'We have heard of editions of Aristophanes, of Polybius, of the Iliad, of Ovid, and what not, which have ever been forthcoming under the hands of notable scholars, who have grown grey amidst the renewed promises which have been given.' So writes Anthony Trollope, rather pessimistically, of Sir Thomas Underwood’s ever unfinished magnum opus in the conclusion to his 1871 Ralph the Heir. But his final words breathe the lighter air of optimism: ‘some of these works have come forth, belying the prophecies of incredulous friends. Let us hope that the great Life of Bacon may yet be written.’ Replace, if you will, the ‘great Life of Bacon’ with William of Conches’s Glosulae super Priscianum, and the description becomes uncannily apropos. William’s glosses on Priscian have been the object of continually renewed promises and more than one notable scholar has indeed ‘grown grey’ since the two versions of text were first brought to light by Édouard Jeaneau. The publication of William’s Glosulae has long been a scholarly desideratum and also has been long in reaching the printing-press for one and the same reason: William’s text is central to our understanding of the development of so-called grammatica speculativa (although the concept is never named as such in the twelfth century); but central though William may be, that development remains imperfectly understood. William is clearly responding to an earlier (late eleventh- and early twelfth-century) gloss tradition, now known as the Glosulae, but the latter has only recently garnered detailed attention, and a full edition of its various redactions still remains in preparation as well. Petrus Helias responded in turn to William’s grammatical thought in his own Summa super Priscianum (published in 1993 by Leo Reilly). And there are even more commentaries, some known by their incipits (e.g., Tria sunt, Promisimus), others by the schools with which they were associated (e.g., Grammatica porretana), many of which remain accessible only in manuscript. In short, there is no shortage of work to be done: the relationships between these various commentaries and the positions that they stake out in the debate over voce and res, words and things, universals and particulars, are fascinating but inordinately complex. We cannot, however, wait for the dust to settle before sending William’s Glosulae super Priscianum to the printer; otherwise, it will remain an opus semper perficiendum.
I will have little to say about the relationship between William and his predecessors or successors in the twelfth-century grammatical tradition. This is, after all, a workshop on the *ars edendi* not the *ars grammaticae*. Hence, my focus will be, insofar as possible, not philosophical but philological: namely examples of the textual problems that we have encountered in the process of establishing the text of the *Glosulae super librum constructionum*, that is Priscian’s *Institutiones grammaticae*, books seventeen and eighteen.

**Traditio textus**

Allow me to dispense with some preliminaries on the *traditio textus* rather summarily. The glosses survive in two (and perhaps three) recensions: (I) a *versio prior*, probably composed by William in the early 1120s, which comments only upon *Priscianus maior* (i.e. books one to sixteen) and is incompletely preserved (there is a lacuna from *Instit.* 8.30 to 8.93) in Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, San Marco 310 (henceforth M); and (II) a *versio altera*, revised by William circa 1150 near the end of his career, which glosses both *Priscianus maior* (through the beginning of book twelve) and the *De constructione* (that is, books seventeen and eighteen) and is extant only in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, manuscrit latin 15130 (henceforth P). Finally, there exists (III) a possible third redaction in the Laud collection at the Bodleian Library, Latin manuscript 67, which differs, sometimes considerably, from both M and P, but it is a short fragment of five folios that covers only *Instit.* 2.12–21. It remains possible that the *Glosulae in Prisciani librum constructionum* as found in P belong only to one version or the other and were never revised. This for two reasons. First, in the accessus of the *versio altera*, William signals his revisions with some precision: “I have undertaken”, he writes, “in my old age to correct the incomplete *glosulae de ortographia* that I wrote in my youth” (P 17a); the *de ortographia*, strictly speaking, should be only the beginning of the *Institutiones* and it certainly does not include the *De constructione*. Second, in both the *prior* and *altera*, the glosses on *Priscianus maior* cross-reference books seventeen and eighteen with the caveat: *deo annuente uitam*, a disclaimer William often employs to indicate a work planned, but not yet complete. Similarly, P’s *Glosulae in librum constructionum* anticipates its later discussions with the same formula: we’ll talk about this later, *deo annuente uitam*. Perhaps William simply saw no need to scrub away the residue of his youthful attempt at a commentary, and so retained the caveats, knowing full well that the text was already completed. But I, for one, hold little hope of finding another version (be it *prior* or *altera*) of the *Glosulae in librum constructionum*. For the foreseeable future, at least, P is the best we’ve got.
Regrettably, P’s best is not very good: it presents its editors with considerable challenges. In the case of the *Glosulae super Priscianum maiorem*, it is at least possible to circumvent P’s problems by collating it with M and L, where they overlap (and the overlap is considerable), although such a methodology creates further difficulty, in that collating *prior* and *altera* threatens to flatten out and erase their intentional differences. Nonetheless, Stephen Pelle and Michael Elliot have nearly completed a full transcription of the *Glosulae super Priscianum maiorem* in both versions (a Herculean feat in itself), and their work has shown that it is often possible to triangulate a plausible reading through a careful comparison of the different versions. The *Glosulae super librum constructionum*, however, is a tightrope without any such safety net. It is, for better or for worse, a single manuscript edition. And throughout, the scribe – who was less than diligent in his duty, to put it charitably – is continually at loggerheads with his author. Consider, for instance, the following passage, thick with (perhaps) unintentional irony:

1 88ra (ad *Instit.* 17.7): Et notandum quod, quamuis omnis ditongus duas obtineat uocales, non tamen in omni utraque sonat, sed in quibusdam ultima tantum, ut ae, oe; in quibusdam utraque sed altera magis, ut au, eu. Si *querat* aliquis quare in istis utraque sonet, in illis altera tantum, dicimus quod u, *que* est ultima in istis, multos habet sonos. [...] Sed, quamuis una pronunciatur sola, tamen debet utraque scribi. Propter imperitos qui volunt quicquid uident scriptum pronunciare, instituerunt moderni ut illa sola *que* ibi habet sonum scribatur, sed tamen ei uirgula *que* sit ditongi nota subscribatur.

One wonders if the scribe wryly smiled to himself as he blithely, perhaps wilfully, proceeded to collapse his diphthongs (highlighted in bold) within this very passage, despite his author’s deliberate plea that such a manner of writing was the mark of the *imperiti*, who want pronunciation to map orthography. Although this passage offers no real textual difficulties, it nonetheless neatly encapsulates the main problem that I wish to highlight today: to remain true to our author requires us to read against the scribe; on the other hand, should we remain true to the scribe, we necessarily do the author an injustice. We cannot have it both ways.

Though it may be impolitic to admit as much, it is difficult to have much sympathy for the scribe. Editing P, in fact, could be likened to a death by a thousand paper-cuts, by the continual nick and prick of scribal error. And although I don’t want to reduce my remarks to a public airing of my grievances with the scribe, indulge me a few examples (text 2), which will set the stage for problems to come.
Traditio textus

2 97ra (ad Instit. 17.26): EX Q V I ⟨BVS⟩ HA ⟨BVERVNT⟩ NO ⟨MINATIONEM⟩, quaedam ab altero¹, quaedam ab utroque.

¹ab altero scripsimus, ablatiuo P (ablat'o pro abalt'o)

87rb (ad Instit. 17.5): AV ⟨DACITER⟩, quod est regulare, quia nomina tertiae declinationis in datiuo accipiunt ‘ter’ et faciunt aduerbia.

¹accipiunt ‘ter’ scripsimus, accipiuntur P

3vb (ad Instit. 17.2): Sic igitur et ⟨unde⟩¹ (id est de dictionibus) et quomodo (id est ostendendo illarum constructionem in constitutione² perfectae orationis) in sequentibus tractabitur ostendit.

¹unde coniecimus, ueram ? P ²constructione a. corr. P

91vb (ad Instit. 17.17): Continuatio: Verba non poterant cum obliquis intransitiue construi¹, et non possunt SINE ADIVNCTIONE SO ⟨CIAI⟩, id est in eodem praedicato ponii; inde² reperti sunt nominatiui participiorum ut³ possent uni uerbo⁴ loco alterius sine coniunzione sociari.

¹construit a. corr. P ²inde scripsimus, non P ³sine coniunctione add. P, sed redundanter ut uidetur ⁴uerbo sup. lin. P

87rb (ad Instit. 17.5): Non solum in simplicibus dictionibus hoc fit, scilicet quod deficiunt, sed IN COMPO ⟨SITIS⟩, VT ‘INCVBV ⟨ERE⟩, ETC.’¹. Sed quaeritur ad quid hoc inducit exemplum, cum in eo nullum sit compositum cuius dictio deficiat. Aiunt: ‘ruunt’ enim non est compositum, sed intelligendum est quod ibi est² hoc compositum ⟨ex⟩¹ ‘ex’ et ‘ruunt’ ‘eruunt’, sed subtrahitur ‘e’, quia ‘ex imis⁴ eruunt’ in heroico metro esse non potest, cum breuem sillabam inter duas longas habeat.

¹Verg. Aen. 1.84–85: incubuere mari, totumque a sedibus imis / una Eurusque Notusque ruunt. ²est sup. lin. P ³ex suppleuimus ⁴ex imis scripsimus, eximi P

6ra (ad Instit. 17.2): Vere ratio tradita de litteris hoc ostendit, quia¹ EA ratio OSTENDIT IVNCT ⟨VRAM⟩, id est coniunctionem¹, dictionum non¹ factam⁴ QVOCVMQVE MODO, scilicet n ⟨ominatiuum⟩ ad ⟨ungi⟩ praepositioni² et alia multa prohibuit. Sed ostendit illam debere FIERI PER ORD ⟨INATIONEM⟩.

No one of these errors alone is real cause for alarm, and many of their solutions are transparent (at least in hindsight), but taken collectively and in the company of the some 1500 other critical notes in the first 15 folios alone, they contribute to a general culture of distrust. This distrust threatens to undermine the seemingly necessary foundation of a solid single-manuscript edition: that the manuscript is the product of a reasonably diligent scribe working from a reasonably reliable exemplar. What then are editors to do when they have but a single, demonstrably faulty text: are they to attempt to deduce a hypothetical ‘authorial text’, presumably garbled or truncated by scribal error? or should they simply present the sole surviving copy with minimal intervention and allow subsequent scholars to wrangle with the text on their own? Neither solution is a happy one. If we do the former, we run the risk of publishing yet another redaction: the *Glosulae super Priscianum* by William of Conches, newly revised and expanded by Édouard Jeanneau and Andrew Hicks. The second, however, runs the risk of doing the author a serious injustice, permanently attaching his name to a faulty copy of his work (something we would all cringe to have done to our own work). This is, of course, a false dichotomy and the best-case scenario falls somewhere in between. It is both the privilege and the burden of the editor to decide, often case by case, which shade of grey falls to which side of the ever-shifting line. I will offer today a few of these shades of grey, chosen to demonstrate the range of problems with some possible solutions. I’ve arranged these cases into three categories:

1. Menial but puzzling emendations (textual problems with several possible solutions in expository passages of little doctrinal import).
2. Suggestive, but uncertain emendations (passages which could be construed as-is, but similar passages elsewhere in the commentary or in other commentaries suggest otherwise).
3. Philosophically motivated emendations (textual problems in philosophical or doctrinal passages where emendation improves the philosophical argument or clarifies the doctrine).

Menial but puzzling emendations

One example concerns the different order of the *partes orationis* in Donatus and Priscian. Donatus discussed the pronoun before the verb, but Priscian after the verb. Here, William summarizes Donatus’s rationale after a long discussion and defence of Priscian’s position. The scribe of P has written as follows (3.1):
Menial but puzzling emendations

3.1 93rb (ad Instit. 17.18): Donatus tamen considerans quod si pronomen ideo praeponeretur uerbo quod significat substantiam, cum eadem causa pronomen uerbo debet praeponi. Vterque ergo | 93va | bene considerauit, sed Priscianus melius.

Correcting the first pronomen to nomen is not enough, for P remains grammatically incomplete and something more must give. The parallel passage in Petrus Helias (3.2) helpfully expresses the same thought in a complete sentence, and its syntax approximates P’s muddle:

3.2 Videns ergo Donatus quod nomen ideo preponitur iverbo quia substantiam significat que prior natura est propria verbi significacione, putavit quoque ratione consimili pronomen quia substantiam significat debere iverbo preponi (Reilly, II, 622).

On the strength of this parallel we might be tempted to borrow a verb like putauit: considerans X, putauit Y, but then we’d leave the conditional deeply unsatisfied. So it’s perhaps better to modify considerans, the clear parallel with Helias notwithstanding, and read considerauit. Lastly, the sense of cum eadem causa, ‘for the same reason’, seems oddly forced and without precedent: I’m inclined to print tum, to be construed as strengthening the apodosis. Thus we emend the passage to read as example 3.3:

3.3 Donatus tamen considerauit quod si nomen ideo praeponeretur iverbo quod significat substantiam, tum eadem causa pronomen iverbo debet praeponi.

But a second, less intrusive option, is to assume that something, namely the main clause, has gone missing from the end of the sentence, and thus we can simply mark the incomplete thought with a final ellipsis (as in 3.4).

3.4 Donatus tamen considerans quod si nomen ideo praeponeretur iverbo quod significat substantiam, tum eadem causa pronomen iverbo debet praeponi ⟨...⟩.

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3.4 Donatus tamen considerans quod si nomen ideo praeponeretur iverbo quod significat substantiam, tum eadem causa pronomen iverbo debet praeponi ⟨...⟩.

Or, less intrusive still, we could swallow hard and allow considerans as oddly anacoluthic. After all, the stakes are low, the meaning is clear, and it’s not worth losing much sleep over it.

A second low-stake example is found on fol. 96r. The passage here concerns the proper answer to the interrogative uter. According to William, Priscian believes that only quis inquires after substance; all other interrogatives concern the
accidents of substances. So William poses the question: does *uter* inquire after substance or accident? P gives the answer as in 4.1:

4.1 96ra (ad Instit. 17.24): *Si autem dicimus quod ad quaerendum substantiam sit repertum, occuret repugnat illud quod ad ipsum substantia respondetur, ut hic: uter istorum legit et iste.*

It’s probable that *occuret* should be *occurr*⟨it⟩ *et*, and indeed *occurrere* occurs elsewhere in William’s writings as synonymous with *repugnare* (e.g. *multa uidentur huic sententiae occurrere: Drag. 6.19.6*). Likewise, it’s clear that the final *et* must be excised. But what does the *quod* clause counter and contradict? Certainly not the first half of the sentence, with which it is entirely in agreement. And so it seems again that we have several options, none fully satisfactory. First, we could (as in 4.2) introduce a *non* in the main clause: ‘if we say that *uter* has *not* been devised in order to inquire after substances, this is countered and contradicted by the fact that a substance is answered in reply’.

4.2 *Si autem dicimus quod ad quaerendum substantiam (non) sit repertum, occurr⟨it⟩ et¹ repugnat id² quod ad ipsum substantia respondetur, ut hic: ‘uter istorum legit?¹ iste’.*

¹*occurrit et scripsimus, occuret P ²*illo*d a. corr. P ³*et add. P

But it remains possible that the passage has been truncated by homeoteleuton and that it originally offered both substance and accident as equally non-viable alternatives. While it would be rash to expand the text to suggest what may be missing, we could (again) print an ellipsis between *repertum sit* and *occurr⟨it⟩* to indicate the break in thought as in 4.3.

4.3 *Si autem dicimus quod ad quaerendum substantiam sit repertum, (…) occurr⟨it⟩ et¹ repugnat id² quod ad ipsum substantia respondetur, ut hic: ‘uter istorum legit?¹ iste’.*

¹*occurrit et scripsimus, occuret P ²*illo*d a. corr. P ³*et add. P

Neither solution, however, changes the substance of William’s argument.

**Suggestive but uncertain emendations**

A first example of a suggestive emendation concerns the proper meaning of *quid* in the question *quid agit?*, a question raised by *Institutiones* 17.25: *uidemur tamen etiam substantiam ipsius actus quaerentes dicre ‘quid agit?’, cui respondetur ‘nihil’ vel ‘currit, loquitur’. According to William (and Petrus Helias), *quid* here is equivocal
and is either accusative or adverbial. In P the explanation, which seems refreshingly free from the usual errors, reads as follows (this is 5.1):


The text remains, perhaps, perfectly understandable as it stands, but it does seem odd that the id est that follows the two articulations of the question quid agit iste? functions on two different levels. In the first case – quid as accusative (lines 5–6) – id est introduces the answer: ‘what’s he doing?’, id est, ‘a house’ or the like. In the second case, however, – quid as adverbial (lines 7–8) – id est clarifies the question by offering a paraphrase: ‘what’s he doing?, id est, ‘what species of act is present in him?’. Once again Petrus Helias presents no such difficulty, for in his Summa, each id est offers a clarifying paraphrase (5.2):


It is tempting to borrow from Peter Helias and supply a missing paraphrase for the accusative quid: ‘quid agit iste?’, id est ⟨quam rem agit iste?⟩: ‘domum’ uel aliquid tale.

5.3 Potest enim ‘quid’ esse accusatiius casus, et tunc quaerit substantia rei in quam transit actus, et tunc respondi debet accusatiius, ut ‘quid agit iste?’, id est ⟨‘quam rem agit iste?⟩: ‘domum’ uel aliquid tale.

Indeed, the repetition of agit iste could easily explain the omission of the para-
phrased question. The problem is, however, that William seems not to paraphrase the question in this way, for twice repeated (on lines 4–5 and 10 of 5.1) is the more prolix formula: quae est substantia rei in quam transit actus. And while we could supply a paraphrase in William’s language – something like: ‘quid agit iste?’, id est ⟨quae est substantia rei in quam transit actus?⟩ – there is no immediately obvious reason why it would have been omitted and admittedly it has no palaeographical grounds. If we supply the first quid agit? with a paraphrase, are we correcting a truncation in P or emending William’s own text?

A second example concerns variants in Priscian’s text that suggested multiple interpretations of a single passage. Consider, for instance, William’s interpretation of Institutiones 17.17: Verba personarum quae per nominativum interleguntur et sunt indicatiua [et] absolute accipiuntur.


1‘per scripsimus, pro P ‘personarum scripsimus, personaliter P ‘quae per scripsimus, quod po. P

The two explanations given here (marked as I and II in your text) differ primarily in the syntax and semantics of indicatius. The first explanation (lines 1–4) places indicatius in the main clause (uerba sunt indicatius), and it is construed as synonymous with demonstratiua, qualified by the objective genitive personarum. The second explanation (lines 5–12) locates indicatius in the subordinate clause and glosses it as indicatiui modi, while construing personarum as uerba personalia. These two different readings depend on whether the sentence has one et or two (Hertz prints only one, but reports a manuscript with two). William must have read the latter in his manuscript of Priscian, which forces a compound predicate: Verba persona […] et sunt indicatius et absolute accipiuntur. But William also knew a tradition that glossed the text with only a single et (as it is printed by Hertz), which forces
a compound relative clause: *verba personarum, quae per nominativum intelleguntur et sunt indicativa [...]*. Hence, as William notes, this second reading requires that *unum solum ‘et’ habetur in serie litterae*.

A similar double reading may lurk behind P’s muddling of a gloss on *Institutiones* 17.19: *manifestum autem, quod ipsius quoque posito nominationis, qua participium nominatum est, non bene servaretur, nisi post nomen et verbum poneretur participium, cum ex eis utrisque per confirmationem pendens ea pars accipiebatur* (GL III, 119.17–20). The question here concerns the reading *confirmationem* in the final clause, which is printed by Hertz with no critical note. P’s comment on this passage, 7.1, vacillates rather unhelpfully between *confirmation* and *conformatio*.

7.1 93vb (ad *Instit. 17.19*): *Inde enim dicitur participium quod capit partem illorum antecedentium*. Et subiungit quare: [I] CVM EA PAR(S) ACCI(PIEBATVR) PE(NDENS) EX EIS. Ex eis enim esse contrahit, et hoc PER CONFOR(MATIONEM), quia *conformatui* eis. Recipit enim a nomine genera et casus, a uerbo tempora et significaciones. Sed habetur per *confirmationem*. Sic legatur: [II] CVM EA PARS, id est cum nomen illius partis ACCPIEBATVR EX EIS partibus, id est ex nomine et uerbo. Sed quia duobus modis contrahit uox nomen a uoce – per abnegationem, ut nomen dicitur neutrum quia non est masculinum nec femininum, per *confirmationem*, id est per proprietatem ex illa contractam quae nomine ipso exprimitur, ut pronomen quia ponitur pro nomine – ideo2, ut ostendat Priscianus quomodo ex illis nomen accepit, subiungit: PENDENS3 PER CONFOR-MATIONEM. Deinde per simile ostendit quod, quia ex eis *conformatur* vel *conformatio*, post illa debet poni. Sed QVOMODO POST MAS(CVLINVM) ET FE(MINIVM) genus po|94ra |nimus NEVTRVM, EORVM ABNEGATIVVM in ordine generum5, ergo multo magis post nomen et uerbum ponimus eorum *confirmationem*, id est participium.

Peter Helias can offer no assistance here, for his *Summa* rarely gets down in the trenches with William to wrangle with the word by word syntax (the *continatio*) of Priscian’s text. The passage, I think, gains focus if we suppose that William knew two readings, both *confirmation* and *conformatio*, and this for three reasons. Firstly, it makes good sense of the phrase *sed habetur per confirmationem* (lines 4–5), as *habetur* is often used to signal a variant reading (as above: *unum solum ‘et’ habetur*). Secondly, and more importantly, it would explain the double gloss wherein the first seems of offer a *realis* interpretation (line 3: ‘the participle receives its being (*esse*) from the noun and verb’), and the second a *vocalis* interpretation (line 5: ‘the *name* of that part of speech, the participle, is taken from the noun and verb’).
Philosophically motivated emendations

I conclude with two brief examples of philosophically motivated emendations. The first example, part of the same long discussion of *quid agit* I spoke of earlier, concerns the *substantia actus*, which William considers to be the primary *signification* of a verb. William’s discussion (§8.1), with its frequent repetitions of *actus* and *substantia*, caused considerable problems for the scribe of P, and the numerous false starts and marginal corrections fail to inspire confidence:

§8.1 96vb (ad *Instit.* 17.25): *Et hoc est: SVBSTANTIA ACTVS*, certa species actus. *Quaerere igitur substantiam actus est quaerere certam speciem actionis. Qui enim quae sit ’quid agit iste?’ quaerit quae species actus insit*’ isti. Idem dicit urbi substantia, quia principaliter significatur a uero. Si tempus enim dicitur accidens ueri quia secundario significatur a uero’, ergo’ certa species actus potest dici substantia ueri, cum principaliter significatur...
Philosophically motivated emendations

12

Si inferunt ‘si species est actus, substantia actus, ergo actus est substantia
actus, et sic idem est substantia sui’, uel dicimus figuratiuam esse locutionem cum
dicitur ‘illa est substantia actus’, id est talis est substantia quae est actus, nec tamen est
substantia; uel dicemus quod quando dicitur ‘species actus est substantia’, ut ‘legere’ est
substantia actus, non dicimus esse illud substantiam alicuius actus nisi sui, nec alterius;
sicuti dicimus hominem esse speciem animalis, nec tamen dicimus ipsum esse speciem
alicuius animalis.

The problem here is the central reductio ad absurdum (line 6–7, printed in bold),
which William feels is damaging enough to warrant at least two counter-arguments
in lines 7–9 and 9–12. As P presents the inferential reductio, it would seem to
translate: ‘if a species is an act, substance is an act, therefore the act is the substance
of the act, and thus one and the same thing becomes its own substance’. But
William is careful (here and elsewhere) never to claim that a substance is an act (nor
that an act is a substance per se). And he seems quite right not to do so. Hence,
transposing the first est and actus in the reductio (as in 8.2) brings the damaging
inference into greater focus and William’s counter-arguments make better sense:
‘if the species of an act is the substance of an act, then an act is a substance of an
act, etc.’.

This is the only way that I can make philosophical sense of the passage. But the
false start in line 4 (see footnote two in 8.1) further complicates matters, as the
scribe began to write: si inferunt: si species actus est substantia uerbi, which does not
match what he writes when reaches the passage in its proper place.

Little time remains to discuss my final example (9), which concerns Aristotelian
primary and secondary substances. Priscian claims that all three verbal
persons can be either: omnis enim persona et generalis et specialis capax est
substantiae et qualitatis (Institutiones 17.15). On this passage, P records William’s
comment as follows:

92ra (ad Instit. 17.15): OMNIS ENIM, ETC. Merito nomina possunt intelligi in omnibus
personis, quia omnis persona capax est illius quod nomen significat et est nominabilis illo
nomine. Et hoc est: \( \langle \text{OMNIS} \rangle \text{PERSONA} \), scilicet loquens, quae est prima, et alia, \( \langle \text{EST} \rangle \text{CAPAX GE\textit{\textit{NERALIS}}} \text{SVB\textit{\textit{STANTIAE}}} \rangle \), id est illius quod \textit{per nomen} \( ^1 \) \textit{appellatiuum et substantiuum dicitur esse. Nichil aliud enim est secunda uel generalis substantia quam uel genus uel species continens primas,} \( ^1 \) \textit{ nisi id quod substantia prima dicitur esse \textit{per nomen} \( ^2 \) substantiuum uel appellatiuum non \( ^6 \) \textit{est capax \textit{GENERA}} \langle \text{LIS} \rangle \text{QVA\textit{\textit{LITATIS}}} \rangle \), quae a nomine significatur, et est capax \textit{SPECIALIS SVBSTANTIA\langle E \rangle} \), quia individua substantia est capax \textit{SPECIA\langle LIS \rangle QVA\langle LITATIS \rangle} \), id est qualitatis quae uni soli inest.

\( ^1 \)\textit{per nomen scripsimus, pronomen P} \( ^2 \)\textit{per nomen scripsimus, pronomen P}

One correction was readily apparent: both occurrences of \textit{pronomen} must be \textit{per nomen} (lines 4 and 6), for a \textit{pronomen appellatiuum} would be a contradiction in terms. And if this were not enough, we have confirmation from a later passage that expresses a similar thought (95va: \textit{Generalis substantia est idem quod res per appellatiuum nomen dicitur esse, quod a dialeticis secunda substantia dicitur}). But the passage remains a \textit{locus nondum sanatus} (lines 6–7 in particular) and we welcome any further thoughts as to how to construe this, as well as any of the others passages I have presented today.

The scribe of P has made the task of editing William's \textit{Glosulae super Prisciani librum constructionum} anything but easy, and the fine line between emending P and correcting William of Conches is blurry at best. Which compromise is the better option? are we to maintain the \textit{dubia} where construal is at least possible and consign further speculation to \textit{fortasse intelligenda} in the apparatus? or should we take greater liberties within the main text and banish P's follies to the apparatus? Whatever middle road the final proofs may forge, we must remain vigilant lest we be subject to the same critique that William often feared from his own critics: \textit{fugiendo Scillum, intrasti Caribdim!} (\textit{Glosae super Platonem}, 119.22; \textit{Dragmaticon}, 2.3.6; \textit{Glosulae super Priscianum}, M 62r).