Responding to Alienating Trends in Modern Education and Civilization by Remembering our Responsibility to Metaphysics and Ontological Education:

Answering to the Platonic Essence of Education

by

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Theory and Policy Studies in Education
University of Toronto

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Abstract

This thesis explores the most basic purpose of education and how it can be advanced. To begin to analyze this fundamental area of concern, this thesis associates notions of education with notions and experiences of truth and authenticity, which vary historically and culturally. A phenomenological analysis, featuring the philosophy of Heidegger, uncovers the basic conditions of human experience and discourse, which have become bent upon technology and jargon in the West. He draws on Plato's account of the 'essence of education' in the Cave Allegory, which underscores human agency in light of truth as unhiddenness. Heidegger calls for ontological education, which advances authenticity as it preserves individuals as co-disclosing, historical beings.
Acknowledgments

Special thanks to professors Trevor Norris and Jeff Stickney for their guidance researching this topic, which, now fulfilled, poses questions to me. I have more to think about and more to think with, thanks to your generous teaching.

I should also thank Iain Thomson for his project on ontological education. In the same vein, albeit closer to the heart, I thank Plato.

And to the old man in Italy, surely passed, who repeated, louder and louder, "It's there! It's there!" He pointed with his cane to a ripe plum on the ground at our feet under the tree. "Where!?" I kept responding. Eventually I saw it, picked it up, and I ate it. It was delicious, and I remember that I could not believe that it was there all along in plain sight. I still have those moments, though now it is usually because I cannot 'see' all aspects of myself, sometimes made too plain to others. I acknowledge the fumbling.
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Introduction

1 The Passing On of Stories

Human life hinges on the passing of stories, culture, and knowledge from generation to generation. Over time, out of necessity, various civilizations and cultures have worked out notions of and discourses about experience, authenticity and truth, as part of the ongoing human endeavour to bring a working order to things. This passing of stories and knowledge is always ongoing, ingraining the members of society in a way that is noticed or spoken of nominally. As values, expectations, and knowledges are passed down to younger generations, thereby enfranchising them, stability and progress passes up to older generations, preserving society and underscoring shared and individual identity. Education is the means of this exchange; the basic conduit between old and new generations.

The role of education is to provide youth and students with the socially sanctioned knowledge and skills they need to succeed in life while at the same time advancing and securing the established needs and values of society, no matter how diverse. However, the interests and ideas of established educational institutions can easily conflict with the actual conditions or needs of new generations, causing doubt, criticism, resistance, and alienation. Whether in response or as a prevention, institutions must have a way to justify their authority, to prove that they are fulfilling their most basic purpose. Unfortunately, the ability to defend or impose authority can eclipse any question of the intrinsic value of it.

The authority of a given society will favour a particular form of education, in accord with its
basic world view. Non-Western countries, including orthodox societies, rely on the authority and power of tradition to provide justification for the particular form of their educational practices. Western society often works with opposed left- and right-wing philosophies of education, drawing on the more conservative, traditional, transmissive approach, and the more liberal, modern, critical approach. Though such political and ideological distinctions have meaning and purpose, they are not central to the scope of this thesis. We can begin to appreciate reasons for this somewhat a-political approach by identifying the increasing adoption of technology that impacts education in Western and in many non-Western nations alike. The issues raised by this thesis speak to the West, as it is typically understood (i.e. Europe and North America), as well as to those developing nations that are increasingly adopting a view of the world and of themselves that is technological. For these reasons, when I refer to 'the West' I include increasingly technological societies as well.

My intention is not to inform a choice between one approach to education or another, but to identify an essence of education that would inform either approach to education. I see the essence of education as a philosophy of education that is responsible to the basic conditions of human experience, and that informs authentic pursuits in life. We will see that the basic purpose of education, or the essence of education, is to bring students to dwell and be alongside others in a shared clearing of possibility. From this perspective, all are co-creators in discourse, and the most basic purpose of education, or its essence, is to acclimatize students to this role. I will draw on the work of Martin Heidegger, who is a preeminent early Twentieth-century philosopher, to provide an analysis of the structures of human experience. We will see that attending to the essence of education sheds light on the taking up of notions and experiences of authenticity, freeing individuals to learn and grow in light of their heritage. Aside from the intrinsic value of reflecting on the essence of education, it offers an important response to the increasing technologization of Western society, which affects all sides of debate.

We will see that the allure of technology, to Western and non-Western societies alike, calls for an ontological analysis that appreciates the particular allure of technology. To pursue the basic purpose of education in a technological era, Heidegger's thought allows us to explore the basic conditions of human experience and phenomenology, and how that impacts
challenges to educational. A technological society provides neat and discrete structures and patterns for understanding phenomena and for acquiring technologically-assisted abilities and pleasures. Through technology, the people can achieve maximum results with a minimum of effort. Given technology's gratifying, self-perpetuating benefits, its low level of admission (assuming one has money to spend) a healthy sense of caution toward technological dependence would be appropriate.

While the basic philosophical analysis of this paper, revolving around metaphysics and the phenomenology of human experience, can be relevant to all cultures that are facing the allure of technology, it will reflect on the Western tradition primarily. I hope to identify some basic, simple concepts that can inform the pursuit of authentic education in Western society, which seems all full of energy, domination, and seeming progress, but without even a partial reckoning with its own values of truth, authenticity, and environmental sustainability.

2 Heidegger's Pursuit of the Essence of Education

Martin Heidegger may be best known for three things: (1) his insightful, deconstructive, Twentieth-century philosophy, (2) his difficult yet sometimes original language, and (3) his brief association with the Nazis. Before entering into the body of this thesis, which will draw primarily on Heidegger's main philosophical contributions, I would address some possible, initial concerns about the integrity of his work. The remainder of this introduction—including a brief review of my sources—will address his unusual language and his deplorable political associations.

As we will see, Heidegger's language is, indeed, difficult to follow at times, though insightful. To facilitate this study, which aims to explore the basic purpose—or essence—of education, I will draw primarily on contemporary philosophers of education who use Heidegger's work. Foremost, in the regard, I cite numerous contributors to *Heidegger, Education, and Modernity*. Indeed, I identified this thesis' area of interest after revisiting Iain Thomson's chapter, "Heidegger on Ontological Education, or How We Become What We Are." This topic involves complex concepts and unusual word combinations, all in Heidegger's style, which can be difficult to penetrate. Fortunately, David E. Cooper, another contributor to the above collection, wrote a book titled "Heidegger". He offers a gentler
initiation, and serves as my main secondary source. Cooper's book, as well as similar endeavours to abridge Heidegger, by Joan Stambaugh and S. J. McGrath, will provide various entries into Heidegger's corpus. These texts have been most helpful to this study of Heidegger and his philosophy, as I have only begun to work with *Being and Time*.

Incidentally, *Being and Time* is itself an incomplete text. It was composed of one of three parts: the first part was itself incomplete (now *Being and Time*), and the remaining two parts were never completed (Krell 17). Other texts and essays by Heidegger will be drawn upon directly as well, including *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, "The Question Concerning Technology," and *The Essence of Truth*. To begin our ascent, then, a cursory review of Heidegger's overall assessment of the West addresses the purpose and importance of his work.

Heidegger describes the challenge (or distress) that the West and its educational efforts face. Cooper distills Heidegger's assessment of the West:

> The natural sciences, with their monochrome view of the world as merely so many "spatiotemporal magnitudes of motion," contribute to a levelling down, a flattening out, of everything. They render the world "boring," and the boredom they inspire is only warded off by the frenzied pursuit of "life-experiences," pointless titillation and "kicks." No wonder that, to the degree the humanities survive in the modern university, they do so as so much cultural decoration. In the terminology Heidegger was increasingly to employ from the mid-1930s on, these various aspects of a contemporary "distress" belong to a late stage in that long process that he refers to as "the abandonment of be-ing."¹

We witness, and even experience, the pain of and distraction from this distress, linked to an abandonment of the question of being, in many high-stakes scenarios: in politics, legal issues, corporatization, and character assassination. Heidegger takes up the question of being at great length, in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, which is effectively his companion to *Being and Time*. As a matter of fact, it was first published along with the seventh edition of *Being and Time*, in 1953, and it was the first of his books to be translated into English, in 1959 (*Metaphysics* vii-viii). In his metaphysical exploration of our historical relation to being, and the question of it, Heidegger refers to a 'darkening' of that relation. He refers to "the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the reduction of human beings to a mass, the preeminence of the mediocre" (47). He uses his phenomenological analysis to describe the

¹"Truth, Science, Thinking, and Distress" 52; Heidegger, "Question"; Heidegger, "Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)"
basic conditions of human experience. He identifies the metaphysical assumptions of a
society (or a time) that change historically, leading to our current technological mind set,
which threatens education in new ways.

2.1 Responding to the Crisis in Education: Heidegger Takes Up Plato

I hope to advance a concept of authentic education that is responsible to the message of
Plato's Cave Allegory, which he used to describe "the most important" aspect of education
(225; sec. 519d). Plato would tell us: 'Don't forget that we see in ideas! That we can have
any ideas at all descends from the highest principle (represented as the sun), that which
allows all ideas, the Good, exists. Therefore, we should liberate ourselves and the being of
others in light of this.' Furthermore, Plato asserts that remembrance requires our full
attendance (the entire soul), not a mere nod (224; 518c).

Since the dawn of history, humankind has reckoned, in some way, with the concepts Plato
raises in his Cave Allegory. However, Heidegger was among the first philosophers to
understand our particular predicament in the West at this time and the need for a fresh study
of Plato's device. Iain Thomson, author of "Heidegger on Ontological Education," confirms
Heidegger's contribution:

Heidegger was one of the first to diagnose correctly what a growing number of
incisive critics of contemporary education have subsequently confirmed: we now
stand in the midst of a historical crisis in higher education. Heidegger's profound
understanding, of the nature of this crisis—his insight that it can be understood as a
total eclipse of Plato's original educational ideal—reveals the ontohistorical trajectory
leading up to our current educational crisis and, more importantly, illuminates a path
which might lead us out of it. (125)

3 Tripartite Analysis: Associating Education, Truth,
and Authenticity

How can we know if education is fulfilling its most basic purpose, and what is it? A study of
what we mean by authentic education and of what comprises the 'experience of authenticity'
is a necessary and fundamental practice for assessing whether education is fulfilling its most
basic purpose. A phenomenological analysis will allow us to trace the connections among:
experiences of authenticity; ideas (or notions) of authenticity; ideas about truth, and; the
related ideas about education. At least in the West, we can note that notions of education, truth, and authenticity overlap and imply one another as a matter of course.

An individual's experiences of education, truth, and authenticity cannot but be influenced by the particular character of local notions or ideas about these three pillars of identity. For example, a society that values tradition and literature (as what is 'authentic') would encourage youth to find interest in and to develop the skill set on offer and lead a related (potentially rewarding) lifestyle. Similarly, a technological society would encourage youth to find interest in and develop scientific skills, which would make available a very different (potentially rewarding) lifestyle. An analysis of education's goals and effectiveness must also look at concepts pertaining to truth and its apprehension, which then influence strongly experiences and concepts of authenticity, all of which bear upon notions of education in turn. Teasing them apart will allow this thesis to bring clarity to the experiences and discourses around education, truth, and authenticity.

Just as experiences or ideas of authenticity can appear fleeting, preformed, or forced, notions of authenticity can impart jargon, indoctrination, and nihilism, contrary to the supposedly benign intentions of authentic education. Indeed, as we will see, the West has inherited a distorted understanding of education. Inside and outside the classroom, we typically hold to a superficial understanding of truth as correctness, rather than as unhiddenness and correctness. Heidegger draws on the work of Plato to bring focus to what amounts to a false interpretation of the essence of education. Iain Thomson, author of *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education*, summarizes Heidegger's project:

> Heidegger seeks to place before our eyes the most influential understanding of "education" in Western history: Plato's conception of paideia. Heidegger maintains that aspects of Plato's founding pedagogical vision have exerted an unparalleled influence on our subsequent historical understanding of "education" (its nature, procedures, and goals), while other, even more profound, aspects have been forgotten. These forgotten aspects of paideia are what his deconstruction of education seeks to recover. ("Heidegger on Ontological Education" 124)

Heidegger contributes to the retrieval of Paideia, which we will see means many things, including culture and civilization, by providing his deconstruction to illuminate our living role set in the background of Paideia. Heidegger describes the conditions of experience that make culture possible, shedding a new light on Plato's message.
A deeper analysis of what comprises the experience of authenticity, and what might be at the core of an authentic education, will shed light on what is a very complex, dynamic, and potentially internally conflicted aspect of human life. This complexity is further compounded, and confounded, by our increasingly technological and scientific relationship with the world, which offers great convenience but threatens to alienate individuals from a more authentic relation to truth and to others. I hope to draw attention to the main structures that allow and even assist the distortion of education, resulting in student alienation. Studying this situation and its result—student alienation—will help expose what parades as fulfilling the purpose of education when, in fact, it cannot be. This tripartite relation and analysis, associating truth, education, and authenticity, will provide leverage for exploring the essence of education, and its varied expressions.

3.1 Organization of Chapters

Chapter One will explore the question of whether education is fulfilling its most basic purpose by first exploring the closely associated concept of and experience of authenticity. Indeed, we deal with authenticity in two ways: in our ideas or notions about authenticity—what it is, what counts as authentic—and in our direct, personal experience of it. We will also see that experiences can engender authenticity as well as inauthenticity. Before entering into Heidegger's philosophy about authenticity, which will occur in a subsequent chapter, in Chapter One I will initially stage this study of authenticity between two poles. First, I will present authenticity in relation to our current technological era, which can drive student alienation and nihilism. Next, a recap of Plato's Cave Allegory will trouble rigid connections between truth and authenticity in education (and in general). Plato reveals that truth can only be transposed onto or through things. That is, truth is not absolute in discourse but rather truth essences or appears in the face of located discourse. The remaining chapters will explore the philosophical mechanics of our relation to the appearing of truth.

Fortunately, a useful sequence emerges from these topics in their individual relations to truth, with: (1) education as the conveying of truth; (2) authenticity as the experience of truth, and; (3) truth as something that appears diversely over space and time. These three aspects of truth will be explored as per the subsequent three chapters. A purposeful narration emerges by first
dealing with the most immediate and formal handling of truth, and that is through the practice of education, which will be the focus of Chapter Two, "The Conveying of Truth." This will begin with a review of the history of authenticity in education, ending with an introduction of Heidegger's historical context and his philosophical thought pertinent to a study of education, truth, and authenticity. This will point to the need for a metaphysical and phenomenological exploration, beyond educative practices, which will be the work of Chapter Three, "The Construction of Truth." Chapter Three will reveal the broad sources of truth formation, according to Heidegger, in metaphysics and onthotheologies, leading appropriately to the narrow focal point of truth apprehension in the individual. Focusing on the individual, in Chapter Four, "The Experiencing of Truth," will bring us to Heidegger's thought on Dasien, authenticity, and inauthenticity, finally identifying Da-sein (being-there) as the measure and locus of truth. Whereas the first chapter exposes authenticity as highly varied experience, Heidegger establishes the conditions of authenticity in surprising detail. Finally, Chapter Five, "The Essence of Truth," will focus on the most basic point of Plato's Cave Allegory, in the early pages of Book Seven of The Republic: that we see in ideas.

Given that our discourses are shaped by the metaphysics in force, and that we experience authenticity and truth in diverse ways, we need a broader sense of truth. The value of truth as correctness or correspondence (among prepositions) cannot be denied in the face of Western progress, for example. However, there is an additional aspect we cannot overlook, wherein truth is understood as a matter of unhiddenness rather than as mere correctness. For example, by identifying a thing correctly as 'such' I am also not seeing it as otherwise, which could be equally valid or perhaps more authentic. I will argue that an education that would seek to promote student authenticity must have some awareness or appreciation of the formation of truth at this level.

As part of my introduction to Heidegger, and his clarion call to the Platonic essence of education (i.e. ontological education), and for the sake of responsible scholarship, would note without censure that he himself demonstrated an apparent deficiency of moral sense. Given the seriousness of some of these shortcomings, it would be prudent to address them, if only briefly, to indicate if and to what extent we can value the thought of Heidegger when, after all, as is well known, he was a member of the Nazi Party for a time. To what extent may I
draw upon the thought of Heidegger regarding the construction of truth, authenticity, and education, given this dreadful association?

4 A Brief Defense of the Value of Heidegger's Thought

4.1 Heidegger's Nazi Connection

In 1931, if suddenly, Heidegger began to support the Nazi Party outwardly. He was motivated to join in part by encouragement from his wife, and perhaps more so by the socio-political, post-World-War-One climate of Germany, which the Nazi Party seemed most able to address in Heidegger's eyes. He believed in "radical curriculum reforms . . . [and the] regrounding of all human and natural sciences in philosophy as the pre-eminent field" (Collins 27). Heidegger was against the fragmentary specialization of technological advancement. To this end, he formed alliances with radical Nazi Party educational reformers, aiming to reform German Universities based on Nazi principles. Jeff Collins, author of Heidegger and the Nazis, explains that in 1933, at the height of Hitler's ascent:

The moment to 'educate the nation' seemed to have arrived. [Heidegger's] ambitions were far more than local. He took on the self-image of a – or more likely the – 'spiritual leader' of National Socialist education. (27)

It would seem his hopes and intentions to educate the nation, as per ontological education, ended up in the wrong camp, though well intended. While it cannot be denied that Heidegger was a supporter of the Nazi movement, the extent to which he was a hard-line Nazi can be questioned.

Having been rejected by the Church in years past, and having revolted against neo-scholastic pressures, he may well have been overly eager to join a movement—any promising movement—that accepted him and that supported his standing as an academic visionary and leader. Heidegger was more interested in guiding Germany through a shift in thinking than in the racist ideology that came with Nazism. Krell notes that his "active collaboration with the Nazi party had lasted ten months (from May 1933 to January 1934); a period of passive support and waxing disillusionment followed" (27). To some extent, he always distanced himself from the Nazi Party. Even in the 1930s, Nazi Party adherents criticized Heidegger
fiercely, and "various restrictions were placed on his freedom to publish and to attend conferences" (Krell 27). Eventually, in 1944, "he was declared the most "expendable" member of the university faculty and ... sent to the Rhine to dig trenches" (Krell 27). A more lengthy passage by McGrath helps to paint a more complete picture:

Heidegger was never particularly interested in the racist agenda of the Nazi Party; anti-Semitism struck him as crude and biologistic. He could overlook this shortcoming, however, so long as what he felt were the deeper, spiritual springs of German unrest were addressed. The political radicalism and decisionism of the Nazis seduced Heidegger into becoming politically active for the first time in his life. In its hour of crisis Germany needed to be resolute – without any guarantees that any particular decision was the right one. Not to make a decision, however, was for Heidegger certainly the wrong course. Under Weimar, Germany had stagnated from too much reflection, mediation, and democracy. It was time for change, and there was no political precedent for what needed to be done. Like Nietzsche's Overman, Germany needed to create new values in the void. (Heidegger: A (Very) Critical Introduction 23-24)

Heidegger's motivation was to wrestle Germany from the grip of indecision and and depression. He sought radical curriculum reforms, representing "disintegration of the old humanistic disciplines, and regrounding of all human and natural sciences in philosophy as the pre-eminent field" (Collins 27). In his own words, in a private letter to a friend, Elisabeth Blochmann, he wrote:

Certain and unshakeable is the challenge to all truly spiritual persons not to weaken at this particular moment but to grasp resolute leadership and to educate the nation towards truthfulness and a genuine valuation of the genuine assets of existence" (qtd. in Collins 26).

Perhaps he was blinded by his enthusiasm, but it seems he perceived a narrow window of opportunity through the Nazi party as his only hope. Excusing Heidegger is not my intention, but rather I mean to contextualize his decisions. I believe this provides some explanation of his decisions, insufficient and glancing though it may be, while allowing for, and even encouraging, an increment of (conceptual) reservation in relation to his philosophy and life as a whole.

4.2 The Viability of His System of Thought

Regardless of the political and emotional climate of the time, one may well question

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2 The location of, and casual name for, the post-World War I political arrangement, in 1919, which replaced an imperial government with a parliamentary republic.
Heidegger's system of thought to see if it contains inherent weaknesses that are prone to misappropriation. During the 1930s and '40s, logical positivists denounced Heidegger's thought on account of its frequent use of unusual language. Phrases such as 'the nothing nothings itself' and 'beings become more beingful' motivated the dismissal of his work by some scholars as "the worst metaphysical nonsense" or "a joke" (Cooper 1). Beyond Heidegger's unusual language, some would label his work inherently Nazi. Against such dismissals, McGrath asserts that "critics who argue that the whole of Heidegger is Nazi ideology . . . overstate their case" (2). Along the same lines, Collins clarifies that such charges "do not prove that his philosophical works are Naziist, that they lead towards Nazism directly or indirectly or that they have Naziist effects" (32). Again, we should recall that the Nazi's were more interested in Heidegger's academic credibility than in his philosophy, and Heidegger was more interested in seeing Germany through an educational renewal, than in racist ideology. Nevertheless, some critics take issue with his use of language:

[His] hermeneutics is intrinsically authoritarian and leads inevitably to totalitarianism. They argue that the model of truth as disclosure (in Heidegger's terms, alētheia) does not allow for the kind of public verification and objective scrutiny essential to democracy. (McGrath 2)

However, as McGrath points out, Heidegger is one of many philosophers, including Plato, who advance models of truth that highlight truth as unhiddenness rather than as superficial correctness (2). These criticism, which lack any serious taking-up of Heidegger's work, and which draw more on anecdotal appeal, cannot address the fact that his work has been exceedingly useful for philosophy up to the present day. Collins notes a paradox: "how texts by a philosopher who advocated Nazism might lend themselves, even in seemingly paradoxical torsion, to political struggles that resist Nazisms of all kinds" (9).

Heidegger's work has been taken up in earnest by numerous high-profile philosophers who challenge the comforts and confines of established thought. According to Collins, "his critique of subjectivity, his 'thinking otherwise' to Western tradition, even his question of being, have proved significant and useful to many post-structuralists," including Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Lacan (Collins 7).

While various philosophers take up Heidegger, few do so without reservations. Huntington
points out one of the limits of Heidegger's ontological perspective, which bypasses the structures of male domination.

[Poststructuralist theorists argue that] dialectical models of subjectivity (as both constituted yet self-constituting) remain caught in a dualistic epistemology that perpetuates associations of femininity with the realm of immanence, nature, and embodiment, while assigning masculinity to conscious intentionality. (Huntington xvii; parenthesis in orig.)

Cutting further into Heidegger's philosophy, pointing out one of his fundamental omissions, Irigaray asserts that "nor does Heidegger acknowledge that the feminine operates as the keystone that bolsters, and thus is crucial for toppling, the edifice of the western patriarchal symbolic system" (Huntington xiv). Feminist theory alerts us to the history of systemic male domination that can still retain itself through Heidegger's philosophy, especially when it is not taken up fully, 'turning the whole soul around.' That is, the strength of his philosophy, to impersonally deconstruct situations, in light of phenomenology and ontotheology, for example, is also its weakness. His philosophy is not keyed to tackle any particular social issue. Nevertheless, I find purpose in the core set of Heidegger's lessons and philosophy for this Master's thesis exploring the essence of education. A PhD. dissertation could cover a secondary, perhaps more useful, set of lessons derived from Heideggerian ontological analysis, such as in feminist theory.

Perhaps the fact that areas of political concern do not come into sharp relief through Heidegger's philosophy could explain some of his own insensitivity, which brings us to a difficult question. Why would Heidegger refrain from an unhindered apology for his Nazi involvement (Krell 27-28)? McGrath refers to a change in the tone of Heidegger's work that, to some extent, represents an apology; at least one that he was capable of offering. He describes Heidegger as someone who came to identify with the human community, as opposed to the strictly German, rural community, with considerable difficulty. In his later work, his "rhetoric of destiny (common to every period of his thinking) expands from his narrow focus on Germany to a transnational embrace of "the West," "man," and finally, the ecological community under the metonym "the earth."" (McGrath 123). McGrath supposes that "he probably felt that this was apology enough for the errors of judgement he committed in the 1930s" (123). On this point, I can identify with others who would find this 'substitute for an apology' wanting and concerning, as it would point to an inadequacy not merely in
Heidegger's sensitivity to others but in his thought which, it seems, can conceal heartlessness behind impersonal social conditions.

Heidegger is laid open to charges that, as Jürgen Habermas puts it, he makes man as the neighbour of being more worthy of thought than man as the neighbour of man. In a history scarred by genocide, that has a powerful resonance. (Collins 52)

Habermas makes obvious reference to the Holocaust. If strangely, Heidegger's philosophy has heart, encompassing our vulnerability as humans, our need to grow and adapt, while establishing a benchmark of authenticity that is grounded in conscience and care for oneself and for one's background.

I have acknowledged and briefly addressed two initial criticisms against Heidegger: his cryptic language and his fumble through National Socialism, to allow for a more confident, if cautious, entry into the thought of Heidegger. His work allows an entry into the considerations of authenticity, technology, and the Cave Allegory, in the next chapter. This will be followed by an exploration of the conveying of truth, in education; the experiencing of truth, in authenticity, and; the essencing of truth, which will return to educational implications, in the final chapter. I will address more philosophically thorough criticisms in the final chapter to inform a kind of ontological education that avoids the allure of jargon and that resists the perpetuation of discriminations.
Chapter One
Authenticity, Technology, and Plato's Cave Allegory

1 Authenticity as Inherently Imprecise, Empty, and Historical

A sampling of the common features of authenticity, as they relate to individuals and to society, will help to clarify the significance of Heidegger's ideas about authenticity. A common thread between Western and non-Western societies can be found in the hope of older generations. Parents typically hope that their youth will take up the established way of life enthusiastically. Whether that way of life is traditional and passed-down, or new and enterprising, part of a developing story, elders and adults assume or hope that their youth will affirm the validity of the education they have received. Perhaps the level of enthusiasm across generations in a society could be taken as a measure of its success. However, as anyone who has recounted a fascinating tale to a disinterested audience knows, there is a difference between ideas about enthusiasm and engendering its actual experience. Enthusiasm cannot be pinned down in a formula, but is more dependant upon a genuine inner experience.

On an explicit level, education seeks to assist students to succeed in or integrate into society, providing them with knowledge and ways of thinking and acting so that they may fulfil society's expectations to lead a good life. While education provides useful skills and knowledge it also outlines, on an implicit level, what is valuable, desirable, meaningful, possible, and real. As a result, education plays a large role in the formation of the student's experience of authenticity.

For an initial definition, I would say that the authentic, in its typical usage, represents a claim to truth and value that is somehow inherently or conventionally good and worth recognition. An authentic article may have an objective, shared value, whereas an authentic experience may carry a more subjective, or intrinsic value. Other intangible things, such as beliefs or personalities, may likewise claim authenticity. The experience of authenticity relates to one's sense of agency or meaningful engagement in the world. The desire for authenticity in
oneself is manifold, seeking: that the world is right; that one has a place in the world that one can claim with confidence and even pride; that one can have a meaningful, self-fulfilling role in society; that one can feel good about oneself, appreciated by others, and; that one can explore and promote their ideas and experience of authenticity among others. All of these criteria involve an external or public world with others, wherein ideas or notions about authenticity circulate, and an internal or private world with oneself, at which level certain experiences feel authentic. Looking at various definitions or words associated with 'authenticity' reveals the complex social conventions inherent in authentic values, expectations, and behaviours.

As we will see shortly, authenticity reflects preferences. One can have personal preferences and senses of the authentic, and, in perhaps a narrow-minded way, one can have preferences and senses about what should seem authentic to others. This is why educators may generally feel enthusiastic and authentic about the particular form of their education, regardless of whether their aim—to support authenticity in their students—is attained or not. In other words, a society will have ideas about what comprises a genuine education for its youth—one that will help them to grow into authentic, engaged individuals—but whether that education is effective and engenders or supports authenticity is another story. In short, there can be a disconnect between educators and the educated that can be related to the disconnect between ideas or notions about authenticity and its actual experience. This brings us to the need for a more detailed handling of authenticity.

Authenticity cannot be prescribed for another person, especially when the other is part of a different ethnicity, but its general characteristics can be examined meaningfully. What is authentic is understood to be genuinely one's own or inherently true for oneself. While authenticity speaks to individual experience and resonates with individualistic pursuits and autonomy, it necessarily highlights shared experience and life with others. In other words, authenticity is known directly by the individual, but typically with reference to others (who usually have similar experiences). Despite this simple explanation, we often forget that discourse, whether as internal or external dialogue, not objective conditions, underscores the experience of authenticity. This is why what counts as authentic or what feels authentic can sometimes shift in a free-floating, casual manner. Widely-published journalist, author, and
philosopher, Andrew Potter, lays out the content of common authenticity claims:

Authenticity is a way of talking about things in the world, a way of making judgements, staking claims, and expressing preferences about our relationships to one another, to the world, and to things. But those judgements, claims, or preferences don't pick out real properties in the world. (13-14)

Authenticity is inherently contingent upon specific, local physical conditions and ideologies, hence its variability. This explains why there are so many diverse experiences and notions of authenticity world-wide, and historically. Indeed, all of our ideas are contingent upon the world we live in, but the concept of authenticity presents a choice: to either hold on to an experience or concept of authenticity, or to hold and then freely release the experience or concept, to allow for a fresh experience or notion of authenticity in the future.

Today, as intimate experiences of authenticity become entwined with technological marvels, commercial value, and culture, what counted as authentic can be reversed, looking superficial, self-absorbed, and manufactured (i.e. not from oneself). If we can say one thing about authenticity, it would be that it is as fleeting as a change in mood, and as diverse as human life itself. In the West, for example, notions of authenticity, which traditionalists might associate more with effort, patience, or grace, tend more toward immediacy, intensity, and proclaim-ability today.

The attainment of 'authenticity' for oneself, or by society, can be evasive, to say the least. In like manner, as we will see in the next chapter, ideas of authenticity and authentic education have shifted over time, and what counts as authentic can shift in a span of seconds. This can only be explained by Plato's assertion: we see in ideas. What would count as authentic in one situation or culture would appear blatantly inauthentic in another, and I mean this both from a historical and a multicultural perspective. Authenticity varies over time and within all individual cultures/ world views. Indeed, authenticity varies over the span of individual lives as well. For example, a loud, sincere laugh at a party vs. a loud, sincere laugh in a funeral, or a smile at a person who is smiling at you vs. the same smile given to a person who is clearly upset—these demonstrate flips between authenticity and inauthenticity. These examples show how the authentic can be strained or reversed, in accord with the ideas that dominate the moment.
Authenticity and inauthenticity can be deceptively, or surprisingly, interchangeable. One's notion or experience of authenticity can appear superficial, self-absorbed, or inauthentic to another. Someone who is leading what might be an inauthentic life, clouded with anxiety and despair over unfulfilled objectives or ideals, may carry on an outward display that is "precisely as its opposite in a dogmatic certainty over who one is" (Vandenberg 90). In this sense, keeping up the appearance of authentic self-certainty can serve to conceal deep-seeded self-doubt, which amounts to inauthentic, manipulative living. Donald Vandenberg, who draws on the work and wording of Martin Heidegger, both of whom will be introduced more fully later, addresses the depth and potential harmfulness of inauthentic living:

Inauthentic existence is midway between dreaming and being wide awake: it is a state of awakeness in which the world happens to one, but of which one is conscious of it happening, in dread. Only because the person can lose the power over his own existence can he become inauthentic; only because this self-estrangement can become dominant can he become "neurotic." To fall into the immanence of inauthentic existence and to be more or less stuck there, unable to project freely into the future, is to be dominated by one's thrownness into existence. (174)

In authentic living and authentic education alike, the aim is to live with confidence, making the best of one's world and excelling in it in a self-directed manner, as opposed to being "dominated by" it. No doubt, life will always have its challenges and adversity, but does the person attempt to overcome them or give in to inertia, and can education help or hinder this effort? An authentic education would seek the former, to help the individual to find success in society and to overcome one's personal challenges, whether that society is democratic, communist, dictatorial, or fundamentalist. Nevertheless, similar to the pursuit or valuation of authenticity in general, an authentic education cannot but contend with the creeping-in of inauthentic education, which threatens to limit and stunt future generations.

1.1 Notions of Authentic Education Vary

Before going in to Heidegger's ideas of authentic education, we must appreciate its common-sense interpretation. In terms that one would expect, an authentic education seeks to promote a self-affirming, personally authentic, yet socially sanctioned engagement of its students in the world. That is, an authentic education supports (or would support) the development of authentic individuals who can lead fulfilling, self-directed lives in harmony with cultural norms and values. Michael Bonnet, a contemporary philosopher of education, describes
personal authenticity as pertinent to Heideggerian education in two ways:

First, in characterizing some central components of what might be meant by "human integrity," [education] provides a view of personhood and therefore, in a liberal tradition, a view of what must be respected and developed in the treatment of young people during their education. Second, because of the link that is made between this and the nature of human understanding, it offers a perspective on the nature of personally significant learning and the conditions that are necessary for it to occur.

(230)

Such aims, as simple as their goal may be—to secure a future of prosperity and meaning—whether at the scale of family, community, or nation, belie the constant conflict that these processes induce. Certainly, different ethnic groups, for example, can clash, asserting contrasting narrations of what counts as authentic human behaviour or education. However, another perhaps more basic level of conflict cannot be escaped: individuals must find a way to balance personal interests and predispositions with the outer expectations and roles into which they are induced and, sometimes, forced. Emerging from this conflict between external pressures and internal aspirations, both of which are bent toward an unrealized future, is a desire for a sense of authenticity. The external pressures upon the individual represent crystallizations of what is supposed to reflect and create authenticity, whereas internal pressures seek the actual experience of authenticity. So we see, authenticity, which is based on inner experience, has its counterpart in ideas, opinions, and notions about what is conducive to experiences of authenticity and what actually counts as authentic to others.

A given culture's ideas about the authentic can extend to the annals of tradition, religion, and myth, some of which can conflict with those of another culture. For example, a society that holds, as a truth, that men are superior to women will find a woman who is unconventionally strong-willed as inauthentic, whereas women may feel truly authentic in herself. Similarly, in the same situation, a man who speaks or acts against this woman would feel authentic, as affirmed by that society and its education, but in our (Western) eyes, he would seem to be inauthentic, offending the humanity within himself and in womankind as a whole.

Given that different societies have different values and ideas of truth, as demonstrated by the countless conflicts of ideology that exist today and historically, a notion of truth as singular and concrete cannot help us as neighbours, especially in nations with immigrants. Instead, we must see truth, like authenticity, as multiple, varied, and contingent on phenomena and discourse. Indeed, notions of authenticity in education have changed over time and vary
across cultures—identifying truth as a construct, or at least as involving construction, is the only tenable explanation. This is not to say that truth as a construct is nothing more than a house of cards, but that the basic underpinnings and assumptions upon which knowledge claims are made shift over time, constructing and re-constructing themselves historically. These changes inform different values and notions of authenticity, which authorize different approaches to authentic education in turn. To examine whether Western education is fulfilling its most basic purpose, which can be understood in terms of authentic education and authentic living, we must examine the constructing of truths as well.

2 Technology and Authenticity

Entering into a technological world view is as simple as purchasing fast-food-chain French fries, a cell phone, antibiotics, or a bootlegged DVD. The more we advance technologically, the more we find comfort in technological marvels, the more we seek to expand our technological prowess, and the more accessible it becomes. Technology can cater to anyone, regardless of the religious or philosophical allegiances one might have. S. J. McGrath summarizes the West's adoption of technology:

Today we are apparently at home with homo technologicus: happy with our iPods and cell phones; awaiting the day when we can rid ourselves of even these clunky gadgets with the help of a microchip implant in the brain. We are all ironists and multitaskers, "saturated selves" comfortable in our bad faith. A few disenfranchised young people and left-wing intellectuals fuss about globalization, but when it is time to outfit a new home, the first stop for the majority is Wal-Mart, home of towering rows upon rows of cheap Asian-made products. We contentedly graze on fresh greens that have traveled a thousand miles; we savour Chilean Merlot. In the first half of the twentieth century, this brave new world of consumer oblivion was already on the horizon and was the subject of some concern. Intellectuals such as Oswald Spengler and Max Weber questioned whether mass culture, mass-produced goods, and technological organization were desirable things; Heidegger and the existentialists he inspired replied with an emphatic no. (7-8)

With all the technology in motion today world wide, manufacturing and shipping products, changing the shape of the landscape, altering the composition of our atmosphere, and even introducing new genetically modified species, we owe it to ourselves, and our civilization, to pause and reflect. All of the earth-shattering technological progress the West has experienced, as well as political and moral failure, calls for a re-examination of the basic purpose of education and of our responsibility to it.
2.1 Reckoning with Student Alienation

Those areas of our lives where we would seek the greatest excitement, commitment, and authenticity, such as family, career, and spiritual practice, can also be the cause of the greatest anxiety and alienation. As such, alienation is endemic, and efforts for greater authenticity can result in alienation. Using accessible, elementary examples, Potter lists a few of the many causes of alienation people face, even suggesting that we can be alienated from the most constant presence in our lives—ourselves:

Husbands are alienated from their wives, students are alienated from their teachers, voters are alienated from their politicians, and patients are alienated from their doctors. Everyone thinks the mass media are alienating, especially thanks to all the advertising. Religious people find the permissiveness of our secular society alienating, and some believe that alienation is what motivates terrorists. People who live downtown find the suburbs alienating, while suburbanites feel the same way about life in the big anonymous city. … In modern society, we are all alienated from nature and from one another, although perhaps that is only because ultimately we are all alienated from ourselves. (46)

Granted, with so much alienation afoot, it would seem normal and natural, perhaps unavoidable. Suffice it to say, he disagrees with various aspects of Heidegger's philosophy. Nevertheless, alienation points to those aspects of our lives that concern us because they seem strange or, perhaps more commonly, they make us feel at risk. In essence, alienation is the flip-side of authenticity. In more academic but equally direct language, Potter asserts that "for a theory of alienation to do any work, it needs a corresponding theory of authenticity" (49). While it would be the case that authenticity can flourish where there is a reasonable state of peace (or non-alienation) in one's normal surroundings and experience, we will also see that we advance authenticity by responding to, or living in the face of, inauthenticity, when we face angst and anxiety.

In my opinion, the all-too-common student experiences of boredom in the classroom, doubt about the purpose of what one is being taught, and alienation point to missed opportunities for promoting students’ ability to find value and authenticity in their education and lives. The typical secular or religious presentation of truth as absolute, rather than as socially sanctioned, imposes related notions of authenticity and education without reflection on the other's view. As a result, an education that closes out alternate, and perhaps more genuine, approaches to authenticity allows entry to closed mindedness, nihilism, and the reductive
treatment of students. I hope to make the argument that human agency can be protected by acknowledging the philosophical foundations of custom and knowledge.

Authenticity and its promotion involves an experiential awareness of and relation to truth forming, which is to be a creative participant in the conventions of society, community, and family. The final chapter will explore how ontological education might endeavour to acclimatize students to being responsible and responsive to others, allowing one another to dwell in the manner of care. That is, a philosophy of education that attends to the fundamental purpose of education cultivates an awareness in students of the pre-linguistic being of others, before we rush to name the other and restrict our own being at the same time. The practice of ontological education holds a greater promise for positive motivation, compassion for others, and openness to change, while preserving the pursuit of authenticity. Without a sensitivity to the interconnected contingents of truth, authenticity, and education, the predominant philosophy of education is prone to exacerbate and even veil student alienation. Technology presents another curtain or overlay that can snatch our attention away from the being of others. Fortunately, the Western canon retains a fascinating tale to study and practice, to approach a more robust authenticity that allows for reflection.

3 Plato's Cave Allegory

Heidegger takes up Plato's allegory of the cave in the spirit with which it was given. He refers to Plato's introduction of the cave allegory, which he labels as illustrating the essence of education. It encapsulates an entire pedagogy, the steps of which Heidegger will later refer to as the different dwelling places of humankind. Socrates tells Glaucon that the allegory describes "that study which we said earlier was the most important" (225; sec. 519d). Plato places principle importance on elucidating the significance of the cave allegory in education. Heidegger reads Plato as elucidating the essence of education, at the beginning of Book Seven of The Republic. Including his own 'additional phrases' in parenthesis, along with the original Greek, Heidegger recounts Plato's preface to the allegory:

3 Heidegger includes "additional phrases," describing them as such, in his partial line-by-line translation of the Cave Allegory. Apparently, lacking an additional note, the same rule applies in the body of his writing, where the following passage appears.
Try to conjure up for yourself from the kind of experience (to be presented in the following story) a view (of the essence) both of 'education' and of the lack of education, both of which (as belonging together) concern the very foundation of our being as humans. ("Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 167)

The above passage presents Plato as describing the essence of education though his Cave Allegory; this is Heidegger's interpretation. I agree with his interpretation, but before elaborating on this, reviewing an un-embellished version of the same passage will help us to be sure of Plato's original intentions. Tom Griffith's translation reads much more succinctly: "If we're thinking about the effect of education—or the lack of it—on our nature, there's another comparison we can make" (111 sec. 514). The allegory begins in the very next sentence! We can see that Heidegger certainly 'makes Plato his own,' so to speak, inserting his reading directly and at considerable length. In any case, since Plato reflects on the allegory as getting to the 'most important' point about education (225; sec. 519d), we can accept Heidegger's framing of it as indicating 'the essence of education.'

Finally, Heidegger explains that the allegory demonstrates the essence of education as directly related to the essence of truth, as essencing. Accordingly, Heidegger asserts that "an essential relation holds between "education" and "truth"" (Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine" 167). Given the weight of the allegory, a brief summary of it would be useful to anyone who is not already familiar.

### 3.1 Heidegger's Highlights on Plato's Cave Allegory

Plato brings our attention to a strange scene. A cave is home to a number of chained dwellers who are forced to look only forward at a screen on which various unseen actors cast a movement of shadows. Having developed a 'smart narration' of the display, the dwellers are certain that they are participating in genuine life and exchange. The charade is preserved due to the nature of their being:

> For the essence of their being is such that, to them, precisely **this** unhidden before them **suffices** – so much so indeed that they also do not know **that** it suffices. They are entirely given over to what they **immediately** encounter. (Heidegger, "The Essence of Truth" 20)

Like 'real life', the cave dwellers have been thrown into a world with views that are always already in force, preempting any need for question. As a result, the cave dwellers will have a complete set of notions, practices, and experiences about truth, authenticity, and education.
To show that there are other understandings of the real, Plato supposes that the shackles are removed from one of the cave prisoners, presumably by an anonymous benefactor, giving him the opportunity to turn his or her head and look back at the light and shadow source toward the entrance of the cave. The reaction is both disappointing and understandable:

He avoids and shrinks back from the demand to fully give up his previous situation. He is also a long way from understanding that man truly is only in so far as he demands this of himself" (Heidegger, "The Essence of Truth" 28).

While being unshackled would seem to promise new freedoms and liberties. "Certainly removing the chains brings a sort of liberation, but being let loose is not yet real freedom" (Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine" 169). The next step, then, is for the cave dweller to be taken outside the cave, under the light of day.

Once out of the cave, the cave dweller would be disoriented, unable to see anything at all until his or her eyes gradually adjust. Then one would see the world and its most luminous object, that lights up everything: the sun. He describes the sun as the image for the idea of 'the good.' Heidegger clarifies that this idea of 'the good' is not be confused with the idea of moral 'good.'

The expression "the idea of the good" – which is all too misleading for modern thinking – is the name for that distinctive idea which, as the idea of ideas, is what enables everything else. ("Plato's Doctrine" 175)

Continuing, he adds:

[The highest, most luminous idea] is that idea which, as the idea of all ideas, remains the cause of the subsistence and the appearing of all beings. Because this "idea" is thereby the cause of everything, it is also "the idea" that is called "the good." This highest and first cause is named by Plato. ("Plato's Doctrine" 180)

The highest idea is that which makes possible all other ideas. With the individual as the microcosm, the highest idea within oneself is the inborn capacity to give ideas to all the ideas in our lives. Plato hopes to bind the activity of seeing and naming to the individual. We have the privilege, authority, and responsibility to 'be sun-like' in allowing ourselves to shine upon and engender meaning upon life. With a caveat, the role of education is to help us to see that how and what we see is a choice born out of our capacity to be sun-like and illuminate a world view. I do not mean to say that anyone can readily change his or her ideas and perceptions at will. The fine point is this: the choice that is made is one of a sub-set of comparable choices, not one that is arbitrary. Just because one is sun-like, it does not mean
they can turn off their illumination at will. Indeed, just as the sun is a constant, without
beginning or end in human terms, our being sun-like is always within the course of a
continuous life experience, shining on every day.

Continuing, then, with the task of education, the free individual who has seen the vast
outdoors is called upon to return in to the cave, and to endeavour to release other prisoners.
However, Plato points out, such a one would face resistance, ridicule, and the threat of death,
lest one betray 'what is real' from the perspective within the cave (223; sec. 517).
Furthermore, in the course of again acclimatizing oneself to the dim cave, and its ways of
communication, one would be tempted to revert to the comfort, predictability, and limitation
of cave dweller thought and discourse. Those who would enlighten the blind may, in the
course of their efforts, lose their vision and settle back in to blindness.
Chapter Two
The Conveying of Truth: Education

1 The History of Authenticity Claims in Education

The first step of this research into assessing whether education is fulfilling its most basic purpose is to examine ideas of authenticity in relation to education and to identify any broad patterns that may provide leverage for discerning 'authenticity' claims. In Reality by Design: The Rhetoric and Technology of Authenticity in Education, Joseph Petraglia suggests that "an understanding of contemporary education hinges on what we take authentic learning to mean and how we believe it is achieved" (14). A review of the history of authenticity in education, and the changes therein, begins to expose the complex interplay between concepts and experiences of authenticity.

Petraglia starts by looking at education in the classical era of the West. He indicates that "we find the beginning of a recognizable system of formal education in the West in the seventh century BC" (Petraglia 17). During that time, opportunities for formal education were limited to the privileged members of society; all upper-class men who were "considered deserving" of higher learning (20), purveying an "elite-idealistic" notion of education (17). The main content of this education consisted in literature, poetry, philosophy, and oratory. At the time, education was not intended to be practical, vocational, or preparatory for a career. Merely practical knowledge was looked down upon, even though various trades would have been highly skilled in their own right (17, 20). Far greater emphasis was placed on the ability to correctly recite historical or famous arguments rather than the ability to create useful or original arguments. Beginning a review of authenticity in education at this time provides a useful baseline as "in terms of authenticity ... the Classical Era might be seen as one in which the authentic was not on the table" (17). Formal education was more anchored in reciting the past than in preparing for the future. As such, early education made no claims to be either conferring or instilling authenticity. Indeed, in contrast to our modern times in which we assume individuals (in the West) can elevate their status in the world through hard work and education, up to and through the Roman times, individuals by and large accepted the place and class into which they were born as a matter of fact or natural fate that should not be
resisted (Levine).

While elite-idealistic education didn't seek authenticity per se, Petraglia identifies threads of notions of authenticity that continue into today's notion of education. The bestowal of elitism through education, the sense of education's mission to civilize individuals, and trust in the transfer of knowledge from teacher to learner existed then as now (19). Education is assumed to 'better' the individual in support of his or her 'upward mobility.' Our society elevates and honours highly educated individuals. Naming certain universities evokes prestige. Furthermore, while Classical Era elite-idealistic education looked down upon merely practical knowledge, in a similar manner contemporary Western education would look down upon a curriculum that consisted in developing merely practical or mechanical skills exclusively, such as typing, mathematics, or science. Already we can see that what was seen as related to authentic education in the past is part and parcel of authentic education today. We have inherited an elite-idealistic notion of authenticity that seeks to appreciate the themes, associations, and theories that are behind and that influence practice.

During the Middle Ages, from the fifth to fifteenth centuries, vocational training began to emerge as a humble alternative to formal education. Professional training also emerged, for lawyers, doctors, politicians, and academics. However, in keeping with the elite-idealistic tradition, such training stressed the study of theory, as well as the rediscovery of classical sources, both of which were carried out in the realm of ideas (Petraglia 20), as opposed to the immediate, practical world. The onset of the Enlightenment period ushered in many changes to notions of education, through the advancement of science and the scientific method, as well as the Industrial Revolution, which granted a higher esteem to practical training and skill. The utilization of instruments, measurements, and statistics moved scholarship from the realm of text and ideas into the realm of the outer world (21). Despite the increasing shift into pragmatism, elite-idealism persisted. Petraglia explains that prior to its independence, America retained its own elite-idealistic educational domain. In the early nineteenth century, Yale University argued fiercely for the preservation of its elite-idealistic educational model (Petraglia 22). However, with the rise of Republicanism, in connection to American and French Revolutionary thought, a new importance was placed on the value of democratic ideals and the opening of education to the citizenry. Education was seen as conducive to the
formation of a society composed of free citizens, and for the first time, "authenticity as a goal of learning entered into education's vocabulary" (Petraglia 22).

Authentic education increasingly entailed knowledge that could be put in to practice by the common man. In both Europe and America, skilled expertise in a trade or other manual work gained greater recognition and valuation, whereas a more erudite life became more marginalized (Petraglia 24). While elite-idealist institutions made compromises, encompassing more study of skills-oriented principles and theory, it resisted its disintegration. Indeed, the most esteemed schools continued to cater to the elites of society (24). Nevertheless, just as today's public schools would not cater exclusively to strictly practical training, the common schools of early America also needed to find a relevant balance between its elite-idealist heritage, which encompassed theory, and interests in vocational learning and practice.

In the late nineteenth century, American educational theorists found a conceptual bridge that could span these two interests through the goal of authentic learning (Petraglia 25). As Petraglia explains:

In a nutshell, the commitment to authenticity in education is the result of an uneasy and still imperfect reconciliation of two antagonistic impulses: the political and economic desirability of making schooling available to the masses and the retention of schooling's aura of intellectual elitism. Without a continuing commitment to elitism, education would be reduced to vocationalism. While without democratization, education would continue in the constrained elite-idealist tradition—one that clearly could not be reconciled to republican ideals. The rhetoric of the Progressivist movement in education of the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries [seeking authenticity] was the force that enabled (and still enables) this balancing act. (25)

Progressive education sought to situate lessons in an "authentic context," so that students could link lessons to the real world more effectively, or so students could learn things 'hands on,' or at a natural pace that matched the individual's developing capacities and interests. The European, Jean Jacques Rousseau punctuated this movement in the Eighteenth-century with his account of the raising of Emile, which popularized these notions of a more natural, and therefore more authentic, education that worked with the dispositions of the student rather than in spite of them. John Dewey is best known for aligning American education with the pursuit of authentic education, where the authentic entails: "integrating education with the
everyday realities and needs of the common man" (Petraglia 26). Dewey argued that we learn best by 'doing' within an 'authentic context.' In tune with his emphasis on experience as central in student learning, Dewey acknowledged that "school was but a small part of a student's larger learning experience (27). Therefore, "that which is authentic, in a Deweyan sense, is that which brings together not only the material and social conditions that shape one's world, but also one's beliefs about the world" (27).

Exploring skills and doing things as they present themselves spontaneously in accord with the developmental interests of maturing students would seem to impart an approach that is in alignment with a natural and therefore authentic order. However, there will be multiple takes on 'natural' just as there are contrasting notions and experiences of authenticity and of truth. The members of a society will always be embedded in a world that offers a discrete and limited range of available possibilities, expectations, and cultural artifacts to know and utilize. In the course of our modern, technological era, increasing scientific authority favoured the standardization and regimenting of education. Unfortunately, such seeming positive aims and means can enforce a nihilism, treating students as mere recipients of detached knowledge that may not be pertinent to their local needs, their personal interests, or the quality of education they have received thus far.

Can we trust that students will 'do' and learn in an 'authentic context' when that context is open to prefabrication, preferential valuation, and greater reinforcement (or the opposites)? In my view, authentic education in the Deweyan sense of 'learning best by doing in an authentic context' remains vulnerable to the ever-present influx of established norms, expectations, and materials. An authentic context that is pre-conceived or pre-formed is prone to revolve norms and discriminations, including the systemic chauvinism, rather than creativity and authenticity.

Granted, Dewey believed that education occurred both within and outside of the classroom, and this review is too brief to comment directly on Deweyan educational practices. As indicated in my introduction, while progressive education offers many benefits, it can also institute discriminations under the guise of authenticity. While Dewey's progressive education does begin to work with authentic learning and authentic education, let us take up
another philosopher of education who outlines a Heidegger-informed approach to progressive education.

2 The Pursuit of Authenticity in Education Today

2.1 Meaningful Connection Between Geography and Landscape

Donald Vandenberg is a philosopher and author who draws considerably on Heidegger to inform an approach to education that recognizes form and flexibility. His work, informed by Heidegger, promises to advance ontological education, providing a useful sense of what contemporary authentic education might look like, and a keen awareness of the alienation and nihilism that is possible through standardized education. His conceptual model distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, which correspond to truth as pre-structured or experienced; correct or unhidden. Vandenberg's approach promises to be pragmatic and it advances Heidegger's educational philosophy. Vandenberg provides a good initial taking up of Heidegger's work on authenticity message while drawing on, and introducing us to, Heidegger's ideas. This will prepare us for the phenomenological perspective that is the core of Heidegger's thought, to be explored in subsequent chapters.

Vandenberg recognizes the value and desirability of structured knowledge while drawing on the contribution of unstructured knowledge outside the classroom. Vandenberg preserves authenticity in contemporary education by allowing students to explore both structured and unstructured knowledge and learning together. He identifies two basic domains of knowledge. The first category, 'geography,' consists of what is generally considered to be formal knowledge. In its common use, geography represents the cutting up of the world into distinct territories, land types, and nations. In like manner, 'geography,' as used by Vandenberg, represents the compartmentalization of knowledge, the cutting up of the world into subjects of study, composed of discrete, objective sets of facts. Structured teachings consists, for the most part, in the conveyance and memorization of 'geographical' knowledge as such. The second category, 'landscape,' refers to the larger, immediate view and
experience of the world that individuals interact with freely and necessarily. A view of the landscape reveals features that overlap, blend, and shift unceasingly, sometimes offering no clear boundaries or categories, but leaving the individual with a self-experienced, self-made knowledge that is itself not fully articulated. Both forms of knowledge—landscape and geography—and the conditions for their learning are equally valid (84-85). Indeed, both forms of learning are always happening, even where schooling is most strict, as the influence and import of the environment and the play of power relations in a community cannot help but make themselves known, even through a minimum of explicit communication in classrooms. A school system that acknowledges both forms of learning, at least with the intention of not forcing a competition or conflict between each source, stands to offer students better conditions for learning and for authenticity.

2.2 Getting to the Ontological Presupposition of Action

This brings us to one of the common challenges within education and student-teacher interaction: the balance between normalized social structure and individual disposition. In other words, schooling faces the challenge of spanning two domains of interest, both of which have competing notions of authenticity. On one hand, the education establishment seeks to convey socially accepted information in a way that is repeatable. The need for practicality, both in training teachers and in developing a repeatable curriculum, necessitates a structured education system. On the other hand, the individual student may be absorbed with the need to succeed or simply survive in his or her immediate environment, drawing on experience and knowledge that is not necessarily related to any formal content. Working with the interests and skills of individual students offers greater rewards for teacher and student alike. A typical school system attends to preparing curricula, standards for evaluation, and tests, but may fail at providing an education that is valuable to all groups of students.

Drawing on his landscape-geography dichotomy, Vandenberg describes the challenge facing education:

Schooling has to have as its major goal the establishment of a common world, or geography; but insofar as schooling is the acquisition of logically ordered knowledge, it attempts to put pupils into that which is factual, repeatable, and valid for all pupils regardless of who the particular pupil is, i.e. regardless of his individual landscape. This is entirely proper and necessary, but then the more efficient it is, the more it leads to the development of a world of pure geography and the more the pupil
becomes a detached, objective, and depersonalized observer. The more effective it is, the more it leads to nowhere; and the more the pupil dwells nowhere, the more alienated he is from the world and from his possibilities of being in it, i.e., from himself. (87)

Without connecting to the immediate needs, concerns, and issues of one's local community and family, schooling imposes an existence upon the student that represents an internal and external disconnect from a sense of the real. Compounding this issue is the fact that the student's parents and society may nonetheless enforce the 'value' and 'importance' of schooling in its present form without sufficient explanation or justification. The student must simply learn to cope with this distance and the resulting boredom, thereby adopting a stunted level of enquiry to avoid frustration. Vandenberg describes more of the consequences of detached and detaching education:

Schooling may become largely a period of waiting due to lack of engagement in concrete possibilities. If the youth’s geography is separated from his landscape, if he is not exploring the intellectual-historical world as part of his wanting-to-be-independently but "learning" whatever he is supposed to learn, he remains removed from possibilities of genuine action. This alienation from himself is the more severe the more the pupil can and does project further into the abstract future. (89)

In this passage Vandenberg alludes to two major considerations in countering the deadening influences of education: understanding the 'intellectual-historical world' as such, and avoiding one of the pitfalls of over-investment in a flat, rationalized world view. First, he affirms that the world is 'intellectual-historical.' That is, our understanding of the world is shaped by concepts that have developed over time, through history, in contrast to the world being intrinsically definable and correctly defined. In other words, the world isn't merely as it is, as a world, but rather, we perceive the world through our ideas of it, which are historically based. Without noting this subtle distinction, individuals are prone to adopt the predominant world view of their society as authoritative and explicit, without viewing it as but one interpretation among many. Secondly, he asserts that alienation from oneself intensifies as one projects oneself into a flat world and its future. That is, the more one sees the world through strictly 'geographic' eyes, the more one needs the world to unfold in a formulaic, preconceived manner, and the more one will tend to see the world, things, and people, reductively, thus limiting the scope of authentic learning or of genuine action. Granted, there will always be exceptions: revolutionaries and other iconoclasts emerge in spite of totalitarian societies and education systems. Just as there is variation across cultures, and
among individuals in a single family, likewise no society can be entirely homogenous—there will be exceptions. Nevertheless, the issue is worth studying and ameliorating, if we wish to guide or inform educational practices, especially in today's technological atmosphere. The contemporary problem of reductive, technological vision will be explored later in greater detail. Suffice it to say, a more healthy and productive interaction with the world becomes possible the more we see the world as 'disclosed' as opposed to 'given.' According to Vandenberg:

Authentic disclosure of world in landscape opens possibilities of action such that the world that is ordinarily disclosed is the world that one is futurizing into. This is the ontological presupposition of action. (89)

For genuine, authentic action to occur, there must be an awareness of the world as mediated through discourse, otherwise action is nothing more than a prescribed reflex that is powerless against its contributors. Naturally, geographic knowledge, such as facts about what is already unhidden, is actionable, but action cannot remain limited to structured knowledge. That is, action that is limited to reacting as others have in the past risks perpetuating any ignorance, discrimination, or superficiality that is encoded in the present knowledge base. Indeed, if we are to live and grow, rather than merely persist, we must always respond to the discriminations and pains that are encoded in our stories—especially those that gratify a centralized, male-dominated status quo.

2.3 Preserving the Pedagogic Paradox

We must allows ourselves (and our institutions) time and space to periodically return to a moment's pause, and perhaps rethink, allowing for a more genuine or freeing sense of what is.

For the deepest and most significant acquisition of knowledge ... some kind of periodic return to landscape or continuous development of geography in and with landscape is necessary. (Vandenberg 96)

Vandenberg describes authentic education as embracing a role that spans both influences, of landscape and geography, not merely as a specific approach, but as reflective of dichotomous human understanding. He explains:

The paradox between the "psychological" and the "logical," between landscape and geography, is the paradox between the unique and the universal, the individual and the social, the private and the public, the conservative and the liberal. Retention of the pedagogic paradox in schooling, then, supplies precisely the educational force that is
needed to counteract the trends in modern life that promote mass, anonymous existence. (106)

Human understanding often involves the identification of contrasting ideals to thereby perceive and describe phenomena and the opinions of individuals as falling somewhere within the bounds of those extreme ideals. In the preceding passage, Vandenberg lists numerous examples of these binary pairs, and the list is by no means exhaustive. Other contrast-defining pairs would include materialism and idealism, atheism and theism, capitalism and socialism, and it would be next to impossible to identify any two individuals who share the same self-positioning among any number of dipoles. To identify a dipole pair is to create a topic of discussion and interest on the one hand, or a smokescreen of intrigue and jargon on the other. We understand things, as they relate to contrast pairs, and we sometimes assess authenticity in a similar manner. We can ascertain or evaluate authenticity claims with reference to our related background knowledge.

While experiences can, through memory, quickly become facts, not all experiences and their related facts can be transmitted formally. By seeing, entertaining, and experiencing different perspectives, in the course of life, as well as in the classroom, the student learns how to relate to and with others (in discourse). Vandenberg refers to preserving this healthy tension, within the classroom, as retaining the pedagogic paradox:

Retention of the pedagogic paradox in schooling, then, supplies precisely the educational force that is needed to counteract the trends in modern life that promote mass, anonymous existence wherein the depersonalization of forces producing inauthentic existence manifested in a compulsive conformity prevent the emergence of the individual from anonymity and thereby prevent the emergence of genuine community, i.e., that prevent the authentically human and interhuman. (106)

Vandenberg's pedagogic paradox in education, which encompasses geography and landscape learning, preserves and highlights the existence of different experiences of the world. The world appears different to different people, just as notions and experiences of authenticity will vary, sometimes tremendously. Retaining the pedagogic paradox preserves a world that is culturally rich rather than flat, such that one world view is not elevated while all others are looked down upon. I realize, however, that for children, working to make sense of their culture, being exposed to too much variation could be confusing. Retaining the pedagogic paradox effectively holds a space for us to enter into phenomenology as a practice that is part of varied human experience, not a mere afterthought.
Though conceptually powerful, I have noticed that phenomenology does not seem to come easily in general. Perhaps Western society is wanting of more philosophy; if so, reluctantly at that. To many people, nothing could be more straightforward and free from confusion than believing that one is having a direct, concrete, correctly-interpreted experience of the world. To such a one, the question of other world views and their incommensurable notions of authenticity can only be explained by plagues of superstition and infatuation that have gripped foreigners; surely not oneself. Instead, the pedagogic paradox allows teachers and students to hold a space for variation in tastes and opinions, experiences of authenticity, and the related perceptions of truth.

3 Explaining the Varied Conceptions of Authentic Education

Just as notions and experiences of authenticity vary, explored in Chapter One, notions and experiences of authentic education vary as well. This would seem to raise an obstacle against any pursuit of authentic education as ontological education. How can a particular form of 'authentic' or 'ontological' education be defended when others would disagree? What we will see is this variation holds a key to the Heideggerian sense of authenticity that ontological education would promote.

In general, and with no surprise, individuals will have varying ideas and opinions about what entails an authentic education, and each will use the word 'authenticity' in their own terms. Petraglia provides examples of this varied assumption of the word authenticity:

Conservative proponents of the view that education should serve the needs of the national economy easily accept the importance of authenticity, for, they can argue that the world of work is the real world. Further along a sociopolitical spectrum, neo-Deweyans can, of course, subscribe to the blurring of the academic and the vocational in the name of correspondence to everyday life. Neoromantics enlist the language of authenticity in their own cause, by arguing that students' lives are multifaceted and that preparing them to deal theoretically with the world necessitates the distancing of the learner from the narrow concerns of the professional world. Radicals can speak of authenticity in a quasi-Nietzschean sense, suggesting that authentic education is that which resonates most closely with the learner's life. (30)

This variation in notions of authenticity that persist through a single, unvaried word indicates that although 'authenticity' conveys a generic meaning of preference or genuineness
it lacks any specific content that would inform what 'true authenticity' or a specific example of it would look like. Authenticity is an inherently personalize-able concept, which, like individual human beings, cannot be catalogued a priori. For this reason, an analysis of authenticity will require an analysis of what makes up human experience and perception. As I have suggested, I will draw primarily on the work of Heidegger for this task. Indeed, much of his work is ideal for this undertaking. Just as authenticity escapes specific definition, so does what is human, and "Heidegger was the first to point out that the existing individual has no properties because, unlike physical objects, it never exists as merely present and available for categorical dissection" (McGrath 1). Failing to see the contingency of notions of authenticity, which are akin to the unpredictable and contrasting multitudes of human behaviour, is to permit a vulnerability to nihilism in education.

Who can claim to know the absolute truth, and thereby command the authority to prescribe what truth should be purveyed throughout society, shaping the form and content of education? This question can be answered in two ways. A traditional approach applied by most orthodox religions that conduct education utilizes the authority of dogma, which typically denounces all other notions of truth and related education practices as false, heretical, and even evil. Contemporary Western society claims to be objective by drawing on the authority of science to provide demonstrable results, enforcing its notions of truth in alignment with science and efficiency. In any case, both Western and non-Western views are whole in that their members will have differing experiences of authenticity and truth, and many people will feel nothing lacking or inadequate with their experience of reality. Humans can and will experience and affirm different perceptions and attitudes in accord with the values that have emerged from their cultural background, the content of which exists, for the most part, below the level of discourse. Given the need for education to be accountable to human variation in authenticity, Thomson describes Heidegger's educational 'odyssey' as 'revolutionary:'

[Heidegger would] bring us full circle back to ourselves, first by turning us away from the world in which we are most immediately immersed, then by turning us back to this world in a more reflexive way. ("Heidegger on Ontological Education" 135) Heidegger is guiding us to redirect our attention in an unusual way. We typically argue with the other, defending our view and criticizing (and even demonizing) our adversary. Instead,
he calls on us to first direct our attention away from our immediate concerns, as if to momentarily release our immediate concerns and ideas. Then, we are to remember our being, as a member of discourse, as we return to our concerns. In a case where a community has an educational crisis, and two contrasting philosophies of authentic education emerge, rather than focusing on differences, Heidegger would have us re-focus on ourselves and our relation to others as coexistent beings with different backgrounds, communities, and experiences. Indeed, if ideological conflict persists, it probably would be wise to include the same topics and issues, at some level, in the education of local youth.

Heidegger offers a way to comprehend the apparent variation of human ideologies and cultures. Variation in experiences of authenticity and of truth can only be explained through a phenomenological analysis. In other words, phenomenology is the key to understanding Plato's Cave Allegory. Plato's device of the absurd, practically blind, yet content cave dwellers cries for a phenomenological analysis to explain the apparent foisting of meaning and discourse upon individuals.

3.1 Phenomenology

Phenomenology deals with how we perceive the world, distinguishing between how it appears to us, as if without our influence, and how we determine how it appears, due to the ways that we comprehend and communicate the world. Phenomenology tracks something that is constantly happening, for the most part, below the level of conscious awareness. The word phenomenology is composed of two Greek terms, phenomenon and logos, and is "the language that speaks of that which shows itself" (McGrath 28). In normal consciousness, we do not usually consider that our understanding of the world, whether in the past, present, or future, is mediated by our five senses and the meaning we attribute to them. What complicates matters further is that, beyond our ideas about things, we have ideas about ideas. For example, neighbours may share similar climate, food, fashion, language, dwelling, and skin tone, but disagree strongly about religion, politics, sexuality, and truth. Neighbours may share in a similar range of things, but disagree about what they mean, how to use them, and how to conduct oneself. Our understandings of things are deeply rooted in cultural norms and tradition, each with a more or less consistent internal logic that cannot but inform distinct
education practices. In his introduction to *Heidegger, Education, and Modernity*, contemporary philosopher of education, Michael A. Peters, provides a concise passage about the fundamental operation of phenomenology. He explains:

On Heidegger’s analysis, values, and the shared cultural practices of which they are a part, form the background against which people make sense of their world. Values, therefore, do not take the form of a kind of explicit moral knowledge—a knowledge that can be made manifest or known—but rather are part of the cultural background—a knowing-how—which is presupposed in every attempt to articulate something. (10)

Our capacity for perception, intelligibility, and discourse is based on established patterns of recognition that have survived the test of time. These cultural norms and linguistic modes convey fundamental assumptions about the nature of people, things, and reality. A broad example, still relevant today, is the concept of women that various cultures possess and that the West has experienced historically. In the past, in practice and principle, women were seen as intellectually inferior, submissive, and weak. Today, at least in much of the West and in other regions, women are seen as equal to men, at least in principle, though inequity still persists in practice to varying degrees. Unfortunately, in some societies, women are still considered inferior in principle as well. Such notions place an a priori, metaphysical definition upon a given woman before she can even speak a word, justifying a restrictive code of conduct for women to assume. Similar demoralizing views pertain to ethnic group, religion, socio-economic status, sexual activity, political leanings, and level of education. Various cultures will encode socially sanctioned morals and values, whether explicitly or implicitly.

To me, and many philosophers, especially those familiar with phenomenology, the idea that we shape the world we perceive is nothing new. Nevertheless, the cognition of phenomena is generally considered passive rather than active, or objective rather than subjective, or faithful, as in true, rather than faithful, as in full of faith. I believe that an understanding of phenomenology is important, both for this thesis and for common knowledge as well, since different world views often conflict simply because they can. Though phenomenology began to find traction among Western philosophers in the early twentieth century, it seems to me that it still has not found general acceptance and acknowledgement throughout the bulk of Western society. A brief review of the history of the emergence of phenomenological analysis in the West will identify the trends in technologization and Christian pursuits that
were of concern then, shaping the work of Heidegger, and that still act today. The same dangers of over-technologization extend to the foreseeable future, keeping his work on the issues of truth construction, education, and authenticity relevant today.

3.2 Historical Review of Phenomenology and Heidegger

Heidegger was an active scholar during the unpopular yet persistent rise of phenomenology, "a subject that is better caught than taught" (McGrath 2), in Western academia. As we will see, phenomenology faced opposition from the more established, Catholic academia, and Heidegger struggled with this conflict personally. He finally decided to embrace phenomenology and all of its apparent explaining power, becoming one of its greatest scholars with his landmark book, *Being and Time*. This thesis will make numerous references to this book as well as to more contemporary authors who draw on it extensively. S. J. McGrath introduces the principle influences on the writing of *Being and Time*:

The development of *Being and Time* … was shaped by three popular movements in early-twentieth-century philosophy: neo-scholasticism, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology. … Heidegger could not have written *Being and Time* without these influences. (9)

Neo-scholastics, who sought to advance the intellectual authority and interests of the church, associated phenomenology with modernity and atheism (12), so these popular movements conflicted, around and within Heidegger. This tension finally resulting in his need to, in a sense, pursue the authentic apart from allegiance to the church. In a deeply Allow me to to begin to flesh out the internal tension Heidegger experienced, as it also highlights an interesting point in Western history.

Heidegger's father was the sexton of a church and he was an altar boy (10). As a youth he demonstrated considerable intellectual capacity, but the only course of education available to him was through Catholic institutions, many of which were dominated by neo-scholasticism. As a result, Heidegger was inducted into neo-scholastic study and allegiance, in addition to his Roman Catholic upbringing (9). Neo-scholasticism rejects history-based, self-interpreted readings of philosophy, in favour of a 'perennial philosophy' that is 'correct' and unchanging, like crystallized truth. Neo-scholasticism rejects "the Kantian fallacy that reality revolves around the subject" (McGrath 12). In 1919, Pope Pious X "ordered professors at Catholic universities to swear an oath against modernism," with which Heidegger disagreed.
mockingly. In a letter to the priest who married him, Krebs, he commented against the mechanical, consumerist culture penetrating the church's intellectuals:

Philosophical demand could be met by setting up vending machines in the train station (free of charge for the poor) . . . [and] all who succumb to having independent thoughts could have their brains taken out and replaced with Italian salad. (McGrath 13)

Like the old stand-by, Italian salad dressing, that is available in most restaurants in North America, Heidegger associates dogma with the commercialization of human opinion. In 1919, in a subsequent letter to Krebs, Heidegger parted ways with Catholicism and neo-scholasticism (12). In his dissertation, Heidegger attempted "one of the first phenomenological readings of the history of philosophy" (12), but since it attempted to span the perspectives of neo-scholasticism and phenomenology, it found little traction in scholars from either field. By now, Heidegger had been twice rejected by the church for an important teaching position as he had supposedly "immersed" himself in Protestant thought (13). Since his seminary days, Heidegger had been reading the work of Husserl, "the father of phenomenology." Husserl was Jewish by birth, but described himself as a non-dogmatic Protestant, and "he vigorously opposed any theological interference in phenomenology" (16). Husserl allowed Heidegger to work with him only after he learned that Heidegger had changed his intellectual allegiances from Catholicism to phenomenology, especially in Husserl's vein (16-17).

Also in 1919, in his first year under Husserl's wing, Heidegger pronounced phenomenology as the only viable route for philosophy, but one that was different from Husserl's concept. He found Husserl's phenomenology as too theoretical and calls, instead, for "a phenomenology more sensitive to the fore-theoretical nuances of everyday life" (21). Heidegger acknowledged that the things and ideas that we encounter on a daily basis are not available for distanced inspection and categorization, but require a less structured approach if only because none is available:

The neo-Kantian transcendental method can to some extent be seen at work in Being and Time . . . The method is empirical insofar as it begins with incontrovertible experiential data; it is transcendental insofar as it does not deduce hidden causes of known effects, but rather conditions of possibility that are of an entirely different order than facts. (McGrath 14)

These views resulted in Heidegger's cornerstone concept, Dasein, in his most famous and
successful work, *Being and Time*, in 1927. In McGrath's opinion, *Being and Time* is one of the best texts on phenomenology (2). He explains that it was the right book at the right time:

> Heidegger's phenomenological ontology was, in my view, the most vital philosophical development of the early twentieth century, an upsurge of philosophical eros in an era of bland positivism and dreary, inhuman reductionism. Heidegger set the tone for the way of proceeding with philosophy in the wake of the collapse of the great modern systems and the conquest of the natural scientific reduction of the human being. His critique of calculative thinking touched the nerve of modernity's obsessive-compulsive relationship with techno-science. (1)

Whereas rationality and scientism promises to provide humanity with the most full understanding of the world, Heidegger's phenomenological analysis preserves a space for the confounding, contradictory, idiosyncratic, and subconscious elements that evade rational illumination and yet permeate our concepts and views. This is why "the early Heidegger believed that, after the collapse of reason, phenomenology could at least be faithful to its own task and give an open-eyed and fearless description of human existence in all its poverty and ambiguity" (McGrath 20). Having indicated the relevance of Heidegger's work in the philosophical climate of the time, McGrath ranks Heidegger among the 20th Century's greatest Western thinkers who were suspicious of the traditional dialogue of self-directed progress:

> The masters of suspicion [Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud] disabuse us of modernity's naïve confidence in reason. Modernity's faith in the rational and moral progress of European culture – the legacy of the Enlightenment – is shattered by Marx's discovery of the economic motive of Western culture; by Nietzsche's declaration of the will to power; and by Freud's exposure of the libidinous id operating behind our most civilized pursuits. Heidegger's contribution to the literature of suspicion is not as easy to encapsulate, but it is no less devastating. First he uncovers the interpretive nature of experience: we can no longer presume to have access to the things themselves unmediated by history and hidden prejudgment. Secondly he shows that Dasein is primarily motivated by self-deception, denial, and anxiety in the face of death, and that these "comportments" shape not only the way we see things but also the very things we see. The master's of suspicion suggest that reason is a puppet at the whim of something less than rational. (4)

Reason, used in parallel with logic, would promise to provide propositions that can be proven to be either true or false. Remaining faithful to the rules of language and perception would seem to advance a shared project of truth discovery, progress, and unity. However, the baseline assumptions that inform the code of logic that a given culture or sub-culture enforces will always vary and perhaps even from situation to situation. Western science
certainly employs reason and rationality in its day-to-day findings and work, but even these are informed, or formed, by theory (which may be false), subjective data interpretation, conceptual restrictions, and the discovery of emergent (i.e. beyond rational), novel phenomena. To this end, science is blind to its course.

Individual religions operate within a separate set of assertions that provide the boundaries for a separate domain of reason and rationality, some with a complete legal system as well. Either framework can justify its own beliefs, supporting the related structures of truth, authenticity, and education. Each framework will include its own vested interests, whether they be institutions or individuals in positions of power that can operate more freely without entertaining any doubt or self-criticism. The self-assured conceptual framework (i.e. culture) comes complete with a code of self-affirming morality that is passed on to younger generations to appropriate. Peters explains:

Heidegger’s analysis would seem to place in question an educational tradition that attempts to teach morality as we have come to teach science, and it would seem to raise some fundamental questions about the assumptions underlying most forms of modern, secular mass education. On Heidegger’s analysis, modern education is part of the problem of nihilism. (10)

A number of times I have heard from teachers who hastily cover certain learning objectives just to be able to report that the curriculum has been completed, not because such objectives are necessarily bad, but because issues related to the community required time and energy. Teachers must remain responsive to the weight of authority, which preserves its status through its base in consensus and authoritative, knowledgeable language, while recognizing the specific interests and needs of students. Without such teacher engagement, modern education cannot but brush against nihilism given the standardized curricula and professional 'evidence based' language that can fail to translate into effective or authentic student engagement and experience.

3.3 Language Shapes the World Including Education

Language is one of the central themes throughout Heidegger's philosophy. His descriptions of language affirm the world as phenomenological as opposed to factual in the strictest sense. That is, he explains how language and discourse is part and parcel to the appearing of the world that those in a specific time and place comprehend and articulate. This stands in
contrast to any concept of language as a completely dispassionate, impersonal means for objective, unquestionable communication. As it happens, day-to-day communication is for the most part concerned with the passing on of immediate messages. Adults are no longer interested in learning language, and its nuances, but utilize it to communicate and bond with people with ease.

The utility and efficiency that language offers is remarkable, and certainly valuable, but the tendency to ossify language as inherently precise and truthful is problematic. In one of his essays, "Building Dwelling Thinking", Heidegger explains:

> It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language's own nature. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages round the earth an unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of this relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation. That we retain a concern for care in speaking is all to the good, but it is of no help to us as long as language still serves us even then only as a means of expression. Among all the appeals that we human beings, in our part, can help to be voiced, language is the highest and everywhere the first. (146)

Heidegger argues that the gloss of language frees us from the uncertainty of investigating the basic metaphysical and ontological assumptions that are not only shaping our view of the world but shaping ourselves. From this angle, truth cannot inform language without having language inform truth.

We believe that we use language to conduct our comprehension of truth, without recognizing that languages shapes our ideas. From different perspectives, a given truth claim may seem incontestable, or it can appear to be conducting lies, or it may seem to owe a considerable amount of its credibility to the power of consensus. Consensus of opinion, which would inform notions of truth, authenticity, and education, can easily fall sway to the allurement of high-sounding language, contrary to the intrinsic worthiness one might claim, thereby creating a façade behind which to hide. In short, the language taken up by a group substantiates itself. Through language we conduct a matrix or web of concepts that can suspend a set of possible realities. There is nothing wrong with this; such is the purpose of language. However, we must remember that when a 'new' thing appears, we will tend strongly toward describing that thing in relation to and in terms of our familiar language.
In his book on *Metaphysics*, Heidegger notes that the "casual use of language destroys our relation to things; in language, things come to be" (15). The flippant use of language makes the mistake that things are as they are and language merely identifies what a thing is. As a result, those who make too-casual use of language—perhaps all of us—can be prone to overlook and devalue the being of things and of people—a being that can change, or be other than as it is identified. This tendency to oversimplify and to define people and things in knee-jerk reaction is part of our "destroyed relation to Being as such [and] is the real ground for our whole misrelation to language" (54). Our entire Western, consumerist, twenty-four-hour-news-cycle culture is particularly vulnerable to this over-dependency on language's simplifying capacity, which results in a compromised relation to being.

The confidence that a language system provides, complete with grammar rules and a large body of users, can in many cases confound the difference between empiricism and sensationalism. For example, one can assert that "the boy who stole the candy is bad" without considering that the boy's family is politically marginalized, disenfranchised, divested of the capacity to grow food, and valued (in somebody's eyes) for his resourcefulness. Ethical issues aside, it is much easier to say 'the boy is bad,' especially when that is already on others' minds. In like manner, to draw on a contemporary theme, a conservative American might argue that "liberals are destroying the nation," without acknowledging that many of America's greatest achievements and liber-ties are based on liber-al principles. It may serve one's political positioning to discredit liberalism and to overlook its benefit to oneself. There are many situations in which what one is actually saying is less important than the response that it generates in others. Indeed, white lies can be purposeful than the truth. Similarly, towing the line or sticking to the sound bites allows one to slip into the stream of powerful emotions and self-righteous claims.

Aligning oneself with a shared world views invokes many protections, including the mutual defence of the world view and of the member him or herself. Furthermore, subscribing to a world view provides reasonable limits to language and discourse, invariably providing safe and easy topics about which to opine. As Paul Standish puts it, "idle talk, characteristic idiom of the They, busies itself with passing on information, with hearsay; it is floating and unattached" (155). Employing language that is regularly penetrated by 'floating and
unattached' passages sets the tone for the level of enquiry, or non-enquiry, that is socially permissible and expected. Perhaps commercial slogans operate at the most superficial level, because it is generally understood that they do not need to say anything specific or falsifiable. "Jaguar, buy one!" "Coke is it"—these are exceedingly floating and unattached catch phrases, which makes them all the more cool and hip, but they do set the tone for a level of communication that is considered real and even desirable on some level. In a mutually-elevating way, they affirm that the individual provides all meaning, and may be free to let his or her feelings excel in a shared exuberance of the They—those who believe in the "one" and the "it" in the previous examples. If not all cultures and educational systems around the world, I believe that ours, in the West, draws regularly on this impulse to use language in a succinct, unexplained manner that gives license to the one to subscribe to a given They without reflection but because it feels right, whether that feeling is truthful or merely ingratiating.

The plain fact that any bully or aggressor who employs name calling can hurt another indicates that language influences feelings of authenticity and inauthenticity regularly. In this case, the aggressor probably feels more authentic in the power and righteousness he or she might feel, which seems to be affirmed by the exhibition of pain or angst by the other, whereas the abused may feel utterly inauthentic and confused in his or her futile attempts to shed off this false overlay, perhaps only adding to the false appearance. Entire societies can draw on a similar phenomenon, for example when marginalizing or actively persecuting a select ethnic group, employing catch phrases, dogma, and propaganda to demonize and subjugate them. As suggested by the commercial examples given earlier, entire corporations or institutions can rally behind an equally superficial statement. As an undergraduate and graduate student, I have come across a number of professors and authors who point to the honourable mission statements of educational institutions that, due to their absolute loftiness, remain difficult to defend or criticize meaningfully. We can permit empty ideals as long as we are happy with business as usual.

Language that is unusually loud, emphatic, and divisive or self-elevating, whether in school cafeterias, school mission statements, religious dogma, or political propaganda bears a power to sway thought and opinion. Like Plato's cave dwellers, who have nothing else to do but
gravitate to the loudest narration, we cannot escape the sense that as humans we coalesce around strange, complex cultural identities. Stephen Mulhall, a Heidegger scholar, and author of *Being and Education*, teaches the following about language's capacity to direct vision:

The accessibility or intelligibility of the world to human understanding can be comprehended only on the assumption that the structures of intelligibility that the world manifests are in essence the structures which constitute language (i.e. discourse) …. Seeing-as pervades all our encounters with things just because language does so too. (*On Being in the World* 126)

Just as language cannot merely reflect reality without reality also reflecting language, so too can authenticity not merely occur to one in the world without considering the ways the world is happening to the individual. Since experiences of authenticity are contingent upon notions of reality, I believe that educational philosophy, which informs goals and practices, should acknowledge the formative relation between language and perceptions of reality, and how this bears on notions and experiences of authenticity. This will be explored in the final chapter. While notions of authenticity may outline typical or socially sanctioned experiences of authenticity, to limit the individual to a restricted, official view of reality is to disregard the reifying effects of language and our uncanny capacity to hide behind superficial parlance.

A well-established way of speaking, which includes figures of speech, as well as politicized historical references, will invariably promote certain aspects and opportunities for authenticity, while marginalizing others. In education, a framework for teaching cannot be entirely rigid, but must be responsive to interaction and discourse with communities and their students. Joseph Petraglia explains that "authenticity does not inhere in just any educational undertaking, but instead is the result of political and economic choices and conditions that warrant making schooling correspond to the real world" (Petraglia 31). This means that the effort to cultivate authenticity in students cannot be optimized and packaged. Rather, a more subtle change in self-positioning is called for. That is, an education that would seek to cultivate authenticity must hold a space, or even an awareness of a space, in which individuals are disclosed as sharing historical, evolving locations. Could it suffice to say that authentic education—one that would promote student authenticity—simply honours individuals as being responsive and alive to possibility?

Acknowledging the possible and likely need for periodic change in an educational system is
inherently healthy and offers society and its new generations, who will face new challenges in the future, greater flexibility and resilience. Because of language's tendency toward oversimplification and our tendency to operate at the most apparent, immediate level of language, we need a phenomenological analysis to see more into the construction and appearance of the reality and truths that we word-smith.

Thus far, I have attempted to relate the issues of authenticity, education, and phenomenology—the discourse of the appearing of truths—as operating equally in contrasting groups: the secular and the non-secular, or the progressive and the conservative or orthodox. However, we see now that members of all orientations can value technology. The allure of technologization is most thoroughly onset in the Western world, but it finds greater currency in developing nations as they take on capitalism, mass production, and consumerism. Such trends will likely usher in education systems to match, being technologized—informed by science and geared toward maximizing efficiency.

Heidegger traces the technologization of education back to Plato's attempted disambiguation on human ontology, given to seal his vision of The Republic, describing a view of "the good." In the Cave Allegory—which he introduces as describing 'the effect of education, or lack of it, on our nature' (111; trans. Griffith, sec. 514)—Plato underscores the notion of truth as unhiddenness. The Greek word for truth, aletheia, means "unhiddenness" as opposed to (truth as) correctness. Today, whether in the school, the office, or the research laboratory, truth is determined by the correspondence of the grammatically correct proposition to observable facts. Relatively very little attention is given to the 'techno-Christian' assumptions that underlie explicit discourse and education:

We need an alternative to our contemporary understanding of education, an alternative capable of favorably resolving our educational crisis by averting the technological dissolution of the historical essence of education. Heidegger's hope is this: Since an ambiguity at the heart of Plato's original understanding of education lent itself to a historical misunderstanding in which the essence of education has been obscured and is now in danger of being forgot, the deconstructive recovery of this long-obscured essence of education can now help us envision a way to restore substance to the increasingly formal and empty ideals guiding contemporary education. (Thomson, Heidegger on Ontological Education 125)

Through the Allegory, Plato shows us how discourse takes on a life of its own, affirming its own parameters as it underscores the range of reasonable (i.e. historical) truth claims.
Fixation on a superficial, results-oriented world view, our guiding ideals have been hollowed out, but left for proud display on the top shelf. Nevertheless, to avoid making hasty conclusions based on Plato's Cave Allegory, let us delve deeper into Heidegger's thought in relation to truth forming and the individual's experience of authenticity. This will prepare us for a more informed return to Plato's Cave Allegory, and Heidegger's use of it, in the final chapter.

As we have seen, the unreflective conveyance of truth as correctness leaves us vulnerable to nihilism. We cannot merely look at the word authenticity for guidance, or it's historical revisions, but the fundamental processes of human experience and perception that change over time and that comprise notions of authenticity. We need to understand the tacit roles of metaphysics and phenomenology, which substantiates the foundation of all of our daily discourses.

Having established the value of a phenomenological analysis, we should get to the core of phenomenology. Indeed, in Heidegger's earlier writings, "his concern was not with the modern condition, but with the perennial and necessary structures of human experience" (Cooper 2, 4). At the core of these structures lies metaphysics, which allows our necessarily incomplete understanding of the world to gain broad, apparently unlacking, functionality. In addition to his exposure of the structures that operate in the appearing of truth, Heidegger addresses our increasingly technological relationship with the appearing of truth.
Chapter Three
The Constructing of Truth: From Metaphysics to Technological Enframing

1 Metaphysics

Our capacity to exist within and relate to a shared world or reality rests upon a set of unspoken assumptions, attitudes, and norms that embody the metaphysics that are in operation in our local setting. These basic assumptions inform the stance that we may take in relation to things, our neighbours, our enemies, and even ourselves. While somewhat questionable, the process of noticing, joining in, and acting out our attitudes, as opposed to undertaking an explicit pre-assessment of them, provides a more practical means for communication and coexistence. In other words, it is easier to grow in to or join the flow of consciousness, rather than critically appropriate it, which would likely be too alienating to others and too distracting from one's immediate needs. The inescapable fact is that we all possess limited knowledge of the world, let alone of ourselves. Fortunately, metaphysics allows the individual and the group to position itself in the world. According to Heidegger, "metaphysics grounds intelligibility" (Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology 146). The metaphysical stance that one takes answers basic questions (e.g. who are we, where are we from, to where are we headed?), and positions one in relation to different groups and other metaphysical systems, sometimes explicitly. Metaphysics fosters the bounds of knowledge, veiling the fact that an exhaustive understanding of anything is elusive.

The prefix of metaphysics, meta, refers to what is implied before any sense of objectivity or of apparent physics actually happens. Metaphysics does not bear on the first appearance of a thing as much as the already established discourses that inform the first appearance of a thing. When something appears without a metaphysical explanation, it confuses us/ the brain, until we understand what we are seeing. For example, when walking or driving at night, I might see a moving object in my peripheral vision, going from A to B, but in fact it was silhouette of an object, with a different shape, going from C to B. In our day to day observations, we use patterns of understanding to permit a short-hand level of perception, usually so we can focus on more immediate matters. Indeed, how often do we not actually
see the objects that surround us regularly? For those things that are beyond our level of interest, we lapse into a 'mental shorthand.' In other words, metaphysics is what connects the actual world, including sense perception, with our incomplete understanding of it, or interpretation of those sense. Metaphysics is something transparent or unconditional, in that it allows any discourse—even that of a mentally imbalanced individual—to carry as if apparent. Rather than place an insurmountable burden of knowledge upon any one person or any shared authority with the need to provide a completely cohesive, perfect, and articulated description of everything, as a matter of practicality, we proceed with life using an adopted construction—often as if it is complete and cohesive. These constructions delimit what counts as normal, possible, interesting (or uninteresting), and real. Metaphysics is the core that determines our basic relation to the world and how we interpret its appearances in things and in human traits and behaviours, all of which becomes encoded in culture, educational practices, and notions of authenticity.

Heidegger teaches that metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what anything is, including education (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education" 128). Metaphysics entails what is the philosophy of a given place or time. In other words, metaphysics is at the core that determines philosophy (Heidegger, Metaphysics 19). Nothing escapes its purview. "There is nothing between heaven and earth that is in itself ontic or ontological; rather, everything becomes what it is only by means of the constellation into which it is brought by philosophy" (Adorno 97). For example, if I find a small stone, it is not merely an inanimate piece of matter, but what it is is informed by all small and big stones, tectonic plates, construction, jewellery, and even vitamin B_{12}. No list of references related to a stone would be exhaustive. Even our scientific understandings do not grasp all phenomena. Metaphysics allows us to marginalize what we do not know and what we do not want to know. It cannot be avoided:

The phenomenological presencing which elicits conceptualization can never be entirely captured by the yoke of our metaphysical concepts; it always partially defies conceptualization, lingering behind as an extraconceptual phenomenological excess. (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education" 138; endnote 47)

While our regular, day-to-day experience of things is typically opaque and unexamined—'a thing is simply what it is'—those meanings are inherently interwoven with the background of basic attitudes and human stories within which they have meaning. For example, the number
four, as plain and purely rational as it might seem to a Western mathematics student, can signify natural balance of the 'four elements,' femininity, or bad luck, depending on the culture to which one belongs. Philosophy and metaphysics bear upon our understanding not only of things but of ideas themselves! Perhaps we have more ideas about ideas than about things, per se. For these reasons Heidegger affirms that philosophy imposes its measure on the times (Metaphysics 9), allowing individuals to comprehend and recount their personal worlds within and with reference to a larger shared world comprised of common tradition, stories, and history. Indeed, common to all world views or local group identities is that each one possesses a past, which represents a historical or an inherited understanding of things, that weighs on the present and that would project onto the future.

The particular philosophical angle of a given society is invariably informed by its history; that is, its established ways of thinking and acting. New cultures do not emerge from a vacuum, and even when there is a novel, fringe group, or sub-culture, its defining features usually stand in opposition to the established grain of society. Heidegger notes that our essential relation to beings is historical (Metaphysics 46). This statement stands in stark contrast to our typical impression of daily life: that our essential relation to beings—that is, our perception of things and of others—is accurate, necessary, and true. For the most part, I think that people are either unaware of the concept of metaphysics, or if they are aware of it, they deride the concept, thinking instead that we are today beyond the vestigial, superstition of metaphysics. Metaphysics may well be unapparent or un-sung, but it remains in full effect nonetheless.

As the practice of the local metaphysics acclimatizes or inculcates new members of the society, to un-inquiring minds and for the most part, metaphysics become invisible, replacing any sense of the construction of norms with confidence in a real, unimagined, apparent world. This elevation of constructions to the domain of absolute assurance is not without purpose. The tacit metaphysics at the core of our construction of reality allow for more immediate and practical knowledge claims to be made. The subsuming of metaphysics provides a structure or model for the entire range of day-to-day endeavours, many of which are relevant to basic survival in a society. The apparent invisibility of metaphysics allows education to carry on with the usual self-assured conviction, unencumbered by the need to
entertain radical self-reflection, which could represent a dire affront to the educational elite. No doubt, for centuries, various cultures with diverse metaphysical traditions have conflicted directly, and have therefore incorporated strong mechanisms of resistance. These mechanisms work to discredit and even justify the eradication of those who would threaten the establishment and its metaphysical system. In the least, the reflex to defend one's own metaphysical presuppositions serves to preserve a world view through time.

A given society will inevitably feature its experts who promote and enforce the rules, not to mention the enthusiastic enforcement that the rank and file of the populace typically provide. The members of one group will tend to think of those outside of their world view as more or less misguided, and vice versa. To use broad strokes, in the West, devout Christians would relegate all non-believers to hell, whereas scientists, especially materialists, would dismiss all religious faith as out-of-touch with reality. Members of either group would believe that modern society or their time-tested religion has done away with metaphysics. Granted, there are many individuals who span both world views more or less, adopting those aspects that serve them, but they too stand on another island of thought, unreconciled with either philosophical pole. What is common to all individuals and groups is the operation of metaphysics, whereby fundamental assumptions shape and confirm the world that appears to each one. The faithful will have experiences that affirm their faith; the materialists will have no reason to think beyond matter; and any observations contrary to one's expectations can be reasoned away one way or another; and there are those who draw on both sets of ideas and values. Though we all live on one planet, our experiences within it can vary and even conflict, informed by the constellation of meanings that one appropriates or modifies personally. The fact that our world consists in billions of people with contrasting world views points to the very existence and operation of different metaphysical systems. Unfortunately, avoiding such a conclusion has its perks.

Minimizing and even discrediting the diversity of metaphysics provides a strategy for growth, not in quality, but in quantity. It does away with the inefficiencies of doubt, dialogue, or dissent. Some philosophies would even do away with metaphysics, believing in technological, rational, or empirical sophistication that makes metaphysics non-existent (Stambaugh 138). The development of more refined and externally justifiable systems of
thought, as in the sciences, represents a double-edged sword. Similarly, systems of thought that receive broad and vehement acceptance, as in the religions, face the same double-edged sword. As a group discourse evolves and becomes more rigorous in its capacity to explain and even predict phenomena, thereby becoming more useful, convincing, and systematizable, it also conducts the believer's thoughts along more narrow and exclusive lines, such that one sees things increasingly reductively. As one view comes into clear and apparent focus, other views or metaphysical systems seem inherently erroneous and not worth entertaining. Ultimately, metaphysics and its operation remain transparent, as if non-existent. This is why secular systems of thought, such as empiricism, positivism, and Marxism, can and will take on an air of 'apparent universality,' untainted by metaphysics, composed of an infallible, fundamental understanding of 'all' things. Metaphysics is ever-present, and cannot be dismissed. Stambaugh lists a few schools of thought that would dismiss metaphysics, which is a symptom of Nietzsche's 'end of philosophy':

"Philosophy" in the phrase, "the end of philosophy" means unequivocally metaphysics. For Heidegger, the history of Western philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche has been metaphysics, even and especially when it has called itself by such names as empiricism, positivism, Marxism, names that would like to deny any metaphysical reality whatsoever. Thus, it is metaphysics that is at an end, not every possible kind of "philosophy" and certainly not thinking as such. (138)

Religious systems will likewise tend toward providing answers for everything—any given thing is either good or bad conclusively, according to dogma or doctrine—again to the detriment of an awareness of metaphysics. What is actually occurring is that by completely marginalizing metaphysics, human agency becomes compressed; investigation narrows it focus, doubting, discrediting, or vilifying all that lies beyond its purview.

In a society that is blind to the ever-presentation of metaphysics, like the cave dwellers, individuals are restricted to ratify the established domain of possibility and appropriateness, such that what is real and what men and women can potentially create or experience is tweaked to not over-exceed what is 'physically real' and 'physically good.' The established world view is not considered to be approaching a clearer view of reality, but is taken to represent and reflect reality perfectly at present. Granted, Western, scientific world views do evolve along with (or a bit behind) the advance of science, but that direction tends more and more toward scientific credibility and commercial interests, which also gravitates toward a
standardized tone.

To elaborate on this metaphysical flattening out of human experience, Stambaugh explains how Nietzsche announced the ultimate form of metaphysics, which appears free from metaphysics the more it is consumed by it:

With Nietzsche's statement that by abolishing the true world (Plato's Ideas), we have also abolished the apparent world, in other words that there is no longer any criterion to distinguish between them, metaphysics has come to its end. This does not mean that metaphysics stops dead in its tracks stunned by Nietzsche's lethal proclamation. Nietzsche's statement is itself still metaphysical since it merely turns Plato upside down. ... The end of metaphysics could last for centuries. The phrase "the end of metaphysics" simply means that metaphysics has run through the gamut of its possibilities. Its last stage in which we are now is that of the age of technology. Technology is now what is decisive in our experience of what is, or the world and even of ourselves. (11)

That is, rather than metaphysics now being eradicated, due to our scientifically verifiable understanding of the world, it remains as active as ever, though in a different guise. The reign of technology offers new knowledge that is repeatable, verifiable, and commercially exploitable as the value of what is good and, therefore, truthful or virtuous enough. The 'modern good,' which is technological, is not up for debate, nor can it be prophesied, but it is determined by what is marketable and efficient. Indeed, technology could simply be the latest chapter in our imperfect and malaise life on Earth, and in relation to Being itself.

1.1 The Question of Being

Contemplating Being, with a capital B, challenges our thinking to step outside of its usual context; to consider what is most primordial and fundamental in our lives and in the universe as a whole. One could ask the far-flung question, 'why do we exist and have thoughts at all?', which, to answer, necessarily extends beyond regular activity. In this brief address of the question, I will in no way seek to answer it, but to clarify the existence of the question itself: What is Being? Or, what is our place in Being? Indeed, one of the main purposes of metaphysics is to explain or more typically to explain away the question of Being. That we exist, that we co-exist along with others, and that our existence is inseparable from the Being of the universe can be explained, for example, as part of an act of God or as the playing out of physics after the big bang. Each answer, which involves a set of assumptions, informs a characteristic way of being in the world with others. A study of anthropology, history, or
philosophy would bear much fascinating insight into studied ways of being in relation to Being. More germane to this study, any given way of being does not call for further investigation of itself, thereby allowing the individual, group, and society to carry on in its usual affairs, unhindered by the limits of socially sanctioned knowledge, which enforce limits of public evaluation and criticism.

For better or for worse, each system of thought answers (or 'answers away') the question of Being. In so doing, the answer guises itself as following correctly from the question, when in fact the two never meet. The question of Being cannot be answered fully, for Being always is—and it is always within us—but we cannot explain why in full detail, and less to the satisfaction of all peoples. This is a problem better avoided than tackled, given the unavoidable, "extraconceptual phenomenological excess" we cannot explain (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education" 148; endnote 47). For this reason, Stambaugh tomes: "Does Heidegger not say that metaphysics has precisely not been a history of Being, that metaphysics is the history of the forgottenness of Being" (138-39)? Perhaps our relation to Being is best defined by our mishandlings of it. We cannot grasp or explain Being, so we cannot employ a metaphysics to bear out a system of perception-communication that follows from an answer to the question of Being. We cannot answer it, but rather, our system supports our answer to the question. In other words, any given answer to the question of Being supports its related system of thought; at the same time, the system of thought makes the answer intelligible and therefore plausible in the first place. As Stambaugh explains,

Metaphysics busies itself exclusively with beings while tacitly assuming that it thereby has Being in its grasp. Stated most succinctly, metaphysics always represents Being as a being. (139)

That is, we effectively anthropomorphize Being, conceptualizing it in human terms that we understand and that seem to describe Being correctly, based on our best understanding of things.

1.2 Ontotheology: The Gradual Shifting of Basic Assumptions

Heidegger created a word to highlight the two key roles of metaphysics, which include our most fundamental assumptions about the details of typical experience, as well as our most ultimate, elevated assumptions or articles of faith that somehow address the question of
Being. Heidegger's word describes the main functions of metaphysics as pinning the most basic or fundamental and the most ultimate knowledge claims that we can make, from the bottom up and the top down. On the one hand, the most basic ideas, related to time, space, and matter, for example, establish the mode of our ontology. Our ontology is shaped by our assumptions about what a person or thing is. Similarly, the ontology of the person or thing is influenced by our ontological assumptions. On the other hand, the most absolute, far-reaching concepts fall under the purview of theology, or whatever secular substitute one might have. For example, how do we comport ourselves in the face of our origin—whether in God or dust from the Big Bang—or within the scope of human tragedies, past, present, and future. Metaphysics allows us to represent the very big, and the very small, resulting in the word **onto-theology**.

Used as a synonym for metaphysics, onto-theology conceals the question of the meaning of being by constructing a narrative that traces all beings back to a highest being, the good, the first mover, the Creator, the first cause or the *causa sui*. In Heidegger's view it is no accident that most metaphysical treatises in the history of Western philosophy are founded on a philosophy of God. Metaphysics, Heidegger says, is essentially onto-theological: it allows us to elide the question of the meaning of being by presenting the origin of beings as a foregone conclusion: we always already know where beings come from (God); hence we can, with seemingly good conscience, limit our thinking to the ontic. (McGrath 73)

I believe that today there are numerous popular non-religious creation stories / theories, in evolution and the Big Bang, for example. These stand in for theological sources, providing the same function. Nevertheless, traditional Christian thought demonstrates this principle dramatically, with the image of a male God, and the first human as a male, Adam. This theological narration (in force in some places) underscores the subjugation of women. In this example, the being of physically dominant men justifies an answer to the question of Being, depicting God as male and male as prior to female. As a result, man, his physicality, and his law may rule over women, in perpetuity.

As for a related technological example, the success of science in explaining measurable phenomena justifies the measurement and optimization of entire student bodies, marginalizing personal preferences and socio-economic issues that are difficult to measure and address. What is deemed good for society and the student can be harmful to both, resulting in, for example, alienated students, racist agendas, and the sedimentation of an
unreflective status quo, all under the guise of normal, well-informed, standardized day-to-day activity.

Metaphysics, with its all-encapsulating gestures, its domestication of the strange, and its persistent failure to think the difference between being human and Being, does violence to this relationship in Heidegger’s view. That is to say, metaphysics predisposes the thinking not just of individuals, but of whole cultures of learning and of belief, to a forgetfulness of what is most worthy of human attentiveness and reverence. (Hogan 220)

Metaphysics bows to the whim of the individual and of society, remaining invisible and unobtrusive, like a 'yes man,' commenting not on the value or truth of the system. We can all think of various practices of foreign cultures, unable to understand why they persist or why they receive vehement defence, all the while the practitioners of them see no reason to think and act otherwise. All metaphysical systems or ontotheologies support themselves as individuals take up and experience truth and authenticity through them. Metaphysics cannot be an external phenomenon, but one that operates within the individual, as perceptions are formed as much as they are informed by the dominant ontotheology. Certainly, from time to time, one's ontotheology will fail to 'domesticate the strange' successfully, or one may experience things that force one to reconsider their assumptions. Such challenges to ontotheologies occur regularly, challenging individuals and societies to revise the narrative that supports the established ontotheology.

The form of a given metaphysics or ontotheology gradually shifts over time as basic assumptions and the interpretations of doctrine change or are challenged, resulting in changing views about people and things. Heidegger acknowledges:

[T]he metaphysical tradition establishes both the fundamental and the ultimate conceptual parameters of intelligibility by ontologically grounding and theologically legitimating our changing historical sense of what is. (Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology* 2)

Inherent within ontotheology is its gradual shifting, as basic ideas and beliefs change over time. This points to the historical content that shapes discourse, that changes over time, and that can account for the sheer variety of world views that exist today. Heidegger's description of metaphysics as related to the history of ontotheologies accounts for the shifting sense of what questions and problems are worthwhile. That is, perceptions of truth(s), the assumptions that encompass them, and notions of authenticity and education shift with time. Akin to a
paradigm shift, "as a new ontotheological understanding of what and how beings are takes hold and spreads, it transforms our basic understanding of what all entities are" (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education" 128).

Any given ontotheology, which outlines what all human beings are, cannot but imply what is human potential, what is in the individual's interest, how to cater to their learning capacity, and what counts as an authentic goal in life. The previous chapter identified the historically changing sense of authentic education, as well as its historically persistent elite-idealistic elements, as explained by Petraglia. These changes in and continuances of what counts as authentic education are directly related to the predominant ontotheology operative within Western society and its educators over time. Understanding the predominant mode of our current ontotheology—that of Enframing—can further our efforts toward understanding the particular challenges of our metaphysics, and its relation to authenticity and authentic education. We will see that enframing finds expression throughout Western society, including its secular and religious circles and their respective education practices.

2 Enframing and Technology as Our Way of Making Things Unhidden

Heidegger identifies the particular form of our present, dominant, technological ontotheology, in the Western world, as one that hinges on "enframing." That is, we have a technologized world view that prompts us to see things and people as if in a frame, reductively, so that they may be conceptualized discretely, fit into scientific categorization, and utilized with maximum efficiency. Martin Heidegger reveals how Western society's dominant mode of thinking effectively "enframes" or conceptualizes beings and things as standing reserve.

Heidegger calls this mysterious phenomenon enframing (Ge-stell in German). The word 'Ge-stell' gathers together several meanings of the -stellen family of German verbs: in Ge-stell, humans are ordered (bestellen), commanded (bestellen), and entrapped (nachstellen). (Waddington 569)

In response to the question, what is enframing? Heidegger answers, "It is nothing technological, nothing on the order of a machine. It is the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve" ("The Question Concerning Technology" 23). In other words, our basic
phenomenology, or appearing of things, operates through a technological metaphysics in which all things take on a utilitarian potential that we are driven to optimize through theoretical science. Not only do things appear to us in a technological mode, but we ourselves become extensions of it, seeing others and ourselves in ways that we would optimize, down to the biochemical level. Scientific (and military) experimentation has joined forces with commercial enterprise, simply because it can and it is lucrative. In short, and a long study could be undertaken, technology is good for business. Businesses cater to a tremendous variety of human wants and needs, and many benefit from and sell technology precisely because it itself is nothing more than "a way of revealing" ("Question" 12).

Heidegger explains:

Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological. ("Question" 20)

Heidegger's concluding comment, that the essence of modern technology is nothing technological, is both counter-intuitive and insightful. However, to remain closer to the topic of ontological education, I will leave this nugget aside, and focus instead on Heidegger's description of our way of revealing as technological world-enframing.

Society, its educational system, and individuals have become, and are, increasingly technologized. In schooling, this can result in withdrawn students who struggle to connect classroom content with the obstacles to success they face. Their capacity to harmonize their intrinsic connectedness with themselves and to the world with the extrinsic details of social life (Vandenberg's landscape-geography dichotomy) becomes troubled, resulting in alienation and inauthenticity. While our predominant ontotheology hinges on technology, another more fundamental, and even more ubiquitous and equally binding human practice bears the same blind spots as technology, and that is our use of language in discourse. Our use of language, which is typically unexamined, relates directly to our half-thought appropriation of technology. Operative both in society at large, and in the classroom, language and discourse set the tone for all social investigation, or lack thereof.
3 Discourse Binds Us to Our Ontotheology of Enframing

We convey our understanding of the world through language, typically thinking that a given phrase is conducting our thought, without considering if our thought has been shaped by language and its framework of significations. For example, one can ask, what colour is the sky, and another might respond that "the sky is blue," and feel confident about this phrase, since it is a figure of speech for a plain, incontrovertible example of blueness. But one might ask, why do not all the stars and moon look blue at night? The answer to this question, which requires some thinking, is not part of typical discourse, and so what was a plain, 'common sense' assertion loses its ground, and the 'picky' inquirer is looked upon with dismay. Our inquirer is seen as inconveniencing his interlocutor, requiring him or her to enter into thought and speech beyond the surface of typical parlance, i.e. beyond one's experience and interest. Language is shaped through its day-to-day use in discourse, while at the same time tuning us to the meanings it conveys and the perceptions to which it predisposes us. Stephen Mulhall explains that our framework of understanding cannot be described or taught explicitly, but, rather, "through the existential-ontological foundation of language, i.e. ‘discourse’" ("On Being in the World" 118). That is, we get the sense of our community's metaphysics through its appropriation of discourse.

Mulhall explains that language and its significations consist in a body of discourse which becomes the actual, local, ontological foundation. In other words, the body of discourse represents an always already present, normalizing status quo of concepts, ideas, and ways of speaking that resists change, in large part because it often isn't seen as such but as inherently normal and valid.

The intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called ‘meaning’. That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call ‘totality-of-significations.’ (Heidegger, Being and Time 203-04; trans. Macquarrie, sec. 34)

Intelligibility—the ability to cognize and communicate things, ideas, and experiences—is possible through our appropriation of language vis a vis discourse. On one level, this affirms
that our language predisposes us to communicate things in a manner such that various
cultural and historical artifacts influence our use of language. On a deeper level, our
articulation of intelligibility through discourse cannot but shape us as human beings. Smeyers
comes to the troubling conclusion that we are at the mercy of discourse in how it shapes our
ideas of others and of ourselves. Since we perceive and communicate meanings at the level
of discourse, various human behaviours invoke descriptions that shape our ideas and
experiences of the being of others and of ourselves, such that they and we are seen as being
this or that kind of person. In German, there is a word for this phenomenon:

The technical term Seinsgeschick expresses that the human being is at the mercy of
the manner in which Being reveals itself in an epoch in a particular mode, a
happening of bringing into the openness of what was concealed, yet at the same time
concealing of what was in plain view. (Smeyers, "The Origin: Education,
Philosophy, and a Work of Art" 81)

This delineation of the being of an individual into a being-of-a-kind occurs as one becomes a
party to discourse, whether as a participant in dialogue, or as an object of analysis and
judgement by another, as the case may be. As one enters the scope of discourse, behaviours
and traits that would be unclear, confusing, or even strange become rarefied and
ascertainable. On the other hand, at the same time, the appropriation of discourse conceals
qualities and characteristics that do not fall under the purview of discourse. This is why, in
continuing the previous quote, "Heidegger tries to think Being itself and not from the already
existing shapes (beings) it has taken on" (Smeyers, "The Origin" 81). Unfortunately,
discourse typically floats at the level of already-established meanings and associations.

Our basic assumptions take on a technological mode which shapes discourse and our
assessment of things, resources, and others. Joel Salatin, a wise farmer in the documentary
film, Food Inc., speaking against the unnatural over-technologization of the food industry,
notes how such practices can damage our relation to the world and to others. He explains:

I'm always struck by how successful we have been at hitting the bulls-eye of the
wrong target. We have learned, for example, how to plant, fertilize, and harvest corn
using global position satellite technology, and nobody sits back and asks, but should
we be feeding cows corn? We've become a culture of technicians. We are all in to the
how of it, and nobody's stepping back and saying, but why?! A culture that just uses a
pig as a pile of protoplasmic inanimate structure to be manipulated by whatever
creative design the human can foist on that critter will probably view individuals
within his community and other cultures in the community of nations with the same
type of disdain and disrespect and controlling-type mentality.
The wholesale adoption of technological practices cannot but then influence discourse and our apprehension of things, including education, in a likewise reductive, enframed manner. A technological relation to the world seeks to rapidly classify things and people, and then exploit them, to advance oneself.

The complete domination of technology with its exclusive manipulation not only of beings, but of beings in their character of being utilizable for some technological demand, would radically preclude any possibility of an openness to Being.

(Stambaugh 13-14)

By acknowledging the Being of others—that they exist and have life beside and in relation to our own—we can take a step back from discourse, even if only periodically, so that we can entertain ideas and experiences of one another that may be more humane, preserving an openness to the Being of others. To do otherwise, is to follow the whimsy of technology.

3.1 Seeking Release from the Grip of Technology and Discourse

Zimmerman, author of "Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art," argues that "we can be "released" from [technology’s] grip only to the extent that we recognize that we are in its grip — this is the paradox" (220). This implies that the greater the extent to which we can see ourselves as entrenched and 'in the grip of technology,' the more we can escape it. Heidegger provides the same reasoning, beginning with the point that the established metaphysics will tend to continue in its way of revealing, and as such always holds sway over the individual. Similar to the expression of holding one's friends close, and one's enemies closer, accepting this connection offers benefit. Heidegger explains:

Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man. But that destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and hears, and not one who is simply constrained to obey. ("Question" 25)

The destining of revealing, or in other words, the momentum behind a given ontotheology to perpetuate itself through the lives of its members, holds a tremendous sway over the individual, but not necessarily always. Heidegger implies that the individual is free to the extent that one can acknowledge their ad hoc induction into his or her ontotheology, and observe it with detachment. He remarks that one who would be free listens and hears, to say that one must be willing to go beyond expected assessments and normal interpretations by
seeing and hearing them with fresh eyes and ears. Then one can choose to obey and reflect the norm, or not. Once again, I trouble distinctions between transmissive and critical theories of education. Orthodox, theocratic, and totalitarian societies and Western, technological societies alike have an event horizon where individuals can differ and discuss possibilities. No doubt, the range of possible discourses can be exceedingly narrow in some places, but I would not hasten to trivialize it. Once again, in light of the basic conditions of human experience, I welcome any openings into the possibility of ontological education, no matter how small they may be.

Our culture is very scientifically oriented. As someone who was raised without any formal religious persuasion whatsoever, and who later adopted a particular spiritual faith as an adult, I found that I needed to question and re-evaluate a tacit, deep faith that I had in science and technology. In the course of this re-figuring, I came to see the encouragement I received to study technology and the sciences, from family, teachers, and peers, through different eyes. I have witnessed within myself the existence of competing views, similar to the competing views that exist in the world at large. This experience demonstrated how one metaphysical tradition could answer certain questions and encompass a set of experiences well, whereas another set of metaphysical assumptions would address a separate or an overlapping range of ideas and perceptions. Whereas before I thought the one view I grew into was necessarily correct, through some inner struggle and outer promptings, I came to see my view of the world as mine to discover. I can relate to and value Heidegger's thought on ontotheology and enframing as it frees us to see current metaphysics, cultural norms, and educational modes as not essential or necessary, but as constructed and subject to criticism and change. To provide students with a grasp on a world that changes and that is shaped, in large part through language and naming, may encourage them to cultivate a personal interest in their immediate world and how they name and view it.

Having understood the variation inherent within metaphysics and ontotheologies, we now see an opportunity and privilege that belongs to the individual to appropriate and, if need be, augment the world view through which he or she lives. As a final step, we approach more closely the question of Being and the experience of it in the individual, especially toward authenticity and inauthenticity. Fortunately, Heidegger's thought on authenticity and
inauthenticity, tied to the phenomenology of individual experience, as Dasein—being-there—can help us to understand the experience of truth, giving us a clearer sense of ‘truly authentic’ education or what it might entail.
Chapter Four
The Experiencing of Truth: Authenticity as Dasein

Chapter One associated notions of authenticity, truth, and education. Chapter Two noted that notions of truth change over time as a matter of course, modifying notions of authenticity and education in turn. The previous chapter presented a phenomenological analysis to explain the basic conditions of human experience, and how notions of truth can, and typically do, change over time. This analysis began with addressing the basic assumptions that comprise any given metaphysics, and identifying the main operation of metaphysics as encapsulated by Heidegger's concept of ontotheology. That is, metaphysics establish the most basic, ontological, and the most ultimate, or (anti)theological knowledge claims that can be claimed coherently. He argues that our current ontotheology drives a technological, enframing mode of experience that has come to dominate and even devalue human experience and educational enterprise. The next step in this analysis, then, calls for a closer examination of the conditions of human experience at the level of the individual.

Whereas Chapter Three introduced the operation of phenomenology at the level of society, Chapter Four will examine the phenomenology of the individual. How is it that metaphysics and ontotheology happen to individuals, thereby establishing notions of what an authentic education would entail? In other words, in what ways are individuals fundamentally predisposed to pick up and advance, or counter, a world view provided by society? We know that a given ontotheology provides a framework of understanding, but furthermore, as a matter of course, it also provides means for living and survival, both for the individual and for itself. That is, an ontotheology can perpetuate itself as long as it makes sense to and works for its members, including its educational system. Understanding, then, how individuals experience the world on a phenomenological level offers to outline the nature of their connection with it. What we will see is that the relation or connection between the individual and the world is constant, bringing into question whether it is even possible to be 'objective' about notions of truth, authenticity, and education, supporting Heidegger's understanding of truth as essencing.
1 Dasein

Heidegger's hallmark contribution to Western philosophy describes the phenomenology of human experience as Dasein. Dasein is a German word which may be translated as *being there*, or *being the there*. In other words, he describes the phenomenology of human experience as *being there*. In German, Dasein is used typically to refer to the *existence* of anything. The Dasein of a ball refers to the existence or the being-there of the ball. However, just as it sounds strange to describe a human being as a human being-there or a human being-the-there, Heidegger's use of Dasein in German sounds equally strange. That is, what sounds strange in English is not an artifact of imperfect translation, but a novel use of language Heidegger employed for a specific purpose. As McGrath explains, "Heidegger's unusual deployment of the word as a noun confronts the German reader with the etymological structure of the word: *da* is German for "there"; *Sein* is German for "being" (McGrath 37).

The individual is not just a being, but a 'being there'; a presence that has location, embedded in a world, that identifies and calls out from a place. Heidegger uses Dasien to mean that "man is Being-there, he is the "there"" (Stambaugh 5), and Dasein can be used "to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses' and to the creatures which possess it" (Cooper 28; Heidegger, *Being and Time* 32). As a result of the many angles to approach Dasein, we will encounter unusual word combinations in the course of this paper, such as 'the Dasein of experience,' 'experience as Dasein,' and 'one's Dasein'. Our Dasein (in the face of *x*) extends to everything we can conceptualize, even the Big Bang. And all things possess their own Dasein.

1.1 Dasein Is In the World

In this simple term, Dasein, Heidegger affirms the sense that everyone has that their immediate, particular world is necessary, valid, and real to him or herself. He describes Dasein as the consciousness of 'being there' that is challenged to accept immediate conditions as "mine" and which must meet the future's need (*Being and Time*). By affirming that one is 'being there,' at any given moment or place, one is identifying his or her presence in the world; seeing things, interacting with them, and living with them on into the future. The concept of Dasein preserves the notion that people, things, and ideas coexist in the world,
inseparably, and that they persist. For example, by 'being there' as a fan at a popular sporting event, one is living alongside the team's fans, the ball, the playing field, the athletes, and the history of the game. The ball and the playing field have significance only in relation to the Dasein of the athletes and fans, just as they signify themselves, their particular Dasein, with relation to the ball and the sport's appearance in general. The Dasein of a sport fan includes not only the particular components of one sporting event, but the extensive domains of the sport in general as well. Heidegger would say that "Dasein and world 'need each another absolutely in that neither can be conceived of in the other's absence; they are the unity of Being-in-the-world'" (Cooper, "Heidegger" 30). Stambaugh explains:

Heidegger's claim is that the phenomenon of \textit{Dasein}, of man's being in the world, is a primordial unity of experience. If one accepts this claim and if one is convinced by the phenomenological analysis of \textit{Dasein}, it is then impossible to separate man and world. (5)

Indeed, it is impossible to think of an individual apart from a human-inhabited, earth environment. Each and every person that we can think of, whether from the past, present, or an imagined future, is necessarily born into a location with established traditions and practices for interacting with its local artifacts and for forming ideas about them. Individuals are necessarily in a world encompassed by its given ontotheology, which necessarily impacts the individual's experience. Heidegger's philosophy finds its foundation in his phenomenology of the individual, and he builds it into his language and approach through the term \textit{Dasein}.

Acknowledging the inherent unity between internal human experience—the perspective of Dasein—and the external world represents a fundamental departure from traditional Western, Cartesian thought, which posits that 'man' can contemplate himself rationally, apart from the fetters and 'trappings' of the world. Heidegger found such philosophical penetration pointless. "For Heidegger, 'the scandal of philosophy' is not that a proof of the external world has never been given, but that 'such proofs are expected" (Cooper 37; \textit{Being and Time} 249; trans. Macquarrie, sec. 205). Cooper elaborates:

The spectre of solipsism which haunts the Cartesian tradition is therefore dispelled from the outset. I do not first encounter the world and then 'add on in thought' the presence of other creatures like myself. Rather, in encountering things in the world, such as clothes and fields, other people are encountered too, even if they are not
physically present — the potential wearer of the clothes, the owner of the land, and so on. (31)

Only the fundamental starting point of Dasein, which begins with humans in the world, can preserve and address the complexity of human experience, its manifold realities, and the interspersion of broad fields of human interest. In contrast to the rational deployment of the enframing world view, that compartmentalizes things and concepts into discrete, parsed categories, Dasein is at ease with the extensive interconnection of things. Contrary to the West's fascination with enframing and technology, an awareness of Dasein does not predispose us to normalize and dissect being human, but allows us to follow the tunes of different ways of life that encompass varied human experiences and values.

The perspective of Dasein makes it apparent that individuals have needs and interests that go beyond themselves, just as specific objects, things, and ideas all exist within an indefinite scope. All things persist within a world of dynamic possibilities and significance, such as the pen that comes from the corner store, shipped from China, composed of fossil (re)sources; and it can be used to write a test, shoot a spit ball, or stab a turtle. The potential perspectives and uses attributed to the pen by the individual modify the Dasein of the person concerned with the pen, whether that be the English student, the artist, or the oil share trader. We generally do not think in these terms, until the unexpected occurs, such as: the discovery of toxic chemicals in pen ink, leading to a nation-wide recall; an exposé of child labour used in their manufacture; the disruption of international shipping lanes due to piracy, or; an instance of a pen as murder weapon. Such events can bring to the surface of attention the association between human Dasein and the world of objects. As such, Dasein "exists in and through its disclosure of the world, its 'concernful' engagement or 'meaningful connection' with it" (Cooper 30). Dasein alone responds to the significance of things, reinterprets them, and is informed and modified in turn. In Dasein (i.e. being-there): one finds use of the article that is there; just as the conditions of the article can modify the composure of one's Dasein. In like manner: an angry person can break a cookie; a broken cookie can make a child whine. The meaning or import of a broken cookie is contingent upon the particular narration involved.

1.2 Dasein and Discourse of the World

By being in the world, we must locate ourselves within established, known settings, to learn
the way or ways of life that are available to us. Discourses represent the shared worlds of meanings and of intelligibility through which one can find or affirm meanings within a larger way of life or lifestyle. This is why Cooper states that "I am not 'in-the-world' as a pea in a pod, but more in the sense that someone is in the world of motor-racing or fashion. It is a matter of engagement, not location" (25). Indeed, any one subject or field of specialization invokes, at the same time, related narratives, objects, and even identities. Let us unpack Cooper's examples of motor racing and fashion. Motor racing is not merely about fast cars, but about national pride and identity, technological advances, risk to life, machismo, oil, the auto industry, 'regular' driving (which is an extension of human locomotion), and urban design. Similarly, in the pursuit of good looking clothes, fashion involves sexuality, fine art, consumerism, mass production, socio-economic status, the textile industry, and 'regular' clothes (informed by cultural norms, department store profitability, and providing basic protection from the elements).

The Dasein of human experience allows us to preserve the complexity of life, even to the extent that discrete political, environmental, or economic conditions can impact the basic dispositions of one's Dasein on a daily basis. Likewise, in relation to material things, human Dasein maintains dynamic, fleshed-out scenarios. To continue the above examples, engine blocks involve iron ore, strip mining, coal, smelting, environmental impacts, refinement, technological advances in alloys, computer-aided design, and fabrication. Similarly, designer jeans may involve cotton cultivation, genetic engineering, petrochemical pesticides, financially and politically exploited immigrant workers, sweat shop labour, historical and cultural icons, and current trends established through the entertainment industry.

People and things alike point to far-flung sources and purposes. Only the human sense of being-there can begin to capture the plethora of relations among humans and the things in the world. Cooper describes our typical handling of things, which marginalizes their extension beyond immediate needs:

In everyday life, things are not initially or 'proximally' encountered by us as mere objects present-at-hand through pure 'perceptual cognition'. Rather, we experience them as 'ready-to-hand' (zuhanden) – as functional, 'manipulable' items like hammers and pens which figure in a field of 'concern': and we do so through our practical 'dealings' with them, not through disengaged observation. (25)
We invent, utilize, or preserve things in the furtherance of our lives and values, not for the sake of the things themselves. All vision, meaning, practice, and direction in our lives consists in our being-there with things and others, especially in as far as they impact our lives. In this sense, "Dasein is 'ahead-of-itself' in being directed 'towards [its] potentiality-for-Being', towards what it will or might become, the possibilities 'for the sake of which' it acts" (Cooper 35; Being and Time 236f; trans. Macquarrie). We invent, collect, and utilize things to further the project of Dasein, which is itself bent upon the future. Furthermore, these articles of convenience are then likely to persist or increase in significance to others in turn, altering the shape of society. In this way, we can understand the development and the deterioration of education. When the Dasein of educational administrators and students focuses more and more on a particular issue or desire, the system responds and reifies that Dasein. Similarly, historically potent episodes, that have strongly influenced the Dasein of past educational administrators, can in effect bloat and distort the current educational system, and the alienating, in authentic Dasein it prompts in students.

2  Dasein as the Phenomenology of the Individual in Society

The perspective of phenomenology allows us to distance ourselves from how things appear; to not confuse the supposed 'rigour of actuality' with the interpretations and conventions that serve to construct a sense of actuality. Conventions of interpretation exist or float at the level of society. Even seemingly basic conventions, such as counting, pointing to, or labelling things (including people) are wrought with conventions of interpretation that assess the significance of given quantities or characteristics. Through its conventions of interpretation and interrogation, society bears upon individual Dasein thoroughly. The experience of Dasein entails not only being there, but more elaborately, being there with others, whether: along with others as part of a dominant group; with others in a group in opposition to another group, or; more or less by oneself. Relating positively to one's society offers the promise of feelings of togetherness through the adoption of accepted / expected modes of self-definition, encoded in larger cultural, group narrations. Being part of a counter-culture offers the same benefits, at least within the domain of that sub-group. Whether one is: part of a largely uniform society, akin to the cult-like devotion found in North Korea; supportive of one of
two major group identities, as found in the U.S.A.'s Republican-Democrat, conservative-liberal dichotomy, or; largely on one's own, as in the case of a recluse, in each case it is ridiculous to attempt to parse the individual's Dasein out from the influential Dasein of society. I do not mean to say that it is impossible or meaningless to identify a person's individual inclinations and freely willed actions. Rather, at the level of educational policy development, for example, dissecting individual motives is less important, precisely because it is difficult to identify an original inclination within an individual without reference to the group he or she grew into and, perhaps, either condones or resists. Therefore, we cannot examine individuals in isolation from their community to define or cultivate what is absolutely authentic within them. Dasein marks the being-there of the individual that is necessarily embedded in a world. Fortunately, Heidegger does offer reasonable means for assessing the value or the authenticity of the individual. It begins with what is under one's nose.

Understanding, assessing, or evaluating the individual and his or her notions or experiences of authenticity cannot be reduced to the content of one's mind but, appropriate to the expansive field of concern of Dasein, such examination must preserve the individual's connection to others. Heidegger was suspicious of rigorous, detached, arm-chair introspection, as a way to examine or improve oneself. As it happens, "there is a further vehicle of self-knowledge — other people, in whose eyes I am, so to speak, reflected. This leads to a second crucial feature of Dasein: it is necessarily 'Being-with-others'" (Cooper 31). In other words, one's sense of being-there' somewhere in the world involves the actual and potential others with whom one coexists, as well as the various roles and identities that others would overlay upon one. This preservation of connections to others explains how specific experiences between two individuals, or between an individual and an object, can invoke large-scale social phenomena, such as: sexism, racism, or social decay. For example, a child who is called by a racial slur suffers increasingly to the extent that he or she realizes that others would institute the same racist agenda or simply offer it no rebuttal. Racist labels and other forms of discrimination qualify the appearance of one in the face of a student body that reflects on the masses. These labels bear such weight precisely because of what they represent to entire groups of people, and the Dasein of sexual, racial, or economic discrimination they may face from day to day. Granted, these examples are all negative, and
not all socially sanctioned labels infringe upon human dignity and potential. Nevertheless, let us not remove our gaze too quickly. Society offers 'places for sexist or racist practices to hide or to find subversive, tacit expression that is all the more harmful to the individual and to society alike due to its invisibility.

Society provides the building blocks of identity and behaviour often without stirring any recognition of its direct influence. It is not simply that we are somewhat swayed or coloured by society as much as we are phenomenologically shaped by it profoundly. Cooper indicates the extent to which Heidegger views society as formative of human behaviour:

Heidegger, indeed, goes further: 'the Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self'. 'Formally', of course, we can be individuated as I, you, she and so on: but in practice it is we or they — the unspecified 'public' — which has taken over the roles usually accredited to a self, such as exercising 'dominion' over behaviour or interpreting things. We are clearly moving here from a mere 'analytic' of human existence to an appraisal of the human condition, as one in which people get 'levelled down' and 'disburdened' of their 'authentic' individuality. (32; Heidegger, Being and Time 167)

From this perspective, growing into a place in society is less about staking one's personal, original position and more about ratifying or recycling established patterns of perception, activity, and expectation. Heidegger explains that society, or 'the They', prevails upon the individual to accept and perpetuate established norms, thereby normalizing individuals and their level of discourse. Similar to the ordered, pleasant, uncritical citizenry depicted in George Orwell's 1984, who were invariably provided with controlled times for venting disorder, anger, and opposition, the They provides outlets for approval and disapproval alike.

Once again, I suppress the perhaps more-apparent sense that critical theories of education lend themselves better to Heidegger's deconstruction. This may well be the case, but the scope of this thesis is to affirm that individuals in 'homogeneous' and in 'diversified' societies alike have the opportunity to make incremental shifts in discourse in proportion to what is actually possible locally, regardless of whether one has liberal or conservative leanings. Perhaps I strain the sense that internal criticism and differences of opinion occur in all organizations and groups. I do admit that the West, which allows criticism, stands to address discrimination and hold space for authenticity with more promise.

Let us continue, then, in this exploration of Heidegger's deconstruction of the They:
In the life under the dictatorship of the They, 'averageness' and 'levelling down' prevail. 'We take pleasure as they take pleasure... find "shocking" what they find shocking'. At the same time, the They imagines that 'one' is leading a full and genuine life' and encourages 'uninhibited bustle', 'versatile curiosity and "knowing it all"' which masquerade as genuine understanding. (Cooper 41-42; Heidegger, Being and Time 164f, 222f, 443)

By providing a complete range of opinion about what is good, true, and virtuous, and what is bad, false, and terrible, the entire person can be engaged, satisfied, and steered. That is, socially sanctioned outlets for praise and for righteous indignation are necessary to justify, preserve, and propagate the status quo. Societal conventions channel human energy. One's capacity to criticize the status quo can be redirected to vilify the so called enemy. This provides an emotional release that effectively quashes the impulse to critique oneself or one's society. The distress that acts upon one's community cannot but stir a similar response in the individual. And as if to 'keep our eye off the ball,' positive outlets of engagement in bustle, curiosity, and ritual provides a surrogate of fulfilment. Where it lacks in quality and depth it abounds in quantity and in capacity to titillate, especially in today's technologically-advancing, materialistically-abundant Western world. If we were to dissect Dasein—even though we have established that it is a unity of experience—we might find, loosely speaking, that whereas the individual provides the 'being,' society contextualizes the 'there.' Granted, the 'there' consists largely of the Dasein of individuals, and one's 'being' is born from others. However, it remains that a severe tilt in favour of one aspect, whether toward the exaltation of one's individual ego, or toward uncontemplated immersion in the They, can only strain any sense of authenticity. Finding authenticity, then, involves a somewhat nuanced relation between these two poles of Dasein's domain: society and the individual.

A notion or experience of Dasein that resonates with authenticity can neither isolate itself in the individual nor can it slumber in release to the ways of the They. A middle ground must be found. However, given the intensity and emotive potential of the They, discovering one's unique positioning of oneself in society would require more than ordinary effort. This will likely involve trial and error, observation, practice, communication, learning, and discomfort. Heidegger would argue:

Far from being our primal condition, authentic existence is only a 'modification' of, and never a total departure from, life 'sunk' in the They. Still, this point, while well-taken, is hardly enough to justify the disclaiming of all critical intent: not, certainly,
given Heidegger's insistence that, with 'resoluteness', a person can achieve a degree of authenticity and thereby approximate to being what he truly is. (Cooper 41)

As suggested throughout this essay, authenticity is less a matter of specific characterization (the authentic as 'x') and more a matter of a constant pursuit and rediscovery ('x' ↔ the authentic). As such, Cooper's (and Heidegger's) notion of achieving 'approximate degrees' of authenticity supports a more human, flexible, non-prescriptive approach. As part of this process, one must take a step back from the society within which one is immersed, even if only philosophically from time to time, and reassess and revalue its various conceptions. In this context, then, finding authenticity as a member of society is more a matter of art than science. Drawing on the thought of Nietzsche, Smeyers suggests that when we speak of "giving one's life style he means that one would overcome resistance to recognizing the particular life one has, properly understanding thus what we have become" (Smeyers, "The Threat of Nihilism" 4). Here, then, we have to strain muscles that are atrophied to see what is typically left unrecognized and then see the 'particular life' one has in all its strangeness.

Really, any way of life is strange in the scope of all actual phenomenologies or ways of life in the world, today and historically. As varied as the world's cultures may be, they all face the same bind: seeking their own preservation while at the same time taming the strange. When notions and experiences of truth, authenticity, and education are constructed, both society and the individual benefit, at least in the short term, in subsuming any sense of construction. This typically occurs by appropriating and defending the level of discourse. One gains trust from others and access to resources by demonstrating that one can carry on appropriately, within approved limits of convention. Seeing oneself, not through the usual lens of local discourse, but through other possible perspectives, takes considerable effort. Certainly, more-than-ordinary introspection can occur in the aftermath of a terrible disaster or a brush with death. And one need not be suspicious of all social conventions, as many, and perhaps most, have served individuals and society to survive and even prosper. However, adopting the level of discourse comes as a two edged sword, providing a space of conformity, normalcy, and shared identity and discourse, while cultivating the conditions for superficiality and dogma on the other. In other words, established conditions and behaviours of goodness, happiness, or excitement can engender authenticity, whereas from a different perspective, they can look inauthentic. Most of us can look at an old photo of ourselves, and laugh at what was, at the
time, a hair style about which one felt confident, comfortable, and authentic. What matters here is not whether the hair style was strange or not, or authentic or not, by any measure, but that the inalienable source of authenticity is within the individual in the moment of living the being-there.

2.1 Dasein and Inauthenticity

The principle of Dasein affirms the individual as situated in the world, having the prerogative to name it or to call it one's own. Here we have a most intimate connection between the individual and his or her surroundings, both material and ideological. One can happily adopt and appropriate the world that is given, shower praise on all things, and have that as one's Dasein, or one can be suspicious of the world that is given, curse its particulars, and have that as one's Dasein. Obviously, these are simplistic, extreme examples, but the point remains that one can reason and believe in one's stance, whatever it may be, and this stance creates certain possibilities. Continuing the above example, the person who embraces the status quo may benefit from more facile cooperation with others, or the person who is suspicious of it may find needed supports from like-minded individuals, as part of a sub-group. The purpose of these examples is to not distinguish which is better but to assert that the Dasein of the individual activates the potentials that are available to it. Heidegger explains:

> In each case, Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. (Heidegger, Being and Time 68; trans. Macquarrie, § 42, sec. 9.)

Dasein cannot but establish the tide of one's life, affirming a baseline stance that thereby contextualizes the import of all things, including the broad culture or cultures in one's world, in relation to oneself. One's Dasein can empower one to either affirm or resist the dominant world view, as the case may be, or it can bear out (or overbear) one's victimization or dis-empowerment. Furthermore, as noted by Heidegger, one's Dasein can erect an inverted semblance. For example: one can feel empowered, even though he or she is thoroughly disenfranchised, or; one can parade all the signs of dis-empowerment, even though he or she is really applying a useful survival strategy. In all cases, no society or cultural authority can assume that all of its members will pick up the identity that is sanctioned. Each individual's
Dasein, which comes from within that individual and, reflecting on the world, which presents itself to others, will be personalized unavoidably.

Joan Stambaugh identifies "authenticity as Heidegger's main concern, expressed or not," in *Being and Time*. She argues that "upon closer examination, the authentic is the fundamental level of Da-sein and the inauthentic is simply a flight from authenticity, however prevalent that inauthenticity might be" (22). The authentic is fundamental to Dasein in the sense of endowing or lending oneself to the life one is directed toward, claiming the Being there of it as one's own. A broader term may well apply, in that one who actively loves his or her life, in a way that is personal and not merely prescribed, is thereby living one's Dasein authentically.

Granted, arguing for a direct association between the love of one's life and authenticity is problematic, as those experiences which can generate feelings of love and happiness could be constructed. For example, a Facebook user with a few hundred 'friends' might take great pleasure in flaunting his or her online popularity, even though this number might belie poor social skills and few 'actual' friends. In this case, what stirs an experience of authenticity may be itself superficial and inherently inauthentic from a different standpoint. Similarly, a drug user on a chemically induced high could have profound experiences of fulfilment, togetherness, and love, but the stain of chemically induced authenticity exposes profound lack, unsustainability, and self-centredness. A student might feel judged (i.e. not caring for oneself, therefore inauthentic) after receiving a low grade on a standard test, despite sincere effort, and an unstable family and community, as the case may be. Another student might cheat on a test, to get higher grades and more praise, but face an inner conflict of conscience, thereby stirring inauthenticity.

Similar difficulty arises when one is doubtful, whether of his or her rightness or ability to coexist or cope with the immediate surroundings. Inauthenticity may prevail when there is a lack of awareness of one's prerogative to choose the direction of his or her Dasein, thereby resulting in disenchantment with others and with one's world, further deteriorating the relation between society and Dasein. This would imply that authenticity involves a healthy, ongoing, dynamic relation between oneself and one's society and world, synthesizing a Dasein that is purposeful for oneself and for others. In certain circumstances there can be great restrictions on human liberties, thus limiting the range of Dasein, making a dynamic
authenticity nigh impossible. In such cases, too, inauthenticity would prevail.

On a superficial level, authenticity and inauthenticity can easily substitute for each other. The two can flip, like two sides of a coin, depending on the perspective from which one assesses authenticity. Theodor Adorno, who we will examine more thoroughly later, notes that Dasein can be characterized as authenticity or inauthenticity, "when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment" (77). To unpack this assertion, allow me to take up these same examples of authenticity that slide into inauthenticity, and vice versa.

*When busy*, one can feel wanted and productive as a contributor, but a closer review of the social or environmental impacts of one's work may expose questions of validity, leading to feelings of alienation and shame. *When excited*, one is caught up in the fullness of the moment, pleased to be sharing the experience with others or for the sake of others, but after the excitement wears away, one might feel manipulated or conditioned. *When interested*, perhaps in buying the latest cell phone, one might find authenticity as an owner (i.e. consumer) of the latest technology, but asking why one needs another new phone when one already owns two working ones, and cannot know if the rare elements within it were mined responsibly, inauthenticity might follow. It seems as if our forgetting plays a role in the experience of authenticity. As we direct our attention to address a certain set of perceptions and actions, we are also foreclosing other possible ways to perceive and act. And, as our moods or requirements change, we embody more or less authentic possible selves.

Such examples clarify the difficulty inherent in analyzing and prescribing what qualifies as the authentic. And of course, there are plenty of examples of human behaviour that are obviously inauthentic from the view of outsiders, though the individual practising them may well feel authentic to him or herself. Such inauthentic behaviours would include: self-absorption; the manipulation of others; inflaming others; being alarmist or excessively assertive, contrary, angry, or violent; waxing profound or nostalgic; being repetitive, whether in behaviour or speech; taking others for granted or being presumptuous, or; being dismissive or denigrating to others. By presenting these last examples of plainly discouraged, 'inauthentic' behaviours, that nonetheless parade as authentic to the individual, I do not mean to trivialize this analysis of authenticity and inauthenticity. Rather, these last examples help
to underscore how authenticity and inauthenticity are often a matter of perspective, in the face of who is receiving the act, what is the sub-text of the situation, and what is the overarching cultural context.

Fortunately, Heidegger offers a fresh angle that offers more clarity:

Heidegger claims that inauthenticity must involve Dasein's disowning of itself, being oblivious to its mineness (to the fact that it is in each case mine and not yours to love), and (utilizing another etymological connection) implies that this indifference to itself is realized in an essentially undifferentiated existence. Authentic modes of existence thereby appear as essentially differentiated. (Mulhall, "Inheritance and Originality" 215)

Undifferentiated existence would be on par with a shielded life in the anonymity of the crowd. The group's desires, expectations, and interests provide the promise of enthrallment with a world of dire concern or identity—these cannot but shape the individual's interests in broad strokes. What nation or culture does not possess ways of life that are compelling for its own people, some of whom may inspire increments of new direction?

As a Westerner, I can easily identify various foreign groups that seem all-consuming, blanketing its members with a relatively undifferentiated existence, at least in terms of politics. Societies that seem to present a homogeneous front of opinion would seem, by their seeming lack of variation, to engender inauthenticity in the guise of authenticity. Granted, I make such claims 'from the outside looking in,' as a Westerner, but my point remains: In contrast to gravitation toward the pull of the masses' opinions, Heidegger associates differentiated ways of thinking and acting as more conducive to truly authentic living. Such a stance would seem to recommend originality as an aspect of authenticity. No doubt, originality, which is akin to innovation and creativity, would typically enforce a sense of authenticity, especially as others find value in it. However, one need not achieve originality to be different. Differentiatedness may be more a matter of entertaining an alternative line of though, or even just allowing oneself a moment to entertain a new vision, perception, or experience. When busy, excited, or interested, one need merely reflect on the value of what is happening, and consider if some kind of differentiated, personal perspective or application would serve one's integrity more effectively. Then one may think differently, act differently, and live one's Dasein differently. As simple as this outcome may seem, marching to a different tune comes with difficulty, as it represents an overcoming of the comfort of
conformity.

2.2 Fluxing Between Hiddenness and Unhiddenness

Phenomenology alone offers a scope of explanation that is sufficiently multifarious to encompass human experience in all its complexity, diversity, and dynamism. Entire world views, vocabularies, histories, and realities offer themselves to their new members who, as they grow up, often eagerly take on and own what is given. However, world views, vocabularies, histories, and realities are unavoidably imperfect and incomplete: no world view can support all human experience and endeavour; no single vocabulary describes all phenomena; no history is impartial; no day-to-day reality is universal. Each one has its peculiarities and idiosyncrasies. This inconvenient truth amounts to little in the face of needing to cope with immediate needs, like any good citizen. Understanding that these world views are contingent upon shared life experience, and are not absolute, essential, or necessary, allows one to preserve a space for personal perspective and authenticity.

Heidegger offers substantial material on the nature of our immersion in the world, and the effect it has to typically hinder differentiation and authenticity. Ideas about how a given metaphysics explains the revealing of one world view yet hides other potential ways (that may be pertinent to authenticity) were introduced in Chapter Three. Going further into the phenomenology of the individual, as Dasein, Heidegger describes Dasein as 'fallen into' or 'thrown' into a world that is already complete (or replete) with ways of navigating it as a human:

Hence 'fallenness', 'being-alongside' things, attests to what Heidegger calls 'thrownness': Dasein's being, at any time, 'delivered over' to a world already mapped out for it by public practices and understanding. (Cooper 33-34)

What one can say in public, and how that public responds, is predetermined by what cultural conventions and practices are in effect. Indeed, a large part of human growth involves how we behave in various public and private settings.

I can understand why for children it would be beneficial to take up the mappings of public practice and understanding eagerly, that they may learn to coexist with others and develop important aptitudes for adult life. However, at some point of maturity, the individual should
engage capacities to view things critically and consciously 'underpin' one's life by selectively appropriating shared and personal perspectives. Otherwise, one's Dasein can and will more readily endow itself to the dominant tide of human perspective and behaviour, risking the privilege and prerogative to contribute to the direction of discourse. I would not argue for a wholesale scepticism and dismissal of any culture or world view, but call for a recognition of our tendency to see incompletely, which is more likely than not reflective of an inherent limit of human cognition. That is, we tend inflate incomplete understandings of various topics such that they seem whole to us, allowing us to make the usual confident armchair pronouncements. Cooper explains:

*Dasein* can and, in "average," everyday "chatter", generally does at the same time disguise and cover up how things are. Indeed, this is inevitable, for if we reveal things in certain ways, then there are other ways in which they are not being revealed. Not all the veils can be snatched away simultaneously. (54)

Any given world view will have its blind spots, and any attempt to rectify them all at the same time will fail. Again, as Cooper explains, 'not all veils can be snatched away simultaneously.' Rather, there must be a protracted effort to reassess one's world view. Only a gradual effort will cover ground due to the limits of discourse, which correlate to the limits of self-criticism or of even self-observation. One can endeavour to educate others only in so far as sufficient background knowledge has been covered previously, that lies both within shared knowledges and in internal ground that has been covered previously (i.e. involving Vandenberg's 'geography' and 'landscape' knowledge, both). One can advance a shared discourse only to the extent that its members acknowledge that their discourse has itself shifted over time as various blind spots become known and traversed. Discourses have roots in antiquity. Civilizations change. For this reason, it is more practical if one's criticism or new perspective represents an augmentation and not a complete revision. Overly drastic possibilities are filtered out by the buffering masses and its appeal to the common denominator. Furthermore, the members of the discourse must appreciate the active role the individual has on phenomenology, such that the accepted discourse can be seen as formative of perception, and not merely descriptive of it. Fortunately, this tendency toward immersion in discourse can be explained in relation to Dasein. Cooper explains:

This presupposition of factual discourse is something we forget, for quite generally, *Dasein* tends to get "absorbed" in the objects which concern it, hence to forget its own contribution to the very possibility of experience and encountering objects, and
so to "understand itself in terms of what it encounters within-the-world." It is due to this forgetfulness and absorption that we treat truth as simply a relation between worldly entities, representations and their objects. Immerging oneself in a world of understanding, which establishes the direction of one's Dasein, involves two conflated aspects. One involves picking up the articles of comprehension—consisting of objects, facts, stories, and the language for conveying them—and the other involves assuming the level of enquiry. One informs the other, and for this reason they cannot be parsed, and the latter is not seen. In other words, we learn to use words just as we learn the extent of agreeable knowledge claims that we can make, but without seeing those limits as articles of convention. In this hectic process, Dasein can easily forget its role in the process of naming, defining, perceiving, and promulgating. As a result, established truths are treated as a matter-of-fact, necessary situation, and not as part of a construction—granted, having some working construction was itself necessary.

The omission of awareness of the contribution of individuals to a scheme of normalization has two detrimental effects that ought to be considered, lest they continue to overbear upon human sovereignty and dignity, and veil the construction of notions of truth, authenticity, and education.

When one group thinks and feels as if their world view is necessary and inherently truthful, then all other groups, especially those with relatively contrasting beliefs and metaphysical systems, will appear inherently false and erroneous. The self-proclaimed 'right' group will invariably provide its members with 'tests, criticisms, and justifications' for judging the other. The basic, childhood dynamic of "I'm right, you're wrong," "No, I'm right, you're wrong" plays out, sometimes at full volume, drowning out all informed, intelligent, and philosophical discourse, concealing any cause for self-reflection. Bold and 'sure' criticisms leap: from one group against the other; from one conception of authenticity against another, and; from one educational system against another. As one group increases its rhetoric, challenging and threatening the other, the more absorbed become its members in facile, pre-fabricated pseudo-discourse, and the more the other group reacts in kind. In contrast, a group that acknowledges that its world view is constructed, consisting of stories and values that

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4"Truth, Science, Thinking, and Distress" 55; Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine"; Heidegger, Contributions 22
been, up to and including now, purposeful, but may be subject to moderate revision, is able to both respect the different-other and to listen to and hear what the other has to say. In the very least, the Dasein of the other group can be respected and trustingly known as being inherently true and necessary, at this time, for the other.

By justifying violence against another group, simply because it is different, one is doing violence to the variation that is inherent within one's own group, community, family, and mind. Such wholesale persecution, not of injustice-personified, but of the human condition itself, leads us to the second detriment, alluded to earlier. The omission of the individual and the society's contribution to the production of reality leaves a kind of void, a non-articulated domain of human experience, that amounts to a separation from the creative process of living. This results in an raw, untraveled area of discourse that often results in defensiveness and overcompensation through a zealous lifestyle. Such enthusiasm bolsters the popularity of the world view while justifying its proud defence. As Cooper explains:

For the general form of this [contemporary] distress is an unthinking absorption in, a being besieged by, objects that, since they are no longer experienced against the background of a process of being's unconcealment, lose all depth, resonance, and mystery. "Hollowed-out" and thought of as simply there for objective measurements, they no longer invite wonder. With truth conceived of as a fixed relation between entities, assertions, and their objects, human beings lose all sense of themselves as being essentially engaged in the emergence of truth, in a process, that calls for "deep awe," whereby things emerge out of hiddenness into the light. It is no objection, Heidegger explains, to the description of the present condition as one of distress that few people are aware of their distress. On the contrary, besieged as they are by objects, absorbed in the world around them, people are without recollection of what has been lost. The symptoms of distress are everywhere, however: in frantic pursuit of life-experiences, in hysterical participation in mass-meetings, in adulation of sporting heroes, in blind devotion to technological progress, and so on. Lives so lived are palpably bereft of the deep awe and wonder that obtain when there is mindfulness of truth – of a world arising from concealment. ("Truth, Science, Thinking, and Distress" 57)

The key point in Cooper's passage asserts that we, as human beings, are "essentially engaged in the emergence of truth," and that the misconception that we are to be 'engaged in the

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defence of truth' leads to un-thinking, hollowness, and distress that is concealed by the energised pursuit of gratifying ideas, material things, and experiences. I argue that education cannot fulfil its most basic purpose without leading students to the concept that all peoples actively construct truths. Such a stance does not argue for unlimited pluralism and the trivialization of epistemology. It does, however, suggest that, as educators, we may need to acknowledge to our students that we may be partially wrong about things. Heidegger offers some direction for the evaluation of different ways of life and their respective knowledge and truth claims, beginning with the preservation of being.

Heidegger believes that "the first concern in the question of being must be an analysis of Da-sein." Recall that the Dasein of any given individual will typically seem inherently real and necessary at any given time (even if the deepest sense is of unreality and non-necessity—indeed, that will seem real and necessary). As a direct result, "no arbitrary idea of being and reality, no matter how "self-evident" it is, may be brought to bear on [any given] being in a dogmatically constructed way; no "categories" prescribed by such ideas may be forced upon Da-sein without ontological deliberation" (Being and Time 14-15; § 16, sec. 5). We cannot impose our perspective upon another, or hope to follow a check-list to evaluate the credibility of someone's life. Such assessments are meaningless.

The manner of access and interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can show itself to itself on its own terms. And furthermore, this manner should show that being as it is initially and for the most part—in its average everydayness. Not arbitrary and accidental structures but essential ones are to be demonstrated in this everydayness, structures that remain determinative in every mode of being of factual Da-sein. By looking at the fundamental constitution of the everydayness of Da-sein we shall bring out in a preparatory way the being of this being. (Being and Time 14-15; § 16, sec. 5)

Heidegger asserts that if ever we wish to 'access and interpret' the Dasein of another, we must look at it within its normal conditions. No doubt, scholastic tests are an important educational tool for assessment, etc., but individuals are more than their class grades, and can benefit from being under the careful gaze and attention of teachers. Indeed, Heidegger describes this most basic, day-to-day composure of Dasein as one of care.

3 Care as the Basic Stance of Dasein

In order to survive, live, and better yet, 'prosper' in the world (whether authentically or
inauthentically) requires that one pay sufficient attention to ongoing requirements and expectations between oneself and the world. In so doing, one is affirming the significance of the world and their part within it. Drawing on the work of Heidegger, Inwood explains that "Care is correlative to the significance of the world. Only if Dasein is care can it dwell in a significant world, and only if it dwells in a significant world can Dasein be care" (52). The positive aspect of this statement is straightforward: that a significant world calls for a Dasein of care. However, the negative point is unusual: that it would be difficult to sustain a Dasein of care in a world that is not significant. Though perhaps strange, it makes perfect sense. It follows that people are less likely to take care of their own health, environment, or future, if their community is broken, corrupt, or hopeless. The degree of care inherent in a given individual's Dasein reflects an assessment of the future to which one is likely to move.

Heidegger describes care as directly related to our existence within time. Our care for any given thing draws on its relation to the future; how it can enhance or harm our position within it. "Care must need "time" and thus reckon with "time" (Being and Time 217; § 235, sec. 45). Care points to our unfinished-ness, our incompletion, and our need to persist and advance in life in the face of stagnation and decay.

Care, which forms the totality of the structural whole of Da-sein, obviously contradicts a possible being whole of this being according to its ontological sense. The primary factor of care, "being ahead of itself," however, means that Da-sein always exists for the sake of itself. "As long as it is," up until its end, it is related to its potentiality-of-being. Even when it, still existing, has nothing further "ahead of it," and has "settled its accounts," its being is still influenced by "being ahead of itself." Hopelessness, for example, does not tear Da-sein away from its possibilities, but is only an independent mode of being toward these possibilities. Even when one is without illusions and "is ready for anything," the "ahead of itself" is there. This structural factor of care tells us unambiguously that something is always still outstanding in Da-sein which has not yet become "real" as a potentiality-of-its-being. A constant unfinished quality thus lies in the essence of the constitution of Da-sein. This lack of totality means that there is still something outstanding in one's potentiality-for-being. (Being and Time 219-20; § 236, sec. 46)

That care is a major component of Dasein likely comes as no surprise, but Heidegger's assertion that 'Dasein exists for the sake of itself' almost seems vacuous or circular. However, on a closer look, he has only enhanced our understanding of Dasein. Just as one's Dasein will seem inherently real and necessary for oneself, so too does he or she sustain or augment that Dasein in the face of what it has been up to now and toward which one intends to advance.
One's care for earning money, for selling illegal drugs, or for fighting poverty may serve others, but it's primary import is for oneself. One takes on his or her Dasein in the furtherance of his or her own life. Just like swimming to stay alive, one must continually strive to stay afloat and to draw nearer to relative safety. Staying truly still or idle is a dubious option at best. The world will always consist in manifold changes and unknowns. Being aware of and responding to them is the purpose of care.

Very often, those unknowns can take on proportions that exceeds one's capacity to cope, leading to a common affliction: anxiety. If education is to fulfil its most basic purpose, to help individuals to succeed in life and to find a sense or Dasein that is authentic, it follows that it ought to appreciate the basic conditions of anxiety that weigh on the individual and on society alike.

### 3.1 Dasein and Anxiety

Human life typically involves coping with and overcoming anxieties. Both external and internal anxieties exist. For example, one may be unable to comply fully with a social activity, whether due to differences in taste, bodily comportment, or philosophy. On a more personal level, one may question his or her own faithfulness, integrity, or identity in general, thus colouring their overall disposition correspondingly. Cooper emphasizes a different word when translating Heidegger's thought about anxiety. He argues that *angst* is a more useful word, in that it avoids connotations of panic-attacks and the like (43). Indeed, one general cause of angst and anxiety is our very vulnerability to these conditions. Heidegger explains that "the physiological triggering of Angst is possible only because Da-sein is anxious in the very ground of its being" (Heidegger, *Being and Time* 177; § 190, sec. 40). Paraphrasing Heidegger (*Being and Time* 232-33; trans. Macquarrie, sec. 40), Cooper clarifies:

> Unlike ordinary fear, its object is not some 'entity within-the-world', such as a vicious dog. Indeed, during Angst, objects lose their importance, everything 'sinks away' into 'utter insignificance'. It is a mood of 'uncanniness', of not being 'at home' in the world. No longer 'absorbed' in the world and getting on with ordinary business, 'everyday familiarity collapses' for the anxious person. (43)

Whereas authenticity would be characterized by confident or trustful engagement with one's world, angst and anxiety represent the opposite; a feeling that one's capacity to engage is insufficient, whether at present or for a perceived future. The need to cope with the future is
cause for anxiety, which can itself stir feelings of authenticity and inauthenticity. The future projects upon the individual a potential reality or need that can be fulfilled, conveying authenticity, or not reached, conveying inauthenticity. Each individual, then, must deal with anxiety, with authenticity and inauthenticity held in the balance. Anxiety and angst, then, can threaten and, when responded to effectively, further authenticity. Questioning and unfinished-ness must remain part of one's ongoing practice of life, if one is to remain flexible toward finding and re-finding authenticity from day to day. Angst and anxiety can serve to 'keep us on our toes' or to make plain problems that could threaten or hamper one's life; conditions that warrant attention. Anxiety and angst indicate that something is not right, but things could be better. As such, they affirm our primordial relation to an external world that is not always within our control. We counter these unknowns, as much as we are able, through attentiveness and exertion, to preserve or reach some semblance of comfort and prosperity. Mulhall describes this activity as essential to Dasein:

In other words, anxiety indicates that authentic individuality remains a possibility for us despite our tendency to turn or fall away from that fact. Anxiety thus lays bare the basis of Dasein's existence as thrown projection fallen into the world. Dasein's thrownness ... shows it to be already in a world; its projectiveness ... shows it to be at the same time ahead of itself, aiming to realize some existential possibility; and its fallenness shows it to be preoccupied with the world. This overarching tripartite characterization reveals the essential unity of Dasein's Being … . (Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality 258)

The phenomenology of Dasein revolves around three basic aspects of human experience. We have all been thrown into a world that is already happening, that projects into the future, and that preoccupies us. Though well articulated by Heidegger, these aspects of Dasein need not be inserted craftily into formal school lessons as a subject of study. These qualities of Dasein are well known through experience, even if they are not addressed explicitly. I would surmise that various cultures take up various practices precisely to manage (1) our being 'stuck' to one another, (2) our care for the future, and (3) our location on earth. Cultures serve to structure and thereby mitigate the demands of life, making various cares manageable. Unfortunately, these conventions can be a source of angst in themselves.

Granted, individuals can experience anxiety and angst that is entirely personal and unique. However, in many cases, the anxiety or angst that a person experiences is directly related to the larger phenomena of anxiety and angst as experienced and expressed by others in the
society. Anxiety can operate at this superficial level, wherein one's angst is readily recognized by others, and commiseration is facilitated. As Heidegger explains, "real" Angst is rare. Often, Angst is "physiologically" conditioned. ... The physiological triggering of Angst is possible only because Da-sein is anxious in the very ground of its being" (Being and Time 177; § 190, sec. 40). Since Dasein must deal with anxiousness as part and parcel of being in the world, a society can and will provide established means and ruts to channel and process anxiety. Anxiety breaches more readily when one is anxious about the anxiety of nearby others. This presents the possibility of a feedback loop of anxiety. Rather than seeking commiseration, and aligning one's angst with that of the masses, one retreats into a more solitary, internal state. I believe this would be more akin to the 'real' Angst Heidegger alludes to. Such angst can be a reaction to the inclinations of one's society that contradict what would otherwise seem justifiable, conscionable, or authentic to the individual.

In Angst, it is appreciated, however dimly, that the world is, so to speak, a product of the They's interpretations, that the possibilities which the They puts on offer are not the only ones, that a different world of significance is open to us to forge. Angst, then, 'individualizes' Dasein, for it 'makes manifest... its Being-free for the freedom or choosing itself', of living authentically. (Cooper 43-44; Being and Time 232; trans. Macquarrie, § 187)

Angst, then, can motivate individual thinking that would seek distance from established norms that can be stifling, inhumane, or unjust, to align the individual more with authenticity, whether through critical or revalued consciousness. Once again we find an analysis that advances differentiated thought as more conducive to authenticity. Such thought is not a matter of mere contrariness, but of responding to a more subtle feeling or inclination that would assert one's individuality in the face of conformity that leaves one unsettled. Angst that arises in response to one's own society involves pros and cons:

The penalty is an unnerving sense of no longer being 'at home' while the reward, for those who do not at once 'turn away' back into the security of 'home', is an 'unshakeable joy' in the prospect of a promised freedom. (Cooper 44)

No doubt, countless individuals question and even challenge aspects of their local politics, culture, or education. However, standing out from the crowd too much comes at a price—sometimes a serious one, as in the case of persecution—but the reward of personal integrity and freedom offers deeper liberation. Granted, 'the powers that be' can clamp down severely on displays of non-conformity. Individual action can invoke profound cultural and political resistance, whether just one individual or an entire minority group marches to a different
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drum. We can easily think of chapters of history in which an individual or a minority has stood for their own sense of justice or truth in the face of yet greater suffering. Individuals will continue to have to weigh the (naive) trust they place in society versus the voice of conscience, which might speak of an unimagined potential that is presently hidden from view. In summary, then, angst motivates individuals to challenge established notions of truth, authenticity, and education, at the cost of comfort and with the risk of alienation. The point of interest is that Dasein entails, within its very own makeup, this entire progression of integration into society and the questioning and challenging of that integration. Going deeper, now, into human make-up, Heidegger identifies an area of concern that is cause for widespread angst and anxiety: death and the significance of the person's life since birth.

3.2 Living with Reference to the Scope of Birth and Death

Heidegger spends considerable time dealing with the issue of death in Being and Time, framing it as an ever-present source of anxiety upon the human psyche. When he speaks of death and anxiety towards it, this is not to be confused with a "clinical" death (Cooper 44). Rather, he believes that "'death' is a 'way of Being' or living towards one's end. Angst in the face of death is Dasein's sense of 'Being towards its end' (Cooper 44; Heidegger, Being and Time 295). When one experiences and contemplates this angst toward death, this typically encompasses one of two areas of concern. One aspect deals not with the mere threat of death — whether it will come as a surprise, or entail great suffering, or descend one's dependants into hardship — but pertains to the moment-to-moment stance one has in relation to these uncertainties, which are inescapable. The second concern of death involves the assessment of the entirety of one's life, and whether one can be at peace with this sum total of one's life. In this sense, Dasein is not just concerned with facing toward death, but toward birth as well. What comes with one's birth is not only the actual beginning of one's life, but a broad set of potentials that would likely be bestowed upon or expected of that child. Cooper elaborates:

By 'birth', Heidegger does not mean birth, any more than by 'death' he meant death. As 'death' referred to our Being-towards-death, so 'birth' refers to our 'Being-towards-the-beginning'. This 'beginning' is what he calls 'heritage', that which has been 'handed down' to us as historically located creatures. (48)

The weight of one's inherited tradition can be great, especially the more rigid are its conventions. On the one hand, an elaborate tradition can offer predictability and community
support that can be valuable, especially the more one gladly embraces what is on offer. On the other hand, those who would question traditions, or face judgement or persecution as a result of them will face greater alienation. For example, a person who wishes to marry another outside of his or her orthodox religion could face intense resistance from family (on both sides), despite one's love for the other, which on its own may feel unquestionably authentic. Or, a person in a closed society who disagrees with the politics in force would feel pressured to not speak or act out that disagreement. In both cases, the individual's experience of authenticity would conflict with socially sanctioned notions of authenticity: one should marry within the religion—it is God's will; one should be glad to extol the glory and virtue of the state—who wouldn't?! In cases such as these, the individual must decide for him or herself what stance to take, whether in silent protest, or overt condemnation. Should one favour the preservation of life and comfort, in tune with one's heritage? Or, should one lead a life of resistance, even to the death? It would be up to the individual to find the most authentic stance, in tune with one's dispositions and the potential outcomes. In this sense, then, "authenticity requires a proper stance towards one's heritage and death. Put differently, only a person whose life is a 'whole' through integrating its outer 'limits' lives authentically" (Cooper 42). This nuanced statement admits that it may be the course of wisdom to not put one's life on the line, in favour of a more protracted, cautious resistance. It falls upon the individual's Dasein to know its inherited place in the world, its relation to it, and to what extent it would seek to think and act contrary to the Dasein of the majority's members.

Vandenberg, the Heidegger scholar who presents the Landscape-Geography dichotomy, suggests that "ontological anxiety, anxiety over having to be one's own possibilities in order to be someone oneself, emerges with the taking of one's possibilities from landscape and putting them into geography through reflection on them" (90). That is, anxiety is addressed by seeing the range of latent, tacit possibilities that are available to one while effectively integrating them with the structures and established knowledges that can offer some support to the individual in finding the best response to their anxiety.

As the 'common denominator' of phenomenology, as the perspective of the individual within the world / society, Dasein can and always will think and act in a realm of flux between individual and society. Dasein is what validates all meanings, for only Dasein can know the significance of anything that pertains to human life. Cooper explains:
Thus, *Dasein* does not *have* possibilities open to it as a bonus added to its existence: it *is* its possibilities in that no sense can be made of a person's existence except in terms of the projects, out of the many available, upon which he is engaged. *Dasein* is to be compared less with a source of light, an 'ego-pole', than with the light itself. Light is not an object which illuminates things: it *is* the illumination. And it is always 'beyond', 'ahead' or 'out there', wherever the things illuminated are. (29)

Inwood also identifies *Dasein* as the "primary locus of truth" (44). I would go further, to say that *Dasein, which is always alongside others, is the locus and measure of truth and of authenticity.*

This paper began with the question of 'how can we know if education is fulfilling its most basic purpose?' I identified our sense of authenticity as akin to our understanding of this question. That is, an education that is supposedly fulfilling its most basic purpose is deemed authentic. I noted that ideas about what comprises authenticity, whether in education, cultural practices, and individual behaviour, change over time and vary from culture to culture. This malleability and variety can be explained by metaphysics, phenomenology, and Heidegger's concept of ontotheology. Our society's current ontotheology is based on enframing and on technology. The present chapter dealt with phenomenology at the level of the individual, which exists as *Dasein*, and which has now been identified as the locus and measure of truth and authenticity. The final chapter of this thesis will draw on this last conclusion, that *Dasein* is the core of human experience which bestows truth and authenticity upon a given ontotheology. The question then follows: how can we know if our education is supporting the *Dasein* of individuals to experience authenticity? Again we can draw on the work of Heidegger who dealt with the same question, notably through drawing on Plato. This ancient Greek philosopher, who has influenced Western thought for millennia, described the essence of education toward the end of *The Republic*. He identifies people as 'chained' to a restricting, *imagined* view of the world that is justified and embellished through discourse, underlining the notion that we do not see the world as it is necessarily, but foremost we see in ideas. *Dasein* is the locus and measure of truth and authenticity, in accord with one's ideas and assessments. Only with an understanding our disposition to see in ideas—the focus of the final chapter—can we hope to preserve and promote a robust authenticity in education that is responsive to individual *Dasein* and authenticity.
Chapter Five
The Essencing of Truth

This thesis seeks to underscore the interconnection of notions, practices, and experiences of authenticity, truth, and education. The final chapter of this thesis, exploring the essence of education—what claims to authority based on notions of authenticity are worth conveying in formal education institutions—brings us to the essence of truth. Earlier chapters argued for a phenomenological account of the history of education that continues up to the current technological, world-enframing civilization in which we find ourselves. The previous chapter's exploration of Dasein explained the necessary embeddedness of individuals, the being-there of their lives. The perspective of Dasein knows and appropriates individual experience. Dasein cannot but accommodate an individual's metaphysical (or ontotheological) disposition, allowing it to colour and give shape to shared life. The variation that is possible through Dasein rubs against the grain of universalizing, positivist, and colonial narrations that would prefer to elevate a singular ontotheology. In other words, the notion that Dasein justifies varied experience and, ultimately, perception, would seem to counter a notion of Truth as an absolute universal that can be recognized and practised uniformly. The apparent variety of life would be at odds with any domineering totalizing world view, whether religious or secular. Once again, we turn to Heidegger, who employed a novel turn of phrase to acclimatize us to the actual, broad domain and nature of truth in human experience.

In Heidegger's work with the Essence of Truth, he focuses not on any specific item, article, or concept that embodies the Truth as an absolute, singular essence, but he rather directs our attention to the (historically) varied human experiencing of Truth. A given person, on earth, at a given time, who is necessarily already inducted into a constellation of meanings, cannot but interpret and derive meaning from experience with reference to the given set of accepted possibilities. As Heidegger sees it, the essence of truth is demonstrated in its capacity for phenomenological richness. The Essence of Truth is that it finds a way to 'essence' or percolate into and through a person or culture in the course of its being experienced and mentally encoded. For this reason, Heidegger used the word essence unusually, as a verb, to say that it 'essences' forth in a particular setting. We form ideas based on how truth essences
or appears to us.

The tone and assumptions built into the historically-based discourse that we grow into contours our estimation of various values and acts. As a result, the same phenomena can be perceived differently by different persons. When an event occurs that is witnessed by a number of people, each person is seeing their particular idea (situated as Dasein) of what has happened. For example, when a guest speaker presents on drug awareness, and some students are eager to learn, while others wish they could disappear, and are harmed, perhaps because their parents or they themselves use. The possibility for such different takes can only be explained by, and underscores the relevance of the notion that we see in ideas.

A single word or subject can be loaded with entire worlds of meaning with surprising, interminable associations. All facts reflect the limits of shared meaning and comprehension. Unfortunately, we too often conflate the absolute ideals that may inspire or give meaning to our thoughts with our actual comprehension that is often symbolic, incomplete, or otherwise enframing. There is nothing wrong with this aspect of human experience. We are fallible. If only for survival, having some working understanding of things is better than none.

Heidegger would accept that humans are disposed to forge some understanding that stands in for a complete understanding of everything. As the truth is contemplated and uncovered, it permeates the local culture and settings, and essences forth, into an appearing that is recognizable and communicable to local others. It effervesces through the multifarious fabric of culture borne in a given landscape and time, thereby informing future experience concerning, not in the least, the formation of opinions about authenticity, truth, and education. Unfortunately, what remains perennially unclear is the appropriateness of a given narration, especially given that objectionable accounts can become larger than life as groups defend and propagate them. One group's account of 'the authentic' can differ and even clash with that of another. Enthusiastic rhetoric establishes superficial, convenient, manipulative relation to language—a jargon—that channels the essencing of truth along cryptic lines. Some forms of discourse enshrine authenticity, thereby quashing it, whereas others are open to fresh discoveries of the authentic.

We can detect a phenomenon, and cognize it, as long as we already have a mental capacity to
do so. Is this not the purpose of a word: to symbolically represent an idea or an idea of a thing? Our working with language cannot be avoided or criticized really, is involving our sometimes clumsy grappling with the world, which can provide very challenging circumstances. However, perhaps our manipulation of ideas introduces a vulnerability in the human race. Many times language has been employed to sway opinion as well as to directly mislead or harm humans. At its worst, genocide has been justified by calling smaller groups impure or "rats" by propaganda. As a North American, I am bombarded by a more multifarious cousin of propaganda, and that is jargon. A too-casual, partially-misleading, and over-charged or -hyped use of language could be taken as a jargon. Jargonistic speech can be found in sports, beauty-products, advertising, politics, religion, and even self-promotion. Plato even speaks of the "rewards and praise and prizes for the person who was quickest at identifying the passing shapes" (222; sec. 516c). Nobody is ever surprised by the jargon, but finds enthusiasm and meaning in the swing of it, and with others, of course. As Frankfurt School philosopher, Theodor Adorno, author of The Jargon of Authenticity, explains, "The jargon, which is not responsible to any reason, urges people higher simply through its simultaneously standardized tone" (66).

1 The Jargon of Authenticity

1.1 Concealing Ignorance and Manipulating Others Through Jargon

From the premise that 'we see in ideas' can be drawn two quick conclusions: (1) we relate to others and to the world through our ideas, and (2) we should hope that there is something preventing us from becoming bound by, or falling sway to, false ideas, as if living a nightmare. The thought is terrible, which is all the more reason to seek (if not project) a sense of not being at risk of living a lie. One would seek safeguards against entertaining such dread, which would be more or less common across the world. I would surmise that some people prefer to see the world as discrete, actual, and either definable or explainable, precisely to abort the tempting flirt with inauthenticity that 'we/ I could be wrong!' I believe that this existential dread motivates, to a considerable extent, enthusiasm in self-gratifying, self-inflating jargon. And why should it be otherwise? One can commiserate all-too-well as
follows: 'everybody tells a little lie now and again;' 'maybe we are just keeping up appearances—it's more than we can live up to anyway,' and; 'besides, this way of seeing and doing things is good and just!' The jargon is all the more appealing in that it turns away no one, as long as the standard tone of the jargon is preserved and left elevated above precise analysis. Before going further in Adorno's study of jargon, I would identify a concise aspect of day-to-day language that is jargonistic in kind. Through our language we name things, giving a symbolic label to the idea (i.e. a word), so that it can be shared and communicated. People typically do not consider that, in the use of language, they engender meanings rather than merely report them. But having said that, it is common to lie about, manipulate, or bend the truth precisely so that we can create a meaning that does not fit all the facts. In some instances, we are hoping that others are seeing according to our ideas. Indeed, we sometimes exploit our capacity to see in ideas, for example, when we keep up appearances to avoid attention, or when we change our priorities.

We typically omit any sense of the construction of our ideas (our words and word-associations), but as if part of a neurosis, on the one hand we take our use of language as matter-of-fact, whereas on the other hand we consciously (and unconsciously) manipulate others by our language! We generally do not see that we make (and ask for) simplifications, assumptions, and presumptions regarding the words we use and their related meanings and ideas. As John Russon, author of Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life, explains:

It is our reliance on this false prejudice [that the world is static and complete] that keeps us from noticing that language actually does something: it does not just report information about a situation, but actually engenders the figuring of the human situation. Language is not a neutral "descriptive" overlaying of an already established human reality, but is the very performance or creation of that reality. (114)

Granted, life often carries on only through a consuming, daily struggle, so we find rest and convenience in certain courtesies that allow for a gloss to suffice. It could be said that we manipulate others, albeit in a courteous, socially acceptable manner when we say "Hi, how are you—oh, I'm not too bad." Nevertheless, a certainly responsibility toward language would be warranted.

Russon explains the two main kinds of language. One is spontaneous and the other is not. In
the former, we use language to communicate with others to learn information, entering into active, dynamic, spontaneous engagement with the other, for which the outcome is not known beforehand. In the latter, the outcome of the speech or conversation is anticipated and even driven toward manipulatively. This deliberate mode of speech can serve to either convey precise information that we want understood as intended, but it can also serve to generate a forced impression upon the other. In this vein, some people repeat stories for the sake of stirring feelings, revisiting memories, or even just having something to talk about with a known and safe ending. In the course of a good ol' story, one need not think, but may savour the nostalgia. Having time to bond with others in such a way can be spontaneous, reassuring, and valuable, but this nevertheless operates through the manipulation of the others. Perhaps in this way, stories that were strange have become familiar to our ears, and find meaning and depth in our group consciousness.

What carries weight, in language, in not merely the precise meaning of words, but the power that comes with weaving through and picking up on the multiple frequencies or layers of discourse, that are inherent within language. As such, we use language to manipulate others; it even represents a stage in the maturity of one's use of language. Even children learn very early to portray an informed style of speaking though they do not know what they say, even stringing together a jumble of words, but with a confident gaze. The problem with this level of communication is that it is invariably manipulative—spoken not to engage the interlocutor and to perhaps arrive at a new thought—driven to a specific end, such as the galvanization of already-established opinion. Granted, there are times when it is appropriate to 'keep up appearances,' but an over-reliance on vigorous jargon certainly numbs our sensibility toward personal integrity and authenticity. Jargon is talk for the sake of talk; to be a voice in a loud crowd that shouts the same, proudly, loudly, rejecting any burden of learning to understand the position, relevance, or authenticity of the other. Russon exposes the unheralded transitions from speaking to inform to speaking to indoctrinate and dominate through jargon. He writes of a fictional woman:

This woman is not ignorant of the "doing" character of speaking; on the contrary, she is very much using her language in an effort to induce an effect in her listeners. But hers, note, is not the stance of one who is engaged, but rather of one who looks on and manipulates. She is not engaged with her interlocutors, but is rather trying to do
something to them. This is a defensive flight from engagement into domination.
(Russon 115)

To be fair, I would note that the same could apply to any politician, who is expected to subscribe to a certain world view with its related rhetoric. But it is important to be aware of, given the scale of jargon that is possible. Adorno explains the scope of manipulative jargon involved when one takes liberties:

[to] use whatever cultural stuffing offers itself to him. And that is the jargon. This shelters him from the disagreeable task of expressing himself seriously on the matter at hand, about which he knows nothing. At the same time perhaps he can thus feign general acquaintance with the subject. The jargon is so appropriate for that because, by its very nature, it always unites the appearance of an absent concreteness with the ennobling of that concreteness. (66)

As Adorno explains, in carrying on, a jargon dismisses the need for a thorough understanding of the subject at hand, and it dismisses what is beyond the scope of the level of investigation, or lack thereof, that is implied. A jargon creates an appearance of "concreteness" despite the lack thereof.

Part of the reason why the jargon works is that, on top of its power to dismiss depth, we already lack general acquaintance with the etymological richness in the language we use. Heidegger understood the broad and ancient roots that extend into discourse today:

It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language's own nature. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages around the earth an unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man. (Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" 146)

For as long as we believe that the language we use is providing a necessarily correct and complete explanation or description of a phenomenon, we fall into a trap with a singular, narrow view that forsakes other views. By adopting a level of discourse, we subscribe ourselves to the superficial, the pseudo-intellectual, each with its own blind spots. Instead, I would entertain the possibility that part of the human condition is that we cannot see all, or we cannot see all that we think we see. Rather, we use ideas to go beyond what we cannot see, providing a 'working construct' from which to progress. Like Plato's cave dwellers, we see less than we have capacity to think. On second thought, a grander comparison would be more appropriate, in that we see with tremendous clarity already, but our capacity to understand what we are seeing, to theorize, to predict, and to believe, is great, perhaps more
like faithful, unschooled peasants. Socrates would be the first to say that it is better to be aware of our inherent limitation than to continue to see less and to assume that one is seeing all.

Having now introduced the concept of jargon as one conduit of the widespread ideological manipulation of communities and groups, and even between individuals keeping up appearances, I should admit to one of the main purposes of Adorno's book, which was intended to criticize Heidegger in particular.

1.2 Giving Voice to Adorno's Criticism

1.2.1 Contra Heidegger

Thus far, I have used Theodor Adorno, author of *The Jargon of Authenticity*, to 'string out' those prestidigitators who switch informed opinion with made-to-order jargon. However, without further ado, I should note that one of the principle purveyors of jargon that he wished to criticize was none other than Heidegger, especially with reference to his principle book—the primary source of this essay—*Being and Time*. He argues that Heidegger's philosophy does not relate to the world; instead, it busies itself with an imagined area of concern. One could attempt to dodge Adorno's criticism by arguing, as mentioned in the Introduction, that Heidegger's language is extremely difficult to follow and criticize. As McGrath explains:

> Heidegger's idiosyncratic language makes it difficult if not impossible to critique him from within his system of thinking because he deprives us of the terms necessary to challenge him. The language Heidegger requires us to speak is a language that endorses his view of things. (3)

I would agree that one cannot escape the grasp of Heidegger's assertion that, whatever happens or is thought or felt, there is a human Dasein in back of it. At some point, arguments against Heidegger's other plain narratives of metaphysics, ontotheology, enframing, and the essencing of truth cannot be levelled, without sounding ungrounded. Nevertheless, Adorno attacks Heidegger's philosophy as one that institutes itself without any relevance whatsoever. He notes how any philosophical argument can easily distinguish between what is thought and what actually occurs, inserting its own interpretations and explanations of why discrepancies exist and how things ought to be, thereby producing its own 'chatter' and jargon. Adorno believes that Heidegger hides this emptiness behind his own jargons about Being / being and
authenticity. He comments on the "concept of being" in particular:

Philosophical language transcends dialectically in that the contradiction between truth and thought becomes self-conscious and thus overcomes itself. The jargon takes over this transcendence destructively and consigns it to its own chatter. … When it dresses empirical words with aura, it exaggerates general concepts and ideas of philosophy—as for instance the concept of being—so grossly that their conceptual essence, the mediation through the thinking-subject, disappears completely under the varnish. These terms lure us on as if they were the most concrete terms. Transcendence and concretion scintillate. Ambiguity is the medium of an attitude toward language which is damned by its favorite philosophy. (8-9)

Adorno reduces Heidegger's 'jargon of authenticity' to its 'ambiguity,' which I defended earlier. Indeed, the key to any harmful jargon is ambiguity. It would make sense that a jargon would be difficult if not impossible to critique externally. It will provide its own self-fulfilling prophecy, blind to other interpretations. Nevertheless, Adorno presses on with his deconstruction of authenticity as an empty container-concept.

1.2.2 Contra Authenticity as a Meaningful Subject

Adorno points out that "'authenticity' names no authentic thing as a specific characteristic." Instead, "the word would receive its meaning from the quality which it is a predicate of" (102). I have elaborated on this general, casual, unattached sense of authenticity, which Heidegger understands as 'inauthentic lostness in the They.' This concept should not seem strange, given that so much of today's tongue-in-cheek advertising blatantly play on the emptiness of certain phrases, such as "the very best," or "Coke is it!" What does "it" not refer to here? Many brands portray authenticity, in its various veils—sports fanatic, cow boy, actress/ model—without grasping authenticity. Instead, they allow the consumers to generate the impression from themselves. Continuing his critique, Adorno argues that Heidegger tempts us, in similar manner, to believe, falsely, that the topic of authenticity should be of concern. He explains:

The category of authenticity, which was at first introduced for a descriptive purpose, and which flowed from the relatively innocent question about what is authentic in something, now turns into a mythically imposed fate. (104)

Like asking your guests if they are comfortable repeatedly, until they are no longer comfortable, Adorno would call Heidegger's invocation and examination of our own possible authenticity as presumptuous, invasive, and harmful. Adorno explains:
Authenticity is supposed to calm the consciousness of weakness, but it also resembles it. By it the living subject is robbed of all definition, in the same way as it loses its attributes in reality. However, what is done to men by the world becomes the ontological possibility of the inauthenticity of men. From that point it is only a step to the usual criticism of culture, which self-righteously picks on shallowness, superficiality, and the growth of mass culture. (100)

According to Adorno, a philosophy of authenticity cannot but institute the uncontrolled measuring of everything that falls in the purview of authenticity, leading before long to criticisms of culture and norms. Certainly, this would bring out the problem of relativism. However, I do not believe that Heidegger's philosophy calls for a spree of authenticity assessments.

Granted, the historical Heidegger did want to see dramatic changes in German education, but I do not feel that the core of his philosophy necessarily estranges or destroys culture, or tradition, for example. Recall, Heidegger's high assessment of the import of one's heritage. In my limited reading, Heidegger does not call for the uprooting of culture. For this reason, feminist theorists, including Patricia J. Huntington, criticize Heidegger's "overly confining philosophical treatment of ontology in abstraction from social theory." Nevertheless, I return to my point: Heidegger's phenomenological and ontological analysis welcomes fundamentalists and progressives alike to be open (if vulnerable) to the possibility of renewed authenticity. This capacity for broad applicability (and appeal) is what allows some feminist theorists to use Heidegger. Huntington acknowledges Heidegger's value:

I extract his fundamental ontological insight—that all entities, human and nonhuman, are autodisclosive. ... Following Marcuse and Irigaray, I show that this fundamental Heideggerian insight can offer the basis for a social ontology that is nonessentialist. (xvi)

I believe Heidegger knew that finding truth in or through authenticity is more of a dance, or an intersubjective play, than an exhaustive exercise that arrives at finality. This is why his philosophy offers use to institutions as they are, assuming its members are alive to the possibility of new authenticity and being. For these reasons, in my opinion, Adorno's portrayal of Heidegger's 'jargon of authenticity' overlooks its actual content, which provides a useful sense of authenticity in the face of human Dasein, which might call for other possible experiences and discourses.
Heidegger associates conscience with authenticity. Authenticity is not a mere empty container, but a vessel of import because it responds to human conscience. That is, the role of conscience is to awaken or alert the individual to authentic action that is reasonable and responsible for a given need.

Heidegger answers these questions by introducing the notion of conscience. Conscience is experienced as a 'call' or 'voice', and what it calls us to we are bound to regard as both feasible and required of us. In this sense, conscience is not a moral authority—God's, our parents' or society's—which we have internalized and which pricks us when we fail to toe the line. Indeed, it 'gives no information... has nothing to tell' about the things we ought or ought not to do. Rather, conscience summons Dasein's self from its lostness in the They.' (Cooper 46; Heidegger, Being and Time 253; § 274-75, sec. 57)

Conscience summons us to react to what threatens to impose upon one's personal integrity or perspective. Rather than conform to the They without reflection, conscience preserves individual human agency, and holds, for the individual, the possibility of greater authenticity through greater integration of one's relation to others and to culture. Authenticity has meaning in as far as reflections upon conscience are in accord.

It would seem that Heidegger's inclusion of conscience offers the significance of authenticity to human life. Still, though, one might doubt whether there is any purpose to forging individualistic authenticity. One could well ask:

Might it not be 'fantastical' to suppose that Dasein could really recover from 'its lostness in the They'? And, second, even if the possibility is a real one, is it one that is genuinely 'demanded' of us? Why should we not regard the attempt to 'be authentic' as a misguided and pathetic one which can only alienate a person from the one thing capable of giving to life some solidity and sense—namely, 'tranquil' immersion in the established ways of one's community? Such, after all, would have been the view in many cultures prior to our more 'individualist' era. (Cooper 46; Heidegger, Being and Time 253; § 274-75, sec. 57)

Indeed, what could be wrong with taking on traditional roles that have survived the test of time? Is individualist authenticity a symptom of our civilization's youth? What is the significance of conscience and authenticity? Fortunately, in response, Heidegger offers greater clarity to the significance of authenticity, especially in relation to 'what is demanded of us.' Heidegger calls for a 'resoluteness' in accord with 'conscience' that is responsible to shared narrations. Well established notions of authenticity, as well as rites of passage that can instil authentic experience, cannot justify themselves simply because they have sway.
Otherwise, going through the motions of 'authenticity,' and taking up the chatter would suffice. Heidegger's philosophy of authenticity offers direction that is purposeful, pedagogical, and resistant to unhindered jargon.

1.3 Resisting Jargon through Heritage, Conscience, and Authentic Action

Heidegger identifies conscience as that part of us which can be on the look-out for ideas and behaviours that are questionable in relation to personal values and interests. Conscience hovers over authenticity, like a watchdog. To provide the scope of this idea—that conscience in a sense throttles authenticity—I would once again return our attention to Heidegger's thought on Dasein. Specifically, I resume the earlier study of Dasein's struggle in life and its relation to death:

Combining his discussion of Angst, 'anticipation' of death and conscience, Heidegger arrives at his final gloss on authenticity: it is 'anticipatory resoluteness'. This is the existence intimated by angst and demanded by the call of conscience: only in anticipatory resoluteness is Dasein's potentiality for its ownmost possibility... struck wholly into the conscience.' (Cooper 47; Heidegger, Being and Time 283; § 307, sec. 62)

According to Heidegger, to respond to the appeal of conscience is for Dasein to claim the world its own by taking on an alert stance of "anticipatory resoluteness." In this way, conscience plugs in to survival and the possibility of prosperity, fully aware of the limit that is death. One anticipates life in the face of death, rather than merely anticipate and eventuate death. Going further, Heidegger gives considerable clarity to the otherwise vague object of anticipatory resoluteness.

Heidegger spoke of Dasein as not just facing toward death, but toward birth. The scope of birth and death enfolds the indefinite scope of human history and life, past, present, and future. What Heidegger highlights is the importance of one's reflection on that broad scope of birth and death in relation to his or her own life and eventual death. I suppose it would be a matter of fancy, whimsy, or wisdom to consider 'how far down the root' one wishes to reflect upon. For example, at any given moment, I could view my life and death in relation to: my neighbourhood, my peers, my age group, my ethnic background and group(s), my legal status, my impact on the planet, my presence in relation to the universe or to God. One must
somehow forge authenticity, through anticipatory resolution, in one's complicated life and in relation to the scope of birth and death relevant to one's Dasein.

Beginning with explaining his sense of the significance of birth, Heidegger then elaborates on the role of one's local heritage (i.e. also Vandenberg's landscape):

By 'birth', Heidegger does not mean birth, any more than by 'death' he meant death. As 'death' referred to our Being-towards-death, so 'birth' refers to our 'Being-towards-the-beginning'. This 'beginning' is what he calls 'heritage', that which has been 'handed down' to us as historically located creatures. ... Far from our heritage dictating the shape of everyday, inauthentic existence, it is precisely 'in terms of the heritage... that resoluteness... takes over' that the possibilities of authentic existence are 'disclosed'. In properly taking over our heritage, we 'snatch' ourselves back from the 'comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly' of the They. (Cooper 48-49; Heidegger, Being and Time 435; trans. Macquarrie, sec. 74)

In related passages, Cooper conveys Heidegger's argument that the tendency of the anonymous masses, at least in the West, referred to as the They, is to dismiss heritage, to call it old hat and trivial, to over-familiarize with the mundane, superficial, preconceived mutterings. For this reason, more than ordinary effort is required to again stand as an individual looking out with fresh eyes, to see if we are allowing ourselves to see the being of others and of things. Understanding our heritage is key to positioning ourselves within a broader scale of time, rather than the immediate world and narration one has stumbled or been thrown in to. Taking an interest in one's heritage is to resolve to erect oneself within it, rather than merely be a bystander of it.

Only in the light of a heritage, Heidegger argues, are our horizons widened so that we can enjoy a 'clear vision' of the Situation in which we are placed and hence authentically respond to it. ... The authentic person, then, is one who, determined to make of his life an integrated whole, is able to understand and properly respond to the Situation he is in by bringing to bear upon it the lessons of tradition. (Cooper 49-50).

Indeed, to show disdain for the exploration of history is to arrogantly elevate one's estimation of oneself, as if others have not faced similar challenges in life and its dramas. With reference to the scope of life in relation to one's birth / heritage and death, "only a person whose life is a 'whole' through integrating its outer 'limits' lives authentically" (Cooper 42). The 'integration' that Cooper calls for would, no doubt, require ongoing effort, likely for the entirety of one's productive life, as one discovers the intimacy and detail of the essencing of truth in our lives.
Fortunately, today's civilizations have benefited from the wisdom and insight demonstrated through the actions and achievements of various geniuses and servants of humanity. Education in the West, then, must preserve and advance studies of the humanities, which include history, linguistics, drama, and philosophy. The history of ideas is the history of the essencing of truth. As such, we are the inheritors of uncertain trends of thinking that are historically based. Chapter 2 indicated that one aspect of our ontotheological heritage that we should be aware of and counteract is our tendency toward and fascination with technological world-enframing. This deviation, if it can be called that, can be traced back to the Plato's exposé, in his cave allegory, of the danger of denying the existence of phenomenology. That is, by denying that truth essences, one consigns oneself to a rigid view of truth as correctness, to the exclusion of truth as it is experienced and understood phenomenally, in its essencing. Omitting Plato's lesson results in what amounts to a perpetuity of ancient ignorance, full of jargon ready to negate criticism.

2 Layers of Truth

2.1 The Superficial, Technological Conception of Truth as Correctness

Heidegger distinguishes between the concept of truth as 'correctness', which is immediate and measurable, and truth as 'unhiddenness' (aletheia) which underscores the appearing of truth as a coming-out-of-hiddenness. Heidegger placed greater attention to this nuanced awareness of truth later in his career, in the 1930s, especially in *The Essence of Truth*. In review of the common 'correctness-view' of truth, Heidegger asks rhetorically:

> What is truth as such and in general? … Truth is *correspondence*. Such correspondence obtains because the proposition is directed to the facts and states of affairs *about which* it says something. Truth is *correctness*. So truth is *correspondence, grounded in correctness, between a proposition and thing*. (1)

Truth, then, should be a matter of propositions, used in accord with reason and the precise rules of logic. Truth as correctness and correspondence is problematic. What values inform the reason that is applied in various cultural settings? Similarly, the rules of logic may be simple and universal in form, but when they apply and to what extent is likewise subject to tremendous variation historically and globally. Heidegger summarizes the point:
Since everything is discussed in a groundless and formal way, we obtain nothing at all intelligible with the concept of truth as correspondence. What presents itself as self-evident is utterly obscure. (Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth* 2)

For these reasons, only an awareness of truth as unhiddenness can account for the full strength of conviction put into the many ways of life and world views in existence historically and today. What is doubtful is why this view of truth is not more widespread, given that it has been part of the Western canon for millennia.

### 2.2 The Unhidden

Though he may be most well known for it, Plato was not the only philosopher to distinguished between truth as correctness vis a vis truth as unhiddenness. Various other pre-Socratic philosophers, perhaps most notably Heraclitus, have as well. Having said that, this distinction may be as old as the Greek language itself. If we were to translate the English word 'truth' in to Greek, and then back in to English, we might not arrive back at 'truth.'

Heidegger recovers a key word in the lexicon of Western philosophy:

> The Greek word for truth – one can hardly remind oneself of this too often – is ἀλήθεια [aletheia], *unhiddenness*. Something true is ἀληθές, unhidden. (*The Essence of Truth* 7)

The notion of truth as unhiddenness is built in to the Greek word for truth, which encodes the act of witnessing the essencing of truth, as it is 'unhidden' before the observer. Heidegger elaborates:

> Truth as unhiddenness and truth as correctness are quite different things; they arise from quite different fundamental experiences and cannot at all be equated. … Precisely 'correctness' is necessary, but simultaneously in the possibility of *derailing* and free-floating. (*The Essence of Truth* 7-8)

Indeed, many things will appear correct, given that certain related conditions are met to the one to whom a truth is ascertained. In contrast, a truth that is prescribed and defended compromises the integrity of the other's Dasein, and "one calls upon a half-measure, which does not become full by everyone going along with it" (*The Essence of Truth* 26-27). A socially sanctioned notion of truth as correctness institutes a partial blinding and silencing upon everyone, akin to the chained heads in Plato's allegory. Western society, especially in as far as it seeks to practice multicultural pluralism, would do well to increasingly sanction an understanding of truth as unhiddenness. Then, perhaps, if we heed Plato's distinction, we may exemplify his somewhat enigmatic assurance: Whoever is turned towards the more beingful
beings, sees and talks more correctly.' (26-27).

2.2.1 Truth as Correctness vs. Truth as Unhiddenness and Correctness

Any assessment of the truth and authenticity in an individual or any given phenomenon will include truth as correctness (regarding various 'plain' phenomena) as well as truth as unhiddenness (regarding more complex social issues, for example). However, as Heidegger points out, in the repeating of any story, the tendency is toward concreteness and correctness, probably the more the distance increases from an origin.

The subsequent tradition will develop only the orthotic understanding of truth at the expense of the alêtheiac. In so doing, we lose "the original essence of truth," the manifestation of beings themselves, and come to understand truth solely as a feature of our own representational capacities. (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education" 135)

Potential end results would include: over-beaureaucritization, frenzied consumption, extremist orthodoxies, technologization, and state cults. All these result in "allowing "education" to be absorbed by enframing" (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education" 135). Instead, by remaining open to the realization of multiple essence-ings of truth, with multiple experiences unhiddenness, we stand to learn and appreciate more. In this spirit, Heidegger muses:

The only one who knows is the one who understands that he must always learn again, and who above all, on the basis of this understanding, has brought himself to the point where he continually can learn. (Metaphysics 23)

Heidegger would have us instil a disposition toward education that is open-ended, as part of the ongoing journey of life.

2.3 We Only Ever See with Ideas, We Endow

The variation in essences of truth is possible simply because we 'see' and cognize the world through our ideas. We do not see things in themselves, as if from an absolute and necessary perspective that is indifferent to human perception. Rather, "we never see beings with our bodily eyes unless we are also seeing 'ideas.'" (Heidegger, "The Essence of Truth" 39). As easily as we can change our opinions about things, we can change what we see according to the idea that we hold upon our attention.

When we so naturally say 'we see the book', we use 'see' in a meaning that is quite obvious and normal, and about which we become suspicious only when someone
makes us pay closer attention. The latter is precisely what Plato did with his discovery of the so-called 'ideas'. This discovery was not some far-flung speculation on the part of Plato, but relates to what everyone sees and grasps in comportment to beings. Plato just pointed this out with previously unknown power and assurance. For what we see there, a 'book', is clearly something different to 'black', 'hard', 'soft', etc. What is sighted in this seeing is the ἰδέα, the εἰδος. 'Idea' is therefore the look of something as something. It is through these looks that individual things present themselves as this and that, as being-present. (Heidegger, The Essence of Truth 38)

As our ideas change so too does our perception, and as our Dasein changes so too does that of others. Acknowledging that we see in ideas allows for a closer attendance to the being of one another while also freeing up a space for new ideas, new discourses, and new avenues and openings to authentic education.

Ontological education would seek to instil an awareness of the pre-phenomenal, pre-linguistic, embodied being of things and of others that our subsequent naming conventions position and shape. Plato's allegory provides an entire pedagogy for breaching and exploring ontological education. In the various stages of the allegory, the cave dweller acclimatizes to the being of beings according to each world view: that it can be enframed, that it can be manipulated, that we give the light to our ideas, and that one ought to endeavour to free the enslaved. Now, under the aegis of ontological education, we may explore the cave allegory in greater depth. The cave allegory is a most excellent tool for outlining the why, what, and how of ontological education.

3 Philosophy-Informed Education is Ontological Education

3.1 The Why of Ontological Education

One of the benefits of acknowledging that we see in ideas of our making, rather than that we see verily, is that it allows for the fact that our understandings, or associations of ideas, are incomplete. No matter what the theory, it cannot predict or explain all phenomena within its purview, recalling again that which "always partially defies conceptualization, lingering behind as an extraconceptual phenomenological excess" (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education" 148; endnote 47).

Ontological education seeks not only to bring our attention to the fact that we see in ideas,
but it would instil in us a freedom to actively participate in the raising up of the world.

For a world-disclosing being to cultivate its essence, then, is for it to recognize and
develop this essence, not only acknowledging its participation in the creation and
maintenance of an intelligible world, but actively embracing its ontological role in
such world disclosure. (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education" 141)

According to Heidegger, our essence is to be the agent that actively participates in the
essencing of truth, 'embracing an ontological role' as caretaker—recall that one of Dasein's
primary stances to itself and to the external world is one of care.

3.2 The What of Ontological Education

What ontological education calls for is an awareness of the phenomenology of the
appearance of truth. Truth as unhiddenness can include truth as correctness, whereas truth as
correctness does not involve the unhidden, since it is already established as unhidden. As
Cooper explains:

In order for any process to count as a genuinely educative one, it must be self-
consciously concerned with reflection on the nature of truth in Heidegger’s favoured,
primordial sense. (Cooper, "Truth, Science, Thinking, and Distress" 51)

With this standpoint in place, we may approach (if unto infinity) the goal of ontological
education, which is to better acclimatize individuals to living toward their birth (cultural
heritage) and death. In this way, "Heidegger seeks to educate his students against their
preexisting ontotheological education" (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education"
137). Then an increment of freedom emerges as one steps back from his or her thought
patterns, and be open to receive and dwell along side the being of others and of things.

Ontological freedom is achieved when entities show themselves in their full
phenomenological richness. The goal of … ontological education, then, is to teach
students to "dwell," to help attune them to the being of entities, and thus to teach them
to see that the being of an entity—be it a book, cup, rose, or, to use a particularly
salient example, they themselves—cannot be fully understood in the ontologically
reductive terms of enframing. (Thomson, "Heidegger on Ontological Education"
138)

What ontological education offers is the grace to go on in life without missing a false sense
of security in having a 'complete,' 'necessary,' or 'inherently true' view of personal or shared
phenomena. No doubt, many people are not bothered by such philosophical problems, at least
not directly. I believe that there would be greater opportunities for peace, dialogue, exchange,
and learning when there is a reckoning with Heidegger's lesson on ontology and Plato's
3.2.1 Paideia and The Study of History, Culture, and Civilization

In the course of The Republic, Plato affirms the value of study and culture. Paideia, as a concept, could perhaps be related to our sense of the humanities. Thomson explains:

A deeply resonant Greek word, paideia can mean "civilization, culture, development, tradition, literature, or education"; thus it encompasses what to our ears seems to be a rather wide range of semantic frequencies. (Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology 155)

Heidegger recognized the multifarious value of Plato's emphasis of Paideia.

Thus, when he seeks to recover the ontological core of Platonic paideia, his intent is not only to trace the technologization of education back to an ontological ambiguity already inherent in Plato's founding pedagogical vision, thereby demonstrating the historical contingency of these disturbing educational trends and so loosening their grip on us. More importantly, he also means to show how forgotten aspects of the original Platonic notion of paideia remain capable of inspiring heretofore unthought possibilities for the future of education. (Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology 142)

Paideia, then, cannot but acknowledge the different revealings or essencings of truth; therefore, it lends itself to aletheia, truth as unhiddenness. To the people chained in the cave, Paideia would weigh most on their issues of 'freedom,' and 'discourse,' given their apparently limited sense of culture, development, and education. In the context of the allegory:

Paideia means turning around the whole human being. It means removing human beings from the region where they first encounter things and transferring and accustoming them to another realm where beings appear. (Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine" 167)

Therefore, the learning and appreciation of Paideia cannot be a mere matter of collecting facts, but of effectively giving oneself over to its implications on (the being of) oneself and others.

3.3 The How of Ontological Education

Plato alludes to a pedagogy for exploring ontological education, reflecting on the dwelling stages within the cave allegory. Thomson notes:

For Heidegger, this well-known scenario suggests the precise pedagogy of ontological education. On his interpretation, the prisoner's "four different dwelling places" suggest the four successive stages whereby ontological education breaks
students' bondage to the technological mode of revealing, freeing them to understand
the being of what-is differently. (Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology 162)

How ontological education is pursued or practised would need to remain sensitive to the
'dwelling stage' at which a given pupil may be able to understand or perceive. Furthermore,
an 'ontological education instructor' would need to remain humble, given the facility with
which he or she might gravitate toward a lower way of being. Fortunately, the lesson of
Plato's allegory, that we participate in the essencing of truth, can be advanced in manifold
ways. Furthermore, Plato describes in considerable detail the amount of investment one must
make in ontological education. Thus far I have asserted the value of making even small steps
as part of incremental change. This is not to say that we should be able to concede small
bargaining chips, but that it is okay, and perhaps strategic, to find small, agreeable ways to
change but in light of the remembrance of our co-creative capacity as beings.

Plato insists that individuals cannot dabble in ontological education. We cannot acclimatize
to being before the being of others piecemeal. Socrates makes this clear to Glaucon:

Education, then, ... would be the art of directing this instrument [the human], of
finding the easiest and most effective way of turning it round. Not the art of putting
power of sight into it, but the art which assumes it possesses this power. (224; sec.
518d)

Once enfranchised with this 'power of assumption and of sight', Plato indicates that it must be
engaged fully, or not at all. As individuals we can access the ability to turn away from our
patterns of recognition, and return to perceive anew, by "turning the whole body. The entire
soul has to turn with it, away from what is coming to be, until it is able to bear the sight of
what is, and in particular the brightest part of it" (224; sec. 518c). What is important is that
students learn to disengage and reengage their capacity to weave discourse and personal life
with a bearing on authenticity. The end result may be a marginally incremental change, or a
more drastic one, but as long as the entire 'person' is able to turn around periodically, then a
locus point of the essencing of truth becomes less burdened, and more free to pursue
authenticity.

3.3.1 Poeisis and Poetry as Opening to Being

Poetry may offer the most accessible and profound exploration of ontological education.
Poetry has the capacity to move one's being deeply, transcending the flatness inherent in
normal language. "For Heidegger an authentic poetic life is characterized by a receptivity of and an obedience to the appeal posed to us by being" (Smeyers, "The Threat" 2). In our receptivity to poetry, and in how it can impact us so deeply, we reconnect with the action of naming and of calling out from a place (as Dasein). The loose meanings that float through poetry put us face to face with the essencing of truth through our ideas, and we contact the mystery of human life, even in the depths of oppression and alienation.

This is the problem with modern technology’s *Enframed* efficiency—there is no mystery, nothing sacred, and, therefore, man cannot dwell there. It is the sense of the sacred that is required, not the destruction wrought under modern technology. Yet, we do not see this, because *Enframing* blocks *poiesis* as an alternative understanding of Being; *poiesis* as an ontology admits to alternatives, *Enframing* does not. *Poiesis* allows for humans as equipment but also allows for much more—including the idea that life is ultimately a mystery. ... Because of its incapacity to allow other views, *Enframing* is a first order of understanding whereas *Poiesis* (because it can) is a second order of understanding and conceptually a more powerful one precisely because of it. (Fitzsimons 187)

Heidegger's warnings against over-infatuation with technology and enframing concern the increasingly rigid and instrumental use of language. As Standish explains:

> The degeneration he associates with technology is then progressively understood as tied essentially to language, while the possibility of a resistance to technology’s totalizing effects is seen especially in the nature of the poetic itself. (Standish 155)

Because of the intimacy of poetry, and the plain awareness that different people hearing the same poem at the same time will experience its truth differently, poetry provides and immediate, authentic reconnection with our 'ontological role.' Heidegger believed that "an essential superiority of the spirit holds sway in poetry" (*Metaphysics* 28).

4 Concluding Remarks

4.1 Dwelling as a Way of Being Toward Others on Earth

Jürgen Habermas criticized Heidegger for emphasizing a sense of man as the neighbour of being rather than of man. He is calling Heidegger's emphasis on being as too impersonal and liberal. On the contrary, a stance of 'dwelling that is sparing and preserving' (i.e. that of care), strikes me as a most human and compassionate stance. A certain stance of disinterestedness or of unconditionality would most preserve the being of the other.
To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. *The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving* (Heidegger, "Poetry, Language, Thought" 149).

To indicate the depth of the connections among being, dwelling, and caring, Heidegger examines the etymology of the word 'being' itself. The German word 'being,' 'bauen,' which even sounds similar to the English, also means to dwell in the sense of dwelling on Earth and caring for and preserving it (Heidegger, "Poetry, Language, Thought" 147). Our being here is to dwell on and care for the earth. Sanskrit, too, has a similar root that signifies both being and the Earth. We can see and restore a 'declining society' through the pursuit of Paideia in education, and the exploration of poeisis to experience language that does not enframe, all of which promote Heidegger's value of dwelling in the world.

4.2 A Human Is a Place of Being

Waxing profound, one might ask, 'what more sensitive and refined vehicle can there be than the human being, throughout the universe, to experience and know being? Who else appreciates the struggle between the epic proportions unto God and the utterly mundane minutia of human life?' I concede, man and woman are like gods, but so much like a helpless fools. Similar to the impersonal march of 'the end of metaphysics,' or our hapless descending into technologization, in many ways it seems the world happens to people, tossing them about. This cannot be denied. Yet at the same time, humankind is the measure of the great and of the small.

Man is truly the "place" of Being, and what corresponds to authenticity is the hope that he will take the step back out of metaphysics and allow Being to be in a new way undistorted and uncovered by the layers of metaphysical thinking. (Stambaugh 22)

The understanding of Being belongs to Dasein (Heidegger, *Metaphysics* 31). Even in the vastness of the universe, one thing we can say for certain is that, at least in this corner of our galaxy, the physical matter that *Is* has resulted in—or borne itself into—us on Earth as aware of Being. And we must always be willing to surrender to the void of un-knowing, which is to let a phenomenon remain hidden. We have no claim to holding on to names and labels since,

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down to the core of our being, "we are expressly unable to lay hold to the Being of Beings" (Heidegger, *Metaphysics* 35).

Our purpose as humans is to uphold a Dasein of care for being of others that is responsible to the call from conscience, accepting that our individual experiences of Dasein all bear the same general contours. In as far as we are similar, which is considerable, we all prosper when there is peace. The question of the essence of humankind is not about what we possess but about our relation to others and to Being. "Then there might take place what Heidegger calls "appropriation," the *rapprochement* between man and Being" (Stambaugh 14). In short, our purpose is to always allow for an increasing scope, in one's thoughts and in discourse. According to Heidegger, "becoming free means understanding being … [which] first of all lets beings *as* beings *be*. Whether beings become more beingful or less beingful is therefore up to the freedom of man" (*The Essence of Truth* 45). Along with our inescapable 'ontological role' we can never avoid the choice, to take up our authority and privilege as a member of communicators, or to lay it down.

### 4.3 Disclosing Human Beings in Worlds

Heidegger's assessment of authenticity goes beyond the particulars of appraisals of the authentic and focuses, instead, on an active awareness of and relation to truth-forming, which effectively posits creative participation in the conventions of society, community, and family. An education that would further such a view of authenticity would explore ontological education, that its students might apprehend themselves and one another as beings that exceed definition. To this end, "phenomenology as a project of self-knowledge as self-transcendence is the completed form of education" (Russon 145). Education should nurture and preserve opportunities for students to learn of themselves as they allow themselves to appear and be present in new, and perhaps more original ways. Russon affirms that "our freedom … is not freedom from what determines us, but is the freedom that opens up within this determinacy" (127).

Are schools, cultures, or religions that demand dogmatic adherence inauthentic? Is understanding that we see in ideas really helpful in a world with actual, physical constraints? For both questions, I would note, knowing that truth is constructed and that we see in ideas
allows the individual to choose or own his or her perspective and to be more open or responsive to possible solutions or ameliorations, and to uphold it for others, rather than be enframed, closed to new possibilities. Education can address its essence by remembering truth as unhiddenness, especially in how we relate to the being of others. Ontological education supports student awareness of the variable essencing of ideas and experiences of truth and authenticity. Dreyfus and Baruch Spinosa offer direction through this unusual and perhaps uncertain positioning of ourselves: "The only comprehensiveness we can hope to achieve is our openness to dwelling in many worlds and the capacity to move among them" (Fitzsimons 188). I recognize this capacity, to dwell in different worlds, most developed in elders, who have seen the many sides to life, as well as its commonalities, as well as in cosmopolitan regions. As an individual with multicultural heritages—heritages that are at peace with each other politically and personally—I appreciate the flourishing of authenticity that I have witnessed, as well as the common struggles we share. I also value Heidegger's speculation:

Understanding the most foreign cultures and “synthesizing” them with our own may lead to the thorough and first genuine enlightenment of Da-sein about itself. (Heidegger, Being and Time 166; §178, sec. 38)

Speaking of his project of ontological education in plainly inclusive (i.e. non-racist) terms, Heidegger's philosophy values and serves a world as diverse and full of potential as that which many Western societies experience today and hope for the future. Foremost, we need to remember our capacity to return toward the being of others and of ourselves in more authentic mutual disclosure.
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