Critical Reflections on Music Education

Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the Philosophy of Music Education

Edited by
Lee R. Bartel
David J. Elliott
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Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the Philosophy of Music Education
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INTRODUCTION

Lee R. Bartel and David J. Elliott, University of Toronto

The period between the 1990 Indiana Symposium and the Second International Symposium on the Philosophy of Music Education held in Toronto in 1994 was marked by active and open reconsideration of the philosophy of music education as aesthetic education, by the development of new paradigms, and by the consideration of new issues in music education foundations. The Toronto Symposium might be considered a culmination of this period of serious debate about fundamental assumptions in music education. In any event, the Toronto Symposium resulted in this highly important collection of papers best titled, "Critical Reflections on Music Education."

In the introduction to the papers of the 1990 Indiana Symposium, Estelle Jorgensen noted the dominance of the philosophy underlying the aesthetic education movement but observed that a few voices were calling for "a reconsideration of the ideas that had guided the music education profession during the past few decades and the development of alternative paradigms for music education." These voices were clearly evident in Toronto; traditional concepts of music education philosophy no longer appeared dominant.

Another change was evident. The papers of the Second Symposium dealt not only with basic philosophical differences but revealed a greater range and diversity of topics. That is, the themes dominating the Indiana Symposium were centrally focused on paradigm essentials: (1) the nature of musical understanding; (2) the place and nature of music in education, and education in music; (3) music curriculum and instruction; and (4) the nature and place of philosophy in music education. However, while these essentials were still at the core of the Toronto Symposium, new issues involving ethics, critical sociology, community, cultural context, gender, and play theory were given significant attention. This opening up or outward-looking trend is an encouraging direction for the field. Certainly, the paradigm dialogue is not over, but other topics are being engaged.


2 ibid, pp. 2-3.
Introduction

As readers will see from the Table of Contents, critical dialogue was a feature of the Toronto Symposium. After each thematic grouping of papers, colleagues responded with critical reflections. These reflections are printed in this collection as an integral part of the Symposium proceedings.

A number of people contributed generously to make this symposium possible. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the office of Adel S. Sedra, Vice-President and Provost of the University of Toronto; the office of Metro Toronto Chairman, Alan Tonks; Lee Karma of the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Trade: Office of International Relations and Protocol; Paul Pedersen, Dean of the Faculty of Music; and Glen Fretz, designer of program and publicity materials. Special thanks goes to the students who assisted during the Symposium: Mary Angastiniotis, Lynnie Kernohan, Sandy Jeronimo, and Julie Honsberger. Special recognition and thanks goes to Lisa Kim for the extensive work in copy editing and desktop publishing this collection of papers and to Dr. Steve Zdzinski for his help in planning and promoting the Symposium.
BEYOND AESTHETICS AND MEANING:
ETHICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION

John W. Richmond, University of South Florida

The purpose of my paper today is to invite our profession to a conversation about the ethics of music education practice. I feel a particular urgency about the standards of professional ethics in my own country, but I likewise suspect that many of the philosophical, economic, political, and psycho-social pressures, that are straining the highest ideals of our work in the United States, are ravaging the educational and cultural fabrics of other nations as well. Arts education policy decision making by expediency, and even exploitation, too often has become an increasingly attractive professional option. If ever it was safe to assume that music educators knew how to make ethical decisions and discern tough moral choices in carrying out their work, the task seems now more formidable, more multi-dimensional, with far less social consensus upon which to draw than at any time in recent memory.

This is not to suggest, as some do, that we are living in a time of unparalleled moral decay. Recent history suggests otherwise. In my own country, the abolition of slavery, the granting of women’s suffrage and the broadening of women’s rights, the instituting of child labour laws, the Civil Rights Movement, and a national effort to curb domestic violence are hallmarks of stunning moral achievement and growth in the last 150 years of U.S. history. Rather, I would suggest that a complex set of pressures is revealing vividly the genuine complexity of ethical decision making in the context of our work as this millennium draws to a close.

We all recognize that our philosophical literature has transformed our understanding of how the arts mean in our lives and those of our children, how the arts illumine our sense of identity, and how they unite us in collective activities which are at once unique and personal, yet shared and universal. It is from and in the branch of philosophy called aesthetics that this work resides, and its history, particularly its recent history, can be a source of pride for all of us. I think it is fair to say that we are well beyond our adolescence in our sophistication about modern music education, that the conversations regarding meaning in music and the arts have many competing voices today, and that our contributions in this area are valued deeply and pervasively across the profession. Symposia of this kind and the emergence of our new journal are but the most recent evidences of the ongoing vitality of music education philosophy.
Beyond Aesthetics and Meaning

To deal with ethical issues of music education practice, however, one must turn to a different branch of philosophy for help, i.e., one must turn to the field of ethics. But this investigation needs to begin with certain qualifiers. Ethics, like aesthetics, is a branch of philosophy thousands of years old, illumined often by another major discipline—religion—and endowed with its own robust and exhaustive literature. A sojourn into this vast intellectual domain, without clear and exacting criteria by which to guide the process as it pertains to music education, is sure to yield more heat than light (ethical debates can be impassioned affairs) and more controversy than clarity about some of our most fundamental and foundational beliefs.

Twenty-four years ago, Bennett Reimer spoke of the selectivity required when engaging in music education philosophy in the first edition of his book, A Philosophy of Music Education. There he noted that

...the field of aesthetics must be approached in a highly selective way. It would be beside the point (and quite impossible) to investigate indiscriminately the writings of every aesthetician in history, or every aesthetician of this century, or every aesthetician alive today, looking for leads to a philosophy of music education. Instead, the search must start with an acquaintance with the field of music education; its problems, its needs, its history, its present status. Aestheticians must be used by the music educator to serve his purposes.

If one substitutes the word "ethics" for "aesthetics" and the word "ethicist" for the "aesthetician" in Reimer's admonition, some very helpful advice for the present undertaking emerges. It is counsel I will do my best to heed. An understanding of music education and its needs provides an appropriate set of criteria by which to judge the relevance of ethicists' writings with respect to the music education profession. For the purposes of this paper, however, even more restrictions must apply. Neither time today nor space in our proceedings allow for so much as a cursory review of the relevant ethics-related topics for music education, much less a summary of the viable ethical positions with respect to those topics. Further delimitation will be necessary.

Therefore, I will pursue three modest objectives in the remarks that follow. First, I will try to provide a conceptual framework regarding much of the current discussion about ethics generally, ethics in certain education contexts, and ethics pronouncements from the arts education community. A terse literature review accompanies this section. Second, I will attempt to apply this framework to questions of morality in music education practice, particularly as these questions pertain to conflicts of interest. The philosophical, economic, political, and psycho-social pressures, to which I referred earlier, "loom large" in these deliberations. Finally, this paper will close with a lament on the nearly countless ethical issues ignored or under-served by this essay, coupled with an invitation to continue this conversation across the profession. After all, monologue is anathema to ethical growth.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR AN ETHICS OF MUSIC EDUCATION

Major Schools of Ethical Thought

Our music education philosophy literature can be described in terms of several, familiar schools of thought. These schools correspond to conflicting positions in the larger aesthetics literature. Absolutism and referentialism, formalism and expressionism, behaviorism and praxialism all define themselves in terms of their respective answers to certain fundamental questions or certain assumptions about their views of humankind, arts processes, and arts products.

It should come as no surprise, then, to learn that the ethics literature is split similarly among an array of competing "camps" or schools of thought. Understanding what unites and distinguishes these viewpoints will aid our discussions of ethical music education practice later.

First, the field of ethics may be understood in both descriptive and normative terms. Descriptive ethics resides less in philosophy than it does in the fields of sociology and anthropology. It seeks to document and catalogue the ethical systems of different cultures around the world. It also tries to understand the evolution of these systems. Normative ethics, by contrast, resides squarely in the field of philosophy, and seeks to offer moral guidance, i.e., normative ethics attempts to suggest what people should do when confronted with a moral choice of action. It also attempts to understand what it means to say that a given action is right or wrong. Normative ethics does not seek to describe, but rather to prescribe. Given our concern here today with questions of ethical music education practice, this discussion is best served by drawing from the literature and ideas of normative ethics as they pertain to our profession.

Second, the literature of normative ethics may be divided into at least three major systems. These systems are defined in large measure by their contrasting answers to the fundamental question of "right action." Consequentialists (the teleological view) argue that an action can be called "right" in direct proportion to the "good" outcomes or consequences it produces. The better the outcomes as a result of a moral choice, the more morally correct the choice must have been. Consequences confirm and justify moral decisions. Ends justify means.

Several sub-systems of consequentialism have had substantial impact on the literature of educational ethics, and warrant a brief review here. The first, hedonism, argues that the "right" moral act is the one which produces the greatest pleasure and the least pain for the actor. A somewhat recent form of hedonism, utilitarianism, argues that the "right" moral act is the one that produces the greatest pleasure or greatest benefit, and the least pain, for the greatest number of people. This is called the "principle of benefit maximization." It is a kind of morality by mathematics. In order to determine a course of right action, utilitarians first must tally the likely
Beyond Aesthetics and Meaning

good and bad outcomes of each choice, as well as the number of people likely to be affected by each. Only then is a moral action possible. This is the dominant form of ethical discourse in the context of public policy formation in the United States—the greatest good for the greatest number.

Of the non-hedonistic forms of teleological ethics, perfectionism, as espoused by Aristotle in ancient times and championed more recently by Mortimer Adler, is perhaps the most familiar. This school of thought holds that moral actions yield a life fully realized, or a perfecting of the self. This is the ultimate outcome, or consequence, of a moral life. Individual moral decisions are made in reference to what Adler calls "moral virtue," a means of decision making in which the individual is guided by four essential precepts: justice, temperance, courage, and prudence. Concern for both individual happiness (again, a fully realized life) and the common good is kept in balance by the influence of this four-fold moral virtue.

Nonconsequentialists (the deontological view) take the opposing side of this philosophical "coin." For the nonconsequentialist, the outcomes of a moral act define it as "right" far less than the moral intent of the actor. Actions cannot be called morally right unless first the actor intended for the action to be right. Nor can someone be faulted for unfortunate, or even tragic, outcomes of a well-meaning person. Much of U.S. civil and case law regarding torts traces from such deontological notions.

Further, and especially for deontological ethics in its orthodox Kantian form, certain a priori doctrines or rules of behavior must be observed. The first is that all persons must be treated as moral agents of equal worth. No action may be considered moral which exploits one person in order to benefit another or even to benefit a group. Nor can any action be considered moral which prefers one person or group at the expense of another. It is this doctrine of individual worth which underpins the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution.

Second, one must consider an action in the light of what Immanuel Kant called Categorical Imperative. This doctrine states that one must "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." That is to say, the moral rightness of an action must sustain the following standard of scrutiny: could this action become a rule of behavior for all persons in all like situations? Is the actor willing to be treated in the ways in which s/he is about to treat another? Kenneth Strike and Jonas Soltis have called the Categorical Imperative a philosophical form of the Golden Rule—"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

Ethical relativists make up the third school of ethical thought to be considered here. Ethical relativists really constitute a set of approaches to the question of right action. Each species of the set deals with right behavior by considering the actions of a moral agent in the
context of the group from which s/he comes. As a rule, ethical relativists do not embrace the notions of moral absolutes or moral universals. Fred Kierstead and Paul Wagner divide ethical relativists into four subsets: ethical egoists, ethical egotists, ethical nihilists, and cultural relativists. Kierstead’s and Wagner’s succinct exposition of these four positions follows.⁶

Ethical egoists argue that what is right for the individual may not be right for anyone else in the group, but that this state of affairs is acceptable, even normal. Consensus is not a necessary pre-condition of moral action.

By contrast, ethical egotists declare that all those who do not embrace their view of morality are wrong. Consensus is important, but it is not achieved by compromise or conversation so much as by conversion of the nonbeliever.

Ethical nihilists declare that moral concepts are meaningless, that they have no basis in objective fact. According to Nietzsche, they are inventions of the weak to protect themselves from the powerful. Actions should not be based on such fancies, but instead, upon the wants and desires of the individual.

Cultural relativists assert that right and wrong are standards which emerge from, are determined by, the culture of the individual.⁷ Moral virtues are coterminous with the boundaries of their own culture, but may be meaningless beyond them. Under this form of ethical relativism, it is clear what one should do "when in Rome...."

Kierstead and Wagner point out an important feature (and weakness) of all forms of ethical relativism which is worth mentioning here. All forms of ethical relativism diminish or dismiss the importance of moral discourse.⁸ I will argue later that moral discourse must be at the center of any strategy for ethical growth and advancement. For us, this is the conversation about ethical music education practice to which I referred in my opening remarks. Further, most forms of ethical relativism permit behaviours which the vast majority of cultures and ethical systems around the world reject as abhorrent and patently immoral (rape, murder, incest, prejudice). If for no other reason than that such systems offer little help in the ethical and orderly practice of public education, they have had little influence on ethicists interested in informing professional education practice, at least in the literature I have reviewed. For that reason, this set of ethical systems will receive no further attention here.

To summarize, then, the literature of normative ethics may be divided into at least three major systems: consequentialism, nonconsequentialism, and relativism. Of these three, consequentialism and nonconsequentialism seem to have had the greatest impact on education ethics literature. But I used the phrase "at least three major systems" strategically. Narrative ethics (found largely in the recent literature of Christian ethics) and feminist ethics (sometimes
called the ethics of caring or the ethics of nurturing) are among an impressive set of emerging ethical schools which promise great help for education ethics generally, and perhaps for our field as well. It is too soon to tell.

Ethics in Education Contexts: Reflective Equilibrium

There is one additional ethical system, residing most conspicuously in the literature of education ethics, which I believe can inform the ethical practice of our field and provide a practical, almost methodological prescription for "what to do" individually and collectively when faced with complex moral decisions. It argues from what I believe are the strengths of both consequentialism and nonconsequentialism while avoiding many of the problems attached to each. In particular, this approach emphasizes moral discourse in ethical problem-finding and problem-solving. The position is known by the several names of reflective equilibrium, rule utilitarianism, or neo-Kantianism.9

Before speaking to the salient features of reflective equilibrium, however, I think it would be useful to review what are considered to be the problems or shortcomings of consequentialism and nonconsequentialism. (Please recall that concerns regarding the shortcomings of relativism already have been summarized.) It then will be easier to understand how reflective equilibrium attempts to address these weaknesses.

Critics of teleological ethics allege that consequentialists require an individual to have knowledge which is often unavailable, if not unknowable.10 How can one quantify for arithmetic purposes the "amount" of pain or pleasure a given action is likely to cause? How can one anticipate the number of lives to be affected by a given choice of action, or the magnitude of the effects? I am reminded of the fictional character, George, as portrayed so brilliantly by Jimmy Stewart in the American film classic, It's a Wonderful Life. George falls on hard times financially and considers suicide, wishing he had never lived. His guardian angel, Clarence, shows him how very different, and awful, life for all those dear to him would have been had the influence of his life and works not been felt. The revelation was life-changing for George as he began to appreciate the countless small but important ways in which our decisions and actions shape the lives of those around us. Such consequences are incalculable.

Critics of consequentialism also note that, even if such ethical reckoning were possible, many tough ethical decisions must be made in far less time than would be required of consequential "accounting." Some of our most vexing dilemmas confront us "on the fly" and choices must be made immediately.
Finally, consequentialism suffers potentially from the same lack of moral "face validity" as relativism—it permits courses of action which are nearly universally abhorrent. Indeed, something as reprehensible as a lynching could be argued to cause more "pleasure" than "pain" if the context of this "utility quotient" is a single victim in a crowd of frenzied racists. For a philosophy of ethics to be compelling, such deficiencies must be corrected.

Deontology is not without its critics either, however. Some allege that nonconsequentialism is based on conflicting tenets. On the one hand, consequences are not supposed to be the barometer of right moral decisions. Instead, the intent of the moral agent should be the gage of rightness. On the other, we are to be guided by the principle of the Categorical Imperative, in which we are to be willing to have our actions in a given instance serve as the standard by which all individuals will treat one another in similar circumstances. How can such a determination be made unless the individual considers the implications of such a universalizing of their actions? What would be the outcomes or consequences of it? Decisions vis-a-vis the Categorical Imperative seem impossible unless contextualized by imagined outcomes.

Deontology also is not very helpful in determining the degree of specificity with which the Categorical Imperative should be derived. Should we declare that telling the truth is a categorically moral act? Should all persons be truthful to all other persons at all times? Clearly not. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution embodies the notion that self-incrimination is a kind of "truth telling" which society must not mandate, for example. History has shown that it leads to forced confessions. Should we then modify our Categorical Imperative such that all persons should be truthful to all other persons at all times, unless such truth telling is self-incriminating? Clearly not. Imagine a case in which you suspect that a student in your school ensemble comes from a home plagued by domestic violence. The father attends your Fall Concert, and asks you how his son is doing in class. You fear that revealing the boy's tardiness and inattention may yield a response far more severe than a scolding. Moral conscience seems to require something other than the naked truth in this case.

One may have come to the conclusion that ethical decision making does not lend itself to philosophical precision. None of the leading schools of thought are without substantial problems. Progress seems less than promising. To quote J. S. Mill,

After more than two thousand years, the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject [of right and wrong]....

Yet Mill was neither a cynic nor a nihilist, as one might infer from these opening remarks to his essay on utilitarianism. Rather, he was an impassioned ethicist, remembered largely for his efforts to bring clarity and understanding to mankind's moral sensibilities. Our
obligation to contribute to this ongoing moral discourse of which Mill speaks, especially in the context of our professional lives, may be embraced and valued more for the process dividends it yields than for a promise of ultimate closure to any given ethical issue.

I suggested earlier that reflective equilibrium seems to capitalize on the strengths of both teleological and deontological ethics, while avoiding many of the major problems attached to each. A review of its organizing principles will bolster this assertion, I believe. Strike and Soltis formulate the central thesis of reflective equilibrium this way:

Moral decisions regarding choice and action require moral sensitivity, rationality, and the development of moral theory for which the primary evidence is our moral intuitions. Moral intuitions, our sense of what is right and wrong, are the basic data for moral reasoning and the construction of moral theory.  

There are several important terms in this thesis statement which deserve attention here. First, what does "moral sensitivity" mean? I would suggest that the essential features of moral sensitivity are awareness and disposition. Awareness is a kind of tacit knowing that actions carry with them moral implications—an acknowledgement that there is meaning in suggesting that an action can be "right" or "wrong." Disposition is a function of attitude, particularly of valuing. Disposition is the degree to which one embraces the notion that making ethical choices is possible, first of all, but also important somehow, and that pursuing an ethical life is better than pursuing an unethical one. Finally, Strike and Soltis emphasize empathy as a central component of sensitivity. In fact, this ability to identify with others is a necessary condition if we are to be able to respect others as moral equals.

Moral intuitions are those standards, largely untested, that often guide our actions. They are our ethical "hunches" of what is right and wrong. Our moral theory consists of that set of moral principles issuing from our intuitions which, having been subjected to rigorous, rational examination regarding the assumptions that underlie them and the consequences they likely will produce, emerge as foundational precepts of moral action. The mechanism for this rigorous examination of moral intuitions is moral discourse, i.e., conversation about ethical action. It is largely through discussion and debate, through conversation and criticism, that ethical awareness and disposition are heightened, and the philosophical metamorphosis from intuition to theory is fostered. It is here that the rationality, of which Strike and Soltis speak in their thesis statement above, plays such a powerful and central role.

Because our moral intuitions form the basic data of our moral theory, it is important to note that not all moral intuitions are equally helpful starting points. Rather, one should begin with those intuitions which seem most self-evident, universal, and uncontroversial. For Strike and Soltis, the most self-evident of these moral "givens" is the doctrine of equal moral worth borrowed from Kantian deontology: each person is acknowledged and respected as a moral
agent of equal worth and value. For Americans, such intuitions are not only Kantian, they are Jeffersonian. They resonate in our Declaration of Independence, which states that "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal...."

Kierstead and Wagner put it differently, though no less powerfully, when they write that,

...respect for individual human beings is the highest value anyone can know. Hence, respect serves as a nonnegotiable variable in any proper attempt at moral reflection. Individuals must not use another person for the purpose of their own improvement. Profound respect for human dignity is a universal requirement for rule utilitarianism.... In short, there is never a justification for treating one person as a means, as a mere tool, in some other person's attempt to achieve an objective. We can never intend to seek our own happiness at the expense of someone else. We can never victimize another in the pursuit of further benefit, no matter how grand that benefit may seem.16

I believe that real help and important advantages can be found in this approach as we converse about an ethics of music education. First, it is an inclusive approach. Each of us starts where we are. Regardless of whether one assumes that our moral intuitions are God-inspired, genetic, or cultural residue, all of us bring our sense of ethical rightness and experience to our personal and professional lives. This position understands and acknowledges this starting place. Second, reflective equilibrium accepts change as a constant feature of our ethical theory making. Ethics is not a once-and-for-all business, or sure the thousands of years of ethical inquiry would have produced far more consensus than it has. Ethical knowing is ongoing and evolutionary. Third, reflective equilibrium produces a moral theory of guiding principles which inform our moral choices day to day and "on the fly." The application of these principles is inevitably imperfect, but is clearly more manageable than ethics by "utility quotients" or blind allegiance to doctrine. Fourth, reflective equilibrium enjoys the capacity to keep at bay the exploitation of the weak and minorities, something which orthodox utilitarianism cannot achieve. It renders certain means to desire outcomes or consequences unacceptable, regardless of their utility, if those means involve such exploitation. Fifth, reflective equilibrium nevertheless permits the rational consideration of consequences as a central activity in the transformation of intuition into theory, something which orthodox deontology cannot achieve. Finally, this approach is a collective one. The evolution of our thinking about the meaning of right and wrong is informed by the scrutiny and criticism of others. It is a community activity, and thereby holds in check the kind of solitary, ethical rationalizing which can lead to unfortunate, even tragic, conclusions. There is philosophical balance here.

Ethics in Arts Education Contexts

So what? Even if one subscribes to the notion that ethical decision making is both possible and important, what do we do? How do we change our practices to advance (if not
create) standards of ethical behavior for our profession? Given what I have proposed thus far, it should come as no surprise that I propose a conversation about it. We need to talk.

First, we should consider the music education ethics literature. In reviewing this literature, I discovered that our research in this philosophical area is comparatively sparse. Some scholars speak to the question of the moral appropriateness of including "provocative" material in the curricula of the young. Most of these works deal with issues of advocacy and law, however, rather than ethical discourse. I make the distinction between advocacy/law and ethical discourse, inasmuch as ethical discourse yields clarity about right action, which then is entered into voluntarily. Advocacy and law often deal in the articulation of vested interests, in which compliance is secured through coercion or sanction.

Other scholars consider the moral power of the arts to transform us into better persons. Jane O'Dea, for example, argues that "...music in performance fosters the acquisition and exercise of certain morally relevant and desirable character traits and dispositions." The more one engages in music performance, the more one acquires these moral virtues. Her ideas have their roots in the writings first of Alasdair MacIntyre, but ultimately in Aristotle. Among these virtues, or what O'Dea calls "ideals," fostered by performance, are courage, truthfulness, patience, tenacity, generosity, modesty, and empathy.

Frans van der Bogert also interprets the writings of Aristotle, as well as Plato, in a similar vein. Here, however, the concern is with the potential of the arts either to exalt the human spirit or to corrupt it. Bogert further asserts that for ancient Greek philosophers, the several branches of ethical, political, and aesthetic philosophy were conceived as being far less discrete domains of knowing than they are considered to be by some today. Karsten Harries is another modern scholar who borrows from the ancient Greeks, suggesting that aesthetic education is a central and foundational strategy of moral education.

Of course, a number of modern philosophers in education and music education take considerable exception to these ideas. Reimer takes issue with O'Dea's argument for ethical transfer, suggesting that

...there is an insupportably large leap from the narrow claim that certain traits and dispositions are required in a particular activity to the broad claim that those traits and dispositions will be manifested generally in a person's life beyond that activity as a direct result of engaging in that activity.

Philip Phenix takes issue with Bogert's notion of the overlapping of ethics and the arts, instead supporting the distinguishability of aesthetic and ethical meaning. He notes that
The most important difference between esthetic meanings and ethical meanings, as between
empirics and ethics, is that in the former the basic ethical idea of right or obligation is absent.
Like a fact, an esthetic object simply is. There is no question of "ought" about it. It is presented
for contemplation, and its perceptible qualities make themselves felt in the perceiver. One may
or may not contemplate the object and one may or may not respond favourably. One need have
no sense of responsibility for artistic production or appreciation and no guilt is incurred in
connection with one's esthetic experiences. In the case of moral conduct this esthetic neutrality
does not apply. Everyone is obliged to do right, and if one fails to do so, he incurs guilt. Moral
conduct is a universal responsibility....

So now I return to my original question. So what? In the light of this music/arts
education literature, what do we do? If one sides with O'Dea, for example, the answer seems
to be to practice music. Clearly, engaging in serious musical pursuits will yield certain ethical
benefits as well. If one is persuaded also by the ideas of Bogert and Harries (and Aristotle and
Plato), one must qualify the admonition to practice music by specifying that one practice "good"
music, i.e., music that edifies rather than corrupts. It is a notion reminiscent of the referentialist
admonitions of Leo Tolstoy.

However, if one sides with Reimer and Phenix, we still are lacking a prescription for
right action, which is the essential obligation of normative ethics. The notion that O'Dea and
others may be incorrect about transference of virtuous behavior in arts contexts to virtuous
behavior generally does not imply an alternative ethical course of action, nor is one offered by
these scholars explicitly. We still need to talk.

I believe there are several steps we can take which make sense, are rather straight
forward, and will be of immediate practical benefit to the profession. First, we can continue
the process begun today—we can converse. There is a designated respondent for today's
conversation, but the discussions and criticisms of this presentation and others can continue well
beyond this meeting and its published proceedings.

Second, we can introduce the topic of professional ethics into the content of music
teacher training, both at the pre-service and in-service levels. From a personal perspective, I
cannot remember one such lecture, much less a course, in any of my undergraduate or graduate
education. If ethical decision making is a learned behavior, we should consider ways to teach
it in contexts relevant to music education.

Third, we need to introduce the topic of ethics into our professional textbooks. A
cursory review of a number of the popular music education texts reveals that the word "ethics"
does not appear in the indexes of any of them. The topic simply is not raised. When one looks
at the publications of the Music Educators National Conference on professional ethics, the
discussion has largely to do with when not to engage school music ensembles for concerts which
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should be reserved for professional musicians. While this issue is a reasonable topic of ethical inquiry, the prescription here could be viewed as collusion and restriction of trade, rather than ethical high ground.

Finally, we need to consider techniques and methods of advancing high standards of ethical professional practice, currently in place in other disciplines, which may hold promise for us. For example, Betty Sichel has proposed that the model of the institutional ethics committee in the field of medicine be considered and tested in education settings.28 Calling this approach the School-Institutional Ethics Committee, she proposes that a multi-disciplinary group of educators from a given school or school district convene regularly for several purposes. Not only would they arbitrate ethical disputes and conflict through hearings and debates, but also would facilitate self-education, policy formulation, and general ethics consultation.

The power of this approach resides for me at several levels. First, it facilitates ethical discourse. The nature and work of such committees are conversational. By their very charge, these committees will convene to talk about ethical issues of the profession. Second, it is a collective enterprise—a group activity. This is important if we hope to hold in check the solitary, ethical rationalizing of which I spoke earlier. Finally, this approach has a substantial track record in another profession, and a life-and-death profession at that. If institutional ethics committees in medicine can be helpful with such ethically charged questions as euthanasia, abortion, and invasive surgical procedures, then institutional ethics committees in music education may find the ethical concerns of our profession no less manageable.

MORALITY AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MUSIC EDUCATION PRACTICE

What are the ethical concerns of the music education profession? How can we begin to organize our conversation about them? I will speak briefly here about morality in terms of the management of conflicts of interest in music education. I have chosen this topic as a starting point for two reasons. First, I believe that conflicts of interest are among the most vexing and pervasive classes of ethical struggle with which any system of professional ethics must contend. Second, conflicts of interest provide an interesting context in which to apply the approaches to ethical analysis we have considered thus far. The list of pressing ethical concerns is much longer than just interest conflicts, of course, and will require ongoing identification, definition, analysis, and prescription as we attempt to further our understanding of professional ethics in our field.

Conflicts of interest occur whenever the resources in which many parties have an interest grow scarce. These resources may involve money and/or influence. Competition for these scarce resources then ensues, and the conflicting pressures applied by these interested parties are
felt keenly by those perceived to be the keepers of the resource. When resources are abundant such that everyone gets what one wants, conflicts of interest abate. Given what we know about the current availability of resource to support public education generally and music education specifically, we can be certain of one thing, at least in the United States: conflicts of interest in music education arise routinely.

The range of interest conflicts in which music educators find themselves today is as vast and far reaching as the range of interested parties in the music education enterprise. Who are these conflicted interests in our profession? Students, teachers, parents, school administrators, and school boards come to mind immediately, but there are many others. Family members (both of students and teachers), academics, fellow teachers, music industry professionals of all types, instrument manufacturers, publishers, retailers, government agencies, professional organizations, clinicians, tour organizers, politicians, labour leaders, religious leaders, and philanthropists all have reasons, under various circumstances, to express interest in, and exert influence regarding, the public music education enterprise.

The nature of this interest extends across the full range of educational policy decisions. These include such questions as: who should be taught music in the schools? Under what conditions? What qualifications are required to teach a given music curriculum? What prerequisites are required to enrol in it? What musical cultures should be emphasized? What musical activities should be stressed? What musical materials should be selected? Who should make such decisions? In consultation with whom? Who evaluates the curriculum, the teaching, the learning, and the methodology? What financial resources are available from public and private sources to support this effort? Whose charge is it to make those resources available? What educational opportunities are constricted or eliminated in order to direct funds to music education? As the interested parties cited above begin to consider this list of questions and many more equally contentious ones, debates and conflicts emerge as each constituency attempts to represent their respective, vested interest.

Conflicts of Interest: A Hypothetical Example from Music Education

The music educator today often finds him- or herself at the very center of such debates, situated among many "combatants," vulnerable from many sides. A hypothetical example will help illustrate this point. Consider a public school choral educator who presents a performance of Vivaldi's Gloria with her students. The choir, orchestra, and soloists perform brilliantly. The audience of parents, teachers, friends, and administrators in the audience respond with an enthusiastic, five-minute ovation.
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The following week, she is served notice that the district superintendent, the members of the school board, her principal, and she have been named in a civil law suit, brought by parents of a student attending the school. The parents allege that the concert, organized by the teacher, constitutes an endorsement of religion by government agency. Such action, in their view, is offensive ethically and violates the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. They seek injunctive relief forbidding the study of choral music with sacred texts, as well as compensatory damages for the pain and suffering caused by the preparation and presentation of this concert.

While most ethical conflicts in the lives of teachers seldom rise to the level of civil or criminal litigation, interest conflicts often are couched by both sides of an issue or incident in the language of normative ethics. Each will allege that their actions are undertaken in order to correct a "wrong" and to protect a "right." Parties on both sides of the issue speak in terms of "ought's" and "should's." Each will claim "moral high ground" and attempt to prescribe what should be done.

Further, such a seemingly innocuous issue as repertoire selection may evoke many additional variations of ethical conflict from interested parties other than those noted in our story. Publishers, for example, may pressure teachers, through retailers and clinicians, to consider recent choral editions, arrangements, and compositions. Product shelf life and profit margins "inform" these initiatives. Students may be attracted to choral arrangements of the music of popular culture, and encourage their teacher to include such pieces in their performance program. Administrators may promote this point of view as well, either implicitly or explicitly, by reminding teachers that their job is enrolment driven. If a teacher wants her position to continue, perhaps s/he should be "market sensitive" to the wishes of her clientele." Academics may pressure teachers to embrace the study of the art musics of the world. This pressure may be applied in pre-service and in-service education settings, as well as in the context of performance adjudications of all types. Feminists may press for study of the compositions by women. Racial minorities and ethnic groups may champion music produced by their constituents. Each will claim that their cause is just, their motives noble, and their prescriptions ethically preferable to the status quo.

Surely these competing interest groups cannot all be right! How can a teacher hope to weigh these many viewpoints and come to some sense of ethical closure? As one considers the mounting pressures placed upon this music educator, it becomes easier to understand how some relativist writers, particularly ethical nihilists, have concluded that an "objective ethics," independent of one's own culture, agenda, or interest, does not exist. Ethical arguments are simply a restating of one's vested interest, according to this view, cloaked in terms which seem more palatable, more noble, and less vulgar. It is for this reason that relativists recommend that
one do whatever is in one's own enlightened self-interest. All other accommodation is either impractical, impossible, or pointless.

For me, however, such reasoning is morally bankrupt at its core because it is operationally equivalent with expedience, exploitation, and greed. No moral stand is taken when such doctrines are embraced. One simply accommodates the overlord to better posture oneself. On its face, this approach is unethical. It offends the moral intuitions of most of the world's cultures. It denies the existence of moral universals, an established tenet of descriptive ethics.

Teleological Ethics and Conflicts of Interests

Now consider how the other schools of ethical thought we have surveyed in this essay might approach the interest conflicts presented in our story. Consequentialists begin by asking what choices of action are available. Clearly, the teacher has the choice of fighting attempts to constrict the range of appropriate repertoire available for her use. She may allege that such constriction compromises her professional judgements, and forecloses some of the most significant masterworks of the genre from her students. She may feel morally bound to defend her own academic freedom and the freedom of her students to experience such important music.

Alternately, she also has the choice of charting a completely new path, in which she attempts to program only secular works for study in the school curriculum. Upon reflection, she may come to realize that this performance of the Vivaldi was but the latest in a string of concerts dominated not only by sacred music, but by Western European sacred music from the Roman Catholic tradition.

She might fear the ordeal of a protracted law suit, either in the light of what it might do to her rapport with her supervisors and administrators, or how it might damage her reputation with colleagues in the school and the profession, or in light of the division and controversy which would ensue from the case among her students, and prefer instead to settle the case with the plaintiff out of court. She even might choose to resign, either out of strict allegiance to her conscience regardless of the impact it may have on her financially and/or professionally, or because she believes that jobs in the "Bible Belt" of the U.S. are plentiful and that her preference for sacred music will be applauded, rather than disparaged, there. If she is supporting a family, she may feel that the choice to resign is not a choice at all. The negative consequences of that choice are too severe, too obvious, too vivid.

Once the choices of action are known, the next step must be to determine, or make an educated guess about, the consequences of each of these choices. To do this, the teacher must create a list of outcomes and, if possible, weight their importance. Next, she must account for
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development

the amount of benefit and the amount of pain or loss which accrues to each person affected by these choices. These persons would include every constituent listed in the narrative above, and others of whom she might think later. Once this tally is complete, she then would select the choice which yields the greatest benefit with the least amount of pain for herself, if she is a hedonist, or for the greatest number of persons affected, if she is a utilitarian.

Deontological Ethics and Conflicts of Interest

By contrast, the nonconsequentialist would turn to certain moral principles or rules of right action for guidance. Of utmost importance would be for the teacher to identify those persons or groups likely to be exploited by virtue of some vulnerability, and to ensure that whatever actions were pursued, no one would be exploited in order to benefit someone else. For example, the teacher could identify her students as the "pawns" in this power play, and conclude that their interests, needs, and desires must be central to the resolution of this ethical dilemma. If she is persuaded that sacred choral masterworks, such as the Gloria, are best for her students because of their rich expressive potential, or because they exemplify historically significant artistic traditions of the choral art, or because they serve the cause of healthy vocal development as few other choral choices can, then she is compelled to defend the inclusion of this repertoire in her curriculum, regardless of the outcomes of such a decision. She may lose her job, she may lose her case in court, and the choral program of her school may be discontinued as a result of this decision, but these consequences are not defining for the purposes of ethical decision making. One must do the right thing, especially in the face of adversity, according to this view.

Next, this teacher would need to scrutinize her decision in the light of the Kantian Categorial Imperative. She must decide if she is prepared to recommend her course of action to all teachers who face this ethical dilemma in the future. Particularly, she must decide if she is willing for one of her own children’s teachers to respond to a concern or criticism of curriculum content which she might raise in this same way. If so, then the strength and "rightness" of the ethical decision are underscored.

Finally, the teacher must look inward to be certain that she intended to do right by her students. Remember that actions cannot be called ethical, according to deontologists, which are not infused with moral intent. Likewise, actions which yield unfortunate, even tragic, consequences cannot be condemned as unethical if the actions were motivated by a desire to do the right thing. This teacher must be certain that her decision to defend the inclusion of sacred classical repertoire in the curriculum of her school was motivated by professional conviction and a desire to do right by her students, rather than being motivated by defensive posturing or belligerence.
Reflective Equilibrium and Conflicts of Interests

Reflective equilibrium requires the teacher to apply, or develop, a moral theory which, in this case, informs the issue of choral repertoire selection for public school students. The primary evidence by which to derive this theory must be the moral intuitions of the individual teacher. Underpinning these moral intuitions is the doctrine of equal moral worth, borrowed from orthodox deontology—respect for the worth of each individual is a priori to any moral reflection or discourse. No person may be used as a means to further the objectives of another person or group. Exploitation of the weak and minorities is never a moral option.

It can be argued that this teacher may well have been acting according to her best moral intuitions by teaching the Gloria in the first place. Hardly an obscure, unimportant, or ignored composition, few choral colleagues would have raised a disapproving eye in learning that she selected this work for study. She felt perfectly justified in choosing such an exemplar of the repertoire. In fact, she was proud to have a choral program that taught the "classics." The ethical dilemma here grew out of a challenge to this intuitive judgement after the fact.

Once questioned, the intuition must be examined carefully, and sustain ethical scrutiny through reasoned criticism, if it is to emerge as action in step with moral theory. The plaintiffs may prove to be a vulnerable minority, who protested the study of the Gloria based upon their own religious convictions. They may be members of a religious sect whose traditions, and particularly whose religious art, would seldom if ever receive comparable attention in a public school concert. They may feel a certain oppression as members of such a minority, and feel that public school should be a place where one's faith is neither propagated nor castigated. It should be impartial to all by leaving religious traditions in the home or worship center. The high school choir concert program served to remind their child that he is different, that the musics of his faith are ignorable, that his beliefs do not share equal footing with those of the dominant culture.

If the initial intuition emerges from this critical process as a tested moral theory, then the teacher will be able to apply it to future questions of this sort as they arise. If not, the teacher will have to consider new intuitions and new answers regarding right action in this context. The process presumes that the teacher is sensitive to the ethical issues that may emerge in the process, and disposed to pursue the most reasonable ethical theory that can be derived from it. It also presumes that she is able to engage in meaningful conversation about the issues with people who will listen to her critically and challenge her assumptions conscientiously.

Sichel's idea of the institutional ethics committee (IEC) could be an attractive option for moral discourse in this case. Rather than turning to the courts as a course of first resort, this
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committee setting might be a better place in which to air the grievances of the parents and hear the professional convictions of the teacher. Here, too, the school administration could participate in an open dialogue regarding the issue. Members of the committee might include other teachers of the school in question, other music teachers in the area, parents, academics, ethicists, and community leaders. The committee might serve as a standing committee of the institution (thereby permitting a certain ethics expertise among its members to evolve), or it might convene on an ad hoc basis. In either case, the committee would consider the issues which each interested party felt compelling, and participate in a vigorous discussion of the matter. At the conclusion, each member of the committee would be afforded one vote. Then, they would be in a position to make recommendations to the contesting parties concerning the issue in question.

While this process sounds remarkably like a binding arbitration process or a jury trial, there are some compelling differences. As I suggested earlier, the distinction between moral discourse and advocacy/law centres around the moral disposition of the contesting parties. In submitting to this ethical scrutiny, each side acknowledges a disposition to uncover the most ethically satisfying course of action, rather than rapaciously pursuing their own narrow interests. Further, each party pledges to pursue that course of action, as uncovered by the deliberations of the committee, voluntarily. Legal wranglings, courtroom strategies, and compliance by sanction have no place in an institutional ethics committee.

The charge of the committee would be to identify the interests of the parties involved in the ethical dilemma, to acknowledge those who are likely to be affected by the ethical choices of action under consideration, and to consider as much as possible the foreseeable consequences of each choice. They also would attempt to identify the vulnerable in this case, and be certain that the deliberations of the committee, i.e., the moral discourse, keep them from being exploited in an effect to placate more powerful interests.

SETTING AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH IN THE ETHICS OF MUSIC EDUCATION

In my opening remarks, I suggested that this paper would close with a lament on the nearly countless ideas and issues ignored or underserved today. Perhaps I also should include the word "apology," for my original intent was also to address the question of equality in the contexts of the music education profession. As my research for this paper unfolded, I discovered that the issues I had hoped to consider were too vast and time and space here too limited to do the topic even cursory justice.

Elsewhere, I have discussed the philosophical concept of equality as it pertains to gross differences in access to arts education instruction at the public expense. The focus of this
earlier work pertained to both ethical issues, and their attendant legal implications, in the context of disparities between school districts within a state of the United States. I had hoped to consider the ethical implications of gross disparities in the intra-school level here.

For example, what are the ethical foundations of a policy which promotes disparate education opportunities among students in public school who receive far fewer learning enhancements and rewards than their more talented classmates? Our profession often defends such practices by invoking the doctrine of meritocracy—students earn special privileges in music programs (better ensemble placement, additional touring opportunities, special ensemble attire, adjudications and clinics with outside experts) as a reward for achieving at a high level in the music discipline. Allegedly, such opportunities have been awarded to them based solely on the merits of their achievements.

Yet the variables which effectively predict this achievement may be status (musical environment of the home, economic status of the home, encouragement from parents, private instruction) rather than alterable (functions of the interventions of the public school music instruction). In other words, the "deck" may be unfairly "stacked" in favour of some students and against others before the first music lesson in school takes place. How then can the uneven, unequal meting out of scarce instructional public resources be justified on merit, when the instructional program effectively predicts the outcomes of a merit-based competition before it begins? As you can sense, this is fertile area for philosophical and legal investigation, but it is simply too pregnant with possibilities to receive appropriate attention here. It warrants its own essay, and that will have to wait for another time.

Other topics in this area seem to cry for attention as well. For example, I suggested earlier that we should include a conversation about ethics in the content of teacher training curricula. This presumes, of course, that ethical reasoning is not only learnable, but also teachable. Yet we know less about moral development, moral socialization, and strategies of moral education than we would like. Studies that consider these questions often do so in general classroom contexts. Is there something at work in the context of music instruction which undergirds these general principles or causes them to be different?

There is an exciting and substantial literature of moral development and education growing, to which the literature of ethics is contributing. Familiar names like Piaget and Kohlberg figure prominently there. Modern scholarship is discovering important themes as this research literature is synthesized. For example, Andre Schlaefli et. al., discovered in their meta-analysis of moral education research that what they call the dilemma discussion approach (a conversation-based approach to moral education)
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...produces moderate and significant education effects on moral development, whereas other types of intervention programs produce smaller effects, and individual academic courses in the humanities and the social sciences produce even weaker effects.30

Such findings confirm the findings of earlier studies, such as one by Ann Higgins, who reported that

The most powerful interventions for stimulating moral stage change are those that involve discussion of real problems and situations occurring in natural groups, whether the family or classroom, in which all participants are empowered to a say in the discussion.31

We now must ask the question: what does this research mean for us? How can we structure classroom and pre-service experiences in ways which heighten both ethical awareness, disposition, and empathy? Can these discussion-based models of moral instruction apply to our own professional curricula? How will we know if our efforts both to develop some sophistication about the meaning of ethical music education practice and to promote such practice among out colleagues are successful? How will our students and we be different? Well-crafted research that builds upon this generalist literature can shed much needed light (and probably a little heat) upon this vital issue too long neglected by our field. We have much work to do.

CONCLUSION

My intention today has been to begin a conversation about the ethics of music education practice. I think that the general ethics literature can be applied in strategic ways to inform our understanding of ethical professional practice for music education. I suspect it is too easy simply to suggest that our artistic activities are themselves sufficient catalysts for our ethical growth. We need to address ethics directly. I am convinced that it is morally wrong simply to suggest that ethics and advocacy are equivalent. But these are my own moral intuitions.

For these intuitions to evolve into a moral theory, they must be examined critically and conscientiously by others. I invite all of you, led by our respondent, to join in this process.

NOTES


5. Strike and Soltis, The Ethics, 15.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 4.

9. For an exhaustive treatment of this position, see Strike and Soltis, 70–95. See also Kierstead and Wagner, 10–12; and John Martin Rich, Professional Ethics in Education (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1984), 80. The Rich text considers ethical education practice in the higher education context.

10. Strike and Soltis, 14.


12. Strike and Soltis, 73.

13. Ibid., 75.

14. Ibid., 73.

15. Ibid.


19. Ibid., 59–60.

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24. Ibid., 6.


TAKING THE "ART" OF MUSIC FOR GRANTED:
A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC

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Not too long ago, New York Times columnist Russell Baker (Baker 1991, 23) asked, "Why have we become a nation of listeners? Why do we make no music for ourselves anymore?" and concluded that we have become passive in the face of technology. A more fundamental cause, I argue, is the institutionalizing of music as a 'fine art' [henceforth Art] of aesthetic contemplation. Over history, the status of Art has been conferred on a particular and narrow range of musical praxis, using an aesthetic rationale to distinguish its music as "classy" and thus promoting it as "higher," "finer" or more profound than other musics or "tastes." Without disclaiming the merits of this music, a critical history of the aesthetic idea shows that this self-serving conflation of the evaluative with the classificatory sense of Art (Dickie 1974, 42-44) is a social construction that has become an institutional ideology;¹ and further, that accepting this aesthetic ideology uncritically as the basis for music education is both unwarranted and counterproductive.

Introduction: The Aesthetic Paradigm

In dealing with ontological questions such as "What is music?" or "Where or when is music to be found?"—'in' the score,² a performance, the process of listening, or as particular situated praxis—the aesthetic paradigm argues that aesthetic qualities determine what music is. To epistemological questions such as what (if anything) can we know through music, what is music "about," and what 'content' is communicated (or "expressed"), strict aesthetic formalism answers: Music is about music! That is, its 'content' is sonorous 'forms' of aesthetic qualities that are autonomous and thus 'pure.'

Among other difficulties, the strict aesthetic formalist claim puts music having a text or music used for a praxial function in an inferior position for being less 'pure.' Thus a less strict aesthetic position allows that music is about "feeling"—that it "expresses" ideas of subjective life in or as 'pure' (or 'ideal') form. The axiology of the aesthetic paradigm is most usually concerned to establish criteria of 'good' music—that is, in distinguishing "masterworks" from 'minor works' and non-Art 'works.' Thus it regularly and profoundly confuses alleged internal aesthetic bases for goodness or value in music with the goodness or value of music as a medium of human agency. Simply put, then, aesthetic formalism fails to deal adequately with the central
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question: What is music good for? Alperson (1992, 218) asks, for example, "Why do we—or should we—listen to music at all?" And Kivy (1991, 553) too, wonders, "What needs of ours does it serve?" In this connection, if music is the profound intellectual and cognitive activity portended by the aesthetic paradigm, we might ask why we describe its practice and production as "play"?

Despite the failure to address such important questions adequately, the aesthetic rationale for music education applauds the aesthetic paradigm and justifies music in schools as "aesthetic education." Regardless of its magniloquence, this rationale has fallen upon the deaf ears of school officials and taxpayers who do not understand or do not accept as sufficiently warranted the "intellectual and emotional balance" claimed to be the benefits of such "aesthetic development" (Tawa 1987, 243—44). And, notwithstanding the aesthetic platitudes, most school music teachers instead continue to be largely preoccupied with developing technical standards of excellence in performance (Fowler 1988, viii) rather than aesthetic responsiveness. Thus, as Alperson (1994, 3) notes, "the list of platitudes about music is a long one but it is not a very satisfying one....We have many beliefs about music which...turn on a myriad of presuppositions which we rarely take the time to scrutinize seriously."

Musicians and music teachers are ill-served, I contend, by taking the nature, function and value of music for granted as Art—that is, as a matter of aesthetic pleasure, metacognitive expression, or intellectual 'high Culture.' When such unexamined assumptions (cf. Coleman 1971) are taken for granted as what music is, is about and is good for, we get the kind of elitism, snobbery and "connoisseurship" (Lynes 1966)—that leaves musical esthetes out on a intellectual and socioeconomic limb complaining that what they enjoy and value warrants higher economic and educational prominence by those who do not share the claim. But clearly, if music as Art was as self-evidently valuable to other intelligent people as it is to musicians and music teachers, its importance for education and society would not continually have to be defended.

The predicament arises in part because, by classifying music according to aesthetic qualities, the aesthetic paradigm has further conveyed an evaluative effect that ranks Art music at the top of a hierarchy—with 'folk,' 'popular,' 'functional,' and 'ethnic,' 'world' or 'multicultural music' arranged in arbitrary positions below. Thus a ranking of inherent value or quality is (generously) implied or (narrowly) contended according to criteria concerning quantity and 'refinement' of imputed aesthetic properties. In other words, the 'profundity' that is alleged to distinguish 'serious' from less recondite music is a matter of the scope and subtlety of 'aesthetic ideas' (cf. Passmore 1991 on "the dreariness of aesthetics") that supposedly required analysis and are necessary for an aesthetic response.

However, scholars operating outside this paradigm (Zolberg 1991; Berland 1982; Stigler, Shweder & Herdt 1990; Shweder and Levine 1984; Welsh-Asante 1993; Blaukopf 1992) have
clearly established "the socially constructed nature of art, cultural institutions, artists, and publics" (Zolberg 1991, ix). Instead of a search for an essentialism of inherent or defining internal aesthetic properties (see Bowman 1994), they understand music (and art generally) more broadly in terms of social agency and praxis (e.g., Shepherd 1991; Shepherd 1992; Blacking 1974; Wolterstorff, 1980). In this view there clearly are as many 'musics' as there are social institutions that define particular cultures and sub-cultures (Káemmer 1993). To gain some insight into the relationship between what music "is" and how it is valued, it is useful to first recount how social institutions arise and what their influence is in determining the 'facts' we accept as "real" and the artifacts we accept as "valuable." This will provide some technical distinctions for the later analysis of the history of the idea that defines music as an aesthetic Art.

The Social Creation of Reality

According to action theory, human activity involves developing various habits for dealing with predictable needs and problems. These habits, as theorist Peter L. Berger puts it, become increasingly routinized and thus taken for granted. Such habitualization narrows choices; habits respond automatically and uncritically to certain possibilities. This eliminates the need for mindful decision-making in familiar situations and frees the mind to be innovative and creative in situations that cannot be taken for granted.

Institutionalization begins when others take the same things for granted. Social institutions thus control and direct consciousness and conduct by setting up patterns of conduct that channel institutional behavior. These routines, assumptions and patterns of conduct are assiduously (and often insidiously) passed on to new generations, a process called historicity.

Institutionally shared habits, assumptions, and beliefs over time take on the character of 'fact,' 'truth,' and 'reality.' These paradigms constitute a consensus reality; and what is thus believed "real," "true" or "necessary" is transmitted to new generations as seemingly external, factual and thus unquestionable "reality." They become "the way things are, and are done!" The conserving and transmitting of such paradigms by institutional mindguards strengthens the sense of the truth and the virtue of the transmission and thus of the institution's paradigms. This promotes objectivation, and institutions therefore come to be experienced as possessing an "objective reality" or facticity. Institutions and their paradigms thus become "facts" experienced as persistently "out there," external to the individual. They resist attempts to change or evade them, and often have coercive power.

However, even though human conditions and needs change over time, few institutions have paradigms that promote or quickly accommodate change. Thus the more set in its ways an institution becomes, the more the possibility arises of deviation by new or marginal members. As an institution is passed on to increasingly remote generations, then, it increasingly requires
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Legitimation by institutional experts—which is to say specialized proof, justification, arguments (rationale or rationalization) and other formal and informal controls.

Language and labelling are principal means of such legitimation. To begin with, language is already a social construction of reality: it has built into it an institutionalized model of reality and conditions the ways in which a speaker perceives and thinks, and thus shapes cultural "reality" (Hayakawa 1978; Suzuki 1973). And, as Bruner (1991, 86; drawing on Jacobson 1988, 92ff.) explains, "there is within every language at every level a highly elaborated system for distinguishing the 'marked' from the 'unmarked'—what is to be taken for granted as given and what is to be highlighted as new, deviant, special, or interest-worthy." Each institution thus develops a special lexicon to do business and to confirm and reconfirm institutional agendas. As an institution thus sets itself apart from other institutions it becomes recognizably "exclusive" to both insiders and outsiders. The Western music "establishment" is such a prime example of an "exclusive" social institution that sociologists study it for general principles of institutional dynamics. It has developed an extensive jargon that is virtually unintelligible to outsiders. This exclusivity, as we shall see later, is an inherent negative consequence of both the aesthetic paradigm of music and the aesthetic rationale of music education.

Legitimation proceeds best when each person's role in the institution is also labelled and clearly typified. Eventually self-consciousness itself becomes structured in terms of such role typifications (see Brissett & Edgley 1975; especially, Stebbins, 133). For example, in schools, learners are labelled as "students" and are thus effectively separated in everyone's minds from "teachers" (or "professors") who thus overlook the pedagogical value of using students as teachers of other students. The typification of "musician" distinguishes—in both senses of the word—institutionally accepted members from ordinary mortals. And musicians are further typified into subcultures of "performers" or "composers" and "theorists," "musicologists," and more. And, of course, "those who can, do; those who can't, teach."

Deviance from expected roles and norms is viewed as a threat to an institution. Heretical values pose not only a theoretical threat to institutional paradigms, but a practical threat to the institutional order, and even its existence. Institutions run smoothest when members "know their place" and act accordingly. Not infrequently, then, institutional legitimations become an ideology that justifies and legitimates the advancement of the institution's vested interests by attempting to subordinate, dominate or eliminate competing institutions (Boudon & Bourricaud 1989, 207ff.). Institutionally created and steadfastly maintained reality thus can become so strong that institutional insiders literally cannot 'make sense' of heretical views or actions and thus dismiss them as "non-sense"—which is a perfect example of how language typification is used as a legitimation procedure.
What has been cynically called "the institutional imperative," then, holds that every institutional action is intended to keep the institutional machinery working in such a way as to protect its continued existence—preferably unchanged (Kharasch 1973). So in music too, as Alperson (1994, 4) notes, various ideas and practices "take on a life of their own and come to us, decontextualized and filtered through the accretions of a long line of transmission, affecting our own ways of thinking about music practices of the past and present."

To be sure, institutions are inevitable and even useful. They are not inherently "good" or "bad"; but they are clearly more or less pragmatic in fulfilling their alleged social contribution. But aside from not functioning as promised, institutions become problematic when competing ones make conflicting demands of individuals or society. The aesthetic paradigm, for example, directly conflicts with the institutional role of schooling for "general education"—an ideal that already is an increasing source of social conflict (Spring 1993). The rationale for music in schools advances its contribution to becoming "generally well-educated." Yet, as we shall see, the aesthetic paradigm of the 'fine Arts' is predicated largely on a social ideology that is essentially at odds with both the expectations for and the "reality" of schooling as a social institution. We turn, then, to account for how school music teachers find themselves in an institutionally created role that is dysfunctional.

An Institutional History of The Idea of Music as Art

For the Greeks, ‘music’ referred mainly to a type of ‘song’—poetry, rhythm and melody—accompanied by gestures and poses performed by actors who were amateurs but who were not typified as "musicians" (Wright 1969, 37-41). For the Greeks "the ideas of play, work and aesthetic enjoyment...covered all the arts, artisries and skills presided over by Apollo and the Muses" (Huizinga 1960, 159; italics original). These ‘musical’ arts were a *praxis* distinct from the largely technical skills not associated with the Muses. Consequently, everything 'musical' was closely related to ritual, ceremony, feasts and other praxis done for ends (*telos*) other than the kind of 'making actions' (*techne*) we call "working."

In general Greek praxis, according to cultural historian Johan Huizinga, the function of music "was purely social and ludic" and, "apart from its religious function music was then praised chiefly as an edifying pastime, a delectable artifice, or simply a jolly entertainment" (Huizinga 1960, 162) that nonetheless possessed ethical, moral, metaphysical and practical significance. In particular—and this is central to the argument—its status as a praxial ‘art’ was closely tied to the concept of *mimesis* (imitation) whereby "any melody, 'mode' or attitude...represents something, illustrates or portrays it" (Huizinga 1960, 162). Thus the creation (*poiesis*) of music, poetry, drama, dance, ritual and social games as play-functions was conducted according to *phronesis*—the rational knowledge of 'right action' needed for 'good results' in everyday living—rather than by aesthetic purport or import.
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A dialectic involving music's *ethos*—its purported influence on the ethical behavior of individuals—and *pathos*—an acute feeling or mood—was closely tied to what today we call "emotion." In fact, according to Francis Sparshott, "there is some reason to think that the concept of emotion itself was not developed independently of music theory" (Sparshott 1994, 38). This helps explain the antipathy of Plato toward music and musicians who, along with poets, he saw as an unsettling influence in the ideal State because of their problematic hedonic influence on ethical character (Republic II and III). Even Aristotle remarked, "it is not easy to determine the nature of music, or why any one should have a knowledge of it" (Politics, 1339a) and proposed a cathartic theory of music as a purging of emotions. Thus, writes Sparshott (1994, 38), "the connection between music and emotion is so intimate and so strong that the attempts (which one often encounters) to represent emotion as irrelevant to music become ludicrous."

Philosophical reflections on music speculated on the divine origins of music and even the magical powers that led to its use as therapy. Of particular interest were the mathematical bases of music associated with the metaphysics of Pythagoras who understood the universe of intelligible reality in terms of harmonies embodied in mathematical proportions. The study of such harmonic theory was included in the general education or 'culture' (*egkuklios paideia*) of the time and made music the only one of what we now call the Fine Arts to be studied in schools. From the first, then, music has been a pursuit of the leisure class that had definite intellectual and philosophical implications. But its inclusion in the "liberal arts" was as speculative mathematics or metaphysics, not as what we call Art (Alperson 1994b).

By the sixth century A.D., the metaphysics of Greek music theory were transmitted in terms that were to dominate for over a thousand years. Reason and the analytical powers of the mind were stressed. Theory and theorists were seen as superior to musicians, who were seen instead as mere practitioners of the theoretical science. Nonetheless, 'music theory' largely continued to serve the creation of music that was governed by praxial requirements that, in turn, served as criteria of its 'goodness' and controlled its development. In particular, such music was composed for use by the Church, the court, the nobles and other aristocracy "as an accompaniment to other activities—dancing, socializing, religious worship. Only in the nineteenth century, as Lasch (1984, 42-43) points out, "did music come to be segregated from ordinary life and surrounded with an aura of sanctity."

What today is called "music history," then, is almost entirely a chronicle of the musical praxis of the privileged leisure class or clerics (except rare instances where other musics were appropriated to "classy" use). The term "musicology," having been institutionally pre-empted for typifying the study of "classy" music, it remained for the institutionalization of "ethnomusicology" to legitimate the study of indigenous and vernacular musics. Today such music is studied from the perspectives of "popular culture," anthropology, social history, ethnic studies and the like, but not as Art music.
With the Renaissance the rekindling of interest in Greek culture brought about a spate of learned treatises by artists and theorists that secured the "sister arts" a place among the liberal arts and humanities as learned science and philosophical theory. "Masters" of the medieval era had been considered mere craftsmen but Renaissance artists and composers now signed their works. In their concern to earn a place for music as a humanist discipline, music theorists such as Zarlino and Galilei sought "a vocal music that would attain the powerful emotional and ethical effects attributed to Greek Music" (Beardsley 1967, 24). This eventually culminated in monody and the creation of opera.

For another century at least, music and music theorizing were closely connected to words and texts. Thus, writes Kivy (1991, 545) "what the eighteenth-century theorists had in mind...when they baptized 'music' Art was always, essentially, music that accompanied a text." Specifically, Alperson adds (1992, 225), they meant "music which, as is the case of operatic monody, could be construed as the artistic representation of human utterance, the fine art of representing human expression in musical tones." Thus, for example, "the so-called stile rappresentivo" transforms the "decorative craft of text setting into the fine art of utterance representations" (Kivy 1991, 548)—in other words, into a musical imitation of speech.

Lacking this association with text and mimesis, instrumental music at first had only minor importance in theory or in practice in "classy" society. It was not until the later eighteenth century, when it became representational or illustrational in its 'content' of literary and pictorial themes and associations, that instrumental music gained prominence (Kivy 1991, 550; Alperson 1992, 225). The early eighteenth century theory of Affektenlehre, based on Classical rhetoric, advanced a mimesis of musical 'gesture' to "express" certain basic affects. Other attempts at "expression" were pursued in the mid-eighteenth century Mannheim School where novel orchestral techniques based on visual and gestural imagery were used to suggest 'dramatic' effects far more expressive than the sentimentality of the galanter Stil (in France, style galant) of the Rococo. And towards the close of the century, the Empfindsamer Stil imitated human subjectivity by employing constant change in the degree or type of affection through continual changes of dynamics, tempo, texture, orchestration, etc.

In general, then, the transition from Baroque to Classical was largely a matter of transforming or abstracting previously speech-like and text-based 'figures' and 'gestures' from opera in purely instrumental terms. Listeners were familiar with a formidable lexicon of musical figures possessing a definite association in reference to emotional states (Harnoncourt 1988, 118–36; Lang 1941, 442, 588, 711–2). For example, according to Harnoncourt (1988, 120), it was clearly understood by instrumentalists in the 17th and much of the 18th century that their music was always expected to "speak."...The matter-of-factness with which composers and interpreters assumed that their audience understood their "tonal discourse" amazes us, since both musicians and listeners today often have great difficulty with this very understanding.
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Even vibrato was called *voce humana* for its similarity to the vibrating singing voice.

This "rationalizing of the affections," as Lang has called it (Lang 1941, 590), was the distinct stamp the Enlightenment put on the 'logic' of *Affektenlehre* as practised during the Baroque—the Age of Reason. The battle cry of this 'enlightened' rationalizing was "truth of expression" (Lang 1941, 588). Therefore, the artificiality of basing an entire movement on one basic affection gave way to nuances of shifting tension and relaxation towards and away from contrasts of themes based on a polarization of tonality between the tonic and dominant. Singularity of *affect* thus gave way to expressively natural *effects* gained by subtle modifications and developments of melodic and rhythmic material, tempo and dynamics. To replace the ongoing flow and continuity of Baroque *fortspinnung*, the repetition of exact or similar musical material resulted in symmetrical melodic constructions and the logical *formation* of separate sections and parts into a closed "form." Subjectivity was thus cast in and controlled by a "unity in multiplicity" that paralleled the search in Leibnitz's mathematical logic of permutations and combinations for a fundamental concept of unity (harmony) within variety (Cassirer 28-31; 289-90).17 And instrumental music was still considered "imitative," although not in the sense of representing but of translating natural affections into tones.

[T]he florid runs, the syncopations, and the large stock of traditional devices taken from the current operatic scenes of "rage," "lament," "exorcism," "revenge," etc., enriched the expressive capability of the orchestra, lending it a vivaciously unknown to the generation before Haydn. Some of these clichés lived on virtually unchanged and are admired by us as typical examples of pure symphonic style. Thus the imitation of the heartbeat in moments of anguish and surprise, especially popular in the opera buffa, was still causing profound tension in the bass pizzicati at the beginning of Schubert's *Unfinished Symphony* (although nineteenth-century composers were probably not aware of its origin). (Lang 1941, 712-13; emphasis added).

Audiences nonetheless craved ever-new musical realizations of these commonly held meanings. Thus, unlike today, *new* music was of far more interest and consequence than performances of familiar or old music. And the paragon of language became the basis of music: the likeness of music to *dialogue*—i.e., conflict, argument, anger and the like—provided its *drama* (Dahlhaus 1989, 12-13).18 Thus the more natural, speech-like directness of melody, and an accompaniment that did not attract attention to itself, was preferred to the distracting contrapuntal complexities of the Baroque.

These developments were felt in Vienna and clearly influenced Haydn and Mozart. In fact, Mozart was always concerned with 'drama' in both his instrumental and vocal music. According to Harnoncourt (1988, 136), "his contemporaries describe Mozart's music as extremely rich in contrasts, vivid, stirring, heart-wrenching; which qualities were the focus of contemporary critics' attacks on his works." This prompts Harnoncourt to wonder, "how could such music be reduced in 150 years, to 'bliss,' to aesthetic enjoyment?" Nevertheless, despite being the culmination of a long heritage of musical referentialism and expressionism, the idea
of 'absolute music' as 'pure form' for disinterested aesthetic contemplation comes into being with Classicism (Rosen 1971) and the rise of the middle class and its upward social aspirations (Dahlhaus 1989; Hauser 1951).

The Legitimation of 'Good Taste' as Aesthetic

Aesthetic theories of "taste" are rooted in a host of entanglements involving socially approved "good taste" and "fine taste" (Cassirer 1968; 321, 325). Kant's concern with judgments of "beauty" in the arts, for example, was largely directed toward guiding taste. But, according to Dickie, aesthetic attitude theory replaced the concern for 'beauty' with the notion of the aesthetic object (Dickie 1970, 82). This was more a case of institutionalizing the outward socio-musical praxis of "classy" society at that time than it was a stipulating of any aesthetic criteria. As Lang (1941, 625) described it,

the classical era surrounded itself with music..., and thus the music of this era was the music of life. It clung to the outward forms of life, it was present at every occasion in order to make use of it, and from this point of view it was "occasional music." But it no longer was, as in the past, the servant of any particular occasion, the means with which man served cultural aims, sacred or secular, or worship or of entertainment.

This music essentially consisted of praxial chamber musicales for the aristocracy's social "occasions." The nouveau riche of the newly ascending upper middle class also began to appropriate the outward cultural manifestations of the aristocracy and thus orchestras consisted of music-loving amateurs (Lang 1941, 723, 571) who made music for themselves and family, not for a paying audience (Lang 1941, 714, 721). However, as Lang (1941, 725) points out, "with the rapidly increasing influence of the dilettante and the dissemination of music in the middle-class home, the high cultural level of the executant musician was constantly lowered, with the resultant rise of the specialist." Thus to the active participation of "amateur-connoisseurs we must add a new factor, the passive participant, the listener, whose tastes and desires were henceforth to demand acknowledgement from both composer and performer."

Early in the eighteenth century, various amateur concert organizations were founded in all major cultural centers of Europe and became the focus of both composers and traveling virtuosi. The ideal of the Enlightenment was the homme galant, the universally cultured man. Music theory no longer was concerned with legitimating the present in terms of the past, but rather with enabling the educated person, in Lang's words (1941, 440), "to form his tastes, understand the technical terms, so that he can discuss this noble science with understanding." Even though the middle class aspired to "classy" status it also regaled against the affectations and pomp of the court. This moral fervor led to a preference for simplicity and the same sobriety of atmosphere and seriousness of purpose that characterized the austere industriousness
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of the bourgeoisie. Thus, art and music was seen as a social and moral matter, an expression of 'upstanding' character and 'wholesome' ideals (Dahlhaus 1989, 4-5).

Only toward the end of the century were the "professional" orchestras and operas of aristocrats made available to the paying public. Thus musical 'dilettantism' spurred both the music publishing industry and the music concert industry. However, most music continued to serve the court (e.g., Haydn) or as a divertissement for the aristocracy and wealthy bourgeoisie (e.g., Mozart). However much it engaged the composer's musical intellect, most 'chamber music' of the time continued to serve a praxial function—what we might today call "background" or "dinner music," or entertainment for the upwardly mobile and those already there. And symphonic music was often an "occasional music" that at the very least provided the occasion for a social "show of class."

In his Critique of Judgement [1790], however, Kant (1952) did not have much good to say about music. Music, he reasoned, "since it plays merely with sensations, has the lowest place among the fine arts" (53, 536). He allowed the possibility that its sensations might engage the imagination in ways requiring a "pure judgement of taste" (14, 485-6) but held that a judgment of taste could not be "pure" if it involved music set to words which would make it dependent, instead, on definite concepts (16, 488). He understood "taste" in public or social terms as a "sensus communis aestheticus" (40, 518-20)—a kind of socio-psychological "common sense" of taste shared by all—that necessarily takes collective taste and public judgment into account. He distinguished this from the "genius" needed instead to understand aesthetic ideas (48/49, 527-32). But, although the work on "disinterested attention" and "disinterested pleasure" of Shaftesbury and other English thinkers (Stolnitz 1961) was well known in Germany, Kant tends to use the word "aesthetic" more to refer to all pleasing perceptual experiences ("sensuous perception"), especially of nature, than to the "disinterested appreciation" of aesthetic-attitude theorists (Dickie 1974, 73).

The notion of an instrumental music "pure" of definite concepts that was thus subject to stimulating individual fancy and judgments of collective taste in response to aesthetic ideas conceived by genius nicely fit the eighteenth century Zeitgeist. Cassirer's (1968, 3-36) description of "the mind of the Enlightenment" clearly shows conspicuous parallels between philosophical and aesthetic theory. Systematic aesthetic philosophy applied the basic spirit of the systematic philosophy of the time as a rationale—as a paragon if not the paradigm—for explaining the artistic taste of the time, which in turn began to respond in practice to the theory. The result was institutionalized and legitimated with the new meaning given to the term "aesthetic" by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten.

Baumgarten, whose early published work (1735) was already current at the time Kant was writing his "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement" (i.e., the first part of the Critique of Judgment), coined the modern sense of the term "aesthetic" in his account of poetry, which he saw as
involving a type of "sensory cognition" where taste (beauty) is an act of pure perception. Baumgarten was admired by philosophers (for example, by Kant) as a master logician and analyst. In his hands, aesthetic theory became a science of sensibility concerned with knowing the content of the sensible world. As a science, systematic aesthetics sought the "distinct knowledge" of Leibnitz (as passed through Christian Wolff to his student Baumgarten) by resolving a phenomenon into the various elements which determine and condition it. In aesthetic perception or intuition, then, a coalescing of these elements was held to take place such that the parts are inseparable from the harmonious whole in an indissoluble unity of multiplicities. (The mechanism for how this synthesis happens, or how it can be 'cultivated' educationally, was not made clear—then or since.)

However, the resulting whole is not a synthesis of logical concepts. For Baumgarten it is accomplished by "inferior," preconceptual intellectual powers—a faculty of the "lower cognitive forces." "The goal of aesthetics," he writes, "is the perfection of sensory cognition as such" (quoted in Cassirer 1968; 347, n. 60). Thus, the new science of aesthetics dwells in and upon the immediate content of appearance. It stresses pure aesthetic contemplation rather than looking beyond or behind sensory appearance to concepts—ideas, symbols, metaphors, imitations, etc.—or any 'thing' else. Sensory cognition is just itself, for itself; it is of the realm of noumena where knowledge is of a thing-in-itself. And Art, thought Baumgarten, provides such distinct knowledge most distinctly (or with distinction) (Cassirer, 338–52).

Baumgarten's Aesthetica (1750–58) sought to extend his claims for poetry to all five major arts—which, by this date, included music (Kristeller 1961)—but was neither finished nor published at the time (Beardsley 1967, 25). In classical Greece, of course, the term "aesthetic" (aisthetikos) had simply referred to sensory knowledge of any kind. But after Baumgarten it became what Sparshott (1994, 35) describes as "a counterpart of logic that would explore the 'laws of thought' governing the nondiscursive use of symbols, in a way analogous to that in which logic has established the laws of discursive thought." Thus it became applied distinctively to the idea of Fine Art and to the study of beauty understood as good taste. In effect, as Sparshott notes, this amounted only to a "normative theory of taste" that condoned and institutionally legitimated "the artistic preferences of cultivated persons" of the time (1994, 39) rather than to any breakthrough in theory or criticism.

With Baumgarten's rationalization and thus humanization of 'sensibility,' the good life was to be devoted to sensory cognition. And Art was most highly regarded because it occasioned pure contemplation or intellectual refinement (Cassirer 1951, 354–56). Both contemplation and refinement obtain "beauty" and provide a distinctive pleasure—and a pleasure of distinction—that in its purity from definite concepts, base desires or worldly contamination, rises above the merely agreeable sensory pleasures Kant had inveighed against. This, of course, rationalized, legitimated and dignified the artistic tastes and other intellectual leisure pursuits of
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"classy" society. And, in consequence, contemplation and intellectual refinement became legitimated as the paragon and epitome of the aesthetic ideology.

In France, meanwhile, leading intellectuals of the Enlightenment were employing logic to make all knowledge orderly and scientific. The idea of Denis Diderot for compiling the first Encyclopedia (1750), for example, was an attempt to scientifically analyze, categorize, label, and then collect all knowledge in one physical location (Gillispie 1960, 174). To serve this effort, new educational institutions were formed and existing ones reformed.24 With the entrance of the leading philosophs into the fray, theorizing about music took on new importance, even intellectual excitement (Verba 1993). The Paris Conservatory (i.e., the Conservatoire des arts et metiers) no less than other educational enterprises of the time, institutionalized the prevailing tendency to make all knowledge—including music—scientific.25

In the minds of the of the leading philosophers, being scientific required three processes (Gillispie 1960, 168–70). First, whatever was to be known was analyzed and thus reduced into its constituent elements or parts. The more precise this reductionism, the smaller and more clearly distinct or separate those parts would be and the more valuable the analysis was believed to be. Then the various atomistic parts were grouped according to their similarities. Such classification and categorization was held to eliminate chaos and confusion and to facilitate understanding. Finally, the classes and categories into which the parts had been induced were labelled, for the prevailing institutional reality was that, "To name is to know" (172). Once these steps had become institutionalized and the labelling nomenclature established, analysis and labelling became a single act of defining and distinguishing parts and categories.

In music theorizing, Rousseau entered the dialogue on the "expressive" side, in defense of Italian opera buffa as against the traditional model of French tragedie lyrique established by Lully and popularized by Rameau. Rameau, a disciple of Descartes, sought in his theoretical writing to restore reason to music after the artificial delicatesse of the style galant. His Treatise on Harmony, published in 1726, was an important response by the institution of 'cultured music' of the time to the scientific paradigm,26 and its "functional harmony" became the foundation of what today is sometimes inaccurately called "music theory."

The Legitimation of Taste, Beauty, and the Sublime as Art

It is instructive to point out the shared basis of these widespread musical developments in socioeconomic stratification and social praxis. Up through the late Renaissance, instrumental music had been almost exclusively the praxial music of the lower class, used for dancing, work, entertainment, etc. Vocal and choral music—madrigals, masses, opera—on the other hand, was virtually the sole praxial music of the upper, "leisure" classes because instrumental music was seen as declassé—as at best a form of "tone speech" or "sound oratory" (Dahlhaus 1989, 6–7).
However, in the seventeenth century, a vogue for court dancing developed and instrumental dance suites became popular as praxial music. By the later eighteenth century, "classy" society had made a transition from an exclusive taste for music with a text to extensive involvement with and the development of purely instrumental music. Musical 'meaning' that was less definite and that thus called upon active powers of imagination and intellect came to be favored. Nonetheless, this music remained functionally connected to social practice and concern with classy "taste" and never achieved the pure aesthetic formalism claimed for it (then or since). However, this praxial elevation in the status of instrumental music legitimated— even sacralized—it. And, from this time on, instrumental music takes its place with text-based music in the annals of "classy culture"— only to return again to literary and representational ideals during the nineteenth century.

Along with the strong influence of text-based music on so-called 'pure' instrumental music, a creative tension between 'romantic' and 'classical' ideals was also present throughout the Enlightenment. The word "romantic" was current in musical usage before "classic." According to Blume (1970, 8) the term "classic" or "classical" came into usage by musical opponents to establish an "esthetic norm and a bulwark against what was felt to be a continuously intensified overexcitement of musical means and an exaggerated individualization" associated with the quick acceptance of "Romantic" music in public taste. Such "excrescences" were seen by critics as too easily accessible and attractive to the passive mind, in contrast to "classic beauty" which required the intellectual collaboration of the listener (Blume 1970, 8–10).

In the first years of the nineteenth century, the idea of "art for art's sake" is first mentioned and achieves currency and facticity in institutional legitimations (if not in fact of practice). This notion emanated from Kant's "Judgement of Taste" where the idea of 'purposiveness without purpose' (14) was inferred by arts theorists and critics. According to Wilcox (1953, 362), as a result of a somewhat inaccurate rendering of Kantian thought in France, four essentially new words appear in theory and criticism, namely "aesthetic, disinterested, free, and pure. To these add art, beauty, taste, form, and sublime, the use of which Kant seems to have retained with new meanings and new relationships."

Interestingly, music came to be seen as the most autonomous and thus sovereign art because of its relative abstractness from nature and freedom from definite concepts.

Now instrumental music, previously viewed as a deficient form of vocal music, a mere shadow of the real thing, was exalted as a music-esthetic paradigm in the name of autonomy—made into the epitome of music, its essence. The lack of a concept of a concrete topic, hitherto seen as a deficiency of instrumental music, was now deemed an advantage (Dahlhaus 1989, 7).

Kant's "transcendental idealism" of a higher knowledge of Ideal content was, in France especially, (mis)appropriated to music which, it should be recalled, Kant had characterized as
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having only the charm or emotion resulting from sensation. Thus, oddly, instrumental music became the "paragon" of the arts, promoting the progressive 'abstraction' of the visual arts to arts of pure sensuous rather than representational qualities (Regelski 1970) at the same time that instrumental music itself was become increasingly laden with literary and pictorial associations (Dahlhaus 1989, 8-9).

In the Classical view, composers created 'ideal forms' that leave the 'content' to each listener's imagination. The extension of the imagination by itself Kant had called "the Sublime." This is no doubt why Kant discussed the arts more in the section of the Critique dealing with the "Analytic of the Sublime" than in the earlier section on the "Analytic of the Beautiful" which deals essentially with nature. The fundamental prerequisite for judgments of taste, according to Kant, "is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form." Thus it is "design" in the formative arts, and "composition" in music, that should be the proper object of taste (Kant 14, 486). According to Blume (1970, 10), then, "from the 'classic' is excluded every sort of music that undertakes to lead the listener's feeling in too definite, too individual a manner, to give his fantasy and collaboration too definite a direction, and to infringe upon his autonomy as co-creator." Romanticists, he adds, "were the first to impute to music concrete content, condemning the listener to passivity" while "equilibrium in the functions of artist and listener" was the epitome for Classicists (Blume, 11). But while learned thinkers debated these subtleties of taste, composers continued to compose music for a variety of aesthetically "extrinsic" purposes—not the least of which was enough fame to earn a comfortable living.

Judging from the constant presence of both "classical" and the "romantic" forces in music right through to the twentieth century, audiences no less than composers reflected either an ambivalence or a disregard concerning learned theory and criticism. The "mass public" as well as connoisseurs continued in ever-greater numbers to pass time in the social act of listening to music, and thus the institution of the modern concert industry and audience were born amidst the contrary notion that music has no purpose. As Dipert (1993, 173) ascerbicly notes:

Despite the popularity of saying art works lack a purpose or use, it seems very likely that they satisfy some human need or desire....It is possible that we are drawn to art works for reasons external to the relationship between ourselves and the art work: that we go to concerts, for example, to be seen by others as concert-goers. Or, more directly, to think of ourselves as the kind of person who goes to concerts...I think it is quite possible that a great deal of artistic activity is of this self-reinforcing pretentious sort.

However, Dipert does allow the possibility that some people may find value in arts as "interpretational exercise" seen as "intrinsically enjoyable or useful for some further end." But he adds the important qualification (174) that claims in favor of the "complexity and ambiguity" of interpretation made on the aesthetic account for Art "do not appear to be sufficient for the
highest artistic value—except perhaps for academics, who make their living from discovering features in works that other citizens wouldn’t have time or patience for."

Aesthetic formalists also conveniently ignore the historical fact that even as late as the Classical period, concert audiences regularly conversed, moved about and socialized during performances. Sitting quietly, focusing on the music alone, and the beginnings of "concert etiquette" as we know it today, were progressively advanced by the entreaties of professional performers. These signs of being "cultured" did not become institutionalized until well after the middle of the nineteenth century when public amateur performance became supplanted by professional groups and virtuosos. Thus, where being "cultured" had from the Renaissance involved considerable skill at amateur performance, henceforth amateur interest in music was largely relegated to the middle class parlor and to a role as listener. The paradigm of 'disinterested perception,' then, is itself socially constructed. Its objectivation and facticity are a result of historicity; it is not an aesthetic condition or criterion.

Aesthetic Formalism, Analysis and Cultural Exclusivity

The tendency, begun in the Enlightenment, to analyze, categorize and label music still represents a powerful institutional bias, particularly of academics and other experts. This paradigm rests uncomfortably on the idea that the musical Art 'work' is an autonomous artifact created especially by an agent called a composer in the form of a musical score among which are numerous 'masterpieces' that are exemplary of what 'good' or 'great' music "is." This association of a notated score with the ontological status of music is fraught with philosophical difficulty and powerful arguments have been mustered against it (e.g., Goodman 1981; Nattiez, 1990; Alperson 1984, 1987; Webster 1971). Nonetheless, the existence of a score remains a powerful factor in the aesthetic philosophy of music. But, as Goehr points out, "its unadulterated character stems from its claim to be 'enlightened' and therefore uninfluenced by 'external'—sociological, political, and historical—considerations. This feigned isolation and purity ends up being a major part of the problem of analysis." Despite the ideology, Goehr cautions, "there is no single, definitive conception of analysis inherent in the body of aesthetical literature or in any other (Goehr 1992, 6; italics added)." Thus the paradigm has been soundly criticized (Goehr 1992; 6, 69–86).

Even if certain pragmatic benefits of score study for performance are acknowledged, there are some negative "messages" that a rational-analytic approach to musical ontology teaches to institutional neophytes at any level. First, it gives the impression that anything less than a thorough-going analytic reduction amounts to superficial perception or conception of "the music" as a 'work'. This creates a dichotomous and thus false understanding that attending aesthetically to music is essentially an analytic action—that is, that the degree or 'depth' of musical 'meaning' or aesthetic 'profundity' is somehow proportional to the degree and rational clarity of the
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analysis. And a philosophy that stipulates the necessity of analysis still begs the philosophical question as to a theory of what music "is"—what is analyzed and how the analyzed parts relate to each other as the "total musical fact" (Nattiez 1990, ix) of musical experience.

The paradigm of "form" is itself a result of the Enlightenment's rational penchant for analyzing music into its supposed constituent "elements." Thus "melody," "harmony," "rhythm," "meter," and "timbre," "form" are each addressed as independent elements, knowledge and perception of which is purported to be necessary (if not sufficient) to intelligent aesthetic responding. Form in Baroque music had been a consequence of psychological "mood," not a guiding aesthetic principle. With Classicism, the evolution of the type of form modeled by the sonata became the institutional paradigm, an absolute norm, of Western music (Lang 1941, 443, 590–91). However, this conception of "form" does not apply to most of the world's music, including much contemporary Art music, and thus cannot be claimed accurately as an ontological, epistemology or aesthetic essence of "music." And instead of improving the postulated relevance to an aesthetic response, the analytic attitude toward appreciation of music often has the anaesthetic and opposite effect: music becomes inert (i.e., "inart")—Onions 1966, 472) when dissected and reduced to abstract atomistic elements.

The idea of "classy" music as an Art of 'works' appreciated for their own sake in terms of purported aesthetic qualities and elements has legitimated certain biases, assumptions and practices. Central among these is the ideology that advances Art as an pursuit having certain hallowed pretensions of erudition and elitism—a "sacralization of culture" as it has been called (Levine 1988). This institutionalization of Art has insured its separation from life (Wolterstorff 1980a, 225–28). For example, noting the "self-conscious, self-referential and academic quality" of most institutionalized modern Art music, Lasch (1984, 442) stresses the irony of the situation:

[This] decline in the quality of artistic production has occurred at the very same time that art has come to be taken more seriously than ever before... In some quarters at least, it is an object of worship. It has come to enjoy the esteem formerly reserved for religion. Indeed, the difficulty may be not that art isn't taken seriously but that it is taken more seriously than is good for it. It has been cut off from the rest of life and put on a pedestal. It has been relegated to the museum and to the concert hall... not because it is considered unimportant but because its adoration can best take place in an atmosphere uncontaminated by everyday concerns.

Composer John Cage (1961, 69), institutional heretic and pariah, not uncharacteristically put it more concisely: "When we separate music from life what we get is art (a compendium of masterpieces)."

The prevailing philosophy of Fine Art and "good" music depends, thus, on a corresponding institution of cultural elitism, the attention of which is focussed on what Wolterstorff refers to as "our society's works of high art" (1980a, 22; italics in original). However, on Wolterstorff's account, "in addition to our society's works of high art there are
also works in our society used (in the way intended) almost exclusively by persons outside the cultural elite. Those we may call our society's works of popular art." And finally, there are works shared by elite and non-elite—what Wolterstorff calls the "works of the tribe" (22).

In consequence, the aesthetic ideology has been institutionalized in direct opposition to popular art. The institution of Art music accords popular and "tribal" musics the status of 'art' only in the original sense that they are skills (ars) organized to some praxial end. But, by institutional definition, any praxis of popular art can be neither "high" nor "fine." Such musics are thus denigrated or devalued by the legitimations of the Art music-world precisely because they are popular and thus can be widely shared without intellectual conditions or pretense. This attitude is even sometimes extended even to include the most popular (and thus most performed) works in the standard repertoire. It seems clear, then, that inaccessibility of music to the "tribe" is at least one criterion the institutional elite apply to judgments of 'good music' and 'good taste'. From this perspective, then, music is held to depend on aesthetic experience that results only from an aesthetic attitude of disinterested perception. Musical Art-'works' provide the aesthetic objects that occasion aesthetic responsiveness. And as a Fine Art, music is specifically directed toward aesthetic appreciation and requires the 'cultivated' taste and understanding of connoisseurship (see Alpers 1991, 219).

Central to the institutionally sacrosanct view of the Fine (i.e., refined) Arts, then, is the concept of disinterested (yet analytic) contemplation (Stolnitz 1961) which seeks "pure" aesthetic satisfaction or aesthetic pleasure (cf. Coleman 1971) through contemplating works of high Art. Regardless of the truth claims made in its behalf, as the benign preoccupation of a very small portion of society, this paradigm might attract no more attention or criticism than, say, connoisseurs whose taste for a exotic or esoteric kind of food or collectible provides meaningful passing of leisure time. However, as an ideology the aesthetic paradigm is advanced as inherently superior to and more valid than other musical praxis and thus is promoted as "the" rationale legitimating music in general education.

In an interesting parallel to the aestheticism of the time, the word "ideology" was first employed in the late eighteenth century to refer to the analysis of general ideas into sensations. The term "ideological" soon came to characterize the philosophical school of Condillac and his French followers whose reductionism, following Locke (via translations by Diderot), characterized understanding as amounting to a modification or accumulation of sensations. The aesthetic ideology therefore has powerful institutional interests that make it far from benign.

It leads, in particular, to the cultural elitism that is the legacy of T. S. Eliot (1948) and Matthew Arnold (1932). According to this institutional legitimation (see Barrow and Woods 1989, 154), Art works are "manifestly superior...to other works in the same sphere and they also have an importance that renders them more valuable than works or products of other spheres of human activity"—particularly 'popular culture' and praxial arts. The production by this "high
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culture" of a body of 'works' of Fine Art, then, should be maintained and supported by society, and its appreciation promoted. However, being 'cultured' requires sensitivity and disciplined understanding. Thus 'cultivated' knowledge and intelligence are requisites of 'true appreciation,' a condition of exclusivity that results in the unfortunate necessity of initiating only an elite few to membership in the institution of high (haute) Culture.

Understood in this way, an aesthetically based, "classy" Art music of "haughty culture" is from the first marginal to society. This has the inevitable effect of making the "status" or role of Art music in or as high Culture one that is not just different than, but rather in earnest ideological opposition to praxial musics and other musics of popular or indigenous 'culture' (Taylor 1978; Levine 1988) on the claim of its purported aesthetic superiority. It thus dismisses other musics as being Culturally destitute or as lacking intellectual profundity. It sometimes even seeks to protect "good" music from the masses.36

It is no wonder, therefore, that the institution of high Art is always and everywhere on the defensive. By its very nature it excludes more potentially new adherents than it is prepared to accept or can successfully institutionalize! Its paradigms and elite aspirations can thrive only by insuring that it produces and reaches an elite, which by definition entails only an exclusive minority.37 Having "taken refuge in the rarefied realm of art for art's sake," Lasch (1984, 45) notes, "it is no wonder that the fine arts have lost popular favor." Furthermore, he sees what he calls the "custodial" function of institutionalized Art music as coming dangerously close to creating socioeconomic class conflict:

[S]erious music, so-called, is inherently unpopular...because it has become so closely identified not just with leisure but with the leisure class. Great works of art have increasingly taken on the quality of collector's items, valued because they advertise the wealth and leisure necessary for their consumption....In industrial societies, art is doubly segregated from everyday life, in the first place because it retains so few of its earlier [praxial] associations with ritual, sociability, and work, and in the second place because the glorification of art has gone hand in hand with its definition as a leisure-time activity and specifically as an activity of the leisure class.

"The democratization of leisure," he concludes (44), "has not democratized the consumption of high culture." Nonetheless the Art music-world regularly and loudly complains that it gets too little social (i.e., economic) support and constantly refines the aesthetic rationale in ever-new vague and unthreatening, noble sounding formulations.

As a result of the obvious disadvantages of this position as a rationale for public support of the arts in a purportedly egalitarian society, political populists continue to be in philosophical opposition to the elite agendas of institutional purveyors of Fine Art, such as the National Endowment for the Arts. These problems also explain why so many parents give lip-service but nowhere near as much economic support to "aesthetic education" in public schools as, say, sports. They may feel that they personally missed out on 'culture,' and vaguely think 'being
cultured' might be useful to upward socially mobility for their children. But, just as with the "aesthetic educators" themselves, most parents have no idea what being "aesthetically educated" might mean, require or entail.

Lacking any tangible criteria of what cultivated "aesthetic responsiveness" is (indeed, of what an "aesthetic response" is or how such an event is to be recognized for purposes of evaluating aesthetic learning and teaching), they therefore remain content to have their children "exposed" or "introduced" to the Arts as part of general schooling. After the school (as one of its institutional roles [Spring 1976]) has performed its function as a "sorting machine" along existing socioeconomic lines, only a small number of parents provide specialized musical training for their children. In the absence of a functional music education in schools, however, the "masses" remain content with nice sounding aesthetic legitimations that involve no additional school taxes or financial sacrifice. (The musical elite is prepared to accept this social stratification without complaint if only schools were more successful in developing enough audience members to make the institution of Art music economically viable. Thus they and their accomplices in the music industry continue to purport what the public refuses to support: the value of "aesthetic education.")

By institutionalizing the paradigm of aesthetic formalism as the necessary and sufficient condition of being "musically cultured," then, the Art music establishment has shot itself in the foot. It is downright ignoble to have to mount subscription drives to support "classical radio stations" and symphony concerts that allow the elite to indulge their fancy and thus to be self-congratulatory about their contribution to the elevated "cultural level" of the community. The result, as Sparshott (1994, 37) observes, is that "a peculiar relationship, compounded of mutual dependence and mutual antipathy, is set up between learned music and popular music-making [that] remains to this day and nothing quite like it prevails in any of the other fine arts."

The world's most prestigious Fine Art museums, for example, regularly include "primitive," "folk" and other indigenous art in their collections. This does raise the question, however, as to how or whether "primitive art," which by its nature is praxial, can be regarded as aesthetic, which by definition should be "disinterested" and "detached" from any function (Blocker 1991). Also raised is the issue of whether its inclusion in museums as Fine Art amounts to "art by metamorphosis" (or designation) where the museum setting imposes a Western aesthetic on praxis that is not originally "art by destination" (Rice 1991, 127). The aesthetic paradigm, then, is imposed on all 'art' and artifacts, and important situated, praxial dimensions of cultural and thus educational significance are ignored in favor of disinterested aesthetic contemplation (Vogel 1990).

What Goehr (1992) calls the "imaginary museum of musical works" that is the concert and recital hall only occasionally and begrudgingly includes comparable musical fare. When it does, it is advertised (i.e., institutionally typified) as "pops" or "beer and jeans" concerts (as
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much to forewarn experts and other cognoscenti as to avoid intimidating the masses?). This musical "museum," however, does share with Fine Art museums participation in and the advancing of an Art-world that defines Art in absolute, autonomous and aesthetic terms, and displays such 'works' accordingly. Moreover, that such 'works' are Fine Art per se and are due a 'higher' Cultural status and value is determined solely by the institutional paradigms and conventions of the Art-world (Dickie 1974; 147, 172ff.), not by any absolute, defining aesthetic essence.

This raises once more the problem of inclusion and exclusion that in turn creates the separation of deserving and approving insiders from unworthy and thus undeserving outsiders. Museum curator Danielle Rice, citing cultural critic Edward Said, points out the resulting problem—one equally valid for music:

Expertise in a given field, such as art, is determined by how well an individual learns the specialized language and concerns of that particular field. A constituency, then, in Said's terms, "is principally a clientele: people who use (and perhaps buy) your service because you and others belonging to your guild are certified experts." "Opponents," concludes Said, "are therefore not people in disagreement with the constituency but people to be kept out, nonexperts and nonspecialists, for the most part." (Rice 1991, 132; Said 1983, 152)

Furthermore, Rice points out, in practice the experts become so zealously devoted to the values and rules of their respective institutional constituencies that they find it difficult "to remember that outsiders cannot value the same things that they do." The result is the further isolation of a class of outsiders who reject or otherwise ignore the institution (Rice 1991, 132–33; McEvilley 1992).

A clearly dysfunctional tension is created to the degree that the institution represents a closed system predicated on the notion of Culture and "good taste" and the need to pass on, as Rice puts it, "the culture of the dominant group to those natives supposedly devoid of real culture of their own (Rice, 135)." Shepherd (1993, 181) sees a similar "politics of museology" in the music-world—a power struggle over musical value that centrally implicates the aesthetic paradigm and its 'refined' agenda. The musical institution of Art music is thus a kind of 'museum' that finds itself at cross-purposes: by institutionalizing and legitimating an Art-world of profound or 'serious' aesthetic values (Passmore 1992) capable of being appreciated only by connoisseurs and cognoscenti, a world of "outsiders"—seen as a naive, even brutish mass public illiterate in aesthetic matters—is created and thus by fiat excluded (Said 1991, 55).

Public school music education demonstrates clearly the counterproductive results of this paradigm. In order to be 'included,' students (as outsiders) must be institutionalized into the Art music-world and its framework of paradigms, values, consensus realities, legitimation and control procedures, language (jargon) and role typifications, and—above all—its institutional imperative. Most music teachers, of course, were themselves "sorted" out by school music
programs—"the cream will rise to the top"—and then further sifted and acculturated (sic) during their 'higher education' in music. Thus the model for school music is predicated largely on many of the central practices and assumptions of the 'conservatory mentality' as a "cultural system" (Kingsbury 1988) that institutionalize an aesthetic paradigm of Art music (e.g., Nelson, 1994).

Heretical challenges to the hegemony of this view have included attempts to legitimate the inclusion of popular and other indigenous musics as valid ingredients of music in general education properly construed (Shepherd et al., 1977; Shepherd 1991a; M.E.N.C. 1991);42 and by thinkers associated with the "Frankfurt School of Critical Theory" who radically extended aesthetic significance to everyday life, criticizing its exclusive appropriation by a privileged class ideology (Lash 1990).43 Also seen as a threat is the challenge of recognizing cultural pluralism and thus the inclusion of 'multicultural' and 'world' music as valid and valuable parts of music in general education (M.E.N.C. 1992). However, in both cases, the inclusion of musical cultures from outside the official "canon" (see, Caswell 1991) has typically been undertaken in "conceptual" and "analytic" terms according to the aesthetic education paradigm (e.g., Frith 1990).44

This "problem of using our concepts to study their culture (Blocker 1991, 88; italics in original)," imposes an unfortunate and erroneous ethnocentric bias that treats such 'works' as Art "only half-heartedly [sic] and somewhat hypocritically" (Blocker 1991, 96 [see also 89]). Thus this music, too, comes to be dealt with as an Art of autonomous objects for disinterested aesthetic contemplation! It is simply approached (pun intended) as a less refined (i.e., less 'fine') and less profound manifestation of aesthetically analyzed concepts and elements that, in comparison to the canon, is nonetheless considered to be valid enough for the developmental level and received tastes of young people (M.E.N.C. 1992).

Sadly, then, the music recommended for 'multicultural education' has been expropriated and sullied by the aesthetic education rationale (e.g., Reimer 1993). This compromises, denigrates, and neutralizes or eliminates the inherent value of praxial music as music and its validity as an important form of human cultural agency. It thus does disservice to the dignity, integrity and authentic nature and cultural value of such music (see Price 1984). Although music educationists have given the appearance of responding to demands for cultural pluralism, the result is mainly a palliative serving to placate 'multicultural' advocates, who would be better served by rejecting the aesthetic rationale and instead advancing the importance of all music in terms of its praxial role in culture understood inclusively instead of exclusively.

History clearly documents that the disinterested aesthetic perception of music (however legitimated) is neither the only nor the best purpose for music in life (Sessions 1971, 7–8) or in education. Lasch (1984, 43) attributes the change from praxial to aesthetic roles for music to the nineteenth century's elevation of the composer to "heroic status." And Robert Craft (1976)
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reminds us that, whatever the cause of its very late development, "passive listening" is "now increasing to what threatens to become the eventual exclusion of active amateur participation." And, as to its separation from life, Nikolaus Harnoncourt (1988, 11) laments:

Today [1980], music has become simply an ornament used to embellish idle evenings with trips to the opera or to concerts, to evoke public festivity or even to banish or enliven the silence of domestic loneliness with sounds from the radio. [Music] is no longer very relevant to our lives. It has become simply a pretty adornment.

A Praxial Philosophy: "Music in Our Lives"45

Countering the institutionally sacrosanct aesthetic ideology is a renewed attention to the original praxial role of music and art. As Alperson (1991, 233) explains:

The praxial view of art resists the suggestion that art can be understood on the basis of some universal or absolute feature or set of features such as...aesthetic formalism....The attempt is made rather to understand art in terms of the variety and meaning and values evidenced in actual practice in particular cultures.

This means that "the truths and values of art are seen rather to be rooted in the context of human practices,...forms of human activity which are defined (in part) precisely in terms of the specific skills, knowledge and standards of evaluation appropriate to the practice" (233–34). Although Alperson believes this does not mean that the aesthetic idea needs to be abandoned altogether, the praxial view at the very least does seem to require that the aesthetic view be rejected as a rationale for curriculum in music (e.g., Phillips 1993). Thus the idea of disinterested perception of autonomous works of high Art must ultimately give way to a recognition (i.e., a recognition) of music as situated in and for various kinds of human action and agency.

This is not simply a matter of legitimating 'low art' but rather of the inclusion, on its own terms, of music situated in contexts where aesthetic qualities or ideas of Fine Art are not at stake—where, in other words, music functions praxially as a signifier of value in everyday life and as a cultural agent (e.g., see Alperson 1991, 234). Thus a praxial view considers music in and as human action. "Serving as object of the action of contemplation," Wolterstorff reminds us, "is but one among other ways in which works or art enter, in fact and by intent, into the fabric of human action." More important, he stresses (1980, 4), "works of art equip us for action. And the range of actions for which they equip us is very nearly as broad as the range of human action itself. The purposes of art are the purposes of life."

The praxial view, then, is governed by criteria of specific musical praxis that, according to Elliott, "only develops in and through the actions of artistic problem-finding and problem solving" particular to a given cultural praxis (Elliott 1993, 78). Such an approach from 'inside'
musical praxis I have called "action learning" (Regelski, e.g., 1983; 1986; 1992) while Elliott (1993, 80) describes it as "curriculum-as-practicum." And still other recent philosophical and psychological analyses point to a philosophy that reaffirms the importance of the what Nicholas Cook (1990) calls the "ordinary listener."

The praxial view, according to Alperson, does not deny cultural significance to the aesthetic paradigm (Alperson 1991, 223)—presumably because many intelligent people seem to function to their praxial satisfaction from within it. However, this is a strictly musical process and not an analytical search for or passive receptivity to aesthetic ideas or qualities. Musical perception is the ‘in-forming’ activity of various types of musical knowing (Elliott 1993). It constitutes any instantiation that is "music" or ‘musical meaning’ according to situated and other praxial criteria—all of which, in the final analysis, will be institutional creations of one kind or degree and not some aesthetic essence that is "music."46

To distinguish a return to Greek antecedents corrupted by Baumgarten’s ‘classy’ typification of "aesthetic," this ‘in-forming’ activity has been called "the esthetic dimension" (Nattiez 1990, 12; italics in original). Esthesics is a neologism coined to emphasize that we do not ‘analyze’ or ‘receive’ "but rather construct meaning, in the course of an active perceptual process."47 Musical attention—'cultivated' or not—is directed to musical materials, not some vaguely construed aesthetic qualities, ideas, or the like. Ideas of an "aesthetic response" are, in any case, so theoretically ineffable as to be incapable of definition or description for the operational purposes of planning and evaluating curriculum or for determining the success of instruction. The types of musical knowing and doing that ‘in-form’ esthesics, on the other hand, can be selected, organized, evaluated and used as criteria of both good teaching and effective learning.

A praxial rationale for music education, then, emphasizes "making music"—composing and performing it, and treating listening as a "praxis" of creative (in-forming, esthetic) action. It approaches music from the ‘inside’ but in terms of particular situated praxis. A praxial view, as Alperson points out, also takes into account the "productive aspects of artistic practice and the cultural (including extra-aesthetic) contexts in which the arts are created, deployed and enjoyed," pointing therefore to a need for "greater attention to the social, historical and cultural conditions and forces in which practices of music production arise and have meaning" (Alperson 1991, 236). This in turn necessitates broadening the notions of "music" beyond the current aesthetic ideology of high Art and institutionalized elite Culture.

Conclusions

The evidence sketched here warrants serious consideration of the conclusion that the ideology of ‘disinterested’ contemplation requiring the ‘cultivation’ of an ‘analytic’ approach to
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'refined' listening—a "sensory cognition" of 'pure' aesthetic qualities for their own sake—is, in actuality, a socially created paradigm the historicity of which is due to the "classy" social practices and ambitions of effete elite esthetes. The currency of this paradigm in the upper socioeconomic classes no more validates its 'truth' than the widespread belief in angels certifies their existence. And rather than continue to engage in Neoscholastic speculations about the metaphysics of either angels or aesthetic responses, it should be clear that the aesthetic paradigm is not warranted as a pragmatic basis for 'music in our lives' or in general education. Instead, "what music is good for" is seen in the extensively varied (and decidedly non-exclusive) uses that humans have for it. Thus a necessary criterion of "good music" is how well it serves a particular praxial "good." Indeed, the sheer breadth of such praxial potential is the best and most easily appreciated rationale for its value in the lives of young and old alike.

Musical 'goods' in this sense are obviously conditioned and 'in-formed' by the situated distinctiveness of authentic musical praxis. Music education should thus advance the kinds of musical actions that are most predictably able to serve as an agency for living life to the fullest and not simply (in both sense of the term) as an agency of social ideology. In the words of Wolterstorff (1980, 3):

Works of art are objects and instruments of action. They are all inextricably embedded in the fabric of human intention. They are objects and instruments of action whereby we carry out our intentions with respect to the world, our fellows, ourselves, and our gods. Understanding art requires understanding art in man's life.

To help students understand the fullest importance of music to the life well-lived, music education is obliged to offer a less exclusive spectrum of musical 'life' than is conceded by the aesthetic paradigm. Instead, it must offer "musicing" (Elliott 1991) that is praxially adequate to the "goods" it can serve—at the very least, as understood from within the agent's current praxial intentions.

A praxial philosophy of music and rationale for music education rightly accords all forms of musicing a pragmatically equitable and thus honest value in the total scope of human agency. Such a stress on music in and through human action—on the enhancing of meaning and value in life through music—entails getting people "into action" musically with the specific intention of actively savoring fully the values music is good for in their lives (Wilson and Roehmann 1990, 400-19, on "Breaking 100 in Music"). As Lasch (1984, 44) has recommended:

Those who love the arts and deplore their marginal status in American society need to rethink the task confronting them. The task is not to broaden the market for the fine arts, not to create larger numbers of enlightened consumers of culture, but to end the segregation of art and to achieve a new integration of art and everyday life.
This, of course, requires challenging the cultural hegemony of the current aesthetic rationale for music education, and the corresponding legitimation of alternative paradigms that acknowledge the praxial nature of music.

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NOTES

1. Dickie also discusses a third "derivative" sense that is relevant to the issue of whether aesthetic criteria of defining Art can or should be brought to musical praxis that is undertaken with no consideration of creating "works of Art" for "disinterested contemplation"—namely most of the music in the world, which is praxial. More on this later.

2. Where needed to mark special distinction, double quotation marks will be used to indicate an accepted concept, and single quotes will be used to refer to distinct uses of the same word. Thus, for example, the modern idea of "music" is not what the Greeks called 'music.' Similarly, the aesthetic paradigm of "art" (also designated fine or high Art) is distinct from the use of the word 'art' in reference to, say, folk 'art' or to distinguish any technical skill practised to an
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end; or tangible "works" (such as a poem or painting) from more the problematic issue as to what constitutes a musical 'work.' Single quotes are also used to avoid overusing the expression "so-called" (e.g., the [so-called] 'work' of music).

3. Keith Swanwick (1992), in his discussion of "What makes music music?" analyses this issue in terms that point well beyond the aesthetic paradigm and instead towards a social praxis for music that goes beyond limiting cultural labels such as "art." Alperson (1992, 223ff.) recounts Kant's view of music as a decorative rather than aesthetic art "that may set the imagination into harmonious free play." On the other hand, in his classic study of the play-element in culture, Huizinga (1960) argues that culture arises through and as play, that music is an important form of play behavior, and that play functions as a defining ingredient in what it means to be human. Its aesthetic value is in creating the kind of order (p. 11) that comes from following the 'rules of the game' and its social value is in its role in promoting a group identity where we are "apart together" (p. 12)—individual humans Being together.

4. So ingrained and precisely guarded is the paradigm of musical essentialism that many otherwise intelligent thinkers—especially the editorial mindguards of many journals and the like—disavow or disallow reference to "music" as plural.

5. Berger and Luckmann (1967) is the primary source for this discussion. To place this model in broader intellectual context, see Robert Wuthnow et al. (1987).

6. Not so much in the sense of the over-reaching "models" of Kuhn (1975, 10) as much as in the sense of "fairy tales about what the 'real world' might be like" (Ford 1975, 2).

7. The Sociology of Music is not a study of "music" per se as much as it is a study of musicians and the social context of music.

8. In the larger educationist institution, then, special jargon terms were needed to describe this possibility; viz., "cross-peer-tutoring or "cooperative learning." Notice, too, how "pedagogy" as leading a boy (peda) or youth to learning has institutionally conquered "androgogy," which instead is predicated on the fact that adults (andro) and children learn differently.

9. This, in turn, requires heretics to produce all manner of warrants just to be noticed—for example, the number of notes and citations in the present heresy.

10. Somewhat inaccurately by Boethius (d.c. 525), Cassiodorus (d.c. 580) and Isidore of Seville (d.c. 636).

11. This paradigm persists to this day as arts practitioners find themselves "uneasy bedfellows" with the liberal arts and sciences in the modern university. "Theory" and "history" courses are typically considered a formal part of "general education" requirements while "studio" or performance-techniques classes are considered "professional." Institutions change slowly, if at all. Thus even today the "theoria" of the Greeks remains ascendent in education over "techne" and "praxis."

12. Note, for example, the institutional control exerted by the decree of Pope John XXII in 1322 that condemned as sacrilegious the secular influences of the French motets, and the later Council of Trent, which banned polyphonic music for garbling the intelligibility of religious texts. Later, homophonic music was pressed into the service of the Protestant Reformation, thus allowing musical participation by the congregation in uttering religious texts.

13. Especially madrigals, and the songs of "courtly love." This latter music, under the influence of the Neoplatonic conception of "Platonic love" articulated by Marsilio Ficino, was the only "classy" music of the time set as monody. However, the entire Eurocentric view of "love" and the social function and tradition of the "love song" was
institutionalized so firmly that it persists today as a staple not only of "art song," but as the core of popular and folk genres.

14. Even when institutionalized in fine arts departments, rather than "analyze" 'works' in terms of presumed aesthetic qualities, such studies tend mainly to be undertaken in terms of cultural praxis. The appeal of listening to such music "for its own sake" at concerts or via recordings is largely a matter of the freshness or uniqueness of its departure from Western aesthetic criteria and models, and often in the exotic nature of the instrumental timbres, microtones, polymetric or arhythmic practices, and the like. Although Welsh-Asante (1993) has edited a volume dealing with what he calls "the African aesthetic," his concern is a proposed African and African-American cultural mindset or consciousness. Thus his book deals with cultural paradigms that often contradict and confound Eurocentric aesthetic criteria underlying the conception of "fine Arts." The authors, thus, are concerned to validate this cultural consciousness and identify it as against or as alternative to Eurocentric aesthetic assumptions. Appia (1992), on the other hand, argues against the idea of an African consciousness, seeing the very concept of race and thus of "Africa" as some sort of unified cultural identity, as inventions of Eurocentrism.

15. Alas, performers were still regarded as mere technical exponents, a situation that remains in vogue today except for leading virtuos who share in our awe the creative genius of the composer—an attitude no doubt stemming from the fact that the virtuosity of composer, conductor and performer became fully separated only in the nineteenth century.

16. A close reading of this, and the following article by John Hoppers on "Problems of Aesthetics," will show any fair reader how in over their heads music educators are who presume to articulate a coherent aesthetic rationale as a basis for practical action in music education. The field of aesthetics is all but incoherent in its lack of theoretical agreement on virtually all details and issues. That is not to say, however, that such thinking should not be undertaken, for it can point out the often simplistic assumptions of musicians, teachers and music researchers.

17. Leibnitz’ ideas influenced the thinking of Christian Wolff, in whose hands they were somewhat transformed then transmitted to aesthetic theory through Wolff’s most noted pupil, Baumgarten (Cassirer 1960, 34). Baumgarten’s specific contribution is considered below. Also worth mention here is the influence in England of Locke, the result of which was the importance of "uniformity in variety" in triggering the faculty of taste (Dickie 1974, 60ff.). English theories were well-known in France and Germany at the time of Kant.

18. Lang (1941) recounts the aesthetic views of Ernest Modest Gretry (1742–1813) whose "aesthetic views mirror the doctrines of the era of the encyclopedia." Gretry’s views on the connection of musical expression (i.e., drama) with words led him to conclude, "it would be advisable to add words to the symphonies of Haydn, these works being a vast dictionary of expression from which the dramatic composer should draw." (552) Writing under the influence of Romanticism around the turn of the century, British musicologist (Colles 1956, 54) reveals this in direct connection with the sonata: "Very often composers have used in sonatas ways of expressing themselves which they first found out in connexion with words or drama, but when they do so successfully it is because they have found that those ways have a musical power of their own and are therefore strong enough to discard the help of words and drama."

19. See Dickie (1970) passim for an extensive comparison of aesthetic taste and attitude theories, and the problems of each.

20. Against this was an aesthetic paradigm advancing the position that the self-sufficiency of musical 'works' was a matter of their purity from words, from definite concepts, not simply their autonomy from praxial matters. Thus it was the pure and unselfish—even unselconscious or selfless—pleasure taken in the use of sensory intelligence that was behind the movement of l'art pour l'art in the case of music (see Dahlhaus 1989, 4–7). Eventually the two originally opposed movements—the socio-moral aesthetic and the absolute music aesthetic—became distinguishable only in the theoretical musings of composers, aestheticians and critics, and in compositions (e.g., Beethoven’s Erotica, finished in 1804, and
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the Fifth Symphony (1808) with its "fate" motif. In fact, some involvement of both impulses is typically assumed in aesthetic theory, and certainly no distinction is made when aesthetic premises are used as a rationale for arts education.

21. Sections in bold; page numbers from the cited edition.

22. His own taste for music, however, was apparently not shared with his neighbors. He apparently was often annoyed by noisy neighbors singing hymns at family prayers. Because "music advances from sensations to indefinite ideas" and gives only fleeting impressions that cannot be put out of mind, he registered a specific complaint in the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement" about music's "certain lack of urbanity" and its obtrusiveness in depriving others of choosing whether or not they wish to listen (56, 536 and n.1).


24. E.g., the first Ecole normale, the Ecole polytechnique, Ecole des pons et chaussées, the Collège de France, and the Institute de France, to name the leading French institutions. This had the effect of making, for the first time, scientists and other experts into "professors" of their institutional agendas.

25. "To the tableau of the sciences' writes Condorcet, 'must be joined that of the arts, which leaning on the sciences, have made great strides and broken the bonds of routine," (Gillispie 1960, 175).

26. Along with J. S. Bach's Well Tempered Clavier (1722, the same year Rameau began his first treatise), an attempt similarly inspired by the scientific spirit in the intellectual air of the time—in this case, to categorize and classify through exploring tonality, which was made possible by the new scientific advances in keyboard technology.

27. I am indebted to colleague Dr. James Davis for reminding me of this important social placement of praxial musics.

28. Wilcox (1953) pegs the date at 1804 by French litterateur Benjamin Constant; Blume (1970, 13–14) attributes it to Karl Phillip Moritz, but around the same time.

29. For example, when Schubert composed four-hand piano duets for himself and the beautiful young daughter of a benefactor, his motives were certainly more complicated than the desire to make art for its own sake. Even if created according to that maxim, the musical art still involves the praxial dimension whereby it is made and enjoyed socially. Did this have nothing to do with the many complexities of crossing hands in these duets? A positive answer would add a new twist to the praxial possibilities of the "play" element of music.

30. The sonata, for example, was the epitome of this view. Thew word comes "originally from the Latin (sonon: to sound) and composers used it whenever they were most anxious to fix attention upon the sound itself, as though to say to their hearers, 'Set yourself free from thoughts of language; live for the time being in pure sound, and let us join hands by its means'' (Colles 1956, 53).

31. While a separate historical critique of this institution cannot be undertaken here, it would at least reveal direct complicity of economic and other forms of musically extrinsic social praxis in the institutional rise and legitimation of the "classy" and conservatory-oriented aesthetic ideology.

32. "As Kivy points out in his book [Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Music Experience (Cornell: 1991)], many listeners see the cultural significance of music in terms of its capacity for 'profundity' which they typically explain in terms of the ability of music to be expressive of the darker, deeper, more serious emotions" (Alperson 1992, 224). Alperson (Alperson 1992, 227ff.) criticizes exactly such an "expressive aesthetic cognitivist" view of aesthetic formalism that he attributes to Reimer [Philosophy of Music Education, 2d ed. (Prentice-Hall, 1989)]. Furthermore,
"Kivy rejects this view because it seems to require a determinate semantic dimension to musical expressiveness," as opposed to musicianship as "the direct elaboration of music potentialities within a given style" (Alpersen 1992, 224; summarizing Kivy's conclusions in *Music Alone*).

33. "There can be no argument about the basic elements," writes eminent theorist Cone (1994, 35). This assumption, however, suffers from the fallacy of *petitio principii*: cf. Cutietta (1993).

34. The entire notion of "elements" is, of course, another example of the reductionism that became fully operational during the Enlightenment with its attempt to apply rational analysis to all phenomena.

35. This discussion is informed largely by Wolterstorff's "praxial" (or "praxical") critique of the institution of high Art.

36. For example, by concerning itself only with school performing ensembles to recruit new initiates to perpetuate the institution (and provide employment for its professors) while at best paying lip-service to music in general education (i.e., general music); or even dismissing it as a bad idea and a waste of time—an argument argued at length by a music professor to a young teacher (i.e., institutional neophyte and heretic) who expressed particular dedication to teaching general music as opposed to ensemble classes.

37. In music education today, this elite amounts to the 10 to 15 percent of students enrolled in the performance ensembles to which most music teachers—particularly at the secondary levels—devote their fondest energies. When general music classes consist of only (otherwise intelligent) students who are not (for whatever reason) in ensembles, students are thought of, in the words of one such-minded teacher, as the "cream of the crap."

38. Rice (1991) refers to André Malraux's distinctions between works intended to be art ("works by destination") and otherwise praxial 'arts' that become transformed into aesthetic Fine Art by when placed in a museum setting ("art by metamorphosis"); see p. 129. See also her recounting (128–29) of Arthur Danto's "Pot People and Basket Folks" for its implications on the assigning of "aesthetic" value to praxial arts.

39. Dickie's analysis of the "institution" of Art seeks to establish that Art is the classification of a status that is conferred by Arts institutions in terms of what he calls "conventions." He seems satisfied to have debunked any essentialist claims for aesthetic qualities, disinterested perception, etc. However, the present institutional analysis seeks in addition to "de-institutionalize" and "de-confer" Art from its quasi-sacred status and to argue the importance of all music as a prime agency of humans Being and Becoming more fully human. Thus I am recommending against uncritical acceptance of the ideology of musical praxis as an Art of aesthetic pretensions and instead for its contribution when, in any convention or usage, it comes "to life." See, for example, Blacking (1990), Kadish (1968), McEvilley (1991, 1992).

40. See also Lumley (1988). The chapter by Jeremy Silver, "Astonished and somewhat terrified": the preservation and development of aural culture," (p. 170) focuses on the politics of power involved in the role of sound recording in aural culture.

41. "Much musicological and theoretical analysis is premised on this sort of *aperçu* [of expertise] which gives rise to reverence, scholarship, and the like. Added to all these things is the very high degree of professionalization in musical discourse; this has had the effect of erecting a cordon around classical music as a cultural activity within society." (Said 1991, 55)

42. Marching band, jazz ensembles, swing, show and jazz choir, etc., are separate institutions and, through the separate institutional "training" of such teachers, maintain an uneasy, often problematic, even openly hostile coexistence within the 'conservatory paradigm.' Those who might argue instead that 'popular' and 'ethnic' institutional sub-cultures
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dominate the public school scene, do so from the perspective of music education as aesthetic education. Arguments for these musics, on the other hand, regularly ascribe to them aesthetic ideas and properties; see below.

43. See, also Kupfer (1983) which deals with the "aisthesis" [sic] of everyday experience. Of course John Dewey's Art as Experience should also be consulted in connection with this heretical paradigm.

44. In a recent example, for example, Frith (1990) argues for a move away from popular music as social praxis and towards a musical theory of its inherent aesthetic value.

45. This expression was the title of Har浓court's acceptance speech given on the occasion of his winning the Erasmus Prize in 1980, and is the title of the first essay in his 1988 work; however, unaware of this, the very same title was chosen for the general music course offered in New York State by which students (who were not in ensembles or did not chose Art class) could fulfill a one-unit Fine Arts requirement for graduation. The curriculum guide designed by leading music educators in the New York State School Music Association for the most part does describe a course based in the praxial philosophy of music; significantly, however, in practice the course is taught by teachers as a traditional "music appreciation" class predicated on the aesthetic education paradigm and thus on an analytic-factual pedagogy. As Curriculum Chair of the New York State School Music Association (NYSSMA) at the time (1983–84), this author was centrally involved in its preparation and revision, and in change-agency attempts to deinstitutionalize teachers from the aesthetic paradigm and conservatory mentality. From visiting classrooms around the State, he is equally in a position to know how soundly the praxial concept has been rejected in institutional practice for general music teaching at all levels. Instead, teaching "concepts" as the basis for consumership is the norm. See Regelski (1986).

46. Some students of Chomsky, in championing an innate "language faculty" responsible for a universal grammar where differences between languages are superficial compared to shared features, have postulated the existence of a "music module" ("organ" or "faculty") that presumably would have the same deep or universal characteristics despite superficial variation (e.g. Ray Jackendorff, unpublished lecture, University of Buffalo, November 12, 1992). Whether or not history will confirm this notion, the present argument would project that any such "deep structure" or essence for music as having some universal grammar would be inherently praxial rather than accounted for aesthetically. Language can become ever-more metaphorical and figurative, even artistic, as its purposes become less mundane and more culturally creative, in part because of the guiding or given substratum of its basic nature which is first and foremost praxial. Any instances where musical "values" exceed praxial requirements, and that thus attract certain attention to such values as an interest in the skill or 'art' aspect for its own sake, will still be first and foremost praxial. Both language and music, on this account, will be seen first as praxial, even in their "expressive" elaborations. That, however, is another argument for another time.

47. Nattiez (1990) credits Paul Valery (1945, 297) for the neologism esthesique.

48. In explanation of the alliterative conceit, "effete" is taken to mean "overrefined."

49. See the cover story of TIME (January/February, 1994) for reference to percentage of Americans who believe in angels.

50. Latin, 'in agreement with.' See, for example, Onions 1966, 202.

51. However, music education also has the obligation to model other or expanded possibilities for musical praxis than what a student can achieve at any given time (see Wilson & Roehmann 1990, 40ff).
THE NATURE OF CANON FORMATION

Zora Neale Hurston, the black writer and anthropologist, liked to tell a story about how she was arrested for crossing against a red light. She laughed, she had gotten off. I told the policeman that I had seen white folks pass on the green and so assumed the red light was for me.

Obviously, Ms. Hurston understood the relationship between traffic signal function and who she was and who and what the policeman represented. She knew how to manipulate the policeman’s perception of her “place” in society. Of course, if one is color blind, the rule remains the same but the perception changes: one learns to cross the street when the bottom light illuminates.

The instructional process by which we orient students to the outside world is anchored in a scale of values governed by dominant cultural traffic signals or rules. These rules are the canons—the accepted standards and principles we turn to in making decisions about what should or should not be part of the body of material we choose to include in our curricula. For the study of music we could argue, the canons we embrace are defined, controlled, and circumscribed by a set of masterworks created by dead, white European male composers. For the past twenty years or so, as we have come to recognize the multicultural nature of our society, we have seen serious challenges to the canonical supremacy of the works of these composers. At such a point, the battle over what is central or marginal to curricula agenda heats up, and the stage is set for canon revision.

What should be "in" and what should be "out" and what is the basis for making such judgments? In his book Canons in Context, Paul Lauter suggests that

...educational institutions seem to be caught between two prepositions, "in" and "to." Part of our mission is to instruct students in.... But, at the same time, we are expected to orient the students to the world outside the classroom, to its creation and recreation in the work they will perform and the ideas they will evolve....There is a tension in these prepositions between the voices of the past and the visions of the future.
Canon Busting

CANON BUSTING

So the stage is set for rethinking what belongs in the canon, and for the curricular revision that inevitably follows such rethinking. We can no longer ignore the fact that as Philip Bohlman observes, "it is getting more difficult to talk about music in the singular. We now have "musics—a defiant plural, clumsy sounding cluster of sibilants." The encroachment of the idea of "musics" into the discipline of music reflects a change in the world view implicit in the old canon—a small and narrowly defined in-group which had the effect of defining everything else as 'out' and somehow 'less.' As Bohlman describes it, "canon was determined not so much by what it was as by what it was not. It was not the musics of women or people of color; it was not forms of expression that resisted authority or insisted that music could empower politics."4

I consider myself a music educator and not a philosopher. Nonetheless, the issues related to the canon underlay both what and how I teach the music educators of the future. It is in my capacity as a teacher of teachers that I will attempt to respond to the philosophical notions advanced by Tom Regelski and John Richmond in the remarks that follow.

Tom Regelski’s paper focuses on canons governing aesthetic music education in the United States. Parenthetically, the use of "aesthetic" as a qualifier is interesting here in that it suggests that there is other music education that is not aesthetic. Questioning the criteria by which we determine what belongs in a canon is not new; it has been going on for several decades—notably in the fields of English and American literature. However, it is relatively new to music education and Regelski joins a growing number of those who question the primacy of Western "art music" in our schools to the exclusion of other "musics." Regelski approaches canon busting by arguing that the aesthetic criteria we use to determine the musical canon place what he calls "art music" on a higher level than other musics. This aesthetic paradigm, as he refers to it, has two simultaneous and related effects. First, the values the paradigm transmit are elitist and, second, the paradigm is constructed in such a way that it ignores all other musics.

To solve this problem Regelski seems to be proposing we abandon the use of aesthetic criteria to determine what music should be valued and studied and, instead, we should include all musics in the curriculum based on the function they have in their own particular cultural settings. Students’ study of music should consist of performing, composing, and listening to musics of all cultures as they are practised on a day-to-day basis (praxis), and develop an intentional awareness of the social, historical, and cultural conditions and forces in which the practice and production of music occur and have meaning—something akin to cultural affirmative action in the classroom.

Although this approach deals with the problem of what should be in the canon, I believe that in throwing out aesthetic criteria altogether, Regelski may have thrown out the baby with the bath water. By abandoning aesthetic criteria, Regelski has introduced another form of
elitism—are we to believe that these "other musics" are incapable of being judged in terms of aesthetic worth and that, therefore, the only criterion to be used in determining the canon involved cultural context? Is Regelski implying that jazz, rock, folk, etc., cannot be aesthetically appreciated unless they are contextualized? Does he believe that only art music has aesthetic worth?

**CANON REVISION**

Bohlman asserts "that to know 'all musics' is one of the most flagrant assaults on the right of individuals and music cultures to retain their own integrity and authority."5 Paul Lauter notes that peoples' experiences in the world differ significantly. Their sense of "place" will differ because their learning, traditions, and values differ. They express themselves in work and play in different linguistic context, both oral and written, to a specific audience....The functions of culture in the life of a group of people changes significantly over time, as social realities and evolving consciousness about them change.6

Regelski's claim that the aesthetic paradigm is controlled by the canon of dead, white European, male composers does not seem to recognize the realities in the American public schools. The elementary school curriculum, as evidenced in the music sung, played, and listened to in the American elementary school, demonstrates that the curriculum is controlled by and relies, in large measure, upon the basal school music series publications, the whims and fancies of the music teacher, or various combinations thereof. Moreover, in some instances, the books' contents are formatted to conform to state mandated goals, objectives, and other pedagogical guidelines. Additionally, the book industry strives, albeit not necessarily successfully, to include musics of the world together with literature of Western culture. Under these circumstances, some may conclude that the American elementary music curriculum is hardly driven by an aesthetic paradigm.

Music education at the secondary level continues to be performance-based, a point that Regelski acknowledges. The literature performed by bands, orchestras, and choirs, is not overwhelmingly music of the masters but more often arrangements of popular tunes, Broadway musicals, and film scores. Ronald Crutcher, Dean of the Cleveland Institute of Music, believes the real purveyor of music education in the United States is MTV.

If schools are engaged in aesthetic education as Regelski believes, then one must consider Paul Lauter's question:
Canon Busting

...does the reading of canonical stalwarts [we can substitute listening to and performing music of the masters] necessarily imply the transmission of elitist values, or the study of working class texts dependably yield working class consciousness? These are interesting questions, perhaps mainly for education sociologists.7

If the aesthetic paradigm has any basis in reality, one must turn to the conservatory and university curricula, which are primarily controlled by applied professors, theorists, and musicologists who rely heavily upon the music of Western culture.

So, what is the musical canon and who controls it? The money and influence of the elite play an inevitable role in the seasonal programming of operas and orchestral works. "Other" musics are rarely selected for performances in these venues. We might well ask whether "art music" is chosen by the elite because they have the ability to appreciate some inherent aesthetic value or because they have been taught that it is the music of Western culture that should be valued. If Regelski is, in fact, saying that the canon should no longer be determined by aesthetic value, then what is the rationale for performing or listening to, for example, Mozart or Brahms? Certainly their cultural context alone does not ensure them a place in the curriculum. Why not listen to and analyze the music of television commercials or the effects of muzak on ethnic shopping habits? These are interesting societal phenomena and do reflect and perhaps control certain cultural assumptions about life and lifestyles.

If we are willing to recognize the "multiculturalness" of the world we live in today, we must also be willing to make the canon more inclusive. To this extent, I cannot quarrel with Regelski. As Lauter so cogently put it,

...culture is no longer largely in the care of white men who claim to represent us one and all. We must acknowledge our limits as teachers and intellectuals, we must acknowledge the limits of cultures as forms of shaping consciousness.8

Having agreed on the rational for change, however, the question still remains, "How do we go about expanding the canon?" Regelski seems to argue that we sweep away the assumptions that make up what he calls the aesthetic paradigm. For him, this appears to mean that not only must we consider works of music within the cultural and social context, but that understanding this context is crucial—or perhaps essential—to putting value on the music itself. In this sense Regelski is in agreement with many philosophers, writers, and educators who argue that works of art cannot be understood outside the context in which they have been created and marketed. For these individuals, context becomes all important for, as Lauter argues, "failing to see the functionality of marginalized art simply misses one of the major values and opens it, as well, to inappropriately applied formal paradigms."9
There is a certain seduction in Regelski’s proposal because it appeals to our democratic sensibilities. Teachers are a nurturing lot; they are deeply sensitive to matters concerning class, race, and gender. There is a reasonable tendency to use music to ameliorate the ills of society. If we could embrace the music of all or even many cultures in our classrooms, we could acknowledge, according to Regelski, the central purpose of music and, further, our work would assist in the promotion and preservation of all cultures and ethnicities.

One cannot easily put aside the practical attraction of Regelski’s reformed paradigm. However, as I have argued elsewhere, music teachers would have to

...be knowledgeable as performers and historians regarding music of other cultures and capable of rendering such performances or playing recordings of artists from the cultures under study.  

Ideally, teachers should go to live in the culture(s) as ethnomusicologists do, in order to fully understand and appreciate those musics in the contexts in which they are created and enjoyed. Given that this is hardly practical, how and to what extent can we gain sufficient understanding of other cultures as the context for appreciating the aesthetic and practical values of the musics that make up our expanding canons?

With these issues as background, let us turn to the paper by John Richmond. Richmond raises concerns about ethical decision making in the work place, suggesting that our profession adopt a "discussion model" when confronted with a moral choice of action. Within the discussion model Richmond claims that "right action" is achieved when a correct moral option influences one’s action. Such correct moral decision making, he says, is best achieved when all concerned collectively engage in moral discourse when faced with problems and solutions that have ethical consequences.

Richmond offers a noble and enormously challenging proposal. There are, however, many factors that influence ethical action in the work place: the political climate, one’s position in the professional strata of academe, the need for power and control, and one’s social and cultural background. These are powerful, controlling agents that may well mitigate against ethical consensus building. Moreover, the more consequential an issue is to an individual (abortion, gun control, sex education) the greater the polarity that mitigates against consensus building.

Furthermore, let us consider Richmond’s proposal in light of what Regelski has tried to tell us about what he views as the currently accepted musical canon. This canon, he argues, is essentially a set of aesthetic norms that reflect the collective masterpieces of "art music." What Regelski and others have argued for is essentially an expansion of the canon through the establishment of what we might consider "relative values"—musics whose value is understood only within each of their particular contexts. Richmond calls for a discussion model based on
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the idea that something like "correct moral decision making" exists. But, this seems to me to be at odds with the contextually-driven values advocated by Regelski.

Perhaps what we see in both of these papers is the recurring tension between the universal and the particular, the relative and the absolute. We recognize that our musical canon is narrow and exclusive, but in moving to expand it, what criteria, if any, do we establish? What should or should not be part of this more inclusive canon? Is all music to be judged only within its own context? Is there no way to revisit and, perhaps, to alter and expand what we consider to be intrinsic aesthetic value, regardless of context? With regard to moral and ethical decisions to be made within a particular (cultural) context: Given the multicultural, multivalued nature of our society today, can we—or indeed should we—expect to build a "normative" model or ethical consensus?

NOTES

2. Ibid., 257.
4. Ibid., 197.
5. Ibid., 197.
7. Ibid., 159.
8. Ibid., 270.
9. Ibid., 270.
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN MUSIC EDUCATION POLICY:
BALANCING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY

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Major restructuring and adaptations in administration and instructional delivery systems can be seen currently in the educational community as it struggles to deal with the demands of our contemporary society. Close examination of these new demands reveals that much of the debate focuses around the struggle to balance the needs/rights of the individual and the needs/expectations of the community. Awareness of the shifting perspectives that are occurring require music educators to reexamine current philosophy and policies of music education in the private and public school enterprise. Music educators' understanding of the forces at work in and around the schools can enable us to realign ourselves effectively with the perspectives of our times and point music education policies in a pro-active direction toward a more successful future. A position is presented that includes discussion of the ways music educators can contribute to the efforts by schools and the society at large to achieve a balance that meets the needs of individual students while addressing contemporary issues of the community.

In examining the topic set before us, it is illuminating to garner some assistance from social philosophers and social scientists who have had much to say about the individual and his/her connection with others in the community. Sociologists refer to an internal "engine of change" that enhances the responsiveness and adaptation of our body society to the constantly changing environment. This discussion has been important in developing an understanding of the dramatic forces that effect the American society, such as those that engulf the educational debate today. While individualism is deeply rooted within America's political, social, and educational history, there have consistently been forces working also to establish a collective view of "the people" as a body, contributing to those things that we, the people, have in common, building our sense of community. The effects of an internal engine of change can also be seen as influencing much of the current philosophical debate about the evolving purpose and value of education in general, and consequently, of music education as well.

Sociological Perspectives

In the early view of an influential group of Western sociologists, the community was seen as a collective body wherein the individual gained status and a place, or "niche," by serving the collectivity. The individual was viewed as a part of a larger organism—the community, having
structure and numerous interrelated parts, each part fulfilling an important function in the life of the total organism. This perspective, known as functionalist theory, suggested that "society tends to be an organized, stable, well-integrated system, in which most members agree on basic values... In the functionalist view, a society has an underlying tendency to be in equilibrium, or balance." Implied by this viewpoint was the idea that the individual finds it acceptable to place a high value upon functioning within the group in order to maintain society's equilibrium or balance. Other sociologists refer to this view of the community as the closed community, for collective authority had power over the individual, pacing and guiding the individual who was believed to be inherently unable to pace and guide him/herself alone, without the legitimate power of the commons. A criticism of the functionalist perspective was that it tended to be an inherently conservative view of society, placing strong emphasis upon social order and stability, at the expense of such things as individual giftedness, accelerated or advanced development, new ideas or expressions outside of the norm, and opportunities for progressive social reconstruction. While functionalist theories were first employed by European sociologists in the nineteenth century, the American sociologist Talcott Parsons applied it later to American society. His functionalist perspective dominated the sociological debate through the 1940's and 1950's.

At that time, just as the American society appeared to be in a period of relative cohesion and stability, education and music education appeared similarly stable and in sync with functionalist perspectives. Emphasis in the schools was upon mass education and the institutionalized socialization that it afforded. Emphasis in music education as practised in schools continued to be cultural transmission through the development of large, functioning groups such as orchestras, bands, and choruses, each seen as an organism with all of its students as parts working together for the good of the whole. Viewed from the functionalist perspective, those individual students who functioned well remained in music education, while those that did not disappeared. In short, individualism was overwhelmed by the more powerful group as agreed upon rules and beliefs were taught, enforced, and passed to the next generation.

Actually, group instruction had long been a part of American music education. The singing societies of the 1700-1800's were important groups contributing to community life as well as to the musical development of their participants. The first violin class instruction in the United States appeared around 1910, having borrowed a group methodology from England, and a similar approach was applied to piano class instruction in Cincinnati in 1913. The band movement and the industrial music ensembles that flourished into the first half of the 1900's were organizations that all emphasized group music-making for various purposes. Music education policies similarly reflected emphasis upon groups and group instruction, as evidenced in the writings of such publications as *Music Educators Journal* and *The Thirty-Fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education.* Such titles as "Music Education Cannot Be Provided Adequately by Private Instruction," "Schools Must Stand Committed to Group Instruction," and "Music Provides Group Activities that Contribute to Individual and School Morale" reveal the emphasis upon developing groups throughout that period.

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practices and methodology used in different musical organizations and groups varied, they centered around the common policy of developing individual participants' awareness of functioning within a group toward the development of a sense of community.

The widespread success of these instructional and large performing groups solidified their place within the music profession as a primary means of music education. Today, contemporary versions of group music-making are being promoted through our school bands, orchestras, and choruses, as well as the large ensembles in the state honors festivals and community performing organizations. The major approach to music education in our middle and secondary schools continues to emphasize performance in a large group. Clearly, functionalist perspectives have had a lasting effect on the present music education profession that takes such pride in maintaining so many large groups.

The dramatic changes that engulfed American society in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's, raised many doubts about the adequacy of the conservative functionalist theories for explaining the functioning of society. Attention shifted to finding or developing different theories that better explained the changes that were occurring. Parsons himself reexamined his own ideas and attempted to include social change theory through his later writings.9

Study by American sociologists of conflict theory that had dominated Western European sociology led to modern conflict perspectives that have been well accepted since that time. Generally, these theorists focused upon the fundamental dynamic qualities of society, as opposed to the static perspective stressed by the functionalists. They regarded conflict as a normal process, positing that the seeds of future social changes are ever present in any society at any given time. While functionalist theory held that any society is compelled by the common values of its members toward stability and integration, conflict theory suggested that it is compelled by the coercion of some of its members by others, dynamically restructuring itself.

New theories evolving from conflict theory, such as social exchange theory, also gained support in the U.S.10 These perspectives subsequently placed much more emphasis upon the role of the individual in shaping self and the collectivity. Generally, they suggested that individuals make decisions based on a weighing of the costs and benefits to self, attempting to maximize rewards and minimize costs in order to obtain the most profitable outcomes. From this position, the individual is of primary importance, and any commitment to groups is based on a rational utilitarian desire to gain greater individual benefits. As the conflict perspective gained acceptance in American society, it had a major impact upon our institutions and our society's views of education and cultural values.

Just as education in general was influenced by acceptance of the conflict theory and concern for the individual, music education was also affected. A shifting of philosophies and policies resulted, as can be observed by examination of resultant publications and methodologies.
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The 1965 MENC publication *Music in General Education* defined eleven desired musical outcomes using decidedly different terminology from that in previous publications of the profession, which had spoken earlier from a group perspective and emphasized music for the community and society's benefit.¹¹ This publication clearly stated its outcomes in terms of the individual, outlining the minimum skills, understandings, and attitudes of "the generally educated person." While there was recognition of the community and social structure in the last musical understanding outcome, it came from the perspective of personal fulfilment, rather than for service or benefit to the community.¹² Other publications of the music education profession, such as the *Documentary Report of the Tanglewood Symposium* and *Toward an Aesthetic Education*¹³ contain other examples of the emergence of the rights of the individual as seen in philosophy and policy in music education. Such publications revealed the position that there was a need for music education to assist the individual in the quest for personal fulfilment. Perhaps the most revealing sign of the emergence of the rights of the individual can be seen in the basic tenet of MENC, the leading professional organization for music education, which coined the phrase "Music for every child, and every child for music."

New methodologies likewise reflected emphasis upon the individual in music education. Comprehensive musicianship, the Manhattanville Music Curriculum Program, and the Hawaii Music Curriculum Program were examples concerned with individual development of music skills, understandings, and attitudes beyond those encountered in previous methodologies.¹⁴ Over twenty different approaches to individualized instruction were presented in *Individualized Instruction in Music*.¹⁵ More examples can be found. All of these methodologies offered strategies for developing the individual through emphasis upon more comprehensive musical experiences and opportunities for independent learning beyond the exclusive group-oriented approaches prescribed before.

In short, the shifting sociological perspectives that were taking place in the larger society and educational system as a whole also had an impact upon the philosophies, policies, and subsequent methodologies and practice of music education. As was true of the larger society, emphasis has shifted between focus on individualism or upon the group or community, as outlined in the sociological debates. At times, music educators have been conscious of the particular perspective of our society, and at other times we have fallen behind in terms of recognizing these movements. For example, even though there was a response by the music education profession to better meet the needs of the individual through innovative approaches developed in the 1960's, there has not been a long term recognition of the value of such approaches in practice. The present lack of opportunities to study music in our secondary schools outside of joining a large performance organization is recognized by some to be a limitation that causes music education to be regarded with less value. This limitation and the secondary school programs' inability to truly meet the majority of students' individual musical needs has been debated at length from several different viewpoints.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the music
education profession's recognition or lack of recognition of society's shifting values have had an impact upon music education's effectiveness and position within the total curriculum.

As is true for other areas of study, arts education in general has been regarded at various levels of importance according to the particular perspectives dominant in society. The current beliefs and the degree to which society perceives arts education as being in sync with those beliefs can also cause music education to be regarded with favor or disregard.

Recently, there has been a growing realization that the effects of each design process and policy in schooling and education have an impact upon the individual citizen and his/her values, expectations, and contribution to the society. If the philosophies, policies, methodologies, and practices of arts education are to be recognized as vital contributions to those for schooling and education in general, we must stay abreast of the sociological debates that continue to examine the values of our society and the regard held for the community, each subgroup, and the individual citizen. It is vitally important that music educators join arts educators and participate in the sociological debates that involve education and socio-cultural values.

**Developing Perspectives**

There are several important sociological debates currently being conducted that reflect society's efforts to deal with the changing demands of individuals relative to the community. Two of these debates are especially relevant to music educators because of the new perspectives on education and cultural values that they offer. We shall examine those perspectives now.

A growing number of social philosophers and social scientists have recently expressed concern that the "celebration of individualism" that began in the 1960's and continues to expand, now threatens to undercut the legitimation of the community. In response to what they see as an over-expansion of individualism, they suggest that society should move toward a "communitarian" approach that seeks to balance the rights and responsibilities of individuals with those of the community.

The Communitarian movement is "an environmental movement dedicated to the betterment of our moral, social, and political environment." It has added focus upon the dimension of rights with responsibility, claiming it is illogical and unethical to demand rights without assuming the responsibilities that must accompany them. Advocates of Communitarianism do not favor a return to the traditional values of the functionalist period, authoritarian leadership, or a renewed emphasis upon the closed community of past decades in American history. They do favor a balanced perspective that forms a responsive society based on a commitment to both the individual and the group or community. This balancing of the
individual and the group is emphasized well by Amitai Etzioni, one of the founders of the Communitarian movement:

When Communitarians argue that the pendulum has swung too far toward the radical individualistic pole and it is time to hurry its return, we do not seek to push it to the opposite extreme, of encouraging a community that suppresses individuality. We aim for a judicious mix of self-interest, self-expression, and commitment to the commons—of rights and responsibilities, of I and we. Hence the sociological recommendation to move from "I" to "we" is but a form of shorthand for arguing that a strong commitment to the commons must now be added to strong commitments to individual needs and interests that are already well ensconced. Balancing the me-istic forces with a fair measure of resumed we-ness will bring our society closer to a balanced position, without a significant tilt toward either side, a society able to steer a stable course.20

It is believed that there is no precise balancing point at which the two forces of the individual and the community are in equilibrium, but that this is an ideal state to be continually striven for as society's conditions vary. Varying degrees of emphasis upon the individual and the community can coexist, allowing shifts in viewpoints on important moral, social, and political issues without undermining the society itself.

The Communitarian movement has addressed issues of concern within many prominent areas of our society, including schools and education. In their view, the single most important factor affecting education from within the schools is not curriculum, teaching style, or similar issues that educators often focus upon. Communitarians emphasize that "awareness and analysis of the school as a set of experiences" is primary, with attention to those experiences that tend to have "deep educational effects" upon the students.21 They see two requirements that "loom over all others, indeed [being] at the foundation of most other needs: to develop the basic personality traits that characterize effective individuals and to acquire core values."22 These traits, which are often referred to in educational literature as "developing character," are vital for the full development of the individual, who interacts through educational experiences both independently and in groups throughout the school experience. There is a recognition that deep educational experiences, or the lack of such experiences, do more to form the character of the individual than has been traditionally recognized, especially in light of the declining influence that modern family life exerts upon our children. This recognition of the importance of educational experiences to individual character development places a new emphasis upon examination of school experiences and the opportunities they offer or fail to offer in this regard. Thus, the individual and group experiences found within music education now take on even more importance.

They also point out the problems that can arise when attention to the needs and rights of the individual are transferred to demands for those of groups and subgroups as well. For
example, recent American history has seen growing demands for the rights of groups as defined by gender, race, age, sexual orientation, and culture (to name a few). The contemporary issues of feminism, affirmative action, and cultural diversity have stretched the demand for rights ushered in with individualism to new levels, often complicated by narrow political motives. In the minting of new rights, there are certain rights that need to be reexamined. Upon closer examination of this debate, much of it can be reduced to, once again, an imbalance of the needs/rights of the individual and those of the group.

The Communitarian perspective offers helpful guidelines for those wrestling with these socio-cultural issues. This perspective has much to say in particular about multiculturalism—an important, demanding issue that music educators are facing with their fellow comrades in education. As can be expected from the Communitarian emphasis on balance between the individual and the community, their perspective welcomes cultural enrichment, but is opposed to cultural superiority. The opportunity for curricula in American schools to help students learn more about cultures other than their own has much merit for development of the individual as well as recognition of groups and subgroups. "Moreover, educated people—whatever their origins—ought to be conversant with the main works and seminal ideas of other civilizations, especially those many of his or her fellow Americans consider part of their heritage, such as African traditions and Hispanic culture." Cultural diversity is perceived by communitarians as an enriching addition to curricula, but communitarians also stress that the inclusion of new ideas should be worked out carefully in curriculum committees so that these new ideas do not become an attack on the shared values of the community. Thus, multiculturalism should be designed to underscore the "shared values that help keep us together as a community of communities." Such a perspective is very helpful to music educators and offers implications that will be mentioned further in another part of this discussion.

Closely connected to the Communitarian movement is another perspective that is being debated in the academic arena, namely, the "politics of recognition." The politics of recognition, as developed by the philosophical work of Charles Taylor, offers a perspective which is also very much concerned with the relationship of the individual to the community. Taylor's work is based on the thesis that our identity is largely shaped by recognition of the individual through interactions with others. It continues the idea posited by the noted sociologist George Herbert Mead about this crucial feature of human life and its "fundamentally dialogical character."

We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression. For my purposes here, I want to take language in a broad sense, covering not only the words we speak, but also other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including the "languages" of art, of gesture, of love, and the like. But we learn these modes of expression through exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own."
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In essence, we define our identity always in dialogue with, and sometimes in struggle against, others throughout our lives. While there may be debate among music educators about Taylor’s statement on the point of whether music itself is a language, even in the broad sense, there would be general agreement that music is indeed a primary mode of expression, having great value to the individual. The point here is that the individual seeks and uses interaction with other people to develop expressive language that enables one to recognize, understand, and fulfill oneself. Taylor further stated:

Thus my discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.29

From the perspective of a music educator, there is a striking parallel between this idea of the recognition of one’s identity through dialogical exchanges and negotiation with others, and the dialogical exchanges and negotiations that occur through music-making. As the music student acquires the language of musical expression through musical contact with others, there is also a discovery of illuminating, compelling qualities of the musical experience that lead to personal awareness. By envisioning the possibilities for self-understanding and expression that music offers, and how to personally use this mode of expression for self and with others, partly overt and partly internal, then the music student becomes able to define self and important aspects of life. This self-definition occurs through the dialogue of the individual musician relating to another musician, to a group of musicians, or perhaps even later to listeners who are not necessarily present, but for whom expectations for the dialogue exist. Thus, due recognition through such expressive languages as music becomes more than a pleasant experience—it has come to be seen as a vital human need.

The concept of the interaction of the individual with others through expressive "languages," developing recognition of self and others, is strikingly similar to other scholars’ findings about "flow experiences and emergent structures of the self," "musicing and self-growth and enjoyment," and music and the aesthetic experience.30 Surely the politics of recognition offer a philosophical position that adds a dimension to our understanding of the purpose and values of music as one vital mode of expression for the individual learning within the group. This perspective points to yet another way that music education relates significantly to the development of the individual and the community.

Taylor goes on to suggest that there is another side to the development of individual identity: recognition (or absence of recognition) of the significant subcultural group to which the individual belongs. He stated, "Democracy has ushered in a politics of equal recognition, which has taken various forms over the years, and has now returned in the form of demands for
the equal status of cultures and of genders."\[31\] In this view, just as it is vital for the individual to obtain personal recognition of the self, it is also vital to obtain public recognition of the group. Recognition of an individual helps self-knowledge and self-growth to occur; recognition of a culture may likewise assist in the definition and growth of the culture. Recognition of a culture allows the individual and the cultural group to have a cultural identity with a distinctive set of traditions and practices and a distinctive intellectual and aesthetic history. Failure of recognition leaves "the members of the unrecognized cultures [feeling] deracinated and empty, lacking the sources for a feeling of community and a basis for self-esteem..."\[32\] The withholding of any recognition is now perceived as more than an oversight, an insensitivity, or even narrowness of vision. It is now seen as a form of oppression, whether of an individual or a group.

It should be noted that there is an important element of balance evident in the politics of recognition as developed by Taylor, one that clarifies some of the dangers currently seen in much of the multicultural movement as it is put into practice. One important element is an understanding that recognition does not necessarily signify equal value.\[33\] All works and ideas from individuals and cultures do not necessarily display equal human accomplishment or make equal contributions to the world’s store of beauty and truth.\[34\] As Taylor more clearly explained:

The claim is that all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings. I have worded it in this way to exclude partial cultural milieux within a society, as well as short phases of a major culture. There is no reason to believe that, for instance, the different art forms of a given culture should all be of equal, or even of considerable, value; and every culture can go through phases of decadence.\[35\]

Thus, recognition does not preclude evaluation. We are still called upon to study and evaluate each culture and its contribution on its own merits. We are still responsible for evaluating each artwork, using our most complete criteria as fairly and as consistently as possible. Such criteria as the degrees of craftsmanship, imagination, sensitivity, and authenticity have long been pondered by aesthetic philosophers and are among the criteria proposed collectively to assist music educators in such evaluation.\[36\]

Within the politics of recognition, there is an implication that recognition of the group cannot supersede recognition of the individual. The recognition of the individual must be maintained in order for authentic self-knowledge and self-growth to occur. The dangers of over-emphasis upon recognition of the group was further described by Steven Rockefeller. He offered particular insight into the meaning of the demand for equal recognition:
Some multiculturalists may demand recognition of equal value chiefly in order to gain leverage in pressing the political agenda of a particular minority group. However, there is more to multiculturalism than this. The call for recognition of the equal value of different cultures is the expression of a basic and profound universal human need for unconditional acceptance. A feeling of such acceptance, including affirmation of one's ethnic particularity as well as one's universally shared potential, is an essential part of a strong sense of identity... The formation of a person's identity is closely connected to positive social recognition—acceptance and respect—from parents, friends, loved ones, and also from the larger society.37

Again the recognition, defined here as acceptance and respect, points back to the individual and his/her interactions with significant groups. Again there is the struggle for balance. The struggle for balance between recognizing the needs/rights of the individual and the needs/expectations of the group are considered in evaluating an individual's contributions to a group or community, such as a musician's contribution to a musical ensemble, to the musical community, to a culture, or even to humanity.

Summary and Implications for Music Education

The study of the dominant sociological perspectives of the last century can reveal the strong influences that these perspectives have had upon American education and the parallel patterns found in major music education movements. These conceptions of the place of the individual within society and the primary processes of interaction and collective behavior offer helpful insights to those people currently redesigning philosophies and policies for music education. Attention to current sociological perspectives can assist in the development of new policies and practices that are more responsive to the demands and priorities of our present society.

Functionalist and conflict theories are generally perceived as being at odds with each other, and have been interpreted in contrasting ways, resulting in vastly different practices in our society. The concept of the closed community occupies one end of the spectrum, formed from overemphasis of the functionalist valuing of the community and for retaining society's stability, even at significant costs to the individual. The closed community fosters autocratic groups that dominate their members, requiring conformity from every individual for the greater demands of the group. On the other end of the spectrum, conflict theory, as interpreted by American sociologists, supported the concept of ultimate freedom of the individual to bring about dynamic changes in the community in the name of personal rights and self-expression. Structures and policies based upon extreme versions of conflict theory inevitably contribute to conflicts between opposing forces in society, even if rebellion and revolution result. Evidence of structures evolving from each of these theories exist in music education as practised in America.
While the presence of both practices in music education’s history seems paradoxical, sociologists point to each approach as “merely focusing on different aspects of social reality: one mainly on statics, one mainly on dynamics.” One theory supports the society and regular functioning of its groups, while the other supports the individual, preventing stagnation of society and generating necessary changes for its members. There is good that has come from both perspectives, and structures based upon either theory can have merit and may coexist in reality. However, it seems prudent to allow these two perspectives to rest in their place in history and look toward more contemporary perspectives, such as those evolving from Communitarianism and the politics of recognition.

As has been discussed at length, contemporary sociologists point to the need for balancing the needs/rights of the individual with the needs/expectations of the group or community. From the new perspectives presented by Communitarianism and the politics of recognition, one can discern a complex network of ways that music education is vital and unique in meeting the needs of the individual and providing interaction with and understanding for the community that hitherto was obscured. Several prominent points and their implications are now evident:

1. Schools should offer a set of meaningful, educational experiences that aim to fully develop the individual as well as pass on the shared values of the community. While character development may be a controversial point as a curricular goal, it is a topic that is being discussed more within such sociological perspectives as Communitarianism. Deep, meaningful experiences in school contribute to the character development of the individual; contrarily, a lack of such experiences hinders such development and results in the student’s inability to know or interact with self and others.

Social scientists and psychologists contend that disciplines exercising both thinking and feeling offer more holistic experiences wherein meaningful encounters with self and others can occur. Both the individual and group activities encountered in music education offer a unique set of experiences that exercise cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains. Such a wide gamut of demands from the student makes these encounters among the most likely to provide meaningful experiences.

Students who are aware of their own personal development or lack of it are more apt to change and grow. Regular expressive dialogue with other students through musical exchanges or “playing” experiences aids in their discernment of self and others. Cognitive/affective encounters that regularly call for critical thinking, evaluation, and personal responses cause students to recognize qualities of experiences. This awareness and use of such skills contribute to students’ personal development and growing recognition of self and others.

If we accept the Communitarian idea that one must acquire languages or modes of expression through exchanges with others, then meaningful exchanges that occur with another
person or group become a necessary commodity of education. The unique mode of expression acquired and exercised in musical experiences makes music education a necessary commodity of holistic education.

2. Music education offers experiences that are exemplary illustrations of the balance between individual and group objectives. Furthermore, students undergoing the experiences are easily made conscious of the dynamics working within the situation, being aware of those things that are related to the needs of the individual and those related to the functions or objectives of the group.

When an individual is involved in group music-making experiences, whether they be group rehearsals, traditional performances, or more improvisatory events, the individual will be forced to recognize personal responsibility for one's own part in preparation for the group experience. The individual must practice to make an effective contribution to the group effort, and may individually interpret his/her part in a new, unique way. Yet when the individual rejoins the group, he or she must recreate the part within the parameters of the group performance, often under the direction of another individual, who exercises yet another set of objectives. Depending upon the group and the parameters set before it, there is a wide range of interaction between the individual and the group in preparation for and during the actual music-making. The organic quality of group music-making, with numerous subtle-to-outspoken expressions by individuals, affects the integral elements of the music alongside the tremendous coordination of musical parts. All of these forces, meanwhile, are working toward the shared goal of a good, authentic performance. In essence, this very real, daily occurrence in music education offers one of the finest examples of the balance between the individual and the group.

3. Having established the value of balance between individual and group experiences in the school, more opportunities for individual music study and music-making should be assured at all levels. Given the usual lack of individual opportunities in music education in the secondary schools, particular attention to the advancement and use of methodologies focusing attention to individual musical development should be given.

Because of the needs of the students according to age and abilities, the balance between the percentage of time for individual development and group development may change from level to level. For example, at the pre-school and early elementary levels, there will generally be a need to offer more time for individual development through exploration with sound and independent musical discoveries and instruction. At the next level, as elementary students are becoming more aware of the people around them, they will welcome more group activities and opportunities to be a part of the community within their classroom, while still continuing with the individual musical development begun in the previous level. Later, as the young adolescents seek more social interaction, there may be a need to offer more varied group experiences through additional music tracks, while maintaining individual musical development in the
comprehensive music course. By the time one examines the percentage of time between focus on individual musical development and group interactions at the high school level, the group experiences may predominate. However, there still should be more varied group experiences utilizing comprehensive approaches, more independent and small group projects, and other opportunities for individual development in certain optional music courses as well as within the framework of those courses that focus primarily upon the group.

4. Considering the politics of recognition, it becomes imperative for consistent recognition of each individual student to persist throughout all levels of the school experience. Throughout these years, the student is continually seeking self-definition and self-knowledge, and as new experiences are encountered, the self is encountered and challenged in a new way. An important part of this recognition of self occurs through the recognition of others. As new experiences with groups occur, these should undergird the individual in his or her genuine quest for self-knowledge, and not allow group agendas to dominate over the individual’s development.

We understand more about ourselves when we study the groups and subgroups we came from and are a part of now. Further understanding occurs when we perceive that from which we did not come. As we recognize and understand ourselves, then we become better able to recognize and understand those other than ourselves. For these reasons, the value of the study of our own cultural heritage and that of other cultures is a vital principle of the politics of recognition. The arts disciplines are among the integral areas in general education that can do this essential study well. Therefore, music educators need to involve students in frequent encounters that help them to recognize and understand more about themselves and about others, such as those prescribed in multicultural experiences.

Communitarians also emphasize the need to study one’s own expressions and artwork for recognition of self and the cultural group(s) to which one belongs. In music, we should continue to engage students primarily in musics found in America. This is not an easy task for music educators, for there are many cultures and musics in America today. Yet Communitarians contend that America is a "community of communities," and that there are shared values expressed in our artwork that can focus such study. Recognizing the groups that gave us those shared values is also an important part of this process. These guidelines can assist music educators in developing a more cohesive approach to multicultural music education.

Having established the need for study of American musics first, Communitarians recommend we add to our musical experience with study of music from other cultures as enrichment, all the while underscoring the shared values found in cultural experiences around the world that use this mode of expression we call "music." They offer guidelines that can make this study truly enrichment, and more than odd, nonrelated encounters done for the sake of exposure.
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Study of all cultures and their musics should include heavy use of the high order critical thinking skills, such as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Thoughtful, reasoned evaluation can only occur after some systematic analysis of the music's structure, its use of the musical elements, and other qualities inherent within the music itself have taken place. A synthesis of important aspects of the music considered alongside the context for which the music was created and used is another important part of the study. Evaluation of the music using a set of criteria which is comprehensive and appropriate for the type of music being studied should also be encouraged. Students need development and exercise of their critical thinking skills which lead to personal informed evaluations. They need study and practice in using evaluation criteria for their own accomplishments as well as those accomplishments of other groups or cultures.

The broad, critical thinking and thoughtful evaluation of human accomplishments and meaningful expressions afforded in music classes which conduct comprehensive multicultural experiences would be highly valued by leaders in education and our society. Music education's incorporation of such worthy experiences within its curricula would contribute to its being regarded as a very necessary part of basic education.

In summary, the philosophies and policies of music education should allow shifts in balance between emphasis upon the individual and the community. They should provide for ongoing assessment of their relevance in light of the current perspectives of our society. They should allow each music educator to adapt curricula and methodologies to meet each school's particular needs. The informed music educator must interpret the current policies thoughtfully, with eyes open, watching for overemphasis one way or the other that may undermine the individual or the community. Music education policies must not be stagnant, and should allow the curriculum to be continually redesigned and practised anew.

An examination of ways that sociological forces influenced music education philosophy and policies in the past can point to parallel influences on our present philosophy and policies. A focus on the balance of the needs/rights of the individual and the needs/expectations of the community can be a positive way to control and direct the many competing forces of minority, gender, and political issues that have the potential of interfering with music education's primary purpose. Our growing ability to recognize and address the sociological perspectives of our times will enable us to consciously direct the profession toward a path that is of more value to humankind.

NOTES

2. Amitai Etzioni, "The Responsive Community (I & We)," *The American Sociologist* 18 (Summer 1987), 146-57.


4. Robertson, 377-90.


12. Ibid., 4-8.


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22. Ibid, 90.

23. Ibid., 8-9. Etzioni presents an example of the exaggeration or abuse of demands for rights through an extreme environmental case where the protection of beaches was argued on the basis of the rights of inanimate, natural objects to exist, with friends of the beaches applying to a court as guardians for beach protection. Etzioni finds fault with this approach that ignores the language of responsibility to protect beaches, but rather, demands rights for natural objects and trivializes rights by advancing the notion that "sand has rights."

24. Ibid., 151.

25. Ibid.


28. Taylor, 32.

29. Ibid., 34.


31. Taylor, 27.


33. Taylor is careful not to use the phrase "politics of equal recognition," while others, such as Steven Rockefeller, use it when engaged in this debate on multiculturalism. Taylor's viewpoint appears to be that of approaching all cultures with at least a presumption of equal value until close scrutiny shows some cultures not to be of equal value.
However, Rockefeller presents an ecological standpoint that views all cultures as having intrinsic value and, in this sense, having equal value. It is suggested that these two standpoints are not mutually exclusive, and possibly both have their place in the multicultural debate. See Rockefeller in Gutman, notes 26 above, 94–95.

34. Taylor, 42. Wolf, 78.

35. Taylor, 66.

36. Reimer, note 16 above, 133–137.


38. Robertson, 612.
MUSIC EDUCATION AS COMMUNITY

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One of the most pervasive models underlying music education is that of community. Whether it be the Hindustani sitarist instructing his disciple in traditional manner, the Western classical pianist conducting her masterclass, the Australian Aboriginal songman teaching his young kinsman a love song, or the Balkan mother singing her daughter a lament, all participate in a community in which music making and taking plays a central role. I shall sketch four elements of the idea of community—as place, in time, as process, as an end—drawing particularly on the work of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Maxine Greene. Exploring aspects of this model illumines music education, broadly conceived, and suggests that community may also constitute a metaphor for envisioning music education thought and practice.

Metaphors are one of the most important means of understanding our experience. Effective metaphors surprise and enlighten. They are not merely ornaments designed to dress up an idea, but constitute a means of cognitive and affective access to things, experiences, ideas, especially those that may otherwise be inadequately known or even incomprehensible. One of the most useful explanations of how they work is provided by Nelson Goodman who suggests that in metaphors a schema (or associative network of ideas) that has built up in reference to one realm is transferred to another alien realm. There, its entities, structures and relationships organize the new realm along the same lines as the old from where it came. As Goodman puts it, a metaphor is a matter of "teaching an old word new tricks," or "an affair between a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting." He explains that these shifts in reference usually amount to "no mere distribution of family goods" but "an expedition abroad. A whole set of alternative labels, a whole apparatus of organization, takes over new territory." Looked at in this way, he adds, "a metaphor might be regarded as a calculated category mistake—or rather as a happy and revitalizing even if bigamous, second marriage." In a sense, then, a metaphor involves "conflict," it "requires attraction as well as resistance—indeed, an attraction that overcomes resistance."2

How do models differ from metaphors? Iris Yob suggests a helpful way of distinguishing the two. A model is also a schema that is transferred from one realm to another. But not all the kinds of transfer make the cognitive demands that metaphor does. For example, scale models and samples usually involve literal transfer. Allowing that "genuine metaphors and many models function similarly in that they call to mind organizing schemata which are applied to new realms for novel insights," Yob suggests that "some models do not function this way. Their organizing schemata are simply extended to a new realm by reading off correspondences without
any sense of invasion or resistance. That is, genuine metaphors act as many models but not all models act metaphorically.  

"Located at in this way, the aspects of community that follow may be construed as metaphor for and metaphorical model of music education. My list is not intended to be exhaustive, but illustrative of the richness of the positive insights community offers for music education."

Community as Place

The simplest and most accessible view of place may be to see it literally, in geographic terms of specific location, distance, distribution, physical organization and the like. The New England fishing village, the Midwestern farming town, the Appalachian coal mining town, the Western mountain resort, and the Southern bayou settlement, evoke images of rural American communities, landscapes that are readily envisaged by those who have travelled in these parts. Images of the bustling city or the tiny hamlet, sprawling megalopolis or sparsely populated forest, urban ghetto or prairie town, intuitively suggest that literal place profoundly shapes the community. People's livelihoods, recreation, worship, commerce, travel, language, artistic expression, learning and cultural opportunities are shaped by, as much as agents in, shaping a landscape. Whether by necessity or choice, their continued presence in this place constitutes a compelling aspect of their lives—its cultural, political, religious, economic, and social expression.

Place is also viewed psychologically. Susanne Langer described this cognitively construed landscape as "virtual space"—a psychologically conceived space with a life apart from the physical environment in which the person finds himself or herself. This psychologically conceived space draws from and contributes to the physical landscape, but nevertheless remains distinct from it. In an isolated desert landscape evocative of the raw, the harsh, the rough, the dry, the desolate, a world of literature, music, dance, drama, born in the cultivation, lushness, urbanity, and civility of a world away, enables an individual to experience a reality beyond that dictated by the immediate physical landscape.

And place is also to be seen socially. In participating in social groups and societal institutions, individuals experience a sense of social space. Their relationships to others are grounded in the sense of varying degrees of equality and social distance. This sense of social place arises out of a plethora of economic, political, social, religious, age, color, linguistic, geographic, and other factors that serve to unite or divide one person and another. Each institution or social group in which an individual participates, whether the particular family, church, club, government, business, or whatever, has its own sense of space—its characteristic buildings or places in which its activities are regularly carried on; it exists within a larger societal milieu, a context serving a role and purpose similar to psychologically and physically
construed place. These various views of the nature and perception of place, while conceptually distinct, seem for practical purposes at least, to interact with each other. Indeed, their interrelationships lead Joe Kincheloe and William Pinar and their colleagues to a self-described social psychoanalysis as a way of understanding the significance of place on curriculum. Their reflections about place take into account not only physical properties, or personal reflections, but a collective group consciousness of place in the beliefs and practices of its membership. When they argue that curriculum appropriately not only occurs in place but is "infused by place" they are thinking not only of literal physical place, but of psychosocial perceptions and realities that transcend literal physical location and distribution. Such socially and psychologically grounded perceptions radically shape the meanings that actors attribute to events and color the belief systems they eventually internalize.

Place serves various functions in defining community. It provides a sense of boundedness in that the community is delimited by boundaries that are necessarily inclusive in some respects and exclusive in others. Just as a village has geographic limits, so individuals and groups have limits, defined by familial ties or other commonly held beliefs and practices that distinguish them from others. That a community is bounded and thereby finite, implies that people outside its bounds are excluded from participation in it, while those within the community are united by certain shared understandings and practices. While communities may differ in the degree of their exclusivity, or openness to others without their bounds, all share in delimitations of some sort—if just that persons outside their borders do not know about them. In order to remain within the community, individual members are expected to adopt, live by, even love certain defining beliefs and practices; they must abide by both its prescriptions and its proscriptions. Those who do not or cannot, risk expulsion. The boundedness of the community, therefore, serves not only to define its distinctiveness from others, but to enhance its cohesiveness and unity, and invoke its discipline.

Place also provides a sense of rootedness. Individuals share ties to and roots in this place that stabilize beliefs and practices, and promote cross-generational traditions, personal feelings of identity, security, and connectedness with this place and the people in it. Some communities have a greater sense of rootedness than others. Scott Sanders argues, for example, that contemporary American society is in a state of flux with people continually coming and going from one place to another. People's disconnection from family and friends causes them to feel insecure, unsure of their identity and where they belong. The decision to make a home and stay put in this place, become identified with it, share in its responsibilities, challenges, limitations, and joys, is a personal affirmation of the importance of rootedness in one's life. Indeed rootedness derives from a commitment to a place, such that one is not only identified with it, but in a sense belongs to it.

Place also provides a sense of interconnectedness with others, their ideas and practices. The belief that one is part of a larger group of persons, that one has something to offer and
something to take from others, that one is interdependent with others for comfort, personal affirmation, intellectual stimulation, a livelihood, goods and services, friendship and love, among a host of things, contributes to one’s sense of personal identity and corporate cohesion. This interconnectedness is multifaceted, in its incorporation of various biological, psychological, sociological, historical, or in whatever perspectives or frames of reference events and beliefs are cast. ⁹

Place also provides a sense of feelingfulness. It involves an attachment to the community that is emotionally and cognitively as well as physically experienced. Beliefs and practices are not tacitly accepted but enacted within corporate rituals that are felt as much as propositionally known. As such, these beliefs and practices come to be loved by the community; they are laden with affect that arises from belonging to this community and sharing with others in its corporate life. One cannot be unmoved within one’s community, but experiences the gamut of emotions as one lives within it. Indeed, a community is feelingful precisely because one lives in it, figuratively if not literally, rather than knows about it. One cannot distance one’s self from one’s community. Rather, it more-or-less pervades one’s entire life. Such is the impact of this influence, that whether it be a family, a city in which one lives, a social club, a chapel, temple or synagogue, a place of work, a neighborhood, a school of thought or practice, one is shaped, at least partly, by the community’s beliefs and actions.

Place also provides a sense of empowerment. Communities are dynamic, in the process of becoming, alive, responding to and changing the world of which they are a part. That one can undertake corporate actions in a unified way empowers individual participants to accomplish more than they might otherwise be capable of alone. Knowing one’s surroundings intimately, possessing self-assurance and confidence in that knowledge, being rooted in and bounded by this place, having one’s place in the community, being intimately interconnected with others empowers one to find one’s own voice and by so speaking, not only act to change the community, but the world beyond. Maxine Greene suggests that making a space where people can participate in naming their world, mutually dialoguing with others, and imaginatively conjuring up new worlds, empowers them to create a community in which they can, paradoxically, experience freedom. ¹⁰

Community in Time

Just as space may be viewed literally or figuratively, so individual perceptions of time vary from actual clock time, and social time, regulated by the recurrence of personal and social events, each with their own temporal dimensions and constraints. ¹¹ A community is constituted in time, just as it is in space. Even though the relationship between time and place is problematical and ambiguous, ¹² it is useful to distinguish the two conceptually and relate each to the community. One might cite the selfsame characteristic functions of community regarding
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time as those respecting place. My approach, however, is to suggest others that are particularly interesting.

Among these, time provides a sense of dynamism. The community impacts on, and is impacted by, the progress of historical events. As a living, vital, dynamic entity, it exists within a context that changes over time. If it cannot or does not adapt to these temporal developments, it may cease to exist. History is replete with examples of past civilizations that disappeared when they ceased to adapt to a changing world around and inside them. The pace of change within society at large may differ dramatically from one time to another, and with it varying expectations of the community. Thus, appropriate beliefs and practices once espoused may become irrelevant, unnecessary, even reprehensible at another, and it is necessary to understand those beliefs and practices in the context of the particular times at which they were held. Aside from responding to change within the societal context, communities can also act to change those societies in which they have developed, and thereby, affect the course of subsequent historical events in society-at-large.

Time also functions as a means of regulation. It delineates the corporately experienced events and rituals that organize the community’s life. Beliefs are enacted, ritualized, played, within time frames (literal and figurative) that distinguish time devoted to community activities from that devoted to personal or other social uses, and time given to certain community activities from others. That certain events occur with regularity creates a characteristic rhythm in the community. Marking off times and occasions in this fashion serves to organize the community’s corporate life, promoting a sense of orderliness and corporate tradition. In a sense, these demarcated times constitute restrictions to individuals within the community, possibly contributing to the sense of boundedness and rootedness that various individuals within it share; these times are also enabling, however, in that they foster particular beliefs and activities that empower individuals within the community.

Time also functions as a basis for tradition. The events that comprise the community’s history become its life story, a remembered narrative repeatedly retold by elders to their youth, passed on from one generation to the next, reenacted in ritual and recalled in history as a vital part of the community’s sense of identity.

Through its myths, rituals, stories, poems, dances, songs, plays, paintings, among other means, a community keeps its story alive in the hearts and minds of its members. Through participating in the rhythm of events that make up the community’s temporal cycle, members come to understand and renew their commitment to its beliefs and practices. By so doing, they become intimately familiar with the people and ideas, beliefs and practices that comprise the community.
Time also brings an awareness of finitude. Communities are born, develop, mature, atrophy, and die, like all things human—be they life spans or civilizations. Their temporal fragility derives partly from their dynamism which holds within it seeds of instability and dissolution. Also, being based on personal and ideational relationships, and transmitted orally from one generation to the next, they can easily be disrupted or destroyed by war, disease, genocide, economic deprivation, social disruption, political upheaval, religious animosity, natural disaster, among a host of other factors. Even the stories (and the beliefs and actions on which they are based) can be forgotten, especially in a world in which literacy and media have overtaken memory as the object of education. The very shortness of human lifespan and the frailty of human memory provide constant reminders of the fact that communities are finite entities. As such, they can never be taken for granted but if considered worthwhile require constant attention and careful preservation.

Community as Process

As a dynamic entity, the community is in a continual process of becoming. Langer’s metaphors of the rushing waterfall or flowing river apply equally well to the community as they do to the work of art. Its beliefs, practices, people, and places are in a constant state of development, granted more obvious at some times than others, but nevertheless forming or dissolving, growing or atrophying, all the same. Aside from events in the natural world, human development and mortality are enough to guarantee at least some modicum of change, even in the most conservative communities.

Among other things, process serves to underscore the sense of communal development. Dewey notes that the educational community, notably the classroom, is engaged in a collective as well as individual process that hopefully develops in the direction of educative rather than miseducative experiences. For Dewey, educative experiences are those that promote continued development and power in realizing the potential of all its members; miseducative experiences are those that stunt, disable, and prevent further growth on the part of some or all its members. Each educational experience, he posits, leaves behind it traces or effects that can never be completely erased, and these collectively determine the outcome of the experience, whether for the benefit or detriment of society and the individual. The ends thus reached become means to further ends. While Dewey takes growth to be a mainly positive process, as Scheffler observes, to develop some potentials necessitates thwarting others. Developing potentials may have a negative valence because of the necessity of choosing what to grow, pruning unwanted limbs, and uprooting unfruitful vines.

Process also provides a sense of reflective action, or what Friere terms conscientização, "learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality." For Friere, such a process is praxial in the special sense that words without actions or vice versa are insufficient; in his view, "to speak a true word is
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to transform the world."18 Through reflective dialogue, the community transforms its vision of what must be, and acts to realize its vision. This cannot be accomplished without the full participation of all members of the community, although others may assist in the process of criticizing the status quo and finding solutions cooperatively that will foster individual freedom and self-fulfillment, and help to overcome oppression. Such reflective action involves replacing the metaphors of conquest, divide and rule, manipulation, and cultural invasion, with those of cooperation, unity for liberation, egalitarian organization, and cultural synthesis.19 What is especially illuminating for music educators is that praxis is both descriptive and normative; it involves not only the acknowledgement of current beliefs and practices, but the search for ideals and the rejection of the status quo when it is oppressive.

Process also admits dialogue. Greene posits that dialogue is predicated on several attributes, among others: (1) It necessitates the freedom to name the world, and describe and value it in one’s own terms, and from one’s own point of view; (2) It suggests collaborative and collective effort in seeking answers to the questions that confront the community; (3) It requires mutual respect of the diverse perspectives that arise from disparate ethnic, linguistic, religious, artistic, among other cultural and personal differences that separate people; (4) It implicates the imagination and intuition in exploring the past and present, and envisioning the future; (5) It opens the individual and community to greater self-knowledge; (6) The arts are especially suited to providing the framework within which it may occur and personal and corporate freedom may be realized.20 As such, her view is praxial, in the Frierean sense of implicating both normative and descriptive reflective-action.21 As she rightly puts it, "When people lack attachments, when there is no possibility of coming together in a plurality or community, when they have not tapped their imaginations, they may think of breaking free, but they will be unlikely to think of breaking through the structures of their world and creating something new."22 Community offers people the opportunity to do this; paradoxically, one may not achieve personal freedom except by accepting limits to that freedom through participating within the community.

Process also offers the metaphor of pilgrimage. This metaphor is analogous to William Pinar’s image of "currere," whereby the curriculum is viewed as the process of running a race, or Herbert Kliebard’s metaphor of "travel," in which curriculum is seen as the route students travel under an experienced guide, companion, or leader.23 Iris Yob takes us farther than Pinar or Kliebard, however, in her metaphor of pilgrimage, in which she suggests that the journey has a sacred or spiritual dimension that transcends the ordinary, the prosaic, the utilitarian.24 While Yob is primarily writing in the context of religious education, she is not the first to recognize the religious and spiritual dimensions of education. To wit, Alfred North Whitehead earlier stated, "The essence of education is that it be religious." By religious education, he meant "an education which inculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises," he wrote "from our potential control over the course of events. When attainable knowledge could have changed the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this perception, that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that
whole amplitude of time, which is eternity." The sense of the spiritual, in which the arts participate, is a dimension that may be forgotten in a technologically oriented, materialistic world. Pilgrimage captures not only the sense of becoming, but becoming in a special spiritual way.

Community as an End

The community is united in pursuit of an objective—one sufficiently compelling to unite people of differing attitudes, dispositions, outlooks, ages, cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, among other things. Without such a shared end-in-sight, the community fragments, disintegrates, and ceases to exist. Importantly, a community is construed for something, as much as it may be created in response or even opposition to a prevailing situation, be it belief system or set of practices. The end provides the goal towards which the community strives.

A community’s end is idealistic. Its vision is intuitively and imaginatively perceived. Individually, community members may strive for personal growth and self-fulfillment; collectively, they may search for freedom from oppression, fear, economic want, and the achievement of a just, egalitarian, caring society, a society founded on the realization of such principles as truth, goodness, and beauty. Dewey, Friere and Greene, all see community in idealistic or radical terms, and in this regard they follow a long and distinguished line of Western philosophers who thought in similar terms. Whether it be Plato’s Republic or Schiller’s vision of the moral state, Pestalozzi’s concept of education in society or Herbert Read’s view of democratic education, philosophers have been a remarkably idealistic breed, not only criticizing ideals but, importantly, articulating them. Whatever the particular ideal—and, notwithstanding notable differences between them, Dewey, Friere and Greene are united in their passion for the values of justice, freedom, caring and carefulness, and dialogue in education—the community cannot exist without ideals. They are embodied in the values the community embraces, be they the things it prizes or esteems or the criteria whereby it evaluates and judges beliefs and actions. They are the stuff of its stories, its rituals, its songs, paintings, and other artistic creations, interwoven with its precepts and prohibitions, and touching every aspect of the daily life of its members.

Ends are codified. History records a tendency for ideals to be institutionalized, stabilized, standardized, formalized, and otherwise codified into a list of prescribed and proscribed beliefs and conduct. As such, they tend to be frozen into texts and traditions, making the leap from the worlds of the imagination to reason, from implication to outcome, from theory to practice. Something is lost in the process. Whereas an original group was attracted to or gathered about a person or persons, or an idea or ideas, more-or-less informally, in a state of flux, as time progresses, the original inspiration is institutionalized, as the members of the community seek to capture and preserve the essence of its ends, its goals, and its character in a set of beliefs and
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practices. Such a code inevitably falls short of the ideal, one reason being, as Joseph Schwab and Israel Scheffler have aptly pointed out in another context, that practice and theory are two separate worlds that do not correspond one-to-one. An idea may suggest a multiplicity of applications, each of which inadequately captures the gist of its foundational vision, and some of which may conflict with others. Codifying an idea provides a means whereby it may remain in the hearts and minds of the community because a code tends to be prosaic and practical. However, it lacks the spirit of the motivating force behind the community and so holds within it the seeds of the community's destruction. Communities are in constant need of looking beyond their codes to the forces and ideas that shaped them in the first place, or that can rejuvenate or reinvigorate them in the future.

Community ends are eminently practical. Codes of beliefs and practices are designed as a means of attaining ends—even if, as Dewey suggests, an end presents a moving target, as each in turn becomes the means to yet another. In order to accomplish these ends, the community is action-oriented. It organizes itself as a self-perpetuating social system such that its purposes transcend those of particular individuals. Its members are assigned certain designated and specialized roles and functions, and are dependant upon one another in realizing the community's vision. It plans and carries out means whereby the young are socialized into the community's way of life, and later, encouraged and constrained to continue as fully-fledged members. Such is the importance of practice in the life of the community, that it imposes deterrents or punishments on members whose actions are incongruent with their beliefs. Indeed, the community's test of membership often emphasizes the evidence of practice over the assent to belief.

Seeing community in terms of its end reminds us that it is pervasively anticipatory. The community looks forward eagerly to the attainment of its vision, and becomes personified, that is, takes on an identity and distinguishes itself from others, in the process of seeking to realize its goal. Its traditions are valued within the context of the future end towards which it tends. Such is the devotion of its members to this vision stretching into the future, that they may embrace revisionist, reactionary, even revolutionary ideas in their enthusiasm to realize it in practice. All our writers—Dewey, Friere and Greene—albeit in different degree and for various reasons, share the hopeful anticipation that their visions for the present and future—whether it be a just and cultured democratic society, or a sensitive, humane, and imaginative people—can be realized. They write in the belief that transformation in society is not only possible but probable, convicted that human faith, hope, and courage can be relied upon to accomplish the remarkable societal and educative transformations they seek.

Implications for Music Education

Seeing community as place, in time, as process, and as end is of particular relevance to music education today. In a changing and shrinking world, in which a sense of dislocation and
alienation is pervasive, community as place with its concomitant notions of rootedness, interconnectedness, boundedness, feelingfulness, and empowerment offers a corrective. It means the importance of grounding the music curriculum in a particular place, and moving to an ever broadening view, ensuring that all learners come to understand their place within a growing community, value differences as well as similarities, feel connected to others, accept and love their own musical traditions, and are empowered to change those things that should be changed and embrace new perspectives. It means defending this place against the onslaught of sometimes well meaning, even hostile agencies that would supplant learners' sense of place with an alien or bogus culture, peddled by religious, political, financial, or other interests, and who would silence them or relegate them to the status of consumers rather than active musical participants. It means fostering the active participation of the family and community in music making, over the gamut of folk, popular and classical musical traditions, and working in conjunction with various social institutions to achieve a unified approach to music education. It means opening the doors of musics that may otherwise be foreign to the learner, by providing keys to those understandings. It means revolutionizing the world of music, and the means by which people come to know it, empowering people to name their own realities, see their own visions, and dream their own dreams. It means acknowledging the bounds of one's insights and perspectives, and the limitations of one's particular place and vantage point. It means having the humility to approach each musical experience with an open mind and heart. And it means embracing and committing to one's community in response to the pervasive individualism particularly in American society.²⁵

Envisaging community in time implies recognizing the importance of seeing the present in the context of the past, and giving students the opportunity to grapple with timeless philosophical and spiritual questions: "How did I come to be here?" "What is the meaning of what I am doing now?" "Where am I going?" Allowing them to sense the dynamic nature of musical experience, the importance of music in regulating their own lives and that of their community, the wealth of the musical tradition in which they find themselves, and their finitude in the face of the rich expressions of artistic genius, provides a perspective not only on a musical treasury, but on an entire culture. It means teaching students to care and to be careful, treasure the present, respect the accomplishments of others who have gone before, and preserve a precious and fragile musical heritage. It means allowing students to participate imaginatively in the music of the past, thereby enabling them to connect with their past and appreciate traditional ways of music making and taking. It means providing them with opportunities to come to know a way of life as a musician, and through the community's rituals, participate in its stories and artistic creations, live its beliefs, and undergo its discipline. It means opening the worlds of musical orality and literacy to them, through composition, performance and listening, among the many ways in which people experience music. And it means meeting the pervasive future orientation and technological change in contemporary society with the values of tradition, cultural stability, and critical sensitivity.
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Viewing community as process is to construe praxis not in a narrow descriptive, even deconstructive way, but in a normative, reformative or reconstructive sense of building something better than the status quo. Construed as development toward individual and corporate enrichment, reflective-action, dialogue, or pilgrimage, it means accepting the need for reviewing the world of music, as well as the process of music education, perhaps revolutionizing not only the ways people come to know music, but musical experience itself. It means opening spaces in which teachers and students can dialogue together in order to name their worlds and better understand their realities. It means valuing the process of this discovery for its own sake, quite apart from the destination to which the journey leads. It means allowing the very destination to change, if necessary. It means revisioning the roles of teacher and student, and allowing mutuality and inclusivity in the place of hedonism and exclusivity. It means respecting cultural, specifically musical, diversity, and out of these differences, exploring those elements common to musical experience among the gamut of world musics. And it means grappling directly with the difficult issue of what today’s objectives for music education should be, rather than skirting around the pressing issues or opting for the status quo.

And regarding community as end requires facing interrelated issues of the specific musical expectations teachers ought to have of their students, the levels of excellence to which they can and should aspire, the qualities of breadth and depth of musical experience, and its relationship to their lives. Construed as an ideal, codified as a set of beliefs and practices, organized as a social system devoted to practical action, and focused on an end which the community confidently anticipates realizing, it means inculcating a love of wisdom in students, an understanding of how to go on in music as opposed to knowing about it, and a high degree of skill attainment (be it physical or critical) enabling students to master their particular musical craft. It means not being satisfied with the humdrum and the prosaic, and reaching beyond to that which transcends the ordinary. In company with Schiller, it means surrounding students with musical experiences that are excellent, appropriate to the situation, inspirational, imaginative, challenging, and within their powers to grasp and master. It means students watching and listening to demonstrations performed by competent musicians, modelling their actions on those of their teachers, and gradually, through osmosis as much as through direct instruction and practice, by participating in the activities of music making, coming to a knowledge of music beyond that they might have hoped or expected. And it means creating a vision of music education that faces the world today, a vision in which musical understanding and artistry are prized aspects of culture, and have a central place within education.

Construed thus, community provides a figure for envisioning music education. Not only does it enrich our understanding of the process whereby people are musically educated, but it suggests a plethora of specific criteria, both normative and descriptive, whereby music education viewed broadly might be adjudicated. As such, it offers a useful theoretical tool in the analysis of music education beliefs and practices.
Beyond, it may constitute a way of envisioning arts education. And, to the extent that musical and artistic communities exhibit the qualities described, they may, in turn, constitute metaphors or metaphoric models for education, and society at large. These possibilities remain to be explored in the future.

NOTES


4. I shall not, for example, explore the darker side of community, those elements that compromise, marginalize, repress, exclude, and otherwise conflict people, and that have been, as Gordon Cox has reminded me, historically potent. Such issues remain for another analysis.


7. See Kincheloe and Pinar eds., Curriculum, 7.


9. The notion of a hierarchy of various levels of generality, each incorporating the preceding lower levels, was suggested by Alastair Taylor, "Systems Approach to the Political Organization of Space," Social Science Information, International Social Science Council, 1975, 7–40.


12. For a theoretical view of social time and space and their interrelationship, see Henry Zentner, Prelude to Administrative Theory (Calgary: Strayer Publications, 1973), chs. 5, 6.


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16. Israel Scheffler, In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions (New York: Routledge, 1991), ch. 2, makes the point that developing potential (itself a problematical notion) involves choices about what to develop and how. Also, see his critique of the growth metaphor (46–48).


18. Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 68.

19. See Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, ch. 4.

20. See Greene, Dialectic of Freedom, especially, chs. 4 and 5, passim.


31. I am indebted to Anthony Kemp for reminding me of this potential.
A RESPONSE TO JORGENSEN AND MOORE

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Although I may risk not doing full justice to the entirety of either one of these two very thoughtful papers, I have chosen to focus my response on the concept of community spoken to by both presenters, albeit differently. In her contribution, "Social perspectives in music education policy: Balancing the individual and the community," Moore places the term in the context of shared group values as they manifest themselves as opposites to values held by an individual. She thus argues her case from a sociological point of view.

At first glance, Jorgensen’s title, "Music education as community," may suggest a similar approach, but instead, Jorgensen establishes the term "community" as a metaphor which she suggests might prove useful as a model to explain music education thought and practice. Her exploration, thus, derives from the tradition of philosophical inquiry.

If both papers come from different vantage points in examining their respective topics, where is the common ground to which I alluded earlier? I believe the answer lies in the fact that both presenters argue for the need to know who we, i.e., music educators, are and whom we serve. I am intrigued by these questions and their interrelationship. After first providing a brief synopsis of and critical commentary separately for both papers, I will comment on Moore’s and Jorgensen’s chosen approaches to address these two questions.

Sociological Perspectives in Music Education Policy: Balancing the Individual and Community

As stated previously, Moore chose the term community in the context of shared group values as they manifest themselves as opposites to values held by an individual. While not specifically stated in these terms, for the purpose of her paper, Moore apparently defined community as a like-minded group of individuals outside the schooling process for whose well-being music educators may be as responsible as they are for the welfare of each and every individual student whom they actually teach.

Throughout the history of music education, Moore suggests, community welfare and individual well-being have been at odds with each other to varying degrees. She traces this phenomenon of incongruent and changing relationships between individual and community values as they have been articulated in music education goals since the 40’s, and she seeks to explain them by providing a somewhat chronologically-based review of four sociological perspectives.
Selected were: (1) the American functionalists as representative of those sociologists who emphasize the stability of group values over the seemingly instable values of an individual person; (2) conflict theorists who have sharpened our focus onto the individual as the determining element in group behavior; and (3) Etzioni's "communitarian" point of view as well as Taylor's politics of recognition as two of the many contemporary perspectives on cultural change and education in which the relationship of group to individual values is seen as an interactive one, suggesting that one cannot be explained without an understanding of the other.

Both Etzioni and Taylor are closely tied to, if not rooted in, George Herbert Mead's theory of symbolic interactionism. I believe that this particular theory can prove of great value to a better understanding of music education theory and practice, and therefore find it easy to applaud the last two of the theoretical perspectives selected by Moore. From a scholarly standpoint, however, a greater depth of explanation regarding all choices would have strengthened Moore's analysis and, thus, the paper.

It, indeed, may be feasible to explain current efforts toward multi-cultural music curricula on grounds of Taylor's theoretical perspective; but, I am not certain about some of the assumptions that caused Moore to draw parallels throughout her paper between changes observed in music curricular goals in the U.S. since the 1940's and the theoretical perspectives mentioned above. Specifically, she referred to music education practice in the schools during the 40's and 50's as "cultural transmission through the development of large, functioning groups such as orchestras, bands, and choruses, each seen as an organism with all of its students as parts working together for the good of the whole" (p. 3). She cited titles of articles in the Music Educators Journal and The Thirty-Fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education as evidence for prevailing policy and practice. For music education policy and practice during the late 50's and 60's, Moore cited goals stated in the 1965 MENC publication Music in General Education, those declared by the Documentary Report of the Tanglewood Symposium and in Toward an Aesthetic Education, and methodologies described in various published curriculum guides and method books of the time. In doing so, Moore implicitly transmits the assumption that curricular goals of any given time period not only reflect the music education practice of that time but also, and more importantly, represent official music education policy. I would question this assumption for the following two reasons: (1) Written goal statements do not reflect necessarily observed practice, and (2) observed practice, even if agreed upon by a number of practitioners, does not allow one to infer the implementation of policy. Policy, I suggest, implies that one person or more, empowered to decide on the direction practice should take, have come to a decision, if not consensus, about such direction, and have succeeded politically in convincing a majority of practitioners to engage in that practice. The diversity of current instructional practice and curricula in the United States would allow one to equate music education practice with policy only in the confines of specific states, regions, school districts, and particular school programs. This would mean, and I am sure Moore would
concur, that to remain valid, sociological analyses would have to be applied to specific practice in specific music instructional environments.

Music Education as Community

Denoting community as place, in time, as process, and as an end, Jorgensen examined four important attributes that may be applicable to an understanding of music education as community. Most notably, educational philosophers John Dewey, Paulo Friere, and Maxine Greene provided the background references from which Jorgensen derived her thoughts on the significance of the four selected attributes. The choice to draw from these philosopher’s thoughts to understand music education thought and practice acknowledges music education first as a derivative of socio-political and educational forces, second as a derivative of music. Addressing the term community from this vantage point therefore suggests a metaphor rooted in people’s behaviors rather than in the outcome of those behaviors. The process of doing provides the metaphor, not the result of that doing. The doing itself becomes the end product, thus suggesting that process and product become one. I commend this premise as an important step toward understanding music education as an process-orientated and activity-based enterprise, set apart from such fields as music psychology, musicology, ethno-musicology, music theory, and other music-related and music-derived analytical sub-disciplines.

Concomitant with the attributes Jorgensen chose to include in her denotation of community, questions arise as to those attributes not explicitly addressed in her paper but referred to in her previously submitted abstract and certainly imbedded in the works of Dewey, Friere, and Greene: Community as a value-laden system, as a self-perpetuating institution, and as a democratic enterprise. These terms, most directly linked to education as a socio-political phenomenon, would have served her well as powerful tools by which to describe music education as an action-based, group-orientated social phenomenon.

Jorgensen’s decision to omit these attributes from the analysis, while regrettable, may, on the other hand, be viewed as her commitment to descriptors most clearly rooted in the tradition of philosophical discourse. In my view, however, such discourse increasingly requires one’s simultaneous engagement in modes of thinking typical of more than one discipline. In the case of educational issues and, particularly, when exploring community as a metaphor to understand music education, those disciplines would need to include political theory, social psychology, and sociology. The metaphor would take on different meanings in the perspective of each of these disciplines and one would need to reconcile the differences before a useful model could emerge.
Response to Jorgensen and Moore

The Common Ground in Both Contributions: Seeking to Understand Music Education as a Profession and Discipline

If Jorgensen philosophically explored the applicability of the metaphor community toward an understanding of music education, Moore’s paper is a plea for understanding music education practice with the help of sociological theory. Both contributor’s interest therefore lies in seeking to understand music education as a discipline and profession by drawing boundaries around the term music education. Jorgensen did so by clarifying the term community itself, Moore by presenting practice as an expression of policy and, thus, community consent. Consequently, while both papers originated from rather different questions about what music educators do, both sought to clarify what music education is. This question, indeed, requires analysis both from a philosophical and sociological perspective.

Music education as a crossroad between several disciplines and different modalities of thought processes and activities (in short: different communities) is a familiar experience to those of us who have learned to act under the label of music educator. This label has been applied to and used by many groups of people: Music teachers in the schools, college teachers responsible for so-called method classes, teachers and advisors of research classes and projects, instructors responsible for classes in music psychology, sociology, philosophy, music education history or other courses typically found in most comprehensive curricula under the jurisdiction of a department of music education. As all of us know, the question of what music education is begins with acknowledging this diversity of activities in which we engage. In Jorgensen’s terms, then, we should ask to which of these activities as place, in time, as process, and as an end, the metaphor community would apply. Would the metaphor suggest that music education as community is a mental construct rather than a defined group of like-minded people? Who is the community of music educators? Who makes up the music education profession? To what person do we refer when we speak of the music educator: Anybody involved in music instruction or the person hired under the label of music educator in a college or university? The applied studio instructor or the public school music teacher? The membership of the Music Educators National Conference (MENC) or those classroom teachers who teach music to kindergartners, first, second, and third graders? All of these questions would suggest that it is important to have a label for what we are and what we do. In interactionists’ terms, labels are titles which carry meaning primarily to those around us. Because we want to act as we believe others want us to act and because others see us according to the title attached to us, we begin to act according to that title. The actions, coupled with the title accompanying those actions, place us into social groups, if not reference groups, and define who we are.¹

When we derive our definition from praxis, questions emerge that reiterate those to which I previously referred as the relationship between observed practice and policy: Is observed practice always reflective of choices deliberately made by a community of professionals? If so, who, as a part of such a community, would make such choices and ratify or, at least, legitimize
the resulting practice as policy? On the other hand, does music education as community in Jorgensen's terms imply adherence to same practice and, thus, policy? Finally, can we say with certainty that musical practice and music educational practice derive from like-minded communities of professionals?

If we answered the latter of the above questions in the affirmative, we would not need music education as a field of study separate from music. If, however, we found significant differences among the communities of musicians and music educators, where did such differences come from and to what extent would such differences (a) impact music educators' credibility as professionals, and (b) music education's status as a discipline and as a community?

I am not proposing that Jorgensen or Moore should have answered any or all of these questions in their respective contributions. That would have changed what they wanted to say. I merely suggest that initially more clearly delineated boundaries of the terms music education, music practice, music educators, and musicians would have helped clarify the subsequent use of the term community, policy, and praxis. Then, Jorgensen's purpose would have gained in focus and her claim that "community provides a figure for envisioning music education" (p. 21) could have been validated. Likewise, with a stated definition of what in her view comprises the profession of music education, Moore's analysis regarding the obligations "the profession" has toward the individual, the group, the community, and society at large would have been more poignant and, thus, of greater practical significance for "the profession."

As it stands, both Moore and Jorgensen found different angles from which to view music education as a discipline rooted in a dialectic tension of theory and praxis. They did not make it explicit, however, that within this tension we find different practices, different theories, and, therefore, different communities, possibly professions, and, certainly, policies. It is precisely this diversity of communities and policies, though, that makes it so difficult to define our field, articulate who we are and what we do, and develop an identity as music educators that sets us apart from other fields and professions. Jorgensen and Moore both remind us that the term music education must be specific enough to unite us as a community of like-minded individuals with common goals and shared practice; at the same time, we must allow for enough room in the definition to allow for varied practice—in time, space, as process, and as an end in itself.

If these demands seem contradictory to each other, they are. But we have been encouraged by Jorgensen's and Moore's presentations to understand this contradiction as a challenge, to view this challenge as an integral part of our discipline, and to examine it by means of as many modalities of inquiry as possible. We then need to incorporate the findings of such multi-faceted research into any working definition of music education. Without such an effort, the boundaries that delimit music education as collective action from which derives a specific body of knowledge will remain vague and without focus, thereby possibly causing our inquiries to remain vague and without focus, a criticism no field of study can afford.
Response to Jorgensen and Moore

NOTES

THE EXPERIENCE OF PROFUNDITY IN MUSIC

Bennett Reimer, Northwestern University

If any generalization can be made about music (and I believe many can be made) surely the one articulated by Francis Sparshott would qualify as defining one of music's essential characteristics—"that it is more nearly true of music than it is of anything else that it offers an alternative reality and an alternative way of being."¹

Sparshott's claim is echoed throughout recorded history, both in what people have said about music and in how people have behaved in regard to music; that is, in both beliefs about and practices of music. That echo is heard in contemporary professional aesthetics; in the legends of pretechnological tribes; in Plato's characterizations of the rapture through which the Muses speak of ideal beauty to the poet-musician; in the many ceremonies, ancient and modern, in which music plays an essential inspiring and even healing role; in Nietzsche's belief in music's "unique Dionysian wisdom;"² in the Baroque poet William Congreve's famous (though usually misquoted) line "Music has charms to soothe a savage breast," which continues, "To soften rocks, or bend a knotted oak." In this last instance, music, it is claimed, can profoundly affect not only people but also nature itself beyond natural laws. (Poets, of course, are expected to exercise their license now and then).

A compendium of claims that have been made for the power of music to alter the reality of human experience and to alter humans' way of being, as Sparshott believes it can, would fill several very large volumes, as would descriptions of instances in which music has done just that. Such volumes would include material from sociology, ethnography, anthropology, psychology, philosophy in most of its branches, including, of course, aesthetics, history, religion, linguistics, musicology, psychoanalysis, cognitive science as it has recently emerged, physiology, and no doubt numerous other fields from which insights could be gained.

There is good reason for this remarkable breadth of thought relevant to the unusual power of music to transform human experience. This power reaches to the very roots of the human condition—that humans are conscious of their individual and collective existence in a world both including them and transcending them, on which they are dependent for life and meaning and to which they contribute life and meaning. Music is, in a certain sense, only one of a multitude of demonstrations of the subject-object interplay that characterizes human reality. But in another sense, music is a remarkably vivid and concentrated instance of the self-within-the-world human condition. Perhaps more fully than any other endeavor, music manifests selfness for the sheer sake of the human need to do so, and it does this with objective (outside-the-self) materials—
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sounds—existing entirely and employed sheealy for the sake of self-manifestation—self as instance of the universal human condition, as instance of the culturally determined human condition, as instance of the individuality of each human’s condition. No wonder music was regarded as long ago as Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.) as harmonizing the very spheres—as endowing the universe with human meaning because the universe can be construed as being musically meaningful.

Reports of Profound Experiences of Music

Such reflections, grandiloquent as they may seem, pale as compared with what people have actually reported music has done to them. We have most of our evidence about musical profundity from verbal reports of musical experiences. Such reports are almost entirely about the subjective dimension of the subject-object polarity of musical experience. In recent years we have had some attempts to focus on the objective dimension—the qualities of music itself that are causative of profound experiences. I will come back to that dimension after characterizing how people have described such experiences. To review such descriptions in any exhaustive way would be quite impossible in a single presentation, of course, given the breadth, complexity, and magnitude of the data. But a brief overview will, I think, yield some useful insights.

We must keep in mind, when examining verbal reports of musical experiences, that we are thrown, by necessity, into the realm of metaphor, imagery, euphemism, figurative language of various sorts, because those are the only modes of language in which inner experience can be expressed. The "truth" of such language is a truth appropriate to its subject, which by its nature, requires representation by oblique suggestion rather than by objective exactitude.3

The classical work of our century on that level of human experience to which the word "profound" applies was carried on by Abraham Maslow (1908–1970). Maslow was interested in the fact that experiences traditionally associated with ecstatic religion or mysticism were in fact commonly reported in association with a wide variety of stimuli or situations having little or nothing to do with religious settings, such as "experiences of the aesthetic, of the creative, of love, of sex, of insight, etc."4 He coined the term "peak-experiences" for such occurrences, which he described as "Moments of highest happiness and fulfillment."5 He spent many years collecting verbal reports of such experiences. Experiences of music, and experiences of sex, it turned out, were the most frequent stimuli for peak-experiences, as we have often heard. (I’m a little disappointed that we have not yet worked out the implications of this for the music curriculum in public schools.)

Maslow identified 25 aspects of peak-experiences that, traditionally, were associated with religious experiences. For example, people in peak-experiences had the clear perception—the
experienced actuality—"that the universe is all of a piece and that one has his place in it—one is a part of it, one belongs in it."^6 Such an experience, Maslow reports, "can change the person’s character and his Weltanschauung forever after," including exerting dramatic therapeutic effects on serious psychological maladies. People in peak-experiences achieve a level of concentration—a total kind of perceiving, listening, and feeling—which does not normally occur. Such immersion in the quality of the experience itself is felt as self-validating to such a degree that it justifies not only itself but even living itself. "Peak-experiences," says Maslow, "can make life worthwhile by their occasional occurrence."^7 In such occurrences one loses a sense of time and space as normally experienced, and feels the now as connected to universality and eternity, in which the world becomes meaningful and accepted and sacred, the dichotomies, polarities, and conflicts of life being felt as transcended or resolved. Respondents use words such as "wonder, awe, reverence, humility, surrender, and even worship before the greatness of the experience."^8

The effects of such experiences, according to Maslow, are sometimes "so profound and so great as to remind us of the profound religious conversions which forever changed the person."^9 When not at that deep level they can nevertheless be positive in a variety of ways. One feels more like a real person, more responsible, active, self-determined, loving and accepting, able to feel gratitude that such fulfillment is indeed possible. "What had been called the 'unitive consciousness' is often given in peak-experiences, i.e., a sense of the sacred glimpsed in and through the particular instance of the momentary, the secular, the worldly."^10 I want to stress that Maslow’s data are clear that the effects of profound experiences, including profound experiences of music, are long-lasting on those that have them. They can change such persons’ sense of themselves and of their place in the world, positively and pervasively. ^11

Education, Maslow believed, must focus on providing experiences at the level of the profound, for such experiences are the highest—the most intrinsically human—available to us.

In this realm of intrinsic learning, intrinsic teaching, and intrinsic education I think that the arts [music, visual arts, and dance especially] are so close to our psychological and biological core, so close to this identity, this biological identity, that rather than think of these courses as a sort of whipped or luxury cream, they must become basic experiences in education. I mean that this kind of education can be a glimpse into the infinite, into ultimate values. ^12

The effects of peak-experiences of music were probed by Robert Panzarella in a study of "The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Peak Experiences."^13 Panzarella collected and analyzed written and aural descriptions of visual art and music peak experiences from 103 persons (52 for visual art and 51 for music) in an attempt to refine Maslow’s insights. He found that the responses fell into four major categories—"renewal ecstasy," "motor-sensory ecstasy," "withdrawal ecstasy," and "fusion-emotional ecstasy."^14
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In renewal ecstasy, the person reports a new vision of the world—a world seen as better, more beautiful than it seemed before, even though it continues to contain all the tragic, imperfect aspects it always had. A deep, profoundly moving experience of music can somehow yield an altered perception of the world, in which the paradox of simultaneous good and evil is not seen as something to be overcome but as something to be accepted. Interestingly, some people reporting this experience were motivated to produce music, but these were only people who already were able to do so with some degree of competence. "There was no instance," Panzarella reports "of an experience which converted a non-performer to [becoming] a performer."\textsuperscript{15} He adds that "It may be true, too, that the impulse to be creative is inherently antithetic to the continuation of ecstatic enjoyment and terminates ecstasy in order to initiate creative probing and testing."\textsuperscript{16} I want to suggest that creative work in music—composing, performing, improvising—can indeed include profound, or ecstatic, dimensions of experience, as reported below, but that an additional concept may have to be added to explain this. I will treat this issue further on.

In "motor-sensory" ecstasy, people report a variety of bodily responses such as faster or slower heart beat or breathing, shivers, chills, tinglings, sweating, a feeling of being "high" or of "floating." These experiences "are rarely described as satisfying, fulfilling, renewing, or the like,"\textsuperscript{17} nor do they seem to produce more than temporary effects. Far more people report such experiences with music than with visual art (35\% against 19\%), which is something we have long assumed given so many reports over history of music's power to affect people physically as well as emotionally. A typical report by Panzarella of such an experience is of a person who turned on the radio to a performance in progress of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony.

I was very happy because I recognized it immediately. It was one of my favorites. I settled down in a comfortable chair with a glass of orange juice. I felt relieved, somehow, immediately. I anticipated the themes that were coming up. I "shadow conducted" a bit. I was feeling more and more loose. I was diving into the music and letting it surround me. I started singing along with the chorus. I got up from my seat and walked about my room. I felt exhilarated, released, joyous. I felt as if I were walking on air. My heart beat faster and I experienced a "chill" in my spine. The symphony ended. I returned to relatively normal almost immediately although I kept humming the themes of the fourth movement for some time. I was not listening to the announcer's voice. I retained the relaxed feeling I had attained during the broadcast. Refreshed and relaxed. I felt as if my problems had diminished considerably.\textsuperscript{18}

The withdrawal ecstasy involves a "loss of contact with both the physical and social environment. A perceptual narrowing occurs; attention is riveted to the aesthetic stimulus."\textsuperscript{19} In the fusion-emotional ecstasy, that attention takes on an intensely affective character, as the person feels emotionally connected or fused with the music. For example, "The only way I can describe it is as being one with the music and not only with the music but with the people,
concert hall, etc. It was as if it were inside me. I can't remember any feeling but a sort of crazy joy.  

Panzarella identified three temporal stages in aesthetic peak experiences—onset, climax, and post-climactic. In stage one, aesthetic judgements and analyses trigger the response, along with disruptions of perceptual set, like surprise and amazement. A sense of loss of self begins, and lasts into the second stage. Here, at the climax, there was often a sense of intense motor response or loss of motor sensations: 'I felt as though I could bear it no more, almost that I would leap from the balcony.' Or 'I became aware of a feeling of elevation, as though my mind were not part of my body but floating above it, in complete freedom. The music seemed to be a force that could be felt moving through my body. My thoughts were very free floating, although the sounds and vibrations of the music held my attention. I was completely free.' In the third stage, emotional responses and transformations tended to cluster. In music, social responses also appeared at that stage:

Transported for a few minutes. A feeling of great good will—troubles and cares were gone—everything seemed right and wonderful—a feeling of having been in touch with something great and beautiful, yet not quite understanding it. There was a great feeling of being uplifted, ennobled—joy in having stumbled onto the concert by accident, the richness of the experience, marvel at how differently I could feel so suddenly.

Panzarella offers some interesting conclusions from his study, although all must be taken as extremely tentative. While the most often cited triggers for musical peak experiences were so-called "masterworks" (Bach, Mozart, etc.), reflecting the musical preferences of his subjects, the range of triggers was quite broad, including popular music, folk songs, and rock'n roll. The structural characteristics of the music were sometimes but not often discussed; similarly for the performance skill aspect of the experience. "Apart from operas, no music was experienced as a vehicle of communication for ideas or emotions...In opera experiences the emotion felt in response to performance qualities sometimes utterly contradicted the emotion the music was attempting to convey. The number of cognitive-perceptual responses in music reports was virtually equalled by the number of bodily sensations. Music," Panzarella suggests, "is a more physical experience than most aesthetic theories take into account." I find that a compelling observation, not only from the listener's viewpoint but particularly from the performer's viewpoint, which I will discuss later.

One other study of musical peak experiences will add to this overview of what people have reported when profoundly affected by music. Alf Gabrielsson and Siv Lindström, of Sweden, pursued the concept of "strong" experiences of music by gathering verbal descriptions from some 800 persons, using both questionnaires and aural reports, about "the strongest (most intense) experience of music that they ever had."
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The respondents' reports are lengthy and filled with impassioned language. A brief selection of their utterances will give a sense of the kinds of things they said:

A 17 year old man:
I remember how the music penetrated my consciousness entirely. How I gradually lost contact with the ground and experienced an ecstasy of all my senses...When the tremendous intensification of the finale started, I cried. I remember that my face was all wet, and I experienced a happiness that, as I realized later, only could be compared with an intense love of another person...I wandered directly out in the woods and thanked God that there was something so incredibly beautiful created by the human hand.

A person listening to Tchaikovsky's Symphony No. 6 for the first time:
...in certain passages it evokes sobs and I feel totally crushed—my listening is fully concentrated, the rest of the world disappears in a way, and I become merged in the music or the music in me, it fills me so completely. I also get physical reactions...wet eyes, a breathing that gets sobbing in certain passages, a feeling of crying in my throat and chest. Trying to find words for the emotions themselves, I would like to use words as: crushed, shaken, tragedy, maybe death, absorption, but also tenderness, longing, desire (vain), a will to live, prayer. The whole experience also has the character of a total standstill, a kind of meditative rest, after which nothing else can follow.

A person at a concert of a favorite pop performer:
The first notes make me almost pass out...I felt that I disappeared for a moment and then waked up like in a dream but aware of the music all the time. Somehow I was soaring above the audience that was merely there but could not be heard and did not disturb. It was like a dream, I was soaring and they played just for me...I regained my senses again when somebody hit me on my shoulder several times and shouted my name...The only thing I can remember from the day after is that I felt totally cleansed and empty inside, but satisfied, incredibly satisfied!

A person reporting an experience when 6 years old:
...my parents want me to go with them to an organ concert...I can still recall that experience from this early concert. I can feel how my little child-body was entirely relaxed, that easy warmth in the body, that weightless state, the clarity of the sound and movement in that big, infinite room. Also a feeling of the notes touching me physically, almost as caresses, as material, as light, color etc. Now afterwards, I would like to describe it as a unique meeting of space-time experience...I became different as a child after this concert, something fundamental happened with me—my parents have later told me that they noticed an obvious change.

A person performing a Bach prelude and fugue:
...one day when I was in school, alone in that big music hall, I sat down at the grand piano. I played the Prelude and the Fugue, and then I suddenly experienced a tremendously strong feeling
that was perceptible both in my body and in my head. It was as if I was charged with some kind of high tension, like ecstasy. The feeling made me ecstatic, inconceivably exhilarated, everything focused on a single here and now. The music flowed as by itself...The ecstasy remained during the whole piece and I staggered out afterwards...the performance itself, the emotion, was in my whole body and everything suddenly became so self-evident. It was as if my whole being was filled with the spirit of Bach. What an incredibly happy experience! I could feel it everywhere, even at my 'hairtops,' that it sounded fantastic, that everything was fantastic. It is not possible to describe.

A person reflecting about a rock concert:
It is an incredible feeling to be in a numerously attended arena together with several thousands of people, everybody there for the same purpose, that is, to listen and 'give everything' to this wonderful music. To be in that crowd of people in front of the stage and sing along with those songs that one has heard long ago on records, that has an intoxicating effect, you feel simply happy, all senses are focused on one point, the stage...'Get high on music' is exactly what this is all about, one gets feelings that cannot be described by words...The whole stadium illuminated with lighters, that's when you get goose flesh...When you go home from the concert you feel uplifted, you walk around intoxicated by happiness humming the songs, just enjoying...A live concert has to be experienced—it cannot be described in words—it lies in another dimension of reality...25

Gabrielsson and Lindström suggest that, while each strong experience of music is unique, seven features seem to appear quite regularly. The first, "General Characteristics," are responses characterizing the experience as a whole—"unique," "exceptional," "fantastic," "incredible," etc., including that the experience is difficult or impossible to describe in words. The second feature relates to physical responses—shivers, stillness, goose flesh, weeping, gliding in space, etc. The "Perception" feature includes auditory, visual, and tactile phenomena, but the researchers point out (echoing Panzarella) that "On the whole...most people do not talk very much about musical details in describing their SEM" (strong experience of music).26 The "Cognition" feature includes changes of one's attitude in which concentration on the music overwhelms other awarenesses. (Interestingly, they say that "A music-analytic attitude, common among musicians, is abandoned in favor of an 'open,' receptive attitude."27 In another place, Gabrielsson says "There were surprisingly few references to the musical structure and little use of music terms in the descriptions, even among the musicians.")28 In addition, there is a merging with the music, an altered experience of one's body in time and space, the arousal of various associations and images including internally heard, imagined music, and a sense of perfection—that the experience is at the height of what can be achieved by humans.

In the Emotion feature there is a range from positive feelings (pleasure, enjoyment, love, peace, euphoria, ecstasy, the most common being a sense of happiness) to negative ones (grief, anxiety, anger, horror, panic), although there were relatively few of these. In the
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Transcendental feature there are reports that the experience transcends ordinary life and reality, taking on a "religious" or "spiritual" dimension.

In the Personal Development category, a sense is gained of new insights, new possibilities, of a mental and physical purification and of a sense of being "healed." In a related paper, Gabrielsson and Lindström focus on this therapeutic dimension, giving a great many reports of how people experience it. They conclude that strong experiences of music do indeed have therapeutic implications. "...our SEM project convincingly demonstrates the power of music to affect individuals and groups in ways that few other means are capable of doing." This claim for music's therapeutic power is hardly new, of course. As Alan P. Merriam points out in his book The Anthropology of Music, "In our own culture, the healing aspects of music have been suggested for literally thousands of years; it is known that some four thousand years ago, the Egyptians called music the 'physic for the soul.' The ancient Hebrews used music in cases both of physical and mental disturbance, and perhaps the most familiar passage quoted in this context is that which pertains to King Saul:

And it came to pass when the evil spirit from God was upon Saul that David took up a harp and played with his hand; so that Saul was refreshed and was well and the evil spirit departed from him. (The Old Testament, I Samuel, Chap. 16, verse 23)

While there are some differences among the findings of Maslow, Panzarella, and Gabrielsson and Lindström, the commonalities are striking, in their reinforcement of the long-held beliefs that music can profoundly affect human beings physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually. So we should not be surprised when someone like John Blacking, after studying the musical practices of the Venda people of South Africa, is led to conclude that "...the chief function of music in society and culture is to promote soundly organized humanity by enhancing human consciousness." We should similarly not be surprised when the philosopher Anthony Storr asserts that "...for me, as for Nietzsche, music 'has been something for the sake of which it is worthwhile to live on earth.' Music has incomparably enriched my life. It is an irreplaceable, undeserved, transcendental blessing." We should understand the possibility T. S. Eliot describes of "music heard so deeply that it is not heard at all, but you are the music/while the music lasts." Or the way that thought is put by Leonard B. Meyer, who says that "...the listener may and frequently does 'lose himself in the music'; and in following and responding to the sound gestures made by the composer, the listener may become oblivious of his own ego, which has literally become one with that of the music." We should understand what the ethnomusicologist David Reck means when he says, in his introduction to his book Music of the Whole Earth, "what these [musical] experiences really are, whether we connect them to moksha, with the Holy People of the Sky or other deities, with an ethical harmony of relationships between ourselves and the entire natural world, or with the inner workings of the human psyche, we all know that something inexplicable happens in our consciousness; we feel
it, it is intangible, perhaps irrational, but it is there."  John Dewey puts the idea of aesthetic profundity this way:

A work of art elicits and accentuates this quality of being a whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we live. This fact, I think, is the explanation of that feeling of exquisite intelligibility and clarity we have in the presence of an object that is experienced with aesthetic intensity. It explains also the religious feeling that accompanies intense aesthetic perception. We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences. We are carried out beyond ourselves to find ourselves.36

Limitations of the verbal reports

All the above material—only the tip of an iceberg of similar material—focuses on the capacity of people to experience music and other aesthetic stimuli at a level well characterized by the term "profound." Clearly, there is a universal dimension to this capacity: it seems to be ubiquitous in human experience. But two very important factors are left unexamined by such material.

The first has to do with the musical-cultural contexts in which profound experiences occur. In practically all cases reported, such experiences took place within a well-defined community of musical expectations. The music to which people responded at levels of deep engagement was music with which they were familiar—not necessarily with the particular piece or performance (although that was the case quite often), but at the level of cultural identification. It occasionally was reported that a profound experience took place with music of a genre not usually enjoyed by a person—classical music with a rock enthusiast and a jazz enthusiast, for example. But I have come across no description of a profound musical experience with music of a culture quite foreign to the person experiencing it. This is not to say that it is impossible, only that it seems to be rare or nonexistent in the literature. We very much need to know with more certainty whether profound musical experiences take place largely or exclusively within the contexts of a culture in which the person is a member. At the moment it seems safe to say that it is far more likely. That likelihood has important implications for music education if, as I will propose in my conclusions, music education should do all it can to encourage profound musical experiences to take place.

The second factor not explained by and seldom mentioned in verbal reports of deep responses to music is that of the particular qualities of the music that were implicated in causing or triggering the response. We are left by such reports with little guidance or insight about specific musical characteristics that operate to cause the reported responses.37 It is easy to assume that, given a particular musical belief system; that is, an identification with a particular
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cultural manifestation of music, any music at all within that system could trigger such a response: all depends on the psychological/emotional readiness and susceptibility of the respondent. That is an attractive hypothesis, but I believe it goes too far. Certainly the person’s immediate subjective state must be an important causative factor in allowing a strong experience of music to occur: after all, such experiences do not occur constantly with all musical experiences any person has with very similar or even identical music. The subjective side of the subject-object duality must have major determining effects on whether a profound experience will take place on any particular occasion.

But we cannot write off the qualities of the music itself or even the qualities of the performance of it as another determining factor. John Blacking provides a useful insight about this in a story he relates of being involved as a performer in a Venda ritual. He points out that a particular Venda possession dance does not send every Venda into a trance, as it is intended to do. "They send only the members of the cult, and then only when they are dancing at their own homes, with which the spirits of the ancestors who possess them are familiar. The effectiveness of the music," Blacking says, in a confirmation of my point, "depends on the context in which it is both performed and heard." He goes on to say, however:

But ultimately it depends on the music, as I found out once when I was playing one of the drums. Dancers take turns coming out into the "arena," and at first there were no complaints about my efforts. Very soon, however, a senior lady began dancing, and she was expected to go into a trance because the music was being played for her cult group. However, after a few minutes she stopped and insisted that another drummer should replace me! She claimed that I was ruining the effect of the music by "hurrying" the tempo—just enough, I suppose, to inhibit the onset of trance.

Clearly, the qualities being perceived in the music and its performance must play a decisive or at least an important role if one’s experience of the music is to be deep enough to warrant the term "profound," no matter whether one is a Venda tribesperson or a North American. It is facile, even narcissistic, to assume that artistic quality is of concern only to those privileged to live in the West, but is of little or no concern to those in "primitive" cultures, for whom cultural or religious beliefs are entirely responsible for what transpires in various rituals in which music plays a part. This point is made, even more clearly than Blacking made it, by Denis Dutton, in an article criticizing Arthur Danto’s neglect of the factor of aesthetic sensitivity in tribal people’s discernment of quality in various manifestations of their art. "Most primitive artworks," Dutton reminds us, "capture attention not only because of the ideas they embody, but because they are made to look striking, shocking, beautiful, grotesque, etc." We cannot "...deny the crucial and determining role of discriminating perception (as opposed to conception) in understanding primitive art...it is a matter of gaining cultural knowledge in order to see aesthetic qualities which have intentionally been placed in the objects to be seen."

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Musical Qualities Causative of Profound Experiences

It seems reasonable to include, as one essential factor in profound experiences of music, qualities of the music itself in addition to the subjective responses of the people experiencing the music, no matter the particular cultural context in which the experience takes place. Is it possible, then, to identify with some precision just what those musical qualities need to be if they are to cause profound experiences to occur?

Peter Kivy makes an interesting, if ultimately futile, attempt to do just this in regard to that music in which he is interested; the genre of music most capable of being separated from external meanings, contexts, representations, and so forth. In pure Western instrumental music, or "music alone" as he calls it, we have the clearest instance of a music that can be construed as "a quasi-syntactical structure of sound understandable solely in musical terms and having no semantic or representational content, no meaning, making reference to nothing beyond itself." Unlike the usual position of musical purism, Kivy makes clear that his version of it includes the possibility that such music "does present or embody the garden-variety emotions as part of its aesthetic fabric, at least on some occasions."

How can such music be regarded, Kivy asks, as being profound, as it frequently is? It cannot be profound by virtue of being about a profound subject matter, as some literature is, because it is about nothing at all. And it cannot be profound because it is expressive of the more profound, serious, darker, more weighty emotions, which would seem to be a reasonable explanation, because "there seems absolutely no reason for believing that a structure with serious expressive properties is any more profound than a structure with frivolous or happy ones." Further, since "music expressive of serious emotions is not about them, that it is expressive of them is no grounds at all for ascribing profundity to it."

Perhaps, Kivy suggests, we can ascribe a certain meaning to pure music, in the sense that it is "about" the very possibilities of musical sounds itself, and that a composition is a discovery of possibilities of musical sounds and hence can be construed to be "about" music itself. Therefore, musical craftsmanship, when it is at its highest levels, elicits the judgment "profound" because it is about the furthest reaches of musical possibilities. The craftsmanship must not obtrude, but be so well integrated into the musical work that our attention is not called specifically to it. Works of consummate craftsmanship succeed in that and therefore are candidates for being called profound because they have a profound subject matter—music itself—and present that subject matter in an "artistically supreme and exemplary way."

Unfortunately, Kivy goes on to explain, this careful argument cannot be sustained. The problem with it is its claim that music itself is a subject worthy of the term "profound." There seems to be no rational justification for such a claim, says Kivy, as there does seem to be of other subjects such as those with which literature often deals. "For even if the [musical] works
we describe as profound have a subject matter, and that is debatable, the only subject matter they can plausibly be thought to have, namely, musical sound itself, does not bear, at least on the face of it, any obvious mark of profundity, as do such subject matters as freedom of the will or the problem of evil, love and marriage or crime and punishment, and so forth: the subjects of 'profound' literary works. While it is possible, and defensible, Kivy says, to call some music "great," on the basis of well established criteria that are employed in the music-critical literature, that is not the same as "profound." We can go on saying that some works are profound, but we cannot rationally justify our doing so. We are reduced, says Kivy, to the only thing we can possibly say when asked to justify why we think a particular work is profound: "Play it again, Sam." We are back to subjectivity.

Kivy's views on the issue of profundity and related matters have generated something of a cottage industry of debate, dissension, and extension, any full treatment of which would be impossible in this context. In my own view, Kivy's assumption that music must be "about" something profound in order to qualify as itself being profound, is extremely questionable. Kivy is on the right track, I believe, to say that "pure" music (if there really is such a thing) is "about" music. I would go further to say that any music, whether or not some subject matter is explicit or implicit in connection to it—and I include the "garden variety emotions" as subject matter—has musical meaning as its essential subject matter above and beyond whatever other subject matter it happens to entail.

To produce such meanings, I would argue, is the reason for music's existence, and it is such meanings which, in fact, seem to cause profound experiences for many if not most people who have such experiences. Kivy says that he takes the word profundity, "when applied to music, as having the same implications as it would have when applied to literature or philosophy. In other words, I have taken it seriously." I believe he has, instead, taken it inappropriately. It may be difficult or impossible to describe specifically any particular musical characteristics that are regularly causative of profound experiences, but that such experiences are caused by music qua music is evident.

Several attempts have been made to probe further than Kivy did into the power of music to induce profound experiences. David A. White suggests that musical characteristics such as unity, whole and part, identity and difference, are, despite Kivy's skepticism, worthy of being considered "essential elements in the articulation of profundity precisely because these concepts are necessary to any account that purports to describe reality." While music, White argues, is not intended to be metaphysics, the qualities of music shared by the qualities of human reality allow musical experience to serve as a kind of "simulacrum of reality." The problem, says White, is to find a way to relate our experience of the expressive content of the music as being distinctively aesthetic, to the fabric of our nonmusical, nonaesthetic existence. That, of course, is the essential problem that has challenged musical aesthetics throughout history, and I suspect it always will until the unlikely time arrives that human consciousness itself can be thoroughly
explained. Nevertheless, White proposes a parallelism between certain musical features and the metaphysical features of our experience of reality itself. He suggests that to understand that parallelism more fully we need to apply the conceptual materials employed by metaphysicians to analyses of musical works "of surpassing power and craftsmanship."\textsuperscript{51} (Such a program, however promising, is also, I would judge, not soon capable of being carried out.)

Alan Goldman tackles the issue head on by raising the key question: "How can mere sequences of sounds, detached from all practical affairs and daily concerns, be of such importance?"\textsuperscript{52} Notice that this question separates "pure" music from music experienced in contexts that are themselves conducive to profound or at least important experiences, exactly as Kivy and White attempt to do. The point here is that profound experiences can easily be attributed to factors other than the music itself when such other factors are dominant or even present, such as music experienced in the context of religious or other culturally significant rituals or ceremonies. In some reports of profound experiences of music the setting could help explain the experience that transpired. Music was perhaps not the key factor in the experience, only contributing another dimension to the experience or serving as an accompaniment to the experience. Yet in many other reported experiences it was clearly the music itself that caused the profound response, even to the point where faulty performance got in the way of such response. So it is helpful to use as a mechanism for understanding how music itself might be experienced profoundly that particular genre of music least associated with auxiliary contexts that may confuse the issue—the genre of Western instrumental concert music. This is not to argue that even that genre can be completely disassociated from social-cultural contexts that influence the experience we have of it. Nothing in our experience can be so completely disassociated. It is a matter of degree.

Goldman's tack on the issue of musical profundity is to ascribe it to music's power to present us with "an alternative world, in which we can be actively, but not practically, engaged."\textsuperscript{53} We are engaged in such a world not by virtue of any reference to ordinary emotions or events outside the musical context itself, but in response to the "broader structures of musical works, structures possessed only by them, as these uniquely unite form as cognitively grasped and affectively felt."\textsuperscript{54} Reference, Goldman argues, including as reference the world of ordinary emotions, "has value in music not because of what it reveals about that world (as this can be of utmost value in literature), but because of the way that it adds to or completes the world of the music."\textsuperscript{55}

That musical world, in which we can become fully immersed, both satisfies and challenges our capacities to think and feel. We experience this as an "alternative reality and an alternative way of being," to use Sparshott's formulation, because the world that music creates is one "completely created by the human spirit."\textsuperscript{56} In it, we meet and share the minds of the composer, performer(s) and audience. This meeting of minds and feelings, because it is within the context of the music, "appears to take place...in a wholly different, ideal world...constituted
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by the common musical experience."\textsuperscript{57} While literature and (representational) painting also present us with worlds experienced through the eyes and minds of their creators, those worlds are opaque, being filled with materials related directly to our normal lives, while in music, in that it "is forever disappearing as it appears," we experience directly the creative force that caused its being. "Thus, music is not only another world. It is a world that can be completely satisfying and fully revealing of the creative powers of other minds. Its peculiar value lies in the purity of its revelation of the human spirit."\textsuperscript{58}

It would seem reasonable to extrapolate from Goldman's analysis the implication that powerful revelations of the human spirit would indeed be interpreted quite naturally by people as being connected to the divine, the spiritual, the therapeutic, the deepest meanings of which humans are capable; in a word, to profundity. One need not limit oneself to the genre of "music alone" in the Western tradition as the sole example to which we can ascribe these characteristics. Any music would seem capable of being revelatory of the creative powers of the human mind as connected to cultural values, beliefs, and occasions, and therefore be regarded with the awe so often experienced in connection with music. I do not believe it is possible to describe particular musical features that would always be implicated in profound experiences, because that would require a split in the subject-object duality not capable of being made. However ritualized and regularized the musical formulae might be for calling forth transcendent experiences, as they are, for only one example, in particular Venda practices, the contribution of the believing, willing subject is essential if such an experience is to take place. But we cannot go so far as to negate the factor of the music itself as the causative stimulus, including features of the music which have the inexplicable yet factual power to be perceived as reflecting profound forces experienced as such. It is extremely likely that such features are culture-specific and perhaps even type-specific.\textsuperscript{59} What we can say with confidence is that most if not all cultures produce music capable of being experienced as profound by initiates.

A Definition of the Experience of Profundity in Music

At this point, and in light of the ideas expressed above, I am emboldened to offer a summative description, or definition, of the experience of profundity in music. It is, quite simply, being moved deeply in response to music. This seems relatively uncomplicated, but it harbors within it a host of issues capable of extensive if not infinite analysis. At this point I can provide only enough of such analysis to demonstrate the fruitfulness of the definition, and then to draw some implications of the definition for practices in various aspects of music education.

The simplest part of the definition is the last—"in response to music." But this is not, it turns out, all that simple. I mean by it that we can attribute to music itself all of, or most of, or at least some of, the profound experience attained. The experience may come from any musical engagement—listening, composing, performing, improvising, conducting, and so
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forth—and in any setting in which music is being experienced, from the only relative "purity" of the concert hall to music as part of a cultural ritual to which it contributes only one part. (I would point out again, that context must always be a factor in musical experience or no musical meaning could exist.) While it may be difficult or perhaps impossible to eliminate from the experience a variety of factors that can cause it other than the sounds themselves, including the person's subjective, personal, self-created complex of feelings brought as predispositions before the sounds actually occur, it is nevertheless reasonable to attribute to the musical sounds a significant portion—even the determining portion—of the profundity experienced. The evidence, after all, is overwhelming that this actually occurs. So "in response to music" assumes that music is at least strongly implicated if not entirely causative of the profound experience being undergone.

The other three terms of the definition—being, moved, and deeply—are each infinitely complex. "Being," in the simplest sense, refers to an engagement of the self as a sentient organism with sounds understood to be musical. But in saying this we are immediately thrown into the complexities and perplexities of the primary ontological issue at the core of metaphysics—the possibility and nature of being as such. My intent in this regard is exceedingly modest—to clarify, to some small extent, that possibility of human experience we call "musical" by explaining some recent thinking about it.

The term "moved" raises the issue of experienced subjectivity—the human capacity to feel and to be aware of that which is being felt as being meaningful; that is, as being significant, fulfilling, and self-determining. I hardly need mention the breadth and depth of the complexities surrounding the issue of the relation of music to feeling—they are painfully well known to anyone who has attempted to think about the nature of musical experience. Again, my purpose here is extremely circumscribed—to reflect briefly about the role of feeling as a sine qua non of profound musical engagements.

The term "deeply" is also rife with complexities, being based in the long tradition of belief that human meanings exist not on a single plane but on a spectrum, ranging from the trivial to the quintessential. This belief is intimately related to the ontological issue, as is the notion of feeling. Both the "moved" and the "deeply" terms of the definition are, ultimately, rooted in a concept of being—of particularly "human" being—which in turn is determined to a large extent by the possibility of feeling deeply. So the terms of my definition overlap in their meanings, their implications, and their complexities. I am afraid that any definition less complex would not do justice to the intricacies this topic entails. Again, my program in regard to the "deeply" component is modest in the present context—to explore briefly the idea that music can, indeed, be a powerful factor in taking human experience beyond the plane of the ordinary.
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Explanations of the Definition

A particularly helpful analysis of musical being, musical feeling, and musical depth is provided by Kenneth Dorter in his explanation of the differences between conceptual truth and aesthetic truth. Dorter points out that "there are at least four levels of experience at which art seems to express a certain kind of truth: those of 1) our emotions, 2) cultural values, 3) sensory experiences, and 4) the elusive significance of our experience." It is this fourth level of truth that particularly concerns us here, in that it includes the others. At this level of the significance of experience, a dimension of human experience outside the range of experience itself appears—a dimension of meaning unperceived in the stimulus itself yet at the same time experienced in light of that stimulus. The most common way this occurs is through religion, and religion has always used art because of the power of art "to represent significance in sensuous objects," as both Kant and Heidegger maintained in their arguments that art deals with meanings of a non-conceptual sort.

Such meanings are always metaphoric. They are embodied in the particular expressive conditions of the particular aesthetic materials being employed. But they point beyond themselves to a sense of significance—the significance of our experience as valuable in and of itself because it is also metaphoric of the very foundation of what is real in human experience—that our being is one of consciousness of being. By deploying its materials "in such a way as to prevent our taking them literally," art focuses our thoughts "beyond definite concepts to an indefinite significance," encompassing our feelings, our consciousness of feeling, the shared life of feeling among human beings, and a sense of the nature of "the experienced world itself, something that is not accessible to conceptual understanding."

Dorter's explanation of the metaphoric relation between the expressive materials of sound and the significance of our experienced world is compatible with Goldman's notion of "an alternative world" in which music engages us and with White's suggestion that musical features are parallel with features of our experience of reality itself. These views, I believe, are far more productive of insights into the nature of musical profundity than Kivy's attempts to locate it in a profound subject matter which music needs to be about.

Another view compatible with Dorter's, Goldman's, and White's is offered by the phenomenologist Michael Dufrenne. Aesthetic perception, Dufrenne points out, examines an object with thoroughness by means of feeling, and discovers in the object an internal world existing in the realm of feeling. This world

...can bear witness to the real, not by propounding what [the real] is in positive fact but by presenting its countenance to us. Thus we can now see what the proper function of art is. By allowing us to perceive an exemplary object whose whole reality consists in being sensuous, art...
invites us and trains us to read expression and to discover the atmosphere which is revealed only to feeling. Art makes us undergo the absolute experience of the affective.\textsuperscript{64}

In doing so, art "orients and refines our perception of reality," while reality "becomes aestheticized at the same time it is humanized." Art "gives us keys" to what is real, or at least to the affective aspects of what is real. Through aesthetic experiences, "something human is revealed in the real, a certain quality by which things are consubstantial with man, not because they can be known, but because they offer to the man capable of contemplating them a familiar face in which he can recognize himself without having himself composed the being of this face." Art, then, is that phenomenon "without which things would be only what they are." The aesthetic object, in presenting the affective possibilities of human experience, "does justice to and thus authenticates the human dimension of the real. The artist is the chosen locus where the real attains to consciousness in terms of what is most secret and yet most visible in it—its humanity."\textsuperscript{65}

The art and artists Dufrenne is discussing need not be construed to be of any particular sort or limited to any particular culture. Nor need the capacity to experience art profoundly be construed as being possessed only by adults, let alone only by highly trained or artistically sophisticated adults. I understand Dufrenne to be describing what any human beings, of any age, in any culture, are capable of experiencing through engagements with art, whether as perceivers or producers of it. All human beings seem to be, by nature of being human, able to experience in music the defining characteristics of profundity conceived as "being moved deeply."

The "being" of profound experiences of art blurs the distinction of subject and object.\textsuperscript{66} Subjective meaning, feeling, and knowing take on an extended reality by merging with significant, imaginative musical events.

The feeling in profound experiences of art is not the result of interpretation or conceptualization or representation: "it appears to be something found or recognized"\textsuperscript{67} in the qualities of the art with which one is engaged. Our self is "moved" affectively from where it was to a new position by the confrontation with such qualities.

That new position is, metaphorically, "deep," implying something not able to be seen when one is positioned at the surface. "Profundity, in the metaphorical use of depth, is of something that is hidden from view."\textsuperscript{68} When that which is hidden is suddenly seen—suddenly experienced—our foundations are shaken. We are seized, physically, emotionally, mentally, by meanings resonant with a sense of that which is most real to us—our consciousness of our selves as being in and of the world. In such moments the wholeness of the self is experienced. As Katherine Lee explains in her article "Transcendence as an Aesthetic Concept," aesthetic encounters achieve transcendence "when there is a perceived wholeness in which the scattered
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details of the object or event fall immediately into order and coherence and resonate with the individual's understandings and feelings. It is a moment of great magnitude because of the transformative insights it affords the individual."\(^{69}\)

All this occurs frequently and powerfully with music, to a degree so remarkable as to suggest that our susceptibility to profundity in music may be the very paradigm of the human capacity for significant experience.

Musical Creation and Profundity

Such susceptibilities exist in any kind of musical response. But creating music—composing, performing, improvising—adds a necessary ingredient not present in listening; the ingredient of critical self-reflection and concomitant decision making required when acting as a musician. Panzarella suggested that this ingredient might negatively affect the ecstatic experience of music. This seems reasonable, and needs to be taken into account in attempts to understand the profundity experienced by musicians when acting as musicians. An aspect of experience that can help explain how musicians overcome the possibly detrimental affects of critical consciousness is what Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi has termed "flow." As is now well known, the flow experience occurs when a person's level of skill is matched by the challenges presented to it, in a context of focused attention, in which the activity itself is its own reward:

At the core, the flow model states that the perception of high challenges (or action opportunities) and high skills can lead people to a state of consciousness (flow) in which high levels of control, concentration, unselfconsciousness, and a strong sense of involvement are experienced. This "negentropic" state of consciousness contrasts with an "entropic," confused, or random state of consciousness. Persons in flow are deeply concentrated and feel a merging of action and awareness, their attention is centered on a limited stimulus field, and they may experience a "loss of ego" and feel in control of their actions and the environment. A further crucial component of the flow experience is its autotelic nature. In other words, the person in flow does not strive for goals or rewards beyond the activity at hand. The activity provides its own intrinsic rewards.\(^{70}\)

Composing and performing, clearly, offer remarkably potent opportunities for the experience of flow to occur in connection with musical experience being undergone intimately and absorbedly. The flow experience occurs in listening as well, obviously,\(^{71}\) but the added dimension of the necessary exercise of craftsmanship gives composing and creating a particularly rich set of opportunities for it to occur. In addition, the involvement of the body in performance focuses and strengthens the intimacy of one's contact with the sounds being experienced, further encouraging the possibility that one will "be moved deeply."\(^{72}\) There are hazards here, of
course, in that the technical demands of performing can become the focus, leaving the musical experience enervated rather than strengthened. As Csikszentmihalyi points out, "...when children are taught music, the usual problem often arises: too much emphasis is placed on how they perform, and too little on what they experience."73

This problem is overcome in effective performance instruction, of course, in which musical experience, through and by the exercise of creative, sensitive craftsmanship, is the goal. This can occur in solo performance, of course, and it can occur in ensemble performance as well, in which case the group effort to communally create musical experience adds still another dimension to the potential profundity of the experience. Evidence of the depths to which performance can take one, both as an individual and as part of a group, is provided in a poignant and sometimes amusing way by members of an Ohio high school band who were asked to write about what they felt when performing a recent concert. Here are some of the responses:

Climaxes, shivers. I can feel my heart flowing into my instrument and can see the notes floating into the air, up and out into the world.
Goose bumps, shivers, felt great, exciting.
Totally awesome! Really moved and very touched.
Unity, oneness, family.
I could imagine a flowing intermixing spirit fly around our band like Raiders of the Lost Ark, except the spirit was good, and together, and musical.
The confidence and force of the band was (such) that being in the midst of all this glorious music that at times it almost brings tears to your eyes.
When I play well, I can feel the music coming out of my heart, it isn’t from my fingers or tongue.74

Surely such remarks are illustrative of the occurrence of musical experiences at the level of the profound or at least approaching that level. Surely teachers of music in the schools hope that such experiences will occur as a consequence of their efforts, if not always, or even often, then at least occasionally. We might even go so far as to say that the achievement of such experiences—of being moved deeply in response to music—is the ultimate goal of instruction in music, encompassing yet transcending all the other goals toward which a good music program aims. What can now be said about what we need to know and what we need to do to optimize the possibilities that such experiences will indeed occur as a result of our work?

Encouraging Profound Experiences of Music

Three essential factors are implicated in profound experiences of music, or experiences of being moved deeply in response to music. The first is the individual who has the experience. The second is the context in which the experience takes place. The third is the musical stimulus
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for the experience. The three must interrelate, in ways we know much too little about, if a deep musical experience is to take place. Certainly we know a great deal about individuals in relation to music. We also know a lot about musical contexts and about music itself. But we know these things as largely or entirely unconnected to each other at the level of how the three must connect to induce experiences of musical profundity.

That is because we have not examined sufficiently, with the seriousness and carefulness and applicability it deserves, the issue of how music education practices might affect, directly and significantly, the depth of musical experience we hope our students will attain. I believe that, ultimately, music means so much to us because it has moved us deeply, and I believe our zeal for music education stems, ultimately, from our desire to help others be so moved. It is high time we included as a primary goal of our scholarly, research activities the attempt to learn as much about this most important of all issues as we have in attempting to learn about a host of matters infinitely less important. Of course everything we learn about music and music education helps us in some way. To learn more about what concerns us ultimately about our field would help us profoundly.

It should go without saying that continuing work in philosophy of music education will be needed to help us further clarify the nature of musically profound experiences so we can be more secure about what it is we are trying to influence. But in addition to the need to lay a great deal of philosophical groundwork, we also need to extend that work through many and diverse empirical studies. In the matter of the individual who experiences music we need to know much more than we do about the content of their reported profound experiences at different ages, in different musical/cultural contexts, under a variety of impinging conditions, and how these interrelate with their musical backgrounds, their personality types, their level of acquaintance with the triggering music, and so forth, so that our background of descriptive data can begin to be sifted for useful correlations. Luckily we now have available to us research procedures able to help us investigate higher-order experiences rather than only lower-order responses, and we are increasingly, albeit somewhat grudgingly, admitting such qualitative procedures into our repertoire of what is conceived as respectable research. Whether we are ready to regard as respectable research the quest to understand ultimate values rather than scattered minutia is an open question. I am hopeful that if we encourage research scholarship dealing with higher or highest musical responses we can produce far more knowledge of use to us, and of meaning for us, than we have by our concentration on lower or lowest musical responses. Certainly our research literature would become more interesting.

I want to suggest several lines of scholarship and action that, at this point, would seem fruitful for encouraging profound experiences to occur as a result of music education practices.

First, I believe we should recognize that such experiences can and do occur often—perhaps most often—from listening. I suspect this happens because most people can be
more fully engaged in music of high levels of structural/affective magnitude, conducive to deep experiences, from listening, than they are likely to be from other kinds of musical involvements. Whatever a person's capacity for fullness and challenge in musical experience, music capable of providing maximal levels of those qualities can be encountered quite easily through listening. I believe that, social/cultural factors conducive of profound musical experiences aside, such experiences are most likely to occur when at the boundary of musical fullness—perceptually and emotionally—capable of being internalized by an individual. It is simply more likely for people to encounter that interface between their own capacities to be engaged with musical repletion, and music of a variety of sorts fully satisfying that capacity, from listening, than can be expected from the far less frequent, far more specialized, activities of performing and composing.

I believe, therefore, that we are likely to provide more people with more musically deep and satisfying experiences of music from listening engagements than from anything else we can do. To the extent there is merit in that belief it will be important for us to learn as much as we can about how to do so optimally for all students at every age—a research agenda that is daunting but capable of yielding very high rewards.

It is likely that profound experiences through listening will occur both when people are alone and in the company of others, in degrees and ways about which we need to know much more than we do. Our social orientation in schooling very naturally provides more group experiences than solitary experiences. While the sharing of musical experience—and the sharing of reports of feelings of profundity among those involved—is among the most precious gifts of music, we should not neglect or minimize the fact that solitary experiences of music can also have their particular benefits and deep-reaching qualities. The celebrated fiction, poetry, and essay writer May Sarton is said to have remarked that music is much too important to be experienced with others. We need not entirely agree in order to appreciate her insight. We would do well, I think, both to provide opportunities for "alone time with music" during school and to encourage our students to provide it for themselves outside of school.

But whatever the opportunities to experience music deeply when listening, the experiences available from performing, composing, and improvising must continue to play important roles in our attempts to encourage fulfilling experiences of music, both in general education settings and in specialized, elective settings. Here we must add to the full engagement of the individual with the depths of significance of the music he or she is creating (and I most emphatically include performance as "creating" music—something I wish did not have to be said) the factor of that compatibility of challenge with competency called "flow." We must be far more conscious, in our musical creating activities, and far more in control, of the need to reach for the edge at which technical capacities and musical richness merge with the experiencing self in moments of deepest meaning. We know that this can happen at every level of competence, if the musical repletion aspect—the level of musical meaning sufficiently abundant to challenge and sufficiently accessible to be "taken within"—is sufficiently provided. That means that, as
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in listening, we must take great care to avoid so concentrating on details that the wholeness of the experience is weakened rather than strengthened. In all our activities we need to keep an optimal balance between parts and wholes, the wholes—the completeness of musical experience—and the parts—the exploration of the significant details out of which the whole emerges—reinforcing each other in the service of deeper perception and deeper reaction. And it is also far more likely that fulfilling experiences of music will occur when students are in an atmosphere where they are secure, unthreatened by the potential of failure or negative appraisal, and able to give themselves fully to the power of the music they are creating or listening to, unfettered by anxieties about being judged by others.75

The wholeness of music is, no doubt, more likely to be experienced with music whose language is native than foreign. Here we need to avoid two extremes. On the one hand we can so emphasize the familiar music of a particular culture, reveling in its accessibility of moving, significant experiences, as to neglect our obligation to broaden the scope from which deeply satisfying musical experiences can be gained. On the other hand, we can be so "other" oriented, so devoted to exploring uncharted territory, as to neglect the need everyone has to be at home in a secure world in which one's soul finds rest. "Soul music" is music that often touches our soul; that is, satisfies our deepest musical needs. Everyone deserves to have such a music—or musics—from which such deep pleasure can be regularly gained.

To keep in balance all the factors relating to individuals, contexts, and music that are implicated in musical profundity, in educational settings optimizing their interrelations so as to encourage all students to be moved deeply by music, is as complex, as delicate, as sensitive a task as any in all of education. That is because music is capable of serving humans at the very depths of what can be experienced. At such depths "an alternative reality and an alternative way of being" is achieved, in which wholeness of meaning is attained in a world full of division and alienation. We may not ever be able to guarantee that experiences of musical profundity will take place because of what we do as music educators—that music will exert its profound powers to "make whole"—to "heal"—as a direct result of our efforts. But we can try, first, by understanding better what musical profundity consists of, and second, learning how we can best invite it to be experienced by those whose musical education is entrusted to us. Those things are doable. They deserve, as much as or more than anything else in music education, to be done.

NOTES


3. See the discussion of this point in Abraham H. Maslow, *Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1964), 84–90. For an excellent explanation of the ineffability of musical experience, see Diana Raffman, *Language, Music and Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). An interesting attempt to gather data about musical peak experiences, using a dial device by which listeners registered the intensity of their "aesthetic experience" while listening to recordings, is reported in Clifford K. Madsen, Ruth V. Brittin, and Deborah A. Capperella-Sheldon, "An Empirical Method for Measuring the Aesthetic Experience to Music," *Journal of Research in Music Education*, vol. 41, no. 1 (Spring, 1993), 57–69. Several of the findings of this study coincide with the verbal reports given below.


15. Panzarella, "The Phenomenology...," 75.


17. Panzarella, "The Phenomenology...," 76.

18. Panzarella, "The Phenomenology...," 76.

19. Panzarella, "The Phenomenology...," 76.


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37. For some hints as to particular musical characteristics to which listeners respond intensely, see Madsen, Brittin, Capperella-Sheldon (note 3 above).

38. Blacking, How Musical, 44.


50. White, "Toward a...," 33.

51. White, "Toward a...," 33.


54. Goldman, "The Value...," 37.

55. Goldman, "The Value...," 42.

56. Goldman, "The Value...," 43.

57. Goldman, "The Value...," 43.

58. Goldman, "The Value...," 43.


62. Dorter, "Conceptual Truth...," 40. Compare the comment by Arturo B. Fallico, that art "carries...an element of seriousness which can only be called religious in the profoundest sense of the term. For, just so long as the creations of art are a reality, all our realities remain tinged with a veil of insubstantiality and provisionality, as if awaiting final approval. Art keeps alive our sense of the omnipotent; it feeds the soul with its profoundest intimations of the divine—of
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63. Dorter, "Conceptual Truth..." 38-49.


71. Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), 110. Here the author takes the position that listening in both live and recorded settings can equally provide flow experiences: "But to argue that live music is innately more enjoyable than recorded music would be just as invalid as arguing the opposite."


73. Csikszentmihalyi, Flow, 112.

74. Personal correspondence from John Kratus to the author.

ON A PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD MUSICS IN MUSIC EDUCATION

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Background to A Philosophy of World Musics¹

Human diversity is never more present than in the music making of the human family the world over. Consequently, speaking on a philosophy of world musics in American music education presents a dilemma. The global perspective calls for broad strokes of ideation that would cover such a vast amount of musical activity. Conversely, one should expect that at the level of specificity, all details will support such ideas. The inherent risks, however, are that exceptions to the larger view may be found too readily. I recognize that to fit all circumstances into a single path may not be possible. Nevertheless, the discussion of ideas is a necessary professional responsibility if we are to avoid aimless wandering on this subject. This paper is intended to satisfy that need.

To explore world musics in music education adequately, four areas will be discussed: (1) The background to formulating a philosophy; (2) the importance of culture as a fundamental issue; (3) music and its meaning in culture; and (4) a world musics program in the schools.

Since music was included in public school curricula in 1838 in Boston, Western art music has been the musical weathervane for generations of American students. Western music has been influenced significantly by musics from other nations outside the West over the century-and-a-half since, yet, the core tradition remains steadfast in its espousal of a system and canon of literature decidedly Western European—largely not even American—in its ingredients.

There are occasional deviations from the Western canon,² but the music education profession has not yet fully embraced a geographically and philosophically broader view of music. It is still rare that the preparation of new music educators pays more than token attention to music of other cultures. Most methods courses throw a bone to what is called multicultural, but that is little understood in the context of a true study of world musics. At the 1994 biennial meeting of MENC, for example, many sessions featuring multicultural musics were still hardly beyond the level of introducing and singing songs from another culture and calling that multicultural education. Moreover, the many texts that influence the preparation of new professionals have not yet dealt with world musics in any significant manner, although, world musics in music education as we know it today had its beginnings at least three decades ago.³
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There are now two paradigms in music scholarship that can be traced to one root: late nineteenth-century German musicology. One major thrust emphasized historical (diachronic) process and the other systematic (synchronic) process. Historical process became the standard in American musicology and led to what I will refer to henceforth as the traditional paradigm, traditional because it stems from Platonic and Aristotelian roots that rely on logic and absolutism as primary attributes.

The systematic process focussed on music as a phenomenon in itself, but also included examination of musics from various non-European countries, comparing one to the other, documenting musical systems and instruments, and analyzing constituent elements (Hutchinson 1976; Schwadron and Hutchinson 1978, 1-5). Ultimately, these comparative and other aspects became the field we now know as ethnomusicology (Sachs 1962, 14-16; Merriam 1964, 3; Ethnomusicology Newsletter 1956, 1-5). These two paradigms, each with their own "constellation of beliefs," (Kuhn 1970, 175), eventually travelled separate paths that have yet to be rejoined. This second path I shall call the new paradigm because its constellation of beliefs is yet forming.

Music from Africa and Asia were considered novelties and exoticisms to the Europeans for centuries, starting from the European global explorations of the fifteenth century. Recently, Bebey wrote that "...Westerners are frequently at a loss to understand the music of black Africa: the concepts of Africans are so totally different" (Bebey 1975, 3, see also 1-3). But Westerners, particularly Americans, did begin a more extensive investigation of other cultures' musics beginning in the 1960s that would take them around the globe.

One such line can be followed. Within the German musicological tradition of the early twentieth century, such scholars as Jaap Kunst carried on a serious study of Javanese music. Mantle Hood, a student of Kunst, established the Institute for Ethnomusicology at UCLA in the late 1950s, from which, with the help of Charles Seeger, numerous scholars traversed the globe in search of differing truths gleaned from human music making. Their methodology, drawing heavily on studies in anthropology as well as music, was to live in the midst of their subjects, subsume the musical techniques and understandings directly through music making, and build from within another musicality with its own qualities not in need of translation through the Western medium. This methodology has had an effect on our understanding of bi-musicality, i.e., the ability to function as a musician in two separate cultures concurrently (Hood 1960).

Numerous organizations such as the Society for Ethnomusicology, the International Institute for Comparative Music Studies and Documentation, and the International Council for Traditional Music, all have a focus very different from the traditional historical studies in musicology. These differences are directed by the felt need to study music in its cultural context, to find how music lends insights to the culture and to understand why a group of humans is making music in a particular way (Hood 1971, 3-4).
Alvin Toffler, futurist author, describes larger movements or epochs, as waves. He has observed three major waves in the known history of culture, the first an agricultural period, the second an industrial period, and the new quite complex and complicated technological age as the third wave. Presently, the latter two are operating; the industrial period is increasingly altering its shape while the technological period is developing to overtake and absorb the industrial process (Toffler 1980).

The third wave, or macroparadigm as it might be called, of which Toffler wrote so eloquently is continuing its inexorable march to the twenty-first century. Travel and communications have reduced the world to a global village as McLuhan described and most musics in the latter quarter of the twentieth century have come within reach of most peoples the world over. Where so many nations had been stable in their ethnic constituencies, new ethnic, national, political and economic conflicts increased immigration, further complicating an already complex tangle of ethnicity and race. The United States is a prime example of large-scale immigration, where major cities with more than a hundred spoken languages within its confines is considered usual. These new groups have not laid their culture at the borders; and music, as a persistent constituent of the psyche, is one of the last cultural components to wither or modify, witness the practice of various musics throughout the world that belie their cultural contexts. And so, within the American borders, one now finds an array of music that well represents the human family.

Directly bearing on American music education, the Yale Seminar and the Tanglewood Symposium were held in the 1960s, contemporaneous with the civil rights movement and growing immigration to the United States. The supremacy of the Western canon was questioned in light of the realities of music practice outside the schools. Other musics were equally valid to a now vastly different population and, upon scholarly examination, were found to be of similar artful qualities. Both Yale and Tanglewood called for the inclusion of all music in the music curriculum of schools, elementary through college. Yet, progress within the profession has been slow. Changing the constellation of beliefs may be too much to expect so soon. The fact is, two worlds exist, one opposed to the dynamic changes occurring and the other embracing them. Much in the new paradigm consists of what might be termed traditional wisdom of older cultures outside the West. Western scholars and writers have given validity to these patterns of old culture for American life and education by recognizing that other cultures have much to teach us. In comparing the traditional and new paradigms, some traits are immediately observable.

The traditional paradigm is unicultural, the new paradigm is multicultural. The traditional is compartmental, analytical, and classificatory in its study; the new is concerned with wholes rather than separation into parts. The traditional is elitist in its view of musicality, the new is communal. The traditional is exclusive and tends to be hegemonic in its relationship to other musics; the new is inclusive and considers all music to be valuable. The traditional
paradigm is formalistic, relying on a list of great works to form the basis of study, while the new paradigm is relativistic, relying on cultural context to designate values. The traditional suggests that music is a universal language, the new recognizes that music is dependent upon cultural context for cues to its meaning. The traditional emphasizes product while the new emphasizes process. The traditional emphasizes a transmission curricular model, a learning about music sometimes referred to as discipline-based, while the new emphasizes experiential learning before and sometimes to the exclusion of abstraction. The traditional has a fetish about notation, the new is concerned with the aural/oral and kinesthetic processes. The traditional emphasizes a contemplative, art-for-art’s sake aesthetic, while the new integrates activities with daily living through music, body movement, dance, and ritual. The traditional bifurcates subject and object, largely distrusting the subject for information about the aesthetic event, the new is subject oriented, believing that music made by human beings needs to have human-centered interpretation.

The Importance of Culture in the New Paradigm

The focus of attention on the importance of culture in the new paradigm is recognition that we live in a culturally relative world with different interpretations of life’s realities and varying concomitant values. By definition, culture is the "totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought (StarPress 1993)." Culture is the accumulation of experience that forms the bedrock out of which expressions in decidedly unique ways become manifest by the members. There are many ways to look at culture; Edward T. Hall suggests that the formal, informal and technical will cover virtually all cultural attributes (Hall 1959, Ch. 4). At whatever level of consciousness culture lies, it is apparent that each group of people who share life’s experiences come to understand its pleasures and vicissitudes in a special way different from other groups. Moreover, as these experiences are reflected in their ordinary and extraordinary lives, so too do music and the other arts reflect and represent their deepest and utmost concerns, their understandings and knowledge of what is true and trustworthy.

To understand music one must understand culture. I draw on four qualities of the diamond as a metaphor to illustrate certain aspects of culture. The diamond has three structural properties and one assigned value: (1) it is extremely hard; (2) it is refractive; (3) it is multifaceted; and (4) human beings assign great value to it.

Like the diamond, the qualities of a culture are hard or enduring. One finds roots going back thousands of years. Those qualities that identify people as members of a specific group experience are extremely difficult to alter; some qualities may, in fact, be ineradicable short of total annihilation of a people. I refer to Hall once again in looking at the component of time as one example of a cultural trait, and how different groups interpret their experience.
Monochronic cultures rub against the grain when dealing with polychronic cultures. The speed with which messages are sent varies greatly. In a clock-strewn society such as in the West, time is ever present. When the sun is your guide, time operates quite differently (Hall 1983). These peculiarities do not change with crossing borders but remain encased in the human representative of the specific culture.

Secondly, as the diamond is refractive, bending light according to its shape, density, and inclinations of each facet, so too does culture act to bend and filter the experiences encountered according to the cultural member’s outlook. Millions of events in a given place over long periods of time, highly selected to form pools of reality, aid groups in developing a sense of their beginnings, their cosmogony. Although their collective wisdom may not be universal in the particulars, it has a ring of truth and transferability as the depths are plumbed appraising the broader themes of life’s experiences. We are, at once, both collective as a species on earth and individual in our sets of experience in the world as members of a culture. At the cultural level—the daily lived-through experiences—we find truths about our existence, but only partial truth because we do not experience the whole of life in our short time and the limited space that we occupy.

As the diamond is multifaceted, so then, is truth, and while each culture may not see the whole truth of existence, each has a window. Truth is that which has meaning for a culture in a particular time and place. Therefore, that which is fashioned within a culture is done so with multiple layers of denotation and connotation forming meanings of life. When we take from another culture, unless we take their truths as they experience truth and reality, we are just mimicking superficialities of the culture, not exercising their revelations. We can only learn their truths of human existence from their point of view. We have to re-live from the inside that culture’s experience in order to understand. Unless we move beyond intellectual awareness, we retain the view of the world from our own perch.

Empathy is the key issue in becoming bi-cultural. Empathy is more than an intellectual understanding; it involves the totality of human capability of feeling, thought, and response to life. To empathize with a culture to such an extent that we learn the world anew through their eyes, ears, touch, smell and taste, is to look in on their window to life, their truth as they understand it.

Finally, the fourth quality is that human beings assign great value to certain material items, physical objects, places, ways of thinking, and beliefs. That identical quality attaches to culture. People will fight to the death to have their beliefs—political, spiritual and religious, social, their way, in short, their culture—survive. Just as Hasidic Jews in New York and Amish Dutch in Pennsylvania hold strong to their religion and the music that celebrates those beliefs, and Native Americans still practice musical and religious rituals stemming from their cosmogony, people all over the world continue to exhibit that these values are worth dying
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for. Without assessing who is right or wrong in a situation, it can be seen as incontrovertible that many ethnic conflicts around the globe presently derive from the desire to retain and propagate cultural identity. Religion, language, music, dance, dress, political organization and the like all harken to some model of what is truth for them. Values are not easy to come by nor are they easy to shed because, I suspect, they are built into the neuronal pathways of the brain. In short, people are their experiences, their culture. To relinquish this fundamental identity is to cease to exist.

Music and Its Meanings in Culture

Meanings of life are contained in the music of a culture. Music is reflective of the deep structures of existence in our response to time, to sounds in the environment, to natural phenomena as they shape our daily existence, and to the perceived or imagined noumena that control the universe and its inhabitants. Music, as a non-verbal phenomenon, lacking intrinsic denotative values, symbolizes the ebb and flow, the waxing and waning of life’s movements. It is to these meanings that we must address ourselves to discover what the other culture knows that we do not. If we can discover some new viewpoint, some new prospect or perspective, some rare insight, in one culture that does not exist in our own, then we stand the chance that our horizons as part of the human family will be expanded and we will benefit from the new knowledge.

The question, "what does music mean?" at the macro level requires a lifelong search. On more specific levels, that question can be given some tentative directions: Time, for example, is a fundamental experience of the human family. Yet, our concepts of time vary widely according to our location on the globe and our cosmogony as it has built up over millennia (see, for example, Hall 1983, various chapters but especially 3 and 5). Compare two examples.

Luther’s hymns and Schütz’s metrical settings of the psalms were the models for Protestant hymn composition. These hymns were not simply metrical but four-square in their accent and stress. Their comparative simplicity and homophonic movement were well suited to a congregation with meager education and religious modesty. These hymns also, in their singing, induce the body to be stolid in its stance and upright in its convictions.

By contrast, the same hymn that developed in the Protestant churches became the basis for music of African-American churches in the American south during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Musical roots taken from Africa, composed along very different time structures and conceptualizations, strongly influenced African-American music, wherever it was sung. Beth Lomax Hawes describes the way music should sound according to Bessie Jones, the well-known Georgia Sea Islander.
Mrs. Jones's advice as to how to be on time was eminently practical. "Move your feet!" she would say...it was a shift of weight, requiring two counts on each side....she would step on her right foot, bring her left foot close to her right, and "step it down" without a weight change, repeating the pattern to the left.

...this was basically a dance movement...it is strong; the body swings slightly with it. The movements are on the first and third beats of the measure, at the points where the dancer would probably take his strong steps.

To clap well, then, you must start with your feet, since the claps come after the weight changes...and thus occur on the normally unaccented beats of the measure....The movement Mrs. Jones calls "stepping it down" (putting the foot down without changing weight) coincides with the claps....

...the performer finds that his feet and hands are holding a kind of conversation—feet stating, hands answering—in the classic antiphonal...structure that seems to underlie all American Negro music. The footfalls, however, are light; the claps are loud, so that the sounded emphasis falls on the "weak" beats, or offbeats, of the measure. Most of the time you cannot hear the "strong" beats at all, the feet step so quietly (Jones and Hawes 1972, 20-21).

This example of two worlds being experienced in the singing of hymns in the United States—Anglo and African-American—and the effect that each has on the body and its movement more than suggests that music reflects deep structures of a people's thoughts and feelings (see also Roberts, J. S. 1974, Ch. 6, esp. 162-64).

Consider another response to time as mirrored in the music. The Japanese term, ma, means an "interval of space-time" or, in another expression, finds this definition, "...negative space (ma) is the stillness and emptiness just before or after a unit of performance." Ma became a major component of Japanese aesthetics centuries ago (Komparu 1983, xx). How this plays out in various traditional arts is something to be learned at the foot of a teacher by imitation, for ma is felt, not counted. Listen to any solo shakuhachi piece and the silences between tones take on a dimension of importance equal to the sounds. The Japanese concept of time is another way of entering into a different realm of human experience. Later, I will discuss my own perplexities learning to understand ma as it applies to gagaku performance.

Cultural identity is another meaning of music. In Trinidad in the early 1940s tamboo bamboo bands were proscribed by the British government. The government made an effort to suppress what they considered to be dangerous, believing that the tamboo bamboo groups would foment an uprising. Not to be silenced by what was considered an unjust dictum, the Trinidadians of African descent developed the steel pan. Although its origins were of assorted pieces of junk such as automobile wheel drums and similar items, the eventual instrument
became an oil drum tuned to various pitches that now contain a full Western scale. While the steel pan repertoire is based on calypso, the groups play everything, some pieces as complex as Tchaikowsky's *1812 Overture*. Their participation in Carnival each year is an extraordinary sight and the accompanying steel pan festival exceeds the visual by an incredible array of musical performances (Roberts, J. S. 1974, 115–17; Palmer 1983).

One final example of meaning to explore briefly involves Hawaii and the hula. Hula to the pre-contact Hawaiians was an all encompassing term that meant dance, chant—accompanied and unaccompanied, worship, "...a way of teaching, a form of entertainment, and a foundation for the *lua*, a self-defence art known only to Hawaiians" (Kanahele 1979, 147). Describing chant, Elizabeth Tatar states:

The chant or *mele* of Hawai’i is the single most important cultural expression belonging to Hawaiians. In function and interpretation it represents the inexplicable mysteries of the deepest levels of physical and spiritual union in humankind and [their] relationship to nature....It was the means of establishing contact between mortal and god. Even the most informal and spontaneous chant by an individual was likely to reflect in some way the deeper, more formal religious chants (Kanahele 1979, 53).

Hawaiian chant is logogenic, that is, the word, its meaning, and intentions are the source of not only constructing the tonal-temporal aspects but the tone quality as well, particularly the use of vibrato. In addition, trills, glottal stops, partial slurring causing unstable and nondiscrete pitches, dynamics of softness and loudness, and a wide variety of vocal articulations are all part of the chant styles. The training of a chanter—usually selected by birthright and outstanding talent—was carefully controlled because of the weighy responsibilities placed on the use of chant.

The chanter had to be very well acquainted with the language, the myths, and the histories of the ali’i [ruling classes]. Any musical stress on a word, consciously or unconsciously made, could bring about any number of happy or unhappy consequences....The chanter was taught to pay close attention to his body movements, as well as his voice production. After all, the words and *mele* he handled were considered sacred and powerful (Kanahele 1979, 64).

The belief in power contained in the chant is verified by Moulin in her description of the Marquesans in French Polynesia. As she states, "...there is a perceived causal relationship between the art form and a non-artistic outcome. This connection of the arts, and particularly chanted words, with power comes up repeatedly in Polynesia, both historically and in contemporary thought (Moulin)."
Although a goodly portion of the ancient hula has been lost, a shred of the original impetus is found today in contemporary form.\textsuperscript{15} Compare, for example, the foregoing with what the present tourist industry announces to the world:

[The Polynesian shows] are glitzy, show-biz interpretations....The hula is the heartbeat of Hawai'i. An integral part of the ritual life of the ancients, the old hula never died. New dances derived from it became popular entertainment for visiting sailors, who paid well to witness these alterations, but Hawaiians didn't fundamentally connect this new and lucrative enterprise with their sacred dance. There are two distinct classes of hula, the ancient and the modern (Island Heritage 1988, 118 and 122).

It should be obvious to even the unenlightened observer that what one sees in Waikiki may be entertaining but has extremely little to do with the original hula. Yet, its new meaning, that of entertainment, is every bit as focussed on its aim as the original was on its differing purpose. Each in its own way represents a reality and constitutes meaning.

The point is that, to be honest to the music and its culture under study when included in the music curriculum as part of a study of world musics, what is singularly important are the meanings associated with each style. Indeed, a wonderful lesson in cross-cultural musical studies could be instituted on the basis of Hawaiian music alone; students could study the forces that changed the music, the styles that resulted, the hegemony of the Western world in the Hawaiian islands, how the collision of cultures brought about fundamental change, and the now present predicament of the native Hawaiians in their struggle for sovereignty. In such a framework, process and product emerge to reveal the role that music with all its attendant meanings plays in the life of a people.

\textbf{The New Paradigm in the Schools}

When expanding the music curriculum to a world base in school music programs, many problems of a practical nature readily present themselves; those having to do with financial support, preparation of teachers, and when children should begin study of another music not from their primary culture, all in some way impinge on philosophy, the primary concern of this paper. Some of these questions were posed at the outset of my inquiry in the early 1970s (Palmer 1975), and while answers are yet elusive, they have become slightly clearer today.

We need to understand, first, that the issue of becoming bi-musical and bi-cultural is not questionable in its basic form. It is possible to become Other, that is, a person who can function like the native in not only performing but understanding the music. Mantle Hood affirms that this is so (Hood 1960). The entire Institute of Ethnomusicology at UCLA was predicated on that basis, and many ethnomusicologists from that program occupy important positions throughout
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the United States carrying on that idea successfully. At the same time, it is important to recognize that we may never become Other to the extent that we will pass for a native. Life's experiences and learning are constructed out of continua, not either—or propositions. The point that we reach on the continuum depends greatly on our own desires, abilities and empathy. To the degree that we can become Other is the degree to which we can glimpse truths of other cultures.

In working with multicultural music, the several following points have become clear:

(1) To learn music of another culture, it is necessary to involve students in music making. To learn about something is merely an intellectual exercise, inadequate to the task. Rather, music needs to be understood in its totality which includes the affective component, and informal and formal processes; young children can only develop skills, techniques, understandings and knowledge by participation and practice. As Herbert Read states eloquently,

Education is the fostering of growth...[but] growth is only made apparent in expression—audible or visible signs and symbols. Education may therefore be defined as the cultivation of modes of expression—it is teaching children and adults how to make sounds, images, movements, tools and utensils....The aim of education is therefore the creation of artists—of people efficient in the various modes of expression (Read 1956, 11);

(2) The study should be in depth and have longevity so that it can be learned from the inside. There can be no argument that a culture's music is not learned in one or two semesters in a school setting. It requires years of involvement in learning the basic structures, learning the skills to manipulate voice or instrument, and conceptualizing the music in its varied aspects in order to replicate the essence with some degree of faithfulness to the original. To be creative, artistic, and culturally representative in a style requires further cultivation and development. The ultimate goal, of course, is to understand a culture through the eyes and ears of its members; that takes time and maturity;

(3) The quality of the instruction needs to be given by one well-versed in the culture's music. This is patently logical even within the Western tradition. Historians have made much of the lineage of performers who can trace their roots through teachers back to a famous progenitor. To not avail ourselves of the same process in using authentic music makers from the culture to inculcate us with their inside understanding is a hopeless venture on a par with learning about music;

(4) Education should begin as early as possible while the mind is still malleable. One need only think of pre-pubescent youth acquiring a second language. They do this effectively seemingly without effort. The same holds true of music. At the very least, we should begin when the child enters school. There is good enough evidence at this time that the child already
has a well founded sense of what his culture's music is and that will not be shaken by introducing another culture with its music immediately alongside Western culture (Lynch and Eilers 1992);

(5) Music transferred from one culture needs to have a certain degree of authenticity when presented to students of another culture. I have written about this extensively (Palmer 1992), but suffice it here to say that it is injurious to the music and the culture when the music is altered, adapted and simplified for didactic reasons. Take, for example, monodic songs, accompany them with Western harmonies on piano, and force their asymmetrical rhythms into even Western measures; both their indigenous intonations and rhythmic variations will disappear. The result is Western music with exotic flavorings, not the art of another culture. While there are problems with authenticity as soon as music is removed from a culture, so long as one stays alert to the dangers of didactic adaptation, it is possible to keep a sufficiency of the original to make the transfer worthwhile.

(6) The final item to be addressed requires comprehensive discussion. Because "...people reared in different cultures learn to learn differently (Hall 1959, 53)," it follows that the resultant mental behavior is unique and life is experienced in a different way. Therefore, in my opinion, this leads us to an important aspect of any methodology that incorporates music from one culture into another. Since the learning system is inextricably bound with the music system in a culture, and our interest is in the truth produced by the total content of a culture, then adopting the learning system becomes an imperative. In other words, if we are not learning music from the culture's point of view we are not learning their truths of existence. While total adoption is quite impossible for many obvious reasons, the importation of music from other cultures should be accompanied with the culture's process of teaching and learning to the greatest degree possible in the new setting. The cultural and musical values embedded in this process would be lost were the methodology of teaching and learning altered. Concepts of the culture lie in relationships of students and teachers, methods of presentation and study, and labels of the phenomena transferred from teacher to pupil.

I offer three examples. The first is the Hawaiian Studies program presently operating in the Hawaii public schools. Since most classroom teachers, non-Hawaiian, are not authentic practitioners of the culture, although they are quite familiar with much of traditional Hawaiian culture, they cannot be relied upon to educate the students according to the espoused goals, which are quite clear. They are to help all students,

Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian, in grades K–12 develop knowledge, understanding, appreciation and internalization of fundamental aspects of Hawaiian culture including values, concepts, practices, history and language which will be of value to people trying to live happy, productive and culturally enriched lives in harmony with [the] island environment (Hawaii State Department of Education 1985, II-5).
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These goals are achieved through the *kupuna* program. A *kupuna* is an elder in Hawaiian culture, one who has not only wisdom but much knowledge and skill. Presently, there are 365 *kupuna* who go into the public schools from the community to assist the classroom teacher and to teach the students what they know of Hawaiian culture, from a Hawaiian point of view, and through traditional Hawaiian methods.

A second example is the experience that Timothy Rice encountered in his study of Bulgarian music (Rice 1994, Ch. 4). His Western training had to be considerably modified to eventually learn to play the gaida (bagpipe). When Rice asked for lessons on the gaida and was refused, he realized that "...the tradition was learned but not taught (65)." The musicians' knowledge "existed beyond verbalization" (66). Learning ornamentation was particularly difficult. As Rice states,

> The problem was that village musicians possessed little vocabulary to describe the structuring of either melody or ornamentation. Whatever cognitive structures and conceptions the musicians acquired were nonverbal and expressed entirely in the music itself. To understand what concepts were necessary to play this music and how they were acquired, I could not turn to cognitive anthropology, the usual way to approach a so-called emic or insider understanding, because there was little speech about music to guide the enquiry. Even [though my teacher] had learned a Western musical vocabulary for melody, mode, and rhythm, [he] could not teach or explain the ornamentation. It would have to come on its own, just as it did for boys in the village (Rice 1994, 72).

Rice concludes that, "Understanding another world of meanings and experience is not a matter of simply observing and arranging words into taxonomies and contrasting pairs, but of expanding the researchers' horizons to include interpretations and meanings that help to account for other's behaviors (88)."

For the third example, I will speak from personal participation, my introduction to gagaku music. I experienced somewhat the same inability as Rice in my efforts to penetrate the learning of Japanese gagaku music because conceptual language was not available to answer my questions. When I first entered the UCLA ensemble, under the direction of a Japanese Imperial Court musician, Suenobu Togi, I took off my shoes dutifully before stepping on the dais in the rehearsal room. My first three months were spent in asking typically Western questions about the music and privately questioning a very uncharacteristic method of rehearsing, a playing through from beginning to end without stops for corrections. A shrug of the shoulders was the response to, what I thought, were penetrating questions. For example, "Why are we (the shō players) playing an f-sharp when the ryutegi is playing an f-natural?" and "Is there improvisation in gagaku?" After three months of getting few answers, I decided to observe. It was then that I noticed there was instruction being given in a quiet but firm way between our playings-through. I learned a great amount by listening to what was thought to be casual
conversation, for example, that the works were carefully chosen for the ease with which they could be assimilated by Western students. The more I kept quiet and gave more energy to aural and visual observation, the more I also stopped counting in the usual Western method of keeping track of meter. I began to feel and to observe aurally and visually that there was a temporal order even to the very elastic last beat of the four-beat pulse. To my sense, I began to get inside the music from a Japanese point of view. When I now removed my shoes and stepped over the dais, my sensitivities and appreciation increased for the activity practiced there. The ultimate satisfaction came when we rehearsed on stage for the end-of-year concert. We were in larger environs and I could not only see everyone in the ensemble but could hear them much more clearly. Suddenly, as though there were no preparation for this event, gagaku music fell into place as a seemingly simple, but intricately and subtly constructed, musical genre. From that time on, I could begin to predict what the next shô chord would be because I now heard how it followed and supported the melody. The Japanese notation in my book was not just a jumble of difficult to decipher symbols but was a melody in itself, for Japanese music is frequently heterophonic.

Later, in Japan, I applied this experience of being a willing learner in a different way, ever alert to the subtleties of instruction. For example, the tempo of a piece—mine always seemed to be too fast unless I took time to settle down before I played—and the feel of a proper application of ma—that space of time between tones—were especially heightened studying hichiriki instead of shô. The feature of ma is especially evident as a structural element in the easily heard melodic parts. Not only was tempo extremely important but the silences within the phrase were essential to the Japanese expression. I practiced these diligently with tapes and kept my attention focussed during every lesson. Consequently, I became much more sensitive to the phenomenon.

Another important aspect of learning through the process of the culture’s way of teaching their own music has to do with language. Language conjures up a conceptual framework in subtle and covert ways. Hall reports that the Hopi, for example, do not have words in their language for indicating verb tense. The relationship between the speaker and the event gives the complete picture of when and how the event occurred (Hall 1983, 35). Language reflects belief about life in the world. Traditional cultures as varied as those in the Pacific, like Hawaii, and those of sub-Saharan Africa do not have separate words for music and dance (Roberts, H. 1967, 164; Bebey 1975, 12).

Like language, music, as cultural artifact, has a quality about it that strongly suggests we examine the view of reality and truth through the labels and symbols that the culture assigns to musical process and product. Language lends insight to how the culture thinks about sounds and their organization. For example, when the term octave is used in the West for two tones at a 2:1 ratio, it is with the tacit but crucial understanding that a heptatonic scale exists, and that numbers are the basis for designating scale degrees, the repeat of the first tone being number
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eight or octave. Further, equitempered tuning is implied. When the terms high and low are used to designate pitches, it is also a Western psychological interpretation of musical phenomena, repeated in the values placed on staff notation. Other cultures have their own terms and their own conceptualizations of the same phenomenon. For example, traditional Korean music employs the terms ch’ongsōng (meaning clear and standing for above), and t’aksōng (meaning rough, unpolished and standing for below), both describing the 2:1 ratio phenomenon. Javanese musicians use the term gembyang for the phenomenon of the 2:1 ratio because the slendro scale is not heptatonic and pelog scales, while heptatonic, are not conceptualized in that manner. The pelog form is still fundamentally a pentatonic structure with two additional tones acting as subsidiary to the core tones. Therefore, the word octave is simply an inaccurate concept. They also use alit (small) and ageng (large) analogous to Western high and low, a conceptually different but also psychologically accurate description of the same phenomenon. To put terminology in perspective, it is as though we related our pitches to the horizontal keyboard on piano and asked the student to play the tone to the right or left as the case may be, rather than higher or lower.

Upon examining language as it is used to designate specific concepts or objects, there seems to be a strong indication that our understanding of the world is encased in the words that we use. The well-known dictum of “starting where the student is” may have to be revised with regard to language. Using new designations of language may not be antithetical to taking students from their present experience. What is required is that we think more clearly about their experience level and connect with that, rather than with the words used to designate the experience.

Summary and Conclusions

In laying out a broad plan for expanding the music education curriculum to a world base, there is much more to the process than simply including music from other cultures, performing it in Western intonations and rhythms, with readily found accompanying instruments. Authenticity is an important consideration, for if musics from other cultures lose their appearance as sound phenomena, they lose the essential characteristics that identify them with a specific people in time and place. Moreover, it is the thesis of this paper that ultimately, meanings of music must be sought so that other peoples’ music can form the channel through which we understand life’s experiences from their point of view. Finally, the culture of a people is embedded in the learning systems of their music. To be effective in a transevaluation of musical values, learning processes, to the extent possible, must accompany the music of any culture in its transfer to new habitats.

It is my conclusion that the new paradigm represents an advance in the investigation of what it means to be human. Moreover, it is more easily embraced when one considers that the
traditional paradigm need not be displaced completely but can be materially aided by a new view, by a reconfigured constellation of beliefs. One motivation for this study has been to enhance the understanding of the new and its attributes so that, upon examination, reconciliation between the traditional and new paradigms might be achieved.

Accepting the new paradigm means striving to keep the context of the original musical impulse, discovering meanings, and recognizing that music represents value choices in structure and use, all relative to the culture in which the music flourishes. (After all, this applies to Western music as well.) If those in the traditional paradigm can be moved to accept that those interested in a wider spectrum of music representing the whole of humanity are not anti-Western music, we will make a leap of considerable distance to advance the whole cause of music in the schools. First, we must both agree that music making is a human activity the world over; that everyone can make music and to a high and worthwhile degree; that music making sheds light on our life experiences both individually and in groups; that all music is valuable because those in each culture making music in their various ways reflect their needs and aspirations, their beliefs and hopes; that music making is a way of learning more about ourselves and our relation to others and the world; and finally and not least, that making music is an extremely satisfying activity in itself, both individually and communally. To close, if those of the traditional and new paradigms agree to be inclusive and strive to make music making in any tradition a normal daily activity, then the educational advantage achieved will be nothing short of revolutionary.

REFERENCES


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Anthony J. Palmer


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NOTES

1. This paper is a refinement of ideas explored earlier (Palmer 1975).

2. Your attention is called to the Pre-Conference Symposium on Multicultural Musics held by MENC in Washington, D.C., in 1990, and the numerous books and tapes that are in the MENC catalog covering multicultural subjects. Also, I recognize that many universities offer courses in the histories of rock and roll, and jazz, and world musics courses that can be taken as electives or general education core courses.

3. I must express some amusement here because one text, Foundations of Music Education (Abeles, et al., 1994), devotes two and one-half pages out of 400 to multicultural music, relying heavily on Joyce Jordan’s article in Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning (Colwell 1992), on multicultural music. Fully twenty-five percent of Jordan’s article was taken from my doctoral dissertation (Palmer 1975). Also, Richard Colwell, as editor, might have chosen a recognized authority to write the article. There are a number of music educators quite knowledgeable about the movement.

4. The word paradigm is chosen here carefully and purposefully, borrowed from the well-known science historian, Thomas S. Kuhn (Kuhn 1970, 10ff). The great German theologian, Hans King, expands the use of Kuhn’s paradigm, talking of paradigm change in describing “epochal, broad-scale temporal upheavals,” further distinguishing among various magnitudes of change that he refers to as macro-, meso-, and microparadigms (Küng 1988, 125).

5. See footnote 2 above. In addition to the Pre-Conference Symposium, other important events not necessary to list for the purposes of this paper have been held during the past three decades. Also, publications have been issued that speak to world musics. For example, MENC published the landmark issue of the Music Educators Journal, edited by an ethnomusicologist, Barbara Smith, dedicated to the subject of world musics in music education (MENC 1972). Philosophically, however, the idea of world musics still remains adjunct rather than a means of transforming our views of human beings and music.

6. The transmission process can be defined as instruction being given from a knowledgeable source to the recipient in a top-down authoritative fashion (Miller and Sellers 1985, 5-6).

7. For a discussion on integration of object and subject, see Palmer 1994.

8. A distinction from ethnic may be helpful. Ethnic involves race while culture does not. The people of former Yugoslavia are ethnically identical but culturally different because of religion. The same might be said for Jews and Arabs who are both Semitic but distinguishable because of religion and culture. (Also see Palmer 1975, 24-40).

9. See Hall 1959: "Formal activities are taught by precept and admonition. The adult mentor molds the young according to patterns he himself has never questioned (69)." "Informal learning is of an entirely different character...The principal agent is a model used for imitation. Whole clusters of related activities are learned at a time, in many cases without the knowledge that they are being learned at all or that there are patterns or rules governing them (70)." "Technical learning, in its pure form, is close to being a one-way street. It is usually transmitted in explicit terms from the teacher to the student, either orally or in writing. Often it is preceded by a logical analysis and proceeds in coherent outline form (71-72)."

10. See Hall 1983: "...complex societies organize time in at least two different ways: events scheduled as separate items—one thing at a time—as in North Europe, or following the Mediterranean model of involvement in several things at once. The two systems are logically and empirically quite distinct (42-43)."
11. The Smithsonian Institution, by an act of Congress, is establishing the National Museum of the American Indian. The letter of solicitation for charter memberships reads, "...Indian culture did not vanish with the buffalo...[It] has survived tenaciously against all attempts to eradicate it" (Smithsonian Institution letter n.d. [1994]).

12. After reading Evolution's End, I believe it can be reasonably conjectured that the brain develops and matures according to the experience of the individual; therefore, life within a given culture produces a significantly different human being in terms of how one thinks and acts (Pearce 1992).

13. There are, of course, exceptions to this where music is imitative of language through tonal patterns and onomatopoeia that have ready references in the real world (e.g., see Bebey 1975, 92ff).

14. Bamboo bamboo are made of long hollow bamboo stalks of varying lengths that when struck on the ground make a hollow, pitched sound consistent with their size, as well as one beaten against the other for percussive sounds. Several of these together create a formidable sound.

15. Two schools of hula exist, the kahiko (traditional) and the 'auana (modern). Both are taught, for example, at the University of Hawaii at Manoa; also, many halau (hula schools) teach one or both of the forms. The kahiko is an attempt to revive all aspects of the ancient hula which includes chant. While chant can be performed alone, hula cannot be done without music.

16. One session at the 1994 biennial meeting of MENC featured Native American music that "could be used to teach 6/8." Firstly, to use other musics to teach Western music is a violation of the other music. Secondly, the musical example played was not at all in 6/8 as it would normally be understood in Western music because the stresses were entirely inappropriate to that meter. (See MENC 1994).

17. The idea of a gap scale (pentatonic, etc.) is in reference to a heptatonic structure with the Greek letter names a through g: gaps cannot exist without something missing. See Curt Sachs for an extensive discussion of the problems ethnomusicologists first faced in assessing tuning and for discussions of various scales outside the Western system (Sachs 1962, Ch. 1; Sachs 1943, Sections III and IV).

18. This comes from discussions with Professors Byongwon Lee, Korean musician, and Hardja Susilo, Indonesian dancer and musician, both ethnomusicologists at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

19. Eloise Ristad has a revealing discussion on improving a student's understanding of notation by turning the score to correspond to the piano keyboard (Ristad 1982).
A RESPONSE TO REIMER AND PALMER

John Shepherd, Carleton University

The papers by Reimer and Palmer concern themselves with the relationship between music and humanity, and how an exploration of this relationship can enhance the value and success of music education. The relationship is approached in different ways, however. Reimer is concerned with profundity in music, with the question of what it is that music—at its deepest—can bring to human experience. He is concerned with what it is that music can most characteristically contribute to the condition of being human, how an understanding of this contribution can better inform music education practices, and how further research in music education can lead to a better understanding of this contribution. Palmer, by contrast, concentrates less on the individual. His concern is with the breadth that explorations of musics from different cultures can bring to an understanding of the human condition as that condition is experienced in different cultures. As Palmer says, "if we can discover some new viewpoint, some new prospect or perspective, some rare insight, in one culture that does not exist in our own, then we stand the chance that our horizons as part of the human family will be expanded and we will benefit from the new knowledge."

Reimer’s paper is particularly welcome in that it concentrates our thinking on a question which I believe is becoming more urgent in all of musicology’s subdisciplines. That question has to do with the human in music, music in humanity, and music as a signifying practice. To speak colloquially, it is the question of: "What’s it all about?" The way in which Reimer approaches this question is also important. He does not approach it as an arid question in aesthetics. He approaches it with passion, with a sense that music has something especially significant to contribute to humanity, and with a sense that we ignore understanding the character of that contribution at our own peril. If this is the case, then music education has a heavy responsibility. Palmer’s paper is also welcome. If music education is to take this responsibility seriously, then it must recognize that there is more than one way of being musical, both in our society and in the world at large. To ignore this fact in McLuhan’s "global village" or—to put it slightly but not completely differently—in this postmodern world, is to operate in music education with a particularly narrow and impoverished sense of what it is to be human and what it is to be musical. It seems to me, then, that both scholars engage the same agenda from different, but equally valuable directions. To ignore this agenda from either direction would, it seems to me, be morally unacceptable.

I wish to establish this point of agreement because it is important. We are all engaged or interested in music education because it has a particular importance. We believe, I think, that
music is in some, perhaps unspecified or unspecifiable way, special, that what is special about it is of central importance to humanity, that this special, central importance is either ignored or marginalised by the society in which we live, and that music educators as a consequence have an important duty to inculcate a strong sense of this special and central character of music in the bodies and minds of young people. However, I wish also to establish this point of agreement because I will now differ in some significant ways from the positions that the two papers advance. The purpose of establishing these differences is to further the agenda to which they both subscribe.

Reimer successfully identifies three components that contribute to profundity in music: (1) the individual who has the experience; (2) the context in which the experience takes place; and (3) the musical stimulus for the experience. As Reimer observes, not much is known about the relations between these three components, a fact that inhibits an adequate understanding of profundity in music. The three components must interrelate, says Reimer, "in ways we know much too little about, if a deep musical experience is to take place. Certainly we know a great deal about individuals in relation to music. We also know a lot about musical contexts and about music itself. But," he concludes, "we know these things as largely or entirely unconnected to each other at the level of how the three must connect to induce experiences of musical profundity." Reimer goes on to identify the cause of this omission. It is "because we have not examined sufficiently, with the seriousness and carefulness and applicability it deserves, the issue of how music education practices might affect, directly and significantly, the depth of musical experience we hope our students will attain."³

This examination, in itself, is a laudable undertaking. In suggesting that it cannot itself throw light on the problematics of musical profundity as set out by Reimer, I am not suggesting either that it can throw no light. However, I believe that what is needed to better understand profundity in music is not more empirical work or, for that matter, greater and more sophisticated manipulation of aesthetic categories. What is needed, to paraphrase Reimer, is to develop "sufficiently, with the seriousness and carefulness and applicability it deserves," a theorisation of the relationships between music, the individual and the context in which the musical experience takes place. It is at this point that Palmer's paper becomes relevant. Palmer seems to be persuaded that both music and individuals are cultural in character. Palmer's intriguing and revealing description of his initiation into Japanese gagaku music demonstrates the initial tensions that can occur between an individual socialised and constituted through one set of cultural norms as they encounter music structured and constituted through another. Reimer's reference to John Blacking's difficulties in drumming sufficiently well to induce trance provides another example of a similar tension at work.

An understanding of cultural context might therefore provide the ground necessary to connect successfully Reimer's three components for profundity in music. However, there are two problems associated with attempting such an understanding, problems which are apparent
Response to Reimer and Palmer

in Palmer’s paper. The first is that music is seen as somehow reflective, rather than constitutive, of cultural processes. In Palmer’s words, “music is reflective of the deep structures of existence in our response to time, to sounds in the environment, to natural phenomena as they shape our daily existence and to the perceived or imagined noumena that control the universe and its inhabitants.” The second is that culturalist explanations of music customarily have little room for the individual in musical processes. I do not mean by this that culturalist approaches do not recognize and appreciate the role of individuals in music. I mean that understandings of music in culture usually go no further than theorising music as an aspect or product of culture. There is little or no theorisation of the individual in relation to culture or, for that matter, music. Culture tends to be reified, assumed to be a unified and undifferentiated presence resulting in an amazingly consensual view of the world. Culture, the individual and music seem to fit together comfortably, perhaps too comfortably. We are back, paradoxically perhaps, with Reimer’s original problem: how to connect the three components that contribute to musical profundity while, presumably, allowing them a measure of distinctiveness as components.

The kind of approach Reimer’s paper represents has its own problems, however. I wish to highlight these problems by comparing three statements. The first is the person listening to Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 6 for the first time, reported by Reimer from the work of Gabrielsson and Lindström:

...in certain passages it evokes sobs and I feel totally crushed—my listening is fully concentrated, the rest of the world disappears in a way, and I become merged in the music or the music in me, it fills me so completely. I also get physical reactions...wet eyes, a breathing that gets sobbing in certain passages, a feeling of crying in my throat and chest. Trying to find words for the emotions themselves, I would like to use words as: crushed, shaken, tragedy, maybe death, absorption, but also tenderness, longing, desire (vain), a will to live, prayer. The whole experience also has the character of a total standstill, a kind of meditative rest, after which nothing else can follow.

The second is from Gabrielsson and Lindström’s analysis of this statement and many others like it: "On the whole...most people do not talk very much about musical details in describing their SEM [strong experience of music]...A music-analytic attitude, common among musicians, is abandoned in favour of an ‘open,’ receptive attitude." Gabrielsson reinforces this conclusion in another publication when he says that "there were surprisingly few references to the musical structure and little use of music terms in the descriptions, even among musicians." The third is Susan McClary reflecting on why people listen to music:

Most people care about music because it resonates with experiences that otherwise go unarticulated, whether it is the flood of cathartic release that occurs at the climax of a Tchaikovsky symphony or the groove that causes one’s body to dance—that is, to experience
itself in a new way. Yet our music theorists and notational systems do everything possible to mask those dimensions of music that are related to physical human experience and focus instead on the orderly, the rational, the cerebral. The fact that the majority of listeners engage with music for more immediate purposes is frowned upon by our institutions.

It is clear that Reimer is not caught within the climbing-frame of notation in his exploration of the experience of profundity in music. He is explicit on the importance of the body in mediating this experience, especially in the classroom. However, it might well be that Reimer is caught within the prison-house of language, within traditional discourses of the aesthetic which owe their formulation so much to the predominance of a particular style and role of language within the academy. In attempting to grasp the experience of profundity Reimer refers to Dortner’s notion of the "metaphoric," to Goldman’s notion of "an alternative world," to White’s "simulacrum of reality," to Dufrenne’s "affective aspects of what is real," and to Harrell’s notion of profundity as "something that is hidden from view." In all these formulations music seems to become something that is beyond reality, a reality made up of concrete people, artifacts, events and ideas, a reality eminently graspable and expressible through language, a reality to which and of which music has nothing directly to say. If this is so, then Reimer is, indeed, attempting to grasp the ineffable. He, with the aestheticians, is attempting to grasp profundity through a particular use of a medium—language—which is inherently unsuited to the task as defined. I want to be very careful what I am saying here. I am not saying that language is incapable of accessing the profound in music. I am saying that if music is taken to lie outside a certain kind of reality, and if language is taken to equate with that reality, then no amount of tinkering with aesthetic categories as conceived and formulated within this equation of reality and language will lead to an understanding of the profound in music. It cannot be admitted within the terms of the hegemony currently achieved through language—and a particular form of language at that—in the academic world. Neither, however, can it be allowed to challenge this hegemony. It must exist out there, in a nether region, permanently mystified and inaccessible to the concrete and reasoned understanding it so badly needs.

The conundrum Reimer faces can be summarised as follows. On the one hand, the apprehension of many musicologists, music educators and aestheticians is that if music is taken to be constituted socially and culturally—to be explicable in terms of its actual use in concrete, everyday situations—then musicality and individuality will be legislated away, flattened conceptually as they are made to serve other agendas. A cursory glance at the fruits of culturalist approaches to understanding music from within ethnomusicology and English language cultural studies will justifiably reinforce these apprehensions, as will a cursory glance at the fruits of the French language tradition of poststructuralism and psychoanalytic theory. On the other hand, attempting to keep alive notions of individuality and musicality within a more liberal-humanist approach (wherein it is assumed that individuals creatively author their utterances) results in the problems just identified in Reimer’s paper: music and individual aesthetic experience end up lying outside the realm of reality and outside the ability of language
to fathom them. A different approach is required if we are to proceed further with an understanding of profundity in music as that profundity finds expression through the many different ways there are of being musical and cultural in this world.

This is not the occasion to engage in that particular exploration. In saying this, however, I am not simply avoiding difficult questions. The exploration is being undertaken and meaningful answers are, I believe, being formulated. Of more importance here is to realize what is at stake in these undertakings, and this takes me back to my opening remarks. We cannot allow music in music education—whether at the primary, secondary or post-secondary levels—to remain an aesthetic object on the shelves of academia. Music—even ‘classical music’—lives in the real world, as the references adduced by Reimer so poignantly testify. Music of all kinds must therefore be understood in the lived contexts of their articulation and reception as pervasively social and cultural in character. However, this social and cultural character must be understood and conceptualized with reference to the specific qualities of music as a signifying practice. Music cannot and must not be reduced to the condition of the ‘social’ or the ‘cultural’ in being understood as a phenomenon that is intrinsically social and cultural, that is, in other words, social and cultural in its own ways. In the same way that it is necessary to free music from the prison-houses of the ‘other-worldly,’ the ‘social’ and the ‘cultural,’ it is necessary to make aesthetics, sociology and cultural studies answer to the specific, concrete, material conditions of music. If we do not achieve this, there will be much that is lost in our understanding of humanity, and much that is lost in our ability to use music in education—to use John Blacking’s words—"to promote soundly organized humanity by enhancing human consciousness."10

NOTES


2. By ‘musicology’ I mean here the English language equivalent of the German ‘Musikwissenschaft,’ that is to say, the whole of the academic study of music including historical musicology, music theory, music analysis, ethnomusicology, music education, the sociology and aesthetics of music and musicological approaches to popular music studies.


5. Ibid., 13.


I recently came across a review of a piece I wrote a few years back advocating a pluralistic orientation to music education. Among the reviewer's comments was the remark that the view I was advocating was not only pluralistic but relativistic. That characterization intrigued me. Had it been intended in a pejorative sense? What was the term relativism intended to connote that pluralism did not? I recalled Monroe Beardsley's distinction between relativism and particularism, and his apparent conviction that the latter was the more untenable extreme. Still, it seemed to me, being called a relativist did not exactly sound like high praise. Whatever Einstein may have achieved by way of tolerance for the idea of relativity among scientists, relativism remains a largely negative characterization in philosophical circles, particularly when it comes to epistemological, aesthetic, and moral concerns.

At the same time, I reflected, "relative" seems a reasonably apt label for many of the views I was advancing and for much of what I have come to believe about music and music education. What is it that worries people so about relativism? Exactly what is it that makes relativism seem so menacing? With these questions in mind, I decided to tentatively accept the relativist epithet and see what might be said in its defense. What follows is the preliminary result of that effort. I acknowledge a significant debt to recent writings by Richard Rorty. Any brilliant insights will be his, and any confusion, mine.

I.

First, why be concerned about relativism or pluralism or whatever we eventually agree to call it? My personal interest in the issue has evolved from rather frustrating efforts to make many of music education's "stock" claims about the nature and value of music articulate with some of my own musical experiences. It comes, as well, from personal discomfort with claims to musical absolutes, universals, essential attributes, intrinsic worth, transcendental value, and so forth, each of which are features of what we now casually designate the "aesthetic" rationale for music education. On these views, there is a level on which all musics (or all musics properly so called) are basically of one cloth, doing essentially the same thing. Behind the diverse and divergent sonorous presences claiming musical status, then, lie characteristics that
are universal and intrinsically musical, and for which all human ears and minds are more or less hard-wired. Since these universals (or "essences," or "absolute" qualities) supposedly underlie all our various musical doings, they are often held to yield criteria that enable us to discriminate good musics from less good musics (the latter presumably capturing fewer of music's essential features, and more of its contingent ones).

Essentialism, universalism, and absolutism share the common conviction there is a basic or foundational job it is music's to do: to represent or reveal aspects of the world, for instance; or to give us insight into particular features of "reality" or of human nature or of the forms of feeling. The particulars of the job description vary, but the assumption that all musical doings can be subsumed by a comprehensive, all-embracing theory about its nature and value does not. Each shares the basic form: Music and music education are important because all music is or does 'x'. There is, in short, a foundational level on which all music deserving of the name is alike.6

But all music? For all time? For all possible people, born and unborn? I would encourage us to entertain the possibility that there may be no essence of music, only a constellation of sonorous human doings we find convenient to call by that name; that the difference between music and pre- or non-musical sound is acquired and exchangeable currency rather than hard-wired essence. I prefer to think of music as a field of activity, fluid and unstable. Its uses are not distinct from its "genuine" meaning, or from what music is "in itself" (whatever that might mean). I have come to believe that the ideas of intrinsic or absolute musical meaning and value are simply more trouble than they are worth. What is more, this level on which all musics are the same sounds suspiciously like Platonic metaphysics, the need for which we ought by now to have outgrown. It purports to be a point of view without perspective, a knowledge independent of a knower, a way music simply and purely "is," independent of human or extramusical contaminants.

Not only is the notion of a perspective-less perspective nonsense, its associated doctrines subtly privilege certain musics over others by implying their value is rooted in culturally transcendent features, rather than being products of acculturation. This idea of intrinsically musical values, values found rather than made, presumes to objectify a certain range of value judgments, to remove them from the influence of the ideological and political realm of human interaction. Judgments grounded in intrinsically or essentially musical features are untainted by the vacillations and contingencies of the human condition. To the extent they transcend acculturation, they claim universal validity.

Now this is not unlike the dubious notion that everybody everywhere knows what an attractive person looks like. Neither that nor the claim to musical universals stand up under close scrutiny. We can hear practically anything as music under the proper conditions, and even the most elegant musical composition can be experienced as noise. The practices and intentions
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which permeate and situate musical doings define what counts as intrinsic and extrinsic; and these practices and intentions are not uniform but multiple. The quest for universals and essences is, as Wittgenstein said, like stripping away the leaves of an artichoke in pursuit of the real artichoke.

The aesthetic ideals of purposelessness, conceptlessness, formal integrity, autonomy, fierce attentiveness, and all the rest are themselves features of a culturally specific and ideologically loaded perspective. There is no "all" of music; no final resting place toward which it is inexorably progressing; no essence of music that is separate from the way our words and actions situate it; no music that is noncontextually meaningful, ahistorically significant, free of the contingencies of the sociopolitical world of human interaction. In short, there is no "objective," value free point outside of culture and acculturation from which we can scrutinize the "whole" of music. The nature and value of music are inescapably plural, inextricably intertwined in the webs of beliefs and desires and modes of human interaction that constitute our respective cultures. Music does not have a nature, only a history. More accurately, musics do not have intrinsic nature and value, only histories.

I believe that hierarchical models on which all music does the same thing with varying degrees of success are remnants of a world view that has been rocked by a cognitive shift no less profound than the one precipitated by Copernicus. Thinkers from Kant to Hegel to Darwin to Wittgenstein have made it exceedingly difficult to accept monolithic accounts of "reality," of "human nature," and so forth. Essentialism has had its ethnocentric and linguistic roots laid bare. Absolutes have become irreversibly qualified by context, history, and other contingencies. Transcendental notions of eternal truths, laws, and values have been increasingly forced to yield to horizontal, pluralistic accounts on which our beliefs and desires are extensively shaped by the ways we interact with and adapt to what is going on in our corner of the world. I believe that in music, too, the essentialist vision and its corollary ambition to transcendence are things that more and more of us are profitably learning to do without, opting instead for philosophical accounts better able to do justice to the profound diversity and multiplicity of musical doings.

In certain respects this view is relativistic. That such a concession is menacing, however, would only occur to someone who continues to nurse the absolutist hope that an alternative is possible. The specter of relativism, Rorty suggests, most disturbs people in the market for "quick fixes and knock-down arguments." To those of us who are wary or just downright distrustful of such indulgences, "relative" is just a reasonably persuasive description of the way things seem to be from our late twentieth century perspective: one that, whatever its difficulties, manages to avoid many of the metaphysical extravagances and pitfalls that traditional theorizing has so often implicated. It is primarily the lingering notion that there somewhere exists an all or essence of music (to which our preferred musics enjoy a privileged relation) that engenders fear of relativism. Lose that notion and much of the apprehensiveness goes with it.
II.

As I say, I am willing to try on the relativist's hat to see how it feels and fits. I suspect, however, that "anti-essentialism" or "anti-foundationalism" (or just plain pragmatism) might more accurately describe my philosophical orientation. I say this because I do not so much have a theory as to what all music is or must be (i.e., "relative"), as I want to renounce the essentialist notions of absolutes and cultural transcendence. My positive conviction is that there are myriad ways for musics to be, myriad values they may have. I am not comfortable sorting them by means of binary value schemes called intrinsic and extrinsic. I am willing to concede that my musical beliefs and values may not work for different musics and different people. Only, unlike our realist or absolutist colleagues, I don't believe that concession undermines the validity of my beliefs and values. Acknowledging the relativity or the cultural specificity of my musical values doesn't mean I hold them any less firmly or enthusiastically. They work for me and others like me, and that's good enough. You won't hear me boast of being a relativist, because that doesn't strike me as a particularly salient feature of my view. It's more incidental. I do want to think, however, that I can get on very nicely without claiming ultimacy and that there are good reasons for trying to do so.

I concur with Rorty's assessment, then, that "relativism" is often just the realist's pejorative label for pragmatism, and that it is primarily people who nostalgically cling to the possibility of non-contingent (objective, absolute) truths, goods, and beauties who find contingency frightening. To the rest of us, contingency is not evil or degenerate, it is simply a reasonably apt description of our experience. "Relativism" only stings if one assumes there is an accessible non-relative alternative out there somewhere. Essences and absolutes are conceptual habits, as Nietzsche said, made by long use to seem "firm, canonical, and obligatory." The temptation to privilege our own habitual modes of response, our own patterns of belief and desire is natural one. It has a familiar name: ethnocentrism. Like relativism, I think ethnocentrism has had a bad rap. There's no particular reason to worry about it so long as we don't become imperialistic about things. But this is just what the essentialist wants to do (indeed, has to do in order to be self consistent). I prefer the more casual stance of pragmatism on which my convictions (my musical values) are simply the best I have at my disposal for the present. They may not speak to all places, people and times, but that doesn't mean I hold them diffidently or that they are somehow less substantive than the absolutist's. They are a work in progress, the result of intensive thought and experience still ongoing. I believe they are justified and justifiable and will be delighted to try and persuade you to my point of view. But I don't presume my convictions, values, and point of view obtain for all musics, everywhere, for all times.

To come at the same issue from a slightly different perspective, ethnocentrism and acculturation are unavoidable. We have little alternative but to live by our own lights, to privilege our own point of view. All musical values are thus culturally and historically situated.
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They are fully meaningful only relative to the sociocultural frameworks within which they exist, fully intelligible only in relation to the priorities implicit in particular styles and genres. Judgments of the value of others' musics are always made through the lenses of our own experience, and we cannot simply set these aside in order to neutrally ("objectively") assess the worth of others. As Rorty is fond of reminding, we cannot shed all point of view in order to adjudicate rival claims. There is no sky hook that can hoist us out of the universe of human cultural interaction in order to objectively weigh and compare one another's webs of values and beliefs in non-human terms. Nor is it possible to value all musics equally, a point that is significant in light of the common misconception that relativism necessarily neutralizes all value claims, making assertions of musical value arbitrary and indefensible.

The pragmatist is not saying that every music is beautiful in its own way. In fact, she is not particularly interested in determining what music "is" (once and for all) at all. Only a god, someone capable of stepping completely outside the human world, could make such a determination. The pragmatist simply wants to judge musics in light of their various uses and purposes. If we can replace the knowledge-opinion split, the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, with the idea of culturally appropriated webs of belief (or replace the need for apparent objectivity with intersubjectivity), we shall have come a long way to curing ourselves of the quest for universal criteria of musical worth: standards to which all musics properly so-called must conform. Again, the pragmatist may be said to hold a relativistic view, but it is not what Rorty calls "silly relativism" in which there exist no defensible standards of choice and there are as many possible definitions of music as there are instances of it in the world. The pragmatist is simply one who is content to conceive musics and musical values in terms of their relevance to certain purposes, renouncing the quest for universal criteria as a metaphysical goose chase not worth the effort and trouble it causes.

David Best has had a bit to say about relativism that may be helpful in sorting things out here. The relativist's mistake, he says, is in assuming that all realities (musics) are equally available to all, and that they are pretty much whatever one chooses them to be. It is not a matter of choosing, he insists, but rather of "learning a language and the natural responses and actions which give sense to it." Elsewhere, he suggests that to posit a separate category called relativism is to misconstrue the character of rationality or objectivity, since these too are "relative to their grounds of learned natural action or response." These comments draw on two different senses of the term relativism. The first is Rorty's "silly relativism," a view to which neither Best nor Rorty nor I adhere, and one Best speaks against very persuasively. It is indeed a mistake, but is not a position that any musically educated or sensitive person takes seriously. Best's other "relativism" is simply the pragmatic concession that relativity does appear to be a salient feature of musical practices. Best argues vigorously that this concession does not preclude the possibility of objectivity, although his argument depends upon a rather different notion of what it means to be "objective." Best's objectivity is not one that claims to by-pass human and historical contingency. It simply means "object-directed," or capable of

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support by reference to features or attributes. It is, one might say, a rather relativistic objectivity, since it does not claim to rest upon some immutable (absolute, universal) and privileged relationship to reality.

It seems to me that Best and Rorty are of the same mind here. Different musics are irrevocably situated in cultural contexts to which they owe any claims they may have to meaning and value. But that does not make their claims to value merely arbitrary or mere matters of assertion. The pragmatist is, like everyone, ethnocentric, but unlike the realist, willing to concede it. And that concession, that admission of potential fallibility, that determination to hold her values firmly yet provisionally, is not a sign of weakness but of strength. For the pragmatist, calling some particular music "good" is not an indication that it does exceptionally well what all musics everywhere do, or that it has successfully captured more essential attributes than other candidates. It is simply a compliment paid to certain sonorous doings that seem, for the time being and in present company, sufficiently apt for present purposes that they do not require strenuous justification. As I said earlier, it is the lingering notion that there is one job it is music's to do, one to which all musics may be found more or less adequate, that makes relativism a dirty word. It is thinking that there somewhere exists an all of music, and that music has an essential obligation to do or be one thing, that leads to the phobic aversion to relativism.

So far, I cannot see that relativism is particularly threatening. Indeed, there is a sense in which even the staunchest realism is relativistic, reality being a function of adequacy of correspondence to the way things "really" are. Relativity is a red herring.\(^{17}\) The real issue, it seems to me is not relativism but skepticism. Kant's recognition of the human contribution to all knowledge, Herder's recognition of the irreducibility of cultures and the diversity of "human nature,"\(^{18}\) Polanyi's insistence on the impossibility of a knowledge without perspective,\(^{19}\) and Kuhn's description of paradigm shifts within science:\(^{20}\) each of these have profoundly (and, I suspect, permanently) undermined foundationalism, absolutism, essentialism, and their cognates. But their demise does not mean all claims to musical value are mere deceptions.\(^{21}\) Nor does it mean that anyone's value claims are as good as any other's. We can still admire and honor "our" musics, and even mount compelling arguments in defense of our musical values, without claiming they are ultimate—the standards by which the worth of every music everywhere can be gauged. The educational bogey man is not the relativist but the skeptic.\(^{22}\)

III.

Absolutism, universalism, and essentialism are each various ways of describing the need apparently gratified by the attempt to stand outside all human needs. It has been suggested here
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that we can and should wean ourselves from this need. In this section I will elaborate on this idea and speculate a bit as to the potential benefits of doing so.

We must be "ethnocentric," Rorty says: but there is nothing necessarily wrong with privileging our own group, so long as we do so in a non-circular way. To be ethnocentric is simply "to divide the human race into people to whom one must justify one's beliefs and others," into we and they. "We" consists of those who share enough of ones beliefs "to make fruitful conversation possible."23 Musics play important roles in establishing and sustaining community, or what one might alternatively designate "musical home." Homes are places where we enjoy unconditional presence. They are places for us, places without them. A secure feeling of home requires suppression of differences,24 such that however expansive and inclusive it may feel, "we" implicitly requires the existence of a "they" who are for whatever reasons excluded. In musical terms, who "they" are depends upon quite a number of things; but musical homes invariably implicate musical others whom they exclude. Put differently, musics are at once the "shared prerogatives" of particular social groups and "expressions of social solidarity against others."25

Now what I think relativism or pluralism or pragmatism (call it what you will) has to teach us is that however inescapable such ideological or musical "homes" may be, however central in defining for the moment who we are as individuals and societies, they are not found, but made. This recognition does not mean we cannot cherish the particular webs of interlocking beliefs and desires into which we are acculturated. It simply means that we cannot endorse or value all possible things (musics) at once. "[W]hen you build a house of Being by speaking a language," explains Rorty, "you are automatically giving up a lot of other possible understandings of Being, and leaving a lot of differently designed houses unbuilt."26

This perspective raises interesting questions for the multicultural ideal currently in vogue, particularly if one espouses what has been designated multiculturalism of the "dynamic" variety27—if on this view it is presumed possible to get outside one's own skin and into the musical skins of others.28 If it is primarily acculturation that makes certain options live or momentous and others seem mere trivial options, and if among the goals of musical education is a depth of engagement that comes only of fluency, we must be wary of becoming purveyors of dilettantism. Musical education should enable the creation of musical homes. If at the same time musical education aspires to expanding people's range of acquaintance, to a breadth of purview complementary to the depth from which many of music education's values derive, we must neither underestimate the difficulties nor the challenges.

Still, in my view, musical education should aspire to both these orthogonal goals, to making people both broad and discriminating in their musical sensibilities. The challenge lies in creating appreciation of both socio-cultural contingency and of the difficulty of rising above it; of illuminating the existence of valid and valuable musical alternatives, without compromising
the depth of value and commitment that should also come of musical education. If one's instruction inadvertently leads to the unwarranted assumption that all musical homes are illusory and arbitrary, including one's own, students are indeed left facing a relativistic abyss.²⁹

I believe we can continue to cherish and to celebrate musical bests without recourse to a persistent "human nature" or "musical nature." Or as Rorty might have it, solidarity can be achieved and maintained politically, without resort to metaphysical musings and essentialist enterprises.³⁰

IV.

If ethnocentrism is an inevitable corollary of acculturation, and if our fondness for universals is something we can and should learn to live without, where is music education left? My preference is to leave that an open question to whose answer we all contribute, but I am prepared to offer a few tentative suggestions for us to consider. Obviously, I think we should try to get over our traditional yearning for transcendence, for 'knock them dead' musical truths. But that is the negative way of articulating something quite positive. I would suggest we strive in our general conceptions of the way things musical "are" to replace objectivity with intersubjectivity, to replace the ideal of getting things "right" in reference to absolute criteria and monolithic truths with the idea of musics as multiple and flexible webs of belief, value, and practice.

That done, we could begin to work on the liberal agenda that represents our best chance of transcending the narrowness of acculturation. In Rorty's estimation, that best chance lies in being brought up in a culture that attempts to pursue solidarity through openness, a culture that prides itself on its "tolerance for a plurality of subcultures and its willingness to listen to neighboring cultures."³¹ The objective of such an educational effort would be to extend the sense of "we," the inclusiveness of "home" as far as possible. We do not need a persistent "we" or a transhistorical metaphysical subject to ground our claims to musical value, only a temporary or local "we" that finds certain musics and musical doings relevant to particular needs in particular circumstances.³² In light of what has been said above, I hope it is clear that this does not entail a rejection of defensible criteria of choice, only a denial of absolute, intrinsic criteria whose systematic application brings us ever closer to an essential, unchanging "core" of music.

That we cannot set aside our ears and habitual modes of musical response when we encounter other musics does not mean they are profoundly inaccessible. Our respective universes of musical discourse are not incommensurate in the sense of being unsharable and unlearnable. But the absence of a culturally transcendent, aesthetic meta-level of musical discourse for which we are all hard-wired means we should probably assume (and strive to cultivate in others) more tolerant and openminded orientations to different musics than we have
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been encouraged to do by certain music educational ideologies. Notions of objectivity and
universality (of transcendental or non-relative criteria of musical value) tempt us to believe in
the mythical existence of a place where musical worth can be determined acontextually. If such
a place exists, it is not inhabited by human beings.

To say that our universes of musical discourse are culture-bound and culturally relative
takes nothing away from them except unneeded metaphysical pretensions. Perhaps the best way
to find out what musics to value or cherish, and why, is and always has been to listen to and
engage in the doing of as many alternatives (and participate in as many energetic critical
arguments about them) as possible. Musics are shared habits, doings, not convergences upon
some elusive, absolute state of being. The objective of musical education should not be escape
from the contingencies of human activity, but rather richer and better human activity. 33

V.

Since I have wandered a bit, let me return in closing to one of the questions that launched
us on this inquiry: What is it about relativism that people find so menacing? First, it seems,
the mistaken notion that relativism is necessarily skeptical or that it means all judgments of
musical worth are equally defensible (this implying, in turn, that none is ultimately defensible).
Second, the mistaken notion that relativism necessarily reduces to mere subjectivism on which,
since all value claims are mere personal assertions, anything goes. Third, the mistaken notion
that relativism necessarily implicates conceptual incoherence, irrationality, irresponsibility, even
anarchy. And fourth, the mistaken notion that relativism necessarily entails the
incommensurability of the different frameworks or interpretive schemata which, since they
constitute radically different ways of being in the world, are doomed to pass like ships in the
night. With misconceptions like these, it is hardly surprising that despite the markedly
relativistic character of most contemporary philosophy, one finds almost no one who
enthusiastically embraces the name "relativism." 34

The practical issue here is how one acknowledges variability, diversity, and contingency
without relinquishing some claim (however tentative) to authoritative and privileged insight. To
the realist, that answer is apparently that one cannot. Adherents of the
essentialist/foundationalist point of view wish to maintain that musical value is objective,
intrinsic, transcultural, transhistorical (necessarily true of all possible musics and binding upon
all competent makers or listeners). Thus, variability and contingency are viciously diversionary.
Real philosophers, they might well join Plato in saying, do not "lose themselves and wander
amid the multiplicities of multifarious things." 35

I hope it has been at least provisionally established here that relativism in at least some
of its formulations is a reasonable thesis, and one capable of avoiding many of the perils

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commonly attributed to it. It seems quite plausible that humans in different musical, social, cultural, or historical settings should employ different beliefs, preconceptions, and perceptual predilections, and that they should find these at least provisionally incommensurable—relating to differently conceived ways of construing events, of interacting, of behaving, and so on. I do not believe this concession necessarily implicates either skepticism or subjectivism. I think Rorty's idea of "ethnocentrism" serves nicely as an antidote for the former, and that intersubjectivity is a plausible alternative to the latter. As Joseph Margolis states,

...[C]ontrary to certain popular views of the doctrine, relativism need not be committed to the thesis that all alternative claims are equipotent, or that there are equipotent reasons for affirming and denying any and all particular claims, or that there is and can be no viable basis on which to decide questions of the comparative force of competing views. All relativism need concede is that judgments of comparative force are subject to whatever contingencies historicizing and praxicalizing inquiry entail...[C]ompelling judgments of superior explanatory power and the like are entirely accessible and theoretically welcome...  

Since relativity of some kind is characteristic of virtually all philosophical orientations, even of the realist and correspondence theories that view relativism with greatest dismay, it would seem that its putative viciousness has more to do with what judgments are held relative (and to what) than the notion of relativity itself. Relativism ranges from assertions of globally incommensurable paradigms and irreconcilable worlds to observations of local variability that do not defy learning and sharing. The former extreme may well be untenable, but it is not commonly held. Relativism finds universalism and its cognates implausible, but is quite capable of entertaining alternatives that do not implicate skepticism or nihilism. Defensible relativism is not a negative thesis about what things are not, but a positive thesis about the way things appear to be—one that willingly accepts its own potential fallibility, yet finds its stance preferable simply because it leads to fewer contradictions. A defensible relativism simply attempts to acknowledge the integrity of traditions (or, for our purposes here, musics) as complex and often highly differentiated problem-situations. It renounces universalism, foundationalism, and essentialism, not because of a conviction that its orientation lies closer to some ultimate truth, but because of a distaste for metaphysical labyrinths and a conviction that universal invariances are problematic in ways that general claims acknowledging contingency are not.

Earlier I alluded to a potential conflict between the concept of musics as culturally specific and the ideal of multicultural musical education: the problem of incommensurability. Although incommensurability is an issue that any relativistic philosophy must wrestle with, I do not think it is an insurmountable challenge. Replacing the troublesome ideas of mutually exclusive frameworks, paradigms, or realities with something softer and more flexible like Rorty's "webs of belief and desire" is a promising step in that task. Commenting on the excesses of Kuhn's theory of paradigmatic shifts (modeled on mutually exclusive perceptual gestalten), Margolis says:
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...[If we do not deny that communities of inquirers may, within their own conceptual horizon, overcome incommensurabilities even if they are bound to generate others in the process, if we drop the quarrelsome notion of plural actual worlds...if we admit that paradigms are not normally assignable clear boundaries, and if we treat incommensurabilities in terms of real-time constraints among [people] trying here and now to understand one another's conceptual schemes (and succeeding moderately well) rather than in terms of a principled distinction between globally incommunicable systems, then Kuhn's point is an entirely reasonable one...]

The relative significance of our musical differences is something we can scarcely ignore. But that problem worry's me less than our inclination to take the condition of one music as representative of the condition of all. Traditional attempts to ground musical value claims in the authority and consensus of the learned (primarily, those fluent in the musical idioms deemed worthy of, and legitimated by, formal study in university schools of music) have wrongly represented the values implicit in the Western canon as those to which all musics aspire. I do not suggest that these values are always and necessarily incompatible with other musics (musical styles, genres, traditions, cultures): only that the absolutism that undergirds such efforts is not particularly compelling and inevitably creates more problems than it solves. The various webs of belief, desire, and activity that we call musical are indeed relative to socio-historical contexts and frameworks. It is therefore reasonable to suspect that—at least some of the time—outsiders' charges of (for example) musical coarseness or incoherence are, at root, affirmations of their status as outsiders rather than objective "facts."

Many of the convictions I hold with regard to music are thus relativistic. But I do not subscribe to the skeptical notions that assertions of musical value are nothing but empty noises, or that different musics occupy utterly incommensurable worlds. I want to think that I can tentatively accept certain relativistic ideas (on grounds they appear to solve problems that seem to need solving without generating a host of others) yet not become "a relativist" in the pejorative sense of that phrase. The relativity of all musical endeavors is not nearly so salient a feature of my thought as is their plurality.

If by relativism is meant the doctrine that there are no rights and wrongs, no betters and worses, it is clearly incompatible with an educative agenda. It has been suggested here that relativism of this "silly" type is not widely endorsed, and that there are defensible alternatives. In fact, I am persuaded that a reasonably powerful form of relativism is not only applicable to a broad range of cognitive endeavor, but viable, resilient, and—as Margolis suggests—"probably ineliminable at the present time." Still, given the connotations of that term, it may be more fruitful to stress the positive educative goal implicit in pluralism: the development, in Michael Scriven's words, of a "proper tolerance for diversity of ideas" (read, in the present context, "musics"). Pluralism, Scriven maintains, "requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs, nor respecting the content of the beliefs." Respect for plurality, without mindless tolerance: these seem to me to be both reasonable and attainable goals for an education in music. Relativistic? Well, yes. But as I say,
relativism assumes many forms and degrees, and there is nothing particularly vicious about relativity per se. The real challenges arise in specifying what is relative to what, and under what circumstances. I think the music education profession and those of us here in particular would only benefit from that kind of inquiry.

NOTES


3. This hardly means that Beardsley endorses relativism. A close reading of pages 478-99 will make his opposition clear, as will his "The Refutation of Relativism" in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41, no. 3 (1983), 265-70. Even so, his 1983 article draws a distinction between relativistic accounts of "aesthetic goodness" and of "aesthetic qualities," the latter being less objectionable than the former. Clearly, Beardsley would concur that "relativism" encompasses a range of theories, some of which are less worrisome than others: a recurrent point in the literature.

4. It may fairly be objected that my conflation of relativity and relativism is not helpful here. I concede there is a difference, but hope that two are sufficiently related to make the general introductory point. On the difference between relativity and relativism, see Michael Krausz, "Relativism and Foundationalism," The Monist 67, no. 3 (1984), 397.

5. I will draw primarily from three sources by Rorty: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991), and Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991), all published by Cambridge University Press. Here abbreviated CIS, ORT, and EHO respectively. While Rorty has next to nothing to say about music, his ideas are replete with potential challenges for philosophy of music and music education.

6. Despite the notorious difficulties that attend demarcation of philosophical terrain into arrays of "isms," in the interest of helping the less philosophically conversant navigate some of the terminology of this paper I offer the following glossary. FOUNDATIONALISM is the conviction that we do or can have a privileged basis for cognitive certainty. ESSENTIALISM maintains the transparency of representations of the "actual" world, such that its essential or underlying character can be discerned amidst its multiplicity of presentations. UNIVERSALISM maintains, probably self-evidently, a level of invariance that undergirds the particularity of all human experience. HISTORICISM, by contrast, finds claims to universal invariance problematic specifically in view of historical and temporal contingency. Thus historicism is a relativistic orientation and one incompatible with universalism. Philosophies ranging from Hegelian to Marxist to critical theory to phenomenology (to identify but a few) are historicist in some sense. PRAXICAL (or PRAXIAL) philosophies stress not only historical but social and cultural emergence of human meanings, with special emphasis upon the centrality of human agency. Thus, both historicisms and practicalisms both disavow ABSOLUTIST notions of invariance and of socio-historical TRANSCENDENTAL facts, truths, beauties, and the like. REALISM in the form most familiar to music educators embraces foundationalist, essentialist, and universalist assumptions, as well as the notion that truth is a function of the adequacy of correspondence between the "real world" and its representations. As a doctrine advocating the recognition and tolerance of diverse practices and perspectives, PLURALISM may be, but need not necessarily be, relativistic. In itself, pluralism is not immediately concerned with whether differences are absolutes or relatives, foundational or constructed: only in advocating openness and tolerance (on pluralism, see also note 22).

7. ORT, 66.
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8. Critics often accuse relativism of self refutation, in that to be consistent its own assertions of relativism must themselves be considered relative. As Mark Okrent illustrates in "Relativism, Context, and Truth" (The Monist 67, no. 3 [July 1984], 352), "if we assume the truth of the claim that all truth depends upon context, it becomes impossible to object to someone saying that in his [sic] context it isn’t true. If the assertion is true, it isn’t true. And if someone wants to say ‘Well its [sic] true for me in my context’; then someone else could say, ‘No it isn’t, it only seems to be, as could be seen from my context,’ etc.

9. David Best, in his The Rationality of Feeling [hereafter, TRF] (Falmer, 1991), makes the following comments which I take to be at least moderately congruent with the points I am pursuing here: "To deny the relevance of...the artist's intention, and of the affective response, is to presuppose a clear, sharp and unproblematic distinction between what the work means and what is extrinsic to it...But this is confused, for the question of what counts as intrinsic and extrinsic is a part of, and inseparable from, the question of how the work should be understood or interpreted. Our conception of a work may be in intentional or affective terms, and to rule out such discourse as extrinsic is to beg the question of what is and is not extrinsic...[I]t makes no sense to suppose that a definitive general distinction can be drawn between what is and what is not relevant as a reason for the meaning of a work of art. Such a distinction can be drawn only in particular cases, and even then it may be difficult" (141).

10. ORT, 23.

11. Quoted on page 32 of ORT.

12. Rorty quotes Davidson thus: "[T]here is no chance that someone can take up a vantage point for comparing conceptual schemes by temporarily shedding his [sic] own." (ORT, 6).

13. Harry S. Broudy writes, "If there are no defensible objective standards of musical quality, then music education is an indefensible imposition of the teacher’s taste upon the pupils, and such terms as ‘good,’ ‘better,’ and ‘best’ are deceptions, for they sound as if they were describing the music whereas they are only describing our reaction to the music." ("A Realistic Philosophy of Music Education" in R. J. Colwell (ed.) Basic Concepts in Music Education, II, [Niwot, Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1991], 72). The "objective" standards to which Broudy alludes appear to aspire to the kind of absolute realistic status Beardsley was also anxious to establish for judgments of artistic goodness (cf JAAC reference in note 3). I suspect that the cost of such status is subscription to the idea of binary subject-object opposition: in my estimation a high price to pay for something obtainable in other currencies!

14. ORT, 89.

15. TRF, 37.

16. Ibid., 72.

17. This is among the conclusions reached by Mark B. Okrent in his "Relativism, Context, and Truth," The Monist 67, no. 3 (July 1984), 341–58.

18. For more on Kant and Herder in particular see William J. Wainwright, "Does Disagreement Imply Relativism?" in International Philosophical Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1986), 47–60.

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21. This is Broudy’s term. See note 13.

22. In this may lie one of the important distinctions between relativism (at least as an epithet of abuse) and pluralism. Relativism is often construed as a skeptical and negative thesis about incommensurability, whereas pluralism is a more positive orientation urging openness and tolerance to (even enthusiasm about) the empirical fact of variability. Joseph Margolis mounts a tightly reasoned argument to the effect that relativism is a logical thesis, and pluralism a political one ['Historicism, Universalism, and the Threat of Relativism," The Monist 67, no. 3 (July 1984), 308–26. Hereafter referred to as HUTR]. Relativism, he writes, is a "logical thesis...about eligible ways of applying...truth-like values to judgments...Pluralism, on the other hand is simply a doctrine of social tolerance, that is, of the reasoned willingness of a community...to concede the admissibility of a range of alternative practices...that cannot be reconciled within a coherent theory" (HUTR, 317–18). The interesting question about relativism, he suggests, is the pertinence of its application to a particular domain of inquiry, whereas the interesting question about pluralism is how to balance determinacy and flexibility so as to avoid vacuous tolerance on the one hand, and the exclusion of practices that threaten its claim to tolerance on the other.

23. ORT, 30.

24. On the idea of "home," see Hank Bromley, "Identity Politics and Critical Pedagogy" Educational Theory 39 (1989). In presenting this paper it became apparent that the severity of domestic violence and abuse make the metaphor "home" difficult for some, a problem that should not be taken lightly. I can only respond that my intention is to describe an affective/cognitive state of relatively secure commonality sought and shared in some degree by most people without regard to particular circumstance. I would discourage the temptation to make more (less?) of this metaphor, by conflating it, for instance, with existing social institutions, physical sites, etc. Its capacity to provoke debate may, however, be a positive rather than negative attribute.


26. EHO, 46.

27. This is the label commonly applied to the cultural ideology Richard Pratte describes as "secular open society," in R. Pratte, Pluralism in Education [Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1979], 61–85. Pratte’s ideas have been applied to music education by David Elliott, "Music as Culture," Journal of Aesthetic Education 24, no. 1 (Spring 1990), 147–66.

28. The issue here is the extent to which some "aesthetic" capacity can mediate meaningful access to the musics of different cultures, or whether, like Kuhn’s perceptually-modeled paradigm shifts, they are largely incommensurable. Margolis (HUTR) wants to distinguish between what he designates internal and external versions of relativism. Internal relativism holds that "we do indeed have a reasonable methodological basis...for epistemically supporting of confirming claims that, on a bipolar model, would be or yield incompatibles." External relativism maintains that "there is no known...procedure or method or practice of policy by means of which justifiably to eliminate...contending or divergent or ‘incommensurable’ paradigms." (320–21). Redirected to issues of commensurability among culturally or stylistically distinct musical practices and values, this distinction has intriguing implications for the conceptualization of multicultural music education.

29. I suspect this is precisely the problem of balance between determinateness and flexibility to which Margolis alludes in his (HUTR) portrayal of pluralism. See note 22.
Music without Universals

30. Also, see my "Why Music Education: Contingency and Solidarity," Canadian Music Educator, in press.

31. ORT, 14.

32. See ORT, 214 for an elaboration of these ideas.

33. I have "appropriated" this phrase from an assertion made by Rorty in a non-musical context. See ORT, 39.

34. Nelson Goodman is a notable exception, who, in his Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978) and other writings espouses nominalistic stance he has called 'radical relativism under rigorous restraints' (x). Goodman's ontological thesis, on which our languages (including those of art) actually create the world as we know it, is among the more extreme formulations of the relativistic orientation. Kuhn's early ascription of different worlds to adherents of different scientific paradigms is similarly located at the extreme end of the continuum of relativistic positions.


37. For elaboration of this line of thought see Friedel Weinert, "Contra Res Sempiternas," The Monist 67, no. 3 (July 1984), 387.

38. Margolis HUTR, 309. I have substituted "people" for Margolis's "scientists." Note that one criticism of Kuhn's theory is its reliance on perceptual shifts between mutually exclusive gestalten. Perceptual models, it is sometimes urged, are not entirely appropriate for describing the operation of conceptual schemata. The point may be well taken. But for music philosophers, it hardly resolves the issue, since musical perception is a function both of perception and conception.


40. Quoted in Richard Pratte, Pluralism in Education (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1979), 169–170. Lydia Goehr, in her "Political Music and the Politics of Music" (Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51, no. 1, Winter 1994) offers yet another perspective on the virtues of pluralism, though I think she may dismiss "relativism" a little too easily. From Isaiah Berlin, Goehr draws the conviction that conceding genuine alternatives regarding the good "is quite healthy, for it leaves us with a robust and permanent uncertainty...[which] in turn persuades us always to be open to new discussion of our values, to constant reconsideration of our most basic beliefs and standards" (109).
When Alan Lomax (1976) proposed cantometrics it was to connect music with certain aspects of the social systems of the people who created and used the music. Although some scoffed, his basic premise that certain music universals are based on non-musical factors deserves serious attention. Lomax looked at music’s connection with economic factors. My earlier prediction (Gates, 1989) that the relationship of social values and public singing would produce increasing difficulty in recruiting women to choruses is, alas, being verified anecdotally.

Music, unfortunately, is what anyone says it is. The libertarian stance this view permits us as music consumers begs serious questions of us as music educators. Teachers must use a more analytical definition of music so that they can sort out some core curricular issues, the most basic of which is reflected in Thomas Regelski’s often-heard question: "Of all that we can know about music, what is worth teaching, and how should it be taught?" (See Regelski, 1981, pp 259–261, for example.) Teachers who take a truly individualistic stance in this issue fall back on their personal answers: "We’ll teach what interests us about the music we know in the ways that we learned it ourselves." This characterization is close to what happens when music is taught in its natural cultural setting. It also comes too close to the truth about much that passes for professional music instruction in America to be comforting. The utility of the libertarian answer is that no criticism can come of it, and its proponents sense this full well. Music teaching, like music performance, is a cultural concern. As such, it is full of issues that divide as well as unify those who engage in musical activity (See Campbell, 1991, for applications).

Teaching, however, is not a direct issue in this paper. Rather, I want to deal with a narrow but important issue in music’s context: the interface between music itself and its closely related phenomena. Sorting out issues, of which defining the interface, is a crucial part can help music teachers organize curriculum content and instruction. They can illuminate actual musical experience, rather than merely duplicate it or attempt to subvert its natural processes in the service of one ideology or another.

It is necessary for this analysis (and desirable in general) that we maintain a distinction between music as gesture and music as a product, or as a collection of products often called a tradition or a genre. I claimed above that music is what anyone says it is, and the musical gesture is what allows people to claim that one sonic experience is music and that another sonic
On the Structure

experience is not. In this paper, the term "music" has its reference in the situation created by a single musical gesture and the single human being who finds it sensible enough either to accept and perhaps enjoy it, or reject it as unworthy of any further interest. I will not mean by the term "music" a whole work, much less a whole tradition. A single work of music is made up of many (usually related) gestures, and traditions or genres emerge when these gestures and the works in which they are embedded form patterns. It is at the gestural level, however, that music is made, perceived, and connected with other phenomena that form music's context. More about this below...

I

I'll ask that the reader accept three assumptions that I don't intend to argue in this paper: the first about education, the second about music, and the third about linguistic theories. First, there are several strong reasons to teach things deliberately that are, like music and the mother tongue, universally learned in the culture. Here is one reason: Many cultural assumptions (alphabetical order is an example) are usefully closed to revision and others are open. One's "legal name" is an example of an open assumption: one can change it, but the assumption that one takes a name of some kind is closed in most cultures. The distinction between these escapes novices to a culture, including children. One result of an education should be a sense of when the personal revision of a cultural assumption is necessary, interesting, possible, advisable, or (alternatively) more trouble than it is worth. The assumption that people will identify themselves with a musical genre from among those available, in most cultures, is a relatively closed assumption. Few escape it except through travel and/or education. It is in our society's interest for children to develop the means to escape from the culture-based assumptions in their surroundings, or at least to recognize the option to do so. Sometimes this is called independent or critical thinking. Critical thinking allows one to review one's urges in light of the cultural assumptions and the social practices that reflect them. In the United States, there is a fast-developing coalition against this view.

Left to its own processes, culture subverts critical thinking. Culture arises from shared responses to life conditions; and, as long as a group's life conditions remain relatively stable, shared responses don't lend themselves to independent thinking, especially if they have reached the level of cultural assumption. William Graham Sumner (1906/59) called these assumptions-in-process mores. He took the deterministic view that culture consisted ultimately of shared ways to resolve issues arising from biological needs: the "four great motives of human action...hunger, sex passion, vanity, and fear [of ghosts and spirits]" (p. 18). Humans have no choice but to develop folkways, according to Sumner, in response to these motives; and these develop into cultural patterns and mores through higher-order steps that Sumner identified. Although he did not discuss music except obliquely as part of ritual, he saw that drama was intimately connect with the mores that developed from the folkways (ch. XVII).
Education's role, Sumner wrote, was to "transfer the mores" (p. 638); but he observed (ch. XX) that this did not always work. Virtue (one of the mythical mores and a hoped-for outcomes of education) did not always win out over the drive for success as a life policy, especially in a society where day-by-day competitiveness is a strong social value. The motorist in a hurry who waits for a green light in the middle of the night exercises virtue, sometimes the virtue of prudence (by avoiding getting caught by a hidden police officer). In the absence of visible traffic, one is tempted to drive through the red light. It is at this mundane level of individual actions—personality-based gestures—that Sumner made his case. Much of culture theory since then has been based on Darwinian ideas that Sumner used. Donald Hodges' interesting case for musical behavior as a human survival mechanism (1989) applies views such as Sumner's to musical behavior.

In the same era, John Dewey (1916/61) posited that the basis for education was a group's need to share meaning by repeating the experiences in which meaning was embedded. This insight resulted in progressive education. Progressive educators, however, sought to insure an escape from routinized, presented meanings, from merely-repeated experiences (ch. 1, 2, & 7), the "received views" based in cultural assumptions. The pragmatic educational theorists who followed emphasized that the educator's function was to reveal subtle and hidden meanings of all kinds in shared experiences.

In our era, Edward T Hall (1976, pp. 11–12) considers culture to be non-rational and finds it subversive enough to warrant special measures in defense of personal liberty. If shared responses (folkways) or shared meanings (received views) are allowed to exercise a priori control over one's reactions to life's conditions, then, he says (p. 12), we are imprisoned by our culture rather than in control of it. One defense is critical thinking, the deliberate construction of new (or, at least, idiosyncratic) cognitive models, a special human ability (p. 13). This takes some effort, and Hall's model attempts to bring the habitual and hidden to consciousness.

Cultures grow and habits change. However, Homi Bhabha (1994) pointed out that, in the information age, changes in cultural habits are created in the interstices between cultures and are rarely created within, as those in Sumner's time assumed. Cultural gestures reflect values, and values are merely held until they come into question. We seldom question our values until alternative values present themselves; and Bhabha's view of cultural change is a widely-held one. Bhabha would agree with John Blacking's views that human musicality (see especially 1987) turns on the notion that music is an expression of human values rather than occupying a sonic world of its own (1985, p. 480). And, with that, we loop back to the beginning of this paper and Lomax's notion that musical gestures and other aspects of life are functionally connected.

These culture theorists and most others agree: humans create cultures; human creative behavior is largely shaped by the culture into which the creators are born; and, because cultural assumptions make up the water in which we swim through life, learning to analyze the contents
of one's culture is an accomplishment worthy of respect. Hall (1959/90, p. xv) urges his readers to "think of culture as analogous to music: ... If another person hasn't heard a particular piece of music, it is impossible to describe." His method and Bhabha's is to study and describe the unconscious culture—the "micro-culture"—of unanalyzed behavior. The motive of all these theorists, and the strategic bias of the work of which this paper is a part, is to reveal the hidden roots of human musical gestures so that we can understand and nurture through education the process that creates and preserves them.

II

The phenomenon in question here is music as gesture and the activity that supports its production and perception. My second revealed bias, then, before the analysis, relates to what I will take to be the core of the musical experience. It is a stipulated definition, made necessary by the task to which I devoted this paper. Putting a fence around music's core, finding music's necessary but not sufficient condition, is required so that we can parse it out of its context. However, music in any culture is never out of context; but, it almost always is separated from its context when it comes from another culture, and that is a severe problem in Bhabha's theory of cultural development. Gestures from another culture are necessarily received in the context of the perceiver's cultural experience. Otherwise, there is no reasonable explanation for meaningfulness unless, like Hodges, we assert that there are convincing connections of musical gestures, across cultural interstices, with human neurological universals. Music, however, seems to be more than a mere series of acoustic and neurological events. Consider the musical gesture brought to consciousness by the following notations adequately performed:

![Musical notation image]

Persons who are culturally Euro-American will "understand" this when performed, and they'll know when to use it, or at least when not to use it. One does not, for example, end a requiem mass with this gesture.

Is music really what any group of people says it is? I'll say "Yes," in spite of the finding that some people have no word for it. One can stipulate, however, that the musical experience has some important family resemblances everywhere. But, those resemblances are not easily revealed because the dilemma of cultural meaning is not easily resolved. That is, one is trapped by one's own culture's terms in isolating the phenomenon for analysis, especially when analysis may not be appropriate.
Here's the core. I take this to be the content of the musical experience: Music everywhere, I shall stipulate for now, shares the characteristic that it is a syntactical complex of sonic gestures, each gesture a learnable Gestalt that functionally synthesizes perceptible non-linguistic sonic events with cultural meanings. This is distinct from merely-perceivable sonic phenomena, even some with cultural meanings (fire alarms, cheers of celebration), regardless of the sonic patterns they may form. Language, ritual, and the other arts share a general patterning characteristic with music. However, sound-as-gesture and our unexamined, pre-critical responses to it lie at the core of this whole business. The supporting structure for this event is its context, and musical gestures are defined by their possessing unique contextual relationships rather than by their possessing standard relationships between their local and regional qualities, between sound patterns and emotion-related responses or referents (see Beardsley, 1958, pp. 82–88). This is what permits a pluralistic definition of music. Language, also, has unique contextual relationships; but they are distinct from those of music. One caveat for music: Musical gestures share the feature that there is a connection through emotional response to other aspects of living. We will return to this principle below.

The general purpose of my investigation of this problem is to explore some functional relationships among features of what I called (1974), on Deweyan foundations, the art situation—the interpenetration of self with aesthetic psychological object. The self-other paradigm dominates aesthetic theory; but both self and other are embedded in a web of contextual relationships that have the potential to contribute to or impede the relationship of self with the art object. To the extent that features of the art (or music) situation interact, they form a structure that includes and supports the core, not like the scaffolding that supports the bricklayer on top, but like the web that supports the spider. A scaffolding sits on a solid surface and the bricklayer hopes it doesn’t move. In contrast, the spider’s web attaches at many places with surrounding plants and other objects, but the spider is best served if the web moves as the plants sway in the wind.

Music’s context consists of a web of contextual nodes formed by cultural and musical meanings and their interconnecting "strands." These nodes allow the person in the musical situation, caught up by the gesture, to have some orientation as to his/her position in the "world" created by the experience and to perceive the gesture’s distance from the musico-aesthetic center of the experience. As the spider moves around its web, so music moves around its context, showing up here and there, now at one node then another. It is possible, indeed probable, that many gestures belong more to their contexts than they do to a "core" aesthetic experience. It would be wasteful, sometimes insulting to their makers, to use such musical gestures aesthetically. The music represented in Figure 1 is almost never the object of aesthetic contemplation if used appropriately.

My third and final bias regards the many theories of cultural gestures, including linguistic theories, that could be of help here. I shall assume their applicability, and shall merely select
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Edward T Hall's as the most persuasive (see especially 1976/81). I shall accept his view of the matter without arguing for it against alternative views, principally those of Noam Chomsky's and, in music's case, Heinrich Schenker's. Culture, for Hall, functions as a screen for meaning. It allows one to avoid information overload by pulling context into every gesture. More to the general point of this exercise, he wrote (1976/81, p 90), "While a linguistic code can be analyzed on some levels independent of context... in real life the code the context, and the meaning can only be seen as different aspects of a single event [his emphasis]. What is unfeasible is to measure one side of the equation and not the others." Hall declared that perception of any sensible event, including a gesture or a word, is influenced by status, activity, setting, and prior experience. Culture provides an additional dimension to these psycho-social factors (ch. 2, and p. 101) We have many analyses of musical code, and some of musical contexts. There is a move on now to accept Hall's challenge to measure code, context, and meaning together. Some of the key players are John Sloboda, Robert Walker, Deryck Cooke, Rita Aiello, Nelson Goodman; some music theorists; and most ethnomusicologists, especially Charles Keil, the late John Blacking, Alan Lomax, and David McAllester. A few of these were doing context-related research at the time Hall was developing his theories. (See Hall, 1976/81, pp 76-77, for a brief analysis.)

In this paper, my task must be limited. Hall's view allows one to deal with the connection between the spider and its web—between music's coded gestures and their contexts. We're looking for the spider's footprints. Some day, I hope to provide a walking tour of the web. I'll do this by identifying some important contextual nodes, describing their functions and suggesting how these functions interact with each other, and giving some idea of how this web attaches to other living structures. But, in the following, I'll do less. I will attempt to maintain contact with the music in the service of which the context exists in the first place. Music without its context is mere sound and abstract gesture. It is in the musical gesture—sound made meaningful—that music pulls its context into the experience.

III

In this paper I will collect some variables that have been established by researchers who sought to establish a relationship between contextual features and music performance or listening, usually to show how one influences the other. I shall assume from this that the researcher saw these features as what I will call close factors. There were ample numbers of studies that used non-musical factors both as independent and dependent variables. I omitted from consideration the many studies that used acoustical rather than musical stimuli or responses, or that used pitch complexes that could not be called musical. Diana Deutsch's famous tritone paradox, for example, was as far as I could stretch this rubric since its importance is somewhat musical rather than merely psychoacoustic.
A study was selected if it appeared in one of three refereed research journals since 1982, and its author(s) found experimentally (or ethnographically, in one case) that a significant statistical (or other) relationship exists between an identified contextual factor and a musical gesture. Not all of these relationships, of course, were causal; and not all were strong relationships. I made no attempt to stratify them beyond the inclusion rules outlined in this paragraph. I found that 59 studies met these criteria from the last ten years of the following journals: *Music Perception* (24 studies), *Journal of Research in Music Education* (21 studies), and the *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education* (14 studies). There are undoubtedly more in other journals, and in older issues of these, but doing this gave a sufficient sample to begin this work. Presently, a more complete literature review will need to be done.

If patterns emerge in these variables, then a grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) might be possible from a more complete analysis of variables in music's context. The selection of variables in any study, of course, preordains the research that flows from them; hence, this may create a circular universe that casts doubt on the usefulness of these studies for the problem I'm working on. I will neutralize this criticism by giving more weight to the rationales than the findings. I am primarily interested in the ways researchers sought to connect the spider with its web—code with context—than I am to prove that one influence is "better" than another for some purpose or other. And, I shall look for patterns rather than critique the rationales. I shall leave the many grand theories of music out of this analysis and tackle those on another day. Therefore, this analysis must stand as suggestive rather than thorough. However, it can be used as one measure of the adequacy of grand theories and that is why I do it first.

Table 1 categorizes 40 dependent variables that produced significant differences. Research subjects produced or listened to musical gestures, and responses of various types were part of the data gathering process. The response types were categorized to form the list. Not surprisingly, preference and semantic response categories head the list. It is relatively easy to gather data about these constructs, and, after all, humans are verbal, evaluative creatures on the whole. Recently, brain function research in music is proving reliable, largely as a result of Hellmuth Petsche and his associates' use of the EEG technique.

Table 2 looks at musical experience from the other side. These studies reflected the interest of researchers in discovering what factors directly influence the production of musical gestures. Musical training and prior musical experience head this list. Two of the three journals I worked with focus on music teaching and learning, and this placement should not be taken too seriously, despite the commonsense view that training and experience lead directly to changes in the production and perception of musical gestures.
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Table 1.
Effect of musical gesture on ... (32 studies. 40 variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF VARIABLE</th>
<th>NO. OF STUDIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preference/evaluation/judgment</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantic differential/description</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination/brain functions/memory</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance accuracy/movement</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STUDIES REPRESENTED:

Preference/evaluation/judgment - Clarke (1993); Cutietta & Foustalieraki (1990); Gotlieb & Konecni (1985); Hargreaves (1984); Karno & Konecki (1992); LeBlanc & Sherrill (1986); LeBlanc & McCrary (1983); LeBlanc, Coleman, McCrary, Sherrill, & Malin (1988); Madsen, Geringer, & Heller (1993/94); Olson (1984); Peery & Peery (1986); Repp (1989); Sims (1992); Smith & Witt (1989); and Sundberg, Fiberg, & Fryden (1991).


Performance accuracy/movement - Bennett (1991); Clarke (1993); Green (1990); Lynch (1991); Metz (1989); and Schmuckler (1989).
Table 2.
Effect of [variables] on musical gesture perception or production (27 studies, 39 variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF VARIABLE</th>
<th>NO. OF STUDIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training/experience</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical transformations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/sex</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation/environment</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality factors</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence/musical ability</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture/ethnic background</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical actions/practice routines</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STUDIES REPRESENTED:


**Age/sex** - Flowers & Costa-Giomi (1991); Jordan-DeCarbo (1989); Miller & Eargle (1990); Schleuter & Schleuter (1989); and Shehan (1987).


**Culture/ethnic background** - Deutsch (1991); Flowers & Costa-Giomi (1991); and Oku (1993/94).

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It may seem somewhat surprising to find intelligence and musical ability so under-represented. What I found, however, was that recent studies using these as predictors employed atomistic, extra-gestural measures as outcomes: labeling intervals, choosing an instrument, guessing the duration of electronically-created tones, and other nonmusical outcome measures were used to establish predictive validity or other correlations. Sonic stimuli used widely for this research put such studies outside the selection criteria for this paper.

I posited a continuum with internal, hard-wired factors on one end, and external factors that are uncontrollable by the subjects or are dominated by other people on the other end. I combined Tables 1 and 2 into one list and placed the items on the continuum (Table 3). Table 3 provides a tentative catalog of close factors, or so it would seem to researchers. The 79 variables represented there have been found significantly related to musical gestures in some way or another. The studies that used these variables were published in three refereed journals in the last ten years, and a broader net should be cast, of course. It is interesting to note that about half (46.8%) of these variables are in the middle three categories on the continuum. This is where most teachers, performers, and producers make their livings. A search for published studies in additional journals will undoubtedly reduce this percentage.

Table 3.
Combined list of factors on an endogenous-exogenous continuum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF VARIABLE</th>
<th>NO. OF STUDIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age/sex</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence/musical</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability discrimination/brain functions/memory</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality factors</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semantic differential/description</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training/experience</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical actions/practice routines</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Performance accuracy/movement</td>
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<td>Situation/environment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical transformations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture/ethnic background</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV

In conclusion, I am going to suggest for now that the constructs underlying the list in Table 3 define where the musical gesture meets its context. However, this is largely structural at this point, not functional. The functional relationships between musical gestures and their contextual "webs" have yet to be made clear. At both ends of the continuum in Table 3, one gets farther and farther away from the musical gesture, to be sure. But a case could be made for extending these categories of factors, bridge-like, to connect the musical gesture with its supporting non-musical factors. These constructs interact, perhaps, within a wagon-wheel structure, with the musical gesture at its hub. Age, for example, and ethnic background are determined by parentage; and cultural background is largely determined by where the care givers are in any person's early childhood. Or, perhaps, these categories interact within a spherical network. Musical experience arises from situational opportunity. To have an effect on musical meaning, to take psychological advantage of one's musical surroundings, one must have the intellectual capacity to encode the musical gestures that one's situation opportunities presents. Musical information arrives alongside the myriad other messages that confront us daily.

The close factors listed in Table 3 connect the musical with the extra-musical in a person's life. They are, collectively, I think, the spider's footprints. The next steps include looking for expanded lists of studies and exploring the functional relationships among the categories of factors that continue to emerge. Wish me luck, a big grant, and a long sabbatical. Thank you.

REFERENCES


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MUSIC EDUCATION IN THREE ERAS:
REFERENTIALISM TO REALISM TO RELATIVISM

Carolyn Livingston, University of Rhode Island

I thank David Elliott for his invitation to me to provide a response to the papers presented by Terry Gates and Wayne Bowman and for organizing this conference. I very much appreciate the challenges and insights that both Terry and Wayne have presented in their papers. Dr. Gates has very appropriately employed the analogy of the spider’s web to describe the context of music. As he has so descriptively pointed out, the spider’s web, like music, like culture, and like music education, is amazingly adaptable and flexible. It is constantly changing, evolving, and fluctuating as it attaches to one node here and another node there. I find it interesting that Dr. Bowman, in his paper on relativism, has also mentioned the term web. He spoke of the webs of beliefs and desires and modes of human interaction that constitute our respective cultures; of culturally appropriated webs of belief; of webs of interlocking beliefs and desires into which we are acculturated; and of the idea of musics as multiple and flexible webs of belief and value.

I would like to discuss these two papers from a historical standpoint, as one views music education philosophy. I have titled my paper Music Education in Three Eras: Referentialism to Realism to Relativism because I see music education philosophy as reflection of society at three stages in our history.

THE FIRST ERA: REFERENTIALISM

Dr. Gates has presented three basic assumptions, the first of which deals with the idea that one of the purposes of education is to teach things in schools that are, like music, widely learned in the culture. The values and principles that the society needs to promote at a particular point in time will appear either in what Eisner refers to as the explicit curriculum or the implicit curriculum. The explicit curriculum is the one which the school purports to teach while "the implicit curriculum of the school is what it teaches because of the kind of place it is." Characteristics such as the physical plant, the furniture, reward systems, and organizational structure reflect the implicit curriculum. The selection of educational materials and choice of teaching methods, techniques, and styles can also imbed the social ideals that the school promotes.
Music Education in Three Eras

Michael Mark has delineated five historical periods in American music education. The Colonial Period lasted from 1620 to 1800. The period that Mark calls Public School Music extended from 1800 to 1864. The third period, which he refers to as Curricular Development, began in 1864 and went to 1920. Mark terms the era that lasted from 1920 to 1960 The Expansion of Musical Performance. The fifth historical period, Aesthetic Education, began in approximately 1960. The passage of time can provide a changing view of history, Mark comments. He states that periods in the history of music education may be viewed more broadly in the future. I have chosen such a broad perspective from which to respond to the papers by Gates and Bowman.

In my article, "Theme and Variations: European Imports to American Music Education in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," which appeared in The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning (1992), I suggested that music education has responded to the social pressures which were predominant in each of those two centuries. In the nineteenth century society required industrial workers who were models of obedience and punctuality and who could efficiently perform rote, repetitive work. It was necessary to acculturate recently arrived immigrants with as much haste as possible to fit them into the emerging work force. Beginning early in the century compulsory school attendance laws made it possible to aim large numbers of workers toward this goal. As the nation moved from an agrarian society to a bureaucratic industrialized system, what Toffler refers to as the shift from the First Wave to the Second Wave, these workers took their place on the assembly line.

The music written and selected for the educational setting by Lowell Mason and his cohorts during this period and, more particularly, the texts of the songs they used, helped to reinforce for students the ideals of morality, hard work, and patriotism. Such titles as "God Speed the Right," "'Tis by Doing That We Know," and "Blessings of Freedom" reflect the mores that the schools needed to promote in order to help society make the transition to industrialism. Referentialism appears in this use of music to teach societal values. In referentialism a musical work provides a reminder or a code that points to something outside the music itself. In the nineteenth century music education served the purpose of instilling the beliefs, values, and traits which society wanted its citizens to hold.

THE SECOND ERA: REALISM

Around the middle of the twentieth century Western society had reached the age of technology which Toffler terms the Third Wave. The Third Wave began around 1955 when white collar and service workers began to outnumber blue collar workers. Music education in the same era turned toward an aesthetic approach that has also been termed absolute expressionism or realism. It is related to universalism or essentialism, the idea that there is a body of knowledge basic to a culture which should be taught to all alike by time-tested methods.
Carolyn Livingston

This emphasis on music itself rather than any segments of the implicit curriculum which music might convey seemed appropriate for training workers for the age of technology. There was a growing need in society for skills that demanded greater use of the intellect in analyzing and solving problems, maintaining objectivity, and thinking intuitively. "The place of music in the curriculum came to be based on a conceptual approach to music as an important component of aesthetic education. This position was carefully formulated through a sequence of events, such as the Yale Seminar and the Tanglewood Symposium, which arose in response to the age of technology." 7

In broadest terms, we have considered now what I shall call the era of referentialism followed by the age of realism in music education. In the interest of historical accuracy, it should be mentioned that the referentialist period lasted much longer than a century, perhaps beginning with Mark's colonial period, while the realist period now seems to show evidence of winding down after a much shorter duration. I propose the idea that today, balanced at the perimeter of the twenty-first century, music education is beginning a transition into its age of relativism.

THE THIRD ERA: RELATIVISM

As defined by Schwadron 8 and, later, by Radocy and Boyle, 9 the relativistic position maintains that musical meaning is dependent upon expectations that are based on cultural orientation and stylistic experience. It acknowledges the development of a personal value criterion related to cultural groups and historical periods. I would suggest that a musical context unique to each individual conditions and influences this value criterion. The relativist also "insists, however, that principles and criteria which serve to guide artistic evaluation be made clear in view of some critical system." 10 These principles and criteria are considered tentative rather than absolute. For example, a composer thought to be mediocre in his or her own time may be considered significant when viewed from a later perspective.

Relativism is related to and may at times be referred to as pluralism. Dr. Bowman has also referred to his own position as pragmatism. The pragmatist believes it is important for students to have as much responsibility for their own learning as they can handle and that helping students learn how to learn is of utmost importance. The pragmatist promotes no set method for teaching but employs different modes of instruction depending on the situation. For the pragmatist, individual differences among students call for different teaching styles. Both musical and non musical outcomes of learning are thought to be valuable. Music instruction is process, rather than product, oriented. 11

Although it is still too early to make anything more than tentative predictions about music education philosophy in the twenty-first century, the social pressures that would appear to
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advance a transition into relativism are reflected in concerns currently being expressed by teachers, parents, voters, and politicians. We worry today about drugs, violence by individuals and groups, abortion, child abuse and neglect, sexual harassment, racial and ethnic discrimination, AIDS, a lack of self esteem among our students, and a host of other people problems. The school curriculum is constantly being expanded in an attempt to help students deal with these issues.

I would maintain that the skills needed for the twenty-first century are intrapersonal and interpersonal ones, attributes which Howard Gardner theorizes12 are not only skills, but like music, actually separate forms of intelligence. The relativism in music education which Dr. Bowman describes can contribute greatly to the curriculum for an age in which our very existence is threatened by humanity's own danger to itself. If, as Dr. Gates has reminded us, the group's need to share what is meaningful is the basis for education, then society's requirement in the twenty-first century is for skills which will enable students to value and appreciate both their own ideas and cultures and the ideas and cultures of other groups and individuals. These skills will be useful both inside and outside the work place in a multicultural society. Music education that is well founded in the we perspective while branching into an ever widening circle, or web, of they is uniquely qualified for an important place in such a curriculum.

David Elliott and others have pointed out that the term aesthetics was originally coined by the German philosopher A.G. Baumgarten and seized upon by members of the eighteenth century European aristocracy to set apart the culturally elite from the plebeian. Although aesthetic education has its roots in a separatist movement, let us not discard the objective consideration which it can bring to a discussion of the characteristics and nature of music. As Elliott proposes, "it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the 'aesthetic concept' of music be granted a limited place within a more comprehensive and realistic philosophy of music education."13

Today's emerging tendency toward relativism, on the other hand, is founded in the widespread interest in the music of all cultures. The trend toward a global view of music and music education during the past several years has grown steadily. Much of this development is due to the efforts of scholars whose work has been mentioned previously today, Lomax, Campbell, McAllester, Blacking, and others. Relativism's basis in pluralism seems to bode well for society in the twenty-first century. A sharing of the music of a wide variety of cultures can help to cause the much needed appreciation of one group for another as well as the culture inherent to one's own group. Just as society of the nineteenth century needed citizens who were punctual, efficient, and cooperative workers, and the twentieth century has needed employees who could carry out assignments involving critical thinking and decision making, the twenty-first century will find essential those who appreciate, care for, and can get along amiably with other people of widely differing backgrounds, perspectives, and cultures.
What approaches can be used to carry out a relativist philosophy of music education in the twenty-first century? I suggest two. Teaching techniques which involve students in the creation of music through improvisation and composition will receive high priority. The writing of musical autobiography and biography, long overlooked by music educators, can lead to the development of a concept of self and other.

**Musical Composition and Improvisation**

A large number of music educators have advocated the teaching and investigation of musical creativity. Approximately five and a half percent of sessions held at the 1994 MENC Biennial In-Service Conference in Cincinnati dealt with composition or improvisation compared to fewer than two percent of sessions held at the 1992 Conference in New Orleans. Activities that involve the improvisation and composition of music have been widely advanced as individualizing and humanizing since they allow for differing needs and abilities. They encourage discovery learning and problem solving. They make it necessary for students to seek relationships between past and present experiences and thus facilitate learning transfer. Creating music leads to the synthesis of musical concepts. Such activities provide tangible evidence of what is being learned in the music classroom. They nurture the creative talents that lie within each child. The creation of music by students of all ages allows those students to enter the composer’s world and thus identify with the greatest musical artists who have ever lived.

**Musical Biography and Autobiography**

Biography and autobiography are techniques which can be implemented in search of a basis for understanding our own and other musical cultures through a revelation of the individual’s musical context. "Music almost always is separated from its context when it comes from another culture," Terry Gates reminds us. Music must to some degree be separated from its context even within the same culture, he states. I would maintain that indeed each person has his or her own musical context and that this personal context is worth exploring. To return to the analogy of the spider’s web, if we were to reproduce that image onto a transparency we could overlay it across an individual’s musical life history. We could then observe the nodes to which the web had attached itself and how connecting strands were interlaced and joined back and forth throughout the individual’s existence to form that person’s own musical history or context.

John Holt, in his musical autobiography, *Never Too Late*, provides a model. Each of us could write our own musical life history and encourage our students to write theirs. I suspect that many of us would learn, as Holt did, that much of our education in music has taken place outside of schools. Most importantly, we would learn what things we have in common in our
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musical lives as well as the ways in which we differ. Think of the learning that could take place as students are assigned to write the musical life history of a classmate of another race or the musical biography of a grandparent or great-grandparent.

I have recently been engaged in two very differing projects. One project deals with musical biography and the other with musical autobiography. In a graduate foundations of music education course, I have asked each student to write a paper dealing with some aspect of the history of music education in the state of Rhode Island, an endeavor which had received almost no attention from historians up to this point. Students choose a subject from an ever expanding list or may select a topic through personal inquiries and experiences. The pieces that have emerged have been primarily biographical in nature.

Research has been conducted on the work of music education philosophers, Abraham Schwadron and Arthur Motycka; on Beth Crook, who edited a classroom series for Silver Burdett; on Stephen Farnum, who began work on the Watkins-Farnum performance scale while he was still a doctoral student at Harvard; on Lowell Mason’s teacher, Oliver Shaw; and on Eben Tourje, founder of New England Conservatory and the first president of the Music Teachers National Association. Music educators and music education programs previously known only to their local communities have also served as subjects for this inquiry. In completing these studies students have relied on oral history techniques as well as primary and secondary sources of a more traditional nature. Early in the semester, students who have projects with similarities are encouraged to share information and ideas as a means of strengthening their pool of data. At the close of the project as the students present oral reports on their work it is striking to see the serious interest which each student expresses for the projects of the others.

In another research project, I have distributed a questionnaire to undergraduate students that seeks to elicit memories regarding each student’s very first musical experience. More than half of the 260 respondents reported that they could remember an experience that occurred at an average age of 4.8 years. A large amount of anecdotal data and an extensive list of song titles were collected. Data have been compiled regarding the students’ memory of the context surrounding their first musical experience, where the experience occurred, and what emotions the music aroused in the subject. Through such activities students can learn about themselves and their families by recalling memories which may have been submerged for years.

The biographer Park Honan has stated that the work involved in writing a biography has the power to change the life of the author. The writer comes to know the subject very well. "And one also begins the slow and stumbling task of changing oneself, one’s outlook, one’s orientations, until it is possible at least approximately to think and feel in the distant and lost world of the subject," he states.20 For music educators and students, it is possible through biographical research to gain a deep understanding of at least one other person’s musical context.
Honan cautions, however, that it is illusory to believe that the biographer can think and feel exactly as the subject did or does. His statement agrees with Bowman's assertion (1994, 4) that it is impossible to temporarily shed one's own point of view to try someone else's. We can come close to sharing the context of another, but we cannot and should not cast our own context aside.

It is probably not coincidental that biographers have delved into the lives of famous composers and performers for centuries. The life touched by music is particularly compelling to both author and reader. We have all been touched by music, however. It is time to let all our stories be known. We can promote music, education, and human understanding by involving ourselves and our students in projects which include musical biography and autobiography.

CONCLUSIONS

I have outlined three broad eras in the history and philosophy of music education, taking the liberty of projecting into the next century. I would maintain, then, that the era of referentialism was followed by an age which emphasizes realism as expressed in aesthetic music education. This age now shows signs of being followed by what we might term the era of relativism. As it has before, society will enlist the assistance of music education in teaching the values and principles that it needs most. I believe that the attributes Gardner calls personal intelligences will be at the top of the needs list in the coming era. Teaching techniques such as musical composition, improvisation, biography, and autobiography can further the search for a language which will help us to articulate a commonality of context.

NOTES


6. Toffler, 30.
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7. Livingston, 6.


10. Schwadron, 45.


RATIONALES FOR MUSIC EDUCATION:
A VIEW FROM THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION

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In recent years, we have seen an increasing interest and engagement in the field of music education. This pleasing phenomenon is apparent among professional groups such as music educators, and now also among research groups, students, as well as parents of students and—in some places—education policy makers. Many people are ready to award music education a higher status. However, although we can see the community is growing, music education has not yet secured its niche in public education. This leads us to the purpose of promoting music education in public schools. In doing so, we have to face the question of how this is to be justified; we have to answer the question: Why is music education so important?

In this paper, I will not only debate the topic of the rationale of music education; as a matter of fact, this is rather an excuse for dealing with a further question, which is: Why is the current status of music education so low in public education, and its existence threatened through every budget cutback, obviously in Europe as well as on this continent?

I will argue that these struggles have to do with the profound relationship between musical mental activity and the emotional domain. We can relate the low status of music education to the fact that, in Western societies, the domain of rationality and thought is seen as the main field of education and development, while the domain of emotion ranks far below. In a second section I will connect these thoughts to contemporary approaches in philosophy of music education. Finally, I will take a look at the upcoming conclusions in respect to the rationale of music education, since this was the initial question in my reflections.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUSIC AND EMOTION: A HISTORICAL VIEW

Let me first focus on the connection of music and emotion. This connection is documented through innumerable personal testimonies provided by composers, critics, philosophers, and poets, past and present. Even Schönberg, who could hardly be recognized for his sentimentality, states that affect is a core component of music.¹ Another example is Mozart, who wrote to his father that music is able to express every emotional movement, or Mendelssohn, who observed and argued that the emotional meaning of music is too precise to be put into words.² And Schopenhauer, famous also as a music lover, said that, "The
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inexpressible depth of all music, by virtue of which it floats past us as a paradise quite familiar and yet eternally remote, and is so easy to understand and yet so inexplicable, is due to the fact that it reproduces all the emotions of our innermost being....

However, in the discipline of music theory as an academic field, the aspect of emotion involvement disappears. As Susan McClary puts it: "The discipline by and large restricts the questions it acknowledges to matters of formal process as they appear in musical scores."

One may ask how it could happen that in professional considerations, emotion in music got excluded to such a large extent. May we presume that the phenomenon is rooted in the splitting of the formal-abstract, theoretical aspects in music from the practical ones. This separation results or is accompanied typically by a hierarchy of the theoretical or rational aspects over emotional and bodily aspects. The field of musicology is primarily related to the rational and cognitive aspects in music, neglecting its bodily and emotional aspects; meanwhile musical practice is integral to social practices and does subsequently embrace the bodily and emotional aspects.

The professional dichotomization of Musicus and Cantor, which emerged in the late first millennium A.D., may serve as an important and comprehensive historical example for this process: In the Middle Ages, when music became part of the Quadrivium and by this a subject of academic education, music needed to be purified from associations with emotion and body. To define music as an academic discipline we referred to the Greek concepts which relate music to numerical logic and rationality. In the course of this academic structuring, the work in the field of music got divided into the domain of the "musicus"—the theorist—on the one hand and the domain of the "cantor," who was the practitioner, on the other hand. This process of separation resulted in awarding a higher social prestige to the musici who were educated at the university and had leadership over the cantores. This historical evolution is reported in a paper by Erich Reimer; regrettably it is not translated from the German.

We must keep in mind that this division of music into its formal-abstract and in its practical aspects is not a given by its nature; rather, it is artificial, and as such it needed to be introduced by a special effort and by psychological means. If we listen to a quotation which Reimer cites from a thousand year-old source, we get an insight into the character of these means: "There exists a great difference between musici and cantores. The former merely sing, while the latter also know what the music entails and means. Those who do something without understanding (consciousness) are to be considered as animals." It means that the theory-oriented work of the musicus was considered to be human, whereas practice without theory was categorized as belonging to the realm of animal behavior. The despising and biting character in this statement hurts. Reflecting upon it we see how boldly and aggressively an emotion- and bodyfree section in music got established; I have to tell that I did not expect that I would find
this argument in relation to music, an argument which is used to establish different social classes in totalitarian systems.

Once established, on the "splitting condition" music developed tremendously as an abstract formal system in Western culture. But since the separation from social and emotional non-musical aspects was, as I assumed, artificial, a certain instability characterized this new order. The hierarchy within the two aspects was required to be reestablished again and again.\textsuperscript{8} We can find, later in history, the denial of music's non-musical emotional aspects and the endeavor to define it exclusively as an abstract formal system. This is best documented in Hanslick's famous statement about the content of music to be "tönend bewegte Formen."\textsuperscript{9} With this statement, Hanslick conjured up the autonomy of music; he assured that the ideas which are presented by the composer should not be understood as the expression of feelings and the like, rather, what the composer presents is to be understood as musical ideas.

It would be unfair to claim, however, that Hanslick was not aware that there is a relationship between music and emotion. His real goal was to fight against the "involvement of affect in scholarly work"\textsuperscript{10} which he truly thought to be wrong. In this denial, we have a statement which documents the deeply rooted belief in the idea of science to be a field of pure rationality, thought and objectivity. We shall see later that this ideal was held up even into our days and how it is mirrored in the psychology of emotion.

This above paragraph is to summarize in the sense that, in traditional musicology, the relation of music and emotion is not of primary importance. What is of primary importance is the relation of music and rationality, which is the idea and comprehension of music as a formal-abstract system.

\textbf{THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUSIC AND EMOTION: A RECONSIDERATION}

Let us now turn to contemporary considerations. Recent papers in the field of music philosophy attempt to relate music closer to emotion than in past days, and there is an endeavor to develop a phenomenological or even theoretical basis for this connection. These contemporary attempts are more convincing than previous explanations of emotion in music; I think of inappropriate ideas like we can find in the designation of music as "the language of feeling," or simple minded ideas expressed by the arousal theory, which says that music directly arouses feelings in the listener.

A first attempt to overcome the arousal theory was presented to us 50 years ago, when Susanne Langer argued that music and emotion are connected because both show similar contours. That is to say, the relationship between emotion and music, would then be that similar patterns such as growing and diminishing, speeding up and slowing down, etc., occur in inner


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human processing as well as in music and that music does not so much arouse as remind people of these inner states and processes. In more recent considerations, Peter Kivy elaborated on this idea when he said that musical structures and expressive human behavior have similarities and thus music is heard as expressive of something. Furthermore, Kivy believes that music is connected to our emotions by virtue of culturally given customs or conventions in music, such as the minor triad being interpreted as "sad," i.e., In contrast to the naive understanding of music's direct impact on emotion which we find in the arousal theory, the ideas of Langer and later of Kivy suggest an indirect connection.

Currently, music philosophers have started to be uneasy also about this theoretical concept. In a recent paper, Kendall Walton writes about the arousal theories that they have of course obvious difficulties, but admits that "there is more to them than usually acknowledged."11 Walton first makes a point about the expressiveness of music; he argues that music is expressive by itself. Then he develops the idea that music has the power to "make believe," i.e., to arouse in the listener imaginaries in the sense of fictional worlds which may indeed have the quality of real emotional experiences. Walton thinks, psychologically speaking, that music has, due to its expressiveness, an impact on human cognition, and that these cognitions then lead to emotional experience, or, in other words these cognitions arouse emotions. This conception relates music and emotion closer to each other than the contour theory does, but the connection remains an indirect one.

A more radical view is provided by Jenefer Robinson.12 She goes a significant step further and does not hesitate to suggest a direct connection between music and emotion, claiming that music may surprise, disturb, satisfy, relax, and so forth. However, her theory is not a mere recapitulation of the simple arousal theory, but a differentiation of it: Robinson thinks that "the feelings aroused 'directly' by music are...more 'primitive' feelings."13 The piece of music as a whole may express something quite different from the aroused feelings, something which will be figured out by an interplay with cognition. If music expresses, for example, unrequited passion, or angry despair, the listener will elaborate this meaning by an interactive psychological process through aroused emotions and cognitions. There is empirical support for this view. Research shows, indeed, that sensory information does converge and interact in the brain.14

To summarize: The dichotomization of emotional and rational aspects in music and the included higher appreciation of the rational aspects—or the dominance of theory over practice, respectively—has become more and more unpopular among acknowledged professionals in the last decades. In 1983, Howard Gardner remarked that the "attempts over the centuries to associate music with mathematics seem a concerted effort to underscore the rationality (if not to deny the emotional powers) of music."15 And Susan McClary, criticizing and analyzing the striking absence of the emotional domain in musicology, provocingly said only three years ago: "Yet it moves."16 Nowadays we can state that also on a theoretical level we are coming closer
to a view which integrates and equalizes the importance of the emotional and rational aspects in music.

Maria Spychiger

It is very interesting that, on a more general level, a comparable development also had occur in theoretical psychology. Leaving many gaps open, I would like to focus briefly on the development of different views on emotion throughout this era:

If we go back to the first part of this century which was dominated by the behaviorist paradigm, we find that emotion was of very little interest. Emotion was a marginal field of research and theory, and it was not integrated in the mainstream of psychology, which was concerned with the investigation of human behavior (or, maybe more precisely, the investigation of rats', dogs', and pigeons' behavior). The most exciting theory in the 1920's was about how emotions arise; this is the well-known James–Lange theory. It tells us that emotions follow one's awareness of bodily reactions. Another field of research in emotion was concerned with the description of emotions. Researchers tried to find out how many emotions can be distinguished, and what their characteristics were, i.e., anger, shame, joy, envy and so on.

After the cognitive shift in psychology, in the nineteen fifties, initially emotions were not really of higher interest, but they were now perceived as obviously playing a role in cognitive processes, such as problem solving. In that latter important theoretical and experimental field, emotions have been seen as a potentially disturbing or interrupting aspect of learning or problem solving processes, and as such a factor we have to cope with or eliminate. Other researchers started to think about the role and function of emotion in the development of the human race and human behavior. In the 1970's, a very influential theory about the person-environment interaction process appeared. In this theory, emotions got a more important and more positive place than they formerly had held in the problem solving theories: Emotions were viewed as influencing a person's cognitive appraisal of a situation. Emotion got conceptualized as a factor in modifying behavior and as taking part in a reappraisal of the situation. But there was still a crucial point in this and other contemporary theories: emotion has been seen as postcognitive—per definitionem: Psychologists claimed that emotions are arising after considerable cognitive operations have been accomplished, that is, emotions are caused by cognition. For example: After I have perceived a situation and appraised it as a dangerous situation, I will be anxious.

The causal view of the 1970's got criticized in the 1980's. It was shown by a number of experimental results that affective judgements may be fairly independent of cognitive operations which are commonly assumed to be the basis of these affective judgements. Affective reactions in the sense of qualitative judgements are often the very first reactions of the organism, especially in situations of 'like' and 'dislike', or 'pleasure' and 'unpleasure'. It was Robert Zajonc who published a paper with the title "Preferences Need No Inferences" in 1980, and four years later, 1984, he even entitled a paper "On the Primacy of Affect." The theoretical basis
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and experimental results supporting this view have such good evidence, also from the neurological research, that the old view can be abandoned.

In the new position, emotion has been liberated from its low esteem in human mental processes and behavior, and from its subordination to cognition. The effect of this theoretical shift in the psychology of emotion is considerable: in the last decade or so, it is no longer a marginal discipline in theoretical psychology. There are more and more people doing research in this field, and the scientific literature is increasing exponentially. Figure 1 shows these main lines of the development in emotion theory.

Figure 1.
Different Views on Emotion and the Role of Emotion in the Person-environment Transaction

I James-Lange theory of emotion (historical, in the twenties)
II Cognitive theory of emotion. Causal role of cognition in emotion
(Originally by Schachter & Singer (1962); later by Lazarus, and others)
III Zajonc (1980; 1984), "Preferences need no inferences"

1) To apply these general theoretical approaches on emotion to the specific relation of music and emotion, consider musical stimuli to be a special instance of environmental stimuli
We can see that these theories mirror the development of the views on the role of emotion in music. First of all, the marginalization of emotion in theoretical psychology reminds us of the corresponding phenomenon in music theory. Then, also the "phenomenon of secondness" of emotion in the James–Lange and the cognitive theory is so similar to the secondary status of emotion in music, whether in Hanslick’s philosophy or in more modern considerations such as Walton’s. It seems that scientists, almost exclusively male in those days, were not able or willing to regard emotion as a direct and autonomous factor in human behavior and mental processing, and they were also not able to regard this in music.

If we consider musical stimuli as to be a special instance of environmental stimuli in general, we can apply these general theories of emotion on the relation between music and emotion, and compare them with the aesthetic theories just introduced. In terms of the James–Lange theory, firstly, this means that music causes bodily reactions, which in turn, lead to emotional responses. Such a view reminds us of the arousal theory. Its weakness in terms of the absence of cognitive aspects appears in a distinct way. We could also say that the James–Lange theory represents very clearly the traditional body–mind or emotion–cognition splitting which is overcome in the later theories. Second, we can relate the cognitive theory of emotion to the contour theory in music, or, with even higher accuracy, to Walton’s idea that emotional experience in music is caused by cognitive stimulation. Finally, the theoretical standpoint of Zajonc corresponds with the most recent suggestion in music philosophy, that is to consider a direct connection between music and emotion.

RELATION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION

I will now relate these thoughts to music education, and its philosophy. I argue that, traditionally, music education is much more connected to the field of music as a social practice than to music as a formal-abstract system. In earlier days, singing religious songs, or folk songs, and Heimatlieder, was the main content of classes in music education.

Since we know that, academically, music as a social practice stood in a lower range than music as a formal-abstract system, it is understandable that music education had to struggle for its acknowledgement and that then a reform movement appeared which tried to enhance the status and quality of music education by introducing the formal-abstract aspects into it. In his classification of 1991, Philip Alperson called this historical stream in music education "strict-formalistic,‖ for the philosophical foundation of this approach derives from Hanslick’s thoughts. It means that musical analysis got conceptualized as a central content of music education. This new approach was further developed in the movement of aesthetic education; Bennett Reimer as the principal promoter in the domain of music education established a philosophical base which reintegrates the expressive aspects of music and which even relates a serious education in music to the education of feeling.
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The first concept, "strict formalism," is no longer valid in public music education, but its reformulation, the expression-in-music focussing aesthetic approach, is alive and is the most known and most taught concept in the U.S.A. Within this philosophy, music education experienced an enormous differentiation and development. But also, and unfortunately, its reputation and status in public education did not really advance.

In our days, the aesthetic approach in music education is challenged. Based on Francis Sparshott’s music philosophical reflections, Alperson sketched in 1991 what he calls "praxial view"—an approach which focuses on the fact that music is something people in every culture do. Thus, in music education, we have to stress the aspect of doing. To achieve musicianship by actively playing and singing will be the "credo" of this approach. This outline of music education is definitely engaged in the view of "music as social practice"—as was the tradition in the earlier days. But it appears with a new self-esteem and with a new claim: It requires to recognize music, understood as a social practice, to be on the same value-level as music understood as a formal-abstract system.

The two approaches have different objectives with respect to the values of music. While the aesthetic view primarily refers to the intrinsic values of music, all kinds of values which are related to the entire practice of music are included in the praxial view. That means also extrinsic values. Since the value orientation figures as the basis for justifying music education, the path which is followed in the praxial approach has a rather pragmatic character. A list of rationales that was recently published by Kenneth Phillips may give an idea of this spectrum:

- to study music is to study a basic form of communication;
- to study music is to study the world's people;
- to study music is to study the learning process;
- to study music is to study the imagination and self-expression;
- to study music is to study the basics (which means basic areas of the curriculum)
- to study music is to study art.

In this paper, Phillips also suggests equipping future music teachers with an assortment of rationales in which the students personally believe. He states that the question of the rationale of music education should be a topic in the course of teacher training.

There are more than the aesthetic and pragmatic arguments in the music pedagogical discussion. In Europe, we actually discuss and investigate the hypothesis of music education's positive impact on personality development. This concept has been held since antiquity. Some experts in music education expect effects such as enhanced creativity, social behavior, achievement motivation, language skills, and so forth. These non-musical educational benefits make then part of the justification for music education.
Another stream of argumentation refers to Gardner's concept of intelligence in which musical mental activity is considered to be a distinct human intelligence. One can then argue that public education should be in charge of furthering the entire potential of human intelligence. Gardner's concept of human intelligence is indeed revolutionary. While traditional concepts only cover mental activities in the logical-mathematical, in the linguistic, and partly in the spatial field, Gardner introduces not only the dimension of musical activity, but also the spatial, the kinesthetic, and the personal and social intelligence. These dimensions have a strong inclination to bodily and emotional aspects, and were thus not considered as domains of human intelligence. Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences was published in 1983, and similar to the above discussed new concepts in emotion theory and music philosophy, also this new approach to the understanding of the human intelligence might figure as an indicator for an upcoming shift of paradigm.

CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO A CONTEMPORARY RATIONALE FOR MUSIC EDUCATION

If I now have to come to an end and to derive some conclusions from the presented thoughts, let me put it this way: I believe that the new view on the human mind with its integration of cognitive and emotional processings and the comprehension of intelligence as an interplay of distinct mental capacities sets the basis for a better status of music as a general educational subject. It should be only a question of time until it seeps through into public education practice.

Concerning the rationale of music education, we can refer to the connection of music and emotion and the role it plays in the human mind. We can also think of all the rationales which have been already formulated, realizing, that in fact, a lot of good evidence for music education's importance exists. However, we should keep in mind that a too wide range of rationales might be confusing and dysfunctional. Each rationale considered should accord a theoretical background from which it is derived. By this, we can automatically reduce the range of rationales.

The discipline of music education itself is ready for enhanced practice, not only on a theoretical level, but also with good didactical concepts and materials. In this, music's connection to emotion may even be of help in providing music education a more secure niche in public education. By saying this I think of an anecdote in connection to a large and influential experiment which expanded music teaching in selected classes in Switzerland from 1988–1992. In one county, three experimental classes gathered and gave a wonderful public performance to which the policy makers in the field of education were invited. The policy makers decided immediately after the performance to start 20 additional classes with the music program. I argue
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that their decision did not originate from predominantly rational reflection—rather, they voted for music education because they were moved.

In this sense, and after all my explanations, I state that music education is important, because music moves.

NOTES


7. Ibid., 4. Original German text: "Zwischen musici und cantores besteht ein grosser Unterschied. Diese singen nur, jene wissen aber auch, was die musica anordnet. Denn wer etwas tut, was er nicht versteht, wird Tier genannt."

8. Further dichotomies which came up throughout history can be related to this, to mention is, i.e., the separation of vocal music and instrumental music, composer and interpreter, orchestra and conductor, listener and performer, etc.

9. Cf. F. Blume, Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart, vol. 5 (Kassel: Bärenreiter, S.1482–1493). Hanslick’s "Vom Musikalisch Schönen. Ein Beitrag zur Revision der Ästhetik der Tonkunst" ("On the Musically Beautiful"), published in 1854, was a polemical work in those days. Its recognition was high and even in our days, many of his statements are still in the focus of the music philosophical debates [cf. Philip Alperson (1994) in his "Introduction: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52, 1–12].

10. In German: "Einmischung der Gefühle in die Wissenschaft."


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13. Ibid., 19. As an extension or correction of this view I would suggest that there could be a range of feelings triggered by music—from primitive to complex and subtle, and that the extent of complexity and subtlety might be related to the person's musical education, in some way. A recent empirical result, showing significantly higher scores on a musical affect intensity measure in musicians compared to non-musicians, may support this consideration [cf. A. C. Lehmann, Habituelle und situative Rezeptionsweisen beim Musikhören: Eine einstellungstheoretische Untersuchung (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 1994)].


17. Following this theory, one does, i.e., not cry because he or she is sad, but is sad because he or she cries.

18. This phenomenon reminds us, by the way, of a similar causal view of the relationship between music and language. Greek philosophers argued that music is derived from language, in the sense that the sound in language represents the musical and emotional element, and that music resulted from sound in language. I maintain that this view is not adequate. On the contrary: in the development of language, sound and vocal imitations were certainly highly influential, and we know nowadays that music and language arose in the course of human development as an interactive process, concentrated in the vocal system [cf. D. Ploog, "An Outline of Human Neuroethology," Human Neurobiology 6 (1988), 227–38].

19. We must bear in mind that this is a topic that requires more elaboration than is possible at this time, since Walton's theory is highly complex.


24. And, of course, with contemporary teaching methods.


26. The discussion of this subject would be topic of another paper. In this context, I refer to two German papers I have written: "Zwischen Mythos und Realität: Aussermusikalische Wirkungen von Musikunterricht, Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht 39 (1992), 243–52. ("Extramusical Outcomes of Music Teaching: Myths and Reality"); "Was zum Teufel ist mit dem Musikunterricht los?" Musik und Unterricht 4, Heft 23 (1993), 11–14. ("What the Devil is Wrong with Music Education?").

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JUSTIFYING MUSIC EDUCATION:

DO WE NEED A PHILOSOPHY OR A RATIONALE (OR BOTH)?

Jere L. Forsythe, The Ohio State University

At this time in the history of music education the future of music in the school curriculum appears more seriously in doubt than perhaps ever before. While the status of school music varies widely among school districts throughout the United States, in some states, such as California and Massachusetts, music programs have been particularly hurt by tax revolts and budget cuts. Support for music seems especially uncertain in difficult economic times when either-or choices appear necessary in the curriculum. But decisions are not always driven by economics, as the arts generally tend to be viewed as more dispensable than other subjects. This message is often conveyed in specific and symbolic ways. The reform movements of the 1980s gave little notice to the arts, though this blatant neglect caused a flurry of efforts to redefine and advance the role of music and other arts in general education. The political arena was entered with some success as the arts are now included in the America 2000 National Educational Goals. While this symbolic victory is encouraging, it is unlikely to alter the votes of taxpayers when levy increases are on the ballot; as Jesse Jackson might say, it is a long way from the "White House to the school house."

The seriousness of the current situation is difficult to assess objectively. A recent status study by the National Arts Education Research Center at the University of Illinois contains both good news and bad news for music education. However, statistical summaries may or may not confirm common perceptions and experience, and few would question that concern is growing. Concern turns to paranoia for those recent graduates of music teacher education programs who begin job searching and end up soul searching instead. Spring time "pink slips" bring on anxiety in those recently employed music teachers who must wait until tax levies pass or fail to learn of their fate. Less dramatic, but no less disturbing, are reports from veteran teachers, who may not be facing staff reduction but who must face declining numbers in programs, reductions in budgets and less scheduled class time for music. Altogether these events confirm that our subject is devalued and that society simply does not support the arts compared with other subjects.

Care must be taken not to overreact to the current conditions. Sometimes disproportional fears are generalized in response to crisis situations in certain school districts. A curious phenomenon occurred in Ohio, for example, in the early 1980s when statewide budget shortages appeared to be eroding support for music, and programs were being cut. An extensive survey
of music teachers found that teachers tended to believe that their own programs were not in serious jeopardy, yet they believed others' programs were in severe decline. Obviously respondents were unaware of the illogic of their collective views. Frequent focus on trouble spots may elicit exaggerated fears, much like the media attention to murder in the United States has raised anxieties, even though the rate of murder is actually less than it was twenty years ago. Negative talk can create negative attitudes. It is important to keep perspective during these times in order to remain optimistic and to avoid a self-fulfilling prophesy.

To keep perspective we must be informed observers, creative thinkers, and passionate advocates. Teachers at every level should support all efforts, big and small, aimed at improving the status of music and other arts in schools. There will be no easy solutions, for the issues which affect schooling in general, and the curriculum in particular, are complex and pervasive. However, there is much that can be done. One of the most worthwhile undertakings is to revisit those fundamental issues that define and sustain every dimension of our field. Nothing is more basic than the very raison d'etre of our profession. Reconsidering our purpose does not reflect pessimism or paranoia. Rather, it serves to redefine and reaffirm one's beliefs, which not only gives meaning, direction and purpose to one's daily life, but can also illuminate those viable ideas that are the foundations for advocacy.

It is a challenge to reexamine basic ideas with freshness and insight. There is a humbling sense in which one's footnotes should outnumber one's sentences as we feel obliged to credit the progenitors of our ideas. Yet the challenge to enlighten seems irresistible, as evidenced by the numerous efforts to do so, including this one. Moreover, the evolution of ideas results from a kind of collective discourse which, in time, yields more clarity to old ideas if not a genesis to revolutionary ones. My purpose is not to challenge the enduring ideas which have withstood much scrutiny in our profession rather well over the years. Rather, I wish to argue for some clarification of terms and issues in a way that may be convincing and functional on various levels and in various contexts.

I begin by arguing that it is useful and important to differentiate between a "rationale" for music education and a "philosophy" of music education. While I propose both theoretical and practical reasons for this distinction, I argue that a sense of "audience" suggests the appropriate mode of dialogue. I review some old and new rationales for music in varying detail and offer an extended critical analysis of the common distinction between "aesthetic" and "functional" justifications. I conclude that music education is multidimensional in nature and that it provides learners with experiences which uniquely attend to the goals of general education, both musical and nonmusical. This view invites a call for more research aimed at verifying the multivariate learning outcomes of music education. Research of this nature will be more feasible and more convincing if music programs demonstrate a coherent and consistent pattern of ideas and practice throughout rationales, goals, curriculum, teaching methods and means of evaluation. I briefly discuss the role and scope of philosophy in music education, and
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I conclude by endorsing all efforts to clarify and advance the role and importance of music in people's lives and in schools.

RATIONALE VS. PHILOSOPHY

Upon first considering the distinction, it may seem unnecessary, if not esoteric, to call for clarification between the terms "rationale" and "philosophy." These are common terms which are often used interchangeably, as if they represent equivalent notions. This has not been very useful to the profession and perhaps not very wise. The expression, philosophy of music education has been widely applied to so many different aspects of the profession that it becomes difficult to determine what, if anything, escapes the monolithic rubric of philosophy. A teacher may emphasize music reading in her general music class and say this is her "philosophy"; other teachers say they adhere to the Kodaly or Orff "philosophy" when they probably mean method or curriculum. Teachers with strong performance-oriented programs, may defend their emphasis upon performance, and sometimes upon competitions, as their "philosophy." And when called upon to defend a program from cuts or to justify an expenditure, a whole other set of arguments are raised which may be defined as philosophy but which, I will argue, are probably better described as rationales. The point is that the terms "philosophy" and "rationale" have been used inconsistently and indiscriminately. Some clarification is in order.

Rationales are the basic ideas for something; philosophy is the study of the basic ideas about something. Rationales are pragmatic, functional and purposeful; they likely provide convincing arguments for advocacy. Philosophical inquiry may be more phenomenological, more introspective and abstract; it may or may not yield useful ideas beyond its own closed system. A more complete description of the role of philosophy will follow, but for the moment let it stand that philosophy, as it pertains to matters of schooling in society, should be that special mode of inquiry within a discipline through which fundamental human experiences in that discipline are analyzed and through which values in that discipline are explored. Philosophical analysis of human experience and human values should probe the possibilities for what it means to be human. But when human values are under consideration for a role in formal education, discourse goes beyond the analysis of the nature of human potentiality. In these matters we enter the social context, an arena in which human values are endorsed by consensus. Having the potential for certain human values is one thing; imparting those values to others through governmental action, such as schooling, becomes quite another. The framers of the U.S. Constitution appear to have understood this issue when they called for a separation of "church" and "state."

A phenomenon, even an entire discipline, can attract the intellectual curiosity of philosophers, scientists, and educators and still not be regarded as worthy of a place in the curriculum. Even mathematics is an example, for it has indeed engaged the intellectual
capacities of many philosophers, including Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead who wrote treatises on the subject. Much can be said about the intriguing nature of mathematics without concluding that children need to study this subject in schools. That a thing has captured our imagination is insufficient reason to defend its role in the curriculum. A rationale for the study of math can be formulated on grounds other than those ideas about the nature of math that are rooted in philosophy and theory. Rationales provide the basis for decision making when social consensus is required. Thus when determining elements in the school curriculum, it is necessary to have rationales for inclusion; philosophy will be pertinent to the discourse as well, but in a different way.

The need to clarify the role of music in formal education emerges in various contexts. Perhaps the most dramatic occasions occur when local school boards, faced with making budget cuts, begin looking for a vulnerable spot. The rush to defend music accelerates with arguments, testimonies, research evidence and speeches. These moments demand convincing ideas and actions, and sometimes the efforts pay off, especially, so it seems, when supportive parents are involved. Responding to these occasions requires good political strategies in addition to well-conceived rationales. These tenuous times are perhaps not the proper moment to appeal to philosophical issues in the usual sense. For example, whether or not artistic meaning is best accounted for by referentialism, expressionism or formalism will hardly be viewed as applicable to a curricular decision by a school board. Even the concept of music education as aesthetic education can be seen by some as too abstract or elite. There are many prevailing issues for internal debate, issues that are important, interesting and relevant in several contexts, no doubt, but perhaps not as pertinent to a rationale for support of music programs. Thus, audience becomes a factor to consider. Philosophy can be very interpersonal, intrapersonal, and introspective; this mode of knowing should have great relevance and appeal to the members of a select academy. Rationales, while also needing debate within the academy, are often aimed at others outside the academy. However, this is not to suggest that rationales should be adapted to the pragmatic moment in a flurry of crisis management efforts. Long before a crisis, rationales should be formulated and articulated; the demands of the moment should not significantly alter fundamental views. An analysis of basic issues should be undertaken with calm and dispassion before a crisis occurs; a crisis should be an occasion for reaffirmation of carefully considered positions. As former Dean of the Graduate School at The Ohio State University, Jules Lipidus, has said, educated people..."need to be dispassionate in our analysis and passionate in our advocacy."

**FUNCTIONAL VS. AESTHETIC ARGUMENTS**

All too frequently, in times of crisis, arguments for music tend to shift from an emphasis upon the concept of "aesthetic education" to a more "functional," "utilitarian" or "nonmusical" basis for music education. This is apparently an attempt to placate decision makers by claiming
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that music can indeed support learning in other subjects. The problem with this approach is not just suspect timing. The validity of the view is not strengthened by the urgency and emotion with which it is expressed. It is the dichotomy itself that needs reconsideration. In one sense, this division does have merit as a conceptual framework for categorizing arguments. It is a basic distinction that has prevailed for some time. A special issue of the Music Educators Journal was titled "Utilitarian vs. aesthetic rationales for arts education," with views on both sides being represented.\(^9\) More recently, efforts have been made to seek some middle position in an apparent attempt to claim that music education can accomplish "all of the above." Philips, an author in the 1983 Music Educators Journal issue returned ten years later to advocate both utilitarian and aesthetic arguments for the study of music.\(^10\)

The problem with this dichotomous distinction is not its validity as a theoretical abstraction. The problem is that in the real world of schools, the distinction becomes so blurred by the practice of music education that it is of questionable value in considering rationales for music. Just as the early brain research too quickly categorized the functions of the brain into left and right hemispheric activities, we have too easily tried to draw lines between supposedly either-or propositions of aesthetic and functional values of music. As a theory this distinction is mostly an intellectual convenience; as a practical matter, it is not possible to separate them; and as a basis for advocacy, it is unwise to separate them. I am not arguing for the abandonment of ideals in favor of pragmatism; rather I am suggesting that this dichotomy is too theoretical to be very meaningful and that we should not propose that aesthetic and functional values are mutually exclusive goals of music education. At the same time, we should not be promoting the idea that benefits to other subjects are central to the purpose of music. This should be avoided not only because of the risks in verifying this effect, but, even if it is true, it may be regarded as too indirect to justify the effort and expense. Moreover, this view subjugates music to the status of a kind of catalyst for other subjects and detracts from its value as an art form and subject matter in its own right. Is, then, the "truth" in the middle? Should we simply claim that music serves both aesthetic and functional values? It is more subtle than that. The answer is that the pursuit of learning anything is multivariate in nature and involves a complex array of motivations, values, benefits, and short-term and long-term outcomes. This should be acknowledged in any discussion of rationales for any subject, including music. While rationales should advance ideals, there is no less value in recognizing that, in the real world, values will always be confounded and complex for such is the nature of human experience, motivation and learning.

INTRINSIC VS. EXTRINSIC

Like motivation, rationales explain the reasons for something. People are motivated to do a particular thing when this brings them something they desire. If the thing (activity or object) they are engaged with is, itself, primarily what they desire, we may say the thing has
intrinsic value because its pursuit seems unrelated to anything else, i.e., it is done for the thing itself. If the thing they are doing is not necessarily desirable, but is done primarily to obtain something else, we define the something else as extrinsic because it is something other than the thing being done. To pursue music "for its own sake," would be more intrinsic. To do music for fame and money would be more extrinsic. But, again, motivation, can be a complex, fluid and multivariate concept, varying with time, place, situation and circumstances. People do things for a variety of reasons, perhaps changing from moment to moment, and it is difficult to isolate a single reason as central or exclusive. One way to find out how devoted people are to their vocations, for example, would be to ask if they would continue in their field if they were independently wealthy (such as winning the lottery). The question is why do people do what they do? The answer is—for many reasons. Teachers are not considered money motivated, but must have adequate incomes to live. Teachers become frustrated and sometimes burn out, but most would probably not choose to be a sanitation worker for twice the pay. Some people are socially motivated and may attend symphony concerts, in part, to be "seen," yet they listen to and enjoy the music as well. Fine hor d'oeuvres are often served at openings of art exhibits and they are consumed faster than the art. Do people come for the art, the food, the social occasion or all of the above? Symphony musicians negotiate contracts to insure fair compensation for making music. Visual artists must sell their works, and dancers need an audience and compensation. Even authors of books on aesthetics receive recognition and royalties which augment the intrinsic pleasure of expressing their ideas. In other words, all pursuits in life are multivariate, including art experiences, which are always confounded by nonart factors. Rationales for music, like explanations for human motivation, must acknowledge the context of human endeavors.

My argument for viewing musical values more holistically is reinforced, perhaps ironically, by the view of E. Thayer Gaston, whose work in music therapy seems to clearly fall in the "functional" category. Indeed his definition of music therapy clarifies this.

Perhaps music therapy and music education can best be distinguished by the fact that the music therapist is chiefly concerned with eliciting changes in (nonmusic) behavior, not with perfecting musical musical endeavor. The opposite is true of the music educator. Characteristics of patients nearly always differ significantly from those of students. The music therapist is more sensitive to the nonmusical behavior of the child. Even so, music therapy and music education have much in common.11

However, in another context, Gaston also suggests that the reason that music is able to affect nonmusical behavior is because of its aesthetic qualities and the need for human beings to have this experience.12 While I have argued previously that a music therapist and a music educator should state their purposes differently at the outset of instruction, partly for matters of professional role clarification,13 it is clear that musical encounters in educational and therapeutic settings will involve complex and overlapping responses, some musical, some nonmusical. The
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expressive qualities of music will have inherent value to a clinical patient or music will not function effectively in therapy. Children learning a song in elementary school are not engaging in a purely aesthetic endeavor no matter how much the teacher emphasizes aesthetic perceptions and aesthetic meaning. It is simply not possible to divorce an experience from its environmental context, and herein lies the issue pertaining to rationales for music.

The notion of a "pure aesthetic" has never been a particularly meaningful concept, even as a theoretical ideal. When humans engage in musical experiences, they rarely occur in a context devoid of nonmusical factors. Listening to music through headphones in a darkened room, all alone, with one's eyes closed may come close, but this is probably less common than jogging with headphones or listening to music with others. And listening to live orchestral music in a concert hall is clearly confounded with all sorts of extraneous stimuli, some of which may even add to the overall aesthetic experience, such as watching the motions of the conductor, and others of which will surely detract, such as coughs and sneezes, and all of which are nonmusical in the strictest sense. The question is, how pure is pure? The visual accompaniments to music are clearly not the music, but the pairing of visual and aural stimuli may enhance a musical experience, and, in the case of dance, this merger becomes the art experience. Visual and aural experiences are joined in MTV for a popular entertainment experience. There is a trend in the contemporary marching band movement toward designing shows that integrate music with visual movement into a creative experience that aspires to be as much aesthetic as entertaining. The growing availability of video taped and video disc recordings of musical concerts attests to the interest in music as an art experience to be heard—and seen.

MULTIDIMENSIONAL OUTCOMES OF MUSIC EXPERIENCE

Visual dimensions of music experience are only one factor which could be said to add or detract from the purity of the aesthetic experience. Music experiences also include a social variable in nearly every context in which they occur. Most people, perhaps especially school-aged children, are attracted by this very human nonmusical correlate of musical behavior. Socialization through music occurs in rock concerts and choir concerts, around camp fires and in churches, in elementary school music classes, in high school bands, in small ensembles and in middle school general music classes. The point is, music participation occurs in a multidimensional environmental context, and the added factors cannot and, therefore, should not be ignored when formulating rationales for the role of music in education.

When establishing rationales for music education it is important to acknowledge the complex environment of the school setting in which music learning will take place, not in order to abandon ideals but to clarify and promote the benefits to be anticipated. Music must be justified in schools on the basis of its value as a total experience. Many of the nonmusical

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concomitants that music inevitably yields would be considered positive school outcomes by most educators and parents. And the argument that these nonmusical values should be deemphasized because they can be obtained through other means should be challenged. There is no research that suggests this is the case. In fact, in a recent book on the effects of sports participation the authors concluded that the common claim that sports activities build "character" and promote "discipline" is largely unsubstantiated.\textsuperscript{14} Music may well be better suited for promoting certain generic behaviors than other subjects or experiences. We should not be reluctant to explore this possibility with greater depth than we have in the past.

School performing ensembles provide a clear and convincing example of the multidimensional character of music experiencing in the school setting. Making music continues to be a major component of music education in schools, particularly in elective ensembles in upper grades. Even though this traditional offering appears to be diminishing in popularity in some areas, it is unlikely to be wholly replaced in the near future by another approach to music learning. Performance programs come under criticism, however, for a variety of reasons which are, by now, fairly well known. One of the more common criticisms is that, in some performance programs, the emphasis upon nonmusical outcomes can become so extreme that the art becomes indefensibly subservient to other purposes, such as winning competitions. This is particularly dubious when only a few pieces are performed, and these are learned primarily by rote, through endless repetitions. While this characterization is an inaccurate description of many competition ensembles, it is not an exaggeration for some. It is beyond my purpose to fully address this issue here, but I will suggest that, even in these competitive programs, much important learning is taking place, including musical values. While these programs should be challenged by music educator peers, we may find it appropriate to acknowledge in some circles that, as in the Chinese concept of Yin and Yang, in every "good" there is a little "bad," and in every "bad" there is a little "good."

Preparing music for performance can give students a sense of balance between the process and the products of an endeavor, between means and ends, between effort and benefits. The process is characterized by peaks and valleys of encouragement and discouragement, and students learn to persevere when challenged. They learn to seek long-term goals (a final performance) and short-term objectives (each rehearsal). They experience the successive proximity to higher levels of perfection and, no doubt, higher levels of musical and personal satisfaction. All of this occurs within a social context in which they learn to cooperate, to share, to support, to work, to blend in, to stand out, to follow directions, to be on time, to pay attention, and, in all likelihood, to like music and want more of it. They usually receive approval for their endeavors, through applause, verbal praise, proud parents, admiring peers, and, yes, perhaps trophies, plaques and parties. And they will associate all of this with the art of music, its sensuous tones, its exciting rhythms, its expressive dynamics and phrases, and its rich array of abstract and concrete emotions in varying intensities and levels of sophistication. Musical performance can serve an indistinguishable blend of aesthetic and functional purposes,
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and in schools, this is inevitable. Part of the rationale for music, therefore, should include those positive elements which accompany the experience and augment its inherent values.

Can good things happen for less than totally admirable reasons? It happens all the time. A skillful teacher will use nonmusical factors, without shame, to lure students into more musical experiences. Where one starts need not be where one is headed. And the process leading toward increasingly richer levels of aesthetic development will intermittently involve elements of where one started. Musical and nonmusical learnings are inseparable, and there is no hypocrisy in recognizing and acting upon this principle while upholding high ideals. Aesthetic goals may inspire and guide the process of music education, but since we can never totally eliminate the nonmusical aspects of musical experience, the positive aspects of those nonmusical correlates should be included in the rationale for music.

The underlying assumption for a rationale supporting the inclusion of experiences in formal education is that these experiences represent a positive human value for most if not all students. There is no unanimous societal consensus as to what constitutes positive values in schools, as evidenced by the continued controversy over sex education and creationism in the schools, as well as by the growing home school movement. Yet in a democratic society, reasonable consensus must be achieved in order to design a curriculum, especially for those experiences that are required.

SOME POPULAR AND PREVAILING IDEAS REXAMINED

In search of a rational and convincing basis for curriculum design, many educators have responded with excitement to Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences. Basically he purports that humans have a wide range of potentialities, far more than the traditional and simplistic concept of the intelligence quotient.15 His arguments and evidence have bolstered the demand for diverse educational goals, and arts educators often appeal to this view in promoting the arts in the curriculum. The theory is the basis for the curriculum at a number of school sites where there is an effort to develop all intelligences. While the theory succeeds in extending the categories under which human potentiality is conceived, its pertinence to curriculum remains questionable. Human traits have no inherent value, thus it is a debatable leap from genetics to classrooms. The human potential for certain behaviors is only the first half of the equation in the argument for curricular inclusion. The other half has to be the social value attributed to the behaviors through societal consensus. Humans clearly have the potential for numerous reprehensible behaviors as well, but only prisons seem to provide inadvertently organized schools for developing misguided intelligence. Thus, possessing the potential for a human activity is a necessary but insufficient basis for including this activity in formal education.
A similar point can be made for another rationale that seems to engender enthusiasm from arts educators. In our attempts to place arts education on an equivalent plateau with other "intelligences" (or other academic subjects), we have been drawn by the argument that aesthetic knowing involves a unique form of cognition which has a depth and sophistication equal to other ways of knowing, as well as an emotional component that is not usually as central to these other ways of knowing. This view is attractive once we agree with the basic assumption that this form of cognition is worthy and valuable. The nature of the human experience with art will be the subject of inquiry for philosophy, psychology and various modes of scientific investigation regardless of whether the arts are included in formal education. The arts are there to be thought about. Their special ability to evoke unique human responsiveness is intriguing and inspiring, but this does not justify their place in the curriculum per se. Some of the arts, in particular dance, theater, and film continue to survive in society, albeit not always in good health, without being aided by a significant role in the school curriculum. Music and the visual arts have maintained a viable place in the curriculum in many schools for some time. Why? It is not because of any special advantage of these arts to elicit aesthetic responsiveness. Indeed Reimer has questioned the dominance of these arts as he calls for a more inclusive view of arts education. The explanation, of course, lies in a history of successful advocacy, a history which has probably been only vaguely influenced by intellectual arguments as such. Moreover, it is unlikely that the engaging notion of art as cognition will have any more impact than past arguments for affective development or the need for aesthetic experience. There are simply too many factors involved in decisions affecting curriculum content. The complex process is as much emotional and political as it is intellectual and rational. Again, it is by social consensus that curriculum is determined, and rationales must be responsive to this reality.

MUSIC IN VS. MUSIC AS GENERAL EDUCATION

The environmental context of most music education in any society is the school house. Rationales for the role of music must consider that context in its entirety. Most music programs do have "purpose" statements in print, often in a required curriculum guide, and these usually contain various affirmations of the importance of music in the education of the "whole child." These statements may attest to both musical or aesthetic values as well as some nonmusical ones. Often, however, these a priori principles appear to be largely ignored as the goals and objectives of the curriculum are subsequently described. The detachment from purpose is perhaps further exacerbated by the fact that daily teaching practices may be only roughly compatible with the curriculum as described. It may be expecting a great deal of educators, but clearly the profession, and perhaps job security, could be enhanced by strengthening the internal consistency among rationales, goals, objectives, teaching procedures and learning outcomes.

It has been a common practice to justify components in the school curriculum on the basis of how well a certain discipline contributes its portion to the overall goals and objectives
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of general education. Apart from specific vocational training, the basic ingredients of a liberal education have endured the test of time relatively unchanged for many years. The arts, which are often paired with the humanities, are usually included in a liberal arts concept, yet requirements are consistently less than ideal and clearly less than those of other disciplines. This minimal allotment contributes to the feeling of neglect and insecurity. So-called "basic" areas are rarely brought into serious question, and their importance is tautologically reassured by their monopoly on outcomes assessment. This design of curriculum by retroaction is rather neatly assured by "co-conspirators" in Princeton, New Jersey. Currently, the control of test content is tantamount to control of the curriculum. There is a chance this cycle could be interrupted by the new National Standards, which will include the arts, but this is years from reality on a large scale.

The compatibility between curriculum and testing is an issue for debate, for the appropriateness of "paper pencil" tests for certain learnings is very much in question, even in subjects other than the arts. Moreover, the trend in other subjects is to promote higher order thinking skills rather than "drill and practice" level of learning. Even in mathematics, there is a movement away from simple arithmetic skill development as students are encouraged "to think" in special ways that are closer to logic and the scientific method than to arithmetic. This trend toward higher order thinking could have implications for the role of the arts in general education, for it is more convincing to argue that the arts contribute to higher level goals of general education in the same way that these newly conceived disciplines do than to argue that the arts contribute to specific learnings in other subjects, such as reading or math.

It is one thing to say that learners need the arts to "balance" their liberal education; it is another to say that the arts contribute to the broader goals of a liberal education as well as the other disciplines do. The latter should be the rationale for music and the other arts, not just that students "need" the arts to be "well rounded" but that the arts contribute to their preparation for life in contemporary society and are as relevant to their futures as other areas in the curriculum. At first it may sound radical and unrealistic to place music and other arts on an equal level with other disciplines. Oddly, I sometimes find people in the arts who do not really believe in this level of equality. For some, the arts come only after the other so-called "basics" are satisfied. But when considering general education goals in the broadest sense, it becomes easier to verify the role of music and the other arts.

There is a sense in which educational goals can be subsumed under three main purposes of general education. Education should enable students (1) to become thinking individuals who are capable of making appropriate choices when provided with options, (2) to become independent learners who possess the desire and ability to continue learning for a lifetime and (3) to pursue happiness and productivity through a balanced life of leisure and work. Rationales for the study of music should emphasize how music can play a role in the development of each of these goals, not just through some vague sense of "transfer" of learning from one subject to
another, but through demonstrating direct relationships between participation in music and the production of both musical and nonmusical outcomes. Therefore, music should not be seen as just an important component in general education; rather, music should be viewed as general education because of its unique nature.

As previously argued, the study of music inevitably produces multidimensional outcomes. In the real world, aesthetic values will always be augmented by nonaesthetic factors. Therefore, we should not only acknowledge but embrace the positive outcomes of this nature and include them as part of the rationale for music, especially when they are related to the general purposes of education. We should not be reluctant to conduct research which examines the nonmusical outcomes of music participation. While results of previous research of this nature have been equivocal, this has largely been due to an emphasis upon studies of transfer to specific learnings in other subjects such as reading. A more appropriate approach would be to investigate whether participants in music programs, particularly elective secondary music programs, have achieved the broadly conceived goals of general education more than nonparticipants. Are music students more independent, self-motivated, life-long learners, good choice makers, and, perhaps, happier and more productive in their lives than others? These are not naive questions, and there are ways to examine these outcomes meaningfully. This type of research may be pursued with some risk. Investigations of claims will need to consider rationales, curriculum content, teaching methods, and methods of measurement of results. Moreover, the analysis of outcomes will, of course, include an evaluation of specific musical learning as well. The musical knowledge, skills, aesthetic perception, aesthetic responsiveness and values of participants will presumably exceed those of nonparticipants. These results will verify that music education serves the general education goal of developing fully educated persons who have the art of music as one of their options for a lifetime of pursuit, either vocationally and avocationally. Therefore, the argument will be that not only does music education contribute to the broad goals of general education, those which permeate and transcend separate disciplines, it does so through experiences with an art form that has inherent value to the lives of individuals in society.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that when clarifying the role music in the school curriculum, convincing rationales are needed more than a philosophy, in part, because rationales are ideas for something, whereas philosophy presents ideas about something. I suggested that a sense of audience will help to determine whether the emphasis in a discourse should be upon rationales or philosophy. The role of philosophy is critically important to the intellectual integrity of our discipline, for through this mode of investigation the fundamental nature of music experience and musical values can be explored in a special way. Philosophical inquiry is needed to examine the uniqueness and complexity of music experience as a cherished human experience. While the fields of psychology, neurology, systematic musicology and others will each contribute to the
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overall understanding of the phenomenon of music, philosophy will always be that mode of investigation which will overlap all other approaches and which will, no doubt, always serve as a catalyst for understanding. Interest in the philosophical analysis of human values, represented by the experience of music, seems to be increasing. Moreover, with the growth of multiculturalism, philosophical investigations into aesthetic theory will become exciting, as the "rules" for criticism will, no doubt, be reconsidered. The broadest concept of the role of philosophy will leave no dimension beyond its purview, including rationales for music in schools. Within the academy, this unrestricted view is perhaps appropriate, but outside the academy, perhaps not. Philosophy has historically been an omnivorous intellectual activity, though, and any call for a limit to its domain will likely go unheeded. Therefore, my principal recommendation is that the distinction between rationales and philosophy be drawn, in part, for pragmatic reasons, for this is useful in those efforts to provide a foundation for advocacy of our art.

I began by raising concern that music in the school curriculum may well be in serious jeopardy. I conclude with the obvious. Music and the other arts must receive a coalition of support from numerous sources in order to assure their survival in society in general and in schools in particular. Intellectual clarity of issues is only one part, albeit an important one, in the challenge to protect and advance the role of music in formal education. Efforts to support music and the other arts must be intellectual, emotional, political, financial, rational and, at times, even irrational. All approaches, from reason to passion, will be necessary if the arts are to thrive in society, and all efforts will be especially critical if the arts are to be included in the most important conduit for culture in society—the schools.

NOTES


JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MUSIC EDUCATION:
ON PARADIGMS, PARADOXES,
CONNOTATIONS AND CONUNDRUMS.
A RESPONSE TO SPYCHIGER AND FORSYTHE

Stephen J. Paul, University of Oklahoma

Spychiger and Forsythe have reflected on the status, history, and efficacy of "rationale-making" in music education. Spychiger has traced the defense of music education through the war between intellect and emotion in aesthetic circles, and on to the related struggles of emotion to gain primacy within contemporary psychology. She concludes that music education has suffered in comparison to other academic fields because of the Western intellectual notion that the mind, emotions, imagination and body are separate.

I agree with Spychiger that music teaching and learning involve intermingled and equally important components of the intellect, the emotions, the physical body, and the imagination. As Collingwood argues in Principles of Art:

Every kind and shade of emotion which occurs at the purely psychical level of experience has its counterpart in some change of the muscular or circulatory or glandular system which, in the sense of the word now under discussion [emotion], expresses it.

In Speculum Mentis (the Map of the Mind) he further hypothesizes a oneness of thought, emotion, and imagination that epitomizes the human experience of thinking and creating. There is no thought without emotion, or emotion without thought: both are germinated from the kernel of imagination that lies between and within them as their generative force.

Forsythe agrees and argues further that musical experience can not be cut apart from the place where it occurs in action, or from the so-called "nonmusical factors" which accompany it:

It is simply not possible to divorce an experience from its environmental context ... when humans engage in musical experiences, they rarely occur in a context devoid of nonmusical factors.
Justifications for music education, according to Forsythe, need to take into account the unity of person and of contextual action. Both authors ably argue that the justification process has been stuck in false dichotomies of: the emotions versus the mind, aesthetic versus utilitarian goals, and individual potential versus social values. They argue for a new theoretical foundation for music education that mends divisive arguments and promotes music in a more practical and effective manner in the real political world of school boards, parents, administrators and state curriculum officials.

ON PARADIGMS

The "unified" version of human musical experience advocated by Spychiger and Forsythe is compatible with the relatively recent "praxial" view of music education. Praxial philosophers contend that the social context of music making and music teaching are the focus and the locus of study and research. They take the position a priori that all of the so-called "elements" of human functioning (thinking, feeling, moving, and imagining) should be studied together, in action, and in context. This praxial theory follows from the tradition of the early Pragmatists (also known as Contextualists) like James and Dewey, and follows through the work of Royce, G. H. Mead, Berger and Luckmann, Becker, White, and others down to the writings of Schön. The work of Vygotsky in Russia also follows from Royce along similar lines and has led to a flowering of contextual educational research both there and in the United States.

The Social Constructionist Paradigm

As pointed out by Spychiger and Forsythe, music education needs to take a broader view of the musical experience than is allowed under the absolutist paradigm that has been prevalent in music education philosophy. Reimer has stated that "the essential nature and value of music education are determined by the nature and value of the art of music." This statement seems self-evident, but the absolutist paradigm has defined musical meaning too narrowly. A social constructionist view allows us to redefine "the art of music" praxially. A praxial view includes all parts of the musical activity—the communicative, social, introspective, and aesthetic elements—and values them equally.

For example, if a gesture of understanding is shared between performers, can we really distinguish it as a purely musical event, a purely social event, or a combination of the two? If the gesture results in a feeling, as feelings follow the form of musical events, is that feeling purely aesthetic and socially unschooled? I would argue that it is social and musical, because musical gestures are learned in and refer to social contexts. Furthermore, as Mead and many others have pointed out, there exists a social context even in solitary thinking. Thought in solitude is really a conversation between and among the various social selves that make up the
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entire person, and each of these selves is woven from a socially and culturally mediated fabric. Thinking to oneself is actually a social conversation, and listening to music by oneself is the same.

Forsythe defends the praxial view, but presents the example of a listener in a darkened room with headphones as representing one of the few musical experiences which is perhaps not social in nature. According to the social constructionist this still represents a social situation, because the listener is engaged in a social interaction among various social selves who react to different gestures of the music. The term "social self" might be elucidated by this example: there is a social self who understands and reacts feelingly to the musical form, another who attends to performance practice and quality, another who reviews recording technique and quality, and another who measures the stylistic progression of the piece against known facts about the composer or the period. There may be yet another social self reflecting upon the context of a former hearing of the piece, such as in a great cathedral or in the company of a special person. Listening, even in this isolated circumstance, is a conversation within oneself, including social selves who react cognitively, imaginatively, emotionally, and physically.

The Analytical or Positivist Paradigm

I realize that it is quite easy to debunk this position. The line of argumentation is as follows: (1) Assume that one of the elements of the musical experience described above is more inherently or uniquely "musical" than the others. Label it the aesthetic element; (2) It follows that this aesthetic uniqueness is primary among the values for music; (3) It follows that all other experiences that take place during the composing of, performing of, and listening to music are secondary; (4) Therefore, we have primary and secondary elements of the musical experience; (5) The primary values should be emphasized as the basis for our beliefs about music education. Secondary values may be useful, but are not to be over-emphasized at the expense of primary values.

This argument is quite potent, logical, and well accepted. It represents the essence of Reimer's argument in the introduction to the 1989 edition of Philosophy of Music Education, which I interpret to be a representative statement of the position that is often called "aesthetic education." Its acceptance in the profession, in the belief of many, has reached paradigmatic proportions. Given this degree of exposure, it is important to understand its intellectual and historical antecedents.

The division of values for music education into primary and secondary categories rests on the same presuppositions, as Spychiger has pointed out, that underlie the Western tradition of rationality. It is dualistic and analytically reductionist. As a dualistic notion, it hypothesizes the splits mentioned previously, of emotions versus the mind, aesthetic versus utilitarian goals,
and individual potential versus social values. As a reductionist hypothesis, it contains the absolutist assertion that there exists a fixed reality that may be approached by scientific reasoning and inquiry.

Writings in music education philosophy are not alone in assuming this underlying world view. Research in music education, primarily based on the model of experimental psychology, springs concomitantly from an absolutist base—assuming that the laws of musical experience are fixed and can be found if only we find the right analytical procedures to deduce from observed facts the universal principles which govern music teaching and learning. It assumes that subjects and events should be observed in isolation, subjected to controls, and then measured. This analytical view, sometime called the "scientific" view by lay persons, is not without its power and value. Who among us in the serious pursuit of quality music education has not wished for an improvement in music teaching as a result of solid, scientific research findings being disseminated and used in the classroom?

If such an analytical paradigm has been advocated for music education for many years, and holds such promise out to the researcher and teacher, why should it be questioned? First, we must recognize that the analytical paradigm in the social sciences is derived from the absolutist paradigm in the sciences. The absolutist version of science started unraveling with Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and Einstein's Theory of Relativity. The natural world, according to many modern scientists, is not accurately represented by fixed qualities and quantities of space, time, and matter. Second, although many years behind the physical sciences, medical science is realizing that the human body and mind relate to each other in far more complex ways than the previously assumed duality allowed. Third, to question the notion that scientific progress is really a linear progress at all, Thomas Kuhn has delineated instead a set of non-linear shifts of socially constructed realities that exist solely in the actions and minds of scientists.11

Even if the notion of progress in the so-called "scientific" view is called into question by Kuhn, is progress not evident in the technological accomplishments of many Western countries? Is there not more leisure time to pursue art and music because of technology and the conveniences that it provides? More leisure time may be available, but pollution, dehumanization of work, and an increase in cancer rates must be considered a heavy price to pay for that time.

Ontologically, the primary question in the absolutist paradigm is "what is real?" The relentless pursuit of this question makes it easy for the scientist to say, as many of those who worked on the Manhattan project proclaimed, "I was only being true to my science." Conversely, this weakness also points out the strength of the social constructionist paradigm. When truth is worked out by consensus with human actors working together, acting and observing as insiders to specific situations, it is easier to be aware of the humanistic question
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"what is right?" along with the question "what is real?" This point was made over and again in reference to qualitative research during the recent Conference on Qualitative Methodologies in Urbana, Illinois. Not coincidentally, qualitative methodologies rest primarily on a social constructionist foundation.12

The question of "what is right," or "beautiful," or "valuable," is certainly possible to answer in a socially constructed system. The absolutist claim that any relativistic view makes these choices arbitrary or impossible is tantamount to saying that social groups have no values. This point can be easily refuted by asking any bebop jazz musician to compare the solos of Charlie Parker and Kenny G. In other words, social constructionism does not imply solipsism, or what Bowman has called "silly relativism."13

Summary

Challenges have arisen to the analytical paradigm that has governed thinking in music education philosophy and research for the past several decades. Multiculturalism is challenging absolutist assertions; praxial philosophy is challenging analytic assumptions; qualitative research is challenging quantitative practice and presuppositions. Since my purpose today is to elucidate the issue of justifying music education, reacting to and adding to the well-stated arguments of my two colleagues, it has been necessary to line out these first principles or paradigmatic assumptions which underlie the arguments inherent in the justification process.

ON PARADOXES

To say that many writers have argued the values of music education is to say that Noah’s weather forecast was "scattered showers." Jones14 cites 469 articles in the Music Educators Journal alone between 1950 and 1970 which discuss these issues, and the flood has continued apace to this day. Most have been arguments back and forth between aesthetic and utilitarian justifications. I agree with Forsythe, Reimer and others that placing the emphasis on this dichotomy is not useful. Paradoxically, I believe that our arguments over aesthetics and utility are not arguments at all, for three reasons. First, the argument is unresolvable. The contentions of both sides are simply shots fired back and forth from competing paradigms. Viewed from the absolutist or analytical side, "non-musical" parts of musical experience exist, and they are secondary. Viewed from the social constructionist position, all aspects of the socio-musical experience have equal value. Both sides are right from their own perspective. End of argument.

Second, the argument is futile as a justification effort. Forsythe is right when he says, "this dichotomy is too theoretical to be very meaningful." Reimer is getting at the same thing.
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when he states: "Philosophy as such, unadapted to political considerations, is seldom sufficient at the level of politics...."\textsuperscript{15} The language of philosophy is not the language of advocacy to lay people.\textsuperscript{16}

Third, the argument is either meaningless, or circular, depending on how one defines the artistic impulse. If art exists entirely for its own sake, and expects no human communicative or therapeutic effect, then aesthetic arguments based on this assumption are useless in justifying the inclusion of art in an enterprise such as education. After all, education is based upon and presupposes communication and therapeutic effect (in the sense of helping people to become enriched in some fashion). On the other hand, if art exists as communication or self-improvement—of one's soul, personality, or capacity for happiness—then it is useful. It has utility, and aesthetic values become a subset of utilitarian values. It is difficult to argue the superiority of a subset over a set, based upon the criteria which define the elements of both as members of the overall set. Paradoxically, the dichotomy is a unity.

ON CONNOTATIONS

A problem which supersedes these three arguments, and which permeates most of the published discussions of purposes of philosophy for music education,\textsuperscript{17} is exemplified in Forsythe's objection that we have not adopted a consistent terminology in making our arguments. As he points out, the terms "rationale" and "philosophy" have been used interchangeably. In fact, the terms "justification" and "ideology" also appear in the literature holding the same connotation. For example, the term "rationale-making" is used in both of today's papers to mean development of principles to justify music education.

Justification

A majority of the published discussions of philosophy of music education to date have been limited to axiological considerations, arguments about values, and thus are attempts to justify either statements of musical value or values accruing to music education in general. As such, these arguments can be labeled "justifications." Justifications are theories, principles, arguments and exhortations, some rational and some rhetorical, designed to convince self or others of the value of something. Webster defines "justify" as: "1. to prove or show to be just, desirable, warranted, or useful: VINDICATE."\textsuperscript{18} "Justification" is then defined as "1. the act or an instance of justifying: VINDICATION: DEFENSE."\textsuperscript{19} The definition of "justify" emphasizes the root word "just," meaning right or blameless. A justification is a defense of a just cause or proposition. Rational or logical consistency and structure are not mentioned in this definition. Quality of a justification must be adjudicated on grounds of effectiveness.
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There exists in the literature a variety of contexts and target groups for justifications, therefore a variety of types of justifications. The first type is delineated by Reimer: "to the degree that individual music educators are helped to formulate a compelling philosophy, the profession will become more solid and secure....there is an almost desperate need for a philosophy which provides a mission and a meaning for their professional lives."\(^{20}\)

Ideology

Reimer's use here of the term "philosophy" refers to a personal justification, which I would label "ideology." Webster defines "ideology" as: "a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture [as in] <bourgeois ideology > <medical, legal, and other professional ideologies >."\(^{21}\) Ideologies operate at both the personal and group level, and provide cohesion, a raison d'être, and an enhanced self-image which provides motivation both individually and collectively for the members of the group. I would include discussions of first principles or presuppositions underlying paradigms in this category. The argument delineated at the beginning of this paper, between analytical and social constructionist paradigms, is an ideological argument.

Leonard and House refer to the ideological function in their statement about purposes for the philosophy of music education: "[philosophy] inspires and lightens the work of the music teacher."\(^{22}\) On the other hand, they refer to another important distinction among justifications in a further elaboration, "[philosophy] helps the music teacher clarify and explain the importance of music to his colleagues and to laymen."\(^{23}\) In this case, a clear separation must be made between ideologies intended for consumption by insiders and external justifications intended for outsiders to music education, including the clientele groups of the public schools—parents, students, administrators, other teachers, and school board members. As I have stated previously, the quality of a justification must be judged by its effectiveness, and justifications to outsiders seldom will be effective when based on ideological beliefs which are foreign to them. Furthermore, theoretical, aesthetic, or philosophical terminology and concepts are not typically effective in external justifications.\(^{24}\) As Reimer states: "the task of philosophy is fundamentally different from the task of advocacy, however related the two must be."\(^{25}\)

To summarize, the three types of justifications are:
1. personal justification or individual ideology;
2. internal justification or group ideology;
3. external justification or advocacy.
Rationale

If we agree to use the terms "justification" and "ideology" to denote the axiological functions of the philosophy of music education, where does the term "rationale" find a proper use? By its dictionary definition, it can be synonymous with "justification," in the sense of being, as Forsythe says, a reason for something. A close examination of the formal definition, however, brings to light a problem. Webster defines "rationale" as "1. an explanation or exposition of controlling principles. 2. the underlying reason: rational basis: JUSTIFICATION, GROUND < the rationale of the law >." 26

Definition one emphasizes the root word "rational," and we find a connotation of logical, theoretical working out of controlling principles. This definition implies an ontological theoretical function—"what are the principles which will accurately describe how people teach and learn music?" Definition two emphasizes the word "underlying," as in the axiological choices which presuppose functional theory. In fact, definition two includes the word "justification" as a synonym.

This contradiction of what versus why in the use of the word "rationale" has not been addressed adequately in music education writings. As was stated, most of the philosophical writings in music education, especially until the last few years, have primarily dealt with value discussions—i.e., "rationale" definition number two. There are some writings, among them a number of research studies (mostly dissertations) which have taken a theoretical approach to describing the principles that govern the teaching and learning of music—i.e., definition number one. 27

In addition to the two papers presented here today, it is easy to find examples of all three levels of justifications referred to as rationales. 28 Robert Smith refers to all three types of justifications, as well as the functional definition of "rationale," in one statement:

Music educators who assert that there is a need for a statement of the rationale of music education often seem to be demanding something which will provide a basis for agreement within the profession [internal justification], a program of action to present to other educators and the public [functional theory—"rationale" definition one], a ground for assurance that music education is important [personal justification], and a brief for the allotment of more time and money for the school music program [external justification]. 29

Smith thus lines out four categories of philosophical endeavor in music education in one paragraph. I have argued elsewhere that his "program of action" purpose, which ties into definition number one above, might be the proper use of the word "rationale." 30 Froehlich has used this same categorization of rationale versus justification in her statement regarding types of extant philosophical research in music education: "There are several studies in music
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education in which researchers have sought to develop either justifications or rationales for music as a school subject. My previous argument was that:

For clarity's sake, the emphasis should be put on the rational nature of "rationale." The root word "rational" implies logical or reasoned thought. Logical principles can be used to justify something, but if principles do not meet standards of logical consistency, they are not rationales. For music education, then, a "rationale" would be a logically ordered construct of controlling principles which describe and govern the teaching and learning of music.

I am now convinced that I was describing what should be called a "functional theory" of music education rather than a "rationale." Such a theory would include ontological presuppositions, methodological hypotheses, phenomenological observations, and epistemological considerations. The word "rationale," when used philosophically in music education, is trapped between the axiological and metaphysical domains. Its everyday language connotation of defense contradicts its formal connotation of rationality, rendering it useless. If discussions of values can be labeled sufficiently as justifications and ideologies, and discussions of the existence and functioning of music and music education can be labeled according to metaphysical, ontological, methodological and epistemological functions, then the term "rationale" is not needed.

A CONUNDRUM

In this paper I have delineated paradigms for music education—the analytical and the social constructionist; I have discussed the paradox or fallacy of the aesthetic/utilitarian debate; I have examined connotations of definitions for various types of justifications for music education; and now I turn to a conundrum: What do you call a music educator whose ideology is uncertain or in conflict with that of his or her students, parents, administrators, and school board? In other words, what does a weak or contentious ideology produce? An impaired, imperiled pedagogue. In order to prevent the palpable panic of passing pall-mall into the pandemic palsy and pathological paralysis of impaired and imperiled pedagoguery (soon to be surrounded by pallbearers), music educators must have passionate justifications for what they do.

All alliteration aside, the internal and external justifications, the ideologies, and the assumptions which underlie methodological practice should be consistent and believable for all groups involved in music education. This is often not the case, as we often are forced to use external justifications which seem contrary to our ideologies. Reimer speaks to this point:

A lack of a unifying core is felt deeply at the psychological level by many music educators who are able to function acceptably in specific practices but who have a sense of emptiness inside because the specifics do not add up to a meaningful whole. When the tremendous amount of
energy it takes to be an effective music educator is not being fueled from a concentrated source of inner power, it begins to want, feeding on itself and dissipating in endless but uncoordinated activity.33

Reimer's answer to this problem is that a music educator should have a strong philosophy, based upon the essence of musical aesthetic value, in order to provide energy and fuel for continued action and enthusiasm. I agree that many music educators suffer from this fault, of a weakness of ideology.

His answer is formulated as the logical conclusion of a line of argumentation based on the analytical, or positivist paradigm. In practice, however, many music educators are uncomfortable with the assumptions of this paradigm, and their frustrations are at least partly caused by their discomfort over its assumptions. Whether or not we use the term "aesthetic" to indicate one of the elements of musical value, many feel that musical values are not delineated into primary and secondary categories. If we look at the problem of psychological temerity or dysfunction from the perspective of the social constructivist paradigm, the problem disappears. If music educators are allowed to value equally all of the various attributes of the socio-musical experience, then there is no discomfort caused by justifying music with arguments more oriented to the general public. These communicative, social, and therapeutic values for music fit perfectly into the justification system and ideology of the public school at large.

The question must be asked, however, "if we accept the equal validity of all parts of musical experience, are we diluting the experience?" To emphasize Reimer's point34 on this issue, are we abandoning a claim for the uniqueness of music if we allow "non-musical" aspects of the musical experience equal sway? I do not think that we are surrendering anything. The social aspect of a socio-musical experience is unique to the context of music making, just as the social aspect of team sports is uniquely tied to the performance of the sport. The language, gestures, and even modes of dress and thinking of the socio-musical "act," to use Mead's term,35 are different from those of the sports field. Each is valuable because of its uniqueness.

To reinforce this point, let us assume the other perspective—that of sports. If we were to assume an absolutist view of football, for example, we would only be true to ourselves as football purists if we would justify it because of its "aesthetic," or rejecting that term, "footballian," essence. Whatever there is in the design of plays or the beauty of coordinated action or the ebb and flow of the game—those dynamics which imitate the ebb and flow of human emotions, and are uniquely "footballian," would be the primary values for football. Undoubtedly there are some who justify football on that basis, but it takes a great deal of knowledge, experience, and study of the intricacies of the form and functions of the game to understand and enjoy it at such a level. I do not think, however, that it would remain in the schools if we attempted to justify it purely on those so-called essential elements, a point which has already been granted by aesthetic writers. More importantly, we would soon become bored
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with the mundane aspects of practice, equipment, scheduling fields, and dealing with behavior problems if our ideology presupposed a primary value only for the most subtle and sophisticated elements of the game.

The psychological dysfunction of music teachers, I believe, has much to do with their indoctrination in the analytical, Western European conservatory tradition which reinforces the notion that as performers, there are primary and secondary values for music. The primary values are those which they experience in the highest moments of performance with their own instruments or voices. Their ears tell them, however, that the same level of aesthetic achievement is not present in their elementary or junior high music class. They are forced to make do with secondary values all day long. Perhaps the ideology of the musician, at least in the conservatory version, is not the best choice of ideology after all for the music educator. And perhaps the values of the art of music, in the limited sense of music as defined by aestheticians, are not sufficient in the context of the music classroom. The classroom is not a recording studio, or Carnegie Hall, and its musical values will necessarily be different—not worse, or better, just different.

If music teachers are willing to adopt a more encompassing view of musical experience, such as one represented by the social constructionist perspective, then there is aesthetic beauty to be found in all aspects of the sociomusical experience. Such an ideology allows a teacher to see beauty in and derive joy from the social interaction of young people playing music, the development of self-discipline brought about by learning the rehearsal attitudes of a musician, as well as the first efforts to turn a phrase or compose or improvise or execute a rubato. None of these aspects represent secondary values; all of them are undeniably ways for the child to express "this is who I am as a musician." The teacher who looks at the musical experience in this way can find passionate justification in each and every moment, and will be well equipped to avoid the fate of the impaired, imperiled pedagogue.

NOTES


2. Jere L. Forsythe, "Justifying Music Education: Do We Need a Philosophy or a Rationale (or Both?)," paper presented to the Second International Conference on the Philosophy of Music Education, Toronto, Canada, 14 June 1994.


5. Forsythe, 8.


10. Spychiger, 4.


15. Reimer, 10.


19. Ibid., s.v. "justification."

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21. Webster's, s.v. "ideology."


23. Ibid.


25. Reimer, 8.

26. Webster's, s.v. "rationale."


32. Paul, "Aesthetic."

33. Reimer, 11

34. Reimer, 2–10.

GENDER, MUSICAL MEANING AND EDUCATION

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Like many adolescent girls in the 1960s to 1970s who played the piano and studied classical music at school, I was as much insecure as fascinated in the realm of rock music. I perceived my insecurity as the result of a split between classical and popular music, reflected in the parallel discrepancy between school and subculture: I had been classically trained at school, and this was why I could not understand the technicalities of rock. What I was unable to entertain, was the additional possibility that my insecurity was a product of gender: that the problem was not so much one of technical differences between classical and rock music themselves as one of cultural ownership of rock by boys. In this paper I want to suggest that there is a peculiar difficulty about questioning one’s own gender-position in relation to music, a difficulty which arises from a specifically musical factor: that we learn music, not only through wider historical, political and educational contexts, but also through musical experience itself. The operation of music meaning as a gendered discourse occurs poignantly in the school classroom as a microcosm of the wider society.

I wish to sketch a theoretical distinction between two virtual aspects of musical meaning. The first operates at the level of musical materials, the syntactical organisation of which gives rise to the listener’s sense of whole and part, opening and close, repetition, difference, and all other pertinent functional relationships. I call this "inherent meaning," not to indicate that there is anything essential or ahistorical about it, but rather that both the materials which form the signifying part of the process of identifying structures, and those which are being signified as structures in some way, are made up of musical materials: inherent, then, in the sense that they physically inhere. Listeners, responses to and understanding of inherent meanings are dependent on the listeners' competence in relation to the style of the music. A place of music whose materials are highly meaningful or very rewarding to you, might be relatively meaningless or lacking in interest to me.

This aspect of musical meaning is only partial, and can never exist on its own. We have become accustomed to the idea that the social or cultural images of performers make an important contribution to their commercial survival. It would be surprising, for example, to see a record cover of Schubert songs depicting the soprano Kiri Te Kanawa in bondage with purple hair; and if we see Madonna in a respectable evening-gown we interpret this as postmodern dressing. But the manipulation of performers' images is not a mere marketing strategy, for clothes, hair-styles or posturing on the sleeves of recordings are all details of a broader, necessary aspect of any music: its mediation as a cultural artefact within a social and historical
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context. This context is not merely an extra-musical appendage, but forms an intrinsic part of the music's meaning during the listening experience. Without some understanding of music's social context, we would ultimately be unable to recognise any particular collection of sounds as music at all. When we listen to music, we cannot separate our experience of its inherent meanings entirely from a greater or lesser understanding of its context. I will therefore suggest a second category of musical meaning, distinct from the first, and called "delineated meaning." By this expression I wish to convey the idea that music metaphorically sketches, or delineates, a plethora of contextualizing factors. As with inherent meaning, listeners construct the delineated meanings of music according to their subject-position in relation to the music's style. Delineated meanings are at some levels, conventionally accepted, and at others, personal.

Whenever we hear music, we are affected to some extent by both types of meaning, and both must always be present in all musical experience. But each type of meaning operates very differently, each acting in various ways upon the other, to affect our total musical experience, our musical practices and the construction of our discourses on music. It is through the mutual interaction of the different aspects of musical meaning, that we learn, amongst other things, our gendered relationships with music.²

I have used the examples of Kiri Te Kanawa and Madonna to indicate that the manipulation of their images contributes in part to the delineated meanings of the music they perform. I now want to suggest that, in much more complex ways than through clothes and hairstyles, something fundamental about their femininity itself also forms a part of their music's delineated meanings. The female singer in a public arena performs on an instrument which is her body, without recourse to the manipulation of any palpable physical object in the world. She enacts a scenario which affirms an enduring patriarchal understanding of woman as both in tune with, and subject to the natural givens of her body; whilst at the same time being alienated from, and needless of, technology. In this highlighting of the body away from technology, vocal performance is akin to a type of display, and indeed, the singing woman has been associated in most cultures with the sexual temptress or harlot.³ But the woman singer not only appears sexually available, for in her private capacity she conjures up an inversion of this public image, that of the idealized mother singing to her baby. Pivoted upon the binary division between whore and madonna, harlot and virgin, the woman singer re-enacts some of the fundamental patriarchal defining characteristics of femininity. When we listen to a woman sing, we do not just listen to the inherent meanings of the music, but we are also aware of her position in this nexus of definition. Her femininity becomes a part of the music's delineations. This affirmation of femininity and its delineation in music is one of the reasons why throughout the history of music, women have been more abundant and successful in singing than in any other single musical role.

In the case of instrumental performance, the presence and manipulation of the instrument itself to some extent interrupts the appearance of the woman's natural intuneness with and
susceptibility to her body. The more unwieldy and loud the instrument, and the more technologically demanding for the performer, the more problematic is the construction of an apparently feminine bodily display by the performer. The woman instrumentalist challenges the binary characterization of woman as either sexually available or maternally preoccupied. There was this young girl on stage, and this enormous drum kit. I couldn’t believe that she was going to play it: but she walked across the stage and sat down behind it, and she did play it—and she played it well too!": the words of an astonished school caretaker at a recent concert. However familiar such incredulity is in so many walks of life, this should not distract us from the implications it raises for musical meaning. I would suggest that the idea of the girl’s femininity had fleetingly become a part of the music’s delineations in the experience of the caretaker. When he listened to the music, he was "listening out" to discover whether she could play well. Not only for him, but for all of us, the gender of the female instrumental performer enters into delineated musical meaning, as an interruption to patriarchal definitions of femininity. This occurs to varying extents depending on the subject-position of the listener, the type of instrument, the musical style, and the social context. The effects of this problematic relationship between femininity and instrumental performance are decipherable throughout the history of women’s musical roles which reveals the fact that unwieldiness, high volume or technological complexity tend to characterize those very instruments from which women have been most vehemently discouraged or banned.

Femininity also enters delineated meaning through the composer. Clearly there is no display of the composer’s body, but composition requires a level of knowledge and control over technique, distinct from the physical motor-control of performance; and through this type of control, mind features in any composition-related delineations of music. As we listen to music, one of the elements of which we are more or less aware, an element that we are prone to marvel at in our best musical experiences, is the mind behind the music. "How could Beethoven have conceived of such a thing?" we are prone to say. Whilst we listen, it is not just the inherent meanings that occupy our attention, but the idea of Beethoven’s mind. When it is not Beethoven, but the woman composer Louise Adolpha Le Beau to whom we are listening, such a response is liable to be marked by an even greater level of incredulity than that of the school caretaker above.

[The final variation] subsequently plunges passionately and boldly on and becomes so violent that one has quite forgotten by the end that the composer is a woman indeed, one could think that one were dealing with a capable man, who can truly strike earnestly and hard as here.

(The words of a contemporary critic, concerning Le Beau’s Piano Variations, op. 3). Like the display of body in performance, there is a metaphorical display of mind in composition, which becomes a part of the music’s delineated meanings. When the composer is known to be a woman, the fact of her display of mind conflicts with her ideologically constructed natural submission to the body, going so far as to threaten patriarchal definitions of femininity. This
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is part of the explanation of why it is that women have throughout music history, been even more vigorously discouraged from composition than from instrumental performance.

The discourses which surround different styles of music place various emphasis upon the relative importance of delineated or inherent meanings. If the music is serious, classical, and purported to be autonomous, then any delineations are often altogether denied by listeners. In the case of such music, listeners are not supposed to be looking at the woman player, or disturbed by the femininity of the composer, because they are not supposed to be paying attention to the delineated meanings at all. If the music is less autonomous, more commercial for example, as with certain categories of popular music, listeners very often take any display of femininity as a legitimate and pertinent part of the delineated meanings, which are themselves celebrated. The delineations of femininity, their capacity to affirm, interrupt or threaten patriarchal definitions, thus vary in degree like all musical meanings, according to the music's style, its historical context, and the subject-position of the listener. But even in the most supposedly autonomous music, the discourse surrounding which totally eschews the possibility of delineated meaning, femininity is nonetheless delineated to some extent: otherwise, if I can put this in a nutshell, there would be have been no heat in the issue of women's musical roles, and the whole history of music would be different.6

I have suggested some ways in which the femininity of the performer or composer enters delineated musical meaning. Clearly, by my definition of inherent musical meaning as purely to do with musical materials, inherent meaning itself can have nothing to do with gender. But the gendered delineation of music does in fact not stop at delineation: it continues from its delineated position, to affect listeners, responses to and perceptions of inherent meaning. In the realm of performance, for example, if the delineation of a piece of music involves overt sexuality on the part of the female performer, we are disinclined to pay much attention to her manipulation of the inherent meanings. This disinclination surfaces in the visual culture of much popular music today, when in videos or television programmes, producers substitute the real performers by women whose main function is to display their bodies. The more attention is paid to bodily display by the performer in such a context, the less likely do we find it that the woman is actually playing the instrument, or even actually singing.7 It is not only that a high degree of feminine display is in the delineations of the music, but that those delineations then cause us to hear and interpret the inherent meanings in a certain way.

In the case of composition also, once listeners are aware that the composer is a woman, a long history shows that they tend to perceive the inherent meanings of the music in terms of delineated femininity. For example, a Scandinavian music critic was in the habit of writing rave reviews about a particular composer. After many reviews, the critic found out that the composer was a woman. He carried on writing good reviews, but his language changed; his praise ceased to describe the music with words like "strident," "virile," or "powerful," and began to include words like "delicate" and "sensitive." What had happened was that his new knowledge that the
composer was a woman, or in the terms I am suggesting, the delineation of the femininity of the composer, affected the way that he also heard the inherent meanings. One cannot help wondering whether, had he known the composer's gender all along, he would have found any merit in the compositions to begin with. A great deal of music by women composers has been denigrated for its effeminacy; other music has been more favourably received as displaying positive feminine attributes such as delicacy or sensitivity; and a tiny amount of music by women has been incredulously hailed as equal to music by a man. History gives us due cause to assume that the composer behind nearly all the music that most people hear, is a man; or to put this another way, part of all musical delineation contains the notion of a male mind. When we discover a woman's mind behind the music, her femininity then enters the delineations, from which position it acts to alter our perceptions, normally unchallenged in this regard, of the inherent meanings. The more that femininity is delineated, the less inclined are we to judge the inherent meanings as autonomous essences.

To summarize the argument so far, music delineates gender in a variety of ways, according to the gender of the performer and/or the composer, in combination with the music's style, its historical context, and the subject-position of the listener. Musical delineations are not closed unto themselves, but they affect our perceptions of inherent meanings. When music delineates femininity through a female performer or composer, we are liable to also judge the handling of inherent meanings by that performer or composer, in terms of our idea of their femininity. It is not that there is anything feminine about the inherent meanings, but that the idea of femininity filters our response to them.

I sent some questionnaires to a selection of mixed secondary schools in different parts of England, which aimed to tap teachers' perceptions of boys' and girls' musical practices and aptitudes. It was no surprise to find that in almost every one of the seventy-eight schools, girls were reported to sing in abundance, often to the total exclusion of boys; that large numbers of girls played keyboard and traditional orchestral instruments enthusiastically, joining orchestras and bands, and taking part in school concerts, whereas boys played mainly electric guitars, bass and drums. Overwhelmingly, teachers stated that girls are better at playing classical music than boys, giving the reason that girls are more persevering, hard-working and committed. It was interesting to discover something about teachers' views of pupils' proclivities in the realm of composition, a curriculum requirement which has only existed in any widespread sense in Britain over the last ten years or so. I found that in teachers' eyes and ears, girls are more conservative at composition, less imaginative, less innovative than boys, who are understood to have all the hallmarks of a sense of aesthetic adventure. In sum, musical girls are understood to be numerous, persevering, but ultimately conservative and mediocre; whereas musical boys are perceived as rare, creative and gifted.

Some of these perceptions, such as how many girls sing in the choir or play the piano, are easily empirically verifiable. In and across music classrooms there is replication of the
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historical precedents that are part-cause and part-effect of gendered musical meanings, as girls and boys continue by their musical practices to reproduce the history of women’s and men’s musical roles. Others of the teachers’ perceptions, such as how gifted girls and boys are at music, and especially how creative they are at composition, are not empirically verifiable at all. Such impressions are based on aesthetic judgements about pupils’ musical products. These judgements can be understood in terms of deeply-embedded musical meanings handed down through history; and like everyone else, teachers and pupils in schools respond to music in terms of musical meanings that are, amongst other things, gendered. This includes not only delineated meanings, but the effect of delineations upon our perceptions of inherent meanings. Thus, as with all listeners and critics, when teachers judge pupils’ work, the gendered musical delineations which cannot be avoided, also act to affect their perceptions of the music’s inherent meanings. For pupils themselves, when they make choices about their musical practices, and when they are working on performances or compositions, the delineated meanings of their chosen music and of their own work will come back at them and affect their perceptions of its inherent meanings.

Music’s incorporation of gender does not reside hermetically in musical meaning, for gendered musical meanings affect our consciousness and experience, not only of music, but through music, of ourselves. Gendered musical meanings participate in the construction of our very notions of masculinity and femininity. This means, therefore, that we can use music to confirm and perpetuate our concepts of ourselves as gendered beings. Such a use of music lies behind many of the teachers’ perceptions of girls’ and boys’ musical activities and abilities. Thus teachers may be right that girls are more interested in violins than drums, and they may be right that girls are conservative in composition: what is crucial, is that such judgements themselves must be combined with the girls’ own musical judgements and inclinations, all of which cannot be separated from the influence of gendered musical meanings. These meanings are not only handed down through history, nor do they only persist in the organization of musical production and reception in the society at large, but they are also re-enacted daily in the life of the in the life of the music classroom as a microcosm of the wider society.

Musical meaning on one hand, teachers’ and pupils’ practices and perceptions on the other; inseparably and complexity these combine in classrooms to make our musical, educational transactions far from innocent. This would therefore seem to be a very bleak outlook for the role of music education. If indeed stereotypical gendered musical meanings are impinging themselves in a way which reproduces the historical precedents of men and women’s musical practices, then there would not seem to be a great deal that the school can do to intervene. Any redefinition of roles and practices would seem to be blocked by the requirement of the redefinition of musical meaning itself. However the fact of this blockage does not make me despair.
The examples above suggest some ways in which pupils and teachers perpetuate gender stereotypes through their mainstream music-educational practices. But it is also possible to resist through music. A group of girls in one Liverpool school got together with a youth leader in the late 1980’s to produce some rap, in which they played electric and percussion instruments. They were at first aggressively ridiculed by boys, who referred to them as "slags" and "tarts," and to their music "rubbish," amongst other expressions. The girls persisted with their music-making on several afternoons when school was over, and eventually having finished a number, they relayed it in high volume down to the playground where a group of boys stood chiding. Now, the meaningful process such as I have been describing, whereby the feminine delineations of the music caused the boys to denigrate both the girls and the inherent meanings, acted in reverse; the confrontational political situation caused the boys to listen again to the inherent meanings. They found them convincing, and they then also changed their minds about the girls' aptitudes and intentions.

Such interventions are rare, not necessarily educative, and most probably short-lived. They do not require theoretical knowledge about musical meaning on the part of teachers, but political commitment. But if as a profession we do seek to harness such interventionary possibilities to the pursuit of our highest ideals, then it may be helpful to be aware of the complexity and depth-embeddedness of gendered musical meanings, not only in our educational structures but also in our musical experiences.

NOTES

1. This theory is treated more fully, although without any reference to gender, in Lucy Green, Music On Deaf Ears: Musical Meaning, Ideology and Education (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1988).

2. Masculinity and femininity are only definable in relation to each other; therefore both must be equally relevant to music. Bearing this in mind, I concentrate in this paper, on femininity.


4. Clearly in putting forward such an argument I am invoking a mind–body split; but this is not because I wish to claim the "correctness" of such a split. On the contrary, it is because this split forms a definitive part of the very distinction between masculinity and femininity which I aim to critique. See Charles Ford, Cosi? Sexual Politics in Mozart’s Operas (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1991), 8–10 and passim. for a discussion of the
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Enlightenment roots of the construction of the male as reasoning and the female as tied to the body, with reference to music; Susan McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality* (Minnesota and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 17–18, 79, 151–52 for a discussion of mind and body regarding masculinity and femininity with relation to music, although I am not in line with her argument that music and woman are both associated with the body; and David Lidov, "Mind and Body in Music," *Semiotica* 66, (1987) 69–97 for a characterisation of performance as somatic, and composition as semiotic.


6. The reference in note 3 would again provide a starting-point for following up this claim.


Feminism as critique in philosophy of music education....For the moment let's set aside the discussion of philosophy of music education and examine the view of feminism as critique; although because this is about music education and philosophy, those concepts cannot remain discrete or unrelated to the initial discussion of feminism as critique. Notwithstanding the contemporary women's movement has been in progress over twenty years and "has led to a significant restructuring of our theoretical tradition from a feminist perspective" in most disciplines, this restructuring is only recent within musicology, and nascent within music education. Long after the national media has named feminism the new f-word and proclaimed a post-feminist era, we have yet to broach the subject as music educators. Perhaps we have been cloistered in our practice rooms a bit too long. Considering the impact of such otherworldliness on our profession, it undoubtedly is necessary to define feminism for this paper. "Defining Feminism" is followed by an examination through feminism of the aesthetic and praxial philosophies of music education, constituting the major section of the paper, "Speaking Philosophy of Music Education." I conclude this essay on feminism as critique with some musings on the possibilities for feminist theorizing in music education in a section called, "Feminist Mus(ic)ing: A Fiction-Theory."

DEFINING FEMINISM

"I myself have never been able to find out precisely what feminism is: I only know that people call me a feminist whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat," said author Rebecca West 71 years ago. A British suffragette, Teresa Billington-Grieg, describes feminism "as a movement seeking the reorganization of the world upon a basis of sex-equality in all human relations;" that it "...has as yet no defined creed...[and] is the articulate consciousness of mind in women...in its different forms of expression." Within the current generation bell hooks has stated that feminism "is a commitment to eradicating the ideology of domination that permeates Western culture on various levels—sex, race, and class, to name a few...." Similarly, Nancy Hartsock says that feminism "is a mode of analysis, a method of approaching life and politics, a way of asking questions and searching for answers, rather than a set of political conclusions about the oppression of women." And Barbara Smith emphasizes:

Feminism is the political theory and practice to free all women: women of colour, working class women, poor women, physically challenged women, lesbians, old women, as well as white
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economically privileged heterosexual women. Anything less than this is not feminism, but merely female self-aggrandizement.⁴

Even though these definitions encompass generations of feminist theorizing, commitment and achievement, the influence of feminism in music education has been nil.⁵ Feminist scholars in music education are still drawn into arguments to demonstrate gender as a characteristic or quality within music, even as our research and that of our colleagues in historical musicology, ethnomusicology, and music theory has moved far beyond that basic point; even as every other discipline has accepted, at least in some corner, that gender matters. For example, Estella Lauter can expect to be understood when she says:

Through its analysis of the operation of gender throughout the Western artworld over four centuries, feminist practice has established that regardless of individual artists' occasional successes, art registers discriminatory cultural practices. Idealism aside, art is gendered.⁶

A music educator cannot expect such understanding when she states that music is gendered. And yet, the evidence that music is gendered through the preparation of musicians, the production of music and the reception of musical works, as well as musical performers/performances has been and continues to be thoroughly documented. Feminist scholars in music education are in a very different situation than their counterparts in the related field of visual arts, where "[t]he resulting widespread dissemination of the concept [of feminism] and the paradigm [of feminist criticism] has allowed for the exploration of more complex theoretical ground as the debate progresses, it is no longer necessary for feminist theorists of the visual arts to reinvent the wheel of their critique in every academic outing."⁷

Let me roll out the wheel of my critique in this academic outing.

Categories of Feminism

To begin, the wheel that is my understanding of feminism as critique grows out of working with diverse feminist theories through the now-established discipline of Women's Studies. An early critical spoke in this wheel was the exploration of distinct feminist theories. Although I no longer use that spoke, it did have value; therefore, I now present a reductionist overview of contemporary feminist theorizing in order to provide background for theorizing feminism as critique.⁸

Feminism as critique is not diminished in magnitude by incongruities among and within a multifold of feminisms. Rosemary Tong identifies the following varieties of feminist theory: liberal, Marxist, radical, psychoanalytic, socialist, existentialist, and postmodern.⁹ In practice, we can find combinations of, additions to, and subdivisions of these seven types. For example, Marxist and socialist feminisms are often hyphenated within one category; lesbian-feminism,
Asian feminism and black feminism frequently are added; existentiaolist feminism might be seen as an historical moment,10 and so forth. In the interests of clarity, and using Tong as a guide, I offer some brief definitions of feminist theories together with examples applicable to music education.

Liberal Feminism

In her definition of liberal feminism, Tong names Mary Wollstonecraft and Betty Friedan, and the concepts of equality in law and androgyny among her examples.11 A liberal feminist analysis of music might be concerned primarily with issues of equal opportunity in music education for students and teachers. Women composers would be added to the existing curricula, i.e., women's compositions would join the canon of great works. Care would be taken to provide girls with the same opportunities as boys to study jazz and use computers and synthesizers. Employment equity programs would work towards equity in hiring and promoting women teachers and professors at different levels of music education.

Psychoanalytic Feminism

Tong suggests Juliet Mitchell, Carol Gilligan and Nancy Chodorow to exemplify psychoanalytic feminism during the '70s.12 Today psychoanalytic feminism often focuses on criticism of Freud and Lacan, while borrowing their concepts where useful. Many literary critics borrow psychoanalytic principles within their feminist criticism. Psychoanalytic feminism might look for solutions to women's absence from music and music education in re-worked and re-visioned psychological constructs. It might also look for and analyze representations of maleness and femaleness within the music itself.

Radical Feminism

Generally, radical feminism could say that the root of the problem is in patriarchal constructions of sexuality, that "women's oppression...is the first, the most widespread, and the deepest form of human oppression."13 Tong's sampler of radical feminist thought includes Kate Millet, Adrienne Rich, Mary Daly, and Marilyn Frye,14 among several writers, poets and philosophers. Another aspect of radical feminist theory, cultural feminism, might be especially applicable in music. "Women's music" of all kinds would be important within this model of feminism. A cultural feminist examination of music education would likely critique the androcentricity of Western art music and look for indications of a feminine music, or a gynecentric aesthetic, in a re-valuing of "woman's nature" from a matriarchal past.15
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Marxist/Socialist Feminism

Marxist/socialist feminism would analyze the inequities within the social structure in terms of class differences and access to music, as well as the value of the art to society; that is, highlighting issues of power and powerlessness, of production and reproduction. Socialist feminism, which sees sex/gender systems as social (not biological) constructions and, therefore, aims to eliminate masculinity and femininity, is "largely the result of Marxist feminists' dissatisfaction with the essentially gender-blind character of Marxist thought." In music, it might very well be the socialist feminist focus would begin from what Dorothy Smith calls the standpoint of women, and examine gender divisions of labour in music education, including the alienation of women from all aspects of production and reproduction of music. As well, such critique, growing from the Frankfurt school of critical theory, might argue, as does Josephine Donovan, that "art is inherently political in that it by definition offers a negative critique of commodity exchange reification." Postmodern Feminism

Tong equates postmodernism with the "French feminism" of Cixous, Kristeva and Irigaray, all of whose work is concerned with literature, language, and drawn from psychoanalysis, including critiques of Lacan and Derrida. Foucault's studies of power, knowledge, sexuality and institutions are important influences and sources for critique in postmodern feminism, also. Postmodern feminist criticism in music would examine the margins of music education as a "celebration of multiplicity." In addition, the attention postmodernists give to subjectivities, representation and performative qualities of gender have implications for theorizing artistry, aesthetics and education. In other words, since music is created through cultural practices (including, for example, particular individual's and group's definitions of music and artistry, self and self-knowledge, masculinity and femininity), it would be worthwhile to examine how these various representations are realized and what they mean in relation to theorizing music education.

Feminism as Critique

Feminism as critique differs from feminist criticism. Feminist criticism might be seen as comparable to literary or artistic criticism and focusing upon works of art, but I am not thinking within that more narrow definition. Feminism is an ideology(ies) seeking nothing less than the reorganization of the world through a commitment to eradicating ideologies of domination; this involves political theory and political action, as well as philosophic and artistic criticism. Feminism is also a mode of analysis, a method of approaching life, a way of asking questions and searching for answers, so that we can name and experience the articulate consciousness of mind in women in all its different forms of expression. In this sense feminism requires praxis, that is, both knowing-what-we-do and doing-what-we-know, "the self-creative
activity through which we make the world,²³ such that philosophising feminist critique in
music and doing music cannot be separate entities. Thus, those of us who speak of feminism
as critique are participating in a paradigm shift that embodies the diversity of women's
experiences in its challenges and questions, while seeking meaning-making conditions that
honour our differences.

Because of the broader context and greater depth of feminist work surrounding us within
a multidisciplinary framework, it is possible to begin at this time the task of feminist theoretical
reconstruction of music through music education, even while we "deconstruct" the Western art
music tradition to uncover its gender blindness and biases. Musicologists, ethnomusicologists,
and (more recently) music theorists increasingly are engaged in this "deconstructive" project as
they examine the realities of women's experiences in music historically, cross-culturally, and in
musical theory or structure. At the 1993 Feminist Theory and Music II Conference I heard
musicologists' and music theorists' initial (and often somewhat naive pedagogically) examples
and questions regarding the transmission and transformation of musical knowledge. Most
frequently there was no recognition that musical knowledge is transmitted within and through
particular kinds of institutions, institutions which present resistance to change. On the other
hand, I did hear a willingness to consider the institutional implications of reconstructing music
through music education voiced by one theorist: could it be that education is the social action
component of feminist music theory?²⁴ To take that question further, I suggest that music
scholars now ask how shifting from men's to women's perspectives might alter the fundamental
categories, methodology and self-understanding of music, particularly as transmitted through the
educational process. This form of questioning exemplifies feminism as critique.²⁵

So long as only one critical position is assumed, basic categories within music—music
itself—would remain unchallenged. Although the initial presentation of categories of feminist
thought help to make different perspectives apparent, in the end the critique must be greater than
the parts; no one model of feminist theory will suffice for a thorough interrogation of music as
cultural practice transmitted through education. We cannot hope to find a singular "common
language"²⁶ for this project. Expanding my definition of feminism as critique to acknowledge
the partiality of any one critical lens, the futility of universal perspectives, the shifting ground
of subjectivity/objectivity, the dominance of "neutrality," the very political substance of
education and art, simultaneously with the centrality of women to feminism—such
acknowledgements fracture the line of fault²⁷ hidden underneath the everyday-ness of music
learning that serves to domesticate girls and women within music worlds. Awareness then
makes it possible to work provisionally through feminism as critique in philosophy of music
education. By placing feminism as critique within philosophy of music education, I attempt to
present a more integral understanding, where "if patriarchy can take what exists and make it not,
surely we can take what exists and make it be," where "utopia would be a fiction from which
would be born the generic body of she who thinks,"²⁸ where consciousness of women's musical
minds can be articulated. Clearly, developing feminist theory is risky business.²⁹
Feminism as Critique

SPEAKING PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION

The problem with the extant philosophy of music education is that there is no accounting of difference, especially difference within sex/gender systems. Now by "accounting of difference," I do not mean simply an enhancement of the classical or art music under discussion/performance with various other types of music (popular, jazz, rock, world music, etc.). I do not mean a marginal addition of cultures other than European-derived. I do not mean a mention of socio-political influences at certain carefully circumscribed moments as possibly relevant to the understanding of music. I do not mean the occasional use of inclusive language to acknowledge that not all of us are white or male (who is us, anyway?). While all of the above do impinge on any movement towards more inclusive philosophies (that is, differences do need articulation), the articulation in and of itself is neither an ends nor a means. Re-thinking of difference in relation to music is required. Therefore, part of what I mean is accounting of difference as if differences matter and play some central role in the meaning of music; specifically, that race, class and gender (and diverse variations thereof) permeate music, have an effect on music and are affected by music.

Aesthetic Education

Although aesthetic education approaches cliché among many music educators, it is equally evident that hegemony is not as secure as it was a decade ago. Criticism of aesthetic education as the philosophy of music education is not new. During the past several years we have begun to hear competing ideas regarding what music means and why we do music in schools. Scholars have been wondering, talking, thinking, and writing about the adequacy of aesthetic education as both a philosophical basis and a rationale for music education. If these competing ideas were ineffectual, it would not be necessary for proponents of aesthetic education to claim that no one else has proposed an alternative philosophy, while simultaneously reducing those competing ideas to policy squabbles. And since ideas do not spring instantly and maturely into publication (unlike the patriarchal myth where Athena burst forth from Zeus' forehead), then it seems significant to acknowledge that musical thinkers have been struggling with the meanings of such competing ideas, that these ideas have a history through, within and around, as well as against, the hegemonic discourse of aesthetic education. However, since texts of aesthetic education and some alternatives to it are readily available; these texts expressing their respective positions better than I; and, since I believe I can assume you are aware of them; and finally, since my focus is on feminism as critique, I will not review all of those philosophical concerns. My attention to these theoretical perspectives will focus on account of/for differences—in, around, through music and music teaching and learning. This particular exploration of feminism as critique (a fiction-theory) pushes and pulls the boundaries of philosophy in music education to expose the gaps excluding so many of us from its myths and narratives.
It appears to me to have been a commonplace among the general population of music educators that aesthetic education is the philosophy of music education. For twenty years Bennett Reimer's, *A Philosophy of Music Education* was the only music teacher education text with reference to philosophy in the title. The prevalence of this text resulted in the emergence of aesthetic education as a master theory that has remained relatively stable for nearly three decades. In fact, in the second edition Reimer states, "No alternative philosophy has been proposed by anyone else." Simultaneously, the contemporary historical period in U.S. music education has been identified as that of Aesthetic Education, or "the aesthetic education movement." Such statements demonstrate the move from a more indefinite "a" philosophy to a hegemonic "the." Consequently, the critique I herein engage pertains to that aesthetic education concept which is hegemonic.

Whether or not one agrees with the philosophic position espoused, aesthetic education as music education has provided some definitive guidelines for teaching practice: good music, expressive music should be what is taught; music should be perceived as aesthetic through its formal elements; aesthetic and/or musical terminology that focuses on the expressive musical elements is appropriate for teaching and learning situations. According to Reimer's recent writing, "Engagements with works that emphasize their meaning as art...may be understood to be aesthetic education." Other key characteristics of aesthetic education include: "transcendence achieved by intrinsically meaningful form or structures"; that which "attempts to provide tuition about how to interact in relevant ways with musical phenomena can be construed as aesthetic education."

**Feminism as Critique of the Aesthetic**

While the definition of aesthetic education appears to be expanding in response to criticisms of its limitations, such components of aesthetic education as musical exemplars, aesthetic perception, aesthetic reaction and aesthetic experience are firmly rooted in eighteenth century aesthetic principles. These principles are appropriately applied to a specific kind of music within an historical location inside the Western art tradition. Simply saying that musics outside of that specific limitation (whether popular music or Ghanaian drumming or fill-in-the-blank music) can be experienced aesthetically, taught through aesthetic education does not make it so—or appropriate.

Part of the problem with aesthetics as a philosophy of music applied to music education is found within philosophy itself. As Carolyn Korsmeyer points out, the feminist challenge to assumed neutrality is especially subversive in philosophy, a discipline priding itself on aspiration to universality and rigorous theory. This aspiration to universality is seen in the axioms of aesthetic education as applied to all musics under the rubric that these axioms are value-free and therefore applicable to any music from any culture or any historical era. Although more
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feminists are critical of aesthetics, Hilde Hein suggests that even though "some of the most formative and central doctrines of classical aesthetics are not at all compatible with feminism and have been inimical to women," aesthetics, more than any other branch of philosophy, offers possibilities for pluralism that may be advantageous to feminist theory. She notes that branches of aesthetics, particularly Marxism and phenomenology, often engage in critique similar to feminism, but without questioning duality or gendered discourse.39

Gender and Museum Culture

Hein proceeds to specify problematic aesthetic doctrine deeply implicated in both gender duality: aesthetic disinterestedness; autonomy of the aesthetic; and, aesthetic transcendence.40 Estelle Lauter adds more doctrine crucial to the master theory of the aesthetic but problematic to a feminist theory of the arts: exclusive consideration of the art object; the requirement for expert training in identification, interpretation, and evaluation of art; conceptualizing the artwork as expressive of an individual artist who perceives differently.41 Specifically in music, Claire Detels defines three main elements of what she calls autonomist/formalist aesthetics:

(1) the definition of art as a distinct activity, apart from other cultural practices; (2) the isolation and reification of 'artworks' (i.e., the physical objects of art), away from their origins and symbolic meanings in human experience; and (3) the use of formalist, or structurally oriented, concepts as universals for judging and hierarchizing the value of artworks.42

This history of aesthetics is not innocent. The eighteenth century sources for the nineteenth century development of aesthetics were steeped in the sexual and racial politics of European culture and society. Philosophers of aesthetics (e.g., Hanslick, Kant, Schopenhauer), all in one way or another exclude women, exclude all but European serious art, and consequently—even though the most recent writing about aesthetic education indicates the possibility of inclusion of non-white and popular culture—it is very difficult to adjust the conceptual parameters to create an authentic space for such diversity. For example, to say that "each piece, no matter its cultural origin, should be studied and experienced for its artistic power including but transcending any specific cultural references,"43 would be to re-shape and re-experience a non-Western, non-artistic music into a culturally inappropriate, historically Western aesthetic mold. Universals are implied through the application of expressive and formal "elements of music"44 defined in Western art music tradition and transcendence is the stated goal. As Detels places these criteria: "Notwithstanding its denial of cultural connections, the autonomist/formalist position itself arose in a cultural context, that of the 'museum culture' of the arts."45

Exemplar as Problematic

Another concept problematic in feminist analysis but implicit in aesthetic education is the exemplar,46 the exquisite art object on the pedestal for disinterested admiration, which

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obviously parallels medieval poetic chivalry as carried forward to the nineteenth century "separate spheres" and "angel-in-the-house," where good and virtuous women were placed on pedestals above the sweat and blood of daily life. According to music theorist, Marianne Kielian-Gilbert:

...given the cultural tendency (as for example, in Hollywood film) to treat the "female body and the female self only as objects of aesthetic contemplation," we may reenact this cultural practice of sexual oppression when we attend solely to the aesthetic features and the autonomy of a musical text, thereby symbolically gendering and rendering it feminine.

Thus, the art object—music—is feminised, passive and beautiful in position to the male admirer. This subject/object split, while most peculiar in terms of music which does not exist as a material object in and of itself, requires even further translation for the female subject, who is not-subject and not-object even as the exemplar axiom requires identification with the masculine subject and objectification of the feminine object. In addition, the absence of women as actors within aesthetic theory itself underlines this feminisation of exemplar/object/music, and specifically in terms of education, reminds us of Rousseau's differential tracts for the education of Emile and Sophie. Gender has always already been a factor in this guilty history, and those occupying the feminine position have always been circumscribed by its limited range.

**Praxial Philosophy of Music Education**

The praxial philosophy of music education is a more recent development and, therefore, neither as ossified or as neatly defined as aesthetic education. The writings of Philip Alperson and David Elliott have been central to the explication of the praxial philosophy; therefore, I rely most heavily upon their definitions, supplemented by Eleanor Stubley's investigations of play and performance as a means of self-knowledge.

Philip Alperson defines a praxial philosophy in reference to the arts in general: The praxial view of art resists the suggestion that art can best be understood on the basis of some universal or absolute feature or set of features such as...aesthetic formalism, whether of the strict or enhanced variety. The attempt is made rather to understand in terms of the variety of meaning and values evidenced in actual practice in particular cultures....The approach is contextual but not relativistic, either in the sense in which it might be thought that no truths about artistic realities can be had or in the sense in which it is claimed that no standards of artistic value can be enunciated. The truths and values of art are seen rather to be rooted in the context of human practices...

As the praxial philosophy of the arts is concerned with the practices of the arts within societal or cultural contexts, it answers some of the criticisms feminists have of aesthetic philosophy, specifically the critique of formalism, universality, exclusivity of the art object, and (to some extent) the definition of art as apart from other cultural practices. In applying this praxial viewpoint as a philosophy of music education, Alperson goes on to say:
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[A] music education program which aims to educate students about musical practice in its fullest sense must take into account, not only the history and kind of appreciation appropriate to the musical work of art, but also the nature and significance of the skills and productive human activity that bring musical works into being, if for no other reason than the fact that the results of human action cannot be adequately understood apart from the motives, intentions, and productive considerations of the agents who bring them into being.51

David Elliott works out more of the details of a praxial philosophy of music education with specific concentration on the meaning of musical performance as integral to that philosophy. Elliott focuses on music as knowledge, a knowing-how embodied in performance that is "a process to be lived," where "real musical/interpretative performing involves both generative and evaluative thinking" becoming "a live deployment of the whole Self."52 Technical skills, propositional and procedural knowledge are integrated within the intentionality (thought-full-ness) of musical performance, concomitant with the value judgements and strategies that are part of a successful musical performance.53 Further, Eleanor Stuble elaborates concepts of play as crucial to music performance yielding constructive knowledge of self and the development of culture, particularly through "feeling apart together."54 Elliott suggests that "From this perspective, to enter into and take up a musical practice is also to be inducted into 'a musical world'," which "rests on long traditions that provide the musical practitioners/teachers/students of these practices with constructive knowledge about who they are in relation to themselves, to each other, and to past others."55

Feminism as Critique of the Praxial

I have no doubts that the praxial philosophy of music education, which is still evolving, opens up more possibilities than the aesthetic, but as I said earlier, my project is to expand the boundaries of philosophy of music education (perhaps into philosophies) and to expose exclusionary practices in current philosophical discussion. My concerns herein are not so much with what is said in definition and explication of the praxial philosophy, but what is not said, that is: if 'otherness' (e.g., gender, race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, abilities) is not named and addressed directly, the dominant group presumes universality and consequently can easily if not intentionally oppress. Employing a praxial philosophy does not yet shift the paradigm to embody the diversity of women's experiences, among others, in its challenges and questions; it does not yet account for difference as if differences matter and play some central role in the meanings we make of music.

Reified Performance

Performance has long been reified within Western musical traditions. For confirmation, we need only note the star status accorded to historical and contemporary virtuosi. Marianne Kielian-Gilbert names one of the oppressive practices resulting from the reification of procedure
and interpretation within music theory. Her reference to an abundance of methodologies, technologies and skills is applicable to a praxial philosophy of music education:

The sheer proliferation of currently available theoretical procedures, and the emphasis on technology and skill, also cloud the consequences of who is doing the interpreting and the ends to which an interpretation is or might be directed. Though perhaps not intended, our focus on procedure promotes aestheticization and the elevation of analytical prowess as an end or display unto itself, and limits interpretation in the sense that tools may easily be used as weapons to dehumanize and destroy.56

Briefly addressing musical performance utilising contemporary technologies, we find research demonstrating that boys and girls approach music technology differently. Austin Clarkson and Karen Pegley report that while girls were proficient in their use of MIDI technology, their attitudes towards its place in the music classroom were less positive than boys, possibly because the girls were more interested in balancing group singing with computer-generated sound, whereas the boys preferred to use MIDI to perform instrumental solos or competitive rap. Further, Pegley noticed that both place and vocality had direct effect on performance, i.e., boys exhibited more interest in performing solos publicly and on videotape, while girls were not willing to be either video or audio taped live, which would have resulted in their collaborations being shared with a wider audience.57

When Kielian-Gilbert says that tools may easily be used as weapons, the meaning need not be limited to metaphor: Induction into Western musical practice has often meant the adoption of 'success at any cost' and 'no pain–no gain' attitudes and priorities. The damage that musical instruments and highly skilled, highly disciplined participation in musical performance can cause to the human body has been identified only within the past decade. While performing arts medical clinics have been established, many are still gathering information about the incidence of injury and, therefore, making educated guesses regarding rehabilitation. In other words, musicians undergo various therapies, even surgery, to relieve pain, but conclusive evidence has yet to be established that these retain their effectiveness once (or if) a return has been made to high levels of musical performance. This new knowledge that performance 'may be hazardous to your health' has yet to be reckoned with in the praxial philosophy.

Contradictory Performance

Musical performance is a contradictory experience for women, as Kielian-Gilbert suggests when she refers to the consequences of who is doing the interpreting and the ends to which an interpretation is or might be directed. On the one hand, performing music can be most empowering and constructive of self-identity. For examples, it can mean "having control over my time and energy and working at home, being paid to do something that felt like an expression of myself, being paid to travel, and most important, being treated with respect and being heard." Simultaneously that same woman musician says:
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Playing and performing hurt me very deeply...in a profession that is traditionally associated with suffering, it would be unthinkable to suggest that we have gone too far, that there is nothing wrong with our bodies, that it is the instruments that must be changed. A culture that hates bodies and their limitations teaches us to scoff at the idea that the discipline and pain required to succeed in the arts is unnatural and wrong.⁵⁶

We must acknowledge that questions of power are embedded in performance. Is the musical performance truly self-actualising, or is it enacted under the supervision of a conductor, coach, mentor, master teacher? If one among the latter, then whose self is being lived? How? And with what effect upon the woman who is performing? As music theorist Suzanne Cusick suggests:

[A]ll musical texts (whether "performed" or not) represent complex models of the mind–body relationship—a relationship which is both severely dichotomized and heavily gendered in European-derived cultures. The virtual elimination of questions about the bodies whose actions allow music to exist from the "toolbox" of music theory and musicology is itself, then, a feminist issue.⁵⁷

In addition, since performance is not devoid of aesthetic features and the primacy of musical text, performing music can be implicated in gendering the music as feminine, the performer as masculine.

This contradictory experience of musical performance can be seen historically in Western art music and cross-culturally. Ethnomusicologist Ellen Koskoff documents these complexities, including those of Western art music, noting that while the meaning of women’s performance differs by culture, it invariably is tied to that culture’s concepts of women’s sexuality. Performances deemed inappropriate for women, perhaps unfeminine, frequently personify sexuality out of control. A woman professional musician may be identified within a society as a courtesan, a prostitute, a loose woman—whatever her sexual reality.⁵⁸ It also appears that in almost every culture women’s musical performances are differently and usually less valued than men’s. Likewise, musical performance is linked to socialisation (whether in educational, religious, or professional settings), simultaneously expressing and shaping cultural gender norms.⁵⁹

Another example of this contradictory performance experience was studied during 1992 by Travis Jackson in his work as a black jazz musician and among black jazz musicians in New York, where he found the jazz performance space mixed in all terms except gender. Through race as a signifier of master/slave, Jackson sees black women being placed outside the definition of womanhood into a completely sexualized position. In conjunction with this positioning, affection displaced to the jazzman’s instrument, often referred to as "my girl." According to Jackson, the "male gaze" is so prevalent as to make the very presence of women antithetical to jazz: Women are seen as a source of evil; the jazz scene demands total commitment to the music and personal or artistic autonomy, thus, placing music first and lover or family second.
and third. Consequently women are not taken seriously or valued professionally as band members or band leaders, but considered to be a novelty.\footnote{62}

It becomes apparent that neither is the praxial philosophy of music education innocent. These diverse power relations are implicated in the "long traditions that provide the musical practitioners/teachers/students of these practices with constructive knowledge about who they are in relation to themselves, to each other, and to past other." Such issues are begging to be addressed through feminist analysis of who is doing the interpreting/performing and to what end.\footnote{63}

**FEMINIST MUS(IC)ING: A FICTION–THEORY**

How does shifting from men's to women's perspectives alter the fundamental categories, methodology and self-understanding of music, particularly as transmitted through the educational process? Some of that shift to women's perspectives has been demonstrated in the previous sections with feminism as critique of the aesthetic and the praxial philosophies of music education, where that value of that paradigm shift:

...lies in its ability to go beyond the liberal feminist vision of equal representation in the mainstream institutions and canons of the arts, and to challenge the underlying exclusionary framework of values and practices that produce and maintain gender inequality, both in and outside of the artworld.\footnote{64}

Other partial lenses into that si[gh]te were found in the definitions of various types of feminism and the explanation of feminism as critique. Some alterations of fundamental categories, methodology and self-understanding of music would occur should these initial examples become reality, because:

...feminist theory returns art to its social contexts and reinvigorates it so that it becomes a source of power to a wide variety of people. Feminist theory enhances our experience of art by accounting for it more accurately. It expands the range of what we consider to be art and prepares the way to legitimate new art forms; opens the community of artists; revalues subjectivity in art and augments it to include women's experiences; allows us to reconnect aesthetic values with political activity; stimulates criticism of obsolete aesthetic standards and validates new ones; valorizes new modes of production; and supports more active response.\footnote{65}

**Feminism as Critique of Instructional Practices in Musicology**

Several musicologists are struggling with similar ideas within the educational process as they find it. Marcia Citron suggests teaching a critique of canonicity as one immediately useful methodology for music historians and performers.\footnote{66} David Code discusses the false
universalization of twelve-tone temperament in terms of his concerns regarding what and how his students learn music theory, while Lawrence Kramer reasons apprehension of the paradigm shift as dependent on "our willingness to read as inscribed within the immediacy-effects of music itself the kind of mediating structures usually positioned outside music under the rubric of context." J. Michele Edwards sees the line blurring between audience, performer, and composer as women performer/composers challenge musical values to pose different modes of musical interaction; whereas, Jennifer Rycenga sees musical agency (and I would suggest, education) as a process:

to create situations that have similar parameters, though they may not imitate this exact compositional/improvisational dynamic. Situations of musical trust will not only deconstruct the composer's presumed authority and prestige, but stress the agency, interaction and extension, over time, of all involved. Thus the human politics of music can become a location for an ethics that is not judgmental, but relational.  

Feminism as Critique of Instructional Practices in Music Education

Within music education itself, Eleanor Stubley points toward this position when she borrows from reader/response theory to suggest similarities between musical performing and reading as transactions which speak from the heart and exist in association with the immediate past and the future about to unfold, where there is a certain simultaneousness of self and other. Patricia O'Toole demonstrates that integral site of knowing in her discussion of choral pedagogy and rehearsal techniques, weaving together theory and experience. Further highlighting the contested terrain of music education, Vicki Eaklor suggests the theoretical problems are based in a discipline that is both too feminine for males and too masculine for females, and Julia Koza documents the heterosexism of choral education texts that exhibit great concern for the missing males and the potential unmanliness of singing, such that good teaching has been defined as that which assures the presence of boys in the music class. In a similar vein, Lucy Green notes that work is needed on teaching the compensatory history of women in music in the school curriculum, both in terms of knowledge of the music and for a foundation for understanding women's situations today; we need "new ways of understanding how girls and boys relate to music as aesthetic and cultural object, or how musical meanings operate within this relationship"; and, we need to discuss "questions about how gendered musical relationships are perpetuated by schooling." 

Feminist Musings

These are all partial and—in some cases—contradictory shifts; they do begin to fracture the line of fault hidden underneath the everyday-ness of music teaching. Operating provisionally, aware of complicity even in critique, I suggest "working from the site of knowing
that is prior to the differentiation of subjective and objective" where one teaches "an explication of the actual practices in which we are active." This site could be:

where art remain[s] embedded in and at[i]se[s] out of conversation with contingent, everyday world. The artistic praxis...works with [context] in a dialogic fashion, that recognizes that moments of being inhere in the everyday world, seeing art as a means of momentarily capturing or highlighting or simply attending to those moments. In this way, researching and thinking about music is not separate from doing music is not separate from teaching music is not separate from the line of fault, that is, the ways in which the everyday musicworlds we experience as women are incongruous with the social expression of those musicworlds. In this way, we can recognize music's subjectivity/objectivity as a shifting ground relevant and even implicated in educational practice, especially as we acknowledge our own actions as inventing musical praxis, and, thus, its political substance. "Art is not transcendent, then, but rather part of the mortal process."

Fundamental concepts requiring explication of musical practices in critical education include those centred in duality: subject/object; mind/body; thinking/doing; masculine/feminine. Interrogating these dualities through feminism as critique recognises the power inequities of many musical actions and activities, making it possible to understand through connections or integration rather than separations and individuation. It is quite possible that through integration of dualities we can come to recognise multiple differences that play central roles in the meaning of musics. It is at this point that we can attend to the permeation and permutation of music by differences—as if they mattered and are worthy of honour. Further to this critique, Renée Lorraine suggests a pedagogy of "fluctuating stasis," such that "[t]here would be no common language...multilingualism would become essential." In a continued explication of the actual, Lorraine envisions:

...urging our students to think, feel, listen, and create for themselves,...familiarizing students with conventional ways of approaching music, but at the same time encouraging them to resist authority and to approach music in their own unique ways.

Concluding Fictions

In conclusion, some of these ideas seem rather pedestrian; others bring me back to the fiction-theory where the generic body of she who thinks would be born, taking what exists and making it be, where consciousness of women's musical minds could be articulated/ composed/ performed. Perhaps here we would find feminist mus(ic)ing. Here we would take pleasure in chaos, revealing deep structures beneath surfaces. Like Patti Lather, "Rather than 'how to' guidelines, what I have tried to 'sum up' here, instead, is the need for intellectuals with liberatory intentions to take responsibility for transforming our own practices so that our own empirical and pedagogical work can be less toward positioning ourselves as masters of truth and
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justice and more toward creating a space where those directly involved can act and speak on their own behalf. As one alternative within that full range of meaning potential, engaging feminism as critique reveals hither to undiscovered, unexamined, and unthinkable possibilities. As one last example, we who are women would know music as if women mattered, while men would know music as if they were women. Thus, feminism as critique in the philosophy of music education increases the capacity of music education philosophy to comprehend and elucidate ‘what music means.’ On the other hand, to attempt awakening to and reflection on the full range of meaning potential in the musical experience without considering feminist theories risks theoretical naiveté.

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Maus, Fred Everett. "Masculine Discourse in Music Theory." *Perspectives of New Music* 31, no. 2 (Summer 1993).


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NOTES


2. Susan McClary's pathbreaking Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), was published in 1991.


5. See British Journal of Music Education 10, no. 3 (November 1993) and The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning 4, no. 4, and 5, no. 1 (Winter 1994) for the first issues of academic journals in music education to address feminist theory.


8. Categories of feminism are most often used as a pedagogical tool in Women's Studies classes. This presentation is approximately one semester of an undergraduate honours seminar in feminist theories reduced to 600 words!

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15. Renée Lorraine proposes a gynecentric aesthetic: 
...we may assume that the powerful emotion of dance and song would be used along with medicine and talk therapy to heal physical, social and psychological ills. (Music, art, and once therapists would be more plentiful, highly valued, and better paid.) Artistic activity would more often adapt to nature, rather than seek to express refinement or domination of nature. The division between intellect and emotion in aesthetic activity would lessen, and both would combine with etion to achieve a synthesis of body and spirit. The erotic would be expressed as a vital, positive force and would be divorced from repression and the domination, submission, and violence of pornography. Artistic activity would be understood by and accessible to all; the authoritarian, hierarchical, and exclusionary nature of traditional artistic circles and performance groups would fall into decline. The emphasis would be off aesthetic objects to be coveted, hoarded, and contemplated, and on dynamic process, fully engaging and socially significant. Renée Lorraine, "A Gynecentric Aesthetic," in *Aesthetics in Feminist Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 45–46.

16. Tong, 39–71 (Marxist feminism); 173–194 (Socialist feminism).

17. Tong, 173.


20. Hélène Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa," *Signs* 1, no. 4 (Summer 1976); Julia Kristeva, "Stabat Mater" in *The Female Body in Western Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One*, trans., Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). This definition of postmodern feminism is even more simplified and problematic than her others (Tong, 217–34). Post-structuralism would be a more accurate name for the theoretical position Tong describes, with postmodernism reserved for critiques of representation.


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25. I draw this formulation from Benahib and Cornell, *Feminism as Critique*, and apply it to music.


30. There are several aspects of philosophy of music education that I have not addressed in this paper, especially those centred in psychological frameworks and what might be called relativism. Due to time/length restrictions I chose to focus my discussion on feminism as critique of aesthetic- and performance-based philosophies, the two that at this time appear to be receiving the most discussion.

31. As but one example, *The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning* 2, no. 3 (Fall 1991) featured a thorough discussion of many of these issues.

32. Gail Scott defines fiction-theory as developed during the 1970s by *les Québécoises*. This *l'écriture au féminin* (translated in English as ‘feminist writing’) sought:

    ...to explore that gap between male dominant culture and an emerging culture in-the-feminine...This was not *theory about fiction*, but rather...[emphasis and ellipses in original] a reflexive doubling-back over the texture of the text. Where nothing, not even the "theory" escapes the poetry, the eternal rhythm (as opposed to the internal logic) of the writing. The better to break continuity (the continuity of patriarchal mythologies) into fragments in order to question syntax/context. This habit of stopping to reflect on the process within the text itself looks forward to a meaning in-the-feminine. Mutable meaning, open-ended...

    ...The lucidity of the theoretical process—in itself an intertextual process involving reading, talking, in which the words of other women play a key role—constantly prepares the way for the new risks she herself moves towards in her own fiction.


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35. Estelle R. Jorgensen, "Introduction," Philosopher, Teacher, Musician: Perspectives on Music Education (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois, 1993), 1. It is interesting that "movement" is language often reserved for heart-felt causes.


40. Hein, 10–12.

41. Lauter, 21–22.

42. Detels, 113.

43. Reimer, Philosophy, 145; emphasis in original.

44. Reimer, Philosophy, 54.

45. Detels, 113.


49. "The search for abstract and speculative truths, for principles and axioms in science, for all that tends to generalisation, is beyond a woman's grasp; their studies should be thoroughly practical. It is their business to apply the principles discovered by men, it is their place to make the observations which lead men to discover those principles. A woman's thoughts, beyond the range of her immediate duties, should be directed to the study of men, or the acquirement of that agreeable learning whose sole end is the formation of taste." "Sophie's mind is pleasing but not brilliant..." "...she has taste rather than talent." Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, trans., Barbara Foxley (New York: Dutton, 1974), 349, 358, 357. Sophie and her relationship with Emile are featured in Book 5 of Emile.

50. Alperson, 233.
51. Alperson, 236.


55. Elliott, 37.

56. Kielian-Gilbert, 4.


60. "[I]t is precisely her [Viardot's] reputation as diva and seductress which makes it difficult to learn much about her achievements as a composer." Clarity James, Caryl Conger, and Linda Plaut, "The Music of Pauline Viardot-Garcia," 17 June 1993; "The stereotype evoked by the... 'dancing lady'... is a sensuous woman of dubious morals, open sexuality, and fickle allegiance who may tempt others into sin." Cynthia J. Cyrus, "Dancing Ladies and Other Moral Orphans: Sexual Stereotypes in the Fifteenth Century," 18 June 1993; "Power invades the personal dimension as well: her [Rosine Stoltz's] success in Paris was rumored to be due only to her liaison with Leon Pillet, the Opera's director." Mary Ann Smart, "Opera's Lost and Obliterated Voices," 18 June 1993. See also: Georgia Cowart, "Women, Sex, Madness: Metaphors for Music of the Ancien Régime"; Barbara Coeyman, "Women performers in the Court of Louis XIV: Necessary Adjuncts to Male Agendas"; Nancy Newman, "Claud Schumann and Modern Female Identity"; all of the above are found in Abstracts Feminist Theory & Music II: A Continuing Dialogue (dal segno), 17-20 June 1993 (Rochester, New York).


63. There is one area in which both the aesthetic and the praxial can be questioned on the same ground, i.e., the idea of genius, whether as seen in the inspired composer or virtuoso performer. See Christine Battersby, Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics (London: The Women’s Press Ltd., 1989).
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64. Detels, 113.

65. Lauter, 33.


71. Patricia O'Toole, "I Sing in a Choir but I Have 'No Voice!'"; Vicki L. Eaklor, "The Gendered Origins of the American Musician"; Julia Koza, "Big Boys Don't Cry (Or Sing): Gender, Misogyny, and Homophobia in College Choral Methods Texts"; all three articles are in The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning 4, no. 4, and 5, no. 1 (Winter 1993/Spring 1994).


74. Donovan, 64. In her essay Donovan makes direct reference to Virginia Woolf's Moments of Being. For me the 'everyday use' calls forward Dorothy Smith's 'everyday world; although Donovan specifies 'everyday use' as the craft of domestic art.

75. Gregory Ulmer suggests that there need not be any separation of research, teaching and art; see Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1985).

76. Donovan, 64.


78. See notes 29 and 32.

79. See Lorraine: What seems more characteristic of fluctuating stasis is intense cultural dissonance or chaos. Our option, if we hope to prevent excessive psychological dissonance in such a condition, would be to learn to take pleasure in chaos. And to remember that much of chaos theory in science and mathematics focuses on revealing deep structures of order beneath chaotic surfaces. "Musicology and Theory," 243.

80. Lather, 163–64.

82. I am paraphrasing Gloria Steinem:

   We have for so long looked at most subjects through male eyes that remedial vision (which for women, would mean looking at the world *as if women mattered*, and for men, *as if they were women*) brings a new perspective.

Gloria Steinem, *Moving Beyond Words* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 14, emphasis in original. For an example of a male scholar appropriately engaging feminist criticism, see Fred Everett Maus, "Masculine Discourse in Music Theory," *Perspectives of New Music* 31, no. 2 (Summer 1993).
Scaling the Ivory Tower:
The Micropolitics of Being a Woman in Higher Education in Music

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As the final years of this century quickly draw to a close, it is important for educators to look back upon the changes which have occurred in the teaching profession. No one would be accused of exaggerating for labeling this metamorphosis as anything less than phenomenal, yet, in many ways, little has changed. In a democratic society, one would expect that equal treatment of individuals would be the rule rather than the exception, and that in education, "the great equalizer," one could expect nothing less. Unfortunately, it seems that this expectation may merely be an illusion. According to many sources, women in careers in higher education have made very little progress in the last century in securing positions (especially those of leadership) in our nation's universities and colleges. Even in the area of music where women have held a proportionately higher number of positions than in mathematics or the sciences, there still is a lack of women in positions of authority and leadership.

In 1889, 24.6% of all faculty members at U.S. colleges and universities were women, while 100 years later the percentage has risen to just 29.7. At the turn of this century women represented eight percent of the full professors at the University of Chicago whereas in 1968-69 only two percent of the full professors were women. In music, a field which has traditionally been viewed as being open to women, the numbers are also interesting. In a census from 1982-83, there were 5,802 males (78% of the total) holding music faculty positions in American colleges and universities and 1,735 females (22%). The tenured men, however, held 67.5% of all the music posts, while only 12.2% of the jobs were held by tenured women. Perhaps the most telling statistic of all, however, is that less than 10% of all our institutions of higher learning are headed by women.

Obviously, being a woman in higher education has some interesting implications, problems, and consequences. There are various position papers and books discussing the implications of the unequal treatment of women in higher education (as cited above), many of which are indeed written by women. Few, however, have approached the problem by directly surveying the perceptions and attitudes of women in the field.

In this study, I sought to speak with women who presently have careers in music at an institution of higher education to learn from them the particular problems and frustrations which they have experienced as females in these careers. I also discussed with them the possibilities
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for leadership which they felt were open to women, and the means by which women could be encouraged to seek leadership roles.

Methodology

The data for this study were drawn from indepth interviews with ten women currently employed as members of the music faculty at a large research university. The women had various levels of experience in higher education ranging from four years to over 25 years of experience. Three were full professors, two were associates, and five held the rank of assistant professor. Their personal lives were also diverse. Five of the participants were married (one had a child) and five were single (two of whom had been previously married).

A conscious decision was made to limit the discussion to gender issues without regard for the interviewee’s race. It was felt that adding the issues confronting women of color (although just as important as their gender) was a complexity which was beyond the scope of this investigation.

The interviews were conducted at the convenience of the participants in their offices or another agreed upon location. They lasted from 45 to 60 minutes. The interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed, and studied by the writer. In the excerpts which follow all references to names and geographic locations which might clearly identify the interviewee have been eliminated to protect each person’s anonymity. Likewise the names of colleagues and associates have been withheld.

An analysis of the data revealed several themes and issues which the women felt were important in their careers in higher education. Despite the small sample size, the amount of uniformity in their experiences, as reflected in their responses to questions, tends to suggest that these are issues of concern to many women teaching in colleges and universities today. Clearly, careful consideration of these issues is warranted if higher education truly deems to be an area of equal opportunity.

Lower Pay

Over twenty years ago in 1972, the U.S. Congress extended the coverage of Title VII to include educational institutions which had been previously exempted under the original act. It would have seemed that this legislation would have been sufficient to eliminate hiring practices which discriminate on the basis of sex. It should have also insured that those hired would be paid equitably according to their years of experience and the work being performed.
Unfortunately, studies have shown that this is not the case in many fields, including higher education. Women in higher education on the average earn about $8.50 for every dollar earned by their male colleagues.\textsuperscript{8}

In the 1993 annual report of the American Association of University Professors, 2200 institutions of higher learning were surveyed. The study showed that there has been an increase of females employed in higher education over the last ten years. For example, in 1983 only 9.1\% of all full professors were female. In 1993 the number rose to 14.4\%, an increase of 58\%, but still a very low percentage overall. Similarly, 19.7\% of associate professors were female in 1992. This rose to 28.9\% in 1993.\textsuperscript{9}

Unfortunately, even though advances have been made there are still a disproportionate number of women at the lowest ranks. In 1993, 54.2\% of all at the Lecturer level, 58.1\% of the Instructors, and 42.3\% of Assistant Professors were females even though the total number of women holding any faculty position was only 29.7\%. When women’s salaries were compared to men’s at the same rank, the women were always paid less and there was no substantial change in the pay ratio over the last ten years.\textsuperscript{10}

Similar frustrations were voiced by the women I interviewed:

Mr. X came in the same year as I did (with basically the same credentials and background I had) at $8,000 more than I got! Nobody works harder than I do. The issue is not that they shouldn’t be getting what they do. I should be getting what they do.

I feel judged on a different scale. When I first went to Z University, they offered me $2000 more than they were actually going to pay me. They enticed me with the $2000, and then didn’t want to pay it. When I told the man, "You’re doing that because I’m a woman," he backed down and gave me the money.

...a man who’s not achieving very much, might get the same as a woman who’s working very hard and achieving a lot, because [they think] you couldn’t really pay a man less than a woman.

Since women are more highly concentrated in areas of higher education which are considered to be "soft" such as nursing, education, and the fine arts, they often face the double jeopardy situation of being an underpaid employee in a field that overall pays lower salaries than the "hard" core subjects of law, medicine, and the sciences. As one woman expressed it:

Since women tend to be in colleges or departments that are not high on the university’s agenda (education, music, etc.), the money tends to get distributed unequally. If they as women are in areas that are seen as "soft" or "feminized" (whether they have a lot of men or not), then those areas tend to get less money for salaries....Sex is a subtle discriminator.
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Another woman noted:

Sometimes I wonder if the discrimination is geared toward my specialization as well as my gender.

Although the university system does have a grievance procedure through which employees may petition if they feel they are treated unfairly, the women had differing opinions as to its effectiveness.

I think it [a grievance procedure] is well worth going through, and I'm glad that such a thing exists. I don't think it remedies the situation, but it's better than the alternative.

What happens is if you file a grievance, they'll get you anyway. Five years from now they'll let your salary slip back down...I feel that to grieve it would hardly be worth it for a couple of thousand dollars, because you get the reputation of being a trouble maker.

Sexist Attitudes of Society

The lower pay given females is just one result of living in a society where sexism is tolerated. Sexism can also show itself in many other forms. Fortunately, people have become more sensitive to the rights of women and minorities in the last several decades. Unfortunately, sexism does still exist. It may be disguised more subtly than it was forty years ago, but it still permeates certain facets of society.

The women who had been in higher education the longest saw the biggest changes. One spoke of her experiences in her early years in being asked to take her turn with the "other women" making coffee for the department and serving punch during a departmental reception. She said:

I asked, "When do the men make coffee?" They don't! And so we got that changed....I view myself as a professional, not in charge of cookies. So when they had a reception, they asked me if I would pour punch. I said, "Sure, if the men are sharing."...People started to think about things.

She expressed concerns over more overt sexual advances as well.

You'd go to a meeting....I'm sitting there and his hand's under the table pressing on my leg, and I think, "Hm!" That kind of thing, when you're younger, I think that happens to every woman at some point.
Being attractive seemed to be a two-edged sword for some of the women as well. As one succinctly stated:

Sometimes if you’re attractive, it’s held against you, too. "She can’t possibly have a whole lot upstairs," or if you do get promoted it’s, "Well, it’s because she’s attractive." You cannot win! That’s all sexism. It’s not necessarily overt, but it’s there.

Another subtle form of sexism had to do with the mindset that some men have about the opinions and ideas of women. One woman described it as a phenomenon called a "discourse, not for her."

This discounting of women in terms of conversation, voice, tonals. The ability to dominate the discussion. Ability not to listen or to override when a woman is speaking, or cutting away at her opinion by making denigrating remarks like, "Well, I appreciate your little concerns," or "Let me interrupt (because I’ve got something important to say)." All of that kind of implies that what you have to offer is not of as much consequence as what else has to be said here. I have experienced that and I have witnessed that.

**Leadership Opportunities**

Despite the rising numbers of women in higher education, most of the top-level positions at the department level and administrative position are still held by men. I talked with these women about their perception of their opportunities for advancement and leadership in higher education.

Several of the women voiced concerns about how females in our society are taught to think of themselves as caregivers who support and nurture, but not as leaders. Women, they felt, are often trained from childhood to be peacekeepers who try to keep everyone happy. Thus, they may be reticent to voice their views, especially if those views are controversial. This mentality, described as "the good girl syndrome" in some research, keeps women from seeing themselves as leaders or pursuing leadership opportunities in their careers. According to one study, "[this] perception of female powerlessness/inferiority is compounded by the conflict between what women are taught to do and what they will be required to do if they become leaders." Some of the comments of the women interviewed were:

I think our society teaches them [women] to be subservient and therefore they are taught to value a supportive role, a facilitator.
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Women tend to get their feelings hurt. If they take a stand and then someone disagrees with them, we tend to get hurt. I think it's part of how society raises women. We always work to please people.

This double standard seemed to be a catch-22 situation to one of the interviewees. She felt that women are categorized as ineffective leaders if they do not voice their concerns and as being pushy if they do.

I do think that there is surprise when you speak up and declare yourself equal for doing that. There's a potential for being damned if you don't because then you can't hold your own with the rest of the folks. There are a lot of traps for women.

Most of the women, however, agreed that they had been given opportunities to show their leadership skills in their various areas. Only two, however, had aspirations to move into administrative positions. The others felt that they personally would not enjoy that type of job, but that there were other ways of leading within a department such as serving as an area coordinator or as chair of a key committee.

One of the women expressed concern that the men who are in leadership roles do not view women as potential leaders. She recounts:

When T left, I was coordinator of this section before Z came, and I really didn't care for the role that much. It was all right, but I really didn't find it all that rewarding. I did it on an interim basis for six months, and the chairman [of the department] said he was amazed [her emphasis] at how well I did it and he asked me to continue. I was rather shocked that he was amazed!

This "good old boy" syndrome provides a networking system for men in which those with the power in leadership positions pass it on to members of their own "club" who are, of course, also males. One woman, who had obviously studied this phenomenon, remarked:

A study was done that identified the fact that the reason even successful CEO women did not get the top notch positions was because they did not have certain experiences that male CEO's consistently had. Part of that is simply not being there where the males are. The right place at the right time. And the right place at the right time might be the men's room....You have to make a particular effort to be where males are. Sometimes that means pushing yourself to do and to be what you normally would not do or would not be.

Part of moving into leadership circles was seen as being active socially and professionally with the people in power. This poses some unfortunate problems for women if those in power always tend to be men. Unfortunately, the sexual overtones of a woman and a man working and socializing together are looked upon with suspicion by some. Therefore, women often cannot
break into the inner circles of leadership simply because they are women and not men. All of the women spoke of this barrier to some degree.

Two men can go out for lunch five days a week, and no one says anything. But if a woman goes out to lunch with the department chair, well, then she's got to be sleeping with him or she's coming on to him to get what she wants.

Men hesitate to be mentors to women unless the department chair assigns them. Men tend to hesitate to see women too much, because there is always the specter of "Is he having an affair with this woman?" There is some truth to that. We haven't gotten beyond all that....Men hesitate to be friends with a woman also, unless it's in a group. "What's my wife gonna say if she sees me going to lunch with her?" It's another barrier that keeps women from gaining power and leadership roles.

You know you can have lunch with a male colleague, but you never [her emphasis] have dinner. Or you don't have lunch everyday of the week, or if you did everybody would be aghast. There are those sorts of things you have to be dealing with.

This may contribute to the fact that, generally at the institutional level, there is very little encouragement for women to develop and become involved in activities which would give them leadership experience. This laissez-faire attitude tends to perpetuate the status quo. One woman expressed it this way:

It may be that it is the heritage of the old boy network. I'm not sure. At one level, I don't see professional development as having been a particular concern of universities. If you want to go out and run things, then fine, but don't expect me to develop a program or to offer opportunities so that women or minorities can learn those skills. You go do it yourself. Yes people can do it, but it's not an institutional goal.

Obviously some women do make it into the ranks of leaders in universities. Unfortunately, most of the women with whom I spoke had had a negative experience with at least one of these "women in power." Where they had expected to receive a sympathetic hearing of their problems, they got an abrupt dismissal of their concern as unimportant or trivial. This "queen bee syndrome" is an interesting phenomenon which has been studied for two decades. The reaction of the interviewees was that they had been betrayed by someone that they had assumed they could trust. They spoke of their specific experiences:

It may have been a particular generation of women who had made it up there. Or it may be what they call the "queen bee" syndrome which is, "I made it. You can make it, too," I often felt in dealing with one particular woman, who is long since dead, that she was interested in your cause only if she could see what was in it for her....But if it was something that was going to
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lose, or a cause that there was nothing in it for her, then she was very matter of fact about it and would shuffle things off. I've had those kinds of dealings with several women on this campus over time. And there are also those kinds of people you don't trust because she'll stab you in the back if she needs to. Now whether that's different for men, I'm not sure. But you do notice it with women when you think, "You'll understand what I'm going through." They might, but they don't give a damn!

Another said:

Some of the women in upper education who are supposed to be our advocates almost have an adversarial relationship. When G——— and I called W——— last year to ask if there was any equity money for salaries available, she said, "Oh, no, no. You all don't have a problem there. You are doing fine. You chose to come in at those low salaries." Instead of helping us fix the problem. So the women that are in the leadership positions are actually the "good old boys" in female clothing in some ways.

Integrating Professional and Personal Life

It is obvious that women are not the only ones who must struggle to keep a balance between the demands of their professional and personal lives. Men struggle with these decisions as well, but it was the perception of the women interviewed that being a female professional added an extra layer of complexity to the situation because of all the roles traditionally thrust on mothers and wives.

One obvious characteristic that all the women saw as vital in this balancing act was the support of the woman's family. The married faculty members praised both their husbands and their children for being very understanding and flexible. They viewed their families as oases of emotional support rather than battlegrounds for confrontations. On the other hand, those who had experienced divorce were leery of attempting such a relationship again. One felt that her divorce was a direct result of her decision to move "in the direction of a high-powered career." All of the women felt that without spousal support, something had to give—either the career or the marriage.

One woman made an especially insightful comparison between professional men married to supportive wives and professional women:

I think that women have very different kinds of experiences because they maintain more complex roles than men, more significant roles. There are a number of roles that women have to balance that men don't think about. You carry those around in your head with you. You don't just leave
them. Men have had women run around and be this wonderful support system, and then we say, "Well, no wonder they're successful. If I had a wife [laughs], I too could be successful.

When asked whether a woman can happily "have it all," the answers were varied:

I'd like to say that you can have it all, but not at the same time! [laughs]

It's hard for me to see how I could have had a professional career if I had married and had had children....I've seen some that have done it, and done it well. I think it's hard.

It's very difficult to maintain a close relationship like a marriage and motherhood, and also go high gear in a career. If it works, it means that at any given time you are giving particular attention to one or another and that's OK.

I feel as though I am always precariously walking a very narrow plank. I have simply too many hats to wear. I've had to balance the needs of my family and my profession and at times I lose myself in the process. Am I only defined by my job and my family?

Support Systems

As well as family support, these individuals also saw other support groups as being important factors in helping women professionals to succeed. The support could be in the form of a single individual (male or female) who became a mentor and helped them through the maze of higher education, or in the form of a group with whom the professional could share concerns and reaffirm her value as an individual.

Interestingly enough, several of the women hesitated when I asked them if they had had mentors. One simply replied, "No," and said that she felt that because she was a self-motivated person, she probably would not have needed such help. Another said:

My first inclination as you were asking that question was to say, "Hell, no! I have not been mentored." Except...

Whereupon she went on to describe an informal relationship which she later agreed was definitely mentoring. The women who did have at least one mentor, whether it was male or female, thought that the process was one which helped them to assimilate themselves into the profession. Generally speaking the relationships were not formal, that is, assigned pairings, but rather informal, mutual friendships which developed out of a sense of common purpose, goals, and having "been there."
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Since the process of mentoring appeared to be an important support system, it seemed curious that educational institutions did not do more to foster and encourage this type of relationship from the top down. One woman commented on the lack of formal mentoring in her department.

Early on I suppose I resented it [not having a mentor in the department], but as I've been in the university setting now, it's quite obvious to me that it was nothing personal. [laughs] Males and females alike experience this. I have colleagues and friends who have been mentored, but that indeed is not the norm.

And another commented on the mindset of universities which may actually discourage individuals from working with one another at times.

They [university administrators] don't highly reward cooperative work. If you're going through tenure-promotion, and you have a list of publications and they're all with somebody else, they're likely to say, "Well, what's the matter with her? Can't she publish anything alone?" They are not likely to say, "Isn't this great that she has good working relationships with her colleagues?" There are a lot of things structurally and in the value system that have not encouraged cooperative working relationships at universities. It makes it very difficult for women when they are scattered among different departments and there is no other woman in department X.

She also suggested that everyone needs to seek out a mentor:

You need to let people develop a personalized relationship with you. You need to find people that you trust to give you advice about publishing, or who would critique something you have written, or that would work with you on some project. You need to seek a mentor.

Support groups were of even greater importance to all the women I interviewed. Each one had one or more specific support groups which generally were comprised of other women, but not always within their specific area of specialization. The groups which were largely informal ones provided the professionals a safe haven to put forth ideas and work through problems. Basically the groups were comprised of friends who had the common experiences of being women in professional fields.

Conclusions

The micropolitical implications of being a woman in higher education are complex and obviously vastly different in various college and university settings, yet they deserve thoughtful consideration by all those in the profession and certainly by all those who aspire to such a career.
The issues of equal pay and equal opportunities for leadership development will not simply disappear if we choose to pretend they do not exist. All administrators must make a concerted effort to objectively evaluate the performance of their institution and take the necessary steps to assure equal treatment regardless of gender. Formal programs designed to promote mentoring as well as professional support groups should be implemented to help facilitate entry into the profession and reduce burnout.

The study also points out the importance of understanding and discussing these issues with those planning careers in higher education. A review of the literature in this area should be required reading for all—male and female. Knowing about the possibilities as well as the potential problems of a professional career would obviously be helpful in averting the latter. Several of the women interviewed stated that they could have avoided some of the pitfalls, if only they had known beforehand of their existence. One woman stated what she saw as the key to the problem:

I think the university is extremely political. That, in itself, is a hurdle and a roadblock. I think that a woman should think twice before she takes that on. Not to stop her from doing that, but so she understands there are a lot more landmines in this particular field.

NOTES


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11. Ibid.


THE 'ADD AND STIR’ POLEMIC:
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE DISPLACED MUSIC CURRICULUM

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In the education system's rendering of what constitutes knowledge, music has not been treated kindly. All levels of schooling have reproduced an epistemological hierarchy which ranks music in the unenviable class of "soft subjects." Consequently, music educators are always searching for that rare if not illusive school board that shelters music programs from recurring financial and political storms. The current escalation of advocacy networking, set off by yet another round of school board budgetary cut-backs and "new" [Canadian] ministry policies, is symptomatic of the chronic state of anxiety about the precarious status of school music.

Here, then, from my location in the province of Ontario, amidst the growing apprehension induced by the certainty of more cuts to school music programs, I am offering a philosophical analysis of "add and stir" projects which have the potential to better sustain music education in the schools. Using Sandra Harding’s insight into contemporary "add and stir" projects generated in response to feminist criticisms of traditional research practices, I will examine parallel "add and stir" projects in music education and the socio-cultural and socio-political implications for the displaced music curriculum. Because I argue that the socio-cultural impetus to eliminate elitism in the traditional music canon and to restore the essence of music by "adding" diverse artistic practices of equally diverse cultures and unique individuals will have little socio-political effect on the lowly position of music in the schools, I will conclude with the introduction of a new project for philosophical inquiry that confronts the feminized location of music and its relationship to the displaced music curriculum (and music educator).

THE EARLY PROJECTS AND THEIR PARALLELS

Harding analyzes three kinds of research projects that "add women...to rectify the androcentrism of traditional analyses." The first project added forgotten or ignored women to historical lists of great inventors, scholars, performers, etc. Although including these "lost women" has validated the achievements of women in the past and provided mentors for future initiatives by women, this alone has not generated a significant challenge to the barriers that concealed or trivialized their accomplishments in the first place. In fact, lauding accomplishments of women who succeeded in the "old boy system" perpetuates the patriarchal
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system that excludes the majority of women. Furthermore, the numbers game can be self-defeating. Limited numbers of success stories fuel the rhetorical question "Would any link at all be missing in the chain of art...if the works of women were missing?" Although important in the overall feminist project to rectify historical omissions of women and provide mentors for young women musicians, Harding views the first "add" project as just that: a first project.

The parallel project in music education is the addition of composers and performers in mainstream music who are not "dead white males." Because appropriate packaging for stardom in art music was, and remains in many ways, white, male, heterosexual or discreetly gay, Western or Eurocentric cultural standards of the artist as hero has had little relevancy to multicultural school communities. Educators who recognize the need to find mentors from the past and to correct historical misrepresentations have called for fairer representation of composers and performers from the full spectrum of ethnic, racial, and gendered groups. The "add" solution, therefore, has been to introduce "lost musicians" during concert programs and in textbooks—a process that has been slow in the uptake. But, like the "add women" strategy to address gender inequities, it can misrepresent the solution. Gillian Gaar, in *She's a Rebel: The History of Women in Rock and Roll*, explains that

[i]f women performers (or songwriters, DJs, managers, etc.) are only seen as exceptional because they are women, this justifies the relegation of women-in-rock to an obligatory chapter, where their contributions are acknowledged but are also portrayed as being a step removed from the history as a whole.

Furthermore, because the numbers of forgotten or ignored musicians will never match the number of dead (and living) white male composers, we are left with statistics that aggravate the scepticism about the worthiness of minorities to be members of an artistic community in the first place. Although this project's socio-cultural agenda to broaden the musical community is important and well-intentioned, its long-term potential is doubtful without a socio-political strategy to counter the misunderstandings surrounding questions like "So why aren't there more women composers?"

The second project that Harding examines is the re-evaluation of women's contributions in social activities or practices that have been perceived as unimportant within the context of a "Man's World." She explains that research topics falsely suggest that "only those activities that men have found...important to study are the ones which constitute and shape social life". The parallel for music education is the addition of "lost" musics, performance and composition practices and even standards. The investigation and appreciation of art music composed by great minds of Western civilization have been joined by an equally stimulating investigation of the musical intricacies of world musics. While aesthetic standards grounded in the Eurocentric classical tradition have left most musical genres to find their own limelight and educational forums, scholars have begun to deconstruct high-culture. To our profession's credit, the
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examination of and debate about how we adjust our past fixation on art music and its heros has also been healthy. An illustration of this debate comes from the first international symposium for philosophy of music education.\(^9\) Here, while Peter Kivy proclaimed that

To have Beethoven’s Third Symphony in one’s blood and bones is a boon beyond compare: part of our rites of passage, part of our tribal identity, an important part, it seems to me, of what makes us human.\(^10\)

Austin Caswell argued against canonicity built on a "fabricated historical lineage and notions of transcendence." Kivy’s view was also off-set by Elizabeth Oehrle’s introduction to African and Aboriginal views of music-making. In her presentation, she proposed that we "set visions beyond a unilateral declaration of Western music education." Similarly, Wayne Bowman, at a recent music education symposium at the University of Western Ontario, explained that we should embrace the plurality of views about and forms of music education as we embrace plurality of musical experiences: they all tell us something salient about the "world of the ear." Presumably, critical analysis will continue to give a lot to the philosophical and pedagogical objectives to better understand, appreciate, and participate in the music of all peoples.

Unfortunately, but inevitably, the second project to "add musics" also faces political barriers which undermine its important ethical and musical principles. Although multicultural societies should indeed be able to give their people an education that represents a broad sample of its many heros and musics, the infra-structure (and perhaps the will) to do so is not promising. The addition of "lost musics" as a strategy to make music education more just (in an ethical sense), more relevant (in a pedagogical sense), or simply more musical (in an artistic sense) has demonstrated good intentions but little understanding of the realities of cultural reproduction within patriarchal institutions such as our education system.\(^11\) To better explain the political barriers, I go immediately to the third project in Harding’s analysis.

The most recent and third project in Harding’s analysis is the study of women as victims of male dominance. These kinds of studies are labelled "victimologies" and do run the risk of portraying women (and other oppressed groups) as only victims.\(^12\) Harding explains, however, that the first two projects have a better chance of success if coupled with an understanding of the dynamics of dominance. Similarly, an increasing academic and public awareness of economic exploitation and socio-cultural discrimination can also further a political impetus in music education. Therefore, to complete the mission of any of these projects, the "add-strategies" in curriculum must be accompanied by critical analyses of how the education system perpetuates the dynamics of dominance. Although schools are touted as a catalyst for social change, they are situated within the configuration of patriarchal institutions. Similarly, while music is touted as an artistic medium and political platform to nurture one’s own "voice," music—and here I excuse no genre of music—has been implicated as an accessory to the injustices of patriarchy, capitalism or cultural imperialism.\(^13\)
Systemic patriarchy manifested in the education system is not the only dynamic of dominance around us. While I do not want to frustrate the sincere efforts of many who uphold and promote the diversity of musical treasures, most of us would agree with Howard Gardner's observation that "one does not easily acquire expertise about other cultures or undo a life’s worth of thinking (and valuing) in a certain way." In her research about the implementation of multicultural music, Betty Anne Hanley observed that "problems of implementation were more often mentioned by experienced teachers who were concerned with the gap between beliefs and practice, a gap largely unnoticed by undergraduate students." Experienced or not, for most of us the personal and professional change such a project entails is difficult to comprehend or even anticipate. But

[un]less we 'school' ourselves about the unequal realities of this society, how can we make it possible for the students, teachers and other with whom we work to have the resources for recognizing and acting on these realities as well?

What then of the third project to examine the dynamics of dominance? First, our enthusiasm for inclusivity or artistry, as identified in the first two projects, must not blind us to music’s role in the reproduction of patriarchal structures and ideologies. Second, studies of "victimologies" cannot be isolated as a phenomenon of musical practice or cultural institutions alone; indeed, all disciplines and the educational institutions that house them are party to the processing of hegemonic power structures. In short, solutions to invite previously excluded musicians and their music need strategies that (a) confront the socio-cultural implications of the dynamics of dominance embedded in all musical practices, and (b) anticipate the socio-political implications of patriarchal structures that reproduce epistemological and cultural hierarchies.

Here I end my review of Harding’s analysis of early feminist research projects. Now I move the direction of this paper to two contemporary strategies. I begin with a strategy which I see as an "add, stir and blend" project. This strategy attempts to secure music in the curriculum by integrating music into various facets of the curriculum.

THE "ADD, STIR AND BLEND" PROJECT

In her analysis of early feminist research projects, Harding explained that if the socio-political framework of patriarchal society remains unchallenged, the benefit of adding women to upper echelons of social, political and labour institutions is negligible, if not self-defeating. A similar fate has already befallen music education in Canadian public schools. I am speaking of the integrated curriculum. The integrated curriculum as an "add, stir and blend" project is a common symptom of the displaced music curriculum. Because of increasingly overloaded curricular timetables and depleted school budgets, the integrated curriculum is a contemporary survival technique that allows administrators to "selectively abandon" curricular materials and
specialists. As budgetary cut-backs reduce the number of music specialists in schools, generalists take up the responsibility of teaching music by "integrating" it into their general programs. Because "there is a tendency to grab at shallow themes that are superficially useful...,"21 themes, instead of learning concepts, have become the thread in integrated programs. As part of thematic school projects, music is added as a motivational and learning tool for skill-development in other disciplines; that is, music education is transformed into music activities. Thus, the status of music education becomes that of a handmaiden to the rest of the curriculum. At the same time, however, administrators and teachers acknowledge that music is very important; after all, it is never excluded altogether from school functions. Nor will it ever be. Yet it does not hold the rank of science, mathematics, language literacy, or even physical education. Although music education, in whatever diluted form, is accounted for, the blending process of this "add and stir" project further reduces music education's already weak status as a knowledge-based and autonomous discipline.

A legitimate integrated curriculum is one where each subject holds equal status within a holistic educational context that encompasses all aspects of being human.22 In this context, music educators should welcome the opportunity to participate fully in such a curriculum.23 However, if the integrated program is misinterpreted as a process of "adding, stirring, and blending" the "soft" subjects into a curricular framework that sustains the traditional epistemological hierarchy, the status and legitimate value of music education will continue to be undermined.24 Without confronting patriarchal values such as those inherent in the fragmented and hierarchal treatment of learning sustained by "add" strategies, music education faces further devaluation, and, in some schools, obliteration.

BEYOND THE EARLY PROJECTS: HARDING'S SUGGESTIONS

I would like to introduce this last section with a recycled joke. I offer this joke because I believe it illustrates a germane problem of the displaced music curriculum. In his article "Finding a Place for Music in the Curriculum," David Elliott told the joke like this:

"Upon reading that regular sex was essential for a radiant complexion, Celeste, a beautiful but neglected young bride, decided to prode [sic] her moody and indifferent husband with the following declaration: "Cecil," chided the sensuous but unsatisfied Celeste, "I intend to have sex 300 times next year!" "Good," said Cecil, "sign me up for two."25"

Elliott went on to explain that "although music offers something beautiful and meaningful..." music in the schools has been "spurned by a moody and apathetic partner." Most of us, like Elliott, have been witness to and participants in the on-again-off-again relationship between school administrators and their music personnel. Many believe that the problem of "spurned" music education programs should be approached by reharnessing the old philosophical
The 'Add and Stir' Polemic

war horses: what is the nature of music and musical experience and what is the educational worth or significance of music education. Although questions of the "philosophical canon" will continue to be fundamental to music, music-making, and music education, I do not believe that rational or logical answers to the same old philosophical questions within the same old epistemological context will genuinely convince public policy-makers to politically and financially support school music.

I return now to Harding for some advice. After examining the limited benefits to be gleamed from "add and stir" strategies, Harding moves into an analysis of the kind of "questions that are asked—and, even more significantly, those that are not asked..." Following Harding’s suggestion, I propose that we recognize, accept, and suffer the personal and professional significance of our question: what makes music a "frill" subject? Both the old questions and the "add and stir" projects point to a need to ask new questions to unravel the ubiquitous perceptions about music as a "frill" which have entangled the justification of music education within a context of androcentric standards.

At the last symposium, John Shepherd noted that

[it] is because music is placed in a "feminized" location in our world that it must be carefully controlled and monitored by the academy, subjected to the phallocentric and logocentric modes of intellec[tion] that McClary, in my view, so legitimately criticizes. But it is also because it is placed in a feminized location that it contains the residues of what it is that our culture, publicly, does not want to communicate with itself about.

Although few deny the weak status of music education, few have taken up the philosophical challenge to clarify the gender-related essence of music and to relate it to music education’s status as a "frill." Some will continue to move the other way to reaffirm a need for a more logocentric philosophy of music education. But when we do venture into discussions about the frill status of music education, most of us seem to participate with confusion as a consequence of "impotent guilt-reflexes."

One example of this kind of reflex is the story about Celeste and Cecil. Celeste grooms herself in a fixed program of "show and tell" to stimulate and exact more substantial responses from her husband Cecil. As music educators, we can appreciate another layer of meaning in this joke—a joke on us as handmaidens to the school curriculum. The "impotent guilt-reflex" is evident in the manner in which music educators in general recognize but dismiss the significance of their role as Celeste in their relationship to a fickle partner, the school curriculum, administration, or school board. Another example of the guilt-reflex is implicit in Bennett Reimer’s introduction to his second edition of A Philosophy of Music Education. Here, Reimer has noted that the "tremendous expenditure of concern about how to justify [music education]...which has been traditional in this field, reflects a lack of philosophical ‘inner peace’." He explains that the way one perceives the value of one’s own profession affects one’s sense of self-identity and self-respect. While Elliott and Reimer appear to be polarized in their philosophical
stance on music education, I propose that they both have taken their cue from an "impotent guilt-reflex" resulting from a latent appreciation of the feminized location of music.

For all the gains in music education as a profession, for which many can claim partial responsibility and success, there remains the destabilizing factor that holds music education in a "continuing secondary status in education." I conclude by conceding that there are gains to be made through philosophical debate to renew pedagogical and artistic practice with the incorporation of a more complete spectrum of musics and a more inclusive community of musians, composers, performers, etc. Nonetheless, I recommend that we confirm the relevancy of the feminized location of music in our discussions of the displaced music curriculum and explore its relationship to the dynamics of dominance in the socio-cultural and socio-political context of making music.

NOTES


2. Ibid., 4.


The ‘Add and Stir’ Polemic


14. Although my intention is not to grade all musical offerings, perhaps the word "treasures" carries elitist assumptions. As a light-hearted exercise of political correctness, I could suggest "musical space" as a more inclusive expression for diverse musical treasures and the equally diverse spectrum of musical experiences they offer.


20. Ibid., 76.

21. Ibid., 56.


23. "Music educators must be assured that integrated projects are undertaken as an expansion of the music program, not as a replacement to the music program." Greater Metropolitan Toronto Music Coordinators’ Association, "Position Statement on Integration," Recorder 36 (Winter/Spring 1994), 85.


26. Some of these philosophical war horses run through the summary of themes which emerged from the first international symposium. See Jorgensen, *Philosopher, Teacher, Musician*, 2–3.

27. Harding argues for questions composed by women and other subdominant groups and not just those "...which (white, Western, bourgeois) men want answered." Harding, "Introduction," 6.

28. Ibid., 7. Not included in this paper is a discussion of Harding's suggestion that our questions are best put to ourselves and to the sources of social and education power instead of our subordinates. She explains that "feminist inquiry joins other 'underclass' approaches in insisting on the importance of studying ourselves and 'studying up' instead of 'studying down'." Ibid., 8.


31. Adrienne Rich explains the political uselessness of a kind of false consciousness among feminist theorists that acknowledges the existence but not the significance of racism in feminist theory. Her description seems appropriate for a similar false consciousness among music educators who acknowledge the existence but not the significance of the feminized location of music. She describes "a tunnel-vision which simply does not see non-white experience or existence as precious or significant, unless in spasmodic, impotent guilt-reflexes, which have little or no long-term, continuing momentum or political usefulness." A. Rich, *On Lies, Secrets, and Silence* (New York: Norton, 1979), 306.


WHEELS WITHIN WHEELS:
FEMINISM, GENDER, AND MULTICULTURAL MUSIC EDUCATION
A RESPONSE TO GREEN AND LAMB

Marie McCarthy, University of Maryland at College Park

It has been a pleasure and a challenge to respond to Dr. Green and Dr. Lamb's papers. The challenge is perhaps one we all encounter when, as Maxine Greene puts it, we are asked "to look through unaccustomed lenses at life in classrooms." Having become accustomed and sensitive to the role of ethnicity in multicultural music education, I considered gender just one more dimension of being multicultural. Now I realize that the process of understanding the role of gender in musical meaning and pedagogy is qualitatively different as well as inextricably linked to that of ethnicity or social class, for example. Furthermore, the challenge lay in coming to terms with the various definitions of feminism and in finding a position from which to offer a meaningful critique. The direction I have taken integrates (while maintaining a separate identity for) feminism and gender studies into the broader spectrum of multicultural music education, thus stimulating the title of the response, "Wheels Within Wheels: Feminism, Gender, and Multicultural Music Education." (I will address ideas from each paper separately and then bring together concerns and issues common to both papers).

The topics of both papers are timely, complex, and provocative, and the authors are to be applauded for extending the frontiers of knowledge toward a more humane and equitable context for music teaching and learning. In "Gender, Musical Meaning, and Education," Lucy Green presents a well constructed, coherent, and insightful paper that explores "the complexity and depth-embeddedness of gendered musical meanings." In fact, an alternative title for the paper might be "music and music education as gendered discourse." Dr. Green’s theory of musical meaning is discursive in the sense that there is constant negotiation between the two types of meaning she identifies, inherent and delineated. To examine the nature of this discourse, she starts out by drawing on personal experience—her insecurity with rock music as a youth and the realization that it was partly "a product of gender" due to the cultural ownership of rock by boys. While this conclusion may not surprise us, given the results of sociological research in music during the past few decades, Green’s claim that we learn our gendered relationships "through musical experience itself" (in addition to other contexts), has implications for expanding the scope of research in musical meaning. Roberta Lamb cites Eleanor Stubley’s suggestion that "the task of a philosophy of research in music education at this time is to awaken
the profession to the full range of meaning potential in the musical experience."2 Exploring musical meaning through the lens of gender is part of this professional task.

The dialectic nature of musical experience evident in Green's description of her relationship with rock music is further explored when she distinguishes between two aspects of musical meaning, inherent and designated meaning. Her theory, fully treated in her book *Music on Deaf Ears: musical meaning, ideology, education*, is now revisited in order to explore the construction of gendered relationships with music. Its philosophical underpinnings are founded on the tenets of Western aesthetics. In her book, she acknowledges the initial influence of Leonard B. Meyer's use of embodied and designative musical meaning on her thinking; however, Green moved beyond it and extended the parameters of Meyer's and other related theories of musical meaning. She drew heavily on sociological concepts, emphasizing at all times the interdependence of individual experience and collective definition in the making of musical meaning. She wrote:

Hence where our individual musical experiences interconnect with our collective social life, that is where the musical world, the little social system of musical production and consumption, with its accompanying ideologies, its internal divisions and its historical reproduction, is born and reborn.3

Assuming that gender is a socially and culturally constructed phenomenon, it is easily accommodated within Green's original theory of musical meaning. Here at the intersection of the sociocultural and individual worlds, our perceptions of gender are embedded in our response to music and they determine in part the nature of our musical experience. As musicologist Susan McClary points out, music is mediated "through actual people with gendered bodies."4

When I say that exploration of gender issues is easily accommodated within Green's theory of musical meaning, I am not implying that it provides the most fertile model for such exploration. Teresa de Lauretis, in *Technologies of Gender*, suggests that the sex-gender system is both "a socially constructed and a semiological apparatus."5 Adapting this definition, Green probably needs to look beyond her own predominantly sociological approach to musical meaning and gender. I'm thinking in particular of Jean-Jacques Nattiez's semiological approach to music described in his book *Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music.*6 While Green's two interactive types of meaning correspond with Nattiez's definition of meaning as existing "when an object is situated in relation to a horizon,"7 yet Nattiez's three levels of analysis—poietic (the creative process), neutral (the immanent trace), and esthetic (the interpretative process)—seem to provide a richer and more comprehensive theory for exploring musical experience. It is not within the scope this response to juxtapose the two theories, but I believe that Green's dualistic division of musical meaning into inherent and delineated has its limitations, given the depth-embeddedness of gender issues in music and culture.

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What protects Green in part from such criticism is her consistent emphasis on the interactive process between the two types of meaning, thus advancing her theory beyond the binary oppositions and absolutes typical of earlier theories. She illustrates the interactive process by drawing on examples of women as vocalists, instrumentalists, and composers. These examples provide insight into the history of women in music and the outcome of sex-stereotyping and image manipulation in musical performance and its reception. They also provide a context for understanding the deep-seated values in patriarchal mentality regarding the roles of male and female musicians. These values shape delineated meaning and in turn, as Green illustrates, can change our experience of inherent meaning.

In the examples she provides, Green’s theory is emancipatory in that it is "the key to the forbidden door," a metaphor used by Susan McClary to describe a function of feminist criticism. Part of what lies behind the "forbidden door" is acknowledgement of the perception and role of the body in the construction of gendered musical meanings. The author confronts this issue and illustrates convincingly the realities of male hegemony in the history of women in/and music. She argues that women’s participation as performers or composers is determined and patrolled by patriarchal definitions of femininity. A series of verbs used throughout this section of the paper synthesizes the hegemonic nature of gendered musical meanings: women participating in music can affirm, re-enact, interrupt, challenge, threaten patriarchal definitions.

It is my perception, although a debatable one, that the male hegemony described by Green is being eroded. For example, perceptions of the male body can now also be seen to enter delineated meaning; in the domain of composition, contemporary women composers not only challenge but succeed in diminishing the misconception of the inferiority of women’s musical minds. However, embedded values and perceptions die hard and contemporary generations of music teachers are products, in varying degrees, of a Western patriarchal system. Green’s research reported in her paper (and in greater detail in her recent article in the British Journal of Music Education), attests to this reality. The results demonstrate clearly how "gendered musical relationships are perpetuated by schooling."

Dr. Green is not a pioneer in the area of gender research in music education. However, her methodology is more exploratory and she reports not only the types of sex-stereotyping but she also brings to the surface how gendered musical meanings are "re-enacted daily in the life of the music classroom as a microcosm of the wider society." In that context, Green advocates a greater "political commitment" on the part of teachers to identify their own gender biases and assumptions in relation to male and female musicality and musical achievement. To assist in this process, Green suggests (albeit indirectly) using more qualitative research methodologies in exploring gender in the music classroom, claiming their usefulness in exposing and explaining "deeply-embedded gendered musical meanings." It is clear from her examples that one’s gender and perceptions of gender are instrumental in the construction of musical meaning.
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In turn, Green argues, gendered musical meanings "affect our consciousness and experience not only of music, but through music, of ourselves." Music education, by implication, can play a vital role in the construction of personal identity. In our efforts to investigate this role further, we must take care, as ethnomusicologist Margaret Sarkissian warns, "not to separate gender from other bases of identity."9 We are multicultural beings and gender is but one determining factor in the negotiation of inherent and delineated musical meanings. It is wise to keep this in mind as we situate gender within the larger spectrum of issues that advocate diversity in the philosophy and practice of music education.

Perhaps the most significant message Green conveys to the music education profession is the responsibility and role of teachers in the mediation and construction of gendered musical meanings—from the very notions of masculinity and femininity to the concept of ourselves as gendered beings. In the course of her paper, Green prepares us, as feminist writer Patti Lather suggests, "to turn critical thought into emancipatory action."10

In a similar vein, Roberta Lamb focuses on gender issues in music education, drawing on feminist literature and models as critique for music education philosophy. Dr. Lamb is a leading scholar in her efforts to apply concepts from feminist theory to the philosophy of music education. Whereas Green’s approach is grounded in familiar theories, and as readers we are led easily from the known to the unknown, Lamb’s approach is radical—radical in the sense that she advocates fundamental change in music education philosophy, namely "a shift from men’s to women’s perspectives."

Furthermore, she brings to the surface many issues that perhaps we would rather not deal with, or that as educators we do not feel a responsibility to deal with—attitudes toward women as musicians, the male hegemony of Western music culture, the lack of "authentic space" to accommodate the diversity of women’s voices. In essence, Dr. Lamb provides an alternative discourse. Her ideas are arresting, provocative, and she succeeds in achieving her goal to pull and push "the boundaries of philosophy in music education to expose the gaps excluding so many of us from its myths and narratives."

The courage and conviction she brings to her writing are admirable. It is interesting to trace the development of feminism in music education through her earlier publications. Concerning the use of feminism, she wrote: "Certainly, there are places where momentary connections can be made."11 In the same article she described the place of feminist music or criticism in the music curriculum as yet "highly speculative and exploratory."12 Later, Lamb spoke to the risks of becoming a subject in the creation of feminist theories of music education. "Becoming the subject," she wrote, "is to sing the bad news that no one wants to hear and to feel the glass rattle as the window is slammed shut, once again."13 Dr. Lamb has taken such a risk in her paper and while I am critical of the extreme nature of how she pushes and pulls the
While we borrow context? that acknowledged terrain in "from additive permeates As perspectives of negotiated? A first phase is already under way in music education, that is, the acknowledgement of women’s contributions to music, or gender studies that recognize that sex-stereotyping permeates music education practices and institutions. These approaches begin to address inequities and rectify silences but do not necessarily change underlying assumptions and biases. As Lamb writes elsewhere, a gentle approach such as this is like applying "a coat of ‘add women’ paint" to the canvas of the music curriculum.

A second phase begins to be articulated in Green’s paper and is fully launched by Lamb in her questioning of the philosophical tenets of contemporary music education. John Shepherd, in addressing "Music and Male Hegemony," describes precisely the need to go beyond an additive approach and instigate change at a fundamental level. He writes:

Rectifying a silence involves not only contextualizing a new body of knowledge (or, more accurately, a new, public body of knowledge) within the pre-existing intellectual terrain. It also involves renegotiating the pre-existing intellectual terrain in such a way that the new body of knowledge can be accommodated appropriately.

Using feminism as critique, Lamb begins to renegotiate the pre-existing intellectual terrain in music education to accommodate ‘otherness’ and to honor difference. The question arises: if honoring "difference as if differences matter" is the issue, how can difference be acknowledged if we are viewing only the female dimension of gender? Is it not more realistic and useful to consider the female in the context of gender, that fluid and flexible phenomenon that determines how male and female relations develop and operate within a social and cultural context? And is the answer to male hegemony female hegemony, implied by the suggested shift "from men’s to women’s perspectives?"

The feminist movement as articulated through the various "-isms" that its members borrow from or draw on—liberalism, essentialism, Marxism, radicalism, postmodernism, to name some—is first a political movement, one that seeks to alter the balance of power relations between male and female. Also, it is an academic enterprise providing, as Carolyn Korsmeyer states, "intellectual perspectives informing scholarly investigations." As music educators, we are entering the discourse at a relatively late stage, thus the urgency of Lamb’s proposal. While many in our profession may see danger in isolating the study of the female in music education, preferring gender studies from the outset, perhaps using feminism as critique is a
necessary step toward a comprehensive theory of gender in music education. Sarkissian expresses a similar view when she writes about gender studies in ethnomusicology:

But while we cannot fully understand women's lives in isolation from those of men, it is only after an adequate body of data focused specifically on such issues has been gathered that new theories concerning gender-related behaviour and ideology can be formulated.¹⁷

Focusing on the female opens up new and exciting areas of research. For example, is there a female aesthetic, a female way of feeling and of expressing lived experience through art forms such as music? Is the gender of the knower epistemologically significant, a theme explored thoroughly in Lorraine Code's book What Can She Know?¹⁸ It is clear that feminism as critique ought to be considered an authentic and legitimate part of our repertoire of ways to explore the musical experience.

Lamb's next task is to apply feminism as critique within philosophy of music education, using it as a disciplinary tool "to begin unpacking the meanings of power and power relations."¹⁹ In the process, she builds evidence that neither aesthetic nor praxial philosophies of music education are innocent; in fact, she refers to aesthetics as having a "guilty history." Since history is not an absolute but rather a recreation of a web of meanings from many possible interpretations, one can hardly level accusations in its direction. Transcending semantics, however, her criticism of philosophy in general and aesthetics in particular is fair and consonant with other recent criticisms of the aesthetic education movement—for example, the issues of neutrality, universality, disinterestedness, transcendence, and the ideology of autonomy.

Feminism as critique deconstructs Western aesthetics rapidly and Lamb concludes that it would be "very difficult to adjust the conceptual parameters to create an authentic space" for diversity. Given the tenets of aesthetics that she identifies, her conclusion seems reasonable. At another time, Lamb might pursue the beliefs of some feminists she cites that "aesthetics, more than any other branch of philosophy, offers possibilities for pluralism that may be advantageous to feminist theory," and by implication in this context, to music education. One major achievement of Lamb's critique of aesthetics is that it helps us understand why and how teachers hold the kinds of assumptions and beliefs about gender and music exposed by Green's study of British music teachers.

The application of feminism to praxial philosophy of music education proves to be more positive than for its predecessor. That is no surprise since proponents of praxial philosophy such as Philip Alperson and David Elliott have been critical of the same limitations of aesthetics that Lamb already identified. However, as she further examines the philosophy, it becomes apparent that "neither is the praxial philosophy of music education innocent." Given her explanation of this philosophy based on the writings of Alperson and Elliott, and my understanding of the current status of praxial philosophy in music education,²⁰ this conclusion seems unreasonable.
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For example, when referring to "the" praxial philosophy as not being innocent, whose definition, or interpretation, or application is in question? And can one say that someone is not innocent if one is not aware of how one is guilty or what one is guilty of?

Lamb extends the parameters of current definitions of praxial philosophy in order to form her critique. As she pointed out, her critique is directed at "what is not said." For example, she examines the health hazards involved in musical performance, questions of power embedded in performance, and the contradictory experience of performance for women. In effect, her goal is to rectify the silence, achieved by going inside "the forbidden door" and bringing into the light aspects of musical performance some would rather not confront. Yes, we need to uncover and acknowledge these realities but I believe that current directions in praxial philosophy, with their emphasis on musical context, are sufficiently open and flexible to accommodate feminist concerns and to create authentic space for the diversity of women's voices. Furthermore, praxial philosophy is itself nascent in our field and without extensive evidence of its implications for and effectiveness in practice, perhaps a feminist perspective integrated into the praxial rather than a feminist critique would be more beneficial at this time.

Dr. Lamb's resolution to her paper is titled "Feminist Mus(ic)ing: A Fiction–Theory." Music educators not familiar with feminism may well question the meaning of "fiction–theory." A prerequisite in crossdisciplinary dialogue is to define terms when adopting concepts and theories. As a reader, it is difficult to make meaningful connections between fiction theory and music education without an explanation of the theory's principles. On the positive side, concepts and ideas from feminism serve to enrich and transform philosophy of music education. As identified by Lamb, they provide a new mode of analysis, a method of approaching life, a way of asking questions and searching for answers.

In order to deepen and broaden our understanding of the musical experience, it is necessary to go beyond the discipline of music and to gain insights from related fields of inquiry. In their papers, Dr. Green and Dr. Lamb illustrate the potential benefit of interdisciplinary study for music education philosophy. This approach was also advanced by Estelle Jorgensen in her 1991 article "Music Education in Broad Perspective." She wrote: "The interdisciplinary view of music education presents us with numerous theoretical and practical possibilities and challenges. It is up to future researchers to further amplify, modify, and critique them." In essence, Green and Lamb are fulfilling this mission. One area of literature that is noticeably absent in both papers is that of gender and feminist studies in education; for example, the many fine contributions to the theme of "Gender and Education" in the 1993 Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Since the foundations of music education are equally rooted in education as in music, it is important to recognize developments in this area; such developments support and impact our efforts to highlight gender as an important variable in music pedagogy.
Dr. Lamb’s final recommendations are similar to Dr. Green’s. Both focus on fracturing "the line of fault hidden underneath the everyday-ness of music teaching" and highlighting the fact that as educators we need to recognize our actions as "inventing musical praxis, and, thus, its political substance." Both authors also identify the need for "creating a space where those directly involved [in music] can act and speak on their own behalf." Most importantly, they both awaken and sensitize us to the central role of gender in the construction of musical meaning. For both authors, feminism as critique must be engaged in exploring "the full meaning potential in the musical experience." Ultimately, however, I believe that feminism in music education needs to be situated in the context of gender; otherwise, it may remain an isolated, disconnected subset of ideas and beliefs. And just as feminist issues find an identity within gender studies, gender must be considered as one fluctuating variable in a web of meanings that is the product of race, ethnicity, cultural context, social class, and so on. The intersection of these multiple variables is also where inherent and delineated musical meanings are constructed. Thus music is gendered discourse and it is timely to explore the full meaning of this reality for music teaching and learning. Dr. Green and Dr. Lamb have laid the foundation for such exploration by providing a strong rationale for the inclusion of feminist and gender studies within our increasingly multicultural, interdisciplinary philosophy of music education.

NOTES


6. Ibid., 15.

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12. Ibid., 170-71.


20. In her article "Music Education in Broad Perspective," Estelle Jorgensen states that in music education, "the implications of the praxial view have yet to be fully mined," in *The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning* 2 (Fall 1991), 14.

21. Ibid., 21.
TOWARD A THEORY OF RESPONSE TO MUSIC

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For the past ten years we have been exploring how people respond to music. We have gathered data from a range of people with the intent of explaining the regularities that govern what people report about their responses after listening to a piece of untexted music. We have discovered much about how people respond and can describe many regularities from their responses. In this paper we will present a theoretical framework which can explain our findings and which can be the basis for further examination and discussion.

A theory of response to music can do several things for those of us who are music researchers. First, it can provide us with a way of organising research and exploration so that new findings build systematically on previous work. To a large extent, music research has been dominated by a project-by-project approach where each researcher selects one or more interesting questions, conducts a project or several projects and relates her findings back to the question. A theory calls for a program approach to research where researchers ask the larger questions and where groups of researchers coordinate their efforts so that studies examine questions which will elaborate, confirm, or disconfirm theory with the results both informing theory and generating questions. At present, there is a body of project research comprised of interesting findings in need of a framework within which they can contribute to a larger meaning. A theory provides that framework. Also, it directs us to new questions, ones that would not have been thought of without the theory.

Second, theory can be the basis for grounded argument: Competing theories can be examined for their ability to account for their ability to account for the data, and counterexamples become important as challenges to the theory, ultimately contributing to the development of it.

An adequate theory of response to music should describe and explain what we know about music in general and about response in particular; that is, that music is a part of every culture, that all normal people are capable of responding physically, intellectually and emotionally to music and that this ability to respond intersects in some way with music, and that response to music is regular. A theory should explain the data, and predict beyond it. As we proceed, we will argue for the adequacy of the theory we present.
EXPOSITION

We have collected verbal protocols from children, adolescents, and adults, from those both musically trained and untrained. To examine development of response, we collected verbal protocols from children in each grade, K–12. To study the effects of prolonged musical experience/exposure, we collected verbal monologues from professional musicians.

In our research we did not limit the complexity of either the response or the input. Our respondents were allowed to listen to complete (usually under five minutes' duration) selections and could self-regulate the length and types of responses. The limitations in our studies come from the fact that we collected verbal responses that were made after a respondent had finished listening to a piece. The music chosen served as another limitation: We played orchestral music, untexted vocal music and a few popular selections.

At first the data that we collected overwhelmed us with the very complexities for which we were searching. For example, we have over a thousand pages of typed transcripts. Through frequently revisiting the transcripts and analyzing them, we began to see the regularities hidden in the complexities. It is these regularities that form the theory that we will present in this paper. There is no space in this paper to describe all the response data that we and others have collected. Instead, we will outline our theory and use examples from our data to illustrate it.

The Beginnings of Response

In order to present the theory, we need to develop a concept of the responder. To do this, we will describe a hypothetical person, a brand new baby—one who has no exposure to, or experience with, music.

It all begins when the baby has her first experience with music; perhaps she listens to a lullaby sung by her mother. Because the sounds are novel, the baby attends to the experience. Current research appears to show that the experience produces a pattern of cell excitation in the brain which is stored in the sense that cells that have been excited build that information into their structure. Perhaps the mother held the child close to her while singing the lullaby. This excitation pattern for the physical experience becomes linked to the lullaby pattern so that the music pattern is linked to something extramusical. Once cells have been excited, they desire further excitation: listening to that music again satisfies the desire.

Let us say that a few days later the mother sings a different lullaby to the child. She might or might not be holding the child close. This auditory experience excites a number of cells, many of which were excited during the first lullaby. Because they have been excited once
and built in that information, those cells excite more strongly, and the pattern for the second lullaby includes both strong and weaker cell excitations. This pattern may or may not have a link to a physical experience like the first.

Let us say that the next day a sibling sings "Eensy Beensy Spider" with actions to the baby. This novel experience excites a number of cells, some which have been previously excited during the first and/or second experiences, and some new ones only during the new experience. Now this pattern is comprised of cells with different excitatory information: stronger, weaker and weakest excitations. It is here that we find the beginning of an overall Music Pattern on which all subsequent music experiences (and those linked to a music experience) build.

This is a simplified and limited case that we have developed; in reality, most children are exposed to many musical experiences which over time build a complex web of links and patterns. At some point in this process, these patterns become strong enough to drive the child to search out experiences that will satisfy the desires for further excitations. This is the beginning of musical preference.

Musical experiences occur within the context of the child's life: the child is raised in a socio-cultural environment that determines values and what the child will experience both with music and other aspects of life; the child has physical, emotional and intellectual responses to experiences which become linked to listening experiences such as things the child learns about the music such as its title, who performs it, names of instruments, how to perform, etc. All of this becomes part of the overall Music Pattern.

By adulthood, Music Pattern for most people is very complex, indeed. Where our hypothetical child had three levels of cell excitation, the adult will have thousands, maybe millions. Where that child had a few links, the adult has thousands, and maybe millions. It all depends on exposure which we define as "meaningful interaction with the music." Meaningful to us means that links are established to the personal (including the physical), the socio-cultural and to music learning.

**DEVELOPMENT**

**Matching Theory**

What we have done up to this point is describe what makes it possible for a listener to respond to music. Now our task is to present a theory that will explain the responses that listeners make. The explanation we have developed we call "Matching Theory." We posit that
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when listeners attend to a piece, they go through a process of comparing the piece listened to with music already experienced, the overall Music Pattern Matching is made possible by the presence of a Pattern Matcher which we argue to be innate and used to match music patterns and other patterns. The Pattern Matcher attempts to achieve the strongest Match possible between the input piece, Overall Music Pattern, Overall Arts Pattern and Overall Life Pattern. How a listener constructs a response is determined by the Pattern for the piece and the relative strengths of the Links.

The Pattern Matcher employs five cognitive processes to achieve the Match: monitoring, categorizing, identifying, relating and imaging We think these processes are universal in that they are used to respond to other sensory input. What follows is our current understanding of these processes.

Monitoring

Respondents monitor their intellectual, emotional and/or physical responses to the piece. We define emotional monitoring as the process of observing one’s emotional state. For example, one respondent said about "Promenade," "That makes you feel good," and another said, "It made me feel happy."

We define intellectual monitoring as the process of observing one’s thinking. It is this process which allows our respondents to verbalize their responses.

We define physical monitoring as the process of observing one’s physical state or activity. One respondent said of the theme from "Beverly Hills Cop," "That makes me want to dance," and another, "I tapped my feet while I listened to that."

Categorizing

Respondents categorise, the process of chunking together input patterns into categories and naming them, and of matching the input piece against these categories, sometimes reorganising and renaming categories. For example, suppose a teenager sees a wedding on TV, where the "Bridal March" from Lohengrin and Clarke’s "Trumpet Voluntary" are played. These two experiences might be stored with links to the name of the show, the characters, etc. Later, when the teen attends her friend’s wedding she hears "The Bridal March" again plus several other pieces. These musical experiences could be linked with the wedding couple, etc. and also to previous wedding music to begin a category called "Music I’ve Heard at Weddings." The names that respondents give to categories depend upon exposure to music and to music learning. People who have very little exposure or learning have what appear to us to be experienced-based
categories such as "funeral music," "wedding music," "horsy music," or "happy music," etc. Through exposure and learning these categories become more sophisticated and/or get recategorised several times. Everyone is categorizing all the time; over time, certain categorisations have been accepted as the standard and are taught as part of music learning, meaning that the more musically educated are more likely to respond using these standard categories such as "Baroque" or "Nineteenth Century," etc.

Identifying

Identifying occurs when a strong Match is established and is the process of retrieving information which identifies the piece such as title, composer, performer and/or previous experience with the piece. A Grade 4 student identified the theme from "Beverly Hills Cop" by saying, "Axelrod. My old music teacher, she told me I could learn it, can play it on the organ."

Relating

Relating occurs when a weak Match is established with a similar instead of same pattern, and is the process of retrieving identification information about the similar pattern. For example, the similar pattern can be another piece of music as is shown when one respondent claimed that the "Aria" from Bachianas Brasileiras No. 5 always reminded her of Pavane by Faure which she identified as "always played on Gilmour's Albums." The similar pattern could also be from the other arts. One of our respondents upon listening to Ionisation related it to Picasso's "Guernica." From this we surmise that the similar pattern was not music but a piece of visual art. Relating leads the responder to identify the similar piece in some way. The similar pattern could be a static image such as a winter scene or a field of daisies, or a familiar sound such as a saw or a child banging on a piano.

Imaging

Imaging occurs when a weak Match is established with a similar instead of same pattern and is the process of generating a narrative that links the two patterns. For example, one of the respondents after listening to "Promenade" from Pictures at an Exhibition said,

The piece sort of reminded me, perhaps of an adventure. There was lots of pauses. They're very excited about their learning, a lot of prancing and dancing, almost flight, but no panic type of flight but as their learning they're going through these different stages and then as the music
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slows down they’re sort of thinking over perhaps what they just learned. Then they start to embark on a new adventure then this new excitement comes again and that’s how I felt.

Influences of the Pattern Matcher

The Pattern Matcher appears to begin Matching as soon as attention is directed to the input, and tries to achieve as strong a Match as possible given exposure and experience of the respondent. Socio-cultural factors determine the quantity and range of exposure to music. For example, we know that exposure to music varies with age, gender, class, ethnicity, etc. Our data reveals that Matches can range from complete (+) to none (-) which can be seen as a continuum. We find it convenient for clear explanation to group the responses between the extremes into two types, recognizing all the time that the continuum (and our data) represent an infinite array of Matches. The type of Match determines how the listener will construct her/his response.

Matching

+ Match

The + Match can also be seen as being arranged along a continuum of completeness. At one extreme, the complete Match, the respondent has experienced repeated listenings. At the other extreme is the faint recollection that one has heard the piece before.

We think that with repeated exposure to a piece, each subsequent experience increases the strengths and linkages of the Pattern. When a respondent has a + Match at the complete end of the continuum, she/he will identify the piece, perhaps monitor, then move to elaboration (a part of the response process that will be discussed in the next section). A good example of a + Match is found when one of the professional musician respondents reports as follows:

Well, let’s see now, what can I say about that? The first thing I guess, is that I was somewhat confused when I very first heard it I recognized the piece. I have heard it many times, but I was thinking, “Now, let me see, who wrote that? Was it Brahms, Dvorak, Schumann and Schubert?” And it struck me, it’s very interesting that, when you listen to a piece like that you can confuse several composers. It could be any of them. The first section sounds very Brahms-like. But then when it got into the second section it had a Dvorak flavour, that Czech flavour to it. And then the giveaway was the arpeggios in the violin, because Schubert uses that all the time. He used that device—he used it, for instance, in the "Trout Quintet."
Shrofel and Browne

When a respondent has a +Match midway on the continuum, she/he will identify the piece, monitor, perhaps create a subcategory. Then, the respondent will elaborate. One of the adult responders said the following in response to "Promenade":

I played that piece in band in Grade 9...It's the "Great Gate of Kiev" or something. Mussorgsky. It's amazing. You sing along with your part...I quite liked it. It was my favourite.

When a respondent has a +Match at the less complete end of the continuum (toward the boundary with a +-Match), after identifying and monitoring, the respondent may recategorize or relate before elaborating. A typical response here would begin with a recognition of having heard the piece before, then continue with relating (usually to the other arts) as is shown in the response of a high school student to "Promenade": "It reminds me of something classy...like a play or a musical or something."

Strong links can be formed between a Music Pattern and a physical or emotional experience that occurred during a listening experience. Sometimes, the link to the emotion is so strong that it may govern future responses to that piece. For example, we know of a person, who as a child, linked the fearful experience of having her house vandalized and Tennessee Ernie Ford singing, "Hang Down Your Head, Tom Dooley." After this experience, hearing this song always caused emotional upset and feelings of fear.

+-Match

While the +-Match can also be seen as being arranged along a continuum, it will be enough for this paper to show a central example instead of the extremes. In this type of Match, the piece is not familiar enough for identification, but enough of a Match is achieved to permit the respondent to categorise, relate and monitor before elaborating. There is enough of a Match within the Overall Music Pattern so that the respondent does not leave this pattern while exploring the Match. A good example is the following: A selection from Bachianas Brasileiras sung by Kathleen Battle was played for four high school students. Their discussion began with categorizing.

T: It sounded like something you'd hear in a monastery.
C: Yeah, it was. It was nunny.
T: ...it was like an opera.
C: It was a really strong opera.

The categorizing is exploratory. Next, they go on to discuss Battle's voice:

S: She had a really good voice.
T: Yeah, powerful, really powerful.

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S: She had a strong, strong voice.

When they don't achieve a +Match, respondents will try to find out how strong their Match is by categorising, discussing aspects of the piece, relating, monitoring and elaborating. One of the professional musicians illustrates this type of response when responding to Schubert's "Death and the Maiden."

An adult responder to "Promenade" explored through imaging. She said, "...in my mind's eye, I saw rugged cliffs and I saw these little dwarfs jumping and dancing all over..." 

-Match

When respondents have a -Match, they tend to find the best Match possible outside the Overall Music Pattern. We think that there is no absolute -Match except in the case of a fetus and the first piece of music experienced. A good example of a -Match is an adult responder to Bachianas Brasileiras No 5. These are her contributions to a discussion with three others:

R: That seems to drift away.
R: I don't know this one.
R: I don't know this one because it drifted away.
R: Well, we can't win them all.

Sometimes with a -Match, the respondent claims that what they listened to wasn't music. Such responses were prevalent when we played music that pushed at their boundaries such as Ionisation.

Elaboration

The second part of the response, after Matching, we call Elaboration. It seems that once the Match has been established and described, some respondents explore the weaker Links in the Patterns. This results in socio-criticising, speculating about alternate performances of the piece, and/or retrieving information from Music Learning.

Socio-critical responses recognize music as being part of the sociological/cultural framework, or recognize social uses for the music For example, one Grade 7 respondent said in response to the theme from "Beverly Hills Cop": "Opera is for older people and this is for younger people."

Many respondents speculate about alternate performances of particular pieces. One respondent to "Promenade" said, "I would like it [the piece] matched with dancers. I would enjoy it more if there were some movement going on."
In this framework, Music Learning refers to knowledge of music in general or about specific pieces that is gained from sources external to music listening such as through instruction or from reading. Our theory draws a distinction between Music Acquisition and Music Learning. Music Acquisition is what the listener acquires from listening experiences. Music Learning is gained from sources external to the listening experience. Music Learning can influence preference, evaluation, cause recategorization, and, of course, provide the necessary knowledge for elaboration. One professional musician, responding to a movement from Schubert’s string quartet said, "This is a string quartet and I venture to say that I have just heard the scherzo and trio. I say scherzo as opposed to minuet, because it seems to be very playful in character."

**Evaluation**

Evaluating is the process of valuing positively or negatively the piece or aspects of the piece. The actual evaluation is a function of Match, Socio-Cultural and Music Learning influences; that is, the more complete the Match, the more positively the piece is evaluated. The very young children in our corpus did not evaluate the pieces we played; it appears to us that in order to evaluate, a listener must have a certain amount of exposure, or have access to some kind of externally imposed norm.

**Preference**

Preference for certain types or pieces of music over others, we explain as being the result of the Desire created by previous excitation (the stronger the Pattern, the stronger the Desire) Preference is also affected by socio-cultural and personal factors.

**CODA**

According to Chomsky, a theory must satisfy the following criteria: (1) It must be descriptively adequate, that is, it must be able to account for all the known primary data; (2) It must display explanatory adequacy in that the description must incorporate a consistent explanation of the data; (3) It must display predictive adequacy meaning that the explanation should hold for any new data that is collected, and direct research by raising questions that wouldn’t likely be raised without the theory; (4) Least importantly, but not to be ignored, a theory must display simplicity/elegance. Chomsky argues that an adequate theory will be easy to understand and will be internally and externally consistent.

Matching theory, we argue on the basis of the discussion in this paper, displays both descriptive and explanatory adequacy. We also argue that it displays predictive adequacy: The theory can account for findings from other studies and raise interesting questions which can direct further research.
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In a recent study, Radocy\(^6\) played short excerpts from a variety of pieces for Grade 7 students, and provided 15-20 seconds for a written response to each excerpt. He categorized the responses into three types: musical, extra-musical and like (which refers to liking or disliking the piece). That he found only three types of responses is likely the result of the short response time. For example, the longest response in his corpus was two sentences. While the primary data examples in his paper are necessarily few, we can explain the students' favourable reaction to particular pieces such as the country piece by Randy Travis, "The Power of Love" and "La Bamba," and their unfavourable reaction to "Carmina Burana," using our concept of exposure. In our culture, most grade 7 students are unlikely to have much exposure to the orchestral works of Carl Orff or anything similar, meaning that the Match they achieve will likely be incomplete, resulting in an unfavourable evaluation.

Radocy played a children's song for the young adolescents to which they responded negatively. One would expect that young adolescents have enough exposure to children's music to achieve a complete Match resulting in a favourable evaluation. That this did not occur can be explained by Matching Theory as being a function of socio-cultural influences, that is, adolescents in our culture are expected to have grown beyond such music, so their negative response is probably connected to this. They recognized it as being children's music, and adolescents are expected to reject non-teenage music.

Questions for Further Research

An adequate theory points researchers to questions that refine, challenge, and/or extend the theory. Matching Theory raises a number of interesting questions for further research: What is the relationship between exposure and categorization? Between exposure and evaluation? What effect does repeated listening to a piece have on response? What is the effect of learning to play an instrument on response? What is the effect of learning to sing on response? Effects of context on response (i.e., concert vs. recorded music)?

The theory also tells us about data still to be collected such as that related to emotional attachments and music, repeated listenings, development of response, etc. It is exciting to work within theory where questions arise from a framework and have relevance to more than their answers.

CADENZA

Writing this paper has been a real challenge to us. Using Chomsky's model of theory adequacy, and building on the work of cognitive theorists, we have forged ahead in a task that we think is long overdue in our field, namely, theory building. We know that we have taken risks. However, we think that our risk-taking can lead to positive results: It is now possible for others to enter the theoretical discussion by proposing counterexamples, refinements and/or competing theories. We look forward to such discussion.
REFERENCES


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MUSIC PLAYED FOR RESPONDENTS

"Aria" from *Bachianas Brasileiras* by Villa Lobos, performed by Kathleen Battle and Christopher Parkening.

"Promenade" from *Pictures at an Exhibition* by Mussorgsky.

*Ionization*, Varese.

*Unsquare Dance*, Brubeck.

*Let Us Run Across the Hills*, Villa Lobos.

*Percussion Melee*, Goodman.

*Anonym*, Hunergschai.

*Morning Prayer*, Tchaikovsky.

"Theme from Beverly Hills Cop," Axel F.


NOTES

1. See References under Browne and Shrofel, and Shrofel and Browne.

2. To be considered musically trained, a respondent had to have at least three years of music education outside of the school music program.


4. The application of microcognitive research and theory to music is that of the authors.


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A Peanuts cartoon strip by Schulz is displayed on the overhead projector. In the first panel, Schroeder is seen admiring the cover of a long-playing recording. Lucy comes up to him and asks, "What's that, Schroeder?" He answers, "This is a new recording of Brahms' Fourth Symphony." Lucy asks him, "What are you going to do with it?" Schroeder responds, "I'm going to take it home and listen to it." Lucy then starts to move her feet and arms in quick rhythmic motions and asks, "You mean you're going to dance to it?" Schroeder answers, "No, I'm just going to listen to it." Lucy then straightens out her arms and rigidly begins to walk in circles around Schroeder. She then asks him "Are you going to march around the room while you listen to it?" Schroeder responds, "No, I'm just going to sit, and listen to it." Lucy stares at Schroeder as he walks away, the album neatly tucked under his arm. She ventures one more question, "You mean you're going to whistle or sing while you listen to it?" Schroeder answers, "No, I'm just going to listen to it."

When I began thinking about this paper, I was reminded of that Peanuts cartoon strip. Explanations of music cognition are very often developed from the point of view of the listener. Schroeder, rather than Lucy, is the candidate of choice for researchers and theorists alike. Lucy's responses in dancing, marching or singing to the music are often considered to be secondary considerations which may even be excluded from the focus of research. Theory development and subsequent research in music cognition is most often predicated on the exclusiveness of music listening over all other means of participating in music.

I would like to present my position at the outset. I contend that by limiting investigations of music cognition to the listening act, too narrow a focus is presented for effective theory formulation. I hold that approaching theory of music cognition strictly from the point of view of the listener emanates from a specific Western philosophical position. For the remainder of this paper, I shall refer to this position as the formalist aesthetic stance. I identify the formalist aesthetic stance as a product of certain social, cultural and philosophical beliefs which flow from a particular historical context. In the modern era, these beliefs were first advanced by the eighteenth century German philosopher, A. G. Baumgartner. In his book _Aesthetica_ [1750-58], Baumgartner develops the notion of artistic beauty as being in a partnership with the concept of fine art. He argues that the receptive appreciation of works of fine art is central to the experience of art. Baumgartner's theory of aesthetics is founded upon the supposition that the
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aesthetic experience involves the formation of mental representations that begin with sensory perception but are necessarily connected with the inner subjective world. Thus, Baumgartner maintains that the notion of artistic beauty is a complex notion which sets up a closed connection between the formal properties of the art object with its aesthetic appreciation. Both Baumgartner and Kant regard aesthetics as a branch of philosophy in which the notion of aesthetic consciousness is to be regarded as a significant and unitary element of human experience. Kant argues that aesthetic judgment is distinct and unlike theoretical or cognitive judgment and practical or moral judgment because aesthetic judgment is effected subjectively. This point is made with the proviso that there is a universality or commonality of aesthetic judgment among humans by virtue of the common ground of subjectivity which humans share. Kant argues that our recognition of the purposiveness of an object of fine art leads to a certain type of pleasure which he refers to as aesthetic. In the spirit of the formalist aesthetic stance as first proposed by Baumgartner and Kant, the twentieth century philosopher Roger Scruton defines music as "a non-representational (abstract) art-form—a condition that other arts may aspire to, but which finds its paradigm instance in the art of sound." An adoption of the formalist aesthetic stance requires an acceptance that the particularities of the formal properties of music are sufficient for a proper and complete experience of music.

In turn, the presupposed closed and formal relation between a work of musical art and the formal experience of it has become the central presupposition in the formulation of modern music cognition theory. The incorporation of the formalist aesthetic stance into music cognition theory requires three conditions to be met. First, there is the requirement of a closed network between the listener (the recipient) and the work of musical art (the musical object). Second, a definition of music cognition requires that the act of listening take priority over all other musical activities, such as performance or composition. Third, the aesthetic stance requires that the meaning of a musical work be exclusively self-referential. That is, as Fiske (1990) says, any contextual factors associated with the musical work, be they programmatic or representational, are deemed not to be essential to its proper appreciation and understanding. In this paper I wish to remark upon the connection between the formalist aesthetic stance and certain assumptions espoused by contemporary theories of music cognition. To that end, I wish to call into question particular implicit and explicit claims being made in music cognition theory for the universality of musical cognitive structures and processes. I shall argue that such claims for the universality of such cognitive processes and structures are folded into assumptions inherent in the formalist aesthetic stance. I shall support my argument on a claim that the theoretical presuppositions and resulting assertions for musical cognitive universality based the formalist aesthetic stance are in themselves historically and culturally situated and thus open to question.

There are a variety of views on what music cognition is. Some theorists regard it as a computational process. Others understand music cognition to be the mental activity involving a set of music-specific auditory processing mechanisms. Still others understand music cognition as a set of music-specific listening behaviours which are deemed to be evidence of the operation
of a set of higher level cognitive skills, such as the processing and comparison of patterns or the construction of tonal and rhythmic hierarchies. Generally, the performative, creative and contextual aspects of the musical experience are deemed to be peripheral or at least reducible to the listening act.

In this paper, I shall focus most of my attention on a recent theory of music cognition, developed in Harold Fiske's (1990) book, *Music and Mind: philosophical essays on the cognition and meaning of music*. Where it is pertinent to the discussion, I shall refer to two other important and recent theories of music cognition; Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff's (1983) book, *A Generative Theory of Tonal Music*, and Mary Louise Serafine's (1988) book, *Music as Cognition: the development of thought in sound*. Lerdahl and Jackendoff model their theory of music cognition upon Chomsky's theory of language and Schenker's theory of deep level musical structuring. They argue that innate mental hierarchies cause a listener to attribute structure to musical auditory data. Serafine's developmental model places generic cognitive processes at the forefront of her theory of musical understanding. Serafine argues that innate cognitive mechanisms determine perception by first dichotomizing and then prioritizing the cognitive over the sensory aspects of the musical experience. The common thread in all three theories is that music itself, and not merely music cognition, is a mentally constructed activity. The character of the construction is founded upon the posited closed relation between the perception of musical sounds and the reconstructing cognitive apparatus.

Fiske builds his theory upon the principles of Fodorian modularity and Chomskian linguistics. He argues that in virtue of the genetic design of the human brain, non-musical information cannot enter the mechanisms of the musical cognitive process. This is so, says fiske, because music information processing mechanisms can only process musical data. Fiske defines musical data as a specific kind of auditory information which is restricted to tonal and rhythmic pattern relationships. The Fodorian cognitive model comprises several separate vertical and encapsulated processing modules. Each module is limited in its capacity for processing particular kinds of sensory information, such as linguistic, visual or musical data.5

Fiske is critical of theories whose intent it is to describe musical mental structure by compiling lists of musical descriptors stemming from a Schenkerian model of musical score analysis. Fiske does not actually name Lerdahl and Jackendoff in *Music and Mind*, but rather creates a fictitious researcher named Bleikovsky (a.k.a. Lerdahl and Jackendoff) who is in the business of compiling the aforementioned musical descriptor lists. It should be noted that in keeping with the restrictions of Schenkerian analysis, Bleikovsky's choice of music is restricted to certain Western classical tonal masterpieces.6 In any event, Bleikovsky's job is to arrange his musical descriptors in Chomskian hierarchical tree structures. Based on his findings, Bleikovsky asserts that the models created will effectively parallel the kind of cognitive processing that goes on when we listen to music.
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In my view, Fiske’s rebuttal of Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s model correctly challenges the assumption that a description of the dynamics of the musical surface itself will not necessarily render a parallel description of the dynamics of musical cognitive processing. Fiske offers two reasons. First, he claims on a point of logic that realized musical cognitive structures have to be caused by something else. Fiske also points out that many of the elements in the musical descriptor list might not necessarily be universally representative of music cognition if the musical resource were restricted to Western art music. The list of descriptors would have to be expanded to include every possible musical idiom that exists because hierarchies constructed from one musical idiom may fit badly in terms of another.

To save us the trouble that such a massive empirical effort would entail, Fiske offers another solution. He suggests that research should focus on the decision-making activities that are in themselves causal to the realized musical cognitive structures accorded by Lerdahl and Jackendoff. This suggestion is based on the assumption that processes at the decision-making level are cognitively universal. The structures as proposed by Lerdahl and Jackendoff, realized from the processes of decision-making in a particular musical idiom must be, in Fiske’s view, local because they are dependent upon the structures of particular musical languages. Fiske says that on this basis, his theory will have a firmer stake to a claim in terms of identifying the source of universal musical cognitive structures. Fiske is critical of other theories that are based on local musical languages because of their content orientation. Fiske maintains that musical content "depends upon some local, specific musical language" and amounts to a set of "perceived musical structures" derived from the dynamics of the musical surface. He claims that his theory, based on the procedure, or rather the form of musical thinking, is in a better position to make a legitimate claim for the identification of universal musical cognitive processes. a will be commenting on both of Fiske’s claims later in the paper. My present task is simply to set out the important features of Fiske’s theory).

Fiske defines music cognition as the process of interpreting musical tonal and rhythmic patterns achieved within the parameters of a musical meta-language. The musical meta-language provides the means for combining small bits of sonic stuff in the auditory signal into larger tonal and rhythmic patterns. These patterns are reducible to three identifiable types: first, initially given patterns; second, variant patterns; and third, invariant patterns. Fiske sets out three goals for his theory: "(1) (to) identify some descriptors of music decision-making activity; (2) (to) show that this descriptor set has universal applications; and, (3) (to) demonstrate the significance of this for a theory of music aesthetics." 8

With a view to the eventual identification of cross-cultural musical cognitive universals, Fiske then draws up three axioms. The first axiom is a claim that "music cognition is unique to human brains." 9 This is in reference to Chomskian notions of the unique genetic capacity of the human brain to form particular kinds of linguistic structures. The generally accepted gospel with innatist theories is that cat brains, for instance, cannot do things that human brains can do
because of their particular genetic design. Fiske’s second axiom claims that "[the] identification of patterns is limited to tonal and rhythmic relationships." This means that all non-auditory information connected with the experience of music, that is, any contextual information, whether it be conceptual, programmatic or representational cannot be processed by musical pattern recognition mechanisms. That is because Fiske’s pattern recognition mechanisms are designed to process only the specific kind of information found in musical tonal and rhythmic patterns. In Fiske’s words, musical pattern recognition mechanisms are "not designed to interpret (non-auditory) information even if it could be sent to these mechanisms, which it cannot." Fiske’s third axiom claims that "music cognition requires time and effort." On a micro-level, the cognitive apparatus requires varying amounts of time and effort in order to process tonal and rhythmic patterns depending on the complexity of the patterns and the skill level of the processor. Fiske maintains that "[the] variance in ability reflects different levels of accomplishment in discerning relevant musical patterns, in detecting and recognizing discrepancies between those patterns, and in recognizing the function of these discrepancies as they concern pattern development and stylistic identity." In summary, Fiske envisions a mechanical cognitive model which can process only the kind of data it is equipped to process. The musical module does not (because it cannot) process extraneous data connected by historical or cultural context, for instance. So-called non-musical data are processed by other vertical modules appropriate to the kind of information received. On the Fodorian model, there is a requirement that the information in the Input Systems be encapsulated, domain-specific, and especially unavailable to introspection, although Fodor would say that that is what goes on at the Central Systems level. Any difficulties encountered by the mechanism in processing specifically ‘musical’ auditory data are deemed to be due only to the complexity of the patterns themselves and not to any possible infusion of contextual (non-musical) information. The cognitive skill level of the listener in her ability to detect and process tonal and rhythmic patterns is deemed to the sole standard of accomplishment in the realm of music cognition.

Now that I have set out the salient points in Fiske’s theory, I would now like to change the pace a little. As I have said, my intention is to bring into question some of the assumptions held by theories of music cognition which adopt the aesthetic stance. First, I would like to play a bit of audio tape for you. Listen to it and see what you make of it.

A tape excerpt of African drumming is played - about 30 seconds.

Can you identify the sounds you have just heard? First, let us remember Fiske’s postulation that bits of sonic stuff which combine to form tonal and rhythmic patterns are processed as music. The problem is, if we were to interpret the excerpt we have just heard as music, we would be mistaken. That is because it was not music at all. It was actually an example of Nigerian talking drums. These drum sounds have been used for centuries to transmit detailed linguistic messages over hundreds of kilometres. However, most of us likely experienced the sounds of the drums as musical tonal and rhythmic patterns. As a straight
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listening experience, aided by our Western listening habits, we would not otherwise fail to interpret those sounds as anything but music. However, information of a kind beyond the strict realm of musical or even nonmusical auditory data would be necessary in order to interpret correctly those same tonal and rhythmic patterns as a linguistic message. Let us leave that for a moment while I play a bit of video tape for you.

Two video tape excerpts are played. The first is the opening to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. The second is a person playing Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star on the piano. The sound is off in both excerpts - about 30 seconds.

Can anyone identify the excerpts in the video? The first excerpt is the opening to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. The second is that of a person playing Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star. The interesting point is how some people, but not all, could make those identifications correctly. There was no sound, just actions. All our judgements were founded on contextual information derived from the moving pictures. Could we go so far as to say that those viewers who correctly identified the excerpts experienced music cognition? I would argue that they did, but for quite different reasons than those that would be proposed by Fiske, Lerdahl and Jackendoff or Serafine. I would argue that the correctness of our identification of the Beethoven excerpt was somehow dependent upon knowledge derived from prior listening experiences of the piece combined with prior visual experiences of performances. With the Twinkle, Twinkle excerpt, some level of additional musical training would be required for a correct identification of the pitches being produced at the keyboard.16

With the Beethoven excerpt, we had no sound, but chances are that acculturated viewers still could make a correct identification. Non-auditory and specifically non-musical clues in the picture, such as the conductor's motions and the player's responses, would lead acculturated viewers to believe the visuals first of all must have something to do with music. Some viewers might even experience some form of musical imaging of the opening motif in the Beethoven, and as a result, could make a correct identification of the music. (As an aside, I have observed that when I have pantomimed the Beethoven excerpt, very few people have failed in giving the correct answer, given that they had at least seen Beethoven's Fifth Symphony performed. Those who had only heard recordings of the symphony had more difficulty in giving the correct answer. My suspicion is that prior visual experience of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony would seem to be necessary for a proper identification).

With the Twinkle, Twinkle excerpt, some specific musical training would be required to make a correct identification. To a person with piano training, the motions of the player's hand on the keys in the silent video represent a musical tonal organization, resulting in a correct identification of the tune. I would argue that the visual experience of the movements of the player's hand on the piano keys and the subsequent audiation comprise a valid instance of music cognition.
My suspicion is that contextual knowledge is not ever filtered out of the processes of music cognition, as theorists such as Fiske would have us believe. Fiske claims that "musical unity is limited to the comparison of patterns that are perceivable aurally, and that emanate from the structure of an (aural) music language. Other claims of unity, that is, those created from rule systems outside the boundaries of the tonal-rhythmic language, are, at best, artificial and, at worst, fictitious." However, I contend that contextual information is crucial in aiding us in making valid judgements of interpretation and evaluation. I propose that if we are going have a workable theory of music cognition, we will have to relax the influence the formalistic aspect of the aesthetic stance otherwise bears on it. As David Elliott explains in his book, *Music Matters: a new philosophy of music education*, there is more to the experience of a musical work than auditory or mentally constructed tonal and rhythmic patterns. Elliott suggests that the experience of music involves a multi-dimensional construction: a performance-interpretation of a musical design that reveals standards and traditions of practice, cultural and ideological meanings, with (possible) expressions of emotion, with (possible) musical representations. Elliott maintains that there is always some kind of cultural content in a musical sound. All sounds in music have historical and cultural implications which must be factored into their interpretation.

Let us return to Harold Fiske. Now that we have some idea of where Fiske stands in the scheme of theories of music cognition, I shall endeavour to offer a few points of critical commentary. This will be done with a view to exposing certain weaknesses in mentalist/internalist theories of music cognition. From the opening sentences of *Music and Mind*, Fiske attempts to deflect any arguments that look for cultural diversity as the basis for understanding the musical mind. The first sentence of the book reads, "In a recent paper Robert Walker (1986) asks how it is possible that music from different cultures, or even music from a single culture, results in such wide diversity of musical styles and musical languages."

In response to Walker, Fiske's reveals his intent to identify universal those cognitive traits in the apprehension of music which override cultural particularities.

Fiske's method of investigation begins by first drafting the minimum number of statements he takes to be true about music cognition. In compliance with scientific methodology, he then reduces music to its smallest parts, as bits of sonic stuff which combine to form tonal and rhythmic patterns. Fiske's next move is to prove the truth of his postulations, with empirical findings based on scientific investigations of musical listening experience. On the basis of those findings, Fiske then advances philosophical questions about music, such as the relation of music to language and the place of emotion in music. These questions are all presented with a view to proving two hypotheses: first, that music is a meta-language at the micro-level; and second, that emotional content or any other extramusical content is outside the realm of music cognition. In reference to the former, Fiske's Axiom 4 claims that "music pattern comparison procedures represent a semantically closed (self-reference), meta-language system." In reference to the latter, Fiske claims that "auditory information is programmatically limited to things auditory; it spends its processing time and space determining tonal and rhythmic relationships and deriving
Fiske goes on to say that "now, what is painfully evident is that, at this point in the music process description, there is no suggestion of expression-specific content." If the reader is to accept Fiske’s assumptions, there is a subsequently required agreement that music cognition is due solely to the functioning of a deep-level music meta-language system. As mentioned earlier, Fiske defines meta-linguistic activity as restricted to the comparison, at the micro-level, of musical patterns. Fiske claims that this pattern comparison activity is done within "a semantically closed (self-reference) meta-language system." As I have previously mentioned, there is unfortunately no explanation of how the cognitive apparatus differentiates between musical and non-musical sounds in the whole acoustical environment. My guess is that Fiske believes the listener inherently knows it is music when it is heard by virtue of Fiske’s version of a Fodorian vertical musical module, although Fodor, to the best of my knowledge, does not talk about a vertical musical module. Nevertheless, as I indicated earlier, Fiske attributes the cause of this knowledge to introspective processes afforded by a listeners beliefs and experiences without providing an explanation of how unconscious mechanical processes illuminate conscious introspection. In any case, to give the final decision of what sounds are musical and non-musical to the powers of conscious introspection is a considerable repositioning of Fiske’s former reading of Fodor. At the end of Chapter 6 of *Music and Mind*, Fiske makes reference to the Fodorian notion of the central processor, which "brings together on-going immediate decisions of the several vertical modules with the concepts and constructs an individual holds concerning how the world is put together." However, Fiske maintains his position as a strict aesthetic formalist by denying reality to the effects the central processor may have on music cognition. He states, "the sense that music X embodies emotion Y (the music 'is' joyful, it 'is' sad, it 'communicates' longing, etc.) is an illusion brought about by certain realizations, of pattern relationships finding association with certain emotions or other life experiences...an emotional response to music is genuine and real-life, but its source is synthetic. The source is an association; the result is an appearance of an emotion-laden event." Fiske concludes that "there is no way to show that appearance-value can communicated specifically or directly through tonal-rhythmic elements or element/patten relationships. Music cognition - either the composer's or the listener's - is just not equipped to handle it."

Fiske makes a number of formalistic statements about music cognition. First, he describes the music meta-language as "(a) language of syntax... limited to syntactical descriptors...and limited to musical statements about other musical statements." This embraces at once the principles of musical absolutism and computational theory of mind. Perhaps in a way musical absolutism and computationalism make a neat fit. At the micro-level, computational theory claims that the brain’s operations are restricted to the syntactic manipulation of symbols. Fiske’s aesthetic formalism, with its condition of the self-referentiality of musical statements, allows him to identify musical patterns at the computational level as syntactic symbols. A principal tenet of computational theory is that the mind or its counterpart, the computer, does not actually operate by flows of electrons through brain cells or silicon chips but rather by sets of rules which govern
the functioning of those physical elements. The somewhat opposing naturalist stance takes the position that the design and the material of the brain itself, as biological phenomena, are causal to the dictates of its operation. I am not saying that the problems identified in Fiske's theory of music cognition would disappear upon assenting to a naturalist point of view. It is rather that the neo-Platonism of computationalism itself requires the enclosure of naturalism within its rationalist conceptual framework. Fiske achieves this move by making the rules of the music meta-language explain the operations of the brain itself. He claims that the music meta-language is "not brain-machine language, but rather the set of rules governing the style and character of music decision-making activity." 28 Fiske reinforces this position by stating that the music meta-language operates as a modular set on a different level than brain-machine language and is "the same for any music language." 29 This is the essence of the aesthetic formalist/computationalist position. Adherents to computational theory claim that if the brain were made of anything from brain cells to silicon chips or even rattling beer cans, it would process all the information it receives basically in the same way. This is consistent with the widespread contemporary functionalism in the cognitive science community. Based on the Turing model, it is required that the rules of the system be causal to its operation.

Let us see how this functionalist view applies in relation to music cognition. One might say that the rules of a particular musical language, at the musical surface, operate within certain permissible tonal and rhythmic relationships for that particular musical style. However, at the micro-level, computational theory requires that the brain operate on a reduced set of generic rules. There is a requirement that the music meta-language functions at the nonvoluntary level and at a level unavailable to conscious introspection. It reveals to consciousness only the forms of realized musical structures, the products of its operations, not its processes. Fiske states that the music meta-language participates in co-operation with the consciously acting mind as "the result of the interaction between the genetic rules and the rules of the social/cultural contract." 30 He also states that "music is understood within its own cultural context." 31 However, his stated intent is "to discover the decision-making structure...that underlies any of these (particular) music systems...the structure that permits any music language to function as a system of communication." 32 On one hand Fiske gives substance to the effects of culture and on the other he takes it away. I am not so sure it is all that possible to separate cultural and genetic influences as he proposes. The real problem is that he does not explain how generic processes relate to the exigencies of the particular musical situation.

This is the formalist aesthetic legacy: many contemporary theories of music cognition are rooted in a preoccupation with the nature of the reciprocal and circular relationship between the autonomous work of music and the autonomous subject. Eighteenth-century aesthetics is the progenitor of cognitive theories in the twentieth century whose quest it is to identify and describe causal relationships in the apprehension of music, not as a performing art, but as an object-centred fine art. Fiske says that he has shown "that we can separate mental activity from the realized musical structures that result from such activity." 33 He claims that mental
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decision-making activity is prestructural and causal to realized musical structures. However, in my view, Fiske is implicitly positing other even lower levels of cognitive structure. The dilemma which presents itself is that Fiske’s next theory would then have to categorize structures that cause the decision-making structures of musical patterns, and so on down the line. Somewhere along this path of causality, my feeling is that the notion of music cognition, or the cognition of something as music, disappears. This is the core of the problem with cognitivist theories in general. As John Eisenberg rightfully points out in his 1992 book, The Limits of Reason, "one cannot categorize mind in the same way as one categorizes inanimate objects such as metals, mass, or electricity. For mind is active and the basis of all knowledge. ‘It’ creates categories... (by categorizing the mind, we) would not capture the mind that knows, the mind that organizes experience.” As Eisenberg asks, how can the mind be subject to the rules it has created?

My second point of criticism has to do with Fiske’s handling of the issue of musical form and content. Of course, the relation of form and content in art has long been a favourite topic of debate among philosophers of music. Fiske differentiates his position from that of Lerdahl and Jackendoff by calling his "a theory of procedure that represents the form of musical thinking, and (Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s) a theory of musical structure which represents content.” My suspicion is that in cognitive theory, when Fiske and/or Lerdahl and Jackendoff talk about musical content they are essentially still talking about musical form. This is especially so with theory which adheres to the tenets of computationalism. I would argue that neither Fiske nor Lerdahl and Jackendoff can effectively bring the notion of musical meaning into the theoretical fold except as formal aesthetic meaning. Recall that formal aesthetic meaning requires the exclusion of extramusical content because of the presupposed direct and uninterrupted line between the autonomous work of art and the autonomous receiver. Fiske’s distinction between his and Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s theory is a misinterpretation of the difference between them because all three are in fact doing the same thing. Allow me to call your attention to the very first sentence of Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s book, which reads, "we take the goal of a theory of music to be a formal description of the musical intuitions of a listener who is experienced in a musical idiom.” Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s theory is founded on a long-term project of accumulating formal, syntactic descriptors of musical meta-language. As they explain, their concern with the form of hierarchical cognitive structures and musical grammars precludes any talk of content such as musical affect, unless it could be explained as a consideration of formal musical structure.

It should also be noted that Serafine’s approach is similar, but takes an even stronger formalist position. Serafine defines music itself as "a form of thinking in or with sound.” She endeavours to identify certain cognitive processes that are generic and still others that are particular to musical styles. In fairness to Serafine, however, her theory grants that there are processes unique to composing and listening respectively, a distinction that Fiske and Lerdahl and Jackendoff do not allow. Nevertheless, Serafine centralizes and prioritizes the form of
musical thinking which is common to and underlying to both composing and listening. She makes the rather provocative statement that discrete pitches, chords and scales are not the building blocks of musical thinking but are only the products of musical analysis. In my view, that statement amounts to a full frontal attack on Lerdahl and Jackendoff. In taking such a radical cognitivist stance, Serafine views the auditory component of music as secondary to its cognition. She compares the aspect of sensory perception in musical experience to "tea-blending and perfumery...while the formal arts have more to do with cognition, that is, with thinking and with ideas."39

In closing, I would like to summarize the main points of discussion. Music cognition theory, in adopting the formalist aesthetic stance, presupposes a direct and uninterrupted line between the artwork and the subject. The process of interpreting and evaluating music is deemed to be internal, and necessarily objective. Universal cognitive structures and processes become the objects of the study of the musical experience. These structures and processes operate on an innate and rationalized system of rules particularly unavailable to subjective and conscious introspection. In the cognitivist theoretical economy, factors such as the standards and traditions of musical practice, implications of emotional content, extra-musical representation or cultural and ideological meaning are deemed to be secondary or appearance-laden in relation to the proposed realities of music cognition.

My concern is that in adopting the formalist aesthetic stance, the identification of universal musical attributes may not be possible beyond base levels of auditory processing. Prospects for the success of explanations of musical experience will continue to be limited if a promise is not in store for a way to give a full and proper account for the musical mind beyond the aesthetic/formalist frame of reference. Although the act of listening is a necessary component of the experience of music, claims for the universality of mental processes and structures founded on the formalist aesthetic stance will be difficult to support in light of the larger experience of music. A theory of music cognition cannot exclude or even place in a subsidiary role the performative, conceptual, emotional and contextual factors which permeate music. As Joseph Margolis has remarked, "the important generic feature of musical properties rests with their being, or including, historied properties, properties that are distinctively what they are (as incarnate) not characterizable apart from their being 'historied'."40 Music must be understood as existing in a time and place. Explanations of music cognition are likely to be imbalanced, if not in danger of misrepresentation, if they are not developed in relation to a more robust concept of musical works than cognitive processes and structures.

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REFERENCES


NOTES


2. The language Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983) employ in describing music reveals that their approach to music cognition theory is based on the premise that music is first and foremost an object of appreciation and specifically an object of art. They state, "the present study will justify the view that a piece of music is a mentally constructed entity" (.2). They further state that "music characteristically functions as art" (p.7).

3. The kind of listening on does while composing or performing music, and I shall include such activities as casual improvisation and playing music alone in a room under the rubric of composition and performance respectively, may differ greatly from the kind of listening on does when one's full and undivided attention is restricted to the musical surface. Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983) do not allow for this possibility. They claim that "listening is a much more widespread activity that composing or performing. Composers and performers must be active listeners as well. And even if not every member of a culture listens to music, those who do are exercising a cognitive capacity; it is this cognitive capacity that we are investigating" (1983:7). Lerdahl and Jackendoff add a sentence at the end of the paragraph, "the fact that not everyone swims is not a deterrent to a physiological study of swimming" (1983, 7), revealing the reductive methodology they intend for a study of music. As much as it may be insufficient to base a study of swimming solely in terms of the physical act of swimming it may be equally insufficient to treat a study of music solely in terms of its cognitive component, at least in reducing composing and performing to the same cognitive acts involved in listening.
4. In Fiske (1990), he sets out his Sixth Theoretical Axiom, which states, "musical meaning is the set of realization (i.e., constructed by the listener) tonal-rhythmic relationships resulting from the relative success in penetrating the music decision-making hierarchy; depth (profoundness, richness, etc.) of meaning is dependent upon extent of hierarchy penetration" (1990: 85–86, Fiske’s parentheses). Fiske positions himself philosophically as an aesthetic formalist by claiming that "any argument that attempts to equate meaning in music with semantic knowledge or belief is doomed from the outset...and is, overall, a relatively pointless endeavour. To do this leads either to Referentialism, which most aestheticians today do not accept, or Expressionism, a position which often looks right, but which relies on a good deal of faith" (1990: 75–76). Fiske’s aesthetic formalist line is clear at the end of Chapter 4, entitled Musical Meaning and Communication in his claim that "the extent of agreement between composer, performer, and listener concerning the quantity and quality of pattern relationships represents the essence of the music communication process. Together, they represent the purpose of Music in its widest intellectual, aesthetic, and cultural function" (1990: 86).

5. Fiske does not explain in Music and Mind how the musical vertical module is able to differentiate between musical and non-musical auditory data. However, in his 1993 book, Music Cognition and Aesthetic Attitudes, he attempts to resolve the issue. He claims that a listener’s capacity to distinguish between musical and non-musical sound is part of an individual’s belief and experience set, found in Component #3 of the model. Judgements about what sounds are musical or non-musical are made on an introspective level after the sounds have been mechanically processed, first at the sensual and then at the deeper cognitive level. However, a problem still persists because Fiske neglects to explain how such previously impenetrable mechanical processes become available to introspection. If I read Fodor correctly, the role of the Central Systems is local in function, involving the fixation of belief, whereas the role of the Input Systems is global, involving the fixation of belief, whereas the role of the Input Systems is local, in that the data is informationally encapsulated and unavailable to the function of problem-solving, primarily because the Input Systems are stimulus-driven. (see Fodor, 1983:117–119) Fodor describes the Input Systems as modular, domain-specific, mandatory, fast, and informationally encapsulated, whereas he characterizes the Central Systems as not modular, not domain-specific, not fast, and not informationally encapsulated. As a true Fodorian, all Fiske has to do in order to explain Component #3 in his Three Component Model is to compare it to the Fodorian Central Systems component, the seat of belief fixation. However, in my opinion, Fiske diverges from his former Fodorian position when he says in a footnote that "Component #3 is introspectively penetrable" (Fiske, 1993: 67, footnote #24, Fiske’s emphasis). This is contrast to Fodor’s position of strict computationalism, which, by definition precludes any possibility for a faculty of introspection. The Central Systems are, as Fodor says, "unencapsulated" (1983:103), and as such merely have different rules (e.g., belief fixation) for operating on incoming information. Fodor avoids referring to belief fixation as a product of introspection, because, as I suspect, it may also involve admitting to such notions as subjectivity and consciousness, which he does not. Furthermore, Fiske does not explain how the introspective level has the capacity to override deep cognitive processes which he postulates are involuntary as well as impenetrable.

6. We would have to assume by his choice of music that Bleikovsky took a good part of his post-graduate studies with Heinrich Schenker as well as with Noam Chomsky. By my calculations, Bleikovsky would have to be the oldest graduate student in history since Schenker died in 1935 and Chomsky is still going strong!


11. As I have indicated earlier, Fodor would disagree with Fiske. Fodor would say that non-auditory information connected with music would be handled by the Central Systems.


13. Ibid, p. xi

14. This point may be at odds with Fodor’s stipulation that the operation of the Input Systems is, by definition, fast, whereas the operation of the Central System is defined as being slow.


16. This is entirely within the Fodorian model. As I have indicated earlier, the Central Processor would take care of that. If Fiske’s model is to include the Central Systems component, he would have to agree that non-auditory information, such as in the video excerpts could be used in music cognition. Fiske is not being strictly Fodorian if the cognitive does not go beyond the modular.


20. Ibid, p. 16.


22. Ibid, p. 115.

23. Ibid, p. 16.


27. Ibid, p. 16.


29. Ibid, p. 17.


31. Ibid, p. 11.

32. Ibid, p. 12.


EMOTION IN THE ARTS:

A CASE STUDY OF RELIGION AND ITS ARTS FOR EDUCATORS

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In music and the other arts there has been a persistent recognition of the presence and power of the emotions. Whether these emotions have been attributed to the composer, performer, audience, subject-matter, or some quality or meaning of the art object itself, emotional expression of some kind or other contributes to most explications of what art is and does. Although it can be argued that emotional elements accompany and even help guide the human quest for understanding in all its forms, whether as curiosity, surprise, wonder, fear, ambition, hope, intellectual satisfaction, and so on, different valuations of the role and place of the emotions in intellectual life have had repercussions in whether the arts are appreciated or disparaged, particularly as part of a general education program.

The purpose of this paper is to support an understanding of emotion that regards it as inseparable from knowledge, particularly the kind of knowledge that is conveyed by the arts. It will do so by examining the place of emotion in one kind of meaning-making, the religions, and the expression and articulation of religious emotion in works of art. Because of the constraints of this paper, its examination will be limited to the claims of a succession of religious philosophers in the romantic tradition, who each identified a particular emotion as the essence of religion, an emotion that they believed prompts and is prompted by certain cognitive understandings, and that finds its most persuasive articulation in music and the other arts.

Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834)

Schleiermacher argued that the absolute, irreducible feature of religion is not as popularly thought reason or morality, but feeling. And this feeling he described as that of absolute dependence, the finite on the Infinite. In On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, he challenged his readers to consider the character of religion not to consist in "systems of theology" which lead to "cold argufying" and "the tone of a common controversy." And, he added, as it is not a "way of rationalizing" neither is it a "way of acting," including liturgical, moral, or aesthetic behaviours. Rather, he asserted:
...religion is essentially contemplative. The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite....It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling....Where this is found religion is satisfied....In itself, [religion] is an affection, a revelation of the Infinite in the finite.\(^5\)

Staking out the field of religion in these terms, Schleiermacher was upholding the personal, intuitive, affective element of religion at a time when dispassionate, objective reason was being accorded sole access to understanding the environing world and even life itself. And yet even in the argument for the feelingful essence of piety, this statement actually brings together "affection" and "revelation:" objective awareness and subjective response: the concrete and the abstract: consciousness and feeling. In other words, the religious emotion of utter dependence, with its accompanying awe, reverence, and devotion, according to this statement, are coexistent on a certain level with cognitive awareness, perceptive sensing, and revelatory insight. Furthermore, he also argued that the emotional essence of piety is the inspiration for what he quaintly likens to "the production of light" (that is, ideas, viewpoints, or knowledge), and of "heat" (that is, actions, or moral behaviours and aesthetic endeavors).\(^6\) He asked:

What can [one] accomplish that is worth speaking of, either in life or in art, that does not arise in [one's] own self from the influence of this sense of the Infinite?...What is all science, if not the existence of things in you, in your reason? What is all art and culture, if not your existence in the things to which you clue measure, form and order? And how can both come to life in you except in so far as there lives immediately in you the eternal unity of Reason and Nature, the universal existence of all finite things in the Infinite?\(^7\)

One of the difficulties we encounter in this argument (and it reappears in the work of other romantic religious philosophers) is that it sweeps everyone into the religious category. But many would locate themselves at least two steps away from Schleiermacher's description of the religious: they do not agree that this felt or intuited Infinite inspires all their accomplishments in knowledge, morality, or art, and furthermore, some even deny the actuality of an Infinite altogether. In such cases, they may still experience wonder, awe, and a sense of dependency but attribute these feelings to a recognition of the immeasurable magnitude of the universe, its boundless variety, the interconnectedness within the ecosystem, natural beauty, or some other such awareness, but not the Infinite.

Nevertheless, we are still left with a definition of religion that equates it with a feeling of utter dependence and its range of associated emotions—"humility" combined with an "exalted feeling of personal existence"; "contrition" alone with "joyful self-sufficiency."\(^8\) "He [or she] only," he repeated, "who has studied and truly known [humanity] in these emotions can rediscover religion in [its] outward manifestations."\(^9\) And it is this emotional essence that he inevitably linked with the arts.
"How are religion and art related?" he asked. "They can hardly be quite alien," he responded, "because, from of old, what is greatest in art has had a religious character." But more than that, he envisaged a blending of life and art which is not just "an accidental shaking together, leaving both unaltered," for they "are fused together by piety, thus revealing their "original unity." The connection he perceived among religion and art and life itself lies in their respective relations to what is comprehended as the Whole, or the Infinite. This idealist construal of the world makes religion and art interdependent: art is a manifestation and reflection of the Infinite perceived by religion; and the idea of religion is apprehended in part by the influence of art.

Words, music, and works of art might be "only the shadows of our religious emotions" but, interpreting Schleiermacher, they are nevertheless the royal road of access to religion. He added:

If it is true that...in a moment, as by an immediate, inward illumination, the sense for the highest comes forth and surprises...by its splendour, I believe that more than anything else the sight of a great and sublime work of art can accomplish this miracle.

How does this happen?

In sacred hymns and choruses to which the words of the poet are but loosely and airily appended, there are breathed out things that definite speech cannot grasp. The melodies of thought and feeling interchange and clue mutual support till all is satiated and full of the sacred and the infinite.

Apparently he sensed that since neither the qualities of music nor of religious feeling can be reduced to words, the affective element of music corresponds at some level with and conveys the affect of religion. Beyond evoking what he called "a moment of infinite intuition," Schleiermacher offered no further explanation of how art provides access to religious feeling.

Rudolf Otto (1869–1937)

In introducing an early reprint of Schleiermacher’s On Religion, Otto explained that this book had been written as an "original and daring attempt to lead an age weary with and alien to religion back to its very mainsprings." It is not surprising that Otto himself undertook a related task in his own thought and work. His most central and important accomplishment was the publication of Das Heilige, which appeared in English as The Idea of the Holy.

Although clearly indebted to Schleiermacher, Otto nevertheless recognized some potential hazards in the work of his predecessor. The feeling of utter dependence, he pointed out, is first
of all not an emotion unique to religious awareness. One can imagine a number of instances, some with no religious significance, in which one could feel overwhelmed by one's own mortality and limitations. Further, a feeling of dependence is what he rightly identified as a "category of self-valuation," a psychological rather than a religious classification, in which case God is only inferred. His own project assumed the essence of religion to be more a feeling for the Holy than a feeling of a particular emotion. As he said, "feelings can only arise in the mind as accompanying emotions when the category of 'the numinous' is called into play."\textsuperscript{16}

The Holy or numinous is intuited through numinous feeling, he explained, the way the ominous is intuited through ominous feeling. It is suggested by means of the special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling.\textsuperscript{17} These numinous feelings, he maintained, involve various states of mind, including especially, \textit{mysterium tremendum et fascinans}—in which \textit{tremendum} contains elements analogous to fear, a sense of overpoweringness, urgency, and energy, while \textit{mysterium} suggests a sense of the unusual, the not altogether intelligible, the unfamiliar, with overtones of the fascinating, entrancing, captivating, wonderful, confounding, longed for, solemn, and yearned after. Together he rewarded all these feelings as nothing more than, but nothing less than, analogies or "ideograms"\textsuperscript{18} for the feeling of the numinous, which is in itself \textit{sui generis}, unique, irreducible. He treated these feelings also as a kind of knowing, above and beyond the rational, the outworkings of the ultimate and highest part of our nature which is more than the sum of sensuous, psychical or intellectual impulses and cravings. Struggling for words, he simply called it "the beatific experience." \textsuperscript{19}

Again, what is the connection of this religious feelingful insight with the arts? Using music as an example, he began his answer by analyzing musical feelings. Here he identified the presence of two kinds of feelings. He believed there are "natural feelings" such as "homesickness perhaps, or confidence in time of danger, hope for a future good, or joy in a present possession," all of which may be expressed in conceptual terms, and often conveyed by the words of a song. But, he added, there is another kind of feeling in the music, "purely as music":

\begin{quote}
It releases a blissful rejoicing in us, and we are conscious of a glimmering, billowy a citation occupying our minds, without being able to express or explain in concepts what it really is that moves us so deeply. And to say that the music is mournful or exultant, that it incites or restrains, is merely to use signs by analogy, choosing them for their resemblance to the matter in hand out of other regions of our mental life; and at any rate we cannot say what the object or ground of this mourning or exulting may be. Music, in short, arouses in us an experience and vibrations of mood that are quite specific in kind and must simply be called 'musical'...\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

While holding the distinction between the two kinds of feelings, Otto recognized a connection between them. Everyday feelings provide a conceptual and experiential frame for
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numinous feelings. In his words, ordinary feelings provide a basis for "rationalizing" and "schematizing" the more esoteric feelings of music.

[And] the resultant complex mood is, as it were, a fabric, in which the general human feelings and emotional states constitute the warp, and the non-rational music-feelings the woof.21

To reduce musical feeling to the familiar and incidental experiences of joy, grief, expansion and repression, as he believed program music tends to do, is, he argued, to misinterpret and pervert the idea of music; it is to lose what is mysterious and unique about music. So, in this regard then,

[m]usical feeling is rather (like numinous feeling) something 'wholly other', which, while it affords analogies and here and there will run parallel to the ordinary emotions of life, cannot be made to coincide with them by a detailed point-to-point correspondence.22

This "overplus" of feeling in music, that is, those feelings engendered by the music that are more than and can only be figuratively compared with the normal feelings one has in ordinary life, is like the "overplus" of emotion experienced in the feeling for the Holy. To rationalize and schematize away "music-consciousness" by reducing it to general feelings is the same mistake as allowing the "august" aspect of the numinous to evaporate into such concepts as the "morally good."

However, the "overplus" of feeling in the two experiences, one musical and the religious, he claimed more insistently than his predecessor Schleiermacher, are not the same; each exists independently in its own right. And yet, he also maintained that while the numinous is infinitely mysterious, and although words and external symbols are the most inadequate means for expressing the Holy, feeling for the numinous is not inaccessible. We have recourse, he argued, to the same way all other moods and feelings are transmitted—through, among other things, works of art.

It is art works in particular that Otto would describe as sublime, and the feeling of the sublime comes closest to describing religious feeling. Sublime art is magical, spellbinding, imposing, solemn: in his words, "nothing more than a suppressed and dimmed form of the numinous." In architecture all the way back to Stonehenge and the Pyramids, in the emptiness and empty distances of Oriental art, in the darkness and silence of Western art, as well as in the sweeping lines and rhythms of landscape paintings, in vaulted halls and lofty forest elates, in poetry and music, Otto believed we could discover the numinous. At times, one has the sense that art-feeling is being equated with religious-feeling, despite his earlier distinction between the two, for he does not always maintain that one merely suggests the other. But his point here is that works of art, among all the imperfect and less than adequate means available, are among
the most effective ways of suggesting the numinous. Even then, he admitted, they are most effective in negative representations of the Holy—their silences, darkness, emptiness.23

The category of the "numinous" used throughout his discussion comes from the Latin numen, for "nod," indicating the nod as a sign of command and, from this, the divine will or divine command. In Otto's work, it is a rather promiscuous term, apparently illustrating how distinctions collapse in his concept of the unity of the Holy. When he first introduced the term, he indicated that he had coined it from numen to speak "of a unique 'numinous' category of value and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied."24 In this sense, it indicates the state of feeling of the worshipper in the presence of the Holy and, by projection, works of art and other representations which express a sense of mystery or holiness. It also refers to the Holy: Yahweh and Allah, for instance, are described as "numinous."25

In effect, Otto's thesis is that since works of music and art, through their mysterious and numinous qualities, convey more than general feelings, they serve as effective means for awakening mysterious and numinous feelings, which, in turn, are successive of mystery and numen. In the end, mysterious feelings and feelings for the mysterious, or numinous feelings and feelings for the numinous, are difficult to untangle. Means and ends become inseparable, interdependent. The objective feeling for the Wholly Other is predicated on the subjective feeling of the wholly other.

Paul Tillich (1886–1965)

In the style of Schleiermacher, Tillich also appealed to the "cultured despisers" of religion, basing his argument on a consideration of the intellectual and existential questions of the day: questions about dread, anxiety, and meaninglessness. Threatened with non-being in its various manifestations which take in everything from an overwhelming sense of guilt or purposelessness through awareness of the evitability of one's own death and oblivion, human beings frame what he considered to be the universal question, "the ontological question," "the question of being."

This question is manifested in a response he called "ultimate concern," a deliberately ambiguous expression. It was meant to indicate both "taking something with unconditional seriousness,"26 and also that which is "infinite," "unconditional," and "ultimate." That is, it refers both to our being ultimately concerned, a subjective experience, and it also refers to the ultimate we are concerned about, the objective element to which that experience points.27 And so in typical tautology he claimed, "...ultimate concern is concern about what is experienced as ultimate."28
When the emphasis is on concern as an emotional experience, being ultimate implies that all other concerns are either subjected to this concern or rejected in its name. It transcends every preliminary and finite concern, he explained, incorporating and going beyond all cognitive, aesthetic, social, and political concerns. It is the around of all other concerns and embraces them all. As such, it demands "total surrender," although it is not clear what it means to surrender to ultimate concern, and it "promises total fulfilment." The ultimacy of the concern refers also to the nature of what the concern is about—it is about that which is ultimately significant, being in fact the around of all that is. When Tillich centered on concern, he was focusing on the experiential character of religion, thus directing attention to an inner human posture not just a highest thing, to a feeling of infinite passion and interest.

The ambiguities in the expression "ultimate concern" raise a number of problems. We might want to know how the subjective faith experience is connected with objective belief and what the link is between concern as an emotion and concern as an object of knowledge? To blur the cap between "ultimate," which refers to the place of existential angst in a hierarchy of human concerns, and "Ultimate," which refers to what satisfies that concern, tends to confuse. Tillich does not address these questions, except to indicate that he was pointing to the transcendent character of "ultimate concern," that it is beyond and subsumes simple object-subject differentiations.

However, the frustratingly ambiguous nature of "ultimate concern" may very well be due not simply to Tillich's acknowledged limitations in English usage, his romantic and artistic bent which put him under the spell of word play, or to a moment of confusion. Given the semantic many-sidedness of "ultimate concern," maybe he, along with his predecessors who faced similar difficulties, struggled to express in straightforward terms that which is ultimate both in human emotion and intuition. Enumerating the multiple meanings, in effect Tillich reinforced the concept of religion as a kind of feelingful knowing in which the subjective and objective elements combine. Although the nature of this combination is unclear, he proposed that it is also experienced emotionally as the "power of love" and the "courage to be."

Drawing on both his experience and philosophy, Tillich proposed that the meeting of art and religion is where one confronts the human condition in its full range of possibilities—from meaninglessness and imminent oblivion through reunification with the ultimate and being-itself. That is, art expresses ultimate concern. When he talked of art that expresses, however, he was not using the term "expression" in the narrow sense in which "only the emotional state of the artist" is expressed. Rather, it refers to the characteristic expression of ultimate concern in a culture at a particular time, the representation of its sense of being, both known and felt. It indicates "more than a subjective outcry" or "an objective record." It is instead the ability of good art to make lucid "a quality of reality which transcends mere objectivity and subjectivity." Here again we meet that elusive, idealist notion of a transcendent in which are united reason and emotion, subject and object, non-being and being, self, other and God.
It is apparent that for Tillich art is also universally religious, the only exception being perhaps a work that is deliberately religious in subject matter but fails to move from the preliminary, transitory, finite level to express ultimate reality. Even art works whose content is non-religious may yet possess a religious style, he maintained, if they penetrate the surface of things, reveal the very beingness of things, and "face the situation out of which comes [the existential] question, namely the human predicament." As he stated,

every cultural creation has a religious dimension insofar as it contributes to the answer of the question of the meaning of our existence and existence universally....

[The artist] cannot escape religion even if he [or she] rejects religion, for religion is the state of being ultimately concerned.

As Sidney Book has retorted, Tillich "convert[s] ‘erring souls’ by arbitrary definition."

In attributing to art the capacity to express the essence of religion or ultimate concern, Tillich nevertheless assigned it an indirect role: art merely uses encountered reality as material for symbolizing ultimate reality. That is, he did not conflate art and religion, but distinguished two different tendencies in the experience of an art work, one which views it as an end in itself and one which sees it as a means to something else. Using the Bach Passion of St. Matthew as an example, he separated the religious experience in which the meaning of the music is related to the last week of Lent with all its implications from the aesthetic experience which judges the performance and the perfection of the choir, the singers, and the composer. Commenting on the difference that separates the two experiences, he explained:

Now in this musical realm there is much which transcends ordinary reality, but the question is whether it transcends the preliminary concerns for the sake of ultimate concern. The question is, whether these people are moved by the music to ask the question of their own lives in an ultimate sense. If not, they remain in the aesthetic realm. In this aesthetic realm something of the ultimate is indirectly communicated but it remains indirect. They do not penetrate to the meaning this music had for Bach, and which it should have if it is performed in the context of Lent. Art as such, whether liturgical or not, whether dealing with religious subject matter or not, penetrates the subject-object reality in which we are living: but whether it penetrates ultimate reality is another question. One of the criteria that indicates something has been penetrated is that the meaning of one’s total existence is involved, not only one’s aesthetic experience. I remember a poem by Rainer Maria Rilke in which he spoke about a torso of an archaic Apollo and said that whenever he looked at it, it said to him, "Change thy life." Now if this is experienced the aesthetic experience is transformed; then the aesthetic has become a matter of ultimate concern and that means a religious experience has occurred.
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Where Otto regarded art feeling as somewhat analogous to, Tillich regarded it as symbolic of, religious feeling.

This understanding lies at the heart of Tillich's insistence that through art he gained an "ecstatic feeling of revelatory character."\(^41\) Literature and poetry, music and art, he claimed, were a "vehicle for insights," insights which incidentally he could later elaborate only abstractly through the concepts of his philosophy of religion.\(^42\) Even in identifying the perceptive quality of art as "the revelatory character of style," Tillich was employing the religious term "revelation." The moment of insight, also incidentally equated with the "moment of ecstasy,"\(^43\) has a "sudden, unexpected, grasping character," he effused. "It brings to light something which in no other way can be grasped by us."\(^44\) He concluded, "I think we must try to devise a better theology than that which language alone can accomplish."\(^45\)

Applications to Music Education

Music educators, particularly those whose efforts are directed at public education, should not too quickly reject the contributions of Schleiermacher, Otto, and Tillich simply on the grounds of their religious focus. Their idealist or romantic assumptions may actually be more unpalatable than their religious beliefs. They consistently present God philosophically rather than theologically as the Infinite (or as Schleiermacher suggested "World-Spirit" to include faiths other than Christianity),\(^46\) the Wholly Other, or the Ultimate. The emotions they described as the essence of religion—utter dependency, numinous feeling, and ultimate concern—may be better described as "spiritual" than "religious" with its connotations of institution, systematics, and belief in God. In fact, so broadly did they all conceive religious experience that they have been more roundly criticized for being too liberal in what they include rather than too exclusive in their representations of religion.

"Spirituality" (and its derivatives) is a less sectarian term and one which incorporates many human activities and systems of faith or belief that are not church-affiliated or otherwise institutionalized. At the least, we might agree to define spirituality as the search for answers to questions about the meaning of life: Who am I? Where did I come from? and Where am I going? Clearly, the religions endeavour to answer these questions, but so do artists, scientists, philosophers, and others, each in their own distinctive languages. If public education would address these questions, even if some in our school communities were to do so using the language of the religions, learners would encounter the possibilities for personal meaning-making and value-formation. And it is to this endeavour that our three writers may have a contribution to make.

What the review of their ideas has shown is that there is a strong tradition supporting the notion that the spiritual quest is bound up with powerful emotions. These emotions originate
in a particular awareness: respectively identified as the awareness of human finiteness and dependency, or of numen, mysterium tremendum, the wholly other, or of the threat of non-being. And these emotions can give rise to insights: respectively insights into the Eternal, the Holy, or Ultimate, and their link with the human predicament. These emotions, then, are interdependent with certain awarenesses and insights. Our writers have insisted throughout that relevant spiritual knowledge is not the result of disinterested reasoning alone nor does it give rise to objective non-involvement. Rather, the division of subject and object—that is, the rift between reason and emotion, between the concrete situation and abstract faith, and between the individual and the Infinite—is transcended and wholeness or holiness is the result.

Can such things be taught in schools? The combined response to this question from these three is yes and no. Yes, there is an avenue of access to these profoundest of emotions and insights, but, no, it cannot be directly transmitted by the kind of teaching methods employed to impart many other kinds of knowledge.

First, regarding the avenue of access, each of the writers admitted the inadequacy of words. Typical theologies, reasoned explanations, and literal discourse have at best a secondary role to play. But through the creative products of the arts, essentially religious or spiritual feeling could be discovered. As Schleiermacher assumed, art works are manifestations of and inspired by the Infinite; as Otto proposed, they provide analogies or schemata for the numinous; and as Tillich reasoned, they symbolically express ultimate concern. In other words, for each of them, the emotional elements of art are responsive to spiritual awarenesses and afford spiritual insights.

Second, regarding the method of art education that would accomplish spiritual ends, they each intimated indirect approaches. While they proposed that every art work is potentially spiritual, the "cultured despisers of religion" and those who remain in the aesthetic realm and refrain from addressing the ultimate questions raised by the work, would not experience these moments of insight, or as Tillich called them, "breakthroughs to reality."\textsuperscript{47} Schleiermacher advised teachers that they may find some who are "responsive to everything that has to do with viewing" works of art. But there are others who are not, although he asserted "the works of art of religion are always and everywhere exposed," and "the whole world is a gallery of religious scenes." The most one can do for these students, he offered, is prompt them by the "commentaries" and "imaginings" of others, but unless they can actively feel the religiousness of the art for themselves, teachers will be able to accomplish little for them. "Show me a [person] to whom you have imparted power of judgment, the spirit of observation, feeling for art or morality," challenged Schleiermacher, "then I will pledge myself to teach religion also."\textsuperscript{48}

For Otto, the mental state he described as numinous was a "primary and elementary datum," which he believed could be discussed, but it could not be strictly defined. His advice to teachers then was:
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There is only one way to help another to an understanding of it. He [or she] must be guided and led on by consideration and discussion of the matter through the ways of his [or her] own mind, until he [or she] reaches the point at which "the numinous"...perforce begins to stir, to start into life and into consciousness....In other words, [this feeling] cannot, strictly speaking, be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes "of the spirit" must be awakened.49

Tillich's advice to the artist was "Open your heart, and that which is there in the depths of reality will enter your heart and you will be able to create."50 Then for the recipient of a work of art he elaborated:

One cannot explain a poem philosophically. One cannot interpret a picture by stating its meaning in discursive sentences and then dispensing with the visual form. Every work of art—a poem, picture, piece of music—has something to say directly to its audience that cannot be expressed by scientific formulas or the language of everyday experience.51

Taken together, the weight of their advice to teachers is to immerse students in a work of art and allow them to discover their own feeling for its emotional center. Questions of artistic technique may be distracting, but questions of personal meaning may lead them to penetrate its depths for spiritual insights into either the demonic or the divine, the human predicament or its source of hope and courage. And quite possibly, the appropriate response to a work of art may not be words at all but further artistic expressions, because art is the language for and the language of the emotions.

NOTES

1. Even when art is explained in other terms, the embeddedness of the idea of its emotional essence is evident in that it has to be denied to make room for an alternative. For instance, Forest Hansen, "Values in Music Education," Philosophy of Music Education Review 2 (Spring 1994), 6.


4. Ibid., 27.

5. Ibid., 35, 36.

6. Ibid., 18.
7. Ibid., 39.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 16.
10. Ibid., 29.
11. Ibid., 122.
12. Ibid., 139.
13. Ibid., 152.
14. Ibid., 236.
15. Ibid., vii–xx.
17. Ibid., 11.
18. Ibid., 24.
19. Ibid., 37.
20. Ibid., 47, 48.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 49.
23. He offered as an example the sudden quiet in Mass music at the most numinous moment in the Mass, the moment of transubstantialism. Ibid., 60–71.
24. Ibid., 6, 7.
25. Ibid., 74–75; 90–91, for example.
27. Ibid., 11.
28. Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 10, 11. In philosophical terms, he described ultimate concern as being-itself and being concerned about being-itself. In more religious terms, he allowed that the subjective reference is to "the faith through which one believes"—"The act of faith"; the objective reference is to "the faith which is believed"—"the content of faith." Here, he intimated, "The ultimate of the act of faith and the ultimate that is meant in the act of faith are one and the same." Apparently, the move from "ultimate concern" to "religious faith" is not as forced in German as it is in English. Wilhelm Pauck, "To Be or Not to Be: Tillich on the Meaning of
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29. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 1; Ultimate Concern, 27; Systematic Theology, three volumes in one (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 1:211.

30. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 1.

31. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:12.

32. Tillich, "Symbol and Knowledge: A Response by Paul Tillich," Journal of Liberal Religion 11 (1940), 203. Pauck, in "To Be or Not to Be," 31, notes that Tillich learned English at forty-seven and was forced to rethink and reformulate his ideas in his new tongue. Tillich himself, however, reported that the process made his thinking clearer and more readily understandable.


34. Ibid., 19.

35. Ibid., 92–99.

36. Ibid., 166.

37. Ibid., 121.


40. Ibid., 115, 116.

41. Ibid., 6.

42. Ibid., 12.

43. Ibid., 235.

44. Ibid., 128, 129.

45. Ibid., 183.

46. Schleiermacher, On Religion, note 12, 111.


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51. Ibid., 176, 177.
A RESPONSE TO:
SHROFEL & BROWNE, STELLINGS, AND YOB

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You will have noticed that papers for most sessions at this symposium were grouped on the basis of some commonality. The papers presented in this session by Salina Shrofel and Nancy Browne, Alan Stellings, and Iris Yob may appear to be unrelated. Salina and Nancy presented some theory-making about processes operative in preference growing out of verbal data gathered from research subjects. Alan focused heavily on a critique of Harold Fiske’s theory of music cognition. Iris presented the views of three theologians regarding the essence of religious feeling, how it might be related to the feeling engendered by art music in the tradition of western Europe, and what effect experiences of this type may have on individuals.

But despite the evident differences among the papers, common themes can be identified. (1) All three papers assume a legitimate place for contextual aspects of music performed. This is very clear in Salina and Nancy’s paper in the assumption that there is need for a match with the overall arts pattern and the life pattern. Alan specifically argued for consideration of contextual aspects and Iris must assume the legitimacy of context because it is essential in the individual’s construction of meaning and insight in relation to the musical experience; (2) All three papers also place importance on emotional response to music. Salina and Nancy do this by focusing the application of their theory on evaluation and preference. Alan does so by again arguing directly for its importance and Iris by examining a particular kind of emotion related to music.

Before I address aspects of the papers individually, I want to compliment all three on taking an attitude if not approach which takes into account more fully than many writers do the lived experience we have with music and an approach to research which may fit into the camp of hermeneutic phenomenology. Even though only Salina and Nancy formally gathered data, the other two authors revealed a sensitivity to the experience of individuals that gives them a context of informal phenomenological data. Hermeneutic phenomenological research, according to Max Van Mannen (1990), is characterized by the interaction of these activities. (1) "Turning to a phenomenon which seriously interests us and commits us to the world." I believe each of these presenters has done that. The papers clearly grow out of serious questions related to a fundamental concern. (2) "Investigating experience as we live it rather than as we conceptualize it." This activity may be the weakest in these papers but I detected an experience oriented realism in each one. In a symposium like this we need reminders occasionally to stay in touch
with experience as we live it. (3) "Reflecting on essential themes which characterize the phenomenon." The phenomenon under consideration by each is musical experience and Salina and Nancy focus on the themes of preference and how to account for it. Alan is more analytic and critical but still calls (and we assume as a result of reflection on his experience and that of others) for consideration of performative, conceptual, emotional and contextual aspects of the musical experience. Iris focuses on the quality and nature of the emotional experience with music and its counterpart in religious experience. (4) "Describing the phenomenon through the art of writing and re-writing." Perhaps we do too little of this in philosophy, but we could often clarify what we mean tremendously by simply constructing an illustrative story or anecdote. The writing of that story in itself, according to Max Van Mannen (1990) and Elliot W. Eisner (1991) is research and probably expresses rather than states the intended meaning. I feel each of the papers could have been strengthened, and probably the philosophical research improved in rigor, if the writers had carefully crafted an anecdote illustrating what they advocated or theorized. The discipline and pedagogical reality required to craft a vivid literary account of the envisioned or theoretical condition may be new to philosophers but would probably introduce an element of honest reality that would be particularly productive in bridging perceived gaps between individual thinkers. (5) "Maintaining a strong and oriented pedagogical relation to the phenomenon." Each of the presenters appeared to be aware of the pedagogical context that ostensibly motivated the research in the first place, but, in my opinion, elaborating the implications of the conclusions of findings for pedagogy could be stronger in each case.

The first paper we heard this morning was by Salina Shrofel and Nancy Browne entitled, "Toward a Theory of Response to Music." This paper does something quite brave—theory-making about what goes on in the mind of a person listening to music. I commend you for your bravery. I believe your description of the five cognitive processes are a helpful way to start thinking about the process of preference perception. I did find myself wondering what your textual analysis or linguistic models were. I thought I might find names like Richard Bauman (1992) or Bauman and Sherzer (1989) popping up. I find the idea of analyzing language associated with music experience or teaching very interesting and applaud your approach to research. The way I read the paper, the theory you propose can be summarized like this: When a person listens to music, the Pattern Matcher attempts to achieve the strongest Match possible between input piece, Overall Music Pattern, Overall Arts Pattern, and Overall Life Pattern. Since evidence of this process was linguistic, you might say that when the person hears music, the person's mind tries to identify stuff about the music. It is a study looking at what Perlmutt and Perkins (1982) described as one of the five possible response modes—the linguistic mode of response.

My primary concern about this paper is that I find the terms rather loosely defined. I think you set us off thinking this is a cognitive psychology model yet it does not seem to take root there. The Overall Arts Pattern and Overall Life Pattern are barely mentioned and certainly not clearly defined. The overall Music Pattern received a little more attention but I still am not
Response to Shrofel, Stellings, Yob

sure what it is. Is it a musical syntax-oriented tonal sense as in a musical language? Is this the perception of contour Sandra Trehub (1984) found children attend to in both music and speech? You say that the values related to music, physical, emotional, and intellectual response, and all manner of information about music are all part of the Music Pattern. That to me is not a satisfying delineation of the concept. This becomes more evidently problematic when you suggest a person might hear a piece of music and find it a "similar" instead of "same" pattern. What could be a ‘same’ pattern if the pattern consists in all these aspects? Related to this problem of definition is the confusion that comes from your use of terms like ‘chunking’ and ‘pattern matching’ that have specific meanings in cognitive psychology but you seem to use in different ways here.

There are some other questions that nag me. You say, "Musical experiences occur within the context of the child’s life: the child is raised in a socio-cultural environment that determines values and what the child will experience both with music and other aspects of life." I essentially agree with this but have some trouble with your use of the term ‘determines.’ Can a person transcend the context in which she is raised?

A particularly urgent question concerns your concept of the responder. You say that cell excitation occurs. Are these the exact cells next time if the mother sings the song a semi-tone lower? Is it then a different experience? What kinds of patterns register—motives? Tonality structures? Or are you not using the term ‘pattern’ the way we are accustomed to it? Is the cell excitation generalized into schema? Or are we talking about pattern perception and cognition as described by Sandra Trehub who has shown that a baby will perceive as novel and consequently respond to a distant key relationship shift of a five note motive but not to a shift to a near key? How does the baby’s mind differentiate music from the vacuum cleaner or does it not matter? If the vacuum cleaner is associated with pleasant feelings the child will like the vacuum sound? Is this all about associations with music rather than about the cognition of music? Alan Stellings raised essentially this question in relation to Fiske’s theory.

An interesting referential connection to music is implied in this statement: "Strong links can be formed between a Music Pattern and a physical or emotional experience that occurred during a listening experience." The way I read this, the significant experience does not need to result from the music. It could be like the experience that my daughter’s cat Gothic had when he fell into a water tank while friends of ours were visiting. Ever after that he appeared to be very afraid of those friends.

You claim that preference results from the desire created by previous excitation and therefore the stronger the pattern the stronger the desire. Does that mean the more a person listens to a piece of music the more they will like it? Then how do you account for the inverted U mapping of preference found in so many preference studies?
I could ask many other questions such as about the definition of response, or what questions were posed to subjects, or are the thousand pages of transcripts from one study or several. But I will only make one more point. You say that Matching Theory raises a number of interesting questions for further research. There is considerable research already in the area of response as was evident in the paper of J. Terry Gates presented on Tuesday. I was surprised to see so very little of this in your list of references. It is a good thing to make theory but theory should not be made in isolation. Existing research and theoretical argument must be taken into account if progress is to be made. You may argue that you tried to do grounded theory but research and philosophical rigor demand that other related work be acknowledged and used to inform and clarify your own.

The second paper by Alan Stellings, entitled "Music Cognition Theory: the aesthetic legacy" presented a critique of formalist—(aesthetic) based music cognition theories. Alan essentially argued that a theory of music cognition cannot exclude or place in a subsidiary role performative, conceptual, emotional, or contextual aspects. Music must be interpreted within the broader context of the whole musical experience from which much of its significance is derived.

Alan, I applaud your careful analytic examination of Harold Fiske's ideas. Theories of music cognition can so easily take on a scientific guise that we may forget the foundation assumptions on which the theory rests. You point out some of these assumptions accurately and effectively. For example, you say that "approaching music cognition theory strictly from the point of view of the listener is due to a very specific Western cultural bias."

There are a few minor loose ends, however. For example, when Harold Fiske says 'tonal' does he mean tonal or sonic? Again, when you refer to "talking drums as musical tonal and rhythmic patterns," do you mean tonal or sonic?

You argue that the contextual aspects of music are part of the cognitive process. I agree with that but I see a somewhat worrisome conflict or contradiction arising in the contextualist approach which seems to assume it is really important to interpret or understand music correctly as intended by originating culture or context. Yet there appears also to be a constructivist assumption in this that each person constructs meaning within the individual context. Is it then not quite acceptable to listen to African talking drums and hear them and appreciate them as music? In Salina and Nancy's terminology we might see this as establishing a positive match for the individual but an incorrect one according to the originating culture.

Alan says specifically that "all sounds in music have historical and cultural implications which must be factored into their interpretation." This again assumes there may be a 'right' interpretation—the interpretation related to specific time and place. This means I suppose that we cannot just hear it as we hear it. We must hear it as intended. This reminds me somehow
of high school poetry class where I had to understand the form, the rhyme pattern, and every allusion the way the poet (or at least the teacher who thought he understood the poet) had it in mind before I passed the "understanding" test. I was not allowed to feel the patterns and words and sensations for the way they registered in my mind in my context. Rather I had to "learn about" and analyze and "read as" until I no longer enjoyed the poem at all. Are we in danger of requiring that of music? Or worse, are we in danger of coming to the conclusion, as Fiske does with musical syntax that, because I do not fully understand the originating context or the tradition of the practice, I cannot claim to understand the music at all? The conclusion one must reach then is that any enjoyment is of the wrong sort. In my opinion this line of thought underestimates the human mind and makes it nearly impossible for anyone to engage the music of another culture or subculture.

Another potentially misleading connection is the role of visual contextual information. Just because experienced individuals can identify Beethoven’s fifth symphony by the physical gestures does not mean they need have any experience with that specific music but they probably have to have experience with the connection between gesture and a rhythmic pulse. Acquaintance with the way motion relates to sound on a specific instrument is probably also important. Given familiarity with the sonic characteristics of Beethoven’s Fifth, the relation of physical movement to rhythmic pulse, and the characteristics of movement associated with a particular instrument, an individual would probably identify the piece when seen even if it were the first viewing. Overall, I believe Alan has made effective and worthwhile observations about the foundations of cognitive theories.

The third paper by Iris Yob is entitled, "Emotion in the Arts: A Case Study of Religion and its Arts for Educators." Being essentially a social and human scientist, I assumed a paper with this title might look at a specific individual or religion or work of art or school with case study methodology. That is not the case and I suppose you can use the term in other ways. Maybe there is a philosophical use of the term of which I am simply unaware.

Since this is a music education symposium I looked at this paper with that set of lenses. I determined that the essence of the paper says that the goal of education is to lead students to insight and awareness. The emotional elements of music can lead to spiritual insight into either the demonic or the divine, the human predicament or its sources of hope and courage. Perhaps this takes place as Bennett Reimer has described through the profundity of music (By the way, I was rather surprised at the omission of Bennett Reimer’s dissertation (1963), "The Common Dimensions of Aesthetic and Religious Experience" from the reference list.) I do think you add a significant ‘dimension’ to his discussion with your consideration of the sense of the numinous.

My first concern is that you limit yourself to a very narrow definition of the essence of religion. You can make that choice, but at the risk of limiting the application of your observation—in this context linking it strongly to aesthetic experience. The three religious
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philosophers selected identify the essence of religion as a particular emotion. Current writers in psychology of religion present a broader and more realistic view which is not incompatible with your central premise. Paul F. Barkman (1977) proposes that there are four modes of religious experience. He contends that various religious groups or denominations tend to use one of these modes of religious experience to determine the depth or intensity of the individual's religiosity. Individuals, however, tend to favour one religious experience over another in some relation to personality. One mode Barkman proposes is the one Tillich, Otto, and Schleiermacher describe (referenced in Yob). This is a feeling-oriented mode that is premised on a transcendent, wholly other, unknowable deity whose presence may be experienced as the 'mysterium tremendum' Otto describes. This sense, of being a mere worm in the presence of an infinitely powerful God, is desired by some religious groups. This experience, which is not unlike an "aesthetic experience," is usually created by means of art designed to create a unique meaning-world—great architecture, paintings, vestments, liturgy, ritual, music, incense, symbols, drama. It can, however, also be experienced in the perception of the sublime as originally conceptualized—the majesty and terror and awesomeness of nature as it might appear in the rugged mountains.

There is theologically, however, a polar opposite to this feeling—the experience of the immanent divine. This is experienced as the filling or possession by the spirit, the friendly relationship with the God who is a help and comfort and guide and support, or the mystical oneness with a God personally revealed through vision. This experience is frequently created or supported by repetitive, hypnotic music designed to induce trance rather than an artistic experience of profundity.

Barkman proposes a rational polarity with one mode being the verbal mode characterized by conscious belief. The religious experience does not consist so much in feeling as in cognitive acquiescence or allegiance to creeds, theologies, scriptures, or doctrines or mental engagement in the analysis and understanding of these verbal forms. Religious experiences of this sort are usually constructed through preaching or teaching or discussion of ideas rather than through artistically expressive forms. Music associated with this experience usually has text and the music is primarily a utilitarian carrier of the text—ballads of sorts.

A final mode of religious experience is the social-relational mode. In this mode it doesn't so much matter what you feel or believe as what you do. This is the active social gospel of the early twentieth century or the radical humanism of Hans Küng (1976). In this mode of religious experience it doesn't matter much what music you make but rather how and with whom you make it. Or music is seen to do what Bennett Reimer claims religious experience should do—make people more aware of their union one with another and with their common world.

I think a broader view of religious experience offers a more realistic interface for musical experience. I agree with Iris that music can create an experience that parallels or resembles or
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supports a religious experience. An experience that can masquerade as religious in itself can become 'religion' focused on the art work as divine as explained by Jacques Barzun (1975) in "The Use and Abuse of Art." But does it lead to insight? Does having a horrilipilating experience with music lead to insight or awareness, or is it the set of contextual conditions that created the experience that may lead to insight, or does insight and awareness have to be there first to make some sense of the experience?

Might the person with no knowledge of a god experience a sense of insufficiency in a great cathedral or on the edge of the Grand Canyon, and interpret it as "numinous"—that is, as spiritual? Perhaps. And perhaps it might also happen with music.

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WHAT DOES MUSIC EDUCATION WANT?

A RESPONSE TO MORTON AND HESS

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In locating myself, as we say, in responding to these two papers by Debra L. Hess and Charlene Morton, I offer my observations as one whose academic and professional identity has grown out of literature and literary criticism but whose primary discipline and first love have always been music. It is somewhat ironic that it should be feminist theory that initiates me into the discourse of music education, and that the trope of displacement—of women within music education and of music education within the curriculum—should be so prominent in these papers. For recently I have begun to think of my area of specialization in literature and literature education as a kind of self-displacement of my own intellectual passions, a kind of “safe house” to work out my ideas on the relationship between text and reader in ontological, ethical, epistemological, and now, especially with the advent of feminist theory, of course, political, terms. Long fascinated by Plato’s banishment of the poets from his Republic, I have been vitally concerned for some years now with justifications for literature in the curriculum, arguments which have, over the past decade or so, altered radically for me as they have tried to keep pace with the changing cultural norms and educational agendas that go to make up the curious blend of contemporary humanist and post-humanist values, as they apply to canon and curriculum. Underlying all this has been the quite heretical hypothesis—at least in most circles—that Plato might have been on to something in his idea that poetry can influence for ill as well as for good.

My trek from humanism to post-humanism has been characterized by my desire to preserve the tension between them. In my own work this journey has traversed the terrain from Northrop Frye’s conception of the educated imagination to what I have called the re-educated imagination. So I welcome the opportunity afforded me to speak from my own vantage point (as someone who left music professionally in part to keep it personally) on the issues raised here today for music education. My ideas about music in this paper will be interspersed with extra-musical digressions and interrupted by snippets of other voices culled from literary works and recent Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio programmes which I heard during its preparation. My response, then, is a sort of collage, which I created partly as a result of my attempt to connect these two papers and to pose some questions which they raise for me as someone whose predispositions about musical experience lie closer to Bennet Reimer than they do to Susan McClary, but as one who cannot ignore or dismiss her compelling analysis,
especially given my own efforts at a feminist critique of the literary canon and its implications for literature education. For me to perform gender criticism on literature, as I have been doing for the past few years, is one thing; but to commit it on music does seem to be taking things one step too far.⁵ So I undertake this task with the residual anxiety that I may not be quite prepared emotionally to ask the questions which the papers by Hess and Morton move me to ask intellectually and politically.

**Feminine Displacement in the Academy and in Music Education**

Debra L. Hess and Charlene Morton, each from differing perspectives, discuss the implications of music education as "the second sex."⁶ Even the presiding metaphors of their titles, "to scale the tower" and "to add and stir" themselves call up the categories "masculine" and "feminine": conquering heights evokes the phallocentrism of music studies as an institution while the "add and stir" of women's work conjures up the witches' brew of alchemical change, change that, as Morton rightly warns, is all too likely to perpetuate the status quo rather than portend anything like subversive activity.

CBC broadcaster Harry Elton on "Mostly Music":⁷ Jane Coop is a well known Canadian pianist; also a wife and mother. We will talk to her later [in the week] about how she manages to pack her busy schedule into one 24-hour day.

In her qualitative study of women in music education, Debra L. Hess pinpoints this problematic of "having it all," of balancing one's professional and private life, as a women's issue.⁸ Other topics covered by Hess relating to the sexual double-bind of women gaining acceptance and enjoying equality in music education range from pay inequity to the masculinization of female administrators, to the "queen bee" and "good girl" syndromes, sexual harassment, physical and psychic isolation, threats to personal and family relationships, the acute lack of mentoring and encouragement to professional development, barriers to advancement, such as fear of being thought of as "sleeping one's way to the top," the delegitimation of feminized modes of scholarship, such as collaborative research and child care, consigned to being a "woman's problem." (I am sure that there are those here who could certainly add to this list.)

Harry Elton to Canadian soprano Edith Wiens: "How much of the year are you away from home?" "You are married, I take it. Where did you find this lucky man?"...

Wiens: [later in the interview] "...Oh, I had my two sons with me all the time [that I was travelling.] Even [my] getting married made a lot of people angry. Are we really sure that marriage takes away from the single-mindedness of a career?... . I [do] have my housework done
for me and that's a terrific boon. There's someone there for the children when they come home from school... My husband [certainly] knew what he was getting into."

The displaced position of women in the academy is a huge topic paralleled by similar studies of women in related professional and educational fields as well as in the workplace generally. I recently read that Britain's Institute of Management has reported that "[f]ewer than one in ten managers is a woman." This represents a better showing than the one in 50 reported in 1974. Ironically, however, within the last year "the proportion of women in top jobs fell from 10.2 percent in 1992 to 9.5 percent."

Reports suggest that this is the start of a trend to the desertion by women of the corporate structure for private small business. Increasingly, in the private sector, as women have struggled to gain equality over the last two decades, they have unwittingly accepted a male agenda of long hours, short holidays and built-in inflexibility. Now that they have reached the top, they find...[that] wide pay gaps between male and female managers persist, and women are less likely to pick up company perks on their way to the top... [Now women seem to be] rebelling against an environment that prides itself on its macho image and makes the intricacies of juggling home and career almost impossible. Last year 4.5 percent of female managers decided to step down to pursue other options, with women under 40 twice as likely to resign as those over 50.

Counterbalancing this picture is evidence of the quite positive effects of affirmative action in the universities. In one of the spring issues of The Chronicle of Higher Education, we glimpse the social effects on the real lives of a married couple, junior English professors recently hired at the State University of New York at Buffalo. "He's white. She's half Chicana. He had one job interview. She had 14—and four offers," including Yale. Carrie Tirado Bramen chose SUNY Buffalo because it was the only institution that could "offer her partner a three-year instructorship." While acknowledging the heterosexual bias of this example, the number of un- and under-employed people of colour not being hired, and the possibility of there being a "let's-kill-the-two-birds-of-race-and-gender-with-one-stone" agenda as part of this hiring practice, I nonetheless want to notice how this vignette illustrates the interdependence of issues of canon and curriculum with those of levelling the playing field of English literature, where the impact of cultural studies and post-colonial scholarship on the literary canon and its implications for the profession has been seismic. Interestingly, in the article just mentioned, Dr. Tirado Bramen's specialization is not Hispanic literature but "the literature and politics of cultural pluralism in the United States from 1880 to 1935." From the perspective of the successful candidate, what makes her a "hot" research topic right now is its cogency in "asking different questions of a traditional period of study." The future of this sought-after academic will doubtless be conditioned, of course, by a whole history of uphill battles won by women in higher education; but she will discover that in a work environment predicated on the free market system, women's strengths often go against them and—to echo
Gertrude Stein's remarks about Los Angeles—"When you get there, there's no there there!" Women in academe are inevitably faced with the double-bind of what Kathryn Pauly Morgan has called "the bearded mother" syndrome [simultaneously having to be academically demanding and emotionally nurturing], what Paula Caplan has identified as the hidden survival traps of *Lifting a Ton of Feathers*, and the sobering awareness that traditionally "feminine" professional virtues such as accessibility, responsibility, and "caring" are rewarded mostly by increased numbers of students in desperate need of disalienation.

Now, we might well ask what any of this has to do with music or music education. Debra L. Hess does not indicate how her study is distinctive as a compilation of grievances of women in music education. We are left wondering why and how the political "landmines" she warns of might resonate differently from those lurking for women in other disciplines. Yet—and this is a point I wish to stress—it is Hess's emphasis on problems for women within the academic patriarchal hierarchical structure per se, one that becomes a double jeopardy in a "soft" subject such as music (as is also the case with literature) that connects her thesis directly to Charlene Morton's caution about the false security of "add and stir" solutions to the justification problem in music education. Morton understands very well that when you reclaim lost composers or re-evaluate found ones, you don't just get an add-on; as Paula Treichler observed about the literary canon in 1986, you can never simply annex "the variable of gender to a well-established tradition of [intellectual] inquiry."

The "add and stir" recipe articulated by Sandra Harding, as cited by Morton, has since been appropriated by curriculum theorists and given its most recent application by Karen J. Warren and Duane L. Cady in their feminist analysis of peace studies. For them, "add and stir" is not just a case of the whole becoming greater than the sum of its parts: it's a matter of the effects of the feminine exceeding itself and the very categories it seeks to supplement or supplant. As Warren and Cady write, sometimes "one cannot always fit women in... . When [what is added to] the basic beliefs, attitudes, values or assumptions [is]... conflict with those already in place, we are more likely to get a different substance—or an explosion—than a simple mixture. This is because what one is adding challenges the very conceptual framework already in place."

Charlene Morton's challenge to the conceptual framework already in place in music education is in part a challenge to solve the problems Debra L. Hess describes as issues that should not be regarded as extraneous to music educators' responsibilities. For Morton, the frill status of music in the curriculum is integrally bound up with the imperative to reconceptualize rationales of music education from a gendered perspective. It is only when remedying the fringe status of music studies finds its parallel in a similar redressing of the power imbalances in the educational hierarchy within which music education is conducted that any real change can take place in either domain. Current transformations in the social and political processes of higher education in English studies and cultural studies are now becoming integrated with reconceptions
of what we should teach and why. Charlene Morton is also asking different questions about a
traditional field of study, questions which for her promise to shore up the logical and political
inadequacy of current polemics about the why-music-is-good-for-you debate. Here I am
reminded of Northrop Frye’s remarks about Shelley’s *Defence of Poetry* \(^{18}\) and other such
historical and contemporary attempts at impassioned and much better reasoned arguments in
defense of art as a way of knowing: they are not likely to convince anyone in need of
convincing.\(^{19}\) These sermons to the converted presuppose a certain consonance in the very
premises of the opposing interlocutors (usually themselves of the cognitivist ilk), their apologias
limited by their incapacity to advance the argument on other than rationalist grounds. What, for
example, would an educational positivist make of Oscar Wilde’s justification for playing Chopin?
For Wilde, such music "creates for one a past of which one has been ignorant, and fills one with
a sense of sorrows that have been hidden from one’s tears."\(^{20}\)

The Defense of Music: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Educational Value

I would now like to move on to what I perceive as a rich paradoxical tension in Charlene
Morton’s paper between the intrinsic and extrinsic value of music. Her socio-political "stew"
reconfigures questions that hitherto have typically been used to counter the music-as-frill
argument—from presuppositions about the intrinsic moral, psychological, social, and educational
value of musical experience to those that insist on addressing the power imbalances that
perpetuate patterns of dominance within music education—and, I would add, those that feminize
education itself as a marginalized discipline within the academy.\(^{21}\) Inherent in Morton’s double
plea for a more inclusive and philosophically undiminished music curriculum is an implicit but
promising contradiction. On the one hand, the social relevance of the music curriculum is
inextricably implicated with the assumptions of a moveable canon in terms of what music is
taught. The very claim that the music curriculum needs to be changed in any way signifies that
content matters. Not just any music—particularly eurocentric music composed by dead, or even
almost dead, white males—it seems, will do. Thus students would be deemed to be able to
"relate" better to some music rather than to other music; some art music, for example, would
be seen to be unsuitable for some students. Such music might be seen to be impermeable,
inaccessible, taking on too much of the character of what Northrop Frye called "an alien
structure of the imagination, set over against [us], strange in its conventions and often in its
values."\(^{22}\)

Morton would probably reject, for example, the argument put forward by Jane O’Dea
in her defense of musical performance as *phronesis*, in which O’Dea argues persuasively that
musical performance itself becomes a training ground for virtuous conduct, that "excellence in
this field demands the exercise of a species of reasoning and judgement analogous to Aristotelian
practical wisdom, and develops the distinctive qualities of character and vision of the practically
wise person."\(^{23}\) On this view, what music is performed or its social context would seem to be
incidental to its educational value. Here doing "music alone" would be sufficient to the task, musical refinement of the sensibilities becoming a kind of moral education sui generis. But this collapsing of the moral into the aesthetic, which has pervaded arguments in poetic apologetics throughout the history of literary criticism founders on the onslaught of counter-examples, from the scores of dysfunctional personalities among the musically gifted to atrocities committed by the musically enriched, many of whom have fiddled while Rome burned.

On the other hand, Morton does appeal, at least indirectly, to claims about the intrinsic value of music, or, at least, to the idea of the fundamental integrity of music inasmuch as she implies that its educational value not be estimated in terms of music's subordination to extra-musical educational agendas, such as "themes" or "study units" within an "integrated curriculum." Yet Morton's dream for the dismantling of hierarchies in the curriculum devolves upon a curious kind of pedagogical hierarchy of its own—cadres of music specialists—those with insider knowledge, those who really know what they are doing in the discipline of music, those who have a true appreciation of what it is that music can do, not what music can reinforce in the other subjects or in the politics of schooling.

Morton describes a situation in which the decorative value of music in the curriculum is seen in much the same way that literariness is often judged to add a "human," "subjective," "pleasurable" quality, a "motivational element" to the "hard" disciplines, on the presupposition that poetry and music, those "soft" areas of human concern whose relationship to the proposition is indirect, are but glosses on the "hard sciences" and discursive prose, which are thought to "really mean what they say." Within this context poetry in its generic sense of "literature" becomes what Frye calls "a rhetorical analogue to concerned truth"; that is, its educational value is delimited by its allegorical function, thus reinforcing literature's instrumentality to conceptual thought and the mimetic quality of literature and the truth-of-correspondence theory of representation that have riddled the history of western literary interpretation.

Harry Elton to Edith Wiens after a recording of Wiens singing Schubert's "The Young Nun": "What is it that moves?"

Wiens: "What moves me is the human longing, what we don't want to define. The spirit is touched. It is the most blessed part of this profession. It makes a difference to the quality of life. Music needs to be made more accessible...."

Morton attempts to integrate music's intrinsic educational value with its extrinsic value by calling for music's liberation from its patriarchal underpinnings such that the musical inequities perpetuated by upper case music in a world of cultural pluralism be remedied at the same time that the solution works to eliminate patriarchy in the world. She doesn't tell us how this might be accomplished, but if she could solve the problem, she might also be able to explain why the Nazi commandant can listen to his Mozart and read his Goethe at night and go happily..."
Pythagoras’ Rib

to his work at the gas ovens in the morning. How this ethical dilemma addresses the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic value is still an open question. As Frye quipped when asked about the classic war-criminal example, thinking of the arts as having, transmitting, or being based on values is a form of social ego-massage. "The arts approached in that way, can add pleasure and refinement and cultivation and even some serenity to life, but they have no power to transform it, and the notion that they have is for the birds."

Edith Wiens: "I have colleagues who are rakes in the highest sense making the lewdest jokes backstage and then go out and sing like an angel. For me, music is a moral activity. I think about what that person in the audience out there might need. The answer is beyond my control, of course, but I know that my own position is at bottom a moral one—as a singer.

I applaud Morton’s multi-layered vision: for music to be inclusionary of currently marginalized musics, to enjoy equal status with other subject areas, and to claim for its pedagogy an expertise that affirms its integrity as a distinctive form of knowledge at the same time that it refashions musical apologetics such that music as a gendered subject becomes central to achieving these goals. But my question would be, What do music educators need to ask themselves in order to “have it all”? If the old boys club is not what women want, what, as a feminized discourse and practice might music education want?

Music as "Rhetorical Analogue": The Rib of Pythagoras

Sandra Harding’s three projects parallel the three waves of feminist theory in literary criticism of the canon over the past twenty years: excavation, re-evaluation, and theorization. Along with others, Morton has alerted us to the dangers of perpetuating patriarchy by essentializing the first two stages. But it is the importance of theorizing music and music education as the rib of Pythagoras, music as the emanation of Logos, as still being bound up with mimesis and bound to phallocentrism that Morton is stressing. "Music talk" is still very much tied to the analytic legacies of logocentrism in much the same way that "literature talk" was—until the advent of poststructuralism and postmodernism: the subject-object split, the sharp distinction between cognition and affect, and above all, the binary opposition between ordinary existence and imaginative experience assumed by western notions about the moving power of poetry and of music. Implicit in Morton’s paper is the need to genderize the discussion of the conceptual and ethical dilemma of how music educators can move from Music to musics without doing violence to either.

I have no full-blown musical theory on this, only what, for me, are difficult questions and some analogous precedents in literature and literary criticism. Frye framed the moral-aesthetic divide in poetry in its relation to referentiality, a problem which he regarded as "a central dilemma of literature. If literature is didactic, it tends to injure its own integrity; if it
ceases wholly to be didactic, it tends to injure its own seriousness." In 1938 Virginia Woolf made the same demands of literature and of higher education for women as we are now beginning to make in music education today. Also sceptical of "add-and-stir" solutions, Woolf waged her own polemic when asked to donate to a college building fund for women. In Three Guineas she wrote:

No guinea of earned money should go to rebuilding the college on the old plan; just as certainly none could be spent upon building a college upon a new plan; therefore the guinea should be earmarked "Rags. Petrol. Matches." And this note should be attached to it. "Take this guinea and with it burn the college to the ground. Set fire to the old hypocrisies. Let the light of the burning building scare the nightingales and incarnadine the willows. And let the daughters of educated men dance round the fire and heap armful upon armful of dead leaves upon the flames. And let their mothers lean from the upper windows and cry, 'Let it blaze! Let it blaze! For we have done with this "education!""

By declaring that educated women need not necessarily "follow the old road to the old end," Woolf modeled the new way, of course, on the personal as the political. Her cry, "Let it blaze! Let it blaze!" rose out of her recognition of the gap between word and world, a gap that has always marked the paradox of human consciousness itself. In "Let it blaze! Let it blaze!," however, Woolf also recognizes a certain hollowness in that cry, "as is shown by a moment's conflict with fact," that fact being the logical and material enmeshment of gender with consciousness. And so, Woolf ultimately complies and does "send a guinea to the honourary treasurer of the college fund," for her to use it, not to burn the house down, but to make its windows blaze for the dance round it by "the daughters of uneducated women."

One of the corollaries of logocentrism as gendered consciousness is its consignment of the feminine to the realm of the "natural" and its concomitant exclusion of the gendered—or otherwise "marked" subject from the world of the imagination. In literature this can be imaged as the silent Beatrice, the muse of Dante. Who might be her counterpart in music? St. Cecilia, perhaps, "Virgin and Martyr," as she is listed in "The Litany of the Saints." In what sense is the musical the political? In what sense is it not? To address these questions, we must figure out what to do with music's logo/phallocentrism. American composer, George Rochberg:

The string quartet is not a piece for four instruments. What emerges is a unity, a purity, a capacity for great energy, great strength. "It seems to have endless capacities for endless search.... [Beethoven's late quartets] take a certain kind of detachment from the immediacy of colour surface textures that are exciting to the ear to [those that are closer] to thinking about music... The composer [of string quartets] has to dig way down deep in himself and say things that he would never say with piano music. As Hector Berlioz said... 'For [Beethoven], as for Homer, the universe was clasped within his mighty soul.'

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Why "detachment from immediacy"? Why this fetishization of transcendence as the "going beyond" of the everyday? Why not inwardness as attachment to immediacy? Certainly inwardness is the very essence of the great "Cavatina" of the Opus 130 string quartet. And why the dichotomization of hearing from thinking, of the joy of sound from ratiocination? Surely because of received wisdom about the superiority of cognition over affect, of masculine over feminine, of eye over ear.

In *Anatomy of Criticism* Frye observed that "the rise of fiction and the printing press develop[ed] an increasing tendency to address the ear through the eye."\textsuperscript{36} The predominance of *opsis* (spectacle) over *melos* (melody), the accommodation by the ear to the visual structural pattern, has informed justificatory arguments for poetry in western high culture. From Sir Philip Sidney to Percy Bysshe Shelley to Northrop Frye, apologists for poetry have grounded their arguments in justifications for that element in poetic art which is primarily rational, and they have done so through an appeal to the visual and spatial containment of the imagination by the predominance of sense, as that which can be seen, over sound.\textsuperscript{37} This, it seems, is simply an inescapable corollary of literacy and its break from the oral tradition, which eventually gave rise to the lyric as the epitome of poetic language. The lyric literally turns its back on the speech of everyday life. Unlike music, in which the material cause of tonality differs substantively from street noises, that of poetic language, the "media of poetic imitation,"\textsuperscript{38} is the same as everyday language. In order for the difference between them to be intelligible, hearing is not enough; we must "see" the difference through a reversal of truth-of-correspondence. "In lyric, the turning away from ordinary experience means that words do not resonate against the things they describe, but against other words and sounds."\textsuperscript{39} Thus, while the sound of words might aspire to the condition of music, it can achieve that condition only when it has successfully overcome the dominance of the ear by the eye; only when contemporary readers are educated to a finer discernment of the lyrical within contemporary language will poetry be released from the didacticism of the descriptive and the expository into "an absorption of the poetic habit of mind into ordinary experience."\textsuperscript{40}

Even though music may be privileged by virtue of the difference between the "stuff" of its very making from the humdrum of mechanized social life, is it, nevertheless, afflicted with a similar problem to that of language? Has the advent of literacy so encumbered musical reception that nothing—in sound alone—can mitigate the discursive visual hegemony wielded by cultural studies and literary criticism? If McClary is right, that art music is inexorably tied to narrative\textsuperscript{41}; and, if Christa Wolf is right that this narrative, this "the blood-red thread of the *agon,*"\textsuperscript{42} is gendered; and, further, if greatness in music is framed in terms of distanciation in musical response rather than in immediacy, then I fear we may never escape the literal and metaphorical muscle-men described by Debra L. Hess, Charlene Morton, and the Director of the British Institute of Management. What might it mean to the justification for music education and to my life as a female academic who left music in order to protect my spiritual relationship with it that I need to continue to love and to play men’s music without compromising my
feminist analysis—and—what does it mean for me as a female philosopher of education who is supposed to be making distinctions, not collapsing them, to be worried about the knitting up of connections that I must perform in order to ameliorate the radical bifurcation of consciousness entailed in my loving music and loving life? In search of an answer I turn again to literature.

**Words and Music: Ideology and "All That Jazz"**

Toni Morrison’s novel *Jazz*, set in the U.S. in the 20s is, according to its book-jacket, "a dazzling act of... improvisation, moving seamlessly in and out of the past, present, and future, a mysterious voice—whose identity is a matter of each reader’s imagination....[Morrison] weaves this brilliant fiction, at the same time showing how its blues are informed by the brutal exigencies of "a racialized other." All of its characters are black. In the following passage one of the women reflects on the significance of jazz in her life. Alice Manfred

knew from sermons and editorials that it wasn’t real music—just colored folk’s stuff: harmful, certainly; embarrassing, of course, but not real, not serious.

Yet [she] swore she heard a complicated anger in it; something hostile that disguised itself as a flourish and roaring seduction. But the part she hated most was its appetite. ...a kind of careless hunger for a fight or a red ruby stickpin for a tie—either would do. It faked happiness; it faked welcome, but it did not make her feel generous,...

Later in the novel, the narrator meditates on the kinetic power of this music:

Under the ceiling light the pairs move like twins... sharing [their] partner’s pulse like a second jugular. They believe they know before the music does what their hands, their feet are to do, but that illusion is the music’s secret drive: the control it tricks them into believing is theirs; the anticipation it anticipates.⁴⁵

Throughout the book, jazz-playing becomes a trope for the gender struggles of the characters in achieving a kind of equality based upon unconditional acceptance of each other. For the women, the frenetic ubiquity of the music becomes a prison-house of their subordination, of their confinement to the survival level of the quotidian. Jazz functions not just as a representation of their oppressive exclusion from the male world of the imagination, but as an enactment of it by way of Morrison’s compositional techniques, her multi-textured interweaving of voices that defy categorization and even naming. By the end of the novel musical kinesis metamorphoses into an emblematic embodiment of mutuality; and music is freed, it seems forever, from being simply a "rhetorical analogue," a mere handmaiden to truth. According to the narrator, two of the main characters (there are no "prot-agon-ists"), Violet and Joe, move
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toward a reciprocal awareness, and they spend the twilight of their lives idling through the urbanscape.

A lot of the time, though, they stay home figuring things out, telling each other those little personal stories they like to hear again and again, or fussing about the bird Violet bought. She got it cheap because it wasn't well. Hardly any peck to it. Drank water but wouldn't eat. The special bird mix Violet prepared didn't help either. It looked just past her face and didn't turn its head when she tweeted and purred through the little bars of the little cage. But,... Violet is nothing if not persistent. She guessed the bird was lonely because it was already sad when she bought it out of a flock of others. So if neither food nor company nor its own shelter was important to it, Violet decided, and Joe agreed, nothing was left to love or need but music. They took the cage to the roof one Saturday, where the wind blew and so did the musicians in shirts billowing out behind them. From then on the bird was a pleasure to itself and to them.⁶⁶

Here the question, What does music mean?, becomes redundant as art and life merge in a poetics of ordinary existence. When John Shepherd asks, "what it is that our culture, publicly, does not want to communicate with itself about,"⁶⁷ perhaps one answer might be the proximity of the everyday, as in the excerpt above, to the "Cavatina" of Beethoven's Op. 130 string quartet. Two members of the Lindsey Quartet on the "difficulty" of listening to and understanding the Beethoven quartets:

Violist Robin Ireland:
I think [Beethoven is] seeking to integrate the heart and the head; the feeling world and the intellectual world. Certainly what he's attempting intellectually through his working with different structures, and so on, can be very complex. I personally have not found them difficult myself; there's always something which speaks immediately. On the other hand, as with any great art, they continue to reveal new secrets about themselves the more you get to know them; I don't think that ever stops. I can't imagine ever getting weary of a late Beethoven quartet.

First violinist Peter Cropper:
If you think that Beethoven's difficult, then isn't that true of anything in this world that is worthwhile? The more you work at anything, the more you give yourself, the more you receive.⁶⁸

Another perhaps less comfortable answer might be another question and its corollaries, which would be transposed from Toni Morrison's celebrated critical work, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination. In her reconsideration of the implication for American letters of the co-dependence of the Enlightenment with the institution of slavery,⁴⁹ Morrison juxtaposes her question, "How does literary utterance arrange itself when it tries to imagine an Africanist other?"⁵⁰ with her invitation to white readers to do a double-take on the transparency of the literary imagination as an innocent datum, to think within a different context about the

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significance of the fact that the "ability of writers to imagine what is not the self, to familiarize the strange and mystify the familiar, is the test of their power." 51 My question for music would then be, What conceptions of the "not-free" and the "not-me" might make possible and sustain the coherence of our assumptions about tonality and the self-intelligibility of music's moving power in western art music? 52 Arnold Steinhart of the Guarneri String Quartet and Peter Oundjian of the Tokyo String Quartet on the "Cavatina" of the Beethoven String Quartet, Op. 130, against the background of the "Cavatina":

"You know that the music is very powerful spiritually.... [The middle section] is really a further wandering on Beethoven's part into the spiritual world, I think, where it seems to me to be a reference to—questioning, [something] which doesn't really exist in the rest of the "Cavatina," which is completely at ease with itself. There's a sense of complete spiritual repose.... [In the middle, Beethoven's] just completely lost his orientation; well, it's just a remarkable thing. Then it returns to this beautiful "Cavatina," which is almost like a hymn of thanksgiving. It's such a magical moment; I find myself doing it almost without breathing every time I play it. 53

Is the state of beatitude evoked by the Beethoven "Cavatina" real for anyone who says it is? And—if so, under what musical—or extra-musical—conditions can that state be real for anyone else who says it is? What of Violet, Joe, and their bird, that non-human other, now no longer a rhetorical analogue to anything? Have music educators any obligation to address these questions? Perhaps distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic musical value obtain only within a patriarchal world order where the generalist can only be a facilitator of social utility; and the specialist, an accessory to the gatekeepers of transcendence. In order for music to help create what Maxine Greene calls "renewal of...a ‘common world,’" human beings live in but also "against their own life worlds and in the light of their lives with others, able to express, to call, to say, to sing. And, using their imaginations, tapping their courage, to transform." 54 In so doing, we espouse, but forgo, the expectation of wholly harmonious resolutions. Like Violet and Joe, we risk incommensurability with the other, and are gifted with sound over sense. To close, I borrow from Martha Nussbaum's thoughts on the educational value of literature: to lend "a more generous view of the ways in which we come to know ourselves." 55 Isn't that what music education really wants?
NOTES


5. This expression was attributed to Susan McClary by Roberta Lamb in the question period following Lamb’s paper, "Feminism as Critique in Philosophy of Music Education," The Philosophy of Music Education: International Symposium II, Faculty of Music, University of Toronto, June 14, 1994. In her Foreword to Catherine Clement’s book, Opera, or the Undoing of Women, trans., Betsy Wing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), McClary writes: "Are deconstructions of religion, language, literature, or philosophy feasible only as long as there is some secure place to stand from which to launch those attacks? Some place that is as reliable, authentic, and unmovable as the memory of the mother’s body? Music?

This argument goes a long way toward explaining the waves of disciplinary—and even interdisciplinary—hysteria that tend to greet most semiotically based analyses and attempts at music criticism. If we are not dealing with a psychological universal here (and I strongly doubt that we are), we at least seem to be tapping a much loved and cautiously protected myth" (xvi).


7. "Mostly Music" is a CBC morning radio programme broadcast weekdays from 9:00 until 11:00. It features classical music recordings, music criticism, and interviews with personalities prominent in Canadian musical culture. The date of this broadcast was May 12, 1994. All the excerpts in this paper involving Harry Elton and Edith Wiens are taken from this broadcast.

8. Hess, "Scaling the Ivory Tower."
9. Lest we be seduced into thinking that gender equity is well on its way to being won on North American campuses, recently Vassar illegally denied tenure to a female biologist because she was married. Ironically, the categories masculine and feminine turned themselves inside out in this case. The judgement stipulated that "Vassar, despite its protest that it advanced the cause of women,...has consistently shown prejudice toward its married female faculty in the hard sciences." Denise K. Magner, "Judge Says Vassar Discriminated Against Married Women," The Chronicle of Higher Education (May 25, 1994), A17.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


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31. Ibid., 36.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 83.


35. CBC Radio broadcasts on the Beethoven Quartets; "The Arts To-night," May 10, 1994, recorded from performances at the Vancouver Playhouse, Vancouver, British Columbia, which took place in June, 1993.


37. See Bogdan, *Re-Educating the Imagination*, chapters 1 and 2.


44. Ibid., 59.

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45. Ibid., 65.

46. Ibid., 224.


50. Ibid., 16.

51. Ibid., 15.

52. Juxtapose with this John Shepherd's persuasive case for the ideological underpinnings of the "key-note" as "the final attainment of power and control" in Western music. As the basis of "functional tonality" in Western music, the key-note literally displaces emotion, the body, and the experiential. "The key-note in functional tonal music thus articulates a false sense of freedom and 'democracy', because the attainment of the final key-note can only be achieved by controlling others and alienating them from their full power to exist in the world." *Music as Social Text* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1991), 140.


PLAY AND THE FIELD OF MUSICAL PERFORMANCE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE IN MUSIC EDUCATION

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PREFACE

Since I learned that I would be sharing my thoughts and reflections with you this morning at the end of what promised to be a long, but intellectually and emotionally rich programme, I have looked forward to this moment with a certain apprehension and trepidation. Heading my list of concerns was whether or not the idea of play would retain the same philosophical fascination as a path having the potential to enhance our understanding and practice as it did when I first began this study. As the week has progressed, this apprehension has gradually turned to anticipation as I realized that many of the issues that have led me to probe deeper and extend my own understanding of play were the same as those motivating much of our discussion here. Whether talking about topics as diverse as critical theory, profundity in music, music as community, the religious dimensions of musical experience, or gender-related issues, we have repeatedly spoken of music as a means of opening alternative ways of being, of self-other distinctions, and of a need to find ways to come to understand, respect, and honour different musical traditions and practices. I would like to present a particular perspective on these issues this morning by approaching the relationship between play and musical performance in a way which focuses attention on the musical voice, style as a form of musical ritual, and trust. While this perspective will be grounded in a study of the play element of musical performance, I would like to encourage you, given our discussions this week, to consider the implications of these ideas beyond the immediate context; I would like to encourage you, if you will pardon the "play" on words, to "play" with the ideas.

INTRODUCTION

In English and other Latin-based languages, it is not at all uncommon for the verbal forms of both terms to be used interchangeably. One, for example, can be described as both performing and playing a musical instrument or composition. While performing, one can also be described as playing with a particular musical style, idea, or performance technique. Both performance and play, moreover, are generally considered to be activities characterized by a deep concern for the quality and distinctiveness of the experience itself. There is in both activities an intense awareness of the present moment, an awareness which, as many scholars
including Francis Sparshott have observed, appears to bind mind, body, and action into a seemingly autonomous whole.¹ This paper seeks to explore the nature of this relationship further through a study of the field of musical performance and the ways in which this field creates a space for play. Musical performance will not be equated with or treated as a form of play; rather, the notion of what it means to play will be used to develop an understanding of the play element in musical performance.

Why musical performance and play? In Western thought, the idea of music-as-object has been central to the definition and practice of musical aesthetics as the philosophical discipline devoted to the study of the nature and value of music. The focus has its roots in Baumgarten's 1759 use of the term "aesthetics" to designate a theory of perception which viewed the immediate recognition or intuition of beauty as a form of knowledge.² Assuming a close connection between ascriptions of natural and artistic beauty, scholars turned to the structure of art objects as a means of better understanding and more explicitly documenting the specific nature and value of this knowledge.³ The focus has provided important insights into the forms and structures of music and the nature of our music listening experiences.⁴ It, however, fails to recognize that music-as-object is not a significant concept in many Japanese, Balinese, African, and Afro-American musical traditions, to mention but a few. It also fails to acknowledge that the early history of music, even in our own tradition, is rooted not in the concept of music-as-object, but in the practice of music-making.⁵

As an ever-growing body of anthropological evidence reveals, the earliest examples of musical activity grew out of the natural rhythms, sounds, and social interactions of daily living.⁶ While many sound sequences eventually became formalized and assumed a certain objective status through their association with particular festivities and ceremonial rites, musical value resided in their performance.⁷ Music was not something to be heard, but something made, something achieved through the active projection and elaboration of sounds at a particular moment and place in time. Given this history, and the celebrity status often ascribed to performers in our own time, a systematic study of musical performance seems as important to the development of a complete understanding of the nature and value of music as the study of music-as-object.

The relationship between musical performance and play represents a timely starting point for such a study in that recent developments in the theory of play have led music education scholars to locate one of the primary educational values of musical performance in the experience of self which the action of play affords.⁸ Our accounts of this value, to date, have assumed a primarily epistemological orientation, with scholars exploring and explicating the knowledge made possible through the intense absorption and experience of wholeness characteristic of both musical performance and play. The vocabulary and methodological concepts of field theory offer an alternative orientation, by turning attention to the nature and character of the action shaping the experience of self in both activities. Such an orientation can
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enhance our understanding in that while musical performance may create a space for play, it is more than play. If the profession is to structure learning environments and teaching contexts to maximize the educational value of this potential for play, it is important to understand not only the epistemological outcomes of play, but also how play can arise in and through the music-making constituting the action of musical performance.

I. Field Theory

Placing the individual’s constructions of the world at the heart of all experience, field theorists hold that the study of any domain of human experience is in part a study of the field in which the experience unfolds. Any situation contains more information and activity than could ever be usefully absorbed by a single individual. The field is that which determines what is of interest and significance at any given moment. It focuses attention, serving as a frame of reference or lens through which objects and actions may be meaningfully interpreted. It defines the physical boundaries of a situation, clarifies the different forces at work within those boundaries, and enables the identification of those aspects of the situation over which an individual has some control. The field, as such, creates a space in the sense of a potential for action. To understand the nature of the action, one must understand the formal parameters and character of the space in which it develops.

In all domains of human experience, the potential for action shaped by the field can be thought of as a composite of three interlocking spaces. The first space is that part of the physical world taken up by the body and through which the body moves. The second space is the invisible and intangible space where thought takes place, what David Burrows has described as the stoic pneuma or the Cartesian res cogitans. The third space is that of the will or spirit. As Paul Ricoeur would describe it, it is the space which defines an individual’s self-hood, that sense of same-ness or self-identity which permeates and encapsulates all awareness. The formal parameters of the field distinguishing different domains of human experience are defined by the forces which connect the three spaces. The character of the composite space is shaped by the particular way in which they interact to create a different experience of self.

II. The Field of Play

Play as a domain of human experience encompasses a wide variety of activities varying in degree of complexity and social organization. At one end of the continuum is the seemingly free and spontaneous activity of the young child, who under the distant but watchful eye of a supervising elder, is intent on stacking and subsequently destroying a tower of blocks. At the other end of the continuum are the highly structured, competitive game forms such as chess and
basketball. The field, in each instance, creates a space in which the goals, pressures, and forces constraining action in ordinary experience are temporarily suspended. The suspension seems so complete in many instances that some scholars have suggested that the field of play creates an illusionary or alternative world. The field, however, does develop in the same physical world as ordinary experience and attaches meaning and significance to real objects and individuals.

Three forces are generally believed to determine the specific formal parameters of the space created by the field of play: human potential, ritual, and trust. Human potential, in its infinite diversity and mystery, defines the focus of the player’s characteristic absorption in the manner in which the experience is unfolding at any given moment, be it a simple physical capacity discovered by chance or the product of several highly cultivated intellectual, physical, and/or social capacities. Ritual defines a process through which this focus achieves the singularity of purpose necessary to give the field a feeling of containment or closure. In Huizenga’s words, ritual brings order and structure to the field, specifying through the repetition and stylization of action which are its essence, the physical boundaries of the space in which play unfolds and the goals and rules through which it develops. Trust maintains the formal integrity of the field. It provides a framework through which the actions of others may be interpreted, by establishing a belief in a common motivation and detailing the degree of freedom and variation allowed in the interpretation and realization of the goals and rules defining that motivation.

Field theorists define the binding power of each of the three forces in terms of the resistance or pressure experienced as the outer parameters of the space for action created by the field are approached. Central to the player’s experience of otherness (be it an object, teammate, or member of the opposing team) as the activity of play unfolds, this power varies with the structure and social complexity of the particular form of play. In the case of the young child intent on stacking and destroying a tower of blocks, ritual is secondary to human potential and trust. While the stylized arm movements which are characteristic of such play intensify the child’s focus and bring to the field, through repetition, a certain order and structure, the specific space for play is a product of the child’s physical capacity and the bond of non-intervention established between the child and the supervising elder. The length of the child’s arm, for example, limits the ways in which the blocks may be stacked. The child’s understanding of the supervising elder’s concern for his or her well-being defines the limits of the energy that may be used to destroy the tower. In the more highly organized, competitive game forms like chess and basketball, however, human potential and trust are secondary to ritual. The stylized mannerisms, habits, and traditions through which the focus of the field is intensified are not a consequence of some capacity, as with the child’s arm movements, but rather define the particular way in which that capacity may be used. Trust follows insofar as the colour of a marker or uniform indicates an acceptance of the rules of play and provides some insight into the particular motivation of the players.
III. The Character of Play

Field theory locates what play scholars define as the playfulness of play in the dialectic interplay of feelings which initiates and sustains play. While the field of play creates a particular space or potential for action, the motivation to act is grounded in a feeling of power and control on the one hand, tension and uncertainty on the other. Play begins with a captivating awareness or recognition of a capacity to make something happen. It continues through an exploration of the limits and strength of this capacity, with challenge sustaining the initial captivation in such a way that each moment hangs on the success and failure of an action taken and the promise of a continuing capacity to act in light of that success or failure. The challenge may be a product of the player's own initiative or it may be built into the structure of the activity itself. The young child in the previous illustration, for example, will frequently explore the power of the forces defining the formal parameters of the field of play, testing in particular the bond of non-intervention by varying the amount of energy used to destroy the tower once the novelty of his or her initial interest begins to fade. In more organized forms of play like chess and basketball, the challenge is a product of the competition distinguishing the play as a game. While "play begins and ends at pre-defined moments," it is all "movement, change, alternation, and succession," as it progresses. The rules define the type of actions that may be taken and sometimes the sequence of events, but it is never clear exactly how other players acting within the field will respond. Moreover, different players will bring to the field different strengths and strategies which may not have been encountered before.

The feeling of power and control which enables action in the face of the uncertainty engendered by challenge can have several sources. At the beginning of play, it may be the product of a chance discovery which, through an accompanying sense of amazement or wonder, seems to instantaneously transform the player's experience of self as having the capacity to make something happen. It may also be grounded in the acceptance of the rules of play. The rules of play, as Kenny explains, are voluntarily accepted, and as such, liberate the player from the sense of self constructed through the pressures and forces constraining action in ordinary experience. At the same time, the rules define a structure which gives the player a sense of what he or she is actually free to do. When challenged, this structure generates a feeling of control, while the feeling of liberation creates the freedom or space to explore the different routes through which the desired outcomes may be achieved, routes which might not normally be travelled in ordinary experience.

As play continues to unfold, this initial momentum can be sustained and enhanced in the face of continuing challenge through a sense of achievement (success or progress) and/or connection experienced as the self moves inward and outward within its own space, forward and backward within its own time. The inward movement enables self-reflection, providing a vantage point which allows the self to see his or her actions as an observer or viewer looking in from the outside. The outward movement enables the self to look through his or her actions
and see those actions as "response to others in their own terms." The forward and backward movement defines the horizon of the field. It enables the self to experience the given moment in light of actions taken when play first began and in light of actions which might be taken at some other point in the future. Assuming a corresponding outward movement, it also enables a sense of connection or identity with other players, past, present, and future, who have achieved or will achieve under similar circumstances. Addressing what Albert William Levi has described as the different dimensions or faces of self, each movement can in and of itself lead to the chance discoveries which often initiate play. As such, while the field of play defines a contained and confined space, play itself creates an open and expanding space which offers opportunities for exploring new ways of being. It is this potential that has led many play scholars to describe the dialectic interplay of feelings that defines the playfulness of play as a formative process, a matter of self-discovery and self-definition.

IV. Play and The Field of Musical Performance

Musical performance, like play, unfolds in many different contexts varying in complexity and degree of social organization. At one end of the continuum is the seemingly free and spontaneous music-making of the musician who, like the young child playing with the blocks, appears to perform or sing by him- or her-self and for him- or her-self. This can include, to note but a few examples, the seemingly random strumming of the guitarist or folk singer deep in private reflection, the free musical improvisations of a sitarist immersed in the rhythmic lilt and energy of a structurally simple folk tune, and the song-like activity of a child struck by the colour or turn created by a particular combination of sounds or words. Towards the other end of the continuum are the more highly structured forms of musical performance involving, like chess and basketball, a group of performers working together and/or an essential interaction between performers and audience. In either instance, the music-making may be improvised or grounded in the performance of a previously composed work such as a concerto or a Javanese ceremonial rite. Audience participation can vary from a distanced "listening" stance to dancing, praise, worship, communal fellowship, and so forth.

In all instances, the field of performance creates, like the field of play, a space or potential for action which appears to temporarily separate the performers and their activity from the goals, pressures, and forces constraining action in ordinary experience. In the Western art music tradition, for example, celebrated artists like Glenn Gould, Eric Leinsdorf, and Maureen Forrester have spoken eloquently about the way in which they enter into the musical world of a work while performing. Members of the Guarneri String Quartet have described how performance requires them to put aside their own personalities and convictions and let the energy of their collective efforts be channelled by a force which supersedes the sum of their individual potentials. In more improvisatory traditions or settings where performance is the result of
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a more spontaneous type of social interaction, performers speak of a feeling of spiritual elevation or a movement beyond the here and now.34

This feeling of separateness is the product of a sense of containment or closure often brought to the field through ritual. The physical isolation and layout of the Western concert hall, for example, enshrines the performers' space by ritualizing the different routes taken by performers and audience as they pass from the outside to the inside and gradually prepare for the intense silence of the inner sanctum where the music will actually be made and heard.35 In the Japanese kabuki drum tradition, performance is preceded by meditation and an elegantly choreographed preparation of the drum.36 Completed before the drummer enters the performance area, and thus lacking any theatrical function, the ritualistic preparations are designed to focus attention and help the drummer achieve a spiritual calm through a celebration of the aesthetic quality of the drum. Thai and Javanese musicians achieve a similar focus through the ceremonial music used to announce that a performance is about to begin. The overture, according to Wong and Lysloff, has through ritualistic repetitious over the centuries come to "initiate an unspoken contract" which interrupts the everyday flow of time and transforms musicians' and audience's sense of "being in the world."37

Regardless of the specific means by which containment and closure are achieved, the field brings about the experience of wholeness characteristic of performance by appearing to blur the sensations and perceptual boundaries distinguishing the body and mind making music and the instrument through which that music is heard and articulated.38 All other things being equal, performer and instrument are experienced as one, with the valves, strings, keys, bow, or vocal cords seemingly organically fused to the fingers or body parts which control them. As Merleau–Ponty notes, it is as if performer and instrument are symbiotically tuned to one another, each affecting the other as parts of a system that collectively demonstrates the property of mind.39 The field in group performance forges a similar symbiotic relationship between different performers within the ensemble. While performers have their own individual spaces, the boundaries distinguishing those spaces are blurred by an awareness of the activity of the ensemble as a whole. Driven by a common goal, the performers work together as one, with each individual action tuned to and affecting the actions of all others.40 Similar relationships may also be developed with an audience, particularly where the music-making serves a purpose beyond itself which links performers and audience through dance, praise, worship, and so forth.41

The focus of the field of performance is determined by the musical voice or persona which emerges as performers symbiotically tune themselves to their instruments and/or the musical activity of others working within the same space.42 The intense absorption in the given moment similar to that created by the field of play is grounded in an interest which focuses the performer's attention on the ways in which the different technical, aural, interpretative and other related musical skills brought to the field may be used to make music. The musical voice
determines the specific focus of this interest in that each performer brings to the field a personal history of past musical and life experiences which affects how the performer approaches his or her instrument and the way in which he or she forges relationships within the field. A particular sensitivity to melodic counterpoint, for example, will affect how a conductor approaches the music of Wagner. The choices made by an improvising sitarist, in turn, will vary with the performer’s command of the instrument and his or her knowledge of Persian folk idioms. The essential character or quality of the music-making will not change in either instance, merely the type of options open to the performer at a given moment. The musical voice, as such, should not be confused with the different skills through which it works. While the interest defined by the musical voice may assume a technical, aural, or interpretative orientation depending upon the specific needs of the moment, it is not the skills themselves which are the focus of attention, but those skills in relationship to the music being made, in the terminology of play, a potential or capacity to make music.

The formal structure and boundaries of the space in which music may be made are to a large degree defined by the stylistic conventions and performance practices distinguishing different musical styles. Although musical style is frequently interpreted by Western scholars as an attribute (or a collection of attributes) of a musical product—the performance or the musical object shaped and elaborated in and through performance—musical style functions in performance much like the goals and rules of play by defining an approach or way of making music. Stylistic conventions, in particular, detail musical goals and the general conditions under which those goals may be achieved. Experienced as norms, they specify how sounds ought to be shaped or sequenced by focusing attention on particular tonal colourings, structural nuances, formal configurations, performance techniques, social interactions, and/or cultural meanings. Performance practices, in turn, furnish a body of interpretative strategies which detail the different ways in which the rules stipulated by stylistic conventions may be applied or utilized in the specific context. As Jane O’Dea notes, they function as aural exemplars, illustrating not only the possibilities of a performing medium, but also the means by which the performer may select, from a range of possibilities, the action most appropriate at any given moment.

The power of stylistic conventions and performance practices as field determinants lies in their status as forms of ritual. As our own history reminds us, musical styles have been and continue to be shaped across time through the actual act of making music. Particular conventions and performance practices are not decreed or imposed, but rather follow from an individual performer’s and community’s recognition of the musical value of some particular way of shaping or sequencing sounds. These actions have come to assume what can best be described as a life or existence of their own through their continual appropriation and adaptation in much the same way that the stylized actions at the heart of the child’s play isolate or set apart the arm and its capacity to make something happen. This "setting apart" represents what Erving Goffman describes as a form of consecration in that, with time, the original actions come to
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assume a new identity and importance through their association with a larger body of related musical achievements.\(^4^7\)

Where the rituals shaping musical styles bring order and structure to the field of performance, trust maintains its formal integrity. In the Western art music tradition, where performance is driven by the concept of a musical object or work created by a significant other, the primary bond of trust is forged through the musical score. Extending the horizon of the field to make the presence of the composer felt, the score demands a commitment on the part of the performer to the musical object (or experience) envisioned by the composer. In some jazz improvisatory traditions, trust is forged through a pledge of allegiance to a tune. As the anthropomorphic characterization underscores, its acceptance as "head" expresses an intent to be guided by and true to a particular musical structure. In still other traditions, trust is established through a commitment to a particular construction of musical time created through the layering of different rhythmic cells or motives as music is actually made.\(^4^8\) In all instances, like the relationships formed in play, the bond establishes a belief in a common motivation and the means through which that motivation may be achieved. It also details, again as in play, the degree to which the performer’s musical voice is free to interpret the stylistic conventions and performance traditions defining those means.

As was the case with the forces shaping the field of play, the power of the musical voice, ritual, and trust in terms of the sense of otherness (resistance, pressure) experienced as the outer parameters of the field are approached varies with the particular form of performance. In relatively free or spontaneous improvisatory traditions where the sitarist, strumming guitarist, and captivated child make music primarily for themselves, the individual interests of the performer’s musical voice are particularly strong. Where the music-making involves a group of performers and/or an essential interaction with an audience, the voice is often secondary to musical ritual and trust. The stylistic conventions and performance practices governing the performance of Japanese traditional music, for example, are explicitly articulated with a precision and specificity which requires the individual interests of the musical voice to be judiciously masked.\(^4^9\) In other traditions, such as the cadenza characteristic of the Western art concerto or vocal aria, the strength of the bond of trust follows from an equilibrium in which the musical voice has been granted full reign within certain stylistic and structural parameters. In all instances, however, whether the music-making is isolated or socially-oriented, the presence of each of the forces must be felt to some degree or another if the action is to be recognized as musical performance and not evolve into or be reduced to the making of noise.\(^5^0\)

V. Musical Performance and The Character of Play

With the fields of musical performance and play focusing attention and creating a space or potential for action through compatible processes, the field of musical performance can be
understood to create a space for play when the motivation to make music is grounded in the dialectic interplay of feelings which initiates and sustains play. Put another way, musical performance can be considered playful to the extent that the act of making music creates an open and expanding space which offers opportunities for self-exploration and self-definition. In explaining this potential, one could begin simply by noting that musical performance challenges, that it involves, like any form of human experience, moments of tension and uncertainty which question whether or not the performer will be able to achieve that which is desired. One could then go on to demonstrate how acceptance of the stylistic conventions and performance practices defining the way in which music ought to be made in a particular musical tradition, can, like the rules of play in such moments, engender feelings of power and control, a sense of being able to act in a way that will be found to have musical value. The approach has merit in that it identifies a dialectic interplay of feelings similar to that defining the playfulness of play. By not exploring the specific character or nature of the action of musical performance, however, the approach fails to explain or demonstrate how this dialectic interplay motivates the self-exploration and self-definition at the heart of play.

To this end, one might begin, as countless others motivated by characterizations of musical performance as techne or craft have done in the past, with the different instrumental and vocal techniques through which musical sounds are produced and shaped. The approach locates the action of musical performance in the sequencing and co-ordination of various intellectual skills and physical gestures. While such activity is an essential part of musical performance, the "tuning" metaphor evoked by Merleau-Ponty suggests that the real action is ultimately grounded in a movement which requires the performer to reach out and open him- or her-self to the musical possibilities inherent in the given situation. In other words, it is a matter of creating and sustaining a musical voice or persona through which the "mind" forged by the field of musical performance as performers symbiotically tune themselves to each other and their instruments can speak. The field of musical performance, as such, can create a space for play to the extent that this action motivates or encourages the performer to explore new ways of being.

This having been said, it becomes immediately apparent that the challenge initiating play in musical performance is not a matter of a tempo marking or an expressive indication which requires the performer to extend his or her technical facility in order to perform faster or softer. While play may enhance or lead to the development of a variety of different skills, the ability to perform any one of those skills, or to perform it better, in and of itself, does not necessarily affect the musical voice or the reaching out through which the performer begins to shape it. If the field of musical performance is to create a space for play, the music-making must challenge the "tuning" of the performer. It must redirect the focus or interest of the musical voice by transforming or bringing about a re-ordering of the different technical, aural, interpretative, and other related musical skills through which the musical voice was originally shaped.
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The way in which such challenges are manifested depends to a large degree on the original focus or interest of the musical voice and the power of the voice, ritual, and trust as field determinants. In the Western art music tradition, for example, where the bond of trust established between composer and performer often allows a small space in which the performer's musical voice may assert its individuality, the challenge may come from an unusual harmonic twist or fingering pattern which opens the performer to certain contrapuntal or motivic nuances missed by a primarily melodic interest to that point in time. In Japanese traditional music, where as previously mentioned stylistic conventions and performance practices are extremely precise, it may manifest itself in an instrumental colour which reveals a slipping of the mask used to disguise the individual interests of the musical voice. In certain Indian drum traditions, on the other hand, the challenge emerges not in the specific patterns or musical sounds being shaped and projected by a performer, but in the way in which the repeated shaping of those patterns leads to a feeling of discontinuity or unexpected connection as interjections and commentaries are improvised by the drum master.

Whatever form or identity the challenge may assume, it alone is not enough to sustain play. As the movement through which the performer reaches out and opens him- or her-self to the possibilities of a given situation evolves into play, the music-making must maintain a feeling of power and control while simultaneously suggesting avenues for further exploration. Given that the challenge initiating play questions the "tuning" of the performer, the feeling of power and control can be achieved through a growing sense of "fit" or re-connection. This experience can create the open and expanding space necessary for exploration in a variety of ways, depending upon the specific formal parameters and the horizon of the field. A sense of fit in terms of a new found capacity to link melodic motives, for example, may, through an inward movement of self, lead the improvising sitarist to re-shape the structural understanding of the Persian folk-tune motivating his or her music-making. Where the music-making involves a group of performers, the actions of others may, through an outward movement of self, lead the performer to refine his or her tuning by tempering a tone colour or melodic nuance. A sense of connection or identity with past performers who have achieved under similar circumstances, in turn, may lead the performer to experiment with other techniques for which those performers were noted. In each instance, the discovery must renew the captivation engendered by the initiating challenge if the performer is to feel free enough from the constraints and focus shaping the original interests of the musical voice to actually explore new ways of being.

VI. Implications for Music Education

Having identified how the field of musical performance can be understood to create a space for play, the question to be addressed now is so what? As I have observed on other occasions in the past, the value of any philosophical exercise lies ultimately in its capacity to expand our vision and help us to see old and familiar things in ways which will inform and
improve the practice of music education. Upon reflection, I think that the ideas explored in this paper have done that in several important ways. To begin with, the concepts and methodological focus of field theory have enabled us to explore the action of musical performance from the inside. Consistent with the importance attached to music-as-object in Western thought, other approaches in the past have typically adopted a stance which looks in on performance from the outside or which explores its action only in terms of a final product. Such approaches, particularly when dealing with the musical traditions of cultures other than our own, have often detailed what performance ought to be about, rather than what it really is. If music education is to help students learn to actually make music in performance, we need to understand what constitutes the action of musical performance and the forces defining the parameters and character of the space in which it unfolds. The idea that the field of performance is defined by the musical voice, stylistic rituals, and trust, begins to develop this understanding in a way which both "honour" and "celebrate," to borrow Roberta Lamb's words, that what it means to make music in performance varies from tradition to tradition. The model, as such, not only enhances our understanding of musical performance; it may also prove useful as a starting point for both meaningful dialogue and curriculum construction as the ever-changing fabric of our society forces us to come to terms with the concept of multi-cultural education.

The understanding afforded by the model also has specific instructional applications. Historically, the concept of music-as-object has had as much impact on the content and practice of music education as it has had on Western thought generally. In performance settings, in particular, it has frequently led us to treat the musical score as a physical representation of a musical object created by a composer. The interpretation has, in turn, led us to develop teaching strategies and reading methodologies which emphasize compliance and "correctness," often at the expense of developing the performer's individual musical voice. The idea that the action of musical performance is ultimately grounded in a reaching out movement through which the performer forges and sustains a musical voice reminds us of the importance of addressing both. To this end, the relationship between the score and the bond of trust essential to the integrity of the field of performance may prove a useful instructional tool. It can help us, on the one hand, to free the performer from the idea that the score is the musical work. It can, on the other, encourage the play through which the musical voice is often developed, by helping the performer understand, that as in all relationships forged on trust, performance can create a space in which the specific parameters or limits of that bond may be explored and tested.

As to how music education can shape and sustain this space for play, the ideas explored in this paper turn our attention to the challenge initiating play and the character of the open and expanding space which it creates. Recognizing the link between musical performance and play, David Elliott has admirably articulated the instructional value of challenge as a tool for stimulating musical growth and the self-exploration and self-definition at the heart of play. Application of this idea, however, is more complicated than it would seem at first glance, in that not all challenge will necessarily lead to play and in that play "to order," as Hans and Huizinga
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remind us, is not play. If play is to evolve within performance, challenge cannot be imposed on a performer, but must arise from within the act of making music itself as the performer reaches out and opens him- or her-self to the possibilities of the given situation. The challenge initiating play for different performers, moreover, will likely vary, as previously noted, with the power of the various forces shaping the parameters of the field of performance and the particular focus or interests of the given musical voice. This being the case, the task of music education is two-fold. If the challenge is to have any hope of initiating play, we must first develop instructional strategies and approaches which not only teach the various skills and techniques involved in performance, but which in so doing nurture an openness to musical possibility. Having achieved this openness, we must then structure performing situations which have the potential to re-direct the musical voice in a variety of different directions, while at the same time engendering the feelings of liberation and control which motivate the performer to explore the value of the re-direction.

Our task may be facilitated by making a sharp distinction between the teacher as authoritarian figure and the teacher as musician. While feedback is essential to the music learning process, a stance in which the teacher simply corrects "errors" provides little or no space for the students to actually make music. We need to see ourselves as musicians working together with the students towards a common goal, by creating a field which encompasses the perspectives and capacities of students and teacher alike. Our experience may give our musical voices more power as field determinants, but that power should be used as a means of increasing the breadth of the students’ focus and the range of possibilities open at any given moment, rather than as a means of asserting control or specifying what the musicians should do.

The idea that the conventions and performance practices distinguishing different musical styles are forms of ritual can prove helpful in this process in three ways. First, by recasting musical style as an approach to making music, it can direct the performer’s attention outward to particular aspects of the music being made as actions, as things that could be done at a given moment. Second, it can make the presence of professional performers, past, present, and future, felt within the field. This presence can lead to the sense of connection or achievement which sustains play, while at the same time providing opportunities for the chance discoveries and captivation initiating play. Third, but by no means least significant, it can help students become actively involved in the construction of the field of performance. Although classroom performance is often treated as distinct from and preparatory to musical performance in the "real world," what differs is not so much the nature of the music-making, as the size of the field in which the music-making unfolds and its permeability in terms of its capacity to enable performance in a variety of different forms and stylistic contexts. The concept of ritual can provide a means of expanding this field, by first encouraging students to be open to and aware of the achievements of each other, then by defining a process through which the value of those achievements may be explored.
To this end, much of our work as teachers will likely be done at the outer parameters of the field. As previously noted, the power or strength of the various forces defining the boundaries of the space in which music may be made is experienced by the performer as a sense of resistance or pressure as the boundaries are approached. This resistance or pressure is central to the performer’s experience of otherness, and as such, a potential means of challenging and re-directing the musical voice. As ritual is used to shape the field of performance within the instructional setting, we can manipulate the boundaries of the field to encourage this experience of otherness as a means of helping performers become aware of various musical achievements and the possibilities of certain types of musical actions. This manipulation can be effected through our own performance, both in terms of the actions we initiate and those arising as response to others as the music-making continues to unfold, and through the repertoire and musical activities in which we ground instruction. Both should provide opportunities for the performers to be able to actually make music in a meaningful way. Both should also encourage the various inward, outward, backward and forward movements of self which sustain play.

As we evaluate student growth and consider how the parameters should be manipulated, however, we must be careful not to define achievement solely in terms of innovation or individuality. The development of the musical voice is not simply about finding a way to sound different than others, but rather of learning to forge relationships within the field of performance, of learning to symbiotically tune oneself to one’s instrument and the musical actions of others working within the same space. Each voice will by definition have certain individual traits, but what is of ultimate importance is not the identity of those traits, but the way in which those individual traits can be used in a particular context to make the best music possible. In some musical traditions, the balance of forces shaping the parameters of the field give the voice considerable space to assert its individuality; others do not. As we create learning situations which encourage play, we must respect these differences and ensure that play arises in and remains grounded in the field of performance.

NOTES

1. This idea, for example, can be found in the writings of philosophers such as Heraclitus, Plato, Nietzsche, and Sartre. Karl Groos, in The Play of Man (New York: Appleton, 1901), 79–83, was one of the first to formally observe the connection between the unified exercise of mind and body in the play of the young child and in artistic creation and production. In Gods and Games (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1970), 139–41, David Miller traces the relationship back to the Greek word, aisthesis, meaning body-knowing or seeing, to seeing with the whole body. Francis Sparshott makes similar observations in Off the Ground, First Steps to a Philosophical Consideration of the Dance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 397–98 and "Aesthetics of Music: Limits and Grounds," in What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music, Philip Alperson, ed. (New York: Haven Publications, 1987), 35–91.
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2. Susan McClary traces the focus back to the dichotomy created in Platonic accounts of music which explained music in metaphysical terms relating to the acoustical properties or structures of the heavenly spheres, while at the same time acknowledging the ethical power or effect music had on the listeners. See, "The Blasphemy of Talking Politics During Bach Year," in Music and Society, Richard Leppert and Susan McClary, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 13–63.


4. Recent examples of the continued primacy of this focus can be seen in the writings of Peter Kivy and in Philip Alperson's "The Arts of Music," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50, no. 3 (Summer 1992), 217–30.


7. It should also be noted that while there came to be a clear distinction between musica-poetica, the art of composing, and musica-practica, the art of sounding out, the practices and traditions defining musica-practica as an art had a significant impact on the structure of music-as-object. See, Carl Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music.

8. See, for example, David Elliott, Music Matters and "Music as Knowledge," and Eleanor V. Stubble, "Musical Performance, Play, and Constructive Knowledge: Experiences of Self and Culture," Philosophy of Music Education Review 1, no. 2 (Fall 1993), 94–103. Other educational values ascribed to performance have treated performance primarily as a means to an end, as either a motivational tool or as a path to musical understanding. See, for example, Israel Scheffler, "Making and Understanding," (State University Press, 1988), 65–78; Bennett Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989).


10. W. McWhinney, Of Paradigms and Systems Theories (Fielding Institute, 1989), 54.


15. D. W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971); Israel Scheffler, "Reference and Play," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 59, no. 3 (Summer 1992), 211–16; Richard Schechner, *The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance* (New York: Routledge, 1993); James S. Hans, *The Play of the World* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1981). All argue against the notion the play creates an illusionary or alternative world, claiming that such descriptions fail to capture the sense in which play or the potential for play can be understood to pervade all human activity. Anna K. Nardo, in *The Ludic Self in Seventeenth-Century English Literature* (New York: Suny Press, 1991), 48, uses the phrase "in between" to achieve a balance, writing "Play is in between originating in the space between self and other,...It is double, allowing the player to stand simultaneously inside and outside his own actions, as both actor and framer of the action. The idea that the field is a composite of three spaces, one defining the physical space in which the self acts, one the mind, and the other, the will or spirit, helps to explain the apparent dichotomy.

16. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, 54–55; Nardo, *The Ludic Self in Seventeenth-Century English Literature*, 47–48 and 116–17. Huizinga makes the same claim in *Homo Ludens*, 13, but he frames the concept as representation, that is to say, that play allows the performer to display something naturally given (For further discussion, see Eleanor Stublely, "Musical Performance, Play and Constructive Knowledge: Experiences of Self and Culture"). Representation, however, assumes a focus from the outside of the field. The intent in this paper is to explore the action of play and performance from within the field.


18. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*. Trust is at the heart of Huizinga's claim in *Homo Ludens* (12) that play is characterized by a feeling of "being apart together."

19. This is derived from Maurice Merleau-Ponty (*Phenomenology of Perception*) and W. McWhinney (*Of Paradigms and Systems Theories*). The field is constructed and maintained by the individual actor or player. The space it encompasses, as such, is in many senses, an action taken by the self. Consequently, anything beyond its parameters is experienced as outside the self. The degree of resistance or pressure felt is a product of the actor's or player's sense of being able to control whatever it encounters. The more pressure, the more a sense of otherness.

20. This connection between human potential and ritual is why so many early theories of play (including those of Plato, Groos, Lange, and Edouard) viewed it as a form of preparation for adult life. For a summary of these positions, see David Miller, *Gods and Games*, 243–56.


22. As Csikszentmihalyi puts it, the player needs to feel that there is some possibility of success, either on the short or the long term, if the player is to overcome the fear associated with uncertainty and the unknown. See, *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), 33–37.


24. Winnicott details the role played by chance discoveries well in *Playing and Reality*. Hans (The Play of the World 7) notes that "one falls into play," that it "cannot be forced."
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25. Kenny, The Field of Play, 82. Many authors, including Millar, Cailllos, Huizinga, and Hans Armgut, argue that play is not play if the rules are forced on the player. To engage in playful activity one has to be willing to give up the ways of the world.

26. This is one of the reasons why Maureen Mansell ("Dimensions of Play Experience," Communication Education 29, no. 1 (1980), 42-53) argues that play is one of the processes essential to creative problem-solving.

27. This idea is developed from Alber William Levi's observations in Mervin Lane (ed.), Black Mountain College: Sprouted Seeds (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990). I have chosen to use the word achievement in lieu of the word success which I have used in earlier sections of this paper to avoid the association with "winning" which the word success of ten elicits where play arises in competitive games. Achievement can be simply a question of having done one's best, of having made progress, or of having seen a route or possible path to be explored which had hitherto been unnoticed.

28. I borrow the words from Nona Lyons, "Two Perspectives on Self, Relationships, and Morality," Harvard Educational Review 53 (February 1983), 127, who, like Carol Gilligan (In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Woman's Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), describes this experience of self as "connected." I have used this idea in my previous study of the relationship between play and musical performance, but Albert William Levi's ideas enable extension to accommodate the experience of connection on a variety of temporal horizons and thus more fully explicate the many different ways in which feelings of control, power, and liberation are experienced in and through play.

29. He describes the backward perspective as heritage, the forward as creativity, the inward as self-reflection, and the outward as self-revelation in intersubjectivity.

30. To name a few, for example, Kenny, The Field of Play, 83; Nardo, The Ludic Self in Seventeenth-Century Literature, 48, 119; Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 53.

31. My description of this continuum follows from Francis Sparshott's observation that for some musicians performance is a matter of interacting with a work or musical sounds as a living organism; for others, it is a matter of an interaction between self and other performers or an audience. ("Aesthetics of Music: Limits and Grounds," in What is Music?)


36. For a description of these ritualistic preparations and their importance, see William Malm, Six Hidden Views of Japanese Music (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 24-34.

38. I will use the term "instrument" throughout to indicate both the singer’s physical voice and musical instruments such as the French horn and sitar. Some would argue that the two experiences are fundamentally different in that the singer’s voice as a physical organ is already within the singer, but instrumentalists frequently describe their instruments as organs or physical extensions of the body. Singers, in turn, describe their voice as "an instrument" and speak of it as a separate part of their being. These differences can be explained by a slightly different interaction between the mind-body spaces in different types of musical performance.


41. Performers, for example, respond to the energy and excitement of dancers moving to the music being created. Indeed, in some traditions, the music is described as that which arises form the interaction of dancers and performers, not the sounds being created by the performer, and to which the dancers move.

42. The use of the term musical voice is derived from Charles Hartman’s work, *Jazz Text Voice and Improvisation in Poetry, Jazz, and Song* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) and my own work with the nature of the reading process motivating performance in the Western art music tradition. For further details, see note 41. It is consistent with the image of mind invoked by my earlier reference to Merleau-Ponty in that the mind linking body and musical instrument must have a voice through which to speak. My use of the term, in this sense, is quite different from David Burrows usage of the notion of voice in *Sound, Speech, and Music*. He uses the term primarily in the physical sense of the sound produced by the instrument. I use it in a much broader sense to refer to the way in which the performer uses the particular colour or capacity of the instrument to actually make music. The sound itself must also be recognized as a product of a “tuning” process, each performer’s physical characteristics and approach to the instrument producing, even in isolation, a slightly different tone or timbral colour.

43. Indeed, a performer can have limited technical facility, but a strong musical voice. Often when we criticize a performer for having limited technical facility, it is because there appears to be no bond or connection between performer and instrument, making the field of performance seem fragmented or torn. This chasm affects the action in the same way that a break in the turf of a football field would threaten the "game" in football.

44. I discuss these different orientations and their connection to the musical sounds being shaped and articulated at a given moment in, "Musical Performance and Reading: Experiences of Self and Work," paper presented at the 1994 Biennial MENC Convention, Cincinnati, Ohio.

45. The roles or musical persona assigned to different members of a gamelan orchestra, for example, limit the ways in which the performers may interact; samba and rock musical styles define different approaches to rhythm and musical time; etc.


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48. As, for example, in certain drumming traditions in Ghana where ensemble togetherness is maintained between the improvised calls of the head drummer and the subsequent ensemble dialogue through a steadfast allegiance to the construction of time created at the beginning of the performance. Conversation with Joseph Rasmussen, "Hearing the Drums Talk" (April 1994).

49. Given the individual characteristics of the musical voice, however, different performers must do this masking in different ways. The musical voice, as such, still plays a role. See, Akira Tamba, "Aesthetics in the Traditional Music of Japan," The World of Music 18, no. 2 (1976), 3-10.

50. Even the spontaneous improvisation of the young child involves some form of ritual, even if that ritual, like the stylized actions of the young child at play, is develops in and through the music-making itself and is not a product of a long history of culturally grounded music-making. One should be careful not to confuse knowledge of particular stylistic conventions and performance traditions with the processes through which those conventions are shaped.

51. The concept of challenge is superficially applied in my "Musical Performance, Play, and Constructive Knowledge: Experiences of Self and Culture" and in David Elliott's "Music as Knowledge." Both articles, however, were initiated from an epistemological perspective which sought to demonstrate how one could know about or of self through action.

52. Such characterizations, however, are frequently erroneous interpretations of the idea of techne as it was explicated by Aristotle and others following in his footsteps.

53. As recent work by Hedden, Sundberg, Gabrielson, and others demonstrates, sequencing and co-ordinating can involve a variety of aural and interpretative skills, as well as the physical know-how necessary to lift a finger or sustain a note for four beats. See, for example, the studies of expert performances by J. Sundberg and W. Thompson in Psychology of Music 17 (1989).


56. Hans (Play of the World, 12), for example, notes the "one falls into play." He goes on, "It cannot be forced; one can only provide the openness it requires." The term "to order" is used by Huizinga in Homo Ludens, 7.

57. When considering the repertoire, we can consider the musical and technical difficulty of given works in terms of the ways in which they require the performer to reach out, and style. It may be that introduction of different musical practices at different points in the performer's development may encourage different movements of self in specific directions.

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MUSIC, IMAGINATION, AND PLAY

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Johan Huizinga, in his book, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture*, maintains that civilization itself "arises and unfolds in and as play."¹ His objective is to determine to what degree culture bears the character of play. To this end he begins with an examination of play and identifies various elements that seem to characterize it and then explores these elements in relation to culture. His approach offers a starting point for the question I wish to investigate here. To what extent does musical experience bear the characteristics of play?

The association between play and music is long standing with its genesis perhaps antedating Apollo and the Muses. From ancient Greek civilization to present day, play has maintained a prominent position in the philosophical literature. Plato, Kant, Schiller, Froebel, and others have set forth theories of play affirming its importance in culture, the arts, education, and the good life. Among psychologists, Jean Piaget, Jerome Bruner, Erik Erikson, and Elliot Eisner, to name a few, have investigated the role of play in the cognitive development of children. Since the time of Schiller, play has claimed a central position in aesthetics as John Dewey, Hilde Hein, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Francis Sparshott, and others confirm.²

Schiller and Gadamer write about *Spieltrieb* as a play impulse which characterizes the aesthetic. Kant states that the free play of imagination and understanding is the productive power of the mind and key to aesthetic judgment. Schiller, following Kant, joins the sensual and the intellectual through play. Pestalozzi employs a sense of play in his object lessons as does Froebel in his collection of "Mother Play Songs." Huizinga identifies humankind as *Homo Ludens*, and Piaget attests to the development of symbolic understanding as originating in the symbolic nature of childhood play.

Among the arts, one plays an instrument, in poetry the reader enjoys the play of words and the contradiction of paradox, painters work with the play of light on canvas, musical works display the play of motives, and audiences attend the theater to see a play. The imagination at play may be a highly intellectual experience as in listening to Bach’s *Goldberg variations*, or complete fun and fancy as in Prokofiev’s *Peter and the Wolf*.

Both Abraham Schwadron and Keith Swanwick identify common elements between play and musical experience. In his analysis, Schwadron focuses on four such elements: seriousness, imagination, disinterestedness, and pleasure. Swanwick, drawing on Piaget’s research, centers on three aspects of play which he finds evidenced in the musical experience: mastery, imitation,
and imaginative play. Donette Littleton and Joe Frost suggest some applications of play theory to the teaching of young children. While this research is illuminating, what music education lacks, writes Swanwick as he echoes Schwadron, is a theoretical framework or underpinning in play theory. I suggest that the precise nature of the relationship between play theory and music merits more penetrating examination.

There seems to be no agreed upon definition among these writers. Artificial antitheses are sometimes established such as that between work and play. Characteristics are opposed that are not necessarily antagonistic, such as, "play is fun, not serious." The word, "play," itself is sometimes used indiscriminately as both noun and verb, or it is employed literally and figuratively without distinction.

John Dewey describes play as not mere amusement, but a mental attitude. He holds that play and work are falsely opposed. The difference between the two, Dewey maintains, should not be based on the presence or absence of imagination, but rather on a difference in the materials with which one is occupied. Play as a way of knowing is an exercise of the imagination, central to education, and I emphasize, to music education. Yet in spite of all the literature through history on the importance of play in learning, the concept of music as play seems to suggest something frivolous, lacking in seriousness, and consequently peripheral. Sparshott and Kingsley Price flatly reject the idea that the arts might be described as play.

Huizinga acknowledges that music bears all the elements of play, but then fails to establish that such is the case. He locates the connecting link between play and music "in the nimble and orderly movement of the fingers" displayed by instrumental musicians who refer to their performance as "playing" noting that the term is never applied to singers.

In spite of its limitations respecting music, the advantage of Huizinga’s analysis of play is its breadth and scope focusing on connections or relationships and degrees of similarity, rather than a categorical and dichotomous all-or-nothing approach. Huizinga views the play experience in relation to other human experiences particularly culture, language, poetry, cognition, and play-forms in art. He regards the play experience, as I do the musical experience, a multi-faceted phenomenon with several participants. Just as children, adolescents, and adults engage in play with commonalities and differences among them, composers, performers, and listeners participate in the musical experience in ways both similar and distinct.

Depending upon the model of play one selects, divergent views of its origin, formal characteristics, and its consequences result. I favor an approach such as Huizinga’s because it avoids the pitfalls of any reductive analysis of play such as Spencer’s surplus energy theory, Csikszentmihalyi’s notion of flow, or Groos’s view of play as preparatory exercise. However, as I shall demonstrate later, his view that play steps out of ordinary life is in error, and his analysis of play in relation to other human experiences contradicts this position.

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Before embarking, it is important to set forth several assumptions I hold respecting play. Everyone may engage in play; play is not limited to children. Games, such as sports, contests, cards, and the like fall within the purview of play. Play may include, but is not limited to physical activity. My interest rests then with a consideration of at least four areas that I view as central in play and music: the role of imagination, the thought processes involved, the symbolic aspects, and the participatory nature of each. Today, given time and space considerations, I shall focus only on the importance of imagination in play keeping in mind that this is a part of a larger piece for a future writing.

**IMAGINATION**

Imagination animates play and may very well be the essence of play. Vygotsky views play as imagination in action, Pauly suggests that art and play live in imagination, Lieberman and Groos attest to the centrality of imagination in the play experience, and Radar contends that play unfolds in imagination. Imagination is central in musical experience too, whether that be composing, listening, or performing.\(^6\) But how does imagination function in the play experience and what relationship is there between its role in play and in music? These questions are the focus of my investigation.

Elsewhere, I suggested a theoretical framework for the functioning of imagination in music drawing upon a continuum of imagination that Vernon Howard describes as moving along at least four points beginning with fantasy, imagining the nonexistent; imagining what exists but is not present; having an image and imposing it on something, imagining X as Y; and ending with perceiving things in general and recognizing them.\(^7\) I use this continuum of imagination in investigating the role of imagination in play and music. Imagining the nonexistent and imagining what exists but is not present I designate as two facets of Fantasy Imagination. Having an image and imposing it on something, that is, imagining X as Y, I specify Figurative Imagination. Literal imagination encompasses perception and recognition and is grounded in the sense world. These are not types but facets of imaginative activity that function both separately and in combination in play and musical experience.

**Imagination: Fantasy as Making Present the non Existent**

Imagination in the play experience may occur as fantasy, make-believe, and magic, envisaging events and things that do not necessarily exist in the "real" world such as fairies and monsters. It includes a young child's pretend play as well as simulation.\(^8\) For example, a decoy duck looks like a real one; an actor may speak and gesture like a real king. But no matter how realistic, the simulation is not real. Whether it be Disney World or *Star Wars*, children and adults may pretend or fantasize in many ways. Fantasy in play embraces possibility and is
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linked to creativity. The creator of the movie, Star Wars, imagined creatures and places that do not exist; a painter depicts a tree unlike any that lives in nature. This element of play, imagination as fantasy, is important or one is limited to a view of imagination in the play experience that merely represents or substitutes for aspects of the perceivable world. Imagination in play is productive, not merely reproductive.

Imagination functioning as fantasy in play maintains similarities in the musical experience. Composers write a new melody never before heard, or develop a new method such as Schoenberg's dodecaphonic technique, or a new timbre as in the Bartok String Quartet No. 4, Allegretto pizzicato movement. Each of these illustrates a sort of fantasy as the composer plays with an idea and eventually brings it from image to external reality.

Fantasy imagination in play is also evident in performing and listening experiences. Performers and conductors invoke fantasy imagination to suggest new and different ways of presenting a work. Opera singers live in a play world of fantasy, myth, and magic as they give life to a character or situation. The listener may respond with imagination as fantasy in such works as Mozart's Die Zauberflöte, Wagner's Der Ring des Nibelungen, Weber's Die Freischütz, Debussy's Prelude a l'après-midi d'un faune. For the very young child Dukas' Sorcerer's Apprentice is a magical play world, and in Prokofiev's Peter and the Wolf a particular melody becomes Peter walking through the woods. Anyone may experience music as play and magic.

Imagination: Fantasy as Making Present the Absent

Another way in which imagination functions in play is to make present things that do exist in the "real" world but are not available. The child imagines a shark swimming through the playroom, drinking tea out of an empty cup and even stirring in cream and sugar, or riding a rocket ship to the moon. Such imagination enlivens play and brings to it things that the child does not have. There is a kind of illusory quality about the experience in that the given object is present in such a way that even an observer is able to identify it, and yet it is not physically there.

In the musical experience, one might compare a kind of imaginative presentation of melodies, songs, or some larger musical composition. These sound events are "heard in the head" though not immediately sounding in the "real" world. Kodaly's concern for the development of "inner hearing," Gordon's notion of audiation, or reading a score without performing it parallel this imaginative activity of making present the absent.

At a more sophisticated level of play, what Kant terms Gedankenspiel, parody, improvisation, and quotation come to mind as other ways of making present the absent.
Fifteenth and sixteenth century parody masses, the Peanuts’ songs for the coming of the great pumpkin, and the children’s opera, Goldilocks and the Three Bears are examples of parody.\textsuperscript{14} Making present the absent joins with the earlier sense of fantasy as imagining the non existent in improvisation where performers draw upon known melodies but treat them in original ways. Quotation also seems to join these two facets of fantasy imagination. In the Symphonie Fantastique, finale, Berlioz uses the melody of the Dies Irae in an original context; other composers have also quoted the Dies Irae in various musical settings. This quotation brings the Requiem Mass to the mind of an informed listener, a kind of making present the absent.

In the case of the performer, imagination enlivens memory. Mere memory seems lacking in vitality and needs this function of imagination, hearing what is about to sound but not yet present, to add interpretive nuances.\textsuperscript{15} Howard suggests that in practicing imagination functioning as fantasy may enable a performer to break through barriers such as overcoming a technical problem.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, there are illusions created in performance such as the speed of a gallop and the restfulness of a lullaby, illusions of shape in rounded endings, high and low points of a phrase, illusions of intensity, of loudness and softness, and the like. Opera especially provides illusions of space and time as the listener is challenged to respond with imagination as fantasy.

In both play and musical experience, imagination functions as fantasy. It is not limited to children but applies to adults as well and may extend beyond conditions identified here. Fantasy imagination may be operative throughout the musical experience of composers, performers, and listeners depending upon context.

**Figurative Imagination: Imagining X as Y**

Yet another way in which imagination seems to function in play is to present a certain image or vision of one thing and impose it on something else as a kind of transformation of what is present. E. H. Gombrich reports that a child rides a broomstick imagining it to be a hobby horse.\textsuperscript{17} When imagining X-as-Y, thumb and index finger may become a gun, the pencil an airplane, or the doll a baby. Toys particularly function in this manner. Adult play bears many similarities. In Mardi Gras parades, adults may imagine their float to be a castle, or themselves heroic, fighting figures out of history. This phase of imaginative activity is often described as noticing an aspect, "seeing as" or aspect perception, that is, imagining X-as-Y where Y is a recognizable aspect of X. The game of charades, played by people of all ages, exemplifies "seeing as" in that a person demonstrates some recognizable aspect of another and the audience is expected to guess the character.

Figurative imagination especially encompasses metaphoric relationships. Howard Gardner and Ellen Winner studied young children’s ability to understand metaphor. Results of
their research showed that children are unable to grasp a metaphor and instead interpret it literally. A difficulty with this study is that all examples used by these researchers were linguistic, but they misdirect their findings to other "humanistic disciplines." In the play experience, I suggest, metaphoric competence is of a different order, more akin to the metaphoric relationships found in music, that is, metaphors that are not necessarily linguistic.  

Feeling in the play experience like feeling in the musical experience is exemplified metaphorically. When children play house, one might be the baby of the family and cry, another the angry parent who chastises the rebellious child. The feelings are distinct from the joy and fun that a child may be experiencing personally during play. Langer writes that such a notion of feeling, imagined but not necessarily felt, is a difficult and perhaps strange concept to understand. Yet this is common in a child's play experience. In fact, if personal feelings intrude and the child actually cries, the emotion may disrupt or destroy the spell of the play experience. Huizinga refers to such an occurrence as the act of a spoil sport.

Similarly, the performer expresses the feeling which the music symbolizes. Like the child at play, the artist directs and guides the feeling rather than being controlled by it or out of control because of personal emotion. The feeling that a work is expressive of is not necessarily the same as that experienced by the composer when writing the music. For the listener too, hearing a work as expressive of sadness is distinct from feeling evoked and subjectively experienced.

Further, the listener might imagine X-as-Y, a composition as exemplifying theme and variation form, or as representative of something such as the meowing and hissing of cats in Ravel's "Love for Two Cats," or the characters in the Mother Goose Suite. "Hearing as" also applies to timbre, the oboe as nasal; or color, the tone as bright; a minor key as sad; or a timpani roll as thunder. Perhaps one reason why audiences enjoy hearing the same work performed many times and by different artists is that each performance offers different aspects of the work that engage our imagination.

Listening to a particular musical selection may invoke visual images; or a visual image may suggest a kinaesthetic one. Voice teachers frequently use images in a kind of X-as-Y, such as throat-as-open, to achieve a particular sound. Figurative imagination is also found in theory classes where students may be requested to hear a cadence as deceptive, a dominant seventh chord as a German augmented sixth, or a passage as modulating with a chord as a pivot.

Figurative imagination also encompasses paradox. The Renaissance in particular saw paradox as a form of adult play especially loved by the philosophers. While paradox is unresolvable contradiction, through imagination one can mediate the opposition.
Figurative imagination functions through paradoxical experiences in music too. Consider for instance the use of leitmotifs where the orchestra contradicts what a character is singing. In bitonality or polytonality, one hears two or more keys in opposition. Rhythmically, the opposing duple against triple suggests another illustration of a kind of musical paradox. Both play and musical experience, then, seem to involve imagination functioning figuratively in seeing or hearing one thing as another.

**Literal Imagination: Perception and Recognition**

The role of imagination in perception and recognition is well grounded. Concept formation in particular depends upon possession of an image against which any particular instance is compared and perceived. One has an image or concept of trees or "treeness," for example, against which any given tree is likened and recognized. Unlike ordinary life, in play almost anything is possible as one suspends disbelief and accepts that which, outside of the play experience, might be labeled foolish or absurd. On the other hand, toys are selected with some interest in their relationship to observable, recognizable structures. Even the broomstick bears some similarity to a horse; yet ambiguity is present as well. Imitation necessarily connects to the real as in playing house or playing school where recognized elements of perceivable, ordinary life are brought into the play experience and mingled with fantasy and other functions of imagination.

Literal imagination is grounded in the sense world and is particularly common to games and competitions with rule-guided action. When one is playing chess for example, a person must imagine a certain strategy and alter it as necessary, anticipate an opponent's moves, and observe the rules of play. Each of the chess figures represents something or someone specific and can be moved only in conformity with rules. The imaginary situation invoked is that of a war. The goal, of course, is to win the battle, but to do so one must know the rules of the game, be able to apply them, and possess some amount of ingenuity and imagination in devising strategy. In general, other games as well as competitions, including sports such as football, require a similar set of abilities. Some are formal and highly intellectual, may demand specific physical skills on the part of the players or contestants, employ judges, coaches, and referees, and may even require a dress code.

The role of the spectator varies from that of one fully informed about the game to the person with little or no experience or knowledge. The result may be various levels of involvement in the play experience from total absorption to complete boredom. We make an imaginative investment in the game and value what engages our imagination. Play with respect to games involves imagination functioning literally in that the play is grounded in the sense world, we are aware of the aims and rules of the competition. Even though the game has such
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rules of order, a certain rhythm to it, and a spirit of cooperation and competition, it contains an imaginary situation.27

Such play also functions within its own specified spatial and temporal considerations, both real and imagined, as demonstrated by the playing field or the game board, the playing time and time out. For spectators as well as players there is a unified experience until time out is called and the whole scene changes. When play resumes, there is again a dynamic, forward movement both spatially and temporally. Although much of the movement is planned, there remains an improvisatory element. Because an opponent’s moves cannot be absolutely predicted, or the situation totally within the contestant’s control, the player is sometimes forced to change plans or to improvise moves on the spur of the moment.

Literal imagination in perception and recognition is grounded in the sense world in the musical experience as well. This penchant for literalness is exemplified in music theory and history assignments where one identifies a composer, work, style, or certain elements in a work, as well as various symbols. Symbols used in music, in the score for example, are somewhat like toys in play. They are used because they have commonly recognized referents. Yet ambiguity maintains in their interpretation. Musicians know the meaning of crescendo, but how each performer presents that crescendo may vary.

Like games, music is rule governed. Sharps and flats raise or lower notes by a half step, meter signatures designate specific time values, and clefs determine absolute pitches. Music composition assignments, at least in some situations, require the proper resolution of various chords and the avoidance of parallel fifths and octaves. For performers including conductors, certain performance practices are the norm for works of a given era. The conductor is like the manager of the game, performers have their coaches, and black, formal attire is the typical dress code of most orchestras.

On the other hand, some aspects of games and contests are more free. The notion of improvisation is liberating, like the spontaneous response of an opponent in a game. Aleatory suggests a somewhat unpredictable experience much like that of the gambler in a game of chance. Time-out seems to occur in the musical experience through the use of ritard, accelerando, or fermata, after which playing time resumes at the designated tempo. The idea of one side playing or contending with the other in a complimentary fashion is exemplified in the antithetical character of antiphonal music. Finally, choral and band festivals as well as major competitions like the Prix de Rome present a sense of contest that can be traced from ancient Greece to the Olympic games of today.28

The highly intellectual element may be a game in itself, a kind of kind game, presenting another way in which literal imagination is operative in the play experience. The recognition and perception of wit and humor engages imagination. Huizinga equates wit with a certain
sagacity of the mind and traces it to ancient Greek civilization. The poet’s play with words, as in puns, satire, and riddles, is not just a metaphor according to Huizinga, but precise and literal truth where words are used with definite purpose and idea and reality are united in imagination. Humor, likewise, suggests a similar sort of imaginative activity as witnessed from the early troubadours, minnesingers, and court jesters, to contemporary stand-up comics including such notables as Victor Borge.

Consider for a moment the third movement of Prokofiev’s *Classical Symphony* No. 1, Op. 25. One might find in it playful, intellectual games such as surprise, humor, satire, and even a kind of musical punning. Early music presents various sorts of intellectual games: the fourteenth century isorhythmic motet, the *caccia*, the fifteenth and sixteenth century complex canons, parody masses, *quodlibet*, and the like. Mozart’s String Quartet in C major, K. 465, opens with strong dissonances that are certainly surprising for the music of its time. The Sextet (2 violins, viola, bass, 2 horns) in F major, K. 522, which Mozart titled, *Ein musikalischer Späts* (A Musical Joke), represents for me a form of satire on compositional techniques, fugue, development, cadenza, and cadence. Humor is illustrated by the *fausse reprise* in the Haydn String Quartet, Op. 20, No. 1, first movement; or the *Farewell Symphony* No. 45, in which groups of musicians gradually conclude their parts until only two violins are sounding; and surprise in his symphony of the same name with a sudden, crashing *fortissimo* chord. Satie satirizes impressionism, demonstrates wit and humor with various directives to performers, and sometimes notates without barlines. On the other hand, there is the complex intellectual *Gioco delle coppie* (Game of Pairs), second movement of the Bartok Concerto for Orchestra which Bartok himself considered a jesting movement. In all of these examples, I have deliberately selected so called "absolute" music to make the point that these works are understood intellectually through imagination without reliance on text or program. Numerous more obvious examples of "program" or "representational" music could be cited as well.

There is yet another sort of imaginative activity that spans the various functions of imagination already discussed. Play, writes Huizinga, is set apart from ordinary life sustained in a sphere of activity with its own boundaries of time and space. Imagination as it functions in the spatio-temporal aspects of play and its relation to concepts of time and space in the musical experience merits consideration.

**Imagination: Spatio-Temporal Considerations**

Play occurs in virtual or imagined space and time, a space and time outside that of ordinary life, but, I suggest contra Huizinga, it also takes place in real, physical space and actual clock time. Music, like play, demonstrates a dynamic interplay of real and imaginatively perceived space and time. These concepts have been touched upon already in the discussion of
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playing fields, playing time, and time-out. But other similarities and differences maintain as well.

With respect to physical space, one finds the playground or space set apart for specific play activity, but there also may be other spaces that become play areas on a temporary basis, such as the sky that transforms to playground for a hot air balloon show. Music similarly, from podium to pit has its playground, segregated physical space set aside for playing music: the band room, choral room, studio, the first chair, as well as the physical space through which the conductor draws sound images. But like the sky for the balloon show, the city street corner or the park on a summer evening may become a temporary play area for the community chorus, a jazz group, or symphony orchestra. There is also an acoustical space through which sound waves travel. Parallels are easily drawn between music and play respecting the notion of real, physical space as playground.

Virtual space occurs at many levels in the child’s play. A small room may represent the ocean upon which a ship is sailing. In addition, there is the space or distance over which the boat travels during its voyage and the sense of space within the ship itself where captain and crew carry out navigational procedures. None of these levels of virtual or imagined space need conform to the conditions or dimensions of actual, physical space.

The notion of virtual or imagined space as playing field may be described on several planes of the musical experience. First there is a perceived illusion of movement through space. Examples include the notion of harmonic space, the distribution of chordal structures as closed or open, and intervals which suggest distance. Monophonic music seems to take less space than polyphonic. The flow or movement of music is not a physical phenomenon in the sense of something actually displaced from a given spot to another location. Instead, musical movement is illusory, an appearance of movement. Melodies may ascend or descend; key relationships may be near or distant. There may be yet another notion of space, such as that of the wide open prairie that one feels in some of Aaron Copland’s works, and spaces suggested by programmatic works, to say nothing of the myriad spatio-temporal relationships evident in opera.

Similar parallels may be drawn regarding the concept of physical or clock time and virtual or imagined time. The child’s ship may take ten minutes to complete an ocean voyage. Or a trip to a geographically close location may extend through two days of real play time because the fun is in getting there, not in arriving.

The concept of time in the musical experience may also be viewed as clock time and imagined or subjectively experienced time. The performer brings the musical composition to sonorous expression in time. A particular musical composition may require ten minutes of playing, that is, clock time and yet seem to last thirty minutes for one person and two for
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another. The extended dominant in many of Beethoven's cadences may seem to take as much
time to come finally to rest as did the performance of the entire recapitulation. Perhaps
Beethoven finds his fun in the journey too rather than in arrival. Reading a score apart from
performance may take less time than actually playing every note. Musical form is dynamic,
unfolding over time; harmonic rhythm is described as fast or slow; time signatures specify
meter; tempo indications, and in some instances metronome markings, denote rates of speed.

In the musical experience as well as the play experience there is a dynamic interplay
among physical space and imagined space and clock time and virtual time. In opera, through
the aural and visual presentation of the music and libretto, the interplay among various time and
space considerations appears more direct and overt; but in so called "absolute" music, music
without program, this interplay occurs as well. For example, harmonic structure may be open
with choral tones distributed over the full range of orchestral instruments exemplifying a lack
of spatial density, and at the same time harmonic movement may be quite rapid suggesting
temporal density. The parallels between music and play regarding real and imaginatively
perceived spatio-temporal considerations seem almost limitless.

SUMMARY

Huizinga, as stated at the outset, holds that play activity steps out of ordinary life. Yet
what has emerged to this point belies a simple separation, and suggests an interplay or tension
between fantasy and reality in the play experience that is upheld in the musical experience. In
fact, play and music seem to break down the distinction since neither is exclusively concerned
with absolute fantasy or pure reality.

As I have shown, a dialectic develops between make-believe life and ordinary life on
various points. We transport things from real life into play but may use them differently. Star
Trek is a fantasy combining the imagined and the real. Toys used in play are from the real
world, such as the broomstick, and yet they enter into something apart as the broomstick
becomes a hobby horse. The magic of Ravel's Mother Goose, the mythology of Wagner, the
reality of Berg's Wozzeck, and the wit and humor of Mozart and Satie, show the dynamic
interaction between make-believe and reality. Imagination engages with the world in play and
music. As Dewey counters, placing the play experience outside of ordinary life is a fiction and
an easy way out, since we are saved the difficulty of having to account for how the two
interact. I have suggested formal and functional likenesses between the real and makebelieve
in both play and music. Interpenetration occurs along the continuum of imagination from fantasy
to recognition and between subjective and objective spatio-temporal considerations.

The study of imagination in play and music I view as a first step toward developing a
framework for music grounded in play theory. I look forward to developing other considerations
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mentioned at the outset such as thought processes involved, the symbolic aspects, and the participatory nature, of play and music. No doubt these and other matters will provide points of departure for further discussion of the relationship between music and play.

NOTES

1. Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture, n.t. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), clearly states in his Foreword that he prefers the subtitle, "A Study of the Play Element of Culture" rather than "in Culture" since his objective is not to examine play as one element found in culture, but rather to determine to what degree culture itself bears the character of play. In spite of Huizinga's objection, the translator justifies "in culture" as opposed to "of culture" with a footnote stating that English prepositions are not governed by the logic of Huizinga's defense, and hence the translator retains the ablative rather than genitive. Huizinga's focus is lost at the outset by a title that misdirects the reader. (The translator's name is not given.)


11. Huizinga points out that "illusion" literally means "in-play" from inlusio, illudere, or inludere, 11.


13. In the Critique of Judgement, Kant states that the free play of sensations is divided into games of chance (Gluckspiel), harmony (Tonspiel), and wit (Gedankenspiel), 197–200. He writes that evening parties without play hardly ever escape falling flat suggesting that play is important to adults as well as children.

14. Among other melodies, this opera for children by Mark Schweizer and Beverly Easterling uses "La Donna e Mobile" from Rigoletto, "Habanera" from Carmen, and the "Sextet" from Lucia di Lammermoor with texts from the fairy tale, Goldilocks.
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15. In distinguishing imagination and memory, I draw upon and expand Warnock's view. Memory is a kind of repetition and is not dynamic; it is recall. Imagination, on the other hand, is active; it transforms, combines, and envisions. See Warnock, 24, 133.


22. Mary Schaldenbrand writes that the image can mediate oppositions. "If types mediate, they must be continuous; but, as types, they must be discontinuous. Working within types, the image allows both continuity and discontinuity." See "Metaphoric Imagination" in Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Charles E. Reagan, ed. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), 63.

23. Imagination in concept formation is beyond the scope of this paper.

24. Gadamer, Dewey, and Vygotsky all mention this aspect of play. One might also consider the painter, Giotto, who attempted to bring art into greater conformity with reality by adding a third dimension to his paintings.

25. My position is with Huizinga, Facknitz, and others who view games as play with only differences of degree not kind between them. Vygotsky points out that the Russian language has only one word for both play and game. See Vygotsky in Bruner, Play, and translator's note, 554. Huizinga, chapter 12, also notes that some games above now become big business with the sense of play atrophied. See also Mark Facknitz, "The Ludic Impulse: Play as a Paradigm for Aesthetic Response," paper presented to the American Society for Aesthetics, Philadelphia, Spring 1989. Sparshott states that German and French languages also designate play and game with one word, Sparshott, "Play," in Aesthetic Concepts and Education, Smith, ed., 107-34.


27. Dewey writes that these elements introduce organization to play, a point with which I do not agree because a child's play may also be quite organized with its own rules specific to his imaginary situation, How We Think, 162.
28. Huizinga offers an extensive discussion of games and contests as play in chapter 3, "Play and Contest as Civilizing Functions," 46–75.


33. Dewey, How We Think, 162–66.
A philosopher is "one who seeks wisdom or enlightenment" (Webster’s Dictionary). As educators and philosophers it would seem that our challenge is to seek wisdom regarding how to develop young philosophers and to stir the old ones to keep wondering and seeking. In this case, we are particularly intrigued by informing and improving music education. Stubley suggests that: "The value of any philosophical exercise lies ultimately in its capacity to expand our vision and help us to see old and familiar things in ways which will inform and improve the practice of music educators." Marcel Proust said in other words something like: "The real voyage of discovery consists not is seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes."

Stubley and Reichling have looked at music education through different lenses and from different perspectives endeavouring to present to their audience a re-vision—one that is expanded, elaborated and extended through play. Philosophers are really the epitome of play experts—they play with ideas and notions and concepts.

I found these papers interesting because I know about many 'blackened wicks' resulting from dyspedagogia. For me, music is one place where I was personally afflicted—a child who grew up in a household of musicians surrounded by good music—a musically literate environment—with a body, mind and spirit that loved music—and I had the wick trimmed and blackened by dyspedagogia. How one experiences the teaching/learning process effects the level to which one becomes engaged and really learns. The alternatives are what we as music educators need to be looking for—for hope, for a new vision...maybe even a paradigm shift. Roberta Lamb challenged us to liberate our intentions and to take responsibility for transforming our own practices so that our empirical and pedagogical work can be less towards positioning ourselves as masters of truth and justice and more toward creating a space where those directly involved can act and speak on their own behalf." Eleanor Stubley says that our current challenge is "to awaken the profession to the full range of meaning potential in the musical experience and to encourage the reflection upon that experience for insights."

The serious business of play has been explored from many perspectives over the centuries as both of the authors have suggested. Even so, very few people really understand the nature and hence the value of play—in fact we are concerned that it is misunderstood. How does one understand play? Can it awaken this meaning potential in music education? Reichling, in particular, presented an overview of some of the literature on the definition of play connecting it with the field of music suggesting that this shift in perspective might effect the revisioning.
I join with the authors in their fascination for and understanding of the power and potential of play as a natural and important phenomenon, a way of knowing, of learning, of thinking and of creating. Through play we clarify and even master many of the complexities of life involving social, emotional, physical and intellectual skills and concepts. It can be enjoyable, spontaneous, voluntary, active, can occur anywhere with just about anything one finds and with just about anyone, and undertaken without regard for external reward (Garvey, 1977). Play is fascinating to observe, particularly that of the young child as she climbs onto the back of Pegasus and explores the universe and comes in touch with who she is, what she thinks, and what she can or cannot do. It has been said by many that it is through play that a child learns what no-one can teach him or her. Although the particular perspective and hence the focus of my interest in play has been in the areas of language and self-concept development, the issues presented in these papers are very similar to that literature.

Reichling and Stubley (Mary and Eleanor) have looked at the nature of the relationship between play and music with Eleanor focussing on the field of musical performance and Mary on the role of the imagination in music. Both papers attempt to "explore the nature of a relationship" which is difficult to do...this is the kind of work that never seems to find an answer or to be definitive—it is hypothetical and exercises the imagination—it is itself play. Using their imaginations and playing with concepts that are new and innovative, both authors have presented ideas that they hope you will play with too. Both of the authors have recognized the creative ability of the learner and in their efforts to secure opportunities they have begun to shape a new pattern in teaching and learning in music education. In fact, play seems to be one of the possible solutions to many of the dilemmas that have been presented as critical pedagogical points at this conference:

- it offers opportunity for "alternative ways of being." Eleanor suggests it is a way of celebrating selfhood;
- it celebrates and honours individual style, giving room for recognition and respect, and celebrating diversity;
- it allows for the 'self and other' dimensions;
- it builds community;
- it is music making!
- it is real, meaningful, and relevant to the learner and therefore engaging;
- it invites an exploration of music making that gives freedom and delight in the learning process while pushing towards excellence and high achievement in this demanding art.

Recent educational developments have led to many varied practices that offer scope for imaginative meaningful learning experiences rather than the limitations of traditional methodologies which were set around restricted and restrictive standards of attainment and established ways of teaching. The matter of purpose which affects actions, procedures and
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strategies seems often neglected in the theory and teaching of music. In the past there was little room in classrooms for imaginative divergent thinking or creativity, little concern for process, exploration and engagement, and limited value given to the learner or his/her context, individual needs and interests and unique, already constructed schema. There was no means of measuring the merit of these things which are unpredictable and difficult to observe, test or understand and, therefore, a threat to the establishment. Education was about delivering the prescribed envisioned curriculum despite the children. Educators ignored what happens when this curriculum is enacted in part because they have not refined the lenses through which to reflect and understand—the child development lens, skill development lens and pedagogical understandings. We have not recognized that the real curriculum is what goes on in the mind, soul, body and heart of the individual learner. Stubley’s paper acknowledges these things and takes a constructivist stance noting that the learner is key, Reichling addresses the curriculum exclusively.

"Play constitutes the extreme pole of assimilation and reality to the ego, while at the same time it has something of the creative imagination which will be the motor of all future thought and even of reason" (Piaget, 1962). "From the point of view of development, play is not the predominant form of activity, but is, in a certain sense, the leading source of development (in pre-school years)" (Vygotsky, 1962, 537). Yawkey (1978) suggests that play is interrelated with thinking skills and intellectual development and is a dynamic process on its own. The elements of transformation and language are its link to intellectual development.

Imagination is the creative faculty of the mind (Yardley, 1973). Experience is stored in the form of images and ideas retained of visual, auditory, tactile and kinesthetic impressions. As one develops this store, she is able to summon up images, to form and reform and to continue to revise mental patterns which enable her to use prior knowledge and experiences to construct, elucidate, extend and expand the immediate, the reality. It is the imagination that is the faculty which enables the learner to use, recall or rearrange these images into a unique or new pattern or schema. An active imagination leads to creative engaged learning full of meaning and consequence because it is connected with and constructed on the basis of personal interest and experience and therefore makes sense. The power of imaginative reflection and metacognition therefore affects significantly one’s ability to think at any depth. Images are a folding and holding together of sensory and emotional impressions. Imaginative action leads to discovery and learning.

Imagination is not to be confused with simply that which is imagined. "Imagination, by creating and combining images, enlarges the store, and the arts enlarge and refine it...This store provides content and form for the apprehension and construal of experience." (Broudy, 1979) "It is the relationship between the imagination and the other functions of the mind that ground the claims of arts education. Briefly, this relationship can be considered in three forms: the relationship of images to language, to thought, and to feeling." (Broudy, 1979, 348) Writers,
artists and visionaries know this in their souls, as have those who are scientists and philosophers in other ways.

It is important that learners be engaged in music making, not just in analysis or criticism but in the aesthetic-kinesthetic (artistic) music making experience—focussing on their cognitive and affective responses and reactions: their sensations, images, feelings, and ideas. Time spent allowing learners to express their personal reactions, to actively search for their own meaning and to wonder about the music develops a lifetime pattern for imaginative interaction with music enabling one to reach a richer understanding.

Imagination should not just be nurtured but also stimulated. The imaginative experience of one can spark others. "The child and artist in any field have much in common; each is struggling to create, in tangible form, ideas and impressions which stir the mind and demand expression. The child, fresh from his own struggles with materials such as clay, paint, wood, notes, movement, words, which lend themselves to the artist yet challenge and frustrate because they are not easy to handle, is highly sensitive to what the masters have to say." (Yardley, 1973, 117)

Today in our rush to educate and to measure and compete towards successful mediocrity we must beware that the imagination not be submerged or die of neglect, that wicks not be blackened. Both Reichling and Stubley recognize this and remind us of things that will help us to keep that passion for learning and for music making burning. Music teachers have come to stress the import of specified technique and precision to the point where the stirring of the soul and the engagement of the imagination has oft-times been lost. Is it because it is more easily controlled, measured and predictable? If music allowed for flexibility and individuality—for flow—it would demand a different kind of teaching...a more demanding one with the music teacher more aware of the essence of the teaching learning process and the many child development and as well a skill development variables. It is a more professionally challenging process indeed.

In her paper, Reichling poses the question of how the imagination (or facets of imaginative activity) functions along Vernon Howard’s continuum from fantasy to the literal in the play and musical experience. The paper begins by attempting to describe, according to the literature, the extent that musical experience bears the characteristics of play but leaves the reader confused and the ideas inadequately developed or defined because Reichling suggests "the precise nature of the relationship between play theory and music merits more penetrating examination." The reader anticipates that the nature of the relationship will be examined. The argument becomes distorted at the outset by semantic quibbling over definition and description and one is left asking, "So what?" Reichling suggests that very few people really understand the nature and hence the value of play but does not follow through to assist the reader in that understanding.
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Based on assumptions about play—its universality and diversity—Reichling suggests that she will consider the role of the imagination as the first of four areas she considers to be central to the consideration of play and music. She does not adequately define what the imagination is. The rest of the paper proceeds by presenting, at each point along the continuum described by Vernon Howard, examples of the role of the imagination—first in play and then in music—without description or development, synthesis or theoretical implications. Musical examples given are broad and diverse and move from the composer through the performer to the listener but do not develop the nature of the relationship of the imagination in play and music or provide penetrating examination. The examples are fascinating but are not generalizable if one considers that everyone's experience is individual because the schema that one operates on, the prior knowledge and context one operates within are personally unique—the examples offered are Reichling's alone.

If the role of the imagination is similar in play and music then the connections need to be made more precisely. Reichling suggests that "Imagination animates play and may very well be the essence of play." Is it then the essence of music? That question is not answered. She suggests that there are 'similarities' but the differences are not presented. As a reader I was delighted with the 'play' of ways one could consider the different texts. I was delighted with the possibilities suggested but wanted to go the next step.

There is much potential in this work and the need for an exploration of the role of the imagination in music making as composer, performer and listener would be helpful. Reichling has promised to do more study in order to develop a framework for music grounded in play theory. What is play in music and the role of the imagination? What are the values of play? How is it fostered? How is play connected to music? What are the common elements between play and musical experience? What is the nature of the relationship between play theory and music? What is the role of the imagination in both? What is the essence of play? How do play and music intersect? These are the questions that one might be left with after reading this paper and these niggles might foster some further play.

In her paper, Eleanor Stubley discusses the relationship between performance and play. She describes quite poignantly the intense awareness of the present moment—the 'now' which binds the body, mind, and action into a seamless whole. She sees the field of musical performance as a field which creates a space for play. In fact, as I read this paper, it became apparent that Eleanor has just shifted from thinking of play and musical performance as things that are alike to thinking of them together as one. Play can be making music, music making is play. She reminds us that the early history of music resides in the practice of music making and that it is artificial and contrived to treat music otherwise. Music began with play—"the active projection and elaboration of sounds at a particular moment and place in time."

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A particular strength in this paper for me was the location of the experience of self, of personal "voice" in play. Musical performance and play engage the whole person—they can be whole-brain activities. It is the nature and character of the action that shapes "the experience of self in both activities." She states: "it is important to understand not only the epistemological outcomes of play, but also how play can arise in and through the music-making, constituting the action of musical performance." and goes on to help us play with this vicariously through her eyes using field theory. Either can instigate and elaborate the other. An individual's construction of the world is at the heart of all experience and every aspect of self is involved in its shaping—the body, mind, and spirit or soul. When talking about musical performance and the character of play, Eleanor suggests that it is playful to the extent that the act of making music creates an open and expanding space which offers opportunities for self-exploration and self-definition—another link to the self. It engenders feelings of power and control while it opens up possibilities, new ways of being. Eleanor is concerned that if the field of musical performance is to create a space for play, the music-making must challenge and invite the "tuning" of the performer.

The level to which one is engaged in constructing knowledge is a significant variable. Eleanor addresses this very clearly throughout her paper. In the character of play she suggests that

play begins with a captivating awareness or recognition of a capacity to make something happen. It continues through an exploration of the limits and strength of this capacity, with challenge sustaining the initial captivation in such a way that each moment hangs on the success and failure of an action taken and the promise of a continuing capacity to act in light of that success or failure.

She acknowledges that momentum can be sustained and enhanced as a result of the context (safe and caring, risk free), a sense of achievement (self-efficacy through self-reflection), and a strong sense of community—other players. Engagement is sustained because play creates an open and expanding space rather than a limiting one, therefore offering opportunities for exploring new ways of being. That makes learning exciting and inviting. It keeps the wick trimmed and fans the flames.

I appreciated the balance of examples along the continuum of play from the free spontaneous creative play to the formal and organized in both papers, Eleanor has learned to trust free play to be meaningful more readily than Mary has as yet. Obviously as one comes to understand the sophistication of the less structured exploratory aspects of play to expand, elaborate and extend thinking, it becomes validated. Mary, in conversation, has acknowledged its power and potential beyond her paper and is moving along this trajectory. On the other hand Mary articulates and expands into the musical experience Huizinga's view of the play experience
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in relation to other human experiences—particularly culture, language and play forms in art—a truly multi-faceted phenomenon.

There was a very strong connection in Eleanor’s paper with Rosenblatt’s work in response theory—a concept written about by Rosenblatt in 1935 but only recently adequately explored and acknowledged and appropriated into practice in the literacy field. Will music educators allow change to happen more quickly? The question of where one believes that meaning resides is the critical one. What is the right interpretation, the right tone, the right voice to give the right meaning? The same process-product dilemma that we face in the field of literacy is raised in the implications. What is important and should be valued—the process of composing or the composition? the process of developing the performance or the actual presentation? Why not both?

The real task we face is to determine how to help students learn to make music in performance. To do this, Stubley suggests that we need to understand what constitutes the action of musical performance and the forces defining the parameters and character of the space in which it unfolds. The definition used by Eleanor of voice, stylistic rituals and trust begins to develop this understanding and we hope that she will continue to study and inform us.

Eleanor suggests that musical performance, like play unfolds in many different contexts and plays briefly with this idea. I believe that it is a critical area of research that could inform practice significantly. It certainly has made incredible change happen in the field of literacy acquisition and development. I found it fascinating to hear and read the stories of writers’ early childhood experiences and have applied that knowledge in my work. The impact of learning from real writers what they do and how they got their skill has radically changed practice in writing. In fact it would be exciting to hear more stories of musicians personal practical knowledge—their narratives—to hear the way in which they have radically changed practice in the musical world and what has sustained and nurtured their growth. We need to hear your stories. Action research and reflective inquiry will enable us to understand more fully the nature of the relationship between play, the imagination and music making. The recursive process of reflective inquiry "results directly in renewal. There will be renewal of pedagogy as the answers to question have implication for action. There will be renewal for the pupils’ learning as they become collaborators in understanding how better to learn. There will be renewal of the pedagogue as the teacher is empowered to find personal answers..." (Cameron and Bartel, 1994).

In summary, I see a number of conditions that the authors have established as critical for music education that are conditions met through the kind of play that is advocated:

— that learners need to be immersed in all kinds of music—to have a music rich environment to provide the context for play with music;
that learners need to receive many demonstrations of how music is (can be) constructed and used.

— expectations need to be high. The expectations of those in community—the others—are powerful coercers of behaviour. Learners achieve what they expect to achieve; fail if they expect to fail; are more likely to engage with demonstrations of those whom they regard as significant and who hold high expectations for them (Cambourne, 1988). Learners will attend to significant others and will imitate and explore what they provide—will use them as experts and reference points.

— that the learners have some ownership in decisions about when, how, and what 'bits' to learn—they are thus empowered to 'play'.

— that learners need time and opportunity to use, to play with, and to practice, thereby developing control in real, meaningful and relevant ways. They need to be able to make music.

— that learners need to be able to approximate the desired model—'mistakes' are essential for learning to take place—this needs to take place in a safe and caring environment.

— that learners need to receive feedback—they need responses from more knowledgeable others and time to reflect themselves on what they know and how they feel about their learning.

The wings of the imagination can take one far. When children have experienced the beauty and romance of music, they will be more interested in working at the precision and effort necessary to create such text. When many musical possibilities will have been experienced, the child has a playground that is open and full of potential. If a child loves music, she is more likely to work at improving her own musical skills and will have the resources at her disposal to do so. Before requiring mastery of music, it is important that the desire to make music and express oneself well through it be instilled and be allowed to grow and develop.

These papers (and so does play) have the potential to "expand our vision and help us to see old and familiar things in ways which will inform and improve the practice of music educators." (Stubley)

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