Narratives of Power and the Power of Narratives: Transformation along the U.S.-Mexico Border

by

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Abstract

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Using the Three Border Model developed by Mike Davis and Alessandra Moctezuma, this thesis presents a number of case studies focused on the narratives of power and transformation that continue to develop on the American side of the U.S.-Mexico border in the post-9/11 context. The first case study overviews the history of the U.S.-Mexico border in relation to the ongoing fortification of the physical boundary and its legal reification in federal policy. The second case study examines the exclusionary policies enacted by the state of Arizona as well as the anti-immigration agenda instituted by the Minuteman Project. The third case study examines the ways in which urban communities in the borderlands contest the material manifestations of the border present in their everyday lives. By surveying case studies at different sites and scales along the U.S.-Mexico boundary, this thesis challenges traditional conceptions of state power at the border.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

From the ancient Great Wall of China to Israel’s West Bank barrier today, walls, fences, and other barriers have been dividing populations for thousands of years (Ivekovic 2005:16). While some scholars have argued that state borders are becoming less relevant (Ohmae 1995; Kaplan 1994), many geographers contend that the continued presence of fences and walls along state borders indicates that these demarcations remain one of the most basic and visible features of the international system today (Diener & Hagen 2009; Flint & Taylor 2007; Andreas 2003; Newman 2006). For example, fences and walls currently separate, or are being constructed to separate the United States from Mexico, Israel from Palestine, South Africa from Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia from Yemen, India from Pakistan and Bangladesh, Egypt from Gaza, and Botswana from Zimbabwe (Dyer 2007; Brown 2008). Regardless of their location, these fencing projects have a tremendous impact on the societies and environments in which they are constructed. As such, this thesis will examine the multi-faceted implications of one of the most controversial fencing projects of our time: the U.S.-Mexico border.

The idea for this thesis project was originally premised on examining the physical border; however, this study has blossomed into an examination of how the border operates in both territorial and non-territorial contexts, many of which are far removed from the official international boundary line formally drawn between the U.S. and Mexico in 1848. The primary purpose of this thesis is to offer substantial insight into the forces that are currently shaping the U.S.-Mexico border, and to build an interdisciplinary model that sheds new light on the distinct and multiple layers that comprise the border. This thesis draws upon, and further develops, the Three Border Model originally proposed by Mike Davis and Alessandra
Moctezuma in *Architecture of the Borderlands* (1999). This model provides a multidimensional framework for the analysis of the U.S.-Mexico divide that moves beyond thinking about the border as simply a physical demarcation. It will illustrate that the border and its associated bordering practices constitute powerful processes of inclusion and exclusion within the sphere of everyday life in the United States.

While the U.S.-Mexico border has become demarcated in more concrete ways than ever before, its role as a boundary is also rendered visible through various social, political, and economic processes. The function of the physical border is not simply to control entry and exit, or the passage of goods. Rather, the border also serves as a potent symbol in the different and overlapping political narratives of inclusion/exclusion within the United States. This is particularly important given the way in which the U.S.-Mexico border figures so prominently in contemporary debates with respect to the politics of migration. More importantly, what the Three Border Model brings to the foreground is that the border, including its various extensions into the interior of the country, is far more “complex and messier than our comforting image of infinitesimally precise black lines on a map” (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 34). The model makes visible the violence inscribed into the everyday landscape through the establishment and maintenance of borders, as well as through an exploration of the power structures that make borders and their divisive practices particularly salient. At the same time, the model lends itself to understanding borders as being an important site for negotiation and communication – an active space – that allows us to rethink the complex reality of the border on the ground. This border space provides a vantage point on how existing power structures affect and are challenged by the communities most affected by the border and its multiple manifestations.
This thesis does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the case studies presented. Instead, it identifies the ways that the border has become manifest at different sites and scales within the United States. For instance, the role of the federal government in the physical fortification of the border is one of the most visible responses of the U.S. to undocumented immigration. Anti-immigration initiatives, however, also operate at the state and local level. On the ground, many of the policies implemented by the border patrol, immigration enforcement agencies and municipal governments have mirrored the physical separation of Mexicans from Americans that has been implemented by the federal government at the U.S.-Mexico border through the erection of a steel fence. While manifest in different ways, these practices have served to exacerbate the divisions that exist between these two contiguous communities on the ground at the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as within numerous communities throughout the United States. At the same time, there are also several examples of initiatives that work to undermine these simple delineations of national and territorial identities. The Three Border Model provides one model for addressing this complexity of border policies and practices on the ground. While this thesis does not foreground the policy implications of its analysis, it is hoped that, with further study, this research will help contribute to rethinking the concepts and policy strategies pertaining to the border dilemmas addressed here, and to move towards more nuanced way of envisioning state borders in the future.

Outline of Thesis

As suggested above, this thesis traces a variety of bordering practices that have been and continue to be instituted either at the physical dividing line between the United States and Mexico, or through mechanisms of structural and social exclusion manifest at various
scales within the interior of the United States which use the physical border as their referent. The second chapter of this study will explicate the reasons for using the Three Border Model for understanding contemporary borders. To do so, I begin with an overview of the ways that the border has been examined from a realist perspective, before turning to examine poststructuralist theories of the border. The literature review demonstrates that realism has predominated in the International Relations (IR) literature, while in the social sciences, including Geography, there has been a shift towards poststructuralist theory. This review will demonstrate how geographers have challenged some of the central tendencies of the notion of borders held by many IR theorists and have, as a result, broadened and enriched the concept. From this discussion, I will move to an overview of the Three Border Model, which both uses and extends beyond the realist and poststructuralist studies advocating a three-pronged approach for examining the border.

The content of chapters 3 through 5 will focus on developing each layer of the border through engagement with a particular case study from the U.S.-Mexico border. Each one of these chapters will explore the practice of constructing borders, either territorial or non-territorial, from the perspective of the United States. Specifically, Chapter 3 will explore the ‘first’ border - the physical dividing line. Some background history dating back to 1848 will be discussed, but the focus will be on more contemporary issues. The examples included within this chapter will include the fortification of the border during the mid-1990s, the implementation of the USA-PATRIOT Act in the weeks following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the introduction of the Homeland Security Act in 2002. My analysis of these controls problematizes the dominant narratives of the U.S.-Mexico border in the United States, many of which seek to justify the ‘hardening’ of the physical border.
The fourth chapter of this thesis will explore what Davis and Moctezuma refer to as the ‘second’ border. This layer indicates that power is diffuse and is not concentrated in the hands of the federal government. Instead, the second border illustrates that power is located at various sites and scales that radiate away from the border. This chapter looks specifically at border measures adopted by the state of Arizona and the role that the Minuteman Project (MMP) has played in shaping the U.S.-Mexico border. While the former concentrates on implementing anti-immigration legislation and bordering practices, the latter mobilizes ordinary Americans to prevent undocumented Mexicans from entering the United States. Both of these efforts of exclusion have served to complicate the power dynamics at the border and have resulted in the generation of new states of exception both at the border and within the interior of the United States.

Chapter 5 will analyze the ‘third border’, as defined by Davis and Moctezuma. In their model, Davis and Moctezuma focus on the architectural and juridical boundaries in rural and urban communities that separate undocumented Mexicans or Mexican-Americans from Americans. This paper draws upon this model but also expands it to consider community-level responses to the ‘third’ border that have created moments of boundary transformation. This chapter focuses on several projects from the San Diego-Tijuana segment of the U.S.-Mexico border, including the movement to keep Friendship Park open to the public, the historical struggle emerging from within Barrio Logan to secure Chicano Park, and the Living Rooms at the Border project designed by Estudio Teddy Cruz.

The sixth chapter will draw together the materials from the previous three chapters. It will identify what is gained by using the Three Border Model, and what this approach might contribute to the study of borders within Geography. Some of the contributions that this
model might make towards more comprehensive and inclusive policy recommendations will also be identified. This chapter will also identify some of the problems with the Three Border Model: what is hidden through this analysis, and what is ignored. Finally, this chapter will serve to wrap up the discussion of the Three Border Model and suggest areas where the application of the model might be useful for future border studies.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The main objective of this chapter is to explore the concept of the border developed within the fields of International Relations (IR) and Geography, and the Three Border Model conceived by urban sociologists Mike Davis and Alessandra Moctezuma. This chapter will be divided into three major sections. The first is a general overview of realist approaches to the study of the border, with particular attention to the relevant literature from the field of IR. Traditional approaches in IR tend to focus on state-based models of the border that prioritize national interest and state security over the socio-spatial impacts of bordering processes. Second, the concept of the border will be examined through the field of Geography and other social sciences where scholars have introduced new layers to the discussion and understand the border as both a territorial and a social space. This understanding of the border comes from the emergence of poststructuralist theory, where scholars are interested in identifying the multiple purposes and meanings of borders from a variety of perspectives. Finally, the third section of this chapter will flesh out the Three Border Model as presented by Mike Davis and Alessandra Moctezuma, and outline its application to a broader case study of the U.S.-Mexico border.

Before embarking on this journey, it is necessary to acknowledge that in the limited space of this thesis, not all of the viewpoints or opinions within each of the examined disciplines are accounted for. The goal of this chapter is to examine some of the dominant narratives generated by scholars across these fields and to identify some of the coherences and contradictions between them. The attention to the realist ideologies embedded within traditional IR theory is necessary for understanding traditional approaches to the border, and how they have been transformed by more recent developments in the field of border studies.
In recognizing the conceptual and pragmatic inadequacies of IR concepts of the border, geographers have actively provided alternative frameworks. The critique of the traditional conceptualization of borders in IR, however, does not imply the abandonment of territorial borders altogether. Rather, the contributions made by geographers highlight the fact that the border and bordering practices are powerfully embedded within social and cultural relations. As I will illustrate in more detail below, the Three Border Model retains a focus on the state border but also captures the more nuanced aspects of the border discussed by poststructuralist approaches.

**Realist Approaches to Understanding the Border**

Within the traditional field of IR, the meaning of state territoriality and its boundaries has often been taken for granted (Agnew 1994; Shapiro & Alker 1996; Newman & Paasi 1998). IR theorists, such as Tuomas Forsberg, have argued that territory is a “strategic asset and territorial disputes are seen as resulting from power struggles that have been traditionally at the core of international politics” (2003: 10). This idea is rooted in the core features of the classical international system, where power is considered to be a direct function of territory and the acquisition of resources, and territorial integrity is the primary meaning of sovereignty. IR theory was adopted as a tool for understanding global politics following the end of the First World War, and much of the early IR scholarship focused on the need for a balance of power system to be replaced by a system defined by collective security (see Waltz 1979: Chapter 1, 4-6). While the two world wars generated new thinking on collective security to rectify the shortcomings of the longstanding classical realist statesmanship, the Cold War saw a resurgence of realism. Operating as a dominant paradigm in IR, realism has had a profound impact on how the concept of the border has conventionally been understood.
In recent years scholars like Kenneth Waltz, and more recently Stephen Walt, have revived this classical realist thinking within the field of IR, but have done so without reconsidering the role of the border in their frameworks. The principle tenets of this realism include the construction of a state-centric model in which states are the primary actors in global politics. Lacking any overarching authority, states must engage in power struggles with other self-interested states as a matter of basic survival (ibid). As a key part of these zero-sum power struggles, borders protect territorial integrity and maintain sovereignty. In fact, in many cases, IR literature has understood borders both as territorial markers of political control and a tangible expression of the consolidation of territorial gains (Banerjee 2002: 34). In this way, the territoriality of the state and its boundaries have been reaffirmed as important fixtures of the international system, often contentious in their location but not in the role that they play (Williams 2003: 27).

The realist framework thus views borders as physical markers that delineate one sovereign state from the next. Accordingly, Harvey Starr explains that borders are intimately connected to the security and preservation of a state because any state that wishes to enjoy its sovereignty requires a “‘hard shell’ against would-be aggressors” (2006: 4). Referencing the work of political realist John Herz (1957), Starr indicates that, “for centuries the characteristics of the basic political unity, the nation-state, has been its ‘territoriality’, that is, its being identified with an area which, surrounded by a ‘wall of defensibility’, was relatively impermeable to outside penetration” (Herz 1957 as quoted in Starr 2006: 4). As the ‘hard shell’ or ‘wall of defensibility’ of the state, borders are often understood by IR theorists as necessary for the protection of its citizens and, as Starr argues, a state’s security is viewed as entirely contingent on its location, size, and power of the state in relation to its neighbours,
and how the legal features of the official boundaries are related to the geographical landscape (2006). To this end, IR theorists like Brendan O’Leary have argued that that “successful statehood requires successful claims to territory” (2001: 3). Moreover, the state system and its boundaries are taken for granted as the primary fundament of global order such that any attempt to remove or even to re-conceptualize a state’s borders suggests a revolution in world politics (Williams 2003; Agnew 1994). State borders are thus not only important to state sovereignty but also the preservation of the international global order.

Paul Hirst attends to the imperial dimensions of these international relations. He argues that borders originally existed as the “mutually recognized and demarcated borders of modern sovereign states, and as the linear systems of external regulation whereby pre-modern empires at the limits of their expansion contained their barbarian neighbours” (2005: 77). Hirst thus draws together the politics of the border’s internal mechanisms, used by the government to control populations, and the importance to external relations, with the frontier viewed as a source of threat to other neighbouring states (2005: 77-78). Within the field of IR, these functions are often referred to as the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty, which underscores the centrality of borders as a discrete line within realist thinking. According to Hirst’s model, external sovereignty enables governments to manipulate the space of the physical boundary for political gain; however, it also indicates that borders serve a necessary function in protecting the state and its citizens. Additionally, the premise of internal sovereignty uses the border to preserve the right of the state alone to determine the character of national life by excluding outside influences and/or interference.

The relationship between a state’s borders and sovereignty is not as simplistic as many IR theorists have posited, argues John Agnew. In developing his theory of the
‘territorial trap’, Agnew suggests that IR theorists need to move away from a model of the territoriality of the state as an unchanging entity and look at the terms of its significance and meaning in different historical-geographical circumstances. He identifies three core problems associated with conventional IR notions of the territoriality of the state: 1) that states are viewed as fixed units of sovereign space which has served to dehistoricize and decontextualize processes of state formation and disintegration; 2) the use of domestic/foreign and national/international polarities to obscure the interaction between processes which operate at different scales; and 3) that the state is a ‘container’ of society and, thus, becomes a national phenomenon (Agnew 1994: 59). He argues that traditional IR models of state territoriality define political identity exclusively in state-territorial terms, which he argues is problematic in modern times as there are a growing number of alternative political identities that have arisen in response to a wider variety of security threats (Agnew 1994: 61). For instance, in addition to security threats, migration and the formation of diaspora communities have also been classified as sources of transnational identities that have significantly impacted the diversity of the state. Also, the growth of civil society and the struggle for democratic rights have challenged the idea of the state’s internal sovereignty. In this way, Agnew advocates that IR theorists need to take into account the diverse political identities that exist and discard habits of universalizing any of the state’s constituents.

Agnew’s second argument is that the binaries created by endorsing a spatially exclusive definition of political identity are problematic because they result in “the rigid separation between those people within the territorial space pursuing ‘universal’ values (politics) and those outside practicing different, and inferior, values” (Agnew 1994: 62). The construction of such divisions is problematic as they are premised on the idea that the state is
the political expression of a unified nation; that a unified territory corresponds to a single people. Moreover, as Agnew notes, the model presumes a hierarchy of nations, with western nations cast as superior to other populations. Such a presumption applies problematically at best to the European origins of the state as an institution\(^1\), but the global implementation of the state model on peoples divided by alternative systems of allegiances has shattered this assumption with a spate of civil wars, secessionist movements and state failure in a number of former imperial colonies.

Within this framework, the primary function of borders is to physically separate between the self and other without adequate attention to the self/other divisions that occur within borders or defy national territorial delineations. Ethnographic studies have shown, however, that “border cities on both sides of the boundary can be considered single communities that enjoy a variety of economic, social, and cultural ties that span the line and constitute a unique ‘zone’ or ‘borderland’ extending hundreds of miles into each state” (Ackleson 1999: 155). Thus, the idea of nationalism that has been so prevalent in IR theories, and the presumption that a coherent national identity can be mapped onto territorial space,

\(^1\) Here I am referring to the fact that the state as an institution of political governance arose in Europe with the treaty of Westphalia as an outcome of uniquely European circumstances. The idea of the nation-state – which came during and after the Napoleonic wars – was also a European invention arising from European circumstances and, in many ways, was always more of an ideal than a reality on the ground. This was because populations were not homogenous due to frequently shifting borders, and the state seldom treated different segments of the population equally as one nation. The fact that the state is now a near universal institution is not due to its naturalness or inevitability (as realism might suggest), but due to the fact that European empires imposed their own institutions of governance (the state) on populations that had long used other institutions. The 'post'-colonial conflicts in such cases attest to the non-universality of the state as an institution of political governance, largely because the modern state assumes a requisite unity amongst the peoples it governs - a consensus on basic political values - that doesn't exist in many countries. The key example is Africa: its present day borders were established in 1885 at the Berlin Conference by European imperial powers and had nothing to do with existent divisions between peoples of Africa and the political institutions they had long established. State lines did not correspond to the political and demographic reality they were imposed upon it by force. The imperialism was to try to force non-European socio-political systems into specifically European frameworks of colony and then statehood.
collapses at the border where it is clear that identity operates in a much more complex and complicated way.

Finally, Agnew argues that the “principle of state sovereignty ‘denies alternative possibilities because it fixes our understanding of the future opportunities in relation to a distinction between history and progress within statist communities and mere contingency outside them” (Walker 1990: 14 as quoted in Agnew 1994: 64). Within this framework, the only alternative for political organization is to divide existing states into more territorial states or to integrate them into a global superstate (ibid). Of particular importance here, Agnew points out, is that the territorial state is not a timeless creation and, therefore, should not be the only mould to be considered within the realm of IR theory. In many cases IR theorists have made the assumption that cultural differences are natural and pre-exist the establishment of state boundaries, indicating that borders are the product of the human demarcation of this seemingly ‘natural’ difference. Where the Western state has been imposed imperially, however, the ongoing history of political and violent conflict defies the presumed universality or naturalism of this historically contingent institution. In their work on the ‘territorial effect’, geographers Stuart Elden and Neil Brenner have also emphasized the “state’s tendency, through its territorial form, to naturalize (at once to mask and to normalize) its own transformative, intensely patterning effects upon sociospatial relations” (2003: 354).

This overview has suggested how the concept of the border has become tangled up with the state and, therefore, has been neatly packaged up with IR’s central themes of power, sovereignty, identity and security. Three main precepts of the border are manifest in IR literature. The first is that the border is representative of the amount of territory controlled by
a state and, therefore, is considered to be synonymous with power. Borders are the “walls of defensibility” or the “hard shell” protecting a state’s sovereignty from external threats. This leads to the second precept: security. The idea of security originally only applied to the prevention of military invasion by neighbouring states and precluded any discussion about human, cultural, economic, or social security. Finally, the state is a central feature of the international system. This mode of thinking has resulted in the drawing of arbitrary lines through ‘border’ communities, separating individuals and groups who may retain a high level of solidarity because of their close proximity, as well as their everyday interactions. What this traditional model of IR overlooks are the social, political, and cultural impacts that borders and bordering processes have on the ground, and the ways that these dynamics challenge realist conceptions of the border as a discrete territorial delineation. While physical borders still exist in the world today, they are often encountered as non-boundaries and are becoming increasingly permeable (Rumford 2006: 14). These changes on the ground have underscored the problems of IR models. While state leaders still attach the state to its territory, consider border control to be one of the state’s defining powers, and, in many places, have begun spending a tremendous amount of resources and time “hardening” their borders with “security controls and state-of-the-art surveillance technology,” these measures have been largely unable to prevent or control the movement of undocumented migrants, terrorists, traffickers in people and drugs, or whosoever is deemed to represent a threat at any particular time (Rumford 2006: 14-15). The realist approach persists in state practice even as borders everywhere present a starkly different reality.

These new challenges have caused many scholars to take a more critical approach to looking at borders and bordering practices, requiring a “reconceptualising, reconsidering,
problematising, and deconstructing” of the ways in which borders have been traditionally understood (Williams 2003: 26). As power has become located in a wide variety of sources and territory is no longer such a central component for retaining sovereignty, borders need to be understood along “a more multi-dimensional, ‘modern’ line” to include “the heightened political influence of non-state actors and multinationals, the resurgence of new patterns of ethnicity and identity, the further internationalization of national economies, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor, as just a few examples” (Ackleson 1999: 159).

It should be noted, however, that some IR theorists have risen to this challenge, such as David Kaplan (1998) and the other academics who contributed to producing Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory and Scale. Kaplan’s work, for instance, problematizes the conventional notions of nation-states, identity, and territory in IR. He argues that territory no longer holds the same weight it once did and can no longer contain notions of identity, and suggests that “the contrasts across national borders will melt, and the difference among the individuals within a territory will magnify” (Kaplan 1998: 46). Here, Kaplan has identified the theoretical shift taking place from realism to poststructural theory where the emphasis is no longer on the physical border itself, but on the processes that make these borders possible. As Kaplan has indicated in his work, some IR theorists are coming to terms with the fading of state territorial power as they recognize the diffuse, transnational, and non-territorial concerns of contemporary politics. While a subsection of IR work on critical security studies has also begun to rethink borders and other precepts of realist theory along more complex lines (see for example Booth 1991), geographers have been at the fore of this re-imagining of the state sovereignty and border studies. Through their contributions, geographers have sought to address the ways that the border is a symbolic feature of the state that is played out
on the ground through a variety of socio-cultural processes. In this way, geographers have turned to examining non-territorial and non-state sources of power. It is to this that I turn in the following section.

**Poststructuralist Approaches to Understanding the Border**

Over the course of the past two decades, geographers have begun to argue that territorial borders are more than just material constructs imposed on the physical landscape, but rather that they are also social constructs (see for example Williams 2003, Paasi & Newman 1998, Wastl-Walter & Staeheli 2004). Borders, then, are to be considered “much more than the physical and static outcomes of the political decision making process” (Newman 2006:145). One reason for this divergent perspective arises from the different role of the state in Geography, where it does not take centre stage, and to which there is not the same disciplinary allegiance. Openly questioning the existence and role of the state does not hinder the credibility of the discipline of Geography as a whole. Instead, there has been a resurgence in the academic study of borders which applies a more flexible approach and allows for the broadening of the concept of borders to include an analysis of the social, political, economic, and cultural processes that has shaped and been shaped by the existence of contemporary borders. The influence of Michel Foucault’s reconceptualization of power has been foundational to this reconsideration of the border. Power, according to Foucault, is not simply a repressive phenomenon. Rather, “what makes power hold, what makes it accepted, is the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces discourse” (Foucault 1977: 119). Therefore, for Foucault, power is located everywhere, albeit manifest and exerted by different actors at different moments. At the same time, Foucault does not
dismiss the importance of the state and its relationship to power. Instead, he writes that he is interested in identifying how relations of power, and the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state (Foucault 1977: 122). Accordingly, his analysis of power is focused on “its capillary form[s] of existence” whereby “power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault 1977: 39). In short, Foucault’s understanding of power can be “exercised within the social body, rather than from above it” (ibid). To this end, Foucault argues that, “the concrete nature of power becomes visible in the daily struggles at the grassroots level, among those whose fight was located in the fine meshes of the web of power” (Foucault 1977: 115-116). This way of framing power thus moves beyond the totalizing, state-based framework that is central to the IR approach to understanding the border and incorporate a more nuanced and localized analysis of the way that power is infused within the border and bordering practices across various locations and temporalities.

In this same vein, geographers have employed a wide range of methodological approaches to examine the border, unlike IR where the focus still tends to be on the study of diplomacy and statesmanship, with a methodology that is centered upon finding the assumptions, principles, beliefs and values that influence state policymakers and their interactions. IR theorists are more interested in understanding how worldviews are established and function than conducting fieldwork on the ground. Many geographers, on the other hand, have produced ethnographies through conducting interviews with individuals living in border communities and producing impact assessment and discourse analysis focused at the community level. Through this approach to understanding borders, many
geographers have become interested in evaluating the meaning and implications of borders beyond their territoriality, rather than simply taking the existence of the state as a bounded unit within a static international system as a point of departure for their research (Newman & Paasi 1998). While IR theorists have traditionally focused on the formal mechanisms of power, such as policies, laws, and institutions, a poststructuralist approach reveals the informal or internalized functions of power that exist through racism, xenophobia, and other practices of exclusion. In this way, a poststructuralist analysis renders the more subtle, internalized and diffuse modes of power visible by indicating that they have just as profound an effect on social reality as their formal counterparts.

The recognition of the complex social and cultural processes that play a role in shaping borders allows geographers to move beyond viewing the physical border as a political necessity. Given their approach to borders, geographers have acknowledged and have begun to address the inherent divisiveness associated with territorial borders within realist IR theory. Recent work in Geography conceptualizes borders in the world today to be in a constant state of flux, as they are defined and re-defined by social processes (O’Tuathail 1996; Agnew & Corbridge 1995). The space of the nation has been increasingly deterritorialized and can no longer be based upon the idea of homogeneity presupposed by realist theories of the state (Doty 1999: 587). The influx of global migration and the rise of ethnic-based conflicts within states has led to a disruption of this spatial imagery and has called into question the adequacy of IR theories which cling to traditional theories of the state (ibid). Rather than viewing the border as a static object to be taken for granted, many geographers have argued that it should be viewed as a site of constant change and flux and,
rather than a line that divides people, it can also be conceptualized as a zone that has the potential to bring people together.

Echoing this understanding of borders, David Knight has pointed out that, “territory itself is passive, and it is human beliefs and actions that give territory meaning” (1982: 517). Even more critically, geographers recognize that each of these processes, which can be initiated from a variety of sites and scales, often embody elements of ethnic, racial, and class oppression that would not be revealed by a simple examination of the lines on a map (Yiftachel 2001: 36). Many scholars have illustrated that a comprehensive understanding of borders demands an ethnographic approach informed by critical theory in order to move beyond the self-sustaining assumptions of realism. Through examining the everyday implications of the borders and bordering practices that have been expressed in different ways in different places, geographers have been able to achieve a more nuanced understanding of the border than IR theorists operating within a realist framework.

Drawing upon poststructuralist analyses of the social condition, geographers have been able to effectively challenge the idea of state borders as being strictly physical phenomena and provide a forum in which mechanisms of power can be analyzed in their complexity (Williams 2003: 28). A poststructuralist approach to understanding the border is able to look beyond the totalizing and institutional manifestations of the border and attempt to discern the more internalized modes of power that effectively serve to simultaneously establish and reinforce the border and its attendant bordering practices. While the realist IR conception of the border is also invested with power, it addresses only sovereign power and state-on-state relations. The fact that geographers are able to work ‘outside’ of the constraints of the state system becomes particularly important in contemporary terms, especially when
notions of territoriality and boundaries have become concomitant with the aims of various social and political groups to define and re-define the relations between social and physical space (Newman & Paasi 1998:188). For IR scholars working from within the realist framework, power is centralized, comprised of the state’s institutional ability to control its political and economic relations. In many ways, this includes the application of an array of formal modes of power, including policies, laws and institutions that work to exclude particular individuals or groups from the space of the nation-state. Geographers, on the other hand, have identified power as being diffuse and dispersed across a variety of scales and actors. Expressions of power are thus more subtle and diffuse, and impact everyday formulations of racism, poverty, and social exclusion. These are just as real in terms of their effects on social reality. As such, geographers are making the call for their colleagues and other academics to pay close attention to the power dynamics of boundary-producing practices and identity formations.

For example, within the field of Geography, feminist scholars provide insight onto the uneven geographies of power at state borders around the world. In her advocacy for a feminist approach to understanding geopolitics, Jennifer Hyndman suggests that even though “...the state remains a vital subject of interrogation in relation to security, it obscures fear and violence at other scales, beyond its purview” (2004: 308). Feminist geography, she argues, is “inherently political in that it advocates change where social, economic, or political relations, including those of gender, are inequitable, violent or exploitative” (ibid). As such, the feminist approach to understanding the border has drawn on key methodological approaches, including compiling ethnographies, which has allowed for a more localized understanding of borders and bordering practices. Therefore, a feminist approach to studying borders allows
geographers to arrive at more accountable and material conceptions of how power is infused both at the physical border and within the everyday reality of those whose lives have become affected by various border practices.

In their chapter in *Mapping Women, Making Politics: Feminist Perspectives on Political Geography*, Doris Wastl-Walter and Lynn A Staeheli argue that territories and boundaries are inextricably linked to the ideas and practices associated with difference (2004). Specifically, they argue that “as expressions of social power, territory and boundaries are ways of enforcing ideas about who and what belongs in particular places and the kinds of activities and practices that belong to a place or are seen as being appropriate” (Cresswell 1996; Wastl-Walter & Staeheli 2004:141). Therefore, questions of identity and difference are a critical component for understanding how social power attains geographical expression. Along these lines, the work of cultural anthropologist Kathleen M. Coll provides an excellent ethnographic account of the challenges that women immigrants face in attempting to gain access to the United States, including the tactics of psychological warfare that have been inserted into public policies and political discourse in order to isolate and silence these women both socially and politically (2010: 61). For instance, Coll cites the elimination of Section 245(i) of the U.S. immigration code and the cutoff of services for undocumented immigrants that was prompted by Proposition 187 in California as being two examples of how women have become isolated (2010: 58). Specifically, Coll recounts the story of Cristina Rodriquez, a Mexican woman whose husband was granted amnesty under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. In 1994, Proposition 187 was introduced threatening to deny healthcare, education and social services to undocumented immigrants in the U.S. During this time, Cristina Rodriquez was pregnant with her first child in an
environment that “gave license to discrimination and intolerance” and would “result in the heightened discrimination against Latinos of all backgrounds” (Coll 2010: 62). Luckily, Cristina had the support and information offered by her sister and other women in a local community organization in San Francisco that allowed her to continue to seek prenatal care and give birth at the county hospital (Coll 2010: 62). It should be noted, however, that other women were not as lucky and at least two deaths were directly connected to the fears that kept undocumented patients and their families from requesting care at public facilities in the state within just two weeks after the passage of Proposition 187 (ibid). Feminist studies of borders, as these examples suggest, are interested in extracting the concept of territory and power from the conventional nation-state in order to reveal how territorial processes and boundary negotiations, including how spatial expressions of inclusion and exclusion can operate within a variety of settings and scales (2004: 143).

Aside from gender considerations, increasingly scholars are also examining the racialization of socio-political ordering processes at the border and in the application of various bordering practices. For instance, Gilberto Rosas discusses the U.S.-Mexico borderlands as the stage for “spectacular displays of state power” through “a diffused form of racial governance that targets Latin American migrants” (Rosas 2006: 338). It is worth noting here that in Rosa’s analysis of the border, state power is not so much the act of excluding particular individuals, but of performing a discourse of who is an American, and activating the physical border as a symbol of state power. In his analysis of the U.S.-Mexico border, he discusses the racism that “occurs in the mundane, daily evaluations of racialized, normative citizenship, as well as being subject to militarized forms of governance, where thousands of people are channeled into the ‘killing deserts’” (Rosas 2006: 339). For example, within his
work Rosas discusses the ‘managed violence’ in the borderlands that has resulted in the establishment of ‘treacherous geographies’ that include “the deserts where over 3,600 immigrant corpses have been found, the violence that takes place within vigilante patrolled terrain, and the one-time underground border crossings via a sewer system between Nogales, Sonora and Nogales, Arizona where immigrants are subject to mugging by the young people of Barrio Libre” (2006: 413). On another register, Rosas describes the death of a 14-year-old boy who attempted to cross the border on three separate occasions through the underground sewer system; caught on his first two attempts, by the third attempt he was successful and made it across only to fall to his death on the tracks of a freight train headed to Tucson, Arizona (Rosas 2006: 402). Rosas argues that because of the growing policeability of the state – a concept he defines as encompassing the militarization of border policing, in vigilantism, and in the informal management of everyday life – immigrants have resorted to extreme measures to ensure that they are not targeted (Rosas 2006: 413).

For Rosas, it is necessary to engage with these dynamics of power because they capture “those forms of power that deems historically subordinated populations worthy of scrutiny, occasional exercises of state violence and other articulations of power” (ibid). In fact, Rosas argues that:

Popular ontological signifiers of race, such as subordinated language and forms of dress, as well as phenotype, underscore the politically organized racialization of immigrants as worthy of dying, subject to militarized policing, or vigilante actions, or daily forms of surveillance. (Rosas 2006: 405).

Similarly, in her study of a series of immigration raids that took place in Chandler, Arizona in 1995, Mary Romero argues that enforcement procedures target more than just undocumented migrants. In her words:
Conceptualizing racial profiling practices in immigration law enforcement as micro- and macro-aggressions helps recognize the discriminatory functions that policing and inspections have on citizenship participation and the rights of Mexican Americans, Mexican immigrants, and other racialized Latinos, particularly the poor and working class. (Romero 2006: 451)

Studies of the racialization of border practices reveal that the space of the state has become deterritorialized in the sense that territory, national identity, and political community no longer neatly overlap one another. Although it should be noted that these raids, policing, and other enforcement policies are all connected to realist thinking in that they operate as indicators of the centralized exercise of a state’s internal sovereignty. However, it is the underlying assumptions of issues such as race, gender, and class that make possible and influence the unequal application of these measures that the poststructuralist approach used by many geographers unveils. For instance, Susan Coutin and Nicholas De Genova describe the “spaces of non-existence” that are created for immigrants (Coutin 2000 as quoted in De Genova 2002: 419). This is a social space of “illegality” that results in an erasure of legal personhood – “a space of forced invisibility, exclusion, subjugation, and repression” that has “very real effects, ranging from hunger to unemployment (or more typically, severe exploitation) to violence to death” (De Genova 2002: 419).

Along this same vein, Susan Mains (2000) has indicated elsewhere that the identities of immigrants have become ‘naturalized’ in the discussions of immigration and power is often strategically located, yet entirely hidden, in discussions of the border. For example, on a number of occasions in recent history in the United States, state legislatures have attempted to pass laws that would prevent access to social services for undocumented migrants. Proposition 187, while later deemed unconstitutional, attempted to deny access to public services, while masking a strategy of persecuting Latin American immigrants by denying
their basic human needs and even human rights. Returning to Mains, her analysis of the Border Patrol and the Californian anti-immigrant organization, Voices of Citizens Together, she shows “that borders are not only created by the construction of fences, walls and floodlights, but also through discourses that mark immigrant bodies and the places with which they are associated as separate, marginal and different” (2002: 151). In sum, these works reveal that borders are infused into society at a number of different scales and in a number of places, not just at the internationally and politically defined border located at the periphery of the state. These exclusionary practices have been implemented by all levels of government, as well as by groups of citizens who have taken it upon themselves to inscribe these divisive modes of thinking into their everyday activities.

Geographers have expanded their focus to include the non-territorial manifestations of the border by focusing on the construction of gendered, racial, and class-based borders. In fact, geographers have begun to rely on variant conceptions of borders as being active spaces where the links between territorial space, collective identity, and group relations must be seen as both dynamic and reciprocal (Jackson and Penrose 1993 in Yiftachel 2001: 360). The concept of active space is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of borders because it highlights the fact that while social processes create spatial outcomes, the territorial shape of these outcomes also has the ability to shape the social, economic, and political environment of the state (ibid). To better understand borders as active spaces, many geographers have drawn upon the work of cultural anthropologists Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson for a more multi-faceted understanding of the border as “also meaning-making and meaning-carrying entities, parts of the cultural landscape which often transcend the physical limits of the state” (1999: 63). By highlighting that borders exist simultaneously as meaning-making
and meaning-carrying entities, Donnan and Wilson have demonstrated the need to consider borders as active spaces – spaces that are deeply connected to the existence of collective identities and group dynamics within, and sometimes outside of, the state.

Meanwhile, other scholars have classified borders as being both real and imagined. For instance, Joel Migdal has argued that an understanding of borders as fixed and hard features of the international community faded with the cessation of the Cold War. State borders today are no longer maintained through the bipolarity of the state system, but instead are maintained through a series of actual and virtual checkpoints and mental maps that groups use to separate one space from another (2004: 6):

Checkpoints refer to the sites and practices that groups use to differentiate members from others and to enforce separation. Monitoring at actual checkpoints includes a variety of surveillance techniques, from checking visas and passports to insidious practices such as racial profiling. At virtual checkpoints, practices go from scrutiny of modes of dress to detection of language and accent differences.

At the same time, boundaries are constructed and maintained through people’s mental maps, which Migdal says, “divides home from alien territory, the included from the excluded, the familiar from the other” (2004: 7). This analogy indicates that groups are actively attaching themselves to a particular spatial configuration, one that distances themselves from those they consider to be different from themselves. Generally speaking, these binaries are implemented by individuals or groups within the existing power structures of a society and can be manifest through a variety of tactics, including anti-immigration practices that are operationalized within the sphere of the everyday as well as those that are implemented from within official government arenas. The separation between self and other is not simply a matter of choice. Rather, it is based on assumptions that arise from processes of socialization rather than conscious decisions, and are embedded in institutional practices and power arrangements. Or, as Migdal suggests, these practices are often internalized, demonstrated
through the ordinary actions of individuals and their cross-border interactions through practices enacted at virtual checkpoints and through the creation of mental maps.

If we take Migdal’s theory of checkpoints and mental maps alongside the concept of active spaces, it can be argued that identity and group relations are central to borders and bordering processes. Here, geographers Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock have looked at how culture and identity can serve as important links between territory and space in so far as territorialization depends on culture as being a “tool of control”; while, at the same time, culture itself becomes increasingly territorialized (2001: 34). If we follow Migdal’s argument further then the border and bordering practices become an indispensable element in the construction and maintenance of national cultures. More importantly, they act as a catalyst for the political impetus to create more rigid boundaries between “us” and “them” in order to preserve a nationalist identity and, subsequently, the modern state (Williams 2003: 23; Paasi & Newman 1998: 187). As David Newman argues:

The multidimensional function of boundaries, not only as fixed territorial lines, but also as social, spatial, and political constructs that are tied up with the politics of identity and in which territorial ordering is a means through which national and ethnic groups form their respective hierarchies of social order and belonging, creating exclusive and inclusive spaces. (2001: 139)

More importantly, Newman contends that the relationship between territory and identity construction is important because territorial boundaries represent the lines that “determine the spatial locus around which national identities are formed” and can themselves become part of the national identity, with “places and spaces taking historical, and in many cases, mythical significance in the creation of the nation’s historical narrative” (Newman 2001: 146). Although physical borders are often considered to be the result of a major instance of social and cultural difference, it is necessary to highlight that in many cases the physical border comes first, and the construction of difference – of the self and other – comes later, as
socio-cultural processes reify the territorial demarcation. This challenges the traditional IR notion that the border is to be considered as a marker of the ‘natural’ division between cultures or social groups. By challenging this antiquated notion, Newman is emphasizing the need to examine the role of the border in reifying perceived social, political, and economic differences between adjacent communities. Adhering to the idea that the border is ‘natural’ denies a comprehensive analysis of the inherent dynamics of the bordering processes taking place at various sites and scales within contemporary states, as discussed previously in this chapter.

Janet Bauer and Vijay Prashad highlight the fact that heightened anxieties about policing the territorial border often translate into anxiety concerning who does and does not belong within the modern nation-state (2000). These anxieties have intensified post-9/11, but long pre-date it. For Mona Danner, this concept can be referred to as “control-oriented state security strategy” which includes a “decrease in civil rights, increased fear and the sense of insecurity, and staggering social and economic costs” (2006: 114). These strategies often result in the creation of states of exception at various sites and scales throughout the country where particular groups and individuals are preemptively targeted and their daily lives significantly disrupted. According to Giorgio Agamben, a state of exception is an “increased extension of power, where questions of citizenship and individual rights can be diminished, superceded and rejected in the process of claiming this extension of power by a government” (2005: 2). The creation of these states of exception results from the policing of the daily life of both documented and undocumented immigrants, as well as the strategies of control enacted at the border through the construction of a physical fence and the deployment of federal troops at the state borderline. While these approaches locate the apparatus of power in
different arenas, they each serve to provide an analysis of the geopolitical architecture being employed by the state that seeks to establish borders between the inside/outside, the citizen/alien, and the domestic/international (Dodds 2007: 55).

At the same time, Chicana writer Gloria Anzaldúa argues that these are the exact processes of identity construction that must be transgressed. In fact, she conceptualizes any type of constructed borders, whether ideological or political, as being “a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary” (Anzaldúa 1987: 3). By viewing the borderlands as a non-territorial enterprise where a “third space” takes root with the development of a new social consciousness, Anzaldúa is highlighting the hybridity that the border and the associated bordering processes necessarily create (ibid). This new consciousness, which she terms the ‘mestiza consciousness’ makes visible the previously invisible power dynamics within the region and implies that individuals, specifically women, living in the border region can only survive by invoking processes of self-transformation and adaptation that allow them to become a “crossroads” (Anzaldúa 1987: 216-7). Here, Anzaldúa recognizes the socio-political impact of the border on individual women, but also her work contains hints of optimism that individuals are also able to adapt to and, perhaps eventually, to re-shape the border through acquiring flexible and multiple identities that reflect the many dimensions of the border. This challenges the notion of the border as a site of division and difference and provides a necessary opportunity to view it as a site of encounter, contact and exchange.

Gilberto Rosas’ concept of “the borderlands condition” (2006) echoes Anzaldúa’s conceptualization of the border. For Rosas, the state of exceptionality, or the status of living as a person exempt from certain rights, tends to emerge from particular, daily practices
including the militarization of the physical border, anti-immigrant vigilantism, and the policing of everyday life in the *barrios* (2006: 337). But Rosas argues that there are a number of organizations working toward achieving basic human rights and security for immigrants from Mexico in the United States and that these organizations underscore the border as a “site of convergence of people engaged in social struggle and everyday practices of resistance to the states of exception within the borderlands” (2006: 342). Most importantly, however, Rosas makes the point that states of exception and their attendant political imaginaries no longer remain fixed to a specific geographic location and, instead, thrive in public discourse and across a wide variety of communities and geographic spaces throughout the United States (2006: 336). Rosas draws upon examples of resistance to these racializations. In his research on the border, he describes how the young people who form *Barrio Libre* have used their resemblance of the Mexican-American community and the sporadic policing of the border to their advantage (Rosas 2006: 414). In fact, they have been able to make claims to “autonomy…in their performances of racialized U.S. citizenship” (ibid). Power, in this conception, is based on the assumptions that allow everyday life to continue unhindered and uninterrupted despite events that, in other circumstances, might constitute a catastrophic disruption to the status quo. The state border must then be understood as a social and cultural construct that has become pervasive in localized spaces in communities throughout the United States. More importantly, however, as both Anzaldúa and Rosas argue, a forum for a sustained borderlands consciousness is required in order to adequately break down the barriers that have been physically and socially constructed along the U.S.-Mexico border. For example, Friendship Park has, until recently when it was closed to the public, become a place of informal encounter and exchange, which had served to
facilitate the borderlands consciousness needed to transgress the institutionalized border and its socio-spatial impacts between communities in San Diego and Tijuana. In an attempt to overcome the uneven power structures that mark the border, individuals and groups are continually challenging and reshaping the border and its practices.

As has been indicated through this brief overview of the existing literature on border studies, geographers and other social scientists have dedicated a substantial amount of resources to examining how social processes have shaped spaces (and vice-versa), including state borders and their attendant borderlands. The departure from realism and the move toward poststructural or critical theory by many contemporary scholars has opened up a space to focus on the human and experiential dimensions of borders (Rumford 2006: 156). Once viewed as singular and only existing at the boundary of polities, borders are now understood to exist in a multitude of places and are dispersed across communities, both local and global. This shift in the spatial logic of non-state actors has challenged traditional notions of the border and has extended security concerns to include other, non-territorial spaces and actors. In this way, border and bordering practices have become selective and targeted toward certain demographics and trends of mobility (Rumford 2006: 164). For instance, the racial profiling of Hispanics as potential undocumented immigrants in places like Arizona or the construction of fences that are aimed directly at keeping undocumented migrants outside of the state but instead channel their crossings into more dangerous, less visible regions. Most importantly, perhaps, is the realization that borders and bordering practices are no longer solely products of the nation-state and that, as Rumford argues, borders “can be created, shifted, and (de) constructed by a range of actors” (ibid).
**Introducing the Three Border Model**

If, as many geographers have indicated, borders are no longer (and may never have been) simply the domain of the state – a line drawn in a specific location to delineate between two sovereign states – than there is a pressing need to look at borders and bordering processes that are emerging at different sites and scales. As such, borders are to be understood as “simultaneously historical, natural, cultural, political, economic or symbolic phenomenon” (Newman & Paasi 1998: 187). Accordingly borders are the:

Interfaces and points between ideas, concepts and movements and thus make themselves viable ‘sites’ for various lines of inquiry. Moreover, they open themselves to change – as socially constructed enterprises, they are always in the process of becoming - thus creating the possibility for critical transformation. (Ackleson 1999: 60)

The Three Border Model proposed by Mike Davis and Alessandra Moctezuma provides an interdisciplinary framework for considering the coherences and contradictions that exist between and across scales. Their model is a resolutely sensitive spatial analysis that also points to the importance of incorporating other narratives that exemplify how different actors in different places and times are able to transform physical, as well as social and cultural, borders. In recognizing the complex processes that comprise borders and bordering processes, urban sociologists Mike Davis and Alessandra Moctezuma have established a conceptual framework that understands the U.S.-Mexico boundary as a multi-layered and dynamic entity capable of serving a number of different functions simultaneously. Their conceptual framework posits three distinct layers that comprise the border and indicates that each layer requires both a spatial and thematic analysis. It is important to note that each layer of the border does not operate autonomously, as the layers are deeply interconnected and often serve to reinforce the others. Since Davis and Moctezuma have only set out a
preliminary framing of this model, the goal of this thesis is to develop it further within the context of the U.S.-Mexico border by completing an examination of each layer and its implications for immigrant communities both at the physical boundary and within the United States.

The first border is reminiscent of the conventional IR mode of thinking about borders and emphasizes the physicality of the border as a critical element in understanding the current complexities of the border. According to Davis and Moctezuma, this border has been constructed and solidified by the aggressive and expansionist policies that were undertaken in the years leading up to and after the Mexican-American War (1999: 34). This border has taken a number of physical forms, and has served as a “geopolitical fiction that barely intruded into the daily existence of largely pastoral communities of mestizo and indigenous [populations]” (ibid). The border, while physically there, did not significantly affect communities in the borderlands until after the Mexican Revolution when the U.S. government began deploying armed forces to the border and instituting exit and entry checking procedures to ensure that the revolutionary ideas brewing in Mexico would not leak into American territory. Although the flow of labour was still welcome by many American companies operating on the northern side of the divide, when immigrants began to organize militant unions in the Imperial Valley between 1949 and 1950 many were deported back to Mexico (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 34). Davis and Moctezuma argue that this same logic is still at work today within the United States and that the “border reinforces the extra-economic coercion of immigrant labour in the non-union sectors of the U.S. economy” (ibid). At the same time, the American government has continued to fortify the U.S.-Mexico border
through deploying troops, implementing high-tech surveillance technologies, and building a border fence along the divide.

As IR theorists have indicated, the physical presence of a line to demarcate a state’s border has been an enduring feature of the ordering system of international politics throughout modern history. Therefore the territorial line should not be overlooked in scholarly inquiry as it has important political and social implications for communities living at the border and within the interior of the state. Chapter 3 of this thesis will be dedicated to exploring these implications further by seeking to understand the efficacy and implications of constructing a physical barrier at the border, but also at creating a spectacle of border patrol personnel, national troops, and high-tech surveillance equipment. In effect, this section of the paper will be dedicated to understanding the ongoing fortification of the U.S.-Mexico border within the last decade, and how this might constitute a crisis of the American understanding of self, other, and threat. Specifically, this part of the analysis will illustrate that the fortification of the border has not been effective in excluding undesired groups from entry into the United States, but instead has simply served political interests by appearing to deter or exclude intrusions through creating a spectacle at the border.

The second border echoes some the key themes discussed in recent literature offered by geographers and other social scientists, and focuses on the ways that immigration enforcement has been implemented at sites far removed from the physical border, as well as by non-federal state actors. In their discussion of the second border, Davis and Moctezuma point to examples from as early as the 1940s when the Border Patrol experimented with a ‘second line of defense’ that consisted of “automobile dragnets…the establishment of permanent checkpoints and detention facilities” (Davis and Moctezuma 1999: 35). The
example used to describe the complications with the bordering practices being implemented outside of the border include a description of the ways that the processes required to circumvent these borders can be detrimental to the everyday existence of migrants. At the San Ysidro/Tijuana Port of Entry, the checkpoints have created a system where coyotes (smugglers) drop off their passengers approximately one mile south of the I-5 at San Onofre checkpoint, forcing them to cross ten lanes of 70-MPH traffic and then to travel across the Camp Pendleton Marine base to a meeting point down the beach so that they can circumvent the police and checkpoints that have been implemented by the federal government (ibid). Over the course of the last twenty years, hundreds of immigrants have been killed trying to cross this freeway and the only response from California’s government has been to establish the world’s first Pedestrian Accident Zone and to erect a number of bizarre warning signs that depict a family sprinting across the highway (ibid). Davis and Moctezuma refer to these actions as the “moral threshold in the naturalization of the unnatural and inhumane” (1999: 35) and this idea can be reflected in the ostensible ‘border measures’ that have become geographically diffuse, found in unexpected locations within the interior of the United States. In Chapter 4 I will discuss the diffusion of power at the border through an analysis of the anti-immigration legislation enacted at the state level in Arizona, as well as the role of non-state actors, such as the MMP, in pushing an anti-immigration agenda.

The third border refers to the bordering practices implemented at the level of the community: the urban architecture that separates blue-collar immigrant and upper-income Anglo communities living in close geographical proximity (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 35). For Davis and Moctezuma, the third border works to restrict the access of poorer Latino communities to public space, including streets and parks, in upper-class neighbourhoods
(ibid). Citing several examples of this in California, the authors paint a portrait of another form of isolation and segregation—of bordering—taking place within the interior of the United States. The authors discuss how the upper-class, Anglo community of South Pasadena lobbied to erect a barricade on one of the busy main streets that separate South Pasadena from the neighbouring town of El Sereno, which is considered to be a blue-collar immigrant community (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 36). The barricade was justified by presenting it as a means of “preventing drive-by shootings”; though this rationale is suspect given that only one such charge had been made within the previous five years (ibid).

Additionally, the third border has also become manifest in parks across California, where community organizations have laboured for a higher than average entrance fee to be implemented in order to keep poor Latino communities out (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 37). The examples that are provided by Davis and Moctezuma include San Marino’s Lacy Park, Arcadia’s Wilderness Park, and Altalena’s famous Mount Wilson – each time a new ban was enforced in a new location, it followed a dramatic decline in recreational use by low-income Latinos and African Americans (ibid; Davis 2000: 63). As the Latino community in the United States continues to grow, “citizenship will never be fully substantive until this third border is torn down” (ibid). These issues will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5 where I examine examples of how Latino communities have been separated through juridical and architectural borders, including the closure of Friendship Park, the legacy of Chicano Park and Barrio Logan. I will also explore opportunities for transformation in the work of several non-state actors who are drawing upon cultural agency to overcome the barriers that have been erected within their communities.
The Three Border Model is appropriate for this analysis as it draws together the different manifestations of power as they are portrayed in both realist IR theory and in the poststructuralist approaches to understanding the border often invoked by geographers. The layered approach to the border recognizes the border as both a spatial manifestation as it has been perceived within traditional theories of realism, as well as a social phenomenon, as poststructural theories have highlighted. Similarly, the Three Border Model understands power at the border to encompass the still very real exercise of centralized state power through formalized institutions as well as the more diffuse and informal forms of discursive power highlighted by poststructuralist thinking. With the first border Davis and Moctezuma have recognized that power can be located in spatial formations, but they have indicated that this examination needs to go beyond simply looking at borders as territorial expressions of power. Rather, they have indicated that there are more subtle and diffuse ways in which power is infused into the border and its practices through both state and non-state actors. Power thus becomes no longer a centralized feature of the state but a phenomenon that takes root in a variety of spaces and contexts and often infiltrates the daily lives of those individuals and communities living either at the border or those who have become marked by the border as either belonging or not belonging within the United States. Using the Three Border Model allows us to explore the complexity of the border and its attendant practices through an analysis of the various ways in which it has manifest itself within the United States. As the model indicates, these scales are not disconnected from one another and often the thematic of power runs across all three simultaneously and, in many ways, this model views the process of bordering as iterative. The model, by and large, indicates that power can be a used as a tool of enforcing exclusion or creating division, but also that through a more
localized understanding of the border moments of encounter, exchange, and cooperation become visible.

Regardless of the artificiality associated with the political discourses that create borders, these discursive processes require a critical examination in order to understand how borders are constructed and re-constructed through social and cultural processes and the assertion of territorially-based state enforcement powers, both of which have profound impacts on daily life practices (Newman 2009: 173). As such, the remainder of this study will discuss the ways that some of the projects that are being implemented at various sites and scales are being used to reinforce a self/other dichotomy that generates a state of exception both at the physical border, but also across communities in different parts of the United States. For example, states of exception are often generated by either agents of the state, such as police, customs officers, and public service representatives, or by civilians pursuing state legislation (as can be seen in Chapter 4 of this thesis in the case of the Minuteman Project that emerged from within Arizona in 2005). Often the way these actors go about implementing these practices do not follow the formal legal procedures associated with state power, but instead through manners that require an assertion of discursive power through evoking social processes such as racism, nationalism, or other subtle and diffuse mechanisms of exclusion. In highlighting some examples of these processes, this thesis identifies some nodes along the border and within border practices where active spaces can be created and bridges can be built across the social and cultural divisions that have only intensified within the shadow of the 1,200 kilometre border fence.
Chapter 3: Legislating Exclusion at the First Border

National borders are political constructs, imagined projections of territorial power. Although they appear on maps in deceptively precise forms, they reflect, at least initially, merely the mental images of politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals.

- Baud & Van Schendel (1997:211)

Introduction

The U.S.-Mexico border has become a high priority for the federal governments on both sides of the divide in the last two decades. A number of contemporary scholars have illustrated the naturalized divisive qualities of the border by describing the international divide as being “a geographic fault line” (Andreas 2009: 3) where the “Third World grates against the First and bleeds” (Anzaldúa 1987: 25). The border has also been considered a unique political phenomenon because “nowhere else in this world do so many millions of people from two so dissimilar nations live in such close proximity” (Martinez 1994: 27). These understandings of the border have provided the framework from which the line drawn in the dirt in 1848 has become infused with powerful practices of inclusion and exclusion that have extended far beyond the physical border and have become integrated into everyday life in the United States. The aforementioned binaries are often used to describe the border in academic literature and serve to underscore the power arrangements attended to by the realist paradigm of IR whereby the state is believed to be the primary determinant of who should and should not belong within the national space. On the other hand, poststructuralist approaches have undermined the perception of a neat, clear division between the two countries by attending to practices at the border and bordering practices prevalent within the interior of the United States. Viewing the border in a traditional realist sense, Joseph Nevins argues, “denies the inherent messiness of social relations that defy national boundaries, and
the strong, vibrant connections between places like the U.S. and Mexico – and along the boundary seeks to limit these ties, or, at the very least, to selectively keep them at bay” (Nevins 2008: 120-1).

This chapter will focus on the first border as defined by Davis and Moctezuma. The first border is the internationally recognized territorial boundary that was drawn between the United States and Mexico in 1848 (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 34). As Davis and Moctezuma have acknowledged in the Three Border Model, the physical location of the border has remained static since its inception in the 19th century but its visibility has increased dramatically through the increased militarization of the border (ibid). This chapter will examine how the fortification of the physical border and the implementation of exclusionary legislation and security measures by the federal government have sought to restrict the mobility of Mexican migrants and impacted the everyday existence of Mexican-born residents in the United States. While national borders have served to provide the illusion of state control, Davis and Chacon argue that these boundaries do “more to determine the status of immigrants within the United States than it does to ‘keep out the invader’” (2006: 204). For many, the construction of the border fence represents the culmination of a long process by which the United States has finally consolidated its control of the territorial border. In contrast, this chapter argues that the fence project must be placed within a broader context wherein the U.S.-Mexico border has become more fortified than ever, but primarily in ways that extend beyond the physical location of the boundary. For instance, both state and federal powers have implemented a number of aggressive policies that are focused on excluding the undocumented from the space of the state. Specifically, this chapter will focus on the legislation that has been passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001
including the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Both of these pieces of legislation are examples of the immediate hardening of the border that took place after 9/11. Through these initiatives the state has worked to make the territorial line increasingly visible to the public eye by erecting fences, walls, and other physical barriers; however, at the same time their bordering tactics have become more diffuse and have extended far beyond the territorial line. The Three Border Model developed by Davis and Moctezuma illustrates the importance of understanding the border as a diffuse set of social, political, and economic processes that elude territorial fixity. By drawing on their concept of the first border, I will illustrate that the physical border manifest in the fence is less an effective territorial barrier than a potent political symbol, icon of security reassurance, and part of a broader process of establishing imagined borders between the self and other.

The fortification of the U.S.-Mexico border began in the 1990s with the imposition of stricter immigration laws, increased security budgets and enforcement agency growth geared toward securing the border. Many scholars agree that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as a catalyst in accelerating has often been referred to as the securitization of migration (Tirman 2004; Walters 2008). The nexus of security and migration in the United States has played out in a number of political and bureaucratic events and processes that operate on a multitude of scales and at different moments in time. As such, there is a pressing need to understand how the physical boundary has been established and perpetuated through an important image-crafting project that has taken root at the physical border, but also through the legislation that reinforces this image. This portrait of the U.S.-Mexico border will also illustrate how border policing and enforcement strategies are being implemented within the interior of the United States, as detailed in the works of Mathew Coleman (2007), Peter Andreas (2003, 2009), and
Susan Mains (2002). As Mains argues, discourses of immigration control need to be examined in a way that “unearth[s] the spatial and social assumptions embedded in discourses of immigration, wherein dominant cultural values are reinforced and reinscribed onto specific places and bodies through the deployment of specific scalar imaginaries” (2002: 193). Thus, the border requires our attention as a substantial re-scaling of immigration geopolitics is taking place – “one that suggests that the border – and border enforcement – is increasingly everywhere” (Coleman 2007: 63). Therefore, the arguments in this chapter draw significantly upon the works of other scholars and are not entirely new; however, the goal of this chapter is to introduce the essential concepts, policies, and history that lead to a more nuanced approach to understanding the border as it exists today.

Creating the ‘First Border’ between the United States and Mexico

According to the Three Border Model, the first border is the internationally recognized border. In the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, it is the outcome of a long history of state violence, including the Mexican-American War, the militarization of the border following the Mexican Revolution in 1917, the structural abuse manifest in the extra-economic coercion of immigrant labour, and more recently the construction of the U.S.-Mexico border fence (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 34). The cessation of the Mexican-American War in 1848 led to the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which established the contemporary geographical location of the U.S.-Mexico border. At that time only a thin barbed wire fence divided the two neighbouring countries. The U.S. acquired a sizeable portion of Mexican territory through the treaty, but also pursued further acquisitions afterward through a series of violent campaigns and raids conducted by both government officials and non-state actors that penetrated into the northern-most states of Mexico. As time
progressed, however, Mexico was able to consolidate its possession over its northern territory, including border towns such as Nuevo Laredo and El Paso del Norte (now Ciudad Juarez), through significant demographic and economic growth in the region (ibid). At this point, the border was simply a political line drawn in the sand that did not significantly influence the everyday interactions between people living on either side of the border (Payan 2006: 1-22).

When the first regulated crossing points were introduced at the border in 1917 by the federal government, it was not meant to inhibit cross-border migration but simply to monitor entry and exit patterns of Mexicans into and out of the United States (Chacon & Davis 2006: 203). In fact, unobstructed movement across the border remained possible until the culmination of the Second World War in 1945 and, even then, when the main points of entry were gradually militarized after 1954, “the idea of the border as a means to prevent movement was neither the intention nor the reality” (Chacon & Davis 2006: 203; Danelo 2008: 50). It was only in the 1970s when the oil crisis and subsequent economic recession hit that the border was “transformed from a political partition between the two countries to that of a ‘fortress barrier’, the last line of defense for the ‘homeland’” (ibid). Undocumented immigration was on the rise and the American government was seeking to address the issue by further militarizing the border.

The physical border, however, became increasingly fortified in the mid-1990s with the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper in California, Operation Hold-the-Line in Texas, and Operation Safeguard in Arizona. These Operations were implemented in tandem with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was intended to liberalize trade relations between the two countries. At the same time, the impact of trade liberalization
associated with NAFTA caused an “increase in unauthorized immigration from Mexico to the United States…requiring enhanced boundary enforcement not simply to create a border region of law and order to facilitate accumulation, but also to stymie the anticipated increase in unauthorized immigration caused by the liberalization of the Mexican economy” (Nevins 2002: 138). It was believed that by making the border more porous to trade, the state would have to simultaneously fortify the border to the movement of people and “the immediate source of the disorder became the unauthorized immigrant, the transgressor of the law of the boundary and thus a criminal” (ibid). To this end, the three border states enacted various operations simultaneously; however, the success of these operations in halting undocumented immigrants from entering the U.S. is debatable. In fact, many scholars have indicated that fortifying the border in this way has only lead to an increase in migrant deaths by forcing many to endure the physical impossibility of crossing through the Sonora Desert or other similarly treacherous routes (Andreas 2009; Chacon & Davis 2003; Nevins 2002; Romero 2008; Rosas 2007).

While also prevalent in the 1990s, recent popular public opinion suggests that Americans are fearful that, given the growing number of Mexican-born individuals in the United States, these immigrant communities will challenge the cultural, social, political, and economic make-up of dominant American culture. Suggesting the “blood is thicker than borders” and that the United States is entering a period of “unparalleled demise”, renowned political scientist Samuel Huntington described these fears in Foreign Policy magazine in 2004:

The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages. Unlike past immigrant groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into mainstream U.S. culture, forming instead their own political and linguistic enclaves—from Los Angeles to Miami—and rejecting
the Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream. (2004: 1)

Amid concerns about the burden of growing immigrant communities on the American welfare system and the theft of American jobs by undocumented Mexican workers, the mode of thinking exemplified by Huntington and other influential individuals has been quite potent in stirring up the anxiety and fears about the identity, security, and well-being of Americans and creating the allusion that migration is fundamentally challenging the existing paradigms of certainty and order (Cehan & Tsoukala 2002: 23). Thus, insecurity becomes wrapped up in the idea that the presence of ‘others’ who do not fit the predominant mould of American society should not be tolerated.

As such, the fences that have been erected on the state border are political constructions meant to reassure the public and produce an image of control over the “‘last line of defense’ for the American people, their culture, and their economy” (Davis & Chacon 2006: 203). Yet Peter Andreas has argued that the escalation of border policing has less to do with deterring migrants from entering into the U.S. than it does with crafting a publicly acceptable political image (Andreas 2009: 143; Anderson 2003). Interestingly, Andreas argues that when the “failure of the deterrence effort leads to a performance crisis, the performers save face by promising a bigger and better show” (2009:144). The border, then, can be viewed as being an act of political theatre being mobilized in the name of ‘homeland security’ and the militarization of the physical border simply serves as a mechanism for the “reassurance for the locals in otherwise far-flung places that Washington, D.C., remains a physical presence capable of exerting control from a distance (Newton 2008: 150). This strategy of reassurance has become particularly obvious since September 11th, when the border became a renewed focal point for the Bush administration. This tragic event prompted
Americans to question whether or not the U.S. state had lost control of its borders and was used to justify actions by the U.S. government to continue to implement systems of militarized control on the U.S.-Mexico border (De Genova 2002:436). The political decisions made immediately after 9/11 reflected the realist perception that fences and border patrol units create a ‘hard shell’ or ‘wall of defensibility’ that would protect Americans from external threats to its sovereignty was prevalent.

The construction of a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border has ultimately delineated the terms of inclusion and exclusion from the space of the nation-state at the border. In his discussion of borders and power, Israeli scholar David Newman argues the following:

The stronger the barrier function of the border, the more powerful the imagined, the more abstract the narrative of what is perceived as lying on the other side. Perceptions of borders usually focus on what exists on the other “invisible” side of the line of separation. Borders exist in our mind by virtue of the fear we have of the unknown of the “there” and which, in turn causes us to stay on our side of the border in the “here”. (Newman 2002: 30)

Therefore, the border fence, instead of providing a forum for dialogue regarding these important issues, has ultimately served to make “illegal immigration less visible, and more dispersed, thus projecting an image of a more secure and orderly border to the American public” (Andreas 2009: 16). In this sense, what Davis and Moctezuma refer to as the ‘first border’ operates as a reification of social processes of the imagined communities ‘self’ and ‘other’. The intimate relationship between the fear of the unknown, the perceived indefensibility of the border created by the spectacle of a border wall, and the mythology surrounding the so-called other perfectly characterizes the fear and insecurity that has become entrenched within much of American public policy and discourse since September 11th. While the fence project running along the U.S.-Mexico border had been in progress since the mid-1990s, in the years following the terrorist attacks support for the expedited
completion of this project was at the forefront of the American policy agenda. Numerous anti-immigration and vigilante groups became active in the borderlands, lobbying for and, at some points, even funding and building their own segments of the fence (See Chapter 4). On October 26th, 2006, the Bush administration enacted H.R. 6061, the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which authorized and partially funded the construction of a new fifteen-foot-high wall across the entire course of the U.S.-Mexico border. Thus, the prevalent security narrative remains “narrow, fixed, and coercive…rooted in fear of the Other and is in and of itself a constant state of anxiety” that places American and Mexican security in a zero-sum relationship predicated on the myth of the border as a dividing line (ibid).

**Hardening the Divide through Post-9/11 Immigration Policies**

As the previous section suggests, the physical border has become the starting point of a whole range of laws and practices that have recently been extended into the interior of the United States. As the government seeks to expand its breadth of control regarding migration management, the spectacle of control being played out at the international border is reinforced by a wide range of immigration and border enforcement tactics that have been implemented in places far removed from the first border, although still guided by the aims of the physical dividing line. There has been a substantial increase of border enforcement and policing mechanisms within the interior of the country, specifically those geared toward criminalizing immigration and further promoting, inadvertently, the extension of the first border into the United States by ‘hardening’ the U.S.-Mexico divide. In addition to tripling the budget for the border fence, doubling of the number of Border Patrol agents and the deployment of additional troops to assist with the monitoring of the border zone, the government has dramatically expanded its policing and enforcement measures throughout
American territory (Brown 2008). In fact, Andreas argues that, “In the aftermath of September 11th, there have been patterns of both continuity and change in the practice and politics of U.S. border policing…it is still the same border game – but one more difficult to manage, with more players, played out on a bigger stage, with higher stakes and greater collateral damage” (2009: 153).

Only days before 9/11 the discussions around border management were quite different in focus. President Bush and Vicente Fox met to clarify the principles from which further discussions about migration would proceed (Waslin 2003: 2). Their discussions seemed optimistic that the two governments could collaborate in “constructing comprehensive reforms in the difficult area of migration policing, including regularizing the status of millions of undocumented immigrant workers currently living the U.S. and bringing additional temporary workers to the U.S. to fill labour shortages through a significantly reformed program” (ibid). On September 6th, 2001, the two presidents issued a joint statement that declared that the U.S. and Mexico would cooperate on an unprecedented scale to foster “new and realistic approaches to migration” that could effectively “ensure it is safe, orderly, legal and dignified” (Joint Statement 2001). Accordingly, the end of the statement proclaimed the following:

Both Presidents agreed that U.S.-Mexican relations have entered their most promising moment in history. Our governments are committed to seizing the opportunities before us in this new atmosphere of mutual trust. The depth, quality and candor of our dialogue is unprecedented. It reflects the democratic values we share and our commitment to move forward boldly as we deepen this authentic partnership of neighbors. (ibid)

During this state visit, Bush and Fox openly discussed the possibility of a bilateral approach to resolving issues regarding migration. While this meeting proved to be a moment of optimism for both governments, the events of September 11th meant that this optimism was
short lived. With 2,995 people dead, there was urgent public and political pressure for the American government to adopt more comprehensive security measures to ensure that another tragedy of this scale could not take place. The new political climate that was established in the days following 9/11 dramatically transformed the budding relationship between the U.S. and Mexico as the U.S.-Mexico border was reconfigured as a source of significant insecurity for the American government and its citizenry. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 marked a change in the dominant political discourse about immigration as the U.S. adopted more nationalist and protectionist policies, particularly pertaining to non-citizens (Koulish 2010: 79). In the days following 9/11, the construction of the fence continued, and additional troops were deployed to the U.S.-Mexico border (Romero 2008).

The most important effect that the terrorist attacks would have on American politics was the need to consider immigration, security, and the guarding of American borders as being synonymous with one another. The first public example of this new agenda item was delivered in the form of Bush’s Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, entitled ‘Combating terrorism through immigration policies,’ delivered only days after September 11th. The directive stated the following:

The United States has a long and valued tradition of welcoming immigrants and visitors. But the attacks of September 11, 2001, showed that some come to the United States to commit terrorist acts, to raise funds for illegal terrorist activities, or to provide other support for terrorist operations, here and abroad. It is the policy of the United States to work aggressively to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens who are within the United States.

This directive would be the beginning of a series of policies geared towards supposedly preserving national security at the expense of the rights and liberties of immigrants wishing to enter into the United States. In fact, a slew of legislation would be proposed, and
subsequently enacted, in the years following 9/11 and much of the practical application of these policies would have a profound impact on the U.S.’s common border with Mexico and Mexican immigrants, both documented and undocumented, residing within the U.S.

As Nicholas De Genova has argued in his work, “‘migrant ‘illegality’ is lived through a palpable sense of deportability, which is to say, the possibility of deportation, the possibility of being removed from the space of the nation-state” (De Genova 2002: 439). Whereas, prior to September 11th, the “illegality” of migrants may have been “irrelevant to most of their activities, only becoming an issue in certain contexts” this changed significantly after 9/11 (Coutin 2000: 40 as cited in De Genova 2002: 422). Within the post-9/11 context, bordering practices became more prominent in communities both within the borderlands and within other areas of the United States. These bordering practices were introduced as an onslaught of aggressive, anti-immigrant legislation that would be applied throughout the United States by the federal government. The federal government promoted this aggressive stance, although as we will see in the next chapter, state governments and various non-state actors have also played a critical role in increasing the deportability of undocumented immigrants in the United States. For now, the remainder of this chapter will explore some of the most striking anti-immigrant legislation passed by the American government immediately after 9/11, including the USA PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Security Act of 2005.

The USA PATRIOT Act: Increasing Immigrant Vulnerability after 9/11

In the aftermath of 9/11, immigration opponents repackaged the anti-immigrant agenda they had been advocating for decades under the banner of preventing terrorism and securing America’s borders. Opportunistic political leaders and anti-immigration lobbyists have been able to make it increasingly difficult for many immigrants to make the United
States their home by severely limiting their basic civil rights and their access to fundamental services. Since the Latino community is the largest minority population in the United States, the implications of these pieces of legislation on this particular demographic has been profound (Passel & Cohn 2009).

The first piece of legislation that was introduced in the weeks following 9/11 was the “Uniting and Strengthening of America by Promoting Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act”, commonly referred to as the USA PATRIOT Act. This act was enacted on October 26th, 2001 and dramatically extended the breadth of “the government’s investigative and surveillance powers by authorizing unprecedented license to conduct secret searches, tap into telephones and internet usage, obtain personal information, and exchange intelligence between different agencies” (Romero 2008:73). In addition, the PATRIOT Act provided the legal and economic framework for the further fortification of both the Canada-U.S. and the U.S.-Mexico borders. For instance, the act provided the funding for the establishment of an integrated entry and exit data system for airports, seaports, and land borders (Section 414). It also directed the Attorney General and Secretary of State to focus on the use of biometric technology and tamper resistance documents readable at all ports of entry and to see the development of a system that can be used by federal law enforcement officers to identify and detain individuals who pose a threat to U.S. national security (Section 414).

While the act explicitly states that it is not intended to target any particular faction of American society, this law laid the groundwork for substantially increasing the number of deportations and detention of immigrants without due process. In fact, the PATRIOT Act offers the federal government an unprecedented ability to detain and deport individuals
“based on vague and unspecified predictions of threats to the national security” (ACLU 2001: 2). Simply, the Attorney General must clarify that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that a non-citizen endangers national security in order to have the individual detained or deported. This puts many non-citizens in a tenuous position as “they could be detained indefinitely if they are deemed stateless, their country of origin refuses to accept them, or they are granted relief from deportation because they would be tortured if they returned to their country of origin” (ibid).

In addition, the PATRIOT Act expands the definition of terrorism to include domestic groups, which ultimately makes membership or material support a criminal offense that can result in detention or deportation (USA PATRIOT Act 2001). As the definition of terrorism in the Act itself remains broad and the ability of the government to intimately track the daily lives of citizens and non-citizens alike has been enhanced dramatically with the passage of this legislation, it is possible for the government and its enforcement agencies to abuse their executive power. In practice this law targets an already vulnerable group within the U.S., increasing the invisibility of unauthorized workers regardless of their location within the country by largely erasing any legal status associated with the individual (Agamben 2005: 3). As such, the PATRIOT Act allows federal officials to make assumptions about a particular individual’s behaviour and associations, which ultimately serves to aggravate the already vulnerable conditions of undocumented migrants in the U.S. and creates a political climate where the “deportability” of the migrant becomes more acceptable under the banner of state security. More importantly, the introduction of the USA PATRIOT Act and its inclusion of biometrics would become an important part of the ‘virtual fence’ that
would be used along the physical border through the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) introduced by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

**The Implementation of the Homeland Security Act in 2002**

The following year, in November 2002, the Homeland Security Act (HSA) was established as an “anti-terrorism bill that further increased federal law enforcement agencies’ citizen surveillance powers and created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), resulting in the largest government reorganization in contemporary history” (Romero 2008: 73-74). In fact, this reorganization of responsibilities can be seen as one of the most immediate institutional expressions of the new fusion between migration and security at the federal level. The new agency, which consolidated twenty-two previously separate agencies, would undertake the mission of “protect[ing] the American people and our way of life from terrorism” (Tumlin 2004: 1173). In many ways, the creation of the DHS furthered the emphasis of U.S. security in keeping out individuals, rather than focusing on who would be let into the country. In the years since its inception, the department regularly publishes and provides media sources with statistics that highlight its ability to exclude the so-called ‘other’ from the country. These include statistics on the number of criminal suspects or immigration violators turned away at the borders, the number of illegal migrants apprehended or deported, and the number of miles of fencing constructed. These practices indicate that the institution responsible for providing the security of the U.S. and its citizenry feeds into the divisive rhetoric by creating what De Genova has called a “spectacle at the border” (2002: 436). In fact, the move to transfer authority over immigration to the Department of Homeland Security seems to indicate that, “all immigrants will be viewed first as potential terrorist threats and only second, if at all, welcome newcomers” (Tumlin 2004: 1173).
The Department of Homeland Security has been responsible for implementing a variety of programs, including a number of immigration enforcement programs (DHS Online). For instance, they are responsible for the 287(g) program, which allows state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal immigration laws within their respective jurisdictions through Memorandums of Understanding (MOU). This program will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4 in order to outline its importance to developing the second border. More importantly, the DHS is also responsible for the Secure Border Initiative, which includes the plans for the construction of the security fence discussed earlier in this chapter, as well as various Worksite Enforcement programs that are aimed at making it increasingly difficult for undocumented workers to attain employment in the United States. Essentially, the SBI is meant to serve as a “virtual fence” that reinforces the physical fence on the ground. This initiative is meant to develop a three-prong approach to securing the border and can be viewed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Secure Border Initiative (SBI) Operational Requirements

<table>
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<th>Elements Needed for Operational Control of U.S.</th>
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| **Personnel**
  - Respond, Confront, and Resolve Illegal Cross Border Activity |
| **Technology**
  - Detects, Identifies, and Classifies Border Crossers and |
| **Infrastructure**
  - Fencing
  - Slows and Deters Border Crossers between Ports |

(Information taken from: DHS Report 2009)
As a result of the Secure Border Initiative, the border patrol has increased its numbers along the border and various types of technology are now being used including video cameras, ground sensors, radiation detectors, geographic information systems, and physical barriers to provide surveillance at the border (see Nuñez-Neto 2006). Therefore, the DHS has formalized the securitization of migration at the federal level and has allocated a significant amount of resources to fortifying the first border. Many of the DHS programs have provided a framework on which to construct the second border throughout the interior of the United States, affecting the way in which immigrants are received and treated within the country.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the first border as the physical dividing line between the United States and Mexico, with an emphasis on some of the attempts to harden the border since 9/11. It is important to note, however, that the USA PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Security Act are just two examples of the ways in which the federal government has focused on ‘hardening’ the physical border since September 11th and that there are countless other examples that exist beyond the purview of this thesis project. The growing securitization of migration since 9/11, including the creation of the DHS, has created an environment where anti-immigration views have become increasingly prominent. At the federal level, the American government has introduced legislation like the USA PATRIOT Act which denies undocumented immigrants the ability to engage in legal recourse or, as Nicholas De Genova has argued, has increased the ‘deportability’ of immigrants, without due process. In addition, the Homeland Security Act has become the federal marker of a focus on the securitization of migration within the United States. The HSA was responsible for the creation of the DHS,
which would implement the Secure Border Initiative. Through this initiative, there has been a renewed focus on fortifying the physical boundary and determining who should be kept out of the United States, rather than who should be let in. The SBI has assumed three key approaches to the border including increasing personnel, technology and infrastructure fencing – each of which serves to reify the physical boundary between the U.S. and Mexico. At the same time, the DHS has extended its reach beyond the physical border and has played a role in establishing a series of programs within the country that are geared toward limiting the ability of undocumented immigrants to integrate into American society. In this way, the DHS has begun to construct barriers within communities that are far removed from the physical border.

The legislation discussed within this chapter was originally touted as being able to prevent other terrorist attacks. However, this legislation has instead served to dramatically alter the way newcomers are treated within the U.S., also impacting the lives of other non-citizens who reside within the boundaries of the state. In this way, it is necessary to acknowledge that it is difficult to talk about the first border without opening up a discussion of the second and third borders. While the American government still presents its understanding of the border as being a ‘hard line’ or a ‘wall of defensibility’, the Three Border Model suggests that it is necessary to move beyond this narrow approach to the border. Legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Security Act, represent a dualistic agenda – one that facilitates the fortification of the physical border, while simultaneously making the border and its processes more diffuse. Davis and Moctezuma posit that the second and third borders ultimately serve to reinforce the international boundary in a concrete way and, accordingly, the processes of border policing
and enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border is not mutually exclusive from the legal production of Mexican migrant “illegality” within the interior of the country. In fact, Nicholas De Genova has argued that:

The legal production of Mexican (and also Central American) migrant “illegality” requires the spectacle of enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border for the spatialized difference between the nation-states of the United States and Mexico (and effectively, all of Latin America) to be socially inscribed upon the migrants themselves – embodied in the spatialized (and racialized) status of “illegal alien”. (De Genova 2002: 416).

Therefore, the U.S.-Mexico border must be considered to be more than just a line, but also as “the place where massive border enforcement can be rolled out, where violent boundary inscription processes define and redefine national, social, political, and cultural points of inclusion and exclusion” (Pickering 2006: 51). By providing an in-depth examination of the national political context that the U.S.-Mexico border has been and continues to be situated within, the idea of the first border becomes a conceptual framework through which it is possible to understand how federal politics and their practical application can serve to reify divisions between Mexicans and Americans by ‘hardening’ the physical and social borders between these two contiguous populations, while simultaneously making possible the erection of the second and third borders throughout the interior of the United States. In this way, the significance and meaning attached to the border by many American citizens, including those living within the border region, has been transformed dramatically “according to the emphasis given to the border, principally by the U.S. government” (Payan 2006: 5). In fact, throughout history the American government has been the “primary agent in determining the face of the border, by dictating how open or closed it should be and what the governing transboundary activity should be” and, as such, those living within the
borderlands are “generally left to adjust, adapt, and react accordingly to Washington’s decisions” (Payan 2006:5).
Chapter 4: The Construction of the Second Border in Arizona

Introduction

Given its geographical proximity to Mexico, the state of Arizona has long served as an entry point for thousands of Mexicans and Central Americans annually (Matthews 2005). In fact, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has estimated that Arizona has one of the fastest growing unauthorized immigrant populations in the country, increasing from 330,000 in 2000 to approximately 560,000 by the end of 2008 (Hoefer et. al 2009: 4). While the previous chapter focused on some of the ways that the American government has responded to the issue of undocumented immigration, this chapter provides insight onto the complexity of the U.S.-Mexico border by examining the political narratives being formulated at the state level. This chapter will demonstrate that the border is everywhere; not simply a function of geography, so much as a matter of the construction of the self, other, and threat.

The goal of this chapter is to argue that the narrative of exclusion does not only exist within the realm of federal law and that the power has become diffuse and dispersed within the anti-immigration movement, including both individual states and non-state actors and their employment of various principles of governance and statecraft. This conforms to the ‘second border’ identified by Davis and Moctezuma which is designed to serve as a ‘second line of defense’, which includes the establishment of permanent checkpoints, detention facilities, and other enforcement strategies operating long distances from the official line of demarcation (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 35). As I will illustrate, the second border, once constructed by the formal legal and policy procedures of the state, is increasingly constructed by informal local initiatives that take on the authority of the state without adopting its
procedures – particularly on those based on rights and checks on the arbitrary exercise of power.

After providing a brief overview of the differences between federal and state jurisdictions on the issue of migration, this chapter will frame some of the most aggressive immigration and local enforcement policies in the state of Arizona as manifestations of an underlying politics of exception. In short, this form of politics provides a space wherein particular groups and individuals are preemptively targeted and their lives are substantially disrupted (Agamben 2005; Doty 2010). This chapter argues that within the context of the second border, local agencies – both official and civil-society based – are usurping federal powers of immigration and replacing the checks and balances of the federal procedures with an arbitrary politics of exception that pushes the boundaries of legality. This leaves room for arbitrary abuse and the forfeiture of any standard of rights and due process. To date, there has been substantial criticism of the federal government over the immigration debate; however, it is important to highlight that policies introduced by the federal government cannot be considered without reference to the policies established by individual states, municipal governments and non-state actors. While historically the responsibility for immigration has been concentrated in the hands of the federal government, many states and non-state actors are challenging the federal government for their inaction and have sought alternative means to address their perceived problems with immigration. States have long been quiet innovators of federal policy, but as I will illustrate below, post-9/11, state governments and non-state actors have increasingly taken on policy-making and immigration enforcement powers as a combined result of the federal delegation and downloading of power, and the internalization of practices of inclusion and exclusion generated through everyday social processes.
This chapter then turns to look at the emergence and growing presence of the Minuteman Project (MMP) both in Arizona and beyond. This chapter will explore the origins of the MMP in the state of Arizona and argue that this particular group of non-state actors has played an important role in shaping state and federal policy by taking the law into their own hands. I argue that both the state of Arizona and the MMP have consolidated the second border by fostering social, rather than geographical, modes of separation, all linked to the imagery of a broken-down or leaky border. While this layer of the border is undeniably connected to the first border, a closer examination provides a critical understanding of the complexity of the U.S.-Mexico divide and how the fortification of the internationally recognized boundary has been used to divert attention away from the more aggressive immigration policies being enacted within communities dispersed across the United States. This chapter thus resonates with the work on the rescaling of the border and the geopolitics of immigration in the work of Mathew Coleman (2007), Peter Andreas (2003, 2009) and Jason Ackleson (1999).

**The Politics of Exception & the Re-scaling of Immigration Policy**

Often, in times of political or economic crisis, governments legitimize the creation of “states of exception” within their own territory (Agamben 2005). Within these states of exception, particular groups and individuals are preemptively targeted and their lives are substantially disrupted with no access to legal recourse. Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, non-citizens in the United States have been subjected to such states of exception, which has disproportionately impacted Mexican nationals. This happens not only at the geopolitical border, but also across U.S. society, Amy Kaplan argues that:
The notion of homeland security contributes to making the life of immigrants terribly insecure. It plays a role in policing and shoring up the boundaries between the domestic and the foreign. Yet it does this not simply by stopping foreigners at the borders by continually redrawning those boundaries everywhere throughout the nation, between Americans who can somehow claim the United States as their native land, their birthright, and immigrants and those who look to homelands elsewhere, who can be rendered inexorably foreign. (Kaplan 2003: 87).

This exclusion of non-citizens leads to policies of exceptionalism whereby, as Doty argues, “the belief that a certain group is an enemy of society permit[s] that group to be singled out and excluded from the basic rights and protections guaranteed by law or the constitution” (Doty 2010: 4). These ‘enemies’ are denied access to the benefits of membership in a society (ibid). In the U.S., the many immigrants who provide the country with a labour force that is critical to agricultural and other blue-collar jobs in the United States today are thus denied basic human and civil rights.

In the United States, the federal government is responsible for granting citizenship and fully enforcing immigration provisions by either detaining or deporting individuals in question. States have the right to enact legislation that deals with immigration within the guidelines set by the federal government. They have recently used this right to train the employees of local enforcement agencies to work as immigration officers under the federal 287(g) program, to outlaw human trafficking, and to increase sanctions on employers who hire undocumented workers. While the federal government retains the sole power to grant formal citizenship, state and municipal governments increasingly regulate the practices of citizenship: from driver’s licenses to public services, to the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of federal immigration laws. Since the governments of individual states invest

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2 Jennifer Ridgely (2008) states that over 45 cities, as well as several individual states, have policies that serve to discourage municipal staff and police from participating in the enforcement of immigration law (2008: 55). Commonly referred to as sanctuary cities, these movements “challenged the exclusion of non-citizens from substantive rights such as housing, health care, education, police services, employment and social assistance,
the most money to integrate new immigrants into American society through second language programs, basic health care, and other integrative services, they play a central role in shaping the political, social, and economic landscape of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. While the formality of immigration remains in federal hands, many of the programs and practices of immigration integration reside in the hands of state and local authorities that give on-the-ground substance to broad federal regulations.

In a report released in 2009 by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the primary difference between federal and state policy was explained as follows:

The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over immigration policy (the terms and conditions for entry into the United States), while states and localities have become responsible for immigrant policy (the policies that help newcomers integrate into the country’s economic, social and civic life). (NCSL 2009: 4)

The division between these two jurisdictions has become, at times, overlapping and unclear. For example, in 1996, when the federal government amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to include section 287 (g), it essentially authorized the federal U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to establish agreements with local law enforcement agencies that would grant local officers the ability to act as federal immigration officers in the course of their routine policing procedures (ACLU 2009: 5). Various reports and studies that have focused on the efficacy of the conglomeration of federal immigration policies and local enforcement laws indicate that the agreements negotiated between federal authorities and local enforcement agencies, often referred to as Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), have been used to “purge towns and cities of ‘unwelcome’ advancing alternative ideas of citizenship in the process” (ibid). These policies have allowed a variation between how involved municipal authorities become with immigration enforcement in any given context. Even in the post-9/11 context, many sanctuary cities have held their ground and have also introduced resolutions to condemn the violent underpinnings of the recent securitization of migration taking place within the policy sphere.
immigrants” (ibid; see also Ridgely 2008). Mark Krikorian, the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies\(^3\), has referred to this enforcement process as a policy of “attrition through enforcement” (2004). He illustrates that many American states implement “firewall policies” that serve to “prevent illegals from being able to embed themselves in our society. They are thus denied access to jobs, identification, housing, and other resources, making it as difficult as possible for illegal immigrants to live a normal life” (Krikorian 2004). Local authorities have increasingly taken on fundamental border functions of the federal government, but may exercise them in pursuit of interests that are not fully consistent with federal immigration goals, policies and procedures.

Through Section 287 (g) of the INA, strategies of attrition through enforcement have become a particularly potent part of the anti-immigration movement throughout the United States, especially in the border states. These policies of attrition through enforcement do not just simply affect populations of undocumented immigrants. They also affect authorized immigrant communities in that racial profiling and baseless stereotyping are tolerated, and often result in the harassment and isolation of the Latino community (ACLU 2009: 5). In many other cases, the proliferation of local anti-immigrant legislation and their associated enforcement procedures has led to the increased deportability of undocumented migrants, which has ultimately led to the silencing of an already vulnerable community (De Genova 2002). As previously noted in this thesis, the questions surrounding the ‘legality’ of the citizen plays an important role in the rights and services that they have access to within the country (see Nevins 2002; De Genova 2002; Coutin 2000). These spaces of “forced invisibility” result in the “exclusion, subjugation and repression” of undocumented

\(^3\) According to their official website, the Center for Immigration Studies “is “animated by a ‘low-immigration, pro-immigrant’ vision of an America that admits fewer immigrants, but affords a warmer welcome for those who are admitted” (Center for Immigration Online).
immigrants and have a wide range of detrimental effects, ranging from hunger to unemployment to violence (De Genova 2002: 419). By and large, these processes create “spaces of non-existence” (Coutin 2000 as quoted in De Genova 2002) or states of exception, wherein if immigrants do not have proper citizenship they are stripped of human rights making their everyday existence precarious.

**Arizona’s Anti-Immigrant Propositions**

The passage of Proposition 200 in Arizona during the November 2004 referendum vote is particularly pertinent to this analysis because this piece of legislation set the stage for a number of subsequent anti-immigration laws implemented at the state and local level. Proposition 200, which was considered to be very similar to California’s Proposition 187 (which was later deemed unconstitutional), was passed by 56 per cent of the state’s voters (Romero 2008: 74). Proposition 200 is still in effect in Arizona and, for this reason, is crucial to the discussion of immigration and the U.S.-Mexico border because it is thought to represent a public decision made on a contentious policy issue through democratic referenda elections (Staudt 2008: 296). The danger of relying on the results of a public referendum is that in doing so the government of Arizona indulges in a form of populist politics that largely dismisses the rights of minority groups within the state. At the same time, the execution of a referendum within the state often creates the illusion that the state is more responsive to local issues than the federal government.

Major provisions of this law included the requirement for employees of local and state governments to verify the immigration status of people seeking government benefits, and to report any violations encountered or suspected to federal officials (Proposition 200 2004). The law explicitly states that the failure to report transgressions would be treated as a
criminal offense, which put local police officers, health workers, public school teachers, and all other public sector employees in a tenuous position where they could be found guilty if they did not enforce the legislation (ibid). This proposition exemplifies the delegation of state powers and the use of extraordinary measures as it turns all public service employees into immigration agents of a sort and creates a legal situation whereby they must actively fight undocumented immigration or risk being considered actively complicit in it. In addition, the law also permits state residents to sue a government employee or agency for failing to carry out these provisions in a satisfactory manner. It also required everyone who wished to vote in state elections to present proof of citizenship prior to casting their ballot (ibid). Importantly, the proposal of screening practices and local enforcement measures such as the ones embedded within Proposition 200 allow law enforcement officials, other government workers, and some private citizens the ability to identify and detain undocumented migrants wherever and whenever they are encountered (Kretsedemas 2008: 334). The constitutionality of Proposition 200 has been challenged by a number of organizations, including the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). They argue that the legislation violates federal law because states do not have the authority to establish their own immigration enforcement system and because the law poses problems for the health and well-being of individuals and families who rely on public benefits for their basic necessities (Romero 2008: 74).

Despite this opposition, in November 2006, Arizona passed another four propositions in a referendum that would have important consequences for unauthorized migrants. Each one of the four proposed propositions received more than seventy per cent of voter approval (ibid). Proposition 100, the Bailable Offences Act, sought to deny bail to undocumented
immigrants who were either charged or were thought to have committed a class 1, 2, 3 or 4 felony (Prop. 100: 2006). Proposition 102 essentially denies a lawsuit to anyone who cannot provide evidence stating that they had entered the country with appropriate documentation, and is another example of how the local assumption of immigration power bypasses the legal protections, checks and balances that one might expect of a federal or state government (Prop. 102 2006). Proposition 103 made English the official language of the state of Arizona, creating a linguistic division between those individuals who were considered to belong within the state and those who were to be considered outsiders (Prop 103 2006). Finally, the most controversial was Proposition 300, which prohibits unauthorized migrants from attending public universities and/or receiving any type of financial assistance (Prop. 300 2006). The impact of Proposition 300 was tremendous, and affected students who were previously unaware of their unauthorized immigration status or who had been living in the United States for almost their entire lives without citizenship. In addition, the state agencies who were administering the provisions of Proposition 300 had to provide a detailed account of the number of persons denied participation in these programs thus revealing the identity of undocumented students to federal authorities (Prop. 300 2006). Through the implementation of Proposition 300, the Arizona government was able to provide immigration authorities with all of the necessary information to find and deport unauthorized immigrants throughout the state. In this manner, public agencies have been required to step outside their role as public service providers and become active agents of immigration enforcement by gathering intelligence on the people they are ostensibly serving.

Each one of these propositions explicitly targets the undocumented immigrant, by allowing the state government to implement a strategy of attrition through enforcement.
Through this strategy local actors have assumed the responsibilities of the federal government, but in a way that allows for an arbitrary imposition of these laws. Therefore the imposition of these propositions serves to increase the vulnerability and deportability of undocumented immigrants by isolating and identifying them by their inability to participate in everyday practices of citizenship, such as education, employment, health care, and other public services. Before moving on to an examination of how the MMP has bolstered the state’s anti-immigrant policies, it is necessary to first look at the latest attempt by the Arizona government to eliminate the undocumented immigrant population within the state: Senate Bill 1070.

**Senate Bill 1070: Formalizing Local Enforcement**

On April 23, 2010 the state of Arizona passed the toughest immigration bill in the recent history of the United States. Senate Bill (SB) 1070 or the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” is purportedly meant to further secure the state’s border from undocumented immigrants. While Arizona lawmakers have continually claimed that the new law is strictly about legality, not about ethnicity or race, the proposed law will institute a number of critical changes to the everyday reality of immigrant communities, regardless of their status, throughout Arizona. Given the political climate that prevails in the majority of the United States and particularly in the state of Arizona, it is possible to view this law as simply the latest in a series of actions targeted specifically at undocumented workers from Mexico. Meanwhile, there has been great division over the legislation among politicians, across various levels of government, law enforcement officials and citizens of every background.

Among SB 1070’s provisions, the new Arizona law is designed to encourage federal,
state and local authorities to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens” in Arizona by making “attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona” (SB 1070: Introduction). The law requires, in the context of a routine traffic stop, detention or arrest, the verification of an individual’s immigration status whenever there is “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is unlawfully present in the country (SB 1070: Section 2). This provision is non-negotiable and is reinforced through the creation of a private right of action, which allows any legal resident of Arizona to collect monetary compensation if he/she can show that any official or agency has adopted or implemented a policy that “limits or restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . to less than the full extent permitted by federal law” (ibid). These provisions create a scenario where individuals, in both an official or unofficial capacity, are encouraged to play a greater role in the daily practices associated with immigration enforcement. The law also creates or alters existing state law criminal provisions, imposing criminal penalties for an unauthorized migrant’s failure to federally register or carry his or her federal registration documents (SB 1070: Section 3), as well as for the smuggling, transporting or harboring of an unlawfully present individual or for encouraging said individual to enter the state of Arizona (SB 1070: Section 5). Section 6 of SB 1070 allows local authorities to make arrests without a warrant if that individual is believed to have committed a public offense, regardless of where that offense was committed.

The provisions of SB 1070 are problematic in a number of ways. First and foremost, they prevent the federal government from mounting a bi-partisan, comprehensive immigration reform strategy. For example, the laws included under SB 1070 singularly pursue the exclusion of immigrants without considering the broader security and
humanitarian concerns inherent to the immigration debate. Second, one of the biggest public concerns about this law is that it will result in racial profiling at the local level, even though the law explicitly states that it is illegal for individuals of a specific race, color, or national origin to be specifically targeted during the implementation of SB 1070. In fact, after immense public criticism of SB 1070 for its potential abuse in the form of racial profiling the Arizona Legislature passed H.B. 2162, which amended the previous bill, on April 30th, 2010 to include a provision that would make it “crystal clear and undeniable that racial profiling is illegal, and will not be tolerated in Arizona” (Brewer 2010a: 1). In addition, upon the passing of the law, Arizona’s state governor also issued an executive order requiring the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training Board to provide local police with additional training on what does and what does not constitute “reasonable suspicion” (Brewer 2010b: 3, 5). Despite these provisions the law has garnered an unprecedented amount of attention by the media and activists who deem it unconstitutional because of the concentration of power into the hands of local enforcement agencies that are at liberty to implement the law according to their own subjective tendencies. At the same time, SB 1070 has also received widespread public support. According to a Rasmussen poll conducted on April 21, 2010, approximately 70 percent of voters approved the new bill, and only 23 percent opposed it (Rasmussen Report 2010).

In some ways the introduction of SB 1070 in Arizona challenges the federal government’s ability to control immigration, and as it was introduced these criticisms were alleged. It creates a reality where immigration policy is increasingly enforced by individual police officers through a broadened range of personal discretion that opens up potential for arbitrariness and abuse of an already vulnerable community. In days following the
referendum vote on SB 1070, the Obama administration declared the legislation “irresponsible” and a “misguided approach that threatens to undermine basic notions of fairness that we cherish as Americans, as well as the trust between police and their communities that is so crucial to keeping us safe” (Obama: 2010). Amidst the protests and boycotts surrounding the Arizona law, the Obama administration launched a lawsuit against the state of Arizona and Governor Jan Brewer on the premise that SB 1070 is unconstitutional as the federal government has the preeminent authority to regulate immigration in the interest of law enforcement, foreign relations, and humanitarian interests (U.S. vs. Arizona 2010: 2). As this dispute suggests, border policies are not a monolith—as a solid border fence would suggest—but contested and contentious across different scales of government.

Taking these concerns into account, the case was heard by U.S. District Judge Susan R. Bolton during the month of July 2010. On the 28th of July, Bolton announced her decision to issue a preliminary injunction on some of the most contested provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070 one day before it was intended to take effect. In her decision, Bolton accepted the Justice Department’s argument that the law intrudes into federal immigration enforcement procedures and placed a temporary injunction on the law. The blocked provisions include the requirement for police to check immigration status if they stop someone while enforcing other laws, the arrest of suspected undocumented immigrants without warrants, and the criminalization of immigrants who do not carry proper registration papers with them at all times (U.S. vs. Arizona Injunction 2010). While it is unclear how the rest of the case will play out, Governor Brewer has indicated that the state of Arizona will appeal the Supreme Court decision (Brewer 2010). Furthermore, SB 1070 has certainly channeled a significant
amount of attention toward the issue of the undocumented immigrants within the U.S. and has also served to intensify the divisions between documented immigrants and American citizens in other U.S. states. In fact, while the debate over the Arizona law continues, seventeen other states have introduced similar bills (Markon and Crummen 2010).

The outcome of the case will determine whether or not the federal government will be able to maintain sole authority when it comes to issues of immigration, but it will also have far greater consequences. For example, the law and the sentiments that motivated its existence will dramatically alter the everyday social and cultural landscape of immigrant communities, regardless of their status, throughout the state of Arizona. Originally it was only the federal government and enforcement agencies that could make decisions about who belongs and who does not; however, the laws that have proceeded SB 1070 and their formalization with the implementation of SB 1070 will create a context where “all members of society are encouraged to make the decision to report whomever they believe to be undocumented. From the highest levels of government to the micro-level of ‘everyday practice’ we see decisions made regarding who ‘the enemy’ is, resulting in states of exception being put into place that severely impact the lives of people in numerous communities across the country” (Doty 2009:102). Here, it is important to recognize not just the state policies but also the local enforcement of these laws and the rise of vigilantism insofar as they severely impact every aspect of the daily life of immigrants, either authorized or unauthorized, in the state of Arizona.

**The Ongoing Role of the Minuteman Project**

As the case of SB 1070 continues to unfold, there is another element of the anti-immigration movement in Arizona that must be addressed. While civilian border patrol
groups have existed in various forms along the U.S.-Mexico border throughout its history, their presence has escalated rapidly over the past fifteen years in response to the perceived consequences of the growing numbers of migrants seeking to enter the U.S. from Mexico (Nuñez-Neto 2006: 2). As the immigration debate has become more intimately linked to issues of national security within the post-9/11 political context, vigilante border patrol groups have been able to disseminate their message to a wider and more receptive audience than ever before by conflating undocumented migrants with potential terrorists. While there are a number of vigilante groups currently operating within the United States, the most high profile and controversial civilian border patrol group is the Minuteman Project (MMP), which was officially founded in 2005 in Tombstone, Arizona. This organization has attracted a tremendous amount of media coverage and has solidified its presence through various spectacles conducted along the U.S.-Mexico border and, more recently, throughout the interior of the United States. While I do not wish to contribute to the significant attention this group has received here, it is important to critically examine the impact of the activities and rhetoric of these non-state actors, as well as some of their local networks and influence. Specifically, this chapter considers the MMP as the civil society counterpart to the trends identified in Arizona’s state legislation above: as a group that is assuming state powers in immigration enforcement and exercising them outside legal and procedural restrictions.

Since the mid-1990s a number of factions had formed and fractured around the growing animosity towards the increase in undocumented migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border (Navarro 2008: 178). In 2005, the founders of the organization, Chris Simcox, a former kindergarten teacher from Los Angeles, and Jim Gilchrist, a Vietnam War veteran and retired accountant, began working from their headquarters in Tombstone, Arizona
What began as a one-month long border patrol and protest in southern Arizona in April 2005 transformed into a national movement, primarily because the MMP were able to present themselves as a unified movement that was purportedly acting on behalf of American public opinion (Nevins 2006: 261).

In the months following the establishment of the MMP, Gilchrist and Simcox embarked on a tremendous recruitment campaign and began instituting larger-scale border patrol missions along the U.S.-Mexico border. Today the MMP boasts that it is “the country’s largest volunteer and grassroots border security advocacy group” with more than 350,000 constituents (MCDC 2009). The strategies of the organization can be categorized in two broad ways. The first is a conventional approach to their advocacy campaign, which relies on anti-immigrant initiatives, laws, ordinances, electioneering, pressure, lobbying and manipulation of the media (Navarro 2008: 153). The second set of strategies is more unconventional and relies on protest, militancy, confrontation, armed vigilantism, and militias (ibid). Through these strategies of mobilization, the MMP has created a space where ordinary Americans have been able to organize and tangibly respond to their fear of the undocumented migrant by actively working to secure the border by enforcing or demanding the enforcement of migration laws. For instance, volunteers of the MMP were active in creating a response to the pro-immigration mobilizations that took place across the United States in 2006. Gilchrist organized a national ten-day tour of thirteen major cities and “in speech after speech, he continued to push for a greater militarization of the border, strengthening of employer sanctions, and membership and chapter formation of for the MMP” (Navarro 2008: 203). While the crowds were small, they were able to capture a tremendous amount of media coverage that would help spread their political message beyond
their attendees (ibid). Also in 2006, the MMP announced Operation Sovereignty, an eight-week border surveillance effort in conjunction with the Texas Minutemen and the American Border Patrol (Navarro 2008: 205). The volunteers showed up this event “armed, carrying binoculars, night vision goggles, and lawn chairs; and some wore camouflaged fatigues or khakis and military boots – in short, their image was that of an armed militia” (ibid). The goal of Operation Sovereignty was to provide a neighbourhood watch system on the border whereby volunteers would “observe and report” individuals attempting to circumvent the border (Gilchrist 2006: 16). While these are just two examples of how the MMP operates, they demonstrate the inflated rhetoric and tactics used by the organization in response to the issue of undocumented immigration.

The fact that the MMP is a grassroots organization has allowed it to become a “powerful tool and rallying point for those who advocate stronger immigration enforcement [and] especially those who focus predominantly on border enforcement as a solution to the current immigration crisis” (Doty 2007: 121). As private citizens, the MMP conveys an emotional and energetic program that the elite and political leaders cannot muster (Doty 2007: 131). By drawing imaginary divisions between the undocumented worker and the ordinary American citizen, the MMP has become yet another critical agent in laying the conceptual framework for identifying undocumented immigrants as a national security threat and, thus, executing an exclusionary conception of security along the U.S.-Mexico border. In this way the MMP is both constructing and enforcing the second border, while internalizing powerful hierarchies between citizens and non-citizens through the various displays of enforcement. In addition, the fact that the MMP has taken root primarily in border states,
such as Arizona, may reflect that border identities are easier to develop and more potent because of their distance from the central institutions of power (Kaplan 1998: 37).

While the MMP has worked diligently to establish imaginary divisions between citizen and non-citizen, they have also managed to palpably concretize this dichotomous thinking into the physical landscape of Arizona. The MMP has raised funds for their own Border Fence Project that aims to “secure America’s sovereignty against incursion, invasion, and terrorism” through the construction of a steel security fence along the U.S.-Mexico border (MMP 2008). Through this project, the MMP have played a role in constructing the first border in the United States, outside of state sanctioned policy and procedures. The Border Fence Project initiated by the MMP has attracted considerable attention from popular media and tacit support from within certain pockets of the American government. Most importantly, however, the group’s public advocacy campaign to secure the border and the coinciding spectacle of erecting a make-shift border fence is reflective of yet another articulation of the economic, racist and nationalist discourse that has produced a divisive border rhetoric in which the undocumented immigrant from Mexico becomes “both figuratively and literally fenced out of the sacrosanct space of American citizenship” (DeChaine 2009: 46). The motivation behind the Border Fence Project initiated by the MMP works to “(re)inscribe the naturalness of geographic borders, positing the alien as a subject who is naturally out of place” (DeChaine 2009: 58). As such, the security of the border is thus framed as being about legal enforcement, not about wielding extraordinary power and control over immigrant communities. In Operation Gatekeeper, Joseph Nevins explains this phenomenon as follows:

[T]he “illegal” is someone who is officially out of place – in a space where he does not belong. Thus, the official relationship of the “illegal alien” to the particular
national space in which he finds himself defines his status. The practice of territority—the effort to exert influence over people and/or other phenomena by asserting control over a defined geographic area—reinforces the designation of “illegal”. Territoriality helps to obfuscate social relations between controlled and controller by ascribing these relations to territory, and thus away from human agency. (Nevins 2002: 147-148)

In this way, it is not only the geographical border that becomes naturalized, but also the social and cultural barriers that exist between Americans and Mexicans across the international boundary and within various communities within the United States. As such, the hardening of the international border by government officials, as well as the MMP, allows for immigrants to become invisible, excluded, and subjugated within the social and cultural landscape of the United States (De Genova 2002: 419).

Like the Arizona Legislature with its imposition of SB 1070, the MMP claims to be filling a void left by the federal government. Arguing that the federal government has not adequately protected its borders and, therefore, has failed in providing order and security for American citizens, the mission of the MMP has always been framed through an analysis of national security that focuses on a perceived lack of border integrity, where the border is characterized by:

...its leakiness; the ease with which undocumented migrants are able to slip across unnoticed; and the ability or unwillingness by the U.S. and Mexican government to seal, secure, and protect the national frontier and its stark line of demarcation. (Dechaine 2009: 44)

In the eyes of the Minutemen, the leaky nature of the border needs to be attended to at the local level, if the federal government will not respond. While they capitalize on the iconic value of the Minutemen of the American Revolution, today’s MMP describes its undertaking as not only a solution, but as an example of what committed Americans (e.g. ‘We the People’) must do in order to secure the border and the well-being of fellow American citizens
In this sense, the MMP perpetuate the conception of the border presented by traditional IR theorists that it is a “hard shell” or a “wall of defensibility” that serves to protect the state from external threat. The efforts of the MMP to rally public support for the continued construction of the security fence along the border are often entrenched within appeals that draw on highly charged language and images of what constitutes true American values, thus creating public understandings of how national identity, community and the ‘other’ are mutually constructed. In a broader sense, the MMP has established a civil society-led nation-building project through their construction of a dichotomous mode of thinking about the relationship between Americans and Mexicans as an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ scenario. The construction of this binary within social, economic, and political spheres at the community level contributes to the delineation of inclusion and exclusion within the United States through supporting a framework in which power becomes infused within the lives of ordinary citizens and non-citizens.

Underlying these civilian border patrol and fence building operations is the notion of the undocumented migrant as the enemy. This theme is shared by the anti-immigrant movement in the U.S., which is large and well funded, and consists of extremists as well as of slightly more respectable restrictionist organizations that profess themselves to be research-oriented think-tanks (Doty 2007: 122). As Arizona’s undocumented population continues to increase, so too does the anti-immigrant rhetoric at the community level. These divisions do not exist separately from the policies being enacted by federal or state officials, instead, both serve a similar purpose by creating ‘enemies’ out of a significant portion of the population, leaving them vulnerable to become victims of racial profiling by local law enforcement personnel or being intimidated by radical, right-wing hate groups. It is important
to highlight that the ability of the MMP and other similar anti-immigration groups to play such a significant role in the process of socially constructing a political enemy provides important insight into who can define citizenship and, more importantly, who can define who is welcome or unwelcome in the space of the nation-state. These groups have an explicit relationship to the laws and the state that may be easily overlooked at first glance. In fact, a number of these civilian border patrol groups have invoked the use of Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly states that, “…every state in this Union shall be protected against invasion” (Deaux 2006: 206). Furthermore, these groups have often mobilized state and federal policy for their own cause. As such, the MMP has often framed their mission in the same vernacular as the American government uses, identifying their actions as working toward “national” or “homeland security”, “human rights” and the “need to secure our borders” which has allowed their viewpoints and actions to become more palatable to the general public (ibid).

The case of the MMP demonstrates that bordering powers are not the sole purview of elite policymakers nor official border enforcement agencies and that civil society is also taking on fundamental functions of the state. The fact that the actions of the MMP are tacitly sanctioned by the state is important to consider because while the group technically operates separately from the state, they serve to reinforce both the state of Arizona and the federal government’s anti-immigration narrative in a more localized way. The fact that these groups are able to operate, without recourse, is telling of the anti-immigration movement that is prevalent both within the formal and informal sectors of the United States. Also significant is the fact that the state and federal powers are allowing the MMP to operate in ways that they themselves would be unable to get away with within the more formalized structures of
political power. As such, this analysis of the MMP can be seen as two of the ways in which power can be played out at a number of sites and scales and how even seemingly insignificant agents can be quite powerful in articulating the politics of exception.

**Conclusion**

The various propositions passed by the Arizona government have targeted immigrant communities, and particularly those who are undocumented, with particular virulence since 9/11. Legislation introduced in Arizona over the last several years has denied undocumented immigrants benefits, has made it increasingly difficult for employers to hire individuals without proper documentation, has denied civil lawsuits to individuals without official status, and has constructed linguistic and educational boundaries between Americans and non-citizens. This has only become possible given that the legislation has made all public service officials into agents of the second border, responsible for functions usually ascribed to the federal government. Most recently, SB 1070 has threatened to introduce a system of racial profiling that is unprecedented in the United States by forcing local law enforcement officials to add immigration checks to their routine procedures based upon suspicion of someone’s status. Each one of these laws has a resounding effect on the immigrant community, both documented and undocumented, within the borders of Arizona. As Roxanne Doty (2010) has demonstrated with her own analysis of the MMP, lines of exception are being drawn by citizens and civilian organizations just as easily as they are determined by various level of government. While many policies of exceptionalism are institutionalized through the government, and these are what Agamben focuses on in his treatment of Carl Schmitt’s work in *State of Exception*, Doty warns us that other manifestations of exceptionalism, including
groups like the MMP, should not be ignored or dismissed because they can also have detrimental impacts on individuals and communities (Doty 2010).

The strength of the anti-immigration movement and its accompanying politics of exception raises important questions regarding America’s democratic ideals. The current immigration policies create ‘enemies’ out of a significant segment of the immigrant population in Arizona, regardless of their legal status. Often the government has often done this in more subtle ways by working to fortify the border and, more recently, through policies of enforcement through attrition, in order to shrink the size of the immigrant population in the United States. However, for groups like the MMP, these policies serve to justify the aggressive practices used by the group to exclude the undocumented population from American society. Therefore, the process becomes iterative as it permeates various sites and scales both at the physical border and beyond.

Arizona’s growing anti-immigration movement is problematic for the authorized and unauthorized immigrant communities within the state of Arizona; however, it also presents a direct challenge to the federal government’s immigration policies. As Agamben suggests:

The place – both logical and pragmatic – of the state of exception in the American Constitution is in the dialectic between the powers of the president and those in Congress…it is often the result of a conflict over supreme authority in an emergency situations…as a conflict over sovereign decision (Agamben 2005: 19).

This point is important to underscore because the battle between the federal government and Arizona typifies Agamben’s concern since Arizona policymakers have justified their actions by alluding to federal government failure to impose its own legislation. Moreover, SB 1070 has created an opening for other states to adopt equally divisive legislation that may lead to a patchwork of approaches that do not adequately address the issue at hand and only serve only to further isolate already vulnerable communities.
The perceived inadequacies of action at the federal level has inspired groups like the MMP to take action on their own accord in order to find a solution to what they perceive as the problem of immigration. These groups have relied on their ability to exercise popular sovereignty in order to demand that the state or the federal government forcefully exercise its sovereignty by controlling its borders and making exceptions of those who have entered the U.S. without appropriate documentation (Doty 2009: 11). Predicated on concretizing the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, these groups have been able to legitimate the exclusion and marginalization of some of the most vulnerable communities in the United States today (ibid). As such, the longer the immigration issue remains unresolved, the louder the voices of the MMP and their vigilante counterparts will become, and the deeper and broader the official lines of exception that exclude immigrants, regardless of their status, from the United States will be.
Chapter 5: Transformation at the Third Border in San Diego

Introduction

Over time the U.S.-Mexico border has been shaped by legacies of war and conquest, as well as processes inextricably linked to the making of the categories of race, class, and nation (Nevins 2008: 77; Hernandez 2010: 21-22). These processes have created hierarchies of exclusion and inclusion, and are reflective of and further the interests of certain groups over others (Nevins 2008: 78). While the border has become most visible in the concrete and steel fence that has been erected along most of the official boundary between the United States and Mexico, it has become increasingly localized through the processes of social, political, and economic exclusion that are manifest in city planning and local architecture. As Joseph Nevins has argued “the border is not just about determining who belongs and who does not, but is also about the terms on which people and places from either side of the line relate to one another” (ibid). While this relationship is manifest in various ways, the goal of this chapter is to analyze the ‘third border’, as defined within the Three Border Model, by examining a number of community projects that have arisen in San Diego, California to confront divisive border politics. In describing the ‘third’ border, Davis and Moctezuma originally focused on the architectural and juridical boundaries that served to separate undocumented Mexicans or Mexican-Americans from Americans. This chapter attends to these inner boundaries, but also looks beyond them to examine sites where boundary transformation is taking place.

The third border must be understood as being deeply connected to the ongoing fortification of the first border and the implementation of mechanisms of enforcement at the second border. As Mike Davis argues:
The border does not end at San Clemente. Indeed, as any ten-year-old in East L.A., or Philly’s El Norte knows, borders tend to follow working-class Latinos wherever they live...In suburban Los Angeles, New Jersey and Chicago, the interface between Anglo majorities and growing blue-collar Latino populations is regulated by what can only be typed a “third border”. Whereas the second border [the INS checkpoints in the interior of the United States] nominally reinforces the international border, the third border policies daily intercourse between the two citizen communities. (Davis 2000: 70-71)

In other words, the third border often consists of the various architectural or juridical barriers that separate Chicano communities from their physically contiguous, upper-income, Anglo neighbours (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 35). According to Davis and Moctezuma, the third border works to restrict the access of poorer Latino communities to public space, including streets and parks, in upper-class neighbourhoods (ibid). As such, Davis and Moctezuma states that “citizenship will never be fully substantive until this third border is torn down” (ibid).

While Moctezuma and Davis have already pointed to a number of examples that illustrate the exclusion of Mexican immigrants from everyday life in the United States, I will use the concept of the third border to explore opportunities for transformation that are being generated by the emergence of cultural projects. Specifically, this chapter focuses on several projects that have emerged at or around the San Diego-Tijuana border crossing. The case studies that will be examined include the movement to keep Friendship Park open to the public, the struggle for Chicano Park that emerged within Barrio Logan, and the ‘Living Rooms at the Border’ project designed by Estudio Teddy Cruz. I will examine the narratives being developed within these particular communities in order to highlight their ability to play a role in challenging the existing power structures and to put forward alternative visions of the U.S.-Mexico border. These alternative imaginings of the border not only challenge the territorial fixity of the boundary, but also the political and social boundaries that reinforce it.
In this way, these communities have been able to forge a counter-narrative to the border fence and the anti-immigrant policies, as they exult in the intercultural, complex identity of communities who have become marked by the border and its attendant processes.

To this end, this chapter will be divided into three key sections. The first section will focus on the legacy of Friendship Park, a public plaza located on the Pacific Ocean where communities from both sides of the border frequently gather to engage with one another, and the community response to recent decision by the federal government to close the park to the public. To illustrate how Mexican immigrants and Chicano communities have been able to strategically secure and use space to articulate their political messages, the second section of this chapter will revisit the historical success of Barrio Logan residents who lobbied for, established and maintained Chicano Park – a park clad with politically-charged murals located just kilometers from the San Ysidro port of entry. The third, and final example included within this chapter highlights the work of Estudio Teddy Cruz, in collaboration with a local non-profit in San Ysidro called Casa Familiar, to transform urban spaces into sites of empowerment that facilitate dialogue across adjacent border communities. Each one of these case studies documents San-Diego/Tijuana urban life and illustrates how the marginalized communities have strategically used the spaces they inhabit and, thus, have played a critical role in negotiating and re-negotiating the spaces of inclusion and exclusion that have been exacerbated by the political decisions being made by the federal and state governments to continually fortify the divide between Americans and Mexicans vis-à-vis the first and second borders.
Friendship on the Line

When the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed on February 2nd, 1848 in Mexico City, it symbolized the cessation of the Mexican-American War and formalized the border that exists between the U.S. and Mexico today. The introduction of the agreement states that the citizens of both the United States of America and the United Mexican States should “establish a solid basis for relations of peace and friendship, which shall confer reciprocal benefits upon the citizens of both, and assure the concord, harmony, and mutual confidence wherein the two people should live, as good neighbours” (Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 1848: Introduction). On the surface, the treaty suggested that there would be a new relationship, guided by a universal peace, between the two contiguous states. More importantly, this agreement shaped the physical border between the U.S. and Mexico. In 1849 the first obelisk was placed on the border between the U.S. and Mexico in what is today considered to be Friendship Park. Article V of the 1848 treaty gave orders for surveyors of both republics to meet in San Diego to determine the boundary and on January 30, 1850 the Boundary Joint Commission agreed to place the first official border marker on top of the coastal bluff that is now known as Monument Mesa (Vargas 2000: 122).

From 1850 until 1910, the international divide between the U.S. and Mexico, as outlined in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, consisted of occasionally placed stone monuments shaped like squat obelisks (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 34). According to Davis and Moctezuma, this version of the border was “a geopolitical fiction that barely intruded into the daily existence of the largely pastoral communities of mestizo and indigenous people thinly sprinkled across the Sonoran Desert” and, often, “…longhorned cattle, copper miners, Apache raiding parties and their US and Mexican pursuits crossed the invisible line at will”
This seemingly invisible border existed until the Mexican Revolution in 1910 when the American army was deployed to the border for the first time to "keep revolutionary ideas and intrigues out of Texas and the Southwest" (Davis & Moctezuma 1999:34). While there was always a method of border patrol present after the 1910 Revolution, the physicality of the border did not change. In fact, even in the 1970s, the border was still viewed as an important site of convergence and emblematic of the friendship between the two contiguous states.

In 1971 First Lady Patricia Nixon visited the California’s Border Field State Park, to inaugurate what is known today as Friendship Park. The park itself marks the southern-most point on the west coast of the continental U.S., located exactly where the U.S., Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean meet. At this point, the border existed as a simple barbed wire construction that delineated the international boundary set out by the 1848 Treaty. (Nevins 2008). During her visit, Nixon inaugurated the space as Friendship Park, or Parque de Amistad, “a place where friends and family could meet, despite their nationality” (Corrette 2008: 6-7). During her address to people on both sides of the border, she symbolically snipped the barbed wire fence that had served as the border in order to greet attendees on the Mexico side. In her statements that day, she stated that she hoped that “…there won’t be a fence here too long”; little did the First Lady know what was to become of the border in subsequent years (as quoted in Corrette 2008: 7). Upon her departure that day, the First Lady unveiled a plaque that had been placed beside the original monument with the following inscription:

Near this site the initial point of the boundary between the United States of America and the Republic of Mexico was established October 10, 1849. Today the flag of the United States of America is again raised to symbolize friendship between the peoples of the United States and Mexico and to commemorate the establishment of a state park adjacent to this point of the international border. (Corrette 2008: 6)
In the two decades that followed, individuals and groups from both sides of the border frequented Friendship Park. A *New York Times* article published in October 2008 stated that “at a time of tumult over immigration, with illegal workers routed from businesses, record levels of deportations, border walls are getting taller and longer, Friendship Park has stood out as a spot where international neighbours can chat easily over [through] the fence” (Archibold 2008). The article goes on to describe some of the daily interactions that take place across the fence including the gathering of “families and friends, some of them unable to cross the border because of legal or immigration trouble, who exchange kisses, tamales and news through small gaps in the tattered chain-link fence” (ibid). Others frequent the park for bi-national activities that range from yoga classes, reiki sessions, language exchanges, and even weekly communion services. While some of these are organized through an organization called *Border Encuentro*, other gatherings are entirely organic. The space of Friendship Park allows for individuals on either side of the border to come together, despite the physical barrier, and find common ground on which to establish and maintain relationships.

While every activity that takes place across the border at Friendship Park is not innately political, when practiced in this particular domain they become so. The annual *Posada Sin Fronteras* celebration is an example of this politicization. It is an interfaith display of cross-border unity and protest against the social injustice of American border policies. In short, a *posada* is a traditional Catholic, Mexican procession that reenacts Joseph and Mary’s search for lodging in Bethlehem. It is a familiar cultural tradition in Mexico and the U.S. Southwest. The *Posada Sin Fronteras* is sponsored by various faith-based and

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4 A *Posada* generally takes place on each of the nine days before Christmas. Each night a procession of children and their families takes place in various neighbourhoods, usually carrying statues of Mary and Joseph. The
immigrant rights groups and is an adaptation of the traditional posada procession to commemorate the plight of migrant families traveling from the south to the north (Hondagenu-Sotelo et al. 2004: 134). According to Hodagenu-Sotelo et. al, “…just as Mary and Joseph sought hospitality in a foreign land, so too, organizers tell us, are Mexican and Central American migrants from the south seeking hospitality in the north” (ibid). As individuals come together from both sides of the border to participate in this celebration, it becomes clear that the event serves both as a commemoration, but also as a way of welcoming migrants into the U.S. and, at the same time, a protest against existing exclusionary American border policies.5

While Friendship Park has stood as a symbol for peace and friendship between the United States and Mexico since 1848, the nature of the physical border began to dramatically change in the early 1990s. Between 1990 and 1994, in the face of growing concerns about the increased flow of unauthorized migration, a primary fence was erected on the borderline between San Diego and Tijuana, replacing approximately 140 years of a simple barbed wire boundary with a fence made of steel and concrete. This action symbolized the changing relationship between the United States and Mexico. In speaking about Lady Nixon’s inauguration of Friendship Park in an independent article written in 2008, Joseph Nevins states that:

While it is impossible to know exactly what Pat Nixon intended almost 40 years ago in Imperial Beach, her words and actions suggested an openness to imagining something fundamentally different in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. It is this openness that is so desperately needed today to end the institutionalized brutality

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and suffering that prevail in the border region and in many immigrant communities.

As Nevins suggests, the peaceful and friendly relations that the park once symbolized are slowly being destroyed. Groups such as Friends of Friendship Park (a broad coalition of community-based organizations) and the San Diego Foundation for Change, who have both been actively advocating for continued public access to the beachfront plaza, have been actively trying to maintain a space of openness between communities who have been forced apart by structural violence. Instead of respecting this meeting space, government officials announced in early January 2009 that the plaza that once provided a space for Mexicans and Americans from both sides of the border to come together was to be demolished to make way for a second layer of fence and a series of dirt patrol roads, which would ultimately prevent further meetings at the border.

The previously existing fence within Friendship Park is one of the last remaining locations along the 3200 kilometre U.S.-Mexico border that allowed for face-to-face communication across the boundary within a large urban area. As such, this has made the park an important gathering place for families and friends who are separated for a variety of reasons, including immigration status. When federal officials decided to construct a 150-foot wide triple fence extending into the Pacific Ocean, destroying this last remnant of what was originally known as Friendship Park, they did so unilaterally. They did not discuss the consequences that building the fence might have for the nature and character of this particular space. Their actions ultimately served to diminish the credibility of a space that once stood as a counter-narrative to the divisive images and language used to describe the border in the media and the federal policies being passed down from the White House. The fact that the federal government was willing to waive over 30 environmental and cultural
laws to allow for the construction of this triple fencing project demonstrates that the federal narrative about the border is focused solely on security in the national sense (Romero 2008: 118). In overlooking the complex reality of everyday life at the border, federal and state officials have also disregarded the fact that Friendship Park has proven that the border is not simply a place of fear and hostility. In fact, the interactions that have taken place within the park have demonstrated that this park has been a public venue for positive, peaceful relations that are able to transcend the limitations of the physical border. It can be argued, therefore, that the closing of the park can be viewed as the foreclosure on friendly relations between the U.S. and Mexico and, subsequently, Americans and Mexicans.

It is important, however, to understand that many of the communities who have frequented Friendship Park have continued to fight for the right for access to this public space. For instance, the Friends of Friendship Park and the Foundation for Change have played key roles in lobbying for the reversal of this federal decision. While both of these organizations have openly stated that they recognize the need for ‘secure’ borders, they do not believe that this should come at the expense of two communities who do not necessarily wish to be separated (Friends of Friendship Park Online 2010). Among the supporters of these two groups and their initiative to keep Friendship Park open to the public are a number of state officials and federal representatives. Among the California elected officials opposing the closure of Friendship Park are Susan Davis, Bob Filner, Denise Ducheny, Mary Salas and Lori Saldana. At the federal level, a number of elected officials including Solomon Ortiz, Silvestre Reyes, Ruben Hinojosa, Raul Grivjalva, Bob Filner, Henry Cuellar, Susan Davis and Ciro Rodriguez, have all actively shown their support for the suspension of the construction of the fence through Friendship Park. It should be noted here that the narrative
presented by communities near the border and their state representatives stands in stark contrast to the narrative presented at the federal level. The movement to stop the closure of Friendship Park has demonstrated that the decisions being made at the federal level have profound consequences for those living within the borderlands, indicating that there is a need for community-based organizations to ensure that both state and federal officials hear their concerns.

After the federal government announced the closure of Friendship Park, The Friends of Friendship Park commissioned James Brown of Public Architecture and Planning to draw up a proposal that would satisfy the needs of both the San Diego Border Patrol and the individuals and groups who frequent the park. While the proposal had been submitted in April 2010 to the San Diego Border Patrol, at the time of writing the Friends of Friendship Park has yet to receive a response. The proposal itself outlines a “dignified but controlled passage” to three important locations on the international boundary, including the historic monument at the center of the park, the bi-national garden located to the east of the monument, and the beach below the monument to the west (Brown 2010: 2). Accordingly, the proposal would allow:

...modulated control of a large rolling gate, using simple and cost effective construction techniques already in use for several smaller gates in the existing fence. The existing main door leading to the monument site would remain unchanged. To the east of that door, a 60-ft long rolling gate would be installed, operated by a motorized gear, and lockable in 20-ft increments. This rolling gate would allow complete security at the Border Patrol’s discretion. It can be fully closed and locked, or it could be partially or completely opened for approved special events. Inside, the meeting plaza also has complete flexibility thru the use of ground imbedded tube steel in which a simple low fence can be moved from one control line to the next depending on the gate configuration. (Brown 2010: 2)

In collaboration with the Friends of Friendship Park, James Brown of Public Architecture will be compiling a more detailed proposal to submit to the City of San Diego in late fall of
2010 (Friends of Friendship Park online). In the meantime, it is important to recognize that this proposal offers an alternative imagining of the border at the San Diego-Tijuana divide. This vision promotes the original principles of the border park as declared by First Lady Nixon almost 40 years earlier, including the provision of a physical space that allows Mexicans and Americans to establish and maintain harmonious relations across the border. The proposal for this space envisions a border built on the understanding that the goals of security and friendship are mutually reinforcing and, ironically, begins at the very spot the first obelisk was laid to form the U.S.-Mexico border in 1849. While it is clear that the discussions surrounding the modifications of the current design for Friendship Park will continue for some time, the movement is growing in both numbers and strength and is determined to maintain open public access to a site that is tremendously symbolic of a different kind of U.S.-Mexican border relations.

**Bridging Borders Through Chicano Park**

It is important to understand that Friendship Park is not an isolated example of communities attempting to secure their own social and cultural space within the context of the United States. To highlight this point, the following section will be dedicated to examining the development of Chicano Park. While the first Chicano urban resistance movements emerged in the 1950s to protest discriminatory policies in public housing, neighbourhood destruction, and redevelopment, many of these initial protests were largely unsuccessful (Diaz 2005: 51). Although these original movements were met with little success, they inspired a community consciousness that would lead to the emergence of the Chicano Power Era in the 1960s. During this time, the Chicano movement dealt with numerous issues that confronted Mexican-Americans including unequal educational and
employment opportunities, political disenfranchisement, and police brutality (Ortiz 2007: 130). In many ways, the movement “reflected a new sense of efficacy and faith in the power of organized collective action and commitment to struggle for social change and social justice” (ibid). Through these efforts, including the struggle against gentrification in Barrio Logan, the Chicano movement was able to organize against repressive policies being implemented in their respective communities across the United States (Diaz 2005: 51).

Generally speaking, in the 1950s and early 1960s, urban barrios were communities under siege, socially, politically, economically and spatially (Acuna 1972). In these years, the Chicano communities were segregated through the implementation of repressive policies. For example, “barrio space experienced a period of spatial devastation from aggressive local redevelopment policies that destroyed housing adjacent to favored economic zones” (Diaz 2005: 57). These policies would include the decision by the state of California to construct Interstate 5 through the community of Logan Heights, severing Barrio Logan from the larger community in 1963. Between 1967 and 1969, the San Diego-Coronado Bay Bridge was built and would further bisect the barrio, isolating it almost entirely from the adjacent community of Coronado – an affluent suburb of San Diego (Rosen & Fisher 2001:94). By and large, government officials were not interested in protecting communities from the potentially devastating and disruptive impacts caused by major public improvement projects in the state of California, echoing the current situation of Friendship Park in many ways.

Since the construction of the highway and the bridge was already a given, the residents of Barrio Logan petitioned to build a park in the empty space under the freeway. At first the government did not acknowledge their request and the land was given to the California Highway Patrol to be used as a substation. Yet in the early 1970s the community
occupied the land and prevented bulldozers from preparing the site for the construction of the substation, and the city of San Diego changed its tune. After twelve days, they agreed to purchase the site for use as a public park. Thus, Chicano Park became a symbol of the struggle for recognition of the neighbourhood underneath the freeway and also became an important cultural landmark for the Chicano community in California, and elsewhere in the United States. Since its success in securing the space for Chicano Park in the 1970s, Barrio Logan residents have made extensive use of the park for social and political events and continue to make use of the park’s facilities including children’s playgrounds, restrooms, a kiosk or dance pavilion, a ceremonial kiva, sculptures, a water fountain, picnic areas, multi-purpose courts, open play lawns, and two small parking areas (Rosen & Fisher 2001:94).

Today Chicano Park stands as a triumphant illustration of the vivacity of the Chicano community in the United States and how this particular community has mobilized to make their voices heard. The history of how Chicano Park came into existence immerses this space with a greater meaning, particularly as it was a result of the friction between Mexican immigrants and Americans at that time – an important element of Davis and Moctezuma’s conception of the third border. However, in addition to the efforts that went into securing the space, Chicano Park is distinguished today by the approximately 40 large, impressive murals painted on twenty-four of the concrete pillars and two abutments that support the San Diego end of the San Diego-Coronado Bay bridge (Rosen & Fisher 2001: 94-5). Motivated by the Chicano Civil Rights Movement, these murals depict prominent moments in Mexican history including the Mexican colonial experience, revolutionary struggles, and other Mexican and Chicano cultural heroes and heroines (Cockroft & Barnet-Sanchez 1993). The murals actively promote Mexican political activism and work to reaffirm Mexican identity outside of
Mexico (Sheridan 2009: 212). Along with other politically charged murals that had sprung up in other barrio communities elsewhere in the United States, these images captured “silent sentiments and creative yearnings that were vivid and eye-catching, explosions of lights that vanquished the shadows while merging the past and the future with the present” (Rosen & Fisher 2001: 101). By and large, these murals “spoke to the ever-increasing social consciousness of the barrio and Chicano sensibilities and reflect issues and symbols that ranged from Aztec icons to the United Farm Workers’ black eagle, combining the Spanish and Indigenous heritage, a significant source of California’s history” (ibid). The murals that were painted in Chicano Park are telling of the experiences of Mexicans and Chicanos alike and have demonstrated the ability of the Barrio Logan community to come together to challenge the neglect of their barrio by turning the intruding infrastructure into a canvas, making it an integral part of the identity of Chicano Park and realizing the struggle for self-determination and self-empowerment of the immigrant community of the neighbourhood.

Ironically, despite the relatively recent history of Chicano Park, in 1997 it became eligible for the National Register under Criterion A at the local level of significance “due to its critical association with the Chicano Civil Rights Movement and events that made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of the City of San Diego’s political and social history” (Rosen & Fisher 2001: 96). More important for the purpose of this paper, however, is the fact that the creation of the park itself was also recognized as a major defining moment in the history and development of the Barrio Logan community (ibid). For this reason, after the 1989 earthquake when the California Department of Transportation was mandated by the then-Governor Pete Wilson to make the highway bridges of the state safer, community pressure ensured that the retrofitting project took into account the existence of Chicano Park.
as a site of monumental Hispanic mural art. While there was a substantial discussion regarding who would be responsible for maintaining and restoring the murals during the retrofitting process, the community lobbied for the protection of their cultural space. The California Department of Transportation agreed to protect the murals during the construction and to restore them to their previous state afterward (Fisher & Rosen 2001: 97). In the end, the California Department of Transportation even provided, with community input, a number of new facilities and amenities for the area including: “a new children’s playground, additional landscaping, new decorated walk-ways, benches, picnic tables, shade structures, barbeques, lighting, electrical outlets and irrigation systems” (ibid).

The effort by the Wilson administration to make the bridges in California seismically safe was not the only obstacle in the maintenance of Chicano Park over the years. In the late 1980s, the community attempted to have the barrio re-zoned to be strictly residential and this provoked a wide array of protests from neighbourhood junk dealers that serviced the adjacent upper-class Anglo communities (Fisher & Rosen 2001: 101). These protests included the defacing of murals via acts of vandalism (ibid). Eventually, the area was re-zoned as residential and the junk dealers were forced out of the area. Years later, in 2003, the community put forth plans to renovate the park and its facilities. The plan was stalled by the California Department of Transportation as they objected to the militant associations of the world ‘Aztlán’, which had been spelled out in rocks at the park for years. It was also argued that using federal funding for the project would violate Article VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by demonstrating preference to Mexicans and Mexican Americans (ibid). After significant consultations with the community and other experts, the Department of Transportation agreed that the word did not violate the law and the grant was able to go
through so that the renovations could be completed (Fisher & Rosen 2001: 102). While these are just examples of some of the challenges that the Barrio Logan residents have faced in maintaining Chicano Park, they provide insight into the small, but significant, attempts at dismantling the community that have arisen over time.

In many ways, the historical success of the Chicano Park movement has set the stage for the use of art in transforming such spaces, and has become an important example of how Mexican and Chicano communities in the U.S. have been able to communicate their visions with a wider audience, particularly those communities that have been geographically and politically isolated from mainstream society. For Mexican and Chicano communities in the U.S., border art and murals have had the ability to unravel power by portraying easily recognizable images and relationships. These murals also provide a forum that is both open to interpretation, but also works to demystify and empower the viewer to understand the reality of this particular immigrant community, or at least some portions of it. In this way, Chicano Park has become an important example of how Mexican-American communities have been able to assert their identity through securing social and cultural spaces.

Estudio Teddy Cruz: Building Stronger Border Communities

As one final example of how communities have used public space to challenge the political status quo within the borderlands, this chapter will now turn to the work of Estudio Teddy Cruz. Calling himself an ‘urban curator’, Teddy Cruz has worked alongside communities at the U.S.-Mexico border in an effort to design public spaces that facilitate dialogue and empowerment, particularly within marginalized immigrant communities. According to Cruz, traditional urban planning often mirrors dominant cultural policy and
consequently reinstates cultural hegemony by ignoring any deviation from the status quo (Cruz 2008). Specifically, Cruz argues that:

The centralization of unchecked and unchallenged police power in Washington, D.C. has made Homeland Security the new national planning department and the PATRIOT Act its social and environmental blueprint, making many disenfranchised inner-city neighborhoods across the United States a renewed focus of police repression and disinvestment, and transforming the 11 million illegal laborers who live in them into criminals. (Cruz 2008: 115)

In his work, Cruz has attempted to balance this problem through a re-mapping of the borderland space, which takes into account not only official urban structures, but also the extensive illicit practices of local residents. In his own words, he is interested in “radicalizing the local” and the “forces and informal dynamics that transgress the barrier” (Cruz as quoted in Dilworth 2006). In fact, what is most interesting about Cruz’s work is that he has been looking at “barrios, nomadic settlements, and informal architecture in Tijuana, and taking things he has learned from these “case studies” and turning them into a template for people in the north to use in rethinking development strategies” (Cruz in conversation with Waldorf 2008). More importantly, Cruz argues that, “We should be turning our attention away from the wall and towards the landscape, the ecology, and the communities” (Cruz as quoted in Dilworth 2006).

Established in 1993, Estudio Teddy Cruz is mainly inspired by the border between San Diego, California and Tijuana, Mexico. In fact, this environment has led Cruz to pose tough questions regarding the role artists and architects can play as producers of new interactions between physical space, communities, and their identities. The work of Teddy Cruz, according to his firm’s website, seeks to outline how “the perennial alliance between militarization and urbanization is reenacted at the San Diego / Tijuana border and later reproduced in many US neighborhoods, as the expansion of a social legislation of fear is
transforming the 11 million illegal laborers who mostly live there into criminal suspects. What are the implications of these forces of control on one hand and of non-conformity on the other in the reshaping of the American City?” (American Architects 2010). Cruz works toward building strong, efficient communities within the context of these complex trans-border urban dynamics, “using this territory of conflict as a backdrop to critically observe the clash between current top-down discriminating forms of urban economic re-development and planning legislature (as expressed through dramatic forms of unchecked eminent domain policies supporting privatization and NIMBYism), on one hand, and the emerging American neighborhoods nationwide made of immigrants, on the other, whose bottom-up spatial tactics of encroachment thrive on informality and alternative social organizational practices” (ibid). By the term ‘encroachment, Cruz is referring to the construction of purportedly transient spaces out of found material, which then become permanent fixtures in the urban landscape (Cruz 2008: 118-119). Here, Cruz seems to be inspired by the inventive everyday practices found in situations of crisis.

In fact, the bulk of Cruz’s original work is centered in Tijuana, where he first became familiar with the socio-economic reality that has forced many people living in colonias or barrios to adjust to the challenges of their environment in new and creative ways. Ranging from building shacks out of old tires and factory debris to the exuberant statue of La Mona (the Doll), which doubles as a five-storey building that has been constructed entirely out of collected refuse, with her fist raised triumphantly in the air (Davis 1996: 33), Tijuana has become home to what Uliss Diaz and Gustavo LeClerc term as “insurgent urbanism”, a method of coping with one’s spatial limitations, but resisting them through the creation of ‘home-made’ architecture (Davis 1996: 9). In places where insurgent urbanism emerges there
is often no city infrastructure or zoning and individuals build their homes out of whatever resources they have available, including tires and chicken wire (Diaz & LeClerc 1999: 39).

As Mike Davis explains, the power of insurgent urbanism is that it is:

Antipodal to the monolithic utopias…where the city is the outcome of a single magisterial vision. In the Do-It-Yourself City, bricolage supplants master planning, and urban design becomes a kind of *art brut*, generated by populist building practices. If only by default, the masses become the city’s true auteurs, and architecture is not so much transcended as retranslated through its dynamic vernacular context. (Davis 1996: 35)

It is this creative, civic energy that Cruz seeks to utilize in his own design project which, within the context of the border, has immense potential as the border has increasingly become “a superb stage for subversive practices of all kinds” (LeClerc as quoted in Davis 1996: 36). One of his most revered design projects to date has been in the San Ysidro community and was completed in conjunction with the Casa Familiar Community Center, a grassroots community organization. The project, entitled ‘Living Rooms at the Border’, involved the design and construction of a community centre facility in San Ysidro from 2002 to 2005. San Ysidro itself was once an independent town, until 1956 when it was amalgamated with the City of San Diego. Thus, the project being undertaken by Casa Familiar and Cruz is situated within a complex terrain, marking the halfway point between San Diego proper and Tijuana. Partially due to its demographics and its geographic location, San Ysidro has a population of approximately 27,000, a growth rate of six percent per annum, and has an overwhelming composition of minority populations, with Hispanics accounting for 89 per cent of the total (Census 2000). Census data also indicates that the median household income is $22,760, with two-thirds of the housing stock being multi-family (ibid). Nearly 35 per cent of San Diego’s subsidized housing is located in San Ysidro and nearly 82 per cent of the San Ysidro School District’s students are classified as having
low socio-economic status (ibid). All of these are signs of the challenges that San Ysidro faces; however, the spatial segregation from the wealthier urban areas of San Diego exacerbates its existence as a poor community.

As the active segregation of blue-collar Chicano or new immigrant communities from the physically contiguous upper-income Anglo communities continues to be reinforced by both architectural and juridical barriers, it is important to ensure that these communities have the capacity to form their own voice through staking claim over a particular space - even if it means recognizing unorthodox forms of participation, including the spatial negotiation of hegemonic and illicit urban structures. For Cruz, the strength of San Ysidro’s tactics of encroachment lies in the negotiation of boundaries and sharing of resources that emerge from the nexus between formal and social planning practices (Waldorf 2008).

As the work of Teddy Cruz suggests, collaborating with a grassroots organization from the community to build housing and communal space is demonstrative of a community’s political agency. The ‘Living Rooms at the Border’ project emphasized the creative, hybrid spatial elements possible within the community of San Ysidro. Working with the local, non-profit organization, Casa Familiar, Cruz was able to transform the site of an old church into a multi-level, high-density, community and affordable housing space, while maintaining the back alley as a pedestrian pathway replete with green space. The design presented by Cruz consists of the development of gardens and alley pathways that are connected by a promenade, and the traditional Mexican plaza in the center, which is meant to be the focus of public life (Dilworth 2006). There is also a senior center’s food counter, which will be built into the front façade, which will allow seniors living in the affordable housing units to sell food to locals to earn extra income. In addition, there will be a children’s

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6 This is compared to 45% in the county and 29% nationally.
center that caters to the many children who are being cared for by their grandparents. This overhaul of space within a marginalized community would provide a forum for individuals to come together to discuss their issues, learn skills, and thrive as part of a vibrant community. Incorporating a number of the elements from Mexican planning schemes, as well as from the pre-existing community, Cruz was able to wedge taco stands and tiendas (small stores) on the bottom level of Casa Familiar, while also leaving a large walk-way that could double as an open space to hold a market whenever the community desired.

The design of the new Casa Familiar Community Center provides a symbol of hope for communities in the borderlands, who face their own internal borders, where spaces for cultural negotiation and agency at a civic level can be achieved through an artistic innovation of design practices. Through this endeavour, it is clear that Cruz and Casa Familiar were able to see beyond the negative conceptions of poverty and the perceived lack of agency that are often associated with immigrant communities and extract a narrative of spatial hybridity and porousness forged through intercultural exchange and the struggle between hegemonic and illicit cultural practice. Essentially, by remapping the borderlands between the U.S. and Mexico as a living space of exchange and plurality, the project that Cruz and Casa Familiar have embarked upon is emblematic of the struggle for social and cultural space that many immigrant communities are faced with. In fact, this project is indicative of a new way of overcoming the divisive attributes of the border – one that suggests that the border can no longer be simply defined through the infrastructure of national defense, but instead through artistic and cultural re-imaginings of the border.

The approach used by Cruz in reinventing the space of the border illustrates the way in which communities can collaborate with organizations, architects and urban planners to
challenge the hegemonic discourses of power that have presented themselves within the borderlands. Through the ‘Living Rooms at the Border’ project the community of San Ysidro has found an innovative way to meet their immediate needs, while creating a space where alternative practices of citizenship can take place. This project challenges the stark social, economic, and political divisions that exist between the predominantly Mexican-American immigrant community that lives in San Ysidro and the adjacent upper class, Anglo neighbourhoods. Cruz has created a space that has the potential to provide an alternative space to those that the growing Latino community has been fenced out of as part of the construction of the third border.

Re-Imagining Friendship at the Border

The conditions and discrepancies that surround and contribute to the challenges facing the U.S.-Mexico border have sparked numerous reactions from varying groups and institutions in the border region. Today, it seems that the state of the border and the methods for resolving its numerous problems have become more progressive in that a myriad of organizations and communities have taken a stake in these development projects. As these three examples have demonstrated, the border today is one where the fusion of cultures takes place and where diversity has become the norm. Accordingly, architect Fernando Romero argues in his book entitled Hyper-border: The Contemporary U.S-Mexico Border and its Future, that only when the adversity of the border is accepted will there be a welcome environment for its evolution (2009: 277). In each example cited in this chapter, those advocating for change acknowledge the difficulties associated with implementing these projects of transformation along the border. For example, in the case of Friendship Park, James Brown has developed a proposal that provides a compromise between the demands of the
San Diego Border Patrol to seal the area and the community groups who frequent the space for numerous reasons. The example of Chicano Park indicates that while the process of construction of the San Diego-Coronado Bay Bridge disrupted the physical space of Barrio Logan, the community came together to challenge the actions of the municipal and state governments and retained a space that has become increasingly important to their community’s identity. Finally, the example of the ‘Living Rooms at the Border’ project designed by Estudio Teddy Cruz suggests that we must be able to acknowledge and also utilize the adversity that is present in border communities to establish functional solutions to the challenges these communities face. Each one of these examples demonstrates a significant transformation of space in San Diego and, in some ways, indicates the ability of immigrant communities to challenge borders and bordering practices wherever they exist. These examples represent the wide array of cultural agency that border communities along the San Diego/Tijuana divide have used in order to break down boundaries through projects of dialogic engagement and socio-political empowerment. Where Cruz is presenting a series of hybrid architectural structures and the Chicano Park Steering Committee have laid claim to a hidden park under the overpass leading to the busiest border crossing in the world, each of these projects are focused on meeting the needs of their own respective border communities.

It should be noted that the interactions taking place within these barrios and/or communities have effects that reverberate outwards and affect neighboring communities on both sides of the border. In fact, the examples of Chicano Park and the “Living Rooms at the Border” projects can be used to strengthen the case for securing the space of Friendship Park. The struggle against existing power structures demonstrates the capacity of communities to
preserve a cultural and social space that is important to the values and heritage of Chicano, Mexican or immigrant communities in the United States. Each one of these struggles for space along the border and in response to bordering practices in communities are important for arriving at a more comprehensive understanding of the struggle for power taking place within these communities. More importantly, they make immigrant communities visible in political discussions. They have helped to transform the concept of the border by creating openings in the political structure of the state where their voices can be heard. These movements are about self-determination, resistance and claiming the social and cultural space for their respective communities. More importantly, through constructing their narratives of community mobilization they have, both directly and indirectly, created spaces of transformation at the U.S.-Mexico border.
Chapter 6: Reviewing the Three Border Model

Introduction

This thesis demonstrates that the U.S.-Mexico border serves as an important crossroads for politics at the federal, state, and local level in the United States. The initial chapters of this thesis set out to identify some of the different theoretical approaches used to understand state borders today. As discussed in Chapter 2, realist theories often understand the border as a manifestation of centralized power of the federal or state government exercised through formal domains such as laws, policies, and institutions. As I have illustrated across this thesis, and in particular in Chapter 3, this conceptualization of power is still relevant today for understanding the political narratives behind the creation, maintenance and fortification of borders. In fact, the constant move of political leaders to fortify state boundaries with steel barriers, armed border patrol agents, and high-tech surveillance equipment indicates that the national border is still an important site for the state exercise of power. While these fortifications have not limited access to the United States, they have served to make the border more difficult to cross in a way that creates greater vulnerabilities for migrants seeking entry. In this way, the border still functions as a mechanism of state security that has very real consequences for immigrant communities both at the border and within the interior of the United States.

At the same time, as the review of the existing literature on borders has indicated, poststructuralist approaches to the border emphasize that borders are social and political constructs, and not just natural demarcations. Foucault’s understanding of power has become particularly informative at destabilizing realist notions of state power, through his suggestion that power is exercised from within the social body, rather than simply from the state level.
This conceptualization of power has allowed scholars working with the concept of the border to move beyond the state-based, totalizing framework that is central to the realist approach to understanding the border. A poststructuralist approach has allowed scholars to incorporate a more nuanced way of thinking about the border and bordering processes, including the acknowledgement that the border exists at various sites and scales both at the territorial divide and within various communities. By incorporating and expanding upon these approaches, the Three Border Model offers a way to rethink the role of the state and the concept of power in relation to the U.S.-Mexico border.

While the original application of the Three Border Model has been upheld within this thesis, it has been necessary to expand our understanding of the border beyond the material manifestations that were laid out by Davis and Moctezuma in their preliminary formulation of the model. By opening up the model to include an analysis of the complex social and cultural processes that play a role in shaping borders, this thesis engages with the border in a more comprehensive manner than the initial rendering of the Three Border Model allows. To evaluate the efficacy of this model, the rest of this chapter will be divided into four key sections. The first section will review the ways in which the Three Border Model has been used and expanded upon within this thesis project. The second section will be dedicated to identifying some of the advantages of using the Three Border Model as a tool of analysis. The third section will introduce some of the concerns about the model with attention to the ways that this thesis has elaborated upon its original exposition. Finally, the last section of this chapter outlines some possible trajectories for future research projects related to the study of borders.
**Expanding the Three Border Model**

The Three Border Model developed by Mike Davis and Alessandra Moctezuma in 1999 provides an effective mechanism for examining three different layers of the U.S.-Mexico border. The goal of this thesis, however, has been both to use the original iterations of the Three Border Model and to further develop the conceptual layers of the border through the application of various studies from the U.S.-Mexico border. In so doing, it has been possible to rethink the role of the state and the concept of power in relation to the shared border between the United States and Mexico.

As explicated by Davis and Moctezuma, the first border refers to the physical dividing line that was first established by the two states after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1848. While this iteration of the first border focuses primarily on the role that the state plays in constructing the geopolitical boundary, in Chapter 3 my thesis has also sought to address the ways that the state has instituted its power to ‘harden’ the border. While this part of the analysis focused on the role of the federal government in fortifying the border through the construction of a steel fence and the deployment of additional security personnel at the border, there is also a need to recognize the non-material bordering practices that began to take shape after 9/11. For instance, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 was the beginning of a series of aggressive and exclusionary laws that were implemented by the American government in order to ‘harden’ the physical border by describing who is to be included and excluded from the space of the state. While examples like the USA PATRIOT Act do not provide a comprehensive understanding of how the border has been constructed by the state, they illustrate the ways that the American government continually exerts its power over both citizens and non-citizens and plays a role in constructing the territorial border through non-territorial means.
According to Davis and Moctezuma, the second border is primarily manifest in the physical bordering practices and procedures that exist within the interior of the United States. These include the construction of checkpoints and detention facilities that have been created to directly target undocumented immigrants. While the second border is primarily located within the United States, it is important for the analysis of the U.S.-Mexico border as it has implications for both the undocumented and documented immigrant population. I have expanded the analysis of the second border, however, to include an examination of the exclusionary legislation passed by the Arizona State Legislature since 2004. This analysis still highlights the important role that the government plays in defining inclusion and exclusion within state borders, yet it also acknowledges the power that individual state governments can wield in maintaining the international border and enforcing borders within local communities. The discussion of the Minuteman Project (MMP) extends this analysis still further because it demonstrates the exertion of power by a number of actors at different sites and scales. As non-state actors, the MMP have indicated their ability to both work alongside and exceed the state’s power in instituting their own bordering practices at the first, second and third borders simultaneously. Chapter 4 therefore addresses the interiorization of border practices away from the border, but also considers the diffusion of power away from the federal state into the hands of local state and non-actors actors.

The third border in the model proposed by Davis and Moctezuma focuses on the architectural and juridical boundaries erected by communities between upper-class Anglo communities and their blue-collared immigrant neighbours. The examples cited by Davis and Moctezuma illustrate that local actors, both official and unofficial, have the power and ability to establish physical boundaries between adjacent communities. While these boundary-creating
processes are still an important part of the analysis provided in Chapter 5 of this thesis, I have also included an examination of the ways that immigrant communities have challenged the manifestations of the border that have been erected within their communities. Within this chapter, the resistance to existing power arrangements becomes an important theme. This resistance, while often visible at the local level, often responds to the issues presented by the first and second borders. For instance, the ongoing struggle by the Friends of Friendship Park and other like-minded organizations to keep Friendship Park open to the public indicates that even local struggles are deeply connected to the first and second layers of the border and vice versa. In this way, it is critical to note that while the federal government continues to play an integral role in shaping the U.S.-Mexico border, it is not the only actor that is able to do so. In fact, power has become increasingly diffuse and has permeated various levels of the border and has been and continues to be exerted by a myriad of actors both to reinforce and to contest the hardening of the US-Mexico border.

**Advantages of Using the Three Border Model**

The case studies discussed within this thesis demonstrate that the border cannot simply be examined at the level of the federal state, but is constantly produced and reproduced by actors at a variety of sites and scales. As such, it is necessary to understand the border as more than just a geopolitical line in the sand, as the traditional IR literature would suggest, but as increasingly pervasive across the state. The Three Border Model provides a conceptual framework that foregrounds the multiple layers that comprise the border, and highlights the multiplicity of sites and scales where the border and its processes can be found. Simply, the model indicates that only looking only at the physical border is problematic because as Jennifer Hyndman reminds us, “While the state remains a vital subject of interrogation in relation to security, it obscures
fear and violence at other scales, beyond its purview” (2004: 308). Therefore, the Three Border Model does not dismiss realist examinations of the border, but opens up border analysis to poststructuralist critiques that employ more expansive conceptions of power. Poststructuralist analyses of the border tend to focus on how the border has been operationalized in daily life through the creation of states of exception that primarily target immigrant communities in the United States. Given that the Latino population is the largest minority population, they are often faced with the brunt of the bordering practices, whether as victims of racial profiling or when they are literally fenced out of the territory of the state. The Three Border Model thus opens a space for considering the ways that fear and violence are perpetuated as the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within the United States are fortified, and the border continues to “draw firm and uncompromising lines between who belongs and who does not, who is deemed to be part of ‘us’ and who is not, who is worthy of rights, opportunities and human dignity and who is not” (Doty 2009: 104).

While the American government has continued to militarize the U.S.-Mexico border, it has also played a significant role in expanding the border into the everyday lives of Latino immigrants, regardless of their status, throughout the country. This expansion is executed through the introduction of a series of aggressive laws that serve to dehumanize the process of immigration entirely and further marginalize an already vulnerable population. In many ways, these constructions of power have been formulated and implemented by a wide variety of actors that include, but also exceed, the federal government. At the individual state level, the case study of Arizona provides a perfect example of how the power structures associated with the border have become increasingly diffuse. For instance, the propositions introduced in Arizona between 2004 and 2006 that aim to withhold rights from immigrant communities within their
jurisdiction serve as a clear example of state power. With the passage of SB 1070, the state of Arizona attempted to take immigration enforcement policies to a new level by forcing local authorities to check the immigration status of individuals during their routine procedures. As argued in Chapter 4, this creates a state of exception where power is no longer regulated by formal checks and balances, but is arbitrary and subject to the whims of the individual officers or public service representatives.

The execution of power at the state level, however, is only one side of the story. At the same time, there has been an increase in vigilante activity in the state of Arizona (as well as other states) since 2005. Vigilante groups such as the MMP are working to reinforce the physical divide between Americans and Mexicans with exclusionary narratives of the self and other. While not officially state sanctioned, there have been only minimal attempts by the state to halt their activities, which conveniently buttress the rhetoric of the American government and the public discourse surrounding the fortification of the border. The role of the MMP as a non-state actor is particularly important to recognize as it suggests that the power of reifying borders and bordering practices is no longer simply manifest in the federal state, but has become increasingly visible at various sites and scales throughout the state. The Three Border Model highlights this array of border enforcement measures insofar as they expand bordering processes away from the physical frontier.

In this way, the Three Border Model provides a conceptual approach suited to the complexity of sites and scales that constitute the border, even if it does not provide a comprehensive overview of their entirety or suggest conclusive policy recommendations. For example, the immigration enforcement procedures being implemented within local communities cannot be thoroughly interrogated without looking at the ways that the official boundary has
been fortified in recent years. At the same time, the various sites and scales at which the border operates must be seen as overlapping. For example, the decision by the federal government to construct a triple-layer fence across the U.S-Mexico divide has required that local authorities prohibit public access to Friendship Park, which has been a longstanding meeting ground for family and friends who have been separated for numerous reasons. As such, the Three Border Model provides a multi-scalar approach to the border wherein the three layers of the border can be seen as deeply interconnected and, in many ways, serve to reinforce one another. This innovation overcomes a common scholarly shortcoming of traditional border studies that focus on only one layer or aspect of the border at a given time.

**Concerns with the Three Border Model**

One of my initial concerns with using the Three Border Model as a tool for analysis was that it implies a hierarchical organization of scale that can be too simplistically mapped onto federal, state and municipal scales. The division of the border into these three neatly packaged, distinct layers is problematic because there is a danger that scholars will only emphasize the differences between them, rather than trying to show how they are iterative. The structure of the model makes it easier to look at each scale of the border individually, rather than conducting studies that examine each of the scales thematically. In fact, within this thesis, I have reproduced this hierarchical organization of scale through the development of each one of the three borders in separate chapters. Within the field of geography, there has been substantial debate regarding the relevance of studying scale. According to Arturo Escobar, conventional approaches to understanding scale have often been reductive in terms of two levels (the micro and the macro), or have modeled a nested series of levels, as symbolized by the proverbial Russian doll (2006: 107). For Escobar, however, alternative bottom-up approaches show “how,
at each scale, the properties of the whole emerge from the interactions between parts, bearing in mind that the more simple entities are themselves assemblages of sorts. Moreover, through their participation in networks, elements (such as individuals) can become components of various assemblages operating at different levels” (2006: 108). In this way, Escobar argues that it is necessary to understand each layer of the border as being connected to the others.

While this thesis retains a scalar analysis, I have attempted to move away from a hierarchical understanding of scale towards a conception of the scales of analysis as mutually reinforcing. For instance, in Chapters 3 and 4 I have indicated that the physical border is reinforced by the bordering processes that take place in communities that are far removed from the territorial boundary. In Chapter 5, the discussion of the material barriers shows how the divisions that have been set out at the international boundary have influenced social, political, and economic relations between immigrant communities and their upper class, Anglo neighbours. There are various actors who are constantly trying to challenge the state perceptions of the border. For instance, the case studies of Friendship Park, Chicano Park, and the Living Room at the Borders project in Chapter 5 of this thesis constitute attempts to redefine scale and scalar assumptions in a way that encourages a fluidity and openness that many scholars have deemed a necessary component of scalar thinking. Thus, as Susan Mains has argued, scale can be used as a “mode of understanding the world – rather than simply functioning as an ontological category or as a fundamental structure of the way we experience place” (2002: 201). Scale cannot be considered a universal concept but must be viewed as a “discursive construction of space that is constantly being negotiated and contested at different moments and in various ways” (Mains 2002: 202). By drawing upon a scalar analysis, multiple perspectives on the border can be brought clearly into view.
More importantly, it is necessary to think about the ways in which the national discourse of anti-immigration policy has been constructed and what implications this may have on the daily life and interactions of local and individual practices. Mains also argues that, “immigration policy is thoroughly embedded in (and reinforced by) local and individual practices” (2002: 209). This is illustrated by the practices through which power has become internalized through organizations like the Minutemen Project and the Border Patrol agents. The meshing of these different sites and scales is an important aspect of the Three Border Model because it is critical to understand that the first border does not exist separately from the second and the third, and that the second border does not exist without the maintenance of the first and the third border, and so on. The Three Border Model, in many ways, serves to create a more comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the border, by providing a framework through which it is possible to engage with the different layers of the border simultaneously and examine relationally the “processes that are made powerful by the existence of borders, or that appear to exist beyond borders” (Hyndman 2004: 310). Thus, representations of the border as a scalar function of contemporary global politics are not simply about depicting identities and power arrangements as they already exist, but they are about understanding how identities are reinforced, challenged, and produced in the shadow of the physical border (Mains 2002: 209).

Some geographers, however, have begun to advocate for an elimination of the concept of scale from geography altogether (Marston et al. 2005, 2007). These scholars suggest that we need another approach to understanding scale that does not affirm hierarchies but instead works to capture the complexity of the socio-territorial configurations that we encounter on a frequent basis. This means developing hybrid models that integrate vertical and horizontal understandings of socio-spatial processes (Marston et al. 419). This would require adopting an
alternative ‘flat’ ontology that “discards the essentialism that infuses not only the up-down vertical imaginary but also the radiating (out from here) spatiality of horizontality” (Marston et al. 2005: 422). In the breakdown of their model for a flat ontology, these scholars have indicated that there is a need to challenge the hierarchical and rigidity of many scalar models. In fact, Marston et al. argue that contemporary scholars must pay close “attention to differential relations that constitute the driving forces of material composition and that problematize the ever-present axiomatic tendencies to stratify and classify geographic objects” (2005: 423).

As the Three Border Model still focuses on the rigidity of scale, it is important to underscore the implications of this way of thinking about the border. The model provides a particular way of examining the different sites and scales of the border, specifically one that continues to rely on tendencies to stratify and classify borders as geographic objects. While the Three Border Model itself privileges a hierarchical version of scale, the conversation that is taking place between different layers of the border is important to highlight. It is clear that Davis and Moctezuma recognized the differential relations between the different layers of the border, even though the Three Border Model does not respond adequately to the concerns raised by Marston et al. in their work as it continues to stratify and classify the different scales of the border. In fact, the way that the three borders can be neatly mapped onto federal, state and municipal jurisdiction is itself problematic. In their original presentation of the Three Border Model, Davis and Moctezuma allude to the idea that the three borders they discuss are interrelated, but do little to expand this discussion into a framework that would meaningfully address the ‘flat’ ontology approach of Marston et al. As such, the Three Border Model suggests both the structure and flexibility of scale, but without carefully charting these dynamics.
Another concern with the Three Border Model is that the discussions of the border and bordering practices are contained with the specific parameters outlined by Davis and Moctezuma. This is problematic because it is necessary to recognize other scales of bordering that might also be analyzed. For example, it is important to consider what a forth or fifth layer of the border might look like. As Joseph Nevins has shown in his work on the U.S.-Mexico border, another important layer of analysis at the U.S.-Mexico border would require looking at the economic and political ties, such as free trade, that have been formulated by the American and Mexican governments since 1994. While the border has become open to free trade, the American government has worked to continue fortifying the physical border to thwart the movement of undocumented migrants into the U.S. At the same time, it is necessary to examine the dynamics of the labour market that entice Mexicans to cross the border in search of employment, including those policies that allow for a steady supply of migrant labour to remain possible in those economic sectors most in need of workers who will accept low paying jobs (Tichenor 2002). By examining the growing economic inequalities both within and between the U.S. and Mexico, the increasing flows of labour and products across the national border, and the growth of informal economies and organized criminal networks, other important layers of the border will be revealed for examination. More critically, it is necessary to determine whether or not we are able to quantify the border and its layers in the way that Davis and Moctezuma propose. For instance, while there are other lines of inquiry that must be examined in relation to the border, there are some that cannot be placed within the specific layers of the border that Davis and Moctezuma outline because the processes that create them are messy, diffuse, and cannot be contained within specific parameters.
In fact, another disadvantage to this approach to understanding the border is that it becomes difficult to explore the more thematic issues that are very much a part of the bordering process. For instance, questions of race, class, and gender were implicit to but not foregrounded in the original articulation of the Three Border Model. While the space constraints of this thesis made it difficult to focus on all of these omissions, further studies should be dedicated to looking at how issues like gender, race, and class are presented across the three layers of the border. The Three Border Model provides a framework in which to explore, or at least recognize, the fact that issues of gender, race, and class have been produced and reinforced by the way that the border has been treated within national and local discourses. As such, this model proves useful for geographers because it reminds us to be aware of the confluence between the physical border and the social, political, and economic processes that create and reinforce its existence.

By removing the centrality of the state from the analysis of the border, the model underscores the idea that power is diffuse and can be enforced by a multiplicity of actors. This is significant to the study of borders as it emphasizes the need to look at the various processes and actors that play a role in constructing the borders, some of which are no longer formally attached to the state, nor regulated by its institutional checks and balances. In fact, as Davis and Moctezuma have identified with their description of the third border, the physical border is no longer attached to a particular geographic space but instead has become attached to particular practices and communities.

In its original form, the Three Border Model was focused primarily on the material manifestations of the border in the U.S.-Mexico context. For instance, the first border was considered to be the physical fortification of the border through the erection of a steel fence and the deployment of additional border patrol agents and military personnel to the border (Davis &
The second border was considered to be the checkpoints, detention facilities, and the increase in surveillance technology that was implemented within the immediate vicinity of the border, although not directly at the border (ibid). The third border was primarily viewed as being the physical barriers that prohibited Latino communities from accessing public or recreational space within the state of California (Davis & Moctezuma 1999: 35-6). The reliance on the material manifestations of the border is problematic because the social, economic, political and cultural processes that support it are not always visible to the naked eye. In fact, Foucault argues that power is often internalized and does not manifest itself in material objects. Similarly, Joel Migdal’s understanding of the actual and virtual checkpoints and mental maps that groups use to separate one space from another also reinforces the idea that borders and bordering practices exist largely outside of their material or territorial manifestations. In fact, Migdal suggests that one of the most prominent aspects of the bordering process is constructed and maintained through people’s mental maps which serve to “divide home from alien territory, the included from the excluded, and the familiar from the other” (Migdal 2004: 7). While I have sought to include these more symbolic forms of bordering in this thesis, doing so has required extending the Three Border Model in ways that it does not make explicit. The model is flexible enough to accommodate these other issues, but in its original form it still privileges material manifestations of power.

A final critique that can be directed at the original conception of the Three Border Model is that it does not acknowledge the existence of resistance to the existing structures of power or the material manifestations of the border. Through their model, Davis and Moctezuma have indicated that barriers are often constructed between adjacent communities and prohibit Latino communities from accessing particular spaces (1994: 34). In my analysis of the border, I have
pointed to some instances where communities are challenging existing power structures and the barriers that they face. As demonstrated through the case studies of the Chicano Park movement, Estudio Teddy Cruz’s ‘Living Rooms at the Borders’ project, as well as the ongoing struggle to retain the space of Friendship Park, these communities have mobilized to make important claims to cultural and physical space. Each one of these projects has faced adversity. However, they have continued to create a platform for the communities who are so often denied rights, citizenship, and space on the basis of their identity so that they are able to have a voice and to contest the boundaries of inclusion on the ground. Ultimately, the application of the Three Border Model has highlighted how the act of bordering is a violent process regardless of which actors are instigating it or where it is being implemented. The analysis pursued in this thesis is primarily about the web of institutions and practices that are produced by and produce this violence, as well as how salient these coercive transformations have become in both physical and mental landscapes in the context of the United States. At the same time, spatial arrangements have been used throughout history as a tool of power and control, but also of resistance. In this respect, the expansion of the Three Border Model to encompass resistance to the material manifestations of power and control as an equally important border dynamic demonstrates that the model can accommodate even broader border phenomena than Davis and Moctezuma initially considered.

**Directions for future research**

The use of the Three Border Model in this thesis is aimed at not only expanding the pre-existing model of analysis, but also at opening up questions of how we might move beyond a strictly regimented schema of border analysis. Through their work, Davis and Moctezuma suggest that we can no longer think about the border as simply a territorial entity, and they
provide a framework for scholars to use to grasp the multiple sites and scales at which the border has become manifest. While the goal of this thesis has been to expand the original Three Border Model into a more nuanced approach to understanding borders today, this thesis has raised an additional set of questions that future studies could explore.

Future studies might turn to examine how and whether the Three Border Model is applicable at other international borders. Both the original version of the Three Border Model and my expansion of the model have focused solely on the U.S.-Mexico border. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the U.S.-Mexico border and another state border would be beneficial in identifying some of the commonalities and differences that are present in borders and their associated processes within different contexts. At the same time, it might be beneficial to further develop the Three Border Model within the U.S.-Mexico context prior to applying it elsewhere. For example, it would help to examine the explicit connection between the three layers of the border, not just through the physical manifestations of the border, but also through a specific thematic lens. These thematic approaches might include looking at questions of gender, race, and/or class and how each one of these issues plays out differently within each of the three layers. Additionally, it may be beneficial to expand the site of analysis beyond just looking at the U.S.-Mexico border solely from an American perspective and attempt to theorize how the three borders might affect individuals and communities on the other side of the international boundary.

Another future research trajectory could give more attention to the community-based projects that are happening in response to the juridical and architectural barriers that have been erected between adjacent communities within the borderlands. In this way, scholars could get a better understanding of how these community projects have been able to transform pockets of
space along the border by challenging existing structures of power. For instance, in this thesis I briefly examined the struggles of immigrant communities to maintain the spaces of Friendship Park and Chicano Park. Future research might include documenting these movements more closely, including conducting on-the-ground research that provides a more comprehensive understanding of the power and bordering dynamics that take place within communities. This is particularly important because the people who inhabit the borderlands are seldom consulted and, instead, the border becomes a “symbol for politicians to grandstand over drugs, undocumented migration, and homeland security and bears little resemblance to the way in which the border is perceived by its residents” (Nicol 2007: 128). Therefore, the significance of this line of future research is that it illustrates moments of transformation at the border, where those communities who have been marginalized or segregated from mainstream society have developed a range of community-building exercises that are able to deepen both their individual and collective experiences and build a sense of solidarity and belonging within a broader context. The application of the Three Border Model to this type of research would allow for a more nuanced understanding of the border and its various manifestations at the community level.

**Conclusion**

By examining case studies at different sites and scales along the U.S.-Mexico border, the purpose of this thesis is to challenge traditional conceptions of state power at the border. As the various case studies have demonstrated, power has become diffuse, exercised in multiple forms by a wide array of actors operating throughout the United States. The Three Border Model encompasses traditional understandings of the border as a physical demarcation while simultaneously incorporating social processes of inclusion and exclusion that extend the border
into daily life throughout the country. In an era where the border is increasingly pervasive, this thesis underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of the border by applying and expanding the Three Border Model to a sampling of the complex power relations that comprise the U.S.-Mexico border. Even more fundamentally, this inquiry demonstrates the importance of the framework we apply to the border in rendering power and either visible or invisible. By exposing the power dynamics overlooked by traditional realist approaches, the Three Border Model does not reify the border but instead sheds light on the multiple dynamics of enforcement, contestation and negotiation – ultimately highlighting the potential for change and transformation that is too easily obscured by steel and concrete.
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