and participation in Soviet organizations such as Komsomol were pre-requisites for quality work placements. If assimilation worked in the Soviet Union, what about Canada? Without doubt Fourth Wave parents wish their children to acclimatize to their new situation so that they would be as advantaged as other Canadian children, firstly at school, then later on in the workplace. It is probable that some Fourth Wave parents believe that Ukrainian schooling could hinder the assimilation of their children and their ability to be competitive with other Canadian children. Thus some might shun Ukrainian community structures and Ukrainian schooling for their children in order to avoid ghettoisation. Asking that they pay for Ukrainian schooling may make the proposition even more illogical to many. If material wellbeing, not cultural preservation, is the overriding concern of many Fourth Wave parents, Ukrainian schooling for their children may be counter intuitive.

Furthermore, unlike the Third Wave, Fourth Wave immigrants, as a group, are not used to voluntary or community participation. Sociologist Victor Stepanenko states that even after
the 2004 Orange Revolution civil society, which would provide the “mechanisms that enable systematic (not spontaneous) citizens’ political and social engagement” has not yet developed in Ukraine. He presents compelling statistics showing that Ukraine does not have a well functioning civil society and levels of public trust are extremely low -- meaning that participation in voluntary or community activities is also low. In 1995, the percentage of people not in any political or social organizations was approximately eighty four percent (84.1%); in 2004 this figure dropped only slightly to approximately eighty three percent (83.8%). He states that the “major problem of post-communist (especially post-Soviet) societies lies in the deformed ... societal structures of those societies, the main deficiency of which is the weak development of the values and traditions of civicness.” According to his data, half of all Ukrainians (49.8%) do not or mostly do not trust anyone, while almost thirty five percent of the population (34.9%) cannot say if they trust people or not. Two reasons may explain the lack of trust and lack of desire to form or join voluntary institutions. One may be the forced ‘voluntary’ involvement in organizations (such as Komsomol) during the Soviet era and the other may be due to “mass disillusionment with pseudo-democratic and quasi-market reforms” which failed to deliver promised economic stability and led to a frustrating situation where people worked but were not remunerated. Thus the Fourth Wavers may view voluntary or community involvement suspiciously, and see no value in it for themselves. The Ukrainian schools in Toronto, supported by voluntary organizations and run with the help of parental committees, may be viewed with distrust and irreverence. Thus, because of the lack of civil society structures in Ukraine, as well as a low sense of trust, Fourth Wave support for community structures and feelings of connectedness to community may remain underdeveloped. Voluntary organizations or community institutions in the
Ukrainian community in Toronto may be viewed suspiciously or ignored as a fact, not an accomplishment, of the community. Because of their experience in the USSR, where the state controlled all levels of life, as well as the fact that the government in Canada along with public voluntary organizations provide a wide range of social services which help immigrants, there is no sense of urgency for Fourth Wavers to become involved in the Ukrainian community that offers no tangible benefits. Although they may feel a level of commonality with other Ukrainians culturally, Fourth Wavers have little sense of connectedness to them.

Last, but not least, the opening of borders may have influenced the necessity of Ukrainian school for Fourth Wavers. Border regulations have changed dramatically since the times of the Soviet Union and in particular since 2005. The large financial and moral support which Canadian Ukrainians gave to Victor Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution in 2004 did not go unnoticed when he became President of Ukraine. On July 26, 2005, President Yushchenko approved new legislation removing visa requirements for Canadian citizens. This allows for more fluid movement between Canada and Ukraine. This in turn, creates for members of the Fourth Wave a different feeling towards the need for Ukrainian school. Unlike during the Soviet era, when access to Ukraine was limited and the Ukrainian school was regarded as the only way to expose children to the homeland, Ukraine is now more easily accessible to children born to Fourth Wave parents. Parents may, and often do, opt to send their children to visit grandparents or cousins in Ukraine where they learn about their heritage. More open access has thus made Ukraine a place to be experienced not just learned about in a classroom, making Ukrainian schooling a lacklustre cultural transmitter.

Differences between Third and Fourth Wave Ukrainians in Toronto are often stark.
Unlike the Third Wave identity, which formulated in the Displaced Persons camps, the Fourth Wave does not have a convergent identity on which it bases itself. The identities brought from Ukraine since 1991, are far more varied or specific to particular individuals, each of whom react to the existing community in a particular way. Some may share a sense of connectedness with other Ukrainians and thus join the existing community structures. Others react very differently. They might avoid the organized community altogether, sharing only a sense of loose cultural commonality. Some of the identities fostered within Soviet Ukraine may have characteristics which made Ukrainian Canadian community structures irrelevant, or threatening, explaining low attendance and participation of Fourth Wave members in these structures. This is no less true of the Ukrainian schools. Since the beginning of Fourth Wave immigration, many members of the Third Wave lament that the Fourth Wave do not send their children to Ukrainian school. The reason for the perceived low attendance of Fourth Wave Ukrainians the Ukrainian schooling system can be explained in terms of identity differences – the Ukrainian schooling system is irrelevant to those Ukrainians who do not share the version of identity which members of the Third Wave had created and hold dear.

1 The Third Wave consists of four generations to date. The original immigrants are not considered a ‘generation’ because of the connotation of ‘generation’ meaning ‘product of,’ however do count as ‘Generation Zero.’ Those born to original Third Wave (Generation Zero) parents are considered the First Generation of the Third Wave (born approximately 1950-1970). Those born to the First Generation, in turn, are considered the Second Generation of the Third Wave (born approx 1970-1990). The fourth generation is just beginning. All are included in the term ‘Third Wave.’ However, after the arrival of the Fourth Wave, the notion of belonging to a specific generation or wave is difficult to parse as intermarriage from different waves and generations produces a mixed understanding of self. This being said, the same type of categorization applies to the Fourth Wave, where original immigrants count as Generation Zero.

2 This was ratified by a referendum held on December 1, 1991.

3 Jars Balan, Salt and Braided Bread: Ukrainian Life in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1984), 16.
4 Please note that the issues surrounding the identity formation processes and community institutions in Toronto are still relevant. There is an argument by Serhiy Kostyuk states that a “Fifth Wave” is underway currently. However, the post 1991 immigrants in popular parlance are referred to as the Fourth Wave collectively. See Appendix F for a special discussion on Ukrainians from Poland during the 1980s.

5 According to Vic Satzewich, Wsevolod Isajiw and Eugene Duvalko, 50% of Fourth Wavers come from Greater Ukraine (the territory designated as ‘eastern’ Ukraine in Chapter 1), 41% are from western Ukraine, and other regions (Southern Ukraine) at 9%. “Social Networks and the Occupational Settlement Experiences of Recent Immigrants from Ukraine in Toronto,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 31, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 2006), 9.


7 For example see Laada Bilaniuk, Contested Tongues: Language and Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 2005).

8 Laada Bilaniuk, Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine, 38.

9 Again ‘eastern Ukraine’ here means the territory east of the Zbruch River. During Stalin’s regime, Crimean Tartars were deported into the interior of the Russian Federation and ethnic Russians were transported to resettle the region in their place. There are also arguments that there was a transfer of ethnic Russians cadres into the territory which was emptied by the Holodomor. Otto Pohl, The Stalinist Penal System: A Statistical History of Soviet Repression and Terror, 1930-1933 (Jefferson: Mc Farland & Company, 1997) http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/statshist.html (accessed July 9, 2009).


13 For more discussion see Paul Robert Magocsi. A History of Ukraine.

14 The exception province is Zakarpats’ka oblast which may be explained by the fact that this province was not under Austrian but Hungarian jurisdiction for long periods of time.

15 Constitutionally, the USSR did not have an official language but Russian was de facto the official language of the state.

16 The eastern, southern and central oblasts are those which are called ‘eastern Ukraine’ in chapters 1 and 2. Data for this table gathered from a poll conducted by the National Institute of Strategic Statistics (Ukraine) “Russian Language in Ukraine,” http://www.answers.com/topic/russian-language-in-ukraine (accessed April 9, 2009).


18 According to Yaroslav Hrytsak, western Ukrainians are more exclusivist and cannot incorporate pan-Slavic or pan-Russian identity because of the attempts of Poland to assimilate Ukrainians in the past. “Historical Memory and Regional Identity among Galicia’s Ukrainians,” in Galicia as a Multicultural

In discussions with Ukrainian school administrators from the Ukrainian Schools in Toronto, all current schools under the auspices of the UCC taught a nationalistic historical narrative which showed Russia and the USSR as an aggressor of the Ukrainian people.

This image is not helped by the fact that many familiar faces from the Soviet era are still members of parliament in Ukraine. Andrew Wilson. The Ukrainians: The Unexpected Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 177.

This argument also is relevant today as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) is bitterly remembered by many as little more than a power grab with no real effects for the Ukrainian people.

Administrators from all Ukrainian schools interviewed answered that the Christian religion is inseparable from the Ukrainian ethnic identity. The traditional orientation of the schools can be determined from the fact that not one school under the Shkil’na Rada is oriented towards other Christian sects.

Frank E. Sysyn, “The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Kyiv Metropolitante,” in Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2003), 24.

However, the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church continued clandestine operations in Ukraine since its dissolution in 1946 and during the 1980s the services in officially Russian Orthodox Churches became very similar to those of the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic ones. For more see Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine.

By faith and not by force as was the case for Greek (Ukrainian) Catholics.

Metropolitan Filaret was defrocked by the Russian Orthodox Church on accounts of ‘leading an immoral life.’ He had made requests for autocephaly during the political strife Ukraine was experiencing in 1991. He sought accommodation with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church by declaring a Ukrainian Orthodox Church- Kyiv Patriarchate, but the Autocephalous Church’s Patriarch, Mstyslav did not agree to the merger. Thus, Metropolitan Filaret carried his creation under his own personal direction. Frank E. Sysyn, “The Third Rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Religious Situation in Ukraine, 1989-1991,” in Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine, 118-119.

There are currently three Autocephalous churches in Ukraine. The Autocephalous Church of Ukraine which began in 1989 and currently has approximately 700 parishes. The second is called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) which holds approximately 4, 500 parishes and the so-called ‘Renewed’ (obnovleña) Autocephalous Church of Ukraine which holds approximately 50-100 parishes. Yurij (Archbishop of the Eastern Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada), interview by Anastasia Baczynskyj, Mississauga, Ontario.

Because of the common desire for Ukrainian cultural elements in the churches, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church gave each other mutual respect, if not support. However this was after 1991, when a period of intense disputes and violence took place between members of both institutions. Frank E. Sysyn, “The Third Rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Religious Situation in Ukraine, 1989-1991,” 113.

It must be made clear that the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada is not affiliated with any church in Ukraine whatsoever and was deemed canonical by the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1990.

32 Catherine Wanner and Elizabeth Gomart, “‘Children Have Become a Luxury’: Everyday Dilemmas of Poverty in Ukraine,” in *When Things Fall Apart: Qualitative Studies of Poverty in the Former Soviet Union*, 263.


41 Victor Stepanenko, “Civil Society in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the Framework of Corrupted Sociality?”, 578. The Komsomol was the youth wing of the Communist Party organized by the USSR. Membership to this organization was considered a prerequisite towards joining the Communist Party.


43 The same argument can be made in terms of access of information via satellite television, radio and internet options. These media provide information which make Ukrainian culture highly accessible in a new (and more exciting) way.

44 Vic Satzewich, Wsevolod Isajiw and Eugene Duvalko, “Social Networks and the Occupational Settlement Experiences of Recent Immigrants from Ukraine in Toronto.”

45 Although Satzewich, Isajiw and Duvalko state that 50% of Fourth Wave immigrants send their children to Ukrainian schools, the raw data collected from Ukrainian schools in Toronto show otherwise. The data for the study done by Satzewich et al. was collected in the 1990s and had a sample size of around 300 participants. “Social Networks and the Occupational Settlement Experiences of Recent Immigrants from Ukraine in Toronto,” 18. See Chapter 4 and Appendix G in this work for more details.
Chapter 4

Aspects of Fourth Wave Identity, the Ukrainian Community and the Schooling System in Toronto

Whatever expectations Third Wave leaders harboured that the beginning of Fourth Wave immigration to Canada in 1991 would infuse fresh blood into the existing Ukrainian community and its institutions were soon dashed. After a brief period, the established Ukrainian community in Toronto began to realize that many of the immigrants arriving from Ukraine in 1991 were not exactly what the organized community defined as ‘Ukrainian.’ Because of the differences in behaviour and attitude towards Ukrainian nationalism, language, heritage preservation, and Soviet control of Ukraine, members of both the Third and Fourth Waves showed little in common. “I call them Soviets,” one Third Waver said, “because they are definitely not Ukrainian.”¹ Another Third Waver stated that “all [Fourth Wavers] care about is this [rubs fingers together]. They speak Russian not Ukrainian.”² Nor did all negative sentiment run one way. “I avoid them at all costs,” one Fourth Wave member said about the Third Wave, later adding that the organized Ukrainian community and its organizations were “lame.”³ The two waves eventually developed names for each other; the Fourth Wave referring to the members of the pre-1991 Ukrainian community as Kanadoly or Baniaky. The Third Wave referring to the Fourth as Novoprybuli.⁴

Members of the two waves had divergent views on many things, one of which was the importance and relevance of the community and its structures, such as its schooling system. The Ukrainian schooling system, developed to preserve what the Third Wave feared was being destroyed by the Soviet Union’s cultural policies, was at a critical point. Although after 1991 Ukraine was independent and the destruction of Ukrainian culture and language by the
Soviet Union was *de jure* over, many members of the Third Wave held fast to the importance of attending Ukrainian churches, organizations and schools because it was understood to be an integral part of their personal identification and connectedness to the Ukrainian community.⁵ This was not so with all members of the Fourth Wave.

The incongruence between the Third and Fourth Waves in Toronto was caused by different understandings, behaviour and values regarding the expression of Ukrainian identity.⁶ To the majority of the Third Wave, membership in the community’s organizations and strong identification as ‘Ukrainian,’ proved one’s status as a ‘real’ Ukrainian. Third Wavers, in short, expected to find a sense of connectedness and shared community with the Fourth Wavers upon their arrival simply because they were of the same ethnicity. In short, Third Wavers expected Fourth Wavers to reflect the same values and imperatives as Third Wavers. However, it has not worked out this way. Many Fourth Wavers do not necessarily feel that involvement in the existing Ukrainian community and its structures, such as Ukrainian schools, is relevant to their being Ukrainian. Though Fourth Wavers members do share a sense of commonality with other Ukrainians in Canada due to their ethnicity, for many, a sense of connectedness to and identification with the Ukrainian community is not essential to their identity. Regional and religious differences as well as the need to make pragmatic choices as new Canadians, contribute to Fourth Wavers identifying differently than Third Wavers. This makes participation in Ukrainian community institutions, including Ukrainian schools, potentially irrelevant to many Fourth Wave members. Thus, Fourth Wave involvement in community institutions such as the Ukrainian schools is lower than expected or hoped for.
Low Attendance: True or False?

The Ukrainian School Board (*Shkil’na Rada*) oversees twelve ‘official’ Ukrainian schools. The four Ukrainian day schools are part of the Catholic school board in Ontario. The rest function once a week on Saturdays. Despite the variety of schools, the complaint from many members of the Third Wave is that Fourth Wave parents are not as interested in sending their children to any Ukrainian school. In a series of interviews conducted with the administrators in the Ukrainian schools in Toronto, a variety of reasons were offered as to why Fourth Wave parents would not wish to enrol their children in Ukrainian schools. The majority of reasons relate to two themes: financial and cultural. Many administrators feel that Fourth Wave parents are simply too busy trying to achieve financial stability to arrange transportation for their child to and from a half day at school on Saturdays, or supervise the extra homework that extra schooling entails. Some administrators also stated that the financial burden of a few hundred dollars for registration is too much to bear for many struggling parents. In terms of cultural issues, some administrators stated that many Fourth Wavers believe that assimilation into the Canadian mainstream will aid in finding a good job and thus is a better investment for themselves and their children in the long run. Some maintained that regionalism and the historical narrative which places Russian culture above Ukrainian culture plays a large role in the decision to send or not to send children to Ukrainian school. Many Fourth Wavers, administrators said, accord Russian culture higher status than Ukrainian, not only in Ukraine but also in Canada. One administrator elaborated, “When people say ‘I am Russian’ others think ‘aha Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy!’ but when you say “I am Ukrainian” people think ‘oh Chernobyl...’”
Interestingly, the majority of the Ukrainian school administrators in Toronto are themselves members of the Fourth Wave. Thus their perspective is grounded in an understanding of the trials which many Fourth Wave parents face. However not all administrators proved equally understanding. One administrator stated that Fourth Wave parents “do not care about their heritage, but they will regret it.” Although there were other reasons which administrators offered for low registration of Fourth Wavers, such as location of the school, level of Ukrainian language used and the school’s reputation, the majority of administrators stated that it is financial constraints and cultural indifference which keep Fourth Wave parents away from Ukrainian schools.

To what extent are the perceptions true? Are Ukrainian schools not representative of the influx of Fourth Wave children? As Satzewich, Isajiw and Duvalko note, Fourth Wavers as a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Number of Students (2009)</th>
<th>Number of Fourth Wave Students (Estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Demetrius</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>75-80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josyf Cardinal Slipyj</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Josephat</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>80% +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Nicholas</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>30-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Volodymyr</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>“very few”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsiopa Palijiw</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuri Lypa</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>“most”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNF West</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesia Ukrainka</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>“a few”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hryhorij Skovoroda13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Franko</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2084</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Number of Students Versus Percentage Estimate of Fourth Wave Students
group, are not involved in the organized Ukrainian community in Toronto. However, judging from approximate numbers given by the administrators, there are some Fourth Wave children that do go to Ukrainian school. In fact, according to their administrators, some schools seem to be completely composed of children who have parents from the Fourth Wave of immigration. (Table above). Furthermore, there are two new Ukrainian schools set up by members of the Fourth Wave, and which have been accepted by the ‘officiating’ Shkil’na Rada. These new schools are Hryhorij Skovoroda (established 2005) and Ivan Franko (2006). These schools were created initially because the academic level of schooling in Ukrainian schools was regarded as not sufficiently advanced for Fourth Wave children. This implies that there are some Fourth Wave parents who do wish to send their children to Ukrainian school.

![Number of Ukrainian School Graduates (GTA)](image)

**Graph 1 Numbers of Ukrainian School Graduates (Kursy) (1991-2008)**
By looking at the number of graduates from *Kursy* and the number of Ukrainian school children in the graph and table above, one sees an enrolment increase since 1991. However, these numbers are relative. The proportionality of the number of children in the Fourth Wave has to be considered and compared. According to Immigration Canada, 24,050 Ukrainians immigrated to Canada from the years 1991 to 2006, approximately fifty percent (50%) percent making Toronto their home. According to the study by Satzewich et al., Fourth Wave immigrants are on average 35 years old; 31.9% of them have one child and 45% have two. If a number of Fourth Wave parents were to send their children to Ukrainian school there should be a much larger number of children in the Ukrainian schooling system, certainly more than is represented by the modest growth of registration represented by the graph and table above. Accordingly, the rates of registration in Ukrainian schooling system, although benefiting from an influx of Fourth Wave children, have not grown in proportion to the number of children of Fourth Wave parents in Toronto.

**Fourth Wave Informant Interviews**

The previous chapter dealt with the events and attitudes which helped shape the Fourth Wave before their arrival in Canada. In discussions with eleven separate informants, from different regional, linguistic and religious backgrounds, several points regarding Ukrainian identity was a constant theme. While no claim is made that these eleven individuals are representative of the entire post-1991 wave of Ukrainian immigration, it is clear that events in Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1749</td>
<td>2084</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4  Percentage Increase of Students in Ukrainian Schools (General) (1991-2009)
before their arrival did effect the way they perceived themselves in Canada. In particular, regional, religious and pragmatic elements were important in how these interviewees located themselves as Ukrainians in Canada. However, they also mentioned the behaviour of existing Ukrainian organizations and individuals in Toronto also affected their level of attachment to the Ukrainian community and its schools. It became clear that those Fourth Wavers who were at home with the nationalistic narrative which the organized community embraces, and which the Ukrainian schools re-enforce, are more likely to send their children to Ukrainian school than those who have varying or competing ideas about what it ‘means’ to be Ukrainian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petro</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Gr.Uk. Catholic</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olena</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volodymyr</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>20s</td>
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Table 5 Informant Summary

Regionalism in the Narratives

After only a few interviews, it was apparent that regionalism is a major factor in shaping the identity of the Fourth Wave Ukrainians interviewed. The narratives of history and the
understanding of Ukrainian culture, politics, religion and involvement in community
structures seems very solidly determined by the region from which the interviewee came.
The interviewees came from four different regional areas of contemporary Ukraine: western,
eastern, central and southern. Those who came from western regions are the most
comfortable in the Ukrainian community in Toronto, since western Ukraine remained a
bastion of Ukrainian nationalism, activism and underground religious activities through the
Soviet era. Fourth Wavers from western Ukrainian are more likely to share a similar
narrative of persecution and pain with those of the Third Wave. Fourth Wave Ukrainians
not from western Ukraine are more likely to feel alienated from the nationalist and anti-
communist underpinnings of identity which the Ukrainian organized community in Toronto
holds as ‘official.’ In the interviews, different regional origins produced sharp discords over
historical narratives, acceptability of Russian language use and internationalist versus
nationalist political ideology.

As expected, regional variation influenced the ways informants described their narratives
of Ukrainian history, and in particular the role of Russia and the USSR in those narratives.
Western Ukrainian informants were socialized to a narrative more in line with the Ukrainian
school curriculum in Toronto, whereas informants from other regions, embrace a less
nationalistic narrative. Bohdan, a young man from L’viv in western Ukraine, stated that his
parents taught him a version of Ukrainian history which countered the influences of Soviet
history in school. He remembers one particular history lesson in first grade when he was
taught that the Red Army was the liberator of Ukraine, a historical ‘fact’ which his parents
corrected at home. Yaroslav, also from western Ukraine, is a little younger than Bohdan and
was schooled in post 1991 independent Ukraine. Thus, he experienced a school program
which was more nationalistic -- Russia and the Soviet Union were portrayed as the oppressors of the people of Ukraine.

This nationalistic context is in contrast to the way that history was taught in other parts of Ukraine. Many narratives from other parts of Ukraine incorporated Russian or Soviet elements. Central informants included them lightly in their explanation of Ukrainian history, whereas eastern and the one southern informant, included them heavily. Olena, a mother of two now in her fifties from central Ukraine, explained how the Red Army was portrayed as the liberator of Ukraine from Polish rule, and then from Nazi oppression. She explained that her town was pro-Soviet, but that everyone spoke Ukrainian proudly both in public and in private. Volodymyr, a young man from Kyiv, believes a vilification of Soviet Ukrainian history is going on in Toronto, a history which he believes is an integral part of understanding Ukrainians today. He states that the Ukrainian community in Toronto seems to deny the fact that the period 1918 to 1991 ever existed. In Kyiv, he adds, there is more tolerance and understanding of differences between the regions. The attempt to balance regional versions of history was seen as important by central informants. However, informants from eastern and southern regions were more definitive with their ideas about Ukrainian history and the positive role of Russia and the USSR within that history. Zina, from Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, was taught a history which celebrated Russian and Soviet governments. She brought away from her history lessons the notion that it was better to have been under Russian and the Soviet control once, then to be tossed between rulers several times and suffer from repeated political disorder. To her, Russia was a protector of Ukraine. She regarded the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 validated Russia’s right to protect Ukrainian territory. Victor, from Kharkiv, states that his understanding of Ukrainian history pits
pragmatic eastern Ukraine against nationalistic western Ukraine. Galina, from Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine, remembers the turnaround of historical narratives in her school after independence in 1991. She recounted how many students rejected the more nationalist curriculum. “My city was founded by Russians,” she said and explained that when the curriculum switched into a patriotic, Ukrainian nationalist narrative of history, it was not well accepted by the students.28

Regional origins, thus creates gulfs in historical understanding. Programs of history in Ukrainian schools must decide how to navigate these different narratives, some of which may be keeping children outside of their classrooms.

The status of Ukrainian language and culture also varies by region and has an effect on whether Fourth Wave parents decide to send their children to Ukrainian school. Western Ukrainian informants all spoke Ukrainian fluently, used Ukrainian at home on a regular basis and spoke of a strong Ukrainian language attachment in their lives. Parents, peer groups and schooling gave positive reinforcement to the status of Ukrainian culture and language. To them, Ukrainian culture is unique and the Ukrainian language has an equal, or higher, status than the Russian language.

This view of the Ukrainian language and culture was not always shared by those from other regions. In narratives from interviewees from other regions, Russian is the language of high culture and status, although they were taught Ukrainian language in school as a subject. Aloisha, from Kharkiv, states that although the Ukrainian language was not outlawed, nobody used it in his city because “it was not necessary for anyone” on a practical level.29 In fact all informants from non-western oblasty (provinces) stated that the Ukrainian language, although taught as a separate subject in schools, was not considered an urban language. As
such the Ukrainian language *de facto* was not esteemed. Petro, who taught at a university in Kyiv, was warned about his Ukrainian use in a place of higher learning. Olena too, remembers shifting from Ukrainian to Russian once she became a university student in Kyiv in her twenties. All informants from non-western regions stated that Russian and not Ukrainian was the language of business, especially in large non-western cities. In fact, four of the eight non-western Ukrainian informants did not speak Ukrainian or were ‘uncomfortable’ in their grasp of the language.30 Some accorded ‘village’ or

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
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<th>Religion</th>
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<th>Speak Russian at Home?</th>
<th>Speak Ukrainian at Home?</th>
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</table>

Table 6 Informant Language Use versus Religion and Region

‘lower’ status to the Ukrainian language and culture outright, while others were reluctant to do so.31 Victor was blunt in his characterization of the Ukrainian language as a ‘peasant language’ and questioned why anyone wished to learn it at all. Zina too said that Russian culture was ‘richer’ than Ukrainian culture. Others were less definitive. Galina was taught
and believes that Russian and Ukrainian cultures and languages are equal, but that there is a slight difference in the cultures’ perceived statuses. Volodymyr, Aloisha, and Petro also said that Russian language and culture are more respected in Ukraine, although Ukrainian language and culture *de jure* have official status. Interestingly, Anna, from central Ukraine believes there is no status difference between the languages and cultures at all, and speaks both Russian and Ukrainian fluently and often.

Language maintenance is a key issue in Ukrainian heritage preservation in Toronto. Schools which do not use Ukrainian sufficiently in their curriculum are rejected by the *Shkil’na Rada.* The fact that only four of the eleven informants speak Ukrainian at home with their families may put them at odds with Ukrainian schools which regard Ukrainian language education a priority.

As was apparent in differing versions of history and attitudes towards language and culture, interviewees’ appreciation of nationalism also varied by region. As was noted, some may be distrustful of Ukrainian nationalism, as politicians manipulated it for their own political ends. This negative view of nationalism, however, was only present in conversations with informants from areas other than western Ukraine. In fact, Ukrainian nationalism was presented in most conversations as a distinctly western Ukrainian sentiment. Two informants, from Donetsk and Kharkiv, were particularly dissatisfied with Ukrainian community politics in Toronto saying that the community was hyper nationalist and reflective of regional politics in Ukraine. Zina and Victor held particularly negative opinions about the nationalism found within the community and its role in the Ukrainian school. Zina, a mother of two from Donetsk, stated that she avoids the organized Ukrainian community in Toronto because of its aggressive nationalistic positions. According to her, Ukrainians in Toronto present
themselves as being better than all other cultures. This is the image she said she was
presented while watching the Ukrainian community’s television broadcasts Kontakt and
Svitoohlad. As a Russian speaking Ukrainian, this made her feel unwelcome in the organized
community’s structures. She heard rumours that the organized community referred to
Russian speakers from Ukraine as ‘Moskali’ and ‘Skhidniky’. She regretted that the regional
tensions between west Ukrainian nationalism and east Ukrainian internationalism had been
carried across the Atlantic and that, as a result, the community in Toronto was very “western
[Ukrainian]” in its politics. She also stated that she wanted to shelter her children from the
negative opinions which the organized Ukrainian community displayed in its attitudes
towards Russians and Russian speaking Ukrainians. In Donetsk, she recounted, everyone
spoke Russian but it was a community of many cultures. There was no concern surrounding
who was of what ethnicity. She stated that to her patriotism was a good thing, whereas
nationalism, which places one ethnicity above all others, is very negative. In her view,
Ukrainian schools in Toronto teach politics, and not culture.

The dominant nationalistic orientation of the organized Ukrainian community also
alienated a younger member of the Fourth Wave who does not agree with nationalist politics.
Victor, in his early twenties, came to Canada when he was ten years old from Kharkiv, a city
which he insists is called by its Russian variant, Kharkov. He avoids the Ukrainian
community because he finds its nationalist tone politically insensitive. Given his admitted
more leftist political orientation, he finds the entire Ukrainian community structure
unbalanced in its political perspective. To him the community is entirely western Ukrainian
and anti-Russian. Given their political bias, the official Ukrainian schools are irrelevant to
him and his definition of Ukrainian culture. He insists that he would not send his children to
Volodymyr, from Kyiv, had a less vehement opinion about the nationalism found in the Ukrainian community in Toronto, but thought that it was decidedly more politically conservative. To him, the nationalism found in Toronto smacks of western Ukrainian politics which, he believes, is not inclusive of those from other regions. He states that in Kyiv, in central Ukraine, there is at least an effort to understand and balance the differences between regional identities. This is not true of Toronto. These informants were clear that, although ethnically Ukrainian, they were not enthused by the mainstream Ukrainian community’s official interpretation of Ukrainian identity.

Significantly, not one informant from western Ukraine complained about nationalism in the community. Evidently non-western and Russian speaking Ukrainian informants, are uncomfortable with the nationalistic orientation of the official community. To them it is distinctly western Ukrainian and anti-internationalist, and thus they are not eager to send their children to Ukrainian schools.

**Religion in the Interviews**

Religion is also a key factor in the formulation of Ukrainian identity and in how the study informants located themselves in the organized Ukrainian community. In particular, there is a non-Catholic versus Catholic divide, with many informants branding the Ukrainian community in Toronto and its schools as ‘Catholic.’ As noted the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church played a key role in nation building in Ukraine, and especially in western Ukraine where the Church helped build Ukrainian nationalism. Since the organized Ukrainian community in Toronto is nationalistic in character, and perhaps because of the over representation of Catholic schools in the Ukrainian schooling system (where only one school
is Orthodox), some Fourth Wave informants assumed that the community is not welcoming of those who are not Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic. Interestingly, this position was not held by those who are Orthodox or of any other faith, it was the view of respondents who declared that they not believers in any religion. Thus, the strong representation of Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic schools and community structures, may bother those Fourth Wavers with no faith, but, surprisingly, not those who are believers in the other ‘traditional’ faith, Orthodoxy.\(^{39}\)

Orthodox informants interviewed were affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church in Toronto rather than any of the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox parishes. They attended Orthodox services in Toronto, but not those which are served in vernacular Ukrainian. If they proved representative of the Orthodox in the Fourth Wave, without doubt this bodes a problem for the future of the Ukrainian community’s Orthodox school in Toronto, St. Volodymyr’s.

One very striking pattern regarding the religious affiliations of the informants was the correlation between Greek (Ukrainian) Catholics and involvement in the organized Ukrainian community. (Table below). Petro used to work at one of the Ukrainian schools in Toronto; Yaroslav sings in one of Toronto’s Ukrainian youth choirs; Nastya is an executive member in a Fourth Wave Ukrainian organization, and Bohdan is president of a long-established Ukrainian youth organization. Aloisha stated that he is too tired after work to participate in organized activities, although he is a member of his local Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church. He also stated that he regularly attends church on Sundays because he insists that his son participate in the services as an altar boy. Interestingly, informants who claimed Orthodox backgrounds were far less involved in their local parish, though some said they attended ‘infrequently,’ mainly for important holidays. Why this difference between Greek
(Ukrainian) Catholic and Orthodox religious and community engagement? Perhaps the explanation rests in the differing status of the two religions in Soviet Ukraine. During the Soviet era, Greek (Ukrainian) Catholics needed to operate under clandestine conditions. The lack of official support necessitated development of a volunteer ethic among the faithful, and the state-led assault on the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic Church bred a powerful determination to save the institution from destruction. With this history of volunteerism and defiance, Greek (Ukrainian) Catholics in the Fourth Wave may be more likely to remain involved in the Church, and the community organizations that so obviously orbit around it. In contrast, the Orthodox Church, albeit under Moscow’s control, was state sanctioned in Soviet Ukraine and even benefitted from state support. There may be a feeling among the Orthodox believers that the Orthodox Church, be it Ukrainian or Russian, functioned without their volunteer

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Table 7 Religious Orientation and Community Involvement of Informants
involvement in Ukraine and can do so in Canada. They may be unaware of the important differences between the organization and administration of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and in Canada. Furthermore because of the fractious and relatively new Autocephalous Orthodox movement in Ukraine, which resurged in only 1988, many Fourth Wavers may remain loyal to the familiar Russian Orthodox Church. All this may keep them at a distance from the Ukrainian community and its schools.

**Pragmatism in the Narratives**

As noted, Fourth Wavers are very concerned with their economic situations and may give far less thought to their Ukrainian identity. Certainly, the list of occupations of the informants (or their parents) is illustrious. It includes those trained in quantum physics, history, business and medicine. However, as is the case with many immigrants, employment in Canada does not always match professional qualifications. This can impact an immigrant’s sense of self worth. “The lower social status,” said an administrator from one of the Ukrainian schools, “you can’t imagine what that does to a person mentally.” It is accepted wisdom in the Ukrainian organized community that the Fourth Wave came to Canada for economic reasons. Indeed all but two informants stated that they moved to Canada for solely economic reasons. Material wellbeing for themselves and their families therefore, is a priority and some, like Aloisha who works a night shift at a hospital, find it a challenge to keep their families comfortable.

Although economic security is a first priority, not one informant stated that registration for schooling was too expensive or that time was an issue, as was suggested by school administrators. Rather some informants indicated that they regarded Ukrainian schools as
incompatible with the long term integration of their children into a Canadian framework. Younger informants in particular want their children to quickly assimilate into Canadian society. Galina, stated that Ukrainian school is not necessary because she desires her children to fit into Canadian society. She argues that Ukrainian language and culture is nice to know, but not critical to success in Canada economically or socially. She states her children will born Canadian, and thus need to know how to behave as Canadians rather than as Ukrainians in order to be successful. Victor also felt that Ukrainian culture and language is not necessary for the survival of his children in Canada and that training them in a Ukrainian identity is illogical. Volodymyr agreed that “[Fourth Wave parents] may feel that [Ukrainian school] might ghettoize their children,” preventing them from fitting into the social and economic fabric of Canadian society. Bohdan, also stated that when he arrived in Toronto he was confused by his Ukrainian identity in a Canadian framework. He wanted to be Canadian but was Ukrainian. He resisted his mother’s pressure to become active in the Ukrainian community. He felt that it was “hypocritical” to be Ukrainian in Canada; that Canada is for Canadians and Ukraine is for Ukrainians. He stated that he would not wish this cultural ‘disorientation’ upon his children and so, as a result, is unsure about the benefits of Ukrainian schooling. Assimilation, or at the least integration of their children is regarded as the priority by many Fourth Wave informants. As a result, these informants show a looser attachment to the community and to their identification as Ukrainians for reasons of practicality, namely the long run wellbeing of their children.

Another practical reason given for avoiding Ukrainian schools is location. Some schools are located in areas of Toronto which were at one time centers of Ukrainian residential concentration. However those schools which have not moved with the demographic they
serve are suffering. It is true that some informants interviewed lived very far from any Ukrainian schools, particularly in northern areas of the city. North York, for example, has a growing Ukrainian population but has no community organized Ukrainian schools. Location of the schools organized by the community remain mostly in the western areas of the city, where the population of Ukrainians is particularly dense. Not surprisingly, schools located in areas which are no longer Ukrainian ‘strongholds’ suffer the lowest enrolment rates. Perhaps relocation of Ukrainian schools from old Ukrainian ‘strongholds’ into new Ukrainian ‘strongholds,’ such as North York and Mississauga, might invite higher enrolment.

Location may influence accessibility to the schools, but there is another more pressing issue which was identified as influencing informant involvement in community structures -- quality of service from community institutions. “We are different from the other waves who would go to [an institution] just because there is a Ukrainian flag on it,” Aloisha said, “I can’t tell you how many people [this institution] lost to Russian language [institutions] because of the lack of quality in the service.” He said that low quality of service was also reflected in the Ukrainian schools. When he and his wife arrived from Kharkiv, they sent their son to Ukrainian school but withdrew him after grade one. In their view, the teachers at the school had a ‘Soviet’ way of dealing with the children and the level of discipline and quality of education was low. He argued that because the teachers worked in a Ukrainian school, they believed their job was ‘safe’ and were indifferent to the quality of education the students were receiving. Petro echoed this when talking about the quality of service provided by the Ukrainian community’s immigrant support services. He reported that they were not very helpful to him when he arrived. He was left to find his own way. Although he did become
involved in the community, he did not remain involved for very long and does not feel a part of the community. Olena also stated that she received no help from the community during settlement and was given no information about Ukrainian schools.

The attitude of the existing Ukrainian community members towards the Fourth Wave is also cited as important in determining whether Fourth Wavers wish to be involved in the community. Negative comments made about Fourth Wave members, personally or as a group, do not go unnoticed and exacerbate intra-group tensions. Aloisha, bitterly recalls hearing negative comments about himself and other Fourth Wavers at community institutions. As if suggesting he was a traitor to the newly independent Ukraine, he recounted how people asked him why he and his family left Ukraine, and why he does not go back. He speaks Ukrainian fluently and counts himself as a Ukrainian but he believes there is an automatic negative reaction to eastern Ukrainians in Toronto’s Ukrainian community. Because of his particularly Russian sounding last name, he is regarded as suspect.51

Volodymyr also asserted that it seemed to him that the mainstream Ukrainian community is ‘cliquish,’ where access is only granted to those with a particular Ukrainian accent. In the end, so long as Fourth Wavers feel alienated from the organized community, there is little chance that they will be willing to send their children to its schools.

**Ukrainian School and Importance of Identity**

For the most part, the interviews focused on whether and how Fourth Wavers in Toronto defined themselves as Ukrainians. However, informants were also given the chance to answer two questions on whether their Ukrainian identity is important to them and why they would or would not send their children to Ukrainian school. The object of these questions
was to explore potential links between identification as Ukrainian and the importance accorded to Ukrainian schools as an institution. Judging from the answers given by informants, self-identifying as Ukrainians does not necessarily result in sending children to Ukrainian school. Some informants who said that their Ukrainian identity was important to them stated that they would not consider sending their children to Ukrainian school, preferring home schooling in the Ukrainian culture and language. Petro stated that his children were raised speaking Ukrainian at home and speak it fluently. He would not consider sending his children to Ukrainian school, stating it is only for those children who are not raised with the Ukrainian culture and language. Zina also taught her children Ukrainian customs and traditions at home and had no intention of sending them to Ukrainian school. Aloisha feels comfortable having his son learn about his culture and language, but not at Ukrainian school. He learns about his heritage through active language use at home and in the church he attends. To many Fourth Wave respondents, Ukrainian schools were for those whose parents lacked the hands on ability to transmit the Ukrainian language and culture to their children. Using Ukrainian schooling as a tool for cultural and language preservation, which plays a role in Third Wave Ukrainian identification and connectedness in Toronto, is not an important factor in the identity of some Fourth Wavers.

Whether or not Fourth Wavers see Ukrainian school as important in preserving and transmitting Ukrainian culture to children, one must also ask if the Fourth Wavers define the Ukrainian identity the same way as the Third Wave does. Judging from the answers summarized in the table below, the key point with regards to Ukrainian school attendance is not whether informants regarded Ukrainian identity important, but how they defined themselves and their children as Ukrainians in Canada. This definition is made up of
religious, regional and pragmatic elements. Eastern Ukrainian and Southern Ukrainian informants were not interested in sending their children to Ukrainian schools because their self-understanding as Ukrainians was not in line with the organized community’s narrative of Ukrainian history and its sense of connectedness. Central Ukrainian informants, in the main, prove less opposed to the idea of sending their children to Ukrainian schools as their

<table>
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<th>Is your Ukrainian Identity Important to You?</th>
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Table 8 Importance of Identity and Decision to Send Children to Ukrainian School

understanding of the Ukrainian identity tries to incorporate nationalistic and Russian-Soviet narratives. However, Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic informants from western Ukraine are the most positively inclined to send their children to Ukrainian school. This may be explained by elements of identity which they share with the Third Wave.
Western Ukrainian Informants, Third Wave Identity and the Ukrainian School

Western Ukrainian informants interviewed for this study shared much in common with Third Wavers with regards to what it means to be Ukrainian. Only western informants stated that active involvement in community is important to being Ukrainian and that the nationalist narrative is intrinsic in the Ukrainian identity. They were also the only ones to give a solid ‘yes’ when asked whether they would send their children to Ukrainian school. Nastya and Yaroslav stated that it was extremely important that any future children they might have go to Ukrainian school. Although Bohdan had his reservations about Ukrainian schooling, he would consider it for his future children and would even support a “slightly nationalistic” frame of reference in the school where he would register them. All three western informants agreed that it is important for Ukrainian schools teach the unique history and culture of Ukraine; in particular they stressed the narrative of Ukraine’s fight for self-determination against its neighbours. This is very much in line with the present curriculum in Ukrainian schools. Significantly, all three western Ukrainian informants are active members in the organized Ukrainian community, and state that they feel a part of it. Two of the three emphasized that active involvement in the Ukrainian community is an important part of being Ukrainian. Sending their children to Ukrainian school is a natural extension of that involvement. Informants from western Ukraine and who are Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic feel more integrated into the community because they are more familiar with the nationalistic narrative of Toronto’s organized Ukrainian community. As a result, they are more inclined to send their children to the schools found in the community. This is not to say that all western Ukrainian Fourth Wavers are integrated into the organized community and all other Fourth Wavers are not. It is to say that all those who agree with the Ukrainian identity presented and
enforced by the Ukrainian organized community in Toronto are more likely to integrate themselves into community institutions like the Ukrainian schools.

When the Fourth Wave began arriving in 1991, they brought with them differing and often competing understandings of what ‘Ukrainian’ means. These differences are reflected in the attitudes of study respondents to the place and expression of Ukrainian identity in their lives and as regards to Ukrainian schools in particular. According to informants, the Ukrainian community’s organizations and institutions, including the Ukrainian schools, are most compatible to those Fourth Wavers who share the interpretation of Ukrainian identity maintained by the Third Wave. These Fourth Wavers feel a level of connectedness with other Ukrainians and so participate in the organized Ukrainian community more willingly.

Other Fourth Wavers find themselves outside the organized community’s definition of Ukrainian. Informants from eastern and southern regions feel alienated and do not support the community’s single lens nationalist portrayal of Ukrainians and their identity. Some of these informants had a self-understanding and perhaps even strong identification as Ukrainian, but this did not imply that they shared a sense of connectedness and shared community with other Ukrainians in the city on the basis of this ethnicity. They find participation in the organized community unnecessary to ‘prove’ their status as Ukrainian.

As a result, the organized community is now faced with a dilemma. In the past it based its identity on the struggle for the liberation of Ukraine. Now the community has seen this achieved and must find a new goal. Furthermore it has witnessed a Fourth Wave of Ukrainian immigration which does not necessarily share its definition of Ukrainian identity, and by in large, is not interested in integrating into Ukrainian community structures. The question for the organized community is whether it can or will re-negotiate the Ukrainian Canadian
identity in Toronto. As things stand today, the organized community must face the fact that its institutions, including its schools, are viewed as unwelcoming, if not irrelevant, to a substantial part of the Fourth Wave of immigration. As Fourth Wave members integrate in the Canadian mainstream, the continuity of the organized Ukrainian community in Toronto hinges on how it responds to this challenge.


2 Maria, interview by Anastasia Baczynskyj, April 9, 2009. Toronto, Ontario.


4 The closest translation to Kanadoly is ‘Canuk’ but in the same way one would use the British term ‘Yanks’ for Americans. The word Baniak is also lost in translation but roughly means ‘old pot’ or ‘buckethead.’ Both are meant to be connotative of low culture or obliviousness, although the term Baniak is much harsher. It is an interesting turn of events that the Third Wave used the term Baniak as a slur towards the older waves upon their arrival. The term Novoprybuly means ‘new arrivals’ but has no negative connotations as such. It is often used in the community to determine the origin and orientation of the person in discussion.

5 There was an incident in the UNF which threatened the collapse and dissolution of the organization. In 1998, there was a dispute over finances. Some older Third Wave members wished to liquidate the assets of the organization to help support the Ukrainian Republican Party, a political party in Ukraine. The argument for this action was that, because Ukraine was now free, the political institutions in that country were more important than the organizations in Canada. The organization was considered expendable because it had served its purpose and was no longer relevant now that Ukraine was independent. Thus, it should help the political parties in Ukraine gain control of the territory. The dispute did not result in the liquidation of assets and the UNF still functions today. Vic Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora (New York: Routledge, 2002), 208.

6 One should not assume that the nature and composition of the Fourth Wave is static. However processes in place during the USSR were vastly different than those in the Displaced Persons camps and then later in Canada.

7 St. Andrew, at Don Bosco Secondary School in Etobicoke applied for entrance into the Shkil’na Rada but was rejected for lack of enough Ukrainian language content. It still functions as an ‘unofficial’ school, although it does not meet the standards set by the Shkil’na Rada. Like the ‘official’ schools, it prepares students for the examination which the Board of Education offers to gain a Grade 12 Ukrainian language credit.

8 See Appendix G for tables regarding affiliations and ties of various schools.

9 All the Ukrainian schools under the direction of the Shkil’na Rada (UCC). Other schools not under this umbrella organization were not investigated due to limitations space. St. Sophia belongs to the Toronto based Shkil’na Rada but is located in Mississauga. It is thus beyond the confines of this study and was not interviewed. Because many administrators requested anonymity, they are all identified by a pseudonym.
What is even more interesting is that, judging by the amount of teachers who hold Ukrainian Pedagogical certificates (issued by the Ministry of Education of Ukraine), the vast majority of pedagogues (82%) who teach in Ukrainian schools are themselves from Ukraine. See Appendix G for numbers of teachers in each Ukrainian (Saturday Schools) and their certifications.

Note that this is not the school of the same name run by Oleksandra Kopach. It is a new institution developed in 2005.


The administrator of Ivan Franko Ukrainian School disagreed with the statement that Fourth Wave parents do not send their children to Ukrainian school. As proof she stated that the composition of her school was 95% Fourth Wave. Interview with administrator at Ivan Franko School, June 9, 2009. Toronto, Ontario.

The initial creation of Hryhorij Skovoroda in 2005 was for this reason. The establishment of Ivan Franko in 2006 was prompted by internal divisions within the administration of Hryhorij Skovoroda. Note that the school established in 2005 bears no connection to Alexandra Kopach’s courses bearing the same name. Interview with administrator at Hryhorij Skovoroda School, April 24, 2009. Toronto, Ontario; Interview with administrator at Ivan Franko School, June 9, 2009. Toronto, Ontario.

Although this is the amount of officially immigrated individuals and the amount of clandestine individuals may be higher. Furthermore this does not include the sizable Ukrainian immigration from Poland. Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, “Overview: The Ukrainian Community in Ontario,” www.ontarioimmigration.ca/Ethno_Cultural_Ukrainian.pdf (accessed July 6, 2009).

Of course there is argument that Third Wave parents also do not send their children to Ukrainian school as they should. This would be the focus of an altogether different, but important, study. Sociologists Isajiw and Makabe state that assimilation starts to show serious effects in the third generation of any given wave of ethnic immigration. The Third Wave is currently entering that stage. Richard Portes and Ruben G Rumbaut further elaborate on the affects of integration of ethnic groups in a host country by stating that it depends on whether 1) governmental policies actively supports or passively accepts the group, 2) the groups positive, negative or neutral acceptance in the labour market, and 3) an ethnic community that is non-existent, working class or professional. Using these concepts, Canada was a place that encouraged retention during the arrival of the Third Wave but now has conditions which are favourable to assimilation or integration into the social fabric. Isajiw, Wsevolod and Makabe, Tomako. ‘‘Socialization As a Factor in Ethnic Identity Retention,’’( Paper in Pluralism and Ethnicity Studies No.7. Department of Sociology. University of Toronto, 1982) ; Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990).

This analysis is corroborated by Wsevolod Isajiw. Wsevolod Isajiw, email to author, August 10, 2009.
For a summary of responses see Appendix H. All answers henceforth are from interviews with Fourth Wave informants. Direct citations will be referenced. All informants will be referred to by a pseudonym.

In earlier discussion, the eastern, central, and southern regional areas were grouped as ‘eastern,’ because these areas were historically under Russian control for longer periods of time. The ‘western’ regional area remains the same as in earlier discussion. See Chapter 3, Table 2 for the provincial subsections of these larger divisions.


This corresponds, interestingly and perhaps significantly, with linguistic patterns. See Table 2 and discussion in Chapter 3.

However, Volodomyr also was never taught about the Holodomor while in school, a fact he finds upsetting and suspicious on the part of the Soviet government.

Here Zina used western Ukraine as an example who had been tossed from Polish to Austrian and then to Soviet control through the past three centuries.

According to 2001 and 2006 statistics, 49.3% of Fourth Wave immigrants are Russian speaking (Mother Tongue) whereas 48.1% are Ukrainian speaking (Mother Tongue). Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, “Overview: The Ukrainian Community in Ontario.”

The discomfort may have been increased because of the interviewer’s status as a Ukrainian speaking Canadian Ukrainian.

Please see note 7 this chapter.

A Moskal’ is a derogatory term for Ukrainians who speak Russian, who have pro-Russian sympathies or for ethnic Russians. A Skhidniak is also a negative term referring to an eastern Ukrainian. Both terms are used to refer to Ukrainians from eastern Ukraine.

Three interviewees, Bohdan, Olena and Zina stated that no one in Ukraine was particularly interested in who was ethnically Ukrainian or Russian before the collapse of the Soviet Union. They said it became an issue after independence in 1991. Olena stated that the only reason she found out if her friends were Russian or Ukrainian was when official documents started to be translated and people started asking each other for translation help.

Thus calling the community ‘Catholic’ is the same as calling it ‘western Ukrainian.’
Incidentally, these non-religious informants were also all Russophone and represent the three non-western areas of Ukraine, east, south and central, which also may be a factor in their labelling the community as ‘Catholic’ since these areas were all traditionally Orthodox territory. Members of non-traditional religious sects are unfortunately not represented in the study as none offered to participate.

Frank E. Sysyn, “The Third Rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Religious Situation in Ukraine,” in Religion in Modern Ukraine, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 200), 90.

Interview with administrator at Yuri Lypa School, April 28, 2009. Toronto, Ontario.

Two informants, Petro and Bohdan, stated that political reasons motivated them to move, citing corruption of state officials as the source of political unrest in the country. Petro and Olena also cited reasons of ecology. Chernobyl and the resulting food contamination made them concerned for the health of their children.

Several administrators also discussed how parents encourage their children to speak to them in English at home so that the parents themselves may be better equipped to enter the Canadian labour market.


At least two administrators feel this one of the reasons why their schools are suffering low enrolment rates.


Ss. Peter and Paul school, in the east of the city, dissolved two years ago due to this reason.

St. Sophia is in Mississauga and according to accounts given by some administrators, is doing extremely well in terms of enrolment. It is tied to St. Mary’s Ukrainian Catholic Church on Cawthra Road in Mississauga which has gained a reputation for being a very strong parish with high Fourth Wave membership.


Interestingly, Aloisha feels that Ukrainians from Poland or from western Ukraine have an easier time integrating into the organized community. This may be for reasons of demographics, as a large part of Ukrainian Canadian immigration, including the Third Wave, was originally from western Ukrainian territories. It may also be for reasons explained in Appendix F. See Jars Balan, Salt and Braided Bread: Ukrainian Life in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1984).

Home schooling may be even more effective for language retention purposes. According to Wsevolod Isajiw, speaking Ukrainian at home is more effective in preserving the language, although the schooling helps develop awareness of “being Ukrainian,” although he does not go farther into explaining what this indicates. Wsevolod Isajiw, “Learning and the Use of Language at Home and School: Sociological Findings and Issues,” in Osvita: Ukrainian Bilingual Education, ed. Manoly Lupul (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1985), 227.

See Appendix H for a summary of answers. The Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic orientation towards the community is worth further study. Aloisha, from eastern Ukraine, was initially drawn to the schooling system because of the Greek (Ukrainian) Catholic dimension. Marina Sokolov, a school placement worker in the Ukrainian day schools, states that the Greek Catholic dimension of the day schools draws
many eastern, central and southern Ukrainians who are of this faith.


55 Deduced from interviews with administrators of eleven of the twelve Ukrainian schools. See Chapter 3, note 20.
Conclusion

The organized Ukrainian community faces a great challenge. The historical narrative, and thus the Ukrainian identity as it knows it, is no longer uncontested. This thesis tracked the development of identity in the mainstream Ukrainian community in Toronto since the early 1950s and the incorporation of this identity in its ethnic schooling system. It showed how the organized community’s definition of ‘Ukrainian,’ embraced by members of the Third Wave and their institutions, seems to be out of step with the thinking of many in the Fourth Wave of Ukrainian immigration. Regional differences about Ukrainian history, culture and language, political and religious orientations, along with practical choices regarding their need to find stability for their families and the negative reactions they sensed from the established community, all play an important role in shaping Fourth Wave identity in their new environment and how they interact with existing Ukrainian institutions. Although no claim is made that the small group studied in this work is representative, it is true that the number of students in Ukrainian schools may not be reflective of the number of Ukrainian Fourth Wave immigrants. Those interviewed for this study may offer clues as to why this is the case.

Among those interviewed, politics seem to be a key point of tension. Many informants disagreed with the politicized notion of Ukrainian that characterizes the Ukrainian community and resented having to choose ‘sides’ between a Russian-Soviet identity and Ukrainian nationalist identity in order to be accepted. For its part, the organized community and the schools which represent it, may feel that the rejection of Russian language use, the role of aggressor played by Russia and the Soviet Union in Ukrainian history and center to right politics are non-negotiable elements which identify Ukrainians in Toronto. De-
politicizing or ‘adjusting’ the narrative of Ukrainian identity may not be compatible with the existing community’s version of what it means to be Ukrainian. In any case, the organized Ukrainian community in Toronto must face the fact that their institutions are not incorporating a heavy membership influx from the Fourth Wave and must decide how to correct this before the alienation and non-participation leads to an erosion of existing community infrastructure which the Third Wavers in Toronto hold so dear.

However, perhaps a complete re-negotiation of identity is not necessary. Instead the community might be well served by a re-negotiation of focus of community institutions. The purpose to forty years of Ukrainian connectedness in Toronto, the liberation of Ukraine, was achieved in 1991. Yet, the Ukrainian mainstream has been hard to accept the consequences of Ukrainian sovereignty, namely the end of collective purpose in the community and the reality of diverse political, linguistic and personal identities emanating from a democratic Ukraine. In order for the Ukrainian community to fuse into a connected group once again, it must find a cause which all Ukrainians can support. The organized community may need to shift the focus away from homeland politics. Ukrainian politics served as a rallying point between the waves only once since 1991. During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 was there a feeling of unity between the waves of Ukrainian immigration in Toronto, where Third Wavers and Fourth Wavers alike stood side by side in support of Ukrainian democracy during rallies, demonstrations and vigils. It may be interesting to further explore the links that began to develop between some Fourth Wavers and Third Wavers during this time. However, homeland politics may not be a sufficient point of convergence between the waves. As was seen, politics is a dividing rather than uniting factor for Fourth Wavers and Third Wavers. Perhaps a re-direction away from heavy emphasis on homeland politics in the community to
a more local emphasis on assisting in economic and social integration together with cultural support would better suit the needs of new immigrants and may be the best way to bring them into community involvement. If Fourth Wavers were heavily supported by the organized community through the immigration and settlement process, from the embassy in Kyiv, through their arrival and preliminary stages of settlement in Canada, perhaps they would be more inclined to take part in community institutions. New immigrants need help with documents, living arrangements, child care and employment. If the Ukrainian community in Toronto could organize its resources in their institutions and organizations into an efficient and professional support network to assist Ukrainian immigrants from the day they apply to come as immigrants, later rejection of the Ukrainian community and its institutions would be less likely. In short, Fourth Wavers are not connected to the community ex nihilo. The Ukrainian community must not expect their participation, but encourage it by making new Canadian Ukrainians feel a part of the community and its structures.

Fourth Wavers did not all receive the narrative of connectedness that the Third Wave did. By finding out how the respective waves are similar, rather than pointing out how they are different, perhaps a new sense of connectedness can be forged in the Ukrainian community, reinstating a sense of focus. The organized Ukrainian community must decide if and how to take the commonality of the Fourth Wave’s Ukrainian ethnicity and turn it into a connectedness with the Ukrainian community in Toronto. Whether it will do so remains to be seen.
Appendix A  
Women’s Organizations

Every Ukrainian organization mentioned, with the exception of SUZhERO, had a women’s division. Women’s organizations had their roots in the interwar period, but continued when members of the Third Wave set up their own organizations. The role women had in the cause for liberation was one that must be noted and appreciated. The Ukrainian community can be respected for the fact that Ukrainian women were considered full members of the community because they participated in attaining its goals. The gender gap was narrowed by a common ‘Ukrainianness’ and the need for women to participate in order for the community to survive. A woman who gave the community recognition as a leading figure in the Canadian mainstream or succeeded in accomplishing a noteworthy endeavour in the community itself, was just as important and received the same status as a man who did the same. They were important in socializing “free citizens” and were therefore important not only as a mothers but as “the key to national liberation itself.” Although this status may seem progressive, their aid was only appreciated so far. They were, in effect, ‘branches’ of the main male organizations and had little to say on the decisions made by the executives. Their work to the organization was ‘feminine;’ limited to preparing the organization’s children culturally by raising them with the Ukrainian language, song and customs, baking for bazaar fundraisers, and preserving the handicraft traditions such as food preparation, embroidery and folk art. These truths should be balanced however, with the strong presence of women in leading roles in the education sector and the performing arts sector of Ukrainian community life. They also participated in demonstrations and protests and thus were visible in democratic political processes. Women’s organizations were perhaps ‘branches’ of the main organizations, but their work was exceedingly important in the performance of identity. As
By historian Frances Swyripa's account, they were truly “wedded to the cause,” literally and figuratively.¹

¹ Frances Swyripa, “Wedded to the Cause,” in Canada’s Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 246, 244, 251.
Appendix B

List of Major Organizations and Abbreviations

Pre 1947 Organizations

BUC  Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics

OHN  United Hetman Association

UCC  Ukrainian Canadian Committee (later Congress)

UCRF  Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund

UCSA  The Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen’s Association

ULFTA  Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (later renamed AUUC)

UNF  Ukrainian National Federation

UPH  Ukrainian People’s Home

USRL  Ukrainian Self Reliance League

Post 1947 Organizations

CLLU  Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine

ODUM  Ukrainian Democratic Youth Association

PLAST  Ukrainian Scouts

SUZhERO  Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror

UYA  Ukrainian Youth Association (‘SUM’)

Europe Only Organizations

OUN  Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

OUN(M)  Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Melnykite Faction

OUN(B)  Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Banderite Faction

UNDP  Ukrainian National Democratic Party

UPA  Ukraiinska Povstanska Armia

1 This list is by no means complete or comprehensive but lists some major organizations relevant to the organized Ukrainian Canadian Community in Toronto.

2 The ULFTA changed its name to the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians in 1947.
Appendix C
Organizations and their Orientations

Pre 1947 Canadian Ukrainian Organizations and their Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Abbrv)</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Religious Orientation</th>
<th>Political Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUUC/ULFTA</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Regina</td>
<td>Greek (Ukr.) Catholic</td>
<td>Center-Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHN</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Saskatoon</td>
<td>Greek (Ukr.) Catholic</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Center-Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNF</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Center-Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPH</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Center-Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USRL</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Center-Right</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New and Imported Organizations in Toronto after 1947 and their Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Abbrv)</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Associated with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUZhERO</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLLU</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>OUN(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UYA (“SUM”)</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>CLLU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plast</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Greek (Ukr.) Catholics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reorientation of Canadian Ukrainian Organizations After 1947 in Toronto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Abbrv)</th>
<th>Religious Re-Orientation</th>
<th>Associated with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>(no change)</td>
<td>all center-right organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNF</td>
<td>Greek (Ukr.) Catholic</td>
<td>OUN(M)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organizations after 1947 in Toronto and their Women’s and Youth Factions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Abbrv)</th>
<th>Women’s Faction</th>
<th>Youth faction</th>
<th>Religious Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUZhERO</td>
<td>(integrated)</td>
<td>ODUM</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLLU</td>
<td>CLLU</td>
<td>UYA/ (‘SUM’)</td>
<td>Greek (Ukr.) Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNF</td>
<td>OUK</td>
<td>MUNO</td>
<td>Greek (Ukr.) Catholic (after 1947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USRL</td>
<td>SUK</td>
<td>SUMK</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix D

Ukrainian Schooling and the Multiculturalism Policy

The need for the preservation of the Ukrainian culture was strong within the community in Toronto but also pushed into larger, national territory. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was the impetus which started a high level of debate in which Ukrainians were heavily involved. The commission, whose role was to “examine the state of bilingualism and (initially) biculturalism in Canada.”¹ The debate concerned most Ukrainians, who found the idea of a bilingual and bicultural state antithetical to the preservation of cultural heritage and language. Ukrainians from all over Canada joined the debate according to Julia Lalande for two major reasons. Firstly, there was the real fear of cultural destruction which the Third Wave immigrants insisted that was happening in the homeland. Secondly, there was a need for funding the cultural programs which would help preserve that which was being lost according to the Third Wave narrative. This debate was discussed in seriously in parliament and eventually led to the advent of the Multiculturalism policy in Canada in 1971 under Prime Minister Trudeau. In 1977, the Ontario Heritage Language Program was announced which allowed parents to request the teaching of a heritage language during the school day “where enrolment justifies it.”² The language training must not exceed two and a half hours a week. The Ukrainian Catholic Schools in the provincially funded Catholic School System in Ontario are subject to these guidelines.

¹ Julia Lalande, “The Roots of Multiculturalism-Ukrainian Canadian Involvement in the Multiculturalism Discussion of the 1960s as an Example of the Position of the “Third Force,”” Canadian Ethnic Studies, 38(1), 49.
Appendix E

Contemporary Chart of Ukrainian Catholic Schools: Ontario versus Prairies 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1905</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on Ukrainian Catholic Schools in the Prairie Provinces

**Manitoba**

Immaculate Heart of Mary Ukrainian Catholic School is the only Ukrainian Catholic School in the province and was started by the Sister Servants of Mary Immaculate in 1905. Since its foundations it has been a Ukrainian Catholic school. Ukrainian is a subject but permeates the rest of the curriculum in concerts, artwork and holidays etc. There was a Ukrainian Catholic High School until approximately five years ago. The schools are given one half public funding and the rest is privately funded. This amount is given to any type of denominational school in Manitoba.

**Saskatchewan:**

Bishop Filevich Ukrainian Bilingual School is the only fully bilingual Catholic Ukrainian school and has an ‘immersion’ style of teaching where all subjects are taught in Ukrainian except for English, Science, and Math. There also is a Ukrainian secondary school named ‘Bethlehem’ in the province which teaches Ukrainian Language and Christian ethics classes in Ukrainian.
Alberta

In addition to the Catholic schools, there are also five public (non-denominational) Ukrainian bilingual schools in Alberta which are publically funded. The Ukrainian language usage in the curriculum at these schools depends on the grade level. From Kindergarten to grade six Ukrainian is used fifty percent (50%) of the day; grade six to grade nine thirty percent (30%) of the day, and grade nine to grade twelve twenty percent (20%) of the day. All schools save one, St Martin Ukrainian Bilingual School, also offer a non-Ukrainian curriculum to students who do not wish to participate in the bilingual education program.

Footnote 1: Many thanks to Vice Principal Ola Kowaluk at Bishop Filevich Ukrainian Bilingual School (Saskatoon), Principal Rod Picklyk at the Immaculate Heart of Mary Ukrainian Catholic School (Winnipeg) and Assistant Principal Taras Podilsky at St. Martin Ukrainian Bilingual School (Edmonton) for their time and information regarding the school systems in the provinces.
Appendix F

Ukrainians from Poland

The early 1980s witnessed an influx of Ukrainians from Poland into Toronto. This influx however, poses a problem of categorization. Firstly, these immigrants arrive before the Fourth Wave officially begins in 1991. Secondly, exactly how many Ukrainians from Poland have arrived in Canada since the first few members is difficult to discern. Ukrainian scholar Jars Balan states that this influx was “too small to be considered a wave” as the number of Ukrainians from Poland from the years 1979 to 1984 stood at 800 to 1000 people when his book, Salt and Braided Bread, was published. However, the amount of Polish Ukrainians in Toronto has grown since this time, as is witnessed by the creation of organizations focused on Ukrainians from Poland. Ukrainian Canadian sociologist Wsevolod Isajiw even stated that this particular wave was the ‘real’ Fourth Wave, and that the wave beginning in 1991 is the beginning of the Fifth Wave. Thus, two questions are raised. Since their numbers have grown since 1984, are Ukrainians from Poland a ‘legitimate’ wave? Secondly, if they are a wave of immigration, do they constitute their own wave or do they belong to either the Third or the Fourth Wave? Interestingly, many Ukrainians from Poland, because of their history of persecution in Poland, are vehemently patriotic and thus share characteristics that are similar to the Third Wave and participate actively in Ukrainian Canadian institutions in Toronto, such as churches and Ukrainian Schools. However, many were born in the USSR, and thus share similar experiences to those of the Fourth Wave. In effect, many Ukrainians born in Poland self-identify as being part of the Fourth Wave, although because of their unique characteristics and experiences, they could easily be considered a special ‘3.5’ Wave.

2 One such organization is the Lemko Association in Toronto. Lemkos are Ukrainians from the far east corner of Poland, historically called *Lemkivshchyna*, although many Ukrainians were forcibly moved from their homes and distributed throughout Poland. Historian Paul Robert Magocsi argues that because of varying grammar and other markers, the Lemkos in Poland, as well as the Boykos and Hutsuls in Ukraine, belong to a separate and distinct ethnicity called ‘Rusyns.’ Although some Lemkos are adamant on stating that they are separate from Ukrainians, the association in Toronto is very attached to being labelled Ukrainian. The Association owns land in Durham, Ontario and has held a popular Lemko festival for the past twenty four years which takes place at the end of July, beginning of August. For more information see Lemko Association of Canada, www.lemko-olk.com (accessed August 12, 2009).


4 Beginning in 1944, an agreement signed between the Polish and Ukrainian communist governments began a ‘repatriation’ initiative where an exchange of ethnic populations was conducted between the two countries. Many of the people repatriated were native to their respective territories. Although initially the exchange was to be voluntary, it became compulsory and enforced by force. This forced movement affected the numbers in the ranks of the UPA as many of those repatriated joined their attack against the Soviet government. This in turn, prompted Operation Vistula, another forced, although secret, repatriation within Poland in 1947, where the remaining Ukrainian population in Poland was redistributed and dispersed throughout the northern and western Poland. See Bohdan Kordan, "Making Borders Stick: Population Transfer and Resettlement in the Trans- Curzon Territories, 1944-1949" *International Migration Review*, Vol. 31, No. 3. (Autumn, 1997), 704-720.

5 Wsevolod Isajiw conceded to call the Ukrainian immigrants from Poland the beginnings of the Fourth Wave. Wsevolod Isajiw, “Fourth Wave Immigrants from Ukraine, 1991-2001: Results of a New Study.”
Appendix G

Ukrainian School Data Toronto 2009

Ukrainian Catholic Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Parochial?</th>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>All Day /Saturday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Demetrius</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>St. Demetrius</td>
<td>All Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josyf Cardinal</td>
<td>affiliated</td>
<td>St. Nicholas</td>
<td>All Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slipyj</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Josephat</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>St. Josephat</td>
<td>All Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Nicholas</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>St. Nicholas</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Parochial?</th>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>All Day/Saturday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Volodymyr</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>St. Volodymyr</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organizational Schools and Religious Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Religious Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsiopy Palijiw</td>
<td>UCC/ (Plast)</td>
<td>(Ukrainian Catholic, Christian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuri Lypa</td>
<td>SUM</td>
<td>(Ukrainian Catholic, Christian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNF West</td>
<td>UNF</td>
<td>(Ukrainian Catholic, Christian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesia Ukrainka</td>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>(Ukrainian Orthodox, Christian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hryhorij Skovoroda</td>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>(Ukrainian Catholic, Christian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Franko</td>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>(Ukrainian Catholic, Christian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Teachers in Ukrainian Saturday Schools versus Type of Certification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Ukrainian Teachers</th>
<th>Hold B.Ed or Higher</th>
<th>Hold Ukrainian Certification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Volodymyr</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St.Nicholas</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsiopy Palijiw</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuri Lypa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNF West</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesia Ukrainka</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hryhorij Skovoroda</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Franko</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Percentage Increase of Students in Ukrainian Schools 1991-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Number of Students (1991-1992)</th>
<th>Number of Students (2008-2009)</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Demetrius</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josyf Cardinal Slipyj</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Josephat</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Volodymyr</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Nicholas</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsiopy Palijiw</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuri Lypa</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNF West</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesia Ukrainka</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>132%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hryhorij Skovoroda</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Franko</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1749</strong></td>
<td><strong>2073</strong></td>
<td><strong>19%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Many Thanks to the Administrators of the Ukrainian Schools of Toronto and members of the *Shkil’na Rada* who helped complete these tables.

2 St. Sophia belongs to the Ukrainian School Board of Toronto however is located in Mississauga therefore falls out of the confines of the discussion.

3 The school was once heavily affiliated with Plast. Interview with administrator at Tsiopy Palijiw School, April 27, 2009. Toronto, Ontario.
## Appendix H

Summary of Informant Responses

### Reasons for Not Sending Children to Ukrainian School in Toronto (Summary)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Would Send Children to Ukrainian School?</th>
<th>Reasons for sending/not sending children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petro</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Ukrainian School is for those who are born here, with no culture, he knows from experience as a Ukrainian school teacher in Toronto, his children are Ukrainian and know this through training at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>maybe</td>
<td>Because she is Ukrainian, but would also send them to Russian school as well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olena</td>
<td>maybe</td>
<td>Did not know much about the schools, lived in an area away from other Ukrainians, no idea where to turn when she arrived with her children, taught them at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volodymyr</td>
<td>maybe</td>
<td>Does not feel Ukrainian exclusively because although he knows the history, he is Russophone, would send them to Ukrainian school if the mother of his children is Ukrainian and insists on it but would also send them to Russian classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zina</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>The schools are too political and ‘western’ oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>The schools are ‘Catholic’ and ‘western’; no need for the Ukrainian culture, his children will be Canadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aloisha</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>The schools are of low quality, knows from experience, teaches his children about their heritage at church and at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroslav</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Important for the children to know the language, literature history and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nastya</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Important for the children to know where their family comes from and orient themselves in the painful history and rich culture of their people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohdan</td>
<td>maybe</td>
<td>If mother not Ukrainian he cannot insist, but would like them to know about the culture and the language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galina</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Children will need to know how to act Canadian because they are in Canada, maybe would teach them at home maybe not if it overwhelmed them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Informant Regional and Religious Difference vs. Meaning of “Ukrainian”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>What does it mean to be Ukrainian?</th>
<th>Would Send Children to Ukrainian School?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petro</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Gr.Uk. Catholic</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Did not understand the question</td>
<td>maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olena</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>calls herself Ukrainian, not Russian, feels a sense of pride for the country when it is mentioned</td>
<td>maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volodymyr</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>speaking the language, knowing the complexities of the history</td>
<td>maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zina</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>her family is from there, her roots are there</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>was born there, being proud of being from <em>Velyka Ukraiina</em> (Greater Ukraine) the ‘real’ Ukraine</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aloisha</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Gr.Uk. Catholic</td>
<td>means going to church and celebrating the cultural traditions</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroslav</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Gr.Uk. Catholic</td>
<td>means to be proud to be from Ukraine, respecting the history, culture and people, getting involved with Ukrainian organizations in Canada</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nastya</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Gr.Uk. Catholic</td>
<td>means having a deep understanding of the historical suffering of the people on the territory and how this relates to the current situation in the country</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohdan</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Gr.Uk. Catholic</td>
<td>means being from Ukraine, speaking the language, being involved in the community and going back once in a while</td>
<td>maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galina</td>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>means ‘thinking’ Ukrainian, understanding the culture and the mentality, knowing how the country really works</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Anna, [pseud.]. Interview by Anastasia Baczymskyj, April 11, 2009. Toronto, Ontario


Ohienko, Ilarion. The Ukrainian Church: Outlines of History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada. Winnipeg: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada, 1986.


Petro, [pseud.]. Interview by Anastasia Baczynskyj, April 13, 2009. Toronto, Ontario


Zina. [pseud.]. Interview by Anastasia Baczynskyj, April 13, 2009, Toronto, Ontario.