REFORM IN TIBET
AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

By

Luo Jia

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Master of Education

Graduate Department of Sociology & Equity Studies in Education

Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

University of Toronto

© Copyright by Luo Jia (2009)
REFORM IN TIBET AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
Master of Education, 2009
Luo Jia
Graduate Department of Sociology & Equity Studies in Education
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education
University of Toronto

Abstract

Reform as a social process is underresearched in the case of Tibet. This study addresses this gap using Social Movement Theory, which sees social change as a complex process involving various Tibetan social groups and external reformers, the Communist Party of China (CPC). This approach was applied by comparing recruitment and mobilization efforts of several key internal and external reform movements in 20th century Tibetan history. Findings include that internal reform failures can be explained by their narrow social and geographic basis and limited mass appeal. Moreover, initial CPC reforms succeeded through recruitment and mobilization across Tibetan regions and social groupings. Subsequent reforms failed due to decreased attention to recruitment and mass mobilization of Tibetans. A major implication of the study is that understanding social reform in today’s Tibet requires a SM Theory approach, which currently is lacking among scholars of the Tibetan question and political representatives of both sides.
Acknowledgements

While finishing this work, I thought it is not enough simply to say thanks because the support of many people are behind this research such as family, professors, helpers, and all the people whose work is related to this work. Here, I would like thank my family first. Thanks to Paul Olson and Peter Sawchuk. I appreciated very much my friend Stephen Bahry’s helps. There are many others I would like to thank: Ronald Silvers, Ruth Hayhoe and Jack Miller.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: Theoretical approaches</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social movement theories</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Opportunity organizations and Threat-Induced contention: Protest</em></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>waves in Authoritarian Settings (2003)</em></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Distinguishing threat from political opportunity</em></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Multi-institutional social movement theory (MISMT)</em></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Applicability of multi-institutional social movement theory</em></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature on Reform and disenfranchisements in Tibet</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>English-language literature</em></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chinese-language literature</em></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tibetan-language literature</em></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: The aim of research and methodology</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>General aim of research</em></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Specific objectives</em></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Research methodology</em></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: Internal reform in Tibet</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting: Tibet before 1949</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fabric of Tibetan society</em></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tribes/Monasteries/Government</em></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical review of social reform in Tibet</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Early social system reform</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>1913s-1949s social movements in Tibet</em></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The 13th Dalai Lama’s government reform program</em></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Categorizing masses into different social classes 54
Mobilizing the masses and leading the internal struggle 55
Democratic reform in monasteries 55
Democratic reform in agricultural areas 60
Democratic reform in pastoral areas 62
Failed external social movement results and pan-Tibetan uprisings (1955-1959) 64
   a) Amdo and Kham 64
   b) U-tsang 67
External social movement (2): Socialism campaign (1959-1961) 70
External social movement (3): Socialism campaign (1961-1966) 70
External Social movement (5): Establishing State Education System and Mass Political Education (1951-2008) 76

Chapter Six: Educational establishment and external reforms in Tibet 81
Political mass education movement as a politically disenfranchising external social movement (1951 to 2008) 81
Formal education reform: Educational reform in Tibet (1980-2000): Struggle over education as conflict between internal and external educational social movements 83
The reduced role of Tibetan Mother-tongue education 84
   a) Tibetan language use in the family 89
   b) Tibetan language use in Tibetan Villages 89
   c) Tibetan language use dilemma in the schools 90
   d) The internal Tibetan language use dilemma in monasteries 92

Chapter Seven: Discussion and conclusion 94
Tibet’s reform process as social movements 94
Discussion: the persistence of the dilemma of reform in Tibet 96
Conclusion: Insights from a social movement perspective on Tibetan reform: towards the resolution of Tibet’s dilemmas

References
Chapter One:

Introduction

In the historical process of social evolution, humans have experienced revolutions and social movements in many forms in a variety of different societies and times. Some succeeded and some failed for different reasons and under many different conditions. This work is an attempt to explore the success and failures of reform in one particular society: Tibet. An analysis of factors influencing success and failure of previous internal and external reforms will be provided, which will serve as a means of better understanding the contemporary reform process in Tibet within P. R. of China. Why did all of the internal Tibetan reform movements fail in modern times and why did the external reform succeed (to a limited degree)?

Responding to the above questions requires a broad, rational and critical view that is based on the application of social movement theory combined with internal cultural perspectives to analyze the social change phenomena. From the first to the twenty-first century, Tibet has had her own fundamental epistemological understanding of life, the environment and the universe. How deeply this view has permeated society is evidenced by the folk song, “How did the universe appear”. Tibetans have invented what they needed and built up a rich spiritual civilization. During the 8th century, Tibet was one of the three great empires in the world. Tibetan civilization progressed through the efforts of many individuals, such as the seven great ministers and kings who had pushed the state of Tibet forward through intellectual reform. All of these were examples of successful internal reforms. However, there were also internal religious conflicts within the society, which finally caused the last Tibetan empire to break up.1

1 The last Tibetan empire broke up in 842 A.D. At this time there was a huge conflict when the king attempted to reduce the role of Buddhism in Tibetan society. The king was assassinated by a Buddhist practitioner. After the
Thus, after almost four centuries, regional religious groups established their own independent institutional power that was not subject to governmental or any other authority, and sometimes even invited external military forces to support their political position. This shameful history of regional division has remained until the present, still dividing Tibetans in China and those outside Tibet in India or other places.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, from the early twentieth century until the 1950s, most internal social and political reform movements failed; in terms of typical historical and political analysis, we can say this was due to excessive regionalism and sectarianism (Dungkar Losang Khrinley, 1981, 2002). However, in terms of social movement theory, they failed due to insufficient tactical mobilization of social resources and mass support.

This short review of historical defects illustrates what caused the internal reform to fail and which institutions have played the key roles in Tibetan society. Furthermore, it is clear that these institutions have been disengaged from the grass roots social movement, and sometimes formed an obstacle development of Tibet during the early twentieth century. Moreover, religious institutions performed government functions parallel to the Tibetan state, such as the administration of justice, and at the same time the majority of villagers strongly preferred to follow religious rather than governmental institutions. Thus, these institutions stopped any reform, no matter internal or external, that opposed their traditional role. For example, the thirteenth Dalai Lama’s first modernization reform was strongly opposed by these institutions.

Thus, Tibet has lost several crucial opportunities to develop a society based on Tibetan culture with social and material conditions improved through modern knowledge. While reviewing the internal contradictions in recent Tibetan history, clearly, there is an imbalance

\textsuperscript{2} From this point of view, each religious sect had its own developmental reforms and movements but I would leave this substantial field for further research work.
between material and spiritual focuses, with overlapping authority of religious and secular institutions, competition among religious sects and among regions. This is a critical component of why Tibetan reforms have failed in past, present and perhaps in the future, social, religious and regional disunity continues.

Clearly, the different understanding and perspective of life value was resulting the different forms of societies. Tibet has lost its political identity and has been losing its cultural identity by only focusing excessively on spirituality, while forgetting that societies also need to have a material basis in order to stabilise the social conditions of spiritual institutions.

This research paper is attempting to find applicable social movement theories in order not only to analyze the facts of how internal and external reforms failed or succeeded but also to develop an unbiased view of how the Tibetan issues are becoming irreconcilable problem within today’s international context. Thus, this research paper has seven component chapters to illustrate the whole picture of Tibetan reform as social movement.

Chapter two will review relevant theoretical approaches. In this chapter, I will discuss the applicability of social movement theory to the analysis of Tibetan reform. Chapter three will focus on the aim of research and methodology. Chapter four will present the social structure of Tibet analyzing internal reforms in Tibet according to SM theory. Chapter five will examine the external reform in Tibet within China, and the very complex social context of sovereignty issues. Chapter six will focus on the traditional educational institutions in Tibet and the external education reform in Tibet within China. Chapter seven provides a critical discussion of the

---

3 Tibet has three major religious groups: 1) Bön, the traditional pre-Buddhist shamanist religion of Tibet, 2) “Red Hat” Tibetan Buddhism, the oldest form of Buddhism in Tibet, so-called because monks wear red hats. This sect formerly dominated all Tibet, but in recent centuries is dominant in Kham province, although it has monasteries and adherents in every region. They accept the Dalai Lama as supreme political leader of Tibet, but not as supreme religious leader 3). The Gelugspa or “Yellow Hat” sect, based on a reform of Tibetan Buddhism undertaken by
findings of the previous chapters and will show that SM perspective on Tibetan reform in China provides crucial insights into persistent failures of both internal and external reform that have led to the current impasse in Tibetan social development in China. It is hoped that a critical social movement perspective might serve to contribute towards a resolution of Tibet’s and China’s current dilemmas.

Lama Tsong Kapha in the 16th century. This sect is dominant in most of Tibet, and their religious head, the Dalai
Chapter Two: Theoretical approaches

Literature Review

Social Movement Theories

*Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings (2003)*

Paul D. Almeida (2003) focuses on the role of "political opportunity and threat environment" in social movement development in authoritarian countries, using the case of El Salvador. He subdivides *political opportunity* into two factors: "institutional access and competitive elections" and subdivides *threat* into three aspects: "state-attributed economic problems", "erosion of rights" and "state repression". He argues that since few social movement researchers applied social movement theory in a non-democratic society, the study of this case can help understand the actual process of social movements under these conditions and contribute to the political process learning theory. His main argument is that a combination of political opportunity and threat can allow for SM development even under extreme authoritarian conditions. Almeida implies also, then, the reverse: where only one of political opportunity and threat exists, the chance of SM organization mobilization is reduced.

This approach may be very fruitful in the analysis of social movement, four disenfranchisements and reforms in Tibetan areas from 1950-2008. However, there are important differences between the El Salvador case and Tibet. In this period there were two state organizations in Tibet, the Tibet government and the PRC, which had negotiated an agreement by which both governments shared sovereignty, with supreme authority belonging to the PRC. In Lama, is also the traditional head of the Tibetan government.
effect, this was a federal arrangement with the Tibetan government somewhat like a provincial
government in Canada or Australia for example. However, the PRC government was controlled
by the CPC, which considered itself both an elite political organization and a mass social
movement at the same time. Thus, in Tibet's case, there are two competing state structures and
one other major institution, the Buddhist monasteries, which played a social role somewhat
similar to the church in El Salvador.

At that time, access to Tibetan government was limited to members of the aristocracy,
while access of Tibetan masses to monasteries was relatively open. However, from 1954-1961,
the Communist Party engaged in external mobilization of the masses and recruitment of an
alternate Tibetan leadership from among existing leadership and the poorest of villagers. This
process was termed by the CPC, democratic reform. Ironically, while access to CPC membership
was relatively open to the richest and the poorest levels of Tibetan society, it was relatively
closed to the middle levels of Tibetan society. Moreover, the competitive election concept is not
completely applicable to the Tibetan situation. Specifically, access to cultural and religious
institutions was always open but not access to politics under both Tibetan and CPC rule.
Currently, there are competitive elections for village and township leadership but from 1950-
2008 there were no competitive elections for political leadership in Tibetan areas. However,
within all three major institutions in society there was a political competition process. In the
Tibetan government and Communist Party there were no internal elections. However, the highest
leadership inside monasteries was elected by the entire body of monks. As a result, some insights
from Almeida's work may be applied to the Tibetan context.

However, Almeida pointed out that authoritarian governments differ in opportunity to
participate in competitive elections. Tibet’s example was a case with no public competitive
elections and so it differs in some ways from El Salvador's case. In El Salvador, competitive elections existed but government repressed participation. In Tibetan areas, social movements organized by the government existed, but participation in non-governmental social movement organizations was also restricted. As a result, the internal secular social movement mobilization and organizations rarely exist in Tibet of China.

Thus, Tibet’s case is only partly comparable with the El Salvador case. Within the political area, El Salvador has competitive elections, while in PRC no competitive elections existed. Furthermore, unlike in El Salvador, in Tibet, no civil society social movement organizations were permitted by the PRC government. As a result, in the non-democratic conditions of PRC, if any Tibetan social movement forms an organization not controlled by the government, then it will be shut down and its members will suffer state repression. As in El Salvador, the strongest social movement organization was religious: the Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador, and the Buddhist monastery system in Tibet. However, in Tibet, the only SMOs outside government control are religious organizations. Therefore non-religious social movement aims are often expressed in religious terms from within monasteries and by monks.

**Distinguishing threat from political opportunity**

Almeida (2003) argues that recently social movement scholars pay more attention to political “opportunity” than “threat”. This study will argue that Tibetan social problems are not only the result of “threat”, but also because of failure to recognize and use actual “opportunities”. These failed opportunities are not only on the government side, but also on the Tibetan side, and may have resulted from neither side taking a multi-institutional approach to reform.
Multi-institutional Social Movement Theory (MISMT)

Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) take the position that society is not monolithic and that there are many power centres within a society, which do not all necessarily have the same membership, ideology and goals. Thus, they critique the main social movement theory approach, political process learning theory, mainly based on its narrow understanding of power and where power is found. This approach focuses on political power and the state as the most important centre of political power. Armstrong and Bennet argue that society is extremely complex. As a result, in their view, different types of power are found in many different social institutions. For example, they cite Foucault's study of prisons and mental hospitals in France in support of a view of society as composed of many different institutions, each with its own view of what is power, and their own system of rewards and punishments. They follow Foucault also in their definition of politics, which does not only involve the state, but all of society outside the state. Thus, Armstrong and Bennet argue for a multi-institutional approach to social movement theory as based on a more accurate understanding of what society is and how it really works.

However, their argument for a multi-institutional approach to social movement theory is also based on their claim that many social movements cannot be explained very well using a PPLT approach. Within PPLT, a SM must focus on changing the state. They point out many examples of social movements that do not fit this model. Within PPLT, they are called "awkward" SMs because they do not fit the model well (p. 78). Armstrong and Bennet argue that instead of excluding social movements that focus on cultural goals, or a combination of political and other goals from analysis, we should extend our theoretical approach to consider movements with non-political or multipurpose goals as normal social movements, and not treat them as
"awkward". Cultural institutions they mention as included within social movement research include "medicine, religion, education, science, the workplace and labor unions (p. 78).

Armstrong and Bennet use the gay movements in North America and Europe as an example of a social movement among a weak social group that achieved many of its aims in a short time. These authors argue that the tactics of the gay movement are partly responsible for its success, and can be used by other marginal social groups. These tactics include: increasing the social status; expanding access; accessing social honor and morality (p.86). For the Tibetan movement to learn tactics from this experience to resolve their sociological challenges within China in non-democratic situation in China is not simple, but may prove extremely useful.

**Applicability of Multi-institutional Social Movement Theory to Reform in Tibet**

Armstrong and Bennet's critique of PPLT can be used to critique literature on Tibetan social and political reform. Most of such interpretations of reform in Tibet, whether those of western scholars (Barnett & Akiner, 1993; Goldstein, 1989, 2004; Grunfeld, 1996; Mullin, 1980), Tibetan scholars in exile and religious leaders (Dawa Norbu, 2001; Panchen Lama, 1998), or Chinese government sources (CPDRI & CPTAR, 2005; TAR History Committee, 1991) base their approach on political and historical analyses that focus mainly on the state. In Tibet's case, this means that they study the Tibetan areas that formerly were administered by a Tibetan government in U-tsang, but pay little attention to levels of society not included in this government and no attention at all to Tibetan regions outside U-tsang. Thus, a multiple-institution approach to the study of reform in Tibet includes a wider conception of Tibetan society that comes closer to the conception of Tibetan society that Tibetans in China had.
A major defect in western research on Tibet is that it accepts social, political and administrative categories given by the state (PRC) uncritically. Social classification categories within Tibetan society often differ significantly from official categories. For example, local administrative boundaries as understood by Tibetans in China differ from provincial, district and county boundaries recognized by the PRC government. Nevertheless, much Tibetan social and economic interaction still follows old boundaries that are "invisible" to the PRC government and to western scholars as well. Tibet had several cultural institutions that continued to function based on their traditional power after 1950. In addition, the village has its own distinct social structure that continued during the reform period. With the grassland reform, and through several political campaigns in Tibet have broken the traditional social structure such as village connections and relationship between villagers and monasteries. In Tibet's complex situation, there is a complex set of parallel institutions that belong to the state and to civil society. A failure of one set of institutions to understand or even recognize alternate institutions may partially explain the success or failure of reform in Tibet in China. Thus, a multi-institutional approach allows us to use the social institution categories that are understood and accepted by social actors themselves, whether they are actors within state structures or civil society. As Friedland and Alford put it, institutions are composed not only of rules, but are also “organizationally structured, politically defended, and technically and materially constrained” (TAR History Committee, 1991, p. 248).

Nevertheless, this approach has some limitations for the study of reform in Tibet in China. It is based mainly on the European and American experience, which is very different from Tibetan social structure and conditions. Research that was conducted in a western, urban, secular society must be applied carefully in Tibet, which is an Asian, rural, religious society.
Literature on Reform and Cultural Revolution in Tibet in China

English-language literature

The major western scholar on reform in Tibet is Goldstein (1989, 1996, 2004). Goldstein's strengths are many. His work has included considerable primary sources based on oral interviews of Tibetan officials in Lhasa and with Tibetan exiles in India, and is able to speak, but not read Tibetan. At the same time, his documentary evidence is mainly limited to English language materials stored in western archives. Thus, he has not included many Tibetan and Chinese language documents in his research. Another limitation of his research is that he did not balance oral histories of Tibetan officials with those of Han officials who had worked in Tibet from 1950-59. Goldstein also focuses mainly on political process and state actors. His work focuses on government structures and officials and does not provide evidence about cultural institutions or actors from civil society. Furthermore, perhaps because of his political orientation towards research, Goldstein's work refers mostly to Lhasa, the administrative centre of U-tsang, or, using contemporary state terminology, the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China (T.A.R.). As a result, information on social movements outside of government and outside Lhasa from 1950-59 is not available in this work. Therefore, Goldstein may be used as a reliable source for a PPLT approach towards SM research in Tibet. However, his work must be supplemented by research on civil society and other Tibetan regions using a MISMT approach, if we wish to have a full and deep analysis of reform in Tibet.

A very detailed personal experience of democratic reform, socialization, political education, Cultural Revolution, has been written by a person who escaped to India (Dhondub Choedon, 1978). This book has several strengths and a few weak areas. The strengths are the detailed information provided on the direct experience of those campaigns, which are what she
saw, what she had faced during those external movements, in Tibetan villages; the weak points are that the writer generalized her experience to all regions, periods and situations uncritically. However, this book’s major value is that it is the only the source available in English that reports on these campaigns at the village level.

Another major resource is Barnett (1994; 2002; 2006; 2008). He has edited or written a number of books on modern Tibet. Barnett's strengths are on Tibet’s political movements and other Tibetan issues, on such as gender issues and modernity issues of Tibet. His work has included considerable primary sources based on his field work in Lhasa and other Tibetan places as well conducted over three years in the 1980s. At the same time, his documentary evidence is not limited to Western literature but also includes the Tibetan and Chinese literature. However, like Goldstein, his research centres on Lhasa, and focuses on the recent politics, history and modernity since 1980 and does not deal with the rural context, or the process of the two key reforms studied in this paper. Therefore, this work has limited application to the aims of this paper.

**Chinese-language literature published in PRC**

There are many accounts of the period 1950-59 published in Chinese in PRC (CPDRI & CPTAR, 2005; TAR History Committee, 1991; TAR Peoples’ Publishing House, 1984). These accounts are generally reliable as to facts about dates, places, people and events. However, they are generally limited to actions taken by the PRC state and its representatives and includes less information about actions taken by local Tibetans outside the Communist state organizations. The interpretation of events and in particular the success and failure of social reform in Tibet from 1950-59 are all made from the party's point of view. From a scholarly perspective, they can
be used as a source for events, particularly in Amdo and Kham, which are rarely mentioned in western literature. However, the approach to social reform in these works leads to an emphasis on the state and political actors similar to Goldstein's. However, they are basically reliable sources of factual information on events, although incomplete, but interpretations must be used carefully, since they do not include opposed points of view, and also are not based on primary accounts from all levels of Tibetan society.

Tibetan-language literature

The report of the 10th Panchen Lama to the Central Government in Beijing in 1962 is a major source for the study of reform in Tibet from 1950-59. This report was translated into Chinese, and later translated into English and published in London (Panchen Lama, 1998). The Panchen Lama, the 2nd highest religious authority in Tibetan Buddhism, worked together with the Chinese government after 1950 in order to implement the 17-point agreement between Beijing and the Tibetan government. He remained in China after 1959 and continued to act as a representative of the Tibetan people to the government in Beijing. In 1962, he wrote a report analyzing the success and failure of reform and political campaigns in all Tibetan regions in China, in the hope of changing some policies and their implementation. He did not criticize the goals of introducing democratic reform and socialism in Tibet. Instead, he criticized the method that was used to implement reform and political campaigns. These methods he argued were incorrect and caused many social problems in Tibet. He argued that the incorrect methods that were used to implement the democratization reform of 1956 were one of the causes of the 1957 rebellion. He supported his argument with examples from local areas in Tibet based on his personal observations and reports that he had received from local Tibetan people.
This report is a valuable document for several reasons. First of all, it is the first internal criticism of the social reform process in Tibet. Secondly, it balances other sources by providing a Tibetan point of view that includes information from all Tibetan regions. Moreover, the Panchen Lama had inside knowledge of Chinese government actors, Tibetan government and religious figures, and also met with representatives of Tibetan common people. Thus, the Panchen Lama's report is a primary source for some aspects of Tibetan reform and political campaigns, and a secondary source for many other aspects of this reform. As a Tibetan-Chinese bilingual he was one of the rare actors who could communicate directly with Tibetans and Han Chinese. Thus, his report has great value in the study of the experience of reform and political campaigns from 1950-59.

The Panchen Lama's report has more value as a source about the process and events of 1950-59 than as an analysis of these events. As a committed Tibetan Buddhist leader, he may have had some bias in his interpretation of why government cadres acted the way they did. Nevertheless, his interpretation can be used to balance the interpretation of government sources.

Another source for the study is Shakapa (1976), a Tibetan scholar who was the Finance Minister of the Tibetan Government from 1939 to 1951. This is the only book written in Tibetan published outside PR China that focuses on Tibet’s political history. This book reports direct experience of a participant in the first social reform studied in this paper. He provides detailed information on this experience. However, his point of view is limited to the perspective of a member of the traditional Tibetan government in Lhasa, and focuses on higher level political questions and ignores the rest of Tibet and the village level, and is strongly biased against the PRC government.
Murge sam dan (1997), a respected traditional Tibetan scholar in Tibet in China has written a very useful history of Tibetan culture for this study. His aim is to seek an approach to the understanding of Tibetan history and culture that can support the maintenance and revitalization Tibetan society within China. His work presents a detailed analysis of the traditional organization of Tibetan society at all levels, including the village level. Among Tibetan scholars in China, in both secular universities and in monasteries, his work is considered the standard of scholarship in this area. However, his work is limited by the fact that he refers only to Tibetan literature. Therefore his main arguments do not respond at all to different ways of analyzing Tibetan society that have been published by Chinese and foreign scholars.

Dungkar Losang Khrinley is a Tibetan historian, anthropologist and lexicographer, who know the traditions and oral maxims well. His major publications included The Merging of Religious and Secular Rule in Tibet (1981), a critical history of the Tibetan system of combined secular and religious authority, based on Marxist theory. His conclusion is that religious and secular authority should be distinct; in effect, he argues for separation of church and state. By attempting to cross-fertilise Tibetan Buddhist thought and Marxist analytical method, and by campaigning for social and educational development, he was able to play a vital role in the reconstruction of Tibetan as a modern language and culture following the Cultural Revolution (TIN, London, 4 August 1997).¹

---

¹ He strongly advocated for the use of Tibetan language as a main language of instruction and the development of Chinese proficiency, saying “all hope in our future, all other developments, cultural identity, and protection of our heritage depends on this. Without educated people in all fields, expressing themselves in their own language, Tibetans are in danger of being assimilated. We have reached a crucial point, (TIN, London, 4 August 1997)”.
Chapter Three: The Aim of the Research and Methodology

General aims of the research

Aiming to analyze the reasons why Tibet has been failed into present situation is very complex research which related political science and philosophical approach, and it also related to the materialism and spiritualism conflicts. These issues will be relevantly explored in this critical sensitive work. More importantly, it is crucial to derive the reasons from brief historical review on the reform and any key internal reform movement that promotes process of social development of Tibet, what caused failure of the internal reform and how the external reform tactically succeeded; caused problems and why?

Specific objectives

In this research paper, internal reforms and external reforms will be examined separately. Internal reform refers to the reforms initiated by Tibetan people and institutions; external reform refers to the reforms initiated by non-Tibetan people and institutions. Several internal reforms were attempted before 1951 and the arrival of PRC power. Each of the reforms will be analyzed individually according to SMT. Three major external reform movements will be examined in the same way. The strategies and tactics of each reform movement and their contribution to the success or failure of reform will be assessed using SMT. Thus, the major research questions of the paper are:

1. How did social reforms in Tibet unfold in the past
2. What type of reforms occurred in Tibet
3. What individuals and groups initiated internal and external reforms
4. What social movement strategies and tactics were used or not used in reforms

5. How did use or non-use of SM tactics and strategies influence reform success / failure

**Research methodology**

The major methodology pursued is qualitative document analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The application of SMT to multiple sources from all sides involved in the reform processes, hostile and friendly, published in Tibetan, Chinese or English, and representing a variety of institutional perspectives is a new, and fruitful, approach to the analysis of Tibetan society that permits a fresh perspective on Tibetan social change.

In order to analyze the historical documents on all of the above subjects I have included three language documents are: English, Tibetan, and Chinese in my research. However, as always in social movement research, during my study, extra subjects seemed to be paralleled important too and I had to make special section to cover the cultural and spiritual disenfranchisements that I came across.

The subject of this study is underresearched. While there has been much political history literature produced, as far as I know, the application of SMT to Tibet, in China is new. Thus, this is an exploratory study, which must integrate primary sources and secondary commentary and analysis from several perspectives and languages through the lens of SMT. Most of the primary and secondary literature is committed to one view. This study attempts not to show which side is right, since 50 years of conflict shows that neither side has succeeded in resolving the Tibetan dilemma. Some information was already written in the literature but this appeared incomplete or least not totally applicable to the situation before and after 1951 in Tibet. In this study I use a few applicable social movement theories as the analytical tools to analyze the Tibetan reform and
social change facts, critically assessing opinions on Tibet of Western scholars, outside Tibetan scholars, Chinese scholars and officials.

Several comparative tables for each reform category have been made that help readers to see the complexities of the social reform movements clearly and also to illustrate the whole picture of social route that Tibet came through. Moreover, most scholars on Tibet from differing viewpoints have been avoiding discussion of certain sensitive political points; in this paper, an attempt is made to impartially analyze the facts and the variety of reasons to show how all these reform movements, internal or external, have sometimes failed and succeeded in Tibet.
Chapter Four:

Internal Reform in Tibet

Setting: Tibet before 1949

As a formal nation, Tibet can have a cultural meaning and a political meaning. Tibetans themselves use Tibet to mean cultural areas where the Tibetan language culture and religion are found (Grunfeld, 1996; Murge sam dan, 1997; Thomas, 2006; TAR, 1984). The Tibetan cultural area includes grassland, mountains, high plateau and foothills; the population consists of herders and farmers. The economy depends on the production of meat, milk, wool, leather and barley. The areas inhabited by Tibetans are traditionally divided into three regions: U-tsang, Amdo and Kham. U-tsang borders India and has about the same territory as today’s Tibetan Autonomous Region in PR of China; Kham is the western part of today’s Sichuan and north-western part of today’s Yunnan provinces in the PRC, and Amdo includes all of today’s Qinghai and the south-western part of Gansu provinces. Figure 1 below shows how most Tibetans see Tibet. Table 1 below describes the political jurisdiction of these three Tibetan regions during the 1930s-1949s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>U-tsang</th>
<th>Amdo</th>
<th>Kham</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Control</td>
<td>Defacto Independent Government; Based in Lhasa; head: Dalai Lama</td>
<td>Republic of China; belongs to Gansu and Qinghai provinces</td>
<td>Republic of China; belongs to Sichuan, Yunnan provinces; some mountainous areas with no government control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1
Regions of Tibetan culture area in the 1913-1949 by political jurisdiction
Fabric of Tibetan society

Tribes/ Monasteries/ Governments

Traditional Tibetan society is hierarchically organized. The basic unit is the village. Four to six villages supports one local monastery; several local monasteries are connected with a district monastery; these district monasteries form the connection with the central monastery of Garden and it is also with Tibetan government. Each three or four villages have a small
monastery that plays several roles: cultural, religious and administrative responsibilities for local people and government. Most Tibetan families had a monk in their local monastery. When young men finished their studies at the local monastery, they then needed to continue their studies in a district monastery; the next highest level was three major monasteries in Lhasa: Sera, Drepung and Galdan (The history of Labrang monastery, 1987).

Before 1949, the majority of Tibetans were poor illiterate herders with little or no land; the second largest groups were Tibetan Buddhist monks, who not only study Buddhism and also study many other subjects. The smallest social groups were the rich aristocratic land-owners and the poor herders, who rented grazing land from them.

As every society has a characteristic structure, Tibet’s social structure was built up on the mode and relations of production. Each village has several families composing of one or more clans, or Pa-aog is the fundamental structure in village. There were also villages in Kham and Amdo who are descendants of garrisons sent by the empire of Tibet to guard the border whoe were the first Tibetan people to reside in the regions.

Thus, several villages centred on a local monastery compose a tribe, and then several local tribes compose a district tribe centred on a district monastery, which is under the direction of one of the three major monasteries in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. The three major monasteries are under the direction of the Dalai Lama in his double function as spiritual head of Tibetan Buddhism and head of the secular central government of Tibet before 1951. With the long historical influence of religion in Tibetan affairs, the boundary between secular and religious spheres overlapped. Thus, those monasteries played a significant role in political and cultural affairs alongside central government of Tibet, and played perhaps a greater role than the
government in overall social cohesion through their pervasive institutional network of monasteries that reached every village in Tibet. As a result, when purely secular disputes between villages occur, for example about grazing rights on land between villages, villagers seek mediation through the religious system rather than justice through the secular government due to the greater penetration of the religious structures than that of the state structures (see Figure 2 for an illustration of the traditional Tibetan social structure⁶).

---

⁶ Tibetan clans are organized patrilineally; each clan believes that it is descended from a common ancestor in the male line.
Historical background of social reform in Tibet

There have been numerous cases of reform efforts in Tibetan history. Some of them have been political, some military and others religious. This section will present reforms that occurred before the 20th century. Some of these reforms were top-down and others bottom-up; some were relatively successful, some failed.

Early social system reform

Many cultural, religious, economic and political changes affected Tibet in its early history (see Tables 2 and 3 below for a display of key early reforms based on Tibetan tradition and histories). These inventive social reform movements had pushed forward the Tibetan society and civilization as an evolutionary progress. Thus, the results of those reforms had rooted the nation of Tibet obtained expandability and started to absorb the foreign culture such as Buddhism from India, the astronomy and medicine from Han culture (Dungkar Losang Khrinley, p.1218, 2002). With the establishment of empire cultural centre and the first state school of Tibet, in the Samye monastery (see the picture below) the seven great people who first became the monk group and monks gradually received high social class position as a strong cultural institution in Tibetan society (Dungkar Losang Khrinley, 1981). This class was not only developing the great Tibetan spiritual civilization but also been as the stakeholders in the society. As a multifunctional social institution it influences the society more than the government dose. However, leading the whole secular society to approach the certain spiritual life is another issue for further research area.

---

6 For a description of Tibetan traditional social structure see Doshi, 2003; Goldstein 1998. These sources provide less detail than the figure above, which is based on my own research and personal observations. PUT local monastery history reference one or two
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministers</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Reform types</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Kings of Tibet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ru le skye</strong></td>
<td>Invented the plough, iron and copper smelting, built bridges, expanded cultivation. Introduced charcoal and glue production.</td>
<td>Developed farm tools to increased the social-economical growth</td>
<td>Approx. 1st century C.E.</td>
<td>spu bde gung rgyal, the 9th King of Tibet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lha bu mgo dkar</strong> (Ru le skye’s son)</td>
<td>Invented method to survey land and irrigation works</td>
<td>Standardized land administration. Developed the Tibetan farming economy</td>
<td>Approx. 1st century C.E.</td>
<td>Ae xo legs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Angor snang btsan mang</strong></td>
<td>Invented the first Tibetan steelyard, and developed commerce.</td>
<td>First to standardize the Tibetan trade.</td>
<td>7th century C.E.</td>
<td>Sdgis re gnan hsegs, the 31th King of Tibet (died in A.D.618)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Thon-mi Sambhota** | a) Invented the Tibetan script.  
b) Translated Indian Buddhist literature into Tibetan and is the first translator in Tibetan history. | This reform standardized the Tibetan Language and writing system. He also was the first scholar to introduce foreign culture to Tibet. | 7th century C.E. | Srong-brstan-sgam-po, who is the 33th King of Tibet (died in A.D.698) |
| **Gangs sgri bzang yang ston** | Moved Tibetan people from mountain valley to the flat lands. Established the first towns. | This reform established the fundamental structure of Tibetan society. | 7th century C.E. | Srong-brstan-sgam-po, who is the 33th King of Tibet (died in A.D.698) |
| a) Ygos khri bznag yab lhag &  
b) Stag ltsan gdong gzigs | a) Formulated law setting out compensation for manslaughter, murder and injury  
b) Equally distributed animals to every herdsman families; made the first animal husbandry customs to save grass in summer for winter. | a) Developed the law;  
b) Developed animal husbandry and solved struggle between Bon and Buddhist groups. | 8th century C.E. | Sgri srong de brstan(742-797), the 33th King of Tibet |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reformers</th>
<th>Reform Types</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kayu tok yon tan mgon bo</td>
<td>Establishment of first private school in Tibetan history. 3rd century</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Succeeded (Individual contribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srong-brstan-sgam-po, who is the 33th King of Tibet 7th century</td>
<td>a) Allowed Buddhism to enter Tibet. b) Sent people to study abroad in many other countries.</td>
<td>a) Organized scholars in many subjects required by state development b) Made Lhasa capital c) Encouraged absorption of elements from neighbouring cultures and established harmonious foreign relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Succeeded (Top-down, state reform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glang dr ma Au dum bstan</td>
<td>a) Destroyed monasteries system; b) Forced nuns and monks return to secular life</td>
<td>Supported secular culture and social development.</td>
<td>Enacted anti-Buddhism policy to aimed at reducing number of monks that were believed to weaken the population's productive capacity</td>
<td>Failed: assassinated by a Buddhist (Top-down, state reform).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhama Tsongkapa</td>
<td>a) Prohibited monks from marrying, and participating in secular affairs b) Corrected defects of translations of various Buddhist texts</td>
<td>a) Founded today's dominant Yellow-Hat (Gelugspa) sect of Tibetan Buddhism. b) Synthesized several Buddhist schools into a unique Tibetan form 9</td>
<td>a) Prohibited monks from controlling secular serfs 10. b) Allowed land-owning monasteries to accept voluntary labour from serfs and free rural population as a religious donation</td>
<td>Succeeded (Religious reform).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cha-ba-Che-gye-sang-ge</td>
<td>Completely revised pedagogy based on methodology</td>
<td>a) First to determine contents of monastery curriculum</td>
<td></td>
<td>Succeeded (Religious reform in monastery education).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dungkar Losang Khrinley, 2002, p.1357

---

7 Put explanation about Glang dr ma Au dum bstan here
8 Lhama Tsongka-pa Buddhist & the great highest philosophical scholar in Tibet, called second Buddha
9 Gelugspa combined a religious emphasis with a secular epistemological focus providing a foundation for all later Tibetan cultural development.
10 Tibetan serfs were divided into two types: one type worked a portion of the landowner’s land and, rendering a certain portion of the crops to the landowner; the second type were indenture labourers, who worked in exchange for basic food, clothing and shelter.
11 Cha-ba-Che-gye-sang-ge was responsible for many innovations: (a) created a completely new tradition of logical reasoning and debate as the main pedagogical method; (b) Created the rule of learning five principle subjects; (c) found new way that do the teaching and debate at the same time; (d) teaching should based on instructor’s peculiarity; (e) Made division of class and length of study period; (f) Created class debate rule; (g) made rule for great learner who can go to other monastery to have debate; (h) Created the name of degree for different levels; (i) determinate the debate practice is as a foundation of methodological curriculum in three level and the debate rules such as respect debate partner.
As Table 2 above illustrates, clearly that the most social reform movements were succeeded in a variety of subjects with the different period and reformers, who focused on monasteries reform or school establishments or politics no matter the key experience that we need to learn is under what condition did they succeeded and how in order to theorize social movement experience from this particular context.

Generally speaking, when a state or empire required developmental social reform, internal reforms succeeded more often than external reforms.

**1913s-1949s social movements in Tibet**

During this period of Tibetan history there was widespread dissatisfaction with the status in Tibetan society. During the late 1800s, Tibetans came more and more into contact with outsider societies, particularly China and India, and through India with Britain. The contrast between Tibet and these societies, which were modernizing, shocked many Tibetans who saw their country as falling behind others. In addition, the experience of invasion by a small British force that was with modern training and weapons able to occupy Lhasa showed many Tibetans that their neighbours could easily defeat them if they did not modernize. As a result, many social movements arose with the aim of reforming Tibetan society, education, government etc. This section will present an analysis of four of these social movements, all of which ultimately failed in achieving their goals. Social movement theory will be used as an analytic tool to understand these failures. Specifically, the concepts of recruitment and mobilization and several of Alinsky’s “Rules for Radicals” will be applied to each of the four reform movements. After a description of each case’s application of these concepts, each movement will be discussed critically, using these analytic tools to attempt to explain the tactical successes and failures of each movement.
that led to the ultimate strategic failure of each reform movement in Tibetan in the 1930s-1940s.

The failure of these internal Tibetan reforms suggests a fundamental flaw in the theorizing of reform in Tibet by Tibetans that may have relevance to understanding the successes and failures of social reform movements in contemporary Tibet.

**The 13th Dalai Lama’s government reform program**

The 13th Dalai Lama’s government had three components: the Dalai Lama as head; a representative from each of the three largest monasteries; hereditary representatives from the aristocracy and no representation of common people. This system was not democratic and was classified by the Chinese Communist party as Feudalism. The thirteenth Dalai Lama’s reformative concept of new polity had received more support from the low class of feudal than the upper feudal class. Because of the lower feudal class gaining more than the upper class do through the reform. However, a few upper feudal classes have high position so they wanted to keep their statue rather than take risk of reform.

The 13th Dalai Lama in 1913s tried to modernize Tibet. This movement emerged through Dalai Lama and his ministers visiting India and seeing government modernization there. They believed Tibet needed modernization so that no other country could control them. He attempted to achieve many reforms; its aims were to make the state strong and modern: by training an army, introducing electric power, modern postal and banking systems, a Tibetan-English bilingual school, building roads etc. Kunming, W. (Ed, 2006), his reform also included religion and restricts the religious discipline; establish the medicine institute in order to develop healthcare system; establish the post Office; reform criminal law and tax regulation; first time to conduct the salary regulation, and so on (p.285).
Education reform

The 13th Dalai Lama wanted to set up modern schools separate from monasteries in Lhasa so that young people who didn’t want to become a monk could become educated. Secondly, the Dalai Lama wanted to include modern curriculum, so that all students would learn science and not only Buddhism, and learn foreign languages (English) as well as Tibetan and Sanskrit. Since monks opposed this reform, no monks’ relatives attended the modern bilingual school in Lhasa. Interestingly, the modern school was free for anyone who wanted to attend.

Social reform

The economy was based on pre-modern agriculture, herding and handicrafts. The majority of the people were landless serfs, who were bound hereditarily to work land belonging to either an aristocratic family or to a monastery (Goldstein, 1989, pp. 3-5), similar to the Russian system in force until the mid 19th century. The 13th Dalai Lama wanted to redistribute land so that all households had approximately the same amount of land; therefore greatly reduce large landowner’s property; confiscate more than 50% of their land to share among poor herders.

Success and failure of the 13th Dalai Lama’s reform: Social movement analysis

Although 13th Dalai Lama reform failed to reform, he started a right direction for whole nation of Tibet. However, Kunming, W. (Ed, 2006), The 13th Dalai Lama never expected that the western concept of democracy transformation in Tibet and stabilization and development of old regulation reform idea got unpredictable conflicts. First, Lungshar’s organization of “skyid phyogs kun mthun”which means well-beings alliance attempted to reform the old system radically, therefore, got very serious clashed with government and Lungshar experienced false charge of against him. Thus, the army organization also clashed government of Tibet. These two
events touched the Kashag, which the government of Tibet’s political system and resulted strong internal political rights struggles (p. 290). His weak recruitment and mobilization undermined his reform movement. The main problem was that he did not communicate effectively with the common people who would have strongly supported his movement if they had been aware that he wished to give them their freedom and land. The 13th Dalai Lama depended on his authority alone, and made no serious recruitment effort. Ministers and aristocrats did not oppose his reforms, but also did not support them actively. They waited to see the reaction of major monasteries, which actively resisted change. Therefore, the movement failed to recruit any real support and only a few officials engaged with and supported the reform. The 13th Dalai Lama’s attitude towards the common people was paternalistic; he wished to benefit them, but did not engage them in discussion. However, the 13th Dalai Lama overestimated his authority over the aristocracy and monasteries.

According to McCarthy and Zald (2003), a social movement needs to recruit all related members in order to get sufficient support to succeed. 13th Dalai Lama’s method was quite different. He only recruited ministers who have Western experience and willing to accept the modernization, and never paid enough attention either to possible supporters, such as the serfs, or possible opponents, such as the monasteries. When the 13th Dalai Lama died in 1933, his reforms had made almost no progress, and had little support outside a few government members.

**Lungshar’s Reform Movement**

When the 13th Dalai Lama died, the government was led by Reting, the highest living lama from Reting monastery. He was in charge of identifying the new incarnation of the Dalai
Lama and ruling in his place until he was old enough to take over government himself. The Dalai Lama’s reforms had had little effect before he died. As Goldstein stated:

Understanding of modern political concepts was virtually nonexistent in the Lhasa of 1934. There were no newspapers or radio stations, and only a handful of officials knew any foreign language. Religion and the serf-based economic system formed the unquestioned foundation of life. It would have been futile to try to organize a revolutionary political party (1989, p. 190).

There was a need to continue the 13th Dalai Lama’s reforms. However, the regent, Reting, followed a conservative policy from before the reforms. However, Lungshar, one of the ministers in the government, who had been sent to England by the 13th Dalai Lama for 11 years to study British modern government and infrastructure, was dissatisfied with Reting’s policy. He believed that 13th Dalai Lama’s reforms should not only continue but also expand. Lungshar “developed and orchestrated a plan that camouflaged his modern and reformist view with the ideology and values of the traditional system (Goldstein, 1989, pp. 190).”

Lungshar wanted every government minister to be limited to a four-year term and be responsible to the assembly; he also highlighted a fundamental change that would reduce powers from the large landowners who desired to control the Kashag, the government head and cabinet ministers, and the assembly. Both were appointed bodies, however. Lungshar wanted assembly members to be elected by the urban population in Lhasa (Goldstein, 1989).

Lungshar’s recruitment tactics were adapted according to the group of people he was dealing with. For example, when he was recruiting members from number of aristocrats and monks who were officials in the government to support his reform, first he would meet secretly with friends in the government to discuss a petition that to the government proposing reform policies. These officials were more interested in reforming first, before choosing a new Dalai Lama. With this group, who were concerned that Reting was trying to have a relative selected as the new Dalai Lama, Lungshar emphasized that in his reformed system, there would be no
corruption of the process for selecting and educating the 14th Dalai Lama. As a result, approximately half of the monks in Lhasa initially supported Lungshar’s movement. Using these recruitment tactics, Longhair’s ideas finally persuaded many of the appointed members of the current assembly to agree with his reform proposals.

However, when Lungshar informed the assembly of his plans for the petition to radically reform government and society, the assembly split into three: strong supporters, neutral members and strong opponents, who immediately informed the regent. Lungshar was arrested by Reting, removed from the government and blinded as a punishment (Goldstein 1989, pp.201)

Lungshar’s weak point was a tactic that broke Alinsky’s Rule No. 2 “Never go outside the experience of your people” (Alinsky, 2003, p.225). Although his supporters agreed with his ideas about making sure there was no corruption in choosing the next Dalai Lama, his petition to radically restructure government shocked many of his supporters who divided into three groups: one group constantly supported him, a second group neither support nor resist the idea of reform, and a third group strongly combated the idea of reform, and informed the regent, who arrested Lungshar. His broader reform ideas came from his experience in Britain, which his supporters did not share and could not understand or accept. To them he was not improving Tibetan society but rejecting it; that is, revolution, not evolution. Moreover, the different reaction to his reforms was based partly on the differences in experience. The group that supported Lungshar was ministers who had visited India; the group that opposed him were monk officials; the neutral group were aristocrat officials.

In addition, Lungshar’s reform movement had several other limitations that caused his reform to fail, for example, geographic and social limitations. He only recruited members in
Lhasa where his enemies had power, and his recruitment strategy was from top-down; he did not recruit common people to engage his reform, only aristocrats and monks.

_Tibetan Improvement Party_

Pandatsang Rapga, the Tibetan Improvement party leader, who came from Kham area and was a trader, founded this Party, and recruited Gendiin Chompel as a member, who was a top scholar of Tibetan philosophy 19th century, wanted to reform Buddhism. This movement wanted to modernize Tibet but not by changing government. They wanted to change the Tibetan culture; particularly they wanted to modernize Tibetan Buddhism and emerged through Buddhist monks and scholars visiting India and discussing modern views about Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy with Western scholars of Buddhism. They believed Tibet needed modernization of culture because popular, but incorrect, conservative views of Buddhism held back social, political and economic progress, and they argued that this was the reason for poverty in Tibet. The Tibetan Improvement Party made a significant contribution to Tibetan reform. “This group sought not simply a change in regents, but the ‘liberation of Tibet from the existing tyrannical Government’ and the revolutionary restructuring of the Tibetan government and society” (Goldstein, page 450). This Party wanted to reform the land, legal and democracy and preferred “giving the monks salaries instead of estates and requiring them to study instead of engaging in business” (Goldstein, p. 453). The idea of giving the salary for the monks was a consideration even for today in Tibet. However, the Tibetan Improvement Party failed for several reasons. First, their aims were too limited; they only wanted to reform monasteries and their recruitment method was limited to public debate with high monks; few monks were willing to argue against them after that debate. They did not really persuade any one. Second, both the British and the
Tibetan regent suspected this group because they were they supported Indian independence as well as reform in Tibet. They only recruited a few people who had been to India. Although monks were impressed by their debate, none actively joined with this party. According to Alinsky’s second rule (2003, p. 225), many monks were not satisfied with some aspects of the monastery system and teaching method, even of Buddhism, but this group completely rejected the existence of Buddha, which was too radical for most monks to accept. This group only recruited people who have similar understanding and experience, never recruited other group of people to support them.

**Tibetan Communist Party**

“A strong nationalist who was already educated and ‘modern’ in the late 1930s, Phünwang dedicated his life to the struggle to create a socialist Tibet that would encompass all Tibetans in Kham, Amdo, and Tibet proper and would be ruled by Tibetans’” (Goldstein 2004, xiii). And this was also “the first Tibetan communist and founder of the Tibetan Communist Party (1939) before it merged with the Chinese Communist Party (1949), is a significant contribution towards understanding Sino-Tibetan relations during the first half of the twentieth century” (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004, 371 p). This movement wanted to modernize Tibet, but by radically changing society and government. They wanted to remove the differences between classes and the place of Buddhism in Tibetan culture. This movement emerged through young students from areas in Kham and Amdo that bordered Chinese areas going to China where they saw China’s modernization and got training from the Guomindang for modernizing Tibet. Later, they saw the oppression and corruption of the Guomindang, and were not satisfied with them. They met Soviet Communist representatives and Communist Party of
China representatives and liked their ideas about “Tibetan” communism. They believed Tibet needed social revolution most of all and also economic modernization so that they could solve the poverty of villages and also remain historical rout of Tibet.

The Tibetan Communist Party, a modern organization from secular educated Tibetans, attempted to retake the region of Kham, which was dominated by the Guomindang. The Tibetan Communist Party was failed by not enough member being recruited and even though in Batang where Party leader who came from, some of people disagree with Party’s idea of revolution, which was only care about their native province, not all of the Tibet. Another weak point is they did not conduct enough mobilization in order to obtain the supports to implemente their plan. This party was also used the Chinese values to judge the social issues of Tibet. Moreover, finally, this Party was also jointed the Chinese Communist party to help them to accomplished their political or colonization agendas in Tibet. On the other hand, limitation of social base was common people only from Kham, Amdo and no attempt to recruit from aristocracy, monks or official who from Lhasa government.

**General Comparison**

A comparison of the aims of these four reform movements reveals interesting similarities and differences between the movements (see Table 2 below displays the aims of the four movements in tabular form). One difference is in the relation to China: the Dalai Lama’s reform wanted no relation, the Tibetan Improvement Party wanted some relation, and the Tibetan Communist Party wanted Tibetan local government under China’s control. A surprising similarity is that the Dalai Lama reform movement and the Tibetan Communist party did not want to reform monastery schools; only the Tibetan Improvement Party wanted to do this. Both
the Dalai Lama reform and the Tibetan Communist Party wanted to set up separate modern schools. The main difference is they had different ideas about modernization. the participation structure of the movements. All four movements had faced different powerful opposition and had

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Reform Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13th Dalai Lama Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Independent Modern Government, Institutions and Public Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery schools</td>
<td>Retain unreformed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern schools</td>
<td>Open government schools that combine traditional Buddhist knowledge, and modern knowledge, including English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Develop ties with India more than China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Retain class structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>need modern army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>keep traditional culture &amp; supplement with modern knowledge; modernization via western knowledge &amp; culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
not enough participators. None of four reform ideas came from bottom society just from what a few reformers thought and what a few reformers saw outside of world.

**Participation Structures**

There were also interesting differences and similarities in who joined the movements, how they were recruited and what they did in the movements. Table 3 shows a comparison of the participation structures of these social movements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation Structures</th>
<th>Reform Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>13th Dalai Lama Reform</strong></td>
<td>Mid-level from minister with a few high Lamas. Around 100 official and monks were participated; Tae meeting as a mobilizing chance to recruit the members. <strong>Leadership:</strong> Lungshar and Kongtru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lungshar’s Reform</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leadership:</strong> 13th Dalai Lama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tibetan Improvement Party</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leadership:</strong> 13th Dalai Lama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tibetan Communist Party</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leadership:</strong> 13th Dalai Lama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Major Activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation Structures</th>
<th>Reform Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recruitment:</strong> co-opt aristocracy by appointment to government positions to implement reform; no serious mobilization effort among people government; try to pressure monasteries to accept reform</td>
<td>Organized and controlled the assembly and to use assembly to implement his reform plan. Try to pressure Reting or government to accept reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5
Comparison of the Participation Structures of Tibetan Reform Movements in the 1930s-40s
An interesting difference is according to whether the movements followed top-down or bottom-up recruitment. The Dalai Lama reforms movement started at the highest levels of society; the Tibetan Improvement Party recruited from the middle level of scholars and the Tibetan Communist Party got members at the village level. An interesting similarity is between the Tibetan Improvement Party and Tibetan Communist Party. They both used democratic methods to try to attract members, but the first party ignored the villages and the second had no contact with scholars and monks.

**Leadership Structures**

There were some interesting differences and similarities in leadership also. Table 4 shows a comparison of the leadership structure of the movements. All four reform leaders have completely different background and also have different reform goals for Tibet. 13th Dalai Lama was a highest leader of both spiritual and political in Tibet but three major monasteries closed his part of reform for the modern bilingual Tibetan-English school; Lungshar had received extra attention from 13th Dalai Lama and he also pointed Lungshar as a key minister in the Tibetan government before alive, but after the 13th Dalai Lama died, Lungshar attempted to remain the Dalai Lama’s reform and add more radical point into his reform petition such as change government system to democracy so that Lungshar targeted powerful enemy with Reting; the Tibetan Improvement party leader, who came from Khm area and was a trader, called Pandatsang Rapga founded this Party, sooner he recruited Gendun Chompel as a member, who was a top scholar of logical reasoning curriculum in 19th century in Tibet, wanted to reform Buddhism tradition but this situated himself into a very political complex and dangerous situation. This Party did not effected society very much; the Tibetan Communist party leader, who from Kham then went to China and studied there, Bapa Phüntso Wangye founded this Party
and he still living today, Bottom-up: Leader and rest of leadership chosen by vote of members and their recruitment tactic is to attract villagers as members at village and school meetings; few members, almost no other activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6</th>
<th>Comparison of the Leadership Structure of Three Tibetan Reform Movements in the 1930s-40s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Structures</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reform Movement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down: Theocratic / hierarchical</td>
<td>Mid-level: The leader who had learned modern theories in British for 11years; Ministers in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest head same; Appoints ministers in government</td>
<td>Advocated newly plan to reform the government system and eager to conduct democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers appoint local officials</td>
<td>No formal voice from society, but consults with monasteries and aristocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No formal voice from society, but consults with monasteries and aristocracy</td>
<td>Co-optation: get cooperation from aristocracy by appointment to government positions to implement reform; no serious mobilization effort among people government; try to pressure monasteries to accept reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Activity of Leadership</td>
<td>Recruitment: returned scholars give public lectures and published newspaper articles on foreign experience to try to attract members; organized public debates with traditional Buddhist scholars to show the need to reform Buddhism: wrote proposals for government to consider</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interesting similarity is that both Tibetan Improvement Party and Tibetan Communist Party had bottom-up leadership structures and selected the leadership by members voting, but in the Dalai Lama’s movement the head selected ministers and the ministers selected officials and followed top-down structure. The major activity of leadership in the two bottom-up movements was recruitment, using persuasion to get more members to achieve their goals. The Dalai Lama reform movement did not really recruit. It gave jobs to aristocrats to get cooperation and it put an
important monk who criticized the reform in jail, so that the monks did not go opposed the reform directly after that.

13th Dalai Lama Reform Failure

Only a few officials and scholars participated in the reform but the public followed monasteries against the reform. This clearly shows that the Dalai Lama did not mobilize the whole society to support his reform. The monasteries were protecting their own benefit and not caring about the national future of Tibet, for example, three major monasteries forced the new modern school in Lhasa, capital city of Tibet, to close in 1944. The Dalai Lama didn’t follow some of Alinsky’s second rule which is never go outside the experience of your people and also failed by did not mobilized whole society to supports and accepted the reforms.

Lungshar’s Reform Movement Failure

This reform failed by targeted Reting as a powerful enemy, who was a leader of government, suspected Lungshar trying to replace his position not empowering the government of Tibet; second, could not mobilized enough the conservatives monasteries to support and implemented his reform ideas because of “The literature on modern Tibet has been monopolized by the voices of monks, lamas, and aristocrats, i.e., people who dominated the traditional semifeual society and generally opposed modernization and change” (Goldstein 2004, xiii). Thirdly, Lungshar’s reform was based on modern values such as democracy that completely opposites with officials and monasteries. This reform seems making the cultural clash so that difficulty to succeeded in that context and time. As Thomas L, (2006) states that after Lungshar died “the conservative faction in Tibetan power circles made it clear that during the coming
regency, there would be no more talk of modernization, of creating a modern army, or of building modern schools (p.259).”

_Tibetan Improvement Party Reform Failure_  
Only a few scholars who went to India participated in this organization and they did not understand what the most society wanted. The masses wanted land not change the monasteries rule in society. Because of their non-mobilization and theoretical thinking not relevant to or understandable to most Tibetans, they could not really engage the society.

_Tibetan Communist Party Reform Failure_  
Only a few students and local leaders participated in this organization and the local people have their own perspective or disagree what this organization was going to achieve. Although this organization was trying to give the land to the masses, villagers in Kham and Amdo did not want to take care about other places outs villages of Tibet.

Why did these four organizations not collaborate with each other or learn successful experience and how failed experience from each other? When we compare the organizations, we can clearly see there were some similarities between them. Four organizations worked in a social reform organization in the same society but they all failed to achieve mobilization. The Tibetan social movement organizations should have combined together to enhance their abilities in order for the social movement to succeeded. We can see that each SMO shared some aims and tactics with each other. Each one has narrow social base, Alinsky says never go outside the experience of your people (rule 2), but they followed this rule. The problem was each SMO needed to go outside its own experience to recruit and mobilize.
Table 7
Application of Alinsky’s rules for radicals to Three Tibetan Reform Movements in the 1949s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alinsky’s rules</th>
<th>Reform Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule 1 and 4 and 13: Power is what the enemy thinks you have; Make the enemy live up to its own rules:</strong></td>
<td><strong>13th Dalai Lama Reform</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is the enemy?</td>
<td>Reting was the enemy. Regent was lack to develop the society and government was also a corruption system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalai lama is leader of all Tibetans.</td>
<td>No clear enemy targeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule 2 Never go outside the experience of your people</strong></td>
<td>Reform completely outside all society’s experience except government leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not try to change their experience;</td>
<td>Try to change the government radically not their experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule 6 A good tactic is one that your people enjoy</strong></td>
<td>A few people enjoy but not all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

Although every internal Tibet reform movement failed in the pre-1949 period, the external reform / revolution brought to Tibet by the Chinese Communist Party after 1949 has achieved a certain degree of success. This relative success of an external organization leads to two questions. First, why was an external organization able to reform Tibet when Tibetan social movements could not do so themselves? Furthermore, why did monasteries so strongly resist all reform and how did they succeed in defeating all social movements in Tibet before 1949?
Trying to answer these two significant questions as a conclusion is very complex. However, applying social movement theory to these movements gives deeper insight into their failures. According to Social Movement theory the four reform movements could not have achieved what they expected or because of their approach to the recruitment and mobilization of their movements, as well as their breaking of several of Alinsky’s rules.

A major method to recruit mass participation and mobilize the masses to action is mass education (Ladson-Billings & Donnor, 2005, p. 290). However, none of these movements engaged in popular adult education activities. The lack of mass education is one of the major factors that caused several serious problems for reform in Tibet. In traditional Tibet there was no education outside of religious monastery education. True, the Dalai Lama wanted to open schools outside monasteries, but only for children and not for adults. The control of all education was one way that monasteries could successfully oppose each modernization in Tibet. No reform movement except the Tibetan Communist Party tried to recruit the common people and none provided popular education. As a result, although the common people would have supported some reform, particularly land reform, they had no understanding of what the aims of the different reform groups were, and had no idea which reformist groups they should support, so they just followed the monasteries out of habit. The lack of mass support and mobilization for reforms undermined the fundamental social conditions of the modernization movements. Thus, each Tibetan reform movement did not obtain the mass support. Later, the external organization of Chinese Communist Party succeeded initially because of their stronger military force. However, the CPC understood very well the importance of recruitment and mobilization through mass support and mass education. One of their first moves was to take land away from monasteries and aristocrats and to share it among the common people. In addition, they created
popular adult education movement against illiteracy in Tibetan. The main people to benefit from this movement were the uneducated masses, who for the first time could receive free education in their own language. Also under Communism, there were no longer any distinctions between classes in Tibet, so that the status of the poor was higher. As a result, although there was resentment against the use of military force, the masses were not dissatisfied with these reforms. Moreover, the content of popular education was mainly political and used to persuade Tibetans that Communist rule was both reasonable and beneficial. From these classes, they were able to recruit indigenous party members who could act as go-betweens between Han Party members and the local population (Goldstein, 1989).

Clearly, the CPC policy in Tibet after 1949 showed a strong understanding of the importance of recruitment and mobilization of Tibetans, as well as an implicit understanding of many of Alinsky's rules. As a result, CPC rule was popular among common people, although it was some aristocrats and most monks were opposed to CPC rule. However, in 1956 the CPC changed its tolerant policy towards local minorities throughout China from 1956-1976 to a mono-ethnic, mono-lingual policy of assimilation. At this time, many indigenous party members were accused of nationalism (Goldstein, et al., 2004; Zhou, 2003).

At present, it is not clear to minorities in China, including Tibetans, whether the accommodationist policy of the early 1950s towards minorities was the true strategy of the CPC towards minorities, or a temporary tactic. If the accommodationist policy of the early 1950s towards China's minorities reflected in mass education and popular education becomes a long-term strategy, satisfaction of the mass of Tibetans will increase again. For continued successful reform in Tibet, it will be necessary to recruit and mobilize through mass education the majority of the population, which desires economic and political equality of all in Tibet, but does not
desire the rejection of religion as a major source of their identity. Any movement which can provide economic and political progress for the masses without demanding that they give up their religious and ethnic identity has a stronger chance of success than movements which do not seriously attempt to involve the Tibetan masses.
Chapter Four:

External Reform Within China

Externalization of Political Disenfranchisement Process

in Tibet from 1950 to 1965

After the People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet, the PRC government and the Tibetan government negotiated an agreement called the 17-point agreement. Many Western scholars, Chinese scholars and Tibetan scholars have agreed that this was the first official document discussing the sovereignty issue between China and Tibet, but they also argue whether this was a real agreement of a policy of “one country two systems” for Tibet or a tactic for PRC government to control Tibet. For a short time, the spirit of negotiation and compromise continued, but afterwards politics of negotiation was not followed by the CPC government anymore. After this agreement, Tibetan society experienced political and economic disenfranchisement through two democratic reforms and socialization movements, which led later on to cultural and spiritual disenfranchisement.

The Seventeen-Point Agreement

Negotiating the issue of sovereignty with the Chinese Communist Party Government, the representatives of Tibetan government signed the Peaceful Liberation Agreement in 1951. The main points of the 17-point agreement were:

1. Tibet is returned to China
2. Tibet permits the Chinese military to enter Tibet
3. Tibet is autonomous within China
4. The Tibetan political system and the role of Dalai Lama remain as before
5. (6) Maintain the Panchen Lama's status and reform his role
6. Protect Tibet's religion
7. Reorganize the Tibetan army into the Chinese army
(9) Develop Tibetan education
(10) Improve Tibetans lives
(11) China will not push Tibet to conduct social reform immediately
(12) Former officials may continue to hold office irrespective of their past
(13) The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will abide by all the above-
      mentioned policies
(14) China will handle the external affairs of the Tibet
(15) China will set up a military and administrative committee in Tibet
(16) Financial support for PRC organizations will be provided by the Central
      People's Government.
(17) This agreement will come into force immediately (Wang, 1998, p.152)

Dawa Norbu (2001) claims that:

The Seventeen Point Agreement (1951) is one of the most controversial and
significant documents in the history of Sino-Tibetan relations since the 821
treaty. In 1951 the Tibetan plenipotentiaries were compelled or coerced, as we
shall find out later, to sign and surrender Tibetan sovereignty for the first time in
more explicit terms than any other Tibetan authorities had done under any
Chinese regime, imperial or republican. The treaty has now become a quasi-legal
instrument by which the Chinese Marxist missionaries sought to legitimate their
takeover of Tibet and to integrate systematically with China in the name of
Marxism (p.179).

Mullin (1980), argues that in Tibet’s conditions, it was not ready to implement a very
new concept of “democratic reforms”. However, according to the 17-point agreement…. reform
of the social system must eventually be carried out. However, after the agreement, the Chinese
immediately started many reforms that according to the 17-point agreement should be delayed
and implemented gradually.

Those critical external social changes were made earlier than the 17-point agreement
allowed, and were not negotiated with Tibetan authorities. However, beginning in 1951 and
continuing to 1959, the Chinese cadres implemented their political agenda at the village level in
all of the Tibetan areas from west to east and from north to south, at first successfully, later with
terrible results.
The 17-point agreement stated that social and political change would be gradual and negotiated with Tibetan authorities. Instead, the PRC introduced *democratic reform* very soon after the 17-point agreement was signed and without negotiation with Tibetan government authorities or consultation with village society. After the agreement, the Chinese started to incorporate the Tibetan Army into People’s Liberation Army. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party Commission in Tibet (CCPCT, 1991), eliminated the use of Tibetan currency and Chinese Renminbi (RMB) became the only legal currency (p.182). Although this first external social movement was initially successful, it nevertheless was followed by an armed uprising. An analysis of this movement using a social movement theory approach can help explain why this movement developed in different ways in different regions and ended in failure for both sides in every region.

*External Reform in all Tibetan areas from 1954-1965*

In the last few decades, Tibetan issues have been receiving much more political attention internationally and dynamically, but so far little attention has been paid to the village level society of Tibet. Western scholars have mainly focused on political science, while the anthropologists and sociologists only study culture and society without paying attention to problems of governance. Tibetan religious scholars have focused purely on Buddhism and its place in society, and Tibetan secular scholars have been working just on research that seems irrelevant to the actual Tibetan realities. The Tibetan government in exile strived for independence until the 1980s, but now is striving to obtain real autonomy for all Tibetan areas following the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way, so far without resolving the dispute. Now the young generation in Tibetan areas of China has been almost totally alienated by 50 years of ineffective education in Tibet.
At the same time, the Chinese government has been buying the political support of the Tibetan masses by providing material benefits. However, recently the being government has started to lose the support of the lower levels of Tibetan society because of increasing social injustice and corruption at all levels of government. This loss of faith in the government is not an ethnic issue; it is leading the masses in Han provinces to lose trust in the government also.

As a result, to develop a society, not only political analysis, but also approaches based on an understanding of the cultural, economical, and spiritual conditions are equally important. Therefore, the social movement theory and perspectives applied to the mass rural Tibetan society may provide useful perspective on Tibetan social and educational dilemmas that capture important aspects of Tibetan social reality that other approaches have neglected, and may contribute to the resolution of social problems that have been ignored in the shadow of the 50-year long political dispute.

This study has two purposes: one, is to use social movement political process theory to understand the historical development of Tibet’s current situation; the second is to use social movement theory and political process learning theory to analyze today’s Tibetans’ social, political, and educational dilemmas as Tibetans strive to find a way forward that maintains their identity within a complex unitary, multicultural state.

During the years 1950-2008 in Tibetan areas of China, several top-down reforms, political campaigns and new disenfranchisements were introduced and conducted by the central government of the People’s Republic of China, which have generally been considered within China and outside to have been failures. Thus, it is important for an understanding of Tibetan and Chinese society to understand the sources of the limited success of these movements, and especially, the sources of their failure. Within the literature, there is a broad range of opinion on
this question, but the majority of research on these questions is conducted within the framework of contemporary political science theory. Therefore, this paper proposes an alternate approach to understanding reform in Tibet, in China: social movement theory.

Applying both theories of social movement and political process learning to the Tibetan situation is not only a critical and dynamic method but also a new area of research. This application is between social movement theory, political process learning theory and Tibet’s practical situation period of 1950-2008. Many sociologists developed the theories of sociology, social movement (SM) and political process learning theory (PPLT) based on their particular societies and on their own epistemological understanding of social complexities.

Building on the conceptual frameworks and analytical tools provided by SM and PPLT, an analysis of social change with the educational reform in Tibetan areas will be attempted. However, these theories were largely developed in a secular, western, urban environment. In contrast, this study will focus on a religious, Asian, rural society. Therefore, SM and PPLT need to be supplemented by Multi-Institutional Social Movement Theory (SMISMT), an approach that includes a greater range of institutions and actors, and is more sensitive to particular cultural differences.

This study is not attempting to dispute with those great scholars who brought out the concept of both SM and PPLT, however, this study would like to make a theoretical contribution to political process learning theory, cultural disenfranchisement and spiritual disenfranchisement, which have been conceptualized from the critical experience of Tibet.¹²

¹² I have informally observed several critical street conversations in Tibet on these questions. For example, monk scholars were asking why monasteries were becoming tourism centres; a local official in Lhasa asked why Beijing is willing to give us so much money, when we even don’t ask for it; many villagers were asking why our language has become secondary in school; many elders in villages were asking why PRC government has progressively developed our society materially, but has neglected our spiritual life which we see as crucial for everyday life; the children were asking why all the teachers were teaching irrelevant textbooks to us; the youth who had finished high-
After Chinese troops entered and took control of Tibet and the traditional government was replaced by a Han-dominated Communist government, the PRC government introduced the democratic reform movement (Goldstein, 1989b, p. 96). This research will attempt to map out how Tibet has fallen into today's situation based on an analysis of this crucial externally-based social movement in Tibet during the 1950s.

**The Tibetan areas of settlement within People's Republic of China**

The English term Tibet and the Chinese term Xizang are problematic for Tibetans. The areas of Tibetan settlements in China were much bigger than "Tibet". The English and Chinese terms mean U-tsang, only one of three traditional Tibetan regions. China has divided the two other traditional Tibetan provinces, Kham and Amdo into their Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan and Qinghai Provinces (See Figure 1 above).

This is a fundamental difference between Tibetan Government & People's Republic of China, which grants different levels of Tibetan "autonomy" for different Tibetan areas, with Tibet Autonomous Region, i.e., U-Tsang having a status roughly the same as a province, while Tibetan areas of Qinghai/Gansu/Sichuan/Yunnan provinces are treated as districts, counties or townships within a non-Tibetan administrative level. According to a representative of the Dalai Lama:

> The Tibetan nationality lives in one contiguous area on the Tibetan plateau, which they have inhabited for millennia and to which they are therefore indigenous. For purposes of the constitutional principles of national regional autonomy Tibetans in the PRC in fact live as a single nationality all over the Tibetan plateau (Dharamsala, 2008).

School or university were asking why they can't find a job in our own society: was it because of their language problems or skill problems? Many scholars were saying we could not expect to use our language until our retirement and so on. Those questions seem very simple, but it is important to explore them deeply in order to resolve these in sociological and educational problems.
Thus, the Tibetan government in exile sees all these areas as Tibet and wants to rejoin all Tibetan areas into one administrative unit, detaching Tibetan areas from Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, and Yunnan. In 1950, ten Tibetan local leaders from Amdo and Kham in eastern Tibetan areas requested the PRC to establish an Eastern Tibetan Autonomous Region formed from the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, and Yunnan provinces, and were imprisoned. The Panchen Lama (1962) also supported this proposal (p.25). Certain PRC government officials agreed with this proposal. Chen Yi, a high official in the central PRC government on his return in 1965 from consultations in Lhasa, recommended the creation of an Eastern Tibetan Autonomous Region, although the Central Government did not act on his proposal (CPDRI & CPTAR, 2005).

**Tibetan Autonomous Districts, Prefectures, Counties**

**U-tsang Province**

Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) refers to the central region of Tibet, in Tibetan U-tsang. TAR was established under the Chinese Communist Party of China in 1965. From 1950-1957 it was under joint administration of the Regional Tibetan government and People’s Liberation Army administration from 1957-1965.

**Amdo Province**

Tibetan Amdo was divided into Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (1953) and Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomy County (1950) in Gansu Province, Aba (Ngawa)Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture(1955) in Sichuan Province, and Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture(1955), Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture(1955), Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture(1955), Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture(1955), Haixi Mongolian and Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture (1955) and Haibai Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (1955) in Qinghai Province.

**Kham Province**

Tibetan Kham was divided into Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (1957) and Muli Tibetan Autonomy County (1955) in Sichuan Province and Daiqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (1957) in Yunnan Province.

**Total Tibetan population**

There is no reliable population estimate of the number of pure pastoralists in all of the Tibetan areas. According to fourth national population census in 1990, the total Tibetan population was 4,593,300; 2,096,000 in U-tsang; and 2,100,000 in Amdo and Kham. Tibetans living in other Tibetan areas in China 400,000; About 110,000 Tibetans live outside PRC. However, Tibetan government in exile says six million Tibetans live in PRC and 250,000 Tibetans live elsewhere.

**Views on Tibetan regions**

Goldstein (1994) distinguishes ethnographical Tibet, which refers to Amdo and Kham Tibetan areas, and political Tibet, which refers to U-tsang. Unlike Goldstein, and in support of traditional Tibetan views, Donnet (1994) said concerning Amso and Kham:

The two latter provinces were simply detached from Tibet and merged with China ‘proper’ About half of the territory inhabited by Tibetans was divided up among the Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai. Nowadays, you can pore over as many official maps of the People’s Republic of China as you like, but you will never again find the names of Amdo or Kham (p.68).

The usual Tibetan notion of nationality is that there is a single nationality without any divisions. Even Tibetans in P. R. of China, never use the concepts such as Goldstein’s political
Tibet and ethnographical Tibet. Among Tibetans outside PRC, Tibet is also considered one nation with no major ethnic division. However, Tsering Shakya (1999), like Goldstein, states that before 1949, neither Chinese nor Tibetan governments ever had any control in Amdo and Kham, which although culturally permeated by Tibetan Buddhism, were ruled by local chiefs.

The official post-1949 view in the PRC of Tibetans is that they are part of one big Chinese family, one nationality of 55 others that form a pan-Chinese nationality, called the Zhonghua Minzu. Nevertheless, Tibetan scholars in China, secular and religious, never thought that the Tibetan nation could be divided. Those different levels of the governments in different locations were established in different times by Chinese government not Tibetans.

_Tibet's situation within the international context after 1950_

Mullin (1980) points out that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) invaded Tibet in October 1950. On 19 October the PRC army, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defeated the Tibetan army at Chamdo (p.7). Another western scholar, Thomas (2006, p.318) and a Beijing-based Chinese scholar, Lixong Wang (1998, p.146), both considered that the PLA entered Tibet with the priority not to bring social reform, but to occupy Tibet.

On 7 November of 1950, the Tibetan government requested the United Nations (UN) for help. However, while a country such as El Salvador urged the UN General Assembly to debate on Tibet, the United Kingdom did not support this proposal, calling Tibet's status “ambiguous” (Grunfeld, 1996, p. 109). However, the Indian government argued that the Tibetan issue should be solved by peaceful negotiation (Mullin, 1980, p.7). The United States of America considered that “it was largely an Indian concern”, while India threatened to end its support for China at the
United Nations if military forces were deployed in Tibet, claiming "that the military operations of the Chinese government against Tibet had greatly added to the tensions of the world and to the drift toward general war" (Grunfeld, 1996:p.105, 109). At the same time, the Soviet Union condemned UN intervention in a Chinese internal matter, indirectly supporting the PRC position, (Grunfeld, 1996, p.109).

According to Grunfeld (1996), Mao considered that “Tibet has always had a special relationship with China---a relationship that never demonstrated absolute 'independence' (as we use the term now); but nor did it demonstrate Tibet to be 'an integral part of China’” (p.263). Wang Lixong considered that peaceful or military control of Tibet by PRC was unavoidable, since Tibet’s power and international influence was too weak to prevent this process (1998, p.149). Indeed, a document prepared by Chairman Mao in 1950 stated that since at that time, UK, India and Pakistan all accepted that Tibet forms part of China, this presented PRC with a great political opportunity to enter Tibet militarily (CPDRI & CPTAR, 2005, p. 9).

Within this international context, the state manager plays a crucial role in social movement theory (Almeida, 2003, p.348; Goodwin, 1997; Jenkins, 1995): in fact, the Chinese leader Chairman Mao, as a state manager, was the most critical actor in guiding the external radicalization in nondemocratic society of Tibet by advising the tactical strategy of threat be used in this particular political opportunity. On August 23, 1950, he encouraged the People’s Liberation Army to “occupy Chamdo, in order to impel the representative of Tibet to come to Beijing to negotiate with us” (CCPTAR, 2005, p.31). This is how Chinese Communist Party Government started the political disenfranchisement in another national society by military force. Since 1950, the PRC has symbolically played a positive force in Tibet “liberalizing” society and

---

13 According to Goldstein, “There were only three foreigners in Lhasa's employ in 1950 and only two other
emancipating serfs and slaves. Nevertheless, these gestures were intended to ensure PRC sovereignty.


table 8
Comparing Democratic Reform Process and Multi-Institutional Politics Perspectives in Tibet (1955-1959)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Process in Tibet</th>
<th>Multi-Institutional Politics in Tibet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The purpose of reform</td>
<td>Stabilize the control of Tibet through Land reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To conduct the Three Antis and Two reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The tactics for the reform</td>
<td>Democratic reform mobilization. Mobilize the poor serfs and slaves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizations</td>
<td>Five classes: the serf-owners’ class, medium class, lower class, poor class and the serf class.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

foreigners in the vicinity. If indeed there were more, Beijing has not produced any evidence to prove that allegation” (Goldstein, 1989a, p.106).
completely non-democratic in the social context of that time.

The traditional Tibetan political system was not democratic, but monasteries had internal democracy. Anyone, of any nationality, could enter a monastery, and there were competitive elections for high scholar positions that were open to any monk in the monasteries. Local village leadership was hereditary, but leaders negotiated with the villagers in village decision making. The Chinese Communist Party’s understanding of democracy was learned from the Soviet Union, and implemented in China from 1951-1952 (Shiping, 1997). Tibetan understanding of democracy was learned from the British and India.

**PRC Government Goals and Tactics of Democratic Reform**

According to the Chinese Communist Party Commission in Tibet (CCPCT, 1991) “democratic reform” was the main aim of revolution in Tibet, by overthrowing the slave owners, liberating the slaves; changing the system of ownership to the workers ownership; eliminating the upper monk class and feudal system of serfdom in order to establish a new democratic Tibet (p.144). The basic task and objective of democratic reform was to satisfy the land need of the poor, to conduct land distribution, and to eliminate the serf ownership completely in order to achieve the masses’ ownership of land (p.154).

Zhou Enlai (1961) explained the typical tactics that should be used in implementing democratic reform. He said that it was necessary “must try to unify with the masses, split up upper class, isolate and fight with the reactionary people. If we do not politically strive for masses, break their internal social institutions into weak groups, if we do not mobilize the masses only rely on armies fighting will not be wine (p.43-48).”

The three major feudal landowning groups, the government, monastery, and feudal nobles, were the target of democratic reform (CCPCT, 1991, p.150). The democratic reform had
two aims: the emancipation of villagers and distribution of land. First, the central government indicated that all serfs should be freed and all debts should be cancelled. Second, all land belonging to nobles and monasteries was shared equally with villagers. Nobles were allowed to keep only as much land as other villagers received and were *compensated* with cash payments for the land they lost. Monasteries lost all their land, and people who rebelled against the PRC also lost their all right to own the land and were imprisoned (CCPCT, 1991).

However, to share the land equally among the deserving masses, it was necessary to categorize each family in Tibet. The Han cadres in Tibetan villages had to categorize the Tibetan villagers into five classes: the serf-owners’ class, middle class, lower class, poor class and the serf class.

Zhou Enlai (1961) also advised that Tibetan democratic reform required effective recruitment of Han cadres and officials, who should learn Tibetan language, and Tibetan cadres who should learn the Chinese language in order to work more effectively for long term of development of Tibet. According to Zhou:

> Our foundations of leaderships cannot only base on the Han cadres in Tibet but also required to recruit and develop the Party’s organization in society; otherwise, the Party’s basis has no stability in Tibet. When we accomplish socialism in Tibet, we then can develop the New Democratic Tibet (CPC, 1991, p.181).

**Categorizing masses into different social classes**

The Chinese Communist Party’s activity in Tibet, a non-democratic and non-socialist society, was based on the actual context at that time. Cadres successfully identified the people who could work with them and recruited them as Party members; those new Party members were people chosen from ordinary people in village or township. Cadres adapted successful tactics
from their experience in Han area democratic reform to the new social context of Tibet. However, some of these tactics caused more conflict later.

The Han cadres in Tibetan villages began to categorize the Tibetan villagers into five classes: the serf-owners’ class, middle class, lower class, poor class and the serf class (Dhondub Choedon (1978)). However, Dhondub Choedon (1978) also states that in some cases when the Chinese cadres first came to Tibet they actually recruited Party members mainly from the upper and middles classes. Thus, the democratic reform aimed at satisfying the lower classes by removing the power of the nobles was implemented by Chinese outsiders and opportunistic nobles.

The Panchen Lama criticized this process, since cadres often gave no thought as to whether the movement was carried out with care and whether the quality was good or bad and they categorized Tibetans villages and township leaders, monastery administrators as feudal lords and their agents without enough investigation and understanding of local society. Categorizing the Tibetan villagers, the Han cadres criteria were based on culturally ignorance and political ideology without considering actual conditions. Thus, cadres created divisions between the classes.

Mobilizing the masses and leading the internal struggle

The Panchen Lama also states that when the cadres were mobilizing the masses, although cadres gathered together the masses and made a report or speech about democratic reform mobilization, the masses understood very little of it, for example, asking what is democracy and what is socialism, never heard even the word no matter how broad meaning of Democracy and Socialism it is (p.7). Thus, mobilization of villagers was based only on economic
benefit, attracting the masses by giving them more land. The mobilization did not depend on any non-material reasons for villagers to participate in the reform and also ignored the importance to villagers of spiritual life.

**Democratic Reform in Monasteries**

As a cultural and spiritual institution in Tibet, the monasteries are a major institution with many important functions for the entire society besides religious functions (see Table 2 below). Compared to the Church sector in El Salvador, the Tibetan monasteries traditionally take political responsibility and are more focused on development of the wisdom and compassion with spirituality. The Church in El Salvador, “was motivated to form organizations via the government’s rural cooperative program and its close relations with the newly elected Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in parliament and city governments (Almeida, 2003, p.363-364).” In contrast, from the Tibetan view, the monasteries are an organization that provides more social cohesion to society than the Tibetan government did. However, when the Chinese cadres (CCPCT, 1991) implemented the democratic reform, they targeted the monasteries as one of the three major landowners and a “nest” of rebels (CPC, 1991, p.177). However, despite these facts, villagers strongly respected the role of monasteries in rural society, and so the “democratic reform” against monasteries neither solved the institutional dilemma nor satisfied the Tibetan villagers’ requirements, but did accomplish external political goals.

The negative treatment of monasteries in democratic reform did not follow the central government’s advice, which was more “democratic”. Zhou Enlai (1961), the second highest state manager of PR China, pointed out that the number of monks and monasteries could keep should
be based on what the local Tibetan masses’ require; as many small and large monasteries could be retained as the local masses wanted (p.43-48).

Thus, Zhou Enlai’s advice was to tolerate religion and not to use force against traditional beliefs and practices. However, the Panchen Lama (1962) pointed out that undemocratic methods were often used in democratic reform in monasteries. For example, in some cases, according to the Panchen Lama, cadres gathered monks and nuns together and asked them whether they preferred to continue as monks and nuns or return to secular life. If few of them chose to return to their villages, some of them would be forced to choose a partner of the opposite sex and return to village life as a married couple against their will. Here we see there was a contradiction between state managers and policy practitioners which caused failure social movement or further conflict. This was also deprived the civil rights of males and females free to choose the marriage partners. Han cadres’ incorrect practice came from a complete lack of understanding of the actual situation in Tibet. First, they did not understand the multiple functions of the monasteries within local society. Second, it is true that the Tibetan monasteries were not engaging in local community development as the Church in El Salvador does. This is a fundamental difference between Church in El Salvador and monasteries in Tibet.

Functioning as a Tibetan institution, the most districts monastery are covering such fields as philosophy, logical reasoning debate as a dialectical practise in order to develop intellectual ability, esoteric Buddhism, medicine, poetry, history, biography, mathematics, theory of Tibetan language and astrology. The monastery consist all those subjects in as six colleges. Based on this, Paul K. Nietupski (2008) views the role of monastery is as the “location resulted in both assertions of Tibetan identity and dynamic social, political, and economic interaction. The monastic authorities owned an enormous nomadic and agricultural estate that extended over
much of southern Gansu Province and into northern Sichuan and eastern Qinghai. Though politically and economically much reduced, Labrang monastery's influence is still important in present-day Amdo (pp. 513 - 535).” Likely, there are many more monasteries in other reigns with monasteries functioning well as Rong bo, Amchog, sDe dge and sku bum monasteries in Amdo and Kham. However, using a political approach similar to PPRT, they saw monasteries as part of the Tibetan state and targeted the entire monastery and monastery system as an enemy, rather than mobilizing and recruiting large numbers of poor monks and monk scholars to participate in reform and “splitting” them from rich monks who were large landowners. Moreover, the monastery also educated “the scientific practitioner and philosopher, especially concerned with the discovery of the nature of reality and the fostering of the human ability to evolve through education, to develop, change, and grow” (Thurman, 2008, p. 37). Moreover, the Chinese Han cadres did not understand this social and cultural function of the monastery in local society and used their political power and variety of tactics to attack it. The short-sighted view had weakened religious institutions but strengthened religious feelings of Tibetan masses, and the Tibetans’ belief got deeper than before. This means that the external reformers twisted the “democratic reform” and succeeded materially, did not succeed in changing the consciousness of The priority of “democratic reform” in monasteries is to distinguish rebel and none-rebel, conduct the different policy for each group, which was to take over the means of production or do the redeem. However, all need to conduct the "Three Antis and Three Accounts" campaigns, the work procedures were: first firmly grasp suppression; secondly grasp feudal specializations; thirdly grasp feudal exploit; fourthly grasp the “democratic administrations.” participation of Tibetan cadres recruited from villagers and poor monks in implementing reform.
Through the monasteries reform to abolish the feudal specialization, cut off the monasteries' connections from the economical, the political and all the aspect of society with rural areas, stockbreeding areas and townships. Villagers and poor monks, based on a lack of understanding of Tibetan society, and insufficient for the democratic reform in monasteries, after finishing the suppression, Chinese committee work in Tibet and People’s Liberation Army administration selected and sent group of Chinese Han and Tibetan people on March 3, 1959 and divided them into three groups of cadres entered the three major monasteries: Drebon, Sera, Gaden, completely mobilized the poor monks and unified upper class of religionists in order to expose crimes of three major monasteries who participated and organized the rebel, check the rebels door to door and take over the arms.

At the beginning of June 1959, tied the two campaigns of monasteries “democratic reform” and agricultural areas’ "Three antis and two reductions" at same time. All the serfs, who came from nearby monasteries, were brought their personal experiences of how the three major monasteries’ exploit and rebellions to light as crimes. Meanwhile, cadres were conducted the "Three Antis and Three accounts" campaign in monasteries. The Chinese Han cadres were broke the internal institutions of monasteries by class categorizations, at the same time, there was no internal organization had led the Tibetan rebels but the cadres were organized the serfs very tactically to make the struggle with the rebels.

Clearly, to stabilize external position in internal society is not a simple situation, it is related every social trend, but the democratic reform in another cultural and spiritual institutions of monasteries were the one of the trends that they have done already.
### Table 9
The variety of views and roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View Roles</th>
<th>Actuality</th>
<th>Villagers’ view</th>
<th>Chinese cadres political view</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Monastery, Lama and high monks owned much local land; poor monks and poor villagers worked this land in exchange for barley</td>
<td>Villagers and poor monks support expropriation of land from lamas, rich monks and monasteries</td>
<td>Monastery is source of economic exploitation of masses; Poor villagers will support expropriation of land from monasteries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Villagers strongly believe in Buddhism</td>
<td>Villagers see religion as central to worldview. Belief in reincarnation leads to acceptance of suffering in this life. Buddhism itself not seen as exploitative.</td>
<td>Religion seen as ideology that justifies the exploitation of the masses. In propaganda, monasteries, lamas and rich monks targeted as enemies of masses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Tibetan traditional schools, colleges &amp; universities</td>
<td>Highly respected by villagers</td>
<td>Monastery knowledge is religious not secular; superstition, not scientific; a feudal relic not modern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extensive network of institutions of all Tibetan knowledge, religious and secular: mathematics, philosophy, history, medicine, science, astrology and astronomy</td>
<td>Cultural resource for villages Most village families tried to send one boy to become a monk and get traditional education</td>
<td>Therefore, no valid, useful, practical knowledge beneficial for masses can come from there Opposed monastery education as of no value to villagers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>As knowledge centre, Tibetan traditional medicine practitioners are located in monasteries</td>
<td>Villagers depend on monasteries for most illness; travel to monastery for diagnosis and medicine</td>
<td>Unaware of medical function of monasteries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and symbolic</td>
<td>Village life centers on Buddhism and monasteries.</td>
<td>Impossible to conceive Tibetan life without monasteries</td>
<td>Ignore cultural and symbolic function of monasteries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Democratic reform in agricultural areas of Tibet**

The PRC government introduced democratic reform in agricultural areas at different time in different place. According to the Chinese central government policy of conducting the suppression of rebellion and reform at the same time, the Work Committee of Party in Tibet reported about how to take the right of law from Tibetan institution or society, delimit the boundary lines in local areas, deal with the old officials from Tibetan government, deal with the rebels, take over the arms, establish new government as the local government, and conduct the
land reform. The “Three Antis and Two Reductions” policy made the detail thirteen points and method of implementing policy for the forming areas and for the thirteen aspects of the monasteries, animal herding areas as well.

Democratic reform in Tibet was conducted into two steps. The first step was aimed at the Three Antis (anti rebellion; anti wulag; anti slaving) Two Reductions (reduce the tenancy and interest); the second step was aimed at implementing the land redistribution (CCPCT, 1991, p.146). The content of the first step of work was: in the agricultural areas conducted the “Three Antis and Two Reductions” (anti rebellion, anti wulag, anti slave, reduce the interest, reduce the tenancy) campaigns then move onto the second step which was to conduct the land reform.

On July 1 of 1959, Chinese Communist Party in Tibet Commission clearly pointed out that the reform needs to be tested in certain areas to obtain the experience, and according to the both subjective and objective conditions then gradually implement reform other areas, and not carry it out everywhere at the same time (CCPCT, 1991, History of revolution in Tibet, p.149).

According to communist Party, the work was divided into three stages: the first stage was to publicize successful suppression of rebellion and the "Three Antis" and the "Two Reductions" policies, start to clarify whom should be united, and whom should be targeted; the second stage was to mobilize the people and carry out struggle, to expose the evils of rebellions and the feudal system; the third stage was to dig up oppression from the roots, constantly develop masses understanding and change the feudal ownership into the working people’s people ownership.

According to (CCPCT, 1991, the History of revolution in Tibet, p.164), during the democratic reform “investigation” and “setting of account”, in all of the Tibet Autonomous Region, there were 634 feudal class families, 462 of which were engaged in rebellion and 172 of which were not involved in rebellion. According to the same source, there were 2,676
monasteries were in Tibet Autonomous Region, 1436 of which engaged in rebellion, and 1190 of which were not involved in rebellious campaigns. Clearly, the huge majority of the feudal class and a bare majority of monasteries were engaged in the opposition to against the Chinese rule. Nevertheless, external the democratic reform succeeded the democratic reform succeeded in Tibetan areas. Why? Because the PLA used land reform skillfully as a tactic to mutualism political opposition. Those who were involved in opposition had their land confiscated; those who were not involved were rewarded with grants of land, most of which came from confiscated land. So although the majority of rebels and monasteries supported rebellion, the masses were inactive at first. After they saw the benefits of land reform, the poorest of the masses, who received land for the first time, because support of CPC reform.

While it is necessarily believed that Tibetan society as a whole opposed external reform, the above analysis shows that this is true primarily of upper levels of society. There was a division between these levels and the lowest levels of society which the PLA exploited and as a result achieved a tactical success in implementing democratic reform.

**Democratic reform in pastoral areas**

Applying the agricultural areas’ democratic reform (1951-1952) experience to the pastoral areas quite different conditions was a unstated. The main purpose of the democratic reform in those areas the same as in agricultural areas, but instead of Two Reductions there were to mobilize the masses, crush down the rebel. Two Benefits (benefit herders and benefit grassland owners). However, in implementation at the local level there are many “excesses”. Thus, Panchen Lama (1962) emphasize that when the cadres arrived in the herding areas they started the “Three Antis” and the “Two Benefits” campaigns. They launched such a fierce and
acute struggle against many herd owners and wealthy herders. They also only thought about how to preserve their own lives, which led to local food shortages, and neglected the care of their livestock. When mobilizing the herding serfs, the cadres only laid particular stress only on educating them to oppose the herd owners and wealthy herding people, and they neglected the necessary education about the “Two Benefits” policy (See table 4).

The Committee in Tibet made a clear and specific policy for pastoral areas: 1) to rely on poor herdsman, and united with any other possible group of people include as much as they could, except to rebels and major land owners; 2) Declared the reform policy for animal herding area, which was no change in all area except the three major landowners, and their regents and grassland owner, who were participated in the rebel, took animals from them to distributes to poor serfs; Conduct Implement the two benefit policy (benefit for herd owners and serfs), is the major policy to protect and develop animal husbandry (CCPCT, 1991, p.174).

Basically, democratic reform was carried out in pastoral areas in the same way as in agricultural areas. Grassland and livestock were redistributed with the poorest class receiving a large share. Those who rebelled had their property confiscated. However, perhaps “Dizzy with Success” they applied this successful policy mechanically without doing discussion and investigation on the assumption that all Tibetan areas were alike. However, although the poor class in the agricultural area were willing to accept the benefits of land and livestock redistribution, they had not participated in external SMO. It may be a result of a communication because both sides were monolingual. Another possible reason is that due to their long isolation and independent lifestyle the poor herders were willing to accept land and livestock but not political constitute from CPC which was seen as an external organization.
### Table 10
Democratic reforms in agricultural and pastoral areas in Tibet, 1956-1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>Upper class</th>
<th>Middle class</th>
<th>Lower class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRC Tactical Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic/Rebel</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist Reform</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Supporters</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Reform Supporters</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F/H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Three Antis:             |             |              |             |
| a) anti rebellion        | All were targeted by PRC, and their institutional functions in the state cut (Engaged in uprisings in 1959 in Lhasa; 1958 in Kham and Amdo) | Initially greeted PRC reforms; disengaged from internal institutions; watched the struggle from the sidelines to see the outcome | All were targeted by PRC, and their institutional functions in the state cut (Engaged in uprisings in 1959 in Lhasa; 1958 in Kham and Amdo) |
| b) anti serf             | All were targeted by PRC, and their institutional functions in the state cut (Engaged in uprisings in 1959 in Lhasa; 1958 in Kham and Amdo) | Factional division: some used PRC reform against local rivals for power; others stood by attempting neutral stance | All were targeted by PRC, and their institutional functions in the state cut (Engaged in uprisings in 1959 in Lhasa; 1958 in Kham and Amdo) |
| c) anti slave            | Most lower class including officials and monks with lower class origins welcomed these reforms | Disengaged from internal institutions; many joined external institutions | Disengaged from internal institutions; many joined external institutions |

| Two reductions:         |             |              |             |
| a) reduce tenancy;      | Not directly targeted this campaign; indirectly the source of their internal power is threatened | a) Co-opt opposition to rebels by waiving this policy and granting them property confiscated from upper class rebels | a) Co-opt opposition to rebels by waiving this policy and granting them property confiscated from upper class rebels |
| b) reduce interest rates| c) Join external institutions; b) Connection with internal social institutions broken completely | c) Join external institutions. b) Connection with internal social institutions broken completely | c) Join external institutions. b) Connection with internal social institutions broken completely |

| Two Benefits:           |             |              |             |
| a) benefit herders      | Attracted this class to be reform supporters and allowed access to external organization/institutions. | No relevant to this group | Attracted this class to be reform supporters and allowed access to external organization/institutions. |
| b) benefit grassland    | No relevant to this group | No relevant to this group | No relevant to this group |
| owners                  |                          |                          |                          |

---

14. The same individuals are called “patriots” in Tibetan sources and “rebels” in PRC sources.
15. Note: “M” refers to monks; “G” refers to Government officials; “F/H” refers to farmers and herdsmen.
16. “Wulag” refers to Tibetan serfs who owed corvée service, including, taxes, rent paid in livestock, and reduced taxes paid in kind (barley flour, etc.)
17. “Slaves”, about 10% of the population in 1949, were in some cases prisoners of war from Tibetan or non-Tibetan populations, while in the majority were enslaved by their debtors (or their parents’ debtors) for unpaid debts. Chinese government documents about traditional Tibetan society combine the two categories of slave and serf.
Failed external social movement resulting in pan-Tibetan uprisings (1955-1959)

Amdo and Kham

Democratic reform began in 1955 in Amdo and Kham provinces. Village poor were enthusiastic about receiving land and most did not resist PRC rule. Poor monks supported confiscation of monastery land, and many accepted the offer of land in return for leaving the monastery and returning to village life. Many rich monks, noble and middle class landowners accepted payment for their land, and some were recruited as Party members. Many lamas also did not oppose the reform. Those nobles and villagers who had fought the PLA when it entered Tibetan areas were sent to jail. Thus, the early results of the democratic reform seemed successful from the PRC government point of view.

However, during this time local cadres struggled directly against the entire monastery system. At first, their tactics were to make propaganda against the monasteries, which villagers did not pay attention to. Monasteries and their leaders also did not oppose this propaganda directly either. However, after it seemed the democratic reform had succeeded with little opposition, local cadres changed their tactics to attack monasteries more directly. Instead of debating with monks and lamas who opposed the reform and making propaganda against them, cadres with the support of the army began to arrest and even execute their religious opponents. Most monastery leaders and monks, even those who had not opposed the reform before, reacted strongly against this new negative attitude and cruel tactics and tried to mobilize local society to drive the PRC out of their district. Local mobilization was very successful and included the majority of local rural society, not only the landowners, but also the poor villagers who had received much material benefit from the PRC reform. This resistance happened throughout
Amdo and Kham in 1957-58. It is important to note that it was mobilized by individual local monasteries in reaction to repression in their district and was not organized on a regional level.

From the CPC side, the uprisings were a surprise and meant the failure of their democratic reform process which was supposed to stop this kind of reaction by mobilizing the masses to support CPC rule. Why did it fail? The major reason is the failure to understand the significant role of the monastery in village life and the high respect villagers gave it even after land reform. Villagers were willing to accept land that was taken from monasteries as an economic benefit. However, that did not mean that they had lost all respect for the monastery and had been persuaded by propaganda that the monastery was their enemy. This can be explained by MISMT which allows us to treat the monastery as a multi-functional institution; Poor masses may have opposed the economic function of the monastery and supported land reform. Clearly, it did not mean that they rejected the cultural and religious function of the monastery and would accept wide oppression of monks and monasteries. The uprisings were eventually defeated but not by social movement methods, but using military force. This was a military victory, but a political and social failure.

From the Tibetan side, the Amdo and Kham uprisings also were a failure, since there was never any serious chance to defeat PRC army militarily. Afterwards, military control of Tibetan areas was increased. To oppose a powerful external challenger or political organization requires according to Social Movement Theory a variety of conditions. It is not only about emotions but also depends on how to mobilize the social resources, including multi-institutional co-ordination and a trained army. However, none of these conditions existed in Amdo and Kham at the time of these uprisings. The Amdo and Kham Tibetan people rebelled based only on an emotional

---

18 This information has not been gathered systematically, but is based on conversations with older villagers and
reaction. It is true, however, that the uprisings were followed by reduced oppression of monasteries and monks, and so in this limited sense, the uprisings succeeded. However, the cost to the village masses was great in terms of loss of life and numbers imprisoned. Furthermore, the nature of local reform changed. Earlier, the PRC cadres had relied more on social movement tactics to reform Tibet than material power. Because of Han cadres use of force against monasteries, one Tibetan institution, an uprising of all Tibetan society was created, which then caused the PRC to use massive military force. Until the last stage of democratic reform, there had been some chance for the monasteries to challenge CPC policy development and implementation through social movement tactics. Furthermore, Tsering Shakya (1999), the uprising in Kham and Amdo started in 1955 because the Chinese didn’t apply the same rules to these areas as to central Tibet and they began many reforms, namely redistributing land and settling nomads. Administratively, the Chinese cut-off the Tibet into Ten Autonomous Prefectures, Two Autonomous Counties and one Tibet Autonomous Region then made different policy to treat as a different nationality. Moreover, many local Tibetans have different reasons to revolt, for example, some Tibetan people thought that red Communist will destroy the holy religion, some thought that red communist will change their lifestyle. Generally, the uprising aimed to target the political external leadership and states. For example, from March 10, 1959 the majority of Tibetans were started the uprising in U-tsang. In Amdo and Kham, there were no professional trained ordinary local people revolted the external political organization of People’s Liberation Army and Han cadres. During the uprising the different Tibetan social institutions did not co-ordinate to supports each other, some of the institution representative were greeted external organization by private discord (Panchen Lama sent the encourage letter to request the
Beijing to liberated people in Tibet) and some against the external organization. This means the Tibetan could not organize their social resources preparedly or never be organized rather than military resistance.

**U-tsang**

The democratic reform process in U-tsang was greatly affected by the experience of Amdo and Kham. The PRC government’s intention was to gradually implement this reform, first in Amdo and Kham and then, learning from this experience, to bring the reform to the more remote U-tsang province. As mentioned above, democratic reform seemed to be very successful in Amdo and Kham, and so it was planned to start this reform in U-tsang in 1959. During the time of the Amdo and Kham uprisings in 1967-58, no major reforms had been introduced in U-tsang and traditional society and government continued according to the 17-point Agreement. No place in U-tsang participated in major protest or uprising during the Amdo and Kham uprisings.

However, one year following the uprisings in Amdo and Kham and their military suppression, *democratic reform* was introduced into U-tsang in January of 1959 without the agreement of the Tibetan government. According to the Dalai Lama, some reforms had been carried out by the Tibetan government before then:

> but when we started the reform committee, the first act was relieving the horse taxes. And then (hereditary) debts. Then there were more reform plans. For example, the estates which were owned by the wealthy families, we wanted those to be given back to the government. There was a step-by-step plan. But then the Chinese were reluctant to allow these reforms to go forward. They wanted their own way. That is true (Thomas, 2006, p.317).

When the democratic reform was introduced, the PRC cadres tried to mobilize the masses of U-tsang, and initially succeeded, because land reform was popular among the poor rural people. The results of political disenfranchising process and movements of democratic reform
caused Uprising in 1959 to against the changing of radicalization in Tibet. Mullin, (1981, p.8) describes “in March 1959 a revolt broke out in Lhasa. The revolt was crushed by Chinese troops, the Tibet government was dissolved and its functions were transferred to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The Panchen Lama was appointed acting chairman of that committee.

The Chinese conducted many different reform policies such as land redistribution and resettling nomads. The Chinese desired deeper dominations and eager to disarm the Tibetans but did not in the Kham. This was caused more anger and revolts and these areas’ people also attacked external rulers. As a result, the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous prefecture was established later in 1957. Unlike Amdo and Kham, only a few rich landowners cooperated with the compensation for land program, and many poor monks opposed taking land from monasteries, lamas and rich monks, even though they themselves did not lose any land. According to Dhondub Choedon (1978), the spiritual, cultural and political role of monks and nobles in U-tsang was more important to them than material benefit. Monks and landowners organized protests and mobilized masses to join the protests, saying that the democratic reform was an attack on Tibetan sovereignty. At first, PRC army in U-tsang tolerated these non-violent demonstrations. However, on March 23rd 1958, an order came from Beijing to crack down hard on this resistance using deadly force. Soon after an uprising began across U-tsang mobilized by Tibetan government official, was saying to Tibetan society that their aim was to defend Tibet’s sovereignty, not to defend Buddhism and the monastery system. When Tibetan officials tried to mobilize the masses to oppose the land reform militarily in March 1959, they succeeded in getting the support of much of the poor rural population. Clearly, the process of democratic reform in U-tsang was quite different and brought very different responses from the actors.
Starting to against a powerful external enemy or political organization is requested variety of the conditions, it is not only about emotions but also depends on how to mobilize the social resources, multi-institutional co-ordinations and been trained army. However, none of conditions were Tibetan people prepared at that time just based on as an emotional rising. Furthermore, Tsering Shakya (1999), the uprising in Kham and Amdo started in 1955 because the Chinese didn’t apply the same rules to these areas as to central Tibet and they began many reforms, namely redistributing land and settling nomads. Administratively, the Chinese cut-off the Tibet into Ten Autonomous Prefectures, Two Autonomous Counties and one Tibet Autonomous Region then made different policy to treat as a different nationality. Moreover, many local Tibetans have different reasons to revolt, for example, some Tibetan people thought that red Communist will destroy the holy religion, some thought that red communist will change their lifestyle. Generally, the uprising aimed to target the political external leadership and states. For example, from March 10, 1959 the majority of Tibetans were started the uprising in U-tsang. In Amdo and Kham, there were no professional trained ordinary local people revolted the external political organization of People’s Liberation Army and Han cadres. During the uprising the different Tibetan social institutions did not co-ordinate to supports each other, some of the institution representative were greeted external organization by private discord (Panchen Lama sent the encourage letter to request the Beijing to liberated people in Tibet) and some against the external organization. This means the Tibetan could not organize their social resources preparedly or never be organized.

The results of political disenfranchising process and movements of democratic reform caused Uprising in 1959 to against the changing of radicalization in Tibet. Mullin, (1981, p.8) describes “in March 1959 a revolt broke out in Lhasa. The revolt was crushed by Chinese troops,
the Tibet government was dissolved and its functions were transferred to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The Panchen Lama was appointed acting chairman of that committee.”

The Chinese conducted many different reform policies such as redistributing land and settling nomads. The Chinese desired deeper dominations and eager to disarm the Tibetans but did not in the Kham. This was caused more anger and revolts and these areas’ people also attacked external rulers. As a result, the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous prefecture was established later in 1957.


After finishing democratic reform and suppression through labors’ campaigns, the Chinese, as an external organization started to move onto the next political stages without internal masses’ requirement. The third seepage of staking into the Tibetan society was tactically carried out with a political campaign: “Socialization”. According to Ginsburgs, clearly, the purpose of this enterprise was largely negative, in the sense at least that its effects were not valued by Peking in themselves but rather as phenomena preliminary and preparatory to further progress. Its immediate function thus lay in helping curry favor with the masses, alienate the latter from their own ruling circles, disrupt the organic unity of the Tibetan society and, eventually enable the Chinese to secure dominant control over a people deeply divided against it, so that the task of "building socialism" could then be begun in properly propitious circumstance (1964, p.60).

According to Grunfeld (1996) Tibet had no other way to travel but the way of socialism. However, Socialism and Tibet are still very different from each other. A gradual reform has to be
carried out….This will depend on circumstance and it will be carried out by the leaders of the people of Tibet and will not be imposed on them by force by other people (p.126).

Zhou Enlai gave the guidance for leading Communist Party members in Tibet at that time, saying:

First of all, leading the masses to focus on development of economy, production, and improve their lives; secondly, completely finish the democratic reform, conduct the education of democratic politics and ideology, patriotic education and socialist perspective education; third, eliminate the removing of reactionaries and anti-revolutionaries; fourth, deal with the upper class unity work; fifth, rectify cadres’ work style, develop the Party’s organization foundations, nurture the Tibetan cadres; sixth, build the People’s representatives’ congress system in order to establish the Tibetan Autonomous Region. If the above stages are done well, then we can enhance the people’s unity and Chinese Han nationality and Tibetan nationality relationships, stabilize the Party’s leadership, labors’ alliance and people’s republic govern, thus we also can create reliable conditions for socialization transformation (1961, p.43-48).

Zhou Enlai (1961, pp. 43-48) also guided them reform as a united front with upper class people who were not involved in the rebellion. Especially, there are advantages if we treat the Panchen Lama and others friendly: first we could unite with all of Tibetan people; secondly we have the reasons to agues internationally on struggle for Tibetan issues so that this is very important.

Conceiving socialization of monasteries, in September of 1963, the Work Committee in Tibet carried out a work policy based on what Zhou Enlai had said, which emphasized class education, patriotic education and socialist education should be prior to conduct through whole society. The class education was the central part of three major educations to advocates class and class struggle. Through the class education to discover the masses’ class struggles. They required that the three major educations implemented as a campaign link to the poverty association establishment (CPC, 1991, p.205). Close the internal cultural and holey institutions monasteries, at the same time the Chinese cadres were organized their own political institutions without competitive election then staked into internal society and have no access for internal masses in the leadership level just use them to participated activities.
Thus, their work focus moved from development onto the class struggles in order to carry out the “Three Educations” and “Four eliminations”. The three educations were divided into two stages: first was anti feudalism and completed the democracy revolution; the second stage was conduct experimental socialism transform (CPC, 1991, p.206). Indeed, socialization itself, for Chinese cadres were not clearly understood what does acutely the mean of socialism. In the Amdo and Kham areas, the Chinese cadres were just use these words such as counter-revolutionaries, reactionaries, spies, class enemies and bad elements and thus to conducted the harshest campaign in Qinghai and Gansu Tibetan areas. Donnet (1994) emphasizes that “in 1959, the monasteries in the Autonomous Region were in habited by 114,000 monks, but by 1966 there were only 6,900 left. Kham and Amdo were not spread the destruction (p.69).” The Chinese built up their domination system and treated ordinary Tibetan people to accept that the Chinese Communist Party is only the one hopeful leadership and the socialism is also only the one historically societal approach of Tibet through this additional campaign. Zhou Enlai (1961) also gave the critical guidance on how to establish the people’s representatives’ congress and committee was the key step of completion of democratic reform and to stabilize the people’s democratic polity, and this has never happened in Tibetan history.

However, the authority must be controlled by lower class or poor people and must be representing all the masses, then implement the People’s democratic dictatorship under the Party’s leadership (pp.43-48). Every levels of official must obey what the Central Committee say there were not allowed any other political creations. All the work must be based on reality through the investigations and Tibetan reality not mechanically implement the Han areas experience in Tibet. Must be rely on masses, follow the class line and masses line, each work benefit is for masses, implement the equal policy of nationality, negotiate with the Tibetan people
and Tibetan cadres, more likely to unify and coordinate with the upper class and religionists, step-by-step work for Tibet (pp.43-48).

However, the Tibet’s rich materially cultural environment, language, customs and dress, which all were completely different from Chinese culture, were still been the visibility of existences as the fertile ground can growth more the new differences in the future. This culturally cleavage caused another disenfranchisement as next section.

*External Social movement (3): Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976)*

David Stephens (2007) thought that “culture is fundamentally about meaning and values. Education and development will be concerned with these two fundamentals as long as individuals, communities and cultures agree and contest what it means to be ‘educated’ and ‘developed’ (p.21).” In a way of extensibility, the meaning and values of culture itself is existed based on inner spirituality and materially cultural environment. Thus, however, as the second stage of radicalization process, the cultural disenfranchisement is that the external organization enter the other society to miss-mobilizes and control the internal masses by political power to destroy the culturally social environment in order to accomplish the radicalization completely, example of Cultural Revolution in Tibet. Stein (1972) sees “The Cultural Revolution has carried its turmoil into Tibet, and reports of fighting between different factions have reached the outer world. It is no wonder that the flow of Tibetan refugees to India is still continuing today (p. 91).”

Thinking the terminology of Cultural Revolution (CR) itself critically is essentially important to understand how the Chinese cadres used the meaning of it during the process. It was all about to destroy the materially cultural environment is the purpose of this campaign. The ten years period of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Zheng, Sh. (1997) “the movement began in the
spring of 1963, and by 1964 thousands of Party work teams and more than one million Party and government officials had been sent down to the villages to mobilize the masses (p.135).” The Chinese government sent and organized group of cadres were working in every village and mobilize the masses to conduct the policy of destroy “four olds: old ideas, culture, customs, and habits (Zheng, Sh. 1997, p.136).” Woser.(2006), changing the name was also a component of Cultural Revolution, which was symbol of creating new name, was gave the new name from street to stores, from villages to every single person because of the Tibetan language name was excluded in Four Olds, must be changed. The names of the majority Tibetan people were changed by public security, in Lhasa (p.154). Compare to the democratic reform, this external cultural campaign targeted monasteries and its construction as ghost nest to destroy it completely in every village over all of Tibetan areas. On May 21, 1967, Chairman Mao advised to establish the Military Control Commission in Lhasa and all other areas. Thus, again, the military took the control from all the different levels of government and strongly functioned in this revolution which became a very complicated campaign (p.210). During the Cultural Revolution, People’s commune was worsened people’s spiritual life deeply and it same as destroyed Four Olds (p.257). However, the four olds included every things that Chinese Han cadres see if it were very differences from them then it were old should be destroyed including the Tibetan language in some of Tibetan areas in Amdo, for example, the Cultural Revolution cadres forced to every villagers to memorized the Mao’s Red book in Chinese language no one allowed to speak Tibetan, in Tianzhu at that period. As a result, now, in this region needs Chinese-Tibetan interpreters to have communication between grandparents and grandchildren.

The Cultural Revolution began when young Red Guards came from elsewhere and was appalled to see the slow rate of social program in Tibet compared with other areas of China. The
practice of religion was still widespread and the move towards agricultural communes—which began in most other areas of China in 1958—had hardly commenced. The Red Guards argued for immediate transformation towards socialism without regard for local conditions. These arguments caused a split among the thousands of Han cadres in Tibet and they divided into two factions: one is favoured existing policies of gradual transformation, and the other one is wanted instant change. The division quickly spread to Tibetan youth, particularly those receiving Chinese secondary and political education, and before long serious fighting broke out between the rival factions. For a while the triumphed and so began the systematic destruction of much of Tibet's rich cultural heritage. Every components of cultural atmosphere is targeted as an old culture to be destroyed and also elder people were denounced as being superstitions.

The destruction took three stages. First, experts came and marked the precious stones and they were then removed; then metal experts came who marked the precious metals for removal; the buildings were then dynamited and timber was taken away for use by local commune and the stones were left for anyone to use. Secondly, most of the destruction was carried out by young Tibetans. The Chinese took care to stay in the background.

The Culture Revolution also saw the introduction of communes throughout most of Tibet. Many Tibetans who had previously benefited under the redistribution of land from the monasteries may have felt they were losing what they had earlier gained.

During this period, officials were under instructions to observe a ten-point policy which aimed to discourage people from voting with their feet by fleeing to India and Nepal, and also brewed further episodic conflict or political movement to target the states by political opportunities.


External Social movement (4):

Establishing State Education System and Mass Political Education (1951-2008)

Mass education (1951 to 2008) as culturally disenfranchising external social movement

Mass education is presented by the CPC government as a major benefit of its policy in minority areas. While presented as a benefit to Tibetans in itself, it also forms a key component of the state’s mobilization and recruitment tactics within Tibetan areas. China’s modernization of Tibetan areas requires a cadre of Tibetans who: (a) understand Tibetan language and culture; (b) understand Han language and culture; (c) understand modern science, technology and administration. Provided such a cadre, there will be expert bilingual staff in management, administration, cultural and education positions who can mediate between the central state and local Tibetan population and who accept the major goals of the CPC for Tibetan areas.

However, in 1951 in Tibetan areas of China, some of the poor masses may have accepted some of CPC goals, but not all: at any rate, the masses were not literate in Tibetan, let alone Chinese. The upper classes who did not openly oppose the aims of the CPC, with whom a national front could be formed, were literate in Tibetan, could speak local Chinese dialect, but were illiterate in Chinese characters, uneducated in modern knowledge, and according to Mao’s class analysis, sooner or later would resist the CPC. Thus, it was necessary in Mao’s analysis to educate a new generation quickly from among the Tibetan masses, who would support the CPC’s understanding of the needs of Tibetan areas for modernization and who could form a mediating stratum between Tibetan masses as well as religious.

Thus, mass modern education on the Soviet model was imported to the Tibetan areas in the 1950s. It was an external social movement in several respects. Its aim was to effect massive,
rapid social change. It also was not implemented in response to any internal demand even from uneducated poor Tibetan masses. Every poor herding family tried to educate one son, a strategy common among nomadic populations worldwide (Krätli, 2000). For pastoralists, one educated child sufficed. Moreover, Tibet’s system of monastery education was free, and thus poor families saw no need for new Tibetan schooling or school policies. It was further an external reform, since it was implemented by external educators from another nationality in their own language, which students did not understand, for the purposes of an external political agency. Thus, it is no surprise that massive resistance to mass education imposed externally through compulsory school attendance, with no linguistic or cultural adaptations, and no local demand, was massively resisted in the 1950s.

In later years, the national Chinese curriculum was eventually translated into Tibetan, and so mass education shifted from linguistic ‘submersion’ in a strange language (Baker, 2001), simply cultural, social and political ‘submersion’. Thus, mass education was resisted by Tibetan villagers even after it was delivered in Tibetan language. Of course, one reason for this failure of mass education in Tibetan areas over the years is the failure to follow social movement theory tactics and strategies. CPC education policy and implementation in Tibetan areas never really understood the conditions and function of existing Tibetan education and simply saw as religious education and nothing else, rejecting its content as superstition and oppressive of the masses. CPC policy and implementation simply transferred their attitude towards traditional Chinese education in a Han rural context to the Tibetan rural context without any investigation, dialogue and negotiation. In fact, they could have formed a united front with a sector of monk teachers from a poor background who could have been persuaded of the benefits of secular, modern knowledge for Tibetans. In fact, there is evidence that Tibetan-Buddhist leaders in some districts
had begun before 1949 to introduce modern secular schools located in monasteries as a means to spread useful knowledge. Although these are acknowledging positively now in some local histories, there is no evidence that any possibility of cooperation with progressive elements of Tibetan society was possible. Tibetan people therefore rejected CPC’s mass education as strange, difficult, and inappropriate and resented its compulsory nature; at the same time, the CPC has absolutely rejected Tibetan traditional education and has forbidden the use of monks as teachers in state schools, and any religious content in schools. Thus, modern education has been at an impasse in Tibetan areas for 50 years with neither side using common SMT tactics and strategies, which could have issued in some interesting potential solutions.

The Panchen Lama in his report (1962/1997) criticized the arbitrariness and one-sidedness of the policy process in Tibet:

In schools, organizations and editing and translating institution from the Central authorities down to the local level, people have taken themselves to be infallible and made arbitrary distinctions between bad and good in relation to our Tibetan language, they took as a pretext there being insufficient new words in the Tibetan language, and misrepresented this to say that the Tibetan language is inferior and locks capability to communicate and express meaning, thus insulting the good name of the Tibetan language. Although it is true that there are insufficient new words in the Tibetan language, it is unheard of in the past and it is difficult to see it happening in the future that any language in the world from its inception could have a rich and adequate vocabulary. Therefore, it is necessary for everyone to abandon pride and complacency in relation to our own language, survey other languages and absorb their merits, in order to develop our language and make it healthy and strong and capable of serving our needs. The point about vocabulary being inadequate should definitely not be grasped in order to slander the language itself. These types of actions are also insults to and discrimination against the nationality itself. There are also more than a few people who, due to their own low level of Tibetan, cannot get their point across or express common things or things of depth and they have said that this is the result of deficiencies in the Tibetan language (p.24, 1997).

Such a misinformed, and thus, misguided, education has been supporting disenfranchisement process much more than any other tools do in Tibet. As mentioned for Tibetan areas to “stand up” within China as equal to other regions, they require Tibetans (and Han) who meet the following three criteria, knowledgeable and proficient in Tibetan culture and language, Chinese culture and language, modern science and a foreign language.
The current Tibetan political elite has only simple spoken command of Tibetan, but can speak and are literate in Chinese; the current Tibetan secular cultural elite has a sophisticated command of spoken and written varieties of Tibetan, but have moderate proficiency in spoken Chinese and little written proficiency; the scientific elite consists of exactly 2 persons with a Ph.D in natural sciences who are teaching Han students in Han areas; Han administrators and educators in Tibetan areas are not required to learn Tibetan language and culture, and only do so on rare occasions out of interest. Therefore whenever any modern economic enterprise is proposed, it is proposed by, conducted by and evaluated by non-Tibetans, as it is considered that there is no Tibetan cadre yet ready to take on this responsibility.

After 50 years of failure, a new kind of curriculum reform has been carried out in China, which is the division of curriculum into three levels: national, local and school-based curriculum. Reformers are disputing what percentage of local knowledge should be included in local and school-based curriculum textbook. The significant of this reform is that the central government has given permission to local school system to experiment with adapting local education to local requirement (Zhu, 2002). The MOE advises teachers to investigate their local context including the community, parents and students, their family education (Yang & Zhou, 2002). Clearly, this reform goes long way towards getting Tibetan education back onto the right track.

Nevertheless, this reform is a top-down creation f the central MOE. There may have been local educators who asked for such reform, but many are suspicious. One local education bureau’s staff was interviewed on the question of school-based curriculum development, and stated that their attitude was: “not to encourage, nor to oppose or to concern ourselves (Li et al., 2006, p. 262). That risk-averse attitude was recorded among a less politically sensitive, model minority, the Yughurs. Nevertheless, Tibetan educators are doubly cautious, since advocating
local and school curriculum can be politicized as a rejection of national unity by ambitious local Han officials trying to make a reputation as guardians of the state. Therefore, implementation depends on the local political atmosphere at the regional, county, township and even village level and on the confidence and courage of local educators, who risk getting caught up in political controversies. Han Chinese educators in Tibetan areas, who are normally safe in these political controversies, are reluctant to initiate innovative bilingual education programmes for fear of getting caught up in Tibetan politics.
Chapter Six:  
Education and Reforms in Tibet

Mass political education movement (1951 to 2008)  
as politically disenfranchising external social movement

Breaking the internal institution socially, culturally, economically and emotionally is as a stage of radicalization in a new social context. Chinese cadres in Tibet were conducted this by several different campaigns. After finished the first step of sovereignty and higher level political disenfranchisement and in order to retain its the Chinese cadres also conducted another form of education, which is called Political Education but not for political science studies, was setting up one Tibetan against another. Through this education the Chinese cadres had directed the Tibetan class struggle meetings’ education in special schools. Dhondub Choedon (1978) remembered that the subjective of political education was focused on as follow: 1) the interpretation of natural phenomena such as solar system; 2) Existence of God and all Religions are Myths; 3) The social Evolution: a. Primordial society—all equal; b. Lord and Servant society; c. Lineage or hereditary society; d. Capitalist society; e. Socialist society—the highest and best social order; 4) Class Consciousness; 5) Nation Consciousness; 6) Socialist Society and 7) Uniqueness of Chinese Communist Party Policies (p.59). The misunderstanding of revolution, which Han cadres were conducted in Tibet, is first, seek the poor people and serfs; second, unify the friends and recruit more with the middle-class farmers include rich farmers; third, isolate and target the serf-owners, agent of the serf-owners, reactionaries and bad dangerous persons.
Table 11
Education Types in 20th and 21st century Tibet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Monastery education</th>
<th>Adult Political Education</th>
<th>Adult Mass Education</th>
<th>Formal Primary and Secondary Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1913-1950)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amdo</td>
<td>Traditional education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed areas: Tibetan-Chinese bilingual education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kham</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Majority areas: Tibetan monolingual education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-stang</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (1951-1966) |  |  |  |  |
| Amdo | Mainly political purpose. Maoism, Socialism and "democratizing" education. | Bilingual adult evening classes in ideology | Started to set up state schools. |
| Kham | Same as above | Same as above | Same as above | Started to set up state schools. |
| U-stang | Same as above | Same as above | Same as above | Started to set up state schools. |

| (1966-1979) |  |  |  |  |
| Amdo | Closed | Started to set up the state schools | Compulsory memorization of Mao’s ideological texts | Most have Chinese language of instruction only |
| Kham | Same as above | Started to set up the state schools. | Same as above | Most have Chinese language of instruction only |
| U-stang | Most closed | Started to set up the state schools. | Same as above | Most have Chinese language of instruction only |

| (1980-2004) |  |  |  |  |
| Amdo | Reopened and developed | Focus on political history of Communist Party in China | Eliminate the adult illiteracy by teaching Tibetan and Chinese. | Reopened and developed school system |
| Kham | Reopened and developed | Same as above | Same as above | Reopened and developed school system |
| U-stang | Reopened and developed | Same as above | Same as above | Reopened and developed school system |

Dhondub Choedon (1978) the reason why cadres did this because of their theoretical policies meant of internal social change whereas in Tibet it was a matter of invasion (p.60). This education had been focused on negative activities; use the poor people bit the aristocrats; describe old Tibetan society is the backwardness, darkness, oppression, etc. As the political educators, the cadres think that the foundations of all Tibetan sufferings and evils, which were
the three major serfs-owners, were the Dalai Lama traitorous clique (p.60). Furthermore, the political education is also forcibly eliminating the history of Tibet from the minds of the Tibetan youths and filling their minds with falsehood by official sanctity to the creation of lies. However, the universal truth is that any change caused by internal factors with the external influence. This education changed the internal public minds then accepted the external influences later. This also made fundamental ground for external policies implementations in all the Tibetan areas.

**Formal Education Reform in Tibet (1980-2000):**

*Educational Struggle as Conflict Between Internal and External Social Movements*

According to Goldstein (1989) “in 1994, another wave of educational and party reform was begun within Tibet that sought both to reduce illiteracy and to control more closely the content of education so that Tibetan students will not be exposed to subtle nationalist, separatist ideology. While Tibetans are free to dress, speak, write, and live “Tibetan”, Beijing is now reluctant to implement (institutionalize) additional “cultural” changes that would emphasize the distinctness of Tibet and isolate Tibet further from the rest of China. Thus, China is not implementing language reforms that would mandate Tibetan language as the standard for government offices, and it has been dragging its feet on expanding a program to teach science in Tibetan language in high school, despite the recent completion of a six-year trial program in which students in such programs performed better on college entrance exams that those in the normal Chinese-language science classes. And in early 1997 there were indications of an ominous reversal in Tibet’s educational policy from expanding the use of the Tibetan language in schools to traducing Chinese language earlier. Similarly, Beijing continues to limit the number of monks and has
tightened its control over rebuilding monasteries and over the administration of existing monasteries (p.97).”

**Reduced Role of Tibetan Mother-tongue education**

Currently, Tibetans are facing the challenge of learning three languages. Tibetan cultural areas include several provinces in addition to the Tibetan Autonomous Region—they are found in Gansu, in Qinghai, in Sichuan, and in Yunnan. With regard to the order of languages, Tibetans need to learn their own language, Tibetan, then the state language, Mandarin, and finally, an international language, English. However, officially, the government regards Mandarin as the first language in Tibetan areas in China by political decision.

Young generations of Tibetans are facing with three languages in schools and social context. Here are the circumstances that Tibetans are facing: if they are not proficient in Chinese, they won't have a job; if they are only learning Tibetan and English, these two languages will become politicized; finally, if Tibetans only study Chinese and English, they will lose their identity. These are the questions that Tibetans are facing. Now, many primary school teachers are asking bilingual education researchers how to make a language choice? No children want to learn three languages in primary school at same times. As a result, some Tibetan parents have decided that their children should not study Tibetan.

Tibetan people are under centralized government control. For example, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), policy-makers decided that for minority people to speak their own language and wear their traditional clothes was counterrevolutionary. Tibetans were forced to study only Chinese in school without their first language. This created a major language gap in families. For example, my wife can't speak Tibetan fluently and her parents can't speak Chinese
fluently; sometimes my wife and her parents have a difficulty carrying on a fluent conversation. This is a common situation. In my experience I have found that just a few people have high level at literacy in two languages, in Tibetan and Chinese. But even when they do, they have no English. Generally, we can classify Tibetan people into two groups: Tibetan-English (this group lives abroad) and Tibetan-Chinese (this group lives in their homeland). According to Bilingual Education and Bilingualism (Baker, 2001, p27), we can classify Tibetan people into different groups more specifically: some Tibetan people speak Tibetan, but they do not read and write in Tibetan; Some listen with understanding and read Tibetan, but do not speak or write Tibetan. Some speak both Tibetan and Chinese, but do not read and write. Some only speak Chinese, but do not have high level of literacy. Not many speak and write both in Tibetan and Chinese, both conversational language and formal language; they usually work in university.

In Tibetan monasteries, monks learn ten subjects such as philosophy, medicine, mathematics, logic, history, meditation and so on. Nine of the subjects are secular knowledge, but the pivotal subject is Buddhism. Thus, the overall curriculum is quite broad and comprehensive compared to the curriculum in an ordinary university. In fact, if Tibetans want to achieve the highest literacy skill to prepare them for academia, they should study to be a monk. For example, my former classmate left the university because he was dissatisfied with the specialized curriculum, where he only studied history and transferred to study in the monastery. He later wrote a letter to the head of university department, saying that he is now in a real Tibetan university. Monasteries focus on how to develop the mind and compassion and publish their own books within the monastery.

The greatest knowledge and skill in the literacy of the Tibetan language remains in the monasteries. This has been achieved over hundreds of years. The wealth of this knowledge and
proficiency is not extended to the Tibetan population because the central Chinese government regards monasteries in a hostile manner insofar as they see this institution as an extension of the Dalai Lama.

Briefly, numbers of each society throughout the world should acquire a high level of literacy skill in their first language before they become proficient in speaking, reading and write a second or third language. This first language must provide societal communication skills for relating its members to their natural and social environment. If it is only necessary to have one language, its members can concentrate on their oracy and literacy skills. If, however, it is necessary for them to learn second and third languages, they can use their first language as a foundation for subsequent ones.


Tibet has started to become bilingual: Tibetan-Chinese and it also has been becoming a trilingual nation Tibetan-Chinese-English. The half century period of external modernization in China has led to an extremely complex situation for Tibetan areas. First, modernization has brought Chinese culture and Tibetan culture into close contact, leading to a cultural mixture that sometimes leads to cultural clash, in extreme cases to loss of identity and values. This process of introduction of modern knowledge and urban Han values to rural Tibetan children through schooling, can lead to alienation of the younger generation from their hometown. In extreme cases, in the name of environmental protection, there are examples of cultural deracination, with resettlement of entire herders’ villages to an unfamiliar distant place. Finally, the negative official view of monasteries leads to a failure to understand the positive contribution that they play in rural Tibetan society, and to overlooking their potential to play an active role in the
popularization of modern knowledge in Tibetan society. The Tibetan language can be a conservative vehicle for preserving the old rural, pastoral, Tibet, a role which many Tibetans have rejected. The Tibetan language can also become a vehicle for adapting to current realities and mediating between the old traditional knowledge and new modern knowledge. Thus, it is crucial to analyze the current social functions of the Tibetan language, including language shift and loss and its causes in order to identify strategies to maintain and revive the Tibetan language in this social context.

This section argues that the village is the basic social unit for the maintenance of the Tibetan language, but that the monasteries and schools may form the basis for popularization of a modernized Tibetan language capable of being used for communicating, teaching and learning modern content. Within such an analysis and any attempt to revitalize the Tibetan language two factors must be taken into account. The major internal factor is the challenge of implementing mass education effectively in Tibetan areas, without mass education having the unintended consequence of assimilating Tibetan children. The major external factor that complicates all discussion of ameliorating conditions in Tibetan society in China is the politicization of all discourse, so that constructive criticism of objective problems can be misunderstood or misrepresented due to Great Han chauvinism as bourgeois nationalism and splittism, so that all serious debate on how to attack real and potential social problems is shut down or cut off prematurely.

Currently, the differing social functions of Chinese and Tibetan and foreign languages have led to a critical language dilemma.

1) if you study in a Tibetan-medium school, and are not proficient in oral and written Chinese when you finish basic education, you can get no job outside of unskilled rural labour
2) if you do not learn at least basic English passably, you cannot easily continue your
education beyond junior middle school to academic stream senior secondary school
3) if you go to a Chinese-medium school, you may learn Chinese and English better, and
have more chance for higher education and a good job, but this will be at the cost of
losing your identity
4) if you study only Tibetan and English, you will meet many political problems.

Village teachers are asking bilingual education researchers how to make these language
choices. Few parents or teachers believe it is possible to learn three languages successfully in
primary school. There are using an uninformed either-or logic, whereby the more time spent
studying one language, the less another language can be learned. There is little knowledge of
international research on models of dual language bilingual education which support a both-and
logic in which two and three languages can be learned as well as in a monolingual model school
and content achievement is also as good as or better than in standard monolingual education,
whether Tibetan or Mandarin-medium. And so, some Tibetan parents have made a painful, but
from their point of view, practical decision for their children’s futures: decided that their children
should not study Tibetan.

In 1962, the tenth Panchen Lama prepared an insightful critique of the implementation of
language policy in Tibetan areas. In particular, he pointed out that the insufficient use of Tibetan
language in government documents and offices was leading to Tibetan gradually ceasing to be a
language of administration and advanced knowledge in many spheres, and becoming simply a
language used by rural people. As the Panchen Lama put it in his 70,000-character petition to
Zhou Enlai:

….Taking the right of autonomy as an example, first of all, we must be able to enjoy the use of our own
language, dress and personal adornments. This is important. However, all documents of the Preparatory
Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet are drafted in Chinese and not Tibetan, and the Tibetans
the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and committee members mostly do not understand Chinese, and
therefore only those documents which (cadres thought) we should see have been translated into Tibetan.
They only sought to make a good job of the Chinese version of legally binding resolutions and of public
announcements; if the Tibetan version was understandable then that was enough, and it was very
infrequent that people paid attention as to whether the Tibetan version was good or bad. Because
transportation in Tibet is not convenient, the orders, instructions and notifications given to the subordinate prefectures by the Preparatory Committee were mostly sent first by telegraph, then the formal documents were gradually dispatched, but very few of these documents were in both Chinese and Tibetan versions; also, there is no Tibetan telegraph code book, and so there is no way to use Tibetan by telegraph. Most of the reports presented to the Preparatory Committee were only in Chinese, very few were in Tibetan; from this it will be clear to you that at grassroots level, also, very few used Tibetan. Because the necessity and usefulness of using Tibetan at all levels of government has declined and is currently declining, Tibetan has gradually become a “folk language” (p. 22-23, 1997).

During the Cultural Revolution, language policy in Tibetan areas was highly restrictive of the use of Tibetan language in schools (Bass, 1998). After the Cultural Revolution, there was a relaxation in these restrictions that originated not in Tibetan districts but from the central government, which was concerned about continued lack of scope for the use of Tibetan in Tibetan districts.

*Tibetan language use dilemma in the family*

In urban areas, most Tibetan families use oral Chinese, not only in public but also in the home. Some families also use oral Tibetan together with oral Chinese. Almost all written communication is reserved to the Chinese language, since urban Tibetans usually are not literate in Tibetan or have too low functional proficiency to make any practical use of written Tibetan. In rural areas, most Tibetans are functionally monolingual in Tibetan, but use Chinese names of modern products in Tibetan pronunciation with no understanding of the meaning of the Chinese terminology they use.

*Tibetan language use dilemma in the Tibetan Village*

In pastoral areas, there has been almost no penetration of the Chinese language except for product names. In agricultural areas, where compact areas of Tibetan settlement are found near Han districts, there is a mutual cultural and linguistic influence: Han and Tibetan farmers know each other’s oral language. This bilingualism under certain circumstances may lead to
replacement of Tibetan by Chinese. In township areas, where Tibetans and Han live together in the same village, there is large scale folk bilingualism and code-switching by both Tibetans and Hans. In these circumstances, Han and Tibetan children learn neither standard Tibetan nor Chinese well.

Recent government policy has been to assist modernization of village governance by top-down appointment of new village leadership, selected from university graduates, who generally can’t speak Tibetan, while most villagers have low functional proficiency in Chinese. In Gannan Prefecture in Gansu, 2000 have been trained already; in Qinghai province, 1865 have been trained. This new policy has the potential to create significant cultural and linguistic misunderstanding. The inability of local leaders to speak Tibetan may lead to increased language shift to Mandarin at the village level.

In reaction to these pressures on the Tibetan language, Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai province has revived the 1950s indigenization language policy at the local level. This policy now requires non-Tibetan party members and officials to learn Tibetan within 1½ years. Future salary and promotion will then be partly dependent on scores on Tibetan proficiency test. However, there is considerable risk that this policy will be resisted passively. It may even be actively resisted by its opponents, who may politicize the questions by raising fears of local minority nationalism.

**Tibetan language use dilemma in the schools**

Currently schools face a language and curriculum dilemma: how to effectively learn Tibetan, Chinese and English in the elementary schools. In the past and even today, the principal would decide whether the school language policy would be to use Tibetan as the main language
of instruction or Chinese as the main language of instruction, despite their lack of training, knowledge and appropriate experience in minority and bilingual education and assessment. In most cases, where children only knew Tibetan, the language of instruction would also be Tibetan; where there was a mixed population and Tibetan children already knew some oral Chinese, the main language of instruction was Chinese. In Tibetan-medium schools, Chinese begins to be taught in Grade 3, while in Chinese-medium schools in Tibetan areas, some schools start teaching Tibetan as a subject in Grade 1, while others delay until Grade 3. The logic of this delay is that there is a fear of Tibetan-language interference with Chinese-language learning. However, this policy means that the weaker language gets the least support from school, and that in cases where Tibetan proficiency is stronger, but students' school achievement is evaluated in Chinese, students' weaker language, the school will perceive that Tibetan students are poorer learners on average than non-Tibetan students are. It is a general principle of equity in minority education assessment to assess students in their strongest language; otherwise, testing confounds subject knowledge achievement and second language proficiency, and students may be falsely labelled as weak learners due to inappropriate pedagogy and/or assessment (Cummins, 1982).

Tibetan is rarely used in senior secondary school, particularly for the teaching of mathematics and sciences. Interestingly, an experimental program to develop and implement terminology and curriculum to using Tibetan as a language of instruction of science and mathematics at the senior high school level has successfully completed a 6-year trial, in which it was assessed as equal or more effective than the normal Chinese-language science classes. Nevertheless, there has been little progress in extending this successful experimental program to other senior secondary schools in Tibetan areas. Goldstein (1995), for instance, states that "Beijing is not implementing language reforms that would mandate Tibetan language as the
standard for government offices”. Thus, current language-in-education policy implementation at the local level seems to favor the stronger languages, while giving weaker support to Tibetan.

**The internal Tibetan language use dilemma in monasteries**

In the past, monasteries were diverse institutions, “one-third religion, one-third secular ethical system, and one-third scientific institution” (Robert Thurman, 2008, p. 36). Thus, they were within Tibetan society analogous to the universities in Europe, centre for creation and dissemination of all types of knowledge valued by a society, religious, secular and scientific. Yet for some time now, Tibetan monasteries have neglected the creation and dissemination of scientific knowledge in Tibetan. One hundred years ago, scientific vocabulary was undeveloped in Chinese. With borrowings of new vocabulary created in Japan as part of its modernization, Chinese modern scientific vocabulary modernized. Today’s Tibetan language similarly should and can modernize its terminology and expand its social functions to include business, administration and science. The Tibetan language is no less capable of lexical modernization than was Chinese a century ago. However, to do so, the only institution within Tibetan society that is capable of participating in such a project is the monasteries: they should function not only as centers that maintain traditional knowledge but also as places that absorb new knowledge, Tibetanize it, and disseminate it throughout society: thus, the monasteries may play an important function in empowering the Tibetan language in local society.

Ninety-five percent of the total Tibetan population lives in villages, which are clearly the fundamental ground to develop Tibetan society. In this situation, all social improvement possibilities are strongly connected to the perspectives of villagers. Nevertheless, if Tibetan villages do not change radically, then there is nothing left for the future of Tibet. China and the
world will then lose a crucial component of cultural diversity. In order to avoid this disaster, the Tibetan village needs a culturally relevant, sustainable, education system. Such an education should be based on the democratic participation of villagers in the determination of the school curriculum, and should at the same time be acceptable to both Tibetan and Chinese government stakeholders. Revitalizing the Tibetan language in the educational sphere at the village level can thus prevent the shrinking of language functions of Tibetan and stimulate its revival in cultural institutions, thereby reinvigorating village society and Tibetan society as a whole.
Chapter Seven:
Discussion and Conclusion

_Tibet’s reform process as social movements_

A certain amount of information on Tibetan society in the 1950s is available. The bulk of this information has serious limitations for the study of pan-Tibetan village level social movements. Most literature ignores major geographic areas in Tibet; most ignores village level social process; most have major bias for or against PRC government. Furthermore, most of the literature offers biased interpretations of events and society in Tibet. However, there are enough facts available in the literature about all regions at the village level to allow an attempt to analyze village social reform in the 1950s in Tibet using a social movement theory and political process theory approach. Thus, data from other scholars can be used in forming a different theoretical explanation than the explanation they gave themselves. By emphasizing all Tibet and focussing on the majority of Tibetans, the villagers, it is expected that a more complete understanding of recent social change and social problems can be developed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Campaigns</th>
<th>Purpose of campaigns</th>
<th>U-Tsang</th>
<th>Kham</th>
<th>Amdo</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People's Liberation Army Invasion</td>
<td>To take over the sovereignty of Tibet</td>
<td>Seventeen Point Agreement</td>
<td>Not included</td>
<td>Not included</td>
<td>23 May, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Reform</td>
<td>Eradicate the slave system; Redistribution land to masses; Eliminate feudal rule.</td>
<td>Accomplished political aims 1950 -</td>
<td>Accomplished political aims 1956 -</td>
<td>Accomplished political aims 1956 -</td>
<td>1952 - 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target the cultural institution of Monastery</td>
<td>Much of Tibet's culture and religion was destroyed between 1955 and 1961, and not during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) alone.</td>
<td>Much of Tibet's culture and religion was destroyed from 1955-1961, not only during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) alone.</td>
<td>Much of Tibet's culture and religion was destroyed between 1955 and 1961, and not only during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) alone.</td>
<td></td>
<td>From 1955 - 1961 and from 1966 - 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uprisings</td>
<td>The most serious resistance to Chinese communist rule.</td>
<td>Targeted state 1959</td>
<td>Targeted Han and state 1957</td>
<td>Targeted Han 1958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uprisings</td>
<td>Serious resistance to Chinese communist rule</td>
<td>Targeted state 1959</td>
<td>In 1955 began enforcing land collectivization, in the process forcing nomads to settle. In early 1956 a major rebellion erupted in Kham.</td>
<td>From late 1955 fighting was general in Kham and Amdo. All Amdo rebellion was in 1958.</td>
<td>1955 - 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Revolution</td>
<td>Destroy the Four Olds: Old idea; Old customs; Old habits; Old culture.</td>
<td>Destroy the Four Olds:</td>
<td>Destroy the Four Olds:</td>
<td>Destroy the Four Olds:</td>
<td>1966 - 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Door open policy of economical opportunity for Han migrations run in Tibet</td>
<td>To enter the world economic market. Chinese Han areas not Tibetan areas.</td>
<td>Did not effected economic directly</td>
<td>Did not effected economic directly</td>
<td>Did not effected economic directly</td>
<td>1980 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reincarnations</td>
<td>To dominate the spiritual institutions &amp; sources.</td>
<td>Strongly against the spiritual system control.</td>
<td>Strongly against the spiritual system control.</td>
<td>Strongly against the spiritual system control.</td>
<td>1995 s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion:

The persistence of the dilemma of reform in Tibet

Clearly, most analyses of Tibetan issues follow the political process model that focuses on challenges to states and between states (Goldstein, 1989). As we have seen, the democratic reform in U-tsang in 1959 was seen by U-tsang government and religious officials as an attack on their authority in an autonomous Tibet ruled according to the 17-point agreement. However, equally clearly an explanation of internal reforms, external democratic reform, socialism, Cultural Revolution and spiritual struggle, all the success and failure and the causes of Tibetan sovereignty lost and uprising in all Tibetan areas but Amdo and Kham should not be the same. Thus, it seems that in all areas of Tibet, even internal reforms were failed by traditions’ power in Tibet. Why? After the few decades the Party cadres tried to mobilize the masses based on giving them economic benefit. In all areas this had some success. However, in all areas the reform only provided material economic benefit as a way to mobilize the masses. When Chinese cadres attacked threatened other roles of Tibetan institutions (religious function of monasteries in Amdo and Kham; political and symbolic role of Tibetan government in U-tsang) the Tibetan masses quickly forgot that it was an external social movement organization that gave them land and internal social institutions that had kept them from having land.

This is evidence of the importance of a multi-institutional approach to understanding social reform in Tibet. Furthermore, it is evidence that Tibetan institutions must be seen as multi-functional. Chinese government propaganda argues that Tibetan government, class system and religious system oppressed the poor of Tibet. Most evidence supports that this was the case. Therefore, when PRC cadres challenged the ability of these institutions to dominate the masses economically and politically, they supported the external social movement organization.
However, when the PRC challenged the cultural, spiritual and symbolic functions of these same powerful institutions, they lost the support of the masses, who either watched passively or were easily recruited into active armed resistance.

These failures of internal reforms and the PRC government after initial success have totally mystified the Chinese government and its political analysis until today. The CPC is a social movement organization whose theory and tactics focus on material benefit. Since 1980 recent reforms have promised economic riches for China’s masses in exchange for cultural, political and spiritual disenfranchisement. Most areas of China have accepted this view of reform. However, democratic reform shows that non-material, non-political issues were major factor in mobilizing Tibetan masses against the CPC reforms, even ones that were popular at first, before it was understood that one kind of disenfranchisement was being traded for another. MISMT provides a way to understand the importance of non-material factors in Tibetan culture.

Philosophically, is there any existing model to balance the material and spiritual factors for an approach to Tibetan society? What form of modern society are Tibetan areas suited for? Is it possible for “socialism with Tibetan characteristics” to develop successfully? Why external organizations always have succeeded in political control of Tibet but have failed to develop successful internal reform movements? How can the monastery function in a modern developed Tibetan society? China now actually practices state capitalism. Are conditions in Tibetan society able to implement this?

All these questions are existed in Tibet for China. However, these questions could link to the political, cultural, economical and spiritual reasons with different perspectives. After half century, acceptable reconciliation between Tibetan government and Chinese government has not yet been reached. Government schools are seen as an external institution that is alienating the
young generation; the language is at risk of becoming endangered language, mainly because of the requirements of the external education system. Thus, these continued problems and the narrow view of both the Chinese government and the Tibetans’ over-expectations of sovereignty will potentially cause more social problems in Asia and the world.

After the thirteenth Dalai Lama pass away and from the People’s Liberation Army invasion to Tibet in 1951 up to today’s ongoing spiritual disenfranchisement process, the Tibet, in China, has experienced and leaned much more critiques than they expected before and ever, which are, first, the Tibetan government transformed into the real democratic administrative government system while in India; second, China established secular public education system from village school level to university even locked in many ways; third, the new awakening of Tibetan people by political and spiritual clash; fourth, Tibetans starting to understand that the Tibetan needs to learn modern knowledge not only retaining and developing the Buddhism. Rationally, in this case Tibet should regretful for China because they teach Tibet a lot. However, how to strengthen the Tibetan’s national identity; how to conduct the social movement by Tibetan people to succeed as Han cadres did; how the Tibetan people can be mobilized as the human resources and all take the responsibilities for engaging in the Tibetan social movement. Thus, to define the applicable social movement theory and political process learning theory to analyze the Tibetan society is very critical for Tibetan areas and Chinese Han areas in China.
Conclusion

Insights from a social movement perspective on Tibetan reform:

Towards the resolution of Tibet’s dilemmas

Any future solution to the many challenges of Tibet’s dilemma of modernization and equal participation in China’s society requires the Chinese government to develop a deep understanding of Tibetan society, language, culture and history, and the importance in this society of certain non-material values. At the same time, Tibetans and the PRC government must rethink their tactics in adapting to current conditions.

In April 1980, Hu Yao-bang, a high CPC leader published a list of six requirements aimed at creating a ‘new, united, prosperous and highly cultured’ Tibet. The six points included:

1. ‘Anything that is not suited to Tibet’s conditions should be rejected or modified, along with anything that is not beneficial to national unity or to the development of production.’ Demanding ‘uniformity in everything’ was condemned as ‘subjectivist’.

2. Efforts must be made to ‘lighten the burden of the masses’ To this end all taxes and State purchasing quotas were abolished for at least the next two years .People should not be assigned work without pay and price for produce purchased by the State should be negotiated and not fixed by central authorities.

3. ‘Peasants should plant whatever crops they wish and no one should interfere’; private production should be encouraged as ‘getting rich is noting to be afraid of’; ‘policy requirements should be relaxed, relaxed and relaxed again.’

4. Although the central government already spends more funds in Tibet than in any other province of autonomous region the centre will increase funds for Tibet still further. In particular primary schools teachers. Whose salary was the responsibility of the local communes will in future be paid by the State.

5. ‘So long as the socialist orientation is upheld, vigorous efforts must be made to revive and develop Tibetan culture, education and science. The Tibetan people have a long history and a rich culture. The world-renowned ancient Tibetan culture included fine Buddhism, graceful music and dance as well as medicine and opera , all of which are worthy of serious study and development.’
6. ‘Unhealthy tendencies’ prevalent among some Han cadres should be corrected. These tendencies were said to include ‘taking advantage of position and power to assign jobs to their own men’ and ‘violating nationality policy’. More responsibility should be given to Tibetan cadres.

While most of these points still refer to material factors, point 5 emphasizes the importance of non-material Tibetan cultural factors in resolving Tibetan problems. This report was a great step forward. Unfortunately, after receiving this critical attention, Hu Yaobang’s plan and policy disappeared very quickly and again policy towards Tibet failed to take an opportunity to find a new way based on dialogue of external and internal actors. Almost fifty years have passed and the Tibetan question has not yet been resolved and the world’s peace movement leader Dalai Lama still lives in India as an honored guest.

Tibetans, from the highly educated down to the herders and villagers, both inside and outside China, rather than depending only on emotion in dealing with their dilemmas, need to learn and apply insights from modern political science, such as SMT and MISMT, so that they can develop more sophisticated analysis of actual social and political conditions that will lead to more nuanced tactical approaches in order to begin to resolve their persistent social, cultural, political and economic contradictions. Clearly, the first step in overcoming conflict is to know oneself; the second step, is to understand the other side. Without self-understanding, and without mutual understanding, the cycle of misunderstanding and failure will continue.
References


Huber, T. (Ed.). (2002). *Amdo Tibetans in transition: society and culture in the post-Mao era.* Leiden, the Netherlands; Brill NV.


**Web sources**


---

**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Party Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIK</td>
<td>Tibet Information Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCART</td>
<td>Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCCPTAR</td>
<td>Documents Select Committees of the Party Commission in Tibetan Autonomous Region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>