THE PROBLEM OF KNOWING THE FORMS IN PLATO’S Parmenides

Byeong-uk Yi and Eunshil Bae

In the first part of Plato’s Parmenides, Parmenides presents several arguments against the theory of forms, propounded by young Socrates as his interlocutor in the dialogue. He puts special significance on one of them. He says that it is of the greatest difficulty to defend the theory against the objection that “it does not even pertain to the forms to be known [by humans] if they are such as we say they must be” (133b5-6), and presents an argument to substantiate the objection (133c3- 134c3). In this paper, we shall examine the argument and present a solution of the difficulty on behalf of Socrates. In section I, we shall give an analysis of the argument. In section II, we shall discuss some objections to the argument and argue that they fail to address the central issue. In section III, we shall present our own objection to the argument and the consequent solution of the difficulty.

I

Parmenides’ argument that forms cannot be known by humans is based on an observation about two counterpart forms and their instances. Suppose that a particular, such as a human being, is a master. Then he must be a master of a particular, such as a human being who is a slave; he cannot be a master of a form, such as the Slave itself. Thus, particulars can be masters and slaves among themselves only. Similarly, Parmenides continues, the forms of which the particular masters and slaves are instances, namely, the Master itself and the Slave itself, are what they are with reference only to themselves; that is, “Mastery itself is what it is of Slavery itself, and Slavery itself is in like manner Slavery of Mastery itself” (133e3-4). Consequently, the forms are not what they are with reference to us humans (133e5).
Parnenides states a thesis that generalizes this observation (133c8-d5, 133e5-134a1, and 134d4-7). The thesis, which consists of two sub-theses, can be formulated as follows:

The Thesis of Correlation: Suppose that there are two counterpart forms (the F itself and the G itself). Then

(i) Correlation of Forms: The forms are what they are with reference not to particulars, but only to themselves; and

(ii) Correlation of Particulars: Any particular instance of one (the F itself) of the counterpart forms is what it is (a particular F) with reference not to the other (the G itself) of the forms, but only to a particular instance of this other form.

Here we say that two forms are counterparts if, as Parnenides puts it, they (e.g., the Master itself and the Slave itself) are what they are with reference to each other. According to the Thesis of Correlation of Forms, two such forms are counterparts only of each other; so neither of them is a counterpart of any particular, including a particular instance of the other form. According to the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars, any particular instance of one of two such forms (e.g., a particular master) is what it is with reference only to a particular instance of the other of the two forms (e.g., a particular slave), and consequently not with reference to any form whatsoever.

Now, Parnenides relates the Thesis of Correlation to the form of Knowledge to show that we humans cannot know forms. To do so, he must explain that the form of Knowledge has a counterpart. Thus, he says: “knowledge itself, what it is to be knowledge, would be knowledge of that very thing, which is [what it is] to be truth” (134a3-4). That is, as we put it, the form of Truth is the counterpart of the form of Knowledge. Then the Thesis of Correlation is applicable to these counterpart forms. We humans are not forms (a fortiori, not the form of Knowledge) but particulars; so, by Correlation of Particulars, we can be knowers of not any forms but only particulars.

This completes our analysis of Parnenides’ argument. In the next two sections, we shall examine it in detail. Before we proceed, however, it is necessary to make two preliminary points on what we take to be the epicycles of the argument.

First, Parnenides begins the argument by noting that Socrates holds that forms are “things that are themselves by themselves” (133a9). This can be taken to indicate the view that, as Cornford puts it, “there is a sharp line between the two worlds” (1935, 99) of
forms and particulars. Thus, the Thesis of Correlation presupposes a fundamental distinction between forms and particulars; accordingly, when Parmenides applies the thesis to humans to draw the conclusion that humans can know only particulars, he must appeal to the fact that humans are not forms but particulars. But it is highly implausible to take the argument to be based on the assumption that forms cannot have any relation to particulars. If this were assumed in the argument, Parmenides would not have needed to go through the case of masters to motivate the Thesis of Correlation. He could have argued directly: we cannot bear the relation of knowing to the forms simply because we are particulars in a totally different world.

Second, Parmenides does not go on directly to apply the Thesis of Correlation after stating that the Truth itself is the counterpart of Knowledge itself (134a3-4). After making the statement, he seems to argue indirectly as follows: (i) in order to know a form, such as Beauty itself, we need to have the form of Knowledge in us; but (ii) we humans do not have the form in us; so (iii) we cannot know any form. We think that it is necessary to make objectionable moves in order to support thesis (i). But such moves are dispensable because the Thesis of Correlation by itself suffices to yield the desired conclusion that we cannot know forms. So Socrates cannot defend the theory of forms by objecting only to those moves, made in the later part of the argument; he must find weaknesses in the main part of the argument that we have presented above.

In section II, we shall discuss some inadequate objections to the main part of the argument. And in section III, we shall argue that Socrates must object to the second part of the Thesis of Correlation.

II

Cornford (1935, 98f) objects to the Thesis of Correlation of Forms or, more precisely, presuppositions of the thesis. The objection is based on his interpretation of Parmenides’ talk of counterpart forms. According to the interpretation, when Parmenides says that the Master itself is what it is with reference to (and only to) the Slave itself, he means that the Master itself is a master of (and only of) the Slave itself; likewise, when he says that

1. Knowledge itself is what it is with reference to the Truth itself (134a3-4),

he means that

2. Knowledge itself knows the Truth itself.
On this interpretation, then, the Thesis of Correlation of Forms rests on the objectionable assumption that the Master itself and Knowledge itself are a master and a knower, respectively, just as their instances are. This objection does not get at the heart of the matter.

To see this, notice first that there is a better interpretation of the talk of counterpart forms. Frank Lewis (1979) clarifies it in terms of the notion of the converse of a relation: two forms are counterparts, on his interpretation, if they correspond to a relation and its converse, respectively. Thus the Master itself and the Slave itself are counterparts, because they correspond to the relations of mastering and being mastered (i.e., enslaved) by, respectively; Knowledge itself and the Truth itself, to the relations of knowing and being known by. We think Lewis' interpretation is better than Cornford's. Lewis' interpretation helps to explain the plausibility of the Thesis of Correlation of Forms; on the interpretation, it amounts to the correct thesis that a relation is the converse of only a relation, not any particular. And in the dialogue, Parmenides (or Socrates) never says that the Master itself is a master of (or only of) the Slave itself; nor does he say that Knowledge itself knows the Truth itself. The only ground for Cornford's interpretation, it seems, is that Parmenides says "Each of the kinds themselves [i.e., forms] . . . is known . . . by the form of Knowledge itself" (134b6-7), i.e.,

(3) Knowledge itself knows each of the forms.

But this cannot be taken as an alternative formulation of (1). What Parmenides would have said if he used "knows" to clarify the phrase "what it is with reference to" in (1) is (2), not (3), which has "each of the forms" in place of "the Truth itself" in (1). On account of this additional difference, (3) cannot be taken to state the counterpart of the form of Knowledge; Knowledge itself is not what it is with reference to, for example, Beauty itself, which is one of the forms.

Second, the Thesis of Correlation of Forms is not essential to Parmenides' argument. The argument can proceed using only the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars. Suppose that Socrates, for example, is a particular instance of the form of Knowledge (i.e., a particular knower); then, by the thesis, he is what he is (viz. a particular knower) with reference only to a particular instance of the Truth itself; so he cannot know any form. This lays out the gist of Parmenides' argument. It consists in drawing a parallel between the case of masters and that of knowers through the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars: A particular, such as a human being,
can be a master of only a particular; likewise, a particular can be a knower of only a particular, not any form. Thus, even granting Cornford's interpretation of the counterpart form, it is easy to reformulate the argument without using the extraneous assumption that he objects to.

Recently, Constance Meinwald (1991 and 1992) has raised another objection to the argument. She distinguishes, on behalf of Plato, two kinds of predications: predication in relation to itself (*pros heauto*) and predication in relation to the others (*pros ta alla*). And she argues that applying the distinction can solve the major problems that Parmenides raises against the theory of forms in the first part of the *Parmenides*. But the distinction does not at all help Socrates respond to the argument here in question.

To see this, let us first examine the distinction.¹¹ Meinwald says that sentences of the form “A is B” are used as predications in relation to the others if they are used to state that the subjects in question have (or, as she puts it, display) the features indicated by the predicates. For example, “Socrates is just,” used as a predication in relation to the others, states that Socrates has the feature associated with the form of the Just itself, which the predicate “to be just” indicates. So the following sentences are true used as such predications:

(4) Mont Blanc is large.

(5) Socrates has vertebrae.

By contrast, the following sentences are false as so used:

(6) The Large itself is large.

(7) The Triangle itself is three-sided.

The Large itself, for example, lacks the feature of being large, because it is not extended in space.

We can see that the category of predication in relation to the others is meant to contain what we commonly understand simply as predications. Addition of the qualification “in relation to the others” reflects the Platonic view that forms have a critical role to play for the truth of sentences like (4) as they are commonly used (Meinwald 1992, 380; and 1991, 61f). Mont Blanc cannot have the feature of being large without having some specific relation to something other than itself, viz. the form of the Large itself.

In a predication in relation to itself, by contrast, no such reference is made to something other than the subject in question. A sentence of the form “A is B,” used as a predication in relation to itself, states
that being B (i.e., what it is to be a B) is part or whole of being A (i.e., what it is to be an A). Thus, sentences (4) and (5) are false used as predications in relation to itself (being large is not part or whole of what it is to be Mont Blanc); whereas sentences (6) and (7) are true as so used (being large is part or whole of being large; being three-sided, of being a triangle).

Now, what does this distinction have to do with Parmenides’ argument that we cannot know forms? Meinwald’s objection to the argument (1991, 161; 1992, 388f) consists in applying the distinction to sentences that attribute knowledge of forms to particulars, such as

(8) Socrates knows Beauty itself.

Such sentences cannot be true if used as predications in relation to itself. But this does not mean that they cannot be true used as predications in relation to the others. Sentence (8) so used is true, she thinks, if Socrates has some specific relation to the form of Knowledge and thus has the feature associated with the form. But his having that relation to the form of Knowledge is no more problematic than his having the same relation to any other form, such as the Large itself. Thus, Meinwald concludes, Socrates can know Beauty itself, for example, because he can have the relation in question to the form of Knowledge.

It is easy to see that this objection fails to address the issue that Parmenides raises with the argument. The issue is not whether Socrates can be a knower, i.e., one who knows something, but whether he, if he can know something, can know forms. Meinwald’s distinction, if combined with the point that particulars can be related to Knowledge itself (as well as to the Master itself),12 might help to establish that Socrates, for example, can be a knower (as well as a master). But it can do no more than that. In his discussion of the case of masters, Parmenides does not put it into question that Socrates can be a master. And he might just as well grant that Socrates can be a master only by virtue of his relation to the form of the Master itself. Still, he can make the correct point that Socrates, in being a master (by participating in the Master itself), can be a master of only a particular,13 and continue that similarly, though Socrates can be a knower (by participating in Knowledge itself), he can know only a particular. Meinwald’s distinction cannot help Socrates respond to this argument, because it is of no use in explaining this disparity between the case of masters and that of knowers. For both “Socrates is a knower” and “Socrates is a master”
must be used as predications in relation to the others in order to state truths.

III

We have seen that the first part of the Thesis of Correlation, the Correlation of Forms, is not essential to Parmenides' argument. What is critical to the argument is its second part: Correlation of Particulars. It is through this thesis that Parmenides can draw the desired parallel between the case of masters and that of knowers. Then Socrates must reject it to meet Parmenides' argument.

To see that the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars is objectionable, it is necessary to distinguish the notion of an instance of a form from that of a particular instance of a form, i.e., an instance of the form that is a particular. Surely, these are two different notions. Moreover, they do not apply to the same things unless every instance of a form is a particular. But not every instance of a form is a particular. Or so a defender of the theory of forms must maintain. Instances of ordinary forms like the Master itself or the Slave itself are indeed particulars, but there is no reason that every form must be like these forms and have only particulars as instances. There are other, higher-order forms like Being and One, which can be instantiated by forms. Beauty itself, for example, is an instance of the form of Being, because it is (i.e., has being); likewise, it is an instance of the form of Oneness, because it is one.

How about the form of the Truth itself? Does it also have forms as instances? The answer to be given by Socrates is yes. It is a key component of the theory of forms that forms are objects of knowledge. Thus, just as the form of Knowledge has as its instances the knowers, such as humans who know some things, its counterpart, the Truth itself, must have as its instances the known, such as the forms known by some knowers, human or not.14

There is then an important difference between the case of masters and that of knowers. By agreeing to the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars, however, Socrates is forced to ignore the difference and assimilate the latter case to the former. But there is no reason to agree to the thesis.

To support the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars, Parmenides appeals to the observation that any particular instance of the Master itself is a master of only a particular instance of the Slave itself. But the observation fails to support the thesis, because it is not needed to explain the observation. Consider the following
thesis, which is like the thesis except that it concerns instances of counterpart forms instead of their particular instances:

_The Thesis of Correlation of Instances:_ Suppose that there are two counterpart forms (the F itself and the G itself). Then any instance of one (the F itself) of the forms is what it is (an F) with reference only to an instance of the other form (the G itself).

According to this thesis, which is not formulated in the dialogue, an instance of the Master itself is a master only of an instance of the Slave itself. Now, this principle suffices to explain the observation: an instance of the Master itself (_a fortiori_, its particular instance) must be a master of only a particular, viz. a particular instance of the Slave itself, because all the instances of this form are particulars.

Frank Lewis (1979) has recently attempted to justify the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars on behalf of Parmenides. He argues that the thesis is "an immediate corollary" of the twin thesis of Correlation of Forms (1979, 109). Recall his interpretation of the counterpart forms, according to which the thesis concerning forms amounts to the thesis that a relation is the converse of only a relation, not any particular. Now, he argues that this thesis concerning relations "entails" that "the entities in the domain of a relation bear that relation not to the converse relation, but to the entities in the domain of the converse relation" (ibid.). Here he states an unchallengeable thesis concerning entities in the domains of relations. But its Platonic counterpart is not the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars but the Thesis of Correlation of Instances, because the entities in the domain of a relation and those in the domain of its converse amount to the instances of a form and those of its counterpart, respectively. Then Lewis' defense of the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars is based on confusing it with the Thesis of Correlation of Instances. The latter does not imply the former without the objectionable assumption that any entity in the domain of a relation is a particular (or, in Platonic terms, any instance of a form is a particular).

We have seen that the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars is not justified. Then Socrates can, and must, reject the unjustified thesis that leads to the unacceptable conclusion that humans cannot know forms and take the case of knowers as a counterexample to it. Though a human knower must be a particular instance of the form of Knowledge, he can still be a knower of a non-particular, such as Beauty itself, because the Truth itself, unlike the form of the Slave itself, can have forms as its instances.
James Forrester (1974, 236) is an author who comes closest to this objection by distinguishing an instance of a form and its particular instance, which he calls "a particular instance of a form" and "an instance of a form which is a (phenomenal) particular," respectively. But he fails to formulate the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars and explain its critical role in the argument. His main objection, which is correct but beside the point, is that the Thesis of Correlation of Forms does not yield the desired conclusion that humans cannot know any forms. Note also that, on his interpretation, "Just as Slavery cannot be mastered by humans, [the Truth itself] cannot be known by humans" (ibid., 235) though other forms may well be known by humans. We see no reason that even this much parallelism must hold between the counterparts of the Master itself and Knowledge itself, respectively. No human (actually, nothing at all) can be a master of the Slave itself, because this form is not an instance of itself. But the feature of not instantiating itself is a peculiarity of ordinary forms that need not be shared by forms like the Truth itself. If so, the reason that the Slave itself cannot be enslaved by humans does not apply to the Truth itself to yield the conclusion that this form cannot be known by humans.

Sandra Peterson is another author who comes close to our objection to Parmenides' argument. She expresses doubts on the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars, though she does not explain why it is doubtful (1981, 16). But she takes Forrester to attribute to Parmenides the assumption that all (correlated) forms have only particulars as instances and objects that the "obviousness" of the falsity of the assumption undermines the significance of the distinction between instances and particular instances (ibid., 15). We, as Forrester in effect does, have pointed out that one cannot get the wrong thesis of Correlation of Particulars from the right thesis of Correlation of Instances without making the wrong assumption that every instance of a form is a particular. But this is not to say that Parmenides has derived the former thesis by making the assumption implicitly. Even those who would flatly deny the assumption if it were clearly formulated to them might still assent to the wrong thesis by confusing it with the correct thesis—especially when the two critical notions of instance and particular instance are not clearly kept apart as is the case in the dialogue. For example, Lewis, it seems to us, falls prey to the same confusion in his defense of the wrong thesis.

This completes our objection to Parmenides' argument. The objection is based on a sharp distinction between the notion of instance and that of particular (instance). The distinction is critical to clarifying the difference between the case of masters and that of knowers
and, accordingly, the difference between Correlation of Particulars and Correlation of Instances. With the distinction made clear, we have seen, there is no reason for defenders of the theory of forms to accept the invidious thesis of Correlation of Particulars. And we think that it is the other thesis that the defenders must accept.

The Thesis of Correlation of Instances has intrinsic plausibility. This can be shown by clarifying its content using the notions of a relation and its converse, as Lewis has done. Moreover, the thesis has right results. It helps to explain the correct observation about cases like that of masters and, accordingly, the validity of the thesis that results from restricting the Thesis of Correlation of Particulars to ordinary forms. In addition, because the explanation of the observation requires an appeal to a specific feature of the ordinary forms in question, it does not apply to the case of knowers to yield the unacceptable result that particulars, such as humans, cannot know forms. Consequently, the defender can use the Thesis of Correlation of Instances to explain why we humans can know forms though we cannot be their masters. According to the thesis, a human can know only an instance of the counterpart of Knowledge itself and can be a master of only an instance of the counterpart of the Master itself. So a human cannot master any forms, because the Slave itself has no forms as its instances; but he may still know forms if, and because, the Truth itself has forms as instances.

We have seen that Parmenides generalizes a feature peculiar to the ordinary cases like that of masters and applies the thesis so obtained to the case of knowers. We have also seen that there is another thesis that gives a correct generalization of the ordinary cases. If Socrates had kept the two theses clearly apart, he could have used the correct thesis to explain that forms can be known by humans. To do so, he would have needed a clear understanding of higher-order forms like Truth, Being, or One, as well as ordinary forms like the Master itself. But the young Socrates of the Parmenides might not have had a firm grasp of such higher-order forms, grappling with which seems to occupy some of Plato’s later dialogues. Perhaps, then, the author of the Parmenides might have thought that including an articulate account of such forms is of a greatest difficulty to be met in defending the theory of forms.

University of Alberta

Received June 5, 1997
NOTES

1. We owe thanks to Mary-Louise Gill, Frank Lewis, Mohan Matthen, Catherine Wilson, Janet Sisson, and an anonymous referee of History of Philosophy Quarterly for discussions and encouragement, comments and criticisms. The coauthored version of this paper was written while the first author held a Killam Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Alberta.

2. All translations are the second author’s. We want to avoid attributing what is said in the dialogue to its author Plato, though in the last sentence of this paper we propose a conjecture about what Plato might have thought when he wrote the dialogue. So we attribute what is said in the dialogue to Parmenides and Socrates as its characters, by which we do not suggest that the dialogue describes an actual discussion between them as historical figures.

3. The argument is followed by a companion argument (134c4-134d7) to the effect that if there is something (e.g., a god) that knows forms, it cannot know particulars. Though the latter argument is related to the former argument, our objection to the former does not depend on any specific interpretation of the latter. So we leave it aside in this paper.

4. We take Parmenides to mean particular instances of a form by “the things among us, whether they are likenesses or whatever one assumes to be [of the form]” (133c9-d1). We take him to mean particulars by “things among us.” Particulars like a beautiful person or a human master are, we say, instances of forms like Beauty itself or the Master itself (notice that it is not decided by this usage that instances of forms are all particulars). In presenting the argument here in question, Parmenides seems noncommittal about the nature of the relation of instantiation; he avoids using a definite word for it and talks of “likenesses or whatever one [e.g., Socrates] assumes to be” (ibid.). (He does so intentionally, because, earlier in their discussion, Socrates has unsuccessfully attempted to explain the nature of the relation in question on two different models: participation and likeness.) See also notes 10 and 15 below.

5. Here we agree with Frank Lewis (1979, 110f) and Sandra Peterson (1981, 15). It is a different question whether the result of the argument (together with its companion and the earlier arguments concerning the nature of the participation relation) is that there can be no substantial relation between forms and particulars (we say “substantial” because one cannot deny that the relation of difference holds between forms and particulars). We can be neutral about this question here, though we think it would be a strong claim for Parmenides to make on the basis of what he has actually argued.

6. Sandra Peterson (1981,7) analyzes the argument along this line.

7. Though he makes other objections to the argument, Forrester agrees with Cornford and says that the argument “rests on the Self-predication assumption” (1974, 233f).
8. What is said, recall, is that "mastery itself is what it is of slavery itself and slavery itself is in like manner slavery of mastery itself" (133e3-4; our italics), where it is natural to take "what it [viz. mastery] is" to be interchangeable with "mastery" rather than "a master."

9. Lewis, too, ignores the additional difference. He (1979, 115) reads (3) to mean that

(3') Knowledge (itself) is knowledge of the forms,

which does not predicate knowing of Knowledge itself, but he agrees with Cornford to take it as a restatement of (1). He quotes (1) while formulating it in his words as (3') (ibid., 114), and argues that (3) is "an alternative way of stating . . . that knowledge is knowledge of truth" (ibid., 115). We agree that (3') is a plausible interpretation of (3), but we do not see how (3') can be a mere restatement of "(the form of) knowledge is knowledge of (the form of) truth."

10. One might object that a particular like Socrates cannot be an instance of the form of Knowledge itself because the instances of this form are specific kinds of knowledge, such as geometric knowledge. This objection arises from misunderstanding of the relation of instantiation-in question: on the objector's view, Socrates could not be an instance of the form of master (or slavery), either, because its instances would be specific kinds of mastery (or slavery), not particulars like Socrates. It is useful to keep it in mind that the abstract nouns "knowledge" and "mastery," used here as names of forms, derive from the verbs "to know" and "to maser"; accordingly, the instances of the forms amount to, roughly, the subjects of these verbs: those who know some things (i.e., knowers) and those who master (i.e., enslave) others (i.e., masters). Thus, in case Knowledge itself is an instance of the form itself, this means only that the form, as well as its particular instances, is a knower, not that particulars are not its instances; likewise with the case in which geometrical knowledge, for example, is an instance of Knowledge itself.

11. She explains the distinction in connection with the use of the Greek preposition "pros" (which she translates as "in relation to") in sentences of the form "A is B pros C," but the distinction can be explained independently of the use of the preposition.

12. In addition, Meinwald might claim that the distinction helps to clarify the way in which particulars participate in the forms: Socrates, for example, participates in forms, such as the Master itself or Knowledge itself, only in relation to the others.

13. It is essentially the same with the example of siblings that Meinwald discusses instead of Plato's own example of masters. Glauccon and Adeimantus are siblings; and they are such, Parmenides can grant, on account of their relation to the form of Sibling itself. But despite their relation to the form, they do not become siblings of any form, including Sibling itself.

14. Here it is not necessary to decide whether the truth itself has particulars, too, as its instances, though this issue is relevant to the question whether we can know particulars as well as forms.
15. What we call the *Thesis of Correlation* is formulated three times (133c88-d5, 133e5-134al, and 134d4-7). In all the three formulations, the second part of the thesis concerns the kind of things that are called "things among us," which we call *particulars*. So they cannot be understood as the Thesis of Correlation of Instances. In the second formulation in 133e5-134al, Parmenides talks of "things in (en) us" as well as "things among (para) us." If the two expressions are not used interchangeably in the passage, the second formulation indicates that the Thesis of Correlation might consist of three, not two, sub-theses. The additional sub-thesis, which would concern entities of a third kind (e.g., the so-called immanent forms) just as the other two sub-theses concern (transcendental) forms and (ordinary) particulars, respectively, would also differ from the Thesis of Correlation of Instances, because this is not a thesis that specifically concerns entities of a special kind that are neither (transcendental) forms nor (ordinary) particulars.

16. He calls them the *principle of factual separation* and the *principle proper separation*, respectively (1979, 106f and 109). His principle of factual separation cannot be taken as the Thesis of Correlation of Instances; it is said to concern separation of "sensibles" (i.e., particulars) from forms (ibid., 109).

17. Forrester calls the counterpart of the form of Knowledge "Object-of-Knowledge," but we retain Parmenides' own words for the counterpart form.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


