DOES CONFORMING MAKE US MORE LIKED?
PERCEPTIONS OF CONFORMIST AND NON-CONFORMIST BEHAVIOUR

by

Tullia Leone

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Psychology
University of Toronto

© Copyright by Tullia Leone, 2010
Abstract

Although social psychologists have long argued that conformity is motivated by a concern for social approval, very few studies have tested whether conformity actually results in increased approval of the conformist. The present research examined participants’ evaluations of confederates who displayed either conformist or non-conformist behaviour. Studies 1 and 2 used a music task, in which remote confederates either conformed or did not conform to participants’ choices for favourite music clips. Participants evaluated confederates by rating them on a series of both positive and negative descriptors. Relative to non-conformists, conformists were rated more favourably on items that referred to ‘liking’ (e.g., likeableness, willingness to befriend) (Studies 1 & 2), and less favourably on items that referred to “independence” (e.g., independence, originality, strength) (Study 2). Interestingly, although conforming confederates were judged as less independent than were confederates who simply agreed with (rather than conformed to) participants’ choices, conformity did not have a positive effect on liking over and above mere agreement (Study 2). Conformity, rather than being a means of gaining approval, might be better construed as a means of avoiding disapproval. Study 2 further examined evaluations made by observers who were exposed to the same confederate behaviours as were targets; however, no observer-target difference in ratings was found.
Study 3 assessed the degree to which participants valued the traits that they ascribed to people who demonstrated either conformist or non-conformist behaviour. Positive traits associated with conformist behaviour (e.g., agreeableness, cooperativeness) were reported as having a more positive effect on participants’ liking of a person than were positive traits associated with non-conformist behaviour (e.g., independence, originality). Furthermore, in determining their liking for a conformist, participants reported placing more importance on the conformist’s possessing the positive traits associated with conforming than on their possessing the negative traits associated with conforming (e.g., dependence, passivity). In spite of their lack of independence, therefore, conformists in Study 2 were liked because participants placed more value on the virtuous aspects of conformity (e.g., agreeableness, cooperativeness). Implications for our culture’s ambivalent attitudes toward both conformity and independence are discussed.
Acknowledgements

I am exceedingly grateful to my advisors, Patricia Pliner and C. Peter Herman, whose insight, caring guidance, and sense of humour have made grad school more bearable. Peter: thank you for introducing me to good science, teaching me about good writing, and unpretentiously modeling the pursuit of both. Patty: thank you for your perceptiveness, your encouragement, as well as your unmitigated kindness during some difficult periods, academic and otherwise. Thanks to both of you for believing in me when my belief in myself waned.

I am indebted also to my committee member, Geoff Macdonald, for providing direction to my research as well as moral support.

To my friends, who have offered unflagging encouragement—Sarah Shaughnessy, my Tequilla-Bookworm writing partner, dearest commiserator, and staunch supporter; Catrin Davies, the light in the Subground in the early days, and my long-distance cheerleader in the late days; Jenny Ryu, my oldest friend and most empathetic ear; Cherie Werhun, whose ability to console and advise is unmatched; Rebecca Pinkus, for whom the word “thoughtful” was probably invented; Maja Djikic, who made it look easy and wonderful; and Raymond Mar, who inspired awe, and made me laugh—thanks to all for being in my life.

I also thank my parents, Mario and Franca Leone, whose love and incredible faith in me are ultimately what made this work possible; my sister, Monica, whose name means ‘advisor’, but whose actions more closely embody ‘saviour’; my brother, Jordan, my alter-ego, my quiet ally; and my grandmother, Maria, consummate mother.

Finally, I am forever grateful to my partner and best friend, Victor Galleguillos, for celebrating even my smallest achievements, for loving me during my least loveable moments, and for never doubting what I could accomplish.
# Table of Contents

Introduction 1
Conformity Defined 2
Support for the Normative-Influence Explanation of Conformity:
   An Overview 4
   The Concern with Gaining Approval and/or Avoiding Rejection 4
   Unconscious Conformity: The Rewards Associated with Mimicry 8
Evaluations of Non-Conformists and Conformists
   Evaluating Dissenters 10
   Evaluating Conformists 15
   The Observer versus the Target’s Perspective 17
The Present Research
   Addressing Problems with Previous Studies: A Summary 25
   Overview of the Present Studies 29
Study 1: Target Evaluations of Conformists and Non-Conformists 30
   Method
      Overview and Design 31
      Participants 32
      Procedure 32
   Results and Discussion
      Manipulation check 36
      Liking for, familiarity with, and trouble deciding on music clips 36
      Factor analysis on Social-Perception-scale items 37
      Participants’ evaluations of confederates 37
      Effect of awareness of being a target of conformity on evaluations
         of confederates 40
      Further Discussion 40
Study 2: Target versus Observer Evaluations of Conformist and Non-
   Conformists in a Revised Conformity Paradigm 43
   Method
      Overview and Design 47
      Participants 48
      Procedure 48
         Active Participants 48
         Observers 50
   Results
      Manipulation Check 52
      Liking for, familiarity with, and trouble deciding on music clips 54
      Replication of Study 1 55
      Factor Analysis on Social Perception scale items 55
      Participants’ evaluations of confederates 56
      Analyses on individual items of the Social Perceptions scale 59
      Individual difference measures 60
List of Appendices

<p>| Appendix 1 | Social Perceptions       | 98 |
| Appendix 2 | Social Perceptions (O Version) | 99 |
| Appendix 3 | Background Information    | 100 |
| Appendix 4 | Need to Belong Scale      | 102 |
| Appendix 5 | Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale | 103 |
| Appendix 6 | Self-Monitoring Scale     | 104 |
| Appendix 7 | Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale | 105 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Responses to Post-Experimental Questionnaire Items in Study 1</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Ratings on Manipulation-Check Items in Study 2</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Ratings on Liking For, Familiarity With, and Trouble Deciding on Music Clips in Study 2</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Ratings in Study 2 of Three Composite Variables used in Study 1 (APs only)</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Means, Standard Deviations and Number of Participants for Liking and Independence/Steadfastness Ratings as a Function of Opinion Condition in Study 2</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Positivity and Value Ratings of Positive and Negative Conformity and Non-Conformity Traits in Study 3</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

Figure 1  Mean ratings (-4 to +4) of Liking, Niceness, and Independence/Honesty as a function of Opinion Condition in Study 1. 112

Figure 2  Mean ratings (-4 to +4) of Liking and Independence/Steadfastness (I/S) as a function of Opinion and Perspective Conditions in Study 2. 113
INTRODUCTION

We are half ruined by conformity; but we should be wholly ruined without it.
Charles Dudley Warner (1829-1900)

Opportunities for conformity abound in everyday life. When perceived or real pressure from others exists, people will often conform to others’ actions, judgments, or preferences. Although this phenomenon has been well documented (beginning notably with Solomon Asch’s early-1950’s line of research, which found that people would ignore the evidence of their own senses to agree publicly with an obviously inaccurate group judgment), the reasons why people conform remain largely unexplored.

The explanations offered in the more than half a century since Asch’s classic studies have focused on two main motives for conformity: 1) the goal of accuracy or correctness and, 2) the goal of approval and social acceptance. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) provided one of the first articulations of these motives with their distinction between informational and normative influence. They introduced the term ‘informational influence’ to refer to influence that leads us to conform to others’ positions when our concern is to make accurate and valid judgments. In other words, we accept information from others as evidence of reality, and act in accordance with this evidence. Deutsch and Gerard reserved the term ‘normative influence,’ to refer to influence that leads us to conform when our concern is to obtain social approval from others. Normative influence leads us to ‘go along with’ the group or individual for instrumental reasons such as the avoidance of punishment, censure or rejection for deviation, or in order to achieve social acceptance.

It is relatively clear why, in situations of uncertainty about the correct course of action, individuals would resort to the effective and time-saving strategy of conforming to a group’s consensus. Lack of confidence in the objective validity of one’s beliefs, coupled with one’s need
to be correct, would understandably lead one to yield to informational influence. The benefit of this yielding—an increased likelihood of behaving “correctly”—is presumably also clear to the conformist. Less clear, however, are the benefits of yielding to normative influence. Whereas individuals who conform because of informational influence may reasonably expect to meet their goal of being “right,” individuals who conform because of normative influence do not have much reason to expect that their goal of being accepted will be met. Although researchers since Deutsch and Gerard (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Insko, Drenan, Solomon, Smith & Wade, 1983; Janes & Olson, 2000) have corroborated the normative-influence explanation for conformity, there is very little evidence supporting the assumption that conformity actually results in increased approval or acceptance of the conformist. Where this evidence does exist, the studies are clouded by methodological problems that make interpretation of results difficult. Given that attaining approval is potentially a goal of conformity, it would be useful to know whether conformity is effective in achieving this goal.

The present research seeks to bridge this gap in the conformity literature by exploring the question of whether conformity does indeed bring about the benefits suggested by the normative-influence explanation. At the same time, the studies presented here are concerned with the potential consequences of non-conformity. Early research makes no real distinction between the motive to be accepted and the motive to avoid rejection. Is it the case that conformity results in approval of the conformist, or simply that it avoids the disapproval potentially fostered by non-conformity? The present research aims to explore this largely neglected topic and to revisit questions that were, to some extent, assumed to be already resolved.
Conformity Defined

Conformity is generally described as a process by which people’s beliefs or behaviors are influenced by others, but definitions have been varied and contested (see Allen, 1965; Levine & Russo, 1987; Nail, 1986; Willis, 1963, 1965). Most of the literature on conformity distinguishes it from normative behavior by applying the criterion of movement from one’s own position to a contradictory position; that is, the individual’s personal position is contrary to that expressed by a comparison other or group that has not been subjected to social influence (Asch, 1956). We thus conform to others when perceived or real pressure from them causes us to act differently from how we would act if we were alone (Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969; Myers, 2008). Conformity distinguishes itself from mere similarity in that conforming to someone’s behavior is the result of social influence and involves a shift in position, whereas being similar to someone is incidental. We are able to conform only when we already know how someone else has behaved or responded, whereas we may be similar to someone else without knowing how he/she has behaved or responded.

Much of the conformity literature focuses on conformity to group behavior and thus examines group-norm conformity. Although group-conformity studies will be reviewed, this dissertation examines conformity (and non-conformity) to the individual. There is certainly precedence for examining conformity in this context. In studying the phenomenon of “ingratiation,” for example, Jones and colleagues (1963; 1964; 1965; 1968; 1976) examined situations in which an individual conformed to the opinion of a second individual in an attempt to ingratiate him/herself to that second individual. Moreover, conformity has been shown to occur in “groups” as small as two people as well as in groups as large as 16 people (Allen, 1965; Asch, 1952). The “modeling of appetitive behavior” literature provides a further example of
conformity to the individual. Although some of the studies within this literature feature remote confederates numbering up to nine or ten, most of the studies involve single confederates who model (or, in other words, conform to) the eating behaviour of single participants (e.g., Conger, Conger, Costanzo, Wright, & Matter, 1980; Goldman, Herman, & Polivy, 1991; Nisbett & Storms, 1974; Rosenthal & McSweeney, 1979).

Support for the Normative-Influence Explanation for Conformity: An Overview

The Concern with Gaining Approval and/or Avoiding Rejection

Initial interest in conformity behaviour was rooted in the earliest social psychological research on suggestibility (Asch, 1948; Moscovici, 1985). It was observed that people held positions that were not based on sufficient information, acted in ways that were contrary to the obvious and objective reality, and followed sometimes bizarre group behaviour, even when it contradicted the individual’s personal position (Asch, 1948). These observations led to the view that individual behaviour was extremely malleable and could easily be shaped by social influence. Critical of this perspective, Asch began a line of research that he expected would invalidate the seemingly overwhelming effect of suggestibility on individual behaviour and dispel the notion that humans are “like sheep.” Contrary to his expectations, however, his research on the objective judgments of line length became compelling evidence of human conformity to group pressure. Subjects in Asch’s studies (1951) were required to match the correct line, of several lines of varying length, with a reference line. He found that 75% of subjects gave, on at least one trial, responses that were both contrary to their personal opinion and objectively incorrect simply because experimental confederates, responding first, unanimously gave that incorrect response. Asch reasoned that because the stimuli were unambiguous, subjects could not be using others’ judgments to provide information about the
correct response. Rather, they must be yielding to what Deutsch and Gerard termed normative influence—conforming in order to gain approval from group members.

Deutsch and Gerard (1955) modified the Asch paradigm so that all members of the group were isolated in cubicles and communicated via a complex apparatus involving switches and light bulbs. They compared this anonymous situation to a public (face-to-face) condition and found that the subjects’ conformity was greater in public than in private situations, suggesting that the effect was mediated by self-presentational concerns. Deutsch and Gerard interpreted this finding as evidence of their normative-influence explanation for conformity.

Insko et al. (1983), however, claimed that Deutsch and Gerard set a precedent (which was followed by many investigators) of confounding “publicness” of responding with degree of contact between subjects. Orally-reported responses in a face-to-face situation were compared to switch-operated responses in a situation in which subjects were separated by partitions. To address this concern, Insko et al. varied publicness of responding in a face-to-face situation. In the public condition, subjects orally reported their judgments and also wrote them down, whereas in the private condition subjects wrote down their judgments only. Again, subjects conformed more in the public condition than in the private condition. Insko et al. interpreted this finding as evidence for the effect of the concern with being liked on conformity.

In the years since Insko et al., the public-private conformity distinction has continued to be used as evidence that conformity under surveillance is born out of a concern for maintaining a desirable public image (see for example, Baumeister, 1982; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Nail, 1986). Researchers have also acknowledged, however, that while normative and informational influence are theoretically distinct processes, in most circumstances they operate together to create conformity (David & Turner, 2001; Turner, 1985). Indeed, it is conceivable that the
concern to be accurate stems from the concern to be liked. Being right, or not being wrong, may be a means to achieving acceptance and approval. In this sense, the primary concern with being well-liked might give rise to the secondary concern of behaving “correctly.” Ultimately then, the goal of maintaining a desirable public image may be served, at least in part, by being accurate and may be in the service of, again in part, the larger goal of gaining acceptance and approval.

More recent support for the notion that conformity is motivated by a concern for approval comes from the social exclusion literature. Williams, Cheung, and Choi (2000), for example, found that participants who had just been ostracized in a ball-toss task were more likely to conform to a group norm in a subsequent perception task than were participants who had been included in the ball toss. Williams et al. concluded that short-term ostracism threatens one’s need to belong. When participants were subsequently given an opportunity to conform to a new group, they did so, presumably in order to restore their sense of belonging. Although Williams et al. do not address the need for approval specifically, they imply that, for participants, conforming was a means to achieving the approval from the group necessary to restore their sense of belonging.

The effect of being rejected on the likelihood of conformity was also examined by Janes and Olson (2000). Across two studies, participants who viewed others being ridiculed were more conforming than those who viewed self-ridicule or no ridicule. The authors concluded that observation of ridicule activates thoughts of being rejected, which in turn motivate careful, conforming behaviours. Conformity is, therefore, chosen as a response to the threat of rejection. Again, the implication is that there is something about conforming that will lead one to either gain approval or avoid rejection, or both. Or, at least, there is a tendency to believe that conforming will lead to these outcomes.
In another recent illustration of the normative-influence explanation for conformity, Jetten, Hornsey, and Adarves-Yorno (2006) examined the self-presentational function of portraying oneself as a conformist. The results of three studies revealed that participants rated themselves as more conformist when they were reporting to higher-status group members than when they were reporting to lower-status group members. Furthermore, junior members (but not senior members) rated themselves as more conformist when they were led to believe that their responses were public rather than private. The difference found between public and private conditions provides strong support for the interpretation that junior group members’ behaviour was strategic (see MacDonald & Nail, 2005; Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000; Spears & Lea, 1994). Interestingly, contrary to findings suggesting that people either deny or are unaware of the influence of others on their own behaviour (Braver, Linder, Corwin, & Cialdini, 1977; Hornsey & Jetten, 2005; Schofield, 1975), Jetten et al.’s studies demonstrated that under certain circumstances, people willingly admit to being responsive to group influence. When participants were presumably attempting to endear themselves to higher-status members of the group, they strategically portrayed themselves as conformists. Clearly, participants were under the impression that their conformity would be valued.

Taken together, the results of the studies described above lead naturally to the assumption that individuals are benefiting from their choice to conform. After all, why would we conform unless we knew that there was something to be gained from doing so? Perhaps, through our past experiences, we have learned of a link between conforming and gaining social rewards, and this presumptive link influences our behaviours, consciously or unconsciously, when our social relationships are threatened. There is as yet no empirical evidence for this hypothesis; perhaps people only think that they will be rewarded for their conformity and their efforts do not produce
the desired results. Given the consistency with which participants in these studies choose to conform, however, that possibility seems unlikely.

**Unconscious Conformity: The Rewards Associated with Mimicry**

The phrase “choose to conform” implies that conforming is a conscious act. For the most part, the literature assumes that it is. The pull toward the “decision” to conform, however, may sometimes be unconscious. If we assume that conformity leads to benefits for the conformist, it is possible that, over time, this behaviour was favoured and eventually became automatic—occurring without conscious awareness or intention (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). This description probably more aptly characterizes a conformity phenomenon known as behavioural mimicry, which appears to operate completely outside of conscious awareness. Also dubbed “the chameleon effect,” this phenomenon describes behavioural matching of postures, facial expressions, vocal characteristics, and mannerisms that occurs between two or more individuals (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Unlike conformity, where the motivation to conform to others is initiated, at least to some degree, within the individual’s awareness, mimicry is thought to occur through the perception-behaviour link: the mere perception of another’s behaviour automatically increases the likelihood of engaging in that behaviour oneself (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). It is assumed that this link evolved to serve the goal of affiliation, that somewhere along the line of our evolutionary history, imitation proved to be advantageous over an absence of imitation in securing the social bonds that were necessary for survival (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). Similar to the findings supporting the normative-influence explanation of conformity discussed above are the findings that having an affiliation goal increases nonconscious mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), and that excluded people mimic a subsequent interaction partner more than do included people (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008).
As in the conformity literature, however, there is scant evidence in the mimicry literature that behaviour matching does in fact increase the mimicked person’s liking for the mimicker (despite the fact that there is general consensus among researchers that it does). Early studies demonstrated a connection between posture-sharing and increased rapport (e.g., Bernieri, 1988, Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991; LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976), but these studies were correlational and conducted in settings where rapport already existed. Other studies have examined the effects of mimicry on inducing prosocial behaviours in the person being mimicked. Van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, and van Knippenberg (2003), for example, found that waitresses who mimicked their customers by using precisely the same words as their customers used received larger tips than when they simply paraphrased the order. In further studies, it was revealed that mimicry not only made the mimicked person more prosocial toward the mimicker, but also led to a more general prosocial orientation (not directed at a specific target). Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, and van Knippenberg (2004) found that participants whose behaviour had been mimicked by an experimenter were more helpful when she dropped pens on the floor than were nonmimicked participants and more helpful to a second experimenter who dropped her pens (even though they had been mimicked only by the first experimenter). Mimicked participants also donated more money to a charity (irrespective of whether the possibility of donation was mentioned by the experimenter who had mimicked the participant or by another experimenter). Chartrand and Bargh (1999, Study 2), provide the only experimental evidence for the relation between mimicry and reported liking. They found that mimickers (who mimicked the posture, movements and mannerisms displayed by participants) were not only liked more than were non-mimickers, but that participants who were mimicked were also more likely to report that the interaction had been smooth and harmonious. To the extent that the potential benefits to be
gained from conformity are similar to those gained from mimicry, these findings may provide some indication of the positive consequences that one might expect from conforming.

_Evaluations of Non-Conformists and Conformists_

_Evaluating Dissenters_

Before examining the potential answers that the literature provides for the question of how conformists are evaluated, it is useful to examine what we know about the answer to a related question, namely: How are non-conformists evaluated? The studies that have asked this question have typically focused on the perspective of a member of the group with whom the non-conformist is disagreeing. These studies have by and large concluded that dissenters—or deviates, as they are interchangeably referred to in the literature—are disliked, rejected, or unwanted. The studies have assessed rejection of the deviate through various measures such as composite attraction scores, sociometric ratings, and committee nominations. For example, Levine, Saxe, and Harris (1976) had participants complete a questionnaire evaluating the deviate on several 9-point bipolar scales (reasonable-unreasonable, informed-uninformed, etc.). Similar rating scales were used by Arnold and Greenberg (1980), Lauderdale (1976); Lauderdale, Smith-Cunnien, Parker, & Inverarity, 1984), Levine and Ranelli (1978), Levine and Ruback (1980), and Sampson and Brandon (1964). Schachter (1951) computed sociometric ratings by asking participants to rank group members in order of preference for remaining in the same group with themselves. Lauderdale (1976) asked participants to rank group members in order of preference and intensity of preference. Similar sociometric ratings were used by Earle (1986), Levine and Ruback (1980), Levine et al. (1976), and Sampson and Brandon (1964). Arnold and Greenberg (1980), and Schachter (1951) also asked participants to nominate group members to various committees. The importance or unimportance of the committees to which people were
nominated served as an index of acceptance or rejection. In general, all these studies found that the deviate was rejected more than the modal group member.

Beginning notably with Schachter’s (1951) study—which examined the degree to which group members would reject a deviate as a function of both group cohesiveness and the relevance of the issue under discussion—the dissent studies have largely explored reactions to non-conformists as they are determined by various factors external to the act of non-conformity itself. Schachter (1951), for example, found that an extreme deviate (i.e., a group member who maintained a position of deviation from the group throughout the discussion) was rejected more strongly (as indicated by sociometric ratings) in high- than in low-cohesive groups. Furthermore, when nomination to an unimportant committee served as an index of rejection of group members, the deviate was overnominated for the unimportant committee compared to other group members, and was rejected more strongly when the issue under discussion was relevant to the purpose of the group than when the issue under discussion was irrelevant to the purpose of the group. Schachter concluded that with increasing group cohesiveness and increasing relevance of issue, the magnitude of pressures acting on group members to change a deviant opinion also increases. The stronger the pressures to change a deviant position, the more a group member who maintains his deviant position is rejected.

Berkowitz and Howard (1959) also examined factors that might affect the level of pressure felt by group members to change a deviant position and that, in turn, might affect the degree to which they reject the unchanging deviate. Specifically, Berkowitz and Howard examined group-member interdependence (which was manipulated by awarding prizes to members of the best groups in the high-interdependence condition and to the best individuals in the low-interdependence condition) and need for affiliation (which was determined by coding
participants’ references to affiliation and classifying them as belonging to one of three levels depending on whether participants fell in the upper, middle, or lower thirds of the distribution of affiliation scores for the entire sample). Reactions to the deviate (who contradicted true participants’ positions on the resolution of a case-history problem) were measured by means of an item that asked about the extent to which group members would want that person to be a member of their group again. Compared to other group members, the deviate was rejected more in all three affiliation groups of the high-interdependence condition, and more only in the high-affiliation group of the low-interdependence condition. Overall, participants who scored high in need for affiliation rejected the deviate to a significantly greater degree than did participants who scored either moderately or low on need for affiliation. Berkowitz and Howard reasoned that individuals whose opinions were shared by the majority of others in their group presumably believed that their opinions were correct. Under interdependent conditions, therefore, the discrepant opinion, which was probably incorrect, endangered their chances of winning a prize, and therefore led to greater rejection of the deviate. Apparently, opinion discrepancy threatened all participants to some extent in highly interdependent groups, but only when affiliation need was high in less interdependent groups.

In another examination of the threat posed by a dissenting other, Miller and Anderson (1979) tested whether the rule by which a group decision was reached had an effect on the extent to which groups of 4 naive participants rated the deviate (confederate) in the group as attractive (as measured by asking participants how much they liked, and how much they would enjoy working with, each of the other group members) as well as on the extent to which the deviate was rejected (as calculated by subtracting mean attraction ratings of one another from mean attraction ratings of the deviate). They found that attraction ratings and rejection scores were
highest when the decision had been reached through a dictatorship in which the deviate herself was the dictator. When a unanimity rule was imposed, and the deviate supported the unpopular decision, she was rated less attractive and rejected more than in either the majority-rule condition, or the dictatorship-with-a-non-deviate-dictator rule condition. Not surprisingly, the deviate received lower attraction ratings and higher rejection scores when she was powerful and made a decision that was unfavourable to the other group members.

More recently, Kruglanski and Webster (1991) have found that group members’ reactions to opinion deviates vary as a function of degree of proximity to decision deadline and of environmental noise. In general, group members’ tendency to denigrate a deviate (as measured by participants’ sociometric ratings of each other on the dimensions of liking, appreciation, and respect) is stronger under conditions of a close deadline and the presence of ambient noise. Kruglanski and Webster argue that these conditions heighten group members’ need for collective cognitive closure and thus make them more likely to downgrade those who impede this closure.

Tata et al. (1996), in their meta-analytic integration of 23 studies, found that the tendency for the deviate to be rejected also increases as the proportionate size of the deviate’s subgroup (that is, the ratio of number of deviates to total number of group members) increases. In other words, a lone deviate in a group of 100 is less likely to be rejected than a lone deviate in a group of 10. Tata et al. reason that as the proportionate size of the deviate’s subgroup decreases, the deviate could become less of a threat to group members for two reasons: first, majority-group members are more likely to be convinced that their opinion is correct, and second, the deviate is less likely to influence group opinion.

Research on the black-sheep effect has further shown that in-group members who deviate from group norms are regarded more negatively than are members of an out-group behaving in
exactly the same fashion (e.g., Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Eidelman, Silvia & Biernat, 2006; Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998; Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001). Evaluations of deviates in these studies are usually either in the form of trait ratings on Likert-type scales or in the form of global-impression-type questions. For the most part, rating scales include both positive traits (e.g., considerate, helpful, intelligent, kind, warm) and negative traits (e.g., cold, self-centered, selfish). Other questions assess overall likeability of the deviate (e.g., liking, likelihood that participants might be good friends with the deviate), overall attractiveness of the deviate (which is usually based on the deviate’s perceived contribution to cohesion in the group), and degree to which the deviate is similar to the participant (which may be considered an indirect measure of liking given that all other things being equal, people tend to like similar others more than they like dissimilar others [Byrne, 1971; 1997]). Across all these measures, deviates are derogated relative to normative group members.

Is there a Positive Side to Dissent? Although the bulk of the research in this area documents the negative responses of group members to non-conformist behaviour, there are a few studies that illustrate the positive attributes occasionally assigned to dissenters. Morris and Miller (1975), for example, found that observers attributed greater confidence and “dispositional dynamism” (a rating based on a combination of Activity [fast-slow, hot-cold, dull-sharp] and Potency [strong-weak, heavy-light, big-little] factors) to a dissenter when his dissenting position could plausibly be seen as having been made in defiance of social pressure (e.g., a dissenter who responded fourth in the presence of majority members). Similarly, Nemeth and Chiles (1988) found that although dissenters (judging blue stimuli as green in a colour-judgment task) were rated as having poorer colour vision and as being less intelligent, they were also seen as being
more individualistic and as having more courage than non-dissenters. Other lines of research have revealed additional contexts in which sanctions against deviant behaviour are waived. For example, leaders are often expected to deviate from traditional roles in order to adopt innovative practices and move a group in new directions (e.g., Bass, 1998; Hollander, 1958). Evaluations of deviant behaviour can also be more positive if deviance increases the overall success of a group (Kelley & Shapiro, 1954). These examples illustrate an acceptance of deviates whose behaviour does not detract from the positive identity of the group or prevent the group from reaching its goals.

Evaluating Conformists

The question of whether conformity results in increased approval of the conformist can be examined from two perspectives, which differ in terms of the source of approval. The first and more obvious source of approval is the target of the conformity (i.e., the person to whose behaviour the conformist is conforming). Given that a potential aim of conformity is to elicit a favourable reaction from the target, it is surprising that virtually no research has focused on targets’ responses to conformists\(^1\). The second source is an outside observer (i.e., a person who watches the conformist conform to the behavior of another person). The literature investigating reactions to conformists began by examining observers’ evaluations, largely owing to the relative ease of obtaining experimental control in observer studies (where the behaviour of both the conformist and the target can be controlled in all conditions). The small amount of research that has explored either the target’s or the observer’s perspective of the conformist was led mainly by Ned Jones in the 1960s. Jones clearly situated his work in the context of ingratiation, and saw conformity of opinion as a class of tactics available to the ingratior. In Jones’s (1964) early monograph, he defined ingratiation as “a class of strategic behaviors illicitly designed to

\(^1\) Jones, Stires, Shaver, and Harris (1968), discussed below, is the one notable exception.
influence a particular other person concerning the attractiveness of one’s personal
qualities…Ingratiating actions are illicit because they are directed toward objectives not
contained in the implicit contract which underlies social interactions (p.11).” Rather than focus
on conformity as a response to social-influence pressure, Jones viewed it as a tactic of social
influence in its own right. While the bulk of previous conformity studies had recognized the
motives of attraction-seeking or attraction maintenance, Jones and colleagues were the first to
treat conformity and agreement as witting or unwitting strategies of ingratiation. Their studies
often experimentally varied the participant’s condition of dependence on another participant;
through the use of differential instructions, participants in one treatment were placed in the
position of needing another person’s approval or attraction and then given the opportunity to win
it in a conversational setting with the other person. Jones and colleagues’ main contribution to
this line of research was their finding that instructions to promote ingratiation resulted in
movements toward greater public agreement with the target person’s stated opinions during the
discussion (Jones, Gergen, Gumpert, & Thibaut, 1965; Jones, Gergen & Jones, 1963; Jones &
Jones, 1964). They emphasized, therefore, the ingratiator’s psychological position and
considered the target and his position primarily from the ingratiator’s point of view.

Jones and colleagues had a secondary interest, however, in studying the reactions of
targets and observers to the ingratiating actor. They began by examining observers’ reactions
and observers’ predictions of how a target would react, and in later research, attempted to
resolve the question of how the target herself would react to a conformist. The scant literature
examining evaluations of a conformist from each of these perspectives (the observer’s and the
target’s) will be reviewed. Although one might discuss these perspectives separately in turn,
because most studies compared the possible differential reactions of targets and observers to the
same potentially ingratiating actor, the following discussion considers these perspectives together on a study-by-study basis. Because Jones’s focus was on ingratiation, the studies discussed also manipulated variables that were predicted to have an impact on reactions to ingratatory behavior (e.g., the potential ingratiator’s motive, the level of agreement between target and potential ingratiator, etc.).

The Observer versus the Target’s Perspective. Although it may seem more natural to examine how a target responds to a conformist’s potential overtures than to examine how an observer responds, special methodological problems posed by having participants be targets of conformity may have made the observer version of this study the more convenient starting point for researchers. Jones, Jones, and Gergen (1963), for example, were interested in the tactical value of differential conformity; they reasoned that since slavish or indiscriminate agreement may be transparent, a more successful ingratiation attempt might inject subtlety into a general position of agreement by combining it with disagreements in trivial or unimportant areas. They therefore needed to manipulate the degree of agreement between targets and potential ingratiators, while holding constant the pattern of opinions expressed by the potential ingratiator. Because this objective could not be accomplished by having participants (whose response patterns were unpredictable and would necessarily lead to various opinions being expressed by potential ingratiators) act as targets, Jones et al. (1963) instead had participants observe an interaction between two others. Rather than participate in the interaction as the opinion-initiating target person, the participant thus acted as an observer. Male undergraduate participants listened to tape-recorded opinion interchanges between two students (experimental confederates following a prepared script), one of whom always expressed his opinions second. In some cases these opinions agreed closely with the opinions of the first student (same condition); in other
cases they were still in general agreement but showed more variation in their opinions (variable condition). In other words, one independent variable was the extremity of tactical use. The second student in the tape-recording always expressed exactly the same opinions and his behavior was thus identical from cell to cell of the design; variations in agreement were arranged by having the first student (the target) state different opinions in the same and variable conditions.

Cross-cutting the same-variable manipulation was an instructional variable designed to vary the extent to which the second student was perceived to be dependent on the first student in the taped interchange. Half of the subjects in the experimental conditions heard a moderator describe the purpose of the taped interaction to the students as a preliminary procedure for selecting highly compatible pairs to participate in a subsequent experiment (where participants would be paid by the hour to take part in an “interesting and worthwhile” study). They also heard both students respond with enthusiasm to the prospect of qualifying for the subsequent session. This combination of instructions and role-player response constituted the high-dependence condition, since Student 2 was presumably dependent on Student 1 for attaining the desirable goal of participation in the subsequent experiment. The other half of the participants heard the experiment described to the students as a study in impression formation; they were asked to merely indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement with a number of opinion statements, and in the process, try to formulate a clear impression of each other (low-dependence condition). The main hypothesis was that Student 2 would be more negatively evaluated for closely agreeing with Student 1 when his dependence on Student 1 was high than when it was low. This prediction was generally confirmed: Student 2 was liked less (as indicated by ratings on four traits reflecting likeability and desirability as a friend) in the same/high-dependence
condition than in the same/low-dependence condition. In other words, observers evaluated Student 2 negatively when he conformed and there were apparent incentives toward gaining approval. Student 2 was further seen as self-promoting and lacking in candor in the same/high-dependence condition. The highest ratings, however, were awarded to Student 2's who did not closely agree when there were evident pressures to do so (i.e., in the variable/high-dependence condition). This latter trend may reflect the participant’s appreciation, as an observer, of Student 2’s independence in the face of pressures to conform. It remained to be seen, however, whether the target of variable agreement under high-dependence conditions would show the same positive attitudes toward Student 2 as did the observer.

Jones et al. (1963) recognized the issue of possible differential reactions of targets and observers to the same ingratiating actor: participants in their study were asked to record both their own feelings and to predict how a target person (the recipient of conformity) would respond to the conformist. They found that the conformist was evaluated more negatively when the participants were expressing their own evaluations as observers than when they were attempting to predict the evaluation which would be made by the target person. There are a few reasons why one would predict that observers would be quicker to infer manipulative intent than would targets: whereas targets probably have a strong, vain desire to assign credibility to compliments (in the form of having their opinions validated by agreement), observers’ vanity should not be engaged, allowing them to view the interaction more objectively. Because target ratings were not obtained in this study, however, there was no way of assessing whether observers’ predictions reflected an accurate intuition that the target of an ingratiation attempt is more likely to be taken in by it.
Jones, Stires, Shaver, and Harris (1968) designed an experiment to determine if, in fact, targets were insensitive to cues that observers had readily interpreted as manipulative conformity in Jones et al. (1963). Their hypothesis was that persistent conversational agreement in a context where the agreeing person (i.e., the conformist) was dependent on the target person (this time, the participant) would create a less favourable impression on the participant than would agreement in a low-dependence context (just as it had for the observers in Jones et al. [1963]). In other words, Jones et al. (1968) believed that at some extreme of dependence coupled with some extreme of tactical use, even the most vain or ingenuous target person would develop a negative impression of the ingratiator. Female participants took part in a 10-minute discussion with a role-playing confederate on a specified topic (concerning whether marriage and a satisfying family life could be successfully combined with a full-time job). The first manipulation consisted of varying the extent to which the confederate agreed with the participant: the confederate demonstrated either persistent agreement (reinforcing the participant with nods, smiles, and supporting statements) or autonomy in her position (presenting herself as being neither in complete agreement nor in complete disagreement with the participant’s position, but rather, as having a “mind of her own”). Following the 10-minute discussion, the second manipulation was administered. It was revealed to participants that their conversational partners were confederates in a study of “first impressions” and that prior to their discussion with the participant, the confederates had listened to an instructional tape for how to behave during the discussion. In the high-dependence condition, participants learned that confederates had been instructed by this tape to try to “win the favor of the other subject—to get her to like you.” The tape went on to describe attraction-seeking techniques that the confederate might employ, namely getting the participant to talk a lot, and conforming to her opinion. In the low-
dependence condition, the tape to which confederates ostensibly listened made no reference to manipulating the participant’s liking of the confederate. Instead, this tape instructed the confederate to “be herself” and to act spontaneously throughout the discussion. Following the playing of the tapes, participants completed a measure of general favorability toward the confederate (which included question about liking, candor, similarity, and general attraction to confederates).

Jones et al. (1968) found that the agreeable confederate was liked more overall than was the autonomous confederate. The predicted interaction between the agreeable-autonomous role and the dependence manipulation, however, was significant only for the similarity cluster. In the low-dependence condition, the agreeable confederate was seen as much more similar than was the autonomous confederate, whereas in the high-dependence condition, this difference did not obtain. Although there were trends toward the predicted interaction for the liking cluster, the candor cluster, and the general positive-evaluation cluster, none of these reached significance. Jones et al.’s hypothesis was therefore largely unsupported. Although agreeable confederates were better liked, participants seemed unwilling to generalize from a discrepancy between private belief and public expression—which they acknowledged in their ratings on the similarity cluster—to a general trait of insincerity. In sum, conformists were liked more than were autonomous confederates even when it was (or should have been) obvious that they were not necessarily sincere.

In order to compare the responses made by involved participants to those made by observers, Jones et al. (1968) conducted a second experiment in which they showed filmed versions of the experimental interactions used in the first experiment to a comparable sample. After viewing the film, participants (observers) were given the same high-dependence or low-
dependence instructions used in the first experiment. Finally, they were asked to complete the impressions rating scale. Surprisingly, the observers’ actual ratings were more similar to involved participants’ ratings than the predictions made by observers in Jones et al. (1963) would suggest. There were no differences between involved participants’ ratings in Study 1 and observers’ ratings in Study 2 in any of the dependence or role-playing conditions. In their discussion of these finding, Jones et al. largely ignored the lack of differences between targets’ and observers’ ratings of confederates and focused instead on the procedural differences between Jones et al. (1963) and this study that might have led observers in the former study to judge conformists more harshly than they had in the latter study. The authors concluded that the experimental interaction in the latter study contained subtler cues (which masked ingratiation tactics to a larger degree) as well as instructions to confederates that “tended to legitimize ingratiation” (p. 378). These factors, they argued, contributed to the finding that observers did not rate conformists as negatively as predicted. In sum, the results of Jones et al. (1968) showed that observers rated confederates (both agreeable and autonomous) in the filmed interactions similarly to how involved participants rated confederates in the live interactions: both observers and involved participants liked agreeable confederates more than autonomous confederates.

Subsequent studies compared observers’ and targets’ ratings of confederates who “yielded to persuaders’ arguments” (Braver, Linder, Corwin, & Cialdini, 1977; Cialdini, Braver & Lewis, 1974). These studies were successful in finding differences between observers’ and targets’ ratings; however, they focused on ratings of intelligence rather than liking\(^2\), and examined persuasion rather than conformity per se. Cialdini et al. (1974) found that relative to

\(^2\) Liking ratings were examined in these studies, but only as a means of ensuring that liking for confederates by persuaders and observers had been kept constant (and thus was not accounting for differences in ratings of intelligence). In line with this goal, no main effects or interactions for liking were found in either study.
observers of the influence attempts, persuaders in these studies (i.e., participants who had been successful in winning confederates to their side after having stated their opinion and a “30-second persuasive argument on the reasons for his/her opinion”) attributed higher levels of intelligence to yielders than to non-yielders. This effect was due to the combined tendency for persuaders to enhance the intelligence of yielders and observers to derogate the intelligence of yielders. Braver et al. (1977) replicated these results and further found that participants adjusted their admissions of yielding to influence so as to make the optimal impression (of intelligence). Participants in this study admitted the most yielding to a persuasive speech when they were in the presence of the persuader alone, and admitted the least yielding when the persuader was absent but when an observer (who would presumably view yielding as an indication of gullibility and lack of intelligence) was present. In the presence of both persuader and observer, participants admitted an intermediate amount of yielding. Although yielding to persuasion is not the same as conforming (in that it is the result of an overt, intentional attempt to influence another person), the findings from these studies provide some indication of how observers and targets might differentially rate those who express agreement with a target’s opinion.

The target-observer difference was further explored in a meta-analytic investigation of the relation between various classes of ingratiation tactics (including opinion conformity, rendering favours, self-promotion, other-enhancement, modesty) and the evaluations of targets and observers (Gordon, 1996). The data revealed a strong positive effect for ingratiation on judgments of interpersonal attraction (i.e., liking). In his meta-analysis, Gordon (1996) included only eight studies (out of 69) that examined the ingratiation tactic of “opinion conformity.” Of these eight studies, three were the studies by Jones and colleagues discussed above, three were studies by Byrne and colleagues (1961; 1965; 1966), which examined incidental opinion
similarity rather than opinion conformity and two were part of one study by Peters and Terborg (1975), which also examined incidental opinion similarity (in the context of evaluating a hypothetical job applicant) and did not examine liking per se, but rather the decision to hire the similar/dissimilar “applicant.” Because only the Jones and colleagues studies examined ratings of observers, effects from the rest of the studies could not have contributed much to Gordon’s overall finding that targets of an ingratiation attempt provided more positive ratings of the ingratiator than did observers of the exchange. Furthermore, given that most of the “opinion-conformity” studies that Gordon examined were actually similarity studies (where participants were exposed to information about remote confederates that either matched or did not match their own opinions; no opportunity for participants to influence confederates’ opinion was present), Gordon’s finding that opinion conformity was one of the “tactics”\textsuperscript{3} that had the most positive impact on evaluations speaks more to the rather robust attraction-similarity effect\textsuperscript{4} than to any effect of conformity on targets’ evaluations.

Finally, a relatively recent study by Vonk (2002) attempted to examine the target-observer difference in a context free of the potentially confounding variables that she argued existed in previous studies (such as the expectation of interaction between the target and the ingratiator, which Vonk argues might increase the motive to like the interaction partner as well as the motive to be liked). Across four studies, Vonk found that people formed more favourable impressions (as assessed by participants’ liking for the ingratiator, whether they perceived the

\textsuperscript{3} The other tactic was “other enhancement” (or, in other words, giving compliments).

\textsuperscript{4} The attraction-similarity effect refers to the finding that, all other things being equal, people tend to like similar others more than they like dissimilar others (e.g., Byrne, 1971; 1997; Carli, Ganley, & Pierce-Otay, 1991; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993; Montoya, Horton & Kirchner, 2004; Palmer & Kalin, 1985)
The results of Vonk’s studies seem to provide more concrete evidence for the target-observer difference; however, because the ingratiate in all these studies used two tactics of ingratiation (both other-enhancement and opinion-conformity), it is unclear which of these two tactics, or whether the combination of the two, contributed to the finding of a target-observer difference.

In sum, although it seems that conformists are liked better or viewed more positively than are non-conformists, the findings concerning the target-observer difference are inconclusive. There is some suggestion that observers are less susceptible to the potentially ingratiatory motives for conformity; however, the difference between target and observer ratings is less pronounced than is often assumed.

The Present Research

Addressing Problems with Previous Studies: A Summary

Although previous studies have made some headway in answering the question of how conformists are evaluated by their targets, interpretation of their findings is often complicated by the presence of confounding variables. The dissent studies (which, by demonstrating how non-conformists are evaluated, provide insight into how conformists might be viewed), for example, often confound dissenting with giving the “incorrect” (in cases where there is an objectively

5 In the Netherlands, where these studies were conducted, the closest word to “ingratiating” is derived from the noun “slime,” which means the same thing as it does in English, but is often used to describe people and behaviours. The adjective “slimy” thus describes a person who engages in ingratiating behaviour for ulterior motives.
correct response) or “unpopular” response. Because the dissenters in these studies are never
dissenting from an incorrect or unpopular group norm, it is difficult to conclude that they are
rejected by group members owing to their dissent per se rather than to some personality
characteristic associated with either being wrong or with holding an unpopular opinion.
Similarly, because dissent in these studies usually interferes with the achievement of some group
goal (prescribed by the experimental context), it is again unclear whether participants reject
dissenters because of their dissent per se or rather, because they represent an obstacle to attaining
group goals.

Studies that have examined evaluations of conformists are also problematic in several
ways. Jones and colleagues’ interest in reactions to conformists was confined to the context of
ingratiation. None of their studies, therefore, examined reactions to conformity in a setting not
involving the intervening variables needed to create a situation in which ingratutory tactics, as
Jones defined them, would be used. The relationship of dependence of the conformist on the
target that existed in most of these studies obscures the basic question of interest by introducing
qualifications to it: rather than “how does a target react to a conformist?,” the question became
“how does a target react to a conformist whose ulterior motive is definitely known to the target?”
Although the latter question is certainly worth pursuing, it seems that a necessary first step was
skipped. Before examining all the potential variables that might affect how a conformist is
evaluated, and before attempting to compare the target’s reaction with an outside observer’s
reaction, it seems that a study that includes only the base conditions needs to be conducted.
Although never articulated, to some extent it was assumed by researchers that the suspected
motives for conformity were in fact fulfilled by the act of conformity. Perhaps it seemed so
obvious a proposition that the importance of testing this assumption empirically was never
considered. As a result, the questions that researchers chose to examine instead might have been more advanced than was warranted. In the present research, the presence or absence of conformity (real or hypothetical) was not confounded with any extraneous variables (such as the presence or absence of any kind of instructions used to create differing levels of dependence on the target of conformity by the conformist). Instead, the present studies examined base conditions only. Examining only the base conditions ensures that any suspicion that participants might end up having of confederates’ ulterior motives is not attributable to the inclusion of a “dependence” manipulation.

Previous conformity studies are further confounded by the presence of live confederates (acting as the conforming or non-conforming participants). The evaluative consequences of a live social interaction are that participants’ final ratings of confederates are a combined result of relevant (to the design) and irrelevant information (e.g., confederates’ gestures, mannerisms, and appearance). Live confederates, therefore, will always introduce variables that interfere with participants’ ratings being based solely on the presence or absence of conformity. This drawback is especially prominent in instances where the conformity takes place in the context of a conversation (as in the Jones and colleagues studies), because there is more opportunity for confederates to display their personalities. The present research uses remote confederates (i.e., fictitious “other participants” with whom true participants communicate only through a computer program. Interactions between participants and confederates, which might have otherwise interfered with the attempt to have ratings of confederates based solely on their conformist or non-conformist behaviour, were thus eliminated.

Another problem with previous conformity studies is their lack of appropriate control groups. Most of the studies compared ratings of an agreeable confederate to ratings of a less
agreeable (not even necessarily disagreeable) confederate. Noticeably absent in these studies were control groups, which would have provided a baseline against which to judge the effect of conformity or non-conformity on participants’ ratings. Without appropriate controls, it is difficult to conclude whether conformity, rather than being a means of gaining approval, might be better construed as a means of avoiding disapproval. The present research, in addition to including both a conformity and a non-conformity condition, introduces control groups that allow a distinction to be made between obtaining approval and avoiding disapproval by conforming.

Finally, the topic of potential agreement or disagreement in previous conformity studies often had an already-established popular opinion associated with it (as for example, in Jones et al. 1968, where the majority of participants already agreed that marriage and a satisfying family life could be successfully combined with a full-time job) and were often in the form of discussion-type responses rather than straightforward yes-no responses. In order to avoid confounding conformist responding with holding a popular opinion or risking confusion (on participants’ part) over whether confederates are conforming or not, the topic of potential agreement or disagreement should not have an obviously accepted or common response associated with it, and the response should be able to be articulated in as straightforward a manner as possible. Conformist and non-conformist responding in the present studies was operationalized in such a way that participants and confederates were asked simply to choose among three letter-options (A, B, or C). This response format, unlike the discussion format used in previous studies, made it easy for participants to discern whether confederates were indeed conforming (or not conforming). Furthermore, in order to ensure that there were no generally
accepted responses to the conformity-task items, and also that the topic was relevant enough to university-aged participants (so that they might base their evaluations of confederates on how they responded), the first two studies used a “music perception” paradigm in which fairly obscure (and therefore, not obviously associated with any particular genre) music clips provided the basis for confederates’ potential conformity.

Overview of the Present Studies

The impetus for the present research was the need for a better understanding of how conformist and non-conformist behaviour is viewed, both by the targets and observers of this behaviour. In order to reach this objective, I conducted three studies that were designed to address problems with previous research and examine my question of interest more directly. Both Studies 1 and 2 investigated whether conformist behaviour (selecting the same “favourite” music clip as someone else selects) does indeed influence the extent to which the target of the conformity (the participant) approves of (or in other words, likes) the conformist. Both studies examined participants’ liking or approval ratings of conformist confederates as well as of non-conformist confederates. Participants evaluated confederates by rating them on a series of both positive and negative descriptors, most of which were chosen on the basis of personality-trait words that were identified by Anderson (1968) as being relevant to determining the “likeableness” of an individual (e.g., sincere, intelligent, likeable, admirable, friendly, agreeable, accommodating, stubborn, weak) or were adapted from Montoya and Horton’s (2004) Interpersonal Attraction questionnaire (e.g., How much do you think you’d like the other

---

6 Rentfrow and Gosling (2006) have shown that, when music preferences are clearly associated with a particular genre of music (e.g., country, jazz), observers will use individuals’ music preferences to form impressions about their personalities.

7 The novelty of clips to participants was examined (see results of Studies 1 and 2 below).

8 Montoya and Horton’s (2004) questionnaire was itself adapted from Byrne and Wong’s (1962) Interpersonal Judgement scale.
participant? How willing would you be to spend more time with the other participant?)

These studies thus examined ratings of traits and affective attraction items that had not been examined in previous “evaluations of a conformist” studies (which had mainly used either sociometric ratings or questionnaires with only a few basic items). Study 2 further examined evaluations made by observers who were exposed to the exact same confederate behaviours as were targets, and thus enabled a more valid comparison to be made between these two groups than had been previously possible (in studies where targets and observers also differed in terms of whether they had been involved in/exposed to a live or a filmed interaction). Finally, in Study 3, I examined the degree to which participants valued the traits that they ascribed to people who demonstrated either conformist or non-conformist behaviour. In other words, I aimed to determine the degree to which participants’ liking for a person was positively or negatively affected by whether the person possessed particular traits that participants themselves had associated with either conformist or non-conformist behaviour.

Study 1: Target Evaluations of Conformists and Non-Conformists

Study 1 examined participants’ ratings of three groups of confederates: 1) confederates who conformed to participants’ choices; 2) confederates who did not conform; 3) confederates about whom no conformity information was provided (i.e., controls). In light of the hypothesized social rewards of conformity, I predicted that confederates in the conformity condition would be rated more positively (and be more liked) by participants than would confederates in the non-conformity and control conditions. Given the findings that people who deviate from group consensus are disliked and rejected, I predicted that non-conforming confederates would be rated less positively (and be less liked) by participants than would control confederates.

9 See Appendix 1 (Social Perceptions) for the full list of descriptors and questions.
As was mentioned above, participants evaluated confederates by rating them on a series of both positive and negative descriptors, as well on attraction items such as: *How much do you think you’d like the other participant?* Although I predicted that conformists would be rated more positively (and be liked more) than would the other two confederate groups (non-conformists and controls), I also considered the possibility that conformists might be seen as less independent (and more dependent) than would the other two confederate groups. I thus included the adjectives “independent” and “dependent” in my list of descriptors. Further, given Jones and colleagues’, Gordon’s (1997) and Vonk’s (2002) theorizing about the potentially ingratiatory motives for conformity, I also included adjectives that might be attributed to someone whose behaviour is perceived as tactical (e.g., “strategic” and “truthful”). If participants sensed any disingenuousness on the part of conformists, they should rate them as more strategic and less truthful than they rate the other two groups of confederates.

**Method**

*Overview and Design.* On the pretext of a study examining the effects of mood on music and social perceptions, participants were asked to listen to eight trials of three 30-second music clips and decide, on each trial, which of the three was their favourite. Immediately following each of their selections, they were presented with information about the remote confederate’s selection on that particular trial. These selections either matched participants’ choices on a random six out of eight trials (Conformity condition) or did not match their choices on a random 6 out of 8 trials (Non-Conformity condition). Participants in the Control condition simply rated music clips without subsequently receiving feedback about the remote confederate’s selections. Ratings of remote confederates (on a series of both personality descriptors and likeability measures) by participants served as the main dependent variables.
Participants. Participants were 138 male and female undergraduates at the University of Toronto (mean age = 19.9, \(SD = 3.6\)) who received credit in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement. All participants were recruited via a course experiment sign-up website that invited students to participate in a study of “The effects of mood on music preferences and social perceptions.”

Procedure. Upon arrival at the lab, each participant was randomly assigned to one of three Opinion conditions—Conformity, Non-Conformity (i.e., each participant would be led to believe that the remote confederate had either conformed or not conformed to his/her behaviour) or Control (i.e., the participant would not receive feedback about the remote confederate’s behaviour). All conformity information was computer-generated, and with the exception of the paper questionnaires presented after the manipulation, the study took place entirely via computer. Participants were informed that they would be listening to music clips and answering a few questionnaires about their mood, self-perceptions, and social perceptions. They were told that in the interests of time, and because of computer-program constraints, they were being run in pairs of participants connected via internet, albeit in separate rooms and by different experimenters. The experimenter mentioned, in passing, that the program restricted the screens from advancing before it received input from at least two users. Each user would be asked the exact same questions and listen to the exact same music clips. They were also led to believe that the experimenter was interested in studying the effects of mood and music on social perceptions, and that part of their task would therefore involve rating the other member of their pair (the remote confederate). This description provided a rationale for why participants would soon be introduced, via computer, to the “other participant” and why the two participants’ responses (one set real, and the other bogus) would be visible to one another throughout the study. The true
The “other participant” was referred to as “Participant 2” (henceforth P2).

First, participants were asked to complete a mood measure, which served to bolster the cover story and was of no other pertinence to the experiment. Next, participants completed a “Demographic Information” questionnaire, which was described as simply a means of collecting basic information about each participant. In reality, the questionnaire was included as a means of distracting participants from the fact that I was actually interested in P1’s reaction to P2’s responses on the music task. Instead, I led participants to believe that the Demographic Information questionnaire would serve as the basis for P1’s later ratings of P2 (i.e., P1 would receive information about P2 through the “Demographic Information” questionnaire that P2 had ostensibly also completed). Participants were required to answer four questions about themselves (gender, age, year in university, and whether or not he/she was an Introductory Psychology student). Responses to these questions would be neutral enough so as not to bias P1 either toward or against P2. Immediately after participants completed this simple questionnaire, their responses were presented on a new screen alongside those of P2. P2’s gender always matched that of P1; his/her age was always “18 years”; his/her year in university was always “1st”; and “PSY100 student?” was always answered “yes.”

Upon completion of the Demographic questionnaire portion, participants were introduced to the music task. They were told that they would be listening to eight trials of three 30-second music clips, and that they would be indicating their favourite at the end of each trial. They were also reminded that at the end of each trial, they might be required to wait a few seconds while P2 made his/her selection (in order to reinforce the point that P1’s music preference would be chosen and visible to P2 for at least a few second before P2 made his/her selection). All music
clips used in the study were selected for their relative obscurity and because they were not
associated with any discernible style of music (i.e., they could not be classified as examples of
one distinct musical genre). I thus ensured that participants had no pre-formed opinions about
any of the music clips, and could not judge confederates on the basis of their liking for a certain
“type” of music. I also ensured that within trials, the three 30-second clips were as similar to
each other in style, tone, and level of likeability as possible so that selecting one clip over
another as one’s favourite could not be perceived as an obviously correct or incorrect response.

In all conditions, participants read the following instructions:

**Participants: Three music clips are about to play sequentially. Please listen carefully.**

After listening to all three clips, you will be asked to choose your favourite by clicking on
the mouse to select A, B, or C. If you need to replay any of the music clips, you may click
on the play buttons. Each of you has control over what you hear once the 3 clips have
played initially (i.e., clicking on the play buttons will replay music clips for you ONLY).

Following each of their selections, P1s waited a few seconds before they were presented with
P2’s selection on that particular trial (again, to reinforce the fact that P2 had made his/her
selection only after being exposed to P1’s choice). In the Conformity condition, on a random six
out of eight trials, P1 was presented with a response from P2 that was identical to P1’s (i.e., if P1
had chosen “clip A”, he/she would watch as P2 also chose “clip A”)

In the Non-Conformity
condition, on a random six out of eight trials, P1 was presented with a response from P2 that was
different from P1’s (i.e., if P1 had chosen “clip A”, he/she would watch as P2 chose either “clip
B” or “clip C”). Finally, in the Control condition, P1 received no information about P2’s clip
selections. Before advancing to each new trial, and after both participants had responded, their

---

10 On the two non-critical trials, P2 chose a response that was different from the participant’s response
(i.e., one of the two remaining clips).

11 On the two non-critical trials, P2 chose a response that was the same as the participant’s response.
responses were summarized alongside one another at the bottom of the screen. In the Control condition, only P1’s response was reiterated.

At the end of the eight music trials, several questionnaires were administered. The first two served only to maintain the cover story that “mood” and “perceptions” were variables of interest to the experimenter: the same mood measure that was administered at the beginning of the study, and a questionnaire entitled “Physical Perceptions,” which asked P1 to rate several aspects of the experimental setting (e.g., the lighting, the temperature, the size, and the odor of the room). The third questionnaire, entitled “Social Perceptions Scale” was of primary experimental interest. This scale asked P1 to rate P2 on a series of positive and negative personality descriptors as well to indicate the extent to which P1 would be likely to like and befriend P2. All items were rated on a 9-point scale (endpoints: -4 = not at all, and +4 = very; see Appendix 1). Before beginning the Social Perceptions Scale, P1s were asked to be as accurate as they could possibly be in making their ratings. They were instructed to “go with (their) gut feeling” and not to be too concerned about having very little information on which to base their judgments. P1s were also reminded that their ratings would be kept confidential and anonymous.

Finally, I administered a questionnaire that included an item that asked about participants’ perception of conformity, and was intended to serve as the main manipulation check (see Appendix 3). Participants were instructed to indicate on 5-point scales their ratings on the following five items: a) novelty of the music clips (1 = completely unfamiliar; 5 = completely familiar); b) liking for the music clips (1 = strongly dislike; 5 = strongly like); c) similarity of P2’s choices for favourite clips to their own choices (1 = not at all similar; 5 = completely similar); d) the extent to which P2 was seen as deliberately conforming to P1’s choice for
favourite music clip (1 = not at all; 5 = completely), and e) the extent to which they had trouble
deciding on their favourite music clip (1 = no trouble at all; 5 = almost impossible). Participants
in the control group were not asked about the similarity between their choices and P2’s choice or
about the extent to which P2 deliberately conformed to their choices (given that they had no
information about P2’s choices). Upon completion of this final questionnaire, participants were
debriefed, given an explanation for the need for deception in the study, and thanked for their
participation.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation check. In order to determine whether participants in the Conformity
condition did indeed perceive confederates as more conformist in their choices than did
participants in the Non-Conformity condition, I conducted independent samples T-tests between
these two conditions for the items “On average, how similar were the other participant’s choices
for favourite music clips to your own choices?”, and “Insofar as the other participant’s choices
were similar to your own, to what extent do you think that he/she was deliberately conforming to
your choices?” Because in both cases, Levene’s test revealed that variances were not equal, I
used the adjusted dfs and t-values for unequal variances to determine significance: participants in
the Conformity condition saw confederates’ responses as both more similar and more conformist
than did those in the Non-Conformity condition, $t_{(76.4)} = 15.7, p < .001$, and $t_{(64.2)} = 8.9, p < .001$
respectively. The manipulation was thus successful. Means and standard deviations are
presented in Table 1.

Liking for, familiarity with, and trouble deciding on music clips. In order to rule out the
possibility that factors related to the music clips might act as confounds, I ran one-way ANOVAs
on the items “On average, how much did you like the music clips you heard in today’s study?”,
“On average, how novel (i.e., new or unfamiliar) were the music clips you heard in today’s study?” and “On average, how much trouble did you have deciding on your favourite music clips?” The ANOVAs revealed that participants did not respond differentially to any of these items across conditions, ps > .05. All means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1.

**Factor analysis on Social Perception scale items.** A principal-components analysis was conducted on the 32 items on the rating scale. On the basis of the scree test, three factors were rotated using a Varimax rotation procedure. The rotated solution yielded three interpretable factors, which I labelled “Liking” (composed of desirable as a friend, fun to spend time with, liking for the other participant, likeable, willing to spend more time, and likely to befriend), “Niceness” (composed of accommodating, sensitive, agreeable, similar to me, respectful, and friendly) and “Independence/Honesty” (composed of truthful, sincere, independent, original, confident, and strong). These factors accounted for 15.9%, 13.6%, and 13.1% of the item variance respectively. All item loadings in each of the three factors exceeded .5, and therefore met Stevens’s (2002) criteria for statistically significant loadings with a sample size of 138. Reliability analyses on the items that made up the three factors yielded Cronbach’s alphas of .87, .78, and .75 respectively. I therefore formed three composite measures by averaging the items that tapped each construct. All other analyses were conducted using these indices as the dependent variables.

**Participants’ evaluations of confederates.** The primary hypothesis tested in Study 1 was that participants’ ratings of confederates would vary systematically as a function of conformity condition. Given the widely-accepted assumption that the attainment of approval is a goal of conformity, and given the findings that non-conformists are generally disliked and rejected, I
posed that ratings related to liking or general positive characteristics would be highest in the Conformity condition and lowest in the Non-Conformity condition. I also acknowledged, however, the possibility that conformity might be seen as strategic and disingenuous relative to non-conformity, thus leading to precisely the opposite pattern of results (i.e., ratings related to liking or general positive characteristics would be lowest in the Conformity condition and highest in the Non-conformity condition). Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to evaluate the relation between condition and each of the three dependent variables. The ANOVA for Liking was significant, $F(2, 135) = 6.16, p < .01$. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests were used to evaluate pair-wise differences between the means; this test revealed that Liking ratings in both the Conformity condition ($M = 1.58, SD = 1.20$) and the Control condition ($M = 1.40, SD = 1.15$) were higher than those in the Non-Conformity condition ($M = 0.78, SD = 1.13$), $p < .001$ and $p < .05$ respectively. Liking ratings in the Conformity condition, however, were not significantly different from those in the Control condition, $p > .05$. The ANOVA for Niceness was also significant, $F(2, 135) = 23.51, p < .001$. Again, Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between the Conformity ($M = 1.71, SD = 0.99$) and the Non-Conformity ($M = 5.35, SD = 1.01$) conditions, and between the Control ($M = 1.37, SD = 0.97$) and the Non-Conformity conditions, $ps < .001$. Niceness ratings, just like Liking ratings, did not differ between the Conformity and Control conditions, $p < .05$. Finally, the ANOVA for Independence/Honesty was also significant, $F(2, 135) = 4.44, p = .01$. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests, however, revealed that ratings differed only between the Conformity ($M = 0.61, SD = 1.17$) and the Control condition ($M = 1.28, SD = 1.02$), $p = .01$. Independence/Honesty ratings in the Non-Conformity condition had a mean of $0.94, SD = 1.01$. (See Figure 1 for a comparison of means across conditions).
In sum, participants did rate conformists more positively (as defined by both Liking and Niceness ratings) than they rated non-conformists, thus partially supporting my hypothesis. A conforming confederate, however, was rated no more positively than was a confederate whose music-clip selection was unknown. A non-conforming confederate, instead, was rated more negatively than was a confederate whose music-clip selection was unknown. Rather than suggest that conforming to a target is effective in gaining that target’s approval, the results seem to indicate that not conforming to a target will elicit that target’s disapproval. In line with the results of the dissent studies reviewed earlier, these results demonstrate that a non-conformist is evaluated negatively; unlike in previous studies, however, appropriate comparison groups were provided (in the form of Conformity and Control conditions), thus making it possible to conclude more definitively that non-conformists are downgraded. Conformity, rather than being a means of gaining approval, might be better construed as a means of avoiding disapproval.

The items that constituted the Independence/Honesty variable were included in order to address the possibility that conformists, while being perceived more positively in general than non-conformists, might nonetheless be seen as less genuine (if their conformity was viewed as strategic) or less independent (if their conformity was viewed as reflecting a lack of conviction in their own choices). Although the items composing the Independence/Honesty variable are all typically seen as reflecting positive qualities, they describe a particular kind of “positivity” not expected to be associated with conformist behaviour. Conformists did receive low Independence/Honesty ratings, but only relative to Control confederates. Strangely, non-conformists were not seen as any more independent/honest than either conformists or controls. Just as conforming did not raise Liking and Niceness ratings above a control level, not conforming did not raise Independence/Honesty ratings above a control level.
Effect of awareness of being a target of conformity on evaluations of confederates.

Although confederates in the Conformity condition were seen as significantly more conformist than were those in the Non-Conformity condition, I noted that the mean score for responses to the item “…to what extent do you think he/she was deliberately conforming…” in the Conformity condition was 2.96 out of a possible 5 points. Because this score was lower than expected, I decided to conduct analyses that included only those participants who had scored 4 or more on this item in the Conformity condition or those who had scored 2 or less in the Non-Conformity condition. Including only those participants that met these criteria led to unequal sample sizes across cells (n = 17, 45, and 45 in the Conformity, Non-Conformity, and Control conditions respectively); however, the assumption of equality of variances was still met, as was indicated by a non-significant Levene’s test. Three one-way ANOVAs on each of the dependent variables revealed precisely the same pattern of significance as was noted in the main analysis above: For Liking and Niceness, participants rated non-conformists more negatively than they rated conformists, and more negatively than they rated those about whom they had no conformity information, all ps < .01. For Honesty/Independence, participants rated conformists more negatively than they rated those about whom they had no conformity information, p < .001.

Further Discussion. In light of past literature on the topic, the finding that non-conformists are negatively evaluated (at least in terms of liking and positive characteristics, maybe even honesty/independence) is not surprising. What is perhaps more surprising is that conformists do not experience a parallel benefit in ratings. To the extent that confederates’ non-conformity to targets conveyed relational information, participants might have viewed this non-

---

13 ANOVAs (using only those participants who had rated the item “…to what extent do you think he/she was deliberately conforming…” as a 4 or more in the Conformity condition or as a 2 or less in the Non-Conformity condition) revealed the following significant effects: $F(2, 104) = 3.32, p < .05$ for Liking; $F(2, 104) = 15.90, p < .001$ for Niceness; $F(2, 104) = 8.08, p < .001$ for Independence/Honesty.
conformity as a form of rejection, and thus downgraded non-conformists as a protective strategy: Buckley, Winkel, and Leary (2004) suggest that because being rejected by a socially undesirable person is presumably less threatening to the self than is being rejected by a desirable one, downgrading the rejector might serve to protect one from the blow of rejection. Why, then, shouldn’t participants interpret confederates’ conformity as a form of acceptance and upgrade them accordingly? The rejection-salience literature seems to suggest that our reactions to rejection might be more extreme in valence than our reactions to acceptance (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister & Schaller, 2007; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2001). If so, the results of the present study might be an illustration of that phenomenon.

Another explanation for these results might lie in my operationalization of conformity. A confederate “conformed” to a target’s behaviour when he/she chose the same music clip as the target chose on six out of eight trials. Although I had intended to examine conformity as separate from similarity, one might argue that my manipulation still confounded conformity with similarity; from a participant’s perspective, a confederate in the conformity condition might have purposely copied the participant’s response or he/she might have just happened to be extremely similar (in terms of musical tastes) to the participant. I assumed that participants would interpret this matching response as a conformist one, and I have evidence that they interpreted it as more conformist than a non-matching response; however, I cannot be sure that conformity was indeed interpreted differently from similarity. Judging from the relatively low mean response to the item “Insofar as the other participant’s choices were similar to your own, to what extent do you think that he/she was deliberately conforming to your choices?” in the Conformity condition, one
might conclude that participants were not in fact construing confederates’ responses as conformist.

Although when one refers to “conformity” colloquially, one is often describing a situation in which Person B has behaved identically to Person A, a more accurate description of conformity would involve Person B shifting his/her initial response to one that matched that of Person A. Indeed, Cialdini and Trost (1998) have defined conformity as behavioural change designed to match or imitate the beliefs, expectations, or behaviors of real or imagined others, and Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) have defined it, more simply, as “changing one’s behavior to match the responses of others” (p. 606). The criterion of movement from one’s own position to a contradictory position thus distinguished conformity from normative behaviour or mere similarity. One aim of my second experiment was to bring my operational definition of conformity in line with these formalizations. Contrary to the classic Asch paradigm in which there was an objectively correct response from which participants shifted, my music paradigm had no objectively defined correct response; participants might not necessarily have inferred that a shift had occurred in the confederate’s behaviour. Study 2 was designed to introduce behavioral change to the conformity condition of my music paradigm, and thus to distinguish conformity from mere similarity. I hoped that this new manipulation would shed some light on my findings from Study 1.

A second aim of Study 2 was to introduce an observer condition and compare observers’ and targets’ reactions to conformists and non-conformists. Unlike previous studies (e.g., Jones et al., 1963; Jones et al., 1968), the present study attempted to make observer and target conditions as comparable as possible, varying only the perspective of the participant. Also unlike in previous studies, only the base conditions were examined. Whereas past studies employed status
differences and tactical variations in their manipulations, Study 2 examined observer reactions in the same way that Study 1 had examined target reactions—free of any relationship of dependence of the conformist/non-conformist on the target.

Finally, in Study 2, I was interested in examining whether certain individual-difference variables would moderate the relation between Opinion condition and evaluations of confederates. To the extent that confederates’ conformity or non-conformity conveyed relational information (to targets, primarily), I assumed that various personality differences might affect participants’ interpretation of this information. Given that belongingness needs, self-monitoring, and self-esteem are all implicated in the way that relational information is perceived (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), these variables seemed to be the most obvious choices for personality variables that might affect the extent to which conformists and non-conformists were evaluated by participants.

Study 2: Target versus Observer Evaluations of Conformists and Non-Conformists in a Revised Conformity Paradigm

The design of Study 2 was very similar to that of Study 1, with some important adjustments. First, in order to address the issue of re-operationalizing conformity in Study 2, I created an opportunity for participants to have exposure to confederates’ initial response as well as to their final response on each trial. Conformity was thus operationalized as moving from an initial response, which was different from the target’s response, to a final response, which was the same as the target’s response. Non-conformity was operationalized as retaining one’s initial response, which was different from the target’s response. This adjustment in design necessitated the introduction of two new Opinion conditions to act as controls: 1) an Agreement condition in
which confederates retained their initial response, which was the same as the target’s response, and 2) a Non-Conformity Movement condition in which confederates’ initial and final responses were different from one another and also different from the target’s response. The Agreement condition distinguished itself from the Conformity condition by presenting no change in the confederate’s response. The Non-conformity Movement condition distinguished itself from the Non-conformity condition by presenting a change in the confederate’s response; this latter condition was thus referred to as the Non-conformity Fixed condition. Because I included these two new control conditions, the control condition that was used in Study 1 was eliminated in Study 2. In total, there were four Opinion conditions: Conformity (C), Non-Conformity Fixed (NCF), Non-Conformity Movement (NCM), and Agreement (A). These conditions are described further in the Methods section.

The second major difference between Studies 1 and 2 was the inclusion of an Observer condition in Study 2. Participants were either active participants (APs; as they had been in Study 1) or observers (Os). These conditions will henceforth be referred to as the Perspective conditions. Os were exposed to all the same information about confederates as were APs but did not perform the music-selection task performed by APs and by remote confederates.

The primary hypothesis tested in Study 2 was that participants’ ratings of confederates would vary systematically as a function of Opinion and Perspective conditions. Given the results of Study 1, I retained my initial hypothesis that Cs would be liked more (by APs) than would both types of non-conformists (NCFs and NCMs), and similarly, that As, by virtue of their agreement with APs, would also be liked more than both types of non-conformists. Further, I predicted that APs would like Cs even more than they would like As. There is some evidence to suggest that yielding (agreement preceded by disagreement) leads to greater attraction than
agreement alone (Lombardo, Weiss, & Buchanan, 1972). I expected that the shift in position to one of agreement would have an effect on liking over and above any effect of agreement alone. No firm predictions were made regarding evaluations of NCMs; however, I speculated that because these confederates not only gave non-conforming responses but also gave inconsistent responses across their two occasions to respond, they might be perceived as indecisive, unsure of themselves or flaky, thus earning themselves more negative ratings than did NCFs.

As for differences between Perspective conditions, two outcomes were considered. The first was that Os, given that they should have no investment in the confederates’ choices for favourite music clip, would be free to view the interaction between APs and confederates more objectively than would APs. In line with Jones and colleagues’ reasoning, this higher level of objectivity would lead Os to rate Cs less favourably than would APs. Furthermore, because their vanity should not be engaged, Os might be more attuned to the potentially negative aspects of Cs’ behaviour (including manipulative/ingratiatory intent, or lack of confidence/conviction in one’s choices), and downgrade them as a result. Conversely, Os (again, because their vanity should not be engaged) might view non-conformists more positively than would APs; furthermore, they might be more attuned to the potentially positive aspects of non-conformity (such as independence and strength of character) and upgrade them as a result.

The second possibility, however, was that Os, like APs, might appreciate the general “agreeableness” of Cs. One would expect that agreeableness, or the tendency to be pleasant and accommodating in social situations, should be viewed just as positively from an observer’s perspective as from a target’s perspective. If both Os and APs focused on the quality of “agreeableness” rather than on the act of conforming, there should be no difference between their ratings of the C (nor between their ratings of the A). Similarly, if both Os and APs focused on
the lack of “agreeableness” of NCFs and NCMs, there should be no difference between Os’ and APs’ ratings in either non-conformity condition.

Finally, in order to address the possibility that certain individual-difference variables might moderate the relation between Opinion condition and evaluations of confederates (by APs specifically), I included questionnaires that assessed need to belong, self-monitoring, fear of negative evaluation and self-esteem. These variables in particular were chosen because of their influence on the perception of relational information and their association with rejection sensitivity. Research on these types of individual differences assumes that, whereas all people are concerned with avoiding social rejection, some people are especially fearful that others will not meet their needs for acceptance and belonging, and respond more intensely to actual or perceived social rejection (Crowne & Marlow, 1964; Downey, Mougios, Ayduk, London, & Shoda, 2004; Levy, Ayduk, & Downey, 2001). I expected that participants with high belongingness needs, for example, might have more reason to appreciate a confederate’s conformity to their behaviour. In this context, conformity, or at least agreement, would presumably fulfill the participant’s need for acceptance from others. This feeling of acceptance might in turn translate to more positive ratings of the C. Conversely, a confederate’s non-conformity might be perceived as a form of rejection for participants with high belongingness needs. These participants might thus downgrade non-conformists as a protective strategy (Buckley et al., 2004). The same reasoning may be applied to participants with a high fear of negative evaluation or with low self-esteem. Participants who score high on fear of negative evaluation or low on self-esteem may be particularly likely to view non-conformity as a form of rejection and thus dislike non-conformists relative to conformists. Along similar lines, research on self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) could be construed to suggest that, relative to low self-
monitors, high self-monitors might be more sensitive to situational norms and more likely to seek acceptance from others (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). If so, high self-monitors might also be more likely than low self-monitors to interpret conformist behaviour as acceptance and non-conformist behavior as rejection, and to rate these behaviours accordingly.

Method

Overview and design. In order to address the issue of re-operationalizing conformity, Study 2 instantiated a slightly different procedure from that of Study 1, in which participants were made aware of confederates’ initial response as well as their final response on each trial. I used the same cover story as in Study 1 (examining the effects of mood and music on social perceptions) except that I told participants that I was also interested in determining how level of familiarity with the particular music clip (i.e., having had prior exposure to it) would influence later mood and social perceptions. I created an opportunity for participants to have exposure to two responses by including in my music paradigm a “prior exposure” condition, in which only the confederate (referred to as Participant 2 [henceforth, P2]) was ever placed. The true participant (referred to as Participant 1 [henceforth, P1]) was always in the “first-time exposure” condition, meaning that he or she got one opportunity to listen to the music clips in each trial and to select his or her favourites. P2 had presumably listened to all the music clips earlier, made his/her selections for favourites, and was now being given another opportunity to respond (with the choice of either retaining his/her initial response or changing to a new response). In the Observer condition, the true participant was referred to as Participant 3 (henceforth, P3) and always had third turn at responding, once P1 and P2 (both confederates) had each given their responses. Rather than select his or her favourite music clip, P3’s task was to judge music tempo. P3 was thus removed from any investment in the music-clip-selection task, but could
observe the “interaction” that occurred between P1 and P2. Ratings of P2s (on a series of both personality descriptors and likeability measures) by P1s and P3s served as the main dependent variables.

Participants. Participants were 131 male and female undergraduates at the University of Toronto (mean age = 20.1, $SD = 1.6$) who received credit in partial fulfillment of an introductory-psychology course requirement. All participants were recruited via a course experiment sign-up website that invited students to participate in a study of “The effects of mood on music preferences and social perceptions.”

Procedure. The procedure for Study 2 was similar to that of Study 1, but incorporated two major adjustments: 1) an altered music paradigm, which comprised the adjusted Conformity and Non-Conformity conditions as well as two new conditions (Agreement, and Non-Conformity Movement, intended to act as controls for the Conformity and Non-Conformity conditions respectively); 2) the introduction of observer conditions, which mimicked the non-observer conditions, but varied the perspective of the participant. To distinguish the role of the participant in the first set of conditions from that in the second set, I refer to the participant as either an Active participant or an Observer. Only the changes I made to the procedure in Study 2 will be discussed in depth.

Active Participants (APs). As part of the introduction to the music task, all APs (always referred to as “Participant 1” during the music task) read the following instructions:

You are in the “first-time-exposure” condition, meaning that you are hearing the music (hopefully) for the first time. Even if it is NOT your first time hearing the clips today, as long as you have not heard them very recently (i.e., within the last day), you still qualify for the first-time-exposure condition. The other participant today is in the “prior
exposure” condition, meaning that he/she has already heard the music clips once right before participating in the second portion of the study (i.e., the portion in which you are now participating).

APs then read the same music-task instructions regarding favourite music-clip selection as had participants in Study 1, listened to each of the clips, and made their selection for that particular trial. Following their selection, they read the following instructions, addressed to P2:

 Participant 2 (prior-exposure): The last time that you listened to these clips, you chose clip __ . If you are satisfied with your response, click yes. Otherwise, enter your new response.

After a couple of minutes, participants were presented with the P2’s response, which was followed by a summary of both participants’ responses alongside one another:

 Participant 1 (first-time exposure): You have chosen clip ___.

 Participant 2 (prior-exposure): You have chosen clip ____.

In the Conformity (C) condition, on a random six out of eight trials, P2 changed his/her initial selection to conform to P1’s response (e.g., if P1 had chosen “clip A,” he/she would watch as P2 changed his/her selection from “clip B” or “clip C” to “clip A”). In the Non-Conformity condition, on a random six out of eight trials, P2 remained at his/her initial selection, which was different from P1’s selection (e.g., if P1 had chosen “clip A,” he/she would watch as P2, given another opportunity to respond, retained his/her initial selection of either “clip B” or “clip C”). In the Agreement (A) condition, on a random six out of eight trials, P2 retained his/her initial selection, which was the same as P1’s selection (e.g., if P1 had chosen “clip A,” he/she would watch as P2, given another opportunity to respond, retained his/her initial selection of “clip A”). Finally, in the Non-Conformity Movement condition, P2 changed his/her initial selection, which
was different from P1’s selection to another selection, which was also different from P1’s selection (e.g., if P1 had chosen “clip A,” he/she would watch as P2, given another opportunity to respond, changed his/her selection from “clip B” to “clip C” or from “clip C to clip B”). The table below summarizes the four Response conditions by indicating the presence of movement by P2, as well as the pre- and post-positions of P2 relative to P1 in each instance. I will refer to the Non-Conformity condition as the Non-Conformity Fixed (NCF) condition in order to distinguish it from the Non-Conformity Movement condition (NCM):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conformity (C)</th>
<th>Non-Conformity Fixed (NCF)</th>
<th>Non-Conformity Movement (NCM)</th>
<th>Agreement (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre: Disagreement</td>
<td>Absence of Movement</td>
<td>Movement</td>
<td>Absence of Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post: Agreement</td>
<td>Pre: Disagreement</td>
<td>Pre: Disagreement</td>
<td>Pre: Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2 changes initial response to conform to P1’s response on 6 out of 8 trials</td>
<td>P2 retains initial response (which is different from P1’s response) on 6 out of 8 trials</td>
<td>P2 changes initial response (which was different from P1’s to another response (also different from P1’s) on 6 out of 8 trials</td>
<td>P2 retains initial response, which is the same as P1’s response (on 6 out of 8 trials)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observers (Os). Os received the same information about P1 and P2’s roles in the music task as P1s received in each of the four AP conditions. P1s and P2s in the four O conditions, of

---

14 On the two non-critical trials, P2 retains his/her initial response.
15 On the two non-critical trials, P2 changes his/her initial response to a response that is still different from P1’s response.
16 On the two non-critical trials, P2 retains his/her initial response.
17 On the two non-critical trials, P2 changes his/her initial response.
course, were fictitious, computer-generated participants. Os were instead referred to as “P3s” and had their turn at responding last, rather than first. Part of their instructions read:

*Participant 3 will be doing a music-tempo task (i.e., evaluating how fast or slow the songs are). You have been assigned to be Participant 3 in this experiment. At certain points during the computer portion, you may be required to wait a couple of seconds while the other participants (1 and 2) make their selections. Please be patient.*

All of the text that appeared on the computer screen leading up to P3’s turn at responding was directed at P1 and P2, and mimicked the exchange that took place between P1 and P2 in each of the four AP conditions (with real favourite music-clip selections by P1 in the AP conditions being replaced with randomly-generated selections by P1 in the O conditions). After being presented with the responses of P1 and P2, P3 was asked to choose the clip with quickest tempo.

Finally, just as in the AP conditions, all responses were summarized alongside one another:

*Participant 1 (first-time exposure/music preference): You have chosen clip # ____.*

*Participant 2 (prior-exposure/music preference): You have chosen clip # ____.*

*Participant 3 (first-time exposure/music tempo): You have chosen clip # ____.*

At the end of the eight music trials, several questionnaires were administered. As in Study 1, the first two served only to maintain the cover story that “mood” and “perceptions” were variables of interest to the experimenter—the mood measure and the “Physical Perceptions” questionnaire described in Study 1. The third questionnaire, the “Social Perceptions Scale,” which was the main DV, asked P1 in the AP conditions, and P3 in the O conditions to rate P2 on the same series of items used in Study 1. (See Appendix 2 for the “O version” of this questionnaire).
Next, unlike in Study 1, all participants were asked to complete a series of questionnaires that were included in order to assess whether several individual difference variables (specifically those related to belongingness and impression-management needs) moderated the relation between Opinion condition and evaluations of P2s. Questionnaires included the Need to Belong scale (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2005), the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (Leary, 1983), Snyder’s Self-Monitoring Scale (1974), and Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem scale (1965); see Appendices 4 to 7. All scales were labeled as “Self-Perceptions” and, as justification for completing these scales, participants were told that “our mood often has an effect on our self-perceptions as well as on our other-perceptions.” Finally, participants completed the same questionnaire containing the main manipulation check as had those in Study 1. The Observer version of this questionnaire replaced references to “the other participant” with references to “P2” and references to oneself with references to “P1” (e.g., rather than read “Insofar as the other participant’s choices were similar to your own, to what extent do you think that he/she was deliberately conforming to your choices?”, Os read “Insofar as P2’s choices were similar to P1’s choices, to what extent do you think that P2 was deliberately conforming to P1’s choices?”). Thus, their task was different from that of APs, and Os were also not asked about how much difficulty they had deciding on their favourite music clips. Upon completion of these questionnaires, all participants were debriefed, given an explanation for the need for deception in the study, and thanked for their participation.

Results

Manipulation check. In order to determine whether APs and Os in the C condition did indeed perceive P2s as more conformist in their choices than did participants in the three other Opinion conditions, I conducted two 2 X 4 ANOVAs for the items “On average, how similar
were the other participant’s/P2’s choices for favourite music clips to your own/P1’s choices?”, and “Insofar as the other participant’s/P2’s choices were similar to your own/P1’s choices, to what extent do you think that he/she/P2 was deliberately conforming to your/P1’s choices?”

The ANOVA on the first item (regarding the similarity of P2’s choices to P1’s choices) revealed a significant main effect of Opinion condition, $F_{(3, 123)} = 140.10, p < .001$, as well as an interaction effect between Opinion and Perspective conditions, $F_{(3, 123)} = 6.03, p = .001$. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests for the Opinion-condition main effect revealed that P2s in the C and A conditions were seen as more similar to targets than were P2s in the NCF and NCM conditions by both APs and Os, $ps < .001$. Pairwise comparisons between APs and Os in each condition (conducted using a Bonferroni correction to compensate for alpha inflation owing to multiple comparisons) following up the significant interaction between Opinion and Perspective conditions revealed differences between APs and Os in both the NCM and A conditions. Specifically, APs rated P2s as more similar to themselves than Os rated P2s similar to P1s in the A condition ($M = 3.93, SD = .26$ vs. $M = 3.44, SD = .62$ for APs and Os respectively), $p = .03$, and less similar to themselves than did Os in the NCM condition ($M = 1.13, SD = .34$ vs. $M = 1.77, SD = .90$ for APs and Os respectively), $p < .01$. The interaction effect for the item “…how similar were the other participant’s/P2’s choices…?” was, therefore, driven by the differences between APs and Os in two Opinion conditions: A and NCM. Means and standard deviations for Opinion conditions as a function of Perspective are presented in Table 2.

The second ANOVA (which was on the item “…to what extent do you think that he/she/P2 conformed…?”) also revealed a significant main effect of Opinion condition, $F_{(3, 120)} = 37.18, p < .001$ and an interaction effect between Opinion and Perspective conditions, $F_{(3, 120)} =

---

18 Responses to this item were not significantly different between C and A nor between NCF and NCM conditions, $ps > .05$. 
8.77, \( p < .001 \). Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests for the Opinion-condition main effect revealed that P2s in the C and A conditions were seen as more conformist than were P2s in the NCF and NCM conditions by both APs and Os, \( ps < .001 \). There were no differences, however, in the extent to which P2s were seen as conformist between the C and A or between the NCF and NCM conditions, \( ps > .05 \). Pairwise comparisons (conducted using a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons) following up the significant interaction between Opinion and Perspective conditions revealed differences between APs and Os in the A condition. Specifically, in the A condition, APs rated P2s as significantly more conformist than did Os (\( M = 3.47, SD = .84 \) vs. \( M = 2.00, SD = .97 \) for APs and Os respectively), \( p < .001 \). The interaction effect for the item “…to what extent do you think that he/she/P2 conformed…?” was, therefore, driven by the difference between APs and Os in the A condition. Means and standard deviations for Opinion conditions as a function of Perspective are presented in Table 2.

Overall, the main effects of Opinion condition on both items indicated that APs and Os viewed Cs and As as both more similar and more conformist than they viewed NCFs and NCMs. Although my manipulation was successful in rendering Cs more conformist than either NCFs or NCMs, Cs were not viewed as any more conformist than were As (by either APs or Os). Although as researchers we are highly aware of the fact that Cs shift from one position to another, it is possible that participants are mostly oblivious to shifts and notice only final positions.

**Liking for, familiarity with, and trouble deciding on music clips.** In order to rule out the possibility that factors related to the music clips might act as confounds, I ran 2 (Perspective) X 4 (Opinion) ANOVAs on the items “On average, how much did you like the music clips you heard in today’s study?”, and “On average, how novel (i.e., new or unfamiliar) were the music clips
The only significant effect that any of the ANOVAs revealed was a main effect of Perspective on the first item: Os, on average, liked the music clips better than did APs, \(M = 3.89, SD = .93\) vs. \(M = 3.26, SD = 1.14\), \(F(1, 123) = 11.84, p = .001\). No other differences emerged on the other items as a function of either Perspective or Opinion condition, \(ps > .05\). All means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.

**Replication of Study 1.** In order to determine whether the results from Study 1 had been replicated (i.e., whether APs had, once again, rated conformists more positively than non-conformists), I conducted an independent-samples t-test comparing C to NCF (in the AP condition only) using the same three composite variables as had been used in Study 1\(^{20}\). Paralleling the findings from Study 1, these results indicated that APs rated P2s in the C condition significantly higher on Liking \((M = .99, SD = .89)\) and Niceness \((M = 1.40, SD = .75)\) than they rated P2s in the NCF condition (Liking \(M = -.27, SD = 1.39\); Niceness \(M = -.26, SD = .75\)), \(t(32) = 2.66, p = .012\) and \(t(32) = 6.48, p < .001\) for Liking and Niceness respectively. The non-significant difference between C- and NCF-ratings of Independence/Honesty was also replicated, \(p = .31\). (Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4). Thus, the finding that APs rated conformists more positively on Liking and Niceness measures but no differently on Independence/Honesty measures than they rated non-conformists was successfully replicated.

**Factor analysis on Social Perception scale items.** A principal-components analysis was conducted on the 32 items on the rating scale using the data from both Study 1 and Study 2 in

---

\(^{19}\) The item “On average, how much trouble did you have deciding on your favourite music clips?” could not be analyzed because Os did not complete the music task, and therefore could not experience any “trouble deciding on...clips.”

\(^{20}\) Responses to items that had formed each dependent variable in Study 1 were averaged to form the same three composite measures (Liking, Niceness, and Independence/Honesty).
order to increase N. On the basis of the scree test, two factors were rotated using a Varimax rotation procedure. The rotated solution yielded two interpretable factors, which more or less corresponded to two of the factors extracted in Study 1. The items that made up the first factor—once again, labelled “Liking”—were identical to those that made up the first factor in Study 1 (namely, desirable as a friend, fun to spend time with, liking for the other participant, likeable, willing to spend more time, and likely to befriend) with three additional items (friendly, agreeable, likely to respect). The second factor was composed of independent, decisive, original, confident, strong, weak (RS), flexible (RS), accommodating (RS), cooperative (RS), impressionable (RS), and dependent (RS). Although this factor, like Factor 3 in Study 1, reflected the concept of independence, it did not seem to reflect honesty or truthfulness to the same extent as it had in Study 1. Instead, it seemed to be a better reflection of steadfastness, or some quality that implies sticking with one’s original opinion and resisting being swayed by an external influence. I thus labelled this factor “Independence/Steadfastness.” These two factors accounted for 27% and 20% of the item variance respectively. All item loadings in each of the two factors exceeded .60 and therefore easily met Stevens’s (2002) criteria for statistically significant loadings with a sample size of 269. Reliability analyses on the items that made up the two factors yielded Cronbach’s alphas of .88 and .77 respectively. I therefore formed two composite measures by averaging the items that tapped each construct. The major analyses for Study 2 were conducted using these indices as the dependent variables.

Participants’ evaluations of confederates. The primary hypothesis tested in Study 2 was that participants’ ratings of confederates (i.e., P2s) would vary systematically as a function of

21 This analysis excluded Os’ ratings of item #1 (similar to myself); because the question to O was “how similar is P2 to P1?” Os’ responses and Ps’ responses to this item cannot be grouped in the same category.  
22 The last 6 items listed here were reverse-scored (RS).  
23 For a sample size of 269, only loadings greater than \(2(.163) = .326\) in absolute value would be declared statistically significant (Stevens, 2002).
Opinion and Perspective conditions. Given the results of Study 1, I retained my initial hypothesis that Cs would be liked more (by APs) than would NCFs (and similarly, that As would also be liked more than would NCFs). As for differences between the remaining pairs of Opinion conditions, I speculated that increased liking in the C condition would occur over and above the effect of similarity on liking, and that P2s would therefore be liked more in the C condition than in the A condition. I had no firm predictions about how NCMs condition would be evaluated but I further speculated that because NCMs not only gave non-conformist responses on their two occasions to respond within each trial but also gave inconsistent responses across the two occasions, they might have been seen as indecisive or flaky and thus be rated even more negatively than would NCFs. As for differences between Perspective conditions, I expected one of two possibilities: either that 1) Os, who should have less investment in P2s’ responses, would rate Cs less positively than would APs, and would rate NCFs less negatively than would APs, or 2) Os, like APs, might appreciate the general “agreeableness” of Cs, (resulting in no difference between Os’ and APs’ ratings of Cs), and dislike the lack of agreeableness of NCFs (similarly resulting in no difference between Os and APs’ ratings of NCFs).

To test these predictions, I conducted a 2 (Perspective condition) x 4 (Opinion condition) ANOVA on Liking ratings. This analysis revealed a significant effect of Opinion condition only, $F_{(3,123)} = 11.24, p < .001$, and no interaction effect. Pairwise comparisons among the means (using an adjusted alpha of .05/6 comparisons = .008) revealed that both C and A differed from both NCF and NCM (all $ps < .008$). No significant differences were obtained between C and A or between NCF and NCM, $ps > .008$. In line with my predictions, P2s in the C and A conditions were liked significantly more than were P2s in the NCF and NCM conditions. Contrary to my predictions, however, P2s in the A condition were rated no differently than those
in the C condition, and P2s in the NCM condition were rated no differently than those in the NCF condition. Finally, APs and Os displayed the same pattern of rating Opinion conditions (i.e., there were no differences between APs’ and Os’ ratings of P2s in any of the Opinion conditions), thereby supporting my second prediction (rather than my first) for differences between Perspective conditions (see Table 5, and Figure 2 for means).

Given the findings from Study 1 (that Cs were rated as significantly less independent and trustworthy than were controls), a different pattern of results was expected for the Independence/Steadfastness dependent variable; specifically, I predicted that P2s in the C condition would be seen as less independent/steadfast than would those in the other three Opinion conditions. I also expected that P2s in the NCM condition would be seen as less resolute in their decision-making and therefore be downgraded on the steadfastness component of this dependent variable (at least relative to P2s in the NCF and A conditions). Finally, with respect to differences between APs and Os on the Independence/Steadfastness variable, my predictions followed the logic of the two predictions outlined above regarding differences between APs and Os on Liking and Niceness ratings. Initially, I expected either that 1) APs’ Independence/Steadfastness ratings of P2s in the C condition would be higher than Os’ ratings (owing to the fact that APs’ greater liking for P2s in the C condition might have distracted APs’ attention from the potentially negative aspects of P2s’ conformity, such as their lack of independence) and would be lower than were Os’ ratings in the NCF condition (owing to the fact that APs’ reduced liking for P2s in the NCF condition might have distracted APs’ attention from the potentially positive aspects of P2s’ non-conformity); or 2) there would be no differences

---

24 Although in Study 1 conformists had not been rated as significantly more independent/honest than had non-conformists, because in Study 2 a slightly different cluster of descriptors made up the Independence/Steadfast dependent variable, I expected a more pronounced difference between conformists and both types of non-conformists in Study 2.
between APs’ and Os’ ratings of either Cs or NCFs on the Independence/Steadfastness variable (owing to the fact that there were no differences between APs’ and Os’ liking ratings of either Cs or NCFs, and thus APs and Os could not be differentially distracted from the negative or positive aspects of conformity and non-conformity respectively). Given that there were no differences between APs’ and Os’ liking of Cs and NCFs, however, Prediction 2 was seen as more likely to be confirmed.

A 2 X 4 ANOVA on Independence/Steadfastness ratings revealed a significant main effect of Opinion condition only, $F(3, 123) = 5.28, p = .002$. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests revealed that, as predicted, Independence/Steadfastness ratings were lower in the C condition ($M = -.42, SD = .84$) than in any of the other Opinion conditions, $ps \leq .01$. Contrary to prediction, ratings in the NCM condition were not significantly different from those in the NCF and A conditions, $ps > .05$. (See Table 5 and Figure 2 for means).

Analyses on individual items of the Social Perception scale. Certain items on the Social Perception scale, which neither loaded strongly on either of the dependent variables nor on any particular component revealed by the factor analysis, nonetheless seemed worthy of separate analyses. Of particular interest were the adjectives that addressed the concepts of admiration (as distinguished from liking), intelligence, and an awareness of strategic behaviour on the part of P2. It is conceivable that admiration for P2s might have been inspired by qualities quite unlike those that inspired liking of P2s. While a conformist might be liked more than a non-conformist for his/her conformity, he/she may not necessarily be admired more for it. Similarly, he/she may not necessarily be considered more intelligent than a non-conformist. The item Strategic was initially included in the scale in order to assess the extent to which participants might have
perceived conformity as a calculated maneuver or ingratiatory tactic (of the sort that Jones has described).

Separate 2 x 4 ANOVAs were run on the items Admira ble, Intelligent, and Strategic. These ANOVAs revealed Opinion main effects on all three items, $F_{(3, 123)} = 4.36, p = .006$; $F_{(3, 123)} = 3.21, p = .025$; and $F_{(3, 123)} = 3.70, p = .014$, respectively. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests revealed only the following significant differences: P2s in NCF were seen as less admirable ($M = -.12, SD = 1.05$) than were P2s in NCM ($M = .79, SD = 1.62$), $p = .028$, and less admirable than were P2s in A ($M = .97, SD = 1.24$), $p = .006$. P2s in NCF were also seen as less intelligent ($M = .48, SD = 1.23$) than P2s in A ($M = 1.42, SD = 1.29$), $p = .03$. Finally, P2s in NCF were seen as less strategic ($M = -.45, SD = 1.56$) than P2s in A ($M = .68, SD = 1.25$), $p = .009$. In sum, although P2s in NCF were liked less than were those in C, they were considered neither less admirable nor less intelligent than were those in C. Contrary to intuition, P2s in C were not seen as significantly more strategic than were those in NCF; however, P2s in A were seen as more strategic than were those in NCF.

Individual difference measures. Total scores were computed for each participant’s responses to each of the four individual-differences questionnaires (Need to Belong, Fear of Negative Evaluation, Self-Monitoring, and Self-Esteem). Two linear regression analyses were conducted using scores on each of the scales and Opinion condition as the independent variables, the first regression using Liking as the dependent variable and the second using Independence/Steadfastness. Because there were no Perspective-condition differences for the dependent variables, data for APs and Os were combined for the purposes of these analyses. The regressions revealed that the individual difference measures were not significant predictors of either of the dependent variables in any of the Opinion conditions, $ps > .05$. Surprisingly,
participants’ Need to Belong, Fear of Evaluation, Self-Monitoring and Self-Esteem scores had no impact on how they perceived P2s in either of the two domains of evaluation.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 raise interesting questions about how people evaluate conformist and non-conformist behaviour. Our perceptions of both those who conform to our behaviour and those who conform to others’ behaviour are far from straightforward. It seems that while we can appreciate certain elements of conformist behaviour (as reflected in participants’ higher liking ratings of P2s in C relative to P2s in NCF and NCM), we can also recognize the potentially negative aspects of being a conformist (as reflected in participants’ lower independence/steadfastness ratings of P2s in C relative to P2s in NCF, NCM, and A). Moreover, individual differences that might lead some of us to be more sensitive than others to the relational information potentially conveyed by others’ conformity or non-conformity to our behaviour do not seem to have an impact on our evaluations of these behaviours.

Independence and steadfastness are both traits that are typically viewed as admirable, whereas a lack of these traits is typically viewed as deplorable. Interestingly, however, in Study 2, those participants who, one could assume, lacked these traits were not penalized with lower liking ratings. In fact, these participants were liked more than were those who displayed these traits. This finding raises two questions. First, to what extent do we actually ascribe certain traits to conformist and non-conformist behaviour? Is it indeed the case that conformist behaviour is associated with lacking independence and that non-conformist behaviour is associated with being independent? Second, to the extent that we do ascribe certain traits to these behaviours, how positively or negatively do we view these traits and how much of a role do they play in determining how much we like a person? Although “independence” might be
viewed as a positive trait, the results of Study 2 would suggest that it might not be a highly valued trait (i.e., we might not place a lot of importance on an individual’s being independent in determining how much we like that individual). Or perhaps the negative traits that are associated with non-conformity outweigh the influence that any positive traits associated with non-conformity might have on our liking for an individual. A further possibility is that the positive traits that we assume are associated with conformist behaviour (e.g., agreeableness) outweigh the influence that any negative traits associated with conformity might have on our liking for an individual.

The finding that P2s in C and A were liked equally suggests that the quality of being agreeable might account for the higher liking ratings in these two conditions relative to the non-conformity conditions. In other words, it was not the act of conformity per se that accounted for higher ratings of P2s in C but rather the act of agreement. Participants might not have been as concerned with winning P2s over to their side as they were with having P2s agree with them (whether P2s started off doing so or merely ended up doing so). The finding that Cs and As were liked equally might also suggest that participants saw no difference between these two categories of P2s. This possibility is refuted, however, by the finding that Cs were indeed viewed differently from As with respect to Independence/Steadfastness. Clearly, participants did make a distinction between Cs and As; this distinction, however, had no bearing on liking ratings. Once again, the “agreeableness” presumably associated with conformist behaviour might have taken precedence over any negative characteristics associated with conformity (e.g., lacking independence).

Interestingly, there were no differences in APs and Os perceptions of Cs (nor were there differences in their perceptions of P2s in any other Opinion condition). Once again, it seems that
it is the quality of being “agreeable” and other associated qualities that might account for this finding. Although one prediction was that Os would be more skeptical about the potentially ingratiating tactics of Cs and would thus rate them more negatively than would APs, it is conceivable that the ability to be “agreeable” was appreciated equally by APs and Os. If conformist behaviour is construed in this way (whether by the target of conformity or by an outside observer), then it may be viewed positively, as indicating a cooperative and accommodating disposition. In this scenario, one should expect no difference between Os’ and APs’ ratings of Cs. Similarly, if non-conformist behaviour is indicative of lacking this agreeable or cooperative disposition, then one should expect no differences between Os’ and APs’ ratings of NCFs and NCMs. In other words, when P2s are viewed strictly as having an agreeable or disagreeable personality, rather than as having copied or not copied P1s’ behaviour, APs’ and Os’ differential personal investment should not affect how they evaluate P2s.

In Study 3, I was interested in shedding some light on the speculations raised above by examining the specific traits associated with both conformity and non-conformity, as well as the relative importance of these traits in shaping our perceptions of individuals who possess them.

Study 3: Evaluations of Character Traits Associated with Conformity and Non-Conformity

Study 3 consisted of two phases, the second of which was designed on the basis of findings obtained from the first. In Phase 1, I sought to find empirical support for the assumptions made above regarding which traits people tend to ascribe to individuals exhibiting conformist or non-conformist behaviour. Participants were required to indicate the extent to which they associated each trait (from a list of trait adapted from the Social Perceptions scale in Studies 1 & 2) with either conformist or non-conformist behaviour. In Phase 2, a separate group
of participants evaluated the traits that had been identified in Phase 1 as being associated with either conformist or non-conformist behaviour. I was specifically interested in the extent to which participants viewed these traits as positive or negative (i.e., the valence of the trait), as well as the extent to which these traits were valued by participants. I use the term “valued” to refer to the degree to which participants’ liking for a person was positively affected by whether she/he possessed this trait. In this sense, the valence of the trait is distinct from the value placed on it; a trait could be viewed in a very positive or negative light without necessarily having a very positive or negative effect on liking.

Given the results of Study 2 (i.e., that conformists were liked more non-conformists), I predicted that traits associated with conformist behaviour would be valued more (i.e., have a more positive influence in determining liking) than those associated with non-conformist behaviour. Because the results of Study 2 suggested that neither behaviour is viewed as strictly positive or strictly negative, I was also interested in distinguishing between the positive and negative traits associated with both conformity and non-conformity and in examining how these traits differentially affected liking. Finally, I wanted to determine whether participants placed more importance on one’s possessing certain traits (whether positive or negative) relative to other traits in determining their liking for that person.

Phase 1 Method

Participants. Participants for the first phase of this study were 63 males and female undergraduates at the University of Toronto (mean age = 19.2, SD = 1.12). Participants were recruited via a course experiment sign-up website that invited students to participate in a study of “Social Perceptions.” They received credit in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement.
Procedure. Once participants in Phase 1 of this study had consented to participate, they were provided with a link to an online questionnaire and instructions for how to proceed in responding to the items. The questionnaire was described to them as having been designed to examine their social perceptions. Participants were asked to indicate which traits (among a list of descriptors that appeared on the Social Perceptions scale in Studies 1 and 2) they would ascribe to a person who had just exhibited conformist or non-conformist behaviour. Specifically, participants read the following instructions:

Please indicate which of the following traits you would associate with each of the following people:

1. Person A **conforms** to a behaviour that you have just exhibited (i.e., behaves the **SAME** way as you did).

2. Person B **does not conform** to a behaviour that you have just exhibited (i.e., behaves in a **DIFFERENT** way than you did).

On the basis of this information, check off characteristics that you might assign to Person A and Person B. For example, do you find Person A friendly? Place a check next to “friendliness” in the Person A column if “yes”; leave blank if “no.” Do you find Person B friendly? Place a check next to “friendliness” in the Person B column if “yes”; leave blank if “no”.

A list of nouns corresponding to the adjectives on the Social Perceptions scale in Studies 1 and 2 followed these instructions. Upon completing this online questionnaire, participants were debriefed, and thanked for their participation.
Phase 1 Results

Traits that would form the basis of the questionnaire in Phase 2 of this study were selected on the basis of two criteria: 1) More than 50% of respondents associated the corresponding noun with either conformist or non-conformist behaviour; and 2) The proportion of respondents who associated the noun with either type of behaviour was significantly different than the proportion of participants who associated the noun with the other type of behaviour. In other words, it was not enough that friendliness, for example, was associated with conformist behaviour by more than 50% of respondents; it must also have been associated by a significantly larger proportion of participants with conformist behaviour than with non-conformist behaviour.

In order to assess which items were associated with either conformist or non-conformist behaviour by more than 50% of respondents, frequency analyses were conducted on responses to each of the items. The following nouns were associated with conformist behaviour by more than 50% of respondents: friendliness; attractiveness; likeability; sensitivity; similarity; sincerity; agreeableness; dependence; respectfulness; impressionability; flexibility; thoughtfulness; weakness; being accommodating; being fun; passivity; being strategic; flakiness; and being cooperative. The following nouns were associated with non-conformist behaviour by more than 50% of respondents: intelligence; aggressiveness; unpredictability; decisiveness; knowledgeability; independence; confidence; originality; stubbornness; strength; admirability; narrow-mindedness; and being analytic.

Next, using only the nouns that had passed the first criterion, I conducted one-sample chi-square tests comparing (a) the proportion of participants associating each noun with conformist behaviour and (b) the proportion of participants associating that noun with non-conformist behaviour. The following nouns were associated by a significantly larger proportion of
participants with conformist behaviour than with no-conformist behaviour: friendliness ($\chi^2_{(1, N=61)} = 49.59, p < .001$); agreeableness ($\chi^2_{(1, N=56)} = 41.14, p < .001$); likeability ($\chi^2_{(1, N=59)} = 20.76, p < .001$); respectfulness ($\chi^2_{(1, N=51)} = 29.82, p < .001$); sensitivity ($\chi^2_{(1, N=51)} = 16.49, p < .001$); thoughtfulness ($\chi^2_{(1, N=57)} = 13.30, p < .001$); respectfulness ($\chi^2_{(1, N=52)} = 11.07, p = .001$); similarity ($\chi^2_{(1, N=47)} = 5.67, p = .01$); impressionability ($\chi^2_{(1, N=49)} = 4.45, p < .05$); dependence ($\chi^2_{(1, N=51)} = 10.97, p = .001$); weakness ($\chi^2_{(1, N=52)} = 4.77, p < .05$); being fun ($\chi^2_{(1, N=42)} = 4.43, p = .05$); passivity ($\chi^2_{(1, N=54)} = 7.41, p < .01$); being accommodating ($\chi^2_{(1, N=54)} = 42.68, p < .001$); and being cooperative ($\chi^2_{(1, N=55)} = 40.16, p < .001$). The following nouns were associated by a significantly larger proportion of participants with non-conformist behaviour than with conformist behaviour: intelligence ($\chi^2_{(1, N=46)} = 4.13, p < .05$); aggressiveness ($\chi^2_{(1, N=53)} = 20.55, p < .001$); unpredictability ($\chi^2_{(1, N=54)} = 29.63, p < .001$); independence ($\chi^2_{(1, N=52)} = 4.92, p = .02$); originality ($\chi^2_{(1, N=53)} = 15.87, p < .001$); stubbornness ($\chi^2_{(1, N=52)} = 9.31, p < .01$); and strength ($\chi^2_{(1, N=49)} = 6.00, p = .01$).

Nouns that passed both criteria were used to form the basis of the questionnaire in Phase 2 of this study.

Phase 2 Method

Participants. Participants for the second phase of the study were 63 male and female undergraduates at the University of Toronto (mean age = 18.4, $SD = .92$). These participants had not participated in Phase 1. As in Phase 1, participants were recruited via a course experiment sign-up website that invited students to participate in a study of “Social Perceptions.” They also received credit in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology course requirement.

Procedure. After participants had consented to participate, they were provided with a link to an online questionnaire and instructions for how to proceed in responding to the items.
As in Phase 1, the study was described as an examination of social perceptions. Participants were informed that they would be asked to rate the positivity/negativity of various traits, as well as to indicate how much they valued these traits in others. They were presented with the list of nouns identified in Phase 1 of this study, and asked to answer the following two questions about each noun:

1. How positively or negatively do you view this trait? (scale = -4 to +4; very negatively to very positively)

2. To what extent is your liking for a person positively or negatively affected by whether she/he possesses this trait? (scale = -4 to +4; very negatively to very positively)

The order in which two questions were presented to participants was counterbalanced. In other words, half of the participants were asked Question 1 first and Question 2 second whereas the other half were asked Question 2 first and Question 1 second. Upon completing this online questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Phase 2 Results.

Dependent Variables. The aim of Phase 2 of Study 3 was to examine how participants viewed traits that had been identified in Phase 1 as being associated with either conformist or non-conformist behavior. Specifically, I was interested in comparing the degree to which participants viewed as positive and valued in others traits associated with conformist behaviour, and the degree to which they viewed as positive and valued in others traits associated with non-conformist behaviour. In order to address this question, I formed two composite variables: the first was composed of the 15 traits identified in Phase 1 as being associated with conformist behaviour (friendliness, agreeableness, likeability, respectfulness, sensitivity, thoughtfulness, flexibility, similarity, impressionability, dependence, weakness, being fun, passivity, being
accommodating, and being cooperative), and the second was composed of the seven traits identified in Phase 1 as being associated with non-conformist behaviour (intelligence, aggressiveness, unpredictability, independence, originality, stubbornness, and strength). These composite variables were labeled Conformity traits and Non-Conformity traits respectively. Ratings of each of these composite variables in response to Questions 1 and 2 above served as the two main dependent variables.

Further, because I was interested in examining the positive and negative traits associated with conformity and non-conformity separately, I formed four additional composite variables on the basis of participants’ responses to Question 1. These four variables were composed of:

1) Conformity traits that were rated positively (i.e., had a mean greater than 0 on the -4 to +4 scale in Question 1): friendliness, agreeableness, likeability, respectfulness, sensitivity, thoughtfulness, flexibility, similarity, being fun, being accommodating, and being cooperative (henceforth, Positive Conformity traits).

2) Conformity traits that were rated negatively (i.e., had a mean less than 0 on the -4 to +4 scale in Question 1): impressionability, dependence, weakness, and passivity (henceforth, Negative Conformity traits).

3) Non-conformity traits that were rated positively: intelligence, independence, originality, and strength (henceforth, Positive Non-Conformity traits).

4) Non-conformity traits that were rated negatively: aggressiveness, unpredictability, and stubbornness (henceforth, Negative Non-Conformity traits).

Ratings of each of these four variables in response to Questions 1 and 2 above also served as dependent variables.
Question sequence. In order to determine whether the sequence in which Questions 1 and 2 were presented had an effect on participants’ ratings in response to these two questions, I compared the responses of participants who had answered Question 1 first to those of participants who had answered Question 2 first. One-way ANOVAs using Conformity traits and Non-Conformity traits as the dependent variables revealed no significant differences in either Question 1 or Question 2 ratings between these two groups, all ps > .05.

Main Analyses. First, I conducted two paired-samples t-tests comparing ratings of Conformity traits and Non-Conformity traits in response to Questions 1 and 2 (adjusting the p-value to .02 to avoid alpha inflation). The first test revealed that Conformity traits were rated significantly more positively than were Non-Conformity traits, t(60) = 5.77, p < .001 (M = 1.52, SD = 1.03 vs. M = .87, SD = .79 respectively), and the second test revealed that Conformity traits were also more valued than were Non-Conformity traits t(60) = 5.64, p < .001 (M = 1.48, SD = .81 vs. M = .84, SD = 1.05). In other words, Conformity traits were perceived both as more positively valenced and as having a more positive effect on participants’ liking for another person than were Non-Conformity traits. Given the well-known effects of similarity on liking (e.g., Byrne, 1971; 1997), I wanted to ensure that similarity was not solely responsible for this finding. I therefore repeated these analyses with similarity omitted from the list of traits constituting Conformity traits. These tests revealed the same pattern of significance (ps < .001) as noted above. Ratings of Conformity traits, therefore, were not determined solely by whether the conformist was similar to the target.

Next, I compared ratings of positive traits only (i.e., ratings of variables 1 and 3 above) in response to Questions 1 and 2 as well as ratings of negative traits only (i.e., ratings of variables 2 and 4 above) in response to Questions 1 and 2. I conducted four paired-samples t-tests using a p-
value adjustment of .01 (.05/4) to correct for alpha inflation. *Positive Conformity traits* were rated no more positively than were *Positive Non-Conformity traits* ($t(60) = 1.41, p = .17$), but they were valued significantly more than were Positive Non-Conformity traits ($t(60) = 5.14, p < .001$). In other words, participants claimed that the positive traits associated with conformity had a more positive effect on their liking for another person than did the positive traits associated with non-conformity (despite there being no difference in the overall positivity of the traits). *Negative Conformity traits*, however, were rated no less negatively than were *Negative Non-Conformity traits*, nor were they rated as affecting liking any differently than were *Negative Non-Conformity traits*, $ps = .08$ and .98 respectively. (See Table 6 for means and standard deviations).

Finally, I was interested in determining whether participants placed more importance on one’s possessing the positive traits associated with conformity in determining their liking for the person than they did on one’s possessing the negative traits associated with conformity. To answer this question, I computed two variables consisting of the absolute values of Question-2 ratings of *Positive Conformity traits* and *Negative Conformity traits* respectively, and compared them in a paired-samples $t$-test. The absolute-value ratings of Positive Conformity traits in response to Question 2 were significantly higher than were those of Negative Conformity traits, $t(60) = 6.88, p < .001$ ($M = 1.99, SD = .79$ vs. $M = 1.17, SD = .90$ respectively). This analysis revealed that, in determining their liking for another person, participants did indeed place more importance on one’s possessing *Positive Conformity traits* than they placed on one’s possessing *Negative Conformity traits*.

The same method was used in determining whether participants placed more importance on one’s possessing the negative traits associated with non-conformity in determining their liking
for another person than they did on one’s possessing the positive traits associated with non-conformity. Two variables, consisting of the absolute values of Question-2 ratings of Positive Non-Conformity traits and Negative Non-Conformity traits respectively, were compared in a paired-samples t-test. This analysis revealed no significant differences between ratings, \( t(60) = .95, p = .34 \) (\( M = 1.48, SD = .89 \) vs. \( M = 1.34, SD = .95 \)). In other words, in determining their liking for another person, participants placed equal importance on one’s possessing Positive and Negative Non-Conformity traits.

Discussion

Taken together, the results of Study 3 provide a context for interpreting the findings of the previous studies. In order to address the questions raised by the results of Study 2, Study 3 focused on how the traits associated with conformist and non-conformist behaviour are evaluated and the extent to which they are used to form judgments of others. Although positive traits associated with conformist and non-conformist behaviour had equivalent overall positivity ratings, participants claimed that the positive traits associated with conformity would have a more positive effect on their liking of a person than would the positive traits associated with non-conformity. This finding sheds some light on why, in Study 2, participants liked conformists more than they liked non-conformists despite the fact that they rated conformists as less independent (a positive trait associated with non-conformist behaviour). It seems that the positive traits associated with conformist behaviour (e.g., agreeableness, being accommodating, being cooperative) were indeed more influential in determining participants’ ratings than were any positive traits associated with non-conformist behaviour (e.g., independence, intelligence, originality).
Study 3 also showed that, in determining their liking for a conformist, people place more importance on the conformist’s possessing the *positive* traits than on their possessing the *negative* traits associated with conformist behaviour. In Study 2, therefore, it is likely that when participants reported that they liked conformists more than they liked non-conformists, they were placing more emphasis on the positive characteristics that they associated with conformist behaviour than they were on the negative characteristics (e.g., impressionability, weakness, dependence). In contrast, Study 3 showed that, in determining their liking for non-conformists, people place *equal* importance on the non-conformist’s possessing the positive traits associated with non-conformist behaviour as they do on possessing the negative traits associated with non-conformist behaviour. In Study 2, therefore, it is likely that participants, in determining their liking for confederates, not only focused more on conformists’ positive traits (relative to their negative traits) but that they also focused *no more* on non-conformists’ positive traits than on their negative traits. In other words, it was not the case that non-conformists’ negative traits outweighed the influence that their positive traits had on participants’ liking for them. This pattern of trait valuation explains why participants, despite recognizing that non-conformists possessed positive qualities and that conformists possessed negative qualities, still preferred conformists to non-conformists.

Given that participants in Study 2 seemed to place such value on the positive traits associated with conformity, it is not surprising that they liked confederates who agreed with them just as much as those who conformed to them. Presumably, the traits that they appreciated in conformists were present to the same extent in agreeers (in particular, traits associated with the ability to be cooperative, flexible, and agreeable). If these are indeed the traits that are valued in making judgments of conformist behaviour, it is also not surprising that APs and Os rated
conformists similarly. Rather than focusing on the traits that might have led to differential
ratings of conformists by APs and Os (e.g., impressionability, dependence, etc.), it is likely that
Os based their evaluations of conformists on the positive traits that were inferred from P2s’
conformist behaviour (just as APs presumably did). Traits associated with the ability to be
cooperative, flexible, and agreeable are presumably appreciated to the same degree by Os as they
are by APs.

In sum, it seems that despite there being positive traits associated with non-conformist
behaviour and negative traits associated with conformist behaviour, the traits that have the most
impact on liking are the positive traits associated with conformist behaviour. This effect is not
driven by similarity; as Study 3 indicated, even when similarity was omitted from the list of
descriptors constituting Conformity traits, these traits were still perceived as both more
positively valenced and as having a more positive effect on participants’ liking for another
person than were Non-Conformity traits. Positive traits associated with non-conformity, instead,
were not as highly valued in determining liking. These findings call into question two general
assumptions that we, as a society, tend to make. The first is that independence is highly prized.
Generally, we tend to think of independence as an admirable quality for which people should
strive. Study 3’s results suggest that, although independence is viewed positively, qualities
associated with a lack of independence have a more positive effect on liking than do those
associated with being independent. The second assumption represents the flipside of the first:
that conformity is culturally stigmatized. Conformity is often portrayed as reflecting an
uncritical and impressionable mind and as leading to erroneous and even destructive behaviours.
Study 3’s results, however, show that there are also positive associations made with conformist
behaviour. Conformists are considered agreeable, cooperative, and accommodating—all traits
that, according to Study’s 3 findings, are important determinants of liking. Clearly, we hold ambivalent attitudes toward both conformity and independence. These behaviours should be understood as varying in positivity across a fairly wide range; depending on the flavour of word that we choose to describe these behaviours (e.g., conformity vs. agreeableness; dissent vs. independence), our focus may be directed toward either the positive or the negative end of the spectrum.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The study of conformity has traditionally been confined to examining the conditions under which people are likely to conform. The convergence of evidence suggesting that people’s behaviour and attitudes are influenced by others has resulted in a dominant ideology within social psychology that conformity is the rule rather than the exception. This finding has been discussed mostly in negative terms, as representing a tendency among people to ignore their personal beliefs in order to go along with the group. Introductory psychology textbooks, for example, focus on the negative outcomes of conformist behaviour—distorting perceptions, perpetuating destructive behaviours, or impairing critical thinking—rather than on the positive consequences of conformity (e.g., maintaining harmony within the group). The frequency with which people conform, however, also suggests an adaptive function of conformity. The present research set out to determine whether conformity was effective in achieving the goal specified by the normative-influence explanation for conformity (namely, the attainment of social approval). The studies presented here were primarily concerned with how conformists were evaluated (in particular, relative to non-conformists). In general, the results indicate that conformity was successful in achieving the goal of obtaining social approval. Various qualifications, however, must be made to this general conclusion.
Despite the fact that conformists are liked more than are non-conformists (Studies 1 & 2), conformity does not seem to have a positive effect on liking over and above mere agreement (Study 2). At the same time, it is not the case that conformity and agreement are rated equally on all dimensions; conforming confederates were clearly not rated as highly as were agreeing confederates on dimensions related to independence and steadfastness. This finding is evidence of the fact that participants are indeed making a distinction between conformity and mere agreement. Given the results of Study 3, however, it seems that it is agreeableness and cooperativeness (and other traits that are associated with conformist behaviour)—as opposed to independence and steadfastness—that positively affect liking. The fact that conformists lack these latter traits, therefore, has no bearing on how much they are liked.

_Dissent versus Independence_

The present research was concerned not only with whether conformity brings about the benefits that are implied by the normative-influence explanation, but also with the potential consequences of _non-conformity_. Early research is rife with instances in which non-conformists or “dissenters” were downgraded and/or rejected (e.g., Berkowitz & Howard, 1959; Miller & Anderson, 1979; Schachter, 1951). In line with the results of the majority of the dissent studies reviewed earlier, these results demonstrate that a non-conformist is evaluated negatively; unlike in previous studies, however, appropriate comparison groups were provided (in the form of Conformity and Control and Agreement conditions), thus making it possible to conclude more definitively that non-conformists are downgraded.

Other studies, however, have demonstrated that non-conformists are sometimes judged positively (e.g., Morris & Miller, 1975; Nemeth & Chiles, 1988). Courage, individuality, and confidence are among the qualities that have been associated with dissent behaviour. Although
the majority of these early studies suggest that non-conformists are evaluated negatively rather than positively, the finding that they are judged positively on some characteristics is more in line with what we as a society are presumed to value: independence, choosing “our own paths,” and “being an individual.” Western culture generally espouses having pride in individual autonomy (e.g., Triandis, 1995). Our cultural veneration of independence is reflected in our constant imparting of adages such as “Be yourself,” and “Don’t follow the crowd.” There is an assumption in more individualistic cultures that there is something heroic in resisting the influence of the group (Baumeister, 1991; Kim & Markus, 1999; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980).

From this perspective, it is surprising that non-conformists and agreers, who were both rated as being more independent than were conformists, were not also liked more than were conformists (Study 2). It appears that people hold an ambivalent attitude toward independence. On one hand, the term represents an admirable quality for which people should strive; on the other hand, the behavioural manifestation of “independence” resembles disagreement, dissent, or opposition—none of which are positions that typically make a person likeable.

The results of Study 3 further support the conclusion that independence is viewed ambivalently. Independence was rated as a positive characteristic associated with non-conformity; however, it was not rated as an important determinant of liking (at least not relative to traits associated with conformity). Although we tend to think of independence as a positive trait, perhaps it may be more accurately termed a positively-valenced trait; depending on how it is interpreted, “independence” may be described in negative terms (as dissent, disagreeableness, and lack of cooperation). Independence, then, must be understood as varying in positivity across a fairly wide range, which might explain why it was not valued as much as one might assume.
Agreeableness versus Conformity

The flipside of independence being culturally prized is that conformity is culturally stigmatized (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995). Whereas resisting influence is seen as heroic, conformity is often seen as reflecting an uncritical, malleable mind. It is considered an undesirable tendency that directly violates core cultural ideas and threatens the self as a worthy individual (Kim & Markus, 1999). Despite these culturally-defined judgments about conformity, however, conformity also represents the quality of being agreeable, a trait that is highly valued. Study 3 demonstrated that conformity was associated with traits such as agreeableness, being cooperative, and being accommodating, and that these traits were all important determinants of liking. It appears that there is a divide between our cultural values with respect to the idea of conformity and our reactions to conformist behaviour in the context of our daily lives. We seem to appreciate the agreeable and accommodating nature of those who conform to our opinions (or, according to the present studies, even of those who conform to others’ opinions). From the perspective of adaptive behaviour, conformity can be a “virtue” because it provides a sense of trust that allows interdependence among group members (Campbell, 1975), and promotes harmony. Despite the emphasis placed by introductory psychology textbooks on the negative outcomes of conformity, therefore, conformity is also associated with positive outcomes—namely (on the basis of the present findings), increased liking and positive evaluation of the conformist by both the target and the observer of the conformity.

A question that naturally arises from this discussion is whether the results of the present studies simply reinforce the classic finding that people prefer similar others to dissimilar others (Byrne, 1971; Festinger, 1954). Although these findings do support the well-known similarity-attraction hypothesis, they also demonstrate that it is not the mere fact of being similar that
drives the effect of conformity on liking ratings. In Study 3, Conformity traits (relative to Non-Conformity traits) were perceived as having a more positive effect on participants’ liking for another person both when “similarity” was included among the list of traits and when it was not included. Traits related to conformity other than similarity are clearly influential in determining liking. Furthermore, the results of Study 2 demonstrate that similarity and conformity are not viewed as one and the same. Participants recognized that agreeers acted independently relative to conformists; while they realized that conformists weren’t naturally similar to them, they nonetheless preferred them to non-conformists. Whether confederates agreed with participants from the beginning or only ended up agreeing with them, the outcome was the same. It appears that we do not place as much value on true similarity as we do on simple agreement, genuine or not.

Target versus Observer Ratings

Although there is some suggestion in the Target-Observer literature that observers are less susceptible to the potentially ingratiable motives for conformity, the difference between target and observer ratings of conformists is much less pronounced than is generally assumed. Study 2’s results with respect to target-observer differences in ratings are consistent with this general conclusion. No differences were found between target and observer ratings of confederates in any of the Opinion conditions. One possible reason for this lack of difference is that no attempt was made in Study 2 to have confederates appear dependent on targets and thus, ingratiable motives could not easily serve as explanations for conformist behaviour. Because ingratiable motives could not easily serve as explanations for conformist behaviour, observers would not necessarily be more prone than would targets to infer manipulative intent on the part of conformists, and thus should not rate conformists any differently than should targets. One aim
of the present studies was to examine only the base conditions (without attempting to examine all the potential variables that might affect how a conformist is evaluated, including a relationship of dependence of the conformist on the target of conformity). By doing so, however, Study 2 might have ruled out any possibility for a target-observer difference in ratings.

A second explanation for why no difference was found between target and observer ratings is provided by the results of Study 3. Given that the positive traits associated with conformity are so highly valued in determining liking, it is not surprising that targets and observers rated conformists similarly. These traits—which describe the ability to be cooperative, agreeable, and flexible—should be appreciated to the same degree by targets and observers. If targets and observers were both basing their liking of confederates on the degree to which confederates possess these traits, their ratings should not have differed substantially. In other words, if confederate were viewed strictly as having an agreeable or disagreeable personality, rather than as having copied or not copied participants’ behaviour, targets’ and observers’ differential personal investment would not have played a role in determining how they evaluated confederates.

*Conformity as a Means of Gaining Social Approval?*

The present research was concerned with testing whether conformity was effective in achieving the goal specified by the normative-influence explanation of conformity (namely, the attainment of social approval), and more generally, with how conformist and non-conformist behaviour is viewed. Conformity, it seems, is effective in gaining social approval (as indicated by Liking and Niceness ratings in Study 1, and Liking ratings only in Study 2) primarily through its association with traits such as agreeableness, cooperativeness, and accommodativeness (Study 3). Given, however, the finding that non-conformists were liked less than both conformists and
confederates about whom they had no conformity information (Study 1) and less than both conformists and agreeers (Study 2), it may be more accurate to conclude that non-conformity is effective in eliciting disapproval. Conformity, rather than being a means of gaining approval, might be better construed as a means of avoiding disapproval.

To some extent, the positive traits associated with exhibiting conformist behaviour (agreeableness, cooperativeness, etc.) are traits that people might expect others to possess by default. Indeed, in first impressions, agreeableness is generally the most commonly-inferred disposition among the Big Five dimensions of personality (Ames & Bianchi, 2008). Ames and Bianchi (2008) suggest that perceivers’ chronic concern for anticipating others’ behaviour toward them, as well as their interest in structuring interpersonal relationships, leads them to readily infer agreeableness in others. It is possible, then, that when their expectations are not met (owing to others’ display of disagreeableness), perceivers react by judging these disagreeable others negatively. When their expectations are met, however, they do not respond with a corresponding degree of positivity because agreeable others merely confirm perceivers’ beliefs. In other words, it might be that there is an asymmetry in the positivity and negativity of perceivers’ evaluations of conformists and non-conformists owing to the fact that the former group is acting in accordance with expectation and the latter group is defying it. The best way to avoid disapproval, it appears, is by maintaining the “default” position of agreement.

Given the frequency with which people are found to conform, and given that, in the present studies, a link was found between conformity and increased liking of the conformist (relative to the non-conformist), we may safely speculate that people are to some extent aware of the association between conformity and gaining social approval (or avoiding social disapproval). Of course, the present research did not directly test people’s motivation for conforming and,
therefore, cannot provide evidence for this assumption; however, in light of previous research
that demonstrates how frequently people conform, the finding that conforming did lead to
increased liking ratings (on par with those received by confederates who were “naturally similar”
to participants) relative to not conforming provides strong support for the notion that people
conform because they know that there is something positive to be gained from doing so or, at
least, something negative to avoid from not doing so.

**Limitations & Implications for Future Directions**

The present research has several limitations that should be discussed if findings are to be
interpreted in their proper context. First, in eliminating all extraneous variables (such as the
presence of instructions used to create differing levels of dependence on the target of conformity
by the conformist) from the design of these studies, it is possible that I removed all opportunities
for participants to be invested in responses to their behaviour. While this removal was
intentional, it is possible that the scenario I created was too artificial, and thereby did not provide
the real-world context necessary for participants to react very strongly to confederates’
behaviours. Indeed, mean ratings on all descriptors were generally not far from the neutral
midpoint. The fact that there was nonetheless a difference between ratings of conformists and
non-conformists demonstrates that even the base conditions that were used in these studies
produced an effect; however, it is possible that for conformity to have an effect on ratings over
and above the effect of mere agreement, a dependence manipulation must be included. Future
studies might benefit from increasing external validity by including conditions that vary the
degree of dependence of the conformist on the target of conformity and comparing these
conditions to appropriate controls.

Along similar lines, the use of remote confederates in Studies 1 and 2 might have lessened
participants’ concern with confederates’ responses; given that participant had no interaction with
congressmen, they might have viewed the responses of these anonymous others as irrelevant to
themselves. Future research should find a compromise between using live congressmen (whose
gestures, mannerisms, or appearance might prevent participants’ ratings from being based solely
on the presence or absence of conformity) and remote congressmen (who are so distanced from
participants that their behaviour might be irrelevant to them). Although time-consuming and
resource-intensive, perhaps using one well-trained and consistent live congressmen across all
conditions is the best solution to this problem.

The failure to find a difference between participants’ conformity ratings of conformists and
agreeers in the manipulation check may be considered another limitation of the present research.
Although differences were found between Independence/Steadfastness ratings of conformist and
agreeers (thereby demonstrating that conformists and agreeers were not viewed as identical), the
non-significant manipulation check might lead us to believe that there are no differences in the
extent to which the two groups of congressmen are viewed as conformist. This lack of difference
might also account for why conformists and agreeers were liked equally. It is interesting to
speculate on why conformists, who actively shifted their positions, were not perceived as more
conformist than were agreeers. It is possible that people are mostly oblivious to shifts from one
position to another and notice only final positions. This explanation would account for the
success of certain politicians, who shift their positions on various issues with impunity. Future
studies might explore whether conformity is actually perceived as wholly distinct from
agreement, possibly by including a conformity-salience manipulation that consists of various
levels of “obviousness” of conformity.

Finally, the present studies did not examine cultural differences among participants. This
omission is relevant in the context of evaluating conformity and non-conformity because of the well-documented differences between Western and Eastern cultures’ perceptions of conformity and non-conformity (e.g., Kim & Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Smith & Bond, 1993). While non-conformity may have positive connotations of freedom and independence in Western culture, conformity has positive connotations of connectedness and harmony in Eastern cultures. Future studies might profitably explore differences in perceptions of conformity and non-conformity as a function of cultural background of the perceiver. It is likely that interesting differences will emerge between participants from different backgrounds.

Concluding Comments

Although psychologists have long argued that one reason why people conform is to gain social approval, very few studies have tested the assumption that conformity actually results in increased approval of the conformist. The main goal of this research was to revisit this largely neglected topic within social psychology and, using an improved experimental design, to provide some clarification on how conformists are evaluated by both the targets of the conformity and the observers of the interaction. At the same time, this research aimed to identify the specific traits associated with conformist and non-conformist behaviour and to assess the relative importance of these traits in shaping our perceptions of the individuals who possess them.

In exploring these topics, the present studies may have raised more questions than they have answered; in doing so, however, they have also opened up a long-neglected field in social psychology. Study 1 took an important step back by examining the conformity-approval phenomenon in a context without certain methodological problems that plagued earlier studies. Studies 2 and 3 provided qualifications and expansions on Study 1’s findings, parsed out various subtleties and led to reformulations of conclusions reached by past studies. Early research made
no real distinction between the motive to gain approval and the motive to avoid disapproval. The present studies, however, seem to indicate that conformity might be better construed as means of avoiding disapproval. It is likely that people expect to encounter agreeableness and cooperativeness in their interactions with others, and when these expectations are not met, they may respond by downgrading these others.

While “conformity” might be culturally stigmatized, “agreeableness,” “cooperativeness,” and “accommodativeness” are valued. There is clearly a divide between our cultural values with respect to the idea of conformity and our reactions to conformist behaviour in the context of our daily lives. Although discussion of conformity in social psychology is generally based on the assumption that group behaviour compromises individual behaviour, without internalizing the attitudes and perspectives of the community or group, “society as we know it would surely be impossible” (Shott, 1979, p. 1325). Perhaps, we, as individuals, may profit from finding a balance between, on one hand, satisfying our need to belong and to be liked by demonstrating agreeableness in our interactions with others and, on the other hand, satisfying our need to be independent by continuing to be our “true selves.”
References


Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 591-621.


APPENDIX 1

Social Perceptions

Often our mood has an effect on our SOCIAL perceptions as well as our physical perceptions. The following questions ask about your perceptions of the other participant (who took part in the computer portion of the study at the same time as you). Obviously, you might find it difficult to answer these questions without ever having met the other participant. But, we are interested in your gut reactions, so don’t worry about not having too much information on which to base your answers. There are no right or wrong answers. Please answer all questions on the basis of any information you can remember about the other participant. Remember that your responses will be kept strictly confidential.

Using the following rating scale, please rate the other participant on the descriptors below by writing the appropriate number in the blank beside each:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. _____ similar to myself
2. _____ friendly
3. _____ intelligent
4. _____ truthful
5. _____ attractive
6. _____ likeable
7. _____ sensitive
8. _____ competent
9. _____ sincere
10. _____ agreeable
11. _____ dependent
12. _____ aggressive
13. _____ respectful
14. _____ impressionable
15. _____ flexible
16. _____ unpredictable
17. _____ thoughtful
18. _____ decisive
19. _____ knowledgeable
20. _____ independent
21. _____ weak
22. _____ confident
23. _____ original
24. _____ accommodating
25. _____ stubborn
26. _____ strong
27. _____ desirable as a friend
28. _____ fun to spend time with
29. _____ worthy of respect
30. _____ passive
31. _____ admirable
32. _____ strategic
33. _____ flaky
34. _____ narrow-minded
35. _____ analytic
36. _____ cooperative

Using the scale above (and following your gut reactions), please answer the following questions.

37. _____ How much do you think you’d like the other participant?
38. _____ If given the opportunity, how likely do you think you’d be to befriend the other participant?
39. _____ How likely do you think you’d be to respect the other participant?
40. _____ How willing would you be to spend more time with the other participant?
APPENDIX 2

Social Perceptions (O Version)

Often our mood has an effect on our SOCIAL perceptions as well as our physical perceptions. The following questions ask about your perceptions of ONE of the other participants (who took part in the computer portion of the study at the same time as you). Obviously, you might find it difficult to answer these questions without ever having met the other participant. But, we are interested in your gut reactions, so don’t worry about not having too much information on which to base your answers. There are no right or wrong answers. Please answer all questions on the basis of any information you can remember about the other participant. Remember that your responses will be kept strictly confidential. You will be rating PARTICIPANT 2.

Using the following rating scale, please rate PARTICIPANT 2 on the descriptors below by writing the appropriate number in the blank beside each:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Very</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. _____ similar to myself 19. _____ knowledgeable
2. _____ friendly 20. _____ independent
3. _____ intelligent 21. _____ weak
4. _____ truthful 22. _____ confident
5. _____ attractive 23. _____ original
6. _____ likeable 24. _____ accommodating
7. _____ sensitive 25. _____ stubborn
8. _____ competent 26. _____ strong
9. _____ sincere 27. _____ desirable as a friend
10. _____ agreeable 28. _____ fun to spend time with
11. _____ dependent 29. _____ worthy of respect
12. _____ aggressive 30. _____ passive
13. _____ respectful 31. _____ admirable
14. _____ impressionable 32. _____ strategic
15. _____ flexible 33. _____ flaky
16. _____ unpredictable 34. _____ narrow-minded
17. _____ thoughtful 35. _____ analytic
18. _____ decisive 36. _____ cooperative

Using the scale above (and following your gut reactions), please answer the following questions.

37. _____ How much do you think you’d like Participant 2?
38. _____ If given the opportunity, how likely do you think you’d be to befriend Participant 2?
39. _____ How likely do you think you’d be to respect the Participant 2?
40. _____ How willing would you be to spend more time with Participant 2?
APPENDIX 3

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Today’s Date: ________________________________

Day   Month   Year

Full Name: __________________________________________________________
First name   Middle initial(s)   Last name

Age: _______ Sex: ( ) Female ( ) Male Date of birth: __________________

Day   Month   Year

What year of university are you currently completing (check one)?
1st ( ) 2nd ( ) 3rd ( ) 4th ( ) 5th ( )

What is your major area(s) of study? ______________________________________

On average, how novel (i.e., new or unfamiliar) were the music clips you heard in today’s study? Please circle one number.

1 Completely unfamiliar
2 Somewhat unfamiliar
3 Neither unfamiliar nor familiar
4 Somewhat familiar
5 Very familiar

On average, how much did you like the music clips you heard in today’s study? Please circle one number.

1 Strongly dislike
2 Somewhat dislike
3 Neither like nor dislike
4 Somewhat like
5 Strongly like

On average, how similar were the other participant’s choices for favourite music clips to your own choices? Please circle one number.

1 Not at all
2 A little
3 Moderately
4 A lot
5 Completely

Insofar as the other participant’s choices were similar to your own, to what extent do you think that he/she was deliberately conforming to your choices? Please circle one number.

1 Not at all
2 A little
3 Moderately
4 A lot
5 Completely
On average, how much trouble did you have deciding on your favourite music clips?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No trouble at all</td>
<td>A little trouble</td>
<td>A moderate amount of trouble</td>
<td>A lot of trouble</td>
<td>Almost impossible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On average, how much did you enjoy participating in this study?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>Completely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4

Need To Belong Scale

For each of the statements below, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement by writing a number in the space beside the question using the scale below:

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Moderately disagree
3 = Neither agree nor disagree
4 = Moderately agree
5 = Strongly agree

1. If other people don't seem to accept me, I don't let it bother me.
2. I try hard not to do things that will make other people avoid or reject me.
3. I seldom worry about whether other people care about me.
4. I need to feel that there are people I can turn to in times of need.
5. I want other people to accept me.
6. I do not like being alone.
7. Being apart from my friends for long periods of time does not bother me.
8. I have a strong need to belong.
9. It bothers me a great deal when I am not included in other people's plans.
10. My feelings are easily hurt when I feel that others do not accept me.
APPENDIX 5

Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale

Read each of the following statements carefully and indicate how characteristic it is of you according to the following scale:

1 = Not at all characteristic of me
2 = Slightly characteristic of me
3 = Moderately characteristic of me
4 = Very characteristic of me
5 = Extremely characteristic of me

_____ 1. I worry about what other people will think of me even when I know it doesn't make any difference.
_____ 2. I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavorable impression of me.
_____ 3. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings.
_____ 4. I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone.
_____ 5. I am afraid others will not approve of me.
_____ 6. I am afraid that people will find fault with me.
_____ 7. Other people's opinions of me do not bother me.
_____ 8. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be thinking about me.
_____ 9. I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make.
_____ 10. If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on me.
_____ 11. Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me.
_____ 12. I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things.
APPENDIX 6

Self-Monitoring Scale

The statements that follow concern your personal reactions to a number of different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement carefully before answering. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, circle the “T” to the left of the statements. If a statement is FALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE as applied to you, circle the “F”.

T  F  1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
T  F  2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes and beliefs.
T  F  3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
T  F  4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
T  F  5. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics I have no information about.
T  F  6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.
T  F  7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of the others for cues.
T  F  8. I would probably make a good actor.
T  F  9. I rarely seek the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music.
T  F  10. I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am.
T  F  11. I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone.
T  F  12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
T  F  13. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
T  F  14. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
T  F  15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time.
T  F  16. I’m not always the person I appear to be.
T  F  17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else.
T  F  18. I have considered being an entertainer.
T  F  19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else.
T  F  20. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
T  F  21. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
T  F  22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
T  F  23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I should.
T  F  24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
T  F  25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
Appendix 7
Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale

Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. If you strongly agree, circle the number in the box in column 1. If you agree, circle the number in the box in column 2, and so on.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. STRONGLY AGREE</th>
<th>2. AGREE</th>
<th>3. DISAGREE</th>
<th>4. STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>I feel that I have a number of good qualities.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>I am able to do things as well as most other people.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>I feel I do not have much to be proud of.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>I take a positive attitude toward myself.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>I wish I could have more respect for myself.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>I certainly feel useless at times.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>At times I think I am no good at all.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Non-Conformity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On average, how similar were the other participant’s choices for favourite music clips to your own choices?</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5: not at all similar to completely similar)</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insofar as the other participant’s choices were similar to you own, to what extent do you think that he/she was deliberately conforming to your choices?</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5: not at all to completely)</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On average, how much did you like the music clips you heard in today’s study?</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5: strongly like to strongly dislike)</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On average, how novel (i.e., new or unfamiliar) were the music clips you heard in today’s study?</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5: completely unfamiliar to completely familiar)</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On average, how much trouble did you have deciding on your favourite music clips?</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5: no trouble at all to almost impossible)</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Ratings on Manipulation-Check Items in Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>APs</th>
<th>Os</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Os</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On average, how similar were the other participant’s choices/P2’s choice for favourite music clips to your own/P1’s choices?</td>
<td>NCF</td>
<td>Os</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCM</td>
<td>Os</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Os</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Os</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Insofar as the other participant’s/P2’s choices were similar to you own/P1’s choices, to what extent do you think that he/she/P2 was deliberately conforming to your/P1’s choices?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NCF</th>
<th>Os</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCM</td>
<td>Os</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Os</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. AP = Active Participant; O = Observer; C = Conformity; NCF = Non-Conformity Fixed; NCM = Non-Conformity Movement; A = Agreement
Table 3

Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Ratings on Liking For, Familiarity With, and Trouble Deciding on Music Clips in Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>APs</th>
<th>Os</th>
<th>APs</th>
<th>Os</th>
<th>APs</th>
<th>Os</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On average, how much did you like the music clips you heard in today’s study?</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>NCF</td>
<td>NCM</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5: strongly like to strongly dislike)</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On average, how novel (i.e., new or unfamiliar) were the music clips you heard in today’s study?</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>NCF</td>
<td>NCM</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5: completely unfamiliar to completely familiar)</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On average, how much trouble did you have deciding on your favourite music clips?</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>NCF</td>
<td>NCM</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5: no trouble at all to almost impossible)</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. AP = Active Participant; O = Observer; C = Conformity; NCF = Non-Conformity Fixed; NCM = Non-Conformity Movement; A = Agreement. Ratings for “trouble deciding” are N/A for Os because Os did not perform the music-selection task.
Table 4

Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Ratings in Study 2 of Three Composite Variables used in Study 1 (APs only).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composite Variable</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>NCF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liking</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>-.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niceness</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence/Honesty</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. C = Conformity; NCF = Non-Conformity Fixed*
Table 5

Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Liking and Independence/Steadfastness Ratings as a Function of Opinion Condition in Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th>NCF</th>
<th>NCM</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liking</strong></td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independence/Steadfastness</strong></td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. C = Conformity; NCF = Non-Conformity Fixed; NCM = Non-Conformity Movement; A = Agreement.
Table 6

*Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for Positivity and Value Ratings of Positive and Negative Conformity and Non-Conformity Traits in Study 3.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive Conformity Traits</th>
<th>Negative Conformity Traits</th>
<th>Positive Non-Conformity Traits</th>
<th>Negative Non-Conformity Traits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>How positively or</strong></td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>-.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>negatively do you view this trait?</strong></td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To what extent is your liking for a person</strong></td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>positively or negatively affected by whether he/she possesses this trait?</strong></td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Mean ratings (-4 to +4) of Liking, Niceness, and Independence/Honesty as a function of Opinion Condition in Study 1.
Figure 2. Mean ratings (-4 to +4) of Liking and Independence/Steadfastness (I/S) as a function of Opinion and Perspective Conditions in Study 2.

Note. AP = Active Participant; O = Observer; C = Conformity; NCF = Non-Conformity Fixed; NCM = Non-Conformity Movement