THE MYTH OF OLYMPIC UNITY:
THE DILEMMA OF DIVERSITY, OLYMPIC OPPRESSION,
AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

by

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The dilemma of diversity is the tension that exists when prescriptive claims are required across reasonable pluralism. Scholar and philosopher Dwight Boyd believes that the dilemma of diversity must be addressed for the continued health of multicultural societies, and suggests that the solution can be found through democratic reciprocity. Though the International Olympic Committee (IOC) markets unity and peace through its Olympic Games, does the Olympics relieve the dilemma of diversity? By critically examining the IOC’s historic and recent treatment of Aboriginals, its encouragement of divisive nationalism, and its educational programs, it is clear that the IOC does not embrace reasonable pluralism. The IOC’s public pedagogy is one that conceals its dominance through diversity. In exposing this dominance, I will argue that the IOC must embrace democratic reciprocity that allows for conversation across difference. Adopting an authentic acceptance of difference will alleviate the IOC’s propagation of Western ideology through neo-imperialism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

When I listen carefully to my coworkers each morning, I am surprised, and frequently offended, by what I hear. Reflecting on my relationship with them, I wonder: “How can my opinions, beliefs, and way of seeing the world be so different from others?”

My coworkers, like myself, are white, middle-class, male, heterosexual, and able-bodied. If we have similar histories, how can we have such differing values? I am often left asking myself, “If I can’t find common ground with those who share a similar culture, how is it possible to find common ground across different cultures?” How can values differ so much that people are willing to fight in the stands of a hockey rink, drop bombs on civilians, ban cultural symbols, bully in the schoolyard, send people to concentration camps, and fly planes into buildings? Why is peace so difficult to achieve?

As I write this, Vancouver is hosting the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. International Olympic Committee (IOC) president, Jacques Rogge, states: “By throwing a bridge over continents, by standing above differences of race, social regime or political system, [the Olympic Movement] can bring hope and togetherness so often and so deeply torn apart” (IOC 2009). The Olympic Games declares itself to be an organization that promotes peace and brings togetherness to citizens throughout the world. While I struggle with my own questions of achieving peace and unification across difference, the IOC believes that it has found a solution. It is from this position of conflict, reflection, and questioning that I explore global diversity and the Olympic Games as a means of uniting across cultural difference.
Cultural theorist and critic Henry Giroux (2008) says that “the major sites of education lie outside of the schools and reside in the wider screen culture” (np). Giroux believes that much of education is done outside of the classroom in what he calls, public pedagogy. When he discusses a critical analysis of film, he believes that they “must be understood in terms of their political and educational character and how they align with broader social, racial, economic, class, and institutional configurations” (2008, np). What do viewers learn about society and culture when viewing a media image? Critical pedagogy examines the social, racial, economic, class, and institutional lessons that become the pedagogy of public pieces, events, and institutions.

The Olympics is a public pedagogy. An international mega sporting event that touches billions of global viewers organized by 205 member countries is a part of national and global culture. It is critical, therefore, that the IOC and its Olympics be examined from the position of its public pedagogy. What lessons do the Olympics teach? What are the social, racial, economic, class and institutional lessons that viewers, supporters, and athletes learn about through the Olympic Games and its television coverage?

After briefly considering Ontario’s mandate for Character Development and Boyd’s critique of the approaches to moral education, I begin an examination of the IOC’s belief in its unity through the Olympics. This examination will be framed by a critical consideration of the Olympics as public pedagogy. Using Boyd’s work on diversity and dominance, I will begin by exploring the IOC’s treatment and representation of Aboriginals. In order to show that the IOC does not respect diversity
and does not unite even within host nations, I will show the misrepresentation of Canadian Aboriginals at the Montreal 1976 Olympics, and the Aboriginal protest and their subsequent vilification during the Calgary 1988 Olympics. In a more recent example, I will explore the ways in which Aboriginal reconciliation became the theme of the Sydney 2000 Olympics. By examining the treatment and representation of Aboriginals in these three Olympics, I will show that the IOC misrepresents Aboriginals and uses them to further their own brand image. Though the IOC declares that it accepts difference and diversity, in the case of Aboriginals, it will become clear that there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. The IOC oppresses and appropriates Aboriginal culture under the guise of unity.

After exploring Aboriginals in previous Olympics and examining the critique of the IOC’s misrepresentation of Aboriginals, I will examine the Vancouver 2010 Games to show that the rhetoric-reality gap still exists between the IOC’s image and their actions towards Aboriginals. While, on the surface, it might appear that the IOC has made strides towards Aboriginal partnership and accurate representation by choosing an Inuit cultural artifact (an inukshuk) as the logo for the Vancouver 2010 Games, but this logo exemplifies the IOC’s misrepresentation and appropriation of Aboriginal culture. By investigating the development of the inukshuk as symbol, I will show that branding is the most valuable commodity for the IOC, and for Canada. This exploration will reveal that the IOC and Canada appropriate culture in order to appear to embrace diversity. These efforts to build acceptance of diversity into a brand has an effect of creating a monoculture and eliminating diversity.
After considering representations of Aboriginals, it will become clear that the IOC works to create an image of aboriginals which acts as pedagogy. The IOC unlike other organizations has a strong presence in the school system where its pedagogical role becomes all the more explicit. The hallways of schools are lined with projects and posters on the Olympic Games, sports and Olympians in the weeks leading up to the Olympics. Olympic Education programs are values education programs that primarily use Olympic stories to inspire and motivate students. The Educational programs are uncritical, unreflective, and provide propaganda to students rather than engaging them in issues. These programs are sponsored by corporations and promote corporate agendas. By closely examining the Vancouver 2010 educational materials, I will show that the programs not only support corporate interest, but that they are a character education program that promotes a value system that is created and defined by dominant Western ideology. The effect of this value system does not embrace diversity, but seeks to spread Western values throughout the globe.

As an international mega-event, the Olympics has an impact upon all nations. Though IOC rhetoric announces the power of the Olympic Games and Olympism to unite, I will show that the Games are divisive. Using sport historian John Hoberman’s concept of “sportive nationalism,” I will show how the Olympics works to build national identity and to promote and encourage international competition. The Olympics spreads Western ideology and capitalist dogma while acting as a tool of neo-colonization spreading Western values in oppressive and imperialistic ways. I will show the shortcomings of Olympism as Enlightenment internationalism and how this vision does
not embrace diversity and difference, but creates a monoculture. It is this singularity of vision that is the IOC as cultural institution creates as its public pedagogy.

After critiquing the IOC, its mantra of Olympism, and its Games, I will propose solutions that will eliminate some of these problems and work towards a more equitable world that reduces its rhetoric-reality gap and makes greater strides towards peace. By examining the failures of Olympic founder Pierre de Coubertin’s vision of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, I will show that the IOC’s goal of unification must be replaced with a vision that encourages difference and embraces diversity. Reengaging with Boyd and Young’s work, this vision gains from Boyd’s concept of democratic reciprocity as well as Young’s “politics of difference”. I believe that these concepts when applied to the IOC, Olympism, and Olympic Games will not only eliminate some of the problems of Nationalism, but will also encourage improved representation of marginalized groups in the true spirit of global peace.

The Dilemma of Diversity

Philosopher of education specializing in moral and character education, Dwight Boyd (1996), hopes that his article “Dominance Concealed Through Diversity” will “be read as a call for the dilemma [of diversity] to be taken as the moral/political crux that I believe it to be for the continued life and health of multicultural societies” (1996, 627). For Boyd, the dilemma of diversity must be addressed in order to multicultural societies, like Canada, to be home for all its citizens. His essay examines how the promise of diversity dominates and oppresses. His starting point is “the tension between accepting
the fact that cultural diversity constitutes an established aspect of contemporary
democratic society and accepting the requirement that prescriptive claims that are located
in the general public domain...must grip (at least most) members of that public, wherever
they are located within that diversity, if the claims are to have legitimacy” (1996, 611).
He calls this the “dilemma of diversity”. It is this dilemma and Boyd’s treatment of it that
is the philosophical point that begins my exploration of the Olympics.

On the surface, cultural diversity is relatively unproblematic because, as
multiculturalism theorist, Brian M. Bullivant, says, “cultural pluralism or diversity is
almost invariably thought of as applying only to differences in lifestyle” (Boyd, 1996,
612). Lifestyle differences are treated as the “‘munch, stomp, and dress up’ view of
multiculturalism” (1996, 612) where multiculturalism education teaches superficial
differences between the lifestyle of diverse groups. This is a pithy interpretation of
multiculturalism and to teach students about lifestyle differences does little justice to
multicultural education. Knowing that latkes, pierogi, and mutter paneer taste good
doesn’t eliminate racism on the school yard and beyond. Boyd would agree: “Although
cultural differences do take some getting used to and do sometimes make people
uncomfortable, they neither constitute the essence of cultural pluralism nor contribute to
the dilemma of diversity in any substantive way” (1996, 612). It is this search for
substance that Boyd believes is vital for multicultural education. Dilemma of diversity, he
says, must be drawn towards “the motivational heart of different ways of life” (1996,
612) and that this is done through moral values and the acknowledgment of value
pluralism: “A culturally pluralistic society is one in which there is value
pluralism….There would be a plurality of values, including of moral values, due to the plurality of cultural communities. Within each cultural community would be a unique set of values, *including a unique set of moral values*” (1996, 612).

Multiculturalism and multicultural education, then, isn’t about the differences of clothing, art, food, or music, but is about “the fundamental ideals, standards, and principles that prescriptively (and prospectively) anchor a particular point of view about how humans ought to conduct themselves in this world, and especially toward each other” (Boyd 1996, 612); it is about the moral values that guide behaviour. Boyd uses cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder’s idea of *definitive* culture as “a reality lit up by a morally enforceable conceptual scheme composed of values (desirable goals) and causal beliefs (including ideas about means-end connections) that is exemplified or instantiated in practice” (1996, 612). Cultures may have different goals and different means of reaching those goals, and there are times when these goals may come into tension or may conflict with those of other cultures. As J. Donald Moon suggests, these differing values may “lead to systematic differences on matters of policy” (Boyd 1996, 613). It is this tension that is my concern when I shake my head at my coworkers conversations, and is a tension that Boyd believes needs careful consideration.

Boyd (1996) points out that “many do recognize this diversity [of values], but write it off as an unfortunate fact that simply indicates how easy it is to make mistakes in these matters” (613) and that this “amounts to accepting the fact of pluralism but not the fact of ‘reasonable pluralism’” (613). Reasonable pluralism isn’t simply an understanding that there are differences among people, but that these differences are
understandable, acceptable, and perfectly reasonable. Differences between definitive values isn’t about one group being “misguided,” but is about the reasonableness of both values: “The asserted fact, however, is not simply that the protection of deliberative liberties will result in a plurality of conceptions of value, but further, that a number of those conceptions will be reasonable, and permissibly taken by their adherents to be true” (Boyd 1996, 614). Reasonable pluralism isn’t a matter of right or wrong but requires that differences between cultures are equally right and that each belief is as reasonable as any other.

Boyd (1996) believes that the dilemma of diversity is defined when the acceptance of reasonable pluralism is combined with “the perceived need for some perspective that can provide legitimating, normative leverage across this diversity in the face of practical questions requiring common action” (614). How can we accept reasonable pluralism and respect diversity when decisions have to be made that must bridge all of this diversity? How can one policy satisfy all? Boyd goes as far as to suggest that policy that must embrace and bridge diversity “makes the reasonableness of the diversity hard to hold onto” and he wonders if “the very possibility of such a perspective seems undermined to the extent that one truly believes the diversity to be “reasonable” (614). Can reasonable diversity be accepted while, at the same time, attempting for determine a single way to bridge all diversities? Boyd suggests that this is the main dilemma of diversity: “if one affirms both sides, one is in the position of both morally prescribing that individuals and groups ought to treat each other in certain ways according to preferred moral principles or ideals and denying, through the acceptance of
the fact of reasonable pluralism, that there is a moral point of view common to all
cultures that would make this prescription meaningful and binding for anyone, regardless
of where they are located within the diversity (616).” Boyd declares clearly what he sees
as the core problem of the dilemma of diversity: the paradox that it is impossible to
accept reasonable pluralism and create a unifying moral point that binds all along a
spectrum of diversity. A choice must, therefore, be made to deny reasonable pluralism
and find unifying moral values or to embrace reasonable pluralism and accept that unity
cannot be found. Boyd argues that uncovering moral values that bridge all diversity does
not embrace the reasonableness of other diversities, but actually encourages the
expectation of the reasonableness of diversity to fit into dominant moral view.

Philosophical Background: Shortcomings of Values Education

In June of 2008, the Ontario Ministry of Education released, “Finding Common
Ground: Character Development in Ontario Schools, K-12,” a document that states that
“a quality education includes the education of the heart as well as the mind. It includes a
focus on the whole person. It means preparing students to be citizens who have empathy
and respect for others within our increasingly diverse communities” (Ontario, 2). While
stopping short of creating a standardized Character Education curriculum, the Province of
Ontario requires school boards to have their own Character Development Plan\footnote{It would appear that the Ministry of Education's use of “Character Development” rather than “Character Education” is deliberate. This program document does not explicitly mention Character Education as an educational outcome, but makes efforts to present the program strictly as a character development mandate.} that must
meet the Ministry’s key expectations. Character Education is not, however, a simple
proposition. The teaching of morals, values, and character is fraught with philosophical and ethical questions.

Ontario’s Character Development requirement can be seen as the Ministry of Education’s attempt to bridge across pluralism and to address the dilemma of diversity: Character development in Ontario schools “is about a process of engagement in which communities come together to build consensus on the values they hold in common” (Ontario, 2008, 7). An Ontario classroom’s students (and their parents/guardians) hold diverse values. In its title, “Finding Common Ground,” the Ministry of Ontario’s Character Development requirement is an attempt to bridge across the diversity that exists within all Ontario classrooms. What is “common ground”? How do teachers approach diversity? What are the impacts of bridging diversity? What are the intended/unintended impacts of finding common ground? Dwight Boyd’s analysis of Values Education’s attempt to bridge across pluralism is helpful because it addresses the salient concerns of any attempt to alleviate the tension caused by the dilemma of diversity. Boyd offers three perspectives that are used in an attempt to solve the dilemma of diversity: groundless tolerance, laundry-list, and the search for universals (Boyd 1996, 616); all of which work to maintain the dominant moral view and deny reasonable diversity.

Groundless tolerance is an approach that calls for a passive acceptance of difference in an effort to maintain civility. It is “a thin, ‘wishy-washy’ plank of liberal tolerance” that does little to make positive change but instead “undercuts the meaning of any commitment to cultural pluralism as somehow aiming at cross-cultural respect and
cooperation” (1996, 617). Boyd admits that tolerance “puts on a good public face, appearing not to flinch from the reality of diversity, even moral diversity” (1996, 617), but that it makes “little effort to grapple with the true dimensions of the problem” (1996, 618). More importantly, it requires “an uncritical acceptance of any culturally embedded moral position” and “blinds one to coming to intellectual terms with the fact of reasonable diversity” (Boyd 1996, 618). Tolerance, on its own, is too lenient. It does not promote reflection and understanding, but ineffectively allows all value positions. It does not assess the worth of values, but turns a blind eye to them: “it functions as a convenient screen to facing the fact that not just anything goes, but, rather, that some notion of reasonableness must operate as a constraint in any viable democracy and that different and incompatible positions meeting this constraint have a claim of credibility on one’s own understanding” (Boyd 1996, 618). Tolerance simply isn’t enough to get at the heart of moral diversity and “fails to face the dilemma [of diversity] squarely” (Boyd 1996, 618). When individuals tolerate the moral values of others, it does not work, in any substantive way, to address the dilemma of diversity.

Tolerance maintains dominance because it “appears to be aimed at some kind of equality” (Boyd 1996, 623), but when we consider the power relationship required for tolerance, we realize that one must have power to tolerate: “in contemporary discourse, it makes little sense to speak of oppressed groups “tolerating” the views of oppressors” (Boyd 1996, 623). The dominant group owns tolerance, and the power to refuse it: “this view will patronizingly ‘let’ others with different views have ‘some’ room” (Boyd 1996, 623), but will not allow them to disturb that dominance. Tolerance, also, lacks real
credibility by failing to acknowledge the reasonableness of diversity. When one thinks about reasonable diversity, it is vital to recognize the fallibility of one’s own beliefs: “for true moral pluralism to be seen as ‘reasonable,’ some degree of bracketing of one’s own commitments must be sincerely accommodated” (Boyd 1996, 624). The fact that the tolerance approach fails to prompt “the dominant view to be self-critical” (Boyd 1996, 624) maintains dominance as a part of diversity and hides it behind a veneer of equality (Boyd 1996, 624).

The ‘laundry-list’ of values perspective for coping with the dilemma of diversity is, upon initial examination, laughable. At the core of this approach is the belief that diversity exists, but that there are overlap points (Boyd 1996, 618) where commonness can be found between all cultures. The challenge is to find that perfect combination of values that appeals to all and therefore become universal. How can diversity exist if there are values that transcend all pluralism? Boyd remains dubious of the laundry-list because it “purports to reveal diversity for what it really is—something of a smokescreen” (1996, 618). This perspective seems to have the effect of destroying not only the reasonableness of diversity, but diversity altogether. It claims that there are values that bridge all cultures and all communities. While it is, of course, a nice idea to believe that there are values that bind us all together as humans, the laundry-list approach is attractive because “it is relatively safe, politically” (Boyd 1996, 619) because few people want to appear to be against any of the “values” that are likely to survive the process of becoming successful candidates for inclusion on the list” (Boyd 1996, 619). Boyd fears that the laundry-list “is really an effort to find a lowest common denominator
among different culturally based value orientations” (1996, 619) and that though some commonness may be found, this “does not mean that the differences thereby disappear or do not matter” (1996, 619).

What concerns Boyd most about the laundry-list of values is “a category mistake in what values are, particularly moral values” (1996, 620). Naming values is not enough. Boyd maintains that the laundry-list “serves only to confuse naming and meaning” (1996, 620). Values, especially moral values, cannot be distilled down to a word on a page. We may decide that honesty is a universal value, but what is the meaning of honesty and how does that meaning differ across cultures? Boyd states: “this deeper level of meaning must be shared across cultures for the prescription of cultural pluralism to gain legitimacy” (1996, 620).

When it comes to the laundry-list approach, we must consider how the list is created:

There is no good reason to imagine that those in a position to synthesize the list represent equally the society’s range of comprehensive doctrines. Instead, theirs will be the perspective of the dominant group in control of the political structures…In essence, the methodological aspect of this perspective is well designed to standardize the list in the direction desired by the dominant view (Boyd 1996, 625).

Boyd declares the power relations that are needed to create a list of values. Who decides what values are included? What does it mean if a value is excluded? How does a list marginalize dissenters and maintain imbalances of power? The list does not go far enough to attribute meaning to the values, but simply seeks to name them; interpretation has no part in the creation of the list: “how these items are interpreted to be values
according to the complex, dynamic web of meaning and justification that constitutes different cultures cannot be accommodated by the list itself or the kind of talk that it facilitates” (Boyd 1996, 625). As a result, “the items obtain true value status through the interpretation of the dominant view” (Boyd 1996, 625).

The irony of the laundry-list of values is that it becomes exclusive rather than inclusive. Boyd claims that “the appearance of meaningful agreement is thus being substituted to the real, owned, moral position that is required to make cultural pluralism anything more than a factual account” (Boyd 1996, 620). Any disagreement about the list “must be expressed in terms that question whether you really are different from everyone else” (Boyd 1996, 620) and then the response is, “to provide evidence that your point does, in fact, fit into the list” (Boyd 1996, 620). It therefore becomes impossible to disagree: “a claim from either side that the list is in some way wrong or a counter-response that someone should find it adequate is simply out of order” (Boyd 1996, 620). Evaluating the meaning of values across cultures and disagreements between diversities is not valid to the laundry-list approach because disagreements become matters of perfecting the list and finding ways to make all perspectives fit into it. The list has the effect of making all disagreements a matter of list interpretation, and thus belittles not only the disagreements, but diversity itself.

The search for universals approach to cultural diversity is similar to the laundry-list approach because it also searches for commonness among all cultures, but is different because “commonalities are thought to be there, but to be at a less obvious, deeper level” (Boyd 1996, 621) and “an attempt is made to look under the surface variation (and
commonality) to uncover the universally valid values and moral principals upon which everything rests” (Boyd 1996, 621). This sounds very similar to the laundry-list approach, but “this perspective respects the notion that values are always matters of interpretation, of meaning, to individuals and groups adhering to them” (Boyd 1996, 621). This approach, “posits that there are some basic interpretations that do not vary because they are, in some way, built into the structure of the universe” (Boyd 1996, 621). Commonness isn’t just likely as with the laundry-list, but in this approach it is necessary. The crux of this approach is that “deep down inside, despite diversity, we are all the same, like one big family” (Boyd 1996, 621).

On the positive side, this approach recognizes “that values, in particular moral values, are not something that can be identified by superficial methods of contingent, nominal description” (Boyd 1996, 622). The real value of this approach is that it:

seeks to get beyond such superficial description of contingent agreement to these prescriptive commonalities by positing that evaluative interpretation that can be shared across cultural differences cannot be grounded in any one cultural perspective, but must somehow transcend all such limited perspectives. Thus it appears to provide the possibility of normative grounding for the commitment to cultural pluralism itself (Boyd 1996, 622, my emphasis).

Though this possibility exists, Boyd believes that the search for universals approach has the opposite flaw as the groundless tolerance approach. Groundless tolerance is willing to accept diversity, but chooses to ignore it whereas the universals approach “purports to find solid bedrock that can dictate a prescriptive denial of diversity” (Boyd 1996, 622). When we consider the dilemma of diversity, the search for universal, core values do not allow for reasonable diversity at all. The reasonableness of diversity is, essentially,
entirely rejected when one decides to seek out that which unites all because it assumes that “there is only one moral culture, waiting for someone to ‘find’” (Boyd 1996, 622).

The search for universals maintains the dominant moral view. It is here that non-neutrality is important because the search for universals is a search for a “we”, and in searching for a “we” invariably this becomes a search for “how ‘most people’ think” (Boyd 1996, 627). The boundaries of moral values transform differing values to fit within that boundary while ensuring that those values of the few adapt or are eliminated. It does not recognize reasonable diversity, but attempts to bridge all pluralisms and therefore does not embrace the reasonableness of other diversities. This isn’t a search for a universal, but a way of making others fit in (and thereby oppressing them).

What is most concerning about the three perspectives is that “each fails even to squarely face the dilemma, operating instead more rhetorically to circumvent acceptance of one or both sides of the dilemma” (Boyd 1996, 623). This apathy to face the dilemma of diversity is not the most scathing flaw, either. Boyd believes that each perspective is political and that those who espouse these perspectives are “located within the diversity as intellectual tools with which they intend to do something vis-à-vis their relationships with others who represent diversity” (Boyd 1996, 623). For Boyd, these perspectives are dangerous because they are held in the name of diversity by the dominant group but are used to justify “the prescriptive preferences of the dominant view in control” (Boyd 1996, 623).

Moreover, Boyd is critical of the use of Moral Education philosopher Lawrence Kohlberg in order to defend a scientific justification for universality of values:
Kohlberg’s theory, the conceptual tool often used in service of this differentiation is the distinction between the form and content of moral judgment” (1996, 626). Boyd believes that in order to see this flaw, it is important “to understand that form and content are correlative terms” (626) and that because of this, “any formal interpretive scheme will necessarily be content laden” (626). There cannot be a universal if one believes Jürgen Habermas who states that “when the form/content distinction is used in the context of moral phenomena, the forms themselves, however abstract, can never be morally neutral” (626). The forms are therefore created by humans and cannot, by definition, be neutral: “to view moral experience through one set of forms is to block viewing that experience through some alternative set of forms” (626-627). In the end:

The discovered forms originate from within the dominant point of view. Once articulated, however, they exert control far beyond the boundaries of that view, squeezing quite different views into the same formal mode. They have this co-opting power first because they are conceived as neutral points of interpretation [even though they are not] that can be empirically used to explore questions of universal commonality in moral understanding. Then, because they are abstract enough to be manifested in some part of most views, the rest of these views with their unique coherent integrity slides out of sight (627).

The search for universals, while explicitly rejecting reasonable diversity, also creates a false universal because the dominant group creates the standard and requires that others fit into it.

The shortcomings of attempts to resolve the dilemma of diversity are clearly seen through the examination of the three perspectives that attempt to bridge across pluralism. The impact of these approaches is to strengthen the values and perspectives of dominant ideology. Boyd believes that this is dominance concealed through diversity, and that it is
important to be mindful of how attempts at bridging across diversity can maintain a
dominant point of view.

**Democratic Reciprocity and the “Politics of Difference”**

Dwight Boyd is skeptical of the three approaches that Values Education has attempted to unite across difference. The groundless tolerance, the laundry-list, and the search for universals all fail to “find common ground” and dominate through diversity. As will be developed more thoroughly later (in Chapter 6), Boyd offers democratic reciprocity as an alternative. Boyd is most concerned with the dominance that is created when Values Education purports to bridge diversity, and he believes that an approach that does not look to eliminate diversity, but one that acknowledges it will not only alleviate the dilemma of diversity, but will reduce domination.

Boyd is quick to point out that he is not offering a panacea, but he does believe that democratic reciprocity is a step towards alleviating the dilemma of diversity. He suggests: “What the dilemma of diversity reveals is that the kind of perspective needed is one that requires, facilitates, and works through its exposure and performative critique of forms of inequality of voice within that reciprocity” (1996, 628). He believes that the tolerance perspective must “make space for views across difference and to start sharing these views across difference” (1996, 628) because this will expose public critique of differential power (1996, 628). Nominal lists must be replaced with “efforts at reciprocal intelligibility, with dynamic intelligibility itself understood to carry significant moral weight” (1996, 628). Finally, universals should “be exchanged for activating and
maintaining constructivist institutions of inclusive interchange and shared public identification of value stances that actively support such institutions” (1996, 628).

Boyd’s suggestions are buttressed by the work of Iris Marion Young. In her book, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, she says:

I criticize an ideal of justice that defines liberation as the transcendence of group difference, which I refer to as an ideal of assimilation. This ideal usually promotes equal treatment as a primary principle of justice. Recent social movements of oppressed groups challenge this ideal. Many in these movements argue that a positive self-definition of group difference is in fact more liberatory… An emancipatory politics that affirms group difference involves a reconception of the meaning of equality. The assimilationist ideal assumes that equal statues for all persons requires treating everyone according to the same principles, rules, and standards. A politics of difference argues, on the other hand, that equality as the participation and inclusion of all groups sometimes requires different treatment for oppressed or disadvantaged groups” (1990, 157-158)

Young is critical of the ideal of justice that transcends difference. Young would criticize the desire to unite across difference because, as we have seen, it works to assimilate and to embrace all within its singular vision. Young’s acceptance and acknowledgment of difference complements Boyd’s conclusion nicely, because it strikes at exactly what concerns him most about the dilemma of diversity: the tension between the belief that diversity exists and the need to create policy/values within it. Boyd’s conclusion that calls for democratic reciprocity seeks to value difference and opposes the search for a commonness across all diversities.
Chapter 2
Aboriginals and the Olympics: Appreciation or Appropriation?

The Olympic Games are the largest international sporting event in the world. There are 205 countries with National Olympic Committees whose mission “is to develop, promote and protect the Olympic Movement in their respective countries, in accordance with the Olympic Charter” (IOC 2010a). With 4.7 billion people watching the Beijing 2008 Olympics on television (Sport Business 2008), the Olympic Games has tremendous global reach. In her Globe and Mail newspaper article, Carly Weeks writes: “The Olympics promote the ideals of peace and unity through sport” (Weeks 2010).

In December of 2009, the Olympic Torch Relay arrived in Oka, Quebec, the site of a 1990 standoff between Kanasatake Mohawks and provincial police over a development dispute. A private golf course planned to expand by adding nine additional holes on Mohawk territory including a Mohawk cemetery. Courts and government had permitted the expansion and Mohawks blockaded the Mercier Bridge, a major Montreal commuter artery. The Oka Crisis had lasted 77 days when Mohawk protestors stood down. Later, the mayor of Oka would cancel the proposed golf course expansion.² Alwyn Morris, two-time Olympic medalist in kayak and also a Kahnawake Mohawk says “the torch relay is about unity, it’s about peace, it’s about bringing together family and friends and uniting the country” (Gordon 2009).

While Alwyn Morris carried the Olympic torch through the site of the Oka crisis, protestors carried signs reading such slogans as, “Remove the poison, remove the torch.” Grand chief of the Kahnawake Mohawk Council, Michael Delisle Jr., contradicts Morris’s belief in the unity of the Torch Relay: “If you go to any man, woman or child in this community, no one would tell you they’re Canadian” (Gordon 2009).

In the example of the Kanasatake and Kahnawake Mohawks, we see a tension between reasonable pluralisms. There is value pluralism at what Boyd calls “the motivational heart of different ways of life” (1996, 612) that is the point of tension between opposing groups. With this example of the tensions between reasonable pluralisms and the failure of the Olympics to unite across diversities, it is helpful to examine how the Olympics has misrepresents Aboriginals3 in order to show that the IOC does not respect diversity and does not unite diversity within host nations. Using examples from the Montreal 1976, Calgary 1988, and Sydney 2000 Games, I will show that the IOC misrepresents Aboriginals to further their own brand image. At the same time as it misrepresents Aboriginals, the IOC declares that it embraces and accepts difference and diversity—that it believes in reasonable pluralism—but that a rhetoric-reality gap is created.

In order to examine the relationship between Aboriginals in Canada and the Olympic Games, it is important to look at how Aboriginal people have participated in

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3 “This is a collective name for all of the original peoples of Canada and their descendants. The Constitution Act of 1982 specifies that the Aboriginal Peoples in Canada consist of three groups – Indians [First Nations], Inuit and Métis. First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples have unique heritages, languages, cultural practices and spiritual beliefs. The term Aboriginal peoples should not be used to describe only one or two of the groups” (Assembly of First Nations (2010). Retrieved February 23, 2010). In this essay, I will use these terms in this way, but will maintain quotations from secondary sources in their original form.
Olympic ceremonies and how these ceremonies have depicted Aboriginal culture and people. While the Vancouver 2010 website claims that their goal “is to recognize and celebrate Aboriginal history, arts, culture and languages throughout the Games,” (Vancouver Organizing Committee [VANOC] 2010a) if we consider past Olympics, the achievement of this goal is called into question. As a major international event with 205 national organizing committees throughout the world, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has tremendous potential to make a positive difference, but occupies itself with maintaining its prominence and power. The IOC works to maintain control over the Olympic Games and the images associated with it. In showing that these images do not realistically portray Aboriginal people and their culture, it will become evident that these images are about marketing the Olympic brand. Portrayals of Aboriginals are appropriation because they do not include First Nations, Métis, and Inuit in their creation. As a result, the depiction is an inauthentic one based on stereotype and historical misrepresentation.

The Vancouver 2010 Olympics took place “on the traditional and shared traditional territories of the Lil’wat, Musqueam, Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh First Nations – known collectively as the Four Host First Nations (FHFN)” (VANOC 2010b). In her doctoral thesis, Indigenous and Canadian sport history scholar Christine O’Bonsawin (2006) critically examines the portrayal of Aboriginals in mega-events. She notes the historical relationship between Canadian Olympic organizers and Aboriginals and also distills the duplicitous relationship between the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) and the Four Host First Nations (FHFN):
Organizers of Canadian-based Olympic Games have perpetually appropriated Aboriginal culture as a homogenous identity in the programming of the Games. Paradoxically, in the formative years of the Vancouver 2010 bid, organizers acknowledged the FHFN with due respect and appropriately identified it as an official partner of the campaign process. With its successful selection, the Bid Committee accordingly transformed itself into an Organizing Committee. With its mandate in place, VANOC soon dishonoured its FHFN participation programme and unveiled Ilanaaq, ‘the friendly spirit and soul of Canada’ (4, my emphasis).

O’Bonsawin believes that VANOC’s choice of a colourful, stylized inukshuk, named Ilanaaq, as logo for the 2010 Games is an example of the “bad faith” shown towards First Nations by the Olympics and the Organizing Committee (this will be examined in more detail later). O’Bonsawin argues that historically, the interactions between Organizing Committees and Aboriginals has long been either absent or inappropriate. The Olympics has a long history of appropriation and colonization.

Before considering the IOC’s depictions of Aboriginals, it is important to understand the way the IOC organizes Olympic Games. The International Olympic Committee oversees National Olympic Committees in countries throughout the world. When it comes to the Vancouver Games, “one of the key conditions of being awarded the right to host the 2010 Winter Games was a commitment to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that the Olympic Brand would be protected in Canada” (VANOC 2010c). The Canadian government helped VANOC protect the Olympic image by enacting laws that allowed them to legally persecute those who contravene IOC dictates. According to VANOC, the protection of the Olympic brand is primarily the protection of its commercial interests; Olympic imagery must be purchased and organizing committees
are charged with the responsibility of this brand protection. Olympic events are organized, managed, and operated by organizing committees, but are overseen and, ultimately, controlled by the IOC. Protection of the Olympic image and the protection of Olympic sponsors is tremendously important to the IOC and all events are controlled by organizing committees and the IOC. The Opening and Closing Ceremonies, similarly, are created and controlled by organizing committees who have the power to control and dictate all aspects of their planning, creation and presentation.

**Representation of Aboriginals at the Montreal 1976 Olympics**

Canada’s Olympic hosting history began in 1976 in Montreal. As one of Canada’s leaders in the field of Canadian Aboriginal sport and recreation, Janice Forsyth investigates how Organizing Committees and the (IOC) used their structural power to construct an image of Aboriginals in Canada. How Olympic Organizing Committees do so is through the creation of Opening and Closing Ceremonies that depict Aboriginal culture and people. Forsyth and eminent critical Olympic scholar Kevin B. Wamsley (2005) state that when it comes to the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, “the Games consistently provide the host nation with opportunities to showcase national and regional culture” (228). In 1976, the Montreal Organizing Committee (MOC) attempted “to depict Canada as a multicultural country, one that respected its Indigenous populations” (Forsyth 2002, 71). Moreover, as Forsyth notes, the Opening and Closing ceremonies also seek to push the IOC’s ideology which, in this case, “aimed to distinguish the Olympic Games from other major international sport competitions by portraying the
event as a humanizing force, capable of bringing diverse groups of peoples and cultures together in peace, harmony, and friendship” (2002, 71). In order to do this, “Olympic organizers appropriated a multitude of popular Aboriginal images and arranged them in a vivid and dramatic display, complete with teepees, tom-toms, feathered headdresses, flags, and buckskin outfits” (Forsyth 2002, 71). Despite this stereotypical portrayal of Aboriginal people, organizers claimed that “the Closing Ceremony was being held to honour Canada’s Aboriginal peoples” (Forsyth 2002, 72), but it is important to declare, as Forsyth (2002) does, that organizers “did not consult with the populations who they professed to respect in the construction of the program” (72). Though some Aboriginals did participate in the show, Forsyth stresses that “the celebration was designed by Olympic organizers for Aboriginal peoples” (2002, 72) and Aboriginal participants followed the lead of a non-aboriginal professional dance troupe “dressed and painted to look like ‘Indians’” (2002, 72).

The MOC and IOC’s decision to appropriate Aboriginal culture without consulting Aboriginal groups was a conscious decision since Kahnawake Mohawks (whose reservation is just outside of Montreal) wanted to use the Games to “forward their own images and ideas about who they were as contemporary Aboriginal peoples through their Indian Days celebration” (Forsyth 2002, 72). Indian Days was to be an event that “included 150 Aboriginal performers and exhibits from different regions throughout Canada” (Forsyth 2002, 72) and was proposed to the MOC to be held as part of the Olympic Arts and Culture Program. The National Indian Brotherhood mandated George Hill to coordinate Aboriginal participation, but “was told by Olympic organizers that it
was not ‘official’ since the Olympic organizing committee [MOC] had not commissioned him” (Forsyth 2002, 72). Because the MOC and IOC feared “‘a feather show’ referring to the possibility of Indian demonstrations” (Forsyth 2002, 72), they used their structural power and control to deny the National Indian Brotherhood’s proposal which, as Forsyth (2002) suggests, sent the message that “Aboriginal participation would be generated and controlled directly by the Olympic organizing committee” (72). The MOC and IOC’s actions show that they wish to maintain ultimate control of the Olympic product actively resisting Aboriginal participation in their planning and depiction.

Even though the MOC and IOC sought to “promote Canada as a country that respects cultural differences and diversities” (Forsyth 2002, 73), they instead “reinforced fixed notions about Aboriginal people being culturally static, homogenous, and unfit for society” (Forsyth 2002, 73). Perhaps most telling is public reaction to the representation of Aboriginals. The daily English language newspapers *The Montreal Gazette*, *The Ottawa Citizen*, and *The Montreal Star* all praised the Games’ Closing Ceremony. Forsyth (2002) believes that the Closing ceremonies were well received because they provided audiences with exactly what they expected, and reaffirmed their preconceived notions and images of Aboriginals: “the public support for the spectacle was not the result of having gained a deeper respect for Aboriginal lives and traditions. Rather, the support was only an emotional response to specific images and ideas that had taken on tremendous symbolic meaning for non-Aboriginal peoples worldwide” (73, my emphasis). Forsyth provides insight into the larger question of semiotics and representation. This was, as Forsyth and Wamsley (2005) point out, typical of Olympic
Ceremonies because “the historical relations between groups within host nations—in this case Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples—are often represented in Olympic ceremonies as harmonious and uncomplicated in order for organizing committees to project positive images of the nation abroad” (228). They suggest that “Aboriginal people and Indigenous cultural imagery have come to represent, and literally embody, liberal democratic ideals of cultural diversity and respect for difference between people” but at the same time “this did not, however, necessarily provide an accurate depiction of relations between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals in any of [Montreal, Calgary, Sydney, Salt Lake City]” (228). Forsyth and Wamsley here are noting the larger issue of semiotics and representation.

Renowned cultural theorist and sociologist Stuart Hall, whose work focuses on representation and semiotics, believes that stereotypes and misrepresentation of the “other” “is part of the maintenance of social and symbolic order” (1997, 258). When the IOC and its Olympic organizing committees misrepresent Aboriginals, they announce:

[there is a] symbolic frontier between the ‘normal’ and the ‘deviant’, the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’, the ‘acceptable’ and the ‘unacceptable’...it facilitates the ‘binding’ or bonding together of all of Us who are ‘normal’ into one ‘imagined community’; and it sends into symbolic exile all of Them --the ‘Others’-- who are in some way different (Hall 1997, 258, my emphasis).

When Hall states that stereotyping “facilitates the ‘binding’ or bonding together of all of US who are ‘normal’ into one ‘imagined community’” he provides an explanation for the misrepresentation of Aboriginals in Olympic Opening and Closing Ceremonies. By stereotyping Aboriginals, audiences not only group themselves from the Aboriginal
“Other”, but simultaneously group themselves together with Olympic supporters. One cannot associate oneself with the stereotyped “other” and also be a supporter of the Olympic Games, and in order to be a part of the “normal” one must support the IOC.

The IOC’s representation of Aboriginals is an example of what Hall calls a “gross inequity of power” (1997, 258). He believes that in order to stereotype, there must exist an imbalance of power between the representer and the represented. Using the work of Richard Dyer on stereotyping, Hall says: “The establishment of normalcy (i.e. what is accepted as ‘normal’) through social- and stereo-types is one aspect of the habit of ruling groups... to attempt to fashion the whole of society according to their own world view, value-system, sensibility, and ideology” (Hall 1997, 258). In showing that the IOC maintains power over the creation and presentation of its Opening and Closing Ceremonies, it can be seen that the IOC through misrepresenting Aboriginals is attempting to impose its world view, value system and ideology. The effect of this, according to Hall (and Dyer) is that “so right is this world view for the ruling groups [in this case the IOC] that they make it appear (as it does appear to them) as ‘natural’ and as ‘inevitable’ –and for everyone– and, is so far as they succeed, they establish their hegemony” (Hall 1997, 258). By stereotyping, misrepresenting, and not including Aboriginals in the production of the images that depict them, the IOC seeks to impose ideological hegemony.

The hegemonic action of the IOC is incongruous with its declared policy and goals. The Olympics – and, by extension, host nations – want to appear to show awareness, understanding, compassion, and respect; these are the values that the
Olympics declare as fundamental to their project. Forsyth and Wamsley (2005) believe, however, that “the historical evidence demonstrates that these ideologies are strategically invoked by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to legitimise the Games, as part of a long-term, broader campaign of unabashed self-promotion that ultimately results in obfuscations of often deep-seated conflicts between people” (229). There is a profound disconnect between “what Olympic organisers communicate to the public at large about Aboriginal peoples in general and, more specifically, their involvement in the Games and, most importantly, the actual relationships that are played out in everyday life” (229). By representing historically frozen images of Aboriginals in Opening and Closing Ceremonies, it is clear that the IOC seeks to appeal to a stereotype that international audiences understand rather than presenting an image that may cause them confusion, or discomfort. In doing so, the IOC announces that they value ideological hegemony and the strength of their brand over the equitable values their rhetoric purports.

**Aboriginal Protest and the Calgary 1988 Olympics**

When Calgary hosted the Winter Olympics in 1988, the Lubicon Lake Indian Nation (a Cree First Nation referred to as the Lubicon Cree) recognized the global appeal of the Olympics and sought to make their political concerns heard. Lubicon Cree had been left “powerless to stop the destruction of their traditional hunting and subsistence economy by oil companies which drilled more than 400 oil wells within a 15 mile radius of their community” (Wamsley & Heine 1996, 174). As early as 1986, they called for a boycott of the Calgary Olympics and an art exhibit at Calgary’s Glenbow Art Gallery.
The gallery’s show to run leading up to and during the Calgary 1988 Olympics called
*The Spirit Sings* was “an exhibition of Native artifacts borrowed from museums around
the world” (Wamsley & Heine 1996, 174). The Shell Oil Company of Canada was not
only a sponsor of the Olympics, but was the sponsor of *The Spirit Sings*. Lubicon Cree
chief Bernard Ominayak pointed out the “irony of using a display of North American
Indian artifacts to attract people to the Winter Olympics being organized by interests who
are still actively seeking to destroy Indian people seems painfully obvious” (Wamsley
and Heine 1996, 174). Wamsley and Heine (1996) go on to suggest the hypocrisy of the
Glenbow museum proclaiming that they were celebrating “‘the richness and continuity of
Canada’s native cultural traditions’” (174) when the Lubicon Cree might not exist if
current oil company practices continued.

The success of their protests and campaigns against the Calgary Games is
debatable. Though they managed to encourage 29 museums to refuse to support the
Glenbow Museum’s Shell Oil sponsored Aboriginal Art exhibition, “*The Spirit Sings*
attracted record crowds of more than 127,000 to the Glenbow. It was by far the best
attended exhibition ever mounted by that institution” (Wamsley & Heine 1996, 175). The
Lubicon continued to protest the Calgary Games and attempted to have their voice heard
by protesting the Olympic Torch Relay as it traveled across the Canada. Though their
protests against Shell’s sponsorship of *The Spirit Sings* attracted support, their protests of
the Torch Relay were met with criticism that was “swift and severe” (Wamsley & Heine
a reserve – but if they persist with their *publicity blitz against the Olympics or other*
unrelated targets, they will be deserving of little respect” (Wamsley & Heine 1996, 176). While Wamsley and Heine argue that public opinion was in strong support of the Calgary Games, the Olympic Torch Relay was not an “unrelated target” since it was sponsored by oil and gas crown corporation, Petro-Canada.

In the two years leading up to the February 1988 Olympics, while the Lubicon Cree protested the Games and called for boycotts, the Olympics went on the offensive. In an effort to redirect Aboriginal attention, the Calgary Olympic Organizing Committee (OCO) and the IOC created a Native Involvement Program in November 1986 which would incorporate Aboriginals into the “proceedings” and in April 1987, a Native Participation Program “provided funding for, among other events, a Native trade show, a Native youth conference, and pow wow competitions” (Wamsley & Heine 1996, 175). Supporters saw this as a podium to the world, whereas detractors interpreted it merely as throwing money at a problem in the hopes that it would buy silence (Wamsley & Heine 1996, 175). Regardless of the reaction to these programs, the message from the IOC was clear: it wanted to separate itself from any land-claims issues and hoped to “channel Native involvement into less controversial areas” (Wamsley & Heine 1996, 175). The Olympics sought – and continues to seek – to be non-political.

The IOC’s failure to be overtly political has a powerfully domineering effect upon groups like the Lubicon Cree. It is important to note here the impossibility of political neutrality. All action and all inaction is political and the IOC’s actions and inaction do declare a position. The IOC cannot be apolitical, but it does wish to be seen as outside of political issues and concerns; especially domestic ones like the government’s treatment
of Aboriginals. Wamsley and Heine (1996) state that “the argument that the Olympics are an emphatically unpolitical event is of course well-rehearsed” (176). They go on to state the impact of the IOC’s self-professed political neutrality on the Lubicon Cree:

> to censure the Lubicon’s political actions on grounds of incorrect identification of target, thereby *precluding any evaluation of the political act’s merit itself*. It was the Lubicon alone, so the criticism implied, who attempted to politicize the Olympic festival. The advocates for the Games and cultural programs appropriated the discursive power not only to strategically incorporate Native symbols for the impact of resistance to the structures of significations produced by such incorporation. The politics implied by an exhibition representing a historical unity of aboriginal cultures at the expense of noting their current problems were never objectified as such. Likewise Shell’s sponsorship of *The Spirit Sings*, and PetroCan[ada]’s lucrative involvement in the torch relay, were never addressed as political issues. Public discourse derived a considerable part of its politically signifying force from what remained unsaid (1996, 176).

Wamsley and Heine show that when the IOC remains ambivalent towards political issues such as the treatment of Aboriginals and Aboriginal groups seek to have their voices heard and their critiques addressed, the IOC vilifies these groups and their actions as an attempt to politicize. Recalling Stuart Hall, it is clear that the IOC is using its power as normalized group to further marginalize Olympic dissenters. The impact of this vilification is to deflect the issue and to rob the Lubicon Cree’s concerns of their political importance. The IOC claimed that it was not to blame; it purported to stand outside of politics and the Lubicon’s disagreement. The IOC had the opportunity to be a catalyst for positive change for the Lubicon Cree, but their desired political apathy heaped blame upon the Lubicon and made represented them as the wrongdoer. In this case, the Olympics chose to protect its image, brand, and sponsoring partners. This choice is a profoundly political one that clearly values commercial over humanitarian interests.
Agenda 21 and Aboriginal Participation in Olympics Outside of Canada

If we look briefly at the historical treatment of Aboriginals in Olympic Opening and Closing Ceremonies, Aboriginal participation outside of Canada before the Los Angeles 1984 Games (with the exception of the 1904 St. Louis Games) cannot be found (Forsyth and Wamsley 2005, 230). Forsyth and Wamsley (2005) argue that after World War Two, Aboriginal groups began to advocate for human rights and believed the international organizations like the United Nations could help their cause (230). Forsyth and Wamsley also state that during this time nations like Canada, the United States, and Australia began to adopt policies that acknowledged and embraced diversity, but that their reasons for these policies are somewhat suspect: “These trends were intimately connected to a global consumer culture that was deeply fascinated with the exotic Other, and a residue of long-standing scientific and upper-class social communities enraptured with the study of ‘primitive’ peoples since the early nineteenth century (230).” While Aboriginal groups were struggling for political rights and countries were embracing multiculturalism, majority groups were enthralled with all things Aboriginal. It is important to ask about the state’s motivations here and it forces one to wonder what motivated governments to embrace multiculturalism. The IOC can be seen as an analogous example and Forsyth and Wamsley (2005) point to commercial and economic benefits for the IOC: “the IOC’s interest in promoting multiculturalism was rooted in more practical motives to secure short-term profit and long-term organisational viability” (230). Like Canada’s Act for the Preservation and Enhancement of Multiculturalism that
was passed in 1985, the IOC officially sanctions space, through the introduction of
*Agenda 21* in 1999, for Aboriginal peoples in Olympic Ceremonies and Cultural Festivals
and that host nations had to involve Aboriginal peoples (Forsyth and Wamsley 2005,
230).

*Agenda 21* seems to be a step forward for minority groups and those on the
fringes of mainstream international events. It is vital to reiterate that “within the context
of the Olympic ceremonies, Aboriginal peoples have little or no control over the
narratives that are scripted for them by Olympic organisers” (Forsyth and Wamsley 2005,
230). It is apparent that while the IOC wants to brand itself as respectful and inclusive by
implementing a program like *Agenda 21*, their control and actions dramatically provide
“a clear indication of their position within national and, therefore, Olympic hierarchies of
influence and control” (Forsyth and Wamsley 2005, 230). The Olympic Opening and
Closing Ceremonies, because of their massive television audiences, “are ideal platforms
to promote ideological agendas” (231), but these agendas are controlled and dictated by
the IOC and therefore become ideal platforms to promote the those agendas in line with
those of the IOC’s. What agenda is the IOC promoting when it displays Aboriginals in
Opening and Closing Ceremonies? We have seen that it is damaging for Aboriginal
groups to be portrayed inauthentically: “distorted images about them [Aboriginals] have
constantly reinforced how much they vary from mainstream societies” (Forsyth and
Wamsley 2005, 231). These images reinforce stereotypes and work against respectful
multiculturalism.
The Sydney Games, Aboriginal Involvement, and Reconciliation

By examining critiques of the Montreal 1976 and Calgary 1988 Olympics, we have seen that the Organizing Committees and the IOC have been historically dismissive of Aboriginal culture and Aboriginal participation. The earlier critique has argued that the depiction of Aboriginals in these events is an inauthentic one based on stereotype and historical misrepresentation. Is this simply a matter of involvement and participation? Would the depiction change if Aboriginals were involved? Does inclusion solve the problem of misrepresentation? The Sydney Games provide an example of Aboriginal involvement and is the first Olympic event after the implementation of Agenda 21. The Sydney 2000 Games are relevant to the discussion of Aboriginal representation by the IOC because Aboriginal representation became a visible and pronounced aspect of the Sydney Games. It will become clear that Aboriginal involvement in the Olympics does not overcome the problem of misrepresentation, and that the IOC’s mandate is to bolster its own image rather than prompting real change in the everyday lives of Aboriginals.

The IOC and its treatment of Aboriginals is not just a Canadian issue. Like the Lubicon Cree during the Calgary Games, Aboriginal groups in Australia saw the Games as an opportunity to share their experience and culture with an international audience. Aboriginal historian and researcher at the University of Western Sydney in Australia, George Morgan, in his 2003 article, “Aboriginal Protest and the Sydney Olympic Games,” examines the Sydney Games in much the same way as Janice Forsyth’s (2002) article and Wamsley and Heine’s (2005) article examined the IOC’s depiction of Aboriginals in the Montreal and Calgary Olympics. Morgan (2003) outlines the history
of sport as a tool of control and dominance: “Sport has long been associated with the efforts of dominant groups to establish social control, with the diversion of those who could potentially threaten social order into the harmless and rule-bound discipline of organized competition. From a bourgeois or colonial point of view aggressive, disorderly and revolutionary impulses are best sublimated and redirected into the healthy contests on the sporting field” (24-25, my emphasis). Morgan, as a historian, points out the ways in which sport has been used by dominant colonial powers as a means of social control and as a means to redirect anger and aggression that may otherwise be leveled against colonizers. This aspect of sport as international development tool sheds light on this examination of the IOC and will be developed in greater detail later.

When Sydney was selected as 2000 Olympic host, Australian Aboriginal groups did not rally countries to boycott the Sydney Olympics, instead, “they planned to stage protests during the Games in order to highlight the discrimination and social problems their people suffered” (Morgan 2003, 26). The plan was to protest in much the same way as the Lubicon Cree had in 1988. Morgan (2003) discusses the Lubicon Cree protests and states that “Aboriginal leaders warned that similar actions might take place in Sydney” (26). Despite pressure from Aboriginal leaders, support was minimal. Elite Aboriginal short-distance runner, Cathy Freeman, who was, at the time of the protests, competing in international track events and preparing for the Sydney Games, stated that “calls for an Aboriginal boycott of the Olympics really frustrate me – there is no point to it. Politics should be left out of the sporting arena and everyone should support the Olympics in Australia – no matter what” (27). This wholly uncritical attitude was one that many
Australians shared and though the Olympic organizers and media feared large public protests, they “were more muted than promised or expected” (Morgan 2003, 27).

Morgan (2003) believes that the Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) “defused indigenous resistance by paying homage to the original owners in the major ceremonies, negotiating the involvement of some prominent Aboriginal people, and incorporating the imagery of reconciliation in the rituals of the Games” (27). In Sydney, Aboriginals did not only participate, but were part of planning and organization. This included more honest festivals and exhibits than at the Calgary Games: “The Metropolitan Lands Council was given the right to establish an exhibition centre on the Games site in which details of the shameful history of colonialism were narrated” (Morgan 2003, 27). The Olympic Torch Relay was carried by numerous Aboriginal athletes and “carried the symbolism of reconciliation” (Morgan 2003, 27). Morgan (2003) believes that many saw Cathy Freeman’s lighting of the Olympic cauldron as “a symbol of reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians” (28).

The example of the Sydney Games is unique and is, perhaps, atypical of Aboriginal involvement in the Olympics. Morgan (2003) believes that “most Aboriginal people were extremely uneasy about the prospect of protest, particularly violent protest, because sporting achievement is for many of them a source of collective pride” (28). Though British colonials “sought to civilize indigenous people” (Morgan 2003, 29) and used sport as a means to do so, Morgan (2003) believes that “sport involves the struggle over meaning as with any other cultural field” (29). Aboriginal groups were able to
“disrupt and subvert the efforts of those who seek to control them, fashioning their own sporting subcultures, resisting external regulation” (Morgan 2003, 29). Morgan (2003) says that in the case of Australia, “Aboriginal people were selective and discriminating in their response to sporting colonialism. Some activities were adopted, others rejected” (29). Sport provided Aboriginals with professional opportunities (Morgan 2003, 29) and allowed Aboriginals to compete with “non-indigenous adversaries on the egalitarian terms that were denied them in other spheres of life” (Morgan 2003, 29).

Despite the colonial influence of sport in Australia, radical nationalism began to take hold in late nineteenth century. At this time, those who were born in Australia rose to outnumber those who had immigrated from England, and with it came a stronger sense of culture and politics that were opposed to those of Europe (Morgan 2003, 29). Because of its experience as a colony, Australians have developed a populist ideology that sees itself as “small, powerless and marginal” (Morgan 2003, 30). This identity is ironic when considering Aboriginal issues and speaks to the Australian experience. Morgan (2003) clearly points out that the non-Aboriginal Australian can hardly be seen as the underdog and describes the irony of Aboriginal domination through Australia’s larger colonial relationship: “Australians have come to the unsettling realization that the same dynamic applying to engagements with England, also characterized the frontier relationship. There is a disturbing awareness that we as white Australians have benefited from years of internal colonialism. How can we masquerade as the underdogs when we have so patently oppressed the indigenous minority as the British oppressed our convict forebears?” (30).
Morgan’s final question provides the zeitgeist that prompted Australians to politically question the relationship between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals as well as the problems of their history. He goes on to declare that “if the indigenous challenge to conventional Australian historiography means anything, it means personally confronting the consequences of the past, both material and psychological. When this is achieved we can begin to alienate the advantages we enjoy vis a vis indigenous people” (31). The pressures of preparing for the Olympic Games, and the threats of Aboriginal action, allowed Australians to see that Aboriginal political issues needed to be addressed.

Though the opportunity existed for the IOC and SOCOG to use the Olympic Games as a venue for change in the relationship between colonizer and colonized, it instead presented an idealized and reconciled relationship. Morgan (2003) concludes by stating that “by deploying the repertoire of symbolic reconciliation, as expressed through the pageantry and symbolism of the Sydney Olympics [especially the Opening and Closing Ceremonies], the state seeks to evade responsibility to address the deeper questions of colonial power” (35). Morgan believes that the reconciliation that was represented in Sydney did not resolve, in any significant way, the relationship between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals, but announced that it had been reconciled. Though critical of the reconciliation that was reportedly achieved, Morgan doesn’t go far enough to explore the way in which the IOC and SOCOG marketed themselves as a catalyst for this reconciliation and, in reality, appropriated.

Aboriginal sprinter, Cathy Freeman, became a symbol of Australian reconciliation. Her lighting of the Olympic cauldron at Opening Ceremonies as an image
of the new relationship between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals was only eclipsed when she carried the Aborigine and Australian flags during the victory lap of her gold medal performance in the 400m. Critical Olympic scholar, Ian Watts of the University of Western Ontario’s Centre for International Olympic Studies, argues in his 2002 article, “Selling Australia: Cathy Freeman and the Construction of an Australian Identity,” that “aboriginal people in Australia, most specifically Cathy Freeman, were used during the 2000 Olympic Games to construct a cohesive political atmosphere in Australia for a global television audience” (77). He believes that not only is this image of unity created to benefit Australia’s image, but “the successful shaping of that image was beneficial to the humanistic agenda of the International Olympic Committee” (2002, 77). Watts goes further to explore show how Freeman was seen as an ideal candidate to become the symbol of the Games:

[She was a] successful athlete, female, Aborigine, a perspective that, in general agreed with the extant philosophies of the Olympic movement. These qualities were uncritically welcomed by the masses because the threat of injection of controversial ideas by Freeman seemed minimal. Indeed, having an individual from a marginalized group, especially of Freeman’s stature, who welcomed the Olympics, from a seemingly apolitical perspective, reiterated an idea of equality and potential for achievement and movement in the dominant culture by Australia’s Aboriginal people that was being forwarded on the political agenda. Cathy Freeman was by no means a ‘boat rocker’ for the majority of the lead up to Sydney 2000. Essentially she was advertised as an example that an individual’s position in sport and society is representative of an entire group’s potential position in a broader social context (77-78, my emphasis).

Watt’s argues that Freeman became a symbol of the reconciliation but also a mascot for the Sydney Games. Furthermore, the Olympics provided the venue for Freeman to excel and her gold-medal win was held up as an example of what Aboriginals can do within
Australian society. Watts asks the obvious question: Can Aboriginals succeed in Australia in the same way that Freeman succeeded at the Sydney Olympics? The long-term issue that should be considered is whether or not reconciliation has changed the structural workings of Australian politics, society, and culture to make Aboriginal success possible. It is vital to critically examine Cathy Freeman as symbol, and the so-called reconciliation that was achieved during the Sydney Games.

The construction of reconciliation and Cathy Freeman as symbol is easy for global audience consumption. Watts (2002) believes that the Opening Ceremonies in Sydney sought “to place Aborigines into a harmonious relationship within a white Australian hegemony, and to represent the process of reconciliation” (79). This was achieved by presenting “predominantly, the static, collective image of Aboriginals” (Watts 2002, 79) which was a traditional representation that provided “a comfortable response among the broader Australian, and global, population” (Watts 2002, 79). These are images that would not “upset the balance of power between white and Aboriginal Australians” (Watts 2002, 79) while also providing international viewers with images of Aboriginals that fit into recognizable stereotype. The opening ceremonies provided global audiences with “symbols such as boomerangs, loincloths, half naked natives” (79) that accommodated an “idea of comfortable Aboriginality” (79). Cathy Freeman fit nicely into this comfortable image because she was a quiet, politically-distant, and uncontroversial athlete.

The IOC used Freeman as athlete, woman, and Aboriginal to market the Olympics and sport as equality panacea. For Watts (2002), Freeman had “become a purposeful
symbol within broader society because often we establish sport as a social utopia, one in which social relationships become diluted, or constructed as the great equalizer so that it is believed that all who participate have an equal opportunity to be represented and, ultimately, succeed” (80). The IOC and, consequently, the international media chose to ignore the reality that “ideas of gender, ethnicity, and class are all reproduced within sporting cultures without resolving broader social issues” (Watts 2002, 81) but instead “opted for the utopian perspective” (Watts 2002, 81). This isn’t surprising, however, when we consider that the IOC purports to be an organization that markets sport, and itself, “at the service of harmonious development of man, with the view to establishing a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity” (Watts 2002, 78). The Olympic brand is one that markets peace, neutrality, achievement and excellence, and Cathy Freeman as member of a marginalized group becoming an Olympic gold medalist was the symbol for Australia of a new more tolerant nation born out of Olympic ideals (Watts 2002, 81). Watts (2002) is critical of the power of sport to overcome larger social issues and that sport is a facade, and a representation: “the value of sport lies in playing out symbolic social relationships to satisfactory resolutions, rather than to acknowledge that these performances actually change little in the way of resolving social conflicts” (81, my emphasis). In the larger context of the Sydney Games, the images of Aborigines during the Games were traditional and were comfortable for the majority. The use of symbols “such as boomerangs, loincloths, half naked natives” (Watts 2002, 79) sought to maintain “a diluted, frozen image” (Watts 2002, 81) that stood in conflict with the modern, international sporting star Freeman. Watts (2002) explains that “the purpose
for constructing a sanitized history of contemporary Aboriginal–White relations in Australia was to position the country so it appeared as a progressive environment that respected the rights and heritage of its Indigenous populations” (81). Australia appears, on the world stage, to be a modern multicultural society and the IOC is glorified as the means to achieving those ends. These images are achieved through the further marginalization and colonization of Aboriginals with little or no real improvement to their everyday lives.

The Olympics and Canada’s Illusion of Diversity

Working at the University of Windsor researching marginalized peoples, the power relations of sport, and government sport and recreation policy, Victoria Paraschak is concerned with the images of Aboriginal people during sporting events. She is tormented by the paradox of the images: “I felt proud, as a Canadian interested in aboriginal issues, to see this symbolic prominence [of Angela Chalmers carrying the flag at the 1994 Commonwealth Games] given to native peoples and their cultures. As a researcher, however, I am troubled as I reflect back on the abysmal support provided to native participants in sport by the federal government” (1995, 347). When it comes to large international sporting events like the Olympics, Paraschak (1995) says that “it is in these carefully constructed extravaganzas that the host society takes advantage of the opportunity to symbolically declare its values in a public forum” (347). These images are not only carefully constructed, but are also done in such a way that they can be easily consumed by audiences. When Canada has hosted major sporting events, it uses
Aboriginal people to prompt “people around the world to believe that Canada is a nation which respects the cultures of its Aboriginal peoples” (Paraschak 1995, 347). This, however, as we have seen, and will see, is false.

Paraschak (1995) notes that when it comes to major international festivals, expos, and sporting events, aboriginal images are always present, but that “while world-wide consumption of a multicultural image of Canada consistently emerges, the inclusion of Canada’s aboriginal peoples within this multicultural patchwork occurs much less frequently” (350). It is important to remember, as Paraschak does, that “Today, each Indian society is as ‘contemporary’ as any other society: it endeavours to change with circumstances; yet through the ‘white gaze’, many Indian behaviours are not appreciated, because they differ from what they ought (or have been naturalized) to be” (351). The “ought” is the stereotypical image that has been present in major international events. Organizers of these events don’t want to shock, surprise, confuse, or alarm their audience; instead, they want to make their audience feel comfortable by providing them with an image that they recognize. The images are created by non-members and “these dominant images tend to be presented as universal and given, and thus become naturalized in society” (Paraschak 1995, 350) many times these images are the only example of Aboriginal life and experience that audiences have. Many times, too, images “have confined native life to a ‘pre-history’ before European presence” (350); and audiences do not see “native culture as an ongoing lived culture, but rather as one which existed in a distant past” (351). This is especially damaging because it frames Aboriginals as historical artifacts making “it extremely difficult for there to be any meaningful cross-
cultural dialogue between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples” (Forsyth and Wamsley 2005, 242). Forsyth and Wamsley astutely state the reasons why the Organizing Committees and the IOC fail to present a representative image of Aboriginals: “the [Olympic Opening and Closing] ceremonies are epic tales that professional, business, and civic elites weave about themselves and their place in society... [that seek] to legitimise imperialism, to promote ideas about multiculturalism, to encourage civic boosterism, to attract international investments, to foster tourism and, to invent historical traditions that show an intimate connection to the land through a primordial Aboriginal past” (242). Forsyth and Wamsley would agree that the Opening and Closing Ceremonies provide images for domestic and international consumption. Because the Aboriginal of the Olympics fails to have an existence in the modern world, political issues are ignored and cross-cultural dialogue is made impossible.

**Conclusion**

The ways in which the IOC depicts Aboriginal people in its Opening and Closing Ceremonies is appropriation. As Forsyth and Wamsley (2005) astutely state: “The difference between cultural appropriation and cultural appreciation lies in the power relations between who is viewing and what or who is being viewed” (243). There are clear issues of power when the IOC depicts Aboriginal peoples without allowing for Aboriginal input or participants. When the IOC depicts Aboriginal people as animal-skin wearing, teepee living, tomahawk throwing, feathered “Indians” for consumption by global audiences, the IOC misrepresents Aboriginal people and their culture. Though
they may believe and argue that they are showing appreciation, without equal power, the Opening and Closing Ceremonies are exploitative cultural appropriation. Until the IOC accepts its influence and power and recognizes that “International sporting competitions from the standpoint of race relations...are and have always been political” (Paraschak 1995, 347) they will continue to appropriate Aboriginal culture for their own financial and influential gain.

The IOC and National Organizing Committees work hard to protect and maintain the Olympic Brand. As such, they have control over all aspects of the Games which allows them to dictate who portrays Aboriginals and how they are depicted. This is problematic because it does not ascribe equal power to each group and culturally appropriates. There is a long history of Aboriginal misrepresentation in Olympic ceremonies and one that seeks to propagate simple, base, and stereotypical representations of Aboriginal people and their culture. This is done, not only out of ignorance, but because traditional depictions of Aboriginals is a comfortable and recognizable image for international audiences. While the IOC has influence to potentially change the ways in which Aboriginals are depicted in order to bring about significant change for Aboriginal communities, it does not seek to do so because it wants to be seen as politically neutral. We have seen (and will develop further) that Organizational Committees and the IOC are far from neutral and frequently make choices that seek only to protect their brand and their sponsors.

The IOC brand itself as a conduit of peace, cooperation, and international understanding. It is clear through this examination of the treatment of Aboriginals by the
IOC, that the Olympics does not achieve its goal of bridging across pluralism. The IOC’s misrepresentation of Aboriginals does not respect diversity and does not unify. Imbalances of power maintain a binary opposition between “normal” and “other” and the misrepresentation of Aboriginals and failure to respect pluralisms proves that the IOC is unable to alleviate the dilemma of diversity’s tensions. By using examples from the Montreal 1976, Calgary 1988, and Sydney 2000 Games, it is clear that the IOC misrepresents Aboriginals and has established a rhetoric-reality gap.
Chapter 3
The Rise of Ilanaaq, Brand Canada, and Marketing Diversity

Through the examination of the misrepresentation of Aboriginals at the Montreal, Calgary and Sydney Olympic Games, it is clear that a rhetoric-reality gap exists between the IOC’s announced goals and their actions for achieving those goals. This examination might be easily dismissed as a product of history (the Montreal Olympics were 34 years ago, and Calgary was 22 years ago; it has been a decade since the Sydney Games). There are those who might believe that things are different in 2010. While on the surface, it might appear that the IOC has made strides towards Aboriginal partnership and accurate representation by choosing an Inuit cultural artifact (an inukshuk) as the logo for the Vancouver 2010 Games. This logo exemplifies the IOC’s misrepresentation and appropriation of Aboriginal culture. By investigating the development of the inukshuk as symbol, I will show that branding is the most valuable commodity for the IOC, and for Canada. This exploration will reveal that the IOC and Canada as a state both appropriate culture in order to appear to embrace diversity. These efforts to build acceptance of diversity into a brand has an effect of creating a monoculture and eliminating diversity.

Through this exploration, it will be shown that the IOC’s rhetoric of peace and unity attempts to build its brand, but its actions do not support its rhetoric, but, instead, support commercial interests. If Dwight Boyd’s concern with the dilemma of diversity is the tension between those who accept liberalism’s belief in reasonable diversity and the need for prescriptive claims across diversity, then the IOC falls short in its efforts to unify across pluralism. The IOC brands itself as unifier across pluralism but its efforts work to
build their brand image rather than taking tangible steps to bridge pluralism. It the IOC’s appeal to the rhetoric of diversity that it uses to brand itself as diverse when it fails to respect diversity, but denies reasonable pluralism and strengthens its monoculture of commercialism.

Ilanaaq and Cultural Appropriation

The Vancouver 2010 Olympics Winter Games logo, a five-coloured, stylized “inukshuk” called Ilanaaq (which means “friendship” in the Inuit language, Inuktitut), was revealed in April of 2005 and has become a symbol of Canada’s multiculturalism and diversity. The logo has been both criticized and celebrated, and an examination of the logo and the controversy surrounding it provides insight into multiculturalism in Canada, neo-colonization, and commercialism. Having already examined how the Olympic Games have portrayed Aboriginal people in previous Olympics, Ilanaaq is an example of the continuous appropriation of culture. I will show that the choice of a logo depicting an Inuit cultural artifact is not about cultural respect and appreciation, but is, instead, about building the Olympic brand and strengthening Brand Canada by appearing respectful of Aboriginal culture, but valuing corporate interest.

From its inception, the Vancouver 2010 Olympic logo was designed as a commercial tool. Elena Rivera MacGregor of Vancouver’s Rivera Design Group (RDG) created the logo and their company’s mission statement holds no illusions about what a logo should do:

Our mission is to maximize your marketing dollars through business-
minded solutions that contribute to the growth of your business. We take an active role in identifying communication needs for each project. As a result we combine strategic solutions and innovative ideas to create marketing materials that are appropriate to an audience, that are consistent, recognizable and reflect brand values. We believe in design as a tool for advancing business and culture. By integrating marketing strategy, technology, and creative design we develop unique communications solutions that capture attention and make a lasting impression. A clear message, focused and distributed to a target audience ensures that your marketing dollars are an investment that increases your business (RDG).

This is a company that understands and appreciates the meanings behind and purpose of their logo for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games. The logo was designed by professionals who understand the ins-and-outs of the advertising/marketing/design business and should be examined for its semiotic importance. The question that remains in response to the RDG mission statement is, “How has Ilanaaq appealed to an audience, in a consistent, recognizable way that reflects brand values?” The answer calls for a consideration of the inukshuk as icon, and, secondly, what brand values are represented.

In his article, “Inukshuk Rising: Iconification, Brand Canada and Vancouver 2010,” Canadian Studies scholar at Carleton University, Jeffrey Ruhl, outlines the history of the symbol of the inukshuk in what he calls “the rise of Brand Canada” (2008, 25) and the unveiling of the Vancouver 2010 Olympic logo “was a brand roll-out” (2008, 25):

the inukshuk was set to take its place among the iconic pantheon of ‘things Canadian’ – maple leaves, tall trees, beavers, moose, Mounties, hockey, totem poles, mountains and lighthouses – the inukshuk, being an Inuit symbol from the North, seemed like a logical addition to the cast of characters that came to represent ‘the True North Strong and Free’ (Ruhl 2008, 25).

He goes on to muse: “What was curious, however, was the speed by which the process of
what I am calling *iconification* occurred” (2008, 25). Ruhl argues that there has been a conscious decision to create icons in Canada that come to symbolize what Canada is and what it means to be Canadian. As we have seen in our discussion of the portrayal of Aboriginals, these representations are often stereotypical and are comfortable, simplified images (or in this case objects) that involve unequal power relations. Though Ruhl does outline the history of the rise of the inukshuk, he doesn’t go far enough to explore the more sinister aspects of the inukshuk’s rise as an icon. In examining the inukshuk, I will do so.

An inukshuk (plural: inuksuit) is a large human-made stone pile of varied shapes, but most often recognized as resembling a human figure with legs, arms, torso, and head. Scott Heyes is a cultural geography and landscape architect who has extensively studied Aboriginal conceptions of landscape and geography in Canada’s Arctic. He explains that because “Canadian Inuit have inhabited the inland and coastal regions of the Arctic for the last 4000 years” (2002, 134), the inuksuit of the Canadian Arctic are historical artifacts and they must be culturally protected. Their exact usage is difficult to pinpoint or easily define. Heyes (2002) cites that they have multiple uses such as: a navigation tool erected as a directional route marker (138), marker of meat caches (137), a marker of fertile fishing or hunting grounds (139), warning marker of dangerous terrain or shallow water (139), a hiding place during the caribou hunt (139), and as a herding tool during the hunt (“a caribou fence, known as *aulaqquat*... was erected to frighten or confuse the animals”(139)). Though their exact purpose is complex, Heyes argues that they must be respected because “to the Inuit, inuksuit are objects of veneration – they are embedded in
the roots of Inuit society within songs, shamanism, myths, legends and stories” (2002, 134).

Despite their cultural significance, inuksuit, Jeffrey Ruhl (2008) suggests, have been transformed from a “relatively ‘natural’ and ambiguous…to a ‘value-laden’ icon imbued with an apparent and innate embodiment of Canadian values” (28). He argues that the path towards iconification is because of, not in spite of, the inukshuk’s ambiguity:

It is chthonic, faceless, genderless, secular and silent. For a vast nation with distinct regions, a diverse immigrant population, and a traditional inability to articulate a unified sense of national identity, the inukshuk ‘speaks’ for no one particular group or people, except of course, the Inuit. And even then, in the iconified inukshuk, the specific Inuit context becomes elided by a more general sense of Aboriginality. This is an important factor because part of the value-myth that is invested into the iconified inukshuk are the values of tolerance and diversity (2008, 26, my emphasis).

For Ruhl, the ambiguity of the inukshuk has led to its promotion as iconified Canadian symbol and allowed it to be transformed into whichever interpretation best suits its user. When Ruhl notes the “general sense of Aboriginality” he does not critically examine the appropriation and commodification of Inuit culture or the lack of cultural respect to non-Inuit Aboriginals whose cultures are diverse. As icon, the semiotic value, according to Ruhl, is that the inukshuk represents the values of tolerance and diversity. Though this may be the desired representation by the Rivera Design Group, and Olympic organizers, the Vancouver 2010 logo demonstrates cultural appropriation by powerful elites.

When Ilanaaq was unveiled, British Columbia First Nations leaders were outspoken in their displeasure in the choice of logo. Grand Chief of the First Nations Summit, Edward John, believes that the “First Nations in British Columbia helped sway
the Olympic selection committee” and that “One of the first important acts the [Vancouver 2010] committee did was kind of a slight on the support of First Nations” (CBC News 2005b). For John, the Ruhl’s “more general sense of Aboriginality” (2008, 26) is inadequate and disrespectful. The Assembly of First Nations points out that First Nations, Métis, and Inuit are separate and should never be considered homogenous. Chief Stewart Philip of the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs believes that the logo should have represented local British Columbia First Nations: “The First Nations community at large is disappointed with the selection. The decision makers have decided not to reflect the First Nations and the Pacific region in the design of the logo” (CBC News 2005b).

Nunavut’s Premiere at the time of the unveiling, Paul Okaliq, was pleased with the logo saying, “We don’t have any maple leaves where I come from. This is very special. It shows a strength. Our inukshuk has been around a very long time. To be shown off to the rest of the world is very special for us” (CBC News 2005a).

For Okaliq, the inukshuk logo is a way for Nunavut and the Inuit to be showcased to the world, and is a way for Nunavut to capitalize on international Olympic audience. The Vancouver 2010 Games Organizing Committee (VANOC) signed a licensing agreement with the Four Host First Nations (FHFN) and Nunavut Development Corporation (NDC) giving them “rights to market merchandise with aboriginal themes under the Olympic brand” (CBC News 2008). For Nunavut, this has meant that 600 artists will be commissioned to create 3000 inuksuit to be sold as authentic pieces of Inuit art (CBC News 2008). The agreement was struck through the Nunavut Development

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4 According to the 2001 Census, Inuit make up 85% of Nunavut’s population, and one half of all Inuit live in Nunavut (Statistics Canada).
Corporation (NDC) whose purpose is “to create a vibrant, diverse and stable economy throughout Nunavut. It creates employment and income opportunities for residents through business development in arts, crafts, and cuisine with sensitivity to cultural and spiritual values” (NDC). In its very name, the Nunavut Development Corporation announces its purpose to promote business opportunities and Paul Okaliq can barely contain his glee during the announcement of the inukshuk licensing agreement: “We’re getting a wonderful gift today. It’s like Christmas in Nunavut…Today’s agreement guarantees that Inuit carvers will be paid a fair price” (CBC News 2008) and the agreement will “help protect [aboriginal artists] from cheap knockoffs made overseas” (CBC News 2008). Similarly, in a Vancouver Sun newspaper article articulates what licensing agreements mean to the FHFN:

Tewanee Joseph, the executive director of the [Four Host First Nations] secretariat, said aboriginal artists have complained in the past that their ideas are sometimes stolen and altered by others. The licensing deal will help showcase and protect work around a particularly important event, he said. "It is mainly to ensure that our cultures are respected while working as partners in the Olympic Games. That’s really our goal (Vancouver Sun 2008).

Joseph seems, in this case, to acknowledge a larger appropriation issue, but seems satisfied that it is solved by a licensing agreement that ensures remuneration is provided to Aboriginal artists. It seems that foreign companies stealing and altering Aboriginal ideas is what Joseph seems most concerned with; the appropriation of Aboriginal culture by the IOC and VANOC does not concern him. Clearly, VANOC and the Four Host First Nations and the NDC have a great deal to gain through their partnership. VANOC is seen as cognizant and respectful of aboriginal groups, and can portray its tolerance and respect
for diversity while Aboriginal groups actively become a part of the Olympic brand. While financial compensation is assured through this partnership, it is an example of the influence of commercialism, and does nothing to address the realities of Aboriginal’s everyday lives that they must allow their culture and art to be sold to the highest bidder.

It should be noted that Paul Okaliq, the Premiere of Nunavut at the time of the agreement, does not represent all Nunavumiut (inhabitants of Nunavut). As Premiere, he represents government interests, and must protect of his territory’s business interests. “The deal…was hailed by MLAs as a publicity coup for Inuit” (Thompson 2008) because it provides a captive market, but also because it allows Northern Canada to be a part of the Olympic Games. Not all Inuit agree, and some have complained that Ilanaaq should not be called an inukshuk at all. Peter Irniq, former Nunavut commissioner explains: “Inuit never build Inukshuk with head, legs and arms. I have seen Inukshuk built more recently – 100 years maybe by non-Inuit in Nunavut – with head, legs and arms. These are not called Inukshuk. These are called ‘inunguat,’ [meaning] imitation of man, imitation of a person” (CBC News 2005b). According to Irniq’s interpretation, the inukshuk is an inauthentic icon because a symbol of a culture it has been appropriated and has had its meaning stripped. In describing the inukshuk, Iqaluit’s Nunatsiaq News reporter John Thompson (2008), says, “The humble inukshuk occupies the lower rungs of modern Inuit art. Once a trail marker, they’re now a trinket for tourists, often roughly hewn from soapstone chunks. In Iqaluit, it’s hard to eat a meal in any restaurant or bar without being offered one for sale. The town is awash with them”(Thompson). The inukshuk licensing deal masquerades as the protection of culture, but through the
appropriation of the inukshuk profit is its primary value.

Jeffrey Ruhl (2008) argues that the Canadian government benefits from the choice of the inukshuk as Olympic logo because “VANOC chose a new national symbol that would be recognized as ‘Canadian,’ and the state, in turn, would use the Olympic logo to benefit its own domestic and external brand” (28). The Canadian government’s attempt to co-brand itself with the Olympics through the inukshuk logo is as important as it is for any Olympic corporate partner. VANOC and the government of Canada have worked to imbue the inukshuk with Canadian values because “the roll-out of Ilanaaq offers the state a large market with corporate co-sponsors in which the values-rhetoric can be easily reproduced, replicated and marketed to a nation of consumers” (Ruhl 29). Ilanaaq and the inukshuk, Ruhl (2008) argues, provide the “values-rhetoric” that appeals most to potential corporate investors:

It is obvious that companies like GM and Bell do not value, say, diversity, tolerance or hospitality above their bottom line. Thus the rhetoric of values at the corporate level remains at best in the sphere of the superficial. Companies market products through brands which, as van Ham suggests, ‘giv[es] products and services an emotional dimension with which people can identify.’ This is why corporations pay substantial costs in licensing fees, so they can have an emotional association with brands like Ilanaaq and market the Olympic or Canadian Spirit rather than a phone or a car (29, my emphasis).

Ruhl declares that corporations want to be associated with values-rhetoric, but do not, necessarily, need to possess those values. By using Ilanaaq, the Olympics associates itself with the values represented by the inukshuk; VANOC wants to be seen as empathetic towards First Nations and aboriginal groups, multiculturalism and diversity. Similarly, the government of Nunavut and the Inuit want to be associated with the Olympics and the
economic benefits that it believes will be brought to the territory. Companies want to be associated with both through sponsorship of the Olympics and the right to display the Vancouver 2010 logo.

Ruhl (2008) uncritically states that “It would seem a rather cynical stance to view the brand state as similar to the corporate brand, associating products with values to appeal to the emotional instincts of consumers” (29). It will become clear that the government of Canada is branding itself to value-rhetoric to appeal customer emotions. Cynical or not, Canada has branded itself and appeals to Canadian values-rhetoric with the intention of appeasing and placating Canadians as well as appealing to international markets. Multiculturalism is an essential part of Canada’s brand and Canada markets diversity for domestic and international consumption.

**Branding**

A global brand is an international symbol that is represented through marketing. Douglas B. Holt is professor of Marketing at the Said Business School at Oxford University focusing on icons, branding, and culture. In his *Harvard Business Review* article (2004), “How Global Brands Compete,” Holt uses economist and Harvard professor Theodore Levitt’s thoughts on global markets and multinational corporations: “transnational companies should standardize products, packaging, and communication to achieve a least-common-denominator positioning that would be effective across cultures” (69). Levitt believed that standardized products, service, and communication allows companies to maintain their production at very little increased expense, while massively
increasing their market. Holt (2004) notes that though standardization is a good idea, in theory, it did not take long until global branding slowed because, “Consumers in most countries had trouble relating to the generic products and communications” (69). Holt (2004) points out that “the forces that Levitt described didn’t produce a homogeneous world market; they produced a global culture” (70) and he outlines how this occurred:

   For decades, communication had circulated mostly within the borders of countries, helping to build strong national cultures. Toward the end of the twentieth century, much of popular culture became global. As nations integrated into the world economy, cross-border tourism and labour mobility rose…those factors force people to see themselves in relation to other cultures as well as their own (70).

For Holt, the catalyst for globalization was communication, and media, transmitted and received globally created a global popular culture. He explains that “the rise of a global culture doesn’t mean that consumers share the same tastes or values. Rather, people in different nations, often with conflicting viewpoints, participate in a shared conversation, drawing upon shared symbols” (2004, 70). While not addressing Boyd’s dilemma of diversity, Holt does allude to reasonable pluralism and the need to bridge across diversity. As a marketer, he believes that brands can accomplish this. Corporate brands are a part of these shared symbols, and as a result “consumers ascribe certain characteristics to global brands and use those attributes as criteria while making purchase decisions” (2004, 70).

   When consumers ascribe characteristics to corporate brands, they assign what anti-globalization author and activist, Naomi Klein, explains as branding: “The idea that if companies wanted to be truly successful in the global marketplace, they had to understand that their true product was not their product (i.e.: sneakers, movies, lattes,
computers.) It was an idea. A lifestyle. It was meaning itself” (No Logo, 2003).

Competition forced companies to realize that their products didn’t matter because Product X was not and could not be unique. For every company, there would be other companies that produced the same product; and that product could be inferior, but it could also be superior. It was up to companies to market their product, and themselves, in such a way that they could be trusted as a company, and that their product was valuable. Klein explains branding: “The process of branding, in its simplest form, is just the process of marking a product with a consistent logo/image/mascot that sends a message to the consumer; a message of consistency a message of quality” (No Logo, 2003). In her book, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Klein believes that there was a shift in the mid-nineties when marketing went from selling a product to selling a brand and that the key to long-term commercial success depended on consumers establishing a spiritual connection with the product and the company: “the products that will flourish in the future will be the ones presented not as ‘commodities’ but as concepts: the brand experience, as lifestyle” (21).

The coveting of lifestyle is the very essence of branding. For companies, branding allows expansion and that instead of producing a single product; a company can apply their brand to other products and can appeal to customers who support a lifestyle. Polo-Ralph Lauren started with a single line of men’s ties and has now expanded to 24 lines of men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing, 24 lines of fragrances, as well as a line of home housewares products including paint, furniture, bedding and baths. The Ralph Lauren brand has been given, through advertising, a lifestyle, no matter what product they
produce. In showing the lifestyle creation of branding, Klein (2000) quotes Renzo Rosso of Diesel Jeans: “We don’t sell a product, we sell a style of life. I think we have created a movement…The Diesel concept is everything. It’s the way to live, it’s the way to wear, it’s the way to do something” (23-24). By way of contrast, Klein (2000) presents The Levi Strauss Company as an example of a company that failed to develop lifestyle, but remained product oriented:

‘Maybe one of Levi’s problems is that it has no Cola,’ speculated Jennifer Steinhauer in The New York Times. ‘It has no denim-toned house paint. Levi makes what is essentially a commodity: blue jeans. Its ads may evoke rugged outdoorsmanship, but Levi hasn’t promoted any particular life style to sell other products’ (Klein 23).

It is believed that global companies must associate themselves with a lifestyle in order to ensure long-term success. The IOC works to brand itself in the same way, and seeks to inspire consumers to embrace its lifestyle, by not only supporting the Olympic Games, but by supporting the corporations and nations that embrace the IOC. This support is not just consuming merchandise and watching sporting events on television, but also supporting IOC values and ideology. Branding becomes the acceptance and normalization of values and lifestyle which dominates the marginalized other who reject its lifestyle. The normalization of dominant values and rejection of the “other” denies reasonable pluralism and, as will be developed later, has dangerous impacts on democracy.

**State/Nation/Destination Branding**

Branding extends beyond corporations to nation-states. Peter van Ham, Global
Governance Research Programme Director at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations and author of “The Rise of the Brand State,” believes that branding goes beyond products: “individuals, firms, cities, regions, countries, and continents all market themselves professionally” (2001, 2). Van Ham (2001) reiterates Klein’s argument when he states: “straightforward advertising has given way to branding—giving products and services an emotional dimension with which people can identify” (2). Van Ham believes that countries, like companies, have realized that for long-term success not only economic, but also political, they must create an emotional connection with global audiences: “[countries] with geographical and political settings that seem trivial compared to their emotional resonance among an increasingly global audience of consumers” (van Ham 2001, 2). Like corporations, countries realize that branding has very little, if anything, to do with products. Van Ham (2001) claims that “branding acquires its power because the right brand can surpass the actual product as a company’s central asset…smart states are building their brands around reputations and attitudes in the same way smart companies do” (3-4). Countries, he believes, must market themselves to other countries and global citizens with an emotional connection that is as important as the quality of its products, a government’s politics, or even the quality of its citizens.

Van Ham (2001) argues that countries believe “creating a brand is not only economically desirable, it has considerable political and strategic implications” (van Ham 4), and he explores how organizations like European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have built their brands. NATO, for Eastern Europe is “the main institution in the security realm, spreading democracy and stability” (van Ham
2001, 5) and “in central Europe, the NATO logo has become a symbol of respectability and the ultimate marker of ‘Westernness’” (van Ham 2001, 5). Similarly, the EU “is in the midst of a campaign to brand itself as a beacon of civilization and prosperity in an otherwise disorderly and disoriented world” (van Ham 2001, 5). Both these organizations hold high standards for membership so as not to allow their brand to become “diluted” (van Ham 2001, 5). Van Ham discusses the state brand’s development, but remains entirely uncritical, but does note the irony that in order “to realistically vie for membership [into NATO and the EU], a state must already have acquired the amenities—security and affluence—promised by NATO and the EU” (van Ham 2001, 6). These organizations have branded themselves as secure and prosperous, and because they will not accept “members that are ‘consumers’ of security” and will only invite “countries with functioning market economies” (van Ham 2001, 6) the brand remains desirable. Countries that wish to enhance their own state brand’s image believe that it is necessary to be a part of this affiliation. Like corporations that market themselves as providers of a particular lifestyle, countries (and organizations like NATO and the EU) brand themselves so that other countries, organizations, and citizens believe that they provide that lifestyle. To recall branding’s core impetus that in a competitive global marketplace, products can be of varying quality, lifestyle branding becomes the determining factor for long-term viability regardless of the real quality of the product: in a world of many states, state branding is believed to be the way to ensure long-term political, economic, and social viability.
Brand Canada

Canada has long been a beacon of state branding. The Federal Identity Program was established by the government of Canada on October 23, 1970 (Large 1991, 32) to “standardize a corporate identity for the Canadian government” (Wikipedia Contributors) and has played an important part in the development of Brand Canada both internally and externally. The Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada runs the Federal Identity Program (FIP) which is:

The Government of Canada’s corporate identity program. It helps project the government as a coherent, unified administration and enables Canadians to recognize at a glance their government at work for them. It facilitates access to government programs and services through clear and consistent identification. The FIP policy, in concert with the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, helps shape the “face” and the “voice” of government (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, my emphasis).

The language used emphasizes consistency, development, clarity, and image. The language implies that the program is intended to convince citizens both domestically and internationally that Canada is well-organized, efficient, and professional.

The date of the FIP’s creation is illuminating because it was during the height of the October Crisis of 1970. French Quebec went through a rapid period of development and growth in the 1960s which saw the strengthening of Quebec nationalism that was in opposition to Canadian federalism; this growth in Quebec is commonly called The Quiet Revolution. During this time, the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), a Quebec-nationalist group, used violence to demand separation from Canada and the establishment of Quebec sovereignty. Members of the FLQ kidnapped British Trade Commissioner
James Cross and Quebec’s Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte and presented a series of demands including prisoner exchanges and the national broadcasting of the FLQ Manifesto. On October 17, 1970, the FLQ announced that Pierre Laporte had been executed. James Cross was held for 60 days before being released. In this time of immense conflict between the Government of Canada and Quebec separatists, the government needed to establish programs that would strengthen federalism in Canada.

Founder of the Registered Graphic Designers of Ontario, Michael Large, in his 1991 article, “The Corporate Identity of the Canadian Government,” notes that “in 1968, the newly-elected Liberal party, lead by Pierre Trudeau, perceived the need to evaluate and co-ordinate all its communications in order to increase public awareness of the role of central government and to improve internal morale” (34). The Official Languages Act of 1969 ensured bilingual communication as “a direct response to growing separatist sentiment in Quebec” (Large 1991, 34). The wordmark, which had been created in 1965 (Large 32) was adopted prominently by the FIP in 1980 as a response to the May 20, 1980 sovereignty referendum in Quebec. According to the Canadian Design Resource, “utilizing tactics previously reserved for business, [the wordmark] is one of the first applications of identity branding by any government.” The wordmark would “[introduce] the word ‘Canada’ more forcibly into the programme [FIP]” and the “Canadian Federal Identity Program was thus an integral part of the government’s response to critical

5 This overly brief and simplistic summary does not give justice to the events and importance of the October Crisis to Quebec and Canada. For more information, please see John A. Dickinson and Brian Young’s A Short History of Quebec, William Tetley’s The October Crisis 1970: An Insider's View, and Robert Bothwell’s Canada and Quebec: One Country, Two Histories.

6 “It consists of the word "Canada" written in a serif font, a modified version of Baskerville, with a Canadian flag over the final ‘a’” (Wikipedia Contributors).
political issues of national unity in Canada as a whole, and separatism in Quebec” (Large 1991, 34). Canada has worked to build its brand, by using identifiers like the wordmark (which is a logo) to show that the government works hard is producing a quality product. Recalling Klein, it is easy to see the relationship between corporate brand and state brand.

Large does not hide the corporate intentions of the design and marketing of Canada through its branding strategy. He points out, interestingly, that “originally, the term ‘corporate identity’ was not acceptable in government because of its commercial connotations, and the term ‘federal presence’ was preferred...with corporate visibility increasing... this distinction has been dropped” (1991, 40). He draws comparisons between the government’s identity programs which are concerned with: “recognition by very diverse publics (whether for commercial or political reasons); internal and external visual consistency and coherence; the communication of policies and qualities to their different publics; and the cost-saving advantages of nationalization” (1991, 41). Large addresses no concerns, issues, or problems of state branding and remains uncritical of nationalism. He approaches his work, not surprisingly, through his perspective as a graphic designer and advocates the power of design and marketing to articulate a message. Large is in the semiotics and representation business, and concludes by saying that the FIP “has been successful in appropriating and co-ordinating a range of national symbols in a vast range of applications. The programme therefore provides a valuable example of the use of identity design to unify a diverse organization internally…and to establish a recognizable presence in the face of strong regionalism” (41). His use of “appropriating” shows that, while he is knowledgeable of the power of branding, he is
uncritical, or ambivalent, of its larger impacts. His use of the words “diverse” and “unify” speak to Boyd’s dilemma of diversity and the need to bridge across pluralism. The FIP is an overt attempt by the Canadian government to bridge pluralisms and address its dilemma of diversity.

While the Federal Identity Program looks to build the Canada brand to domestic and international consumers, other federal programs look to capitalize on it. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), a federal department reporting to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, has established a program entitled “Canada Brand International” which promotes Canadian Agriculture through Brand Canada. It directly declares:

As soon as anyone sees or hears of a Canadian food or agricultural product, we want them to instinctively decide that the product will meet or exceed their expectations. Why? Because it’s from Canada. The Canada brand is our image and reputation. It’s what customers can expect to experience, every time they deal with us... Successful organizations that have developed a strong brand know who they are and why they are relevant to their customers. How they look, what they do, the way they sound and how they promote themselves are all consistent with the way they want to be perceived in the market place. And, what they stand for is captured in a brand promise with core attributes that they want to be known for (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2006, my emphasis).

AAFC holds no illusions about the purpose and impact of the establishment of the Canadian state brand. Using language like “image,” “reputation,” “perceived,” and “core attributes” show that Canada has bought into state branding and actively encourages individuals and companies to get on board to capitalize on Brand Canada’s established emotional connection with consumers.
The AAFC’s promotion of Brand Canada International stresses the creation of lifestyle and the emotional connection of branding. Perception is of the highest importance, and AAFC values the Canadian lifestyle more than the product: “We want them to think that: our products are excellent, as a multi-cultural country we focus on customers and respond to the needs of our international clients, as an industry, we are committed to continuous improvements (AAFC, my emphasis). The AAFC’s use of the phrase “we want them to think” suggests that it isn’t important whether or not the product is excellent; for the purposes of the brand, the only thing that is important is that international consumers think that Canada’s agriculture is of the highest quality. Secondly, AAFC is drawing connections to multiculturalism when it claims that “as a multi-cultural country we focus on customers and respond to the needs of our international clients.” Brand Canada has recognized the multicultural nature of the country and markets its multiculturalism. This is the commercialization of multiculturalism.

**Democracy and the Politics of Brand Canada**

Canadian Studies scholar working on national identity and the politics of branding Canada, Richard Nimijean, suggests that the Liberal Party of Canada under Jean Chrétien’s leadership, succeeded because Brand Canada “was used not only to advance national interests but also to promote the government’s policy agenda” (Nimijean 2006a, 85). Nimijean (2006a) believes that state branding is insidious: “the case of Canada under Jean Chrétien’s leadership shows that framing public policy in terms of national identity
and national values can be used not only to promote international competitiveness or interests of state but also to advance narrow partisan interests” (85). In the same way that a company cultivates a brand image, and a country builds a state brand/image, political parties (partisan interests) brand themselves. What is problematic is that Chrétien’s Liberals branded themselves as inextricably linked to “national pride” and “Canadian values” (Nimijean 2006a, 86) which narrowed political discussion and reduced democracy, by framing critics of the governments and its policies as un-Canadian and opposed to Canadian values.

While in power, the Chrétien Liberal Government used branding to create an emotional connection with Canadians, but undertook drastic cuts to programs such as health care, postsecondary education and social assistance. While “implementing steep cuts to the welfare state even as they were celebrating its merits” (Nimijean 2006a, 87), the Liberals cloaked themselves in a state brand that was “defended in the name of the Canadian identity” (Nimijean 2006a, 87) but was, in reality, created, promoted, and marketed by the Liberal government. The Chrétien Liberals succeeded in “[introducing] ‘fiscal sovereignty’ as a new core Canadian value….Couched in the language of Canadian pride and sovereignty, it allowed Liberals to proclaim the necessity of a progressive welfare state, but only in terms of a state that was affordable” (Nimijean 2006a, 87). The welfare state was cut on the grounds of fiscal responsibility and those who decried the government’s decision to reduce funding to social programs were vilified as anti-Canada and portrayed as irresponsible and unaccountable. Similarly, those who critiqued the social programs were similarly anti-Canada because the compassion of the
social welfare state is seen as a core Canadian value. This created a paradoxical system of “progressive social values and tight fiscal policy” (Nimijean 2006a, 87); a paradox that could only be maintained through Brand Canada.

Nimijean beautifully articulates how Jean Chrétien and the Liberal Party were able to frame Brand Canada to their own agenda:

In the middle to late 1990s, Chrétien began highlighting ‘progressive’ Canadian values like ‘caring and sharing’ and ‘compassion,’ arguing that Canadian institutions like federalism and programs like medicare embodied these values and were a reflection of ‘The Canadian Way,’ a unique response to the challenges of the Canadian experience (2006a, 86).

The Liberal Party of Canada modified and defined Brand Canada within the values and rhetoric of their own policies. From a political perspective, Chrétien had “rearticulated Canadian values” in alignment with that of his own party: “Brand Canada could claim that Canadian values were Liberal Party values and vice versa, relegating [other political parties] to the margins of political influence” (Nimijean 2006a, 87). Brand Canada had been manipulated in order to secure popular government support while eliminating much of the Canadian social support system. During the Chrétien government years, when the Liberals claimed increasing Canadian prosperity Nimijean states that “Economic inequality grew during the 1990s. University tuition more than doubled. Billions were removed from health care, social assistance and unemployment insurance” (Nimijean 2006a, 90). Brand Canada had, ironically, allowed the Liberal government to reduce the programs and services that had once been defined as uniquely Canadian.

Brand Canada has the effect, according to Nimijean, of reducing debate and
limiting dialogue: “policy initiatives and pronouncements are framed in terms of a distinctive Canadian value set that limits the ideological spectrum and clash of ideas necessary for debating policy” (2006b, 68). In the past, it was hoped that competing ideologies interacted, a negotiation took place, and the policies developed through these negotiations “had to respect the multidimensional levels of Canadian diversity, such as class, ethnicity, region and gender” (Nimijean 2006b, 68). This interaction and negotiation is especially important because the results are uniquely Canadian policies: “a unique form of federalism, integrated policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism, redistributive policies reflected in the welfare state, public health care, peacekeeping, and the desire to be a middle power internationally” (Nimijean 2006b, 68). Nimijean notes David Bell’s assertion that “reframing debates about public policy in terms of ‘Canadian values’ has effectively reduced the scope of ideological diversity in Canada, which is one of the foundations of the Canadian political culture” (2006b, 69).

Brand Canada’s reduction of dialogue and policy negotiation internally has implications to Canada’s global position. In much the same way that Brand Canada has been marketed and sold to Canadians, Canada, as brand, is being sold to other nations. The diversity of dialogue and ideology in Canada “has been superseded by the rise of the ‘entrepreneurial Canadian,’ who focuses much less on social policy than on questions of neoliberal restructuring in light of heightened globalization” (Nimijean 2006b, 68). Still, in a Canada that is becoming less diverse politically, Nimijean believes that diversity “has been assigned a strategic yet secondary role” (2006b, 68) while at the same time, “diversity has become a key element of the transformed Canadian narrative, and even a
selling point for neoliberal restructuring” (Nimijean 2006b, 69). Diversity is seen as a selling point, but political diversity is shrinking raising the question: Whose voice is dominant?

The selling of Canadian diversity “is central to the efforts to transform the national narrative” (Nimijean 2006b, 70), but Canada isn’t marketing its diversity in the hopes of making the world a more socially just and compassionate place; Canada’s interest in diversity is economically motivated. Canada brands itself as a more open and caring alternative to the United States and other wealthy Western nations. Canada has directly marketed itself to China to the point in which former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien boasted that “China said Canada was its best friend” (Dolbec), and Former Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific, David Kilgour, “framed Canada in terms of its ‘Asianification,’ due to close immigration, education, and economic links” (Nimijean 2006b, 70). Nimijean (2006b) believes that when it comes to the branding of Canada’s diversity:

Diversity, most tellingly, was the first selling point to Asians: ‘our country offers an alternative concept in North America to that of our closest neighbour. Our brand in the world today is diversity and inclusiveness. We are a non-colonizing power that believes in constructive multilateralism’ (70).

The Canadian diversity is used as a marketing tool for Canada’s brand and is used to generate interest in Canada from foreign investors and global markets. Brand Canada appeals to potential consumers’ emotions and hopes that consumers buy into the Canadian lifestyle.
The Perils of Branding

It is necessary, then, to reconsider the authenticity and the credibility of Canada’s diversity in its branding. Nimijean (2006b) states: “the articulated ideals of Canadian foreign policy often stand in contradistinction to the promotion of Canada’s more narrow economic interests that drive much of the foreign policy agenda” (71). What Canada says and what Canada does is not necessarily the same thing and Brand Canada is intensely hypocritical: “it is rather presumptuous to claim that Canada has a monopoly on certain values, and that the realization of such goals exceeds the capacity of Canada to promote them. In other words, the values articulated by the federal government often do not correspond with its public policy actions” (Nimijean 2006b, 71). What is happening here, according to Nimijean, is that Canadian values, projected abroad through Brand Canada, have created a “rhetoric-reality gap” and he agrees with Thompson Rivers University Philosophy, History, and Political Science professor, Terry Kading, who believes that “As Canada’s good reputation abroad appears to be used to achieve more important strategic trade goals, it is perhaps worth reflecting on precisely which values we are exporting” (Nimijean 2006b, 71). Kading’s call for a reflection on Canada value export demands that Canada reexamine itself as “non-colonizer”. Is Brand Canada’s exporting of values neo-colonization? What values are being sold when the rhetoric-reality gap grows ever wider? Brand Canada is hurting Canada’s international reputation because there is a broad rhetoric-reality gap between its rhetoric and the realities of Canadian life.

Canada’s foreign policy is to blame. Nimijean believes that the fusion of the department of External Affairs and the department of International Trade in the 1980s is
the genesis of the problem. The success of Canadian culture became tied to financial and economic gain masqueraded as foreign policy: “vitality of our culture is also essential to our economic success” (Nimijean 2006b, 72). What is problematic about this alliance between external affairs and international trade is that much of Canada’s work in other countries is not for foreign aid, but for the financial benefit of Canada. Canadian aid to Africa is an example of what political author and commentator, Andrew Cohen, calls “tied aid”: “The Canadian Council for International Cooperation reported that despite the $500 million “Canada Fund for Africa,” $100 million of the $420 million allocated as of 2003 was for private sector partnerships, that is, for Canadian for-profit firms to deliver water, energy, and other services” (Nimijean 2006b, 75). Canada’s boasts of fiscal sovereignty and balanced budgets come at the expense of not only domestic social programs, but also at the expense of developing nations. While “Canada’s contribution was 0.25% of GDP, below the international average of 0.39%, and well below Canada’s high point of 0.75% in 1975” (Nimijean 2006b, 75), Brand Canada proclaims Canada’s values, but delivers “an approach to foreign policy that apparently sought to minimize commitments while maximizing prestige” (2006b, 77).

Douglas B. Holt (2004) states that “Global success [of brands] often allows companies to deliver value to consumers by authoring identity-affirming myths” (74), but it is vital that they “create appropriate myths” (74). Holt declares that “when companies author less-than-credible myths, it can hurt brands” (Holt 2004, 74). Brand Canada can easily be seen as an example of this kind of inauthenticity. Canada has worked to build its brand in the same way that companies do. There are many countries in the world in which
to live or do business, and Brand Canada presents a lifestyle and experience that it hopes will differentiate it from the competition. The image Canada presents is one of multiculturalism and diversity, but the positive relationships that it presents are inauthentic. Holt believes that the myths that brands create must be credible in order for the brand to succeed. In the same way that an oil company can’t credibly brand itself as environmentally friendly and sustainable, Canada can’t brand itself as culturally diverse and socially responsible when its policies cut the social safety net in Canada and value economic benefit over reasonable pluralism.

**Conclusion**

The IOC, as organizer of the world’s largest international event, wants to brand itself as an organization that values diversity and believes in reasonable pluralism. By choosing a stylized inukshuk as its logo, the IOC and VANOC hopes to project a positive relationship with Aboriginal people and to build its image of accepting of diversity. The IOC and VANOC actions are not respectful of Aboriginal cultures but instead appropriate their culture by valuing commercial interests.

By exploring branding, and the reasons why a company, an organization, a nation-state, and Canada want to create and market their brand, it is clear that long-term economic viability is the priority. The examination of branding culminates with branding’s manipulation resulting in the reduction of democracy. By branding values and lifestyle, discussion, dissent, and negotiation are reduced with the effect of strengthening and maintaining the dominant point of view. Branding is important to the discussion of
Boyd’s dilemma of diversity because if the IOC and the Olympics are a means of bridging across diversity, then it is important to examine the IOC brand and the impacts that it has upon reasonable pluralisms. This critical exploration of branding reveals that it works to create a monoculture that does not value pluralism. The IOC and its Olympics are not unifying but divisive.

As will be explored in detail later, the Olympics does not bridge diversity, but strengthens nationalism and reduces diversity. Before examining how this is accomplished, it is first important to understand and evaluate the educational aims of the IOC. This exploration will uncover further the commercial interests of the IOC and the ways in which it develops brand loyalty by advertising, through in-school educational programs, the corporate interests of its corporate partners. These educational programs provide facts and figures that act as propaganda that does not encourage critical thinking and reflection, but eliminates dissent, the result of which is to spread Western ideology, strengthen capitalist agendas, and to reduce pluralism.
Chapter 4
Olympic Education: Gold Medal for Propaganda?

If you had walked into most Canadian schools a few weeks before the Vancouver Games, you would have seen hallways coloured with posters, drawing, and projects displaying work on the Olympics. While corporations enact marketing campaigns, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has penetrated the school system and actively promotes Olympic Education in schools. What is the goal of Olympic Education? What motivates the IOC to create educational materials? How have the Olympics become a part of Education, and what is its educational value? I will examine the origins of Olympic Education, and explore how the Vancouver Olympics has entered the classroom. Throughout this work, I have examined the public pedagogy of the Olympics and critiqued the cultural lessons of the IOC. It is essential to explore the pedagogy of the Olympics in the classroom since its lessons are all the more explicit. I will critique these programs to examine what students actually learn about values, culture, nationalism, and the IOC. In doing so, I will show that the IOC teaches students a value system that is created and defined by corporate interests and dominant Western ideology. This – in line with the IOC’s public pedagogy– has the effect of creating a monoculture that denies reasonable pluralism, and further shows that the IOC’s goal of uniting across diversity is ineffective.

Olympic Education

Olympic Education is a relatively new concept first appearing in the 1970s.
Norbert Müller, sport historian, member of the IOC’s Commission for Culture and Education, and vice-president of the International Fair Play Committee, states that Olympic founder Pierre de Coubertin “wanted mankind in the 20th century to experience sport in the harmonious interplay of physical and intellectual skills, so that – in an artistic, aesthetic frame – it would make an important contribution to human happiness” (2004, 5-6). Coubertin reestablished the Olympic Games in 1894 “to ennoble and strengthen sports, to ensure their independence and duration, and thus enable them to fulfill the educational incumbent upon them in the modern world” (IOC 2010a) and believed that sport was a path to personal growth. He believed that the development of the athlete built “mind and body, emotion and conscience” (Müller 2004, 7). Coubertin saw himself, first and foremost, as an educational reformer. He was critical of the “overwork” of children in the schools of his time: “‘Overwork was on everyone’s lips, and summed up the criticism which the French were leveling at their contemporary school system. Parents believed that their children had too many lessons and not enough free time, and that their education was too intellectual’” (Coubertin 2000, 60). Coubertin’s solution was an emphasis on sport and physical education in school that would allow children time to play and enjoy sport. For Coubertin, this development of sport in education provided values development. Olympic Education, however, does not have the same meaning today as it did for Coubertin. Modern Olympic Education teaches students about the Olympic Movement and Olympism.

If sport can be used to develop human values, then “Olympism combines, as a halo, all those principles which contribute to the improvement of mankind” (Müller 2004,
Coubertin was a product of the Romantic Period and was a modernist. He believed that it was in the capacity of humankind to create a better world, and Olympism is his attempt to “improve” humanity. Though his contemporaries saw scientific achievement as the means to human improvement, Coubertin saw sport as an important part of this march towards modernity. Müller (2004) explains that Olympism is “aimed at all people, irrespective of age, occupation, race, nationality or creed. Its general characteristic is that it brings together all men of good will, provided they take their commitment to humanity seriously” (7). The IOC’s Fundamental Principles of the Olympic Charter states “Olympism is a philosophy of life; exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will, and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect to universal fundamental ethical principles” (IOC 2010b,11). “This is a values education mandate” (2005, 5) according to the University of Alberta’s Institute for Olympic Education director, Deanna Binder. It is difficult to create a philosophy that is respectful of “all people” without assuming “universal fundamental ethical principles,” but this universal value creation, as we will see, is problematic.

Norbert Müller is enthusiastic about Olympism and its educational potential because it provides a holistic approach: “‘Olympic education’ endeavours to provide a universal education or development of the whole individual” (2004, 7). Though Coubertin, hoped to see the “the propagation of sport and physical education in schools” (2004, 8), the Olympics, Müller states, was also “the internationalization of his educational vision, where his main priority at first was the idea of peace among nations”
Thus, Olympic Education is the IOC’s version of Peace Education.\(^7\)

Coubertin wanted his Olympic Movement to not just be an event every four years, but believed there must be “permanent factories” (Müller 2004, 8, see also Coubertin 1918b). These factories were to be schools. Coubertin worked to develop Olympism in schools by founding Olympic Institutes, Olympic Centres, lobbying the League of Nations, and writing more than 1100 articles and 30 books (Müller 2004, 9). This work was aimed at promoting the Olympic Movement and Olympism. Education was a part of the movement, but the overarching principle was the development of the whole being through sport: “[the Olympic Movement’s goal was to develop] the inner, moral, responsible attitude of the athlete to which the ‘Olympic education’ was to contribute” (Müller 2004, 9). Education, according to Coubertin (1918a), was too compartmentalized with students learning in packets without any connection to a larger whole: “[Education] has allowed itself to be carried away by extreme compartmentalization, by which it was then swept away. Each strength works in isolation, without any link or contact with its neighbour” (547). Coubertin (1918) goes on to suggest:

> If the topic is muscles, the only thing they want to see is animal function. The brain is furnished as though it were made up of tiny, air-tight compartments. Conscience is the exclusive territory of religious training. As for character – no one wants to take responsibility for that. In a short time, the educated man will end up looking like those primitive mosaics in which little pieces formed the larger, crude and stiff pictures (547).

Coubertin was critical of an education that, he believed, was overly specialized without

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\(^7\) Peace education is "directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". It promotes "understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups" and furthers "the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace" (UN n.d.)
thought of teaching the whole child. Coubertin aims to address the education of character and believes that athletics is the ideal means to develop morals: “[athletics] provides the teacher with an extremely powerful yet very delicate instrument for moral education” (Coubertin 2000, 536).

Values education is, however, problematic, and Coubertin’s vision of Olympism and education is naïve. Born into an aristocratic family and as a member of French elite society, Coubertin was “an accomplished and attractive member of a wealthy elite [and] he was predisposed to see a world of many choices” (MacAloon 2008, 27). Still, former IOC 2000 Reform Commission executive member and historical and anthropological Olympic researcher, John MacAloon, believes that Coubertin felt discomfort with his aristocracy at the same time as there was rising prejudice towards aristocrats (2008, 27). He was, MacAloon (2008) argues, conflicted, tormented and alone as an aristocrat in an increasingly unaristocratic world:

Wealth, education and social connections were considerable resources for plotting an autonomous individual career. Yet these same resources were emblems of a social class and caste suddenly marginal in the new order of things. Coubertin suffered and lamented that marginality, but it left him in solidarity with no group, for he came to despise the escapism, hedonism and vacant illusions of his brother aristocrats (27-28).

Despite MacAloon’s belief that Coubertin may have felt anti-aristocratic sentiment, he was still well-educated, well-traveled, and had the freedom to make his own choices. Coubertin was an elite but MacAloon (2008) argues there was a weight of responsibility on Coubertin and a code to which he felt obliged to follow:

Just as the nom [name] that he acquired at birth consisted in the honneur [honour] accumulated by his ancestors’ noble deeds in acceptable fields of
action, so to maintain the family *nom* and to gain *honneur* for himself the young nobleman had to select an appropriate vocation and to perform similar *nobles travaux* [noble deeds]... Aristocrats are called to activity by virtue of their positions. They are not to seek or to occupy positions in rationalized, bureaucratic, formal organizations, offering lifelong security, financial reward and regular advancement according to fixed rules...they must take pains repeatedly to establish their *amateur* [amateur] status: to demonstrate that they act disinterestedly for the love of the Faith, the Motherland, Nature, Art, Humanity. Actions based on organizational routines and rational expectations bring no credit to an *homme de noblesse* [nobleman] The only deeds which bring *honneur* [honour] and demonstrate *vertu* [virtue] are those which belong to a special class of actions called *prouesses* (‘feats of prowess’) (6).

MacAloon uses elitist vocabulary, and implies that an aristocrat like Coubertin had to rise above the everyday realities of the average citizen. When examining Coubertin and the modern Olympic Games, it is essential to remember that Coubertin was looking from an elitist position for a way to “demonstrate virtue” and to achieve a “feat of prowess” to not only maintain his stature, but to be regarded as excelling within it. Coubertin’s pedigree made him powerful and he sought, “spontaneous, irreproducible, unique and conspicuous moral acts undertaken for honour and not for utility” (MacAloon 6).

Since its inception, Coubertin hoped that the Olympics would be a means of teaching values through sport. Olympic Education intends to be much the same today. Olympic Education in schools, according to the Canadian Olympic Committee’s Education Program:

is designed to promote Olympic values and the importance of pursuing personal excellence in all facets of life. The three core values of the Canadian Olympic Committee are Passion, Integrity and Excellence. These are explored in the Canadian Olympic School Program through fair play, leadership, excellence, respect and perseverance (COC).

Whereas Coubertin hoped that students would get out of the classroom and onto the
playing field to learn values through sport, today’s Olympic Education is education about the Olympics and Olympism. Using athletes, and moments during the Olympic Games, the Olympic Education Program is “to inspire students to achieve their personal best” (COC). It is important to examine why this change has occurred and what it implies about the IOC and Olympic Education.

**Dominance Concealed Through Olympic Education Programs**

In her article, “Olympic Education Inc.: Colonizing Children’s Minds?,” Olympic critic, and activist Helen Jefferson Lenskyj (2004) questions Olympic Education “in order to expose hidden or not-so-hidden messages from the Olympic industry and its corporate sponsors” (151). She believes that educational programs and the use of children as promotional tool results in “the exploitation of children through these purportedly educational initiatives [which] is unethical” (2004, 151). Olympic Education, for Lenskyj (2004), is a misnomer that can take many forms including “idealistic rhetoric about Olympic values” and can be “unabashedly commercialized in the service of Olympic sponsors” (151). What is the key problem for Lenskyj is that educational programs are more about “transmission of Olympic knowledge – facts and figures – rather than the development of children’s intellectual ability, critical thought, and moral reasoning” (2004, 151). Olympic Education, therefore, is propaganda rather than education.

Lenskyj uses Norbert Müller’s article to point out the exhortation of the Olympics’ mantra of “fair play, equal opportunity, amateurism, international tolerance, and ‘the harmonious development of the whole human being’” while also promoting
“cross-cultural understanding, mutual respect, and ultimately world peace” (Lenskyj 2004, 151). She is highly critical of Müller because his version of Olympic Education doesn’t encourage students to use critical thinking to consider the Olympic industry, but instead it uses Olympic rhetoric with no acknowledgment that the IOC’s actions contradict that rhetoric: “although few details were provided on these Olympic subjects, fair play seemed to be the major focus. This of course raises the question of the “unfair play” for which the Olympic Games have become infamous” (152). The IOC has been wracked with scandals through its history including recent judging scandals, bribery of Olympic officials during the host-city bid process, as well as performance-enhancing doping.  

Lenskyj is critical of the penetration of Olympic Education into schools as well as the use of children by Olympic Organizing Committees during the bid process. She states that “flag-waving youngsters greeting IOC officials and athletes, costumed children dancing, and so on” (2004, 152) are used to pull at the heartstrings of officials and to show youth support of the Olympic industry. Lenskyj (2004) believes, also, that Olympic Education is, more problematically, about the “corporate targeting of children and adolescents and establishing brand loyalty by imprinting a concrete idea of a brand in children” (152). Corporate partners take full advantage of Olympic ideals rhetoric penetrate into school education programs; programs that allow their corporation into classroom that they might not otherwise be able to enter. Lenskyj outlines numerous

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8 For more information on Olympic scandal, see Richard W. Pound's Inside the Olympics: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the Glory of the Games, Christopher Shaw's Five Ring Circus: Myths and Realities of the Olympic Games, and Helen Jefferson Lenskyj's Inside the Olympic Industry: Power, Politics, and Activism.
dubious educational programs and corporate educational materials, but I will examine materials provided by the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC).

Formal Olympic Education became the official responsibility of the host-city’s organizing committee in 1976 at the Montreal Games (Kwauk 2008, 527). Christina Ting Kwauk scholar working on socio-cultural sport history and colonization states in her 2008 article, “An Olympic Education: From Athletic Colonization to International Harmony” suggests that “Olympic Education Programs took on greater importance for OCOG’s [Organizational Committees of Olympic Games] as they became a major component of Olympic legacy creation” (527). “Legacy creation,” she states is to create “long-lasting educational and cultural impact that could sustain interest and involvement beyond the Games” (527). Kwauk (2008) believes, as Helen Jefferson Lenskyj does, that education programs are used to bolster enthusiasm for the Olympics and to neo-colonize students “through the normalization of the ‘symbolic codes’ of Western capitalist culture” (527). VANOC’s Olympic Education program, as will be proven, is no different and is consistent with neo-colonization and Western corporate normalization.

**VANOC Educational Programs**

The VANOC Educational Program boasts that “as the Olympic and Paralympic athletes begin their final preparations for the 2010 Winter Games schools across the country will be tuning in to media coverage and commentary, providing teachers with an unprecedented series of teachable moments” (VANOC 2010d). While this may be true, it is important to note that it is not VANOC’s educational program that recognizes and
capitalizes on teachable moments, but individual teachers who, we hope, can use them for critical thinking and reflection.

Interactive media assumes a prominent role in VANOC’s educational programs. Their website asks, “Why should I use media in the classroom?” and answers by stating that media in the classroom allows teachers to: “connect your students’ emotional (affective) engagement with the Games, reach audiovisual learners, develop students’ media literacy skills, create connections to others in Canada and the world, and to examine “how the media works to enhance, structure, qualify or, in some cases, manipulate opinions and attitudes” (VANOC 2010e). It is encouraging to see that there is mention of the ways in which media “in some cases, manipulate opinions and attitudes,” but, as will be seen in the close examination of these educational programs, that one of VANOC’s real reasons for using media in the classroom is because it brings corporate advertising to the computer screens of students.

The VANOC Educational Program website lists twenty-six “Feature Programs” all of which receive corporate funding. Either overtly sponsored by corporations, or sponsored through corporate partners, each click-through leads to advertising-laden websites. For example, “Historica-Dominion at the Games” is part of book publisher McClelland and Stewart’s Canadian Encyclopedia and is “dedicated to creating greater knowledge and appreciation of Canadian history, identity and citizenship” (VANOC 2010f). The Canadian Encyclopedia’s main page has an advertisement banner atop, advertising BMO bank, Gain laundry detergent, and Downy fabric softener, while its corporate partners include Daimler-Chrysler, Bell Canada, Royal Bank of Canada,
Westcoast Energy, and CanWest Global Foundation, among others. At the same time, Historica-Dominion’s *Canadian Encyclopedia* “is a registered charity” and donation links adorn many of its pages. Children are also exposed to an encyclopedia that features department store, Sears Canada, as one of its “Most Commented On” articles (when accessed on February 16, 2010) and whose article includes a link to the Sears Canada online retail website. “Historica-Dominion at the Games” is an example of Lenskyj’s hidden messages from corporate sponsors (2004, 151) because it exposes children to media rife with corporate advertising.

*Intellectual Muscle: University Dialogues for Vancouver 2010* is one of VANOC’s featured educational programs. Sponsored by Canadian newspaper, and official media partner of the Vancouver Games, *The Globe and Mail*, it features thirty-seven podcasts of lectures by leading intellectuals on topics related to the Vancouver Olympics. These are relevant, academic articles that are, at times, highly critical of the IOC, the Olympics and the Vancouver Winter Games. Some of the topics include University of British Columbia’s National Core for Neuroethics’s Director Julie Illes “In Perilous Pursuit of Perfection: The Ethics of Neuroscience in Sport,” (addressing the science of the pursuit of athletic achievement), the University of Western Ontario’s International Centre for Olympic Studies’ Director, Janice Forsyth’s, “The Illusion of Inclusion,” (critiquing the IOC’s representation of multiculturalism and aboriginals), and Wilfred Laurier

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9 “The National Core for Neuroethics is an interdisciplinary research group dedicated to tackling the ethical, legal, policy and social implications of frontier technological developments in the neurosciences. Our objective is to align innovations in the brain sciences with societal, cultural and individual human values through high impact research, education and outreach” (National Core for Neuroethics)
University’s Steven Wenn’s “The Olympic Movement and the Road Ahead: Status Quo or Will the IOC Tackle the Big Issues?” examining the Olympics’ potential for social change. Scholars participating represent universities from across the country, and, although critical, are offering the IOC suggestions for improvement and provide points that are important to the Olympic discussion. Contributors are not, however, radical. Still, “Intellectual Muscle” presents important conversations and ones that, combined with the accompanying teacher’s guide can be very effective materials in the classroom, provided the teacher using them hopes to engage students in meaningful conversation and reflective thought on the larger philosophical issues.

In closely examining the teacher’s materials, some glaring problems can be identified. As Lenskyj critiqued, Olympic Education programs were mainly “transmission of Olympic knowledge – facts and figures – rather than the development of children’s intellectual ability, critical thought, and moral reasoning” (2004, 151). It is evident that the transmission of facts remains more valued than critical and reflective thinking within VANOC educational materials. The RBC Olympic Torch Relay School Kit provides a one-page background information section and then its accompanying activity asks:

Read the attached article and show students the map of the torch route. Describe how the Olympic Flame will travel through all provinces and territories, passing through over 1,000 Canadian communities. Brainstorm how this relay will bring Canadians together in the spirit of peace, unity and friendship. For younger students, these concepts may require explanation. This is a chance for Canadians to communicate to the world – and to each other – what the true spirit of Canada is (VANOC 2010g).

The article presents a version of the history of the torch choosing to teach that “Messengers would run to all the cities announcing the Olympic Games. They would
declare a truce. People had to stop all wars. This peace let the athletes and spectators travel safely to Olympia” (VANOC 2010g). While this is accurate, the article does not mention that the Berlin 1936 Games Organizers began the torch relay to bolster support for the Olympics and Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime. By choosing to represent the Torch Relay as peace, friendship and unity, the lesson acts as propaganda and presents Olympic rhetoric. The lessons is, it should be noted, aimed at the elementary school level, but, still, there is no hint of critical reflection. A lesson about the Torch Relay could have included discussions of democracy and examined ways in which torchbearers were chosen. While advertised as a program that provided relay spots to Canadians who make a difference in their communities, news media reported large numbers of torchbearers who were corporate executives of sponsors, members of media of official partners, and celebrities: “30 per cent of the total torchbearer positions were allocated to groups, such as Canada’s national winter sport organizations, the Canadian Olympic Committee and VANOC’s 60-plus Games sponsors” (VANOC 2009). Though there was an opportunity to develop critical thinking skills, the Olympic Education program chose to promote one-sided rhetoric that favourably reflects the Torch Relay, the Olympic Games, and corporate sponsors.

This is not the only example, as the VANOC website is littered with other similarly uncritical and promotional “lessons”. The Canadian Paralympic Schools Program website offers dozens of lesson plans for teachers. A typical lesson, entitled, “The Case for Inclusion,” is a two-page lesson that aims to have students “choose a position, define it, and promote and defend their point of view;” (Paralympic Schools
Program, 2009a) and hopes that the lesson will “apply critical thinking skills to develop and express agreement or disagreement with an informal text” (Paralympic Schools Program, 2009a). As a motivational activity, students are directed to watch an online video about inclusion. With a bold Petro-Canada advertisement adorning the top of the page, students are given definitions of inclusion, equity, and accessibility and told that “athletes with disabilities have a greater opportunity to participate in sports than ever before” (Paralympic Schools Program, 2009b). The video, however, provides no evidence of this, despite the lesson being about defending an argument. A narrator explains terms like inclusion, equity, fairness, and accessibility over, mainly still, images of people with disabilities engaged in physical activity. There are no interviews, or comments from athletes, coaches, or officials engaging with issues in sport for people with disabilities, or about inclusion, equity, fairness or accessibility. In the lesson, students are asked to defend or refute the statement, “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me” (Paralympic Schools Program, 2009a). Though it is possible for a teacher to draw out issues with regards to inclusion as their students work through their research and writing, the Educational Program does not provide any guidance for this. Instead, like the previous Torch Relay example, the educational materials simply provides resources that propagate facts, figures, simple definitions, and platitudes.

The Canadian Olympic School Program (COSP) is one of the main providers of Olympic Education resources. Sponsored by Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), the program has a character and values education focus with educational partners including: The
Canadian Association of Principals, The Alberta Teacher’s Association Science Council, The British Columbia Science Teachers’ Association, The Joint Consortium for School Health, and The Catholic Principals Council of Ontario. Featuring Olympic athlete profiles, each athlete’s story showcases an Olympic value (responsibility, sustainability, excellence, leadership, respect, perseverance, resiliency, etc.). The COSP website also includes information resources including a “library” that links to outside websites. The vast majority of these sites are Olympic operated or Olympic partnered. The heading, “Canadian Olympic Information”, lists: “Canadian Olympic Committee [IOC and Government sponsored], Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games [VANOC and IOC sponsored], National Sport Organizations List [Government sponsored], National Library of Canada – Canadian Olympians [government sponsored], and RBC Olympians [Olympic partner]” (COSP 2009a). Similarly, the heading, “Olympic Origins and History”, lists eight resources all of which are official IOC materials: “Olympic Charter [IOC], The Olympic Games in Ancient Greece, The Olympic flame and torch relay, Olympic Symbols, Olympic Games Posters, The Olympic Movement, Olympic Legacy, and The Best of Us” (COSP 2009a). The only link that presents any voice of dissent is to that of The University of Western Ontario’s International Center for Olympic Studies. Since its site features scholarly articles aimed at adults, it is unlikely to be sourced by many school children.

A Close Reading of VANOC Educational Material

What is most ethically problematic is the “Project Pack” entitled, “Money
Management”. This program, like all on the Canadian Olympic Schools Program (COSP), is sponsored by RBC. The package includes stories from three Olympians each focusing on a different theme including: saving, sharing, and spending. Lesson one is from Olympic snowboarder, Alexa Loo, who advises to “save until you have the money to buy what you want” (COSP 2009b, 2). The resource also states that “Alexa also says she never uses her credit card unless she can pay it off at the end of the month” (COSP 2009b, 2). Despite the worth of Loo’s advice, the message to students – who are too young to have credit cards – is that they need credit cards and that credit cards are an important part of adult life. This is a clear example of what Christine Kwauk (2008) calls “the normalization of the ‘symbolic codes’ of Western capitalist culture” (527). The lesson on saving continues with activity questions that teach students about compound interest. By examining the three activity questions, it is evident that RBC is encouraging students to learn about banking.

Example one encourages students to save the same amount of money each month. Students are asked how much money they will have at the end of ten years if they save $10 each month. Example two encourages students to invest a $100 gift into a bank account that earns compound annual interest. Students are told “If you keep $100 in a piggy bank, your $100 doesn’t grow. If you invest this $100, your money would earn interest” (COSP 2009b, 3). Though the lesson does acknowledge that “The amount of interest you earn depends on the interest rate” (COSP 2009b, 3), in the example provided, students are given a sample interest rate of 10%. According to the RBC website, the current interest rate for the RBC Leo’s Young Savers Account is 0.01% (RBC). Students
learn in the classroom example that at the end of 10 years, their $100 will grow to $259.37, but outside of the classroom world the reality is that their money would have grown to $100.10 in ten years. Example three encourages students to save the same amount each month into an account that earns compound interest. In much the same way as example two, students are given an interest rate of 10% and they watch how their money grows. When students are instructed, “Use your calculator to help” (COSP 2009b, 5), the lesson, which could have been used as a math lesson, is now an exercise in banking and becomes advertising for RBC. There is no mention in the lesson about the ways in which banks use deposited funds, RBC annual profits, nor is there any mention of banking fees, or that other banks exist and may offer better products and services than RBC.

The second lesson, “Sharing,” highlighting Olympic speedskater, Clara Hughes’, work with the sport development charity “Right to Play” provides a lesson on fundraising. It begins by suggesting that students raise money for the Canadian Olympic Foundation: “Every Olympic athlete dreams of winning a medal. But earning a medal can be expensive. The Canadian Olympic Foundation supports our athletes by providing the money needed for coaching, travel, and equipment. It helps our athletes be at their best in time for the Olympic Games” (COSP 2009b, 8). Not only does this sentiment build nationalism by referring to the student’s patriotic emotions by using the phrase “our athletes” and encourage students to support high-performance athletes, the lesson strengthens a capitalist agenda. Students learn that they can raise funds by buying pizzas and selling them to their schoolmates. There is no mention in the lesson about other,
perhaps healthier, products that could be sold, or the socio-economic issues that might exist within their school that might prevent a student from purchasing pizza (or eating lunch at all!). Furthermore, the lesson contradicts the advice given earlier in Alexa Loo’s lesson. Loo suggests that in order to save money for something special, it is important to forgo certain luxuries: “If you want something, then you learn to prioritize. Sure, you can always go and buy a bag of chips or you can eat a packed snack, get exactly what you want to eat, and save the money for something you want more” (COSP 2009b, 2). In the fundraising lesson, students are being encouraged to contradict Loo’s recommendation and to buy pizza at the school fundraiser. While the lesson shows students how to organize and plan, it more distinctly shows students how to make money and strengthens capitalist culture.

The final lesson, “Spending,” features figure skater, Jeff Buttle, and also encourages capitalist culture. The lesson involves creating a spending budget. Students are asked to create a plan for a vacation with Buttle’s words in mind: “‘Spending money can be scary,’ Jeff says, ‘it’s something you have to do for something you love’” (COSP 2009b, 11). It isn’t overtly clear what this lesson intends to teach. The example situates students at Whistler ski resort where they must spend $600 on food, entertainment, leisure, and souvenirs for themselves and a guardian. Students must prioritize their spending based on whether they determine it to be a need or a want. Students are asked to make a budget based on prices provided for various meal options and activities. The lesson does not offer critical reflection into their own spending habits, or issues of poverty. Jeff Buttle’s words, “a life without some risk would be pretty boring wouldn’t
it?” (COSP 2009b, 11) encourage students to spend and contradict any saving lesson that they might have learned in earlier lessons. While Buttle’s example involves decisions to hire coaches and fly them to his competitions, students are asked to imagine themselves as tourists at a ski resort. There is no mention of alternatives to spending, but the lesson teaches students that consumption is exciting, thrilling, and fun. Not only are students encouraged to consume, RBC hopes they are also building brand loyalty. The singular vision of consumption put forth by RBC and perpetuated by the Canadian Olympic Schools Program is profoundly uncritical and does not recognize that social inequity and diversity. Students are indoctrinated into a dominant view of finance and consumption while ignoring issues of financial literacy.

**Conclusion**

By remaining uncritical and unreflective, the VANOC Educational Program becomes superficial propaganda. Lenskyj (2004) quotes Olympic scholars Tara Magdalinski and John Nauright who write about educational materials for previous Olympic Games and argue that they are insufficient as educational materials because they present: “a history that is virtually free of politics and social inequity and one that provides isolated examples to illustrate broad assertions about Olympic ideologies or Olympologies... decontextualised and dehistoricised sport disguised as a virtual religion of Olympism” (154-155). The shortcomings of the materials provided by VANOC are not unusual in the history of Olympic educational programs. Though some of the VANOC
educational programs do provide some reflective material, most is superficial and propagates Western ethical and capitalist dogma with little acknowledgment that alternative perspectives exist.

Clearly, the Olympics has infiltrated the schools. Unlike other international corporations, the Olympics as part of education is rarely discussed by school boards. While a school board would discuss and debate whether or not to allow Coca-Cola to set up a machine on its premises or allow McDonald’s to advertise in their schools, it will uncritically allow Olympic Education programs. These programs may be sponsored and encourage brand exposure to develop brand loyalty. It is essential, therefore, for teachers to critically examine these materials and to use them carefully. Teachers must also encourage students to not only think critically about Olympic educational materials, but also about the Olympics itself. How might these educational materials build loyalty to the Olympic brand? How might projects be shaping the attitudes of future taxpayers when their city bids on a future Games? What messages does the Olympics send about nationalism? How equitable is the portrayal of developing countries? How are women portrayed? How much do kids learn about the Olympics through its public pedagogy? These are all questions that teacher must consider when preparing Olympic lessons, and are all questions that are painfully absent from most, if not all, of the VANOC educational programs. One-sided, biased, educational materials allows the IOC to teach students a value system that is created and defined by corporate interests and dominant Western ideology. This has the effect of creating a monoculture that denies dissent and reasonable pluralism.
Chapter 5
Nationalism and the Olympic Paradox

The Olympic Games is the result of Romantic, aristocrat Pierre de Coubertin’s world view. The Romantic ideal of the power of human achievement, and its march towards human betterment guided Coubertin to resurrect the Olympics in 1896. He believed that sport could transform lives and build values, morals, and character, and, as was common for Romantics, to civilize. For Coubertin, “civilization” was two-pronged: one, participating in sport provided participants with internal, personal improvement of body, mind, and soul; secondly, sport could be used to bring rules and structure to participants. According to Olympic historian, scholar, and supporter, Norbert Müller (2004): “the Olympic Movement today is committed to a substantially emancipatory approach. Taking as its starting point Coubertin’s guiding principle of ‘all games, all nations’, it stands for equal rights not only among nations but also among sports, not just equal rights for all races but equal rights for both sexes” (13). The accuracy of Müller’s interpretation of today’s Olympic Games must be examined and issues of imperialism, strengthening nationalisms, and neo-colonialism must be exposed in order to understand the consequences and impacts of the Olympics globally. Though his article was published by the pro-IOC Centre d’Estudis Olímpics (Centre for Olympic Studies in Barcelona, Spain), Müller (2004) argues that Coubertin “tried to bring about enlightened internationalism by cultivating a non-chauvinistic nationalism” (5). Combined with his vision of “peace among nations” we have, as Müller notes, a contradiction: “the relationship between nationalism and international peace” (5). How can one reconcile the...
nationalist structure and exploitative nature of the Olympics while proclaiming its goal of peace? What role do/should the Olympics play in globalization? The IOC’s strengthening of nationalism does not embrace diversity and difference, but creates a monoculture. Again, the IOC fails to achieve its goal of uniting across pluralism. By showing how the Olympic Games strengthens nationalism and denies difference, I will show that the IOC’s public pedagogy is to spread Western ideology and capitalist dogma with the effect of oppressing through neo-colonization.

**Sportive Nationalism and Canada’s Own the Podium Program**

Sports are used to build and promote nationalism. John Hoberman, a University of Texas academic working on sport history, politics, and race, calls the “doctrine that promotes sportive success in international competitions as an instrument of national self-assertion” (2004, 184-185) sportive nationalism. He believes that nations cling to the athletic successes of its citizens in order to create “indispensable symbols of national vitality” (185) and they use these athletes to “contribute to the survival of the nation through role-modeling effects” (185). An athlete’s success is as much a national as individual achievement. This is the rhetoric that Olympic an education program like the Canadian Olympic Schools Program exemplifies when it provides athlete profiles to students to motivate them to learn about and work to achieve the values (respect, resiliency, responsibility, etc) extolled in their educational materials.

The Vancouver 2010 Winter Games have stirred strong sportive nationalism in Canada. Hoberman (2004) states that “governments allocate national resources to the
production of Olympic medals on the grounds that this benefits the morale of the nation and its general standing in the world” (185). Canada’s “Own the Podium” program (OTP) began in 2005 and is:

A national initiative supported by all of Canada’s winter sport organizations and major funding partners including Sport Canada, Canadian Olympic Committee, Canadian Paralympic Committee and Vancouver 2010 – designed to help Canada’s winter athletes win the most number of medals at the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver, and to place in the top-three nations in the gold-medal count at the 2010 Paralympic Winter Games (OTP 2009a).

Own the Podium’s manifesto states that “the podium represents the essence of excellence – the universal symbol for the celebration of achievement” and that “when one of our athletes takes their place on top of the podium, we all share in their victory” because “champions from any discipline, sport or otherwise, inspire us to work harder, dream bigger, and strive further” (OTP 2009b). It is clear that the Own The Podium program is meant to provide Canadians with role-models and inspiration; the program is Canada’s attempt to build sportive nationalism.

Own the Podium, however, is not just about developing nationalist pride among Canadians; it also seeks to show a global audience Canada’s superiority: “Own the Podium 2010 is a challenge to an entire nation to step up and show the world their best” (OTP 2009b). Similarly, Hoberman (2004) provides the example of Norway’s Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland who campaigned “to persuade her country that the Olympic medals won by Norwegian athletes, and the hugely successful 1994 Winter Olympic Games in Lillehammer, demonstrated the nation’s fitness to compete in international markets in general and the European Union market in particular” (185).
Sportive nationalism has both domestic and international aims.

It is evident that Canada, through hosting the Olympic Winter Games and the Own the Podium program, is attempting to show the world Canadian athletic ability and achievement. If we recall the earlier discussion of branding, it can be seen that Canada’s brand is one that values physical activity and athletics, while providing its citizens with the resources to meet their goals. The Own the Podium program also presents Canada as a unified place in which we can all take enjoyment from the achievement of our fellow Canadian. The gap between the rhetoric and reality of sportive nationalism and Own the Podium is secondary to its acceptance and consumption by national and international audiences.

Canadian hockey fans understand after finishing seventh in Men’s Ice Hockey at the Turin 2006 Olympics that “sportive nationalism can also take the form of a kind of masochistic self-reproach that blames the nation for its inability to meet global standards of excellence” (Hoberman 2004, 185). Ian Brown in his Globe and Mail newspaper article, “Is Canada a Spoilsport?”, says that the Own the Podium program actually got its start after “national despair over the fact that Canada was the only country that had never won gold on home ground” (Brown 2010, F6) and that Canada has “never placed higher than third in the medals” (Brown 2010, F6).

When we consider the conflict between nationalism and peace, the sportive nationalism of the Own the Podium program has, Brown argues, “produced a lot of very un-Canadian sounding rhetoric, even a bit of… well, boasting” (2010, F6). He notes that “Canada banned U.S. speed skater Catherine Rainey from practising on the new Olympic
oval in Richmond” (2010, F6) and that the Canadian Olympic Committee “declared war on the ‘just happy to be here and get a personal best’ stereotype of Canadian athletes” (2010, F6). Prime minister Stephen Harper in a speech to the B.C. Legislature said that the Olympic Games provide an opportunity for Canadians to “feel that warm glow of pride. As we should, as Canadians. Patriotism, ladies and gentlemen, patriotism as Canadians, should not make us feel the least bit shy or embarrassed” (Harper 2010, 8-9).

Brown (2010) asks, “What’s wrong with wanting your country to win?...And is there anything wrong with wanting your country to thrash all the other countries at the Olympics?” (F6). Brown suggests that the appeal of defining Canada’s success by medal count is because it is tangible: “It’s easier to define a nation’s character by hard numbers and medal counts than it is with vague concepts like multiculturalism and decency and good government” (F6). Brown quotes University of British Columbia president Stephen J. Toope who alludes to the potential problems of the Own the Podium program:

I think that with Own the Podium, that [Canadian achievement] gets turned into mindless nationalism. And as an international lawyer with an interest in human rights, mindless nationalism is not something I like to see. Let’s not turn the Olympic Games into a referendum on whether Canada is a good country or not (Brown 2010, F6, my emphasis).

Toope not only fears that Own the Podium will spark mindless nationalism, but that sportive nationalism will become a benchmark by which to evaluate Canada’s merits. Canadian sportive nationalism at the Vancouver Games has become a matter of showmanship forcing Brown to wonder: “if medals come with funding, and funding comes and goes, does the value of being Canadian fade with it?” (2010, F6).

Sport and culture historian and critic John Hoberman says that “sportive
nationalism appears to be entirely compatible with the globalization process if we define the latter as a gigantic competitive arrangement that rewards sheer performance and efficient technique” (186). Hoberman suggests that sportive nationalism has a direct connection to globalization when globalization is not the interaction of individuals, companies, and countries in collaborative one-world, but a competitive globalization in which a country’s success spreads throughout the world. Hoberman presents two visions of globalization: a democratic, global world versus an imperialistic world in which strong nations dominate the weak. It would seem that Canada has adopted imperialistic globalization, and the Own the Podium program is an effort to prove Canada’s superiority to the globe.

This misconstrued vision of globalization had tragic consequences during the Vancouver Olympics. The Own the Podium (OTP) program was not only a financial sponsorship program for elite athletes, but also set restrictions on Canadian technology and facilities. Restrictions such as ensuring that training teams are “all-Canadian” (Davidi 2010). This means that in order to receive OTP funding, Canadian athletes could only train with other Canadians. American long-track speedskater, Shani Davis, was removed from his training team by Team Canada. Davis would later win gold and silver medals, while his former Canadian training partner and friend, Denny Morrison, would fail to make the podium. Morrison blamed Own the Podium for his lack of success and as reporter Grant Robertson states: “The two skaters used to be close rivals, skating within hundredths of a second within each other. Now the American is dominant and Morrison is going home without the medals he was supposed to win” (Robertson 2010).
In the months leading up to the games, OTP also restricted access by international athletes to the Vancouver Olympic facilities. It is this policy that came under criticism when Georgian luger, Nodar Kumaritashvili, was killed during a practice run a few hours before the Vancouver Olympics’ Opening Ceremonies. London’s *Daily Mail* columnist Martin Samuel blames Canada and its Own the Podium program for Kumaritashvili’s death: “Canadian athletes have been given access to the luge, skeleton and ski runs at Whistler and the speed skating track at Richmond that has been denied to their rivals. For the best, it merely puts them at a competitive disadvantage; for the less talented it is potentially fatal” (Samuel 2010). While within International Olympic Committee (IOC) rules, Canada has taken a great deal of criticism from international media and, as London’s *The Guardian* suggests, “it came across as distinctly un-Canadian at the time, and in the context of Friday’s death it seemed like a terrible misjudgment” (Donegan 2010). Certainly, harsh criticism in the international media does little to boost Canada’s global image. The irony is that any advantage that Canada might have had by having exclusive access to the luge course was lost when the starts were moved down the course (to locations that Canadians had not prepared for) after Kumaritashvili’s death.

**Globalization and Sport as International Development**

This competitive interpretation and implementation of globalization is one that is profoundly imperialistic. Olympic historian Byron Peacock (2006) uses his colleague John MacAlloon’s idea “that the Olympics are more important in the Third World than in the nations of the global North” (202) because there is “political legitimacy gained by
emerging states that march in the Opening Ceremony for the first time or by the heroic and iconic status attributed to medalists from traditionally unsuccessful sporting nations” (202). By participating in the Olympics, developing nations announce to the world that they belong and are legitimate states worthy of international respect and consideration. Peacock (2006) argues that modernization “hinges on the premise that there are two types of societies, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern,’ and that ‘other countries could and should develop a...system similar to that of the United States’” (203). It is this binary that justifies imperialism and colonization of developing nations: “it was thought that improved infrastructures, market liberalization, enhanced land management, or technical know-how, to name a few, were the characteristic component that led to becoming developed” (Peacock 2006, 203). By providing these systems and resources to developing nations, it was hoped that development would “trickle-down” to states and citizens eventually allowing them to modernize and become Western.

Sport is used as a part of international development. Eric Anderson, professor at the University of Bath focusing on sport and sexuality, states:

Societies employ ritual to transmit the symbolic codes of the dominant culture to ensure the reproduction of that culture and to secure the position of the ruling class. Sport serves as a significant means by which a state can socialize its citizens into common norms and values while boosting pride in the nation by providing citizens with common displays of patriotism. Sport, then, becomes a site for rituals that are reproduced from one generation to the next (2006, 260, my emphasis).

As a tool of international development, Anderson believes that sport is a means of socialization and acculturation in which the transmission of dominant social norms are spread domestically and globally. Anderson’s article, “Using the Master’s Tools:
Resisting Colonization Through Colonial Sports,” uses the colonization of North American Navajo as an example of sports as socialization tool wielded by colonizers (in this case, Christian missionaries).

From a Canadian perspective, aboriginal sports historians Janice Forsyth and Kevin B. Wamsley argue that the assimilation of Aboriginals in Canada before Confederation in 1867 used sport as a part of socialization:

Just as sports and games were utilized to reproduce normative cultural values in broader society, they were also used in the civilizing process in residential school programmes. Sport and recreation activities were utilized as forms of reward, where children were taught to follow specific rules and regulations regarding forms of play. Educators replaced the ‘boisterous and unorganized games’ with well-organized and well-regulated ‘modern’ activities (2006, 299).

While Forsyth and Wamsley note the use of sport as colonization tool, they go on to argue that Aboriginal sport became a way of resisting their colonizers and building cultural strength. Anderson’s article, similarly, argues that sport has become an important part of Navajo culture, and although basketball was forced upon them by their oppressors, it became an avenue for resistance and cultural building. Not only did Navajo teams compete against other Navajo, they also competed against their colonizers.

The Olympics is neo-colonization in which the IOC hopes to extend its influence globally. In much the same way that Coubertin sought to use sport to build values and modernize the “uncivilized,” the modern Olympics seeks to bring Olympism to all people and all nations. In order to do this, Byron Peacock (2006) says that the IOC takes three points of action: “first, the dispatching of technical know-how in the form of coaches, administration, and sports medicine training; second, infrastructure development by
establishing and training national for professional teams, leagues, and sports federations; and finally, the granting of physical capital, such as balls, jerseys, and other equipment and facilities” (203). Like modernization, “the process of distributing the resources aimed at elite success can be thought of as a type of ‘trickle-down Olymponomics’” (Peacock 2006, 203). The Olympics becomes a paradox in which “on the one hand, Olympism is a philosophy that, in principle, is to be shared by all nations and individuals, but, on the other hand, spreading Olympism to, and promoting it in, regions traditionally inaccessible to its grasp often smacks of cultural imperialism” (Peacock 2006, 204). The IOC becomes neo-colonizer when it sets as its primary goal to be embraced by all nations; it seeks to impose itself and its Western values on the mindset and culture of developing nations.

Vassil Girginov is an academic in sport management and development who has worked with sport organizations and national Olympic committees, like Byron Peacock, believes that “Modern Olympism emerged in an increasingly materialist Western culture and advocated a ‘transmission model’ of culture” (2008, 895) and that “Olympic ideology [is] a set of ideas pertinent to the social needs of the West” (2008, 896). He echoes Peacock when he states that the Olympics is “similar to the Enlightenment, [because] it represents a ‘cultivating process’ that relates civilization to culture and seeks to promote standardization and universalism with a strategy from above” (2008, 896). From its very beginning, Girginov declares that “Pierre de Coubertin’s Olympic Games have become a manifestation of the ‘civilized sport’ model towards which all nations should aspire” (2008, 896).

The Beijing 2008 Olympics were the third Summer Olympics held in Asia, and
the first Olympic Games held in China. They are a stark example of imperialism and the IOC’s colonization effort. Girginov (2008) notes that the case of China has been different from other countries because “it is precisely this implicit suggestion of Olympic ideology [that of civilized sport aspiration] to which China has always refused to subscribe” (896). From a Western perspective, “sport must not only be organized in various forms but also marked culturally as traditional or modern, professional or amateur” (Girginov 2008, 896) and stands in conflict with “the cultural biography of traditional Chinese physical activities, such as martial arts, dragon boat races and wrestling, the West classes them not as sports [because they do not meet Western standards as sport] but as religious festival” (Girginov 2008, 896). It is the conflict of the Western view of modernization and the IOC’s demand for modernization through sport that is at issue here. China has had a troubled history with the Olympics and its traditional “response to Western imperialistic interests in sport... was to withdraw” (Girginov 2008, 897).

Though this is not the place to discuss the long history of China’s cultural ideology and its historical interaction with the West, it is worth noting that “China has always questioned the Enlightenment mentality of the West rooted in anthropocentrism and scientific rationality and driven by aggressive individualism” (Girginov 2008, 898). Girginov (2008) declares:

China’s vision for the 2008 Beijing games is very different from the two previous Asian hosts of the Olympics: the 1964 Tokyo Games helped Japan regain its place among the world’s important nations, while the 1988 Seoul Games were used to encourage Korea’s transition from a military dictatorship to a modern democratic nation. This compels us to pay attention to *Beijing’s proclaimed intent ostensibly to reinterpret the fundamental Olympic principles by challenging the established Western*
ontology and norms of sport and ‘to promote the harmonization of world civilizations’ (899, my emphasis).

Girginov clearly presents the Beijing Olympics as China’s attempt to open their doors to the West in order to present the strength of an alternative ontology. The Beijing Olympic Organizers, for Girginov, were aware of the Olympics’ imperialism and, as a result, created three themes for their Games: Green Olympics, High-Tech Olympics, and Humanistic Olympics (2008, 899). The Humanistic Olympics was an attempt to “both construct a moral order to counterbalance the materialist tendencies in China’s rapid march to modernization and to produce an alternative to the excessive commercialization and ‘spectacularization’ of the games” (Girginov 2008, 899). It was an attempt by the IOC to bring universalism to China, but also for the West to see, understand, and learn about China: “If China’s involvement in the Olympic movement was in some measure a result of China seeing itself through the eyes of the West, the 2008 Beijing Games will challenge the West to abandon the occidental interpretation of Olympism and to embrace the oriental view” (Girginov 2008, 899).

The Olympics are a medium for the construction of identity and are a part of a sportive nationalism. Journalism, cultural theory, and communications professor, Teresa Heinz Housel (2007), uses the Sydney 2000 Games as an example of how the Olympics created an Australian national identity. One way, she says, “that nation-states react to globalization is by intensifying existing national and ethnic divisions” (447) and she goes on to suggest that “the ‘claimed universalism’ of the Olympics ‘can be appropriated into a particular nationalist cause and merged with a set of national values’” (447). Housel
(2007) suggests that in Australia’s case, “uncertainty about what it means to be Australian results from threats to the nation from global capitalism’s economic forces, the global market’s integration, and the country’s increasing ethnic pluralism” (447). Despite these threats, “by presenting a strong and unified nation through a White-centered narrative, the opening ceremony promoted Australia’s economic and political strength in a global system of power hierarchies among nations” (Housel 2007, 455). It is this strong sense of nation that allows a host country and Olympic participants to carve out its identity to global audiences.

**Avoiding the Imperialism Pitfall**

While sport has a long history as colonization tool and the IOC can be seen as an imperialist power, Olympic sport need not be an oppressive force. Byron Peacock believes that one of the ways the Olympics can avoid the traps of imperialism is that it “must remain committed to its people-centered roots” (Peacock 2006, 205). Peacock (2006) says that by focusing on athletes, Olympism will “remain current, in-touch, and an effective guardian of the Olympic Movement” (205), for him, this is not a matter of developing elite athletes, but developing sport at the grassroots, community, and schoolyard levels. Rather than working with state governments, the Olympics, he suggests, should “discover what proposals individual communities have and how they feel resources will be best used” (2006, 205). Individuals participating in Olympism will increase when the IOC listens “to how different groups and cultural traditions feel about how they will be best represented” (2006, 205). This is especially important because it
overcomes the diaspora between rich and poor communities. Huge blanket policies at the state level will not impact all people and tend to favour those with wealth and opportunity. Listening to and working with the grassroots in a respectful way will allow “young people, the religious, ethnic, linguistic, racial, political, or economic barriers that often divide communities, even within national boundaries to fade” (2006, 205). When asked, in a February 15, 2010 interview with CBC Northeastern Ontario, if the Own the Podium program was fair, Olympic researcher and historian, Kevin Wamsley, said:

The Olympic games have never been a level playing field summer or winter. Nations have different amounts of opportunity and different resources to put into sports competition and Canada is a very wealthy country. So, no, it’s not fair. It’s not fair that we can put all this money into our sport and face a competitor from another country that doesn’t have the same opportunities, but unfortunately, that’s the way of the world (CBC Northeastern Ontario).

It is up to the IOC, if it really does believe in sport, to work with communities at the grassroots level, otherwise the Olympics will continue to be dominated by wealthy Western nations.

Olympism’s view has been a humanistic one. We have seen that Coubertin was a part of the Enlightenment, but his “conception of Olympic humanism was one that claimed roots stretching back to Antiquity, linking body, mind and spirit in the quest for moral uplift, social betterment and international peace” (Carrington 2004, 82). Ben Carrington (2004), sociology and cultural studies professor interested in the race and spectacle, quotes Tony Davies who dismisses humanism and Olympism “as an ideological smokescreen for the oppressive mystifications of modern society and culture’ as well as causing ‘the marginalization and oppression of the multitudes of human beings
in whose name it pretends to speak”” (83). Carrington points out numerous thinkers who believe that Romantic humanism was hypocritical because it posited rights and freedoms, but did not provide them to all:

Of course this construction of humankind was narrow and partial. That slave-owning could continue in the US, that the Rights of Man was actually about the rights of property owning men, that France and other European imperial powers could see no contradiction between the doctrine of Universal Rights and the denial of these to colonial subjects demonstrated the deeply racialized and gendered nature of humanism (Carrington 2004, 83).

Carrington clearly identifies the disjunction of Romantic humanism and believes that there is a “patent gap between the rhetoric of humanism and the acts carried out under its name” (85). Though many are critical of humanism, Carrington (2004) states that they “do not dismiss it per se” (85), but they adhere to “‘universalist’ principles of self-determination, freedom and emancipation that attempted to make real the claims made under the rubric of humanism” (Carrington 2004, 85). Humanism’s critics try to expose the European ethnocentrism of humanism in order to “construct new bases for a universalist project of post-racial, cosmopolitan humanism” (Carrington 2004, 85).

Carrington summarizes the discussion of internationalism versus cosmopolitanism, and defines the terms clearly, by saying: “whereas internationalism sees itself as a doctrine committed to international harmony and cooperation, but still within the logic of nation-state affiliation, cosmopolitanism in its neo-Kantian form makes claims for a global civil society within which individuals see themselves as world citizens united, at some level, by a common sense of species connection” (86). Cosmopolitan citizens locate themselves within a global community more than within a
national one which addresses “binaries of self/other, friend/stranger, insider/outside” (Carrington 2004, 86) and stands in opposition to Coubertin’s internationalism.

Carrington (2004) discusses the Olympic paradox: “This contradiction at the heart of Olympism, an ideal that posits the universal bonds between humans through the pursuit of individual greatness, but also an ideal that defers to the supposed natural bonds of national allegiance, has never truly been resolved” (93). The very fact that individuals cannot participate in the Olympics and must represent a nation-state shows the non-cosmopolitanism of Olympism and Olympic Games.

In order to overcome the nationalist dogma of the Olympic Games, Carrington argues for a “cosmopolitan Olympism” which he believes will provide a new outlook for the IOC:

Cosmopolitan Olympism challenges the saliency of national teams, emblems and allegiances. It decenters nationalism and nation-state symbolism and promotes the sense of human achievement; it avoids a spurious amoral universalism and embraces a contested and explicitly political sporting democracy; it engages and extends sport’s human rights discourse and the basis upon which those rights are formed thus politicizing the IOC’s own statements; it questions the focus on the elite and the body beautiful at the expense of the participatory while centering the importance of the para-Olympics. As the Olympics is awarded to cities a radical opportunity is opened up to constitute the ethical position of hospitality to the stranger (93).

Carrington’s vision dissolves competition between nations and emphasizes human participation and achievement in sport in a humanist sense. It is a terrifically utopian vision. Still, Carrington (2004) believes that in this new Olympism, there are “significant transformations to nation-state hegemony” and that “nation-states are increasingly decentred in a context where there are pluralized, diasporic cultural identities, multiple
legal and judicial frameworks, increased forms of devolved power to regions and cities, and a weakening of the ties between territorial residency and civic responsibility, driven, in part by a new global age of the world economy” (94). The IOC, through Olympism, and demonstrated in the Olympic Games, has the ability to be a catalyst for change by providing a place for cosmopolitan Olympism, and rethinking nationalism. Olympism has the potential to be a positive force in building the cosmopolitan utopia Carrington describes. He concludes by pondering, “if it is true that the only thing wrong with Olympism is the Olympics itself, then we might require greater intellectual and political commitment into reshaping its current complicit form” (2006, 97).

In discussing nationalism and Olympism, University of London professor studying sport hegemony and nationalism, John Hargreaves (1991), writes in his article, “Olympism and Nationalism,” that there are three views worth examination. Firstly, is the view put forward by people who support Olympism: “nationalism pervades the Olympic Movement [and those who support Olympism] readily express their regret and condemnation; and even go so far as to advocate eliminating it” (119). These supporters of Olympism hope to see nationalisms replaced by internationalism in much the same way Coubertin advocated. How this would happen is unclear. Secondly, there are those who believe that the Olympics support and promote nationalism by promoting dominant Western ideologies. These critics tie Olympism to nationalism and believe that Olympism’s failure to eliminate nationalism is proof that the Olympic Movement is flawed and should be opposed. Finally, Hargreaves suggests that there is a third viewpoint that believes that “nationalism in the Olympics reflects the nature of the global
political system, [and that] it is unrealistic to think and hope it could be otherwise, so we had better learn to accept and adapt to it” (120).

In his article, “Cosmopolitanism, Olympism, and Nationalism,” critical social and political theorist working mainly in sports philosophy and ethics, William Morgan (1994), critiques John Hargreaves’ article and states that “What these three views share in common, of course, notwithstanding their obvious differences, is the presumption that nationalism and Olympism stand in an antithetical relation to one another, that, in other words, the particularist aims and commitments of the former contravene the universalist aims and commitments of the latter” (79). Morgan sees nationalism and universalism (as a goal of Olympism) at a point of paradox because their goals contradict. Olympic scholars call this contradiction the Olympic paradox. Hargreaves (1991) argues that nationalism and Olympism “are rarely completely dissociated...but nevertheless, they are in principle different, and it is a crass mistake to reduce the former to the later” (121). He believes that it is vital in examining the Olympic paradox to “maintain a distinction between nationalism as an analytical construct and nationalism as a ‘true belief’” (124); in other words, Hargreaves insists that nationalism and Olympism demand “a turn away from normative theory, which deals with values from the standpoint of the ideal world, to theoretical-empirical inquiry, which deals with causal relations from the standpoint of the real world that purports to ‘explain why circumstances are as they are’” (Morgan 1995, 80).

Morgan explains Coubertin’s version of internationalism by pointing out what he believed was insincere cosmopolitanism or as Olympic historian and Coubertin
biographer John MacAloon (1986) calls “empty cosmopolitanism” (10). For Coubertin, whose position as European aristocracy allowed him to witness first-hand, two forms of empty cosmopolitanism. The first is one in which Europeans travel throughout the world but ensure “that their provincial habits and tastes are not upset by their gallivanting in foreign lands by setting up what amount to enclaves...that cater to... familiar habits and tastes” (Morgan 1995, 82). There is, therefore, the illusion of seeing another land and another culture, but in reality, the traveler transports his/her own comfortable European lifestyle elsewhere. The second form of empty cosmopolitanism occurs when the traveler does immerse her/himself into “the daily details and conventions of those cultures” (Morgan 1995, 82), but what they learn “is hardly revelatory of the core beliefs and values of these cultures” (Morgan 1995, 82). Coubertin (1911) writes:

What connection can possibly exist between the fact that Americans drink iced water and eat fried oysters and their methods of government and education? Would they be any less good republicans if they ate macaroni, and would the Russians change their character if they ceased to eat caviar? Now I greatly regret that I am obliged to note the fact that the information possessed by many cosmopolitans concerning the peoples whom they have visited does not exceed that range of ideas (431).

The empty cosmopolitan does not gain any significant understanding of the core values, or, as Boyd calls them “moral values” that guide action and define pluralism. MacAloon (1986) suggests that when athletes and their coaches travel to international sporting events like the Olympics it is “passed off as valuable ‘cross-cultural learning’ [but] often does not exceed such disembodied banalities” (9). If we recall the earlier discussion of “the munch, stomp, and dress up” approach to cultural diversity, learning superficial banalities do not contribute to authentic understanding of moral pluralism.
Coubertin offered an alternative to this form of cultural surface-skimming: true internationalism. Morgan refers to this concept as “Enlightenment cosmopolitanism”. He points out that Coubertin had a “longing for an open-ended, boundless world, a world unmarked by national and other cultural differences” (1995, 83). This was a kind of world for those who “only feel at home in larger cosmopolitan settings, and, therefore, always feel hemmed in and estranged in smaller parochial ones” (Morgan 1995, 83). This form of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism is one that “people and cultures, to include, of course, one’s own, can be seen in their true light and given their just due if they are seen in an undistorted way” (Morgan 1995, 83) and relies on the elimination of limited, particular perspectives to promote “universal, unsituated ones” (Morgan 1995, 83). Objectivity and detachment from any particular individual viewpoint, perspective, or paradigm calls for a “universal, God’s-eye standpoint” (1995, 84). Morgan uses philosopher Thomas Nagel’s notion of the “view [of] the world from nowhere in particular” (1995, 84) to argue that “what they [Olympism supporters] are further telling us is that this radically decontextualized view of the world will be recognizable to, and binding on, all ‘rational’ persons who view it from the same objective standpoint” (1995, 84).

Enlightenment cosmopolitanism espoused by Coubertin and Olympism is, for Morgan, a profoundly frightening perspective because it calls for a sameness of vision. Morgan (1995) suggests that this monological character and the view from nowhere calls for human beings to be “in touch with their core humanity, with their core selves – which turn up everywhere to be the same precisely because they are not subject to the
deformations of history and culture” (84). Morgan would agree with Donna Haraway who believes that there is no view from nowhere. Haraway (1988) argues for “a view from a body, always a complex, contradictory, structuring, and structured body, versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity (589).

Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, for Morgan, is “a matter of locating sameness rather than encapsulating difference, of decontextualizing beliefs and values rather than contextualizing them in ever richer ways” (84). He believes, as Haraway would, that this vision is impossible: “it is a futile notion for the simple reason that no one as yet has been able to spin out a completely detached account of themselves nor, for that matter, of anybody else who has ever lived on the planet” (Morgan 1995, 85). He uses the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer’s perspective when he says “that every time we succeed in reflectively putting into question some feature(s) of ourselves or of others, we ineluctably take some other feature(s) of ourselves or others for granted” (Morgan 1995, 85). Morgan (1995) concludes, as Haraway does, that since “we are unable to get a critical view of the world in which we and others live without drawing on some other feature of that world as a backdrop” (85) and because of this, “we have good reason to reject the idea of a privileged point of view from nowhere because there are no good grounds for believing that such a vantage point exists” (85).

Morgan goes even further to critique Enlightenment cosmopolitanism by suggesting that when culture and history is stripped from humanity, nothing of relevance remains. He refers to political philosopher Michael Walzer and says:

‘Humanity,’ [in contrast to societies and cultures] has ‘no memory, and so
it has no history and no culture, no customary practices no familiar life-
ways, no festivals, no shared understanding of social goods.’ When we try
to view human agents, then, from a place outside of their culture and
history, all we manage to do is link them to an abstract amorphous
community...so non-descript that it provides no telling clues as to who
these individuals are, let alone what conditions give their lives meaning
and their actions intelligibility (85).

Morgan believes that even if we could escape the complex bias of our viewpoint and
could achieve the view from nowhere, we would have no way of knowing ourselves or
any of the groups that we attempt to observe which, ultimately, provides no insight or
advantage. Enlightenment cosmopolitanism fails because it relies on an “open-ended,
boundless world, a world unmarked by national and other cultural differences” (Morgan
1995, 83). Since Enlightenment cosmopolitanism is not possible, then, it follows that
Olympism and nationalism cannot be disconnected. Are we “imprisoned by our
ethnocentrism” (Morgan 1995, 86)? Does “our socialization irrevocably determine the
limits of our self- (and other-) understanding” (Morgan 1995, 86)? Morgan (1995) uses a
hypothetical critic to raise the obvious concerns about Olympism and nationalism:

What is especially damaging about this message to enthusiasts of
international movements like Olympism is that it means that these
movements are not bona fide international movements at all, that standing
behind their lofty and far-flung programs and agendas are the local and
narrow programs and agendas of select nations. So any talk of
internationalism here is just that, mere talk, or to be more exact, mere
nationalist talk trying to pass itself off as something larger and grander in
order to legitimate its sectarian ambitions (87, my emphasis).

Morgan’s hypothetical critic believes that the IOC pretends to be an international
movement and to unite across pluralism, but actually promotes the narrow agendas of
Western nations. When examining Olympism in this light, it is clear that “nationalism is
the real driving force in Olympism, as it must be for every internationally ordered
movement and program” (Morgan 1995, 87) the ultimate goal of which is “disguising
nationalist interests and aims as international ones is a favorite ploy of empire-builders
(cultural imperialists), and one heavily and readily used by rich Western nations to widen
their sphere of influence” (Morgan 1995, 87).

It is the side of Morgan’s critic that most reflects the critique leveled against the
IOC in this examination. Morgan, however, disagrees and believes that just because we
cannot escape our ethnocentrism and are tied to our cultural and national socialization,
doesn’t mean that we are doomed to a life of imperialism. He uses a language metaphor
to point out: “But that we must speak in particular tongues [rather than a universal one]
does not mean that we are permanently fated to speak in the same tongues, that we are
incapable of learning new ones, and so of speaking in more nuanced and capacious ways”
(1995, 87). Recognizing the inescapable nature of nationalism and ethnocentrism, he
believes, gets us closer to Coubertin was driving at with Olympism than Enlightened
cosmopolitanism does: “it is an admixture of different nations and their characteristic
forms of life, an admixture which by blending these different strands of national life
together creates an international, cross-cultural language that is, strictly speaking, neither
ours or theirs” (Morgan 1995, 88).

Though he rejects Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, Morgan’s interpretation of
Olympism that recognizes and embraces cultural difference can be seen as utopian.
Though his conclusion that national and cultural identity does not preclude one from
drawing connections between people, it is important to recognize the reality of the
Olympics in order to call into question Olympic rhetoric. John Hargreaves (1991) notes many examples that show the nationalist aims of the Olympics in contrast with its internationalist proclamations: competitors must represent a nation-state (125), the ritual and spectacle of the opening and closing ceremonies (125), the marching of the athletes (126), the creation of national symbols, media portrayals through a “nation-tinged lens” (127), television audience ratings and commercialism, and quest for national prestige to name a few. The reason for this nationalist bent in Olympism, according to Hargreaves is that state funding provided to athletics demands that the state get return in the national interest: “pursuit of the national interest becomes the rationale of state involvement in high performance Olympic-oriented sport” (128). Nationalism is irrevocably linked to Olympism, but, Christina Kwauk, writing from an educational perspective, states: “the constant emphasis on the noble humanitarian values of Olympism including peace, equality, fair play, and international friendship, and the simultaneous downplaying of its political nature has enabled Olympic initiatives to escape the critical eye of many scholars” (523). Nationalism likewise, is hidden from view under Olympism’s rhetoric of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism.

**Conclusion**

When the IOC declares that its goal is unification and the acceptance of pluralism it hides its public pedagogy of strengthening of nationalism. The effect of which is to spread Western ideology, and to neo-colonize. In order to eliminate the imbalances of power that are maintained by the Olympic paradox, critical acknowledgment of sportive
nationalism and the IOC’s creation of a monoculture must occur. Instead of working to maintain its inauthentic internationalism, the IOC must work to eliminate nationalism. As it stands, the IOC promotes nationalism rather than plurality. I will argue that Dwight Boyd’s concept of democratic reciprocity, and Iris Marion Young’s “politics of difference” are steps towards a more respectful IOC and alleviates the IOC’s oppressive neocolonialism.
Chapter 6
What Can the IOC Learn From Democratic Reciprocity
and the “Politics of Difference”?

We have seen what Ben Carrington and William Morgan believe the IOC must do in order to overcome the Olympic paradox of marketing international peace but selling divisive nationalism. Carrington is critical of the European ethnocentrism of Romantic humanism and calls for an Olympic cosmopolitanism in which national boundaries are dissolved and citizens become a part of a global community. Morgan, similarly, critiques the imperialism that results from the IOC’s strengthening of nationalism concealed through the promise of peace. Morgan does not suggest a vision for a resolved Olympic paradox, but argues that the inseparability of the IOC and nationalism must be acknowledged. I will build on the concepts of Dwight Boyd’s democratic reciprocity and Iris Marion Young’s “politics of difference” that began this examination and will offer the IOC a more respectful and non-imperialistic vision.

What Democratic Reciprocity and the “Politics of Difference” Means for the IOC

In the earlier discussion about the three perspectives on the dilemma of diversity, Boyd offers suggestions for improvement that can be connected with Young’s notion of difference. Tolerance, he says, is limited by the work that it can do and that tolerance should “make space for views across difference and start sharing these views across difference” (1995, 628). The laundry-list must “be replaced by localized performative efforts at reciprocal intelligibility, with dynamic intelligibility itself understood to carry
significant moral weight” (1995, 628). The search for universals “will be exchanged for activating and maintaining constructivist institutions of inclusive interchange and shared public identification of value stances that actively support such institutions” (1995, 628). Boyd knows that if this were to happen, that oppression would not “go away overnight…but, I submit, dominance would be put on the table of public discourse by these kinds of changes of perspective on cultural diversity” (1995, 628). If the IOC were to adopt democratic reciprocity, oppression would be visible and could be discussed and the reasonableness of all perspectives could be explored.

For Iris Marion Young, there are two competing concepts of liberation. The assimilationist paradigm is one that seeks to make everyone the same, whereas the diversity paradigm recognizes the importance of difference. The assimilationist approach is not without merit; it has been very influential “in the history of emancipatory politics” (1990, 159). The key point of contention for Young is that it “presents a clear and unambiguous standard of equality and justice. According to such a standard, any group-related differentiation or discrimination is suspect” (1990, 158). The IOC clearly adopts the assimilationist approach. The difference paradigm, on the other hand, has “a positive sense of group difference [and] a different ideal of liberation, which might be called democratic cultural pluralism…in this vision the good society does not eliminate or transcend group difference, rather, there is equality among socially and culturally differentiated groups, who mutually respect one another and affirm one another in their differences” (Young 1990, 163). Democratic cultural pluralism rejects transcendence of pluralism and values cultural differentiation. Instead of overcoming pluralism, Young
calls for an acknowledgment of difference and the respectful affirmation of difference. By accepting a more democratic cultural pluralism, the IOC would take steps to overcome its neo-imperialism. Instead of demanding that all nations abide by IOC dictates, if it chose to affirm difference, the IOC and nations could work together in a respectful way to find ways to accommodate and embrace pluralism.

Young outlines the value of diversity. She states that “those promoting a politics of difference doubt that a society without group differences is either possible or desirable” (1990, 163) and goes on to say that “attachment to specific traditions, practices, language, and other culturally specific forms is a crucial aspect of social existence” (1990, 163). For Young, as much as we believe that “no person should be excluded from political and economic activities…group differences nevertheless continue to exist, and certain groups continue to be privileged” (1990, 164), and like Boyd, she believes that “under these circumstances, insisting that equality and liberation entail ignoring difference has oppressive consequences” (1990, 164). Young believes that a world without group difference is not only impossible but undesirable. The IOC’s desire to unite and deny group difference, has the effect of ignoring difference and is an example of Young’s “oppressive consequences” (1990, 164).

Young notes three oppressive consequences to ignoring difference. The assimilationist strategy that ignores difference means that those who are drawn in are asked to alter themselves and join a structure that already has established rules and conduct: “assimilation always implies coming into the game after it is already begun…and having to prove oneself according to those rules and standards” (164). We
see this when a developing country enters into the Olympic Games. Since they are not provided equal development opportunity, they cannot participate equally with those who are established within the Olympic family. An example of this is Eric Moussambani who competed in the Sydney 2000 Games in the 100 metre freestyle event. Eight months before the games, the Equatorial Guinean learned to swim in a 20 m hotel pool. Finishing almost two minutes behind the gold medal winner’s time, his performance was called “a hapless attempt at swimming” (Nauright & Magdalinski 2003). Moussambani was not given the same opportunities as an athlete as his peers in established Olympic nations. Because the privileged group creates the standards and “their privilege involves not recognizing these standards as culturally and experientially specific, the ideal of common humanity in which all can participate without regard to race, gender, religion, or sexuality poses as neutral and universal” (164). This universality, as we have seen is simply an oppressive façade.

The second problem with ignoring difference is that it “perpetuates cultural imperialism by allowing norms expressing the point of view and experience of privileged groups to appear neutral and universal” (165). The belief in neutrality —which both Young and Boyd (among others) agree is impossible— allows assimilationists to believe that all groups can be a part of humanity. The problems is that “dominant groups tend to define the norms of such a humanity in general…only the oppressed groups come to be marked with particularity; they, and not the privileged groups, are marked, objectified as the Others” (Young 1990, 165). Impossibly, the IOC attempts to maintain neutrality, and its efforts to do so do not allow it to see its own oppressive structures.
Finally, when a neutral standard exists, Young believes that members of the non-privileged group feel an internal devaluation (1990, 165) because it forces them to “be like the mainstream, in behaviour, values, and goals” (1990, 165) creating a paradox: “to participate means to accept and adopt an identity one is not, and to try to participate means to be reminded by oneself and others of the identity one is” (1990, 165). The “politics of difference” “asserts that oppressed groups have distinct cultures, experiences, and perspectives on social life with humanly positive meaning, some of which may even be superior to the culture and perspectives of mainstream society. The rejection and devaluation of one’s culture and perspective should not be a condition of full participation in social life” (166). Accepting the reasonableness of diversity is the acceptance that other perspectives are all equally valid. Because the IOC maintains control over the Opening and Closing Ceremonies (as well as throughout the Games), as we have seen in its depictions of Aboriginals, we see an example of oppressed groups being asked to adopt an inauthentic identity in order to participate. The devaluation of one’s culture should not be a criterion for Olympic participation.

Young (1990) believes that valuing difference shows the limitations of the dominant group: “positive group specificity introduces the possibility of understanding the relation between groups as merely difference, instead of exclusion, opposition or dominance” (166). Young anticipates that her vision of the assimilationist approach might be critiqued as being overly harsh: “the free society envisaged by liberalism, they might say, is certainly pluralistic…liberty encourages a proliferation in life styles” (1990, 168), but she states: “While I have no quarrel with social diversity in this sense [as one
that allows social diversity], this vision of liberal pluralism does not touch on the primary issues that give rise to the politics of difference…radical democratic pluralism acknowledges and affirms the public and political significance of social group differences as a means of ensuring the participation and inclusion of everyone in social and political institutions” (1990, 168). Young is calling for the acceptance of private sphere difference to become a part of the public sphere universal. Instead of the universal being a place that demands a singularity of vision, Young hopes that it can, instead, include the pluralism that comes from all private spheres.

Young admits that there are dilemmas in her call for the assertion of difference. The starting point is the irony that those who seek difference desire equality: they “certainly wish to affirm the liberal humanist principle that all persons are of equal moral worth” (1996, 169). Similarly, this is the starting point for the assimilationist standpoint; we have two groups with the same goal who disagree so strongly about how to achieve that goal. Social and political philosopher, Bernard Boxill, suggests that the dilemma is that “on the one hand, we must overcome segregation because it denies the idea of the human brotherhood; on the other hand, to overcome segregation we must self-segregate and therefore also deny the idea of human brotherhood” (Young 1990, 169). Human rights law expert Martha Minnow suggests that there is a dilemma in “focusing on difference [because it] risks recreating the stigma that difference has carried in the past” (Young 1990, 169). Young acknowledges that these are legitimate risks, but believes that it is more empowering in political life to affirm that differences exist in social life (Young 1990, 169) and that the very “meaning of difference itself [must become] a terrain of
political struggle” (Young 1990, 169). Young would argue that the IOC should not be afraid of difference but should actively affirm that difference exists.

For Young, acknowledging difference also becomes the denial of difference. Dichotomies present a norm and its opposition (male/female, white/non-white, civilized/savage, heterosexual/homosexual): “in every case the valued term achieves its value by its determinately negative relation to the Other…Difference in these ideologies always means exclusionary opposition to a norm” (Young 1990, 170). When groups are essentialized in this way, differences within the group are repressed. Young notes that this essentialism becomes a fear not only in Othered groups, but also within the dominant group because of “the Western subject’s sense of identity, especially, but not only, in the subjectivity of privileged groups” (Young 1990, 170). Though I may categorically fit into a certain group, I may not want to be a part of that group, or may have unique differences from other group members. There is a certain amount of subjectivity within all groups and Western ideology recognizes that that subjectivity may be important. Young believes that “the politics of difference confronts this fear, and aims for an understanding of group difference as indeed ambiguous, relational, shifting, without clear borders” (1990, 171). When difference is reclaimed, “oppressed groups seek to seize power of naming difference itself…Difference now comes to mean not otherness exclusive opposition, but specificity, variation, heterogeneity” (1990, 171). Rather than seeing difference as stigmatizing, it becomes variation and a celebration of specificity, and, in the end, has the effect of eliminating group standards (i.e. what qualities define a group) and embracing the specific human differences. This relational understanding of difference empowers all
people.

It is the transformative power of difference that, I believe, strengthens Boyd’s conclusion and is revelatory for the IOC. Young and Boyd are clearly in agreement about the oppressive nature of universals: “policies that are universally formulated and thus blind to differences of race, culture, gender, age, or disability often perpetuate rather than undermine oppression” (Young 1990, 173). The Olympics, while professing to be neutral and cosmopolitan, works to oppress. Boyd’s call for democratic reciprocity demands “attention to, and public recognition of this attention to, the degree to which claims on public goods and political space can be shared across differences in the citizenry” (1995, 628). Boyd demands that there be recognition of just how much public policy can work across pluralism. For the IOC, Boyd might wonder just how possible it is for the IOC, or any group to uniformly work across diversity. The IOC needs to adopt a more democratically reciprocal outlook which can allow it to understand that its claim to unity is unfeasible.

Boyd’s call for sharing across differences requires Young’s notion of the “politics of difference”. The dilemma of diversity suggests that the tension between accepting diversity and accepting values that grip most or all members of the public. The perspectives on this dilemma (tolerance, laundry-list, universals) are rife with structural oppression and only maintain dominance. Boyd declares that “what the dilemma of diversity reveals is that the kind of perspective needed is one that requires, facilitates, and works through its exposure and performative critique of forms of inequality of voice within that reciprocity” (1995, 628). I suggest that Young’s “politics of difference” is
We have seen that the assimilationist ideal of liberation is well established in our society. Initially, it is easy to agree with a statement like Richard Wasserstrom’s “a truly nonracist, nonsexist society…would be one in which the race or sex of an individual would be the functional equivalent of eye colour in our society today” (Young 1990, 158). A world without difference is what the assimilationists offer; it is what the IOC offers. What is intensely problematic is how the assimilationists would meet that goal. Perhaps intentionally, perhaps not, the denial of difference prompts conformity, homogeneity, and dominance. When the IOC declares that it represents all sports for all nations, it does not acknowledge difference and does not recognize the reasonableness of diversity. To acknowledge difference would allow the IOC to see the hypocrisy, homogeneity, and oppression that it perpetuates.

**How the IOC Can Change: Eliminating Nationalism, Rethinking Sport, and Accommodating Difference**

It isn’t enough to point out the failings of the IOC and to shake a disapproving finger in their direction. Through this examination it is apparent that there is a rhetoric-reality gap between the IOC’s vision of global unity and the impact of its Olympic Games. Boyd and Young can offer a vision that looks quite different from today’s IOC. While offering an alternative vision, Boyd and Young’s work may not cure all these issues, but an exploration of an IOC that embraces democratic reciprocity and the “politics of difference” can provide insight into what the IOC could be and the world that
might be created as a result.

If the Olympics is to be a truly global event that encourages global participation, it must work to reduce competitive nationalism. This can be achieved easily if the IOC were to eliminate its requirement that all participants must represent a nation. The Olympics, presently, embraces internationalism rather than cosmopolitanism: “committed to international harmony and cooperation, but still within the logic of nation-state affiliation” (Carrington, 2004, 86). Carrington considers the difference between internationalism and cosmopolitanism by quoting sociologist Ulrich Beck who says the “national perspective is a monologic imagination which excludes the otherness of the other. The cosmopolitan perspective is an alternative imagination, an imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities, which include the otherness of the other” (2004, 86). Carrington values cosmopolitanism and recognizes a world that is increasingly global.

Similarly, in her book Inclusion and Democracy, Iris Marion Young (2000) argues “for a model of global democratic discussion and regulation that accommodates differentiated solidarity by giving a more relational interpretation to the meaning of self-determination” (9) and goes on to state, “We should envision global democracy as the interaction of self-determining peoples and locales on terms of equality in which they understand obligations to listen to outsiders who claim to be affected by their decisions or actions and to resolve conflicts with them through settled procedures in a global framework of regulatory principles democratically decided on together by all the self-determining entities” (9). Young argues for what she calls inclusive democracy; a
democracy that recognizes the impacts and effects of decisions upon insiders and outsiders. National boundaries are ineffective because they impact those beyond them, and communication between insiders and outsiders is integral to any decision-making process. Likewise, Boyd’s democratic reciprocity argues for “views across difference,” “reciprocal intelligibility,” and “inclusive interchange” (1995, 628) all contributing to increased communication and exchange of ideas, issues, and concerns. In an increasingly global world, nation-states can no longer hide behind arbitrary borders and insulate themselves from their global neighbours. What makes our global world more complicated is that inclusion and reciprocity is essential and must be a part of all decision-making. Nations cannot act alone.

The IOC has an opportunity to be a global leader by restructuring its Olympic Games to embrace inclusive democracy and cosmopolitanism by changing its nationalist requirements. Sport historian Allen Guttmann (2002) outlines the IOC’s nationalist structure: “the IOC created an institutional structure based on national representation: no athlete can compete as an individual; every athlete must be selected by his or her country’s national Olympic committee; every athlete... must wear a national uniform; when a victor is honoured, a national flag is raised and a national anthem is played” (2002, 2). We have already seen the effects of sportive nationalism, but what effect would the elimination of national affiliation have on the Olympics? If the IOC were to adopt a cosmopolitan rather than international stance, what might the Olympics look like? A cosmopolitan stance by the IOC would shrink its rhetoric-reality gap. By eliminating the national requirements, Olympic sport would be a celebration of human achievement and
would value participation rather than elite performance.

Olympic sport must be redefined. Through the earlier examination of how sport has been used as colonization tool, it is clear that the IOC needs to work to lessen its neocolonization by addressing the sports it considers “Olympic”. In a 1984 article in the *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, Henning Eichberg suggests that there has been “an increasing expansion of Western sport disciplines into the cultures of Africa, Asia and Indo-/Latin America at the cost of the national and native games and exercises” (98). Eichberg believes that the expansion of Western sport comes at the detriment of local cultural games and native folk games. Eichberg (1984) argues that “Olympic sport is neither self evident, nor natural, nor necessary for all peoples. It is socially and culturally relative, tied to a specific historical-cultural formation” (99) and he asks “Sport for all –yes; but what sort of sport?” (100).

If the IOC’s rhetoric is one that encourages sport for all people, then it must rethink what it considers sport. The IOC allows only certain sports into competition at the Summer and Winter Games. The IOC demands that sports have global interest and have an International Federation acting as its representative body. These rules eliminate many local sports and thereby exclude many from Olympic participation. Not only are local sports not considered by the IOC, indigenous and cultural games are ignored. Martial arts, indigenous games, contests, dances, as well as open-air activities (rock-climbing, rappelling, hiking, etc.), and meditative activities (Tai-Chi, Yoga, etc.) are not considered sport by the IOC and are not a part of the Olympics.

By not recognizing indigenous and local sport, the IOC is imposing its colonizing
vision. If the IOC were to adopt a more reciprocal view of sport and one that acknowledged the “politics of difference” it could encourage local, indigenous, cultural, and spiritual activities that contribute to physical, cultural, and emotional health. When the IOC demands that only certain sports enter Olympic competition, it maintains an imbalance of power that benefits established Western nations. Not only does this exclude large portions of the global population from Olympic competition, it makes Olympic competition inequitable and favours affluent nations.

The IOC has the ability through the Olympic Games to not only be a catalyst for athletic participation in all forms, but also a showcase for local and indigenous games and culture. In the same way that Olympic sport is marketed as an inspiration, restructuring Olympic sport to include non-Western practices, games, and activities can inspire athletic participation and conversation across diversity.

At the Vancouver 2010 Games, Brian McKeever became the first Paralympic athlete to be chosen for the Canadian Olympic team. Legally blind, McKeever was a member of the cross-country ski team, but was left out of competition by his coaches two days before his event. McKeever would later win three gold medals at the Vancouver 2010 Paralympic Games. The title of a Vancouver Sun article on McKeever, “Legally blind skier embodies the Olympic ideal,” strikes at the rhetoric-reality gap in the IOC’s failure to embrace and accommodate difference. While McKeever may embody the Olympic ideal, the reality of the IOC’s structure has made it difficult for outsiders to participate in the Olympics.

The Paralympic Games’ mandate is to enable: “To create the conditions for athlete
empowerment through self-determination” (IPC(c)). According to the International Paralympic Committee’s website, “Paralympic competition accommodates male and female athletes with a physical disability such as spinal injury, cerebral palsy, amputation, blindness/visual impairment, and les autres conditions\textsuperscript{10}. Athletes compete in three categories based on their functional ability, and a results calculation system allows athletes with different impairments to compete against each other” (IPC(a)). If accommodations can be set up to allow fair competition among athletes of varying disabilities, then it must also be possible for the IOC to set up similar competition within the Olympic Games and to embrace difference equitably.

The IOC is in a powerful position to assert Young’s “politics of difference” by encouraging participation and allowing accommodations in Olympic competition. Since Brian McKeever is legally blind, he was granted the accommodation of a guide (his older brother Robin\textsuperscript{11}) during his Paralympic participation. Ironically, had Brian McKeever competed in the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games, he would have been denied a guide because the IOC would consider it inequitable for other competitors even though denying McKeever a guide would have been inequitable for him.

If the IOC embraced difference, it would allow greater participation in the Olympic Games. In an August 15, 2010 article, “Olympics must move with the times, says Coe,” journalist Martin Parry writes that at the 2010 Youth Olympics, “Some sports have been adapted to appeal to a younger audience with street basketball being played,

\textsuperscript{10} “A group which includes all those that do not fit into the aforementioned groups” (IPC(b)).

\textsuperscript{11} Who, incidently, also was granted three gold medals for his participation and aid to Brian. Guides and aids share in any Paralympic medals.
triathlon with mixed gender teams and relay races in the swimming pool”. The Youth Olympics for athletes 14-18 is in its inaugural year and is, unlike its Olympic counterpart, looking for ways to innovate. By opening competition up to mixed gender teams the Youth Olympics is taking steps towards embracing difference. Chief of the London 2012 Olympics, Sebastian Coe says, “If those sports and those innovations prove to be successful and energise the Games, then yes, we should look at trying them in the full-blown Games” (Parry, 2010). Mixed competition in Olympic events can also show that the IOC embraces difference, and can be a positive alternative to the IOC’s present structure. By embracing difference and making accommodations for competitors the IOC not only empowers participants, but aligns itself more closely with its own Olympic ideals.

Conclusion

Young’s belief in difference and her acceptance of diversity in which all are valued for their uniqueness is invaluable in promoting reciprocity. In a world without groups in which difference is important and encouraged, reciprocity must be integral, because there can be no lumping people together into easy-to-manage groups. This reciprocity through difference encourages inclusive interchange that include differences rather than trying to eliminate them. This is especially important because it will require that discussions across difference which can keep differential power at bay by providing

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12 Equestrian (dressage and jumping) is the only Olympic event that allows mixed competition (of both horse and rider). As of 2010, the Paralympics allows mixed competition in Boccia, Team Cycling, Rowing, Sailing, Shooting, and Wheelchair Rugby.
“the ability and opportunity to voice those views” (Boyd 1995, 628). The value of difference can be a part of overcoming the dilemma of diversity by providing “principles and practices that identify liberation with social equality that affirms group difference and fosters the inclusion and participation of all groups in public life” (Young 1990, 11). This isn’t about treating everyone the same so that dissenters are marginalized, but about treating everyone as different so that the marginalized are included and valued. For the IOC, this may be a difficult task, but one that might allow it to overcome the Olympic paradox by overcoming nationalism and becoming the authentic cosmopolitan it so desperately hopes to be.

This is, perhaps, a utopian vision, but one that sees democratic reciprocity and the “politics of difference” within the grasp of the IOC and a potential part of the Olympic Games. By recognizing its own shortcomings and opening up discussion across diversity the IOC might become a more inclusive and reciprocal. It is, perhaps, naive to hope that by suggesting that the IOC work to eliminate nationalism, redefine sport, and allow accommodations would instantly eliminate its inherent neocolonialism. Nevertheless, it is important to make small steps towards a more just and equitable IOC.

It is worth asking whether the Olympics is sustainable if these changes are undertaken. Would audiences care enough about sport, competition, and human achievement if the Olympics did not strengthen competitive nationalism? Would audiences watch a hockey game played between the world’s most elite players? Would audiences cheer sportsmanship and play-making skill in the same way they cheer for their national team? Would the Olympics be newsworthy if participation was the standard
of success? Would these changes strengthen or harm the Olympics?

It is important to ask, “What is the goal of the Olympics?” Are the Winter and Summer Games an exhibition of athletic prowess and competition, or is the Olympics a commercial entity that seeks out as much corporate profit as possible? Would the “politics of difference” change the IOC’s cultural impact and its public pedagogy? By adopting an approach that embraces the “politics of difference”, the IOC reduce the rhetoric-reality gap between Olympic marketing and the reality of the Olympic Games. If the Olympics really wants to be a truly cosmopolitan, global, and inclusive organization, it must takes steps towards eliminating nationalism, neo-colonialism, and exclusion.
Chapter 7
Conclusion

The philosophical question that prompted this study is: “In a world with so much diversity, how do we get along?” As I was wrestling with this question, Vancouver prepared to host the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. I wondered, “Is the Olympics the answer?” Presented with advertising images of athletes from around the world coming together to compete in peace seemed a possible solution. Does the Olympics unite?

Dwight Boyd believes that by accepting reasonable pluralism, multicultural societies are faced with the tension of creating policy that acts across pluralism. This tension he calls “the dilemma of diversity” must be addressed in order for multicultural societies to remain strong and healthy. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) believes that “By throwing a bridge over continents, by standing above differences of race, social regime or political system, [the Olympic Movement] can bring hope and togetherness so often and so deeply torn apart” (IOC 2009). This study explores the question: Does the Olympics alleviate the tension of the dilemma of diversity?

By exploring the IOC’s treatment and representation of Aboriginals, I have shown that the IOC does not respect diversity and does not unite diversity within host nations. In closely examining the IOC’s the misrepresentation of Canadian Aboriginals at the Montreal 1976 Olympics, the Aboriginal protest and the subsequent vilification of protestors during the Calgary 1988 Olympics, and how Aboriginal reconciliation became the theme of the Sydney 2000 Olympics I have shown that the IOC misrepresents
Aboriginals and uses them to further their own brand image. Though the IOC declares that it accepts difference and diversity, in the case of Aboriginals, there is a gap between Olympic rhetoric and Aboriginal reality. The IOC oppresses and appropriates Aboriginal culture under the guise of unity.

After historically exploring Aboriginals in previous Olympics it is clear the rhetoric-reality gap still exists between the IOC’s image and their actions towards Aboriginals. While, on the surface, it might appear that the IOC has made strides towards Aboriginal partnership and accurate representation by choosing an Inuit cultural artifact (an inukshuk) as the logo for the Vancouver 2010 Games, this logo exemplifies the IOC’s misrepresentation and appropriation of Aboriginal culture. In the investigation of the development of the inukshuk as symbol, branding is seen to be the most valuable commodity for the IOC, and for Canada. The IOC and Canada as nation-state appropriate culture in order to appear to embrace diversity. These efforts to build acceptance of diversity into a brand has the effect of creating a monoculture and eliminating diversity.

The IOC, as an organization, is in a unique position to present its vision of unity since it has a strong presence in the school system. School boards have allowed Olympic educational materials into their schools and allow teachers to use Olympic Education as part of their Values and Character Education curricula. By critiquing Olympic Education and its educational materials, it is clear that the programs uncritically act as Olympic rhetoric and propaganda. The effect of this is to expose children to corporate advertising and to develop children to embrace a value system that is created and defined by dominant Western ideology. What becomes most evident is that the educational materials
do not embrace diversity, but seek to maintain the status quo by spreading dominant Western values.

Since the Olympics is an international mega-event, it has an impact upon all nations. Though IOC rhetoric announces the power of the Olympic Games and Olympism to unite, by examining sportive nationalism, it is evident that the Olympics works to build national identity and to promote and encourage international competition. By strengthening competitive nationalism, the Olympics spreads Western ideology and capitalist dogma while acting as a tool of neo-colonization spreading Western values in oppressive and imperialistic ways. By showing the shortcomings of Olympism as Enlightenment internationalism and how this vision does not embrace diversity and difference, I have shown that it creates a monoculture.

By critiquing the IOC, its mantra of Olympism, and its Games, an image of an oppressive, anti-democratic, tyrant appears. While it is imperative that the IOC is examined critically, it cannot be denied that the IOC has tremendous power. As a cultural institution, the IOC and its Olympics have a clear public pedagogy that has an impact on the social, racial, economic, class, and institutional configurations of global society. With this powerful public pedagogy, the IOC has the potential to wield its power to make a meaningful difference in the lives of all people. With this in mind, the IOC must work towards equity. By replacing the IOC’s Enlightenment cosmopolitanism with a vision that encourages difference and embraces diversity, I have drawn on Dwight Boyd’s concept of democratic reciprocity as well as Iris Marion Young’s “politics of difference”. These concepts when applied to the IOC, Olympism, and Olympic Games will allow the IOC to
reduce its emphasis on competitive nationalism, and will allow it to be more flexible, accepting, and inclusive. It is hoped that this vision will encourage improved representation of all marginalized groups in the true spirit of reciprocity.
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