Ancient Rhetoric and the Synoptic Problem

by

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University of Toronto

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Abstract

Only recently have studies of the synoptic problem begun to ground their assessments of literary dependence in ancient conventions. In an effort to appreciate more fully the evangelists’ modus operandi, our study examines their appeal to Greco-Roman rhetoric, the “science of speaking well.” Focusing on a rhetorical form called the *chreia* (χρεία), we examine rhetorical techniques and reasons for chreia adaptation, particularly reasons why authors changed this form in theory and in the practice of the Hellenistic authors Plutarch and Josephus. With these reasons in mind, we assess literary dependence among the synoptic gospels, focusing on one chreia in the Triple Tradition (Matt. 9:14-17/Mark 2:18-22/Luke 5:33-39) and another in the Double Tradition (Matt. 12:22-37/Mark 3:20-35/Luke 11:14-36). Our study illustrates that hypotheses of Markan priority, like the Farrer Hypothesis and Two-Document Hypothesis, are more rhetorically plausible than hypotheses of Matthean priority. While Matthew and Luke’s adaptations of Mark reflect the rhetorical reasoning that we should expect, Mark’s reasoning is often problematic, for Mark repeatedly works against the fundamental rhetorical principles of clarity and propriety.
Acknowledgements

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Anchor Bible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABD</td>
<td>Anchor Bible Dictionary. <em>Edited by D. N. Freedman. 6 vols. New York, 1992</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGHJ</td>
<td><em>Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANRW</td>
<td><em>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung.</em> Edited by H. Temporini and W. Hasse. Berlin, 1972-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAA</td>
<td><em>Ancient Quotes and Anecdotes: From Crib to Crypt,</em> Compiled and Edited by V. K. Robbins. Sonoma, 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETL</td>
<td><em>Bibliotheca ephemeridum theologicarum lovaniensium</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BibInt</td>
<td>Biblical Interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BibS(F)</td>
<td><em>Biblische Studien (Friburg, 1895-)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiTS</td>
<td>Biblical Tools and Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTB</td>
<td><em>Biblical Theology Bulletin</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budé</td>
<td>Collection des universités de France, publiée sous le patronage de l’Association Guillaume Budé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZNW</td>
<td><em>Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBET</td>
<td>Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Foundations and Facets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>Frankfurter theologische Studien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRBS</td>
<td><em>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCS</td>
<td>Hellenistic Culture and Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Harvard Dissertations in Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Critical Commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBL</td>
<td>Journal of Biblical Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Journal of Roman Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSNT</td>
<td><em>Journal for the Study of the New Testament</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSNTSup</td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSPSup</td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha: Supplement Series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCL</td>
<td>Loeb Classical Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td><em>Lectio divina</em></td>
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</table>
NIB   The New Interpreter’s Bible
NI GTC New International Greek Testament Commentary
NovT   Novum Testamentum
NovTSup Novum Testamentum Supplements
NRSV   The New Revised Standard Version
NTG    New Testament Guides
NTM    New Testament Monographs
NTS    New Testament Studies
SAC    Studies in Antiquity and Christianity
SBLSBS Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study
SBLSP  Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers
SBLTT  Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations
SBLWGRW Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Greco-Roman World Series
SemeiaSt Semeia Studies
SJSJ   Journal for the Study of Judaism Supplements
SNTSMS Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SNTSU  Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt
SSEJC  Studies in Early Judaism and Christianity
TUMSR  Trinity University Monograph Series in Religion
WUNT   Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament

Ancient Authors and Works

Ages.    Plutarch, Agesilaus
Alex.    Plutarch, Alexander
Art.     Plutarch, Artaxerxes
Caes.    Plutarch, Caesar
Comp.    Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De compositione verborum
Cor.     Demosthenes, De corona
Ctes.    Aeschines, In Ctesiphonem
Ant.     Josephus, Antiquitates judaicae
De or.    Cicero, De oratore
Hist.    Thucydides, Historiae
Hist. Consr. Lucian, Quomodo historia conscribenda sit
Il.      Homer, Iliad
Pomp.    Plutarch, Pompeius
[Reg. imp. apophth.] Plutarch, Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata
Rhet.    Aristotle, Rhetorica
Rhet. Her. Rhetorica ad Herrenium
## Sigla

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sigla</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2DH</td>
<td>Two-Document (Two-Source) Hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2GH</td>
<td>Two-Gospel (Neo-Griesbach) Hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Farrer-Goulder Hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXX</td>
<td><em>Septuaginta: Id est Vetus Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interprettes edidit Alfred Rahlfs</em>, Stuttgart, 1935</td>
</tr>
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Introduction
Ancient Rhetoric and the Synoptic Problem

Writing in 1997, Richard Burridge reflected that “it is possible that . . . evidence of rhetorical influence might help with the problem of . . . [the gospels’] literary relationship.”¹ This comment is remarkable not so much for its insight, important though it is, as for its rather recent formulation. With evident brevity and hesitation, Burridge indicates that critics have made few soundings in the juxtaposition of rhetorical criticism and source criticism. In spite of the growing effort to understand the rhetorical conventions that inform early Christian literature, there has been relatively little effort to apply such conventions to determine the more plausible sequence among the synoptic gospels.²

My goal is to address this need: to apply rhetorical conventions to the investigation of the synoptic problem. I shall argue that an awareness of rhetorical conventions can help us determine more and less plausible scenarios of adaptation among the synoptic versions of a rhetorical form called the chreia. In particular, I shall demonstrate the rhetorically problematic nature of hypotheses of Markan conflation and the relative plausibility of hypotheses of Markan priority. By examining rhetorical


reasons to adapt literary sources, I conclude that an author would not likely have adapted his sources in the manner in which Mark allegedly conflates the gospels of Matthew and Luke on the Two-Gospel (Griesbach) Hypothesis. For in doing so, Mark would consistently disregard rhetorical principles, particularly propriety. An author would more plausibly have adapted Mark’s gospel along lines suggested by the Two-Document and Farrar Hypotheses. The following pages seek to illustrate this thesis.

Let us begin by acquainting ourselves with some basics about Greco-Roman rhetoric (ἡ ῥητορική/oratoria). According to Quintilian, a near contemporary of the evangelists, rhetoric “is the science of speaking well” (ea est bene dicendi scientia), a science that aims to instruct, entertain or persuade others. And for this science, “the first essential . . . is that he [the orator or speaker] should be a good man.” This basic theory of rhetoric we know was fairly consistent through antiquity, and it centered on the activities of inventing appropriate material, arranging it well, conveying it eloquently and (when speaking), committing it to memory and to effective delivery. Many of us are

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3 According to Quintilian, the terms ῥητορική and oratoria are rough equivalents: “Rhetoric is a Greek term which has been translated to Latin by oratoria or oratrix. . . In the one case it is an adjective i.e., ars rhetorica, the rhetorical art . . . in the other it is a noun like philosophy or friendship.” Quintilian 2.14.5-2.15.2 (LCL, trans. Butler). Kennedy remarks that in conventional usage, oratory is the in fact the genre of speech, for which rhetoric provides—as it does for many other genres—a theoretical background. See George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), xi. For distinctions between ancient and contemporary rhetoric, see Dennis L. Stamps, “Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament: Ancient and Modern Evaluations of Argumentation,” in Approaches to New Testament Study, eds. Stanley E. Porter and David Tombs, JSNTSup 120 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 135.


probably not used to thinking about the evangelists’ work in quite these terms, but recent analysis shows that the evangelists indeed knew these activities and brought them to bear on their compositions about Jesus. Mack, who characterizes ancient rhetoric as the concern with compelling *argumentation*, stresses the importance of rhetoric for the evangelists.  

Important then as rhetoric is, we would expect secondary literature on the synoptic problem to be sensitive to it. Yet this is not really the case: few critics have related Greco-Roman rhetoric to the synoptic problem. I am not the first to express this concern. According to Derrenbacker, studies on the synoptic problem have given little consideration to ancient literary techniques that could underwrite or problematize alleged changes that conform to an evangelist’s redactional interests. Our own review of the literature bears out these conclusions when it comes to rhetorical modes of

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transformation. For there have been few efforts to find rhetorical explanations for a gospel’s editorial transformations. When we search studies of the synoptic problem for the term “rhetoric,” we gain the impression such studies have not engaged it much. While it may seem somewhat artificial to suggest this by searching indices for the term “rhetoric,” the results are still indicative. T. L. Longstaff and T. Page’s 1988 *The Synoptic Problem: A Bibliography*, for instance, has no entry for “rhetoric” and only two entries for the rhetorical form of *chreia*.9 One looks in vain for the term “rhetoric” in such classic works as W. R. Farmer’s *The Synoptic Problem* (1964), even though there appears some discussion of certain rhetorical forms including the *chreia*.10 Similarly we do not see explicit reference to rhetoric in C. M. Tuckett’s discussion of criteria and arguments in *Revival of the Griesbach Hypothesis* (1983),11 in R. H. Stein’s *The Synoptic Problem: An Introduction* (1987) or in Mark Goodacre’s recent *The Synoptic Problem: A Way Through the Maze* (2001).12 Intriguingly and to their credit, these erudite works do employ some rhetorical conventions to infer the gospels’ sequence, but they show little awareness that such conventions characterize *rhetoric*.13

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13 In *Revival of the Griesbach Hypothesis*, Tuckett subjects arguments of the Griesbach Hypothesis to the criterion of coherence: the criterion whether alleged editorial activity (say by Mark) occurs in all the places in which we should expect it to occur on the GH; in the course of this analysis Tuckett examines Mark’s alleged stylistic adaptations, such as duplications (pp. 20-21) and use of the historic present (pp.24-25). Moreover, on pp. 85, 86, 88 and 92, Tuckett’s awareness of essentially rhetorical forms and concerns (such as parallelism, chiasm and propriety) helps him infer which of two gospels might be anterior to the other. Cp. similarly Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 87, who refers to Matthew and Luke’s apparent improvement of Mark’s style as evidence for Markan priority. He further describes (see pp. 146, 165) how Mark uses the rhetorical device of irony and how Matthew and Luke are “typically attempting to clarify the . . . ironic Markan scene.” Goodacre too touches on the rhetorical concern of propriety (*πρεπέω* or *aptum*), explaining that in some cases, Matthean material omitted by Luke can be explained by its lack of accord with
In a fitting if unhappy complement, studies of New Testament rhetoric show little engagement with the synoptic problem. In D. F. Watson and A. J. Hauser’s 1994 bibliography *Rhetorical Criticism of the Bible*, for instance, there are several entries that appear to connect rhetorical with source-critical concerns, at least in the New Testament. In recent surveys of rhetoric by Kennedy, Stamps and Mack, however, we find little to no discussion of the synoptic problem, while Aune’s recent dictionary of New Testament rhetoric offers similarly little reflection. To be sure, some rhetorical analyses make source-critical assumptions (such as the Two-Document Hypothesis), but the aforementioned works rarely test those assumptions rhetorically. Perhaps part of the reason for this inattentiveness has been the absence of rhetorical treatises that teach how to edit sources. And the dominance for much of the twentieth century of the Two-Document Hypothesis (or 2DH) has likely also discouraged evaluation from a rhetorical standpoint.


15 Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 106, 108: “Rhetorically it seems very unlikely that Mark could have used Matthew’s account. That hypothesis requires the assumption that Mark read the Gospel of Matthew and reacted strongly against its rhetoric. He would then have composed his own version, using material from Matthew, but stripping it of its argumentation and amplification, and restoring the gospel to that radical rhetoric which he regarded as more genuine. There is no good model for that kind of redaction elsewhere; it is inconsistent with the traditions of the early Church. . . . All of this seems psychologically improbable. . . .” (p. 106). Stamps, “Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament,” 129-169. Mack, *Rhetoric and the New Testament*. Without commenting on the synoptic problem, Mack does believe that different qualities of rhetoric (e.g., “debate” versus “pronouncement”) can indicate which elements of the gospels and Q are earlier and later (see pp. 50, 85, 100, for example).


To its credit, however, New Testament scholarship has for over a century employed rhetorical insights to address the synoptic problem. The following survey aims to show that scholars have occasionally employed elements of rhetoric as standards of composition, a yardstick as it were, for inferring who among the evangelists elevates the others’ work towards such standards.\textsuperscript{18} We shall summarize this survey with the literature’s contributions and limitations.

** Appeals to Style

Perhaps the earliest, and the most recognized, effort to employ rhetoric in service of source criticism has been to appeal to the rhetorical activity called λέξις/ elocutio or “style.”\textsuperscript{19} It is worth outlining appeals to style briefly here, for these appeals make a contribution to source-critical questions, though they also have limitations.

That New Testament critics have appealed to style probably should not be surprising, because appeal to style corresponds to what George Kennedy and others have called the tendency to “identification of rhetoric with style.”\textsuperscript{20} When source critics speak of “style” they tend to define it as choice of vocabulary, syntax and grammar, and sometimes include the choice of “Semitic” and/or “Greek” elements. Significantly, critics have tended to argue that a gospel which shows better quality by ancient Greek standards

\textsuperscript{18} Although we cannot review the literature exhaustively, we can survey enough works at least to outline the kinds of appeals that scholars make to rhetoric as a source-critical tool.

\textsuperscript{19} For activity see May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 29 and n. 37. For the popularity of style as a criterion, see for example Farmer, *Synoptic Problem*, 121-122; Stein, *Synoptic Problem*, 52; and E. P. Sanders and Margaret Davies, *Studying the Synoptic Gospels* (London: SCM; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1989), 72. For the ancient terms and an introduction to elocutio, including its four principal virtutes or principles, see Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 453-462 (for the translation “style” see Kennedy, *New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 5-6. Lausberg distinguishes between elocutio and grammar. “The difference between the two lies in the level of the virtutes [virtues] striven for . . . : grammar as the ars recte dicendi . . . aims at linguistic correctness (recte), whereas rhetoric as the ars bene dicendi . . . seeks higher perfection (bene) (in relation to the purpose of the speech) even with regard to linguistic formulation (elocutio): Handbook § 456.

has likely improved its sources. And a key form of this argument is that Matthew and Luke have stylistically improved Mark.\(^{21}\) As early as 1909, in his “sprachlicher und stilistischer Vergleich der drei Synoptiker,” Eduard Norden wrote that Luke had a superior command of style (Stil),\(^{22}\) and opined that Luke’s relatively periodic clause constructions vis-à-vis Mark and Matthew were evidence of stylistic improvement.\(^{23}\) At about the same time, John C. Hawkins appealed to stylistic criteria in his *Horæ Synopticae: Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem*.\(^{24}\) Comparing the three synoptic gospels, Hawkins took certain qualities of Matthew and Luke’s style vis-à-vis Mark to be indications that they had improved Mark, and to this end he located Markan passages characterized by “rude, harsh, obscure or unusual words or expressions,” including asyndeton,\(^{25}\) the historic present, and “anacoluthon, or broken or incomplete construction.”\(^{26}\) In fact, Hawkins seemed more to assume than to argue that Matthew and Luke had stylistically improved Mark, and focused instead on whether or not they had stylistically improved an *Ur-Marcus*.\(^{27}\) Nonetheless, he commented that differences in style between Mark and the other evangelists made sense only as improvements of


\(^{26}\) Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticae*, 131 and n. 2, 132-137, 143. Similarly, “those who used . . . [Mark] would . . . modify the language . . . by substituting more familiar or more conventionally sacred expressions.” (On p. 132 nn. 1, 4 and p. 133, Hawkins grounds his view in the fact that the ancient grammarian Phrynicus, as well as certain “Classical writers,” accord in some preferences with the stylistic preferences of Matthew and Luke.)

Mark. Not many years later, B. H. Streeter cited Hawkins approvingly and perceived for himself some stylistic improvements of Mark:

Matthew and Luke regularly emend awkward or ungrammatical sentences; sometimes they substitute the usual Greek word for a Latinism; and there are two cases where they give the literary equivalent of Greek words, which Phrynichus the grammarian expressly tells us belonged to vulgar speech.

According to Streeter, Mark had by ancient Greek standards a relatively poor style which the other evangelists improved. The approach of Norden, Hawkins and Streeter, that awareness of ancient stylistic conventions can suggest which evangelists write “better” and therefore “later,” has found continued favour over the twentieth century. In his handbook to Greek literary style in the New Testament, Nigel Turner points out that “Matthew’s style . . . is . . . smoother than Mark’s; in this respect Matthew’s Gospel may be said to be secondary to Mark’s, and a development from it.” Turner thinks among other things of Matthew’s more frequent use of particles (such as οὐν and γαρ), and “avoidance of . . . graphic” phrases. He also believes that Luke improves Mark’s style, for instance by removing “vernacularisms” and “superfluous pronouns.”

In recent times some critics such as J. A. Fitzmyer have continued to use style in defense of the priority of Mark (1981). Significantly, though, other critics such as E. P.
Sanders have responded by challenging inferences from style as being inattentive to tendencies in the ancient adaptations of texts\textsuperscript{35} and to the influence of differing audiences.\textsuperscript{36} These critics believe that changes in style—whether such changes improve or erode an alleged standard of quality—can occur in response to different contexts.\textsuperscript{37} In this connection, it is worth mentioning that whenever scholars have considered the plausibility of supposed adaptations based on their suitability for a new social or literary context, they have gone beyond the typical appeals to style to ask about the stylistic virtue of propriety or appropriateness (τὸ πρέπον, aptum), even though they do not explicitly connect it with rhetoric. Propriety denotes the necessary harmony between expression, content, arrangement, and the circumstances in which one gave a speech.

Hence, when Farmer refers to E. A. Abbott and B. H. Streeter having concluded that Luke improves Mark on grounds of “seemliness” and avoiding “offence,” he reveals their concern to show that Luke wanted to make Mark’s work more appropriate to a new audience.\textsuperscript{38}


Sanders surveys alleged “tendencies” including stylistic tendencies (e.g., a decreasing use of Semitic features) to which critics often appeal when deducing literary sequence. He concludes that such tendencies, when compared with known source adaptations, do not appear accurate. When outlining his method, Sanders does not employ rhetorical inferences (see pp. 13-26). Nevertheless, he acknowledges a “great deal of work has yet to be done on the relationships between observations about literary characteristics . . . and source criticism” (p. 230; cp. p. 231). See \textit{The Tendencies of the Synoptic Tradition}, SNTSMS 9 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 7-11, 16-21, 29, 45, 190-255 (esp. 230-231, 249-55), for example.

\textsuperscript{35} “The entire notion of ‘improvement’ or its reverse is very shaky. People who rewrote material rewrote it in their own style. If a later author liked elegance and knew how to achieve it, the product would be more elegant. But the reverse could and often did happen. . . . Many authors, and no doubt many readers and hearers, preferred more colloquial and less elegant prose.” Sanders and Davies, \textit{Studying the Synoptic Gospels}, 72 (emphasis added); cp. Farmer, \textit{Synoptic Problem}, 122, 230. Dungan points out Sanders’ criticism in \textit{A History of the Synoptic Problem}, 379.


\textsuperscript{37} Farmer, \textit{Synoptic Problem}, 96, 160, 224 (on the latter page Farmer makes similarly informed remarks himself). A similar sensitivity to the appropriateness as helping account for change (although again,
In all, source critics have profitably employed style as a means to measure relatively plausible adaptations of sources. But the fascination with style has two limitations. First, some New Testament critics are not fully aware that style is an ancient *rhetorical* activity; few refer to handbooks from Aristotle, Cicero or Quintilian, or to basic rhetorical exercises called *progymnasmata*, or to terms such as “rhetoric” or “oratory.” This oversight can unfortunately lead us to neglect the ancient and rhetorical contexts of style which bear on its meaning. Second, examination of style alone has limited value, for style is but one rhetorical activity. We cannot profitably conclude that one gospel has adapted another (and not vice versa), merely by comparing their Greek style.

**Appeals to Invention and Arrangement: The Chreia**

According to Robbins, New Testament scholarship has started to appreciate that rhetoric, particularly a rhetorical form called the *chreia*, is source-critically useful in ways that extend beyond style to invention and arrangement. While Robbins and Mack have outlined this developing appreciation, we need to fill in some details and take notice that scholarship has only rarely applied such rhetorical conventions to the synoptic problem itself.

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without an explicit link to rhetoric) appears for instance in Stein, *Synoptic Problem*, 58: he takes the audience into account when assessing whether it is more plausible for Luke and Matthew to omit Aramaisms from Mark, or for Mark to add them to Matthew and Luke.


40 Again, this should not really be surprising, for only quite recently have we recognized that rhetoric itself reaches beyond style to argumentation and its concern with invention and arrangement.
In his 1964 monograph *The Synoptic Problem*, and continuing through his book *Jesus and the Gospel* (1982), W. R. Farmer tried to deduce directions of literary dependence using rhetorical conventions of invention and arrangement.\(^{41}\) While Farmer’s conventions were neither all ancient nor necessarily applied thoroughly, he still took the important step of judging literary dependence in a rhetorically informed way. For instance, Farmer argued that an awareness of the gospel of Luke’s genre, historiography, can infer how Luke improves Matthew. As he put it, “Luke’s gospel seems to reflect the results of a prolonged and careful study of Matthew, with a view to the creation of a new διάγησις which would be free of . . . defects.” By historiographical standards, that is, Luke improves Matthew.\(^{42}\)

A clear move towards a more rhetorically informed approach to source criticism has been to focus on ancient principles and methods for recasting a rhetorical form called the chreia (ἡ χρεία), which for the moment it suffices to define with R. F. Hock as “a saying or action that is expressed concisely, attributed to a character, and regarded as useful for living.”\(^{43}\) A popular rhetorical form, the chreia expressed wisdom teachings—

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\(^{41}\) Farmer, *Synoptic Problem*, 169. A half century earlier, Hawkins too indicated that Matthew and Luke had adapted Mark on rhetorical grounds of invention and arrangement. He remarked on their removal of Markan “passages which may have been omitted or altered as being liable to be misunderstood, or to give offence, or to suggest difficulties” (p. 117), and noted Matthew’s rearranging of Q material (pp. 161-164). Hawkins also located some ancient literary parallels for these operations (as on p. 162 n. 1, with reference to rearrangement techniques in Tatian’s *Diatesseron*). But in these cases Hawkins did not use explicitly rhetorical terminology. Consider his rather general reasoning: “What possible cause for the insertion of . . . [redundant references] by a later editor can be assigned, except a mere wish to extend the size of the narrative, without adding to its substance? And surely such a wish is inconceivable in the times and circumstances of the composition of the Gospels” (p. 126, emphasis added).

\(^{42}\) The defects include “duplicate accounts” and chronological idiosyncracies. Farmer, *Synoptic Problem*, 222-223.

and it did this not in a wordy or digressive way but in a brief way that made it sound memorable or striking.\textsuperscript{44} One good example comes from the Greek biographer Plutarch, who wrote of Alexander the Great, “Learning that in gambling with dice some of his friends did not enter into the game as a sport, he [Alexander] punished them.”\textsuperscript{45} Scholars have identified many such sayings and actions in Jesus traditions in the synoptic gospels.\textsuperscript{46} Scholars have also recognized that an elaborated chreia is the elementary form of a full judicial speech, and as such that a chreia invites analysis using speech conventions.\textsuperscript{47}

To return to source criticism, recently critics have made a key insight: rhetorical conventions for the proper invention and arrangement of chreiai can help us infer literary dependence. From at least 1962, Farmer employed rhetorical conventions to this end.\textsuperscript{48} In an analysis of the chreia of the Widow’s Mite (Mark 12:41-44/Luke 21:1-4), Farmer argued that, “on form-critical grounds, Luke’s form is clearly more original,” because “in its original form the \textit{Chreia} required the concise use of terms and images immediately comprehensible to hearers,” whereas Mark’s version adds details, like the equation of the

\textsuperscript{44} Hock, “General Introduction,” 3, 5, 9.
\textsuperscript{45} Plutarch, [Reg. imp apophth.] III.181 (28) (LCL, trans. Babbitt).
\textsuperscript{47} Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 35, 51-57; Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 196-198; and below, Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{48} In 1962, Farmer described ancient rhetorical theory for chreiai (e.g., addition of illustrative parables) and suggested that such theory applied strictly to oral discourse. This became the basis for his interpretation of two distinctively Lukan chreiai, each with an attached parable (13:1-9 and 15:1-32). According to Farmer, the restriction of rhetorical techniques to orally transmitted chreiai precludes the possibility that Luke fused the chreiai with the parables in 13:1-9 and in 15:1-32. Rather, Luke must have adopted each unit from a source. In this sense Farmer observed the basis of what he believed to be rhetorical convention. See “Notes on a Literary and Form-Critical Analysis of Some of the Synoptic Material Peculiar to Luke,” \textit{NTS} 8 (1962): 309-314.
two copper coins to a *quadrans* (12:42) typically found in ancient revisions of chreiai. 49

While Farmer regarded his approach as form-critical, he was effectively employing rhetorical convention—in this case, a tendency—to infer a source. For this same chreia moreover, Farmer suggested that Luke’s version of (Luke 21:1-4) expanded on a version in his special source material. Farmer went on to explain,

> Verse 4 . . . is what the rhetoricians termed an *aitia*, or “reason.” It was one of the standard acceptable *additions* to attach to a *Chreia*, and had as its purpose to explain the general principle incorporated in the *Chreia*. The reason why it could be said that the two very small coins of the widow were more than the gifts of all the rich was that: “They gave to the treasury out of their abundance; but she, out of her want, cast in the whole of her substance” (Lk. 21:4). 50

Here Farmer reasoned that a rhetorical principle of invention can explain literary dependence. 51 Whether or not Farmer is correct is not really the point. Rather, the point

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49 Emphasis added. Farmer added that chreiai without Greek characteristics were likely earlier, and (citing F. H. Colson) that parables could be and typically were added to chreiai. See Jesus and the Gospel: Tradition, Scripture and Canon (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 70-72 (generally pp. 68-73). In this book Farmer repeated, “in Hellenistic literature outside of these style [sic] manuals [i.e., the *Progymnasmatas*], chreiai are not developed according to this pattern [s] [i.e., elaboration, paraphrase] since by definition this development was designed to enable a speaker to make more effective use of them in oral communication. . . . When we find chreiai in the synoptic tradition that are illustrated by parables, we are in direct touch with a particular form of oral tradition (p. 71).” We shall see however that in the synoptic gospels there occurs varied kinds of expansion, paraphrase and elaboration of chreiai, which surely are as much if not more the product of each evangelist’s rhetorical transformation than of inherited oral tradition.

50 Farmer, Synoptic Problem, 268-269 (emphasis added in quotation). He went on to say that “this *aitia* then opened up the possibility for the rhetorician or preacher to expatiate on the subject of sacrificial giving. . . .” I am unclear whether Farmer regards the preacher’s need for basic material as an additional explanation why Luke expands 21:1-3, but he appears to do so (see p. 268 n. 16).

51 In a similar vein, Farmer employed a rhetorical principle to infer a source, commenting that Mark’s “added detail that he [Jesus] ‘called his disciples to him’ [Mark 12:43] . . . is . . . a literary effort at verisimilitude” or plausibility vis-à-vis Luke. Farmer, *Synoptic Problem*, 269. Theon of Alexandria in his *Progymnasmatas* regards plausibility as a quality of narrative. Farmer therefore appears to have grounded his comments, consciously or unconsciously, in this rhetorical quality. Farmer also perceptively remarks that students, “having written *Chreiai* themselves . . . would better understand the principles governing their composition, and thus be better prepared to make the most effective use of those collections of *Chreiai* of philosophers and famous men. . . .” *Synoptic Problem*, 268 n. 16. He adds that “in the Hellenistic literature in which *Chreiai* are found (notably in the lives of various famous men) the pattern is not for the authors of these works to create *Chreiai*, but rather to incorporate them into their accounts from earlier collections of *Chreiai*. On the basis of a comparative study of the nearest parallels in contemporary literature, it seems likely that the *Chreiai* in Luke have been incorporated into that Gospel from some earlier source or sources” (p. 267).
is that he consciously employs rhetorical tendencies and principles to help infer literary dependence between traditions. Unfortunately, Farmer neither examined rhetorical treatises thoroughly nor stressed the importance of rhetoric. In any case, perhaps because of Farmer’s analysis, further work began to employ principles of invention and arrangement to help indicate the more plausible direction of literary dependence between two gospels. For instance, in a 1984 monograph entitled *Jesus: The King and his Kingdom*, G. W. Buchanan argued that the Two-Gospel Hypothesis (or 2GH) better reflects a rhetorical tendency in ancient literature to the abbreviation of chreiai.

By later in the 1980s, the application of rhetorical tendencies and rules to source criticism took on new sophistication in the work of Burton Mack and Vernon K. Robbins. During that decade and continuing through the 1990s, Mack and Robbins investigated the chreia and its associated compositional techniques in invention and arrangement to help determine the development of traditions. Robbins in particular has

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52 In *The Synoptic Problem*, Farmer tries to discern the gospels’ sequence by asking whether they adhere to basic literary standards of editing. In this he draws on six criteria (e.g., “insertion by one writer of material not in the other, and clearly interrupting the course of thought or symmetry of plan in the other.”) These he takes from E. DeWitt Burton, *Some Principles of Literary Criticism and Their Application to the Synoptic Problem*. From what I can tell, Burton does not draw explicitly upon ancient rhetoric; he does, however, call attention to the importance of examining contemporary ancient literature, conventions of style and propriety, and conventions of scribes: See Ernest DeWitt Burton, *Some Principles of Literary Criticism and Their Application to the Synoptic Problem* The Decennial Publications, Printed from Volume 5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904, Rpt. Cornell University Library Digital Collections, 1991), 5, 6, 17, 36; Farmer, *Synoptic Problem*, 229.

53 “We should not necessarily imagine early Christians consciously conforming to rhetorical standards. But . . . the influence (conscious or subconscious) of Hellenistic rhetorical practice upon the form of some very early literary units . . . should occasion no surprise.” Farmer, *Jesus and the Gospel*, 72-73.

54 Buchanan compares chreiai in Theon’s *Progymnasmata* with parallel, later versions in the work of Doxapatres. George Wesley Buchanan, *Jesus: The King and His Kingdom* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1984), 61-64 (esp. p. 64 n. 67).

55 In the chapters of their co-authored work *Patterns of Persuasion in the Gospels*, Mack and Robbins argue that synoptic chreiai are not merely short sayings but are rather bases of lengthier discourses that embrace Greco-Roman conventions of argumentation. These conventions, which pertained to proper invention and arrangement of forms in speeches, were found especially in the more elementary handbooks called *progymnasmata*. Drawing upon these rhetorical traditions, the evangelists commonly applied progymnastic convention in the form of a technique known as ἔργασις (elaboration) and drew on further rhetorical conventions such as stasis theory. See Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 195-198, 200, and
examined sources with an awareness of rhetoric, arguing that underneath early Christian texts exists a *rhetorical culture* that shapes how Christians thought and argued. To be sure, Robbins has only tentatively and occasionally engaged the synoptic problem itself, preferring to examine developments in orally transmitted, pre-gospel traditions up to and including their adoption in the gospels. But in doing this he still offers two related insights. First, Robbins revises older form-critical notions of development. As he puts it,

> Using the approach of Dibelius or Bultmann [form critics], the interpreter would probably assert that the short form of the unit [a chreia] represents an earlier, purer form of tradition . . . whereas the longer form reveals secondary interests imposed by a redactor. What this approach misses is an awareness that both forms are the result of composition according to some person’s interests. . . . The

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57 This *rhetorical culture* was informed by texts like the progymnasmata. For too long, Robbins explains, we have misunderstood the literary environment that nurtured the evangelists’ compositional skills, assuming that the evangelists modified work within an essentially “scribal culture”—that is, using scribal techniques that attempt chiefly to preserve a source. The evangelists also applied rhetorical conventions from the progymnasmata; they wrote and modified others’ work in a manner acutely aware of Greco-Roman literary forms and the need to persuade through argumentation. See esp. Robbins, “Progymnastic Rhetorical Composition,” 116, 118, and Vernon K. Robbins, “Writing as a Rhetorical Act in Plutarch and the Gospels,” in *Persuasive Artistry: Studies in Honour of George A. Kennedy*, JSNTSup 50 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 145-146, 148-149. (My attention was drawn to this work by Derrenbacker, *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem*, 27-29.) D. E. Aune criticizes (unconvincingly) Robbins’ belief that the evangelists had progymnastic rhetorical training; see “Oral Tradition and the Aphorisms of Jesus,” 225-226.

58 This point he makes in “Progymnastic Rhetorical Composition,” 112.
shorter version . . . results from a desire to tell the tradition in the shortest and most poignant form possible. . . . [I]t is highly speculative to assume that the shorter form is earlier and more reliable, since often the longer forms in a piece of literature were the source for shorter forms that a teacher or author composed. 59

From this critique Robbins proceeds to a second insight, proposing that we characterize and explain chreia developments in rhetorical terms, particularly in what he calls social-rhetorical terms. 60 Robbins’ insight is essentially this: under the influence of social circumstances and rhetorical convention, pre-gospel “traditions will be expanded and elaborated to make stronger, more explicit arguments.” 61

59 Robbins, “Chreia & Pronouncement Story in Synoptic Studies,” 18 (and cp. Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 207); cp. Henderson, Jesus, Rhetoric and Law, 87. Robbins is similarly dissatisfied with Bultmann’s form-critical notion that “sayings were primary, and situations and actions were created out of and for sayings, to create a narrative context for them.” Bultmann had proposed several reasons for such change, ranging from the desire to lend a saying of Jesus “vividness” to the simple “generating power” that an original saying carried (Rudolf Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, rev. ed., trans. John Marsh [Peabody: Hendrickson, 1963], 47, 93, 61.) But according to Robbins, this reasoning fails to appreciate the place of rhetoric within developing traditions. I quote Robbins’ words (emphasis added) from Robbins, “Progymnastic Rhetorical Composition,” 134; see further Robbins, “Chreia & Pronouncement in Synoptic Studies,” 2, 17-19; and Robbins, “Plucking Grain on the Sabbath,” in Burton L. Mack and Vernon K. Robbins, Patterns of Persuasion in the Gospels, FF Literary Facets (Sonoma: Polebridge Press, 1989), 122-123.

60 For rhetorical characterization see Robbins, “Progymnastic Rhetorical Composition,” 122-123, 125, 133-134, 135-136, 140, 141, 144. Cp. Robbins, “Plucking Grain on the Sabbath,” 123; and Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 206-207. Scholars who follow Robbins have pointed to the major role social location plays in Robbins’ method: see Rod Parrott, “Conflict and Rhetoric in Mark 2:23-28,” Semeia 64 The Rhetoric of Pronouncement (1993), 131. In a 1996 book on the topic, Robbins defines socio-rhetorical criticism along essentially two lines. First, it seeks to describe a text’s “networks of meaning” or “textures,” namely social and cultural texture, ideological texture, inner texture and intertexture. Second, socio-rhetorical criticism applies theories (psychological, sociological and the like), that describe and relate these networks; theories that connect “texts to society and culture and . . . society and culture to texts,” helping show their interrelationships. Hence, he continues, socio-rhetorical criticism denotes “strategies of analysis . . . that exhibit the multiple networks of meanings and meaning effects that the words in our texts represent, engage, evoke and invite.” Vernon K. Robbins, The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, society and ideology (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 9 [quotation], 11-3, 20 [quotation], 27-40 (see also p. 3 for the broad scope of socio-rhetorical criticism). Cp. his discussion of intertexture (pp. 30-33).

61 Emphasis added. Quotation from Robbins, “Progymnastic Rhetorical Composition,” 132. “The interpreter can expect . . . that a selection of components and figures will work together in the tradition in a manner that makes stronger and stronger ‘Christian’ arguments” (for detail, see pp. 121-123, 130-131, 134-135, 136-137 and Robbins, “Plucking Grain on the Sabbath,” 110). Cp. similarly James R. Butts, “The Chreia in the Synoptic Gospels,” BTB 16/4 (1986): 135-137. At the same time, though, Mack and Robbins caution that “[c]lean distinctions may not be possible . . . merely on formal grounds, since ‘complete elaborations’ were not a sufficient mark of ‘later’ developments. In order to control such an investigation, we would need additional considerations, including the correlation of issues addressed with junctures of
While Robbins’ insights have been influential in some recent exegetical work (for instance, by Cameron [1996]), Robbins has only rarely brought his appreciation of rhetoric to bear on the synoptic problem. We receive one brief glimpse in a 1989 essay, in which Robbins describes how each synoptic evangelist expands and elaborates their shared chreia about Jesus’ plucking grain on the Sabbath (Mark 2:23-28/Matt. 12:1-8/Luke 6:1-6). Reflecting on the extent to which Mark and Matthew portrayed Jesus defending the disciples for their plucking of grain, Robbins ventures to suggest—and only to suggest—their sequence:

Whatever the relationship between Matthew and Mark, Matthew was not satisfied with an argument from one or more sayings in the tradition that left an implication of wrongdoing on the disciples. If he knew the Markan tradition with the saying “the sabbath was made for man,” he recognized that it was not decisive in Jewish circles. He had to develop a complete argument against the accusation. If Mark knew the Matthean version, he considered the detailed exoneration of the disciples to be beside the point (I consider this order to be much harder to envision) and preferred to leave an implication that the disciples had performed an action considered unlawful by Pharisees and ground a defense in a gnomic saying about God’s institution of the sabbath.

social histories identified, as well as with changes that occur in the characterization of Jesus and the grounds for his authority.” Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 207. Socio-rhetorical criticism is not the focus of essays in Mack and Robbins’ Patterns of Persuasion (see pp. 195-208, esp. 195, 203-204, 206-208). Robbins’ work in 1993 and 1997 pursues socio-rhetorical criticism more explicitly. Related influences on the development of tradition include an evangelist’s larger narrative and rhetorical interests: see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 177; Robbins, “Chreia & Pronouncement in Synoptic Studies,” 19-22; Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 201-202.


Robbins, “Plucking Grain on the Sabbath,” 139. Robbins also remarks, “In some instances, they only slightly revised a version that existed in another written document, a practice followed by many authors outside the biblical tradition. In other instances, they presented the unit in quite a different form, either following the lead of another written or oral form of the tradition or composing it differently for their own rhetorical purposes” (p. 19). For general suggestions by Mack and Robbins on the sequence of traditions (pre-gospel and/or among the gospels), see “Conclusion,” 199-200, 201-202, 207. On p. 200, Mack and Robbins note that “the author of . . . [a] new elaboration would have to decide how to take the saying [found in their predecessor’s version], whether as the rationale, or as an argument from the contrary, from analogy, from example, or even as a judgment.” The flexibility that they detect in an author’s adaptation of tradition we shall see for ourselves among the evangelists (Chapter 5).
Significantly here, Robbins employs the fundamental rhetorical requirement for persuasion to infer more plausible directions of dependence. Though Robbins has only rarely made such suggestions about the synoptic problem, his work still marks two advances. The first is that it is fallacious to assume that a lengthier tradition (such as a lengthier chreia) necessarily grows out of a shorter tradition. The second is that several fundamental rhetorical conventions—persuasion along with the argumentation, invention and arrangement that serve it—can be standards for inferring more plausible directions of literary dependence between versions of chreiai.

**Appeals to Invention and Arrangement Independent of Chreiai**

Few scholars have built upon Robbins’ rhetorically informed inferences on chreia sequence. Nevertheless, new work independent of the chreia continues to suggest the bearing that a full range of rhetorical conventions can have in inferring literary dependence. One excellent illustration is the work of Robert Morgenthaler (1993). Albeit on a hypothesis of Markan priority, Morgenthaler reasons that Luke applies rhetorical techniques to improve on his sources. In other words, Luke *rhetorizes* his sources,

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64 Here he also opines that a more thorough argumentation is likely a development of briefer and simpler argumentation. While Robbins’ approach is insightful, he does not appear to have pursued it since then. In 1997 he applied rhetorical conventions to consider the question of sources behind the *Gospel of Thomas* and gospel of John. In this he actually assumed the Two-Document Hypothesis and concluded that there exists a direct line of oral transmission from Q to the *Gos. Thom.* and from the *Gos. Thom.* in turn to the gospel of John. See Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition in Thomas,” esp. 88, 93, 96-97, 102.


including Septuagint traditions, the sayings gospel Q and the gospel of Mark.\textsuperscript{67} To rhetorize means to do essentially two things. First, Luke raises his sources’ style to a clearer, more concise and more artistic level.\textsuperscript{68} Second, Luke incorporates his sources well: he “shapes” them into a cohesive narrative\textsuperscript{69} using techniques of invention (addition and omission of material) arrangement and style (use of figures like repetition).\textsuperscript{70} Although Morgenthaler assumes the 2DH, he believes that it accommodates Luke’s rhetorical improvements in a way that other hypotheses such as the 2GH cannot.\textsuperscript{71} More recently, David Neville (2002) similarly pleads for awareness of rhetorical convention to aid in source criticism. According to Neville, inadequate attention to the ancient boundaries of rhetorical forms has created an anachronistic, often vague notion of “pericope” in arguments from order. A better awareness of ancient rhetorical forms like chreiai as well as oral transmission techniques can help us better infer gospel sequences.\textsuperscript{72}

One recent if distinctive appeal to a full spectrum of rhetorical conventions is the appeal to μίμησις or imitatio—“imitation.” The work of Dennis MacDonald and Thomas Brodie stands out in this regard. In his *Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark* (2000),

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Morgenthaler, *Lukas und Quintilian*, 192-193, 175, 220, 253-254, 280-281, 309.
\item That is he creates a style which has more rhetorical virtues: Morgenthaler, *Lukas und Quintilian*, 175, 220, 281; cp. pp. 235, 241. Such virtues also include propriety (pp. 192, 237), about which we shall say more in Chapter 1.
\item Morgenthaler, *Lukas und Quintilian*, 175-176, 192, 220, 221-222, 224, 233-234, 253-254, 281, 301. Morgenthaler nicely summarizes his thesis as follows: “Wir verfolgen gar nicht die Absicht, umbassend und abschliessend zu beweisen, dass Lukas seine Vorlagen rhetorisiert habe. Wir suchen nach Spuren fur rhetorische Textgestaltung durch Lukas, Spuren, die bei gelungenem Beweisverfahren Anlass sein muessten, im Rahmen der redaktionskritischen Forschungen zu Lukas der Rhetorik einen gebuhrenden Rang zuzuweisen [p. 254].”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
MacDonald explains how ancient authors like the author of Mark’s gospel took “classic” texts (for example Homer’s *Odyssey*) as *models* from which to borrow and with which to compete. This is the essence of *imitatio*. Such *imitatio* entailed a wide and rich variety of methods. Indeed, as MacDonald admits, this scope and range of methods are the subjects of ongoing study. Sometimes imitative methods are subtle, entailing allusion without extensive adherence to a model’s arrangement and wording.\(^\text{73}\) At other times, imitative methods call to mind the extensive, paraphrase style of adaptation that we find among the synoptic gospels.\(^\text{74}\) According to MacDonald, Mark imitates Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, modeling for instance the story of Jesus’ burial partly on the Homeric story of the death of Hector.\(^\text{75}\) Significantly, when MacDonald observes that Luke’s gospel conforms only slightly less to the structure of a Homeric story than does Mark, he argues that it is less plausible for Mark to have “improved” the near perfect imitation of Homer in Luke, than for Luke to have distanced himself from the fuller imitation of Homer in Mark.\(^\text{76}\)

Like MacDonald, Brodie regards rhetorical *imitatio* as a good means to help infer the synoptic gospels’ sequence:

> [A]re there no categories of adaptation that would cast light on Luke’s possible use of Matthew? If, for instance, so sensitive an artist as Ovid could subvert and compress his revered older contemporary, Virgil, why could not Luke’s Sermon on the Plain be a subversion of or, at least, a compressed revision of Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount?\(^\text{77}\)

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\(^\text{74}\) See MacDonald, *Homeric Epics*, 9; for the range of imitative method see also MacDonald’s forthcoming *Intertextual Commentary on the New Testament*.


\(^\text{76}\) MacDonald, *Homeric Epics*, 189.

Significantly, Brodie believes that some imitative techniques—techniques like paraphrase, emulation, contamination, compression, fusion and positivization—can help to make sense of Luke’s adaptations of Matthew’s gospel. Whether or not Brodie is correct, he recognizes that ancient techniques can help to indicate one gospel’s adaptations of another. He also raises the important issue of what kind of ancient literature we should consider as parallels for the synoptic gospels’ editorial activity.

Perhaps the newest and most informative appeals to rhetoric come from Michael Schufer. In his work Schufer takes principles in the progymnasmata (educational texts) as standards to assess more and less plausible improvements between two traditions. Focusing on the rhetorical form of narrative (διήγησις) and its virtues of clarity, plausibility and brevity, Schufer argues that we can better see Luke enhance these in Mark’s gospel than vice versa, and this irrespective of the different contexts for which each evangelist wrote. If we can similarly apply progymnastic rhetorical theory to the

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According to Brodie, “Greco-Roman Imitation,” 35, “there often develops an . . . expectation that whatever progress is to be made on the [synoptic] problem is to be made on the basis of comparing texts that show obvious verbal similarity. But obvious verbal similarity . . . is only one of several possible relationships between texts.” He adds, “we do not have a tidy genre and a clear-cut field” of exact parallels to the gospels (e.g., biography or history). His opinion is well taken, although I would make two qualifications. First, there is now a fair consensus that the gospels stand close in genre to ancient biography. Second, we should at least begin with transformations that the closest genres (like biography) make to their direct sources. It seems unreasonable to conclude that because Plutarch alludes to drama or poetry (pp. 28-31), we should give such allusions the same weight as his treatment of his direct sources. In fairness, Brodie is careful not to equate imitation of “ancient texts” with that of “more recent sources,” suggesting that each has different qualities (p.34).

analysis of *synoptic chreiai*, then we can gain leverage on the synoptic problem. To date, however, no analysis of synoptic chreiai has drawn on the full range of rhetorical conventions for speeches, of which chreiai were elementary forms.

**Compositional Practices**

Some scholars have worked to infer literary dependence by appealing to conventions that most of us would not characterize as rhetorical in nature. Nevertheless these conventions deserve mention, because there is recognition that at some level, authors understood certain of these conventions as rhetorical and connected them with rhetorical handbooks. Derrenbacker has helpfully labeled these conventions as *compositional practices*.

While some have made efforts to show that compositional practices in Semitic literature can help deduce literary dependence, these practices stand outside the scope of the present work. More revealing have been recent appeals to Greco-Roman literary practices, the most recent full-length treatment of which comes from Robert

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81 For some time I had similarly supposed that rhetorical techniques and principles might indicate one text’s improvement of another. I became sceptical about this, however, for two reasons. First, I believed that any author’s choice of techniques or qualities must be suitable for their particular context, and hence that it would be unrealistic to ask which of two authors had more plausibly improved the other’s work. Second, the techniques that I observed were usually so specific—each relevant only to one or two forms (like a chreia or fable)—that they would not provide much evidence when examining a more complex unit in the gospels. Schufer’s proposals, though, convince me to take rhetorical theory more seriously as a means to infer literary dependence.


83 See the work of Downing and Cadbury, below.


In his work Derrenbacker investigates adaptive practices that range from conflation and note taking to posture and mnemonic technique. Through appeal to such ancient authors as Josephus, Livy and Plutarch, Derrenbacker focuses his assessment on gauging how well the major source hypotheses (the GH, FH and 2DH) account for and reflect these adaptive practices. Significantly, numerous critics including Derrenbacker conclude that the 2DH stands in closer accord with ancient compositional practices, while Dungan holds that “conflationary literary techniques” in Mark’s gospel and in 1 Peter better reflect the 2GH.

On occasion, students of compositional practices do make explicit references to rhetoric. F. G. Downing for example employs rhetorical terms such as “coherence” and “credibility” to infer Luke’s sources. In another essay he reasons that rhetorical conventions for conflation better reflect Luke’s simple conflation on the 2DH, not the

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89 For this characterization see Derrenbacker, *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem*, 9-16.
92 See Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 57.
more complex conflation of Mark and Matthew on the FH and 2GH.\textsuperscript{93} Similarly explicit references come from George Kennedy (1978), who highlights the rhetorical practices of memory and \textit{imitatio} (imitation) as helping infer the evangelists’ methods.\textsuperscript{94}

\textbf{Summary}

The literature offers two major insights into the application of rhetoric to the synoptic problem. The first is that a range of rhetorical conventions can serve as standards against which to measure more plausible kinds of literary dependence. Some of these conventions are theoretical, that is, techniques (“what” writers do) and principles (“what writers \textit{should} do”); other conventions appear in practice.\textsuperscript{95} Only occasionally do scholars claim that rhetoric explicitly suggests why we should adapt sources; more often, scholars use rhetorical conventions for original work as bases on which to infer why one author would plausibly improve another author’s work. The second insight is


\textsuperscript{95} Downing helpfully characterizes ancient “theory” and “practice”: see “Compositional Conventions,” 70. Work for example by Farmer, Downing, Robbins and Schufer illustrates the use of techniques and principles from theory; work by Buchanan, Derrenbacker and Downing illustrates the use of conventions in practice.

\textsuperscript{96} See for example, Brodie, \textit{Birthing of the New Testament}, 6-7 (commenting on Quintilian).
that the chreia is a particularly useful rhetorical unit for inferring literary dependence.\footnote{According to Mack, defining a rhetorical unit in ancient terms can point accurately to principles that govern its use. If for instance Luke writes a chreia, and then builds a judicial speech upon it, then we know that specific rhetorical principles (such as invention and \textit{stasis}) are at play: \textit{``Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,''} 32; cp. similarly Kennedy, \textit{New Testament Interpretation}, 33-35.}

The fact that chreiai change through rhetorical techniques of expansion, compression and elaboration, helps us to view rhetorical development accurately.\footnote{For ancient techniques of change see Robbins, \textit{``Rhetorical Composition \\& the Beelzebul Controversy,''} 161-193 and 198. 98}

Given these two insights, however, rhetorical investigation of the synoptic problem leaves much work to be done. At present the literature takes a piecemeal approach to rhetoric, failing to take the full range of rhetorical theory into account. What is worse, few studies employ rhetoric to address the synoptic problem (or for that matter, literary dependence of any kind). Worse still, there is actually a \textit{reticence} about saying that rhetoric can address the synoptic problem. Robbins for example comments that \textit{``one may be concerned to establish if the first version of the story is earlier, later or more authentic than the other . . . [but] these concerns . . . may have no certain answer.''}\footnote{Robbins, \textit{``Writing in Plutarch and the Gospels,''} 158; cp. pp. 165, 153.}

Similarly, D. E. Aune doubts whether we can determine the sequence of two or more \textit{chreiai}. Among his remarks is the following:\footnote{Aune, \textit{``Oral Tradition and the Aphorisms of Jesus,''} 213: \textit{``enormous methodological problems''} make source criticism of aphorisms (e.g., in the synoptic problem) \textit{``difficult if not impossible.''} On pp. 225-226, moreover, Aune is sceptical about whether the progymnasmata influenced the evangelists; as he puts it, \textit{``[a]phorisms of Jesus are contracted as well as expanded, and while Theon mentions the \textit{συστέλλειν} of \textit{chreiai} in passing, he does not provide any examples or discussion of such abridgement.''} This however is not an argument at all. Abridgement is quite simply the opposite of \textit{``expansion''} (\textit{ἐπεκτεῖνωσις}), a technique that Theon discusses and that we can infer occurs in the opposite manner as expansion.}

The Greek mania for systematization was such that there is no . . . way to expand a \textit{chreia} which the rhetorical handbooks have not anticipated, i.e., any expression whatsoever appears to agree with the prescriptions of the writers of the progymnasmata.\footnote{Aune, \textit{``Oral Tradition and the Aphorisms of Jesus,''} 226.}
Scholars must focus on a convincing analysis of each aphorism [or, chreia] in all of its extant versions before drawing any general conclusions about the oral and literary history of the aphorisms of Jesus. Since New Testament scholars do not all agree on the proper solution to the Synoptic problem, it is hardly likely that they will agree on whether Version 1 of Aphorism A is dependent on Version 2 or whether the reverse is true. Human ingenuity being what it is, the evidence is infinitely manipulable.¹⁰²

Aune implies that we lack solid rhetorical methods to determine which of two gospels improves the other’s chreia. For reasons that we shall see, Aune and Robbins are incorrect.¹⁰³ Their skepticism betrays a lack of progress in rhetorical investigation of the synoptic problem.

A sound rhetorical study of the synoptic problem demands that we study chreiai and their adaptations. Chreiai are rich in analytical potential: since the chreia is a prototype for a speech,¹⁰⁴ it becomes a form to which we can apply numerous rhetorical conventions for speeches—conventions from both the elementary progymnasmata and the advanced rhetorical handbooks.¹⁰⁵ This full range of rhetorical conventions can help us to infer literary dependence more thoroughly and so more accurately.

Part 1 of our study summarizes rhetorical conventions for adapting the chreia. We shall begin by seeking rhetorical techniques and principles that can infer how and especially why an author might improve chreiai (Chapter 1). We shall then examine reasons for chreia adaptation in non-Christian literature parallel to the gospels. Chapter 2 will focus on the writings of Plutarch, and Chapter 3 on the writings of Josephus. In Part

¹⁰³ Aune’s remarks neither prove that the evangelists were ignorant of progymnasmata nor that we cannot determine more plausible directions of literary dependence. The evangelists are so sharply attuned to rhetoric that we can be sure that they had studied, at a minimum, the progymnasmata or texts like them (below, Chapter 1). Moreover, we shall see that a thorough grounding in rhetoric can help to reveal more and less plausible chreia adaptations (Chapters 1, 2 and 3).
¹⁰⁵ An insight of Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 198, 200. Mack and Robbins point out that since the gospel chreiai show marks of advanced rhetorical theory, it is fitting to consider such rhetorical theory, not simply the basic theory in the progymnasmata.
of our study, we shall assess literary dependence among the synoptic gospels by asking into the accord of the major source hypotheses with rhetorical reasons for adapting chreiai. We shall analyze one chreia in the Triple Tradition (Chapter 4) and another in the Double Tradition (Chapter 5).  

Throughout, we shall focus on the adaptations to rhetoric chiefly “in” chreiai (that is, its invention, arrangement and expression), not so much the rhetoric “of” chreiai, except inasmuch as its purpose and context bear on our understanding of rhetoric within it. For the distinction see Rod Parrott, “Conflict and Rhetoric in Mark 2:24-28,” *Semeia 64 The Rhetoric of Pronouncement* (1993), 117, 131. In making this distinction Parrott refers to the precedent set by Robbins, “Plucking Grain on the Sabbath,” 128, 140-141.
Part 1. The Rhetorical Adaptation of Chreiai
Chapter 1
Rhetorical Conventions for the Adaptation of Chreiai

Introduction

This chapter introduces rhetorical techniques and principles that are important for modifying chreiai, and are accordingly important for inferring literary dependence. Our key sources in this chapter include rhetorical exercises called progymnasmata (προγυμνάσματα). New Testament scholarship has started to recognize that rhetorical techniques and principles in the progymnasmata informed the evangelists’ adaptation of chreiai. By examining these conventions in detail, we can appreciate more accurately the literary sequence of the synoptics.

Thus far we have used the term composition, and we need to briefly explain it. While as we have seen, the evangelists likely employed imitatio, I do not find this term adequate to describe their close, sustained use of sources—the use we see for instance through a gospel synopsis. According to Derrenbacker, an appropriate ancient label for

107 Teresa Morgan has helpfully distinguished educational theory and educational practice. Her comments inform my decision to divide my study along these lines. Teresa Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, Cambridge Classical Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5-6.
108 To what degree this theory conforms to literary practice is a question we shall take up in Chapters 2 and 3.
110 Recall Burridge’s statement that it is time for critics to examine the progymnasmata for techniques that can illuminate the gospels’ transformation of their sources. See “Gospels and Acts,” 512 (above, Introduction).
111 Scholars including Brodie characterize the evangelists’ use of sources as μίμησις (Latin imitatio). According to Brodie, we should understand paraphrasing and close adherence to sources as one expression of imitatio, found in genres of historiography and biography; see “Greco-Roman Imitation,” 20, 31. For a similar view see MacDonald, Homeric Epics, 4-5, 172.
112 For instance, in seeking to “emulate” (to improve on) their sources; in antiquity, aemulatio was a popular element of imitation, on which see MacDonald, Homeric Epics, 6.
this close use of sources is συγγράφειν: “to write” or “to compose.”\textsuperscript{113} Composition
denotes using the literary material of one’s predecessor, at times very closely and at times
with substantial changes.\textsuperscript{114} Such composition, which looks different from the more
piecemeal and allusive technique of imitatio, is indeed a term of choice among Greek
historians.\textsuperscript{115} We find συγγράφειν\textsuperscript{116} in at least four historiographic works spanning
several centuries in Jewish and non-Jewish environments.\textsuperscript{117} Thucydides for instance uses
συγγράφειν, having “written the history of the war [Ἐνέγρουσ τὸν πόλεμον] waged
by the Peloponnesians and the Athenians against one another.”\textsuperscript{118} Lucian of Samosata
uses the term in his work’s title, ΠΩΣ ΔΕΙ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΝ ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ (How to Write
History), and often in his text to describe “writing history.”\textsuperscript{119} Likewise, Arrian sets out
to make a “composition” (ἱ συγγραφή),\textsuperscript{120} while Josephus remarks similarly in the
Jewish Antiquities.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{113} Derrenbacker, \textit{Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem}, 53-54, 75-76, esp. 61-62.
For this term see LSJ, and cp. συγγραφέως: “one who collects and writes down historic facts, historian”;
“then, generally, prose-writer”; “simply, writer, author.” Similar Latin terms include compono and
conscribo. Other critics have similarly distinguished \textit{imitatio} from techniques that appear more descriptive
of the gospels’ techniques such as paraphrase. P. S. Alexander for example distinguishes Josephus’
imitation of a model (Dionysius of Halicarnassus) from his paraphrasing of sources (such as the Bible). See
Philip S. Alexander, “Retelling the Old Testament,” in \textit{It is Written: Scripture Citing Scripture. Essays in

\textsuperscript{114} Derrenbacker, \textit{Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem}, 44, 61-62.

\textsuperscript{115} For ways in which Lucian and Arrian follow their sources, see Brodie, “Greco-Roman Imitation,” 27-32.

\textsuperscript{116} Various Greek words have been translated as “compose”: see for example the translations of Theon,
ἀπαγγέλλειν (“will . . . compose”).

\textsuperscript{117} Josephus employs several related terms: ἐκδιηγήσασθαι (“to narrate” [\textit{Ant.} 1.4]), διάτοξα (“translation
. . . [of] the Hebrew records [\textit{Ant.} 1.5]), συνήθειαν (“rendering” [\textit{Ant.} 1.8]), μεταφράσει (“to “translate”
[\textit{Ant.} 1.11]) and ποιήσατε (“to follow” [\textit{Ant.} 1.17]) (LCL, trans. Thackeray).

\textsuperscript{118} Thucydides, \textit{Hist.} 1.1.1 (LCL, trans. Smith).

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Hist. conser.} 2.4,5,6 (LCL, trans. Kilburn).

\textsuperscript{120} Anabasis 1.Pr.3 (LCL, trans. Brunt). In 1.Pr.1 Arrian refers to historians having ταύτα . . .
συγγράφαν (translated by Brunt as “given . . . accounts”).

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ant.} 1.1, 1.6 (LCL, trans. Thackeray). Authors use other terms too: ἀναγράφω (“to record” in Plutarch,
\textit{Per.} 2.4 [LCL, trans. Perrin], and γράφω (“to write” in Lucian, \textit{Hist. conser.} 12 [LCL, trans. Kilburn]).
Theon uses words including λογοσκοποῦς (“prose writer,” 2.141 [trans. Butts]) and λόγος (a “writing,”
Let us turn to examine how students learned to compose rhetorical forms, chiefly the *chreia* but also forms found alongside and even within chreiai. To this end, we shall first introduce ancient rhetoric and rhetorical education. Then we shall describe the chreia and important related forms in the context of the progymnasmata. After surveying the progymnasmata, we shall turn to focus on techniques and principles or “rules” from the progymnasmata and more advanced rhetorical tradition that governed good composition of chreiai.

### 1.1: Ancient Rhetoric: An Overview

Underlying ancient literary composition is *rhetoric*, “the science of speaking well” (*bene dicendi scientia*), or more precisely the science of speaking effectively in the service of instructing, entertaining or persuading an audience. Ancient definitions of rhetoric share a basic concern for communicating in a compelling way.

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2.142-143 [trans. Butts]); he also uses ποιέω ("composing" units in larger works, e.g., refutations, 2.147 [trans. Butts]). As Derrenbacker has recently indicated, a label such as “editing” sounds anachronistic while “composition” sounds more realistic: *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem*, 8, 53-54; cp. pp. 61-62, 65.

122 The importance to chreia interpretation of other related rhetorical forms in the gospels is clarified by (for instance) Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 187, 198.

123 For basic definitions and these words of Quintilian, see Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 13; cp. Kennedy, *New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 4-5 (activities of rhetoric), 6 (oral and written modes of rhetoric). In his *New History*, Kennedy adds that rhetoric “is applicable equally to public speaking and written composition.”

124 Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 13; cp. May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 23; Christopher Pelling, *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian*, Approaching the Ancient World (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 1; and Mack, *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, 31-48. For sample ancient definitions see (as quoted by Kennedy, above): Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.2.2 (LCL, trans. Freese): ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ενδεχόμενον πιθανὸν ("Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever": 1.2.2); Quintilian 2.15.1-3, 2.15.33-34 (LCL, trans. Butler): Est . . . frequentissimus finis, rhetoricien esse vm persuadendi ("We get the common definition of rhetoric as the power of persuading": 2.15.3); *Nos autem ingressi formare perfectum oratorem, quem in primis esse virum bonum volumus* ("For my part, I have undertaken the task of moulding the ideal orator, and . . . my first desire is that he be a good man": 2.15.33); *Huic eius substantiae maxime convenient finito, rhetoricien esse bene dicendi scientiam* ("The definition which best suits its real character is that which makes rhetoric the *science of speaking well*": 2.15.34). The essential aim to communicate persuasively (or rather, effectively) should not eclipse the numerous differences among teachers of rhetoric.
fact define rhetoric in slightly more precise terms, for we need to distinguish it from
oratory (speeches). While rhetoric was a science that informed all composition, oratory
was the main genre that rhetoric informed and with which it concerned itself.\textsuperscript{125}

The fundamental features of rhetoric come chiefly from handbooks (τεχναί) like the
*Art of Rhetoric* by Aristotle (384-322 BCE), the *Rhetoric for Herrenius* (first century
BCE), the dialogue *De Oratore* by Cicero (106-43 BCE), and large parts of the *Institutio
Oratoria* by Quintilian (ca. 35-95 CE).\textsuperscript{126} There were also more elementary handbooks
listing exercises (progymnasmata) which introduced the basic techniques.\textsuperscript{127} At base,
rhetorical theory aims to develop skill in composing speeches, particularly judicial and
deliberative speeches, and to this end rhetoric sets forth fundamental features that inform
not only speeches but also further literary genres too.\textsuperscript{128}

What exactly are these “fundamentals” of rhetoric? First, speakers can achieve
persuasion, entertainment or instruction in precise ways: by demonstrating their own
credibility of character (or Ἰθώσ); by creating particular emotions in their audience
(emotion is called πάθος); and by appealing to the audience’s sense of reason and
intelligence (the Greek word for such reason is λόγος). The common term for these three
means of persuasion is *proofs* (πίστεις), or more precisely artistic proofs, since the

\textsuperscript{125} Esp. Richard A. Burridge, “Biography,” in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period,

\textsuperscript{126} Mack, *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, 31-32; for τεχναί see Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the
Hellenistic School,” 33.

School,” 33-35.

\textsuperscript{128} For the focus of rhetoric upon these types of speeches, see Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 13.
On the relevance of rhetoric for composing certain types of literature (for instance biographies), see
“Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 34, 63-65.
A second fundamental feature of rhetoric is to characterize communication within one of three “species” (*genera*), defined chiefly by aim. These species are known as judicial, deliberative and epideictic. Judicial (or forensic) speeches aim to persuade an audience to adopt a particular interpretation of some past event(s). Such speeches were common in courts, and resemble speeches today employed by prosecuting and defense attorneys. The deliberative speech aims to persuade an audience to follow a particular policy or strategy, and was usually employed in deliberative assemblies (for instance, in the Athenian assembly of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE). The third species of speech, called *epideictic*, is speech “that does not aim at a specific action but is intended to influence the values and beliefs of the audience.”

The catchphrase that we often use to define epideictic is “praise or blame” of an individual on such occasions as funerals or civic celebrations. The aforementioned three speech species are then, distinct, but scholars recognize that deliberative and judicial are essentially the same in form, while the epideictic requires different conventions.

Proofs and speech species are two building blocks of effective communication. But rhetorical theory also puts these to work within a framework of five rhetorical activities. These activities are invention (*ἐὑρεσία*), arrangement (*τάξις*), style (*λέξις*), memory (*μνήμη*) and delivery (*υποκρισία*). The first activity is to invent or develop

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129 Kennedy, *New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 4-5; Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 14, 15. As Kennedy notes here (p. 15), there were also *inaesthetic* proofs: essentially, material which exists independent of the speaker.


133 See esp. May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 28-29. Cp. Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 52-53. Mack adds, “The differentiations among the three modes of persuasion were theoretical, and never restricted the use of any means of persuasion which might be found appropriate or helpful to a given rhetorical occasion.”

material, and to do this does not necessarily mean fabrication but rather “thinking out the subject matter.” What usually necessitates invention is a dispute, called a στάσις or “issue,” which implies at least two opposing interpretations. Hence at the heart of invention is to decide what to say in service of a particular interpretation of an issue. The material that a speaker invents to this end is essentially πίστις (proof) of the various kinds listed a moment ago. These proofs include audience emotion (πάθος), the speaker’s character (ήθος), and reasoning strategies (λόγος). Essential to λόγος are building blocks of content known as “topics” (τόποι): some τόποι are themes, like wealth, age and ability; others are “strategies” of reasoning, which Kennedy classifies into “four groups . . . the possible and impossible, past fact, future fact, and degree.” In addition to τόποι there are further strategies of argumentation, foremost among them the ἐνθυμημα ("entymeme"), a conclusion that a speaker builds upon premises.

Many teachers regarded invention as the first activity, followed by arrangement. Theoretically, the arrangement of a judicial speech entailed some five parts: the προοίμιον (or exordium), διηγημα (narratio), πρόθεσις (propositio or key point), πίστις (argumentatio), and ἐπίλογος (conclusio). These parts helped to

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138 Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 16-17. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 16, notes that there was inductive and deductive logical proof: “Logical argument [λόγος] is of two forms, either inductive, which uses a series of examples to point to a general conclusion, or deductive, which enunciates premises probably acceptable to an audience and draws a deductive conclusion from the premises.” As for learning to distinguish and compose an inductive proof and a deductive proof, Bonner explains this was a separate art from the creation of topics: see Education in Ancient Rome, 302-303.
139 On which see for example, May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 30-32.
140 Necessary as this part might seem (and important as it will be in New Testament speech forms), May and Wisse note that it was not that common in ancient speeches. For this part as well as other less common parts, such as the divisio and digressio, see “Introduction,” 29.
structure a speech coherently; they also demanded particular proof—namely, ἡθος in the prooimion, λόγος in the διήγησις and πίστεις, and πάθος in the ἐπίλογος.\(^{142}\) Beyond arrangement, theorists placed great importance on proper expression or style, for which there were numerous conventions, systematized later into four ἀρεται or virtutes: correctness (ἐλληνισμός),\(^{143}\) clarity (σαφήνεια), ornament (κόσμος) and propriety (τὸ πρέπον).\(^{144}\) In all, rhetoric encouraged particular conventions for inventing, arranging and expressing material effectively. Training in rhetoric was the surest means bene dicere.\(^{145}\)

1.2: Rhetoric in Education

How would a person intrigued by rhetoric go about learning it? Clearly there was more to education than simply finding a handbook (τεχνή). We need to first remember that rhetoric was one of the most highly regarded components and products of ancient education, and this is on account of its close association with παιδεία or culture.\(^{146}\) To pursue a proper education meant to pursue a literate education, an education in how to read, write and speak well.\(^{147}\) And to pursue a literate education meant to pursue a curriculum that reached its apogee in the proper composition of literary genres, in

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142 Mack, *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, 35-36 (“Nevertheless, ethos and pathos always had to be kept in mind throughout the entire speech. It was the content of the speech itself (logos), however that received the greatest attention in the handbooks”); cp. Kennedy, *New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 5; for a more nuanced summary see Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 275, 355, 431, 437.
143 As Lausberg defines it, “the idiomatically correct manner of expression”: *Handbook* § 463, 458.
144 For Greek terms see Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 463, 528, 538, 1055.
146 The other summit of education was philosophy, though it appears to have attracted far fewer students and not to have shared quite the same lustre as rhetoric: on philosophical study see H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. George Lamb (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 206, 253-254.
147 This definition comes essentially from Morgan, *Literate Education*, 3.
particular oratory, built on conventions of rhetoric. Literate education, then, was not “all rhetoric,” but it did seek to advance students towards a knowledge of rhetoric.\footnote{See Marrou, \textit{History of Education}, 194. For a similar characterization of rhetoric and use of “literate education” (over against “numerate education” or mathematics, as well as musical and physical education), see Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 2-9, 21 esp. 4-6.}

The ideology that lurked behind rhetorical training was simple: rhetoric trained people who were to assume political authority in the Roman Empire.\footnote{See following note.} As Morgan makes clear, rhetorical training was unabashedly “elite,” directed not to all and sundry, as modern models of public education might lead us to assume, but rather to children from high status families who would partake in government.\footnote{Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 19-23, esp. 33 (regarding literacy in general), 71-72, 82, 230-234 (pp. 226-234), 234-239, 269-270, 271-272. For equation of Greek and Latin education see p. 24. On Cicero’s views see May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 11-12.} And if it needs mention at all, scholars recognize that in spite of the occasional participation of elite females in education as teachers and students, education was a male preserve.\footnote{For a recent appraisal applicable to the ancient Mediterranean, see Raffaella Cribiore, \textit{Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt} (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 1-2, 74-76; cp. Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 48-49 and n. 149.} For such elite youth, rhetoric supplied cultural status and in turn undergirded political status.\footnote{Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 4, 23, 74, 266 (in these instances, though, Morgan does not speak of “rhetoric” over against lower levels of education, but rather of education generally: the higher the education, the greater the degree of status, and in turn the greater the opportunity and scope for political influence.)} There was an ideology also behind the more basic literate education in grammar, reading and writing that led to rhetoric. Such education sought to provide people of lower social status with a sense of engagement with and participation in Greek culture.\footnote{Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 56-57, esp. 72, 74, 88: “widespread teaching of the elements of literacy and reading of literature” (pp. 56-57). On developments and changes in educational levels, see \textit{Literate Education}, 63-64.} Ancient society seems to have channelled literate education towards fewer and fewer people, the more advanced such education became.\footnote{Quotation from Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 51, 56-57 and 62, for example (with specific reference to Egypt), 65, 71, 74, 84, 88-89 (pp. 74-89). As she notes, in terms of actual practice, “it is possible to build
Apropos of comments on ideology, it is important to recognize that in antiquity there was no standardized and publicly administered “school system.” The point might seem obvious but it requires underlining here. As Bonner points out in his classic work on the subject, a Roman literate education was privately funded, it was inaccessible to many people who could not afford its expense, and it was never mandatory. Moreover, scholarship suggests that literate education had a very limited reach, most children never completing all of its roughly defined curricular stages—let alone its preliminary stages. In his nuanced discussion of ancient literacy W. V. Harris estimates the general ability to read and to write in the Roman Empire at a mere 10% at most, although he emphasizes that levels varied somewhat with place, time and culture. This figure is a powerful witness to the limitations in even basic reading and writing skills. Moreover, to complete a literate education – that is, to engage rhetoric, the highest level of study – was an achievement only for those who could afford its requisite leisure and expense; in other words, for a remarkably small and socially elite segment of the population, composed up a picture of widespread teaching of the elements of literacy and reading of literature. The next stages of education – grammar and rhetoric – went on in far fewer places” (pp. 56-57); also cp. pp. 64-65.

155 Morgan, *Literate Education*, 25-28, 52, 67-68. She reminds us (pp. 27-28) that in antiquity there was no regulatory body for education and hence neither funding for all children nor uniform standards and curricula.


157 See Morgan, *Literate Education* (above).

158 “[O]nly a very small fraction of those in Egypt who learned to read and write and to read some literature, progressed as far as learning grammar.” Morgan, *Literate Education*, 163; cp. pp. 72, 112, 117-118, 245, 273. The limited reach of literate education is strongly suggested by the rather limited reach of literacy (see note below).

more than likely of members of the highest social orders (at Rome, senators and knights; in the empire, provincial aristocrats).  

How ought we describe such an education, given the disparity in conditions and in “standardization” across the ancient Mediterranean world? To begin, let us consider three general characteristics of literate education that had a bearing on the culture in which the evangelists learned to read and write. The first characteristic is memorization and mnemonic skill. When students learned their Greek alphabet, and later went on to read material such as chreiai, fables and poetry, they had to *memorize* it. Consequently, they developed strong mnemonic skills. A second characteristic is use of μίμησις or *imitatio*, imitation, as a means for learning how to write. As Morgan comments,

Imitation occurs at every stage of *enkyklios paideia* and forms one of its most important articulating features. Hard on the heels of infusion and memory at every stage, it helps the child to learn to speak in infancy, to write, to practise literary criticism, and it is the means by which he practices what he is taught in rhetoric, culminating in the time when he no longer requires to be taught. . . it is always habit-forming, and this is its most important characteristic and the key to its function in education.

Concern for *imitatio* appears in Theon’s progymnasmata, where Theon explains how listening to (ἀκροασίας) and reading (ἀνάγνωσίας) the best literature enables students to compose well. A third characteristic that Morgan highlights is the non-critical character of most literate education: students did not learn to read and write in order to

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160 Morgan, *Literate Education*, 190. Even here however, notes Morgan, evidence from papyrus school texts shows that most students did not learn nearly as much as rhetorical handbooks suggest (pp. 199, 225-226).
develop analytical ability and creativity.\textsuperscript{165} Granted, such skills were relevant for a very few highly educated pupils who went on to compose original essays about society or government or ethics, and Marrou notes that students learned conventions for identifying a text’s literary and moral features.\textsuperscript{166} But illustrative of Morgan’s insight that education in reality tended not exactly to mirror educational theory\textsuperscript{167} is the fact that most students focused more simply on absorbing information. As she puts it,

The pupil did not have the option . . . of doing things his own way, or in an unconventional order. He was dependent on his teachers to tell him what to do and when, a condition which must have been exacerbated by the practice of feeding students short extracts from literature, to be copied out of context: a line to copy on a writing board, a papyrus with one or two or ten lines of Homer written on it. An education arranged like this may have taught what it set out to teach very efficiently, but the autonomy of the pupil was not, until the very highest levels, among its aims.\textsuperscript{168}

In all, the various stages of education encouraged students to memorize, imitate and absorb material.

Work on literate education has yielded consensus on basic features that span time and space.\textsuperscript{169} The Greeks envisaged education as an \textit{enkyklios paideia}, a “general education,” whose literate component in the form of reading, writing, grammar and rhetoric had a fairly consistent structure.\textsuperscript{170} Probably the most outstanding fact of

\textsuperscript{165} Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 92-93, 102-103, 224-225.
\textsuperscript{166} Marrou, \textit{History of Education}, 166-170.
\textsuperscript{167} Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 225, cp. 64-65, 94-100. She adds, on the other hand, that in outline the accounts of educational practice found in literary sources are accurate (p. 37).
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Literate Education}, 93; cp. Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. x, and Marrou, \textit{History of Education}, 174-175. Hock notes the consensus in “Homer in Greco-Roman Education,” 56. Indeed, work by Marrou and Bonner, and more recent scholarship by Hock and Morgan, indicate some consistent practices in ancient study. On the broad uniformity of educational practice in antiquity, see especially Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 23-24, 44-45, 50; on the similarity between essential features of Greek and Roman (i.e., Latin language) education, see Bonner, \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, 165.
\textsuperscript{169} For the term see Morgan, \textit{Literate Education}, 33-34; Quintilian quotes the Greek as ‘\gamma\kappa\upsilon\kappa\lambda\iota\sigmaς \pi\alpha\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha’ (1.10.1 [LCL, trans. Butler]); English translation from Marrou, \textit{History of Education}, 176-177. On
enkyklios paideia is this consistent structure. Broadly speaking, scholars, most recently R. F. Hock and Raffaella Cribiore, agree that the structure contains three stages: a “primary” stage, a “secondary” or “grammar” stage, and a “tertiary” or rhetorical stage.\footnote{Hock notes its classical statement in Marrou and in Bonner, upon whose insights I rely in the main, below. See Hock, “Homer in Greco-Roman Education,” 56, 59 ff. Cp. Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 2, 160-244; Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 44 (for Rome); Marrou, History of Education, 160. Morgan, reminds us of the discrepancy between the “theory” and the “practice” of education, the latter tending not to rise to the sophistication of the former. See Literate Education, 51-52.}

The first, primary stage of literate education aimed to develop basic skills in reading and writing.\footnote{See Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O’Neil, The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises, Translated and Edited by Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O’Neil, SLBWGRW 2 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), 2, 51; for nuances recently proposed to the three-stage model, see pp. 2-4. Marrou suggests that education at the primary level began at age seven (History of Education, 143). Morgan regards claims about age, regulation and uniformity, and universal progression through the stages, as poorly grounded in actual schooltexts and as simplifications of actual practice; see Literate Education, 67-68.} Under the tutelage of an instructor who was often called a γραμματιστής, pupils learned the Greek alphabet and basic grammar (the identifying of syllables, letters, basic speech units such as verbs and nouns, and a limited vocabulary), as well as their application in reading and writing.\footnote{Morgan, Literate Education, 90 (actual contents of study are not really her focus, and mentioned in passing); cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 165; Marrou, History of Education, 150-157.} The method of learning here appears to have been graduated, for the instructor taught students first to sound and to write letters and syllables, then words, then sentences, then short wisdom sayings called gnomai (or maxims or apophthegmata), and then brief passages such as a fable.\footnote{Hock, “Homer in Greco-Roman Education,” 59; Marrou, History of Education, 150-157 (esp. 155; on the γραμματιστής see p. 144); Morgan, Literate Education, 71; Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 165-180.} The actual contents of such learning came often from Homeric texts, the Iliad and Odyssey.\footnote{Morgan, Literate Education, 70, 105; Hock, “Homer in Greco-Roman Education,” 56, 62-63.}

Interestingly enough, an ideal education according to Quintilian began at the beginning in infancy, when infants ought to absorb and imitate sounds from their nurse and parents. “No doubt,” Quintilian writes, “the most important point is that they (nurses) should be of
good character: . . . they should speak correctly as well.”¹⁷⁶ In any event, the well-to-do youngster began acquiring literacy by studying grammatical basics along with elementary reading and writing.¹⁷⁷

A secondary and far less commonly reached stage¹⁷⁸ the ancients often characterized as study of grammar. This stage built upon the primary stage: pupils continued learning to read and write, but now at a level that was more complex and more directly focused on preparing speeches. As Marrou tells it, the subject matter was threefold: the detailed study of grammar, the reading and interpretation of poetry, and a training in rhetorical forms like the χρεία (chreia) and ways of modifying them.¹⁷⁹ It was to a different class of teacher called a γραμματίκος (Latin grammaticus) that this stage of education belonged.¹⁸⁰ Children learned grammar now in more detail, grammar that we find for instance in the manual by Dionysius of Thrace, with its focus upon the distinctive forms and functions of verbs, nouns and other elements.¹⁸¹ Reading (accompanied by recitation) now focused upon larger swaths of classic poetry, especially Homer and

¹⁷⁶ Quintilian refers here to nurses, although he appears to feel similarly about parents: 1.1.4-6 (LCL, trans. Butler).
¹⁷⁷ Morgan suggests that the three educational stages were arranged in a particular way: the first is a “core” (a stage far more common) while the latter two constitute a “periphery” (stages much less common) and were but two among several other peripheral options for study; Literate Education, 70-72. Cp. the helpful summary by Hock, “Homer in Greco-Roman Education,” 58, 59.
¹⁷⁸ See note above.
¹⁷⁹ Marrou, History of Education, 164-175; cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 189 (pp. 189-197), 198-211, 212 (pp. 212-225), 228 (pp. 227-249), 250-251 (pp. 250-276).
¹⁸¹ Marrou, History of Education, 170; cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 189: “At the primary stage, it had been sufficient to train the child’s observation, memory and imitative capacity; he learned to recognize the shapes of the letters, knew their names, practised forming them in writing, and could pronounce them as they occurred in syllables and words. At the secondary stage, he was introduced to a closer study of their phonetic values, and became familiar with their standard classification,” as well as with matters such as correct spelling and pronunciation, what Bonner calls “correctness in speech and writing” (pp. 198-199). On the learning of grammar cp. Hock and O’Neil, The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises, 51; they add that “instead of merely reading short, connected passages, . . . students] started to read and interpret lengthy literary works, primarily Homer,” too.
Moreover, teachers supplemented reading with a more total appreciation: “the grammarian’s treatment of an author had four stages: criticism of the text [text criticism], reading, exposition [summation of contents] and judgment [identification of virtue in the work]—διόρθωσις, ἀνάγνωσις, ἔξηγησις, κρίσις.” Significantly, students here were learning already to make judgements about a text, thus preparing them to take and explain a position.

Significantly too, it is in this secondary stage that pupils also began learning rhetorical forms—forms like the chreia—through exercises called progymnasmata or “exercises preliminary to the study of declamation.” The progymnasmata mark the transition to and prepare for speech composition (or declamation), the ultimate goal of a literate education. Hence, at this stage, rhetorical techniques already become a major interest, anticipating concerns to come more fully later.

These concerns emerge fully in the tertiary, highest stage of literate education: rhetoric and its application in oratory. According to Marrou, this rhetorical stage (taught by a ῥήτωρ) consisted of the “theory” of rhetoric—its goals, species, activities and

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182 Marrou, History of Education, 162-164 (on recitation see p. 166); for reading of Homer, cp. Hock, “Homer in Greco-Roman Education,” 64: “[I]nstead of merely reading sentences or short passages of poetry, they started to read and interpret lengthy literary works, always Homer and principally the Iliad, but also other poets, most likely Euripides and perhaps Menander.”

183 Marrou, History of Education, 165 (for the exercise of commenting upon a text, cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 237, 248). Marrou also indicates the importance attached to absorbing ethical lessons which Greek culture perceived in classic works (pp. 169-170).

184 Cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 244.


186 For instance, Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 33, 35; cp. Hock and O’Neil, The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises, 81-82. The extent to which pupils undertook progymnasmata within the context of grammar training versus within the higher, rhetorical stage seems a matter of some debate: see Marrou, History of Education, 172; cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 250-251; Hock and O’Neil regard it as essentially part of the rhetorical stage: see The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises, 81. The division of progymnasmata, however, is really not germane for our study. The key point is that the progymnasmata prepared students for rhetorical training per se.

187 Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. x: “Boys usually began [rhetorical study] between the age of twelve and fifteen.”
theory of speech construction—along with “practice” in actual speech composition.\textsuperscript{188} Such speeches were called \textit{declamations} (\textit{μελέται}, \textit{declamationes}), “the crowning achievement to which the long study of grammar, essay-writing, paraphrase, character-delineation, commonplaces . . . and the other exercises which filled the Roman school curriculum, was designed to lead.”\textsuperscript{189} Such rhetorical training was the apex of literate education, and it might well have capped the training that the evangelists brought to the composition of their gospels.

The focus of the rest of this chapter will be \textit{secondary} education, more precisely the progymnasmata. Why focus on the progymnasmata instead of the far more encyclopaedic rhetorical handbooks?\textsuperscript{190} Our reasons are threefold. First, Mack rightly comments that the progymnasmata actually give a clearer outline of compositional techniques than the handbooks.\textsuperscript{191} Second, we simply cannot afford to survey the whole field of Classical rhetoric; it is too wide, and to investigate it in detail calls to mind the proverbial toss of a new swimmer into a pool’s deep end.

But the most important reason for examining the progymnasmata is their \textit{relevance} for the synoptic gospels and synoptic problem. The work of Mack and Robbins strongly indicates that the evangelists had progymnastic training, since the evangelists so often employ rhetorical forms such as chreiai, and techniques such as chreia elaboration,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{188} Marrou, \textit{History of Education}, 197-202; Hock and O’Neil, \textit{The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises}, 79-81.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Stanley F. Bonner, \textit{Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire} (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949), vi. For discussion of the form and typical features of declamations (including their extension of the forms and techniques that students had already learned), see pp. 51-70. Cp. Marrou, \textit{History of Education}, 202-204.
\item \textsuperscript{190} In fact, later in this chapter we shall examine some major and recurring components in rhetorical handbooks. We shall not, however, examine the philosophical tradition of \textit{dialectic} and its tradition of arguing for and against theses, on which see Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{191} “These handbooks . . . assumed readers with a general knowledge of rhetorical practice and thus are slim on preliminary matters having to do with the learning of rhetoric.” Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 33; on the importance of progymnasmata cp. Bonner, \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, 276.
\end{itemize}
introduced therein. In all likelihood, the evangelists did have training from texts like the progymnasmata; they might even have had more advanced training. The tendency in the last century, it is well known, has been to regard the evangelists as representatives of a little-educated Christian underclass, whose gospels constitute a *Kleinkliteratur* qualitatively well beneath the erudite literature of pagan authors. We have become increasingly aware, however, that the idiosyncratic qualities of Koinē Greek style should not mask the skill that informs the gospels’ composition. The gospels, we now recognize, are not *Kleinkliteratur*, but rather rhetorically informed works. And this means that they are products of a rhetorical education. Indeed, somebody who could compose a Greek gospel in a world where few people could write their own names, almost certainly had exposure to higher rhetorical training. Mark for instance must have had—at the least—progymnastic training, for he can compose in sophisticated ways; he can for instance compose an entire chreia elaboration (Mark 2:18-22), as work

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192 Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 196-200; cp. Hock, “General Introduction,” 37-41. According to Black, “To demonstrate that . . . the authors of the Gospels received formal education in rhetoric is as impossible as it is needless. Undeniably they were born into a culture whose everyday modes of oral and written discourse were saturated with a rhetorical tradition.” Black, *Rhetoric of the Gospel*, 3; cp. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 9-10 and Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 254. Significantly, Kennedy on p. 22 adds that, “If students subsequently undertook serious literary work, they tended to utilize progymnasmatic forms in the development of their thought” (emphasis added).


196 For comments on the evangelist’ education see Burridge, “The Gospels and Acts,” 510, 530. I agree with Burridge that evangelists had training at the “secondary level” from progymnasmata. But *contra* Burridge I believe that the evangelists’ training extended into the higher, rhetorical level; and I disagree with him that “it is unlikely . . . [Mark] has had any formal training in Greek rhetoric. It would be surprising if he took the secondary and higher classes in rhetorical composition but had missed the primary linguistic training in the use of καί and ο郤!” (p. 530). Downing reminds us that apparent infelicities of style mark “a difference at the most superficial and least significant level. When we come to contents and kinds of content, then closely comparable material abounds” (“A Bas Les Aristos,” 217).
by Wolfgang Schenk makes clear.\(^{197}\) Given we know that some synoptic material shows a keen awareness of higher rhetorical theory, it is attractive to imagine the evangelists having partaken of higher education.\(^{198}\) But whether or not the evangelists partook of such training, they surely had training from progymnasmata. By perusing progymnastic discussion of the chreia and of closely related forms, we can illuminate the evangelists’ use of sources.\(^{199}\)

1.3: The Progymnasmata: An Overview

The term *progymnasmata* (προγυμνάσματα) or “preparatory exercises”\(^ {200}\) denotes two important things: first, rhetorical *forms* (the chreia for instance is a progymnasma); and second, *techniques* for modifying these forms.\(^ {201}\) The recent translations and critical editions by George Kennedy, J. R. Butts and Michel Patillon will offer a good introduction.

As “preparatory exercises,” a treatise of progymnasmata has two goals. The first is to introduce basic rhetorical forms like the chreia and so provide a basis for reading

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\(^ {198}\) For indications of advanced rhetoric in the gospels see Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 196-198, 200, esp. 198.

\(^ {199}\) We must be careful not to force rhetorical patterns upon the gospels (so Black, *Rhetoric of the Gospel*, 21). But we must also recognize that patterns in the gospels often reflect rhetorical patterns closely enough to justify interpreting the former by the latter.

\(^ {200}\) LSJ, s.v.; also Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. x.

and composition in any literary genre. Accordingly, a treatise of progymnasmata defines rhetorical forms, introduces techniques for adapting them (techniques useful for lending variety to one’s composition and/or adapting others’ compositions), and prescribes virtues (ἀρεταί) for them.

Second, a treatise of progymnasmata teaches how to construct a speech. Already it teaches this indirectly through introducing rhetorical forms (above); but it also introduces particular forms, like the chreia, thesis and law that approximate a speech itself. Mack summarizes the aims of progymnasmata as follows:

These graded lessons allowed for learning through memorization, imitation, and practice as an introduction to the whole system of rhetorical theory and technique. Basic skills in the analysis of issues (quaestio; στάσις), the building of a persuasive case (inventio), practice in composing material appropriate to the various parts of the speech (prooemium, narratio, argumentatio, conclusio), exercises in argumentation (κατασκευή) and rebuttal (ἀνασκευή), considerations of style (including figura), diction (λεξις) and delivery—all would be engaged.

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202 Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. ix; cp. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.70); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 13; cp. 2.59/p. 3. Christopher Pelling notes that rhetorical techniques extended beyond the genre of oratory into the composition of prose genres including history and biography. Pelling, Literary Texts and the Greek Historian, 1-2; cp. Marrou, History of Education, 195. Hock and O’Neil point out the progymnasmata’s pedagogical function in introducing rhetoric: “Better to begin with shorter, simpler compositions that . . . teach the rudiments of rhetorical argumentation and style. . . . [T]he progymnasmata provided this intermediary step between the simpler lessons learned . . . [at the second stage] and the more complex . . . [rhetorical stage]”; see The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises, 81.

203 Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 34, 36 (“skills”); Henderson, “Quintilian and the Progymnasmata,” 94. Most critics recognize that what were initially exercises were compositional techniques which the student would use throughout his career: see for instance, Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 35.

204 On variety see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.60); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 4. Theon indicates in his discussion of paraphrase that he understands these techniques are useful for adapting sources: see Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.62-63); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 6.

205 See for instance, Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.62); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 6.


In what follows, we shall examine three treatises of progymnasmata that appear closest in time to the gospels. These are the progymnasmata of Aelius Theon of Alexandria, the progymnasmata discussed by Quintilian and the progymnasmata of Hermogenes.\(^{209}\) While there is some dispute concerning specific dates, we can be reasonably sure of the broader timeframes.\(^{210}\) And there are good reasons to locate these or similar exercises in the mid- to late first century. Progymnasmata had come into use long before—as early as the first or second centuries BCE.\(^{211}\) More significantly, recent scholarship has shown that the synoptic evangelists were aware of such preparatory exercises, if not from Hermogenes, then from work quite similar to his.\(^{212}\) Hence a judicious use of progymnasmata can help us illuminate the evangelists’ composition with chreiai and closely related forms and techniques.\(^{213}\)

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\(^{210}\) As regards Theon, Patillon, *Aelius Théon*, xvi, places him before Quintilian, in the early to mid first century CE. Recently, Malcolm Heath has argued Theon lived at a very late date (fifth century CE); see “Theon and the history of the progymnasmata,” *GRBS* 43 (2002/3): 129-60. Heath’s view however is not the majority view: for agreement on a late first or early second century date, see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 1. In any event, our analysis will show that Theon’s progymnasmata do help describe and interpret conventions in the gospels.

\(^{211}\) Hock, “General Introduction,” 10 and nn. 54-56.

\(^{212}\) See Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition and the Beelzebul Controversy,” 177; Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 195-198.

\(^{213}\) For the chronological sequence Theon-Quintilian-Hermogenes, see discussion in notes above. Sometimes, Theon, Hermogenes and Quintilian can give distinct labels for a similar technique. From time to time, this ambiguity will force us to choose one label, but still to acknowledge the others.
1.3.1: The Progymnasmata of Theon

While there has been a tendency to conclude that Theon’s exercises did not reflect educational practice very closely, they are still worth examining here. Theon’s progymnasmata is one of our few extant educational treatises. What is more, we should not assume that Theon’s exercises were unknown: there are too few documents at all from the early Common Era to assume that. Theon’s numerous insights are typical to some degree, for he repeatedly illustrates his teaching with examples by authors including Thucydides and Homer.

Recent work shows that Theon arranges his exercises to help students make the transition from grammar to rhetoric, “based on the criterion of ‘from the easier to the more difficult.’” The exercises move in pedagogical stages, from grammar modification towards argumentation, and in turn from argumentation on “widely agreed upon subjects” towards argumentation on subjects for which there are multiple positions. Below we outline Theon’s main pedagogical stages.

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214 Paraphrasing I. H. Henderson: “Comparison of Quintilian and the standard Progymnasmata with Theon places the latter in the light of an innovator and experimenter over against prevenient tradition.” Henderson, “Quintilian and the Progymnasmata,” esp. 90-91, 94 and literature there.

215 See notes below on work by Butts, Patillon and Henderson; cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 253, 267.

216 Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 14; cp. similarly Patillon, Aelius Théon, xxi, xxix-xxx.

217 Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 19.

218 The essential outline I combine from 1. Patillon, Aelius Théon, xxvii-xviii (and n. 43 there), xxix-xxx, and 2. Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 18, 19-20 (Butts also makes explicit the “pedagogical” character of the stages [p. 15]). The terminology (first and second cycle; first and second-order) I borrow and adapt from Henderson, “Quintilian and the Progymnasmata,” 94. I have added some subtitles and further terms to clarify Patillon’s outline. I follow Patillon in believing that the second-cycle (accompanying) exercises were done not only alongside chreia, fable and narrative but in fact throughout the whole sequence of ten first-cycle exercises, contra Butts.
First pedagogical stage:

**“First cycle” exercises**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First-order exercise</th>
<th>Second-order exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. chreia (inflexion, reading, listening, paraphrase)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. fable (recitation, comment, reading, listening, paraphrase)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. narrative (contradiction, expansion, compression, reading, listening, paraphrase)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second pedagogical stage:

Exercises that argue “widely agreed upon subjects”

**First cycle exercises**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First-order exercise</th>
<th>Second cycle exercises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. topos</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. description</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. speech in character</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. speech in praise</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. comparison</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third pedagogical stage:

Exercises that argue debatable subjects

**First cycle exercises**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First-order exercise</th>
<th>Second cycle exercises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. refutation and confirmation of the chreia</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase; elaboration, contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. refutation and confirmation of the fable</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase; elaboration, contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. refutation and confirmation of the narrative</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase; elaboration, contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. refutation and confirmation of the thesis</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase; elaboration, contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. refutation and confirmation of law</td>
<td>reading, listening, paraphrase; elaboration, contradiction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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219 Theon does not speak of “stages” (Kennedy uses the term: see Progymnasmata, p. 19). I insert the labels (following Butts, who uses numbers) to clarify points where there is advance towards greater argumentation.

220 Paraphrase of literature.

221 Patillon admits uncertainty regarding when Theon intended students to add elaboration and contradiction, noting that Theon says students should practice them “once they have gained some experience”: Patillon, Aelius Théon, xxix n. 46. But with Patillon, I include them in each of the final five exercises (not, contra Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 20, as a fourth stage.)

222 By placing refutation of thesis and law here, I follow Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 20. Patillon (Aelius Théon, xxix-xxx) is incorrect to place the thesis and law (assuming he means their one and only exercise: refutation and confirmation) before refutation/confirmation of chreia, fable and narrative; this contradicts Theon, who says that refutation of thesis and law only comes after refutation of chreia, fable and narrative: Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.65); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8.

224 Although Theon does not make this outline so explicit, students would come to appreciate it as they worked from exercise to exercise.
Each pedagogical stage contains two broad “cycles” of exercises. In the first cycle, there are two “orders” or subsets of exercises, each of which has a similar structure. The first-order exercise denotes a rhetorical form, for instance the *chreia*, including its definition, “classification” of its subforms, and/or description of virtues (ἀρετη) that students must foster in its composition. Each second-order exercise, undertaken alongside the first-order exercise, adapts the form in question. One such exercise is inflexion; another is recitation. Following the first cycle of exercises is a second cycle of exercises that Patillon aptly calls “accompanying exercises.” These exercises, most of which a student performs concurrently with the first cycle, are compositional techniques—reading, listening and paraphrasing—that are applicable to the form in question (for instance the chreia) as well as to a text that contains many such forms. Let us now review each stage with an eye on the chreia and on related rhetorical forms.

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226 It also often specifies how it resembles and differs from similar forms (the chreia for example, Theon compares with the maxim): Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Spengel, 2.96-97); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 15.

227 As Theon puts it in his chreia chapter, ἐν ἀρετή τοῦ ἀπαγγέλτα Προγυμνασμάτων . . . ; “Chreias are practiced by restatement [etc.] . . .” Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Spengel, 2.101); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 19. In his fable exercise (2.74), Theon together labels the various ways for modifying the fable, “the exercise” [τὸ γύμνασμα].

228 For the exercises as compositional techniques, see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. ix; Hock, “General Introduction,” 40-41; cp. Theon’s own words in *Progymnasmata* (ed. Spengel, 2.60); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 4.


231 Students are to listen and read not using the rhetorical forms, but rather actual *texts*, for example a portion of Homer’s *Odyssey*): Patillon, *Aelius Théon*, xxx. Theon believes that students also should practice rewriting literature too, or alternatively writing down something from their own lives, such as “what they did in the recent past or what has happened to their friends”; *Progymnasmata* (ed. Patillon, 106-107); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 69. Cp. similarly Patillon, *Aelius Théon*, xxx, who refers to Quintilian’s discussion (10.3).
The first pedagogical stage. At this stage, the student learns rhetorical forms or first-order exercises—namely, the chreia, fable and narrative—as well as techniques for varying them, or second-order exercises.232

1. The chreia (χρεία). The chreia was a rhetorical form to which pupils had much exposure.233 Theon begins discussion of this first-order exercise with a definition.

Χρεία ἐστὶ σύντομος ἀπόφασις ἤ πράξις μετ᾽ εὐστοχίας ἀναφερομένη εἰς τι ωρισμένον πρόσωπων ἢ ἀναλογοῦν προσώπω.

A chreia . . . is a brief saying or action making a point [lit. with “good aim”], attributed to some specified person or something corresponding to a person. . .

Chreiai are short units of speech, or alternatively of narrated actions, associated with an individual, which impart wisdom in way that is “well-aimed” (i.e., clever) and that befits the speaker.235 Good examples are the following:

Εὐριπίδης ὁ τῶν τραγωδιῶν ποιητὴς εἶπεν· τύχῃ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα, ὁκ ἐυβούλια.

Euripides, the writer of tragedies, said: “Chance, not good counsel, directs human affairs.”236

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232 For an early effort to describe chreiai as pronunciation stories see for instance Tannehill, “Introduction: The Pronouncement Story and Its Types,” 1-2, 6-7, 8-9. For these stories’ indebtedness to Greco-Roman literary forms (esp. the chreia) and conventions, and for collected non-Christian examples, see the Introduction to AQAA, xi-xii; Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 200; and Robbins, “Introduction,” vii-x. In these works Mack and Robbins regard chreia as a more accurate, ancient term for many synoptic sayings of Jesus. Robbins, though, still uses “pronouncement story” to label these sayings: see AQAA, xi and n. 4, and Robbins, “Introduction,” vii-viii.

233 Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 173, 175-176. In Jesus, Rhetoric and Law, Henderson argues that critics have paid too much attention to the chreia as a form for instruction in early Christianity (instruction by Jesus, his disciples and by the earliest transmitters of his teachings and deeds). He tabulates both gnomai and chreiai in the synoptic gospels (see pp. 286, 411-413).

234 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.96); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 15.

Diogenes the Cynic philosopher, on being asked by someone where the Muses dwell, said: “In the souls of the educated.”

As these examples suggest, the chreia has distinguishable subforms, and Theon classifies these.

The most general categories of the chreia are three: some are verbal (logikai [λογικαί]), some describe an action (praktikai [πρακτικαί]), some mixed. Verbal are those that have their authority through words, without action. . . . There are two species of verbal chreias, declarative (apophantikon [ἀποφαντικόν]) and responsive (apokritikon [ἀποκριτικόν]). Of the declarative, some are statements volunteered by the speaker. . . . Others relate to a circumstance [i.e., are responsive]. . . . In addition, there are four species of responsive chreias: in response to a question; in response to an inquiry; giving a cause for the answer to a question; and what is called “apocritical,” having the same name as the genus.

Theon also classifies chreiai by “manner of presentation.” A manner of presentation is essentially a verbal “frame.” According to Theon, a chreia’s ordinary manner of

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236 O.Clermont-Ganneau (no inventory number); Hock and O’Neil, The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises, 37. Hock explains: “We have supplied ‘directs’ from Cicero’s Latin rendering of this line, which uses the verb regere: vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia.”


238 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.78-79, 2.73); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 28-29, 23-24.

239 Theon also remarks: “there is, besides these, also another species of chreia falling into the verbal category and called “double.” A double chreia is one having statements by two persons where either statement makes a chreia by one person.” Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.97-98); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 16-17.

240 English translation from Robbins, “The Chreia,” 13. Theon says: Τά μὲν οὖν εἶδη τῶν χρειῶν ταύτα ἐστι: προφέρονται δὲ οἱ μὲν γνωμολογικοὶ, οἱ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί . . .”: “These then are the species of chreias. Some are expressed as gnomic sayings, some as logical demonstrations . . . .” Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.99); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 17.

241 Theon regards presentation of narratives and of chreiai as basically the same activity, because he uses similar Greek terms to define them: cp. προφέρονται . . . γνωμολογικοὶ [for chreiai; 2.99] with εἰσόδαμεν ἐκφεύγων . . . ὡς ἀποφασιῶνει [for narratives; 2.87]. Theon also speaks of treating both in the manner of a wish: cp. οἱ δὲ [χρείεις] κατ’ εὐχὴν [for chreiai, 2.99] with ὡς εὐχόμενοι [for narratives, 2.87]. When talking about narratives, he also calls the activity κατὰ πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους τρόπους ποιεῖται τὴν φράσιν, lit. “to make the style according to many and diverse ways,” or as Kennedy puts it,
presentation is gnomic (γνωμολογικῶς). For example, Isocrates’ chreia that “the root of education is bitter, but its fruit sweet,” is presented as a gnomic saying. But there are other manners of presentation, each of which changes slightly the chreia’s expression and meaning. Significantly, Robbins has located nearly every such manner in the synoptic chreiai of Jesus.

2. The fable (μῦθος) and 3. the narrative (διήγημα). Still in the first pedagogical stage, Theon introduces further first-order exercises: the fable and the narrative.

A fable . . . is a fictitious story giving an image of truth, but one should know that the present consideration is not about all fables but about those in which, after stating the fable, we add the meaning of which it is an image; sometimes, of course, we bring in the fables after having stated the meaning.

Narrative . . . is language descriptive of things that have happened or as though they had happened. Elements . . . of narration . . . are six: the person . . . whether that be one or many; and the action done by the person; and the place where the action was done; and the time at which it was done; and the manner of the action; and sixth, the cause of these things.

“to vary the expression in many ways.” Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.86); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 34.

242 See notes above.
243 Theon lists several manners of expression for chreiai: “Some are expressed as gnomic sayings, some as logical demonstrations, some as a jest, some as a syllogism, some as an enthymeme, some with an example, some as a prayer, some with a sign, some as tropes, some as a wish, some with metalepsis, and others are composed of any combination of the ways just mentioned.” Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.99); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 17.
245 Kennedy explains that “narrative” (διήγημα) is (at least after Theon) used in the context of an exercise, while “narration” (διήγησις) belongs in a speech, and that Theon, unlike most ancient writers, reverses the use of the terms. Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 4 n. 10.
As for chreiai, Theon defines and classifies these forms, and remarks on their virtues.

Once Theon has taught these first-order exercises like the chreia, he introduces second-order exercises: techniques for composing and adapting the first-order exercises. The second-order exercises teach how to compose forms in slightly different ways, and so encourage variety in composition, while also teaching how to improve existing forms in literary sources. At this stage, there are four or five second-order exercises.

- recitation (ἀπαγγελία)
- inflexion (changing a form’s grammatical case: κλίσις)
- expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις) and its opposite, condensing (συστολή)
- adding a comment (ἐπιφωνεῖν, ἐπιλέγειν)

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246 A complete list is in Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.87); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 35. The manner of classification for narratives differs from that for chreiai; the normal manner for narratives is “as a straightforward statement”: Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.87); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 35.

247 For instance, when reciting fables, “the style should be simpler and natural” than when reciting chreiai, “and in so far as possible artless and clear”: Ἐγὼ μὲν ἰππαγγελον ἢτις ἦσστιν, καὶ ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς χρείας διεσπέρασα, εν δὲ τοῖς μύθοις ἀπλοστεράσαν τὴν ἐρμηνείαν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ προσφυή, καὶ ὡς διεναρθήσεως τε καὶ σαφῆνες· Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.74); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 35. Or for example, when defining narratives, “virtues . . . of a narration are three: clarity, conciseness, credibility”: ἂρεται δὲ διηγήσεως τρεῖς, σαφῆς εἰς, συντομία, πιθανότης. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.79); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 29. Theon goes on in detail about these virtues in Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.79-85); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 29-34. These virtues are the focus of Schufer’s essay, “The Function of Imitation and Emulation.”

248 As indicated by Henderson, “Quintilian and the Progymnasmata,” 94; Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 19-20.

249 ὁ τε γὰρ καλὸς καὶ πολυτρόπως διηγήσαι καὶ μῦθον ἀπαγγέλας καλῶς καὶ ἱστορίαν συνθῆσαι, καὶ τὸ ἱδίως ἐν ταῖς ὑποθέσεις καλομένων ἱδίων διήγησαι. . . . Ὁ δὲ οὐχ ἕνα . . . narration and a . . . fable in a fine and varied way will also compose a history well and what is specifically called ‘narrative’ . . . in hypotheses . . . .” Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.60); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 4. In other words, these exercises build ability to compose in different contexts.

250 See however Theon’s comments in Progymnasmata (ed. Patillon, 110-111); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 71-72: the exercise here of “elaboration” (ἐξέργασία, not to be confused with the different elaboration exercise of Hermogenes) teaches students to improve on sources. It is obvious that these types of improvement incorporate the second-order exercises (inflexion and expansion, for instance).

251 The nominal forms are from Hock, “General Introduction,” 36.
For the chreia, there is one additional exercise called contradiction (\antilogy).\textsuperscript{253}

Having completed a first cycle of exercises in forms and their composition, Theon commends an entire second cycle of exercises, or “accompanying exercises”: reading, listening and paraphrase. Hence while the student learns the chreia, he also reads, listens to and paraphrases excerpts from larger, literary works such Homer’s Odyssey. The purpose of these exercises is to build skills required in composition.\textsuperscript{254} As Theon says,

\begin{quote}
Anagnōsis (reading aloud) . . . is the nourishment of style; for we imitate most beautifully when our mind has been stamped by beautiful examples. And who would not take pleasure in akroasis (hearing a work read aloud), readily taking in what has been created by the toil of others? But just as it is no help to those wanting to paint to look at the works of Apelles and Protogenes and Antiphilus unless they themselves put their hand to painting, so neither the words of older writers nor the multitude of their thoughts nor the purity of language nor harmonious composition nor urbanity of sound nor, in a word, any of the beauties in rhetoric, are useful to those who are going to engage in rhetoric unless each student exercises himself every day in writing.\textsuperscript{255}
\end{quote}

With this cycle complete, students are ready to progress onwards to a second major pedagogical stage.

\textsuperscript{252} Patillon indicates that this is essentially the same exercise performed on each form: see Aelius Théon, xxv. For the chreia, Theon calls the exercise επιφώνειν and has students support the chreia. Quotations, Greek terms and translations from Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.103, 2.75-76, 2.91); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 21, 26, 38-39.
\textsuperscript{253} Term adapted from Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.103); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 21. The exercise of “adding a comment” seems to belong here in the first stage (see Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 8-9; similarly Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 20). Nevertheless Patillon points out that “adding a comment” in fact mirrors confirmation, and so in effect pupils are beginning to learn some argumentation early: see Aelius Théon, lxix.
\textsuperscript{254} Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 66. Similarly, “Quintilian . . . considers . . . [reading] . . . as an accompanying exercise, since he designates it as a contribution to the progress of the students (ad profectum discentium 2, 5, 1). . . .” Patillon, Aelius Théon, xciii.
\textsuperscript{255} Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.61-62); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 6-7.
The second pedagogical stage. In the second pedagogical stage, Theon advances from composition of rhetorical forms like the chreia, towards rhetorical forms that contain a simple kind of argumentation called amplification.256

[I]t is easier to amplify [ἀυξήσαι] what is clear than to demonstrate [ἀποδείξαι] what is unclear. Thus, when we begin ourselves to form arguments [lit. to argue: ἐγχειρεῖν]257 . . . we shall start with the commonplace [τόπος], followed by the ecphrasis [ἐκφρασίς], next the prosopopeia [προσωποποιία], then we practice encomia [ἐγκώμιον], then syncrisis [σύγκρισις]; these deal with things generally agreed to and there is nothing to be said on the opposite side . . . .

None of these forms states a position against which we can object. Rather, each form’s position is universally held, and so each contains amplification (ἀυξήσαι).259 Theon defines the aforementioned forms as follows:

1. Τόπος ἐστι λόγος αὐξητικὸς ὀμολογούμενον πράγματος ἢ τοιού ἀμαρτήματος ἢ ἀνδραγαθήματος: ἐστι γὰρ διίτος ὁ τόπος, ὃ μὲν τις κατὰ τῶν πεπουρνημένων, . . . ὁ δὲ τῶν χρηστῶν τι διαπεπραγμένων. . . τῶν δὲ τῶν τινῶν οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἄπλοι, οἱ δὲ ὧν ἄπλοι. . . τῶν δὲ ἐς ἐγείρησαι, ὅτι ἄπτ’ αὐτοῦ ὄρμωμεν οἶον ἐκ τοῦ ῥᾶδιως ἐπιχειροῦμεν κατὰ τῶν ὀμολογουμένων ἁδικεῖν, διὸς ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀφορμὴν ἐπιχειρημάτων αὐτοῦ ὄρισαντο.

Topos . . . is language [or: a speech] amplifying something that is acknowledged to be either a fault or a brave deed. It is of two kinds: one is an attack on those who have done evil deeds, . . . the other in favor of those who have done something good. . . . Some of the topoi are simple, but some are not simple. . . . It is called a topos because starting from it as a “place” we easily find arguments (epicheiremata) against those not admitting that they are in the wrong. For this reason some define it as a starting point for epicheiremata (epicheiremata).260

257 LSJ, s.v: both verbs ἐγχειρεῖν and ἐπιχειρεῖν can essentially mean “to argue.”
258 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.65); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8 (emphasis added).
259 Theon also continues to classify varieties of these forms. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.114-115, 2.116-117); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 54-55, 48-49. Amplification is part and parcel of each of these forms: Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.65, 2.106, 2.119, 2.116-118, 2.109-111, 2.112-113); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 8, 42, 46, 48-49, 50-51, 52-53.
260 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.106-107); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 43. In n. 143 Kennedy explains that he adds “not” following Patillon. Butts clarifies that Theon uses τόπος to denote a rhetorical form (ancient authors often called the τόπος a “commonplace” [“Progymnasmata of Theon,” pp. 416-417; cp. Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 42 n. 141]): a τόπος contains an opinion with supporting epicheiremata; as such it resembles a little speech. Butts thereby helps explain Theon’s ambiguity in his chapter on τόπος,
2. Ἐκφρασις ἐστὶ λόγος περιηγηματικὸς ἐναργῶς ὑπ’ ὡφιν ἄγων τὸ δηλοῦμενον. γίνεται δὲ ἐκφρασις προσώπων τε καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν καὶ χρόνων.

Ecphrasis . . . is descriptive language, bringing what is portrayed clearly before the sight. There is ecphrasis of persons and events and places and periods of time.

3. Προσωποποιία ἐστὶ προσώπου παρεισαγωγὴ διατιθέμενον λόγους οἰκείους ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀναμφισβητήτως, οἷον τίνας ἀν εἴποι λόγους ἀνὴρ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα μέλλουσιν ἀποδημεῖν, ἢ στρατηγὸς τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ τοὺς κινδύνους. . . . ὑπὸ δὲ τούτῳ τὸ γένος τῆς γυμνασίας πίπτει καὶ τὸ τῶν πανηγυρικῶν λόγων εἰδος, καὶ τὸ τῶν προτερπτικῶν, καὶ τὸ ἑπιστολικῶν.

Personification [prosopopoeia] . . . is the introduction of a person to whom words are attributed that are suitable to the speaker and have an indisputable application to the subject discussed; for example, What words would a man say to his wife when leaving on a journey? Or a general to his soldiers in time of danger?. . . Under this genus of exercise fall the species of consolations and exhortation and letter writing.

4. Ἐγκώμιον ἐστὶ λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος τῶν κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν όρισμένων πρόσωπων. . . .

Encomion . . . is language revealing the greatness of virtuous actions and other good qualities belonging to a particular person.

5. Σύγκρισις ἐστὶ λόγος τὸ βέλτιον ἢ τὸ χείρον παριστάσῃ. γίνονται δὲ συγκρισεῖς προσώπων τε καὶ πραγμάτων. . . .

Syncrisis . . . is language setting the better or the worse side by side. There are syncrises both of persons and of things.

Each of these rhetorical forms contains a position or characterization and an amplification (Ἀμφιθυσία) of that position made of “starting points” or subject areas.
in which one offers an ἐπιχείρησις or “argument”: a statement that either supports the opinion or fills out the characterization. As well as defining the forms, Theon prescribes stylistic virtues for them.

As pupils learn these rhetorical forms, they also subject the forms to second-order exercises. But the second-order exercises are no longer to inflect or recite the form. Now the exercise is to amplify (αὔξανω) the form’s position: to assign ἀφορμαί with their epicheiremes, to arrange the ἀφορμαί conventionally, and then to set the ἀφορμαί into the wider context of a speech: the ἀφορμαί become proofs which the student frames with an introduction and conclusion. Theon also has students continue with their

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264 See the above quotation (ed. Spengel, 2.65; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, 8): Theon speaks of amplifying every one of these five forms.

265 Kennedy defines ἀφορμαί as “resources, materials, or topics for discussion useful in composition.” Progymnasmata, p. 4 n. 9. These ἀφορμαί (also called τόποι in a sense distinct from the rhetorical form, above) are themes or subjects, for instance “the just,” within which one offers ἐπιχειρηματεῖς (epicheiremes): see Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.116-117, esp. 117: ἐπιχειρεῖν δὲ δεῖ ἐξ ἕνων ἐνδέχεται τόποιν; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 48-49 esp. 49: “For one should argue from whatever topics [=ἀφορμαί] are possible”; cp. 2.105 (p. 23). For Theon’s synonymous use of ἀφορμη and τόπος, see Butts’ edition of Progymnasmata, 8.69-77 (=Progymnasmata, ed. Spengel, 2.117 = Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 49), and the clarificatory comments by Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 416-417.

266 Even in the chapter on ecphrasis, which is “plain description” (see note above), Theon says ἐπιχειρήσομεν δὲ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐκφράζωμεν ἐκ τῶν προγιγνομένων . . . , lit. “when describing . . . deeds we argue from both the things having happened before . . . [etc.]”

267 Virtues such as “vividness” in a τόπος and “clarity” in an ἔκφρασις. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.108-109, 2.119); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 45, 47.

268 For the term σύξησι see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.65); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8.

269 Indicated by Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.71); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 13; cp. p. 4. For the procedure in a commonplace, see pp. 43-44; for the ecphrasis, p. 46; for prosopoeia, pp. 48-49; for encomion, pp. 50-51; for syncrisis, p. 53.

270 Theon recommends this last exercise of speech creation for the τόπος (2.107; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 44), and the ἐγκώμιον/ψώγος (2.111; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 51). In Greek, “proofs” are πιστεῖς; these constitute a section called the πιστεῖς/argumentatio, which contains “proofs” or “arguments” (πιστεῖς/ἐπιχειρήματα, argumenta). The Greek terms and English translations here I take from Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 35, 36, 38, 53-54, 55. Cp. May and Wisse, “Introduction,” in On the Ideal Orator, 30. On argumentation see Kennedy, New History of Classical Rhetoric, 4-5. Theon does not speak of using all five conventional speech parts for composing on every form; he most often speaks of adding just a prooemion: see Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.107, 2.111); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 44, 51.
second cycle or accompanying exercises: reading, listening accompanied by writing, and paraphrase.\textsuperscript{271}

\textit{The third pedagogical stage.} In his third pedagogical stage, Theon introduces a new and more advanced kind of second-order exercise: to \textit{demonstrate} (\'\'αποδείξασι) an opinion against which there is a \textit{contrary} opinion.\textsuperscript{272} That is to say, students confirm \textit{(κατασκευάζω)} or refute \textit{(ἀνασκευάζω)} rhetorical forms that invite a contrary opinion--forms like the chreia\textsuperscript{273} as well as the thesis and law, which Theon defines as follows:\textsuperscript{274}

\begin{quote}
The contentious exercises are the chreia, fable and narrative, thesis and law (in this order). See Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.65); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 55, 62.
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{271} Patillon, \textit{Aelius Théon}, xxix-xxx; Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.65); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{272} Theon calls such refutation or confirmation, \textit{τοῖς ἀμφισβητομένως γυμνάσσασι:} “the contentious exercises.” Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.65); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 8; cp. Bonner, \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, 270-271.


\textsuperscript{274} Thesis and law more closely approximate complete speeches than the chreia, and so these forms come nearer the end of the progymnasmata: Bonner, \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, 270-271, 272. A thesis, note May and Wisse, does not deal with specific persons, events or circumstances, whereas the hypothesis does: see May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 25; cp. Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.61); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{275} Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.120 [and editorial comments there], 2.128); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 55, 62.
As they refute or confirm these forms, students essentially write a speech with conventional sections (prooemion, narrative, division, argument or πίστις/probatio, and conclusion), within which their refutation or confirmation—the place where pupils list starting points (ἀφορμαί) and their arguments (ἐπιχείρήματα)—becomes the argument section. Refuting and confirming are significant because they anticipate speeches.

One who can refute or confirm . . . [fables, for example] is not far behind those speaking hypotheses [speeches], for everything that we do in judicial hypotheses is there as well: first, there is the prooemion and narrative; then we try to meet each of the things said in the . . . fable and to put each to a test; next we take thought how we shall best arrange each of the epicheiremes, and we amplify and disparage and do other things that would be too long to mention here.

Through these refutation and confirmation exercises, Theon seeks to instill skill in invention (ἡ ἐφεσία) and arrangement (ἡ τοξικεία).

In this third stage, students continue with second cycle exercises of reading, listening and paraphrase, now adding two further exercises: ἔξεργασία or “elaboration” and ἀντίρρησις or “contradiction.” Elaboration, as Theon puts it, “is language that

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276 ἐπιχείρημα: Theon uses the term to mean not only individual arguments (individual epicheiremes) but also, as Kennedy’s translation clarifies, the “argument”: the speech part that contains headings and their epicheiremes. Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.76); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 26.

277 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.59-60); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 4, and see n. 164 above.

278 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.105-106, 2.76-78, 2.60, 2.93, 2.120-123, 2.129); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 22-23 (chreia), 26-28 (fable), 4, 40 (narrative), 55-57 (thesis), 62 (law).

279 These “exercises . . . [are] . . . useful . . . to those who are going to practice rhetoric.” Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.70); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 13.

280 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.60); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 4 (emphasis added).

281 While some details differ depending on the form, the exercise remains consistent. For instance, Theon remarks that for fables, “the same topics . . . are useful also for the refutation and confirmation of narratives.” Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.78); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 28. An example of form-specific convention (for refuting and confirming narrative) is the following: “We shall easily have a supply of arguments if in each of the topics we use what are called the ‘elements’ of which all action consists. These are . . . person, action, place, time, manner, cause.”) Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.94); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 41.

282 Patillon estimates similarly in Aelius Théon, xxix-xxx; in n. 46 he admits that Theon is silent on exactly where these exercises begin; Patillon guesses that they begin while students are learning the thesis. Since,
adds what is lacking in thought and expression.” And contradiction “is discourse that
attacks the credibility of another discourse,” and is “useful in replies,” that is in reply
speeches (ἀντιγραφάι),283 where it functions as a sort of anti-refutation or anti-
confirmation.284

Simply put, Theon’s progymnasmata introduce rhetorical forms like the chreia. They also introduce techniques for modifying, amplifying, refuting and confirming the forms.

1.3.2: The Progymnasmata of Quintilian

Although Quintilian does not author a treatise of progymnasmata,285 he recommends that pupils undertake progymnasmata like the chreia as part of their rhetorical education. And significantly, “almost all of . . . [Quintilian’s] progymnasmata are given and in an order which departs minimally . . . from the standard sequence” of ancient progymnasmata.” In other words, the progymnasmata of which Quintilian knows relate to an extent to progymnasmata by Theon and Hermogenes.286 From various

283 The quotations are from Theon: the first is from the Armenian (Progymnasmata [ed. Patillon, 111]; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 72). The second is from the Greek: καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἔξεργασιας εἴδος, πολλακοὶ τε ἀλλοθεν ὡφέλιμον, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν ταῖς δευτερολογίαις· ἤ δὲ ἀντίρρησις ἐν ταῖς ἀντιγραφαῖς. “Surely . . . (elaboration) is also useful in many other contexts, and especially in second speeches in trials. And . . . (contradiction) is useful in replies.” Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.64); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8.

284 Butts, “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 18. Butts is however incorrect that “the exergasia . . . is restricted to use in the deuterologia (“speech of rebuttal”) and the antirresis . . . in the antigraphe (“reply”). Theon never restricts these exercises to either speech form. As Kennedy properly translates, Theon admits various applications of the exercise; he simply says it is “useful” (ὡφέλιμον) in the speech of rebuttal and of reply. See Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.64); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8.

285 As Henderson, “Quintilian and the Progymnasmata,” 87, 89-90, points out.

286 Henderson, “Quintilian and the Progymnasmata,” 94; cp. p. 90: Quintilian offers “a framework of exercises which he and the Progymnasmata share closely.”
sections of Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* (1.9, 2.4 and 8.5). Henderson has reconstructed Quintilian’s description of progymnasmata, both first-order exercises and second-order exercises. Given the similarity of Quintilian’s exercises to those of Theon and of Hermogenes (below), we shall not outline them here.

We should mention one feature of Quintilian’s given its special importance to the adaptation of chreiai and related forms. This is his espousal of *emulatio*, the technique of *improving* on one’s literary models. Although Quintilian does not mention emulation explicitly while discussing progymnasmata (1.9, 2.4 and 8.5), the connection seems obvious enough in his mind. Significantly, Theon too commends *emulatio*. Such *emulatio* helps us appreciate that ancient authors sought to *improve* on their predecessors’ work.

### 1.3.3: The Progymnasmata of Hermogenes

The fact that Hermogenes’ progymnasmata are relatively early among ancient treatises warrants our awareness of their treatment of chreiai. Hermogenes’ work contains twelve first-order exercises (that is, twelve rhetorical forms). Like Theon,

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287 Henderson, “Quintilian and the *Progymnasmata*,” 82.
288 Henderson’s discussion is somewhat confusing and difficult to summarize. See “Quintilian and the *Progymnasmata*,” 93 (and pp. 87, 88, 91, 92).
289 See for instance Quintilian 1.3.2 with 1.9.1-6. On Quintilian and *emulatio* see Chapter 1 of MacDonald, *Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark*, and Quintilian 10.2.1-28, esp. 10.2.4-9, 15, 23, 28 (LCL, trans. Butler). For the locations of Quintilian’s discussion of progymnastic exercises see Henderson, “Quintilian and the *Progymnasmata*,” 82.
290 As he indicates in the following advice: “Do not imitate only one model but all the most famous of the ancients. Thus we shall have copious, numerous, and varied resources on which to draw. . . . ‘When someone admires what is good in all and understands how to conform his thought to that, so that there exists in him a kind of ideal model of style which each can mould in accordance with his own nature, he does not seem constrained to fix his eyes on a single style, but he acquires . . . a part of all these excellences.’ Thus it it most useful to collect what has some beauty in all works, to recite this, and to recall it frequently.” Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Patillon, 105); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, pp. 68-69.
291 Indeed, scholars have found echoes of Hermogenes in Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* (ca. 95 CE) and the even earlier rhetorical manual *ad Herrenium* (ca. 150 BCE). On Quintilian, see Henderson, “Quintilian and the *Progymnasmata*, 90-91; on *Ad Herrenium*, see Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 52-54.
Hermogenes usually includes in each exercise a definition, a classification and compositional virtues; these he follows with second-order exercises. And generally speaking, like Theon, Hermogenes arranges his second-order exercises to evolve from grammar modification towards argumentation.

In a first set of exercises, Hermogenes has students learn the μύθος (fable) and διήγημα (narrative):

They give some such sketch of... [the fable] as follows. They think it right for it to be fictitious, but in all cases to be useful for some aspect of life. In addition, they want it to be plausible.

The authorities want narrative... to be an exposition of something that has happened or as if it happened. A narrative (diégêma) differs from a narration (diégêsis) as a piece of poetry (poiêma) differs from a poetical work (poiēsis). A poiēma and a diégêma are concerned with one thing, a poiēsis and a diégêsis with many.

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292 According to Kennedy, Hermogenes’ work “is the simplest of the accounts of preliminary exercises, little more than an abstract of previous handbooks.” He also doubts that Hermogenes himself wrote this work. Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 73.

293 See Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. ix-x. As Butts indicates, Hermogenes’ exercises do not exhibit quite the pedagogically sensitive sequence as do Theon’s exercises: “Progymnasmata of Theon,” 20.

294 Hermogenes continues: “How would it become plausible? If we attribute appropriate things [προσέκοντα πράγματα] to the characters. For example, someone is arguing about beauty; let him be represented as a peacock.” Notice again how πρέπον or aptum is an essential quality of the form.

295 Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.2, 6.4); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 74, 75.
In addition to defining these rhetorical forms, Hermogenes offers some classification and a few comments on virtues.\(^296\) He also mentions one second-order exercise for the fable, the ἐπεκτείνωσις (expansion) and συστολή (compression).\(^297\)

In Hermogenes’ second set of exercises, students learn to demonstrate (ἀποδείκνυμι) a disputed position. To this end Hermogenes introduces the χρεία (chreia) and the related γνώμη (gnômē or maxim), as well as second-order exercises that build the chreia into a small speech. He defines the forms as follows:

Χρεία ἔστιν ἀπομνημόνευμα λόγου τινός ἣν πράξεως ἣν συναμφότερον συντομοῦ ἔχουν δήλωσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον χρησίμου τινὸς ἕνεκα.

A chreia is a recollection of a saying or action or both, with a pointed meaning,\(^298\) usually for the sake of something useful.

Γνώμη ἔστι λόγος κεφαλαιώδης ἐν ἀποφάνσει καθολικῇ ἀποτρέπων τι ἣ προτρέπων ἐπὶ τι ἣ ὁποῖον ἐκαστὸν ἔστι δηλών.

Maxim is a summary statement, in universal terms, dissuading or exhorting in regard to something, or making clear what a particular thing is.\(^299\)

To these forms of chreia and maxim Hermogenes applies second-order exercises that build the chreia into a short speech. The first of these exercises is the ἐργασία or elaboration exercise.\(^300\) Hermogenes’ ἐργασία has proven highly significant, for Mack and Robbins have identified precisely such chreia elaboration in all three synoptic

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\(^{296}\) For example, Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.1-3, 6.4-6); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 74-75, 75-76.

\(^{297}\) For narrative, though, he does assume that students will change its manners of expression. This exercise resembles Theon’s exercise: Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.5-6, 6.2-3); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 76, 74-75. See further the discussion of paraphrase below.

\(^{298}\) “Pointed” is Kennedy’s translation (p. 77) of συντομοῦ; I prefer Mack and O’Neil’s “concise,” for they clarify that συντομοῦ means direct, short or brief (see Hock, “General Introduction,” 24-25).

\(^{299}\) Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.6, 6.8-9); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 76, 77-78.

\(^{300}\) Kennedy has the right English term but misprints the Greek ergasia as exergasia, a rather different exercise taught by Theon: see Progymnasmata, p. 77 (cp. the Greek text of Rabe, 6.7 [ἐργασία]).
gospels, and pointed out how it anticipates an actual speech (λόγος, oratio). Such chreia elaboration will become our focus and so deserves attention here.

An elaboration is an eight-part composition that supports a chreia. The chreia itself expresses a position that requires support; it is akin to the υπόθεσις or propositio—the key point—of a judicial speech. The seven other parts of the elaboration simply support that position. Hermogenes describes this process at work:

Now let us come to the point, and this is the elaboration. . . . Let the elaboration be as follows: [1] first [πρῶτον] a brief encomion of the speaker or doer; [2] then [εἶτα] a paraphrase […] of the chreia; [3] then the cause [ἀιτία]; for example, Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but the fruit is sweet.

[1] Praise: “Isocrates was a wise man,” and you will slightly develop [πλατύνεις] the topic [τὸ χώριον: “subject”].

[2] Then the chreia, “He said this,” and you will not state it in bare form but expand the statement [πλατύνω τὴν ἐρμηνείαν: lit. “widen the expression”; i.e., paraphrase].

[3] Then the cause, “For the greatest things are wont to succeed through toil, and when successful bring pleasure;”

[4] Then by contrast [κατὰ τὸ ἔναντίον] “Ordinary things need no toil and in the end give no pleasure, but things of importance are the opposite.”

[5] Then from a comparison [ἐκ παραβολῆς], “For just as farmers need to reap fruits by working the soil, so also with speeches.”

[6] Then from an example [ἐκ παραδείγματος], “Demosthenes, by shutting himself up at home and working hard, later reaped the fruit in the form of crowns and testimonials.”

[7] It is also possible to bring in a judgment [ἐκ κρίσεως]; for example, “Hesiod said (Works and Days 289), ‘The gods put sweat before virtue,’ and another poet says, ‘The gods sell all good things to us for toils.’”

[8] At the end you will put an exhortation [παράκλησιν] to the effect that one must be persuaded by the person who has said or done this.

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302 They admit that Hermogenes’ exercise does not appear in the gospels in a “wooden” or fixed form (to the contrary, each gospel varies the elaboration for different purposes). Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 198.

303 Mack sets out in detail parallels between chreia elaboration and typical speech parts in “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 51-57 (on these terms see p. 55). He is careful to distinguish the υπόθεσις or “position” from the στάσις or “issue” that gives rise to opposed positions (p. 55).

304 Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.9-10); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 78.
So much for now; you will get more complete teaching later.305

Again, an elaboration supports a chreia much as an actual speech’s proofs support its propositio. In the elaboration, the first statement (encomion) and last statement (exhortation) respectively praise the speaker and encourage emulation of the chreia. In this way they anticipate a full speech’s introduction (προόμισον, exordium) and conclusion (ἐπιλογίς, conclusio).306 In between these framing statements are four central statements—Hermogenes calls them τόποι, “topics”—each supporting the chreia with specific reasoning.307 Together these topics anticipate a full speech’s proofs (πιστείς/argumentatio).308 Hermogenes’ second and related exercise with chrei ai is ἀνασκευή/κατασκευή (refutation/confirmation).309 The refutation is “an overturning of something that has been proposed, and confirmation . . . is the opposite.”310 This exercise resembles the elaboration, for it too gathers topics in support or refutation of a...
Both exercises mimic, at an elementary level, the tasks entailed in composing a full speech.

Hermogenes’ third set of exercises focus on amplifying (σύζησις) a widely accepted proposition. He introduces the rhetorical forms of common-place (ὁ τόπος ὁ κοινὸς), encomion (ἔγκωμιον), syncrisis (σύγκρισις), ethopoeia (ἐθοποιία) and ephrasis (ἐφρασία). The common-place “is an amplification [σύζησις] of something that is agreed, as though demonstrations had already occurred.” The encomion is “an exposition of the good qualities of a person or thing,” while the syncrisis is a “comparison of similar or dissimilar things, or of lesser things to greater or greater things to lesser.” The encomion and syncrisis are almost identical, since they use the same

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311 “You will refute . . . from what is unclear, implausible, impossible, from the inconsistent, also called the contrary; from what is inappropriate, and from what is not advantageous.” Hermogenes does not mention τόπος here but probably assumes the term. See Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.11); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 79.

312 Quotation and Greek terms from Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.65); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8.

313 Kennedy points out that although this is essentially the same form as we find in Theon, it here takes the more usual Greek expression (i.e., κοινός τόπος), than Theon’s simple τόπος. See Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 141.

314 ὁ τόπος ὁ κοινὸς προσαγορευόμενος σύζησιν ἐχει τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου πράγματος ὡς τῶν αποδείξεων ἡ δὲ γεγενημένη: Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.11-12); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 79. Kennedy indicates that this is essentially Theon’s understanding: Progymnasmata, p. 42 n. 141.

315 Ἐγκωμίον εὖσιν ἓκθεσις τῶν προσόντων ἄγαθῶν τινι (there is no Greek definition of syncrisis in Hermogenes; Kennedy supplies it from a Latin translation of the original Greek by Priscian): Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.14, 6.18, 6.19); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 81, 83 and n. 39, 84. Hermogenes explains that a syncrisis can play a role within another form, for instance as a topic: “Syncrisis has been included in common-place, where we amplify the misdeeds by comparison, and in encomion, where we amplify the good features of the subject by comparison . . .” Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.18); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 83. For the insight that forms can play roles within other forms, see Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 12 n. 56.
kinds and arrangement of τόποι or topics,\textsuperscript{316} including “time” (χρόνος), “nurture” (τροφή) and “national origin” (ἔθνος).\textsuperscript{317} As for ethnopoiesis and ecphrasis,

`Hθηποιία ἐστὶ μὴμας ἥθος ὑποκειμένου προσώπου.

Ethopoiesia . . . is an imitation of the character of a person supposed to be speaking. . . . \textsuperscript{318}

`Εκφρασίς ἐστὶ λόγος περιηγηματικός, ὃς φασίν, ἐναργής καὶ ὑπ᾽ ὀψιν ἀγων τὸ δηλούμενον.

Ecphrasis . . . is descriptive speech, as they say, vivid . . . and bringing what is being shown before the eyes.\textsuperscript{319}

These forms too are quite similar: each uses essentially τόποι arranged in chronological order.

Hermogenes’ last set of exercises contains contentious or demonstrative forms called the thesis (θέσις) and introduction of a law (νόμου εἰσφορά).\textsuperscript{320} The thesis “is a consideration of some subject [ἐπισκεψιν τινος πράγματος] viewed apart from any specific circumstance.” The introduction of a law is essentially the same, except that the consideration concerns law.\textsuperscript{321} In each case, the second-order exercise is to compose a speech that addresses the “subject” or law with a proposition.\textsuperscript{322} Not surprisingly then,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{316} Hermogenes defines τόπος as “a starting point” for arguments. See Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.16); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 82. For his use of τόπος in encomia see 6.17—Kennedy (rightly) translates this as “source of argument” (p. 82).
  \item \textsuperscript{317} Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.19, 6.15-16); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 83, 82. Hermogenes locates “qualities” (in Greek this term is not explicit) within certain topics. Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.15-16); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 82.
  \item \textsuperscript{318} Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.20); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 84.
  \item \textsuperscript{319} Hermogenes classifies each as well. See Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.20-21, 6.22-23); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 84-85, 86.
  \item \textsuperscript{320} On their demonstrative quality see Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.25); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 87.
  \item \textsuperscript{321} Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.24, 6.26); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 87, 88 and n. 52.
  \item \textsuperscript{322} Indicated in Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.24, 6.25, 6.26); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 87-88. In discussing thesis, Hermogenes speaks of “confirming” using κατασκευάζω. He also speaks of “refuting,” now simply using ἀνατρέψω and λύω instead of ἄνασκευάζω. See Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.26); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 88.
\end{itemize}
students need to invent and arrange τόποι. Although Hermogenes prefers the term “headings” (κεφαλαίοι) to τόποι here, they remain essentially the same thing.

Διαίρονται δὲ αἱ θεσεῖς τῶν τελικῶν καλουμένων κεφαλαίοις, τῷ δικαίῳ, τῷ συμφέροντι, τῷ δυνατῷ, τῷ πρέποντι.

The logical divisions in discussion of theses [and laws] are what are called “final headings”: justice, advantage, possibility, appropriateness.\footnote{Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.25-26); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 87. For the same terminology in the introduction of a law, see Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.27); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 88.}

With these exercises the student concludes the progymnasmata.

The point of this survey is to show that through progymnasmata, students learned how to compose and adapt rhetorical forms including the chreia. The chreia was, of course, only one of several rhetorical forms that could anticipate, through its elaboration, a judicial or deliberative speech. But it was a form in which the synoptic gospels show a keen interest, and as such we shall keep it in focus as we proceed now to articulate how authors adapted it.

1.4: Rhetorical Techniques for Adapting Chreiai

The foregoing survey of progymnasmata is a foundation on which we can now articulate two key rhetorical features of composition: rhetorical techniques for adapting forms like the chreia (Section 1.4), and rhetorical principles or laws that govern adaptation of these forms (Section 1.5).\footnote{Theon understands that many progymnastic exercises are adaptive techniques in actual literature: see Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.62-63); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 6-7. His words demonstrate that accomplished orators employed compositional or adaptive techniques from progymnasmata in their work. Cp. Henderson, “Quintilian and the Progymnasmata,” 94-95.} Admittedly, rhetorical theory as a whole does not focus on adapting sources. It tends more to prescribe conventions for original work, and these conventions can suggest how to improve sources. Nevertheless, rhetoric does
speak explicitly of some adaptive conventions, and below we shall describe these and so equip ourselves better to characterize the synoptic gospels’ adaptation of chreiai.\textsuperscript{325}

A good way to summarize adaptive techniques is by their principal rhetorical activity: invention (\(\varepsilon\upsilon\rho\varepsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\)), arrangement (\(\tau\alpha\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\)), expression (\(\lambda\varepsilon\xi\iota\varsigma\)), and a combination of these.\textsuperscript{326} These techniques, Mack and Robbins remind us, are techniques of \textit{argumentation}: rhetorical means for persuasion.\textsuperscript{327} We shall employ the following outline:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Adaptive techniques (progymnasmata)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Invention</td>
<td>expansion and compression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Arrangement</td>
<td>changing headings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>weaving forms</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Invention and Arrangement</td>
<td>refuting and confirming with (\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(elaboration)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contradiction</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Expression</td>
<td>adding a comment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paraphrase</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Improvement \textit{through changes in all activities:}</td>
<td>perfection ((\varepsilon\xi\varepsilon\rho\gamma\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha)):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>techniques to improve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sources\textsuperscript{328}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{325} The wide application of second-order exercises that we have already seen, suggests that we should expect to see exercises like paraphrase used on many forms and in many contexts.

\textsuperscript{326} Patillon specifies that individual exercises fall within activities of invention, arrangement and expression (\textit{Aelius Théon}, cix and cxi); cp. Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 66. Patillon even notes that recitation and paraphrase characterize expression (\textit{Aelius Théon}, cv-cvi and n. 205). This insight has encouraged me to categorize all the techniques under their respective activities (cp. Burridge, “Gospels and Acts,” 514-529).

\textsuperscript{327} Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 196.

\textsuperscript{328} We shall not, in the main, examine more sophisticated discussions of rhetorical handbooks or the declamations. Although the declamations illustrate progymastic techniques, I overlook them here for two reasons. First, Seneca’s declamations are not actual speeches, but rather constituent \textit{colores}, epigrams, and sententiae. Second, time and the scope of my work constrains me from looking at these. On the declamations see Bonner, \textit{Roman Declamation}, vi, 53-57.
1.4.1: Inventive Techniques: Expansion and Compression

The inventive techniques for adapting chreiai are expansion (ἐπεκτείνω, ἐπεκτείνωσις) and compression (σύστελλω, συστολή). As Theon puts it: “We expand the chreia whenever we lengthen [μηκύνωμεν] the questions and answers in it, and the action or suffering, if any. We compress by doing the opposite.” To expand, explains Patillon, is to add “ideas” or “semantic elements.” Consider Theon’s illustration with a chreia.

οίον σύντομος χρεία: Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ἀτεκνὸς ἀποθνήσκων, ἔλεγε τοῖς φίλοις, δύο θυγατέρας ἄπελιπον, τὴν τε περὶ Λευκτρα νίκην, καὶ τὴν περὶ Μαντινείαν ἐκτείνομεν δὲ σύντομον ὀν: Ἐπαμεινώνδας, οἱ τῶν Θηβαίων στρατηγοῖς, ἥν μὲν ἀρὰ καὶ παρὰ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς, συστάντος δὲ τῇ παρτίδι πολέμου πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, πολλὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ ἔργα τῆς μεγαλουχίας ἐπεδείξατο. Βοιωτάρχων δὲ περὶ Λευκτρα ἕνικα τοὺς πολεμίους, στρατεύομενος δὲ καὶ ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀπέθανεν ἐν Μαντινείᾳ. ἔπει δὲ τραβεῖς ἐτέλευτα τὸν βίον, ὀλοφυρομένων τῶν φίλων τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ διότι ἄτεχνος ἀποθνήσκοι, μειδίασας, παυσάθει, ἐφί, ὥ φίλοι, κλαίοντες, ἐγὼ γὰρ ὑπὲν αἰθανατος δύο καταλέλοιπα θυγατέρας, δύο νικᾶς τῆς πατρίδος κατὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, τὴν μὲν ἐν Λευκτρῷ, τὴν πρεσβυτέραν, νεώτεραν δὲ τὴν ἀρτί μοι γενομένην ἐν Μαντινείᾳ.

[This chreia is brief [σύντομος]: “Epaminondas, dying childless, said to his friends, ‘I leave two daughters, the victory at Leuctra and that at Mantinea.’” We expand it as follows: “Epaminondas, the general of the Thebans, was, you should know, a great man in peacetime, but when war with Lacedaimonians came to his fatherland he demonstrated many shining deeds of greatness. When serving as

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329 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.103); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 21-22 (Kennedy’s translation uses both English terms for σύστελλω: compare the Greek of Spengel’s edition with the terms used by Kennedy on pp. 21 and 26). The nominal forms I saw in Hock and O’Neil, Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric, 36. Theon refers to a chreia without expansion as “concise” (σύντομος); see Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.103); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 21.

330 LSJ translates μηκύνω as “lengthen,” “prolong,” “spin out [a speech],” “expound,” “enlarge upon,” “talk at length about,” as well as “continually repeat” and “dwell on.” For Theon’s remarks see Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.103); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 21.


332 See further Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.74, 2.75); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, 24, 25-26 (fables); Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.85-86); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 34 (narratives).
Boeotarch at Leuctra, he defeated the enemy; and conducting a campaign and contending on behalf of his country, he died at Mantinea. When he had been wounded and his life was coming to an end, while his friends were bewailing many things, including that he was dying childless, breaking into a smile, he said, ‘Cease your weeping, my friends, for I have left you two immortal daughters: two victories of my country over Lacedaimonians, one at Leuctra, the elder, the younger just begotten by me at Mantinea.”

This latter chreia is an “expanded chreia.” The expanded chreia lengthens “the action and the suffering” of Epaminondas, essentially by adding his previous engagements in battle, the events leading to his death, and the death scene, as well as praise for Epaminondas. Hence the additions are supplementary: the new content does not divert from the original idea and saying of the dying Epaminondas. Hermogenes speaks of ἔπεκτείνωσις and συστολή similarly as supplement.

1.4.2: Arrangement Techniques: Changing Headings and Weaving Forms Together

Authors can adapt literary material like a chreia through rearranging its component parts and reconfiguring its sequence. Theon talks about two arrangement techniques. One is “changing the order of headings” (ἐναλλάττομεν τῶν κεφαλαίων τὴν τάξιν, or ἀναστρέφειν) and a second is “weaving” or “combining” forms together (συμπλέκειν, συμπλοκή).

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334 He does not use this exact label, but he does say ἐκτείνομεν: “we expand [the chreia]”: Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 104); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 21.
335 The expansion applies both to the narrative portions and to direct discourse.
336 Expansion, Hock indicates, can apply to all parts of the chreia. He adds that Theon’s expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις) is merely one step beyond recitation (ἀπαγγελία): expansion goes further by adding, not just changing, words and phrases. Hock, “General Introduction,” 40. For expansion of fables and narratives, and its similarity to expansion of chreai, see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.74, 75, 85); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 24, 25-26, 34.
337 Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.2-3); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 74-75.
338 Terms and translations from Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 2.85, 2.86, 2.92); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 34, 39.
To change the order of headings means to rearrange the order of a narrative’s direct and indirect discourse or synonymously to rearrange “headings” (κεφαλαία), namely ἡ αρχή, τὰ μέσα and τὰ τελευταῖα, or “beginning,” “middle things” and “final things.” This technique can take a “natural arrangement” (κατὰ φύσιν . . . τὰ ξύσι) based on chronology and logic and adapt it into a more “elegant arrangement” (οἰκονομίας γλαφυρᾶς)  

Although Theon speaks of narratives, we should not be surprised to see rearrangement in chreiai as well.

A second rearrangement technique is to “combine” or “weave” (συμπλέκεῖν) forms together. To weave together means simply to alternate among two or more rhetorical forms. “After having stated . . . [a] fable,” for instance, “bring in a narrative, or conversely . . . put the narrative first, the fable second.” Such weaving becomes a little more complex among narratives, for one has to switch periodically back and forth, telling them concurrently.

1.4.3: Inventive and Arrangement Techniques: Refutation and Confirmation with τόποι (Elaboration); Contradiction

Two rhetorical techniques that are highly relevant for adapting a chreia entail both invention and arrangement. One technique is refutation and confirmation with topoi (τόποι), a technique which in its application to the chreia we call elaboration (ἐργασία). A second technique is contradiction (ἀντίρρησις). These techniques entail addition,

339 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 2.86); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 34, 35.
340 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 2.75); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 25.
341 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 2.92); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 39.
342 The term may be found for instance in Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.64); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8.
omission and resequencing of τόποι vis-à-vis a chreia, and so can substantially transform it.\footnote{The progymnasmata suggest that refutation/confirmation can modify forms like a chreia in two ways: we can either add a refutation/confirmation itself, or we can adapt or retool an existing refutation/confirmation. Although the progymnasmata show little interest in reinventing and rearranging τόποι, they do suggest and allow for this possibility.}

1. Refutation and confirmation with τόποι. For Theon and Hermogenes, a τόπος ("topic") is simply material that supports a proposition. To be more precise, it is a theme, for instance birth, intelligence, beauty, impossibility or worthiness, within which an author sets one or more ἐπιχειρήματα or "arguments," that is, specific statements of logical reasoning.\footnote{τόποι are so understood in Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.59, 2.105, 2.76, 2.117, 2.111, 2.116-117 [= equivalently, διάφορα μι or starting points], 2.113, 2.121-122, 2.129); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 4 n. 9, 23, 26, 49, 51, 48-49, 53, 56-57, 62; Hermogenes, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.10, 6.15-16, 6.17 [= "source of argument"], 6.19, 6.21-22); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 78, 81-82, 83, 85-86. On arguments see Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.60, 2.105, 2.76, 2.94, 2.109-111, 2.123, 2.125-126, 2.128); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 4 n. 11, 23, 26, 41, 50-51, 57, 59, 61; Hermogenes, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.11); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 79. The imagery that I use (τόπος/locus as "place") I borrow from among others Aristotle: see Butts, "\textit{Progymnasmata of Theon}," 416, and cp. Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.94); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 41.} Take for instance a chreia that praises the greatness of Alexander the Great. A topic that would nicely support this chreia is \textit{birth}, and its argument might sound like this: "Alexander’s greatness is evident from his noble birth, a birth indeed foretold by the gods."\footnote{See further Aune, \textit{Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric}, 476-477, Kennedy, \textit{New Testament Interpretation}, 20-21, and Butts, "\textit{Progymnasmata of Theon}," 416.}

According to Theon, when we refute or confirm a form like a chreia with topics, our first major concern is \textit{which} τόποι to use and our second is how to \textit{arrange} them.\footnote{Beginning in his chapter on narrative, Theon describes how to arrange topics. Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.93); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 40.}

One should refute chreias on the ground of their being unclear, pleonastic, deficient, impossible, incredible, false, inexpedient, useless, or shameful \[all, topics\]. . . . Refutable from being deficient \[ἐκ . . . τοῦ ἐλλειποντος\] whenever we show, (for example,) that Demosthenes did not rightly say that rhetoric was a matter of delivery; for we need many other things for rhetoric. Refutable from the impossible \[ἐκ . . . τοῦ ἀδύνατον\], as if we say against Isocrates that it is not possible for men to be born from gods. . . . From the useless \[ἐκ . . . τοῦ}
Theon characterizes refutation similarly for chreiai and for forms like theses and laws, whose refutation and confirmation similarly anticipate full speeches. He recognizes that these techniques will differ somewhat with different forms, and that we cannot employ every topic in every situation.


348 Having already defined important forms that we shall see in the gospels, it is not essential to quote the Greek text here in full. Theon continues: “But do not forget that it is not possible to argue from all topics in all chreias. We shall, of course, follow the same order of epicheiremes (ἐπιχειρήματα) as we have given of topics (τόπων).” Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.104-105); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 22-23. Theon also notes that the chreia’s topics “would be the same for both refutation and confirmation of maxims,” as well as of theses: Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.105, 2.128); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 23, 61.

349 For composition of fable and narrative, see next note. For composition of thesis and law see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.121-123, 2.125-126, 2.129); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 56-57, 59, 62, and Progymnasmata (ed. Patillon, 99-101); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 65-66. On the forms anticipating speeches, see for instance Kennedy, Progymnasmata, x. Not every rhetorical form employs τόποι to refute or to confirm. The progymnasmata commend τόποι to refute or confirm the following rhetorical forms: chreia, fable, narration, thesis and law; τόποι work similarly in elaboration (ἐργασία) of chreiai and maxims. However, several rhetorical forms to which Theon does not assign refutation or confirmation (namely: the commonplace [Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.120); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 55]; ecphrasis, prosopopoeia, encomion/invective, and syncrisis) still contain essentially τόποι that either support a proposition or else merely serve as description. In fact, these forms contain τόποι already (while the mini speech called τόπος or commonplace similarly contains arguments [Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.106); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 43]). For these forms, Theon still commends a particular selection and arrangement of τόποι. Here invention and arrangement varies with the form, and sometimes (as in ἐκφρασία) with specific varieties of that form and with other circumstances. To appreciate this variety see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.107-109, 2.119, 2.115-118, 2.109-112, 2.113-115); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 44-45, 46, 47-49, 50-52, 53-55. In the chapter on encomion and invective, Theon prescribes a particular order for topics and even particular arguments to make within these. Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.111-112); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 51-52.

350 For distinct forms and their topoi see Theon, Progymnasmata, (ed. Spengel, 2.76); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 26. On theses see further Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.120-121); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 55-56, and Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.125-126, 2.128); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 59, 61. On laws, see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.128-129); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 62. On narratives, see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.78, 2.93); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 28, 40. And on fables, see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.76); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 26: ληπτέον δὲ τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα ἐκ τόπων τῶν: “Epicheiremes should be taken from the following topics: the unclear [ἄσφος] the implausible [ἀπόθων], the inappropriate
Like Theon, Hermogenes commends τόποι for refuting and confirming forms, namely theses and laws,\footnote{352} whose refutation or confirmation anticipates the composition of full speeches.\footnote{353} In fact, Hermogenes commends more or less one set of τόποι for refuting or confirming theses and laws; for convenience, we summarize these τόποι in Appendix 1 (Table 1.1).\footnote{354} He commends a slightly different set of τόποι for composing an encomion, syncrisis, ethopoeia and ecphrasis. These “encomiastic topoi” (τόποι ἐγκωμιαστικοὶ) include “time” (χρόνος), “national origin” (ἐθνός), “manner of death” (τρόπος θανάτων), “family” (γένος) and “upbringing” (ἀγωγή).\footnote{355} Generally

\[\text{όπρεπος}, \text{ the deficient [ἐλληπος], the redundant [πλεονάζωνος], the unfamiliar [ἀσωηθος], the inconsistent [μοχυμηνος], the disordered [τάξεως], the inexpedient [ἀσυμφόρου], the unlike [ἀνομοοιος], the false [ψευδος].}\]

\footnote{351} For instance, when refuting true, “if it should seem true, we shall then ask if something is omitted or too much has been added [emphasis added].” Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.93); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 40.

\footnote{352} Hermogenes implies that students can refute or confirm any number of rhetorical forms. Kennedy points out that after the refutation/confirmation exercise, Hermogenes next applies it to theses: see \textit{Progymnasmata} p. 79 n. 25.

\footnote{353} Like Theon too, Hermogenes similarly prescribes topoi for composing a common-place (ὁ τόπος ὁ κοινος), encomium (ἐγκωμιον), syncrisis (συγκρισις), ethopoeia (ἡποτοια) and ecphrasis (ἐκφρασις). Again it might sound confusing to speak of a “topos” that uses “topoi.” But Hermogenes seems to envisage, like Theon, two kinds of topos: see Hermogenes, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.15); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 81.

\footnote{354} He also commends these for composing a κοινος τόπος or commonplace. Granted, Hermogenes does not use the word τόποι for these forms; he says that theses and laws διαιρούνται . . . τελικοις κεφαλαιοις (“divide into final headings”) and similarly that the commonplace employs final headings. These terms, however, often overlap with Theon’s τόποι and have basically the same evidentiary function. See Hermogenes, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.25-26, 6.27, 6.12); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 87-88, 79. Hermogenes uses τόποι to denote such themes as (for instance) “manners,” “education,” “growth” [Kennedy p. 83], “nurture,” “family” and “national origin” [Kennedy, p. 82]. Compare Hermogenes’ final headings listed here with Theon’s τόποι: for instance, the incredible, the appropriate, the unclear, the impossible and the false. Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.93); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 40.

\footnote{355} The commonplace is the one exercise in which Hermogenes describes a structure akin to an actual speech: see \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.12-14); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 79-81.

\footnote{356} Hermogenes, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.15-16, 6.19); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 82, 84. Within these general themes, we may create more specific statements: Hermogenes, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.15-16, 6.19); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 82, 83-84. Generally speaking, choice of τόποι varies with circumstance, such as subject (for instance, an encomion of a person versus an encomion of a plant), yet they are similar: Hermogenes, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.15-18); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 82-83.
speaking, Hermogenes knows, like Theon, that circumstances can affect one’s selection and sequence of τόποι.356

In a departure from Theon, Hermogenes assigns a specific name to the refutation and confirmation of chreiai: elaboration (εργασία).357 Let us pause to examine chreia elaboration in more detail, for it will become central to our analysis of the gospels. As we saw earlier, a chreia elaboration creates a mini speech that supports a chreia through eight precisely arranged parts: an introduction, a chreia paraphrase, a rationale, a set of four τόποι,358 and a concluding exhortation. In an elaboration the τόποι differ only slightly from the τόποι in Hermogenes’ refutation and confirmation exercises. To appreciate the exercise, let us review Hermogenes’ own illustration.359

Let the elaboration be as follows: [1] first [πρωτον] a brief encomion of the speaker or doer; [2] then [είτε] a paraphrase […] of the chreia; [3] then the cause [αίτια]; for example, Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but the fruit is sweet [the chreia ή χρεία].

[1] Praise: “Isocrates was a wise man,” and you will slightly develop [πλατυνεῖς] the topic [τὸ χωρίον: “subject”].

[2] Then the chreia, “He said this,” and you will not state it in bare form but expand the statement [πλατυνον τὴν ἐρμηνείαν: lit. “widen the expression”; i.e., paraphrase].

[3] Then the cause, “For the greatest things are wont to succeed through toil, and when successful bring pleasure.”

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356 Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.21, 6.22-23); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 85, 86.
357 The elaboration resembles a refutation and confirmation exercise. I first saw the parallel between Hermogenes’ elaboration and refutation, made by Mack and O’Neil, “Chreia Discussion of Hermogenes of Tarsus,” 171. Hermogenes applies the elaboration exercise strictly to the chreia and maxim: Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.7-9); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 77-78. The term elaboration creates some confusion in the literature. Kennedy’s translation (Progymnasmata, p. 77) mislabels Hermogenes’ elaboration an exergasia (ἐξεργασία), probably influenced by Theon’s use of the term. Similarly, Mack and O’Neil (“Chreia Discussion of Hermogenes of Tarsus,” 162) misidentify Hermogenes’ ἔργασια with Theon’s ἐξεργασία. Hermogenes’ ἔργασια is very different from ἐξεργασία, on which see below.
358 Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 57-63, esp. 56-57, 61. For the term τόποι in elaborations, see Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.10); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 78.
359 I provide Greek text only for key technical terms that will become important in our analysis of the gospels.
360 Also translated “amplify” by Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 51 (cp. LSJ, s.v.).
361 Whether Kennedy’s translation of χωρίον as “topic” implies that the word is synonymous with τόπος, I am not sure.
[4] Then by contrast [κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον] “Ordinary things need no toil and in the end give no pleasure, but things of importance are the opposite.”

[5] Then from a comparison [ἐκ παραβολῆς], “For just as farmers need to reap fruits by working the soil, so also with speeches.”

[6] Then from an example [ἐκ παραδείγματος], “Demosthenes, by shutting himself up at home and working hard, later reaped the fruit in the form of crowns and testimonials.”

[7] It is also possible to bring in a judgment [ἐκ κρίσεως]; for example, “Hesiod said (Works and Days 289), ‘The gods put sweat before virtue,’ and another poet says, ‘The gods sell all good things to us for toils.’”

[8] At the end you will put an exhortation [παράκλησιν] to the effect that one must be persuaded by the person who has said or done this.362

So much for now; you will get more complete teaching later.363

The chreia elaboration exercise is akin to confirmation; like confirmation, it argues in support of the proposition (“Isocrates said that the root . . .”), which is essentially the chreia itself.

Mack, we recall, has shown that chreia elaboration predicts the essential components of judicial and deliberative speeches. Each of the elaboration exercise’s eight parts mirrors a part of a judicial/deliberative speech: the encomion mirrors a speech’s prologue (προοίμιον); paraphrase and cause mirror the speech’s narration (διηγησίς); the four τόποι mirror the speech’s section of proofs (πιστείς); and the exhortation mirrors the speech’s conclusion (ἐπιλογος).364 To appreciate better these parallels between chreia elaboration, a speech and a related “complete argument” (a distillation of speech argumentation for school purposes discussed by the Rhetorica ad Herennium), we reproduce Mack’s table:365

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362 Interestingly, Hermogenes refers to ἔργασια of the ethopoeia—but beyond sharing the name, the technique is entirely different from elaboration of chreiai and maxims: see Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.21-22); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 85.

363 Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.7-8); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 77. I have formatted this excerpt with the help of Mack’s outline (“Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 51-52).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>Complete Argument</th>
<th>Progymnasmata: Hermogenes’ elaboration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Proooimion</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Encomium/Praise</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Simile</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Exemplum</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Amplificatio</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) Iudicatio</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Epilogos</td>
<td>Complexio</td>
<td>8. Exhortation³⁶⁷</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The similarities between the elaboration technique and the speech unambiguously demonstrate their common basis.³⁶⁸ And the significance of all this is twofold. First, elaborated chreiai are essential rhetorical forms in Jesus’ exchanges with opponents. Second, elaborated chreiai are essentially Greco-Roman speeches, and as such they invite familiarity with advanced rhetorical principles that can help us analyze adaptations (below, Section 1.5).

2. **Contradiction.** A second inventive-arrangement technique is *contradiction* (ἀντίρρησις). As Patillon notes, contradiction differs slightly from refutation/confirmation.³⁶⁹ While refutation or confirmation addresses a specific

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³⁶⁶ Mack’s more detailed summary also includes a column of parallels from Hermogenes’ *De Inventione*: “(1) analogy (ἀπὸ παραβολῆς); (2) example (ἀπὸ παραδείγματος); (3) the lesser (ἀπὸ μικρότερου); (4) the greater (ἀπὸ μείζονος); (5) the same (ἀπὸ ἵσου), and (6) the contrary (ἀπὸ ἐναντίου).” See Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 54, 56.

³⁶⁷ Table adapted from Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 54; for more detailed outline and comparison of these parts, see pp. 53-57.

³⁶⁸ Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 32, 35. Quintilian uses certain expressions akin to τόπος: materia (2.4.19), quod lex, quod publica, quod ad religionem deum comparata sit (2.4.34). Here he does mention destruendi confirmandique (i.e., ἀνασκευή and κατασκευή) of narratives, the laus and vituperatio (i.e., ἐγκόμιον and ψόγος), the comparatio (i.e., σύγκρισις), thesis (i.e., θέσις) and lex (i.e., νόμος). See Quintilian 2.4.18-42 (LCL, trans. Butler).

³⁶⁹ Patillon, *Aelius Théon*, cxiii.
proposition, contradiction denotes *refuting a whole speech*. In other words, contradiction refutes a refutation or confirmation! Contradiction is instructive for adapting literary sources, for it *recalls* a speech in the course of contradicting it. When recalling his source, the speaker can modify it using progymnastic techniques.

1.4.4: *Expressive Techniques*: “Adding a Comment” (ἔπιφωσκεῖν) and Paraphrase (παραφράσις)

Rhetorical theory teaches explicitly how to *express* material like the chreia anew. The progymnasmata reveal two major techniques for changing expression. One is “adding a comment” (ἐπιφωσκεῖν) and the second is paraphrase (παραφράσις, paraphrasis).

1. *Adding a comment*. To add a comment (ἐπιφωσκεῖν) is to “articulate” an existing position using a brief statement—a maxim or more generally “conclusion.” Theon recommends Ἐπιφωσκεῖν for chreiai, fables and narratives, and he knows of it in historiography and oratory too. While functionally, adding a comment may be an

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370 Contradiction critiques not only the speech’s arguments but also their arrangement and expression. On contradiction (the text of which is extant only in Armenian), see Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Patillon, 111-112); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 72.
371 This however does not necessarily imply that a gospel containing a reply speech is later than a gospel lacking a reply speech.
373 Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Rabe, 2.91); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 38. I use Kennedy’s translation *add a comment*, see for instance *Progymnasmata* (ed. Rabe, 2.86); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 34.
375 Butts, “*Progymnasmata of Theon,*” 240. Patillon points out that the exercise differs a little depending on the form; for chreia, it acts as a supporting argument: Patillon, *Aelius Théon*, lxv, lxix.
inventive technique, Patillon observes that rhetorical treatises usually classify it under expression.377

2. Paraphrase. The understanding of paraphrase is fairly consistent among Theon, Quintilian and Hermogenes, and it is an adaptive technique *par excellence*, even if it is one of the few adaptive techniques about which rhetoric is explicit. In any case, it deserves careful attention, for it is conspicuous in the gospels.

A. Theon. Theon’s παραφράσις denotes quite simply the fresh expression of an idea(s):378 “paraphrase,” he writes, “consists of changing the form of expression while keeping the thoughts; it is also called metaphrase [μεταφράζω (2.62)]” or moulding anew (μεταπλάσσω [2.62]).379 As Patillon nicely summarizes:

> [P]araphrase teaches the art of formulating ideas. And it concerns only expression. . . . In theory the exercise exploits the possibility that the working of language offers, to formulate in various ways content of identical thought.

He reminds us too that expressive change inevitably yields mild content change, but change so mild that it still retains the same basic idea:

> Addition and subtraction are made . . . by the multiplication or the simplification of the expression of the same semantic element, or again in presenting the idea more explicitly or more implicitly. The content of thought . . . remains identical at a sufficient level of abstraction.

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378 Greek term in Theon, *Progynasmata* (ed. Spengel, 2.62); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 6. Theon mentions paraphrase in three locations: the first is in chap. 1 (ed. Spengel, 2.62-4); the second is in chap. 2 (ed. Spengel, 2.69); and the third in chap. 15, extant only in Armenian (ed. Patillon, 107-110).
381 “L’addition et la soustraction se font dans les mêmes limites par la multiplication ou la simplification de l’expression d’un même élément semantique, ou encore en rendant l’idée plus explicite ou plus implicite . . .
Paraphrase, then, retains a text’s essential meaning even while it adds or omits relatively detailed images and ideas.\(^{382}\) And paraphrase encompasses several relatively precise progymnastic techniques that we have already seen,\(^ {383}\) including restatement or recitation (\(\alpha\pi\sigma\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\iota\alpha\))\(^ {384}\) of the chreia using slightly different expression.\(^ {385}\)

Within Theon’s paraphrase technique, scholars recognize several precise forms. Indeed there are at least four. First, paraphrase can take a thought and vary its expression in words, grammar and “style.” Theon lists “variation in syntax, by addition, by subtraction, and by substitution, plus combinations of these.”\(^ {386}\) Second, paraphrase can specify a relation, drawing out a “logical connection.”\(^ {387}\) Third, paraphrase can create what Patillon calls a *pastiche* or rendition into an individual’s characteristic style of

\(^{382}\) Admittedly, what represents a “sufficient level of abstraction” is open to judgment.

\(^{383}\) For example, *Aelius Théon*, cv; cp. Kloppenborg, “Reception of Jesus Tradition in James,” 117 (concerning \(\alpha\pi\sigma\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\iota\alpha\)).

\(^{384}\) Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Spengel, 2.101); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 19. Again, the English terms that I use are unless otherwise indicated, from Kennedy’s edition; Kennedy uses the English terms “state” and “restate” for \(\alpha\pi\sigma\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\iota\alpha\), while Hock, “General Introduction,” 36-37 (for example), prefers “recitation.” Of course, recitation without any alteration of words or syntax, as Patillon says, is not paraphrase (Aelius Théon, cv.)


\(^{386}\) Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Patillon, 107-108); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 70. On syntax see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 70 n. 208: when Theon says “syntax” he “is thinking more of rearrangement of the order of words than of actual changes in syntax. . . . Such syntactic paraphrases as changing a clause into a genitive absolute would, perhaps, fall under ‘substitution.’” For the sake of clarity here, I will say “syntax.”

\(^{387}\) Kennedy’s translation of Patillon’s text obscures this observation. (Kennedy admits that he offers only a selective translation of Patillon [*Progymnasmata*, p. 64.]) For an example see Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Patillon, 109-110); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, pp. 70-71.
speaking.\textsuperscript{388} And fourth, paraphrase can shift an idea’s perspective.\textsuperscript{389} Theon himself illustrates these changes with the following text:

Thucydides (1.142.1) said, “in war, opportunities are not abiding” [τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καιροὶ οὐ μενετοί] . . .

while Demosthenes (4.37) paraphrased this, “opportunities for action do not await our sloth and evasions” [οἱ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ μένουσιν καιροὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν βραδυτήτα καὶ εἰρωνείαν].\textsuperscript{390}

Here we see addition of words (δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων . . . τὴν ἡμετέρας βραδυτήτα καὶ εἰρωνείαν),\textsuperscript{391} subtraction of words, retention of words, and syntactical changes, for instance the replacement of the adjective μενετοί with the verb μένουσιν. In short, we see several changes in such paraphrase, and Theon allows for such “combinations.”\textsuperscript{392}

Indeed, Kloppenborg has pointed to the sophistication with which authors could paraphrase, ranging from mild grammatical changes (for example, of case) to quite comprehensive packages of change that entailed adapting elements to “fit” a new context, as well as syntax, vocabulary and style.\textsuperscript{393}

\textsuperscript{388} Patillon, Aelius Théon, cvii. Patillon is right here to call paraphrase a kind of imitatio; cp. similarly Kloppenborg, “Reception of Jesus Tradition in James,” 120.

\textsuperscript{389} Kloppenborg clarifies that in paraphrase and restatement (ἀπαγγελία) of a chreia, “[s]ometimes the saying component . . . was reproduced mainly unaltered, but the introduction modified and reframed to suit the rhetorical situation.” Similarly, students practised “how to manipulate sayings to suit the grammatical construction in which they were to be quoted and to present them in various forms—as unmotivated pronouncements, as responses to particular circumstances, as answers to questions, etc.” Kloppenborg, “Reception of Jesus Tradition in James,” 117, 118. Theon’s discussion in Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.62); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{390} Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Patillon, 108); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 70. Greek texts from Thucydides, Hist. 1.142.1 (LCL, trans. Smith), and Demosthenes, 4.37 (ed. Blass).

\textsuperscript{391} This is in fact Theon’s point, and the reason why he gives this illustration: Progymnasmata (ed. Patillon, 108); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{392} Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Patillon, 109); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 70; cp. Quintilian 10.5.8 (LCL, trans. Butler).

\textsuperscript{393} See Kloppenborg, “Reception of Jesus Tradition in James,” 118-121.
A second illustration of Theon’s paraphrase is more liberal, incorporating numerous varieties of change. The illustration comes from the fourth century Athenian statesman Demosthenes, who paraphrases his own words.

In *Against Meidias* (§37) he says, τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐκ οἶδε τοῦ μὲν πολλὰ τοιούτα γενέσθαι τὸ μὴ κολάζεσθαι τοὺς ἔξωμαρτομόντας αἰτίων ὁν, τοῦ δὲ μηδένα υπρίζειν τὸ λοιπὸν τὸ δίκην τὸν οἰεὶ ληφθέντα, ἦν προσήκει, διδόναι, μόνον αἰτίων γενόμενον;

“Who of you does not know that the cause of many such things happening is that those who do wrong are not punished, and that the only way to prevent someone from being outraged in the future is for one caught doing so always to pay the penalty?”

And in *Against Aristocrates* (§99) he says, ὅ γὰρ εἰ τι πῶποτε μὴ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐπράξῃ, σὺ δὲ τούτῳ ἐμίμησα, διὰ τούτῳ ἀποφύγοις ἂν δικαίως, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον, πολὺ μάλλον ἀλίσκεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα: ἦσπερ γὰρ εἰ τις ἐκείνων ἐὰλω, σὺ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἄν ἐγραψάς, οὕτως ἂν σὺ δίκην δῶς, ἀλλος οὐ γράψει.

“If something has not been done in accordance with the laws, and you, Aristocrates, imitated the act, you would not for that reason be justly acquitted; on the contrary, it is much more a reason for you to be convicted. For just as if someone had been convicted for that act, you would not have introduced your decree, so if you are now convicted, another will be deterred.”

Several expressive adaptations emerge in this paraphrase. First, there is a shift in perspective. The former version is a question, the latter a statement with rationale; the former addresses several people, the latter addresses principally Aristocrates. Second, there are changes to vocabulary and syntax. The former version contains one sentence, the latter two sentences; the former contains indirect statements (“Who of you does not know that . . . ?”), the latter has none; it prefers a conditional sentence followed by a comparative sentence. In the latter, moreover, Demosthenes adds some terms and phrases (e.g., ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον, πολὺ μάλλον ἀλίσκεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα: “on the contrary, it is

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much more a reason for you to be convicted”), subtracts others (“the only way to prevent someone from being outraged in the future”), and substitutes yet others (the more precise τι πώς μή κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἔπραξη instead of πολλὰ τοιοῦτα).

And the paraphrase’s changes in perspective, audience and syntax often necessitate grammatical changes (e.g., from δίδοναι to δῷ). Perhaps most strikingly, Theon’s paraphrase can exist on various scales—from an entire narrative right down to a single thought.

B. Quintilian. Quintilian’s paraphrase (paraphrasis) is much the same technique that we observed in Theon. Quintilian puts it this way: neque adeo ieiunam ac pauperem natura eloquentiam fecit, ut una de re bene dici nisi semel non possit; “nature did not make eloquence uninteresting and poor to such a degree, that it is not possible to speak well about one thing [re] except once.” Paraphrase takes an idea (res) and assigns alternate expression to it through such means as figures (figurae) or by choosing among “brevity and copiousness.” When Quintilian speaks of copiousness, cautions Lausberg, he does not mean a copiousness of distinct ideas, but rather copiousness in elocutio: tropes such as metaphor, metonymy and hyperbole, and figures such as isocolon and

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395 Or this is a substitution in further words for the original version’s μή κολάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐξαμαρτόμοντας.
396 Similarly: μή κολάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐξαμαρτόμοντας (“those who do wrong are not punished”) with διὰ τοῦτο ἀποφύγων ἄν δικαίω (“you would not for that reason be justly acquitted”).
397 Note worthy also is that the paraphrase version sounds harsher than the original. Its use of two sentences, a rationale, and emphasis (“much more reason for you to be convicted”), strengthen the condemnatory tone. Here we have amplification, which Patillon characterizes as part of ἔξεργασία, on which see below.
398 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Patillon, 110); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 71; cp. p. 7: “Indeed, Philistius in his history of Sicily borrowed almost the whole account of the war with Athens from Thucydid es.” Patillon adds that, “L’exercice peut se pratiquer oralement ou par écrit. . . . Dans l’exercice écrit, l’élève a sous les yeux le text à reformuler. Il paraphrase des séquences de plus en plus longues et complexes, selon le même principe pédagogique de progression constante dans la difficulté qui régit tout le programme.” Aelius Théon, cv.
399 Quintilian 10.5.5 (LCL, trans Butler and author). We can translate res as “thing, object, being; a matter, affair, event, fact, circumstance, occurrence, deed, condition, case . . . and sometimes merely = something.” Lewis and Short, s.v.
400 Quintilian 10.5.8 (LCL, trans. Butler).
Paraphrase techniques do entail idea changes on a minute level—but from an ancient perspective they change only expression. Moreover, paraphrase has a “duty . . . to rival and vie with the original in the expression of the same thoughts.”

C. Hermogenes. Hermogenes’ (likely inauthentic) treatise On the Method of Forcefulness has an understanding of paraphrase similar, according to Patillon, to Theon.

[In] paraphrase . . . one changes either the order employed by the first speaker, or the length: if the first speaker expresses himself at length, one repeats him by condensing [the material] briefly and in reverse.

The basic resemblance to Theon is obvious: paraphrase adjusts an idea’s expression. Hermogenes’ Progynasmata also implies a similar understanding of paraphrase. While describing elaboration (ἐργασία) of a chreia, Hermogenes says that it must contain paraphrase (παράφρασις), about which he adds οὐ θησεῖς αὐτὴν ψιλὴν ἀλλὰ πλατύνων τὴν ἐρμηνείαν: “You will not state it [the chreia] in bare form but expand the statement.” Since a more precise translation of ἐρμηνείαν is “expression,” it is safe

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401 Lausberg, Handbook §§ 1104-1106, and esp. § 1102 (esp. reference there to figures and tropes) and §§ 453-456: figures and tropes belong to elocutio, the “linguistic expression” or “linguistic garment.”
402 Quintilian 10.5.5 (LCL, trans. Butler). In other words, the expression is to be superior (10.5.4-8), or to practice aemulatio, a point underscored by Kloppenborg, “Reception of Jesus Tradition in James,” 120-121.
404 Hermogenes in Hermogène: L’Art Rhétorique, 536.
405 Hermogenes, Progynasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.7); Kennedy, Progynasmata, p. 77.
406 LSJ, s.v. Indeed Theon uses the term in this way: Progynasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.64); Kennedy, Progynasmata, p. 7.
to conclude that Hermogenes’ paraphrase, like Theon’s paraphrase, essentially changes an idea’s expression.\textsuperscript{407}

D. Paraphrase in School Practice. From ancient classroom practice there have survived some texts that scholars consider paraphrase.\textsuperscript{408} Teresa Morgan has collected and studied one collection of paraphrases on papyrus from Greco-Roman Egypt. Significantly, she assigns the bulk of the school paraphrases to roughly the progymnastic level of education. Hence these texts warrant our attention.\textsuperscript{409}

Morgan has amassed three major tendencies in school paraphrases. The first tendency is towards austerity.\textsuperscript{410} Most paraphrases “excerpt from, shorten and simplify the original narrative, moving abruptly between highlights of the story.”\textsuperscript{411} To this end the paraphrases employ parataxis, avoid subordinate clauses, and restrict each sentence to one main idea. Linking these features to the progymnasmata, Morgan comments that we find a “close paraphrase of what Quintilian and Hermogenes describe as the most elementary type.”\textsuperscript{412}

\textbf{Original}: . . . ἵστω νῦν Ζεὺς πρῶτα, θεῶν ὑπάτως καὶ ἄριστος, Ἔτη τε καὶ Ἡλίων καὶ Ἐρινύες, ἀο θ’ ὑπὸ γαίαν ἀνθρώπους τίνιονται, ὅτις κ’ ἐπιορκον ὁμόσση, μὴ μὲν ἐγὼ κούρη Βρισιῆδι χείρι ἐπένεικα, οὔτε ἐνυής πρόφασιν κεχρήμενος οὔτε τευ ἄλλου. ἄλλ’ ἐμεν’ ἀπροτιμάστος ἐνὶ κλισθέισιν ἐμῆσιν.

\textsuperscript{407} Kloppenborg draws attention to an important feature of this particular example: it can quite markedly alter the expression of ideas, replacing most if not words. For instance, Hermogenes’ paraphrase of a maxim (original: οὐ χρή παυσύχιον ἐφεδρον βουληφόρον ἄνδρα: “A man who is a counselor should not sleep throughout the night”) completely transforms its expression (ὅτι ὄλης νυκτός ὅπι προσήκεα ἄνδρα ἐν βουλαίς ἐξεταζόμενον καθέδειν: “It is not fitting for a man proved in councils to sleep through the whole night”), even while the content remains essentially the same. Kloppenborg, “Reception of Jesus Tradition in James,” 119-120. Translations from Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.10); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{408} Morgan has helpfully underscored that practice differs from theory, and that it can be as illuminating precisely because it reflects actual customs: see Morgan, Literate Education, 5-6, for example.

\textsuperscript{409} Morgan, Literate Education, 198, 202-203, 215 and generally 203-215.

\textsuperscript{410} Morgan, Literate Education, 209.

\textsuperscript{411} Morgan, Literate Education, 209.

\textsuperscript{412} Morgan, Literate Education, 204; cp. 205, 210, 213.
“Be Zeus my witness first, highest and best of gods, and Earth and Sun, and the Erinyes, that under earth take vengeance on men, whosoever hath sworn a false oath, that never laid I hand upon the girl Briseis either by way of a lover’s embrace or anywise else, but she ever abode untouched in my huts.”

Paraphrase: ὃμνυεὶ δὲ μῆποτε τῆς εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι ἢδε μιγήναι... He swears that he has never approached her bed nor slept with her...

Such simplified expression recalls suggestions in the progymnasmata, as does the paraphrases’ second tendency: to render more explicit the sequence of events and causal relationships. These paraphrases reflect the progymnastic options of simplifying expression and drawing out logical connections.

But the school paraphrases display a third tendency that we cannot find in the progymnasmata: they omit many events from the narrative, and retain only “highlights.” In effect, these paraphrases compress the narrative (συστόλη) by removing semantic elements. Here we have a definitely more radical, substantive paraphrase than in the progymnasmata. To illustrate, consider this school paraphrase of the Iliad (Books 18 and 19):

[Dωρίς καὶ Πανόπη καὶ Ἁγακλείτη Γαλατεία Νημειρήτης τῇ [καὶ Ἄψευδὴ καὶ Καληλάνασσα [ἐνθὰ δὲ ἤν Κλυμένη Λαυείρα τῇ [καὶ Ηάνασσα Μαιρὰ καὶ Μεριθυσά [εὐπλακαμὸς τ’ Αμαθία άλλαι [θ’ αἱ κατὰ ἀλὸς Νηρηδίς... [7 fragmentary lines]


413 Homer, II. 19.258-263 (LCL, trans. Murray).
Oreithuia and Amathuia of the beautiful hair . . . and the other Nereids from the deep of the sea . . .

Then she dropped ambrosia and scarlet nectar into Patroclus’ nostrils so that his flesh might be whole, and when she has done this she withdraws . . . Achilles calls all the Achaeans to an assembly and renounces his anger. Agamemnon gives him back all his gifts and the Briseis . . . He swears that he has never approached her bed nor slept with her, and so the assembly is dissolved. Briseis, standing by the body of Patroclus, mourns . . .

Strikingly, this paraphrase covers nearly two whole books of Homer’s narrative (18 and 19),\(^{418}\) representing about twenty pages in an English edition! Obviously it omits much content, like Agamemnon’s lengthy, apologetic speech to Achilles. Perhaps the student felt that he was preserving essential content and merely altering its expression. It is hard to know.

Paraphrase, in all, is a rhetorical technique that adapts the expression of ideas. The progymnasmata and seasoned authors alike employ it,\(^{419}\) and it is a major adaptive technique among the gospels.

1.4.5: Enhancing a Text Through All Activities: Perfection (ἐξεργασία)

A final rhetorical technique for adapting chreiai is called elaboration (ἐξεργασία), or better perfection.\(^{420}\) Patillon has rightly distinguished this ἐξεργασία

\(^{417}\) Morgan, Literate Education, 211. See Morgan’s additional comments on the importance of names and the absence of nuanced rhetorical techniques such as figures (pp. 211-212, 214). Again, the paraphrase eliminates direct discourse.

\(^{418}\) Morgan, Literate Education, 211: “The author quotes short passages from . . . part of the catalogue of Nereids (Iliad 18.45-9), the description of Thetis preserving Patroclus’ body (19.38-9) and Agamemnon’s oath that he has not slept with Briseis (19.176), moving between them with paraphrases of each relevant scene.” Morgan does find the occasional paraphrase that does not compress and that employs quite nuanced expression. See Literate Education, 205-209. The paraphrase comes from Bodleian Greek Inscription 3019.

\(^{419}\) We know this because Theon provides examples of paraphrase from actual literature. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.62-64); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 6-8.

\(^{420}\) This technique clearly demonstrates the orientation of certain progymnasmata towards adapting sources.
from Hermogenes’ quite different exercise with topics (ἐργασία), which we earlier saw applied to chreiai.\footnote{Patillon notes that while Theon is aware of essentially the same exercise as Hermogenes’ ἐργασία (in 
_PROGYNASMATA_ [ed. Spengel, 2.72]; Kennedy, _Progynasmata_, pp. 14-15), Theon’s ἐξεργασία is distinct; see _Aelius Théon_, cviii. Mack and O’Neil, “Chreia Discussion of Hermogenes,” 162 and 171 n. 54, have not read Theon’s distinctive elaboration (the ἐξεργασία), probably because an English translation of the Armenian text was not available until 1997.} Perfection, according to Theon,

is language that adds what is lacking in thought and expression. What is “lacking” can be supplied by making clear what is obscure; by filling gaps in the language or content; by saying some things more strongly, or more believably, or more vividly, or more truly, or more wordily—each word repeating the same thing—, or more legally, or more beautifully, or more appropriately, or more opportunely, or making the subject pleasanter, or using a better arrangement or a style more ornate.\footnote{Text extant only in Armenian; at the beginning of the Greek text Theon mentions the exercise. Theon, _Progynasmata_ (ed. Patillon, 110); Kennedy, _Progynasmata_, p. 71.}

Theon’s ἐξεργασία denotes changes of invention, arrangement and expression that enhance a text’s quality.\footnote{Patillon, _Aelius Théon_, cviii-cix. Cp. similarly Quintilian’s technique of “correction” (emendatio). See Quintilian 10.4 (LCL, trans. Butler). Henderson is correct that ἐξεργασία as a school exercise (a progymnasma) is not found outside Theon (“Quintilian and the _Progynasmata_,” 90), but as a technique it does occur elsewhere, as in Quintilian. ἐξεργασία also dovetails with imitatio in its concern to improve upon sources. Patillon’s connection with activities and hence their importance in composition, has encouraged me to categorize all exercises under activities.} That is to say, changes of ἐξεργασία enhance virtues of composition like clarity, beauty, propriety and force.\footnote{Patillon, _Aelius Théon_, cit.} Certain of these changes do conspicuously lengthen a text, for instance, “by filling gaps in the language or content . . . or using . . . a style more ornate.” Lengthening, however, is not always desirable; lengthening is desirable in certain contexts.\footnote{Indicated by Patillon, _Aelius Théon_, cx and n. 214, citing for illustration Demetrius, _De Elocutione_ 280 (LCL, trans. Innes; cp. note d). See further Lausberg, _Handbook_ § 835.} Such a figure makes sense when the context demands it, but other contexts will demand brevity.\footnote{Theon, _Progynasmata_ (ed. Spengel, 2.83); Kennedy, _Progynasmata_, p. 32; see further _Progynasmata_ (ed. Spengel, 2.83-84, 2.79-80); Kennedy, _Progynasmata_, pp. 32-33, 29) (emphases added).}
Theon illustrates ἐξεργασία by comparing Aeschines’ speech Against Ctesiphon with a reply speech (δευτερολογία) by Demosthenes entitled On the Crown. In ca. 324 BCE, Aeschines, an Athenian assemblyman, wrote a speech denouncing the proposal for the civic award of a crown to Demosthenes. In turn, Demosthenes wrote a speech to justify his award! It is in this context that Demosthenes perfects Aeschines’ speech.

Aeschines: πόλεις αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀπέδωτε ὅρθως καὶ δικαίως τοῖς παρακαταθεμένοις, οὕτως ἴσας δικαιούνται ἐν τῷ ὁργῇ ἀπομνημονεύειν ἐν τῷ πιστεύσαι.

You righteously and justly restored the cities themselves and their constituitions to those who had entrusted them to you; for you felt that it was not right to cherish your anger, now that they had put faith in you.

Demosthenes: καλὸν μὲν ἐποίησατε καὶ τὸ σῶσα τὴν νῆσον, πολλῷ δὲ ἔτι τούτου κάλλιον τὸ καταστάντες κύριοι καὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἀποδούναι τάτα δικαίως αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐξημαρτηκόσιν ἐίσι υμᾶς, μηδὲν ὀν ἤδικησα ἐν οἷς ἐπιστεύθη ὑπολογισάμενοι.

Your deliverance of the island was a generous act, but still more generously, when you had their lives and their cities at your mercy, you restored them honestly to men who had sinned against you, forgetting your wrongs where you found yourselves trusted.

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427 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.64); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8. Theon’s discussion of the speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes appears to equate a “second speech” (δευτερολογία) with a “reply” speech (ἀντιγραφή): it responds to the speech of one’s opponent: Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.64 with 2.70); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 8, 13.


429 Given that Theon regards elaboration “useful . . . especially in second speeches [δευτερολογίαις] in trials,” then he probably regards Demosthenes’ version as the elaboration. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.64); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 8. But it is useful in historiography too (see 2.69-70; Kennedy, pp. 12-13).

430 Aeschines, Ctes. 3.85 (LCL, trans. Adams).

431 Demosthenes, Cor. 100 (LCL, trans. Vince and Vince).
Although the Armenian text is a little ambiguous,\textsuperscript{432} Theon seems to prefer Demosthenes on three grounds:

[1] Aeschines simplified in combining the good deeds into one; Demosthenes made them into two things, presenting separately the act of saving and the act of restoring, [2] and at the same time he has amplified the second act\textsuperscript{433} with the addition of “a yet nobler thing by far” \textquoteleft \textquoteleft πολλῷ δὲ ἔτι τοῦτο κάλλιον\textquoteright \textquoteright. [3] Moreover, Aeschines spoke of the state of mind in which the Athenians acted; Demosthenes described it more fully: “You, on the one hand, did a noble thing,” brings credibility by adding “on the one hand” \textquoteleft \textquoteleft μὲν\textquoteright \textquoteright.

Significantly, \textit{ἐξεργασία} is a technique for which we can look among the gospels and that can help us infer more plausible adaptations; it is more plausible than our contemporary idea of “redaction,” and so can help us detect which of two gospels in fact adapts the other.\textsuperscript{435}

Not all rhetorical techniques would appear so useful in proving literary dependence, and for two reasons. First, as Sanders and Davies suggested earlier, certain adaptive techniques have opposite techniques. For instance, there is expansion \textit{(ἐπεκτείνωσις)}, but also compression \textit{(συστολή)}. These opposite techniques make it difficult to conclude, for instance, that “Luke is expanding Mark,” for Mark might be compressing Luke. Second, adaptive techniques usually cannot explain \textit{why} an evangelist uses them. Techniques modify something, but they cannot account for the modification. Hence it is not sufficient, for instance, to argue that, “Luke is posterior to Mark because

\textsuperscript{432} Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 72: “Because Demosthenes’ version is heavier in sound (?), Aeschines’ version can seem in contrast solid, firm and simple, and because those who understand such things can perceive that Demosthenes repeats sounds, let us, when teaching, examine and discuss the details.”

\textsuperscript{433} Patillon remarks that a characteristic of a good second speech is amplification of material in the first (opponent’s) speech; \textit{Aelius Théon}, cxii and n. 217.

\textsuperscript{434} Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Patillon, 111); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{435} Like paraphrase, Theon’s \textit{ἐξεργασία} is known to more advanced rhetorical theory, for Theon offers illustrations from literature: \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.62-64); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 6-8.
he expands Mark.” We must substantiate this claim by asking, Is there a rhetorical reason why Luke’s expansion of Mark is more plausible than Mark’s compression of Luke? This question will be the focus of our next section, where we consider rhetorical principles.

1.5: Explaining Change: The Importance of Rhetorical Principles

The purpose of our final section is to pursue further Schufer’s argument that authors could apply rhetorical principles to their adaptation of sources, and that the application of such principles is a plausible way of accounting for change. This insight has the appeal of going beyond describing how authors adapt sources to describing why they do it. We have already seen one rhetorical technique that shades into a principle for improving sources: Theon’s ἐξεργασία.

Because accounting for change is so crucial to weighing hypotheses of literary dependence, we need to expand the discussion. We should fully examine rhetorical principles for speeches, looking to the progymnasmata and the more advanced rhetorical handbooks, because speeches represent the mature use of chreia elaboration (ἐργασία) with which the synoptic evangelists were familiar too. Therefore, below we shall describe rhetorical principles for composing original work, that is, virtues (ἀρεται, virtues) and

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436 The presence in one text of techniques such as addition of a comment (ἐπιφωνέω), inflexion (κλίνω), weaving (συμπλέκω), refutation (ἀνασκευάζω), confirmation (κατασκευάζω), elaboration (ἐργάζομαι), contradiction (ἀντιρρητορέω), and paraphrase (παραφράζω), cannot prove that the text is posterior to another text. While the progymnasmata teach students, for instance, to elaborate a text, they do not forbid students from omitting (part or all of) an elaboration, or from unweaving texts, except in the case of certain techniques that students should not apply to certain forms in the first place (like refutation to fables: Hermogenes, Progymnasmata [ed. Spengel, 6.11]; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 79).

437 Such preferences overlap with redaction, or characteristic theological emphases of each gospel vis-à-vis others. The advantage of assembling rhetorical techniques and virtues is that these constitute a standard independent of data in the gospels themselves.

438 Schufer, “The Function of Imitation and Emulation.” Schufer focuses on ancient discussion of narrative (διηγησις) and its virtues. He does not compare source hypotheses in detail.
other “rules” of composition,\textsuperscript{439} that can serve as plausible explanations or reasons for change.\textsuperscript{440}

Standing in the way of our analysis is an alleged problem articulated by Sanders and Davies: are rhetorical principles not subjective and aesthetic? While certain principles might appeal to one author, the opposite principles might appeal to another author writing in a different genre\textsuperscript{441} or having different purposes or addressing an otherwise different context.\textsuperscript{442} A good illustration concerns the expressive principle of “ornament” (κόσμιος, ornatus).\textsuperscript{443} While one audience and presentation will demand highly ornamented expression, a different audience might demand very plain expression.\textsuperscript{444} In the synoptic gospels, we face the added challenge that the historical and social contexts in which each gospel emerged are permanently lost. Can we, therefore, infer which of two texts has really improved the other?

What appears a problem is not really a problem once we consult rhetorical theory more closely. We should not take too literally Sanders and Davies’ remark that “the whole notion of ‘improvement’ and its reverse is very shaky.”\textsuperscript{445} It is not quite that shaky.

\textsuperscript{439} For this term see May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 29.
\textsuperscript{440} Theon’s \textit{exergasia} understands several techniques as having one and the same function of improvement. The techniques and motivation of improvement are inseparable: for example, adding forcefulness, adding beauty, adding strength, adding vividness, believability, “filling gaps.” Many of these techniques we can count as principles of improvement.
\textsuperscript{441} Kennedy for example observes that, “the epideictic style tends to amplification and is fond of ornament and tolerant of description and digression.” \textit{New Testament Interpretation}, 75.
\textsuperscript{442} Sanders and Davies, \textit{Studying the Synoptic Gospels}, 72. See similarly Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} §§ 8, 1055-1057, 1063, 470), and Robbins, “Chreia & Pronouncement in Synoptic Studies,” 18-21. Theon repeatedly condemns particular traits of expression; but his association of such traits with authors such as Philistus and Hegesias, indicates that they valued such expression! See \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.71); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 13-14.
\textsuperscript{443} Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} §§ 8, 1063, 1078. Kennedy remarks that the progymnasmata imparted skill in all five activities: see for example, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{444} See Lausberg (\textit{Handbook} § 282); and cp. J. S. Kloppenborg’s criticism of the scholarly tendency to make aesthetic judgements that lack grounding in ancient conventions: Kloppenborg, “On Dispensing with Q?” 231.
\textsuperscript{445} Sanders and Davies, \textit{Studying the Synoptic Gospels}, 72. Perhaps scholars have been reticent to employ rhetoric on account of the large mass of rhetorical theory (consider Quintilian’s discussion of στάσεις in
Several rhetorical principles are basic enough to composition that we can expect their application to be valid much of the time. Of course, this fact does not disallow an author from attenuating a sound rhetorical principle if he needed to address a special context or if the principle appeared rather foreign or beyond the extent of his training. But the existence of such basic principles suggests that much of the time, whichever of two authors arguing for the same or similar propositio draws the other’s work into closer accord with rhetorical principles is the more plausible adaptor.

Although we cannot analyse all the progymnasmata and rhetorical handbooks in detail, such detail is probably unnecessary to appreciate the broad strokes. First, we shall summarize principles for parts (μόρια, partes) of a speech. Second, we shall examine principles within the rhetorical activities, and finally we shall examine principles so fundamental that they deserve special emphasis.

1.5.1: Principles for Parts of a Speech

The progymnasmata and the rhetorical handbooks prescribe basic principles for composing each part of a judicial speech. Some principles are counseled regularly

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3.6.9-10, 4.1.16-19 and 4.4.1-3 [LCL, trans. Butler]). Another reason might be that there were many conventions over which teachers disagreed: see for example 3.6.21-22 (LCL, trans. Butler); Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 75.

446 J. S. Kloppenborg has encouraged me to recognize that certain conventions (for instance, how typically to compose a peroratio), are good guides to determining why an evangelist has made a particular change to a source. Similarly, R. H. Stein remarks that we must not differentiate the evangelists’ educational skills too sharply: “That Mark was not a Greek literary giant has always been acknowledged, but to claim that he was so incompetent that he could not see the difference between the good Greek of his source(s) and his own poor Greek goes much too far in the other direction”: Synoptic Problem, 54. Even Sanders and Davies acknowledge that some elements of rhetoric can indicate literary dependence, in Studying the Synoptic Gospels, 72; cp. Sanders, Tendencies of the Synoptic Tradition, 231.

447 May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 29. The progymnasmata contain numerous rhetorical principles. They teach for instance that if a student elaborates a chreia, he should do so in certain ways (Hermogenes, Progymnasmata [ed. Spengel, 6.7-8]; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 77); similarly, they teach that if a student refutes a chreia, he should do so along particular lines (Theon, Progymnasmata [ed. Spengel, 2.104-106]; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 22-23). The principles in the progymnasmata, though, are often
enough or receive such emphasis that an author would probably employ them in many
contexts. Other principles varied more readily with one’s context, and while certain
variations were understood, there are others about which we cannot generalize. In any
case, basic principles still emerge from the literature, including the classic discussions of
rhetorical handbooks by Bonner (1977) and Lausberg (1998 [1960]), as well as Theon
and Hermogenes’ *Progymnasmata*. Arranged according to the five major speech parts
(προοίμιον, διήγησις, πρόθεσις, πιστείς and επίλογος), these principles matter in
speeches. Conspicuous is what material each part requires, including its duty or
officium, and how one should appropriately express that material.

1. *The Introduction* (προοίμιον or exordium). Rhetoric highlights two principles
or rules for introductions. The first is the duty to please (*delectare*) the audience, in
particular to gain its favour, often, though not necessarily, by appealing to one’s ἀρετή
or good and trustworthy character. Displaying one’s good character was useful in the key
task of “securing . . . goodwill” (*captatio benevolentiae*), the audience’s trust and
receptivity, so that it would accept the case and proofs that the speaker was soon to set

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very specific; we seek to summarize broader, more fundamental principles by looking to rhetorical theory
for speeches, a theory towards which the progymnasmata build.


449 In § 295). Orators concurred, for instance, that *insinuatio* was a good means to introduce a speech if arguing under

450 Conditions of mistrust and hostility (Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 290).

451 Cp. further May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 29. Quintilian admits that a speech can vary with its

452 Context, but he also believes that some principles are generally applicable: Quintilian 2.13.1-2,7 (LCL, trans. Butler).


454 Rome*, 289-304.

455 In *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, 35-36, Mack stresses the importance of ἀρετή in the introduction;

456 Cp. May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 32. We employ ἀρετή in the sense of “good character”;

457 This is the meaning employed by Aristotle (Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation*, 15).
out.\textsuperscript{453} Along with a few further principles for relating both to the audience and to the judge adjudicating the dispute,\textsuperscript{454} ἡδος was highly important.\textsuperscript{455}

The second key principle is a style that is “varied” yet not too ornamented, a style appropriate to pleasing the audience.\textsuperscript{456} The expression ought to employ sufficient ornament to this end.\textsuperscript{457}

2. The Statement of Facts (διήγησις or narratio). Perhaps the solidiest consensus on rhetorical principles concerns the statement of facts, where the speaker presents in his view the facts that underlie the dispute. This part’s duty is to instruct the audience (docere), and such duty demands plain expression.\textsuperscript{458} Characteristic of plain expression are three virtues.\textsuperscript{459} As Theon puts it, “the virtues (ἀρεταί) of a narration are three: clarity, conciseness, credibility.”\textsuperscript{460} At least some rhetoricians regarded the plain style as appropriate to instruction,\textsuperscript{461} though even plain style ought to employ stylistic ornament

\textsuperscript{453} On the significance of captatio benevolentiae, see Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 289. On gaining sympathy, see Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 289; Lausberg, Handbook § 257.2 (the more general duty to which gaining sympathy belongs is called delectare, “to please”).

\textsuperscript{454} See Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 289-290.

\textsuperscript{455} Mack, Rhetoric and the New Testament, 36.


\textsuperscript{457} On which see Lausberg, Handbook § 257.2b.

\textsuperscript{458} Lausberg, Handbook § 293, 295; on the appropriate, plain style, see § 1079.1a (citing Quintilian 12.10.59). Lausberg observes the narration’s broader aims of teaching (docere) and in turn persuasion (persuadere) (§ 293). Quintilian does allow stylistic ornament but explains, “Such ornament as is employed must be of a more severe, restrained and less obvious character” (8.3.11 [LCL, trans. Butler]).

\textsuperscript{459} Not every study attributes these virtues specifically to style. Several studies do: see Quintilian 8.3.1, 12.10.64 (LCL, trans. Butler); Demetrius, De Elocutione 190-194, 202-205 (LCL, trans. Innes). But cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 292.


\textsuperscript{461} Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 25 (citing Cicero’s Orator); cp. Quintilian 12.10.59 (LCL, trans. Butler).
in moderation.⁴⁶² Although there is detailed discussion of these virtues and varied ways to achieve them,⁴⁶³ it is important for now simply to note that these are the key virtues.

3. The Propositio (πρόθεσις). Brief though it might be, the statement of case or propositio is an intuitive part of one’s speech: it is the key point that the speech supports. Analogous to our modern “thesis statement,” the propositio is “the intellectual core component of the content of the narratio.”⁴⁶⁴ Inasmuch as theorists place the propositio within the statement of facts, its duty too is to instruct, and accordingly its style should be plain and marked by clarity, conciseness and plausibility.⁴⁶⁵

4. The Proof (πίστις or argumentatio).⁴⁶⁶ In the fourth part of a speech, the proof, the major duty remains docere (to instruct).⁴⁶⁷ Now, more precisely, the duty is to present logical proofs for one’s propositio. To instruct through logic here demands rhetorical principles, of which three stand out in primary and secondary sources. The first principle is, of course, an appropriate style, in this case a plain style marked by clarity, conciseness and plausibility.⁴⁶⁸ A second principle is amplification (αυξησις, amplificatio). As Anderson defines it, amplification is “a broad term covering various

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⁴⁶² To just what extent such ornamet and figures is appropriate is unclear. Probably its use is limited. In narratives, “Ornatus . . . has the effect of making the long narratio appear short while also serving the goals of the narratio probabilis,” Lausberg, Handbook §§ 313, 314. He adds, “In general the use of . . . digression in practice (especially in literature) is freer than the rules would like to admit.”
⁴⁶⁴ Lausberg, Handbook § 346. Many teachers regarded the propositio as a distinct part: for various views see §262. Quintilian considers it optional depending on whether one expresses it at the close of the narratio: 4.4.1-2 (LCL, trans. Butler).
⁴⁶⁵ Quintilian indicates these virtues in 4.5.26-27 (LCL, trans. Butler). As Lausberg explains, there were more sophisticated forms of a propositio, such as an enumeratio; see Handbook §§ 346-347; cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 294-295. For varied opinions on this form and situations in which to use it, see Quintilian 4.5.1-28 (LCL, trans. Butler).
⁴⁶⁶ For terms see Lausberg, Handbook § 348.
⁴⁶⁷ Lausberg, Handbook § 348.
methods of promoting or conversely denigrating any given matter.” A speaker employs σύζησις to enhance the force of their proofs, for instance by drawing positive comparisons, or by congeries, “the piling up of synonymous words and sentences.” We probably should not assume that amplification is always necessary or that speakers should amplify too much, but the technique is important.

A third convention for proofs is a special propriety (τὸ πρὸς τὸν ἀπτόμενον). Already we have noted that rhetoric demands propriety between duty and style. There is however another major form of propriety, this time between the πρόθεσις/propositio and the choice and sequence of πίστης (“proofs”). In fact, this form of propriety appears the most important virtue for the argumentatio if measured by the attention it receives in rhetorical theory, including the progymnasmata. Accordingly, we need to see how speakers choose and sequence proofs appropriately for a propositio. In their progymnasmata, Theon and Hermogenes recommend particular proofs in a particular sequence for refutation: these proofs are “from the [topic of the] unclear, pleonastic,

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469 Anderson Jr., Glossary, 26. He adds that the technique is quite common in ἐπιλογοι. Although theoretically a technique of invention, amplification could entail considerations of style: Lausberg, Handbook §§ 400-409, 406.  
470 See Anderson, Glossary, 26. For congeries (also called “accumulation”) and methods of amplification see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 401-406.  
473 Lausberg considers it chief among virtues (see Handbook § 427, citing Quintilian 5.10.123); cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 296 (296-302). Quintilian 5.10.123 (LCL, trans. Butler): “the arguments which suit our case.”  
475 See Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.121); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 56. Hermogenes prescribes it for thesis and law, and Theon similarly prescribes it for thesis, law, chreia, fable, narrative and contradiction. See Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.11); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 79; 6.25-26 (pp. 87-88), 6.27 (p.88). Hermogenes assigns a distinct set of proofs for ἐργασία of chreiai and maxims
deficient, impossible, incredible, false, inexpedient, useless, or shameful.”

Although the choice and sequence of proof can vary with the rhetorical form, the general similarity between Hermogenes and Theon is striking.

More advanced students came to learn this πρότεινω through a theory called στάσις or “issue” theory. In judicial rhetoric, stasis theory is a theory for deciding the issue (στάσις) over which parties conflicted, and in turn the appropriate proofs to support one’s own side. Although it does not appear clearly in the progymnasmata, we should appreciate it, for (pace Anderson) critics have detected its application in the synoptic gospels. To determine the precise issue and hence one’s response, stasis theory prescribes four questions, for which May and Wisse offer a clear summary:

[Stasis theory] concerned the question at issue in a speech, and amounted to an elaborate classification of all possibilities; the emphasis was on judicial cases, and on the stance of the defense... There were four main subcategories... representing successively weaker lines of defense: the so-called conjectural status, in which the issue is one of fact (the defense denies the charge, e.g., “X did not kill Y”)... the status of definition (e.g., “X killed Y, but it was not murder but self-defense”... of quality (e.g., “X killed Y, but Y’s death was

(pp. 77-78). Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.121-125); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 56-59; 2.129-130 (pp. 62-64), 2.104-105 (pp. 22-23), 2.76-78 (pp. 26-28), 2.93-96 (pp. 40-42), 111P-112P (p. 72).

476 Emphasis added. For illustration I list the topics for chreiai: Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.104-105); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 22-23. When discussing refutation of chreiai, narratives and theses, Theon believes that we should use topics in roughly the sequence quoted above: Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.105, 2.93-94, 2.121-123); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 23, 40-41, 56-57.

477 The pattern of proofs underlines Mack and Robbins’ discovery that selection and sequencing of proofs was instilled through the ἔργασια exercise for chreiai. Granted, Theon and Hermogenes do not assume that this pattern is applicable when refuting or confirming every rhetorical unit. Theon reminds students to choose only topics relevant for chreia refutation/confirmation. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.105, 2.76-78, 2.93); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 23, 26-28, 40; Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.11, 6.25-26, 6.27); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 79, 87-88. Moreover, Theon and Hermogenes prescribe particular configurations for rhetorical units that “amplify something on which is agreed,” the κόινος τόπος; Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.12); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 79. Cp. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.107-108). They also prescribe particular proofs for the σύγκρισις and ἐγκώμιον: see Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.15-16, 6.19); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 82, 83-84. Cp. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.109-110, 2.113); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 50, 53.

478 Anderson Jr., Glossary, 19. Robbins, however, has applied the theory to show how Matthew constructs speech material: “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 177-185.

479 This theory is the focus in Bonner’s summary of handbook tradition. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 296-302.
beneficial to the state” . . . ), and of transference (procedural objections). For determining to what category “the point of decision” (iudicatio) belonged, the handbooks prescribed a procedure of successive elimination.\textsuperscript{480}

Based on στάσις theory, the speaker selected a propositio and supported it with appropriate logical proofs. These proofs were logical (λόγος), while other parts of the speech had proof from good character (ἠθος) and from audience emotions such as fear or hope (πάθος).\textsuperscript{481} What really matters here is the implication of stasis theory for adapting sources. If a propositio is virtually identical in two works, then it would appear that whichever author conforms better to the theory of stasis would more plausibly adapt the other’s work.

4. The Conclusion (ἐπίλογος or peroratio). In the context of a speech’s key duty to persuade, a conclusion has two more precise duties. The first is to instruct (docere) by reiterating the propositio and proofs. The second is to draw the audience emotively to one’s side (movere);\textsuperscript{482} in other words, to employ proof from arousal of audience emotion, a type of proof called πάθος.\textsuperscript{483} The emotions to arouse varied with the kind of speech and with the speaker; for instance, a judicial speech demanded arousing emotions of conquestio for oneself and indignatio for one’s opponent.\textsuperscript{484} A speaker needed also to be attentive to a few precise virtues (ἀρεταί). The style most appropriate for kindling emotions is “grand”: this style displays emotion through figures of speech and thought, as

\textsuperscript{480} May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 32-33.

\textsuperscript{481} On the peroration, see Bonner, \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, 303.


well as lengthy, suspense-building sentences. Quintilian, ever fond of vivid comparisons, characterizes this style as “like to some great torrent that rolls down rocks and ‘disdains a bridge’ and carves out its own banks.”

With these rhetorical principles in mind we can ask: Which of two speeches sharing the same propositio draws the other towards those principles? Since proofs are fundamental throughout a speech, for instance, we might ask which text offers more or more amplified (αὐξάνω) proofs, or we might ask which text does a better job of inserting proofs in appropriate places, for instance ἡθος in the introduction, λόγος in the narration and proofs, and πάθος in the conclusion. So rhetorical theory is encouraging: whenever two authors share roughly the same aim and context, then the author who strengthens adherence to rhetorical principles in the other’s work is more likely the improving author.

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485 Lausberg, Handbook §§ 435, esp. 1079.3b-c. Moreover, in the exercises of ἔργασία, θέσις and κόινος τόπος, Hermogenes recommends closing with an exhortation, a technique that Robbins has connected with πάθος: Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.8, 6.10, 6.26, 6.14); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 77, 78, 88, 81. See also Hermogenes’ comment on the need for emotion in conclusions in Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.6); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 76. At the same time, when one opened one’s conclusion with a necessary review of one’s case, one had to employ plainer, more compact expression (Lausberg, Handbook §§ 431-432, 435). Even when one proceeded to arouse emotions, one had to be careful not to dwell on those emotions: Lausberg, Handbook § 440; cp. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 303, 304.


487 The intensification of proof (adding proofs, or amplifying proofs), in other words, is one good criterion for proposing literary dependence.

488 For kinds of logical proofs that rhetorical theory infers we can add, see Lausberg, Handbook § 357. For amplification see Anderson, Glossary, 26-29; Lausberg, Handbook §§ 259, 400-409, 432; cp. Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.65, 2.106; ed. Patillon, 110-111); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 8, 23, 71-72. Rhetorical theory does not demand that we add proofs to a source. But it seems intuitive that we can add proofs; for by adding proofs we make our speech more effective, provided that we do not bore or confuse the audience (on taedium as a consideration in speech making, see Lausberg, Handbook § 269-271, for example). Cp. § 349: “The argumentatio = probatio = πίστις . . . as part of the . . . speech consists of at least one proof, but generally of several proofs.”

489 Of course, we need to assume that both texts have broadly the same sensitivity to speech parts. We need also to remember that apparent improvements that text a makes to text b might actually be text b’s effort to moderate an over-zealous application of the virtue in a. In other words, apparent improvements might actually be vitia to be corrected, or else might be unsuitable for a particular context that warrants alternate conventions: Indicated by Lausberg, Handbook § 1063.
1.5.2: Principles from the Rhetorical Activities

Not only principles for speech parts but also principles for rhetorical activities can indicate which of two texts improves the other.\textsuperscript{490} We have just seen an approach to speeches in which we compose each speech part following specific principles. An alternative approach comes from Aristotle, Cicero and their students, who believed that we should employ principles, not in the context of each speech part, but in whichever manner best serves a particular speech.\textsuperscript{491}

1. Invention and Arrangement. While in the handbook tradition, the arrangement of parts essentially governs invention, Aristotle and Cicero believed that invention should govern arrangement: we first invent all proofs, and then arrange them among parts in the most persuasive way.\textsuperscript{492} Cicero held, for example, that ἕθος is effective in every speech part, unlike handbooks which recommend ἕθος strictly in the introduction.\textsuperscript{493}

2. Arrangement. Aristotle and Cicero also had a distinct approach to arrangement. On the one hand, this approach suggests that we arrange our logical proofs, not into one “proof” section, but rather across the speech with the best proofs functioning as a frame.

(1) the strongest arguments should be placed at the beginning and at the end of the pleading; (2) those of medium force, and also those that are neither useless . . . nor essential to the proof, which are weak if presented separately and

\textsuperscript{490} Invention, arrangement, expression. Two further activities were memorization and delivery. For our purposes, though, memory and delivery are irrelevant.
\textsuperscript{491} For these two approaches, see esp. May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 10, 28-32, 34-36; cp. Cicero, De orat. 2.82-88 (trans. May and Wisse) and Quintilian 2.13 (LCL, trans. Butler).
\textsuperscript{492} For Cicero, each distinct speech should be our centre of gravity. In other words, conventions for speech parts are useful, but not at all times; they can be effective, but not if we use them in one, fixed manner. See May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 10, 28-29, 31-32.
\textsuperscript{493} See Cicero De orat. 2.310-311 (trans. May and Wisse). Hence we could argue that a text containing proofs from character throughout a speech, would more plausibly improve a text that had limited such proofs to its introduction.
individually, but become strong and plausible when conjoined with the others, should be placed in the middle.\footnote{Rhet. Her. 3.18.1-2 (LCL, trans. Caplan). Kennedy’s edition pointed me to this passage: Theon, Progymnasmata, p. 59 n. 180. Cp. similarly Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.125-126); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 59.}

On the other hand, Cicero counsels arranging all proofs in a way appropriate for each individual speech.\footnote{Indicated by May and Wisse, Cicero: On the Ideal Orator, 10 and 209.} Yet at the same time, he agrees with the idea of arranging the best proofs as a frame!\footnote{Pointed out by May and Wisse, Cicero: On the Ideal Orator, 209 and n. 302. See Cicero, De or. 2.314 (trans. May and Wisse). Quintilian 4.5.28 (LCL, trans. Butler) adds that, “the worst fault of all is to treat your points in an order different from that which was assigned them in your propositio.”}

3. Expression. Expression entailed four key \textit{virtutes}: correctness (\textit{hellenismos}),\footnote{Correctness in fact belonged to the study of grammar, not rhetoric: Lausberg, Handbook \S\ 459-460. However we categorize it though, correctness will afford a pretty clear criterion for rhetorical improvement. On its importance in composition see Morgan, Literate Education, 178: In theory, she writes, “By far the most important virtue of speech was \textit{hellenismos}, defined on the level of the individual word by analogy and etymology and in the relations of words with one another by the parts of speech and syntax.” Cp. p. 223, where she points out that in school paraphrases, correctness includes making adjustments into more Attic forms.} clarity (\textit{sephneio}), ornateness (\textit{kosmos}) and propriety (\textit{proepou}). A good style ought to be attentive to these four virtues.\footnote{Lausberg, Handbook \S\S 458 ff., esp. 458-461; Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 25; Mack, Rhetoric and the New Testament, 33.}

All these principles from rhetorical activities can, again, help us to measure the direction of literary dependence between two texts that share the same \textit{propositio} or aim. Yet problems remain. What happens, for example, if one author simply prefers plainer, less ornate style while the other does not? Or if one author prefers fewer proofs while the other prefers more? How then do we decide which author has improved the other’s work?\footnote{As I have argued elsewhere, ornament \textit{alone} is a rather context-specific measure of rhetorical improvement: any alleged improvement in expression by text \textit{a} to text \textit{b} could as easily be a different improvement by text \textit{b} to text \textit{a}, simply suited to its distinct context and needs (Damm, “\textit{Ornatus},” 341).} What happens if one author employs principles for speech parts, and the other,
principles from rhetorical activities?\footnote{Similarly, we cannot regard one approach as “better” than the other, for authors could choose between approaches (an impression given by May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 28-32, and Bonner, \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, 288). At times the two approaches agree: both believe for instance that the \textit{ἐπιλογος/peroratio} is an appropriate part for employing \textit{πόθος}. See Cicero, \textit{De or.} 2.332 (trans. May and Wisse); cp. May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 35.} In all these cases it of course becomes difficult to judge the authors’ sequence; we cannot in every case identify an unequivocal improvement because each author addresses his own, distinctive (in some measure) context.\footnote{At least two elements of an author’s context can affect whether or how we apply a principle. One is our text’s \textit{genre} (see Lucian, \textit{De conscib.} 59 [trans. Russell and Winterbottom]); a second is the \textit{rhetorical form} that we compose. For example, Theon associates the fable with virtues that are less applicable to a chreia. Principles cannot always be a definitive criterion for two texts’ sequence. Rather, they offer guidance that \textit{helps} in judging that sequence.} We still need principles so foundational to rhetoric, so universal in their application, that we can unambiguously recognize one text’s application of such principles over against another.

\textbf{1.5.3: Universal Principles: Clarity and Propriety}

Two rhetorical principles can play a special role for the source critic. We might characterize these principles as \textit{universal}: they permeate rhetorical theory so much, that they are easily identifiable \textit{and} can explain differences between two texts in a way that leaves little latitude for each author to have understood it in a “context-specific” way. Encouragingly, the progymnasmata of Theon and the handbooks highlight two such principles: the first is \textit{clarity} and the second is \textit{propriety for one’s context}.\footnote{There are others, but these stand out as most common. Other motivations include: making the expression “vivid”; “conciseness”; “credibility”; aptly employing digression and amplification; when to use recapitulation; and the importance of varying grammatical case: see \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.71, 2.80, 2.106, 2.74); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, pp. 14, 29, 23, 25. For the handbook tradition’s emphases see Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} §§ 458-461: correctness (\textit{ἐλληνισμός, Latinitas}), perspicuity (\textit{σαφήνεια, perspecuitas}), ornament (\textit{κόσμος, ornatus}) and propriety (τὸ πρέπου, aptum).} The progymnasmata and handbooks commend these principles repeatedly and in different
settings. On this note, it is encouraging that all three synoptic evangelists, whatever their geographical or cultural setting, had a literate Greek education, for they would likely have learned these virtues from the progymnasmata or comparable instruction in rhetoric. Again, this is not to say that what constituted “good” rhetoric was uniform across the entire Mediterranean world, but rather that we should be open to hold the evangelists to fundamental rhetorical principles.

1. Clarity (σαφνεία) is arguably the most recurring virtue in Theon’s progymnasmata. Theon values clarity in many rhetorical forms including the chreia: it is frequently the first grounds on which he recommends confirming or refuting others’ speech, and it applies not only to expression but also to invention and arrangement. For expression Theon counsels that we avoid “ambiguity” in word choice, as well as eschew “archaisms and foreign words.” Hock and O’Neil point out that for Theon, particular virtues (ἀρεταί) characterize a good restatement of a fable, and significantly Theon first recommends clarity:

503 Lausberg’s summaries of virtutes/vitia for speech parts in the handbook tradition often focus on clarity and propriety. See Handbook §§ 294-295 (clarity), 427 (clarity or “perspicuity,” propriety).
504 I say this not only because the evangelists appear to have studied at the level of progymnasmata, but also because Mack and Robbins have demonstrated a need for advanced rhetorical theory to interpret the gospels: “Conclusion,” 198, 200.
505 It is striking in this connection that Aristotle regarded clarity as the key virtue of style: Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 25.
506 From the chreia to the narrative to the ecphrasis or description: Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, trans. Kennedy), 2.71 (p. 14), 2.100-101 (p. 19), 2.104 (p. 22), 2.74 (p. 24), 2.76 (p. 26), 2.79-83 (pp. 29-32: notice the length and nuance of the discussion), 2.93 (p. 40), 2.119 (p. 47: “virtues of an ecphrasis are . . . most of all, clarity and a vivid impression”), 2.129-130 (pp. 62-64: notice again the length of discussion); 99P (p. 65), 110P (p. 71); 111P (p. 72). P denotes Armenian text in Patillon’s edition.
507 As such, clarity is a τόπος: see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.104-105); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 22-23. Cp. 2.76 (p. 26), 2.93 (p. 40; notice here that clarity is to be discussed “first”), 2.129 (p. 62), 111P (p. 72).
508 See Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.80-81); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 29-30.
509 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.82, 2.76); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 30, 27.
We have made clear the nature of the original statement [i.e., restatement] in the account of the chreia, but in fables the style should be simpler and natural, and in so far as possible artless and clear.

Theon is not alone here: Hermogenes too regards clarity the first τὸ ποσ with which to refute or confirm a speech, and he recommends it in the ecphrasis: “Virtues . . . of an ecphrasis are, most of all, clarity (σαφήνεια) and vividness.” Theon and Hermogenes did not come to value clarity in a vacuum, for as Kennedy explains, clarity was the single most significant virtue for Aristotle.

Clear expression entails words which are conventional and free from the risks of obscurity latent in regional, technical, and metaphorical language, as well as syntax and grammar that is similarly conventional and free from risks for instance of too little or too many elements in a sentence. Further qualities of clarity emerge from Morgan’s analysis of paraphrases. As Morgan puts it,

These exercises teach the pupil to process information. He learns to identify the important features of the texts he reads, which consist in general of certain key events, certain ethical principles, and characters. He then learns to restate what he

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511 Kennedy translates ἀπαργελία as “original statement” and “restatement”: see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.101 and 2.74); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 19, 24. What is meant throughout, though, is surely restatement.

512 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.74); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 24 (emphasis added).

513 Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.23); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 86; cp. 6.5 (p.76), 6.11 (p. 79), 6.27 (p. 88).

514 Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 25. Further comment on the importance of clarity comes from Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 36 (Theon); Black, Rhetoric of the Gospel, 63 (Quintilian); and Mack, Rhetoric and the New Testament, 33, regarding composition in general: “Clarity was frequently mentioned as all-important.”

515 On clarity in invention, arrangement and expression, see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 315, 528, (esp.) 532-533 and 537. Lausberg cautions that “present, empirical . . . usage” denotes that of an “educated persons,” not colloquial language (§§ 533 with 469). On unclear expression see §§ 1067-1070.

516 Most paraphrases that she examines are from Roman Egypt and of Homer. These paraphrases (from ca. 200 BCE to 700 CE), exercises performed on “literary texts” like Homeric epic, “represent the important features of all kinds of early rhetorical exercises” and correspond roughly with the second (progymnastic) of three educational stages. Morgan also notes that extant school paraphrases accord, generally speaking, with sources on education. See Literate Education, 199, 203.
reads in his own words, making much of chronology and little of narrative variety or sophistication. He concentrates on events rather than motives and rarely records conversations and debates. He sometimes points out logical connections but more often omits connectives altogether. . . . It teaches him to make clear and uncomplicated statements but gives him no access to the larger or more sophisticated forms of narrative and argument.

In her examination of nearly twenty-five extant school paraphrases, Morgan observes that the most important, consistent feature is a “strong tendency to clarify, organize and hammer out the narrative order.” This tendency becomes evident from a paraphrase of the *Iliad* (Books 18 and 19), in parts of the narrative that follow Patroclus’ death at the hands of Hector. In the original Homeric text, we read of Achilles’ anger and sorrow at Patroclus’ demise, the preservation of Patroclus’ corpse, the mutual understanding of Achilles and Agamemnon, and the reaction of Briseis to Patroclus’ death. One of the noteworthy features of this original is that it spans almost two whole books—several hundred lines. In what follows, I reproduce merely samples.

(a) There were Glauce and Thaleia and Cymodoce, Nesaea and Speio and Thoë and ox-eyed Halië, and Cymothoë and Actaea and Limnoreia, and Melite and Iaera and Amphithoë and Agave, Doto and Proto and Pherousa and Dynamene, and Dexamene and Amphinome and Callianeira, Doris and Panope and glorious Galatea, Nemertes and Apseudes and Calianassa, and there were Clymene and Ianeira and Ianassa, Maera and Oreithyia and fair-tressed Amatheia, and other Nereids that were in the deep of the sea . . . . [Homer, *Il.* 18.39-49]

(b) . . . So saying, she [Thetis] filled him [Achilles] with dauntless courage, and on Patroclus she shed ambrosia and ruddy nectar through his nostrils, that his flesh might be sound continually. But goodly Achilles strode along the shore of the sea, crying a terrible cry, and aroused the Achaean warriors. And even they that aforetime were wont to abide in the gathering of the ships—they that were pilots and wielded the steering-oars of the ships, or were stewards that dealt out food—even these came then to the place of gathering, because Achilles was

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517 Usually events are sequenced chronologically forwards—but sometimes also backwards: Morgan, *Literate Education*, 210.
518 Morgan, *Literate Education*, 225. “In no case does . . . a slightly more complex sentence-structure induce the writer to develop a more involved narrative style or structure” (p. 214).
519 See Morgan, *Literate Education*, 209. Only occasionally do paraphrases add content and stylistic “embellishment,” such as *Bodleian Greek Inscription* 3019 (*Literate Education*, 205; see pp. 205-209).
come forth, albeit he had long kept him aloof from grievous war. . . . [Il. 19.37-46]

(c). . . [Agamemnon]: “Gifts am I here ready to offer thee, even all that goodly Odysseus promised thee [Achilles] yesternight, when he had come to thy hut. Or if thou wilt, abide a while, eager though thou be for war, and the gifts shall squire take and bring thee from my ship, to the end that thou mayest see that I will give thee what will satisfy they heart.” . . . [Odysseus]: “And let him [Agamemnon] rise up in the midst of the Argives and swear to thee [Achilles] an oath, that never hath he gone up into the woman’s bed neither had dalliance with her, as is the appointed way, O king, of men and of women; and let the heart in thine own breast be open to appeasement.” . . . [Agamemnon]: “And to thine own self [Achilles] do I thus give charge and commandment: Choose thee young men, princes of the host of the Achaeans, and bear from my ship the gifts, even all that we promised yesternight to give Achilles, and bring the women withal.” . . . [Achilles]: “Father Zeus, great in good sooth is the blindness thou sendest upon men. Never would the son of Atreus have utterly roused the wrath within my breast, nor led off the girl ruthlessly in my despite, but mayhap it was the good pleasure of Zeus that on many of the Achaeans death should come. But now go ye to your meal, that we may join in battle.” So spake he, and hastily brake up the gathering . . . [Il. 19.140-143, 175-178, 192-195, 270-276]

(d). . . But Briseis, that was like unto golden Aphrodite, when she had sight of Patroclus mangled with the sharp bronze, flung herself about him and shrieked aloud, and with her hands she tore her breast and tender neck and beautiful face. . . . [Il. 19.282-285].

There is no shortage of reading here. But more importantly, what happens in the student’s paraphrase? First, the paraphrase greatly compresses the original narrative, extracting significant events and arranging them chronologically, much like measuring travel distances by landmarks. Second and crucially, it clarifies the narrative sequence by opening sentences with words like “then” and “after,” and by using simple, paratactic connection of clauses. Such clarity emerges below:

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520 Excerpts from Homer’s Iliad translated by A. T. Murray (LCL). I render complete the original’s sentences; ellipsis points mark gaps between stories.
521 Morgan, Literate Education, 209, 210-212.
522 Morgan, Literate Education, 204, 210, 212-213. She also draws attention to the importance of characters as an organizing principle.
523 Morgan, Literate Education, 212-213: “With . . . two exceptions . . . [the paraphrases] always move chronologically forwards and often stress chronological connectives.”
(a’). . . [preceding part of sentence fragmentary] Doris and Panope and glorious Galatean and Nemertes and Apseudes and Kallianassa. Then there were Clymene and Janeira and Ianas and Mairia and Oreithyia and Amathuia of the beautiful hair and the other Nereids from the deep of the sea. [7 fragmentary lines] . . . . [Il. 18.45-49]

(b’). . . Then she [Thetis] dropped ambrosia and scarlet nectar into Patroclus’ nostrils so that his flesh might be whole, and when she has done this she withdraws . . . . [Il. 19.38-39]

(c’/d’). . . Achilles calls all the Achaeans to an assembly and renounces his anger. Agamemnon gives him back all his gifts and Briseis. He swears that he has never approached his bed nor slept with her, and so the assembly is dissolved. Briseis, standing by the body of Patroclus, mourns . . . [remainder of sentence fragmentary] [Il. 19.40-75, 140-143, 192-195, 282-284]

Paraphrases like this one call to mind modern day business minutes: they avoid verbatim quotations in favour of reporting main events in sequence; they clarify proceedings in a dehydrated, concise form. Although we should not expect every author to clarify in the same way, we can see that clarity matters for students. And significantly, the rhetorical discussions imply that when an author adapts a text, he will more than likely clarify it. In all then, clarity affords a powerful criterion for measuring which of two texts is more plausibly adapting the other.

2. Propriety (τὸ πρὸτον, aptum) or appropriateness is a second universal principle. Propriety denotes a right “fit” between rhetorical elements in speeches. Although theoretically a principle of expression, propriety encompasses every rhetorical activity. It is also, like clarity, a universal rhetorical principle. And there are two good

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526 Propriety is a virtue that ties together expression, invention and arrangement in the handbooks. Lausberg, Handbook §§ 1055-1062. According to Patillon, Aelius Théon, cx, propriety is a “quality of style . . . often presented after the others”; his examples indicate that propriety is subsumed within one of the other qualities (cp. Lausberg, Handbook § 460). But however we categorize propriety, it remains highly important.
reasons to regard it as a universal principle. First, rhetorical theory regards propriety as fundamental: Quintilian devotes an entire chapter to propriety (11.1), Lausberg characterizes it as one of the four cardinal virtues of expression,\textsuperscript{527} Kloppenborg has underscored its importance in paraphrase,\textsuperscript{528} and we have already seen propriety in the very definition of the chreia.\textsuperscript{529} Indeed, πρέπον/aptum was fundamental from an early stage: Theon and Hermogenes’ progyrnasmata apply it repeatedly and to different rhetorical forms.\textsuperscript{530} Indeed, propriety matters throughout the progyrnasmata, for Theon claims that some techniques and principles are apt for one unit (say, a chreia), and not for another (a fable).\textsuperscript{531} The second reason why propriety is a universal and most valuable principle is that it underlies or governs use of other conventions. It is an organizing principle. If for instance a speaker desires an ornate style, propriety governs whether this is appropriate for his speech’s content, audience and other contexts.\textsuperscript{532} In all then, propriety stands in the first rank of rhetorical conventions.

Propriety has two basic forms: the internal and the external.\textsuperscript{533} We shall examine internal propriety, or the ways in which components of a speech should fit together in the


\textsuperscript{528} Kloppenborg, “Reception of Jesus Tradition,” 116, 117, 121-122.

\textsuperscript{529} Hock, “General Introduction,” 24-25.


\textsuperscript{531} Consider for example, Theon’s comment about narratives, in \textit{Progrjynasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.93); Kennedy, \textit{Progrjynasmata}, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{532} See Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} §§ 1056, 1078-1079.

\textsuperscript{533} Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} §§ 1056, 1057, 1058. External propriety “concerns the relationship of the whole speech and its components . . . to the social circumstances of the speech,” including occasion, physical setting and audience (see Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} § 1057). For further discussion of propriety see Stamps,
service of persuasion. Such internal propriety has in turn two essential kinds. The first and indeed single most important kind is to invent, arrange and express material to serve one’s chief goal. In other words, the speaker must direct everything to making the propositio effective. Lausberg calls this propriety “party utilitas”; it is the propriety of material for one’s propositio.

The second kind of internal propriety helps achieve the utilitas. We call this propriety the three genera dicendi: the three “ways of speaking.” Each way of speaking matches particular contents (material, parts, and duties) with a particular style. At the risk of overgeneralizing, such propriety means that banal content invites a plain (ἰσχυρόν) style, “delightful” content a middle (ἀνθηρόν) style, and the most sophisticated content a grand (ὁδρόν) style. Ancient sources amply testify to this propriety. Hermogenes for instance advises that in an ἐκφράσις, “the word choice ought to correspond to the

“Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament,” 154-156. This kind of propriety is difficult to measure in the synoptic gospels, for we lack much information about the gospels’ social circumstances.

534 Lausberg, Handbook §§ 1056, 1058.
535 Lausberg, Handbook § 1060.
536 Also called utilitas causae, in Quintilian’s words “the interests of the case.” Lausberg, Handbook §§ 1060, 63; Quintilian 5.11.16, 2.13.7 (LCL, trans. Butler). Lausberg draws upon Quintilian in Handbook §§ 1060: “The main line of the aptum in the speech, directed towards the audience, is party-utilitas: the speech is biased . . . and all components of the speech . . . are at the service of the utilitas of the party. . . . The utilitas is the guiding principle for all theories of rhetoric. . . . Even rhetorical doctrine may thus be brushed aside if the utilitas demands it.” Cp. Kloppenborg, “Reception of Jesus Tradition in James,” 104, 128, and 133, who indicates that propriety for a text’s rhetorical purpose (for example apology, or paraenesis) might explain why the author of James adapts particular Q sayings. It is still unclear to me exactly what utilitas entails: Is it simply the need to support the propositio? Or does it mean to address other concerns? Confusingly, Lausberg adds that utilitas “is directed towards the audience” (§ 1060). Quintilian is vague when he remarks we need adjust material “as the interests or adornment [decor] of our case may demand” (5.11.16 [LCL, trans. Butler]).
537 Although as we shall see, it is not exhaustive of considerations of propriety a speaker had to make. For an overview of kinds of aptum see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 1055-1058. In our application of this outline to written work, we omit considerations restricted to speeches (like apt pronunciation).
538 Lausberg, Handbook §§ 1078-1079; Greek from Quintilian 12.10.58 (LCL, trans. Butler); English terms (level; plain, middle, grand) from Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 25. Lausberg, Handbook § 1080, adds, “the three genera only represent a selection of the possibilities of the really necessary forms of expression; the breadths of variation . . . alone show that the genera have a certain amount of latitude. In practice the system of genera dissolves into a large number of variants.” Cp. Handbook § 257.2, where Lausberg indicates that the exordium has more than one function, and so would have more than one appropriate style. Cp. §§ 431, 434-435.
subject. If the subject is flowery, let the style be so too; if the subject is dry, let the style be similar.\textsuperscript{539} Further evidence comes from one of Lausberg’s major sources for the \textit{genera dicendi}, Quintilian:

\begin{quote}
[\textit{W}e may differentiate three styles of speaking, all of them correct. For they agree that one is plain which they call \textit{ισχυςν}, the other grand and forcible, which they call \textit{ἀδρόν}; as a third, some add a category midway between the two, others add the florid (\textit{ἀνθηπρόν}). The nature of these three styles is, broadly speaking, as follows. The first would seem best adapted for instructing, the second for moving, and the third . . . for charming or, as others would have it, conciliating the audience; for instruction the quality most needed is acumen, for conciliation gentleness, and for stirring the emotions force. Consequently it is mainly in the plain style that we shall state our facts and advance our proofs. . . .\textsuperscript{540}
\end{quote}

In an accompanying table (Table 1.2, Appendix 1), we show the three styles and their appropriate contents. This table, based on the summary by Lausberg, is not exhaustive,\textsuperscript{541} it offers a rough sketch of how to match a speech’s content with an appropriate style.\textsuperscript{542} And our awareness of propriety encourages us to ask two precise questions of the evangelists.\textsuperscript{543} First, does an evangelist miss material that would support his \textit{utilitas}?

\begin{footnotes}
\item[541] Lausberg draws largely from Demetrius (ca. 200 BCE) and Quintilian: see Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} § 1079. This summary is a clarification and expansion of the \textit{Handbook} (§§ 1078-1079). Theorists sometimes disagree, and each style contains enough detailed prescriptions to warrant a separate study. For prescriptions regarding word sequence, see for example Demetrius, \textit{De Elocutione} 199-201 (LCL, trans. Innes).
\item[542] The aforementioned kinds of internal propriety are not exhaustive; there are further kinds that we shall not measure, such as propriety for the emphases of one’s larger narrative. On propriety for a particular genre (like biography) see Tannehill, “Types and Functions of Apophthegms in the Synoptic Gospels,” 1793 n. 2 and 1794, Burridge, “Gospels and Acts,” 527, and Burridge, “Biography,” 386-388. See further Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} § 1056).
\item[543] Theon highlights the importance of propriety: “What is ‘lacking’ can be supplied by . . . saying . . . some things . . . more appropriately.” \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Patillon, 110); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 71.
\end{footnotes}
Does he overlook material that he ought to use to support his chief goals? Posing this question breaks an impasse in which any alleged adaptation simply implies its own plausibility. For our question opens two logical options: either an evangelist has offended against propriety—or more likely he never saw the other gospel in the first place. The more often an evangelist adapts out of character given his major purpose(s), the less likely that the evangelist is “improving” at all.

Our second question is equally powerful: Which of two evangelists fosters relative propriety among elements of content and style when adapting the other’s work? The table reveals that authors need to adapt speeches in ways that tighten or at least preserve the fit between content and style. Our question gauges propriety by asking whether authors maintain propriety between content and style.

The quantity and quality of an author’s alleged changes will help show whether his work appears plausible. There should be a relatively high number of plausible looking improvements in one direction, while improvements in the other direction at times appear unfamiliar or far-fetched, and so require special pleading.

1.6: Summary

In this chapter our goal has been to suggest rhetorically how and why an author would adapt rhetorical forms like chreiai. These questions are fundamental for assessing rhetorical development.

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544 From a rhetorical perspective, something important is something that is integral in supporting one’s major purpose(s). With this question we address an objection against the 2DH of its “major supposition . . . Everything is from a source, and no one would leave out anything important” (Sanders and Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels, 79).

545 Our question asks into oversights. It is harder to ask, “Has an evangelist included material which he should not (or, arranged material in a way he should not), given his sources?” For this question falters on the fact that the evangelist already has that material in that arrangement, and must have chosen it regardless of his sources.
How would authors adapt chreiai? The progymnasmata offer a concise set of techniques. In invention, authors can modify material along two lines: expansion (ἐπεκτείνω) and compression (συστέλλω).

In arrangement, authors can similarly modify along two lines, either by resequencing statements (ἡ ἀναστροφή) or weaving forms together (συμπλοκή). Moreover, we might add or delete and rearrange material at one and the same time by elaboration (ἐργασία) or similarly by composing topics that refute (ἀνασκευάζω) or confirm (κατασκευάζω) a proposition. Finally, we can adapt expression through paraphrase. Rhetoric even offers a technique (the ἔξεργασία), for changing invention, arrangement and expression together, all in the service of strengthening adherence to principles of good composition.

Why would authors adapt chreiai? Their reasons are to draw chreiai into closer accord with rhetorical principles. Some principles apply to speech parts, principles such as proving our case and inserting particular proofs in specific parts of speech. Other principles apply to carrying out the rhetorical activities, such as the principle that we need to frame weaker with stronger arguments. Perhaps the most telling principles are the universal principles that govern how we employ the plethora of other rhetorical rules. These principles are to foster clarity (σαφήνεια/perspecuitas) and to enhance propriety (πρέπον/aptum), especially between each speech part’s duty and its style. Principles like these are a sure foundation for explaining chreia adaptations among gospels.

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546 We recall also the technique of adding a comment. I recognize that the progymnasmata apply these techniques to specific forms, for example the chreia (see Section IV), although we should be prepared to see these used on other forms too.

547 Schufer proposed that a narrative displaying more plausibility than its purported source had likely improved that source. But plausibility is but one virtue—and a virtue over which others might take priority. It is therefore necessary to provide a more complete catalogue if we are to analyze the gospels’ speech material.

548 We need to speak of degrees, or shades, of plausibility; because we essentially compare one real with one counterfactual scenario, measures of plausibility will be relative. Examination of Gundry’s
commentaries on Mark and on Matthew has helped me appreciate this and so make more confident judgements of plausibility. He explains how Mark can compose quite intentionally and artistically in and of himself; but at the same time, shows how Matthew might have equally good reason to modify that artistic composition to serve his own interests or sense of what represented better work).
Chapter 2
Chreia Adaptation in the Writings of Plutarch

Introduction

In Chapter 1 we examined rhetorical theory to catalogue techniques and reasons for chreia adaptation. In Chapters 2 and 3, we shall illuminate, underwrite and add nuance to these conventions by perusing Greek literature contemporary with the gospels. Chapter 2 focuses attention on the biographical work of Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca. 50 CE-ca. 120 CE) containing chreiai, and Chapter 3 examines the adaptation of full speeches by the Jewish historian Josephus in his Antiquitates Judaicae.

Why devote one chapter to chreiai in biography, and the next to speeches in history? Our plan builds on the logic of V. K. Robbins, who has pointed out that writers composed chreiai using basically two rhetorical techniques. The first was ἐπεκτέινωσις (expansion), which enlarges a chreia saying into a small story; the second was ἔργασία (elaboration), which begins with a chreia saying and then argues for its validity through proofs. Significantly, Robbins has observed the expansion and elaboration of chreiai in Greco-Roman biographies (βίοι), while Downing has observed the adaptation of Greco-Roman speeches—essentially, elaborated chreiai—in Greek and Roman histories. In all then, biography and history offer a large and appealing database for examining how authors adapt chreiai.

550 Robbins, AQAA, xii, xiv-xv; cp. Butts, “The Chreia in the Synoptic Gospels,” 137. New Testament critics recognize that ancient biography and the gospels overlap: see Burridge, “The Gospels and Acts,” 507-510. Indeed for some time scholars have drawn positive comparisons between biographical literature (especially Plutarch’s Vitae) and the gospels, and this means that we should look to biography to learn more about chreia adaptation.
551 See esp. Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 46-65; Downing, “Redaction Criticism II,” 29-48. Downing helpfully adds that speeches typify history while chreiai characterize biography. See F. G. Downing,
Numerous scholarly comparisons suggest that Plutarch’s work in particular offers a good analogy for the synoptic evangelists. Downing for instance has remarked that Plutarch’s adaptations of chreiai can, by virtue of his literary and cultural proximity to the evangelists, suggest how the evangelists worked. Similarly, Robbins has observed rhetorical parallels in the working methods of Plutarch and the evangelists. According to Robbins, Greco-Roman writers like Plutarch did not engage in verbatim, “scribal reproduction” of chreiai. Rather, they engaged in progymnastic composition. Authors like Plutarch and the evangelists “recited” chreiai, both preserving and changing them with progymnastic techniques.

Now we shall pursue further the work of Robbins by examining Plutarch’s chreia adaptations with more precision, considering precise changes such as expansion or compression, elaboration and paraphrase, and how these connect to his work as a biographer. To appreciate Plutarch’s work, we need to first acquaint ourselves briefly with his nomenclature.


555 Building on Robbins, “Writing in Plutarch and the Gospels,” 155-167, I wish to examine in more detail and at greater length how Plutarch adapts chreiai, and whether (and how) his adaptations are grounded in biography.
2.1: Plutarch’s \( \alpha \pi \rho \omicron \theta \epsilon \gamma \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \)

Scholars tend to label Plutarch’s sayings traditions in various ways, and the variety can create confusion.\(^{556}\) Plutarch himself commonly labels sayings traditions—when he does so at all—as \( \alpha \pi \rho \omicron \theta \epsilon \gamma \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \) (apophthegms), a fact made clear by the work of Richard A. Spencer.\(^{557}\) By examining the works of Aristotle, Quintilian, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius, Spencer defines the \( \alpha \pi \rho \omicron \theta \epsilon \gamma \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \) as a short saying,\(^{558}\) more precisely "‘a pointed expression . . . prefaced by an assertion concerning by whom and under what circumstances the assertion was made’.‘\(^{559}\)

This definition of apophthegm certainly calls the chreia to mind.\(^{560}\) And little wonder: scholarly work has shown that these rhetorical forms are indeed very similar and that we can apply rhetorical discussions of the chreia to apophthegms. According to Spencer, the chreia, “a saying or action that is expressed concisely, attributed to a character, and regarded as useful for living,” largely overlaps with the apophthegm.\(^{561}\) That is to say, “a . . . distinction is indeed difficult (if it is even possible) to make in some

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\(^{557}\) Plutarch’s terms of choice are \( \alpha \pi \rho \omicron \theta \epsilon \gamma \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \) (apophthegm) and \( \alpha \pi \omicron \mu \rho \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \alpha \) (memoir): Spencer, “Biographical Apophthegms,” 171-172, 187-188, 199. Cp. similarly Robbins, “Classifying Pronouncement Stories,” 31 and n. 6. Hermogenes defines every chreia as “a reminiscence (\( \alpha \pi \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \alpha \)) of a saying or action or both, with a pointed meaning, usually for the sake of something useful.” Hermogenes, \textit{Proygymnasmata} (ed. Rabe, 6.6); Kennedy, \textit{Proygymnasmata}, p. 76.

\(^{558}\) On these authors, see “Biographical Apophthegms,” Abstract and p. 128.


\(^{560}\) Spencer admits that “it is at times quite difficult . . . to distinguish between apophthegms . . . and chreiai.” Spencer, “Biographical Apophthegms,” Abstract, 310, 460-461, 312-313 (quotation from p. 313). Spencer nuances his general definition by looking to apopohthegmata in authors like Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius.

\(^{561}\) Quotation from Hock, “General Introduction,” 26. On the similarity, see following note. The similarity, of course, is not exact: according to Spencer, “The moral concerns or points of the apophthegms are narrower and the situations upon which they can be brought to bear are fewer than the moral concerns and situations of applicability of the chreia.” Spencer, “Biographical Apophthegms,” Abstract; cp. pp. 162-163.
cases, for in ancient popular literature the terms are at times fluid.” Moreover, Robbins has successfully applied rhetorical techniques for chreiai to apophthegms. He understands that Plutarch composed apophthegms using rhetorical techniques like expansion and elaboration. We may, then, for all practical purposes call Plutarch’s apophthegms chreiai. These chreiai frequently find a place in Plutarch’s biographical work, to which we turn next.

2.2: Plutarch’s Vitae

As part of his varied and copious literary output, Plutarch composed numerous biographies of famous statesmen called the Lives or Vitae (βίοι). In what follows I would like to flesh out and illuminate P. A. Stadter’s observation that Plutarch’s biographical work falls within “two interdependent categories: biographical techniques and appropriation of sources.” What is more, according to C. P. Jones Plutarch’s biographical motives and techniques help determine how he appropriates his sources.

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562 “Biographical Apophthegms,” 456; cp. p. 289. This fluidity would not be surprising given the similar fluidity that Kloppenborg has found between the chreia and γνώμη (gnomē); see Formation of Q, 291 and n. 91; and cp. Hock, “General Introduction,” 26. See further Tannehill, “Types and Functions of Apophthegms,” 1793 n. 3, and D. A. Russell, Plutarch, Classical Life and Letters (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 25.

563 According to Robbins, authors could compose units that they had labeled apophthegms under (at least some) influence of rhetorical techniques for chreiai. Robbins, “Classifying Pronouncement Stories,” 31 and Robbins, AQA, and Robbins, “Introduction,” vii. On the general influence of rhetoric on Plutarch’s work, see Pelling, Literary Texts and the Greek Historian, 1, 2, 5-9, and 44-45.


567 C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 87. While Plutarch’s work probably reflects to an extent that of other biographers, Pelling makes clear that different biographers can employ different purposes and techniques (“biography, Greek,” in OCD, s.v.).
1. Biographical Principles and Techniques.\textsuperscript{568} Albeit probably a simplification, our survey of the literature indicates that Plutarch approaches biography along two broad axes: he composes biography for particular reasons or purposes on the one hand, and employs particular techniques on the other.\textsuperscript{569} It is widely recognized that Plutarch’s purposes are biographical: his first purpose is “the portrayal of character, and . . . [the] ultimate purpose will be protreptic and moral.”\textsuperscript{570} That is to say, Plutarch aims to portray somebody’s character and in turn to uphold their virtues or flaws as moral examples.\textsuperscript{571}

To illustrate these purposes, scholars often point to Plutarch’s words in the Prologue to his \textit{Vita} of Alexander:

\begin{quote}
Οὐτὲ γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ Βίους, οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεις πάντως ἔνεστι δήλωσις ἀρετῆς ἤ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πράγμα βραχύ πολλάκις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ παιδίᾳ τις ἐμφασιν ἤθους ἐποίησε μᾶλλον ἢ μάχαι μυρίονεκροι καὶ παρατάξεις αἱ μεγίσται καὶ πολιορκίαι πόλεων.
\end{quote}

It is not Histories that I am writing, but Lives; and in the most illustrious deeds there is not always a manifestation of virtue or vice, nay, a slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character than battles where thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities.\textsuperscript{572}

Here it is implicit that Plutarch wants not only to portray Alexander’s character or \̲hydration, but also to assess it: he seeks to commend or condemn character to offer his

\textsuperscript{568} The following section draws chiefly on work by Pelling. For further discussion of biographical conventions see Russell, \textit{Plutarch}, 102-103.
\textsuperscript{571} On character portrayal see Pelling, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source-Material,” 102; Pelling, \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 45; and Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch Alexander}, xxxvii, xxxviii.
\textsuperscript{572} Plutarch, \textit{Alex.} 1.2-3 (LCL, trans. Perrin); for the frequent citation of this quotation see for instance Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch Alexander}, xxxviii.
\textsuperscript{573} For citation and Greek term, see Pelling, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source-Material,” 102. Pelling cautions, however, that the only common characteristic among ancient biographies was the general purpose of describing people (“biography, Greek” and “biography, Roman,” in \textit{OCD}, s.v.).
readers a good role model.\textsuperscript{574} And while Plutarch might also seek to narrate an exciting or emotional story, or to interpret a subject more along the lines of a historian,\textsuperscript{575} he does frequently keep biographical purposes as his focus, sometimes writing on just one subject, and at other times comparing two subjects and their relative merits. Hence Plutarch’s frequent composition of \textit{Vitae} in pairs.\textsuperscript{576}

We may illustrate Plutarch’s purposes through his \textit{Vita} of Alexander the Great. In his study of this \textit{Vita}, Hamilton observes that Plutarch portrays Alexander as determined and brave and also admires Alexander.\textsuperscript{577} When describing Alexander’s bravery, for instance, Plutarch says the following.

The Macedonian counselors had fears . . . and thought . . . [Alexander] should give up the Greek states altogether and use no more compulsion there, and that he should call the revolting Barbarians back to their allegiance by mild measures and try to arrest the first symptoms of their revolutions; but he himself set out from opposite principles to win security and safety for his realm by boldness and a lofty spirit, assured that, were he seen to abate his dignity even but a little, all his enemies would set upon him.\textsuperscript{578}

For Plutarch, Alexander will bravely take a battle to the enemy rather than letting it come to him. And Plutarch approves of such bravery: his very inclusion and choice of adjectives (“boldness and . . . lofty spirit” \[τόλμη καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνη\]) infuses the

\textsuperscript{574} See for example Pelling, \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 49, and 47.
\textsuperscript{575} He also indicates that Plutarch’s techniques might, accordingly, differ too: Pelling, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source-Material,” 102-105, 106. Here Pelling suggests that in fact, Plutarch did \textit{not} compose the bulk of his biographies with explicitly biographical purposes in mind: While for biographies “[t]he theory is clear and consistent. . . . [T]he practice often closely corresponds” (p. 102), these purposes “are not very typical” (p. 103), and Pelling even believes that we “should not think of a single ‘biographical genre’ . . . but rather of a complicated picture of overlapping traditions” including history and novels (“biography,” in \textit{OCD}, s.v.). In what follows I shall focus on Plutarch’s biographical purposes and techniques.
\textsuperscript{576} Συγκρισις (Chapter 1): for an informative summary of Plutarch’s biographical comparisons, see Russell, \textit{Plutarch}, 110. See also Stadter, \textit{Plutarch’s Historical Methods}, 10, 125; Pelling, \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 44-45, 57-58. On pp. 44-45 Pelling adds, “the themes of one \textit{Life} are often affected, even directed, by those of its pair.”
\textsuperscript{577} Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch Alexander}, ixii. Hamilton adds however (p. ixiii) that Alexander is subject not only to Plutarch’s admiration but also to censure.
\textsuperscript{578} Plutarch, \textit{Alex.} 11.2 (LCL, trans. Perrin).
story with a commendatory tone.\textsuperscript{579} Granted, Pelling reminds us that Plutarch might appeal to rather standard portrayals, as for example in the \textit{Vitae} of the Athenian General Alcibiades and of Julius Caesar.\textsuperscript{580} Nevertheless, Plutarch’s basic biographical purposes of portraying and evaluating people’s character remain significant.

Plutarch’s purposes go hand in hand with his biographical techniques—the “how” or method—for portraying character. Pelling draws attention to two broad kinds of techniques: explicit and implicit.\textsuperscript{581} Sometimes Plutarch will describe and assess character quite explicitly.\textsuperscript{582} He makes for instance a rather direct criticism of Alexander’s paranoia:

\begin{quote}
Alexander . . . since he had now become sensitive to indications of the divine will and perturbed and apprehensive in his mind, converted every unusual and strange occurrence . . . into a prodigy and portent . . . . So, you see, while it is a dire thing to be incredulous towards indications of the divine will and to have contempt for them, superstition is likewise a dire thing, which, after the manner of water ever seeking the lower levels, filled with folly the Alexander who was now become a prey to his fears.\textsuperscript{583}
\end{quote}

There is no secret here as to what Plutarch thinks of Alexander’s phobias.

At other times, Plutarch describes and assesses character more implicitly or subtly.

According to Pelling, Plutarch would,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[579] For \textit{τόλμη}, LSJ offers English translations having both a commendatory sense (“courage, hardihood”) and pejorative sense (“recklessness”); similarly, \textit{μεγαλοφορσύνη} can have a positive sense (“greatness of mind”) and negative sense (“arrogance”). The context here implies a positive sense.
\item[580] Pelling, \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 55; cp. similarly p. 58.
\item[581] That is to say, to portray character we can “show” (implicit) or can “tell” (explicit): see Pelling, \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 8. Similarly, when it comes specifically to evaluating character, Plutarch’s techniques are “[b]oth descriptive and protreptic [i.e., explicitly instructional] . . . . some Lives, like \textit{Caesar}, veer to the descriptive end of the spectrum, while others, like \textit{Aristides} or \textit{Brutus} or \textit{Aemilius Paullus}, tend to the protreptic.” See C. B. R. Pelling, “The Moralism of Plutarch’s Lives,” in \textit{Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies} (Swansea and London: The Classical Press of Wales and Duckworth, 2002), 239, 248.
\item[582] Pelling, “The Moralism of Plutarch’s Lives,” 239; for examples see p. 237 as well as Pelling, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source-Material,” 105.
\item[583] Plutarch, \textit{Alex.} 75.2 (LCL, trans. Perrin); emphasis added. As we are not quoting a chreia or apophthegm here, we do not need to provide the Greek text.
\end{footnotes}
prefer to allow . . . big ideas to emerge through the narrative, to allow readers to infer the leading themes through recurrent patterning, selective emphasis, suggestive juxtaposition, and sometimes through the speeches of the characters themselves. ‘Show, not Tell’: that is the historian’s craft.\textsuperscript{584}

In fact there are several such implicit techniques for portraying character.\textsuperscript{585} Plutarch might for instance simply describe character.\textsuperscript{586} He can also reveal character in subtler ways, arranging his portrayal to emphasize character traits. In the \textit{Vita} of Alexander for example, Plutarch composes stories of Alexander’s clemency adjacent to one another, and in the process he draw special attention to this trait.\textsuperscript{587} Moreover, Plutarch can portray several characters in ways that “mirror” or highlight the biography’s principal character.\textsuperscript{588} Plutarch can even attribute his own observations and opinions to characters within the biography, and so make them voice his own views!\textsuperscript{589}

Significantly, one such implicit technique for portraying character is the use of \textit{chreiai} and \textit{\acute{a}pof\theta\acute{e}g\mu\omicron\alpha\tau\omicron}.\textsuperscript{590} Chreiai are a Plutarchan technique \textit{par excellence} for

\textsuperscript{584} Pelling refers to historians, but he surely includes Plutarch, whom he indicates (e.g., pp. 1-2) would work in a generally similar way. Pelling, \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 8.
\textsuperscript{585} Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch Alexander}, xl-xliii: “Plutarch generally allows his portrait of Alexander to emerge through his narrative.”
\textsuperscript{586} When for instance Plutarch describes Alexander as “by nature a lover of learning and a lover of reading,” we can sense Plutarch’s admiration. Plutarch, \textit{Alex.} 8.1-2 (LCL, trans. Perrin).
\textsuperscript{587} See Plutarch, \textit{Alex.} 12.3-13.3 (LCL, trans. Perrin).
\textsuperscript{588} To paraphrase Pelling closely: “mirroring” is “to develop other characters in such a way as to offset his leading figure’s traits.” See \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 57.
\textsuperscript{590} Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch Alexander}, xxxviii (“casual remark or jest”), xl-xliii (“anecdotes”). He adds (p. xli) that Plutarch’s “\textit{selection} of anecdotes, from which the narrative is built up, show us how he intended to portray the character of Alexander.”
portraying character. In book 47 of the *Vita* of Alexander, Plutarch uses an expanded chreia—a story that ends in a brief saying—to reveal something of Alexander’s personality.

Moreover, when he saw that among his chiefest friends Hephaestion approved his course and joined him in changing his mode of life, while Craterus clung fast to his native ways, he employed the former in his business with the Barbarians, the latter in that with the Greeks and Macedonians. And in general he showed most affection for Hephaestion, but most esteem for Craterus, thinking and constantly saying, that Hephaestion was a friend of Alexander, but Craterus a friend of the king.  

The chreia depicts Alexander as a cosmopolitan ruler who incorporates cultures of conquered nations into his life in order to show his affinity with those cultures. It also portrays Alexander as impartial, for in spite of his friends’ distinct preferences, Alexander values them both. Whether through “showing” or “telling” directly, then, Plutarch has a range of techniques for revealing his subjects.

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592 Plutarch, *Alex.* 47.5 (LCL, trans. Perrin). I follow the boundaries of the apophthegm in Robbins, *AQAA* 140a (p. 53).

593 The context in which Plutarch sets the apophthegm would suggest this (see *Alex.* 47.5.3-5): Plutarch links the apophthegm with the preceding context by using δὲ (“and” or “moreover”).

594 The English translation might imply that Alexander favours Craterus, but the Greek τὸν μὲν . . . τὸν δὲ simply denotes “on the one hand” and “on the other hand.”

595 Quoted terms from Pelling, *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian*, 8.
2. Source Adaptation. Generally speaking, Plutarch’s biographical purposes and techniques often underlie and explain his adaptations of sources,\textsuperscript{596} sources that included historical and biographical narratives, and reports transmitted orally and in writing.\textsuperscript{597} To borrow Stadter’s words, we can observe “Plutarch . . . select, combine, abridge, and narrate anew his material in such a way that it becomes no longer another’s, but his own.”\textsuperscript{598} Specific findings bear this summary out: Pelling’s study of \textit{Vitae} of Roman statesmen as well as \textit{Vitae} of Greeks argues that Plutarch’s biographical motives drive his expansion and compression of sources.\textsuperscript{599} And intriguingly, biographical interests can lead Plutarch to add chreiai to a \textit{Vita}.\textsuperscript{600} Granted, there are some more technical reasons why Plutarch might change his sources, including a multi-stage process of composition,\textsuperscript{601} his appeal to memory,\textsuperscript{602} his gathering of information from

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\textsuperscript{596}For instance, “different Lives select different material for emphasis, as Plutarch tailors his material to suit the Lives’ subjects and aims”; see Pelling, “Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives,” 4, and following notes. It would be impossible and unnecessary to link every possible biographical convention with particular kinds of adaptation. Cadbury reminds us that different authors adapted texts in different ways: see Cadbury, \textit{Making of Luke-Acts}, 161.
\textsuperscript{597}For Plutarch’s sources see Jones, \textit{Plutarch and Rome}, 85-87.
\textsuperscript{598}Stadter, \textit{Plutarch’s Historical Methods}, 9-11, 139-140.
\textsuperscript{599}Pelling, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source-Material,” 91, 92-93, 102-103. When it comes to biographical techniques, “focalising through concerned spectators is . . . [Plutarch’s] hallmark,” and we see Plutarch focalise by adding material to his sources: Pelling, \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 47-49. Plutarch also brings other, more generally literary purposes to his work, for instance “to organize [the narrative] in a more elegant or suggestive manner.” Pelling, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source-Material,” 92, 96, 95. See also Pelling, \textit{Literary Texts and the Greek Historian}, 47-49, 49-51; cp. Hamilton, \textit{Plutarch Alexander}, xli, xlii, xlvi; for illustration in Plutarch’s use of Thucydides see Pelling, “Plutarch and Thucydides,” in \textit{Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies} (Swansea and London: The Classical Press of Wales and Duckworth, 2002), 119.
acquaintances, his use of translations and his conflation of various sources. Nevertheless, Plutarch’s biographical purposes and techniques can still account for several source adaptations.

The insight at which we arrive is simple: Plutarch’s biographical purposes belong with the more narrowly rhetorical principles, like clarity and propriety, that we introduced in Chapter 1. There are then, both rhetorical and biographical explanations for adapting chreiai.

2.3: Chreia Adaptation in Plutarch’s Vitae

We now propose a second insight: Plutarch’s biographical purposes and techniques drive the specifically rhetorical techniques for adapting chreiai that we saw in Chapter 1, techniques like expansion (ἐπικτείνωσις), elaboration (ἐργασία) and paraphrase (παραφράσις). The literature has only occasionally explored the effect of biographical interests on chreia argumentation; we shall do so further here.

We shall illustrate by examining two scenarios of literary dependence in the work of Plutarch that afford parallels to the synoptic gospels. Among the gospels, an evangelist might incorporate a chreia from a sayings collection (the sayings gospel Q) into his narrative, or he might incorporate a chreia from another narrative. The first scenario finds

604 See Jones, Plutarch and Rome, 85-86.
605 Pelling, “Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives,” 18; cp. Stadter, Plutarch’s Historical Methods, 139.
606 I distinguish the two kinds of principles for the sake of clarity. Probably it is more accurate to regard biographical principles as a subset of rhetorical principles, for rhetoric pervaded the composition of literary genres: see Pelling, Literary Texts and the Greek Historian, 1-3; Burridge, “Biography,” 372-374.
607 Pelling speaks of adaptations in quite general terms, such as abridgement: “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source-Material,” 91.
608 The closest precedent is Robbins, “Writing in Plutarch and the Gospels,” 157-167. In what follows, I cannot be certain that Plutarch (or the evangelists) would have used precisely these terms, since the theorists who coin them sometimes postdate the first century. But Plutarch is still employing a form having a rhetorical, persuasive aim; to this I wish to draw attention.
an echo in Plutarch’s adaptation of chreiai between a chreia collection called the 
Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum (“Sayings of Kings and Commanders”) and a 
Vita. The second scenario finds an echo in Plutarch’s adaptation of chreiai from one 
Vita into another Vita.

2.3.1: Scenario 1: Chreia Adaptation Between a Chreia Collection (the 
Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum) and a Narrative Vita

For this scenario we shall examine two chreiai, each of which has a version in the 
Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum and a version in the narrative Vita of Alexander 
the Great. Both texts share generally in a biographical purpose. While Pelling concedes 
that there is no consensus regarding the exact sequence of the apophthegmata collection 
vis-à-vis the Vita, we can still compare the Apophthegmata’s chreia version with the Vita 
version. Doing so will help us recognize two crucial facts: Plutarch rhetorically adapts 
a chreia’s argumentation, its types and arrangement and expression of material, and he

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609 Pelling notes that there is sometimes “extreme closeness in wording between the Apophthegmata and the Lives”; see “Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum,” 69.
610 These scenarios neither exhaust Plutarch’s works nor the interrelationships among them. For variety in the composition and character of the Vitae themselves, see Pelling, “Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives,” 25, and Russell, Plutarch, 116. We should also remember that there might not in every case be a direct literary relationship between versions, on which see Stadter, Plutarch’s Historical Methods, 133-134). Still, neither Stadter nor Pelling (“Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum,” 68-71), regard Plutarch as having always forgotten or avoided his own earlier versions of sayings traditions.
612 Pelling summarizes the positions in “Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum,” 68-69, 84-85. Most chreia versions in the Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum are relatively compressed vis-à-vis the versions in Vitae. Pelling is aware of this: see “Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum,” 74. Our own analysis bears this out. Using the versions in Robbins, AQA, I find that of twenty-four chreiai in the Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum which I can judge clearly, approximately fourteen appear relatively compressed vis-à-vis their Vitae counterparts: Plutarch, [Reg. imp. apophth.] 186E,3 (Alc. 7.1); 179D, 2 (Alex. 4.8-10[4-5]); 179C,30 (Alex. 9.12-14[6]); 181D,29 (Alex. 47.9-10[5]); 181F,32 (Alex. 41.1-2[1]); 179C-D,31 (Demetr. 42.3-4); 190F,3 (Ages. 23.5); 191A,5 (Ages. 21.5); 180D,15 (Alex. 27.10-11[6]); 180B,11 (Alex. 29.7-9); 176D,3 (Tim. 15.4); 185A-B,4 (Them. 11.1-3); 188C,9 (Phoc. 18.1-3); 190A (Crass. 2.7-8). Approximately seven are roughly the same length: Plutarch, [Reg. imp. apophth.] 179D,1 (Alex. 5.4[2]); 190E,3 (Lyce. 22.1); 191A,4 (Ages. 13.4); 183E,2 (Demetr. 12.5); 190E,2 (Lyce. 7.4); 190A (Cleom. 27.1 and Dem. 17.4[3]); 191C,10 (Ages. 30.4). Approximately three are more expansive: [Reg. imp. apophth.] 180E,16 (Alex. 28.3[2]); 181E,31 (Alex. 60.14[8]); 181F (Gallb. 1.4).
does so largely if not always for biographical reasons. In the accompanying tables, bold print denotes chreia compression (σύστολη), underlining denotes chreia expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις) and elaboration (ἐργασία), and italics denote paraphrase (παραφράσις).

Chreia 1: Alexander and his Friends ([Reg. imp. apophth.] III: 181D [29]; Alex. 47.5; Robbins, AQAA 140a,b). Our first chreia, which concerns Alexander the Great, has a concise (σύντομος) version in the Apophthegmata and a relatively expanded and elaborated version in the Vita Alexandri (Table 2.1, Appendix 2). On the face of it, these versions are rather similar. Both approximate a sayings chreia (λόγικη χρεία) of the statement species (ἀποφαντικὸν εἴδος). Both “are expressed . . . in the manner of an explanation” (προφέρονται . . . σὺ ἔτο αποδεικτικῶς). And both portray Alexander along similar lines as a man who replies aptly or appropriately to his friends. In the concise version, Alexander responds to two people from his innermost circle of friends (φίλοι) appropriately for the manner in which they treat him. Craterus’ “love to the


614 Classification based on Theon, Progymnasmata (eds. Hock and O’Neil), pp. 85, 88-89. The expanded chreia is a mixed (μικτή) chreia of saying and action, since Alexander is both “saying” and “thinking.”

615 I take the boundaries of these chreiai as defined in Robbins, AQAA. English translations are from the Loeb Classical Library, although I shall harmonize English translations of the same words even if the Loeb edition translates them differently.

616 This interpretation rests on the right understanding of two points of grammar. First, as glossed by LSJ, φίλος—(e.g., φιλοβασιλεύς) denotes “lover of” or “friend of” in the sense of “friend to.” Thus, φιλοβασιλεύς means “friend to the king” (one who shows friendship to the king), and φιλολέξισανδρος means similarly “friend to Alexander.” Second, γὰρ is causal (not adverbial), for the causal meaning tends, as here, to have a postpositive position (on which see Smyth, Greek Grammar §§ 2803, 2810); it also renders the sentence more logical. Hence Alexander “seems to have honoured (τιμάω) Craterus most . . . because Craterus loved the [office and role of] king,” and that he “seems to have loved (φιλεῖω) Hephaestion most . . . because Hephaestion loved the [person of] Alexander.”
king” (φιλοβασιλεύς) is appropriately requited with Alexander’s “honour” (τιμῶν), while Hephaestion’s more personal “love to Alexander” (φιλαλέξανδρος) is appropriately requited with “love” (φιλεῖν). In the expanded-elaborate version, Alexander behaves similarly: to close friends who most respect his kingly role, he replies with high “honour,” and to friends who most respect his personality, he replies with the highest “love.”

When we examine the chreia versions more closely, however, we find critical differences in their argumentation. The concise chreia’s argumentation is simple: it consists of a propositio (προβολή) and a rationale (σίτιο).

**Propositio:** Of his foremost and most influential friends . . . [Alexander] seems to have honoured Craterus most and loved Hephaestion most.

**Rationale:** “For,” said he, “Craterus is fond of the king, [and] Hephaestion is fond of Alexander.”

How does the *Vita*’s chreia argumentation (Alex. 47.5-47.7) compare? It is definitely more sophisticated. If we were to call our concise chreia a book, then we might say that our expanded chreia provides bookends. That is to say, Plutarch adds an expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις) to the chreia’s opening, and an elaboration (ἐργασία) to its end. First comes the expansion (underlined).

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617 In LSJ, honour (τιμῶν and τιμέω) is “bestowed (whether by gods or men) as a reward for services.” Hence, Alexander replies appropriately to the services rendered him by Craterus (“love to the king”).

618 Robbins remarks that chreiai in biographies such as Plutarch’s *Vitae* tend to “function as παράδειγματα [examples]” which illustrate the speaker’s character. As such, their purpose is epideictic. See Robbins, “Plucking Grain on the Sabbath,” 130, 131.

619 These are terms that Robbins uses; see “Introduction,” ix, xiii; Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 54, 56.

620 The propositio constitutes the narrative or “setting” portion of this chreia, and the rationale is the saying: see Robbins, “Introduction,” xiii. Admittedly, Plutarch does not always have his characters “speak” (as here in this propositio). But indirect discourse and actions can similarly reveal and be understood rhetorically akin to speech parts. On action chreiai see Robbins, “The Chreia,” 8-9; Robbins, “Chreia & Pronuncemenet Story in Synoptic Studies,” 13-14, 15; Robbins, “Introduction,” in *AQAA*, xi-xii.
1. **Chreia expansion:**

**Example:** And when he saw that among his chiefest friends, Hephaestion approved his course and joined with him in changing his mode of life, while Craterus clung fast to his native ways, he employed the former in his business with Barbarians, the latter in that with Greeks and Macedonians.

**Propositio:** And in general he showed most affection for Hephaestion, [and] most esteem for Craterus,

**Rationale:** thinking and constantly saying, that Hephaestion was a friend of Alexander, [and] Craterus a friend of the king.

The expansive version here has added an example (παραδείγμα) to support the original propositio. The example claims that Alexander deploys Craterus and Hephaestion appropriately, that is, to environments that are appropriate for their individual cultural preferences. Next, of course, comes the propositio and rationale.

The second adaptation is elaboration (ἐργασία). Following the original rationale, the elaboration offers a second propositio and example, followed by a counterproposition, judgement and conclusion (underlined).

2. **Chreia elaboration:**

**Propositio:** And in general he showed most affection for Hephaestion, [and] most esteem for Craterus,

**Rationale:** thinking and constantly saying, that Hephaestion

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621 Hermogenes regards the παραδείγμα as a type of argument: see Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 52.

622 The example is cast in the form of a διήγημα or mini-narrative, on which see Kennedy’s remarks in *Progymnasmata*, p. 4 (and n. 2). As Kennedy points out, the ancient term for the progymnastic exercise is διήγημα (“narrative”). We shall however use the Greek διήγησις for “narrative” since this is the term more common in mature rhetorical usage for narratives (Kennedy *Progymnasmata* p. 4 n. 2, and Lausberg, *Handbook* § 289 n. 1 [p. 137]).

623 Robbins remarks that we can find such combinations of expansion and elaboration: see “Introduction,” x. An elaborated chreia begins with the chreia’s saying or action as a propositio; the elaboration then justifies it (see Robbins, “Introduction,” ix, xiv). Similarly, our unit offers a new propositio and then justifies it.
was a friend of Alexander, [and] Craterus a friend of the king.

**Second propositio:** For this reason, too, the men cherished a secret grudge against one another and often came into open collision.

**Example:** (ending in judgement) And once, on the Indian expedition, they actually drew their swords and closed with one another, and as the friends of each were coming to his aid, Alexander rode up and abused Hephaestion publicly, calling him a fool and a madman for not knowing that without Alexander’s favour [lit. separated from Alexander (αφαίρεσα)] he was nothing; and in private he also sharply reprove[d] Craterus.

**Counterpropositio:** Then he brought them together and reconciled them, taking an oath by Ammon and the rest of the gods that he loved them most of all men.\(^{624}\)

**Judgement:** but that if he heard of their quarrelling again, he would kill them both, or at least the one who began the quarrel.

**Conclusion:** Wherefore after this they neither did nor said anything to harm one another, not even in jest.

The added argumentation begins with a *propositio* that Craterus and Hephaestion resent each other on account of Alexander’s replies. An example illustrates their explosive resentment, and then Alexander steps in with a *counterpropositio*: he loves both men.\(^{625}\) Alexander next makes a judgement to enforce his counterproposition, and then a conclusion describes a resolution of the problem.\(^{626}\) Clearly, the argumentation has become more complex.

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\(^{624}\) Here the oath functions as an inartificial (ἀτεχνὸς) proof, on which see Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 350-354. Alexander uses the oath as proof that he loves both men.

\(^{625}\) In the example, Alexander expresses partiality for Hephaestion (on such partiality generally see Hamilton, *Plutarch Alexander, 130*); but Alexander nevertheless goes on to state a *propositio* “that he loved them most of all men.”

\(^{626}\) Alexander also emerges as more persuasive than Craterus and Hephaestion, having argued that he loves both men most. Here we see illustrated an insight by Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 192: Plutarch achieves an *epideictic* aim of praising Alexander, by assigning him argumentation that is *judicial*. 
Why has Plutarch adapted the argumentation in this way? One reason is biographical: to develop and enrich the portrayal of Alexander. Plutarch’s biographical reasoning is evident behind his chreia expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις). In the *Apophthegmata* Plutarch groups our chreia with chreiai that share merely the theme of friendship. But in the *Vita* Plutarch affixes our chreia to the larger narrative’s account of Alexander’s effort to dress and carry himself appropriately for his subject peoples (47.3-4). In this new biographical context, it makes sense to add the expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις [47.5]): it portrays and so reinforces Alexander’s propriety, while it also anticipates the *propositio*.

We similarly see biographical reasoning for Plutarch’s elaboration (ἐργασία). As we said, the *Apophthegmata*’s chreia sits within a set of chreiai that share merely the theme of friendship. Flacelière and Chambry point out, however, that in the *Vita* Plutarch has specific biographical interests in showing Alexander’s sense of “mildness” (douceur). In fact, they suggest that this very chreia is illustrative of Plutarch’s larger biographical interest in mildness:

With regard to his friends, Alexander shows an inexhaustible generosity and patience, at least in the first part of his reign. . . . Alexander, who has such a violent and irascible temper, knows to conduct himself with regard to his friends with mildness, this virtue so important in the eyes of Plutarch (40,2: πράσως καὶ φιλόσοφως [mildly and reasonably] – and 41,2: πάνυ πράσως [very mildly]).

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627 The *Apophthegmata*’s version sits between two chreiai that tell of Alexander’s friendship, but beyond presenting varied images of Alexander’s friendship (φιλήσοις), these chreiai have little in common: the first chreia concerns his sportiveness (181D [28]), the second his reactions to friends (181E [30]), and the third his great numbers of friends (181E [31]). There really is no overarching or common portrayal.


629 “Reasonably” is the translation by Perrin (LCL).
It is necessary to see, in 47.9-12, the tact with which he reconciles Hephaestion and Craterus.\(^{630}\)

Significantly then, Plutarch has elaborated the *Vita*’s chreia to address his biographical interest in highlighting the gentle nature of Alexander’s friendship.\(^{631}\)

**Chreia 2: Alexander and Parmenio ([Reg. et imp. apophth.] III: 180B (11); Alex. 29.4; Robbins, AQAA 912a,b).** Our second chreia has a concise version in the *Apophthegmata*, and an elaborated version in the *Vita* of Alexander (Table 2.2, Appendix 2). At a general level, these chreiai are quite similar. In form, both approximate sayings (λογικαὶ) chreiai of the responsive (ἀποκριτικῶν) species.\(^{632}\) In manner of expression, both are “expressed . . . with wit” (προφέρονται . . . κατὰ χαριεντισμὸν), since Alexander cleverly inverts Parmenio’s advice using his own words.\(^{633}\)

At a more precise level, however, the argumentation of the versions clearly differs.\(^{634}\) In the concise version, the argumentation falls into two cases, each of which

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\(^{630}\) Flacelière and Chambry, “Notice,” 5-6. This elaborated chreia rests within a larger, narrative (διήγησις) context. (I follow the labeling of narrative in Lausberg, *Handbook* § 289 n. 1 [p. 137]: Hermogenes “distinguishes . . . the full form . . . of διήγησις (e.g., the work of Herodotus) from the small form . . . of διήγημα . . . A διήγησις is thus composed of several διηγήματα.”) Plutarch links this chreia with preceding narrative, about Alexander’s adaptation to Barbarian cultures (47.3-4), and with the subsequent narrative, about his intrigue against Philotas (48.1-49.8). The Loeb English edition helps clarify that the chreia and surrounding narrative constitute a thematic unity.

\(^{631}\) I express for convenience that Plutarch composes the *Apophthegmata* version first and the *Vita* version second. Whatever the actual sequence of chreiai, however, Plutarch’s motivations remain similarly biographical. The nature of Plutarch’s genre (biography) here might also explain why Plutarch expands and elaborates the chreia in the *Vita*. If the *Apophthegmata* version is merely a draft for the *Vita* version, Plutarch might believe that the latter simply offers more room to underscore Alexander’s mildness.

\(^{632}\) The *Apophthegmata* version also approximates a double (διπλός) chreia, since it contains two brief responses by Alexander. These chreiai do not appear “useful for living,” as appears required by Hock, “General Introduction,” 26; they stand closer to the apophthegm. But Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Spengel, 2.96); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 15, does not require this usefulness in chreiai.


\(^{634}\) Plutarch here employs deliberative argumentation, which seeks to persuade an audience of a course to pursue in future. Since ancient orators considered deliberative argumentation closely related to judicial argumentation, we employ judicial terms here.
presents a *propositio* and argument(s). The first case belongs to Darius, the second to Alexander.

1. **Case of Darius:**
   
   **Argument one:** *(ab effectis)*  
   When Darius offered him [Alexander] ten thousand talents,

   **Propositio:**  
   and also offered to share Asia equally with him,

   **Argument two:** *(a fictione)*  
   Parmenio said, “I would accept it if I were Alexander.”

2. **Case of Alexander:**
   
   **Argument one:** *(a fictione)*  
   “And so indeed would I,” said Alexander, “if I were Parmenio.”

   **Counterpropositio:** *(metaphor)*  
   But he made answer to Darius that the earth could not tolerate two suns, nor Asia two kings.

Darius’ *propositio* is to “offer to share Asia equally [*ετίσης*] with” Alexander. It is not his offer of 10,000 talents; this rather is an inducement to accept the *propositio*; as such it approximates an *argumentum ab effectis* (argument from effect), where the good effect of Alexander sharing Asia will be to receive 10,000 talents. Following the *propositio*, Alexander’s friend Parmenio offers a second argument, now an *argumentum a fictione*. This type of argument, like all arguments, is a form of deductive reasoning; an argument *a fictione* deduces the plausible on the basis of a fictitious situation. Next Alexander offers the second case, the case in reply. Alexander begins with an *argumentum a fictione* that brilliantly inverts and so nullifies Parmenio’s reasoning. Then

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635 See Lausberg, *Handbook* § 398, citing Quintilian 5.10.95.
636 “The *argumentum . . .* is a proof that is developed by rational deduction from the facts of the *causa*” (§ 366). The *πίστει* (or *argumentatio*) is a part of a speech, which individual *πίστεις* or *argumenta* constitute: Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 349, 351, 355, 366, 373, 376-399.
he turns to Darius with a counterpropositio that flatly refuses any sharing of Asia. This Alexander expresses using an astronomical metaphor that might carry special force given Persian deference to the sun.\textsuperscript{637}

How does this argumentation compare with that in the \textit{Vita} (29.4)? While it echoes the concise chreia, there emerge two major differences. First, the \textit{Vita}’s chreia contains essentially elaboration (ἐργασία): Plutarch amplifies Darius’ \textit{argumentum ab effectis} and amplifies Alexander’s counterpropositio (underlined).\textsuperscript{638}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Case of Darius:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argument one:</td>
<td>When Darius sent to him a letter and friends, begging [δέχουσιν] him to accept ten thousand talents as ransom for the captives, to hold all the territory this side of the Euphrates, to take one of his daughters in marriage,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Propositio}:</td>
<td>and on these terms to be his ally and friend,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Divisio}:</td>
<td>Alexander imparted the matter to his companions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument two:</td>
<td>“If I were Alexander,” said Parmenio, “I would accept these terms.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{(a fictione)}</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>2. Case of Alexander:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argument one:</td>
<td>“And so indeed would I,” said Alexander, “if I were Parmenio.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{(a fictione)}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Counterpropositio}:</td>
<td>But to Darius he wrote: “Come to me, and you shall receive every courtesy [φιλανθρωπία]; but otherwise I shall march against you.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the one hand, Darius’ \textit{argumentum ab effectis} is fuller and more pleading, with added and enticing inducements; in fact the concise chreia’s \textit{propositio} (“to share Asia equally”) has now become a mere argument for a new and much weaker \textit{propositio} (that Darius “be

\textsuperscript{637} On metaphor as a way in which to offer a chreia, see Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Spengel, 2.100); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{638} The possibility of such amplification I have learned from Robbins, “Introduction,” xiii-xiv.
[Alexander’s] ally and friend”). On the other hand, Alexander’s counterpropositio contains a caveat: Darius may “come to him and receive every courtesy.”

The question remains: Why does Plutarch elaborate the argumentation? The answer emerges partly from Plutarch’s developing biographical interests. Of course, Plutarch wants both chreiai to show in no uncertain terms Alexander’s ambition. Hamilton has commented on Plutarch’s interest in revealing Alexander’s high “ambition” (φιλοτιμία), an ambition that underlies his efforts forge a world empire. This ambition appears clearly in the concise chreia, where Alexander dismisses Darius’ offers to rule Asia alongside him. Indeed it becomes stronger in the Vita through elaborating with the added argument (ab effectis) of Darius.

In the Vita version Plutarch wants to portray not only Alexander’s ambition but also his generosity. In the chreia’s immediate narrative context, an (oft-observed) image of Alexander’s generosity is in focus: our chreia follows at least four other chreiai on generosity (29.2-3), and precedes narrative material that similarly reveals such

639 Hamilton, Plutarch Alexander, 12, 13 (with reference to the Vita); as the quotation in the following note shows, “ambition” is essentially the same as his desire for “glory” [δοξα], which Hamilton also highlights (pp. xlii). On Alexander’s ambition, see for instance Alex. 4.4-5 (LCL, trans. Perrin): “his ambition [φιλοτιμία] kept his spirit serious and lofty in advance of his years.”
640 See Hamilton, Plutarch Alexander, 13; cp. Plutarch, Alex. 5.1-3 (LCL, trans. Perrin): “[H]e preferred to receive . . . a realm which afforded, not wealth nor luxury and enjoyment, but struggles [ἀγών] and wars [πολέμους] and ambitions [φιλοτιμίας].”
641 This portrayal finds reflection is the chreia’s context, for Plutarch sets the chreia among other chreiai that illustrate Alexander’s ambition: in the preceding chreia, Alexander recommends seizing an enemy’s beard in battle (III: 180A-B [10]), and in the following chreia, he expresses satisfaction at his soldiers’ readiness (III: 180B [12]). Indeed several surrounding chreiai portray Alexander as a confident and ambitious General.
642 To enhance the portrayal of Alexander’s ambition, Plutarch amplifies Darius’ pleading but still subjects it to Alexander’s flat refusal.
643 See for instance Hamilton, Plutarch Alexander, xl, xli. Plutarch labels such generosity with terms like μεγαλοθρόνος and φιλοφροσύνη (Alex. 39.1 [LCL, trans. Perrin]).
644 On the technique of grouping chreiai together in a Vita, see Hamilton, Plutarch Alexander, xl.
generosity (30.1-3) and “magnanimity” (μεγαλοψυχία; 30.6). This context hints at the emphasis on generosity that we might expect Plutarch to bring to the chreia, and Plutarch does just this through an elaborative change that we outlined above: Alexander now asks Darius to “come to him [in defeat] and receive every courtesy [φιλανθρωπία].” Moreover, Plutarch arranges Alexander’s closing refusal further to enhance—ironically enough—his generosity; Plutarch arranges the refusal so that it introduces the subsequent (italicized) narrative:

[T]o Darius he wrote “Come to me, and you will receive every courtesy; but otherwise I shall march against you.” Soon however, he [Alexander] repented [μετεμελήσθη] him of this answer, when the wife of Darius died in childbirth, and it was evident that he was distressed at this loss of opportunity to show great kindness [χρηστότητος].

Here Alexander regrets his ambition on grounds it might militate against his generosity! Clearly then, in the *Vita*’s chreia, Plutarch’s argumentative changes serve his biographical interest in portraying Alexander as ambitious and generous. An insight with which we may conclude these cases is that Plutarch’s biographical impulses are an important force behind his rhetorical techniques.

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646 Φιλανθρωπία is another quality that Plutarch highlights in the biography; see Hamilton, *Plutarch Alexander*, xi; Flacelière and Chambry, “Notice,” 5. On Alexander’s generosity towards conquered enemies, see Hamilton, *Plutarch Alexander*, xli.
647 “To feel repentance, to regret” (LSJ).
649 This regret does not, however, nullify Alexander’s ambition; for shortly afterwards we learn that Alexander still “marched against Darius” following the death of Darius’ wife. *Alex.* 31.1 (LCL, trans. Perrin).
650 Another reason why Plutarch might adapt the argumentation is to address different genres: the *Apophthegmata* simply might not afford room to portray Alexander’s generosity, while the fuller, narrative *Vita* offers precisely such room.
2.3.2: Scenario 2: Chreia Adaptation Among Vitae

We now examine chreiai that Plutarch adapts from one Vita into another Vita. This scenario appears comparatively clear, for we can base it on Jones’ chronology of Vitae.\(^{651}\) Granted, the idea that we can safely establish such a chronology has met criticism,\(^{652}\) and even if Jones’ chronology is correct, we cannot assume that Plutarch always adapted the extant version.\(^{653}\) Nevertheless, we shall see that generally speaking, biographical impulses often underlie adaptive techniques like expansion, compression, elaboration and paraphrase.

Chreia 1: Agesilaus’ injury (Pel. 15.1-2, Lyc. 13.6; Robbins, AQAA, 172a,b).

Our first chreia, which concerns the battle injury of a Spartan General named Agesilaus, exists in several different Vitae, of which we select two: The Vita of the Theban General Pelopidas, and the Vita of the Spartan lawmaker Lycurgus (Table 2.3, Appendix 2).\(^{654}\)

These versions are generally similar: they approximate sayings (λογικὴ) chreiai of the statement (ἀποφαντικὸν) species, and are expressed with definite wit. In each, the sayings portion is attributed to a Spartan associate of Agesilaus named Antalcidas, who chidingly scolds Agesilaus for having attacked the city-state of Thebes. Still, Plutarch adapts the chreia’s argumentation in the Vita of Pelopidas into something different in the Vita of Lycurgus. The argumentation of the Pelopidas Vita begins with a narrative and proceeds to a propositio.\(^{655}\)

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\(^{652}\) Namely by Pelling: he believes that Plutarch employed “simultaneous preparation”; see “Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives,” 8, 9 and n. 56.

\(^{653}\) Plutarch might recall a variant version; so Stadter, referring to stories in Mulierum Virtutes, 133-134.

\(^{654}\) I arrange these chreiai from left to right in one possible sequence (based on work by Jones, “Towards a Chronology,” 68) in which Plutarch composed them.

\(^{655}\) Robbins, “Introduction,” xiii, would call this an “amplified chreia.”
The Thebans, too, by always engaging singly in Boeotia with the Lacedaimonians, and by fighting battles which, though not important in themselves, nevertheless afforded them much practice and training, had their spirits roused and their bodies thoroughly inured to hardships, and gained experience and courage from their constant struggles. For this reason Antalcidas the Spartan, we are told, when Agesilaus came back from Boeotia with a wound, said to him:

“Indeed, this is a fine tuition-fee which you are getting from the Thebans, for teaching them how to war and fight when they did not wish to do it.”

In the Vita of Lycurgus, Plutarch adapts this chreia’s argumentation. This time his changes come essentially in a mini expansion (underlined) and paraphrase (italics) of the chreia’s narrative portion.656

And this was the special grievance which they (Lycurgus’ followers) had against King Agesilaus in later times, namely, that by his continual and frequent incursions and expeditions into Boeotia he rendered the Thebans a match for the Lacedaimonians. And therefore, when Antalcidas saw the king wounded, he said:

“This is a fine tuition-fee which you are getting from the Thebans, for teaching them how to fight, when they did not wish to do it, and did not know how.”

Plutarch expands the narrative by adding Sparta’s resentment of Agesilaus. He also paraphrases: he specifies that Agesilaus’ incursions were the reason for Thebes’ strength; he refashions the Thebans from subjects to objects; and he delays the idea that the

656 That is, the argumentation of each chreia’s saying portion changes very little; most adaptations are confined to its narrative portion: this reflects the analysis by Babbitt, “Introduction,” 6 and note a.
Thebans “did not know how [to go to war]” from the narrative portion into the saying portion.

Important reasons for these adaptive techniques are biographical. One precise reason is what Pelling calls *biographical relevance*. Praise of Pelopidas makes good sense in his own biography. But when Plutarch comes to the *Vita* of Lycurgus, he knows of course that Pelopidas is less relevant and Lycurgus more relevant. Hence Plutarch adjusts the argumentation to this end, paraphrasing in a way that specifies the subject and cause of problems (Agesilaus’ Spartan war policy) that Lycurgus must fix.\(^657\)

A second biographical reason for change is the new biographical context. In the *Vita* of Pelopidas, the chreia’s focus on Thebes well reflects the larger narrative’s praise of Thebes (13.3-4, 15.3) and its General Pelopidas for achieving good results in difficult situations.\(^658\) But in the larger narrative about Lycurgus, we have a different focus: Plutarch is describing Lycurgus’ creation of laws called *rhetras* (ῥήτρας; Lyc. 13.1-6), including the *rhetra* “which forbids making frequent expeditions against the same enemy, in order not to accustom such enemies to frequent defence of themselves, which would make them more warlike” (Lyc. 13.5-6). In this biographical context, Plutarch naturally enough shifts the chreia’s argumentation to draw attention to the foibles of Agesilaus that necessitate the rhetras. Indeed, Plutarch positions the chreia so that it serves as an example (παραδείγμα) why Lycurgus created a *rhetra* against war mongering (13.5-6).

**Chreia 2:** “Artaxerxes Buys Victory” (*Art.* 20.3-4; *Ages.* 15.6; Robbins, AQAA 290a,b). The version of this chreia in Plutarch’s *Vita* of the Persian emperor Artaxerxes (465-424 BCE) is expansive; the version in his later composed *Vita* of Agesilaus the

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\(^{657}\) Similarly it makes sense in the Lycurgus *Vita* to add the Spartans’ grievance against Agesilaus, for Agesilaus’ policy is the problem that Lycurgus must fix.

\(^{658}\) Pelopidas was a Theban General of the early fourth century BCE.
Spartan is relatively concise (σύστολη) (Table 5.4, Appendix 2). Both chreiai are sayings chreiai of the response (ἀποκριτικόν) species and are “expressed with wit” (χαριευντισμόν). In both, Agesilaus reacts wryly to his nemesis Artaxerxes’ effort to finance the allegiance of Greek states against Sparta.

In the *Vita* of Artaxerxes, we have an expanded chreia whose argumentation consists of a narrative, *propositio* and rationale.\(^{659}\)

**Narrative:**
Artaxerxes considered how he must carry on the war with Agesilaus, and sent Timocreon the Rhodian into Greece with a great sum of money, bidding him use it for the corruption of the most influential men in the cities there, and for stirring up the Greeks to make war upon Sparta. Timocrates did as he was bidden, the most important cities conspired together against Sparta, Peloponnesus was in a turmoil, and the Spartan magistrates summoned Agesilaus home from Asia. It was at this time, as we are told, and as he was going home, that Agesilaus said to his friends;

**Propositio:**
“The king [Artaxerxes] has driven me out of Asia with thirty thousand archers”;

**Rationale:**
for the Persian coin [τὸ γὰρ Περσικὸν νόμισμα] has the figure of an archer stamped upon it.\(^{660}\)

When Plutarch composes this chreia afresh in the *Vita* of Agesilaus, he adapts its argumentation along two lines. First, he sets the entire chreia into a much larger speech of refutation against the views of one Erasistratus, where the chreia becomes an argument from example. Second, Plutarch compresses the chreia, dehydrating it of details concerning Artaxerxes. Below we italicize the new version:

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\(^{659}\) This rationale is unlike that of a judicial speech, which defends a *propositio*. Here the rationale simply explains why Agesilaus could say what he said. Its position immediately after a statement and its use of γὰρ suggest that Plutarch was thinking of this rhetorical figure.

\(^{660}\) The larger narrative appears to resume following this chreia.
Refutation of Erasistratus:

Narrative: Why, then, should we not call Sparta happy in the honour paid to her by Agesilaus, and in his deference to her laws? No sooner had the dispatch-roll come to him than he renounced and abandoned the great good fortune and power already in his grasp, and the great hopes which beckoned him on, and at once sailed off, “with all task unfulfilled,” leaving behind a great yearning for him among his allies.

Propositio: and giving the strongest confutation to the saying of Erasistratus the son of Phaeax, who declared that the Lacedaemonians were better men in public life, but the Athenians in private.

Rationale: For [γόρ] while approving himself a most excellent king and general, he showed himself a still better and more agreeable friend and companion to those who enjoyed his intimacy.

Argument from example (chreia):

Narrative: Persian coins were stamped with the figure of an archer, and Agesilaus said, as he was breaking camp,

Propositio: that the king was driving him out of Asia with ten thousand archers;

Rationale: for so much money had been sent [τοσούτων γόρ . . . κομισθέντων] to Athens and Thebes and distributed among the popular leaders there, and as a consequence those peoples made war upon the Spartans.

Strikingly, Plutarch also reverses the chreia’s own argumentative sequence. Below, we print the result in a way that shows how deftly Plutarch can change a part of speech’s function. Plutarch converts Agesilaus’ rationale (underlined) into the narrative; and he converts the narrative (italics) into Agesilaus’ rationale.\(^\text{662}\)

\(^{661}\) As Perrin points out (p. 41 n. 2), this quotation is from Homer, II. 4.175.

\(^{662}\) There are further differences between the chreia versions. For example, in the Vita of Artaxerxes Plutarch refers to “thirty thousand archers,” while in the Vita of Agesilaus he refers to “ten thousand.”
Artaxerxes considered how he must carry on the war with Agesilaus, and sent Timocreon the Rhodian into Greece with a great sum of money, bidding him use it for the corruption of the most influential men in the cities there, and for stirring up the Greeks to make war upon Sparta. Timocrates did as he was bidden, the most important cities conspired together against Sparta, Peloponnesus was in a turmoil, and the Spartan magistrates summoned Agesilaus home from Asia.

It was at this time, as we are told, and as he was going home, that Agesilaus said to his friends; “The King has driven me out of Asia with thirty thousand archers”; for the Persian coin has the figure of an archer stamped upon it.

Persian coins were stamped with the figure of an archer.

and Agesilaus said, as he was breaking camp, that the king was driving him out of Asia with ten thousand archers; for so much money had been sent to Athens and Thebes and distributed among the popular leaders there, and as a consequence those peoples made war upon the Spartans.

There is evident flexibility here in Plutarch’s adaptation of parts and roles. We have not seen this flexible reassignment in rhetorical theory, but it is becoming clear in rhetorical practice.

Such sophisticated adaptations find, once again, a biographical explanation. One particular biographical factor is relevance. In the Vita of Artaxerxes Plutarch focuses on the Persian emperor; after all, it is his biography! But in the Vita of Agesilaus, where Plutarch changes focus onto the Spartan General, the treatment of Artaxerxes obviously becomes less relevant. The shift in relevance explains several chreia adaptations: it leads Plutarch to compress the chreia’s narrative portion, eliminating unnecessary details about
Artaxerxes; and it leads him to rearrange the chreia into a speech that helps spotlight Agesilaus’ exemplary reputation contra Erasistratus.

A second biographical factor is the changing context. The broader narrative in the Vita of Artaxerxes portrays Artaxerxes’ failure to control Greek colonies on account of his military weakness (20.1-3), and to describe his success in subjecting Greek states (21.1-5). Sandwiched into this context is our chreia, which tells (with Plutarch’s clear disapproval) why this change occurred: Artaxerxes manages to bribe most of the Greek states. In the broader narrative of the Vita of Agesilaus, however (15.4-6), Plutarch concentrates on praising Agesilaus. And in the context of such praise, Plutarch refutes a chreia attributed to Erasistratus, in the service of which he employs our chreia as an argument from example (ἐκ παραδείγματος [15.6]) that praises Agesilaus’ good nature and wit. In short, the new context of praise helps account for Plutarch reconfiguring the chreia into an argument from example. Biographical change drives change in argumentation.

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663 Compare the Vita of Agesilaus (“... for so much money had been sent to Athens... and as a consequence those peoples made war upon the Spartans”), with the much richer description in the Vita of Artaxerxes. In the Vita of Agesilaus, Plutarch omits many details of Artaxerxes’ plot. Similarly, Plutarch reduces the “thirty thousand archers” in the Vita of Artaxerxes to “ten thousand archers” in the Vita of Agesilaus: the larger number sounds more fitting for describing Artaxerxes’ decadence.

664 It might also be the reason why Plutarch converts the chreia’s rationale into a narrative (“Persian coins were stamped...”), for its leading position draws our attention to Agesilaus’ wit. Plutarch omits the phrase that Agesilaus “said to his friends” because he has mentioned such friends immediately prior to the chreia (15.6).

665 Within a larger narrative that begins at least as far back as 15.1, Plutarch describes a similar situation as in the Vita of Artaxerxes: most Greek states have turned against Sparta under the lure of Persian money (15.2). (This narrative does not simply start in 15.1 and end in 15.6: these references simply mark the immediately surrounding contents.)

666 Plutarch implies disapproval when he remarks, shortly before this chreia, that the “empire of the Persians and their king abounded in gold and luxury and women, but in all else was an empty vaunt” (Art. 20.1 [LCL, trans. Perrin]).

667 In paraphrasing, Plutarch alters grammar (cp. in the Vita of Artaxerxes the indicative verb ἔξελαύαντο [“has driven... out”] with the infinitive ἔξελαύασθαι [“to drive out”] in the Vita of Agesilaus).
Chreia 3: Caesar and Pompey (Caes. 33.4; Pom. 57.5; Robbins, AQAA 953a,b).

In this case, one chreia appears in the Vita of Julius Caesar, and the other in the Vita of the Roman General Pompey (Table 2.5, Appendix 2). Both versions approximate sayings chreiai; the former belongs to the statement species and the latter to the response (ἀποκριτικόν) species. Both chreiai entail presentation “in the manner of an explanation” (ὁποδεικτικῶς).

In the Vita of Julius Caesar, the chreia’s argumentation consists of a propositio followed by two rationales. In Theon’s terms the chreia is also double (δίπλη), as it contains two concise and witty sayings: the first (the propositio) by Favonius, and the second by Pompey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositio:</th>
<th>Favonius bade him [Pompey] stamp on the ground;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[chreia saying 1]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale:</td>
<td>for [ἐπεί] once, in a boastful speech to the senate . . . [Pompey] told them to take no trouble or anxious thought about preparations for the war,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale:</td>
<td>for [γάρ] when it came he had but to stamp upon the earth to fill Italy with armies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[chreia saying 2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When Plutarch now recasts this chreia into the Vita of the Roman consul Pompey, he omits Favonius’ propositio, converts and paraphrases Favonius’ rationale (“for once, in a boastful speech . . .”) to become Pompey’s propositio (“he bade them be in no concern”),

668 For sequence (Caesar’s Vita followed by Pompey’s Vita), see Jones, “Towards a Chronology,” 68.
669 See Theon, Progynasmata (eds. Hock and O’Neil), pp. 88-89. The chreia in the Vita of Caesar has two explanations (one by Favonius, one by Pompey).
and expands with a narrative of Pompey’s dire situation along with his “smiling countenance and calm mien” (μειδιῶν τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ διακεχυμένος).670

Narrative: when someone said that if Caesar should march upon the city, they did not see any forces with which to defend it from him, with a smiling countenance and calm mien,

Propositio: he bade them be in no concern;

Rationale: “For,” said he, “in whatever part of Italy I stamp upon the ground, there will spring up armies of foot and horse.”

Just as in the chreia about Artaxerxes’ bribes, Plutarch can reassign material from one role (a rationale) into an entirely different role (a propositio).

If we ask why Plutarch changes the chreia’s argumentation, we find biographical answers. To an extent, the biographical portrayals in these chreiai are alike: both speak of Pompey’s self-assurance as he defends Rome during the civil war against Julius Caesar (in ca. 49 BCE). But the nuances differ. In the Vita of Caesar, the chreia contrasts Pompey’s former confidence with the dire situation of Caesar’s advance. In the narrative leading up to this chreia (in Caes. 32.1-33.3), Plutarch has described Caesar’s advance upon Italy as he crosses the Rubicon and makes war on Pompey. Immediately before the chreia, Plutarch vividly describes the fear among Pompey’s allies and the Roman people as Caesar approaches Rome (33.1-3). Then, immediately after the chreia, Plutarch continues in a similar vein by narrating Pompey’s sense of fear and defeat, juxtaposed

670 Plutarch also paraphrases: he rewrites for instance the idea that Pompey can easily raise good defenses. Changes include vocabulary (cp. the Vita of Caesar’s στρατευμάτων [“armies”] with the Vita of Pompey’s πεζικοί καὶ ἵππικοι δυνάμεις [“armies of foot and horse”] as well as in syntax (cp. the Vita of Caesar’s infinitive εἰμπλήσειν [“to fill”] with the Vita of Pompey’s indicative ὁνομάσθει [“there will spring up”]).
with Caesar’s confident approach (33.5-35.1). Fittingly, in this biographical context, the chreia with Favonius’ caustic propositio contrasts Pompey’s former confidence with his current desperation.

In the Vita of Pompey, however, Plutarch tweaks the chreia’s portrayal towards his biography’s larger portrayal, a portrayal that Pelling characterizes as reminiscent of Greek tragic drama and its hubris. Indeed our chreia concludes a lengthy description of Pompey’s hubris or “arrogance” (μεγάλη γεύση), and functions biographically as an illustration (παραδελίγμα) of it. And significantly, with this shift in the chreia’s portrayal towards arrogance, Plutarch retools its argumentation. He omits for example Favonius’ propositio and adjacent rationale with γάρ, for Pompey’s duress is no longer a focus. Plutarch also adds the narrative of the Romans’ fear that “they did not see any forces with which to defend . . . [Rome],” for this makes Pompey’s laconic reaction appear all the more hubristic. And within this narrative Plutarch adds reference to Pompey’s “smiling countenance and calm mien,” for it further underlines Pompey’s conceit, as do the paraphrastic flourishes of cavalry and infantry “springing up” (ἀναδύσονται) “in whatever (ὅπου γάρ ἄν) part of Italy I stamp upon the ground.”

Sometimes, Plutarch’s changes in chreia argumentation weaken, ironically, his intended portrayal of Pompey’s arrogance. For Plutarch omits some touches from the version in the Caesar Vita that would enhance the portrayal. He omits for instance description of Pompey’s speech as “boastful” (μεγάλη γεύση), removes Pompey’s

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672 Following the chreia, Plutarch changes focus and narrates the plans of Caesar (58.1).
673 Plutarch adds narration (“When some said . . . they did not see any forces with which to defend it from him”) in order to provide information not available in the immediately preceding narrative. The Caesar Vita’s narrative context has already made this clear, since its focus is precisely Caesar’s powerful military advance.
confident sounding admonition to take “no trouble or anxious thought” (οὐδὲν εἰς πολυπραγμονεῖν οὐδὲ φροντίζειν) and removes his confident reference to “whenever” war comes (ὅταν ἔπιτη) and to “filling Italy with armies” (στρατευμάτων ἐμπλήσειν τὴν Ἰταλίαν). Granted, Plutarch usually replaces these expressions with more effective expressions. For example, he replaces the admonition to “take no trouble or anxious thought” with an admonition simply to “overlook” (ἀμέλειν ἑκέλευσεν) Caesar; ἀμέλεω usually connotes something like our modern expression, “throwing caution to the wind,” and has a pejorative sense.⁶⁷⁴ Similarly, Plutarch’s omission of Pompey’s phrase “whenever war comes” is fitting in that Pompey, in his hubris, needs not even to mention the possibility of war; and the replacement of στρατευμάτων ἐμπλήσειν with armies “springing up” (ἀναδύσωσται) sounds at least as hubristic.⁶⁷⁵ The point is that Plutarch does not carry over every possible expression from his source to foster a portrayal; he might replace some such expressions with better expressions, or might on occasion leave out helpful expressions altogether. In all, though, the trend is clear: Plutarch will pull the argumentation of a chreia into the service of a new portrayal.

2.4: Summary

Our introduction to Plutarch’s treatment of chreiai affords two solid conclusions. First, Plutarch’s purposes and techniques are biographical. As an author of βίοι, Plutarch portrays people’s character and seeks to uphold particular character traits as good (or

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⁶⁷⁴ LSJ, s.v.
⁶⁷⁵ Moreover, Plutarch might omit “boastful” (cp. Caes. 33.4) because he already stresses Pompey’s boastfulness in the surrounding narrative. In any case, the surrounding emphasis on Pompey’s arrogance would explain also Plutarch’s paraphrase (above), which renders Pompey’s words more confident.
poor) ethical models. Critically, this means that when Plutarch carries a chreia from one biography into another, the demands of a distinctive portrayal—demands perhaps in the immediate context, or perhaps in the biography as a whole—might necessitate change. These biographical reasons for change join our more strictly rhetorical reasons for change, namely to strengthen conformity to principles like clarity and propriety (Chapter 1), as explanations for chreia adaptation.

Second, Plutarch’s biographical motives adapt a chreia’s argumentation in precise terms. Plutarch employs precise rhetorical techniques of chreia adaptation—expansion or compression, elaboration and paraphrase—in the context of his biographical interests. To foster a portrayal, Plutarch can employ one or more of these techniques in a given chreia and on various scales. In this regard, two further observations are apposite. First, Plutarch can reconfigure the function of one element like a *propositio* into a rather different element such as a rationale (adaptations from the *Vita* of Artaxerxes to the *Vita* of Agesilaus, and from the *Vita* of Caesar to the *Vita* of Pompey afford good examples). Second, Plutarch’s adaptations do not betray one consistent pattern, for instance a movement towards “longer chreiai over time.” Plutarch composes according to his needs in each case. In all, Plutarch’s biographical interests drive his specific rhetorical techniques for chreia transformation.

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676 As Pelling reminds us, Plutarch has further reasons to adapt sources that extend beyond the strictly biographical (“Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source-Material,” 91, 102, 103, 106-107). Nevertheless, we have found that biographical considerations remain important.
Chapter 3
Adaptation of Speeches (λόγοι) in Josephus’ Antiquitates Judaicae

Introduction

The last chapter demonstrated that biographical purposes push Plutarch to adapt chreiai using rhetorical techniques such as expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις), elaboration (ἐργασία) and paraphrase (παράφρασις). The precise number, kind and combinations of technique could vary; the key point is that we can see how and why a biographer might adapt chreiai.

Chapter 3 pursues the same goal: to learn how and why authors adapt chreiai. The difference is that Chapter 3 shifts the focus to examine rhetorical techniques in the larger context of speeches (λόγοι) in the historical writing of Josephus. Such speeches constitute ideal data, and for three reasons. First, a speech represents a fuller form of the elaborated chreia, and hence a speech contains conventions akin to, if more varied and nuanced than, conventions for chreia elaboration. Second, speech conventions were probably well known to the evangelists, for they composed both chreiai and speeches. And third, speeches of Josephus are particularly attractive in that Josephus writes from a historical and cultural position very much like that of the evangelists: Josephus is a late first-century author fluent in Greek and learned in Jewish tradition, who composes in a genre which calls to mind the gospels (or at least Luke-Acts), that is to say history with

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677 We recall that the progymnasmata call these techniques school “exercises” (γυμνάσια). As adaptive techniques, these also had use beyond education, as we have seen in the work of Plutarch.

678 Λόγος is a term that Aristotle uses to denote “speech”; see Lausberg, Handbook § 263.

679 For the sophistication with which the synoptists could compose speeches, see for instance Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 161-193; for Markan speeches see Black, Rhetoric of the Gospel, 47-73 (Mark writes with “extraordinary . . . rhetorical sophistication” [p. 72]); for Lukan speeches, Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 114-140.
strong biographical interests. Indeed Josephus’ work is even more attractive since Feldman remarks that as an educated Greek author Josephus likely had educational training from texts resembling progymnasmata.

Our focus for speeches will be Josephus’ historical work entitled Antiquitates Judaicae, a history of the Jewish people that Josephus composed for a mainly Roman audience in ca. 95 CE. There are especially good reasons to study the speeches in this work. For one, Josephus draws these speeches largely from literary sources that are still extant. For another, Josephus’ general method calls to mind quite closely that of the evangelists on any source hypothesis. We would, again, best characterize this method as composition: closely following a particular source through a combination of paraphrase, addition (προστίθημι) of ideas and omission (παραλείπω) of ideas. Another rhetorical method which might well characterize the work of both Josephus and the synoptic evangelists is to improve a source: this method we have called perfection (ἐξεργασία).

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680 For the biographical character of Josephus’ work, see Steve Mason, Josephus and the New Testament, 2nd ed. (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2003 [1992]), 116, 121; on Josephus’ relevance for comparison, see pp. 2, 251-293, 300; cp. similarly Derrenbacker, Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem, 100-101, and Downing, “Compositional Conventions,” 74. Downing points out additional benefits of examining Josephus: He is “the only first-century author for whose use of sources we have extensive controls. . . . [and t]he use he makes of Jewish scriptures . . . looks very like the procedures” of other ancient authors (Downing, “Compositional Conventions,” 74).


683 Downing, “Compositional Conventions,” 74, for example.

684 Josephus’ main source is the Hebrew Bible; for other sources see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 51-56, 64-65. Josephus uses these Greek terms in Ant. 1.5: see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 37. Notice that there is a difference between addition/omission (προστίθημι/παραλείπω), and expansion/compression (ἐπεκτείνω/συστέλλω). Josephus employs the former very generally in Ant. 1.5. The progymnasmeta assign “expansion,” “compression” and “elaboration” more precise meanings: to build up or compress a rhetorical unit with new ideas, while retaining the form in question. For Josephus’ and the evangelists’ parallel method see Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 46-48,” and Downing, “Redaction Criticism II,” 48.

685 I prefer perfection to Kennedy’s translation (elaboration), because the latter can confuse this exercise with Hermogenes’ quite different exercise of ἐργασία (elaboration).
Work by Downing on the compositional conventions of Josephus and other narrative authors (1984, 1988) offers at least two major insights. The first is that for Josephus and Plutarch alike, the number of sources determines in part how they adapt those sources. For when faced with two sources, Plutarch and Josephus will tend to conflate them according to the extent of their congruence:

Where [the sources] agree, he follows (unless the story line is particularly weak); where they can be taken as supplementing each other, he allows them to; where they entirely disagree, he simply follows one; where they contradict in detail in an otherwise similar episode, he makes up his own version.

Second, simplicity governs ancient source adaptation. Authorial practices are clear and easy to envision. For Downing, such simplicity counts against the plausibility of scenarios of “unpicking” of existing conflation that occur on the FH and GH.

Building upon the work of Downing, Derrenbacker has examined compositional practices further. His findings we reproduce here nearly verbatim.

1. A preference for eyewitness source material.
2. Frequent use of oral sources together with written.
3. Choice of the more plausible when two sources disagree (when they concur, one follows their consensus).
4. Use of ὑπομηματα (“notes,” or a “draft” version), in the production of ancient texts.
5. Epitomizing (summarizing) of works for convenience.
6. Following one source at a time.
7. If following a particular order of a parallel source, authors adapt the wording of that source.

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686 Downing, “Compositional Conventions,” 72, 76, and following note; for differences among authors see for example p. 77.
687 Quotation from Downing, “Compositional Conventions,” 81, with reference to Plutarch (for Josephus, cp. pp. 75-76). Downing adds that “[a]ll of this matches precisely . . . what we are told about the exercises in writing that Plutarch is likely to have done as a lad.” These exercises are the proximigmata, in particular the exercise of “weaving” (συμπλέκειν), which Downing parallels with conflation (p. 74). In addition, at least three of the aforementioned authors paraphrase their sources (see pp. 71, 72, 74, 76); cp. generally Downing, “Contemporary Analogies,” 60.
688 Downing, “Compositional Conventions,” 82.
689 Derrenbacker, Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem, 116-117.
8. Avoiding radical reordering of source material.

9. Addition of legomena to existing material—sayings or anecdotal information about a particular person or event. These legomena would be interlaced among the narrative material culled from other (written) sources, and occasionally clustered together.

10. Adaptation of source material was multi-faceted. The “principles” of Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ “science of literary composition” are “followed” by several authors, namely “subtraction, addition or alteration” of source material.

These conventions represent what most authors did, most of the time, with sources.

Derrenbacker recognizes that behind such conventions there were motive(s) and a context, but his focus remains on the techniques that authors typically used to adapt sources.

Downing and Derrenbacker’s work offers fresh insight into source adaptation. The techniques that they discover afford patterns that can account for changes among the gospels. Their work leaves unanswered, though, two questions germane to our study.

First, how would a historian like Josephus understand adaptation in rhetorical terms?

That is to say, what are his rhetorical techniques for adapting sources? And second, why does he adapt sources?

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690 For nos. 1-5, see Derrenbacker, *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem*, 75-76 (for nos. 6-8, see pp. 116-117).
691 From Derrenbacker, *Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem*, 75-76. According to Downing, when biographers adopt speeches from historiography, they tend to cut them down or eliminate them: see “Contemporary Analogies,” 56.
692 Dionysius’ “subtraction” (ἀφαίρεσις), “addition” (προσθήκη) and “alteration” (ἀλλαίωσις) resemble terms that Josephus uses (below). Dionysius, *Comp.* 6 (LCL, trans. Usher).
693 Downing and Derrenbacker engage ancient rhetoric by engaging ancient literature: all ancient literature was consciously “rhetorical”; it could not be otherwise. But they do not focus on rhetorical conventions for adaptation (save for Downing’s passing mention [1988] of the rhetorical handbooks and progymnasmata).
694 See Downing’s passing reference to explanation in “Compositional Conventions,” 81 (referring to his more in-depth study of Josephus [1980]). Several scholars place the Antiquitates in a category of texts that often are labeled Rewritten Bible and include Jubilees, the Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum of Ps.-Philo, and the Genesis Apocryphon. See for example, Alexander, “Retelling the Old Testament,” 99-100, and Evans, “Luke and the Rewritten Bible,” 179. There has been further, an effort to set Rewritten Bible texts—and by extension, Josephus—within the Jewish exegetical tradition of midrash: see Alexander, “Retelling the Old Testament,” 117-118; Geza Vermes in *HJPACJ* II, 346-348. Feldman though offers several good reasons to bracket consideration of midrash and of “rewriting” for an understanding of Josephus: see Feldman,
3.1: Josephus as a Historian

As a rhetorically educated author,\textsuperscript{695} Josephus worked in the context of three key rhetorical activities: invention (ἐὑρεσία), arrangement (τάξις) and expression (λέξις). There is wide agreement that Greek historians brought sensibilities of rhetoric to their work, whether through rhetorical activities, use of rhetorical forms like *ecphrasis* or *prosopopoeia*, and/or aims of education, persuasion and entertainment.\textsuperscript{696}

At the same time, recent scholarship helps us appreciate that Josephus’ work is not only rhetorical but also *historical*; Josephus is a rhetorically trained historian who works within the historical genre. In his study *Josephus’s Interpretation of the Bible* (1998), Feldman remarks that Josephus understood himself to be composing history, a genre that was well established by the mid-first century CE and afforded many models, among others the histories by Thucydides, Herodotus and Polybius. Indeed Josephus had read several Greek histories, including those by Thucydides and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, along with Jewish historiography (including Hecataeus of Abdera). Within this broad tradition of Greek history, Josephus followed essentially two Greek precedents...
or “schools” of historical composition: one represented by Isocrates (436-338 BCE) and the second by Aristotle (384-322 BCE). As Feldman puts it,

In his approach to the writing of the history of the Jewish people, Josephus is indebted to the traditions of the two great Greek schools of historiography, the Isocratean and the Aristotelian. He follows the former in his adoption of fictitious speeches, digressions, moralizing, psychologizing, and painting of events with epic, rhetorical, and, above all, tragic hues. But he is also indebted to the latter, which stressed scientific, empirical investigation and the classification of types of lives, with emphasis on the study of character for its own sake. . . . In particular, there was a tendency . . . to abandon the distinction between history and biography.

Feldman’s latter point is especially significant as it shows Josephus’ conventions to be related to Plutarchan biography (Chapter 2). But still, we can characterize Josephus’ work at least partly in historical terms. In the following discussion we do so with reference to Josephus’ purposes and his techniques.

1. The historian’s purposes. Historian that he was, Josephus’ overarching purpose was to offer an accurate history of the Jewish people, their leaders, their religion and their history. Scholarship has, moreover, nuanced this characterization by explaining that Josephus wrote history with an apologetic purpose. In Greco-Roman antiquity,

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697 Feldman also explains that Josephus had precedents from Judaic tradition (in particular, the targumim, or Aramaic paraphrases of the Bible, and the Septuagint); see Josephus’s Interpretation, 7, 9, 12-13, 16-17, 23, 62, 82 and n. 2.
699 According to Feldman, historians such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who embodied the precedents of both Aristotle and Isocrates, offered Josephus a compositional “model.” That is simply to say that while Josephus composed history from sources (namely the Tanakh or Hebrew Bible), he also modeled his work upon characteristic features of Thucydides and Dionysius, including turns of phrase, imagery and interpretive remarks: Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 12-13. Others have similarly noted that Dionysius was an object of μίμησις or imitatio. On the popularity of imitation see MacDonald, Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark, 4-6.
700 Varneda, Historical Method of Flavius Josephus, 274.
701 For example, Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 132; Harold W. Attridge, The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates Judaicae of Flavius Josephus, HDR (Missoula: Scholars Press for the
apologetically oriented history was a specific genre for defending Judaism against hostile charges.\textsuperscript{702} As such, a key theme of Josephus’ *Antiquitates* is that God has not abandoned the covenant with Israel and has given Israel its outstanding leaders, laws and religion. This is Josephus’ basic defense or *apology* for Judaism.

To appreciate history as apology requires a brief word on the historical situation that Jewish authors like Josephus experienced. As Mason well explains, Josephus lived through the tumultuous later decades of the first century CE, including the First Jewish War of 66-73. For several centuries, Gentiles who had colonized and later conquered the Near East had tended to regard Jews and Judaism with some suspicion. They had developed numerous negative perceptions of Jews, including the notion that they were “misanthropic,” that they consciously set themselves apart from non-Jews with respect to status and purity. During the first century anti-Judaic sentiments persisted and grew among many Gentiles, particularly amongst Romans who had an interest in maintaining suzerainty over the conquered territories of Judea and Galilee.\textsuperscript{703} During the early part of the century, tension had gradually increased between Rome’s exercise of imperial authority through governors, and the peoples of Roman Judea and Galilee who resented Rome’s burdens of taxation and sometimes capricious and excessive judicial policies. Such tensions, deepened by sporadic armed resistance movements and consequent misunderstandings, exploded into open and wide-scale rebellion from 66 to 73 CE. In

\begin{itemize}
  \item Quoting Gregory Sterling (1992), Feldman characterizes apologetic history as “the story of a subgroup of people in an extended prose narrative written by a member of the group who follows the group’s own traditions but Hellenizes them in an effort to establish the identity of the group within the setting of the larger world.” *Josephus’s Interpretation*, 132.
  \item For Roman attitudes towards the Jews, and more precisely in the years following the First Jewish War, see Mason, *Josephus and the New Testament*, 55-64.
\end{itemize}
spite of the eventual success of Rome in capturing and besieging the Jewish rebels, the war led to a deepening resentment towards Jews and Judaism. In this climate of hostility, with its charges that Jews were rebellious, impious, ungrateful and misanthropic, Josephus wrote a history of Jews and Judaism addressed principally to gentile and politically influential Romans that could defend Judaism against such charges. Josephus himself had participated in the war, first as a rebel but later defecting to the Romans and assisting in their campaign. Against this background, Josephus’ apologetic and pedagogical purpose is to offer an accurate history that can correct misinformation about Jews, promote toleration, and offer ethical instruction for all readers.

According to Attridge, Josephus’ apologetic purpose manifested itself in two specific notions: that providence governs the Jews’ history, and that high moral standards were characteristic of Israel’s great leaders, in particular its Lawgiver Moses but also its progenitor Abraham and kings like David and Solomon. To see these emphases in Josephus’ own words, Attridge points to the proem to the Antiquitates:

But, speaking generally, the main lesson to be learnt from this history by any who care to peruse it is that men who conform to the will of God, and do not

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704 For circumstances leading to the First Jewish War and a discussion of the war itself see L. I. Levine, “Jewish War,” ABD 3, 839-840; for its effect on Roman attitudes see Mason, Josephus and the New Testament, 60-61.
705 Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 132, esp. 160-162.
708 Feldman in contrast contends that on balance, Josephus does not appeal to providence: see Josephus’s Interpretation, 205 and 664-665.
709 Attridge, Interpretation of Biblical History, 66-70 (generally, 71-144); cp. Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 52 and, on David and Solomon, see Louis Feldman, Studies in Josephus’ Rewritten Bible, SJSJ 58 (Leiden · Boston · Köln: Brill, 1998), 546-551. Attridge calls these interpretive themes (for example, p. 67); these were themes already in the biblical narrative, which Josephus wanted to highlight (pp. 69-70, 109, 181).
venture to transgress the Laws that have been excellently laid down, prosper in all things beyond belief, and for their reward are offered by God felicity; whereas, in proportion as they depart from the strict observance of these Laws, things (else) practicable become impracticable, and whatever imaginary good thing they strive to do ends in irretrievable disasters (Ant. 1.14).

Our legislator [Moses] . . . having shown that God possesses the very perfection of virtue, thought that men should strive to participate in it . . . . I therefore entreat my readers to examine my work from this point of view. For, studying it in this spirit, nothing will appear to them unreasonable, nothing incongruous with the majesty of God and His love for men (Ant. 1.23-24).  

Josephus wants us to know that Israel had bona fide “hero” figures of outstanding ethical standards, piety, intelligence and bravery (among other qualities), who could answer Gentile accusations that Jews were weak, unscrupulous and impious.  

Attridge adds that apologetic could defend against quite specific charges. Scholarship has taken note of several such charges and Josephus’ defenses. One such charge, writes Feldman, was that Jews were poor fighters, “weaklings” who could not defend themselves against stronger and braver conquerors, such as the Roman forces who had defeated the insurgents in Judea. Another charge was that the Jews’ holy books (the Bible) were dubious, mere fabrications.

710 Quotations from Attridge, Interpretation of Biblical History, 67, 53.
711 The idea that biographical portrayals serve an apologetic goal is clear in Attridge, Interpretation of Biblical History, 106 and 143-144 with 181. For specific accusations against Jews and Josephus’ response, see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 132 with 74, 129-131. As we indicated earlier, this careful attention to character portrayal reveals Josephus’ interest in biography. Because Attridge has shown this interest to characterize not only Vitae but also Hellenistic historiography (Attridge, Interpretation of Biblical History, 68-69, 109), we can say that Josephus’ interests parallel those of Plutarch.
712 See for example Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 160-162.
713 For this accusation see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 133. Josephus is careful to rebut another Gentile charge: that Jews regarded themselves as superior to and purer than Gentiles (Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 161; cp. Feldman, Studies in Josephus’ Rewritten Bible, 557-558). This, believes Josephus, is simply not true, and so at places such as Ant. 11.6, while narrating how the Persian emperor Xerxes helped Jews to return to Israel, Josephus adds that Ezra “became friendly [γίνεται φίλος] with King Xerxes” (Ant. 11.122 [LCL, trans. Marcus]). By drawing attention to this friendship, Josephus helps show that Jews are not misanthropic, but rather open to Gentiles as they are to other Jews.
In all then, Josephus is a historian whose apologetic purpose is to defend and claim a rightful place for Jews and Judaism in a hostile Roman environment.\textsuperscript{714} Granted, Josephus brings other purposes to his work too,\textsuperscript{715} and certain of these are more narrowly rhetorical: Josephus likes to add, for instance, elements characteristic of Greco-Roman drama and novels, as well as “psychologizing—that is, analysis of the true motives of people, . . . characteristic of Euripides and of the rhetorical schools.”\textsuperscript{716} Moreover, “simplicity,” Downing says, “is a major part of Josephus’ aim.”\textsuperscript{717} It is striking that Begg concludes similarly:

So many of the . . . omissions, rearrangements, modifications and additions do, in fact, seem motivated by the desire to provide readers with a narrative that is smoother-reading.\textsuperscript{718}

Indeed, simplicity recalls the very similar and very important rhetorical principle of \textit{clarity} or \textit{σαφήνεια} (Chapter 1). Perhaps it is fair to conclude, then, that both historical and specifically rhetorical purposes guide Josephus.

2. \textit{Josephus’ techniques for adapting sources}. Taking as his major source the biblical narrative,\textsuperscript{719} Josephus adapts it: he interprets the Bible in accord with his

\textsuperscript{714} Feldman points to a related, pedagogical purpose: “Ancient historians believed that it was necessary for the historian not merely to inform but also to instruct. . . . Consequently, Josephus frequently introduces wise sayings and proverb-like reflections: e.g., those who obey well will know to rule well (\textit{Ant.} 4.186); men lose control of reason when blest by fortune” (\textit{Ant.} 6.116). Feldman, \textit{Studies in Josephus’ Rewritten Bible}, 565-566.

\textsuperscript{715} Begg, \textit{Josephus’ Account of the Early Divided Monarchy}, 285, 286. According to Begg, “items likely to prove uninteresting to Hellenized readers are reduced or eliminated, whereas more congenial material, e.g., accounts of political and military developments are accentuated.”


\textsuperscript{717} Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 64. Josephus achieves simplicity for instance by removing redundant repetitions or tensions between accounts of an event: Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 50; cp. p. 57: “A clear and coherent story is most likely to appear credible and hold attention.”

\textsuperscript{718} Such simplicity is not the only aim; Begg goes on to discuss other motivations, such as theological motivations. Begg, \textit{Josephus’ Account of the Early Divided Monarchy}, 285.
purposes, adapting it in ways that can legitimate Judaism to a non-Jewish audience.\footnote{Some specialists on Josephus characterize his historical work as rewriting that narrative—rewriting the Bible: for this idea and for Josephus’ biblical source, see Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 14, 16; cp. observations of the ancient Greek and Latin tendency towards using one or a few major sources and following one at a time: Derrenbacker, \textit{Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem}, 116; Downing, “Compositional Practices,” 71-73; and the comments by Pelling, “\textit{Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum},” 65.}

The choice of “interpret” here is deliberate; this is precisely the term, explains Feldman, with which Josephus characterizes his work (\textit{Ant.} 1.5). Using the Greek terms \textit{μεθηρμηνεύω} and \textit{μεταφράζειν} (\textit{to interpret}), Josephus saw his task as adapting the biblical narrative.\footnote{For the effect of his apologetic purpose on the narrative, see for instance Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 54, 132, 171 (and chapter 4 generally); Attridge, \textit{Interpretation of Biblical History}, 43, 52, 57, 60; and Feldman, \textit{Studies in Josephus’ Rewritten Bible}, 562-563, 546, 548.} Today we recognize that for Josephus, adapting the narrative did not mean dispensing with the truth. Rather, Josephus understood interpretation as bringing out truth, clarifying the Bible’s intended story.\footnote{For Josephus’ understanding of interpretation see Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 45-46; cp. similarly Varneda, \textit{Historical Method of Flavius Josephus}, 277-278, esp. 273; cp p. 258 n. 115. For the historiographic convention (in Dionysius of Halicarnassus) of asserting absolute fidelity to sources while in fact adapting them, and for this convention’s influence on Josephus, see Attridge, \textit{Interpretation of Biblical History}, 58. The fact that Josephus interpreted what he regarded as a holy, inspired text (indicated by Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 43-44, 45) implies that the evangelists would be at least as willing to modify one another’s work. C. A. Evans is “not sure . . . if Luke . . . viewed Mark as sacred text, as he undoubtedly viewed the dominical tradition in particular and the Jesus story in general” (Evans, “Luke and the Rewritten Bible,” 179 n. 28). But a precise answer is not necessary: if Josephus could modify Scripture, then the evangelists could modify their gospel sources.}

Generally speaking, we can find many such adaptations in Josephus’ \textit{Antiquitates}. Attridge has located places where Josephus accentuates, for example, the notion of God’s providence and the Jews’ high ethics,\footnote{Attridge, \textit{Interpretation of Biblical History}, 181-182; cp. Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 51, 53.} and we can find illustrations for ourselves. While narrating for instance how Cyrus permitted the Jews to return to Israel (1 Esdras 2:1 and Ezra 1:1),\footnote{Marcus gives the biblical parallels in the margins of his Loeb edition.} Josephus accentuates God’s providence: he underlines God’s influence by reporting that Cyrus “wondered at the divine power and was seized by a strong desire and
ambition to do what had been written.” Similarly, Josephus accentuates the ethical character of the Jewish king Josiah (2 Kgs 22:1; 2 Chron 34:1-7). To be sure, the Bible itself praises Josiah, for he “did what was right in the sight of the Lord, and walked in the ways of his ancestor David; he did not turn aside to the right or to the left” (2 Chron 34:2 [NRSV]). Yet Josephus paraphrases and embellishes with Greek moral terminology, a convention with which Gentile readers would be familiar: Josiah “was of an excellent character and well-disposed to virtue [τὴν δὲ φύσιν αὐτὸς ἀριστὸς ὑπῆρχε καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐγενομένος] and emulous of the practices of King David, whom he made the pattern and rule of his whole manner of life.”

Let us endeavour to be more precise and indicate the kinds of adaptations that Josephus makes. Earlier we demonstrated that while Plutarch’s biographical interests drive his adaptations of chreiai, the adaptations or techniques themselves are rhetorical, such as expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις) and elaboration (ἐργασία). It is similarly the case for Josephus: while his apologetic and rhetorical purposes drive his adaptations of the Bible, the actual adaptations are rhetorical in form. The literature sometimes describes his adaptive work in rhetorical terms, but at other times it categorizes such work in what appear to be broader and more abstract terms like addition, omission, modification and integration (or conflation). Varnera lists nearly thirty such kinds of change, while
Begg offers a simpler taxonomy. Our task below is briefly to demonstrate the rhetorical character of Josephus’ biblical adaptations. To begin, we need to acknowledge that Josephus engages the rhetorical activities of invention, arrangement and expression.

A. Invention. Josephus’ statement that he will not “add” (προσθείς) or “omit” (παραλιπόν) material from the Bible (Ant. 1.17), quite apart from its disingenuity, does not readily call rhetorical techniques to mind. But Josephus is sensitive to rhetorical invention, for he values apodeixis (ἀποδείξις) or proof: he knows that he must engage in the key inventional concern of proving his interpretation. Moreover, προσθείς or addition does in fact appear in a rhetorical context. Although the handbook tradition uses the term to denote stylistic additions while Josephus uses it to denote more substantive changes, the similarity is unmistakable and suggests that Josephus understood “additions” and “omissions” as rhetorical techniques.

730 These include: “additions, mixture of another source or of other biblical quotes, contribution and personal interpretation, errors, condensing of texts from the Scriptures, enlarging, narrative variants, anachronisms, contradictions, abiblical aspects, omissions, mixture of sources, emphasis, amalgam of themes, invention, harmonizing of sources, use of LXX text and Hebrew text, inversion of source, remoulding of the sources, biblical and non biblical literal quotes, simplification of the sources, anticipation of the source” and so forth. Varneda, Historical Method of Flavius Josephus, 268-271. See further Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 50-64.

731 Begg, Josephus’ Account of the Early Divided Monarchy, 276-284. Some of the motivations that we summarized earlier (apologetically motivated changes, such as stressing the strength and martial skill of Jewish warriors) are probably hard to associate directly with one specific kind of change such as “addition” or “omission,” and need not be. A common observation is that Josephus’ changes are usually small in scale, occurring on the level of a verse or two (Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 54-56; Feldman, Josephus’ Interpretation, 70; Begg, Josephus’ Account of the Early Divided Monarchy, 276, 284). Nevertheless, as Mason puts it, “it is clear that . . . [Josephus] felt free—remarkably so from modern perspectives—to alter and reinterpret the Bible as required by current needs.” Mason, Josephus and the New Testament, 119, 131 (with reference to the evangelists). Cp. Mack, “Persuasive Pronouncements,” 285, and Feldman, Studies in Josephus’ Rewritten Bible, 542-543.

732 Terms quoted in Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 37.

733 On Josephus’ concern for ἀποδείξις, see Varneda, Historical Method of Flavius Josephus, 263-266, esp. 263. For its rhetorical context see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 357, 372.

734 Moreover, his term παραληπόν or omission appears in some rhetorical contexts as a figure of thought; the parallel is close enough to suggest that Josephus might regard omission as an inventive technique. For παραληπόν see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 810, 882-885; cp. Anderson, Jr., Glossary, 88-89.
B. Arrangement. Josephus could not only add and omit material but also rearrange its sequence, and the technique of rearrangement reflects rhetorical training. Feldman has pointed to Josephus’ numerous uses of τάττω (to arrange), the Greek expression for the second rhetorical activity, and this term suggests Josephus’ rhetorical sensitivity. As Begg indicates, Josephus rearranges material along essentially two lines. The first is to rearrange individual stories into a different sequence. Compare for instance the reports of the death of the Israelite king Jehu. The Bible locates the episode in 2 Kings 10:32-36, following narration of Jehu’s career (chapters 9-10) and before narration of his descendents (chapter 11 onwards). The Antiquitates however places the report of Jehu’s death after describing some of his descendents (Ant. 9.160).

Josephus’ second kind of rearrangement is conflation, combining the narratives of two sources into one. According to Derrenbacker, historians commonly resorted to conflation when using two or more parallel narrative sources. In his study Derrenbacker reveals essentially three conflationary tendencies. First, “authors . . . tend to follow one source at a time.” Second, “If following a particular order of a parallel source, the . . . authors will also adapt the wording of that source.” Third, “we do not see a radical reordering of source material”: rather, authors tend to follow the sequence of pericopae or stories in their sources. To these Derrenbacker adds one further significant conclusion:

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735 Feldman, *Josephus’s Interpretation*, 163-164; Feldman does not link the term with rhetoric here; he sets the discussion within the context of “Stylistic and Other Changes.”
737 Begg adds that “within a given unit Josephus will sometimes rearrange the Biblical disposition of the material.” *Josephus’ Account of the Early Divided Monarchy*, 278. Downing has also noticed that Josephus will rearrange stories and ideas “in terms of topic, person, place or event,” grouping them along more “thematic” lines: Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 57; cp. Feldman, *Josephus’s Interpretation*, 163.
conflation tended to occur at the level of episodes (stories or pericopae), not of words, phrases and sentences within pericopae. Such “micro-conflation” was not a common practice.

C. Expression. In rhetorical terms, authors had to express ideas in a way that was clear, grammatically correct, ornate and appropriate for their audience. Concern for good expression appears in the progymnasmata and, among other writings, in Lucian of Samosata’s *Quomodo conscribenda historia sit*. As an educated historian, Josephus shared this concern for good expression, and he regularly paraphrased (παραφρασις) his sources.

Features identified in Josephus’ paraphrase include adaptation of direct discourse into indirect discourse, the removal of unclear Hebrew names and the adaptation of Semitic parataxis into more periodic construction (typified by subordinate clauses). Similarly, Begg notices that “Josephus . . . inserts items which serve to improve the style of the original.” How might such expressive changes be significant? According to

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743 On Josephus’ awareness of rhetorical (and specifically expressive) conventions that appear in Lucian’s treatise, see Feldman, *Josephus’s Interpretation*, 279 n. 133.
745 Feldman, *Josephus’s Interpretation*, 164 (and footnotes there); although Feldman speaks of Josephus’ *Letter of Aristeas*, he implies that these paraphrase techniques are similar to those in the *Antiquitates*.
746 Emphasis added. He continues: “Under this heading mention may be made of his recurrent interpolation – both within and between units – of closing and/or transitional formulae designed to smooth over the Bible’s often abrupt movement from one topic to another.” Begg, *Josephus’ Account of the Early Divided Monarchy*, 280.
Feldman, Josephus’ improvements render the expression more amenable to Greek readers suspicious of Judaism, and in this way serve apologetic interests.\(^{747}\)

3.2: Speech (λόγος) Adaptation in the Antiquitates Judaicae

We now turn to examine Josephus’ adaptations of three speeches (λόγοι), units that approximate expanded-elaborated chreiai. Our study will show that Josephus adapts speeches in a manner not unlike Plutarch, using rhetorical techniques of addition (προστίθημι), omission (παραλείπω) and paraphrase (παραφράζω).\(^{748}\) Our study will also show that behind these transformations are at least two reasons or motives. The first motive is explicitly rhetorical: to make a speech more compelling.\(^{749}\) A second and often related motive is apologetic: to defend the Jewish people through soundly narrating their history.\(^{750}\)

The speeches, which come from 1-2 Samuel, 1-2 Kings, and 1-2 Chronicles and correspond roughly to Antiquitates 6-8, call to mind chreiai in that they offer propositiones in a setting of prefatory material (like expansion/ἐπεκτείνωσις) and proofs (like elaboration/ἐργασία). And there are good reasons to examine speeches particularly in Ant. 6-8. Josephus composes these speeches on the basis of the Septuagint text,\(^{751}\) and

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\(^{747}\) Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 171.

\(^{748}\) The literature shows awareness of such rhetorical motives on occasion: see Begg, Josephus’ Account of the Early Divided Monarchy, 278; Derrenbacker, Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem, 95; Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 61-63.

\(^{749}\) See Chapter 1. Cp. Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 623, who draws attention to other sorts of explicitly literary reasons for change; as he puts it, “clarifications, increased suspense and drama.”

\(^{750}\) Feldman (see paragraph above) has already shown that stylistic changes have an underlying apologetic purpose.

\(^{751}\) On the biblical text(s) that Josephus uses for Samuel, Kings and Chronicles see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 23-36, esp. 64.
such use of Greek sources helps further to approximate the editorial conditions among the gospels.\textsuperscript{752}

For each speech, we shall first describe the rhetorical activities—invention, arrangement and expression—in the original, Septuagint version. Our description will include the speech’s invention, its exigence or general problem and its more precise \(\techne\); its \textit{propositio}; and its proofs.\textsuperscript{753} We shall then describe the speech’s arrangement and its expression.

After we describe the Septuagint speech, we shall describe Josephus’ rhetorical changes in terms of invention, arrangement and expression. To illustrate these changes, we shall use distinctive fonts: \textbf{bold print} denotes omission; \underline{underlining} denotes addition; \textbf{highlighting} denotes rearrangement, and \textit{italics} denote paraphrase. Finally and critically, we shall explain Josephus’ changes.\textsuperscript{754} Since Josephus composes speeches, we shall throughout use terms appropriate to speeches and not so much to chreiai.\textsuperscript{755}

\textsuperscript{752} Additional criteria help further to approximate scenarios among the synoptic gospels. The selected speeches are by characters whom Josephus regards positively (including of course God), and this attribution helps approximate the evangelists’ attribution of speeches to Jesus. Moreover, according to Mason (\textit{Josephus and the New Testament}, 116), the \textit{Antiquitates} has elements of ancient biography that include speeches that portray character, a feature that calls to mind gospel speeches that portray Jesus.

\textsuperscript{753} I adapt the following method of description from Kennedy, \textit{New Testament Interpretation}, 34-38, and May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 32-36. \textit{Exigence} is a term coined by Lloyd Bitzer (Kennedy, \textit{New Testament Interpretation}, 34-35). Whether or not Josephus characterized his speech adaptations in \textit{precisely} these rhetorical terms is less important than our effort to identify the main adaptations.

\textsuperscript{754} We shall not list every possible change or reason for change. Rather we shall draw out the major rhetorical tendencies.

\textsuperscript{755} Josephus probably understood some of his work in progymnastic terms (terms like \textgreek{"e}ργασία and \textgreek{"e}πεκτείνωσις), but we shall eschew most progymnastic terms for three reasons. First, they were with some exceptions (e.g., \textgreek{παράφρασις}) germane to an educational setting beyond which Josephus had passed. Second, the terms tend to apply to specific rhetorical units, especially the chreia, narrative and fable, not to the bona fide speech parts (\textgreek{προοίμιον, διήγησις, πρόθεσις, πίστις, ἐπίλογος}) that Josephus composes. Third, Josephus makes changes for which there is no clear progymnastic name, yet which Josephus himself names, for instance \textit{adding} (\textgreek{προστίθημι}) and \textit{omitting} (\textgreek{παραλείπω}) material.
Speech 1: Samuel to Israel (1 Kgdms (LXX) 12:1-25 [=1 Sam 12:20-25]; Ant. 6.86-94). The original, Hebrew author of 1 Samuel 12:1-25 did not compose under the influence of Greek rhetoric. He worked in a Semitic milieu before the Hellenization of the Near East; similarly, the Greek translators of biblical texts set out chiefly to translate these speeches, not to recast them along more Greek lines. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of a Greek reader like Josephus, our Septuagint speech betrays basic rhetorical activities and parts, if only in outline. From this standpoint we shall describe the Septuagint speech (1 Kgdms 12:1-25) (Table 3.1, Appendix 2).

The author of 1 Kgdms 12:1-25 has already revealed his exigence in Chapter 8: responding to a threat from Ammon’s king Nahash, Israel has requested the prophet Samuel to abdicate in favour of a king who can provide a stronger defence (1 Kgdms (LXX) 8:1-9). Hence the precise problem or στάσις is judicial: Whom should Israel have taken for its ruler, Samuel the prophet or a monarch? In his speech replying to this stasis, Samuel offers essentially this propositio: “your great evil, which you committed before the Lord . . . [occurred] when you requested a king for yourselves”
In support of this *propositio* Samuel offers numerous proofs, proofs that we can summarize by proceeding through the speech’s parts. From a perspective informed by rhetoric, Samuel presents three proof types in a sequence that recalls Greek speeches: ἡθος, λόγος and πάθος. We can therefore demarcate the parts along rhetorical lines. Beginning in the προοίμιον, Samuel offers proof from his character (ἡθος), for he claims a record of clean and upright behaviour during all his time in Israel (12:2-6). Then Samuel offers two logical proofs (λόγος). The first is an artificial (ἐντεχνος) proof from example: Israel had mistakenly sought monarchical rule in its distant past, and so invoked God’s anger (12:7-13); it logically follows that Israel should not repeat the mistake now (12:14-15). Samuel’s second proof is inartificial (ἄτεχνος) and from authority: he justifies his claim that God is disappointed by invoking a threatening storm (12:16-19). After a brief narrative interlude which shows the fear and repentance that the storm has driven into Israel (12:18-19), Samuel proceeds to a conclusion, the ἐπίλογος. And here we see his proof from emotion (πάθος): Samuel arouses Israel’s hope by reassuring that it can again be justified before God (12:20, 22-23); at the same time he also arouses fear, cautioning that “if you ever commit evil with evil, then also you and your king will have brought evils upon yourselves” (12:25). The

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760 From this point, we use “author” and “Samuel” interchangeably. The author of course composes the speech for Samuel. Samuel does not convey this *propositio* directly, leaving a desideratum that Josephus will fix.

761 Hence our discussion of invention will overlap with arrangement. By describing material part by part, we shall follow a conventional practice, and can also better illuminate Josephus’ changes: for ancient invention that proceeds part by part see May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 10, 29, 31.

762 Perhaps this should not be a surprise, for Cicero remarks that a Greco-Roman speech arrangement is quite intuitive and common sense. “That we should say something before addressing the case, then set forth the case, after that prove it by establishing our own arguments and refuting those of our opponents, then conclude our speech and so bring it to an end—this is prescribed by the very nature of oratory.” Cicero, *De orat.* 2.307 (trans. May and Wisse).
fact that Samuel sequences proofs in a fashion reminiscent of Greek speeches (1. ἡθος, 2. λόγος, 3. πάθος) is suggestive and warrants rhetorical labels.

Having invented and arranged material, Samuel needs to express it effectively too. Earlier we introduced three levels of expression and their appropriate contents. Although we cannot take account of every stylistic feature, we can examine two indicative features which belong to ornament (κόσμος, ornatus): first, the nature and extent of artistic devices, like tropes and figures; and second, the quality of sentence construction (namely running versus periodic style). On the basis of these two features, what kind of style does the Septuagint employ in 12:1-25? A Greek reader might categorize the speech as approximating the plain level. The Septuagint employs a few artistic devices numerous times, for instance repetition of terms to underscore ideas, terms that include ἐιλήφα (12:3), μάρτυς (12:5) and εἰς χείρας (12:9). It also employs a rhetorical question (12:17) and emphatic expressions like πάντω ἀνδρα (12:1), ἐκ χειρός οὐδενός οὐδέν (12:4) and πᾶσαν δικαιοσύνην (12:7). Among tropes the Septuagint uses some metaphors, for instance “into the hands” (12:9) and “the good and straight path” (12:23). In all, the Septuagint uses a few types of ornament, and of these types, the repetitions and emphases convey a vividness that recalls Demetrius’ ideally plain style (De Elocutione 209-14). In sentence construction too, the style is plain:

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763 Because it is a translation of a Hebrew text, it is difficult to assign it in Greek terms an expressive level. After all, 1 Samuel in Hebrew knew no Greek rhetorical conventions. But a Greek reader aware of style could still interpret the Septuagint’s language at an approximate level of style.


765 See further τὸ ῥήμα τὸ μέγα τούτο (12:16), πᾶς ὁ λαὸς (12:19), πᾶσας τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν (12:19), πᾶσαν κακίαν ταύτην (12:20), τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ τὸ μέγα (12:22), μηθαμῶς (12:23) and ὅλη καρδία (12:20,24). Lausberg, Handbook § 1246 (“emphase”) admits that “emphasis” as we understand it, is not discussed in ancient rhetorical theory. But whether discussed or not, its use here is quite conscious and seems a variation on normal speech, enough of a variation to warrant labeling as an artistic device.
the clauses are mostly running in thought, tend to be short and are joined paratactically with καί (for example, 12:3-4, 12:7-11).\footnote{This, in spite of a few subordinate clauses (12:16,17) and the repeated ἐὰν clauses in 1 Kgdms 12:14-15. For further discussion and for the near absence of periods in the New Testament, cp. BDF § 464. It is difficult to determine every instance of periodic style, for to do so first requires knowledge of word positions in numerous kinds of Greek clauses and phrases.}

Now we may ask how Josephus rhetorically adapts Samuel’s speech (Ant. 6.88-94). On the one hand, Josephus leaves much of it the same. In invention he retains basically the same context, exigence and propositio: “you have impiously done many things to God, asking for a king” (6.88).\footnote{Cp. 1 Kgdms 12:5,7. Alternatively, Josephus might intend the propositio to appear first in 6.88, paraphrasing the Septuagint’s “I shall judge you before the Lord” (12:7), into the statement: “you have impiously done many things to God, asking for a king.” In either location, though, the propositio is the same. The speech’s immediate context remains the same as in the Septuagint: the speech follows Samuel’s condemnation of Israel for having chosen a king, and Israel’s repentance (Ant. 6.88-92). After the speech, the narrative resumes by describing Saul’s improper sacrifice and his campaigning against the Philistines (Ant. 6.95-105).} And in arrangement he retains basically the same sequence of parts, beginning and ending respectively with a προοίμιον and an ἐπίλογος.

But on the other hand, Josephus makes significant changes. Consider first his reinvention and rearrangement of material. In the προοίμιον Josephus makes two omissions.\footnote{Gk. παραλείπω (Ant. 1.5): see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 37. The terms addition and omission (προστίθημι, παραλείπω) generally denote addition or deletion of ideas or of forms like narratives and chreiai. However, progymnastic terms like expansion, compression and elaboration (ἐπεκτείνω, συστάλλω, ἔγραψο) denote addition or deletion of material while preserving the form itself.} Josephus first omits Samuel’s recollection of his long association with Israel and his announcement that he will speak (1 Kgdms 12:1-2). He then omits Samuel’s questions “Whom have I oppressed? Or from whose hand have I taken a bribe to blind my eyes with it? . . . I will restore it to you” (12:3 NRSV). Here in the προοίμιον Josephus also makes additions (προστίθημι). In fact, he adds four phrases: in the first, Samuel encourages an objective assessment of himself (6.86, cp. 1 Kgdms 12:2); in the second, Samuel specifies unsavoury motivations that Israel might attribute to
him (6.86, cp. 12:3); in the third, he legitates some acts with which he might be charged (6.87, cp. 12:3); and in the fourth, Israel vindicates Samuel for having “governed the nation with holiness and justice” (6.87, cp. 12:4). Here, moreover, Josephus minutely rearranges material: he takes Israel’s oath closing the προοίμιον (“The Lord is witness, He who made Moses and Aaron, He who led our fathers up out of Egypt” [12:6]) and moves it to the beginning, paraphrasing it as a command (Ant. 6.86).

After the προοίμιον Josephus blends omissions and additions in a way that draws out two new or at least more articulate speech parts: a διήγησις (statement of facts) and a πρόθεσις/propositio.769 First, Josephus changes the Septuagint’s πίστις from example by redirecting Samuel’s charge that “they forgot . . . their God” (12:9) to the second person “you have been traitors to His worship and His religion.”770 He thereby converts the Septuagint’s πίστις from example (an event in Israel’s more distant past) to resemble better a διήγησις, or statement of facts, regarding Israel’s recent behaviour. Josephus next adds a sentence that functionally and positionally resembles a propositio (6.91). Although the Septuagint speech offers such a propositio (12:12; cp. 12:14-15), it lacks directness; Josephus articulates Israel’s fundamental error by having Samuel pointedly state the speech’s core point, its propositio: “What madness . . . possessed you to flee your God and to wish to be under a king?” (6.91).

After articulating the διήγησις and propositio, Josephus omits several of 1 Kgdms’ πίστεις or proofs,771 and then similarly makes three omissions to the speech’s

769 Inasmuch as new parts appear, Josephus has not only created new content for them (invention) but also has changed the arrangement.
770 Josephus also adds a phrase which emphasizes God’s generosity in forgiving Israel in the past (οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καί: “Yet for all that . . .”).
771 He omits statements from Samuel’s proof from example (that God punished the Israelites for their eschewing Samuel in favour of a monarch, and they repented for it [12:9-10]; in spite of this, they have
ἐπίλογος or conclusion: first of Samuel’s accusation that the Israelites “have made . . . evil” (12:20); second of some reassurances (12:22-24); and third of Samuel’s threat that “you and your king will have brought evils upon yourselves” (12:25). Josephus also adds phrases: Samuel reassures Israel that he can “persuade” God, adds a threatening condition (6.94) and predicts massive (μεγάλην) vengeance which will come, not simply from Israel’s own misdeeds (1 Kgdms 12:25) but also from God (Ant. 6.94).

Josephus changes not only the speech’s invention and arrangement of material, but also its expression through liberal paraphrase. If we take into account both his paraphrase and the expression of his added content, we find that Josephus elevates the expression slightly: although he does not render it grand (ἀδρός), he certainly moves it in that direction. To this end, Josephus uses artistic devices like repetition, and in so doing he tends not simply to repeat terms (for he omits many Septuagint repetitions), but to repeat terms in sets of three: he admonishes Israel, for instance, μηδὲν μὴν ἀιδοῖ  χαρισαμένους μὴν ὑποστειλαμένους φόβῳ μὴν ἄλλῳ τινὶ πάθει (6.86); he next specifies his possible motives ἠ κέρδους ἑνεκα ἠ πλεονεξίας ἠ χάριτος τῆς πρὸς ἄλλους (6.86); and he then demands three times that Israel try to accuse him of wrongdoing (6.86-87). Through these tripartite repetitions Josephus elevates the Septuagint’s style.

overlooked God again in favour of Saul [12:11-13]; they need to take a lesson from past examples [12:14-15]).

773 I mean the expression of content that he adds, versus expression of content that he omits.

774 For example, cp: 1 Kgdms 12:3/Ant. 6.87, 12:4/Ant. 6.87, 12:5-6/Ant. 6.88, 12:17-18/Ant. 6.91-92, 12:21/Ant. 6.93. While the Septuagint’s repetitions evoke a vivid and so plain style, Josephus might well regard the repetition as having a long-windedness that actually cuts against plain style, and for this reason omit many of its repetitions. This tendency is in accord with what Feldman observes elsewhere in the Antiquitates and in Josephus’ other works, a “tendency to replace verbal repetition with varied formulations Josephus’s Interpretation, 164.

775 Josephus’ tripartite repetitions continue in 6.90 (”first by causing you . . . last over the Philistines”), and continue in 6.92 and in the threefold injunction to “remember” in 6.93. In hardly any case does the
Josephus further elevates its style by converting paratactically linked clauses into more periodically linked clauses in at least three places. The first is in 1 Kgdms 12:6: by inserting two subordinate clauses (ὅς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς . . . δουλείας) and delaying the verb ἐπομενεῖν (ἐπομενεῖν . . . ἐπομενεῖν), Josephus creates a period with its characteristic delay of thought (6.86). Similarly in 1 Kgdms 12:7-8, he fuses multiple subordinate clauses together in a thought-delays delaying, periodic manner; and he does this again in 1 Kgdms 12:19 (cp. 6.92: καὶ ἰκετεύειν τὸν προφήτην . . .). Further along these lines, Josephus employs genitive absolute constructions, which have a periodic effect (6.88, 6.92). The net result of Josephus’ paraphrase—that is, his use of artistic devices and his more rounded sentence constructions—is the slight elevation of the Septuagint style; he moves it from something that a Greek reader would call plain (ἰσχύος), to something slightly more refined.  

If, however, Josephus elevates the Septuagint’s style in some ways, in other ways he renders it plainer—that is to say, clearer, more concise and more plausible. For example, he inserts some relatively vivid expressions, including “the miracles of God,” “the legislation of Moses” and “by thunderings, lightening and a torrent of hail” (Ant. 6.93,92). By using vivid language Josephus fosters clearer and so plainer style. On

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775 Septuagint employ similar repetition (cp. 1 Kgdms 12:21; Josephus probably regards this to be an awkward phrase. See below). While the Septuagint employs similar repetition in a couple of places (12:9, 12:20b), Josephus has reasons to omit these uses: he omits 12:9-10 and he replaces the repetitions in 12:20b with an alternate repetition of threes (see above).  
776 Josephus also converts the Septuagint’s direct discourse into indirect discourse leading up to and throughout the ἐπιλογος (Ant. 6.93-94).  
777 Further such vivid expressions include: “they all cried out” (ὑερσογόνον: 6.87); “tell me if I have done anything sinister” (ὑερσογόνον: 6.86); “I tell you with boldness” (παρρησία: 6.88-89); and “his posterity, increased by many myriads” (6.89). Josephus retains about the same number of vivid, evocative terms as the Septuagint: τὸν μέγιστον θεόν (6.86), τούτων ἐν τῷ κατειπεῖν (6.87), τὸ μὴν ἀτοπον (6.88), μεγάλα ἰαβήσατε (6.88), σωθεί ν πρότερον εἶδεν (6.91), μνημονεύειν ἂei (6.93)
occasion, Josephus also clarifies by drawing out detail ("first by causing you to triumph over the Assyrians . . . then by granting you victory over the Ammonites and Moabites, and last over the Philistines"). Moreover, Josephus fosters conciseness by cutting away some of the Septuagint’s repeated expressions, and in at least one place he makes the Septuagint speech sound more plausible, more realistic: he recasts the sentence “The Lord gave sounds and rain” (1 Kgdms 12:18) to the more realistic image of a “tempest at midsummer” marked by “thunderings, lightning, and a torrent of hail” (6.91-92). This shift towards greater realism reflects Downing’s observation that Josephus tends to enhance the plausibility of biblical events that might sound far-fetched.

The reasons behind Josephus’ changes are twofold: first, to make the speech more rhetorically effective, and second, to express distinctive apologetic-theological interests. And in places, we can see that Josephus’ reasons overlap or interconnect. Let us consider each of these reasons in more detail.

a. Rhetorical effectiveness. On many occasions Josephus seeks to make the Septuagint speech more persuasive. One way in which he does this is to articulate speech parts (μόρια) and so draw the speech closer to Greco-Roman convention. We saw, for instance, Josephus take parts of 1 Kgdms’ πίστις from example (12:12-15, 12:17) and articulate a propositio (Ant. 6.91), turning Samuel’s vague charge into a more pointed

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778 Emphases added. Cp. 1 Kgdms 12:19/Ant. 6.92 ("all their other insolences and transgressions"). We should not confuse Josephus’ drawing out and specifying of terms, with repetitiveness (redundancy), which Josephus reduces in several places. Josephus’ clarifications here recall the clarification through enumeration that we saw in student paraphrases (Chapter 1).

779 Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 50.

780 In what follows, I cannot prove precisely how Josephus thought; how each of his principles interrelate. I simply want to show that he works from multiple and often concurrent principles.
charge.\textsuperscript{781} We also saw Josephus take 1 Kgdms’ πίστεις from example (1 Kgdms 12:7-15) and replace many of their third person references (“they . . . they”) with second person references (“you . . . you”), thereby articulating a διήγησις (6.88-90).\textsuperscript{782} Such a διήγησις takes the history of other people and makes it the history and responsibility of Samuel’s audience, presenting facts that it must face.

A second way in which Josephus rhetorically enhances the Septuagint speech is to elevate its style, making it more appropriate for his elite, educated Roman audience. This audience would appreciate something more than a plain style, for plainness mimicked a colloquial language that fell beneath its more cultured standard.\textsuperscript{783} Hence Josephus needs to incorporate some elements of higher style—in this case, periodic syntax—which would strike the educated ear as intelligent and sophisticated.\textsuperscript{784}

At the same time, Josephus does try in several places to foster a plainer style, a style marked by clarity (σαφήνεια), conciseness (συντομία) and plausibility. When Josephus replaces 1 Kgdms 12:12-15 with a more articulate propositio (6.91), he essentially makes the speech clearer.\textsuperscript{785} When he replaces the long-winded critique in 12:9-10 with something direct (“You have been traitors to His worship and His

\textsuperscript{781} Or, alternatively, articulate it back in 6.88, in which case he articulates the Septuagint’s vague “I shall judge you before the Lord” (12:7), into a far more pointed statement: “you have impiously done many things to God, asking for a king.”

\textsuperscript{782} A διήγησις typically focuses on actions of the defendants themselves (in this case, Israel).

\textsuperscript{783} See Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 161, 163-164, 171; Burridge, “Biography,” 386, 387-388; and esp. Quintilian 11.1.45 (LCL, trans. Butler): “Who does not know what different styles of eloquence are required when speaking before the grave assembly of the senate and before the fickle populace . . . a learned judge must not be addressed in the same tone that we should employ before a soldier or a rustic, and our style must at times be lowered and simplified, for fear that he may be unable to . . . understand it.”

\textsuperscript{784} Granted, it is equally plausible that Josephus exercises stylistic restraint on account of his narrative context: in all likelihood, he recognized that Samuel’s own audience “within” the narrative (Israel) was uneducated. Perhaps then Josephus has created a style plain enough for Samuel’s audience, yet elevated enough for his own Roman audience.

\textsuperscript{785} Indeed all changes that strengthen conformity to the form of a typical Greek speech are in effect making it clearer.
religion”), he makes the speech more concise.\(^{786}\) And as we saw, his more realistic description of the divine storm (1 Kgdms 12:17-18/Ant. 6.91-92) is essentially more plausible. Admittedly, Josephus’ adjustments towards plain style stand in some tension with his added flourishes of a higher style. But just as stylistic elevations are fitting for an educated audience, so stylistic mutings are appropriate for the speech’s judicial species (Table 1.2, Appendix 1).\(^{787}\) Josephus’ changes, in other words, are appropriate for both the judicial species and his educated audience.

\(\text{b. Rhetorical effectiveness and apologetic interests.}\) Thus far, we have accounted for Josephus’ changes on grounds of rhetorical effectiveness. But these rhetorical interests overlap, in various ways, with more apologetic and theological interests. Feldman has already argued that as part of Josephus’ apologetic effort to portray Jewish statesmen like Samuel as wise (wisdom being an important Gentile virtue), he had to render their speech rhetorically effective.\(^{788}\) Let us consider this interplay of rhetorical and apologetic principles further here in Ant. 6.86-94. In his προοίμιον, Josephus’ numerous omissions and additions enhance Samuel’s proof from character (ἡβοσ) and so the speech’s effectiveness. For instance, the added injunction not to “show favour through respect” amplifies Samuel’s integrity. The added reasons why he might steal, and his caveat that some such reasons are just, also amplify his integrity: the former underscores his exoneration (6.87), and the latter reveals his ethical sensibility. Josephus’ added exoneration for Samuel (“he had governed the nation with holiness and justice”

\(^{786}\) Similarly, Josephus’ paraphrase eliminates some redundancies (1 Kgdms 12:4, cp. Ant. 6.87; 12:21, cp. Ant. 6.93) to enhance conciseness. This has been already observed as typical by Begg, Josephus’ Account of the Early Divided Monarchy, 276; cp. Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 50. While Demetrius, De Elocutione 197 (LCL, trans. Innes) comments that “clarity often demands repetition,” there was enough latitude among theorists that it remains plausible for Josephus to cultivate both clarity and conciseness.

\(^{787}\) While Josephus elevates the Septuagint’s style (below), he does not render it in the “purple,” highly ornate, grand (ἀδρος, grandus) style with extensive figures and periods.

\(^{788}\) Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 348-349, 496-497.
[6.87]) strengthens his character further still. In short, Josephus makes the speech more persuasive by adding ethical proof and in an appropriate location (a \(\pi\rho\omicron\io\omicron\nu\)).

On the other hand, by enhancing Samuel’s \(\hat{\eta}b\omicron\s\) Josephus also expresses an apologetic aim. According to Feldman, Josephus not only tends to “psychologize” through “analysis of the true motives of people,” but also to exercise—even in this very speech—an apologetic concern to portray Samuel and other Jewish leaders as just, indeed as just, wise, courageous and temperate, virtues that a Roman audience would associate with Greek and Roman heroes. It is fascinating that the aforementioned enhancements of Samuel’s character serve to make his motives appear just. Clearly then, by building up Samuel’s \(\hat{\eta}b\omicron\s\), Josephus does not merely support the speech’s \(\textit{propositio}\) but also voices an apologetic aim of showing Samuel’s justice. And to build on Feldman’s suggestion, Josephus’ support for the \(\textit{propositio}\) serves his apologetic aim.

A similar blend of persuasive and apologetic aims emerges from Josephus’ changes to the \(\pi\iso\te\si\s\) (in 12:7-8,11, 16-19). Josephus no doubt aims to enhance the proofs’ rhetorical effectiveness, for he paraphrases in a way that amplifies the proofs. While 1 Kgdms 12:11, for instance, reports that God helped Israel (“the Lord . . . took you out of the hands of those who had encircled you”), Josephus enumerates three forms

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789 Josephus’ rearrangement serves a similar goal: by shifting Samuel’s oath by God, Moses and Aaron to the beginning of Samuel’s speech (6.87; cp. 1 Kgdms 12:6), Josephus highlights Samuel’s confidence in his innocence.

790 See Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 197, 96, 131, 500. Feldman does not say that Josephus’ apologetics enhance Samuel’s \(\hat{\eta}b\omicron\s\) in the \(\pi\rho\omicron\io\omicron\nu\), but he recognizes that apologetics shape Samuel and other heroes’ character portrayal, sometimes in the specific rhetorical medium of \(\hat{\eta}b\omicron\io\omicron\nu\io\omicron\s\) (p. 279).

791 Equally fascinating, the addition that Samuel might steal “on account of love of money or of greediness” (6.87) serves Josephus’ interest in rationales. Josephus does not express all apologetic-theological interests through speech conventions. Take for example 1 Kgdms 12:20 (\textit{Ant.} 6.93). When Josephus adds to the \(\epsilon\pi\iso\lo\o\s\) that Samuel “will persuade \(\pi\iso\te\si\nu\) God,” the explanation is theological: one of Josephus’ theological tendencies was to highlight the wisdom and consequent rhetorical skill of prophets like Samuel (Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 496-497, 507-508). Yet the addition does not seem conventional in an \(\epsilon\pi\iso\lo\o\s\)—it does not build \(\pi\hat{\theta}o\s\).
of such help: “first by causing you to triumph over the Assyrians . . . then by granting you victory over the Ammonites . . . and last over the Philistines” (6.90).\textsuperscript{792} And while 1 Kgdms claims that in his anger God “gave sounds and rain in that very day” (12:18), Josephus amplifies by reporting “thunderings, lightning, and a torrent of hail” (6.92). These amplifications, of course, support the speech’s propositio that Israel did wrong to choose a king. But these amplifications also achieve an apologetic concern. Josephus wanted to convey to his Roman audience—which liked to envision its own absolute monarchy under a republican veneer of rule by the “first citizen” (princeps)—that Jews too were averse to monarchical rule.\textsuperscript{793} By amplifying the speech’s proofs and making the speech more persuasive, Josephus in turn achieves an apologetic concern of discouraging monarchy.

The connections between Josephus’ persuasive and apologetic goals recur in his ἐπίλογος or conclusion. On one level, Josephus makes the speech more rhetorically persuasive by augmenting πόθος and articulating the ἐπίλογος in which it appears. To this end Josephus omits certain divine reassurances to Israel, namely that “the Lord will not reject His people” (12:22-23), and he adds ominous phrases (“if they had any desire for continued salvation”; “there would come . . . a great visitation . . . from God”). These changes deepen the reading audience’s emotions, particularly hostility towards Israel and its monarchical leanings (cp. 1 Kgdms 12:20-25). In rhetorical theory, particular emotions like “goodwill” for one’s client and “hostility and indignation” for one’s

\textsuperscript{792} Emphasis added. Moreover, while 1 Kgdms 12:8 reports simply that, “the Lord sent out Moses and Aaron and led our fathers out of Egypt,” Josephus explains that the Lord so acted “without any king” (Ant. 6.89, emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{793} Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 502-502. Apology may also help explain Josephus’ paraphrase: his concretization of the final sentence (“remember . . . the miracles of God . . . the legislation of Moses”) may be an attempt to clarify Hebrew ethics for his Gentile audience. On Josephus’ desire to clarify Jewish culture for Gentiles, see Begg, \textit{Josephus’s Account of the Early Divided Monarchy}, 279, 281.
opponent were important in an ἔπιλογος; here in 6.93-94, where Samuel casts Israel as his opponent, we detect precisely such hostility and indignation. That Josephus is indeed sensitive to the ἔπιλογος as a place for emotional proof (πάθος) is also clear in fact that he has Samuel “exhort” (συμβολεύω) Israel, for exhortation was typical in conclusions of elaborated chreiai (Hermogenes Progymnasmata 6.8 [παράκλησιν])

On another level, strengthening Samuel’s hostility satisfies Josephus’ apologetic interests. Josephus’ Roman audience, we saw, had tried to couch its absolute monarchy in a republican guise. Knowing this, Josephus strengthens Samuel’s hostility to show that Jews too are averse to monarchy. In all, then, augmenting πάθος does not merely drive home Samuel’s propositio; it also voices Josephus’ apologetically motivated distaste for monarchy. Here again, the apologetic aim appears to underlie and inform the rhetorical aim.

Speech 2: Nathan gives God’s Temple instructions to David (2 Kgdms (LXX) 7:4-16 [=2 Sam 7:4-16] and 1 Chr 17:4-14; Ant. 7.92-93). The Septuagint versions in 2 Kgdms and 1 Chr are virtually identical (Table 3.2, Appendix 2). The authors of 2 Kgdms and 1 Chr have invented material based on a basic problem or exigence: David

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794 Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 303.
795 One might reply that it is perfectly legitimate for Josephus’ source (1 Kgdms 12:20-25) to express relative goodwill, an emotion often cultivated by ἔπιλογοι. But the key point is that Josephus believes he is improving his source. Alternatively, since a virtue recommended for the ἔπιλογος is brevity, Josephus might be cultivating brevity through omitting much of the Septuagint’s material.
796 Two further points here are significant. First, adaptation need not result in a “bigger” speech: Josephus has shortened this speech. Second, the aforementioned reasons for adaptation indicate that it matters not so much to be persuasive for an audience in the narrative; the reasons—at least in this case—appeal to the audience of the narrative: Josephus’ Roman audience.
797 Downing has already examined this speech, and finds that Josephus liberally adapts it (moreso than the narrative) through omission, addition and rearrangement (drawing back material on the scale of sentences, from much later in Chronicles [1 Chr 22:7-19]): Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 62.
798 In spite of distinctive narrative contexts: 2 Kgdms 7:4-16 is preceded by David’s procession with the ark to Jerusalem (6:1-15) and the story of Michal (6:16-23); it leads to a lengthy prayer by David (7:18-29) and account of his campaigning (8:1ff). The context preceding 1 Chr 17:4-14 is distinctive in three major ways: first, the Chronicler makes only very brief reference to Michal (15:29), then he inserts a psalm (16:7-36), and finally a brief account of the administration of the ark (16:37-43).
wishes to construct a temple for God (2 Kgdms 7:2/1 Chr 17:1), but God does not want David to do so (2 Kgdms 7:5/1 Chr 17:4). Hence the deliberative στάσις or issue is this question: Should David construct a temple for God? In answer, God’s speech through the prophet Nathan offers the propositio: “You will not build a house for me to settle in” (2 Kgdms 7:5, cp. 1 Chr 17:4).

The invention and arrangement of the material is straightforward. Let us again summarize the material by proceeding sequentially through the speech’s parts. While the speech’s προοίμιον lacks appeal to the ἔθος of the speaker, God, the πίστις or logical proofs section contains three logical proofs. The first proof is derived from one of the τόποι/loci (topics) that Aristotle characterizes as past fact:799 God explains that his past disinterest in a temple—a past fact—is grounds for David to abstain from constructing a temple now (2 Kgdms 7:6/1 Chr 17:5).800 After restating this proof as a rhetorical question (2 Kgdms 7:7/1 Chr 17:6), God offers a second proof from τόπος of past fact: the fact that God has done numerous past favours for David is grounds for David to respect God’s wish that he not construct a temple. God then offers a counterproposition, saying that he intends to construct a temple by David’s son Solomon (2 Kgdms 7:10-16/1 Chr 17:9-14). There is no clear ἐπίλογος, although a concluding tone emerges inasmuch as God offers proof from arousing emotion (πάθος): he reassures David (2 Kgdms 7:11,12,16/1 Chr 17:10,11,14), and he threatens Solomon (2 Kgdms 7:14).801

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800 “In its present, Deuteronomistically edited form . . . Nathan’s oracle merely defers the erection of a temple to the next generation (i.e., to Solomon). These two verses [vv. 6-7], however, reflect the idea that the ark should be housed in a tent, a portable shrine, and seem hostile to a temple under any circumstances; they may represent the core of an older oracle prohibiting rather than postponing the construction of a temple.” Note by P. Kyle McCarter, Jr. to 2 Samuel 7:6-7 in the *HarperCollins Study Bible.*
801 This is not really πάθος, since it is not directed at the addressee (David) but rather at Solomon.
The speech’s expression sounds plain. In terms of artistic devices, the Septuagint authors occasionally employ tropes, for instance “sheep” and “flock” in 2 Kgdms 7:8,16/1 Chr 17:9,14, and “throne” in 2 Kgdms 7:13/1 Chr 17:12, as well as a few figures: an *interrogatio* or rhetorical question (2 Kgdms 7:7), similes (1 Chr 17:8,13), emphasis (2 Kgdms 7:5, 1 Chr 17:6, 2 Kgdms 7:14), and repetitions (2 Kgdms 7:15,16, 1 Chr 17:5, 1 Chr 17:9). The authors link roughly half of their clauses paratactically, mainly using καί, and the progression of thought tends to be linear, although it is more delayed or rounded in places, such as 2 Kgdms 7:7/1 Chr 17:6. These characteristics infer that our speech’s style is plain or slightly higher.

Although Josephus’ version (*Ant.* 7.92-93) is significantly shorter, its brevity should not disguise the variety and sophistication of his changes in invention and arrangement. Josephus preserves the speeches’ deliberative *propositio* that David must not build a temple. But Josephus also changes his sources significantly. When it comes to changing ideas (the invention), Josephus begins in the προοίμιον by adding for God a logical proof from past fact, in which God commends David’s good-willed and sincere character (*Ant.* 7.92). Josephus nexts adds an entirely new part, a rationale (αἰτία/ratio), in which God chastises David’s martial and violent behaviour (*Ant.* 7.92) and makes these shortcomings the rationale for the *propositio* that David must not build the

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802 Cp. 2 Kgdms 7:6, 7:10-11. For delay of a thought over several clauses (i.e., over a sentence), we take Demetrius as a guide. He says: “Try not to make your periodic sentences too long. Take this sentence: ‘For the river Acheolous, flowing from Mount Pindus, passing inland by the city of Stratus, runs into the sea.’ Make a natural break here and give the listener a rest: ‘For the river Achelous flows from Mount Pindus, and runs into the sea.’ . . . Sentences are like roads. Some roads have many signposts and many resting places; and the signposts are like guides. But a monotonous road without signposts seems infinite, even if it is short.” Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 202 (LCL, trans. Innes).
temple. This new rationale also entails rearrangement, for Josephus has advanced it from a much later speech (1 Chr 22:8).

Significant change follows in the πίστις/argumentatio: Josephus omits two of the Septuagint’s three proofs from past fact (2 Kgdms 7:6-7,8-9/1 Chr 17:5-6,7-8). And Josephus drastically abbreviates God’s counterproposition, omitting the promises that Israel will “be anxious no longer” (2 Kgdms 7:10; cp. 1 Chr 17:9) and will have “rest from all . . . enemies” (2 Kgdms 7:11; cp. 1 Chr 17:10). Instead, God says simply that, “after a long life, the temple should be brought into being by his [David’s] son and successor to the kingdom” (Ant. 7.93). Here Josephus also adds the name of the son, Solomon, advancing it from 1 Chr (22:9), and rearranges by moving ahead the promise “to restore . . . [David’s] throne into the age” (2 Kgdms 7:13; cp. Ant. 7.93) and replacing its eternal reign with a more limited promise “for his children’s children.” Moreover, as Feldman explains, Josephus substitutes God’s promise of fatherhood (2 Kgdms 7:14/1 Chr 17:13) with a promise to be as (ὁς) a father. Josephus then omits much of 2 Kgdms 7:14-16/1 Chr 13-14, leaving God’s threatening remark against Solomon (“if ever injustice comes upon him, I shall disgrace him”) positioned near the speech’s very end. Finally, Josephus closes his speech by replacing Solomon’s punishment of “lashings” with a national punishment of plague (“sickness and barrenness of the soil” [Ant. 7.93]).

803 Josephus has added both comments about David’s character in a generally appropriate place: we should expect such discussion of character near the beginning of a speech, even though in this case the character is not the character of the speaker (God).
805 According to Marcus, Josephus transfers much of this into David’s immediately following prayer (Ant. 7.95), but Josephus paraphrases it there in a very brief and dehydrated manner. See Josephus, Ant. 7.95 (i.e., see Ant. p. 409 note e).
806 Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 62.
807 Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 603.
808 This is one of the only places in which the Chronicler clearly omits content from 2 Kgdms’ speech. It appears then, that Josephus likes to retain distinctive content from each version (so Begg, Josephus’s Account of the Early Divided Monarchy, 270)—provided that it serves his purposes to do so.
While adapting the speeches’ invention and arrangement, Josephus also adapts their style through paraphrase.\(^{809}\) His seeks a more Greek sounding _plain_ style. In terms of artistic devices Josephus adds an occasional figure of speech, such as alliterative repetition in 7.92 (φανέντως καὶ φράσας κελέσαντος). But he also omits artistic devices, such as the emphatic expression οὐ σὺ οἴκοδομήσεις μοι (2 Kgdms 7:5/1 Chr 17:4). Moreover, the proportion of devices vis-à-vis the Septuagint speeches remains roughly the same.\(^{810}\) In terms of linking clauses, Josephus takes about half of the Septuagint version (2 Kgdms 7:4-5/1 Chr 17:3-4) and paraphrases it in a more periodic style, substantially rounding or delaying the first sentence’s thought (Τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ ἡ ἄγετον μὲν πρότερον ἢ μὲν τῶν δίανοιαν . . . δὲ πολλῶν πολέμων . . . ποιήσας ναὸν αὐτῷ [Ant. 7.92]). But in paraphrasing the second half of the Septuagint versions (2 Kgdms 7:12-16/1 Chr 17:11-14), Josephus removes paratactic clause linking in favour of more hypotactic linking with subordinate clauses (7.93). When we compare Josephus’ speech to the Septuagint speeches as a whole, we find that both have about the same proportion of such sentences. In all then, Josephus seeks to retain a plain style or else elevates it only slightly.

Having summarized what Josephus does, our other important task is to account for his changes. Why would Josephus add, omit and paraphrase material in these ways? Again his work yields two motives: to enhance the speech’s rhetorical effectiveness, and

\(^{809}\) Reinforcing Pelletier’s oft-cited observation (1962) that Josephus likes to paraphrase his material thoroughly in the _Letter of Aristeas_, Josephus paraphrases every line of text that he retains. Even where he draws back content from later in Chronicles (1 Chr 22:8,9) he paraphrases it. At places, it is hard to tell whether Josephus is paraphrasing 2 Kgdms 7/1 Chr 17, or 1 Chr 22 (cp. for example, 2 Kgdms 7:13/1 Chr 17:12 vis-à-vis 1 Chr 22:10).

\(^{810}\) Josephus’ speech employs roughly nine or ten devices, if we include emphatic expressions such as “that night” (ἐκεῖνην τὴν νύκτα [7.92]) and vivid expressions such as “stained with the blood of his enemies” (τοῖν ἐχθρῶν μεμισσένω). The Septuagint speeches have more, but these speeches are relatively long.
to voice his apologetic or theological concerns. In some places these aims appear on their own, and in other places they interrelate.

a. Rhetorical effectiveness. Frequently Josephus seeks to enhance the Septuagint speech’s persuasive power by fostering plain style. Already we remarked that to this end, Josephus removes ornament and periodically linked clauses. Similarly to this end Josephus enhances conciseness (συντομία) and clarity (σαφήνεια). 811 In the προοίμιον for instance, Josephus omits the Septuagint’s phrase, “The Lord says these things”/ “Thus says the Lord” (2 Kgdm s 7:5/1 Chr 17:4; cp. Ant. 7.92). Similarly, when in the propositio Josephus paraphrases God’s words “You will not build a house for me” (2 Kgdm s 7:5b/1 Chr 17:4b; cp. Ant. 7.92), he omits its words “to settle me in,” probably because he recognizes their redundancy. 812 Alongside conciseness, Josephus enhances clarity. In the πίστις section, he takes the antiquated and indirect sounding imagery of 2 Kgdm s 7:12/1 Chr 17:11 (“and it will be when your days are fulfilled and you will be put to sleep with your fathers”), and renders it modern and direct (“after David’s death at an advanced age and at the end of a long life” [Ant. 7.93]). 813 A similar desire for clarity leads Josephus to replace the Septuagint’s trope for monarchy (2 Kgdm s 7:13/1 Chr 17:12: “throne”) with the more direct “kingdom” (Ant. 7.93). 814

811 We are seeing changes to this effect in Josephus’ speeches, even though Theon had emphasized these two virtues as characteristic of a narration.
812 Similarly, Josephus omits the Septuagint’s repetition of the phrase “his throne will be restored into the age” (2 Kgdm s 7:13/1 Chr 17:12; 2 Kgdm s 7:16/1 Chr 7:14). Nevertheless, Josephus employs repetition here, perhaps to show that David had the Greek virtue of a full life. On encomia see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 82-83.
813 The modernizing of archaic language characterizes Ἐλληνισμός/ Latinitas (“idiomatic correctness”: Lausberg, Handbook § 463). The effect of this change, though, is still to make the speech clearer; as Lausberg puts it, “[clarity’s] . . . linguistic basis is Latinitas.” Another reason for changing the expression is that its relative directness underscores Josephus’ point: that David will live a long life.
814 Further to this end Josephus replaces antiquated, indirect and redundant terminology from 2 Kgdm s 7:12 (cp. 1 Chr 17:11) with more direct and concise language: “but in any case . . . the temple should be brought into being by his son and successor to the kingdom” (7.93). Josephus similarly takes 2 Kgdm s 7:14/1 Chr 17:13 (“I shall be to a father for him and he will be to a son for me”) and expresses the thought more
One significant feature of Josephus’ stylistic changes is that they tighten the speeches’ propriety (τὸ πρὸς τὸν ὀπίσθιον) for their new context. By maintaining the speeches’ plain style, Josephus fosters propriety for their judicial and deliberative species.\(^{815}\) At the same time, Josephus’ occasional stylistic flourishes foster propriety for his educated, Greek-reading audience. This audience would probably expect a style elevated in places to something more suitable for its highly cultured and literate language.\(^{816}\) Aware of this, Josephus accordingly elevates slightly the style in places: as we said earlier, he changes half of its expression into a more periodic form, removes some parataxis, and infuses it with some ornament. As in the first speech, Josephus’ changes here might well cultivate appropriateness for both the judicial species and his educated audience.\(^{817}\)

\(b.\) Apologetic-theological interests. Apart from rhetorical interests, Josephus’ apologetic and theological interests often explain his adaptive techniques. They explain, for instance, his abbreviation of the Septuagint’s counterproposition with its divine promises that Israel will “be anxious no longer” (2 Kgdms 7:10; cp. 1 Chr 17:9) and will have “rest from all . . . enemies” (2 Kgdms 7:11; cp. 1 Chr 17:10). Why should Josephus

\(^{815}\) We detect this propriety largely from silence: from the relative similarity between Josephus’ style and his sources’ plain style.

\(^{816}\) I surmise this because Lausberg characterizes the simplest kind of sentence style (oratio soluta) as “colloquial” and as evoking “simplicity,” Handbook §§ 916, 918.

\(^{817}\) We might say that the ultimate reason for such persuasion-oriented changes is apologetic, since an appropriate style serves an interest in placating Josephus’ Roman audience. The centre of gravity, though, remains persuasion more than apology.
omit such great assurances? According to Feldman, Josephus was concerned that a Gentile audience recently at war with Jewish Zealots would regard Israel’s exaltation and messianic driven independence as subversive and offensive. In this context it makes sense to shorten the counterproposition. Shortly afterwards, Josephus similarly exercises theological reasoning. While the Septuagint promises God’s fatherhood for Solomon, Feldman insightfully shows why Josephus replaces the term εἰς (to) with ως (as):

Whereas in the Bible, G-d tells the prophet Nathan that He will be Solomon’s father and that Solomon will be his son (2 Sam 7:14), Josephus, realizing that this would seem reminiscent of pagan claims that kings such as Romulus and Alexander were the sons of gods, is careful to revise this statement ever so slightly, so that G-d promises, not that he will be Solomon’s father, but rather that he will watch over Solomon and care for him “as a father for a son” (Ant. 7.93).

Here we have another case of what Feldman characterizes as detheologizing.

For apologetic-theological reasons, Josephus will not only add or omit material but will also paraphrase it. Consider for instance how he reduces the Bible’s wordy phrase “if ever injustice comes upon him” (2 Kgdms 7:14) to the simpler “if he sinned” (7.93). Is Josephus trying to render the style clearer? Probably not: this replacement

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819 Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 603.
820 Towards the end of the πιστις, Josephus further adapts the counterproposition (2 Kgdms 7:10-16/1 Chr 17:9-14) for apologetic reasons. Josephus has advanced a phrase from a later speech in 1 Chr (22:9), which specifies that the coming king’s “name would be Solomon” (7.93). According to Feldman, Josephus wants to show his Roman audience that Solomon is a particularly special Jewish king on account of his wisdom, an oft-praised virtue among Gentiles, yet a virtue that many Gentiles had charged was absent in Jewish heroes (Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 574-575). In this context, the rearrangement makes perfect sense. Moreover, when Josephus replaces the Septuagint’s threat of “lashing” Solomon (2 Kgdms 7:15) with the threat to subject all Israel to plague, to “sickness and barrenness of the soil” (7.93), the explanation appears similarly apologetic. Feldman has intriguingly argued that Josephus replaces this phrase as part of an apologetic appeal to Gentiles, and that his means is μίμησις: Josephus has the threats of “sickness” allude to similar threats in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex (Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 580). In this way, Josephus associates a virtue attributed to famous Gentiles with leadership of the Jewish community.
reflects Josephus’ theological interest in detheologizing: while the Bible implies that sin could enter Solomon from outside, Josephus wants to convey Solomon’s responsibility for his own actions. Josephus can even attenuate clear or concise expression to help underline an apologetic or theological point.

c. Rhetorical effectiveness and apologetic-theological interests. Josephus variously combines persuasive and apologetic-theological motives when adapting his sources. This blending appears from the start, in Josephus’ changes to the προοίμιον. When Josephus adds that God “approved of his [David’s] purpose—for no one . . . had taken it into his mind to build Him a temple” (Ant. 7.92), he voices an apologetic concern. According to Feldman, the Antiquitates seeks to strengthen the Bible’s praise for hero figures like David. Josephus achieves this apologetic aim by praising David’s piety—one of the essential virtues with which a Greco-Roman audience would identify. But as he does this he also shows sensitivity to good rhetorical convention—for he adds praise near the speech’s opening, recalling the ethical material typical of προοίμιον. This sensitivity does not really explain the addition. Rather, an apologetic

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821 On detheologizing in material about Solomon, see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 603-605.
822 We see that it is not a case of “either” omitting “or” adding material in Ant. 6.93-94 and 7.92-94: it is rather a case of “both/and.” Josephus’ additions and omissions do not stand in tension, for his choice of technique depends on his motivation: if he has reason to omit material, he will do so; if he has reason to add material, he will do so.
823 In Ant. 7.93 Josephus paraphrases that God would not only act “as a father” but also had “promised to watch over and care for” Solomon (προστήρεσθαι καὶ προνοῆσαι . . . κατεπιγεγέλετο). Here Josephus has replaced the Septuagint’s repetitive “I shall be like . . . he will be like” with the equally repetitive phrase “watch over [προστήρεσθαι] and care for [προνοῆσαι] (emphasis added). At first glance, the repetition seems superfluous, for fatherhood naturally enough entails such care. But Josephus adds this phrase for an apologetic reason: it further augments Solomon’s stature. There are then, occasions when Josephus might sacrifice plain style to convey apologetic-theological concerns.
824 The Septuagint versions have προοίμιον only inasmuch as they express something before the propositio. Josephus definitely makes the material resemble more in its function a προθεσία.
825 On which see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 74 and 96 with 130-131; see esp. 557.
826 Moreover, Josephus is adding an encomiastic topic of praise for the mind. According to Hermogenes, “You will say . . . about his mind that it was just, temperate, wise, brave.” Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.16); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 82.
goal explains it. Nevertheless, as Josephus pursues his goal, he is sensitive to conventions for good arrangement.\textsuperscript{827}

We can similarly explain a second change in the προοίμιον by apologetic-theological and rhetorical motives. We recall that Josephus adds a ratio: David must not build “because he had fought in many wars and was stained with the blood of his enemies” (Ant. 7.92). Josephus’ first and probably chief reason for the addition is apologetic. Feldman has shown that, in the wake of Roman suspicions of belligerency and seditiousness among Jews in Judea following the Jewish War, Josephus wants to convey that Jews and the Jewish God dislike belligerent behaviour.\textsuperscript{828} Josephus’ interest here explains his critique of David’s martial behaviour. The second reason for Josephus’ added ratio is that it renders the propositio and speech more persuasive. By adding the ratio that David is belligerent, Josephus supports the propositio that David should not build.

As we move from the προοίμιον to the πίστις or logical proofs, we see Josephus work again from apologetic-theological and rhetorical motives. We may explain part of Josephus’ omission of the Septuagint’s proof from past fact (2 Kgdms 7:8-9a/1 Chr 17:7-8a) from his theological interest in reducing God’s determining influence over Israel, an interest that Feldman calls “detheologizing.”\textsuperscript{829} By omitting 2 Kgdms 7:8-9a with its

\textsuperscript{827} Similarly, Josephus adds the ratio in a manner that is sensitive to rhetorical conventions of arrangement. For one, he is inserting material that is essentially about David’s character (that is, ἰδιός) in an appropriate place: the προοίμιον. For another, Josephus appears cognizant of a special arrangement that Theon commends. By “putt[ing] the arguments for something in advance of the propositions they support,” explains Theon (Progymnasmata [ed. Spengel, 2.125]; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 59), a speaker can make a presumably bolder and so more persuasive case. This quite closely resembles what Josephus does: he arranges the ratio to a position before the propositio.

\textsuperscript{828} See Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 140, 149, 155.

\textsuperscript{829} Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 205.
emphasis on God’s power and guidance, Josephus mutes the Bible’s providence. Moreover, we may explain Josephus’ omission of the latter part of this proof (“I utterly destroyed all your enemies from your face” [2 Kgdms 7:9b/1 Chr 17:8b]), by his apologetic concern to minimize divine violence. At the same time, we can explain this omission on rhetorical grounds, for 7:9b/17:8b would ironically have sanctioned the violent behaviour that God had just cited to dissuade David from constructing the Temple. The omission leaves the speech clearer and more consistent.

Josephus continues to work from motives apologetic and rhetorical as he adapts the Septuagint’s counterproposition, replacing its promises to “restore [David’s] throne into the age” (2 Kgdms 7:13b/1 Chr 17:12b), with a mere promise of “the kingdom for his children’s children” (βασιλείαν τέκνων ἐγγόνοις: 7.93). For this subtle adaptation Feldman suggests an apologetic explanation: following the first Jewish War, many in Josephus’ audience would have been acutely suspicious of Jewish messianic hopes. In this climate, Josephus wants to underscore that the Bible’s messianic hopes, hopes associated foremost with King David, do not point to any future messiah and concomitant demise of Roman authority, and so on these grounds he adapts the counterproposition. There may also be a second, rhetorical principle behind Josephus’ change: to enhance clarity. Later, in Ant. 8.197-198, God expressly intends to underwrite David’s family only to the generation of his grandson, and even then to diminish that grandson’s power. In this context, it serves the interests of clarity and consistency not

830 “And now you will say to my servant David . . . I was with you in all the times when you were journeying.”
831 Literally, “kingdom of the children to the grandsons.”
832 Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 148-152 (esp. 152).
833 Josephus, Ant. 8.197-198.
to promise eternal rule to David’s descendants here; the change removes tension in the narrative.  

Behind another change to the πίστις is a confluence of apologetic and rhetorical interests. When Josephus omits the Septuagint’s assurance of eternal mercy for Solomon, he seeks on the one hand to pacify his Roman audience: omitting the phrase “into the age” with its overtones of eternity might reflect Josephus’ fear of implying that God intended an eternal Davidic lineage. On the other hand, Josephus also seeks to clarify the speech. Later in the Antiquitates [8.197], God expresses disappointment with Solomon for his idolatrous behaviour and marriage to non-Jewish women. Strikingly, his speech alludes back to Ant. 7.93:

[A] prophet . . . threatened that . . . [Solomon] should not long continue in his course with impunity but that, while in his lifetime he should not be deprived of his kingdom since the Deity had promised his father David to make him his successor [cp. Ant. 7.93], on his death He would cause this to befall Solomon’s son and, while not taking all the people away from him, would deliver ten tribes to his servant and leave only two to David’s grandson for the sake of David himself.

Here God does remove eternal mercy from Solomon’s kingdom: he refuses forever to underwrite his descendants’ rule. In this context, the omission back in 7.93 makes perfect sense, for 7.93 becomes clearer and more consistent: God is left to grant favour only “to the generation of the grandsons” (βασιλείαν τέκνων ἔγγόνοις: 7.93). This speech

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834 Cp. 2 Sam 7:14-16 with 1 Kgdms 11:9-11. Another clarification is the slight rearrangement of 2 Kgdms 7:13b/1 Chr 17:12b (“I shall restore his throne into the age”) to a position after the Septuagint’s promise to “be like a father. . . .” Rearranging it forward allows Josephus to describe Solomon’s future more clearly.
835 2 Kgdms 7:15-16/1 Chr 17:13-14; “your house and your kingdom shall be made sure forever before me; your throne shall be established forever”; cp. also 2 Kgdms 7:13/1 Chr 17:12 (NRSV).
836 Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 152.
837 Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 604-605.
demonstrates Josephus’ rhetorical skill on the one hand, and his acuity and his sensitivity to Jewish history on the other.

Speech 3: David speaks to his son Solomon (1 Chr (LXX) 22:7-16; Ant. 7.337-40). In this speech David tells Solomon essentially what Nathan had told David in the prior speech (see Table 3.3, Appendix 2). The exigence/στάσις is deliberative: Should David or should Solomon build the Temple? (1 Chr 22:7-11). David’s propositio is that Solomon should build (22:11). And in support, David invents and arranges proofs that we shall again summarize in the context of the speech’s parts. The first part approximates a διήγησις or narratio, in which David recounts quid in controversia sit: David had originally wanted to build a temple, but God instructed him to pass the project on to Solomon (22:7-10). This narratio continues with David recalling two logical proofs (λόγος) for this instruction. The first proof, from a τόπος of past fact, is that David’s violent behaviour has rendered him unfit to build the Temple (22:8); the second proof, essentially from a τόπος of future fact, is that Solomon fit to build because he “will be a man of rest” (22:9-10).
Following this *narratio* David turns in typically Greek fashion to his πρόθεσις/propositio: “You will build a house for the Lord your God as He has spoken concerning you” (22:11b). To this he attaches a proof from τόπος of future fact: “The Lord will be with you, and He will help you along the way” (22:11a). We might expect to find further logical proofs for this *propositio*, but instead David offers further propositiones. The second comes in 22:12: Solomon must “prevail upon Israel . . . to guard and to fulfill the Law of the Lord,” to which David adds a logical proof from τόπος of past fact (22:12). Then comes a third *propositio*: Solomon must himself fulfill the Law, presumably setting the tone and example for Israel (22:13). This third *propositio* receives the same logical proof as the first *propositio* (“He will help you along the way” [22:13]), and leads to a more general exhortation to “be a man and be strong,” an instruction that captures something of all three propositiones. After setting forth these propositiones, David offers a relatively lengthy logical proof (λόγος) for the first *propositio*, a proof from a τόπος of past fact (22:14-16a) which asserts that God has prepared ample material and labour resources for the Temple. Here David engages in αὐξησις/amplificatio, speaking at length of how solidly God has prepared by assembling workers and money and procuring stone, wood and other materials. The speech closes with a brief ἐπίλογος, an exhortation which repeats the first *propositio* to build and which has built into it an enthymematic proof that God “will be with you.”

By Greek standards, the Septuagint speech’s expression remains plain. Nevertheless, the author of 1 Chr 22 makes some effort to ornament this speech with artistic devices like repetitions (1 Chr 22:8,10,13,15,16) and emphases (22:9,10 [οὗτος],

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844 For the use of two or more propositiones in a speech, see Quintilian 4.4.2-5, 4.5.26 (LCL, trans. Butler). Alternatively we could label the unit a digression (Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 340-342).

845 It falls too early in the speech to configure it as a concluding exhortation typical of elaborated χρείαπ.
In 22:14 the author even employs something like a Greek figure of accumulation. Moreover, Marcus has detected a clever double entendre in the name Solomon: it is not simply the king’s name but also the name that recalls the Hebrew term for “peace” (shalom): “I shall give him rest . . . for his name is Solomon” (22:9). There is thus a fair amount of ornament, though meager in variety. In terms of clause linkages, the style is more or less “running” since it relies on a large number of paratactically linked clauses using καί.

How does Josephus adapt this speech? He leaves intact the same deliberative στάσις, the same propositio and for the most part, a similar speech and context. And yet Josephus does make numerous changes in invention and arrangement. These begin with a major rearrangement: instead of opening with a διήγησις/narratio, Josephus opens with the propositio. At the same time he omits its proof from τόπος of future fact (“He will help you along the way”; Ant. 7.337; cp. 1 Chr 22:11). Only now does Josephus turn to the διήγησις where he supplements God’s promise of “peace” (εἰρήνη) with added “prosperity” or “blessings” (εὐδαιμονία). He retains its proofs (22:8, 22:9-10), but adds that peace itself will be “the greatest of all blessings,” and promises prosperity and fatherly support. Alongside these additions, Josephus also makes several omissions:

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846 On accumulation figures see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 665-687. In 22:14, the categories of metal grow: from 100 000 talents of gold, to 1 000 000 talents of silver, and then to a near-infinite amount of copper and iron.
847 See Marcus, note to Josephus, Ant. 7.337 (pp. 542-543 note a).
848 A running style stands in contrast to a periodic style (see Demetrius De Elocuione 12 [LCL, trans. Innes]). Possible instances of periodic style in this speech are 22:13, 22:14 and 22:16.
849 The speech’s narrative context departs a little from the Septuagint. Before the speech, Josephus adds remarks about the significance of David’s choice of Temple location: it is the location of Abraham’s attempted sacrifice of Isaac (Ant. 7.333-334 [cp. 1 Chr 22:1]). After the speech and some appended instructions to Solomon and to prominent citizens (Ant. 7.341-342), Josephus embellishes the Bible’s story about Solomon’s appointment as king with a lengthy narrative about Adonias’ plot to seize his power (Ant. 7.343-362). Then he returns to 1 Chronicles’ narrative of David reviewing the Temple roles.
850 Emphasis added.
he removes the foreshadowing of Solomon as a “man of rest,” removes the connection between “rest” and the name Solomon, and removes God’s promise to “restore the throne of his kingdom in Israel into the age” (22:10). He replaces moreover the phrase “for [γάρ] his name is Solomon” (22:9) with the simple clause “he should be called Solomon.”

After the διήγησις/narratio, Josephus follows the Septuagint in offering a second propositio: Solomon must follow the Law (Ant. 7.338, cp. 1 Chr 22:13). But Josephus makes several modifications. First, he omits the Septuagint’s proof that God “will help you along the way” (22:13), substituting something slightly different: the will of God, or providence (προσοφεία), justifies Solomon’s task (Ant. 7.338). Second, Josephus alters the nature of Solomon’s task. No longer is Solomon’s primary duty to follow the Law (22:13); it is now more generally to be “pious, just and brave,” and only in the context of this duty must he follow the Law (7.338). In other words, David exhorts Solomon not so much to follow the Law as to live the kind of pious life to which following the Law belongs. And in this, Josephus rearranges one clause and so collapses two of the Septuagint’s propositiones (no. 2 and no. 3) into one.

After these propositiones, Josephus continues following 1 Chronicles by supporting the first propositio (Solomon must build the Temple) with proof from the τόπος of past fact: David has gathered ample Temple materials (22:14-16; cp. Ant. 7.339-340). Josephus however restates this propositio (7.339), and only then offers the

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851 This however is the Septuagint’s third propositio.
852 The injunction to be “pious, just and brave” is Josephus’ refashioning and rearrangement of the biblical injunction to “be a man . . . be brave and do not be scared” (1 Chr 22:13).
853 “and do not permit others to transgress them” (cp. 1 Chr 22:12).
854 Through paraphrase here too, he explicitly reassures Solomon in his task by admonishing him “not [to] . . . be dismayed at the magnitude of the labour, nor shrink from it” (Ant. 7.339).
logical proof. Moreover, Josephus changes the nature of this proof: he omits David’s claim to have provided “over against my poverty” (22:14), he replaces the massive quantities of silver and gold with more modest amounts (22:15), and he rearranges to the proof’s end David’s instruction to provide additional materials (22:14). Following this proof, Josephus retains the Septuagint’s ἐπιλογος/conclusio, but makes one important change: David exHORTs Solomon no longer to “construct” the Temple (22:16), but rather, to be a “brave” (ἀριστός) man.

Needless to say, Josephus couples his inventive and arrangement changes with numerous changes to expression, paraphrasing all of 1 Chr 22:7-16. And as in earlier speeches, Josephus keeps the style plain or close to plain. He certainly keeps this speech’s style plain—even plainer than his source. Beyond paraphrasing grammar and syntax, Josephus does little else. He refrains from artistic devices like figures, and he removes several repetitions (for example in 1 Chr 22:8,10,13,14,16), emphases (22:9,10) and the word play on Solomon (22:9). He also abstains from elevating the Septuagint’s running style into periodic style; instead he keeps the clauses quite paratactic. And in spite of occasionally delaying completion of an idea, Josephus prefers an essentially

855 Why Josephus has changed the numbers of gold and silver talents, I am not sure.
856 Josephus also changes the expression here to specify that God will be Solomon’s “protector” (προστάτην).
857 This speech illustrates Josephus’ paraphrase techniques: he retains a source’s expression in some ways and adapts it in other ways. The change tends not to be total, yet as Feldman indicates, it is still significant (Josephus’s Interpretation, 164).
858 Cp. for example 1 Chr 22:8 (.Accessible εἰς πλήθος γέζης καὶ πολέμως μεγάλους ἐποίησας· οὐκ ὦκοδομήσεις οἶκον τῷ ὄνομάτι μου) with Ant. 7.337 (αὐτὸν . . . κολλησειν θεὸς αἵματι καὶ πόλεμος πεφυμένον).
859 While reducing the Septuagint’s use of καί (from ca. 17 to ca. 4-5 uses), he still employs numerous other co-ordinating conjunctions (μέν, ἐν, τε); the most we can really say is that he seeks greater variety and perhaps a more “Greek” sound. It might be for this reason that Josephus also employs more participles: the Septuagint uses only two; Josephus uses seven.
860 For instance, he delays the term “peace” to the end of the long sentence closing 7.337. Also compare the following: ἄφλάζεις τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ προστάγματα καὶ τὰ κρίματα, ἀ ἐνετεῖλατο κύριος τῷ Μωυσῇ ἐπὶ Ισραηλ [22:13], with καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς νόμους οὓς διὰ Μωυσέος ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν
“linear” sequence of thoughts. In all, he keeps the speech’s style more or less plain (ισχυρός).

Why does Josephus make these changes? Again, his motives are to enhance rhetorical effectiveness and to further his apologetic-theological agenda. And again these principles can emerge on their own or in tandem.

a. Rhetorical effectiveness. To enhance the speech’s persuasive power, Josephus draws it into tighter accord with several rhetorical conventions: he rearranges its parts, articulates those parts, enhances proofs in appropriate parts, and strengthens its clarity and conciseness. Let us first consider rearrangements. In deliberative speeches, explains Kennedy, only “occasionally a narration is employed; when it does occur, it is often after rather than before the proposition.”

Significantly, Josephus takes the Septuagint’s major proposicio (1 Chr 22:11) and advances it to the speech’s very beginning, prior to the narration and along the lines that Kennedy describes.

Later in the speech Josephus articulates its parts (μόρια/partes). He articulates the final πίστις by introducing a restatement (“as for the Temple . . . nor shrink from it”: 7.339-340), thus smoothing the transition to a proof to which the Septuagint proceeds rather abruptly (1 Chr 22:13-14). Josephus further articulates this transition by inserting a γάρ clause: by explaining upfront why Solomon should not be dismayed (“for I shall make everything ready for you”: 7.339), Josephus introduces the subsequent proof.

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862 Similarly, Josephus adds a participle to clarify cause in the επίλογος: γίνου τοίνυν ἀριστος τὸν θέον ἔχων προστάτην (7.340 cp. 1 Chr 22:16). At other places, though, Josephus seems to weaken enthymematic logic: in paraphrasing 1 Chr 22:8, Josephus omits the particle ὅτι (a clear indicator of an enthymeme) and inserts instead a participle, πεφυμένον (this is not as clear an indicator of an enthymeme).
Josephus further tightens conformity to rhetorical convention by adding proof that is appropriate for the ἐπίλογος/conclusio. While in the Septuagint David exhorts Solomon to “construct” the Temple, Josephus has David exhort Solomon to “be brave” (γίνοι . . . ἀριστος [Ant. 7.340]). While Josephus’ reason for including bravery is probably apologetic (to associate Solomon with bravery), commending bravery in the conclusion is rhetorically effective. In rhetorical theory, deliberative ἐπίλογοι had to cultivate hope in the context of suasion. Josephus commends the closely related emotions of bravery and confidence right here in his ἐπίλογος, betraying a keen awareness of deliberative speech conventions.

To enhance his speech’s rhetorical effectiveness Josephus also heightens qualities of plain style: clarity (σαφήνεια), conciseness (συντομία) and plausibility (πιθανότης). And a most striking illustration comes in his very first change. The Septuagint buries its propositio deep in the speech and so leaves readers unclear about the basic case. When Josephus takes the propositio from 1 Chr 22:11 (“he . . . bade him build the temple to God” [Ant. 7.337]) and advances it to the speech’s very beginning, he substantially clarifies the speech. Shortly after, Josephus makes a similar clarification in the narratio. In the Septuagint, David’s proof wanders: he recalls that he was first deemed unfit to build the Temple (22:8); he was then told that he would have a son, Solomon, who would cultivate peace (22:9); then, that Solomon would build the Temple (22:10a); and finally, that God would care for Solomon and prolong his reign (22:10b). There is little cohesion to this proof. Significantly, Josephus makes two rearrangements

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863 Bravery, explains Feldman, was a key quality associated with Gentile hero figures, but which many sceptical Gentiles doubted was present in Jewish heroes. Josephus’ attribution of these qualities to Jews is thus an apologetic effort (Josephus’s Interpretation, 96, 106).
864 And fear in the context of dissuasion. Lausberg, Handbook § 437.
865 For the Greek, see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.79); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 29.
that clarify the thought sequence (Ant. 7.337). First, he moves back slightly the prediction that Solomon would build the Temple (22:10a), thus consolidating references to its construction. Second, he moves ahead slightly the prediction of peace for Israel (22:9b), thus consolidating discussion of political conditions. The effect is to organize the discussion better and so clarify it. Some of these clarifications concern ideas and others expression, but the net effect is the same.

Josephus continues to clarify and render more concise the Septuagint’s style in numerous places. One such place is the διήγησις/narratio. As Josephus paraphrases the narratio, he adds a participial phrase “telling him that” (λέγων ὅς) to David’s proof that he had behaved violently (Ant. 7.337, cp. 1 Chr 22:8), and so helps David clarify his proof. Josephus clarifies further in the final proof (22:14; Ant. 7.339-340). In the Septuagint, David simply lists materials for Solomon (22:14), but Josephus has David

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866 As in the second speech, Josephus paraphrases God’s promise of care like a father (22:10b) in a dehydrated, more concise manner.
867 Josephus’ narratio further betrays efforts at clarity. For instance, Josephus omits the Septuagint’s claim that “I shall give . . . rest from his enemies, for [γάρ] his name is Solomon” (1 Chr 22:9), replacing it with a simpler clause (“he should be called by this name”: Ant. 7.337). As we indicated, the Septuagint justifies the name Solomon because the name closely resembles the Hebrew word for “peace” (shalom). Yet as Marcus points out, this double-entendre would be all but lost on a strictly Greek-speaking audience, and because of its obscurity Josephus omits it (Marcus, note to Josephus, Ant. 7.337 [p. 542 note a]). Josephus makes further clarifications in the final proof (1 Chr 22:14/Ant. 7.339-340). In the Septuagint, David follows his third propositio (Solomon must obey the Law: 22:13) abruptly and awkwardly with proof (David has assembled Temple materials) for his first propositio. Josephus clarifies the transition in two ways. First, he restates the first propositio before proving it. And by restating this propositio (7.338), we are reminded that David is returning to prove it. Second, Josephus rearranges ahead slightly 1 Chr 22:13, and specifies precisely what Solomon needs to do and why: “do not be dismayed at the magnitude of the labour, nor shrink from it, for [γάρ]” (7.339). Supplementing the propositio with a precise injunction and rationale makes a clear bridge to the proof. Furthermore, within this proof Josephus rearranges material to enhance clarity. In the Septuagint, David abruptly says in the midst of listing materials that “to these things you will add more” (22:14). His clause sounds raptur and out of place. Josephus takes the sentence and repositions it as the final sentence: “Whatever else is needed you yourself will add” (Ant. 7.340). He thereby makes the instructions more cohesive and clear.
868 Similarly, when he adds, “He also foretold that” (προείποι δ’ ὅτι), he helps David articulate his proof from future fact. Two further changes in the narratio might be driven by clarity. First, Josephus omits “it came to pass for me [to build a house]” (ἐμοι ἐγένετο ἐπὶ τῷ ψυχαῖ[22:7]), and replaces it with the simpler “he himself had wished” (βουλόμενον). Second, Josephus omits “this man will be a man of rest” (22:9). Josephus might regard “rest” as incidental to cultivating political peace.
first say, “I shall make everything ready for you before my death.” Josephus fosters conciseness by replacing the Septuagint’s tedious clauses (“this one shall be as much as a son to me and I shall be as much as a father to him”: 22:10) with the single clause “promised to watch over him like a father” (7.337).

He similarly trims the Septuagint’s repetitive exhortation to bravery, ἀνδρίζω καὶ ἵσχυς, μὴ φοβοῦ μηδὲ πτοηθῆς (“be a man and be strong, do not fear and do not be frightened” [22:13]), to the much simpler ὄν . . . ἀνδρείας (“be brave” [7.338]). Josephus further enhances conciseness in the πρόθεσες/propositiones. While the Septuagint offers three propositiones, Josephus collapses two of the propositiones into one, subordinating Solomon’s duties to exhort Israel (22:12) and to obey the Law (22:13) under a general ethical exhortation to be “pious, just and brave” (Ant. 7.338).

Finally, Josephus enhances the speech’s plausibility by adjusting certain references to Temple finances. In the Septuagint, David sets aside “one hundred thousand talents of gold and one million talents of silver” (1 Chr 22:14) for the Temple’s construction. Josephus reduces these numbers to a more realistic or believable “ten thousand talents of gold and one hundred talents of silver.”

Through all of these adjustments, Josephus makes his source’s style more appropriate for his context. Earlier we saw that a plain style was fitting for the judicial species (speech 1) and deliberative species (speech 2) in which Josephus wrote. Inasmuch

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869 Emphases added. Similarly, he reduces the Septuagint’s two phrases “you have poured out blood in great measure”/ “you have poured out much blood” (22:8; cp. Ant. 7.337), into one: “because of his being stained with blood shed in war” (Ant. 7.337).

870 See further the discussion of Josephus’ aims in paraphrase, below.

871 Josephus adds τοινύν in paraphrasing 1 Chr 22:13. By Marcus’ translation (“therefore”), the effect of the term is unclear; we translate τοινύν as “moreover.” Interestingly enough, shortly afterwards, when Josephus adds the reassurance “do not be dismayed at the magnitude of the labour, nor shrink from it” (Ant. 7.339), he appears less concerned with conciseness. Perhaps this is because he is trying to introduce more clearly the following proof, or because he wants to emphasize the reassurance.

872 For the idea of plausibility and its apologetic purpose in turn, see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 570-571.
as Josephus retains or solidifies this speech’s plain style, he makes it similarly more fitting for its deliberative species.\(^\text{873}\)

\(b. \text{Apologetic-theological interests.} \) Josephus’ theological and apologetic interests frequently drive his adaptations. In the διήγησις/narratio, for example, apologetics explain Josephus’ omission of God’s promise to “restore the throne of his kingdom in Israel into the age” (22:10), for the remark has a potentially subversive tone that Josephus needs to downplay in light of the Jewish War.\(^\text{874}\)

Apologetically motivated changes continue in the propositiones. Josephus omits from each of the Septuagint’s three propositiones (1 Chr 22:11, 22:12 and 22:13) God’s assurances to assist Solomon.\(^\text{875}\) At first glance we might puzzle over why Josephus omits these assurances. After all, God is promising his favour for Solomon! But the picture is more complex and teaches us to avoid the fallacious inference that more proof is necessarily better. Josephus’ omissions probably serve his theological interest in “downgrading the role of God in order to emphasize the virtues and achievements of his biblical heroes.”\(^\text{876}\) By weakening the expression of God’s promised aid to Solomon, Josephus heightens Solomon’s responsibility for his good character; as Josephus puts it,

\(^{873}\) At the same time Josephus’ use of a wider variety of conjunctions probably aims to make the speech sound more conventionally “Greek.”
\(^{874}\) See Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 149.
\(^{875}\) “He will help you along the way” (22:11); “The Lord has given you both wisdom and intelligence” (22:12); “Then He will help you along the way” (22:13).
\(^{876}\) Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 664-665; cp. 205-207 (Feldman makes the general point). Feldman cautions, though, that for a “leader of a nation (p. 664),” namely Moses (not so much Abraham, David, or other kings like Solomon), Josephus in fact augments providential care for the apologetic reason of bringing the portrayal of Moses into line with typical Gentile portrayals of divinely guided kings. See Josephus’s Interpretation, 206-207 (and all pp. 205-208), 664-665, 206-207.
“since . . . you were chosen by God to be king, endeavour to be worthy of his providence by being pious, just and brave.”

On several occasions Josephus’ apologetic and theological interests lead him to paraphrase the Septuagint. For example, while David promises Solomon “to give peace and rest to Israel in his days” (22:9), Josephus offers a wordy, amplified promise of peace as “the greatest of all blessings . . . peace and freedom from war and civil dissension.” In this case, it appears that apologetics trump conciseness. By highlighting the political stability of Solomon’s reign, Josephus achieves an apologetic aim of emphasizing Jewish loyalty and obedience to rulers. In other places, apologetic factors lead Josephus to express himself more concisely. Consider changes to the διήγησις/narratio (22:7-10; Ant. 7.337). In the Septuagint, David graphically recalls how God condemned his violent behaviour (“You have poured out blood in great measure and you have made great wars . . . you have poured out blood” [22:8]). Josephus however paraphrases the criticism in a less graphic manner, omitting a reference to bloodletting. Feldman points to an apologetic reason behind several changes in the Antiquitates that would appear important here too:

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877 In fact, Josephus’ reasoning is apologetic too: by muting the role of God, Josephus writes more in the mode of Greco-Roman historiography with explanations in terms of natural causes (Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 205). On Solomon’s high status as a biblical leader, see pp. 574-576. One further reason to eliminate repeated assurances might be conciseness: when Josephus rolls the Septuagint’s second πρόθεσις (22:12) into his restatement of the third (22:13, cp. Ant. 7.338), it makes sense to eliminate one of the two assurances. There are good reasons still for Josephus to mention providence. On the one hand, explains Feldman, this particular reference is part of Josephus’s apologetic effort “to elevate Solomon’s stature” (Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 571). On the other hand, mentioning the support of providence is apologetically useful because it harmonizes with tenets of Stoic philosophy, popular among Greeks and Romans in the first century CE (See Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 193-194).

878 On this apologetic desire to mollify a Roman audience, see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 140 (for example). The latter phrase (“Keep the commandments . . .”) enhances the portrayal of David as just and ethical, on which see Feldman, Josephus’s Interpretation, 551-556.
Josephus is trying to reduce the impression of Jewish belligerence at a time when Rome might suspect sedition in Judea. \(^879\) Taken together, Josephus’ changes are numerous. \(^880\)

\textit{c. Rhetorical effectiveness and apologetic-theological interests.} Josephus often voices his theological and apologetic interests in a way that is sensitive to rhetorical conventions. For instance, apologetic motivations explain Josephus’ amplification of God’s promise of peace for Israel (\textit{Ant.} 7.337; \textit{cp.} 1 Chr 22:10): by highlighting stability and calm in Solomon’s reign, Josephus emphasizes the loyalty of Jewish subjects to their rulers—a point he did not want lost on his Roman audience. \(^881\) At the same time, Josephus is sensitive to rhetorical convention by making the amplification here in the \textit{narratio}. In the Septuagint speech, we recall, the \textit{narratio} contains logical proofs. Josephus amplifies these proofs here, and although the \textit{narratio} is not a typical place for logical proofs, rhetoric closely associates the \textit{narratio} and proofs. \(^882\) The point is that

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\(^{879}\) Similar reasoning is evident behind Josephus’ omission of God’s promise to “give rest from enemies all around” (22:9/\textit{Ant.} 7.337), followed by added reference to political stability (“the greatest of all blessings, namely peace and freedom from war and civil dissension” [22:10/\textit{Ant.} 7.337]). Omitting the first clause is sensible given the unsavoury images that it might evoke from the Jewish War, while the added calm and stability conveys Josephus’ desire for peace and his satisfaction with Roman rule, distasteful as it was of “civil dissension.”

\(^{880}\) Apologetic motivations are evident behind further changes too. Josephus’ added injunctions in the Septuagint’s πρόθεσις/\textit{propositio} (no. 3) to cultivate piety and justice afford prime examples (\textit{Ant.} 7.338; \textit{cp.} 1 Chr 22:13). These are two virtues that Gentiles tended to admire highly in great leaders. It is precisely to win Gentile admiration for Jewish leaders that Josephus highlights piety and justice in biblical leader figures such as David and the prophets (\textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 96, 130). Josephus works from similar motivations towards the close of the speech (7.339). In his source (1 Chr 22:14), David assures Solomon that he has amassed materials to construct the Temple. Significantly, Josephus omits David’s reference to assembling materials “over against my poverty” (22:14; \textit{cp.} \textit{Ant.} 7.339). Why omit this phrase? Feldman incisively comments that “because the Jews had been charged with being a nation of beggars, Josephus . . . goes out of his way to highlight the wealth of Abraham, Moses, Solomon, and Josiah” (Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 130). It was incumbent on Josephus to show that great Jewish figures were not, as the Bible might at times suggest, in a state of poverty. A further apologetic motivation exercises an influence over the speech, for while earlier Josephus shortened a wordy injunction to “be brave” (\textit{Ant.} 7.338), he repeats this in the concluding sentence (γίνου . . . ἄριστος/ “be brave” [7.340]). By repeating the injunction, Josephus can emphasize leadership virtues among Jews—namely bravery, wisdom, piety and justice—that would appeal to Gentiles (on these virtues and Josephus’ application of them to biblical leader figures, see Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 74, 96, 130).

\(^{881}\) See Feldman, \textit{Josephus’s Interpretation}, 140 (for example). This amplification also supports the \textit{propositio}.

\(^{882}\) Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} § 348.
Josephus neither amplifies logical proofs at the speech’s beginning (where ethical material is most appropriate), nor at its end (where arousing emotion is most appropriate). Rather, he does so quite fittingly in the narratio.

A second apologetically motivated change is Josephus’ addition of a logical proof (“Therefore . . . since, even before your birth, you were chosen by God to be king. . . .” [7.338]). This proof not only supports David’s second propositio, but also serves Josephus’ apologetic interest in highlighting Solomon’s stature.883 And once again, Josephus shows sensitivity to rhetorical convention by adding the proof here, right before the propositio. The arrangement is astute, for it reflects the handbook convention of “put[ting] the arguments for something in advance of the propositions which they support.”884 Josephus did not have to place the proof here—as in so many other cases, he could have placed it anywhere he wanted. That he places it here speaks to his sensitivity to conventions for speech parts. Trained to invent, arrange and express speech material, Josephus adds, omits, rearranges and paraphrases speeches in order to sound more rhetorically effective and to convey apologetic and theological concerns.

3.3: Summary

Having observed so many of Josephus’ adaptations, we run the risk of losing perspective on his changes as a whole. We need then to take stock and summarize his work along the two key axes of techniques and motives. In technique, Josephus adapts sources along the lines of invention (ἐὑρεσίς) by adding and omitting ideas, arrangement (τάξις) by rearranging ideas, and expression (λέξις, φράσις) by paraphrase.

883 The propositio is “Endeavour to be worthy of his providence by being pious, just and brave” (Ant. 7.338).
884 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.125); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 59. Theon applies this arrangement only to theoretical theses.
Josephus’ adaptations range widely in size. On the one hand Josephus adds, omits, rearranges and paraphrases entire speech parts (for instance, he restates a πρόθεσις in Ant. 7.339; omits the προοίμιον from 1 Kgdms 12:1-2 [6.86]; rearranges the πρόθεσις in 1 Chr 22:11 [7.337]; and paraphrases a πίστις in 1 Kgdms 12:7-8 [6.88-89]). The last example is noteworthy also because it illustrates Josephus’ ability to rename or recast a part of speech: in this case he recasts 1 Kgdms’ πίστις (12:7-8), through paraphrase, into a διήγησις (6.88-89).

On the other hand Josephus can add, omit, rearrange and paraphrase material on a very small scale—as small indeed as individual words, phrases and clauses. He adds for instance a mere two words, “pious” (εὐσεβὴς) and “just” (δίκαιος), to supplement the content of 1 Chr 22:13 (see Ant. 7.338). In the course of adapting 2 Kgdms 7:14/1 Chr 17:13, he rearranges back a phrase from 1 Chr 22:9 (ὁτι Σαλωμων ὄνομα αὐτῷ) and paraphrases it to read κληθησομένου δὲ Σολομῶνος (Ant. 7.93). Similarly, when Josephus adapts 2 Kgdms 7:5/1 Chr 17:4 (Ant. 7.92), he advances and paraphrases a brief clause from 1 Chr 22:8 (φῶνω τῶν ἐχθρῶν μεμισμένω). If ever an author could make micro-level changes, it is Josephus. In any case, the scale of most changes we would best characterize as ranging from a phrase or clause through multiple sentences.

Josephus’ speeches are in fact a succession of changes interlaced one after another, and he can modify one unit (like a sentence) either consistently or in multiple

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885 Josephus also can adapt on the level of individual proofs (πίστεις): he adds, for instance, individual πίστεις to 2 Kgdms 7:5/1 Chr 17:4 (Ant. 7.92).

886 Similarly Josephus omits only one word, “to” (ἐν), from 2 Kgdms 7:14/1 Chr 17:13—and then adds in its place one word, “as” (ὡς: Ant. 7.93). As we saw, this minor lexical change produces a major content change. Cf. moreover Josephus’ addition to 1 Chr 22:14 of a mere phrase of two words: “limitless quantity” (ἄλην ἀφθονον), and his addition to 1 Kgdms 12:11 of the phrase, “yet for all that” (οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καί).

887 Another example of paraphrase on a minute scale is of 1 Chr 22:16b (καὶ κύριος μετὰ σοῦ): Josephus paraphrases with the equally brief τὸν θεὸν ἔχων προστάτην.
ways. In his adaptation of 1 Kgdms 12:7-19 (Ant. 6.89-92) for instance, Josephus paraphrases two sentences (1 Kgdms 12:7-8/Ant. 6.88-89), adds one sentence (6.90), omits two sentences (12:9-10), adds one phrase (6.90), paraphrases one sentence (12:11/6.90), omits two sentences (12:12-13), adds two sentences (6.91), omits one sentence (12:14-15), and finally paraphrases five sentences (12:16-19/6.91-92).

Behind Josephus’ changes are two motives. One is to make the biblical speeches more persuasive by tightening their accord with rhetorical conventions. This motive recalls our findings in Chapter 1, where we learned that authors sought to draw material into closer accord with rhetorical principles. Josephus will often pull a judicial or deliberative speech into closer accord with conventional form by placing proofs into appropriate speech parts (Table 3.4a). Rhetorical theory emphasizes that particular proofs belong in particular parts of speech—and although it makes exceptions in certain circumstances, it encourages essentially one usage: ἡθος in the introduction, λόγος in the body and πάθος in the conclusion. Strikingly, Josephus tends to strengthen these proofs in these parts. He enhances character proof near the speech’s beginning, in an area that approximates a προοίμιον/exordium. He enhances logical proof in parts that require such material—that is, in the midst of the speech in an area that approximates the πίστις/argumentatio. And he enhances emotional proof near the end of the speech, in an area that approximates an ἐπίλογος/peroratio. Granted, he very often builds on proofs that the Septuagint already has in these places. But that is not the point. The point is that he builds on proofs in these places, recognizing that ἡθος matters in the introduction, λόγος in the body and πάθος in the conclusion. Although we have not traced every one

888 I shall not attempt to prove precisely how Josephus interrelated or prioritized his aims. I want simply to show that he has multiple, concurrent aims.
of Josephus’ added proofs to an appropriate speech part, we see a clear tendency to add and amplify proofs in places that rhetorical theory demands. Josephus’ more basic or fundamental reasons to add proof tend to be apologetic or theological. But Josephus remains motivated to arrange proofs into rhetorically appropriate places. In this he shows great sensitivity to rhetorical convention.

Table 3.4a: Insertion/Amplification of Proof in Appropriate Speech Parts (=Table 3.5, column d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional part (form, function)</th>
<th>Josephus’ version of LXX speech</th>
<th>Kind of change (scale of change)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. contains an introduction</td>
<td>Ant. 6.86-87 (=speech 1): adds proof from appeal to character in introduction</td>
<td>content addition (clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(προόμισσι/εξορδίου), defined by proof from appeal to character (ηθος)</td>
<td>Ant. 7.92 (=speech 2): adds two proofs from appeal to character in the introduction</td>
<td>paraphrase (sentences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. contains a section of proofs</td>
<td>Ant. 6.90, 6.91-92 (=speech 1): heightens logical proofs, both in the statement of facts and in the proof section</td>
<td>content addition (clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(πίστει/απολογία), defined by proof from appeal to reason (λόγος)</td>
<td>Ant. 7.337, 338 (=speech 3): heightens logical proofs in the statement of facts and immediately beside a propositio</td>
<td>paraphrase (amplification by use of artistic devices [e.g., repetition]);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. a) contains a conclusion</td>
<td>Ant. 6.93 (=speech 1): enhances proof from emotion in the conclusion (e.g., inserts “exhorted” [συμβουλέυει]. This recalls exhortation in conclusions of chreia elaborations: Hermogenes Prog. 6.8 [παράκλησι])</td>
<td>content omission (sentences, clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ἐπίλογος/peroratio), defined by proof from arousing emotion (πάθος)</td>
<td>Ant. 7.340 (=speech 3): adds exhortation to bravery (resembles hope) in conclusion</td>
<td>content addition (clause)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) In deliberative speeches, conclusions should arouse hope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, Josephus articulates and rearranges parts of speech and enthymemes themselves to adhere better to convention (Table 3.4b). Sometimes, Josephus makes these
changes in the course of adding material that voices his apologetic-theological interests; at other times he makes these changes simply for their own sake. But in either case, Josephus’ changes stem from his sensitivity to a rhetorically conventional sequence of distinguishable speech parts.

### Table 3.4b: Articulating Speech Parts and Their Sequence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional speech part</th>
<th>Josephus’ version of LXX speech</th>
<th>Kind of change (scale of change)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Deliberative speeches often arrange the <em>propositio</em> before the statement of facts</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.337 (=speech 3): rearranges <em>πρόθεσις/propositio</em> to a position before the statement of facts</td>
<td>content rearrangement (one clause)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Judicial and deliberative speeches contain a statement of facts (<em>διήγησις/narratio</em>)</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 6.88-90 (=speech 1): adapts LXX’s proof into unit better resembling a statement of facts</td>
<td>paraphrase (changes third person into second person); (sentences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Judicial and deliberative speeches contain a <em>πρόθεσις/propositio</em></td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 6.91 (=speech 1): articulates <em>propositio</em></td>
<td>content addition (two sentences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Judicial and deliberative speeches contain a part of logical proofs</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.339 (=speech 3): articulates logical proof at two places (1. by restating the <em>propositio</em> that it supports: “As for the Temple which he has decreed shall be made for him . . . do not be dismayed . . .” 2. by inserting a rationale which concisely introduces the entire subsequent proof: “<em>for</em> I shall make everything ready for you before my death”)</td>
<td>paraphrase (clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. For judicial and deliberative speeches, handbooks prescribe conventions of good arrangement, for example, to “put the arguments for something in advance of the propositions which they support” (<em>Theon, Prog.</em> 2.126)</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.92 (=speech 2): inserts proof into a position immediately before the <em>propositio</em> which it supports</td>
<td>content rearrangement from another speech (clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. In judicial and deliberative speeches, logical proofs are often enthymemes</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.339 (=speech 3): articulates enthymeme by inserting <em>γὰρ</em> (“<em>for</em> I shall make everything ready for you before my death”)</td>
<td>paraphrase (clauses)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While articulating speech parts and proofs, we have also seen Josephus on occasion add proofs that both support the speech’s *propositio* and express particular historical or theological interests. The more important interests or motives are undoubtedly historical or theological, but Josephus adds proof in a rhetorically sensitive manner.

Beyond adding proofs and articulating speech parts, Josephus rhetorically improves his speeches by tightening their conformity to rhetorical *virtutes* that include clarity (σαφήνεια), conciseness (συντομία) and plausibility (πιθανότης)—the hallmarks of a plain style—as well as propriety (τὸ πρέπον). His changes towards propriety are not as evident as his changes toward clarity and conciseness, but Josephus does value propriety.\(^\text{889}\) Very often Josephus makes such changes for their own sake, to improve the style. On occasion he has deeper theological or apologetic reasons; indeed, every adjustment serves apologetic interests inasmuch as it makes a more comprehensible and familiar sounding speech.\(^\text{890}\)

### Table 3.4c: Enhancing ἀποταῖοι/virtutes of Clarity, Conciseness, Plausibility, Propriety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtus</th>
<th>Josephus’ version of LXX speech</th>
<th>Kind of change (scale of change)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. clarity (σαφήνεια) | *Ant.* 6.91 (=speech 1): clarifies πρόθεσις  
Ant. 7.92; cp. 2 Kgdms 7:6/1 Chr 17:5 (=speech 2): clarifies speech  
Ant. 7.93; cp. 2 Kgdms 7:12/1 Chr 17:11 (=speech 2): clarifies speech  
Ant. 7.93; cp. 2 Kgdms 7:13b/1 Chr 17:12b (=speech 2): clarifies speech  
Ant. 7.93; cp. 2 Kgdms 7:15-16/1 Chr 17:13-14 (=speech 2): clarifies speech by omitting God’s promise of | content addition (two sentences)  
content omission (clauses)  
paraphrase (clauses)  
content omission (one phrase)  
content addition (one phrase, one clause)  
content omission (sentence [2 Kgdms 7:15] and phrase “into the |

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889 Downing, “Redaction Criticism I,” 50.  
890 Sometimes the changes extend beyond style to content, although rhetorical theory makes allowance for some such shading into content. Lausberg, *Handbook* § 528.
2. conciseness (συντόμια)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ant. 7.337; cp. 1 Chr 22:7-10 (=speech 3): clarifies sequence of thought</th>
<th>eternal assistance for Solomon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.337; cp. 1 Chr 22:9 (=speech 3): clarifies through replacing the Septuagint’s obscure word play</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.339-340; cp. 1 Chr 22:13-14 (=speech 3): clarifies transition of thought between πρόθεσις and final πίστις</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.340; cp. 1 Chr 22:14 (=speech 3): clarifies thought sequence within the final πίστις</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.337; cp. 1 Chr 22:8 (=speech 3): clarifies a πίστις within the διήγησις (“telling him that . . .”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.339-340; cp. 1 Chr 22:14 (=speech 3): clarifies final πίστις</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ant. 6.87 (=speech 1): eliminates repetitions (cp. 1 Kgdms 12:4), and so makes more concise |  |
| Ant. 6.90 (=speech 1): makes διήγησις more concise |  |
| Ant. 7.92 (=speech 2): makes προοίμιον more concise (cp. 2 Kgdms 7:5/1 Chr 17:4) |  |
| Ant. 6.93 (=speech 1): eliminates repetitions (cp. 1 Kgdms 12:21), and so makes more concise |  |
| Ant. 7.93 (=speech 2): enhances conciseness (cp. 2 Kgdms |  |

<p>|  | age”; 2 Kgdms 7:16]; clauses [1 Chr 17:13] and phrase [“into the age”; 1 Chr 17:14]); paraphrase (one clause [2 Kgdms 16b/1 Chr 17:14b]) |
|  | content rearrangement (two clauses) |
|  | content omission (one word) content addition (one clause) |
|  | a) content rearrangement and paraphrase (clauses [7.339]) b) content rearrangement and paraphrase (clauses [7.339]) |
|  | content rearrangement (one clause) |
|  | paraphrase (one sentence) |
|  | paraphrase (one sentence) |
|  | paraphrase (one sentence) |
|  | paraphrase (clauses) |
|  | paraphrase (clauses) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. plausibility (πιθανότης)</th>
<th>Ant. 7.93 (=speech 2): enhances conciseness by omitting repetition of God’s promised assistance for Solomon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>content omission (sentence [2 Kgdms 7:15] and clause [2 Kgdms 7:16a]); paraphrase (2 Kgdms 7:16b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>content omission (clauses [1 Chr 17:13b,14a]); paraphrase (1 Chr 17:14b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paraphrase (clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.337 (=speech 3):</td>
<td>enhances conciseness by omitting repetition (“this one shall be as much as a son to me and I shall be as much as a father to him” [1 Chr 22:10])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.338 (=speech 3):</td>
<td>enhances conciseness by omitting repetition in exhortation to bravery (cp. 1 Chr 22:13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.338 (=speech 3):</td>
<td>enhances conciseness by collapsing two πρόθεσες into one (cp. 1 Chr 22:12-13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paraphrase (clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>content addition (clause [7.338]).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>content rearrangement (clauses [1 Chr 22:12]); paraphrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 6.91-92 (=speech 1):</td>
<td>enhances plausibility by offering a more vivid and realistic description of the storm (cp. 1 Kgdms 12:18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.340 (=speech 3):</td>
<td>enhances plausibility by reducing unrealistic references to finances for constructing the Temple (cp. 1 Chr 22:14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paraphrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>content replacement (phrases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. propriety (τὸ πρᾶπον)</td>
<td>Ant. 6.86-93 (=speech 1): maintains a sufficiently plain style for the (judicial) species and for the (inner, narrative) audience; elevates style enough for an educated Greek audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[based on expression of speech as a whole, plus paraphrased material]; propriety exists on more or less all scales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant. 7.92-93 (=speech 2):</td>
<td>maintains a sufficiently plain style for the (deliberative) species; elevates style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[based on comparing expression of versions as a whole, plus paraphrased]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By augmenting clarity, conciseness and plausibility, Josephus fosters *plainer* style, for these virtues were its traditional hallmarks. And with a plainer style, Josephus strengthens three kinds of propriety (τὸ πρέπειον). The first is propriety between style and the species of his speeches: Josephus keeps the style plain enough to satisfy the rhetorical demand that deliberative and judicial speeches—what Quintilian called “serious” matters—remain solidly plain. Josephus also strengthens propriety between plain style and the *narrative genre* in which he writes: that clarity and conciseness are so important to Josephus is partly explained by the fact that his *Antiquitates* is narrative, for which the progymnasmata laid such emphasis on clarity, conciseness and plausibility.891 And finally, Josephus fosters propriety between his style and his audience: the style has enough eloquence and variety to please a cultured audience.

Josephus’ second major reason to adapt speeches is to express his theological and apologetic interests. Sometimes, such interests support the speech’s *propositio*, and at other times they do not. In any case, these interests are essential and it will benefit us to list these interests and resulting changes in the following table (Table 3.5). The far right column indicates whether Josephus adapts with an awareness of rhetorical conventions—usually awareness of amplifying proofs in the appropriate *parts* (above, Table 3.4a).892

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891 Schufer’s focus on units of narrative in the gospels turns out to be especially wise; for its virtues apply not just to a unit of narrative *within* the gospels, but also to the gospels *as a whole*.

892 Usually, omissions are difficult to characterize as sensitive to convention, and so we label them “not clear.”
Table 3.5: Apologetic, Theological and Literary Reasons for Change:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) Reason</th>
<th>b) Josephus’ version of LXX speech</th>
<th>c) Kind of change (scale of change)</th>
<th>d) Achieved in a manner sensitive to rhetorical conventions?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. apologetic</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 6.87 (=speech 1): adds praise for Samuel’s character (ἵθεος) as just</td>
<td>content addition (phrases, clauses)</td>
<td>yes: praise added in προοίμιον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. apologetic</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 6.93-94 (=speech 1): enhances Samuel’s hostility (πάθος) against opponent, Israel</td>
<td>content addition (clauses)</td>
<td>yes: hostility enhanced in ἐπίλογος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. apologetic</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.92 (=speech 2): adds praise for David’s character (ἵθεος)</td>
<td>content addition (clauses)</td>
<td>yes: although praise is for speech’s recipient, it is still in the προοίμιον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. apologetic</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.92 (=speech 2): adds disapproval of David’s violent behaviour; essentially criticism of character (cp. 2 Kgdms 7:5/1 Chr 17:4)</td>
<td>content rearranged back from 1 Chr 22:8 (clauses)</td>
<td>yes: although criticism is for speech’s recipient, it is still in the προοίμιον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. theological</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.92 (=speech 2): omits material that conveys divine providence (2 Kgdms 7:8-9/1 Chr 17:7-8)</td>
<td>content omission (sentence, clause)</td>
<td>not clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. apologetic</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.92 (=speech 2): omits material in which God sanctions violence (2 Kgdms 7:9b/1 Chr 17:8b)</td>
<td>content omission (sentence)</td>
<td>yes:: omission also serves the πρόθεσις/propositio (“do not build”): not build: omitting divine violence supports the logical proof (above no. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. apologetic</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.92 (=speech 2): omits promises of Israel’s security (cp. 2 Kgdms 7:11b/1 Chr 17:10b)</td>
<td>content omission (clause)</td>
<td>not clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. theological</td>
<td><em>Ant.</em> 7.93 (=speech 2): adapts language of God’s fatherhood of Solomon (cp. 2 Kgdms 7:14/1 Chr 17:13)</td>
<td>content omission (one word)</td>
<td>not clear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<p>| 9. apologetic | Ant. 7.93 (=speech 2): specifies in God’s promise to David that his coming son’s name “will be Solomon,” thus enhancing Solomon (cp. 2 Kgdms 7:13/1 Chr 17:14) | content rearranged (one phrase) | not clear |
| 10. apologetic | Ant. 7.93 (=speech 2): reduces promised time of assistance for Solomon’s descendents (cp. 2 Kgdms 7:13b/1 Chr 17:12b) | content omission (one phrase: “until the age”) content addition (one phrase, one clause: “for his children’s children”) | yes: adds logic material in πίστις |
| 11. apologetic | Ant. 7.93 (=speech 2): Similarly, reduces promised time of assistance for Solomon’s descendents, to avoid conveying that Israel would be eternally independent (cp. 2 Kgdms 7:15-16/1 Chr 17:13-14) | content omission (sentence [2 Kgdms 7:15] and phrase [“into the age”; 2 Kgdms 7:16]; clauses [1 Chr 17:13] and phrase [“into the age”; 1 Chr 17:14]); paraphrase (one clause [2 Kgdms 16b/1 Chr 17:14b]) | not clear |
| 12. apologetic, literary | Ant. 7.93 (=speech 2): uses literary technique of μιμησία/imitatio of Sophocles: serves apologetic aim of associating Jewish king (Solomon) with Gentile king (Oedipus) | content addition (one phrase) | yes: arouses fear in the ἐπίλογος |
| 13. apologetic | Ant. 7.337 (=speech 3): omits promise of God’s eternal assistance for Israel (cp. 1 Chr 22:10) | content omission (one clause) | not clear |
| 14. theological | Ant. 7.337-8 (=speech 3): augments Solomon’s responsibility for ruling virtuously (cp. 1 Chr 22:11,12,13) | content omission (clauses) | not clear |
| 15. apologetic | Ant. 7.337-8 (=speech 3): added reference to providence supporting Solomon | content addition (clauses) | yes: is appended to πρόθεσις/propositio, very close to existing πίστις |
| 16. apologetic | Ant. 7.338 (=speech 3): adds virtues when exhorting Solomon | content addition (two words) | no: exhortation is more typical of the ἐπίλογος |
| 17. apologetic | Ant. 7.339 (=speech 3): | content omission (one) | not clear |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>apologetic</td>
<td>omits David’s reference to his poverty (cp. 1 Chr 22:14)</td>
<td>content addition (one clause)</td>
<td>yes: commends bravery in ἐπίλογος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>apologetic</td>
<td>Ant. 7.340 (=speech 3): repeats an injunction that Solomon be brave (cp. 1 Chr 22:16)</td>
<td>paraphrase (one clause)</td>
<td>yes: adds logic proof within δήγησις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>apologetic</td>
<td>Ant. 7.337 (=speech 3): amplifies God’s promise of peace</td>
<td>paraphrase (clauses)</td>
<td>not clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>apologetic</td>
<td>Ant. 7.337 (=speech 3): trims down criticism of Solomon “pouring out blood” (cp. 1 Chr 22:8)</td>
<td>paraphrase (omits clause)</td>
<td>not clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>apologetic</td>
<td>Ant. 7.337 (=speech 3): enhances reference to political calm and stability (cp. 1 Chr 22:9-10)</td>
<td>content addition (one phrase, one clause)</td>
<td>yes: adds logic proof within δήγησις</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Josephus can employ practically any technique and on any scale. Moreover, as Josephus adapts sources he frequently shows a keen sensitivity to rhetorical conventions. On occasion, Josephus nods in this regard, for instance when certain of his additions jeopardize clarity and conciseness. But on these occasions, we have detected an overpowering apologetic or theological interest at work. In other words, Josephus would not regard himself as “weakening” the speech, but rather as implementing necessary improvements. In all then, Josephus adapts his sources using rhetorically informed techniques, and for reasons that are both rhetorical and apologetic.
Conclusion to Part 1

In our study of the rhetorical theory and practice for adapting chreiai, we have found two consistent features of adaptation. One is adaptive technique. Some techniques, like expansion and compression, are particular to one or a few forms, while other techniques such as paraphrase (παραφράσεις) can apply to any form. For purposes of assessing literary dependence, these techniques do not appear very useful. For one, some techniques are reversible. An expansion of text $a$ by text $b$ for instance might in fact be a compression of text $b$ by text $a$. For another, the techniques tend to lack explanatory power: although we can detect paraphrase or inflexion (κλίσεις) or addition of a comment (ἐπιφώνεις) to a chreia, there is nothing about these techniques to which the progymnasmata assign an explanation—something that students would agree consistently made one version better than another. Most such techniques seem not to indicate improvement; they just indicate change.

Rhetorical adaptations, however, reveal a second feature that has greater potential to measure literary dependence: rhetorical motives for improvement. Rhetorical theory highlights principles towards which authors should aspire; it speaks often of ἀρεταί (or virtutes) and of how we “should” compose. To be sure, rhetoric infrequently applies

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893 On techniques like expansion, see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.103-105, 2.74-76, 2.85-86, 2.107, 2.119); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 21-23, 24-26, 34, 44, 46. On techniques like paraphrase, see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.62-64); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, pp. 6-7.
894 We do not mean to suggest that techniques for modifying texts are not valuable; Derrenbacker has successfully applied his awareness of transformative techniques to an assessment of the gospels’ sequence: Derrenbacker, Ancient Compositional Practices, pp. 75-76, 116-117 with 165-166, 202, 253-255.
895 On addition of a comment see Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.103); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 21. It is possible that authors understood a chreia with an added comment to be posterior to a simple chreia. It is hard however to know this for certain, for as Mack and Robbins remind us, posteriority is not simply proven by presence of “more” material: see Mack and Robbins, “Conclusion,” 207.
896 See the above note and, for example, Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.84); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 33.
these principles to the adaptation of sources: there exists no ancient manual focused on how to improve others’ work. But rhetorical principles remain standards towards which an author can draw others’ work, and as such they furnish motives for adapting sources. A text that consistently and in numerous ways improves another text along rhetorical lines is probably posterior to a text that rarely improves its alleged source, or that systematically removes marks of effective composition. The rhetorical practice of Plutarch and Josephus highlights not only the effort to conform to such principles, but also further motives that are biographical, historical and theological.

In all then, rhetoric reveals four major reasons to improve a chreia. The first reason is to draw the chreia into closer conformity with principles for speeches (A), namely to intensify proofs, to arrange proofs appropriately in each part of speech, and to foster an appropriate style. The second reason is to address a biographical, theological or apologetic concern (B). The third reason is to enhance the fundamental rhetorical principle of clarity (C), and the fourth reason is to tighten adherence to the equally fundamental principle of propriety (D). We may list these reasons as follows:

A. To draw chreiai into closer conformity with rhetorical principles. An improving author might,

1. Intensify proof, either by adding proofs (signs, arguments, examples), or amplifying proofs (σύνεργασία) via comparison, congeries, incrementum

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897 Exceptions include έξεργασία (above) and μιμησία / imitatio: MacDonald, *Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark*, pp. 4-6, 8-9, and Quintilian 10.2.13.23.27.28 (LCL, trans. Butler).
898 Rhetorical principles that can imply literary dependence also include beauty, truth, cogency, and further virtues in Theon’s έξεργασία exercise. Theon, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Patillon, 110); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 71.
899 Chapters 1 and 3. When I say “conventions for speeches,” I am thinking of the two, related genera or species of speeches: the judicial and the deliberative. These appear close enough in parts and in conventions for those parts, that we may generally speaking treat them together, on which see Lausberg, *Handbook* § 261.
900 Chapters 2 and 3.
901 Chapters 1 and 3.
for example. Reasons for intensifying proof might be biographical, apologetic or theological (below, B)

2. Address the στάσεις in closer accord with stasis theory; or similarly, invent and arrange proofs in closer accord with the progymnastic pattern: “from the [topic of the] unclear, pleonastic, deficient, impossible, incredible, false, inexpedient, useless, or shameful”

3. Pull towards a typical five-part arrangement, by adding proofs in appropriate parts, and/or by articulating and properly sequencing parts: introduction, statement of facts, propositio, logical proofs, conclusion

4. Rearrange proofs more effectively, i.e., (a) frame weak arguments with more powerful arguments; (b) arrange a propositio to a position after its proofs

B. To address biographical, historical and theological interests: An improving author might,

Change a chreia’s invention, arrangement or expression (for example, add proof or omit proof) in order to conform better to biographical, apologetic or theological concerns

C. To draw a chreia into closer accord with the fundamental rhetorical principle of clarity (σαφήνεια/perspecuitas)

D. To draw a chreia into closer accord with the fundamental rhetorical principle of propriety (τὸ πρέπον/aptum)

1. Propriety of one’s changes for the part of speech in which one makes them. If paraphrasing (i.e., changing words, word sequence, syntax), changes should maintain a style appropriate for the existing content: an introduction demands a middle style; narration and proofs demand a plain style; a

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903 The basic importance of proofs to one’s case, as well as the importance that Theon attaches to amplification of such proofs, warrants this principle.

904 These are the two techniques for which I shall look in the gospels.

905 Our attention to plain style will focus on two of its three virtues: clarity and conciseness. It is more difficult to measure plausibility, because plausibility depends on several factors (e.g., plausibility within a narrative; plausibility for the speaker; plausibility for the audience).
peroration demands grand style. If adding or rearranging entire proofs, the proofs should appear in appropriate places: an introduction demands ἱθός, logical proofs demand λόγος and a conclusion demands πάθος.

2. Propriety for one’s utiitas causae: We need to use source material that serves our utiitas or exigency. The exigency in ancient rhetoric is essentially to support the propositio; when adapting sources, the exigency might be the major reason(s) for the bulk of changes.

In this summary we have a spectrum of rhetorical reasons for adapting chreiai.

We shall assess the plausibility of each source hypothesis by measuring its conformity to two criteria. The first criterion is the presence of one of the three aforementioned reasons for changing a source (A, B and C). The more often an evangelist’s changes suggest these motives, the more plausible his changes appear. The second criterion is adherence to or fostering of propriety (above, D), for propriety affords the most powerful criterion for gauging literary dependence. Propriety, in turn, has two precise standards. The first standard is to foster accord between a chreia’s contents and its style: changes to introductory material need to reflect a medium style; changes to narrative and proof material must reflect a plain and clear style; and changes to conclusions must reflect an elevated style (D.1). The second standard is to include as much as possible of the putative source to satisfy the evangelist’s major motives (D.2). That is to say, an evangelist should take liberally from a source to address his overarching

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906 This standard of propriety affords us more precision than is possible by measuring propriety merely between a speech’s species and its style (e.g., the judicial speech’s general use of a plain style). 907 Propriety provides points of reference, usually locations, vis-à-vis which other improvements will either look fitting or out of place. See Lausberg, Handbook §§ 1055-1058, 1078-1079.
interest(s) or *utilitas*; if he repeatedly misses material that satisfies his interests, then his work begins to appear less credible. After all, if an evangelist had really seen the source that a hypothesis alleges, then he should not repeatedly overlook material that his interests invite or even demand. We may summarize our assessment of literary dependence as follows:

**Question 1:** Does an evangelist adapt his putative sources for reasons that rhetorical theory and practice reveal (above, A, B and C)?

**Question 2:** Does an evangelist foster the rhetorical principle of propriety (above, D), namely by:

1. Adapting in a way that stylistic or content changes are appropriate to the material in question (i.e., to an introduction, to a narrative and proofs, or to a conclusion)?
2. Employing all or most source material necessary to achieve the evangelist’s major aim(s)?

The best evidence will be to find solid adherence to each standard on one hypothesis, and to find weak and/or inconsistent adherence to each standard on the other hypothesis.

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908 It is less useful to ask where an evangelist should have omitted material that he in fact retains. This question is difficult to answer, because whatever material he retains will always appear fitting for his gospel. In other words, the only answer to the question whether an evangelist should have omitted material that he in fact retains, is “No”.

Part 2. Applications of Rhetoric to The Synoptic Problem
Chapter 4
Rhetorical Criticism and the Triple Tradition

Having amassed rhetorical reasons for adapting chreiai, we may now compare chreia adaptations in the “Triple Tradition,” that is in material that is common to all three synoptic gospels, Matthew, Mark and Luke. In particular, we shall ask whether it is more plausible that Mark adapts Matthew and Luke’s chreiai as the Neo-Griesbach or Two-Gospel Hypothesis (2GH) argues, or whether Matthew and Luke have each adapted Mark’s chreia, a scenario argued by the 2DH and FH. We examine, that is, Mark-Matthew relations and Mark-Luke relations for the 2DH, 2GH and FH.\footnote{Although our focus here leaves unaddressed the question of Matthew-Luke relations from the perspective of the FH, we shall assess Luke’s use of Matthew in Chapter 5.} For this study, we have chosen a chreia that conforms to recent scholarly classification.\footnote{Klaus Berger, Formgeschichte des Neuen Testaments (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1984), 80-81.} The attention to detail that we require for a worthy assessment limits us to one Triple Tradition chreia. We choose Mark 2:18-22 because of its bona fide chreia form in all three synoptic versions, and because those versions are similar enough to invite comparison.\footnote{A fair comparison requires that the gospels overlap in at least their key case or propositio.}

We shall compare the evangelists’ work for changes that conform to our two criteria for literary dependence: sound rhetorical motive and attention to propriety. Again, by propriety, we mean the fit between contents and style (criterion D.1), and an evangelist’s incorporation of as much source material as possible to address his chief interests (criterion D.2). With these criteria for literary dependence in mind, we shall see
that some changes appear rhetorically acceptable, while other purported changes appear rhetorically implausible.\footnote{On the difficulty in establishing clear criteria for assessing the sequence of chreiai, see Robbins, “Progymnastic Rhetorical Composition,” 153, 158.}

\textbf{4.1: Description of Chreiai}

All three synoptic pericopae consist of a responsive, sayings chreia that is expanded and elaborated (see Table 4.1, Appendix 3). In the table we arrange the chreiai according to labels in the progymnasmata.\footnote{Along lines suggested by Kennedy: 1. Describe the unit in rhetorical terms (including exigence, \textit{propositio}, invention, arrangement and expression); and 2. Describe its setting or context (Kennedy, \textit{New Testament Interpretation}, 33-38). For describing chreiai with regard to species and activities of invention, arrangement and expression, see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 171-177.}

\textit{a) Mark 2:18-22.} Mark’s chreia (2:18-22) betrays two major compositional techniques: expansion (ἐπεκτέινωσις) and elaboration (ἔργον). The expansion begins in 2:18, where we learn that specific groups of Jews are fasting: the Pharisees (οἱ Φαρισαῖοι) and the disciples of John the Baptist (οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰωάννου). Together these Jews pose a question to Jesus, which implies a judicial στάσις: Do Jesus’ disciples have any justification for eating during a period in which Pharisaic Jews hold that it is necessary to fast?\footnote{The pericope’s boundaries correspond to the boundaries of the chreia.}

Since the Pharisees ask about behaviour unlike their own, we can be certain that they see no justification for Jesus and his disciples eating (2:18a).
Next, Mark composes an elaboration or ἔργασία (2:18b-22) that conforms closely to the pattern in Hermogenes. I am not the first to observe that Mark’s chreia conforms to an ἔργασία; Schenk has independently drawn attention to it.\textsuperscript{918} I believe that we need to take seriously the logic of chreia elaboration if we are to interpret Mark 2:18-22 correctly. This logic is straightforward: in a chreia elaboration, all arguments directly support the propositio. Such is the logic that characterizes elaboration of a chreia, at least according to Hermogenes.\textsuperscript{919}

Using the nuptual metaphors of νυμφίος ("bridegroom") to designate Jesus and υἱοὶ τοῦ νυμφῶνος ("sons of the wedding hall") to designate his disciples,\textsuperscript{920} Mark’s propositio is the χρεία saying (2:19a). As Mark’s Jesus puts it, “The sons of the bridegroom cannot fast in the time when the bridegroom is with them (can they)?” (2:19a).\textsuperscript{921} I believe that Mark intends this statement more or less exactly as it sounds: The presence of Jesus precludes his disciples’ fasting, leaves them “unable” (μὴ δύνανται) to fast.\textsuperscript{922} This is the view of Gundry and Marcus.\textsuperscript{923} It is not the view of Schenk, who argues from the following verse (2:19b) that the disciples’ adherence to

\textsuperscript{918} Schenk, “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 268-270.
\textsuperscript{919} See the discussion in Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 51, 57-63.
\textsuperscript{921} Or, during the time when (dative of duration): ἐν τῷ.
\textsuperscript{922} This propositio also contains a built-in rationale (σκύτλη: the second step in elaboration): the disciples cannot fast because of the presence of Jesus.
\textsuperscript{923} Jesus is “a kind of bridegroom whose presence makes fasting . . . impossible” (i.e., with Jesus, the disciples are not able [μὴ δύνανται] to fast; they could not even fast if they were permitted or wanted to do so): Gundry, Mark, 132-133. Gundry rightly draws attention to the portrayal of Jesus as authoritative here: Gundry, Mark, 131, 132. Cp. Marcus, Mark 1-8, 236: “The bulk of the passage . . . is focused on things that are impossible to do: to fast while the bridegroom is present.”
Jesus precludes fasting.\(^{924}\) Schenk’s view, though, not only complicates the chreia, but also violates the flow of chreia elaboration as Hermogenes presents it.\(^{925}\)

The remainder of Mark’s unit is remarkable for its conformity to chreia elaboration. His next step is precisely what the *Rhetorica ad Herrenium* (4.43.56) prescribes immediately following a *propositio*: a restatement. The restatement helps us see precisely what Mark’s Jesus is arguing: “For as much time as they [the disciples] have the bridegroom [Jesus] with them, they cannot fast” (ὡςον χρόνον ἐχουσιν τὸν νυμφίου μετ’ αὐτῶν οὐ δύνανται νηστεύειν).\(^{926}\) Here Jesus repeats that his presence precludes the disciples’ fasting, and Gundry shows that Mark uses several stylistic devices to this end.\(^{927}\) In short, Mark’s restatement nicely reinforces his *propositio*.

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\(^{924}\) “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 259: “[N]icht Jesus ist es, der die Zeitdauer begrenzen würde, sondern sie sind es gegebenenfalls; solange sie an ihm festhalten, ist Fasten für sie eine Unmöglichkeit.”

\(^{925}\) According to Hermogenes, the arguments support the *propositio*. “Let the elaboration be as follows... for example, ‘Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter but its fruit is sweet.’... [F]rom a comparison [i.e., analogy], ‘For just as farmers need to reap fruits by working the soil, so also with speeches.” Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Spengel, 6.7); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 77. According to Schenk, Mark’s *propositio* argues that only the disciples’ adhering to Jesus renders them rightly incapable of fasting (2:19b: “As long as they hold [ἐχουσιν] the bridegroom with them”: “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 259). Accordingly, when the disciples do fast in future, it will be an indication that they have “pull[ed]... away from... [the] Lord” (2:20: “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 259-260, 265-266). On this reading, Jesus’ *propositio* is essentially a caution against fasting or other Jewish acts of piety (“Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 251-255, 259-260, 266, 269, 272-273, 276). Schenk’s reading seems awkward for two reasons. First, it is not clear that the disciples’ adherence to Jesus determines whether they fast; in 2:19a, Jesus’ presence determines whether they fast. Second, Schenk’s reading violates the flow of chreia elaboration; it renders Mark’s arguments from analogy (2:21-2:22) incapable of supporting his *propositio*. The analogies argue that “nobody” would combine the old with the new because the new overpowers the old; Jesus’ presence determines whether people fast (Gundry, *Mark*, 134; esp. Marcus, *Mark 1-8*, 238). Pace Schenk then, it would appear clumsy to argue something totally different in 2:19b: that the disciples’ *loyalty* to Jesus determines whether they fast. By rhetorical standards, Gundry and Marcus more plausibly see the *propositio* (2:19b) and analogies (2:21-22) make one and the same argument: Jesus’ presence precludes fasting.

\(^{926}\) Rhet. ad Her. 4.43.56 (LCL, trans. Caplan). For the pattern and discussion see Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 57.

\(^{927}\) Gundry, *Mark*, 134, 132-133: “The mention of inability at the beginning and at the end of Jesus’ words in v 19 and the use of ‘day’ at the beginning and at the end of his words in v 20 form inclusions. These inclusions stress the difference that his presence and absence make between the present time of non-fasting and the future day of fasting (cf. J. Dewey, *Markan Public Debate*, 91). The delay of νηστεύειν, ‘to fast,’ in his counter question, ‘The sons of the wedding hall are not able... to fast, are they?’ gives emphasis to ‘while the bridegroom is with them’; and within the clause the delay of ἐστιν, ‘is,’ allows the accent to fall
Mark next takes a third step—a step that the ad Herrenium prescribes immediately following a restatement: argument from the opposite (adferre contrarium [4.43.56]; cp. κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον [Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel), 6.7]). Jesus offers precisely such an argument from the opposite, into which he builds a rationale (2:20).

Characteristic elaboration continues in Mark’s next (fourth) step, an argument from analogy (ἐκ παραβολῆς; simile). In fact Mark offers two arguments from analogy: the first using cloth (2:21), and the second using wine (2:22). If we remember that arguments in an elaboration support the propositio, then we can accurately grasp these analogies. In the first analogy, Mark’s Jesus asserts that a patch of new cloth sewn over an old, ripped garment will exacerbate the rip as it inevitably shrinks, and hence that it would be illogical to conjoin such new cloth to the garment (2:21). In the second analogy, Jesus similarly asserts that new wine’s expansion against older wineskins makes it illogical to pour such wine into old skins (2:22). On account of its power, the new wine does not permit coexistence with old wineskins. By analogy then,

on the bridegroom’s presence. The following up of this counter question with a declaration that repeats the notes of presence and inability . . . doubles the emphasis on the overpowering effect of his presence.”

928 See Rhet ad Her. 4.43.56 (LCL, trans. Caplan). Hermogenes recommends similarly: chreia, then rationale, then argument from opposite: Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 6.7); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 77.

929 “But days will come when the bridegroom is taken from them, and then they will fast in that day” (2:20).

930 Hermogenes, Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.8); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 77; Rhet. ad Her. 4.43.56 (LCL, trans. Caplan).

931 Hermogenes begins with the chreia saying (i.e., the propositio) itself: “‘Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter but its fruit is sweet.’ . . . Then [we support it] by [an argument] from a comparison, ‘For just as farmers need to reap fruits by working the soil, so also with speeches.’” The argument from analogy/comparison more or less directly supports the chreia. Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.7-8); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 77.

932 “Nobody stitches a patch of unshrunk cloth onto an old cloak.” Gundry points out that it is the power of the new cloth and new wine (i.e., of Jesus) that affects the garment and wineskins (Mark, 134; cp. Marcus, Mark 1-8, 238).

933 Whether we translate Mark 2:21 as “otherwise, the fullness takes away [something] from it [the garment], the new [takes away something] from the old (Gundry, Mark, 134), or as “the patch pulls away from it [the garment],” the result is the same: the new patch affects the garment.
the power of Jesus and his teaching does not permit coexistence with traditional customs like fasting.\textsuperscript{934}

Mark’s final elaborative step comes in his concluding clause: ἀλλὰ ὁ ὄνων νέον ἐὰς ἁσκοῦς καὶ νόμος (2:22b). Commentators have translated this clause in different ways. Because the clause lacks a verb, the translator must supply it. But which verb should we supply? The NRSV and Gundry render the clause “but one puts new wine into new wineskins.”\textsuperscript{935} The verb is third person and in the indicative mood. Marcus renders the clause “but [put] new wine into new wineskins!”\textsuperscript{936} Here the verb is in the imperative mood. Attractive as this proposal is for its conformity to the hortatory conclusion of an elaborated chreia, it misinterprets the grammar: as Metzger points out, Mark 2:22 contains a parenthetical construction in which the initial verb ἑλλὰ ἐὰς (“No one pours . . .” [v. 22a]) is to be applied not only to the first clause but also, following the clause ἐὰς δὲ μὴ . . . ἁσκοῖ, to the second clause (v. 22b).\textsuperscript{937} But in any case, the clause implies the same thing: just as new wine permits coexistence only with new wineskins, so Jesus’ authority permits coexistence only with new forms of piety that abstain from fasts.

Mark’s chreia about fasting stands solidly within its narrative context. The work of Joanna Dewey has taught critics to recognize that 2:18-22 is the central pericope

\textsuperscript{934} Marcus, Mark I-8, 238. According to Gundry, Jesus, the new cloth and the new wineskins share tremendous authority (Mark, 131, 132): “The point consists in the power of the new” (p. 134). Gundry rightly draws attention to Jesus’ power, but he does not take account of the phrase “nobody puts” (“Nobody puts new wine into old wineskins [2:22]”: no sensible person would try to juxtapose Jesus’ overpowering presence with old customs.

\textsuperscript{935} Gundry, Mark, 134.

\textsuperscript{936} Marcus, Mark I-8, 235, 236.

\textsuperscript{937} Metzger, TCGNT, 67. An additional attractive point of this translation is that it fosters the very parallelism that Mark works so hard to create across vv. 21-22. Although Hermogenes prescribes a concluding exhortation (Progymnasmata [ed. Spengel, 6.8]; Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 77), other chreia elaboration patterns (Rhet. ad Her. 4.43.56 [LCL, trans. Caplan]), do not require exhortation.
within a chiastic arrangement extending from 2:1 to 3:6. Paired with a pericope about feasting (2:13-17), the pericope on fasting stands within a macro-unit characterized by particular themes that include Jesus’ authority and Jesus’ conflict and “incompatibility” with Jewish religious elites. At one and the same time Marcus draws attention to a growing hostility in 2:1-3:6 between Jesus and his Jewish opponents, a hostility that escalates from their first encounter at the healing of the paralytic (2:1-12), to their standoff over Sabbath healing (3:1-6). In this context, Mark argues that Jesus’ authority trumps and obviates fasting.

b) Matt. 9:14-17. Matthew similarly subjects his chreia to rhetorical expansion (ἐπεκτείνωσις) and elaboration (ἐργασία). The expansion begins in 9:14, where John’s disciples approach Jesus to pose a question. The question in 9:14, with a slight variation, calls to mind the same judicial στάσις as in Mark, but as John’s disciples pose the question it could as easily infer a deliberative or forward-looking στάσις. In either case, the question is this: Does Jesus have justification for his disciples to eat when John’s disciples and the Pharisees fast?

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939 “The three central controversy stories (2:13-17; 2:18-22; 2:23-28) all concern the theme of eating, are pure examples of the controversy form, and have a consistent cast of characters: Jesus, his opponents, and the disciples.” Marcus, Mark 1-8, 212-214 (quotation from p. 213).
940 On authority see Gundry, Mark, 5-6 (Gundry disputes whether conflict is a major theme in 2:1-3:6); on conflict see Marcus, Mark 1-8, 212-214, 235. From Marcus I take the term conflict (p. 212).
941 Marcus, Mark 1-8, 214, 235. I do not agree with Marcus’ outline of the pericope itself, which overlooks considerations of rhetoric.
943 In the preceding pericope (9:9-13), the Pharisees question Jesus, whereas in 9:14-17, John’s disciples question Jesus.
944 As Metzger explains, this term “is obviously a scribal assimilation to the parallel in Lk 5.33, where πῦκνα is read without variation.” TCGNT, 20.
Matthew’s chreia and its elaboration answer this question (9:15-17); but Gundry points out that Matthew’s answer is different and lacks certain of Mark’s steps.945 The elaboration begins similarly enough; as in Mark, Matthew’s Jesus offers a *propositio*: “The attendants of the bridegroom cannot mourn for as long as the bridegroom is with them, can they?” (9:15). And as in Mark, Matthew’s Jesus rolls the *propositio* together with a rationale (*αἰτία*), explaining that his disciples are unable to fast because of his presence. A striking difference from Mark’s gospel is in allusion: Matthew’s Jesus equates fasting with *mourning* (*πενηθέω* [9:15]) and in this perhaps alludes to Isaiah946 and more clearly to Amos and his prediction of woe for Israel (Amos 8:8,10).947

Matthew’s elaboration continues in 9:15, but without Mark’s restatement (Mark 2:19b).948 Instead Matthew proceeds directly to an argument from the opposite (9:15b / cp. Mark 2:20).949 The argument is straightforward: while Jesus’ presence renders fasting inappropriate, his absence will render fasting appropriate again not just for one day, but for the whole future. This argument remains almost verbally identical to that in Mark, but it differs in the details: Matthew envisions the disciples fasting regularly after Jesus’ death. That is to say, for Matthew fasting is not to become a useless or defunct custom. Rather, with his positive view of the Law, Matthew understands fasting to be a highly valuable practice that Jesus’ followers should resume in the period following his ministry; accordingly, for the Matthean Jesus, the disciples are to abstain from fasting

946 Gundry, *Matthew*, 169: “With an eye on Jesus’ being ‘taken away’ in death (cf. Isa 53:8), he . . . puts ‘to mourn’ in place of ‘to fast.’” Whether Mark associates such fasting with mourning is not clear, although Marcus believes that he does. For Mark’s allusions to Amos see Marcus, *Mark 1-8*, 234.
947 *πενηθέω* is not in Isaiah 53, but occurs repeatedly in Amos 8. Mark too alludes to mourning in Amos, using different words, on which see Marcus, *Mark 1-8*, 234.
948 A step recommended by *Rhetorica ad Herrenium* (Mark 2:19b).
949 For direct progression see Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Rabe, 6.10); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 78.
only temporarily (9:15b).\textsuperscript{950} This fact explains why Matthew lacks certain touches in Mark like the closing phrase “in that day” (Mark 2:20).\textsuperscript{951}

Matthew’s chreia elaboration continues with a fourth step, much as in Mark, in the form of arguments from analogy (9:16-17; cp. Mark 2:21-22). But as Gundry points out, Matthew’s analogies are distinct: unlike Mark, Matthew’s analogies encourage Christians to keep fasting—metaphorically speaking, to keep the old garment and old wineskins (9:17a, 9:17b).

Emphasis falls on the wineskins as well as the wine. Their preservation links with Matthew’s stress on the coming of Jesus to fulfill the law and the prophets rather than destroy them (5:17-20). Thus the resumption and continuance of fasting after the brief interlude of Jesus’ ministry . . . exemplifies this preservative fulfillment. Individual identifications of the old wineskins, new wine, and new wineskins spoil a simple metaphor concerning the need to preserve a good religious practice.\textsuperscript{952}

For Matthew then, Jesus’ presence now temporarily precludes fasting.

Matthew carefully arranges this chreia in its narrative context. In some ways the context calls Mark’s gospel to mind. Like Mark, Matthew precedes the chreia with two pericopae: the first shows Jesus healing a paralytic and forgiving his sins (9:2-8; cp. Mark 2:1-12), and the second has Jesus engage in fellowship with sinners (9:9-13; cp. Mark 2:13-17). These two scenes, as in Mark, share the context of eating. Further, over the course of these pericopae, explains Luz, there is consistent conflict between Jesus and his Jewish opponents, although Matthew takes care to specify distinct opponents in each of the three pericopae (first scribes [9:3], then Pharisees [9:11], and in our chreia the

\textsuperscript{950} Gundry, \textit{Matthew}, 169, 171.
\textsuperscript{951} According to Gundry, Matthew on the 2DH eliminates this phrase and makes other grammatical changes in 9:15, precisely in order to give a positive place to fasting (\textit{Matthew}, 169).
\textsuperscript{952} Gundry, \textit{Matthew}, 171.
disciples of John [9:14]). So Matthew and Mark are rather similar in some ways. In other ways, Matthew’s context markedly differs from Mark’s context. For example, Matthew’s pericopae mirror only the first half of Mark’s larger chiasm (that is, 2:1-22) in Mark 2:1-3:6. Matthew’s pericopae belong to a larger thematic section that Luz characterizes as miracle-focused; this section begins in 8:1 and progresses to a set of “concluding miracles” (such as the healing of two blind men [9:27-31]) that ends in 9:35. Still, Matthew ends his section like Mark in a conflictual manner: As Luz puts it, the miracle section “introduce[s] the division that the Messiah creates in his people and that will end with Israel’s rejection of Jesus.”

c) Luke 5:33-39. Luke’s chreia shares with Mark and Matthew the proposicio that Jesus’ presence prevents his disciples from fasting (Luke 5:34). But Luke’s Jesus does not say that his disciples “are unable to fast [μὴ δύνανται . . . νηστεύειν]” because he is present (Mark 2:19a / Matt. 9:15), but rather that the Pharisees “are unable to make . . . [the disciples] fast [μὴ δύνασθε . . . ποιήσαι νηστεύσαι]” because he is present (Luke 5:34). Instead of emphasizing Jesus’ authority over disciples then, Luke emphasizes Jesus’ authority over against the Pharisees.

In Luke’s chreia expansion (5:33), the Pharisees accuse Jesus of failing to instruct his disciples to fast; his disciples are instead “eating and drinking” (5:33). As in Mark and Matthew, Jesus replies with the proposicio (the χρεία saying): the Pharisees cannot exercise authority over Jesus’ disciples on account of his authority (5:34). Luke then

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953 Luz, Matthew, 26. According to Luz, Matthew intends to craft 9:9-13 (eating with sinners) and 9:14-17 (our fasting controversy) as one narrative unit—one dinner, during which Jesus debates with Pharisees and then turns to answer the disciples of John (9:14). Luz, Matthew, 26, 36. It seems that Mark also intends one scene or story to contain both 2:13-17 and 2:18-22.
954 Luz, Matthew, vii, 1, 39, 50.
955 Luz, Matthew, 50.
elaborates this *propositio* first with an argument from the opposite (κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον), specifying what Matthew and Mark’s Jesus says less directly: the disciples will in future fast because (καὶ ὁταῦτα . . . τότε) Jesus’ authority will be absent (5:35; cp. Matt. 9:15 / Mark 2:20). Luke continues with two arguments from analogy (ἐκ παραβολῆς), to which he even applies the proper rhetorical label (5:36). While these analogies are generally the same as in Matthew and Mark, Luke’s *accent* is on irreconcilability of Jesus and Pharisaic practices, as in the analogy of old and new cloth in 5:36. As one critic puts it,

Luke’s form of the saying . . . makes two points: the new garment is ruined by the piece being cut from it [contrast Mark 2:21], and the patch will not fit properly on the old garment. . . . The [general] point is that the old and new ways cannot be combined.

Luke’s first analogy then highlights the “incompatibility” of new and old cloth (5:36). Similarly, Luke’s second analogy speaks of the incompatibility of new wine with old wineskins (5:37). By Luke’s analogies then, Jesus and the Pharisees are entirely at odds with each other.

Unlike the other synoptists, Luke closes with a third analogy: “nobody drinking the old wine wants the new; for he says, ‘The old is useful’” (5:39). Against Bovon’s

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956 For this reading see Schenk, “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 259-260.
960 “The reader’s attention . . . is not directed to the superiority of the new over the old, but rather to their incompatibility.” Fitzmyer, *Luke I-IX*, 601.
assertion that 5:39 is not authentically Lukan, the Greek New Testament committee and various commentators regard “the external attestation for the inclusion of this verse . . . almost overwhelming.”962 But if we accept the verse, we need to grapple with two rather different interpretations of it. An older interpretation holds that 5:39 actually opposes the preceding chreia.963 On this view, which takes the “old wine” to be a metaphor for the Pharisees or their fasting practices, Luke’s Jesus argues that nobody should try new wine, nobody should, that is, follow Jesus, when (s)he knows already that “the old is good,” knows in other words to follow Pharisaic practices. On a newer, very different interpretation, Luke 5:39 does not imply that people should follow Pharisaic practices. Rather, it condemns people who follow these Pharisaic practices.964 This view makes good sense in three ways. First, an antagonistic and condemnatory tone in 5:39 accords with Jesus’ similar tone towards Pharisees earlier in the pericope. Second, 5:39 sounds rhetorically intuitive as a conclusion: its condemnatory tone calls to mind the necessary παράδοσις towards opponents that characterizes the conclusions (ἔπιλογοι) of judicial speeches. And last but not least, to suppose that Luke’s Jesus tries to sound paradoxical in 5:39 seems implausible.

Luke carefully sets 5:33-39 into his larger narrative context. According to recent study, Luke 5:33-39 belongs within a major section of Jesus’ Galilean ministry (5:1-7:50), and within this macro-section it belongs to a set of pericopae linked by themes of

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conflict as well as healing and especially the calling of disciples (5:1-6:16).\textsuperscript{965} As Culpepper shows, 5:33-39 illustrates Jesus’ disagreement with religious authorities in the context of his calling disciples, and stands shortly after the pivot or centerpiece of the larger section (Luke 5:1-6:16): Jesus’ calling of Levi (5:27-32).\textsuperscript{966}

4.2: Mark’s Adaptation of Matthew and Luke (the Two-Gospel Hypothesis [2GH])

On our first scenario, part of the Neo-Griesbach Hypothesis or 2GH, Mark conflates Matthew and Luke’s gospels. In order to assess how plausible Mark’s alleged work is, let us focus on his motivations in 2:18-22.\textsuperscript{967} We are not the first to observe that the 2GH has only recently attempted to explore the question of motivation at all. Critics including Kloppenborg have charged the hypothesis with failing adequately to explain why Mark would adapt Matthew and Luke along lines of ancient literary practices. Indeed, for Kloppenborg, proponents of all source hypotheses have tended to blur descriptions of an evangelist’s purported activity with explanations for it. For an adequate explanation, critics must reason why—most profitably, by examining ancient non-Christian analogies—authors would adapt sources.\textsuperscript{968}

To be fair, proponents of the 2GH have offered some explanation for Mark’s conflational work, although it is not grounded in literary practices. According to


\textsuperscript{967} It is beyond the scope of this work to consider conflation; the texts that we examined (in Chapters 2 and 3) tended not to conflate sources, and conflation has recently been the object of scrutiny elsewhere. See Derrenbacker, Ancient Compositional Practices, 128-143, 151-163.

\textsuperscript{968} Kloppenborg, Excavating Q, 43. Cp. his comments cited in Derrenbacker, Ancient Compositional Practices, 8 n. 22.
Farmer, Mark combines the perspectives of Jewish Christianity (Matthew) and Gentile Christianity (Luke) into one coherent gospel suitable for new Christians from either heritage, and in the context of late first or early second century persecution in the Roman Empire. Other proponents of the 2GH, explains Derrenbacker, have begun to look more closely at ancient literary conventions, seeking support in the work of epitomes and of historical writing described by Lucian of Samosata. Foremost among such efforts is the recent monograph from the Research Team of the International Institute for Gospel Studies, entitled *One Gospel from Two: Mark’s Use of Matthew and Luke* (2002). According to Derrenbacker, these investigations have been few and not very convincing when measured against ancient compositional practices.

In *One Gospel from Two*, the Research Team ventures to explain some of Mark’s editorial decisions from literary conventions including what it calls Mark’s *rhetoric*. The Research Team outlines what it believes, independent of any source hypothesis, to be Mark’s major motifs, including the power of Jesus and the weakness of Jesus’ disciples, who are caught between demonstrations of his power and their own opposition to him. According to the Research Team, these motifs point to Mark’s overarching aim to

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972 On the paucity of such studies see Derrenbacker, *Ancient Compositional Practices*, 9, 144-151, 162-163.

provide a “unified theological vision” that centres upon the Son of God exonerated.\textsuperscript{974} Significantly, the Research Team believes that Mark’s aims and themes can help explain how he adapts Matthew and Luke’s gospels, articulating and sharpening their focus on his desired themes and purpose.\textsuperscript{975} The Research Team’s method, however, is not rhetorical-critical, for it does not address conventions in general or in 2:18-22 that we have come to associate with ancient rhetoric.\textsuperscript{976} In not seeking independent rhetorical practices to account for Markan redaction, the Research Team’s method appears as “little more than statements of what [Mark] . . . must have done.”\textsuperscript{977}

We therefore need to pose the question afresh: Why rhetorically does Mark adapt Matt. 9:14-17 / Luke 5:33-39? Mark has two significant reasons. One reason, a biographical reason, is to strengthen Jesus’ image as authoritative—to draw attention to Jesus’ power and authority, the “new” quality of his presence (reason B [above, pp. 218-221]).\textsuperscript{978} Mark’s second reason is to render his sources’ style plainer (reason C [above, pp. 218-221]).

In the accompanying table (4.2, Appendix 3), green denotes changes, including borrowings from one gospel over against the other gospel, that augment Jesus’

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{974} Peabody, \textit{One Gospel from Two}, 62, 63. The Research Team here does characterize the ancient genre of Mark as βιογραφία or biography.
\item \textsuperscript{975} Peabody, \textit{One Gospel from Two}, 59-60.
\item \textsuperscript{976} There is no further mention in the book of rhetorical criticism, nor is there an index of ancient authors whose methods might prove informative. In \textit{One Gospel from Two}, 106-107, Peabody does observe that Mark “destroys the poetic alliteration (ἐπιβόλαλει + ἐπιβλήμασι) of the Greek version of this saying . . . in Matthew and Luke.”
\item \textsuperscript{977} C. M. Tuckett, “Review of Allan J. McNicol, \textit{Beyond the Q Impasse: Luke’s Use of Matthew},” \textit{JBL} 117 (1998): 365, quoted in Derrenbacker, \textit{Ancient Compositional Practices}, 150. Tuckett is referring to the Research Team’s earlier publication on Luke’s use of Matthew, but the criticism can apply also to \textit{One Gospel from Two}.
\item \textsuperscript{978} Gundry highlights Mark’s concern in \textit{Mark}, 132, 133, esp. 134. Gundry does not argue, however, that Mark changes Matthew and Luke; I am inferring how Mark needs to change Matthew and Luke.
\end{itemize}
authority.\textsuperscript{979} Gray denotes changes towards plainer style, while an overlay of colours denotes both aims together. The 2GH requires that in the Triple Tradition, Mark refashion his sources through micro-conflation; he adapts Matthew and Luke at the level of sentences and phrases.\textsuperscript{980} Let us consider Mark’s reasons to adapt Matthew and Luke in more detail.

1. Enhancing Jesus’ authority. Mark highlights Jesus’ special authority over fasting. In 2:18a, Mark begins by changing Matthew’s προσέρχονται to ἔρχονται and changing λέγοντες into the indicative λέγουσιν. Mark’s use of the historic present ἔρχονται and λέγουσιν together create a vividness which will recur frequently and which, notes Gundry, “highlights the question of authority” between Jesus and his opponents.\textsuperscript{981}

In 2:18b, Mark makes further and multiple changes that intensify this “authority question.”\textsuperscript{982} First, Mark significantly tightens verbal repetitions, and so enhances the sentence’s vividness in Matthew 9:14b/Luke 9:33.

\[\text{διὰ τί οἱ μαθηταὶ ἰωάννου καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ τῶν Φαρισαίων ἦσαν νηστεύοντες, ὥς ἔσε ὁ Μάθηται οὐ νηστεύοντες; (2:18b)}\]

\textsuperscript{979} In green I also include changes towards more vivid style. Vividness (ἐναργεία) characterizes clarity and it helps to highlight fundamental ideas.

\textsuperscript{980} This accords with possibilities listed by Farmer, “The Two-Gospel Hypothesis: The Statement of the Hypothesis,” 134.

\textsuperscript{981} Gundry, Mark, 132. For vividness (ἐνάργεια, evidentia) as a quality of plain style, and for various types of vividness see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 810 (810-819), 319, 334; Demetrius, De Elocutione 208-220 (LCL, trans. Innes). According to Demetrius, “vividness” (ἐνάργεια) or visual appeal to one’s imagination, is permissible in a plain style; one way to create it is through repetition (De Elocutione 208-211). Cp. BDF § 321: “The historical present can replace the aorist indicative in a vivid narrative at the events of which the narrator imagine himself to be present. . . . This usage is common among NT authors, especially Mk” (emphasis added). Granted, Mark also appears simply to dislike Matthew’s verb προσέρχονται: Mark uses it five times (1:31, 6:35, 10:2, 12:28 and 14:45); Matthew uses it over fifty times.

\textsuperscript{982} Gundry, Mark, 132.
As Gundry explains, Mark here draws attention to the issue of authority between Jesus and the Pharisees and John. By writing two parallel clauses with vivid repetitions (δι' αὐτής . . . νηστεύουσιν, οί δὲ . . . οὐ νηστεύουσιν;), Mark anticipates and so enhances the coming propositio (2:19); the clauses in 2:18 essentially ask, “Who has authority?” and so anticipate the case that Jesus has authority. In building vivid repetition, Mark chiefly follows Matthew, whose latent repetition Mark tightens with an added μαθηταί and νηστεύουσιν. Mark also borrows Luke’s phrase οί μαθηταί ἱσοάννου to intensify the contrast between John and the Pharisees’ disciples on the one hand, and Jesus’ disciples on the other. In this careful and deft combination of elements from Matthew and Luke, Mark paints a more authoritative image of Jesus. This is but the first occasion on which Mark combines words and phrases for biographical ends.

In 2:19a, Mark frames and underscores the propositio of Jesus’ authority with an inclusion using μὴ δύνανται (cp. 2:19a and 2:19b). Mark underscores that authority further by vividly repeating νηστεύειν. To construct these figures, Mark finds the first δύνανται in both Matthew and Luke’s gospels, and the first νηστεύειν strictly in Luke (5:34: νηστευόσαι). Mark’s delay of the second νηστεύειν to the very end of 2:19a not only creates parallelism but also highlights the phrase “in the time when the bridegroom

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983 Gundry, Mark, 132.
984 Indicated by Gundry, Mark, 132. We could regard Mark as clarifying Matthew and Luke, although it is clarification in the sense of drawing attention to Jesus’ authority. Quotation from Gundry, Mark, 132. If as Gundry says, the Pharisees in fact did not have disciples (Mark, 132), it would be hard to see how Mark could find Matthew 9:14 unclear. Rather, Mark heightens the issue of authority.
985 Mark also borrows Luke’s vivid pronoun σοί (hence creating the phrase σοί μαθηταί: “the for-you-disciples”). But pace Gundry (Mark, 132), Mark probably does not use σοί to intensify the contrast or hostility between parties, for σοί is simply a dative reflexive pronoun and is not really emphatic here.
986 Gundry, Mark, 132.
987 Matthew, who prefers πενθείν, stands in the way of repeating νηστεύειν.
is with them, further accenting Jesus’ authority. Again, Mark cleverly combines elements from Matthew and Luke to emphasize his portrayal of Jesus.

Mark’s fourth move is to add a restatement (2:19b): this of course underscores the propositio, not only by vividly repeating δύνανται (in an inclusion) and ἡστεύειν, but also by vividly repeating the propositio as a plain fact: “For as much time as they have [or: hold] the bridegroom with them, they cannot fast” (2:19b). This is an improvement on Matthew and Luke, who have posed the propositio only negatively and as a question (Matt. 9:15a / Luke 5:34).

Following his restatement, Mark ornaments his next unit, an argument from the opposite (κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον: 2:20), with a second inclusion, this time using “day(s)” (ἡμέρας . . . ἡμέρας). In this Mark ornaments Matthew on the basis of what he sees in Luke. Nevertheless, it is striking, as Gundry notes, how Mark uses these inclusions one immediately after the other. As he puts it, “the mention of inability at the beginning and at the end of Jesus’ words in v 19 [the propositio] and the use of ‘day’ at the beginning and at the end of his words in v 20 [the restatement] form inclusions. These . . . stress the difference that his presence and absence make between the present time of non-fasting and the future day of fasting.”

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988 Without reference to a source hypothesis, Gundry points out the significance of the phrase’s position here (Mark, 132-133).
989 Gundry, Mark, 132.
990 In 2:20 Mark weakens Luke’s inclusion by changing Luke’s second σι ἡμέρας (plural) to ἡ ἡμέρα (singular). Mark does, though, have good reason for this change; see the following note.
991 Gundry, Mark, 132 (citing Joanna Dewey, Markan Public Debate, 91). The latter inclusion (ἡμέρας . . . ἡμέρας) might also highlight the eschatological character of Jesus’ coming passion. This is pointed out by Marcus, Mark 1-8, 234 (referring to both “days will come” and “in that day”), who observes in the singular ἡμέρα an allusion to Amos 8 (LXX) which casts Jesus’ death as “an apocalyptic event.”
Mark’s most impressive changes underlining Jesus’ authority begin in 2:21-22, where he adapts Matthew and Luke (Matt. 9:16-17/Luke 5:36-38) to enhance a “triple parallelism” in wording and in ideas.  

(21) [A] Οὐδεὶς ἐπίβλημα ῥάκους ἀγνάφου ἐπιράπτει ἐπὶ ἰματίον παλαιόν

(22) [A’] καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁσκοῦσα παλαιόσα ἁσκοῦσα
[B’] εἰ δὲ μὴ, ῥήζει ὁ ὁινὸς τοῦ ἁσκοῦσα [C’] καὶ ὁ ὁινὸς ἀπολλύται καὶ οἱ ἁσκοὶ.

ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁσκοῦσα καινοῦσα.  

We base this diagram on Gundry’s commentary, and we quote his incisive summary of the parallelism and further techniques that underscore Jesus’ authority:

“The triple parallelism of the two illustrative sayings heaps enormous emphasis on the irresistibility of Jesus’ new teaching: (1) ‘no one sews a patch of unshrunken cloth on an old garment’ is paralleled by ‘no one puts new wine into old wineskins’; (2) ‘otherwise, the fullness takes away [something] from it, the new [takes away something] from the old’ is paralleled by ‘otherwise, the wine bursts the wineskins’; (3) ‘and a worse rip comes about’ is paralleled by ‘and the wine is lost, and also the wineskins [are lost].’ . . . Yet further emphasis accrues to the irresistibility of Jesus’ new teaching from the repetitive explanation, ‘the new from the old’ [τὸ καινὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ], from the additional subject ‘also the wineskins’ [καὶ οἱ ἁσκοὶ] from the multiple ellipses [e.g., in 2:22b] (which add vigor), and from the emphatic forward positions in the Greek text of ‘a patch of unshrunken cloth,’ ‘a worse rip,’ and ‘the wine’ before ‘is lost’ (against Mark’s usual placement of a subject after its verb). The point does not consist in the destruction of the old. In fact, the new is subject to destruction, too: the destruction of the wine which is new, is mentioned even before the destruction of the wineskins, which are old; and the worse ripped garment now includes the new patch. The point consists in the power of the new. And since the destruction of the old is mentioned alongside that of the new and nothing is said about preserving either one (contrast the synoptic parallels and Gos. Thom. 47), the point consists solely in the power of the new.”

993 The parallelism is described by Gundry, Mark, 134.
994 Gundry, Mark, 134.
To convey such power, Mark uses some material common to Matthew and Luke, namely the analogies of powerful cloth and wine. He takes other material from either Matthew’s gospel or Luke’s gospel, micro-conflicting their contributions. Mark borrows his inclusion (2:20) for instance from Luke, borrows the historic present (2:18a) from Matthew, borrows the forward position of his clause “in the time when the bridegroom is with them” (2:19) from Luke, and borrows much of the parallelism in the Pharisees’ question (2:18b) from Matthew. As he adapts, Mark also omits some material that is less relevant to Jesus’ authority, including Luke 5:36. Overall we receive an impression that Mark is mining his sources for elements that can accent Jesus’ authority.995

2. A plainer style. Thus far, we have seen that Mark emphasizes Jesus’ authority. Mark also aims to foster plainer style in places: a style that shows conciseness, plausibility and clarity. It is worth remembering that clarity (σαφήνεια), one of rhetoric’s fundamental principles, denotes conventional words and syntax and is more or less free of artistic ornaments and figures.996 Beginning in 2:19, Mark appropriately fosters plainer style in his narrative and proof material. Here Mark prefers Matthew’s sequence of elements (καὶ ἐπιθετός ὁ Ἰησοῦς [Matt. 9:15]) over Luke’s less conventional...

In all, Mark adapts to foster plainer style and especially to draw attention to Jesus’ authority. The former motive accounts for seven or eight changes, while the latter accounts for close to twenty changes.

Assessing Mark’s Adaptations of Matthew

Mark’s interest in intensifying the portrayal of Jesus’ authority and in fostering plainer style are plausible; they make sense given our reading of Plutarch and Josephus. Mark’s interests also make sense in the context of his composition in the surrounding narrative (2:1-3:6), for Gundry has shown that Mark accents Jesus’ authority throughout it. The evangelist’s changes in 2:18-22 are in perfect accord then with his emphasis in

997 To judge by comments in BDF § 472. Mark clarifies the introduction to the unit in his first sentence (2:18a), by adding that the Pharisees and John the Baptist’s disciples undertook to fast.
998 See BDF §§ 233, 235(1).
1000 We could include changes towards vividness (ἐνάργεια) within plain style, since several authorities regard vividness a quality of clarity (σαφήνεια): see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 319, 334, 810; according to Demetrius, a plain (ἰσχυρός) style should be characterized by vividness (ἐνάργεια). “[V]ividness . . . comes first from the use of precise detail and from omitting and excluding nothing . . . . Consequently repetition is often more vivid than a single mention.” Demetrius, De Elocutione 210-211 (LCL, trans. Innes). But I include changes towards vividness under the motive of enhancing Jesus’ authority, for the changes all function to highlight Jesus.
1001 Gundry, Mark, 6.
2:1-3:6. Usually, moreover, Mark does not miss Matthean material that would support his biographical aims (criterion D.2). Indeed, we have seen that Mark repeatedly goes to some length to combine elements from Matthew and Luke that accent Jesus’ authority.

Less certain, however, is Mark’s tendency to substitute in Matthew words and syntax that are conspicuously less **clear** in places that require clear style (criterion D.1). Mark appears inattentive to propriety, for he inserts multiple linguistic ambiguities into his adaptation of Matthew. Clarity, we recall, is one of the single most important conventions in ancient rhetoric (Chapter 1), particularly in parts of the chreia that approximate a speech’s **narratio**, **propositio** and logical proofs. Yet in these places, Mark attenuates such clarity and clouds the expression several times.\textsuperscript{1003} Let us highlight five such changes to the body of Matthew’s chreia (Matt. 9:14-16). For one, Mark juxtaposes at close range references to apparently different groups fasting (2:18a vs. 2:18b; cp. Matt. 9:14). This conspicuous complication leaves the reader guessing whether the Pharisees are fasting (2:18a) or the “disciples of the Pharisees” are fasting (2:18b). To imagine that Mark would prefer this formulation in place of Matthew’s single “Why do the Pharisees fast?” [9:14]) is improbable. Second, when Mark adds a restatement that emphasizes Jesus’ authority over fasting (2:19b), his choice of εὑρίσκω, a verb that has two meanings, creates ambiguity: Mark doubtless wants to convey that the disciples will avoid fasting “for so long as they have the bridegroom with them,” but readers could easily (mis)understand the sentence to mean “for so long as they hold the bridegroom with them.” The latter version contradicts Mark’s emphasis upon Jesus’ authority. Third, Mark

\textsuperscript{1002} Mark’s tendency to write more vividly also appears plausible, calling to mind a number of Josephus’ changes to 1 Kgdms (LXX) 12:1-25 (Ant. 6.86-94).

\textsuperscript{1003} Several observations here I infer from Gundry’s discussion of clarifications that Matthew makes to Mark; see Gundry, Mark, 132, 134, and Gundry, Matthew, 169-170.
adds a highly unusual verb in 2:21a (par. Matt. 9:16a). This verb, ἐπιράπτει ("to sew on") is a hapax legomenon in the New Testament and rare in other ancient literature. Granted, the verb is effective in its vividness and graphic clarity. But to substitute such an unusual term in place of Matthew’s more conventional and still vivid term (ἐπιβάλλω: “to throw over”) appears implausible, for such a term violates clarity’s premium upon comprehensible and easily recognized speech. Mark also needs to make a similar change to Luke (5:36), replacing Luke’s direct term καίνως (“new” [cloth]) with ἀγνάφως (“uncarded” cloth), a term that we find only twice in the New Testament (Mark 2:21 and Matt. 9:16), and that, given the existence of a specialized clothing industry in Palestine, would appear rather technical. In a further obfuscation, Mark eschews Matt. 9:16a’s clearer word sequence in 2:21a (delaying the verb [ἐπιράπτει] to a position after the object [ἐπιβλημα ῥόκους ἀγνάφου]). He similarly rejects Matt. 9:16b’s clearer syntax in 2:21b. In one instance, moreover, Mark ignores the relative clarity of both Matthew and Luke.

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1004 According to LSJ, the term appears in writings of the physician Galen (second century CE) and the epic poet Nonnus (fourth/fifth century CE). My search of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (www.tlg.uci.edu) using the stem ἐπιράπ- yields occurrences only in Mark 2:21 and in Galen. These results indicate that the verb is rare. Cp. similarly Turner, Style, 40 (“a very rare word”).

1005 On ἐπιβάλλω see AGNT, 26. Rowe remarks that “rhetoricians . . . understand the object of clarity to be the immediate apprehension of the speaker’s remarks even by inattentive readers or listeners. . . . [T]hey discern two areas where clarity could be achieved or lost—in the selection of single words and in the combination of words. Regarding the former, it is the speaker’s task to select the word which is the first to designate an object or an idea and which through constant use has become the appropriate word (verbum proprium). Types of inappropriate words include . . . the word removed from usage.” Rowe, “Style,” 123-124; cp. similarly Lausberg, Handbook §§ 532-533.


1007 Gundry, Mark, 134, and Matthew, 170.

1008 On conjunctions as fostering clarity, see Demetrius, De Elocutione 192 (LCL, trans. Innes). From the perspective of the 2DH and FH, Matthew in 9:16b replaces Mark’s αἱρεὶ τὸ πλήρωμα ἀπ’ σῶτοι τὸ καίνων τοῦ παλαίου (2:21b) with αἱρεὶ γάρ τὸ πλήρωμα σῶτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰματίου (9:16b). In this, Gundry detects a clarification of Mark: “Mark’s rough text is translated literally ‘Otherwise, it [the patch] draws away the fullness [the overlapping edge of the patch] from it [from the garment], the new from the old’ (see M. G. Steinhauser in ExpTim 87 [1976] 312-13). . . . Matthew simplifies the text, so that it reads ‘For its fullness [that of the patch] takes away from the garment.’ In other words, the unshrunk patch
These are but the most obvious changes against clear style; Mark makes further such changes too. In 2:18, he inverts Matthew’s conventional sequence of noun-pronoun, in 2:19a he postpones the infinitive νηστεύειν to the very end of his sentence, and in 2:19-20 he inserts inclusions with δύνανται and ἡμέρᾳ. While these devices might be biographically effective, taken together they begin to pull away from clear speech.

Granted, when Mark reaches his final verse, essentially his conclusion (2:22, esp. 2:22c), his changes to Matthew appear more natural and appropriate: Mark’s ellipses (2:22b, 2:22c) and his forward positioning of his noun ὀίνος (2:22b, 2:22c) afford good examples. But these do not excuse Mark’s host of similar changes earlier in material that should be clear.

While Mark makes several adjustments towards plainer style in material that demands it, his changes are offset by a number of occasions on which he conspicuously attenuates clarity. Mark’s rhetorical motives are sound enough, and Mark certainly is entitled to adapt Matthew and Luke to satisfy those motives; indeed, rhetorical theory even permits some stylistic ornament and flourishes to this end in an otherwise plain style. Every evangelist, moreover, will elevate on occasion his putative sources’ style in places that rhetorical theory requires be generally plain. But Mark introduces obfuscation and ornament regularly enough into his adaptation of Matthew’s chreia when his style should remain plain, that his work looks rhetorically counterintuitive.

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1009 I.e., replacing ἐπιβάλλω (Luke 5:36) with ἐπιράπτω.
1010 See Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 309-314; Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 208-222 (LCL, trans. Innes). Demetrius (below, Table 1.2, Appendix 1) encourages “vividness” in plain style, and such vividness can include ornaments of “repetition” (211) and hence parallelism, “circumstantial detail” (217), insinuation (216), and epanalepsis, “the resumptive repetition of the same particle in the course of a long sentence.”
Assessing Mark’s Adaptations of Luke

Mark has a sound biographical reason to adapt Luke: to underscore Jesus’ authority. But Mark’s changes to Luke look anomalous in that Mark actually overlooks Lukan material that could achieve his very aims. In this he appears inattentive to propriety (criterion D.2). In many places, Mark does adapt Luke’s gospel in ways that accent Jesus’ authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Changes to Luke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mark 2:18b (cp. Luke 5:34) (διά τι οἱ μαθηταὶ . . . ηστεύουσιν . . . οἱ δὲ σοι μαθηταὶ οὐ ηστεύουσιν;)</td>
<td>Replaces several terms to create a tight antithetical parallel and so emphasize Jesus’ authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark 2:21 (cp. Luke 5:36) (ἐπιράπτει)</td>
<td>Replaces ἐπιβάλλει with more vivid term to convey Jesus’ power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark 2:21 (cp. Luke 5:36) (τὸ καινὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ)</td>
<td>Inserts “the new from the old,” to emphasize the power of the new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark 2:21 (cp. Luke 5:36) (καὶ χείρον σχίσμα γίνεται)</td>
<td>Replaces Luke’s phrase (“the new will be torn, and the piece from the new will not match the old”) with “and the tear will become worse”: better conveys power of the new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark 2:22 (cp. Luke 5:37) (ἀπόλλυται)</td>
<td>Replaces Luke’s future (ἀπολύουται) with the historic present:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1011 From the perspective of the 2GH, Mark also picks up some of his accents on Jesus’ authority from existing accents in Luke, for example Luke’s strong verbal parallelism (οὐδεὶς . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ γε . . . καὶ οὐδεὶς . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ γε [Luke 5:36-38]).

1012 NRSV.
heightens vividness of the new.

In at least five places then, Mark draws attention to Jesus’ authority. This effort is perfectly plausible; it recalls Josephus’ motivation to augment the stature of heroes like David and Solomon.

Where the plausibility of Mark’s changes falters however is that he overlooks useful Lukan material for this major aim. From the perspective of the 2GH, there are five places where Mark overlooks Lukan material that could accent Jesus’ authority. Even more problematically, most of Luke’s material would not interfere with Mark’s need for a clear, concise and plausible style in the body of the chreia. Of course, an author might not always change a source in all the places that we expect.1013 But it would seem counterintuitive if he repeatedly ignores material that benefits his major interests.1014

The first case concerns Luke’s positioning of ὁ Ἰησοῦς as the head of his sentence (5:34: ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν . . . [cp. Mark 2:19a]). In Luke, the forward position of Jesus’ name accents his importance. Since it is precisely Jesus whose authority Mark tries to augment, it would make sense to follow Luke, yet Mark (2:19) does not. Why not? Ostensibly Mark seeks a more conventional and so plainer word sequence (καὶ εἶπεν σὺν τοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς . . .). But following Luke would seem natural at a point where Mark otherwise works hard to highlight Jesus’ authority;1015 he hardly seems concerned for plain style around this phrase. Although we should allow that Mark retains clear expression here, his failure to follow Luke remains noteworthy. Since Mark often shifts

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1013 Josephus, for instance, brought multiple concerns to bear on changing the Septuagint.
1014 And in places quite textually sound had Mark known Luke’s autograph or something close to it.
1015 The immediately preceding verse, 2:18, contains repetition and emphasis; following Jesus’ name in 2:19, Mark begins an inclusion.
sequences elsewhere in this pericope and seems comfortable in other pericopae with the forward position of names (2:13: καὶ πᾶς ὁ ὀχλος; 3:7: καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς μετὰ τῶν μαθητῶν), it seems that he ought to be comfortable in 2:19 advancing Jesus’ name, given that Luke had already suggested it.  

A second dubious refusal to follow Luke is in Jesus’ reply to the Pharisees: μὴ δύνασθε τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ νυμφῶνος ἐν ὧδε νυμφίος μετ’ αὐτῶν ἔστιν ποίησαι νηστεύσαι; (Luke 5:34; cp. Mark 2:18). This reply, “you cannot make the attendants to fast,” would be useful because the second person accentuates Jesus’ relative authority vis-à-vis John and the Pharisees. To help us appreciate Mark’s intense interest in Jesus’ authority, Gundry summarizes the import of the question to Jesus in Mark as follows:

[T]he [Pharisees’] question does not deal with fasting so much as with the relative authority of John, of the Pharisees, and of Jesus: Does Jesus have authority to suspend fasting for his disciples despite John’s and the Pharisees’ requiring that their disciples fast?  

Now Luke clearly sets Jesus’ authority over above the Pharisees (“You cannot make the disciples fast” [Luke 5:34]). But Mark refuses Luke’s formulation in favour of a weaker formulation (2:18). Hence Luke does a better job of showing Jesus’ relative authority than Mark. Why would Mark reject this ready-made formulation? It is possible that Mark avoids Luke’s second person (“You cannot . . .”) because it sounds too hostile or agonistic. Yet the second person is not invariably hostile—it can simply be more pointed. And inasmuch as it is hostile, it is quite fitting, for in the unit’s larger narrative context (2:23-28, 3:1-6), Mark goes out of his way to make Jesus’ language hostile. Mark’s Jesus

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1016 That Mark should follow Luke’s word order might seem a small change, but Mark is a master of effective word order throughout the chreia (e.g., in 2:18, 19, 21). It would thus seem permissible to follow suit here.

for instance asks almost sarcastically whether the Pharisees have “never [οὐδὲποτε] known what David did?” (2:25); shortly after, he even shows “anger” (μετ’ ὄργης) towards them (3:5). These features are only in Mark. Given this tone, it would be appropriate back in 2:19 to have Jesus address the Pharisees in the second person. Moreover, the second person would interfere neither with the Pharisees’ sharply worded question to Jesus (2:18), nor with the inclusion using δύναμαι (2:19). Indeed, use of the second person would foster vividness, which Mark is otherwise so eager to create. On grounds then of accenting Jesus’ authority, Mark ought to follow Luke.

A third place where it would make sense to retain Luke is in Mark’s restatement (2:20). Mark, we recall, is eager to enhance the image of Jesus as an authoritative presence who precludes his disciples from fasting; this is indeed his propositio (2:19a). Now to reinforce this propositio, Luke’s argument from opposite offers just the right follow-up formulation: “When [ὅταν] the bridegroom has been taken away from them, then [τότε] they will fast” (5:35). Schenk has rightly drawn attention to Luke’s distinctly “causal” logic here. And this difference poses a problem, for Mark weakens Luke’s formulation by changing the syntax: “And the days will come when [ὅταν] the bridegroom has been taken away from them, and then [καὶ τότε] they will fast.”

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1018 One (weak) reason why Mark might eschew Luke 5:34 is his larger compositional interests (in 2:1-3:6). According to Marcus, Mark seeks to portray only a gradual build-up of conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees (see for example the “anger” [ὄργη] of Jesus exclusive to Mark 3:5; and the plot to kill Jesus exclusive to 3:6). Mark therefore might find hostility between Jesus and the Pharisees at this earlier point, against his liking. (On conflict in Mark 2:1-3:6, see Marcus, Mark I-8, 214.)

1019 Lausberg categorizes under vividness, “direct speech to one another by the persons who figure in the narration” (Handbook §§ 812, 817). Luke’s use of the second person makes the engagement more pointed and concrete—and so more vivid.


1021 Against Schenk, who indicates that Mark does not intend ὅταν ... τότε as causal at all, but rather to convey that the disciples will fast at the same time Jesus is taken away (the events are gleichzeitig), and that such fasting is a sign that they have abandoned Jesus. Schenk, “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 260, 265-266, 272-273, 276.
Mark would have been able better to convey Jesus’ power by retaining Luke’s causal sentence.

The fourth change that works against the concept of a Markan redaction of Luke is Mark’s omission of the word νέος (new: Luke 5:37). In 2:22 Mark emphasizes the awesome power of new wine. It is a little difficult then to see how Mark could omit Luke’s νέος, since Mark uses several linguistic devices in 2:21-22 precisely to accent the power of things new. To suppose that νέος would spoil parallelism between verses 21 and 22 is not credible; Mark is not interested in having every word, case and element of grammar in verse 21 parallel that in verse 22. Perhaps omitting νέος allows verse 22 to sound more rapid and so more vivid, but such reasoning seems equivocal.

Finally, Mark’s replacement of the word “new” (καίνως: Luke 5:36b) with ἀγναφος (“unshrunken”: Mark 2:20a) seems unlikely. While it is possible that Mark chooses ἀγναφος to foster vividness, or so that his audience could more clearly identify the practical effect of new cloth, Mark’s interest in things “new”—and that right in 2:20, with a forward position given the new item and use of the complementary term παλαιός (“old”)—makes it implausible to reject the very word when Luke offers it. It appears more unlikely given the technical character of a word like ἀγναφος. It looks even more unlikely given that Mark went out of his way to add καίνως to Luke earlier in his gospel when characterizing Jesus’ teaching (Mark 1:27; cp. Luke 4:36). We grant that in

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1022 This is evident, for example, in Mark’s use of the historical present tense (ἀπόλλυται).
1023 To suppose that Mark seeks conciseness is possible. But this reasoning is inadequate, for 2:22 is essentially Mark’s conclusion, and in conclusions we require a richer or more elevated, πάθος-arousing style (below, Table 1.2, Appendix 1).
1024 Mark does have good reason to omit Luke’s repetition of καίνως (in Luke 5:36d). Luke uses this noun to construct the second half of an inclusion (τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ καίνου), which highlights the phrase “it will not match” (οὐ συμφώνησει). The inclusion is likely too weak a formulation for Mark, who would prefer to augment the sheer power of new cloth to tear the old patch.
these four cases, Mark has rhetorical reasons to adapt Luke. But these reasons are not very strong, and Mark repeatedly ignores useful material in a way that cuts against his biographical interests. This fact leaves the 2GH with explaining to do.

Summary

Mark’s work as a redactor of Luke and Matthew shows some plausibility. His biographical aims are rhetorically conventional. Two features of Mark’s work, however, raise concern. First, Mark repeatedly attenuates clarity in places where clarity matters (criterion D.1). Second, Mark overlooks some biographically useful material in Luke that could portray Jesus’ authority (criterion D.2). Mark’s oversights appear ironic given his great effort otherwise to heighten this portrayal. Let us now turn to the opposing theories.


4.3.1: Matt. 9:14-17/Mark 2:18-22

If Matthew adapts Mark’s gospel, then he has three major reasons. A first, biographical reason is to underline Jesus’ authority (reason B). A second, theological reason is to ensure that fasting remains an acceptable component of Christian worship after the death of Jesus (reason B). And a third reason is to draw Mark’s chreia into closer conformity with conventions of plain (ἰσχυρός) style (reason C). In the accompanying

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1025 Especially given that Mark more frequently achieves his goals by using existing material in Matthew and Luke (he infrequently creates artistic material himself). Here and there, Mark adds a word or phrase that accents Jesus’ authority. But apart from the added restatement underscoring Jesus’ authority (2:19b), Mark adds just the introductory verse (2:18a) adds part of a phrase, [τῷ καινῷ τῷ παλαιῷ (2:21), and omits some material (such as Matthew’s closing statement about wineskins [9:17b: following Gundry, Mark, 134] and the verb from Matthew and Luke’s final clauses [2:22]).

1026 For these reasons for adaptation, see above, Conclusion to Part 1.
table (4.3, Appendix 3), we print Matthew’s biographically motivated changes in green, his theologically motivated changes in blue and his stylistic changes with shading.

1. Enhancing Jesus’ authority. According to Gundry, Matthew emphasizes Mark’s prize image of Jesus’ authority in places. In 9:14 for instance Matthew’s substitution of προσέρχονται and λέγοντες contribute to this aim. Moreover, in 9:15 Matthew advances Mark’s μετ’ αὐτῶν (2:19b) in a way that alludes to Jesus as Immanuel, and Matthew makes Mark’s “originally adverbial ὁσον [2:19b] . . . objective after ἔφ’ and introduces the clause in which the bridegroom is subject rather than the clause in which ‘they’ is the subject of ‘have’ (so Mark).” This cluster of subtle stylistic changes draws attention to Jesus. Most of these changes do not entail stylistic ornamentation (προσέρχονται and λέγοντες and the advancing of ὁσον are not figures of speech), although Matthew makes a kind of artistic change as he advances μετ’ αὐτῶν. In any case, Matthew paraphrases Mark to suit his biographical aims.

2. Giving a place to fasting. Matthew also has a theological reason to adapt Mark: to ensure that fasting remains part of Christian worship that commemorates the death of Jesus. To this end Matthew begins by omitting Mark’s restatement (Mark 2:19b). Although restatement is conventional, Matthew’s omission “remov[es] any justification for failure to fast that antinomians might try to draw from the failure of Jesus’ disciples to fast during his earthly ministry.” Similarly to this end, Matthew omits a phrase from Mark’s statement from opposite: fasting in that day (ἐν ἐκείνην τῇ ἡμέρᾳ: Mark 2:20 cp. Matt. 9:15b). However attractive Mark’s inclusio (ἡμέρᾳ . . . ἡμέρᾳ) might sound,

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1027 Gundry, Matthew, 169.
1028 For these changes see Gundry, Matthew, 169-170.
1029 See BDF § 472 (1).
1030 Gundry, Matthew, 169, 171.
1031 Gundry, Matthew, 169.
Matthew’s omission permits fasting to remain a continuing practice, not a mere one day (ἡμέρα) event as in Mark.$^{1032}$

Matthew makes further, similarly motivated changes in his analogies (9:16-17 cp. Mark 2:21-22). To be sure, Mark and Matthew’s analogies remain similar: both argue that what is new precludes, on account of its power, co-existence with what is old. But the analogies differ in their accent, a point to which Gundry has drawn attention. While Mark emphasizes verbal parallelism between the first (2:21) and second analogies (2:22), Matthew focuses on parallelism within his second analogy (9:17; cp. Mark 2:22).$^{1033}$ Let us compare the evangelists’ parallelism more closely. Mark employs parallelism to highlight the authority of things new—of Jesus.$^{1034}$ The following quotation shows this (parallel arrangements I print in italics; parallel words I print in bold and underline).

(21a) Ὄδεις ἐπίβλημα ῥάκους ἀγνάφου ἐπιράπτει ἐπὶ ἰμάτιον παλαιόν
(21b) εἴ δὲ μὴ, αἱρεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ καινὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ χεῖρον χίσμα γίνεται.
(22a) καὶ Ὄδεις βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁσκοῦς παλαιός.
(22b) εἴ δὲ μὴ, βήχει ὁ οἶνος τοῦ ἁσκοῦς καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἀπόλλυται καὶ οἱ ἁσκοί.
(22c) ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁσκοῦς καινοῦς.

$^{1032}$ And this even if Mark understood ἡμέρα (singular) and ἡμέραι (plural) interchangeably (so Schenk, “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 266). Gundry believes that Matthew omits both “in that day” (ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ [2:20] (Mark 2:20) and even the restatement (2:19) for the same reason. “The cutting away of Mark’s ‘in that day’ from ‘and then they will fast’ . . . forestalls any limitation of fasting to a brief period at the time Jesus is taken away” (Matthew, 169).

$^{1033}$ Parallelism was a figure of speech common in Semitic and Classical languages, and served as an artistic means to underscore a concept. Certainly this was true of Greco-Roman figures of repetition, a building block of parallelism. Lausberg, Handbook § 608.

$^{1034}$ Mark, 134.
Here Mark’s parallels support Jesus’ *propositio*: to claim that the new is so powerful that it would wreck itself and the old when combined (2:22b) is to assert that Jesus leaves people unable to engage in old customs like fasting (2:19).\(^\text{1035}\)

Matthew’s parallelism has a different centre of gravity. On the one hand, Gundry shows that Matthew maintains, even heightens, Mark’s parallelism between the analogies of cloth (Matt. 9:16) and wine (Matt. 9:17). For instance, by adding δὲ in *οὐδὲ* (9:17a; cp. 9:16a *οὐδεὶς* δὲ) and by converting Mark’s future ῥῆξει into the present ῥῆγανται (9:17b) to parallel the present αἱρεί (9:16b), Matthew tightens the parallelism.\(^\text{1036}\) Further to this end Matthew positions βάλλουσιν (9:17) in the same relative position as ἐπιβάλλει (9:16). Matthew’s tightening of parallelism intensifies Mark’s idea that the new and old coexist to the detriment of both.\(^\text{1037}\)

But on the other hand, Matthew’s parallelism in 9:16-17 has a different centre of gravity.\(^\text{1038}\) Mark has argued that since the new and old coexist to the detriment of both, we can only follow the new (2:21-22, esp. 2:22c). Matthew, however, argues that since the new and old coexist to the detriment of both, their separation allows each its *proper place*: Jesus is present and precludes fasting, but after Jesus’ death there will be fasting.\(^\text{1039}\) To convey this point, Matthew adds conspicuous parallels within his second analogy (9:17a/b and 9:17c): in 9:17c he repeats βάλλουσιν, and he adds to this a second clause that has a plural subject and present passive verb (*καὶ ὁμφότεροι συντηροῦνται*).

\(^{1035}\) Gundry, *Mark*, 134. In the elaboration described by Hermogenes, the argument from analogy does not go so far as to show consequences or implications of the chreia. It simply repeats the chreia as an analogy: see *Progymnasmata* (ed. Rabe, 6.7-8); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, p. 77.


\(^{1037}\) See Gundry, *Matthew*, 171.


\(^{1039}\) This point comes more or less from Gundry, who summarizes the analogies as arguing “the need to preserve a good religious practice.” *Matthew*, 171.
The parallelism within 9:17 then emphasizes that the new and old coexist to the detriment of both, while their separation allows each its proper place. Through augmenting the parallelism here, Matthew emphasizes the importance of church fasting.

3. A plainer style. Matthew makes numerous changes that render Mark’s style plainer, in particular clearer. These begin in 9:14, where Matthew renders Mark clearer and more concise by eliminating his opening sentence (καὶ ἤσαν οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰωάννου καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι νηστεύοντες [2:18a]). To see this clarification, we need to recall how Mark opens his chreia. According to Mark, two specific groups are fasting: Pharisees and disciples of John the Baptist. Now in 2:18 Mark twice mentions fasting: once by the Pharisees and disciples of John (2:18a), and then once by “disciples of the Pharisees” and disciples of John (καὶ ἔρχονται καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰωάννου καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ τῶν Φαρισαίων νηστεύουσιν . . . ; [2:18b]). According to Gundry, Mark 2:18b is especially concerned to create antithetical parallelism through repeated mention of disciples: Jesus’ disciples over against John and the Pharisees’ disciples (οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰωάννου καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ τῶν Φαρισαίων νηστεύουσιν . . . σοὶ

1040 That Matthew fosters plainer style finds support in Luz’s redaction-critical observation that “Matthean style is sparser than that of Mark. The narratives are tightened. The Matthean abridgements try to bring out clearly what is essential.” Luz, Matthew 1-7, 49.
1041 Both Matthew and Mark, in the preceding pericopeae that they share (Matt. 9:9-13/Mark 2:13-17), characterize Jesus’ questioners as Pharisees of a kind: Matthew mentions Pharisees (9:11), while Mark mentions the scribes of the Pharisees (2:16).
1042 Emphases added.
μαθηταὶ οὗ νηστεύουσιν. The parallelism in turn prepares to highlight Jesus’ authority.

The significant point is that Matthew clarifies Mark’s presentation. For Matthew only once mentions fasting: fasting by Pharisees and John’s disciples (9:14). To Matthew, Mark 2:18a (“Pharisees . . . fasting”) and 2:18b (“disciples of the Pharisees . . . fast[ing]”) must have sounded awkward; Matthew would understandably prefer clearer and more consistent references. Matthew also prefers a more concise (σύντομος) presentation, for as Gundry explains, Matthew omits Mark’s redundant reference to fasting, a kind of move that Matthew frequently makes from the viewpoint of the 2DH. Matthew makes further adjustments towards conventional syntax too. All of these adjustments pull in the direction of what Demetrius calls the normal (κυρίο) diction definitive of a plain (ἰσχυρός) style.

Matthew makes further changes towards plainness in 9:16-17 (cp. Mark 2:21-22). At the beginning of their analogies, Matthew and Mark share the following clause: “Nobody stitches a patch of uncarded [unshrunken] cloth onto an old cloak” (Mark 2:21a, cp. Matt. 9:16a). Here Matthew clarifies Mark in four ways: he adds the coordinating

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1042 Gundry, Mark, 132.
1044 Incidentally, when Mark here mentions “disciples” of Pharisees, explains Gundry, he means a specific group of Pharisees who are not scribes, and are being instructed in fasting by a slightly different group of Pharisees who are scribes (Gundry, Mark, 132). In 2:18a, Mark simply conveys that Pharisees “in general” (οἱ Φαρισαῖοι) are fasting (Gundry, Mark, 132).
1045 Cp. Marcus’ confusion over Mark’s expression in Mark 1-8, 233. Mark does not refer to the Pharisees as Jesus’ opponents as often as Matthew (Mark: 12 references; Matthew: 30 references). From the perspective of the 2GH, alternatively, Mark might repeat mention of fasting in order to sound vivid: Demetrius explains that repetition can foster “vividness” (ενάργεια) that is “welcome in [a plain] . . . style”; Demetrius, De Elocutione 210-216 (LCL, trans. Innes). Mark’s language, however, still sounds confusing.
1046 Gundry, Matthew, 169.
1047 In 9:14, Matthew rearranges Mark’s pronoun to a position after its noun (μαθηταὶ σου; cp. Mark 2:18: σοι μαθηταί); it is more conventional in koinē Greek to position the pronoun after the noun that it modifies (Gundry, Mark, 134). Moreover, in 9:15, Matthew appears to advance Mark’s infinitive (νηστεύειν [Mark 2:19]) to a more conventional position (πεθεῖν [Matt. 9:15]).
1048 Demetrius, De Elocutione 190 (LCL, trans. Innes).
conjunction δὲ; he substitutes ἐπιβάλλει (“affix, add”) for Mark’s ἐπιράπτει (“stitch/sew”); he advances this verb to a position before the direct object; and he changes Mark’s case after ἐπὶ from the accusative (ἐπὶ ἰμάτιον παλαιόν: “onto an old cloak”) to the dative (ἐπὶ ἰματίῳ παλαιῷ: “upon an old cloak”). These changes warrant mention together because Matthew’s motivation appears to be stylistic clarification. Adding the conjunction δὲ (‘and’) is a clarification of sorts.  

Certainly δὲ is a conjunction with which Matthew, who employs it far more often than Mark, is quite comfortable. Second, replacing Mark’s highly unusual verb ἐπιράπτω definitely represents more conventional and so clearer usage. Third, the advancing of Mark’s verb pulls towards conventional usage. And fourth, employing the dative case with ἐπὶ (i.e., ἐπὶ ἰματίῳ παλαιῷ) might aim to make Mark better approximate Classical Greek convention, and so sound clearer. Admittedly, this last improvement is problematic: the dative case does not reflect the koinē convention (ἐπὶ + acc. to denote “upon”) more typical in the

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1049 This would accord with Demetrius’ advice: “[plain style] involves . . . connectives” (De Elocutione 192 [LCL, trans. Innes]). Gundry sees Matthew’s addition as theological: “to relate the sayings about the new patch . . . and the new wine . . . to the future fasting of Jesus’ disciples” (Gundry, Matthew, 170).

1050 Matthew: approx. 510 occurrences; Mark: approx. 165 occurrences.

1051 Support for this interpretation comes from Turner, Style, 39-40, who argues that Matthew, throughout his gospel, “will avoid the vividly and descriptively colourful in Mark, and will seek a more commonplace expression” (emphasis added). On the importance of recognizable words, see Rowe, “Style,” 123: “It is the speaker’s task to select the word which is the first to designate an object or an idea and which through constant use has become the appropriate word (verbum proprium). Types of inappropriate words include the improper synonym, the word removed from usage, the made-up word, the word familiar to certain regions, and technical jargon.”

1052 To judge by comments in BDF § 472.

1053 BDF §§ 233, 235(1); cp. similarly Smyth, Greek Grammar, § 1545. In its Classical usage (§§ 233, 235), Matthew’s dative is clearer inasmuch as clarity reflects the conventional usages “of educated persons”: Lausberg, Handbook §§ 469 with 533, 537; Davies and Allison characterize this change as part of Matthew’s overall improvements to Mark’s style: W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Jr., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew, vol. 1 Commentary on I-VII, ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 74.
Near Eastern, first-century setting to which Matthew and Mark belonged. Hence it is hard to speak conclusively of Matthew clarifying Mark here.

Nevertheless, in 9:16b Matthew further clarifies Mark 2:21b. While Mark has αἱρεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ καινὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ, Matthew adapts to αἱρεῖ γὰρ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰματίου (9:16). As Gundry puts it,

“Mark’s rough text is translated literally ‘Otherwise, it [the patch] draws away the fullness [the overlapping edge of the patch] from it [from the garment], the new from the old.’ . . . Matthew simplifies the text, so that it reads ‘For its fullness [that of the patch] takes away from the garment.’ In other words, the unshrunk patch becomes the source of rending at the first washing and shrinking of the patch. The change entails a shift in the referent of αὐτοῦ from the garment (so Mark) to the patch.”

Matthew might thus omit Mark’s τὸ καινὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ because it is now unnecessary, or to render the sentence more concise. Matthew further enhances clarity in 9:17 by adding a final βάλλουσιν to Mark’s closing sentence, which lacks a verb (Mark 2:22). Now two of Matthew’s changes appear reversible inasmuch as Mark might make the style plainer. But Matthew’s clarificatory changes remain numerous and various.

Assessing Matthew’s Adaptations of Mark

Matthew’s adaptations will appear plausible if they reflect plausible motives (A, B and C) and are attentive to propriety (τὸ πρέπον, aptum: D.1 and D.2). We can already tell that Matthew’s motives are rhetorically sound; biographical and clarificatory

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1054 BDF §§ 233, 235(1).
1056 Gundry, Matthew, 170.
1057 First, Mark’s omission of ὅδε might render Matthew more concise (Mark 2:21a cp. Matt. 9:16a). Second, employing the accusative case with ἐτρί represents clearer, more conventional koinē grammar (Mark 2:21a cp. Matt. 9:16a): see BDF § 233, 235 [1].
motives are exactly what rhetoric would lead us to expect. Let us then consider whether Matthew is mindful of propriety, first between speech content and style (criterion D.1).

1. Enhancing Jesus’ authority. We need to recall that the duty of a speech’s body, including the narratio, propositio and logical proofs, is to instruct the audience. As such, it requires plain and especially clear style. Significantly, in 9:14-15, which approximates a speech’s narratio, Matthew usually accents Jesus’ authority in ways that keep the style plain and clear. When in 9:14 (cp. Mark 2:18), Matthew replaces Mark’s ἐρχονται with προσερχονται and changes one of Mark’s main clauses into a subordinate clause, he maintains a clear and direct style. And when in 9:15 Matthew inverts Mark’s phrase ὁσον χρόνον (2:19b) so that its subject (“they”) becomes an indirect object (“with them”) while its object (“the bridegroom”) becomes the subject, he does not at all complicate Mark’s grammar.\footnote{Matthew does employ an ellipsis with χρόνον in 9:15 (ἐφ’ ὁσον . . . ), but he is merely taking over the ellipsis already in Mark 2:19 (ἐν ὃ . . . ). Matthew’s avoidance of χρόνος, moreover, maintains an idiomatic style: it was common to leave χρόνον unexpressed after ἐφ’ ὁσον (“as long as”): LSJ, s.v. (p. 1262). Matthew’s replacing of Mark’s ἐν ὃ with ἐφ’ ὁσον appears no less clear.} Although Matthew might create a less conventional word sequence by advancing the phrase μετ’ αὐτῶν (Jesus “with them” [Mark 2:19]) in a temporal clause (9:15a), this would be the only change that weakens clarity.

It might appear counterintuitive that in his subsequent proofs (9:16-17), Matthew elevates Mark’s style, tightening parallelism between 9:16 (par. Mark 2:21) and 9:17 (par. Mark 2:22).\footnote{See Gundry, Matthew, 171.} We make two points, however, in Matthew’s defence. First, rhetorical theory allows for moderate ornament, including repetitions, in proof material.\footnote{Demetrius, De Elocutione 190-222 (LCL, trans. Innes).} Second, in several of these elevations Matthew simultaneously clarifies Mark: (1) by advancing Mark’s verb (9:16a [ἐπίβαλλει]; cp. Mark 2:21a), Matthew not
only fosters parallelism between 9:16 and 9:17 but also employs a more conventional verb position; (2) by replacing \( \varepsilon \pi \rho \rho \alpha \pi \tau \varepsilon i \) with \( \varepsilon \pi \beta \alpha \lambda \lambda e i \), Matthew not only tightens parallelism between 9:16 and 9:17 (\( \beta \alpha \lambda \lambda o v \sigma i v \)) but also employs a more conventional verb;\(^{1061}\) and (3) by repeating the conjunction \( \delta \varepsilon \), Matthew not only enhances parallelism (\( \sigma \upsilon \delta e i s \ \delta \varepsilon [9:16a]; \sigma \upsilon \delta e [9:17a] \)) but also, in the process, reflects Demetrius’ principle that conjunctions facilitate clear thought.\(^{1062}\) Although Matthew makes two further adjustments that elevate Mark’s style here, he still appears attentive to clarity.\(^{1063}\)

2. Giving a place to fasting. When emphasizing the need to fast after Jesus’ death, Matthew adapts Mark in ways that are similarly appropriate for their location. We need again to remember that in judicial rhetoric, the body of a speech invites plain and especially clear style, while the speech’s conclusion warrants a more elevated and artistic style. In the body of his chreia (9:14 through 9:16), Matthew is attentive to the demands of clear style. When in 9:15 Matthew emphasizes the importance of fasting after Jesus’ death by replacing Mark’s metaphor \( \nu \sigma \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon i \varepsilon i v \) (“to fast”: 2:19) with \( \pi \nu \theta e i n \) (“to mourn”), he not only employs a clearer word but also advances it to what appears a more conventional position.\(^{1064}\)

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\(^{1061}\) On conventional words see Demetrius, *De Elocutione*, 192 (LCL, trans. Innes).

\(^{1062}\) For the parallelism, see Gundry, *Matthew*, 171; Demetrius, *De Elocutione*, 192 (LCL, trans. Innes). On top of these changes, Matthew clarifies Mark 2:21-22 by adjusting Mark’s syntax (9:16b cp. Mark 2:21b); he even *mutes* Mark’s parallelism (2:21-22 / Matt. 9:16-17) in three places: He replaces Mark’s first \( \varepsilon i \ \delta e \ \mu \eta \) with \( \gamma \alpha \rho \), replaces Mark’s repeated second person verb (\( \beta \alpha \lambda \lambda e i \): Mark 2:22a) with the third person (\( \beta \alpha \lambda \lambda o v \sigma i n \): Matt. 9:17a), and replaces Mark’s second \( \sigma \upsilon \delta e i s \) with \( \sigma \upsilon \delta e \).

\(^{1063}\) I.e., (1) According to Gundry (Matthew, 171) Matthew adjusts Mark’s future tense verb \( \rho \varepsilon e i \) into the present tense \( \rho \gamma \nu \nu \nu \tau i a \) (9:17), heightening parallelism with 9:16 (the present tense \( \sigma \pi e i \)). But in Matthew’s defence, \( \rho \gamma \nu \nu \nu \tau i a \) (9:17b) appears not so much aimed at “a closer parallel with ‘takes away’ \( \sigma \pi e i \) in the preceding saying,” but rather to create a series of historic present verbs in 9:17b that form an *inclusio* (\( \rho \gamma \nu \nu \nu \tau i a \) \( \sigma \sigma o k o i \) \( \sigma \sigma o i v o s \) \( \varepsilon k e i t a i \) \( \sigma \sigma o k o i \) \( \alpha \pi \alpha \lambda \lambda o v \tau a i \)), and as such are most appropriate in the chreia’s conclusion. (2) Gundry remarks that in 9:16, Matthew “engage[s] in . . . wordplay by changing Mark’s \( \varepsilon i \pi \rho \rho \alpha \pi \tau \varepsilon i \) to \( \varepsilon i \pi \beta \alpha \lambda \lambda e i \), which is cognate to \( \varepsilon i \pi \beta \lambda \mu \mu \sigma \)” (Matthew, 171).

\(^{1064}\) Gundry comments that in Matt. 9:15, “the originally adverbial \( \sigma \sigma o n \) becomes objective after \( \varepsilon \phi \),” but this does not elevate the style; whether it is grammatically obscure, I cannot tell.
In his conclusion (9:17a/b/c), Matthew unabashedly employs stylistic embellishment that emphasizes the value of fasting. And his embellishment is highly appropriate to a conclusion, which needs to arouse the audience’s emotions with an ornate style. Matthew’s repetition of βάλλουσιν ὄνος νέου (9:17b, 9:17c) is appropriate here, as is his paralleling of οἱ ἁσκοὶ ἀπόλλυμαι (9:17b) with ἀμφότεροι συντηροῦμαι (9:17c). In v. 17b, he adds the particle γε for intensity and he even creates an inclusio that artfully draws attention to the loss of old and new (ῥύγυνται οἱ ἁσκοὶ καὶ ὁ ὀίνος ἐκχεῖται καὶ οἱ ἁσκοὶ ἀπόλλυμαι). Matthew’s fondness for verbal parallels is well known; it is striking that he enhances them in his conclusion. His work adheres to rhetorical guidelines for ornament in just such a place. In all then, Matthew’s theological changes are attentive to propriety.

3. A plainer style. Usually, Matthew’s adjustments towards plainer style are attentive to propriety too, for they come in appropriate places: the narratio, propositio and proofs. Already we have seen Matthew maintain and even heighten clarity in this material. There are further appropriate places in which Matthew fosters plain style. For instance, Matt. 9:14/Mark 2:18, which constitutes the chreia’s expansion (the ἐπεκτείνωσις), corresponds to a speech’s narratio. Now a narratio generally demands a plain (clear, concise and plausible) style. Its duty was to ensure that the audience understood clearly what had caused a dispute. Matthew enhances plainness in 9:14 by eliminating Mark’s redundant and potentially confusing sentence about Pharisees and disciples of the Pharisees, and by rendering some of Mark’s words in more conventional

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1065 For γε see Gundry, Matthew, 171.
1067 Lausberg, Handbook § 1079 1a) and b).
position (i.e., replacing 

\( \text{σοι\ μαθηταί with μαθηταί\ σου} \)). In 9:15, Matthew’s *propositio*, we have already seen that Matthew pulls towards a plain style.\(^{1068}\) And in 9:16, a logical proof, Matthew similarly adjusts Mark towards plainness.\(^{1069}\)

Here in material that requires plain style, we also saw that Matthew elevates some elements of style. But in Matthew’s defence, it may be argued that *every* synoptist ornaments his sources’ style to some degree in proofs: we saw Mark do it, and we shall see Luke do it too. Indeed, rhetorical theory commends certain kinds of ornament in plain style. We should ask, therefore, not whether an evangelist elevates his style, but rather how he elevates it. Matthew elevates Mark’s style usually by adapting word order for emphasis, and by heightening parallelism. He does this in several places: in some of these places, he simultaneously clarifies Mark; in other places he does not. In this program of work, Matthew simply reflects the work of Mark according to the opposing hypothesis, the 2GH.

**Summary**

Matthew regularly maintains and even enhances propriety between the contents and style of the material that he produces (D.1). Moreover, Matthew does not overlook Markan material that would contribute to his portrayal of Jesus or to his emphasis on church fasting (criterion D.2); there is only one term that Matthew perhaps should have

\(^{1068}\) Regarded by some theorists as a culmination of the διήγησις/narratio (a speech part itself warranting plain and clear style), the *propositio* was the key point to prove, and as such it had to be clear (on which see Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 346-347).

\(^{1069}\) One possible oversight is to have chosen the dative case (ἐπὶ ἰματίῳ πάλαι: 9:16) instead of Mark’s more conventional accusative case (ἐπὶ ἰματίων πάλαι: 2:21). Matthew’s choice of the dative, however, appears defensible from classical precedents and perhaps proper usage too (see Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 469, 533, 537.)
borrowed to help show Jesus’ authority over fasting, and in our judgement Matthew’s oversight is insignificant.\footnote{To enhance parallelism in 9:16-17, Matthew could have borrowed Mark’s first εἰ δὲ μὴ (“otherwise”: 2:21b), but he chooses γάρ (“for”). In Matthew’s defence, we may note that Matthew uses γάρ much more often than Mark; the term “typifies his diction” (Gundry, \textit{Matthew}, 170).}

In two qualitative ways, Matthew’s adaptations are more plausible than those allegedly made by Mark. First, Matthew avoids inserting rare and technical words. Mark, by contrast, inserts an obscure word into his adaptation of Matthew (ἐπιράπτει [2:21]), and inserts a rather technical word into his adaptation of Luke (ἀγνάφου [2:21]). Whatever might be the rhetorical value of these terms, they offend against clarity. Second, only Mark obscures his putative sources on the \textit{intellectual level}: he goes beyond expressive changes, such as ellipses and shifts in word order, to the more fundamental obfuscation of ideas. In 2:18 Mark inserts at close range references to two different groups fasting, a move that leaves the reader wondering which group Mark intends.\footnote{Perhaps Mark is clarifying Luke at this point (2:18 cp. Luke 5:33). But I still believe that, given Mark’s relatively close adherence to \textit{Matthew} throughout this chreia, it is counterintuitive for Mark to refuse Matthew’s clearer, briefer formulation (9:14).} And in 2:19b Mark obscures his own \textit{propositio}: he claims, with Matthew and Luke, that fasting depends on the presence of Jesus (2:19a, 2:21-22), but then he implies that fasting depends on the disciples’ commitment to Jesus (Ὥσον χρόνον ἔχουσιν τὸν νησιφίον μετ’ αὐτῶν [2:19b]).\footnote{Mark’s confusing expression remains a problem, regardless of whether he intends the former idea (so Gundry, \textit{Mark}, 132-134) or the latter idea (so Schenk, “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 259).} Mark’s tendency to obscure Matthew renders his work less plausible than a scenario in which Matthew improves upon the work of Mark.
On hypotheses of Markan priority, Luke adapts Mark’s style through paraphrase, and adapts his content through expansion and elaboration, for three major reasons. The first and biographical reason is to heighten hostility between the Pharisees and Jesus (reason B). A second and related biographical reason is to carry further the emphasis on Jesus’ authority (reason B). And a final reason is to render Mark’s expression plainer (reason C). In the accompanying table (4.4, Appendix 3), we print changes heightening hostility in red, changes augmenting Jesus’ authority in green, and changes creating plainer style in shading.

1. Heightening tension between interlocutors. One reason why Luke adapts Mark is to intensify hostility between Jesus and his Pharisaic opponents. To this end he indeed makes at least nine changes. First, in 5:33 Luke converts the Pharisees’ question into a statement, and so in effect an accusation against Jesus. This change implies hostility between parties. Luke then paraphrases the Pharisees’ second use of...
νηστεύοντες (Mark 2:18b) into the phrase ἐσθίουσιν καὶ πίνουσιν (Luke 5:34), and in the process, according to Fitzmyer, conveys their hostility towards Jesus. To enhance further the hostility of the exchange, Luke converts Jesus’ response from a question in the third person to a question in the second person (μὴ δύνασθε . . . ποιήσατε νηστεύσατε; [5:34]). Indeed, this adjustment heightens hostility in several ways: the question hits back at the Pharisees with an accusation; it alters the propositio from assertion of Jesus’ authority over disciples to assertion of Jesus’ authority over Pharisees; and as such it takes direct aim at the Pharisees’ honour. An added touch to this effect is Luke’s slight repositioning of the subject Ὁ Ἰησοῦς in 5:34 (cp. Mark 2:19a) such that it stands first in the sentence and so underlines Jesus’ presence. Luke’s propositio betrays an antagonism that is programmatic for the rest of the unit.

In further ways Luke heightens hostility between Jesus and his opponents in 5:33. For one, Luke has the Pharisees establish themselves as a clearer standard of piety by adding ὀμοίως: “John’s disciples fast often and make prayers just like also the disciples of the Pharisees” (Luke 5:33, cp. Mark 2:18). The implication is that Jesus’ disciples do not, and so do wrong. And Luke continues to intensify hostility in his analogies (5:36-39). In the first analogy (5:36) he makes two significant changes. First, he shifts emphasis from the sheer power of new cloth on an old garment (Mark 2:21) to the incompatibility between new cloth and old garment: for Luke, the key problem is that the new will not match the old (οὐ συμφωνήσει: 5:36). Second, Luke underlines this point by

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1079 The tone of the remark is pejorative; it is meant as a reproof to Jesus” (Luke I-IX, 598). Alternatively, Culpepper believes that Luke’s change helps to create links between 5:27-32 (see 5:30) and 5:33-39, links that help to convey one larger scene (“Luke,” 130).
sandwiching it into an inclusion using the phrase “patch from the new” (5:36b,c). While Luke retains essentially the same second analogy as Mark (5:37), he heightens hostility by inserting γε after εἰ δὲ μὴ (5:36, 5:37), by adding ἐκχυθήσεται to highlight the mutual destruction of wine and skins (5:37), and by adding a third analogy that denigrates the Pharisees’ stubbornness: “Nobody drinking old wine wants the new; for he says, ‘the old is useful’” (5:39).

2. Emphasizing Jesus’ authority. Luke underscores Mark’s image of an authoritative, powerful Jesus. To this end he maintains several Markan touches, for instance Mark’s forward position of ὁ νῦμφιος μετ’ αὐτῶν and the forward position of ἐστίν (5:34). Luke adds further touches too. In 5:35 he strengthens the inclusio in Mark’s argument from opposite (Mark 2:20) with two plural terms for “days” (ἡμέραι). This underlines the enclosed argument that the removal of Jesus will cause his disciples to fast. Luke’s concern to emphasize Jesus’ power probably also accounts for his omission of Mark 2:19b, for Mark confuses readers by implying, contra Mark 2:19a, that the disciples’ fasting depends on their commitment to Jesus: “for as long a time as the disciples hold the bridegroom with them, they cannot fast” (ὁσον χρόνον ἐχουσιν τὸν νῦμφιον μετ’ αὐτῶν οὐ δύνανται νηστεύειν [Mark 2:19b]). By omitting this sentence, Luke leaves no doubt that the disciples’ fasting depends on the presence or absence of Jesus. To emphasize Jesus’ power even further, Luke proceeds in 5:35 (cp. Mark

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1080 ἐπιβλῆμα ἀπὸ ἰματίου καινοῦ (5:36b); τὸ ἐπιβλῆμα τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ καινοῦ (5:36c).
1082 On the role of these word positions that accent Jesus’ authority in Mark 2:19, see Gundry, Mark, 132-133.
1083 Converting Mark’s singular ἡμέρα to the plural ἡμέραι also clarifies by removing inconsistent references.
1084 Whatever precisely Mark intended, there is still tension between 2:19a and 2:19b. For the difference between Mark and Luke see Schenk, “Funktion der Fastenwarnung,” 259-260. Luke has another good
2:20) to change Mark’s use of ὁταν . . . τότε to clarify and drive home the point that Jesus’ presence determines whether or not his disciples eat and drink (ἐλέύουσαι δὲ ἡμέραι, καὶ ὁταν ἀπαρβῇ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, τότε οὐσαμεν [Luke 5:35 cp. Mark 2:20]).

Luke yet further enhances Jesus’ presence by replacing Mark’s indirect ἀγναφὸς (Mark 2:21) with a clearer word for “new” cloth: καίνος (Luke 5:36). In addition, Luke adds the very word “new” (νέος) to describe the powerful wine in 5:37 (cp. Mark 2:22). In these ways, Luke further accents the power of Jesus.

3. A plainer style. Luke often renders Mark’s style plainer. In 5:33 he omits Mark’s reference to Pharisees fasting, more precisely scribal Pharisees (cp. Mark 2:18a and Luke 5:30). This leaves Luke and Mark referring to fasting by “disciples of the Pharisees” (μαθητὲς τῶν Φαρισαίων [Mark 2:18b]). In the process, Luke has deftly removed Mark’s confusing references to different groups fasting (Mark 2:18a, 2:18b), and so he clarifies. While we might charge Luke himself with not being entirely clear (in 5:30 “the Pharisees and their scribes” address Jesus, and in 5:33 they ask Jesus about his conformity to “disciples of the Pharisees”), this dialogue is not as awkward; Luke removes Mark’s close juxtaposition of references to different groups fasting.


Luke maintains Mark’s highlighting of the new in 5:36-38 (cp. Mark 2:21-22) by preserving the forward position of the phrase “patch of new cloth” (ἐπίθλημα ἀπὸ ἱματίου καινοῦ). Similarly, he keeps Mark’s forward position of the verb “tear” in 5:37 (cp. Mark 2:22) to accentuate the new wine’s power.

For these Pharisees in Mark (Mark 2:18a) as scribal Pharisees see Gundry, Mark, 132.


Culpepper is correct that Luke has not specified the distinction between Pharisees (Luke 5:30) and “disciples of the Pharisees” in 5:33 (“Luke,” 130). But we might have expectations of specificity that Luke’s audience did not have.
Luke makes several further changes towards plainness. In 5:36 he clarifies Mark by adding a preface to his analogies: “And he also told to them a parable.” This clarification is in fact unnecessary, for educated speakers knew that a chreia elaboration contained arguments from analogy (ἐκ παραβολῆς). Still it would be the most apparent reason to add the introduction. In 5:37, Luke converts Mark’s present tense ἀπολλυται into the future (ἀπολοῦνται), probably to render the flow of thought more consistent (cp. ῥήξει in Mark 2:22/Luke 5:37) and so clearer. Similarly, in 5:38 his addition of ἀπολοῦνται after οἱ ὁσκοί repairs the abrupt ending of Mark’s sentence (2:22: . . . καὶ οἱ ὁσκοί), while addition of ἐκχυθῆσεται creates a more vivid picture and/or aims at a clearer (fuller, more logical) sequence of images. Finally, in 5:38 Luke clarifies by adding the verb βλητέον (“must be put”; cp. Mark 2:22b). If Metzger is correct that copyists tended to insert a verb into 2:22b, not recognizing that Mark had intended his earlier verb βάλλει to follow a parenthesis (εἰ δὲ μή), then Luke and Matthew might be thinking along the same clarificatory lines.

Assessing Luke’s Adaptations of Mark

Luke’s biographical and clarifying motives are rhetorically conventional and need no further comment. We need to examine further whether his adaptations show

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1093 Plausible too is that Luke’s adaptations reflect emphases of his larger narrative. Hostility and conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees is important enough in Luke 5:1-6:16 that it would be highly appropriate
propriety (τὸ πρέπον, aptum); more precisely, whether Luke fosters propriety between content and style (criterion D.1) and whether he uses all available Markan material to achieve his goals (criterion D.2).

1. Heightening tension between interlocutors. The material in Luke’s chreia that approximates a speech’s narratio, propositio and logical proofs, namely 5:33-37, requires a plain and clear style. In this material, Luke usually underscores hostility or distance between the Pharisees and Jesus in ways that indeed maintain plain style. Many of Luke’s changes are simply changes in ideas, not expression, and they do nothing to raise the style in Mark. As such they are perfectly appropriate. These changes include Luke’s conversion of 5:33 into a statement, his added reference to John’s disciples praying “often” (5:33b), his conversion of the third into the second person (5:34b), as well as his adjustments that describe the incompatibility of old and new cloth and wine: namely, the insertion of καὶ τῷ παλαιῷ οὐ συμφωνήσει (5:36c).

There are, to be sure, four places where Luke accentuates the distance between Jesus and the Pharisees along more stylistic lines. First, Luke assigns the Pharisees a contemptuous tone, both through an ellipsis, omitting their reference to disciples (5:33c), and through specifying that the disciples “eat and drink.” Second, Luke advances ὁ Ἰησοῦς to the head of his sentence in 5:34, against the more normal positioning of a subject after the verb. Third, Luke inserts an inclusion that highlights the irreconcilability

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1094 Luke’s added words render, of course, his style wordier than Mark, and as such pull away from plain style. But Luke’s added words convey new ideas; they do not aim at stylistic effect. Hence they are defensible.  
1095 I.e., not “fasting” (ἠστευόμενοι) as in Mark 2:18.
of a new garment and old garment (5:36), and finally, he twice adds the emphatic particle γε to εἰ δὲ μὴ (5:36b, 5:37b; cp. Mark 2:21b, 2:22b). All of these changes entail the artful additions, omissions or rearrangements; they essentially create figures of speech. But even though Luke makes these ornamental changes in places that rhetorical theory demands be plain, his work is defensible, not only because rhetoric permits mild ornament in plain style, but also because Luke makes exactly these changes to Matthew according to the 2GH. Given that these changes are identical from the perspective of all hypotheses, they are by definition conventional, if not in rhetorical theory then certainly in practice. Accordingly, Luke’s changes pose no problem for hypotheses that advocate Markan priority (the 2DH and FH). And just as Luke maintains a plain style in 5:33-38, he appropriately adds ornament in his concluding verse (5:39). Luke’s final sentence not only raises pathos by denigrating the Pharisees’ preference for old wine, but also artfully underscores it: the repetition and emphatic forward position of οὐδείς, the alliteration (πιστῶν παλαιὸν), direct discourse and the forward position of παλαιὸς underwrite the sting of Jesus’ closing words.

To underline the fact that Luke remains attentive to stylistic propriety when widening the ideological gap between the Pharisees and Jesus, consider a place in Luke’s proofs where he widens this gap and simultaneously clarifies Mark’s style. Luke draws Mark’s analogies into closer conformity with each other by adding that the patch is

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1096 ἐπίβλημα ἀπὸ ἰματίου καινοῦ (5:36b); τὸ ἐπίβλημα τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ καινοῦ (5:36c).
1097 Luke in 5:36 also adds a participle (σχίσας) and replaces Mark’s genitive of possession with a prepositional phrase (ἀπὸ ἰματίου καινοῦ); but he does just the same to Matthew (and also delays Matthew’s verb to a less conventional position) from the perspective of the 2GH. I am uncertain whether Luke creates less conventional word orders in 5:34, where Luke replaces Mark’s infinitive sentence with an imperative clause (μὴ δύνασθε . . . νηστεύσαι).
1098 When Luke adds the verb ἔχρυθίζεται (5:37), he does sound wordier; but the addition fosters a clearer sequence of images in 5:37.
1099 According to the 2DH and FH; according to the 2GH, Luke similarly clarifies Matthew’s style.
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a “patch from a new cloak” (5:36). As Marshall puts it, “[s]ince a patch is not ‘destroyed’ in the same way as wine, Luke had to introduce the idea of the garment from which the patch was taken [i.e., the new garment is destroyed] in order to gain parallelism between the two sayings.”

2. Emphasizing Jesus’ authority. When emphasizing Jesus’ authority, Luke enhances an appropriately plain style. We may observe, first, that Luke’s omission of the restatement from his adaption of Mark (2:19b) not only clarifies Mark, but also makes the case more concise; after all, vivid as Mark’s repetition sounds, it says nothing new. In 5:35, Luke again clarifies Mark: changing Mark’s ōtav . . . kai tōte (2:20) to kai ōtav . . . tōte (5:35) clarifies that Jesus’ presence determines whether or not his disciples eat and drink. Luke’s version has been characterized as grammatically “clumsy but more correct” than Mark; clumsy though it might be, it certainly sharpens Mark. Still in 5:35, Luke’s repetition of the plural ἡμέραί not only sharpens Mark’s inclusion (2:20) but also renders Mark more consistent (cp. 2:20a: ἡμέρας) and clarifies that fasting has an ongoing place in the practice of the church. In any case, Luke’s repetition hardly makes the verse more ornate than it is in Mark. When, in 5:36, Luke replaces Mark’s term ἀγναφός (“uncarded”: 2:21) with καὶνός (“new”), he more clearly, more directly, accents Jesus’ presence: Mark’s reference to “uncarded” cloth, however vividly graphic, does not get to the heart of his own emphasis as directly as does “new” cloth. Granted, Luke’s threefold repetition of καὶνός is a kind of stylistic ornament that does not clarify

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1101 Another rhetorical benefit of Luke’s omission is that it contributes to the sense of hostility or distance between Jesus and the Pharisees. When Jesus poses his rhetorical question in 5:34 without a restatement, he intensifies its force.
1102 BDF § 382 (3).
1103 It appears less likely that Mark would replace Luke’s clear term with a less direct term like ἀγναφός, given Mark’s intense interest in conveying Jesus’ power.
Mark; but Luke as much adds this ornament to Matthew from the perspective of the 2GH. And when, finally, Luke repeats the term νέος (Luke 5:37b; cp. Mark 2:22b), he employs a technique and vivid sound that is wholly appropriate to a plain style. On the whole, Luke maintains a plain style in his adaptation of Mark.

3. A plainer style. As we have already seen, Luke’s adaptations towards plainer style come in appropriate places: the narratio, propositio and proofs (Luke 5:33–38). His occasional stylistic flourishes find parallels in the work of Matthew and Mark, and as such are to be expected; what is more, he must add these same flourishes to Matthew according to the 2GH. With only the occasional nod towards clarity, Luke’s work looks rhetorically conventional.

We have suggested that Luke maintains a style appropriate for his chreia (criterion D.1). Has Luke failed to adopt any Markan elements that would facilitate his aims (criterion D.2)? Luke has in fact used as much of Mark as possible, missing perhaps only one term. Consider first Luke’s heightening of hostility between Jesus and the Pharisees. Luke could have used Mark’s historic present tense verbs ἔρχονται and λέγουσιν (Mark 2:18a) to intensify the opening scene; and could have used Mark’s pointed repetitions of μαθηταί and of οὗ νηστεύοισιν (Mark 2:18). But such observations do not provide evidence against the 2DH on two grounds. For one, Luke’s oversights of Mark are equally oversights of Matthew from the perspective of Markan posteriority: Luke as much eschews Matthew’s προσέρχονται (9:14) as he does Mark’s ἔρχονται (2:18a); and he as much rejects repetition of νηστεύοισιν in Matthew (9:14) as he does in Mark. For another, Luke has his own decent rhetorical reasons for each

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1104 I.e., 1. Luke tightens Mark’s inclusio (Mark 2:20/Luke 5:35) by repeating the plural “days” (ἡμέρας); 2. Luke creates the inclusio around his analogy in 5:36 (using ἐπίβλημα ἀπὸ . . . καινοῦ); 3. Luke adds the introductory comment ἔλεγεν δὲ καὶ παραβολὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι (5:36a).
omission. Omitting ἐρχόμενοι helps link 5:27-32 (the call of Levi and meal with sinners) with 5:33-39 so that they constitute a continuous exchange. Since the two pericopae are phases of one exchange, it would make no sense to repeat “they come” (ἐρχόμενοι) when they have not gone anywhere. Omitting the repetition of οἱ μαθηταί actually accentuates the Pharisees’ hostility as they refuse to dignify the disciples with their name, referring to them simply as “those for you” (οί δὲ σοί [Luke 5:33]). Moreover, replacing Mark’s οὐ νηστεύουσιν with ἐσθίουσιν καὶ πίνουσιν (“eat and drink”) creates more vividness and helps Luke to link 5:33-39 with 5:27-32 into one large scene.\footnote{A device noted by Culpepper, “Luke,” 130. Luke should perhaps have retained Mark’s vivid historical tense verb λέγουσιν (Mark 3:18b) instead of converting it into the aorist (ἠλεποῦν [Luke 5:33]). But Luke’s formulation is both more conventionally Greek (hence clearer) and is part of a larger tendency to substitute a past tense for nearly every Markan historic present tense (see Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 107).}

Does Luke overlook Markan material that could accent Jesus’ authority? He does not; in fact, Luke’s seeming oversights actually contribute to his accent on Jesus’ authority. What some might see as an oversight is Luke’s rejection of Mark’s vivid term for “sew”: ἐπιράπτει (2:21), which Luke replaces with the less vivid “put on”: ἐπιβάλλει (5:36). But Mark’s ἐπιράπτει is a rare term.\footnote{LSJ, s.v.; BAG, s.v.} Hence it makes sense to replace it, just as Matthew did, with something less technical and hence clearer. Moreover, sewing is actually not a metaphor for Jesus’ authority; it is rather the lifting off or pulling away (ἀναίρει: Mark 2:21) of new cloth, and for this Luke substitutes a more vivid and even onomatopoeic term, rip (σχίσει: Luke 5:36). Luke’s changes seem deliberate and effective.\footnote{Similarly, Luke needs to dismantle parallelism in Mark 2:18 to insert a term which raises animosity between Jesus and the Pharisees (ομοίως). Luke also needs to omit Mark’s restatement (2:19b) on account of its confusing logic and redundancy. It is as a function of other concerns that Luke will attenuate Mark’s focus on Jesus’ authority.}
Another possible Lukan oversight comes in Luke 5:37, where if Luke really wanted to show the power of new wine, he should have retained Mark’s blunt closing clauses with their vivid historical present tense and ellipsis (i.e., εἰ δὲ μὴ . . . καὶ ὁ ὀίνος ἀπόλλυται καὶ οἱ ἁσκοὶ [2:22]). But to the contrary, Luke’s substitution of καὶ σὺντός ἐκχυθήσεται καὶ οἱ ἁσκοὶ ἀπολοῦνται (5:37) is effective on three grounds. First, using σὺντός to repeat “wine” might in fact be an intensification that sounds more pointed.1108 Second, using ἐκχυθήσεται (“will be poured out”) for wine and ἀπολοῦνται (“will be ruined”) for the wineskins heightens tension between old Pharisaic authority and the new authority of Jesus, by vividly describing the fatal results of their juxtaposition. In this it also recalls the image of disharmony (οὐ συμφωνήσει) in the first analogy (5:36).1109 Third, setting these verbs in the future tense is defensible inasmuch as Luke smooths over Mark’s inconsistent tenses in 2:22 (ῥήξει [future]; ἀπόλλυται [present]). Hence Luke makes the style clearer. Another place where we might suggest that Luke should follow Mark is in keeping Mark’s ellipsis in 2:22b (cp. Luke 5:38). According to Gundry the ellipsis gives Mark’s sentence urgency.1110 But of all places where Luke could adapt Mark, this is an excellent one: Luke’s insertion of the verbal adjective βλητέων (“must be put”) not only fills a verbal gap in Mark and so sounds clearer, but is also at least as emphatic.1111

1108 LSJ, s.v., notes that σὺντός in late Greek is “mostly emphatic” (and even includes an example from Luke 4:15), but is unclear whether this applies in prose or not. If it does, it would seem at least as effective as Mark’s repetition of ὁ ὀίνος.
1110 Gundry, Mark, 134.
1111 Granted, as Marshall (Luke, 227) points out, the verbal adjective form (βλητέων) and omission of the verb ἐστιν is rare and appears in the New Testament only here; but he adds that it is a good Classical idiom (citing BDF §§ 65[3] and 127[4]). Regardless, Luke’s insertion of the term in place of Mark’s ellipsis looks conspicuously like a clarification.
Summary

Luke’s adaptations of Mark are plausible, indeed more plausible than Mark’s putative changes to Luke. While Luke does on occasion insert a “clumsy” (albeit correct) or classical form with which readers might not be familiar, he fosters clarity by eschewing Mark’s technical words ἐπιράπτει and ἀγναφὸς. Indeed, the fact that Luke himself is familiar with and discusses ancient garment production (Acts 10:32 and 16:14), suggests that while he could appreciate the term ἀγναφὸς, he knew that his readers would not so readily understand it.\textsuperscript{1112}

Although Luke on occasion eschews material that could help achieve certain of his aims, he has solid reasons to do so, namely to serve other aims. Mark, however, repeatedly overlooks Lukan material that would contribute to his interest in emphasizing Jesus’ power. Given the care and intensity of his micro-conflations already to this end, Mark’s oversights render his work less plausible. As such, Luke’s adaptations of Mark appear more plausible than Mark’s purported adaptations of Luke.\textsuperscript{1113}

4.4: Conclusion

The foregoing study yields two insights. One insight is that the evangelists, whatever their sequence, composed in a manner less rigid and more flexible than rhetorical theory implies. For all the evangelists elevate the style of chreiai more regularly or rigorously than rhetorical theory would lead us to expect. Consequently, we should not rush to apply standards of rhetorical theory too hastily to rhetorical practice;

\textsuperscript{1112} For Luke’s awareness of garment manufacture, see Edwards, “Dress and Ornamentation,” 237-238.
\textsuperscript{1113} It would be best in further analysis to study all of Luke 5:27-39 since Luke here envisages one large narrative unit.
rather, we should recognize that rhetorical practice will inevitably, from time to time, qualify rhetorical theory.

A second insight is that a perspective informed by rhetoric can indeed suggest more and less plausible patterns of literary dependence. From this perspective, let us summarize the appeal and the problems of hypotheses of Markan posteriority, and then of Markan priority.

*Markan posteriority.* In two ways, editorial work by Mark according to the 2GH appears problematic. First, Mark attenuates the clarity of Matthew and Luke at the level of ideas. In spite of his sound rhetorical motives, *Mark inserts ambiguities into his adaptation of both gospels.* As we have shown, clarity is one of the single most important conventions in all of ancient rhetoric. Yet Mark clouds his progression of thought particularly vis-à-vis Matthew in 2:18 and in 2:19, places in the chreia body that demand clear style (criterion D.1). And Mark not only weakens the intellectual clarity of his putative sources, but also weakens their expressive clarity by replacing clear terms with less clear terms: Mark inserts ἐπιράπτει in 2:21a (cp. Matt. 9:16 / Luke 5:36b: ἐπιβάλλει) and borrows Matthew’s ἀγναφος in 2:21a (cp. Luke 5:36: καυνός). On hypotheses of Markan priority, by contrast, Matthew and Luke *clarify Mark’s vocabulary.* Granted, on these hypotheses, Matthew and Luke do on occasion replace Mark’s clear grammar with formulations that are not so current in first-century koinē
Greek. But in each case, Matthew and Luke have classical, Attic Greek precedents, and so have a certain authority. Mark’s choices of words have no such authority.

Mark’s second problem is his oversight of material in Luke that could help achieve his biographical aim of accenting Jesus’ power (criterion D.2). To appreciate this oversight, consider that Mark makes great efforts to conflate Luke and Matthew’s language in ways that underlie Jesus’ power: sometimes he will create speech figures by skillfully combining one element from Luke (νηστεύουσιν [5:33]) and one element from Matthew (νηστεύουσιν [9:15]). This method becomes more intense as Mark builds parallelism across 2:21-2:22. In the quotation below, bold text shows contributions to parallelism strictly from Matthew, and underlining shows contributions strictly from Luke.

(2:21) Οὐδεὶς ἐπίβλημα ὀάκους ἄγνάφου ἑπιράπτει ἐπὶ ἰμάτιον παλαιόν· ἐι δὲ μή, αἰτεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα ἀπ’ αὐτὸῦ τὸ καίνων τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ χείρον σχίσμα γίνεται.

(22) καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκούς παλαιόύς· ἐι δὲ μή, ῥήξει ὁ οἶνος τοὺς ἀσκούς καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἀπόλλυται καὶ οἱ ἄσκοι.

Here Mark finds repetition of οὐδεὶς strictly in Luke (used only once by Matthew); he also finds repetition of ἐι δὲ μή in Luke (used only once by Matthew); he finds the forward position of the second verb (αἰτεῖ/ῥήξει) repeated strictly in Matthew (used only once by Luke)—yet also finds the singular and active qualities of that verb repeated strictly in Luke (plural and passive once in Matthew [9:17]). Beyond a doubt, Mark is

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1115 Moreover, according to the Two-Gospel Hypothesis Luke has already introduced two of these phrases into his adaptation of Matthew (nos. 2 and 3). Hence there is hardly a change that is not common to all hypotheses.
attentive to detail. But if Mark is this attentive to detail, it is odd that he repeatedly rejects Luke’s more evident portrayals of Jesus’ authority: the forward position of Ἰησοῦς in 5:34, the use of the second person in 5:34, ὅταν . . . τότε in 5:35, the inclusion using καίνας in 5:36, and the use of νέως in 5:37. According to the 2GH then, Mark pursues his goal by a circuitous route, and about this there is something counterintuitive. Together, Mark’s circuitous method and his obfuscations render his alleged conflationary work rhetorically problematic.

Markan priority. Hypotheses of Markan priority, the 2DH and FH, appear rhetorically plausible on three grounds. First, Matthew and Luke have rhetorical reasons to adapt Mark.\textsuperscript{1116} In particular, Matthew and Luke often produce clearer style at the level of ideas and level of expression, and their adaptations find strong support in the rhetorical emphasis upon clarity.\textsuperscript{1117} In fact, Luke and Matthew clarify in their adaptations of Mark more often than Mark clarifies in his alleged adaptation of their gospels: Matthew alone clarifies Mark seven to eight times, whereas Mark clarifies Matthew only three to four times. I hesitate to weigh numbers of changes, for numbers alone are an inadequate measure and do not account for all changes towards plainness. But it is still worth noting that Matthew and Luke’s clarifications are relatively frequent. Second, Matthew and Luke clarify in the right places: they are attentive to propriety between the style and the contents of their chreiai (criterion D.1). And third, Matthew and Luke use all the material

\textsuperscript{1116} For instance, Matthew’s recourse to more conventional word sequences (9:14-15), more conventional vocabulary (9:16) and more conventional grammar (9:14) appear believable changes towards plain style.

\textsuperscript{1117} To suppose that Matthew and Luke at times understand clarity or propriety differently is not to say that their adaptations are not bona fide. There are, within limits, various understandings of rhetorical improvement. But we should expect such variety, given the richness of rhetorical theory.
in Mark that they need; neither evangelist repeatedly jettisons material that would support their biographical aims (criterion D.2).\textsuperscript{1118}


If there is a problem for Markan priority, it is the apparent minor agreements between Matthew and Luke against Mark. Perusal of Neirynck’s survey (1974) indicates eleven minor agreements, and the 2GH regards these agreements as indications of Luke’s use of Matthew.\textsuperscript{1119} The agreements do not, however, pose a significant problem to the 2DH.\textsuperscript{1120} Four agreements are \textit{omissions} (first, of Mark 2:18a; second, of Mark’s restatement in 2:19; third, of Mark’s \textit{μαθηταί} in 2:18b; and fourth, of Mark’s \textit{καὶ} \ldots \textit{καὶ} [\textit{λέγωσιν} in 2:18a]). These agreements pose little to no problem. The first is grounded in Matthew and Luke’s concern for plain style; the second in their disagreement with Mark’s logic; the third could easily be coincidence; and the fourth finds explanation in the differing programs of Matthew and Luke.\textsuperscript{1121} Seven further

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1118] Sometimes, Luke will bypass touches in Mark that could help achieve one of his aims, but in the process Luke achieves another of his aims. We should expect this periodic selection of source material from time to time.
\item[1119] A list of agreements is in Frans Neirynck, \textit{The Minor Agreements of Matthew and Luke Against Mark with a Cumulative List}, BETL 37 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), 72-73, 199-201. For interpretation of these agreements, see for instance Sanders and Davies, \textit{Studying the Synoptic Gospels}, 67-73.
\item[1120] Let alone to the FH, on which we should expect them.
\item[1121] As for this fourth agreement, Matthew and Luke would find such style in Mark unappealing not only in its parataxis. It is unappealing also inasmuch as Matthew wants to create a more authoritative image of Jesus vis-à-vis those who approach him (above, section i), and inasmuch as Luke wants to link the chreia with the preceding pericope (above, section ii).
\end{footnotes}
agreements concern common additions. Again however, most pose little to no problem in our view to the 2DH.\footnote{The first is Matthew and Luke’s addition of οἱ and the prefix/preposition πρὸς – (Matt. 9:14/Luke 5:33). These can be interpreted as part coincidence and part the product of distinct motivations: Matthew likes προσ(προσοντας) for the added deference it gives to the disciples’ approach to Jesus; Luke likes πρὸς as a distinct, more distant formula of address to Jesus’ opponents. The common οἱ simply denotes the subject who speaks and could easily be coincidental. The second agreement is in addition of δὲ in Matt. 9:16/Luke 5:36. But Matthew and Luke not only use the particle in distinct sentences; they also simply use a particle that clarifies the opening of a clause. The third and fourth agreements are in addition of (forms of) the verbs for “put” (i.e., sew: ἐπιβάλλω) in Matt. 9:16/Luke 5:36, and for “pour” (βάλλω) in Matt. 9:17/Luke 5:38. Mark however chooses a quite unusual verb (ἐπιράπτω) which later authors would wish to clarify. Moreover, as Fitzmyer indicates (Luke I-IX, 595), ἐπιβάλλω would be a ready-to-mind alternative for each evangelist independently of the other (ἐπι— is found already in Mark’s verb), while use of βάλλω in Matt. 9:17/Luke 5:38 is simply the byproduct of each evangelist already having taken over the term in Mark (2:22) and having to fix Mark’s ellipsis.\footnote{“Coincidence is the obvious explanation. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐγέρσθε for εἰ δὲ μὴ γέργε was a standard expression; see e.g., LXX Dan 3:15; Bel 8; Matt. 6:1; Luke 5:36, 37; 10:6; 13:9; 14:32; 2 Cor 11:16; Josephus, Bell. 6.120; Ant. 17.113; P. Oxy. 1159.6.” See W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Jr., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew, vol. 1 Commentary on VIII-XVIII, ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 114 n. 135.} Second, Matthew and Luke add a similar verb for “pour” (Matthew in 9:17 [ἐκχεῖται]; Luke in 5:37 [ἐκχυθήσεται]), but this agreement becomes less conspicuous on closer inspection. For one, Matthew and Luke actually use slightly different verbs (Matthew: ἐκχέω; Luke: ἐκχύννω).\footnote{Marshall, Luke, 227.} For another, they employ different tenses (Matthew: present; Luke: future). And third, their sentences have slightly different connotations. Matthew sets the verb, fairly common in papyri,\footnote{Moulton and Milligan, Vocabulary of the Greek Testament, 200; cp. LSJ, s.v.} in the centre of a chiasmus (ῥύγυνται οἱ ἁρκοὶ καὶ ὁ ὀίνος ἐκχεῖται καὶ οἱ ἁρκοὶ ἀπόλλυνται [9:17]) in the context of warning about the risk of losing the old and the new wine. Luke, though, pairs the verb with ἀπολοῦνται to convey the incompatibility of old and new
wine (5:36). Hence the agreement might be coincidental. Even if it is not, we might account for it from oral tradition or textual assimilation.

The third agreement is in Matthew and Luke’s addition of the verb “destroy” (Matthew 9:17: ἀπόλλυται; Luke 5:37: ἀπολούνται). Again, Matthew and Luke have a good rhetorical reason to add the verb independently of each other. For their addition helps fix one of Mark’s ellipses: his conclusion of 2:22b beginning with οἱ ὁσκοί. Now for Matthew and Luke, the most natural way to fix this ellipsis would be to add the verb that Mark had intended for οἱ ὁσκοί but never expressed: ἀπολλυται (2:22). In the end, the minor agreements do constitute a problem for Markan priority. How much weight we assign them is a matter for debate beyond the scope of our study. But most of our explanations for these agreements in Mark 2:18-22 and parallels are reasonable in their appeal to rhetorical convention.

Our study of the chreia in Mark 2:18-22 and parallels shows that hypotheses of Markan priority are more sensitive than hypotheses of Markan posteriority to rhetorical principles, particularly to clarity and propriety. The Two-Gospel Hypothesis needs to postulate an evangelist who downplays clarity and reaches for less obvious contributions to his causes. From a rhetorical standpoint, hypotheses of Markan priority appear more plausible.
Chapter 5
Rhetorical Criticism and the Double Tradition

As in Chapter 4, we shall assess the sequence of synoptic χρεία using rhetorical criteria. But now we turn our attention to the Double Tradition—to a chreia shared by Matthew and Luke but not Mark. The Double Tradition constitutes a major issue in the synoptic problem. Advocates of the 2DH believe that Matthew and Luke draw this material from the sayings gospel Q. Advocates of the 2GH and FH believe that Luke draws it from Matthew.

We choose not simply a chreia in the Double Tradition, but a specific kind of material that the 2GH and FH regards as powerful evidence against the existence of Q. Scholars conventionally call this material “Mark-Q overlap” material: for while Matthew and Luke share it, Mark presents a version that is rather different in wording and content. The Markan version, in other words, is a version against which Matthew and Luke agree substantially, yet with which at the same time they share contours. And an excellent example of a chreia in overlap material is the Beelzebul Controversy (Matt. 12:22-37 / Mark 3:20-35 / Luke 11:14-36).

We examine overlap material for two reasons. One is to take seriously hypotheses that challenge the existence of Q. These hypotheses regard overlaps as clear evidence that Luke has simply taken over Matthew, and that it is unnecessary to appeal to a lost source from which they allegedly draw.\footnote{See for instance (from the perspective of the FH), Goodacre, \textit{Synoptic Problem}, 130-131, 148-151. A study by Albert Fuchs of the development of the Beelzebul controversy concludes that Matthew and Luke adapted a \textit{second (now lost) edition} of Mark’s gospel, which had itself combined an earlier edition of Mark} A second reason to examine overlap material is that
it adds value to Chapter 4: unlike the rest of the Double Tradition, overlap material allows us to continue assessing Mark’s alleged conflation of Matthew and Luke.

In this chapter we shall vary our approach slightly. In Chapter 4, we began by summarizing each evangelist’s chief interests, their most frequent reasons for change. In Chapter 5 we shall search systematically for each of the interests summarized in Part 1: drawing chreiai into closer conformity with rhetorical principles (A); biographical and apologetic interests (B); and an interest in clarification (C). This approach is merely a different means to discover the evangelists' aims.

Since the evangelists’ aims will continue to appear plausible, there is little point in asking further about their conformity to this first criterion for literary dependence (above, Part 1, p. 219). But we shall continue to apply our second criterion: the evangelists’ interest in propriety, interest D. Again this criterion contains two precise questions. First, does an evangelist adapt his putative source in a way that maintains propriety between contents and style (criterion D.1)? Second, does an evangelist overlook material in which he is otherwise intensely interested and/or which would be useful for his purposes (criterion D.2)?

5.1: Description of Chreiai

Table 5.1 (Appendix 3) presents the Beelzebul Controversy in each synoptic chreia. Robbins has accurately captured the rhetorical borders and parts of these

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with the sayings gospel Q. Fuchs regards key evidence for his thesis of a Deuteromarkus as the minor agreements as well as the overlap tradition: see Fuchs, Die Entwicklung der Beelzebulkontroverse bei den Synoptikern, SNTU B/5 (Linz: SNTU, 1980), 12-15.

1127 For characterization of this chreia (Matt. 12:22-30 / Mark 3:22-27 / Luke 11:14-36), see Berger, Formgeschichte, 80-81 and Kloppenburg, Excavating Q, 322 and n. 10.
chreiai, and we delineate them accordingly. As we summarize each synoptic chreia below, we should observe that each chreia contains two basic sections: the first presents accusations against Jesus, and the second presents Jesus’ reply.

_a) Mark 3:20-35._ Work by Robbins has drawn attention to Mark’s nuanced invention, arrangement and expression in 3:20-35, essentially an expanded and elaborated chreia that centers on Jesus’ _propositio:_ “How can Satan cast out Satan?” (3:23). In form, Mark 3:20-35 contains three _τόποι_ arranged in a chiasmus: the three topics contain three charges against Jesus, followed by three replies in reverse sequence (a – b – c – c’ – b’ – a’). According to Gundry, Mark’s Jesus argues for his ability to _redefine family_— in the frame of the chiasm (a/a’)—by arguing he _works with the Holy Spirit,_ in the centre of the chiasm (b/c/c’/b’).

The first half of the chiasm (3:20-22) approximates a chreia expansion and presents the three charges against Jesus. The first charge, voiced by people who watch Jesus return home amidst throngs of curious onlookers, is that he is crazy (ἐξεστή: 3:20-21). This charge reveals a conjectural _στήσις_ (a question of fact), for it implies a dispute over what Jesus is like. The Jerusalem scribes standing near Jesus then voice a second charge: Jesus “possesses Beelzebul,” whom Mark equates with Satan, the Adversary of

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1128 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy.”
1129 The bulk of description below comes from Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 171-177. (With a slightly different emphasis, Robbins labels 3:22 as the chreia and 3:23 as a paraphrase of it [p. 173]). It is fascinating that Mark himself seems either not to recognize or not to care about, labeling this saying as a “chreia”; he says that Jesus simply will “speak in parables” (3:23).
1130 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 172; cp. Marcus, _Mark 1-8_, 278-279. Because the topics attack and defend Jesus’ character, Robbins characterizes the rhetorical species as _epideictic_ (pp. 174-175, 177). Peabody, McNicol and Cope’s description of Mark 3:20-35 would have benefited from Robbins’ work, but the Research Team is not aware of it, and so describes the unit inaccurately: see _One Gospel from Two_, 119-120 (where the team mistakes Mark’s repetition of ἔλεγον ὅτι as a key to the unit’s structure), and 121.
1131 Gundry, _Mark_, 170.
This charge similarly reveals a conjectural στόσις. And to this the scribes quickly add a third charge: “in the power of demons he [Jesus] casts out demons” (3:22b). This last charge reveals a στόσις of definition, for it concerns not what Jesus does, but rather how to define what he does: does Jesus work by Beelzebul? 

In the remainder or second half of the chiasmus (3:23-35), Mark’s Jesus replies to these charges. And in chiastic fashion, Jesus begins by answering the third charge. His propositio, the key to our entire unit, is a responsive, sayings chreia: “How is Satan able to cast out Satan?” (3:23-27). The counterintuitive, witty and pointed qualities of this propositio certainly call chreiai to mind, even if Mark labels it a “parable” (παραβολής: 3:23). Mark’s Jesus supports his propositio with logical arguments, three from analogy and one from opposite. Robbins has astutely detected a tripartite form here.

**Topic: Casting Out**

1. **Quaestio (paraphrase of scribes’ final remark)**
   
   And he called them to him, and said to them in parables, “How can Satan cast out Satan?”

2. **Argument for Implausibility from Analogies (ἐκ παραβολῶν)**
   
   (i) “If a kingdom is divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand.”
   
   (ii) “And if a house is divided against itself, that house will not be able to stand.”
   
   (iii) “And if Satan has risen up against himself and is divided, he cannot stand, but possesses an end.”

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1133 Pointed out by Marcus, Mark 1-8, 281, although without reference to στόσις theory. The charge itself approximates a declarative (ἀποφαστικόν) and sayings (λογικά) chreia. Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 162 (a double chreia: διπλά χρειά), 171.

1134 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 173; on p. 174 he adds that “the three-part argument . . . contains a three-part center.”

1135 Indeed Robbins shows a tripartite form in all of Jesus’ three replies, and remarks that the “extreme censure” in Jesus’ language (e.g., 3:29) and the use of topics, gives Mark’s speech an epideictic quality: “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 162, 172-175, 174-175, 176-177.
3. Argument for Falsity from a Contrary (ἐξ ἐναντίου)

“But no one can enter a strong man’s house and plunder his goods unless he first binds the strong man; then indeed he may plunder his house.”

Following this reply to the first charge, Mark’s Jesus offers a tripartite reply to the second charge (3:28-30), a countercharge that warns the scribes that their remark will earn them eternal status as sinners (3:29): “whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit . . . he is subject to sin of the age (i.e., forever).” Finally, Jesus replies in good chiastic fashion to the first charge (3:31-35). When Jesus’ family inquires into his whereabouts, Mark’s Jesus replies with another chreia. In this he asks, “Who are my mother and my brothers?” (3:33), following which he freshly identifies his family with “those who do the will of God.”

The chiasmus that we have outlined reveals Mark’s real skill in invention and arrangement.

Throughout, Mark also brings skill to his expression. Robbins has demonstrated that Mark uses multiple figures of speech to foster the unit’s cohesion: he employs for instance repetitions, ranging from the conspicuous (δύναται [3:23,24,25,26,27]) to the more subtly effective. Indeed, Mark employs repetitions especially of three. There is for example an arrangement of three arguments and three topics within Jesus’ first reply (3:23-27). Commentators have also pointed to the frequency with which Mark

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1137 Jesus’ reply assumes that in charging him, the scribes have actually sinned against the Holy Spirit: see Gundry, Mark, 176; for the tripartite form see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 175.
1138 This shares with the previous chreia a responsive and sayings form.
1139 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 176.
1140 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 175-176 and n. 31. Gundry, Mark, 172, also observes that Mark uses repetition (for example, in 3:23, of προσκαλέω [cp. 3:13]) to allude to incidents earlier in his narrative.
1141 He observes this in, among other places, Jesus’ second reply (i.e., the second topic: Mark 3:28-30): see “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 174-175.
1142 On which see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 172, 173.
carefully arranges individual words. Mark not only skillfully employs the figure of hyperbaton (the artistic arrangement of words),\textsuperscript{1143} but also blends it with three-fold repetition in his argument from opposite (3:27):

\[
\text{'all' of which is for the house of evil. He will plunder his house, he binds and he will plunder his vessels.}
\]

Mark constructs this saying with an emphasis on plundering (διαρράσασαι) that begins with “plundering his vessels” and ends with “plundering his house.” In addition, the Markan version has a tripartite form in which the verbs stand in emphatic final position and the verbs present an alliterative pattern: διαρράσασαι . . . δήσῃ . . . διαρράσασαι (“to plunder . . . he binds . . . he will plunder”). The compositional strategy strengthens the assertion that he will “plunder his house” and supports the prior statement that Satan “possesses an end.”\textsuperscript{1144}

Such design illustrates Mark’s stylistic dexterity.

\textbf{b) Matthew 12:22-37.} In his essay “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” Robbins shows the extent to which Matthew employs conventions of stasis theory described by Hermogenes’ treatise \textit{On Stases}.\textsuperscript{1145} Like Mark, Matthew reveals certain issues (στάσείς) between Jesus and his opponents that concern Jesus’ character. But unlike Mark, Matthew engages the judicial species more directly: for he assigns Jesus’ speech a judicial form, not, as in Mark, a more idiosyncratic chiastic form. This form, explains Robbins, addresses a στάσις concerning definition: when in 12:24 the Pharisees accuse Jesus of “casting out demons . . . by Beelzebul,” the point of

\textsuperscript{1143} On hyperbaton see Gundry, \textit{Mark}, 172 (for example, concerning the initial position of the phrase ἐν παραβολαῖς in 3:23). Gundry also points to Mark’s use of emphasis through the historic present tense (p. 170) and inclusions (p. 170).

\textsuperscript{1144} Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 174.

\textsuperscript{1145} The bulk of the description below comes from Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy.”
contention—the στάσις—concerns not what Jesus did, but its definition: casting out demons by Beelzebul. Matthew shares this stasis with Mark (3:22).

Matthew’s unit (12:22-37) addresses this στάσις, proceeding through several of Hermogenes’ steps. To introduce Jesus’ speech, Matthew presents an expanded chreia (12:22-24) which describes Jesus’ casting out of malign spirits (δαιμονία) and then presents a quaestio by crowds (οἱ ὀχλοί) who are struck by Jesus’ abilities (12:23): “Is this one not the son of David?” To this question, a group of bystanding Pharisees replies with a caustic chreia: “this one does not cast out demons except by Beelzebul the prince of demons” (12:24).

Following this introduction, Matt. 12:25-37 offers Jesus’ speech in reply. In fact, Matthew’s Jesus argues his reply in two parts, a “case in defense” (12:25-29) and a “case against” the Pharisees (12:30-37). Although this speech does not reflect Hermogenes’ argumentation in every detail, it does address the στάσις of definition using rhetorically conventional units—and often in the very sequence that Hermogenes describes!

1146 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 179. The following we base on Robbins’ description (pp. 178-185). Mark shares Matthew’s στάσις (3:22b), but includes further stases too: a stasis of fact, in the accusation that Jesus’ is crazy (ἐξετάζεις; 3:21), and a second stasis of fact, in the scribes’ accusation that Jesus “has Beelzebul” (Βεελζεβούλ τεκεί; 3:22a). The unit’s species also appears judicial inasmuch as it concerns judgement of the past (What is Jesus like?) and centres upon a question of στάσις (“Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 181, 192; cp. May and Wisse, “Introduction,” 32).

1147 Robbins labels 12:23 a quaestio and labels 12:24 the propositio (“Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 179). But we could equally well call 12:23 a propositio is that it approximates Hermogenes’ very first unit addressing a stasis of definition (see Nadeau, “Hermogenes On Stases,” 404). When in 12:23 the crowds ask, “Is this the son of David?” they in effect identify Jesus as Solomon, who was adept at healing (Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 178-179, citing D. C. Duling). Therefore, Matthew 12:23 has the crowds say in effect: This man (Jesus) performs legitimate healings that recall the work of Solomon. This is essentially the propositio that Jesus himself will defend from 12:25 onwards. 12:24 approximates Hermogenes’ second unit: the definition (Gk. ὁ ὀρὸς), typically given by the opponents (the Pharisees). This outline reflects closely the sequence in Hermogenes.


1149 According to Robbins, these units are the definition (12:24), argument from quality in common (12:27), counterdefinition (12:28), syllogism (or as he calls it, inference [12:30]), gravity (12:31), and “comparison that establishes a diatriesis,” or differentiation (12:33): Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 179, 180, 182, 183. For Hermogenes’ description, see Nadeau, “Hermogenes’ On Stases,”
Matthew’s case in defense begins with arguments from analogy (ἐκ παραβολῶν: 12:25-26). Jesus then offers an argument from quality in common or ἡ κοινὴ ποιότης: “In whom do your sons cast out demons?”, followed by a counterdefinition (ἀνθρωπισμός): “If in the spirit of God I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you” (12:27-28). After this, Jesus restates his counterdefinition as an analogy (12:29).

Next Jesus offers his case against the Pharisees (12:30-37). According to Robbins, Jesus begins with a statement that calls to mind Hermogenes’ syllogism (συλλογισμός): “He who is not with me is against me” (12:30). Next, Jesus makes two statements, which Robbins approximates to a statement of gravity (12:31) and statement of law (12:32) respectively. These warn the Pharisees that their conduct against Jesus amounts to a “sin” against the Holy Spirit, an act which warrants God’s eternal withholding of forgiveness (12:32). The warning continues with a comparison between good and bad using the analogy of ripe and spoiled fruit (12:33). Finally, Matthew’s Jesus reaches his conclusion in the same manner we saw in Chapter 4, by employing an emotionally appealing style. After calling the Pharisees a “brood of vipers” (12:34a) Jesus baldly accuses them of “being evil” (πονηροὶ ὄντες: 12:34b-35), after which he presents a

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400-406. This work is Robbins’ source. Robbins does not suggest that Matthew knew Hermogenes’ work directly.

1152 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 181.
1153 Robbins translates (following Nadeau) Hermogenes’ συλλογισμός as “inference” (“Rhetorical Composition and & Beelzebul Controversy,” 182).
1154 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 182.
1155 As Robbins puts it, the “analogy [of] . . . the tree and its fruit . . . associates the Pharisees with production of evil that reveals evil character at its source.” (“Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 183 (see pp. 182-183).
1156 The point is from Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 184 (see pp. 183-184).
judgement threatening them and implying that they have set the stage for their own
demise (ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου καταδίκασθησι: 12:36-37).\footnote{1157}

Like Mark, Matthew employs expression that is rich with rhetorical figures. According to Robbins, Matthew employs varieties of parallelism. The evangelist for instance uses parallelismus membrorum, in which elements in a first clause recur in a second: πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα καθ’ έαυτῆς ἔρημωται καὶ πᾶσα πόλις ἡ οἰκία
μερισθείσα καθ’ έαυτῆς οὐ σταθήσεται (12:25). In 12:25-26 Matthew also incorporates this parallelism into a larger, chiastic-like arrangement.

\begin{align*}
\text{βασιλεία [A]} & \text{ μερισθείσα καθ’ έαυτῆς [B]} \ldots \text{ οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ έαυτῆς [B]} \ldots \text{ σατανᾶς} \ldots έφ’ έαυτὸν ἐμερίσθη [B] \ldots \text{ βασιλεία [A]}.\footnote{1158}
\end{align*}

In addition to parallelism, Matthew employs stylistic devices such as repetition and inclusions (12:22-23).\footnote{1159} Further, he employs metaphors (12:34) and rhetorical questions (12:29,34).

c) Luke 11:14-36.\footnote{1160} Luke organizes much of his controversy, like Matthew, around an exchange within the stasis of definition: Jesus’ opponents begin with a chreia that defines his exorcism “by Beelzebul” (11:15), after which Jesus replies with a speech progressing towards a counterdefinition (11:20) and syllogism (11:23).\footnote{1161} At the same time, Luke arranges the entire unit (11:14-36) according to four topics, each of which

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1157} See above note. The invention and arrangement are heavily informed by rhetorical theory. Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 178, 184-185.
\item \footnote{1158} Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 180.
\item \footnote{1159} These are reflective of usages elsewhere in his gospel, for which see Luz, Matthew 1-7, 49-53.
\item \footnote{1161} Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 186. In Robbins’ analysis, Matthew’s inference opens Jesus’ case against the Pharisees (12:30), while Luke’s inference closes Jesus’ reply (see “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 182, 186.)
\end{itemize}
\normalsize
Luke anticipates in his introduction (vv. 14-16). First, Jesus exorcises a demon from a mute man, anticipating the topic of exit (11:14a, taken up in 11:24-26). Second, the crowds’ amazed reaction forms the topic of praise (11:14b, taken up in 11:27-28). Third, several people around Jesus charge that he works “by Beelzebul” (11:15) and this charge together with Jesus’ reply Robbins characterizes as the topic of censure (11:17-23). Finally there appears a fourth charge: “others . . . were trying to seek a sign from heaven by him” (11:16). This is the topic of test (11:16, taken up in 11:29-36).

After this introduction, Luke’s Jesus commences a speech that addresses each topic with a propositio. Beginning with the topic of censure, Jesus’ first propositio is that he works “by the finger of God,” not by Beelzebul (11:17-23). Jesus then addresses the topic of exit with a propositio that persons who have committed evil will invariably commit more evil (11:24-26). Next Jesus takes up the topic of praise with a propositio that obedience to God is paramount (11:27-28). Finally, Jesus addresses the topic of test with a propositio that his preaching is a sign to which people need pay attention (11:29-36). And to do this he composes an elaborated chreia (11:29-36). He begins with his own charge: “This generation is an evil generation” (11:29). He then

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1164 For this description of the introduction see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 185-186.
supports this definition by arguing that he can offer only “the sign of Jonah, namely the action and speech of the Son of man that functions like the action and speech of Jonah to the men of Nineveh” (11:29).\textsuperscript{1169} The argumentation consists first of a rationale (11:30), then a pair of arguments from example (11:31-32), then an argument from analogy (11:33-34) and finally a hortatory conclusion (11:35-36).\textsuperscript{1170}

One observation on Luke’s arrangement is worth note. Luke and Matthew use similar rhetorical units but they arrange the units differently. Luke places his fable of the unclean spirit (11:24-26) well before the elaborated chreia about Jonah (11:29-36); Matthew employs this fable (12:43-45) as a conclusion to his chreia about Jonah (12:38-42)\textsuperscript{1171}—and all this material follows Matthew’s Beelzebul Controversy (12:38-45).\textsuperscript{1172}

Like the other synoptics, Luke’s gospel employs a \textit{koine} dialect of Greek and usually a plain style.\textsuperscript{1173} Moreover, like the other synoptics, Luke’s gospel employs figures including metaphor (11:21-22) and rhetorical question (11:19).\textsuperscript{1174}

\textit{d) The Sayings Gospel Q (11:14-23).} From the perspective of the 2DH, material common to Matthew and Luke which does not appear in Mark constitutes the sayings

\textsuperscript{1169} Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 190; for this interpretation of the sign cp. also Goulder, \textit{Luke}, 512.
\textsuperscript{1171} That is, in Matthew, 12:43-45 (the fable on the unclean spirit) forms the conclusion of the rhetorical unit beginning in 12:38-42 (the Jonah chreia): Gundry, \textit{Matthew}, 241, 246; Luz, \textit{Matthew 8-20}, 213.
\textsuperscript{1172} Moreover, the unit which Matthew employs next, an expanded and elaborated chreia (12:46-50), parallels the concluding part of \textit{Mark}’s controversy (3:31-35).
gospel Q. We base our work on the reconstruction of the text (Table 5.2, Appendix 3) according to the International Q Project.\footnote{The Critical Edition of Q. Synopsis including the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, Mark and Thomas with English, German and French Translations of Q and Thomas, eds. James M. Robinson, Paul Hoffmann and John S. Kloppenborg, Managing Editor Milton C. Moreland, Hermeneia Supplements (Philadelphia: Fortress Press; Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2000). Unless otherwise noted, we follow the English translation provided therein, found also in The Sayings Gospel Q in Greek and English, with Parallels from the Gospels of Mark and Thomas, eds. James M. Robinson, Paul Hoffmann and John S. Kloppenborg, Managing Editor Milton C. Moreland (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002). We shall also note several variations in the reconstruction by Harry T. Fleddermann in Q: A Reconstruction and Commentary, BiTS 1 (Leuven - Paris - Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2005).}

Although recent exegeses of Q’s Beelzebul Controversy carry different emphases, we can still summarize its argumentation in outline.\footnote{For example, according to Kloppenborg, Q 11:14-23 and 11:24-26 are essentially one rhetorical unit in which Jesus responds to accusations that he has healed by Beelzebul (Kloppenborg, Formation of Q, 121, 124-125, 127). By contrast, Kirk, in his Composition of the Sayings Source, argues that Q 11:14-23 and 11:24-26 have different functions and as such do not belong together. According to Kirk, speeches in Q including 11:14-23 approximate instructional speeches (Composition, 149-151, 184-192, esp. 188-190, 192). In describing the instructional speech, a key component of which could be a chreia (Composition, 87, 109-113, 149) Kirk highlights three statements that create a ring form: an opening admonition; a central maxim that “may act as a coordinating pivot between [two] sections”; and a final admonition (Composition, 150).} Q’s purpose is to argue that Jesus’ exorcisms are legitimate and empowered by God (11:20), and hence to invite adherence to him and his preaching (11:20-23).\footnote{There are also secondary, wider purposes to which 11:14-23 contributes. One of these is to critique Jesus’ opponents, “this generation,” for not accepting him and his preaching, and to forbode divine judgment upon it (Kloppenborg, Formation of Q, 102, 147-148; Jacobson, First Gospel, 152; Fleddermann, Q, 515, 504, 508). A second broader purpose, to which Martin Hüneburg has drawn attention, is biographical: for Q, Jesus has authority so great that he is essentially a proxy for God—he is the authoritative Christ. Critical to such authority is Jesus’ healing work (as here in Q 11): Martin Hüneburg, Jesus als Wundertäter in der Logienquelle: Ein Beitrag zur Christologie von Q, ABG 4 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2001), 225, 227-228.} In Q the controversy contains the same stasis of definition as appears in Matthew (12:24), Luke (11:15) and Mark (3:22b): By whom does Jesus cast out demons?\footnote{Q’s chreia infers this stasis through the propositio by Jesus’ opponents: “Some said, by Beelzebul . . . he casts out demons” (Q 11:15). See Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 179.} The opponents’ propositio is that Jesus works illegitimately, employing the help of Beelzebul (Q 11:15). Jesus’ propositio is that he works legitimately, employing the help of God (Q 11:20).\footnote{I.e., the counterdefinition. Translation from Critical Edition of Q. Kirk, Composition, 188, agrees with Robbins (“Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 186), that 11:20 constitutes a}
Faced with the opponents’ *propositio*, Jesus begins his reply (11:16-26) with two logical arguments, each in the form of a rhetorical question. The first argument implies that Satan (Beelzebul) would not work against his own better interests (Q 11:18). The second argument implies that Jesus’ accusers are as heinous as he, if his power base is in fact Satan (11:19). These arguments lead to the counterdefinition (11:20).

Q’s argumentation continues with an argument from analogy (Q 11:21-22). While the wording of this analogy according to the IQP is uncertain and might reflect either Matthew or Luke, Jesus in either case argues for the divine sanction of his exorcisms by appealing to the analogy of a strong man overcoming an opponent.

After this argument comes the same syllogism that we found in Matthew and Luke: “The one who is not with me is against me, and the one who does not gather with me scatters” (Q 11:23). In this syllogism, Jesus “demands a decision about allegiance,” and if allegiance is not forthcoming then one needs to anticipate divine judgement and punishment. Finally Jesus offers a fable in 11:24-26, which scholars agree “stands in counterdefinition that opposes 11:15’s definition. (To be sure, Robbins is describing Matthew’s version, but the argumentation, says Kirk, is the same as in Q.)

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1183 That is, to judge by the Q unit’s close similarity to Matt. 12:29, itself an analogy, on which see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 180.
some such elaborative connection to the preceding speech.”\textsuperscript{1186} Whether Q’s Beelzebul Controversy ends in 11:23 or in 11:26, is not so important for summary purposes.

In its literary context, Q 11:24-26 gives way to a series of sayings about Jonah (Q 11:16,29-30,31-32,33,34-35). Several scholars concur that Q envisions these sayings as a unified composition.\textsuperscript{1187} These sayings begin with the charge that “some . . . were demanding from him a sign” (11:16), and to this charge Jesus replies with a \textit{propositio}: “This generation is an evil generation; it demands a sign, and a sign will not be given to it – except the sign of Jonah!” (11:29).\textsuperscript{1188} The emerging consensus is that in Q the sign of Jonah is a metaphor for Jesus’ preaching, in particular “Jesus’ announcement of judgment.”\textsuperscript{1189} Following the \textit{propositio} Jesus offers a rationale (11:30), examples (11:31-32),\textsuperscript{1190} and finally a fable (11:33-36), in which Kloppenborg observes a strong connection to the Beelzebul Controversy:

\begin{quote}
Q 11:33-36 must be interpreted in the context of the issues raised in 11:14-26, 29-32. Throughout, the conflict between Jesus and his opponents is based on
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1186} Kirk, \textit{Composition}, 330-331. On 11:24-26 as a fable, see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 187; Fleddermann, \textit{Q}, 508 (parable); Kirk, \textit{Composition}, 331. Several critics argue that its purpose is to demonstrate the preceding admonition (11:23): one either chooses allegiance to Jesus or one becomes allied with evil, much like a clean house into which evil spirits come (Kloppenborg, \textit{Formation of Q}, 127; Fleddermann, \textit{Q}, 508; Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 187-188). Depending on how we delineate Q’s Beelzebul Controversy, the syllogism in 11:23 marks the end of the unit (Kirk) or it gives way to an illustrative fable in 11:24-26 (Kloppenborg).

\textsuperscript{1187} Kirk, \textit{Composition}, 330-331. On 11:24-26 as a fable, see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 187; Fleddermann, \textit{Q}, 508 (parable); Kirk, \textit{Composition}, 331. Several critics argue that its purpose is to demonstrate the preceding admonition (11:23): one either chooses allegiance to Jesus or one becomes allied with evil, much like a clean house into which evil spirits come (Kloppenborg, \textit{Formation of Q}, 127; Fleddermann, \textit{Q}, 508; Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 187-188). Depending on how we delineate Q’s Beelzebul Controversy, the syllogism in 11:23 marks the end of the unit (Kirk) or it gives way to an illustrative fable in 11:24-26 (Kloppenborg).

\textsuperscript{1188} Kirk, \textit{Composition}, 330-331. On 11:24-26 as a fable, see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 187; Fleddermann, \textit{Q}, 508 (parable); Kirk, \textit{Composition}, 331. Several critics argue that its purpose is to demonstrate the preceding admonition (11:23): one either chooses allegiance to Jesus or one becomes allied with evil, much like a clean house into which evil spirits come (Kloppenborg, \textit{Formation of Q}, 127; Fleddermann, \textit{Q}, 508; Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 187-188). Depending on how we delineate Q’s Beelzebul Controversy, the syllogism in 11:23 marks the end of the unit (Kirk) or it gives way to an illustrative fable in 11:24-26 (Kloppenborg).


faulty perception: the opponents mistake the workings of “the finger of God” (11:20), which should have been taken as evidence of the kingdom, as deeds of Beelzebul. Then they request a sign from heaven, not perceiving that Jesus’ preaching is itself the sign they request. Such a failure . . . can only be interpreted as abject moral blindness, worthy of judgment and condemnation.\footnote{Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 138; cp. similarly Kirk, *Composition*, 201, and Jacobson, *First Gospel*, 173-174.}

In summary, Q’s Beelzebul Controversy, which belongs to a larger set of controversy traditions in Q 10 and/or Q 11, is to to “censure or condemn this generation” (\(\tilde{\iota} \gamma\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\alpha\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\) [Q 11:29]), the people who oppose Jesus’ preaching.\footnote{Kirk, *Composition*, 310-311, 327; Jacobson, *First Gospel*, 152, 182-183; Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 121, 147. Cp. similarly Fleddermann, *Q*, 500-501.}

In its style, Q 11:14-23 does not fit neatly into one register. In some ways its style is plain. For instance, Q’s sentence composition calls to mind something between *oratio soluta* and *oratio perpetua*, the use of one or two clauses per sentence (for instance, Q 11:14, 15, 19, 23); it lacks syntactically complex sentences. Kloppenborg adds that features of the sayings gospel’s Greek are Semitic, such as parallelism and the frequent use of κα\(\acute{\iota}\), and so would strike Greek readers as requiring improvement.\footnote{Kloppenborg Verbin, *Excavating Q*, 73.} In other ways, Q calls to mind a more elevated style, as it frequently appeals to figures like metaphor, repetition, and rhetorical questions (see Q 11:17, 19, 19-20). These betray awareness of ornament, and the frequent use of ring form and “catchwords” also suggests something more than plain style.\footnote{On ring technique and catchwords, see Kirk, *Composition*, 188-189, 311, 312 (for example); term and discussion in Fleddermann, *Q*, 503. In *Formation of Q*, 64 (cp. *Excavating Q*, 80), Kloppenborg demonstrates that Q was originally composed in Greek.}

### 5.2: Mark’s Adaptation of Matthew and Luke (the Two-Gospel Hypothesis [2GH])

The accompanying table (Table 5.3, Appendix 3) affords a visual impression of places where Mark modifies his putative sources, Matthew and Luke. We shall begin by
describing Mark’s changes in terms of the three major purposes that we amassed in Part 1: 1. to draw the chreia into closer conformity with principles for speeches (purpose A); 2. to foster a particular biographical or apologetic portrayal (purpose B); and 3. to clarify (purpose C).

1. Pulling Matthew and Luke towards principles for speeches. Mark 3:20-35’s distinctive, chiasmus form makes it difficult at first glance to imagine that he might pull his alleged source, Matthew’s gospel, towards a more conventionally judicial speech form.\footnote{Although Mark likely takes topics from Luke 11:14-36, he seeks virtually nothing further. Matthew is his chief source. From the perspective of the 2GH, Matthew appeals more to Mark than does Luke. Hence Mark’s departures from Luke are improvements to Luke.} Comparing two very different forms is akin to comparing an apple with an orange. In invention for instance, Mark has several στάσεις (3:21, 3:22a, 3:22b), whereas Matthew has just one (12:24). And in arrangement, Mark of course employs a chiasmus, whereas Matthew does not. Such differences raise a caution: if the evangelists have different priorities, then asking which evangelist adheres better to judicial speech convention can be artificial. But we may still make a judicious comparison: inasmuch as the evangelists’ work is reasonably similar or overlaps, we can look for Mark’s improvements. And there are three places where Matthew and Mark overlap: first, in their stasis whether Jesus works by Beelzebul (Mark 3:22b-27/Matt. 12:24-29/Luke 11:15-22); second, in their stasis whether Jesus possesses Beelzebul (Mark 3:28-30/Matt. 12:31-32/Luke 12:10);\footnote{In fact, only Mark is interested in this issue. Luke and Matthew share the material, but they use it differently: Luke uses it to encourage Jesus’ disciples to proclaim the good news (12:2-10); Matthew uses it to speak against the Pharisees’ charge of working by Beelzebul (12:31-32).} and third, in Jesus’ closing reply (Mark 3:31-35/Matt. 12:46-50/cp. Luke 8:19-21).\footnote{In the latter case, Mark follows Matthew more closely than Luke: Matt. 12:46-50 (a distinct rhetorical unit in Matthew), comes very shortly after Matthew’s Beelzebul unit (12:22-37), and so Mark probably brought Matthew to mind more readily than Luke. Moreover, the wording of Mark and Matthew is very different.} Since these sections agree substantially, we can ask: Does Mark
pull his putative sources towards conventional speech form? As it turns out, Mark often does pursue this purpose. Consider the following two overlaps.

In the first overlap (Mark 3:22b-27/Matt. 12:24-29/Luke 11:15-22), all synoptics present a στάσις of definition: Does Jesus work by Beelzebul? In this passage, rhetorical convention invites improvement through intensifying logical proofs, either by adding proofs or by συζητήσεις/amplificatio of existing proofs (A.1). Though rhetoric does not demand that Mark intensify proofs, Mark often does just this: he heightens proof usually by paraphrasing, by changing words and phrases, and sometimes by replacing Matthew’s various figures with different figures. This technique appears rhetorically credible, for συζητήσεις/amplificatio appears to permit various thought and speech figures. What is more, we have already seen that Josephus fulfills apologetic and theological goals through paraphrase and mild idea changes on the level of a clause (Chapter 3).

Let us survey some of Mark’s changes that intensify proof. In 3:23, he opens his proofs with a question (πώς διψάται σατανάς σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλειν;) that underscores Jesus’ case: that it is not by Satan that he works. Then, in 3:26a, Mark adds the verb ἀνέστη (“if Satan has risen against himself”), underscoring the implausibility of Satan’s alleged work. Further, in 3:26b Mark adds ἀλλὰ τέλος ἔχει ("But he [Satan] has an

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Lausberg, Handbook §§348, 257.1, 259: “Amplificatio is served by res et verba . . . , and thus [by] the means of inventio . . . and elocutio [i.e., figures of thought and figures of speech].” This is the only improvement (A.1) that we can measure. To measure whether Mark draws sources into closer conformity with stasis (A.2), and whether he articulates the five main speech parts (A.3) seems unrealistic, since Mark employs a very distinct arrangement and additional propositiones. Mark does not rearrange Matthean material in more effective ways (A.4).

Lausberg, Handbook § 259 (see above note) and §§ 400-409; cp. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, 22: “All speech involves the ‘working out’ (ergasia) of its inventional topics. . . . [U]seful in this process . . . are devices of style, especially figures of thought, which awaken audience interest and allow them to see the material in new ways.”
end"), underlining the dire consequences. To sharpen Jesus’ arguments, Mark also repeatedly inserts figures of speech: threefold repetition using καὶ εἶ (3:24-26), repetition and a ring pattern with alliteration in 3:27 (διαρπάσαι . . . δήσῃ . . . διαρπάσει), and positioning δήσῃ so that it falls, like the verbs around it, at the end of its clause (3:27).

In the second overlap (Mark 3:28-30/Matt. 12:31-32/Luke 12:10) too, we might expect that Mark intensifies his sources’ proofs (B.1). And he does just this mainly through paraphrase: in 3:28 he adds ὀμὴν (“truly”: cp. Matt. 12:32/Luke 12:10), in 3:28b he builds up a series of related words (an amplificatory technique called congeries), in 3:29 he inserts the strong term ἄνωθεν ἄρχειν (cp. “speak” in Matt. 12:32/Luke 12:10), and he paraphrases Matt. 12:32b with the more vivid ἀλλὰ ἐνοχὸς ἐστίν αἰώνιον ἁμαρτήματος (“but is guilty of an eternal sin”). All of this paraphrase intensifies Jesus’ threat against his opponents. Here Mark’s work looks plausible.

1200 At the same time, Mark might have added this phrase also to foreshadow his use of ἔχει in 3:30 (on which see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 173-174).
1201 Moreover, according to Gundry, Mark’s “placements . . . of ‘a kingdom against itself’ and ‘a house against itself’ before ‘should be divided’ . . . [3:24: καὶ ἐὰν βασιλεῖα εἶ ἐστημεν μεριζθῇ] reemphasize the absurdity of thinking that Satan is casting out Satan (Mark, 173). Mark might take his cue for rearranging the words from Luke 11:17b.
1203 That is, he “piles up” terms which highlight God’s compassion (τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ αἱ βλάσφημοι ὅσα ἐὰν βλασφημήσωσιν [3:28]). This emphasis upon compassion, explains Gundry, prepares to contrast the withholding of forgiveness to the scribes (3:29): Mark, 176. On congeries see Lausberg, Handbook § 406: “the piling up of synonymous words and sentences.”
1204 In the case of congeries (Mark 3:28b), according to the FH and 2DH, Matthew eliminates it to clarify Mark (so Gundry, Matthew, 237). Moreover, the contribution of these words to Jesus’ case is indirect, while in any event Matthew achieves essentially the same goal by repeating himself in 12:32a.
1205 Should Mark have retained Matthew’s repeated condemnation (Matt. 12:32)? We can explain Mark’s omission by the fact that Matt. 12:32 does not make good sense for Mark. As Gundry puts it, “The . . . saying would not fit the editorial comment in [Mark] v 30: the possibility of forgiveness for the person ‘who will speak a word against the Son of man’ (Luke 12:10; cf. Matt 12:32) would contradict the equation of the unforgivable sin with the scribes’ saying that Jesus ‘has an unclean spirit’ (v 30). If that is
2. Biographical purposes: Enhancing Jesus’ authority. In Mark 3:20-35, Jesus states three *propositiones*: the first is that he does not “exorcise demons by the ruler of demons” (3:22b-23); the second is that he does not possess Beelzebul (3:22a, 3:28-30); and the third is that he regards as his family “whoever does the will of God” (3:35). These *propositiones* neatly imply that Mark has three aims. But as Gundry indicates, these aims also share in an underlying, biographical purpose, evident in the narrative context. Much as in 2:18-22 (above, Chapter 4), Mark wants to *demonstrate and account for Jesus’ authoritative character*. 

Where does . . . [Jesus’] authority come from? That is the question now discussed. . . . [Mark] sticks the scribes’ charge in the middle of the pericope to give a theological interpretation of the story concerning the attempt of Jesus’ mother and brothers to seize him. According to this interpretation *Jesus has the Holy Spirit*, not the unclean Spirit Beelzebul, and *therefore has the authority* to form a supernatural family rather than having to submit to search and seizure by his natural family.

To portray Jesus’ authority to create a new family, Mark assigns Jesus two *propositiones* in the centre of the chiasmus: first, Jesus does not have a demon, and second, he does not use Satan to drive out demons (3:22-29). In this way, Mark authorizes Jesus to offer a third *propositio* in the frame of the chiasmus (3:20-21, 3:31-35). 

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1207 The Research Team does not adequately describe this purpose. It suggests based on its source-critical assumption (the 2GH) that “Mark has focused the unit on the demon possession charge” (*One Gospel from Two*, 120). This describes what Mark does according to the 2GH. But we need to ask: What is the purpose of Mark’s unit as it stands?
1209 Gundry, *Mark*, 6, 7, 73, for example. On compositional techniques to achieve this purpose, see Gundry, *Mark*, 170-179. Recent commentary indicates that Mark has further concerns. One is to portray deepening *conflict* between Jesus and his opponents: Marcus, *Mark 1-8*, 255, 277-278; cp. Peabody, *One Gospel from Two*, 117. Mark’s techniques of adaptation are conventional enough: Mark expands, compresses, paraphrases and elaborates the chreia, omitting a rationale [Matt. 12:34c-35] and a judgement [Matt. 12:36-
With this biographical aim in mind, Mark rigorously adapts Matthew and Luke.\textsuperscript{1210} For instance, Mark omits and adds material to produce his chiastic arrangement of three topics: A (3:20-21) – B (3:22a) – C (3:22b) – C’ (3:23-27) – B’ (3:28-30) – A’ (3:31-35). The chiastic arrangement helps justify Jesus’ authority to call disciples (A/A’) by arguing for his ability to cast out demons (B/B’ and C/C’).\textsuperscript{1211} Moreover, by adding the phrase καὶ προσκαλεσόμενος σὺτούς (“and calling them to him”: 3:23a), Mark gives Jesus authority to lecture his critics.\textsuperscript{1212}

Mark enhances Jesus’ authority through changing his sources’ expression, too. By replacing Matthew and Luke’s participles (μερισθείσα: Matt. 12:25a-b/cp. Luke 11:17) with the subjunctive verb μερισθῇ (3:24-25), for example, Mark distinguishes the hypothetical division of kingdoms and households from Jesus’ more certain division of Satan, which he conveys using an indicative verb (ἐμερίσθη: 3:26).\textsuperscript{1213} Mark further enhances Jesus’ strength through use of the letter δ- for words at the end of successive clauses (Matt. 12:29; cp. Mark 3:27). At the same time he converts Matthew’s question

\textsuperscript{37}). These recall techniques in the progymnasmata. It is worth noting that Mark usually follows Matthew; he has little interest in Luke’s contributions, on which see Peabody, ed., \textit{One Gospel From Two}, 119.
\textsuperscript{1210} An impression that we have from reading Gundry, \textit{Mark}, 170-179.
\textsuperscript{1211} To achieve this chiasm in turn, Mark adds the framing topic of Jesus’ family, both the charge that he is ἔξωτοτι or “outside himself” (a: 3:20-21), and his reply that his family constitutes “whoever might do the will of God” (a’: 3:31-35). Mark also adds a second topic: Jesus’ possession by Beelzebul. This topic contains the charge “he has Beelzebul” (b: 3:22a), and Jesus’ reply that such a charge is an unforgivable sin (b’: 3:28-30). But this topic does not really contribute to Jesus’ authority. It certainly contributes to the theme of conflict, and perhaps indirectly to Jesus’ authority (as indicated by Gundry, \textit{Mark}, 172: “The charges that he has Beelzebul . . . set up a contest of didactic authority”).
\textsuperscript{1212} Gundry, \textit{Mark}, 172: “‘And summoning them’ recalls [3:13, where he summoned those whom he willed, and again alludes to his authority.”
\textsuperscript{1213} Still in this middle part, Mark adapts Matthew and Luke’s question πῶς . . . σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία σὺτοῦ; (“How . . . will his [Satan’s] kingdom stand?”: Matt. 12:26/Luke 11:18) into the assertion ὁ δύναται στήναι ἅλλα τέλος ἔχει (“He is not be able to stand, but comes to an end”: 3:26). This shift recalls Theon’s injunction in ἔξοργασία to render ideas “stronger” or “more truly.” By focusing on Satan himself and by specifying his total ruin, Mark unabashedly augments Jesus’ authority. Observation of Mark’s concluding phrase is from Gundry, \textit{Mark}, 173.
into a strongly worded statement containing two negatives:\footnote{Matthew's Jesus asks: πῶς δύναται τις εἰσελθείν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἱσχυροῦ εἰσελθῶν τὰ σκέυη ἀρπάσαι, ἕαν μὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἱσχυρὸν δῆσαι/ “How can someone enter a strong man’s house and plunder his property without first tying up the strong man?”}.\footnote{“No one is able . . . unless . . .” implies that Jesus has been able . . . because . . .” Gundry, Mark, 174.} We print the resulting expression below.

\[\text{ἀλλ’ οὔ δύναται οὐδεὶς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἱσχυροῦ εἰσελθῶν τὰ σκέυη ἀρπάσαι, ἕαν μὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἱσχυρὸν δῆσαι/“But no one can enter a strong man’s house and plunder his property without first tying up the strong man”).\]

Mark constructs this saying with an emphasis on plundering (διαρπάσαι) that begins with “plundering his vessels” and ends with “plundering his house.” In addition, the Markan version has a tripartite form in which the verbs stand in emphatic final position and the verbs present an alliterative pattern: διαρπάσαι . . . δῆσῃ . . . διαρπάσει (“to plunder . . . he binds . . . he will plunder”). The compositional strategy strengthens the assertion that he will “plunder his house” and supports the prior statement that Satan “possesses an end.”\footnote{Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 174.}

Through many changes then, Mark accentuates the authoritative image of Jesus. Such changes recall the changes that Mark made in 2:18-22 (Chapter 4).

We should note that Mark is intensely interested in recasting Matthew and Luke to adapt Jesus’ speech into conspicuously chiastic and tripartite patterns. Take for instance 3:23-30, in which Mark paraphrases part of the Matthean Jesus’ reply (12:26a) into the question “How can Satan cast out Satan?” (πῶς δύναται σατανᾶς σατανάν ἐκβάλλειν; 3:23b). Asking “How can Satan cast out Satan?” sharpens the chiasm at its pivot, by answering the scribes’ charge (c/3:22a: [ἐν τῷ ἀρχοντὶ τῶν δαιμονίων ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια] with a similarly phrased question (c’/3:23b: σατανᾶς σατανάν
Moreover, shifting this question back into 3:23a (italicized, below) moulds Jesus’ reply into three parts, to underscore its rhetorical force.

3. Clearer (and plainer) style. Clarity is a fundamental virtue to which rhetorical tradition demanded adherence. It is not surprising from the viewpoint of the 2GH, then, that Mark clarifies his sources. To appreciate his clarifications, we need to return to the

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1217 Adapted from Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 173. What is more, Mark’s juxtaposing of the two nouns (σατανάς σατανάν [3:23; cp. Matt. 12:26]) at such close range “highlight[s] the point of absurdity” in supposing that Satan could cast out Satan. See Gundry, Mark, 172-173. This three-part reply might also prove significant for the entire unit: Robbins suggests that Mark similarly moulds each of Jesus’ remaining replies into three parts (Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 174-175).

1218 Although the last formula lacks the conditional particle ἢν ("if ever"), the repetition is conspicuous enough. Observation of the repetition here comes from Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 173-174.
three places where Mark and Matthew’s material overlaps. The first two places where they overlap (i.e., Mark 3:22b-27 and parallels, and Mark 3:28-30 and parallels), contain instructional material (proofs), and clarifications would be especially appropriate here. The second overlap is Mark 3:31-35 (Matt. 12:46-50/Luke 8:19-21), Mark’s concluding topic. Although Mark might seek a more ornate (middle or grand) register of style here, clarity still remains appropriate.1219

Let us begin with the first overlap (Mark 3:22b-27). To clarify means to eliminate ambiguity; to avoid figures and to maintain familiar words and grammar.1220 By this definition, Mark clarifies his sources at three points. First, he inserts a propositio in 3:23b (πῶς δύναται σατανᾶς σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλειν;). While Matthew and Luke open directly with arguments (Matt. 12:25/Luke 11:17a), Mark prefaces these arguments with his clear propositio (3:23b).1221 Clarity is not Mark’s only reason to add this propositio. Mark is trying to compose Jesus’ reply speech (c’/3:23-27) in three parts—even the centre argument itself contains three repetitive clauses (3:24-26)—and for this arrangement the propositio functions as the first part. Nevertheless, 3:23 still fosters clarity.1222

In his second overlap with Matthew (3:28-30), Mark clarifies further. We find Mark clarifying in 3:29, where he smooths Matthew and Luke’s Semitic idioms into more conventional Greek (Matt. 12:32/Luke 12:10).1223 He substitutes βλασφημέω for his

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1219 To demand that Mark clarify his putative sources would be unrealistic; it is more realistic to ask whether there are signs that he clarifies those sources.
1221 An opening propositio characterizes Hermogenes’ elaboration exercise.
1223 Gundry, Mark, 176.


There is however a caveat to Mark’s alleged program of plainer style: for we have seen that Mark also adds stylistic figures to Matthew and Luke, cultivating a more ornate, elegant style, often in places that demand plainness. For instance, Mark inserts a rhetorical question in 3:23 and then heightens Matthew’s parallelism (12:25b,c) with threefold repetition (3:24-26), rounding off the unit with ring composition through his references to Satan. In 3:27 Mark adds threefold repetition of δ-words at the end of successive clauses (adjectio). So while Mark renders Matthew’s language plainer in some places, he makes it more ornate and elegant in others, and his tight chiasmus similarly

1224 Gundry does not argue for Mark changing Matthew and Luke (i.e., according to the 2GH), but rather changing a (perhaps oral) tradition. Gundry summarizes as follows (Mark, 176): “To ‘speak a word against’ (so Luke 12:10a; Matt 12:32a) is a Semitism that Mark’s version, followed in part by Matthew and Luke, Graecizes with the verb blasphēμαι. . . . Mark’s version also gets rid of the Semitic casus pendens, ‘everyone who,’ picked up by ‘to him.’ . . . ‘To the sons of men’ [Mark 3:28] not only effaces ‘against the son of man’ [Matt. 12:32] but also replaces ‘to him.’ And an original, Semitic ‘it will not be forgiven to him’ behind Luke 12:10b . . . has probably been Graecized with ‘does not have forgiveness,’ which J. A. Kleist . . . describes as ‘splendid Greek.’” Mark’s overall arrangement is in a sense relatively clear too. Mark opens with his key point (3:23) and then argues in its favour, while Matthew and Luke leave the proposittio in a less clear position (12:26/Luke 11:18).

1225 From the perspective of the FH and 2DH, Matthew’s questions are not entirely artistic. Interrogatio is a stylistic figure, but according to Quintilian, questions were also common in judicial argument, particularly in examination of witnesses (see 5.7.1-37 [LCL, trans. Butler]; on questions as figures see 9.2.6-17, to which Lausberg refers us in Handbook §§ 354, 766). I cannot find signs of Mark clarifying his sources in 3:31-35 (the final element of the chiasmus [a’]).

1226 The difficulty in the first three cases is that Mark’s relative conciseness aims not so much at plainer style but rather at a tight chiastic arrangement.
pulls against plain style. The more important question is whether Mark has any rhetorical justification for moving in the direction of ornament, of elegance. In rhetorical practice he does, for every evangelist intensifies logical proof via stylistic ornament; this we saw already in Chapter 4.

Assessing Mark’s Adaptations of Matthew

To assess Mark’s adaptations of Matthew’s gospel, we need to ask the same two questions that we posed in Chapter 4: Does Mark maintain a style appropriate for his material (criterion D.1)? And does Mark use Matthew “to the full” in achieving his desired aims (criterion D.2)? On both counts, Mark’s work is problematic.

Stylistic propriety (D.1). The fact that Mark 3:22b-30 (overlaps one and two) contains proofs suggests that they need a plain style. On the one hand, we have already seen that Mark fosters plainness by omitting several of Matthew’s speech figures. On the other hand, we have seen that Mark heightens style too, adding figures: threefold repetition using καὶ ἐὰ (3:24-26), repetition and a ring pattern with verbs that begin with δ in 3:27 (διαρπάσαι . . . δῆσῃ . . διαρπάσει), and a positioning of δῆσῃ so that it falls, like the verbs around it, at the end of its clause (3:27).

1227 Mark has reason to attenuate clarity in three further places: 1. In 3:25 he twice replaces Matthew’s μερισθείσα καθ’ ἐαυτῆς (Matt. 12:25b) with ἔφ’ ἐαυτὴν μερισθῆ (Gundry notes Matthew’s more conventional word sequence: Matthew, 233.) Mark might change it in order to emphasize the illogical concept at issue [Gundry, Mark, 173]). 2. Removal in 3:28a of Matthew’s direct object following “every,” and repositioning of it to the end of the clause (τὰ ὁμαρτήματα καὶ ἡ βλασφημία ὅσα ἦν βλασφημημένου. Mark might do this in order to foster a chiastic arrangement of clauses [diagram in Gundry, Mark, 176]). Hence in these cases Mark’s work has rhetorical reasons.

1228 Jesus’ replies (c’/3:23-27; b’/3:28-30) are essentially judicial in form—each reply contains arguments. Granted, repetition has a place within πίστεις (Quintilian 9.2.4 [LCL, trans. Butler]). But the repetition by Mark in 3:23-27 looks more artistic and conspicuous. Significantly, on the FH and 2DH, Matthew reduces this repetitiveness (i.e., Mark’s repetition of καὶ ἐὰ [3:24, 3:25, 3:26] and the phrase ἔφ’ ἐαυτὴν μερισθῆ, ὅ ὄντα σταθήσει [3:24; cp. 3:25, 3:26]). Matthew varies from ἔρημοῦται (12:25b) to φύλαλλει (12:26).
Matthew’s word sequence less conventional,\textsuperscript{1230} replaces Matthew’s vivid κατά (“against”: 12:32) with the less vivid εἰς (3:29), and replaces Matthew’s balanced phrase οὐκ ἄφεθησεται αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι (12:32) with a relatively complex phrase (οὐκ ἔχει ἄφεσιν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἀλλὰ ἔνοχος ἐστιν αἰῶνίον ἀμαρτήματος [3:29]). Mark also employs wordier, redundant expression in 3:28. How do we explain Mark’s stylistic elevations here in proof material? We might account for his changes as suiting the epideictic qualities of his speech, like topical organization and artistic arrangement.\textsuperscript{1231} We might also account for the changes in Mark’s effort to intensify proofs. We have already seen (in Chapter 4) that all evangelists ornament the expression of proof material along the lines that Mark does, and Mark might well do so here.

Where Mark’s attentiveness to propriety becomes questionable is in the second overlap with Matthew: Jesus’ final reply (3:31-35). Again, Mark’s chief source is Matthew. Although we are not dealing with the conclusion of a typical judicial speech, the concluding position of 3:31-35 implies that Mark requires a somewhat more ornate—middle or grand—register of style. Some theorists argued that style should become grander in the conclusion.\textsuperscript{1232} Mark need not necessarily add grander style through

\textsuperscript{1230} On Matthew’s relative clarity, see Gundry, \textit{Matthew}, 237: “In v 31 he smooths out Mark’s order of words by advancing τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ αἱ βλασφημίαι to a position right after πάντα at the head of the clause.”

\textsuperscript{1231} Again, however, Jesus’ replies (c’/3:23-27; b’/3:28-30) are essentially \textit{judicial} in form—each contains arguments—and so Mark’s moves towards ornamenstality still look questionable. For Mark, the technique of chiasmus surely was artistic.

\textsuperscript{1232} “Of the emotions, \textit{pathos} is assigned to this . . . [grand style].” Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} § 1079.3c; cp. § 257.3 and cp. Quintilian’s remarks in § 1079.3a. In judicial speeches, a conclusion should arouse emotions (\textit{movere}), namely pity (\textit{conquestio}) and outrage (\textit{indignatio}), which can win an audience (Lausberg, \textit{Handbook} §§ 436-439). An author ought then to employ πάθος, and we might well expect Mark to intensify it in Matthew. Since 3:31-35 is Mark’s last unit, it would seem intuitive to arouse emotion here, if only in the very concluding verses (vv. 34-35). According to the 2GH we could argue (weakly) that if Matthew originally lacked 12:47, then Mark’s addition of 3:32 intensifies drama in the narrative. But this is
figures, or longer more rounded clauses; perhaps he found his sources to be grand enough. But it would be odd if Mark *attenuated* ornament in his sources. And this is precisely Mark’s problem according to the 2GH. To be sure, Mark does add some arguably dramatic effect with the historic present in 3:31 (ἐρχετοι), 3:32 (λέγουσιν), and twice in 3:33-34 (λέγει). But Mark repeatedly attenuates Jesus’ indignant style, even though indignation is *precisely one of the emotions that conclusions should arouse against opponents.* Three moves look rhetorically counterintuitive in this regard. In 3:33 Mark omits Matthew’s repetition of τίς ἡμῖν μοι καὶ τίνες εἰσίν οἱ ἀδελφοί μου; (12:48). Second, Mark replaces Matt. 12:50’s emphatic ὅστις ἀν (“For whosoever does the will of God . . .”) with the somewhat simpler ὅς ἀν in 3:35. Although ὅστις and ὅς have been characterized as “hardly different,” the fact that Mark dulls Matthew’s emotive term remains noteworthy. Third, Mark shifts Matthew 12:50’s adjective “my” from its emphatic position in Matthew (σὺντος μου ἀδελφὸς καὶ ἀδελφὴ καὶ μήτηρ ἡμῖν) to a

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1233 As Gundry puts it, “The historical present tense . . . ‘he says,’ stresses the rhetorical question that follows (v. 33).” Gundry observes that Mark uses λέγει again in 3:34 (Mark, 178). Mark also enhances the unit’s dramatic quality. For instance, while Matthew writes that Jesus’ family “were . . . wanting to speak to him” (εἰστήκεισαν . . . ζητοῦσιν αὐτῷ λαλῆσαι; 12:46), Mark paraphrases that his family “sent for him, calling him” (ἐπέστείλαν πρὸς αὐτὸν καλοῦντες αὐτῶν; 3:31). The new terminology intensifies the effort of Jesus’ family to control him. By advancing Matthew’s adverb έξω in 3:31 (cp. Matt. 12:46), and by inserting τοὺς περί αὐτῶν κύκλῳ καθημένους (“those sitting around him in a circle”) in 3:34, Mark deepens the divide between people who belong to Jesus’ true family, and blood relations who do not. Critically, however, these changes are not the intensifications that we should rhetorically expect: intensifications in the *speaker’s words*, the speech of Jesus himself.


1235 It is possible that Mark removes the repetition to create ellipsis, although this would be odd given that in Matthew he has a ready-made figure, and that Mark likes elsewhere to repeat words in a sort of redundant style (even in this unit: see 3:28). If moreover Mark 3:33 lacked the final μου, then Mark has omitted another term whose repetition would have well conveyed indignation.

1236 LSJ ὅστις s.v. It is however noteworthy that “[q]uite often ὅστις takes the place of the simple relative ὃς . . . this occurs rarely in classical usage . . . but much more frequently in later Greek” (BAG ὅστις s.v. [p. 587]).
position ahead of “brother,” thus weakening Jesus’ point that “whoever does the will of my father is my brother.” Together these changes are significant: Mark went out of his way in 3:22-30 to add stylistic ornaments. Why then should Mark remove them from a peroration, where they are especially fitting and already in his source? The fact that Mark attenuates an emotive tone is all the more noteworthy given his efforts to ornament the style earlier, in the speech’s body. It is more reasonable to expect Matthew, from the viewpoint of the FH or 2DH, to intensify Mark’s indignant tone, especially since it is appropriate: Matt. 12:46-50 itself is the peroration to one of his large narrative blocks.

Using all necessary material (D.2). As he pursues his biographical purpose of augmenting Jesus’ authority, Mark does not overlook valuable material in Matthew. But when we turn to Mark’s purpose of drawing Matthew towards conventional speech form we find a striking oversight in Mark 3:22b-27: Mark actually omits key proof without a convincing reason. Although Mark retains Matthew and Luke’s case that Jesus does not work by Beelzebul (3:23-27), he omits the highly significant counterdefinition.

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1237 One might suggest, with some justification, that the stylistic requirements of a topically arranged speech differ, and perhaps as Lausberg comments, the grand style “should not be sustained during the whole speech; it should . . . be reserved for those ideas which are real highlights” (Lausberg, Handbook § 1080). But showing that Jesus has authority to redefine a family is certainly a highlight.

1238 On which see Luz, Matthew 8-20, viii. One might argue that Mark’s changes in 3:31-35 serve clarity and conciseness, but I do not believe that this is the case. If it were, there would be no place at all for add stylistic ornament. I do not think that clarity and conciseness are so important in a conclusion that they trump ornate style.

Of course, Mark should omit this if it is of no use; but it is precisely its usefulness that makes his omission suspect. For arguing, “if I expel demons by the spirit of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you” (Matt. 12:28/Luke 11:20) gets to the heart of Mark’s biographical concern to account for Jesus’ authority. Matthew and Luke’s counterdefinition is proof for Jesus’ legitimacy, the backbone of his authority. What is more, Mark practically invites counterdefinition by having the scribes first offer a false definition of Jesus working by Beelzebul (3:22b). Why Mark should omit this is rhetorically puzzling and counterintuitive, on grounds both of portrayal and of intensifying proof in good rhetorical fashion.

Mark appears, at first glance, to have reasons to omit the counterdefinition. Mark must do so either to maintain a chiasmus (the counterdefinition interferes with his tripartite reply in 3:23-27); to preserve Jesus’ messianic secrecy; or to foster conciseness.

Let us review these possible reasons more closely. One reason that Mark omits the proof might be formal: his sources’ proofs interfere with a close-knit, tripartite reply in 3:23-27. This is possible, but to omit such important proof for the sake of form sounds

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1241 Problematically, Mark also omits Matthean material (Matt. 12:36-37) that could help reply to the charge that Jesus “has Beelzebul” (Mark 3:22a). In Jesus’ second reply (Mark 3:28-30), he hotly threatens the scribes with eternal alienation from God on account of their accusation (ὅς δ’ ἂν βλασφημήσῃ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον, οὐκ ἔχει ἄφεσιν εἰς τὸν οίκων, ἀλλὰ ἐνοχός ἐστὶν αἰωνίου ἀμαρτήματος [3:29]). To defend by going on the attack like this is essential to legitimating Jesus for listeners (“I tell you, on the day of judgment you will have to give an account for every careless word you utter; for by your words you will be justified, and by your words you will be condemned.”) Now for Mark, this threatening judgement could help defend Jesus’ propositio that he does not possess Beelzebul. After all, Mark has already strengthened Jesus’ threatening tone in 3:28-29 (cp. Matt. 12:31-32), and since Mark adds the accusation against Jesus in the first place (2:22a), he would want to provide Jesus a strong defense.
disingenuous, since Mark’s omission once again (as we saw in Chapter 4) eschews obvious proof in favour of circumspect, coded argumentation.\(^{1242}\)

A second reason that Mark might omit the proofs is that the phrase “by the spirit [Luke: kingdom] of God” (Matt. 12:28/Luke 12:20) might betray Jesus’ messianic identity.\(^{1243}\) But this reasoning is not compelling. For one, the counterdefinition poses little threat to Jesus’ messianic secrecy: to exorcise “by the spirit of God” would resonate as the method of any exorcist and it hardly characterizes Jesus as the Messiah.\(^{1244}\)

Second, if in Mark’s view Jesus’ claim that “the kingdom of God has come upon you” (Matt. 12:28b/Luke 11:20b) threatened to reveal his identity, the evangelist was under no obligation to retain that phrase. Given the scale and nuance of his micro-conflations elsewhere on the 2GH, Mark could surely substitute a more circumspect phrase.\(^{1245}\)

That Mark might have omitted his sources’ proofs because he wanted to make the style more concise is possible: on stylistic grounds Josephus can omit material. But again it sounds suspicious to invoke conciseness as a serious reason for omitting a brief

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\(^{1242}\) Peabody argues that Matthew uses 12:22-37 to illustrate activity of the Holy Spirit described in 12:17-21, and Mark omits it (One Gospel from Two, 123). The reason Mark omits the material, suggests Peabody, is that he is not interested in it, as illustrated by the absence of material concerning the Spirit in the immediate context around 3:20-35. I am not convinced by this argument. For one, Matt. 12:36-37 is not directly speaking of the Spirit. For another, Mark’s failure to discuss the Spirit around his unit is not a logical reason to eschew Matt. 12:36-37.

\(^{1243}\) According to Jacobson, if Mark knew this tradition (from the perspective of the 2DH, in the context of the sayings gospel Q), he might have avoided it because “Q 11:19 and 11:20 jeopardizes the eschatological uniqueness of Jesus” (Jacobson, First Gospel, 163). While Jacobson’s point is not to describe Mark’s work according to the 2GH, his point is weak, because Matthew, whose Christology Gundry among others indicates is higher, retains the phrase, as does Luke (Matthew, 7-8, 230).


\(^{1245}\) A further place in which Mark might have benefited from his sources’ proof is in the argument from the opposite (3:27). Here he could have incorporated more of Luke’s version, for it contains imagery that enhances Jesus’ strength vis-à-vis demons (for instance, Luke 11:22 speaks of a “stronger man” [ισχυρότερος] and uses verbs conveying more powerfully the stronger man’s effects: νικήσῃ: “conquer”; αἴρει: “takes away”; διαιδιδώσιν: “divides”).
statement that is arguably the most important statement in the whole unit. In all, Mark’s omission of the counterdefinition (Matt. 12:28/Luke 11:20) sounds suspect.

Summary

Does Mark strengthen Matthew’s conformity to rhetorical conventions? The result is equivocal. Some of Mark’s work looks plausible: we find Mark pursuing argumentative (A), biographical (B) and clarificatory (C) aims through numerous adaptations. And he often attends to propriety, maintaining appropriate style (D.1) and using much useful material (D.2).

But just as in the Triple Tradition, Mark’s work here in the Double Tradition is problematic. From the perspective of the 2GH, Mark makes two crucial oversights. First, Mark’s elevation of Matthean style suddenly ceases, indeed recedes a little, where it should be appropriately elevated in his conclusion (D.1). Second, Mark eschews very important proof in Matthew and Luke—a counterdefinition—without adequate reason (D.2). His best reason would be to foster artistic tripartite form, but such reasoning favours the circuitous over the obvious. On these grounds, Mark’s work is rhetorically problematic.

5.3: Matthew’s Adaptation of Mark (The Farrer Hypothesis [FH])

The Farrer Hypothesis:

Building on work earlier last century by Austin Farrer, the British critics Michael Goulder and more recently Mark Goodacre have argued that Matthew’s adaptive work concerns strictly the gospel of Mark, and accordingly that the sayings gospel Q does not exist. This hypothesis, which we shall label the Farrer Hypothesis (FH), explains
Matthew’s adaptation of Mark as driven more thoroughly by Matthean editorial interests than would be the case had Matthew conflated Mark and Q. As we now describe Matthew’s adaptations on the FH, we need review three of its pertinent arguments for Matthew adapting Mark here in 12:22-37.\footnote{For discussion see Kloppenborg Verbin, *Excavating Q*, 41. The argument that Matthew’s use of Mark is more “straightforward” than his conflation of Mark and Q we shall not discuss here (see Goodacre, *Synoptic Problem*, 148-149). Tuckett rightly points out that the data is equivocal: a handful of overlaps, such as the Beelzebul Controversy (12:22-37) and narrative of John the Baptist (Matt. 3:1-6, 11-12) would not be surprising in two such otherwise different traditions as Mark and Q: see Revival of the Griesbach Hypothesis, 77-78.}

One argument is linguistic. Using John Hawkins’ criteria to determine an evangelist’s characteristic vocabulary (namely, that an evangelist use a term at least four times, and twice as often as the other two synoptists together), Goulder argues that alleged Q tradition contains so many characteristically Matthean terms that it is more cogent to assume that Matthew deployed them when improving Mark.\footnote{Summary in Goodacre, *Goulder and the Gospels*, 42-44; Goodacre makes the point himself (based on his own assessment of Goulder) in *Synoptic Problem*, 149.} Indeed, Goodacre finds in the Beelzebul Controversy two characteristically Matthean terms: “to gather” (συνάγω) and the pair of words “good” and “evil” (ἀγαθός, πονηρός), along with several “semi-Matthean” words.\footnote{Goodacre, *Goulder and the Gospels*, 70-71. Goodacre’s list of Semi-Matthean words contains: κωφός, οἱ όχλοι, εἰ, διὰ τῶν έτσταιεσσονται, ἀρά, ἀφίμη, θςαυρός, πονηρός, περισσεύω, στόμα.} Kloppenborg has recently critiqued Goulder’s argument, so that it is no longer to be regarded as conclusive.\footnote{For critique of Goulder and Goodacre, see Kloppenborg, “On Dispensing with Q?,” 223-224, 233-234.}

A second argument that the FH makes is redaction-critical: Matthew’s work reflects interests of his gospel as a whole. The FH invokes this argument, which in fact encompasses the aforementioned linguistic argument,\footnote{As Derrenbacker pointed out (above, Chapter 1), redaction-critical arguments are handicapped by the fact that they merely set an evangelist’s adaptations in the context of what the evangelist already does. They do not take account of ancient conventions, which are an independent standard of plausibility.} to explain Matthew’s work in the Beelzebul Controversy. According to Benedict Green, for example, Matthew’s
special, redactional interest in Jesus as *Son of man* (singular) explains his omission of Mark’s confusing label for people as sons of men (Mark 3:28; cp. Matt. 12:31).\textsuperscript{1251}

Similarly, Goulder believes that Matthew’s redactional interest in fashioning pericopae as *lections*, texts for liturgical reading in a lectionary cycle, can explain some of his editorial decisions. For example, when Matthew pairs his Beelzebul Controversy (12:22-37) with the Sign of Jonah pericope (12:38-45), he seeks to call to mind the lection of atonement.\textsuperscript{1252}

A third argument from the FH is that Matthew uses identifiable ancient compositional practices. Probably the most important proposals come from Goulder, and although he has been criticized of late his work continues to win support. According to Goulder, Matthew does not conflate Mark with the sayings gospel Q; rather, Matthew employs *midrash*, ancient Jewish techniques for Scriptural interpretation, as a means to adapt Mark.\textsuperscript{1253} Such midrash allegedly helps account for Matthew’s adaptations in the Beelzebul Controversy, where he employs for instance *reverse expository* interpretation from 12:33 through 12:45.\textsuperscript{1254} On this view, three logia constitute Matt. 12:33-45: the first concerns speech (12:33-37), the second sight (12:38-42) and the third possession (12:43-45). As Green puts it, the logia “correspond in the inverse order (chiastically) to the three conditions, possession, blindness and dumbness, of which the sufferer is cured in the comprehensive miracle of Matt. 12.22.”\textsuperscript{1255} To achieve this chiasmus of themes, Matthew needs to reconfigure Mark in accord with Matt. 12:22. That is to say, Matthew

\textsuperscript{1251} Green, “Matthew 12.22-50 & Parallels,” 163.
\textsuperscript{1252} See Goodacre, *Goulder and the Gospels*, 345-349.
\textsuperscript{1254} Goulder, *Midrash and Lection in Matthew*, 331-332; for its midrashic character see pp. 250-251.
\textsuperscript{1255} Green, “Matthew 12.22-50 & Parallels,” 165.
first composes 12:33-37 (dumbness/speech) himself; in 12:38-42 he adopts Mark 8:11-12 (blindness/sight of sign), and then in 12:43-45 he further composes material himself (possession). The appeal of Goulder’s argument for midrash is its effort to explain Matthew’s work from ancient conventions—something that few studies have attempted to do.\footnote{This arrangement is equally plausible according to the 2GH and the 2DH.}

Our goal is rhetorically to analyze this scenario in which Matthew adapts Mark according to the FH. Based on a table that sets Mark and Matthew in parallel (Table 5.4, Appendix 3), we shall describe how Matthew addresses his purposes: to draw Mark towards principles for judicial speeches (A), to foster a new portrayal (B), and to enhance clear style (C).

1. Drawing Mark towards principles for speeches. We shall focus on material where Matthew and Mark overlap (Matt. 12:24-32/Mark 3:22b-30).\footnote{From the perspective of the FH and 2DH, Mark 3:31-35’s overlap with Matthew (12:46-50) is not so relevant here: while Mark employs this material for his version of the Beelzebul controversy, Matthew does not.} Since Matthew and Mark share a \textit{propositio} that Jesus does not exorcise demons by Beelzebul (Matt. 12:29, cp. Mark 3:23-27), can we detect Matthew intensify Mark’s proofs (A.1)? Can we detect Matthew pull Mark towards closer conformity with stasis theory (A.2)? Does Matthew pull Mark towards a more conventional speech form with its appropriately positioned proofs (A.3)? And finally, does Matthew improve Mark’s arrangement (A.4)? The answer, in the main, is positive.

\textit{Intensifying proofs (A.1).} Matthew intensifies Mark’s proof usually by paraphrase or other, slight changes in idea. For example, he replaces Mark’s phrase \textit{kai	extbackslash e}	extit{a&n} (“and if”) and conditional clauses, with the adjective \textit{pa~sa} (\textit{every}) and declarative clauses...
Subtle though these changes appear, they are quite effective, for declaring that “every [without exception] kingdom divided against itself falls” (12:25b) permits no further question; Satan will fall. Here Matthew appears to be mindful of Theon’s ἐξεργασία technique, in which an author “adds what is lacking in thought.” Matthew also omits mention of Satan’s ability (δύναμιν [Mark 3:24-25]), and so amplifies Jesus’ superior power. Matthew further intensifies proof via paraphrase in 12:25, where “the change of Mark’s ἑτ’ + the accusative to καθ’ + the genitive sharpens the meaning ‘against’” in Mark. By making Mark’s expression more pointed, Matthew paints more vividly the image of an imploding kingdom.

Besides paraphrase, Matthew adds whole rhetorical units to Mark, namely an argument from quality in common (12:28) and a counterdefinition (12:29). According to the 2GH we could find little reason why Mark would omit this material. According to the FH, though, Matthew’s additions look plausible: his counterdefinition directly answers the charge that Mark poses (3:22b) yet does not answer.1263

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1258 Matthew even amplifies the charge against Jesus (12:24): in Mark, the scribes say that “by the ruler of the demons he exorcises demons” (3:23), Matthew articulates and so amplifies the charge: “This one does not exorcise demons except by Beelzebul the prince of the demons.” Cp. Luz, Matthew 8-20, 199. A point made by Gundry, Matthew, 233. Gundry adds that πᾶσα “typifies Matthew’s diction,” but this does not compromise Matthew’s effort to amplify Mark. It means that Matthew chooses to amplify Mark with a term that he likes.

1259 One place where Matt. 12:24-29 seems to weaken Mark’s proof is in omitting Mark’s “but he [Satan] has an end” (ἀλλὰ τέλος ἔχει: 3:26). This omission, however, has a satisfactory explanation. Matthew paraphrases it in the form of a rhetorical question (“And so how will his [Satan’s] kingdom stand?” [12:26]), and so the force of Mark’s point remains. Gundry observes that Matthew needs to omit the phrase to make way for this question (Matthew, 234). A question helps to drive home the point that Satan’s self-divided kingdom cannot stand; the device forces Jesus’ opponents to acknowledge the awkwardness of their own charge.

1260 Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Patillon, 110); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 71.

1261 Gundry, Matthew, 234: “Thus . . . it is not a matter of inability but, more forcefully, of the defeat [of Satan] itself.”

1262 Gundry, Matthew, 233. According to Gundry, the term is typical in Matthew. But this should not infer that Matthew has not amplified Mark.

1263 One place where Matt. 12:24-29 seems to weaken Mark’s proof is in omitting Mark’s “but he [Satan] has an end” (ἀλλὰ τέλος ἔχει: 3:26). This omission, however, has a satisfactory explanation. Matthew paraphrases it in the form of a rhetorical question (“And so how will his [Satan’s] kingdom stand?” [12:26]), and so the force of Mark’s point remains. Gundry observes that Matthew needs to omit the phrase to make way for this question (Matthew, 234). A question helps to drive home the point that Satan’s self-divided kingdom cannot stand; the device forces Jesus’ opponents to acknowledge the awkwardness of their own charge.
In proof material in Matt. 12:31-32 (Mark 3:28-30), Matthew intensifies Jesus’ case in three further ways. First, Matthew repeats Jesus’ condemnatory threat. Mark’s Jesus threatens the Pharisees just once (3:28-29), but Matthew’s Jesus takes aim twice, in 12:31 and in 12:32, stressing the capital nature of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. This repetition recalls the amplificatory technique of *congeries*.

Second, Matthew paraphrases Mark’s εἴ ("against") with a preposition that Gundry suggests is more pointed for characterizing opposition: κατά (12:32a, 12:32b).

Third, Matthew paraphrases Mark 3:29 (“he does not have forgiveness into the age, but he is guilty of an eternal sin”) with the phrase “will not be forgiven either in this age or in the age to come” (Matt. 12:32). Although Mark could have amplified Matthew here, Gundry explains that in Matthew, “the parallelism of the two negative phrases adds to the judgmental tone of the saying.”

*Tightening treatment of stasis (A.2).* Matthew pulls Mark’s treatment of a stasis closer to Hermogenes’ theory. He adds a counterdefinition (12:28), a syllogism (12:30), a statement of gravity (12:31-32) and a comparison (12:33). This fact should not be taken

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1264 Even though Mark’s threat replies to the charge that “Jesus has Beelzebul” (3:22a, 3:30), while Matthew’s threat replies to the charge that Jesus *draws upon* Beezebul (12:24), Matthew seems to consider any “word against the Son of Man” (Jesus) *forgivable* (12:32a) and any “word against the Holy Spirit” *unforgivable* (12:32b). Hence for Matthew, the Pharisees’ charge is not in fact against Jesus at all but is rather defamation against the Holy Spirit (12:32). Similarly, in Mark the scribes’ charge against Jesus is *de facto* a charge against the Holy Spirit (Marcus, *Mark 1-8*, 284; cp. Gundry, *Mark*, 175).

1265 Such *νοεις* is noted by commentaries, although not using that term: Gundry, *Matthew*, 237; Luz, *Matthew 8-20*, 206.


1267 Gundry, *Matthew*, 237. If not sharper, the preposition κατά would seem at least clearer or more direct, and so reflects another rhetorical convention.

to imply that the opposite hypothesis, the 2GH, is less plausible—for Mark has his own entirely distinct and legitimate speech form.\textsuperscript{1269}

Adding proofs in appropriate parts of speech (A.3). According to the FH, Matthew adds proofs in appropriate places. The evangelist, that is, seems aware that ἰθὸς belongs primarily in an introduction, λόγος in logical proofs, and πάθος in a conclusion. In his introduction, for instance, Matthew intensifies the crowds’ wonder at Jesus: he writes that ἐξίσταντο πάντες and adds a question which indicates that Jesus’ character is more significant than any other (12:23).\textsuperscript{1270} And in his conclusion, Matthew adds Jesus’ emotionally harshest remarks against the Pharisees (12:34-37). Indeed Matthew has added an entire conclusion (12:34-37), which includes the proof from emotion (πάθος) that we should expect.\textsuperscript{1271} By declaring that the Pharisees are pernicious (12:34), detailing why they are pernicious (12:34-35), and threatening alienation “on the day of judgement” (12:36), Matthew’s Jesus attacks the Pharisees in a way that would raise their indignation and wound their sense of legitimacy. By adding such emotional proof (πάθος), Matthew makes a rhetorical improvement par excellence.\textsuperscript{1272}

More conventional arrangement (A.4). When we consider how effectively Matthew arranges his material, we detect further improvements to Mark. In this regard

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\textsuperscript{1269} To determine the plausibility of Mark adapting Matthew’s chreia into a chiasmus, we would need to first examine adaptations of judicial speeches into chiastic speeches in non-Christian literature. Tuckett indicates that the procedure would be difficult for Mark: \textit{Revival of the Griesbach Hypothesis}, 88.

\textsuperscript{1270} Similarly according to the 2DH.

\textsuperscript{1271} Matthew would also continue to pull Mark towards an exchange within stasis of definition: his added comparison follows the outline given by Hermogenes (for which see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 182).

\textsuperscript{1272} Incidentally, one cannot argue against the FH (or 2DH) that Matthew’s omission of Mark 3:31-35 is an oversight—that Matthew overlooks helpful material. With its emphasis on true family, verses 31-35 do not contribute to Matthew at this point.
Matthew rearranges Mark’s *propositio* (‘‘How can Satan cast out Satan?’’ [3:23]).

According to Theon, we can arrange effectively by placing ‘‘the arguments for something in advance of the propositions which they support.’’ If we are right to regard Mark 3:22b as a kind of *propositio*, then Matthew heeds Theon’s advice: he inserts Mark 3:23 after his arguments from analogy (12:27), and repeats it (more clearly than Mark!) in his counterdefinition (12:28). This is the kind of rhetorically informed work that we should expect.

2. Biographical purposes: Distancing Jesus from Pharisaic Judaism. Whatever were his sources, Matthew’s biographical purpose in 12:22-37 is to portray what Luz calls Jesus’ *withdrawal from Israel*. This purpose pervades the unit’s narrative context, in which Jesus expresses dissatisfaction with the religiosity of contemporary Judaism and its emerging leadership class of Pharisees. In this context, Matt. 12:22-37 illustrates themes of the larger narrative blocks (12:1-50, 12:1-16:20) to which it belongs—themes namely of conflict and condemnation, of Jesus’ withdrawal from Israel. Luz sets 12:22-37 in the context of Jesus departing to form a community

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1273 Matthew does not entirely omit Mark’s *propositio*; he shifts it to a point immediately after three arguments from analogy, in 12:26. From the point of view of the 2GH, one might ask why Matthew refers in 12:26 to Satan’s *kingdom* imploding, and not more directly (as in Mark) to Satan per se. Gundry suggests that Matthew *is* amplifying Mark: “substituting Satan’s kingdom for Satan himself sets up a parallel and conflict between Satan’s kingdom and God’s (cf. v 28)” (Gundry, *Matthew*, 234). This is a conflict that God wins (12:28), while the insertion also accords with Matthew’s purpose of showing Jesus turn from Israel (Gundry, *Matthew*, 233: “overarching theme of conflict”).


1276 Matthew’s repositioning of the *propositio* does not come, as Theon suggests, after *all* his arguments (Matthew composes further arguments in 12:29ff), but Matthew does delay it. Gundry suggests that by omitting Mark 3:23, Matthew amplifies and clarifies Jesus’ speech (see *Matthew*, 233).


1278 To appreciate Matthew’s purpose in 12:22-30, we need to understand the unit’s form and context. On the importance of knowing the form see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 178 ff.

And as Jesus departs, he critiques Israel and replies to the Pharisees’ charges against him. In short, Matthew weaves his Beelzebul Controversy into a narrative block that defines a new religiosity over against the Pharisees.

Knowing that Matthew wants to distance Jesus from Pharisaic Judaism, the important question is how he accordingly adapts Mark. As Matthew refashions Mark through a blend of paraphrase, expansion, and elaboration towards Hermogenes’ stasis of definition, he consistently infuses Mark with arguments that betray a threatening tone towards the Pharisees. When for instance Matthew elaborates with the argument from quality in common (12:27), counterdefinition (12:30) and statements of gravity, law and comparison (12:31-33), he implies that the Pharisees have fallen out of all good standing before God. And when Matthew elaborates further with a lengthy conclusion (12:34-37) in which Jesus condemns the Pharisees as evil (πονηροί), Jesus’ speech has in no uncertain terms a pejorative and menacing quality. On the FH, such changes make sense in Matthew’s larger narrative: Matthew is changing Mark to suit his larger purpose of having Jesus condemn and withdraw from Israel. In all then, Matthew overlays onto Mark 3:20-30 a “grid” of units within the στάσις of definition. These enhance Jesus’ case that he does not work by Beelzebul, and they also enhance Jesus’ conflict with the Pharisees.

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1280 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 177, 178.
1281 Luz shows how precisely Matthew arranges material within the large block on Jesus’ withdrawal (12:1-16:20), often configuring it into cycles of three and grouping it by subject, for instance deeds or parables. See Luz, Matthew 8-20, viii, 177, 178. This arrangement reflects the rhetorical boundaries that we saw earlier (i.e., Matt. 12:22-27, Matt. 12:38-45, and Matt. 12:46-50).
1282 From the perspective of the FH, it is striking how Matthew manages to use Mark 3:28-30 (which in its Markan context replies to the charge of Beelzebul possession) to reply to the charge of working by Beelzebul.
1283 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 182-184; Goulder, Midrash and Lection in Matthew, 331.
3. Clearer (and plainer) style. In his overlaps with Mark (Matt. 12:24-32/Mark 3:22b-30), Matthew appears concerned to enhance clarity on occasion, and to make several related changes towards the simplicity and conciseness that characterize plain style. Matthew reduces for instance figurative language in Mark’s triple analogy (3:23-26), omitting Mark’s repetition (καὶ ἐὰν . . . καὶ ἐὰν . . . καὶ εἶ) and repetition of σταθῆσαι. Matthew also replaces Mark’s less conventional word sequence βασιλεία ἐφ’ ἐσοπτήν μερισθῇ. And Matthew similarly reduces figurative language in Mark’s argument from opposite (3:27, where he removes the triple repetition and adiectio using δ-words). This simplification continues in 12:31-32 when Matthew affixes ἐμαρτήσα directly to the adjective πᾶσα (12:31).

Assessing Matthew’s adaptations of Mark

Stylistic propriety (D.1) Most of the material which Matthew shares with Mark is instructional and as such, invites plain style (Matt. 12:25-33). In some places, Matthew adds more ornate style and so pulls against the plainness necessary in instructional material. Matthew attenuates plain style by adding some stylistic ornament and Semitic idiom in his logical proofs. He inserts for example parallelism between 12:25b and 12:25c (πᾶσα βασιλεία/πόλις μερισθεῖσα . . .), inserts rhetorical questions (12:26, 12:29), adds repetition and parallelism (first in 12:29 [ἐἰσελθεῖν . . . ἀρπάσα]1289;
again in 12:31-32 and 12:32 [κατὰ . . . κατὰ; οὐτὲ . . . οὐτὲ]), and he replaces certain
of Mark’s conventional Greek expressions, such as βλασφημεῖο. Further still, Matthew’s
omission of Mark 3:23 deprives his proofs of a clear introduction. So according to the
FH, while Matthew sometimes fosters plainer style, he at other times adds more ornate
style. In short, the propriety of Matthew’s changes falls under suspicion, for he is
intensifying ornament in an area that demands plainness. We have seen however, that
Mark similarly ornaments the style of Matthew’s logical proofs on the 2GH. Moreover,
when we compare Mark’s conclusion (3:31-35) with parallel material in Matthew that
also happens to function as a conclusion to a narrative block (12:46-50), we find that
Mark weakens an appropriately emotive, elevated style, whereas Matthew strengthens
it.

Using all necessary material (D.2). Does Matthew ever weaken or overlook
Markan proofs that would help him? For the most part, Matthew pulls Mark towards
judicial speech conventions without overlooking effective material. One might argue that
Matthew actually weakens Mark (3:28-29 / Matt. 12:31-32) at three points. One point is
Matthew’s omission of Mark’s adverb ἐμὴν (Mark 3:28; cp. Matt. 12:31). Even

1290 Gundry, Matthew, 235.
1290 And he replaces Greek expressions in Mark 3:28-29 with Semitic expression. However, Matthew might
have some reason for each change: 1. replacing Mark’s verb βλασφημεῖο (3:29) with the Semitic
influenced phrase εἰπῃ λόγον κατά (Matt. 12:32a,b) might attempt to avoid too much repetition between
12:31 and 12:32; 2. replacing Mark’s phrase οὐκ ἔχει ὀφέσιν (“he does not have forgiveness”: 3:29) with
the Semitic influenced phrase, containing casus pendens, [οὐκ] ἀφεθήσεται οὐτό (”it will [not] be
given to him’”. Matt. 12:32a,b) might well serve as a relatively harsh or threatening expression (recall
Luz, Matthew 8-20, 206). Casus pendens denotes the use of a pronoun phrase that comes outside of a
clause; it is used for emphasis.
1290 For Matthew’s introductory material (12:22, or 12:22-24) and conclusion (12:34-37), we cannot assess
whether he has tightened propriety between Mark’s content and style, because Matthew and Mark have
different contents altogether. We can, however, compare Mark’s conclusion (Mark 3:31-35) with the
parallel Matthean version (12:46-50) that closes a narrative block; we have already seen that Matthew quite
appropriately elevates Mark’s style.
1290 Matthew moreover uses ὑμὴν frequently, according to Gundry, Matthew, 237. (Matthew uses the term
31 times; Mark, 14 times).
though Matthew’s replacement expression (διὰ τοῦτο) does maintain an effective “threatening” tone, his omission of ἀμήν remains suspicious given Matthew’s rather frequent appeal to the term. In two further places, however, Matthew’s changes are defensible on stylistic grounds. The first is his omission of Mark 3:28b (“the sins and blasphemies, whatever they [the sons of men] might blaspheme”). According to Gundry, Matthew’s omission is in fact a clarification: Mark writes “sins and blasphemies” (ἀμαρτήματα καὶ αἱ βλασφημίαι) at the sentence’s end—not after the adjective πάντα, where we would expect it—while Matthew shifts the phrase back to a more conventional position after the adjective. Moreover, given that Mark’s style shows characteristic redundancy (e.g., in the closing phrase ὁσα ἐὰν βλασφημήσωσιν), Matthew’s omission fosters conciseness. Matthew’s second clarification is of Mark’s phrase “whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit can never have forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin” (3:29). This Matthew replaces with a briefer and clearer formulation, “neither in this age nor in the age to come” (12:32). While maintaining a menacing tone, Matthew’s phrase sounds clearer at a point where clear style is appropriate: in logical proofs. Hence Matthew’s changes, apart from his omission of ἀμήν, look quite plausible.

A more serious problem for Matthew is that much of his added logical proof (Matt. 12:27-33) has an emotionally intensive quality that would be more fitting in his

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1293 For this tone see Luz, Matthew 8-20, 206.
1294 Gundry, Matthew, 237.
1295 Gundry, Mark, 176.
1296 Gundry includes among Mark’s typical redundancies the phrases “‘however many [sins] they slander’ plus ‘whoever slanders the Holy Spirit,’ and of ‘does not have forgiveness eternally’ plus ‘is guilty of eternal sin.’” Mark, 176.
1297 In describing the 2GH, we learned that Mark has a clearer, more idiomatic Greek formulation in “does not have forgiveness” (οὐκ ἔχει ἀφεσιν [3:29]) instead of Matthew’s Semitic phrase “it will not be forgiven to him” (οὐκ ὀφεθηκεῖσαι σῷτῳ [12:32]). But Matthew has reason to adapt Mark, for the latter phrase has a “harshness” and “urgency” which could amplify Jesus’ threat (so Luz, Matthew 8-20, 206).
conclusion (purpose A.3). That is to say, when Matthew adds a counterdefinition (12:27), a syllogism (12:30) and statements of gravity and law (12:31-33), he infuses each with a threatening tone that appears inappropriate for logical proofs. But in Matthew’s defence, he reserves his most threatening material for his conclusion (12:34-37), going so far as to characterize his opponents as a “brood of vipers” (12:34).

Does Matthew overlook Markan material that would serve his biographical ends (purpose B)? For the most part, Matthew uses Mark to the full. There are some places where Matthew might overlook useful material. For one, Matthew omits Mark’s ॲम in 12:31 (Mark 3:28), an expression that could intensify Jesus’ argument. For another he omits Mark’s ॲعجب (‘if Satan has risen against himself’ [3:26a]), thus weakening the implausibility of Satan’s work. A third omission of material which Matthew might have used to accentuate Jewish opposition to Jesus, is the mention in Mark 3:22 that the Pharisees are “from Jerusalem.” Finally, since Matthew portrays hostility between Jesus and Jewish leaders, it might have been appropriate to retain the leaders’ charge in Mark 3:22a. This last critique however is weak; in a sense it is unfair, since Mark 3:22a is

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1298 I.e., he works against purpose A.3.
1299 A glance at Markan material that Matthew does not use, bears this point out. First, Mark 3:20-21 and 3:31-35 are irrelevant, as they constitute a different issue altogether (Jesus’ relationship to his family). And second, Mark’s reference to scribes (3:22a) would not help Matthew address his propositiones, for Matthew has a special interest in setting Jesus against Pharisees. Gundry, Matthew, 232.
1300 Matthew might omit the term for clarity. Marcus (Mark, 283) points out that in Mark 3:28, “the transition to [the] . . . countercharge is a bit awkward (why does Jesus interrupt his own speech with ‘Amen’?)”
1301 Perhaps Matthew omits it for conciseness; after all, Matthew has already shifted here his paraphrase of Mark 3:23 (ει ὁ σατανᾶς τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει . . . [12:26]) in a way that recalls the opponents’ charge (12:24), and so to include Mark’s σατανᾶς ἄνεστι would be unnecessary and in fact “clutter” the progression of thought.
1302 Matthew 12:1-16:20 “tells of Jesus’ ‘retreat’ in the face of the attacks from Israel’s hostile leaders.” Luz, Matthew 8-20, 177; cp. similarly Gundry, Matthew, 221, who sees the “motif of persecution that dominates 11:2:12:50.”
an opponent’s charge, not proof.\footnote{Moreover Mark offers hardly any new material (3:28-30) with which to answer the charge. And as Gundry points out, in Mark, “the charge means that Jesus is himself a demoniac, and it follows naturally the immediately preceding charge that he is berserk [Mark 3:21]. But in Matthew and Luke the lack of such a preceding charge deprives the charge of having Beelzebul of its antecedent.” \textit{Matthew}, 232.} In all Matthew overlooks a few details that might have enhanced his rhetoric, but they are small, and most are explicable.

\textit{Summary}

Matthew elaborates (ἐργάζομαι) Mark’s chreia on three rhetorically conventional grounds. Overall, Matthew’s work looks rhetorically plausible not only because he works from these conventional purposes, but also because his work is attentive to propriety (criterion D). Granted, there are difficulties. One difficulty is that Matthew adds material rich in pathos into a place that we should confine ourselves to logos. Another difficulty is that on occasion Matthew overlooks useful material to contribute to his portrayal of Jesus in conflict (terms like ἀμήν and ἀνέστη). But Matthew’s oversights represent less of a problem than Mark’s tendency to eschew stylistic ornament in his conclusion and to overlook a key rhetorical counterdefinition.

\textbf{5.4: Matthew’s adaptation of Q and Mark (the Two-Document Hypothesis [2DH])}

We now analyze a different scenario in which Matthew adapts Mark. According to the 2DH, Matthew composes 12:22-37 by conflating Mark’s gospel with the sayings gospel Q (Q 11:14-23). For the most part, Matthew paraphrases Q’s Controversy (Q 11:17-23). It is that simple: Matthew takes over Q from 11:17 through 11:23 (Matt. 12:25-30). In doing so, Matthew paraphrases quite closely and often copies Q verbatim. In fact, Q provides Matthew with its basic structure or arrangement, for Q has already built into it a definition (11:15), counterdefinition (11:20) and inference (11:23). In only
small ways does Matthew conflate Q with Mark. First, he transposes the pejorative description of Jesus by his family in Mark (ἐξέστη: “he is beside himself” [3:21]) into an 
admiring description: ἐξίσταντο πάντες: “they were beside themselves [with wonder or admiration]” (Matt. 12:23). Second, Matthew paraphrases Mark’s question (3:23: πῶς δύναται σατανᾶς σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλειν;) as a conditional sentence (εἰ ὁ σατανᾶς τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει [Matt. 12:26a]).

Having incorporated Q 11:17-23, Matthew draws it closer to Hermogenes’ outline by adding a statement of gravity (12:31-32). In the process, Matthew conflates and paraphrases Mark’s judgement (3:28-29) with Q’s warning to opponents (12:10).

Finally, Matthew paraphrases Q’s comparison (6:43-45 [Matt. 12:33]) and then adds a conclusion (12:34-37) that charges the Pharisees with hypocrisy—with feigning piety while in fact contriving against Jesus. Matthew also makes a few more substantive changes. He imperativizes Q’s observation that good and bad fruit are traceable to good and bad trees (6:43).

He omits Q’s rhetorical question and advances its closing rationale to answer the stinging question “How can you be good, speaking evil things?”

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1304 Rhetorically it is hard to characterize this change, but whatever we call the change it remains plausible, for it occurs in some way on each hypothesis (2DH and FH; Mark makes the opposite change according to the 2GH). Perhaps we should label this kind of change (a kind we are seeing often) as recontextualizing of a word or phrase to mean something quite different.

1305 It seems fortuitous that Matthew finds material in Mark (Mark 3:28-29) that resembles a statement of gravity, for it so happens that in stasis theory a statement of gravity follows a syllogism (Q 11:23 [Matt. 12:30]). But in fairness to the 2DH, a statement of gravity (Q 11:23) does not, in rhetorical theory, immediately follow a syllogism.

1306 Gundry, Matthew, 239. Matthew fashions his conclusion as essentially the elaboration (vv. 34b-37) of a chreia (v. 34a). Q 6:43-45 cautions to “distinguish good from bad”: Kirk, Composition, 173 (quotation), 173-176.

1307 That Q is trying to point out a cause behind particular morality, see Robbins’ comments in “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 183. Also Gundry, Matthew, 239: “[T]he former [Q’s] axiom that a good tree produces good fruits and a bad tree produces bad fruits becomes a command to make the tree and its fruit good or to make the tree and its fruit bad, i.e., to avoid hypocrisy (so also vv 34-37).”
And he converts Q’s admonition to the community into condemnation specifically of Jesus’ *opponents*.

In all then, Matthew elaborates Q 11’s instructional speech, pulling it into closer accord for a Hermogenes’ exchange within stasis of definition.

Based on a table that sets Matthew, Mark and Q in parallel (Table 5.5, Appendix 3), we shall describe and assess changes that draw the sayings gospel Q towards principles for speeches (A); changes that serve a biographical purpose (B); and changes that enhance clarity (C).

1. Drawing Q towards principles for speeches. The close overlap between Matthew and Q invites four questions. First, does Matthew intensify proof in Q and Mark (A.1)? Second, does Matthew address their στάσις in closer accord with stasis theory (A.2)? Third, does Matthew pull his sources towards a conventional, five-part form (A.3)? And fourth, does Matthew improve on Mark’s arrangement? The answer to all three questions is positive.

**Intensifying proofs (A.1).** Matthew repeatedly intensifies Q’s proofs, usually by paraphrase or subtly modifying ideas. Take for instance Matt. 12:22. Here Matthew fills out Q’s description of Jesus’ power, indicating that Jesus can cure not only muteness but also blindness. Matthew also adds a reference to Jesus’ healing of the blindness (τυφλός . . . ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτόν [12:22; cp. Q 11:14]). This touch gives his work more credibility. Moreover, while Q reports that “the crowds were amazed” (ἐθαύμασαν οἱ

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1308 The rhetorical question is in Q 6:44b: μήτι συλλέγουσιν ἐξ ἀκαθήτων σῶκα ἢ ἐκ τριβόλων σταφυλ[άς]. The closing rationale is in Q 6:45b: ἔκ γὰρ περισσεύματος καρδίας λολεῖ τὸ στόμα [σουτοῦ].
1309 On the direction of Q’s instructions in Q 6 to its community, see Fleddermann, *Q*, 266; Kloppenborg, *Formation of Q*, 171.
1310 Subtly changing ideas is something we have above characterized as “something a little more than paraphrase”; Matthew either understands it as paraphrase or small-scale inventive change. The changes are usually on the scale of a word or phrase.
Matthew embellishes with the phrase, “all the crowds were beside themselves” (ἐξίσταντο πάντες οἱ ὄχλοι [12:23]). To fortify this admiration even further, Matthew assigns the crowds a reaction of amazement: μήτι σὺτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς Δαυίδ; (12:23). These touches add to Jesus’ effectiveness for his onlookers and readers alike.

In Jesus’ reply speech (12:25-37), Matthew continues intensifying Jesus’ proof through paraphrase. As Robbins points out, when Matthew states that Jesus “knew their [his opponents’] thoughts” (12:25; cp. Q 11:17), he replaces Q’s “thoughts” (διανόηματα) with the more suggestive term ἐνθυμήσεις. Robbins explains just how significant is Matthew’s paraphrase:

> From the perspective of rhetorical analysis, this comment suggests that Jesus knew the essential propositions (ἐνθυμήματα) the Pharisees would use to supply the proofs (πίστεις) for their definition of his act. Matthew’s choice of Greek is fascinating, since the noun ἐνθυμήματα (“thought”) is amazingly close to the noun ἐνθυμημα ("enthymeme"), which is the rhetoricians’ term for the kind of deductive argument that is most powerful in disputation.

Matthew further underscores Jesus’ case by having Jesus speak of the implausibility of a house or kingdom “divided against itself” (Q 11:17b) and also of a city divided against itself (Matt. 12:25b). Moreover, Matthew rearranges and paraphrases Mark’s question on Satan (3:23b; cp. Matt. 12:26) to enhance proof against the counterintuitive idea of Satan “casting out Satan.” Two of Matthew’s changes to Q (addition of ἐξίσταντο [12:23] and of σατανᾶς . . . σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει [12:26]) are supplied by Mark.

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1311 Emphasis added.
1312 The parallel between the expression of this question (μήτι σὺτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς Δαυίδ;) and the Pharisees’ immediately following comment (σὺτός οὐκ ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαίμονια . . . ) is intentional.
1313 Cp. Gundry, Matthew, 231.
1314 Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 180. He adds that, “Matthew’s comment suggests that Jesus is able to intercept and preempt the Pharisees’ argument, because he knows the essential components of their argument.”
By pairing Mark 3:28-29 (Matt. 12:31) with Q 12:10 (Matt. 12:32), Matthew yet further intensifies proof: he layers two threats, underlining the Pharisees’ predicament (12:31-32). Even as he paraphrases Q 12:10, Matthew subtly intensifies Jesus’ argument, changing the εἰς in Q 12:10 to κατὰ and so expressing hostility more clearly. Matthew also supplements Q 12:10 by specifying that there can be no forgiveness “either in this age or in the age to come” (12:32). Matthew thereby intensifies the severity of the opponents’ blasphemy, and further still by repeating οὐτέ . . . οὐτέ (12:32). In 12:32 Matthew again recalls Mark (Mark 3:29), for here Mark describes eternal alienation for blasphemers.

Tightening treatment of stasis (A.2). Matthew also pulls Q’s treatment of a stasis closer to the ideal. For Matthew adds rhetorical units that make Q’s treatment of στάσις better approximate rhetorical theory: statements of gravity (12:31-32), comparison (12:33), and a clearer opening statement of Jesus’ legitimacy (12:23). Together these units recall Hermogenes’ στάσις theory. By sharpening Q’s exchange on the 2DH, Matthew parallels his sharpening of Mark’s exchange on the FH.

Adding proofs in appropriate parts of speech (A.3). What is more, according to the 2DH Matthew adds proofs in the places where we should expect them: ἰθὸς in introductory material, λόγος in “proofs” or logical argumentation, and πάθος in concluding material. It is significant, for instance, that Matthew intensifies the crowds’ wonder in his introduction: it is here that he includes ἔξισταντο πάντες and a question which shows Jesus’ noble character (12:23). And Matthew saves an especially
vituperative comment—the kind that would raise his opponents’ pathos and indignation (i.e., “Brood of vipers!” [12:34; cp. 12:37])—for his conclusion (12:34-37). Here Matthew declares the Pharisees pernicious (“How are you able to speak good things, being evil?” [12:34]), explains why (12:34-35), and threatens alienation (12:36). In fact, when Matthew shifts back Q 6:45b (ἐκ γὰρ περισσεύματος καρδίας λαλεῖ τὸ στόμα [αὕτοῦ]) to a position immediately before 6:45a (Matt. 12:34c), he is heightening emotional proof in the appropriate place. By adding such emotional proof or πάθος here, in the conclusion, Matthew makes a classic rhetorical improvement.

2. Biographical purposes: Distancing Jesus from Pharisaic Judaism. On the 2DH, Matthew aims to portray Jesus’ alienation from Pharisaic Judaism. The one major thing that changes for Matthew, vis-à-vis his work according to the FH, is his material, for he now employs not only Mark but also the sayings gospel Q. With Q, Matthew makes important changes to accentuate the distance between Jesus and the Pharisees. For one, Matthew specifies the Pharisees as Jesus’ opponents (Q 11:15; cp. Matt. 12:24). For another, Matthew adds pejorative references to Pharisees in 12:34 and 12:36-37. What is more, he draws together verses of judgement from various parts of Q (i.e., from Q 6:43-45, and from Q 12:10) that in combination level at the Pharisees a sharp condemnation.

3. Strengthening clarity. On the 2DH Matthew clarifies Mark in the same places as on the FH, and clarifies Q. Matthew makes only three clarifications to Q, but these are enough to show his appreciation of clarity. Matthew makes two clarifications in Q’s introduction (Q 11:14-15). First, Matthew adds precision to the names of characters. Q 11:14 refers to a “mute demon” (δαιμόνιον κωφόν [11:14a]) and then distinguishes it

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1318 Similarly, Matthew recasts Q 6:43-45 from the indicative to the imperative mood. This is effective, for as Robbins suggests, in a conclusion the imperative ignites emotions. Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 183, 184.
from a mute man whom it had possessed (ἐκβληθέντος τοῦ δαίμονιον ἐλάλησεν ὁ κωφός [11:14b]). Such an interchange of terms is acceptable, but Matthew clarifies by referring consistently to the man (δαίμονιζόμενος . . . κωφός [12:22a]; ὥστε τὸν κωφόν . . . [12:22b]). Second, Matthew clarifies Q’s logic. Q 11:14 consists of two paratactically linked clauses, the second of which contains a genitive absolute. Together, these clauses show the effect of Jesus’ healing: “and he [Jesus] cast out a mute demon; and when the demon had come out, the mute man spoke.” Jesus’ healing effect here is clear enough, but Matthew makes the link between demon’s exit and healing more explicit: Jesus ἐθεράπευσεν αὐτὸν (healed him) ὥστε (so that) τὸν κωφόν λαλεῖν. Third, Matthew clarifies the logic of Q 11:18. In this verse, Jesus replies to the charge against him (“by Beelzebul the prince of demons . . . [Jesus] casts out the demons” [11:15]), by asserting that it is preposterous to imagine Beelzebul work against himself. As Jesus puts it,

καὶ εἶ ὁ σατανᾶς ᾧ ἐαυτὸν ἐμερίσθη, πῶς σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;

And if Satan is divided against himself, how will his kingdom stand? (Q 11:18)

Matthew takes over this assertion from Q (in Matt. 12:26), but also adds to it a paraphrase of Mark 3:23b:

καὶ εἰ ὁ σατανᾶς τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει, ᾧ ἐαυτὸν ἐμερίσθη· πῶς οὖν σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;

And if Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself; and so how will his kingdom stand? (Matt. 12:26; cp. Mark 3:23b)\(^{1320}\)

\(^{1319}\) Even Matthew’s insertion of ἐθεράπευσεν (12:22b; cp. Q 11:14) might be a clarification, for Matthew makes explicit the act of healing, not explicitly stated by Q.

\(^{1320}\) Emphasis added.
By paraphrasing the charge’s logic, Matthew’s Jesus replies more clearly to the charge than does Jesus in Q (11:15).

Assessing Matthew’s adaptations of Q

*Stylistic propriety (D.1).* If Matthew truly adapts Mark and Q, he should be sensitive to stylistic propriety; he should at least maintain an appropriately medium style in his introduction, plain style in the body, and ornate style in his conclusion. In Matthew’s introduction (12:22; cp. Q 11:14), we find little evidence for or against propriety. However, Matthew does clarify Q here, and this work looks fitting since clarity matters throughout a speech. In the body of the unit (12:23-33), we would like to see evidence that Matthew strengthens plain (clear and concise) style. In 12:23-24, Matthew actually adds words (πάντες, ἀκούσαντες) and a phrase (μὴ τὸν ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς Δαυίδ;) to Q, lengthening the speech. But at the same time, Matthew’s additions intensify his portrayal of Jesus’ good character at a point quite close to the introduction with its demand for such ethical proof. Moreover, Matthew’s additions do not really elevate the style, for they do not entail figures of speech. Indeed in the body of Matthew’s speech (12:23-33), Matthew does not raise Q’s style. Rather, apart from occasionally adding a word or phrase to clarify or intensify his case, Matthew preserves Q’s style; he keeps what is already there.

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1321 It is hard to see Matthew inject the “wit” that would convey an appropriately medium style of an introduction, though we cannot expect much change within one verse. Some readers might argue that Matthew’s speech does not really have a *prooemium*, and hence that looking for signs of a medium style is unrealistic.

1322 Similarly, Matthew’s paraphrase of Q 11:15b (οὐκ ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ Βεελζεβούλ ἀφχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων) intensifies the charge against Jesus, and this suits Matthew’s interest in having the Pharisees appear hostile. This intensification reflects the work of Josephus.

1323 Similarly, according to the 2DH, Matthew does not make Q *lengthier* (with exceptions necessary for intensifying proof). Vis-à-vis the FH, the 2DH is attractive in that Matthew does not elevate his style in logical proof material; rather, he simply keeps what he finds in Q. Moreover, the places where on the FH
In Matthew’s conclusion (12:33-37), moreover, the evangelist quite appropriately elevates the style of Q (6:43-45): Matthew draws out repetitions which underline his charge against the Pharisees. Earlier we observed that Matthew in his conclusion changes Q’s content in a similar spirit: he rearranges Q’s rationale (Q 6:45b) to a position immediately before 6:45a, where it becomes a stinging explanation why the Pharisees are evil (12:34c). Hence Matthew colours Q’s condemnation with more condemnatory, pathetical hues.¹³²⁴

Using all necessary material (D.2). Has Matthew weakened adherence to speech principles (A) or missed helpful biographical material (B)? From the perspective of the FH, there were a few cases where Matthew might have overlooked useful proof. But each case was rather minor—its omission did not leave a gaping hole in the case—and each had a good explanation. From the perspective of the 2DH we find these same cases. Further, there is Matt. 12:22 (Q 11:14), where if Matthew had retained Q’s term for exorcising (ἐκβάλλω) a demon, he could have better dramatized Jesus’ power. But Matthew compensates by substituting a clearer, more direct term: “healing” (ἐθεράπευσεν).¹³²⁵ Matthew’s omissions, moreover, do not leave the sort of gap that appears when Mark omits his sources’ counterdefinition. Usually, Matthew repeats the proofs that he finds in Q, and regularly intensifies them.

¹³²⁴ Matthew awkwardly substitutes more Semitic expressions in place of conventional Greek expressions (i.e., Mark 3:28-29/Matt. 12:31-32) disappear on the 2DH, where Matthew simply takes over what he finds in Q (Q 12:10 [cp. Matt. 12:32]). In the end, however, every hypothesis requires that an evangelist elevate his alleged sources’ style in logical proof material.
¹³²⁵ The plausibility of Matthew’s changes does not reduce the plausibility of the 2GH and FH, for Matthew there composes with the same awareness of emotional proof. On the 2DH, Matthew simply applies his awareness to the adaptation of his source.
¹³²⁵ From the perspective of the 2DH, Matthew’s oversights of Mark are identical to oversights from the perspective of the FH.
Problematically, nonetheless, Matthew adds to the body of his speech proof material that has a pathetical, threatening tone: this includes his statement of law (12:32 / Q 12:10) and comparison (12:33 / Q 6:43-45). This material would appear more appropriate in his conclusion.

Summary

From the perspective of the 2DH, Matthew’s work leaves the same impression that we received from the perspective of the FH. His motivations look plausible: Matthew sharpens his sources’ conformity to principles for judicial speeches, he paints a distinctive picture of Jesus, and he clarifies. Moreover, Matthew creates styles appropriate for each part of his speech and only occasionally nods when it comes to retaining and positioning helpful proof material. It is difficult to judge whether the 2DH is more credible than the FH. The 2DH is problematic inasmuch as Matthew’s positioning of Mark 3:28-29 (a statement of gravity) after Q 11:23 (an inference) in a manner that fits Hermogenes’ sequence, appears coincidental. But occasional moves like this do not render the 2DH less plausible.

5.5: Luke’s adaptation of Matthew (the Two-Gospel Hypothesis [2GH] and Farrer Hypothesis [FH])

According to the 2GH and FH, Luke composes his elaborated chreia (11:14-36) by adapting Matthew’s gospel. Our interest, of course, is in assessing Luke’s rhetorical reasons for adapting Matthew.1326 Based on the table that sets Matthew and Luke in

parallel (Table 5.6, Appendix 3), let us summarize how Luke draws Matthew towards principles for judicial speeches (A), how he adjusts Matthew to serve his biographical interests (B) and how he clarifies Matthew (C).

1. Drawing Matthew towards principles for speeches. Luke and Matthew are similar enough in argumentation to justify comparison. We shall see that Luke intensifies Matthew’s proofs (A.1), pulls Matthew’s στάσεις into closer accord with theory (A.2), and pulls Matthew towards more conventional speech form (A.3).


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1328 In Chapter 3 we learned that Josephus could intensify proofs by simply adding words, phrases and sentences. I regard almost any stylistic or substantive change to be a bona fide intensification of proof. Similarly, Luke strengthens Matthew’s parable by replacing Matt. 12:15’s “They do not” (οὐδέ) with “nobody” (οὐδεῖς) and by replacing “under the bushel basket” (ὑπὸ τοῦ μόδιον) with “into the cellar” (εἰς κρύπτην); the latter change provides an even sharper paradox. And by replacing Matt. 12:28’s πνεῦματι with διδάσκαλο (11:20), Luke alludes to the overpowering effect of God in Exodus 8 (on which see Kirk, “Going Public with the Hidden Transcript,” 188-189). Further, in 11:34b Luke augments parallelism in Matt. 6:22b-23 by repositioning ἦν and twice adding καί. And according to Marshall, Luke, 480, Luke moves ἐπτά to the end of the clause in 11:26 as a way to dramatize the problem of the multiplied unclean spirits (“a climax”).
Matthew’s Jesus “plunders” (ἀρπάζω) the strong man’s house through “binding” (δήσῃ) the strong man, Luke’s Jesus not only “conquers” the strong man (ψιχήσῃ αὐτὸν) but also “carries off” (στραφεί) his weaponry “and distributes his plunder” (τὰ σκύλα . . . διαδίδωσιν). In effect Jesus destroys him. To be sure then, Luke intensifies Matthew’s proof.


Adding proofs in appropriate parts of speech (A.3). Does Luke add proof material in appropriate places? By this criterion Luke does very well. In the body of his unit (11:17-33), Luke keeps Matthew’s logical proofs or substitutes other logical proofs.1332

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1331 There is little data with which to assess whether Luke effectively rearranges units in Matthew (A.4). One rearrangement is to reverse the sequence of Matthew’s arguments from example (cp. Matt 12:41 [Luke 11:32] and Matt. 12:42 [Luke 11:31]). Although it might seem clearest to have paired 11:30 with 11:32 (both refer to Nineveh), Luke might want 11:31 first because it refers to an authoritative female paradigm. Upholding women as positive examples was important to Luke more generally (Green, Luke, 317-320).

his conclusion (11:34-36), Luke refashions the Matthean Jesus’ observation (Matt. 6:22-23) into an exhortation (σκόπεί οὖν . . . [11:35]) that contains not only a warning but also a positive exhortation to allow light into the body (11:36). This change is fitting on two grounds. First, exhortations are appropriate to conclude an elaborated chreia. Second, Luke appeals both to his audience’s fear and its hope by suggesting that it can become full of light (11:36); appeals to fear and hope are most appropriate to a conclusion.  

2. Biographical purposes. According to Green, Luke 11:14-36 belongs to a slightly larger thematic unit of 11:14-54, and this unit is characterized by two biographical themes: “surging animosity” towards Jesus and Jesus’ admonition to adhere to his teachings. And these two themes are closely related: “hostility [11:15-16] provides the horizon against which is underscored the urgency of a decision regarding Jesus.”

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As we might expect, Luke changes Matthew in ways that draw out these biographical themes. For one, Luke enhances Matthew’s portrayal of hostility towards Jesus. To this end he advances the request for a sign in Matthew (12:38-42) into his Beelzebul controversy (Luke 11:16,29-32) and adds the insidious connotation that the people who ask for a sign are “testing” Jesus (ἐτεροὶ δὲ πειράζοντες σημείου ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐξήτουν παρ’ αὐτοῦ [11:16]). Luke also paraphrases Matthew in ways that intensify animosity towards Jesus. In 11:15, for instance, Luke advances the phrase ἐν Βεελζεβούλ to the head of the opponents’ charge, accenting Jesus’ allegedly demonic character. For another, Luke emphasizes the need to adhere to Jesus’ teaching (11:27-28).

3. Clarifying Matthew. In many places, Luke clarifies Matthew’s expression and thought. In 11:18, Luke has Jesus clarify the course of argument by repeating back to his opponents the charge that “you say that by Beelzebul I cast out demons.”1336 In 11:24, according to Schmid, Luke replaces Matthew’s word sequence (ἐν τὸν δικον μου ἐπιστρέψω [12:44b]) with a more conventional sequence (ὑποστρέψω εἰς τὸν δικον μου),1337 and makes further clarifications.1338 Luke also clarifies Matthew’s logic (“they place a light . . . upon a light-stand, and it shines for all in the house” [5:15]), by adding an adverbial clause: one “places a light . . . upon a lamp-stand, so that all those who enter

may see the light” (11:33). Finally, Luke adds a concluding verse (11:36) that clarifies Matthew’s enigmatic wording.\(^{1339}\)

In some places where Luke apparently obscures Matthew, he actually has good reason. One such place is in 11:17b (Matt. 12:25b).\(^{1340}\) Here Luke reverses Matthew’s conventional word sequence: while Matthew writes πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα καθ’ ἐαυτῆς ἐρημοῦται (12:25), Luke separates the noun and attributive with a prepositional phrase (πᾶσα βασιλεία ἐφ’ ἐαυτήν διαμερισθείσα ἐρημοῦται).\(^{1341}\) Luke has good reason for this change, for he wants to unify and drive home arguments across 11:17-23 by repeating ἐπί (11:17,18,20,22).\(^{1342}\) In some other places where Luke obfuscates Matthew, we need to remember that his changes appear on every hypothesis.\(^{1343}\)

Two omissions are harder to explain. First, Luke omits Matthew’s clarificatory remark “So it will be against this generation” (Matt. 12:45).\(^{1344}\) Second, while Matthew writes that “no sign will be given to it [this generation] except the sign of Jonah the prophet” (ὁ προφήτης [12:39]), Luke omits “prophet.” This word would have clarified

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\(^{1340}\) Given the typical positions for possessive genitive pronouns (BDF § 284), both Matthew’s arrangement in 12:25a (τὰς ἐνθαμμένες αὐτῶν) and Luke’s in 11:17a (αὐτῶν τὰ διανοήματα) appear conventional.

\(^{1341}\) On word position as a means of emphasis see BDF § 473.


\(^{1344}\) Perhaps Luke omits Matthew’s closing phrase to sound more concise.
Jonah’s identity for Gentile readers. But again, Luke has reasons for these omissions, either stylistic (conciseness) or theological; his changes away from clarity often have good reason and often occur on all hypotheses.

Assessing Luke’s adaptations of Matthew

Stylistic propriety (D.1). Luke neither strengthens nor weakens the propriety or “fit” between the content and style of Matthean speech parts. In the body of his speech (11:15-33), Luke does cultivate plain style through numerous clarifications, although he does not match these with adaptations towards conciseness. And while we have already seen that Luke creates an appropriately elevated, grander style in his conclusion (11:34-36 [above, n. 213]), he still removes some marks of grander style from Matthew, such as repetitions (εὖν . . . εὖν [Matt. 6:22]; ὁ ὀφθαλμός . . . ὁ ὀφθαλμός [Matt. 6:22-23]).

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1348 In Luke’s conclusion, one further change looks a little hard to explain. Luke’s conclusion (11:35-36) contains material for exhortation and emotional proofs (πάθος), and such material demands elevated style. This reveals a problem in 11:34, where Luke compares two states of the eye, one “healthy” (ἁπλός) and the other “evil” (πονηρός), for Luke weakens Matthew’s elevated style. Stylistically, Matthew 6:22b-23 creates parallelism by repeating terms in sequence (ἐὰν οὖν ἢ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ἁπλός, ὅλων τὸ σῶμα σου φωτεινὸν ἐσται ἢ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου πονηρός ἢ, ὅλων τὸ σῶμα σου σκοτεινὸν ἐσται.) The repetitions would be useful for Luke’s conclusion, but Luke omits several of these (of ἢ, ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου, ὅλων and ἐσται) and so attenuates the sentence’s force. Since moreover Luke actually creates new repetitions here too (he positions ἢ similarly in each clause; he adds καὶ to each clause), then
Using all necessary material (D.2). Luke does not, in the main, overlook material in Matthew that is essential to his purposes. There are, though, three places where Luke’s omissions look problematic given his otherwise careful use of Matthew at the level of words and phrases. The first is in his introduction (11:14). While Matthew has Jesus heal a “blind and mute” demoniac (τυφλός καὶ κωφός [Matt. 12:22]), Luke describes the demoniac as merely mute (κωφόν). Now it would help Luke to show Jesus’ power if Jesus could cure muteness and blindness—in other words, could make the demoniac “see” (βλέπω [Matt. 12:22])—especially since “blindness” and “sight” are important for Luke later in the controversy. Since Luke repeats other terms in this unit, repeating βλέπω would seem sensible. What is more, retaining βλέπω would help Luke to integrate this chreia better into his larger, artfully crafted narrative.

According to Standaert, Luke carefully shapes his narrative around the story of Martha and Mary (10:38-42) by “framing” it with verbal parallels; these parallels appear between 10:1-37 (the commissioning of the disciples and the parable of the good Samaritan) on the perspective of the 2GH and FH, Luke must be reducing parallelism only to seek parallelism. But once again, we must accept that Luke makes some of the same omissions to Q 11:34 from the perspective of the 2DH (οφθαλμός σου, ὅλου). So what appear counter-rhetorical changes are often justified by the fact that Luke makes them on competing hypotheses.

In several places, Luke’s omissions are explicable and pose no problem. Given that Josephus omitted proofs altogether, we need to allow Luke to do similarly. And Luke often has theological or stylistic reasons to omit proofs. When he omits the crowds’ admiring question, “Is this not the son of David?” (Matt. 12:23), he might at first appear to refuse ready-made συζητήσεις in which a question intensifies amazement (ἐξίσταντο πάντες οἱ ὄχλοι [12:23]). But Luke might omit this question because his Jesus later criticizes such praise as misguided (11:27-28). Similarly, when Luke abbreviates Matthew’s explanation why Satan could not cast himself out (Matt. 12:26, cp. Luke 11:18), or abbreviates Matthew’s analogies by removing “city” and employing ellipsis (11:17b), he might simply be fostering conciseness. What is more, while Luke refers to the demon “having come out” (ἐξελθόντας [11:14]) instead of using Matthew’s more direct image of healing (Matt. 12:22), he has a literary reason: in 11:24-26 Luke’s analogy of the unclean spirit picks up upon and repeats this very image (Ὅταν τὸ ἁκάσκαρτον πνεῦμα ἐξέλθῃ [v. 24]).

As Robbins points out, “from Luke’s perspective, all of the hearing in the elaboration [i.e., in 11:30-36] has been seeing,” for Luke takes pains to exhort Christians to see rightly, with the illumination of God’s word. Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 190.

one side, and 11:1-54 (the Beelzebul controversy and woes against the Pharisees) on the other side. That is to say, in these two units Luke repeats words in a ring pattern that highlights the story of Martha and Mary. Significantly, by keeping βλέπω in 11:14, Luke could have contributed to these parallels (cp. Luke 10:17-18 and esp. 10:23: οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ οἱ βλέπουντες ἐὰν βλέπετε).  


1352 Standaert argues that Luke arranges material concentrically in 10:1-11:54 in five sections: A (10:1-24), B (10:25-37), C (10:38-42 [centre]), B’ (11:1-13) and A’ (11:14-54). He shows, moreover, several verbal parallels between A (10:1-24) and A’ (11:14-54): in A Jesus pronounces three woes upon Galilean cities (10:13-15), while in A’ he pronounces sets of three woes upon his opponents (11:42-52); in A Jesus recalls seeing “Satan fall from heaven” (10:18), while in A’ Jesus is asked for a sign “from heaven” and discusses Satan’s fall (11:16-18); in A Jesus blesses his disciples (10:23), while in A’ he blesses people “who hear the word of God” (11:28). These correspondences also share for the most part in the same relative sequence. Significantly, by omitting Matthew’s image of sight restored (Matt. 12:22: ὁστε τὸν κοφὸν λαλεῖν καὶ βλέπειν) here in A’, Luke eliminates a parallel for the already corresponding passage in A (10:17-18), in which Jesus “watched [ἰδοὺ] Satan fall from heaven like a flash of lightning. See [ἰδοὺ], I have given you authority. . . .” In places where Luke has already sought a correspondence (10:17-18 and 11:16-18), and in which an added correspondence using βλέπω would fit quite snugly, it would seem useful to have copied Matthew. Benoît Standaert, “L’Art de composer dans L’œuvre de Luc.” In À Cause de L’Évangile. Mélanges offerts à Dom Jacques Dupont, LD 123 (Publications de Saint-André, 1985), 323-347, esp. 336-337, 346-347.

1353 That is, a Greek image with which Luke would be comfortable. We can infer Luke’s comfort with such Greek imagery from the fact that his Greek style tends to be refined (Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 107, 113) and “the most sophisticated of the evangelists” (Goulder, Luke, 115). It has been suggested that in 5:19, Luke inserts reference to the tile-roofing (δίοι τῶν κερασίμων) characteristic of a Hellenistic house (cp. Mark 2:4). See Marshall, Luke, 213 (Marshall himself disagrees that Luke makes the picture appear more Hellenistic).

1354 Goulder suggests that Luke “eschews the wordy Semitic parallel “kingdom – city/[or?] house” (Luke, 504). πόλις, though, remains an eminently Greek term. Moreover, this word could help Luke create another correspondence between A (10:1-24) and A’ (11:14-54). By eliminating πόλις (“every city divided
has omitted useful material in Matt. 12:36-37. These Matthean verses, which threaten judgement on people who accuse Jesus, could underline and flesh out Luke’s own threat in 11:23-26 that one needs to choose between a life dedicated to the gospel and a life alienated from God.

How would the FH and 2GH explain Luke’s omissions? These hypotheses might suggest that Luke makes gestures towards conciseness. This reasoning is not very strong, for we are dealing in two of these cases with a mere word. There are, however, stronger reasons. For one, Luke omits much of the same material as he does on other hypotheses. Luke’s omission for instance of Matt. 12:31 and advance of 12:32 (to Luke 12:10) occurs not only on the FH but also on the 2GH, and on the 2DH Luke omits the very similar threat in Mark 3:28-29. For another, Luke omits some Matthean material because it is either not useful or it works against Luke’s imagery. This is the reason for instance why Luke omits Matt. 12:34 (charge and question): it would make no sense to call Jesus’ audience a “brood of vipers” (Matt. 12:34) when Jesus needs later win its trust enough to exhort it (11:36). A further reason why Luke omits Matthean material is that he prefers it in another context. This preference helps account for his shift of Matt. 12:32 to Luke 12:10. In all then, Luke’s handful of oversights does not constitute a major problem, but it does leave the FH and 2GH with some explaining to do.

upon itself falls”), Luke has eliminated a parallel for material in A (10:8-12) that anticipates rejection of Jesus by πόλεις (10:8,10,11,12; cp. 10:13-15).

And this even if Luke is trying to abbreviate Matthew elsewhere in 11:14-36; on abbreviation see Goulder, Luke, 504, 506.

Another example is the replacement of Matthew’s vivid preposition κατά (Matt. 12:25) with ἐπί (Luke 11:17). Though ἐπί might appear less vivid, Luke makes the same replacement in Q (Q 11:17) on the 2DH.


Does Luke overlook essential material in Mark? To an extent, the very question is problematic, for in 11:14-36 Luke follows chiefly Matthew. Still, there are general reasons why Luke avoids Mark. For one, Luke must have found Mark’s tight chiastic arrangement of propositiones to be idiosyncratic. For another, Mark offers hardly any proofs with which to answer his propositio that Jesus possesses Beelzebul (2:22b).
For his biographical purposes, Luke does not overlook Matthean material. To be sure, we might charge Luke with overlooking Matthean material that he could have adapted for his purposes. For instance, Luke should perhaps have borrowed and adjusted Matt. 12:33-35. In Matthew these verses take aim at the Pharisees’ hypocrisy (“Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad . . .” [12:33]; “The good man draws out good things from a good treasury . . .” [12:35]). Luke could adapt slightly these verses to illustrate his biographical interest in having Jesus demand adherence to the gospel. It is logically difficult, however, to judge whether an evangelist should have adapted source material for his purposes, for the answer is inevitably “Yes.” We can judge more soundly whether an evangelist borrows existing material that serves his purposes. And Luke has borrowed all the existing material that is useful for his Beelzebul periscope in 11:14-36.

I wish to suggest, nonetheless, that Luke very much misses useful Matthean material in his immediately following pericope, 11:37-54, where Jesus condemns Pharisees and lawyers. One of the strongest impulses in this condemnatory speech is against the Pharisees’ hypocrisy (11:39-42, cp. 12:1). It is here that, from the perspective of the FH and 2GH, Luke nods in his use of Matthew. For Matthew, in his own Beelzebul

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For the charge of hypocrisy here, see Gundry, Matthew, 239, 241.

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controversy, offers a rich store of material that condemns precisely Pharisaic hypocrisy in 12:33-35, and further material that condemns impious speech in general, in 12:31-32,36-37. Significantly, Luke does not employ any of these seven verses of ready-made material in Jesus’ speech against the Pharisees, a speech that both invites the material and follows immediately on Luke’s Beelzebul controversy. Luke certainly had Matthew’s controversy ready at hand or in his memory at this point in his gospel. Why then does he fail to borrow any of it in 11:37-54? It is inadequate to argue that Luke employs part of this Matthean material to conclude his sermon on the plain (Luke 6:43-45) or in the exhortation to fearless confession (Luke 12:10). That material would be as or more suitable here in 11:37-54, for in Matthew it already targets Pharisaic hypocrisy; Luke surely could have repeated it or elements of it in 11:37-54. It is similarly inadequate to argue that Luke, like Josephus, omits proof in order to be concise; for Luke to overlook this material in favour of pulling together various and distant Matthean passages (i.e., from Matt. 15:1-9, Matt. 23), makes that argument improbable. Luke’s oversight of directly relevant Matthean material in Matt. 12:31-37 is a weighty count against his alleged use of Matthew. But because the oversight does not occur in Luke’s Beelzebul controversy itself, it is admittedly cheating to use it as evidence unless and until we examine every evangelist’s use of sources in adjacent pericopae.

Summary


1360 There are good reasons why Luke does not use Matt. 12:31-37 in his Beelzebul controversy per se. In the Beelzebul controversy, Luke is addressing ordinary Jews (not Pharisees, the subject of the hypocrisy charge); this address belongs to a larger pattern throughout 11:1-13:39 in which Jesus speaks in sequence to (1) disciples; (2) ordinary people; and (3) Pharisees (Diefenbach, Komposition, 96).
retains Matthew’s stasis and clarifies some expressions. To be sure, Luke occasionally misses opportunities to intensify and to clarify Matthew’s proofs. How then should we summarize Luke’s adaptation of Matthew? Luke’s work has some problems but is, on the whole, plausible.

5.6: Luke’s Adaptation of Q and Mark (the Two-Document Hypothesis [2DH])

In recent years scholars have pointed to the rhetorical qualities of Luke’s adaptation of the sayings gospel Q.\textsuperscript{1361} In a study of Luke’s use of Q 13-17 for example, Christoph Heil remarks that Luke’s “redactional work reminds us a little of what the anonymous \textit{Rhetorica ad Herrenium} IV 42,54-44,58 . . . describes as \textit{expolitio} (= \varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\rho\gamma\sigma\iota\alpha . . . ‘elaboration’).”\textsuperscript{1362} An \textit{expolitio} / \varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\rho\gamma\sigma\iota\alpha denotes “dwelling on the same topic and yet seeming to say something ever new,”\textsuperscript{1363} and as a technique it includes paraphrase and chreia elaboration.\textsuperscript{1364} Although Heil does not suggest that Luke elaborates specifically Q 11:14-35, his general point remains relevant: \varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\rho\gamma\sigma\iota\alpha entails modifying and improving a source, and these activities we can detect in Luke’s use of Q.\textsuperscript{1365}

This work is relevant to our study, for from the perspective of the 2DH, Luke draws his Beelzebul controversy almost entirely from Q. Using a table that parallels Q

\textsuperscript{1361} Morgenthaler, \textit{Lukas und Quintilian}, 258-281, esp. 280-281.
\textsuperscript{1363} \textit{Ad Herr.} 4.42.54 (LCL, trans Caplan). The observation comes from Heil (see note above).
\textsuperscript{1364} For the technique see Anderson Jr., \textit{Glossary}, 48-49; the \textit{Rhetorica}’s discussion of chreia elaboration as a kind of \textit{expolitio}/\varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\rho\gamma\sigma\iota\alpha is in 4.43.56-4.44.57 (LCL, trans. Caplan). Heil himself points us to Anderson’s glossary and to the techniques of elaboration and paraphrase (\textit{Lukas und Q}, 355).
\textsuperscript{1365} Or as we said in Chapter 1, “enhancing” the source: see Theon, \textit{Progymnasmata} (ed. Patillon, 110); Kennedy, \textit{Progymnasmata}, p. 71. Anderson refers to Theon in \textit{Glossary}, 49.
11:14-35 with Luke 11:14-36 (Table 5.7, Appendix 3), we shall describe and then assess Luke’s adaptations in terms of the three rhetorical purposes: to draw Q towards principles for judicial speeches (A), to adapt Q’s biographical portrayal (B), and to clarify Q’s thought and expression (C).

1. Drawing Q towards principles for speeches. Luke intensifies Q’s proofs (A.1), perhaps pulls Q’s στάσις into closer accord with theory (A.2), and pulls Q towards more conventional speech form (A.3).

Intensifying proofs (A.1). On occasion, Luke intensifies Q’s logical and emotional proofs, usually by paraphrase. In 11:17 for instance, Luke underlines Jesus’ ability to assess his opponents by adding one personal pronoun and advancing another: “He [σὺτός] . . . knowing their [αὐτῶν] thoughts” (cp. Q 11:17).Luke strengthens Q’s participle μερισθεῖσα (divided) to διαμερισθεῖσα (11:17b, 11:18), and he advances a pronoun to presage his opponents’ approaching judgement (ἐμῶν κρίται ἔσονται [11:19]). Luke also advances Q’s prepositional phrase εἰς κρύπτην to a position before the verb τίθησιν, and so emphasizes the bizarre notion of kindling a lamp only to put it in a cellar (11:33). He adds yet another pronoun for emphasis in 11:34 (“your eye” [σου]), and he closes by repeating Q 11:35’s negative formulation in a more positive formulation, driving home its exhortation to be “full of light.”

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1366 Granted, by advancing σὺτόν before διανοήματα, Luke uses a less conventional (less clear) word sequence.

1367 The shift might create a less clear or conventional word sequence: Schmid (cited by Goulder, Luke, 506), observes that it is more conventional to place a verb before a prepositional phrase. It is still, though, rhetorically justifiable.

1368 There are two further, possible changes to this end. First, Luke might reverse Q 11:17b’s word sequence (from μερισθεῖσα καθ’ ἑαυτῆς to ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν διαμερισθεῖσα) in order to emphasize the destructive effect of being divided “upon oneself.” Second, Luke might insert the particle δὲ into 11:18a (εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ σατανᾶς ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν διαμερισθῇ) to emphasize the comparison between “every” kingdom and Satan. On the emphatic role of δὲ see Smyth, Greek Grammar § 2891. (Otherwise, Luke probably intends δὲ as a clarification).
Tightening treatment of stasis (A.2). Another rhetorical principle to which Luke is sensitive is στάσις. Q 11:14-26 implies a stasis or issue of definition: By whom does Jesus work, Beelzebul or God? The sayings gospel also furnishes Jesus with a speech that he works by God. In this speech Jesus presents a counterdefinition (11:20), syllogism (11:23) and fable that functions like a statement of gravity (11:24-26). For his part, Luke simply adopts Q and adds (or perhaps retains) 11:27-28, a comparison. According to Hermogenes, a statement of comparison (πρὸς τί) is effective in a reply speech. If Luke has added the comparison, he has articulated the speech’s conventional form.


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1369 Kirk believes that Q’s fable (11:24-26) stands at the very centre of a series of speeches arranged in a ring form: Composition, 310-311, 313, 330-332.
1370 The IQP expresses uncertainty whether Q 11 contained verses 27-28, and if so, what its contents were. See Robinson, Hoffmann and Kloppenborg, Critical Edition of Q, 244-245.
1372 Lausberg, Handbook § 437.
...tan (11:36), and that Luke inserts “repetition in reverse” right through 11:34-36: **φωτεινός . . . σκοτεινός . . . φῶς . . . σκότος . . . φωτεινός . . . σκοτεινός . . . φωτεινός**. Such ornate style is highly appropriate here in the conclusion for stirring pathos. In all then, Luke intensifies emotional proof (πάθος) where rhetorical theory demands it.

2. Biographical purposes. As we remarked in our discussion earlier of Luke and Matthew, Luke 11:14-36 belongs to the larger thematic unit of 11:14-54, and this unit portrays both hostility towards Jesus and Jesus’ admonition to adhere to his teachings. From the perspective of the 2DH, Luke changes the sayings gospel Q in order to highlight these biographical themes, but he does so only on occasion. For example, Luke advances Q’s request for a sign from a position after its Beelzebul controversy to a position *within* his own Beelzebul controversy (Luke 11:16,29-32), thus doubling the challenge to Jesus. Similarly to this end Luke adds the connotation that people who ask for a sign are “testing” Jesus (**ἐτεροὶ δὲ πειράζοντες σημεῖον ἔξ οὐρανοῦ ἐζήτουν παρ’ αὐτοῦ** [11:16]).

3. Clarifying Q. Luke clarifies Q on several occasions. He inserts into 11:18 the clarifying phrase “For you say that I cast out demons by Beelzebul,” reminding us of the charge which Jesus immediately refutes (11:19-20). In 11:24a, as Schmid indicates,

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1374 See Lausberg, *Handbook* § 1079.3.
1375 For the fusing of Q units to create a larger unit (Luke 11:14-36), see Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 185. It is unclear according to the IQP whether Q 11 contained vv. 27-28, and if so, what the contents of these verses were.
1376 Alongside this change Luke accordingly adds δὲ to open 11:19 (just as on the FH). The δὲ, an adversative conjunction (“But”) helps heighten the contrast between what Jesus’ opponents say and what Jesus shows really to be true. For this adversative use of δὲ see Smyth, *Greek Grammar* §2835: “Adversative δὲ often marks a silent contrast . . . in questions which imply opposition to something just said . . . [or] in objections or corrections.”

By contrast, a handful of Luke’s changes attenuate Q’s clarity, but these are rhetorically justified. In 11:14a Luke casts Q into more Semitic idiom, replacing Q’s indicative verb ἔξεβαλεν with the periphrastic construction ἦν ἐκβάλλων. Luke has reason for this change: the periphrasis puts “emphasis on [the] duration” of the exorcism and so draws attention to it.\footnote{For quotation and periphrasis, see BDF § 353. Cp. Marshall, *Luke*, 472: the construction is “slightly odd. It is probably meant to set the scene for the saying in v. 15.” Fitzmyer regards the usage as part of “Luke’s imitation of Septuagintal style.” He adds that “Luke uses many instances of the verb ‘to be’ with the perfect ptc.; this is merely the standard usage in classical and Hellenistic Greek for the pf., plupf., and fut. tenses. . . . One might suspect that he is merely extending this usage to other tenses” (*Luke I-IX*, 122-123, *Luke X-XIV*, 919). If one judges these explanations to be inadequate, Luke’s lengthier ἦν ἐκβάλλων is still the only change against clarity that we cannot explain.} When in 11:14b Luke chooses another relatively Semitic expression (ἐγένετο δὲ),\footnote{“And it came to pass that” (AGNT, 169); on the Semitic quality see Marshall, *Luke*, 53-54, 472 (Marshall cites BDF §472[3]), and BDF § 442(5).} he admittedly sounds less clear and less concise than Q, though he adds the same expression to Matthew according to the FH/2GH.\footnote{I.e., to Matt. 9:33 (according to the 2GH and FH, Luke 11:14 is following this doublet to Matt. 12:22). Luke has “an aversion to beginning a sentence with a temporal designation” such as ὁταν or μετά: BDF § 442(5).} Further
apparent obfuscations have similarly good explanations. When in 11:31 Luke reports that “the Queen of the South . . . will condemn” specifically “the men [οἱ ἄνδρες] of this generation,” he sounds less clear than Q 11:31, but the phrase serves his interest in moderating the patriarchal divide between men and women. In any event, Luke makes this last change according to all source hypotheses (2GH, FH and 2DH), and so we need to take seriously that he is improving either Matthew (12:42) or Q (11:31).

Assessing Luke’s adaptations of Q

Stylistic propriety (D.1). Does Luke maintain or strengthen Q’s propriety by dressing parts of speech in appropriate style? He maintains an appropriately plain style in the speech’s body (11:15-33). His aforementioned changes that do pull away from plain style are justifiable inasmuch as the evangelists ornament style on all hypotheses, and inasmuch as rhetorical theory encourages ornament in service of variety and of

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1382 In further cases, Luke works against clarity, but he does so also according to the FH and 2GH (in adapting Matthew). Hence we cannot regard Luke’s changes as counter-rhetorical. The changes include the following: 1. Luke advances εἰς κρύπτην ahead of τίθησιν, employing a less clear word sequence (11:33); 2. Luke reverses Q’s conventional word sequence: while Q has πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα καθ’ ἐσωτήρις ἐρημοῦται (Q 11:17b), Luke separates the noun and attributive with a prepositional phrase (πᾶσα βασιλεία ἐφ’ ἐσωτήριν διαμερισθείσα ἐρημοῦται [11:17]); Luke probably does this to emphasize the folly of imagining Satan cast out Satan (11:17); 3. Luke changes Q’s phrase πᾶσα οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ ἐσωτήρις οὐ σταθήσεται (Q 11:17b) to the more ambiguous οἶκος ἐπὶ οίκον πίπτει (Luke 11:17b).
1383 In his introduction, Luke does not clearly elevate Q’s style to a medium level (11:14). In the body, Luke maintains Q’s plain style through retaining its conciseness: he omits words from Q 11:26 and 11:34; he only occasionally adds words or phrases, namely ἐν ἐκβάλλων (11:14a), ἐγένετο δὲ (11:14b), πειράζοντες . . . ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (11:16), αὐτὸς (11:17), δὲ (11:18a), the phrase ὅτι λέγετε ἐν Βεελζεβούλ ἐκβάλλει με τὰ δαιμονία (11:18b), the phrase τῶν δὲ ὀχλῶν ἐπαθροίζομενοι (11:29), and τῶν ἄνδρῶν (11:31). We have already rhetorically accounted for the additions in 11:14a, 14b, 17, 18a, 18b, and 31; and Luke makes several of the same additions (in 11:16, 11:17a, 11:18a, 11:18b and 11:31) to Matthew according to the FH and 2GH. Hence Luke’s additions do not pose a problem for the 2DH.
strengthening proof. Luke heightens appropriate style in his conclusion, for as we saw he infuses Q with more elevated style using alliterative repetitions (11:34-36).\footnote{Luke weakens stylistic parallelism in Q 11:34b by omitting its repetitions of ὁ ὁδικάλλος σου and ὁλο. These omissions according to the 2DH, however, are similar to his omissions from Matthew (6:22) according to the FH/2GH.}

*Using all necessary material (D.2).* Luke does not overlook essential proof material in Q, nor does he do anything to weaken Q’s treatment of stasis or arrangement of proofs.\footnote{Although in places Luke weakens Q’s proofs (he delays the participle διαμερισθήσα in 11:17, and omits Q’s repetitions of ὁ ὁδικάλλος σου and ὁλον in 11:34), Luke makes these changes to Matthew according to the FH and 2GH.} This conclusion might sound disingenuous given that Q exists in Luke by definition, but it remains to Luke’s credit from the perspective of the 2DH that he incorporates all of Q.\footnote{As from the perspective of the FH, so from the perspective of the 2DH Luke does not miss essential proof in Mark (see note 233, above).}

**5.7: Conclusion**

As regards Luke’s use of either Matthew according to the 2GH and FH, or of Q according to the 2DH, the evidence does not point unambiguously towards one or the other scenario. We conclude that Luke’s changes to Matthew and to Q appear about equally plausible: each scenario reveals much rhetorically conventional change, and each scenario reveals some—and usually the same—rhetorically counterintuitive changes.\footnote{If we consider Luke’s adjacent pericope (11:37-54), we would conclude otherwise. Here Luke’s use of Matthew appears implausible. Luke not only overlooks useful proof (terms like ἓπειρα and πόλις) for his Beelzebul controversy, but also misses a swath of Matthean material (Matt. 12:31-37) that would be ideal for Jesus’ condemnation of Pharisaic hypocrisy in 11:37-54. When, however, we stick to assessing Luke’s composition in the Beelzebul controversy itself, we cannot claim that his alleged use of Matthew is less plausible than his use of Q.}

When it comes to the 2GH, however, Mark’s alleged conflation of sources appears problematic in two major ways. First, Mark fails to include material that I have shown to be useful for his case (Matt. 12:36-37) and sometimes essential for it, namely the counterdefinition (Matt. 12:28/Luke 11:20). Possible explanations for his omissions
are not convincing. This is not to say that Matthew’s alleged adaptation of Mark (FH/2DH) or Luke’s alleged adaptation of Mark (2DH) is free of problems. But in no case according to scenarios of Markan priority do Matthew or Luke omit something that is as important to the case, as is the counterdefinition to Mark.

Second, Mark is inattentive to propriety in speech style. Mark adds numerous figures of speech, including alliteration, rhetorical questions, repetitions and hyperbaton, to intensify proofs in the body of his speech (3:22-30). This much is fair; such changes occur often in the evangelists’ work. But in the conclusion of his speech (3:31-35), where Mark ought to add further figures, Mark thrice omits them. Even though Mark’s speech lacks the typical judicial form, this does not justify the tension in his work. Why should Mark omit stylistic devices from a peroration where they are fitting and already in his source? It would be more plausible to imagine Matthew intensify Mark’s conclusion by adding stylistic devices (12:46-50), and this is exactly what Matthew does. Appropriately enough, Matt. 12:46-50 itself concludes a narrative block.

Mark’s inattentiveness to stylistic propriety in his conclusion does not appear on hypotheses of Markan priority (the FH and 2DH). How is Matthew and Luke’s work more fitting? Matthew’s conclusion (12:34-37) certainly has an intense and pathos-evoking style (12:34-37). Luke, while omitting some stylistic devices from Matthew (FH, 2GH) or Q (2DH)—a surprise to be sure—nevertheless vigorously adds other very fitting

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1388 It is odd for example that Matthew in 12:31 omits one of his favourite terms from Mark 3:28 (αἵματι) when its inclusion would not adversely effect his own case.

1389 Taken together and in comparison to a scenario in which Matthew makes three opposite and highly appropriate changes towards ornament, Mark’s changes appear implausible.

1390 One might suggest that the stylistic requirements of a topically arranged speech differ, and perhaps the grand style “should not be sustained during the whole speech; it should . . . be reserved for those ideas which are real highlights” (Lausberg, *Handbook* § 1080). However, showing that Jesus has authority to redefine a family is most definitely a highlight.

1391 I do not believe that Mark’s alleged changes in 3:31-35 serve clarity and conciseness. Clarity and conciseness are not such valid reasons to dull an ornate style *in a conclusion*.
devices: exhortation, appeals to hope and alliterative repetitions.\textsuperscript{1392} Hence, Matthew and Luke are sensitive to a conclusion’s stylistic demands. From the perspective of the 2GH, Mark is not so sensitive: he omits marks of grand style from Matthew \textit{and} fails to replace them. Although Mark does not need rhetorically to add marks of ornament, his alleged composition becomes problematic in that he actively omits them.\textsuperscript{1393}

\textsuperscript{1392} Although it is a surprise justified by the fact that Luke in 11:34-36 omits marks of grander style on all hypotheses.

\textsuperscript{1393} If an evangelist simply does nothing according to a particular hypothesis, we do not thereby have evidence against that hypothesis. Solid evidence against a hypothesis requires that an evangelist actively \textit{remove} necessary proofs or appropriate style.
Conclusion

Exploring an author’s rhetorical motivations proves fruitful for assessing literary relationships among the synoptic gospels. Admittedly, our examination of a Double Tradition χρησια has not indicated whether Luke more plausibly adapts Matthew (the 2GH and FH) or the sayings gospel Q (the 2DH). Study of further pericopae will help us reach more solid conclusions.

The evidence is less equivocal however for Markan priority. The combination of two types of evidence across two chreiai renders hypotheses of Markan priority more rhetorically plausible than hypotheses of Matthean priority. The first type of evidence is positive: in the Double and Triple Traditions, Matthew and Luke make rhetorically conventional changes to Mark and the sayings gospel Q. Matthew and Luke each modify their putative sources for biographical and theological reasons. They intensify their putative sources’ proof material, usually if not always to foster their biographical or theological aims. And they make changes towards a style that is clearer and more appropriate. It is noteworthy in this regard that possible oversights on one of these grounds are usually explicable on another, while such oversights are not of material that looks absolutely essential to the evangelist’s purposes. One important lesson that we have learned is not to define “plain” style too quickly; plain style does not preclude appeals to ornament and speech figures. Each evangelist on each hypothesis elevates his alleged sources’ style, and this is often inextricably linked to the furthering of their biographical or theological program. In the end, such stylistic convention probably should not come as a surprise: for Josephus and even the rhetorical handbooks encourage a measured use of figures in otherwise ordinary expression.
The second type of evidence pertains more directly to Mark’s alleged composition, and it is negative. To determine this entails judgments of quantity and quality, and I believe that on both counts Mark’s work looks rhetorically counterintuitive in places. Some of his oversights are stylistic: on the 2GH, Mark quite rigorously omits clear expressions from Matthew and Luke—too often, given the rhetorical importance of clarity, to appear plausible (Chapter 4). Along similar lines, Mark in both the Double and Triple Tradition chreiai conspicuously lowers the stylistic level of expressions that we read in Matthew and Luke’s ἐπίλογοι (conclusions), as we have shown in Chapters 4 and 5. Other oversights concern useful biographical and argumentative material. For Mark omits material which seems essential, given the strength of his interests elsewhere in the very unit: these include omissions of material that help portray Jesus’ authority (Chapter 4) and of material that both serves and is indeed invited by his unit: a counterdefinition (Chapter 5).

Although hypotheses of Markan priority appear to offer scenarios more in keeping with the rhetorical conventions catalogued here, this work is one small step in developing an awareness of the literary context in which the evangelists worked. By further grounding our judgments of literary dependence in ancient conventions, we can approach more confidently the questions of the sequence in which these rhetorically learned authors wrote their gospels.
## Appendix 1

### Techniques and Principles for Adapting Chreiai

Table 1.1: Hermogenes’ *Topoi* for Refutation and Confirmation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref./Conf.</th>
<th>Ref./Conf. of thesis</th>
<th>Ref./Conf. of law</th>
<th>Commonplace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. τοῦ ἁσαφοῦς/ the unclear</td>
<td>τῶς σαφεῖ/clarity</td>
<td>τῶς δυνατῶ/possibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. τοῦ ἁπιθάνου/ the implausible</td>
<td>τῶς δυνατῶ/possibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. τοῦ ἀδυνάτου/ the impossible</td>
<td>τῶς δυνατῶ/possibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. τοῦ ἐναντίο/ the contrary</td>
<td>τῶς δυνατῶ/possibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. τοῦ ἀπροποῦ/ the inappropriate</td>
<td>τῶς πρέποντι/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. τοῦ ἀσυμφόρου/ not advantageous</td>
<td>τῶς συμφέροντι/advantage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>τῶς δικαίω/ the just</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>τῶς νομίζω/legality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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I have assembled these from Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata* (ed. Rabe, 6.11, 6.14, 6.26, 6.27); Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, pp. 79 (and n. 26), 81, 87, 88. Hermogenes never specifies that these be used in a particular arrangement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Style</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Appropriately Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plain</td>
<td>• General: correct, clear, no ornament (no tropes or figures) (Quintilian 8.3.1, 8.3.3); “terse . . . devoid of all redundancy” (12.10.64); “such ornament as is employed must be of a more severe, restrained and less obvious character; above all, it must be adapted to the matter in hand” (Quintilian 8.3.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• λέξις/dictio (individual words): “normal and familiar” (Demetrius, De Elocutione 190-191); no “neologisms,” metaphors [tropes] or compound words (De Elocutione 191); no archaic terms or barbarisms (Lausberg, Handbook §§ 469-470, 479-495)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• συνθέσις/compositio (clauses/sentences): Quintilian and Demetrius allow figures (σχήματα) of speech, but not “conspicuous” (σημειώδη σχήματα). Rather, “such ornament as is employed must be of a more severe, restrained and less obvious character.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- no “conspicuous figures” (Demetrius, De Elocutione 204)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- no periods, use conjunctions (not asyndeton), and keep clauses short (De Elocutione 192-194, 202-205) permissible figures: vividness, persuasiveness (De Elocutione 208-222)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(In narratives and in logical proofs, there is a place for ornament and πάθος: Lausberg, Handbook §§ 313, 314, 324, 427)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1395 English translations in the table are chiefly from LCL editions. Words in quotation marks come from the sources used.  
1396 In 8.3.1 and 8.3.3 (see Lausberg, Handbook § 1079.1c), Quintilian characterizes plain expression as concise, clear and correct.
Demetrius assigns clarity especially to *plain style* in *De Elocutione* 203 (LCL, trans. Innes). However, clarity still remains important in *most* speeches *most* of the time, and I say this for several reasons. For one, it is counterintuitive that most speeches should be unclear. For another, Demetrius’ words (μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἱσχυροίς ἀκτή λόγοις χρηστέων) imply that clarity is a virtue in some measure, in every speech. Moreover, we know that at least two major speech parts (the διήγησις and προοίμιον) required plain style and so clarity; the προοίμιον/exordium also required clarity (see Lausberg, *Handbook* § 283). Finally, “certain licenses for obscurity . . . must always have a special justification” (Lausberg, *Handbook* § 530). We might compromise clarity at times by artistic devices, but it is *generally* an important virtue.

Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 208 (LCL, trans. Innes).

Quintilian 8.3.13 (LCL, trans. Butler). He adds here that, “above all, it must be adapted to the matter in hand,” with reference to the audience and to the subject addressed (8.11.13-14).

Lausberg, *Handbook* § 921. Lausberg characterizes the style based on Aristotle, Demetrius (*De Elocutione* 12) and Aquila.

For further characteristics see Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 196-198 (LCL, trans. Innes).

Quintilian elsewhere modifies this rule: “[I]f the subject be one of real importance every kind of ornament should be employed, so long as it does nothing to obscure our meaning.” Quintilian 5.14.33-34 (LCL, trans. Butler).

Demetrius offers an example “like this passage in Lysias, ‘I have a small house on two floors, the one above exactly corresponding to the one below.’” Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 190 (LCL, trans. Innes).

Quintilian notes “how much more elegance and ornament is allowed by the topics of demonstrative oratory [demonstrativae materiae], whose main object is the delection of the audience, than is permitted by deliberative or forensic themes” (11.1.48 [LCL, trans. Butler]). A deliberative or forensic speech will *tend* to have a plainer style, then, by virtue of its content.
Quintilian envisages one grand style; Demetrius envisages two styles: 1. “grandiose/sublime [χαρακτήρ] μεγάλοπρεπής and 2. the passionate/vehement [χαρακτήρ] δείνος”; each has distinctive λέξεως and σύνθεσις (Lausberg, *Handbook* § 1079.3f):

• λέξεως/dictio
  (Demetrius, *De Elocutione*):

  1. for grandiose/sublime style:
     - compound words, neologisms, metaphors (for instance; Lausberg, *Handbook* § 1079.3faII ‘A’)
  2. for passionate/vehement style:
     - compound words, metaphors (Lausberg, *Handbook* § 1079.3fB2 ‘A’)

• συνθεσις/compositio
  (Demetrius, *De Elocutione*):

  1. grandiose/sublime style:
     - long clauses (*De Elocutione* 204)
     - periodic clause construction 1405
     - see further Lausberg, *Handbook* § 1079.3fa2 ‘a’
  2. passionate/vehement style:
     - periods: “vehement meaningful commata instead of longer cola . . . short periods of two elements . . . close succession of periods . . . final position of vehement elements”
     (Lausberg, *Handbook* §1079.3fB2 ‘a’)

The period denotes a sentence with a departure and return in thought: “at the beginning of the period incomplete idea elements occur which are in need of integration, and which are only integrated into a complete idea at the end of the period” (Lausberg, *Handbook* § 924). Usually, a period emerges through two or more cola (a main clause, subordinate clause, participial phrase, infinitive phrase, predicate nominative phrase; any unit which “shows a certain completeness”); these cola permit the complete idea to emerge only late in the sentence. A period can also emerge through just one colon in which we “delay” completion of an idea (using techniques of: 1. hyperbaton/anastrophe, or placement of a word(s) in an atypical position; 2. parenthesis, or interjection of a distinct idea; 3. cross-arrangement, or the chiastic sequencing of words.) See Lausberg, *Handbook* §§ 924, 929, 933.
Appendix 2
Chreiai in Non-Christian Literature

(See over the page.)
Chapter 2: Chreiai in the Writings of Plutarch

Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Reg. Imp. apophth.] III:181D (29) (Babbitt, LCL)</th>
<th>Alex. 47.5 (Perrin, LCL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Τῶν δὲ πρῶτων φίλων καὶ κρατίστων τιμᾶν μὲν ἐδόκει Κρατερὸν μάλιστα πάντων, φιλεῖν δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνα. Κρατερὸς μὲν γὰρ, ἔφη, φιλοβασιλεύως ἦστιν, Ἡφαιστίων ὁ δὲ φιλαλέξανδρος.</td>
<td>Επεὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν φίλων ἐώρα τῶν μεγίστων Ἡφαιστίωνα μὲν ἐπαινοῦτα καὶ συμμετακοσμοῦμενον αὐτῷ, Κρατερὸν δὲ τοῖς πατρίοις ἐμφέντα, διʼ ἐκείνου μὲν ἐχρηματίζει τοῖς ἀρτιάριοις, διὰ τούτου δὲ τοῖς Ἑλληνιστὶ καὶ τοῖς Μακεδονίᾳ καὶ ὅλοι τῶν μὲν ἐφίλει μάλιστα, τὸν δὲ ἐτίμη, νομίζων καὶ λέγον ὅτι τὸν μὲν Ἡφαιστίωνα φιλαλέξανδρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ Κρατερὸν φιλοβασιλεία.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of his foremost and influential friends

he seems to have honoured Craterus most and to have loved Hephaestion most. “For,” said he, “Craterus is a friend of the king, but Hephaestion is a friend of Alexander.”¹⁴⁰⁶

Moreover,¹⁴⁰⁷ when he saw that among his chiefest friends Hephaestion approved his course and joined with him in changing his mode of life, while Craterus clung fast to his native ways, he employed the former in his business with the Barbarians, the latter in that with the Greeks and Macedonians. And in general he showed most love for Hephaestion, but most honour for Craterus, thinking and constantly saying, that Hephaestion was a friend of Alexander, but Craterus a friend of the king.¹⁴⁰⁸

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¹⁴⁰⁶ Lit. “On the one hand . . . on the other hand.” See Smyth, Greek Grammar § 2904.
¹⁴⁰⁷ Lit. “And when”
For this reason too the men cherished a secret grudge against one another and often came into open collision. And once, on the Indian expedition, they actually drew their swords and closed with one another, and as the friends of each were coming to his aid, Alexander rode up and abused Hephaestion publicly, calling him a fool and a madman for not knowing that without Alexander’s favour he was nothing; and in private he also sharply reproved Craterus. Then he brought them together and reconciled them, taking an oath by Ammon and the rest of the gods that he loved them most of all men; but that if he heard of their quarrelling again, he would kill them both, or at least the one who began the quarrel. Wherefore after this they neither did nor said anything to harm one another, not even in jest.

**Table 2.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Reg. et imp.apophth.] III:180B (11) (Babbitt, LCL)</th>
<th>Alex. 29.4 (Perrin, LCL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δαρείου δὲ δίδοντος αὐτῷ μυρία τάλαντα καὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν νεῖμασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπίσης, καὶ Παρμενίωνος εἰπόντος, ἔλαβον ἀν ἐὰν Ἀλέξανδρος ἦμη, καγώ νη Δία, εἶπεν, εἰ Παρμενίων ἦμην, ἀπεκρίνατο δὲ Δαρείῳ μὴ τὴν γῆν ἥλιος δυὸ μὴ τὴν Ἀσίαν δυὸ βασιλεῖς ὑπομένειν.</td>
<td>Δαρείου δὲ πέμψοντος ἐπιστολὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ φίλους δεσμένους μῦρια μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐξελεγκτῶν λαβὲιν τάλαντα, τὴν δὲ εὑράτου πᾶσαν ἔγωντα καὶ γνώματα μιᾶν τῶν ἄνευτέρων φίλων εἶναι καὶ σύμμαχοι, ἐκοινοῦσα τοῖς ἐταῖροις, καὶ Παρμενίωνος εἰπόντος ἔγγο μὲν, εἰ Ἀλέξανδρος ἦμη, ἔλαβον ἀν τοῦτα, καγώ, τῆν Δία, εἶπεν δ’ Ἀλέξανδρος, εἰ Παρμενίων. Πρὸς τὸν Δαρείον ἐγράψεν, ὡς οὖν ἄντυχει τῶν φιλανθρώπων ἔλθου ὑπὸς αὐτὸν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, αὐτὸς ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ ἡ δὴ πορευεσθαί.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When Darius offered him ten thousand talents, and also offered to share Asia equally with him.

When Dareius sent to him a letter and friends, begging him to accept ten thousand talents as ransom for the captives, to hold all the territory this side of the Euphrates, to take one of his daughters in marriage, and on these terms to be his ally and friend.

Parmenio said, “I would accept it if I were Alexander.” “And so indeed would I,” said Alexander, “if I were Parmenio.”

But he made answer to Darius that the earth could not tolerate two suns, nor Asia two kings.

Alexander imparted the matter to his companions. “If I were Alexander,” said Parmenio, “I would accept these terms.” “And so indeed would I,” said Alexander, “if I were Parmenio.” But to Dareius he wrote, “Come to me, and you will receive every courtesy; but otherwise I shall march at once against you.”

1408 Lit. “On the one hand . . . on the other hand.”
### Table 2.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pel. 15.1-2 (Perrin, LCL)</th>
<th>Lyce. 13.6 (Perrin, LCL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Οἱ δὲ Θῆβαι οἱ καθ’ αὐτοὺς ἐντῇ βοιωτίᾳ συμπλεκόμενοι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἕκαστοτε, καὶ μαχόμενοι μάχας αὐτῶς μὲν οὐ μεγάλας, μεγαλὴν δὲ τὴν μελέτην ἔχουσας καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν, ἑξερρηπίζοντο τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ διεσπορουντο τοῖς σωμασίων, ἐμπείριαν ἀμα τῇ συνηθεῖᾳ καὶ φρονήμα προσλαμβάνοντες ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων.</td>
<td>καὶ τοῦτο γε μᾶλλον κατηγοροῦσιν Ἀγησίλαον τοῦ βασιλέως ὀστεροῦ, ὡς ταῖς συνεχέσι αἰ πυκναῖς εἰς τὴν βοιωτίαν ἐμβολαῖς καὶ στρατείαις τοὺς Θῆβαιον ἀντιπάλους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατασκευάσαντος.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Διὸ καὶ φασὶν Ἀνταλκίδαν τὸν Σπαρτιάτην, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος ἐπανηλθέν ἐκ βοιωτίας τετραμένον, εἰπὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ καλὰ διδακάλα παρὰ Θῆβαιον ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτῶς πολεμεῖν καὶ μάχεσθαι διδάξας.</td>
<td>διὸ καὶ τετρωμένον αὐτὸν ἰδών Ἀνταλκίδας, Καλά, ἐφη, τὰ διδακάλα παρὰ Θῆβαιον ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτῶς μὴ εἰδότας μάχεσθαι διδάξας.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Thebans, too, by always engaging singly in Boeotia with the Lacedaemonians, and by fighting battles which, though not important in themselves, nevertheless afforded them much practice and training, had their spirits roused and their bodies thoroughly inured to hardships, and gained experience and courage from their constant struggles.

For this reason Antalcidas the Spartan, we are told, when Agesilaus came back from Boeotia with a wound, said to him: “Indeed, this is a fine tuition-fee which you are getting from the Thebans, for teaching them how to war and fight when they did not wish to do it.”

And this was the special grievance which they [Lycurgus’ followers] had against King Agesilaus in later times, namely, that by his continual and frequent incursions and expeditions into Boeotia he rendered the Thebans a match for the Lacedaemonians.

And therefore, when Antalcidas saw the king wounded, he said: “This is a fine tuition-fee which you are getting from the Thebans, for teaching them how to fight, when they did not wish to do it, and did not know how.”
Artaxerxes considered how he must carry on the war with Agesilas, and sent Timocreon the Rhodian into Greece with a great sum of money, bidding him use it for the corruption of the most influential men in the cities there, and for stirring up the Greeks to make war upon Sparta. Timocrates did as he was bidden, the most important cities conspired together against Sparta, Peloponnesus was in a turmoil, and the Spartan magistrates summoned Agesilas home from Asia. It was at this time, as we are told, and as he was going home, that Agesilas said to his friends; “The King has driven me out of Asia with thirty thousand archers”; for the Persian coin has the figure of an archer stamped upon it.

Persian coins were stamped with the figure of an archer, and Agesilas said, as he was breaking camp, that the King was driving him out of Asia with ten thousand archers; for so much money had been sent to Athens and Thebes and distributed among the popular leaders there, and as a consequence those peoples made war upon the Spartans.
Table 2.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caes. 33.4 (Perrin, LCL)</th>
<th>Pomp. 57.5 (Perrin, LCL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favonius de auton ekelleue toti podi ktpiein tnh ynh,</strong></td>
<td><strong>kai tovs legeontas av elaiun Kaisar epi tnh polin, oux oron dynameis aiz auton amyroontai,</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Favonius bade him [Pompey] stamp on the ground; for once,</em></td>
<td><em>when someone said that if Caesar should march upon the city, they did not see any forces with which to defend it from him,</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in a boastful speech to the senate, he told them to take no trouble or anxious thought about preparations for the war, for when it came he had but to stamp upon the earth to fill Italy with armies.</td>
<td>with a smiling countenance and calm mien he bade them be in no concern. “For,” said he, “in whatever part of Italy I stamp upon the ground, there will spring up armies of foot and horse.”¹⁴⁰⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Speeches in the Writings of Josephus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Reference</th>
<th>Ant. 6.86-94 (Marcus, LCL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Kgdms (LXX) 12:1-25 | (1) Kai εἶπεν Σαμουὴλ πρὸς πάντα ἀνδρὰ ἱστορῆλα
| | (prooimion/exordium): Ίδοὺ ἱκουσα φωνῆς υμῶν εἶς πάντα, ὡς εἶπα μοι, καὶ ἱβασίλευσα ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς βασιλέα.
| | (2) Kai ὁ βασιλεὺς διαπορεύεται ἐνώπιον υμῶν, κἀγὼ γεγήρακα καὶ καθησμαί, καὶ οἱ υἱοί μου ἵνα ἐν ὑμῖν· κἀγὼ ἱδοὺ διελθήθη ἐνώπιον υμῶν ἐκ νεότητος μου καὶ ἵνα τῆς ἡμέρας ταύτης.
| | (86) Εἰκλησίαν δὲ Σαμουήλος ποιήσας ὁ προφήτης τοὺς Ἑβραίους
| | (prooimion/exordium): ἐπόμνυμαι, φησίν, υἱῶν τῶν μεγίστων θεῶν, ὡς τοῦς ἁδελφοὺς· τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἐκείνους, λέγω δὴ Μωσήν καὶ Ἀραβῶνα, παρήγαγεν εἰς τὸν βίον καὶ τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ἐξηράσασαν Ἀιγυπτίων καὶ τῆς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ δουλείας· [back from 1 Kgdms 12:6] μὴν μὴν αὐτοὶ χαρουσαμένοι μὴν ὑποστείλαμένοι· φῶς μὴν ὄλλῳ τινὶ πάθει παραγγελισμόντας εἰπεῖνεν,
| | (3) ἵνα εὖ γνω, ἀποκρίθητε κατ’ ἐμοῦ ἐνώπιον κυρίου καὶ ἐνώπιον χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ
| | μόσχον τῖνος εἴληφα· ὥν ὁνὸν τῖνος εἴληφα· τί διὰ τιμής, καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἑλθαί· τί διὰ τιμής, καὶ ὅπως ὁ ἐλλησάμαι· τί διά τιμής, καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἑλθαί· τί διά τιμής, καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἑλθαί·
| | ἡ τίνα ἐξετίσας· ἢ ἑκ χειρὸς τίνος εἴρθα· ἐξήλασμα καὶ ὑπόθημα;
| | (4) Kai εἶπαν πρὸς Σαμουὴλ Οὐκ ἡδίκησας ἡμᾶς καὶ οὐ κατεδυνάστευας καὶ οὐκ ἐβλάσσας· ἡμᾶς καὶ οὐκ εἴλήφας· ἐκ χειρὸς ὑδένως ὑδέν.
| | (5) Kai εἶπεν Σαμουὴλ πρὸς τὸν λαὸν Μάρτυς κυρίου· ἐν υμῖν καὶ μάρτυς χριστὸς αὐτοῦ σημαρέν ἐν ταύτη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ· ὅτι σὺν εὐρήκατε· ἐν χειρί μου ὑδένως καὶ εἶπαν Μάρτυς.
| | (6) Kai εἶπεν Σαμουὴλ πρὸς τὸν λαὸν λέγων Μάρτυς· ὁ ποιήσας· τοὺς Μωσήν καὶ τὸν Ἀραβώνα, ὁ ἀναγαγῶν τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ἐξ Αἰγυπτίων·
| | (7) Kai τὸν κατάστητε, καὶ δικαία· ὑμᾶς ἐνώπιον κυρίου
| | (pístis/argumentatio (no. 1: from example)
| | (8) Kai ἀπαγγέλω ὑμῖν τὴν πᾶσαν δικαιοσύνην
| | (87) Kai τούτων ἐν τὶ κατεπείνα παρόντων· ὑμῶν τοῦ βασιλέως·
| | (88) Kai τὸ οὐκ ἀνέκραγον τούτων· ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ·
| | (89) Kai τὸν εἶπεν ταύτας· ἐὰν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν·
| | (90) Kai τὸν εἶπεν ταύτας· ἐὰν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν·
κυρίου, ἐποίησεν ἐν ὕμνῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πατράσιν ὕμων· (8) ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἱασθαὶ καὶ οἱ ὕμνοι αὐτοῦ εἰς Αἰγυπτοῦ, καὶ ἐπαρασκεύασεν αὐτοῦ Ἀιγυπτοῦ, καὶ ἐβοῦλαν οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν πρὸς κύριον, καὶ ἀπεστίλησεν κύριος τὸν Μωάβ καὶ τὸν Ασσοῦ καὶ ἐξῆγαγεν τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν ἐξ Αἰγυπτοῦ καὶ κατάχαρεν αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ.

(9) καὶ ἐπελάθηκτο κύριος τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν αὐτοὺς εἰς χείρας Σισαρά ἀρχιστρατηγοῦ λαβὲν βασιλέως Ασσοῦ καὶ οἱ χεῖρας ἄλλοι καὶ εἰς χείρας βασιλέως Μωάβ, καὶ ἐπολέμησαν ἐν αὐτοῖς· (10) καὶ ἐβόλυσαν πρὸς κύριον καὶ ἐλέγον Ἡμάρτομεν, ὅτι ἐγκατέλειπομεν τὸν κύριον καὶ ἔσοδοςαμον τοῖς Βασιλίς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις· καὶ ὕμνον ἐξελεφόν, ἡ χείρος ἐξέβρασαν ἡμῶν, καὶ δουλεύσαμεν σοι.

(11) καὶ ἀπεστίλησεν κύριος τὸν Ιερομεσαι καὶ τὸν Βαρακ καὶ τὸν Ἱεροσολύμο καὶ ἔξειλασεν ὑμᾶς ἐκ χειρός ἐξέβρασαν ἡμῶν τῶν κυκλοθεν, καὶ κατακείτε πεποιθέτες.

(12) καὶ εἶδετε ὅτι Ναας βασιλεὺς υἱῶν Αμμων ἠθένε εἴς ύμᾶς, καὶ εἶπατε Οὐχί, ἀλλ’ ἂν ὦτι βασιλεὺς βασιλεύει εἴς ύμᾶς καὶ κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν βασιλεύει ἡμῶν. (13) καὶ οὐν ἰδοὺ ὁ βασιλεύς, ὃν ἐξελεφόνθη, καὶ οὐδ’ διδάχων κύριος εἴς ὑμᾶς βασιλεύα.

(14) ἦν φοβηθῆτε τὸν κύριον καὶ δουλεύσατε αὐτῷ καὶ ἀκούσατε τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ ἔρίζατε τὸν στόματι κύριου καὶ ἤπει καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς ὁ βασιλεύεις ἡμῶν ὑπὸ κύριου παρεξοῦνεν· (15) ἦν δὲ καὶ διδάχων τῆς φωνῆς κύριου καὶ ἔριζατε τὸν στόματι κύριου, καὶ ἔσται χεῖρ κύριου ἐπὶ ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν βασιλεία ὑμῶν.

(16) καὶ ὃν καταστῆτε καὶ ἴδετε τὸ ρήμα τοῦ κυρίου καὶ ὑπήρξεν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑμλοῖς· (17) οὐχὶ θερίσατε παρὰ ἕρα ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ, ἐπικαλεσάμενα κύριου, καὶ δοκεῖσαι φωνάς καὶ ὑμῶν, (πρόθεσις/προποσιτίο) καὶ γνώτε καὶ ἴδετε ὅτι ἡ κακία ὑμῶν μεγάλη, ἡ ἐποίησάντες.
And Samuel said to every man of Israel, (1) And Samuel said to every man of Israel, (1) And Samuel said to every man of Israel, (1) And Samuel said to every man of Israel, (1) And Samuel said to every man of Israel, (1)

prooimion/exordium:

“Look, I have heard your report of everything, all the things which you told me, and I have placed a king over us. (2) And now, behold, the king is passing through before you, and I shall come and shall sit, and behold my sons are among you; and behold I have passed through before you from my youth and up until this very day.

(86) Samuel, the prophet, having called an assembly of the Hebrews, said:

prooimion/exordium:

“I adjure you by the greatest God, who brought those excellent brothers, I mean Moses and Aaron, into this world, and rescued our fathers from the Egyptians and bondage beneath their yoke [back from 1 Kgdms 12:6] that neither showing favour through respect nor feeling
Here I am; reply against me before the Lord and before his anointed.

Have I taken somebody’s calf or have I taken somebody’s donkey, or have I injured something of yours, or have I laid hold of someone or taken somebody’s offering and sandal [?] from their hand? Reply against me, and I shall atone to you.”

And they said to Samuel, “You have not done us an injustice and you have not injured us, and you have not oppressed us and you have not seized anything from anybody’s hand.”

And Samuel said to the people, “The Lord is a witness among you and his anointed is a witness today in this very day, that you have not found anything in my hand”; and they said, “He is a witness.”

And Samuel spoke to the people saying “The Lord is witness, He who made Moses and Aaron, He who led our fathers up out of Egypt.

And now stand before me, and I shall judge you before the Lord and I shall proclaim to you every righteousness of the Lord, the things which He has done among you and among your fathers.

So Jacob and his sons went into Egypt, and Egypt made them low, and our fathers shouted to the Lord, and the Lord sent out Moses and Aaron and led our fathers out of Egypt and settled them in this very place.

And they forgot the Lord their God, and He gave them over into the hands of Sisara the high general of Jabin the king of Asor, and into the hands of foreigners, and into the hands of the Egyptians.

It befits you to remember how that with only seventy of our family, our grandfather Jacob came on account of hunger into Egypt, and how there, when his posterity, increased by many myriads, had been subjected to bondage and grievous outrage by the Egyptians, God, at the prayer of our fathers, without any king, brought deliverance to the multitude from their distress by sending to them the brothers Moses and Aaron, who brought you into this land which you now have.

And they forgot the Lord their God, and He gave them over into the hands of Sisara the high general of Jabin the king of Asor, and into the hands of Egyptians.
hands of foreigners, and into the hands of the
king of Moab, and they fought among them.
(10) And they shouted to the Lord and they
said, ‘We have sinned, for we have abandoned
the Lord and we have served the Baals and the
Astartes; and now take us out of the hands of
our enemies, and we shall serve you.’

(11) And the Lord dispatched Jerobaal and Barak
and Jephthah and Samuel, and he took you out of
the hand of those who had encircled you, and so
having been taken, you have settled down.

(12) (πρόθεσις/propositio) And you saw that
Nahash the king of the sons of Ammon came
upon you, and you said to me, ‘No, but a king
will rule over us,’ although the Lord our God is
our king.
(13) And now behold the king whom you have
chosen, and behold, the Lord has given a
kingdom to you.

(14) If ever you will fear the Lord and will serve
Him and will hear His voice and will not
contend with the mouth of the Lord, then surely
also you and the king who rules over you will
journey after the Lord; (15) but if ever you will
not listen to the voice of the Lord and will
contend with the voice of the Lord, then the
hand of the Lord will be against you and
against your king.

πίστις/argumentatio (no. 2: from authority)
(16) And now sit down and see this great message
that the Lord will make in your eyes. (17) Is there
not a harvest of wheat today? I shall call upon the
Lord, and He will give sounds and rain,
(πρόθεσις/propositio) and you shall know and see
your great evil, which you committed before the
Lord, when you requested a king for yourselves.”
(18) And Samuel called upon the Lord, and the
Lord gave sounds and rain in that very day; and
the entire people feared the Lord very much
and Samuel. (19) And the whole people said to

Yet for all that,
when you were fallen under the hand of your enemies,
He delivered you, first by causing you to triumph over
the Assyrians and their might, then by granting you
victory over the Ammonites and Moabites, and last
over the Philistines. And all this you accomplished, not
under the leadership of a king, but with Jephthah and
Gedeon for generals.

πρόθεσις/propositio:
(91) What madness then possessed you to flee your
God and to wish to be under a king? But I have
appointed him whom He has chosen.

πίστις/argumentatio (from authority)
However, in order to show you that God is angry and
vexed at your choosing kingship, I will prevail with
Him to reveal this to you by signs clearly. For that
which not one of you ever saw befall here before—a
tempest at midsummer—that through prayer to God I
shall cause you now to witness.”
(92) Scarce had Samuel spoken these words to the
people, when the Deity by thunderings, lightning, and a
torrent of hail, attested the truth of all that the prophet
had said; whereupon astounded and terrified they
confessed their sin, into which, they said, they had
collapsed through ignorance and impatience, and the prophet...
Samuel, “Pray on behalf of your servants to the Lord your God, and may we not die because we have added evil to all our sins, having requested a king for ourselves.”

επίλογος/peroratio:
(20) And Samuel said to the people, “Do not fear: you have made this whole evil, but do not turn hereafter from the Lord, and serve the Lord in your whole heart, (21) and do not stand again beside things which are nothing, which have amounted to nothing and have not accomplished anything, because they are nothing.

(22) For the Lord will not reject His people on account of His great name, for the Lord has mercifully taken you into a people for Him. (23) And it is not at all for me to sin against the Lord to stop from praying concerning you, and I shall serve the Lord and I shall show you the good and straight path. (24) Except fear the Lord and serve Him in truth and in your whole heart, for you have seen the things which He has exalted with you,

(25) and if you ever commit evil with evil, then also you and your king will have brought evils upon yourselves.”

επίλογος/peroratio:
(93) And he promised that he would beseech God to pardon them in this thing and would persuade God; however, he exhorted them to be righteous and good and always to remember the evils that their transgression of virtue had brought upon them, the miracles of God and the legislation of Moses,

if they had any desire for continued salvation and continued happiness under their king.

Table 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2 Kgdms (LXX) 7:4-16</th>
<th>1 Chr 17:4-14</th>
<th>Ant. 7.92-93 (Marcus, LCL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>προοίμιον/exordium:</td>
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<td>(4) καὶ ἐγένετο τῇ νυκτὶ ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἐγένετο ῥῆμα κυρίου πρὸς Ναβαν λέγων (5) Πορεύου καὶ εἰπὼν πρὸς τὸν δούλον μου Δαυὶδ Ταῦδε λέγει κύριος</td>
<td>(3) καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἐγένετο λόγος κυρίου πρὸς Ναβαν λέγων (4) Πορεύου καὶ εἰπὼν πρὸς Δαυὶδ τὸν παῖδα μου Οὔτως εἶπεν κύριος</td>
<td>(92) τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ κατ’ ἐκείνην τὴν νυκτὰ τῷ Ναβαν λέγων καὶ φράσαι κελεύσαντος τῷ Δαυὶδ ἀς τὴν μὲν προσέρεσαι αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν εἰπθαινὰν ἀποδέχεται, ὁμοθένος μὲν πρῶτον εἰς νόμαν βαλομένου ναον αὐτῷ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1411 On which see Lausberg, Handbook §§ 767; Lausberg finds the Greek label in Theon, Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.97); cp. Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 16.
1412 Adapted from NRSV.
“The accounts of David’s first thoughts about the building of a Temple are very similar in both sources [=2 Sam 7, and 1 Chr 17]; nonetheless Josephus harmonizes both with the sentiments expressed later in Chronicles [1 Chr 22], so that God drops all objections to being given a static headquarters, in general approves the plan, and demurs only at David’s blood-stained hands; the formal designation of a name for Solomon is also brought forward here. David’s reply is also almost identical in both sources; even so, Josephus puts part of what is God’s speech in his sources onto the king’s lips; and there are other minor conflations.” Downing, “Redaction Criticism I.” 62.

According to Marcus, this addition comes from Josephus; see Josephus, Ant. p. 408 note a.
| καὶ ἀναστήσω τὸ σπέρμα σου μετὰ σέ, οὐ ἐσταὶ εὖς τῆς κοιλίας σου, καὶ ἐτοιμάσας τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ (13) αὐτὸς οἰκοδομήσει μοι οἶκον τῷ ὄνοματί μου, | καὶ ἀναστήσω τὸ σπέρμα σου μετὰ σέ, οὐ ἐσταὶ εὖς τῆς κοιλίας σου, καὶ ἐτοιμάσας τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ (12) αὐτὸς οἰκοδομήσει μοι οἶκον, |
| καὶ ἐν ἄνθρωπόν μετετέθη ἡ ἁδίκια αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐλεύθερον αὐτὸν ἐν ῥάβδῳ ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἐν ἀβαίσιν υἱῶν ἄνθρωπων. | καὶ ἐν ἄνθρωπον ἡ ἁδίκια αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐλεύθερον αὐτὸν ἐν ῥάβδῳ ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἐν ἀβαίσιν υἱῶν ἄνθρωπων. |

| δούλωρ μου Δαυὶδ Τάδε λέγει κύριος παντοκράτωρ Ἑλαβόν σὲ ἐκ τῆς μάνθρας τῶν προβάτων τοῦ εἶναι σὲ εἰς ἤγουμενον ἐπὶ τὸν λαόν μου ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσραήλ (9) καὶ ἦμν μετὰ σοῦ ἐν πᾶσιν, οἷς ἐπορεύομαι, καὶ ἐξωλέθρευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἑχθροὺς σου ἀπὸ προσώπου σου καὶ ἐποίησας σε ὑπομαστὸν κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα τῶν μεγάλων τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. | δούλωρ μου Δαυὶδ Τάδε λέγει κύριος παντοκράτωρ Ἑλαβόν σὲ ἐκ τῆς μάνθρας ἐξοπλισθέν τῶν ποιμνίων τοῦ εἶναι εἰς ἤγουμενον ἐπὶ τὸν λαόν μου Ἰσραήλ. (8) καὶ ἦμν μετὰ σοῦ ἐν πᾶσιν, οἷς ἐπορεύθης, καὶ ἐξωλέθρευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἑχθροὺς σου ἀπὸ προσώπου σου καὶ ἐποίησας σε ὑπομαστὸν κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα τῶν μεγάλων τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. |

| counterproposition (10) καὶ θησαυρίζει τόπον τῶν λαών μου τῷ Ἰσραήλ καὶ καταφυτεύεις αὐτὸν καὶ κατασκήνωσες καθ’ ἑαυτόν καὶ οὐ μεριμνήσαι οὐκέτι, καὶ οὐ προσθήκησαι υἱὸς ἁδίκιας τοῦ ταπεινώσας αὐτὸν καθὼς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς. (11) ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμερῶν, ὃν ἔταξε κριτάς ἐπὶ τὸν λαὸν μου Ἰσραήλ, καὶ ἀνάπωσας σε ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἑχθρῶν σου, καὶ ἀπαγγελείς σοι κύριος ὅτι οἶκον οἰκοδομήσης αὐτῷ. (12) καὶ ἐσται εὖς πληρωθῶν αἱ ἡμέραι σου καὶ κοιμήθη μετὰ τῶν πατέρων σου, | counterproposition (9) καὶ θησαυρίζει τόπον τῶν λαών μου Ἰσραήλ καὶ καταφυτεύεις αὐτὸν καὶ κατασκήνωσες καθ’ ἑαυτόν καὶ οὐ μεριμνήσαι οὐκέτι, καὶ οὐ προσθήκησαι ἁδίκιας τοῦ ταπεινώσας αὐτὸν καθὼς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς. (10) καὶ ἀφ’ ἡμερῶν σὺν ἔταξε κριτάς ἐπὶ τὸν λαὸν μου Ἰσραήλ, καὶ ἑταπεινώσας ἀπαντάς τοῖς ἑχθρῶν σου· καὶ ἀξίζουσι σε, καὶ οἶκον οἰκοδομήσης σοι κύριος. (11) καὶ ἐσται ὅταν πληρωθῶν αἱ ἡμέραι σου καὶ κοιμήθη μετὰ τῶν πατέρων σου, |

| (13) αὐτὸς οἰκοδομήσει μοι οἶκον τῷ ὄνοματί μου, | (14) ἐγὼ ἐσομαι αὐτὸς εἰς πατέρα, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσται μοι εἰς υἱόν |

| Κρήτες 7:13/1 Χρ 17:12[α] | [head from 1 Chr 22:9] |

| χειρισθᾶται τὸν ναὸν υπὸ τοῦ παιδὸς τοῦ μετ’ αὐτὸν τὴν βασιλείαν παραληψόμενα | οὐ προστήσατε καὶ προνοησεν ὡς πατήρ υἱοῦ κατεπηγελλετο, |

| ληθαυσμένου δὲ Σαλομώνος | τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν τέκνων ἐγγόνων φυλάξας καὶ παραδόθως [ahead from 2 Κρήτες 7:13/1 Χρ 17:12] |
(15) τὸ δὲ ἔλεος μου οὐκ ἀποστήσας ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, καθὼς ἀπέστησα ἀφ’ ὧν ἀπέστησα ἐκ προωράπου μου. (16) καὶ πιστῶθηται ὁ οἶκος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ ἐως αἰῶνας ἐνώπιον ἐμοῦ, καὶ ὁ βρόνος αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἀνωρθωμένος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.

καὶ τὸ ἔλεος μου οὐκ ἀποστήσας ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀπέστησα ἀπὸ τῶν δυτικῶν ἐμπροσθέν σου. (14) καὶ πιστῶσα αὐτὸν ἐν οἴκῳ μου καὶ ἐν βασιλείᾳ αὐτοῦ ἐως αἰῶνας, καὶ ὁ βρόνος αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἀνωρθωμένος ἐως αἰῶνας.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>προοίμιον</th>
<th>exordium</th>
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<th>exordium</th>
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<td>(4) And there came in that night news of the Lord to Nathan, saying (5) “Journey and say to my servant David, ‘The Lord says these things</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) And there came in that night a word of the Lord to Nathan, saying, (4) “Journey and say to my child David, ‘Thus says the Lord:</td>
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<tr>
<td>πρόθεσις</td>
<td>propositio:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>You will not build a house for me to settle in;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>πίστις</td>
<td>argumentatio:</td>
<td>πίστις</td>
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<tr>
<td>(no. 1: proof from τόπος of past fact) (6) for I have not settled in a house from the day when I led the sons of Israel up out of</td>
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<tr>
<td>(no. 1: proof from τόπος of past fact) (5) for I have not settled in a house from the day when I led Israel up until this day, and I</td>
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</table>

αὐτὸν δὲ τιμωρήσων, ἃν ἄμαρτον τύχῃ, κοσὸν καὶ γῆς ἀφορία. | προοίμιον | exordium |
| (92) But God appeared to Nathan that night and bade him tell David that while He approved of his purpose and desire—for no one before him had taken it into his mind to build Him a temple, as David had thought to do—, still. 1414 |

αιτία | ratio (includes a πίστις | argumentatio from τόπος of past fact | [David’s character]) |
| because he had fought in many wars and was stained with the blood of his enemies; | [back from 1 Chr 22:8] |

πρόθεσις | propositio: |
He could not permit him to construct a temple for Him.
Egypt until this day, and I was traveling about in an inn and in a tent.

**Counterproposition**

(9) And I shall appoint a place for my people Israel, and I shall plant it, and it will lodge by itself and it will not be anxious, and injustice will not set out to humble it, as from the beginning.

(10) And from the days, of which I appointed judges over my people Israel, and I shall give you rest from all your enemies, and the Lord will proclaim to you that He will build a home for you; (12) and it will be if your days are fulfilled and you will be put to sleep with your fathers, and I shall raise up your seed after you, which will be from your belly, and I shall prepare his kingdom; (13) he will build for me a house for my name, and the temple should be brought into being by his son and successor to the kingdom.

(7) In all the places where I passed time among all Israel, if speaking, did I speak to one tribe of Israel, whom I commanded to tend my people Israel, saying, “Why is it that you have not built me a cedar house?”

(6) In all the places where I passed time among all Israel, if speaking, did I speak to one tribe of Israel to tend my people, saying that, “You have not built me a cedar house?”

(8) And now you will say to my servant David, ‘The Lord almighty says these things: I took you out of the fold of the sheep to be leading my people Israel. (9) And I was with you in all the times when you were journeying, and I utterly destroyed all your enemies from your face and I made you famous like the name of the great people upon the earth.

**Counterproposition**

(9) And I shall appoint a place for my people Israel and I shall plant it, and it will lodge by itself and it will not be anxious, and injustice will not set out to humble it, as from the beginning. (10) And from the days, of which I appointed judges over my people Israel, and I shall humble all your enemies; and I shall exalt you, and the Lord will build a house for you; (11) and it will be when your days are fulfilled and you will be put to sleep with your fathers, and I shall raise up your seed after you, which will be from your belly, and I shall prepare his kingdom; (12) he will build a house for me,
I shall restore his throne until into the age.
(14) I shall be to a father for him and he will be to a son for me; and if ever injustice comes upon him, I shall disgrace him by the human staff and by lashings of the sons of men. (15) But my mercy I shall not remove from him, just as I have removed it from those from whom I have removed my face. (16) And his house will be made trustworthy and his kingdom trustworthy before me into [the] age, and his throne will be restored into the age.'

and I shall restore his throne until [the] age.
(13) I shall be to a father for him and he will be to a son for me; and my mercy I shall not remove from him as I have removed it from those who are before you. (14) And I shall make trustworthy in my house and in his kingdom into [the] age, and his throne will be will be restored into [the] age.'

whose name would be Solomon
[back from 1 Chr 22:9],

and whom He promised to watch over and care for as a father for his son, and to preserve the kingdom for his children’s children and transmit it to them.
[ahead from 2 Kgdms 7:13/1Chr 17:12]

but He would punish him, if he sinned with sickness and barrenness of the soil.
Table 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Chr (LXX) 22:7-16</th>
<th>Ant. 7.337-340 (Marcus, LCL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>diήγησις/narratio:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) καὶ ἐπεβεβλήθη ἢ τῶν θεῶν τοῦ οἴκου τῶν θεών, ἵνα καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν Ἰσραήλ, ἵνα ἔχεθαι καὶ ἐρχόμενος καὶ τὰ τῆς γῆς ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ χάριν τῶν ἡμερῶν τῶν Ἰσραήλ. (8) καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν Ἰσραήλ, ὅτι τὸ θέμα τῆς γῆς ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ χάριν τῶν ἡμερῶν τῶν Ἰσραήλ. (9) καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν Ἰσραήλ, ὅτι τὸ θέμα τῆς γῆς ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ χάριν τῶν ἡμερῶν τῶν Ἰσραήλ.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>πρόθεσις/propositio (no. 1):</strong> Build temple</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(337) Καλέσας δὲ τὸν παῖδα Σολομώνα κατασκευάσας τῷ θεῷ ναὸν αὐτῶν ἐκέλευς [back from 1 Chr 22:11] διὸ δεξιόμενον τὴν βασιλείαν.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>πρόθεσις/propositio (no. 2):</strong> Exhort Israel to uphold the Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) καὶ νῦν, ὦ προφήτης τῶν θεῶν, ἐστιν μετὰ σοῦ κύριος, καὶ εὐδοκήσαι καὶ οἰκοδομῆσαι οἶκον τῷ κυρίῳ σου, ὡς ἐλαλήθην πρὶν σου.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(12) ἀλλὰ ἡ δόξα σοι σοφίαν καὶ σύνεσιν κύριος καὶ κατασχίσαι σε ἐπὶ Ἰσραήλ καὶ τοῦ φυλασσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν τὸν ναὸν κύριον τοῦ θεοῦ σου.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1415 “only” (NRSV).
**prothesis/propositio (no. 3): Solomon must uphold the Law**

(13) **τότε εὐδοκῶσει, ἕαυν**

φυλάξῃς τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ προστάγματα καὶ τὰ κρίματα, ἂν ενετείλατο κύριος τῷ Μωϋσῆ ἐπὶ Ἰσραήλ.

**πίστις/argumentatio for prothesis/propositio no. 1 (proof from τόπος of past fact):**

(14) καὶ ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ κατὰ τὴν πτωχείαν μου ἀνδρίζου καὶ ἰασχε, μη φοβοῦ μηδὲ πτωχής.

**prothesis/propositio (no. 2): Solomon must cultivate piety and justice**

(338) σὺ τοινύι ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἀπεδείχθης βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πειρῶ τά τε ἄλλα γίνοσθαι τῆς τοῦτο προνοιας ἄξιοις,

καὶ τὰς ἑντολὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς νόμους οὓς διὰ Μωϋσέως ἐδωκεν ἠμῖν φιλαττὼ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις μὴ παραβαίνειν ἐπίτρεπται. [ahead from 1 Chr 22:13]

**prothesis/propositio (no. 1) restated:**

(339) τὸν δὲ ναὸν, ὃν ὑπὸ σοῦ βασιλεύνως εἶλετο αὐτῷ γενέσθαι, σπουδασοῦ ἀποδούσαι τῷ θεῷ [ahead from 1 Chr 22:11] μὴ καταπληγήσῃ τὸ μέγαθον τοῦ ἐργοῦ μηδὲ ἀποδειλίασαι πρὸς αὐτὸ [ahead from 1 Chr 22:13]

**πίστις/argumentatio for prothesis/propositio no. 1 (proof from τόπος of past fact):**

πάντα γὰρ σοὶ πρὸ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ τελευτής ἐτοίμα ποιήσω.

(340) γίνοσκε δὴ χρυσὸν μὲν ἢδὲ τάλαντα συνειλεγμένα μὺρα, δὲκα δ' ἀργυροῦ μυριάδας ταλάντων, χαλκὸν τε καὶ σιδηρὸν ἀριθμὸν πλεῖον συντεθείκα

καὶ ξύλων δὲ καὶ λίθων ὑφὸν ἄφθονον, ἔχεις δὲ καὶ λατόμοι πολλάς μυριάδας καὶ τεκτῶνοιν

(16) ἐν χρυσίῳ, ἐν ἀργυρίῳ, ἐν χαλκῷ καὶ ἐν σιδηρῷ ὡκ ἐστὶν ἀριθμός.

**ἐπίλογος/peroratio:**

ἀνάστηθι καὶ ποιεῖ, καὶ κύριος μετά σοῦ.
And David said, “Solomon my child, it came upon my soul to build a house for the name of the Lord God. (8) And the word of the Lord has come upon me, saying 'You have poured out blood in great measure and you have made great wars; you will not build a house for my name, for you have wasted many kinsmen upon the earth in my presence. (9) Behold, there will be born a son for you; this man will be a man of rest, and I shall give him rest from his enemies from all around, for his name is Solomon, and I shall give peace and rest to Israel in his days; (10) This one will build a house for my name, and this one will be as much as a son to me and I shall be as much as a father to him, and I shall restore the throne of his kingdom in Israel into the age.’

Then he called his son Solomon and bade him build the temple to God [back from 1 Chr 22:11] after he should have succeeded to the throne.

He had also foretold that his youngest son Solomon would build Him a temple [back from 1 Chr 22:10] and should be called by this name, and promised to watch over him like a father, and bring prosperity to the country of the Hebrews in his reign, with, among other things, the greatest of all blessings, namely peace and freedom from war and civil dissension [ahead from 1 Chr 22:9].

Therefore,” he said, “since, even before...
πρόθεσις/propositio (no. 3): Solomon must uphold the Law
(13) Then He will help you along the way if you take care to fulfill the commands and the judgements which the Lord has enjoined upon Moses for Israel;

be a man and be strong, do not fear and do not be scared.

πίστις/argumentatio for πρόθεσις/propositio no. 1 (proof from τόπος of past fact):
(14) And behold, I have prepared over against my poverty for the house of the Lord 100 000 talents of gold and 1 000 000 talents of silver and copper and iron, for which there is not storage, for it is in great quantity.

And I have prepared planks and stones, and to these things you will add more. (15) And there will be constructing with you in great numbers craftsmen and builders of stone and carpenters of stakes and every man skilled in every craft.

(16) In gold, in silver, in copper and in iron there is no number.

πρόθεσις/propositio (no. 1) restated:
(339) as for the temple which He has decreed shall be made for Him in your reign, take pains to complete it for God [ahead from 1 Chr 22:11], and do not be dismayed at the magnitude of the labour, nor shrink from it [ahead from 1 Chr 22:13] for your birth, you were chosen by God to be king, endeavour to be worthy of His providence by being pious, just and brave [back from 1 Chr 22:13]; keep the commandments and the Laws which He gave us through Moses, and do not permit others to transgress them [ahead from 1 Chr 22:12];

πίστις/argumentatio for πρόθεσις/propositio no. 1 (proof from τόπος of past fact):
I shall make everything ready for you before my death. (340) You should, indeed, know that 10 000 talents of gold and 100 000 talents of silver have already been collected, and that I have brought together more bronze and iron than can be reckoned, and a limitless quantity of wood and stone.

You also have many tens of thousands of stone-cutters and carpenters, and whatever else is needed you yourself will add. [ahead from 1 Chr 22:14]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΕΠΙΛΟΓΟΣ/PERORATIO:</th>
<th>ΕΠΙΛΟΓΟΣ/PERORATIO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construct and build this, and the Lord is with you.”</td>
<td>Be, then, most brave, for you have God as your protector.”</td>
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</table>
### Appendix 3

Chreiai in the Synoptic Gospels


Table 4.1: The Question on Fasting

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ēpekteiνωσις/expansion:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ēpekteiνωσις/expansion:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Ὁτὲ προσέρχονται αὐτῷ οἱ μαθηταὶ ἱωάννου λέγοντες· διὰ τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι νηστεύομεν,</td>
<td>(18) Καὶ ἦσαν οἱ μαθηταὶ ἱωάννου καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι νηστεύοντες καὶ ἔρχονται καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτῷ· διὰ τὸ οἱ μαθηταὶ ἱωάννου καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ τῶν Φαρισαίων νηστεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ σοι μαθηταὶ οὐ νηστεύουσιν;</td>
<td>(33) Οἱ δὲ εἶπον πρὸς αὐτὸν· οἱ μαθηταὶ ἱωάννου νηστεύουσιν πολλά καὶ δεήσεις ποιοῦνται ὁμιλῶς καὶ οἱ τῶν Φαρισαίων, οἱ δὲ σοί ἐσθίουσιν καὶ πίνουσιν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ δὲ μαθηταὶ σοῦ οὐ νηστεύουσιν;</td>
<td>χρεία/chreia (=propositio), presented in figurative manner and as an interrogatio:</td>
<td>χρεία/chreia (=propositio), presented in figurative manner and as an interrogatio:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· ὁ Ἰησοῦς· μὴ δύνανται οἱ οὓς τοῦ νυμφῶνος πενθείν ἐξ ὃς οὖν μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁ νυμφίος;</td>
<td>(19) καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· ὁ Ἰησοῦς· μὴ δύνανται οἱ οὓς τοῦ νυμφῶνος ἐν ὧ ὁ νυμφίος μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐστιν νηστεύειν;</td>
<td>(34) ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς· μὴ δύσασθε τοὺς οὓς τοῦ νυμφῶνος ἐν ὧ ὁ νυμφίος μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ποίησαι νηστεύσαι;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1416 In each of the following tables, footnotes proceed sequentially through each column.
1417 Parentheses indicate words in the original tense or which the reader needs to supply; square brackets indicate words supplied by the context.
1418 Characterizing the core statement to be proven (the πρὸς/proposito) itself as “the chreia” is a convention in Hermogenes’ Progymnasmata (ed. Rabe, 6.7); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 77. Theon lists manners of presentation for chreiai, including the figurative manner: see Progymnasmata (ed. Spengel, 2.100); Kennedy, Progymnasmata, p. 18 (translations “manner of presentation” and “figurative manner” from Robbins, “The Chreia,” 15). Theon does not include any manners of question (e.g., the interrogatio or rhetorical question), but the evangelists obviously employ this figure of thought, on which see Lausberg, Handbook § 767.
1419 I use the “approximates” sign to designate a unit’s close but not identical similarity to the unit as described in progymnasmata. I take Greek terms from Theon and Hermogenes’ Progymnasmata. The English translations of Greek terms for parts of expanded and elaborated chreiai (e.g., “argument from . . .”), I borrow mainly from Robbins, “The Chreia,” 19-21, and Mack, “Elaboration of the Chreia in the Hellenistic School,” 52-61.
1420 Clause clarified by NRSV.
1421 Following translation by Gundry, Mark, 134, and Metzger, TCGNT, 67-68; against Marcus, Mark 1:8, 232, 236.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Greek Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>≈κατά τὸν ἐναυτίον/argument from the opposite: ἐλεύσονται δὲ ἡμέραι ὅταν ἀραβῆ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, καὶ τότε νηστεύουσιν.</td>
<td>≈κατά τὸν ἐναυτίον/argument from the opposite: (20) ἐλεύσονται δὲ ἡμέραι ὅταν ἀραβῆ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, καὶ τότε νηστεύουσιν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy (no. 1): (16) οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐπιβάλλει ἐπίβλημα ῥάκους ἁγνάφου ἐπὶ ἱματίῳ παλαιῷ· αἱρεί γὰρ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ χείριον σχίσμα γίνεται.</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy (no. 1): (21) Οὐδεὶς ἐπίβλημα ῥάκους ἁγνάφου ἐπιράπτει ἐπὶ ἱματίῳ παλαιίν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, αἱρεί τὸ πλήρωμα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ καινὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ χείριον σχίσμα γίνεται.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>ἀλλὰ βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁγκούς παλαιοὺς, καὶ ἀμφότεροι συντηροῦνται.</td>
<td>(possible) ἐν τῷ τέλει παράκλησιν/concluding exhortation: ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁγκούς καινοὺς.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy (no. 2): (17) οὐδὲς βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁγκούς παλαιοὺς· εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, ῥήγχνυται οἱ ἁγκοὶ καὶ οἱ οἶνοι ἐκεῖται καὶ οἱ ἁγκοὶ ἀπόλλυται.</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy (no. 2): (22) καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁγκούς παλαιοὺς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ῥέβει οἱ οἶνοι τοὺς ἁγκοὺς καὶ οἱ οἶνοι ἀπόλλυται καὶ οἱ ἁγκοὶ ἀπόλλυται.</td>
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<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy (no. 1):</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy (no. 1): (36) Ἐλεγεν δὲ καὶ παραβολήν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐπίβλημα ἀπὸ ἱματίου καινοῦ σχίσας ἐπιβάλλει ἐπὶ ἱματίῳ παλαιοῦ· εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, καὶ τὸ καινὸν σχίσει καὶ τὰ παλαίων ὑσυφωνήσει τὸ ἐπίβλημα τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ καινοῦ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy (no. 2):</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy (no. 2): (37) καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁγκούς παλαιοὺς· εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, ῥέβει οἱ οἶνοι τοὺς ἁγκοὺς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκυθάρηται καὶ οἱ ἁγκοὶ ἀπολύεται.</td>
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<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy: (38) ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἁγκούς καινοὺς βλητέον.</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολής/argument from analogy: (39) καὶ οὐδεὶς πιῶν παλαιοῦ θέλει νέον· λέγει γὰρ· ὁ παλαιὸς χρηστὸς ἐστιν.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Then the disciples of John approached (approach) saying, "Why are we and the Pharisees fasting [much,] but your disciples do not fast?"

And Jesus said to them, "The attendants of the bridegroom cannot fast in the (time) when the bridegroom is with them (i.e., can they)?"

But the days will come when the bridegroom has been taken away from them, and then they will fast in that day.

And nobody adds a patch of uncarded [pre-combed, unshrunk] cloth upon an old cloak; for its fullness [the unshrunk cloth] pulls from the cloak and the separation become worse.

And he was also telling them a parable that "Nobody having separated a patch from a new cloak adds it onto an old cloak; otherwise indeed, also the new [cloak] will be torn and the patch from the new will not be in harmony with the old."
(17) And they do not put new wine into old wineskins; otherwise indeed, the wineskins will break and the wine will pour out and the wineskins are destroyed; but they put new wine into new wineskins, and both are preserved.

(22) And nobody puts new wine into old wineskins; otherwise, the wine will break the wineskins and the wine is destroyed, and [i.e., along with] the wineskins.

(37) And nobody puts new wine into old wineskins; otherwise indeed, the new wine will break the wineskins and the wine itself will be poured out and the wineskins will be destroyed.

(38) but one must put new wine into new wineskins.

(39) [And] nobody drinking the old (wine) wants the new; for he says, “The old is useful.”
Table 4.2: Mark’s Adaptation of Matthew and Luke

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ἐπεκτείνωσις/expansion:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ἐπεκτείνωσις/expansion:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Τότε προσέρχονται αὐτῷ οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰωάννου λέγοντες: διὰ τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ οἱ Ἰσραήλιοι νηστεύομεν [πολλά,] οἱ δὲ μαθηταὶ σοῦ οὐ νηστεύουσιν;</td>
<td>(18) Καὶ ἦσαν οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰωάννου καὶ οἱ Ἰσραήλιοι νηστεύοντες, καὶ ἔρχονται καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτῷ: διὰ τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ τῶν Ἰσραήλιων νηστεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ σοὶ μαθηταὶ οὐ νηστεύουσιν;</td>
<td>(33) Οἱ δὲ ἦσαν πρὸς αὐτὸν οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰωάννου νηστεύσαν πυκνά καὶ δεήσεις ποίουσαν ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἰσραήλιων, οἱ δὲ σοὶ ἐσθίουσαν καὶ πίνουσαν.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>χρεία/chreia (≈propositio), presented in figurative manner and as an interrogatio:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(15) καὶ ἤπειρος ὁ Ἰησοῦς· μὴ δύνανται οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ νυμφῶν πενθεῖν ἐφ’ ὅσον μετ’ αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὁ νυμφίος;</td>
<td>(19) καὶ ἤπειρος ὁ Ἰησοῦς· μὴ δύνανται οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ νυμφῶν ἐν ὃ ὁ νυμφίος μετ’ αὐτῶν ἔστιν νηστεύειν;</td>
<td>(34) οἱ δὲ ἦσαν πρὸς αὐτούς· μὴ δυναθή τους υἱούς τοῦ νυμφῶν ἐν ὃ ὁ νυμφίος μετ’ αὐτῶν ἔστιν ποίησαι νηστεύσαι;</td>
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<td><strong>ζεκατά τὸν ἔναυστον/argument from the opposite:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ἔλευσονται δὲ ἡμέρας ὅταν ἀραβῆ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, καὶ τότε νηστεύουσιν.</td>
<td>(20) ἔλευσονται δὲ ἡμέρας ὅταν ἀραβῆ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, καὶ τότε νηστεύουσιν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ.</td>
<td>(35) ἔλευσονται δὲ ἡμέρας, καὶ ὅταν ἀραβῆ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, τότε νηστεύουσιν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| (21) Οὐδεὶς ἔπιθλημα πάρκου ἄγναφου ἐπὶ ἰματίῳ παλαιῷ αἴρει γάρ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰματίου καὶ χείρον σχίσμα γίνεται. | (22) Οὐδεὶς ἔπιθλημα πάρκου ἄγναφου ἐπιρήματε ἐπὶ ἰματίῳ παλαιῷ ἐὰν δὲ ὁμίλησα δεῦ, αἴρει τὸ πλήρωμα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ καινὸν τοῦ παλαίου καὶ χείρον σχίσμα γίνεται. | (26) Ἐλεγεν δὲ καὶ παραβολὴν πρὸς αὐτούς ὁ Παῦλος: οὐδεὶς ἔπιθλημα ἀπὸ ἰματίου καινοῦ σχίσατε ἐπὶ ἰματίῳ παλαιῷ· εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, καὶ τὸ καινὸν σχίσει.
Argument from analogy (no. 2):

(17) οὐ δὲ βάλλουσιν οἴνον νέον εἰς ἁσκούς παλαιόν, εἶ δὲ μή γε, ῥήγνυται

οἱ ἁσκοὶ καὶ ὁ οἶνος

ἐκχείται

καὶ οἱ ἁσκοὶ

ἀπολλυται.

(22) καὶ οὐδὲῖς βάλλει οἴνον νέον εἰς ἁσκούς παλαιόν, εἰ δὲ μή, ῥήξει ὁ οἶνος

τοὺς ἁσκοὺς καὶ ὁ οἶνος

ἀπολλυται καὶ οἱ ἁσκοὶ

(possible) έν τῷ τέλει

παράκλησιν/concluding

exhortation:

άλλα βάλλουσιν οἴνον νέον εἰς ἁσκοὺς καινοὺς, καὶ ἀμφότεροι συντηροῦνται.

(37) καὶ οὐδὲῖς βάλλει οἴνον νέον εἰς ἁσκούς παλαιόν, εἰ δὲ μή γε, ῥήξει ὁ οἶνος οἶνος

τοὺς ἁσκοὺς καὶ αὐτὸς

ἐκχυθήσεται

καὶ οἱ ἁσκοὶ

ἀπολλυται.

(38) άλλα οἴνον νέον εἰς ἁσκοὺς καινοὺς βλήτεον.

Argument from analogy, as conclusion:

(39) καὶ οὐδὲῖς πιὸν παλαιὸν βῆλει νέον· λέγει γὰρ· ὁ παλαιὸς χρηστὸς ἐστίν.
Table 4.3: Matthew’s Adaptation of Mark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matthew 9:14-17</th>
<th>Mark 2:18-22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Επεκτείνονται/Expansion:</td>
<td>Επεκτείνονται/Expansion:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Τότε προσέρχονται αυτῶι οἱ μαθηται Ιωάνου λέγοντες: διὰ τὴν ἡμέρα</td>
<td>(18) Καὶ ἦσαν οἱ μαθηται Ιωάνου καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι νηστεύοντες: καὶ έρχονται καὶ λέγουσιν αυτῶι: διὰ τὴν ἡμέρα οἱ μαθηται τῶν Φαρισαίων νηστεύοντες, οἱ δὲ σοι μαθηται οὐ νηστεύοντες:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ δὲ μαθηταὶ υἱοὶ οὐ νηστεύουσιν;</td>
<td>χρεία/χρεια (=propositio), presented in figurative manner and as an interrogatio: (19) καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς: μὴ δύνανται οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ νυμφίους ἐν ὧν ὁ νυμφίος μετ' αὐτῶν ἔστιν οὐ νηστεύειν;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χρεία/χρεια (=propositio), presented in figurative manner and as an interrogatio: (15) καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς: μὴ δύνανται οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ νυμφίους ἐν ὧν ὁ νυμφίος μετ' αὐτῶν ἔστιν οὐ νηστεύειν;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≈κατά τὸν ἐναντίον/argument from the opposite: εἰλαξόνται δὲ ἡμεραὶ ὅταν ἀραβῆ ἁπ' αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, καὶ τὸτε νηστεύουσιν</td>
<td>≈κατά τὸν ἐναντίον/argument from the opposite: εἰλαξόνται δὲ ἡμεραὶ ὅταν ἀραβῆ ἁπ' αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, καὶ τὸτε νηστεύουσιν ἐν ἑκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≈κ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy (no. 1): (16) οὐδὲς ἐπὶ βάλλει ἐπίβλημα βάκουσ αγνάφου............. ἐτὶ ἰματίῳ παλαιῷ αἴρει γὰρ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰματίου καὶ χείριον σχίσμα γίνεται.</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy (no. 1): (21) Οὐδὲς ἐπὶ βάλλει ἐπίβλημα βάκουσ ἀγνάφου ἐπιράπτει ἐπὶ ἰματίῳ παλαιῷ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, αἴρει τὸ πλήρωμα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ καὶνὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ χείριον σχίσμα γίνεται.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≈κ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy (no. 2): (17) οὐδὲ βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκός παλαιός· εἰ δὲ μὴ γε. ῥήγνυνται: οἱ ἀσκοὶ καὶ οἱ οἶνοι ἐκχείται καὶ οἱ ἀσκοὶ ἀπόλλυνται.</td>
<td>≈κ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy (no. 2): (22) καὶ οὐδὲς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκός παλαιός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ῥήξει ὁ οἶνος τοὺς ἀσκοὺς καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἀπόλλυται καὶ οἱ ἀσκοὶ· (possible) ἐν τῷ τέλει παράκλησιν/concluding exhortation: ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκός καίνος, καὶ αμφότεροι συντηροῦνται.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.4: Luke’s Adaptation of Mark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ἐπεκτείνωσις/expansion:</strong></td>
<td><strong>ἐπεκτείνωσις/expansion:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18) Καὶ ἦσαν οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰοάννου καὶ οἱ Φαρισαίοι ἠπετεύουσιν.</td>
<td>(33) Οἱ δὲ εἶπαν πρὸς αὐτούς- οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰοάννου ἠπετεύουσιν πυκνά καὶ δήσεις ποιοῦνται ὡμοίως καὶ οἱ τῶν Φαρισαίων, οἱ δὲ σοὶ ζῆσθε ὑπὸ θυσίαν καὶ πινοῦσιν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καὶ ἔργουσι καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτῷ·</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διὰ τι οἱ μαθηταὶ Ἰοάννου καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ τῶν Φαρισαίων ἠπετεύουσιν,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἱ δὲ σοὶ μαθηταὶ οὐ ἠπετεύουσιν;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>χρεία/chreia (=propositio), presented in figurative manner and as an</strong></td>
<td><strong>χρεία/chreia (=propositio), presented in figurative manner and as an</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>interrogatio:</strong></td>
<td><strong>interrogatio:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19) καὶ ἐπεστάλλεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς·</td>
<td>(34) ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς·</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μὴ δύνασθε τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ νυμφῶν ἐν ὦ ὁ νυμφίος μετ’ αὐτῶν ἑστιν ἦπερευνεῖ;</td>
<td>μὴ δύνασθε τοὺς υἱοὺς τοῦ νυμφῶν ἐν ὦ ὁ νυμφίος μετ’ αὐτῶν ἑστιν ποιήσατε νηστεύσατε;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>χρεία with rationale restated:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὁ δὲ σοὶ ἦσαν τὸν νυμφίον μετ’ αὐτῶν οὐ δύναται ἦπερευνεῖ.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ἐκτάτω τὸν ἐναντίου/argument from the opposite:</strong></td>
<td><strong>ἐκτάτω τὸν ἐναντίου/argument from the opposite:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20) ἐλευθεροῦται δὲ ἡμέραι ὅταν ἀραρθῇ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, καὶ τότε ἦπερευνεῖν ἐν ἑκεῖνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ.</td>
<td>(35) ἐλευθεροῦται δὲ ἡμέραι, καὶ ὅταν ἀραρθῇ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὁ νυμφίος, τότε ἦπερευνεῖν ἐν ἑκεῖναις ταῖς ἡμέραις.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ἐκ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy (no. 1):</strong></td>
<td><strong>ἐκ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy (no. 1):</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21) Οὐδεὶς ἐπίβλημα ῥάκους ἀγαθοῦ εἰπίραπτε ἐπὶ ἰματίου παλαίαν·</td>
<td>(36) Ἑλεγεν δὲ καὶ παραβολὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐπίβλημα ἀπὸ ἰματίου καίνον σχίσας ἐπιβάλλει ἐπὶ ἰματίου παλαίαν· ἐδέ μη γε, καὶ τὸ καίνον σχίσει καὶ τῷ παλαιῷ οὐ συμφωνήσει τὸ ἐπίβλημα τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ καινοῦ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰ δὲ μη, αἱρεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ καινόν τοῦ παλαίαν καὶ χεῖρον σχίσαμα γίνεται.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ἐκ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy (no. 2):</strong></td>
<td><strong>ἐκ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy (no. 2):</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22) καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει όλον νέον εἰς ἁσκοῦς παλαίαν· εἰ δὲ μη, δύναται ὁ όλος τῶν ἁσκῶν καὶ ὁ όλος ἀπόλλυται καὶ οἱ ἁσκοί· (37) καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει όλον νέον εἰς ἁσκοῦς παλαίαν· εἰ δὲ μη γε, δύναται ὁ νέος τῶν ἁσκῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολυται· (38) ἀλλὰ όλον νέον εἰς ἁσκοῦς καίνον βλητέον.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(possible) ἐν τῷ τέλει παράκλησιν/concluding exhortation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀλλὰ όλον νέον εἰς ἁσκοῦς καίνον.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
argument from analogy, as conclusion:

(39) ἐκ παραβολῆς
καὶ καὶ καὶ καὶ
οὐδεὶς οὐδεὶς οὐδεὶς οὐδεὶς
πιθανὸν πιθανὸν πιθανὸν πιθανὸν
θέλει νέου· λέγει γάρ· ὁ παλαιὸς χρηστὸς ἔστιν.

We arrange the parts of each chreia version in that chreia’s sequence as well as in parallel with other synoptic versions. We print parallels in italics.\footnote{I arrange gospel parallels following Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum. At points, however, I modify this arrangement to emphasize parallels between rhetorical units, for instance a topic or an argument.}\footnote{Labels are from Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 172-175, 178-183, 185-189. For Mark cp. similarly Gundry, Mark, 170. Jacobson explains that Matt. 9:32-34 affords a closer parallel in wording to Luke 11:14-16, than does Matt. 12:22-23. Jacobson, The First Gospel, 156. For structure see Gundry, Matthew, 10-11, 203-204, 241, 248-250. So Betz, Sermon on the Mount, 154, 158, 162-163. An argument from analogy in Matthew’s context. Betz, Sermon on the Mount, ix, 437, 450, 453: “Where . . . lies the paraenetical edge of the saying? It appears that the careful listener will ask: What if my inner light is darkness? How can it be made to shine again?” (p. 453). An argument from analogy in Matthew’s context. See Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 173. Robbins does not label this unit a chreia (“Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 175). Context from Marcus, Mark 1-8, vii. Context from Marcus, Mark 1-8, 288-289, 314. English translations from NRSV.}

Table 5.1: The Beelzebul Controversy\footnote{English translations from NRSV.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Accusations against Jesus:</td>
<td>a) Accusations against Jesus:</td>
<td>a) Accusations against Jesus:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{ἐπεκτείνωσις/}\text{expansion:})</td>
<td>(\text{ἐπεκτείνωσις/}\text{expansion:})</td>
<td>(\text{ἐπεκτείνωσις/}\text{expansion:})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic 1: Jesus’ family</td>
<td>Topic 1: Exit</td>
<td>Topic 1: Exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation:</td>
<td>Situation:</td>
<td>Situation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20) Καὶ ἔρχεται εἰς οἶκον καὶ συνέρχεται πάλιν [ὁ] ὄχλος, ὡστε οὐ δύνασθαι αὐτούς μηδε ἀρτὸν φαγεῖν. (21) καὶ ἀκούσαντες οἱ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐξηλθόντος κρατήσαντι αὐτὸν ἔλεγον γὰρ ὅτι ἔζεστι.</td>
<td>(14) Καὶ ἦν ἐκβάλλων δαιμονίου [καὶ αὐτὸ ἦν] κωφόν:</td>
<td>(14) Καὶ ἦν ἐκβάλλων δαιμονίου [καὶ αὐτὸ ἦν] κωφόν:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καὶ ἔθεράπευσεν αὐτόν, ὡστε τὸν κωφὸν λαλεῖν καὶ βλέπειν.</td>
<td>Τοῦτο ἐγένετο δὲ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐξηλθόντος ἐλάλησεν ὁ κωφός.</td>
<td>Τοῦτο ἐγένετο δὲ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐξηλθόντος ἐλάλησεν ὁ κωφός.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quaestio (presentation of case):

(23) καὶ ἐξήσταστο πάντες οἱ ὥρχοι καὶ ἔλεγον· μὴ τούτος ἔστιν ὁ υἱὸς Δαυίδ;

ορός (definition):

(24) οἱ δὲ Φαρισαῖοι ἀκούσαντες εἶπον· οὗτος οὐκ ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμονία εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ Βεελζεβούλ ἀρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων.

b) Jesus’ reply:

Transitional comment:

(25) εἰδοὺς δὲ τὸν ἐνθυμημένον αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·

ἐκ παραβολῶν(arguments from analogy for implausibility of Pharisees’ definition):

πάσα βασίλεια μερισθείσα καθ’ ἑαυτής ἐρημώνται καὶ πάσα πόλις ἢ οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ ἑαυτῆς οὐ σταθήσεται.

Topic 2: Does Jesus possess Beelzebul?

(22) Καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλήμ καταβάντες ἐλέγον ὦτι Βεελζεβούλ ἔχει

Topic 3: Casting out demons χρεία/chreia:

καὶ ὧν ἐν τῷ ἀρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων εκβάλλει τὰ δαιμονία.

b) Jesus’ reply:

Transitional comment:

(15) τινὲς δὲ εἰς αὐτῶν εἶπον· ἐν Βεελζεβούλ τῷ ἀρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων εκβάλλει τὰ δαιμονία·

Topic 3: Censure χρεία/chreia (propositio no. 1):

(16) ἐτεροῖ δὲ πειράζοντες σημειοῦν εἰς οὐρανὸν εἴητον παρ’ αὐτοῦ.

b) Jesus’ reply:

Responsive chreia:

(23) καὶ προσκαλεσόμενος αὐτῶν εἰς παραβολάς ἐλέγεν αὐτοῖς· πῶς δύναται σατανᾶς σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλειν;

ἐκ παραβολῶν(arguments from analogy (x 3):

(24) καὶ ἔναν βασιλεία ἐφ’ ἑαυτὴν μερισθῆ ὦ τίνες δῦναι σταθήσαν ἡ βασιλεία ἐκείνη· (25) καὶ ἔαν οἰκία ἐφ’ ἑαυτὴν μερισθῇ ὦ τίνες δῦναι σταθήσαν ἡ οἰκία ἐκείνη.

ἐκ παραβολῶν(arguments from analogy for implausibility of definition:

πάσα βασίλεια ἐφ’ ἑαυτὴν διαμερισθεία ἐρημώνται καὶ οἶκος ἐπὶ οἴκον τίππει.

Topic 2: Praise και ἐθαυμασάν οἱ ὥρχοι.

Topic 3: Censure χρεία/chreia (propositio no. 2):

(17) αὐτῶς δὲ εἰδοὺς αὐτῶν τὰ διανοήματα εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·

b) Jesus’ reply:

Transitional comment:

(18) ἐτεροῖς δὲ πειράζοντες σημειοῦν εἰς οὐρανὸν εἴητον παρ’ αὐτοῦ.

b) Jesus’ reply:

Responsive chreia:

(23) καὶ προσκαλεσόμενος αὐτῶν εἰς παραβολάς ἐλέγεν αὐτοῖς· πῶς δύναται σατανᾶς σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλειν;

ἐκ παραβολῶν(arguments from analogy (x 3):

(24) καὶ ἔναν βασιλεία ἐφ’ ἑαυτὴν μερισθῆ ὦ τίνες δῦναι σταθήσαν ἡ βασιλεία ἐκείνη· (25) καὶ ἔαν οἰκία ἐφ’ ἑαυτὴν μερισθῇ ὦ τίνες δῦναι σταθήσαν ἡ οἰκία ἐκείνη.

ἐκ παραβολῶν(arguments from analogy for implausibility of definition:

πάσα βασίλεια ἐφ’ ἑαυτὴν διαμερισθεία ἐρημώνται καὶ οἶκος ἐπὶ οἴκον τίππει.

1436 I change Robbins’ terminology here from counterdefinition (“Rhetorical Composition and the Beelzebul Controversy,” 186) to argument from quality in common, the same label as for Matthew 12:27.

1437 I change Robbins’ terminology to specify this particular question as the counterdefinition; see preceding note.

1438 Diefenbach, Komposition, 95-96.

1439 Bovon, Luke 1, 305.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(26) καὶ εἶ ὁ σατάνας τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει, εφ’ εαυτὸν ἐμερίθη; πῶς σὺν σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;</th>
<th>(27) καὶ εἶ ὁ σατάνας ἀνέστη ἐφ’ εαυτὸν καὶ ἐμερίθη, οὐ δύναται στήμαι ἄλλα τέλος ἔχει.</th>
<th>(28) εἴ δὲ καὶ ὁ σατάνας ἕφ’ εαυτὸν διεμερίθη, πῶς σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argument from quality in common:</td>
<td>Counterdefinition:</td>
<td>Argument from quality in common:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26) καὶ εἶ ὁ σατάνας τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει, εφ’ εαυτὸν ἐμερίθη; πῶς σὺν σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;</td>
<td>(27) καὶ εἶ ὁ σατάνας ἀνέστη ἐφ’ εαυτὸν καὶ ἐμερίθη, οὐ δύναται στήμαι ἄλλα τέλος ἔχει.</td>
<td>(29) εἴ δὲ καὶ ὁ σατάνας ἕφ’ εαυτὸν διεμερίθη, πῶς σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterdefinition:</td>
<td>(28) εἴ δὲ ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ ὕπαρξεν ἐφ’ ὕμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.</td>
<td>(29) εἴ δὲ ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ ὕπαρξεν ἐφ’ ὕμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restatement by analogy:</td>
<td>(27) αὐτὸν ὑπάρξει στάθησαι διὰ τοῦτο εὐθυμίαν ἀρέσκεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον δήσῃ τὸν ἴσχυρόν; καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρράφει.</td>
<td>(30) ἐκ παραβολῆς/argument from analogy:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26) καὶ εἶ ὁ σατάνας τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει, εφ’ εαυτὸν ἐμερίθη; πῶς σὺν σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;</td>
<td>(27) εἴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νυκτίς νικήτη φωτός, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον δησῇ τὸν ἴσχυρόν; καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρράφει.</td>
<td>(21) ὅταν ὁ ἴσχυρός καθαπλησίως φυλάσσῃ τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ, ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐστὶν τὰς ὑπάρχουσας αὐτῶν. (21) ἐπὲν ὁ ἴσχυρότερος αὐτοῦ ἐπέλθῃ νικήτη αὐτοῦ, τὴν πανοπλίαν αὐτοῦ ἁρίη ἐφ’ ἐπεποίθη καὶ τὰς σκύλας αὐτοῦ διαδίδωσιν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26) καὶ εἶ ὁ σατάνας ἀνέστη ἐφ’ εαυτὸν καὶ ἐμερίθη, οὐ δύναται στήμαι ἄλλα τέλος ἔχει.</td>
<td>(27) ἀλλ’ οὐ δύναται οὐδὲς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἴσχυρος καὶ τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ ἀρραβώναι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον δησῇ τὸν ἴσχυρόν; καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρράφει.</td>
<td>(22) ἐπὶ καὶ ἐξ ἱερήμονος αὐτοῦ ἐπέλθῃ νικήτη αὐτοῦ, τὴν πανοπλίαν αὐτοῦ ἁρίη ἐφ’ ἐπεποίθη καὶ τὰς σκύλας αὐτοῦ διαδίδωσιν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syllogism:</td>
<td>εἴ ἐν τῷ ἰσχυρῷ εἰς τὸν ἰσχυρόν εἰς τὸν ἰσχυρόν ἐπέλθῃ νικήτη αὐτοῦ, τὴν πανοπλίαν αὐτοῦ ἁρίη ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐστὶν τὰς ὑπάρχουσας αὐτῶν. (23) ὁ μὴ ὅπερ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ μὴ συνάγων μετ’ ἐμοῦ κατὰ ἐμοῦ ἐίησαν καὶ ὁ μὴ συνάγων μετ’ ἐμοῦ κατὰ ἐμοῦ ἐκποίθη.</td>
<td>Syllogism:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(26) καὶ εἶ ὁ σατάνας τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει, εφ’ εαυτὸν ἐμερίθη; πῶς σὺν σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;
Gravity:
(31) Διὰ τοῦτο λέγω ὑμῖν, πάσα ἀμαρτία καὶ βλασφημία ἀφεθήσεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,

ἡ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος βλασφημία οὐκ ἀφεθήσεται.

Statement of law:
(32) καὶ ὁς ἐὰν εἴπῃ λόγον κατὰ τοῦ ὑιοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ· ὁ δὲ ἐὰν εἴπῃ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἄγιος, οὐκ ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ· οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι.

Comparison: (cp. Matt. 7:16-20)
(33) Ἡ ποιήσατε τὸ δένδρον καλὸν καὶ τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῦ καλὸν, ἡ ποιήσατε τὸ δένδρον σαπρὸν καὶ τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῦ σαπρὸν· ἕκαρ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δένδρον γινώσκεται.

Conclusion:
Direct address:
(34) γεννήματα ἐχεῖς·

Quaestio:
πώς δύνασθε ἁγαθὰ λαλεῖν ποιητοὶ οὕτως·

Rationale:
ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ περισσεύματος τῆς καρδίας τὸ σῶμα λαλεῖ. (35) ὁ ἁγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ ἐλθὼν λαλεῖ ἡμῖν.
Judgement with rationale:

(36) λέγω δὲ ύμιν ὅτι πᾶν ῥῆμα αργὼν ὁ λαλήσωσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἄποδόσασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγων ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως· (37) ἐκ γὰρ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιωθήσεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου καταδικασθήσεται.

Matthew 12:46-50: An expanded/elaborated chreia which, following the Sign of Jonah unit (12:38-45), concludes Matt.’s (third) major narrative section (11:2-12:50).

Topic 1: Jesus’ family (reply) εἰς συγκρίσεως/argument from comparison with concluding question and answer:

(31) Καὶ ἐρχεται ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἁδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ξεῖνον ντόντες σοι λαλήσατε.

(32) καὶ ἐκάθετο περὶ αὐτοῦ ὄχλος, καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτῷ· ἢδοι ν ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ οἱ ἁδελφοὶ σου ἔξω ζητοῦσι σε.

Reply (=χρεία/chreia):

(33) καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς αὐτοίς λέγει· τίς ἦστιν ἡ μήτηρ μου καὶ οἱ ἁδελφοὶ μου;


(19) Παρεγένετο δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡ μήτηρ καὶ οἱ ἁδελφοί αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἤδυναντο συντυχεῖν αὐτῷ διὰ τὸν ὄχλον.

(20) ἀπηγγέλθη δὲ αὐτῷ· ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ οἱ ἁδελφοί σου έστηκαν ἐξω ιδέεις βλέποντες σε.
Conclusion: κρίσις μετ᾿ αίτια/judgement with rationale:
(49) καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν χείρα αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ ἐίπεν ἢδον ἢ μήτηρ μου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοί μου. (50) ὡστε γὰρ ἡ ποίησις τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς μου τοῦ ἐν ὑπάρχον αὐτὸς μου ἀδελφὸς καὶ ἀδελφή καὶ μήτηρ ἑστίν.

Matthew 12:43-45: Remainder of Matthew’s Sign of Jonah unit

ἐκ μύθου/argument from fable:
(43) Όταν τὸ ἀκάθαρτον πνεῦμα ἔξηλθη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, διέρχεται δι᾿ ἀνώδρου τόπων ζητοῦν ἀνατρέψαι καὶ οὐχ εὑρίσκει: (44) τότε λέγει· εἰς τὸν οἶκον μου ἐπιστρέφον οὐκ ἔξηλθον καὶ ἔλθων εὑρίσκει σχολάζοντα σεαραφμένου καὶ κεκοσμημένου (45) τότε πορευείται καὶ παραλαμβάνει μεθ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ ἑπτὰ ἑτερα πνεύματα πονηρότερα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ εἰσελθόντα κατοικεῖ ἐκεῖ καὶ γίνεται τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἑκείνου χείρονα τῶν πρῶτων. οὕτως ἑστι καὶ τῇ γενεᾷ τῇ πονηρᾷ.

Conclusion: κρίσις μετ᾿ αίτια/judgement with rationale:
(34) καὶ περιβλεψάμενος τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν κύκλῳ καθημένους λέγει· ἢδε ἡ μήτηρ μου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μου. (35) ὡς [γάρ] ἐν ποίησις τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, οὕτως ἀδελφὸς μου καὶ ἀδελφή καὶ μήτηρ ἑστίν.

Topic 1: Exit (reply)
ἐκ μύθου/argument from fable:
(24) Ὄταν τὸ ἀκάθαρτον πνεῦμα ἔξηλθη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, διέρχεται δι᾿ ἀνώδρου τόπων ζητοῦν ἀνατρέψαι καὶ οὐχ εὑρίσκον. (25) τότε λέγει· ὑποστρεφώ εἰς τὸν οἶκον μου ὡς ἐξήλθον. (26) τότε πορευείται καὶ παραλαμβάνει ἑτερα πνεύματα πονηρότερα ἑαυτοῦ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἰσελθόντα κατοικεῖ ἐκεῖ καὶ γίνεται τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἑκείνου χείρονα τῶν πρῶτων.

Topic 2: Praise (reply)
ἀποκριτικὴ χρεία/responsive chreia:
(27) Ἐγένετο δὲ ἐν τῷ λέγειν αὐτὸν ταύτα ἐπάρασσα τὰς φωνὰς γυνὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὄχλου εἴπεν αὐτῷ· μακαρία ἡ κοιλία ἡ βαστασάσα σε καὶ μαστοὶ οὓς ἐθήλασας. (28) αὐτὸς δὲ εἴπεν· μενοῦν μακαρίοι οἱ ἀκούοντες τοῦ λόγου τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ φυλάσσοντες.
Matthew 12:38-42: The Sign of Jonah unit: immediately follows (but is not a part of) Matt.'s Beelzebul Controversy

Mark 8:11-12: From Mark's Third Section (6:6b-8:21): Testing while in the wilderness

Topic 4: Test (Luke's Sign of Jonah unit) (reply)
Matt. 5:15: From metaphors of salt and light (5:13-16): the “commission” in Matt.’s Sermon on the Mount

Mark 4:21: From Mark’s parable of the lamp (part of chiastically structured parables discourse [4:1-34])


Mark 4:21: From Mark’s parable of the lamp (part of chiastically structured parables discourse [4:1-34])
a) Accusations against Jesus:

Situation:
(22) Then they brought to him a demoniac who was blind and mute; and he cured him, so that the one who had been mute could speak and see.

Quaestio (presentation of case):
(23) All the crowds were amazed and said, “Can this be the Son of David?”

o#roj (definition):
(24) But when the Pharisees heard it, they said, “It is only by Beelzebul, the ruler of the demons, that this fellow casts out demons.”

Topic 1: Jesus family
(20) Then he went home; and the crowd came together again, so that they could not even eat. (21) When his family heard it, they went out to restrain him, for people were saying, “He has gone out of his mind.”

Topic 2: Does Jesus possess Beelzebul?
(22) And the scribes who came down from Jerusalem said, “He has Beelzebul, and by the ruler of demons he casts out demons.”

Topic 3: Casting out demons
(14) Now he was casting out a demon that was mute; and the crowds were amazed
when the demon had gone out, the one who had been mute spoke
The crowds were amazed
(15) But some of them said, “He casts out demons by Beelzebul, the ruler of the demons.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b) Jesus’ reply:</th>
<th>b) Jesus’ reply:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transitional comment:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topic 3: Casting out demons (reply)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(25) He knew what they were thinking and said to them,</td>
<td><strong>Responsive chreia:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(23) And he called to them to him, and spoke to them in parables, “How can Satan cast out Satan?”</td>
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<td><strong>ἐκ παραβολῆς</strong>/arguments from analogy for implausibility of the Pharisees’ definition:</td>
<td><strong>ἐκ παραβολῆς</strong>/arguments from analogy (x3):</td>
<td><strong>ἐκ παραβολῆς</strong>/arguments from analogy for implausibility of definition:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Every kingdom divided against itself is laid waste, and no city or house divided against itself will stand.</td>
<td>“Every kingdom divided against itself becomes a desert, and house falls upon house.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(26) If Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself, how then will his kingdom stand?</td>
<td>(26) And if Satan has risen up against himself and is divided, he cannot stand, but his end has come.</td>
<td>(18) If Satan also is divided against himself, how will his kingdom stand?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argument from quality in common:</td>
<td>Argument from quality in common:</td>
<td>Argument from quality in common:</td>
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<td>(27) If I cast out demons by Beelzebul, by whom do your own exorcists cast them out? Therefore they will be your judges.</td>
<td>-- for you say that I cast out the demons by Beelzebul. (19) Now if I cast out the demons by Beelzebul, by whom do your exorcists cast them out? Therefore they will be your judges.</td>
<td>-- for you say that I cast out the demons by Beelzebul. (19) Now if I cast out the demons by Beelzebul, by whom do your exorcists cast them out? Therefore they will be your judges.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Counterdefinition:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Counterdefinition:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Counterdefinition:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(28) But if it is by the Spirit of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you.</td>
<td>(20) But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out the demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Restatement by analogy:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29) Or how can one enter a strong man’s house and plunder his property, without first tying up the strong man? Then indeed the house can be plundered.</td>
<td>(27) But no one can enter a strong man’s house and plunder his property without first tying up the strong man; then indeed the house can be plundered.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Syllogism:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Syllogism:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(30) Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters.</td>
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<td>(30) Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gravity:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(31) Therefore I tell you, people will be forgiven for every sin and blasphemy, but blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Statement of law:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(32) Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come.</td>
<td>(29) but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit can never have forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin” – (30) for they had said, “He has an unclean spirit.”</td>
<td>(10) “and everyone who speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven; but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Luke 12:10**

(10) “and everyone who speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven; but whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven.”
Comparison:
(33) Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad; for the tree is known by its fruit.

Conclusion:

Direct address:
(34) You brood of vipers!

Quaestio:
How can you speak good things, when you are evil?

Rationale:
For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks.
(35) The good person brings good things out of a good treasure, and the evil person brings evil things out of an evil treasure.

Judgement with rationale:
(36) I tell you, on the day of judgement you will have to give an account for every careless word you utter; (37) for by your words you will be justified, and by your words you will be condemned.”

Luke 6:43-45
(43) “No good tree bears bad fruit, nor again does a bad tree bear good fruit; (44) for each tree is known by its own fruit. Figs are not gathered from thorns, nor are grapes picked from a bramble bush. (45) The good person out of the good treasure of the heart produces good, and the evil person out of evil treasure produces evil; for it is out of the abundance of the heart that the mouth speaks.”
**Matt. 12:46-50**

### επεκτείνωσις/expansion:

| (46) While he was still speaking to the crowds, his mother and his brothers were standing outside, wanting to speak to him. |
| (47) [Someone told him, “Look, your mother and your brothers are standing outside, wanting to speak to you.”] |
| **xρεία/chreia:** |
| (48) But to the one who had told him this, Jesus replied, “Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?” |

### Conclusion: κρίσις μετ’ αιτία/judgement with rationale:

(49) And pointing to his disciples, he said, “Here are my mother and my brothers! For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother.”

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### Topic 1: Jesus’ family (reply)

### εκ συγκρίσεως/argument from comparison with concluding question and answer:

| (31) Then his mother and his brothers came; and standing outside, they sent to him and called him. |
| (32) A crowd was sitting around him; and they said to him, “Your mother and your brother and your sisters are outside, asking for you.” |
| **xρεία/chreia:** |
| (33) And he replied, “Who are my mother and my brothers?” |

### Conclusion: κρίσις μετ’ αιτία/judgement with rationale:

(34) And looking at those who sat around him, he said, “Here are my mother and my brothers! Whoever does the will of God is my brother and sister and mother.”

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### Topic 1: Exit (reply)

### εκ μύθου/argument from fable:

| (24) “When the unclean spirit has gone out of a person, it wanders through waterless regions looking for a resting place, but it finds none. (25) Then it says, ‘I will return to my house from which I came.’ (26) Then it goes and brings along seven other spirits more evil than itself, and they enter and live there; and the last state of that person is worse than” |

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**Luke 8:19-21**

| (19) Then his mother and his brothers came to him, but they could not reach him because of the crowd. |
| (20) And he was told, “Your mother and your brothers are standing outside, wanting to see you.” |

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**Matthew 12:43-45 (Remainder of Matthew’s Sign of Jonah unit)**

| **(21) But he said to them, “My mother and my brothers are those who hear the word of God and do it.”** |

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### Topic 1: Exit (reply)

### εκ μύθου/argument from fable:

| (24) “When the unclean spirit has gone out of a person, it wanders through waterless regions looking for a resting place, but not finding any, it says, ‘I will return to my house from which I came.’ (25) When it comes, it finds it empty, swept, and put in order. (26) Then it goes and brings seven other spirits more evil than itself, and they enter and live there; and the last state of that person is worse than” |
is worse than the first. So will it be also with this evil generation."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic 2: Praise (reply)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>αποκριτική χρεία</strong>/responsive chreia:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27) While he was saying this, a woman in the crowd raised her voice and said to him, “Blessed is the womb that bore you and the breasts that nursed you!”</td>
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<tr>
<td>(28) But he said, “Blessed rather are those who hear the word of God and obey it!”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic 4: Test (Luke’s Sign of Jonah unit) (reply)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>πρόθεσις</strong>/propositio (a chreia):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29) When the crowds were increasing, he began to say, “This generation is an evil generation; it asks for a sign, but no sign will be given to it except the sign of Jonah.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Matt. 12:38-42: Matthew’s Sign of Jonah unit: immediately follows (but is not a part of) Matthew’s Beelzebul Controversy**

**Mark 8:11-12**

| (39) But he answered them, “An evil and adulterous generation asks for a sign, but no sign will be given to it except the sign of Jonah. |
| **αίτιο/rationale:** |
| (40) For just as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the sea monster, so for three days and three nights the Son of Man will be in the heart of the earth. |
| **ἐκ παράδειγμα**/argument from example 1: |
| (41) The people of Nineveh will rise up at the judgement with this |

| (41) The people of Nineveh will rise up at the judgement with this |
| **αίτιο/rationale:** |
| (30) For just as Jonah became a sign to the people of Nineveh, so the Son of Man will be to this generation. |
| **ἐκ παράδειγμα**/argument from example 1: |
| (31) The queen of the South will rise at the judgement with the |
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If then the light in you is darkness, how great is the darkness!

So, if your eye is healthy, your whole body will be full of light; but if your eye is unhealthy, your whole body will be full of darkness.

Therefore consider whether the light in you is not darkness. If then your whole body is full of light, with no part of it in darkness, it will be as full of light as a city that is built on a hill.

The queen of the South will rise up at the judgement with this generation and condemn it, because she came from the ends of the earth to listen to the wisdom of Solomon, and see, something greater than Solomon is here!

Example 2: The people of Nineveh will rise up at the judgement with this generation and condemn it, because they repented at the proclamation of Jonah, and see, something greater than Jonah is here!

Analogy:

a) Contrary:

(33) No one after lighting a lamp puts it in a cellar, but on the lampstand so that those who enter may see the light.

b) Application:

(34) Your eye is the lamp of your body.

c) Diairesis:

If your eye is healthy, your whole body will be full of light; but if it is not healthy, your body is full of darkness.

d) Concluding exhortation:

(35) Therefore consider whether the light in you is not darkness. If then your whole body is full of light, with no part of it in darkness, it will be as full of light as a city that is built on a hill.

Example 2: The people of Nineveh will rise up at the judgement with this generation and condemn it, because they repented at the proclamation of Jonah, and see, something greater than Jonah is here!

Analogy:

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(33) No one after lighting a lamp puts it in a cellar, but on the lampstand so that those who enter may see the light.

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If your eye is healthy, your whole body will be full of light; but if it is not healthy, your body is full of darkness.

d) Concluding exhortation:

(35) Therefore consider whether the light in you is not darkness. If then your whole body is full of light, with no part of it in darkness, it will be as full of light as a city that is built on a hill.
light as when a lamp gives you light with its rays."
Table 5.2: The Sayings Gospel Q: Text of Beelzebul Controversy (Q 11:14-23), Return of Unclean Spirit (11:24-26) and Demand for a Sign (11:29-35).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q 11:14-35</th>
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<tr>
<td>(14) καὶ έξη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) τινὲς δὲ εἶπον· ἐν Βεελζεβοῦλ τῷ ἀρχοντὶ τῶν δαμιονίων ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαμιόνια.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17) εἶδος δὲ τὰ διανοήματα αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· πάσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα [[καθ’]] ἑαυτῆς[[σ]] ἐρμοῦται καὶ πάσα οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ ἑαυτῆς οὐ σταθήσεται.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18) καὶ εἶ ὁ σατανᾶς ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐμερίσθη, πώς σταθήσεται η βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19) καὶ εἶ ἐγὼ ἐν Βεελζεβοῦλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαμιόνια, οἱ υἱοὶ ύμων ἐν τίνι ἐκβάλλουσιν; διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοὶ κρίνει· ἐσονται ύμῶν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20) εἰ δὲ ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ ἐγὼ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαμιόνια, ἀρα ἐφθασεν ἐφ’ ύμας ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (21-22) [[< >]]
| (23) ὁ μὴ ὡν μετ’ ἐμοῦ κατ’ ἐμοῦ ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ μὴ συνάγων μετ’ ἐμοῦ ἀκορτίζει. |
| (24) ὅταν τὸ ἀκάθαρτον πνεῦμα ἐξῆλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, διέρχεται δι’ ἀνύδρων τῶν ζητῶν ἀναπαύσαι καὶ οὐξ εὐρίσκει. |

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1441 The signs that we include are from the IQP: [[ ]] (brackets) represent material whose certainty is relatively low (i.e., letter C on a scale of certainty that begins with A [highest certainty] and descends through D); < > (angled brackets) represent revisions inserted by the IQP; .. (two dots) represents “some text . . . that cannot be reconstituted, though . . . this remains uncertain”; … (three dots) “indicate[s] there is some text that cannot be reconstituted, where not even a gist is suggested”; and ?? (question marks) represent text “where even the existence of any text at all is in doubt.” Robinson, Hoffmann and Kloppenborg, Sayings Gospel Q in Greek and English, 73-74. In the table we include two further units in Q that immediately follow and stand outside of its Controversy (1. the Return of the Unclean Spirit [11:24-26] and 2. the Demand for a Sign [11:16, 29-35]). The reason that we include these units is that Luke includes them in his Beelzebul Controversy, and so it will help to see their formulation first in Q.

1442 Fleddermann prefers μερισθείς ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἐρμοῦται καὶ οἰκίας ἐπὶ οἰκίαν πίπτει. See Q, 493.

1443 Fleddermann prefers πνευματικοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ. See Q, 493.

1444 Fleddermann believes that the text can be reconstituted as follows: ἣ πώς δύναται τις εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἱσχυροῦ καὶ τὰ σκέπα ἀρπάσαι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον δῆσῃ τὸν ἱσχυρόν; καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρπάσει. See Q, 493.
The IQP expresses uncertainty whether 11:27-28 exists in Q and (if it does), what its wording is. Fleddermann does not include the unit.

Here begin the two units that immediately follow the Beelzebul Controversy: the Return of the Unclean Spirit (11:24-26) and Demand for a Sign (Q 11:16, 29-35). Both Fleddermann (Q, 502-504) and Alan Kirk regard the Demand for a Sign as a distinct unit in Q, but also regard it as closely related to the Beelzebul Controversy and so to be read together with it. See Fleddermann, Q, 475, 503, 509; Kirk, Composition, 192-197, 310-311, 327-328. In Q 497, Fleddermann reconstructs Q 11:16 differently than the IQP: ἐτεροὶ δὲ έίπον αὐτῷ· διδάσκαλε, ἑξελεύνειν ἀπὸ σου σημείον ἁπέδει. See Q, 494.

Fleddermann prefers ὃ δὲ ἀποκρίθησιν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· γενέα ποιημάτων ἐπιζήτει· . . . ; see Q, 494.

Fleddermann prefers ὡσπερ γὰρ ἦν ἱερος τοῖς Νινευῖταις σημείον, and omits καὶ from the following clause. See Q, 494.

Fleddermann prefers ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑδίου; see Q, 520.

Fleddermann prefers in place of this possible clause, καὶ λάμπει πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ. See Q, 520.

Fleddermann records εὰν in place of αὖ in this sentence, and prefers to render the final verb ἔσται. See Q, 520.

The IQP doubts that Luke 11:36 has come from Q (doubts there was a Q 11:36).
...αν δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς σου πονηρὸς ἦ, ὅλον τὸ σώμα σου σκοτεῖν. (35) εἶ ὅλω τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν σοὶ σκότος ἔστιν, τὸ σκότος ποσοῦ.
Table 5.3: Mark’s Adaptation of Matthew and Luke (the 2GH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a) Accusations against Jesus:</strong></td>
<td><strong>a) Accusations against Jesus:</strong></td>
<td><strong>a) Accusations against Jesus:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22) Καὶ ἐξέται εἰς ὄφον καὶ συνέρχεται πάλιν [ο] ὦστος, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι αὐτὸς μηδὲ ἄρτον ἑαυτοῦ. (21) καὶ ἀκούσαντες οἱ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἐξήλθον κρατήσας αὐτὸν ἐλεγον γὰρ ὅτι ἔζησθ.</td>
<td>(22) Τότε προσήχθη αὐτῷ δαιμονιζόμενος τυφλός καὶ κωφός, καὶ ἔθεραπευσαν αὐτὸν, ὡστε τὸν κωφὸν λαλεῖν καὶ βλέπειν. <strong>Quaestio</strong> (presentation of case): (23) καὶ ἐξελθὰτο πάντες οἱ ὀστοὶ καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι αὐτὸς ἔστιν ὁ υἱός Δαυίδ;</td>
<td>(22) Καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς οἱ ἀπὸ ἱεροσολύμων καταβάντες ἐλεγον ὅτι Βεελζεβοῦλ ἔχει. <strong>Topic 2: Does Jesus possess Beelzebul?</strong> (22) Καὶ ἦν εἰκάλλων δαιμονίους [καὶ αὐτὸ ἦν] κωφόν. <strong>Topoi:</strong> Exit ἐγένετο διὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐξελθόντος ἐλάληκεν ὁ κωφὸς. <strong>Topic 2: Praise</strong> ἐλευθερώθη ὁ δαιμονιζόμενος ὅτι Βεελζεβοῦλ ἔχει. <strong>Topic 3: Casting out demons</strong> καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1453 The divisions and labels below are from Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 172-175. Cp. similarly Gundry, Mark, 170.
1454 For structure see Gundry, Matthew, 10-11, 203-204, 241, 248-250.
1455 Since the chreia (the propositio) is posed negatively, it might seem at first difficult to appreciate how this argument from the opposite supports it. It essentially says: “One can hurt somebody else” (hence supporting the propositio that one would not hurt oneself).
| Argument from analogies for the implausibility of the Pharisees’ definition: |
| πάσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα καθ’ εαυτής έρημοτάι καὶ πάσα πόλις ἢ οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ εαυτής οὐ σταθήσεται. |
| (26) καὶ εἰ ὁ σατανᾶς τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει, εφ’ ἐαυτὸν ἐμερίσθη; πῶς οὖν σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ; |
| Argument from quality in common: |
| (27) καὶ εἰ ἔγω ἐν Βεελζεβούλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμονία, οἱ οὐκ ὕμων ἐν τίνι ἐκβάλλουσιν; διὰ τούτο αὐτοὶ κρίται ἔσονται ὕμων. |
| Counterdefinition: |
| (28) εἰ δὲ ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ ἔγω ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμονία, ἀρα ἐφθασεν εφ’ ὕμως ἢ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ. |

| Argument from analogy for implausibility of definition: |
| πάσα βασιλεία εφ’ ἐαυτὴν μερισθείσα εὑρίσκεται καὶ οἱ οἰκίαι ἐπὶ οἰκον πίπτει. |
| (18) εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ σατανᾶς ἐφ’ ἐαυτὸν διεμερίσθη, πῶς σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ; |
| Argument from quality in common: |
| ὅτι λέγετε ἐν Βεελζεβούλ ἐκβάλλειν μὲ τὰ δαιμονία. |
| (19) εἰ δὲ ἔγω ἐν Βεελζεβούλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμονία, οἱ οὐκ ὕμων ἐν τίνι ἐκβάλλουσιν; διὰ τούτο αὐτοὶ ύμων κρίται ἔσονται. |
| Counterdefinition: |
| (20) εἰ δὲ ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ [ἔγω] ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμονία, ἀρα ἐπάθανεν εφ’ ὕμως ἢ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ. |

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1456 I change Robbins’ terminology here from *counterdefinition* (“Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 186) to *argument from quality in common*, the same label as for Matthew 12:27.

1457 I change Robbins’ terminology to specify this particular question as the *counterdefinition*; see preceding note.
Restatement by analogy:
(29) ἢ πῶς δυναται τις εἰσελθεῖν ἐις τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἱσχυροῦ καὶ τὰ σκέψη αὐτοῦ ἀρπασαι, ἕαν μὴ πρῶτον δήσῃ τοῦ ἱσχυροῦ; καὶ τὸ τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρπάσῃ.

Syllogism:
(30) ὃ μὴ ὧν μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ κατ᾿ ἐμοῦ ἔστιν, καὶ ὃ μὴ συνάγων μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ σκορπίζει.

Gravity:
(31) Διὰ τούτο λέγω ὑμῖν, πάσα ἁμαρτία καὶ βλασφημία ἀφεθῆσαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,

ή δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος βλασφημία ὑπὸ ἀφεθῆσαι.

Statement of law:
(32) καὶ οὗ ἐὰν εἶπῃ λόγον κατὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀφεθῆσαι αὐτῷ ὃς δ᾿ ἂν εἶπῃ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου, οὐκ ἀφεθῆσαι αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι.

Topic 2: Does Jesus possess Beelzebul?

Syllogism:
(23) ὃ μὴ ὧν μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ κατ᾿ ἐμοῦ ἔστιν, καὶ ὃ μὴ συνάγων μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ σκορπίζει.

Syllogism:
(28) ἂμην λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πάντα ἀφεθήσεται τοῖς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ ἢ βλασφημία ὑπὸ ἀφεθησάτωσιν.

Gravity:
(29) ὃς δ᾿ ἂν βλασφημήσῃ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγίον, οὐκ ἔχει ἀφεσιν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἀλλὰ ἐνοχὸς ἐστὶν αἰωνίου ἁμαρτήματος. (30) ὅτι ἔλεγον πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον ἔχει.

Luke 12:10:
(10) Καὶ πᾶς ὁς ἔρει λόγον εἰς τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ τῷ δὲ εἰς τὸ ἁγίον πνεῦμα βλασφημήσαντι οὐκ ἀφεθήσεται.
Comparison:

(33) Ἡ ποίησαι τὸ δένδρον καλὸν καὶ τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῦ καλὸν, ἢ ποίησαι τὸ δένδρον σαπρὸν καὶ τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῦ σαπρὸν· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δένδρον γινώσκεται.

Conclusion:

Direct address:

(34) γεννηματα ἑχιδών,

Quaestio:

πῶς δύνασθε ἁγαθά λαλεῖν πονηροὶ ὄντες;

Rationale:

ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ περισσεύματος τῆς καρδίας τὸ στόμα λαλεῖ. (35) ὁ ἁγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει ἁγαθά, καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει πονηρά.

Judgement with rationale:

(36) λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶν ῥῆμα ἁρχον ὁ λαλῶσαν οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἀποδόθωσιν περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως· (37) ἐκ γὰρ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιώθησαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου καταδικασθῆσαι.

Matthew 12:46-50: An expanded/elaborated chreia which, following the Sign of Jonah unit (12:38-45), concludes Matt.’s (third) major narrative section (11:2-12:50)1434

Luke 6:43-45:

(43) Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν δένδρον καλὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν σαπρὸν, οὐδὲ πάλιν δένδρον καδρόν ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν. (44) ἐκαστὸν γὰρ δένδρον ἐκ τοῦ ἱδίου καρποῦ γινώσκεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκανθῶν συλλέγοντας σύκα οὐδὲ ὡς βάτου σταφυλῆν τρυγόσιν. (45) ὁ ἁγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ τῆς καρδίας προφέρει τὸ ἁγαθόν, καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ προφέρει τὸ πονηρὸν· ἐκ γὰρ περισσεύματος καρδίας λαλεῖ τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ.

Topic 1: Jesus’ family

Argument from comparison (ἐκ συγκρίσεως) with concluding question and answer:

(31) Καὶ ἔρχεται ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ ἔστηκεν

John 8:19-21:

(19) Ἐφέρεντο δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ.
οἱ ἀδελφοὶ αὐτοῦ εἰστήκεισαν ἐξο ξητούντες αὐτῷ λαλῆσαι.

(47) ἔπειν δὲ τις αὐτῶν ἤδου ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ σου ἐξο ἐστήκασιν ξητούντες σοι λαλῆσαι.)

χρεία/χρεια:
(48) ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν τῷ λέγοντι αὐτῷ· τίς ἐστίν ἡ μήτηρ μου καὶ τίνες εἰσίν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μου;

Conclusion: κρίσις μετ’ αἴτια/ judgement with rationale:
(49) καὶ ἐκτείνει τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ εἶπεν ἤδου ἡ μήτηρ μου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μου. (50) ὡστὶς γὰρ ἂν ποιήσῃ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς μου τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς αὐτοῦ μου ἀδελφὸς καὶ ἀδελφὴ καὶ μήτηρ ἐστίν.

στήκοντες ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς αὐτὸν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν. (32) καὶ ἔκαθητο περὶ αὐτοῦ ὁχλὸς, καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτῶ· ἤδου ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ σου [καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ οἱ οἱ ἐξο ξητούσιν σε.

Jesus’ reply:
(33) καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς αὐτοῖς λέγει· τίς ἐστίν ἡ μήτηρ μου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ [μου];

Conclusion (judgement with rationale):
(34) καὶ περιβλεψάμενος τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ κύκλῳ καθημένους λέγει· ἢδε ἡ μήτηρ μου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μου. (35) ὡς [γὰρ] ἂν ποιήσῃ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, οὗτος ἀδελφὸς μου καὶ ἀδελφὴ καὶ μήτηρ ἐστίν.

αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἠδύναντο συντυχεῖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ ὄχλου.

(20) ἀπηγγέλη δὲ αὐτῶ· ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ σου ἐστήκασιν ἐξο ἰδεῖν θέλοντες σε.

(35) ὡς ἔφυγεν ἀπὸ τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ἀπὸ τὸν πάτριον τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ σου καὶ τους σου ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἀδελφὴν καὶ μήτηρ σου ἐστίν.

(21) ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς· μήτηρ μου καὶ ἀδελφοὶ μου οὗτοι εἰσίν οἱ τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ ἀκούσαντες καὶ ποιοῦντες:
Table 5.4: Matthew’s Adaptation of Mark (the FH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Accusations against Jesus:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>έπεκτέινωσις/ expansion:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22) Τότε προσηνέχθη αὐτῷ δαιμονιζόμενος τυφλὸς καὶ κωφὸς, καὶ ἐθεραπευσαν αὐτὸν, ὥστε τὸν κωφὸν λαλεῖν καὶ βλέπειν.</td>
<td>(20) καὶ ἔρχεται ἵς δίκοις καὶ συνέρχεται πάλιν ἕκεν ὅ χολος, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι αὐτοὺς μὴ ψεύδονται.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Κωμεία (presentation of the case):</td>
<td>(21) καὶ άκουσαντες οἱ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἔξηλθον κρατήσαει αὐτὸν ἐλεγον γὰρ ὅτι ἐξεστή.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23) καὶ εἰσίσταντο πάντες οἱ χολοί καὶ ἐλεγον μὴ τί οὔτος ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς Δαυὶδ;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>béρος (definition):</td>
<td>Topic 2: Does Jesus possess Beelzebul?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24) οἱ δὲ Φαρισαίοι ἀκούσαντες εἶπον: οὗτος οὐκ ἔκβάλλει τὰ δαίμονια εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ Βεελζεβοῦ ἀρχον τῶν δαίμονίων.</td>
<td>(22) Καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰεροσολύμων καταβάντες ἐλεγον ὅτι Βεελζεβοῦ ἔχει</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Jesus’ reply:</td>
<td>Topic 3: Casting out demons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional comment:</td>
<td>Χρεία/ χρεία:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(25) εἶδος δὲ τὸς ἐνθυμήσεις αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς:</td>
<td>καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀρχον τῶν δαίμονίων ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαίμονια.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument from analogies for the implausibility of the Pharisees’ definition:</td>
<td>b) Jesus’ reply:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα καθ’ ἑαυτῆς ἔρισανται καὶ πᾶσα πόλις ἡ οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ ἑαυτῆς οὐ σταθήσεται.</td>
<td>Topic 3: Casting out demons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>έκ παραβολῶν/arguments from analogy (x 3):</td>
<td>Responsive χρεία:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24) καὶ έαν βασιλεία ἐφ’ ἑαυτῇ μερίσθη, οὐ δύναται σταθήσαι η βασιλεία ἐκείνη: (25) καὶ ἐαν οἰκία ἐφ’ ἑαυτῇ μερίσθη, οὐ δυνήσεται η οἰκία ἐκείνη σταθήσαι.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1458 These terms are adapted from Robbins, “Rhetorical Composition & the Beelzebul Controversy,” 178-183.
Topic 2: Does Jesus possess Beelzebul?

Since the propositio is posed negatively, it might seem at first difficult to appreciate how this argument from the opposite supports it. It essentially says: “One can hurt somebody else” (hence supporting the propositio one would not hurt oneself).
Conclusion: 

Direct address: 
(34) γεννήματα ἐχιδνών,

Quaestio: 
πῶς δύνασθε ἀγαθὰ λαλεῖν πονηροὶ ὀντεῖς;

Rationale: 
ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ περισσεύματος τῆς καρδίας τὸ στόμα λαλεῖ. (35) ὁ ἄγαθος ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει ἀγαθὰ, καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει πονῆρα.

Judgement with rationale: 
(36) λέγω δὲ ὅτι πᾶν ῥήμα ἀργὸν ὁ λαλήσασθαι οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἀποδώσασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως. (37) ἐκ γὰρ τῶν λόγων σοῦ δίκαιωθης, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων σοῦ καταδίκασθης.
Table 5.5: Matthew’s Adaptation of Mark and Q (the 2DH)


#### a) Accusations against Jesus:

**Expansion:**

- **Topic 1: Jesus’ family [a]**
  - (20) Καὶ ἐχρηστεύει ἐν τῷ ὀλίγῳ και συνήχθει πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡςτε μὴ δύνασθαι αὐτοῖς μηδὲ ἁρτον φαγεῖν. (21) καὶ ἀκούσαντες οἱ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἔξελθουν κρατῆσαι αὐτοῦ ἔλεγον γὰρ ὅτι ἔξεστι.

- **Topic 2: Does Jesus possess Beelzebul? [b]**
  - (22) Καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς οἱ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ Ἰεροσολύμων καταβάντες ἔλεγον ὅτι Βεέλζεβού ἔχει

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1460 The IQP expresses uncertainty regarding the wording of Q 11:21-22.

1461 In its Q context, Kirk characterizes Q 12:10 as a statement cautioning opponents of the Q community (not its members); the unit “threatens them with condemnation if they reject the . . . witness of those standing before them.” This statement belongs to an instructional speech that “exhorts to courage” (Q 12:2-12)—that encourages Jesus’ followers to speak bravely. This speech in turn belongs to a macro-unit which Kirk labels the Eschatological Discourse, a unit “structured in its entirety to depict an eschatological reversal of status”: see *Composition*, 211-212, 213, 214-215, 294-296. Fleddermann, *Q*, 591-592, describes and contextualizes 12:10 similarly: it is an admonition “urging the disciples not to worry about earthly things” (p. 608). In some ways however he and Kirk differ: Fleddermann believes that 12:10 “corrects” 12:8-9, an interpretation with which Kirk, *Composition*, 210-211, disagrees, preferring to see 12:8-9 and 12:10 each aimed at a different audience (the first at Q adherents, the second at Q opponents). Moreover, Fleddermann contextualizes the statement differently (pp. 583-594), without the same degree of rhetorical sensitivity as we find in Kirk’s presentation (pp. 206-215).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quaestio (presentation of the case):</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(23) καὶ εξίσταντο πάντες οἱ ὀχλοὶ καὶ ἔλεγον· μήτι σὺτος ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς Δαυίδ;</td>
<td>καὶ έθαύμασαν οἱ ὀχλοί.</td>
<td>καὶ έθαύμασαν οἱ ὀχλοί λέγοντες· οὐδέποτε ἐφάνη σὺτος ἐν τῷ ἱερολ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὁρὸς (definition):</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24) οἱ δὲ Φαρισαῖοι ἀκούσαντες εἶπον· οὗτος εἰκ γὰρ ἱκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια εἰ μὴ εἰς τὸ Βεελζεβοῦλ ἀρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων.</td>
<td>(15) τινὲς δὲ εἶπον· ἐν Βεελζεβοῦλ τῷ ἀρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων ἱκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια.</td>
<td>(34) οἱ δὲ Φαρισαῖοι ἔλεγον· ἐν τῷ ἀρχοντὶ τῶν δαιμονίων ἱκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Jesus’ reply:</td>
<td>b) Jesus’ reply:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional comment:</td>
<td>Transitional comment:</td>
<td>Transitional comment:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(25) εἴδος δὲ τὸς ἐνθμήματος αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·</td>
<td>(17) εἰδὸς δὲ τὰ διανοήματα αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·</td>
<td>(23) καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος αὐτοὺς ἐν παραβολῇ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς· πῶς δύναται σατανᾶς σατανᾶν ἱκβάλλειν;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument from analogies for the implausibility of the Pharisees’ definition:</td>
<td>Argument from analogies for the implausibility of the Pharisees’ definition:</td>
<td>Argument from analogy (x 3):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα καθ’ εαυτῆς ἐρημοῦται καὶ πᾶσα πόλις ἡ οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ εαυτῆς οὐ σταθήσεται.</td>
<td>πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθείσα [καθ’] ἐαυτῆς[[s]] ἐρημοῦται καὶ πᾶσα οἰκία μερισθείσα καθ’ εαυτῆς οὐ σταθήσεται.</td>
<td>(24) καὶ ἕαν βασιλεία ἔφ’ ἐαυτὴν μερισθῇ, οὐ δύναται σταθῆναι ἡ βασιλεία ἐκείνη (25) καὶ ἕαν οἰκία ἔφ’ ἐαυτὴν μερισθῇ, οὐ δύναται ἡ οἰκία</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1462 This is Mark’s Topic 3: Casting out demons, in form of χρεία/chreia (that expresses ὁρὸς/definition): [c]. We mention this in a footnote in order to help show the close parallel between Matt. 9:34 and Mark 3:22b.

1463 Since the chreia (the propositio) is posed negatively, it might seem at first difficult to appreciate how this argument from the opposite supports it. It essentially says: “One can hurt somebody else” (hence supporting the propositio that one would not hurt oneself).
(26) καὶ εἶ ὁ σάτανᾶς τὸν σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλει, ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐμερίσθη: πῶς σὺν σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;

Argument from quality in common:
(27) καὶ εἶ ἐγώ ἐν Βεελζεβοῦλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαίμονια, οἱ υἱοὶ υἱῶν ἐν τινὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν: διὰ τούτο αὐτοὶ κρίται ἔσονται υμῶν.

Counterdefinition:
(28) εἰ δὲ ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ ἐγώ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαίμονια, ἀρα ἐφθάσαν ἐφ’ υμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.

Restatement by analogy:
(29) ἡ πῶς δύνασται τὶς εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἱσχυροῦ καὶ τὰ σκεῦη αὐτοῦ ἀρπάσαι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον δήσῃ τὸν ἱσχυρὸν; καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρπάσει.

Syllogism:
(30) ὁ μὴ ὄν ἐμοὶ κατ’ ἐμοῦ ἐστὶν, καὶ ὁ μὴ συνάγων μετ’ ἐμοῦ σκορπίζει.

(18) καὶ εἶ ὁ σάτανᾶς ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐμερίσθη, πῶς σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ;

(21-22) \[\text{merισθη, οὐ δυνήσεται ἡ οἰκία ἕκεινη σταθήσει.}\]

(19) καὶ εἶ ἐγώ ἐν Βεελζεβοῦλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαίμονια, οἱ υἱοὶ υἱῶν ἐν τινὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν: διὰ τούτο αὐτοὶ κρίται ἔσονται υμῶν.

(26) καὶ εἶ ὁ σάτανᾶς ἀνάστη ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐμερίσθη, οὐ δύνασται στήσαι ἄλλα τέλος ἑξεῖ.

(20) εἰ δὲ ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ ἐγώ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαίμονια, ἀρα ἐφθάσαν ἐφ’ υμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ.

(27) ἀλλ’ οὐ δύνασται οὐδεὶς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἱσχυροῦ εἰσελθῶν τὰ σκεῦη αὐτοῦ διαρπάσαι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἱσχυρὸν δήσῃ, καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρπάσει.

(23) ὁ μὴ ὄν μετ’ ἐμοῦ κατ’ ἐμοῦ ἐστὶν, καὶ ὁ μὴ συνάγων μετ’ ἐμοῦ σκορπίζει.
Gravity:
(31) Διὰ τούτου λέγω ύμίν, πάσα αμαρτία καὶ βλασφημία αφεθήσεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν, ἣ τοῦ πνεύματος βλασφημία οὐκ αφεθήσεται.

Statement of law:
(32) καὶ ὁ ἐὰν εἰπῇ λόγον κατὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, αφεθήσεται αὐτῷ ὁ δὲ ἐὰν εἰπή κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου, οὐκ αφεθήσεται αὐτῷ. οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἔτει τῷ αἰῶνι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι.

Comparison:
(33) Η ποίησετε τὸ δένδρον καλὸν καὶ τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῦ καλὸν, ἢ ποίησατε τὸ δένδρον σαπρὸν καὶ τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῦ σαπρὸν.

From Q 12:10
(10) καὶ ὁ ἐὰν εἰπῇ λόγον εἰς τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αφεθήσεται αὐτῷ ὁ δὲ ἐὰν [[εἰπή]] ἐν τῷ ἁγίου πνεύμα ὁ οὐκ αφεθήσεται αὐτῷ.

From Q 6:43-45
(43) οὐκ ἢ εἰσίν ἵστιν δένδρον καλὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν σαπρὸν, οὔτε [[πάλι]] δένδρον σαπρὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν.  

From Q 12:10
(1461) καὶ ὁ ἐὰν εἰπῇ λόγον εἰς τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ αἰῶνος τῶν Ἀμαρτιῶν, οὐκ ἐχει άφεσιν οὐκ άφεσιν οὐκ άφεσιν οὐκ άφεσιν οὐκ άφεσιν.

From Q 6:43-45
(15) Προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῶν φεαστῶν, οἵτινες ἔρχονται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ἐνδυμασίᾳ προβάτων, ἴσως ἐὰν λοιπὸν ἁρπαγῆς.

Topic 2: Does Jesus possess Beelzebul?

From Ko 12:43
(28) Μήν λέγω ύμίν ὅτι πάντα αφεθήσεται τοῖς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἀμαρτίματα καὶ αἱ βλασφημίαι ὁσα ἔχειν ἡμῖν βλασφημήσωσιν.

From Q 6:43-45
(29) οὐ δὲ ἐν βλασφημίᾳ ἐγὼ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγιόν, οὐκ ἔχει ἀφεσιν εἰς τούς αἰῶνας, ἀλλά ἐν χόρῳ οὗτος ἑστιν αἰωνίου ἀμαρτίματος. (30) οὕς ἔλεγον πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον ἔχει.

Matthew 7:15-20 (a partial doublet to 12:33-37):

(15) Προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῶν φεαστῶν, οἵτινες ἔρχονται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ἐνδυμασίᾳ προβάτων, ἴσως ἐὰν λοιπὸν ἁρπαγῆς.


(18) οὐ δύναται δενδρὸν ἀγαθὸν καρποὺς ποιῆσαι οὐκ ἐν βλασφημίᾳ ἐγὼ τὸ δενδρὸν σαπρὸν καρποὺς καλοὺς ποιῆς (and cp. v. 17: σύντον ἐν δενδρῷ ἀγαθὸν καρποὺς καλοὺς ποιεῖ, το δε σαπροῖν δενδρῷν καρποὺς ποιητικὸς ποιεῖ.)
 ek γάρ τού καρποῦ τό δέντρον γινώσκεται.

Conclusion:
Direct address:
(34) γεννήματα ἐχίδνων,

Quaestio:
πώς δύνασθε ἀγαθὰ λαλεῖν πονηροὶ ὄντες;

Rationale:
ἐκ γάρ τοῦ περισσεύματος τῆς καρδίας τὸ στόμα λαλεῖ. (35) ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει ἀγαθά, καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει πονηρά.

Judgement with rationale:
(36) λέγω δὲ ύμιν ὅτι πάν ῥήμα αργοῦ ὁ λαλήσαςαι ὁι ἄνθρωποι ἀποδοθοῦνε περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον ἐν ἡμέρα κρίσεως. (37) ἐκ γάρ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιώθης, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου καταδικάσθησιν.

(44) ἐκ γάρ τοῦ καρποῦ τό δέντρον γινώσκεται.
μὴ τι συλλέγουσιν ἐξ ἀκανθῶν σίκα ἢ ἐκ τριβόλων σταφυλίζαι;

(45) ὁ ἄγαθος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει ἀγαθά, καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ θησαυροῦ ἐκβάλλει πονηρά. ἐκ γάρ περισσεύματος καρδίας λαλεῖ τὸ στόμα ἑαυτοῦ.

(16a) ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν αὐτῶν ἐπηγώσασθε αὐτοὺς.
(16b) μὴ τι συλλέγουσιν ἀπὸ ἀκανθῶν σταφυλίζαι ἢ ἀπὸ τριβόλων σίκα;
### Table 5.6: Luke’s Adaptation of Matthew (the FH/2GH)

|----------------|--------------|

#### a) Accusations against Jesus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(\text{ἐπεκτείνωσις/expiration:})</th>
<th>(\text{ἐπεκτείνωσις/expiration:})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation: (cp. Matt. 9:32-34)</td>
<td>Situation: (14) Καὶ ἢν ἕκβαλλων δαιμόνιον [καὶ αὐτὸ ἢν] κωφὸν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22) Τότε προσηνέχθη ἀυτῷ δαιμονίζομενος τυφλός καὶ κωφός, καὶ ἐθέράπευσεν αὐτόν, ὡστε τὸν κωφὸν λαλείν καὶ βλέπειν.</td>
<td>Τοπίο 1: Exit έγένετο δὲ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐξελθόντος ἐλάλησεν ὁ κωφὸς</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quaesitio (presentation of case):</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topic 2: Praise</strong> καὶ ἐθαύμασαν οἱ ὁχλοί.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23) καὶ ἐξίσταντο πάντες οἱ ὁχλοί καὶ ἐλεγον · μήτι αὐτὸς ἐστιν ὁ υἱός Δαυίδ;</td>
<td><strong>Topic 3: Censure</strong> καὶ οὐκ ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια εἰκόνα ἐν Βεελζεβούλ τῷ ἀρχοντὶ τῶν δαιμονίων ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ὅρος (definition):</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topic 4: Test</strong> (=propositio no. 2):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24) οἱ δὲ Φαρισαίοι ἀκούσαντες εἶπον ὁὕτος οὐκ ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια ἐν τῷ Βεελζεβούλ ἀρχοντὶ τῶν δαιμονίων.</td>
<td>(16) ἔτεροι δὲ πειράζοντες σημείον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐξήτουν παρ’ αὐτοῦ.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### b) Jesus’ reply:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Transitional comment:</strong></th>
<th>Argument from analogies for the implausibility of the Pharisees’ definition:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(25) Εἴδος δὲ τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς.</td>
<td>πάσα βασιλεία μερισθεῖσα καθ’ έαυτὴς ἐρημοῦται καὶ πάσα πόλις ἡ οἰκία</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1465 Goulder, Luke, 510-511, believes that Luke 11:17-28 is so close in content to Matt. 12:46-50, and in sequence too (i.e., 11:27-28 follows directly upon Luke 11:24-26, the parable of the unclean spirit, just as Matt. 12:46-50 follows directly upon that same parable), that Luke must be following Matthew. The notion that Luke could have found in Q (or in Lukan Sondersgut) similar material and in the same relative position, Goulder finds too much of a “coincidence.”
1466 According to Luz, Matthew 1-7, 223, 246-247.
1467 According to Luz, Matthew 1-7, 391-392.
1468 An argument from analogy in Matthew’s context.
(10) Καὶ πᾶς ὁς ἔρει λόγον ἐς τοῦ ὕμων τοῦ ἄνθρωπον, ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ: οὐ δὲ ἂν ἔρει λόγον τοῦ ἄγιου νευματοτοκοῦ, ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ τάς δὲ εἰς τό ἁγίων νευματα βλασφημησαντι οὐκ ἀφεθήσεται.

(43) Ό γὰρ ἠτίν αὐτῶν καλὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν σαπρόν, οὐδὲ πάλιν δεήσω σαπρὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν. (44) Ἐκατον τόν δὲ ἀκατάλληλον καλὸν ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν.

Conclusion:
Direct address:
(34) γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν,

Quæstio:
pώς δυνασθε ἄγαθα λαλεῖν πονηροὶ ὄντες;

Rationale:
εἰ γάρ τοῦ περισσύμματος τῆς καρδίας τὸ στόμα λαλεῖ. (35) ὁ ἄγαθος ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ ἄγαθου θησαυροῦ εκβάλλει ἄγαθα, καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς ἀνθρώπος ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ θησαυροῦ εκβάλλει πονηρὰ.

Judgement with rationale:
(36) λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι πάν ῥῆμα ἄργον ὁ λαλῶσαι οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ ἀποδώσουσιν περί αὐτοῦ λόγον εἰς ἡμέρα κρίσεως. (37) ἐκ γὰρ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιωθήσῃ, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου καταδικασθήσῃ.

Matthew 12:43-45: Remainder of Matthew’s Sign of Jonah unit
Argument from fable:
(43) ὅταν τὸ ἄκαθαρτον πνεῦμα ἐξῆλθη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, διέρχεται δι’ ἀνώδρων τόπων ζητοῦν αναπαυσιν καὶ οὐχ εὑρίσκει. (44) τότε λέγει εἰς τὸν οἶκον μου ἐπιστρέφων ὅθεν ἐξῆλθον καὶ ἔλθον εὑρίσκει σαμαριταίους καὶ κεκοσμημένους. (45) τότε πορεύεται καὶ παραλαμβάνει μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπτὰ ἐτέρα πνεῦμα πονηρότερα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ εἰσελθόντα κατοικεῖ ἐκεῖ καὶ γίνεται τα ἐσχατὰ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἑκείνου χείρονα τῶν πρῶτων, οὕτως ἔσται καὶ τῇ γενέᾳ τῇ πονηρᾷ. [cp. 6:45 above]

Topic 1: Exit (reply)

(24) ὅταν τὸ ἄκαθαρτον πνεῦμα ἐξῆλθη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, διέρχεται δι’ ἀνώδρων τόπων ζητοῦν αναπαυσιν καὶ μὴ εὑρίσκον· [τότε] λέγει· ὑποστρέψω εἰς τὸν οἶκον μου ἐδών εξῆλθον· (25) καὶ ἔλθον εὑρίσκει σαμαριταίους καὶ κεκοσμημένους. (26) τότε πορεύεται καὶ παραλαμβάνει ἑτέρα πνεῦμα πονηρότερα ἑαυτοῦ ἐπτὰ καὶ εἰσελθόντα κατοικεῖ ἐκεῖ καὶ γίνεται τα ἐσχατὰ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἑκείνου χείρονα τῶν πρῶτων.
Matthew 12:38-42: The Sign of Jonah unit: immediately follows (but is not a part of) Matt.’s Beelzebul Controversy [cp. Mark 8:11-12]

Expansion:
(38) Τότε ἀπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ τίνες τῶν γραμματέων καὶ Φαρισαίων λέγοντες· διδάσκαλε, θέλομεν ἀπὸ σου σημείον ἰδεῖν.

Proposito (chreia):
(39) ο δὲ ἀποκρίθησεν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· γενεὰ πονηρὰ καὶ μοιχαλὶς σημείον ἐπίζητεί, καὶ σημεῖον αὕτη δοθήσεται αὐτῇ εἰ μὴ τὸ σημεῖον ἱωνᾶ τοῦ προφήτου.

Rationale:
(40) ὥσπερ γὰρ ἦν ἱωνᾶς ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ τοῦ κήτους τρεῖς ἡμέρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας, οὕτως ἦστα τῷ ἰώσ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τῆς γῆς τρεῖς ἡμέρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας.

Argument from example 1:

Argument from example 2:

Topic 2: Praise
Comparison (cp. Matt. 12:33, above):
(27) Ἐγένετο δὲ ἐν τῷ λέγειν αὐτῶν ταύτα ἐπάρασα τῆς φωνῆς γυνῆ ἐκ τοῦ ὀχλοῦ εἶπεν αὐτῷ· μακαρία ἡ κοιλία ἡ βαστάσασα σε καὶ μαστοί ὑσ τῆς ἐθήλασας. (28) αὐτὸς δὲ εἶπεν· μακαρίοι οἱ ἄκουσαν τοῦ λόγου τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ φιλάσσοντες.

Topic 4: Test (Luke’s Sign of Jonah unit)

Proposito (chreia):
(29) Τῶν δὲ ὄχλων ἐπαθροιζομένων ἥραστο λέγειν· γενεὰ αὐτῆ γενεὰ πονηρά ἵσταν· σημεῖον ζητεῖ, καὶ σημεῖον αὕτη δοθήσεται αὐτῇ εἰ μὴ τὸ σημεῖον ἱωνᾶ.

Rationale:
(30) καθὼς γὰρ ἠγένετο ἱωνᾶς τοῖς Νινευίταις σημείοις, οὕτως ἦστα καὶ ο ὦς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ γενεᾷ ταύτῃ.

Argument from example 1:
(31) βασιλείας νότου ἐγερθῆται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετὰ τῶν ἄνδρων τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης καὶ κατακρινεῖ αὐτῶς, ὅτι ἠλθεν εἰς τῶν περάτων τῆς γῆς ἀκούσαι τὴν σοφίαν Σολομώνος, καὶ ιδοὺ πλείον Σολομώνος ἔδε.

Argument from example 2:
(32) άνδρες Νινευίται ἀναστήσονται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετὰ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτήν· ὅτι μετενόησαν εἰς τὸ κήρυγμα ἱωνᾶ, καὶ ιδοὺ πλείον ἱωνᾶ ἔδε.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument from analogy:</th>
<th>Argument from analogy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(15) Οὐδὲ καὶ οὐσίαν λύχνων καὶ τιθέασιν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον ἄλλ’ ἐπί τὴν λυχνίαν, καὶ λάμπει πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ οίκῃ.</td>
<td>a) Contrary: (33) Οὐδεὶς λύχνων ἁψας εἰς κρύπτην τίθησιν [οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον] ἄλλ’ ἐπί τὴν λυχνίαν, ἵνα οἱ εἰσπορευόμενοι τὸ φῶς βλέπωσιν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Cp. Mark 4:21]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Matt. 6:22-23: From a unit warning against material possessions (6:19-24), within Sermon on the Mount.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument from analogy:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22) ὁ λύχνος τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ὀφθαλμός:</td>
<td>b) Application: (34) ὁ λύχνος τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰς οὖν ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ἀπλοῦς, ὅλον τὸ σῶμα σου φωτεινὸν ἐστι (23) εἷς ἕν ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ἄνυσθα, ὅλον τὸ σῶμα σου σκοτεινὸν ἐστι.</td>
<td>c) Diatresis: μή τὸ σῶμα σου σκοτεινὸν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα σου σκοτεινὸν.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰς οὖν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν σοὶ σκότος ἐστίν, τὸ σκότος πόσον.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) Concluding Exhortation: (35) σκότει οὖν μὴ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν σοὶ σκότος ἐστίν.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(36) εἰς οὖν τὸ σῶμα σου ὁλον φωτεινὸν, μὴ ἔχον μέρος τι σκοτεινὸν, ἐσται φωτεινὸν ὅλον ὡς ὅταν ὁ λύχνος τῇ ἀστραπῇ φωτίζῃ σε.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (14) καὶ ἐκλήθησαν δαίμονοι κωφόν καὶ ἐκλήθησαν δαίμονοι τοῦ δαίμονοι έλάλησαν ό κωφός καὶ ἐθαύμασαν οἱ ὄχλοι. | **Accusations against Jesus:**
| | (14) Καὶ ἐκλήθησαν δαίμονοι καὶ ἐκλήθησαν δαίμονοι έλάλησαν ό κωφός καὶ ἐθαύμασαν οἱ ὄχλοι. |
| (15) τίνες δε εἶπον ἐν Βεηλζεβούλ τῷ ἀρχοντί τῶν δαίμονῶν ἐκβάλλει τα δαίμονια. | (15) τίνες δε εξ αὐτῶν εἶπον ἐν Βεηλζεβούλ τῷ ἀρχοντί τῶν δαίμονῶν ἐκβάλλει τα δαίμονια. |
| [cp. Q 11:16, below] | (propositio no. 1): |
| (17) εἰδὼς δε τὰ διανοήματα αὐτῶν εἶπεν αὐτοῖς. | (16) ἔτεροι δε πειράζοντες σημείον εξ οὐρανοῦ εξήτουν παρ’ αὐτοῦ. |
| πᾶσα βασιλεία μερισθέισα [[καθ’]] έαυτὴ[[ς]] ἐρημοῦται καὶ πᾶσα οἰκία μερισθέισα καθ’ έαυτῆς οὐ σταθήσεται. | b) Jesus’ reply:
| | Topic 3: Censure |
| | Transitional comment: |
| (18) καὶ εἰ ὁ σατανᾶς ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐμερίσθη, πῶς σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ; | (17) αὐτὸς δε εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὰ διανοήματα εἶπεν αὐτοῖς: |
| | (propositio no. 2): |
| | ἐκ παραθολῶν/arguments from analogy for implausibility of definition: |
| (19) καὶ εἰ ἐγὼ ἐν Βεηλζεβούλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαίμονια, οἱ υἱοὶ υμῶν ἐν τίνι ἐκβάλλουσιν; διὰ τούτο αὐτοὶ κρίται ἐσονται υμῶν. | πᾶσα βασιλεία εφ’ ἑαυτὴν διαμερισθέισα ἐρημοῦται καὶ οἶκος ἐπὶ οἰκον πιπεῖ. |
| | Argument from quality in common: |
| (20) εἰ δε ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ ἐγὼ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαίμονια, ἀρα’ ἐφθασεν εφ’ ύμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ. | (18) εἰ δε καὶ ὁ σατανᾶς ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν διεμερίσθη, πῶς σταθήσεται ἡ βασιλεία αὐτοῦ; |
| | Counterdefinition: |
| | (19) εἰ δε ἐγὼ ἐν Βεηλζεβούλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαίμονια, οἱ υἱοὶ υμῶν ἐν τίνι ἐκβάλλουσιν; διὰ τούτο αὐτοὶ υμῶν κρίται ἐσονται. |
| | (20) εἰ δε ἐν δακτύλῳ θεοῦ ἐγὼ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαίμονια, ἀρα’ ἐφθασεν εφ’ ύμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ. |
(21-22) 

Argument from analogy:
(21) Όταν ο ιαχύρος καθαπλισμένος φυλάσση τήν έαυτου αύλην, εν εἰρήνῃ ἑστιν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῦ. (22) ἔπαν δὲ ιαχυρότερος αὐτοῦ ἐπελθὼν νικήσας αὐτοῦ, τήν πανοπλίαν αὐτοῦ αἴρει ἕφ᾽ ἑ ἐπετείθει καὶ τὰ σκῦλα αὐτοῦ διαδίδωσιν.

Syllogism:
(23) ὃ μὴ ὄν μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἔστιν, καὶ ὃ μὴ συνάγων μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ σκορπίζει.

(23) ὃ μὴ ὄν μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἔστιν, καὶ ὃ μὴ συνάγων μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ σκορπίζει.

(24) Ὅταν τὸ ἁκάθαρτον πνεῦμα ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁνθρώπου, διέρχεται δι᾽ ἁνύδρων τῶν ἁπτῶν ἀνάπαυσιν καὶ σὺς εὐρίσκει. [[(τότε)] λέγει· ἐς τὸν οἶκόν μου ἐπιστρέψας ὁδεῖν εξηλθοῦν· (25) καὶ ἐλθὼν εὐρίσκει σεσαρωμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον. (26) τὸτε πορευεῖται καὶ παραλαμβάνει μεθ᾽ ἕαυτοῦ ἐπτά ἑτερα πνεύματα πονηρότερα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ εἰσελθόντα κατοικεῖ· εἰκε· καὶ γίνεται τὰ ἑσχάτα τοῦ ἁνθρώπου ἐκεῖνον χείρονα τῶν πρῶτων.

(24) Ὅταν τὸ ἁκάθαρτον πνεῦμα ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁνθρώπου, διέρχεται δι᾽ ἁνύδρων τῶν ἁπτῶν ἀνάπαυσιν καὶ μὴ εὐρίσκουσιν. [τότε] λέγει· ὑποστρέψας εἰς τὸν οἶκόν μου ἐδῶν εξηλθοῦν· (25) καὶ ἐλθὼν εὐρίσκει σεσαρωμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον. (26) τὸτε πορευεῖται καὶ παραλαμβάνει ἑτερα πνεύματα πονηρότερα ἑαυτοῦ ἐπτά καὶ εἰσελθόντα κατοικεῖ· εἰκε· καὶ γίνεται τὰ ἑσχάτα τοῦ ἁνθρώπου ἐκεῖνον χείρονα τῶν πρῶτων.

(27) Ἐγένετο δε ἐν τῷ λέγειν αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ἐπάρασα τις φωνὴ γυνῆ ἐκ τοῦ ὄχλου ἔπειν αὐτῷ· μακαρία ἡ κοιλία ἡ βαστάσαις σε καὶ μαστί ὡς ἐθήλασαν. (28) αὐτὸς δὲ ἔπειν· μενοὺς μακάριοι οἱ ἁκούσαντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ φυλάσσοντες.

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(16) τινὲς [[δὲ]] ἐξήτουν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ σημείον.

Topic 1: Exit
Statement of gravity:
(24) Ὅταν τὸ ἁκάθαρτον πνεῦμα ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁνθρώπου, διέρχεται δι᾽ ἁνύδρων τῶν ἁπτῶν ἀνάπαυσιν καὶ μὴ εὐρίσκουσιν. [τότε] λέγει· ὑποστρέψας εἰς τὸν οἶκόν μου ἐδῶν εξηλθοῦν· (25) καὶ ἐλθὼν εὐρίσκει σεσαρωμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον. (26) τὸτε πορευεῖται καὶ παραλαμβάνει ἑτερα πνεύματα πονηρότερα ἑαυτοῦ ἐπτά καὶ εἰσελθόντα κατοικεῖ· εἰκε· καὶ γίνεται τὰ ἑσχάτα τοῦ ἁνθρώπου ἐκεῖνον χείρονα τῶν πρῶτων.

Topic 2: Praise
Comparison:
(27) Ἐγένετο δε ἐν τῷ λέγειν αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ἐπάρασα τις φωνὴ γυνῆ ἐκ τοῦ ὄχλου ἔπειν αὐτῷ· μακαρία ἡ κοιλία ἡ βαστάσαις σε καὶ μαστί ὡς ἐθήλασαν. (28) αὐτὸς δὲ ἔπειν· μενοὺς μακάριοι οἱ ἁκούσαντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ φυλάσσοντες.

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Topic 4: Test
Chreia (πρόθεσις/propositio):
(29) [[ό]], δε... [[εἶπεν]],... ή γενεά αὕτη γενεά πονηρά... ἐστὶν· σημειον ζητεί, καὶ σημειον οὐ δοθησαται αὕτη καὶ μή το σημειον Ιωάνα.

(30) [[καθ']] γὰρ ἐγένετο ἱωνᾶς τοὺς Νινευίτας σημειον, οὗτος ἐσται [[καὶ]] οὐίς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ γενεᾷ ταυτῇ.

(31) βασιλείας νότου ἐγερθήσεται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετά τῆς γενεᾶς ταυτῆς καὶ κατακρινει αὐτήν, ὁτι ἤλθεν εἰς τοὺς περάτους τῆς γῆς ἀκουσαὶ τὴν σοφίαν Σολομώνος, καὶ ἰδοὺ πλεῖον Σολομώνος ὄδε.

(32) ἀνδρεῖς Νινευίται ἀναστήσονται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετά τῆς γενεᾶς ταυτῆς καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτήν, ὡς μετενόησαν εἰς τὸ κήρυγμα ἱωνᾶ, καὶ ἰδοὺ πλεῖον ἱωνᾶ ὄδε.

(33) οὐδεὶς καί<ει> λύχνον καὶ τίθησιν αὐτόν ἐν εἰς κρυπτῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν, [[καὶ λάμπει πάσιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ]].

(34) ὁ λύχνος τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ὀφθαλμός.

...αὐτὸν ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ἀπλοὺς ἡ, ὃλον τὸ σῶμα σου φωτεινὸν ἐστὶ[[ἰν]]... ἀν δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου πονηρός ἡ, ὡλον τὸ σῶμα σου ἀκοτεῖνου.

(35) εἰ ὁμί τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν σοὶ σκότος ἐστὶν, τὸ σκότος πόσον.

(29) Τῶν δὲ ὀχλῶν ἐπαθροζωμένων ἤρετο λέγειν· ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη γενεὰ πονηρὰ ἐστὶν· σημειον ζητεί, καὶ σημειον οὐ δοθησαται αὕτη καὶ μή το σημειον Ιωάνα.

Rationale:
(30) καθὼς γὰρ ἐγένετο ἱωνᾶς τοὺς Νινευίτας σημειον, οὗτος ἐσται καὶ ὁ ύιὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ γενεᾷ ταυτῇ.

Argument from example 1:
(31) βασιλείας νότου ἐγερθήσεται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετά τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῆς γενεᾶς ταυτῆς καὶ κατακρινει αὐτούς, ὧτι ἤλθεν εἰς τῶν περάτων τῆς γῆς ἀκουσαὶ τὴν σοφίαν Σολομώνος, καὶ ἰδοὺ πλεῖον Σολομώνος ὄδε.

Argument from example 2:
(32) ἀνδρεῖς Νινευίται ἀναστήσονται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετά τῆς γενεᾶς ταυτῆς καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτήν, ὡς μετενόησαν εἰς τὸ κήρυγμα ἱωνᾶ, καὶ ἰδοὺ πλεῖον ἱωνᾶ ὄδε.

Argument from analogy:
a) Contrary:
(33) οὐδεὶς λύχνον ἄφας εἰς κρύπτῃν τίθησιν ὃδε ὕπο τοῦ μόδιον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν, ἵνα οἱ εἰσπομενοὶ τὸ φῶς βλέπωσιν.

b) Application:
(34) ὁ λύχνος τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου.

c) Diatresis:
(33) οὐδεὶς λύχνον ἄφας εἰς κρύπτῃν τίθησιν ὃδε ὕπο τοῦ μόδιον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν, ἵνα οἱ εἰσπομενοὶ τὸ φῶς βλέπωσιν.

(35) αὐτὸν ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ἀπλοὺς ἡ, καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα σου φωτεινὸν ἐστὶν· ἐπὰν δὲ πονηρός ἡ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα σου ἀκοτεῖνον.

d) Concluding exhortation:
(35) σκότει σοὶ ὁμί καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν σοὶ σκότος ἐστιν. (36) εἰ ὁμί τῷ σῶμα σου ὁ σοφιτὸς ἐστιν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα σου φωτεινὸν, καὶ ἀπὸ τοὺς τις ἀκοτεῖνον, ἐσται φωτεινὸν ὃ ὅταν ὁ λύχνος τῇ ἀστραπῇ φωτιζήσει σε.
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