STRUCTURAL METAPHOR: AN EXPLORATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC ESSENCE

by

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In this study the subjective experience of psycho-analytic essence is approached through an examination of conscious and unconscious representations of self-in-work (Dreyfus, 1991). The study begins with an heuristic identified as the *psycho-analytic moment*, a transitory self-state arising in the course of conducting a psycho-analysis and felt to correspond to occasions of right, expert, good or exemplary therapeutic practice. The study advances to an examination of the lived experience of clinical psycho-analysis through a set of structured and unstructured interviews with two psycho-analysts.

The study’s general approach incorporates a revised version of Goethe’s delicate empiricism as adapted by Hoffman (1989). The methods for interviewing participants and for analyzing transcripts were designed to access unconscious communications regarding subjective experience. Interview procedures combined phenomenological and free-associative narrative techniques: Procedures for transcript analysis were developed from literary studies, psycholinguistics, psycho-analysis and grounded theory.
The analysis of participants’ utterance led to the hypothesis that an unconscious configuration of inference and memory gives shape to the subjective experience of composite elements of psycho-analytic practice. This hypothesized coherence of unconscious memory and process structures is identified as a structural metaphor. The structural metaphor is posited to underwrite the verisimilitude of lived experience, personal idiom and aesthetic within the clinical encounter. Thus, the structural metaphor is hypothesized to shape not only the psycho-analyst’s representations of his or her way of being-in-work and linguistic deportment within the interview setting, but to also shape the subjective experience of psycho-analytic practice.

Thus reconsidered, the psycho-analytic moment is viewed as an existential moment in the ongoing phenomenology of lived experience, occasioned by a convergence of unconscious identity and experience within the clinical field. This existential moment is taken to be indicative of the presence of something essential about self, work or self-in-work, as a result of a set of psychological, affective and visceral factors that arise in this moment of convergence. However, the psycho-analytic moment is assigned little epistemic value in identifying properties of psycho-analysis as a discipline or a practice, instead reflecting the structural metaphor that underlies the experience of that practice.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract and of difficult comprehension, this affords no presumption of their falsehood. ... And whatever pains these researchers may cost us, we may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge in subjects of such unspeakable importance.

_Hume 1748, quoted in Wilson, 2001, p. ix_

Ways of Remembering: The Experience of Essence in Psycho-analytic Practice

In _Remembering, repeating and working through_ (1914a), Freud develops his earlier distinction between conscious and unconscious memory (Freud, 1894; Bueuer & Freud, 1895) into a seminal formulation, the repetition compulsion. Following a familiar binary structure, conscious remembering in language is set against unconscious remembering as repetition in action, found most particularly in conversion symptoms or acting out. This is a distinction which is critical to an understanding of the dynamics of mind found in classical psycho-analysis and the concepts that are central to this model: conflict, repression, defence, primary and secondary process, as well as to an appreciation of the therapeutic power of insight and interpretation in psycho-analytic treatment. Psycho-analysis began with the discovery that unconscious memory of traumatic events was pathogenic and that bringing such memories into conscious awareness, releasing affect and linking both of these to personal meaning was therapeutic. Freud famously argued that hysteria was a _disease of reminiscence_ (Freud, 1892; Breuer & Freud, 1895) meaning, by this, that it was purely psychological in nature and did not arise from physiological factors as had been previously held. That unconscious memory might serve an adaptive function is, however, implied in Freud’s consideration of the place of identification in the formation of the super-ego (1917a; 1923) and is developed further by later psycho-analytic thinkers.
In *Some considerations on repetition and repetition compulsion (2000a)*, Hans Loewald re-conceptualized the adaptive potential of repetition as a creative reactivation of unconscious memories in the achievement of higher levels of psychic organization. For Loewald, this can be observed within the conditions created by the transference relationship in a psycho-analysis, in the dialectic between the unconscious and a preconscious that he has re-conceptualized as a secondary memory system. Based on findings of active unconscious planning and testing for relational safety within the psycho-analytic encounter, Weiss and Sampson and the Mount Zion Psychotherapy Research Group (1986) have also formulated an hypothesis of higher level unconscious functions. In their studies and formulations, both Loewald, and Weiss and Sampson and the Mount Zion Psychotherapy Research Group focus upon the mind of the analysand: In the current study, the focuses is upon parallel processes in the mind of the psycho-analyst.

This study considers unconscious memory and its dynamic transformations by enquiring into clinicians’ experience of psycho-analytic clinical practice. It begins with an heuristic identified as the *psycho-analytic moment*, a concept meant to identify the phenomenology, or lived experience, of psycho-analytic essence. The study’s examination of clinicians’ reports of their experience of clinical practice suggests that creative transformations of early formative memories configure outside conscious awareness in a manner constitutive of *what is taken to be* the essentially psycho-analytic, and of analytic deportment within clinical practice: Exploration of the subjective experience of psycho-analytic practice pointed to the influence of unconscious memory within that experience. This hypothesized coherence of unconscious properties implicit in the lived experience of the psycho-analytic moment and the way of being-in-work of the psycho-analyst, is designated by the researcher as a structural metaphor. Understood in this manner, structural metaphors constitute an adaptive unconscious *way of remembering.*
The psycho-analytic moment. Descriptively, the psycho-analytic moment refers to a transitory self-state that arises as a combined visceral, affective and cognitive event which is consciously understood by the analyst to be the occasion of correct, expert, good or exemplary practice. Subjectively, the psycho-analytic moment refers to a feeling of visceral, affective and cognitive expansion or extension while in the course of conducting or, as Meltzer (1967) has put it — presiding over— an analysis. This state is characterized by a calm, heightened, seamless integration of internal and external perception, and freedom from conflict within and between dimensions of identity.

This quality of self-experience may share some features with Maslow’s (1961; 1968) relative peak experience, an experience of a heightened state of well being. Unlike Maslow’s related concept of the absolute peak experience, the relative peak experience does not encompass the mystical, but refers to an extension of a lived experience which does, however – and this is the point of interest to us – give rise to a sense of encounter with the essential feature, or essence, of some thing.

Further, and from a different point of entry conceptually, the psycho-analytic moment appears to combine aspects of coenesthetic-emotive receptivity and diacritic perception, as Spitz (1945) identified these, and may reflect an active dialectic between these two classes of experience in both their immediate and memorial registers. What Spitz calls the coenesthetic-emotive organization refers to a receptive function of the nervous system that registers viscerally as a felt experience of “vague, extended, diffuse sensations such as gastrointestinal, sexual, precordial, or dizziness sensations etc.” that manifest psychically as “emotions, affects and certain attributes of dreams” (Spitz, 1983, p. 205). Spitz chose this term based on its original Greek source - koenos and eisthesis - meaning respectively ‘common’ and ‘sensibility’. It is an innate capacity, present at birth and developmentally predates the diacritic organization by approximately four months. It may be
speculated that coenesthetic elements are active in our experience of the uncanny, the familiar unknown (Freud, 1919), as well as in intuition which Spitz himself considered. Spitz argues that “the coenesthetic organization continues to function throughout life…” and “…its extensive, primarily visceral receptivity” (1965, pp. 43-45) establishes memory traces which can be presumed to play a significant role in subsequent apperception. For Spitz, the diacritic or sensory dimension of the nervous system, encompasses the functions of conscious thinking as well as intentional and voluntary acts. He identifies a developmental movement from the coesthetic-receptive to the diacritic-perceptive, pointing out, as have others, that perception proper is predicated upon apperception. Shifts in affect states along the coenesthetic-emotive dimension effect the distribution of libidinal cathexis; thus, movement in and out of the transitory self-state identified as the psychoanalytic moment would reflect a corresponding change in the economic balance in the libidinal matrix. Interaction between diacritic-perception and coenesthetic-emotive-reception and the related dynamism within psychic organization—most particularly between the unconscious and preconscious—are features in the flow of influence between affect, symptoms and transference.

However, as Schwartz (cited in Tuckett, 1999) suggests, while psycho-analysis, like all the psychologies and any science, seeks to understand phenomena in material terms, psychologies domain, human subjectivity, must be understood at its own ecological level. Just as molecular biology, Swartz argues, is not simply applied physics and chemistry, psychology is neither applied molecular biology nor applied neuroscience. Thus, the psycho-analytic moment is approached psychologically at an experiential and observational-descriptive level. This means that whatever the functional mechanism at the material level necessary to the creation of this phenomenon, it is the level of the experiential or subjective that is of particular interest to the psychologist; we ask, what is its lived experience for human beings.
Finally, at the outset of the study the researcher wondered whether the heightened physiological, affective and cognitive reception-perception-convergence that constitutes the psychoanalytic moment may be an instance of what Strawson (1994) has called the *qualia of understanding*. The qualia of understanding denotes that aspect of an experience of understanding which is unique to the individual who has that experience. For example, using Stawson’s own explanatory formula, we may note that any two individuals reading this sentence and understanding it to have the same meaning will, nevertheless, have a different *experience* of that understanding. Where Strawson links this to what he calls emergent properties, an idea he pursues into metaphysical realms, as considered here Strawson’s concept of qualia would designate a property of human experience which arises from material processes which are at least theoretically knowable, even if as yet unknown and thus currently not possible to describe. Strawson argues that emergent properties are not explicable through reference to constituent properties and process at a lower level of organization, an idea that confounds a materialist and realist epistemology, and is therefore not a perspective that can be accommodated by this study. Stawson is on to the ‘unknowable’ and leaves mere science behind.

Similarly, while some psycho-analysts may wish to forge a likeness between the psychoanalytic moment and Bion’s (1965) concept of O, as a primarily metaphysical category, O falls outside the epistemology of this study. In Bion’s notation system for transformations in the contents of mind (1963; 1965) of psycho-analyst and analysand, O identifies the ultimate unknowable, K+ the acquisition of knowledge and K- the absence or stripping away of knowledge. The psychoanalytic moment describes a link with what, in principle at least, is knowable about psychic reality and claims no approach to a presumed ultimate unknowable. In addition, the positive affective character of the psycho-analytic moment distinguishes it from Bion’s transformations in O or from
K+ to O (K>O) both of which are characterized experientially, by Bion, as fear or catastrophe. Rather, the psycho-analytic moment may be considered in relation to Bion’s transformations in K+ (1962 a, b; 1963; 1965), since K+ refers to enhanced understanding of internal and external reality. While beyond the reach of this study, a consideration of the psycho-analytic moment as a brief rapprochement, or temporary diminishment of psychic distance, between the ego and the ego-ideal may be fruitful; that is, between the ideal self and the self as realistically perceived. How each of us hold the ego-ideal in mind and how it is constituted would be the critical determinate within such an integration.

The psycho-analytic moment and essence. The researcher has applied the term the psycho-analytic moment to a subjective experience in the working lives of clinical practitioners, one that is taken to be or to mark something essential about psycho-analysis, without suggesting that such a subjective experience does in fact refer to, or in any way identify some essential feature of psycho-analysis in an objective sense, or in any terms beyond that subjective meaning.

The concept of essence has a long history in Western philosophy and the sciences. Within philosophy, essence is that quality or characteristic without which some thing, some phenomenon, would not be that which it is – one finds oneself considering questions such as ‘what is the tableness of a table.’ More generally, essence has come to be understood as the irreducible something of some thing.

Conventionally, the essence of phenomena has been linked to the divine or understood to be given in nature. For the ancient Greeks, essence was related to the ideal form, understood as the embodiment of the divine, as in Plato. In Aristotle, the ends, or the final cause which guides unfolding through basic principles, is linked to nature, and is that purpose to which any class of phenomena is destined and against which any single instance or example of that class may be
measured. Essence is a concept that has held a significant place in moral and political philosophy in particular if a largely contentious one in more recent times. Atomic and particle physics on the one side and the modern conception of a historically contingent development in culture, individuals and species, on the other, have brought this classical conception of essence thoroughly into question. It is really no longer possible to speak in such terms without raising the ire of educated minds.

One illustration of this change may be found in the example of the influence within modernity of J.S. Mill’s concept of developmental democracy (1859/1972) and in his critique of essentialist views of women (1869/2006). Mill’s work did, of course, follow from the larger and more general changes wrought in the West by the European and British Enlightenment and the French revolution. The move from a metaphysical to a scientific frame has meant that in psychology, when considering character or the notion of something essential in personality (Freud, 1905; 1908b; 1916; 1931; Young-Bruehl, 1991), this is understood to refer to the outcome of a developmental process involving an interaction between environmental and innate factors. Where “constitutional” factors are used to account for variance across individuals, this proves to be a kind of soft physiological concept – typically left unspecified or vague – that is very different from a notion of the determining powers of the gods or fixed natures. In our time, essence appears to have found its level or levelling within popular culture; for example, in the advertising of cosmetics.

Despite modernity’s disenchantment with essentialist models, it remains the case that the idea of essence continues to have a rather long half-life in the lexicon of Western consciousness where, it may be argued, it remains an important category through which human beings render experience into memory. Essence is a concept that gives shape, perhaps as Loewald (1978; 2000b) uses this term, to the phenomenology of lived experience.
Considered in this way, a research enquiry into essence is an enquiry into human subjectivity; that is, into the phenomenology of essence: in this study, enquiry is into those moments in the working life of the psycho-analyst which \emph{are taken} to be psycho-analytic essence, experienced as irreducibly, fundamentally, definitively psychoanalytic.

**Approach.** Participants in this study, senior psycho-analysts in private practice, were interviewed regarding their working lives. In a minimum of three hour-long interviews, one structured and one unstructured, participants provided descriptions of work experiences and their reflections upon these. The first structured interview was framed by a set of prepared questions designed to facilitate the participant in providing detailed descriptions of a range of work experiences. In the second interview, the researcher provided feedback to the participant, introducing a theme identified through the first analysis of the first interview. This provided participants an opportunity to consider and comment upon the identified theme and initiated the second, free associative interview.

The research praxis combines principles from phenomenology, grounded theory, psycho-analysis and textual analysis found in psycholinguistics and literary criticism within an overall qualitative research approach. Also included is a variation on the reformulated model of the research participant in qualitative research provided by Hollway and Jefferson (2000). Hollway and Jefferson’s \emph{psycho-social subject} is part of an important critique of the presumption of a simple and transparent subject-participant found in much of current qualitative research. Following from insights into human nature long known to psycho-analysis, literature, and philosophy, the participants of this study are recognized to be complex, non-transparent and historical. Hollway & Jefferson’s psycho-analytically informed model places emphasis upon social construction, context, and systems of defences. In this study, an integration of insights from Winnicott (1953) Loewald
(2000a), Weiss & Sampson, (1986), Green (1986), Eagle (1984a, b) and others, the model of the research participant reflects a somewhat different picture of mental dynamics by de-emphasizing the defensive regulation of instinctual wishes. It also considers the role of conflict and repression in the regulation of self-awareness through creative psychic solutions that constitute a reorganization of conscious and unconscious psychic registers.

Eagle’s (Eagle, 2000a; 2003; Eagle, Wolitzky & Wakefield, 2001) critique of the new view in psycho-analysis provides an important support for this study’s commitment to an epistemology of realism. Eagle has assigned his term, new view, to the appearance of formulations, principles, approaches or understandings within psycho-analysis that are taken from post-modernism. In Doing qualitative research differently, Hollway and Jefferson (2000) propose that qualitative researchers take up an epistemology of critical realism and a revised view of the research participant consistent with this. The interpretative perspective of this study has two critical features: it posits an objective reality beyond our perception or construction of understanding; consistently, it limits the potential for an endless interpretative cycle and realizes interpretative containment by linking interpretative processes to the disciplines of psycho-analysis, literary criticism and psycholinguistics. As a science of subjectivity (Loewald, 2000b), psycho-analysis, like psychology more generally, presupposes an objective reality out of which individual subjectivities are constructed: To think otherwise risks falling into subjectivism — an idealist’s equation of mental experience with reality.
Chapter Two: Developing a Method

Method of Preparation

Orientation. An appreciative relationship to theory is critical to an historical or developmental view of knowledge in the sciences and to the quality of collegiality found in integrative disciplines, such as psycho-analysis, that inform this study and others of its kind. The theoretical indebtedness of the approach taken in this study is reflected in the complex praxis of its method. The study seeks to combine formulations and principles taken from philosophy, psycho-analysis, literary studies and psychological research within a framing perspective of realism. It develops methodologically as a series of procedures that integrate and adapt elements of research practices found in life history, narrative, psycho-analysis, and psycholinguistics into a design suitable to the study of lived experience. The study began as an attempt to conceptually and empirically ground a quality of experience that had arisen at certain moments in this researcher’s experience of clinical practice. This experience came to be called the psycho-analytic moment. An early speculative identification of the psycho-analytic moment with the concept of essence – arising in part from a cognitive-visceral dimension in its experience – turned the theoretical trajectory of the early phase of the study’s development away from literary studies to existential philosophy. (This marked a departure as the researcher’s clinical orientation unmistakably reflected an undergraduate training in literary studies.) The explorations of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and dialectics focused, largely, on the concepts of essence, alienation, Being and creativity. As the study developed into a practical method equal to the task of examining the experience formulated as the psycho-analytic moment, it took shape as an interview based qualitative study of the work experience of senior clinical practitioners in psycho-analytic practice; this an effort to illuminate something essential about that experience or that practice. The need for a method that could access unconscious
thought and communication in phases of interviewing and of textual analysis made psycho-analysis and psycholinguistics essential; this linked the study, once again, to language.

The first premise of the method of this study is that much communication, both expressive and receptive, takes places outside awareness. Thus, it follows that the task of translating such communications into consciousness falls to the researcher as does the task of explicating the process of translation. The epistemic cultures (Karin Knorr Cetina, 1999) of psycho-analysis and psycholinguistics have provided the models of enquiry which have made a research approach to the unconscious and the place of the unconscious in subjectivity possible within productive science. These models of scientific enquiry and researchers who have made contributions to evolving theories concerning this realm, have brought it within the compass of intelligible conscious communication; that is, within the governance of the ego and of the discourse community of science.

By taking the unconscious and subjectively seriously as phenomena deserving of scientific enquiry, while striving to maintain the standards of empirical science, psycho-analysis and psycholinguistics made it possible to construct a research frame incorporating principles of phenomenology and grounded theory, psycholinguistics and psycho-analysis in a manner that has gone some distance in meeting the specific challenges set by phenomena that exist at the interface of self and other, inside and outside, identity and creativity that are the psycho-analytic moment.

**Epistemology: Questioning knowing.** In considering the challenge of understanding in psycho-analysis, Eigen (1998) has interpreted Bion in a manner that places emphasis upon the problem of misunderstanding:

Bion never tired of painting problems inherent in the communication of mental states. How do we communicate what goes on inside? What is inside? What does it take to discover a feeling? How do we know what we feel, or feel what we feel, or let another know? Can we know without an other? We discover our feelings as we speak them, but aren’t they changing as we
discover them. We can not keep up with affective transformations, but we also are them. How do we communicate with ourselves and others? Often we discover the other has heard something quite different from what we said, or thought we meant to say. Dare the analyst ever take for granted his and the patient’s understanding of one another? Bion knew from experience how difficult it is to feel understood, to understand oneself, to understand another. One wonders, from reading Bion, if it is more unusual for people to understand each other than is ordinarily imagined. The sum of violence issuing from misunderstanding testifies to the importance of the difficulties he highlights. (p.67)

This representation of the thought of Bion recasts it within the sensibilities of post-modernism as a meditation upon misunderstanding: The psychic realm is forever enigmatic, communication and understanding are unattainable, and the other and ourselves are essentially unknowable. This idealization of uncertainty (Bader, 1998), along with Eigen’s hyperbolic characterization of misunderstanding as violence, well illustrates the pervasive, if often subtle, encroachment of post-modernism upon psycho-analytic thought; this is an encroachment that can also be seen within qualitative research in psychology. Nevertheless, Eigen’s appropriation of Bion to the post-modern project is questionable. This is clear when it is recognized that it is knowing that Bion has characterized in the language of violence: For Bion, it is truth that is explosive and dangerous, as Eigen acknowledges to be the case — “Bion uses the experience of truth as one example of explosive consciousness. If lies poison, truth explodes” (Eigen, 1998, p 72) — but appears to insufficiently weight. Bion’s formulation of truth as explosive places his thought within the tradition of the Enlightenment, like that of his muse Freud and like psycho-analytic theory and practice properly understood; all of these fall within the epistemology of realism. The dangerous leveling power of truth, imagined by the Enlightenment mind, resides in successfully challenging, through science and reason, the authority of church and state to make claims about reality founded in institutionalized metaphysics and to, thereby, wrest the power derived from such metaphysics away from these institutions. This is the philosophical and pragmatic foundation of modernism.
The reification of “not knowing” within psycho-analysis, seen here in Eigen, is part of a more general drift in the psychologies that has followed upon historical debates in the philosophy of science. One resolution of epistemological debates between the sciences and philosophy saw the emergence of philosophical phenomenology, beginning with Husserl, followed by the articulation by Dilthey of a category of cultural or human sciences distinct in its method and focus from the natural sciences. As Dilthey (quoted in Habermas, 1971) explains it,

Alongside the natural sciences, a body of knowledge has developed spontaneously out of the tasks of life itself, which is connected through the identity of its object. All these sciences bear on the same major fact: the human race…and (are delimited)…from the natural sciences…most particularly…through their special methodological position”. (p. 141)

It is this notion of a ‘separate methodological position’ which has been particularly troublesome. Through the 1874 publication of *Principles of a physiological psychology* and the establishment of the first experimental laboratory in psychology at the university of Leipzig (Thorne & Henley, 2001), Wundt had set in motion the emergence of psychology from philosophy as a separate academic discipline, with a circumscribed focus and delimited method, within the university system. In a significant departure from his teacher Husserl, who had insisted that psychology could not be a natural science precisely because it could not be experimental, Wundt identified “conscious” mental processes as the sole subject of an explicitly experimental science of psychology. Wundt’s intention was to secure psychology and psychological research within the confines of physiology even while he continued to attempt to address, experimentally, what had been philosophical preoccupations since the time of the Greeks, in particular the question of free will. Wundt’s insistence on experimental methodology for psychology may be understood in the context of the need to establish
psychology as a natural science at a time when introspective approaches and other philosophical residuals threatened this endeavor. Freud, like Wundt, was convinced that psychology was and must be a science and that psycho-analysis was part of that scientific discipline: a depth psychology (Freud, 1933). Where they differed was on the critical issue of the focus and method of this science, differences which determined whether psycho-analysis could be recognized as part of legitimate psychology and a natural science. By restricting its focus to human consciousness and its method to the controlled laboratory experiment, Wundt effectively insured the subsequent exclusion of psycho-analysis from what was taken to be empirical psychology in the academy. Neither Freud nor Wundt wished to partake in the special methodological status of the human sciences identified by Dilthey. Indeed, the historical hostility between psycho-analysis and academic psychology arguably has its genesis in the strenuous efforts of both these men to establish their respective fields as legitimate natural sciences. For Freud, as a committed Darwinian (Gay, 1988), no special status for research into human phenomena could be justified: Human beings, and human minds, were part of nature and the standards of a natural science must apply. In the end, questions regarding human phenomena are empirical questions; that is, they are, finally, methodological ones. Wundt’s early attempt to restrict the domain and methods of psychology as a way of acquiring scientific credibility reappears in Watson’s further restriction of psychology to observable behaviour - effectively eliminating consciousness itself from psychological enquiry in the academy. “Only Harlow’s rise in academic psychology marks the decline of the behaviorist paradigm and a renewed appreciation for the complexity of the human psyche…” (Peterson, 2006, p. 218). Arguably, however, reaction against the hegemony of behaviorism within the university system, long overdue by the time
of it’s toppling, has underwritten psychology’s vulnerability to the influences of post-modernism (Bader, 1998). Serious epistemological challenges to psycho-analysis, in addition to the authoritarian profile of institutionalized clinical psycho-analysis, have made it similarly ripe for post-modernist challenges (Bader 1998; Eagle 2003; Eagle, Wolilzsky & Wakefield, 2001).

Qualitative researchers have, in general, and however unknowingly, sought methodological justifications within elements of highly technical debates in the tradition of German idealism concerning the nature of the relationship between noumenon – the thing in itself- and phenomenon or the appearance of the thing. It is from the distinction made between the natural and the human sciences, clearly articulated by the middle of the 19th century with the emergence of the category of cultural science within the German school (Habermas, 1971), that qualitative research has developed and to which its justifications, implicitly or explicitly, may be linked. In psycho-analysis, the impact of these developments within philosophy, general psychology, and the social sciences have largely taken the form of epistemological and ethical challenges that have ultimately influenced clinical technique. Thus the validity of seminal concepts and principles of psycho-analytic theory and practice have been brought into question within the psycho-analytic community, as has the relationship between the analyst and her analysand. In combination, these have seeded fissures and the emergence of a “relational stream” of psycho-analysis which has largely discarded theory and technique normally identified with psycho-analytic practice and justified this through arguments derived from philosophical sources. Research methodologies within psychology marked by these influences include phenomenological, life history, heuristic, and hermeneutic approaches found in qualitative studies. Qualitative researchers in psychology have looked primarily to interpreters of Husserl, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Habermas for epistemological constructs.
In qualitative theory and practice, the distinction between the human and natural sciences has influenced the focus of research, as can be seen in the model provided by van Manen (1997):

For Dilthey, the proper subject matter for Geisteswissenschaften is the human world characterized by Geist-mind, thoughts, consciousness, values, feelings, emotions, actions, and purposes, which find their objectifications in languages, beliefs, arts, and institutions. (p.3.)

The influence of this distinction can be seen in the kind of knowledge qualitative researchers seek and in the manner in which they set about acquiring such knowledge: It has influenced the identification of both the ends and the means of research. Further, formulations that have developed from this distinction have linked knowledge and method in a manner that has significant implications for epistemology and for ethics. Thus, in promoting qualitative research, van Manen has advised that “…the method one chooses ought to maintain a certain harmony with the deep interest that makes one an educator, parent or teacher, in the first place” (van Manen, 1997, p.2). Simply, the method of enquiry, conceptualized as a relationship between researcher and participant, is understood to influence the understanding achieved: This occurs in a context where understanding has replaced knowledge as the end of research. Research standards and principles meant to humanize method have been conflated with others concerning empirical practice in what are, arguably, unsophisticated importations of philosophical debates into the sciences. Heidegger’s (1927/1962) proposition that the method must be suited to the phenomenon occurred within a very particular intellectual context and theoretical debate: It was part of a sophisticated and complex defence of the continuing value of philosophy and the valued place of philosophy’s historical methods of contemplation and discourse within the continuing search for knowledge of human existence. This was a response to challenges from the Historical School in Germany, in particular the positivism of Comte and the scientism that followed from this, and was
not meant, by Heidegger, to devalue or to overcome the methods of empirical science (Clark, 2002). Taken by itself, the notion that the practice of science is in and of itself somehow inherently less human than, say, the writing of poetry, an idea implicit and often explicit within qualitative research discourse, is obviously absurd. Heidegger was far from recommending that objective science be replaced by philosophy or its method. Under Heidegger’s valuable critique of positivism “scientific objectivism remains intact, but as the methodological standard appropriate to some kinds of investigation, not as the sole measure of legitimate knowledge” (Clark, 2002, p. 21). Further, as Linge (1976) has pointed out, Dilthey’s hermeneutics, as essentially reconstructive in nature, “took the language of the text as a cipher for something lying behind the text,, (eg., the creative personality or the world view of the author)” (p.xx), identifying “the meaning of the text or action with the subjective intention of its author” (p. xii). Thus, Linge argues, Dilthey’s hermeneutics presupposes an objective reality behind the text, a feature of hermeneutics which is lost within the work of Gadamer (Linge, 1976). And even yet, for science, the challenge of method remains the same, and is an empirical one. Heidegger (1960/1977a), in his later work on language, identified a text, such as a poem, with noumenon — the thing-in-itself — as part of a challenge to acts of interpretation that pointed to the effect of the artifact in its existence and the effect of its existence upon us. Heidegger means, among other things, to protect the literary and plastic arts from the reductive readings of literary critics or psychological interpreters; but, for Heidegger, the ends of poetry differ from the ends of science. For Heidegger, to approach a poem through interpretation is to render its effect through production, and thus to alienate its essence, constituting it as information or standing reserve Heidegger, (1954/1972b). The question is one of methodological approach: “The expression phenomenology signifies primarily a methodological conception” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 50) or, as Krell (Heidegger, 1927/1977c) translates this
more simply, “a concept of a method” (p.73). Perhaps it is by conflating the ends of science with those of art that epistemological and methodological difficulties have arisen in the psychologies.

The philosophical debate within German idealism has had an unexpected and inordinate effect upon the development of psychology and psycho-analysis as branches of science in contemporary times as post-modernism imports to psychology and psycho-analysis the epistemological perspectives of relativism and subjectivism (Eagle, Wolitzky, & Wakefield, 2001). Within contemporary thought these developments have undermined a notion central in the sciences and the Enlightenment that truth, however difficult to know and at times to accept, is different from error or false belief, and emancipatory in its very nature (Gay, 1977). The proposition of an objective reality independent of us combined with the recognition that there are factors that compromise our capacity to perceive it, including factors that arise from the place in psychic life of the dynamic unconscious as Freud formulated this, does confront us continually with our vulnerability to error. Our effort in the sciences remains the challenge to become aware of and to limit the influence of those factors which contribute to such error, rather than to jettison the possibility of knowledge in favor of a mistaken democratization of perception and understanding. The re-conceptualization of psycho-analysis as an hermeneutic (Ricoeur, 1981), and of qualitative research as a limited type of phenomenological practice or hermeneutic, has influenced not only psycho-analytically informed scholarship in the humanities, as might be expected, but also theorizing, research and practice in the clinical realm. As in psycho-analysis, so in psychology more generally: post modernist thought has had a significant influence upon qualitative research: its methods, epistemology and ethics.

Critical realism. Arguably the first principle of critical realism is that there is a reality that exists outside or beyond ourselves, one that is not dependent upon our perception
of it for its continued existence. Critical realism is the epistemological position taken in this study because it facilitates the identification of the two major challenges that researchers into human experience face. The first of these is gaining perceptual access to the existential experience of the other: the second is the representation of that experience without recourse to rhetoric, or other instruments of persuasion available to philosophy, the humanities, and the arts. Commitment to a realist perspective means that naïve equivalences between self and other, belief and truth, opinion and reality must be abandoned, as must equally naïve formulations of qualitative/phenomenological research as a way of “giving voice” to participants or participant groups, however ego-syntonic or aesthetically, emotionally, or ethically appealing this notion may be. Ethical and emotional appeals by phenomenologists regarding what should be or what feels as if it should be true must be eschewed. We may feel as if it ought to be true, or we may feel that it is right that it is true, that the relationship between researchers and participants is a simple and direct one where the researcher merely provides the occasion for the participant to voice his or her true story. Alas, things are not so simple and a research method into human experience must take this reality into account.

Critical realism, in positing a distinction between objective and subjective reality, brings into view a necessarily mediated space in which a relationship between these two realms unfolds, has its effects and may be examined and considered. This is the space in which perception, apperception, language, thought, art and unconscious communication are to be found. While not equivalent to Winnicott’s transitional space (1953; 1967; 1971), in this concept Winnicott has sought to map the terrain between inner and outer reality. By conceptually sustaining the space between subject and object, a critical realist perspective makes explication of the findings of this study possible since a
formulation of an hypothesized unconscious metaphor active in the communication of unconscious representations of self-in-world and in subjective experience becomes possible.

Arguably, and from a psycho-analytic perspective, critical realism, unlike constructivists theories of reality found, for example, in the works of Gadamer (Linge, 1976) and Habermas (1971), proposes a model of a relationship to reality which presupposes the psychological capacity to acknowledge and tolerate the loss and frustration inherent in the reality of the separation between self and other. This is a reality in which the world, like the object, stands apart from us, and knowledge, like any other form of link (Bion, 1962b), is always incomplete and always, in some way, unsatisfying. Constructivist theories of reality, from this view, appear narcissistic derivatives insofar as the world’s meaning or “reality” is made by, and in some sense is, the self. This is true, for example, even where Habermas’ model, for example, does seek to address issues of validity by suggesting that consensual truths are always subject to critique, incorporating, if only implicitly, the possibility of error. In acknowledging, if only implicitly, that discourse might “get it wrong,” there is, then, a “right” to get, one which we may apprehend with different degrees of correspondence, although Habermas would not use this term. Habermas’ attempt to combine a consensual view of truth, as “co-created,” within an imagined, purely theoretical, and arguably idealized “free discourse community” incorporates a safe guard for truth that that must be recognized to be a meager and very weakened, Enlightenment derived, notion of critique. Arguably unsuccessful philosophically, this model, more importantly, makes no place for the knowledge of group or mass thinking provided by seminal research in social psychology (Milgram, 1963; 1974), or for far too familiar events in history — the various holocausts of modern times not the least of these. These realities must, nevertheless, be taken seriously
because, in reality, there is no free discourse community nor, given the evidence of politics, history, and human nature as we know it, is there ever likely to be. The lesson of the Enlightenment, and indeed of relevant research in psychology, is that it is within individual consciousness, struggling for independence from the mass in opinion and action, that the chance of achieving a view of reality independent of wish and fear is tipped somewhat in our favor.

**Validity, subjectivity and inference to the best explanation.** This study limits its focus to what is consciously and unconsciously communicated by participants regarding their subjective experience and does not suggest any necessary relationship between participants’ explicit conscious linguistic representations of their working lives, or the unconscious representations of these lives, and actual events beyond these realms of language and conscious and unconscious thought. Correspondence between a participant’s linguistic representations of self-in-world across domains of experience, and between these representations and discourse events recorded in transcripts, are taken as evidence of subjective experience. The study strives for an objective view of the participants’ subjective, or lived, experience and of the composition and dynamics of that subjective experience: the text answers only to itself. Following Lipton (2004), in this study, the inferences drawn from textual analysis are understood to constitute best or loveliest explanations of the observation of textual and of intersubjective discourse dynamics and of representation.

**Inference to the loveliest explanation.** In Lipton’s (2004) model of scientific reasoning, called *inference to the best explanation*, the term *loveliest explanation* refers to the outcome of an inferential process where the explanation provides the greatest understanding for observations, empirical facts, and the relations between these. Lipton
suggests that in the best circumstances, the loveliest explanation is also the most probable or best fit. *Inference to the best explanation*, in addition to describing the scientific process of reasoning, formulates an inferential process that “confers epistemic warrant to the conclusions reached” (Farmakis & Hartmann (2005) through these means. Inference to the best explanation, in Lipton’s understanding, works best in conjunction with a causal explanatory model. In this study, causal explanatory models from psycho-analysis and psycholinguistics are the primary causal explanatory models the researcher calls upon.

**Psycho-Analysis**

The emergence of psycho-analysis as a science of mind is partly attributable to the need to account for human irrationality in the “age of reason”. Enlightenment in political philosophy, the social and the political institutions of progressively democratized governments had failed to realize the promise of a progress in reason within the history of consciousness, as anticipated by de Condorcet (1795/1988), or in the behaviour of individuals as J.S. Mill (1859/1972) had predicted. Manifestations of human irrationality in the private and public spheres provided ample evidence of this failure.

Psycho-analysis brings what in contemporary psychology is called an interactionist and evolutionary perspective to its consideration of this reality as it does to all aspects of human existence. In psycho-analytic theory, irrationality arises as a function of a dualistic human nature, is supported by a divided consciousness and results in an ambivalent relationship to selfnowledge. Innate human nature consists in primitive, survival related, aspects of human biology, including instinct driven sexual-procreative imperatives understood to serve the ends of preservation of the species (Freud, 1905; 1908b) and social imperative aims more directly concerned with individual self-preservative. In early models, aggression was conceptualized as
necessary to the active expression of these instincts, in the course of their satisfaction, and to become more pronounced in degree, or potentially altered in form, where excessively frustrated (Freud 1908). Irrationality reflected the poor fit between these primitive instincts and potentially any social context in civilized culture. In this model, variations in an achieved capacity for guilt and of a realistic expectation of punishment are understood to underwrite morality. Contributions by later psycho-analytic thinkers would suggest that social instincts (Bowlby 1958) including relations with others, or object-relations, rather than the satisfaction of sexual instincts, were primary in maturation and in development within the inter-subjective field, as well as in shaping psychic structure (Fairbairn, 1941, 1944). It is arguable, however, that these later developments have a comparatively limited explanatory power in giving an account of human irrationality when compared to the original classical models provided by Freud and in the British school developed by Melanie Klein following Freud’s late hypothesis of an independent instinct for aggression.

In psycho-analytic theory, adult psychology carries the imprint of a developmental process where innate and environmental factors make maturational demands. Among other outcomes of this process is the development of character or identity and different degrees of vulnerability to psychological illness across individuals. In psycho-analytic understanding, both the development and the preservation of identity depend upon excluding from conscious awareness certain motivations and memories associated with instinctive life. The methods and degree of these exclusions are understood to reflect developmental history, the flexibility and strength of the ego, and a particular relation to reality. In this model, repression functions along a continuum where, at one end it serves adaptation and, at the other, institutes neurosis by compromising the capacity for a realistic relation to self and world.
Structural Metaphor 24

**Psycho-analysis as science.** In the course of formulating a critique of deductive reasoning, specifically the problem of proceeding from definitions in the development of theory, Freud describes the legitimate place of conceptualization in the dialectic between observation and theory making in the natural sciences:

> We have often heard it maintained that science should be built up on clear and sharply defined basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather in describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify and correlate them. Even at the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract ideas to our material in hand, ideas derived from somewhere or other but certainly not from the new observations alone. Such ideas, which will later become the basic concepts of the science, are still more indispensable as the material is further worked over. They must at first necessarily possess some degree of indefiniteness; there can be no question of any clear delimitation of their content. So long as they remain in this condition, we come to an understanding about their meaning by making repeated references to the material of observation from which they appear to have been derived, but upon which, in fact, they have been imposed. Thus, strictly speaking, they are in the nature of conventions – although everything depends on their not being arbitrarily chosen but determined by their having significant relations to the empirical material, relations that we seem to sense before we can clearly recognize and demonstrate them. It is only after more thorough investigation of the field of observation that we are able to formulate its basic scientific concepts with increased precision, and progressively so to modify them that they become serviceable and consistent over a wide area. Then, indeed, the time may have come to confine them to definitions. The advance of knowledge, however, does not tolerate any rigidity even in definitions. Physics furnishes an excellent illustration of the way in which even ‘basic concepts’ that have been established in the form of definitions are constantly being altered in their content. (Freud, 1915a, p. 117)

In describing his thinking on method, this opening paragraph from Freud’s *Instincts and their vicissitudes* also contains his perhaps most eloquent defence of the psycho-analytic method as a scientifically legitimate form of research into the functioning of mind. With characteristic clarity
and sophistication, he describes the process through which the practice of an observational science advances toward knowledge through a dialectic in which abstract ideas play a necessary part within perception and theory making. Taking as an article of faith the scientist’s, like the philosopher’s, love of truth, Freud commits psycho-analysis to a method which seeks to bring reality more proximate to perception, implicitly incorporating a correspondence theory of truth. This model, and its view of the relationship between the researcher and the object of her enquiry, places psycho-analysis within the boundaries of realism and identifies psycho-analysis as an observational science as well as a therapeutic praxis.

In the *Interpretation of dreams*, Freud (1900) distinguishes between objective or external reality, on the one hand, and psychic reality on the other: Psychic reality is “a particular form of existence not to be confused with material reality” (1900, p. 620). This *particular form of existence*, as Freud describes it, may be understood to be a constituent part of subjectivity. In his ongoing debate with the experimentalists, Freud identified consciousness as an apparatus having the status and functional capacities of a sense organ through which the unconscious could be observed. In this formulation he sought to address the epistemological challenge mounted against the inclusion of the unconscious within “legitimate” psychological research and to claim for psycho-analysis the status of an observational, empirical science (Freud, 1914b).

Freud’s method for the study of the unconscious and its relationship to consciousness was developed in the research context that is unique to clinical psycho-analytic practice: The psycho-analist observes the analysand’s transference, free associative speech, and the effect of therapeutic interventions while striving to maintain a mental state that is the essential instrument of this praxis. This empirical method, one Freud considered part of natural science, was perhaps reasonably unanticipated, misunderstood and unappreciated outside that
context by the experimentalists. While it has been argued that Freud did not fully recognize
the specific epistemological challenges of his science (Bucci, 1989) or failed to address them
(Gruenbaum, 1984), his commitment to science and his conviction that psycho-analysis is a
science is clear. He also believed that he had addressed the epistemological challenges
through what has been referred to as the tally argument (1917b) is clear.

Were psycho-analytic clinical practice recognized to be an observational science, in
the conventional sense, observation based inferences drawn from that context would be
recognized as a rich source of heuristics, hypothesis and implicit knowledge regarding
psychic functioning, psycho-pathology, and human nature more generally as well as
therapeutic technique. Hanly (1992) has argued for a recognition of the validity of clinically
tested psycho-analytic theory through a defence of Freud’s tally argument, arguably meeting
Gruenbaum’s (1984) challenge to the scientific status of psycho-analysis. By contrast, Eagle
(1984a) has argued that the testing of psycho-analytic theory must be conducted through
extra-clinical studies. Main (1995), taking a middle ground, has proposed that under
conditions of research practice where the predictive value of the discourse is tested, discourse
analysis does acquire the status of a natural science. However, to meet this requirement,
Main’s research context, of necessity, extends beyond the interview setting, and her model
thus presents familiar ethical and therapeutic problems to the clinical researcher. Also
conducting research outside the clinical setting, using principles from depth psychology in
in-depth interviewing, Hollway and Jefferson (2000) have proposed that in interview based
studies in familial groups, confirmation of the content of narratives through cross referencing
across participant’s reports meet the requirements of validity. Thus, the models of Main
(1995) and Hollway and Jefferson (2000), appreciative psycho-analytic thinkers, fail to
provide psychologists and psycho-analysts a means to confirm findings from observations made within the dyadic encounter of an interview or session without recourse to extra-textual sources.

In clinically based psycho-analytic research, Tuckett (1994) and Target and Fonagy (2003) strive to meet empirical standards without going beyond clinical evidence. Target and Fonagy (2003) have proposed an integration of qualitative research methods and psychoanalytic principles through a modification of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) in a manner meant to “extend this method beyond the subject’s conscious and preconscious beliefs” (Target and Fonagy, 2003, p.155) to include unconscious meanings and motivations. In light of the difficulties facing the validation of clinical findings, they propose a model which is an alternative to classical psycho-analytic clinical case study research method.

Tuckett (1994) views psycho-analytic clinical practice as a participatory-observational science and has drawn upon principles from grounded theory to develop a method for the validation of interpretations within sessions – micro-validation. In addition, through what he refers to as macro-validation, Tuckett has proposed to relate interpretations validated through micro-validation to general theory. In this approach, Tuckett employs data drawn exclusively from the material produced within the clinical sessions and thereby proposes a model that addresses many of the ethical concerns that adhere to clinically based research. Tuckett’s model incorporates both a fine attunement to nature of the psychoanalytic clinical encounter and is the most broadly useful since it is designed to be used by clinicians.

Bucci (1989) has suggested that “psycho-analysis be seen in the context of a theoretical network of interrelated propositions, or ‘nomological net’ which constitutes a
general theory of mind” (p. 255). Bucci, in the development of a body of research designed to bring the functions of the unconscious within the scope of contemporary empirical approaches, has argued for the validity of “using linguistic features as operational indicators of non-observable hypothetical functions capable of making referential links” (Bucci, 1989, p. 270) between sensory-motor memory and reflective understanding. She is, she argues, following Freud (1937b) in her “use of stylistic or content features … as indicators of a match between interpretation and subjective representations in the patient’s mind” (Bucci, 1989, p. 270). For Bucci, “verbal material is used as a type of manifest behaviour from which inference to underlying representational structures may be made, rather than as presumed veridical reports of past events” (1989, p. 273).

Following Bucci, the view taken here is that while it may be possible to say something truthful about the contents of the participant’s mind, including those contents that may function outside conscious awareness, no claim to validity beyond the domain of the psychic is made. Specifically, the method in this study does not attempt to speak to the question of correspondence between this subjective realm and events in external reality. Given this focus, the methodological challenge becomes that of saying something true about this internal psychic realm, the realm of the subjective. In part this epistemological distinction turns on differences in the goals of research: Hollway and Jefferson (2000), as sociologists, seek to make comparative statements about the degree of correspondence between the contents of a participant’s mind and the external world in which they live; Main (1995) is concerned with the power of an internal schema — the internal working model of attachment — to prospectively influence parenting practices and to retrospectively indicate developmental events: Both address external reality. By contrast, Bucci and Tuckett address
the nature and content of the unconscious as this can be known through verbal articulation within the clinical encounter. This study, an enquiry into subjectivity, is similarly concerned with the internal psychic realm.

**Psychic reality and the subjective realm.** In the seminal text that introduces the psycho-analytic model of the dynamic unconscious and a technique of dream interpretation through which one could gain access to this realm, Freud (1900) introduces the concept of “psychical reality” (p.620). Laplanche & Pontalis (1968) explain that “when he introduces this concept to sum up his thesis that a dream is not a fantasmagoria, but a text to be deciphered, Freud does not suggest that this is the whole of the subjective, the complete psychological field, although it is understood to be a heterogeneous element or “nucleus” within this field” (p. 3). “Frequently it means nothing more than the reality of our thoughts, of our personal world, a reality at least as valid as that of “material reality” (Freud, 1916-17, p. 369) which he contrasts with “external actuality” (Freud, 1911, p. 225) and is therefore the reality of the purely subjective” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1968, p. 2). To disclose the role the unconscious plays in subjective experience is a significant part of what “analysis” of the “psyche” consists in.

In summarizing Freud’s formulation of fantasy, Laplanche & Pontalis (1968) find a “marked ambiguity” (p. 2) that they argue create difficulties that “lie in the very nature” (p. 2) of the relationship between “three kinds of phenomena, (or realities, in the widest sense of the word: material reality, the reality of the intermediate thoughts or of the psychological field, and the reality of unconscious wishes and their “truest shape”: phantasy” (p. 3). In psycho-analysis, the resolution of this ambiguity is the preoccupation of every analysis and of theory itself. As Laplanche and Pontalis state, “we are, in fact, just saying that we are
dealing with what is imaginary, with the subjective, but that this subjective is our object: the object of psychology is as valid as that of the sciences of material nature” (p. 3). Laplanche and Pontalis (1968) go on to state that, initially, for Freud,

the world of fantasy seems to be located exclusively within the domain of opposition between subjective and objective, between an inner world, where satisfaction is obtained through illusion, and an external world, which gradually, through the medium of perception, asserts the supremacy of the reality principle. The unconscious thus appears to inherit the patient’s original world, which was solely subject to the pleasure principle…With the introduction of the reality principle one species of thought-activity was split off; it was kept free from reality testing and remained subject to the pleasure principle alone. This activity is fantasying. (Freud, 1911, p. 222) … “In the absence of any new category, the suspension of reality judgments leads us once more into the “reality” of the purely subjective. (p. 2)

This study does not seek to resolve the question of the correspondence between inner and outer reality, and limits enquiry into participants’ subjectivity. It seeks instead to examine this reality as it may be disclosed at the interface between self and other, within utterance. This was approached through analysis and interpretation of the verbal productions of participants in an interview setting.

A psycho-analytic model of human nature. The model of the subject embodied in the approach taken in this study places emphasis upon the largely unconscious nature of the mental life of human beings as this is modelled in psycho-analysis. Loewald (2000c) has argued that psychoanalytic thought proposes that human nature is, in fact, unconscious activity. Availing himself of a rhetorical strategy, Freud (1900) opens the text of the Interpretation of dreams with a series of examples that illustrate the existence of unconscious memory for real knowledge. Having established the fact of unconscious memory, he launches a thorough, scholarly and highly creative
argument which makes the case for recognition of an unconscious realm that, he argues, is at the very center of human life; it is the source of not only our dreams and of human irrationality, but also generative of existential meaning as well as motivation. In the early psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious, culminating in the 1915 essays *Repression* (1915b) and *The unconscious* (1915c), psychic forces are formulated as impulses to action and ideational derivatives of the drives, as well as the defences which oppose these, regulated through the pleasure principle and the reality principle.

This picture of the unconscious revolutionized the understanding of human nature within the West during the first half of the twentieth century through component insights that have permeated psychology, psychiatry and the humanities. This is, in part, because the theory is continuous with core Enlightenment principles pervasive within modernity. The Freudian model of the unconscious, in conjunction with the concepts of psychic determinism and infantile sexuality, pushed human self-understanding into a new realm within which new perspectives upon human endeavor were possible and from which it had been reasonable to think there could be no retreat (Kandel, 1999). Kandel suggests that the decline in psychoanalytic influence evident on the eve of the twenty-first century, a result of the failure to develop “objective methods for testing the exciting ideas it had formulated … is regrettable, since psycho-analysis still represents the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the mind” (p. 505). Fonagy has related the decline in influence of psycho-analysis to its isolation from other disciplines engaged in scientific research into the mind (2003a) and, in addition to problems within psycho-analysis in the relationship between the development of theory and clinical technique (2003b). Speaking from within academic psychology, Bucci (1994; 2000) attributes the epistemological challenges raised in the 1960’s and 1970’s to Freud’s metapsychology to behaviourism’s domination of American psychology during this period. While integrations
between neurobiology and psycho-analysis have been ongoing, Eagle (1984a) has noted that dialogues initiated within psycho-analytic psychology integrating research from, for example, cognitive psychology have largely been ignored within canonical psycho-analytic discourse. This is true, Eagle suggests, despite it being the case that, “Freud’s claim that complex unconscious mental processes are ubiquitous raises no special empirical or conceptual difficulties” for cognitive psychology or should raise no such difficulties (p. 161). Bucci (2001), notes the historical difficulty of psychologists, as distinct from psycho-analysts “to conceive the notion of unconscious perception (Reik, 1948, p.133)” (cited in Bucci, pg. 41), but does agree with Eagle that, in our own time, the current issue for psychologists is “not to demonstrate the existence of unconscious processing, but to explore its complex and multifaceted nature” (Bucci, 2001, p. 42).

For Freud, critical to understanding human minds as containing an extensive and significantly influential unconscious realm - the most basic and definitional premise of psycho-analysis — is a conceptualization of mental life as characterized by, as well as developed through, conflict. Psycho-analysis models the human being as complex and conflicted, a creature of both biology and culture; the most salient feature of the latter is morality. These dimensions are conceived of as existing in a never fully reconciled tension with one another. Associated complex mental dynamics arise from this essential feature of human existence; thus, mental contents are interactive or dynamic in a quite particular way arising from the need to address this conflict.

This model of inescapable conflict is, from one perspective, Freud’s variation on the Darwinian principle of the evolution of the human species, like all animal species, through the adaptive development of instinctive nature within a specifically human environment, distinguished by civilized culture. In this conceptualization, human evolution encompasses human mind represented by advances in the capacity for reason that parallel progress in culture or civilization.
more generally. While our nature as a social species enmeshes us in culture, it is the capacity for independent reason upon which a uniquely human progress depends. However, these same propensities put us in conflict with our instinctual natures. In Freud’s model, the imperatives of instinct which are meant to extract our contribution to, or insure our complicity in sexual procreation and the survival of the species are set against higher order pleasures, as J. S. Mill (1972) identified these. Higher order pleasures, associated with the building of culture, necessitate participation in social institutions and the sublimation of these lower order instincts in higher order activities. This entails the sacrifice of the pleasures which accompany the direct satisfaction of instincts through unsublimated, lower order, drives. Devotion of the self to the greater social good refers to the sacrifice of direct instinctual satisfaction and their replacement by sublimated satisfactions.

Freud’s familiarity with the work of J. S. Mill is well documented (Gay 1988). His early discussion of instinct lays out his essential formulation of conflict within the individual and between the individual and the society suggesting the contributing influence of Enlightenment thought upon his own. In Freud’s earliest model there are two kinds of instinct: those which are meant to preserve the individual (selbsterhaltung), and those which are meant to preserve the species (arterhaltung). In the former case these are the ego or self preservative instinct and in the latter, the sexual instinct. The cathecting energy of the former is interest and of the latter, libido. The life preservative instinct is governed by the reality principle whereas the sexual instinct is governed by the pleasure principle.

Freud subsequently dropped from his theory the notion of a set of component life preservative instincts emanating from the ego, subsuming them instead within the ever expanding umbrella of the sexual instinct. In 1920 he introduced the concept of a death instinct, thereby preserving the notion of a dual instinct model central to a formulation of life as organized through conflict and our responses to conflict. Developments which fleshed out this second hypothesis, and
which led ultimately to the formulation of a second dual instinct model, do not constitute the abandonment of the essential psycho-analytic proposition of conflict. Conflict is always both intrapsychic and intersubjective; that is, between aspect of mind, and between the individual and his culture.

The Enlightenment slogan ‘dare to know’ pictures man as conflicted in his relationship to knowledge or truth. Progress in reason is occasioned by the overcoming of the fear of knowledge – of our world and of ourselves. This principle, adapted by political philosophers of the Enlightenment from the ancient Greeks, had its political role in the revolution of the structures of power within political culture in modernity and, in principle, within the mind of every individual. In psycho-analysis, the individual’s conflict is concerned, most significantly, with the governance of awareness of our relation, in thought as well as in deed, to the morally forbidden.

If we both love and fear truth, about ourselves and our world, it follows that our minds are shaped by conflict between these two dispositions: the maturational inclination toward knowledge, and the regressive pull toward illusion. Freud’s early formulation of mind as a dynamic between conscious and unconscious mental contents models this. The philosopher Galen Strawson’s (1997) description of his observations of the content of his mind depicts an experience consistent with the model of mind Freud theorized in 1915c. Strawson’s (1997) description of a coming and going of thought not only supports Freud’s model of a dynamic relation between states of consciousness and unconsciousness, it also illuminates features of mind’s place in subjectivity and in that.

When I am alone and thinking I find that my fundamental experience of consciousness is one of repeated returns into consciousness from a state of complete, if momentary, unconsciousness. The (invariably brief) periods of true experiential continuity are usually radically disjunct from one another in this way even when they are not radically disjunct in respect of content. (It is in fact often the same thought — or nearly the same thought — that one returns to after a
momentary absence.) The situation is best described, it seems to me, by saying that consciousness is continually restarting. There isn’t a basic substrate (as it were) of continuous consciousness interrupted by various lapses and doglegs. Rather, conscious thought has the character of a (nearly continuous) series of radically disjunct eruptions into consciousness from a basic substrate of non-consciousness. It keeps banging out of nothingness; it is a series of comings to. It’s true that belief in the reality of flow may itself contribute to an experience of flow. But I think that the appearance of flow is undercut by even a modest amount of reflection. (p.422)

In Freud’s 1923 reformulation of the mind as dynamically interactive functions in what is referred to as the “structural model,” consciousness is identified as an occasional event, or state, into and out of which the otherwise continuously unconscious mental life of human beings may pass. Consciousness flits across the larger unconscious reservoir of memory, the derivatives of the forbidden and the processes-functions that manage these. This model of mental functions – id, ego and super-ego – compliments, rather than replaces, the earlier formulation in which mental contents are seen to exist in relative degrees of proximity to awareness.

Freud’s picture of discontinuity in consciousness is associated with the proposition of conflict as central to human existence since it is those thoughts that create, or have the potential to create, conflict that repressing processes seek to keep out of awareness. In the psycho-analytic model of mind, mental events have their genesis outside conscious awareness and, depending upon a number of factors, may or may not achieve a state of consciousness. In addition, through counter-pressure, constraints upon once conscious mental contents which have been removed from consciousness maintain repression. Conceptualized in an integrated manner, mental events or contents do not change location: the spatial metaphor refers to an alteration in the functional status of mental contents and the degree of access to awareness or consciousness. Repressed unconscious mental contents may gain the status of consciousness only through circuitous or indirect means,
typically symbolized in dreams, symptoms, parapraxes in behaviour or language, as well as impulse to action or intention. Each of these obliquely expresses the original repressed thought. The creation of stable process structures that govern this dynamic movement of mental contents in and out of consciousness plays a significant role in the development of personality, character or identity.

Character or personality is manifest in what, over time, become established patterns in the choice of what must be excluded from consciousness and the means of exercising and maintaining those exclusions across different contexts. This model of dynamics explains motivated forgetting as a solution to the mental conflict inherent in the tension between the imperatives of our dual natures as creatures of biology and civilized moral culture struggling, internally, with the instincts of sex and aggression.

Important precursors to the fundamental premise of a dynamic unconscious in psychoanalytic theory are present in Freud’s earliest writings on psychopathology before the development of psycho-analysis as a distinctive theory or technique. In his introduction to the 1895 text Freud co-wrote with Breuer, entitled *Studies in hysteria*, Strachey (1955a) suggests that the observation and overcoming of the patients’ amnesias led to “the realization that the patient’s manifest mind was not the whole of it” (p.xvii). This, along with the concept of catharsis – the therapeutic expression of emotion - was the central element of the emerging method and theory. Within five years, further clinical experience and Freud’s self-analysis though the vehicle of his dreams is integrated within the 1900 text that launches psycho-analysis. In the editor’s introduction to *The unconscious* (Freud, 1915c), Strachey (1955b) argues that, with the publication of the *Interpretation of dreams*, in 1900, “the unconscious was established once and for all” (p.164). By 1915, Freud was asserting that a coherent explanation, or even description, of phenomena observed within clinical practice and in everyday life, such as parapraxes, and post-hypnotic suggestion, required a concept of an
unconscious. Limited to the concept of consciousness, or to purely physiological explanations via recourse to concepts of stimuli, neural events or neurochemistry were insufficient to model the mind in a manner that preserved psychic continuity, Freud argued. Strachey (1955b) goes further in asserting that by 1915 the conventional equation of the mental or psychical with consciousness had been overturned (p. 162). As Loewald (2000c) would later put it, metapsychology in psychoanalysis is a scientific theory of unconscious mentation meant to describe mental activity behind consciousness; that is, the contents and processes of the unconscious. A recognition of the seminal and continuing place of the concept of the unconscious within psycho-analytic metapsychology is evident in Freud’s 1923 reflection: “the distinction between that which is conscious and that which is unconscious is our one beacon-light in the darkness of depth psychology” (Freud, 1923a, p.18).

In this essay on the unconscious, Freud (1915c) also makes the case for two types of unconscious: a preconscious, or latent unconscious, and a repressed unconscious - mental contents and events which never achieve the status of consciousness but that, nevertheless, have all the properties that give them the potential for influence that events in consciousness have. Boundaries of repressive censorship exist between the preconscious-consciousness and the dynamic unconscious. “Unconscious processes only become cognizable by us under the conditions of dreaming, and of neurosis” (Freud, 1915c, p.187); “nevertheless … the unconscious is alive and capable of development and maintains a number of relations with the pre-conscious, amongst them, that of cooperation” (p.190). Unconscious mental events continue into the pre-conscious in derivative form and consistently influence the pre-conscious and are influenced by it (p.190). However, …“becoming conscious is no mere act of perception, but is probably also a hypercathexis, a further advance in the psychical organization” (p. 194) in order that these contents may overcome the censorship.
Rethinking the unconscious. Loewald, (1978) integrates the concepts of the late structural model (Freud 1923), of id, ego and super-ego with the early topographical concepts of the unconscious and consciousness emphasizing the notion of a hypercathexis of a higher level of psychic organization. Loewald re-conceptualizes the dynamics of the unconscious as regulated through higher mental functions and repression within unconscious control that reflects a form of unconscious thought. Loewald’s innovative integration arises, in part, through a more positive perspective on mental development that emphasizes creativity. In Loewald’s model, the mind of every individual registers the history of developmental arrests as well as ongoing normal and pathological conflict configured in individual creative solutions as well as defences; in their combinations these form character or what Loewald calls ‘shape’ (1978).

Weiss and Sampson (1986), “following leads in scattered passages throughout Freud’s late works” (p. 11) propose a “most general hypothesis” that constitutes a significant revision of the early Freudian model of unconscious functioning. In this revision, the unconscious “performs many of the same kinds of functions” (p.8) as does consciousness, including thinking, the assessment of reality, decision making and the execution of plans meant to test for and to preserve psychological safety. Where Loewald’s re-conceptualization emphasizes the development of higher mental functions, within a revised theory of the pre-conscious, the development by Weiss and Sampson elaborates an object-relational or inter-subjective dimension that they argue is undeveloped, though occasionally implicit, within Freud’s model leaving the original model intact. However, formulated with regard to Freud’s original model, both Loewald, and Weiss and Sampson identify a type of reasoned thought functioning outside conscious awareness.

Unconscious communication. In the 1915 essay on the unconscious, Freud also identifies what he calls a “very remarkable” (1915c, p. 194) feature of this realm to be “that the unconscious of...
one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the system consciousness (p.194). This “incontestable” (Freud, 1915c, p.194) fact opens the door to a consideration of unconscious communication and influence in human affairs. It also raises questions regarding just which unconscious mental mechanisms make it possible to bypass conscious registers in the conveyance of mental contents from one unconscious to another. In further consideration of this, Freud (1922) raises the critical question when he asks whether the preconscious does or does not play any part in this. In a reflection upon the mechanism of projection, Freud (1922) addresses a negative potential of this capacity for one unconscious to ‘react’ upon another. He proposes that in selecting a target for the externalization of unwanted contents of our own minds onto others, human beings “let themselves be guided by their knowledge of the unconscious, and displace to the unconscious minds of others the attention which they have withdrawn from their own” (Freud, 1922, p. 226) and suggests that this move achieves unawareness for unwanted mental contents. In later theoretical developments within the British school of psycho-analysis, a combination of this notion of unconscious communication and the externalization of unwanted mental contents into others gives rise to the historically highly contested concept of projective identification (Klein, 1947). As initially conceived, all projective mechanisms establish and maintain illusions about self and distort perception of the other. Subsequently, the British school elaborated not only the defensive, but also the communicative potentials of projective identification.

**Goethe’s Phenomenology: A Delicate Empiricism**

Freud understood himself to have moved beyond what he had characterized as Goethe’s romanticism (Gay, 1988) and his method is not phenomenological. Nevertheless, the nature of Freud’s disciplined approach to observation, with its specific attention to the state of mind of the analyst in the act of observing the unconscious of the analysand does
have a kinship with Goethe’s *delicate empiricism*, an approach to research Seamon and Zajonc (1998) have identified with phenomenology.

Phenomenology has its genesis in the task set for 18th century western consciousness by the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment: this was the need to reconcile the reductive atomistic trajectory of the experimental sciences, which threatened to fragment man’s vision of himself and his world, and philosophies dichotomy of reason and emotion with older holistic principles inherent in humanism’s view of the material, social and spiritual realms (Habermas, 1971). Current qualitative research conventionally looks to the phenomenology of Husserl and to Dilthey’s solution to this challenge, where he severed the human from the natural sciences, for justifications of an epistemological and methodological ground (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992; van Manen, 1997; Moustakas, 1994) for an ongoing search for the irreducible truths, or essence, of human experience.

Goethe’s contribution precedes Husserl’s phenomenology by a century and is unique in its early effort to address concerns accompanying problems inherent in the experimental method, however exemplary its power, including those represented by the pursuit a unified method in this new science, and to do this without forfeiting the core principles of empiricism. Like Shelley’s *Frankenstein or the modern Prometheus* (1818/1998), Goethe’s *Faust* (von Goethe, 1808/1977) considers the dangers to the individual and to humanity of the trajectory of a soulless science. For Goethe, knowledge becomes intoxication and magic when not subject to no values beyond itself. As envisioned by Goethe, enquiry in *natural philosophy* retained observation as a legitimate scientific method while combining this with a relationship of care for the phenomenon thereby enquired into. In Goethe’s work on plant morphology and chromatics he depicts a relationship between the researcher and the object of his study which is at once rigorously scientific as well as characterized by care, or love, what Goethe calls a delicate empiricism (Seamon and Zajonc, 1998).
Goethe identified the task of method to be that of combining the strengths of the empiricism of science with more holistic and humanistic principles of care. Goethe’s concept of delicate empiricism serves as a model from which principles have been drawn to guide the development of the method of this study into the experience of clinical psycho-analytic practice.

Looking to Heidegger, van Manen (1997) has suggested that the methodological question phenomenological researchers must ask themselves is how the phenomenon they are interested in would describe itself if it could (p. 33). Phenomenological research practice in psychology and in other disciplines (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000) have in general taken up this prescription as part of their self understanding. For individual researchers, this manifests as the task of creating the conditions or, more precisely, developing methodologies through which the thing in itself can speak from itself of itself, and thereby, reveal its essence. For Husserl, essence is considered to be a transcendental and invariant structures of consciousness (Thorne & Henley, 2001). By contrast, Goethe envisioned an active dialogic or dialectic engagement between the scientist and phenomenon incorporating a number of stages or degrees of engagement in the development of a relationship: preparation, readiness, observation of an objective kind and a sensitive humility in speaking of rather than for the other; speaking then of his experience of this other rather than of its essence, while saying what might not otherwise be said. In this model, a profound responsibility falls, then, to the scientist him or herself. Goethe’s model of enquiry pictures a mature relationship between the scientist and the phenomenon and part of this relationship is the responsibility that falls to the scientist, the one who perceives. Such a relationship of care and responsibility presupposes a distinction between subject and object. We then tolerate our separateness, the loss that this evokes and in refraining from collapsing the distinction between self and other open the space of perception, responsibility and care.
Goethe’s essence. What is broadly understood to be “essence” within transcendental and existential phenomenology and in contemporary qualitative research models indebted to these, and more broadly in the philosophical sources to which such readings bear some resemblance, is called ur-phenomena by Goethe. But there are important differences as well. By this term, Goethe refers to fundamental structures specific to an entity; by this he means the pattern or processes that guide morphology, transformation and generativity or creativity. For Goethe, this may be seen and experienced by the practiced, sensitive observer. Goethe argues that the essential task of the scientific researcher is to transform oneself, through preparation and practice, in such a way that the researcher becomes an instrument adequate to perception of the object of study. “Goethe conceives of the scientific experiment as the systematic exploration, practice, and elaboration of a mode of representation” (Amrine, 1998, p. 40) that presupposes perception.

Goethe’s scientific method requires that researchers situate themselves within the aesthetic, or creative process, of the object. Procedurally, this means assuming a sensitive practiced observational vantage, from which position he or she may employ a rigorous observation and type of thinking characteristic of the sciences more generally. For Goethe, observation and scientific thinking is a form of conscious participation in a selected aspect of the natural world of which we are also a part. With properly conducted observation, “facts and theory can arise smoothly together because each is part and parcel of the other” (Seamon, 1998, p. 4). This, for Goethe, is a ‘higher objectivity’ through the practice of an educated perception: “The human being himself, to the extent that he makes sound use of his senses, is the most exact physical apparatus that can exist” (Goethe, quoted in Seamon, 1998, p. 3). This practice begins with direct experiential contact, such as forms the basis of all scientific generalization and understanding. For Goethe, such perceptual abilities are not given but must be achieved, through disciplined practice requiring effort and perseverance, in
order “to bring our intellect into line with what they tell”, a telling which consists in the unique manner in which an entity is present in the world. Properly practiced, such a scientific relation makes theoretical articulation continuous with perception through transformations along the sensory-cognitive dimension: “There is a delicate empiricism which makes itself utterly identical with the object, thereby becoming true theory” (Goethe, quoted in Zajonc, 1998a, p. 311).

This quote expresses what Seamon (1998) has described as Goethe’s conviction that there is “no inherent conflict between experience and idea or fact and conception (since) genuine understanding entailed a(n) … interplay of fact and theory” (p.4). The ideas in nature are present in the active process of nature. Like Goethe, Freud insisted on seeing man as embedded within not only history, but nature and his own method employed an empiricism characterized by rigorous observation of what his teacher Brentanao had taught him were the externalizations of consciousness (Thorne & Henley, 2001) in acts of behaviour and language. Following his teacher’s lead, to this Freud turned to consider externalizations of the unconscious. In a formulation that may arguably owe much to his readings of Goethe, Freud took the position that consciousness was itself a perceptual organ through which the unconscious could be observed. For Freud, the identification of consciousness as a perceptual organ was meant to distinguish his method from introspection and to meet the requirements of an empirical epistemology, distinguishing his method from idealism and metaphysics. Freud, in his time, also made the case for the legitimate place of theory within observational science (1915a).

In contrast to contemporary phenomenologists, who have incorporated principles of relativism and constructivist models of truth within their epistemology of the human sciences, Goethe, like Freud remains intellectually alive to the possibility for both accuracy and error within observation based science: “Accurate description is not the phenomenological end, … but the means by which the
phenomenologist locates the more generalized patterns, structure and meanings”(Seamon, 1998, p.2). It is a method through which the researcher is meant to open him or herself up to the core aspects and qualities of the phenomenon under consideration through consistent work, marked by prolonged empathic contact grounded in direct perceptual experience (Seamon, 1998, p. 2). Goethe argued that this kind of understanding is arrived at through effort “not through an extraordinary spiritual gift, nor through momentary inspiration…but through consistent work” (Goethe quoted in Seamon, 1998, p 3-4) while “maintaining continuous experiential contact” (Seamon, 1998, p. 4). Goethe argues that his method reveals both affective qualitative meanings as well as empirical and sensual content of the phenomenon free of the obstruction inherent in the laboratory:

it is a calamity that the use of the experiment has severed nature from man, so that he is content to understand nature merely through what artificial instruments reveal and by doing so even restrict her achievements…Microscopes and telescopes, in actual fact, confuse man’s innate clarity of mind. (Goethe, quoted in Seamon, 1998, p.2)

Consideration of the possibility of error as well as accuracy in efforts to know the world and the other, or the actual, is premised upon respect for the integrity and individuality of that other. With regard to the mind or the subjectivity of the other, this risk of error is very real indeed. For Habermas (1971), the risk of error resides in the fact “the ego does not manifest itself immediately in the general categories or general norms of its life expressions and only communicates itself indirectly within them” (p. 167). For Habermas, “this is the way the dimension of being and illusion or essence and appearance belongs to symbolic representation” (p. 167) requiring, then, interpretation. Goethe’s model is observational rather than interpretative and Goethe retains a very qualified regard for the place of theory in methods of observation. Theory is carefully governed, but inference drawn from observations during direct contact does have a place. Seamon (1998)
suggests that in Goethe’s view, “the greatest danger in the transition from seeing to interpreting is the tendency of the mind to impose an intellectual structure that is not really present in the thing itself. How difficult it is to refrain from replacing the thing with its sign, to keep the object alive before us instead of killing it with the word” (Goethe, quoted in Seamon, 1998, p. 3).
Chapter Three: Delicate Empiricism – The Interviews

Science is carried forward, not by new theories, but by advances in method, or technique.
Meltzer 1978, Part I, p. 17

Interview Procedures

The method used to interview participants combines elements and principles from a number of strands of research. It employs features characteristic of a phenomenological approach to life history studies (van Manen, 1997), clinical observation within a set situation (Winnicott, 1941; 1953; 1969) phenomenology in the natural sciences (Hoffman, 1998) free-associative-narrative-interview-technique (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000), and grounded theory (Glaser & Staruss, 1967; Glaser, 1968; 1992; Kelle, 2005) including its application within the clinical setting (Tuckett, 1994). Interviews were designed to obtain detailed descriptive accounts of the participants’ subjective experience of their working lives as clinical practitioners and free associative reflections upon these experiences. They were also designed to promote both unconscious and conscious communication. In-depth face-to-face interviews of two different types, with two different methodological goals in mind, were conducted and audio recorded. A form of modified phenomenological interview and a free-associative narrative interview were conducted with each participant, providing a set of audio records and written transcripts that constituted the data for the study. It was anticipated that, given a choice, participants would prefer to be interviewed in their offices where they conducted their clinical practice, and this proved to be the case. It was expected by the researcher that this comfortable and familiar context would facilitate participants’ access to memories of work experiences and their reflection upon these.

Finding participants. Volunteer participants were sought through a professional association for psycho-analysts in Canada, an affiliate of the International Psycho-Analytic Association. The
society first reviewed the research proposal and ethical review for the study and then granted
permission for the researcher to contact its members, through a letter containing a brief description
of the study and a request for volunteers. (Appendix I) This was distributed by the society to their
members. Psycho-analysts who were willing to consider joining the study as participants were
invited to contact the researcher by telephone. Six potential participants contacted the researcher.
The initial phone contact consisted of a sometimes brief and sometimes more lengthy discussion in
which the researcher answered questions regarding her research interest, and described in detail the
kind of commitment participation in the study would involve. Participants were informed that the
research concerned their experience of their working lives, that they would be interviewed for
approximately two to three hours over two meetings and that they would be given copies of the
transcripts of these interviews. Participants were also advised that in the first interview the
researcher would ask them a set of prepared questions and that the second interview would be an
unstructured interview in which they would be given an opportunity for free discussion with the
researcher regarding their work and her interest in their work, including what had emerged during
the first interview.

Each participant was advised of the methods for preserving confidentiality and of their right
to withdraw from the research project at any time. Where the potential participants decided to take
part in the study, arrangements were made for the first meeting. With one of the two participants,
meetings were of shorter duration over an increased number of meetings due to scheduling
constraints. The analysis of the interviews conducted with two participants comprise the basis of this
report.

Participants were provided with a complete set of transcripts following the second interview,
and invited to meet with the researcher for a third time if they wished to correct, elaborate upon or
alter their initial contribution. Neither participant chose to meet for a third time or to alter the content of the transcripts.

**The research relationship.** Studies based on life history interviews have emphasized rapport in creating those conditions suitable to qualitative studies (van Manen, 1997; Gleshne & Peshkin, 1992). For van Manen, rapport between researcher and participant is viewed as critical to gaining access to the ‘truth’ of the lived experience of the participant. This view is evident in the notion that given the right conditions - trust, a redressing of power relations, empathy, rapport – the researcher can ‘give voice’ to that life. Hollway and Jefferson (2000) critique this formulation insofar as it conflates questions of ethics in research using human subjects with those of validity, and, dispute the notion that it is ever possible to ‘give voice’ to another human being since, they argue, no person has direct access to another person’s experience (p. 3). They suggest that the absence of direct access to the experience of another, and the often ambiguous nature of our representations of our experiences, means that we must always interpret the communicative productions of others. Hollway and Jefferson (2000) also remain unconvinced by the proposition that hermeneutics is a sufficient response to this challenge since, they argue, the problem of the nature of the relation between a life history narrative and the actual events to which the narrative description refer remain (p. 32).

While this study strives to distinguish ethical from epistemological issues, it incorporates basic principles governing in-depth interviewing properly recognized in and outside the clinical setting; that is, it recognizes the value of rapport to successful interviewing. This value informed the development of the first question in this study where participants were asked to describe their experience of decorating their offices. This question was intended to promote the development of a relaxed, conversational quality in the interview encounter. However, the researcher was also
concerned to extend to participants what may be understood to be common human decency within the interview encounter, irrespective of the implications for research goals. All questions in the first interview were designed to convey to the research participants the researcher’s genuine interest in and respect for the particularity of their experience of their work as unique individuals and experts in their field. No contradiction between these ethical principles and the research goal of obtaining participants’ detailed descriptions of their experience of work was anticipated. Consideration of issues of rapport also influenced the approach taken in the second interview where, in that instance, feedback from the researcher’s initial impression of the first interview was conveyed to the participant in the expectation that this would promote rapport in that interview.

In what may seem a counter-intuitive move, and one contrary to standard practices in much life history interviewing, no overt attempt was made to promote rapport through affirming the participant by reference to shared background, status, opinion, experience or world views. The researcher’s identity as a rather anonymous graduate student with an interest in psycho-analysis was expected to promote communicative freedom for participants and was therefore not qualified through emphasis upon her training and practice as a psycho-analytically oriented psycho-therapist. A degree of professional anonymity was also intended to avoid the development of theoretically oriented discussions regarding psycho-analytic schools or orientations and to keep the focus of the interviews on the participants’ lived experience of practice. Collectively, this combination of respectful, anonymous enquiry was also intended to promote reverie (Bion, 1962), or calm receptivity (Hinshelwood, 1991), in the mind of the researcher in the hope of facilitating communicative freedom for the participant.

It was also anticipated that in both interviews an implicit communication of the researcher’s genuine respect for the integrity of each participant’s answers, reflections and the value of their
individual views would be promoted by the researcher’s reception of participants’ communications without challenge and, in general, without query or requests for clarification or elaboration. This receptive approach was also meant to reduce the influence of the researcher upon the shape of participants’ answers.

Eagle (1984a) following Gill and Hoffman (1982), in his contribution to epistemological debates in psycho-analysis, tells us that the way in which any individual holds his or her past within their internal world, represents it to self and other, constitutes the subjective or current truth for that individual. Subjectivity or current truth, changes as a result of a number of factors: these include experiences of learning from reality, the integration of aspects of unconscious memory or understanding within conscious or pre-conscious awareness. Moreover, the experience of a psycho-analysis may alter the unconscious through the realization of understandings between the unconscious of the analyst and the unconscious of the analysand and these understandings may remain within the realm of unconscious communications and knowledge. Thus the verbal production of the participants may be understood to be an expression or manifestation of current truth; that is, as a creative expression of a current active relationship to an aspect of reality at the interface of the external and internal world at a particular moment in time.

At its simplest, the decision to conduct the first interviews using a set of prepared questions is premised on the notion that as participants can be expected to make use of questions in an individual manner, and in doing so to create, something that constitutes an artifact of culture that is interpretable according to the rules which govern the class of objects to which it belongs, in this case language. In the first interview the researcher refrained from using follow up questions or probes. This approach contrast with familiar models in qualitative research (Glesne & Peskin, 1992) where “the interview is rightly conceived as an occasion for depth probes-for getting to the bottom of
things” (p. 85), and probes are “requests for more: more explanation, clarification, description, and evaluation” (p. 85). The decision to not use follow up questions or probes in response to the participant’s answer to the prepared questions in the first interview was intended to reduce the influence of the researcher upon the trajectory of the participant’s memory and upon the shape taken by the participant’s creative communicative engagement with these memories. This approach to interviewing reflects the conviction that communication of subjective experience is, to a considerable degree, non explicit, and that understandings of importance about the self are often unconscious.

The approach taken in the second interview - the free associative narrative interview - is distinguished from an unstructured interview in a clinical setting where the interviewer will through an ongoing micro-analysis and validation (Tuckett, 1994) make inferences regarding the relational, transference themes, the mental status, reality testing, or level of anxiety of a patient and modify questions in response to this. Similarly, in this study the researcher did not conceptualize follow up questions as a type of interpretation, as proposed by Hollway and Jefferson (2000). Follow up questions were used in the second interview and had two goals: to maintain the conditions of a free associative flow of communication between the participant and researcher and to illuminate the theme-impression that had emerged in the first interview.

In this study, the participants, as sophisticated clinical experts were expected to have carefully considered their decision to become participants and, having done so, were presumed to have a strong motivation, both conscious and unconscious, to communicate something about their work. The research challenge was to create conditions that would facilitate each participant’s implicit and explicit communication.
The research participation agreement. Green (1986) has suggested that in every communicative dyadic encounter bounded in time and space, the speaker, will be motivated to achieve a point of contact-understanding and that this should neither be mistaken for nor expected to reflect the totality of that individual. Decisions governing communicative intent within the encounter are, he argues, at least partially unconscious. As the participant seeks to say something about themselves; the researcher seeks to say something about their participant, a humbler goal perhaps than “giving voice to the truth” of any individual. In this study, the researcher speaks of, not for her participant.

In this study, each participant was alive to the risk that they might be misinterpreted, misunderstood or misrepresented despite the best intentions of the researcher and the measures she has taken to guard against this possibility. This is a risk that resides in all communicative interactions. Given the centrality of the principle of unconscious communication in this study, it is understood that the interpretative power that accrues to the researcher in such a study brings with it a corresponding responsibility to answer for that power through a method that respects participants’ integrity and their wish to be understood and to have what they have communicated properly represented. This risk of participation is balanced against the possibility that one might, in fact, be understood while having a say about something of importance, and to do so through a role which requires a limited commitment of time and for which one need not assume final responsibility.

In a study such as this, additional risks to participants fall within the domains of affects and confidentiality. It may be worthy of note that the participants in the study were members of a particularly sophisticated group of psychological thinkers: each is a senior member of his profession, and demonstrated a robust confidence in his ability to determine and ensure that his participation in this study in no way breached his individual standards for the preservation of his personal privacy,
professional integrity and self-respect. Nevertheless, the felt experience of being interviewed and the reflections generated by such an experience can be disturbing to any individual. Measures to reduce this risk and associated harm included the interest, respect and care expressed by the researcher, explicitly and implicitly, in the course of the interviews, providing each participant with a copy of his transcripts, the offer to correct or delete material upon request, and the offer to meet with participants following the participant’s review of the complete transcript set. The offer of a third meeting was to provide a potential containing function in circumstances where the interview experience had been unsettling for the participant. Neither participant chose to meet for a third time.

Participants were also given a bound blank paged book for their use to record reflections upon the experience of participating in the study. It was each participant’s choice to have these records, or parts of these records, included within the material of the study or to use them for their personal and private benefit. It was contemplated that participants might achieve understandings of themselves or their work through private reflection in the course of the research experience which they might choose not to share with the researcher. At the choice of participants, no material from these records was included in the study. Measures taken to ensure confidentially covered the conducting of the interviews, the storage of the audio records and written transcripts, and the representation of the participants within the research report document.

Each participant signed a research participant agreement form (Appendix II) which stated the terms of their agreement to participate in the study, informed them of the use of their interviews for the purposes of this dissertation, and possible other publications, as well as their right to withdraw from the study at any time.

The First Interview: Phenomenological Narrative in a Set Situation.
Following the basic principles of life-history interview method in phenomenological research, (van Manen, 1997) a prepared set of open ended questions designed to elicit detailed descriptions of experiences of the participants’ working lives were asked in the first interview (Appendix III). The goal of such interviews, according to van Manen, is to gain access to the “thoughts, consciousness, values, feelings, emotions, actions, and purposes which find their objectifications in languages, beliefs, arts, and institutions” (van Manen, 1997, p.3). In a variation on van Manen’s approach, these questions were restricted to enquiry into the working lives of the participants and were not designed to elicit personal life histories. In another variation on van Manen, and following principles derived from the psycho-analytic model of observation in a set situation (Winnicott, 1941; 1969) and governing the design of laboratory observational studies such as the strange situation (Ainsworth & Wittig, 1969; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978), questions in the first interview were standardized across participants. The fixed features of these questions, analogous to fixed variables in the set situation as Winnicott (1941; 1969) describes this, are meant to bring individual differences to light. It is not only that “the researcher’s intended meaning in the use of certain terms and the asking of certain questions may be understood quite differently across participants” (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000), it is also that the questions, when kept constant, viewed as stimulus from the environment, or aspects of reality, in evoking differential responses, illuminate the unique nature of any participant’s subjective experience of that reality. Thus the decision to conduct the first set of interviews using a set of prepared standardized questions was premised upon the notion that questions are objects that the participants would make use of in their own individual manner, providing replies expected to illuminate the subjective experience of the working lives of psycho-analysts. From Ainsworth’s (1969; 1978) strange situation was taken the example of combining familiar and discordant elements. Thus the interview combined a setting
familiar to the participants with unfamiliar elements. The discordant elements included being questioned rather than listening, being tape recorded, and the questions themselves which could not be anticipated. The experience of the familiar in the Ainsworth study depended upon the similarity of the laboratory play room to physical environments previously encountered by the child. In Ainsworth’s model, the essential measure is the nature of the contact sought by the toddler with a parent at reunion following a discordant experience of separation. In this study, the quality of the relational link sought by the participant in response to discordant elements had not been identified by the researcher to be of interest during the interviewing stage of the research process. During the stage of analysis and interpretation, this feature emerged as a research interest. While it is clear that the researcher does not constitute an attachment figure for these participants, differences in the types of relational links established within the two research-participant dyads were suggestive of pre-existing relational structuring processes evoked within the research encounter.

The set situation. In *The observation of infants in a set situation*, Winnicott (1941) describes the introduction of a simple object, a tongue depressor, into the ordinary conditions of the clinical observation of a mother-infant dyad within an office setting. He does this in order to observe the particular use made of this ‘fact of reality’ by each infant. In this manner, Winnicott gathered information regarding the individual infant’s way-of-being in the world through a consideration of their active response to an opportunity to creatively interact with the reality beyond the mother-infant dyad. The premise that there is value in observing individual differences in the use of some aspect of the environment, held constant across individuals, was developed further in *The use of an object* (Winnicott, 1969), a paper in which Winnicott integrates related concepts of the transitional object (1953) and transitional phenomena (1967) he had developed in the intermediate period. In this 1969 paper, while addressing clinical questions specific to a particular group of adult patients,
Winnicott draws an analogy between the 1941 “object from reality” – the tongue depressor - and himself, and applies the principles associated with his formulation of the ‘use of the object’ to a consideration of the analysand’s use of the analyst as a fact of reality. The significance of Winnicott’s contribution to psycho-analytic understanding represented by this formulation turns on his distinction between use of and relation to the object. In a classical psycho-analytic understanding of the clinical context, the ‘set situation’ may be compared to the stability of the analytic frame including the deportment of the analyst where it is governed by anonymity, neutrality and abstinence. Within this context the analysand’s differential ‘relation to the analyst’ is taken to reflect the particular nature of the analysand’s internal world, as this is revealed in the clinical encounter through the transposition of past into present and internal into external, constituting what is known as the transference. Winnicott’s shift in emphasis is away from this essentially historical view of relations as repetition, to one which considers the analysand’s active use of reality, of which the analyst is a part, in a manner which takes that external reality into account, while bringing to bear upon it one’s own internal or psychic reality. This is what Winnicott takes to be an innate potential to do something new; that is, to create something other than a mere reenactment of history in relations with others. This potential to do something new is, for Winnicott, part of an innate inclination towards health in every human being. For Winnicott, what is created, this new element, exists, psychologically, between inner and outer reality in what Winnicott terms transitional space and is, in his formulation, transitional phenomena. The concept ‘use of an object’ suggests that the analysand is in active engagement with another human being where the end of that engagement is not a narcissistic recreation or reliving of an historical relationship - the repetition compulsion in classical psycho-analytic terms. It is, rather, a way of living in the world through creating or making a place for oneself in external reality while taking that reality into account. The use of the object,
then, constitutes transitional phenomena created in the encounter of inner and outer within transitional space. The opportunity provided by reality, including the reality of the other, is for creative encounter and includes, in principle, the research moment.

In his model of transitional phenomena, Winnicott proposes a markedly different view of creativity than is found in the classical psycho-analytic model where the sublimation of instinctual energies, derivatives of sexual and aggressive drives, represented psychically as wishes and thoughts, become aim inhibited actions and are, thereby, satisfied through various displaced symbolized forms. Winnicott’s formulation shares something with phenomenology’s view where phenomena, including the artifacts of language culture, tell through neither displaced nor historical referent but, rather, in their own existence or way of being-in-the-world. For Winnicott, this is realized or evident in the creative use an analysand makes of him to do something new.

**Step One: Impression – Open Coding – Transcription of the First Interview**

...how to watch, how to think, how to twine beauty with science and objectivity with empathy; how to deepen an understanding of oneself in the face of a wild, exuberant, natural world... p.12

_Haupt, (2006)_

**Impression.** The approach taken in this preliminary analysis, called *impression*, incorporates aspects of *open coding* developed in grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser 1978, 1992; Kelle, 2005), modified to fit this study, within a frame adapted from Hoffman’s (1998) and Goethe’s phenomenology. Open coding as practiced in this step was designed to meet methodological challenges presented by the second interview. These included the need to develop an initiating question, to promote rapport and to set in motion a free associative line of thought and communication. It was anticipated that the impression gained through open coding-transcription in the first step in the analysis of each participant’s utterance would facilitate the researcher in meeting these methodological goals. This step, impression, consists of a first analysis of the first interview
Conducted in the course applying a variation on open coding technique. The primary modification to open coding technique consists in its application during transcription of the audio record (open coding-transcription) of the first interview rather than during engagement with a written transcript. Open coding-transcription is an approach to analysis that is meant to bring the researcher’s pre-conceptual impression within the explicit procedures of the method. This preliminary analysis, in impression, is the first step in a layered analysis that otherwise employs procedures that engage the transcribed written record of each participant’s interviews.

In this study, open coding-transcription is viewed as a class of analysis that depends upon expert knowledge, implicit knowledge of a more general kind, in addition to the researcher’s particular theoretical sensitivities (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Glaser, 1978; 1992) as identified in grounded theory. This step was designed to identify something of the researcher’s immediate, holistic, pre-conceptual grasp of a participant’s communication – the impression – through explicit research procedures, and to situate this impression within the final stage of data collection – the second interview - and the subsequent steps in the analysis - steps two through five.

As understood by Hoffman (1998), who adapted this from Goethe and Bockemuhl, the first impression is a rudimentary source of “sensible” information which is very “telling”, a pre-conceptual comprehension that is gradually made more conscious, and explicated, through the completion of subsequent stages of the research process. While far from knowledge, properly understood, the first impression is an important part of the overall process of Goethe’s delicate empiricism.

The transcription of the audio record of a participant’s first interview was the researcher’s first encounter with the participants’ utterance, as data, and was undertaken prior to the researcher conducting the second interview. During transcription, the audio record of the first interview was
employed in a manner designed to generate an emergent property, or impression. This emergent property was used to establish the ground for the second interview: the impression generated through open-coding transcription was communicated to the participant in the second interview forming the basis of an initiating question. This initiating question was expected to promote rapport and to establish a free-associative exchange between participant and researcher in that interview. In the second interview, questions were not standardized across participants, as they were in the first interview, and were of two distinct types: the initiating question, and follow up questions that were embedded in a free associative discussion. The initiating question, as noted, was developed from the researcher’s impression of the individual character and features of a participant’s communication in the first interview as this emerged during open coding-transcription. The follow up questions were the researcher’s responses to participants’ communications in the second interview. Follow up questions were governed by a principle of minimum intervention that was meant to sustain participants’ free associative expression.

**Sensibility to sense.** Impression, the first point of analysis, the open coding-transcription of the audio tapes of the first interview, is indebted to Hoffman’s (1998) development of Bockemuhl earlier adaptation of Goethe’s phenomenological method. Hoffman’s and Bockemuhl’s methods were developed for use in studies in ecology, and have been adapted here for use with human beings. Hoffman’s first refinement of Goethe’s phenomenology to suit a contemporary ecological discipline emphasizes a relation of *living with* phenomenon, an emphasis that well captures the desired quality of the research encounter in phenomenological studies in psychology with human participants. In this study the term impression not only names this preliminary step, it also refers to the property of mind through which this impression emerges during the special conditions of open coding-transcription. Following Glaser, as this emergent impression moves from the point of its
appearance in the mind of the researcher, during open coding-transcription, to be actively employed within the research, it is re-identified as a soft substantive category.

Goethe identified three stages in his research method, a form that described his own practice as a naturalist and that he proposed as a model for natural science research: he called these stages empirical phenomena, scientific phenomena and pure phenomena, and, in addition, included a careful consideration of the significance of ‘first impressions’ within his method (Hoffman, 1998). Both Hoffman and Bockemuhl use four stages and more formally identify the “first impression” as a additional preliminary stage, for a total of five. For Hoffman, “the first impression” is the intimation of a particular mood or quality that can be concisely recorded, verbally or pictorially.” (p.131). In a departure from Goethe, Hoffman requires that the researcher produce a representation, however impressionistic, of this first impression: within this representation, he includes poetry, water colours and line drawings. Hoffman quotes Goethe as suggesting that, “we can consciously carry this impression throughout the course of the research process and allow it to develop and become more clear” (p. 131), testing it against information derived through later stages. For Goethe, first impression remains a thought impression and memory, an aspect of mind and does not take on plastic form.

For Goethe, the impression arises during the initial encounter with the phenomenon and is “the world as we experience it, immediately and directly” (quoted in Hoffman, 1998, p. 131) unmediated by theory, categories or intentional or directed perception, dependent only upon sensory-affective experience, arguably incorporating co-anesthetic aspects, essentially a sense-impression that functions pre-consciously and requires no articulation.

In Bockemuhl’s system, each stage is designated by a metaphorical label of one of the four elements. His use of these ancient classifications of elements as metaphors in his modern ecological
studies is meant to capture the particular quality of the researcher’s mediated engagement with the phenomenon at different points in the research process: what mediates is a particular observational mode. This is in keeping with the historical methods of natural science studies prior to the development of the experimental method exemplified in Goethe’s work where the scientific method is a highly refined and sensitive observation. Hoffman adopts Bockemuhl’s metaphor-labels, but in another alteration reflecting contemporary understandings found in modern phenomenological studies, he proposes that his method be viewed as comprised of moments in a continuum that constitutes the research process, rather than discreet sequential stages: this re-conceptualization captures the integrated, recursive and dialectic quality of the experience of research practice in contemporary phenomenological studies in psychology and in the social sciences.

In this study, the researcher has retained Bockemuhl’s metaphoric labels and Hoffman’s structure of a preliminary and four additional ‘moments’ as a kind of skeletal frame to which has been added explicit procedures suited to a research interest in human subjectivity. These procedures specify the particular nature of the mediated engagement between researcher and empirical phenomenon at different points in the analysis of the participant’s utterance in recorded audio and written transcript form: the analysis is of the utterance.

However, in place of Goethe’s term ‘stage’ and Hoffman’s ‘moment’ this researcher has used ‘step’ in order to emphasize the active nature in the practice of research of this type, of its analytic rather than contemplative posture. Step is also meant to connote agency in the researcher, including the agency implied in attention as schooled observation, through theoretical sensitivities to which Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer. “Step” is also used to identify the experience of forward and reverse movement in the cognitive dimensions of the research practice of empirical analysis, visualized as occurring along both a vertical and horizontal axis, thus denoting depth as well as time.
dimensions. Empirical analysis in qualitative studies is intensive, detailed and recursive, characterized by multiple returns to the data, with each return deepening the researcher’s engagement with it and understanding of it. This feature of qualitative research follows from the multiply layered nature of human language, the medium that constitutes utterance, and the complexity of human thought that language conveys.

For the psycho-analytic psychologist, an analogy may be drawn between these first impressions in ecological studies and events in the psycho-analytic process: so understood, first impressions corresponds to those very telling first moments in each psycho-analytic session, broadly recognized to carry within them the kernel of what will grow within the analytic space and in the mind of the analyst through the course of the total session. Awareness grows as the analytic dyad finds words for what the analysand’s unconscious communicates. This suggests that the session is, for the analysand, bounded not only in real time but is also a delineated unit in the history of contact with the analyst and that the analysand has a communicative intent specific to that history. This intention shapes the encounter as beginning, middle and end. As Green (1986) has expressed it, in each session, the analysand has something to say, some particular communicative intent, even if this is not conscious. This preliminary scene setting communication frequently occurs in the absence of conscious awareness in either partner in the dyad in the first moments of the session, perhaps especially when the analytic pair includes a less experienced psycho-analyst. Its predictive quality more typically becomes clear at some later moment in the session, sometimes not until near its end. There are many factors, including the degree of experience of the clinician, that make it more or less likely that the psycho-analyst will grasp the shape of this initial communication at its outset. An experience common in clinical supervision, consultation and in case presentation in continuous case seminars that form part of psycho-analytic training, is the identification of the features of this
preliminary communication and its place in the overall structure of a session by more experienced analysts or colleagues who bring a more fully conscious observational vantage to what are largely unconscious process. Normally, within any given session, in the absence of collegial help, each analyst strives for a mental state where observation of that very important first impression of the analytic hour can be made sense of within the overall session, and treatment, in a way that promotes growth in the analysand. Following Jane Austen, (1811/2006) we might say we seek to give sense to sensibility.

In an adaptation of Goethe’s and Hoffman’s model, here the step called impression identifies the moment of first contact with the auditory record of the utterance, rather than of the participant in the first meeting. Access to a participant’s subjectivity is sought through the analysis of the utterance. The audio record of the utterance is both an artifact of the interview encounter and the most complete record of the participant’s communicative intent. As Green (1986) reminds us, what is said is not equivalent to the individual who has spoken but is a point of contact: through our research we can only purport to discover what was communicated, not who the speaker is. The audio record is also the only material available to others for purposes of reliability, were that subsequently pursued.

An unconscious pre-conceptual impact of the holistic aesthetic of a participant registered during the course of conducting the first interview can be expected to have informed the researcher’s subsequent encounter with the auditory record of the utterance during its analysis, in the course of transcription. The task for the researcher differs from that of a partner in a communicative dyad in everyday life where the unconscious also plays a role. This researcher seeks to, insofar as possible, bring these normal unconscious sources of information into conscious awareness; that is, to make sense of pre-conceptual impressions or sensibilities through methods designed for this purpose.
Additional requirements of research methods of this type is to attempt to ensure that such impressions are asked to answer to the overall sense that is made of a participant’s communicative intent as this is identified through the complete analysis and interpretation process. The first step of analysis, makes a place for the articulation of the impression within the research method.

The inclusion of open coding in the preliminary step, impression, systematizes that part of the method where the registration of an impression emerges, orients interest and shapes subsequent steps in the study. In this study impression is that step in which the method facilitates the emergence in the researcher of a salient interest, which will in turn be used to develop the methodological approach for the second interview. This step imparts an orientation through the conversion of the identification of impressions to soft substantive categories, interests and the initiating question which follow from these. This step also orients the relationship between researcher and participant since it forms the basis for the development of the initiating question, thereby significantly influencing the second encounter between researcher and participant in the second interview. As the response to the participant’s utterance, impression has inter-subjective import, and plays a role in the development of the relational dimension of the research dyad. This has important implications for the rapport and thus for the free associative production in the second interview.

The utterance is a product of a participant’s communicative creativity but, consistent with the principles of open coding as Glaser (1978, 1992) developed these its grammatical or linguistic features are not identified during impression but in subsequent steps. Rather, this initial step gives expression to an overall sensibility that has the energy and openness inherent in a more immediate form of contact.

**Open coding.** In grounded theory methodology, open coding is meant to facilitate properties of empirical data emerging into the awareness of the researcher that he or she might otherwise fail to
recognize were analysis conducted through pre-existing code categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). These emergent properties were originally viewed as constituting or contributing to theoretical innovation because not indebted to pre-existing theory. As a consequence, when utilized as code categories they were viewed as uniquely suited to serve the task of subsequent analysis of the empirical data (Kelle, 2005). However, it has long been recognized in grounded theory that emergence is dependent upon theoretical sensitivities, (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Kelle, 2005) or implicit knowledge, an understanding that Glaser developed further through revisions that methodically formalized the ad hoc manner in which theoretical sensitivities interact with empirical material (Glaser 1978; 1992 cited in Kelle, 2005). In this study, the application of open coding is modified in a manner that recognizes influential sensitivities beyond the formally theoretical, especially where open coding is applied during transcription. As Kelle maintains, the successful use of open coding as originally conceptualized and as ultimately clarified by Glaser (1992) depends upon a sophisticated theoretical knowledge implicitly available to the researcher. In addition, this study places an emphasis upon the role of expert knowledge in open coding.

The value of open coding, particularly as an initial approach to data, is to systematize open-mindedness or freshness in perception. The principles governing open coding may also serve to alert the researcher to the potential that extra-textual influences may effectively close one’s mind to new insights or may produce staleness in one’s response to a participant’s communication. An analogy may be drawn between the researcher’s mental attitude in open coding in this study and a kind of listening in psycho-analytic practice referred to as free-floating attention, a concept developed into a notion of the analyst striving to listen ‘in the absence of memory and desire’ (Bion, 1970) as a theoretical ideal of technique that, like all ideals, is meant to guide practice while recognized to be unattainable in any absolute sense.
Characteristically, in qualitative research incorporating interviews, transcription requires a prolonged period of intensely focused engagement with the audio recording of an interview, where the researcher’s conscious attention must address the task of creating an exact record of the verbal exchange that constitutes the interview. Practiced as the search for emergent themes, open coding typically involves repeated reviews of such written transcripts. By contrast, in this study, during impression, open coding was done during the transfer of a participant’s utterance from spoken to written form rather than by the more common practice of “scrutinizing the field-note, interview, or other document very closely; line by line or even word by word” (Strauss, 1987, p. 28 quoted in Kelle, 2005).

Emergent themes as originally understood by Glaser and Strauss (1967) refers to the derivation of new theory out of empirical data unmediated by existent theory, thus, postulated to be a kind of pure theory. However, as is recognized in all but the most naïve empiricisms, it is not possible to analyze empirical evidence in the absence of a theoretical perspective; thus, even in its initial formulation, open coding was recognized to require recourse to implicit theory. As Kelle (2005) suggests, subsequent to its introduction, developments in grounded theory were very largely concerned with attempts at mapping the relationship between theoretical sensitivities or implicit theory and empirical data. In the language of grounded theory, a researcher’s theoretical sensitivity can be expected to orient perception in the identification of relevant themes or codes. In principle, and in Glaser’s revision (1978; 1992), theoretical sensitivities mean that a theory is applied ‘ad hoc’ in response to the suggestiveness of the data.

As considered here, the concept of theoretical sensitivities is broadened beyond formal theories associated with the researcher’s field of study to include any discipline which forms part of a researcher’s formal knowledge as well as theories derived through informal learning and
experiences in professional practice. All of these constitute sources the researcher may call upon implicitly during open coding. Most significantly, theoretical sensitivities include a researcher’s expert knowledge, a kind of knowledge where theory and practice have become integrated in a manner which constitutes a synthesis: expert knowledge is praxis. This may be particularly pertinent in clinically based research, or non-clinical research by experienced clinicians, as in this study, but in principle would apply in all fields where practitioners of all kinds conduct research using grounded theory, including for example, education. In principle, implicit expert knowledge may become explicit when linked to theory but it is not at all clear that, for example, the psycho-analyst’s learning through experience (Bion, 1962a) may be fully captured by theoretical categories, which may lag behind the articulation of lived practice knowledge. It is an often acknowledged phenomenon that the majority of psycho-analytic clinicians don’t write of their work at least in part because putting into words the multiple layers of experienced knowledge that go into expert practice is such a daunting task. Clinical psycho-analysis may reasonably be considered, at least in part, craft.

In this research, open coding during impression, is designed to take this reality into account through the special conditions created by transcription itself where, outside conscious awareness, an impression gathers, one which may or may not be consciously recognized. In this step, the researcher’s task is to tap this source of inter-subjective understanding which calls upon unconscious knowledge by making a place for what Goethe and others have called first impression, and despite its inherent difficulties to articulate this in explicit language; that is, to ultimately articulate this in conscious awareness through the procedures of subsequent steps of the method. The procedures taken in this preliminary step were meant to make a place for the impressionistic aspects of the communication between the participant and researcher within the study. This is perhaps particularly important since, unlike the context created by the more usual research goals that accompany the
application of open coding - the development of general theories grounded in empirical data – in this study the research goal is to gain access to the subjective reality of participants’ working lives. The dimensions of subjective reality may be experienced and communicated unconsciously.

**Emergent soft substantive categories.** The application of open coding during the step called impression led to the emergence of *soft substantive categories*, to *interest*, and finally to the articulation of an initiating question used in the second interview. In “interest,” the researcher’s mediated engagement with the participant’s communication takes on an active mode as from interest, the focal or initiating question for the second interview is developed.

The term *substantive categories* is used in place of *substantive codes* to identify the different use made of the products of open coding in this study; that is, in application in a second interview rather than as codes to begin the analysis of all data. The term is qualified in this study by ‘soft’ to identify the changes in the application of open coding during the preliminary step called impression. Glaser introduced the concept of *substantive codes* in his 1978 clarification of theoretical sensitivities where he distinguished them from *theoretical codes* (Kelle 2005). For Glaser, *substantive codes* are developed during open coding through repeated reviews of transcripts where the data is considered without predetermined categories, and without a specific research question or interest (Kelle, 2005).

The qualification of *substantive category* by the term ‘soft’ is meant to identify substantive categories that emerge during open coding under the special conditions created by transcription. For Glaser, substantive codes emerge and this is followed by theoretical coding. In this formulation of substantive codes, Glaser seeks to identify something happening in the researcher’s encounter with his or her data that is prior its organization through the conscious application of theory.
In this study, soft substantive categories identify a more impressionistic, more immediate class of response to some aspect of the participant’s utterance during the transcription of the audio record of the interview than either theoretical or substantive codes identifies. Soft substantive categories are hypothesized to illuminate constituent aspects of a participant’s subjectivity, viewed through the researcher’s response to the participant’s communicative intent as it is impressed upon her by calling up and forming links with implicit sensitivities, of both a formal, informal and experiential kind. Open coding during the conditions of transcription may further submerge theoretical sensitivities from formal learning within that wider range of implicit theoretical sensitivities, including most importantly, those that are constitutive of expert knowledge through practice. While in general in all instances of open coding, implicit knowledge can be expected to be importantly influenced by expert knowledge, under the conditions created by coding during transcription this effect may be increased. This may be particularly pronounced where the researcher’s expert knowledge, as developed through training and daily clinical practice, is specifically that of listening for non-explicit communications about subjective experience and personal meaning. Soft substantive categories may be expected to call heavily upon that expert knowledge. Conversely, under these particular conditions of research, the concept of emergence may assist in illuminating the common clinical experience of something coming to mind.

**Soft substantive categories and the unconscious.** The identification of soft substantive categories as part of analysis is an attempt to bring into view the full communicative exchange with the participant; that is, to systematize the process through which something comes to mind, through factors that may form part of the conditions of expert clinical practice in psycho-analysis, and clinical psychology more generally. This method attempts to bring these subtle natural processes of communication within the embrace of scientific scrutiny.
Soft substantive categories may arise from thought that is at least in part dynamically as well as descriptively unconscious. This distinction forms part of the general theory of psycho-analysis and the depth psychologies, and, speaking in those general terms, the dynamic unconscious identifies a realm of mental contents that is kept outside of awareness for motivated reasons, and in order to maintain a psychic equilibrium (Joseph, 1989; 1992; Meltzer, 1981). This is distinguished from the merely descriptive use of the term unconscious which refers to mental contents that are out of awareness for purely functional reasons, due to capacity or efficacy issues and available to consciousness when needed through a focusing of attention. In general psycho-analytic theory, contents of the dynamic unconscious, while powerfully influential upon affective experience and behaviour, are not directly available to consciousness since these contents, memories for example, may cause psychic pain including anxiety, sorrow, or guilt and must, therefore be symbolized. In this model, that part of mental contents that is unconscious in the merely descriptive sense is referred to as the preconscious and the motivated or dynamic unconscious is the unconscious proper. In this study, it is presupposed that the researcher as well as the participant each have these aspects of mind. Clinical psycho-analysis is largely comprised of practices meant to bring analysands’ dynamic or motivated unconscious into conscious awareness in support of their pursuit of self knowledge and a consequent expansion of the domain of conscious agency in their lives. This is facilitated by the psycho-analyst’s familiarity with his or her own unconscious, a result of the training analysis, an aide to the comprehension of the unconscious communications of the clinician’s analysands. In the particular conditions that constitute the clinical space, this technique of practice promotes the achievement of such understandings. Extensive supervised practice with analysands, part of the apprentice like nature of psycho-analytic training over many years, makes the psycho-analyst increasingly familiar with the workings of the unconscious more generally, and appreciative of
commonalities and variations across many individual analysands. Thus a constituent part of expert practice in clinical psycho-analysis is the availability of an integrated experiential knowledge of the dynamic unconscious – its processes, symbolic manifestations in a variety of forms; that is, its ways of telling of itself in symbolized form. In this study, this knowledge is included within theoretical sensitivities.

**Theoretical sensitivities and expert knowledge.** In contrast to Glaser (1978, 1992), in this study theoretical sensitivities are understood to play a role in open coding for substantive categories – it is asserted that it could not be otherwise, although an emphasis is placed upon the role of expert knowledge and the ad hoc manner in which the expanded range of theoretical sensitivities function during open coding for these soft substantive categories. Soft substantive categories, integrate the notion of theoretical sensitivities which depend upon extended training but rather than in sociology, in psycho-analysis. As Kelle points out, “Glaser emphasizes that coding is a process of combining “the research analyst’s scholarly knowledge and his research knowledge of the substantive field” (Glaser, 1978, p. 70) and has to be realized ad hoc, which means it often has to be conducted on the basis of a more or less implicit theoretical knowledge” (quoted in Kelle, para. 14).

The fields of literature and psycho-analysis are two among many sources of this researcher’s theoretical sensitivities that have the potential to have oriented perception during all stages of analysis, including the preliminary step of impression when open coding for soft substantive categories was conducted. The identified research focus upon subjective experience may also have done so. While, following Glaser (1992) this first analysis of the transcripts was not governed by a precise research questions or problem, (Kelle, 2005) the identified research focus upon the lived experience of psycho-analytic practice, and the hypothesized concept of the psycho-analytic moment, can be expected to be active in this first phase of the analysis and in doing so to have, in
turn, shaped the free associative process during the second interviews. It may be the case that the emergence of impression, or soft substantive categories during transcription, may reduce the impact of those aspects of theoretical sensitivities which are indebted to formal learning, and may more easily access implicit categories that are less immediately available to consciousness, potentially including those that tap episodic memory as well as the resources of the dynamic unconscious. Emergence here means emergence into conscious awareness where the category necessarily attaches itself to pre-existing mental contents in order to come into conscious awareness. Freud (1915c) approaches this process of mind in his discussion of the relationship between what he refers to as thing presentation (sense impression) and word presentation (language) a function of the preconscious.

At minimum, it must be recognized that the range of possible implicit influences upon the mind of the researcher during open coding in impression must certainly go beyond that of formal theory. What particular aspect of the researcher’s pre-existing knowledge and expertise may have schooled her innate human capacity for pattern recognition to give rise to what is here being called soft substantive categories cannot be easily discerned. Nor can the degree to which the novelty of any individual participant’s rhetorical power played in overwhelming the researcher’s pre-conceptual preconscious or unconscious biases, thereby breaking new psychic ground and seeding the identification of the new. While the usual practice in grounded theory research is that once substantive codes are identified, they are then brought into relationship with explicit theoretical categories, in this study, the soft substantive categories identified through open coding, were not immediately considered in relation to an explicit theory. Instead the researcher pursued her interest in the category that had emerged by developing this into the initiating question for the second interview while also taking into account the requirement that the initiating question should promote
free associative thought and speech by the participant. The emergence of a soft substantive category during the transcription stimulates an interest in knowing more from the participant. Conscious reflection, contemplation or interpretation by the researcher of the soft substantive category does not play a role in this step. The possible symbolic significance of the soft substantive category or its structural relationship with other elements of the utterance is not considered during the development of the initiating question.

Emergence during open coding is understood to be an unconscious process and the manifest soft substantive category a result of this process: the initiating question is formulated in a manner that seeks to introduce this to the participant in an unmodified form. The researcher must strive to tolerate the affect of animate interest about the category without foreclosing the possibilities of its yet to be revealed meaning for the participant by a premature recourse to interpretation by herself. The researcher awaits elaboration by the participant in the second interview. For the researcher, the soft substantive category remains at the level of what might be called exciting or enticing interest. Thus a link of a particular quality has been forged between the researcher and the participant through the communication of the soft substantive category. Interest of this type has the effect of focusing the researcher’s attention upon the participant in order to satisfy the interest that has been stimulated. The audio record in interaction with a synthesis of the researcher’s theoretical sensitivities, in the broadened sense in which it is understood here, working at an unconscious level, brought to mind some thing that captivated the attention and oriented the interest of the researcher, which then formed the basis for the ‘initiating question’ employed in the second interview. The initiating question communicates the researcher’s interest in knowing more and the researcher’s unconscious understanding of the participant’s unconscious communications. Surely, captivating attention and inciting inquiry is what all utterance is meant to do. Because the initiating question conveys the
researchers unconscious reading of the participant’s communication to the researcher it is expected to initiate a free associative process.

**Interest.** Interest, as understood here, arises from soft substantive categories but has a more active quality. Interest also reflects the relational dimension of the practice of a textual analysis, since while interest resides in the researcher it is a response to a participant’s utterance as this gave shape (Loewald, 1978) to the participant’s communicative relational intent, both conscious and unconscious. Interest is active as a felt connection and in this study it is understood that the researcher’s interest attaches to some quality or aspect of the participant’s communication that emerged as the soft substantive category during open coding. Interest is also relational insofar as it gives rise to questioning, thereby making the mediation of the space between researcher and participant distinctly human: questioning is inherently part of a relational dynamic.

In psycho-analytic terms, interest is related to cathexis, a concept which refers to the investment of libidinal energy in some aspect or quality of life, most significantly the other, but also work or art or ideas. In non-analytic psychological models, interest corresponds closely to attention. Unique to a psycho-analytic understanding of interest or attention as this is formulated in the theory of cathexis, is its link to instinct, a foundational concept in psycho-analysis. In psycho-analysis, libidinal energy is understood to originate in the dual instincts of sex and aggression - collectively the id - or interest may arise from preoccupations with survival and adaptation to external reality in what are designated *ego instincts*. In this study, the psycho-analytic model of interest-cathexis as arising from instincts of the id and ego is extended to include an hypothesized social instinct, having similar functional characteristics but manifest in an aim to know the other and the paired aim to be known by the other. Melanie Klein’s (1930) notion of an epistemophilic instinct follows from Freud first psycho-analytic formulation of an instinct to know (1908c). In Klein’s model, curiosity and the
search for knowledge is secondary to innate sexual curiosity, thus secondary to the sexual instinct. Julia Kristeva (1994) has reformulated Klein’s model to propose a primary instinct for knowledge about the world. For the purposes of this study, the necessary point is that human beings are motivated to focus perceptual attention or instinctual energy, consciously and unconsciously, to cathect that is, the other or aspects of the other, most specifically upon what tells us of them. It is also probable that each of us may have a heightened alertness to, that is, to more strongly cathect, aspect of the other that share some likeness with aspects of ourselves. Manifest desires, derivative of the social instinct, are to not only know the other but also to be known by the other and to know ourselves. This follows from not only Klein’s epistemophilic instinct as I have adapted it, but also from principles and models in psycho-analysis. Freud’s Enlightenment influenced variation on the Socratic prescription to “know thy self”, became the responsibility of the rational modern individual to know the unconscious self and its motivations, the unreasoned or irrational in us including the irrational in our cathexis of the other: desire. When enriched by contributions from object relational theory, this desire would also mean that we are drawn to others through whom we may come to know ourselves including those with whom we forge unconscious connections. This is consistent with the enlightenment principle of liberty as this is formulated by Habermas (1971) in his proposal of an emancipatory instinct, which he identifies as active in psycho-analysis. This has implications for both the clinical realm as well as the realm of research where a shared search for knowledge is understood to be underwritten by an emancipatory drive or interest.

As adapted here from grounded theory, interest may be conceptualized as a derivative or manifestation of a soft substantive category, generated through the effect of the participant’s recorded utterance upon the researcher when conscious attention is occupied with the task of transcription. These conditions may back-ground, or bracket, the researcher’s theoretical sensitivities
more proximate to consciousness in a manner that promotes the forging of more loosely associative, divergent and potentially creative links across implicit categories. It is this generative quality of interest that is most important to this step in the study. Interest is generative insofar as it mobilizes a wish to know more about some thing, giving rise to an active scientific engagement, an enquiry organized around that interest.

Interest takes on methodological properties in this study when it takes shape as the initiating question asked in the second interview. The value to the study of the question that interest generates, like that of soft substantive category, is its correspondence to the participant’s conscious and unconscious communicative intent. It is presupposed that, in this unconscious inter-subjective dynamic, the participant wishes to be understood and the researcher wishes to understand: our methods seek to bring this shared social goal more surely within our grasp and to diminish the possibilities of misunderstanding. In the pursuit of this goal through research of this type we seek also to increase our grasp of those factors which obstruct the achievement of that primary desire to know and be known as well as those which, despite such obstacles, make understanding possible.

The understanding of “telling” used here is taken from Heidegger (1977b), where he suggests that the way a phenomenon is in the world, tells of its existence. Tells in this sense is very close to reveals or shows. Telling in this sense can also be related to Heidegger’s notion of deportment, as way-of-being-in-the world. Heidegger used this notion perhaps to most effect in his appreciation of poetry and art more generally as an example of Being as uninterruptible existence. His point is that a poem speaks for itself. In his consideration of art-work, in pursuit of understanding what a thing is, he suggests that the “workly character of the work is learned… unwittingly” (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 164), not by a report of the process of the making of the thing, nor by description or explanation but rather by bringing ourselves into the presence of the thing, in a state of readiness: “only by bringing
ourselves before van Gogh’s painting. This painting spoke. In the nearness of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be” (Heidegger, 1977b, p.164). Art discloses truth, Heidegger tells us, and takes for granted the readiness to hear or to listen; that is, presupposes history in culture and mind, in Being. Nevertheless, we may suggest that while the appreciation of a poem may not require familiarity with literary theory, the appreciation of the poem does require an educated reader or listener. Appreciation requires an ear and mind familiar with poetry, someone conversant in the aesthetics, the ways of poetry through experience of both language and that art. You can know a poem through the experienced knowledge of having come to love poetry. In this sense, and following Goethe, knowing a phenomenon, like loving, comes through experience.

**The initiating question and test passing.** Participants’ free associative expression in the second interview was expected to be promoted by the introduction of the initiating question. It was anticipated that the initiating question would facilitate free association by promoting rapport as it served the function of test passing (Weiss & Sampson, 1986), since test passing has been shown to promote freedom in conscious and unconscious communication. This element of the method follows from Weiss and Sampson’s psycho-analytic process research, where they demonstrated that psycho-analytic patients unconsciously test their analyst’s understanding and sensitivity, and modulate the emergence of unconscious memory and other unconscious contents into conscious awareness and verbal communications with their analysts in accordance with the results of this monitoring. *Test passing* is a condition which is met when an analyst responds to an analysand’s communication in a manner that reassures the analysand that he or she is psychologically safe. This is an unconscious process. In this study, it is hypothesized that unconscious testing for conditions of safety of the type Weiss and Sampson identify, is likely to be a feature of communication within dyads outside the consulting room, including the research setting. As conceived of here, the researcher is tested by the
participant: it was anticipated that test passing would be realized where an initiating question embodied and conveyed the researcher’s understanding of a participant’s conscious and unconscious communications in the first interview. Thus, the experience of being understood by the researcher, as demonstrated by the researcher’s initiating question, was expected to promote a free associative mode of communication by the participant because it is constitutive of a psychological context of safety.

Within conditions of psychological safety, a free associative interview may be conceptualized as in the nature of a verbal squiggle game (Winnicott, 1971). Winnicott’s squiggle game is a technique developed for assessment and treatment of children as one unconscious speaks to another through a dialogue of line drawings between clinician and child. The concept ‘squiggle’ provides a theoretical explanation for the familiar experience of finding oneself talking about ‘this or that as it comes to mind’ in conversation with those with whom we feel safe. A fundamental principle of psycho-analysis is that contents of the dynamic unconscious cannot come directly into conscious awareness but must always appear in some symbolized form. Dialogic drawings are understood to act as a vehicle in the transfer of unconscious understandings or meanings between the members of the dyad. The parallel with the method of this study is an exchange of free associative dialogic communication of symbolized unconscious thought during the second interview. In Winnicott’s context symbolization takes the form of drawings, in the context of this research, the form is figurative and associative language.

**The Second Interview: The Free-associative Narrative Interview**

The second interview was designed to elicit participants’ free-associative narrative (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000) elaborations of soft substantive categories that had emerged in the step called impression, and introduced to the participant through the initiating question. Hollway and Jefferson
(2000) developed a free associative narrative interview technique for their sociological study of gender and anxiety in perceptions of community safety. Their incorporation of the concepts of free association and psychic defenses, taken from psycho-analysis, is meant to address limitations they identify in qualitative research practices using life history interview methods. The second interview in this study, incorporates principles of a free associative interviewing method adapted from Hollway and Jefferson (2000) to the particular requirements of the current study. The method followed here modifies Hollway and Jefferson’s approach in a manner meant to diminish the influence of sociological perspectives relative to these from psychology, psycho-analysis, psycholinguistics and literary studies.

**Free association.** Free association is a potential of mind, a type of thought, and also a technique of clinical psycho-analytic practice. As part of clinical technique, access to the analysand’s unconscious thinking is sought through the observation of the associative patterns in the analysand’s speech. This pattern is taken to be led by unconscious thought and dynamics. The modification of narrative interviewing technique through the incorporation of the concept of free association follows from this notion of unconscious thought and the related concept of a dynamic unconscious reflecting an interplay of psychological forces that place limits upon self-awareness.

In clinical practice, free association is considered the most fundamental technical approach for gaining access to the contents of the unconscious, playing the central role, for example, in the interpretation of dreams. The principle is that free associative speech will follow a chain of associations that are led by the influence of the unconscious and defenses against the emergence of unconscious content into awareness. The contents of the unconscious include memory as well as a type of reasoning, inference making and affects, each of which are constitutive parts of an individual’s unconscious view of the world, including his or her place within configurations of
Structural Metaphor

relationships. The role of sexual and aggressive instincts and their derivatives, identified in their early days of psycho-analysis to be significant influences within psycho-dynamics are now recognized to articulate themselves within a orienting primacy of relatedness to others. Unconscious contents powerfully influence perception, behaviour, and affect pertaining to relatedness. Free association, was developed as a psycho-analytic technique by Freud to replace hypnotism (Lewin, 1955) and in Lewin’s description, is a special mental state requiring certain conditions and a certain context. Many of the features of psycho-analytic technique, including anonymity, abstinence and neutrality, and what is referred to as the frame, are meant to encourage and preserve the conditions necessary to occasion analysands’ free associative thought and speech. The analyst contributes further to the quality of this special context by the suspension of judgment. Speaking from cognitive psychology, Pinker (2007) has argued that human beings communicate about themselves with varying degrees of explicitness in order to preserve “face”. Thus non-judgment, in the free–associative interview setting, may also be expected to promote freedom in conscious and unconscious communication, in part because it preserves face for the participant.

The psycho-social defended subject. Hollway and Jefferson’s (2000) development of a free associative narrative interview method incorporates a critique of narrative interviewing in the social sciences through a reconsideration of the epistemic status of narrative approaches in research. In Doing qualitative research differently, they propose a revision of views of human nature typically found in research practice and theory where these have ascribed transparency to human speech and an unquestioned truth-value to narrative and life history reports. Their critique turns on what they identify as the problem of the transparent subject and seeks to address the challenges they identify by proposing a new model of the research participant - the psycho-social subject. The concept of the psycho-social subject seeks, on the one hand, to address the embeddedness of the research
participant within a social context and, on the other, to take account of the vagaries of a rich and complex internal or psychic realm within participants.

Hollway and Jefferson’s (2000) method departs from phenomenological and conventional narrative approaches in their proposal that interviews are an opportunity to gain access to the complex lives of individuals, rather than transparent accounts of the truth of participants’ lives. To address this complexity they integrate psycho-analytic principles of mental function and human motivation, and what they argue are widely accepted realities of human communication more generally in their revised model of the research participant. These revisions follow from their substantively different understanding of the capacity for human beings to know remember and tell about themselves (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 1) to “tell it like it is, (and to) know who they are and what makes them tick…” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 2). They argue that the notion of a transparent subject is naïve and suggest that such models, commonly presupposed in the research methods in sociology, ethnography and in participant observer studies in the human sciences has lost touch with the everyday knowledge human beings have of the subtlety and complexity of human communicative relationships. After all, they argue “research is only a more formalised and systematic way of knowing about people.” (Hollway & Jefferson, p. 3). Moreover, they suggest that human beings have a conflicted relationship to knowing and to telling about themselves.

The defining feature of Hollway and Jefferson’s model of the psycho-social subject is proposal of a dynamic or dialectical relation between the nature of the individual’s inner world and the individual’s outer world, or external reality. The participant is understood to have an inner world that “is not simply a reflection of the outer world, nor a cognitively driven rational accommodation to it” (p.4). They posit, however, that there is a discernable “relationship between people’s ambiguous representations (in language) and their experiences” (Hollway & Jefferson, p. 3) and it is
therefore, it is possible for the researcher to gain knowledge of the participant’s experience through research practices that disambiguate this relationship. For Hollway and Jefferson, the psycho-social subject is known through mapping the dialectic between inner and outer. They argue, however, that it is not possible to know the inner world of any individual without knowing the outer world, a position that reflects a sociological perspective. Such a research perspective necessitates extra-textual validation of participant’s narratives in order to identify the nature of the external realm. By contrast, in the current study, where the focus is on unconscious communications of subjective experience, the corroboration of participants’ reports of their experience through extra-textual sources is irrelevant as it is precisely subjective experience that is of interest.

Hollway and Jefferson also argue that while interpretation is always necessary, not all interpretations are equally valid and dispute the hermeneutic principle that interpretative possibilities are endless. In these latter assertions, they challenge central propositions of hermeneutics and propose a model that they argue provides a way out of the problem of the potentially endless hermeneutical circle, which they see as rendering the very idea of interpretative meaning, meaningless.

It follows from Hollway and Jefferson’s view of the conflicted relationship human beings have to self knowledge and self revelation that the psycho-social subject, is also modelled as a defended subject. The notion that conflict is inherent in the relationship to self knowledge is present in all psycho-analytic models. In general, psycho-analytic theory posits that anxiety mobilizes defences against both memory and awareness and in consequence, wishes, thoughts and fantasies deriving from the instincts of sex and aggression, and of the imagined effect of these upon others, are often represented and satisfied in displaced symbolized form, without registration in consciousness. Defences against self-awareness not only triturate access to a range of mental
contents but are also constitutive aspects of diverse personality types, including, most particularly the character or style of relating to others.

**The Kleinian mind and defences.** Hollway and Jefferson model the inner world to which they argue human beings have only limited direct or conscious access is indebted to theories and formulations of mental function taken from Kleinian psycho-analytic theory.

Kleinian theory postulates a surreal internal world constituted of objects or parts of objects, where ‘object’ refers to representations of the other. These are understood to be configured in ways that combine recalled and imagined relationships coloured by the predominance of one of two qualitatively different classes of anxieties, phantasies and defences, reflecting progressively greater psychic maturity and referred to respectively as the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. Kleinian theory of mental life emphasizes aggression and, what are taken to be, other derivatives of the death instinct. In a departure from Freudian theory, where developmental achievements in ego maturity are considered to be relatively stable and regressions to more primitive mental states infrequent except in pathology, in Klein’s theory there is an ever-present potential in normal psychic life for regressive shifts to the more primitive set of defences and object relations. Psychic mechanisms characteristic of the more primitive paranoid schizoid position considerably weaken ego functions, including perception and reason.

Hollway and Jefferson’s model of the researcher’s reflexivity is also informed by Kleinian and post-Kleinian theory. They suggest that, as a result of projective mechanisms, the researcher’s mental state reflects the mental state of the participant: The mind of the researcher is the repository of a participant’s projections. Hollway and Jefferson have also included in their method of narrative interviewing techniques that parallel clinical interviewing in psycho-analytic practice including, for
example, recognition, containment and, most notably, what they understand to be interpretations in the form of questions.

**Narrative.** Narrative has held an important place in psycho-analysis from its beginnings where Breuer and Freud (1895) found that the dissolution of amnesia for traumatic life events was therapeutic. In treating hysteria, re-finding memories that filled in the amnesiac gaps in an analysand’s personal life history, accompanied by the emotions linked to these events, was the preoccupation of early clinical models in psycho-analysis. Later, the mapping of the general developmental effect of trauma, the associated memory loss and repressed affect became a preoccupation of theory making as the examination of its particularity within therapeutic work with individual analysands proceeded. It came to be understood that in a successful analysis, the story of the analysand’s life would be filled in, in all its important aspects. As Eagle (1984b) has pointed out, this fact of practice does not constitute evidence that narrative repair is itself curative and may be merely a by-product of what are in fact the therapeutic element of the analytic experience and relationship. Nevertheless, analysands telling and retelling the story of their lives, in an effort to make sense of this story and themselves, remains a central feature of every psycho-analysis. Eagle’s concern is, in fact, not with this narrative feature of practice itself, but rather with the epistemic and therapeutic value ascribed to it in the absence of other measures.

The practice of using open ended questioning in face to face interviewing in qualitative studies is premised on the attribution of a set of positive values to eliciting personal narratives Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). In comment upon narrative interviewing as currently and broadly practiced in qualitative research, they have observed a range of presuppositions that include the notion that narratives are the central vehicle for human meaning making and identity construction, for the organization of perception and the experience of reality (Josselson; Polkinghorn; Day
Sclater; Sabin & Josselson cited in Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). In addition, narratives have been assigned ethical status, and epistemic credibility in a manner which suggests that epistemological questions of validity and reliability have been rendered irrelevant within this form of research (Bauer, 1996 cited in Hollway and Jefferson 2000).

Narrative method in qualitative research has depended upon a simple, often implicit premise of a one to one correspondence between the narrative provided through in depth face to face interviews and truths of human existence, including the life of a participant. In this understanding, truth has been re-conceptualized as meaning often without a clear recognition of this epistemic fact or its implications. Within this view, the narrative interview method has been assigned both ethical status and epistemic credibility. It is in this sense that van Manen, (1997) suggests that life history narrative descriptions express the truth of participants’ lives. Hollway and Jefferson’s incorporation of a more complex view of human communication and their argument for validation of first person report through extra textual corroboration may be understood as one attempt to correct this view. Nevertheless, methodological approaches suggesting equivalencies between what is said by research participants and what is remain common in qualitative research and the incorporation of an hermeneutic perspective leaves this notion intact.

In a critique from psycho-analytic psychology, these views are identified to be part of what has been termed the ‘postmodern turn’ (Eagle 2003; Eagle, Wolitzky & Wakefield, 2001), and to import subjectivism, relativist conceptions of truth and constructivist view of reality into research and theory. In qualitative research in sociology and psychology the elevated epistemic status of narrative truth has arisen in a contentiously political atmosphere created by a conflation of epistemological question with those which pertain to issues of research ethics with human subjects. Eagle (1984b) has argued that within psycho-analysis, “there has been an arrogance in which much
is asserted and assumed regarding the effectiveness, force, transformative power of the psychoanalytic narrative” in the absence of meaningful accountability for these claims” (Eagle, 1984a. p. 638). Spence, (1983, cited in Eagle, 1984) for example, has sought to distinguish narrative from historical truth arguing that narrative truth supersedes historical truth consequent upon its therapeutic efficacy through powers of persuasion and influence, following from Spence’s claim that in psycho-analysis “the truth is never known” (Spence, 1983 p.469, cited in Eagle 1984a, p. 630). As Eagle (1980; 1984) notes, such arguments, like Mitchell’s constructivism (1998), serve to significantly downgrade the truth value of an interpretation in psycho-analysis and moreover to denigrate the pursuit of truth itself.

Qualitative researchers not engaged in a therapeutic endeavor may, nevertheless, consider the question of the nature of the relationship between narrative life history reports and actual events a critical one, and may be particularly concerned to do so in sociological studies of a kind conducted by Hollway and Jefferson. Because this study has a research focus upon subjective experience it confronts different methodological challenges than those which seek to map the relationship between internal and external reality. And yet, it is no more reasonable to expect transparency in the communication of subjective experience, than it is with regard to the communication of any other aspect of reality. By its nature, communication requires interpretation, and lends itself to misunderstanding. Communication about subjective experience may also be deceptive, whether consciously or unconsciously so. Once the researcher accepts the existence of the unconscious, the challenge of comprehension of highly nuanced communication must be faced; this includes the task of translation from one realm to another. This task is further complicated by the fact that much of unconscious communication is read unconsciously.
Narrative in clinical practice. In clinical psycho-analytic practice, narrative may be considered in relation to the technical issues of repression and working through. It is recurrently observed in clinical practice that the story that analysands tell about themselves to themselves and to their analysts changes throughout the course of a psycho-analysis. There may be considerable disparity between the narratives told early in an analysis and what will in time be recalled or learned to be the more probable case. Changes occur not only with regard to transformations in the meanings assigned certain memories, but in the memories themselves when, over time and through the course of treatment, clarity, continuity and coherence increase. An example from a long term psycho-analysis may illustrate this point.

An analysand had on occasion, through the course of treatment referred to photographs of herself as a child, describing them and the meaning the scenes they depicted had for her to her analyst. Reference to the photographs helped her explain to herself and to her analyst why she was who she was and, in particular, what she understood to be the fixed nature of her personality since childhood. This also supported her assertion that she was unable to change. One photograph had particular relevance for her and was recurrently referenced. As reported by the analysand, the scene in the photograph was of herself at approximately eighteen months of age dressed up and attending a Christmas party, alone, very sad and crying. Elaborations upon the theme of sadness, loneliness and isolation from her family associated with a long standing depression were woven around this memory of the photograph. Some years into the psycho-analysis, when the analysand’s life was changing in positive ways, she had occasion to look at her box of family photographs again and reported finding the one she had recalled and discussed a number of times over the years. With some surprise, she reported that it did not in fact show her crying. Nor, she reflected, was she alone, since she was at a party, being photographed by her father, who, she recalled, had always taken a lot of
picture of her. She also reported that another photograph, one she had not previously discussed, was also quite different from how she had remembered it. In this latter photograph, recalled initially to be her father and herself in a canoe, showed that, in fact, she was not in this photograph at all: In the spot where she had recalled herself sitting next to her father, sat, instead her brother.

With due consideration, the analyst and patient discerned that these photographs, as mistakenly remembered, had represented the analysand’s internal psychic reality at a moment in time, in a manner in which, she had represented important aspects of reality to herself: This was her then “current truth” (Eagle, 1984a) even if it did not, in fact, reflect the actual physical reality of the photographs. Upon consideration, there proved to be painful realities about the analysand’s early family life she had excluded from awareness: In the first photograph, she was holding two small bears she had received at the party as a gift up to the camera and to her father. These bears had later become figures in her play representing herself and a younger brother. This photograph was taken at a time in her life she had later calculated to correspond to this brother’s conception. Her imagined tears, meant to suggest she had always been unhappy and to deny the reality that her unhappiness was in response to the unwelcome birth of this brother. In the second photograph, the analysand had recalled herself to be sitting at the front of the canoe, alone with her father, when it proved to be the case that, in the photograph this same brother was seated in that spot. Only when she became able to tolerate thinking about her hurt and angry feelings regarding her sibling, did the facts that the photograph recorded become possible to see and the story of her experience of her family life fill in. This re-seeing itself has become part of the narrative the patient now tells of herself to her analyst and to herself as she engages in the process of working through. When the analysand no longer needed the distortions the mis-remembered photographs served, she was able to see them as they really were and to see herself, including her affective life, with its greater complexity as well. She
came to understand the function these distortions had served. Perceptual distortion and memory frequently serve repression; in this example what were painful realities of family life were kept out of awareness as awareness of associated ego dystonic affects. As treatment progresses, the narrative analysands tell about themselves change, corresponding to deeper structural shifts and therapeutic gains that can be observed in the treatment. Extra clinical evidence of repressed memory and of the power of psychic reality is not common in psycho-analytic practice where corroboration of these kinds are not sought. Part of working through, the integration of the self knowledge the analysand has gained in the course of treatment, involves bringing narrative in line with the reality, including the reality of changes in themselves and their self understanding.
Chapter Four: Delicate Empiricism – The Analysis of the Written Text

General Principles of Analysis

Analysis of verbatim transcripts of each participant’s two interviews followed the second interview. Analysis is governed by principles meant to respect the complexity of human communicative relationships and the singularity and integrity of each participant’s communicative intent. Each participant’s complete transcript set, viewed as an autonomous holistic record of their intended communication, was analyzed independently of the other participant’s transcript set. Transcript analysis considered a variety of individual properties of a participant’s communication in a single meeting with the researcher and within the complete record of the total communication across all meetings. The approach taken presupposes the existence of a communicative intent in the utterance that exists independent of any interpretative act and acknowledges that an interpretative practice may fail to properly read a speaker’s communicative intent. This approach to analysis and interpretation is distinguished from an hermeneutic approach since it presupposes that the speaker’s meaning is independent of the listener’s capacity to comprehend it. In contrast to relativist models, interpretative possibilities are understood to be constrained by the speaker’s communicative intent, of which the transcript is considered to be a record.

Textual analysis and interpretation arises as a possibility and requirement because of the paradox of human communication: On the one hand, we are driven by an instinct to communicate (Pinker, 1994) as part of an innately social nature, and on the other, language avails human beings of deception, suggesting that communication has social functions in addition to the simple conveyance of knowledge, meanings or information. This dual potential to reveal and show or to dissemble and “seem,” as Heidegger (1962) has described
it, is a property of language that plays a role in the relations human beings have with one another and with themselves. Perhaps nowhere more than in the domain of communication about ourselves is this duality more evident. It is one of the continuing paradoxes of clinical psycho-analysis that analysands must struggle against forces in themselves that oppose their explicit conscious wish to tell about themselves and to be understood by another human being, their psycho-analyst. Properties of language serve this conflicted wish: figurative language, syntax, grammar and qualitative features make both dissembling and nuanced revealing possible. Textual analysis and interpretation presuppose that utterance may communicate its meanings implicitly or indirectly. However, even where it is accepted that interpretation is of hidden meanings (Freud, 1906, 1923), theories about the reason for this, about the nature of what is hidden and why it is hidden vary broadly. Interpretative models follow from these explanatory models.

The approach to analysis taken here integrates principles from textual analysis in literary studies, psycholinguistics and psycho-analysis in a series of steps developed within a structure found in Hoffman’s (1998) adaptation of Goethe’s phenomenology. Hoffman’s modification of Goethe’s model retains a methodological frame that supports a distinction between analysis and interpretation when applied to language. In this study, analysis refers to discerning linguistic properties of an utterance and focuses upon what may be called the surface elements of the text and its linguistic structure. This is the approach taken in an examination of both explicit and implicit communication following principles from literary studies and psycholinguistics.

Psycho-analysis is the body of theory that informs interpretation, goes beyond linguistic properties and operates at a more abstract level while incorporating findings from
the linguistic analysis. Interpretation, then, is answerable to the body of psycho-analytic theory in addition to the logic of linguistic structure. Acts of analysis and interpretation are viewed as accessing textual layers that are understood to be linked in a lawful manner. In psycho-analytic approaches, interpretation of hidden meanings presupposes a relation between surface and depth, a dynamic dimension of any text, including verbal communication, corresponding to layers of mind that identify relative degrees of proximity to consciousness and constitute structure.

Pinker has sought to address the complexity of language where, he argues, its truly infinite possibilities in the conveyance of ideas (Pinker, 1994) is matched by its equally impressive capacity for subtlety and the indirect realization of communicative intent. Pinker (2007), following Grice has argued that communication serves intersubjective goals including the management of “face” through its potential to create effects through indirect means. Citing Goffman, Pinker defines face as a combined need for the approval of others and autonomy from others (2007, p. 380). We communicate in a manner that creates the conditions for inference as well as disavowal, and through these means influence the sensibilities in addition to the conscious and unconscious thought of others. Language makes this artfulness possible.

Pinker (2007) conceptualizes the unconscious not as a reservoir of drive derivatives in the form of wishes, but rather a medium of “wordless thought” encompassing beliefs, knowledge, judgment and reasoning about causal relations. This is an unconscious that performs many of the same tasks as consciousness. This view shares much with psycho-analytic thinkers such as Loewald (2000a) and Weiss and Sampson (1986).
For Pinker (2007), language can do as well as tell. Communicative exchanges position an antagonist (the one who acts) and agonist (the one who is acted upon) in roles roughly corresponding to a speaker and his or her audience. In a simple reading of Pinker’s model, “doing” by the speaker creates effects in the audience. Appreciation of the intricate interplay of emotion and thought along both conscious and unconscious dimension enriches understanding of the significant effect communication partners can have upon one another. To realize unconscious goals through communication is simply to use one of the inherent capacities of language.

For the speaker, the risks of communication pertain to features of the communicative context and include the receptivity of the audience and the degree of psychological safety the audience represents (Weiss & Sampson, 1986). The unconscious search for understanding and, the capacity to unconsciously monitor degrees of success in this search and to modulate communicative relations in response to this has been empirically established (Weiss & Sampson, 1986). While the clinical relationship is designed to provide the speaker access to a context and audience that is facilitative of both conscious and unconscious communication, this is not true of all communicative dyads.

Relative degrees of ego strength in a speaker will influence a his or her ability to sustain an independence in communicative intent in the face of variability in receptive factors in an audience. With less ego strength, a speaker may sacrifice communicative autonomy to other social goals, including both “face” and what Pinker calls “solidarity”, a concept that may be simply stated as a sense of belonging. Breaches in solidarity stimulate guilt and anxiety which are arguably associated with a primary, if unconscious, threat of loss, although Pinker does not take his formulation this far. Nevertheless, in these instances the
speaker will comply with the explicit or implicit demands made by an audience regarding what may or may not be said or known, enforcing social, familial or dyadic taboos.

In studies of this kind, it must be recognized that participants’ self-knowledge and communicative conflict may fluctuate depending upon a number of factors. A participants’ conscious goal to communicate may be ambivalent and vary as a function of unconscious factors including communicative safety (Weiss & Sampson, 1986). In addition, while participants may not have conscious awareness of the full range of the subjective registers of the experience of their work, they may nevertheless pursue unconscious communicative goals meant to convey their unconscious understandings of those experiences.

Hollway and Jefferson (2000) suggest that interpretation of interview text provides access to the autobiographical gestalt (Schwartz cited in Hollway & Jefferson, 2000) of the participant. This study departs from Hollway and Jefferson insofar as it limits interpretative goals to disclosing participants’ communicative intent and current truth (Eagle, 1984b) as articulated within the bounded communicative moment of the research encounter.

A Layered Analysis

..the analysis is not the individual, but it is a point of contact and expresses something the individual wished to say about himself, perhaps unconsciously. Green 1986, p. 19

The analysis of interviews is reported separately for each participant. For the first participant, Dr. Ashe, this is detailed in a graduated series of procedures corresponding to the steps of analysis identified in the methodology chapter above. This detailed report of the analysis of Dr. Ashe’s transcript set is included in order to demonstrate the method developed this study. Extensive excerpts from the transcripts are included to illustrate the process of calibrating a layered method of analysis and interpretation of the utterance that,
cumulatively, comprise the reading of the conscious and unconscious dimensions of each participant’s communication of their experience of their work. Having demonstrated the method in this detailed manner through the analysis of Dr. Ashe’s transcripts, the analysis of transcripts of the second participant, Dr. Wyeth’s is not reported in detail. Dr. Wyeth’s, textual analysis is not reported for steps two through four although the analysis if his transcripts was conducted using the same method. In Dr. Wyeth’s case, the analysis is described beginning with the finding of the soft substantive category and its introduction to Dr. Wyeth at feedback in the second interview. This is followed by the testing of this category by his verbal response in that interview. Finally, a combined analysis which includes the report of the structural metaphor for this participant and a consideration of the relationship of this hypothesized construct to textual representations of Dr. Wyeth’s subjective experience and conceptualization of clinical practice is provided.

In order to orient the reader throughout the demonstration of the layered method of the analysis as applied to Dr. Ashe’s utterance, the same transcripts excerpts, or parts of excerpts are, on occasion, included in the document more than once. This is done in order to assist the reader through the recursive analytic moves that constitute the method of analysis.

The conceptualization of and the procedure for open coding-transcription in the first step of the analysis called impression, have been described above (pp. 57-77). As noted, this modification to open coding technique is intended to access the researcher’s unconscious readings of participants’ utterance and the identification of an emergent impression denoted the soft substantive category. Modifications to open coding as applied during impression, including the researcher working exclusively with the audio record, rather than written transcripts systematizes the researcher’s procedural approach to unconscious processes active in the dyadic communication. It also identified
a point of departure for the second interview that was intended to promote free associative communication in that unstructured interview setting.

Before conducting analysis in steps two through five, each participant’s soft substantive category was introduced to them in the second free associative narrative interview. This provided participants with an opportunity to consider, reflect upon and express their thoughts regarding the particular soft substantive category that had identified through open coding-transcription of the audio record of the first interview. Introduction of the soft substantive category had the additional goal of promoting participants’ free associative narratives about their work experience in the second interview.

Finally, following the second interview, each participant’s emergent soft substantive category, identified in step one – impression – was employed through the four subsequent steps in the layered analysis of written transcripts, each utilizing a different approach to textual analysis. The interpretation and generation of an hypothesis in step five is the end point of the analysis practiced in the earlier steps, each of which produced partial findings.

**The tally test.** An incorporation of an approach to the verification of interpretations taken from psycho-analysis (Freud, 1917b) was included in this study as a test of the validity of the researcher’s reading of the participant’s individual soft substantive category emergent during the open coding-transcription in step one. This began as the emergent soft substantive category was reported to the participants in the second interview. Where, following its introduction to the participant, the soft substantive category was verified by the verbal response of the participant, verification of the soft substantive category was not sought through analysis of the written transcript. This was the case with one participant, Dr. Wyeth. Where the verbal response of the participant, following the introduction of the soft substantive category failed to verify the soft substantive
category, this category was tested further through an analysis of the participant’s written transcript set. This was the case with Dr. Ashe, the first participant reported below. Because Dr. Wyeth’s verbal response verified his soft substantive category, no further verification was sought.

The tally test is a test of correspondence or confirmation found in the response of a speaker subsequent to the introduction of an interpretation of the speaker’s earlier utterance. In clinical practice the psycho-analyst listens carefully to the analysand’s response to an interpretation to determine whether what they have said does, “tally with what is real” (Freud, 1917a, p. 452). When introduced, what has become known as the tally argument was intended by Freud to address the problem represented by the charge that psycho-analysis worked by suggestion. In response to this challenge, which, he noted, if justified would mean “psycho-analysis would be nothing more than a particularly well-disguised and particularly effective form of suggestive treatment and we should have to attach little weight to all that it tells us about what influences our lives, the dynamics of the mind or the unconscious” (p. 452). Freud argued that the health achieved through treatment validated the interpretations, the treatment method and the theory of mind from which these were derived since the patient’s “conflicts will only be successfully solved and his resistances overcome if the anticipatory ideas he is given tally with what is real in him” (p. 452). As Bucci, (1989) points out by “anticipatory ideas” Freud is referring to interpretations. Suggestion, Freud goes on to argue, touches only the patient’s intellect not his illness. From this introduction as a model of confirmation of interpretation measured through success of treatment, the tally model has become part of clinical practice as a means of ongoing evaluation of the utility of individual interpretations and the psycho-analyst’s working hypothesis of her patient. Interpretations and such models as the psycho-analyst holds in mind are considered against the response of analysands as a measure of the degree of correspondence such interpretations have to the internal world of the analysand. Tuckett’s (1994)
model of micro-validation incorporates the tally method where he notes that “micro-validating …
goes on all the time in most ordinary analyses, particularly as we seek to bend our ‘ears’ to the
patient’s responses to the interpretations we make” (p. 1161-1162). Judgments about interpretations
based on the patient’s responses include a determination that an interpretation has been wrong: “I
find that sometimes I only realize what I am saying or see links, or perhaps decide I have completely
missed the point, while I am actually speaking, or possibly later when I have noticed how my patient
responds” (Tuckett, 1994, p. 1159).

Confirmation through tally is not satisfied by verbal affirmation which may be a function of
the analyst/analysand relationship where it could, for example, constitute compliance resulting from
the asymmetrical power and dependency relations in the analytic dyad, but requires confirmation of
other or additional types. For example confirmation not infrequently takes the form of the
emergence of memories in the mind of the patient that, for the analysand and psycho-analyst alike,
corroborate the interpretation. Current literature in psycho-analysis often views this phenomenon
through the language of resonance, which places emphasis upon the affective dimension in what is
essentially a type of validation through patient response. In both, to tally refers to a response from
the analysand that indicates, in one way or another, that the analysand has found the analyst’s
interpretation helpful, has experienced it as saying something truthful or insightful about them. This
may be the case even where, or especially where, what has been said is a new thought, at least in the
conscious realm. A patient’s confirming response commonly occurs along a number of dimensions
alive in the analytic encounter: memory, affect and reason. For example, an interpretation to the
effect that an analysand engages in dangerous behaviours in order to evoke a quality of experience
that characterized his relationship with a dangerously neglectful parent would be confirmed by the
emergence of a memory of having been hidden and told to stay quiet behind the curtains in a hotel as
a small child while his father drank at the bar. It would also be confirmed by a memory of a “family story” his mother laughingly told about him where as a toddler he was tied to a tree root on a beach so he wouldn’t wander off, with the result that his mother forgot about him while she talked with her friends and waves repeatedly crashed over him. Either memory might be accompanied by one of a range of affects arising from the analysand’s particular relation to that memory and that parent at that time in the treatment, including possibly anger, sadness or shame. The emergence of either memory could be followed by a perhaps wistful comment such as, “But I still miss her/him,” or alternatively, “It’s very difficult, fighting this, the pull to hurt myself.”

Bucci (1989), in rethinking the tally argument and seeking to link it to current knowledge in psychology has argued that “accuracy of an interpretation is defined in terms of (its) correspondence to …nonverbal perceptual-motoric-emotional structures” (259). In Bucci’s dual code model, experience is registered in the mind in two different formats: the verbal and nonverbal codes. The verbal system is the abstract code of language and logic. The elements of the system are lexical items; the system is designed for single-channel, sequential processing, and follows logical organizing principles. The nonverbal system includes experience in any sense modality, representations of bodily experience, and representations of motoric activity. Like the linguistic and logical structures of the verbal system, the nonverbal schemata are organized and rule-governed, but they follow different rules. The nonverbal system is capable of multi-channelled, parallel processing, organized by analogic principles, and reflecting functional and perceptual similarities, also reflecting the individual experiences of one's life. That is, things are connected, or categorized in the nonverbal system because they look or feel alike, because they occurred together in the same time or place, or have similar structures or forms. The range of contents of the nonverbal schemata is as wide as human experience and that of other species as well. Organized schemata composed of sensory, motoric, and visceral representations constitute systems of “knowledge,” “expectations,” and “beliefs” that exist outside of language. Such schemata may exist in other species, and in
children prior to acquisition of language, and continue to be operative in adults as well (pp. 256-7).

However, Bucci’s reformulation of the tally argument, insofar as it suggests that interpretations are correct, that they “tally with the real (when they forge) referential connections to the nonverbal system” (261) seems very much like the kind of verification that psycho-analytic clinicians have long sought through close observation of qualitative shifts in affect and behaviour, subjective experience and the emergence of mental contents, including memory, in the free association of their analysands.

The problematic issue regarding confirmation by tally is the notion of unconscious or implicit corroboration. Given the model of the psycho-dynamics central to psycho-analytic theory and practice, mental contents of significance may function and hold influence in the lives of individuals and yet remain outside conscious awareness. Therefore, manifestations of the unconscious, symbolized in behaviour, affect and properties of language following upon an interpretation, may lend credence to its relevance in the absence of explicit conscious confirmation. For the analysand, the unconscious knowledge of the relevance of these implicit confirmations is also unknown where the links between conscious and unconscious awareness is severed. An analysand will also lack conscious awareness of this break of links. In clinical practice, the question of the correctness of an interpretation, in addition to being one of truth value, is also one of therapeutic value, and is, therefore, a technical issue. Thus, an interpretation may be wrong in its lack of correspondence to the analysand’s internal reality, or it may have been made prematurely and therefore wrong, where if made at another time would have had therapeutic value. Only subsequent events in a psycho-analysis will establish this.

As will be shown below, following the principles of the tally test, the verbal response of the first participant, Dr. Ashe, to the introduction of the soft substantive category did not verify that
category. For this reason, an extensive analysis of the written transcript was undertaken in order to further test the soft substantive category. The researcher’s introduction of the soft substantive category to Dr. Ashe, the examination of his verbal repose which fails to confirm the value of this category and the subsequent extensive analysis of his transcript set to test the that category is reported below.

For both participants, following the completion of the second interview, the researcher conducted an analysis of the complete record of each participant’s utterance. This included, but was not restricted to, a consideration of the place of the soft substantive category within the complete transcript, including textual dynamics, themes, communicative intentions, communicative deportment and finally in relation to the hypothesized structural metaphor. Thus in addition to be tested against the participant’s explicit response, the soft substantive category was reconsidered through the steps of analysis subsequent to impression and verification by tally. Thus, the soft substantive category, the emergent finding from step one, plays an influential role in both orienting the second interview and is central to the analysis and interpretation practiced through steps two through five.

The detailed analysis of Dr. Ashe’s transcript is also meant to demonstrate the method of analysis developed in this study for access to unconscious dimensions of subjective experience within utterance. Because Dr. Ashe’s verbal response to the introduction to the soft substantive category failed to provide confirmation of this finding from analysis through open coding-transcription his transcript set was chosen for use in a demonstration of the method. It was reasoned that the method must meet the challenge set by a transcript set that was confounding the first approach to analysis. It was also reasoned that once the method was demonstrated through the detailed analysis of either transcript, that it was not necessary to provide the same detail in reporting
the analysis of the other participant’s transcript set. For this reason a detailed description of each step in the analysis of Dr. Wyeth’s utterance is not provided. It was also reasoned that since Dr. Wyeth’s verbal response to his *soft substantive category* did confirm its value to an appreciation of this participant’s subjective experience, that his transcript set would not as thoroughly challenge, and therefore not as thoroughly demonstrate, the method developed in this study.

**Dr. Ashe: Analysis**

**Feedback of the soft substantive category and failure by tally.** The *soft substantive category* that emerged during the open-coding-transcription of Dr. Ashe’s first interview is *intrusion*. Introduction of this *soft substantive category* to the participant at the beginning of the second interview was intended to initiate a free and unstructured conversation between researcher and participant about the participant’s work. It was also to provide the participant an opportunity to consider, reflect upon, elaborate, clarify or qualify the impression left upon the researcher by her encounter with the audio recording of the first interview and the interest this impression evoked during open coding. The unstructured, free associative form (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000) of the second interview was intended to facilitate unconscious communicative processes in both the participant and researcher. As a result of Dr. Ashe’s schedule, the structured interview was conducted over two meetings. Thus, the third meeting marks the beginning of the unstructured interview. Therefore, the emergent *soft substantive category* of *intrusion* was introduced to Dr. Ashe at the beginning of the third meeting between participant and researcher.

The excerpt below is taken from the beginning of the third meeting, the start of the *free associative narrative* interview and contains the introduction of the soft substantive category to Dr. Ashe and his response to this. In all transcript excerpts “Q” represents “question” indicating the speech of the researcher and “A”, represents “answer,” indicating the speech of the participant. The
numbers at the end of each text excerpt indicate the page number in the transcript from which the excerpt has been taken:

Q: First I’d like to ask you a question that is really about your relation to your patients, that’s probably what one could say about it. I was really interested to see that um I found myself thinking about the issues of intrusiveness and defence in our discussion. That was because, um, (181)

At this point, Dr. Ashe interrupts the researcher with a request for clarification of the researcher’s specific meaning in her use of the term defence and its relationship to the term, intrusion:

A: You mean like the defence in reaction to the intrusion?
Q: Yes, and I’m thinking about a particular kind of intrusiveness that you seem very concerned about and take measures to protect your patients against.
A: Do you recall the instance? (181)

Upon clarification, given in the excerpt below,

Q: …this may be consistent with your use of the term intrusiveness, which you are concerned about with regard to your patients, a term you used when discussing your space for example, you know – not having intrusive objects, protecting patients...and I just thought that was really (a beeping sound is heard on the tape) (182)

Dr. Ashe responds to the theme of intrusiveness in a manner that suggests it is a category of little or no significance to him. He does not take it up explicitly at this time even though the researcher, in clarification, elaborates the soft substantive category in a manner intended to provide the fuller context of her interest in the theme and affirmation of the participant.

Dr. Ashe had closed the second meeting of the first interview by expressing his particular interest in what the researcher would identify of interest to her for discussion in their next meeting.

A: I look forward to hearing what has struck you. (180)
However, examination of the excerpt below, shows that Dr. Ashe expresses no interest in the theme of intrusion identified by the research and does not discuss it. Instead, he returns to the issue of theoretical and technical differences between different schools within the psycho-analytic community, a subject of focus in the first interview. Dr. Ashe has prepared for this discussion with the researcher by copying a journal article for her that he hopes will illustrate his points. Following the interruption by the beeping photocopy machine, Dr. Ashe explains as follows:

Q: Is that something you want to deal with?
A: It’s actually an article I’m photocopying for you.
Q: Oh, thank you, that’s very kind.
A: To give some flesh around um I’ve I’ve receive the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis
Q: Yes
A: the lead article was stunning
Q: yes?
A: it’s a very short article
Q: Oh
A: And it’s a detail of just two sessions back to back
Q: Oh
A: that an analyst is reporting on and talking about some of the things I was trying to express to you
Q: yes
A: and it’s very very rarely is it exposed
Q: So well laid out, sort of?
A: Well, no, so penetratingly laid out
Q: Oh
A: with a lot of the anxiety that, that – he can be criticized by his colleagues, for what he did
Q: Oh, I see
A: but which he values, nonetheless
Q: uh ha
A: He still is concerned about the psychoanalytic community. He’s heavy on that, on how there are concerns, but what he does, what he thinks about, what he is doing otherwise with the material, is something you you and I have touched upon in terms of what my experience is and so I thought this would be an interesting, interesting for you to read. (182-3)

The failure of the soft substantive category intrusion to interest Dr. Ashe is evident not only in the explicit content of what he says, but also in the manner in which he conducts himself in relation to the researcher in this second interview as this demonstrates the failure of the introduction of the theme of intrusion to stimulate a free associative discussion of his work.
experience, one of the methodological purposes of the introduction of the emergent category to participants. Simply, the introduction of the soft substantive category was intended to facilitate a deepening in the communication between researcher and participant in an area of importance in his work. However, while the researcher has specifically linked the category of intrusion to Dr. Ashe’s work and invites his consideration of that, consistent with the overall focus of the study, Dr. Ashe’s introduction of the journal article returns the focus of the discussion between him and the researcher to more general topics considered in the first interview. These include the therapeutic principles of spontaneity and mutuality within the relational school of psychoanalysis.

Later in the interview when Dr. Ashe does, for the first time, grasp the positive nature of the researcher’s attribution to him with regard to this theme and that the researcher’s question has linked intrusion to his care of patients he, nevertheless, remains uninterested in exploring the theme of intrusion in relation to his clinical experience. He explicitly disagrees with the researcher’s suggestion that he may have felt concern about protecting patients from intrusions and disagrees with her on this point. He also shifts the context of the consideration of this theme away from that of his work to the that of the interview:

A: Oh, well, yes, I see where you’re coming from. The first question you asked me, had to do with my one of the primary things I looked at, was the issue, to what extent does one intrude, to what extent is one in the background
Q: yes
A: um how much of myself is pushing on them
Q: right
A: um, I don’t, I see where you’re going with that but I don’t have that sense. I mean, I uh, I feel very easy about talking about my patients. I feel, well, they are well disguised; I leave out details always, that in any way would identify them to any mutual friend.
Q: O.k.
A: So I don’t have that feeling. (185)
Thus, Dr. Ashe explicitly dismisses the researcher’s suggestions that intrusion is a concept of relevance to understanding his clinical practice. Based on the participant’s response to the initiating question, the emergent category of intrusion finds no support in the participant’s explicit and immediate consideration of this theme. Thus the finding of the soft substantive category of intrusion through the open coding-transcription is not confirmed by the participant’s explicit response. From the perspective of Weiss and Sampson (1986), insofar as the soft substantive category was intended to convey understanding, to promote rapport and to thereby free up and deepen communication, the soft substantive category of intrusion once again fails. At the explicit level of the participant’s response, the result of the researcher’s open coding of this participant’s utterance in the first interview failed what in psycho-analytic research and practice is called the tally test: in simple terms, the emergent category of intrusion made no sense to the participant.

Having failed the tally test, the emergent soft substantive category of intrusion was tested through a variety of approaches in the stages of analysis described below. Findings are reported in order in which the interviews were conducted, and of the steps through which they were analyzed: two through five. In step two, the participant’s utterance in the first interview was analyzed through a close reading.

**Step Two: Exact Description – Earth**

**Close reading.** Unlike the analysis conducted during the step called impression utilizing the audio recording of the first interview, this second step is the analysis of the utterance is applied to the transcripts of both interviews. This step was developed from Hoffman’s first stage, which combines aspects of Goethe’s empirical and scientific phenomena in order to realize a transition from direct and immediate experience, characteristic of first impression, to an exploration of progressively deeper levels of contact, in what Goethe called “the experiment.” In both Hoffman’s
and Goethe’s formulations, emphasis is upon exact or precise description of phenomena, derived from observation gathered through the senses. For Goethe, this observational practice is an apprehension of the phenomenon as it exists along the dimension of space, its presence in material or empirical reality.

Through the second step of this study, the transition from the type of unmediated experience characteristic of impression to contact with the empirical level of the data is accomplished through an analysis modeled upon the practice of close reading found in literary criticism. As the name suggests, close reading employs a careful scrutiny of a text grounded in the empirical dimension of an utterance in order to discern the author’s intended meaning. Brought to literary criticism in the 1920’s by I.A. Richards (2001), close reading is a practice of textual analysis that emphasizes the mechanisms of language and depends upon an engagement with the text through conventional linguistic categories, including grammar, diction, syntax, figurative language, rhythm and meter. Richards placed emphasis upon communicative intent in the use of language both in and outside the linguistic arts, such as poetry. “Ambiguity,” he notes, “in the poem, as in any other form of communication, may be the fault of the poet or the reader” (Richards, 2001, p. 192). For Richards, the communicative efficiency of imagery in language, “must, of course, include control over emotional as well as intellectual reactions” (p. 110).

This integration of linguistic principles within Hoffman’s ecological framework is conceptualized here as a refined form of observation, an example of Goethe’s “experiment,” and provides a first method of approach to the transcripts. The goal of this step is to obtain a precise description of the phenomenon, here the utterance. Following Brokemuhl, this step is given the label “Earth” as it is intended to provide the researcher with access to the most substantive or empirical
level of a phenomenon; in this study, the task is to understand the communicative intent of the utterance.

Bockemuhl’s metaphor of earth is meant to picture the scientist’s observational mode or relation to the substantive, physical reality of the phenomenon. This mode of relating mediates the intermediate space between subject and object – scientist and phenomenon. In this study, the researcher’s challenge when working with text, always conceptualized as observation, is to give a description of the utterance that is recognized by any reader of English to correspond to the observed data.

More specifically, the first interview was analyzed through close reading to identify whether there is any textual basis for the emergent category of intrusion that had been identified in open coding-transcription of the audio recording of that interview and dismissed by the participant in the second interview.

**Close reading of the first interview.** While Dr. Ashe explicitly dismisses the theme of intrusion at the beginning of the second interview, the close reading review of the transcripts of the interview demonstrate that the theme of intrusion, in fact, both opens and closes Dr. Ashe’s communication in that first interview, crossing the two meetings between participant and researcher. The textual evidence for this finding is described below. In order to provide the textual context of the analysis in this step, the relevant excerpts from transcripts include the researcher’s speech.

The questions asked in the first interview were designed to address the research interest in the subjective experience of clinical psycho-analytic practice by eliciting detailed descriptions of that experience. Principles from Winnicott’s interview approach in the set situation complimented this basic method of interviewing in phenomenological studies. The approach taken in this interview diverged from more conventional practices of face to face interviews in phenomenological studies
insofar as no follow up questions, probes or requests for clarification were included in the protocol, nor were there attempts to ensure the participant was “staying on track.” A principle governing research that incorporates a theory of unconscious communication is that participants’ utterance may address a researcher’s query in a variety of ways, not all of which will be explicit or direct. Therefore, although the set of prepared questions were designed to create many opportunities for participants to describe personal experiences of their work and thus to provide information regarding their subjective experience of work, once a question was asked, the researcher did not intervene in the trajectory of the participant’s reply.

**The first question.** With some variation in specific phrasing, the first question in the set of prepared questions asked all participants to describe their experience and thinking about furnishing and decorating their offices. With Dr. Ashe, the first question was asked in the following manner:

Q: I wonder if you could tell me about the process of selecting the furnishings and the art work and the uh the objects in your consulting room, what that was about and what thinking went into that. (128)

This is Dr. Ashe’s complete reply:

A: Well first of all, um, I need space, to sit and to work, especially when, especially when I’m in the chair: I need to have a long view. And I’ve always had the pleasure of, I don’t have it here unfortunately, because of the traffic and because there is a little walk outside here, um, I’ve had to put up blinds here that are louvered, away from it, so people can’t see in and so that people don’t have the feeling of being exposed. I’ve always been higher up, and had a long view way outside when I was practicing in (city name). Um I had a view, I had a view, on a clear day I could see (mountain name) way way in the distance. Um, and the same thing when I was working in (city name) I would say. So here, so that was an important consideration, to have a consulting room that was long, so I could actually sit back and have a long view. Um, the other thing is, of course I wanted to make it as comfortable as possible, uh, for… I was very very intent about making it comfortable, um, for uh, for my patients, for my analysands and uh so I try to pick my wall paper and the wood and everything else to be a kind of unjaring situation. And I have little pieces here and there that are not intrusively disclosing of me. Except for two, well one item in particular which is up there, a picture in black and white, right near you, except for that one, the rest is um fairly interesting and engaging but doesn’t disclose a hell of a lot about me, except maybe the two paintings that you saw in the waiting room, up against the wall. Actually they’re, they depict (city name), uh, so disclose, they disclose my identity. But so does my name. So um and um uh let’s see. I wanted to
make a waiting room comfortable, not quite like a living room, as a comfortable reception area which is private and feels closed and private and where people are not meeting each other.

Q: yeah
A: Now they have to of course with this door. Many analysts would prefer to have an outgoing door to the corridor and an incoming separate, but I can’t here. Um, the prior occupant did have the waiting room here and had an administrative office, bookkeeping and secretarial and so on where the waiting room is, and people pass back and forth. And though many analysts do that I, I find that not, not very agreeable for people, or for myself. Um, so people come in, came in like you did and can leave and go right out or use the washroom. The washroom is important. I wish I had a private washroom where people don’t feel that they are sharing it with me. Um but I can’t because of the structure of the place, without carving into the space. Um, I uh have that plant over there in order to kind of somewhat hide the stuff I have on my little parson’s table there, to somewhat hide the stuff on the actual cabinet but the stuff on top can be seen from there. That arrangement is pretty stable. I try to keep my stuff stable as well. When I moved from where I was on (street name) I had that plate up there almost exactly in the same position, so I thought that was important to remain to remain as one piece of constancy. Um and the motif of the plate itself fitting in with, as well as the blueness of other items has a certain, has a flow to it. The fact that, the fact that one fish is red, other people have noticed that it corresponds to what they view as my original hair colour.

Q: Oh.
A: I have a red haired complexion about me, so people make that association, which is fine. And it happens that that fish is leading all the others.

Q: there out front, yeah
A: yeah. Out front, in front of the pack. I hadn’t made that connection, but it feels agreeable to people and whenever that plate is tilted, happens sometimes when the cleaning lady is here, I feel that I need to make sure that the waters are running horizontally, rather than upwards or downwards. Um, uh, I could describe the actual pictures themselves in terms of what I feel about the, what it means, the difference it means to me and what especially it means to my patients. The couch I made it leather, to give people a feeling to put their uh either their stockings or their bare feet on it without worrying too much about it, and to keep it durable.

Q: um hm
A: The previous couch I had um some tares in it. It was cloth and people were feeling very, somewhat uncomfortable about whether they were causing damage

Q: uh, yeah
A: I do have people when they come in with goulashes

Q: mm
A: or to leave their goulashes on that tray out there, when it’s wet. If, if, they don’t have to remove their shoes when they come in, but it’s also don’t put their shoes flat on the uh, on the skin. More than that, they have to take off their shoes. Many just lie there with their shoes. You know. But those who feel they aren’t going to be able to do that take off their shoes. Uh, the rocking chair, the chair that we bought uh, many many years ago when our children were born and uh it was used to, we had (omit), so it was used to feed them um. Lets see, the um table is open, its not a desk, and I wanted the feeling of openness but at the same time I was very very aware that you
could see right through. I don’t practice from there at all. I use it just to book patients. I work from either here or over there. So I wanted to make sure that the waste paper basket was somewhat attractive but not intrusive and I try to keep the level of waste in there low enough so there is not, push up. Are you, are you getting too much from me or not?

Q: No, I was just thinking how thoughtful, you know, the thought that has gone into this.

A: yeah. The chairs I have here as part of a same set as is those two out in the reception area.

Q: mm

A: People want to use those chairs to put their boots on, to put their shoes on or what have you, they use those chairs and its all the same material. And I wanted to be sure that the chairs are equal, just the same, to uh give a mutuality.

Q: yes

A: Um, the things I have up there are mainly just some people who thought that they were mementoes of one form or another that they wanted me to have. Um, uh, sometimes I put flowers in there. Um there is a mirror in the waiting room, uh, and people can look in the mirror. I wanted to put a mirror up here as well in this spot. I don’t know what more I can say. (132)

The underlined sections of the transcript excerpt above indicate four variations on the theme of intrusion including two different uses of the term by the participant. The concept of intrusion is used by Dr. Ashe in his description of the way in which he decorated his office in order to make it comfortable for his patients and the thinking that went into the choices he made. He first describes his use of blinds to protect his patients from being seen by people using a foot-path by his office and to protect them from feeling exposed. In the next section, Dr. Ashe describes the selection of décor elements such as wallpaper and wood furniture that would not be jarring to his patients. Secondly, Dr. Ashe describes his concern that the office art and the absence of a separate patient washroom may, by disclosing too much about himself, be uncomfortable to his patients by creating a burdensome unwanted intimacy. These latter concerns address the possibility of the intrusion of information or ideas about himself upon the thoughts of his patients. Though not explicitly articulated by Dr. Ashe, this concern follows from a fundamental principle of clinical psycho-analytic practice that the analytic hour, including the analyst’s and the analysand’s thought and attention in that hour, be devoted exclusively to thinking about the analysand. In Dr. Ashe’s last expression of concern about the
effect of aspects of his clinical space upon his patients he refers to the care he had taken in
selecting a non-intrusive waste paper basket and in monitoring its contents. In sum, Dr. Ashe’s
concerns pertain to the intrusion of aesthetic elements of the environment and information
about himself upon his patient’s experience of affective, physical and emotional integrity. This
was a central preoccupation in his thinking about his office.

**The final question.** At the close of the first interview, when the set of prepared
questions had been asked and answered, each participant was offered the opportunity to speak
about anything that they wished to speak about. While, again, this was phrased somewhat
differently with each participant, the manner in which the researcher expressed this to Dr. Ashe
is similar to that of the other participant:

Q: very useful, yeah. Thank you. That’s actually the last question I have of
the this set of questions I have, other than to just ask you if you had any
final thoughts about things you would like to say, that you think maybe I
should know about or you would like to speak about. Is there anything,
given what we have said, that you feel you haven’t been able to say. (172)

Dr. Ashe replied in the following way:

A: Well, one has to do with ethics
Q: mn
A: and what are the appropriate ethics for this kind of practice and what are
some of the dilemmas.
Q: oh
A: Another one could be with the preservation of confidentiality and the
kind of impingements that one experiences as a citizen or as a citizen in the
province or a country or nation
Q: yes
A: Um, like the courts.
Q: yes
A: uh, giving testimony, uh, um, uh, those kinds of things. Those are rather
specific I would think, but um, uh, but they kind of bring up some of the
work, some of the concerns.
Q: right.
A: Now, um …
Q: I would very much like to hear you speak about that.
A: Well, but ethics, just one thought about ethics
Q: yes
A: I was just had a discussion with somebody last night who was asking
about my experience with ethics, because he has, he’s building a committee
of one of the other institutes in town
Q: mn
A: And uh the ways in which an institutional response… I guess when you are working with an institution, if you aren’t working solely in private practice, is that there are certain strictures that the institution places on you that are inimical, or can be inimical, not necessarily are, can be inimical to a free process between. Sometimes institutions or organizations go so far as to prescribe, proscribe and prescribe a certain kind of behaviour that is like a kind of a, blunt fisted, all I can think of is using a pile driver to kill a mosquito—very uh, undiscerning, uh, approach to a problem. I remember, for example, a number of years ago when, in terms of psychiatry, about how one should never accept gifts from a patient. Now I’ve been through that prohibition and I’ve uh identified with it and so on and so forth and I’ve realized that it’s had some disastrous results, when someone comes and like “I’d like to give you something”
Q: yes
A: and you say ‘you pay your fees and that’s really enough for me’ But no, they want to give you something personal
Q: of themselves
A: something personal, expressing appreciation
Q: right
A: It’s a genuine response.
Q: right
A: And how do you handle that, can be very very tricky
Q: right, yes
A: Um, so that is one example of it. I um I guess, I guess the ethics would be an institutional response to it. I mean, there’s an agenda there: don’t want to leave any room for the public to look askance that may seem abusive or exploitative
Q: uh, oh
A: or what have you, right
Q: right
A: Um, talking about this, some things that have really gone too far. One person was called up on the carpet, a really well known analyst too, he had one of his patients fund a research foundation. The person was very very wealthy, you know, was dying to do something.
Q: yeah
A: There was a patient in (city name), where I practiced where um and where I worked, who donated an entire building, um, uh, because he was a very grateful patient who was very highly placed. Did a lot of lobbying, and also contributed millions of dollars
Q: mm
A: for the construction of this facility, which is for the good of the public
Q: right
A: but there is a certain self-servingness about it
Q: mm
A: and the issues of exploitation
Q: yes
A: so you have to be very, very careful
Q: yes
A: Um, in terms of the um, in terms of uh, um, being required out of risk of contempt of court, to give testimony
Q: right
A: you have someone who has expected that your information is absolutely confidential is really being problematic. And there are people who are prepared to go to jail
Q: right
A: for that. Um, insurance companies who want to know what someone’s diagnosis is and who want to know a lot about what goes on there. Even if the person says, I would like for you to do this, signs a waiver, a release
Q: right
A: I still have a hard time with that
Q: right, yep
A: Um, another example, its an example, (long pause) ah, its just slipped me, I can’t recall it off hand right now (pause) No.
… um. Oh yeah, the other one I was thinking of was the college, we allow our college of um, that um, to insure that they are receiving, that the population is receiving good quality care, so they like to root out or uh restrict the practice of people who are not functioning adequately
Q: right
A: So, uh, the college, in fact in the middle of the eighties approached me as one of the random, as one of the random sampling, and wanted to investigate my practice.
Q: uh
A: And how do they do it: they come in and they and they uh, they take the files from you, of a number of patients and go over them, hopefully at the college, they examine the files to see what, to see..
Now it works for a surgeon who’s done post-operative notes, has done a gall bladder operation
Q: right
A: but it sure as hell doesn’t work for a psycho-analytic practice.
Q: right
A: And runs rough-shod over, well can you actually use a, indicate the quality of practice, some people don’t keep any notes
Q: right
A: some of them don’t keep notes because they don’t want the time or the interference of notes. Some don’t keep notes because they are afraid that their notes will be looked at in a subpoena.
Q: right.
A: Um, what, the notes are for me, there’re not for the next physician. In case I die: “ Dr. (E), your notes must be legible to other people, if you die or something happens to you, someone has to take over your practice’ Nobody’s gonna take over my practice. My notes are only for me
Q: right
A: and they’re only an aide to myself
Q: right
A: they may be the source of an article
Q: right
A: I may want to write
Q: right
A: a case history I may want to draw on
Q: right
A: but there’re not for anybody else, but for me
Q: right, yeah
A: So, uh, I had a conflict and I uh said, no I can’t do this
Q: right
A: I can’t be, the main thing, you know, being confidentiality, - ‘you can disguise the person’s name’: yeah, but almost every page is full of references that will situate the person
Q: right
A: and if I’m paying attention in the analysis, wondering whether this or that is gonna go in the notes, or if the notes are going to be read
Q: right
A: it obstructs my session with the patient, um, ‘ But, you know Dr. (E) um this is a regulation of the college and um what is does is it makes you immune to any suit on the part of the patient where it breaches confidentiality.’ ‘But that’s not good enough, that’s fine for you guys, but that’s not fine for me’
Q: right.
A: So I had uh a four month struggle with the college around that, eventually they relented and they did something which is acceptable to me. I still told them where they could get what they wanted to get, but at least I preserved my peace of mind, regarding confidentiality, and I preserved my sessions
Q: right
A: So another kind of
Q: yeah, interesting
A: institutional response from another agenda other than the deep therapeutic one… I think its basically, one: they have a need to do something that fits with the institutions mandate
Q: sure
A: and secondly, they’re not, they’re ignorant
Q: mn hm
A: But even, even analysts when they construct their own ethics guidelines, you know, who should know better so to speak
Q: mn
A: over, over guideline, over prescribe
Q: Oh. yeah?
A: Again because they are run by the prospect of, - oh this person screwed his patients.
Q: mn hm
A: Well, where was the ethics committee?
Q: right
A: What about you, are you all corrupt to the core. Or what. What about the back room hush hush business.
Q: hm
A: So, it’s a very powerful agenda
Q: mn
A: that they are carrying. (180)

Consideration of the underlined sections of the transcript of Dr. Ashe’s use of the opportunity to speak about any issue of importance to him as a clinician, shows that he first addresses the impingement of government and courts upon the right of citizens to confidentiality. He turns then to what he refers to as the “inimical strictures” and prohibitions upon freedom in the practice of psycho-analysis created by ethical standards set by institutions, by organizations and by member colleagues. The participant represents his perspective on the excessive nature of such encroachments upon practice through a metaphor of violence: a pile driver used to kill a mosquito. He expresses particular concern for the effects of these impingements upon patients’ reasonable
expectations of confidentiality and upon patient and analyst when ethical standards prohibit gifts from patients to the clinicians who have treated them. Viewed collectively, these description of ethical issues in clinical practice place an emphasis upon the negative effects of different classes of intrusions upon psycho-analysts and analysands. Dr. Ashe explains in this section that he believes that these institutional intrusions arise from non-therapeutic agendas.

The close reading of Dr. Ashe’s reply to the first and final question in the first interview finds support for the open coding emergent identification of intrusion as a category of significance in the participant’s utterance. This suggests that Dr. Ashe’s explicit dismissal of this theme when it was raised by the researcher in the second interview, depends upon the participant having, at least temporarily, lost conscious awareness of its place within his thinking about his work and of having addressed it extensively in the first interview. As will be shown, intrusion proved to be a theme of salience throughout the participant’s utterance.

Observation of the participant’s use of the questions in the first interview, conceptualized as “objects of reality” (Winnicott, 1941), and analyzed through close reading, supports the identification of intrusion and themes related to intrusion as holding a central place in Dr. Ashe’s communication regarding his work. A consideration of this finding through the perspective provided by Winnicott’s insights into the differential use made of objects in reality also suggests that intrusion holds a place of individual meaning for this participant and is an appropriate research focus in the continuing analysis of this utterance and in the researcher’s attempt to appreciate this participant’s subjective experience. Continuation of the close reading of the participant’s first interview proceeds to an examination of the case illustration it contained where the theme of intrusion is evoked when the participant speaks more specifically of his practice.
**Intrusion and the case illustration.** Dr. Ashe uses a case example to illustrate his assertion that restrictions imposed by theory and by colleagues would limit his freedom to practice in a manner that would diminish his therapeutic effectiveness. In this example, the intrusion upon his freedom to practice pertains specifically to limitations on the use of counter-transference disclosure in the course of conducting an analysis. The following excerpt is the participant’s reply to a question which asked him to “describe an experience from the work when you have had the sense that things are going well”(154).

An extensive editing of this excerpt to preserve the confidentiality of the case described and to focus upon the theme of intrusion has been made. These exclusion are marked thus (omit), or by parentheses that contain the researcher’s paraphrase of the excluded material:

A: hm Well, I think there, well I think there are times when, um, I don’t know if I spoke about the issue of spontaneity
Q: Yes, you did.
A: I did, yep. I mean, I meant, a good example, probably the times when I feel things are going well is when I can leave myself free to um, to judiciously, leave myself free to express something ah, that isn’t in the books so to speak. Uh, and is also outside the expectations of my analysand
Q: mn
A: but which catches hold and I think to myself, well the reason why it catches hold is because there is a, very much of an in tune rapport, we’re in-sync with each other, and that it is a testimony to the uh to the uh, I guess the constancy or the durability of those kind of in-sync feelings that I can depend upon in this relationship to be open and to be receptive on both parts
Q: mn hm
A: even though um something I’ve said is a little bit, maybe a little bit off the beaten technique. Or getting past stuff that you don’t think, number one, in your more or less conservative leaning colleagues, letting know about it, and leave you open to all kinds of interpretations about your own counter-transference. …Um, one of them had to do with the fat man, I think I spoke about
Q: yes, you mentioned him to me
A: And the issue there was, how come you’re so fat, talking about why are you so fat. Now that was um, a risky business, because in the first half hour of our encounter. But we’ve been through a number of things like that um, um, and I have, reassured ourselves of the importance of being able to do that with him in order to get under his skin rather than to be met with pinging off his armor.
Q: mn hm
A: And he has a lot of armor. Loads of armor.
Q: yeah
A: um I was a, I had a phone session with him yesterday. …And I found myself reflecting on the experience I’m having being described these kinds of excursions (the patient is having while on holiday) and the feeling I’m having in those situations is, ‘gee, I wish I could do that’

Q: mn
A: Um, and even more so, gee, I’d like for him to take me along, he seems to know exactly where to go, how to uh, how to uh, provide people with amazing experiences. I reflected back on this (omit) and uh I said to him uh, I said, “George”, it’s not his real name. “George, um, gee when I hear you describe this”’ uh, I have a sense of what I’d said before, “why don’t you take me with you, I’m a supplier, I’m a this, I’m a that. What am I chopped liver? Take me with you.” And he, the first thing he said was, “Eh, I’d love to”. Right. And um, then I remembered the pleasure he had at taking his kids (on outings that involved activities where there was physical contact between them)

Q: ah
A: Right, yeah, uh in a thrilled analytic kind of way. And my thought was that his kids probably did not say something like, ‘Dad, that was fantastic, that day was just, you are the best Dad’

Q: yeah
A: we could possibly have’ Ah, and I said that to him. And he said, “Well, no I didn’t get that” and he got sad and he started crying. And he remembered his father telling him, a father who (had suffered a great deal), telling him, um, or telling them, the family, I suffered a lot to provide for you. He was a very hard working man. And I hope you appreciate it. You shouldn’t suffer what I have suffered. And he knew, that he had been a bit of a bane of his father’s. He was one of (omit) (family) who was a real scoundrel, as a kid. He knew his father suffered from it too, not just to make a living. And that was the context of the tears and so on. But again it was that move made.

Q: right
A: my kind of counter-transference, which I exposed, in a certain limited sector

Q: uh ha
A: that evoked a whole flood of stuff, which reached the sadness, which went through the armor. But he could sustain it in his relationship with me. Uh, and then it led to something that I hadn’t heard before: that his father was that way with him, and the guilty experience. I’d heard about the guilt before but he would never clothe it that way. And he saw his reaction to his kids, in much the same way. And this man does suffer. He suffers mentally with his own depression and his weight. So that’s an example of uh

Q: yeah
A: what was the question? (laughter)

Q: The question was about the work going well.

A: yep

Q: An example of

A: Yeah, yeah, and that sort of underscored

Q: yes

A: ‘Now, he’s been, he’s been conflicted about whether he wanted to have sessions on the phone or whether he wants to have, be free to have a holiday with his kids

Q: right

A: which means to thrill his kids, to thrill his kids, to thrill his wife. His wife is rather cool and uh so he hung in there, he took it up, he ran with
it, and the relationship was so emotional for him to have to pull back, from the very very emotional experience and was looking forward to, was looking forward to today. Uh and he said he would call me and he’s uh, I was not sure whether he’s gonna call me or whether he’ll cancel or not cancel Q: mm A: because there is much on the agenda for today. So I’m still wondering whether he’s gonna actually have a session with me or not Q: ah A: and I haven’t heard yet from him; he said he would call me last night Q: uh ha A: So I have all kinds of thoughts as to what he is struggling with Q: yes A: not having called. So… (154-158)

In addressing the question, Dr. Ashe explains that he knows work is going well when he has overcome the constraints created by thoughts of the prohibitions of his more conservative colleagues and theory so that he can act with his analysands in a manner that is most therapeutically effective. In this context, work goes well as he is then able to make counter-transference disclosures which get through the analysand’s defensive armor to their affective life. In this description of things going well in his work, the participant depicts this is a language of spontaneity, prohibitions, excitement, mutuality or reciprocal experience. These themes remain ones important in this participant’s characterization of relationship and work experiences throughout the utterance.

This case example is provided by Dr. Ashe to illustrate the therapeutic value of clinical technique that includes counter-transference disclosures, a practice potentially restricted by theory and the anticipated disapproval of colleagues thereby linking his freedom to practice in a manner which he believes to be best for his patients. The illustration is provided in order to demonstrate the value of the use of counter-transference self-disclosure, a practice the participant suggests the intrusive opinions of others would prohibit. This excerpt suggest that intrusion by colleagues and theory is of concern to Dr. Ashe.
**Intruding and being intruded upon.** Dr. Ashe’s explanation of the reason for the therapeutic value of the particular intervention he describes here is that it got through the patient’s “armor” and “got under his skin” thereby reaching the patient’s affect, in particular his sadness. Thus, Dr. Ashe depicts his practice on the one hand as evading the constraining intrusions of conservative theory and conservative colleagues, while on the other as incorporating a technique he represents to himself and to the researcher through the language of intrusion. The participant’s intervention with the patient is described in a language that utilizes metaphors of breaching the boundaries of the body of the other; that is, of a physical intrusion to represent effects in what are in fact psychological dimensions of existence. This imagery of the body is combined in the utterance with the imagery of war through the use of the term armor, which figuratively makes it a physical invasion, or necessary act of aggression – a physical intrusion on the body of the other for the benefit of that other. This imagery is similar to that used in a representation by the participant of himself in his work as a psycho-analyst in response to an earlier question.

In answer to the second prepared question in the interview, a request that the participant provide an example that would illustrate what it is they like about their work:

Q: What I’d like to ask you now is to um if you could think of an example from your work that uh would illustrate what it is you like about this work. (132)

The participant replied:

A: In how many words or less? (laughter)
Q: However many words you’d like to use. Really.
A: Um, just think sort of now.
Q: yeah
A: It’ easy to express how much I enjoy the work but I don’t think I’ve ever thought about the particular role (some unclear words). Well first of all there is the idea of privilege, and the, the privilege of being able to um listen to and be told about some of the really deep stuff that people are carrying around, that nobody else has access to. I suppose just in the same way as a surgeon who is allowed to
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use a knife to cut into people um with the idea that it’s for good, but nobody has that except during wartime. (132)

This depiction of himself at work introduces an image which represents the technique of the psycho-analyst through a figurative language of necessarily violent physical entry into the body of the other: the psycho-analyst like the surgeon must do violence to the body of the patient or analysand in order to heal. Where body represents mind, the domain and medium of psycho-analysis, this image depicts one mind intruding upon another.

Another occasion where word choice constitutes a variation on the theme of intrusion occurs at the close of the first interview. However, in this instance it is used to characterize the relationship between the participant and the researcher rather than between psycho-analyst and analysand:

Q: Well, thank you. We are nicely up to time.
A: Again? (laughter)
Q: Yes (laughter) Very very interesting again.
A: I look forward to hearing what has struck you.
Q: Yes, yes. I’m looking forward too. (sound of tape being shut off) (180)

Each participant had been informed that the second interview would consist of an unstructured discussion between participant and researcher in an exploration of all topics related to the participant’s work including those that the researcher had identified in her preliminary analysis of the first interview and reported to the participant. When, at the end of the first interview, this participant expresses his wish to hear from the researcher regarding what she had found interesting in the answers he had given to her questions, he does this in a language of forceful physical contact: he looks forward to hear what has struck her. The metaphor “struck” is used figuratively to represent communicative contact through the language of physical impact. The participant is interested in hearing from the researcher about the effect he has had upon her, and expresses this through the use of a metaphor which transits in the imagery of physical impact connoting physical
violence. The specific term “struck” places the communication and the relationship to which it refers within the domain of intrusion, specifically through the imagery of a blow to the body. Dr. Ashe’s communication of his curiosity is, given its explicit denotative meaning and the connotative domain it invokes, implicitly queries the nature of the participant’s effect upon the researcher and places this within the category of intrusions. This event at the figurative level of the implicit utterance occurs within an explicit language context where Dr. Ashe has reported an experience of feeling intruded upon by others, underlining the salience of the concept of intrusion to Dr. Ashe’s implicit thinking about his interaction with the researcher.

Close reading of the transcript of the first interview provides additional examples of diction that are related to the soft substantive category of intrusion. In answer to question four, a request for a depiction of a moving experience from his work, Dr. Ashe describes the response of analysands to his spontaneity, and the effect of his interpretations also in the language of impact, where the impact of his spontaneity is understood to create therapeutic openings:

A: But there is some comment on the material, some take on the material that I have, that the patient responds to, in a profound kind of way. Uh, I marvel at, I marvel at the impact that something that I would, that something I wouldn’t have regarded as being all that significant.
Q: mn
A: takes hold and how the session becomes extremely productive in and around the opening up of something that’s been caused by my fairly spontaneous remark (138)

The salience of soft substantive category, intrusion, identified in open coding-transcription, is supported through the close reading of the transcripts.

Step Three: Imaginative Cognition – Water

_The complete process of understanding is better characterized by the joke about the two psychoanalysts who meet on the street: One says, “Good morning”; the other thinks, “I wonder what he meant by that.”_  
_Quoted in Pinker, 2007_
Dynamics. The mode of observation in this third step calls upon what Hoffman (1998) refers to as an artistic sense in the researcher, by which he may be understood to refer to the capacity to draw scientific inference from the empirical data in the creation of explanation and understanding. For Goethe, through “imaginative cognition” a move from what he refers to as the purely empirical or lower empirical, characteristic of the previous mode, to the truly scientific, is taken. The scientist’s task is to reach an understanding of relationships between aspects, elements and qualities perceived through the previous mode of observation.

Hoffman argues that this analytic stance is necessary to the achievement of an inner perception of what Goethe calls the scientific phenomenon. In speaking of ecological studies, Hoffman explains that at this point in the research process, the scientist’s observational mode is meant “to open oneself to the dynamically relational character … and to apprehend how one quality derives from the other, one part from another, (in order to) experience the (phenomenon’s) time dimension and growth process” (Hoffman, p. 133). In the analysis of text, dynamics of constituent parts are examined within the super-ordinate relationship between surface and depth, each viewed “like frozen moments in a continuum of metamorphosis” (Hoffman, p. 133). Hoffman explains that for Goethe, inner perception of the scientific phenomenon depends upon a process of “cognitively participating in an organism’s generative movements (through) “exact sensorial imagination” (p. 133), each observed element, implying another to which it is related across time – in the case of plants, for example, a petal implies a bud. For Hoffman, when metamorphosis is conceptualized as change within time, a phenomenon’s growth process becomes explicable. Comprehension of this growth process begins with an experiential encounter with a phenomenon’s dynamic structure (Hoffman, p. 133). As envisioned by Goethe and by Hoffman, the experiential
encounter consists, in part, in the researcher molding him or herself to, or taking on the shape of, the phenomenon, this move constituting the imaginative dimension. Thus Bockmuhle’s metaphor of water refers both to the scientist’s perceptual state and to the metamorphic character of living organisms the scientist seeks to know.

Goethe’s emphasis upon an “imaginative” cognition that will illuminate an organism’s metamorphic process or generative movements (Hoffman, p. 133) is favorable to the analysis of dynamics in utterance, especially where implicit dimensions are considered. In this study, dynamic growth, or metamorphosis is encountered across a unit of real time framed by the interview encounter within which dynamic processes engage linguistic elements in communications’ growth. Every organism is, for Goethe, “a progression of uninterrupted activity” (Goethe, cited in Hoffman, p. 133) which we may participate in through imaginative cognition. In this study this is realized in the observational encounter in this step in the analysis. Inference making, arising from this imaginative participation, – the cognitive dimension of this encounter – coheres in theory.

Hampe (2003), in addressing the creative dimension of empirical practice, has argued that all knowledge is “founded in forms of action” (p. 52). For Hampe, scientific experience is the result of an immediacy of engagement with phenomena and the consequences of this activity. Individual forms of theorizing experiences discipline this active pursuit of knowledge, on the one hand, and empirical action resists theoretical imposition, on the other. He argues that the capacity for resistance, inherent in empirical reality, “drives the theorizing mind into new directions” (Hampe, p. 53). Thus, the active encounter with the empirical is integral to the creativity that he identifies as the “main function of scientific experience” (Hampe, p. 53). The ability to “draw consequences from the more empirical activity for the more theoretical activity” (Hampe, p. 53) is, for Hampe, a competence of judgment, which, he goes on to suggest – and on this point he follows Dilthey – is specific to a particular field or
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discipline. He points out that generalizing practices that are part of these activities may relate to
dynamic rather than causal processes (Hampe, p. 49) in the phenomenon.

Bockemuhl’s metaphor for this step – water – is meant to represent the dynamism inherent in all
living structures and also the character of a researcher’s scientific engagement with natural phenomena.
Water imagery, used by Bockemuhl and Hoffman in ecological studies, is also a fitting figurative
depiction of the nature of dynamism in utterance: communicative intent moves or develops through an
active relation between depth properties that give character to surface flow while these depth elements
are unavailable to
direct perception, unfathomable except in the experiential immediacy of the encounter with language
based meaning. This step seeks to explore the dynamics out of which surface properties manifest.

When applied to utterance, the concept of dynamics refers to active relations between elements
of language in the creation of implicit and explicit meanings in the realization of an array of
communicative intentions. The explicit or surface level of a text is comprised of the formal properties,
or elements, of language and the principles which govern the manner in which these can be combined in
the conveyance of meaning. While implicit or hidden meanings also utilize these properties of language,
they frequently do this in an idiosyncratic manner. In combination, the relation between the constituent
parts of surface and depth elements, and between explicit and implicit meaning, is dynamic structure.
Thus, anomalies of diction, pronoun usage, verb tense and disjunctions created by fragments may not so
much fail to communicate clearly or confound comprehension as deliver secondary or implicit
meanings. Among other dynamic elements operative at the surface level of a text, are *switch-words* or
verbal bridges (Freud, 1901, pp. 273-274;). Presuming the existence of a dynamic relationship between
conscious expression and unconscious meanings and the dynamics of representation found in the
psycho-analytic model of dreams, *switch-words* are openings into the unconscious as they create a
passage between the manifest to the latent level of meaning in language. Imaginatively, one might draw an analogy between the switch word and the rabbit hole through which Alice in Wonderland² (Carroll, 1978) tumbles into the dream. Switch words play a role in the conveyance of implicit understandings between speaker and audience. As linguistic anomalies, switch-words, like all surface disruptions in text, point to hidden meanings.

Switch-words are discussed by Freud in a broader consideration of the *Psychopathology of everyday life* (Freud, 1901), in which he examines the influence of the unconscious in the lives of normal and psychologically healthy individuals, seeking to establish that this influence in mental life was not restricted to a clinical population of the neurotic and psychotic. Part of a series of minor errors or lapses that appear in the conducting of our ordinary lives, in speech, action or memory, they range from slips of the pen and tongue, misreading, to bungled actions or intentions and the forgetting of proper names. Collectively they fall into a class of mental events Freud called parapraxes. In their first consideration, switch words are described as consisting in not only the error but also in the manner in which they expresses an unconscious meaning, preoccupation or thought, through the particular content and features of the error. This is also true of parapraxes. Structurally, they convey this meaning in hidden form through the use of capacities of representation including symbolizations, displacement, condensation, and reversals that are also found in dream structure (Freud, 1900). This is shown when a chain of associations from the error or an element of the content of the error traverse a chain of signifiers and lead to that hidden meaning. Thus it is in the nature of not only what is left out or forgotten or replaced, but also in the character and the qualities of what mistakenly replaces the omitted, that the meaning is found. Switch words express “a remote thought, foreign in its essence … (by) utilizing the switch word “Beforderung” to form a connection with an indifferent or innocent topic” (Freud, 1901, p. 273-274).
Turning later to a consideration of *switch words* or *verbal bridges* as he also called them, in a case study (Freud, 1909), Freud suggests where the patient implicitly expressed a complex set of conflicted thoughts and feelings that linked money, eroticism and his relationship with his father through a *verbal bridge* that played on the words “Raten-Ratten” (Freud, 1909, p. 213).

**Psycholinguistics.** Particularities in the use of linguistic elements create particularities of meaning and contribute to qualitative features of the utterance. Psycholinguistics has taught us that comprehension within a communication dyad depends upon not only shared knowledge of a particular language, but also upon a set of shared premises which are in their turn dependent upon a mutual expectation of cooperation necessary to the development of the “complex chain of inferences that lead to the speaker’s intention” (Pinker, 1994, pp. 225-6). These tacitly shared premises are that the information provided will be relevant, unambiguous, informative, truthful, clear, brief and orderly (Grice, Sperber and Wilson 1975, cited in Pinker 1994, p. 228). “These expectations in the listener diminish inappropriate readings of ambiguous sentences, give coherence to fractured utterances, excuse slips of the tongue, guess references of pronouns and descriptions, as well as fill in the missing steps of an argument” (Pinker, 1994, p. 228). Deliberate breaches of the maxims of cooperative speech are rhetorical strategies to covertly convey real intentions within layers of meaning (Pinker, 1994, p. 230), while preserving relationships with self and other. Breaches of the rules by the speaker increase interpretative responsibility for the listener. While, as Pinker suggests, the listening partner will, in such a situation, “interpolate assumptions” (Pinker, 1994, p. 135) that restore relevance to the utterance, a different or second layer of meaning has also thereby been created.

In reflection upon communication within the analytic setting, Green (1986) describes it this way:

“The relationship established in the analyst’s mind between different parts of the material communicated by the analysand’s free association, including some missing links which are implicitly active in silence, suggest that a certain form of logic is at work behind the
scenes, which does not obey the rules of common reason” (p. 17). This is why the latent content is intelligible (p. 17). “A form of contact is also established through speech, indicating which part of himself the analysand wishes to place into contact with the analyst” (p. 19).

The manifest level corresponds to the explicit or consciously intended communication and the latent level to the implicit or unconscious communication behind it and structured according to a different reason system. In psycho-analytic theory, anomalies of language, logic, aesthetics and others apparent at the surface level of utterance create a passage from the manifest to the latent level, or meaning. Commonly referred to as parapraxes (Freud, 1901), such anomalies in spoken language, like those in behaviour, are understood to provide invaluable help to the psycho-analyst in the performance of the analytic function - the achievement of insight into the internal world of the analysand, comprehension of which is at the heart of therapeutic movement in the analysand. “The withheld or unconscious thoughts from which the disturbance in speech derives are of the most varied origin (Freud, 1901, p. 273). In this step in the analysis, an understanding of participants’ consciously and unconsciously intended meaning is sought through an examination of textual dynamics.

Principles of discourse analysis provided by psycholinguistics (Pinker 1994; 2007) and adult attachment research (Main,1995), in addition to basic psycho-analytic principles of psycho-dynamic from psycho-analytic theory, have also been employed in this step and are intended to complement Goethe’s and Hoffman’s in the move between imaginative participation and inference, or what Hampe calls the empirical and the theoretical. A translation of the unconscious communicative intent in the text into explicit the conscious realm was sought through a reading of the implications inherent in the dynamics of linguistic properties.

**Linguistic anomalies as growth.** Anomalies in the application of the system of governance of language usage create disruptions in the surface of an utterance and shape the aesthetic quality or character even as they contribute to the growth of communicated meanings. “Intentional violations of
the unstated norms of conversation are also the trigger for many … forms of non-literal language, such
as irony, humor, metaphor, sarcasm, putdowns, ripostes, rhetoric, persuasion, and poetry” (Pinker, 1994
p. 389). An examination of surface disruptions, or anomalies, within dynamic structure illuminate
complex networks of inferential meaning. A psycho-analytic perspective suggests that surface
appearance may reflect more of less successfully resolved compromise between competing intentions,
including the wish to know oneself and to be known by the other, and the competing wish to not know
the self and to not be known by the other. Linguistic anomalies, then, are viewed not as error, but rather
as part of the ever active progression in the achievement of conscious and unconscious communicative
intent within utterance.

**Affect.** Hoffman’s (1998) notion that explication of a phenomenon begins with an experiential
encounter with its dynamic structure, and Hollway and Jefferson’s example of qualitative research
practice is convergent with principles in psycho-analysis that address counter-transference, since each
advise the researcher to attend to the affective dimension of the encounter with the empirical
phenomenon. In this case, seemingly anomalous affect is considered for its potential to point to latent
meaning. In addition, in research of this type, the researcher’s experiential encounter with the living
active text is, more specifically, with the meaning-making processes there employed. In ordinary
conversation, disruptions in addition to conveying implicit meanings, may merely, by confounding
explicit comprehension, create feelings of disjunction registered as distrust, disbelief, self doubt or
anxiety among other affects. Typically in everyday communication, implicit communication, confusions
and associated affects are not consciously examined. Researchers, however, may employ scrutiny of
their affective response to text as part of analysis.

**Mentalese and wordless thought.** Pinker (1994, 1997) has argued that depth properties of mind
include *mentalese*, a form of thinking that influences our use of language in a continuous manner, while
being functionally independent of any particular language. Mentalese is an innate capacity for abstract thinking about the world through categories of cause, goal and change: it is the “language of thought in which our conceptual knowledge is couched” (Pinker, 1997, p. 90). Pinker calls this capacity of mind, ‘wordless thought’ or ‘nameless thought’. “Knowing a language, then, is knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of words” (Pinker, 1994, p. 73). While prior language, mentalese plays a role in configuring the dynamics of language as it sets about constituting meanings and instituting communicative goals. The independence of mentalese from any particular language means that this deep structure of reason is not constituted by language but rather, is part of mind that configures language.

Thought is much greater than language, Pinker argues, and “sometimes it is not easy to find any words that properly convey a thought” (Pinker 1994, p. 47). Language is subsumed to the task of expressing meaningful statements about reality, including statements that pertain to thought about subjective reality, through an arrangement of symbols or concepts that correspond, most particularly, to who did what to whom (Pinker, 1994, p. 72). ). As complex as language is, thought exceeds language on this measure. He argues that concepts of freedom and equality, for example, will be thinkable even if they are nameless (Pinker, 1994, p. 73). In 1994 Pinker accounted for error in language usage as a consequence of “breakdown” – two systems at “cross purposes” (p. 72) by arguing that “the representations underlying thinking … and any individual thought embraces a vast amount of information” (p. 72) … whereas the communication of such an idea often fails because, human “attention spans are short and mouths are slow” (p. 72) on the one hand. On the other, he suggest that apparent error may in fact be motivated (Pinker, 1994):

> It is natural that people exploit the expectations necessary for successful conversation as a way of slipping their real intentions into covert layers of meaning. Human communication is not a transfer of information between two fax machines; … it is a series of alternating displays of
behaviour by sensitive, scheming, second guessing, social animals (230)

Furthering this latter position, Pinker (1994), in quoting the fiction writer Marguerite Yourcenar, identifies irregularities, or apparent error in usage, with human irrationality and creativity:

Grammar, with its mixture of logical rule and arbitrary usage, proposes to a young mind a foretaste of what will be offered to him later on by law and ethics, those sciences of human conduct, and by all the systems wherein man has codified his instinctive experience (p. 135)

Mentalese exploits the properties of language in the indirect conveyance of meaning. From a psycho-analytic perspective, the translation of mentalese into communication falls within the functions of the unconscious ego, as, potentially, would the reading of such communications. While for Pinker, mentalese is the language of all thinking of particular interest to an analysis of utterance, in particular textual dynamics is the manner in which such thought may or may not appear within communication, through which form it achieves word representation – that is how directly or indirectly – and whether it need achieve consciousness in order to pass into linguistic representation.

As already considered, wordless thought may evade explicit language in order to serve a diverse set of complex social goals including the preservation of face as well as what, in psycho-analysis is called psychic equilibrium. Pinker (2007) argues that the explicit expression of certain thoughts threaten not only social solidarity but also the achievement of unacknowledged social goals, such as the exercise of power over others. Indirect speech, he points out, does not serve politeness (Pinker, 2007). As he explains it, thoughts are kept out of direct expression when to do otherwise would bring them into shared awareness where awareness would cause painful feelings or threatens the achievement of goals.

Communicative events that convey implicit meanings, referred to as ‘implicatures,’ “power the comprehension of many kinds of non-literal speech” (Pinker, 2007 p. 378). Implicatures have two levels, a literal content, and an intended meaning (Pinker 2007, p.379). Implicatures also offer
“a way out” (Pinker, 2007, p. 390) of social risks as where, for example, a layering of implicit meanings creates a linguistic context for plausible deniability (Pinker, 2007, p. 389). Pinker (2007) has emphasized the inter-personal dimensions of implicatures, and indirect communication more generally. He has argued that rational ignorance, or choosing not to know (2007, p.422), facilitates our ability to maintain or to renegotiate our ties with our fellows (2007, p. 423). There are, he argues, “certain messages the rational mind may not want to receive” (2007, p. 422) and that “the ultimate reason our speech is so indirect may … (be) that we might be poisoned by what it says….Sometimes we may choose not to know things because we can anticipate that they would have an uncontrollable effect on our emotions” (2007, p. 423). In psycho-analytic terms, implicatures are employed in the communication of unconscious meanings and the realization of unconscious goals. Within particular communication contexts, implicatures may play a role in not only testing power relations but also in testing for conditions of psychological safety (Weiss & Sampson 1986).

Thus discourse moves may arise from intentions related to psychological safety (Weiss and Sampson, 1986; Weiss, 1995). Understood in this manner, discourse events reflect participants’ unconscious intentions to test and to create conditions of safety with a relationship. As Weiss and Sampson point out, under conditions of felt psychological safety, psychotherapy patients lift repression, in order to let themselves and their therapist know what they had formerly protected themselves from knowing. Weiss & Sampson have also shown that analysands are motivated to test and seek disconfirmation of their pathological beliefs regarding relationships. Where dyadic partners fails such tests signal anxiety can be expected to mobilize defensive processes, including exclusions of memory and perception. All of these defensive moves will influence utterance.

Viewed as a class of linguistic anomalies, implicatures may be analyzed for their place in the dynamics of participants’ utterance and as points of entry into unconscious thought. Disruptions in
surface flow in utterance from anomalous relations between linguistic elements and result in layered meanings. Anomalies include logical contradiction, disjunction between style and meaning content, breaches in the rules of syntax and grammar, gaps in requisite information, abrupt shifts in the trajectory of speech.

In ordinary communication dyads, linguistic disruptions may be accompanied by affective disruption where disruptions create a layering of emotions corresponding to the layered meanings of the utterance. While inferential meanings may be properly understood, the nature of those intended implicit meanings, the vehicle of their communication, as well as their covert form, may contribute to corresponding anomalous affects. Richards (2001) has argued that the purpose of artful communication is to create an experiential effect upon the other. For Pinker, listening to the speech of the other has the intimacy and inter-subjective implication of touch: “When we put words into people’s ears we are impinging on them and revealing our own intentions, honorable or not, just as surely as if we were touching them (1994 p. 230). In psycho-analytically informed research, the researcher’s affective response to an utterance creates a responsibility analogous to that set by the psycho-analyst’s counter-transference within the clinical setting: the task of examining that response in the context of what has been heard and felt, tempered by self-awareness and self-analysis. In psycho-analytic practice, and in this context, self examination is meant to both limit and bring caution to the use of affective response in the psycho-analyst as an indicator of an the unconscious meaning of the analysand’s free associative utterance and to delineate the mind of the analyst from the mind of the analysand.

**Spontaneity.** One form of disruption in utterance occurs where there is a contradiction between competing claims or where a claim is contradicted by evidence cited as support which fails to provide support or which may in fact function as counter examples to the claim. In this
third step logical contradictions, viewed as an element of dynamics, were considered with regard to the overall meaning in the text with a special focus on the previously identified emergent soft substantive category of intrusion and themes related to this.

Analysis of dynamics reveals that the theme of spontaneity identified through close reading in step two is marked by contradiction. In interview one, this occurs when an explicit claim and the illustration cited as the support of this claim occurs when the participant seeks to convey the value of spontaneity in clinical technique. As will be seen, the example provided by Dr. Ashe describes a moment in practice where the technical intervention is characterized by careful thought and planning, is, in fact, “premeditated” to use his term, rather than spontaneous in nature.

In reply to question four in the first interview that asks each participant for the description of an experience with a patient that was particularly moving, Dr. Ashe first explains that while he has some difficulty in recalling a particular case example, his belief is that such experiences are comprised of the analysand’s response to an intervention he has made, that is unanticipated by the analysand, neither “pre-thought or in any way premeditated”. (138).

A: “can’t think of any one in particular. But every time something happens, uh, and I have I have almost every day, in the course of my day, um (pause) Um, it seems to be a response to something that actually cropped up in the session that is unanticipated
Q: hm
A: and it’s interesting that it has involved the patient’s response, the analysand’s response to something, to some um some spontaneous action on my part that is not pre-thought or in any way premeditated, but that comes out as my reaction to what I am hearing…that the patient responds to, in a profound kind of way. Uh, I marvel at, I marvel at the impact that … some spontaneous action on my part that is not pre-thought or in any way premeditated…that comes out as a reaction … which would include my own counter-transference. It can be very fruitful, very very productive and to value those moments. …the session becomes extremely productive in and around the opening up of something that’s been caused by my fairly spontaneous remark, (138)

Dr. Ashe proceeds by explaining that spontaneity doesn’t fit with established psycho-analytic technique, evoking the theme of prohibition, and refers as well to the difficulty teaching spontaneity.
He then queries the researcher regarding her request for memories that illustrate a moving experience in the work:

   Um, I can’t, I can’t, you still want an incident do you? (139)

The researcher affirms her continued interest in a description of a moving clinical experience:

   Q: Well, um, I was thinking it might be good to have one, but (141)

Dr. Ashe then provides an example that, upon examination, fails to illustrate his point that moving moments follow from technical interventions characterized by spontaneity. The illustration provides instead a counter-example that describes an effective intervention with a patient where Dr. Ashe thoughtfully considered and reflected upon what he would say before he spoke. This carefully considered intervention was, in his own words, thoughtfully premeditated. In the following excerpt, omissions have been made to preserve confidentiality:

   A: O.k, well, here’s something. I was just thinking about someone who was referred to me…
   Q: mn
   A: Uh, after many years of therapy and maybe even uh the odd attempt at analysis at the age of (omit), um he came to see me….People had been treating him in such a way so as not to mention the obesity.
   Q: Yeah, right.
   A: Um, at one point, half way through, when he was sort of sort of stuck somewhere, and he’s (profession), sparing with me and uh and yet another, yet another therapist so to speak.
   Q: mn hm
   A: with lots, with low hope that anything would be accomplished but driven because he felt emptiness, because his weight is a tremendous embarrassment to him and so forth. He didn’t mention his weight at all, anything about that at all. And at one point I said to him, “So how come you’re so fat?”
   Q: mn
   A: He looked at me, and he was stunned, that I would say such a thing. And he said, “I don’t believe you said that.”
   Q: mn
   A: He thought about it, he thought about it, and then he began to laugh. He said, “No one has ever dared say that to me.” And from there flowed a whole bunch of stuff. And uh, in and around his weight, which now I understand he’s been using his weight to buffer himself against the tremendous hurt of um of not being acceptable to people.
   Q: mn
A: (omit) but there is a profound, its almost like a huge buffer, (of) pounds of
Q: between him and
A: Yeah, right. So that set off something. Now that was, that was premeditated.
Q: mn
A: I mean I was thinking about that for at least fifteen minutes before I actually said it: should I say it? Shouldn’t I say it? Is it germane? How germane is it? What kind of benefit will come from it? Would there really be a benefit? Otherwise I better not do this. You know, and I was aware that this had not been done before. He’d not been faced with it before. And I, and I spilled it out.
Q: mn hm
A: Uh, that’s it. (141)

The contradiction at the surface, explicit level of the utterance between the claim and the case illustration provided as evidence to support the claim brings the theme of intrusion again into focus as the theme of spontaneity is linked to his concerns regarding prohibitions from both theory and colleagues. Restriction upon spontaneity will, he explains, diminish his efficacy as a practitioner. The assertion that this type of technical intervention cannot be taught implies that effective technique is beyond theory and formulation. The understanding of spontaneous technique that is communicated does not appear to incorporate the concept of expert or experienced practice often associated with informed intuition of pre-conscious knowledge. When considered in relation to the particular question asked – regarding moving experiences in the course of one’s work – prohibitions on spontaneity understood to negatively impact the affective experience of clinical work, including the pleasure gained through the analysand’s response to such spontaneous actions. In addition, as is common in process evaluation in psycho-analysis, the analysand’s response to the intervention is read as a measure of the effectiveness of that intervention.

Because the claim regarding spontaneity is contradicted through counter-example, the theme of intrusion to which it is related is rendered more complex: The contradiction creates a variation on the soft substantive category as it raises questions regarding the speaker’s
relationship to the claim and the category of intrusion to which it is linked. What is in question is not to the claim itself, not the truth value of the claim according to any objective measure, but rather the nature of the participant’s relationship to the claim and to the related category. The case illustration not only fails to support the claim regarding the value of spontaneity, but by implication the validity of the claim that there is need for self protection from the intrusive scrutiny of colleagues who would not approve of spontaneous technique. The counter example of the therapeutic value of thoughtfulness rather than spontaneity problematizes the need for defence against colleagues.

This particular anomaly reveals a contradictory or conflicted relation in the dynamic structure of the utterance to the claim and to the linked theme of intrusion suggesting exclusions from awareness of thoughts that bear upon these themes. Whether the claim had been supported or, as is this instance, contradicted by the evidence, the theme of intrusion in either instance holds a place of significance in the utterance and in what the utterance communicates about work, at a conscious as well as an unconscious level. The unintended or unconsciously intended meaning of this communication in the utterance regarding work is that interventions with patients who are the product of careful reflection, and not spontaneous in nature, are therapeutically effective. The conscious or explicit communicative intent in this section is brought into question, or undermined by the anomaly or implicature that realizes unconscious communicative intent; that is, the explicit claim is brought into question by the inferences implicit in the anomaly and apparent to the listener. The case illustration and the claim it is meant to support is related to the soft substantive category of intrusion where, as we have seen, it has been explicitly argued that conventional principles of psycho-analytic technique which caution against spontaneity intrude upon freedom in clinical practice and thus clinical effectiveness. The finding of contradiction at this surface level between
claim, the evidence and the unconsciously inferred meaning also suggests a conflicted communicative intent regarding the intrusiveness of restraint upon the therapeutic efficacy of spontaneity itself: the utterance consciously intends one point and unconsciously intends another. The assertion of technical inefficiency caused by the intrusions of conservative principles of technique that caution against spontaneity is explicitly made even while the logical inference of the case illustration provided contradicts this. It describes, instead, an effective therapeutic intervention using what may reasonably be considered conventionally cautious or conservative technique.

An alternative explanation of this anomaly, following Pinker, would suggest that the speaker may be saving face by failing to grasp the import of the case example which does not depict a clinical innovator. Further, an extension of the notion of face to the intra-psychic realm would mean that in this instance, face saving refers to one’s appearance before the self. In psycho-analytic terms this would address concerns of the super-ego and ego ideal, a defensive preservation of the ego’s sense of self. Following Hollway and Jefferson (2000), this anomaly may be understood to exclude from consciousness perceptions something that would challenge the preservation of ideological commitments that serve critical functions within psychic economy. For Hollway and Jefferson, ideology is understood to replace thinking and to thereby suppress disturbing affect. In this latter point their model converges with Pinker’s link between self deception and emotion (2007, p. 423).

**Countertransference and disclosure.** A second example of textual dynamics and the anomaly of a contradiction between a claim and the illustration of that claim also concerns clinical technique and therapeutic effectiveness. Once again, the soft substantive category of intrusion and the linked theme of prohibition and excitement are part of the dynamics of communication, as the utterance more explicitly addresses the technical issue of counter-transference disclosure. The case illustration already examined above through close reading is analyzed here with a focus upon
dynamics. Analysis in this step illuminates a counter-example which contradicts an explicit claim regarding the psycho-analysts’ use of counter-transference disclosures as part of clinical technique. In this section, the case example is meant to illustrate the claim that counter-transference disclosures promote therapeutic gains by facilitating an analysand’s access to repressed affect and associated significant memories. Reconsideration of this section of the transcript with a view to dynamics and with regard to this claim shows that the case illustration contradicts the claim that counter-transference disclosure as reported in this section was responsible for the affective opening and recall of significant memories by the analysand described in the case vignette. Relevant passages from this section of the transcript have been underlined. Omissions made to preserve confidentiality are noted and do not go to the questions under consideration. Parentheses indicate omissions or contain paraphrase:

**SECTION A**: A: Um, at one point, he was describing (this wonderful holiday) Loads and loads of stuff about that one day and he described how he got back (omit) and sat down for a meal and said in a remarkably toned down way to the kids, um, “it was not a bad day”, you know not a bad day for the kids. And I found myself reflecting on the experience I’m having, being described these kinds of excursions (omit) and the feeling I’m having in those situations is, ‘gee, I wish I could do that’

Q: mn

A: Um, and even more so, gee, I’d like for him to take me along, he seems to know exactly where to go, how to uh, how to uh, provide people with amazing experiences. I reflected back on this (omit) and uh I said to him uh, I said, “George”, it’s not his real name, “George, um, gee when I hear you describe this”’ uh, I have a sense of what I’d said before. “why don’t you take me with you, I’m a supplier I’m a this, I’m a that. What am I chopped liver? Take me with you.” And he, the first thing he said was, “Eh, I’d love to”. Right. And um, then I remembered the pleasure he had at taking his kids with him on a Harley Davidson, going around corners and having the feel of how they hold him.

Q: ah

A: Right, yeah, uh in a thrilled analytic kind of way.

**SECTION B** And my thought was that his kids probably did not say something like, ‘Dad, that was fantastic, that day was just, you are the best Dad’

Q: yeah

A: we could possibly have’ Ah, and I said that to him. And he said, “Well, no I didn’t get that” and he got sad and he started crying. And he remembered his father telling him, a father who (had suffered a
great deal), telling him, um, or telling them, the family, I suffered a lot to provide for you. He was a very hard working man. And I hope you appreciate it. You shouldn’t suffer what I have suffered. And he knew, that he had been a bit of a bane of his fathers. He was one of (omit) (family) who was a real scoundrel, as a kid. He knew his father suffered from it too, not just to make a living. And that was the context of the tears and so on.

**SECTION C** But again it was that move made,

Q: right
A: my kind of counter-transference, which I exposed, in a certain limited sector
Q: uh ha
A: that evoked a whole flood of stuff, which reached the sadness, which went through the armor. But he could sustain it in his relationship with me. Uh, and then it led to something that I hadn’t heard before: that his father was that way with him, and the guilty experience. I’d heard about the guilt before but he would never clothe it that way. And he saw his reaction to his kids, in much the same way. And this man does suffer. He suffers mentally with his own depression and (omit). So that’s an example of uh
Q: yeah

**SECTION D** A: what was the question? (laughter)

Q: The question was about the work going well.
A: yep
Q: An example of
A: Yeah, yeah, and that sort of underscored
Q: yes

**SECTION E** A: Now, he’s been, he’s been conflicted about whether he wanted to have sessions on the phone or whether he wants to have, be free to have a holiday with his kids
Q: right
A: which means to thrill his kids, to thrill his kids, to thrill his wife. His wife is rather cool and uh so he hung in there, he took it up, he ran with it, and the relationship was so emotional for him to have to pull back, from the very very emotional experience and was looking forward to, was looking forward to today. Uh and he said he would call me and he’s uh, I was not sure whether he’s gonna call me or whether he’ll cancel or not cancel
Q: mm
A: because there is much on the agenda for today. So I’m still wondering whether he’s gonna actually have a session with me or not
Q: ah
A: and I haven’t heard yet from him; he said he would call me last night
Q: uh ha
A: So I have all kinds of thoughts as to what he is struggling with
Q: yes
A: not having called. So… (156-158)

The underlined text in section A contains the description of the counter-transference and the counter-transference disclosure: The countertransference is the feelings leading up to and culminating in the thought expressed as, “gee, I wish I could do that ... and even more so, gee, I’d
like for him to take me along etc.” The countertransference disclosure is the communication of these thoughts and feelings to the analysand: “uh I said to him …George, um, gee when I hear you describe this … why don’t you take me with you, I’m a supplier, I’m a this, I’m a that. What am I chopped liver? Take me with you.”

The underlined text in section B reports the interpretation that was made: the analyst says to the analysand that he expected that the analysand’s children had not expressed appreciation for his efforts to please them. In the analysand’s response to this interpretation, also contained in this section, the analysand affirms that his analyst is correct, becomes tearful and recalls meaningful memories of his father and links his relations to his children to those between his father and himself. The analysand’s appropriate affective response, and associated memories suggest that the interpretation had therapeutic value, had tallied with the patient’s internal reality. This effect was not dependent upon, nor did it follow upon the counter-transference disclosure identifying a child like feeling state combining complaint, and accompanying wish to be taken on a thrilling adventure by his analysand but rather from the psycho-analyst’s insightful and empathic interpretation. Indeed, the therapeutic effectiveness of the interpretation made in this second verbal intervention falls within the class of standard interpretative, if conservative, practices characteristic of best practice by of experienced psycho-analysts.

In this case illustration, meant to illustrate the therapeutic value of counter-transference disclosure, two types of contradiction are present. Firstly, as noted above, the therapeutic emergence of affect and related significant memories cannot be attributed to the counter-transference disclosure as claimed in section C. Rather, they follow from a quite conventional analytic intervention – drawing attention to unexpressed feelings, in this case of being undervalued or unappreciated – that tapped into an unconscious link of identification in the analysand’s psychology between a current
relationship experience and formative early relationship experiences involving fathers and children. This type of interpretation incorporates two of the three features of what is known as the “mutative interpretation” (Strachey, 1934); that is, a type of interpretation that has long been recognized to be therapeutically effective and to promote psychological growth and change. While touching upon past and present experiences, this interpretation omits only the third feature of the mutative interpretation – reference to transference experience.

Secondly, the claim regarding the therapeutic value to the analysand of the counter-transference disclosure is contradicted by textual evidence which suggests, following broadly accepted measures used in the evaluation of the therapeutic process, that this disclosure may have been therapeutically counter-productive. This is suggested by the analysand’s failure to call his psycho-analyst, as arranged, to confirm or cancel that day’s appointment. Despite the explicit attribution, (given in section E) of the analysand’s failure to call to the intensity of emotion created by work in the day’s session that the analysand was “struggling with” – “the relationship was so emotional for him to have to pull back from the very very emotional experience” – the dynamics of the utterance communicates unconscious awareness of the possibility that the counter-transference disclosure is behind the analysand’s failure to call as agreed. The attribution to the analysand of an inability to tolerate and integrate the feelings and memories arising from the day’s session depends then on a second attribution of a limitation in the ego strength of the analysand. While each of these attributions are, in general terms, continuous with clinical events familiar to most psycho-analysts, their theoretical possibility does not address the specifics of the textual dynamics of this section and the understandings promoted by these dynamics.

Sections C and D contain two dynamic features – incomplete sentences: “So that’s an example of uh,” and “Yeah, yeah, and that sort of underscored.” Both these implicatures are
intended to reinforce the claim regarding the value of counter-transference disclosure, but by their failure to complete the explicit statement, they open the door to an implied reading; that is, that this was, in the first case an example of something else, and in the latter that it underscored, again, something else. While on the one hand these implicatures may, as Pinker (2007) would suggest, function to obstruct the possibilities for reflection upon the self-disclosure, including the potential it may have been a factor that more directly contributed to this disruption in the analytic relationship. On the other hand, they open upon the communication to other possible interpretations.

Between these two implicatures at the beginning of section D is another dynamic feature, a loss of focus that suggests unconscious preoccupations: “what was the question? (laughter).” Following Main’s (1995) identification of loss of communicative focus with the emergence of disturbing memory, this loss of focus in the communication following the report of this particular memory from clinical practice suggests that its emergence is disturbing. It may be conjectured, that the implicatures address the affective threat associated with the memory. The question that has been momentarily forgotten asks participants to recall an example that would illustrate when their work is going well. Analysis of this section of the transcripts suggests that while this is an example of work that is going well, those aspects that exemplify this cannot be taken as evidence to support the explanatory claim provided for this. That the emergence of this memory from clinical practice was disturbing gains further support by a review of that point in the utterance when it first appears. The section quoted below, precedes the report of the memory containing the counter-transference disclosure, and communicates the experience of its emergence

A: Um, probably because it’s hard to describe, I suppose, but there are no, there are no formulas that you can go, something that you can go back on except your disposition. I’ve got a
problem, my thoughts went to a number of experiences that
I've had just yesterday, the problem this morning is not what
I'm blocking on. Um, one of them had to do with the fat man,
I think I spoke about
Q: yes, you mentioned him to me (155)

Although emphasized to different degrees, it is a standard part of technique across most
schools of clinical psycho-analytic practice, for the psycho-analyst to observe countertransference,
to reflect upon it as a possible source of information about the analysand’s internal world as well as
the internal world of the psycho-analyst. Historically, and within more classical models still, the
emphasis is upon the latter as a way for the psycho-analyst to maintain professional competence by
dealing with their own issues; that is, aspects of their own psychology that might obstruct their work.
The psycho-analyst’s disclosure of his or her counter-transference to their analysand, is however, not
standard practice. In large measure, this is because a psycho-analyst’s personal revelations are
considered an intrusion of the psycho-analyst’s internal world into the shared mental space and time
reserved for the analysand, an un-therapeutic shift of focus from the analysand to the psycho-analyst.
It is generally understood that psycho-analysts’ counter-transference responses may be, and
frequently are, indigenous to the mental state and preoccupations of the analyst, independent of their
analysands and to arise from their psyche. The use of counter-transference as a source of
information, must proceed with caution and of most relevance for her, does not require disclosure to
the analysand. Restrictions upon disclosing counter-transference reactions to analysands does not
limit their use as a potential source of information about an analysand where it may help the psycho-
analyst to shape a therapeutically useful interpretation following careful containment and processing
of the counter-transference reaction, accompanied by a mindful calibration of its use.

Not all counter-transference reactions carry information about the analysand, and where they
do, disclosure will still shift the focus of the dyadic interchange away from the analysand to the
analyst; that is, to his or her subjective experience of their analysand weighted by often indiscernible
aspects of the psycho-analyst’s psychology. Disclosure of counter-transference reactions, even where these show the influence of aspects in the psychology of the analysand, may nevertheless provoke affects in analysands that do not facilitate therapeutic progress: these include guilt, shame, fear, anger, concern among others. Furthermore, a brief consideration of the range of possible counter-transference reactions any psycho-analyst may have, including, for example affects or fantasies of worry, fatigue, anger, arousal, despair, confusion, boredom, envy or disappointment may make the risks associated with revealing such reactions to an analysand, obvious.

In this case illustration, as in the previous one, contradictions in the discourse prove also to be related to the theme of intrusion. This can be observed through analysis of that part of the utterance that functions as a prelude or introduction to the case example:

A: …, probably the times when I feel things are going well is when I can leave myself free to um, to judiciously, leave myself free to express something ah, that isn’t in the books so to speak. Uh, and is also outside the expectations of my analysand
Q: mn
A: but which catches hold and I think to my self, well the reason why it catches hold is because there is a, very much of an in tune rapport, we’re in sync with each other, and that it is a testimony to the uh to the uh, I guess the constancy or the durability of those kind of in sync feelings that I can depend upon in this relationship to be open and to be receptive on both parts
Q: mn hm
A: even though um something I’ve said is a little bit, maybe a little bit off the beaten technique. Or getting past stuff that you don’t think, number one, in your more or less conservative leaning colleagues, letting know about it and leave you open to all kinds of interpretations about your own counter-transference. And number two um you know it’s hard to teach (155)

The communication of this illustration, intended to convey the therapeutic value of counter-transference disclosure places this affirmation, were it successful, within a context that secondarily illustrates the inappropriateness of the intrusion by institutions, committees and colleagues upon this practice. While the question of the therapeutic efficacy of counter-transference disclosures cannot be resolved through any means this study has available to it, and is not addressed here, when these sections are examined with a view to appreciating both explicit and implicit communicative intent, it
may be recognized that both these intended communications coexist dynamically with contrary positions. His countertransference disclosure to his analysand may have had a negative therapeutic effect. Analysis of text dynamics suggests competing unconscious thoughts regarding these linked questions. Insofar as these contrary positions can be seen to coexist in the utterance, illumination of their dynamic relation, one to the other, may be illuminated where they are considered in their dynamic relation to two secondary themes: excitement and mutuality.

**Excitement and mutuality.** Three implicatures created by diction choice and one arising from the dropping of a pronoun illuminate the place of the theme of excitement in the overall dynamics of this section and its link to the soft substantive category of intrusion as well as the theme of prohibition. Diction used in sections A and E introduce a theme of excitement into the utterance at this point, and the communication concerning the value of counter-transference disclosures. The first, found in section A, remains somewhat opaque: “Right. And um, then I remembered the pleasure he had at taking his kids with him on a Harley Davidson, going around corners and having the feel of how they hold him. Q: ah. A: Right, yeah, uh in a thrilled analytic kind of way.” The word choice is clear enough; however, the meaning is not and attention is drawn to the need for analytic scrutiny of textual dynamics in order to discern the meaning, in part, by the affective response of confusion in the audience. The appearance of this language in the utterance follows upon that part of the counter-transference disclosure where the analyst has asked to be taken along on the trip by his analysand and the analysand has said that he would “love to.” The communication then links this to the psycho-analyst’s memory of the analysand enjoying being held by his children during, presumably thrilling motorcycle rides. Thus “thrill” is linked to physical contact between children and parents, specifically parents by their children, thrill arising from physical contact in a situation of danger. By mapping this parent child encounter upon the analytic dyad the otherwise
incomprehensible anomalous phrase, “in a thrilled analytic kind of way” takes on discernable meaning; that is, this anomaly covertly brings into the utterance an image of the psycho-analyst being thrilled by physical contact with his analysand. In section E, the phrase that reintroduces excitement through word choice, “which means to thrill his kids, to thrill his kids, to thrill his wife,” suggests by the repletion of “thrill his kids” two categories of kids to be thrilled. This repetition in the language communicates excitement through a type of rhythmic hurrying that suggests a tripping over itself, like a child.

An anomaly created by the absence of a pronoun, found in section E functions as an implicature that achieves a conflation between the analysand and the psycho-analyst: “…The relationship was so emotional for him to have to pull back, from the very very emotional experience and was looking forward to, was looking forward to today” (157). The absence of a pronoun reference means it is unclear whether it is the psycho-analyst or the analysand who is “looking forward to today” (157).

Mutuality is another theme present in the dynamics of this section and in the growth of meaning it communicates. Prior to the detailed description of the example of an experience in that section of the answer to question eight that precedes the emergence of the memory, an explanation of the reason freely expressed, spontaneous, unexpected interventions create the feeling that “things are going well” is given:

but which catches hold and I think to my self, well the reason why it catches hold is because there is a, very much of an in tune rapport, we’re in sync with each other, and that it is a testimony to the uh to the uh, I guess the constancy or the durability of those kind of in sync feelings that I can depend upon in this relationship to be open and to be receptive on both parts (154)

Spontaneous interventions “catch hold” when there is mutual openness between psycho-analyst and analysand. Thus the dynamic relation between the soft substantive category of intrusion,
the related themes of excitement and mutuality suggest an intricate configuration of wordless or nameless thought behind the conflicted claim regarding the value of counter-transference disclosure and spontaneity.

**Step Four: Modeling and Gesture – Air**

**Form.** In the fourth step in the analysis, the researcher’s orientation and mode of observation is meant to articulate the *formative* nature of the dynamic relations identified in the previous step, deepening participation in the phenomenon through artistic capacity. For Goethe and Hoffman (1998) this observational orientation reveals phenomena’s *gesture*, understood as idea in action or intention. Formulated in this manner, dynamics is seen as a coherence of form-giving intentions. Gesture, or active form and the dynamic properties that constitute this, are understood by Hoffman to be underwritten by meanings or “formative life principles” (p.134). For Hoffman (1998), “a gesture is not merely a movement but, rather, an action through which a definite meaning expresses itself” (p.134). In his discussion of meanings and formative life principles in botanical phenomena, Hoffman suggests that these are akin to an intelligence that is prior consciousness. As adapted in this study, formative life principles are hypothesized to be unconscious or preconscious psychological phenomenon that give form to gesture in the active realization of intention. For Hoffman (1998), the observational mode and orientation practiced in this stage achieves an “intensification” or “distillation” of the phenomenon that configures morphology or dynamics as form (p. 134). In meeting the requirement of this mode of observation in this study, the researcher calls upon the abstracting capacities of the scientist in order to bring the organizing intention of phenomena into view: to recognize, to conceptualize and to represent.

In this study, the dynamics of formative intentions is viewed in the gestures evident within communicative utterance. In this step, unconsciously informed communicative intentions are
considered through an analysis of discourse moves and constituent themes. The dynamics of intention establish form, character or shape of the utterance (Loewald, 1978).

For Hoffman, the scientists representation of phenomena’s form is artistic in nature, characteristically realized through poetry, painting or music in what he calls “gesture sketches” (p. 134). In adaptation to this study, the concept of gesture sketches is extended to include modeling in language as a mode of representation through which the purpose identified by Hoffman may be realized: “This is the phase of research when the “first impression” (in this study, step one) perhaps an overall mood, may become more meaningful and take a more organized expression” (pp. 134-5).

Bockemuhle’s metaphor of air for this step embodies a caution against rigidity and conviction in the sketching of any phenomenon’s gesture. In conceptualizing this within botany, Hoffman (1998) proposes an ecological practice where, “Whatever “idea” lies behind the formative movements of a plant we begin to apprehend through an “airy cognition” (p. 134). His reading of Bockemuhle metaphor is that “We see things through the air, but not the air itself, and this transparency or acquiescence needs to become the character of our cognitive mode” (p. 135).

Bockemuhle’s use of the term “acquiescence” connotes an observational mode where the researcher’s mind gives way to the presence or identity of the phenomenon prior to representation. The term acquiesce, like the metaphor air, also encourages thoughtfulness regarding the occluding potentials of pre-conception.

In this study, the modeling of human gesture or form-giving intention employs psycholinguistic and psycho-analytic theory. Representation conceived of as a sketch connotes not only creativity but also abstraction: in science, understood to exist at some distance from the empirical. In modeling, this researcher takes an epistemological perspective founded in principles of inference to
loveliest explanation (Lipton, 2004); that is, the sketch or model is an inference that seeks to provide explanation for the greatest number of observations.

Notions of “airy cognition” and “acquiescence” envision lightness in the incorporation of theory in the analytic approach taken in this step, as well as in the epistemological stance taken in relation to models created. In the sciences theory, lightly held, assists perception, as well as imaginative innovation in the development of new theory. Theory making or modeling gives pattern to interrelated sets of inference and observation. At its best, theory helps us see, in the metaphorical sense; that is, it make sense of what is. Theory also brings a collegial dimension to research, where the work of others assists our own. The metaphorical meanings of lightness and transparency suggest a sensibility for governing principles where research imaginatively organizes perception within new models.

**Relationship episodes.** The Luborskys and Crist-Cristoph, (Luborsky 1984; Luborsky and Crits-Cristoph, 1990; Luborsky, L. and Luborsky, E. 1995) researchering transference phenomena, have identified an element in the narratives of psycho-therapy patients he has called relationship episodes. Relationship episodes are discreet narrative units depicting interactions with others and comprised of three elements: a wish, a response from the other and a response from the self. Luborsky analyzed these for incidences of recurrent patterns in the nature and configuration of wishes and responses in these event episodes. As applied here, participant’s descriptions of interactions with colleagues, analysands, professional societies and with the researcher are viewed as relational episodes that depict the way in which the participant holds himself-in-relationship in mind, and analyzed through categories other than those introduced by Luborsky. Relationship episodes give form to dynamic elements identified in step three.
Discourse moves and intention. A first approach to form and intention in the utterance begins with a re-consideration of dynamic properties associated with the soft substantive category of intrusion and one of its derivatives, constraint. Dynamic features of utterance that are goal directed or intend communicative effects are referred to here as discourse moves. Gesture is conceptualized here as a coherence of discourse moves within a relationship episode, that is, a movement in relation to the other through communicative acts. A reconsideration of text dynamics with a view to discerning gesture or form in the utterance reveals discourse moves that take shape in addressing intrusions or themes associated with intrusions. Intrusion remains a salient feature influencing inter-subjective and intra-psychic dynamics evident within the form taken by communicative acts or gesture. Dynamics that address intrusion, and give form are understood to maintain psychic equilibrium and to achieve associated inter-subjective goals. These two types of goals may be seen to operate in tandem.

In communication, gesture may be thought of as the expression of intention in the process of the realization of intention. Gesture is active and goal directed. Discourse moves realize a variety of intentions and give shape to gesture. Recognition that social intentions need not be consciously pursued or realized raises questions regarding the nature of the relation between the inter-subjective and the intra-psychic. For Pinker these converge in the role communication plays in maintaining face. For Pinker, face is maintained through verbal strategies in indirect speech that navigate the intricacies of intimacy and power. Here, Pinker’s understanding of face is extended beyond the management of the image of the self before the other to include the management of the image of the self before the self or intra-psychic face. In addition, following from psycho-analytic insights, it is recognized that the other may refer to an unconscious imago that may have varying degrees of correspondence to any actual person.
Equilibrium, psychic pain and form. Meltzer’s (1967; 1978; 1984; 1986) examination of psycho-dynamics in the inter-subjective field, has led him to suggest that the central issue in intra-psychic dynamics and unconscious communication is mental pain. Joseph (1989a) has subsequently referred to this as psychic pain. In Meltzer’s model, psychological or mental balance refers to a tolerable level of mental pain, the achievement of which may require use of psychic defences, most particularly projective identification. Joseph calls this “tolerable level” psychic equilibrium. For Meltzer, thoughts or other mental contents that create disequilibria are those that cause mental pain. Threats to self or to the sense of self – what would fall within Pinker’s (2007) “face” – are one of the three types of mental pain Meltzer identifies (1986, p. 389). The use we make of others through communicative acts or discourse moves, encompass intra-psychic goals that preserve psychic equilibrium. Communicative acts meant to establish or re-establish equilibrium give shape to gesture or active form. Understood in this manner, the pursuit of equilibrium gives shape to gesture.

Projective identification is one of a number of types of projection recognized in psychoanalysis to be part of the psychic repertoire of all human beings. Projective identification modulates access to awareness of mental contents that are the composite elements of mental life. Phantasies, feelings, expectations, inferences and thoughts about self or world are organized in and gain access to consciousness in a manner that is “regarded as best” (Joseph, 1992, p. 237); that is, that address psychological imperatives. In this model, anxiety is created by the approach to, or emergence of, disturbing thoughts into consciousness. The anxiety signals a threat to balance or equilibrium and mobilizes psychological defences to address this threat to mental equilibrium or comfort. Projective identification utilizes a combination of psychic mechanisms including externalization, repression, displacement, identification and omnipotence to address disequilibria,
or mental pain. For Joseph, as for Meltzer, understanding constitutes one of the major threats to equilibrium (Meltzer 1978; Joseph, 1989b), including those that develop in the course of treatment and those that have been repressed. For both clinicians, the task in clinical practice is to listen to the analysand in a manner that illuminates what it is that threatens the analysand’s sense of internal balance and to observe the methods the analysand uses to prevent or right imbalance. What is observed is both the associative patterns of thought and memory – reassuring memories or fantasies that self sooth may emerge for example – but also features of the communication – here called discourse moves – designed to have effect upon the psycho-analyst, thus, for example, linguistic anomalies including implicatures that accompany psychic strategies. Joseph puts it this way: “Listening to communications from an object relational perspective can bring the methods any individual uses to maintain balance in the face of such threats to light” (1988, p. 633). Psychic equilibrium is maintained, in large measure, through actual and phantasy relations with others conducted through communication. Projective identification is considered part of gesture since re-establishing equilibrium constitutes intention and gives shape to utterance.

In the absence of the integration of distressing thoughts and associated affects, psychic measures to rid the mind of these contents in order to maintain or re-establish equilibrium projective identification may be used. Projective-identification functions as a method of disavowing parts of the self, including the part that understands (Joseph, 1989d, p. 175). This is accomplished through an externalization of parts of the self by attribution to the other, either individual or group. For the clinical practitioner, observation of projective-identification processes also illuminates the internal world of the analysand since they may communicate mental contents that cannot be directly verbalized. This may be especially helpful in those periods when the analysand is engaged in the mental and emotional work of integrating the new understandings of
self and world that have been gained in the analysis. This process of “working through” is often accompanied by mental pain. For the psycho-analyst, reading the shifting internal state of the analysand requires a sensitive and educated expert attention. Where there is a greater capacity to tolerate knowledge of self and world, projective identification comes to serve a largely communicative rather and a defensive function and in ordinary communication is understood to play a role in empathy.

In its more pernicious forms, projective identification is characterized by phantasies of aggressively entering, controlling or attacking the other and differs from simple projection because, in addition to merely ascribing aspects or qualities of the self to others, it is concerned with control or influence upon others, imagined to now contain those aspects of the self that have been disavowed. Phantasies of this nature may represented in pre-verbal dimensions as well as nuanced in language, or, for example, the management of space, and have relational impact although read unconsciously or pre-consciously. However seemingly immaterial, such phantasies influence actual relationships through their potential to distort perception, including the perception of the other, pushing this in a negative direction, with the logical consequence of creating correspondingly negative expectations of the other and then also influencing behaviour toward the other. Psychic equilibrium depends upon maintaining representations of particular configurations of self, of other and of self-in-world-with-other in the internal realm and realizing corresponding relational goals in interaction with others.

Main (1995), in discourse based studies has examined psychological phenomenon at the interface of the intra-psychic and inter-subjective, considers the need to maintain stable psychological states through a concept called “conditional strategies”. Main has shown that individuals use conditional strategies to maintain what is taken to be optimal attachment proximity
through the modulation of attention and perception. These strategies can be observed in the relation to external reality, including relations with others, and with internal reality, including, most particularly, the content of memory. Ongoing use of these strategies “will eventually also involve defensive distortion of certain memories and perceptions…” (Main, 1995, p. 233).

Understood by Main to arise out of a history of relationships in early development, conditional strategies ensure that many classes of experience can neither be thought about nor spoken about. For Bion (1962), experiences that remain unprocessed in this way, fail to contribute to learning.

Analysis through the approach taken in this step suggests that for this participant, disequilibria arises, or is threatened by ideas, memories and understandings associated with the theme of intrusion. The co-occurrence of disequilibria arising from themes related to intrusion with the use of discourse moves that breach the boundaries between self and other suggests that the communicative context is experienced by the participant as threatening and is redressed through the complex psychic and communicative strategy of projective identification, motivated by an intentions related to an imperative to address disequilibria. This may be observed in a relationship episode that describes an interaction between the participant and a professional association. In this episode, reported in the course of answering the final question of interview one, the participant recalls being questioned by a medical review committee. Aspects of the experience of being interviewed by the researcher appear to have converged with the memory of the historical experience of being interviewed by a representative from his professional college. The researcher then becomes another “conservative colleague” from whom the participant anticipates criticism.

In addition to the disruption created by memory itself, parallels between that memory of being questioned about his work and the experience of being interviewed more generally may have provoked the discourse move within the research context that utilizes projective identification. The
research situation is an unusual and unfamiliar one for the participant and potentially evocative, in part because it reverses certain features of conducting clinical practice. The clinical dyad in psycho-analytic practice is comprised of one who speaks and one who listens. In the research setting, the participant is asked to speak and the researcher listens. In addition, however benign in appearance the set of standard questions and the intentions of the researcher, for any participant, answering questions that call upon personal memory always carry the risk of creating distress. Pinker has suggested that “requests are among the most face-threatening speech acts, because they challenge the hearer’s autonomy by assuming her readiness to comply” (2007, p. 382). However threatening complying to an interviewer’s request to answer a question may be, in and of itself, in this instance compliance through answering questions about work may be reasonably understood to have been additionally distressing for this participant because of its association with an earlier experience of being questioned by members of his professional association as part of a test of professional competence.

The participant reports that experience in the excerpt below, in reply to the final question of interview one:

A: um. Oh yeah, the other one I was thinking of was the college, we allow our college of um, that um, to insure that they are receiving, that the population is receiving good quality care, so they like to root out or uh restrict the practice of people who are not functioning adequately
Q: right
A: So, uh, the college, in fact in the middle of the eighties approached me as one of the random, as one of the random sampling, and wanted to investigate my practice.
Q: uh
A: And how do they do it: they come in and they and they uh, they take the files from you, of a number of patients and go over them, hopefully at the college, they examine the files to see what, to see
Now it works for a surgeon who’s done post-operative notes, has done a gall bladder operation
Q: right
A: but it sure as hell doesn’t work for a psychoanalytic practice.
Q: right
A: And runs rough-shod over, well can you actually use a, indicate the quality of practice, some people don’t even keep any notes
Q: right
A: some of them don’t keep notes because they don’t want the time or the interference of notes. Some don’t keep notes because they are afraid that their notes will be looked at in a subpoena.
Q: right.
A: Um, what, the notes are for me, there’re not for the next physician. In case I die: “Dr. (A), your notes must be legible to other people, if you die or something happens to you, someone has to take over your practice’ Nobody’s gonna take over my practice. My notes are only for me
Q: right
A: and they’re only an aide to myself
Q: right
A: they may be the source of an article
Q: right
A: I may want to write
Q: right
A: a case history I may want to draw on
Q: right
A: but there’re not for anybody else, but for me
Q: right, yeah
A: So, uh, I had a conflict and I uh said, no I can’t do this
Q: right
A: I can’t be, the main thing, you know, being confidentiality, - ‘you can disguise the person’s name’ : yeah, but almost every page is full of references that will situate the person
Q: right
A: and if I’m paying attention in the analysis, wondering whether this or that
Q: is gonna
A: is gonna go in the notes, or if the notes are going to be read
Q: right
A: it obstructs my session with the patient, um, ‘ But, you know Dr. (A) um this is a regulation of the college and um what is does is it makes you immune to any suit on the part of the patient where it breaches confidentiality.’ ‘But that’s not good enough, that’s fine for you guys, but that’s not fine for me’ right.
So I had uh a four month struggle with the college around that, eventually they relented and they did something which is acceptable to me. I still told them where they could get what they wanted to get, but at least I preserved my peace of mind, regarding confidentiality, and I preserved my sessions
Q: right
A: So another kind of
Q: yeah, interesting
A: institutional response from another agenda other than the deep therapeutic one
Q: and no way to really accommodate
A: well I did accommodate but
Q: yeah, well for them to accommodate the reality of doing this work
A: right
Q: in their
A: yeah
Q: structure
A: I think its basically, one: they have a need to do something that fits with the institutions mandate
Q: sure
A: and secondly, they’re not, they’re ignorant
(176-9)

Viewed from a classical psycho-analytic perspective, another convergence is suggested; in this instance, between the researcher and aspects of the participant’s super-ego, that self-critical part of our psyches. In this view, the researcher has unwittingly become the embodiment of a harsh self-judgment. In combination, these convergences contribute to the participant’s misinterpretation of the nature of the researcher’s enquiry, both generally when being interviewed and in particular on the occasion of receiving feedback where intrusion was introduced as a theme. On that occasion, the participant failed to scan the researcher’s positive attribution regarding his care of his patients, the context in which the soft substantive category of intrusion was reported. As we have seen, the relationship episodes reporting interactions between the participant and his analysand demonstrate thoughtful and helpful interventions. Nevertheless, the utterance is preoccupied with a concern that others do or would disapprove of the way he works. This understanding has explanatory power for the participant’s immediate dismissal of the researcher’s request that he share his thoughts on the theme of intrusion as it relates to the clinical context at the beginning of the second interview. The researcher’s report of the soft substantive category at feedback in the second interview cannot, however, account for features of the utterance in the first interview, where discourse moves apparently addressing disequilibria shape gesture.

In the penultimate comment in answer to the final question of the first interview, quoted below, the participant describes his experience of psycho-analytic ethics committees as overzealous,
over controlling, suspicious and concern with ethical issues as interfering with the ability to maintain
focus upon therapeutic issues in practice:

#1A: But even, even analysts when they construct their own ethics
guidelines, you know, who should know better, so to speak
Q: mn
#2A: over, over guideline, over prescribe.
Q: Oh, yeah?
#3A: Again because they are run by the prospect of, - oh this
person screwed his patients -.
Q: mn hm
#4A: Well, where was the ethics committee?
Q: right
#5A: What about you, are you all corrupt to the core. Or what,
What about the back room hush hush business.
Q: right
#6A: So, it’s a very powerful agenda
Q: yeah
#7A: that they are carrying.
Q: right
#8A: So even as an analyst, which makes it very hard to think
about
Q: yes
#9A: the other issues
A: right
Q: Well, thank you. We are nicely up to time.
#10 A: Again? (Laughter)
Q: Yes (laughter) Very very interesting again.
#11A: I look forward to hearing what has struck you. (179-
180)

A review of an anomaly in this excerpt, cohering as a gesture, illuminates the participant’s
intention in a use of the communicative context to address distress and to maintain equilibrium.
This gesture, both recalls and re-creates a relationship event in which colleagues and a professional
society are interfering and intrusive. The communicative gesture then addresses this by discourse
moves in the research dyad. In this section of the transcript, the explicit meaning of the
participant’s communication is relatively clear: Having to think about ethical issues makes it
difficult for an analyst to think about clinical issues. Here the term “an analyst” is used inclusively
for both psycho-analysts who sit on ethics committees and the participant as he goes about his
daily practice. The utterance also explains that the “powerful agenda” of these committees,
nevertheless fails to protect patients from sexual exploitation (4a). Careful observation of this section shows that at the beginning of the reply to the question, the referent is the memory of an actual situation, where, by the end of the reply the referent is in the realm of the imagined: The beginning describes the professional college as having a concern regarding the competence of all practitioners and recognizes that the selection of the participant for review is random. By the end of the reply, the college is depicted as having a powerful and questionably motivated agenda to search out doctors who exploit their patients sexually. If closely observed, these movements in the utterance from the actual to the imagined and from the proper to the improper may be seen to map a transformation of subjective experience through the intrusions from an internal realm of meaning, incorporating a set of inferences that are pre-linguist or functioning within wordless thought.

The intersubjective consequence is reflected in this sequence in the utterance in a discourse move which, on the one hand addresses someone other than the researcher, while on the other, and at the same time, addresses a question to her (#5A). At the most explicit level of the text, this is a rhetorical strategy where assuming the identity and briefly playing the part of the intrusive, constraining ethics committee member persuades an audience of a speaker’s proposition. The communicative complexity of the utterance here is that this discourse move also creates in the listener the effect of the experience that is being reported by the speaker as his own; that is, to communicate to the listener the experience of being intruded upon by a hostile and accusatory ethics committee in a concrete and active mode. This discourse move evacuates un-integrated or unprocessed memory and associated affects which have the potential to disrupt psychic balance, moving them beyond conscious awareness.
The question also marks a moment in the utterance when the line of identity between the mind of the participant and researcher is crossed. This is accomplished in part by reversing the conventional roles of questioner and questioned in the interview setting and, in part, through the content of the question itself, which conflates the identity of the researcher and participant when the morality and ethics of the researcher is forcefully questioned. In this move, a reversal, the way of remembering becomes an intersubjective event that repositions the participant from the one who is acted upon to the one who acts. Psychic transgressions of this type, realized through projective-identification, communicate concretely, use language as action, and create understanding in the other while evacuating it from the self. However theoretically formulated, this fluidity of identities across researcher, participant and ethics committee colleague is integral to this move in the utterance.

The success of this discourse move to reconfigure the research dyad as an interrogation of the researcher by the participant is facilitated by the discourse move that immediately precedes it (#4A) where a rhetorical question effects two discourse intentions: It renders indisputable the assertion that ethics committees are ineffective in preventing abuse and it effects the first simple reversal of roles within the research dyad. Viewed simply, this first rhetorical question falls within the class of standard linguistic conventions that “power the comprehension of many kinds of non-literal speech” (Pinker 2007, p. 178), a conversational implicature as Pinker has described these. However, it also effectively reverses the roles of the one who questions and the one who answers and does, thereby, facilitate the interrogation of the researcher by the participant in the next discourse move (5A). It is, then a communicative strategy that goes beyond the achievement of understanding to the accomplishment of a combined intra-psychic and intersubjective goal. The communicative efficiency of this move
arises in part from a special feature of rhetorical questions that by their nature effectively silence a communication partner.

Indeed, the paradox of this section of the transcript (page 179-180: 1A through 11A) arises, in part, from a conflation of identities where the researcher becomes the participant and the participant becomes a member of an ethics committee: In this reconfiguration, the researcher becomes the passive recipient of intrusion. An ambiguity created by pronoun usage shifts is important to this reconfiguring of interactional roles. As represented in the utterance, the researcher becomes a place holder for an historical figure, configuring her as a memory that is relived rather than recalled. Scrutiny of sections 4A and 5A of the above excerpt from the text reveals a slippage from the achievement of a conversational structure in 4A, already an intentional discourse move, to, in #5A, a discourse move which realizes an intention of a more complex kind where the tables are turned on the researcher as signifier for “intruder” necessitated by the discomfort that was the affective accompaniment of memories and ideas concerning ethics. A disturbing past experience has been re-created in the present, as psychological and discourse intentions and giving shape to the utterance and the communicative relation with the researcher.

Thus equilibrium is re-established. The use of the term “struck” at the close of this section, previously considered through close reading in step two, is now recognized to communicate through it’s connotative meaning, some anger for the discomfort or disequilibria experienced by the participant in the course of answering this question as a result of the memory it evoked.

The suggestion that this memory is significant finds additional support simply by the fact of its emergence in response to the final prepared question, the first that did not direct participants in any way, but rather invites them to speak on any topic of interest regarding their work. The selection of issues of confidentiality may have been a partly conscious and a partly unconscious
decision. Precisely because of its lack of structure, this open question may have created a context where an expression of a pressing concern and associated memory is recalled and re-experienced in real time with the researcher, necessitating discourse moves meant to regain equilibrium. Thus gesture in the utterance makes its appearance in a style of modulating distress or mental pain and maintaining balance through a variety of communicative acts.

Finally, this understanding that the disruptive effects of reflection upon the theme of confidentiality and associated memory set in motion a dynamic of defensive discourse moves, gains further support by observation of the retrospective repression of the memory of parts of this communicative exchange. This is evident at the beginning of the second interview, where responsibility for the introduction of the topic of confidentiality is ascribed to the researcher.

Consideration of this brief excerpt suggests that the management of thoughts and memories related to intrusion is central to the discourse intentions or gesture and have a significant influence in shaping the form of the utterance and the communication style of the participant. Thus, the soft substantive category of intrusion remains an important organizing property of the communication.

**Mutuality.** A second instance demonstrating the place of intrusion in shaping discourse intentions and giving form to the utterance is found through a re-view, or re-seeing of the dynamic properties of the utterance as an holistic entity. This review suggests that the framework set by the protocol of the first interview was itself constraining and that this constraint, like the intrusions of mental contents associated with conventions of ethical and technical standards in medicine and psycho-analysis, obstructed the achievement of communicative intentions active in the dynamics of intrusion. Each of these intentions can be realized or frustrated within a communication context and each play a role in shaping the utterance in gesture and intention.
These intentions are firstly, the realization of an affirmation of innate goodness through the response of the other to the unmediated or unconstrained spontaneous self, what the participant refers to as his “disposition” (transcript p. 155). In turn, this intended response from the other consists in states of shared excitation, mutuality and affirmation of specialness, each realized through overcoming difference along a number of dimensions. The achievement of these subjective states affirms innate goodness as expressed through spontaneous action and disposition. In some instances, this overcoming takes form as discourse intentions that achieve merger across boundaries representing minds or bodies.

Communicative gesture or intentions that achieve mutuality address intrusion though the psychic principle of negation; that is, the subjective experience of mutuality in a relational context negates the possibility of intrusion, since, where there is mutuality across subjects, difference is overcome and, without difference there is no longer a risk of intrusion. Mutuality manifests at the conscious level as an ideology, as Hollway and Jefferson (2000) have described this, and as a language-mediated inter-subjective intention that is employed in the management of intrusion – permitting it while denying its existence. If two entities are indistinguishable how can there be intrusion? Mutuality is a psychologically motivated communicative intention that organizes the dynamics of utterance in the realization of psycho-social goals.

Mutuality may be understood to perform the function of achieving a psychological experience of merger, or loss of differentiation of the boundary between self and other. A psycho-analytic reading suggests that psychodynamic and associated communicative intentions of this kind address anxieties about the nature or state of the core self, typically in response to traumatic loss (Volkan, 1981). Understood in this way, the emergence of the soft
substantive category of intrusion during the open coding of the audio record of the first
interview arose through the researcher’s reading of the implicit communicative level of the
utterance as it set about employing discourse moves that realize combined intra-psychic and
inter-subjective intentions intended to address anxieties evoked by the experience of being a
research participant. Where intrusion shapes discourse form and reflects unconscious
communications intended to maintain equilibrium through affirmation of specialness and
subjective experiences of mutuality, constraints of whatever kind obstruct critical
communicative goals.

**Constraint.** As already noted, at the close of the first interview, the participant
explicitly expresses an interest in feedback from the researcher:

> I look forward to hearing what has struck you (180)

As also noted, early in the second interview the participant reports that he had constrained
himself during the first interview in order to ensure he did not intrude upon the researcher. A
consideration of the participant’s experience of self constraint due to concern for the
researcher is considered below. Consideration of the manner in which the research protocol
forms part of the larger context of the experience of constraints and of the discourse moves
taken to overcome these is also reported. The sense of being constrained by the protocol of
the first interview is suggested by the pattern of answers to the prepared questions which in
general, asks for detailed descriptions of work experiences.

In phenomenological studies using face to face interviews, detailed description of
actual experience is basic data (van Manen, 1997). While adaptations in this study following
from the incorporation of methodological principles derived from the concept of the “set
situation” (Winnicott. 1941, 1968) meant that the researcher did not reiterate the request for
detailed descriptions contained within the questions or otherwise take steps to ensure that
participants provided them, the pattern of this participant’s replies suggest that he did not consider fulfilling the researcher’s request useful to the realization of his communicative intentions - either what he consciously wanted to say about his work, or unconsciously sought to communicate or to realize inter-subjectively. Rather, these requests can be seen to have frustrated both conscious and unconscious communicative intents. As noted above, the researcher had initially misunderstood this difficulty in providing such descriptions to arise from a concern to protect analysands from the intrusion reference to them in the research context might present.

Among the participant’s communicative goals frustrated by the protocol of the first interview is its failure to provide the participant with information, in an ongoing manner, regarding his impact upon the researcher. The significance of this resides in the intricate connection, for this participant, between the responses of partners within communication dyads and affirmations of self, specifically of spontaneity and disposition. Indeed, as already discussed, in the absence of this, the participant ascribed to the researcher, a positive response she had not in fact experienced, but through which he felt affirmed. The protocol of the first interview frustrated the intention of affirmation of spontaneity. Thus, the protocol of the first interview frustrated the realization of the intra-psychic and inter-subjective communicative imperatives that give intentional form to the utterance: affirmation of innate goodness, specialness, excitation and overcoming difference or mutuality and merger. These are the constituent elements of the dynamics of relational episodes detailed in the few description of actual work experience that are provided. Reconsidered in this context, the participant’s use of the figurative language of “impact,” when questioning “experience,” suggests that the response of a partner within a communicative dyad to “impact” may be
important to the intention to preserve a sense of self as good by disconfirming a fantasy of harming the other. At the beginning of the second interview, the participant explicitly links his interest in his impact upon the researcher to a concern that he may have intruded upon her.

**Specialness.** The participant’s utterance contains a detailed discussion of a current and contentious theoretical and technical debate between different psycho-analytic schools and an explanation of his particular orientation, the change in his theoretical commitments and clinical technique which resulted from this change in orientation. As described, these schools differ on theoretical and technical issues of practice pertinent to psycho-analysts’ modulation of a sense of self-worth within the psycho-analytic dyad. Mutuality and affirmation of self combine in the clinical setting: “if we’re in sync, what’s good for you is what’s good for me” (transcript, p. 161). The communication situates the speaker in relation to this debate as part of the school that is modern, innovative, free and comparatively more therapeutically successful. Such specialness means one is not subject to the constraints of convention.

This representation is consistent with a more conscious self-representation provided in the first interview, where the participant is pictured as “out front, in the front of the pack.” In that communication, introducing the theme of specialness, this identification as a leader is ascribed to analysands interpreting an art object in his office. The excerpt below is the reply to question one. The item described is a ceramic plate decorated with a representation of a school of Koi fish painted in blues and red, swimming in a pattern where a single red fish swims in front of a group of blue fish. Words in parenthesis have been altered in consideration of the preservation of confidentiality:
A: … That arrangement is pretty stable. I try to keep my stuff stable as well. When I moved from where I was on (street name) I had that plate up there almost exactly in the same position, so I thought that was important to remain to remain as one piece of constancy. Um and the motif of the plate itself fitting in with, as well as the blueness of other items, has a certain, has a flow to it. The fact that, the fact that one fish is red, other people have noticed that it corresponds to what they view as my original hair colour.
Q: Oh.
A: I have a red complexion about me, so people make that association, which is fine. And it happens that that fish is leading all the others.
Q: there, out front, yeah
A: yeah. Out front, in front of the pack. I hadn’t made that connection, but it feels agreeable to people and whenever that plate is tilted, happens sometimes when the cleaning lady is here, I feel that I need to make sure that the waters are running horizontally, rather than upwards or downwards. (129-130)

In addition to introducing the theme of specialness, this communication also more subtly introduces the theme of equilibrium: the text tells us that stability is preserved, provided the representation of specialness – that is, the representation of self as being out in front, a leader – is kept flowing smoothly along, undisturbed. Notably, the excerpt reports that, on occasion, action must be taken when that even flow, balance or equilibrium has been disturbed, as by the cleaning lady. What has been brought from the old to the new location is a representation of self and stability. In this text old and new refer also to an old way of working and thinking as a psychoanalyst and the new way of thinking and working as a psycho-analyst; that is, this opposition refers to the change from the old classical to the new relational school, also represented in the artifact. In this communication analysands affirm the psycho-analyst’s specialness providing reassurance through this memory in real time. In the excerpt below, analysands are depicted as expressing a general appreciation of this change in their psycho-analyst’s technique that follows from the change in orientation or schools.

The orientation of this new school is described by the participant as both permitting and valuing the type of technical innovations reported to be part of a new way of conducting clinical practice. These innovations, in their turn, are reported to provide opportunities for the
realizations of satisfactions that are understood to be shared by the psycho-analyst and analysand. Innovations and satisfactions of a related type can be seen to shape discourse intentions in the utterance. In addition to the realization of affirmations of specialness and innate goodness through the responses of analysands, a linked intention to realize shared states of excitement and mutuality are composite parts of communicative gestures in this utterance. The realization of these intentions maintains equilibrium.

These innovations and related satisfactions are addressed explicitly in the answers to two questions in the first interview and at other points in both the first and second interview. Question two asks participants for an example from their work that would illustrate what it is they like about it. In place of an example, the participant describes how his change in orientation has freed him from the constraints of a his classical psycho-analytic training and reports being affirmed in this change by his patients, an affirmation that is ascribed considerable importance:

“Um, so that, that orientation has made me freer and not so intent upon the triad of neutrality, anonymity.
Q: right
A: and abstinence.
Q: mn
A: Um, so I’m I’m freer in my conditions and my patients appreciate that. It’s interesting to have to, to do reanalysis, and it’s, be people who early on in my career, at least early on in, it will be twenty-two years now, but people who saw me almost from the outset, I was told, in another mode, um. They’ve had a full analysis. They’ve come back after a period of time for another analysis with me, and uh, and they’ve noted an important difference in my, they report, technique.
Q: ah
A: Um, and um, they’ve appreciated it as well, a lot more than how it was back then for them.
Q: mn
A: So that’s been really important for me. Um, and I, um, my work is a lot more relaxed, it’s a lot more enjoyable; it’s a lot more fun. Um I look forward to my patients and uh and I don’t really conceive of myself as retiring.
Q: mn
A: or whatever, I want to do this ’till I stop working, with my boots on, because it is enjoyable.
(134)
The relationship between the analysand’s response to the psycho-analyst’s spontaneous action and the experience of being affirmed is addressed in the reply to question four – also analyzed above in dynamics - which asks for a memory or memories of work that the participant has experienced as moving:

Um, it seems to be a response to something that actually cropped up in the session that is unanticipated
Q: hm
A: … it has involved the patient’s response, the analysand’s response to something, to some um some spontaneous action on my part that is not pre-thought or in any way premeditated, but that comes out as my reaction to what I am hearing
Q: yeah
A: which would include of course of my own counter-transference take on, its impact… I’m really disposed toward uh, saying something is, out of the confines if I’m about to make an interpretation. And they aren’t as neutral, I’ll tell you more about that. But there is some comment on the material, some take on the material that I have, that the patient responds to, in a profound kind of way… something that’s been caused by my fairly spontaneous remark. (137)

Thus what is moving are occasions when a patient’s response affirms the unconstrained, spontaneous remark by the analyst. The participant’s answer to question seven, which asks for an example to illustrate what sustains the clinician his their work is quoted extensively below, and edited for references to affirmation and shared excitement:

A: Well, I think I’m enjoying it. I think I’m enjoying it more.
Q: mn
A: Not that I wasn’t enjoying it then
Q: mn hm
A: but there is so much more richness, now. It’s a richness, it’s a richness, … It’s being held in high esteem. You know, um, it’s the sense of gratitude, the sense of the person saying, “I never thought of that before”, or “that’s very very meaningful to me” uh, “I thought it was extremely helpful”…
Q: mn hm
A: … Basically a response to me, and how helpful I’ve been… And this is not often talked about, … but the area of mutual, of, of, collaborative excitement uh, uh, in and around the relationship itself (149-152)
The excerpt above identifies shared excitement in a collaborative relationship with analysands as part of the set of responses which affirm the participant. Diction demonstrates a link between these affirmations and the theme of mutuality.

In reply to question eight, which asks for a description of an experience from the participant’s work that gave him a sense that things were going well, the participant replies:

A:...probably the times when I feel things are going well is when I can leave myself free to um, to judiciously, leave myself free to express something ah, that isn’t in the books so to speak. Uh, and is also outside the expectations of my analysand
Q: mn
A: but which catches hold and I think to my self, well the reason why it catches hold is because there is a, very much of an in tune rapport, we’re in sync with each other, and that it is a testimony to the uh to the uh, I guess the constancy or the durability of those kind of in sync feelings that I can depend upon in this relationship to be open and to be receptive on both parts
Q: mn hm
A: even though um something I’ve said is a little bit, maybe a little bit off the beaten technique. Or getting past stuff that you don’t think, number one in your more or less conservative leaning colleagues, letting know about it, and leave you open to all kinds of interpretations about your own counter-transference... there are no, there are no formulas that you can go, something that you can go back on, except your disposition.  (155)

In the absence of a description of actual experience, this reply by the participant identifies the inter-subjective ingredients that make up a subjective experience of work that provides a sense that things are going well. These elements may be understood to be principles of practice as they are identified as markers of good work. In addition, these elements and principles parallel the discourse intentions that give shape to the utterance. Focused as inter-subjective and intra-psychic intentions, these elements combine to provide a subjective experience of work characterized by an experience of mutuality that affirms the spontaneous self.

The participant has explained that freedom from conventional or classical psychoanalytic technique identified as anonymity, neutrality and abstinence provides opportunity for the type of spontaneous interpretations through which his innate disposition is affirmed by the
response of the analysand: This freedom creates an experience of mutual excitement. This affirmative response by analysands of the psycho-analyst’s disposition, or self, appears as the single most important factor in his enjoyment of his work, as indicated by frequency of reference and by its use as the measure of the quality of the work. Thus the participant proposes an equivalence in mental states between psycho-analyst and analysand, characterized as mutual excitement or being in-sync. A less conscious communication links these shared states to merger or the overcoming of boundaries including physical boundaries.

This is a marker of the quality of practice because what is good for the psycho-analyst is understood to be good for the analysand: “that if its good for me, it means if its good for me, its good for him if we’re in sync”(161). Inter-subjectively, this is accounted for “because of the highly personal connection … the area of mutual, of, collaborative excitement” (152). This experience of work and this measure of therapeutic effectiveness is related to the theme of intrusion since they arise from clinical interventions which “get under the skin” of the analysand (155), a variation on the theme of intrusion.

The participant reports that he has found theory, principles of technique and regulatory institutions an intrusive constraint on satisfaction of this type of affirmation through the experience of mutuality in the therapeutic encounter with analysands. By the participant’s report, these in-sync experiences benefit both the analysand and himself, and thereby affirm his change in theoretical orientation and technical approach, the way he works.

**Colleagues and theory.** In research on the rational and emotional processes that guide change in theoretical and technical orientations by psycho-analysts, Bernardi (2007) looked at both the nature and quality of debates on theory and technique within psycho-analytic societies and at the rational and emotional processes that guide individual analysts in their choice of
orientation when changes in theoretical and technical ideas occur (125). He found that societies
did not make it possible for their members to adequately explore the merits of different
positions and that these changes were governed by moments or problems of great personal
importance, often related to situations of personal crisis and did not follow from rational
judgments of relative merits of different approaches. Change resulted from a complex
interaction between conceptual arguments and personal experience and were not grounded in
evaluations of clinical experience or research. He found, in addition, that psychoanalysts’
“relationships with analytic institutions is also a source of both submission and rebellion,” was
a factor of significance in such changes. Analysis of the communication by this participant
regarding his change in orientation suggests that he understands himself to be a leader, who
has so advanced in his work that he does not expect colleagues to appreciate its value.

We see that the technical innovations and the satisfying experiences that follow from
these are not shared with societies and colleagues from whom disapproval is anticipated. The
dynamic relation between submission and rebellion that Bernardi identified in psycho-analysts
was found to be particularly salient in its influence upon member’s relations to their societies.
For this participant, rebellion, reflected in the conviction that one is beyond convention, is
understood to be the mark of an innovator who must hide his work.

The relation to theory can be recognized in the excerpt below, where he replies to the
question nine, that asks: “to tell me now about experiences from the work that suggest to you
that the work for you has changed over time, if that’s the case.” The question is contextualized
in an interchange between researcher and participant where the researcher recalled an earlier
point the participant had made about the change in his work, one that included a distinction
between experience distant and experience near interpretations. This distinction is
conventionally understood to refer to making interpretations that arise out of close attention to a patient’s affective life both in and outside the consulting room or failing to do so. It is not generally understood to refer to the experience of the analyst, the manner in which this participant uses it.

The participant also explains in this excerpt that he prefers not to link his technical innovations in his way of working and experiencing his work to any existing theory, nor does he want to develop these innovation into a new or independent theory. He corrects the researcher who had misunderstood him on this point. He explains that to formalize the identified change into a theory of practice, would, “be slotting it into something,” forcing it and making it formulaic, more specifically, it would no longer be spontaneous.

The participant had drawn an analogy between men’s suits and interpretations, where what is “tailor made” is uniquely suited to an individual analysand, and what is “off the rack” or mass produced is generic and ill fitting. While the participant does not have an analogy for a theory-less technique, he does propose an opposition between theory-driven practice and a type of practice that is spontaneous:

Q: … I think we did talk about that a little bit last time about change for you in the work……
A: theory driven versus
Q: theory driven versus a more uh, well I guess an extension of theory that would help you respond more spontaneously
A: mn hm. Um. Yeah actually I don’t have a word for the opposite of theory driven, but your description feels apt, to allow the theory to expand, to take account of .. Well I’m interpreting for .. To allow the theory to expand, my theory, my personal theory
Q: mn hm
A: adds onto whatever theory I can add it on to, if I want to. I don’t always want to
Q: mn
A: Sometimes I do. Because I do belong to a psychoanalytic community and I want to talk with people.
Q: right
A: But to allow the theory to expand, my theory to expand to take into account, the kind of um, uh, thoughts and feelings I’m having as I’m hearing material, where we don’t find a home in
the theories I’m entertaining while I’m doing my work. And uh, the realization, um, I don’t know, I guess I can’t give an account of the history but this is my fantasy of what happened: Its happened to me over a while, I’ve um perhaps have been more aware of my own reactions to the material to a far greater depth than before. And I guess the extreme would be slotting it into something, like shoehorning it into something and coming up with a formula
Q: mn
A: an off the rack kind of thing, I used that expression
Q: right (160-161)

In contrast to the formulaic and ready made, the participant describes positive change in his practice to be a consequence of moving away from the formulaic and ready made to an approach where his thoughts and feelings while listening to an analysand’s material are disclosed to the analysand with a goal that de-emphasizes insight in place of a deepening of the relationship between psycho-analyst and analysand. This approach is based on a premise of reciprocity and mutuality where what is good for the analyst is also good for the analysand in the creation of a shared transformative experience. Thus this reply addresses change of two sorts – in the manner of working and within the analyst emphasizing mutuality or shared states.

Theory can neither formulate nor convey this approach:

A: um, recognizing, um giving credence to, and taking serious, that means really seriously contemplating the um the extent of my own emotional and cognitive reactions, uh, reflections on myself and I guess thinking to myself something like: well in a sense what a shame it is that I, that we’re not disposed towards making use of this in a really deep and sensitive kind of way. Making use of it in the sense of, let it be recognized, um, thinking that if its good for me, it means if its good for me its good for him if we’re in sync. Um and going to uh see if I can’t find some tactful way, some non-disruptive way of letting him know, (words unclear) what my thoughts were. Not only to lead to more understanding, things for me to grapple with but also at the same time deepening of the relationship too, giving a sense of reciprocity and mutuality.
Q: mn
A: Which is hard to book because this is my office, its my rules, I um, I sit here, you sit there, I charge you, you pay me and there is a certain um (asks to be excused – sound of door- pause on tape- sound of door) So I guess, that’s kind of a transforming,
Q: mn
A: transformative experience I think I’ve, I probably have had
at the earlier part of this. Which to me keeps going on, keeps
being reconfirmed in these new experiences (160-162)

An appreciation of the satisfactions consequent upon the freedom provided by the change in theoretical orientation and mode of clinical practice substantiate and illuminate the consistently negative characterization in the utterance of classical psycho-analysis, classically oriented colleagues and similarly conservative institutions, since they intrude upon or constrain the freedom to practice and thus to realize the kinds of satisfactions that are identified in the series of excerpts above. The manner in which this change came about is consistent with Bernardi’s (2003) findings that analyst’s make such changes as a result of powerful personal experiences rather than through an examination of theory and technique within a shared field of argument or by a test of theory through empirical research, such as outcome or process studies. The participant reports that these changes are of benefit to his patients, although no case illustrations are provided to support this claim. In the case illustrations provided, therapeutic gains are, in fact, linked to interventions following conventional technique presumably relying upon earlier training and years of experience. Nevertheless, a conviction that there is mutual benefit to analysand and psycho-analyst from a new technical approach is central to the participant’s subjective experience of his work where this subjective experience is used as a measure for therapeutic efficiency, and is what can be taken to be understood as true psycho-analysis.

The Second Interview

Analysis of the first interview – the phenomenological interview in a set situation – demonstrated the presence in the utterance of findings consistent with the emergence of the soft substantive category of intrusion during open coding in the step called impression. It also linked this category to a set of constituent themes and brought to light communicative intention associated with these themes. Since the participant’s response to the researcher’s introduction of the soft substantive category in the feedback at the beginning of the second interview, was to dismiss its relevance to
understanding his experience of his work, an analysis of the transcript of the second interview was undertaken to determine whether the finding from the open coding did or did not find support in the utterance following the introduction of the theme of intrusion to the participant. The analysis of this free associative narrative interview was done according to the principles and following the methods of step two through four as applied to the first interview above. That analysis of the first interview had confirmed the relevance of the soft substantive category and identified links to related composite themes of mutuality, spontaneity, and specialness.

In the analysis of the second interview, the researcher has combined those from step two through step four: earth, water and air, in an integration of close reading, dynamics and gesture. Interpretation in step five – Fire – the final step of the analysis of both interviews are reported following this integrated analysis of the second interview and introduces the hypothesis of the structural metaphor.

**Intrusion and related themes.** Close reading of the transcript of the second interview following the introduction of the theme of intrusion in feedback to the participant, shows that this theme is explored by the participant with regard to his relationship with the researcher rather than with regard to his experience of his work. The participant also explicitly dismisses the soft substantive category as significant to an understanding his working life. The analysis of the second interview, however, shows that intrusion and thematic derivatives related to intrusion hold an important place in the implicit level of communication in the utterance, playing a central role in textual dynamics and in the discourse intentions that give the utterance its shape. The participant’s utterance in the second interview also communicates concern regarding the theme of intrusion when it ascribes responsibility for the content of the first interview to the researcher. In particular, the inferential meaning communicates the participant’s belief that the researcher is responsible for
instances of the participant’s self-disclosure in the first interview. These disclosures concern issues related to intrusion. As described by the participant, this causal responsibility follows from two behaviours ascribed to the researcher: firstly, that she introduced the theme of confidentiality into their discussion and secondly that she shifted her style of interaction with the participant in a positively affective direction which, in turn, invited him to engage in self-disclosure. These attributions form part of the communicative dynamics of the utterance and give intention form in realization of discourse goals meant to preserve equilibrium. The dynamism of the utterance shows an early discourse move to realize this intention and to reframe the structure of the dyadic encounter – as a pedagogical rather than a research dyad – and secondly to reverse the role of the one who questions and the one who answers.

At the explicit level of the text, while dismissing its relevance to his work, the participant does take up the theme of intrusion, in the course of reflecting upon the person of the researcher and his experience of the encounter with the researcher during the first interview. He explains, “that’s the only way I can relate it” (187). By “it” the participant refers to the theme of intrusion. The excerpt below contains the participant’s reflections on the theme of intrusion following its introduction by the researcher in the initiating question at the beginning of the second interview:

A: So I don’t have that feeling  
Q: O.k.  
A: But there is something, though, in this relationship which is um which is interesting, maybe in that regard, I remember I told you I was impressed with the care you took to make sure everything was just right and not intruding at all  
Q: mm hm mn hm  
A: Um, although you brought me really the idea of confidentiality. But it was the idea of making sure the frame was set just right.  
Q: Yes.  
A: And your deportment here reinforces that. I find that consciously there is my desire to make you feel more comfortable  
Q: uh ha
A: so that when you perked up after one or two questions, I say perked up, by perked up I mean, um, that you uh, although you were careful on the issue of disclosing aspects of the project
Q: right
A: when I asked that, you didn’t have much response and so on
Q: right
A: uh that you seemed more engaged
Q: yes
A: and less uh less concerned about the formal aspects
Q: yes, right.
A: of our of our visit,
Q: right
A: um, (long pause) and I guess I don’t want to abuse that
Q: ah
A: my not wanting to abuse that, to get under your skin, or get past that, a certain boundary or certain barrier
Q: oh, interesting
A: so that you can keep your composure, so to speak,
Q: ah
A: but when you responded, you know when you responded affectively and positively then it looked as if, well, I could really show myself. - well, you’re enjoying this
Q: uh ha
A: maybe you’re enjoying this more than some others that you’ve interviewed
Q: uh ha
A: suddenly everything’s come to life here
Q: uh ha
A: and that gets into your uh
Q: uh ha
A: that gets into your juices, so to speak
Q: uh ha, yeah, that’s interesting
A: yeah
Q: yeah
A: So that’s the only way I can relate it. Now in terms of blocking, uh, I think, I think it’s because of the complexity.
Q: ah, o.k. (185-7)

In the above excerpt, the participant first takes up the theme of intrusion by explaining that he has appreciated the researcher’s non-intrusive style of conducting the first interview. However, this assertion is qualified by the next statement when he explains that the researcher has “brought (him) really the idea of confidentiality,” a topic, as we have seen, about which the participant had spoken extensively at the close of the first interview. The use of the conjunction “although” (underlined above) to link these two statements – that the researcher had not been intrusive on the one hand and that the researcher was responsible for the participant’s discussion of confidentiality on the other – subtly suggests that the participant, in fact, believes that the researcher intruded by
“bringing” the theme of confidentiality into their discussion. His use of the term “bringing” can reasonably, within its particular language context, be understood to mean “introducing”. As noted in earlier points in the analysis of this participant’s transcript, confidentiality is a concept associatively related to or derived from the theme of intrusion in two ways: protecting the patient from intrusion by others and protection of the participant’s freedom to practice from the intrusions of conservative others. While there are many elements of interest inviting analysis in this section of the utterance that will be taken up later in this section, analysis turns first to the first interview, a simple close reading to verify the participant’s assertion that the researcher introduced “confidentiality” into the first interview.

A review of the first interview identifies that point where the discussion turns for the first time to confidentiality, following the researcher asking the participant the last of the prepared questions in that interview, question fourteen:

Q:… Is there anything, given what we have said, that you feel you haven’t been able to say.
A: Well, one has to do with ethics
Q: mn
A: and what are the appropriate ethics for this kind of practice and what are some of the dilemmas.
Q: oh
A: Another one could be with the preservation of confidentiality and the kind of impingements that one experiences as a citizen or as a citizen in the province or a country or nation (171-172)

This excerpt fails to substantiate the participant’s memory that the researcher had “brought” or introduced the theme of confidentiality to their discussion. Nevertheless, this is his experience as recalled. Thus, it is important to understand that the intentions understood to be driving discourse dynamics in the utterance and creating form are in part, and likely in large measure, unconscious, in the descriptive sense; that is, outside awareness. In simple psycho-analytic terms, the exclusion from consciousness of mental contents, a psychological event called repression, or the distortion of
memory or perception serves the end of the avoidance of mental pain. This discourse move is the first in a series of moves which progress to re-establish equilibrium.

Because the participant addresses the theme of intrusion explicitly only in the course of a commentary upon his interaction with the researcher rather than with regard to his work, an examination of the interaction in the research dyad at this point in the utterance was undertaken. This material suggests that the emergent soft substantive category of intrusion is important to understanding the discourse intent of this participant’s utterance, although this analysis reveals a meaning different from the one the researcher had initially ascribed to it in the initiating question where she understood it to refer to the participant’s concern for his analysands.

The dynamics of intrusion and its management, becomes a more notable feature in the inter-subjective dimension of the communicative encounter of researcher and participant in the second interview once the structure provided by the set of prepared questions is no longer present. This is reflected in the shape of the utterance. The structure provided by the set of prepared questions in the first interview may have mediated the relation between participant and researcher in the first two meetings in a manner that on the one hand frustrated the participant’s communicative intentions while, on the other, maintaining the discourse focus upon the research. This understanding is consistent with the participant’s experience of that interview as constraining since, as we have seen, limiting the realization of discourse intentions related to mutuality and shared states of excitement and is also consistent with the growth of communicative dynamics in that second interview.

In the opening communication, at the beginning of the second interview, the researcher begins to inform the participant of her interest in his thoughts on the theme of intrusion that had emerged during opening coding. An interruption by the sound of a photocopy machine, making a copy of an article that the participant is preparing to give to the researcher breaks the original frame
of the research protocol and reconfigures the dyad as a pedagogical relationship with the participant as teacher to the researcher. Although the researcher has begun to provide the feedback that reported her interest in his consideration of it, the participant begins to question the researcher about herself. Following his introduction of the journal article, the participant asks the researcher what, given the context, can reasonably be considered a personal or, in a word, intrusive question:

A: Did you say that you were also in analysis yourself?
Q: I did have a personal analysis.
A: You did. That’s over now?
Q: Yeah, that’s over now.
A: uh ha
Q: … So yeah, so thanks. (184)

With this question, the focus of the discussion between the participant and the researcher is turned away from the participant’s experience of clinical practice to the person of the researcher and in so doing reverses the relationship between researcher and participant as he now asks question of her. Thus the discourse intention realized by this discourse move in the utterance is to alter the nature of the relationship in the dyad, away from research to pedagogy and to accomplish a role reversal. There are other intentions realized by this discourse move. Viewed as an implicature, the question “Did you say you were in analysis yourself?” infers a prior discussion on this question. Pinker (2007) reminds us that such communicative events are designed to render a communicative partner complicit in an implicit message and turns on relations of power between subjects.

A review of the transcripts indicates that there is no previous mention of the researcher being or having been in analysis. The inferential effect of this implicature is that the participant not only steps over the collegial professional-personal boundary but accomplishes this through a question that by its structure suggests this boundary has already been crossed by the researcher: that is, she has shared personal information with the participant. Thus responsibility for this breach is ascribed to the researcher. As in the attribution of responsibility for the introduction of the theme of
confidentiality considered above, this discourse move not only redirects the trajectory of the
discussion, it also tests the personal boundary of the researcher and the researcher’s response to this
assertion of communicative dominance. She is, in Pinker’s words now being acted upon. While brief
in her responses the researcher does not challenge the participant on the attribution or refuse to
answer his question. Had she explicitly corrected the participant on this point or refused to answer
his question she would have failed to preserve face for the participant, understood to fall within her
responsibility as a researcher. Thus the participant breaches the research frame by making use of the
implicit standards of professional deportment in research: that is, unlike normal conversation, the
researcher will not challenge anything a participant says. This aspect of the discourse dynamics
shows intrusion to be an intention that shapes the participant’s utterance as he “rights” himself
psychically and re-establishes equilibrium in response to the disturbance created by the researcher’s
introduction of the theme of intrusion into the conscious level of their discourse.

As indicated in the excerpt below, the participant has some awareness that both giving the
researcher an article, taking an essentially pedagogical position in relation to her, and asking the
question regarding her analysis, and, instituting a reversal of roles, constitutes an intrusion:

Q:...So yeah, so thanks.
A: for the intrusion of that? (laughter)
Q: (laughter) No, yeah, no that’s o.k. (184)

The composition of the communicative interchange suggests, through structural ambiguity,
that the researcher might or should be grateful for this intrusion. In addition, the ambiguity of the
reference “that” insures “intrusion” may be understood to refer to either the question asked or to the
giving of the article, and thus potentially both. The participant’s laughter at this point in the
utterance preserves a facsimile of communicative co-operation and renders the researcher complicit
in this inference that the intrusion “good” for her, as it was for him; that is, that they are ‘in-sync.”
Thus the intention of mutuality is also realized in this discourse move. This shift in the dynamic
structure has been foreshadowed in the narrative unfolding between participant and researcher by the interruption, or intrusion created by the buzzer on the photocopy machine. In the discourse move, the participant is motivated to establish a dyadic structure that reestablishes a certain relationship in his external world. Thus the discourse intention also achieves a re-perception of external reality in correspondence with psychic reality; that is, a distortion, most particularly in his understanding of the subjective experience of the other. In a psycho-analytic reading, this is projective-identification.

The questions asked in both the structured interview and in the free associative interview focused upon participants’ work experience and did not query participants’ personal life, nor did they inquire into participants’ personal or training analysis. The question under discussion shifts the focus away from his work to the researcher and queries her personal life, not her work. These discourse events at the beginning of the second interview demonstrate an intention to restructure the communicative dyad and to establish a different ground for that second interview. Scrutiny of this section of the text, shows that while negotiating the participant’s question within the research protocol, the researcher makes a discourse move meant to recall into the discussion her interest in the soft substantive category introduced to the participant in the initiating question prior to the interruption by the photocopy machine and the participant’s question regarding her personal psycho-analysis. The excerpt below contains the researcher’s reply to the participant’s question:

A: Did you say that you were also in analysis yourself?
Q: I did have a personal analysis.
A: You did. That’s over now?
Q: Yeah, that’s over now.
A: uh ha
Q: And that was, of course, a very wonderful experience too. But now that I’m in practice in psychotherapy, I wanted to do this kind of research, partly to learn as well as help others I hope by it, the research. And it’s been very good that way. So yeah, so thanks.
A: for the intrusion of that (laughter)
Q: (laughter) No, yeah, no that’s o.k. Well, one of the things was I was really interested in, it came up a
number of times, as I say, you spoke … in concern about the patient not being intruded upon, invaded upon, … And I was interested in that thought, a very careful protection of your patients. And I just wondered how, you really see that in your role, protecting them, or how you think about their vulnerability during the process of the analysis, and that relation. (185)

The researcher’s reply to the participant’s question and his allusion to what he refers to as his “intrusion” is an atypically lengthy one and in addition to elaborating upon her interest in the soft substantive category, it also reiterates information regarding the researcher’s dual motivation for her study, information that had been provided to participants prior to their decision to join the study: to learn about clinical practice from expert practitioners, to share this knowledge with others, and to provide participants with an opportunity for self-reflection about their work. Observation of this departure into a lengthy comment by the researcher suggests that while reestablishing the research frame, the researcher also seeks to preserve face for the participant by engaging in a pseudo response to his question. Thus she neither directly nor indirectly challenges the participant: she answers the question while doing so in a manner that does not communicate agreement with the inference that this information has already been shared. In addition, by speaking in over general terms – “it was of course a very wonderful experience, too,” the researcher avoids the topic of herself, she then affirms her respect for and interest in psycho-analysis and then reframes the participant’s question by linking it to her research, in particular by elaborating upon her question regarding the theme of intrusion and thereby she also returns the focus of their communication to the participant’s work experience. The researcher also acknowledges the participant’s reference to his “intrusiveness” and suggests she has not been harmed by it: “No, yeah, no, that’s ok.” This gesture to reassure, and to preserve face for, the participant may also preserve the interview. To do so requires that the researcher not address the intrusion directly or the participant’s efforts to reconfigure the structure of their communicative relationship, while not endorsing this change. As Pinker (2007) has pointed out, the preservation of
face plays an important role in discourse events, and the inferences that follow from them as they
distribute or redistribute power between communication partners. Following Pinker, we see that the
participant exploits the conditions of the context, specifically those set by the researcher’s adherence
to protocol, as he exercises power and seeks access to personal information about the researcher in a
move to address discomfort created by the research experience.

It may be considered that the participant’s discourse move immediately following the
researcher’s introduction of the theme of intrusion may reflect necessary efforts to recreate safety in
conditions of psychological danger. Understood in this way, safety was lost when the researcher
made a request of the participant for a conscious explication of the theme of intrusion in his relations
with his patients. The participant’s misunderstanding of the actual nature of the researcher’s interest
and related question may be the consequence of a restriction of his perceptual and cognitive
capacities following from the pre-conscious reading of this danger. In Main’s (1995) terms, these are
then defensive exclusions designed to re-establish a representational-perceptual state that
characterizes the subjective experience of safety including the achievement of control and the
externalization of conflicted communicative intentions including merger. To this psychological end,
all thoughts about the theme of intrusion or associatively related to it are necessarily dynamically
reconfigured.

**Psychological safety and mutuality.** The second interview proceeds as the participant
expresses the view that he had controlled the researcher’s response to him through the conscious
management of the degree of his intrusion upon her during the first two meetings that comprised the
first interview. He continues in his explicit discussion in interview two of the theme of intrusion
when he expresses his view that he was concerned in the first interview to make the researcher feel
comfortable, to not abuse the researcher by “getting under (her) skin” or trying to “get past that, a
certain boundary or barrier.” The figurative language found in the phrase “get under your skin,” is a metaphor for intrusion that transits on a bodily image in its representation of a quality of human relating. This word choice connotes intrusion of a physical kind where the barrier or boundary traversed is the skin itself. This language also parallels the language used by the participant in his description of his technique in the case illustration of his experience of work going well. As discussed above, that interaction was also characterized by the participant as positively affirming of him through a kind of mutuality of enjoyment. The participant characterizes his behaviour in the interaction with the researcher as motivated by concern, and then recalls the response he had evoked in the researcher in this interaction, as he remembers it. He describes this as affectively positive since, in his words, the researcher had “perked up” and “become engaged.” He also, once again, subtly communicates his understanding that the researcher is responsible for those of his behaviours he has characterized as intrusive

A: so that when you perked up after one or two questions, I say perked up, by perked up I mean, um, that you uh, although you were careful on the issue of disclosing aspects of the project
Q: right
A: when I asked that, you didn’t have much response and so on
Q: right
A: uh that you seemed more engaged
Q: yes
A: and less uh less concerned about the formal aspects
Q: yes, right.
A: of our of our visit,
Q: right
A: um, (long pause) and I guess I don’t want to abuse that
Q: ah
A: my not wanting to abuse that, to get under your skin, or get past that, a certain boundary or certain barrier
Q: oh, interesting
A: so that you can keep your composure, so to speak,
Q: ah
A: but when you responded, you know when you responded affectively and positively then it looked as if, well, I could really show myself, - well, you’re enjoying this
Q: uh ha
A: maybe you’re enjoying this more than some others that you’ve interviewed
Q: uh ha
A: suddenly everything’s come to life here
The participant recalls his concern that he not abuse the researcher, by breaching boundaries or “getting under her skin,” and explains that this management of the interaction between himself and the researcher was meant to insure that she could “keep (her) composure.” Although the participant does not explicitly convey what a “loss of composure” by the researcher would in fact constitute, analysis of the text suggests the participant has imagined a state in the researcher similar to those he describes in his analysands when “things are going well” in the treatment; that is, there is a positive response to him. This understanding is consistent with an interpretation of the intention of this discourse move in the participant’s utterance to reconfigure the structure of the research dyad on the model of a clinical dyad; that is, to situate himself as a clinician who “takes care.” The utterance also implies that in preserving the composure of the researcher, the participant would also be preserving the research, or the research frame: Along this line of meaning, the participant assumes one of the roles that normally fall within the domain of responsibility of a researcher; that is, to preserve the research frame which in this instance he has imagined to be threatened by the potential loss of composure of the actual researcher. Thus the participant pictures himself as both researcher and clinician to the actual researcher. A close reading of the conjunctions communicates the participant’s understanding of the causal sequence in these events; once again, the participant shifts responsibility for intrusions to the researcher, in addition to ascribing a positive affective response to these communicative events.

In the above excerpt, the participant goes on to explain that it was his perception of this positive affective response by the researcher and his belief that she was “enjoying this,” by which he means the interview with him, that led him to feel that he could “show himself.” We have
previously seen that in describing his experience of clinical practice the participant has reported that positive responses from his analysands – where coextensive with positive self-states – affirm him and are also taken to be indicators of therapeutic effectiveness. This formulation played a particularly prominent role in the participant’s representation of the value of counter-transference self-disclosures as a technique of clinical practice. In this description of the interaction by the participant we may identify intentions of affirmation through the response of the other, represented as a mutually positive experience. We have also previously identified a language of breached boundaries in the participant’s discussion of analysands.

While not consciously recognized by the participant as relevant to his work, the soft substantive category of intrusion is recognized by him to have relevance in thinking about the interaction between himself and the researcher, an interaction which as has been shown to, in turn, have associative links to the clinical context and to have been reconfigured as such. Along another dimension, the participant assigns what he understands to be an increase in the researcher’s positive affective response to him causal significance for evoking in his behaviour when he explains that it made him feel that he could “show himself” to her: This may be observed in the use of conjunctions, ‘so’, ‘so’, ‘but’ and ‘then’ (transcript p.186). Following Pinker’s formulation of communication structures as relations between the agon and the agonist, attention to the series of conjunctions in this section of the transcript above reveals another important attribution, more subtly conveyed than the one regarding the origin of confidentiality. In this series of conjunctions, the participant communicates an explanation for his efforts to get under the researcher’s skin, in a series of implicatures that communicate causal meaning through the series of inferences carried in the logical links created by the conjunctions “so, so, but, then.”
The turn of phrase, “show myself” and the related idea of self-revelation, is taken up elsewhere in the utterance when the participant refers to revealing himself in his work, specifically in the technique of countertransference disclosure to analysands. In the case illustration, the participant had attributed positive therapeutic effects to a counter transference self-disclosure and had also noted that this view would not be shared be by his colleagues. But as he believes is the case with his analysands, so he believes it to be with the researcher: the positive response of the other to these disclosures provides psychological safety where they are read as affirmation of these acts and thus of the spontaneous unmediated self. In his consideration of the interaction with the researcher the participant understands the researcher’s response to him to have a positive affective quality that then is further understood to account for his showing or revealing himself in the first interview. The importance of these attributions to the participant’s equilibrium may be illuminated when the view of counter-transference self-disclosure generally held within psycho-analytic thought is taken into account: formulations in psycho-analysis, in theories and principles of technique of the psycho-analysts self-disclosure the analysand turns on the issue of intrusion and boundaries where it is held that self-disclosing behavior is harmful to the treatment and self-serving by the clinician. In psycho-analytic theory and practice, counter-transference self-disclosure or self-disclosure more generally are conventionally considered breaches of the principle of analytic anonymity.

**Analytic anonymity.** In psycho-analytic theory and practice, psycho-analysts’ self-disclosure to analysands is considered to risk intrusion by the analyst upon the analysand in a context where the analytic hour and the mind of the analyst and analysand alike are devoted to reflection upon the lived experience and internal psychic world of the analysand. Thus an exchange of information about the psycho-analyst not only shifts the focus of an analytic hour; it is also understood to risk obstructing the development of the transference, the primary therapeutic vehicle
of psycho-analytic treatment. Given these widely recognized understandings, the participant’s move to both attribute to the other causality for self disclosure and therapeutic value to “getting under the skin” of the other, preserves the sense of self as good. Psychological consists then, in part, in the self-assurance that the other is not harmed by breaching boundaries and that the other experiences positive affect in response to him. The other here is the researcher, and the analysands for whom the researcher holds an analogous and transferential position.

The principle of analytic anonymity is meant, among other things, to protect the analysand from intrusions and, for example, to guard against potential re-traumatization of analysands who have been subject to traumatic boundary-crossing in their history. It is also meant to guard against confounding the internal world of the analyst with the internal world of the analysand, an eventuality that can cripple the psycho-analyst’s capacity for observation of the analysand’s unconscious. The related technical principle of abstinence refers to the analyst abstaining from using the analysand to satisfy his or her needs or desires of any kind – sexual, aggressive or ego related. Within this model, to reveal, show or disclose personal information to an analysand is understood to be motivated by personal needs in the psycho-analyst of a variety of kinds rather than the best interest of the analysand. Thus it seems that the participant’s interaction with the researcher, and his way of understanding it, may draw some of its significance and dynamic structure from the centrality of the issue of self exposure and intrusion within his working life and the professional community of which he is a part. Thus the participant seeks affirmation of the value to the other of self-disclosure in principle and in fact. As reflected in the dynamics of the utterance, self-disclosure and intrusion, as discourse intentions, are linked to a communicative intention to achieve affirmation of the innate, spontaneous or essential self.
**Attribution and the other.** The participant’s memory of his interaction with the researcher as a mutually enjoyable and affectively positive interchange, parallels his characterization of the interaction between himself and his analysand in the case illustration provided in the first interview. Other indicators in the utterance that have been noted suggest that, in the dynamics of communication in this dyad, the researcher is, at times, a place holder for the participant’s analysands. Thus, analysis of the affective state of the researcher, at that point in the first interview to which the participant refers when ascribing a positive affective response to her, was undertaken. This was done to illuminate both this actual encounter and also the participant’s subjective experience of his work life.

Because the participant described a change in the researcher’s demeanor or style reflecting a more positive and responsive affective state – as ”perked up” and “more engaged” – to have occurred “after one or two questions,” particular attention was given to the researcher’s verbal response to the participant’s answers to each of the fourteen prepared questions in that first interview. Any comments by the researcher that went beyond the usual monosyllabic “yes, yeah, right, uh, ha, mn, hm,” or simple affirmations of “interesting” etcetera are referred to as *supplementals* and are identified by the question number and in consecutive sequence by letters, beginning with the letter (a). For example, the first question that had a supplemental was question four, where there were two, designated 4(a) and 4(b). There was no supplemental following questions one through three. The supplementals to question four were (a) “the structure of that”, which functions as a request for a clarification of what the participant had just said: “But it’s hard to teach. It’s hard to put together, it’s hard to formulate some kind of regular pattern” (138); (b) “well I was thinking it might be good to have one, but,” which confirms the request for descriptions of work experience that the
participant has just queried: “… you still want an incident do you?” (139). The single supplemental to question five was in the nature of a follow up: “Um hm, how would you describe the difference, as you saw it, between yourself and these colleagues, these particular colleagues, in terms of the way one.” This supplemental followed the participant’s use of an analogy where sunglasses represent misunderstanding between himself and colleagues and this meaning had not been clear to the researcher. The excerpt given below contains a description by the participant of the futility of talking with colleagues from different theoretical orientations and uses the metaphor of polarized lenses to represent this futility.

With Bernardi (2003) in mind, this excerpt also reports the participant’s experience of finding no way to engage in theoretical discussions across different schools in the psychoanalytic society of which he is a member:

And um, how it didn’t feel productive because of that, because there is no meeting because of our theoretical stances. Um, so they would have one set of lenses or set of filters, and I’d have my set and they would not, they would not put any light on …Sometimes I think of the analogy of the Polaroid lenses sunglasses: you take two glasses with Polaroid lenses and you put them one in the front of the other and the light that the Polaroid filters, ‘cause there is light that is reflected off snow, or water or the road and it comes in horizontally and it blocks persons out or tends to block those out, but if you turn one set of glasses over the other, and hold one set vertically, and one horizontally and put the lenses against each other you don’t see anything at all.

Q: mn
A: It’s a totally totally black, so that’s, it’s that kind of out of kilter
Q: yes
A: It doesn’t bring any light in; it doesn’t enlighten anything. So, uh, that’s uh, that’s how it feels.
Q: yeah
A: And and and I left the group within about four or five meetings. And the contact, the social contact was nice
Q: uh huh
A: We had dinner, we had snacks and we sort of chummed around.
Q: mn hm
A: But in terms of the actual point
Q: mn hm
A: of the whole thing, it had lost its meaning,
Q: mn hm
A: very quickly. And others, the group in fact broke up
Q: uh
A: because there was such dispirit ways of seeing things.

Four supplementals to question six are of a similar nature as that on question five: two are follow ups inviting more information – (a) “Right. And what is it they don’t get, to you?”; requesting clarification – (b) “To make inferences, you mean?”; a restatement of what the participant had said – (c) “You fall back more on theory rather than,” – (d) “Yeah, it does. But what you were saying also is that you bring the same understandings of human nature, awareness of the depths, the layerings and complexities of it, to a situation which in its own way doesn’t allow for all that complexity to necessarily reveal itself.”

Question seven has ten supplementals, an exceptional number when compared to all other questions in the interview. As noted above, because of the participant’s schedule, the first interview was conducted over two meetings. Question seven is the last question asked in the first meeting of the first interview. A review of the second meeting of the first interview shows that supplementals to questions eight through fourteen are rare and follow the pattern of those found in questions 4 (a) through 6 (c): they are brief restatements or requests for clarification. For this reason, the supplementals to question seven offer the single point in the transcript where a consideration of the participant’s assertion that the researcher’s interactive style had changed to such a degree and in such a manner that he felt ‘he could reveal himself”.

Question seven is a request for descriptions that would illustrate what it is that sustains the clinician in their work. The excerpt below includes the researcher’s supplementals as well as what the participant had said prior to these. This is done to provide a context for these supplementals. As this is the point in the interview when the researcher says the most, the verbal exchange around this question is
considered with regard to the participant’s experience that the researcher’s response to him had become less formal and more affectively positive, had “perked up”:

A: Well, I think I’m enjoying it. I think I’m enjoying it more.
Q: mn
A: Not that I wasn’t enjoying it then
Q: mn hm
A: but there is so much more richness, now. It’s a richness, it’s a richness, it’s a very sort of, the variety, um, different dispositions, um, um. It’s being held in high esteem. You know, um, it’s the sense of gratitude, the sense of the person saying, “I never thought of that before,” or “that’s very very meaningful to me” uh, “I thought it was extremely helpful” um “I found myself taken by it, I dreamt something
Q: mn
A: in response to that” uh “I look back now and I realize how different things are now for me than they were back then” um “What you said three years ago at a time when bup bup bup, you said this, or this happened between us or, left a mark on me and this is how its worked itself out”
Q: mn hm
A: the sense of relief that the patient expresses over um the lifting of the shackles of the neurosis and being able to relate better, more satisfying. Basically a response to me, and how helpful I’ve been.

SUPPLEMENT 7 (a) Q: Yeah, well you have talked about experiences that are very meaningful
A: mn hm
SUPPLEMENT 7 (b) Q: of connecting with another human being, aside from anything else, and also, I think, conveying a sense of the feeling of the value of healing, of the opportunity to actually heal
A: Right.
SUPPLEMENT 7 (c) Q: you know, and I’m interested in that too, as a question, your sense of a distinction between the therapeutic, on the one hand, and understanding, on the other. I’m just wondering how you see that, do you see that as a tension at all.
A: No. I don’t make a division there.
Q: yeah
A: It’s all one and the same for me
Q: yeah
A: Its uh, understanding, insight, getting a grip on, uh, to my mind has to happen through a salubrious relationship with somebody else
Q: mn mn
A: and its all, its one and the same thing
Q: mn hm
A: I know that the, that people have divided it up between the value of the interpretation which is commanding understanding and the therapeutic action of the relationship itself and we have words for that like, the therapeutic alliance, the working alliance, stuff like that
Q: right
A: and Kohut made a big deal about that in his posthumous book, ‘How does analysis cure’, and he made this deep division between the insight and understanding, on the one hand, and on the other hand what he talked about as the transmuting internalization
Q: mn hm
A: somehow, um relating it to a deep (affective?) relation with another person. But to me they come together
Q: mn hm
A: I don’t separate them out
SUPPLEMENT 7 (d) Q: mn hm Would you say that it’s in the experience of being understood, that the patient forms that sense of relationship, that strengthens through the experience of being understood?
A: Yes, yes, it happens that way and it happens the other way too, where the relationship is such that there is there is such an openness, because of the trust,
Q: right
A: because of the highly personal connection
SUPPLEMENT (e) Q: uh, the safety?
A: the safety, or, and this is not often talked about, the safety is, but the area of mutual, of, of, collaborative excitement
Q: oh, right
A: uh, in and around the relationship itself, opening up the possibility of talking about things that one would never dream of talking about
Q: right
A: um I mean it happened, for example, with that (omit) man very early on, within, within the first half hour I said something that would have been, that could have been jarring, and very alienating, but he was open to the fact that I was remarking about something that was vitally important to him and he, he took that in because, I think because of that very brief time that we’ve had in the chair, face to face like this,
SUPPLEMENTAL (f) almost like you took that risk for his benefit
A: yeah, right, yeah. Well it better be. Yeah, you better understand that it is for his benefit, rather than for your own, blurting.
SUPPLEMENTAL 7 (g) Q: somehow he seemed to have understood that as well, your saying
A: yes, yes. That’s why he laughed.
SUPPLEMENTAL 7 (h) Q: yes, that it wasn’t from some distant position of just observation of some kind
A: Yes, there is an expression of ‘experience distant’ and ‘experience near’
Q: right,
A: And uh, the experience distant, you can talk to your colleagues about that
Q: right, yeah
A: and you can teach about that but when it comes down to the actual clinical interaction
Q: yeah
A: experience distant is out, is out
SUPPLEMENTAL 7 (i) Q: it’s a felt connection?
A: yeah
SUPPLEMENTAL 7 (j) Q: Somehow, the two of you are already in a relationship?
A: That’s right, in sync, on the same track, there are all kinds of metaphors for that (153)

As supplementals do not appear until question four and are in the nature of short simple statements until 6 (d), which is more conversational in nature, the participant’s memory that after the
first couple of question the researcher’s style of interaction had changed in a significant way, is not substantiated. Although numerous, the supplementals to question seven underlined above do not support an interpretation of a significant change in the direction of a positive quality in the researcher’s affective response. This understanding is strengthened when the language the participant used to describe this change in the researcher, as he perceived it, is recalled and is observed to find no match in the content or the quality of language usage by the researcher in the first interview. The participant’s report of the positive affective change in the researcher is, however, continuous with the discourse intention of mutuality, or in sync states of shared excitement. The related intention to be seen as special by others, evident at the explicit level of the text below in the reflection “maybe you’re enjoying this more than some others that you’ve interviewed,” where being special is a comparative measure relative to other participants in the researcher’s study is another attribution made by the participant to the researcher:

A: so that when you perked up after one or two questions, I say perked up, by perked up I mean, um, that …you seemed more engaged. and less uh less concerned about the formal aspects… of our of our visit, … when you responded, you know when you responded affectively and positively then it looked as if, well, well, you’re enjoying this, maybe you’re enjoying this more than some others that you’ve interviewed…suddenly everything’s come to life here and that gets into your uh that gets into your juices, so to speak. (186-187)

While the consideration of supplementals to questions asked in the first interview do not support the idea of increased positive affective response by the researcher, scrutiny of the final moments in this first meeting of the first interview shows a verbal interchange which suggests the participant misunderstood the researcher’s specific meaning in the communicative exchange and which may explain his more general failure to understand the researcher’s experience of interviewing him. This occurs when the participant asks the researcher a direct question concerning her experience of interviewing, shortly after he has answered question seven that initiates the exchange. The participant’s question follows a statement of appreciation by the researcher meant to bring the first meeting of the
first interview to a close. This discourse event also turns on the theme of specialness previously identified as a communicative intention animating this utterance.

Q: yeah, yeah. O.k. thank you very much, its very interesting. I must say I found this all, this work, very compelling,
A: This work? Specifically? You mean, or all this, all this you’re doing?
Q: This specifically and of course all of this, yes, very much so. Very compelling. I’m very fortunate to be doing this. I’ll uh, I’ll uh, end the tape now. (153)

The researcher’s reply to the participant’s question suggests that she had some difficulty negotiating the task of preserving face for the participant while communicating the truth of her experience of conducting the research interviews. This is because the participant’s request for clarification implicitly concerns the issue of his specialness and communicates a request for affirmation that the researcher appears to have read at the implicit level. The researcher’s answer to the participant’s question is unclear. The lack of clarity results from the researcher’s conflation of the two elements the participant has sought to discriminate, her experience of interviewing him individually and her experience of conducting the research overall. In this conflation, the researcher avoids individualizing and limiting her expression of appreciation to this particular participant while continuing to include him within the general experience of doing the research to which he has made a contribution and for which she is expressing gratitude. The confusion in the interchange appears to arise from different meanings ascribed by the researcher on the one hand, and by the participant on the other to the term “work.” For the researcher, the work refers to the work of doing the research as a whole, whereas to the participant work refers specifically to this interview with himself. While the researcher has sought not to affirm ‘specialness,’ and instead to communicate a rather generic appreciation, the participant has understood her communication to be an affirmation of his specialness. This interpretation is supported by his description – given in the transcript excerpt above (transcript pp. 186-7) from early in the second
However, given the nature of the participant’s question, the researcher’s reply may have been interpreted by him in a manner that has meaning beyond that intended by the researcher and that is beyond its intended function to express a standard professional courtesy. That there is such a misunderstanding is supported by a reconsideration of the transcript of the second interview where the participant clearly states at the beginning of that interview that he believed the researcher had said that she had enjoyed interviewing him more than other participants in the study. It remains the case, however, that, in fact, there is no evidence in the text indicating such a communication by the researcher or, more particularly, of the transformation in the researcher’s affective state of the kind to which the participant had referred and through which he goes on to give an account of his showing or disclosing himself. This is particularly salient where, as we have seen, response from the other is, for this participant, linked to affirmation of basic goodness of the self, or failure in that search for affirmation in the management of psychic equilibrium. This is related to the superordinate theme of intrusion, the soft substantive category, where the participant is concerned to receive affirmation that his counter-transference disclosures are beneficial to his analysands just as they are to him. This participant’s intrusion upon the researcher through discourse moves reflect the intention to realize such affirmations in the form of a response indicating that he is innately good, special and pleases or excites the other.

Hollway and Jefferson’s, (2000) advise that researchers consider their affective responses to their participants as a source of information about the internal world of the participant, is applied here for verification of the participant’s assertion regarding the researcher’s affective state; that is, of the degree of correspondence between the participant’s assertion and the researcher’s actual experience. Approached in this manner, the internal world of the participant is illuminated. To this
end, it is noted that the researcher’s experience of the first interview with this participant included occasions of discomfort and could not, in general, be described as subjectively positive. Nor was it experienced as having acquired a heightened positive quality as the interview progressed, as the participant believed to be the case. This self-reflexive information is consistent with the lack of textual evidence found in analysis of the transcripts of the first interview reported above that would support the participant’s memory of the affective state of the researcher. This also brings into question the use of the psycho-analyst’s subjective experience of practice as a measure of their analysand’s internal world or the therapeutic value of their work.

**Breaches in mutuality.** Analysis of the transcript of the third meeting, which records the second interview, suggests that the participant’s initial misunderstanding of positive affirmation of his clinical technique by the researcher, may have followed from the anxiety stimulated by the explicit introduction of the theme of intrusion in the initiating question at the beginning of the second interview. This moment in the research process occurs before the particular significance of that theme, or related themes had been understood through the analysis practiced in the later steps in the research process. That the theme of intrusion creates anxiety for the participant is suggested, in part, by his interruption of the researcher before she has completed asking the initiating question in full:

Q:… First I’d like to ask you a question that is really about your relation to your patients, that’s probably what one could say about it. I was really interested to see that um I found myself thinking about the issues of intrusiveness and defence in our discussion. That was because, um, A: You mean like the defence in reaction to the intrusion (181)

As considered above, anxiety may have restricted memory and mobilized communicative intentions utilizing projective identification to maintain psychic equilibrium. The appropriateness of this interpretation of this discourse event follows from its explanatory utility in accounting for the participant’s misunderstanding of the initiating question, despite the researcher’s efforts to restate
the question within a context that depicted the participant in a positive light; that is, as protecting his patients from intrusion and as open in discussing his clinical technique. The specific meaning of terms such as “defence” are very context dependent. In psycho-analysis, for example, defence has a quite different meaning than that for which it is being used by the researcher in the initiating question contained in the excerpt above. The researcher is using defence in its more general meaning in English as ‘protection’ from harm. However, in the psycho-analytic lexicon, defence refers to an essentially negative neurotic function, where aspects of reality are excluded from awareness by an individual in response to the anxiety that awareness of that reality evokes for them. While a part of the mental life of all human beings, the frequency and quality of the defence any individual uses is not only part of what constitutes character or personality but also distinguishes neurotic from psychotic pathologies. When either is used to an excessive degree, or where a limited number of more pathological defences predominate, defences are very costly to psychological health. Even when utilized in the ongoing day to day management of our relationship to reality, all defences compromise the perception of reality to some degree.

In addition to the researcher’s use of the term “defence,” the participant’s anxious misunderstanding may also have been evoked by the researcher quoting the participant to himself in his use of the term “blocking” to describe his inability to think of case material to illustrate points he was making during the first interview regarding his theoretical and technical orientation. This reflected the researcher’s preliminary understanding of what might have accounted for her participant’s limited provision of descriptions of actual work experience in interview one. This convention of in-depth interviewing practice – where the interviewer incorporates the language of the participant into their speech – is meant to promote rapport. However, in psycho-analytic understanding “blocking” refers to a brief failure of memory, understood to be context specific and
to result from an unconscious resistance to remembering due to anxiety. Blocking is familiar in ordinary conversation. While typically mild in nature, and commonly soon overcome, blocking is considered a form of defensive response. Like many psycho-analytic terms, blocking is found in general conversational usage and in that context refers to a temporary forgetting without the specific psycho-dynamic implications. Thus the researcher’s use of a convention of face to face interviewing technique where the interviewer paraphrases what a participant has said, integrating some of their language, may have contributed to anxiety rather than building rapport.

From another psycho-analytic perspective, the participant’s mistaken view of the researcher’s affective experience, where the participant attributes his experience of the interview to the researcher, may be considered a mirror assumption; that is, the participant’s perception of the researcher’s affective state is a reflection of his own. Projective identification, like all forms of projection, however formulated within different schools of psycho-analytic thought, share the feature that some aspect of the internal world of one individual is externalized and attributed to some other individual or group. In this instance, of attribution of a positive affective experience to the researcher by the participant serves the intention of a realization of the subjective experience of mutuality and merger, shaping communicative gesture. As noted, the researcher’s experience of the first interview was quite the contrary and the review of the transcript of the first interview fails to identify elements of the communicative interaction that could account for the participant’s memory of the development of a more than average positive affective response to himself by the researcher. While the researcher is polite, her responses are minimal in keeping with the research protocol for the first interview, and affirmative in a manner designed to maintain rapport and refrain from foreclosing or shaping the participant’s free response to her questions. In a break with conventional practice in much phenomenological life history studies in qualitative research, in the first interview,
no follow up probes or attempts to keep the participant on track were used, nor, in general, were there requests for clarification except in the one instance of question seven. This discipline upon the researcher, part of the protocol of the first interview may have placed an unanticipated stress upon the participant. A review of the transcript shows only the most subtle shifts in the researcher’s choice of monosyllabic words of affirmation or interest in what the participant was saying reflecting the researcher’s aim of maintaining rapport through interjections calibrated to preserve communicative contact without interfering with the participant’s thought trajectory and without confounding his ideas and subjective experience with her own. This approach was part of the protocol of the first interview and not the second and may have frustrated the realization of unconscious discourse intentions for the participant thereby creating disequilibria and further shaping gesture. Analysis of the second interview does provide evidence that suggest the participant was able to more successfully satisfy relationship goals or intentions within a less structured research encounter.

**Memory and conflict.** The earlier consideration of the participant’s mistaken memory that the researcher had introduced the theme of confidentiality to their discussion may be extended through a re-reading using the psycho-analytic formulation of conflict. As we have seen, the theme of confidentiality is associatively related to the theme of intrusion. From a psycho-analytic perspective, the failure of memory and the accompanying attribution by the participant to the researcher of the introduction of that theme of confidentiality suggests conflict regarding that theme and the more encompassing theme of intrusion of which it is a derivative. Memory, like perception may become selective as a way of resolving psychological conflict. Repression, the removal of mental contents from consciousness, like projection, functions outside awareness. In combination, these psychic mechanisms may have rendered conscious reflection upon the reasons for, or the
clinical implications of, a change in technique to include counter-transference self disclosure beyond the reach of conscious reflection; that is, unthinkable. While Pinker (1994, 2007) has no dynamic view of mentalese where thought is seen to passes in and out of word representation, the notion that conflict may render or maintain thought outside awareness while influencing the shape of communicative gesture integrates psycho-analytic and psycho-linguistic principles in a fruitful manner. Analysis of the utterance revealed that the introduction of the theme of confidentiality and ethics resulted in the participant’s detailed description of intrusions by others upon his freedom of practice and the attributions to the researcher already discussed. Thus projection is used in two forms of externalization of unthinkable thoughts. Conflict is resolved by externalizations and by the removal from awareness of questions regarding therapeutic implications of recent innovations in clinical technique. In psycho-analytic theory conflict arises between behaviours, intentions or memories derived from instinctive life and higher mental functions of the ego including rationality, conscience and standards of morality where these instincts are not employed in derivative form through sublimation in creative endeavor. Where not employed in creativity, the resolution of conflict with the instincts may evoke the repression or projection of mental contents that are discordant with these higher mental functions. Projection in this instance, then, means that the researcher has become the repository for disavowed mental contents that give rise to anxiety for this participant. The researcher has also, unknowingly, created an obstacle to the participant’s achievement of communicative goal of mutuality or shared states stimulating anxiety, since affirmation of self through these moves preserves equilibrium.

Another example of a breach in mutuality can be observed in the utterance. As noted above, the participant does not explicitly address the theme of intrusion except in his description of the interaction between himself and the researcher. The analysis of the text of the second interview
following the researcher’s introduction of the soft substantive category and the participant's assertions regarding that interaction reveals a communicative event worthy of consideration. This is the explicit expression of disapproval of the researcher by the participant. This follows an interchange where the participant has given consideration to the possible symbolic significance for his analysands of the absence of a plate that had formerly hung on his office wall and that he had accidentally broken that morning before the third meeting with the researcher. The plate under discussion had initially been described by the participant in his answer to question one in the first interview where it introduced an understanding of himself as special and a leader in the eyes of his analysands (this is considered above in step three). The researcher then asked for the participant’s thoughts concerning the possible symbolic significance of another item of office décor, a rocking chair. The rocking chair had been of interest to the researcher because it was in a style unlike the other items in the office, suggesting that it held significance of some kind. In the following communicative exchange, the participant objects to the language the researcher has used in framing her question and links this language to theories in psycho-analysis of which he disapproves and more specifically to the classical or Freudian school about which he then expresses a more general disapproval. The participant goes on to express his conviction that such language “does violence” to a number of things, including, by implication, himself.

The excerpt below contains that section from the transcript which records this interchange:

Q: Right, fascinating, yeah,. I was actually going to ask you about another symbol, about the symbolism of another object in the room, which was the rocking chair.
A: right
Q… it evoked for me the issue of the maternal aspect, or the maternal function in the work. I wondered how you think about the meaning of that for you and also that aspect of yourself for the work. Um, if you could just
A: Uh, yeah, yeah, I have over the past just few years been thinking about, I have reservations about assigning such terms to the different aspects of the relationship
Q: uh
A: Um and um maybe I’m helped in that by the fact that one of my daughters is a very ardent feminist and uh has spent a lot of time about de-genderizing so many words
Q: mn, mn hm
A: Um, the uh, what I, when I helped feed, feed the babies, uh, I mean I fed the babies, I changed diapers and nurtured
Q: right
A: as part of my personhood
Q: right
A: I didn’t see this as particularly paternal, or maternal
Q: O.K.
A: And it’s the same kind of relaxed and calm nurturing, I think,
Q: mn hm
A: that had me bring the chair in
Q: mn hm
A: and had me disposed towards, uh, that kind of sense of providing, giving
Q: mn hm
A: being available
Q: mn hm
A: that sort of thing….
A: So it something, yeah, its something of myself, something parts of me that’s very very personal
Q: mn hm
A: that I actually brought in here. And there’s no other, not many other things that are, are, I can’t think of anything actually that I brought here; everything you see here was pretty well acquired with the office in mind
Q: yes, that was my sense
A: yeah
Q: when you explained it
A: yeah. That’s the only piece.
Q: that there was something very special about that piece
A: right, right, that is the only piece that’s personal and I use it myself, sensitive to that, deeply sentimental
Q: And its very interesting to have you check me on that maternal-paternal split as well.
A: right, and its still being used. And when I hear it, it distresses me,
Q: mn hm
A: because I, I feel it’s an unreflected utterance… Almost like an off the rack, or a close at hand or a handy thing to pull in. And I think it does violence to a lot of stuff, because uh I believe that, when I think about it, maternal-paternal, I think I’m erecting a false edifice, I think – I’m gonna mix the metaphor- I think I’m going to end up in a cul-de-sac before long
Q: mn
A: Uh…I’m glad that there is much less of this
Q: mn
A: in the whole new relational field
Q: ah
A: of psycho-analysis
Q: right
A: And much, a lot of it still goes on, with people who are rigorously holding onto classical psychological stuff… Um, and it helps I think it helps alienate me, so to speak, even more so from that writing
Q: right
A: I have a hard time penetrating, well, ‘what do you really mean by maternal?’
Q: right
A: and what do you mean by the maternal function?’
Q: right
A: What are you really getting at here. Why are you floundering about with an idea that keeps it inaccessible.
Q: uh ha
A: as if there is some kind of mystique about the idea of something paternal, something maternal
Q: right
A: There is a divide there: men are acting one way, women are acting another way, the twain don’t meet…I mean for a while, we struggled between truly maternal, a mother, a mother versus a mother substitute
Q: mn hm
A: As if there was a difference.
Q: hm
A: You know, how do you tell a wet nurse from a mother’s breast. I mean
Q: mn hm
A: One of our colleagues, has done a lot of work on nannies
Q: oh yes
A: And uh, I mean, I find nothing remarkable about the nanny in that she is another mother. I had a nanny.
Q: mn hm
A: For six years of my life, my mother was away
Q: mn hm
A: she was out at work
Q: mn hm
A: and she was my mother for that time; she was a parent
Q: right
A: you know. But because women have breasts
Q: mn hm
A: you know, somehow we are brought up to the idea that she’s the only one who can, uh, authentically feeds. (194-200)

The participant’s objection to the researcher’s use of the term maternal function arises from his understanding that the term implies a distinction between parenting roles along gender lines. He links what he characterizes as this seriously harmful error of distinguishing between maternal and paternal care to another harmful and erroneous distinction between nannies and biological mothers. The participant explains that to suggest such a difference is an error of a very serious kind, one that does violence to important things. An overview of this excerpt shows that the movement in the participant’s critique of the researcher is from a discussion of language usage to the professional realm of associations and theoretical schools to the personal realm, his
Structural Metaphor

relationships with his mother and nanny. The affective intensity reflected in the language of
“violence,” “alienation” and “distress” may be understood to arise from this latter dimension of
personal meaning. The researcher has inadvertently touched upon an area of significance from the
personal life of the participant. This understanding is confirmed at a later point when the
participant once again addresses these figures in his life, communicated at the close of the second
interview, following upon the researcher having stated that the interview was finished. This
communication and its context is given in the excerpt below:

A: Right, right. Is that it?
Q: It’s all the questions I have, but I would be pleased to
hear, I’m just mindful that I don’t want to take your time
A: Sure, yeah, uh, so we’ll stop. There’s one more thing,
first of all you’ve been very good, your very thoughtful,
your very very thoughtful.
Q: Thank you
A: And your response to me does a lot for me
Q: Oh
A: I’ve got a lot from this.
Q: Oh, I’m so glad; that’s what I wanted to happen
A: Right, I, we don’t often talk that way
Q: uh ha
A: with my colleagues, we don’t often talk that way.
Although it may come up in the course of a class
Q: mn hm
A: and so fourth. And I thought to myself, thank goodness I
had a nanny
Q: yes
A: who wasn’t my mother
Q: yes
A: uh, thankfully she was out at work and she let this person
come into my life.
Q: right
A: I was with her for six years
Q: right
A: So there was something perhaps from there
Q: Yes
A: That there’s um there’s two things
Q: right
A: I don’t want to get too too… I’ll give you the
photocopy…(218-219)

The term ‘maternal function’ has come into conventional usage in psychology and psycho-
analysis more particularly in recent times to refer to a set of care taking functions upon which the
infant and small child depends for its survival and development, recognized to be potentially
performed by both men or women in contemporary society although historically the provision of such care by a father was uncommon and not socially sanctioned in most cultures. This conventional meaning was the researcher’s intended usage in her invitation to the participant to discuss the symbolisms of the rocking chair. Thus, use of the term is, inclusive of the participant, and men more generally as potential providers of such care. Following from biological factors as well as social convention, the term maternal function is recognized to refer to that dimension of care that is crucial to psychological growth and development in addition to physical survival. The paternal function, also potentially provided by a female, is understood to be related to the promotion of the development of the child through sponsoring separation from the primary caretaking figure and thus to individuation and to issues of loss, identification as the child turns to and engages with the reality of the larger world. The participant’s concern is to make the point that, to the baby, it makes no difference who feeds it and he understood the researcher’s use of the term ‘maternal function’ to suggest that it does. At the simplest level of meaning, the use of the terms ‘maternal function’ and ‘paternal function’ developed in psychological language precisely to suggest otherwise, as it replaces the more restricted terms ‘mother’ and ‘father.’

The participant’s objection to the distinction being made between types of care provided by mothers and fathers, we have seen is related to another distinction between a biological mother and a nanny, a distinction that may be of more salience. The question of difference or no-difference, as the participant sees this, pertains to the infant’s or child’s experience, with regard to which, he insists there is none; that is, for the baby, a nanny is as good as a mother.

Exploration of the participant’s expression of disapproval of the researcher’s use of the term ‘maternal function’ also illuminates a set of understandings that are part of his theoretical orientation and technical approach that may be seen to be consistent with personal experience.
This communication also directed the interview away from an exploration of the participant’s work experience to a theoretical discussion of psycho-analytic schools. Thus the rocking chair becomes the locus of a disruption in the communicative relation between researcher and participant characterized by a breach in mutuality or in-sync feelings for the participant. The researcher’s inquiry into the rocking chair and the language she uses to make that inquiry appears to have disrupted an illusion of mutuality. In addition, the researcher’s enquiry evoked an area of significant meaning for the participant, associated with gender and parenting that had significance in his personal life symbolized by the rocking chair that remains opaque.

The participant reports that the relational field of psycho-analysis, promotes a view that is continuous with a de-gendering of language and of the analytic function. Thus the researcher’s use of a gendered language is experienced by the participant as “doing violence” to him and to “a lot of other things.” Most immediately in relational terms, it ‘does violence’ to the participant’s subjective experience of mutuality in the relation between himself and the researcher. The researcher’s inquiry into the symbolic significance of the rocking chair inadvertently touched upon meanings for the participant that threatened psychic equilibrium in addition to disrupting the communicative relation between herself and her participant. This disruption results in a discourse move evident in the participant’s utterance which solidifies the distance in the dyad through an intensification of the participant’s pedagogic stance in relation to the researcher. He corrects and instructs her on her error. The intensity of the participant’s experience of the researcher’s use of the term maternal function seriously disrupts the relation between himself and the researcher because of the importance of overcoming distinctions along a number of dimensions.

**Mutuality and merger.** The theme of mutuality was introduced by the participant in his explicit reply to questions one and two in the first interview. In describing his office
In reply to question two, in describing what he likes about his work, the participant says,

A: Um, there’s also the recognition that what people come in with, um, begin to feel open and trusting, that they are saying things that I’m familiar with, not only in terms of with other patients, but can locate similar or same trends or trends of thought in myself. And uh in that sense, there is something that in a sense uh is salubrious about that for the analyst, in that uh, it’s sometimes said that, in the way in which the analyst continues his self analysis is though contact, through situations, immersion in situations that uh evoke memories and thoughts and feelings that go back a long long way

Q: yeah
A: and that touch on certain themes, however conflictual, you know, that you have to revisit them, when you see them in somebody else. Um, the immersion is important, in that I depend a great deal on the capacity to empathize, to use empathy in my work, and to put myself in the person’s shoes and to identify with them. Um, mutuality is important. Um, I feel freer now than I felt during my training, or shortly after my training,…(132-133)

In reply to question nine, the participant explains that what he thinks of as transformative for his analysands, in addition to being understood, rather more important is, the experience of reciprocity and mutuality in the relationship with their psycho-analyst. This is, in turn, also what confirms him in his new way of working:

…thinking that if its good for me, it means if its good for me its good for him if we’re in sync. Um and going to uh see if I can’t find some tactful way, some non-disruptive way of letting him know, (words unclear) what my thoughts were. Not only to lead to more understanding, things for me to grapple with but also at the same time deepening of the relationship too, giving a sense of reciprocity and mutuality.

Q: mn
A: Which is hard to book because this is my office, it’s my rules, I um, I sit here, you sit there, I charge you, you pay me and there is a certain um (asks to be excused – sound of door-pause on tape- sound of door) So I guess, that’s kind of a transforming,

Q: mn
A: transformative experience I think I’ve, I probably have had at the earlier part of this. Which to me keeps going on, keeps being reconfirmed in these new experiences (161-162)
In speaking about his relationship with his analysands, the participant explains that an experience of mutuality, of self-states shared by himself and his analysands, referred to as the ‘in-sync’ feeling, make the type of unconventional therapeutic interventions that he has described as the most therapeutically effective, possible. The in-sync feeling, “is a testimony to, the constancy or the durability of those kind of in-sync feelings that I can depend upon in this relationship to be open and to receptive on both parts…getting past…conservative leaning colleagues…to get under (the analysand’s) skin rather than, pinging off his armor,” (transcript p. 154) providing access to the analysand’s affective experience and thereby advancing the therapeutic process.

A review of the participant’s reply to question eight reveals a use of pronouns which effect a moment of merger through the realization of a conflation of identities between the participant and his analysand. In this conflation, “I” becomes “ourselves” or “we”:

Now that was um, a risky business, because in the first half hour of our encounter. But we’ve been through a number of things like that um, um, and I have, reassured ourselves of the importance of being able to do that with him in order to get under his skin rather than to be met with pinging off his armor. (155).

Another, and more detailed, description of merger experienced in the course of clinical practice, is provided at the close of the second interview when the participant describes his method of note taking when in session. This is in reply to the researcher’s final question in the second interview when she has asked the participant if he would elaborate on the theme of mutuality. Reference to the participant’s earlier reply to question two, given above, suggests that in asking this final question, the researcher is recalling this very early communication by her participant. The question and the reply are given below:

Q: There is only really one more question that I was going to speak about, which was, but I see the time
A: Well go ahead, the person coming in is usually a little late
Q: Oh, o.k. It was about mutuality, this was something you referred to and it seemed very important to you. And um I was wondering about that because you talked about it as something really beyond empathy, a kind of taking on of identities, you know when either you take on a colleagues position in relation to his patients or her patients
A: oh yeah
Q: or the patient’s position. And I was very interested in that, almost it felt like the permeability, and the comfort you had with the permeability of boundaries, so taking that on, and it made me think of the way you use yourself as an instrument. And I just wondered if you could think about that, out loud, or talk about that in any way you want.
A: Well I think I talked about the idea of getting into someone’s shoes.
Q: Yes, that’s a phrase you used.
A: And um, uh, I don’t know what I’d want to say about it. I mean there may be something about the idea having a conversation with oneself
Q: mn
A: of experiencing oneself in identification with the patient and also of experiencing oneself as an object of that, of that for the patient
Q: yes
A: of that complimentary position, so that uh, in the material… First of all, when I write my notes I do, I mean I do make note of explicit comments I made
Q: yes
A: or thoughts I’m having, right
Q: yes
A: I use parentheses, and brackets for my words.
Q: yes
A: But most often, most of my notes, my uh my own conveyance of the patient is embedded in the patient’s productions.
Q: yes
A: So I’ll have the patient say something that I’ve said and which I’ve derived clearly from the material, maybe say that and it is in the midst of the experience as he discovers it so that the conversation flows and I’m recording this as if the patient is saying almost everything. That’s another, that’s another manifestation
Q: oh, that’s interesting
A: of that; it wrecks havoc with anyone reading my notes because they don’t see where I’ve made any interpretation or made any comments, or what have you.
Q: oh, I see
A: but it’s in, it’s in, it’s as if it’s part of the patient’s experience
Q: um, could I say that - in trying to understand this - um, that the patient partly finds their way to themselves, sort of, in you
A: right
Q: you know and it’s somehow possible to do that when it’s contained somehow for them in that way?
A: yeah, they, what they, maybe they hear themselves talking
Q: yes
A: when I’ll say something
Q: right
A: and they’re having that dialogue with themselves and it appears that way in my notes, comes out that way,
Q: right
A: although they haven’t actually said it, I’ve said it, you know
Q: yes, so that it’s not, you know it’s interesting, cause it sort of takes us back to intrusiveness, overcoming, helping the patient overcome the experience of being intruded upon where they actually experience you as part
A: as part of themselves, that’s right
Q: of them.
A: that’s right.
Q: So I had it the wrong way around initially.
A: Well, yes. I have the experience. But I have it both ways, and maybe that’s where the mutuality comes from
Q: yeah
A: because I have the experience of their, of them being in me as well
Q: right (216-217)

This image of the notes from an analytic session blending the identities of the psycho-analyst and the analysand into a single utterance conveying the image of a single identity powerfully communicates a representation of this participant’s way of working and of his experience of his work, bringing to life both his subjective experience and his deportment as a psycho-analyst.

The experience represented is that of merger, or overcoming boundaries, specifically boundaries of identity. The researcher’s struggle to understand what the participant is in fact describing may in part be accounted for by the uniqueness of the participant’s approach. He describes writing his notes in a manner that attributes to his analysands parts of what has in fact been said in session by himself, combining his words with theirs. It is apparent that the researcher’s difficulty in understanding this remains as long as she seeks to make sense of what she is hearing within the more conventional model of communicative dynamics in psycho-analytic practice where the psycho-analyst comes to understand the patient in part through the projections, including attributions, that the analysand makes to their psycho-analyst. These are understood to be a manifestation of the transference, but this can only be recognized where the psycho-analyst retains her sense of having an identity separate from her analysand. The researcher remains unable to comprehend what her participant has said until she links it to the participant’s early formulation of what he has described as a technique of “getting under the skin” of his patients, for their benefit. This is an understanding that requires that the researcher accept the participant’s
premise or claim that his way of working, incorporating various forms of merged identity between himself and his analysands, is therapeutically successful. In the absence of this, the mode of note-taking that the participant describes would be understood within general psychoanalytic practice and theory of technique as a quite concrete manifestation of a psycho-analyst’s countertransference. Thus in this instance, the researcher’s comprehension of the participant’s communication also necessitates a form of identification where the researcher must take on the perspective of the participant merely to comprehend what he has said. While the resolution of the question of the therapeutic viability of merger techniques is beyond the compass of this study, the participant’s description of the manner in which he writes his clinical notes does further substantiate the discourse intention of merger as an important component in this participant’s subjective experience of his work.

**Step five: Intuitive Judgment – Fire**

**Theory of existence.** In the final step in the research process, the researcher’s mode of observation represents what Goethe called a “higher empiricism,” (Hoffman, 1998, p. 135) more active in nature than previous modes, it brings into view “pure phenomenon” through a “distillation” (p.135) of gestures observed in the previous step. For Goethe, pure phenomenon refers to the *creative potency* of a living organism or its *theory of existence* manifest in an integrated presence and *way* an entity *is itself.* Within a broader phenomenological perspective, pure phenomenon may be understood as way of being-in-the-world (Dreyfus, 1991).

The observation of any organism’s pure phenomenon presupposes preparation by the observations made in all previous steps and, for Hoffman (1998) arises through the scientist’s “*intuitive perception*” (p. 135). Hoffman’s intuitive perception is, he points out, a variation on Goethe’s term, (anschauende urteilskraft) usually translated as intuitive judgment, the latter placing
a greater emphasis upon the rational, reasoning or cognitive aspects of observation in this mode. Subtly divergent in emphases, Goethe and Hoffman each stress the role disciplined practice and experience play in intuition. Intuitive perception, or judgment, is not an innate capacity, but an achieved one and is also a self generating activity.

In Goethe’s and in Hoffman’s view, this mode shifts the balance in the researcher’s observational stance, away from an empirical objective perception to an internal knowing, where the perception of the other become part of the self, both knowledge and sensibility. Represented by Bockemuhl through the metaphor fire, this self-generative aspect is imagined as a flame’s leap, connoting both the energy inherent in a leap of intellect and the burn of realization. Practice in this step performs a synthesizing function that moves beyond the basic empirical to abstraction. The metaphor of fire connotes an observation that is no longer acquiescent, as in step four burning instead with the intensity of conviction. Nevertheless, in this step, scientific balance requires that the researcher remain aware that “in the infinite depths of nature, there would always be higher principles under which one’s axioms or theories could be subsumed….Pure phenomenon is neither bounded nor fixed” (Hoffman, 1998, p. 135).

This mode of observation also calls upon a researcher to express or present pure phenomenon through the power of the symbolic, including, for Goethe, mathematics. For Hoffman, in his botanical studies the symbolic expression is poetry and painting. In this study, the researcher turns to metaphor. It is the symbolic aspect that Hoffman seeks to emphasize in his choice of perception over judgment, and that Goethe implies in his distinction between a lower and a higher empiricism, a dimension of scientific practice to which Hampe (2003) has more recently drawn attention to in his consideration of scientific creativity. For Freud also, creativity, including creative intelligence, performs an integrative, combining or synthesizing function.
Bockemuhl’s metaphor also connotes the quality of warmth generated at a point of contact between two entities through identification, heightening intensity in both cognitive and affective dimensions. Following Heidegger, Hoffman’s understanding of identification both a pointing to the phenomenon as an entity external to the self and also an internalizing process of where re-cognition or knowing becomes part of the self.

Symbolic representation takes intuitive judgment to communication. Scientific communication or dialogue, brings commitment to an idea, proposition or an hypothesis from where one begins again. When research praxis is both active observation and creative achievement, it is a coming through, an exacting engagement with reality, resulting in communication.

Writing. In this study, the researcher has joined the emphasis upon contact and synthesis to the notion of a researcher animated through symbolic representation to conceptualize scientific writing within a Goetheian phenomenological sensibility: representation as an observational mode is praxis and Goethe’s higher empiricism. In scientific writing, the researcher holds a paradoxical position akin to that of science in history; this is a position that requires commitment or conviction on the one hand, with open mindedness on the other. Scientific writing, like the practice of research is an effort to bring something into view and to disclose this view to others: by seeking to join an ongoing discourse and by inviting a reply, it is both dialogic and collegial.

Structural metaphor. In the final step of analysis, the researcher has conceptualized pure phenomenon as a structural metaphor, to represent a set of communicative dynamics and gestures that express a theory of existence or creative potency observed in the utterance. Within communication, pure phenomenon or theory of existence-creative potency manifest in inclinations toward the realization of qualities of subjective experience in communicative deportment or gesture, or communicative action (Habermas, 1971). The concept structural metaphor links the concept of
pure phenomenon to understandings of metaphoric function. Unconscious structural metaphors represent an unconscious picturing of self-in-world. Within a psycho-analytic understanding, this trope or textual conceit of self is read as representing the unconscious phantasy of self-other dynamics, or object-relations. The concept of a structural metaphor, an hypothetical construct, follows from the principle of inference to the loveliest explanation (Lipton, 2004); that is, it is meant to give an explanatory accounting of the observations derived through the layered analysis of data that is the record of each participant’s utterance.

The structural metaphor is conceptualized to be in the nature of pre-linguistic inferred proposition as Pinker (2007) formulates this through his concept of wordless thought. Structural metaphors are hypothesized to function at that level of mental life within which Pinker (2007) locates mentalese, and are hypothesized to manifest through similarly innate mental potentials. Structural metaphors are distinguished from the metaphor found within literary forms where this innate human capacity is brought under conscious control, educated or crafted as it is developed as an artifact of aesthetic culture.

As Pinker (2007) suggests, inference making and planning is centered on the categories of agonist and agon – the one who acts and the one who is acted upon - and the causal links between these relational properties. Pinker’s formulation of wordless thought is continuous with the findings of this study where the creative use of the metaphoric function demonstrates a dimension of reason. Structural metaphor is used to account for participants’ representation and communication of unconscious understandings of self-in-work as well as in the realization of intersubjective and intra-psychic ends in the research encounter. The concept of the structural metaphor is meant to assist in the comprehension of the subjective experience of the participants in this study identified in the analysis of conscious and
unconscious communicative contact. Structural metaphors, understood as a psychological construct achieve subjectivity. A structural metaphor is theorized to manifest in the shape of a way-of-being in work, and in communicative deportment reflected within utterance and subjective experience. This concept is used to account for the character of the utterance in this study as participants represented their experience of work. In any single instance the coherence observed in the manifest form of the structural metaphor is understood to register inferences from a history of individual experiences and the solutions they imply to the psychic tasks set by existence.

Structural metaphors viewed as a *theory of existence* emphasize the active moment by moment creation of *something new* in the ongoing negotiation between inner and outer reality. The structural metaphor is hypothesized to take form in unconscious communication with self and with other in the course of lived experience.

**The metaphorical function.** At the core of figurative language, metaphor creates new understandings through connotative meanings when it exploits familiar or unusual likenesses between one thing and another: this function depends upon the capacity of the human mind for fluidity in establishing associative links across a multiplicity of representational and experiential dimensions. In the creation of new meaning, a metaphor links indirectly, obscures but never entirely loses the connection to its origins. Bollas (1980) speaking of metaphor through an object relational view, has suggested that a metaphor creates the experience of an intimate relationship between its creator and its interpreter, a felt relationship that may transverse vast stretches of time and space.

The capacity for metaphor is part of the generative potential of all human beings, a function of mind, innately and psychologically given. Empirical evidence to support the innately metaphorical nature of the mental life of human beings has gathered in psychology where the
contribution of metaphor to cognitive efficiency in the adaptations of formal learning and in skill development is emphasized. Spelke, (1997) has identified the use of metaphorical thinking in very early pre-mathematical abilities which she takes to be innate. Bowerman (1983) has found that preschool aged children spontaneously create their own metaphors “in which space and motion symbolized possession, causation and time” (quoted in Pinker, 1997. p. 356). Lackoff & Johnson (cited in Pinker, 2007) have suggested that metaphors are constitutive of understandings and meanings that govern experience, and in this role, cross conceptual domains.

Pinker, (1994) while having also argued for the ubiquity of metaphor in mentalese - his name for a form of innate thought which is prior language (p. 73) - has more recently challenged Lackoff and Johnson when he has argued that “metaphor is a way of adapting language to reality, not the other way around…” (2007, p. 259) and that metaphors “accomplish the task of the accommodation of language to the causal structure of the world” (p. 257), where, for example, conceptual metaphors aide the making of complex and subtle inferences, facilitating what is broadly thought of as human reason (p. 253). Further, Pinker argues, the metaphors one encounters in the utterance of others can themselves be evaluated by each of us for their truth value, an evaluative process that goes on at implicit as well as explicit levels. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Pinker argues that “the ubiquity of metaphor in language does not mean that all thought is founded in bodily experience, nor that all ideas are merely rival forms rather than verifiable propositions” (p. 257).

As formulated in psycholinguistics, root metaphors are relatively static unconscious theme-schemas about self or world – life is war – for example, and are sustained over time. Where root metaphors are derived from shared cultural understandings that are imported into personal meaning structures, structural metaphors express highly nuanced and idiosyncratic personal meanings through the realization of intersubjective and intra-psychic goals in communication. Thus, structural
metaphors, do not shape meaning but by their shape, both *tell* and *are* meaning as they appear in form or gesture - intention in action - or deportment - style or idiom as a way-of-being. Structural metaphors are understood to underwrite subjectivity and what is felt to be true in experience.

The term ‘conceptual metaphor’ denotes the ability to draw analogies across conceptual domains: spatial imagery expressing causal relations, or hierarchies, for example (Pinker, 2007). Structural metaphors also demonstrate a capacity for fluidity in the creation of meaning through association by analogy across conceptual modalities, as through implicatures communication evades or pushes against the logical constraints of discursive language categories and linguistic convention.

Following Loewald (1973), structural metaphors as process fall within the preconscious, or unconscious ego functions. These metaphors may be considered to be one of the class of mental processes that make latent meanings possible (Green, 1986) combining the functional capacities of primary and secondary process thinking as they manifest in communication inter-subjectively and intra-psychically.

**Structural metaphor – shared skin.** Analysis of Dr. Ashe’s descriptions of positive and negative experiences of his work in three meetings identified themes of spontaneity, specialness, excitement, mutuality and merger. These have been linked to a superordinate theme of intrusion, an instance of a soft substantive category. The participant’s subjective experience of work has been considered through his representation of encounters with analysands, colleagues, theory, and professional societies. In addition, patterns and qualities of communicative interaction between the participant and the researcher were considered for the presence of these themes. When considered in their relation one to the other, to the soft substantive category of intrusion and to discourse features, including disruptions, these themes are viewed as process properties active in structure, giving shape to the utterance, to
the dynamics of communication and to the subjective experience of the participant’s work life in the practice of clinical psycho-analysis. Consideration of these themes and observation of the discourse properties of the participant’s utterance led to the hypothesis of an active coherent property that both expressed and realized a way of being-in-work, a structural metaphor of *shared skin*. The hypothesis of a structural metaphor of shared skin is proposed to give coherence to the identified properties of the participant’s utterance.

This metaphor represents an overcoming of difference along a number of dimensions including identity and roles. *Shared skin* is a structural metaphor that represents the self-in-relation-to-the-other, and a communicative gesture or intent as the realization of merger, the overcoming of loss inherent in bounded existence. The structural metaphor of shared skin also represents a theory of existence active in conscious and unconscious communication in the research encounter.

In the course of two interviews over three meetings, Dr. Ashe communicated a positive subjective experience of his relationship with his analysands. Consistent with the *theory of existence* or structural metaphor of shared skin, he experiences his analysands in a variety of states of merger with himself, in the realization of the therapeutic goal of mutual affirmation in a context of spontaneous, unmediated contact, where – “a quest to be affirmed as being good” identifies therapeutic effectiveness. Dr. Ashe “…wants (his) patient to understand reciprocity and mutuality” in their relationship and promotes the development of this type of therapeutic dynamic.

For Dr. Ashe, merger comes in many guises: “…things are going well when the patient responds spontaneously to my spontaneous gesture” in an unmediated engagement with his analysands, it “doesn’t come out of theory, its not theory driven … in a dialectic, is
the uh, the urge, or the spontaneous action, a quest to be affirmed as, as being good, in that you look for that response in the other.”

The structural metaphor of shared skin is most fully realized in the utterance in the participant’s communication of his method of note taking, perhaps the most compelling representation of the theme of merger, active in the structural metaphor of shared skin in the participant’s lived experience of his work.

Through his style of note taking, Dr. Ashe represents and experiences himself as embedded in what may be understood as the most distinctive or singular feature of an analysand’s identity, their free associative utterance, the voice of their unconscious. This has the effect of overcoming the boundary between identities and minds: “…maybe they hear themselves talking … and they’re having a dialogue with themselves … although they haven’t actually said it, I’ve said it. Dr. Ashe describes his analysand as experiencing what he has said as part of themselves and in this way, they “…overcome the experience of being intruded upon…” and he has the experience of “them being in me as well.”

In marked distinction from the experience Dr. Ashe reports having with his analysands, he reports his relationship with his colleagues and the professional societies with which he is affiliated as complicated and ambivalent. Dr. Ashe describes these relationships as threatening his clinical effectiveness and compromising his pleasure in his work. He expects that his way of working with his analysands, including, in particular, his more recent innovations in his clinical technique incorporating greater spontaneity, as likely to evoke misunderstanding and accusations of counter-transference from his peers. For these reasons, he feels he cannot be open with colleagues about his most successful and satisfying experiences of his work. Thus, in speaking of his relationship with his colleagues he
Structural Metaphor

describes a very limited benefit from collegial consultation, where an inability to share points of view ultimately leads to greater obscurity in case discussions, for example. Dr. Ashe experiences his relations with analysands as compensatory for his sense of disjunction from colleagues and his work as affirming of him where his colleagues are not. As represented in the utterance, colleagues and collegial organization obstruct communicative gestures arising from a theory of existence or structural metaphor of shared skin. In the utterance, colleagues and theory that are depicted as embodying opposition to the realization of subjective experiences of merger are conceived of as outside a coherent structure of value considered by the participant to be of relevance to his work existence.

Another of the ingredients of a clinician’s work life, conventionally understood to be a source of support and stimulus to growth that Dr. Ashe reports as a largely negative experience is theory. Somewhat more varied than the representation of colleagues, Dr. Ashe’s communication depicts theory as in some instances obstructing the realization of shared skin experiences, while in limited instances to promote and support these. The difference in part appears to turn on the participant’s relation to time where older classical theory obstructs and recent relational theory promotes: “the relational field doesn’t do this violence because it doesn’t make this distinction” (transcript p.198) between biological and surrogate parents, between genders or between roles within the therapeutic field. In more general terms, however, theory of any kind, simply by mediating an otherwise idealized merging contact between psycho-analyst and analysand, is understood to obstruct. Theory obstructs because it interferes with the development of a spontaneous and mutually gratifying relationship between psycho-analyst and analysand.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, freedom from theory insures that the “the quest to be affirmed as being good…” is realized when “…an unmediated connection…” (transcript p. 210) insures that the affirmation Dr. Ashe receives from the analysand is to his disposition, and that the response has been to him and, “not to some theory” (transcript, p. 211).

Although in speaking of his experience of being a participant in this study, Dr. Ashe reports that he had “got a lot from this” (transcript p. 219), analysis of the utterance suggests that the participant’s experience of reflection upon his work in the context of the research protocol and the communicative dynamic between himself and the researcher varied qualitatively through a series of satisfying mergers and unsatisfying breaches of merger.

When considered in relation to Goethe’s concept of pure phenomenon, - as theory of existence and creative potency – the structural metaphor of shared skin provides explanatory power for observations in this final step in the analysis, a symbolic representation of a complex living entity at a single moment of communicative contact within the research moment.

**Shared skin and loss.** The understanding that loss is a formative factor in shaping Dr. Ashe’s subjective experience of his work, and active in the structural metaphor of shared skin depends upon illumination of this participant’s implicit communication. These include linking sometimes fractured and oblique representations of loss through a variety of dissembling figurative uses of language as well as readings of the nature of the intersubjective encounter in the course of the interviews. At the very close of the second interview, Dr. Ashe speaks for the first time about his mother and his experience of early care takers in a manner that implicitly evokes the theme of loss:

Q: It’s all the questions I have, but I would be pleased to hear, I’m
just mindful that I don’t want to take your time
A: Sure, yeah, uh, so we’ll stop. There’s one more thing, first of all you’ve been very good, your very thoughtful, your very very thoughtful.
Q: Thank you
A: And your response to me does a lot for me
Q: Oh
A: I’ve got a lot from this.
Q: Oh, I’m so glad; that’s what I wanted to happen
A: Right, I, we don’t often talk that way
Q: uh ha
A: with my colleagues, we don’t often talk that way. Although it may come up in the course of a class
Q: mn hm
A: and so fourth. And I thought to myself, thank goodness I had a nanny
Q: yes
A: who wasn’t my mother
Q: yes
A: uh, thankfully she was out at work and she let this person come into my life.
Q: right
A: I was with her for six years
Q: right
A: So there was something perhaps from there
Q: Yes
A: That there’s um there’s two things
Q: right
A: I don’t want to get too too, I’ll give you the photocopy, there’s..
Um, do you know Irwin Hoffman

A psycho-analytic reading of this communication when considered in relation to the first and most notable disruption in this participant’s subjective experience of being interviewed – an experience of breach in mutuality when the researcher referenced maternal care – suggests a history containing an experience of painful early loss for this participant. This is consistent with a structural metaphor that promotes the realization of the subjective experiences of merger symbolized by shared skin.

In a consideration of what he terms “complicated mourning,” Volkan (1981) has suggested that loss of boundary distinctions is associated with a history of traumatic loss, and is frequently accompanied by a reification, through symbolization, of the loss. In this model the loss comes to be represented by a concrete object that symbolizes the one who cannot be mourned. This concrete object is called the linking object by Volkan. Psychic processes that
provide the subjective experience of overcoming boundaries are accompanied by a complimentary sense of bodily completion where body integrity has been compromised by early loss-trauma, he argues. It may be considered that the structural metaphor of shared skin is a unconscious representation of the subjective experience of the realization of overcoming boundaries in moments of merger and that these, in turn, provides the recurrent experiences of overcoming loss or the threat of loss and the psychic pain associated with loss.

Like boundary breaching, the linking object also functions to deny loss. Following Volkan’s formulation of the linking object, an interpretation of the disruption in the participant’s experience of mutuality/merger with the researcher when she used the term ‘maternal function’ is furthered by a consideration of the symbolic meaning of the rocking chair in Dr. Ashe’s office. It is this object that had suggested the question regarding the maternal function in psycho-analysis to the researcher. In addition, the aesthetically anomalous nature of the rocking chair within the overall art deco style of the office, likens it to a switch image which, like a switch word (Freud, 1900) in linguistic communication, provides a point of entry to a deeper level of meaning in a text. A switch image, as a bridge from the conscious to the unconscious realm since embodied in a physical object in space also bridges from external to internal reality – here literally from the office of the participant to the mind of the participant. Such an understanding follows both Brentano (Thorne and Henley 2001) and Freud in the notion of externalizations of aspects of mind in various form of representation in external reality.

Freud’s most through consideration of representations of unconscious meaning through plastic imagery is found in his examination of the symbolism and mechanisms of dreams, the dream work, in his perhaps most important text, The interpretation of dreams
(Freud, 1900). As with *switch words* or linguistic and behavioural parapraxes more generally, Freud insists that imagery in the dreams of ordinary people, not only the dreams of a clinical population, expresses unconscious thought by forging associative links between explicit and implicit meanings. In one demonstration of this psychic phenomenon, Freud discusses the dream of a young friend where a bouquet containing three types of flowers were understood, via the dreamer’s associations to these elements of the dream, to represent a number of meanings connected to her upcoming marriage and the anticipated beginning of a mature sexual life. A complex set of personal meanings is represented through the language of flowers in condensed form: These concern virginity, masculinity, defloration and pregnancy (Freud, 1900, pp. 373-377).

Such a symbol, will also characteristically have an anomalous aesthetic character or element because, in psychological or psycho-analytic terms more specifically, the psychological element to which it refers, here hypothesized to be loss, is unintegrated psychically. Such elements of mind are characterized in Kleinian theory as an “undigested bit” of psychic reality. To be undigested or unintegrated means essentially to be unthinkable; that is, to be a fact of reality in the external mind or in memory or thought that causes psychic pain. In this instance, that fact of reality or thought is hypothesized to be loss and the rocking chair is understood to stand in the place of something or someone lost. At the same time the rocking chair overcomes that loss by being taken to be the equivalent of what or who has been lost. As an equivalent, such an object forms part of a system of denial of the loss. In Kleinian formulations, this constitutes a *symbolic equation* (Segal, 1952) where the relationship of meaning between the symbol and thing symbolized is not one of representation but rather of equivalence: Psychologically the symbol *is* the thing it stands in
place of. As noted above, the meaning of or place of the rocking chair in the office is similarly unintegrated within the discourse between participant and researcher. When it is raised, it is not addressed in discussion in a manner that serves to make shared sense of it.

A consideration of the symbolic significance of the rocking chair through Volkan’s (1981) theory of complicated mourning would suggest that it is precisely because the rocking chair functions as a linking object that its meaning could not be integrated in the discourse between researcher and participant. Volkan argues that the linking object is a defensive variation on the *transitional object* (Winnicott, 1953) and that as with transitional objects, must never be challenged through the articulation of its meaning within consciousness. The researcher’s enquiry regarding the meaning of the rocking chair, based on her unconscious perception that it held symbolic significance, inadvertently asked the participant to do just that. In addition, by raising it in the context of a question regarding maternal care she doubly created difficulty for her participant as this appears also to have touched upon the theme of loss. As the transcripts show, this marks a disruption in the participant’s positive experience of the interview for the first time and is followed by the theoretical discussion through which communicates to the researcher an experience of having been harmed by her.

**Dr. Wyeth: A Combined Analysis – Impression to Metaphor**

Dr. Wyeth is the second participant in this study, another senior member of his profession and a training psycho-analyst. The inclusion of a consideration of aspects of the analysis of Dr. Wyeth’s utterance in the report of this study is to serve a limited set of purposes: to demonstrate individual differences across participants in their subjective experience of their work as this is represented in their communication with the researcher; to demonstrate individual differences across the participants in the character and quality of both
the emergent soft substantive category and the hypothesized structural metaphor; and to provide a context for a discussion of the relation of the structural metaphor to early loss. As noted above, (p. 97; pp. 104-105) the detailed description of the analysis of Dr. Ashe’s transcript was meant to meet the need to demonstrate the method of a layered analysis developed for this study. Because it is no longer necessary to demonstrate the method, a detailed description of the layered analysis of Dr. Wyeth’s utterance is not included. The description of the analysis of Dr. Wyeth’s utterance is limited to a consideration of the validity of the emergent soft substantive category identified through open coding-transcription in the first step of the analysis called impression (this text pp. 60-77) and, a consideration of the structural metaphor proposed for Dr. Wyeth, the *tethered boat*. The inclusion of this more limited analysis of Dr. Wyeth’s utterance in this report is to illustrate the distinctly individual nature of the participants’ subjective experience of their work, of their communicative style and of their use of the research encounter or moment. Each participant, through their response to the interview experience, the research questions and the researcher, conceptualized as “objects of reality” (Winnicott, 1941; 1969) created “something new” (Winnicott, 1941, 1969) and distinctly their own.

The report of the analysis of Dr. Wyeth’s utterance begins with step one – impression – identifying the emergent soft substantive category and the participant’s response to this at feedback. It then proceeds to an analysis that integrates steps two through five and the identification of the structural metaphor. The interviews with Dr. Wyeth were conducted over two longer meetings corresponding to the structured and unstructured interviews, the *phenomenological narrative in a set situation* interview, and the *free associative narrative* interview respectively. The first interview contained the same set of prepared questions that
were asked Dr. Ashe. The second interview, as with Dr. Ashe, included feedback based on the initial analysis of the first interview through open coding-transcription – reporting the emergent soft substantive category – and a free discussion between participant and researcher. Dr. Wyeth was also interviewed in his office.

**Emergent soft substantive category.** As noted above, in the step called impression, (this text, pp. 57-77) for each participant, the soft substantive category, an emergent property, was identified through a modified form of open coding\(^3\) employed during the transcription of the audio recording of the first interview into a written transcript. As with Dr. Ashe, participant, this was done between Dr. Wyeth’s first and second interview in an attempt to glean the researcher’s pre-conceptual impression of her participant, prior to formal analysis of linguistic properties of the written transcript, and to bring this “impressions” within the procedures of the method. Open coding-transcription is considered a mode of pre-analysis of an hypothesized unconscious communication between participant and researcher. With Dr. Wyeth, open coding-transcription was done between the first and second meeting of the participant and the researcher as the structured interview – the *phenomenological narrative in a set situation* – was completed during that first meeting. Thus the soft substantive category for Dr. Wyeth was introduced to him in his second meeting with the researcher.

The soft substantive category that emerged through open coding-transcription of Dr. Wyeth’s first interview is *water*. The initiating question that introduced this emergent category to the participant during feedback in the second interview, and that was intended to facilitate a free associative communicative process in that interview, is given below:

Q: the question, I wasn’t sure I should really ask, has to do with being very interested in the recurrent imagery from the sea and I was just wondering if you
The introduction of the soft substantive category of water sets in motion an extensive free associative communication in which the participant explores what proved to be the central and formative place of water in his life from his earliest years into adulthood, encompassing both personal and professional realms. These free associative productions by the participant confirmed the identification of the soft substantive category of water by open coding-transcription as a salient one in this participant’s subjective experience of his work life. As will be seen in the excerpt below, and following the principles of the tally test as noted above (this text pp. 97-102), the soft substantive category of water is supported by the response of the participant that follows its introduction. For this reason no further tests for validity of this category were undertaken. This contrasts with the response at feedback by the participant Dr. Ashe following the introduction of the soft substantive category of intrusion, which by the standards of the tally test failed to validate this category. Dr. Ashe’s emergent category was, therefore, scrutinized through further tests for validity as reported above.

As can be seen in the excerpt on page 232, this text, at feedback, the participant Dr. Wyeth interrupts the researcher and completes her sentence by providing the category – water – himself. The significance of the soft substantive category, water, is confirmed further within Dr. Wyeth’s free associative productions by the emergence of numerous memories and images of water into his thoughts as well as by his explicit reflections upon this theme following its introduction. Below is the transcript excerpt immediately following the quote given in the above excerpt. The complete response is given without edit. The speech of the participant is indicated by A, for the answer, and the speech of the researcher is indicated by
Q for question. The lines are numbered to assist the reader in orienting themselves in the researcher’s discussion which follows this excerpt:

1A: yeah, yeah. Well if I think if I move to water I might get so
general, because right away I’m thinking about my Mother watering
plants and my Dad showing me his laboratory and his test-tubes with
water
Q: oh, right
6A: Uh, the annual pilgrimage to the family cottage, uh, and the uh,
tremendous emotional reaction to leaving the cottage at this time of
year, incredible transference. That’s where, why I’m into buildings,
because of my transference to the cottage.
Q: hm
11A: uh where I spent my summers in tranquility and tragedy, uh,
ranging from the shotgun death of my older brother, uh, in a hunting
accident, that occurred on that lake. So there’s death, death of a
sibling, uh, as a singular event as against usually tranquilizing
mergers with my mother and my younger sister and a little bit less
with my older brothers who by the time, lets say I was aware of
things around four or five, uh uh, they were like, they had summer
jobs, they were away, the next oldest one, (name) was nine years my
senior, so, uh, even if we were also at camp at the same time, he was
off with the older kids. They were part of that sibling experience,
you know, you don’t get to play with your sibling or your sibling’s
friends because you’re a little whimp, a snotty nosed little whim.
And uh anyway, so, you get there, the first thing you do, besides
making sure the cottage is still standing is you go down by the lake.
So its as though the lake is competing with the cottage for libidinal
attachment, uh, you want to see it. What do you see? You see a
beautiful flat reflecting body of water with uh, to your right, you’re
standing on a beach, and to your right the beach gets overridden by a
tree line all the way around to a peninsula and directly in front of you
and slightly to your left. And beyond the peninsula there’s a gap and
an island and then another gap and then another island. Between
those gaps, occasionally, a lake freighter goes through, big,
lumbering, slow mechanical beast in this natural.. Contemplation. A
lot of time is spent hanging around. The only highlights of the day
would be masturbating and and having a nice meal, usually with my
mother and younger sister, uh. And then after the tragedy when I was
four, I didn’t really know what the hell happened. I was protected
from it completely. I have no memories, just reports. I think mother
got a little more organized in terms of our passive summer days.
And I remember her doing something, organizing. The first matrix I
saw, was my mother made a uh, took a piece of shirt cardboard and
drew some vertical and horizontal lines and then made the chores of
the day and so on and so on, and the days of the week. And she got
some stars and she, you know, if you brushed your teeth and you did
this and that uh, you got organized, right, by this thing. And it had a
tremendous, it organized my (word unclear) and gave me a focus.
Um, my libidinal pleasures, my instinctual pleasures remained the
same, but it reminded us that there was a structure to the day, even
though we weren’t in school. Uh, which is a distinct memory. Aside
from that activity, the most predominant memory was the lake.
standing by it, sitting by it, rowing a boat on it, going in for a swim
go fishing and not wanting to fish. I didn’t like what it did to the
worm: I didn’t like what it did to the fish and I was turned off by it,
maybe because of what happened to my brother, uh so I was a timid,
quiet boy, uh, in the physical adventure sense. I picked blueberries.
But the main thing was the water, watching my mother go for a long
swim, It was the only physical activity I saw her doing. My brothers
would come and they’d be more active on the water, really not water
skiing, but we had sailing. My older brothers went sailing, the sail
boat was long gone by the time I was big enough to do it. So it was
water and contemplation like the two trees in the chair,
contemplation.
Q: yes
A: Nature was on the water, the sun, hot sun, activity, forestry
service, pontoon planes landing on it, uh, it was the biggest
excitement of summer. But most of the time it was the hot sun, the
quiet evenings, the big sunset over here, uh, marshmallows and so
on: all the activity by the water. You were active, you were by the
water. Also when you were contemplative you were by the water.
Life was by the water, eh? Uh then you move ahead a whole
developmental stage, many developmental stages. Oh, we lived on a
river, o.k. So as I got older, right by our house was the (name) Boat
Club and adolescence came along in the face of young lusty feet
going down the boardwalk in front of our house to the (name) boat
club, um, which went down the land, then when it got to the swampy
water at the edge of the river it went into a wooden bridge and when
we when we, in the first stirrings of adolescence we’d go under the
bridge and try and look up the girls skirts.
Q: oh.
A: So like, life by the river, eh, then there were sculls. See the, can
you see the boat?
Q: yes, oh, yes
A: o.k. So I became a boater?
Q: yes
A: those are later boats
Q: they’re very beautiful
A: and the boathouse. That’s when swinging my partner out onto
the dance floor and then out onto a little, there was a little porch. So,
uh, you had your intimacies out there on the porch overlooking the
water. Then twice, twice a summer there would be the July 1st and
the Labour Day boat races, so you had competition. So I learned
about life on the water.
Q: on the water
A: yeah, and I was interested, I studied, one of the early things I
studied analytically was Neiderland’s papers on uh, on uh,
symbolism of water, when he said that water is the sister. Or rivers
are the sisters...And moving on to (another city) which was on a
river for my internship, go to (another city) for my residency, I meet
my wife to be and she’s from (a city on the) shore. So when we were
early married we would take our honeymoon and later on our kids,
then we moved back to (place name),
which is by a river, a lake rather, we had a lot of important
summers on the shore.
Q: hm
This extensive free associative response to the soft substantive category gives a sweeping picture of water in a wide range of memories and meanings across the breadth and depth of this participant’s life. By the standards of the tally test, the soft substantive category is both explicitly and implicitly confirmed. In the pattern of the associations, water is linked to themes of loss, family relationships, including relations with siblings, social development, sublimated intellectual interests, aesthetic sensibilities, love, eroticism, the management of aggression and states of contemplation. Moreover, the saliency of the soft substantive category water is confirmed by a series of associations that link these water images to important events in the participant’s external and internal life, integral to, in his words, “moments of both tranquility and tragedy.” Water is also linked associatively to a theme of structure. In the case of this latter theme of structure the associative relation to the soft substantive category of water is dialectic in nature, whereas with regard to the themes of tragedy and tranquility, for example, the relation is representational.

In this response to the soft substantive category in the second interview, Dr. Wyeth acknowledges and evocatively communicates his understanding of his relationship to water including linking his current aesthetic interests to a personal history in which water has been intertwined with all aspects of his development. In addition, analysis of the implicit communication of the text, gives further confirmation of the validity of the soft substantive category, water. Finally, analysis of the complete written transcript of both the first and second interviews, confirms the identification of this category as important to this participant’s subjective experience of his work.
The central place of water imagery within the communicative properties of the utterance invite enquiry into the nature of this choice of symbol as the cohering representational form for a life. A consideration of the memories, images and themes found in the participant’s response to the introduction of soft substantive category of water and the associative patterns in the utterance linking these across both interviews, reveals that this category holds an important place in a layering of significant meanings in Dr. Wyeth’s professional as well as his personal life. As depicted in the excerpt below, this layering of meaning of self-in-work has at its foundation Dr. Wyeth’s relationship with his parents

In his first association to the introduction of the soft substantive category Dr. Wyeth links water to a positive representation of each of his parents:

Well if I think if I move to water I might get so general, because right away I’m thinking about my Mother watering plants and my Dad showing me his laboratory and his test-tubes with water
(lines 2-4)

Principles from textual analysis in psycho-analysis identify the first associations to an interpretation, like the first associations to a reported dream or the opening words or actions of an analytic session, as a key to the total communication. In this pair of associated images of the parents, water is shown employed in human activity and is not purely a property of nature, unlike many of the subsequent associations to water in natural states. In this image of the parents, water is also, notably, contained within, or bounded by, a human tool in the course of its employment: the water in the test tube presents the most direct representation of this where the image of water contained within a falling stream or by the implied watering can, suggests a type of containment that is more ephemeral while still not abstract. This divergence in the nuanced qualities of these images of water finds parallel in the nature of the activities represented where, in the first instance, the activity of watering plants implies growth, a quite general developmental term, one
associated with maternal care and family life and in the latter image of activity with test tubes connotes both work, specifically science, and the larger world beyond the family, associated, for this participant, with the paternal: “My dad was an internist and laboratory expert…” (transcript p. 86).

This combined image of the parents proves to represent not only aspects of parental care that promote progress along a developmental course but also to be a representation of the participant’s identity as a psycho-analyst pictured as a synthesis of these aspects. Growth and scientific work are understood to be in a dialectic relation that incorporates identifications with both parents. Textual analysis shows that this principle of synthesis, of diverse aspects of his parents is found in the character of Dr. Wyeth’s unconscious thinking about his deportment within his work including particularly the mental state in which he conducts a psycho-analysis and in the quality of the relation between himself and his analysands. As a mental state, this synthesis is one of contemplation; as a self-state it is equanimity and as a relation to analysands it corresponds to the techniques of affective containment (Bion, 1959) or holding (Winnicott, 1972). This state can also reasonably be said to characterize this participant’s self-reflective state while thinking and communicating about his work as a psycho-analyst within the research encounter. Within the text, contemplation is represented through a number of paired images that exist in balance and create a synthesis of diverse qualities or properties they symbolize resolved through a dialectic process. The primary set of paired images represented in dialectic relation to one another – synthetic elements representing contemplation – are water and structure. With the exception of the image of ‘contained water’ discussed above, water is represented in natural forms. Structure is most importantly represented by images of trees, buildings and boats. Analysis shows that water represents primarily affect but also the unconscious and nature;
structure represents primarily thought and reason but also order, including time. Important images representing structure include a set of trees and the family cottage, each of these associated with childhood and boats, associated firstly with older siblings and then, the accomplishments of his own adult life. Figuratively, the images of structure approximate a developmental progress through an inference of processes that transform or create. The images representing structure include trees in a relative, but not entirely natural state – standing on a street recalled from early childhood – and trees as *made things* or *processed* in the form of houses and boats. Both these latter images also appear in reflections upon work.

The most important representation of water, carrying, arguably, the most meaning is the lake at the cottage, where water is in a natural state. In these images, water exists in a dialectic relation to structure. These images and the concepts and thought they implicitly communicate come together in representations of thoughts upon contemplation as well as the technical term in psycho-analysis referred to as *evenly suspended attention*, the preferred mental state of the psycho-analyst listening to their analysands. Thus, in combination, these images articulate or bring to the surface of the utterance, a synthetic theme that is important to the illumination of Dr. Wyeth’s experience of his work. In addition to the concept of evenly suspended attention, this synthetic image may be considered to represent a later technical variation on this early Freudian term called containment, by Bion (1959) and holding, by Winnicott (1972). This is most fully realized in an image of “boats tied to a dock resting” (transcript p.68) given in the first interview. Ultimately, these paired images and the set of themes they link point toward the identification of the structural metaphor for this participant.

**Water and structure – mother and father.** As noted above, in his associations in the second interview, immediately following the introduction of the soft substantive
category, the participant first turns to thoughts of his parents engaged in productive activities utilizing water. In the series of associations that follow this image, the participant recalls an earlier memory of his parents and himself, (line 51-53, p. 230 this text). This earlier representation to which this association refers is given below:

A: I don’t know if I told you of my tricycle memory.
Q: No.
A: By the tree?
Q: No.
A: Well, o.k, now. I was physically somewhat timid, like a as a sportsman, sort of thing. So I didn’t ride a two wheel bike until I was ten.
Q: mn
A: So I had this nice big tricycle, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten – I’m still riding that tricycle. And I get on my tricycle and I go down to the main street we lived on, I go down about four or five blocks. Right by the sidewalk there was this huge triplex tree and the third one was cut off just like a chair, with two big, listen to the metaphor, with two big fully grown trees, the parents you know, the idealized parents and this custom cut chair. I ride the tricycle down the street, I’d sit there; I didn’t know what the hell I was doing but, I was totally affectively driven, unconsciously driven. And I’d just sit there and watch the street go by; I still do that outside my writing room window. Something came together then and I knew I would sit and think and I would have these two big trees behind me: safety, affirmation, facilitation, recognition. (transcript p. 113)

In this memory from early childhood, the participant pictures his parents as “two big fully grown trees” and himself as “totally affectively driven, unconsciously driven” in an image of being held by strong parents who make it possible to “sit there and think” about the world going by. In the participant’s later reference to this memory (lines 51-53, transcript, pp.117-122) in a slippage of signifiers, “water” and “contemplation” have replaced the antecedent terms “affect” and “thinking” used in the first telling of this memory suggesting their interchangeability as representational images.
In the excerpt below, the psycho-analyst now contains his patients. Considered together, this set of memories illustrates a development from being contained affectively and therefore being able to think despite strong feelings, to being able to contain others. In a case example that illustrates a technical intervention and mental state in the psycho-analyst that assists a patient in experiencing frightening feelings of depression, a subtle image that represents this affect as water is used, where the analysand is told to let the feelings flow over her. This intervention is also recalled in language that suggests a sensorial context suggesting ‘contemplation by the water’ as also depicted in the numbered transcript section above (line 60, p. 230).

It’s late afternoon, uh, sunny, mild weather outside. Probably Early fall. Um, I had this patient talking in a kind of monologue, it’s going along, uh, and she uh gets into her depression, depressive issues and she describes as she’s talking, her mood’s sinking. I have a very distinct mood that is generated, uh, warm, peaceful, tranquil, sunny afternoon. It’s like I’m in a church, Uh, I, there is a kind of equanimity, a kind of, uh, I feel pacified …Uh, I, uh, the patient gets agitated. I have an idea to say to her, “It’s alright, let the depression come, let the mood go over you, don’t be afraid” She went on talking. Otherwise it was a, except for my emotions and the significance of what I said to her, it might have seemed to an outside like a uh relatively ordinary analytic hour. But to me, uh, and I’ve thought of it many times since, it was my first experience of affective holding. With a depressed mother of two small children. (transcript p. 74)

Of the set of affects represented by water in Dr. Wyeth’s transcripts, including fear and confusion, the most important is that of depression, an affect closely associated with the participant’s memories of his mother. In the memory of the tricycle, Dr. Wyeth uses a phrase which links both his childhood confusion and his timidity, or fear, to the tragic death of the older sibling when Dr. Wyeth was four. In describing his affectively driven tricycle ride to the triplex of trees on the main street, Dr. Wyeth tells us that “I didn’t know what the hell I was doing.” (p. 113) and uses this same turn of phrase, (lines 26-27 pp. 117-122) uncharacteristically containing the same very mild profanity “hell” when he describes his confusion, at four, following the death of his brother, thus linking the confusion to the death of his brother.
And then after the tragedy when I was four; I didn’t really know what the hell happened. (lines 26-27, p. 230)

Dr. Wyeth’s communication also suggests that his childhood confusion may reasonably be understood to have followed from his mother’s reactive depression following the death of her older son rather than to the death itself. The confusion to which he refers, in large measure, appears to follow from the change in the mother precipitated by the death.

A:…a time when my mother was still, a personal memory of my mother grieving the accidental death of my next oldest sibling. Uh, and what would have probably been my first experience of my mother being depressed and I would have been between four and six. Uh, because my sister was born, yeah I would have to be six plus because my sister was uh uh about two; she is four years younger than me. And I think it was the time in other words when I was first confronted with something I didn’t know why I…I didn’t know…now I know… a depressed mother is what I know as an adult. Um, that was what my analysis, my personal analysis was about. (transcript p. 74)

Understood in this way, the significance of the mother’s close association with the water imagery again suggests that the affect most meaningfully represented by water is depression. The image of Dr. Wyeth watching his mother swimming, immersing herself in water, conveys the poignancy of a child’s view of a loved mother temporarily immersed or preoccupied.

But the main thing was the water, watching my mother go for a long swim. It was the only physical activity I saw her doing. (lines 47-48,)

In a memory quite different from that of her swimming, Dr. Wyeth recalls his mother’s response to her son’s death when she brought structure to her children’s days at the family cottage following the accident. Although he has no memory of his brother’s death, this recollection of his mother, as Dr. Wyeth expresses it, is a “distinct memory” of his mother’s response to the “singular event” of the loss of her son. In this memory, the mother not only structures her children’s days in order to keep them safe in the face of life’s dangers, she also is shown to have, in some measure, contained her depressive affect within this ordering, structuring activity through the creation of a matrix on a shirt cardboard (lines 28-40, pp. transcript117-122). Through structure, the mother also
contains her youngest son’s fear and confusion as she returns herself to her children in a caring relation. In a reconsideration of the first image of the mother in association to the soft substantive category (lines 2-4, pg. 230 this text, pp. 117-122, transcript) water is life-giving water-affect is shown to be bounded or contained when it promotes growth. Like the image of the triplex of trees, an image of parent’s joined together in their provision of a safety that makes thinking possible for their timid, confused child, this image of the structuring matrix evokes a paring of these parents. The allusion to the father is through the reference to the matrix being written on a shirt cardboard, a masculine symbol in this 1930’s middle class Canadian household.

**Structure and work.** Images of structure appear in Dr. Wyeth’s first communication in the study, in his discussion of his office in answer to question one. The researcher’s particular phrasing of this question and the participant’s reply is given below in order to show that Dr. Wyeth’s focus upon structural features of the outfitting of his office in his reply reflects his particular use of this question, and is not shaped by the manner in which the question is asked. Corroboration of this point can also be found when this participant’s reply is compared to the reply of the other participant to the same question. The transcripts show that the question was asked of each participant in a very similar language. Each is asked about the process and thinking that went into selecting furnishings, art work and objects:

Q: First what I’d like to ask you about is the, uh, the uh, process by which and the thinking that went into the selection of the furnishings and the art work and the objects that you have in your office.
A: How did that go?
Q: Yeah, how did that go.
A: Well, we, ah, we bought this building in uh around (year) uh and ah the first thing I had to do about the environment was uh take out some french doors. These, they were like these at this end as well. This was a dining room. O.k. So that was filled in. The doors were taken out and moved upstairs. That was, that wall had to be filled in. This, this, uh, wainscoting here was over there, o.k. So we moved it from over there to here and then uh, the interesting gentleman from England that did it, uh, built these shelves, uh. So, then I figured I was going to be here a long time, so then I got pot lights put in and, uh. The intent was to uh was to provide a library or office like setting. I find the, I find that books are appealing because
most people who come for a long term psychotherapy tend to be educated people who value that. It also reflects me obviously; its also a useful place to store things, so its functional as well. For a long time I had a uh, a dark brown rug which I got tired of and just recently replaced, um, for medical reasons, because I was getting an allergy to it. And, uh, also because I think it’s um, a hardwood floor with a um, a persian rug is a little more like the Freudian model, my image of Freud’s office, which is over there by the bird, the calendar. Q: oh yes
A: Freud’s office, Freud in his office, um. The the boats reflect the rowing. I used to be a raver. So that reflects me. And the boating pictures are uh. They just appealed to me aesthetically; I subsequently realized that uh, I enjoy, I enjoyed a period of sailing so it’s something that is soothing. Subsequently for an office that I use in (city) I’ve bought a lot of miniature boats, so I’ve gotten interested in boats. I find boats soothing.
Q: mm hm
A: The idea of boats, tied to the dock, resting, uh, is a soothing counterpart to a long hard working day, with relatively few breaks. So I could be talking to you if you are a patient, or a colleague or whoever uh then I can, my eyes can fall on these boats where there is a rowing. That blue model over there to your left on the table is a uh reflection of the fact that I did actually row in competitive rowing while in high school and university. So I like that. I like nature, so hence the (unclear). I like airplanes and antique cars. They all reflect interests of mine, but they’re still relatively, they’re not too personal. When a patient comes in, it doesn’t say a lot about me. Um, so uh, then mostly the office in there is just functional. (transcript pp. 67-68)

In this reply to question one, Dr. Wyeth expresses himself through themes of structure and themes of water. In another evocation of structure and water, in his associations immediately following the introduction, at feedback, of the soft substantive category of water, Dr. Wyeth speaks of the family cottage, the building, holds equal meaning for him as does the lake: “And uh anyway, so, you get there, the first thing you do, besides making sure the cottage is still standing is you go down by the lake” (line 13-14, pp117-118). This sets the image of the cottage, and the meaning it symbolizes, in a dialectical relation to the image and meaning of the lake. Dr. Wyeth also explains that he believes that his interest as an adult in buildings is a result of the psychological meaning the cottage holds for him (lines 7-8, pp117-122). Within the context of the text, this polarity of images – lake and building – suggest not only that the lake represents the mother but that structure, specifically the cottage building, represents the father. Further, the participant tells us, the lake and
the cottage, and we may interpret, the parents these symbolize compete for his love (lines 13-17, pp. 117-122).

The important place of structure in Dr Wyeth’s way of thinking about his work is evident in a consciously used metaphor he employs in interview one. In answer to question two that asked participants to illustrate what they liked about their work, Dr. Wyeth replies using the following image:

A:… Anyway, but to answer the question why do I like doing it now. I like doing it now because you can change a person’s life. I compare it to uh I compare it to a total renovation of a house. A house is a good metaphor for analytic work and often it appears in your dreams, as a reflection of the patient’s self awareness, of various regions of conflict. The basement is either the pelvis or the repressed unconscious; the uh social side of the self in terms of the first floor; the primal scene is on the second floor; the forgotten memories on, in the attic and so on and so forth. I like I like the idea that a properly conducted analysis is an opportunity to help somebody completely renovate their head and, and their experience. And when uh one of the great pleasures of my life was realizing that what I am telling you isn’t a bunch of b.s. I’ve lived it and that’s been my joy, my working joy, was living the experience of helping people transform themselves and then being able to write about it and teach about it, that it’s real and it’s true. (transcript p. 70)

In the second, free associative, interview Dr. Wyeth more explicitly addresses his belief in the importance of the concept of psychic structure in psycho-analytic thinking, clinical theory and technique.

A:…It’s important because you do or don’t have a concept of psychoanalytic structural theory, that is, the concept of the development of the vicissitudes of the development of psychic structure, the vicissitudes of psychic structure in the decompensation of the patient, the vicissitudes of the psychic structure in the course of the evolution of the transference, in the treatment. The repair and the restoration and development of psychic structure is the sine qua non for me at. which is the core for me. People say a good analysis fully analyses transference, yeah, and in the process restores psychic structure or permits the resumption of growth and development of psychic structure, o.k. That’s what’s underneath the analysis of the transference and the healing through the experience of the treatment of defective structures – ego, super-ego, id. Now you listen, you listen to these papers where they go too overboard on relational – you gotta ask ‘what is the relationship first of all between that relational element,
say in a marriage of an analysand, what is the relationship between that and the transference and the evolution of structure, the vicissitudes of structure': that’s what you gotta ask, all aspects of structure. (transcript p. 95)

In the language of clinical practice, structure refers, on one hand, to the component functions of our psyche – the id, ego and super-ego – or internal structure, and on the other, is also used to refer to aspects of the psycho-analytic space and hour, including the mind of the psycho-analyst. These aspects of structure include the regularity in the scheduling, frequency and duration of sessions, stability in the physical environment and in the deportment of the psycho-analyst including importantly what is meant by the technical concepts of anonymity, abstinence and neutrality, critical components in the receptivity of the analyst’s mind and psycho-analytic way-of-being. These aspects of the analytic space are also collectively referred to as the “frame”. The frame or structure of the psycho-analytic hour is part of what contains (Bion, 1959) or holds (Winnicott, 1972) the patient, creating a safe space for the rhythm of “defensive storms” (transcript p. 72) and reflective calm that characterizes a long and successful treatment as it unfolds. What is cycling through and being held is affect; defences are in response to anxiety, and often the fear of feeling.

Dr. Wyeth’s way of being in his work demonstrates the place of structure or frame in the dialectic between the two minds that engage within his clinical space. The importance of structure, provided by a number of features of the analytic frame, including the mind of the psycho-analyst, makes the containment of sometimes frightening and overwhelming affect possible. Further reflection on the imagery representing the dynamic between psycho-analyst and analysand in the relationship episode of the depressed young mother of two children, (this text, pp. 235-236) considered above, shows that the threatening fluidity of the analysand’s affect, represented through water imagery, is contained within the thinking of the psycho-analyst.
Within the structure of Dr. Wyeth’s mind, the dynamic of affect and thought makes both feeling and knowing possible for himself and for his analysand. As Dr. Wyeth goes on to explain, he had responded within himself to the patient’s affect, through his “mood” – an empathic response – but had not, himself, been overwhelmed by the patient’s depression. But neither did he fear it and thus render it “unthinkable.” In further comment on this moment in the case, Dr. Wyeth explains,

So here I was then, now I’m in the driver’s seat right. I didn’t see it coming; I just responded to my own mood. It was kind of like this was like a church you could let your hair down here. You could, you don’t need to be afraid. You’re getting, you’re not alone in letting yourself feel depression.(transcript p. 76)

In a subtle allusion to structure, for Dr. Wyeth identified with aspects of his father, the participant accounts for his capacity to maintain control in the situation as the responsibility falls to him: “now I’m in the driver’s seat right.” The “driver’s seat” is not only the location of the one who must keep others safe by maintaining control, it is also, for a man of Dr. Wyeth’s generation, the place of the father. This interpretation depends, in part, on the layered time context created by the structure of this sentence. Through shifting verb tense, the sentence locates this event in clinical practice in both the present and the past: “here I was then, now.” While for Dr. Wyeth the mood is one of the past, his mind is in the present and demonstrating the capacities that later development in thinking, as well as feeling, has brought – structure contains affect. This capacity for contemplation or containment reflects growth in the psycho-analyst and promotes growth in the analysand.

A return to the first description of this clinical event in the transcript excerpt given above (pp. 235-236, this text) suggests that Dr. Wyeth’s capacity to provide affective holding for his analysand depends upon an internalization or identification with his mother; that is, the maternal function, in addition to the safety of his father’s control. This is suggested in the sentence, “Uh, I, there is a kind of equanimity, a kind of, uh, I feel pacified” where the term “pacified” stands out for
its connotative allusion to the soothing of an infant or small child, a term that in the explicit meaning context is slightly anomalous. It gains its meaning when considered through a close reading in relation to the term equanimity, denoting a mature state of calm. “Pacified” is the historical term. In the dialectic of minds within the analytic hour, the analysand’s development of self-knowledge depends upon this dual or integrated capacity in the psycho-analyst for affective attunement, which combines the ability to at once feel with and think about the internal state of the analysand. In combination, this is the synthesizing dialectic structure and affect in containment or holding. In Dr. Wyeth’s unconscious thought, this is personified in the synthesis of parents and this synthesis underwrites the dialectic of minds within Dr. Wyeth’s psycho-analytic way-of-working.

The inference that identification with a father’s control and internalization of the paternal function does not give a full accounting of Dr. Wyeth’s unconscious understanding of his capacity to hold or contain his patient’s affective states – that the maternal function plays a role as well – finds corroboration in his narrative account of choosing psycho-analysis as his profession. In this transcript excerpt Dr. Wyeth pictures an approach to healing that is limited to the purely technical and scientific, identified as masculine, to be both “unsatisfying” (transcript p. 86) and largely unsuccessful. He stresses, through repeated comment, that in contrast to the practice of medicine or science alone, the practice of psycho-analysis permits him to use his whole personality. Dr. Wyeth’s whole personality is founded upon an integration of positive identifications with both maternal and paternal aspects of his parents. Dr. Wyeth wished to heal while being able to both feel and think.

Question six asks participants to comment upon a quote from Michael Eigen that turns on a distinction between doing and being (Appendix III). Dr. Wyeth replies, “Yeah I think it’s very true” (transcript p. 85), and explains that this is “why I went into analysis in the first place” (transcript p.85). Dr. Wyeth then uses the quote to reflect upon the process through which he came to be a
psycho-analyst as he searched for a professional life when a young man: “…from the beginning I wanted to do a work that was meaningful and important and used my whole personality” (transcript p. 86). He explains that to be “an internist and laboratory expert” (transcript p.86) like his father, where “after six and seven hour operations (the) patient dies on the operating table…after hours of meticulous work somebody dies on your table (was something he) wouldn’t ah, couldn’t go through” (transcript p. 86) despite there being “a lot of heat on (him) within (his) family of origin to become a doctor,”(transcript p. 86) especially following the death of his father in “grade ten” (transcript p. 87).

**Containment and contemplation – a synthesis of identifications.** In reply to question one, as noted above, Dr. Wyeth speaks first in the language of structure, the renovation and remaking of the analytic space, a metaphor for the mind of the analysand. As he continues in his reply, by describing the art in his office space, images of water and boats emerge. The excerpt is repeated below:

A: Freud’s office, Freud in his office, um. The the boats reflect the rowing, I used to be a rower. So that reflects me. And the boating pictures are uh. They just appealed to me aesthetically; I subsequently realized that uh I enjoy, I enjoyed a period of sailing so its something that is soothing. Subsequently for an office that I use in Sault Saint Marie I’ve bought a lot of miniature boats, so I’ve gotten interested in boats. I find boats soothing.(transcript p. 68)

In a variety of images and objects that represent activities *on or near* water, boats and boating predominate. In this excerpt Dr. Wyeth identifies and considers the importance of this imagery to him, identifies himself with a boat and tells us that boating pictures are aesthetically pleasing and also soothing. In his reply, Dr. Wyeth continues by describing the manner in which he calls upon internal resources in the course of his busy days, by evoking soothing “ideas” or images when he turns his gaze to these carefully chosen paintings and objects in his office.
The central image is one of synthesis where boats, tied to a dock are resting. In this image, it is the relation between the water and the boats that is of interest and it is this image that Dr. Wyeth tells us, he calls upon to sooth himself in the course of his working day. Quoted above, the part of the excerpt that contains this image is repeated below:

A… I find boats soothing.
Q: mm hm
A: The idea of boats, tied to the dock, resting, uh is a soothing counterpart to a long hard working day, with relatively few breaks. So I could be talking to you if you are a patient, or a colleague or whoever uh then I can, my eyes can fall on these boats where there is a rowing. (pause) That blue model over there to your left on the table is a uh reflection of the fact that I did actually row in competitive rowing while in high school and university. So I like that. (transcript p. 68)

The integrating image of ‘boats resting’ brings structure and water together in a balanced relation where structure – the dock to which the boats are tied and the boats themselves – contain or limit fluidity and drift, insuring safety. However, where the structure of the boats are needed to stay afloat, neither the boat nor the water alone can provide the sense of soothing safety independent of the other. Nor can a boat tied to a dry dock float; floating or suspension depends upon both water and structure. In Winnicott’s and Bion’s models, the soothing of the baby depends upon both the sensory experience of contact with the mother’s body and the ability of the mother to think about the baby’s state, to process through thought the affects that the baby cannot itself process.

Dr. Wyeth identifies the image of the resting boats as an “idea” by which he can be taken to mean a fantasy or mental representation arising in association to one of the objects in his office – perhaps a small wooden boat – to which he has turned for soothing. But it may also be understood to be an idea in another sense, insofar as such a fantasy, fleeting present in our minds – as Freud and perhaps even Pinker would tells us – condense much unconscious thought. For Dr. Wyeth, these unconscious thoughts are soothing.
This is not a self-representative image but is rather a highly cathetheted, intricately condensed symbol whose evocation mobilizes unconscious recourses through the nature of the representational meanings to which it is associatively linked. Analysis of this image within the context of Dr. Wyeth’s utterance suggests that sustaining sensory memories of family life including early comforting or soothing experiences registered and evoked along the (coenesthetic) and (diacritic) matrix. The image is of a number of boats, rather than one, suggesting family life with siblings and parents. Both mother and father, the cottage and the lake, are implied in this image, and are also present in the nuanced derivative image of the water and the dock. The children rest safely within the embrace of this complex image of the security of family. It is not unreasonable to suggest that in Dr. Wyeth’s family, as in that of many traditional professional families of this era in Ontario as Dr. Wyeth’s family was, summers at the cottage provided those occasions when the children have most access to the time and attention of both parents and the experience of loving parents together. However, where a tragedy like the one that befell Dr. Wyeth’s family has occurred, the question of safety remains a psychological preoccupation in the minds of the children, even those, or particularly those who have no conscious memory of the event. And where the death of a child, as in Dr. Wyeth’s experience, has occurred through guns over water, it is not surprising that the locus of the child’s question regarding the parent’s ability to provide safety is also worked out through the symbolism of water. In this image of boats safely tied, children find the rest that is possible when safety is assured by strong and loving parents.

In Dr. Wyeth’s description of his moments of “drift” to this soothing idea-image of “boats tied to a dock, resting” in the course of a busy day, we can see that like the boats, he is momentarily at ‘rest’ but also safe, and so one can surmise are his analysands.
**Structural metaphor – the tethered boat.** Analysis of Dr. Wyeth’s utterance, including his description of his experience of his work life in the structured and unstructured interview identified themes of growth, structure, development, affective containment and contemplation, linked to a super-ordinate theme of water, an instance of a soft substantive category. Consideration of Dr. Wyeth’s subjective experience of various aspects of his working life including his relation to his analysands, colleagues, professional societies and theory suggest a coherent property that gives shape (Loewald, 1978) to both his utterance and his way of being-in-work. This, in conjunction with the observation of communicative dynamics within the text and within the relational field that is the interview encounter, have led to the proposal of a structural metaphor of the tethered boat for this participant. The structural metaphor of the tethered boat represents this participant’s creative potency – theory of existence as an ongoing or recurrent re-achievement of a mature relation to internal and external reality in all its aspects. This is subjectively experienced and inter-subjectively and communicatively realized as autonomous identity.

The structural metaphor of the tethered boat, although figuratively close to the image of “boats tied to a dock resting,” described by Dr. Wyeth and considered above, is importantly distinguished from that image. Structural metaphors are hypothesized to be coherent process structures and are inferred from sets of observed phenomena in communicative utterance: the character of the formal, qualitative and dynamic features of language, explicit and implicit meanings and discourse aesthetics. Structural metaphors also function outside awareness and are not equivalent to nor are they fully explicable as a self-state or as self-soothing. Structural metaphors are also not conscious representation of the self. While Dr. Wyeth can “return home” in unconscious fantasy and memory through a
nurturing dialectic between past and present, interior and exterior reality, this is a temporary state, a benign regression within a working identity that firmly situates him in external reality. *The tethered boat* represents a picture of self as secured to both an internal reality through positive identifications and to an external reality through observation and contemplation.

One of the most salient features of the structural metaphor of the tethered boat as a theory of existence is its incorporation of a link between individual autonomy and a mature relation to reality viewed as development or achievement. The creative potency of this structural metaphor is evident in Dr. Wyeth’s capacity to create and sustain a quality of mature relations across all dimensions of his working life, including his relations with his analysands, his colleagues, the professional societies with which he is affiliated and with theory. The structural metaphor of the tethered boat manifests in a professional deportment where Dr. Wyeth actively engages with an at times difficult reality through effort and thoughtfulness: a quality of interested and committed engagement characterizes the link Dr. Wyeth recurrently forges between himself and the various aspects of his work.

Dr. Wyeth’s subjective experience of work is positive while not idealizing, as is his relations with the wide range of individuals and groups that make up his working life. Also with this come loss, responsibility and care. Dr. Wyeth’s communication about his work suggests a balanced perspective that takes reality into account including human nature and time and the vagaries of his own internal world. Dr. Wyeth continues to develop in his professional life even as the opportunities and responsibilities change over time and he seeks affirmation of his autonomous self in ways that continue to take others into account, and to include a realistic recognition of his position as a senior and very experienced clinician who
has much to offer younger colleagues, and diverse patient populations, despite the effort this costs him.

Where contemplation describes the cognitive relation as a subjective self-state, the tethered boat achieves equanimity. For Dr. Wyeth, equanimity denotes a feeling state of mature affective calm, free of illusion and coextensive with an ability to contemplate the real world, and to conduct himself in a healing relation to it. This requires contact with his internal world and conscious effort in the external world. Dr. Wyeth’s regular decision to put the effort in to help others, such as younger colleagues, rises out of a realistic sense of his place within his professional community but also affirms him through the opportunities for personal growth upon which he places a high value. This mature perspective upon himself and his view of the positive value of growth underwrites not only what may be viewed as his professional generosity, but also his feelings of gratitude for a diverse range of professional experiences, including many responsibilities requiring considerable effort.

Dr. Wyeth’s maturity as the recurrent achievement of a reflective engagement with reality, or contemplation, means that he considers indicators outside himself to assess the progress of healing in his analysands. This includes, in addition to objective outcome measure of symptom relief, his observations in session of the diffusion of awareness within his analysands where the insights into themselves and their world achieved through treatment becomes evident in the way they develop in their abilities to think about themselves.

Through unconscious identifications, Dr. Wyeth’s way-of-being a psycho-analyst is itself a way of remembering others. Identifications with parents, leaders in his field such as Freud and mentors enrich and strengthen an inner life which he calls upon for both his patients and himself. This rich inner life means among other things that Dr. Wyeth has
sources of affirmation in his work life that preclude the need for direct affirmation from his patients. For Dr. Wyeth, his work affirms him insofar as he can determine by objective measure that his efforts are contributing to the growth and development of his analysands, that he heals them. Aspects of masculine control and feminine affection, active and recurrent in the unconscious symbolic lexicon of this participant’s communications, are combined in a singular representation of himself at work – the structural metaphor of the tethered boat.

The structural metaphor of the tethered boat represents a sensibility or work best characterized as containment. Containment within the psycho-analytic dyad refers to a relation between minds in a realization of balance or calm where what is disturbing can be thought about, and as a consequence is no longer disruptive to relations, discourse or mental calm and no longer generative of psychic pain.

Containment refers to the processing of experience, including affects and mental contents, to make them understandable and bearable. Containment turns mental disruption or pain into calm. Most fully developed as a concept in the work of Bion (1959, 1962b), where it is proposed that containment is occasioned first in the dyad of infant and primary caretaker, eventually becoming a function taken over by the mind of the baby, as part of the psychological capacity in maturity to “think unbearable thoughts.” The concept of containment “derives from Klein’s original description of projective identification in which one person in some sense contains a part of another. This has given rise to a theory of development based on the emotional contact of the infant with mother and, by extension, a theory of the psychoanalytic contact” (Hinshelwood, 1991, p. 246). Along the coenesthetic dimension, containment means soothing; cognitively it is active reflection, or contemplation, as Dr. Wyeth describes his working mental state.
Dr. Wyeth retains a secure sense of his role, is fasted to his own identity and preserves a distinction between himself and his patients. This supports his ability to understand their experience as their own and to remain focused on that experience. This sensibility of practice appears also in an ability to dream or otherwise imagine the experience of the analysand, particularly their affective experience, with one part of his mind while retaining a reality based sense of his role and responsibilities as a psycho-analyst and to keep in mind the reality of the analysand within the overall history of the treatment.

Dr. Wyeth communicates an openness and flexibility in contemplating, appreciating and incorporating ideas from other theoretical schools and in his active engagement with colleagues of other orientations, even those he ironically identifies as his “adversaries.”

In an expression of gratitude to the community in which he grew up, the participant maintains an office in a northern town where he attends patients regularly although his home and primary practice is in a large urban center in the south. Dr. Wyeth’s communication exhibits an active and inquiring mind, and an attitude of gratitude for his life and the people who fill it. His work life integrates enriching experiences of others.

Dr. Wyeth also expressed appreciation for the opportunity for self-reflection upon his work that his participation in the research had provided. Within the framing structure of the research protocol he freely explores his work life and his internal world, thoughtfully relating the one to the other. From a perspective that kept the external reality of the research context in mind, Dr. Wyeth plumbed the internal realm of his subjective experience of work. In this research dyad the identities and roles of researcher and participant remain distinct, and collegial. The positive experience this participant reports of the research encounter is neither created nor guaranteed by the researcher or the research context. Rather, in his particular use of this aspect of reality, Dr.
Wyeth creates for himself, “something new.” This new experience is nevertheless continuous with the structural metaphor of the tethered boat, and constitutes what Winnicott (1941, 1968) would call a creative use of an aspect from reality. Critical to this positive creative response is this participant’s ability, arising from the nature of his internal world, to make use of what is offered despite its imperfection and to respond positively to a containing structure. In general terms the communicative shape taken by Dr. Wyeth’s utterance is one of an integration reflecting ease within the self and between himself and others. The communicative intent of this participant’s utterance is shared understanding and contemplation. His use of language serves this end. Discourse moves have the effect of expanding and deepening understanding and contact through a communicative engagement which is an active and living process of knowing. The researcher’s experience of this participant was, at times, of being an observer of a process of an active gathering of understanding within language. Thus, the distinguishing feature of this participant’s utterance is its shape as a fluid realization of a communicative intent to link with the other through understanding. The dynamics of the utterance develop or flow unimpeded, in the virtual absence of confusions, contradictions or disruptions of other kinds. While the participant remains aware of the presence of the researcher and her distinction from himself, he makes use of her for the occasion to recall, reflect upon and share understandings of meaningful, sometimes painful memories that are his own. He does this while sustaining a generous communicative contact that also preserves his individual integrity in the dyadic encounter. This quality in the participant’s relationship to the researcher corresponds with the picture that develops of this participant relation to his analysands as a kind of shared contemplation of the thoughts that flow between them. The internal and external converge in moments of shared understanding even while identities remain distinct. In clinical technique, contemplation
Structural Metaphor

combines free-floating attention with structure, represented unconsciously as the tethered boat. For this participant the psycho-analytic moment or essence of psycho-analysis is achieved in the course of helping his patients to understanding. It is hard work, but understanding and empathic contact is possible.
Reflection

This study began with an heuristic, the psycho-analytic moment, identified in the researcher’s subjective experience of work in clinical practice. The study developed as an exploration of that experience, in particular whether it said anything about the nature of psycho-analysis itself, perhaps something essential about it. Such a question, framed in such a manner is only asked in certain contexts. On the one hand, the researcher was newly in independent practice as a psycho-analytic psychotherapist, and the strong subjective experience of what is here termed the psychoanalytic moment naturally raised questions about its relation and importance to psycho-analytic practice. On the other hand, questions regarding the place of the psycho-analyst’s subjective experience within the clinical field were animating and indeed dividing the psycho-analytic community in North America. There were those who assigned epistemic status to subjective events, holding that the analyst’s subjective experience was a measure of any number of things, including the contents of the analysand’s mind, the quality of the working alliance in the psycho-analytic dyad, and the success of interpretative interventions. And there were other psycho-analysts, mostly with backgrounds in psychology rather than medicine, who were struggling to develop empirical research methods that could offer objective measures of unconscious processes. These included measures of transference, and the incorporation of evidence from studies of attachment and infant research. Since the psycho-analytic moment was a subjective experience, but presented itself as an experience of essential reality, it seemed like a promising avenue for investigating the epistemic value of the analyst’s subjective experience.

Through interviews with two practitioners, data was gathered that would be relevant to investigating the subjective experiences of therapeutic psycho-analysis. The development of the
study proceeded to a consideration of unconscious process structures active in subjective experience and communicative dynamics. This was approached through an examination of the qualitative properties of discourse. The methodology integrated and developed principles taken from research in the psychologies and phenomenology for natural science to design procedures meant to illuminate unconscious communication. Analysis and interpretation was assisted by concepts and practices taken from psycho-analysis, psycholinguistics and literary criticism. While not all of these elements of method proved to facilitate the research in the manner anticipated, over time a coherent set of procedures was settled on that served to illuminate the research question.

The attempt to interpret and explain the findings from this process of textual analysis led to the hypothesis of the structural metaphor. This concept identifies unconscious process structure of reasoning and memory proposed to be active in structuring subjectivity. In structuring subjectivity, the structural metaphor is unique to each psycho-analyst, being a product of and solution to the developmental challenges raised by the analyst’s individual memories and experiences, most notably of loss, and reanimated within the clinical encounter.

The concept of the structural metaphor can perhaps be seen as the central hypothesis that came to organize the interpretation of the findings. The initial interest in the essence of the psycho-analytic moment was informed by this development, ultimately becoming a view of the psycho-analytic moment as subjectively structured by the structural metaphor for each participant, and hence as conveying no genuine knowledge concerning psycho-analysis as an independent entity. Nevertheless, this moment arises under the special conditions of the psycho-analytic encounter as a consequence of the interaction between psycho-analyst and analysand, illuminating the psychodynamics of that psycho-analytic dyad. The structural metaphor therefore provides an account of the psycho-analytic moment that minimizes its objective epistemic importance, but
illuminates its place within the psycho-analyst’s subjective construction of their way of being-in-work.

**The structural metaphor.** The structural metaphor is understood to be a form of unconscious remembering and remaking within subjective experience and in the expression of derived meanings of self, including self-in-work. It is constitutive of both the phenomenology of psycho-analytic essence - the psycho-analytic moment – and the way-of-being of the psycho-analyst, or psycho-analytic deportment. Structural metaphors constitute *ways of remembering*, which are, in some instances less and in some more, proximate to consciousness and correspondingly more or less facilitative of communication with self and other.

Participants’ memories of working experiences of therapeutic engagement with patients were found to evoke meaningful encounters with both conscious and unconscious registers of significant early life experiences, some of a traumatic kind. In this study, it was shown that participants’ working experience of therapeutic engagement with patients evoked meaningful encounters with the unconscious register of identity-memory theorized to be at the core of the hypothesized structural metaphor and created opportunities for participants’ active use of transformed memories within their work. Linguistic, dynamic and thematic features in each participant’s set of transcripts were also found within the communication between researcher and participant. Analysis of these features suggests links between the evoked memories and associated inferences and the participant’s theoretical orientation, collegial relations, communicative style and clinical deportment. In this study, the use of the term deportment refers to personal style, aesthetics, or idiom of one’s way of being-in-the-world. Deportment may be understood to carry within it tradition, culture and history, as Heidegger suggests, but is understood here in psychological terms to embody unconscious memory and to incorporate unconscious inferences or prepositional thought and identifications.
Idiosyncratic in form to each participant, structural metaphors artfully configure self-representation and adaptive communicative intent, and are associatively linked to formative early memory and derived meanings regarding self-in-world. The creative potential inherent in an innately poetic metaphoric function given in the psyche, may mean that mind gives shape to the verisimilitude of lived experience as it crafts the idiom of identity.

Findings suggest that the psycho-analysts’ unconscious metaphorical representation of self to self and self to other are constitutive of a professional identity continuous with a largely unconscious psychic configuration. This psychic configuration reflects the integration of formative early memory with related idiosyncratic psycho-dynamics. These in turn form the basis of the phenomenological or subjective experience of the essence of psycho-analysis. While explored in this study only in their manifestation in self-in-work, structural metaphors imply stable identity features that may be hypothesized to reach beyond communicative contexts and representations of self. It is hypothesized that, within the clinical context, structural metaphors may play an influential role in the familiar mechanisms of countertransference, enactments, role-responsiveness and projective-identification each an aspect of the unconscious dynamics of communication and inter-subjectivity within that field.

**The psycho-analytic moment – essence and subjectivity.** The initial heuristic conception of the psycho-analytic moment hypothesized it pointing to something essential about psycho-analysis. The concept of structural metaphor, however, led to a reconceptualisation of the psycho-analytic moment without any appeal to the concept of essence. The psycho-analytic moment identifies an experience that suggests itself as something essential about psycho-analysis, but this study suggests this is not the case. Structural metaphors refer to a coherence of unconscious...
processes that underlie what might be called the verisimilitude of lived experience – the felt real. The structural metaphor is an unconscious configuration of inferences and memory that shapes communicative dynamics, intersubjective goals, and the self-in-work. The psycho-analytic moment, as a subjective experience of self-in-work, is therefore configured by the structural metaphor. As such, it is an idiosyncratic response to the analyst’s experience of the therapeutic encounter. The psychoanalytic moment may therefore be revelatory of the analyst, but not of psycho-analysis considered as a discipline. As a theoretical construct it may assist in the illumination of the subjective quality of a clinician’s working experience of conducting psycho-analysis and what is valued by them in that experience. This appears, in part, to be underwritten by memorial registers of early experience along the coenesthetic-diacritic dimension associated with, among other things, loss and its resolution. However, as the structural metaphor depends fundamentally on the particular experiences and memories of the analyst, the dependence of the psycho-analytic moment on the structural metaphor indicates it is subjective, not essential in any significant sense.

**Implications for practice.** The suggestion of this study that subjective experience is no measure of clinical competence speaks to the debate on this issue. Dr. Ashe used his subjective experience as a measure to assist him in the determination of his therapeutic effectiveness in an ongoing manner. Dr. Wyeth, by contrast looked to long accepted objective process and outcome measures in psycho-analysis and the psycho-therapies more generally. Dr. Ashe’s use of his subjective experience to evaluate his therapeutic effectiveness and the state of his analysands followed from his change in theoretical orientation. This research suggests, however, that his reliance on the epistemic value of the psycho-analytic moment (for him the experience of merger) grants excessive credibility to an experience that is deeply shaped by his personal
history. Thus, while the concept of the psycho-analytic moment does not answer questions regarding the nature of psycho-analysis in general terms or what constitutes best practice in clinical psycho-analysis, it does shed some light on the unconscious origins of psycho-analysts own experience of their practice, and therefore speaks to the epistemic warrant of subjective clinical measures.

The psycho-analytic moment is seen as a self-state coextensive with the achievement of the theory of existence of an individual’s structural metaphor. The study questions whether experience of the psycho-analytic moment is any measure of quality of technique. It suggests that insofar as it is associated with good practice that this is accidental and corresponds to occasions when standards of care would meet other measures of competence. The study indicates that the psycho-analyst’s experience of the psycho-analytic moment can arise in conditions where technique is poor by external judgments of standards of practice. In one of the two participants there was correspondence between right practice and peak experience of work (the psycho-analytic moment) and in the other the experience of the psycho-analytic moment corresponded to subjective states of merger when technique was questionable. Of interest is the example of Dr. Ashe where his expressed beliefs about effective technique – spontaneity, for example – were not always reflected in the technique employed. Since even Dr. Ashe’s evaluations of the technique he employed in interventions were unreliable, it calls into question the extent to which his subjective experience of merger could be a reliable marker of therapeutic success.

Notes on method. The establishment of rapport with participants is one of the essential requirements of qualitative research. Interestingly, two of the methods employed in an attempt to establish rapport had unanticipated consequences. This illustrates the difficulty of incorporating principles of the unconscious within research techniques, and forced a re-evaluation of the
assumptions that had been made in constructing the relevant research procedures. At the same time, both of these unanticipated outcomes were ultimately beneficial to the study.

The first of these unanticipated outcomes involved the opening question of the first interview with the participants. This question, as per the methodology of the interviews, was the same for both participants, and was primarily intended to establish rapport at the beginning of the research relationship. However, the question that was chosen for this purpose – asking the participant to describe their office – proved in the subsequent analysis to be a singularly important source of the unconscious communications by the participants about their view of themselves in work. It foreshadowed the development of the structural metaphor because their idiosyncratic description of their offices proved to correspond to deeply held representations of themselves as psycho-analysts. The intended function of the initial interview question therefore proved to be ultimately subsidiary to its importance in revealing the participants’ unconscious self-understandings.

The second of these unanticipated outcomes involved the first question in the second interview, also intended to promote rapport. This initiating question was comprised of two parts: In the first part, an “impression” was reported to the participant. In the language of the methodology, this was conceptualized through a variation on concepts taken from grounded theory as a soft substantive category, although more easily identified as a theme. This “impression” was drawn from the researcher’s open coding-transcription of the audio record of the first interview, and was conceptualized as the researcher’s unconscious reading of the participant’s unconscious communication. In the initiating question, each participant was asked to consider and comment upon the researcher’s “impression” with regard to their experience of their work. As developed in the method, this was originally considered likely to promote rapport between researcher and participant, insofar as the communication of the soft substantive category to participants was expected to convey
the researcher’s unconscious understanding of the participant and thus, on the model proposed by Weiss and Sampson (1986), to constitute test passing for conditions of safety. Weiss and Sampson understand this to promote a sense of psychological safety that deepens engagement in a dyad. However, the differential response by the participants to their respective soft substantive categories suggests that such a model, and hope, had not taken a number of factors into account. In particular, the responses of the research participants suggested they were not equally tolerant of their unconscious communications being brought into consciousness. While the soft substantive category for the participant, Dr. Ashe, was subsequently validated as an indication of unconscious content, Dr. Ashe explicitly rejected the significance of the soft substantive category, and the “impression” therefore failed to promote rapport with Dr. Ashe. Its value as a method to promote conditions of psychological safety for the research participant, therefore, appears to vary depending upon the particular psychology of the participant and any number of other unidentified factors in the dyadic exchange.

The structural metaphor and loss. Thinkers such as Green (1986) have identified loss and mourning as the single characteristic of most importance in contemporary psychoanalytic therapeutic thought. The analysis of features of participants’ communications suggests that structural metaphors embody the unconscious memory of emotionally weighted formative early life experiences. For both participants the structural metaphor appears to represent loss as this is addressed through the full range of transformations within work experience, suggesting that loss and its resolutions play a generative role in the shape of that experience. Analysis therefore suggested that loss, its memory and influence within psychodynamics, holds an important place in a number of dimensions of the psycho-analytic professional life as well as the composition of the structural metaphor.
The character of the structural metaphor suggests that structural metaphors may grow
around early loss. Loss appears to function as the poignant center of this aesthetic-reasoning
unconscious construct, in one instance holding a central place in the sad beauty of mourning
and in another appears as a site of painful struggle with self-awareness. In Dr. Wyeth’s
transcript, where loss was consciously recalled, recognized to be significant, and reflectively
considered - suggesting a successful working through or integration of a significant loss - the
structural metaphor promoted flexibility, positive engagement with all aspects of
professional life and performed a creatively adaptive organizing function promoting
communication with self and other. During two meetings, Dr. Wyeth spoke openly about
loss and communicated an integration of losses within his way of thinking about himself and
his way of working in a manner that supports empathic attunement and affective sensitivity
in clinical practice as well as in professional development. The structural metaphor of the
tethered boat pictures a way of being that successfully integrates and addresses loss, most
particularly, the loss that followed from his mother’s reactive depression to the death of his
brother. Where, as with the participant, Dr. Ashe loss was referenced only implicitly while
not consciously acknowledged to be significant nor considered in a reflective manner, the
structural metaphor was associated with communicative disruptions, professional isolation,
conflict and less integrative patterns in the utterance.

Language, revealing and dissembling – understanding and alienation. Meltzer (1967) uses
the term *publication* to capture his sense that human utterance is the public manifestation or end
product of an interior process that is complex, creative and largely unconscious. Pinker (2007)
distinguishes between private knowledge and mutual or shared knowledge, and argues that
language facilitates placing many checks on shared knowledge within communicative events. The
findings of this study suggest that the communicative role of structural metaphor, like metaphor more generally, may function in a manner that, in some cases serves the ends of understanding and the capacity for empathy. In others it may serve less benign ends in an exercise of power in relations with others and is meant to prevent understanding, a notion with which Pinker would concur. The correspondence between the character of the structural metaphors, the manner in which participants address loss and the representational styles in their utterance may be considered in relation to Heidegger’s distinction between the language of thought and the language of information. The distinction turns on ends where, in the former instance, language promotes and participates in the understanding of human existence, and, in the latter instance, is used in the production of something other than understanding and is designated, standing reserve (Heidegger, 1977b). Standing reserve participates in alienation. As embodied in utterance, structural metaphors may fall within one of these two classes of language; that is, as the language of thought or the language of information. Where the end of language of thought is understanding, the end of the language of information presupposes the conversion of language into ‘use value’ in the realization of an array of possible ends but, significantly, not that of understanding.

For Heidegger, language as thought or understanding actively creates human Being or existence in the myriad facets of self as understanding or self awareness, what he identifies with the definitively human. For Heidegger, language as thought is associated with poesis or techne in the artful revealing of Being: Language, then, is implicated in both the revealing or showing of Being. Alternatively, the language of information is implicated in seeming or the dissembling of Being in the production of non-understanding or mere information.

Within a contemporary context, Hollway and Jefferson have identified a type of language usage they call ideological which, like Heidegger’s standing reserve, prevents
reflective thought. In Marx’s theory of human nature (1844/1983), this would correspond to a use of language in the alienation of human beings from their essence, which he conceptualized as creativity.

A meta-communication regarding communication about the self through dissembling, and of hidden meanings, may be observed in Dr. Ashe’s final representation of self, a representation that reads as a pre-conscious allusion to this issue. In this final communication from the participant, in a reflection upon both his work life and the interview experience, he represents himself as a masked man, communicating his unconscious knowledge of his recourse to dissembling. This is a moment of considerable poignancy in the research dyad. Alienation achieved through language is from the self and from the other. By contrast, Dr. Wyeth’s utterance revealed his thinking about himself to the researcher within her thinking about him, enabling her to comprehend his way of thinking about himself, both consciously and unconsciously. Thus, consideration of Dr. Wyeth’s communicative way of being in language evokes Heidegger’s distinction between revealing and seeming, where one may observe Dr. Wyeth’s relation to language, communication is akin to truth-in-existence.

In a final reflection, this thesis posits a formulation that psycho-analysis, properly practiced and understood, provides an experience on non-alienation for psycho-analyst and analysand alike. For the psycho-analyst, non-alienated labour is occasioned as he goes about creating the conditions for the coming into being of his patient, meaning in this formulation, a coming into understanding as the revealing or showing of individual essence, as theory of existence, of the self. Looking again to Marx, we see a human essence conceived of as self aware, uncompelled activity in the artful creation of species-being. In his model, the aesthetics of existence links the human being to the natural world through an active contemplation. For Marx, this turns on the relation of any
individual or class to the means of production, that is, his or her labour relations, or activity with others.
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Endnotes

1. The term subject is used here in its broader meaning of agent, or independent individual, with the associated venerable meaning in the humanities and political theory since the Enlightenment and not in its compromised meanings in human science research in contemporary times.

2. Pinker has also made reference to this Lewis Carroll’s story in his 2007 text, in his case to illustrate the his experience of “stumbling upon a microcosm – the world of basic human ideas and their connections – in the course of trying to solve …a mundane problem in psycholinguistics…the verb system of English” (pp. 25-6). My employment of Carroll’s image of Alice’s fall preceded my encountering its use by Pinker.

3. For a detailed explanation of the step called impression and the modification to open coding (open coding-transcription) the reader is directed to this text pages. 60-77. The major modification entails the application of open coding during transcription of the audio record of the first interview to a written transcript. This element of the method, considered a preliminary analysis, was to bring the researcher’s pre-conceptual impression of the participant’s communication within the systematic steps of the method. Open coding-transcription and the soft substantive category are reconsidered in chapter four.

4. For an explanation of the tally test, the reader is directed to pp. 99-104, in this text. For the demonstration of the application of the tally test and the failure of the soft substantive category for Dr. Ashe to meet its requirements for validation, the reader is directed to pp. 105-109, this text.
MEMO: May 27, 2002

TO: the Membership of the __________ Psychoanalytic Society
FROM: Christina Whyte-Earnshaw
RE: research participation – request for volunteers

Dear Members,

I am a Ph.D. candidate in psychology at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto and have been granted permission by the Board of Directors of your Society to speak to you regarding a study into aspects of psychoanalytic practice. This memo is meant to inform you about this research and to make the specific request that you take a few moments to consider the possibility of becoming a participant in it.

The study forms the basis of my Ph.D. thesis. All participation in the study is voluntary and in order to consider whether it might be something you would be willing to do, you need to have some understanding of its nature and what being a participant would involve. While this memo will not likely provide enough information for you to make a final decision regarding whether to volunteer or not, it is meant to provide information sufficient to encourage you to contact me directly for the answer to any questions you may have that would help you make such a decision.

The study I have embarked upon is qualitative and phenomenological in nature. Characteristic of this kind of research methodology and the philosophy of science to which it is attached, this study seeks to add depth and range to the understanding of a particular human phenomenon rather than to answer a single research question or test a particular research hypothesis as is the case in classic quantitative research in the sciences with which you may be more familiar. My particular study seeks to increase understanding of the experience of psychoanalytic practice. Thus it is to practitioners themselves that I turn as a researcher to learn about this, in order that practitioners in the field may share their experienced knowledge with me so that I and others may learn from them.

In its most general terms this study seeks to increase understanding of psychoanalysis. In order to do this data is produced primarily through interviewing psychoanalytic practitioners regarding their work. For this reason, members contemplating participation in the study should be aware that making a contribution to it involves being interviewed. When considering the idea of being interviewed, I would like you to be aware of some of the history of the methodology I am using: qualitative research developed in psychology in part in response to increased attention to the ethical responsibilities of researchers to their subject-participants and to the need to develop methodologies which more accurately access and represent human experience. This latter goal is arguably particularly emphasized in phenomenological methods such as this study employs. My own sense as a researcher is that psychoanalytic practice and theory has retained principles and sensibilities regarding human experience which suggest a fit with a phenomenological research perspective. It is also my expectation that psychoanalytic practitioners may be particularly alive to the issues faced by such research and the kind of research questions it seeks to explore.

In practical terms, I believe you can reasonably expect that the most onerous aspect of participating in this study to be finding or making the time to be interviewed. This is expected to require a
commitment of a total of approximately 4 to 6 hours. The exact particulars of involvement in the study will be provided to you should you contact me either by mail or telephone to discuss volunteering. Consistent with expanding ethical considerations in qualitative research it is hoped, though of course cannot be guaranteed, that your experience of participating, of reflecting upon the interview questions in the company of an interested interviewer, may be of some interest to you in and of itself.

Also, be assured that in addition to the particular ethical considerations a qualitative-phenomenological research design seeks to address, this study is also governed by the standards of ethical practice for all research in psychology, including, in particular, safeguards on confidentiality for all participants.

Finally, it is hoped that the findings of this research will illuminate the experience of psychoanalytic practice for other professionals in the field and psychoanalysis more generally for those engaged in psychoanalytic discourse across a variety of disciplines.

I hope this memo has both piqued your interest and addressed your concerns to a degree that encourages you to contact me to discuss volunteering. I am of course very appreciative, in advance, of all who do contact me regarding possible participation, even if ultimately you decide not to volunteer. I am also grateful to the Society for letting me speak to you in this way and to you for your consideration of my research through the reading of this memo. I may be contacted at the address or telephone numbers noted below. As prompt a reply as possible would be very much appreciated. Thank you again for your consideration of my research.

With best regards,

Christina Whyte-Earnshaw

926-170 St. George Street
Toronto, M5R 2M8
416-927-0911
416-750-4107
Appendix II

Participant Release Agreement

I ______________________, agree to participate in the research project of Christina Whyte-Earnshaw, a doctoral candidate at the University of Toronto, on the working experience of professional psychoanalytic practice. I understand the purpose and nature of this study and am participating voluntarily. I understand that participation in the study is in the form of three one and a half hour interviews, spaced over approximately two months and the keeping of a research-experience diary during the period of participation in the research.

I understand that it is at my discretion to provide access to this diary to the researcher. I also understand that I will be given a copy of the interview transcripts in order that I may, if I wish, elaborate, clarify or otherwise comment upon them and that these contributions will be included as part of the research data by the researcher at my request.

I grant permission for the data to be used in the process of completing a Ph.D. degree, including a dissertation and any other future publications. I grant permission to tape-recording of the interviews and understand that all materials will be treated as confidential and that I will be assured of anonymity in the writing up of the research and in the oral defence of the dissertation. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw from the study at any time, should I so wish.

________________________________________
Research Participant/date

________________________________________
Primary Researcher/date
Appendix II (a)

Letter of Intent

Date________________________

Dear____________________________________

Thank you for your interest in my dissertation research on the working experience of psychoanalytic practitioners. I value the unique contribution that you can make to this study and look forward to the possibility of your participation in it.

The purpose of this letter is to reiterate some of the things we have already discussed regarding my research and participant in it, and to secure your signature on the participation-release form that you will find attached.

The research model I am using is qualitative in nature and through it I am seeking comprehensive descriptions of your experience of what it is like to do the work that you do. Through your participation, I hope to understand in greater depth the essence of the experience of psychoanalytic practice.

Participation in this study is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time. I value your participation and thank you for your willingness to commit your time, attention and effort to contribute to this study. If you need any clarification before signing the release form, I can be reached at (416) 927-0911

Thank your for giving consideration to participating in my study.

Yours truly,

Christina Whyte-Earnshaw
Appendix III

Interview One: Questions for Participants

1. Would you tell me about selecting the furnishings, the art and other objects for your office.

2. Could you think about your work and give me an example of an experience from it that would illustrate what it is you like about your work.

3. Would you think back to the early experiences of your professional life and tell me of a memory or memories from that time that have stayed with you.

4. If thinking about your present experience of your work, could you tell me of an experience from your practice that has been particularly moving.

5. If you were to think for a moment about conversations you have had with colleagues, could you tell me of a conversation that would illustrate meaningful differences in the way you think about clinical practice.

6. I’ve taken a quote from Michael Eigan that I have found interesting and wonder if you could comment on it for me. He says, “psycho-analysis is not something that you do, it is something that you are”.

7. Could you describe an experience you have had that might illustrate what sustains you in this work.

8. Could you describe an experience from your work that gives you the sense that things are going well.

9. Are there experiences from your work that suggest to you that the work has changed for you over time. If that is the case could you give me an example of that.
10. Could you take a moment and imagine being a novice in psycho-analysis, trying to understand it: what question would it be important to ask.

11. What aspect of psycho-analysis stands out, for you, as the thing that should be understood.

12. I wonder how you think of psycho-analysis as part of the health care system. Are there experiences from your work that might illustrate your thinking on this.

13. Could you tell me about encounters you have had of representations of psycho-analysis within popular culture and what you think of those representations.

14. I have no other specific questions. I would just like to ask you for your final thoughts, perhaps there are things you would like to speak about that I didn’t ask about but should have, or things that you would just like to speak about now.
Appendix IV

Christina Whyte-Earnshaw
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy

The Medical Arts Building
926-170 St. George St.
Toronto, M5R 2M8
(416) 927-0911

Dear Dr. __________________

January 14, 2003

Dear Dr. __________________

Enclosed is the transcript of the two meetings in which we discussed your experience of and thoughts on psychoanalytic practice. I hope, when time permits, that you will review the transcript. I expect you will find it extraordinarily interesting, as I have. The copy I forward to you is yours and is laid out in a manner to permit markings, comments or reflections to be noted. This may be used for your own interest or as a basis for clarifications, qualifications or the elaboration of points you feel should be added to the data that will be included in the study. If you feel you would like to comment upon or make additions, clarifications or corrections to what was said I would be very pleased to meet with you. Alternatively, if you prefer to make notations, margin notes or in some other form put your points or queries in writing and forward them to me, I would be pleased to incorporate them in the data in this way. Finally, if, however, you would prefer not to make comment or discuss the transcript, that is fine too. While I would welcome further discussion of the topics and themes raised in the transcript, as we discussed, that is your choice and you are not obliged to do so. In either case I do very much want to thank you for your participation thus far.

Thank you for the respectful and thoughtful manner in which you approached the task of making a contribution to this study. I continue in my efforts to insure that your contribution takes a final form that is worthy of your contribution. Thank you again. Please just let me know if you would like to discuss the transcript, in which case we will set up a meeting at your convenience, and if not, if you would be good enough to call and let me know that, I would appreciate it. Thank you again. With best regards, I remain,

Yours truly,

Christina Whyte-Earnshaw