A Trace of Genocide

Racialization, Internal Colonialism and the Politics of Enunciation

By

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Abstract

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This analysis examines the implicatedness of the self as an embodied space of marginality, knowledge, and resistance to the discursive and material effects of systemic oppression. It explores the implications and possibilities as they relate to social collectives [in nation-state contexts] in resisting and contesting the constraining forces of dominant/dominating institutionalized power and authority in the context of speaking and/or enunciating from the space of abjectification, racialization, and outcastness that has been constructed historically by the nation-state of Britain as a body codified as included-as-excluded-as-removed from the dominant sociopolitical collective’s sense of self and identity? This study argues that enunciation in this form carries with it a politics of ontological transformation that has profound implications for the social collective that is Britain as a whole specifically in the context of social justice affirmation and the reclamation [and assertion] of a collective sense of self that is grounded in a refusal and contestation of the multi-layered hegemonic conceptual frameworks that continue to naturalize, (re)produce and sustain systemic oppression as a state of permanency [Bell, 1992]. This study will explore the permanency of oppression further in relation to the discursive and material negation and amputation of social difference [i.e. class, gender, disability, and sexuality] while centering race [and its prostheticization] as a salient organizing tool in the (re)production of a hegemonic social order. To this end this study utilizes two key interconnecting concepts, internal/internalized colonialism, and racialization.
It suggests that racialization mediated and channeled by and through a process of internal/internalized colonialism underpins the hegemonic social order of Britain and as such both terms are re-conceptualized and subjected to a complex analysis. Finally, this study examines the theoretical possibilities for developing an anti-racialization framework as a politics of enunciation that makes usage of the concept of racialization as a tool for [1] demystifying systems of oppression, [2] understanding the processes of collective implicatedness in oppression, [3] refusing pathologization and [4] mobilizing transformation through and within a refusal of the amputative and negative capacities of the racialization process.
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A Trace of Genocide:
Introduction and Purpose of Study

If as suggested by Gramsci, the starting point of critical elaboration is the coming to consciousness of what one really is, then it is indeed imperative that we compile an inventory of what it is that has constituted us [Dei, et al, 2004]

Plate 1 – My photo

Following on from Dei et al’s [2004] reference to Antonio Gramsci the purpose of this study is to re.trace the discursive and material violence that the nation-state of Britain palimpsestically wrote upon my body and that of my mother’s during the period of the late 1950s to the mid 1960s [I should say here that the photograph of the little boy that prefaces this study is that of myself]. In
taking up this position I am looking not only to reclaim my sense of self through a discursive re-tracing of ‘what it is [discursively] that has [oppressively] constituted’ myself, I am also looking to indictment the nation-state as whole in our [myself and my mother’s] physical and psychological violation in such a way as to reveal both the racialization of Britain as a nation-state and the institutionally enforced collective implicatedness in the systemic imposition and practice of oppression. I do this in an attempt to formulate the possibility of developing a framework of resistance to the reproduction of hegemonic national identity assertions of self that are [at the historical and contemporary level] premised primarily on homicidal/genocidal violence, whitecentrism [Essed, 1991], and the amputation and negation [Fanon, 1952] of social difference in all of its variegated and multi-layered forms.

This study looks then to (re)analyze what it means to speak as a social collective from a hegemonic positionality wherein the nation-state’s collective voice is determined by the constraining and paralyzing mental frameworks of dominant racializing discourse sustained and disseminated by and through institutionalized authoritative power and knowledge production, to that of an individual and collective mode of transformative anti-hegemonic enunciation [Foucault, 1972] that acknowledges [a] the racializing process of oppression in British nation-state contexts [b] acknowledges the saliency of race in this process [c] acknowledges the role and presence of collective implicatedness in maintaining and reproducing oppression and [d] unrelentingly refuses to give consent to that very process and its epistemic and materially violating contemporary reproduction wherever, whenever, and in whatever discursive and material form it emerges.

In taking up this study I hope not only to add to critical discussions as they relate to agency and social structure but also to formulate an anti-hegemonic framework that can be utilized in both
educational contexts and as a critical methodology and practice for asserting a transformative, liberatory collective nation-state identity of self that is grounded in a refusal to implicate itself in the prostheticization [Erevelles, 2009] and amputation of social difference. While this study is centred on the nation-state of Britain, its analytical focus and call for transformative change in nation-state contexts is transferable I believe to other Whitecentric nation-state collective identifications of self [e.g., Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Canada, United States, Australia etc] including geopolitical sites of racialization such as the Caribbean, Israel/Palestine, Iran, and Northern Ireland among others.

In ‘Black Skin White Masks’ [1952] Frantz Fanon argues that the ‘living expression of the nation is the moving consciousness of the whole of the people’ and as such, a national government ‘if it wants to be national ought to govern by the people and for the people, for the outcasts and by the outcasts’ [p.205]. In this statement Fanon asserts the possibility of nation-state identities formulating themselves not in an oppressive exclusionary [Grewal and Kaplan, 2002] form but through an anti-hegemonic mode that centers the multiple expressions, experiences and knowledges of all positionalities of difference and, in particular, those who are subjected to minoritization, marginality, oppression, alienation and outcastness. It is a vision of a collective national, nation-state expression of identity underpinned by a fluid, moving, decolonizing sense of political consciousness that is consistently undergoing a process of re-evaluation and is therefore on a constant alert for instances when its very own expression of identity may serve to reproduce oppression and exclusionary practice even while it claims that its political positionality stands in contradiction to this.
We [and I use ‘we’ here to denote all who are engaged in the multilayered, multi-leveled practice of struggling, navigating, surviving and resisting the violence of everyday and ‘every night’ [Kinsman, 2000] systemic oppression] might think of the Freireian [Friere, 1973] imperative to throw out at all times the oppressor inside of us whenever its presence appears. My analysis attempts to expand on Fanon’s statement in the context of Britain firstly by evoking not only the stultifying ambiguities, the negations of self, the paralysis of voice and the discursive genocidal violence embedded palimpsetically and entangled in the everyday lived material reality of hegemonic English and British nation-state identity re/production, but also the discursive and material navigations of this violent and violating social system taken-up and experienced by all social bodies entangled in imaginary and material forms within and without its racialized boundaries.

I argue that negations of self, paralysis of voice, and entangled genocidal violences are embedded in [and integral to] dominant notions of Englishness and Britishness and represent a discursive and material social reality of violence imposed not only on those marked as ‘outcasts’ but concomitantly on the social collective of my country of Britain in its entirety. The normalization of this everyday process and practice of internal/internalized nation-state violence however is heavily dependant on the representation and ultra [racist] visibilization of non-white bodies as the collective embodiment of all that is criminal, immoral, violent, primitive and thus alien to that of Britishness. Consequently, the nation-state’s implicatedness in [for example] the systematic epidemic of physical and psychological violence experienced primarily by White women in Britain whereby two women are subjected to murder on a weekly basis [Kundnani, 2007] is erased, invisibilized, and disavowed by the State itself through the pathologization of non-white bodies as contaminatory carriers of all that is problematic and threatening to the State.
It is within this latter framework [and I will expand upon this further as this study proceeds] that race and raced bodies are [in British nation-state contexts] subjected to a process of prostheticization, a process in which race [constructed and imagined as a non-white space of inferiority and pathologization] is strapped on by dominant discursive whitecentric identifications and assertions of Englishness and Britishness as a tool both to negate and disavow its implicatedness in violence such as that experienced by women and other spaces of social difference within the social collective [egg class, disability, sexuality etc] and also as a tool [prosthetic] to ameliorate the pain, tension, anger and cognitive dissonance caused by the nation-state’s enforced negation and amputation of its multi-layered self and its multi-layered voice and enunciation of struggle and experience with oppression. As I will discuss later in this study resistance - in relation to the conceptualization of oppression that I have laid out here- must formulate itself in and through an individual and collective refusal of the prosthetic and prostheticization [a process of sociopolitical refusal that is not exclusive to White bodies].

It should be fully recognized and acknowledged even as I make these statements however, that the discursive effects of prostheticization are, for those bodies subjected to prostheticization, psychologically murderous for the spirit particularly where race as a prosthetic is internalized or when and where its effects are manifested in the constant profiling/persecution of the prostheticized body. Moreover, in physical material terms, as the street lynchings of Anthony Walker and Stephen Lawrence, to name but two make clear, the prostheticization of race is homicidal for the both the individual and collective body.

I am mindful that to speak of Englishness and Britishness together may appear problematic to some particularly when I speak of these two national signs in ways that appear to conflate the two but
while I am aware of the hegemonic Imperialistic dominance of Englishness over Scottish, and Welsh and Northern Irish cultural and political assertions of self and the suppressions of those identities within this thing called Britain, the slippage that arises from my usage for both terms Englishness and Britishness emerges from my own sense of ambiguousness as a ‘British’ body of colour, for whom the assertion of Britishness in relation to non-whiteness has taken some time to arrive at. By contrast Englishness still evokes for me a sense of racial [White] purity which makes its usage less palatable for me though not completely so. This ambiguous situation I pinpoint to my sense of in-betweenness in relation to a history of racialized outcasteness and my strategic political positionality of resistance which at times asserts the right [as a necessity of/for belonging] to claim the space of Englishness and to refuse the racist claims of those who would deny me that right, but which at the same time, harbours a deep discomfort with all essentialist notions of national and cultural identity expressions that look to flatten the multiple complex layers of social difference in its collectivity and the fluid historical and contemporary process of emergence through which such collectivities arise. It is from this positionality and from my positionality as a person with a history of racialized ‘outcastness’ in British contexts then that I take up [and at times interchange] the terms Britishness, Englishness, Britain, England and so on.

Following on from Fanon’s statement my analysis looks to emphasis that the racialized marking and imagining of an ‘outcast’ space of identity is essential and contingent to the ongoing formation of a hegemonic English and British nation-state identity and collective sense of self not only in terms of its reliance on Otherization [that is to say the institutionalized socially constructed and socially imagined racial/racialized Other, a form through which dominance dialectically comes to know itself and define itself in ways succinctly explained by Trinh T. Min Ha’s [Ashcroft, et al, 1995, p.217] statement, ‘if you can’t locate the Other, how are you to locate yourself’], but also as
a discursive and material [in terms of its effects] means, method, and tool for the enforcement of a process of negation and ‘amputation’ [Fanon, 1963] systematically imposed upon [and internalized by] the collective self of the nation-state of Britain. What I mean by this assertion is that contrary to a wide field of critical analytical scholarship [see Gilroy, 1991; Hall, 1992; Hebidge, 1996; Floya and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Carby, 1982; Goldberg, 2002; et al] the collective identity or collective sense of self [in terms of nation-state identity formation and the (re)production of national spaces such as Britain] is derived, produced and underpinned hegemonically not only through and within a process of exclusion, that is to say the promise of national belonging and nation-state identity conferred upon a chosen group to the exclusion of others and Othered spaces of social identity [e.g. women of colour have historically for example been excluded from discourses of national belonging in the context of white supremacist patriarchal nation-state formulations], but also by and through a process of amputation, negation and denial of the collectives self’s multidimensionality of difference.

To elaborate further on this point I am speaking of the intersecting multi-layered fluid complexities of social difference and social identity formulated within an interlocking framework or ‘matrix’ [Grosfoguel, 2007] of race, class, disability, gender and sexuality, that are mediated in such a way as to form a politics of difference that cannot [although this is an imperative of the amputative process] be disconnected from social relations of power nor can they be de-coupled from the tensions [and resistances] that emerge from those relationships as they relate to Euro nation-state collective identities and the enforcements of fixed biologized [and therefore racialized] notions of difference that such hegemonic nation-state formations rest upon.
This study asserts then that the collective sense of self and the historical and contemporary imagined community [Anderson, 1983] of Englishness and Britishness is predicated on the coerced amputation and negation of this complexity of difference as it relates to the social collective as a whole that in turn represents a process of internal/internalized colonialism which the historical/contemporary assertion of Englishness and/or Britishness in its hegemonic racialized form is dependant upon for its production, re-production and maintenance. Moreover, as previously stated, this analysis will take up the position that within the process of internal colonialism, that is to say the racialized discursive and material process of institutionally enforcing consent for the negation and amputation of expressions of difference that do not conform to ‘normal’, ‘legitimate’, ‘proper’, ‘moral’ and ‘respectable’ state sanctioned eugenicizing notions of, gendered, sexualized, classed and dis/abled positionalities of social difference, race constitutes a key, central, and salient presence [see Dei 2002; Omi and Winant, 1993; et al]. Thus, to become firstly, conscious of this amputative process in relation to the individual and collective sense of self, and secondly to refuse this violating and dominating process marks the emergence of voice as a form of enunciation that is the embodiment of a spiritual and political assertion of resistance. This process represents a central task for this study.

Reflecting back on Dei et al’s [2004] reference to Gramsci’s statement regarding the compilation of an ‘inventory’ of what one really is and ‘what it is that has constituted us’ [p. 20] as an imperative and starting point for individual/collective ‘critical elaboration’ and critical consciousness to take place, this study represents a contestation of the hegemonic formulation of the nation-state of Britain and the racialized discursive and material violence that constitutes the State and which [as mentioned previously] has been written on in and over my body [represented by the photograph at the beginning of this study]. Specifically, I look towards confronting and
contesting my own case file as a racialized inventory, a case file produced by the most famous children’s charitable organization in Britain known as Barnardo’s in partnership with various local and state agencies of governance and authority. This case file however is not simply a racialized artifact of wounding discursive violence written onto and into the body of both myself and my mother as individuals but rather it is representative of the historical and ongoing fragmentary destructiveness of the nation-state of Britain itself as a violent/violating space re-productive of negation, amputation and, what Che Guevara [1965] has referred to as, social ‘despoilment’. Moreover [and to reiterate], although this study is specific to Britain, it is nevertheless relevant to all such formulations of nation state expressions that are underpinned and sustained by racialization and the discursive and material practices and enforcements of internal/internalized colonialism.

The significance in Gramsci’s call for the compilation of an inventory of ‘what it is that has constituted us’ [Dei et al, 2004] for transformative counter-hegemonic possibilities of nation-state identity expressions and assertions is perhaps best summed up by Tara Atluri [2010] in her analysis of a Russian story re-told by Slavoj Zizeck in which he says, ‘[t]here is an old story about a worker suspected of stealing’. Each evening as he leaves the factory a wheel-barrow that he takes with him is inspected. ‘The guards can find nothing. It is always empty. Finally, the penny drops. What the worker is stealing are the wheel-barrows themselves’. As Atluri explains, Zizeck’s point is that ‘when it comes to violence, people tend to spend a lot of time searching in the wheelbarrows themselves. We search for problems or failings in the social structure rather than question the foundations of the [social structure] itself’ [p.4]. In keeping with this process there is a failure in the part of contemporary nation-state sociopolitical assertions of self to discern that such ‘foundations’ represented by and through racialization and internal colonialism are written on and through bodies as an inventory of violence that constitutes the very construction and ontology of
the nation-state itself. The importance of Gramsci’s statement therefore lies in its call to utilize one’s individual and collective body as a weapon so as to make the state’s discursive and material violence visible and so to contest, resist, and refuse its historical and ongoing physical and psychic violence.

Thus, from a marginalized and anti-hegemonic standpoint of embodiment it is critical to use the violence written on the body as ‘data’ [Fanon, 1952] to indict the state and social structure itself in the impact and experience of oppression as it relates to the minoritized and marginalized space of social difference and to indict and implicate the state and the social structure in much broader and more systematic forms of violence that involves collective oppression/repression and, most notably, genocidal practice. The first stage of this process then of coming to critical consciousness and thus refusing to give consent to the hegemonic social order [particularly from the positionality of a body abjectified, outcasted and thus subjected to violation] lies not only with the process of gathering an inventory but of first developing the voice to do so. In other word integral to this process of seeing the wheel barrow is the Freireian process of *naming* the wheel barrow, of coming to voice, of developing a fearless capacity for enunciation and therefore a fearless capacity and space of/for resistance.

**Research Questions and Components of Analysis**

My analysis will look towards an exploration of three key research questions the first of which involves the implicatedness of self. Judith Butler [Meijer and Prins, 1998] poses the question, can the abjectified [or outcast] body speak? Interconnected with this is the process of how to ‘read the traces of what does get spoken’ [p. 285] on the part of the abjectified and outcasted body. As Butler goes onto to say, ‘I don’t think it is impossible to do but I think it’s a really interesting problem…how to do a history of that which was never supposed to be possible’ [p. 285]? When
speaking of the implicatedness of self as it relates to coming to voice however it is not simply a question of ‘how to read the traces’ of what gets spoken by the outcast and abjectified body. There are limitations here in Butler’s analytical questionings, limitations that are taken up in my first research question, which is:

- What are the implications and possibilities in nation-state social collective contexts involved in the ‘how’ to speak and/or enunciate from the space of abjectification and the space of the outcast and the outcasted as a body that has historically been constructed by the nation-state of Britain as a body ‘removed’ and thus outcasted/abjectified from the social collective’s sense of self and identity?

In exploring this question I intend to implicate my own body in this process. I do not think that it is ‘impossible to do’, but how? Importantly, from the standpoint of the abjectified and the outcasted in both historical and contemporary terms, this question is not merely an ‘interesting problem’ as Butler suggests it is an ontological imperative, an imperative that has profound implications for the social collective that is Britain as a whole.

The second research question that this study explores is inextricably connected to the first. Given, as I have stated that there are profound implications for the social collective that is Britain as a whole in coming to voice from the positionality of outcastedness I look to explore these implications in relation to a negation and amputation of social difference [i.e. class, gender, race, disability, sexuality,] that is enforced and manifested [in British nation-state contexts] in an internal/internalized colonial form. To this end question two explores the question of:
How to formulate and pursue an analysis of social relations of power within and through a critical, complex, interrogatory assertion and conceptualization of internal/internalized colonialism and racialization while still centering race as a central, salient presence and factor that underpins those relations and yet is simultaneously integral to a collective nation-state expression of self, voice and enunciation that is transformative, liberatory and anti-hegemonic?

As this second questions suggest there are two interconnecting concepts that are key to this study, that of internal/internalized colonialism, and racialization. My argument is that racialization as a process underpins the hegemonic social order of Britain mediated by and through a process of internal/internalized colonialism and as such my analysis necessitates a complex analysis and conceptualization of both terms and their material and discursive presence in British nation-state social relations of power. I argue that internal/internalized colonialism and racialization can be utilized to understand the hegemonic regulation and control of variegated sites of social difference [i.e. race, class, gender, disability, sexuality] and the means through which agency as voice and enunciation can be produced and asserted in a form that acknowledges the connections between social difference, in terms of a collective implicatedness in oppression, a collective experience of oppression and self negation, and, a collective refusal to give consent to the ongoing maintenance and reproduction of a social order based upon these formulations and emanations of oppressive, violent and violating power.

My third research question builds on the first and second by asking the question:
In British and Western nation-state contexts [though not exclusively so] what are the possibilities for a collective nation-state expression of self, voice and politics of enunciation that is transformative, liberatory and anti-hegemonic within what might be called an anti-racialization framework?

**Broader Goals and Objectives of Analysis**

The broader goals and objectives of my analysis look to explore the possibilities for assertions of voice, enunciation and transformation [in terms of a collective nation-state/ed sense of self] within a framework grounded in an anti-hegemonic positionality that refuses to give consent to the re/production of oppression in all of its multiple expressions. I argue that an exploration of what constitutes ‘to speak’ is essential for the assertion of a counter-hegemonic collective sense of national identity. In this context then the broader goals and objectives of this study look towards answering questions such as:

- What are the imposed, enforced and internalized constraints on voice?
- How can we locate those constraints? How is ‘to speak’ understood within dominant discourse?
- What are the implications in these contexts for an embodied space marked as abject, outcast and dehumanized? In other words, how can we speak from such a space and what would ‘to speak’ look like from this positionality?
- Is there a distinction to be made between speaking and enunciation? If so, what are the particularities of this distinction and what is its significance for anti-hegemonic formulations of individual and collective agency?
• In terms of abjectification and outcasteness, how might ‘to speak’ and/or enunciate from this positionality intersect with wider broader issues of hegemony, oppression, social regulation, and entangled genocidal practice, while simultaneously providing the possibility for collective resistance and transformation in such a form that implicates self, community and the contestation and transformation of structures of governance and power?

Chapter one situates the analysis. It engages in a discussion of the specificities of internal/internalized colonialism in the context of a historical and contemporary British nation-state collective sense of self and the asymmetrical power relations that are integral to its hegemonic formation. In addition, this chapter provides a discussion of both the historical context from which the study arises and the historical context as it relates to the embodied experiential knowledge that I bring to the study. Chapter two engages in an overview of the method and methodology utilized by the study. Importantly, this chapter looks towards the carving out of a critical methodology of self as it relates to the study’s imperative goal, that is to say, the process of ‘coming to voice’ individually and collectively. Chapter three examines the literature and the discursive framework that grounds the study. Chapter four undergoes an analysis of the formulation of Britain as a space of negation by engaging in an embodied re/tracing of the discursive and material effects of racialization and the discursive and material entanglements of genocide that pervades [in its absent/present form] the concrete and imaginary re/production of Britain as a nation-state. Chapter five explores and pinpoints the violating and disintegrative impact of racialization in its eugenized form as a process that is fundamental to the reproduction of the British nation-state as a space of internal/internalized coloniality. Chapter six looks to continue the examination of race as a salient factor in the formulation, production and reproduction of hegemonic constructions and
expressions of Britishness by examining its role as a prosthetic. Chapter seven explores the possibilities for individual and collective resistance and transformation within an anti-racialization framework, a framework that seeks to utilize the concept of racialization as a tool for [1] demystifying systems of oppression, [2] understanding the processes of collective implicatedness in oppression, [3] refusing pathologization and [4] mobilizing transformation through and within a refusal of the amputative and negative capacities of the racialization process.
Chapter One
Carving out a Space for a Critical Analysis of this Thing Called Britain

Situating the Analysis

In the introduction to their anthology entitled ‘Black British Cultural Studies’, Houston Baker, Manthia Diawara and Ruth Lindborg [1996] borrow from Dick Hebdige’s [1996] essay ‘Digging for Britain: An Excavation in Seven Parts” [found in the same volume] by referring to this place ‘called Britain’ as a space for ‘intellectual excavation’, a space that converts the ‘very sign Britain [my italics] into a metonym for international theoretical territories of debate’ and discussion’. Britain, as a sign, space and place is further conceptualized by the authors of the volume as a house, a slave master’s house constituted by a specific set of tools that manifest themselves through a specific set of cultural values, discourses and norms. These tools, according to Baker et al [1996] are continuously building and re-building this slave master’s house called Britain. It is however, Baker et al’s assertion [bending Audre Lorde’s [1984] well known statement that ‘the masters tools will never dismantle the master’s house’] that the master’s tools can be utilized not only to ‘deconstruct the house’ in ways that opens up space for the development of a critical sense of consciousness, but more importantly from the position of those outcasted from this house on the basis of race as a means ‘to complicate the master’s own sense of precisely whose house it is anyway’ [Baker et all 1996, p.15].

My analysis in part draws its influence from similar ‘intellectual excavations’ of this thing, site and sign called Britain. However, while Baker et al view the nation-state that is Britain as a hegemonic space underpinned by both the exclusion and hierachicalization of social difference [primarily in terms of race as Other], what I argue further is that in British contexts hegemonic social relations of
power are representative of an internal and internalized set of social relations that are fundamentally colonial and principally organized and informed by an ongoing discursive process of racialization, a process in which the presence of race plays a central role and which [in turn] implicates multiple sites of social difference.

As George Dei [1999] argues, the configurations and intricacies of colonial and colonialized power relations should not be understood ‘simply’ as a set of asymmetrical power relations between North/South, but in terms of the ways in which ‘knowledge can be imposed on others [discursively] through imperial relations’ of domination in which social difference based upon race, class, disability and sexuality becomes central. As Dei explains further, approaching hegemonic social relations of power in this form allows for a ‘discursive approach’ that gives space for an interrogation of ‘why, within communities’… [and nation-state social collectives such as Britain]…some knowledges embodied in terms of social difference are legitimized, validated and/or privileged [and thus viewed as respectable] as opposed to other forms of knowledge that are in turn delegitimized’. It allows for example for an analysis of how ‘male knowledge, or knowledges along the lines of gender, class, sexuality, ability or ethnicity is privileged’ over others and the ways in which the very logic of this process gives rise to an enforced internal/internalized negation of those forms of difference that are marked, produced and reproduced as subordinate, ‘abnormal’ invalid, immoral, illegitimate, inferior and thus non-respectable. More important still is how an acknowledgement of this process points towards a consciousness of the difference in positionalities between speaking [from the epistemological and ontological space of dominant hegemonic constructions of difference itself] and enunciation as a transformative process of agency that draws voice and assertions of self from a refusal of this space and a refusal to give consent to oppression in all its variegated forms.
Positionalities of transformative enunciation [Hall, 1996] in these contexts then should entail and center an understanding [and contestation] of the intricacies and complexities of the constraints placed on voice by ongoing enforcements of discursive and material colonial relations of power and a critical interrogation of the differences that are entailed between speaking and enunciation. For example, positionalities of transformative enunciation should be grounded in [and draw strength from] questions such as, are we enunciating when we are speaking? Is there a difference between speaking and enunciation? When I am speaking now am I enunciating? Such discursive questions [and self questionings] are integral to resisting the processes of internal/internalized colonialism and ongoing colonial relations of power that underpin the social orders of Western nation-states such as Britain.

Similar to Dei [1999], Grosfoguel [2007] reconceptualizes colonial relations of power from a set of power relations between the global North and South to one that is much more nuanced and one in which social difference in its heterogeneous complexity becomes paramount. Grosfoguel draws on Quijano’s [1992] theorization of a world system of colonial dominance theorized as a ‘historical-structural heterogeneous totality’ that has a specific matrix which Quijano refers to as a ‘colonial power matrix’ [Grosfoguel, 2007, p.217]. This ‘matrix’ of colonial power according to Quijano, affects ‘all dimension of social existence’ [p.217] such as disability, gender, sexuality, authority, subjectivity and labour. Thinking about colonial relations of power in this form and its multi-layered destructiveness in the context of social relations and social connectedness may bring further clarity and significance to Che Guevara’s [1965] powerful assertion made at the United Nations in 1965 that colonialism is a ‘process of despoilment’.
In extending Quijano’s [1992] work however, Grosfoguel [2007] re-conceptualizes colonial power relations in terms of what he calls the ‘coloniality of power’. This coloniality of power consists of an ‘entanglement’ or ‘intersectionality’ comprised of ‘multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies [and heterarchies] of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation where the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European [constructed as White] non-European divide transversally reconfigures all of the other global power structures’ [p.217]. Grosfoguel argues that this power matrix of coloniality which is the central mechanism of colonialism, is a mechanism that neither resides in the historical past, nor in the presence of a subjugating colonial administrative apparatus, but rather it resides within a hegemonic process in which the colonial ‘machinery of power’ [Foucault, 1995] penetrates itself in, on and over the colonized social collective for the explicit purpose of manipulating and reconfiguring the multi-dimensionality and heterogeneity of its collective psycho-social existence.

What Grosfoguel [2007] argues therefore, following on from critical anti-colonial scholars such as Dei is that the coloniality of power is inscribed not only in relations of exploitation [between capital and labour] and relations of domination [between metropolitan and peripheral states], but [more fundamentally] in the production and reproduction of “subjectivities and knowledge” which underpin global and local hierarchies of social difference [p.221]. What is significant and what is central to Grosfoguel’s notion of coloniality and what he refers to as the ‘colonial power perspective’ is that it is the ‘idea’ of race and racism [contrary to Eurocentric Marxist modes of analysis which center class] which represents the “organizing principal” structuring the entangled hierarchicalization of difference that is inherent in the historical and contemporary world system.

As Grosfoguel goes onto explain:
The idea of race organizes the world’s population into a hierarchical order of superior and inferior people that becomes an organizing principal of international division of labour and of the global patriarchal system. Contrary to the Eurocentric perspective, race, gender, sexuality...[disability]...spirituality, and epistemology are not additive elements to the economic and political structures of the capitalist world-system, but an integral, entangled and constitutive part of the broad entangled package called the European modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world–system. European patriarchy and European notions of sexuality, epistemology and spirituality were exported to the rest of the world through colonial expansion as the hegemonic criteria to racialize, classify and pathologize the rest of the world’s population in a hierarchy of superior and inferior races [p.217-218]

What is crucial in both Grosfoguel [2007] and Dei’s [1999] conceptualization of coloniality and colonial relations of power is that their formulation of dominating and subjugating power as coloniality, pinpoints colonialism and colonial relations of power as ongoing, ongoing in ways that underpin the social and political relations between North and South, between metropolitan and periphery states, between peoples of difference in so called post colonial and ‘post independent’ societies, and, [more importantly for my own analysis] between peoples of difference within historically imperial racializing nation-states such as Britain. What is important about their framework of analysis is that it allows for a space of individual/collective resistance, that is to say decolonization, or a ‘decolonial turn’ as Grosfoguel [2007] puts it. Importantly it allows for a recognition and acknowledgment of a collective implicatedness in consent to oppression and [from the positionality of those bodies and communities formed and constructed as marginal and inferior] it allows for a psychic confrontation and contestation with internalized colonialized knowledge thus freeing up space for a politics of enunciation to emerge.

As a consequence, it gives space for an embodied anti-hegemonic process to take place, one that is framed within what Grosfoguel calls a “body-politics-of-knowledge” [p.213], a politics crucial for the emergence of enunciation as an anti-hegemonic positionality of voice and one that is grounded
in the ‘epistemological and ontological power of difference’ [Kincheloe, 2006] in both individual and collective terms [see also Dei, 1999; Anzaldua, 1987; Michalko, 2001; hooks, 1983, et al].

**Re/Conceptualizing Internal colonialism**

The concept of internal colonialism was initially used first by V.I. Lenin and then Antonio Gramsci [Hechter, 1975] as framework for describing and explaining the social, economic and political inequalities existing between regions within a particular social system. In keeping with the process of modern colonialism which enforces a system of exploitation between the Imperial metropol nation-state and that of the colonized nation, there is, in terms of internal colonialism, a power relationship of exploitative dependency between the periphery [regions] and the core [the administrative metropolis] which, due to the very dialectical relationship of exploitation, is a necessary condition which cannot be transformed merely through economic and industrial development.

As Michael Hechter [1975] explains, internal colonialism emerges from a ‘spatially uneven wave of modernization over state territory’ which in turn gives rise to ‘relatively advanced and less advanced groups’ within the nation-state itself. The effect of this leads to the ‘crystallization’ of an ‘unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups’ [p.9]. From this point onwards, according to Hechter, the ‘superordinate group or core seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system’. Part of this process entails regulating the ‘allocation’ of high prestigious, social and political roles for those bodies, communities and regions defined [by the core itself] as being members of the core group. Thus, what is produced and reproduced is a stratified system characterized by a ‘cultural division of labour’ which in turn contributes to the formation of a process of ‘distinct ethnic identification’ between [and within] the two groups. The subordinate,
subjugated, peripheral group that is the internal space of colonialism produces wealth for the benefit of those regions and communities that are constructed as being more closely associated with the core or center of power and therefore the state itself. Closest to the centre is not necessarily denoted by physical distance however, as peripheral communities and regions more often than not, according to Hechter, will be marked for differential treatment within the nation-state on the basis of religion, language, ethnicity and culture. The experience of Indigenous peoples globally might serve as one such example.

What is significant for my own analysis is Hechter’s usage of the term internal colonialism to describe the formations of power within the so called ‘British Isles’. Within Hechter’s framework the internal colonies, that is to say, those regions and communities subjected to exploitation and dispossession that lie on the periphery of the core of ‘Britishness’, are represented by the Celtic nations of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. However this framework might also be used in part to describe the regional inequities and inequalities within the so called core itself [the economic and cultural divisions for example between the largely neglected and decaying industrial North and the relatively prosperous South of England].

There are limitations however to Hechter’s usage of the concept of internal colonialism which perhaps reflects Grosfoguel’s [2007] own critique of Eurocentric theorizations of colonialism itself. Once again the practice and penetration of colonialism is conceptualized exclusively in terms of an imposition of an exploitative binary relationship of dominance and subjugation between the core and the periphery enforced primarily through the instrument of colonial administrative power. My usage of the concept however sharply diverges from Hechter’s in that it builds upon both Grosfoguel [2007] and Dei’s [1999] radical conceptualization of coloniality and colonial power.
relations as a process mediated through the hierarchicalization of racialized notions of social difference.

In arguing that this sign called Britain is constitutive of internal/internalized colonialism, I use ‘internal’ not simply to differentiate a physical external and internal core/periphery set of power relations mediated through an administrative apparatus of power, nor for that matter in terms of Foucault’s notion of internal colonialism, that is to say, a process of violence imposed upon colonized peoples and countries which is then reflected back to the metropolis in a ‘back and forth’ discursive and material method of social organizing [Stoler, 1995] but rather I make use of the term as a means to denote the internalized coloniality of the collective consciousness and psyche that is Britain thus allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the power configurations that characterize this nation-state. To this end my re-configuration and re-assertion of internal colonialism looks to develop an alternative framework for understanding, contesting and transforming the violence that is inherent in the historical and contemporary formation and organization of the nation-state of Britain.

Internal Colonialism: The Key Components:

Central to my engagement with internal colonialism and its reconfiguration is an urgency for bringing to the fore an anti-hegemonic positionality and response to ongoing discourses and practices of systemic oppression/repression. I do not look to reproduce any ‘grand theory’ for understanding social relation of power but rather I wish to engage in a process of coming to critical consciousness, of making senses of the social/political conditions and discursive formations which constrain individual and collective thought and give rise to material effects that are homicidal, violating and genocidal. My thrust then is one of contestation with the social order, a social order that I argue is productive of relations of power that are fundamentally colonial in their nature. I am
engaged not simply in a description of internal colonialism but a critical analysis, interrogation and contestation of its active presence. In the context of colonial relations of power however any contestation must place at its center a conceptual movement towards de-colonization.

bell hook’s [1993] understanding of this process is to contextualize colonial relations of power in terms of discursive constraints, that is to say a set of imposed and enforced knowledges that constrain the possibilities for agency and resistance on the part of the marginalized. hooks defines decolonization within a similar framework to that of the anti-colonial writer and social justice activist Ngugi Wa Thiong’o [1989] in that the principal imperative of decolonization involves the decolonization of one’s own individual/collective mind. As hooks [1993] argues ‘decolonization refers to breaking with the ways our reality…[as subjugated peoples]… is defined and shaped by the dominant culture’ and in turn ‘asserting our understanding of that reality’ out and through ‘our own experience’ and knowledges of struggle and survival [p.1-2]. Franz Fanon [1963] with a similar emphasis on the implicatedness of the social structure insists further that decolonization necessitates a transformation of the social structure in its entirety, and that the “‘whole social structure…be changed from the bottom up’” [Mohanty, 2004]. The implication here is that it is from the positionality of the marginalized and the negated where transformative revolutionary change must occur. As Mohanty notes, Fanon argues that such a change is a change that is ‘willed, called for, demanded’ by the colonized” [p.7] the outcasted, and those abjectified and constructed as ‘disposable’ [Giroux, 2006] and/or ‘socially invisible’ [Goldberg, 2002].

Drawing on Fanon [1963], Mohanty [2004] asserts that decolonization is a “historical process” and as such it “can only be understood in the contexts” of the historical production, re-production and re/enforcements of discursive and material domination and the formulations of resistance
against this process that gives decolonization [in socio-political terms], its “‘historical form and content’” [p.7]. Decolonization then involves an anti-hegemonic re-creation and re-transformation of the social system as an interconnected whole in such a way as to implicate both the individual and collective consciousness and the constraining influence and impact of the social system’s institutional and systemic apparatuses of hegemonic power and authority.

Decolonization therefore, is an interrelated process that ‘involves profound transformations of self, community, and governance structures’ [p.7]. It is a ‘call to consciousness’ [Goodleaf, 1993] that engages itself not only in a contestation with the State but with a ‘state of mind’ [p.243]. As a result decolonization as it relates to the individual/collective consciousness ‘can only be engaged through active withdrawal of consent and resistance to structures of psychic and social domination’ [Mohanty, 2004, p.7].

Decolonization as a critical transformative approach and counter-hegemonic positionality however must first begin with an understanding of the intricacies and complexities of the processes of domination that serve to produce, sustain and maintain a hegemonic collective state of mind in the first place. It is with this first step in mind that I look towards a reconfiguration of the concept of internal colonialism and in doing so I want to expand on what I believe are five key interrelated components: 1] The hierarchicalization of difference. 2] The internalization of internal colonialism [and its contingent violent effects of negation and amputation]. 3] Racialization. 4] The saliency of race: In this later component race saliency is constituted in 2 forms: a] Whitecentrism and [b] the prostheticization of race. The fifth component speaks to the collective implicatedness of oppression and the refusal of the prosthetic.

**The Hierarchicalization of Difference**
Dominant Eurocentric notions of national identity underpinned as they are by capitalist colonial discursive modes of individual and collective self actualization, are reliant upon the structuration and evaluative hierarchicalization of social difference. David Goldberg [2001] draws on Hall’s assertion that Western nation-states are ‘structured in racial [and interactively in gendered and class] dominance’. As a result, ‘the state is not neutral but structurally reproduces and regulates the hierarchies it has helped institutionally to constitute’. Within these contexts however the space of social difference is subjected to socio-political hierarchicalization not as an individual but as a biologized population or collective. For example Crichlow and Mearthy [1993] cite Homi K. Bhaba [1992] who argues that colonial discourse [in British and European contexts] constructs the colonized as a ‘population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origins in order to justify conquest and establish systems of administration and instruction’ [Crichlow and Mearthy, 1993, p.256]. As Crichlow and Mearthy note further this process is dialectically productive of a dominant, hegemonic self mediated ‘through the fear or derision’ of a socially constructed inferiorized Other ‘along an ‘ideological order of differentiation and hierarchicalization’ [256].

Historically the hierarchicalization of ‘race, gender, sexuality, spirituality and epistemology’ has underpinned the ‘economic and political structures of the capitalist [modernist] world-system [Grosfoguel, 2007 p. 21] a process which in turn has characterized the emergence and formation of modernist Western nation-states entities and their internal colonialized social relations of power. Western externally enforced colonial power relations as they have historically been imposed upon the so called global South however have been conceptualized by Western nation-states in a form that imagines the world as a racial space in which the ‘putative [racial] superiority’ of the European exists in an oppositional Manichean binary to that of the racially inferior non European’. In this latter context while race and racial hierarchies have been paramount to the relations of dominance
‘hierarchicalized dichotomies’ [Peterson, 1999], underpinned for example by heterosexuality as normalcy, have also enforced discursive and material violence upon colonized peoples through the imposition of dominant notions of gender, sexuality and sexual expression [Feinberg, 1996] which have served to eradicate indigenous ways of knowing and identity expression represented for example by 2 spirited peoples which served to re-produce an internalization of misogynistic violence that has fragmented colonized communities from within.

Implicated in this process is the enforcement of heterosexism as a normalized ‘system of hierarchical dichotomies’ [Peterson, 1999] which codifies sex in rigid, biological binary, biological biologized male–female splits with sex being equated with the further binary of gender constructed, produced and enforced as fixed biologized masculine/feminine subjectivities and difference. Moreover, these hierarchical dichotomies enforce and reproduce sexuality solely through the binary of “heterosexual–homosexual” with heterosexuality fixed as the norm. As Peterson points out heterosexism is ‘naturalized’ within the colonial discursive framework that underpins the formation of European nationalism and nation-state re/production “through multiple discourses, especially western political theory and religious dogma, and by the reification of the (patriarchal) ‘family’ as ‘pre-political’ – as ‘natural’ and non-contractual”. As Peterson explains further the ‘binary of male–female difference’ as fixed biological entities enforce by the social ‘ordering of masculinity over femininity’ which is, ‘in western metaphysics (hence, political theory/practice) evident in all collective meaning systems where the hierarchical dichotomy of gender is foundational to symbolic ordering and discursive practice’ [p.40]. According to Peterson:

[A] conceptual ordering of masculine over feminine is inextricable from political ordering imposed in state-making and reproduced through masculinist discourse (political theory, religious dogma) that legitimizes the state’s hierarchical relations. Insofar as (hegemonic) masculinity is constituted as reason, order, and control,
masculine domination is reproduced through conceptual systems that privilege male entitlement – to authority, power, property, nature. Central to this ideology is male entitlement to women’s sexuality, bodies, and labor. Heterosexism as sex/affect involves the normalization of exclusively heterosexual desire, intimacy, and family life. Historically, this normalization is inextricable from the state’s interest in regulating sexual reproduction, undertaken primarily through controlling women’s bodies, policing sexual activities, and instituting the heteropatriarchal family/household as the basic socio-economic unit. This normalization entails constructions of gender identity and hegemonic masculinity as heterosexual, with corollary interests in women’s bodies as objects of (male) sexual gratification and the means of ensuring group continuity. In complex – and even contradictory – ways, masculinity as entitlement and control is here linked to heterosexual practices and expression of power and violence [p.40].

While Peterson makes some critical points here that will be expanded upon further in this study [particular in relation to eugenicized state violence against women and state imposed notions of what counts as ‘proper’ gender relations] there is a problematic here in terms of slippage into a homogenization and universalization of difference. It is important to acknowledge in a critical analysis of coloniality and the hierarchicalized power relations that come with it that there are also hierarchies within hierarchies [Foucault, 1980] and therefore entanglements within entanglements. The hierarchicalization of difference race, class, gender, disability and sexuality are for example, interconnected and constitutive of one another [Carbado, 2005]. Peterson’s [1999] analysis of the contours of oppression needs therefore to be rested away from homogenization in order to complexify the processes by which privilege and entitlement is reproduced and reified hegemonically.

As Avtar Brah [1992] points out for example, the colonial construction of ‘white women as the moral guardians’ of a superior race’ [p.137] has the effect of ‘homogenizing white women’s sexuality at the same time as it fractures it across class in that the white working class woman although also presented as a ‘carrier of the race’, is simultaneously constructed as prone to ‘degeneracy’ because of her class background’ [p.137]. Implicated here is the role and presence of
racialization by first, conceptualizing social difference [in this case class] in biologizing terms whereby whole communities or spaces of collective difference are imagined and marked as a species sharing the same biologically determined deviances, character and/or behavior, and second by the hierarchicalization [along these lines of racialization] of white bodies of difference within the space of Whiteness. The concept, formulation and historical/contemporary production reproduction and maintenance of internal/internalized colonialism and colonality in hegemonic British nation-state contexts is grounded in this latter power relationship, a power relationship organized within and through the discursive field of Whitecentrism and its hierarchicalization.

The Internalization of Internal Colonialism:

My analysis of ongoing colonial discursive modes of hegemonic power [e.g. internal colonialism] draws on the work of numerous scholars [Gilroy, 1991; Hall, 1992, et al] who have argued that nation-states and national identities such as Britain are premised on exclusion through the enforcements of hegemonic constructions of citizenship wherein “full citizenship” is predicated on dominant and subalternized [Asgharzadeh, 2007] formations of gender, race, class, sexuality and disability, in determining access to material resources. Floya and Yuval-Davis [1992] in their focus on ‘racialized boundaries’ as they apply to British nation-state contexts argue for example that ethnic, gender and class divisions in Britain ‘involve differential access to resources and processes of exclusion and inclusion’ with racism predicated not on ‘explicit ideologies or discourses of biological inferiorization’ but on ‘different forms of exclusion on the basis of a group not belonging to the culture of origin of the dominant ethnic group within the state apparatus’ [p.11]. David Goldberg [cited in Murji and Solomos, 2005] has also placed an emphasis on exclusion in his assertion that the relationship between difference, identity and culture needs to be conceptualized and located within a broader understanding of what he calls ‘substantive democracy’. Goldberg’s conceptualization of ‘substantive democracy’ here is one that speaks to
the ‘rights of minorities and the racially marginalized’. The importance of a politics of this nature ‘is that it foregrounds the complicated issues in the discourse of substantive citizenship.’ According to Goldberg this approach locates ‘conflict over relations of power, identity and culture’ within an arena of ‘broader struggles to advance the critical imperative of [and for] a democratic society’. He goes on to argue that working within a framework that positions the nation-state as a site of exclusion, is critical to this process as it ‘locates the notion of democracy itself away from any …liberal…and thus hegemonic… understanding of the term’ [p. 10].

In centering exclusion/inclusion Goldberg suggests that variegated forms and patterns of exclusion and inclusion are interlinked in the contemporary moment [and in their historical emergence] in the sense that ‘political, social and economic exclusion can culminate in physical exclusion’, for example ‘at the border’, ‘either with a refusal of permission to enter’ or deportation. Physical exclusion and its material effects is further manifested in the nation-state’s notion of what counts for citizenship, which can be seen in the ‘high price that some pay to stay, enter or remain in wealthy states…or…in bodies suffocating to death in containers….frozen to death in luggage compartment of aircraft’[p.10] or asylum seekers subjected to violent death and murder prior to entering Britain and once in Britain subjected to murder on the streets and death via suicide in detention centers [Athwal, 2006].

Bodies in these contexts according to Goldberg [Murji and Solomos, 2005, p. 10], represent ‘socially invisible populations…unable to speak…and…denied voice’. However it is on this very invisibility that a further violent effect of exclusion is constituted, a violence that occurs internally within nation-states. As Goldberg says: ‘socially invisible’ bodies ‘repeatedly find themselves…confined for indefinite periods of time without full explanation of the reasons for
their detention in a language they cannot understand and too many times without legal representation’ [p.10]. This represents the violent dialectic of inclusion/exclusion for while, as Goldberg explains, “located within the space of transnationalized citizenship and the globalization of labour] …there are… those who can claim to enjoy global or flexible citi-zenships, there are more who are shut out of every aspect of citizenship local and global”. As Goldberg further argues, ‘these different forms of exclusion emanate from the restrictions of the nation-state’, stunting ‘the development and…impeding…the advancement of sizable populations of groups within societies’ [p.10]. Given these conditions it is critical according to Goldberg to develop ‘an analysis of contemporary trends and developments sensitive to what is happening at the level of nation-states, localities and regions as well as transregionally’ [p.10]. For Goldberg this, in turn necessitates a ‘rethinking and rewriting of social difference in relation to wider considerations of membership, community and social responsibility’ [p.10]. Moreover, Goldberg makes a critical point here, which is, that social difference ‘re-thought, re-written, re-conceptualized’ [and, I would add, re-asserted], must be done so in relation to the self, the community and local and global structures of governance power and authority.

I suggest that Goldberg’s assertion argues for a re/conceptualization of social difference which draws its strength from both an acknowledgement of a collective implicatedness in systemic oppression and a collective refusal of that implicatedness, in other words, the collective refusal to allow one’s social difference to be used as a tool for the reproduction of oppression. Goldberg’s conceptualization of ‘exclusion’ refers to those social invisible populations who are excluded certainly, however dialectically. His conceptualization also implicates those dominant bodies that are doing the excluding along with the variegated structures of governance, power and authority which confer privilege and entitlement upon them. Interrogating the ways in which ongoing
colonial discourse constructs social difference in violating hierarchicalized forms for the purpose of re-producing a hegemonic social system reliant upon raced, gendered, abled, sexualized, and classed asymmetrical power relations for its existence, is an important step towards a re-assertion of social difference as an individual and collective transformative entity.

Centering colonialism and coloniality as a process of internal/internalization makes for a divergence from Goldberg however. For while Goldberg’s work looks to complicate the process of exclusion and looks to expand on its material impact as it relates to social difference, a focus on the internalization of colonialism as discourse in the context that I am framing it in this analysis argues that while most certainly the nation-state is a space of physical exclusion, it is much more so a space of physical/material and psychic negation and amputation and, more specifically, the physical/material and psychic negation and amputation of difference. When Goldberg speaks of the dominant discursive and material practice of exclusion in relation to its capacity to render particular bodies of difference as socially invisible, and/or ‘disposable’ [Giroux, 2006] this constitutes a process of the negation and amputation of difference on the part of the nation-state as a social collective. In other words, particular bodies and communities are not just rendered, ‘socially invisible’ in relation to the social collective and nation-state, or just rendered excluded, outcasted and abjectified by the social collective and nation-state, they are psychically negated and amputated by and from the body of the social/nation-state collective as a whole with all the necessary accompanying violence that is contingent with such a terrorizing and homicidal process. Significantly however, as this study will later point out, this is never a complete process.

Processes of negation and amputation are central to the logic that formulates nation-state collective identities such as Britain which are reliant, consciously and unconsciously, upon colonial power
relations and coloniality [as discourse and material effect] for their maintenance and re-production. Coloniality as discourse conceptualizes, represents, produces and systematically enforces rigid binary assertions of social difference as hierarchicalized, homogenized entities of race, class, gender, disability and sexuality, whose ontological make-up is constructed as biologically determined and therefore fixed and immutable. As a result the negation and amputation of difference is not only a consequence but a logical imperative.

First and foremost the negation of social difference in these socio-political historical contexts equals genocide. Ward Churchill [1997] writing about the genocidal effects of Euro colonial [discursive and material] domination as it relates to Indigenous peoples, has spoken of the process whereby the imposition of colonialism entails the practice of removing and displacing Indigenous peoples from their land followed by the appropriation and assertion on the part of the colonizers [who have looked to replace them] of the term ‘native’ and ‘indigenous’. As Churchill explains, this removal and erasure of Indigenous peoples constitutes ‘a quite literal negation of the very existence of those who are truly indigenous to the colonized locales’ [p.162]. It is a process of negation in which the attempt is to not only remove and displace, but to simultaneously digest and absorb Indigenous peoples into the colonial social order. As Churchill, points out ‘what is at issue in this instance [and context] is not simply systematic resource expropriation [with all the concomitant human misery that implies], but genocide. It is genocide of an extremely sophisticated type to be sure, but it is genocide nonetheless’ [p.162].

The destructive and disintegrative aspect of this genocidal process however is such that it does not merely reduce its focus to the negation of an Indigenous physical presence but more insidiously it targets for negation the presence and existence of Indigenous ontological and epistemological ways
of knowing. Colonial violation [discursive and material] is, as Linda Tuhiwai Smith [1999] points out, ‘a process of systematic fragmentation’ [p.28] in which Indigenous and colonized peoples are forcibly disconnected from ‘their histories, their landscapes, their languages, their social relations and their own ways of thinking, feeling and interacting with the world’ [p.28]. This is carried out for example through the imposition of alien conceptualizations of temporality, space, subjectivity, values, morality, cosmology, and individual/collective social relations. Included in these alien dominating colonial impositions are binary racialized conceptualizations of social difference that includes who and what counts as ‘fully human’ [p.26] what counts as civilized, savage, primitive, backward, barbaric, heathen, immoral, and [importantly], who and what does not. In other words, what is imposed is the concept of Otherization as an epistemological method of knowing. This genocidal negation of Indigenous cultural ways of doing however is not achieved solely through colonial coercive force it requires the colonization of Indigenous minds. Thus, it requires as Gramsci [Bell, 1997] has pointed out in his reconceptualization of the concept of hegemony, the consent of subjugated peoples, and therefore [in this context] Indigenous peoples themselves. It requires that those who are colonized view their world, their understandings of the cosmos, their histories, their social relations, their communities and their bodies, through alien epistemologies. And where colonial discourse conceptualizes the Indigenous body as savage it requires Indigenous peoples to internalize this also, to view themselves as the savage Other in need of salvation and saving.

The fragmentary and violent effect of this process is the self denial, negation and amputation of the individual and collective self and identity in the psychological struggle to distance oneself individually and collectively from a thingified [Cesaire, 1972] objectified, abjectified, outcasted Other and thus to look to pass for what counts as respectable, what counts as almost [if not fully]
human, and, in the context of colonial social relations of power underpinned by racialization, to pass for what counts as whiteness and most closest to whiteness. It is to view oneself as the Other, as the abnormal, as a body that carries a naturally endowed deficit or disorder in need of fixing, curing, rescuing, rehabilitating, and/or medicalizing.

As Frantz Fanon [1952] has written, in these socio-historical contexts the ‘image of one’s body is solely negating, it’s an image in the third person’ [p.90]. An image congealed of the colonizer’s perception and conceptualization of the colonized. An image of ‘their’ conception of ‘us’. The negation and amputation of the individual and collective self therefore is the material effect of internalizing colonialism [external or internal] in its discursive form. Rod Michalko [2002] has noted similar processes of violation in relation to disability. Speaking of the imposition of binary modes of thought, Michalko explains how ‘the binary opposition of sightedness/blindness privileges the former [which] imagines blindness not merely as opposite to sight but as the negation of it, generating a conception of blindness as a lack – lack of knowledge, lack of normalcy, lack of ability’ [p.27]. Speaking of navigating the ‘loss’ of his sight in his late childhood and adolescence he writes:

“When I saw blind people in the movies or on television and even when I saw “real” ones, I saw incompetence, sadness, poverty. And I saw misfortune. Whether my perception was accurate or not is irrelevant; this is what I saw. What I did not see when I saw these blind people is just as significant as what I did not see. I did not see me. Still, when I saw them, I experienced a nebulous fear that I later understood was the fear of seeing myself” [p.24]:

As Michalko’s experience as a young, blind body navigating a period of passing for sighted and thus ‘normal’ reveals this enforced negative/amputative process as a discourse internalized that impacts and penetrates not only the body, but the very psyche itself.
**Racialization:**

Underpinning the coloniality of power relations and the process of internal/internalized colonialism as it relates to the hegemonic formation of the nation-state of Britain is that of racialization. According to Robert Miles [1989], racialization is a historical ‘representational process whereby social significance is attached to certain biological [usually phenotypical] human features, on the basis of which those people possessing those characteristics are designated as a distinct collectivity’ [p.74]. Miles’s conceptualization of racialization is of crucial importance in the arena of critical social analysis and praxis and of critical importance in understanding the forms through which particular sites of social difference have historically been marked for differential treatment in ways that both biologize and collectivize [i.e. ‘pluralize’, Memmi, 1965] their social difference. With this in mind [and drawing on Mile’s work] I argue for the concept of racialization to be taken up as the common sense belief and/or active political assertion that certain individual bodies of minoritized social difference represent a homogenous social group in which, criminality, degeneracy, immorality, destitution, violence and other forms of socially ascribed ‘deviancies’ are imagined as an inherited biologically determined aspect of their historical, cultural and/or racial identity [Doyle-Wood, 2010].

What is important about this conceptualization of racialization is that its discursive and materially enforced presence is not necessarily restricted to race, skin colour or [contrary to Mile’s assertion] ‘phenotypical human features’. Because racialization through discourse and language constructs and marks certain individual bodies of social difference as representatives of an entire homogenized collective, whose ascribed inferiority is biologically determined it has underpinned the inferiorization of whole groups historically not only on the basis of race but also on the basis of class, gender, disability and sexuality. Racialization as a concept then becomes a critically
important means for understanding the connected ways in which the ‘idea’ of race [e.g. the biologization and the homogenization of difference] historically and contemporarily informs [within British internal/internalized colonial contexts], the subjugation of social difference in its variegated collective forms. Having said this however, there is, as scholars such as Dei [2000] and Omi and Winant [1993] have stressed, a saliency to race in racialized Whitecentric systems of power and it is this saliency as a further key component of internal colonialism that I now wish to discuss.

**Whitecentrism**

Following on from Philomena Essed’s [1991 p.193] work I qualify Eurocentrism and Europeanness as a racial White assertion. Like Philomena Essed I argue for a qualification of Eurocentrism towards one that contests its racial, white centric construction. As Essed points out Eurocentrism’s message that [for example] ‘Black women do not belong at all…or [who must remain] only at the bottom of society’ is a message that is rejected by Black women not only on the basis of a European cultural dominance but also on the basis of a Euro (White) centrality [p. 192]. The representation and centrality of Europeanness is a representation and conceptualization of culture that is specifically racial. As Essed writes, quoting the stories of Black women’s everyday experience of racism, ’I cannot expect to turn on the television and see some recognition of us [as Black women] or some obvious value for us, or something that shows us in a good light’. Thus, Europeanness as with Englishness/Britishness is represented as a racial entity. As Essed points out, Eurocentricity as Europeanness made synonymous with white and normalized as such in the above statement ‘suggests that Blacks do not count’. As Essed goes onto to assert, Eurocentricity is fundamentally Whitecentric. ‘Whether it concerns the media, the lack of ‘books and toys’ for non-White children, ‘to identify with’ or ‘that colours in the cloth stores are all focused on these very
White housewives’ the message that society is culturally tuned to the interests and needs of the White (middle class) group constantly penetrates the lives of Black women’.

Europeaness/Englishness/Britishness operationalized as Eurocentrism is ‘interwoven in social relationships, in the language [and discourse of European nation-states such as Britain]. It is woven ‘in the habits of thinking’, in the nation-state’s world view, in the conceptualization of an imagined set of ‘core values’ that define the nation-state’s collective identity. It is operationalized ‘in institutional regulations’ and ‘in the conditions under which individuals or groups gain access to resources’ and it is done so through a ‘pure White point of view’ [p.194]. Thus, in these contexts, Eurocentrism as Whitecentrism becomes so ingrained in the social cognitions of White peoples that it leaves White bodies ‘often incapable of understanding the world from the point of view’ of those marked as non-White. As Essed goes onto to say, ‘[w]hitecentrism prevents Whites in everyday life from being systematically confronted with the way Blacks [and other non-white peoples] perceive reality, with what they feel, and with what their purposes in life are. Whitecentricity in national belonging and dis-belonging ’permeates everyday situations’ [p.193]. It reproduces itself in employment, schooling and ‘non-verbal’ neglect’. As Essed further argues, it is lodged in names, accents, conditions of alienation, suicide, death and murder. It is central to racialized hierarchicalized relations of power: gradations, to hegemonic formations of respectability and what counts as ‘proper’ assertions of identity. As Essed explains, ‘Whitecentrism is a problem of who is [racially] central and who is [racially] marginal’ [p.193] and as such Whitecentrism/centricity is central to the process of Racialization and its ancillary, the prostheticization of race:

**The Prostheticization of Race**

Ejidra and Premjee [2010] argue that the process of racialization is a dehumanizing process that gives rise to conditions of racism wherein bodies are ‘stripped of their humanity’ and ‘amputated’
by an *external* force to the point where they can only be understood by the dominant psyche by and through ‘fictitious binaries’ and boundaries [p.20]. Utilizing Judith Butler’s [1993] concept of the ‘phantasmic realm’ [a space in which bodies of colour are ‘defined’ in the imagination of the dominant psyche prior to any physical contact], Ejidra and Premjee assert that racialization in its formation as a mode of thought is integral to both the ‘phantasmic realm’ and the ‘phantasmic screen’, which, as they point out, is the phantasmic realm’s contingent psychic tool and mechanism for defining and making sense of the social world. As they go on to argue, it is ‘through the process of racialization that bodies of colour are systematically viewed within a phantasmic realm of imagination’ and through a phantasmic screen that re/creates the bodies of racialized peoples ‘through a pre-existent racist ideology’ [p.20].

Slavoj Zizeck [1997] takes a similar analytic approach to that of Ejidra and Premjee in his book *The Plague of Fantasies*. For Zizeck it is the so-called Third World constructed as it is in the Western imagination as a racialized entity that is reliant on the phantasmic screen for its racialized re/ invention and re/production. It is through a phantasmic screen that Calcutta, India, for example, is imagined as ‘Hell on Earth’ and, correlatively, the archetypal representation of ‘the decaying Third World metropolis’ that is ‘full of social decay, poverty, violence and corruption with its residents caught in a terminal apathy’ [p.18]. This racializing conceptual gaze however implicates a key contingent discursive component, that of pathologization. For as the phantasmic screen not only imagines, constructs, determines and re-produces a racialized conceptual understanding of Calcutta, it also imagines, constructs and determines the conceptual frameworks through which the ‘problem’ and ‘disorder’ that it views as Calcutta, must be approached and treated. This is where the significance of pathologization emerges. To pathologize Calcutta is to view it as a carrier and container of an inherent disorder that must be fixed, rehabilitated and/or contained and it is into this
discursive hegemonic space that, according to Zizeck, the ‘saintly’ Euro-Whitecentric-religious presence of Mother Teresa enters the scene with the hegemonic discourse ‘that poverty is to be accepted as a way to redemption since the poor in enduring their sad fate with silent dignity and faith repeat Christ’s way of the Cross’ [p. 18].

For Zizeck, there is a ‘bi-directionality’ [Carbado, 2005] to this process which sustains and reinforces sociopolitical relations of power and privilege through the reproduction of benefits for the dominant and [bi-directionally] penalties for the oppressed. As Zizeck [1997] explains the benefits in terms of the ideological for dominant systems of power and [simultaneously] the material effects for the oppressed that arise from this discursive pathologizing process are two fold. Firstly, as the poor and oppressed are directed towards the seeking of ‘salvation in their very suffering’ they are simultaneously directed against investigating and ‘probing’ the structural causes of their conditions of oppression and thus directed against ‘politicizing their situation’ [p.18]. Secondly, the discourse of pathologization personified by Mother Teresa provides the West with the ‘chance of’ a kind of substitute – redemption’ through the provision of monetary donations to her charitable work [p.18]. As Zizeck points out, ‘all this works against the background of the phantasmic image of the Third World as Hell on Earth, as a place so utterly desolate that no political activity, only charity and compassion, can alleviate the suffering’ [p.18].

The so called Third World as it is constructed within and through the phantasmatic realm and screen however is [like Mother Teresa’s personification of pathologization] an embodied process in which the ‘disorder’ that is the Third World and ‘Hell on Earth’ is imagined as a space synonymous with that of a particular body both as an individual and as a collective. Thus, if the phantasmic screen imagines the white Christian body of Mother Teresa as the embodiment of a racialized notion of
the West as a progressive space of non-violence, civilizing goodness, morality, kindness, order and
tolerance on earth, then the opposite is imagined for non-white individuals and populations. It is
the latter, who [through the phantasmic screen] come to embody ‘poverty’, utter desolation, passive
suffering, ‘social decay’, disorder, ‘the decaying Third World metropolis’, violence, terrorism,
corruption, and ‘terminal apathy’, which, as a consequence of the violent logic of the process,
must be subjected to surveillance, profiling/persecution, disciplining, regulation, punishment,
incarceration, and/or death.

It is in the field of what is called [in mainstream discourse] ‘racial profiling’, where the material
consequences of racialization and the prescriptive violence advocated by its corollary,
pathologization meet. In effect racial profiling is the offspring of racialization and pathologization.
The material consequences of this practice include, psychic and physical terror and torture,
murderous neglect, incarceration, and individual and collective state sponsored [and state
produced] homicide, all of which are rationalized within and through the phantasmic realm and
phantasmic screen as necessary for containing the ‘problem’ of the non-white body. Judith Butler,
cites the decision by an all white jury to acquit four white Los Angeles police officers of the brutal
beating of Rodney King in 1992 as a decision determined by the phantasmic realm and screen
which views and profiles the Black male and Blackness itself as a ‘danger’ [Ejidra and Premjee,
2010, p.22] to the social order. Consequently, despite viewing the video tape evidence showing
King’s body, prostrate on the ground surrounded by five white police officers [with several more in
the background] who taser him, club him, kick him and beat him with their fists over fifty times
resulting in his hospitalization, the jury interpreted King’s instinctive attempt to defend himself
from the police officer’s blows as an act that in fact endangered the officers. As a result, the
savage beating King received was, according to Butler, seen by the jury as a demonstration of
justifiable force for him [a Black man] ‘threatened them’ and was now being ‘justifiably restrained for, ‘[i]f they cease hitting him, he will release his violence’ [p. 22]. As Butler asserts, ‘King’s palm turned away from his body, held above his own head, is read [within the phantasmic realm and through a phantasmic screen] not as self-protection but as the incipient moments of a physical threat’ [p. 22].

Similarly, the wallet that Amadou Diallo, takes out to show the New York police officers on the evening of February 5th 1999 as he stands on the front steps of his apartment is read within the phantasmic realm and through the phantasmic screen by the white police officer’s, not as a wallet but as a gun. As a result 41 shots are fired at him, 19 of which slam into his body killing him. Speaking of Amadou Diallo’s murder in the context of racial profiling Bill Bradley, the candidate for the 2000 democratic presidential nomination in his debate with Al Gore at the Harlem Theatre condemned racial profiling as practice that ‘seeps into the mind of someone so that he sees a wallet in the hand of a white man as a wallet, but a wallet in the hand of a black man as a gun’ [Bradley, 2002].

Racial profiling is the practice of racism. It equals violence and violation. It is the homicidal outcome and effect of a racialized Whitecentric White supremacist social structure, formation and psyche. Racial profiling, in its discursive and material effect constitutes racial persecution. It represents the tool that operationalizes pathologization and confines the violence that is pathologization to a context that is specifically racial. As Ejidra and Premjee [2010] point out the violent material effects of this process are by no means limited to overt physical acts of systematic racist brutality [i.e. state sanctioned assault, murder and incarceration]. For every Rodney King or Amadou Diallo incident that manages to draw public attention there are thousands of small
incendiary moments and acts of racist violence experienced by individuals and communities of colour on an ongoing, everyday [Essed, 1991] basis giving rise to what Adrien Katherine Wing calls ‘spirit injury’ or, to use Patricia William’s term for the psychologically damaging effects of racism, ‘spirit murder’ [Wing, 2003].

According to Butler [Ejidra and Premjee, 2010], the phantasmic realm and the violence that emerges from it is a process derived by fear and ‘white paranoia’. Ejidra and Premjee however diverge from this position, arguing rightly so that although white paranoia is certainly implicated as is fear, the problematic in this analysis lies with a pathologization of white racist violence which removes accountability, political intent and hate. While I agree with Ejidra and Premjee’s assertion that it is hate [hatred of the Black body and indeed a pathological hatred of all bodies of colour that is the predominant element motivating the dominant psyche towards violence]. I want to build upon Butler, Ejidra and Premjee’s analysis further in addition to that of Zizeck’s [1997], by arguing that the phantasmic realm and phantasmic screen along with its embedded components of white paranoia and hatred for the body of colour as Other, are representative of a dominant and dominating white-centric psyche that is formed not solely from a fear of the Other but from a cognitive and emotional dissonance born from the negation and amputation of its multi-layered self. In this context then the phantasmic realm of imagination and its ancillary the phantasmic screen, targets the individual and collective body of colour for violence discursively and materially primarily because the body of colour is constitutive [within the logic of racialization] of a process of prostheticization, a process whereby race as a biologized idea and as the discursive and material embodiment of non-whiteness is systematically constructed, re-produced, consumed and strapped on [Thomas, 1997] by the dominant/dominating white-centric psyche as a prosthetic that ‘saturates the consciousness’ [Ejidra and Premjee, 2010 p.20].
Erevelles [Provenzo, 2009] quoting Mitchel and Snyder [2000] points out that a prosthetic is a discursive tool that ‘accomplishes an illusion which enables people to fit in’, to pass for respectable and to ameliorate the interconnected, psychologically violating process of de-emphasizing and disavowing their difference so that they can perform ‘a state of imagined normativity’ passing for respectable. As Mitchel and Snyder [Provenzo, 2009] suggest, to wear a prosthetic or to engage in ‘prosthetic practices’, entails a negation and amputation of difference that has collective and individual multiplicative implications particularly so for those bodies assigned to the role of the prosthetic. For example, as Mitchel and Snyder argue where disability is prostheticized, disabled students who are also ‘identified as different because of their race, class, gender, ethnicity or sexuality are validated if and only if they can deploy prosthetic practices that enable them to pass themselves off as not really that different from the norm by hiding their dis/ability’, or, more accurately, by negating and amputating disability from their bodies. And this is the primary function of a prosthetic to stand in as a replacement for what is constructed by dominance to be a missing, or a lack of, or a deviation from normalcy [Michalko, 2002; Titchkosky, 2006; Garland 1997; Linton, 1998 et al]. Thus a prosthetic as an artificial limb which stands in and replaces what is constructed in dominant discourse as the body’s ‘absent’ arm performs the illusion of normalcy represented in ableist terms by 2 limbs.

And yet a prosthetic must also [if it is to meet its hegemonic purpose] embody artificially a fixed set of ingredients, components and boundaries which are not simply material, that is to say a mass manufactured ‘flesh coloured’ [read white] plastic artificial limb, but discursive. In other words, [and in the context of disability] the prosthetic must constitute a fixed, reified discourse/narrative about disability itself that the wearer can draw a sense of security [i.e. wholeness] from. It must
embody a particularly fixed representation and narrative of disability that can be sustained, imagined, produced, reproduced, replicated and re-replicated on continuous basis.

In the context of Mitchel and Snyder’s [2000] assertion, the narrative of disability that is congealed in disability as a prosthetic and which is internalized and subsequently consumed, strapped on and consciously and unconsciously worn by the students is one that defines disability as a shame-filled curse of nature, a disorder and/or as an impairment and disfigurement of for the individual body that must be disavowed, denied, hidden, overcome and/or treated, fixed, rehabilitated, cured and/or eradicated. In other words, it is the dominant, brutalizing and historically genocidal discourse of disability that is prostheticized and psychically strapped on by the students. In Mitchel and Snyder’s analysis, disability as a prosthetic emerges and is generated and re-generated in language and discourse by disabled students themselves through dehumanized visual and visualized representations of disability as deviancy which is then circulated in concretized visual/visualized fetishized and stigmatized linguistic forms such as ‘crippl e’, ‘spaz’, ‘spastic’, ‘moron’, ‘imbecile’ etc [Linton, 1998] which the students recognize and strap on in the form of a collective agreed upon negation of disability, which says discursively, ‘this thing is what we are not’. Thus, the prosthesis/prosthetic of disability is concretized in the negation and amputation of disability. It is the negation of disability as a space of knowledge and as ‘a life worth living’ [Michalko, 2001]. In its prosthetic form disability emerges as a discursive device that replaces or ameliorates a collective psychic angst and dissonance born from an enforced and internalized amputation and negation of difference along the intersectional lines of race, gender, sexuality, and class, and in doing so it achieves the illusion and the passing of/for wholeness, equilibrium, normalcy and respectability.
In terms of collective hegemonic identity formation as it relates to British nation state-contexts and indeed all nation-states to which racialization and ‘whitecentricism’ [Essed, 1991] is foundational however, I argue that the Nation-state’s prosthetic is that of race. Race prostheticized not only mediates the State enforced racialized amputation of the individual and collective sense of self but is the instrument that sustains and reproduces consent to that very violating process. In addition, race as a prosthetic is not only produced and reproduced within and by dominant institutions of power and authority [i.e. ‘regimes of truth’ Foucault, 1980] but is a process that is also generated and regenerated within and through the very racialized thought processes of the social collective itself [Lawrence, 1982]. Fundamentally, race as a prosthetic is constituted as both the discursive expression and rationale of and for the production and reproduction of racism in its white supremacist form, and simultaneously, as an artificial appendage strapped on, worn and consumed [consciously and unconsciously] by the collective colonized white-centric British psyche as a means to ameliorate and disavow the systematic, material and psychologically violating effect and impact of the British collective’s internal/internalized amputation and negation of its multi-layered self.

Just as the prosthesis/prosthetic of social difference in the context of disability must [if it is to perform its oppressive/repressive functional task] embody a fixed hegemonic representation and narrative of disability, so too must the prosthetic of race. When/where race is prostheticized, individual bodies and communities that are overtly and covertly marked and constructed by whitecentrism and whitecentric institutions and systems of power as ‘non-white’, are subjected to a process in which they [or we] are filtered through a prosthetic prism [Smith and Morra, 2006 p.47] that demands conformity to an externally ascribed fixed visualized and visibilized set of corporeal and self actualizing parameters. A prosthetic is not a prosthetic if it has no concrete
tactile functionality and/or if it cannot be seen physically and psychically by the wearer. Nor is a prosthetic a prosthetic if it cannot be recognized by the wearer as a prosthetic. Thus, the racial strap-on prosthetic equivalent of the pink ‘flesh coloured’ artificial limb, is [in its fixed tactile, concrete objectified form] constituted for example, in/by Flannery O’Conner’s [1953] ‘artificial nigger’ which, as a ‘cast-in-iron Sambo’ object [Moore, 1985, p.129] with its ‘standard matte black face, grinning broad lips and white eyes’, represents [in historical and contemporary terms] the ‘mass psychological need to reduce Black people to the simple lines of caricature’ which in turn performs the violent role of a ‘substitute icon for the living breathing, complex reality’ [p. 129] of Black peoples.

As Opal Moore argues the ‘artificial nigger’ or ‘artificial Negro’ is ‘both artifact and symbol’ [p. 129]. For while it symbolizes the dehumanizing forms through which Black peoples in Western white-centric nations have been represented, the ‘artificial nigger’ concretized as the ‘little black figure’, ‘golliwog’ ‘figurine’ ‘artifact’ [p. 129] icon or ‘thing’ [Cesaire, 1972] also ‘exerts’ a particular form of ‘power over those Whites’ who prostheticize it, consume it and ultimately strap it on, that is to say the ‘power to dispel…[negate and amputate their]…‘differences of age, culture, or class’ which in turn ‘allow[s] them to unite within the myth of their racial superiority’ [Moore, 1985 p. 129]. Prostheticization as an ancillary to racialization is both a mode of thought and a material effect. The starting point for contesting and resisting the latter lies therefore in challenging the former.

**The Historical Context**

If I am to pinpoint the space, place, moment, in which my racialization of thought [Fanon, 1952] began to emerge, began to consume my entire sense of self, if I am to trace back to where this began it would be one specific children’s Home that I was placed in as a child and the institutional
apparatus of power that facilitated it. This was the same place that my mother rescued me from not too long before the photograph [shown at the beginning of this analysis] of myself as a child was taken. The institution that administered the Home was called Dr, Barnardo’s. It is now known simply as Barnardo’s. It is [as it was then in the 1960’s when I was incarcerated] the most famous of all children’s charities and the largest in Britain. Back then the bulk of the children Barnardo’s had authority over were children deemed to be in need of ‘rescue’ [a term that resonates with contemporary notions of ‘at risk’]. Such children [for much of the 20th century] were housed and warehoused in numerous residential institutions [known as ‘Homes’] that were strewn across Britain. It is the influential effects of this institution of Barnardo’s and the Barnardo’s Home that I was placed in where I now locate the emergence of the racialization of my psyche and body and which I now use as an entry point through which to locate broader discursive modes and enforcements of internal/internalized colonial relations of power that underpin this space called Britain and the re/production of its collective social identity as a space of physical and psychic negation, violence and violation.

For example it was in this place and space of Dr. Barnardo’s where I remember thinking as a 5 year old child that my best friend’s sister skin was the colour of dog shit. And I remember feeling hurt and wounded by this, feeling that I must keep this thought deep inside as if I was somehow bad, sick or not ‘normal’. Simultaneously I remember struggling with the deep seated feeling that I could be contaminated by her skin, by this ‘dog shit’ that represented to me filth, dirt and darkness [this later internalized by myself in the utmost negative terms] and so I looked to amputate her physically and psychically from my space of play and my everyday world. This was not the only aspect of an emerging sense of self predicated on race and the complex obsession with negation however for I began to feel slowly that this ‘dog shit’ this filth, this dirtiness [and this dirtiness I
associated with darkness] was inside of me, contaminating me, sullying me, uncleaning me. In addition, it seemed that although I had experienced violent oppression prior to entering the Home, oppression in the form of class discrimination, poverty and homelessness, it was in this Home that I first experienced a sense of terror, and a sense of terror that left me paralyzed in terms of voice, that is to say in terms of my capacity to enunciate my thoughts and fears. It is in this context that Barnardo’s constitutes the entry point for my own intellectual excavation and constitutes the space through which to excavate the racialization of the [my] nation-state that is Britain. So who or what is/was this thing called Dr Barnardo’s and/or Barnardo’s? The foundational pillar in relation to the philosophical and discursive influence and values that underpin the Barnardo’s children’s charity organization was that of Dr. Barnardo himself.

According to the Barnardo’s Organization’s contemporary, historical account [2010] ‘Dr’. Thomas John Barnardo [he did not finish medical school] was born in Dublin, Ireland in 1845 and at the age of 16, “converted to Protestant evangelicalism with the aim of pursuing ‘medical missionary’ work in China’. ‘With this in mind he then traveled to London in 1866 to take up training to be a doctor. In the words of the Barnardo’s organization the city of London at the time of Thomas Barnardo’s arrival “was a city struggling to cope with the effects of the Industrial Revolution. The population had dramatically increased and much of this increase was concentrated in the East End, where overcrowding, bad housing, unemployment, poverty and disease were rife”. In addition, “an outbreak of cholera swept through the East End killing more than 3,000 people and leaving families destitute. Thousands of children slept on the streets and many others were forced to beg after being maimed in factories”. It was in this context and setting then that Thomas Barnardo in 1867 set up the first ‘ragged school in the East End, where poor children could get a basic education’. According to the contemporary Barnardo’s account, Dr. Barnardo had a moment that
constituted an epiphany, a moment which steered him away from a desire to do missionary work in China towards that of ‘rescuing’ young children from poverty in Britain. According to the account this epiphany took place one evening when ‘a boy… Jim Jarvis took Thomas Barnardo around the East End showing him children sleeping on roofs and in gutters. The encounter so affected him [that] he decided to devote himself to helping destitute children”.

As Batt, [1904] has written, Barnardo’s initial, ‘desire to go to China merged into an all consuming absorption of passion to befriend and recover to Christ and to His Church, to civilization and the commonwealth of the nation the wasted lives of our [Britain’s] city waifs” [p.27]. As a result Dr. Barnardo opened his first home for boys in Stepney Causeway London in 1875 [Barnardo’s, 2010]. A short while later he would ‘open the first Girls Village Home in Barkingside, which ‘housed 1,500 girls”. In the words of the present Barnardo’s organization, “[b]y the time a child left Barnardo’s they were able to make their own way in the world – the girls were equipped with domestic skills and the boys learnt a craft or trade”. As they go on to explain, “Thomas Barnardo strongly believed that families were the best place to bring up children and he established the first fostering scheme when he boarded out children to respectable [my italics] families in the country. He also introduced a scheme to board out babies of unmarried mothers. The mother went into service nearby and could see her child during her time off”.

The reference to the discourse of respectability and ‘respectable’ families however betrays both the racialization of thought that embodied both Barnardo himself and the very forms in which racialization as discourse embodies the thought processes of the institution of Barnardo’s itself both historically and in the contemporary moment. Respectability as a racializing discourse is entangled with fixed eugenicized and thus biologized notions of morality, virtue, religion,
behavior, character, culture and social difference that have historically and intrinsically been bounded and determined by assertions of identity predicated on whiteness. Consequently, ‘respectability’ has historically been produced and imagined, as a marker of Englishness which has/is heavily dependant on the saliency of race as whiteness and as colour [e.g. non-white], a process that is integral to the maintenance, production, reproduction and enforcement of internal/internalized colonialism in British contexts.

**Internal Colonialism: Respectability, Biologization, Whitecentrism and Nation**

Heather Horst [2008] has written about the destructiveness of ‘respectability’ in its Whitened, Whitecentric palimpsestic form, a form through which whiteness, constituted as respectable is traced on, over and into the bodies [individually/collectively] of non-white colonized peoples. Speaking of Jamaican contexts, Horst describes this as a process of internal/internalized colonialism that is violent and violating, a process in which whiteness as a standard of both inner and outer beauty become commensurate with Englishness. As Horst explains, referring to historical processes and their contemporary legacies, the internalization of these evaluations of European [read white] images of beauty on the part of colonized women of colour was made particularly evident through the painful process of hair straightening with the application of hot oil, creams and the use of a hot metal combs. In addition the lightening of the skin with creams and face powders, represented/represents a strategy to ‘lift up’ oneself within society through the erasure and amputation of colour and texture on the skin and body.

Henriques [2008] notes further that in Caribbean colonized/colonizing contexts ‘fair’ women were particularly concerned with any permutations in their skin colour, to the extent that women of ‘fair’ complexion [language as a carrier of racialization as discourse is crucial here] might avoid the sun for fear of darkening. This white bias extended to the practices involved in social reproduction,
such as marriage and education, wherein many men sought fairer women for marriage. In addition, families with restricted budgets granted children of lighter colour greater access to education and other opportunities than their darker-skinned children. As Austin-Broos [cited in Horst, 2008] argues, in Jamaica, ‘culture, class and race do not merely coincide. They merge as phenotype rendered through culture’ and a biologized notion of ‘inheritance made potent through environment and experienced’ through and by ‘inscriptions’ written ‘on the body’ [p. 150]. Thus to ‘think of oneself as English, was therefore one step closer to being white’. [p. 150]

Victorian notions of social difference were institutionalized by the emergence firstly of Social Darwinism and then [building on the racialized philosophical foundations of Social Darwinism] the Eugenics movement. Social difference was imagined and produced as scientific truth in terms of fixed biological notions of human nature. Darwin’s [1872] Descent of Man contributed to emerging notions in the latter half of the 19th century to fixed and essentialized ideas of human evolution and the social improvement of character and behavior that was viewed as synonymous with various sites and expressions of social difference and which served to rationalize and justify the maintenance and reproduction of a social order of power predicated in the hierarchicalization, domination and subjugation of social difference. For example in terms of Gender with the emergence of scholars such as Comte and positivism [Hargreaves, 1994 p.44] scientific arguments were used to construct a ‘factual’ and ‘objective’ ‘legitimation of patriarchal relations and male domination’ in which ‘women [were] depicted as passive victims of their biology] [p. 44].

Dr. Henry Maudsley for example in 1874 argued the ‘scientific’ principle that the psychology of the female [read white] sex was governed by a fixed degree of energy for all mental, physical and social action. Too much brain activity according to Maudsley would sap the ‘absolutely fixed and
limited resources of the female body to such an extent that pathological conditions would result’. Maudsley argued that ‘excessive energy in procreative functions’ left a limited amount of space for intellectual activity [Hargreaves, p. 44]. Maudsley concluded that ‘women were marked out by nature for a very different office in life than men’ although, this was no ‘expression of prejudice nor of false statement: it [was a] plain statement of a physiological fact’ [cited in Twells, 2007 p.36]. Maudsley’s statements reflect a discourse of racialization [e.g. the biologization of difference] that was pervasive, embedded and as such normalized in the cultural construction and re/production of Victorian British nation-state identity formation.

Like Maudsley, Thomas Barnardo represents a historical embodiment of racialization as discourse, an embodiment that reproduces itself in the institutional body of the institution of Barnardo’s discursively in the present. In the construction of a saintly benevolent mythical figure, imperialism and white supremacist imperialistic influences and motivations are not only erased by the Barnardo’s organization, they are reinforced as good, desirable and commensurate with qualities to be valorized, celebrated and exalted.

It is this racializing imperialistic discursive mode of thought [a thought process reliant on Otherization] that is [palimpsestically] traced over the poor of Barnardo’s London but it is also a mode of thought wherein race, coded in terms of ‘colour’ and thus non-whiteness, is salient. It is a discourse of racialization that is inescapably racial even as it traces itself palimpsestically over the bodies of the white destitute children. Children of poor peoples and poor communities are for example viewed as ‘wild Arabs of a wilderness of black darkness and the region of the shadow of death’ [Batt, 1904, p.24]. More so they are ‘street Arabs’ to be saved and rescued from ‘vice cursed populations’ [Blatt, 1904]. Seth Kovan [1967] has noted the ways in which poor and
destitute populations of England resided in the Victorian imperial imagination at the foot of a social hierarchy ‘in which racial, sexual and class, categories converged”. As Kovan argues, terms such as ‘street Arab’ became synonymous with the homeless and destitute body and were discursively drawn from an imperialistic assumption that the homeless and destitute body was ‘literally a member of a savage [‘vice cursed’] race because they existed outside the seat of domesticating, moralizing, and civilizing influences, the home”, [p. 61].

Moreover as Elaine Lomax [1998] has written, the children of poor populations were ‘subjected to exploitation and manipulation” by a variegated array of artists, photographers and writers who produced works for an art market hungry for images and stories of children navigating the conditions of destitution. Victorian evangelical writers such as Barnardo himself whose published non-fictional narratives stories followed a similar vein depicted “paradigmatic luminal spaces where the (non) labouring classes took shelter… [in]… lodging houses, archways and railway bridges”. As Lomax explains Barnardo ‘promoted’ these stories as ‘true tales’ that were ‘drawn from [real] life,’. Narratives like those produced by Barnardo and others mainly for the privileged classes, rendered East London and its people struggling for survival in the face of poverty within a discursive framework of ‘recognizable tropes’ that ‘associated’ the poor with ‘filth, darkness, and abjection’ [p. 88]. As Lomax says, “[w]hilst images of the poor child are exoticized in order to appeal, this exoticism is harnessed, degraded and manipulated to diverse ends”. Thus the ‘wild’ street-waif – already a victim of, and a scapegoat for, society’s shortcomings – becomes the object of mingled fascination and prejudice. Victorian discourse proposes both the primitive [the colonized Other] and the poor child – particularly the street child – as manifesting unbridled savagery, and lacking social and sexual restraint. Moreover the association of the poor White child with the savage and the immature [or uncivilized of race] and society underpins Victorian
colonialist thinking and reflects fundamental issues of power and subordination”. As Lomax further points out, “[t]he process is multi-directional” for through these racialized representations of the “outcast city and the marginalized or ‘uncivilized’ of other cultures not only are the colonized of the distant dark continent infantilized, but the dark continent is displaced to regions nearer to home”.

Caroline Bressey [2002] writes that Barnardo’s missionary positionality entangled as it was within an imperialist discursive framework “was one that sought to tackle the problems associated with an ‘other’ located not in a distant colonial land but in British cities”. To this end an ‘imperialist geography’ and an imperialist discursive mode of thought [previously utilized as a discursive tool to map on and trace over a set of hegemonic cultural ways of knowing on an external colonialized space and Other] was re-appropriated by dominant Victorian positionalities of power, thought and knowledge production as a means to explain, rationalize and make sense of the internal ‘uncivilized’ spaces and bodies inhabited by the poor populations of Victorian London. For example, as Bressey points out further when Henry Mayhew visited a neighbourhood where he believed the people to be listless and lazy, he observed that ‘these people, who here seem as inactive as negroes, [my italics] will perform the severest bodily labour, undertaking tasks that the English are almost unfitted for”.[p. 19]

‘Coloured’ : A Space Removed/Amputated from [British] Nation-State Identity

As Bressey [2002, p. 60] argues, “Black people within the working class were defined “by the colour of their skin” and as bodies racially removed from the imagined space of Englishness”. In contrast, ‘the poor’ or ‘these people’ to quote Mayhew are included as a hierarchicalized physical and biologized inferior species of a people within the space of national identity. And this has crucial significance for both the saving and rescuing project of the so called [and so imagined]
‘street Arab’ and the production of a physical, material and imagined national sense of self. For while the ‘street Arab’ remains White and thus English, despite her/his ascribed marking of immorality, laziness, sexual deviancy, etc., he/she is still savable, redeemable; rescueable. Within the hierarchicalization of whiteness and thus Englishness their ‘uncivilized‘ differences still can be fixed and treated unlike those marked as Negros who will always remain as bodies removed from the national English collective sense of self. Moreover as Mayhew suggests, English [non-white] bodies marked in colored coded forms [e.g. ‘coloured’, Negro etc] were not only removed from Englishness but simultaneously was ‘removed’ provided a salient marker through which respectability as a fundamentally white construction could be measured, gauged.

As Richard Dyer [1997] points out in the Victorian period [to the discursive present] within dominant hegemonic discourse white people may be ‘coloured white’ but may carry and be ascribed a hierarchicalized position within whiteness on the basis of class, and socioeconomic status. For example, as Dyer has pointed out Victorian’s equated outdoor labor with that of a particular status within whiteness. As a result ‘to be darker’ [as a result of the sun’s rays] ‘though racially white [was] to be [gradationally] inferior’. In this context whiteness and gender differentiation is also crossed with that of class. For example lower class women may be darker than upper-class men: As Dyer points out, ‘to be a lady is to be as white as it gets’. As Dyer argues further “white as a skin colour is just as unstable, unbounded a category as white as a hue, and therein lies its strength [and its violence]. It enables whiteness to be presented as an apparently, flexible, varied category, while setting up an always movable criterion of inclusion, the ascribed whiteness of your skin” [p.57]. Despite the violence inherent in this process of ‘inclusion’ however the marking of ‘coloured’ as non-white excludes any such inclusion and, as Mayhew’s comments suggest, serve as a central measure and tool for the maintenance and re-production of
the British social system as a racialized hierarchicalized social order consolidated by and through whiteness: In other words it is a system that is utterly reliant on the construction of the ‘coloured’ body [as a body removed and excluded from the national British imaginary] for its discursive and material existence.

Bressey [2002] points out that Dr Barnardo [and the Barnardo’s institution as a whole] put into place “a massive and meticulous process of classifying the poor and destitute children that were brought into his ‘homes’”. Bressey’s study which encompassed the scrutinization of 40,000 images of children in the Barnardo’s files suggest that ‘colour’ in the context of racialization was a salient presence particularly in its role as a classificatory means for visibly marking those bodies for amputation from the collective national identity. Bressey’s research of the archives discovered the images of 26 young Black girls who were admitted into the Barnardo’s Homes between the years of 1874 and 1911. As Bressey rightly points out that, these images add to the weight of evidence that testifies to a long historical presence of Black peoples in Britain despite its erasure by dominant historical narratives. Bressey undertook a concentrated focus on the stories of three Black girls for the purpose, as she explains, of using “them to initiate a historical geography of [B]lack women who found themselves in children’s homes, asylums, prisons and on the stage. Photographs of black women provide images that become an immediate way [as Bressey says] of challenging the whiteness of British history, although the method that locates them, that is, the reliance on physical features as a sign of ‘ethnic origin’, is [still] problematic” [p. 19].

The ‘problematic’ that Bressey speaks to here is that of racialization. It is a problematic that is central to the hegemonic relations of power that defines the British nation-state’s sense of collective self and identity. It would be a mistake however to conceptualize this problematic as if it
were some dust gathered artifact of a less progressive time which no longer applies to the present. Racialization in the form taken up by Barnardo’s, that is to say the biologization of culture and/or so called ‘ethnic origin’ [read non British] in which race as skin colour becomes [along with other imagined physical features] the key defining marker, is consistently re-reproduced generationally in the British nation-state imaginary as discourse. The resonance and resilience of racialization in its discursive form can be seen in the comment made by Nick Griffin the leader of the racist political organization the British National Party, who, a few months before the 2010 national election, told a call-in listener to the BBC Radio 4’s program ‘World at One’ that he was unable to tell if the caller was British ‘as he couldn’t see what he looked like’ [Padley, 2010]. Bressey explains that Dr Barnardo’s and his institution were meticulous in their documentation of children. As a result the institution produced highly detailed admission dossiers of all of the children who were admitted into their Homes, as Bressey [2002] notes, within the child saving structure of Barnardo’s.

[t]he story and network of a girl’s life was given in as much detail as possible, including age, date and place of birth, the religion of both parents and whether the girl had been baptised. The colour of each girl’s hair, eyes, and complexion, her height, the size of her chest and the ‘general condition’ of her body was also recorded. There was also a space for other remarks made by the Medical Officer. Details of the parents’ employment were then gathered as well as anecdotes about their reputations [my italics] and that of their extended families. Uncles, aunts, in-laws, partners, cousins, sisters and brothers would all be detailed in a girl’s history [p. 336].

Despite such details however as Bressey’s research reveals the Barnardo’s admission records embodied a racial construction of Englishness and Britishness in which the ascription of Englishness and Britishness was removed from those children marked ‘coloured’ and/or other non-white markings. In addition, ‘white children [are] assumed as white by the absence of references to race and colour’ [p. 25]. For example, Bressey refers to early examples of the colour
coding of children and their families by Dr. Barnardo starting with the Williams children in 1857 whose mother is described by Barnardo’s as a ‘negress’ and whose admission photograph is given the description of ‘IT REVEALED THREE WOOLLY BLACK HEADS’ [p.25]. This is a reference to Barnardo journal account in which he gives an account of discovering the children along with their mother living in destitution. Barnardo tells the story of pulling back several sacks in the room to reveal the children [p.25]. Among other racially marked children in the Barnardo’s records there is the admission of ‘Jane’ in 1882 a child, born in England who is classified as a ‘half-caste girl’ and in other documents as ‘a little coloured girl’ [p.336]. There are the sisters Nancy and Florence and their friend Elizabeth admitted in 1889 who in their admission records are given the description of ‘octoroons with dark complexions’ [p. 336]. As Bressey notes, in Elizabeth’s case her racial marking is changed by the ‘Medical Officer to that of ‘quadroon.’[p. 336]. As Bressey states,: “Jane is initially described as a ‘half-caste’ girl, although we later learn that her black ancestry comes from her paternal grandfather and her ‘mixed-race’ father. Nancy, Florence and their friend, Elizabeth Smith, although far more likely to be ‘half-caste’ than Jane, are initially described as octoroons”. As Bressey explains further Barnardo’s made “serious attempts to learn all they could about a child’s family’s history”.

Thus, as Bressey asks, [“f]ollowing these investigations and the knowledge which the admission staff had, could the girls’ ‘racial’ definitions have been predominantly produced from anything other than the colour of the girls’ skin?”[p. 336]. There are two critical aspects here in terms of ‘saving and ‘rescuing. In the case of Black children “[i]t is the apparent ‘whiteness’ or lack of ‘blackness’ in the girls’ skin colour that seems to be the primary motivation in ‘saving’ them from their poor families” in other words saving them from blackness. Thus, redeemability [and saving/rescuing] is connected to colour. In addition, in terms of national identity, the national
identity of the children is removed by and through skin colour and the fractionalized marking of ‘coloured’, ‘half caste’, ‘octoroon’, and ‘quadroon’ all of which designate [and become symbolic of] non Englishness. As Bressey states, the significance of the “Williams’ case illustrates the racialization of national identity in the British Isles. Dr Barnardo’s colouring of the Williams family reflects a public face of racial discrimination. The case of the Williams children was made acceptable [that is to say the ‘saving’ of them] in the public sphere by removing the children’s English identity. It was acceptable to be black and of Empire, but not to be black and of England” [p. 336].

Bressey makes some critically important observations here but while her analysis in part is crucial to that of my own, there are a few additions I want to make. In understanding the importance of racializing language and racialized markings within the context of a critical transformative analysis, it is crucial that discourse and its historical and institutionalized contextualization [as it relates to the formulation and maintenance of a hegemonic social order] is taken up for interrogation. It is crucial that the embeddedness of racialization within discourse is made visible, contested and named. If this is not done it is possible that when Bressey for example suggests that “challenging the whiteness of British history” when the process used to locate it lies in a ‘reliance on physical features as a sign of ‘ethnic origin’ may be ‘problematic’”, I would argue that it may be even more problematic when this same process is re-produced without fully recognizing the full extent of the ‘problematic’ particularly when a complex awareness of the hegemonic implications of language and discourse is absent.

For example it is important in this context to qualify and distinguish the usage of the term ‘black’ by the Barnardo’s institution and therefore by colonial discursive practice from that taken-up by a
space of criticality and critical political consciousness. Barnardo’s usage of ‘black’ here is not capital ‘B’ Black. It is not the politically self defining term produced and re-appropriated by Black peoples in a moment of anti-racist resistance, a term re-appropriated in ways that seek to disarm its violating negative biologized connotative effect and one which reflects the reappropriation of Cripp, say for disabled peoples [Linton, 1998] or Queer [Duggen, 2002] in the context of gay and lesbian identity assertions. ‘Black’ is grounded in a particular historical moment of Black British cultural identity and its assertion is framed within a similar space as that taken up by the anti-colonial movement which sought to re-configure and reclaim African ways of knowing from the colonial assault of pathologization [Mama, 1995] and thereby to re-claim oneself as a collective psychically. In the context of Black British cultural politics the reclaiming and re-assertion of ‘Black’ represents, as Stuart Hall [Baker et al 1996] points out, a political positionality that is grounded in the ‘common experience of racism and marginalization in Britain’ and, as such, provides for an ‘organizational category’ for a ‘new politics of resistance among groups and communities with, in fact, very different histories, traditions and ethnic identities’ [so called] [p.163].

The notion of psychic reclamation is crucial here, particularly when the reclamation of self is underpinned by [to recall hooks [1993] and decolonization] a ‘breaking with the ways our reality is defined and shaped by dominant culture’ [p.1-2] and dominant/dominating discourse. To do this it is imperative that an awareness and consciousness of the intricacies and complexities of dominant discourse is brought to the foreground of analysis. If not, to borrow from Ngugi Wa Thiong’o [1989] we may not recognize when dominant discourse continues to sustain itself through its control over our ‘mental universe’ which in turn will limit and constrain our abilities to formulate transformative possibilities. Barnardo’s usage of ‘black’ for example is not simply a negative label
residing in some historical past; it represents a discourse, a mode of thinking, and a space of mental conceptualization. Here ‘black’ is a marking of dehumanization. It marks and fixes biologically Black peoples as an inferior species in relation to White peoples who in turn are also imagined in fixed biological terms. There are profound implications here. For if the association of whiteness with Englishness is left uncontested, then the ongoing biologized and therefore racialized conceptualization of its usage will continue to exclude Black peoples. The pitfall lies in speaking of inclusion and evoking a historical long terms presence in England for Black peoples through language that discursively marks, reproduces and reifies that presence historically and contemporarily as an included/excluded entity that is a logical [and ‘natural’] outcome of its racialized in/capacity.

Dialectically a crucial implication for White peoples lies [and is embodied] in the biologized mode of thought uttered by Nick Griffin, a mode of thought that also carries a discursive ‘look’, a look that is dehumanizing and homicidal in the context of its potential effects and indeed logical ends. Jim Shutze [2002. p.15] speaking of his schooling experience as a white child in a mixed school dominated by whiteness and Whitecentricity writes about the implication of violence embedded in this discursive process when he says, ‘the black kids were invisible to all the white kids. They couldn’t be pretty or handsome or cool or important: they couldn’t even really be present, not truly present, because we made them not there with our eyes. It’s not child’s play that trick of the eyes. It’s the first step, the very beginning of the process that ends with the trains and the ovens with murder and with lynching’.

Foucault [1978] writes that ‘it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together’ [p.100]. Moreover, it is within the ‘distribution’ of discourse as set of ideas, statements,
knowledges, and utterances that makes possible an interrogation of ‘the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden… with the variants and different effects – according to who is speaking, [her/his] position of power and the institutional context in which [she/he] happens to be situated’ [p.100]. Despite my critique of Bressey, the ‘institutional context’ in relation to the racialized marking of children that Bressey speaks of in relation to Barnardo’s is crucial particularly in relation to Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse in the context of what he refers to as ‘governmentality’. Foucault defines governmentality as, ‘[t]he ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of….a….complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge, political economy, and as its essential technical means, apparatuses of security’[Larner and Walters, 2004, p.3]. Larner and Walter explain that the notion of governmentality and its analytical standpoint pinpoints the ways…in which ‘governing involves particular representatives, knowledge, contributions and expertise in relation to that which is to be governed’ [p. 2]. While there are limitations for me in using governmentality and a Foucauldian approach as a central framework for my analysis [limitations which I will discuss later], there are pivotal components which are useful to me in my analysis of the process of racializing and the complexities of colonial relations of power, more specifically, the framework’s foregrounding of ‘technologies of governance’ and the ‘effects of rule’ [Rojas cited in Larner and Walters, p.111] on the individual and collective body and the implication of power and knowledge as an instrument for rule and subjugation.

David Scott [1999] for example has used this analytical framework for interrogating what he calls the ‘political rationalities of colonial power’, meaning ‘those historically constituted complexes of knowledge/power that give shape to colonial projects of political sovereignty…[which
are]…organized as an activity designed to produce effects of rule…. [in addition to re/producing]…the targets of…[and for]…colonial power’ [p.25]. Bringing this back to Bressey’s analysis, the racialized marking of children by Dr. Barnardo can be thought of as a technology of rule and subjugation which implicates not just the institution of Barnardo’s but the structures of governance that underpin and give shape to the nation-state of Britain itself. Barnardo’s racialized classification of the Williams’ children and that of Jane and Elizabeth represents a technology of containment, rule and subjugation premised on keeping Black peoples in an imagined, discursive and materially physical black place and space and out of an imagined, discursive and materially physical White place and space [Razack, 2002]. Barnardo’s classificatory system of race is both discursive and materially reflective of the post slavery Jim Crow ‘one drop rule’ in the US which held that one drop of ‘black blood’ not only confirmed a person as black in the biologized white construction of the term but more importantly as not white. It sought to fix race as an essence in official terms [Malcomson, 2000 ] an essence that could be used as a tool to police the boundaries of US national identity and citizenship synonymous with race and whiteness [albeit hierarchicalized]. In relation to the ‘effects of rule’ the fractionalization of race as half breed, quadroon, and octoroon, served to enforce this process and [and this becomes critical in the British context] to mark those [like myself] who could pass for white and so appear invisible and therefore prone to contaminating the racial purity of the nation. Thus, while the ‘almost white’ ascription carries some redeemability the ‘almost white’ with its ‘trace’ of non-whiteness also represents in the racialized imagination, a hidden biological contagion and a contaminatory presence. Within this racializing racist process, racial coding and racial marking serves as the tool and technology through which the otherwise hidden contaminant can be seen and made visible.
In this latter context it is important to note that Dr. Barnardo and the Barnardo’s regime drew and stills draws [in the contemporary context] its beliefs and values not only from Christian Protestant Evangelism but also in discursive contexts from social Darwinism and Eugenics. The discourse of evolutionary progress for example is evident in Dr. Barnardo’s ‘before and after’ photographs. Barnardo’s utilized the medium of photography to display to the public the condition or state of children before they entered his institutions and afterwards. The children would be photographed in ways that juxtaposed an image of their bodies in ragged clothing [representing their condition before entry to the institution] with that of a clothed cleansed image of the same child [representing their state and condition after entry. This became a template for Christian organizations such as Barnardo’s in the [late 19th century] contemporary moment. As Seth Kovan [1967] writes, Barnardo’s usage and manipulation of the images of child bodies “intentionally underscored the raggedness of the children’s clothing” and thus the ‘raggedness of their social status condition, which was accomplished not only through manipulating the photographic images taken but also through the deliberate, physical act of ripping and tearing the children’s clothing prior to the taking of the images so as to expose to a greater degree the bodies and extremities of the children and thus to strengthen the image of raggedness in the public’s imagination’ [p.120]. For the body that is racially marked however there are racial implications attached to nakedness in which nakedness serves as a racialized visual marker and trope for the Black body as a homogenous primitive species-like collective [Lomax, 1988].

Dr. Barnardo’s died in 1907. The institution however continued and continues to grow with outreach programs disseminated across Britain that connects with over a hundred thousand children and their families. I argue however that the same racialized discursive underpinnings which influenced its history continue to do so in the present. To return to Bressey’s [2002] analysis, the
destruction of the Black British body is carried out in large part through an erasure of its presence in the history and memory of the collective social body as a whole. In short it has been removed from place [Razack, 2002]. However constructed as biologized species-like entity the Black body has also been removed from what is counted as human and citizen. Bressey as a Black British scholar utilizes her history and her embodied presence in a linear form to trace the lineage of Black historical presence in Britain. While this process as means and method of resisting invisibilization and dehumanization is crucial, from the perspective of the bodies such as Jane, and the William’s children [i.e. those bodies racially marked by Barnardo’s] there is a discursive technology of violence written onto their bodies in historical and contemporary terms that needs to be addressed and which Bressey’s historical linear framework does not necessarily allow for. It is with this in mind that I look to continue with the historical context from an alternative position.

**The Historical Context and the Body**

To center a historical context in relation to voice, self and constraining systems of power requires that the contextualization of historical formations takes up more than a linear tracing from which the author’s embodied voice is removed. It requires a ‘body politics’, that is to say the taking up of a positionality of voice and enunciation generated/drawn from a set of knowledges that are directly derived from an embodied experience of resistance and survival of/with oppression. As Foucault [Rabinow, 1984] argues, history and its effects are traced on the body and as a result the body itself emerges and is formed as an ‘infinite text’. As Foucault explains, “the body is the inscribed surface of events [traced by language and dissolved by ideas]. In this context, genealogy therefore, as an analysis of sociopolitical descent, inquiry, and contestation, represents a form of articulation whereby the body and history are inseparable. The task of genealogy in this form lies not only in exposing “a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body”
[p.83:] but also the modes of resistance on the part of the body to this historical destructive and disintegrative process. Genealogy in this context then represents a process of coming to voice and enunciation from that very positionality. It is more than merely an exposure of power in its dominating/subjugating form. It concerns itself with the hegemonic/anti-hegemonic process of how to speak when the imprint of histories oppressive effects lies discursively inside the body, embedded and internalized. How might the Williams’ children for example speak back to this edifice of power? This is the process that I engage with now to re-trace the ‘inventory’ [Gramsci, 1971] of discursive violence that British nation-state institutions of power have written on my body, while simultaneously working towards what Stuart Hall [Baker, et al 1996] calls a positionality of enunciation. So let me continue the historical context as an embodied context.

In January 2000 my mother died at her home in a town called Clitheroe in the county of Lancashire, England I myself had been born a few miles away in the main hospital [Queens Park] of the large industrial town of Blackburn. From that hospital my mother and I would move to our first shelter, a large mansion type house called the ‘Grange’ but known officially by the local administrative authorities and social services as a ‘Home for Unmarried Mothers’. Ten years or so before my mother’s death I had moved to Canada from England to live there, to work there, to fall in love and to have children. On the day that my mother had died I had called her from Canada around lunchtime but there was no answer. I remember having a feeling of deep fear that something was not right. To my mind on that first time of calling her it would have been 5pm or so in England and my mother would normally have been home. I knew that her routine was to go to do a little shopping early in the day and then spend the rest of the day either doing some chores or preparing her supper or reading and or watching television among other things. I had intended to see a football (soccer) match that day, to watch my favorite team Manchester United on television
at a local bar. I had hesitated and wavered whether I should go or not but decided that at least it might prevent me from worrying for a few hours. I watched my team lose badly but my mind was not on the game it was on my mother and the phone call I was going to have to make as soon as the game finished.

I was dreading that there would be no answer because then it would be very late in the evening in England and if there was no answer then something would be seriously wrong. Strangely enough though, I already knew that my mother had died. I could feel it. By the time the game finished it was 5pm. Once home I called ‘home’. There was no answer. My heart sank and panic set into my body and a deep feeling of loss took over me. I called my sister who lived a mile or so away from my mother. She also tried to call and agreed something must be wrong. She drove to our mother’s house knocked on the door but there was no reply. The curtains were drawn and there were no lights on. She then called the police. To get in they had to force open my mother’s back kitchen door. My brother- in- law told me later that my mother was in her bedroom when they found her. She was dead. She was kneeling on the floor with the top half of her body on the bed. She had one arm across her chest and shoulder. She had died early on Saturday morning while I was still sleeping in Canada of deep vein thrombosis. I had last spoken to her the day before on the Friday and she had said to me that I was her hero. I remember saying to her ‘but mum I haven’t finished my Master’s yet’ [at that time I was studying for my MA] and she had responded by saying ‘Stan that is not why you are my hero, you are my hero because of who you are because of everything that you do”. Those were the last words I ever heard from her. On hearing of her death I boarded the first plane I could get and arrived at my mother’s empty house a few days later. Her body had been claimed by my sister and was at the time undergoing an autopsy.
On arrival I entered my mother’s rented sheltered accommodation house with my key. In fact I wanted to knock. The curtains were still drawn. I entered through the front door and stopped in her little hallway. It was as if she had just stepped out, as if she had just gone out to the shops maybe for a newspaper, a bottle of milk, or tea bags, or perhaps some bacon for her favourite meal of bacon and eggs with some slices of margarine spread over white sliced bread on the side, just right for mopping up the runny yolk and bacon fat. Her presence was still there. It was still there as an absent presence. I called out to her, ‘mum’. I went into the living room, still calling out to her, ‘mum, are you there’? Everything was in place as she had left it. There was the cup on the tiny fold up wooden table that I had bought for her on a visit to the Lake District area of Northern England. The cup still had tea in it. Her favorite plate decorated with red flowers was next to the cup. It had a few leftover crumbs on it. I went into the kitchen [I was avoiding the bedroom]. A pan was on the stove with a little tomato soup still in the bottom. A few plates were left to be washed in the sink. I went into her bedroom. The bedclothes were as she had left them. I pictured her dying in that room, alone. I stared at the spot where I was told she had died. I stood still for a while before sitting on her bed. I then laid myself down on the bed and curled up on it. My stomach became painfully knotted. I stayed in that position for a while and then I raised myself up. I started to utter slowly softly at first ‘mum, where, are you? Tell me where you are’. I left the bedroom went back in the living room and began to cry and began to cry out louder and louder ‘MUM WHERE ARE YOU, WHERE ARE YOU MUM, PLEASE, WHERE ARE YOU?’ My tears and my crying were uncontrollable. All I could do was shake and shout even louder ‘MUM WHERE ARE YOU?’ I went into the kitchen calling out again and again and again ‘PLEASE TELL ME WHERE ARE YOU?’
I went back into the bedroom, back on her bed. And softer now, I called out ‘please mum, please, say something, please give me some sign, please mum, please… My left hand moved under my mother’s pillow as I said this and I felt something. There was something there that my mother had left. I brought it out. It was her purse, an old fraying red purse. I opened it up. There was nothing in it except a note, though not even a note, more a scrap of paper. It was a shopping list. It read ‘bread, paper hankies, cotton wool, eggs, milk’...and at the bottom underlined were the words ‘don’t let the buggers get you down’. I took this to be the sign, my mother’s signing off. I took this to be her voice to me because this was our politics. This was our politics of spirituality, our epistemological and ontological positionality of survival. The ‘buggers’ were all of those bodies of authority who were constantly looking to take me away from my mother. The bargers were all of those bodies of authority who bullied us and treated us as if we were less than human, as if we were not part of the ‘public’ [Kawash, 1998] social body. They [the bargers] also constituted the ‘them’. So when on those many Winter days when we would be forced to walk and walk around a strange town waiting for the shelters to open I gradually began to get a sense when my mother would say ‘don’t let the bargers get you down’ that this was not our fault, that these conditions that we lived in were not about some deficit in us, or some lack of character or laziness, or bad luck nut that there were other factors, and other causes in play and there were people out there who had some say in this, in these causes.

So the bargers, the ‘they’ the ‘them’ were the powerful. And so we otherized them the ones who had authority and institutional and political power. And we otherized the individuals who placed the signs on their windows on the bed and breakfast business that read ‘no coloreds ‘no Irish, no children, no dogs’. And though we slept in those shop doorways and though it was terrifying and psychologically the hungriest feeling that I have ever experienced, gradually the thought was
emerging that there was a cause and a purpose to this cause and as I began thinking this way I began to make critically conscious connections between my social conditions and that of others. For example when I would watch television [on those occasions when the hostels or shelters had a TV room] I would see newsreel images of Black and Brown children in other lands who were subjected to psychological and physical pain, torment, starvation, death and maiming at the hands of napalm and other sources of mass murder and I began to ask questions in my own mind, questions that wondered why these conditions seemed to be happening to Black and Brown bodies everywhere, that pain and suffering whether outside or inside Britain seemed to be impacting the same kids. This was the power of that little piece of paper: this was my mother’s enunciative legacy whereby I began to think of the ‘them’ as a social and political structure of power that was dominating.

On the journey to England to bury my mother I had decided to first go back to Lancashire in the same way that I had always done since migrating to Canada and so I followed the same ritual as if she was still alive and I was just visiting. I landed at Manchester Airport and then took the train to Blackburn. Once there I sat in the pub known as the Star and Garter to collect myself before boarding the bus to my mother’s. There was always a sense of coming home here which, given the racism that I had experienced in England might seem paradoxical but in part this feeling was due to a shared experience of racism amongst Black and Brown British people. There was a race consciousness about Britain that I missed and while I am acutely aware of the spaces of rootlessness, of traveling in borderlands [Anzaldúa, 1987] I also maintain the need to be seen by my [marginalized] People.
The bus traced its way through the same route that had grown very familiar to me over the years. It drove past the large school in the centre of Blackburn town center where it would then climb up the hill past the Grange [no longer the Home for Unmarried Mothers] and then through several villages before reaching Clitheroe. Going past the school I had again noted even in my grieving the change in racialized terms of the population of the children playing in the school yard. When I had first started to leave England and travel abroad in the late 70s, I would return to the town of my birth taking this same route first to see my sister and then my mother. The population of children in the playground then was largely South Asian and White, reflecting the local population of the town but it was in the mid 80s that I noted the change from a racially heterogeneous population to an homogenous one. This was not a developing change however whereby the population appeared to be slowly moving towards a mono racial, mono cultural demographic, but a radical change where all the children that I observed in the school yard appeared to become suddenly almost all [if not wholly] South Asian. This schoolyard [by the time I had made my last journey to my mother’s house in this way] was the most visible indicator of ‘white flight’ and the most visible indicator of a racialized segregationist mode of thought that had re/gripped my region and my country.

This mode of thought and discourse was in fact a reflection of Thatcherite policies, which, in the early 80’s began the process of putting into practice the policy of ‘parental choice’, a policy that would allow parents to choose the school of their choice through an open admissions process that would allow schools to recruit students from outside their catchment area, and, in addition, would give schools the power to opt out of the control of their local education authority. As the 1989 Burnage Report – the report of the MacDonald Inquiry into the murder of Ahmed Iqbal Ullah a 13 year old South Asian student stabbed to death by a 13 year old white student in the playground of Burnage High School in Manchester, England in 1986 – made clear, this was a policy that incited a
culture of racism among White parents and the entrenchment of eugenicizing fears of contamination from the perceived cultural differences of Asian British peoples. In Dewsbury for example [a town close to Blackburn, Lancashire], white parents insisting on the ‘right to have freedom of choice’ refused to allow their children to ‘be educated in schools where the majority of students were Asian’ [p.321]. Statements made by Dewsbury parents at the MacDonald Inquiry took the form of: ‘I do not want my child to attend Heathfield … [a Manchester High School] … for many reasons. The main thing is the difference in culture and religion. We have been told that Heathfield is a C of E school [Church of England] but it can’t be because 90% of the children are Muslim and so our religion is being killed’.

As the MacDonald Inquiry suggested however, Asian culture, imagined as an alien, biologized, contaminatory space, underpinned by a Whitecentric xenophobic, or, to borrow Sivanandan’s term [Fekete, 2001], a ‘xeno-racist’ discourse [i.e. the denigration and reification of whole peoples prior to ‘segregating and/or expelling them’] was embedded in the thought processes of the white parents. Sivanandan [1982] is careful in his usage of xenophobia however to dismiss the problematic, dominant, interpretation of the concept as a ‘natural’ fear of strangers” and ‘foreigners’ in favour of a ‘fear’ that is constructed, re/produced and supported by racist discourse and practice. As such Sivanandan suggests that ‘xeno-racism’ is a form of ‘racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating at western Europe’s doors, the Europe that helped to displace them in the first place’.

While Sivanandan’s term is useful to describe the recurrent and emerging racisms that are directed at ‘new categories of ‘displaced’, dispossessed’ and ‘uprooted peoples’ seeking refuge in Britain
and Europe from oppressive conditions [which Britain and Europe are heavily implicated in], in the context that I am taking up here of white self segregation, it perhaps needs to be taken further in ways that speaks to those forms of racism that are underpinned not only by codes of colour but also by discursive codes that biologize culture. In terms of ‘white flight’ and white self segregation and, in relation to the Macdonald Inquiry [1989], these two components are salient. As one parent remarked in the Inquiry, “[i]ts more the cultural aspect, I want R---to go to a Christian school; I don’t want her to learn about other cultures –why should she in Britain” [p.322]. Enmeshed in this statement is the constructed phobia of contamination, a phobia drawn from a conceptualization of culture as a biologized entity that can be contaminated, diluted and thus rendered impure. It is a phobia that makes culture synonymous with the ‘idea’ [i.e. as a biological concept] of race in a form similar to that asserted by Frantz Fanon [1952] for if, as Fanon says, ‘to suffer from a phobia of Negroes is to be afraid of the biological’ [p. 165], then to suffer from a phobia of Asian culture and/or Islam [in the context that I have outlined here] is also to be ‘afraid of the biological’.

The playground in the middle of Blackburn then was a representation of the effects, the materiality and the concreteness of these enforced and internalized Whitecentric biologizing discourses, and, as a result, constituted the variegated effects, practices, and expressions of internal colonialism as a process of racialization. Simultaneously while these effects were/are experienced on multiple levels and in multiple forms by racialized bodies [e.g. a school assistant in 2006 is sacked for refusing to remove her so called ‘veil’ in school if a man was present, Wainwright, 2006], internal colonialism as a process of racialization also carried variegated implications for the psyche of those white inhabitants of Blackburn who engaged in the both the conscious and unconscious practice of white flight, and self segregation. For example, as the bus that carried me to my mother’s home and passed the school it made its usual climb up a hill, a hill known locally as ‘The Kyber Pass’. In the
racialized imagination of the white Blackburn inhabitants the name serves as a means to mark the large population of Blackburn Asian inhabitants who live in the houses that are built on the hill’s incline.

There were broader implications in terms of the negation and amputation of social difference and self in the context of internal colonialism and racialization however. For example, Jack Straw the former Foreign Secretary and Member of Parliament for Blackburn [and a person from a working class cultural space of knowing] would claim 6 years later that when Muslim women [wearing a niqab] visited his constituency office, he would ask them to take off their veils. According to Straw he would first explain to them that “this is a country built on freedoms”. He would then follow this up by assuring the local visitor that he first, ‘defends absolutely the right of any woman to wear a headscarf’ and that in terms of the ‘full veil, wearing it breaks no laws’ [Wainwright, 2006] but then he would explain that ‘the conversation would be of greater value if the lady took the covering off her face”. Straw would speak of the value of meeting, as opposed to a letter or phone call ‘so that you can – almost literally see - what the other person means, and not just what they say”. Amputating and negating Blackburn Muslim women from both the space of Blackburn and indeed the space of Englishness and producing Blackburn Muslim women as ‘strangers’ through the otherizing discourse of us, ‘we’, ‘our’, them and ‘these’ Straw went onto argue , “[t]his [the ‘veil’] is an issue that needs to be discussed because, in our [my italics] society, we are able to relate particularly to strangers by being able to read their faces and if you can't read people's faces, that does provide some separation. ‘Now I understand of course why some of these ladies decide to wear the veil” [BBC, 2006]. Against the backdrop of years of white flight in Blackburn and its consistent denial, Straw would further argue that the ‘veil’ is a "visible statement of separation and of difference” [BBC, 2006].
And yet what emerges here is that Straw amputates his own cultural embodiedness as a person with a grounding in working class cultural ways of surviving and struggle and in doing so re-produces a colonial discourse that works to separate and pit historically and contemporarily marginalized and oppressed groups against each other for the purpose of continuing a social order based upon hierarchicalization, racialization and the exploitation of social difference. As Haylett [2001] argues referring to the re-moulding of racializing discourses as they relate to poor white working class peoples, “[t]he shift from naming the working class poor as ‘underclass’ [and thus] a racialized and irredeemable ‘other’ to [re] naming them ‘the excluded’, a culturally [and biologically] determined but recuperable ‘other’ is pivotal to the recasting of Britain as a postimperial, modern nation” [p. 351].

As Khiabany, [2008] points out the former Home Secretary, David Blunkett [in addition to arguing that schools and doctors surgeries were being ‘swamped’ by asylum seekers and supporting the views of both Gordon Brown and Tony Blair about ‘our way of life’, being under threat] further reiterated support for Straws position by ‘linking the veil to the issue of immigration’ and the need for citizenship testing. However, like Straw, Blunkett negated and amputated himself in relation to his positionality as a minoritized body [and as historically racialized body within the hierarchicalized space of Whitecentrism] for David Blunkett as a blind man since birth has no embodied knowledge of the colonial discourse of visibility that links seeing with knowing [Michalko, 2001].

**Returning ‘home’: The Politics of Paralysis**

I buried my mother in the Village of Bamber Bridge, Preston, Lanacashire, a village where I had first experienced the first semblance of what might be called home given that it was the first place after my birth that my mother and I were able to live together as a family under the same roof. I
buried her with her father and mother, the three of them finally coming together after years of conflict and apartness when they were alive. I delivered a speech that spoke of my mother’s courage in the face of a lifetime of adversity and then a few days after saying goodbye to my beloved sister and nieces, I headed back to Canada to my beloved partner and two children and to return to my classes as an MA student of equity studies and social justice at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto. My feeling was that I would return to my studies and use the critical knowledge that I was gaining to speak truth back at the state of British institutional power. And yet when I returned to class I could not speak. My voice was literally paralyzed due to the loss of my mother. My grief simply left my body unable to speak. Yes, I was noting the discussions on race, and racism alright but I could not physically respond. I was literally stunned into a paralysis of voice. I had gone from a person who had to work hard to control his vocal input to that of a frozen body of silence.

Of course I was also controlling my body in a different way. I was controlling myself simply to avoid a breakdown. And then one evening in my class on the Principles of Anti-Racism taught by Dr. George J. Sefa Dei a student was describing a school setting in which she worked as an elementary teacher. It was [as the student described] a multicultural setting though largely populated by Asian Canadian students. The staff it appeared was predominantly White with the exception of the student. As I listened to her in my frozen state I noticed that she was speaking primarily of her classroom. As she spoke I remember thinking of the school back in Blackburn. I wanted to speak, to make a comment and so I pushed my body in such a way that it seemed like I had to push my voice out from some place deep inside outwards and upwards through to my mouth and onto the classroom table. And then I spoke, uttered. I asked the student if the school, her school, had a culture of anti-racism. Taken aback a little perhaps by my coming out of silence,
she replied by saying, ‘in my class there is’. I again struggled to force my body to enunciate its political self’s concern. My reply was. “I am sure your class has. I have no doubt but is there a culture of anti-racism in the school as a whole”? ‘No’, she replied. George J. Sefa Dei responded by saying “see when Stan asks that question, if the answer is ‘no’, then there is a problem” [Dei and Doyle-Wood 2000].

Of all my years in educational institutions I had encountered only a few educators of colour and I had never encountered an educator of colour who was critical of the social structure, who spoke of race in an in-your-face unapologetic way, one that unpacked the politics of race, who gave one permission to feel validated to feel that one’s concerns with the issues of race were critical and necessary for the transformation of both the individual and the collective sense of self and whom laid stress on social transformation as a collaborative process. In addition, I had never met an educator whose central focus on an everyday daily basis was to instill into his students the notion of decolonization, a notion and mode of living that begins [as Dei consistently reminded his students] by asking the question of oneself ‘where does my knowledge come from’?

And this was the question that was burning in my brain on my journey to England. It was the question that was burning in my brain on a consistent basis as a child growing up in the UK. It was the question that was burning in my brain on seeing the emergence of racism in the UK, on seeing the re-formation of racist ideologies by groups such as the British National Party become mainstream in the political system. My mother’ death seemed to crystallize a need to speak back at the ‘buggers’, those who had manipulated us, incarcerated us, left us so poor to the extent that I had to use the many bags of pennies that my mother had collected to pay for her burial. But I wanted to do more. I wanted somehow to figure out how the violence that had been traced on and over our
bodies was somehow connected to broader emanations of hegemonic power that had implications for my social collective of Britain as a whole. I also wanted to figure out how my own racialized internalizations that had deeply wounded my sense of self in my growing were connected to a deeper process of negation and amputation that again had profound implications for the collective self of my nation and its transformation. I wanted to engage with what I sensed was a crisis of collective enunciation in British nation-state contexts. I felt that I had reached the point in my life in which I had gained a strong enough sense of critical consciousness to approach this task.

At the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education I had become armed with the necessary tools of critical knowledge to do this, tools provided by powerful critical scholars such as George Dei, Sherene Razack, NjokeWane, Kari Dehli, Sheryl Nestel, RinaldoWalcott, Alissa Trotz, Paul Olson and many others. It was the knowledges that I had gained from these individual scholars that had enabled me to begin the process of theorizing the politics of my living from the beginning of my arrival in Canada, to then understanding the politics of the nation-state that I had entered and the implicatedness of colonial violence as it relates to Aboriginal Peoples that is inextricably entangled in the historical and ongoing formation of this state called Canada that I found myself in. And so after my mother’s death I was looking towards a process of coming to voice of coming towards an enunciative space of being.

My intuitive knowledge grounded in the experience of navigating oppression combined with the scholarly knowledges that I had accrued suggested to me that there would be clues in the institutionalized violence that my mother and I had experienced all of our lives from the very beginning of our time in the ‘home for unmarried mothers’ to the myriad foster homes and children’s homes I was forced into, to our numerous interactions with the local and state
institutions of power and authority. I felt that I needed to know what the machinery of power in England had said about us, how they had constructed us, what discursive practices were implicated and for whose benefit, what political purpose and to what ends? Of all of our interactions with the local and state apparatuses of power however, there was one institution that stood out in my mind that had continued to leave its mark on my consciousness. This was the Dr Barnardo or Barnardo’s children’s charity organization. This would be my starting point. I had also been made aware shortly after my mother’s death that it was possible due to the newly implemented Freedom of Information Act of 2000 in Britain to request from Barnardo’s my case file and/or any other information that had been gathered by them and/or other local and state authorities in the course of their custodial interactions with me and my mother. In fact due to the Act’s implementation thousands of similar requests were being made by individuals who also had histories with Barnardo’s and whom also had multiple questions that they were seeking answers for, questions that involved missing relatives, missing mothers fathers sisters brothers, citizenship rights and ‘stolen identities’ [Snow, 2000].

My sense was that I would perform a devastating critique of the institution which would in turn allow me to come to voice or out of victimhood at the very least. I could not have undertaken this while my mother was alive however somehow I had a sense that there were secrets there that she would have wanted to remain secret. Several weeks after I had finally managed to overcome the paralysis of speaking caused by my grief and loss I e-mailed Barnardo’s with a request for any files they had on me. I received a reply almost immediately and once it was verified that I was a former Barnardo’s Home child arrangements were made to have my documents transferred to me. The transference was administered by a Barnardo’s unit known as the ‘Barnardo’s After Care team’ which, besides its work with former Home children in British domestic contexts also handled the
transfer of requested case files to former ‘migrated’ Home children. These were children who were part of the mass transportation of children from Britain to countries such as Zimbabwe [then Rhodesia], Canada and Australia during a period that spanned from the late 19th century to the late 1960’s. In the language of both Barnardo’s and official British governmental institutions this project of mass child transportation was termed ‘child migration’. I will speak to this later: The Canadian phase of this was halted in the late 1930s [Parr, 1980].

It was arranged that I would meet a member of the Barnardo’s After Care team at a hotel located on the same campus as my university, the University of Toronto. But on meeting the representative of Barnardo’s in part I am a child again wanting to impress, wanting to say this is what I have become, respectable. The After Care Worker has been waiting for me in the lobby of the hotel. I entered wet from the rain and flustered I glance around the lobby. I go to the service desk inquiring. It is then that he walks up to me and asks me if I am Mr. Stanley Doyle-Wood. It is as if he seems to know that I am the ex Barnardo’s Home child he has come to meet, as if I still have the look of hunger. He is a white male [the After Care team is almost exclusively White]. I wondered if he was looking for a particular body that could be matched/checked/ticked off against his imaginary and/or against any categorizations he might be carrying that relates to me. We take an elevator up to his hotel room. Many doors were open on his floor as the After Care team was conducting similar meetings largely with individuals much older than myself who had been ‘migrated’ decades before. We would all go through the same ritual however. I was invited to sit down at a small table. My file of documents were placed on the table in a large blue envelope, a similar colour size and shape to the envelope handed to the adopted adult in Mike Leighs moving film Secrets and Lies [1996].
The After Care Worker sat a distance away from me hovering, watching me. It is a process that I feel he has gone through many times. He tells me that he is there as support, in case [I assume] I breakdown. It seems however more like the old policing that I experienced in the Barnardo’s Home in Liverpool. There is a ritual, a routine about the process that feels instinctively to me like the old surveillance. I am told that I am to read the documents while he sits there and afterwards when I had read them he will try to answer any questions that I may have. He asks [what I sense is a standard question asked of all former Home children] if I had experienced any sexual abuse. I tell him that I cannot recall [deliberately emphasizing ‘recall’] any sexual abuse. I phrase my answer in this form to suggest that this should not necessarily be interpreted to mean that sexual abuse of my body did not happen. He takes my answer however as an affirmative ‘truth’ in the negative that I had not experienced sexual abuse. He appears relieved. I follow up my reply by stating that although I do not recall any sexual abuse I do have a profound lasting memory of emotional and psychological abuse. This does not appear to interest him. He simply responds by saying that this appears to have been a common experience and it is left at that.

As a person who has worked within the education system and has an understanding of the politics of the administrative process of categorizing and classifying student bodies I know that he knows what is in the documents, what they contain, or at least he thinks he does. I know that he has read them already, perhaps poured through them and scrutinized them in ways that will allow him to build on his positionality of power and authority over Stanley through the consumption of knowledge about me and the most intimate secrets about my life. And then he confirms what I sense and know. He tells me in a confident, authoritative, privileged and entitled way that I might be shocked by the racism I might find in the documents but that this [racism] was simply a reflection of the period. As a racialized anti-racist scholar and activist I am irritated and disturbed
by the comment but I keep my feelings in check. I am not the child of these people I say to myself. They do not have any power over me anymore. Indeed I had prepared myself well in advance of the meeting telling myself not to allow them to psychically dominate me, intimidate me, and make me feel inferior and subordinate to their institutional positionality of authority and power. As a result, I do not smile. I police my body not wishing to give away the slightest hint of vulnerability. This is my pedagogy, a pedagogy first taught by my mother long before I knew what pedagogy was, a pedagogy practiced since I was little more than 5 years of age.

On opening the file though I was shaken. The first fragment/document was a photograph of my Home that sent shivers through me. The next document was an application for admittance into the Home. Under the listing of siblings, were the words ‘boy, ‘half –brother’. I knew nothing of this and stared at the print. I looked up and saw he was watching me intently. I said something like ‘it says I have a brother here’. His reply was something to the effect of ‘yes, did you not know? On the same page I saw that I was classified as ‘half-cast-West Indian’. I saw and recognized my mother’s signature but this is/was as far as I got. I could not carry on. I had to get away from this surveillance to be alone with my file. I left. I tried to open them again and look at them in a café close to the hotel. I got half way through but could not go any further. It was too painful. Eventually I went home and tried again, after all I was going to use this material to speak back at the machinery of power that had manipulated the bodies of my mother and me. I was [I reminded myself] going to write a devastating or at least a strong critique. But I could not look at them. I put them away with my mother’s belongings [which I could not look at either] under the bed. Occasionally as days, weeks and months went by, I would take them out and attempt to go through them to analyze them, but I would get so far into the descriptions, the language, intimate details that I remembered, secrets that I knew nothing of, passages that spoke of my mother as a species,
as a thing, as an object and then I would cry and cry and the power of the institution would win over me and I would break down again in an individualized sense of victimhood and powerlessness. The institution and the discursive authoritative power that it embodied still owned me, still owned my self still denied me of agency. I could not speak. I put them away. And then I thought about voice [Asgharzadeh, 2007; Bannerji, 1991; Johal, 2005 et al]. I asked myself, how many times had my voice been paralyzed like this? How often and in what form? I decided that this would be my starting point. To seize hold of this paralysis as a source of knowledge, to subject it to interrogation as an external imposition, to trace its political antecedents.

In my analysis of self I could see that the paralysis of voice that immediately affected me after my mother’s death was not the same paralysis as that which prevented me from speaking back to the file. It was not the same paralysis of voice that I experienced both within the Barnardo’s Home and in the aftermath of my leaving it. Though my childhood was consumed by relentless feelings of alienation, persecution and rage, from my earliest memories of oppression, even as a homeless body [Kawash, 1998] sleeping in shop doorways with my mother as a child, I had never for example felt such an overwhelming sense of psychic terror until I became institutionalized in Barnardo’s. I had never felt a paralysis of voice since that was comparable. The attempt on the part of the Home was to teach me to speak to myself and to the world differently, that is to say differently from whom I was when I entered, or whom I was perceived by the institution to be. I was taught therefore not to speak from my space of difference represented by the community that I came from, that is to say my mother. Collectively, we, as children, were taught [and I internalized this much] that our classed and raced backgrounds and identities which we embodied, marked us as a pathologized people, not ‘normal’, not ‘respectable’ and this was conveyed physically yes but more insidiously in the racializing language and discourse which we were forced to internalize. In
the aftermath of leaving Barnardo’s my paralysis of voice emerged in a post-traumatic form out of a combination of internalizing my sense of self and body as a space of inferiority and policing what I said out of a fear of making any movement, oral, physical and psychological that would send me back. It was an emotional, psychological sense of immobilization and emotional trauma experienced as if I had been sexually violated, but more so.

On leaving the Home I could not speak outside of this framework that had been imposed on me. In fact I did not know how to speak outside of this framework. I could not reconnect with my sense of self. I trace this experience and connect it with sexual violation not in any trivializing way because 5 years later a similar sensation of frozenness followed after a sexual assault on my body. But even this was not the same. In that particular case it was an individual who assaulted me and violated my frozen body, it was not an institution. This individual did not have the power of what seemed to be the absolute institutional authority to rape my senses [to invert Maya Angelou, 1986] by implanting into me ‘dog shit’ negations including the enforcement of respectable, ‘normal’ masculinities that prevented me from even speaking of this assault. And so I took up once again the case file centering voice as my entry point in my analysis of the data with a particular focus on the racializing and racialized formations of language and discourses implicated in my paralysis of voice past and present and the connections to be made with a methodological framework that centers voice, self and enunciation as resistance.

I was as a child and youth consistently told that I was a ‘trouble-maker’. I was now going to reappropriate these markings [and indeed re-claim them] by bringing trouble back to the trouble that had constructed them.
**Chapter Two**  
**Data Analysis, Method, and Methodology**

**Introduction**

In this chapter I want to set the theoretical and discursive groundwork with a discussion on method, and methodology. In addition it is important for the purpose of moving out from paralysis [in the form outlined in the previous chapter] to begin with an interrogation in relation to the data under study of what has been said [in both scholarly and ‘common sense’ terms] with regards to voice, and ‘to speak’ and indeed to work through what is conceptually understood by the very notion of enunciation in relation to the constraints on agency and voice imposed by dominant discourses that are produced and enforced through the institutional power and state apparatuses of governance and authority.

The data to be studied in my analysis is comprised of documents from my personal child care file accessed from the Barnardo’s Children’s Charity, a charity that is based in Britain. It is an institution in which I formally resided as a child. The file was initially requested 10 years ago in 2001 and placed in the possession of myself by the Charity under the British Freedom of Information Act. These documents are now the property of myself. This situational experience follows that of tens of thousands of other former ‘Home Children’ in Britain, Canada and Australia who have also regained their documents under similar circumstances. The file was requested shortly after the death of my mother with the initial intention of locating information regarding lost siblings, siblings who may now be in their 50s and over. The file of documents is approximately 45 years old. The study looks to utilize 9 of these documents within the file as the central data for answering my proposed research questions which connect to broader issues of identity, self, community and governance structures of discursive and material disseminations of authority and
power within British nation-state contexts and the possibilities for the conceptualization and practice of resistance and transformation. Through an interrogation of these documents I hope to reveal the historical and contemporary violence that is embedded in the discursivity of Britain as a nation-state, a discursivity that is implicated in both genocidal practice external to its borders and a psychic and homicidal violence internal and internalized within. My intention is to seek out a transformative mode of collective self assertion in nation-state contexts that finds its spiritual sense of knowing through a collective contestation and refusal to give consent to this historical process of violence.

My analysis takes 2 forms. The first is an autobiographical personal/political account of my life as it relates to the Barnardo’s institution. The second is constitutive of a systematic excavation of the text that is Barnardo’s. This latter method of analysis entails re-appropriating through the use of critical discourse analysis the dominant psychosocial ‘case study’ framework which [in Euro White-centric contexts] has a long history of violence through the discursive rendering of particular bodies and communities of social difference as invisible and as objects. This is done primarily via the racializing and pathologizing discursive frameworks that are embedded and entangled in the very language of ‘case’ and ‘case study itself’. For example Dara Culhane [2003] writing about the violent impact of dominant case study discourse as it relates to Aboriginal peoples in Downtown Eastside Vancouver, Canada, refers to it as a descriptive language that ‘disappears’ the subjectivity of Aboriginal peoples. This is done through discursive language that is produced and reproduced by state institutionalized regimes of power such as the police, social work institutions, and the justice system in forms that describe, classify and categorize Aboriginal peoples not as individual human beings but as a pathologized collective who are defined as ‘marginal’, ‘socially excluded’, ‘patients’, ‘criminals’, ‘perpetrators’,
‗offenders’, ‗sex workers’, ‗the poor’, ‗the homeless’, ‗missing women’, ‗street entrenched youth’ and ‗at risk’ [p. 597]. For Culhane hegemonic discursive impositions such as these operationalize themselves upon Aboriginal bodies and communities as a ‘regime of disappearance’.

As Bonita Lawrence [2004] has rightly pointed out language that categorizes certain bodies and social collectives represents more than just the production of a system that marks people for classification, it determines the discursive ways in which people think. It determines the modes of thought of institutional power itself. The language that Culhane refers to is a language underpinned by the discourse of racialization, a discourse which, in its control over the mental frameworks of what can be said, written, spoken and conceptualized about Aboriginal peoples constrains speakability and therefore represents the anti-thesis of enunciation. In addition, within a framework that racializes and pathologizes social bodies and social collectives as harbouring disorders, racialized bodies and collectives are not only descriptively marked as deviant, they are marked for differential treatment manifested for example in regulatory and disciplinary actions, medicalization, punishment, correction, incarceration, death, murder, and genocide. The effects of racialization as discourse therefore are psychologically, emotionally and physically material.

**Critical Discourse Analysis**

According to van Dijk [1993] ] one of the key concerns of critical discourse analysis [CDA] lies in the sociopolitical imperative to place a focus on ‘dominance relations by elite groups and institutions as they are being enacted, legitimated or otherwise reproduced by text and talk’ [p. 249]. Additionally, critical discourse analysis calls for an examination ‘of the relations between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality’ [p, 249] and the very interconnectedness of these areas as they relate to the body of the critical discourse analyst in the context of her/his
positionality within these sociopolitical relationships of asymmetrical power. An analysis, interrogation and contestation of dominance therefore is crucial. Critical discourse analysis focuses on the ‘role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance’. Dominance within a CDA methodological framework is conceptualized as ‘the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups that results in….both…social inequality and social inequity. This includes ‘political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality’ [p, 250] and inequity. As van Dijk points out these material effects of dominance are reproductive through discourse and as such this ‘reproductive process may involve such different ‘modes’ of discourse-power relations as the more or less direct or overt support, enactment, representation, legitimation, denial, mitigation or concealment of dominance” itself [p.250]. Primarily critical discourse analysis ‘wants to know’ what forms and ‘structures’ of discourse such as ‘speech acts’, ‘rhetoric’, knowledge production, statements, language and/or ‘other properties of text, talk, verbal [and written] interactions or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction’.

To this end, critical discourse analysis examines the link between knowledge, power and dominance, that is to say who or what carries the power to [re] produce discourse and who and/or what has the power to legitimize and validate it. In other words who or what carries and produces the power to speak, to be heard and/or to decide what constitutes voice and therefore what constitutes speech and speaking. In addition, critical discourse analysis wants to know to what extent, and in what formation, does discourse [(re)produced within this knowledge-power-dominance framework] sustain and reproduce in different forms a social order of dominance and [additionally] to what extent it normalizes such an order. Critical discourse analysis therefore focuses on both ‘social power’, and institutional power [p 254]. Social power refers to the ‘privileged access to socially valued resources’ that are constituted by income, wealth, ‘position,
status, force, group membership, education or knowledge’ [p.254]. Institutional power constitutes power that is ‘organized’ through the institutionalized apparatuses of power within the state itself.

Here, the ‘social dominance’ and marginalization of particular bodies and collectives is ‘sanctioned by the courts, legitimized by laws, enforced by the police’ [p.254], the social services, child welfare agencies, and the education system alike. Moreover, this ‘social, political and cultural organization of dominance’ is ‘ideologically sustained and reproduced by the media [and] or textbooks’ [p.254] which in turn implicates a ‘hierarchy of power’ in which certain bodies or ‘power elites’ who claim membership of ‘dominant groups and organizations’ also claim control over the processes of knowledge production, ‘decision-making’ and planning that is integral to what van Dijk calls ‘the enactment of power’. Privileged access to multiple forms and ‘contexts of discourse and communication’ therefore cements, generates and intensifies the social power of elite bodies and collectives [p.254]. Thus, this ‘special access’ to [and control over] discourse and its (re)production means that such power elites ‘literally have most to say’ [255]. Critical discourse analysis acknowledges and interrogates the hegemonic aspect of this process, that is to say the communicative forms, structures and strategies, through which dominance not only subjugates and controls by force the bodies of particular individuals and groups but it also discursively controls and influences their consciousness and mind [p.254].

As van Dijk explains, in this form the (re)production and enforcement of social and institutional power as subjugation, control and dominance is ‘cognitive and enacted [discursively] by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one’s own interests’. As van Dijk points out further this is particularly significant for critical discourse analysis work for “[i]t is at this critical point where discourse and critical
discourse analysis come in: managing the mind of others is essentially a function of text and talk’ [...] “may be enacted and reproduced by subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk that appear ‘natural; and quite ‘acceptable”. As a result CDA stresses the focus of analysis towards an examination of the “‘discursive strategies that legitimate control, or otherwise ‘naturalize’ the social order”’ [p.254].

As Asgharzadeh [2007] explains, critical discourse analysis engages in a critical analysis of ‘texts, contexts and languages’. To this end it concerns itself with the processes of ‘unreading’, deconstructing, investigating and ‘critiquing texts for the purpose of uncovering new conclusions or building different cases’ and meanings [p.32]. CDA then concerns itself with the excavation of embedded and entangled relations of power, dominance, subjugation and violence that are ‘concealed in language, speech, text, context, and discourse’ [p.32]. Fundamentally, as Asgharzadeh points out further, CDA focuses itself on the ‘relationships, interconnectivities and interdependencies between languag...text, context, discourse, society’ [p.32] and the connections to be made between not only knowledge production but both the discursive constraints placed on voice by the social structure and the possibilities for challenging, contesting, rupturing and transforming those physical and discursive constraints in the pursuit of voice and agency.

This study then, utilizing the method of critical discourse analysis, looks towards analyzing and interrogating the racializing meanings discursively embedded in the discursive voice and language of the documents [e.g. half-Cast-West Indian’, ‘illegitimate’, ‘low mentality’, ‘low intelligence, ‘coloured’, ‘normal mentality’, ‘morally weak’, ‘moral welfare’, ‘feckless’, etc.] as it relates to both myself and my diseased mother. Using this method for the data analysis I will attempt to tease out the discursive connections to be made with the historical enforcement of racializing eugenics
derived notions of normalcy, which [as I will attempt to argue] have served to define in both historical and contemporary terms the violent and violating hegemonic collective sense of self and identity that is the nation-state of Britain.

To begin with then let me initially take up 2 of the 9 Stanley Wood case file documents that I intend to utilize for my examination and analysis using the frameworks of critical discourse analysis. The first document below represents my official ‘removal’ from the Barnardo’s residential institution, or ‘Home’. ‘Removal’ in this context signifies that Barnardo’s and the local agencies of authority have now placed me back into my mother’s care and custody although the local and state agencies of governance as it relates to child welfare still retains and enforces [or rather attempts to enforce] a regime of surveillance and regulatory power over myself and my mother.
The document reveals the discourse of racialization particularly as it relates to citizenship and nation-state identity. There is for example the categorization of ‘nationality and race’. Under this categorization I am officially installed, fixed and produced as a ‘half-caste West Indian’ a designation that denies citizenship in the context of Britishness while simultaneously bestowing a form of included/excluded racialized citizenship categorization whose racial/cultural partiality is biologically produced and biologically amputated from the nation-state that I am born into. Spiraling out to further aspects of the document itself, reveals the implications of racializing discourse and practice. Here I am speaking of mobility, or the denial of mobility. Mobility is a critical component of racialization. It is a critical outcome for racialized bodies and communities. It represents the practice of keeping people in place, or rather in their place in ways that both racialize space and spacialize race [Razack, 2002]. In this form particular sites of social difference are imagined and produced as belonging to a deviant social space, an immoral space and a degenerate space whose uncivilized origins are from somewhere else. Thus, the document shown discursively reveals the strict regulation of movement imposed on the body that is racially marked.

Moving the analysis towards the left corner of the document we can see how literal this is. Note that it is the ‘movements control statistics’ office that regulates the bodies under their custody, surveillance and authority. The so called ‘science’ of statistics has been directly associated with state and nation-state formation. As Foucault [Burchell, et al 1991 p. 96] has noted “in all its different elements, dimensions and factors of power, questions which were termed precisely ‘statistics’ meaning the science of the state’ were essentially questions to do with the political economy the targeting of populations and the acquisition of knowledge of the state itself”.

Constraining mobility, to reiterate, is a critical component of racialization. It is a critical outcome for racialized bodies and communities. The options of mobility within the confines of state control here are severely limited. Aside from ‘removal’ by a parent or family member, the only other avenues of movements are ‘death’ ‘committal to approved school’, ‘migration’, ‘adoption’, discharge to mental hospital’ and ‘revocation of custody order’. These comprise the limitations of mobility ascribed to the racialized body marked by the ‘movements control and statistics clerk and the institution she/he embodies. As Hacking [Biagioli, 1999] has observed statistics as it emerges in the nineteenth century is centered on the notion of moral science or an “analyze morale”, that is to say, the “statistics of deviancy” which places its focus on “the numerical analysis of suicide, prostitution, drunkenness, vagrancy, madness, crime, [and] les misérables” [p. 161]. Thus, the imposition and enforcement of racialization marks bodies as a social problem and as ‘trouble’. I [and my mother] am therefore marked as a ‘problem’ and as ‘trouble’. However, let me reiterate what I have previously stated, these documents and indeed my story and analysis is not specific to an individual case, or individual experience. I view these documents, this file and its historical racialized production not only as an individual story but rather the story of the racialization of the nation-state [in this case Britain] itself, a nation-state where social difference has historically been constructed as a racialized problem and where the production of the nation-state, the imaginary conceptualization of the nation-state and its imagined identity lies not simply in the national assertion of racial/racialized identity but much more so in the negation and amputation of social difference.

As both van Dijk [1993] and Asgarzadeh [2007] have explained discourse is carried by language, and racialization as discourse is embedded in the language that constitutes the documents of my case file and indeed the file itself. Below in this second document [as with the first] racialization
as discourse is congealed in language and syntax and as such it speaks in a particular way. It speaks through a discursive conceptual framework that is underpinned by the racialization and pathologization of thought. It speaks for example of ‘putative’ in reference to my father. It speaks of me as an illegitimate child. It evaluates and measures ‘mentality’ and attributes my mother with a mentality relegated to the scale of ‘low’. Moreover, racialization as a discourse speaks, in such a way as to target my body as one that [in keeping with the history of Barnardo’s] is in need of saving from the contaminatory influence of my mother who is represented as a body that is immoral. This construction is sustained and reproduced through the reference to her of having an ‘extra marital child’ and to the charge that she ‘does not bother to see me off in the mornings’. Racialization as discourse says here that if I stay with my mother I ‘will be thoroughly neglected’ and will ‘probably be in trouble for not attending school’. It is for my ‘sake’ that the recommendation is made that I be admitted to the Home. It is for my ‘sake’ that the case is made for my ‘rescue’. To this end, it is suggested that I have redeeming qualities. For example it is stated that I have a ‘good deal of good’ in me but this ‘good deal of good’ in me must also be contextualized with racialized redeeming qualities such as that carried by my father, after all while ‘he is said to be a West Indian’ he is also said to be ‘not very dark skinned’.

Plate. 3
Making the case for admission
Van Dijk [1993] in his formulation of critical discourse analysis has argued, that while coercive control over the (re)production, dissemination and ‘management of discourse’ is crucial to the enforcement of dominance in its institutional and systemic form, given its power to validate [and invalidate] what counts as legitimate forms of ‘who is allowed to say/write/hear/read what to/from whom, where, when and how’ the enactment of power as dominance in this form also carries with it a ‘cognitive dimension’ which ‘presupposes mind management’ [p.257].

The complicatedness with my own work is that though I can understand this process of CDA and can utilize this as a method for analyzing data, when the data is in me it is not so straight forward, [i.e. when the subject for analysis is not only discursive violence but a discursive violence that is mapped onto the body of the researcher [my body], in such a form as to paralyze me, and therefore my voice]. As a result when the very language of analysis constrains that same analysis, the process first requires an interrogation of how to speak. It requires first an interrogation of self. There is no safe space from which to perform an analysis of the subject in these contexts. There can be no separation of self from the subject of analysis when the very discourse of analysis is embedded in you. Even as I study these documents through a critical discursive analytical framework, I am crying. There is no safe space to retreat to after I have studied these documents. And so, it is first critical to engage with an interrogation of the constraints posed by discourse: constraints on voice. What we understand by voice, what we understand by ‘to speak’ individually but always in relation to the collective and always in relation structures of power governance.

**A Critical Methodology of Self**

Let me return then to my first research question and use this as a means through which to guide me as I push towards not only moving out of my state of paralysis but also situating my enunciative
immobility within a broader politics of paralysis that looks to situate this very space of abjectification and paralysis as a space of power and resistance. To this end the conceptual framework underpinning Judith Butler’s question [how can the abjectified speak] becomes crucial. As Butler [Meijer and Prins, 1998] argues the abject body represents “all kinds of bodies whose lives are not considered to be ‘lives’, whose materiality is understood not to matter” [p. 281] and whose narratives are not meant to be told or heard. Speaking about ‘abjectified bodies’ and the implicatedness of, voice, power, self and being [i.e. ontology], Butler asks, ‘how is it that the domain of ontology is itself circumscribed by power? How is it that certain kinds of subjects lay claim to ontology? How is it that they count or qualify as real’? What these questions implicate is the ‘distribution’ of violating ‘ontological effects’ wielded as a tool of power, ‘instrumentalized’ for the purpose of ‘hierarchy’, ‘subordination’ and exclusionary practices that are institutionally generated through the discursive production of ‘unspeakability’ and unthinkability. Butler argues that the space of abjection is a space that is performed. It is a space that embodies ‘acts that constitute a domain of unspeakability’ [p.284].

Thus, the critical question is, how do you/I/we who have [or continue to] embody abjectification come to speak from this space? How do you/I/we come to speak from this space in a liberatory form that traces both the trace of violence discursively [and materially] written on our bodies and the production of our unspeakability in a way that implicates the self, the social collective and the structures of governance and power as a whole. As Butler goes onto say, ‘what’s going to be really interesting is how you do a history of that; the traces of which have been, or are for the most part erased. That is a very interesting problem for a historian: How to read the traces of what does get spoken. I don’t think it is impossible to do, but I think it’s a really interesting problem…how to do a history of that which was never supposed to be possible’.
As I argued at the beginning of this study, for the abjectified and for those constructed and produced [and indeed produced towards an internalization of seeing ourselves as] ‘socially invisible’ [Goldberg cited in Murji and Solomos, 2005] these questions are also a matter of ontological survival. So what constitutes ‘to speak’, to utter? How is ‘to speak’ to be defined? How is ‘speech’ to be defined? What constitutes speech, utterance and enunciation within the context of abjectification and objectification? Are ‘we’ speaking when we speak? Is there any difference between enunciation and speech? What are the political/sociocultural linguistic connections to be made between the body and voice? How is knowledge production and discourse implicated? How is discourse implicated in the formulation of constraints, and im/possibilities of/un/speakability and enunciation? When Condoleeza Rice, the former US Secretary of State, for example, claims that the politics behind the devastating conditions of suffering and death that impacted the Black population of New ‘Orleans after Hurricane Katrina was an issue of class rather than race, is she, as a Black woman, speaking? Is this enunciation? When David Blunkett the now former UK Home Secretary gives support to the former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s position of asking Muslim women who enter his Blackburn constituency surgery to remove their ‘veil’ so that he ‘can see them’, is he, as a blind, disabled body, speaking? Is this enunciation? Are these differences that make a difference or differences that make no difference [Davis, 1998]? Additionally how is the notion of ‘to speak’ and enunciation connected?

It is in her well known work *Can the Subaltern Speak*, that Gayatri Chakrovati Spivak [1988] takes these issues up in part through an exploration of the epistemic constraints placed upon colonial subjects [specifically working class Indian women] by colonial discourses that are re-reproduced and re-imposed by postcolonial elites. Spivak examines what constitutes ‘to speak’ when the utterances, mental frameworks, paradigms, cultural values and world views of both working class
postcolonial subjects and postcolonial elites are still determined by Western colonial discursive thought in the aftermath of so called ‘independence’. It is within such contexts that Spivak asks the question, ‘can the subaltern speak’. Spivak’s conclusion is that within these constraining discursive frameworks that determine the conceptual and epistemic space of the subaltern, s/he cannot.

There are problematics in Spivak’s analysis, for example Spivak appears to dismiss the multiple forms in which voice as resistance and agency is expressed, enunciated and enacted on the part of the subaltern [Parry, 1987]. However, Spivak’s focus on the constraining power of colonial discourse is important. Moreover, it is the problematics within Spivak’s analysis placed in tandem with my own experience of both paralysis of voice and the internalization of dominant colonial/colonizing discourse/voice that pushes me into questioning the distinctions between ‘to speak’ and enunciation, that is to say enunciation as a counter-hegemonic space of voice and liberation that allows me to speak [outside of dominant discourse] of my own body, to speak of the pain and violation traced on it and to speak of this in ways that constitute liberation not only for the individual self but that of the collective via a collective refusal and contestation of dominant discursive and material institutions of power, governance and violence.

To engage further in what has been said about ‘to speak’ let me take up the work of Michel Foucault as a pathway and guide towards developing a methodology of self that is grounded in an anti-hegemonic conceptualization of enunciation and its distinctiveness from ‘to speak’. Foucault [1986] asserts that there are distinctions to be made between actual words spoken or written and the action and context of speech itself. It is in the ‘action’ of speaking and the context within which speech takes place that, according to Foucault, enunciation is realized. As Sheridan [1990] explains, “by enunciation…Foucault means not the words spoken or written but the act [my italics]
of speaking or writing them, the context in which they are uttered and the status or position of the author” [p. 99]. By ‘enunciative modality’ then, Foucault is referring to “the laws operating behind the formation of things”. However as Sheridan explains further these laws “concern the status of the speaker [‘medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, efficacy, even their therapeutic powers…cannot be dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to speak them]… [Including]… the sites from which the statements are made [hospital, laboratory, library]”. Thus, in this context and conceptualization the possibilities for enunciation implicate ‘the positions of the subjects of medical discourse [in relation to the perceptual field, new systems of registration, description and classification’ [Sheridan, 1990 .p.99]. In other words enunciative capacity is related to status, that is to say, to those bodies who have the authority to speak and the authority to have ones voice and utterances accepted as truth, or conversely, rendered illegitimate and thus forced into silence.

Philip Corrigan [1990] takes up Foucault’s framing of enunciation in relation to mainstream education and the mainstream classroom. Speaking of the production of what he calls ‘routines of normalization’, Corrigan describes the forms through which students are silenced, and made silent. According to Corrigan:

[t]hey are… [made]…silent because their communicative capacities are regulated by the approved, proper, rewarded occasions for talk and writing. And yet…‘noise’ [alias ‘trouble’] is also a norm of the hourly, daily, termly, year-in and year-out, historical texture and social forms of schooling. What happens in school is part of a more general stucturation of expression through the domination of approved and encouraged times, occasions, reasons for talk or performance [and this always in approved and encouraged forms] and disapproval, discouragement or denial of talk in other approved forms…. I am seeking to investigate the procedures and patterns through which some students and pupils come to speak and write effortlessly: how some others do this with difficulty; but how for most, this is not their experience of schooling at all… Is it not time, at least as an hypothesis to be investigated that we raised the spectre that mass [schooling systems were never intended to educate all the children but were intended to [re] constitute the social identity of a minority and to
regulate into confusion, silence, hesitate, and resentment the majority of those who have been schooled [p.157-158]

Enunciation then and what constitutes speech is embodied. It is embodied by ‘proper’ and ‘approved’ ‘speaking persons’ in forms that are intent on producing a ‘certain kind of self’ and a certain kind of ‘social identity’ that in-forms and structures the curricular content of ‘what [is] actually said’ [p.158]. Corrigan identifies grammar as a discursive instrument through which ‘correct’ forms of speech are rewarded. Conversely and bi-directionally [Carbado, 2005] the ‘incorrect’ is/are punished ‘through ridicule, marginality and violence’. As Corrigan [1990] points out grammar as a code for the enforcement of ‘proper’ respectable language sustains, produces and reproduces discursive ‘forms of signification’ that includes ‘bodily features and forms’ that normalize a culture to the unquestioned assumption that ‘those who do not succeed have only themselves [or their families, their communities, their gender, their ethnicity, their anything –else-that- comes –to-mind] to blame” [p.159]. Respectability and legitimacy in their relational link to what counts as speaking and enunciation then are held by the body and enforced, produced and sanctioned by the state and its apparatuses of governance, power and authority. As Corrigan points out however, the effects of this regime of power and constraint serve also to produce social constraints on speaking and enunciation that are [as a further extension of the voice constraining process] re-produced and re-enforced within and through the body.

As Asgharzadeh [2007] explains “tongue voice and language are techniques and properties of the body...[and] [t]hese bodily properties are...shaped and conditioned by a variety of physical, social, cultural and political forces’. Thus, an acknowledgment and awareness of the implication of external structural forces on the constraints on voice and enunciation is critical in the process of formulating a critical methodology of self. Asgharzadeh goes on to say, ‘although the body ought
to have the freedom to express itself, one cannot ignore the societal limitations imposed on such freedom and such expression” [p. 13]. Properties then that constitute the self and body as a site for the production of hegemonic power and alienation implicate the social collective and its governance structures in ways that enforce a particular kind of state sanctioned self, one that is considered by the structures of governance and hegemonic power as, respectable and [as a necessary part of the process which necessitates the body’s collaboration through its internalization of these properties] docile. It is in this state of docility that the internalization of self as pathological is realized. And so within a set of discursive mental frameworks that deny my utterance, that enforce what constitutes in ‘truth’ ‘proper’ ‘respectable’ masculinities in tandem with other variegated performances of difference, I cannot utter the ‘things inside that need to be said’ [Roberts (unknown date)] and, moreover, by refusing my self the space [and permission] to utter them I must negate them. I must amputate them from my body.

Thus, the constraints on voice, on ‘to speak’ and on enunciation are constitutive of a process of negation, a negation of the individual and collective self, by the self. Any contestation of this process [a contestation that is integral to the formulation of a critical methodology of self that seeks to care for the self in ways that gain freedom through contesting and resisting these processes however will necessitate a close interrogation and confrontation of hegemonic governance structures, or to be more specific, truth producing regimes [i.e. regimes of truth] that seek to re/produce, enforce and determine what counts as ‘to speak’. Moreover any such contestation must assert a politics of enunciation that is also grounded in interrogating the dis/connections and tensions between, ‘truth’, ‘to speak’, enunciation’ knowledge and power. Michel Foucault’s analysis of truth telling regimes, or ‘regimes of truth’ becomes useful to this end.
Regimes of Truth

A "regime of truth" according to Foucault [Rabinow, 1984] represents each [Western] society’s ‘general politics of truth’, that is to say a given society’s beliefs, values and the forms of discourse which that society ‘accepts and makes function as true’. A regime of truth is thus constituted by the ‘mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth’ and ‘the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” [p.73]. Foucault goes onto explain that in Western contemporary societies the ‘political economy of truth’ is distinguished by several specific traits [each of which are interconnected and interspersed with both the production of knowledge and the circulation of power and its effects. What emerges as ‘Truth’ then within this framework is dependant on the ‘form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it’ [p. 73]. Truth then as Foucault argues is ‘subject to constant economic and political incitement’, that is to say, ‘the demand for truth’ is connected to both ‘economic production’ and ‘political power’.

Truth is formulated within and ‘under’ what Foucault refers to as ‘diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption’ which in turn circulates ‘through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict limitations.’ It is these limitations however represented by modes of constraint, that is to say, the production and transmission off truth ‘under the control, dominant if not exclusive of a few great political and economic apparatuses [university, army, writing, media] that become central in the production and the emergence of truth’. It is this web-like constraining system then that constitutes a regime of truth. Truth, which is commensurate with ‘to speak’, and which governs what counts and what is accepted as to speak, and which ultimately constitutes voice and enunciation, is
produced, consumed and diffused through and within ‘multiple forms of constraint’ and is, in turn, produced, validated and sanctioned as legitimate through and within what Foucault terms the ‘truth-generating [knowledge producing] apparatuses’ of Western societies [p.72].

The notion of ‘truth’ then ‘is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements’ [discourses] governing what can be said, enunciated. So within this discursive regime of truth of what constitutes to speak, only the documents of my file can speak. Only they can enunciate, only they embody the status to validate and legitimate what counts as ‘to speak’ and therefore what counts as truth. So what [in these contexts] is truth in material terms? In the regimes evaluative language of what counts as to speak, truth is that I am my mother’s ‘illegitimate’ child. Illegitimacy here is consecrated as a systematic discursive marking of immorality set against what counts and what is sanctioned by the regime [and thus the social system itself] as legitimate. It is a truth that my mother was married at the age of 20. That she gave birth to a daughter who was later legally adopted by my grandfather. It is a truth and is legitimized as a truth by the ‘truth generating apparatus of the child care institution and its connecting knowledge producing bodies of state and local government agencies, that my mother ‘gave birth to an extra marital child’ and that her husband subsequently divorced her. It is also a truth that my father, is a supposed, ‘putative father’ who is said to be a West Indian not very dark skinned’. I have dark eyes and I have not been ‘attending school regularly’. According to the regime of truth, my mother is neglectful, she ‘does not bother to see me off in the mornings’, and though this statement is not sanctioned and legitimized in factual observation but rather ‘felt’, nevertheless, as a statement produced within the regime of what counts as to speak, it becomes truth. The regime states that it ‘is said’ that I ‘have a good deal of good’ in me but that my mother ‘is of low mentality’. And here again there is ‘truth’, a truth, that my mother is [if the regime says
she is] of ‘low mentality. And where there is reference to it ‘is said’ here the regime appropriates statements, perhaps statements that have been taken out of context and reconstitutes them as ‘truth’ [and thus political] within the truth generating apparatus.

As Foucault has emphasized there is an inextricable connection between truth and power whereby truth ‘is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to [the] effects of power which it induces and which extend it’ [p.72]. And so when the ‘truth generating’ machinery of power that is Barnardo’s along with State and local authority agencies produces myself and mother as a ‘case’, it is a case produced, legitimized and consecrated by the State agencies, and thus the State, as a ‘truth’. The nexus between power and knowledge has a profound impact on the production of constraints placed upon a body’s capacities to speak and [correlatively] to think which is specifically poignant when these discourses and dominant conceptual frameworks are internalized as natural and as normal by the abjectified and marginalized individual and collective self. And yet this power/knowledge nexus also has implications for resisting the constraining forces that Foucault and Corrigan reveal and carries implications for producing the possibilities for the individual and collective refusal of its negating/amputating effects which is, I argue, representative of a process of enunciation that is not simply synonymous with ‘to speak’, or to ‘utter’, but it is about something much more transformative.

The crucial importance of Foucault’s framework for me at this point is that it provides me with an analytical means through which to analyze, excavate and interrogate the constraints imposed on my voice and my enunciative capacities. It allows for an analysis [and reconceptualization] of what might be understood by enunciation [and what might not be] and the implication of knowledge
production and power in this process. It allows me to begin to move down a pathway towards what hooks [1989] has called talking back, or what Said [Khalidi, 1998] has famously called ‘speaking truth to power’. It allows me to move towards a caring for my wounded self, that is to say the self behind my child eyes encapsulated in the photograph shown at the beginning of this analysis.

Foucault [like Spivak] opens up a pathway through which I can begin to answer Butler’s question, how can the abjectified [myself] speak? Indeed how am I even speaking now? How can I even answer Butler’s question from this [abjectified and abjectifying] space? Additionally [and looking towards complexifying this notion of enunciation that I have started to outline] how might Butler’s body be implicated in this and how [as an interrelated and contingent aspect of this process] might Butler’s [and my own] social collective be implicated? But Foucault can only take me so far at this point. And this is the major problematic for me in looking towards carving out a methodology of self that is liberatory [in relation to the individual and the social collective] and which allows me to enunciate in a form that is representative of speaking truth to power and the refusal of negation. For within this conceptualization of truth, power and the constraining matrix of regimes of truth, Foucault actually reproduces my paralysis of voice and thus paralysis of enunciation. For example Foucault suggests that in looking towards formulating a ‘new politics of truth’ [I prefer to substitute this term for a new politics of enunciation] that the ‘problem’ does not lie in ‘changing peoples consciousness’ but rather changing the ‘political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth’ [Rabinow, 1984 p.74].

Now while it is crucial [for counter-hegemonic methods of analysis and action] to center the dominant, systemic and institutional production of truth and the ways in which it circulates and reproduces itself in macro and micro contexts, what Foucault does [in this particular framework] is
to universalize consciousness and negate any connection between the production of so-called truth [that is to say what counts as ‘to speak’], and the alienation of self. As Foucault says, ‘it is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power [which is a chimera, for truth is already power] but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural within which it operates at the present time. The political question to sum up is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself’ [Rabinow, 1984 p.75]. In saying this, Foucault forecloses any possibility that I can move out from paralysis [in the context that I have been speaking about], he forecloses any possibility that I can speak for what counts as ‘to speak’, what counts as truth precisely because the central problem for me is an alienated consciousness. Crucially, Foucault’s framework at this point reproduces my alienation and the alienation of all bodies marked for abjectification and indeed conversely all those bodies that embody the power to mark and abjectify.

Once again I return to Butler’s question: How can the abjectified speak? But perhaps a further question: How can the abjectified speak within and through Foucault? How can I speak? Well I can speak at least in the terms of what counts, what is legitimated, what is considered valid and what is therefore accepted as discursive truth within Foucault’s regimes of truth. As I voice inside that my best friends sister is the colour of dog shit, I am speaking. I am speaking in thought discursively as my body is inhabited by a legitimised discourse. As Butler points out discourses live in bodies, they are lodged in bodies and are carried by bodies ‘as part of their own life blood’ [Meijer and Prins, 1998 p.282]. This knowledge, this ‘truth’ has been enforced by institutions of power such as the education system, through everyday discourse and here [in the context of this study] through the ‘truth generating apparatus’ represented in part by the Dr Barnardo children’s Home and its supportive and connecting agencies of state and local government. The racial evaluations that I have
consumed are what counts as truth. They comprise a set of discourses that circulate and are produced within a set of covert and overt rules, procedures, regulations and patterns to form a systemic and institutionalized web like system of mental constraint.

The designation of ‘coloured’ that is traced on my body in the document below by the Barnardo’s regime and its supportive governmental structures of power is a marking that historically and in the present, racially separates me from non-coloured [white] peoples. It is a colour coded marking constitutive of what counts as British and what does not. More so, it is a racial/racializing evaluative discourse, a discourse produced as truth by institutions of power that are charged with re-producing the sanctioning of what truth is. As ‘truth’, it ‘circulates’ through the social collective, and through my body. It is sanctioned, validated, and legitimized by the truth generating apparatuses of education, and institutions of power, regulation and control of Britain. And so when I internalize this discourse of racialization that marks me as different in an ugly way, in a bad way, in a way that makes me feel inferior, abnormal and excluded, I am speaking [inside]. I am embodied by a discourse of ‘truth’, the truth being [among other forms] that dark skin is dirty, that it is of less value, that it looks like shit as opposed to light skin and white skin which is beautiful, safe, civilized, desirable and clean morally, spiritually and physically.

Plate.4
‘Coloured’
Within these discursive constraints then, if I am to utter verbally the statement that my best friend’s sister is the colour of dog shit, I am of course enunciating what counts as truth and therefore what counts as ‘to speak’ within the societal discursive web despite the psychic torment it causes me, a torment predicated on the negation and alienation of what I imagine and have been forced [coercively] to imagine as the dirty and ‘improper’ space of difference that is me [and that is in me]. And this is a central violating problematic in Foucault’s analysis, and the problem for me. In discounting the positionality of an alienated consciousness, Foucault’s framework cannot paradoxically speak? It cannot speak to the effects on the alienated consciousness of this process and positionality that I have referred to here, nor, in its universalization of consciousness, can it even conceptualize the existence of this positionality. This transpires primarily because within Foucault’s framework of regimes of truth there is a failure to acknowledge the violence of internalization [consciously and unconsciously] that is associated with truth generating apparatuses and a failure to acknowledge the implicatedness of this in relation to the navigative processes of cognitive inner resistance on the part of those who are alienated. ‘To speak’ here within Foucault’s methodology is to engage in torment. It is to engage in torment, psychologically, spiritually and physically. It is to engage in the amputation of self.

In looking to formulate a methodology of self that can speak back to this process of internalizing dominant discourse through Foucault’s notion of truth I am forced into working through a methodology that gives me no space for cognitive/spiritual resistance given that it denies me the space as an alienated consciousness through which to ask the imperative question, where does this discourse [embedded in me and which alienates me] come from? While I am aware of Foucault’s notion of the opening up of possibilities for a “‘strategic reversibility’ of power relation” that is to say, the possibility of ‘turning around’ the ‘terms of governmental practice’ [e.g. the ways in
which the ‘history of government’ as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counter conducts’] the dismissal of the complexities of an alienated self, linked to the alienated self of the social collective forecloses this [Burchell et al, 1991 p.5]. Foucault, at this point reinforces my alienation by denying firstly my positionality and secondly by conceptualizing discourse in such a way [i.e. neither dominant or dominating] as to deny me the conceptual possibility to contest the regime as represented by Dr. Barnardo’s here which is fundamental for my coming to enunciation and voice.

Implicated in this is Foucault’s conception of power which constitutes one of the central constraints and reinforcements of alienation as it relates to speaking/enunciating from the positionality of abjectification. According to Foucault, power is not constituted in ways that entail ‘one individual’s domination over others or one group or class over others’. Thus, it is ‘not a case of those who possess [power] and those [who do not]. There is no descending top down emanation of power. Rather power, circulates’, it manifests itself ‘in the form of a chain….through a net like organization’. So there is no ‘binary and all encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations’ [Gutting, 1994]. In addition, power is an entity that should not be analyzed at the level of ‘conscious intention or decision’ or the level of internal points of view… [p. 19] ‘but rather at real practices, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our [my italics] bodies, govern our gestures and dictate our behaviours’ [see Olsson, 2006, p.21]. Foucault’s argument that power circulates… translates to an argument that there is no such thing as a top down mode of power. Thus power operates in a manner that is dispersed rather than something that is concentrated in the form of the state [Derrida, in Kearney, 1994]. In other words, ‘there is no such thing as the Power’, ‘there are only micro –powers’. [p. 74]
Derrida argues with caution that this is a ‘useful approach’ rather than ‘relying on a homogenous and centralized concept of power’ [p.74]. According to Derrida such an approach represents the ‘condition for a new politics, a new approach to politics’, one that is ‘necessary and useful’ [p.75]. Derrida’s concern however, reflects in part the problematic that a methodology of self premised on tracing the origins of dominating power comes up against. As Derrida rightly points out while it is important not to dismiss the ways in which power circulates, in the form of micro –powers, ‘invisible powers’ and ‘new forms of powers’ that are ‘larger or smaller than the state, or foreign to the logic of the state’ it is imperative that we do not ignore, deny or forget that the concentrated top down power of ‘the [S]tate is still very strong [and that] the logic [my italics] of the state is still very strong’. This is evident in the refusal of the State [in US contexts] to come to the assistance of thousands of African American inhabitants of New Orleans who lost their homes and lives in the wake of the devastating impact of Hurricane Katrina. The State’s refusal to do nothing in and of itself constituted a political act of homicidal negligence. Additionally, the power of the State in its top down form is made concrete in post 9/11 anti-terrorism legislation which legalizes the practice of racial profiling, forced abduction, torture and the indefinite incarceration of men, women and children. As Derrida rightly points out the power of the State to dominate whole populations of peoples both external and internal to its borders remains unprecedented in both the historical and in the contemporary moment [p. 75].

A critical methodology of self must look to reclaim the self, to resist the alienation of consciousness. To this end it must be able to (re)trace the origins [contrary to Foucault’s notion of genealogy] of its alienation. It must be able to (re)trace the discursive pathway and movement between ‘speaking’ that my best friend’s sister’s skin is the colour of dog shit [later translating to I am the colour of dog shit] and the utterance of an abjectified consciousness that begins to ask
critical questions of itself, questions of spiritual love and caring such as, ‘where does this statement come from?’ ‘Who or what planted these wounds within me?’ This process constitutes the nexus between speaking and enunciation. Tracing the discursive source in this form marks a rejection of pathologization and in (re)tracing the source to larger broader systems of hegemonic, genocidal power, it should be possible to generate/nurture a sociopolitical mode of love and caring for both the individual and [simultaneously] the collective self.

Within the space of a critical methodology of self, a caring for the self must be inextricably tied to political and institutional influences, the social collective and broader institutionalized and systemic modes of power and governance: A caring for the self then, within a critical methodology of self framework constitutes the development of a politics of enunciation and a process of freedom not ‘self mastery within societal constraints’. A critical methodology of self must pinpoint the cause and source of alienation: It must pinpoint and trace the origins of one’s paralysis and contest those origins through a process of criticality grounded in a rage and anger [Johal, Lorde et al] that is out/raged at injustice whenever, wherever and to whomever it occurs.

Caring for the Self: Tracing the Origins, Cause and Source of Alienation and Unspeakability

Let me expand on this further. In the summer of 2004 I was invited to attend a small informal meeting with bell hooks in my department of sociology and equity studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto, Canada. The discussion that ensued revolved around issues of wellness and mental health in the face of ongoing systemic and institutionalized conditions of oppression as they are experienced ostensibly [but not solely] by women of color and their children. During the discussion a male colleague and myself placing our own personal experience at the centre of discussion spoke of the white-centric messages and signals that batter
our children daily telling them explicitly in overt/covert language that they are of less value, of less
worth and as a result leaving scars that are often buried deep in the psyche. To illustrate the
consequences for young children forced to navigate such racialized social conditions the colleague
in question shared the story of his 7 year old son and the challenges he was struggling with. The
boy had begun to rapidly develop a sense of shame for his own skin color and his sense of
blackness to the point where his parents had caught him trying to rub his skin colour off his arm,
[the ritual of attempting to rub oneself white, [Onwurah, 1998]. The father, in order to challenge
the negative racial evaluations that his son was accumulating and internalizing had made the
conscious decision of introducing him to various films and works that he had heard included Black
characters. On taking him to see a particular film however, that had appeared initially to offer
some form of diversity he noted to his despair that the Black and Brown characters were all
depicted in a negative light. Halfway through the movie his son stood up in the middle of the
movie theatre pointed at the screen and shouted out ‘see Daddy I told you all black people are bad’.
So here we were with bell hooks bringing our personal to the political table and bringing also a
sense of despair, despair, that our children are/were still after all these years being subjected to
traumatization and violation as a result of these forms of oppression.

I asked bell hooks, where do we begin to heal? How does healing take place because it is not
simply a physical violation it is a spiritual and psychic violation. I was speaking as much to the
child in me [my wounded self in the photograph] as I was to my daughter and son. bell hooks’
response was that we ‘seek out the cause’ of the trauma in our children, that we ‘pinpoint the
cause’.
I can think of and ‘pinpoint’ a myriad causes and/or sources of trauma and unspeakability as it relates to my growing and the history of my present. One Incident stands out. One assault among many. It is the incident briefly mentioned in the previous chapter in relation to voice paralysis. Three years or so after the school photograph of me was taken and 4 years after being rescued from Barnardo’s by my mother I had been invited by a friend to look for baby rabbits in the local wood with a boy who my friend knew, but who I had never seen before. He was boy from a different school who was much older than us. When we got further into the woods, we came to a stop. I was still looking for rabbits in the undergrowth when I saw that my friend had started to run away with a look of fear on his face. He knew what was going to happen. It was a set-up. We never had anything to do with each other after this but I later realized that he must have been assaulted sexually by this boy also and assaulted many times looking for rabbits. He ran and I was left alone to be subjected to paralysis and violation. I was told ‘not to speak’, to ‘hush’, I was told ‘it will be alright’. I was asked, ‘does that feel good’. I murmured some speech that was representative of ‘yes’. I murmured the speech of ‘yes’ from a state of frozenness.

Speech and ‘to speak’ here was constitutive of what the dominating power wanted to hear with its knee on my chest. I was terrified. I was terrified because I thought that I was not only going to die but that I was going to be murdered. It is interesting this relationship of ‘to speak’ and the notion of voice because here the directive to me was that I must not speak with my voice. I must only mimic /utter the voice of the dominant, that is to say what the dominant wanted to hear. And it is understood in this relationship that the response cannot be, must not be, ‘no it is not good’ because if this happens then it is also understood that a force of violence that will end your short time on Earth will rain down upon you. And so I could not speak using my voice and my frozen body was assaulted. Finally, he was disturbed by people wandering near by and I was able to make a bolt for
it, to escape. I ran and I ran and I ran. And when I finally stopped and looked back and saw only the country road behind me and no-one there, it was then that I began to feel the beginnings of the internal bomb like effect that Arundhati Roy writes about in her novel *God of Small Things* [1997] that is to say the stomach sickening process of guilt, shame and unspeakability that gradually corrodes away your insides.

My paralysis of voice was not physical, it took another form. I could not speak to my mother or anyone of this incident. I could not speak of what had happened. But this was less to do with the physical trauma that gripped my body for the longest while afterwards. It was not the actual physical act of speaking that was the problem but much more to do with a sense that I was now dis/ordered. That I would be seen [if anyone found out] as not being normal, for a boy. That I would not be seen as a ‘normal’ heterosexual masculine lad and that I would be ridiculed…and viewed as having a disorder that must be cured, fixed, treated and/or medicalized. The internalization on my part of what the social structure said counted as masculine and as a boy and therefore as what counted as respectable and normal was now compromised. In the internalization of this process not only could I be seen by my peers, by my social system as having a disorder, I saw myself this way.

And so it seemed to me that my experience marked me as someone who had deviated from what my social system counted as normal and even to think of it made me, in my own mind, appear sick, depraved, dirty, and above all *abnormal*. I could not speak of this experience that was now congealed inside of me as a part of my embodiment. I had to negate it. I psychically consciously and unconsciously amputated this experience that formed the multi-layered aspect of my difference from my body. And because I had no alternative paradigms or understandings of what it meant to
speak beyond the performing of dominant notions of heterosexual masculinities [and therefore dominant notions of gendered modes of social difference] my body was not only subjected to an enforced silencing of voice, but more significantly it could not conceptualize any other possibility of speaking about its difference and the *politics* of that difference [i.e. the contextualization and implication of social relations of power in the formation and experience of social difference].

As a result the pain and torment of the actual sexual assault transformed itself into an inner encirclement of greater pain and torment that was born out of the very imposition of unspeakability that [in turn] gave rise to a condition of neurosis, which [whenever I allowed myself to think about the assault at all] forced me into the belief [due to my social system’s total and totalizing disavowal of any implicatedness] that only myself Stanley Wood [the individual] experienced this.

When the social system did speak, it was to say that my site of difference and experience of violation was not only something that it could fix through medicalized treatment, but that it was also up to the individual [myself] to ‘overcome’ my tragic impairment of shame and violation. Returning to hook’s statement then, I would argue that pinpointing the cause of pain and trauma is not enough. In point of fact, it may represent the problem itself. The young Black child already had a sense of what was the cause of his dissonance, anxiety, self shame and dislocatedness. It was his own body. It lay within himself. To reclaim the self however to resist [cognitively/spiritually] domination requires an active consciousness of the implicatedness of the social system. It requires dominant discourse to be projected outwards not inwards. It requires an *out*-rage of anger as love that says the ‘cause’ is not the self, it is not me. I am not the pathologized one.
In *The Location of Culture* [1994], Homi K. Bhaba writes about the possibility of (re)conceptualizing and (re)asserting the space of difference as a space of resistance to racializing colonial power relations through what he calls a ‘Third Space of enunciation’ [p.37]. For Bhaba this ‘Third Space’ is a space which lies beyond the inter-relational space of articulation that is the colonizer and the colonized. It is a space of difference whose articulation and enunciation emerges and draws its voice from the very subjugated and disavowed location that it occupies, that is to say, a location that embodies the material, discriminatory effects of a discourse of cultural colonialism in which violence as a field of force is predicated in part on the disavowal [amputation] of these effects. As Bhaba argues ‘domination’ in colonial discursive and material contexts ‘is achieved through a process of disavowal that denies the chaos of its intervention as *Entsellung*... [and denies, negates and disavows]...its dislocatory presence in order to preserve the authority of its identity in the teleological narratives of... [its]...historical and political evolutionism’ [p.111]. The Third Space of enunciation is the voice of marginalized difference whose very presence and existence ruptures this disavowal. Moreover, it represents the material, concrete articulation of the effects of colonial violence, displacement and dislocation [p.111].

Difference constituted by voice and enunciation in this context emerges, according to Bhaba, as a space of hybridity. Hybridity for Bhaba however is not a fixed racial space of in-betweenness, nor is it a ‘third term’ that ‘resolves the tensions between two cultures [p. 113-114] but rather it is a ‘process of splitting’ an ambivalent space that troubles colonial racist and racializing representations of the colonized. It ruptures the relationship of power between the signified and the signifier through an articulation of difference that defies the enforcement of colonial representations of difference. Moreover, in re-articulating and voicing difference outside of the fixed, rigid, boundaries of colonial discourse, it performs and expresses cultural difference as a
space that ‘can no longer be indentified or evaluated as objects of epistemological or moral contemplation’. In this, difference as enunciation is enacted as a collective strategy of ‘subversion that turn[s[ the gaze of the discriminated back upon the [colonial] eye of power’ [p.111]. As Bhaba argues further, hybridity as the articulation of difference and as a space of enunciation, ‘is the name for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal [that is, the production of discriminatory identities that secure the ‘pure’ and original identity of authority’ [p.112]. While it is important to view Bhaba’s Third Space of enunciation and indeed his conceptualization of hybridity as a fluid space and not as a place of arrival which in turn suggests [in the absence of an acknowledgement of the individual and collective implicatedness of oppression] there is a need to be mindful, on a constant basis, of the necessity to consistently expose our enunciative capacities and expressions to a relentless process of re-evaluation lest we simply re-mimic colonial discourses of gendered, racialized, sexualized, abled, and classed hierarchicalized social relations of violence, dominance and power even as we pat ourselves on the back as having broken free from them.

Bhaba’s work is crucial however in terms of his conceptualization of enunciation as a process of resistance and caring for the self that draws it power from implicating [and indeed pinpointing] the social structure as the cause and source of the production of dominance. Caring for the self as a process of enunciation is grounded in the marginalized [individual and collective] self’s articulation of the structural effects of the violence that is mapped on and through her/his/our body in a socio-political way that indicts the social political structure rather than the individual and or collective self. Bhaba exemplifies the importance of this process as one that is inextricably linked to enunciation as a process of caring for the self when he refers to the women of 124 Bluestone Road in Toni Morrison’s Beloved: [p.16]. As Bhaba says:
What finally causes the thoughts of the women of 124 ‘unspeakable thoughts to be spoken’ is the understanding that the victims of violence are themselves ‘signified upon’: they are the victims of the projected fears, anxieties and dominations that do not originate within the oppressed and will not fix them in the circle of pain. The stirring of emancipation comes with the knowledge that the racially supremacist belief ‘that under every dark skin there was [is] a jungle’ was the belief that grew, spread, touched every perpetrator of the racist myth, turned them mad from their own untruths, and was then expelled from 124 Bluestone Road [p.16]

**Enunciation and Frantz Fanon’s Historical Racial Schema**

If enunciation implicates an ‘emancipation’ from the internalization of dominant discourse and the assertion of a set of knowledges that have been forcible subjugated, then the process that Homi K. Bhaba reveals here marks the ‘stirring’ and/or the entry point of enunciation. It marks the moment of coming to speakability, a moment constituted by the question, ‘where does my knowledge come from’ [Dei, 2000; Smith 1999, et al]. It is the starting point for conceptualizing and asserting a refusal of negation and pathologization. Enunciation however, as a counter-hegemonic space of embodied articulation requires more than this. It requires in addition, both a focus and an acute awareness of the variegated impositions and effects of negation as it impacts the social collective and [simultaneously] an outright confrontation and contestation with the social political structure and its apparatuses of hegemonic power, governance and authority.

Pinpointing the cause [locating the source of racist and racializing signification] is not necessarily the same as a contestation of the cause itself. It marks the starting point [and not the end outcome] of a politics of enunciation and a caring for the self as an individual and social collective. And it is at this point, this enunciative moment that Bhaba speaks of in relation to the women of 124 Bluestone Road in Morrison’s novel that my divergence with Foucault’s methodology and my convergence with other critical frameworks of analysis which insist on centering the alienation of consciousness begin. This shift however, is not a divergence in terms of a dismissal that leaves
behind and ‘moves on’ from Foucault rather it represents a re-articulation and indeed re-appropriation of Foucauldian analysis in the context of my own situatedness. It is within the analytical struggles within transformative spaces fields of knowledge and epistemological frameworks that we find we can begin to formulate our voice as embodied sites of critical knowledge by asking the question of oneself, ‘after all is said and done, does it speak to me?’ ‘Does it recognize me?’ ‘Does it recognize and acknowledge my political situatedness?’ It is through such analytical struggles that we can move the knowledge further by asking questions that are derived from our very sociopolitical situatedness.

For example, aside from the importance of Foucault’s analyses of regimes of truth and the implicatedness of the body as a target of power, Foucault’s concept of ‘subjugated knowledge’ represents a critical concept for the kind of analysis that I am taking up here which looks to reclaim and re-center my alienated consciousness in British nation-state contexts. According to Foucault [1980], ‘subjected knowledges are comprised of “a whole set of knowledges that are either hidden behind more dominant knowledges but can be revealed by critique or have been explicitly disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity”’ [p.82]. As Foucault goes onto say

[w]hen I say 'subjugated knowledges' I mean two things. On the one hand, I am referring to historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systemizations. [In other words, I am referring to] blocks of historical knowledges that were present in the functional and systematic ensembles, but which were masked, and the critique was able to reveal their existence by using, obviously enough, the tools of scholarship. Second, when I say 'subjugated knowledges' I am also referring to a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as...insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity. (Hill-Collins, 1991, p. 15)
At the same time however, Foucault’s conceptualization of this term poses a struggle and a tension for me largely because in failing to speak to the situatedness of the women at 124 Bluecoat Road and their resistance to oppression it fails to speak to me. And yet it is within this very tension and struggle with omission that I look then to re-appropriate, re-configure and indeed bend Foucault’ approach in much the same way as Patricia Hill-Collins [1991] has done in her formulation of Black feminist thought and methodology. For while Hill-Collins utilizes Foucault’s concept of ‘subjugated knowledge’ she reconfigures and re-appropriates it arguing that within the context of Black feminist thought and the situatedness of Black women in relation to systems of oppression in the United States, subjugated knowledge is:

Not a ‘ naïve knowledge’ but has been made to appear so by those controlling validation procedures’. Moreover, Foucault argues that subjugated knowledge is a’particular, local, regional knowledge [and a] differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed to everything surrounding it [1980, p. 83]. The component of Black Feminist thought that analyzes Black women’s oppression certainly fits this definition, but the long-standing independent Afrocentric foundation of Black women’s thought is omitted from Foucault’s analysis [Hill-Collins, 1991 p.15].

Thus, the concept and presence of subjugated knowledge is defined by ‘long standing’ epistemological ways of knowing and doing [Hill-Collins, 1991; Dei et al, 2000; Wane, 2000]. It is constitutive of a consciousness and mode of living that is enacted, asserted and reasserted on a daily day to day basis as an embodied counter-hegemonic form of resistance to systemic oppression. But subjugated, [minoritized and abjectified] knowledges are [as Hill-Collins,1991 points out] far less subjugated and voiceless [Spivak, 1998] than they are made to appear so by dominant/dominating frameworks of thought and analysis. In the context of the everyday social realities of marginalized and racialized peoples, subjugated knowledges in the context in which they become symbiotic with the process of resisting and refusing dominance in its discursive and
material form, are not subjugated [that is to say they are not rendered docile and powerless] despite the attempts by dominant institutionalized enforcements of power and authority to impose a regime of subjugation upon them. In the context of the women of 124 Bluecoat Road subjugated knowledge represents a set of knowledges and epistemological frameworks ‘gained at the [experiential ] intersection’ of [race, dis/ability, class, gender and sexualized] oppression [which in turn ] ‘provides the stimulus for crafting and passing on’ the counter-hegemonic epistemologies of ‘Black women’s [lived] culture of resistance’ [Hill-Collins, 1991 p.10]. Moreover, as subjugated knowledge in these contexts finds its decolonizing strength in nurturing both a consciousness of the ‘dialectics of oppression’ and a refusal to be suppressed by such conditions, it does not conceive itself as a set or block of ‘historical knowledges’ that are fixed and which claim an absolute truth that needs no critical re-evaluation.

On the contrary, as a process of coming to enunciation in an anti-colonial Fanonian, Freirian mode that looks to push out the oppressor within, the assertion of subjugated knowledge is an assertion that places itself under constant critical re-evaluation and re-assessment. It is consistently engaged in the process of decolonizing its voice as a ‘partial [not absolute] perspective on domination’ which ‘at all times and in all places’ makes explicit, de-mystifies and contests the externally imposed ‘insult’ ‘that exists in oneself’ [Fanon, 1963, p.304]. As a result it draws its enunciative power and its struggle for freedom from the full understanding that the ‘first struggle’ [as the Black Panther leader George Jackson observed] with a system of domination ‘is one [that is] waged within our own [individual and collective] minds’. Epistemologically, subjugated knowledge therefore represents a philosophical and spiritual mode of consciousness. It is an experiential concrete everyday practice of cognitive and physical resistance to oppression from the sociopolitical positionalities and locatedness of outcasted, abjectified and racially marked peoples.
Importantly for this study, subjugated knowledge in its embodied form constitutes that which underpins a critical methodology of self. Subjugated knowledge as a space of embodiment in these contexts can be utilized as a method and means for critical social inquiry and interrogation. As such it represents an embodied methodological process for social analysis that works against the grain of dominant/dominating conceptual frameworks of thought. It provides the catalyst for asserting a critical methodology of self as a politics of enunciation that stands in opposition to those hegemonic forms of autoethnographic storytellings which fail to engage the broader socio-cultural-political and historical context due their reliance on an individualized ‘self indulgent’ process of depoliticized ‘introspection’ [Chang, 2008, p. 54] that disembody the self from its congealed histories of racialization and internal/internalized coloniality.

Consequently, within this framework of a critical methodology of self that I am proposing here the implicatedness of the body as a politicized raced, gendered, dis/abled, sexualized and classed site of knowledge is crucial. As Foucault [Rabinow] argues, the body cannot be separated from its socio-political-historical history. The effects of history are traced on the body, that is to say ‘descent attaches itself to the body’ and as such the body is constitutive of a socio-political historical text that is infinite. It is an ‘inscribed surface of [discursive and material] events [traced by language and dissolved by ideas]’. To trace in a genealogical form the historical sociopolitical discursive traces that are inscribed on the body [my body and that of my collective] and to trace and analyze their descent is a crucial imperative for this study. Moreover, it is a crucial imperative for the methodology of self that I utilize in my analysis and approach. As Foucault notes in his description of genealogy and the genealogical method, ‘[g]enealogy as an analysis of descent is…situated within the articulation of the body and history…Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body’ [83].
And this is, to a large degree, the task of/for this study and its methodological framework. However, this study and its critical methodological framework of self also looks to move beyond those critical sociological studies of race and racialization, which, due to their Foucauldian mode of analysis, place so much emphasis on the deployment of dominating power and the multi-layered forms [e.g., spacialization] through which dominating power targets and penetrates the body, that to a great extent the body itself [that is to say the target of power] is individually and collectively objectified. As a result the individual/collective body that is the target of institutionalized violating power becomes the target for yet another form of institutionalized domination and violence, that of hegemonic social science research which, in its objectifying methodological approach, denies voice and agency even when the opposite effect is intended.

An example of this is that of Samira Kawash, [1998] whose spatial analysis of the projection of dominating power on the target of that power [i.e. the ‘homeless body’] while important is centralized in her study to such a dominating degree that it leaves the homeless body without a voice. In other words, in Kawash’s analysis the homeless body does not speak and indeed cannot speak. A critical methodology of self asserted as a politics of individual and collective enunciation works to avoid this pitfall by centering the corporeality of subjugated knowledge as the method and means through which to analyze sociopolitical power configurations. In other words, the body is centered in such a way that it is the structural apparatus of power and authority, the regimes truth, that come under scrutiny, that become the object of/for analysis and interrogation by [and through] an embodied knowledge of oppression and the knowledges gained by the oppressed in the struggle for material survival. The struggle with oppression however is a struggle [in terms of its violent materiality] that has psychic implications and as such the embodied knowledge of the oppressed is
a knowledge drawn from the direct experience of the psychic destructiveness that systems of domination inflict upon the body.

As W.E.B Dubois writes in *Souls of Black Folk*, [1989] this psychic violence is manifested in an externally imposed epistemic violence that divides and/or splits the self and psyche of the racially marked subject who is forced to navigate a social world constitutive of a racial ‘veil’ [p.5] or [to borrow from Frantz Fanon, 1952] a historical racial and epidermalizing schema that is spiritually obliterating in that it ‘yields’ the racially marked subject with ‘no true self consciousness but only lets [her/him] see [her/himself] through the revelation of’ [Du Bois, 1989, p.5] its dislocating conceptual framework. As Du Bois notes, the discursive and material violence of a racist, racializing nation-state turns racially marked bodies [those who are epidermalized as inferior] into outcasts and strangers in their own house [Du Boise, p.5]. The genealogy of Frantz Fanon articulates this ‘splitting’ process of double ‘consciousness’ as a violent ‘ethno-psychiatric’ imposition that is ‘specific to colonial’ [Gilroy, 1993, p.161] relations of power. Fanon however, teaches us that the psychic and material violence that colonial domination and colonial discourse imprints on and through the bodies of the oppressed can be seized, reappropriated, and utilized by the oppressed as ‘data’ through which the sociopolitical system can be held up not only for interrogation and social inquiry [Du Bois, 1989] but also for contestation and refusal.

For Fanon (1952), the body of the oppressed as a critically conscious space becomes a powerful weapon for sociopolitical inquiry, interrogation, and contestation of the hegemonic order all of which merge as a process that is constitutive of a spiritual reclamation of the individual and collective self. It is a process that is epistemologically grounded in the concept of amputation as it
relates to the individual and collective self and the oppressed body’s rage filled refusal to ‘accept’ (p.119) its ontological existence as a lack or deficit.
The Literature Review: Racialization

In looking to making a conceptual linkage between the concepts of race and racism, Avtar Brah [Murji and Solomos, 2005] has argued that ‘one of the ramifications of the complex and continuously changing discourses, practices and histories of the idea of race is that the concept of racism may not [in and of] itself be quite adequate as an explanation tool’ [p.83] for understanding the complexities of racism. Here Brah is speaking of the complexity of the shifting discourses that discursively transmit and operationalize racism through new complex meanings and definitions that are erased of any specific mention of the concept of racism itself and indeed are erased of any mention of the violating presence of racialization. It is in this context that Rattansi [Murji and Solomos, 2005] argues for racialization as a conceptual tool to be utilized to a greater degree to analyze the processes of racism and oppression, ‘to analyze its operations’ [and] ‘to unpack its complex articulations with other forms of cultural essentialization, biological reductionism, and configurations of power, knowledge and inequality’ [p. 298].

Any theoretical framework which centers racialization however is going to be guided by the conceptualization of the concept of racialization itself, that is to say, how racialization is understood. Within the field of the social sciences Michael Banton is credited with the first usage of the concept. He defines it as a ‘process which in historical terms’ intersects ‘race-making and race unmaking’ within the ‘realm of politics’ [Banton in Murji and Solomons. 2005]. According to Banton, this ‘historical mode of racialization was an attempt [my italics] to account for the unequal development of large human groups’. He goes on to explain that the ‘contemporary mode of
racialization’ [is] a way of claiming that the relative privilege and disprivilege of such groups derives from earlier misrepresentations of these biological characteristics” [p.51]. As Banton argues further, racialization as the process of race-making and race-unmaking is derived from the invocation in language of the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘racial’. Thus, racialization as a race-making process is located within language or the usage of racial nomenclature that refers to groups of social bodies as races. But according to Banton’s theoretical approach ‘race-making’ [or racialization] also occurs when concepts of race and racial are used within processes that target what he calls ‘race-unmaking’, that is to say anti-racist work, anti-racist policy, practices, strategies and so on. So where anti-racist educators and activists might [Dei, 2002; Razack, 2002 et al] seek to draw attention to [for example] the marginalization of students of colour in mainstream schooling by calling for a dialogue on the role that race plays in curriculum exclusionary practice, in Banton’s view this constitutes a re-production of racialization.

In this framework of analysis then any specific reference to the concept of race itself represents racialization. The problematics of this approach of course are significant for any form of work that seeks to contest systemic and institutionalized racist discourse and practice and moreover seeks to centre the experiences and identities of those most affected by these processes. As Dei [has poignantly observed if we cannot talk about race then we cannot put race on the table, and if we cannot put race on the table how can we talk about racism [Dei, 2008]. There is danger then in Banton’s approach in the sense that it re-produces and re-legitimizes a hegemonic status quo, a status quo where not only is the supremacy of whiteness an essential ingredient in the social order left intact but the presence of everyday racial violence in its multiple manifestations is sustained and strengthened. Primarily, the weakness in Banton’s conceptual thinking lies in his usage of the
concept of race to explain racism and racialization, a usage which eschews the implication of racially coded language [Murji and Solomons, 2005] in racializing processes.

Banton’s understanding of racialization then, does not refer to the process of interrogating and revealing racially coded language as a discursive representation and manifestation of racism. In fact for Banton racially coded language is preferable to specific references or utterances of the concept of ‘race’ itself. Referring to the language of 1950’s post WW2 Britain and the discourse of ‘coloured’ [which as noted in previous chapters is embedded in the dominant psychology of late 19th century and Victorian Britain], Banton notes that although the primary [racialized] division was between ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ groups [Banton also acknowledges, those designated as ‘coloured’ were also classified as ‘West Indian’, or ‘Jamaican’ etc] [Murji and Solomons. 2005], these markings and classifications were not practices and processes of racism and racialization because for Banton the usage of the term ‘coloured’ [or ‘West Indian’ for that matter] did not carry any race specific connotations. What Banton did note however [and where, for him racialization was to be found during this period] was in the ‘growing tendency led by intellectuals to prefer the language of race to that of colour’. As Banton argues, it ‘is worth pausing over the comparison’ between the two concepts [e.g. ‘race’ and ‘coloured’]. Banton’s comparison concludes that it was “better to describe a person by referencing to his or her colour because colour is observable where race is not”. And as he explains further “[t]o speak of colour difference is to recognize them [those marked as ‘coloured’] as a form of continuous variation from one individual to individual” [p.59].

In this mode of analysis however, Banton ignores the blatantly racist, eugenicizing government policies such as the 1962 Immigration Act designed to ‘limit’ ‘Coloured’ immigration to Britain and its template the ‘Coloured Seamen’ acts of the 1940’s, the latter of which was put in place
specifically to prevent non-White males born outside Britain and serving in the British merchant fleet [my father included] from taking up residence in Britain and thus [as a material effect] preventing them from reproducing [in Britain] any so called ‘coloured’ children such as myself. Banton dismisses any connections between the production and enforcement of dominant biologizing constructions of race and the variegated forms through which such notions are re/produced within and through racially coded language. As a result, Banton’s formulation of racialization leaves no space to analyze and interrogate [as a process of enunciation] the multiple ways in which racialization as the epidermalization of inferiority [Fanon, 1952] is discursively produced, re-produced circulated and materially enforced on the social collective. In addition, it does not [and cannot, given its conceptual limitations] allow for any possibility to interrogate the power relationships that are implicated in the signifying process of marking and naming, a process in which Banton’s own body [as a space of embodied dominant discourse] is deeply implicated.

The limitations of Banton’s usage of racialization as a hegemonic concept and as a theoretical space from which to analyze social relations of power in the context of nation-state formations [e.g. Britain], is evident here. Such a limited conceptual understanding cannot adequately speak to the complexities of racialization, [for example the forms in which racialization in language reproduces itself through and within sites of social difference other than race] nor the violent impact of racialization [as an institutionalized tool for otherizing particular individuals and communities of difference] as experienced by those subjected to its effects. And yet Banton is not on his own in this. Similar conceptualizations have been taken up by scholars such as Reeves [Murji and Solomons, 2005] who, following on from Banton, have critiqued the usage of the term ‘anti-racism’ as being commensurate with the production of ‘race-making’ and thus [in the context of this approach] racialization. It is in Reeves’ approach however where the full hegemonic
potentiality of this analytical position is to be found, for according to Reeves, racialization is derived less from racist government policies related to immigration [e.g. the 1962 Immigration Act, the Coloured Seamans Act etc.,] and more so from those policies that concern themselves with anti-discrimination [p. 63].

By contrast Robert Miles’ understanding of racialization moves towards a more nuanced interpretation that opens up space for greater analytical clarity. Miles’ [1991] usage and conceptualization of the concept of racialization has undergone a journey of gradual change however [1989:120, 150]. Initially Miles conceptualized racialization as an ‘ideological process’ whereby racialization acts as a ‘synonym for the concept of ‘racial categorization’ [p.74]. In this context racial categorization [as racialization] emerges as a “process of...[the]...delineation of group boundaries and of...[the]...allocation of persons within those boundaries by...[a]...primary reference to ...[supposedly]...inherent and/or biological [usually phenotypical] characteristics” [p.74]. Miles subsequently dispensed with employing the concept of racialization as an interchangeable ‘synonym’ for racial categorization. Instead, he sought to interrogate and reconceptualize racialization in ways that would not limit its application to a narrow focus [as with Banton] on race as a concept but would rather look to conceptualize racialization as a process occurring [and in play] at any point where the idea of ‘race’ is present’ [p.74].

This becomes crucial because from this point onwards. Analytical understandings of race in relation to racism are no longer grounded [and thus constrained] in a fixed concept called race but rather in the idea of race. As a result, hegemonic deployments of race can no longer hide behind markings such as ‘coloured’ for it is now understood that within these ascriptions lies embedded
and entangled the dominant [i.e. biologized and biologizing] ‘idea’ of race as a discourse of racializing signification: [Omi and Winant, 1993].

The movement towards thinking of dominant deployments of race as an idea rather than a fixed concept is a crucial step in looking to formulate a complex understanding of the intricacies of racialization and its effects. For Miles’s framework of analysis points towards the possibility of conceptualizing racialization as a process that is not necessarily limited to the concept of race, race formations and/or race relations, but one that [if we are speaking of a biologizing ‘idea’ of race ] also implicates other formations of social difference such as class, culture, gender, disability and sexuality. This possibility is opened up due to Miles’s conceptualization of racialization as a signifying process through which social identities as collectives are constructed, defined, and constrained [i.e. kept in their place]. As Miles [1989] explains, racialization refers to ‘instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectives’ [p.75]. As he goes on to say, the signifying process of ascribing biologizing notions of characteristics that stand in for entire social collectives, have varied “historically and although they have usually been visible somatic features, other non-visible [alleged and real] biological features have also been signified” [.p75]. In this form therefore racialization as a concept “refers to a process of categorization, a representational process of defining an Other [usually, but not exclusively] somatically” [p.75].

Racialization then is a historically recurring process that constructs social difference as a biological collective entity with a set of fixed and unalterable biologically determined characteristics, the particularities of which can be read on the very body of social difference itself. Moreover, as a
historically rooted idea it also re-occurs and is re-produced as a *discourse*. For example the biologizing discourses that underpinned Victorian representations of the so called poor [white working and underclass populations] are in part reproduced in the signifying [and therefore racializing] process that marks Black women [and Black culture] in Britain as a space of deviancy almost 100 hundred years after Barnardo’s ‘saving’ project began. As Gilroy [1991] writes, during the 1970’s ‘mugging robbery and street rioting –were understood to be the natural expressions of black culture, which was defined by dominant discourse as a “cycle in which the negative effects of black matriarchy and family pathology wrought destructive changes on the inner city by literally breeding deviancy out of deprivation and discrimination’ [Gilroy, 1991 in Henry, et al, 2000 p.114]. Gilroy [1991] here notes the importance of the biologization [and thus racialization] of difference as a discursive formation of racial and racialized notions of nation and national understanding of collective identity and self, a process in which Black peoples are constructed as ‘innately criminal or at least more criminal than [their] white neighbors whose deprivation they share’.

As Gilroy explains racializing discourses of this nature “became common-sense during the early 1970’s” and were “crucial to the development of new definitions of the ‘black problem’ and new types of racial language and reasoning’. The discursive violence of racialization in the British contexts of Gilroy’s focus however was not necessarily new in terms of its implication in common sense thinking. The process of racialization in its signifying discursive form that Gilroy refers to here reflects similar pathologizing ascriptions assigned to Black families in the US through historical and contemporary social policy dissemination and (re) production [Limbert and Bullock, 2005; Hill-Collins, 1991, 2004; Grewal & Kaplan, 2002; Cazenave and Neubeck, 2001; Seccombe, James and Walter, 1998; Quadagno, 1994]. The discursive construction of the ‘bad black mother’
[Hill-Collins, 2004, p. 131-132] served as a tool to surveil, monitor and rationalize calls for the regulation of reproductive capacities of Black families. This represents a discourse that circulates from slavery to Jim Crow and perhaps reaches its mainstream zenith in the Moynihan Report of 1965, a report that blamed African American ‘matriarchy’ for the ‘problem of inner city poverty’ [see Cazenave and Neubeck, cited in Limbert and Bullock, 2005]. According to Moynihan, “[in] essence, the Negro community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is too out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great many Negro women as well” [Moynihan, 1965]. Racism here is re-worked, reconfigured and (re)produced through and within a discourse of racialization that for the most part remains unchanged.

As Gilroy [1991] makes clear, racialization as a biologizing process of signification is a central factor in social relations of power and dominance in British nation-state contexts. Miles’s [1989] conceptualization of racialization lays the groundwork for interrogating social relations of power in ways that are not necessarily tied to race and the formations of race but [and this is a crucial point that I want to make] still implicates race and racism in its coded form as a salient factor. Moreover as racialization is conceptualized by Miles as a dialectical signifying process central to the production of power relations this also necessitates a focus on the effects of those very same power relations as a process that requires [and demands] a collective implicatedness. It is in this latter area that Frantz Fanon allows for movement beyond Miles, for racialization as a process involves more than signification, more than the process of ascribing, targeting, and marking bodies as Othered. Racialization operates as a [internal/internalized colonial] matrix of domination [Grosfoguel, 2007] and as such any analysis of the impact, and discursive formulations of racialization must take into
account the psychic effects of racialization as an internalized/internalizing process. It is important then to move beyond conceptualizing racialization solely as a signifying process in favour of a Fanonian understanding of racialization as a process not simply of signification but of ‘thought’.

As Fanon explains ‘racialization of thought’ is embedded in colonial power relations. It is embedded in the process in which the colonized and in particular [colonized intellectual elites] look to resist colonial dominance through a recourse to a ‘national culture’, a recourse that sought to contest the forms through which colonialism ‘‘has never ceased to maintain that the Negro is a savage,’’ that never relented in its assertion that the colonized were ‘‘neither Angolan nor Nigerian’ peoples but simply ‘Negroes’’’, that never relented in proclaiming that ‘‘this vast continent [Africa] was the haunt of savages’’ a space ‘riddled with superstitions and fanaticism destined for contempt weighed down by the cures of God, a country of cannibals – in short the Negro’s country’’. But as Fanon [1963] explains [p.211-212], the process of speaking back [in the context of racialization as thought] enters a pitfall, a pitfall that constrains voice and thus enunciation: as Fanon says in the recourse to national consciousness, in the process of attempting to ‘escape from the claws of colonialism’ the colonized intellectual's attempts are logically inscribed from the same point of view as that of colonialism’, that is to say, ‘the colonized intellectual who has gone so far beyond the domains of Western culture and who has got it into his head to proclaim the existence of another culture never does so in the name of Angola or of Dahomey’. The culture which is affirmed is ‘African culture' [Fanon, p.212]. This follows a colonial racialized discursive mode of thinking which implicates the process of collective implicatedness in oppression and coloniality.

The notion of collective implicatedness as it relates to racialization as a discursive/material practice and mode of thought is crucial. It frames racialization as a constraining discursive and material
matrix of power and domination that implicates self, community and governance structures. Thus racialization can be utilized as a central discursive tool in an interrogative analysis and contestation of oppression in a form similar to that of Antonio Gramsci’s re-articulation of Lenin’s analysis of hegemony, that is to say the modes through which the subjugated give consent to their/our own oppression. Dei and Kemp [2006] conceptualize racialization in a similar form. They argue that racialization is a historical construction and a process that enables ‘white supremacist systems of power to’….discursively…suppress racial minorities as unequal and different in order to [materially] justify their suppression and domination’ [p.22].

As Dei and Kemp go on to argue further, it is crucial that the ‘project of racialization’ is understood within the context of ‘historical processes and trajectories that have allowed dominant groups...through dominant discourse...to call upon culture, gender, ethnicity, language, religion, sexuality and race [as skin colour] as a way of distinguishing groups for differential and unequal treatment’ [p.25]. Dei and Kemp’s conceptualization of racialization offers a nuanced approach to understanding the trajectories and specificities of oppression. As they explain, it is crucial to ‘acknowledge that racialization entails [and is grounded in] notions of biological determinism’. In other words racialization is underpinned by ‘the concept that particular human traits [behaviors, characteristics etc] are biologically determined and are consistent both for individuals and for the groups to which those individuals may belong’ [or are assigned to].

**The Anti-Colonial Discursive Framework:**

This chapter discusses the discursive framework that grounds this study. Following on from the work of numerous critical scholars [Dei, Asgazadeh, Zine et al] I use the term ‘discursive framework’ as opposed to ‘theoretical framework to reaffirm a particular epistemological position in my analytical approach which relies upon a fluid reflective methodology. This stands in
contrast to the forms through which theoretical frameworks operate and which are often characterized by fixed, rigid rules and boundaries which define and determine their mode of analysis.

My analysis is grounded in the field of anti-colonial thought, struggle and philosophical, analytical, discursive and material resistance proposed by anti-colonial thinkers, activists, leaders and scholars such as Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore, C.L.R James Albert Memmi, Amir Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Jose Marti, George Manuel, Claudia Jones, Harold Cardinal, Cabral, Neyrere, Sivanandan, Ghandi, Che Guevara et al, all of whom have enunciated the conditions of the oppressed, the particularities of colonial relations of power and its contingent exploitative and dehumanizing underpinnings.

As Dei and Asgharzadeh [2001] assert, an anti-colonial discursive framework provides for a ‘common zone of resistance in which the oppressed and marginalized are enabled to form alliances in resisting various colonial tendencies’. Moreover an anti-colonial framework, ‘interrogates the power configurations embedded in ideas, cultures and histories of knowledge production, validation and use’ [Dei and Doyle-Wood, 2006 p.95]. It draws upon indigenous and local knowledges that enunciate counter-hegemonic paradigms and epistemologies that emerge as resistance knowledge [p.95] in encounters with systemic oppression’.

An anti-colonial discursive framework: is multiple centered and fundamentally premised on ‘pedagogies of dissent’ [Mohanty, 2004, pg18]. It constitutes a decolonizing philosophy that calls into question [and ultimately changes] ‘the entire social order of things, where that social order is hegemonic’. As Dei and Asgharzadeh [cited on Dei and Doyle-Wood, 2006 p. 110] have argued
further, this process of revolutionary questioning that Fanon calls for is of crucial importance not in terms of seeking ‘a resting place, but in order to make the connection between what is and what ought to be’. This latter aspect, of the, ‘what is and what ought to be’ and the inseparability of these two components for any transformative counter-hegemonic change to occur represents one of the central tenets of the anti-colonial discursive framework and anti-colonial thought and practice. A critical understanding of the ‘what is’, [that is to say the politics and particularities of colonial power relations] or in the words of the Hip-Hop artist Terminology, the ‘how it goes’ [Doyle-Wood, 2009] carries profound implications for agency, resistance and transformative change. Understanding the ‘how it goes’ determines the conceptual questions that can address the ‘what ought to be’. For instance, a central tenet of an anti-colonial discursive framework entails drawing on knowledges of the oppressed that dismiss categorically the mystificatory, obfuscating discursive language [Chrysjohn, 1997] of coloniality, language that works to mask an inherent violence that is not simply incidental or indeed accidental to its framework but rather is integral and contingent to its logic.

Kwame Nkrumah [1964] for example, reveals how exploitation is necessarily embedded in the production and reproduction of imperialism and colonialism in ways that both extend and refine feudalistic forms of dominance through capitalism. The process of imperialism and colonial/neo-colonial relations of power ‘consists [therefore] as much in the methods by which labor is coerced as in the mode of production’ itself [p.72]. Through a Marxist analysis Nkrumah reiterates the nature of colonial relations of power as a dialectical project of dehumanizing exploitation and alienation reflected in slavery and feudalism. As he explains, in ‘the slave society, as in the feudal society, that part of society whose labours transform nature is not the same as the part which is
better fulfilled as a result of this transformation. If by their fruits we shall know them, they must first grow the fruits. In a slave and feudal society, the fruit-eaters are not the fruit growers’ [p.72].

Within the field of anti-colonial thought and struggle this violent dialectical logic constitutes one of the cardinal elements in the process of colonial exploitation, that ‘the section of a society whose labours transform nature is not the same as the section which is better fulfilled as a result of this transformation’ [p.71]. Implicating imperialism within this process, anti-colonial thinkers such as Nkrumah followed Lenin’s poignant statement that imperialism was/is the highest form of capitalism [Lenin, 1970]. As a consequence an anti-colonial consciousness and conceptual gaze moves towards an understanding that the superstructure which gives rise, produces, sustains and necessarily reproduces and underpins systemic exploitation [in its colonialist form] is that of capitalism. Thus, as Nkrumah [1964] reveals a ‘colonialist structure [and relationship of power] is essentially ancillary to capitalism’ [p.74]. It is the auxiliary means through which capitalism knows and makes itself. It is the mechanism of its expression. The philosophical positionality of anti-colonial thought and practice therefore calls for a ‘fierce and constant struggle for emancipation’ from these asymmetrical relations of power [Nkrumah, 1962 p.xv] that impose, enforce and reproduce colonial relations of domination and subjugation. In doing so anti-colonial thought and practice works to expose the brutal logic of Imperialist/colonialist social orders that systematically bind colonized peoples and countries to the Imperial power for the soul purpose of economic exploitation.

For Nkrumah the logic of the conditions of colonial, capitalist exploitation expressed itself in such a way as to necessarily reserve happiness and aspirations for the few at the expense of the many - culminating in conditions of cultural, spiritual and material alienation. As he explains the
immorality of capitalism ‘consists in its alienation of the fruit of labour from those, who with the
toil of their body and the sweat of their brow produce this fruit. This aspect of capitalism makes it
irreconcilable with those basic principles which animate the traditional African society’. As
Nkrumah [1964] explained further, speaking of the process of decolonization as it related itself to
newly independent African states, capitalism was not only an unjust imposition, not only too
complicated to be workable, it was also ‘alien’ [p. 76].

Anti-colonial thought has been unrelenting in revealing and contesting colonial discourse and the
forced imposition of colonial relations of power as a ‘process of alienation’ [Wa Thiong’o, 1989].
Moreover, as a central component in the development of critical consciousness or concentizacoa
[Friere, 1973] on the part of the colonized, anti-colonial thought and practice has been consistent in
demystifying and delegitimizing the hegemonic claims made by colonial discourse and colonial
power structures. Walter Rodney [1972] for example, as a starting point in analyzing colonialism
in African contexts begins discursively with the question ‘who and what, is responsible for African
[so called] ‘underdevelopment’ [p.27]. Rodney dismisses the dominant racializing discourses of
African ‘underdevelopment’ as either a state of social backwardness resulting from [p.21]
either the ‘generic backwardness of the race of black Africans’ or the lack of ‘skilled personnel to
develop’ roads, bridges, ‘hydroelectric stations’ etc by arguing that it is Europe itself and more
specifically European colonialism that has caused the ‘underdevelopment’ of Africa. Focusing
specifically on so called underdevelopment in terms of child undernourishment, malnourishment
and health deterioration, Rodney explains that such conditions were/are created by the violence of
colonialism which has ‘led not just to periodic famine, but to chronic [p.236] undernourishment
and deterioration in the health conditions of African peoples collectively.
For Rodney then there is a critical imperative from an anti-colonial standpoint to contest, interrogate and dismiss dominant colonial discourse. This anti-colonial imperative lies in the process of offsetting and intervening in the colonial control of the ‘mental universe’ [WaThiong’o, 1989] of the colonized. As Rodney explains, colonial discourse and its tool of oppression ‘bourgeoisie propaganda has conditioned even Africans to believe that malnutrition and starvation were [are] the natural lot of Africans from time immemorial” [p.236]. Rodney [1972] argues [and this point is a fundamental component of anti-colonial discursive practice and analysis] that the internalization of colonial discourse determines the conceptualization on the part of the colonized of the ‘what is’ [that is to say what constitutes the intricacies of colonial relations of dominance and subjugation] which in turn determines, [borrowing again from [Dei and Asgharzadeh, 2001] the ‘what can be’, [i.e. the possibilities for agency and resistance]. As discussed in previous chapters, racialization as discourse and as a discursive mode of thinking serves to limit and constrain what can be spoken of, how, and in what form, thus constraining our enunciative capacities [from the standpoint of the marginalized] to fully comprehend the complexities of both our conditions of oppression and the possibilities for transforming those same conditions.

As Rodney [1972] makes clear, colonial discourses that pathologize colonized peoples through an emphasis on cultural deficits [an emphasis that works to mask the implication of the violence of colonialism itself] must be called into question wherever and whenever they arise [including within ourselves]. Rodney makes this point in his critique of Oxfam when he says, “A black child with a transparent rib cage, huge head, bloated stomach, protruding eyes, and twigs as arms and legs was the favourite poster of the large British charitable operation known as Oxfam. The poster represented a case of *kwashiorkor* – extreme malignant malnutrition. Oxfam called upon the people of Europe to save starving African and Asian children from *kwashiorkor* and such ills.
However Oxfam never bothered their consciences by telling them that capitalism and colonialism created the starvation, suffering, and misery of the child in the first place” [p. 236]. Rodney’s critical attention is rightly focused here on the means through which colonial discourse masks the structural causes of poverty and deprivation. But what is revealed further is the presence and reproduction [on the part of dominant knowledge production and discourse] of the colonized, marginalized, and racialized body as Other.

A critical interrogation of the processes of Otherization in sustaining and mediating colonial relations of power represents a key element in anti-colonial practice and discursive modes of analysis. Moreover an understanding of the significance of Otherization as it relates to all forms of racialized relations of power is a crucial aspect in formulating transformative positionalities of enunciation. As Aime’ Cesaire’s [1972] work suggests, the production of the colonized as Other is a necessary element in colonial enforcements of domination and subjugation. Within this process of Otherization, the colonized body is dehumanized and reduced to that of an object or, thing. The colonized body as Other, stripped of all her/his multi-dimensionality and represented both in the knowledge production of the dominant and in the dominant imagination as an Object or thing, is, within this dehumanizing construction, subjected to violence and violation as a result of her/his reduction to sub-person status. Thus within an enforced and internalized power relationship between the colonizer [as persons] and the colonized [as subpersons],

there is room only for forced labor, intimidation, pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, arrogance…. degraded masses. No human contact, but relations of domination and submission which turn the colonized [woman] man into a classroom monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the indigenous [woman]man into an instrument of production. My turn to state an equation: colonization = “thingification”. I hear the storm. They talk to me about progress, about “achievement”, diseases cured, improved standards of living. I am talking about societies drained of their
essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out [Cesaire, 1972, p.42].

While anti-colonial thought situates the material effects of Otherization as a process reliant on binary oppositional logics which constructs a colonial relationship of power between the colonized and colonizer [Memmi, 1965] as a world split in two [Fanon, 1963] it also conceptualizes coloniality as an externally imposed internalized process of negation and amputation [Fanon, 1952] of the individual and collective self wherein alien and hegemonic cultural ways of knowing are discursively traced on, over and through the collective body of the colonized in a palimpsest form. It is within the field of anti-colonialism that a re-positioning and reformulation of palimpsest emerges. The concept of palimpsest arises from the Greek word ‘palimpsestos’ which refers to a process undertaken historically in periods where writing materials were hard to come by and as such it became necessary to work from the same materials again and again by erasing and rubbing out what had previously been written before: However, when this process did occur the erasure was not always successful and oftentimes what had previously been erased still showed through and still left visible traces of its existence. Thus, palimpsest in technical terms refers to the process of a tracing over a previous tracing or written presence, and, simultaneously, the still visible presence of that which lies underneath and of that which has been subjected to erasure. As a result there is a paradox in palimpsest for it represents [simultaneously] both the space of presence and the space of absence, that is to say the space of an absent presence.

In the contexts of anti-colonial thought palimpsest is re-conceptualized and re-configured in ways that speak to the material and psychic effects of a colonial and thus alien set of knowledges, values and discursive world views imposed upon the colonized in such a form as
to trace over, replace and negate their [our] existing histories, pasts and cultural ways of knowing. WaThiongo [1989] has spoken of the devastating material, psychic/spiritual effects of this process in the context of alien impositions of colonizing language. Notably the field of postcolonial scholarship borrowing from anti-colonial thought has taken up palimpsest as a key concept and element for both analyzing colonial relations of power and for formulating possibilities of resisting their imposition and psychic effects. As Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin [1995] point out,

The trope of the palimpsest emblematises colonial history and its series of writings, overwritings, and erasures. The palimpsest implies that colonial trauma is not just singular and discrete events, but an encompassing and long-lasting pattern of writings and erasures on land, colonial bodies, and colonized minds. The palimpsest implies not just a resistance to current oppression and violence but also a remembrance of the past, which informs the present even though there may be only traces or buried silences of 'official' historiography”. “The concept of the palimpsest is a useful way of understanding the developing complexity of culture, as previous 'inscriptions' are erased and overwritten; yet remain as traces within present consciousness. This confirms the dynamic, contestatory and dialogic nature of linguistic, geographic, and cultural space as it emerges in post-colonial experience. (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin *Key Concepts* 176) “ [Cited in Cryderman, 2002]

Edward Said’s [1979] work constitutes perhaps the best known example within postcolonial scholarship and discourse of the analysis and utilization of palimpsest to reveal the complexity of Otherization and the dialectical reciprocal relationship that is implicated in the process of erasure and negation that is integral to its re/production. This is most observable in his analysis of Orientalism in which Said reveals the epistemic and material violence of Orientalism as palimpsest. As Said has argues, “Orientalism was [is] ultimately a [Western] political vision of reality whose structure [through the manipulation of knowledge and knowledge production, the so called natural and social sciences, humanities, literature etc] promoted the difference between [p.43] the familiar [Europe, the West, “us”] and the strange [the Orient, the East, “them”]. Within
this ‘vision’, construction, invention, it is the West that invents the Orient which “in a sense created, then served the two worlds thus conceived”. Non Europeans constructed as ‘Orientals’ then ‘lived their world….and in their world and ‘we’ lived ours and in ours [p.45]. As Said explains however Orientalism is no mere ‘rationalization of colonial rule’ but is a palimpsestic text wherein “the nexus of [racialized] knowledge and power” that is traced over the ‘colonized “creates and re-creates ‘the Oriental’ through and within its racial/racializing discursive frameworks thus obliterating him[her] ‘as a human being’.

Said’s analysis of colonial discourse as palimpsest does not place emphasis on the multi-layered ‘obliteration’ [p.45] of the colonized body’s material presence as a subject that also possesses resistance. Said rightly views the creation of the Other [Oriental] as necessary to the dialectical process of Orientalism, a process wherein the Occidental [and the idea of Europe] knows itself through what it is not [Oriental]. However, in the context of palimpsest it is important to emphasis that the process of palimpsest in its obliteration of the colonized as a subject and thus as a human being can never completely erase her/his presence as a subject. As such [given that subjectivities imply knowledges, ontologies, histories of how we come to be, how we come to know, histories of struggles and encounters with oppression and indeed the violence entangled in that very oppression both materially and discursively] it can never fully erase or amputate the colonized, the oppressed [as subject], even as it consistently attempts to discursively write and re-write out of existence her/his presence.
Chapter Four
Racialization and the Entanglement of Genocide:

As stated previously there are two key interconnecting concepts that I utilize in this study, internal/internalized colonialism and racialization. My argument is that racialization as a process underpins the hegemonic social order of Britain mediated by and through a process of internal/internalized colonialism and as such my analysis necessitates a complex conceptualization of both terms and their material and discursive presence in British nation-state social relations of power. I argue that internal/internalized colonialism and racialization can be utilized to understand the hegemonic regulation and control of variegated sites of social difference [i.e. race, class, gender, disability, sexuality] and the means through which agency as voice and enunciation can be produced and asserted in a form that acknowledges the connections between social difference, in terms of a collective implicatedness in oppression, a collective experience of oppression and self negation and, a collective refusal to give consent to the ongoing maintenance and reproduction of a social order based upon these formulations and emanations of oppressive, violent and violating power.

The crucial question posed at the beginning of my analysis is how to formulate and pursue an analysis of social relations of power within and through a critical, complex, interrogatory assertion and conceptualization of internal/internalized colonialism and racialization, while still centering race as a salient absent and ‘hyper visible’ [Walcott, 1995] presence and factor that underpins those hegemonic relations and one that is simultaneously integral to a collective nation-state expression of self, voice and enunciation that is transformative, liberatory and anti-hegemonic.
This chapter then looks towards addressing this very task through the discursive ‘data’ palimpsestically written on my body as a historical racial and epidermalized schema [Fanon, 1952] and which, simultaneously, speaks to the broader implicatedness of the processes of negation and their relationships to governance structures of authoritative power, domination and homicidal/genocidal effects. To this end let me now return to my documents.

My Dr. Children’s Home: 16 Alexandra Drive Liverpool, England, UK [Plate. 5]

The first piece of documentation that met my eyes in the handover of my file was a black and white photograph of the Home itself. My childhood memories of this huge imposing Victorian stone structure returned to me immediately. The smell of its authority flooded back into me. I had not seen this Home for decades but looking at it in that moment even as an adult brought back the fear that I carried for it as a child. It was as if it still held me, as if it still had power over me. It was in spaces such as these that for much of the 20th century Barnardo’s as an institution enforced upon
the children in their care the same racialized notions of respectability that Dr. Barnardo in his Imperialistic Christian evangelical mode of thought had been guided by from the very start of his mission to ‘save’ Victorian underclass children from poverty, deprivation and the detrimental influence of their parents and families.

The Home, as an institution, was a cold house prison in which internal colonialism organized through racialization as a discursive process and practice was systematically written palimpsestically onto [and into] the bodies of the children in an unrelentingly, concentrated form 24 hours a day. This process represented a methodological attempt on the part of Barnardo’s to ‘improve’ [and thus ‘rescue’] children from an imagined biologically determined space of degeneracy [Razack, 2002]. Like their Victorian counterparts before them, the Barnardo’s authorities of my generation discursively imagined my child body [and that of others] in racializing classist terms as a dark Other, contaminated by the immorality of a primarily working class [and underclass] culture. More violating however, was the imposition of a racializing process through which my body was imagined and produced through a historical racial schema [Fanon, 1952] as a ‘coloured’ Other removed from British national identity.

Barry Coldrey [2001] in his research on the history of children’s residential institutions, orphanages, reformatories and industrial schools in Britain argues that what characterized all of the varied child carceral regimens, was a ‘spectrum’ of violence mediated at the level of the physical and the sexual. According to Coldrey, “underpinning all forms of care was a sever discipline which often became abusive”. [p.95]. Abuse both physical and sexual in these institutions was more than simply widespread it was on an ‘industrial scale’. As Coldrey argues, the primary purpose and priority behind the establishment of child residential institutions, “orphanages, industrial schools
and reformatories” lay in the “protection of respectable society from the depredations of certain classes of children” [p.95] within British society. Those incarcerated were simultaneously removed and amputated from their communities and removed, amputated and negated from respectable society. The process of removal from their communities looked towards eradicating their community’s cultural influence on their bodies through a regimen of ‘systematic training’. The overriding fear drawn from a set of racialized thought processes was that their “chaotic lives” would become “dangerous to society as a whole” [p.96]. Thus within and through a discourse of racialization that biologized social difference as a contaminatory space, individual children who were viewed as “idle, abandoned, illegitimate,” [and] “poverty stricken” were imagined to be ‘natural recruits’ to the contaminatory influence of the “dangerous’ classes who threatened the stability of the state” [p. 96]. Thus in its circulation from one generation to another, from the Victorian period to the period of my 1960’s incarceration, racialization as discourse embodied, inhabited and lodged within the thought processes of the dominant continues to produce the ‘urban lower class’ child as a ‘threat’ to the security of the nation-state to which institutions reformatories and children’s Homes were upheld and championed as ‘the appropriate response’. [p.96]

As Coldrey explains further, ‘the children’s residential institution [from its Victorian inception] “be it an industrial school, training ship farm school, or orphanage became the ‘field of dreams’ on which to plan for the ‘saving’ [and rescuing] of these children; to draw them [away] from the anarchic freedom of the streets and the influence of feckless parents and mould them into responsible members of the respectable working class” [p.96]. This was done through a palimpsestic process whereby white middle-class cultural norms, underpinned by biologizing and thus racializing notions of difference, ‘proper behaviour’ and respectable ‘family values’ were
traced on and into the bodies of working class children in a concerted and systematic attempt to erase the cultural knowledges the children possessed prior to entering the institutions. Through the rigid policing of dominant notions of difference [e.g. ‘proper’, respectable sexualities and gender the object was to transform ‘human behavior’ [p.96]

**The New Asylums**

Drawing on Foucault’s [1995] analysis of the institutionalization of bodies marked as deviant into spaces of regulation, correction discipline and punishment [e.g. the military, the classroom, prisons and asylums] Coldrey [2001] argues that the children’s residential institutions in Britain particularly in their pre 1950’s form [and the culture of my 1960’s institution still very much reflected this period] constituted what he terms ‘new asylums’. These ‘new asylums according to Coldrey were ‘total institutions’ that is to say “‘their management sought a complete regulation of the daily life of each inmate and the creation of a new personality” [p.97].

Drawing attention to the similarities between the regimes of prisons and asylums Coldrey explains that the institutions of asylums, “prisons, reformatories, workhouses and orphanages” were ‘analogous’ to one another in terms of their populations [i.e. constitutive of ‘the poor, the dispossessed, the unprotected and the stigmatized”] and their single minded engagement with those very same populations which were embodied in discourses such as ‘incarceration’, ‘deterrence’ and ‘rehabilitation’” [p.97]. The correctional and disciplinary culture of these new asylums was one marked by austerity and severe psychological and physical abuse. The austere living conditions would, according to the racialized thinking of the regimes, ‘develop the children’s capacity for sustained hard work’ while improving their ‘self discipline and respect for authority’ [p.99]. In other words, working class and under-class children were disciplined into knowing and accepting
their inferior place in the class/caste system. Through this process of punishment and prisonification the children would then in the logic of the regime be ‘fit to re-enter civil society on release’, cleansed of their community’s negative contamination.

Countless accounts from former inmates placed in ‘care’ institutions such as Barnardo’s give testimony to the physical and psychological abuse endured by the bodies and minds of children. As June Rose, a Barnardo’s biographer, [p.100], noted, an ‘undercurrent’ of sexual and physical abuse and [moreover] the ‘pervasive severity’ [of this abuse] characterized the Barnardo’s Homes through to the 1960’s. In addition, this pervasiveness of physical and sexual abuse was accompanied by a psychological abuse more often mediated through emotional neglect. As John Norman testifies, [‘I remember above all being unloved and treated cruelly’…‘The staff specialty was the rod and the good book [The Christian Bible]. They chastised usmercifully’ [p. 100].

The photograph of the Barnardo’s Home [*my Barnardo’s Home*] that I have shown at the beginning of this chapter, must have been taken [I am guessing] in the late Spring or sometime in the Summer or even perhaps in early Autumn. I am guessing this because of the strength of the sun and the presence of full leaves on the trees. The house is surrounded in the front section by a walled garden. The large windows of the house are open to varying degrees to let the summer breeze in and to air the dormitories. It is a ritual I remember. I peer closely at the windows. I am looking to see a face, a child’s body, anyone, but I can see no-one. The place seems empty, particularly so of children but I can hear their absent present noises and sounds like ghosts in my memory. I can hear the noises/sounds of their/our interactions with one another. The way the light and the shadows fall in the image tells me that the photographer must have taken this photograph of the Home in the afternoon at some point. I am thinking that the children [and I might even have been one of them
when this photograph was taken] must be either at school if it is a weekday, or, if it is a weekend, either visiting the local parks or at Church. Alternatively, they/l/we might be downstairs standing with our heads bowed in prayer internalizing a belief that we/were/are morally inferior and thus in need of salvation from our sinful selves and the sinful places and peoples we came from.

In this Barnardo’s Home as in all Barnardo’s Homes, Church worship and Christian teachings were strictly observed and enforced. Each day constituted a daily diet of Protestant Christian prayer and hymn singing. We would sing hymns such as “Onward Christian Soldiers” that gave a sense that cleansing ourselves was somehow connected to warfare and involved others that were not clean in their beliefs if they did not stand behind the white ‘Cross of Jesus’. It gave an early introduction to the ‘Manichean delirium’ that the world was split into two [Fanon, 1963], that it was racializingly made up of others, that is to say ‘they’ and the ‘them’, who sat in a binary opposition to ‘us’. ‘We’ stood behind Jesus, ‘they’ did not. Jesus stood behind ‘us’, but did not stand behind ‘them’.

Frantz Fanon [1963] has likened the imposition of Christianity in colonial/colonizing contexts to that of the pesticide DDT [see, also Mazama, 2007 p. 49]. Speaking of the French politician Monsieur Meyer who [during France’s colonial occupation of Algeria] stated in the National Assembly of France that the [French] Republic should not allow Algerian people to become part of it as they would contaminate and prostituted it [Fanon, p.42], Fanon captured the racialization embedded in the statement in his assertion that [according to the colonial discourse embedded in Mayer’s body] “[a]ll ..[European]… values are irrevocably poisoned and diseased as soon as they are allowed in contact with the colonized race”. As Fanon goes onto to say,
[t]he customs of the colonized people, their traditions, their myths—above all, their myths—are the very sign of that poverty of spirit and of their constitutional depravity. That is why we must put the DDT which destroys parasites, the bearers of disease, on the same level as the Christian religion which wages war on embryonic heresies and instincts, and on evil as yet unborn. The recession of yellow fever and the advance of evangelization form part of the same balance sheet [p.42].

I had referred at the beginning of this study to my internalization as a child of what I called dog shit discourse, that is to say the enforced internalization of a Whitecentric discourse that equated non-whiteness with that of dirt and filth which the body could be contaminated with and made unclean. I had spoken of the violence and trauma associated with this as it related to my own sense of self and self negation and in speaking of this process I had pinpointed and implicated Barnardo’s as the initial institutionalized cause and source of my trauma which I had argued, emerged as a result of an enforced regime of Whitecentric notions of morality and respectability. But of all the varied racialized messages and signals that impacted themselves upon me in these contexts, Christianity
was the most salient. The Protestant, Christian religious Faith was the primary discursive weapon and tool for moral cleansing in the Home, a moral cleansing predicated on racialized evaluations of goodness as white.

Fanon [1963] states that “[t]he Church in the colonies is the White people’s Church, the foreigner’s Church. She does not call the native to God’s ways but to the ways of the white man, of the master, of the oppressor” [p.42]. Similarly as a process of internal colonialism organized through and within racialization as discourse, in our Home and in our so called Mother Country, we too were subjected to the same implantation. We too were told discursively in covert and overt forms that Jesus was white and that he was a ‘snow white lamb’ and that goodness therefore was embodied in whiteness. We sang songs with passages such as “Praise, my soul, the King of heaven, to his feet thy tribute bring, ransomed, healed, restored, forgiven, evermore his praises sing’. Other hymns that were sung by us, were hymns such as “Over the sea there are little brown children Fathers and mothers and babies dear. They do not know of the little Lord Jesus They do not know that God is near”. And still others that spoke of ‘blessed saints of snow white purity’ that stood in opposition to darkness which we gradually understood to be an element synonymous with sin. And we had to be delivered from evil [from this darkness] so that we could be brought into the light of the world. On a daily basis and at different points during the day we were subjected to a routinized ideological battering against darkness. An ideological battering that claimed ‘no darkness have we who in Jesus abide’ or spoke of ‘dwellers in darkness with sin blinded eyes. We were told that we lived in a world of darkness and therefore sin and evil which we had to be delivered from by ‘our father, who was in Heaven’. We were told that we had a deficit which Christianity could cure and where whiteness was associated with goodness and therefore respectability. The deficit for those classified as ‘coloured’ was our very corporeality, the skin on our bodies and the skin of our
parent[s] in our bodies which I/we were coerced into amputating from our individual and collective sense of self.

As Foucault [1988] has noted in his study of the ‘Birth of the Asylum’ and the history of insanity in sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century European Institutions of Correction, religion played a key role in correctional methods and in the ‘care and cure’ discourse and discursive practices of the so called ‘insane’. As Foucault makes clear, religion [specifically Christianity] operated as a ‘constant principal of coercion’ and of ‘rule’. There can be no doubt that one of the central components of ‘rule’ and coercion as it relates to religion is that of physical punishment as a means to instill discipline. This is evident in the numerous testimonies from survivors of Christian based child residential institutions who have spoken of the brutal, physical and sexual mistreatment they received at the hands of Christian monks and nuns [e.g. Aboriginal survivors of the Residential school system, the ‘Magdalene Sisters’ etc.]. Coercion in these contexts although brutal in its physical form, was however delivered insidiously through instilling the fear of God in the child. For example when it came to voicing our resistance to the correctional regime we spoke in whispers due to an internalized fear that God might punish us somehow for speaking out against those who ran the Home whom we had been forced into believing were close friends of Jesus and God and as a result had been appointed by them to rule over us.

Within a religious/cultural regime of violence such as this, children are imprisoned in a ‘perpetual state of anxiety’ which in and of itself represents a major pedagogical tool for their/our physical and moral confinement, constraint and segregation. Under these circumstances of confinement we did not need physical constraints placed upon us [note in the photograph of the Home there are no
bars on the windows, no grills] to control our bodies, we constrained ourselves. Religion, operated in our bodies like a panoptican in the sense that we policed ourselves.

**The Absent Presence of Race**

Years after my time in the Barnardo’s Home and the subsequent physical deprivation of homelessness and poverty that followed I began the psychic journey of refusing the amputation of my father within my body by allowing my mother’s stories of my father to enter my consciousness and to become part of my sense of identity and self. During this early period of moving towards voice and enunciation I would concentrate on certain places and surroundings in the North of England were we lived, places and surroundings that my father had been to in his time in England and during the time he and my mother were together. I imagined that his presence was still there even though his body was absent. When I stood sometimes on the platform of the railway station in Preston, Lancashire, I imagined that his body had stood in the same place waiting for the train to take him to London before he boarded a ship back to Trinidad and Tobago. I imagined the presence of his body was till present on red brick walls that he might have brushed up against, or in fish and chip shops that he might have entered on a Friday or Saturday night.

I imagined all of this because at times he did not appear to me to be real, he did not appear to me to exist and so I looked to find and see his leftover presence in my physical surroundings even though he was long gone. The absent presence of race and racism remained also despite Whitecentrism’s palimpsestic discursive attempt to disappear it. The historical racial schema could not be erased in that present period any more than it could be erased in the 1950’s period of my father’s arrival in Britain. It was for this reason that my father carried a jackknife under his armpit, ‘just in case’.
Referring to the Indigenous poet Jimmy Durham, Rinaldo Walcott explains how Durham’s analysis has focused on the ‘invisibility of American Indians’ in a form that is “not to plead a case for more visibility but to attempt a tentative investigation into the ramifications of the ‘presence’ of the absent/absented Indian body’ in American discourse” [Walcott, 1995 p.149]. Walcott goes on to explain that in this context, ‘absent presence works’ through the presence of “place names, names of sporting teams, commodities and other ‘everyday’ American artifacts that carry Indian names or other affiliations but that do not immediately manifest themselves as ‘Indian’ and in most cases probably would not manifest themselves as ‘Indian’ to those who are not ‘Indian’”, [p. 149].

Taking up the forms through which educational systems in North America are ostensibly “constituted principally to both exclude and restrict blackness”. Walcott takes up the saliency [and contingency] of race as an absent presence further in relation to Black peoples in his analysis of Toni Morrison’s *Playing in the Dark*. As Walcott argues Morrison’s evoking of absent presence works to reveal that “America [as a white supremacist entity] is only intelligible when blackness is recognized as the matter or source that makes whiteness possible” [p.148]. He goes onto argue further that Morrison’s central premise is that “blackness, has to be suppressed [absented, erased], rendered abnormal and silenced in order for white hegemony to be seen as a site of normalcy” [p. 148]. It is in the contexts of so called ‘classic American’ literary texts Walcott argues, that Morrison seeks through an interrogative re-reading of such texts to locate the “lurking blackness [that] makes these texts intelligible as specifically [read white] American” [p.148]. And so although Blackness is erased and removed, the presence of that removal is still present: It is still present as an absented presence.
Additionally, Stuart Hall, speaking of British sociopolitical contexts argues that race as an absented presence is embedded deep in the dominant [White] imaginary. Hall traces this embedded and interlocked presence back to Queen Elizabeth 1st proclamation in the 1500’s in which she stated that all ‘blackamoors’ throughout England be expelled from England due to their alleged drain on the nation’s resources. This would be echoed by the racist ‘swamping’ discourse of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980’s and that of Labour government of the 21st century. As Hall rightly argues the ‘projection of internal [and I would argue also internalized] problems [psychic and material] onto an “external presence” [e.g. race as colour] “has a long historical” lineage. As Proctor [2004] explains Hall’s reference to Elizabeth 1st Proclamation for a racial expulsion and removal from the space of Britishness and Englishness “signals the long presence of blacks in Britain [as a result of the slave trade] is a testimony to the social fact that race [as colour, as non-whiteness] far from being an ‘external’ presence or ‘problem’ “is an internal feature constitutive of Britishness” of Englishness. As Hall goes on to argue, race as colour “is in the suger you stir, it is in the sinews of the famous British ‘sweet tooth’, it is in the tea leaves at the bottom of the next “British cuppa”, thus it is inside you. [p.82]. Hall conceptualizes the absented presence of race as an exploited, violated, raped and murdered presence whose entangled presence is negated in the imagined and materially constructed cultural and racial assertions of Englishness and Britishness. The absent presence of race is not only entangled in discourse but so too is the contingent exploitative, dehumanizing, homicidal/genocidal effects of the racialized asymmetrical power relations that make race matter.

Entangled within the racializing discursive language mediated through the white supremacist Christian hymns and prayers that we as children were forced to digest in the Barnardo’s Home, lay/lies the absent [and negated] presence or trace of homicidal/genocidal violence. Roxanna
Dunbar-Ortiz [2003] writing about the emergence of white supremacy and Imperialism/capitalism explains that the connections between whiteness and imperialistic racist/racializing doctrines were underpinned and fired by the Christian religious discourses of whiteness as purity. The evangelical mission palimpsestically and schematically traced over the cultural ways of knowing of non-Christian and non-European peoples in a Mission dedicated to washing the so called dark sins away of colonized peoples in the cleansed [white] blood of the Lamb of Christ. Here in this process of Imperial/colonial palimpsest is entangled the absent presence of race and its contingent trace of murder and genocide: As Dunbar-Ortiz points out, embedded in the Christian discourse of whiteness as moral supremacy and purity is the *law of limpieza de sangre*, a law that emerges out of the Christian Crusader wars to eradicate the cultural ways of knowing of Islam and of Africa. As Dunbar-Ortiz argues, the Christian Crusades gave rise to the emergence of the ‘law of limpieza de sangre’ or the law of ‘cleanliness of blood’ which the Spanish Inquisitions [of the 11th and 1400s] were ‘mandated to investigate and determine’, As a result it was the Christian Crusader wars [e.g. ‘the Castilian conquest of the Iberian Peninsula and the expulsion ‘of Jewish and Muslims peoples] which ‘created the seed ideology and institutions for modern colonialism with its necessary tools—racist ideology and [its] justification for genocide’.

It is within and from these racialized/war/expulsion contexts on what is now established as the European [read White] country of Spain that the racializing discourse of ‘cleanliness of blood’ [*limpieza de sangre*] begins to emerge in the Christian faith. As Dunbar-Ortiz notes, it was the Vatican that produced ‘the original institution of the Inquisition in 1179 for routing out Christian heretics, the original mandate being free of racialization. However, the 1400s in Spain saw increasing Inquisition investigations of *conversos*, that is, Christian converted Jews, and of *moriscos*, Christian converted Muslims. Jews and Muslims who refused to convert were finally
deported *en masse* from the Iberian Peninsula at the end of the fifteenth century’ [Dunbar-Ortiz, 2003]. The underpinnings of the Inquisition investigations became predicated on the ‘concept of biological race based on blood’. As Dunbar-Ortiz argues the “concept of biological race based on ‘blood’ is not known to have existed as law or [as a] taboo in Christian Europe or anywhere else in the world” prior to this point. Pinpointing the significance of this emerging process of racialization as it relates to the dehumanization of variegated sites of social difference in wider historical socio-psychological contexts Dunbar-Ortiz writes, 

[As] scapegoating and suspicion of *conversos* and *moriscos* intensified in Christian Spain, the doctrine of *limpieza de sangre*, “purity of blood,” was popularized and had the effect of granting psychological, and increasingly legal, privileges to “Old Christians” thereby obscuring the class differences between the poor and the rich, *i.e.* between the landed aristocracy and the land-poor peasants and shepherds….What we witness in late fifteenth and early sixteenth century Spain is the first of instance of class leveling based on imagined biological racial differences, indeed the origin [of] white supremacy, the necessary ideology of colonial projects in America and Africa. We see here the beginnings of the “thousand year Reich” of settler capitalism/colonialism, and its characteristic tug of war over the hearts and minds of the majority of the settlers—the yeomanry, and later the “white” working classes.

Thus, while the discourse of racialization with its focus on white supremacy, surveils and marks for marginality and amputation those bodies and knowledges whose inferiorization and contaminatory potential it imagines as residing in the corporeal, the epidermal, the cultural, the linguistic etc, it also looks to police an imagined set of hidden biologically determined contaminants [Anderson, 1983] that may infiltrate a sense of self, derived from blood based notions of purity, morality and respectability. Those millions whose ascribed inferiority was imagined as being constituted by visible physical markers [skin colour+tone etc], were subjected to immediate expulsion, rape, homicide and/or genocide, for as Dunbar-Ortiz [2003] explains, “The law of limpieza de sangre represented the [discursive] genocidal cargo on the 1492 voyage of Christopher Columbus, sailing
under the flag of Spain”. This genocide perpetrated at the end of the 15th century by the Spanish against the Aboriginal peoples of what is now the Caribbean, was documented by the Franciscan priest Las Casas in his *Short History of the destruction of the Indies* [1992].

As Las Casa writes, ‘[t]hey slaughtered anyone and everyone in their path, on occasion running through a mother with her baby with a single thrust of their swords. They spared no one, erecting especially wide gibbets on which they could string their victims up with their feet just off the ground and then burn them alive thirteen at a time’, [p.15]. Las Casas describes the mass murder inflicted upon the Tainos, Siboney, Arawak and those of my ancestors the Carib peoples by the Spanish as a kind of lactificatory [Fanon, 1952] gorging process [Itwaru, 2009] as if the discursive cargo of racialization demanded [for its sense of self knowing and equilibrium] a prostheticizing consumption of Aboriginal bodies that could only be achieved through torture, rape and genocide. Moreover, formulated within the discursive cargo of racialization, the consumption of the ‘unclean’ as the reviled and negated opposite of white as purity encompassed a myriad of epistemological and cultural ‘deviancies’”. For example, as heterosexuality was naturalized as a marker of inner biological cleanliness, this was done so in direct binary opposition to so called homosexuality. As a result the diverse, complex and fluid sexual and gendered expressions and knowledges of Aboriginal peoples such as those embodied by 2 spirited peoples [Feinberg, 1996] were amongst the first to be subjected to homicidal violence.

The discursive cargo [or conceptual framework] of racialization which fueled limpieza de sangre wove and traced its way into Christianity in its Protestant form and in doing so organized the emergence of England as a colonizing homicidal/genocidal force. As Ortiz explains:
England emerged as an overseas colonial power a century later than the Spanish, and absorbed aspects of the Spanish [racialized] caste system into its colonialist rationalizations, particularly regarding African slavery. However, Puritanism and Calvinist Protestantism uniquely refined white supremacy as a political/religious ideology (a Covenant with God) requiring the shedding of blood for purification—blood must be white—a justification for the greed and profits which fueled modern colonialism, but which took on a life of its own as ideology. The rationalization ideology of the Ulster-Scots Calvinists who made up many of the settler/colonizers of Northern Ireland and (illegally) of the western lands over the Appalachian/Alleghany spine of English North American forms the basis of the definition of whiteness in the United States' origin story. This origin story tells of pilgrim/settlers doing God's will and forging into the promisedland, killing the heathen (first the Irish, then the Native Americans). Thereby, the sacrifice and blood shed is perceived as proof of the sanctity and purity of the nation itself. All the descendants of those who made such sacrifices are the true inheritors of the land.

Underpinned by racialization, Protestantism and Christianity as a space of philosophy and embodiment discursively stated in the Barnardo’s Home that disease, dirt, moral uncleanness and immoral behaviour was not simply on the outside of our bodies but on the inside. It was in our bodies, in our very biological make-up. Christianity then was the tool used to disinfect and thus ‘save’ and ‘rescue’ us from our immoral state of being. But as physical cleanliness of the internal body correlated with the cleanliness of the external body in the Barnardo’s Liverpool Home I was not only subjected to a discursive moral cleaning relentless enforced through an indoctrinatory regimen of Christianity I was also subjected to a physical assault on a daily basis whereby my body would be scrubbed and scrubbed as if, as Fanon [1963] suggests the harder the ‘coloured’ body is scrubbed on the outside the cleaner [and thus more respectable] the inside will be. This scrubbing process was, as with everything in the Home, ritualistic and routine. The ritual went this way. I would be forced to stand in the bath before bedtime. The bath however was never full. In fact it barely held more than a few inches of water. The water was always steaming hot, as hot as my body could stand it. I was never allowed to sit down in the bath or lie in the bath, instead I was always forced to stand naked before the care nurse or ‘Aunties’ as we were forced to call them. The Aunties were always dressed in sterile, starched uniforms. The Aunty would kneel down with her
face at the level of my penis and genitals. She would then rub and scrub them hard. The rest of my body was always left untouched. After this process I was ordered to wash my face at a sink and then clean my teeth with a tin of spearmint flavoured toothpaste.

There was always a deep feeling that something was wrong with this process despite the fact that it became part of the normalized routine of the new asylum. When my mother finally managed to regain custody of me [that is to say when she finally managed to rescue me], I remember her asking me about the dirt on my body. I had dirt caked in my belly button and dirt caked on my ankle bones. The dirt on my ankle bones was embedded deep in the pores of my skin and had been a part of my body for so long that I had become used to it and thought that it was a natural part of my skin, like a birth mark. I remember saying to my mother ‘isn’t it supposed to be there’? She gave out a noise of exasperation and disgust [not at me but at Barnardo’s] and eventually removed the dirt by rubbing the sandpaper edge of a matchbox against it.

When I look further at the photograph of the Home my attention is drawn to the bottom windows just left of the front porch entrance on the far right. This was where I would sit waiting for my mother’s visit. Parents and families where allowed to visit on Sundays, and so for many of us, those who were lucky enough to have people in our lives who could visit us, Sunday [the visiting day] was the day that we all looked forward to. All week I looked forward to Sunday when my mother would come, when she was allowed to take me out into the local parks away from the Home and when we could communicate outside of the rules, regulations and surveillances of the Home. Most of all, given that we ‘Home children’ were starved of love day in and day out I looked forward to having my mother’s arms around me, hugging me. No matter how traumatic the week was for me, no matter how mentally and physically abusive it was, the one thing that kept me
together emotionally, psychologically and spiritually, was the knowing that I would see my mother [who would sometimes also bring my sister with her] coming up that driveway on Sunday afternoon.

When I sat at the window however, looking out at the world it was not only my mother that I was looking for, I was also looking for rain. The supervisors of the Home had devised a mode of correctional treatment that seemed to be exclusive to me and exclusive for my own personal re-education. While the families and or parents of the other children were allowed to come into the Home to visit them and to be with them on Sundays if it rained, my mother was not. We were told that this was a rule but given that I could plainly see that this rule did not apply to my friends I would fly into a rage and scream, throwing furniture and banging desks. For this I would be punished. Not physically that I can recall but by and through silence. No child, no friend could speak to me or associate with me or have anything to do to me. My punishment was complete isolation.

In the new asylum I was shunned in to a wall-less solitary confinement. Waiting for the week to reach Sunday then was a torturous time, full of anxiety and ambiguity. I wanted desperately for Sunday to come but I also attempted to police my emotions so that if it rained the Home could not hurt or wound either myself or my mother [which to my mind was what they wished to do]. On the Sunday afternoons then before the time of 2:00pm that was set for parents to visit and after the indoctrinatory session of inner and outer moral cleanliness at Sunday Mass and Sunday school at the local Church I would sit at the window looking only at the sky, watching the clouds, watching for rain. And when it did rain, it always seemed as if it started gradually. It always seemed as if it started just at the time that I was sitting at the window, first slowly with a few little
slashes of rain on the glass of the window, and then a few heavier drops until the full downpour. Not that it mattered. Even a few drops would be enough of an excuse for the Home to use in order to prevent my mother from seeing me. On those days then I would sit at the window, waiting for my mother to come up the driveway. She would see me at the window my face pressed against it, wave at me with a look of barely concealed pain and then disappear in the front entrance. A few minutes would pass in silence and then my mother would reappear again, walking down the driveway and out of the front gate without turning her head. And after my resulting expression of rage subsided, I would then once again try to prepare myself for emotional survival over the next coming seven days.

Johal [2005] speaks about the ways in which dominant racializing discourse constructs the rage emanating from the marginalized as a disorder and as a sign of a pathologized mental condition. Internalized in this way the oppressed look then to stifle their/our anger and rage and therefore negate and amputate what is a necessary and legitimate response to conditions of injustice and a necessary means through which the oppressed can [and must] ‘untie...[their/our]...tongues’. As Johal explains, in these contexts if our rage is suppressed and silenced within ourselves it must be directed elsewhere and more often than not it is directed at ourselves, at our own communities, and at those we love. Hence my rage was directed at my mother for not standing up to the authorities on those rainy Sunday days, or at least this was how I perceived things. It took a while before I understood that my mother had to be very careful not to display any action that would be used against her by the Home, its authorities, and the local and state authorities, action that would allow them to deny her access to me and deny her any claims to regain custody of me.
Foucault [1995] has noted of the 18th century ‘houses’ and ‘Hospitals’ of correction that sought to isolate and cure transgressive [and] in the case of children, potentially transgressive individuals of ‘madness’ and/or other State designated and constructed classifications of ‘social defects’ [p.48], that these institutions [as with the new asylums of the 20th century including mainstream schooling] were actually (re)productive of mental illness, torment and confusion and inner terror. When I had first looked at the photograph of the Home in the hotel room with the representative of the Barnardo’s After Care team watching over me I could not remember which floor my sleeping dormitory was on but then looking at it closely and feeling the trace of the same fear for Barnardo’s coming into my body again I knew it had to be on the top floor. My floor had to have been on the top because there were no more stairs going up and stairs were an important part of my experience there. I knew also that our dormitory did not have another room to the right. It was at the top corner of the building so there in the top right hand window was where I slept along with many other boys of my age.

Looking at the photograph that first time I could hear [and still can hear] the frightened cries of the children, not only from our dormitory but from the dorm on the left and the ones below. Cries, screams, moans and whimpering were an every night occurrence but the Aunties in their disinfected bleached uniforms would not move to comfort any of us. Instead they simply sat at the doorways of the dormitories like sentries on guard. Looking at the photograph then and now I can also hear the squeaking sounds of the rubber urine-proof sheeting that was given to children such as myself who wet their beds, or who suffered from ‘enuresis nuersis’ as they [the Home authorities] called it. But of all the screams that I hear on looking at the photograph of the Home, [and particularly looking at that top window] my own screams are the loudest in my head.
In my time in the Home there must have been nights when I slept without breaking into an uncontrollable screaming fit, but if this is the case they do not stand out enough in my memory to be of any psychological significance. As I have stated my sense was that all of us [we children that is] screamed and moaned and/or cried in the night [and every night]. My screaming though took on a different turn to the other children in my dormitory although it was similar to the other children’s’ torments in terms of its relentlessness [even as the Beatles were singing about heterosexual teenage romantic angst down the road in the Cavern in the Liverpool town center]. These uncontrollable screaming fits began with a terrifying dream. It was always the same dream. I would be running terrified trying to escape a predator that was coming for me. The predator was not human though. It appeared as a large white sticky ball that chased me cutting off all of my escape routes. To touch it was like touching a mass of sticky needles that would entire my entire body but I could feel the needle pain running through my body even if it did not touch me. It was as if it was inside my body as well as without. And it seemed that just thinking this massive white sticky predatory thing gave me pain and a sense of terror. In trying to escape it though I would always end up in the same position, trapped in a small hole in which the ball would follow and subsequently smother me.

This did not set my screaming off though even though my claustrophobia made me terrified of small enclosed spaces, even lifts [elevators]. What triggered my screaming was the coming out of my sleep–walking routine that followed this dream. Once the sticky white ball had me trapped in the hole this was the point where I would rise from the bed asleep still dreaming with my eyes open. With my white teddy bear in my arms [I was given the choice by Barnardo’s between a white teddy bear and a ‘golliwog’ the Sambo minstrelsy doll, I chose the teddy bear] I rose from my bed and walked to the landing. Always on the landing at the entrance to the dormitory door sat
a Home Auntie, the same Home Aunty who rubbed and scrubbed me. She never touched me this time as I walked past her. She never laid her hands on me. She never spoke to me or prevented me from moving or doing what I wanted to do or rather what my body compelled me to do.

The stairs were high and they had banisters. These banisters sometime beckoned us to slide down them but of course this was against all rules. But in my sleep-walking with my teddy in my arms I would hitch one pajamed leg over the banister in full view of the Aunty and slide down. I would do this all the way down each landing of the Home until I reached the bottom. And it was only when I got to the very bottom that I seemed to regain consciousness. I had been awake. I could see everything but I was not consciously awake. It was coming to the bottom that triggered my awareness and it was at this point that I broke into a fit of uncontrollable screaming which would leave me shaking and traumatized for many hours: This constituted the routine of night-time in the Home for me. I see now that I felt consciously and unconsciously a sense that I was persistently being pursued by a discourse of whitecentrism [with all its entanglements of genocide] that was constantly looking to penetrate my body for the presence of sin. I see and feel now the connections with whiteness as a ‘terrorizing’ [hooks, 1990] palimpsestic/schema which gave rise to the psychic trauma that my body was subjected to. I see now the terrorizing psychic effects on my child body of a regime that is systematically constitutive of ‘routines of normalization’[Corrigan, 1990], routines of normalization predicated on the amputation and negation of imagined contaminants and deviancies and a regime that was/is productive of spiritual and psychic wounds.

The sleepwalking experience was not something that I told my mother about at the time. Perhaps I did not want to worry her; perhaps I could not fully understand what was happening to me. All I wanted to do when she arrived [when it was not raining] was to go out with her. For half an
afternoon at least I was free [to some extent] from the violence of the Home and I was able to take shelter in the real home of my mother’s loving presence. The Home authorities allowed her to take me anywhere that she chose on that one clear Sunday afternoon but distance was always constrained by time and we could not waste even a second of it by traveling too far so we would go to the local parks in the Home’s Liverpool, Toxteth district. We would visit Princess Park with its big well groomed grass spaces and its even bigger [or so it seemed at the time] boating lake where people would sail huge model yachts. From there we would make a 5 minute walk to Sefton Park a much bigger park where you could buy ice-cream, feed the ducks or watch the peacocks in the aviary.

On the surface and from a dominant discursive standpoint it might have appeared as if the landscape was a race-less space but the saliency of race as an absent presence was everywhere. As Michael Omi and Howard Winant [1993, p.5] argue, [see also Dei, 1999, et al] the saliency of race which [in its conceptual discursive and material expression as a social construct] can ‘develop over half a millennium or more of diffusion [or enforcement] as a fundamental principle of social organization and identity formation’ [p.5]. Race and racism therefore, as an object of discourse in the Foucauldian [Foucault, 1972, p.117] fragmentary sense was embedded in history, groups of statements, ideas, signs, signifying practices, and in the materiality of the everyday world not as a dead relic of a historical moment that has since past but as a living sociohistorical knowledge producing process entangled in and through the entire physical social space of Liverpool which/was is entirely colonial and racialized.

The wealth that built the parks and houses for example were all a product of systematic racial violence manifested first in the slave trade [Liverpool being the most important port in England for
the British slave trade] and then through the neoslavery of Imperialism and colonialism. The facades of the large Victorian houses and the ornate affluence of the parks that reflected ‘back [historically] the powerful and the [racialized] legitimacy of the powerful’ [Corrigan, 1990] never spoke of this of course. These facades remained silent, apolitical, a racial and neutral [like the Britished nationed-state as a whole] as if the wealth that produced them arose out of a ‘natural’ God given consequence of hard Protestant Christian graft and White upper-middle class British entrepreneurial endeavor. But like Edward Said’s [1994, p.69-70] observations of Jane Austin’s ‘Mansfield Park’, the Antiguan slave plantation of Thomas Bertram and it’s brutally exploitative existence is invisible, negated but nevertheless present and embedded as congealed human chattel labour in the ‘poise and the beauty’ of Mansfield Park. It is worth remembering that by the end of the 18th century alone a million slaves in the ‘British Caribbean’ constituted 3 million hours of free labour per year in the production of sugar, coffee and cotton for the British economy, [Martin, 1999, p.60]. Similarly, the same presence of institutionalized rape, labour exploitation and racialized violence that was/is congealed within the bricks, mortar, and cultural/racial expression of the Home’s physical presence and its surrounding Toxteth geography remained [and remains] invisible, negated/amputated and/or suppressed in the collective, institutionalized memory and psyche of the dominant social forces and formations which undergird the hegemonic national [British] sense of its collective self and identity.

An example of the ways in which this process of negation/amputation interpolates in the reproduction of dominant thought but fails to erase the absent presence of race and its trace of homicide/genocide is the famous Beatles song ‘Penny Lane’. Both Paul McCartney and John Lennon who wrote the song describe Penny Lane as a Liverpool street that ‘is in my ears and in my eyes’ but what is both negated/amputated and simultaneously entangled [in our ears and in our
eyes] in the pop song [given that the street is named after John Penny an 18th century slave trader] is the presence of mass rape, torture and murder. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak [1999] writes, although ‘the relationship between the European discursive production and the axiomatics of imperialism may change ‘the latter continues to play the role of making the discursive mainstream appear clean…[while at the same time continuing]…to make itself appear as the only negotiable way [p.4]. In Sefton Park, the embodiment of this cleansing, negating/amputating, palimpsestic, homicidal/genocidal process was the ‘Palm House’.

![Plate 7. The Palm House, Sefton Park, Liverpool](image)

My mother and I gravitated to the Palm House always on those Sunday visiting afternoons. Inside it’s racial ‘paradisiacal fantasy’ [Wahab, 2004] and imperial consumption of flora netted, collected and stolen on expeditions to exoticized, orientalized places, promised warmth and shelter to us. The Palm House was a huge Victorian white glass dome smelling of hot house plants that steamed in rain forest smells or at least what we [my mother and myself ] imagined a rain forest smell to be. The Palm House made you experience a sense of warmth and of comfort, but it was a comfort full
of tension and ambiguity. It was an uneasy insecure comfort that made you feel in some form that the violating ordering, classifying, and categorizing regime that controlled our lives on the outside of its glass walls were still present on the inside.

Thinking back on the Palm House now I am reminded of Arundhati Roy’s description of the ‘History House’ in her novel *God of Small Things* [1997]. Roy’s History House is a colonial relic of a building constitutive of the absent presence of dead imperial master ancestors. It is not a place for the colonized or the subjugated. As Roy’s character Chacko states “we can’t go in…because we’ve been locked out, and when we look in through the windows, all we see are shadows. And when we try and listen, all we hear is a whispering. And we cannot understand the whispering because our minds have been invaded by a war. A war that captures dream, and re-dreams them. A war that has made us adore our conquerors and despise ourselves” [p.52]. As Chacko goes onto say, in the History House ‘[w]e’re Prisoners of War… [o]ur dreams have been doctored. We belong nowhere. We sail unanchored on troubled seas. We may never be allowed ashore. Our sorrows will never be sad enough. Our joys never happy enough, Our dreams never big enough. Our lives never important enough” [p.52].

The Palm House was like this. As an imperialistic racial/racializing discourse mapped and remapped in the White working class and British bourgeois imaginary [Razack, 2002, p.5] it represented all of this and more, because for those to whom it had subjugated and constructed as alien and less than, it did not simply tell us to stay out, it seduced us to go in. It needed us to go in. For the ‘war’ to penetrate and regenerate itself in our psyche we had to be included in the British social order as excluded. It derived its penetrative and mystifyingly contradictive discursive power from this ambiguous splitting of our bodies which simultaneously worked to manipulate,
destabilize, wound and injure our spirits [Wing, 2003] and our subjectivities by creating/producing within our psyches the discursive incendiary that we were “[a]lmost the same but not quite white” or right [Bhaba, 2003 p.89] and therefore not quite [and never would be] respectable.

As Homi K. Bhaba argues however, bodies such as these/ours also represent in their ‘splitting’ an embodiment of resistance and threat, that is to say they/we/our bodies could confuse [and in doing so resist] the “metaphoric and metonymic axes of the [hegemonic] cultural production of meaning” [p.90]. Which in its lactificatory compulsion to regulate, pathologize, and invest with mental illness any threat to its dominance was forced to seek out, make visible, and destroy the presence and/or emergence of any sign or semblance of a critical politically conscious self.

And so as a mirror of the nation-state of Britain the Palm House made you feel that even when you were inside it you were still outside, [included as excluded and/or removed] that you were still being persecuted by the outside, represented by discursive and material practices of humiliation, alienation and dis-belonging. All of this seemed to hang in the hot air of the colonial conservatory with its green bananas, and ‘exotic’ fauna that was guarded just outside by the statues of Karl Linneaus, Christopher Columbus, and Walter Raleigh, some of the key carriers of the ‘discursive cargo’ that spiritually and physically murdered the people whose indignity was/is congealed in every petal, leaf and root. Of course my mother and I did not see these violent and violated absent presences and neither did we see our racialized implicatedness and congealment in the bricks and mortar of Toxteth Liverpool [and the whole of Britain for that matter], but we did see ourselves as subjects of regulation and control. As with the regulation of our time on those Sunday visiting days our entire lives were subject to constant surveillance, regulation and conditioning by the controlling authorities, and what Amina Mama [1995] in her critique of colonial psychiatric practice and
discourse has called ‘psychologies of control’, a process in which institutionalized administrative, authoritative ‘forms and contexts’ of moral medicalized regulation sought to determine, police and silence our every utterances, our every displays of gesture, indication and action [Corrigan, 1990 p.109].

We, my mother and myself, did not know at the time [that is to say in these Palm-House-Barnardo’s-Home days] of the ways in which we two seemingly insignificant bodies represented a historical and contemporary subversive threat to the dominant formation of the British nation-state as a whole. But we did know [my mother of course more than I] that we were under constant surveillance and that in some way this had to do with who we were, that is to say poor, homeless, and a single white mother carrying a ‘coloured’ child born ‘out of wedlock’. What we did not and could not know [because we did not have the conceptual tools] was to connect this process to a broader, wider politics of hegemonic nation-state formation and collective identity.

We did not have for example, the conceptual tools and thus a methodology of self that would allow us to follow June Jordan’s [1980] enunciative pathway of self-reclamation, a pathway and methodology of self that links violence against women [that is to say the forms of physical and psychological violence that men [not my father] had subjected my mother to prior to my birth] with that of a broader politics which implicates violence against women as a systemic form of violation that is inextricably connected to nation-state formation and the maintenance of a particular social order premised on exploitation, domination and subjugation in which difference and its embodiment, matter. We at that point did not have the conceptual tools to ask the question ‘who the hell set it up like that’ that Jordan asks [which implies ‘why’ and for what political purpose?],
but we did have an experiential sense [as previously mentioned] of who the ‘who’ were and what they damn well looked like.

Our understanding of the apparatus of power that was at work on our bodies was to take up the ‘who the hell set things up like ‘this, in the moment, in small acts of survival. On the Sunday-visiting-hot-house days, acts of survival or ‘splitting’ as resistance were performed and nurtured in the communicative intimacy of love between ourselves as mother and child and the shutting out through the vehicle of anger and rage [Johal, 2005] of those we marked and othered as the ‘who’.

As Dunbar-Ortiz [2003] reveals, the discourse that underpins the colonial tools of racist ideology, genocide and its justification, is that of racialization with its imagined sense of blood purity and the expulsion/negation and amputation of the imagined contaminatory effects of blood impurity and impurities from those marked as biologically deviant and inferior. It is from this discursive and material space that the biologization of social difference with its notions of racial/blood cleanliness, respectability and the hierarchicalization of whiteness that the ‘discursive cargo’ or ‘seed ideology’ [Dunbar-Ortiz, 2003] of racialization becomes systematized in the British social system from the late 19th century onwards and for most of the 20th century by the Eugenics movement. As Dunbar-Ortiz has suggested discourses of racialization with their primary focus on white supremacy look to surveil and mark for marginality and amputation not only those bodies and knowledges whose inferiorization and contaminatory biological potential it perceives as residing in the visible corporeal, the visible epidermal, the visible cultural, and/or the visible linguistic, it also looks to police an imagined set of hidden biologically determined contaminants [Anderson, 1983] that may infiltrate an imagined collective national sense of self derived from blood based notions of purity, morality and respectability.
Eugenicization as discourse, practice and mode of classifying thought facilitated this in British sociopolitical contexts in a form resonant with Foucault’s notion of what he calls biopower [1990, 1997], that is to say a discursive and material apparatus of State governance and authority in which the ‘workings of the State…is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race [as the central tool though which]…to exercise its sovereign power’ [Giroux, 2006 p.51]. It is through this biologizing process with its obsession with biological re-production that multiple spaces of social difference [e.g. race, class, disability, gender and sexuality] are represented in British contexts as the immoral ‘they, ‘them ‘or ‘type’ that must be rooted out, classified and isolated. Importantly for this power structure any children of those classified and marked in this way must be removed from what was/is imagined by the biopolitical classifying mind as a deviant influence.

Through this process there emerges the foundation and catalyst for the systematization of a hegemonic social order, comprised of an internal/internalized whitecentricized coloniality that is underpinned and organized by/through a reconfigured process of racialization. In 20th century British nation-state contexts this new reified form of racialization as a discursive cargo and ‘seed ideology’ with its congealed trace of homicide/genocide would concentrate an internal sociopolitical/religious focus specifically on bodies such as those of myself and my mother; and in the 1980’s its violating homicidal component of prostheticization as it relates to race would be reflected back onto the racially marked inhabitants of Toxteth Liverpool in the form of police brutality, a brutality that would be challenged, confronted and resisted.
Let me push on with this further by analyzing more of the discursive ‘data’ of internal/internalized coloniality and racialization that is/was palimpsestically written onto the bodies of my mother and I by Barnardo’s regime and the various local and state governing agencies of authority and control. The following item is a further document from my ‘case’ file. It is a document that reveals some personal details of the two of us at the time of my imminent incarceration in 1962. The document as with the entire file consecrates in ‘truth’ a set of knowledges about us that are produced and reroduced within the varied ‘regimes of truth’ that underpin the social relations of power within the nation-state of Britain. There is however a discursive intertextuality about this process given that the varied individual case workers who contributed to the file’s contents relied upon each other’s collected knowledge about us as the primary method for the file’s construction and thus the primary means of constructing our bodies [and in particularly myself] as a ‘case’.

Plate 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Stanley Wood</th>
<th>Admitted: 18.9.62</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born: 25.7.56 at Queens Park Hospital, Blackburn.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptised: C.B. in St. Mary’s Chapel, Salisbury by W. Midlton, 12.10.56.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Religion: C.B.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeable C.B.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last continuous six months address: 26, Club Street, Barnbor Bridge, Preston.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last School attended: Walton-lo-alo Barnbor Bridge Methodist.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother to pay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>when in work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicant: Miss K. Dunn, Superintendent, Parkinson House, 68, West Cliff, Preston.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mother: Joan Wood (35) unemployed. N.A.B. allowance; health fairly good; character good, morally; saw 9s. 9d. p.w.; electricity and gas 11s. p.w.; rent 15s. p.w., 26, Club Street, Barnbor Bridge, Preston. Father (Potato): Stanley Doyle (35) West Indian; engineer; health good; whorabouls not known. Mother’s husband: Dunn, Married mother at Wakefield Register Office 21.3.46; divorced; no other information given. Half-brother: (born about 1948) adopted. Half-sister: Joyce Waterfield (15) Grammar School pupil; adopted by maternal grandparents; with grandfather. Grandfather: George Smith Waterfield (62) part time roadman; 7, West Street, Barnbor Bridge, Preston.

Half-Caste Child – West Indian.

The mother is an attractive looking woman, but is of low grade.
Importantly this collected knowledge along with the observations made by the caseworkers, are/were grounded in [and determined by] the discursive cargo of racialization and internal/internalized coloniality that is/was manifested in a eugenization of thought and practice which is fundamental to Benedict Anderson’s [1983] notion of the ‘classifying mind’. Thus, here above [in this document] it is a eugenicizing ‘classifying mind’ [as an embodied discourse] which documents and records my mother’s material assets and conditions as an inventory of her character. The classifying mind records that she is unemployed and living on a National Assistance Allowance [N.A.B]. Her physical health is ‘fairly good’. For what in other documents is referred to as a ‘condemned cottage’, she pays 9 shillings and 9 pence for coal. She pays 15 shillings in rent. She pays 11 shillings for electricity and gas. No comment is made by the classifying mind regarding these monetary outgoings which constitute [according to other documents] roughly three quarters of her allowance and therefore represent a condition of utmost poverty. Her character [according to the embodied discourse that surveils her/us] is recorded however. It is recorded as ‘weak morally’. My father and his name [Stanley Doyle] is also mentioned but he is designated as ‘putative’. He is therefore officially classified as the ‘supposed’ father.

Bonita Lawrence [2004] writes about the ways in which processes of classification such as these do not simply work to categorized but rather they determine and reproduce processes of thought and thinking. In this context the designation of ‘putative’ is an imagined evaluative statement. It states discursively [and is (re)produced in the classifying mind’s imagination as such] that my mother’s word regarding whom my father is cannot be trusted. It states that this woman is sexually promiscuous, ‘weak morally’ and that she gives birth to so many ‘illegitimate’ [out of wedlock] children with so many different fathers that ‘we’ [as a regime of moral respectability and authority]
cannot trust her to know who the father is. It is therefore a gendered, sexualized coded marker and designation that makes her imagined and ascribed sexual deviancy and transgressiveness visible.

The document identifies what is claimed to be our ‘last consecutive six month address. As mentioned the address of 26 Club Street is described in other documents as a ‘condemned cottage’. The address itself, the place of shelter, and the conditions of destitution that constituted the shelter become part of an inventory which reproduces the Barnardo’s missionary/saving discourse that is referred to in chapter one. In addition to my mother’s morally weak character [a designation that would serve as a justification for my removal from her care] there is the congealment of race represented in my designation of ‘Half Caste Child - West Indian, a representation that again marks the reproduction of a racializing/racist discourse which [as a discursive cargo] is congealed in the thought processes of individual bodies in such a way as to move and pass through bodies from one generation to the next. There are also secrets here. The ‘half’ –brother’ mentioned here was unknown to me prior to my accessing of this file and his removal from my mother is indicative of a wider much more systemic process of social disintegration that forced the removal of children from mothers that the state considered to be immoral. I will expand upon this later

The address of 26 Club Street, Bamber Bridge, Preston [Lancashire] that is recorded represents the street where I had made what my sister has always referred to as ‘Stan’s Last Stand’. I had known for some time that Barnardo’s were coming for me [the case file and ‘data’ that I am confronting here is comprised of 2 attempts on the part of Barnardo’s to admit me] and so when my admittance in the institution was finally arranged it is not in my recollection that it was a surprise but rather that it was shock. It was a shock to come to the realization that there were people and things out there that had the absolute power to do this that had the power to remove you from the care of your
mother and to take complete control over you. I had practiced resistance to what I considered to be wrongful and hypocritical treatment on multiple levels up until this point.

For example on one of the occasions when I was taken to a case worker’s office to be interviewed I recall being left to sit alone in a room for a while. The room was furnished with dark wooded polished chairs and a large dark wooded table. My mode of resistance here was a practice that I had performed regularly and therefore had perfected. Alone, I picked my nose and dragged out the squiggliest succulent boggy and wiped it under the base of the table. Once the adults came back I smiled outwardly and inwardly [at the case worker] knowing that the boggy was there and knowing that they did not know it was there.

Small acts of resistance like this were important I realized many years later because they kept me from feeling that I was fully dominated and therefore helpless. Acts of resistance such as this preserved my spirit. The day the local authority officials or as they were known then the Moral Welfare Workers [and I will discuss this later] came for me I had decided to make a more concrete stand of resistance. I ran to the top of Club Street and taunted them. I challenged them to come and get me. I might have shouted at them to ‘bugger-off’ or to ‘piss-off’. I cannot remember. I know that I was screaming that I was full of rage, full of anger and full of fear. When they began to advance on me, two of them in raincoats, I ran, still taunting them. I challenged them to catch me if they could. I knew deep down though that I could only run so far. I knew that they would eventually catch me. I had made the final stand by running to the back of Club Street to what was at the time an area of fields and derelict land that had once during the 1940’s been an American Army camp. The Moral Welfare Workers had eventually cornered me in an old broken down truck
surrounded by a pool of muddy water. Although they caught me I had at least caused them distress and discomfort by forcing them to wade out to the truck.

Here again on this derelict space however lay the presence of race as an absent and negated presence in the nation-state’s collective sense of self, an absent presence constituted by the African American soldiers that were billeted there less than 20 years before and the 15,000 children that were subsequently born across England from the sexual and loving relations between the soldiers and their white English and British female partners. Large numbers of these children were subsequently abandoned by their white mothers and communities and placed in Homes such as Barnardo’s. I would argue however that this abandonment implicates more than individuals and communities impacted by racialized notions of respectability. This abandonment represents the nation-states negation and amputation of its collective sense of self.
The photographs shown here depict Club Street as it was in the late 19th century when Dr. Barnardo was still alive. Little had changed in its physicality from this time to the time my mother and I lived there and to the time of its demolition in the late 1960’s. In both photographs the working class inhabitants are standing on the stone steps of the cottages posing for photographs, posing in what would be their Sunday best clothing. In the first photograph gendered dynamics are evident in the ways in which the two males stand atop the steps with the women and their children arranged below in a triangulatory hierarchy of power. The street itself was built on a hill [it was at the very top where I had made my ‘last stand’]. In this first photograph the viewpoint looks upwards and shows the cottages on the right side of the street. Our cottage at number 26 was also on the right and would most certainly have been one of these shown in this first photograph as it was situated in the middle of the two rows of 50 or so cottages that were built on either side of the street.

The second photograph shows the left side of Club Street. The details of the cottages are clearer in this photograph. Again the inhabitants stand at the top of the stone steps posing for the photographer. My mother like all of the women in the street would scrub these same stone steps so as to convey an appearance of respectability. The low windows that can be seen to the right of the steps served as a coal cellar when I lived on the street and this was where the coal merchants delivered their sacks of coal for which my mother paid nine shillings and ninedpence. During the period in which these photographs were taken however, these cellars housed looms for the weaving of cotton.

According to Karl Marx who in his research for Capital during the 19th century made a close study of the oppressive conditions of working class families in the cotton industry in Lancashire in the
North West of England, the entire family including children was inducted into the process of producing cotton. The women and children depicted here in these photographs represented the ‘congealed human labour’ [Marx, 1954] embedded in the finished cotton goods that contributed to the monetary wealth of the elite classes of Britain. The so called nuclear marital family unit with its re-productive heterosexist and heteronormative patriarchal family system served as a unit of gendered labour exploitation and alienation. As Engels [1845] has stated ‘the first class oppression occurs within monogamous [and let me add heterosexist] marriage’ in which notions of private property are filtered through a caste/class based social order predicated on the gendered and racialized social division of labour.

In addition as Marx argued a social order based upon class exploitation must [as a method of domination] work to produce a social division of labour in the form of a caste system which must remain both fixed [or as Marx [1954] termed it] ‘petrified’ and must be able to reproduce itself from one generation to the next. Thus, in addition to the role of heterosexuality and patriarchal notions of ‘marriage’ in this class/caste biologizing and familial reproductive system of exploitation there lies the process of racialization. But what is also integral to this system as a political economy and what is embedded in the portraits of the White working class families posing for the photographer is again the absent presence of race in the form of Black enslaved labour whose physical and sexual exploitation [and blood] is congealed in the very cotton that runs through the fingers and looms of the Club St community.

Following on from Marx, Louis Althusser [1971] makes a distinction between repressive state apparatuses such as the Police, the Courts and the Armed Forces and Ideological state apparatuses such as the Family, the schools, the Church and the mass media. Ideological state apparatuses such
as the family operate according to Althusser via a socialization process that maintains the existence of the capitalist system and the dominance of the capitalist class within that system without the use of repressive coercive force. Althusser noted however that if the power of ideological state apparatuses is insufficient to maintain the dominance of the capitalist class, the capitalist class may ultimately maintain its power by the use of the repressive state apparatuses. In British late 19th and 20th century contexts however, the distinctions between the repressive state apparatuses and the ideological state apparatuses are less exclusive to one another and indeed interconnect and merge in cases where a threat to the socialization process is perceived and identified by the state structures of governance.

Those families who lived a hundred and more years before us in these same cottages, and assembled on these same stone steps that my mother would scrub represented two interconnected hegemonic discourses. The first entailed the material and psychological enforcement of ‘Family’ as a nuclear, heteronormative, ‘respectable’ entity in which fixed racializing constructions of femininity, masculinity and sexuality were integral to the ‘forced relations of power’ [Foucault 1978, p.102] that constituted ‘The Family’ as the ideological state apparatus of socialization in the reproduction and maintenance of the hegemonic social order of Britain. The second hegemonic discourse was to be found within the discourse of sexuality and the embodiment of respectability and [conversely] the embodiment of threat to this political economy of power relations.

Racializing discourses such as these that rely upon the biologization of difference and the marking of particular spaces of difference as deviant and as a threat to the social well-being of the nation-state underpinned the hegemonic collective sense of self that is Britain throughout the 20th century and indeed continue to do so in the 21st century. For example in these same respectable familial
discursive spaces [as shown in the photographs], in these same cottages, on these same steps in the 1960’s, threat constituted as transgression and deviancy is embodied in my mother. Moreover, it is an embodiment of deviancy in which I, Stanley, marked as an ‘illegitimate’, ‘half –caste- West Indian child’ born out of ‘wedlock’ constitute the most visible proof of ‘threat’ to the ‘The Family’ and thus to the social health of the nation-state as a whole.

As Foucault argues, the Malthusian political economy of power relations that begins to first emerge in late 18th century Britain [and then accelerates in the 19th and early 20th century] is underpinned by the control and regulation of populations of which ‘The Family’, the regulation of sexuality and the ‘deployment of sexuality’ as discourse are crucial, indispensable, interconnecting components. It is from this emergent point that ‘The Family’ begins to be produced and constructed as a kind of ‘alliance’ of/for the control, discipline, punishment and regulation of the body. More specifically ‘The Family’ emerges as ‘a system of marriage and kinship ties’ through which the control regulation and the ‘reproduction’ of a particular kind of social body as a collective can take place [p.108]. As Foucault argues, ‘the deployment of sexuality ‘is linked to the political economy through ‘numerous and subtle relays”, the main ‘relay’ [for its penetrative effect] being the body.

Thus, ‘the body that produces and consumes’ represents the lynchpin of the re/production of the family as an alliance, an alliance through which a ‘homeostatis’ of the social body and by extension the social collective can be maintained and re/produced. All other bodies that fail to conform to this process are either subjected to correction and/or incarceration or they are abjectified and rendered invisible and/or disposable [Giroux, 2006]. The Family as alliance then emerges as an apparatus of power for the control and disciplining of bodies, however its primary means of disciplinary control according to Foucault lies in the regulation and control over sexuality
and reproduction. And it is here that the discursive and material deployment of sexuality operates as a tool for the enforcement of and consent to, an oppressive social order in which the enforced re/production of proper/improper sexualities is integral and paramount.

As Foucault [1978] argues the enforcement of sexuality as discourse [and practice] constitutes the means and method to ‘expel from reality the forms of sexuality that were [are] not amenable to the strict economy of reproduction’. Thus, ‘The Family’ and/or family cell emerges as a hegemonic mechanism for the policing of ‘unproductive activities’. It serves as a means ‘to banish casual pleasures; to reduce or exclude practices whose object was [is] not procreation’ [p. 36]. The production and enforcement of discourses of sexual respectability, that is to say, heterosexual, white, abled, sexual relations, sanctioned through and within marriage for the purpose of reproduction were not solely, as Foucault makes clear however, tactics of repression. More specifically they were/are productive. That is to say, they were/are contingent on the re/production of discourses of sexual/ respectability/non-respectability and/or ‘sexual irregularity’ against which the coercive enforcement of ‘legal sanctions multiplied’ and became ‘annexed’ to medically, sanctioned discourses of pathologizing ‘abnormalities and mental illnesses’ represented for example, in the classification of my mother’s character and body as ‘weak, morally’.

To this end the main elements of the deployment of sexuality where constituted within and through a hegemonic, biologized and thus racialized/racializing construction of what counts as the ‘feminine body’, which in turn, underpinned eugenicized fixations with ‘infantile precocity’, the ‘illegitimate child’, the ‘fallen women’, ‘the regulation of births’ and ‘the specifying and visibly revealing for the purpose of incarceration, isolation, rehabilitation, and medicalized treatment, all those marked as ‘the perverted’ and immoral [p.108]. As Foucault writes these processes
developed along ‘two primary dimensions’ the “husband –wife axis and the parents –children axis” [p.108]. Both of these ‘dimensions’ worked to (re)produce ‘The Family’ and the ‘family cell’ as a ‘crystal’ for the deployment of sexuality as the central mechanism for the control and regulation of reproduction and the nation-state’s reproductive capacities which took a specifically Whitecentric, racialized turn from the mid and late 19th century onwards. Thus, the family cell itself becomes a tool for the (re)production of an internal/internalized colonialism.

As Foucault argues it engages itself in ‘searching out the slightest traces of sexuality in its midst [p.111] wrenching from itself the most difficult confessions, soliciting an audience with everyone who might know of something about [it] and opening itself up unreservedly to endless examination’ [p.108]. It becomes its own panoptican: As a result The Family viewed as the source of sexuality emerges as the ‘means to extract and produce knowledge’, to produce ‘confessions’ and to enforce ‘proper’ ‘respectable’ performances of sexuality and ‘proper’ masculine and feminine modes of expression. Moreover, this process of surveillance and regulation is reinforced and intensified by both the wider members of The Family [e.g. grandparents, aunts, cousins etc] and by the wider but local agents of institutional authority and power such as teachers, head teachers [principals] doctors, clergy, and police, who operate in and collaborate with the nation-state’s institutional and systemic apparatus of power and domination.
Here in these documents shown above, the full weight of the social structures of authority are mobilized in the process of ‘searching out’, identifying and ‘specifying the ‘irregular sexualities’ that are perceived to be embodied by my mother and which serve to underpin the case [that is to say, the charges of deviancy] that is/are made against her. In these documents my mother is
constructed through and around a story that is reliant on sociopolitical constructions [and enforcements] of deviancy, normalcy and respectability, constructions that are reified in discursive language that marks her body and biology as the very threat [and the very opposite] of/to respectability. She is considered by the case-worker firstly to be an ‘attractive woman’. This is a desirable trait, in terms of what constitutes [within a raced, classed, abled, sexualized framework] the ‘feminine body’. This is offset however by her ‘low grade mentality’. This [‘low grade mentality’] will later be ‘confirmed’ by the local medical authority [i.e. the village doctor] later as the case for my ‘removal’ from my mother’s influence is built upon further.

At this point the case worker who is writing the report outlines a history of immorality on the part of my mother, a history that is conceptualized within a racialized mode of thought. Here my mother is revealed as a woman who first began work at 15 years of age. Her marriage status is given. It is a marriage in which she gave birth to my sister. My sister, according to the case-worker, was then legally adopted by my grandparents. The case workers writes that my grandmother died 6 years previously and that my mother was married for two years when she gave birth to ‘an illegitimate child’, a ‘little boy’ which she gave up for adoption. It is said that this was done in an ‘effort’ to ‘save’ my mother’s marriage. As the story continues, my mother’s husband [my sister’s father] ‘periodically ‘leaves my mother for a ‘few weeks at a time’ until finally divorcing my mother ‘on the ground of adultery. My mother then asks my grandparents if she can stay with them, but according to the case story, she ‘was a great trial to them and at length the grandfather asked her to leave”. The case worker does not inquire as to how my mother survived but rather moves to a description of her finding ‘employment in a munitions factory’ where she meets, my father [described as the ‘putative father – a West Indian’] ‘in a factory hostel’.
According to the case-worker, when my mother becomes pregnant she moves into other lodgings and stays there until I am 2 years old. It is stated that while my mother works I am ‘in the day time [in the] care of a neighbour’ but ‘difficulties’ arise and through a moral welfare worker. I am ‘placed in a foster home’ which is ‘not successful’ and, as a result, I am returned to my mother. According to the case worker, I am a ‘pleasant looking boy’ but, [and this is my mother’s observation, according to the case worker] I am ‘ill-tempered and not amenable to discipline’ and at this point I have grown ‘rapidly beyond’ my mother’s ‘control’ and I often strike my mother. In addition, I stay ‘away from school’ or arrive ‘very late, saying that [my] mother [has] not bothered to get up’. My grandfather is asked to testify. He is reported as saying that my mother has ‘always been beyond [his] ‘control’. The reference to ‘control’ is significant here.

As mentioned previously [and as Foucault [1978] suggests] in the re/production and enforcement of ‘The Family’ and the controlling influences placed on the policing of for transgressions of dominant, hegemonic constructions of the ‘feminine body’, ‘parents and relatives became the chief agents of a deployment of [state sanctioned ‘respectable’] sexuality which drew [draws] its outside support from doctors, educators and later psychiatrists…which began…[begin]…by competing with the relations within the family cell’ [p.108].

A violent and homicidal effect of this discursive process [and this has particular resonance in relation to the racialized discursive and material effects of internal/internalized colonialism] is the psychologization and psychiatrization of the family cell for the purpose of ‘control’ and regulation of reproduction. However the target for psychologization and psychiatrization is concentrated more specifically on and over the bodies of women and children through the medicalization of surveillance, regulation and control. As Foucault has noted it is due to the emergence of
medicalization in the late 19th century that new racializing discourses begin to appear, discourses which target deviancy and immorality as a ‘problem’ that is biologically determined and which is housed in the bodies of women whose primary threat lies in their ability to contaminate the alliance of The Family and by extension the social well-being of the entire nation-state.

As Foucault argues it is within these contexts that, ‘new personages… [make]…their appearance;’ ‘the nervous woman’ the ‘frigid wife’ the ‘indifferent mother’, [or worse, the mother beset by ‘murderous obsessions’; ‘homosexuality,’ ‘the hysterical or neurasthenic girl’; ‘the precocious and already exhausted child’, or, the ‘unmarried mother’ and/or the ‘illegitimate child’. All of these discourses represent and reify the ‘combined’ bodies of an ‘alliance gone bad’ [p.110], bodies which, once identified and thus made visible can be expelled given that they represent those forms of sexuality that… [are]…not amenable to the strict economy of…[respectable] reproduction’.

This process, as Foucault, writes is a process designed ‘to say no to unproductive activities, to banish casual pleasures, to reduce or exclude practices whose object was not procreation’ [p.36] in its state sanctioned ‘respectable’ form.
The document shown above reveals this process of searching out for deviancy and it reveals moreover an intensification and an urgency on the part of Barnardo’s and the local authorities and state agencies to remove me from the care of my mother and her influence. Here the case worker writes that she went to see my mother. She tells my mother that she would be assisted by the authorities in help with regards to the costs of transportation if she decides to have the authorities take charge of me and remove me to a Home in the South of England. My mother does not want to do this as the distance would make it be hard for her to visit me because of the cost and if she got a job it would be even harder.

The case worker tells her institutional colleague that my mother has ‘refused’ the ‘vacancy’ that has opened up in Cheltenham in the South of England because of the distance. The case worker is not pleased. She states that my mother is ‘aggressive about the whole thing’. The case worker is particularly affronted by my mother’s action, which leaves her standing on the door step, and
refuses to allow me to come to the door. In the judgment of the case worker I am ‘obviously not at school’.

The case worker suggests that there might be a vacancy at Liverpool. She records my mother’s reluctance to let me go saying that my mother claims that I am ‘upset at the thought of leaving her’ and that I ‘did not want to go’. The case worker continues to push my mother stating that she had to remind her that it was ‘she who asked’ the authorities to ‘take’ me. My mother subsequently cancels my admission. The case worker states that she hopes that my mother will not ‘regret her decision’. The case worker then claims to agree with her colleagues that my mother’s response is ‘typical’, saying that this is ‘typical of mother’.

It seems that another colleague will seek to approach my mother again though the Moral Welfare Worker that is to say the case worker who states that she had tried to see my mother twice the week before. My mother it is claimed refused to appear at a previously arranged appointment. She appears desperate to hold onto me but this is viewed not as a natural position of a mother who loves her child but rather as a sign of her intransigent and obstructive character.

The Moral Welfare Worker suggests ‘that the boy should come to us on the grounds of Rescue’. Rescue is underlined. A previous case-worker states that she ‘forecasts that I will be in an ‘approved school’ [i.e.prison for young offenders] at the age of eleven years if something is not done to ‘save’ me. It appears that the Moral Welfare workers are not going to give up in their quest to ‘rescue’ me. They feel that they can change my mother’s mind. The reference to ‘rescue’ and Moral Welfare work are crucial components of the systematic enforcement of oppression in its
internal/internalized Whitecentric racializing mode of operation during this period however and it is within this discursive space that I now look to enter.

**Moral Welfare Work and the Eugenic Ordering of Society**

The origins of Moral Welfare Work begin with the work of first wave feminist figures such as Josephine Butler [Hall & Howes, 1965] and the movement of social purity and hygiene within British nation-state contexts. It draws its influence additionally from the Magdalena asylums for so-called ‘fallen women’ who were to be ‘rescued’ from their ‘sins’ of prostitution and other ‘irregular’ sexual practices [p.14]. ‘Fallen women’ therefore were constructed as victims of their sinful ways. The constitution of the Magdalena Hospital in London in 1758 for example claimed itself as a ‘desirable, safe and happy retreat from their [‘fallen women’s] wretched and distressful circumstances’. Influenced by the discursive cargo of racialization within a whitecentric framework the constitution of the Hospital, like many others, claimed to admit ‘all classes and backgrounds’ with the exception of Black women who were ‘expressly excluded’ [p.14].

The movement for social purity was according to Hall and Howes, a synonym for sexual chastity and built its foundation on discursive influence of Christian evangelical teachings which fueled moral panics of urban decay, working-class unrest, and the decline of the so called Anglo-Saxon [read White] race. Moral welfare as it emerges into the early 20th century is comprised of a network of educated lay and professional white, middle-class, evangelical Christians. Social purists like Butler were intent on eradicating prostitution. The central focus of the movement however concerned itself with the causes and cures of societal human degeneracy, and [as cure] with the moral regulation of all non-reproductive sexual activity and reproductive sexual activity that was conducted out of so called wedlock. It was directed mainly by social purity feminists in
organizations like the Salvation Army. Among its targets was the notion of male sexual vice as it related to racial, national, and imperial degeneration. It targeted among others, what it considered to be immoral living, the ‘unmarried mother’, ‘girls in acute temptation’, ‘troublesome girls’, the ‘illegitimate child’ and boys and girls with a ‘bad moral background’ [p. 41].

Moreover, within the framework of social hygiene and social purity activism [white] feminists essentialized women as sexually passive and as ‘mothers of the race’ [Perry, 1999]. All women were not however viewed in equal terms. Due to their superior evolutionary heritage, women of white middle and upper middle class/cast status were it was claimed, best suited to assume a leading role in purifying society. Moral regulation occurred on three fronts: the redemptive, the punitive, and the preventive [Sethna, 2010]. Thus, Social Purists as rescue workers worked to ‘rescue’ prostitutes from their immoral character, feeble minded-ness and immoral life and as a panacea for their perceived immoral condition sought to coerce them to train as domestics in female refuges.

As legal reformers lobbied to raise the age of sexual consent for girls and penalized male homosexual activity, sex education advocates demanded that boys and girls be taught about social purity [Hall and Howes, 1965]. The perceived public health threat of sexually transmitted diseases in the late 19th century, combined with the belief that able-bodied heteronormative middle and upper middle-class white children represented the foundations of a racially, physically and psychologically healthy society moved ‘social purists and physicians to join in an alliance in favour of sex education as a medico-moral prophylactic’ [Sethna 2010].

At the onset of the 20th century however the social purity movement drew its theoretical strength [in terms of organizational, philosophical and political focus] from the emergence of Eugenics
and the Eugenics movement with its fixations on social contamination and degeneration. It held that the biologization of the social body was prone to contamination, collective biological degeneration and the impurification of its collective blood and bodily parts. And it is within and through the discursive framework of Eugenics that Moral Welfare becomes systematized in an alliance between the Church of England and the state [Hall and Howes, 1965]. Protestantism, fields of education, medicine, the social sciences and [significantly for this study] social workers formed a coalition of collective political eugenical discursive embodiment which re-configured itself in the 20th century in what came to be known as Moral Welfare and Moral Welfare Work.

As Davis [1995] explains the term Eugenics is derived from the Greek word for ‘well born’. It is a term initially coined in 1883 by Francis Galton a cousin of Charles Darwin. As Davis writes, Galton was clear in what he meant to convey in his usage of the concept. In Galton’s word’s the term constituted a means through which to “express the science of improving the stock which is by no means confined to questions of judicious mating but which, especially in the case of man takes cognizance of all influences that tend, in however a remote degree, to give the more suitable [my italics] races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable [my italics again] than they will otherwise have” [Davis, 1995]. Widening the focus of Eugenics Galton state’s further that Eugenics is ‘all that is transmittable by heredity whether it be ancestral origins or a persons sport or mutation’[Richardson, 2003 p.85].

Galton’s reference to the strains of blood’ reflects the central focus of Eugenics that of heredity. Heredity, premised on the conception of difference in biological terms constitutes the systematization of the racialization of difference both on individual and collective terms in a form that encompasses multiple site of difference. The Eugenical framework is predicated on the
discursive conception and belief that individual behaviour and character is a biologically determined process that is reflective of the behaviour and character of an entire social group and/or community of difference. So for example Galton’s focus on heredity constructs social class in biological [and thus racialized] terms as an issue of heredity and inherited defects, a process that is used to rationalize the presence and effects of social inequity and social inequality. In other words, if the working class [or underclass] are living in conditions of destitution, misery and oppression, it is a problem stemming from *their* [and note that racialization always collectifies, or to bend Memmi [1965], pluralizes difference] shared lack of moral character, a lack of moral character that is innate to the group. This constitutes the framework of knowing that underpins and determines Moral Welfare work and the actions and imaginings of the classifying mind:

One of the major concerns within Eugenics theorizing and practice during the period up until the 1940’s was how moral defects were produced. Mary Ziegler [2008] for example cites one theorist Richard Dugdale, a prison reformer in the US and author of the cacogenic study, *The Jukes* as one of the major contributors in the introduction of a biologized gendered element to this notion. According to Ziegler [2008], Dugdale identified ‘harlotry’ as a moral defect and suggested that immoral sexual behavior could produce diseases, and ‘disorders’ that would be passed onto children which would, in turn, create ‘eugenic flaws’ in the nation as a whole’ [p.215 ]. Within this eugenicized framework of thought that is/was embodied in and constituted by Moral Welfare Work the Moral Welfare Worker’s reference to my mother as a woman ‘out of control’ cannot be disconnected or abstracted discursively from the eugenical focus of control as it relates to the control of reproduction as an overall means to control the ‘fitness’ of the race as it applies to the social collective and nation-state within the dominant notion and institution of marriage.
First and foremost according to Dugdale’s [Ziegler, 2008] study, a woman “who was unchaste or uninterested in marriage and motherhood was labeled eugenically unfit” [p.215]: In addition, the discursive language in my documents that refers to my mother as a body of ‘low mentality’, ‘low grade intelligence’, and ‘weak morally’ is representative of the discourse of eugenics and thus the discourse of racialization: Concepts of ‘illegitimacy’, ‘out of wedlock’, ‘moral defects’ and ‘moral traits’ as hereditary flaws are all derived from Eugenicization as a discourse, as discursive practice and as an ideology of/for the re-production of a political economy underpinned by racialization and an internal/internalized form of coloniality.

As Ziegler [2008] goes onto explain Richard Dugdale’s definition of moral defect was highly influential. Hospitals began classifying female patients who exhibited so called immoral behavior as ‘high grade imbeciles’. Dugdale’s conceptualization of a gender based definition of moral defect inspired later eugenicists, such as Charles Davenport who argued that “eugenic marriage laws could not accomplish the purpose for which they had been designed because morally ‘defective’ people were indifferent to marriage …[and]…would continue to reproduce outside of the institution” [p. 216]. Davenport and other eugenicists argued that marriage [not interracial marriage] was a social good and a monogamous marriage was an indicator of eugenic fitness. Those who engaged in illegitimate sexual pursuits, by contrast, were considered ‘defective’ [p. 216] and were subjected to medicalized treatment, abjectification, incarceration or death.

In both the United States and Britain the enforcement of compulsory sterilization between 1910–1935, for so called morally unfit women that ‘sought to impede procreation’, was encouraged. The flip-side of this entailed the promotion of ‘positive eugenics’ that is to say, the encouragement of reproduction for those constructed as ‘fit’. Women who were subjected to sterilization were often
diagnosed as “feebleminded” [p. 218] but as Zeigler notes, this diagnosis as it related to women who produced ‘illegitimate’ children outside of ‘wedlock’ “did not denote mental disability but, rather, [it designated] a social status of irredeemable “immorality” or “unfemininity” [p. 218].

In California, a lack of conformity to gender norms was conflated with whatever was termed mental insanity. In addition, women with what was viewed as less severe disorders were nevertheless officially diagnosed as “insane” on account of their “failure to conform to standards of feminine behavior or sexual modesty.” The sterilization of these women was largely determined by how morally acceptable their eccentricities were. As Ziegler notes further the criterion for the sterilization of a woman was any premarital and extramarital sexual activity. As she explains for example “[i]n California…a [1940s] study of sterilized women found that four-fifths had engaged in premarital sexual experience and forty had been pregnant at least once, with seventeen giving birth to one illegitimate child and three of them to two children out of wedlock” [p. 218].

As Stoler [1995] writes eugenicizing practices and notions of degeneracy as they relate to reproduction and gender have to be read within a context in which white European women [are constructed] as bodies that are crucial to the internal and global expansionist project of Euro white supremacist Imperialism. White women became vital to this project which was underpinned by a policing and a ‘solidification of racial boundaries in ways that repeatedly tied their supportive and subordinate posture to community cohesion [conceptualized as a homogenous biological entity] and colonial security” [p. 97]. As Stoler [1989] writes, the indispensable implicatedness of white women in imperialist, colonial relations of power was ‘reinforced at the turn of the 20 century ‘by a metropolitan bourgeoisie discourse [and an imminently anthropological one] intensely concerned with notions of degeneracy’ [and thus contamination of the imagined biologically pure social
Middle-class morality, manliness and mother-hood were seen as something that was threatened and endangered by ‘degeneration’ and [one of the perceived causes of racial degeneration and thus contamination] that of “miscegenation” [p. 643]. According to Stoler degeneration was defined as ‘departures from the normal type…transmitted through inheritance and lead[ing] progressively to destruction’ [p.643]. “Degeneracy brought on by environmental, physical and moral factors, could be averted however by positive eugenic selection or negatively, by eliminating the ‘unfit’ or the environmental and more specifically cultural [and racial] contagions [contaminants] that gave rise to them” [p.643].

It is within this context that the concepts of ‘Half-caste West Indian’ and/or ‘coloured’ become sociopolitically meaningful for the racialized internal/internalized colonialized nation-state. These concepts discourses and racialized markings make the imagined contagions visible. These racialized/racializing discursive entanglements as they relate to my documents however find their coalescence in two interconnecting concepts and practices that of ‘Rescue’ and the project of ‘child migration’. Both these concepts are integral to the existence and salient trace of genocide that is embedded in the discursive framework which constitutes the system of oppression and which is the focus of this study’s analysis.

**Child Migration: Barnardo’s and the Implication of Genocide**

The document below constitutes a further fragment of the eugenically framed and derived knowledge of myself and my mother acquired by the Barnardo’s regime and the local and state agencies of authority and power. It looks to record [and gather] answers to questions regarding any history that I may have regarding the criminal justice system or whether any ‘application’ has been made on the part of ‘any other Organizations’ to have me placed in their care. The Moral Welfare Worker is further required to make an evaluation of my ‘character’, ‘habits and disposition’
including a special mention on whether my ‘habits are clean’ [or not] or whether my mother might consider placing me up for legal adoption.

The Moral Welfare Worker enters an answer for all of the questions here in this document with the exception of two. These two questions are different from the rest. They are framed in such as way as to draw out the very intuitive feelings of the Moral Welfare Worker, intuitive feelings that are based on her/his overall investigation. The Moral Welfare Worker is asked to enter an answer that reflects how s/he feels about the possibility of broaching the ‘subject of migration’. To be more
accurate there is a specific requirement to detail the ‘parent’s [in this case my mother’s] feelings’ regarding this subject. In addition if the Moral Welfare Worker feels [‘felt’] that there are ‘strong reasons against bringing the subject up, then s/he is required to ‘record them’. There is however no answer given to this required question. The space where an answer should be entered is left blank. It is in the blankness of space however and the conceptualization of [child] ‘migration’ where the trace and absent presence of race as an enactment and experience of genocide is to be found. Moreover, it is in this conceptual space that the direct implicatedness of Barnardo’s in genocide is located. But what was/is ‘migration’ as it relates to children and in what form is it constitutive of genocide?

The first beginnings of the practice of ‘child migration’ can be traced back to the 17th century, specifically in 1618 where according to Bean and Melville [1989] a ‘group of orphaned and destitute children’ were transported by sea from Britain to Richmond Virginia in the United States. This marked the beginning of ‘child migration’ as a colonial practice that would last for almost another 350 years [p.2]. It would see tens of thousands of children removed [amputated] often without the consent of their parents and families from Britain and transported to other Peoples’ lands. But while early practices of child migration are significant, the context in which the document refers to is that of a systematic, governmentally structured phase of child migration that emerges in the late 1880’s and one that was inextricably linked to the Imperial and colonial project of British Empire expansion. As Bean and Melville explain, ‘altogether about 150,000 children were ‘exported to outposts of the British Empire – to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, to a lesser extent South Africa, Rhodesia [now Zimbabwe] and the Caribbean’ [p.2]. Canada alone between the years late [1880s and 1930] was the recipient of over 80 thousand children [Parr, 1980]. The last boatload of ninety children left Britain in 1967 for Australia.
Dominant discussions regarding child migration have in part interpreted the practice as a process of, ‘salvation’ or ‘rescue’ of poor working class children from the ‘plight’ of poverty, abandonment and destitution. Aligned with this is the representation and analysis of child migration as a ‘safety valve’ [Parr, 1980 p. 33] or mechanism to prevent the possibilities of ‘internal [civil] disorder’ emanating from poor children due to the ‘immoral’ influence of their families and communities who represented the emergent mass of urban destitute peoples in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries [Kohli, 2003]. Racialization is embedded in this discourse of ‘rescue’ and as discussed previously is in evidence in the attempt on the part of the Moral Welfare regime to separate me as a child from my mother.

Further discussion and interpretations of child migration and its connections to ‘Salvation’ or ‘rescue’ contextualize the practice within a 19th century British society’s navigation of industrialization, nation-wide poverty, unemployment and the movement of large numbers of rural populations to urban centers. These conditions and circumstances are combined with negative Victorian sensibilities regarding childhood [e.g. particularly working class and under-class children who were viewed simply as young adults]. Marjori Kohli [2003] for example argues that as ‘industries developed’ and rural inhabitants searching for work moved to the cities in the 19th century the populations of Britain’s cities doubled, tripled ‘or in some cases increasing by as much as tenfold in as little as ten years. It took people such as Lord Ashley, who became the 7th Earl of Shaftsbury, Mary Carpenter, Dr. Guthier, William Booth and other reformers of the time to draw attention to the plight of the inhabitants of the inner city, especially the children’. According to Kohli “Victorian attitudes towards children were vastly different from those of today. ‘Childhood’, they said, ‘was a time of preparation for adulthood, for work and responsibility. Children of the lower classes did not play but rather worked to help support the family”. In addition as Kohli goes
on to explain ‘[t]here were precious few schools for the masses to attend and even less opportunity to consider the luxury of an education. For many, just keeping food on their table, a roof over their head and clothes on their backs was a daily struggle’ [Kohli, 2003 The Golden Bridge:].

Here Child Migration is primarily linked to the ‘saving’ and rescuing motives asserted by Dr. Barnardo’s and other Victorian philanthropists and reformers who according to Kohli [2003] not only drew attention to the ‘plight’ of children forced into destitution in the 19th and early 20th centuries but were instrumental in the promotion of child migration as a means to ‘save’ or ‘rescue’ young children from their poverty stricken circumstances: In constructing the child migration project as an outcome of ‘good intentions’ Kohli further describes the ‘plight’ of working class children in this period through the accounts given by reformers such as Shaftsbury, who in his observations of poor communities in London noted that poor people in their hundreds were ‘compressed and hidden in a dozen small and wretched houses packed in a court, the houses and court occupying less than the area of a good-sized barn, or a village church, or a moderate-sized emigrant ship’ [Kohli, chapter one].

These conditions occur [according to Kohli] against a social climate of child labour exploitation in which “[c]hildren from lower class families were sent out to work in mines, brick yards, woolen mills, and factories of all kinds from the time they were very young. Children were a source of income and so were put to work as soon as possible to add even a few pence to the family income. They were employed as farm labourers, chimney sweeps, rag pickers, matchbox makers and beggars. Small children were sent into cold, dark mine shafts in places where men could not fit or into or where they could scurry under equipment, like rats along the floor, to fill bobbins, collect waste or check machinery. A child of suitable size was often stolen, sold by parents, obtained from
workhouses or apprenticed to a chimney-sweep and was forced up chimneys to clean them, sometimes becoming wedged in the bends and dying of asphyxiation or succumbing to disease” [Kohli, 2003].

Such conditions initiated the implementation of a raft of child legislation in the UK designed to protect in part children from labour exploitation. Thus, child migration was asserted, by its proponents, as a means to ‘rescue’ children from these conditions and to give them a better life and future by exporting them abroad to what were viewed as the expansive, healthy spaces of Canada and Australia [Kohli, 2003]. As authors such as Bean and Melville [1989] have made clear however there were other motives, Imperial and colonial motives, that lay behind this practice, motives that engendered, pain, violation and suffering for those children who were, by all intents and purposes, forcibly transported out from Britain.

According to Dr. Barnardo there was a direct link between ‘Rescue’ from destitution and the influence of ‘immoral’ parents and the project of child migration. For Dr. Barnardo in the late 19th century ‘child migration was the flip-side of the ‘Rescue’ coin. ‘Emigration’ as it was termed initially was, according to Barnardo’s, ‘the word of practical power’ [Barnardo, 1889, p.181]. Barnardo, likened the masses of destitute children that he had gathered in his Homes in the late 19th century in terms of a ‘lake’, a ‘lake’ that [according to Barnardo], needed its “outlets as well as its tributaries”. The outlet or ‘practical power’ would be provided by and through the emigration of British children to ‘new lands’ overseas, lands that were seen to provide greater space and opportunities and which in turn would provide further space for the expansion of a British imperial social order, organized by white supremacy and hierarchically structured along the lines of gender, sexuality, dis/ability and class. For this project to succeed in terms of its imperial expansionist
ambitions however, the ‘lake’ needed to be ‘continuously gathering in fresh inmates’ to justify its existence. Destitution therefore was a necessary condition for the projects evolution, a process whereby ‘fresh’ child bodies would be ‘Rescued’ from what Barnardo called the ‘moral cesspools’ of the overcrowded cities [p. 182].

Foreshadowing the eugenicat ion of thought that would underpin the discourse of ‘Rescue’ and ‘Moral Welfare’ [and indeed the Barnardo’s institution as a whole] in the 20th century, Barnardo Social Darwinistic logic asserted that the overcrowded and ‘immoral’ spaces of British cities could be cleansed, or, to use his own term, ‘deodorized’, by the removal of poor working class [read White] children who represented the ‘weakest element in the struggle for existence’ [p.182]. The children would not only be removed from the cities, they would be amputated from the country itself through the process of ‘child migration’ a process that [according to Barnardo] provided the ‘simultaneous solution…to…a whole nest of…intractable problems’ [p.182]. In Barnardo’s words:

We in England with our 470 inhabitants to the square mile, were choking, elbowing, and starving each other in the struggle for existence: the British Colonies over the seas were crying out for men to till their acres, to feed their national life, to add to their human resources. Canada alone for instance, with an acreage nearly equal in area to the whole of Europe, possessed on the population of London. Here was a boundless field for settlers, and for just such settlers, too, as could be selected from my family – boys and girls of good physique, of tested moral character, of upright habits…What was needed in order to give them (the children) the opportunity they had missed…was, in a very real sense, a new heaven and a new earth – the fresh conditions of colonial life…Canada wants settlers and can absorb hundreds and thousands of boys and girls for a long future [p.182-84]

Barnardo here reveals the underlying premise behind child migration, that of Empire building. While child migration in its Imperial/colonial form was certainly not the exclusive terrain of Barnardo and the Barnardo’s organization, Barnardo’s as an institution was certainly the most
prolific. Out of an estimated total of one hundred thousand children transported to Canada between the late 1880’s and the 1930s, Thomas Barnardo and his organization were responsible for the shipment of over thirty thousand of those children [Parr, 1980]. In addition Barnardo’s played a prominent role in the transportation of tens of thousands of children to Australia after the Second World War and up until the late 1960s under that country’s ‘White Australia’ policy [Griere, 2002; Paul, 1997].

A good deal has been written since the late 1980’s about ‘child migration’ and these children ‘bricks of Empire’ as they were called. Bean and Melville [1989] [as previously mentioned] have for example described the torturous nature of the process as it has impacted the lives of children shipped to countries such as Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Australia, and Rhodesia, [now Zimbabwe] as part of an Imperial project designed to disperse ‘British stock’ [a racialized/racializing code word for white] to the so called ‘far corners’ of what was perceived psychologically, emotionally, politically, and physically as the Empire by the British political apparatus of power and its supportive volunteer and charitable organizations alike. The accounts of those children that were subjected to transportation by organizations such as Barnardo’s reveal lives devastated by sexual and physical abuse. In addition, the withholding of documents and information has left many survivors with a ‘lack of identity…a….lack of confidence and confusion about their status’ [p.159].

Gillian Wagner’s book, Children of Empire [1982], gives an historical account of the project of child ‘juvenile emigration’ as it applied to the policies, the local and state organizations and the individuals and children implicated in the project. Wagner’s work however eschews critique of the project by claiming an ‘objective’, approach. As Wagner states, while there are stories and
evidence of ‘physical and mental hardships’ there are also stories of ‘happiness’ and ‘fulfillment’ experienced by the migrated children in their ‘adopted’ countries. Wagner argues that, ‘[w]hen only a fraction of the whole story can be known is it possible to make any real assessment of the consequences of emigrating children to new lands’ [Wagner, 1982, p.xv]. Similar to Wagner, Sherrington and Jeffery’s [1998] account of the role played by Kingsley Fairbridge in child migration along with his colonial aspirations contains no critique of the destructive nature of his endeavors. Thus, in dominant discourse the violence of the child migration project is either erased or masked or, like June Rose’s [1998] For the Sake of the Children, it is rationalized and justified as a policy grounded in good intentions, a discourse that ultimately absolves individuals such as Barnardo and the Barnardo’s organization as a whole of any blame, culpability and implication in systemic and institutional violence towards children.

As Rose states, no-one can ‘doubt the commitment of Barnardo’s’ and ‘their vitality and their resolve to do the best for the sake of the children’ [p.96]. However the discourse of racialization that underpins colonial relations of power in ways that places race as a salient presence is negated here. Moreover, race as a visible non-white entity subjected to a process of removal within a palimpsestic Whitecentric framework of oppression is made invisible. And yet this is/was a central discursive and material component for Barnardo’s and for the project of child migration as a whole stemming from the very early beginnings of the removal of those marked ‘coloured’ from the British national identity. Barnardo’s son Stuart reveals as much and indeed reveals not only the presence and material reality of a racial epidermal schema in British nation-state contexts but also his vision of a racialized hierarchy that could be facilitated on colonized lands via the tool of child migration. Looking for possible recipients in South Africa for children in the care of his father’s institution Barnardo writes to his father in 1907 saying:
I should recommend your keeping them...[the migrated children]...in the institution out here no longer than six months before going out to situations as the cost of living is so great that you could probably keep at least two children at the cost of one out here. Another point that cannot be too much insisted upon is that the boys and girls sent out by you must be absolutely kept away from mixing with natives in any way and you must not send out children who have the least trace of colour in them, or at any rate these must be sent out quite separately from the rest as the great danger with young immigrants to South Africa is that of getting down to the native level and forgetting they are whites and consequently the superior race [in Wagner, 1982, p.186]

Authors such as Bean and Melville [1989], Parr [1980] et al have brought attention to the experience and impact of the violence of ‘child Migration’ on those children forced into the scheme and, in the case of Bean and Melville [1989] have revealed the project’s linkages to a white supremacist colonial project in its migration of essentially white children for the purpose of increasing British ‘stock’ in countries such as Canada and Australia. Indeed in the case of Australia, the Australian government’s White Australia Policy [Greir, 2002; Paul, 1997 et al] insisted that Barnardo’s and other child migrating organizations supported by the British government should only send white children. Thus for Barnardo’s and other child care institutions to follow and to put into practice a racist policy, marks them also as racist. In point of fact [given that my documents fall within the period in which Barnardo’s was still transporting children to Australian under this policy] the racial [and racist] classificatory system that Barnardo’s employed to categorize children such as myself as ‘coloured’ or ‘Half-Caste–West Indian’ served, whether the intention was there or not, to filter out those children whose bodies carried a ‘trace of colour’ and who might as a result jeopardize the white supremacist project of producing an all White Australia.

It should be noted at this point that recently in 2010 due to the activism by former migrated Home children both the governments of Australia and Britain have apologized for the brutality of the
project and the suffering experienced by the children. Canada has yet to apologize. And yet there is a crucial omission in this process of ‘apology’ and indeed in the prevailing dominant discussion regarding the subject which also includes the positionalities taken up by those white survivors of the child migration scheme. What is omitted is genocide, a practice and indeed process in which the effects are still ongoing and which Barnardo’s [as one of the main organizations facilitating the White supremacist project of child migration and indeed one of its main proponents] is directly implicated in both historical and contemporary terms [considering the ongoing effects of genocide as it applies to colonized peoples and the lack of recognition or acknowledgement on the part of Barnardo’s of its implicatedness].

**Rescue and Genocide: The Residential School System**

The removal and amputation from Britain of poor white British by Barnardo’s and the local and state structures of governance to the so called wider spaces of the globe was designed [as a logical outcome of a political project of imperial and colonial domination] to form palimpsestically a white British community on colonized lands and colonized peoples. As Amina Mama [cited in Dei & Kemp 2006] has pointed out colonizing practices of forming communities on colonized lands necessitates the ‘unforming’ of communities that were/are already there. This unforming in the context of Canada and Australia manifested [and manifests] itself in genocidal terms of rape, murder, starvation, dispossession of land, chemicalized death, ‘prisonification’ [Ogden, 2005] and the attempted eradication of Indigenous cultural ontologies and epistemologies. Populating ‘new lands’ with white bodies simultaneously depopulated [and depopulates] the Black and Aboriginal bodies that were/are already there. The flip-side of child migration in colonial contexts therefore is genocide.
When Stuart Barnardo speaks discursively of policing and monitoring for the presence of what he terms the ‘least trace of colour’ he is revealing not only racialization as a mode of thought and as an embodied discursive cargo but also the trace of genocide that is congealed in his discursive and material sense of self and being, a trace that runs through the discursive racialized/racializing collective sense of self that is the nation-state of Britain in both its historical and contemporary form.

As stated, the flip-side of the British White supremacist child migration system was/is that of genocide. In Canadian contexts this was operationalized through the formation of the Residential School system, a system of brutality that gave rise to what Kevin Annett [2002] has referred to as the ‘Canadian Holocaust’ and what Roland Chrysjohn [2001] has termed ‘cultural genocide’. As thousands of white Home children were shipped into Canada to increase the British ‘stock’ a similar number of Aboriginal children were simultaneously shipped into the Residential School system with the intent of rescuing and saving them from [in the racist colonial modes of thought of the Canadian authorities of governance] their primitive, savage and uncivilized cultural ways of knowing [Chrysjohn, 2001]. As a key component of the Canadian government’s Indian Act however the residential school system as an industrial complex of assimilation was designed primarily to erase Aboriginal identity for the purpose of disposessing Aboriginal Peoples of their land so as to lay the foundations for the construction and (re)production of the white settler state of Canada as a nation-state.

Kevin Annett [2002] among others has meticulously documented numerous examples of the ‘genocidal atrocities’ that occurred in the Residential School system. According to Annett these atrocities were perpetrated ‘by clergy, staff, government agents, medical personnel and police’.
These atrocities included: “the mass murder of children, by ‘beating, poisoning, hanging, starvation, strangulation, electric shocks [and] medical’”. In addition, Aboriginal children were ‘thrown from windows, and kicked or thrown down stairs’. They were subjected to ‘[r]ape’ by adult ‘individuals and groups’. These were acts that were ‘encouraged and abetted by staff’’. They were subjected to ‘[s]exual molestation’ ‘on a routine and daily basis’. Further torture included ‘[d]aily, unprovoked, systematic beatings by staff and clergy using whips, sticks, horse harnesses, iron bars, table legs, studded leather straps, pool cues, and bare fists’.

The children were also subjected to the ‘[r]outine administering of electric shocks’. This was administered to ‘children as young as five as a punishment and disciplinary device’, and for ‘demonstration’ purposes to visiting church and government officials”. The children were further subjected to the ‘[d]aily administering of electro-convulsive shocks’ to their heads. This was done [according to Annett’s research] ‘under the supervision of doctors, social workers, clergy and the RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police]”.

In addition to this, children as young as five were subjected to the “[p]rolonged and deliberate exposure…to X-Ray radiation,’ which caused ‘subsequent illness and death”. Physical and psychological torture and punishment for speaking indigenous languages included, the ‘tightening’ of ‘fish twine around boys’ penises’; ‘sticking needles into children’s’ tongues, ears and penises”; ‘forcing children’s’ heads into toilets and making them eat excrement”. They had their heads smashed ‘against concrete and wooden surfaces resulting in permanent’ damage and were forced to strip ‘naked in front of the assembled school’ as form of physical and sexual degradation.
As Aboriginal scholars and activists such as Roland Crysjohn [2001] and Lee Maracle [1996] have emphasized, of the hundred thousand children who were removed from their parents and communities and forced into the Residential School system from the late 19th century up until the 1990’s, over half of them died and many were simply dumped in unmarked graves in the vicinity of the schools. The traumatic effects of this genocidal practice continue to affect the lives of Aboriginal Peoples in the 21st century contemporary moment.

**Racialization, Respectability and the Amputation of Race**

The institutionalized rape, homicide and genocide described here is representative of a process of obscene, dehumanizing violence in which the children’s charity of Barnardo’s as an institution is fully implicated along with the structures of governance and authority that comprise the nation-state of Britain. In its hegemonic discursive form however this systematic violence is representative of the contingent ongoing effects of Benedict Anderson’s [1983] notion of the ‘classifying mind’ [a concept] that suggests [at least in the context that I am describing here in this study] a violating, homicidal/genocidal mode of racializing thought that is woven into the classificatory and categorization process, a process essential for sustaining [and enforcing] the systemic racialized hierarchicalization of difference that is necessary for colonialism and coloniality [in its historical and ongoing form] to function.

As this chapter has looked to emphasis, the process of racialization in its eugenicizing discursive form underpinned the social relations of power that are integral to the history of the present [Foucault, 1995] as it relates to my case file. Racialization as both a mode of thought and practice conceptualizes social difference in biologizing terms and works towards rooting out imagined deviancies and contaminants that are perceived to endanger the psychosocial health of the nation-
state as a whole. As racialization consistently looks towards marking bodies of difference for differential treatment through a prism of whitecentrism, it not only creates, sustains and reproduces a social order based upon the hierarchicalization of whiteness, it also creates, sustains and reproduces a social order in which respectability and respectable and ‘proper’ expressions and assertions of social difference [e.g. gender, dis/ability, class, and sexuality] are paramount. Thus, all forms of social difference that do not comply with what is considered ‘proper’ and/or respectable are either explicitly removed, ostracized and/or subjected to discursive and material amputation and negation from the social system by the institutional and systemic apparatus of power [regimes of truth] or they/we are coerced towards negating and amputating their/our own externally ascribed deviancies. In other words they/we are forced to pass for respectable, to pass, [and to speak] of/for what counts as for example a respectable and ‘proper’ assertion of masculinity and femininity.

The consequences of this [as I have mentioned previously in relation to my own experience] can be devastating. It is this process that informs and underpins an internal/internalized coloniality in British nation-state contexts. It is this very process that marks Britain as a space of negation and amputation. And yet within an amputative sociopolitical framework of internal/internalized coloniality - which is in turn mediated by and through racialization and whitecentrism - race as non-whiteness is marked for amputation in a different form. As the process of racialization works towards rooting out imagined biological contaminants [within the family of whiteness], the non-white body as an individual and collective acts as a visible marker by which respectability can be measured and defined. In addition, the body marked as non-white also acts as a means through which whiteness as a hierarchicalized space of collective difference can also mobilize [even in its imagination] a sense of unity and solidarity.
As a result, racialization in the context of internal/internalized colonialism has consistently enacted violence against those bodies who, on an individual and collective basis, have/are marked as non-white. In other words, if [within whitecentrism] the amputation of difference is integral, the first and most salient space to be subjected to amputation is that of non-whiteness. The residential school system testifies to the brutal outcome of the oppressive logic of this process which must, by necessity, consistently enact violence on bodies marked as non-white both external and internal to its whitecentric borders. Oppression in this form however implicates the entire social collective. In the contemporary moment of the 1960’s in which my documents are situated there is an epidemic of violence occurring against women in Britain, an epidemic that is met with a collective silence and negation by the nation-state and its structures of local and state governance. Erin Pizzey [1976] notes in her seminal work ‘Scream Softly or the Neighbours will Hear’ [p.19] that when it came to women fleeing domestic violence ‘local borough councils and the social services asserted that there was nothing they could do for a woman, who either alone or with her children fled a violent and abusive relationship’. According to the local authorities if a woman left her home in this way then she had as a result ‘voluntarily made herself homeless and therefore [was] not entitled to any assistance from the social services” [p.19].

Moreover, due to the enforcements of whitecentric notions of respectable modes of gender expression, victims of violence are also forced into an amputative state of silence. As one woman wrote on reading about Pizzey’s refuge center for women fleeing domestic violence “[t]he article…tightened the muscles of my throat as I had similar experiences….One hid such a thing...to appear respectable”. As Pizzey writes further women who revealed the violence impacted upon their bodies and made it public were not respectable women. As a consequence, women subjected to battering, torture, rape and the abuse of their children were expected to ‘scream softly’ so that
their neighbors [and the nation-state as a social collective] would not hear. As Pizzey points out ‘[f]or all the efforts to keep the screaming soft, the neighbors know’. And as such they ‘will go to any lengths’ to deny this knowledge, to negate this and to remove it from their lives, as a result women who make their experiences of violence public are then constructed as women who ‘enjoy it’ or ‘deserve the treatment’ or ‘they must have done something to provoke it’ [p. 19]. And yet this process of external and internal negation and amputation is/was mediated by race. As Pizzey noted [and recall here the Magdalena Hospital’s abjectification of Black women in the 18th century in tandem with the essentialized and racialized construction of my father as a ‘West Indian’ who is ‘not very dark skinned’] once the epidemic of violence against women was made visible to the nation-state the response from fields of authority and power [e.g. social work] was one of shock primarily because ‘wife beating’ was viewed as a ‘West Indian syndrome’ [p.24].

Pizzey reveals here the ways in which non-whiteness internally finds itself subjected to a similar process of violence and abjectification by the classifying and racializing mind and nation-state as that experienced by non-white bodies that are external to the borders of the classifying mind. Importantly however in the negating/amputating contexts of racialization and internal/internalized coloniality, race as non-whiteness takes on another role, that of a prosthetic. Thus, the classifying mind is also a prostheticizing mind and it is this area that I now look to address in the next chapter.
I want at this point to reflect briefly on the components of my second research question that I have referred to in the opening introduction to my analysis. The argument that I have been pursuing in this study is that racialization as a process underpins a hegemonic social order that is constitutive of the dominant construction of this thing called Britain. Moreover I have looked to argue that this hegemonic nation-state formation is mediated by and through a process of internal/internalized colonialism. As a consequence of this understanding my analysis has necessitated a complex conceptualization [and concretization] of both internal/internalized colonialism and racialization as it relates to their material and discursive presence in British nation-stated social relations of power.

In doing so however my analysis positions itself in such a way as to pursue the argument that internal/internalized colonialism and racialization can be utilized to both understand the institutionalized hegemonic regulation and control of variegated sites of social difference [i.e. race, class, gender, disability, sexuality] and simultaneously to provide the means through which agency as voice and enunciation can be produced and asserted in a form that acknowledges the connections between social difference, in terms of its collective implicatedness in oppression [i.e. a collective experience of oppression and self negation] and the assertive possibilities of an individual and collective refusal to allow one’s body to give consent to the ongoing maintenance and reproduction of a social order based upon these formulations and emanations of oppression and violence.

As stated in the introductory chapter the difficulty that is embedded in this approach however is how to formulate and pursue an analysis of social relations power within and through a critical, complex, interrogatory assertion and conceptualization of internal/internalized colonialism and
racialization while still centering race as a central, salient presence and factor that both underpins those relations and yet is simultaneously integral to a collective nation-state expression of self, voice and enunciation that is transformative, liberatory and anti-hegemonic. The key to this question as far as this study is concerned and argues lies in the concept of prostheticization and the prostheticization of race. It is in this area where my analysis now looks to enter.

The previous chapter looked to place a focus on the violence of internal colonialism, the violence of an enforcement of collective negation/amputation and also the nation-state’s discursive and material implicatedness in genocide. However, while dominance and oppression in this form requires the forcing of hegemonic discursive constructions of difference onto the consciousness of the social collective body by dominating institutions, regimes, and systems of authority and power, it also requires the social collective’s consent. As stated previously this consent requires [and indeed demands] that embodied social difference not only conforms to a dominant construction of itself but that it also actively and willingly engages itself in a constant process of negating/amputating from its body any expressive form of difference that deviates [materially and/or imaginatively] from this construction. What emerges is that the (re)production of oppression in this hegemonic framework requires, on the part of the social collective, a process of passing, that is to say a process of passing for respectable.

Where Whitecentricism is implicated however, consent to this violent process is secured by and through the raced body which, in its dominant construction and role as the anti-thesis of normality and respectability, constitutes [in the dominant imagination] a space to be attacked, rejected and to flee from. In this form the raced body acts as a means by which the pain, dissonance and anxiety arising from the social collective’s racialized and Whitecentricized psychic negation and
amputation of its whole self can be accepted, tolerated, ameliorated, and simultaneously denied and disavowed in the strapping on of race as a prosthetic.

In her paper *The Homeless Body*, Samira Kawash [1998] writes about the ways in which the dominant discursive (re)production of a respectable body consolidates itself around the abjectification of the homeless body as a non public body in counterpart to that of the respectable property owning ‘public’ body. Kawash provides an example of this process which as she explains is a process of ‘emplacement and embodiment’. In an encounter between the homeless body and the body of the ‘public’ on a subway car, ‘the specificity’ of the homeless body as the embodiment of homelessness ‘is given in the way it inhabits the subway car’ in the way it sleeps ‘cramped’ and ‘dirty’ which concretizes in the racialized ‘public’ and thus respectable imagination that there is a difference [and an ‘embodied contrast’] between being homeless and not. As Kawash writes, in this instance ‘the embodied contrast’ ‘lies in ‘the manner of emplacement’, that is to say the ‘embodied contrast between inhabiting the subway car as a sleeping or dwelling place and transiently occupying the subway car as a mode of transportation between other places’ [p.336].

As Kawash goes on to argue this socio relational process is not simply a relationship of power based upon exclusion, nor solely a process by which the notion of a respectable public identity can know itself and define itself through what it is not, but that it also represents a means by which the assertion of ‘public’ as identity can simultaneously achieve and effect a sense of wholeness while disavowing any perceived or imagined failure to be whole. In this the homeless body as a non-public body must be consistently marked as non-public which in turn necessitates the consistent impact of violence. Violence in this context is actualized as a contingent process that must [as a
practice central to its logic] ‘render’ the homeless body ‘impossibly small, approaching disappearance’ [p.329-30].

Violence against the homeless body in this form represents for the ‘public’ imagination a sign and ‘proof’ that the homeless are not part of the ‘public’ which in turn serves as a means and method for securing in the public imagination a sense of psychic equilibrium and wholeness. As Kawash argues further however, it is precisely because the assertion of a collective identity predicated on ‘public’ and ‘public security’ is in its own imagination consistently insecure in relation to its sense of wholeness that violence must be consistently enacted as a means to both secure a sense of wholeness [unattainable in these contexts] and to deny any such antagonisms that arise as a consequence of this process. As Kawash explains ‘the antagonism that the imaginary whole of the public aims to disavow or exclude is thus not just the sign of failure of any whole to be whole: it is an ongoing practice of violence.’[p. 337]

Similarly race as a prosthesis or prosthetic is (re)produced and actualized as a process in which multiple spaces of social difference [within Whitecentricism] can imaginatively [and materially] appropriate and wear, so as to ameliorate the violating effects of an enforced amputative process resulting from a social system [i.e. Britain] that is reliant for its cohesiveness and collective sense of self on an internal/externalized coloniality. As previously mentioned in chapter one Mitchel and Snyder [Erevelles, 2009] conceptualize the concept of prosthetic as a [discursive] ‘device that accomplishes an illusion’ which allows social bodies to fit in, to be viewed as respectable, [to] negate their social difference [that is to say those reproduced and constructed as ‘abnormal’ and/or non respectable] and to even disavow this very negation in order to exercise an ‘imagined’ positionality of ‘normativity’ [p.251].
In other words, race as a prosthetic is strapped on by the social collective as a means to ameliorate the anxieties and antagonisms that arise from a coloniality of social relations predicated on the negation and amputation of the individual and collective self. Fundamentally, race as a prosthetic is constituted as both the discursive expression and rationale of and for the production and reproduction of racism in its white supremacist form, and simultaneously, as an artificial appendage strapped on, worn and consumed [consciously and unconsciously] by the collective colonized white-centric British psyche as a means to ameliorate and disavow the systematic, material and psychologically violating effect and impact of the British collective’s internal/internalized amputation and negation of its multi-layered self. As with Kawash’s [1998] analysis of ‘public security’ and the homeless body, prostheticization is contingent on the reproduction and enforcement of a ‘circle of violence’ [p. 336].

**Race as a Prosthetic**

As argued and outlined in chapter one, race prostheticized underpins the process of internal/internalized colonialism. It not only mediates the racialized amputation of the individual and collective sense of self but is the instrument that sustains and reproduces consent to that very violating process. Race as a prosthetic is a process of dehumanization. It is everything that is said about race as an inferorized colour-coded space of non-whiteness defined within and through the archive of racialization. Race as a prosthetic is everything that is uttered, everything that is thought, written, expressed, represented, produced, and reproduced within and through a dominant biologized racialized framework: It is both a discursive practice and a material effect. For example when bodies of colour are collectively pathologized by a biologizing, racializing field of knowledge production, they are [as a material effect] collectively murdered and brutalized by the State both physically and psychologically through a process which surveils them, profiles them and
asubjects them to stop and search procedures on a daily basis in multiple public places. Wherever and whenever this occurs, race as a prosthetic is in play.

Fundamentally, race as a prosthetic is constituted as both the discursive expression and rationale of and for the production and reproduction of racism in its whitecentric, white supremacist form, and simultaneously, as an appendage worn and consumed consciously and unconsciously for the purpose of denying, accepting and thus giving consent to the violating racialized effect and impact of White British society’s internal/internalized amputation and negation of its gendered, sexualized, dis/abled, and classed individual and collective self.

Race as a prosthetic is enforced and reproduced for consumption in multiple forms and discursive expressions that have profound material effects. It can take the ultra visible form of a spectacle, represented for example by the Little Black Sambo figure, the ‘Golliwog’ or Saartje (Sara) Baartman, the so called ‘Hottentot Venus’ whose naked body for the racialized collective European psyche represented all Black and African peoples. Kidnapped from South Africa and exhibited in a so called ‘freak shows’ in Paris and London in the 1800’s, her body served to satisfy a European consumptive psyche obsessed with the buttocks and genitals of African peoples a process which reflected 0their own obsessions with proving their own superiority, and with proving that others, particularly Black peoples, were inferior and oversexed. The ‘perverse palimpsest’ [Bhabha, 2003] written on Sara’s body embodies the manifestation and re/production of race as a prosthetic in its ultra visible discursive form.

Prostheticization must not only ascribe a set of fixed boundaries to the prostheticized body, it must police it for any deviancy or threat to these ascriptions. In other words any resistance real or
imagined must be confronted and stamped out. Indeed [for the prostheticizing mind] any resistance that may emerge in the future must be circumvented, squashed and eradicated. In thinking of this I am reminded of a story told to me by a friend of mine about a child in his youth care program in the racialized community of Regent Park, Toronto, Canada. The child, a young African Canadian boy, appeared nervous as they passed a police car. When my friend asked him if he was alright the young boy told him that he did not like the police. He then began to tell my friend of a recent incident when the police had come to his family’s door. The boy had opened the door. The White police officer who stood there showed him photographs of young Black males and asked the young boy if he had seen any of them. The young boy had his own question however. He asked the police officer why they kept coming to his family’s door looking for Black people in this way. The police officer’s anti-black racist [Foster, 1996] response to the young boy was that ‘we want to put them away before they commit any crimes’ [Premjee, 2008].

Prostheticization must by necessity enforce a set of fixed, rigid boundaries that is constitutive of the prosthetic of race. Any deviation from these boundaries represents both a threat and resistance to this process. In this context then, for the prostheticizing mind, it is not so much a question of ‘how can you locate yourself if you can locate the Other’ as Trin Mhin Ha [1991] states but rather how do you locate and live with your amputated self if you cannot locate your prosthetic? Violence in the form of dehumanization then is integral to the prostheticization. In this sense those subjected to prostheticization are in turn subjected to what [in the context of colonizer-colonized power relations] Amir Cesaire [1972] has referred to as ‘thingification’, that is to say the form by which individual subjects and whole peoples are reduced to objects and things. As Cesaire makes clear within a set of power relations in which the state of existence for the colonized necessitates dehumanization ‘there is only room for forced labor, intimidation, pressure, the police, theft, rape,
compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self complacency, degraded masses. There is [or can be] ‘no human contact but relations of domination and submission’ [which in turn] turn the colonizing body’ and here let me add the prostheticizing mind ‘into a classroom monitor, an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the indigenous [prostheticized body] into an instrument of production’.

Thingification is the necessary ascription, condition, and demand of prostheticization in the context of race. As Cesaire points out under these dehumanizing relations of power, violence and genocidal effects are the necessary outcome, the material effects of which lead to ‘whole ‘societies drained of their essence, [whole] cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed…and… [we might think of the young boy as an individual and as a member of a social collective here]… extraordinary possibilities wiped out’ [p.42]:

In the period in which my case file is situated and contextualized [roughly between] the late 1950’s and the first half of the 1960’s, a whole set of prostheticizing discourses, actions and dehumanizing material effects are in play which in turn served to concretize the circularity of violence that prostheticization depends upon for it’s (re)production and sustainment.

As Sivanadan [1982], Gilroy [1991], Hiro [1991] and others have documented this is a period marked by terror and homicidal violence towards ‘coloured’ coded bodies. It is a period marked by the Notting Hill rebellions of 1958, rebellions which sought to respond to the organized assaults of violence perpetrated against racially marked bodies and communities by groups such as the terroristic organization the National Labour Party, a White supremacist nationalist group [Gable,
p.141] and the White Defense League who as Sivanandan [1982] has pointed out went on a ‘jamboree’ of violence in 1958 ‘for several weeks under the watchful eye of the police’ [p. 9]. This ‘jamboree’ of what was also termed ‘nigger hunting’ by the groups [p.13] culminated in the murder of Kelso Chochrane who was stabbed to death in Notting Hill by a gang of white supremacists. No one was charged with Kelso Chochrane’s death, even though both groups ‘boasted’ about his murder. And yet as Sivanandan [1982] has pointed out, while the everyday experience of racist violence for bodies and communities marked as ‘coloured’ during the 1950’s was drawn from extreme fascist organizations and individuals whose homicidal violence was accompanied by a ‘Keep Britain White’ campaign, racism, as discourse and practice, became systematically entrenched in the British political system as a whole with the passing of the racist/racializing Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 [p. 12].

The primary purpose of the act was to enforce immigration control into Britain on those marked as ‘coloured’, however this act did not simply bar ‘coloureds’ from Britain. As Sivanandan noted, this act represented the discursive and material tool through which the political economy of the nation-state of Britain could decide ‘at the very port of entry which blacks could come in and which blacks’ could not. Moreover, it carried the power to decide where those marked as ‘coloured’ ‘could go’, ‘where they could live…how they should behave…how they should conduct themselves and how they should present themselves to the dominant white British population’ [p. 12]. As Sivanandan emphasizes further, any deviation from these rigid, fixed, parameters, or any non-conformity to these rules on the part of ‘coloured’ coded bodies would be met with the ‘immigration officer at the gate’ and the ‘nigger-hunting’ ‘fascist within’ [p. 12].
In enforcing limitations and restriction on the movements [and/or preference] of/for black and brown bodies the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 embodied a key tenet of the (re)production of race as a prosthetic that is fundamental to the prosthetic’s function and role: It embodied an absolute necessity for the prostheticizing process, which is to maintain control over the prosthetic’s shape and form. This process was reinforced and bolstered however by the discourse of racialization and its contingent element, pathologization. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act made racist discourse and action respectable. It made respectable the racist pathologizing discourse which stated that ‘problems’ with social in/cohesion or disorder in Britain were derived from the presence of Black bodies and that ‘fewer blacks would make for better social relations’ [p.12]. In these contexts however it was not simply a question of presence, for the very biology of those marked as ‘coloured’ was targeted as a ‘problem’ that carried contaminatory potential. The discursive and material effects of this was played out on the bodies of school children as ‘more British born children of immigrant families’ entered the schools, along with a further increase due to more ‘children entering the country before the Act closed any further entry’ [p.13]. The British schooling system reproduced a racialized, pathologizing discourse re-generated from the Act that suggested that children marked as ‘coloured’ carried problems and deviancies that were integral to their skin colour and which in turn might infect British [White] children.

Sivanandan has noted the ramifications of this. For example, “[i]n 1963 white parents in Southhall [London]…demanded separate classes because ‘coloured’ children were holding back their progress ‘[p. 14]. The racialized pathologization of ‘coloured’ or ‘immigrant’ [read non-White] children as a contaminatory and problematic presence in Britain penetrated every institution of authoritative power in the nation-state. As Sivanandan writes, in December of 1963 for example, the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, a body formulated to ‘advise the Home
Secretary on matters relating to the welfare and integration of immigrants’, stated that ‘the presence of a high proportion of immigrant children in one class slows down the general routine of working and hampers the progress of the whole class’ [p.14]. Within this discursive framework the ‘whole class’ is homogenized. The violence of an education system that imposes a set of curricular practices that enforce marginality on the basis of gender, class, disability and sexuality is negated. As a consequence the gendered, sexualized, classed and disabled embodidness that the ‘whole class’ bring to their learning environment is subjected to amputation and is disavowed by the schooling system.

The multiple barriers and obstacles to learning that children are forced to navigate such as poverty for example are rendered invisible in this discursive arena. However, it is done so through the process of prostheticization. Moreover the strapping on of race, of the ‘coloured’ child as a prosthetic acts as a means to deny and disavow any of these negations, any trauma or angst. And what is discursively strapped on during this period is that ‘coloureds can’t react fast enough in traffic’ [p. 13]: that ‘coloured children are slow learners’: that ‘coloured children are diseased, violent: angry: lazy: immoral: and/or that their ‘problems are the result of their colour’ [p. 14]. This is what constitutes the prosthetic within Whitecentric racializing cultural contexts. To reiterate, the prosthetic must take on a fixed pathologized form. It must conform to a set of boundaries that the prostheticizing mind can recognize, and these boundaries must be policed. Violence as previously mentioned therefore is a contingent factor in this process. Violence inflicted on the prostheticized body in discursive and material forms represents the primary means through which the prostheticizing mind and social system can locate and know its prosthetic. Consequently, race as a prosthetic and as a prostheticized entity is [in and of itself] constitutive of a discursive and material congealment of violence and violation.
But there is paradox to prostheticization however. For while the logic of prostheticization leads [within a framework of racialization and Whitecentricism] inexorably towards the amputation and removal of race through homicidal practices and strategies of individual and collective violence, prostheticization and the prostheticization of race [as a process] nevertheless necessitates the presence of race. In this latter context race is conceptualized, produced and imagined as an included/excluded space. Its violent expulsion from the nation-state’s collective sense of self is a palimpsestic, ambiguous and never fully completed process of removal and amputation. In other words [and to repeat previous references to this], the prostheticizing mind must have [and it must be able to locate] its prosthetic, either in a physical sense as a visual, concrete, thingified artificial niggerized [Flannery O’Connor, 1953] spectacle, or imaginatively through the pathologizing discourse and language of racialization. Both forms, [which are not exclusive to one another] represent a congealment of violence.

The central racializing discourse that illustrates the process of prostheticization in these contexts during this period of the early to mid 1960’s is that of ‘integration’. In the racialized political economy of the British nation-state the discourse of integration as a carrier of the culture of prostheticization locks the non-white body into a perpetual state of being, whose collective ontology is included in Britain’s sociopolitical sense of its collective self and nation-stated identity only as an excluded or removed body.

Integration and Prostheticization:
There is no policy document that captures this more than the report on ‘racial integration’ commissioned by the Barnardo’s regime in 1965 and published in 1966. The report entitled, ‘Racial Integration and Barnardo’s: A Working Party Report’ fused racialization as a discursive
language and race as a concretized spectacle together. It purported to gather statistical data on the presence of children in the Barnardo’s children’s Homes who had been officially marked and categorized racially as ‘coloured’ by the institution itself and by local and state agencies. Given that the cohort of children used by the Report included ‘coloured’ children residing in the Homes between the years 1960 and 1965 I would presumably also have been included in the statistical data used for the research on the ‘coloured’ child and her/his integration. Below is the visual depiction of the ‘coloured’ child [and by extension myself] which was placed on the front cover of the Report.

Plate. 14

The cover illustration here represents the visual imaged form of the prosthetic of race which in turn reveals the prostheticizing mind’s reliance on the visual and the hyper visible [Walcott, 1995] for
as previously mentioned the prosthetic must be seen to be known and located. Embedded and carried in the image is a long discursive history of racist/racializing African child representations of Black peoples reduced to a naked bodily physicality [Hill- Collins, 2004 p.166] as the sign of an imagined primitivity. The ascription of nakedness to the ‘coloured’ child by the Barnardo’s Report is the discursive expression of a historical racialized representation of Black bodies in which Whitecentric colonialized notions of primitiveness, and savagery is made synonymous with that of Black/Brown physical nakedness for the purpose of exploitation and commodification [Hill- Collins, 1991; 2004].

Moreover, as Stoler [1995, p. 158] has noted, these discursive colonial fixations on nakedness as they relate to colonized children were historically heavily sexual. The depiction of the colonized child as a naked body was a ‘central marker’ that gave the sign in the Whitecentric colonial mode of thought that colonized children knew ‘about sexual matters at an earlier age than European White] children’ in the colonies [p.158]. As Stoler argues it was ‘they [the colonized children] who initiated their pure European playmates in precocious pleasures and influenced them with their sexual precocity….a precocity….drawn from their tropical surroundings’ [p. 157]. Coloniality in this form is not merely discursive however. As this study has been at pains to emphasis there are real material effects that arise from these discursive impositions. In this case, the material effects can be seen historically in colonialism’s specific usage of rape, sexual exploitation and sexual commodification of Black, Brown and Aboriginal, women and children as a political weapon of/for the domination and terrorization of the colonized as an entire social collective [Davis, 1998; Andrea; Smith,(2005).
In the racializing Whitecentric colonial imagination, nakedness, the tropics and eroticism go hand in hand and yet here in the contemporary moment of 1965-66 [as the front cover of the Report reveals] although the British born Barnardo’s child is unlikely to be found naked on the streets of Liverpool, London, Bristol or Manchester, skin colour and nakedness marks her/him as the embodiment of the erotic, the tropical and the primitive. In this form the ‘coloured’ child [and indeed myself] is/are constitutive of a prosthetic that can be strapped on by the dominant, racialized/racializing psyche in ways that discursively removes the ‘coloured’ child from Britishness while simultaneously fixing her/his identity at the level of removal, that is to say as an ambiguous body that is never fully a part of ‘us’. The cover of the Report therefore is the visual embodiment of race as a prosthetic, that is to say the embodiment of an included/excluded object whose strap-on discursivity is represented in the signifying language of racism and coloniality and whose strap-on re-production is dependant on an ongoing process of removal that is constituted by and through daily acts of physical and psychological terror that are not only impacted on the prostheticized but which are also internalized by them.

The strap-on prostheticization of race then is discursively embodied in the Barnardo’s Report itself which (re)constructs and (re) produces the ‘coloured’ child’s body as a problem that is pathological, that carries a disorder and is in need of fixing. Underpinned and guided by racialization as discourse and mode of thought, the document professed to ‘report on the position of children of non-European descent in Dr. Barnardo’s whether in residential care or otherwise [and] to examine the problems [my italics] arising and to make recommendations’ [p.3]. Specifically, the report concerned itself with the ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ into British society of ‘children of different races’ [p.4] ignoring the centuries of Black presence in Britain. The presence of ‘children of different races’ was seen by Barnardo’s as a consequence of Britain’s post world war 2
immigration policy that allowed for large scale migration from Commonwealth countries into Britain. According to the report, the ‘problems’ that immigrants encountered were derived from the differences embodied by the immigrants themselves and the difficulties entailed in assimilating those differences. Thus, any racializing barriers experienced by racial minority immigrants stemmed from their ‘different culture, upbringing, diet, clothes, mother tongue, family structure, childcare, discipline, and religion’ which differed ‘from the usual British patterns’ [p.4].

The Report biologized and thus racialized culture and ethnicity. As a result all ‘coloured’ children were represented as ‘non European’ therefore explicitly assigning a racial marking of non Europeaness to non-whiteness. According to the Barnardo’s Report the marking of ‘Coloured’ was a classificatory marking that was ‘used in its widest sense’ to refer to children ‘with one or both [coloured] parents’. While the report made the claim that ‘in all but exceptional cases [these were not specified] Barnardo’s should do everything in [its] power to make these children feel they [my italics] belong to British society which is historically multi-racial’ [p.5]. The discursive racializing and Whitecentric framework that guided the thinking of Barnardo’s [since its conception in the late 19th century to the time of the Report’s publication] could not fail to reproduce and enforce further the racialized minoritization and alienation of such children, given that it was underpinned by the adoption of a biologized classificatory system of race reminiscent of the late 19th century US ‘one drop rule’ which held that one drop of ‘black blood’ confirmed a person not simply as black [in its white supremacist negative sense] as is mistakenly thought, but more destructively and more insidiously as partially black or closer to whiteness.

This assignment of partial blackness served to construct a hierarchy of blackness within blackness in which those fractionalized as ‘half-breed’, ‘quadroon’, ‘octoroon’, and ‘mullatto’ etc, could
achieve a degree of White partiality and thus respectability. It was a process however that policed the boundaries of both blackness and Whiteness [Malcomson, 2000]. Similarly, Barnardo’s [1966] racial fractionalization of non-white children reproduced a pigmentocracy of citizenship. In the assignment of partial pigmentary citizenship, non-European children for example were classified as either ‘fully coloured’ or ‘partly coloured’ [p.3] which stemmed from the ‘non-European’ cultural ancestry of the children’s parent[s] [conceived in biologizing racial terms and therefore ‘colour’] being mapped onto the bodies of the children. And as culture was conflated with race and race conflated with culture the ‘non-European’ parents [whether British born or not] were also classified in fractionalizing apartheid like racial terms such as ‘fully or partly Asian, fully or partly West Indian, fully or partly African, [and/or] fully or partly American Negro’. As these racialized ascriptions were further mapped onto their children the prosthetic of race as an included/excluded, included/removed category and space of partiality and existence in British nation-state contexts was reinforced and reproduced through their bodies.

**The Politics of Mimicry and Threat**

Barnardo’s adoption of the discourse of integration as mentioned previously however was reflective of the wider systematic reproduction and enforcement of race as a prosthetic in British nation-state contexts during this period in which my file is contextualized. Prostheticization is a process of consumption. It is process in which raced bodies are discursively consumed by the prostheticizing mind which in turn [as a condition of the logic of the process] saturates raced bodies materially with violence. Integration represents a discursive component that fuels and sustains this consumption along with its ancillary, the dissemination of violence. Consequently, the discourse of integration is a vital and dispensable component of the prostheticization of race and the enforcement of race as a prosthetic.
The discourse of Integration biologizes and thus racializes difference. It conflates culture with race and makes colour commensurate with culture. As a result Britishness and the British collective sense of self is reproduced as a biological, racialized/racializing entity. Cultures that are alien and incompatible with Britishness and the ‘usual British patterns’ [Barnardo’s, 1966] are therefore invested with immutable heterogeneous and biologically determined alien characteristics. Integration constructs an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ relationship with the ‘exhalted’ [Thobani, 2007] and pure ‘us’ constructed and asserted as being under threat from the infiltration and contamination of the impure ‘them’. Thus the concept of threat gives rise to notions of contamination, purity and to practices of ‘White flight’ and to violent policing methods all of which serve as key discursive and material means and methods through which the prostheticizing mind and systems of dominating power can consume race as a prosthetic.

Just as prostheticization looks to police the fixed boundaries that it has set for the prosthetic and just as it works to circumvent and/or eradicate any deviation on the part of the prosthetic from these enforced parameters, the discourse of integration in its prostheticizing role demands that the voice of racial/cultural difference as a complex heterogeneous multi-layered space of knowledge and expression be subsumed, silenced and amputated as a prerequisite for entry into a biologized/racialized whitecentric notion of Britishness made pure through the cleansing of its past and present expression of violence, a violence represented in the sterilization of the ‘unfit’, domestic violence on an epidemic scale, daily acts of racist murder and assault, and the rape and genocidal destruction of whole peoples as a result of its palimpsestic colonial penetration.

And it should be re-noted here that even as the Barnardo’s Working Report calls for the ‘integration’ of ‘coloured’ children in the 1965/66 present, the institution as an extension of the
British immigration policy is assisting the Australian government’s ‘White Australia’ immigration policy by shipping thousands of its designated ‘British’ [White] children to Australia so as to increase the White British ‘stock’ [Grier, 2002] in that country. The genocidal flip-side of this racist policy, as has been mentioned in previous chapters, lies in the attempted eradication of Australian Aborigine peoples through the forced adoption of Aboriginal children into White Australian families. A policy designed to bleed out Aboriginal identity thereby operationalizing the amputation from Australia of what the Australian authorities termed was the ‘indelible stain’ of Aborigine Peoples [Reynolds, 2001]. Thus, there is a circularity of violence to the amputative process of prostheticization which is by extension inherent in the discourse and practice of ‘integration’. Simultaneously however, integration demands that the prostheticized individual/collective body remains silent in the face of these contradictions.

Significantly as the discourse of integration is reflective of the prostheticized mind’s need to position the raced body as an included/excluded space, integration is never a place of arrival, for even when the prostheticized body is granted the status of being ‘fully integrated’ it is a place of violence and death where the prostheticized body [individual and collective] cannot breath and cannot speak outside any other framework other than that which has been assigned to her/him. Thus, the prostheticized body in its existence as a state of amputation and excludedness is the only space in which it is [paradoxically] allowed to be included. To arrive at the place called ‘fully integrated’ is to arrive at a place of perpetual physical and psychological violence, negation and anxiety wherein the prostheticized body is coerced into giving consent not only to its own ascribed subjugated included-as-excluded/removed citizenship status but also to the violence that is necessary in the enforcement of this status, a violence that is inflicted upon it discursively and materially on a day to day, night to night basis.
A central arena for the re-production of psychological violence lies in the prostheticizing mind’s demand to see the prosthetic engage in the performance of mimicry. Integration as a discursive tool of prostheticization works to enforce mimicry as a condition of ‘fully integrated’ status. Thus, the prostheticized body must internalize the racialized prostheticizing discourses that have/are historically and contemporarily mapped onto her/his body as a means for fixing her/his parameters of expression. Discourses for example that speak of ‘coloured’ bodies as carrying the deficits of violence, primitivity, mental deficiency and immorality must be internalized by the prostheticized body in addition to the prostheticized body’s construction and (re)production as a pathological space and condition. In this context [and as a requirement of mimicry] the prostheticized body must also internalize the racializing, pathologizing discourse that she/he embodies. As such the prostheticized body is coerced into viewing her/his body as a deficit that is derived directly from her/his colour [and that of her/his parents and community] and which must be overcome either by the prostheticized body itself or through the medical, judicial, or pedagogical intervention of authorities of power, who [in designating the prostheticized body as a ‘problem’] mobilize its institutionally derived and sanctioned energies and power towards fixing and treating it.

For example, the ‘treatment’ that the Barnardo’s Working Party [1966] proposed in fixing the ‘problem’ of colour and culture in British children in its care was that of religion in its Christian, Protestant-cleanliness-of-blood form. Thus, the Working Party’s recommendations for helping [what it termed] ‘our coloured children’ to cope with the ‘problems arising from colour’ revolved around the ‘religious training of coloured children’. This entailed the frequent reading to the children of passages from the New Testament section of the Christian bible. According to the Report, The New Testament was viewed as having a ‘special bearing on race’ and as such the following passages were to be ‘particularly emphasized’ [p.47]: ‘Whoever does the will of God is
my brother, my sister, my mother’ Mark iii.35, New English Bible.cf. Matthew xii. 50; Luke viii.21: You are all brother…for you have one Father and He is in Heaven’ Matthew xxiii.8,9: ‘For through faith you are all sons of God in union with Christ Jesus…There is no such thing as Jew and Greek, slave and freeman, male and female, for you are all one person in Christ Jesus’ Galatians iii. 26-28, New English Bible, and, ‘[t]here is no question here of Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, freeman, slave; but Christ is all, and is in all’, Colossians iii. II. New English Bible [p.47].

The ‘coloured’ child therefore had to be assisted towards accepting and overcoming her/his/my deficit and burden embodied in her/his/my skin colour and [importantly] she/he/I had to be seen to be giving consent to this process, that is to say she/he/I had to mimic back to the prostheticizing mind the discursive and expressive components of a prostheticized identity that was forced upon her/him/I. In other words as victims of our skin colour we [as ‘coloured’ children] not only had to internalize the notion that we carried a defect and deficit and to pray for our salvation, we had to perform this internalization for the prostheticizing public realm’s consumption. Thus, prostheticization demands mimicry. It demands that I internalize and perform myself as a ‘coloured’ included-excluded/removed pathological ‘problem’. It demands that I [and my ‘coloured’ cohorts] perform myself/ourselves as the prosthetic, that I/we view myself/ourselves not as the complex multi-layered and multi-dimensional body that is represented in the photograph of myself [see below on the left] but that I/we see myself/ourselves as the one-dimensional thingified racist discourse drawn from the colonial racializing and prostheticizing imagination that ejaculates itself not only in the cover image of the Barnardo’s Report but throughout the entire text itself.
Within the context of colonial discursive practice Gayatri Spivak (1999) reminds us that mimicry stems from the colonizer’s desire to have the racial other speak back to him/her in mimetic fashion in order to possess and domesticate the native as a body of mimic through the negation of his/her voice [Doyle-Wood, 2007].

The process of domestication [as an integral component of prostheticization] enforces and demands that we as prostheticized bodies can only speak through the discursive parameters and frameworks that have been set for us. This means that we not only view ourselves as pathologized bodies ashamed of our accents, neighborhoods, parents, social status, skin colour, hair, cultural and social difference but that we articulate and express our pain and our agency through these same prostheticizing epistemological ways of knowing, ways of knowing that [again] lock the ‘problem’ of social difference inside the individual and away from the social structure. Rage and anger for example is internalized [in these contexts] as either something to be ashamed of, something to overcome, or something that is directed inwards [consciously and unconsciously] at the individual prostheticized self and body [Johal, 2005] with devastating consequences.

In her short film ‘Coffee Coloured Children’ Ngozi Onwurah [1988], describes the violence of this process, that is to say the violating trauma experienced absorbed and internalized by herself and her
brother in their childhood as a result of an internalized, institutionally enforced, construction of normalcy predicated specifically on whitecentric discursive notions of who, in racial terms, belongs to the British nation-state and who does not and who is fully human and who is not. It is a film that depicts the everyday discursive and material mundane reality of Britain from the positionality of a child [and children] of colour as the navigation of an unrelenting, externally imposed, onslaught of self negation/amputation, torment, pain and psychic and physical torture. Onwurah’s film makes no specific reference to the prostheticization of race but it is implicit throughout. Embedded in her film is the full terror inducing impact and effect that is re/produced when race is institutionally and systematically prostheticized.

As discussed previously, race as a prosthetic is constituted as a fixed, objectified, biologized and dehumanized thing that is strapped on, worn and consumed by the dominant, Whitecentric, racializing and prostheticizing imagination so as to ameliorate, deny and disavow its own externally imposed self amputation of its gendered, dis/abled, sexualized and classed multi-layered self. Contingent with its functionality, the prostheticization of race is a process of relentless discursive and material violence aimed at the prostheticized individual and collective body. Thus, the prostheticizing mind can only know and locate its prosthetic through violence.

In Onwurah’s film this is illustrated in psychological terms by the incessant playground chants of white children [Onwurah’s class photographs show herself and her brother as the only children of colour in the classroom] singing ‘eenie meenie miny mo, catch a nigger by his toe, if he hollers let him go, eenie meenie miny mo’. While these chants penetrate the everyday and every night thoughts and dreams of Onwurah and her brother as they live their childhood yearning to be white, yearning to be ‘normal’ and yearning to be free of persecution, they also, I would argue, reflect the
violence of prostheticization. In this, the chanting of the children facilitates the discursive means and method by which the White children can strap-on Onwurah and her brother so as to reproduce and consolidate their collective sense of self and knowing within a curricular space predicated on coloniality and the amputation of difference. But if the internalization of discourses of prostheticization entails a circulatory of violence that necessitates violence towards those bodies that are prostheticized and which in turn implicates the violence that is connected to the acceptance, denial and disavowal of the prostheticizing mind’s own negations and amputations then, as Onwurah makes clear, the internalization of oneself as a prosthetic constitutes a further and more insidiously [in psychological terms] wounding outcome of the amputative and terror-filled process of prostheticization.

This is crystallized in Onwurah’s depiction of herself as a child engaged in the psychological and physical amputation; her sense of self and body through the dousing of her hair and skin in powdered bleach in her attempts to turn herself into the white princess of western whitecentric children’s folk tales. In what is perhaps the most harrying scene, and one which exposes the full extent to which Britishness is a racial space of terror, both Onwurah and her brother are depicted as children in the bath alone in the dark scrubbing ferociously their brown skin with bleach as if it is a stain of dirt in an attempt to turn it white. As Onwurah makes clear, this is what it means to perform and live Britishness. For the body marked as non-White, this is what it means to be ‘fully integrated’. This is what it means to live and survive as a prosthetic. It is a constant process of negation and amputation.

Frantz Fanon [1952] has spoken of these negations of self and yearnings for whiteness that Onwurah is taking up here as the ‘lactification of consciousness’. What Fanon means by this is that
the anxieties, angst, and neurosis brought about by the forced internalization of oneself as epidermally inferior can in these contexts be lactified by the consciousness [a false perception of course] through a negation of Blackness/Browness that is commensurate with the desire for, and physically/psychologically strapping on of, whiteness. Fanon however does not pathologize the body marked as non white and whose inferiority is epidermalized and he refuses to pathologize the strategies that an alienated consciousness resorts to. Rather, Fanon views this specific process of lactification as a move of resistance [despite its negating psychological impact]. For Fanon it is only natural for the body that is institutionally and systematically inferiorized in this way to run from what she/he has been forced to perceive as the source of its inferiority: In this case her/his skin colour. As Fanon rightly understands, this process of lactification represents a natural strategy and struggle on the part of the racially marked, prostheticized, colour coded body for psychic survival.

There is no doubt however that a consciousness that is forced to lactify itself in this form is a consciousness that is forced to live in a constant state of negation and amputation as a contingency of/for psychic survival. In this sense, as Onwurah points out, the consequences for the self are severely damaging. However, for the prostheticized self [i.e. the racially marked body] that internalizes and views her/his own body and self through the Whitecentric, racializing, colonialized discursive properties that constitutes the prosthetic and whom in turn takes up a position of State sanctioned power and authority [e.g. administrator, teacher, social-worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, police officer, soldier, politician, etc], the process of lactification through negation is physically and psychologically destructive [and indeed homicidal] not only for the individual self but for the prostheticized body as a community and social collective.
Not only is the prostheticized body constituted as a fixed, objectified, biologized and dehumanized collective thing however, it is also a space of pathology. Any physical or psychological effects or any externally or inwardly projected anger or rage on the part of the prosthetic as a result of her/his interaction and navigation of oppression and prostheticization is perceived and marked as a disorder of the body and its difference, a disorder that must be treated in order to fix it, cure it, control it, discipline it, punish it, incarcerate it and/or kill it. Moreover, pathologization in these contexts works as a means through which the rigid, fixed, boundaries that form the prosthetic can be monitored, maintained and policed for any deviation. An example of this can be seen in my file document below. Here the Barnardo’s regime appears to mobilize itself towards the containment and treatment of any resistance on the part of myself [the ‘coloured’ and prostheticized child] to my incarceration. According to Barnardo’s I can be described as ‘lively and intelligent’. I ‘enjoy aggravating both children and adults’.

It is claimed that I looked ‘bewildered and unhappy’ when I entered the regime but that I eventually ‘settled down’. The regime of incarceration was initially ‘gentle’ with me but have since ‘naturally’ had to ‘tighten up’ their disciplinary practice. As a result of this, the regime admits that they now see in me a ‘very stubborn little boy with a temper’. It appears also that I am failing in school and that this ‘failing’ is ‘creating trouble in class’. In school I am also ‘derisive’ towards my teacher. According to the document, the regime had tried to solicit information from me regarding my mother who again is viewed as a negative influence but I resist giving anything away. I go on the ‘defensive’. I give them a ‘very crooked little smile’ and say nothing.
The tightening up of the ‘treatment’ of my dis/ordered self that the document refers to is manifested in an increase in my isolation and alienation within the institution. ‘Treatment’ was made concrete in a tightening up of the psychology of control and terror upon my body. This was administered not so much in physical forms of punishment but rather in the institution’s shunning of me. As a result the children in the Home were instructed [or so my friends told me] not to speak to me. My confinement to silence by the institution exacerbated my anger and my physical expressions of resistance and as a result [in my conscious awakened state] I aggravated and taunted more and more adults and more and more children. I screamed and raged more. I threw more furniture, banged more toy lockers and banged them as loud and as long as I could on a day to day basis. The more I raged however, the more my body reinforced the institution’s belief that I had a
disorder that needed to be fixed and controlled for the prime purpose of ‘getting’ me ‘on the way’ to where I ‘should be going’.

The notion of ‘where I should be going’ as a body is determined, it should be remembered however, by a racializing, prostheticizing conceptual framework of thought which determines that I am not going in the direction that I am supposed to go. I have a problem. I not only have a problem though I am a problem. But what kind of problem? And if the institution has a plan to take me to this place that it believes I should be going to, where is it? Where I have been, the cultural space, its habits, its customs and what was familiar and from where I have been rescued, is the place of degeneracy and immorality. The problem that I carry is a contaminatory one embodied by my mother and which must be circumvented and its presence in my body amputated. I am a pathology that must be fixed otherwise I am a danger not only to myself but that of my social collective and nation. The place to which I am being treated for and guided towards is a place of being constitutive of respectability and domesticity. It is a place of being that knows its place and internalizes and willingly cooperates and gives consent to its place [as status] in the imperialistic, racializing and prostheticizing social order of things. It is a place of being that believes itself to be pathological and dis/ordered and therefore in need of rescue by individuals and forces that are superior on the grounds of religion, intellectual ability, class/cast, morality, race and culture. It is a place of being [of ontology] devoid of criticality, one that does not question the asymmetrical relations of power that defines the social order.

As such, it is a place where [on arrival] I mimic back to the dominant its own construction of me thereby nullifying any contaminatory threat to the social order that I may have previously posed or promised some years down the line. It is a place of mimicry. But as my analysis has revealed
while the immoral, cultural, influence of my mother is a major concern for the apparatus of power I am also a ‘coloured’ child for whom mimicry [the place where I should be going] is the place of integration. Thus, any real or imagined non-cooperation with this process is productive of an intensity of controlling eugenically driven ‘treatment’ on the part of the institution that is systematic and reflective of my social collective’s response and mode of talk as a nation-state.

There is then the presence here of a broader politics of race and its prostheticization. A presence in which my ‘crooked little smile’, ‘no answer’ [and indeed my ‘failing’ and creation of ‘trouble’ at school] as a perceived non-cooperative response to controlling practices cannot be decontextualized from wider institutionalized anxieties and regulatory treatment as it relates to the racially marked ‘coloured’ body’s refusal and resistance to its prostheticization as mimic. The refusal of mimicry in these contexts either conscious or unconscious on the part of the prostheticized is constitutive of a threat to the boundaries and fixed parameters imposed by the prostheticizing mind and prostheticizing apparatuses of power. As previously mentioned the prostheticizing mind must be able to see its prosthetic in order to know it, recognized it and strap it on: Any expression of identity, utterance, and mode of being that the prosthetic takes up and asserts [or is imagined as asserting] outside of the externally imposed parameters, and boundaries that defines the prosthetic is perceived and conceptualized by the prostheticizing mind as a threat to its own sense of power, authority, equilibrium and knowing. As a consequence the prostheticizing mind cannot stand to see or tolerate any resistance to this process on the part of the prosthetic and the prostheticized. Put more bluntly, the prostheticizing mind cannot stand to see, Blackness, Browness and/or Aboriginality asserting itself outside of the externally imposed racialized boundaries that constitutes the prosthetic of race. Where this occurs, is imagined to occur [or where
there is an imagined future possibility of such an occurrence] the prostheticizing mind must mobilize itself to confront this threat and to stamp it out.

And it is in this construction and the policing of threat where the systematic terror and terrorism of prostheticization lies. The prostheticizing mind and prostheticizing apparatus of power must mobilize itself to confront the threat that challenges the boundaries that it has imposed. As the history of the period in which my documents and my surveilled incarcerated self is set this confrontation is characterized by racist immigration legislation, ‘nigger hunting’, racist assaults, street lynchings and the profiling for segregation in the British school system of those children marked as ‘coloured’ for isolation in programs for the so called ‘educationally subnormal’ [Coard, 1971]. Street lynching as an act of homicidal terror in British contexts and as an action that regulates mimicry finds its roots in the institutionalization of lynching in the United States, itself a product of systemic prostheticization and a prostheticizing, homicidal mind. It can trace its discursive history to the murder en mass of African American peoples such as Emmett Till a beautiful 14 year old African American boy from Chicago who, in 1955 while visiting his relatives in Mississippi, is dragged from his bed, tortured, castrated, shot in the head and lynched as a punishment for allegedly whistling at a white woman, Carolyn Bryant. The two white men accused of killing Emmett, Bryant's husband, Roy Bryant and his half brother, JW Milam, were later acquitted by an all-white jury. Two months later Milam confessed to the murder to a reporter from Look magazine. In that confession [which was not followed by any further criminal charges] Milan stated "I'm no bully; I never hurt a nigger in my life. But I just decided it was time a few people got put on notice. ‘Chicago boy,' I said, ‘I'm tired of them sending your kind down here to stir up trouble, I'm going to make an example of you, just so everybody can know how me and my folks stand’” [Younge, 2004].
As Emmett’s mother Mamie Till made clear in her refusal to allow Emmett’s coffin to be covered, this was an act of terroristic murder by the nation-state itself rather than an act carried out by a few individuals. Mamie Till’s political act of making public what the nation-state had done to her son exposed and pinpointed the cause of her son’s murder, that of a sociopolitical system of power, terror and dominance, predicated on white supremacy and enforced and naturalized by a dominant individual and collective psyche through the prostheticization of race and the material violence associated with the systematic policing of the prosthetic’s boundaries for any perceived or imagined threats of transgressiveness on its part, to its externally imposed mimic status and place in the social order. Milam’s comments reflect the homicidal voice of the prostheticizing mind as an individual and as sociopolitical collective. It is important to note that the flip-side of the institutionalization of lynching as a political weapon of terror in the context of African American peoples and the violence of internal colonialism in U.S contexts and indeed in the context of external colonialism is that of rape [Davis, 1998;Carby, 1982]

As stated previously race as a prosthetic is strapped on by whitecentric social collectives as a means to ameliorate the anxieties and antagonisms that arise from a coloniality of social relations that are based on the negation and amputation of the individual and collective self. Moreover, the violence that is inherent in the prostheticization of race draws its ferocity and permanency from both a disavowal of this amputative state and a denial of the prostheticizing violence that is contingent to it. Central to the process in which the prostheticizing mind disavows its terror and the effects of its actions and practices are the components of decontextuality and reification. The erasure of these components renders the prostheticizing mind as a space that is pathological in that it is made devoid of the conceptual means through which to pinpoint itself [the social structure] as the cause of violence.
Frantz Fanon’s [1952] analysis and critique of European psychiatry exemplifies this, particularly his critique of the French colonial psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni who in his analysis through interviews of the dreams and behaviours of the colonized Malagasy peoples, claims that the Malagasy suffer from a ‘dependency complex’ which is ‘exhibited’ [Mama, 1995, p31] according to Mannoni, in the Malagasy people’s ‘dependant behaviour towards [their] colonial masters’ [p31].

As Fanon argues Mannoni’s analysis of the behaviour and dreams of the Malagasy peoples is an analysis that decontextualizes the physical and psychic suffering of the Malagasy and reifies it as the by-product of their collective cultural makeup. In other words, it erases the effects of colonial violence. It erases, the ‘fact’ that under colonialism ‘some eighty thousand (one in five of the total population) were killed’. It erases the practice of mass torture by the colonial systems of power [Mama, 1995, p.32]. As Fanon argues, within Mannoni’s conceptual framework, there is no consideration that the impact of colonial violence might have ‘affected the local psychology or permeated the dreams of those he interviewed’ [Mama, p.32]. As a result of decontextuality and reification [both of which sever the historical traces that connect the genocidal conditions of the Malagasy peoples with the sociopolitical structures of colonial domination that cause them] the symptoms of colonial violence are pathologized and the Malagasy people’s are diagnosed by Mannoni as children who have a ‘natural’ [Mama, .p32] cultural and biological make-up that is predisposed towards colonization by their European master’s. As stated previously, there is a discursive permanency to the process of prostheticizing violence which I want to examine further in this continuing analysis of my case file documents.
Plate. 18- Revisiting Barnardo’s

This document records the moment when my mother having gone through the rigorous process of re-gaining custody of me from the Home has re-visited it with myself in tow. My mother had made the decision primarily as a means to convince the Home and the State agencies that we were still monitoring us that we were surviving [although when we turned up that day we had spent the last few weeks homeless on the streets of London with little money]. I have said at the beginning of this analysis that the most impactful source of what I have referred to as a paralysis of voice, was [in my own discursive pinpointing] that of the Barnardo’s Home in addition to the psychic effects of a Moral Welfare state agency apparatus that pursued and targeted me as a body in need of ‘rescue’, via a relentless regime of intensive surveillance from 1960 to 1965. This document then describes a moment that is still very real to me. I can still recall the terror that was building inside of me as we came closer to the Home in Liverpool and as I began to recognize the streets, parks and buildings that were part of Toxteth, the district in Liverpool where the Home was situated. I remember screaming at my mother that the visit was simply a ‘trick’ to put me away
again. In that moment I had thought that she had betrayed me and that she had colluded with the Home to have me re-incarcerated.

My life up until that point had taught me to be wary of trusting anyone fully [even my mother at times]. By the time we came to the building the feeling of terror had filled me to the point where I could not speak, I could only cry and shake physically. These symptoms would generally be followed by an intense uncontrollable outburst of rage and anger. This time however, rage and anger did not follow. As the document testifies I eventually accepted and trusted the assurances given to me that I was not going to stay. The voice of the Home’s regime states that I ‘was the picture of worry’. That I was ‘very wary’ about returning to the Home and that I ‘showed it too’. It states that it took some time for me to be ‘persuaded’ to temporarily leave my mother so as to visit the rest of the children in the Home and to allow the regime to speak to my mother privately about her circumstances and her continuing ability [or inability] to care for me. In addition, the voice of the regime states that many promises had to be made to me that I was not going to stay.

The focus of the regime however, follows the consistent behaviourist school of observing, commentating and documenting my behaviour and [as in many other documents in my case file] that of my mother in a pathologizing form that disavows and decontextualizes human behaviour from any social, political and subjective meaning. As a result, what is also revealed in this documented moment of pain and distress is the destructive, violent and violating nexus of decontextuality and pathologization which fuels the prostheticizing mind; and which was/is central in this contemporary moment to the re-production of racializing, eugenicizing notions of embodied degeneracy as it relates to institutionally ascribed and enforced biologizing ideas of contaminatory ‘unfit’, non respectable sites and expressions of social difference.
And these properties of pathologization and decontextuality are crucial to reproducing what I want to argue is the ‘permanency’ of prostheticization and the permanency of its material racialized/racializing violence, that is to say its reproductive impact [on the nation-state as a social collective], of trauma, alienation, incarceration and physical and psychic terror. For despite the feelings of terror that I carry for the Home in this moment and which I am clearly displaying, the regime - through its pathologization and decontextualizing of my rage, of my resistance and my feelings of terror and trauma - cannot place the cause and the source of that terror at its own feet, and by extension, at the sociopolitical structural source and cause which constitutes this thing called Britain. The sociopolitical context through which my rage, anger, trauma, resistance, and non-cooperation arises therefore is removed/erased and the collective implicatedness of a sociopolitical structure of dominating asymmetrical power [e.g. the racist, abjectifying terror structurally embedded in the ‘usual British patterns’] is negated, disavowed and rendered invisible.

At the unconscious level the concept of reification is key to the re-production [and therefore permanency] of this hegemonic and oppressive process [and concomitantly to a conscious, individual and collective refusal of this process]. Reification generated and imposed through knowledge producing regimes of state sanctioned truth [e.g. mainstream education systems] re-produces ideas, concepts, beliefs and statements as real and as concrete. Reification, facilitates the reproduction of the speciesization of bodies as prosthetic like things that acquire [in the dominant/dominating imagination] a ‘fixed’ natural and ‘immutable quality’ [Abercrombie, et al, 2006, p.325]. This occurs primarily because the processes of thingification, of pathologization and therefore prostheticization have had their sociohistorical discursive trace to those political forces that produced them, for the maintenance and reproduction of a hierarchilized, racialized, caste based social order of power, severed. Reification severs sociopolitical connectedness, context and
implicatedness. It de-contextualizes, and as a consequence it conceals through the pathologization of the material effects of oppression, the asymmetrical socio-political relations of power that are congealed in the dehumanizing, racialized, representations of thought and action that are the direct cause of these violent/violating effects in the first place.

And yet a body’s biological resistance in terms of anger, rage, non-cooperation, and indeed trauma in the face of oppression is the antithesis of the pathological. It constitutes a ‘system of auto-protection’ [Fanon, 1963, p.294]. Anything less than this, in terms of the oppressed body’s response, would be pathological. In these contexts then, it is not in the material effects of oppression [i.e. a racialized alienated consciousness, rage/anger as resistance/non-cooperation and trauma as a wounding effect at the psychic and physical level] where pathology lies, it is in the sociopolitical institutionalized, structure of power and authority itself. A structure that is produced and systematically enforced as a discursive and material effect and as a mode of thought. For where reification, pathologization and decontextualization work to naturalize oppressive social relations of power, a sociopolitical structure such as Britain that is dependant upon these components as a base for its conceptual framework of knowing and social ordering, cannot critique itself, or place its pathologizing focus back upon itself. Consequently, it is in this conceptual space where the permanency of prostheticization and the (re)production of the discursive and material effects that constitutes the violence that is prostheticization remains ongoing and guaranteed.

**Prostheticization as a Discursive Archive:**

The internalization of discourses of prostheticization entails a circulatory of violence which necessitates violence towards those bodies that are prostheticized and which in turn, implicates a further violence that is connected to the acceptance, denial and disavowal of the prostheticizing mind’s own negations, and amputation. Implicated in the permanency of this process is the concept
of the Archive. The Archive according to Foucault [1972] is constitutive of a system of statements and discursivity which implicates the enunciative im/possibilities of any given social collective. As Foucault argues, the Archive is the ‘first the law of what can be said: it is the system of rules that governs the ‘enunciative possibilities and the impossibilities that it lays down’ [p.129, 130, 131]. In other words if we think of prostheticization as an Archive [or discursive cargo] that determines and defines discourse, then we can begin to understand the ways in which it becomes implicated in defining and determining what questions can be asked, what can be said about a given thing and what cannot be said, and as a general system of the ‘formation and transformation ‘of discourse it therefore defines and determines how a given thing is imagined and crucially, how it is [or can be] conceptualized.

Foucault’s analytical approach in relation to the Archive borrows in part (whether consciously acknowledged or not) from Fanon’s conceptualization of both the historical racial schema and racialization as a mode of thought. Critical writers, scholars and social justice activists such as Edward Said [1979] and Linda Tuhiwai Smith [1999] writing from positionalities of racialized minoritization have bended Foucault’s thinking in ways that infuse a Fanonian analysis through an extension of the Archive’s significance in determining the enunciative im/possibilities as it relates to discourse and the social collective as marginalized, epidermalized, oppressed peoples. This is done by exposing and implicating alien impositions and enforcements of particular forms of hegemonic cultural ways of knowing as discursive arenas of violence. Linda Tuhwai Smith [1999] for example has reinterpreted Foucault’s notion of the Archive as a discursive space that is specifically cultural. In relation to Western colonial systems of power and domination Smith conceives the Archive as a ‘storehouse’ of ‘histories, artifacts, ideas, texts and/or images’ and knowledges [Lawrence, 1982], that are subjected to classifications, categorizations, preservations
and arrangements [Smith, 1999 p.43] and which are then ‘reproduced and re-represented back to the Western consciousness in new forms, in new social contexts and in new social situation’s’. Smith’s emphasis on the Archive as a library or storehouse of discourse that retranslates itself into ‘new forms’ while still maintaining the same oppressive discursive meaning (and material effect) is significance here. It suggests that colonial racializing discourses that conceptualize difference in biologizing prostheticizing terms do not necessarily change, they re-emerge in ‘new forms’ in ‘new contexts’ and in and through renewed and reified languages, terms and concepts.

The central hegemonic aspect of the Archive [and its significance for this study] lies in the constraints it imposes on voice, thought, and enunciation in that all possible forms of conceptualization are themselves governed by a set of cultural, epistemological, discursive parameters determined by the Archive. Thus it is the circulation and re-production of discourse in this form that maintains and strengthens the hegemonic capacity of the Archive given that hegemonic discourse embedded as it is in bodies, can be re-reproduced and re-imposed from one generation to the next in different forms without losing its destructive, dehumanizing capacity to oppress, repress, violate and murder.

It is why Barnardo’s and the Moral Welfare Workers approach my mother and myself in the 1960’s using the same mode of thought as that taken up by their colleagues in the Victorian period several generations earlier. Bodies may change from one generation to the next and they may take up new languages and terms to explain their social world but the discourse that determines those explanations does not necessarily change. It is still carried within those bodies. Hence, the discursive and material violence of limpiadis de Sangre, [cleanliness of blood] can be carried through and by social bodies for 500 hundred years and more in different forms [e.g. eugenics]
The Permanency of Prostheticization: Material Effects

The permanency of prostheticization in the form of racialized pathologizing social policy and practice is in evidence in the historical and contemporary formation of the United States. The construction of the ‘bad black mother’ [Hill-Collins, 2004 p. 131-132] for example can be traced from slavery to Jim Crow to the Moynihan report of the 1960’s whereby African American ‘matriarchy’ rather than systemic racism and ‘racial Americanization’ [Goldberg, 2009 p. 68] is/was considered to be the cause of the ‘problem’ of inner city poverty [see Neubeck and Cazenave, cited in Bullock and Limbert, 2005]. For Moynihan [1965] the innate sense of self, shame and inadequacy that he suggested was embedded in the psyche of African American males was according to his thinking exacerbated by the dominant status of African American women within the family unit. According to his argument,

The [n]egro male is made to feel inadequate, not because he is unlovable or unaffectionate and, lacks intelligence or even a gray flannel suit, but in a society that measures a man by the size of his pay check, he doesn't stand very tall in a comparison with his white counterpart. To this situation he may react with withdrawal, bitterness toward society, aggression both within the family and racial group, self-hatred, or crime. Or he may escape through a number of avenues that help him to lose himself in fantasy or to compensate for his low status through a variety of exploits [p.33].

To ram home his pathologizing and prostheticizing attack on African American mothers, Moynihan quotes Thomas Pettigrew who argues that:
the Negro wife in this situation can easily become disgusted with her financially dependent husband, and her rejection of him further alienates the male from family life. Embittered by their experiences with men, many Negro mothers often act to perpetuate the mother-centered pattern by taking a greater interest in their daughters than their sons[p. 34].

Underpinned by racialization, whitecentrism, and pathologization, the discursive Archive of prostheticization that is constitutive of the Moynihan report is reflected in the Barnardo’s Working Report on Racial Integration. And while both of these discursive documents emerge in the same 1960’s period, prostheticization as a discursive Archive or as an integral component of a historical, epidermalizing, matrix-like racial schema ensures a permanency to this violent and violating process primarily because [regardless of the social bodies of authority that are born into one particular social period and take up positions of power from one generation to the next], the same [prostheticizing] conceptual frameworks [Foucault, 1972 p.129-31] are re-reproduced in and through those bodies.

For example in the United Kingdom a 2007 report [‘Reaching Out: Think Family’, Cabinet Office, July 17th, 2007] into ‘families at risk’ by the Government’s ‘Social Exclusion Task Force’ [with contributions by Barnardo’s] cites 140,000 ‘at risk’ families in the UK ‘whose lives are blighted by a dangerous combination of poverty, poor housing, drug abuse and criminality’. The report proposes the targeting of whole families - rather than just children - because "the root causes of children's disadvantage...often lies in the difficulties of their parents… Some families with multiple problems can create significant harm to themselves and the communities in which they live". The report goes on to say that "[t]hey ['families at risk'] may externalize their problems through criminal or antisocial behaviour which can have an impact on whole communities". The report specifies eight key ‘family characteristics’ that it claims are directly associated with families who
are both ‘at risk’ of multiple problems, and what it claims are the ‘root causes’ of ‘criminality and/or antisocial behaviour’. The top four key ‘characteristics’ are: 1]‘living in council [public housing] accommodation’: 2] a ‘lack of English at home’: 3] ‘if the child is born to a single mother’: and 4], if the "mother's ethnicity is black". The inescapable message is that children of Black mothers are ‘more likely to turn to crime’ [Woolf, 2007] given [as the report maintains], that their mother’s racial and gendered identity combined is perceived as a ‘root cause’ of any criminality and/or ‘social exclusion’ that may be linked to their children.

To reinforce the representation of Black mothers as a ‘source of risk’ [for their children] the report claims that ‘[r]esearch shows that families with a black mother (African, Caribbean or Black British origin) are more likely than families with a white mother to be lone parents (54% compared with 25%); live in social housing (44% compared with 20%); and be in the lowest income quintile (30% compared with 16%)”. In addition, “Pakistani and Bangladeshi families experience the highest rates of poverty with 65% of children living in poverty (calculated after housing costs). 30% of children in Black families and 28% of children in families of Indian origin also live in poverty’. And yet, these statistics of comparison do not spur the UK Cabinet Office and authors of the report to see this as an indication of systemic racism and/or systemic inequity. On the contrary, the ‘problem’ of poverty and social exclusion is embedded/embodied in the raciality of the mother, or to use the reports code for race, ‘ethnicity’ which is seen to be a ‘source of risk’. Race as non-whiteness is again [re]circulated and strapped on in the contemporary moment as a problem and/or disorder that needs saving, fixing, controlling and or eradicating and as such it is once again constitutive of the prostheticization of race and [in addition] constitutive of the permanency of prostheticization.
As there is a permanency to prostheticization as discourse so there is a permanency to its material effects. There is a permanency within the conceptual space of prostheticization to the violence which is contingent with maintaining the fixed, rigid, boundaries of the prosthetic and for the regulation [and obliteration] of any real or imagined deviances, threats or resistances to these violating impositions and constraints. As previously mentioned the material effects of this process are racial profiling/persecution, incarceration, psychic/spirit injury and homicide, the latter of which is manifested on a systematic basis in the form of street lynching. The most prominent incidence of this in recent decades is that of Stephen Lawrence.

Stephen was [and certainly still is in the heart of his family] a young Black British man, 18 years of age. At approximately 10:30pm on April 22nd, 1993 he was murdered by a gang of white male British youths. That evening Stephen and his friend Duwayne Brookes were waiting for a bus to take them home. Stephen walked a little further up the road to see of he could see the bus coming. Duwayne remained at the bus stop. The account given by the Public Inquiry states that a group of 5 or six young white males stood across the road opposite Stephen. They shouted out to Stephen, ‘what, what nigger’. The group then crossed the road and ‘literally engulfed Stephen’ [Gilborn, 2008 p.121]. They viciously attacked him stabbing him twice. According to Cathcart [1999] one stabbing blow to his ‘chest cut through two major nerves, a large vein and an artery before penetrating a lung. The other, gashing the left shoulder, also cut through an artery and a vein. As a result, Stephen lost all feeling in his right arm and his breathing was constricted, while losing blood from four major blood vessels. The shock of the attack had sent his heart rate sharply up, so the blood was pumping out into his clothing and on to the ground’ [p.11].
Stephen called out to Duwayne who was ahead of him. Duwayne called back ‘just run’. Stephen had ‘managed to cover more than 200 hundred yards up the hill’ however his body was getting weaker and weaker and he was ‘progressively losing feeling [in his body] and slowing down’. He called out to Duwayne saying ‘look at me, tell me what’s wrong’. As Cathcart writes, Stephen’s ‘clothes were dark and it was at night, but looking closely now Duwayne could see by the orange light of the street lamps that his friend was soaking with blood and that it was actually gushing out through his clothing just below the neck. Duwayne was appalled, but he was also afraid that the white boys would come back for more. ‘Just keep running,’ he said breathless. ‘I can’t,’ protested Stephen, putting his hand to his chest. ‘I can’t’.” [p.11]. Stephen’s heart stopped shortly after.

Physical racist violence is contingent to prostheticization and as previously observed the prostheticization of race as discourse [and as a discursive racializing ‘cargo’] underpins and is congealed in the very physicality of racist violence in British nation-state contexts. This discursive congealment was to be reproduced in the subsequent police investigation. As the Public Inquiry states Stephen’s friend Duwayne Brooke’s was immediately placed under suspicion: He was labeled under questioning as ‘agitated’ and as ‘[a]gressive’ [Gilborn, 2008]. The public inquiry later concluded that Duwayne was ‘stereotyped as a young Black man [exhibiting] unpleasant hostility and agitation, who could not be expected to help and whose condition and status simply did not need further examination or understanding’. For the Lawrence family [in the aftermath of Stephen’s murder] however the violence of prostheticization was multi-layered and unrelenting.

As Cathcart [1999, p.122] writes, with the exception of going to the mortuary and church the Lawrence family had hardly left their house for 8 days after learning of Stephen’s death. Needing to stock up on food they went to the local shops. As they drove into the parking lot of a store
“[t]hey saw two white women [a mother in her fifties and her adult daughter] returning to their car with a full shopping trolley. Doreen [Stephen’s mother], who was behind the wheel...stopped the car to let the woman pass, but did not move. The gap was small so Doreen maneuvered to make more room but a misunderstanding developed and Doreen eventually made a gesture of impatience, saying inside the car: ‘What are you doing?’ The younger of the two white women became angry and called Doreen a ‘fucking nigger’. Doreen parked, but her passengers [Stephen’s sister and Aunt] were furious and as soon as they could, they ran over to the white women to remonstrate....One of the white women...used the words ‘black cunt’, while Cheryl or Lorna said: ‘It was one of you bastards that killed my nephew.’

According to Cheryl... [this was the response]: ‘If he hadn’t been here [in this country], he’d still be alive’[p, 122]. As previously stated, discursive and material violence is contingent with prostheticization. In the context of prostheticization the need to police and fix the boundaries of the prosthetic is an absolute necessity for the prostheticizing mind, as is the need to obliterate any real or imagined perceived threats or resistance on the part of the prosthetic to these externally imposed constraints. Prostheticization then represents a discursive and material practice of terror; but it is a terror, as can be seen here in this incident with Stephen’s family, that impacts and effects not only an individual, racialized, prostheticized body but the entire collective to which that body belongs.

As Ida B Wells [Carby, 1982] has noted with regard to the institutionalized practice of lynching in African American contexts, the target for terror at the level of both the physical and the psychological was that of African American peoples as a collective whole. Similarly, Angela Davis [1998] has also pointed out that the flip-side of lynching as it relates to African American men [i.e.
the systematic rape of African American women] was not an individual act of brutality but rather a political weapon of terror aimed at violating physically and psychically African American peoples as a whole. In other words, the prostheticizing violence against African American peoples constituted in these contexts by lynching and rape was primarily a political weapon designed to keep African American peoples in a space of subjugation. Thus the racist murder of Stephen impacts, violates and traumatizes the body of Stephen as a collective constituted by family and community [i.e. community as a space of shared struggle and resistance].

Moreover, murderous, homicidal practice in its racist, racializing, prostheticizing form in turn implicates the prostheticizing mind as a regime of State power dominance and authority and as a social collective, a social collective which relies upon its discursive and material production and effects for its own sense of equilibrium and knowing. Thus the murderers of Stephen are not merely individuals; they reflect and constitute the organization and formation of the British nation-state itself. The utterance of the individuals in the parking represents a discursive and material formation of the prostheticization of race that does not have to physically murder. The very discursivity of prostheticization speaks murder. It says, we will kill you physically and psychically simply because you are Black or Brown. It says we will amputate you from this [British] space. As a result of this discursive and material enforcement of terror, Britain as a space of prostheticization in the context of race, constitutes a place of death, everyday terror, and homicide. According to research by the Institute of Race Relations [2010] in the UK, the numbers of people who have been killed in Britain as a result of racist violence between Stephen’s murder in 1993 and 2010 amount to an average of five people per year.
These include among others, Mohan Singh Kullar in 1994 who was murdered by a gang of racists in his own shop: Mushtaq Hussain in 1995 who died of a stroke after being beaten by two men: Michael Menson in 1997 who was set alight by a gang of youth while he was in a phone box: Farhan Mire who in 1998 was ‘kicked to death in the street by a white man’: Hassan Musa a Libyan student who in 1978 was kicked by a white racist gang to the point of unconsciousness and left in a ‘vegetative state’ for 21 years. He died in 1999. Included also is Firsat Dag an asylum seeker who was stabbed to death in 2001. Firsat had been located by the British Home Office as part of its ‘dispersal program’ to a housing estate known as Sighthill in Glasgow Scotland, an estate that was known to harbor racist elements which would place asylum seekers in danger. The Home Office’s response to Firsat’s murder and the subsequent critiques of the ‘dispersal program’ was that ‘we [the British Government] will not pull out of areas simply because people say its an area where there could be racists’ [Fekete, 2001]. As Liz Fekete writes, three days after Firsat’s murder, a further asylum seeker, Davoud Rasul Naseri was stabbed on the housing estate outside his front door by a gang of white racist youth who during the assault called him ‘nigger’. Although physically surviving the attack Davoud [arguing that the human rights abuses on the estate were worse than the places which asylum seekers were fleeing from] stated that it would be better for him to return to his country because there ‘I would be killed because of my aims, not because of nothing’ [Fekete ].

The permanency of prostheticization as a State produced discursive and material enforcement of terror, is crystallized in the post 9/11 period in Britain and the European Union as a whole in what Liz Fekete [2006] calls Cultural and Enlightened fundamentalism. As Fekete argues, quoting Stolcke [1995], cultural fundamentalism as a discursive tool works to ‘monoculturalize’ European nation-states by reifying ‘culture…as a compact, bounded, localized and historically rooted set of
traditions and values transmitted through the generations’” [p.9]. Reproducing the prostheticizing discourse of 1960’s Britain, cultural fundamentalism ‘assumes that there is a single homogenized set of values’ that is expressed in the form of a collective cultural identity by the State itself [Fekete, p. 9].

European nation-states are viewed therefore, as an arena for the mobilization of a ‘shared sense of belonging and loyalty predicated on a common language, cultural traditions and belief” [Gullestad, 2002 cited Fekete p. 9]. It is a process in which ‘roots nationality and citizenship’ as ‘hereditary cultural heritage’ [p. 9] are based on an imagined set of shared ‘core values’ which are conceived as deriving from what are considered to be Enlightenment notions of liberty, tolerance, secularity ‘forward thinking’, progressiveness and a belief in ‘democracy and social justice [p. 10]. In the prostheticizing face of cultural and enlightened fundamentalism which constructs these imagined ‘core values’ as something that must be protected, defended, secured, and safeguarded, non-western immigrants must cast off their ‘backward culture’ and assimilate into the modern, secular values of the Enlightenment. If for Christian and Islamic fundamentalists, the Bible and the Qur’an are sacred texts, not open to interpretation or adaptation, for cultural fundamentalists [then] the Enlightenment is an equally sacred, finished process. But as Sivanandan [1982] has argued, the Enlightenment has yet to extend its remit of liberty, fraternity and equality to the non-white peoples of the world [Fekete, 2006, p.8].

Sivanandan’s observation is not spoken of however. It is erased: Enlightenment philosophy as it is produced and constructed in contemporary dominant forms is cleansed of this aspect: Similarly, It is cleansed of its history of religious, racial, sexual, classed, gendered and abled violence, incarceration, exclusion and genocidal practices. And this is a key issue because it is this cleansing,
this cultural cleansing, that has a direct influence on the present prostheticizing social order of things post 9/11 which begins to serve as a tool for the organization of new fascist notions of nation and the nation-state. As Fekete makes clear, this is not an ideology that resides with small extremist fascist groups. It is an ideology that has become the central policy of governments’ post 9/11 across Europe. Government reforms post 9/11 now speak of the ‘alien culture’ of Muslim peoples: Islamic culture and its values are accused of being incompatible with the values of European states and culture.

This is accompanied by the re-reproduction of the racialized prostheticizing discourse of integration constituted by statements, ideas, and common-sense thinking that refer to Muslims as a homogenous group of people who ‘cling’ on to their cultural values [Kundnani, 2007] and refuse to ‘integrate’ into European norms, customs, values. All of this serves to justify [in law] and through the justice system the persecution and oppression of Muslim peoples in addition to an incitement to violence on the street, whereby daily acts of violence and homicidal incidences against hijab wearing women and any man who [in the imagination of the prostheticizing mind] looks Muslim, have increased exponentially. The permanency of prostheticization then is congealed in violence both in its psychic and physically wounding material form and in the racializing ‘clash of civilizations’ discursivity which underpins discussions on ‘citizenship and national belonging’. Discussions that begin with the notion that a ‘set of fixed cultural norms and values is [needed] to establish on what basis [so called] foreigners should gain access to, or be excluded from, the national community and its territory” [p.9].

As Fekete writes, Samuel Huntingdon’s [1996] book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order asserts the belief that ‘civilizational conflict occurs not just between nations, but
within those western nations which fail to control immigration and/or fail to preserve civilizational coherence and homogeneity’ [Fekete, 2006 p.8]. Thus, in these contexts if so called ‘radical’ Islam is constructed and imagined by the prostheticizing mind as uncivilized, alien and as an entity that poses ‘a threat abroad, [then] Muslim communities within western countries [must] also…be strictly monitored’ [p.9]. As a consequence, the process and practice of prostheticization which fixes Muslim peoples as deviant, savage, backward and terroristic, organizes and operationalizes its strap-on violent materiality through anti-terrorism statutes and dehumanizing systems of immigration control, regulation and citizenship testing.

Fekete has outlined some of the examination tests that are now forced upon immigrants to Europe, more specifically immigrants from what are perceived by European security and immigration authorities to be Muslim countries. In Baden-Wurttemberg for example [and as Fekete reminds us, this was the first German state to ban civil servants from wearing the Hijab] ‘applicants for citizenship from some fifty-seven Islamic countries now face a lengthy interrogation that includes questions on belief and attitudes towards religious freedom, equality of the sexes, homosexuality, promiscuity, freedom of expression, [and] the concept of honour and forced marriages’ [p.5]. Further examples include the Netherlands’ so called ‘pre-arrival integration exam’ in which images are of gay men kissing and topless women on the beach are shown to Muslim applicants. The applicants are tested for any behavioural changes, such as changes in eye movements or body.

Other regulatory practices include proposals to ‘introduce integration badges’ to be worn by Muslim immigrant families [though this has not been implemented]. There have been codes of conduct pushed into law which calls for only Dutch to be spoken on the streets on the Nederland’s and [not only on the street but] by immigrant families in their own homes. In France,
prostheticizing islamophobic legislation that essentializes Muslim culture and constructs Muslim girls and women as bodies that need to be saved and rescued from their perceived uncivilized primitive religion and ‘bad biological cultural father[s]’ has facilitated the removal of children from the homes of orthodox religious families and placed them in care thus stripping the parents of any parental rights [p.17-18].

Drawing on Gullestad [2002], Fekete [2006] asserts that what undergirds these ideas and discussions on citizenship, integration and national belonging is the consistent “reference to a ‘lack of belonging’ [on the part of Muslim peoples] due to some ‘innate’ quality [i.e. deficit] such as ancestry, a shared cultural heritage and so on” [p.9]. As Fekete observes [again borrowing from Gullestad, 2002] within these hegemonic and homicidal frameworks of thought and action “[n]on western citizenship applicants are being asked to ‘become European’ at the same time as it is tacitly assumed that this is something they can never really achieve” [Fekete, 2006 p.9]. This violent/violating process thus constitutes an example of the biopolitical permanency and transferability of prostheticization as it relates to racially marked included-as excluded/removed bodies in Euro nation-state contexts.

As mentioned in chapter three and explored further in chapter four, Foucault's notion of biopolitics and biopower examines the formulation of a ‘new relations of power’ [Giroux, 2006 p. 51] administered within an apparatus of authority, subjugation, and control that utilizes the ‘body as a mechanism of/for control and surveillance’ [Asgharzadeh, p. 13]. As Giroux [2006] has pointed out however, [p.51] biopolitics and biopower is “concerned not only with the body as an object of disciplinary techniques that render it ‘both useful and docile’… [Foucault 1997, p. 249]…but also with a body that needs to be ‘regularized’ [and made] subject to those material means of production
that produce ways of life that enlarge the targets of control and regulation”[ Giroux, 2006, p. 51]. The material effects of this State produced and sanctioned apparatus of power are that biopolitical configurations of power possess and maintain the power to decide who can live and who can die.

As Giroux argues, Foucault suggests that this “death function in the economy of biopolitics is justified [and materialized] primarily through a form of racism in which biopower ‘is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race to exercise its sovereign power’” [Giroux, 2006 p. 51]. Nowhere is this more in evidence for Giroux than Hurricane Katrine’s destruction of New Orleans’s and the Federal government of the United State’s disavowal of responsibility in helping the poor and marginalized Black population of that city thus rendering them invisible, disposable and re-productive of a life left bare.

Like Giroux, Zine [2010] among others has noted the ways in which Foucault’s concept of biopolitics and biopower has been taken further by Giorgio Agamben in his book Homo Sacer [1998]. As Zine [2010] has observed Agamben argues that the notion of what he calls 'bare life’ is reproduced and reinforced by the dominance of sovereign [State] power. As Zine writes, according to Agamben, “‘bare life’ is life that is banished from political community and becomes expendable despite the moral sanctions against sacrificing human life’. ‘Thus the space’ of "[t]he sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life that is a life that may be killed but not sacrificed is the life that has been captured in this sphere”’ [Agamben, 1998, p.83, cited in Zine, 2010]. As Zine writes, racially marked bodies particularly those of children and youth are consistently “reduced by the state/police to this form of 'bare life' and are open season for killing with impunity” [2010].
The material effects of prostheticization follow this same violent pattern. The effect of its permanency is/are that of physical, psychological and spiritual death. To bend Agamben’s analysis to these contexts is to acknowledge that prostheticized bodies are similarly considered in and by the legal apparatus not to be human. They/we are rendered ‘disposable’ [Giroux, 2006] and invisible. And yet within the power dynamics of prostheticization there is a process at work that is not only about disappearing and/or invisibilizing a people nor is it necessarily about killing ‘without committing homicide’ or producing exceptionalities within law. In terms of prostheticization which fixes the prostheticized body as an included-as-excluded/removed body and disseminates its violence in these ambiguous contexts the State is in/by law allowed, and indeed encouraged, to commit homicide.

For example, in 2009 I had attended a coroner’s hearing of a young racialized 17 year old boy whose name was/is Alyw Al Nadir. Alyw had been shot to death by police officers one evening in a local park close to his home in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. He was unarmed. The coroner’s hearing was conducted under the auspices of a ‘special investigations unit’ a format in which the police as an institution investigate themselves and [as with all such cases as they relate to murder in Ontario, Canada contexts] exonerate themselves under the façade of transparency. The hearing revealed a litany of contradictions on the part of the police officers however these contradictions were simply ignored within the rigid and limiting parameters of the ritual itself which were designed to force the jury towards a specific outcome, that of the exoneration of the police officers and the police force as an institution of any criminal responsibility. This was rammed home in the directive the Coroner gave to the jury. According to the Coroner, Alwy’s death was the result of only four possibilities, suicide, accidental, natural, or homicide. The Coroner then explained that
Alwy’s death was not suicide nor was it natural nor was it accidental. As a result they [the jury] could come to only one conclusion, that his death was the result of homicide.

For a brief moment as I heard this it appeared that justice was going to take place, that there was going to be some acknowledgement on the part of the criminal justice system that Alwy’s death was the result of a criminal act. But then the Coroner proceeded to direct the jury into the criminal justice systems definition of the term ‘homicide’. According to the Coroner, homicide under English law [the system underpinning the Canadian criminal justice system] simply meant that one person had died at the hands of another person. This did not imply criminality according to the Coroner. As the Coroner explained [in what appeared to be an attempt to reassure the jury of any doubts or misgivings they might have had], they [the jury] could find that Alwy’s death was due to homicide but not due to any criminality. This was the official finding of the jury.

Thus, when race is prostheticized, homicide against racially marked bodies is enforced, entrenched and enacted in law to the extent that the law itself represents a murderous tool that is amputated [wiped clean] of any semblance of criminality or dominant institutional accountability. In other words, when race is institutionally prostheticized the criminal justice system, juridical statutes, laws, legislative policies, human rights protections and the protocols of policing that is specific to a nation-state such as Britain [and in these particular contexts, Canada] are not merely suspended for racially marked bodies and communities, they actively produce, reproduce and sanction homicide of thought and action against those bodies and against those communities as a contingent aspect of the systematic dehumanizing process that characterizes the prostheticization of race. Moreover, to reiterate, as a process of ongoing violence, prostheticization is unrelenting in the sense that because there is [on the part of the prostheticizing mind and apparatus of power] a need to fix the
boundaries of the prosthetic, to policing its forms so that it can be seen, known, recognized, the prosthetic [as a collective] is not only killed, disappeared and/or disposed of, it is also violated physically and discursively as an included-as-excluded/removed presence. Thus, the violence of prostheticization is an ongoing consumptive violence. It is a lactificatory violence that finds its historical, cultural trace in the Euro/Whitecentric genocidal violence of slavery and colonialism.

In his work *Master Race, Murder and the Gory Globalization* Arnold Itwaru [2009] speaks to lactification in similar contexts in relation to what he calls the ‘Eurocentric master race culture’. This culture according to Itwaru is an embodied, racialized, re-productive place of violent discursive and material expression, which, ‘insofar that it has defined itself in terms of Whiteness and white supremacy has [in addition] lactified itself in Whiteness through the vilification of Blackness” [p.62] . It is an ‘explosive murderous superiority’, ‘driven by the predatory mania to violently own and control’ [p.63]. Moreover, as Itwaru argues, violence in this lactificatory form represents ‘an anxiety which finds a precipitous security in the compulsion to conquer’, to alienate, torture, maim and kill ‘those opposed to its domineering will’ [p.63]. The lactificatory compulsion to do violence against that which is constructed and imagined as the prosthetic is [as has been mentioned] a form of violence that must consistently work towards policing the fixed discursive and physical boundaries that the prostheticizing mind and political apparatus has set for the prosthetic. In addition, this lactificatory mode of violence is enacted as an ongoing process of consumption that attempts to disavow, negate and deny the prostheticizing mind’s own anxieties drawn from its own self negation; self hate and alienated sense of consciousness. And so to reiterate, as violence itself its constitutive of the process of strapping–on the prosthetic and is the only form through which the prostheticizing mind can see, know and recognize the prosthetic that fills its negations, the prosthetic embodied by racially marked peoples is rendered as an ongoing,
unrelenting discursive and material receiver of violence at the level of the psychic and the physical. In other words, as an included-as excluded/removed individual and collective body.

In Canadian contexts and the process of prostheticization which underpins the homicidal violence that is experienced and impacted by bodies such as that of Alwy and his family is made institutionally permanent in the operationalization of racializing practices such as 208 carding. In concrete material terms it represents Toronto, Canada’s version of the ‘nigger-hunting’ practices of racial persecution conducted by British police in the 1950’s and 1960’s against Black peoples. The 208 carding system targets primarily young Black males who are stopped on the streets of Toronto by the police if they are deemed to be engaging in ‘suspicious’ behaviour. What counts as suspicious behaviour however, is framed within a racist, racializing and prostheticizing mode of thought that biologizes Black bodies [or anyone that the police deem to be Black] as an entire collective who all share a set of biologically determined criminal characteristics and behaviours that are correlative with skin colour. Having made a stop the police then compile a set data on the [208] cards, data comprised of information regarding name, race, age, address, and the reason for the stop including time and date. In addition to this the police also report on the cards the name[s] of the people that the person who is stopped was with initially. They too have the same information recorded [Sewel, 2010]. The police then use these cards to build a wider profile which connects the individual with her/his friends, family and community.

As Sewel states, between the years 2003-2008, approximately 1.7 million racialized people were stopped by the police services. Not only does this prostheticizing practice institutionalize the psychic terrorization of young Black and Brown bodies on the streets of Toronto and indeed
their families and communities, it also produces the compulsion to maim and kill, a compulsion born out by the homicide of Alwy and numerous other young racialized men such as Junior Alexander Manon [Joshi-Vijayan, 2011] a young 18 year-old man beaten to death in full daylight public view by a group of police officers, officers who were subsequently acquitted by the same judicial system which legitimized in law Alwy’s death.

Returning to Britain, the violence of prostheticization which renders racially marked bodies as included-as excluded/removed from the nation-state’s conceptualization of what counts as fully human is enacted in the State’s treatment of Asylum seekers. As Athwal’s [2006] study Driven to Desperate Measures, [2006] makes clear, asylum seekers are marked for prostheticizing violence as an included as excluded and removed collective. They are included as excluded and removed from healthcare, safe working conditions, and included in on the terms of destitution, homelessness, suicide and murder.

The permanency of prostheticization however as a discursive, archival-historical racial/racializing schema like process that constrains thought and which determines through its conceptual framework the modes, means and forms through which social analysis take place and indeed the methods and questions that are to be centered, used, asked, is to be found in the discursive components of prostheticization, that is to say pathologization and decontextualization both of which are reliant for their oppressive impact on reification. In the present contemporary moment of the 21st century an example of this process in action is that of the Barnardo’s organization’s implicatedness in the detention of asylum seeking families through their collaboration with the UK Border Agency. As Francis Webber [2011] argues the facility which Barnardo’s has committed to oversee [despite their claim that is not a detention center] is a detention center in everything but
name. The investigation of *NoBorders* as Webber reveals shows that “center will be a detention center-complete with 2.5 meter perimeter fences, locked areas, internal fences dividing the site into accessible and inaccessible areas, a ‘buffer zone’ inside the perimeter fence and powers to use force and ‘control and restraint techniques on both adults and children’. Barnardo’s claim, that their staff will be able to ‘bring much needed welfare support to children and families at an extremely stressful time of their lives’ [p.3]. They will further “ensure that staff [at the center] is trained to safeguard children and treat [the] families with the dignity and respect they deserve”…and as they say, “if not us, then who”?

I would argue that this positionality by Barnardo’s here encapsulates the discursive constraints on voice and ‘to speak’ that the archival impact of racialization and its ancillary prostheticization bring with it. It encapsulates the permanency of prostheticization, for Barnardo’s can still not see that the center is a prison with all of the psychic trauma that comes with a prison, particularly as it impacts children. The prosthetizing mind that pathologizes and decontextualizes continues to be incapable of tracing a line of analytical consciousness to the cause of trauma and the cause and source of dehumanization and its material effects. In other words, it is incapable of pathologizing itself, the sociopolitical structure.
Chapter Seven
Conclusion: Anti-Racialization and the Politics of Enunciation

Introduction

Even as I write the final portion of this study Jack Straw the former Home Secretary is once again voicing his analysis of sociopolitical issues through the conceptual framework of racialization and its ancillary component, prostheticization. Commenting on the case of two South Asian males convicted of sexually assaulting young girls, Straw makes the claim that white girls are now viewed as “‘easy meat’ by Pakistani rapists” [Batty, et al, 2011]. Arguing that ‘grooming [white girls] is a problem among some Pakistani men’, he goes on to assert that ‘there is a specific problem which involves Pakistani heritage men…who target vulnerable girls’. According to his thinking, ‘[w]e need to get the Pakistani community to think much more clearly about why this is going on and to be more open about the problems that are leading to a number of Pakistani heritage men thinking it is ok to target white girls in this way’; Straw locates these ‘problems’ in Pakistani culture/heritage. As Straw says, ‘[t]hese young men are in Western society, in any event, they act like any other young men, they’re fizzing and popping with testosterone, they want some outlet for that, but Pakistani heritage girls are off-limits and they are expected to marry a Pakistani girl from Pakistan typically’.

Once again Barnardo’s as an organization makes a contribution to the debate, a contribution that cannot escape the constraints of the racializing, prostheticizing conceptual framework that has defined its historical existence. For while Martin Narey [2009] the chief executive of Barnardo’s and former director general of the British Prison service suggests that the issue that Straw has referred to is ‘more about vulnerable children of all races [who are] at risk of abuse’ rather than dismissing Straw’s comments outright for the racism that they represent, Narey leaves open a
suggestion that there may be some element of truth [in terms of sexual assault and its connections to culture] to what Straw has to say. As Narey says, ‘I certainly don’t think that this [grooming of children for sexual abuse] is a Pakistani thing. My staff would say that there is an over-representation of people from minority ethnic groups...Afghans, people from Arabic nations...it's not just one nation’. Both Straw and Narey echo the pathologizing, racializing, heteronormative discourses that circulated during the late 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s which depicted West Indian males [as a cultural collective] as sexual predators who prayed on and threatened white girls. Moreover, the comments of Straw and Narey serve to reify in the dominant imagination the 19th century Orientalist, strap-on, prostheticizing spectacle of Asian and Arabic males as carriers of a collective biological make-up that is predisposed towards the sexual abuse and enslavement of women, particularly those who were white.

By Straw and Narey should not be viewed however simply as racializing individuals. They embody a racializing, prostheticizing, strap-on discursive conceptual framework that is central to the social organization of the nation-state of Britain and to its collective sense of self. As discussed in the previous chapter and throughout this study, internal-colonialism, whitecentrism, racialization and prostheticization as a systemic discursive archive and racial schema constrains voice, it places constraints on the questions that can be asked, the questions that can be conceptualized. For example, when a white male brutalizes a white woman [an oppressive reality that is in epidemic proportions in the contemporary moment in Britain] is this not a case of white-on-white-violence? If not, why not? Is it a social issue in which whiteness intersected with heterosexual and heterosexist maleness needs to be placed under political scrutiny? If not, why not? Is this not a case in which the ‘white community’ needs to ‘think more clearly about what is going on and ‘to be more open about the problems that are leading’ to this violence? If not, why not? To ask such
questions is to make the movement towards stepping outside of the historical archive/racial schema of racialization and prostheticization and to make the move towards enunciation, that is to say the coming to voice as an assertion of the individual and collective sense self and knowing that is constitutive of an active everyday refusal to give consent to the ongoing discursive processes and material effects of racialization, amputation, and negation; and which in turn refuses to strap-on the prosthetic of race and the discursive archival/racial schema of prostheticization, that wounds, murders and strips the body of all humanity.

As mentioned previously in this study, dehumanizing constructions and categorizations of social difference do not simply work to assign labels such as ‘half-caste-West–Indian child’, ‘low mentality’ ‘illegitimate’, ‘weak morally’, and ‘coloured’) to people, groups and communities but rather they define, determine and re/produce collective processes of conceptualization. The prostheticizing mind which is a homicidal/genocidal mind however is [as this study has argued] both a mode of thought and a collective embodiment of a system of violent and violating discursivity that is foundational to the re/production of British nation-state identity formation as a space of historical and contemporary internal/internalized colonialism, a space in which racialization, prostheticization and the negation and amputation of difference [externally/internally] is central.

**Anti-Racialization as a Politics of Enunciation**

But in working towards a theorization of the possibilities of/for resistance to this field of oppression, what are the broader philosophical and theoretical implications involved in foregrounding internal/internalized colonialism, racialization and the congealed discursive and material violence of internal colonialism? In other words, in the context of a hegemonic British
nation-state collective sense of self, how might I begin to shift this discussion towards developing a framework of resistance that works towards the decolonization of our internal/internalized coloniality [as a social collective] while opening up space for the assertion of a politics of enunciation which speaks to a collective implicatedness in oppression and acknowledges simultaneously the saliency of race as an integral component of this implicatedness? How might we/I begin to assert a politics of enunciation in which our/my nation-state’s identity and collective sense of self is constitutive of a collective refusal [and contestation] of prostheticization and its foundational hegemonic pillars of racialization, whitecentrism and coloniality?

**Mau Mau and the Aftermath of Barnardo’s: Racialization, Amputation and Resistance**

To begin to trace an answer to this question let me turn back to the period after my ‘removal’ from Barnardo’s. This was a period characterized by homelessness and physical and psychological hunger. For us it was not the swinging sixties. It was a period of moving from town to town, hitching rides from truck drivers, living in shop doorways or seeking shelter in public washrooms when the towns that we arrived in where devoid of any homeless shelters. It was also a period in which bed and breakfast hostels would oftentimes refuse to take what little money my mother had due to their frequently practiced policies of denying access to ‘coloureds, Irish, children and dogs’.

In the 2 years or so following my removal from Barnardo’s I spent little time in school. In some cases where we spent a month or so in one town my mother would enroll me in the town’s elementary school and I would spend a few weeks or so in it and then we would move on. These schools were not like the multi-racial school that I had attended in Liverpool. In these schools I was the only designated ‘coloured’ child and as such the cultural, experience for me was one similar to that of Ngozi Onwurah and her brother which constituted an everyday ‘eenie-meeny-miny-mo–
catch-a-nigger–by-his-toe’ discursive navigation. In addition, given that I was experiencing what might now be called post traumatic stress after my experience at Barnardo’s in some cases the only way that I could be brought physically into the school was to be carried by the school authorities screaming with rage, fear and anger at being separated from my mother.

Eventually we came to a small town in the North West of England, a town called Lytham-St.Annes. After some months of instability of finding shelter and work, my mother looked to enroll me in one of the local elementary schools. As most of the schools were selective I spent sometime going from one school to another being scrutinized by school authorities before being turned down. The only school that was obliged legally to take me was the one state run [Council] school in the town. It was a school that took in all of those children whom the other schools refused to select for enrolment. As a result, the population of the school represented to a large degree the less valued and the ‘surplus people’ [Lorde, 1984 p.111] of the town itself. The school encompassed a preponderance of disabled, working class and underclass children most of whom came from the town’s social housing estate known locally as ‘Mau Mau’ a name that was self ascribed.

As Corrigan [1990] has argued mainstream state controlled and regulated ‘schooling systems were [are] never intended to educate all the children but were [are] intended to [re] constitute the social identity of a [privileged numerical] minority and to regulate into confusion, silence, hesitation, and resentment the majority’ of student bodies who [were/are] forced to attend them’ [p.157-158]. This ‘culture of violence’ characterized the school and in doing so it mirrored the Barnardo’s ‘new asylum’ [Coldrey] that I had been rescued from.
The classroom that I was placed in was [like the school itself] a rigid, militarized, violating and brutal regime of control and regulation. This was enforced through corporal punishment, psychological denigration and ridicule. It constituted a culture of silence [Friere, 1973] and violence on multiple levels which was operationalized through rewards, punishments and the constant surveillance of/for any resistance on the part of the students to the classroom’s oppressive order of things. The classroom and school as a whole however mirrored the physical communal space of the Council Estate from which the bulk of the students came from.

The Council estate like the school and classroom was physically structured on the lines of a military barracks or prison which reflected the blueprint format of working class housing estates across the country [Foucault, 1995]. Like the school, the estate was a red brick fortress and like the school it had just two entrances which allowed for the monitoring and controlling of bodies entering and leaving. These two entrances of the estate led into a maze of geometrically circulated rows of housing. These rows traced themselves from the very outer-rim to the middle. The interior was broken-up with small units of houses which constituted small communities within the community. All the houses were identical and all faced inwards observing each other: It provided its own shops and mini grassy squares. It was a township built on the edges of the town and separated from the town. It was a camp [Agemban, 1998] and as such it constituted a ‘regime of regulation’ [Foucault, 1995].

Like the school and classroom culture there was also a physical and psychological coloniality underpinned by racialization that was embedded in the power relations between the estate, its inhabitants and the rest of the town. As an estate/township for ‘surplus people’ [Lorde, 1984 p.111], it existed in an apartheid state of colonial power relations with the rest of the town and its
middle and upper-middle class affluence. Frantz Fanon’s [1963] examination of the ‘lines of force of the colonial order’ resonate here, for the estate reflected Fanon’s analysis of the ‘colonial world [as] a world cut in two’ [p.38] and as an apartheid system of social relations [p.38], ‘divided into compartments’, into systems of ‘compartments’ represented by ‘native quarters’ and ‘European quarters’, ‘schools for natives’ [and] ‘schools for Europeans’. As Fanon writes,

In the colonial world [t]he settlers’ town is a well fed town, an easygoing town; its belly is always full of good things. The settlers’ town is a town of white people, of foreigners’. In dialectic opposition however the township of the colonized, that is to say ‘the Negro village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, peopled by [women and] men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how they die there, it matters not where, nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; [women and] men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire. It is a town of niggers and dirty Arabs [p. 38].

In comparison with the estate the rest of the town and its occupants seemed to have [and had] cleaner air. They had more space in which to move. They had surplus food in their houses such as bowls of fruit on their tables. They had cakes uneaten in their kitchens. They had hot running water and heat and warmth that circulated in every room. This was the contrast that I noted when we moved to Mau Mau and when I would accompany my mother when she cleaned the sheets, the skid marked underpants, the bedrooms, the toilets, the living rooms and the kitchens of the comfortable and the affluent.

As Fanon [1963] points out, colonial relations of power impact on both physical and psychological terms and as such they operate as a ‘language of pure force’ that enters both the home and the ‘mind’. This language of coloniality is constitutive of externally imposed and internal digested racialized markings such as dirty, lazy, violent, criminal, promiscuous, limited intelligence:
primitive, irrational, angry, savage, immoral, single parents, fatherless families, single mothers, welfare cheaters, etc. It reduces the subjugated and the colonized to that of a biological collective and as a species. This language of coloniality and racialization was mapped onto the estate and its occupants but while the estate/township certainly internalized this negative and prostheticizing discursive language they/we were not ‘docile bodies’ [Foucault, 1995], their/our subjugation was not complete.

The estate/township’s name of Mau Mau [self assigned during the 1950’s] signified resistance in the form of a consciousness on the part of the estate/township’s white working class community of its own racialization and cultural marginality in relation to wider broader systems of power. This self ascribed and self re-appropriated name suggested a historical consciousness and connectedness with the anti-colonial struggles of Kenyan peoples in the 1950’s. The name of Mau Mau was drawn from the Kikuyu Kenyan resistance fighters derogatorily named Mau Mau by British colonial authorities and settlers who were responsible for brutality that included rape, lynching, torture and the mass murder of over three hundred thousand Kenyans.

The appropriation and assertion of the name by the white working and underclass inhabitants of the estate/township could only have been taken-up as a form of identification with, and consciousness of, the anti-colonial struggle and its resistance to colonial relations of power. The markings of savagery, of primitiveness and violence that were assigned to the Kikuyu anti-colonial fighters was re-appropriated by the estate/township in a mode of defiance that shouted out to the rest of the town that yes we are savage and we are proud of it, we do not apologize for it, so you had better watch out.
I am not going to romanticize things here, as I have said the estate/township was certainly a space of internalized coloniality and [by the time my mother and I arrived there] it was certainly a space where the conceptualization of race as a prosthetic was well entrenched in addition to an internal/internalized coloniality of ableist, heterosexist and hetero-normative dominant/subordinate relations of power. But in that moment of political self ascription in the 1950’s, in that moment of announcing publicly that it was Mau Mau, it not only announced that it too was the Other it proclaimed a critical consciousness of the process of racialization as something that works to subjugate, inferiorize, and dehumanize whole communities not only on the basis of colour but in such ways that it assigns racial meanings to other [and Othered] sites of social difference who are marginalized for example on the grounds of class and caste. Importantly, the declaration of Mau Mau represented a refusal on the part of the estate/township community to amputate itself fully in the face of dominant eugenicizing, whitecentric impositions of what counts as respectable and ‘proper’ and in doing so it refused to a certain extent self shame and victimization by venting its rage and anger at the social-political structure and system rather than at itself.

The school however worked to erase these emerging self-generated, anti-racialization and anti-colonial enunciations of cultural knowledge and cultural resistance on the part of the township. It imposed an official state-sanctioned regime of coloniality and racialization on the children of the estate penetrating their bodies with a discursive conceptual framework that served to negate and amputate their working class and under-class cultural locatedness. Philip Corrigan [1990] has spoken specifically of the Council school system as a system that enforces alienation and disengagement. In his analysis a working class adult is quoted as saying, ‘school which is the Council school [the state school], is in origin quite alien to working class life. It does not grow from that life; it is not ‘our’ school in the sense that other schools can be spoken of by the folk of other classes. The government
forced them on us…school in working-class life expresses nothing of that life, it is an institution clapped on from above’ [p.162]. In the council school, working class life ‘could not be spoken of in the curriculum, in the everyday culture of the schooling, ‘it was not drawn from working class notions of ‘to speak’. But it does speak in other forms.

As Corrigan says, “[e]very time we enter a school it says to us ‘This is education, this is what it looks like’. Thus the process of amputation ‘is what education looks like’: State schooling as an institution is a physical, psychic and emotional space of marginality. In physical terms it organizes and enforces the physical ‘separation’ of what it maintains is ‘education’ from ‘the rest of social life’ [Corrigan], that is to say the social life that is embodied by the students themselves and their communities [represented in my case by my mother]. As Corrigan goes onto to say ‘physical separation’ is a key ‘concern and focus of the state agencies that regulate institutions such as schools and which ‘compel’ students to attend them for the purpose of re-producing ‘respectable’ subjectivities. These respectable subjectivities in turn coerce students towards the domesticating commonsense perception that asymmetrical social relations of power are ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ as opposed to socio-politically constructed for the purpose of maintaining a violating, hegemonic social order.

The students who came to the classroom where not simply white working class and underclass students however, they were also students who came with tensions drawn from poverty and hunger, they came with tears, rage, anger, they came as disabled students who were rendered invisible, they came as gendered students and sexualized students who were either navigating or resisting dominant impositions of ‘proper’ masculinities and femininities or reproducing them as a source of identity production. In all they came to the classroom as multiple dimensional bodies and
as multi-layered sites of difference that were left alienated, ignored and unacknowledged by the classroom and the school resulting in what Corrigan calls the production of ‘active wounds’. These ‘active wounds’ though seemed to close or at least they seemed to be temporarily healed when I entered the classroom. The all white classroom seemed to rally itself towards a kind of equilibrium from the moment I walked in and from the moment the classroom strapped me on.

I became the classroom’s whipping boy and the source through which the classroom, [including the white male teacher] could vent their frustrations, ameliorate their anxieties and simultaneously fill and deny the negations forced upon their individual and collective psyche due to the amputative logic of internal/internalized colonialism. On a daily basis I was subjected to ridicule, psychological assault and physical brutality. In some sense it seemed [again even though I could not articulate it as such] that the population of the classroom itself consumed me for their own needs. I raged against this and my rage in turn seemed to attract more violence. Frequently I would be dragged out by the teacher and held at arms length by my collar for the children to laugh at. The teacher would spin me around by my collar as if I was a rag-doll and ask me a questions on just about every subject: math was a favourite: If I could not answer I would be forced to stand in the corner of the room with a paper hat on my head. The hat of the class ‘dunce’. I was abused as a form of entertainment for the students. The teacher would laugh and the students would laugh along with him. I was the central pedagogical tool used by the teacher for exercising control and equilibrium and for bringing a sense of wholeness and unity to the class. I was the classroom’s prosthetic.

One instance stands out for me: The teacher asked the class what 4 take away 4 was. Hands went up. Mine stayed down. The teacher then called upon me [as he always did] to give the answer. I
was confused with the question trying to answer it in my mind while in a state of fear knowing that I would be pulled out to face the class. When I was finally pulled out everyone laughed as always. The teacher began the usual torturous ritual of ridicule confident in the knowledge [or so it seemed to me] that I could not answer the question. He repeated the question. ‘What is 4 take away 4’. I was gripped by fear, terror and shame. I could not give an answer. He held out his hands. One of the hands held 4 beans. ‘Look’ he said ‘I have 4 beans in this hand so how many do I have if I take away them away’. He followed this by transferring the 4 beans to his other hand. I said nothing. The class laughed louder. In exasperation he repeated himself. ‘LOOK I HAVE 4 BEANS IN THIS HAND AND I TAKE 4 AWAY HOW MANY DO I HAVE LEFT”? I still could not answer. ‘I HAVE NOTHING IN THIS HAND, SO HOW MANY DO I HAVE LEFT WHEN I’VE TAKEN FOUR AWAY?’ I kept staring at his empty hand. I followed everything back in my mind. I followed the fact that he had 4 beans in one hand which he had placed in another. But I kept staring at his empty hand trying to figure out what nothing or no beans meant when they were in his other hand. I was grasping with this notion of zero, and how you could take an object away from itself. I was trying to figure out the meaning of taking something from something which apparently could make that something cease to exist. It made no sense to me.

The fact is that I had not been in the schooling system long enough to be indoctrinated into the dominant Eurocentric notion of abstract knowledge. Even at Liverpool my daily routine in school was less concerned with formal education procedures than with using the space itself as a means to subvert the legal and material hold Barnardo’s had over me. As such my days at the school were generally taken up with exercising my own brand of non-cooperation guerrilla warfare which meant getting into as much ‘trouble’ as I possibly could. But there was another aspect however to this ‘math lesson’. My experience with living up until that point, had given me the understanding
that knowledge of whatever sort was connected to daily life. It could not be abstracted from my struggles and the forms of communications I had with loved ones, family and the social conditions of oppression we navigated. Everything was connected. The teacher was asking me to disconnect and decontextualize learning [in this case mathematics] from all of this.

And this was what I was struggling with when the teacher’s hand *spoke* in response to my difficulty. It came crashing down across my face. As the classroom’s prosthetic this was routine for me as was the prostheticization of race in the culture of the curriculum as a whole. The saliency of race in this form was everywhere and was embodied [as far as the classroom was concerned] by myself as the school’s ‘coloured’ boy. I was strapped-on by the classroom in multiple ways. There were the names of ‘half caste’, ‘coon’, ‘nigger’, Sambo, ‘wog’ or ‘Paki-Stan’ which not only circulated around the classroom in full hearing of the teacher but were actively encouraged by the teacher himself. There were the classroom texts such as Little Black Sambo [which on one occasion I was forced to read aloud] which reinforced and re-produced my body as the classroom’s prosthetic on a daily basis. I remember one particular text and textual prostheticizing lesson. It was a lesson on geography. The teacher read aloud and we the children cognitively followed him by tracing our fingers over the words of the text that he was reading from. We each shared a text with our desk partner. The book text and the discursive textual embodiment of the teacher spoke about sugar-cane workers in Grenada in the West Indies. According to these textual regimes of truth the sugar-cane workers were biologically suited for sugar-cane labour. The black worker’s bodies were strong and their hands were unusually large. The texts prostheticizingly spoke of the workers as a species whose tongues were red and whose hands although very dark on the outside were almost white on the inside. When the texts spoke of this there was a loud whispering that went around the room and I heard one student say ‘just like Stan’s, look at his palms’. I remember pulling back my hands from the book and sliding
them under my desk in shame. I wanted to disappear to get as far away as possible from the species that was in me, that apparently was me.

These incidents represented a daily battering and assault of messages, signals and physical actions upon my body that made me wish at best that I had never been born and at worst that I was dead. These wounds and assaults did not relent when I left the classroom and the school however. Everyday going to and from the school I had to watch for the possibilities of being beaten by gangs associated with my classroom colleagues and every evening and every weekend was the same. Sometimes I would be subjected to racist terror and bullying in the town itself in full public view of adult by-standers who would not only watch, ignore or encourage but would oftentimes express distaste at any expression of rage and anger on my part as if [by British standards] my perceived savagery trumped [in terms of inappropriate, non-respectable behavior] the material violence that was being meted out to my body. As a result of all this I began to experience [much more consciously and concretely than I had ever done before] the psychic and material violence associated with the institutionalized, externally derived and enforced process of internalizing one’s individual and collective self as a prosthetic [with all of its thing-like components].

During the evenings for example when my mother went to work cleaning and washing for the comfortable and the wealthy I would sit alone at home staring, at myself in the mirror, scrutinizing my face, trying to figure out where the race [the prosthetic] was. What did they [those who racially marked me] see? Figuring I was not quite white enough, I would pat talcum powder on my face and then stand back to check for improvements, to check to see if this would allow me to pass for white and so prevent me from accumulating more assaults and wounds. As a result, in the mornings before school I would secretly base my face with a light coating of my mother’s Johnson’s baby powder.
Did it work? No. My body was still marked for prostheticization but I do recall a sensation of confidence coursing through my body and my psyche when I first walked down the street with my whitened face on. There were other private amputations of course. I would sleep for example in such a way as to allow my head to pin down and flatten my ears which, I was told, were like the ears of monkeys and therefore like the ears of niggers, wogs, or coons. My nose too was a problem. Even though I could see very little in it that would prevent it from passing for white, there was a little too much width at the nostrils. This was not simply my imagination; this was something I was violently told on a daily basis by my social world. To deal with this when I was alone at home I placed clothes pegs on my nose in an attempt to train my nose to grow straight and nice. In bed while working on my ears I slept with my fingers against each side of my nose, breathing from my mouth and one nostril at a time. My hair was also a problem. I was told that it was too curly and too frizzy. Relief came to me when I learnt that I could use my mother’s iron to flatten the bangs and other parts of it straight. Like the childhood of Ngozi Onwurah my main focus of living was concentrated on the amputation of this prosthetic entity which constituted race from my body and from my life, but as this study continues to stress, these amputative processes in British nation-state contexts carried and carry a much more complex and broader sociopolitical significance for the social collective as a whole specifically in the relation to the mode in which it [external and internally] speaks.

I am reminded here of a recent incident that involved my young adult daughter. She woke up one morning to find on her phone a series of racist text messages addressed to her from a person she did not know although a few days before we had attended a human rights case which involved the racial profiling of her body by a city bar and restaurant. We won the case. The messages contained words that referred to my daughter as, a ‘fucking whore’, they said ‘you think you are smart but you are not smart’. She was called a ‘dark dark bitch’ and a ‘fucking nigger bitch’. My daughter
was in tears, wounded, crying, and brutalized as were we all. We called the police who traced the phone to a person who claimed that it was a mistake, that he was intending these words for a friend. The police suggested later that it was simply a coincidence that it had nothing to do with our previous human rights case. We did not believe this however and remained on alert for any escalation of racist persecution for many weeks afterwards. Despite the sense of terror that we experienced however what stayed with me was the account given by the person who had sent the messages allegedly by ‘mistake’, for he not only claimed that these words were intended for a friend but that this was how they [he and his friend] always spoke one another. This was their language of communication.

In the culture of my classroom and school [as in the township and town], language, speaking and what counted as communication and the articulation of the collective self was reproduced in a similar way. Speaking as a violent/violating process reliant on racism in its prostheticizing form enabled the students to negate and amputate their embodied difference and to disavow and deny the psychic wounds emanating from those very negations. It allowed for the disavowal of the forms through which their identities and expressions of individual and collective underclass/working class selves were subjected to alienation pathologization and reification. Speaking/conceptually articulating and relating to one another in this racist, prostheticizing form, allowed for the reproduction [and not simply in the classroom but in the psyche of the collective community of Mau Mau itself] of a masking of daily ableist practices of marginalization. It allowed for a masked amputated silence and conceptual unspeakability around issues of heterosexist and heteronormative assaults against women. It enabled and facilitated a masked silence and conceptual unspeakability about elder abuse, about the systemic causes of poverty and systemic deprivation. It allowed and enabled a facilitation and reproduction of silence and conceptual unspeakability
around any form of masculinity/femininity and identity expression that did not conform to the state sanctioned and state re-produced notions of respectable and proper modes and expressions of identity and self to the extent, that bodies such as mine [who were subjected to sexual assault] remained silent and were denied agency not simply because we could not speak as a result of trauma, but because of the State’s violent discursive and material enforcements upon our psyche we were left with no conceptual capacity to articulate our experience and make sense of it beyond the confines of a closely guarded sense of self-shame. As a result, anger and rage dominated our means of communication.

But this anger and rage in these racializing, prostheticizing internal/internalized colonial contexts was a rage and anger that was depoliticized, decontextualized and pathologized by the sociopolitical structure and as a result of internal/internalized coloniality it was a rage and anger that was directed either at ourselves as individuals [as in the case of Ngozi Onwurah] or at ourselves as a social collective in an amputative and/or murderous form. This was the language of communication [of speaking] then in the classroom, the school, the township and the surrounding town itself and as such it was not the language of any ‘council estate of mind [Skinnyman, 2004].

As the classroom, school, township and town mirrored the racializing, prostheticizing, amputative nature of the nation-state itself, this was how the nation-state as a sociopolitical collective whole talked to itself. This was how it spoke. And in the contemporary moment this is how this thing called Britain continues to speak. It should be possible however to formulate a collective mode of speaking, of communication, in which the assertiveness and articulation of the social collective’s sense of self as a nation-state – that is to say how it speaks to itself, [internally], and to others [externally] - is dependant for its central sociopolitical enunciative existence and consciousness on
an angry, rage-filled decolonizing opposition, contestation and refusal of the language of coloniality and its whitecentric, racializing, prostheticizing, amputating, homicidal [psychic and physical] capacity for destructiveness. It should be possible to assert a politics of enunciation that is constitutive of a broader process of decolonization that implicates the individual self, the social collective and the institutionalized sites of power and authority which (re)produces the nation-state as a hegemonic, homicidal sociopolitical formation.

Chandra Mohanty [2004] writes that decolonization ‘can only be engaged through active withdrawal of consent and resistance to structures of psychic and social domination. It is a historical and collective process and as such can only be understood within these contexts’ [p.7]. When we speak decolonization as a language and as a language that is symbiotic with asserting a politics of enunciation then we are speaking [enunciating] a philosophy and praxis that ‘involves [as an ongoing everyday process of struggle] profound transformations of self, community [and] governance structures’ of subjugating power [p. 7]. Thus, a politics of enunciation would entail the breaking away from the psychic sociopolitical constraints that dominant archival-like discursive frameworks impose upon voice and by extension upon the emergence of the conceptual frameworks necessary for the counter-hegemonic transformation of the individual and collective consciousness.

To this end Frantz Fanon’s [1963] analysis of the decolonizing process in the context of Algeria is important here. Speaking of Algeria’s liberation from colonial rule in the 1950’s and his participation in the Algerian anti-colonial struggle Fanon wrote that it was an imperative for the colonized to challenge, confront and overthrow the apparatus of French colonial domination and power in its brutal material form. However, [and this is crucial to my framing here of a politics of
enunciation] it was also imperative that this was done *simultaneously* with an equally vociferous interrogation and confrontation with the conceptual frameworks of coloniality and its discursive ingredients [e.g. racialization, pathologization and decontextuality] particularly in terms of when and where these dominating conceptual frameworks are found to be congealed/internalized in the consciousness of the individual/collective self of the colonized, *and*, crucially, where [and in what form] in the sociopolitical structure of the country do they emanate from. In the broader context of challenging the disintegrative amputating power of internal/internalized colonialism these two areas which both pinpoint and target the social structure for interrogation and contestation are central to the emergence and nurturing of a politics of liberatory enunciation at both the individual and collective level. In these decolonizing anti-racialization [and indeed anti-amputation] contexts the individual is inseparable from the collective. In these contexts there is an acknowledgement of the collective implicatedness of oppression and an acknowledgement that homicide as a physical, spiritual and sociopolitical act of violation is a dialectical process in which homicide/murder is prostheticizingly connected with an externally imposed self amputation of the homicidal murderer’s individual and collective self.

As Fanon writes, the political discussions that took shape within the space of the Algerian anti-colonial resistance movement particularly those that concentrated on an interrogation of the processes of racialization as they related to externally imposed [*and internally consumed*] notions of Algerian criminality, allowed for a deeper more complex understanding and discernment of the ‘idea of social and individual liberation’, for when, as Fanon explains,

in revolutionary practice the question of Algerian criminality is raised in the presence of leaders and militants, when the average figures of crimes, misdemeanors and robberies are cited for the period before the revolution, when it is explained that the nature of a crime or the frequency of offenses depends on the relations which exist between men and women [and between persons of social difference and the state], and when everybody understands
this; when we see before us the breaking up [and the breaking away from] the idea of the Algerian or the North African [or the underclass/working class Mau Mau inhabitant] who is a criminal by vocation, an idea which was equally implanted into the consciousness of the Algerian [or again by extension the British Mau Mau peoples ] then it can be sure that the revolution is making progress [p .304].

As Fanon makes clear in his de-pathologizing approach, the reproduction of violence within the space of the oppressed [e.g. the dominant/subordinating relations between men and women] is an effect of colonial discursive and material oppression and not an outcome of any natural biological propensity towards violence, nor an outcome of any ‘hereditary character’ of Algerian peoples. In the colonial context, violence between the oppressed is a logical outcome of an externally imposed social structure of violence and dehumanization which pits the oppressed against one another as they navigate and survive a living of desperation, self negation, humiliation, death, alienation, homelessness, labour exploitation and the barest conditions of existence. By rejecting pathologization, racialization and decontextuality and by contextualizing and pinpointing the violence of coloniality and racialization in its internal/internalized psychic form at the level of the socio-political structure of power, Fanon’s analysis has profound implications for confronting and contesting the ongoing internal/internalized colonial formation of Britain and the possibilities for a collective engagement in a politics of transformative enunciation.

A politics of enunciation in these contexts then would see the social collective of the nation-state that is Britain engage itself on multiple levels and in multiple spaces in political discussions that would work towards a critical transformation of the national consciousness of the people as a collective, spiritual whole. It would be grounded in a refusal of the racializing, prostheticizing, amputating imperatives of internal colonialism. It would engage itself collectively and systematically in an everyday/every night process of confrontational non-cooperation at the cognitive emotional and physical level with all of the myriad covert/overt discursive manifestations
of pathologization, decontextuality and reifications that are sanctioned, legitimized, produced and reproduced by and through the sociopolitical structure of power that is constitutive of this thing called Britain in its historical and contemporary hegemonic homicidal formation. A politics of enunciation would ground itself in the epistemologies of those ‘who have known the cruelties of becoming’ [Akomfreh, 1987] as a methodology for halting the continuing psychic destructiveness of internal/internalized colonialism and the prostheticizing discursive cargo of racialization. As the narrator in John Akomfreh’s landmark film on Black resistance to racist oppression in Britain Handsworth Songs says, ‘let them [those who have experienced and resisted the violence of the social system] bear witness to the process by which the living transform the dead into partners in struggle’.

Education is a crucial site for building an alternative collective mode of nation-state speaking [enunciating] outside of the amputative conceptual archive/schema/matrix of internal/internalized colonialism and its ancillary components. To this end it should be possible to seize hold and re-appropriate the violent and violating discursive ‘data’ of internal/internalized colonialism as a method for grounding an individual and collective politics of refusal. It should be possible for example to center the concept of racialization in much the same way that Gramsci seizes hold, re-appropriates and re-conceptualizes the concept of hegemony [Bell, 1997] as a discursive tool that allows for an understanding that the dissemination of systemic oppression does not necessarily require force but can be operationalized by the social collective giving consent to its own oppression through an internalization of dominant discourse as something natural and ‘common sense’[Bell]. In educational contexts racialization could be taken-up in an anti-racialization form with its key goal and objective centered on pinpointing the multiple discursive and material ways in which the social system enforces an individual and collective amputation of the self. An anti-

To this end, an anti-racialization curriculum [which would form the base for a broader politics of enunciation as a transformative reinvention of the nation-state’s collective sense of self] would ground itself in the enunciation of key questions such as: Is ‘success’ in educational contexts dependant upon students amputating their social difference as a pre-requisite for success? Are the components of the discursive cargo of racialization present in terms of biologization, that is to say is cultural difference biologized? In other words, are whole social collectives of difference perceived as carriers of essential biologically determined behaviors and traits, [i.e. Asian students who perceived as passive and/or ‘good’ at math, Black students perceived as angry violent, good at sports, and dialectically, not good at math or academics in general]? Is pathologization present in the language and culture of the curriculum as a mode of thought and as a discursive and material practice? Are the social differences embodied by the students perceived as a deficit? In other words are students on the basis of their social difference viewed as harboring a disorder that needs to be fixed either through medicalization, regulation, surveillance [i.e. policing in schools] or via segregation [e.g. overtly gender based segregation, and/or covertly racially based learning disability programs].

Language as Ngogi Wa Thiongo [1989] pointed out is a carrier of culture [and determines practice and action] and so an anti-racialization framework [as curriculum] would consistently watch, monitor and surveil itself for the moments when it renders students, the communities to which they
belong, and indeed any social collective as a ‘they’ or a ‘them’. It would take this up as part of a broader philosophy and pedagogy of de-pathologization in which self, community and governance structures of power and authority are engaged intersectionally.

In pinpointing the cause or source of dislocatedness, amputation, and physical and spiritual homicidal violence in its internal/internalized colonial form, an anti-racialization approach does not rest at simply locating cause or source as both bell hooks and Bhaba have suggested in this study however. In both educational contexts and as a broader politics of enunciation it confronts and contests the discursive and material source and cause. As a result an anti-racialization framework would not simply surveil for the embeddedness of racialization and its ancillary pathologization in the language and culture of its curriculum and, once located, erase and dismiss them, on the contrary an anti-racialization framework would seize hold of these discourses of violence and hold them up for scrutiny, interrogation and contestation by the students themselves. Moreover as part of a wider mode of critical political education an anti-racialization framework in its refusal to disembody both the students and the culture of the classroom and school from the broader sociopolitical aspects of living would submit for critical scrutiny and interrogation the discursive violence of internal/internalized colonialism that is pervasive in the student’s wider world.

Consequently regimes of truth such as the dominant media which perpetuates the racialization of crime, immigration, terrorism, and poverty through discourses of pathologization would be held up for critique and contestation in ways that confront and interrogate both the violent [discursive and material] configurations of racial prostheticization and the amputative effects of such violence as it relates to the implicatedness of a gendered, dis/abled, sexualized and classed whitecentricized
One of the key aspects that came out of the [1989] Macdonald Inquiry into the murder of Ahmed Ullal Iqbal [mentioned at the beginning of this study] concerned the challenges present in putting anti-racism into practice in ways that did not marginalize the experiences and struggles with oppression of white working class students. An anti-racialization framework would work to avoid this due to its conceptualization and centering of racialization. As this study has demonstrated racialization is a process that works to subjugate, inferiorize, and dehumanize entire communities not only on the basis of colour but also in ways that assign biologizing racial meanings to other [and Othered] sites of social difference who are themselves [as individual and collective wholes] marginalized [intersectionally] on the grounds of religion, language, class, caste, disability and sexuality. Thus, racialization [as a concept, discursive process, and material effect] in the context of an anti-racialization framework can be reconfigured and re-appropriated as a politics of enunciation that makes for the building of alliances across social difference while still maintaining the saliency of race as the central focus and entry point in its confrontation with systemic oppression in its internal/internalized colonial form.

Central to the contestative nature of anti-racialization is a refusal to decontextualize language discourse and learning from its sociopolitical connectedness to the wider ongoing politics of amputation and murder of the individual and collective self. However, within an anti-racialization framework the de-pathologizing/decontextualizing, anti-amputative processes and practices of refusal and contestation, given that they are interconnected with a broader politics of enunciation,
demand a cognitive and emotional commitment towards social justice that is characterized by rage and anger at the discursive and material violence of the sociopolitical structure.

It is not enough for the women of Bluecoat 124 to pinpoint the source and cause of their negations and amputative wounds, the source/cause [that is to say the sociopolitical structure in its discursive and concrete form] must be [in the cognitive and/or physical sense] actively contested with rage and anger. Ngozi Onwurah’s reclamation of her sense of self emerges through an angry rage filled contestation at the social structure a contestation that indicts the social structure as a site of violence. Like that of Mammie Till’s mother who opened her son’s coffin so that her son’s violated, lynched body would speak as a witness to the violence of the social system. Onwurah [as with Doreen and Neville Lawrence] indict the social structure while simultaneously refusing to allow its violence to remain invisible. Rage and anger in this form as an individual and collective contestation of the discursive and material effects of oppression constitutes a spiritual act of physical and psychological love and caring for the individual and collective self that is fundamental to the practice and politics of enunciation. Thus, within an anti-racialization framework a politics of enunciation locates its primary method of articulation in anger and rage, an anger and rage expressed not out of any wounding homicidal lactificatory hatred but a rage and anger formulated and expressed out of love: The love of/for the individual and collective self.

Gurpreet Johal [2005] writes that rage can be utilized to provide a powerful vehicle for resisting injustice. In his re-conceptualization of rage as a form of anti-oppression pedagogy Johal contests dominant constructions of rage that pathologize, racialize and decontextualize the rage and anger of oppressed peoples. In these pathologizing contexts for example, the dominant discursive construction of ‘Black rage’ [and we might add Brown and/or so called Third World rage to this]
depicts the anger and rage of Black peoples in their/our daily response to injustice as something that is biologically determined and thus the result of a ‘pathological condition of an under-privileged segment of society’ [p.270]. In this way Black rage and anger is associated with a racialized conception of Black culture which is depicted as a set of fixed biological characteristics and behaviours that are intrinsic to the physicality and physiology of all Black [and racially marked] peoples.

As Johal [p.271 points out racialized depictions of the rage and anger of the oppressed in the mainstream media are [re]produced on a consistent ‘common sense’ basis, that ‘invokes’ for the dominant imagination and thus for the prostheticizing mind, ‘notions of the familiar and the normative’ [p.271]. Thus, rage and anger in the mainstream media is ‘operationalized’ through discourses that link race, rage and anger with that of ‘criminality and militancy’ that in turn intersects with ‘gender, class, age and ability’. The prostheticizing image that concretizes these discourses is that of ‘an underclass made up of youths of colour who are recognized as the enemy from whom those of the bourgeois utopia are to be protected’ [p.271]. As a consequence, racially marked youth are, according to mainstream media and dominant racializing/prostheticizing discourse, constitutive of an ‘irrational rage’ that arises as a result of their biology, skin colour, and ‘culture’ and as such must be treated, fixed, eradicated, cured, ‘policed and contained’ [p.271].

As a result, racially marked bodies are subjected to moral panics mobilized around so called ‘gun violence’ and youth ‘extremism’ which in turn fuels calls for greater ‘integration’ mandates, tighter immigration controls, anti-terrorism legislation ‘stiffer’ judicial penalties, ‘new laws’, increased policing, and, in terms of schooling, racist ‘zero tolerance policies’, ‘medication such as Ritalin’, streaming, segregated programs [p.271] and the placement in schools [in North American contexts] of armed police.
Contrary to dominant racializing, prostheticizing conceptions of rage Johal writes that rage is a healthy healing response on the part of the marginalized to oppression and exploitation. Rage is therapeutic in that it allows for the naming of oppression and the enunciation of experiences with injustice. Thus, rage is a necessity for the oppressed. It is a ‘necessary element for every form of struggle against oppression’ [p.217]. As Johal says, rage ‘represents a passion for justice’ and it is this passion [or fire] for justice that serves as a catalyst for rage. As he goes on to argue, ‘the fire inside that demands justice in the face of injustice fuels rage’ and it is in these contexts that rage emerges as an ‘act of love of self’ and a catalyst for ‘the collective movement toward freedom’. Affirming the rage of the oppressed then represents a conscious and deliberate strategy towards the development of ‘interconnectedness and self love’ [217]. Rage as a politics of enunciation focused as it is on the individual and collective love of/for self, interrogates and confronts with fire and passion both internal and external enforcements and impositions of oppression. Thus, rage confronts the oppressor within. It confronts the externally imposed discourses of racialization, prostheticization and coloniality that have been historically and forcefully embedded in the self and which in turn have served to re-produce consent for the amputation of one’s own individual/collective multilayered self and that of others.

As a social collective then our politics of enunciation must activate a rage against these destructive discursive impositions of coloniality that have been implanted [Fanon, 1963] within ourselves. As Johal [2005] recognizes however, dominant conceptualizations of anger and rage are too oftentimes internalized by the oppressed which is a necessity for the reproduction of the status quo given that the oppressed must see themselves/ourselves as pathologized, prostheticized, and as ‘perpetual’ victims of conditions that are of our own making. In these contexts we are forcefully expected to suppress our rage at the injustices of the social system, to view it as a sign
of powerlessness, to internalize our rage as a negative condition that must be overcome. Moreover, when we internalized the belief that we carry a disorder when we feel/experience rage, we cannot even speak of it, express it and/or name it. Under these hegemonic conditions and contexts then the process of living with rage and anger inevitably means that our rage and anger has to be directed somewhere, and more oftentimes [as Ngozi Onwura and Frantz Fanon have described] it is directed at the self. It is directed at the self with enormous physical and psychological costs both for the individual self and the social collective as a whole.

To reiterate, rage and Anger as a politics of enunciation set within an anti-racialization framework is an anger and rage that is directed not at the self but at the amputative imperatives of the social structure. As Audre Lorde [1984] writes, ‘my response to racism is anger. I have lived with that anger, ignoring it, feeding upon it, learning to use it before it laid visions to waste, for most of my life. Once I did it in silence, afraid of the weight. My fear of anger taught me nothing. Your fear of anger will teach you nothing also”. [p. 125]. Anger conceptualized and expressed as a politics of enunciation and articulation within a transformative framework of anti-racialization that contests oppression brings ‘clarity’. It tells stories, of exclusion, murder, genocidal practices, the violence of unquestioned privilege, of racial distortions, of silencing practices, of ‘stereotyping, defensiveness, misnaming, betrayal and cooptation’. Anger in these contexts names oppression. It refuses pathologization, decontextuality and the violence of prostheticization. It cognitively, emotionally and physically pinpoints the source of systematic injustice: It indicts the social system and its regimes of truth. It implicates the social collective and the state apparatus of internal/internalized colonial power. When rage and anger is articulated in this form as a politics of enunciation Emmett speaks: Stephen speaks. In these contexts we reclaim our selves in a rage filled refusal to amputate our bodies.
**Conclusion:**

In 2005 I was invited [as a former Barnardo’s Home child] to attend the centenary gathering to commemorate on hundred years of Barnardo’s since the death of its founder, Dr Thomas Barnardo. The gathering brought former Barnardo’s children from Britain and from all parts of the world. I had initially accepted the invitation. A part of me hoped to make contact with some of my friends that I remembered from Liverpool. I was hoping to see two close friends in particular who joined me in planning and plotting resistance and escape. We would always hang together on the play bars out in the play yard either trying to figure out the best way to make a break for it or express our resistance by having whispered conversations that would mock this figure called Dr. Barnardo. Other times we would intersperse our sentences with one another using the worst swear words we could and then smile back at the Aunties that were not our Aunties. In the pray sessions when we were forced to chant ‘Our father who art in heaven’, we would mix up the words whispering between ourselves our father who fart in heaven, how loud be thy farts, etc. I hoped to see them but in the end I declined the invite. I had too many conflicting feelings still within me at that time.

I notified the Barnardo’s After Care Center that I was unable to attend and so they sent me a ‘souvenir program’ of the event along with the program of what was called the ‘Order of Service’ for the ‘thanksgiving service’. This thanksgiving service was a re-production of the prayer rituals I remembered with their congealment of racialized evaluations, missionary positionalities and whitecentric, cleanliness-of-blood language. As former Barnardo’s Home children we were to thank God for our rescue and for our salvation. This was not all however for we not only had to thank God for our rescue but thank God for giving us Dr. Barnardo himself and by extension Barnardo’s as an institution. A Former Home child was to read a poem entitled ‘Thank You Dr. Barnardo’, which was described as a ‘Prayer of Thanksgiving’. The dedication which everyone was
to stand for consisted of a prayer that continued the same theme, that is to say the ‘giving of thanks to Dr. Barnardo’. We were to thank God for the ‘gift of life’, for ‘other people who enrich our lives’ and for ‘those who demonstrate God’s love and make the world a better place’. Above all we were to thank God ‘for Thomas John Barnardo and for the faith and vision that inspired him and sustains us’. We were also to pray for the ongoing work of Barnardo’s and for the ‘staff, volunteers, directors and trustees’. And after all of this we would sing a final hymn, ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’. I hear my mother inside of me. I hear her smile with pride that I refused that amputation.
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