The Haj in the *Urbs Prima in Indis*: The Regulation of Pilgrims and Pilgrim Traffic in Bombay, 1880 to 1914

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the degree requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Abstract

In this thesis I argue that the management of Muslim pilgrims and the Haj traffic in Bombay was the result of the localization of an international regime of regulation aimed at controlling Hajis as mobile threats to public health and imperial security. International scientists, doctors, and politicians problematized Hajis as diseased, dangerous and disorderly through discourse produced in print material and at international conferences taking place across the globe. Local, elite concerns over their own power, Bombay’s urban spatial order, and the city’s international trade shaped the way these larger global and imperial projects were implemented in Bombay. These findings point to the importance of local, place-based social, political and economic structures in the day-to-day governance of empire.
Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been completed without the generous support of a number of people. I owe a very large debt of gratitude to my supervisor Robert Lewis. I am especially grateful for the opportunities he provided to explore the archives in London and Chicago, without which I never would have come upon my thesis topic in the first place. His support and advice about the intricacies of archival research, historical geography, academic work, and life in general were indispensable to me. As well as my supervisor, I would like to thank my committee members, Jayeeta Sharma and Mark Hunter for their assistance and advice while I worked on this project.

Much of this work could not have been completed without funding from the Canada Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and the University of Toronto. As well, the archival work for this thesis was helped along by the assistance of the staffs at the British Library, the University of Chicago's Southern Asia Collection, and the University of Toronto's Inter-Library Loan office.

I would also like to extend my thanks to my colleagues in the Department of Geography and Planning for their friendship over the past year. Special thanks goes to Corey Ponder for talking out ideas during tough periods of writing. I want to thank all my friends for providing support while I was engaged in this project. I am especially grateful to Sandra Zadkovic for providing her friendship and support, as well as encouraging me to pursue historical geography in the first place. Many thanks to my friends who provided welcome relief from the process of research and writing, as well as a lot of fun, especially Joel Dekter and Erin Alija.

Finally I want to thank my family members for their love and support. My nonna, Fortunata Macaluso, has been an integral part of my life throughout this project. Thank you to my uncles Michele and Saro Macaluso for their generous support, especially dinners and lunches throughout. I am especially grateful to my parents, Donald and Francesca Lombardo, for their phone calls and visits which provided so much help during my Masters. Thanks very much as well to my sister, Alex, for making me laugh so often during our post work phone calls.
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Chapter One

The Regulation of the Haj, 1880 to 1914: Theoretical and Contextual Frameworks

Introduction

In 1883, a British ship carrying 800 Indian pilgrims sparked an international incident. The captain of the ss Clan Alpine, a pilgrim ship, had been warned by officials in the Red Sea area that any attempt to reach Mecca from Bombay before the start of the Haj would likely end in failure. Unsure how to proceed, officers from the ship, which was owned by the Liverpool based C. W. Cayzer & Company, decided to seek advice from health officials and the Turkish Consul in Bombay. The ship's officers were told by those officials that though the law required ten days of quarantine, Ottoman officials "had never held strictly to any such regulations when vessels were lying there and the day for the ceremonies at Mecca was close at hand."¹ Deciding to risk it, and with 800 pilgrims on board, the Clan Alpine, chartered by Bombay resident Oosman Voydinia, left Bombay and proceeded to Kamaran, an island at the mouth of the Red Sea, on September 22nd, 1883. On arriving at the quarantine station on October 2nd, the captain was informed by Ottoman sanitary officials that the ten day quarantine was indeed required, and the pilgrims would not be allowed to make Haj. Hearing this, the Hajis on board told the ship's captain that they would "take the lives of himself and the officers if he stopped longer than twenty-four hours or attempted to get assistance from the shore."² After consulting with the local British Consul and being told to "act on his own judgement,"³ the captain broke a number of newly minted international conventions and fled Kamaran on the afternoon of October 3rd for Jeddah.

The Ottoman navy responded quickly and violently to the pilgrim ship's flight from Kamaran. After clearing the harbour, a Turkish man-of-war "fired two shots across her bows, then two straight for the pilgrim steamer, which fell short, and still other two which went very close."⁴ Having just narrowly survived the Ottoman attack, the Clan Alpine and her 800 pilgrims continued on to Jeddah. Once there however, Ottoman ships refused to let her touch shore, thus

1 "Exciting Experiences of a Pilgrim Vessel,"The Times of India (October 29, 1883): p.4.
2 "Exciting," p.4.
3 "Exciting," p.4.
4 "Exciting," p.4.
preventing the pilgrims from making Haj. These 800 Indian and Central Asian Hajis were caught in the middle of a larger web of empire and international diplomacy. The experience of the Clan Alpine was fraught with the weight of what I term the international Haji regime. The ship's experience demonstrates the international framework of regulation which international officials had implemented by the early 1880s around the Haj. Whereas before pilgrims from India moved through the Red Sea with little in the way of government intervention, an international Haji regime which targeted them for regulation across space had been put in place. The regime's logic of intervention was the foundation of Bombay's regulation of Hajis and the Haj traffic from 1880 to 1914.

This thesis is concerned with the way the international Haji regime was created, reproduced, and made local in Bombay. It considers how discourses of science, administration, religion, class, race, and communalism intersected to target Hajis as problematic. This was manifested through a particular local assemblage of actors and practices, both material and discursive, to regulate Hajis within Bombay as both transit and urban space. I ask how the management of the Hajis and Haj traffic by local elites in Bombay was related to the international discourses and the knowledge they produced in the realms of medicine, as well as imperial discourse around religion, class, communalism, race, and order in India. For the sake of style and brevity within this thesis, I use the terms 'the Bombay elite', 'the city's elite', or more generally 'elite', to discuss the collective, class based group comprised of Indians and Europeans in Bombay including local, colonial officials who assembled around the Haj's regulation in Bombay. When the elites of any subgroup differed from others regarding my analysis I indicate this by using appropriately specific terms such as 'Muslim elites' and 'colonial officials.' This thesis asks how elite efforts reflected their goal of increasing their own power and prestige as well as that of the city. I argue that these discourses were understood and acted upon by an elite and official coalition which sought to safeguard its own position of power within Bombay and the world. In doing so, the city's elites regulated the Haj in Bombay under two distinct, yet

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5 Of course, this is not meant to obscure the diverse composition of this relatively large group, in terms of political leanings, religious, ethnic and caste community as well as place of origin and occupation. The elites I refer to throughout this thesis were made up Bombay’s various communities. These included British merchants and officials, such as Scots and English traders and industrialists, Parsi business people and Hindu Brahmins and other high caste community figures. The Muslim elites had great internal diversity, and reflected Bombay’s unique position. Included amongst these were the heads of merchant networks which spanned the subcontinent to Africa and the Middle East. It also included lawyers, members of the Bombay Presidency governing council as well as prominent doctors and other wealthy citizens.
closely related frameworks through which they understood the city. The first was through Bombay as transit space and the second, Bombay as urban space.

I argue that threats to Bombay's commerce by international officials who targeted Haji mobility through problematic medical knowledge led to the creation of a regulatory infrastructure which targeted pilgrims for regulation within the city as transit space. These mechanisms of control focused on the surveillance, bodily, and spatial regulation of Hajis within the city as imperial port and international commercial hub. These concerns over the wealth and productivity of the city which were so tied to its elite's own wealth and power were related to concerns over Hajis in Bombay's social and economic spaces. I argue that elite understandings of both their own role within in the city and Bombay's role within the wider imperial world shaped their understanding of Hajis as threats to the city. This understanding was part of an elite imagination which saw Bombay as a centre of prestige and power. Within this understanding of Bombay as urban space, elites saw their own role as being leaders within their local communities. These understandings shaped the development of regulatory mechanisms that targeted Hajis spatially. Together these two broad understandings of Bombay influenced the specific way the international Haji regime would be implemented locally in that city. This thesis examines distinct aspects of the interaction between officials and elites with Hajis and the Haj traffic in Bombay as well as their relationship to the wider world. Beginning with an exploration of the construction of the Haji regime, I demonstrate how Bombay as transit and urban space was the site of contestation, problematization, and control through a variety of administrative and physical practises.

The Haj from the 1880s onwards was undertaken in a radically different framework than before. I argue that through discourses and measures undertaken around the world, the Haj was implicated in global and imperial politics, science, and culture within the framework of the international Haji regime. Before the 1880s however, the movement of Hajis flowed largely unchecked from India to the Hedjaz. Hajis were treated no differently than other travellers. The only checks and inspections imposed on the pilgrims were those conducted as part of the generally laissez-faire maritime regulations then in place at each port.6 The maritime measures' laxity also reflected Indian Hajis' social composition before the 1880s. Previously, elite Muslims made up the bulk of the pilgrims. Often taking years to complete via an expensive overland trek

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or small craft voyage, the Haj prior to the 1880s was typically undertaken by wealthy Muslim merchants, clerics and officials. By the late 19th century though it was characterized by much larger numbers, especially of poor, rural Hajis. This change was part of larger cultural and economic trends occurring at the time. Islamic reform movements from the 1830s onwards, which stressed the observance of Islam’s Five Pillars, one of which was the Haj, were increasingly adopted by large numbers of non-elite Muslims throughout India and Central Asia. As the Haj grew in cultural importance, so did the number of poor Hajis setting out on the pilgrimage. At the same time, technological advancements in shipping allowed the social and class scope of the pilgrimage to expand with falling ticket prices on the steamship routes between Bombay and Jeddah. Steamships, which first reached Bombay in 1825, had lowered the cost of oceanic travel considerably by the 1880s, putting the Haj within financial reach of those rural, non-elite Hajis who had never before had the opportunity. The regime's implementation in Bombay reflected local concerns over power and trade in the physical and bureaucratic infrastructure of regulation developed there by elites to target the changing Haj.

As the social composition of the Haj changed, the movement of Hajis was targeted for surveillance, control, and scrutiny from actors not just in Bombay or the holy city of Mecca, but around the world. From the 1880s onwards, officials and elites in Bombay would intervene in the Haj in increasing scope and severity until the outbreak of war halted the pilgrim traffic in 1914. This thesis explores how the efforts of Bombay's officials were a reflection of the administrative logic of Haji regulation as part of the international Haji regime. The regime consisted of linked discourses, knowledges, and a logic of state intervention which targeted Hajis to construct and control them as religiously, politically, and medically dangerous bodies. This knowledge of Hajis and the corresponding regulations sparked for the first time major governmental intervention in the pilgrimage from India. At international conferences taking place in Europe, and in the newspapers and legislative chambers of the British Empire and the world, scientists, anthropologists, and administrators targeted Hajis in the construction of a body of knowledge around epidemic medicine, loyalty, and religious fanaticism. The international Haji regime's

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linked discourses and related forms of regulation were made material in the streets, bandars, railway stations, and musafirkhanas of Bombay.

Tens of thousands of Muslim Pilgrims en route to Mecca travelled through Bombay each year. At the international and imperial levels, Hajis and the Haj traffic became part of diplomatic discussions between European empires jockeying for maritime and trade supremacy in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions. I argue that Hajis were a point of intersection between these discussions and those revolving around class and religious anxieties throughout Indian and British imperial elite worlds. In an era when intra- and inter-imperial mobility was bifurcated on the basis of race and class, poor Hajis were seen as dangerously traversing the boundaries of empire. Discourses on race and religious hierarchies of power in the empire informed and were influenced by the spread of epidemics from the subcontinent to the rest of the world. Diplomats and doctors from Europe eager to isolate themselves and their countries from the dangers of cholera and the plague drew Hajis into international discourses around epidemic diseases.

These large scale conversations entered an India where Hajis, by virtue of their religious nature, were viewed as threats to the communal order of the Raj. It was in Bombay however that these various streams of discourses were enveloped within local concerns of urban order and the city's prestige. Hajis and the Haj traffic were constructed as objects of knowledge and concern in terms of political, medical, and imperial rationalities. This highlights the concerns of both elites and officials who worked together through negotiated power structures to target Hajis for regulation. The city was the space within which the international regime was made material. City elites managed Hajis and the traffic in ways which would satisfy external observers while contesting international characterizations of Bombay as a source of disease and disorder while boosting its prestige. I argue that these elite concerns about their own power within Bombay and imperial political structures, as well as their continued success in trade, shaped the way that the international Haji regime would be implemented in Bombay.

**Situating the Haj and Hajis in Imperial, Urban and Global History**

Local regulation of Hajis in Bombay was part of wider currents taking place around the world. Understanding the motives for and strategies of Bombay's intervention in the Haj requires a look far outside the municipality. This thesis is a history of place. It is also, necessarily, the study of the connections between actors and knowledge at different scales. This section lays out the historiographical framework within which this thesis approaches the analysis of the
construction of the international Haji regime and its implementation in Bombay. It considers the Haj and Hajis' place within contemporary currents of imperial, urban, and Indian historical studies. I begin by laying out the way that imperial historiography has changed over the past few decades with reference to the changing conception of relationships between colony and metropole. The relationship between the construction of the discourses and regulatory logic of the international Haji regime to on-the-ground efforts of Bombay's elite to implement the new measures needs to be examined without the barriers formed by a strict focus on the city, or even the colony's history. This highlights the role of those involved in the Haj in Bombay in wider imperial and international systems of exchange and power.

This thesis takes into account the histories of metropole, colony and everywhere in-between as constituent parts of a single entity. This is part of the tradition of the New Imperial History. The constituent spatial parts explored here are numerous. Bombay City, the Presidency, India, and Empire are vital components targeted for analysis. These places though have fuzzy and often times changing borders which effect one another. The practise of imperial history has been fraught with its ideological and practical role in the support of empire itself. More than anything, this has meant the construction of empires as natural phenomena, predetermined, and commonsensical. This ideological stance furthered orientalist notions of an essentialized difference between, and indeed the very existence of, West and East. Nationalist histories, which flourished until the third quarter of the twentieth century, countered these orientalist notions. At the same, however, these studies essentialized the idea of India as nation.

These historiographic traditions all have an understanding of places as pre-existing or natural. The boundaries of municipality, nation or even empire as points of reference need to be challenged. Understandings of empire as more nuanced, constantly shifting, and contested, highlight the ways actors related to one another across space. The relationship between colony and metropole was multidirectional and hierarchical. A good number of histories before the 1990s have tended to understand events in India as the result of one-way flows from policy

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makers in London. Postcolonial and more recent histories that come out of non-postcolonial methods however have highlighted the importance of understanding these relationships as multidirectional. An increasing recognition of the importance of understanding Britain or India's history as part of the wider histories of each other and empire has emerged. This has been extended from Britain to the other constituent parts of the empire.

Histories of place require examinations of events occurring outside national or even regional boundaries. This focus on the linkages between spaces allows us to see those processes which occur either above or below the level of region or nation. The research questions presented here are more so than anything about Bombay as an imperial space that acted as a "sphere of a multiplicity of trajectories." In particular, the spaces of the city were shaped in ways which will be explored in depth in this thesis through the construction of the international Haji regime. More than this however, this thesis studies the Hajis and officials who interacted in Bombay. At its centre is the relationship between discourses which problematize Hajis and their local manifestations in regulations of pilgrims, and how these are embedded in spatial scales ranging from the city neighbourhood to the India Office in London.

**Problematization and the Creation of Categories of Difference in Colonial Knowledge**

Through discursive problematization by officials and elites in positions of power and influence, colonial subjects were made into problematic objects of knowledge. Constructed lines of difference, particularly religion, communalism, class, and race were combined by officials and scientific experts to medicalize Hajis as epidemic threats. This section explores the concept of problematization in a way which highlights its links to control through the creation of colonial categories of difference. These lines of difference were utilized to construct certain colonial groups as further away from the loyal colonial subject and therefore as threats to empire. It

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begins by outlining a general theory of problematization. I demonstrate how colonial knowledges of religion, communalism, race, and class were used to problematize certain groups by imperial thinkers, officials, and elites. The problematic knowledge associated with those social categories was collapsed into western medical knowledge to medicalize subaltern Indians as diseased and insanitary. Together these scientific and social knowledges were used to construct Hajis as religious, political and medical threats to the world. This section demonstrates the concept of problematization's usefulness as a tool for understanding the various practises of regulation which were developed and targeted pilgrims under the international Haji regime.

Problematization refers to the practises through which people or phenomena are made into objects of knowledge. Through this knowledge, those in power, such as administrators, policy makers and elites, understand the targeted objects as in need of a regulatory fix. Crucially, problematization refers to the process through which phenomena are identified and classified as such. It is this identification and classification into realms of pre-existing knowledges which makes phenomena problematic in a particular way. Rather than the creation of new knowledge, phenomena are drawn into those which already exist as problematic. The nature of these problematizations influenced the type of regulatory mechanisms developed in response to this knowledge. Officials in charge of regulating certain bodies used their understandings of just how problematic certain phenomena were, in order to manage and control colonial subjects. In the colonial context the process of problematization of poor Indian subjects was done through the creation of a new body of knowledge around them which distanced them socially from the ruling British. Administrators and elites constructed identities of subalterns which utilized these knowledges of Indians along the lines of religion, race, class, and communalism in order to govern by making them more dangerous and thus necessitating regulation. Colonial identities constituted an epistemological conception of Indian subjects. These categories defined the way administrators would view subjects' legal statuses and how they would be allowed to express their agency within the colonial structure of governance.

The construction of Indian Hajis as problematic was carried out through discourses amongst elites in Bombay and sites around the world. Knowledge around key understandings of

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21 Legg, Spaces of Colonialism, p.12.
problematic subjects was created in service of imperial power.\textsuperscript{22} Administrators and others undertook a systematic project of knowledge creation about colonial subjects in India. Through censuses, anthropological ethnographies, and other academic efforts, a large body of knowledge about Indians was created for use by the colonial state apparatus. Throughout the late 1800s, officials expanded this knowledge of colonial subjects to classify and thus make knowable virtually everyone. This was clearly demonstrated in the creation of the categories of martial races and criminal tribes. Administrators linked some groups, such as Sikhs, to militaristic knowledges to construct them and other 'martial races' as ideal imperial soldiers.\textsuperscript{23} The sorting of Indian society into finite groups with marked borders between them was part of the maintenance of colonial rule. Moreover, these categories of difference were made increasingly strict under the Raj. The expansion of this knowledge which categorized Indians based on their perceived threat to colonial order under girded all aspects of the colonial encounter between British officials and colonial subjects.\textsuperscript{24}

The categories created through British administrative efforts utilized distinct yet related sets of knowledge to create an understanding of Indian society. The lines of difference were used in various combinations to construct groups as problematic. Moreover, these categories were the lenses through which administrators and policy makers interacted with Indians. Colonial officials and scholars constructed a knowledge of Indians which strictly defined religious affiliation as central to lines of difference from the 1860s onwards. The importance of religious identity in India was all encompassing. Indian society was understood as being composed of a number of religious communities. Non-elite members of these communities, the largest of which were Hindu and Muslim, were understood first and foremost through their religious membership.\textsuperscript{25} It was through these religious communities that Indians interacted both with one another and colonial officials. Laws governing the two largest religious groupings in the Raj were codified, for example, using the Quran and the Hindu scriptures.\textsuperscript{26} The British use of colonial categories to understand Indian society was clear from this bureaucratic division into Hindu and Muslim laws.

\textsuperscript{22} David Arnold, "Race, Place and Bodily Difference in Early Nineteenth-Century India," \textit{Historical Research}, 77 (2004): p.254.
\textsuperscript{26} Matthew Groves, "Law, Religion and Public Order in Colonial India: Contextualising the 1887 Allahabad High Court Case on 'Sacred' Cows," \textit{South Asia}, 33 (2010): p.87-121.
These polices based on religious boundaries demonstrate the link between colonial knowledge creation and official practise. The knowledge of Muslims through which Hajis would be problematized by the 1880s was part of wider religious knowledge. Along with the construction of an understanding of Muslim as a category was an effort by colonial officials to more strictly define the boundaries between religions in order to govern through these communal groupings. The category of Muslim thus had its own discrete set of knowledge. Prior to the 1860s, there was little in the way that religion was practised by many non-elite Muslims and Hindus to demarcate spiritual affiliation. Putatively Muslim Indians were part of what has been called a "working composite culture" which blended aspects of local Hindu and other religious practises with those of Islam. Muslim shrines were celebrated using typically Hindu religious practises by Muslims, Hindus and others. This synchretic culture extended even into the Muslim festival of Muharram, which typically featured the raising of tabias, fake coffins, through towns and cities. Amongst the various Muslim sects and organizations gathered to celebrate, Hindu neighbours often erected their own tabias, taking part in the festival. The rigidly bounded religious categories of the late 19th and 20th centuries were clearly part of the experience of colonialism.

British creation of strict religious categories defined Muslims as a distinct, knowable group. Communal identities were held to explain not only society at large, but also individual behaviour and personalities. Communalism became a key sphere of knowledge used to target non-elite Indians as problematic and in need of regulation. For British administrators, this understanding of religion essentialized all Indians as inherently communal and problematic. Communalism was tied to notions of religiously inspired violence and irrationality. In this it was strongly linked to notions of class. Non-elite Indians, were, within colonial knowledge, unable to act in modern, rational, and putatively British ways. Authorities perceived religious bigotry and intercommunal violence between non-elite Hindus and Muslims as proof of subaltern backwardness. This was especially the case during riots which occurred in Bombay in 1893 between Hindus and Muslims over the slaughter of cows during the Muslim festival of Eid-al-

These knowledges of religion and communalism heavily influenced British and elite understandings of non-elite Indians. British officials saw communalism as representing the essence of India through religious bigotry and irrationalism. The linkages between class status and the understanding of communal activities as irrational demonstrate an understanding of the embodied protectionless and backwardness of poor Indians.

As political expression, communalism was tied to other interests which were not spiritual in nature. Communalism blurred the lines between religious and common economic, cultural, and political issues. Since the only way to interact with government was through an individual's communal identity, religious practices became simultaneously political practices. Political activities were routinely expressed through collective religious ceremonies so that for the British, Indian religion was hopelessly intertwined with nationalist and anti-colonial politics. By implicating non-elite religiosity in anti-colonialism, officials made all non-elite Indians politically dangerous. Within the colonial world view poor, communal Indians embodied political danger. This was part of an effort to increase social distance between elites and poor Indians. India specific understandings of religion were influenced by a larger colonial knowledge of race. Poor Indians were, within social constructions of race, less white, and therefore more dangerous than elites.

Discourses problematized religious, communal, or class phenomena in part by drawing them into knowledges of race. The imposition of racial meanings onto various phenomena, the process of racialization, was a part of the way that categorization and problematization took place. Cultural practices, including religion, were racialized to make groups exhibiting them less powerful. This was clear across time and space. In eighteenth century Britain for instance Irish immigrants were constructed as different, less white, and more dangerous than their English neighbours. Catholicism and class tied together to construct an understanding of the Irish as in need of regulation. Two hundred years later in 20th century Harlem, religion was tied to both

class and race to discursively problematize at various times Italians, blacks and Latinos as more dangerous than Northern European whites. More than simple differences of skin colour, race was a composition of cultural and physical characteristics. Administrators, scholars and a host of others created a knowledge of racial difference which changed over time as political needs saw fit. Just as religious boundaries had been hardened through the colonial production of knowledge, so had racial categories. By the 1880s for example, mixed-race people were considered less white, and more dangerous than Europeans or elite Indians. In the earlier era of imperialism, however, children of mixed-race families were often recognized as legitimate both in the metropole and India.

Changing boundaries were linked to events taking place across very different social and political landscapes. Increasingly over the 19th century, racial knowledge of Indians became "scientifically" based even as it was influenced by political and cultural characteristics of individuals. As working class whites in Europe and the settler colonies gained rights, non-elites elsewhere were constructed as less white, and so were lower within imperial hierarchies. The threat of disloyalty and disruption of public order were the driving force behind the problematization of poor Indians as threats to elite and official power and wealth. This was in sharp contrast to elites, those who embraced European political practises and certain cultural norms. The merchants, industrialists, and officials who worked with the British were considered the least problematic and most loyal subjects. With religion as the overarching paradigm of Indian society, these other lines of difference coalesced to problematize poor Indians as politically and socially dangerous. The construction of knowledge around Indian society occurred in tandem with the expansion of western scientific knowledge into the realm of the social.

The lines of colonial knowledge around Hajis were distilled into the singular threat of epidemic disease through discursive practises of medicalization. Scientists and officials accomplished this through work which linked social knowledges of Indians to scientific understandings of bodies and disease. The association of people or social phenomena within this sphere of knowledge is known as medicalization. Modern western medicine, which developed around the middle of the nineteenth century grew out of and as part of the imperial project.\(^{42}\) It was a component of the knowledge creation process of colonial rule. Medicalization engenders definitions of bodies, health and disease with socio-political forces in the consciousness of practitioners and others.\(^{43}\) In western medicine, diseases are made into social and political forces. It was impossible to separate the creation of biomedical knowledge from the construction of those of a social and political nature.

Discourses of race, religion, class and communalism were foundations on which diseases were constructed as social. Elites throughout history have tended to construct certain diseases as class based. This points to the understanding of a link between poverty and embodied unhealthiness. Cholera and other epidemics were seen to target certain bodies which were already constructed as dangerous in other ways.\(^{44}\) This in turn changed the way that disease transmission was managed. Cholera, for instance, was constructed as a disease of poor, communal Indians. This allowed administrators to deal with the epidemic as an inherent aspect of Indian-ness.\(^{45}\) Medicalization refers then to the way that diseases are imbued with social and political forces. At the same time however, it also refers to the ways that categories of people are problematized as medical.\(^{46}\) These lines of difference were associated with problematic aspects of Indian bodies. The creation of medical knowledge around India was part of the same imperial project of control through knowing. Across the colonial world, medicine was a crucial tool of empire. Western scientific knowledge marched in step with imperial domination.\(^{47}\) The construction of medical knowledge played a substantial role in constructing colonial subjects as objects of knowledge.


The embodied irrationality of poor Indians meant that in British eyes they were incapable of behaving according to modern norms of sanitation. Medical practises distilled ideas about other lines of difference into the single idea of insanitary, and therefore dangerous. These systems of categorization in turn were used to enforce the imperial order of power. Western medicine in particular has been understood as the most penetrative part of the colonizing process. Medical knowledge worked to distil the social understandings of colonial phenomena into measurable scientific phenomena. In doing so, it allowed officials and elites to target bodies and behaviours which had been made medically problematic. This medical and social knowledge formed the basis of the general administrative logic of colonial rule.

**Colonial Administrative Logic and the Physical Control of Imperial Subjects**

Key to the functioning of the colonial state was the transfer of an administrative logic of control across the empire. This logic was based on the maintenance of an imperial hierarchy built off of the categories of difference, such as religion, race, and in particular, class, developed through colonial knowledge creation. The effect of these colonial categories was to construct an imperial hierarchy where British officials and elites wielded the most power. Colonial administrative and legal practises utilized these categories to function. The problematization of non-elite Indians as threatening to the colonial order of things meant that they were granted fewer rights and privileges. Categorization thus defined groups' rights in relation to their position within the hierarchy. In this section I argue that the creation of problematic knowledge about colonial subjects was a crucial tool of colonial rule. This section examines how the transfer of administrative logic and imperial knowledge functioned across space both within and outside the empire. In particular it is concerned with the way that colonial knowledge was localized through the actions of elites and officials within the colonial city. I argue that the official and elite knowledge of colonial subjects was the foundation of a bureaucratic framework of regulation. It was through the logic and imperative of this framework that the physical regulation of empire was carried out. The localization of imperial flows of knowledge and administrative logic were made material in the spatial and bodily regulation of colonial subjects. More than anything, it

was the maintenance of imperial, official and elite power over non-elite Indians through which Hajis were regulated from 1880 to 1914.

At the top of the colonial hierarchy were officials and elites, who used their status and position to gain wealth and increased political power. At the bottom were poor Indians, a group constructed as different, problematic, and in need of regulation and protection by those at the top of the hierarchy. The administrative logic, built on this knowledge of Indians, was the guiding rule for regulation in India. Regulation developed to control and govern colonial subjects was a response to, as well as part of, the knowledge created. This administrative logic was integral to the functioning of the colonial state. Moreover it was shared across space by officials, policy makers and elites in various positions, from low level clerks to viceroys. Ideas about governance and the knowledge of race, religion, class and communalism flowed between actors across space within imperial networks.

Various linkages brought disparate regions and communities, such as Bombay's elites and Europe's diplomats, into contact via systems of mobility and exchange. Networks are a way of conceptualizing these linkages between actors across space. Officials and elites in places far removed from one another are connected via flows of various types, whether discursive such as knowledge and policies, or physical in the case of commodities like cotton or coal. The linkages took place through exchanges within relationships between individuals and institutions. The relationships between officials, elites, and others across space form the basis on which colonial networks of knowledge functioned. They overlapped with one another to bring the disparate parts together into an overall structure of empire. Networks are never singular. Rather, a single actor, or a single space, is part of a number of different networks. These systems of exchange and circulation are differentiated by the types of flows as well as the purposes of the connections.

Networks were especially critical to the imperial project. Empires functioned as transnational organizations whose goals were the mobilization of resources on a global scale. Of particular importance to the cohesiveness of the overall structure formed by the linkages was the transfer of legal practises and governmentalities. These were not however, always intended linkages, nor did these flows always guarantee successful transmission. The British Empire's economic and

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political domination of its colonies would have been impossible without these connections between both the metropole and colonies and the colonies themselves.\textsuperscript{53}

Imperial connections utilized older, pre-imperial circulatory regimes incorporating local, indigenous flows of people and information for efficacy.\textsuperscript{54} These included systems of exchange built on relationships within the context of religious or cultural institutions. Unofficial systems of exchange between elites could be as influential in the practice of colonial governance as those of an official nature. Knowledge creation around, for instance, medical science, operated within networks separate from, but reliant on imperial power and communication. This was particularly true in the case of missionaries working in British colonies.\textsuperscript{55} The intertwining of local and international linkages has been highlighted through studies of maritime labour in the Indian Ocean region. Indian lascar seamen, for instance, plied ships owned by firms from around the world. Firms would utilize local employment agents who in turn would interact with a rural labour pool through kinship and caste networks. From the rural interior, to port cities on the subcontinent and to Europe, local networks of exchange were intermeshed with international networks of trade and capital.\textsuperscript{56} These interconnected systems of knowledge exchange meant that colonial administrators were influenced by, and in turn influenced, non-official knowledge. This was particularly true as in the case of policy transfers around prostitution throughout the colonies. Officials and social reformers with ideas around the segregation and inspection of prostitutes as separate from the rest of the population, worked first in Britain. Through newspapers and speaking tours, these reforms to prostitution policies were spread throughout the colonial world. Local officials in places as distant as New Delhi and Hong Kong eventually implemented versions of these prostitution reforms.\textsuperscript{57} It was through the relationships between officials and elites in a number of networks that knowledge transfers occurred.

\textsuperscript{53} Hopkins, "Back to the Future," pp.198–243.


Though the case of linkages between spaces could be made on the basis of shared policies alone, such as those implemented around prostitution, this obscures the fuller picture. Rather, linkages were also created by actors, united in purpose and desire towards common goals.\textsuperscript{58} Functionaries of empire moved between Bombay and London, as well as within the colonies, such as between Bombay and Calcutta. Rationalities of governance which were common across different jurisdictions were operationalized by various actors. Analytically then, spaces were united through the goals which drove the practises of colonial governance.\textsuperscript{59} From its beginnings, the Indian colonial administration was run by men trained to place the goal of imperial domination and success at the very foundation of their work.\textsuperscript{60} The administrators who filled the ranks of the Indian Civil Service from the 1880s onwards were, in many cases, the products of families with long histories of employment in the larger project of British imperial domination. Many trained at a handful of schools in the metropole where colonial knowledge was institutionalized.\textsuperscript{61} The logic of colonial rule was transferred across space by individuals who made this knowledge, learned through the colonial institutions within they were trained and worked, part of their own understandings of the world. As these colonial officials, functionaries, and elites moved around the colonial world, this logic moved with them.

Local officials and elites in imperial cities had their own goals and power within the hierarchical networks of empire. Elites utilized the categories constructed under the British to claim traditional authority over non-elite Indians. In turn, officials took part in a number of strategic practises of alliance in order to produce consent amongst those towards the top of the imperial order.\textsuperscript{62} Official and elite logics based on the hierarchy of empire instituted regulations which strengthened and protected their positions. The elite desire to sustain their own holds over the wealth generating industry and trade of the colonial city was reflected in their increasing adherence to the colonial ideal of removing so-called public nuisances. This desire for control served as the rationale for increasingly strong police action relating to the use of public space by

\textsuperscript{61} See Elizabeth Buettner, \textit{Empire Families: Britons and Late Imperial India} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): pp.163-80, for an extended look at the British familial aspects of imperial rule.
non-elites. The colonial state ultimately worked its power through practises of collaboration between Indian elites and colonial officials. This collaboration hinged on the compatibility of goals between elite and official interests around the ordering of public space and society to sustain the imperial hierarchy of order.

The agency of actors within imperial networks was the driving force for the local transformation of discourses and policies which targeted imperial cities in some way. Individuals are best seen as embodying an incomplete position as actors within these networks. Local desires were quite influential, such as concern over Bombay's prestige and reputation within the empire. These overlap and conflict with larger imperial desires. As individuals lack complete knowledge their power is limited in numerous ways. What this means is that each element within networks, such as flows of knowledge about Hajis, are never truly mastered by a single actor or group. These networks have to be seen as a series of interactions which all exceed the handling of individual agents. Flows are made material through the agency of the actors involved. Bombay was inhabited and ruled by actors involved in power relationships with one another through linkages as part of a number of larger networks. Effective political and economic control of the colonies, and as importantly, the exploitation of indigenous labour and resources for wealth, were projects which linked officials and elites. The flows within these networks were driven by the agency of the actors involved. The way flows of understandings and practises of colonial difference were made a part of local knowledge was the result of this agency. This thesis is particularly concerned with the material effects the localization of these larger flows had on the ordering and governance of the imperial city.

Colonial policies and unofficial connections had their most frequent and far reaching manifestations in imperial cities. As particularly dense transfer points for knowledge and power, cities represented crucial linkages in imperial and international networks of knowledge exchange. It is these material effects, such as those on the spatial ordering of bodies in Bombay under the logic of colonial rule which are best analyzed through these connections. Cities acted as the sites where the colonial power was physically embodied in the built form, for example,

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66 Tambe, *Codes of Misconduct*, p. xii.
through the construction of monumental architecture.\(^6^8\) Places such as Bombay or Calcutta acted as relational spaces within networks of knowledge and power. Within these spaces ideas were transferred in accordance with the hierarchical relationships inherent in the networks.\(^6^9\) These flows from more powerful figures higher up in the imperial power structure did not enter imperial cities unencumbered or unchallenged. Rather, these knowledges and ideas often hit barriers constructed out of the locally particular geographies of difference, such as between Muslims and Hindus or elites and subalterns.\(^7^0\) The colonial logic of hierarchical rule was made material through the physical practises of imperial regulation carried out in sites across space. This administrative imperative which made the imperial hierarchy’s maintenance the first priority of governance formed the basis for the physical policing of the colonies.

Colonial policing was a tool for the sustainment and reinforcement of colonial order along the lines of difference, especially race, class and religion. Indian colonial police forces, which developed out of the Metropolitan police model, differed from Britain's own in their organizational focus.\(^7^1\) Policing in India, particularly from the late 1850s onwards after it became a Crown possession, was primarily meant to maintain large-scale social order. Its purpose was to protect the property of elites and the maintenance of the \textit{pax britannica} rather than to prevent crime.\(^7^2\) In urban areas in particular police intelligence focused on preserving British and elite authority. The physical policing of urban space reflected a colonial regulation strategy of maintaining public order.\(^7^3\) This was carried out, for example, through actions against labour and political groups.\(^7^4\) The priorities of the colonial police in Bombay were reflected by the number of stolen goods recovered each year, which was extremely low and limited to elite property. Rather than focus on these types of personal crimes, as policing in the metropole had begun to by the 1880s, colonial police actions in individual cases, such as against anti-colonial agitators like B.G. Tilak, were aimed at wider goals of maintaining and entrenching the colonial status quo. Policing targeted bodies made problematic as religious and communal threats to the empire by

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\(^{68}\) King, \textit{Urbanism}, p.27.
\(^{70}\) Legg, "Governing," p.461.
\(^{73}\) Kidambi, "Ultimate Masters," p.27.
closely monitoring working class and religious organizations.\textsuperscript{75}

This was especially true, for instance, in the official focus on stamping out anti-colonial nationalism across India from the 1900s onwards. During the Imperial Durbar, for example, specialized colonial officers were sent in to conduct intelligence gathering and surveillance on any group with communal, working class, or anti-colonial sympathies.\textsuperscript{76} The regulation of Indians during the era of colonial rule reflected the way in which colonially constructed knowledges had problematized subjects. The creation of the knowledges in and of themselves were part of the structure of colonial control. The entire functioning of the colonial state was one which was based off ensuring that imperial officials, and their supporting elites, remained at the top. Control over capital, labour and power within India was based on the maintenance of this strict colonial hierarchy. The internal logic of the colonial administration was put in place through actions of officials throughout all levels of government. It was this administrative logic, based as it was off the constructed lines of difference within colonial knowledge, which provided the rationale for the regulation of Hajis in Bombay from 1880 to 1914.

**Thesis Structure**

This thesis examines the materialization of knowledge and desire in the official and elite intervention in the Haj through Bombay. In order to do so I utilize a wide range of archival material, as well as contemporary manuscripts, newspaper and journal articles as evidence. Archival sources are never unproblematic, and colonial sources even more so.\textsuperscript{77} Those chosen for this thesis reflect the research question being examined. The focus of this thesis is on the actions of the officials and elites and it is their construction and implementation of the international Haji regime in Bombay which this research explores. To analyze this, the archival material used comes almost exclusively from official records. Most of the material was gathered at the British Library, and includes Bombay general, police, and judicial reports. These sources often contain correspondence between officials, as well as official texts of laws, policies and orders. They are particularly useful for understanding the logic of administrative decisions. At the same time they expose much of the official knowledge of Hajis.

\textsuperscript{76} Legg, *Spaces of Colonialism*, pp.96-99.
\textsuperscript{77} In particular, official archival sources are notable for the absence of non-European, and more glaringly, non-elite voices. This is however a reflection of the way in which colonial governance itself was carried out.
As so much of this thesis involves the construction of various discourses, I relied heavily on newspapers and other print media from the time. Newspapers and journals contained reports which reflected general elite knowledge. Just as importantly, however, they often contained editorial or opinion articles. These were particularly valuable for understanding elite and international thought and public opinion. Manuscripts, which formed the backbone of colonial knowledge creation, have also been used where appropriate. I attempt to utilize the sources in this thesis to show the ways that discourses and regulations were made material through the actions of Bombay's officials and elites.

The chapter which follows this examines the development of the linked problematic knowledge of Hajis, interventionist logic, and the responding regulations as part of what I term the international Haji regime between 1850 and the early 1880s. I argue that this problematization was carried out by elites, officials, diplomats, scientists, and others around the world. These actors utilized colonial knowledge of categories of difference in order to problematize Hajis travelling through Bombay as religious, subaltern threats to the imperial hierarchy, and thus in need of control. This chapter explores the problematization of the Haj as religious practice through the colonial and metropolitan discourses on Muslims themselves. I demonstrate that problematizing the pilgrimage was part of a larger response to Islamic reformism, non-elite religiosity, communalism and the growth in numbers of poor Hajis, as threats to British power in India. Moreover, these colonial categories of religion and class were implicated, especially at the International Sanitary Conferences from 1851 to 1894, into the official knowledge of cholera to medicalize poor Hajis as epidemic threats to global public health. The production of this problematic knowledge was linked to the creation of an interventionist logic which required, through international treaties and the demands of imperial powers, the regulation of the Haj in Bombay. Problematic understandings of Hajis and the logic of administration was transferred to India and Bombay by imperial officials through discourses and polices. The introduction of the Pilgrim Passport and the establishment of a Muslim Vice-Consul in Jeddah demonstrate the transfer of the international Haji regime's logic to Bombay.

78 While these newspapers and journals were valuable, there is a large hole in the source material available to me. This was due to the fact that I do not read any South Asian languages. The focus of this thesis, however, which is mainly on the official and elite relationships to the Hajis not just in Bombay but elsewhere was necessarily reliant on English or French language official and media sources. That being said, access, especially to those newspapers geared towards Muslim elites, such as those printed in Urdu and Gujarati, would allow the scope of the project to expand somewhat.
This logic made the regulation of Hajis through surveillance and patronizing protection a part of the city's bureaucratic framework of Haj regulation.

Bombay loomed large as the source of the problematic pilgrims in the minds of the assorted international and imperial actors who constructed the international Haji regime. Chapter three considers Bombay's role as a transit space to understand how the regime's international nature was made material in place. To understand the connections between the international Haji regime and the Bombay elites' role within the city as transit space I examine two events which established and extended the administrative and physical components of Haji regulation in Bombay. The first, the introduction of the Pilgrim Ships Bill of 1895, demonstrates the flow of policy and regulatory mechanisms internationally into Bombay through the actions of British officials. As well, the Bill's bureaucratic and physical framework represented the localization of this knowledge and logic by officials and elites working together to safeguard their own wealth and power which was linked to Bombay as imperial port city. Through an analysis of the extension and increasing severity and scope of Haji regulation during the plague crisis beginning in 1896, I argue that interventionist logic and problematic knowledge of Hajis was made firmly commonsensical in elite and official minds by the 1890s. Through the crisis of the plague, officials expanded their intervention in the Haj to become more directly involved in terms of bodily and spatial regulation. The regulatory mechanisms, both bureaucratic and physical, explored in this chapter were localizations of wider discourses based on official and elite desires to safeguard their power and wealth which was tied to their understanding of Bombay as transit space.

Chapter four examines the way that Bombay's pilgrim spaces were understood, created and policed by local elites and officials. This chapter demonstrates how elite concerns for their own and Bombay's position within the imperial hierarchy shaped the construction of a regulatory framework which targeted Hajis in Bombay's social and economic spaces. I argue that an elite imagination of Bombay as a centre of prestige was tied to their own political and economic power. Within this understanding of elite position in the hierarchy, pilgrims, problematized as communally and medically dangerous paupers in need of protection, required regulatory action to safeguard Bombay's status. This regulation would take the form of a bureaucratic apparatus in the offices of the Protector of Pilgrims and the Haj Committee, as well as the physical component of the musafirkhana. I explore the discursive production of an imagination of Bombay as prestige centre, which acted as part of the administrative knowledge of the city. This
knowledge reflected desires of elites and officials to gain power not just locally but across the empire through the maintenance of social and spatial order in the city. In service of this, the regulatory framework which was developed through the offices of the Protector of Pilgrims and the Haj Committee focused on the spatial regulation and surveillance of Hajis as in need of protection. These bureaucratic components were foundational to the construction of the musafirkhana, or pilgrim hostel, as a crucial physical component of the Haji regulatory infrastructure.

This thesis explores how the international Haji regime was implemented in Bombay from 1880 to 1914. From Bombay as transit space, to the city as urban space, this thesis explores the ways that Bombay was the site of internationally connected discourses and regulations. It begins by examining the knowledge, discourses, and related logic of colonial administration which flowed into the city. Overall, this thesis is concerned with the local response to and interactions with these flows. It does not see the international Haji regime as being imposed on the city from outside. Rather, it looks at the agency of local elites and officials who controlled and surveilled pilgrims and pilgrim spaces within the overarching framework of the international Haji regime. Of particular importance to this history are the prismatic effect that local goals had on the larger knowledge flows. Concerned about their local status and power, as well as their position within dense hierarchies of colonial order in India, the British Empire, and the world, officials and elites acted in certain ways. By probing the connections between the larger scale changes which were manifested through state practises in Bombay by the 1880s, this paper situates the Haj traffic and Haji management as simultaneously local, imperial and international.
Chapter Two

The Construction of the International Haji Regime, c.1850 to 1880

Introduction

The British Indian Government took a firm hand in regulating and monitoring the Haj under the international Haji regime. Prior to 1880s however, colonial officials were more unwilling than not to get involved. Regulating the Haj meant two things to them. First, in the Indian context, it was considered a dangerous political move. Direct involvement in religious practise was anathema to the typical governance of the Raj. In Bombay, officials expressed their reservations based on the fact that, "government measures would operate, so far as they operated at all, as restrictions upon pilgrimages to Mecca, and the ignorant among the pilgrims would consider it as an interference with their religion."1 Second, official actions around the Haj represented an international liability for colonial administrators. To intervene would admit responsibility for pilgrims in Mecca as well as for threats to global public health. The development of the international Haji regime by officials, scientists, and diplomats from around the world problematized pilgrims as political, non-elite, medical threats to the empire and the globe who were in need of control. The implementation of the regime in the early 1880s made the regulation of pilgrims in India a part of the administrative logic of the Raj. It was a major break from the previous era of laissez-faire state involvement in the Haj.

By the 1880s, there were increasingly vocal calls for Britain to become involved in the Haj. These calls came from both outside and within India. British and Indian officials at different government levels were forced to contend with problematic Hajis by taking responsibility for their regulation in India. By the late 1870s, the British Empire had begun to implement the international Haji regime. The first, tentative, step towards this was when the Government of India appointed Abdul Ruzzack, Bengal's Assistant Surgeon, to carry out a study on the Haj. According to Ruzzack, a number of interventions in the Haj traffic, beginning in India, would reduce the threat that Hajis posed to themselves and the world.2 Officials responded that, "the Government is ready, when the Mahomedan community evinces a desire to raise the question

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[as] to the matter [of the Haj] into consideration.” The willingness of colonial officials to regulate the Haj reflected the problematic knowledge of Hajis developed by international diplomats and scientists. These knowledges reflected and informed colonial understandings of Hajis to shape the way they would be seen in Bombay as political, religious and medical threats.

As we have seen in chapter one, the British governed colonial subjects in ways which reflected the problematic knowledges created about non-elite Indians; Haji regulation functioned within this governmental paradigm. The international Haji regime was a collection of discourses and measures which dealt ultimately with regulating pilgrims travelling through Bombay. These discourses, from scientists, intellectuals, policy makers, and officials, constructed pilgrims as religious, political, and medical threats to the imperial world. The regime was not made up of a single line of discussion. Rather, it was composed of discourses between actors across space that dealt with a number of different aspects of the pilgrimage, as well as a larger institutional framework which mandated Indian intervention in the Haj. This interventionist logic resulted in regulations in Bombay which reflected the sets of knowledge developed as part of the international regime throughout the 1800s. This chapter asks how pilgrims were problematized as part of the international Haji regime from the 1850s onwards, and how the regime's institutional logic was implemented in the early 1880s. I argue that the problematization of Hajis as religious, communal and classed bodies was strongly linked to understandings by international observers of pilgrims as epidemic threats to global public health. This problematization of Hajis was a part of the logic of direct, state intervention in the Haj which was instituted under the regime. How did the regime spark a movement away from laissez-faire attitudes toward the Haj in the middle of the 19th century, to an interventionist model which included appointing officials to monitor and directly regulate the pilgrimage by 1880?

This chapter argues that discourse and knowledge creation occurring outside of India was central to the construction of the regulatory logic of the regime from the 1850s to the 1880s. I demonstrate how the discursive construction of knowledge around Hajis by British and Indian officials, anthropologists, and writers influenced doctors, diplomats, and scientists globally. This chapter begins with an overview of the problematization of Hajis as religiously fanatic, political threats to the imperial order. Using manuscripts, newspapers, and official statements this section shows that Hajis were known by a range of actors as religiously and politically dangerous. I then

turn to the links between religious and medical knowledge. The medicalization of Hajis by doctors and scientists constructed them as epidemic threats to Europe. This process of medicalization was the cornerstone of the international Haji regime. This chapter explores the findings, minutes and reports of the International Sanitary Conferences held in Europe in 1851, 1866, and 1874, which allow us to analyze the construction of an official set of medical knowledge around Hajis. Moreover, I argue that the conferences acted as a direct impetus for action by the British and Indian governments. This chapter considers the first material outcomes of the international Haji regime in India by highlighting the relation between the international discourses and the implementation of the Pilgrim Passport and British Consular assistance in the Hedjaz. The international Haji regime acted as the foundational framework within which, from the 1880s onwards, Bombay's local officials and elites would regulate and monitor Hajis.

Fanatical and Rebellious Muslims: The Hajis as Political Threats to Empire

Officials saw the Hajis as fanatically religious subjects to be both feared and carefully dealt with by authorities. Colonial discourses which melded race and religion with those of class and empire intersected around the figure of the Indian Haji. Reform movements, as well as communal politics, would have a great impact on the Haj in India. Moreover, responses to these movements by those in power were an integral part of the international Haji regime's knowledge of Muslim pilgrims. This section explores the way that religion as an organizational paradigm became a central component in the creation of the international Haji regime. The colonial conception of Indian religion as being linked to subaltern irrationality and anti-colonialism was part of the way that Hajis were problematized. In this section, I demonstrate how the changing nature of the Haj and colonial understandings of it were linked to Islamic reform and the creation of a colonial knowledge around Islam. I argue that the Haj was understood both as religious ceremony and potentially threatening political action by the British.

Changes to Islamic practise and communal politics throughout the nineteenth century would change the Haj considerably in character and size. Shifting patterns of Islamic religious practise influenced the creation of problematic knowledges which under-girded understandings

of the Haj. These changes to everyday practises of Islam, as well as to Muslim identity in India, are best summed up under the expansive rubric of Islamic reform. While no religion is ever stable, the middle of the 1800s marked a well-documented shift in the ways Muslims understood themselves and their religion. These reform movements would have a particularly influential effect on British understandings of the Haj as well. Begun in the 1830s, reform movements were introduced to North India by Islamic scholars, the ulama. Indian ulama were increasingly influenced by thought from the rest of the Islamic world. The geography of the reforms had an impact on the religious movement's perception by the British; they began in North India, where Mughal rulers were quickly losing power to the British East India Company's agents. Religious reform gained a following just as Muslim political power waned. This was in part a response to the encroaching power and expansion of the colonial state. The British viewed these reform movements as potential threats.

There was no single Islamic reform movement in India. Rather, reform is the general name given to a number of Muslim religious projects active from the 1830s onwards. These various projects aimed to re-order Muslim societal and institutional structures in the face of colonial power. Their overarching goal was to place religion at the centre of daily life. In many ways, these movements were associated with the encroaching modernity of colonialism. While their individual characteristics differed, at their centre lay efforts to bring Indian Islam into line with the perceived core foundations of the religion. In this, it had much in common with other religious reform movements, such as Protestantism. The efforts of reformers represented a project of religious rationalization. That this was in response to the British fixation of religious knowledge is evident in the efforts to further demarcate Muslims from non-Muslims.

The British constructed Islam and Hinduism as very clearly and sharply separated religions. Islamic reform movements aimed to purge Muslim practises in India of accretion and

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11 Metcalf, Islamic Revival, pp.5–6.
the intrusion of local customs.12 This demonstrates the effect that the construction of colonial knowledge had on the lived experience of Indian Islam. One of the key ways this was accomplished was a turn towards scripturalist interpretations of the religion. Practises such as observing the Five Pillars of Islam, which included the Haj, became a defining feature of Muslim religiosity. This movement away from customary tendencies and towards those based on the Quran were a shared feature amongst the various strains of reformism on the subcontinent.13 Each Muslim, within this reformist view, was responsible through their actions for their own spiritual well-being.14 It was within this nexus that the Haj became an increasingly significant part of Muslim religious life in India. The Quran required the pilgrimage, exhorting adherents to "observe the complete rites of the Haj and umrah for Allah".15 Free from synchretic associations, it was completely Muslim in a way other religious practises were not. The pilgrimage to Mecca emerged as an important piece of Muslim identity and religious practise by the middle of the 19th century. For colonial observers, it demonstrated religious fanaticism, and the fear of communal and anti-colonial violence.

The Haj was a potent symbol of Muslim identity and communal politics by the 1860s.16 This was related to another aspect of Islamic reform, which viewed all of life as potentially religious. It was through religious practises that subalterns could express themselves politically. Chief amongst these for Muslims was the Haj. The link between Indian religiosity and anti-colonialism problematized Muslims performing the pilgrimage. In the eyes of the British, the very action of travelling to Mecca demonstrated that Hajis were potentially dangerous religious fanatics. British officials who linked religious practise to anti-colonialism constructed the Haj as even more of a threat.

British officials and others in India routinely questioned the loyalty of Indian Muslims. Reformists aligned Islam in South Asia ever closer with international Islamic thought. This sparked fears in the British of pan-Islamic, anti-colonial sentiment amongst Muslims which extended from India to the metropole. The discursive production of Indian Muslims as dangerously religious and anti-British is demonstrated by the political rhetoric of the time. This knowledge's wide range is especially clear through its reproduction in the metropole. The way

13 Metcalf, Islamic Revival, pp.5–6.
14 Robinson, “Islamic Reform,” p.266.
15 The Holy Quran, 2:196.
that Muslims were characterized within imperial discourses were reflected in speeches given in
the British Parliament. On July 27th, 1862, the House of Commons in London debated the
number of British troops to remain stationed in India. Mr. Vansittart, the Member of Parliament
for Windsor from 1857 to 1865, spoke out firmly against removing European soldiers from
India. He questioned how anyone in Britain could advise doing so, "knowing full well the hate
and the fanaticism of the Mohammedan population, and the impossibility of calculating for any
length of time on the preservation of peace in a country so full of combustible materials as
India." In the opinions of many in the imperial world, Muslims had to be constantly supervised
in order to neutralize their status as threats. As W.H. Gregory wrote in an editorial in the Times
of India, Muslims were "watched with ceaseless vigilance, and deservedly, for no doubt
intentions to revolt were rife among them." The need to monitor Muslim religious practises,
especially the Haj, gained widespread acceptance by the 1880s. It was a crucial component of the
colonial administrative logic which served as the framework for the international Haji regime's
implementation in Bombay.

Muslim loyalty and fanaticism was consistently compared unfavourably to that of their
Hindu neighbours in India. From the earlier days of the East India Company's conquest of
Bengal, the British imagination saw Muslims as constant schemers and threats to the Raj. Moreover, this political threat was tied to outside influence of anti-colonial agitators. It was in
the Hedjaz where Muslims subjects of the Crown would come into contact with pan-Islamic and
anti-colonial ideologies. As the Earl of Lytton, Viceroy of India from 1876-1880 stated, "If three
Turks were to land at Bombay, with a message from the sultan commanding the faithful of India
to proclaim a jihad against the British government, our whole Muslim population would
(however reluctantly) obey the mandate." The creation of knowledge about Indian religions,
central to the functioning of the colonial state, cemented and furthered this problematization of
Muslims.

Books such as The Indian Musalmans, show how foundational the notion of Muslim
political and religious danger was to the problematization of Hajis. Sir W.W. Hunter, a member
of the Bengal Civil Service, and considered an expert on various aspects of Indian society, was a

17 Mr. Vansittart, MP. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (June 27, 1862): pp.1152-71.
20 Azmi Ozcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924 (New York: Brill, 1997):
pp.18–20.
noted author of a number of treatises on Indians such as *The Annals of Rural Bengal, A Dictionary of the Non-Aryan Languages of India and High Asia, and A Dissertation, Political and Linguistic on the Non-Aryan Races of India*. In the third edition of his book, published in 1876, he wrote that: "I have tried to bring out in clear relief the past history and present requirements of a persistently belligerent class - of a class whom successive Governments have declared to be a source of permanent danger to the Indian Empire."\(^{21}\) For Hunter and his fellow civil servants, Muslims in India were faced at all times with the question of deciding if they were to be a "devoted follower of Islam, or a peaceable subject of the Queen."\(^{22}\) Within this knowledge of Islam, Indians Muslims could never be completely loyal. The knowledge of the Haj as a prominent feature of reformist Islam linked it even closer to these problematizations of Indian Muslims in general.

The coverage of the incident of the *Empress of India* in English language media demonstrates how the Hajis were understood as religious fanatics as well as political threats. By October of 1881 the *Empress*, a pilgrim ship chartered by a group of Muslims in Bombay, had failed to leave for Jeddah. Her scheduled departure date had been sometime in September, and after numerous breakdowns she was finally boarded by 979 eager pilgrims on October 14th. Once on board however, the ship's officers realized that "owing to the lateness of her departure and her slow rate of speed, she could not reach Jeddah in time to allow the pilgrims to get to Mecca when the Haj begins."\(^ {23}\) The passengers on board, who by the paper's own admission, "had come from very considerable distances, and at an expenditure which involved the savings of years," were not pleased.\(^ {24}\) Rather than ascribing this to the ship's officers' breach of contract, the *Times* depicted the complaints as those of religious fanatics. "Pilgrims," the article stated, "are a restive cargo at all times, but pilgrims disappointed of the Haj might be apt to take another method of securing paradise by cutting the throats of six infidels."\(^ {25}\) In the end, European members of Bombay's police force were sent on board to remove the passengers in an operation that was deemed as risky as "belling a cat."\(^ {26}\) The newspaper concluded that the pilgrims left "vowing vengeance and there are now about a thousand homeless Afghan and Persian and other

\(^ {22}\) Hunter, *Musalmans*, p.11.  
\(^ {24}\) "Editorial Article," p.2.  
\(^ {25}\) "Editorial Article," p.2.  
\(^ {26}\) "Editorial Article," p.2.
fanatic strangers in the streets of Bombay.” These discourses implicitly linked non-elite status to religious fanaticism. The embodied backwardness of poor Indians was understood as being part of their perceived propensity towards anti-colonial and communal violence.

For officials and religious reformers alike, the Haj was one of the strongest symbols of pan-Islamic fraternity. For reformers the Haj represented the importance of a wider Muslim consciousness. For officials, it represented the threat of anti-colonial movements. Religious reform leaders in India exchanged knowledge within the wider networks of religiosity of Dar-al-Islam at Mecca. Ottoman newspapers were translated and published in Bombay, as part of efforts to increase pan-Islamic feeling. At the same time, anti-British and anti-colonial agitators worked to build connections with Indian Muslims around the world. The role of Mecca as a centre of knowledge exchange amongst Muslims was clear. This was reflected in the fairly uninformed opinion of Lord Elcho, speaking in a House of Commons debate session in 1878. According to Elcho, "The inhabitants of Mahomedan countries meet annually at Mecca with Mussulman subjects of the Queen from India, and from them they learn that, under English rule they enjoy complete religious toleration and also perfect security.” While this may have been wishful thinking on the part of the British, it represents a knowledge of Mecca as site of exchange for Muslim political thought. Under the international Haji regime, Indian Hajis were problematized as disloyal, dangerously fanatical religious threats. Discourses taking place elsewhere would draw on these knowledges to medicalize Hajis as epidemic threats to the rest of the world.

**Cholera and the International Sanitary Conferences: The Institutional Basis of the Regime**

India, and Indian bodies, were seen as inherently diseased from the earliest days of colonialism on the subcontinent. As discussed previously, throughout the imperial era, the discourses about Indians by the British consisted in large part of medical knowledge linked to discourses around religion and class. Indian religiosity was medicalized and placed in the sphere

29 Ozcan, *Pan-Islamism*, p.53.
of epidemic knowledge. Religious practises which for the British marked Indian irrationality, were seen as particularly dangerous. No other religious ritual was medicalized in such a way as pilgrimages. These yearly events, especially the Haj, were understood as being not just dangerous but also inherently diseased. The medicalization of Hajis through the creation of a medical knowledge around cholera was the most significant aspect of the international Haji regime. This section asks how Hajis were problematized as dangerously diseased over the course of the 19th century. It considers the confluence of discourses emanating from India around problematic religious practises, the embodied irrationality and insanitariness of poor Indians, and those around epidemic medicine. It was at the International Sanitary Conferences, first held in Paris in 1851, where this knowledge was operationalized and made official. The proceedings and findings of these conferences along with the discourses of the British medical press demonstrate how Hajis were hopelessly conflated with cholera in imperial and international observers' knowledge by the 1880s.

The link between disease and Indian religion was clear in the eyes of officials. Cholera appeared as an annual scourge in parts of the Raj, and in particular around the great pilgrimages of the subcontinent.32 For the British, the management of cholera was considered a matter of political expediency.33 However, medical practitioners at the time failed to understand the nature of the disease's transmission through polluted water sources. Even after success was found in French ruled Pondicherry by building new water pipes, British officials were unwilling to undertake similar projects.34 Rather, scientists and administrators, through the creation of western medical knowledge, had constructed cholera as a disease of filth and poverty. British administrators took the view that since it was endemic to India, and Indians were always filthy, then nothing could be done.35 The association of cholera with Indian religion and class soon focused on one of the largest religious events in Asia, the Haj.36 In 1831, the first reported case

of cholera was reported in the Hedjaz. In 1865, Mecca was the site of one of the largest cholera outbreaks outside of India up to that time. In that year, tens of thousands of Javanese pilgrims alone were killed at Islam's holiest city.\(^ {37} \) In the eyes of the world the Haj would become synonymous with cholera.

The disease was particularly deadly in the Indian Ocean region.\(^ {38} \) However, the millions of Indians who were estimated to have died from the disease by the end of the 1800s were not what sparked international action. Rather, it was the spread of the disease throughout Europe's major cities. Death in London and Paris forced European and colonial authorities to respond to what they considered to be an Indian disease. Cholera spread along with increasing levels of global connectedness through shipping technology and European imperial expansion in Asia. The main response to the issue of the cholera epidemic was international cooperation through a set of conferences that focused on the best way to protect Europe's public health.

The International Sanitary Conferences held between 1850 and 1894 were the most influential components of the construction of the international Haji regime. A body of people, consisting of doctors, diplomats and policy makers, among others from across Europe came together to decide on measures of quarantine, scientific definitions of disease and actions to be taken. The conferences made the connection between Hajis and cholera an official part of medical knowledge. At the same time, the interventionist logic crafted to respond to cholera would shape Bombay's management of the Hajis from the 1880s onwards. The age of the International Sanitary Conferences began when the first session opened in 1851 in Paris. The conference was conceived as a way for Europe to fight the epidemic of cholera. Its main purpose though was to avoid the disastrous effects on continental trade that the piecemeal quarantine actions had in the past.\(^ {39} \) The conferences brought together diplomats and scientists at a time when scientific knowledge was used as one the key tools of imperial control in the East.\(^ {40} \) The intensification of steamship routes had brought Europe ever more closely into contact with Asia and so the conferences focused mainly on setting up quarantines at the point of intercontinental

\(^ {37} \) Mishra, Pilgrimage, p.53.
contact, the Red Sea region. The conferences also marked the furtherance of a new age of internationalism. This international cooperation focused on creating a medical knowledge based on the discourses of an imperial hierarchy, where Europe was to be defended.

The 1851 conference saw delegates from across Europe take up the task of protecting the continent from the dangers of foreign disease and disorder. Upon opening the conference, Mr. David, the president and delegate from France began by exclaiming to the assembled meeting:

Sirs, I am particularly pleased to have been called to announce the opening of the conference, during which you will be called upon to render important services to the commerce and navigation of the Mediterranean as well as safeguarding the public health of the different states which have honoured you with their confidence.

To accomplish these goals, delegates soon focused their attention on setting up an efficient quarantine system on Europe's eastern edge in the Ottoman Empire.

Delegates set to task determining the best way to bar cholera from crossing the Bosporus from Asia to Europe. This was decided at the conference's 14th session held on October 4th, 1851. The session was attended by delegates from across the continent representing Austria, the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, Spain, the Roman States, France, Britain, Greece, Portugal, Russia, Sardinia, Tuscany and Turkey. Addressing the assembled crowd, Dr. Bartoletti, representing Turkey and a member of the city of Constantinople's Health Council, lamented the arbitrary quarantines then in place for keeping out cholera. The Ottomans though, he continued, were not to be held responsible for the disease's importation into Europe; rather, the scourge's home was clearly India. He offered as proof of this the fact that, "Mecca has again been terribly ravaged by cholera, which most likely, the Muslim pilgrims from India, having the sickness amongst them, have imported to Mecca by way of the Red Sea." The delegates at the conference agreed with Dr. Bartoletti. In keeping with the task of maintaining a safe and sanitary Europe, the Ottomans offered to strengthen their line of quarantine from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf. More importantly though, they would extend it "along the entire coast of the Red Sea so [Turkey] will monitor, in a direct way, the arrivals from India, principle home and

44 Procès, 1851, p.3.
45 Procès, 1851, p.4.
46 Procès, 1851, p.5. [Translation by Author]
Indian Hajis had thus been targeted by international medical knowledge as threats to Europe's public health. The 1851 conference introduced the logic of intervening in the Haj by state authorities. What this did was bring Hajis and the Haj traffic more closely under international scrutiny. The problematic nature of the Haj itself had been made a part of Europe's official medical knowledge.

It was the 1866 conference which officially found Hajis from India the cause of cholera in the rest of the world. The conference was opened on February 13th, 1866 in Constantinople. Mr. Droyn de L'Huys, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the conference was called "in the hope that some measures might be devised and recommended to the Oriental governments, by which the disease might be arrested at the very point of its departure on its destructive march." The 1866 conference was the first to extensively and scientifically target Hajis as medical threats. Its focus was mainly on the importation of cholera from India. The conference built on ideas developed in 1851 in Paris, especially the notion that the Haj was a medical phenomenon. This was highlighted by the pilgrimage's investigation by medical authorities as a part of cholera's epidemicity.

By the time the 1866 conference at Constantinople was being struck, medical knowledge around the world had conflated Hajis ever more strongly with the threat of cholera. In the British Empire, it was tied even more closely to the knowledge of religious problematization. One article that appeared in the *Malta Observer*, and printed in the *Times of India* in 1865 was entitled, for example, "Pilgrimage to Mecca Cause of Cholera." In it, the author claimed the knowledge that Europe's cholera was caused by the Hajis was one held not just by doctors, but by all "intelligent persons." Writers blamed the insanitary nature of the fanatical pilgrims for the cholera epidemic. A few weeks later, another *Times of India* article reported the findings of Europe's doctors regarding the disease. The opinion of those writing in India was shaped more than others by religious and class knowledge of Muslim Hajis. This was clear in the article when cholera was blamed on "The crowd of dirty, half-starved, and worn-out pilgrims who annually assemble

47 *Procès*, 1851, pp.4-5. [Translation by Author]
50 “Pilgrimage to Mecca Cause of Cholera,” *The Times of India* (October 6, 1865): p.3.
51 “Pilgrimage,” p.3.
The construction of a medical knowledge of Hajis' religious practise as a root cause of cholera was to become a foundational discursive aspect of the international Haji regime.

The 1866 conference ordered a special commission struck to officially determine the causes of cholera from India. The commission was given the task of answering questions regarding the "Origin, Endemicity, Transmissibility and Propagation of Asiatic Cholera." It was made up of twenty-three diplomats and doctors from across Europe, from Russia to Britain. The members were divided into six subcommittees. They were also told to determine how cholera was imported and transmitted, the influence of crowding on the disease, a general summation of all the facts known about cholera, and an overview of the deadly 1865 epidemic. The first question was answered quickly and with certainty. Cholera had its origins in India, and its appearance in Europe in 1830 was not the first time it had been noted. The assembled experts concluded that "It is beyond a doubt that long before 1817, and even at an epoch so far back as the first establishment of Europeans in India, [cholera] has been observed in that country." It was cholera from India which had "at different times run over the whole world."

Indian pilgrimages, above all the Haj, were determined to be the main cause of the disease's global spread. The fourth subcommittee, made up of Doctors Gomez, Fauvel, Salem and Lenz, represented the finest medical minds of Spain, France, Britain, and Russia respectively. Given the responsibility of showing the effect of large collections of people on cholera's propagation, they immediately singled out the Haj. They looked first at the historical incidence of the disease in the Hedjaz where cholera outbreaks, they determined, always coincided with the pilgrimage itself. As they wrote, "It was always imported by pilgrims coming from India." The frequency of cholera epidemics in Mecca from 1831 onwards was thus linked officially to the pilgrims, a fact which was reported at places as far removed from the conference as an 1868 meeting of the Epidemiological Society in London. There, the honorary secretary, Mr. J. Netten Radcliffe, gave a lecture on the 1865 epidemic. In it, he stated with total certainty
that "the starting-point of the epidemic, as far as Europe was concerned, was Mecca, at the time of the Mahommedan pilgrimage."  

More than just the pilgrims' origin in India, it was their behaviour as poor, religious Indians which was to blame for the epidemics. The commission at Constantinople was given the task of finding the disease's origins. Medical experts elsewhere however explored the root causes of the association between religious, subaltern Indians and disease. Writing about the commission's findings in 1866, the *British Medical Journal* agreed wholeheartedly on virtually every point the commission had made. They went further, however, in coming to the conclusions on the link between pilgrimages and epidemics. In doing so they invoked the discourses of British imperialism around Indian insanitariness and irrational religiosity. The metropolitan medical establishment was especially influenced by the knowledge creation of putative experts in India itself. The link between fanatic religious practise and India was clear: the insanitary nature of Indians was only amplified by the religious nature of the pilgrimages. These gatherings all exhibited "horrible accumulations of garbage and filth, bad food, bad water, unwholesome beverages, vicious excitement, debauchery, exposure, and a shockingly tainted atmosphere." The article concluded that the importation of cholera to Europe was a result of the Haj's Indian participants. As the *British Medical Journal* wrote, "As in India on the grand scale, so on a small scale at Mecca."  

The 1874 conference at Vienna officially dealt with Hajis as medical dangers. Tellingly, this was the first conference taking place after the opening of the Suez Canal. This in and of itself had put the issues of Haji health onto the radar of increasing number of Europeans. Muslim pilgrims became the central issue at the conference. In defending Russia from accusations that public health authorities there had failed to keep cholera from spreading, Mr. Arkhangelsky called for special precautions to be taken against India. A separate annex to the conference proceedings dealt exclusively with what at the time was being called the "Mecca pilgrimage question." The increasing connectedness between Asia and Europe brought on by the Suez became the target for Haji related regulation. Attendees at the conference recommended

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62 Harrison, “Disease,” p.121.
64 *Procès*, 1874, p.421.
that a health authority should be established in the Red Sea. The authority would be assisted by an international commission made up of parties with vested interests in the region. They were so concerned with the regulation of the pilgrims that they even proposed the stationing of an armed force in the Hedjaz to enforce them. These recommendations of government intervention in the Haj were virtually unprecedented. Whereas before quarantine had been at the discretion of the state, the conferences made it mandatory. The interventionist logic of the international Haji regime was put in place through the mandating of the quarantine. It not only made state regulation of the Haj and Hajis an international requirement, it entered it into the official logic of colonial administration.

By the 1880s the international Haji regime's medicalization of Hajis had been made both concrete and commonsensical. From their very beginnings in Paris in 1851, the conferences produced discourses around medical knowledge. The construction of a knowledge around cholera was the implicit, and at times explicit goal of the delegates at the conferences. The disease had spread into Europe from its initial home in India. It was determined, officially and scientifically, that the Haj was the main means of cholera's propagation. Building off colonial religious and class knowledge of Indians, pilgrimages were understood to be medically dangerous. The idea of the insanitary nature of Indian Hajis shaped the way that cholera was known. In the eyes of these experts transmissibility was the fault not of polluted water supplies but rather the insanitary and irrational nature of the Hajis themselves. The regulations which would be put into force by the 1880s, were responses to this problematization. This logic of internationally required intervention made the Haji regulation by Bombay's officials necessary. It was through this logic of intervention that the first, bureaucratic, regulatory mechanisms were implemented by elites and officials in Bombay.

Diplomacy and the Passport: India Implements the International Haji Regime, c. 1880

In 1882 the London Times lamented that "In India we have hitherto left the question of the pilgrimage very much to chance, and complaints have been made that the interests of the pilgrims from that country have been much neglected by the British government." That year however, a series of governmental actions as part of the international Haji regime were

65 Procès, 1874. p.421.
implemented. This marked the British Indian Government's first direct intervention in the Haj. The pilgrimage from India was thus squarely placed within the purview of official action which established the administrative framework upon which subsequent direct, bodily and spatial regulation of Hajis in Bombay would be built. The appointment of Abdul Ruzzack as special British Vice-Consul in Jeddah to look after the concerns of Indian Hajis and the introduction of the Pilgrim Passport at Bombay led the Times to conclude that the pilgrimage from India "will no longer be neglected."67 This section explores the first pieces of the administrative logic and bureaucratic framework implemented as part of the international Haji regime through which Bombay's officials and elites regulated pilgrims. Abdul Ruzzack's installation as special consular officer for Hajis abroad and the Raj's introduction of the Pilgrim Passport demonstrates the colonial desire under the international regime to monitor Hajis and take a more direct role in the pilgrim traffic. I argue that this highlights the extension of the logic of intervention from the international level to Bombay in a way which highlighted Indian concerns over the maintenance of the colonial hierarchy.

Imperial policy was deeply ambivalent about the pilgrimage. From the 1870s, the British were under both official and popular pressure to regulate and control Indian pilgrims. Their response was to create a physical and bureaucratic apparatus of surveillance and bodily and spatial control which were part of what I have termed the international Haji regime. Newspapers as far away from Mecca as the New York Times routinely criticized the British government for not doing enough to stop the importation of cholera by Hajis, noting that "the disease is conveyed to the holy cities by British boats."68 British Indian official ambivalence about intervention stemmed from the political dangers of regulating Indian religious practises. The colonial paradigm which consigned religious practise into the private sphere was at odds with the interventionist framework of the Haji regime.69 In the end, wider British imperial interests won out.

The British were forced to directly monitor and manage the Haj due to their trade and geopolitical concerns in Europe, Asia and Africa. The international focus on the Red Sea was a part of the imperial goals of establishing trade supremacy in the region. Prior to the 1870s, the Red Sea region was considered under Indian jurisdiction. Aden for instance, located on the

67 “The Indian Haj,” p.6.
69 Mishra, Pilgrimage, p.16.
Arabian Peninsula, was administered directly by the Government of Bombay.\textsuperscript{70} The opening of the Suez, and the diplomatic manoeuvring of other European empires in the region ratcheted up imperial rivalries. What this meant was that increasingly, it was the metropole, rather than India that was directing polices regarding the pilgrim and other Indian maritime traffic in the Red Sea region.\textsuperscript{71} At the same time, Indian voices, particularly elite Muslims, were calling for increased diplomatic and financial assistance in the Hedjaz such as protection from constant attacks by the Bedouins who preyed on caravans from Jeddah to Mecca.\textsuperscript{72} The willingness of elite to seek imperial assistance highlights the expansion of the interventionist logic developed at the international level. The type of intervention, through diplomatic assistance, reflected elite concerns over their own power and the threat of communal politics at home.

British and Indian observers in the Hedjaz often remarked on the lack of assistance that government gave to their Indian subjects. Abdul Ruzzack, who would, in September of 1882, become the first Muslim Vice-Consul at Jeddah, was sent by the Government of India to the Hedjaz on a fact finding mission. The purpose of the trip was, according to the Government, "the benevolent object of relieving Indian pilgrims" of their pain and suffering.\textsuperscript{73} That this was a novel step towards intervention in the Haj under the newly implemented regime was clear. It also reflected the official ambivalence associated with the political threat of Muslim spirituality. The Secretary of State for India directed enquiries to be made by Ruzzack, a Muslim, "as it was desirable that the real intention should not be misconstrued."\textsuperscript{74} Ruzzack entered Jeddah incognito, attempting to measure water pollution and record data without arousing the suspicion of residents of the Hedjaz. This was considered particularly dangerous as Mecca was where "fanatics from India are domiciled. They would never have appreciated the benevolence of the motives."\textsuperscript{75} The complicity of the British in the unhealthiness of the Haj was made clear as well. Readers of Ruzzack's reports had their attention brought to a "large hillock of filth" located in Jeddah's Harat-al-Yemen neighbourhood near the British Consulate.\textsuperscript{76} According to Ruzzack, Turkish officials would never fix these problems, and if nothing was "done by the British

\textsuperscript{71} Blyth, \textit{The Empire}, pp.15-37.
\textsuperscript{72} "The Attacks on Mecca Pilgrims," \textit{The Times of India} (May 23, 1881): p.3.
\textsuperscript{73} "The Holy Land," \textit{The Times of India} (November 19th, 1879): p.2.
\textsuperscript{74} "The Holy Land," p.2.
\textsuperscript{75} "The Holy Land," p.2.
Government towards making an effort to mend matters for the sake of the thousands of its subjects that annually go through this place, the poor pilgrims will continue to suffer.”77 These elite and official joint actions represented the beginnings of a larger series of government interventions in the Haj.

Ruzzack's report was representative of the new interventionist thrust of the international Haji regime. At the end of his four part report published in Indian newspapers, Ruzzack gave a list of suggestions to the Government. First, he recommended a medical examination to take place in Bombay. Second, each pilgrim should only be allowed to leave if they had at least Rs 300. Third, each ship should carry a Muslim doctor and official regulations should be implemented to regulate latrine and cooking accommodation on board. In the eyes of the doctor, British medical officers should be present not just in Bombay, but in Jeddah and Mecca as well to minister to Indian Muslims.78 As the Times of India noted though, these measures were considered much too oppressive and impractical; no Government could ever put them into place. The failure to implement Ruzzack's suggestions at the time is demonstrative of the earliest stage in the process of building the regulatory framework of the Haj. It reflected a widespread official desire at the time to avoid implementing direct spatial and bodily mechanisms of Haji regulation. As international and Indian gazes focused on pilgrims in the Hedjaz, the British were forced to take direct action.

The British sent strong signals in the 1880s to demonstrate their commitment to international public health and Haji security. They first became directly involved with the Haj with the establishment of a Vice-Consul in Jeddah specifically for Muslim pilgrims. By 1881, the Government of India was reported to be "anxious to establish a Consular Agent of their own on the Red Sea Coast."79 The stated reason for this was to protect Indian pilgrims from the vagaries of ship captains and the Ottoman authorities of the Hedjaz.80 Prior to the implementation of the international Haji regime it would have been unthinkable to take such direct responsibility for the Indian Hajis in foreign territory. International pressure within the regime which made Hajis out to be dangerous threats, however, made it necessary. The Times of India remarked on Abdul Ruzzack's appointment that "perhaps no one is better fitted for the post of Vice-Consul at

79 The Times of India (September 3, 1881): p.3.
80 The Times of India, p.3.
Jeddah. This first step emphasized the protectionless nature of Hajis in the eyes of elites. It represents the first concrete component of the construction of the administrative framework of the regulation which would over time be expanded in both scope and severity in Bombay.

The introduction of the Pilgrim Passport in 1881 forced local actors to begin regulating the pilgrimage within the international Haji regime. The Pilgrim Passport underscored the international nature of the imperative to regulate the Haj. From the 1880s onwards the need to count and know the Hajis had become the framework for governmental intervention. The Bombay elite's response to the Pilgrim Passport set the stage for the ways that they would interact with Hajis in the future. Introduced by the Ottoman Empire in 1881, the Passport was conceived by authorities as a way to keep poor pilgrims from being stranded in the Hedjaz.\footnote{Harrison, “Quarantine,” p.123.} Turkish authorities informed British officials that "access to the Empire is forbidden to any person who has not a passport, and is not in a position to establish his identity."\footnote{Government of India, General Instructions for Pilgrims to the Hedjaz and A Manual for the Guidance of Officers and Others Concerned in the Red Sea Pilgrim Traffic (Calcutta: Office of the Supt. of Govt. Printing, 1897): p.2.} It was part of a growing international trend under the regime of direct government intervention. Moreover, the Pilgrim Passport was the first time that municipal level officials in Bombay took a direct hand in its regulation.

The Pilgrim Passport was introduced in India to specifically target Hajis. Just as the International Sanitary conferences were part of the birth of the modern world of diplomacy, so was the introduction of the passport.\footnote{General Instructions, p.5.} While there were passports in place by the 1880s for elite Indians travelling abroad, the Pilgrim Passport was different. The British Indian Government's \textit{General Instructions for Pilgrims to the Hedjaz} advised Hajis that the passport was "intended only for the Hedjaz and if a pilgrim desires to travel beyond Medina, he should procure a regular passport which is granted on the production of a certificate of identity and which should be \textit{visé} by the Turkish Consul at the Port of embarkation."\footnote{John Torpey, \textit{The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): p.2.} Official differentiation of Hajis from other travellers was part of the regime. Hajis were, by 1880, known by officials across the world as more dangerous than elite travellers, such as those who studied in the metropole or in continental Europe and were not targeted as importers of cholera. Regular passports were intended only for

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\item \footnote{The Times of India (September 16, 1882): p.5.}
\item \footnote{Harrison, “Quarantine,” p.123.}
\item \footnote{John Torpey, \textit{The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): p.2.}
\item \footnote{General Instructions, p.5.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the issue to Indians of "means and respectability." Poor pilgrims were to be surveilled as medical threats through the passports as a way of making them knowable, and therefore controllable.

Hajis were known solely as pilgrims. Religiously, politically and medically dangerous, Hajis were to be identified only as such. Passports were handed out with little attention or concern for the verification of individual identity. The Pilgrim Passport was only issued to men over the age of twelve. Women and children were only listed on male companions' passports. Even the identifying data contained in the Passport left little doubt that the status of the individual was less important than the knowledge that each person was a Haji. The regular passport routinely carried fingerprints and individual data. The Pilgrim Passport included only name and father's name, resident province, occupation, age, marks, and the names of nearest relations in India. Even British Subject status was considered unimportant. The initial Government bulletin published in Indian newspapers on July 2nd, 1881 which introduced the rules, informed local officials it was unnecessary to "institute any inquiries as to the character or country of the intending pilgrims applying for passports." This lack of concern highlights the nature of the Hajis as generalized, rather than individual threats.

The Pilgrim Passport was, more than an international obligation, a means for the British to control Haji mobility. The knowledge of Hajis as potential anti-colonial agitators who would come into contact with pan-Islamic thought was a foundational component of the international regime. By the middle of the 1800s, British officials were increasingly careful to monitor networks of anti-colonial discontent within Indian diaspora networks. This was particularly true of Indians living in the Middle East. The Pilgrim Passport, which allowed British officials to keep track of who left for Mecca, was used in large part as a tool of surveillance. Moreover, this was an official measure that had never been seen before. The purpose of the Passport as a

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88 General Instructions, p.5.
89 Singha, "Passport," p.50.
90 General Instructions, p.5.
91 John Nugent, "Passports for Pilgrims," The Times of India (July 11, 1881): p.3.
92 Low, “Empire,” p.270.
tool of colonial control over the Haj was clear when the Ottomans stopped requiring it and Indian officials continued to do so. The Indian government informed pilgrims that this was to ensure that they would be able to receive consular assistance in the Hedjaz.94 I argue that the Pilgrim Passport allowed British officials to easily monitor potentially seditious Muslims in the Hedjaz.

The introduction of the Passport by Indian officials also cemented Bombay's local authority over the Haj within the city. Unlike others, the Pilgrim Passport was issued not in the local district by a police official who would have had the resources to ensure proper identities, but rather at the port of embarkation, Bombay. The agent responsible there was the Commissioner of Police. The process in Bombay was characterized by high volumes, disorganization and rushed deadlines. In 1894 the Commissioner of Police and Protector of Pilgrims were so overwhelmed by passport seekers that they requested three new clerks from the government.95 In 1895, 7,677 passports were issued in Bombay, along with 2,870 of what were known as identity passes to non-British Subjects.96 In 1896, more than 9,500 passports were issued by Bombay authorities.97 This large volume usually occurred over a short period of little more than a month. There was little local authorities could do to check identities. Together, the Pilgrim Passport and British action in the Hedjaz represent the material implementation of the international Haji regime. They represented just two of many actions which had become not only commonplace but extensive from the 1880s onwards.

**Conclusion**

The introduction of measures of surveillance and patronizing protection through the Pilgrim Passport and consular assistance in the Hedjaz were the beginnings of a broader based regulatory framework of the Haj in India. These initial measures highlight the transfer of knowledge and logic across space, within and outside of the empire's boundaries. Internationally, officials, diplomats, scientists and others developed a logic which framed intervention in the Haj as the means of controlling pilgrim threats to Europe and the rest of the world. This logic, and the discursive problematizations it was developed as part of, were extended into Bombay through

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94 *General Instructions*, p.5.
96 "Returns of Passports and Passes Issued to Pilgrims Who Proceeded to the Hedjaz During the Year Ending 30th September 1895, January 3, 1896* *GPBP 1895*: p.1, BLAPAC.
97 "Resolution, Passports and Passes, Returns Of, March 8, 1897* *GPBP 1897*: p.145, BLAPAC.
imperial mandates passed through levels of the colonial administration. Moreover, the interventionist logic of the Haj was taken up by elites as well. As such we can see the beginnings of the regulatory framework through which the Haj was managed in Bombay from the 1880s onwards. The internalization of the need to count, know and take an active hand in the Haj traffic through Bombay was one which shows how wide reaching the transfer of knowledge was. As well, it highlights the ways that officials and elites worked together to protect their own interests within the colonial project.

The international Haji regime was constructed over roughly a thirty year period, beginning in the early 1850s. Actors worked in a variety of contexts to construct a knowledge of Hajis as problematic. Pilgrims were communalized within Indian and imperial discourses as religious and political threats. Imperial thinkers, officials and policy makers openly questioned Muslim loyalty to the crown. This disloyalty made the Hajis into perpetual threats under the regime. Hajis were therefore a religious and communal threat to themselves as well as everyone else. The knowledge of fanatical and irrationally disloyal Muslim pilgrims informed the construction of a medical knowledge of Hajis. The International Sanitary Conferences proved to be the most influential component in the construction of the international Haji regime. The resultant knowledge drew unmistakable links between Indian Hajis and disease. More than this though, the conferences sparked government interventions to begin the implementation of the regime by 1880s.

The first, early government interventions in the Haj in Bombay focused on the surveillance rather than the bodily or spatial control of Hajis themselves. This was the foundation of the regulatory framework of the Haj in Bombay. Pilgrims were problematic threats to imperial order and the only way to control them would be by knowing them. This underpinning of the regulatory regime of the Haj would form the basis for the spatial and bodily control of pilgrims in Bombay as transit space. The first implementation of the regime established not just a logic of intervening, but also a bureaucratic framework through which to do so. While these first steps seem relatively hands off, they were in fact major departures from the past. Moreover, they were part of a larger trend in the colonial world of direct spatial and bodily interventions in the mobility of colonial subjects. The 1880s was a time when the notion of imperial belonging and equality was being shown to be false. Immigration laws in the settler colonies, particularly in Canada, South Africa, and Australia, targeted poor Indians by prohibiting their settlement. Hajis,
as poor Indians, were mobile bodies who needed to be controlled. This larger colonial logic of monitoring and controlling subaltern mobility was part of the regime's acceptance and implementation in Bombay. Through the city as transit space, local authorities in Bombay would expand on this administrative framework to create a physical apparatus of bodily regulation in the city, in response, and as part of the international Haji regime.
Chapter Three

Pilgrim Ships and Plague: Hajis in Bombay as Transit Space

Introduction

In the colonial imagination, Bombay was the urbs prima in Indis and the Western Gateway to the subcontinent. For those who grew wealthy off the city's trade, it was the metaphorical and literal connection between East and West. Bombay functioned within imperial and local imaginations as transit space. The city's railways, stations, docks, bandars, and other port facilities loomed large in understandings of it. The Haj traffic through Bombay did not simply utilize these pieces of transit infrastructure. Rather, the pilgrim traffic was understood as a significant component of the city's role as a space of mobility; an imperial and Indian entrepôt. The implementation of the international Haji regime by the 1880s would change the way the city's elites understood, intervened in, and regulated the pilgrimage within Bombay. The problematic knowledge of Hajis as well as the significance of Bombay as transit space shaped the regulatory infrastructure put in place through the localization and material effects of wider discourses. The Haj played a role in the colonial imagination of Bombay as a space of mobility and connection, as the node linking Orient and Occident, shown in this excerpt from the Times of India:

To visit a pilgrim ship just before she sails is an extraordinary and always a very sad sight. Every type almost of race and colour is here represented; swarthy Malays, with their ugly features; timid and cleanly-dressed Bengalis; fair, stalwart Bokharis, and stately tall Afghans, Tamils and Decanees [sic], beggars in filthy rags, loudly soliciting alms, daughters of the people, whose lives are hard as those of their wretched beasts of burden; men, and women, boys and girls of every age and every rank of life.1 Bombay's role in the Haj here was clear. The essentializing and orientalist descriptions of the pilgrims on board demonstrates the city's capacity as entrepôt.

Through its transit infrastructure, in the eyes of elites, Bombay connected the religiously fanatical, poor, irrational masses of the East with the modern technologies of the West's steamships and railways. The correspondent's breathless description of Hajis reflect their problematization as poor, unruly and unmodern. The Times' author's focus, as well as Bombay's

elites', was on poor, rather than elite Hajis. The intersection of class knowledge with those of race and religion was openly at play. I argue that it was through these forms of identity that Hajis were understood. This knowledge was intertwined with the Bombay elite's understanding of the city as transit space. This conception of the city shaped the regulatory infrastructure constructed around the Haj traffic, both bureaucratic and material. Prior to the international Haji regime's implementation, pilgrims moved through the city as part of the general traffic. Afterwards, they were targeted as different from other travellers. The author's description of the detailed medical inspection on board the pilgrim ship differed markedly from the quick check pilgrims were given before. As the nineteenth century drew to a close the regulations that would frame and target the Haji as a threat to Bombay as transit space became more permanent and proscribed. The bureaucratic and physical apparatus constructed to regulate Hajis as problematic was one which increased in scope and intensity after the 1890s. I argue that in response to international pressure to curb the perceived pilgrim threat and a desire to safeguard Bombay's role as one of the most important ports in India, the city's elites managed pilgrims materially using a newly implemented framework of regulation.

This chapter is concerned with the relationship between the Bombay elite's understandings of the city as transit space and the regulation of Hajis. It asks how, under the international Haji regime, elite knowledge of both Hajis and Bombay led to the implementation of regulation from different spatial scales. The city's role as important trading centre for elites influenced the degree and mode of intervention under the international Haji regime. I argue that Hajis were regulated through the creation of a material and bureaucratic infrastructure as problematic bodies who, as medically dangerous, threatened the city as transit space. This chapter outlines this imaginary of Bombay and the materiality of the flows of pilgrims through the city. It begins with a brief sketch of the history of Bombay as commercial node. I argue that elite understandings of the city as transit space were influenced by its active development as a centre for Indian Ocean trade by colonial officials and merchants. An examination of where the Hajis came from, and how many flowed through Bombay highlights how the materiality of the Haj traffic reinforced its place in elite conceptions of Bombay as transit space and the type of the regulation to come.

This chapter also looks at the implementation of two key moments in the building of a physical and bureaucratic infrastructure of Haji regulation through which Bombay as transit
space was actualized. The first was the Pilgrim Ships Act of 1895. This legislation was implemented by local officials under global pressure. International discussion at the Sanitary Conference of 1894 and global media targeted Bombay specifically as the source of epidemically dangerous pilgrims. This characterization of Bombay constituted a threat to the city's ability to trade with Europe and elsewhere. The Pilgrim Ships Act was implemented in response. The Act gave local officials in Bombay power over the Haj which they had never before had. Its implementation required the construction of a physical infrastructure through which pilgrims were regulated. The second key moment, I argue, was the introduction of a number measures which closely controlled Hajis during the plague crisis from 1897 until 1902. I argue that the crisis of the plague was used as an opportunity by Bombay's officials to build off the regulatory foundations of previous interventions in the Haj and resulted in material effects which served to entrench Haji medicalization. The Government of India and Bombay used the plague to legitimize and extend their regulatory involvement with the Haj in their protection of Bombay's wide reaching and profitable trade. I demonstrate the linkages between the Bombay elites' understandings of the city as well as their own self-interests with the specific types of regulations carried out under the international Haji regime. The notion of Bombay as transit space was the paradigm within which regulation of pilgrim mobility would occur from the 1880s to 1914.

**Bombay as Transit Space**

The elite understanding of Bombay as transit space saw the city as a space of mobility through which goods, commodities, and people moved through.² For elites, the free movement through the city from and to all points was crucial to Bombay's success. While tied to the city's docks, railways, and other pieces of transit infrastructure, these were symbolic of a larger immaterial conception of the city as transit space. More than just the material components, this idea of Bombay was one which viewed mobility through the city as integral to its life and success. The annual “Pilgrim Season,” which saw tens of thousands of Hajis move through the city, was part of the Bombay elites' idea of Bombay as vital transit space. From the 1880s

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² This would have been particularly characteristic of those elites involved in the city’s trades which were dependent on transport connections to the rest of the world. As noted earlier, a large portion of the city’s elites I examine in this thesis were merchants involved in trading networks which extended across the Indian Ocean and to the Persian Gulf as well as the rest of the world. Industrialists who produced textiles in the city’s many mills, cotton merchants, and especially the Parsi, British and other European shipping company owners, who were prominent in the city’s elite communities, had special interests in the city’s role as transit space.
onwards, however, a key element of the international Haji regime was the construction of the idea that Haji mobility was problematic. An infrastructure of surveillance and recording was established which allowed officials to monitor the numbers and origins of the Hajis entering the city.

In this section I argue that the city's elites understood Bombay as transit space, to be monitored and regulated. It was through this conception that the international Haji regime was localized in Bombay. In particular, I consider Bombay as transit space through an analysis of local imaginations of the city as a cosmopolitan, modern, and imperial port. I argue that this idea of Bombay was fundamental to local Haji regulation within the international regime. I use the records of Pilgrim Passports and other official files to show the material nature of the flow of Hajis through the city. It was the presence of such large and growing numbers of poor pilgrims from so many different places which had the largest influence on the way regulation was carried out. The international Haji regime was put into practise by local elites with the goal of maintaining the various flows, both human and commodity, through Bombay.

Bombay was a space of connection tied to Europe, Asia, Africa, and elsewhere through the physical manifestations of imperial and international forms of mobility in passengers and commodity traffic. The commercial considerations of the city, the Western Gateway to India, met those of a political nature to make the management of Haji transit space a requirement under the international Haji regime. Bombay by the 1880s was a hub within global networks of trade and transportation. Elite and official imaginations of the city understood it largely within the context of those far reaching connections. This was a part of the city's function within the empire. The importance of Bombay as transit space was the product of a decades long project by colonial power. The goal of this was to construct the city as one of India's most profitable ports, able to capture trade from both the subcontinent and the larger Indian Ocean region. When Bombay first became one of the East India Company's factory towns, it was not the premier trading city in the region. Rather, that title was held by Surat, which commanded a rich agricultural hinterland and had strong trade linkages across western India, the Arabian Sea, and beyond. To construct Bombay as the trade centre of western India, colonial officials brought in Parsi and Gujarati merchants to the city.3 Bombay's site on a natural, deep-water port allowed merchants to take

advantage of the new shipping technology of the steamship to expand their trade.

Bombay entered the age of rail in the 1860s. By 1869, with the opening of the Suez Canal, the city found itself within relatively short shipping distances to the lucrative markets of Europe. Aided by the imperial navy, Bombay's shipping lines were kept clear and open to the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{4} The city's status as transit space was one which was enshrined in its very development (Figure 1). Merchants and officials expanded Bombay's port infrastructure through the 1860s and 1870s. Land was reclaimed from the sea with the goal of increasing wharfage and modernizing port facilities. In 1873, government and business interests set up a port trust to take centralized control over the port facilities' operation and development. Their efforts included the construction, in 1880, of the Princes' Dock, one of the largest modern pieces of transit infrastructure in India.\textsuperscript{5} These infrastructure improvements highlight the significance of this imagination of Bombay as transit space to the city's governance. The city by the 1880s wielded vast commercial influence in the Indian Ocean region. Indian trading firms based in the city controlled significant portions of the commerce between India, East and South Africa, the Middle East, and South East Asia.\textsuperscript{6}

Bombay was seen by observers throughout the empire as an international trading city. Dr. George Smith, in \textit{The Charm of Bombay}, summed up the elite imagination of the city's commercial reach, writing that "Bombay carries in its ships the commerce of the Mediterranean, opened to it by the Suez Canal, but it bears that also of the vaster Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf."\textsuperscript{7} International firms opened up branch offices in the city. These linked Bombay, especially in elite minds, to the rest of the world via international brands and trade. Indeed, it was typical to see Indian and international firms operating side by side. The city's newspapers held advertisements for Indian firms such as the C. Thakkar and Co., importers of "all kinds of patent

\textsuperscript{4} Kosambi, "Commerce," pp.32-5.
\textsuperscript{6} See Sugata Bose, \textit{A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire} (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006) for a detailed look at the ways Bombay functioned as command and control centre for the Indian Ocean economy throughout the colonial era.
Figure 1: Bombay's Transit Facilities, c. 1900

Legend
- Steam Companies
- Railway Stations
- Docks and Bandars
- Railway Lines

Source: Imperial Gazetteer of India, V. 8, 1907-1909; The Times of India Calendar and Directory for 1900 (Bombay: The Times of India Steam Press, 1900).
Drawn by Nicholas Lombardo, 2011
medicine," next to those for Gillette Razors and Dunlop Tires. The elite imagination of the city as transit space was based on the importance of not just trade, but also of human mobility to the city's wealth.

The pilgrims' travels through Bombay were a part of the imagination of the city as transit space. During the pilgrim season, tens of thousands of Hajis entered Bombay from all over Asia and elsewhere. I argue that the surveillance of pilgrims, begun with the Pilgrim Passport in 1881, was part of the larger issue of improving and protecting mobility through Bombay. The importance of the increasing numbers of Hajis and the official surveillance of pilgrims to elite understandings of Bombay is clear from writings of the time. Perhaps no one summed up the prevailing feeling amongst elites as well as S.M. Edwardes, one of Bombay's quintessential colonial officials. His professional work in the Indian Civil Service was complemented by his own amateur scholarship; apart from his capacity in several offices he was also an "orientalist and criminologist." Edwardes, a graduate of Eton and Oxford, began his service in Bombay in 1894. There, he was able to "amplify and revise the public knowledge of "The Town and Island [of Bombay]," to a far greater extent than any contemporary." In his official role as Commissioner of the 1901 Census he published an extensive history of Bombay. Between 1906 and 1910 he published three volumes of the Bombay Gazetteer for the imperial government. As the London Times wrote in his obituary, his books, the Rise of Bombay, Byways of Bombay and the Gazetteer, "gave him an enduring place as an authority who must always be consulted on any point connected with the great city." He served not only as the official in charge of the 1901 Bombay Census but also, in 1904, as an officer of the Bombay Improvement Trust. In his numerous roles, both official and otherwise, Edwardes acted on the colonial logic of control and regulation. In 1910, he became the Commissioner of Police, a role in which his attention turned to pilgrims.

For Edwardes, the Hajis entering the city were in need of official attention to ensure that traffic through the city operated efficiently. By 1884, according to Edwardes, the number of Hajis had reached an almost unwieldy 8,000 persons, too many for the limited number of steamships bound for Jeddah lying in port at any one time. The police commissioner was forced

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10 "Orientalist," p.17.
11 "Orientalist," p.17.
to take direct action as the situation threatened mobility through the city. As a result, wrote Edwardes, "the growth of the Haj traffic before the outbreak of the Great War added immensely to the volume of work annually devolving upon the Police and acquired additional importance from the political significance given to it by Indian Moslem agitators." The official intervention in the growing traffic of Hajis through Bombay reflected local and colonial concern for Bombay as transit space. By the 1870s the need to ensure steamship traffic was accommodated in the city was accompanied by the construction of both a physical infrastructure, for example the Princes' Docks, and a bureaucratic apparatus, the Port Trust, to protect Bombay's mobility. The city was to be a space where movement of goods and people was relatively free, yet controlled.

The number of Hajis travelling through Bombay grew steadily between 1880 and 1914. While the regulation of the Haji traffic in Bombay focused on preserving the city as a space of efficient movement, the actual number and origins of the Hajis influenced the scale and scope of the regulatory infrastructure. By the 1890s, the number of pilgrims making Haj had increased to more than 10,000 annually from roughly an average of 8,000 during the 1880s. For the 1893-1894 Haj season, for instance, Bombay officials granted 12,736 passports to pilgrims. Of these, 7,863 were British Subjects, born either in British India or other parts of the empire, including Singapore or Ceylon. Importantly, the passports were also issued to 1,179 subjects of the Native States, while more than 3,000 were issued to those listed simply as foreigners, mainly from Central Asia. That so many passports were issued to non-British Subjects highlights the nature of the documents as a means of tracking the Haj traffic in Bombay. Though the Pilgrim Passport was introduced as a requirement by Ottoman officials in 1881, it had ceased to be necessary by the 1890s. British officials continued to encourage pilgrims to obtain passports. I argue that the passports were a means of monitoring Haj traffic in the city as transit space. The 1894-1895 Haj saw a slight decrease in passports given out, with only 7,677 passports given and 2,870 informal passes granted to foreigners. The 1895-96 and 1896-97 pilgrim seasons saw 13,112 and 10,952 Hajis, respectively, officially registered as travelling through Bombay. These numbers dwarfed

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16 "Returns of Passports and Passes Issued to Pilgrims Who Proceeded to the Hedjaz," *GPBP 1896*: 1, BLAPAC.
those of the past. From the 1880s onwards, the Haj traffic, as noted by Edwardes, had increased as flows of Hajis from all over moved through the city.

For elites, the growing number of Hajis reaffirmed their idea of Bombay as transit space and its role connecting East and West. Bombay was a crucial node connecting wide reaching networks of the Haj to the Hedjaz (Figure 2). The Hajis underscored this idea of connectivity for elites as so few pilgrims, only 345 in 1905, came from Bombay. Highlighting the city's role in the Haj were the almost 6,000 pilgrims from Bengal who eschewed the nearby port of Calcutta for the urbs prima. The city's increasing trade and connectivity with the rest of the world was mirrored in the Haji traffic, which increased throughout the 1900s. In 1903, for instance, more than 16,000 pilgrims passed through Bombay. The increasing numbers sparked more intense interventions in the Haji traffic in the service of protecting Bombay as transit space. These interventions, for example, cost the government Rs. 15,207 in 1903. The Akhbari, or Great Haj, which occurred whenever the date of the pilgrimage fell on a Friday, brought an unprecedented 18,000 pilgrims through Bombay in 1905, only increasing the cost to the government and the scope of its regulation. The pilgrim traffic through Bombay was one which connected a number of actors, from the Hajis themselves, to officials, to transportation agents in a way which further embedded the pilgrimage in the notion of Bombay as transit space.

Hajis from Central and South Asia relied almost exclusively on the steamships of international companies to reach the Hedjaz. Of the pilgrims arriving in the Holy Land by sea in 1905, Indians were the largest group at 22%. This was more than double the next largest, Javanese, and five times the number of Malays. The pilgrimage traffic through Bombay was significant not just to local actors, but also to those outside of the city. In particular, owners of international steamship lines took notice of the pilgrim trade. By the 1870s, the movement of Hajis across the Indian Ocean to Mecca was part of international networks of transportation and trade. When the international Haji regime was firmly in place in the 1880s, a more than substantial portion of the pilgrim shipping interests were controlled by British capital. Ships such as the ss Hoseinee demonstrated the relationship between British shipping capital and the

"Returns of Passports and Passes," GPBP 1897: p.145, BLAPAC.
17 "Returns of Passports and Passes," GPBP 1906: p.189, BLAPAC.
18 "Pilgrims," GPBP 1906: p.189, BLAPAC.
19 "Nationality and Numbers of the Pilgrims who Arrived by Sea for the Year 1905," GPBP 1906: p.189, BLAPAC.
Figure 2: Bombay and the Haj, 1895

Legend
- • Homes of Pilgrims
- ★ Bombay
- ▲ Jeddah
- ♦ Kamaran
- ⚔ Mecca
- --- Steamship Route

Source: GPBP, 1898.
Drawn by Nicholas Lombardo
pilgrim trade. The *Hoseinee* was built in 1890 by W. Dobson & Co. in Newcastle.\(^{21}\) It was owned by the Bombay based, but British owned Bombay & Persia Steam Navigation Company, which was managed by the British Indian firm of Turner Morrison & Co. The company, founded in 1877, specialized in trade across the Arabian Sea between Bombay, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.\(^{22}\) The ship carried between 133 and 825 pilgrims to Jeddah on several trips annually from the 1890s until it was scrapped in 1914.\(^{23}\) The participation of Bombay based but British owned steamship companies in the city's Haj traffic demonstrates the role of the Haj in the larger understanding of Bombay. The ships, crucial to the overall ideal of transit space, show the way the Haj fit into overall notions of mobility in Bombay.

European shipping capital was especially eager to take advantage of the demand for Haj transportation. It ensured companies operating in the Indian Ocean would have full holds during the pilgrim season while strengthening relationships between western firms and Muslim merchants.\(^{24}\) Large firms fuelled by British capital quickly overtook the smaller Indian firms operating the Haj route before the 1880s. This was evident in the increasing size and decreasing number of ships carrying Hajis. By 1886 two thirds of pilgrims were carried on large vessels over 1,000 to 1,500 tonnes with an average of 764 Hajis per trip. By 1913, most ships were over 2,000 tonnes, representing 93.3% of the pilgrim trade.\(^{25}\) I argue that the concentration of the pilgrim trade within the hands of international firms highlights the Haj traffic's significance to Bombay's transportation economy. Between 1890 and 1895, only a small number of separate ships officially plied the pilgrim trade between Bombay and Jeddah. They carried as few as 72 pilgrims, in the case of the *ss Naderi* on her July 29th, 1894 departure for Jeddah. Most however carried more than 700 Hajis, or in the case of the *Naderi* on the May 17th, 1892, more than 1,000.\(^{26}\) These pilgrim ships were one of the key focuses of regulatory intervention under the international Haji regime. On the one hand they represented the international maritime economy which was so crucial to understandings of Bombay as transit space. On the other, they were the

\(^{21}\) *Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping, from 1st July, 1890 to the 30th June, 1891* (London: Lloyd's, 1891): p.ii.


\(^{23}\) "Special Table, Pilgrim Ships," *Public and Judicial Annual Report of the Bombay Presidency [PJAR], 1895*, BLAPAC.


\(^{26}\) "Special Table," *PJAR*. 57
most important link between Bombay and Mecca.

**The Pilgrim Ships Act of 1895**

The Pilgrim Ships Act was a key way that the idea of Bombay as transit space was actualized around the regulation of the Haj. Under the international Haji regime pilgrim ships were targeted for regulation in ways which reflected the problematic nature of medicalized pilgrims. In Bombay, the association of the problematic Haji with pilgrim ships was one of the key ways the international Haji regime was implicated in the project of protecting Bombay as transit space. I argue that port facilities, customs, and shipboard conditions, all material components which influenced ideas around Bombay as transit space, were implicated in the regulation of Haji mobility under the regime. Considered one of the deadliest in memory, the 1893 cholera epidemic in Mecca sparked another meeting of the International Sanitary Conference in 1894 which focused in on Bombay as transit space.

This conference, which led to a convention signed by a representative of the British Indian government, specifically targeted the shipping of pilgrims from Bombay. The result was the 1895 Pilgrim Ships Act. I argue that the Bombay elites’ implementation of the Act resulted in material and administrative changes which reflected the localization of discourses of the problematic Haji from the international regime through the lens of elite conceptions of the city as a space of mobility. In this section I demonstrate the ways that discourses and events occurring far outside of Bombay were intimately related to the construction of a permanent and extensive regulatory infrastructure in the city. The discourse of the International Sanitary Conference and global media targeted Bombay as a site of epidemic danger. I argue that the Act was a contestation of this characterization. At the same time, it highlights the interconnectedness of urban policy within the imperial world. The Act was also related to the construction of a permanent material and bureaucratic framework of regulation constructed in order to meet the requirements of world scientists, diplomats and local merchants. Bombay as transit space was the paradigm within which pilgrims were regulated under the international Haji regime in that city.

Hajis were understood as embodying insanitary practises. As a result, pilgrim ships, symbolic of global interconnectedness of Hajis and cholera through Bombay were placed under intense scrutiny from the 1880s onwards (Figure 3). From the earliest days of the international Haji regime, these ships were considered one of the evils of the pilgrim trade. Conditions were
horrible, and it was common for Hajis to die on board throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Captain Carter, who served at the helm of the steamship King Arthur during the 1879 pilgrim season, wrote to the Times in London to express his horror at conditions on board. Carter, a Briton working on a British flagged ship based out of Bombay, described the King Arthur in a way which simultaneously blamed the problematic Hajis and ship line owners. Writing from his post on November 30th, 1879, he exclaimed that:

No one who has not witnessed the pilgrims actually en route can form the slightest conception of the unromantic and unpicturesque appearance of these wretched fanatics. There are horrors on board such a ship which no Christian has ever dreamt of, and none but those who grow rich by such wickedness can form any idea; wickedness worse, by far, than was ever found on board a slaver.27

The ships represented the very worst of the trade. Writing in an English newspaper, in a letter reprinted in India, Rafuddin Ahmad sought to inform readers about the ships. He was particularly concerned that shipowners subjected Hajis to such overcrowding that "more space is allowed to cattle in Trans-Atlantic vessels."28 Hajis' embodied protectionlessness served to make them the target of local concern within Bombay as transit space. Pilgrim ships were a key facet of the idea of transit space which was placed under regulation. Concern over the ships represented a range of elite opinions, all of which reflected the problematization of Hajis as medical threats in need of protection.29 In the eyes of elites, fanatical Muslims, due to their essential unhealthiness, were unable to behave in sanitary ways appropriate for modern steamships. As part of the traffic which characterized elite conceptions of the city, the problematic nature of Hajis was linked to their mobility.

It took one of the deadliest outbreaks of cholera ever to turn the regulatory attention of the world directly onto Bombay. I argue that the 1893 outbreak at Mecca served to make

29 The availability of a wider range of elite opinions is one way my work was impacted by the limited availability of sources. Having access only to English language newspapers from India, my only glimpse into vernacular texts was through the Government compiled Bombay Native Newspaper Reports. One can surmise that a look within Gujarati, Urdu and Marathi newspapers, amongst others, would provide evidence of a much more nuanced range of opinions about elite understandings of Hajis as problematic or not. The evidence contained in English language newspapers and government compilations could be more critical of the Haji problem than more sympathetic Muslim papers for instance. What remains clear however is that the prevailing opinion amongst officials and their elite supporters in various communities was that Hajis represented a medicalized threat to Bombay as transit space.
epidemic knowledges of Hajis ever more concrete and made their medicalization into a threat to Bombay as a space of mobility. Scientific and diplomatic attention began to focus on the connection between the state of pilgrim ships and the epidemic. In doing so, Indian sanitation efforts and Bombay as a point of connection came under international criticism. The 1893 epidemic resulted indirectly in the implementation of a significant, material regulatory infrastructure in Bombay which was further entrenched discourses of problematization in local knowledge. That the epidemic was such a catalyst was due in large part to its intensity. Throughout the 1893 pilgrim season, it was estimated that Hajis died at the rate of more than one thousand per day. The situation became so unmanageable that the Ottoman army was called into bury the dead. Of these soldiers, two thirds were thought to have succumbed to the disease. Piles of corpses, it was claimed, could be seen by ships passing from the Red Sea. Health officials in the region traced the disease to a single ship, the ss Knight of St. John, a British ship sailing from Bombay.30

The 1894 International Sanitary Conference was convened as a way of exploring means of imposing western sanitary rationalities on the East. The stated goal of the conference was to bring a new age of international disease management to the world. Paris in February of 1894 was

to be the place where a new era of solutions would be initiated which would explicitly protect public health and international commerce. Under the international Haji regime, the link between public health and the threatening mobility of pilgrims was established through the material space of the pilgrim ships. Decades after the first international conference, the 1894 session was meant to finally succeed in protecting Europe from the diseased Hajis responsible for cholera. Opening up the proceedings on February 8th, M. Barère, the French delegate, made it clear Hajis were at the very top of the agenda. He informed the gathered delegates that "It is incontestable that pilgrims are the most powerful vehicle for cholera; if it was otherwise, this conference would be pointless."  

The 1894 Conference's focus on India was clear to all involved. India would be represented by a special delegate, former chief of the Government of India's medical department, Surgeon General J.M. Cunningham. He joined Mr. Phipps, Her Majesty's Minister in Paris, and Doctor Thorne, Head of the Sanitary Department, as British delegates. That the interests of imperial India were to be affected in Paris was clear from the lack of representation from any other of the British colonies. In recognition of the direct impact of the proceedings on Indian shipping and business interests, India was given the right to vote independently of Britain in technical commissions. This in and of itself was a compromise, as the other attendees, whose aims were largely to impose new rules on Indian shipping, refused to give Cunningham full voting rights. This situation demonstrates that Indian interests came second to those of the larger colonial project.

Indian interests in the Haj traffic were mainly those of a political and commercial nature. During the second meeting on February 13th, Phipps stated that the interests of Her Majesty's Government were mainly focused on the Mecca pilgrimage. "At stake," he intoned, "is the well-being of about sixty million Muslim subjects of Her Britannic Majesty." Phipp's concern for Indian religious politics demonstrates the balancing act officials attempted in order to assuage both international and specifically imperial interests. Cunningham, in his presentation, assured the other delegates of the willingness of Indian officials to put a stop to the epidemic. He refuted

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32 Conférence, p.16. [Translation by Author]
33 Conférence, p.37.
34 Conférence, p.51. [Translation by Author]
the notion that "the very mention of India suggests the idea of cholera." He outlined the various inoculation and sanitation schemes put into effect by the Indian government. In doing so, I argue, Cunningham sought to show that colonial control over the essentialized medicality of Indians was firmly in place. Concluding his address, he again maintained that international health was India's goal, as far as it was practicable "and not contrary to the religious feelings of the Mohammedan population." This willingness to comply through intervention in the Haj show just how important the continual mobility of transit through Bombay was to colonial power.

By the end of the conference, the delegates had decided that the greatest threat to Europe's health came from pilgrim ships. Count Kuefsten, a delegate for Austria-Hungary, presented a paper on the 1893 epidemic. Listing off the history of cholera outbreaks in the Hedjaz, he placed the blame squarely on British ships. The Hesperio in 1882, the Deccan in 1890, and the Sculptor in 1891 all carried cholera, he claimed, and all came from Bombay. The conference only stood to bolster what was already the opinion of most observers outside of India. An article appearing in the New York Times in 1893 claimed that the pilgrim traffic, "carried on for the most part from Bombay, continually menaces the health of Europe and the entire civilized world." In the same publication, an American doctor, William G. Eggleston wrote that scientific investigations had determined that cholera "travelled from Bengal through India to Bombay, and thence to Mecca." The conference finally agreed on a convention which would force India to implement new laws around the pilgrim ships. According to Henri Mond, from France, this was necessary due to the continual lack of favourable results from Indian efforts at sanitation. The convention, which led directly to the Pilgrim Ships Act, laid out new medical inspection and sanitation guidelines as well new space requirements on board.

The Pilgrim Ships Act was seen as a necessary step to protect Bombay as transit space by safeguarding the city's place in international trade networks. I argue that it was also an unwelcome intrusion into religious politics by the Raj's always wary officials. Its implementation was intended to contest the idea that the colonial government was incapable of instituting rational, modern policies to control colonial subjects. Officials and elites however were unhappy

35 Conférence, p.52. [Translation by Author]
36 Conférence, p.55. [Translation by Author]
37 Conférence, p.63.
40 Conférence, p.94.
with the Act from the very start, as Sir Alexander Mackenzie demonstrated when he introduced
the bill in 1895. He made it quite clear that the bill was meant to meet the requirements set out in
Paris as "the flow of Indian pilgrims to the Hedjaz is not a matter in which India alone is
interested. It is regarded with feverish and not, as we think, always well-informed interest by the
whole of Europe." Mackenzie's language demonstrates the desire of local officials to govern
within the political contingencies of India. It was through the local knowledge of Bombay as
transit space that the act was implemented materially.

The Act gave local officials sweeping new power to regulate Haji transit spaces in ways
which had not been seen before. The interventions contained therein were part of the
international Haji regime, a way to regulate based on the problematic nature of the poor, diseased
Haji. That the Bill explicitly targeted Hajis, rather than all travellers was clear when it defined a
pilgrim solely as a "Muhammadan passenger going to or returning from the Hedjaz." The
Pilgrim Ships Act explicitly limited the geographic extent of Haji transit space. Under the law,
only certain cities were designated as pilgrim ports. Local governments, such as Bombay, would
have the ability to agree or disagree to the designation and no ship could carry pilgrims if it did
not leave from those ports. Vessels would be required to declare themselves as pilgrim ships by
giving notice to Local Government.

More than this however, the Act extended the notion of Hajis in Bombay as transit space
to include not only the port, but the ships themselves. Local officers were given the right to board
any pilgrim ship at any port to carry out inspections. The implication was that Haji mobility
through Bombay as transit space was to be targeted for strict regulation. Bombay officials'
jurisdiction now extended across the ocean, on board ships. The Act included the entire notion of
travel through the port, reflecting the idea of the city as a space of mobility. The ships themselves
were regulated in ways which targeted the microgeographies on board, in particular the spaces of
the lowest classes of pilgrims. Indeed, the entire Act can be seen as really only applying to the
poorest pilgrims. Most of the rules regarding food, water, and space would never have applied to

41 "Pilgrim Ships Act, 1895," PJAR 1895: p.2. BLAPAC.
42 "Pilgrim Ships Act," PJAR 1895.
43 "Pilgrim Ships Act."
44 Government of India, General Instructions for Pilgrims to the Hedjaz and A Manual for the Guidance of Officers
and Others Concerned in the Red Sea Pilgrim Traffic (Calcutta: Office of the Supt. of Govt. Printing, India,
1897): p.16.
45 "Pilgrim Ships Act."
first or second class pilgrims travelling in private cabins. Rather, the microgeographies of the poorest pilgrims became the target for regulation.

Under the rules laid out at Paris, ships were to be seaworthy, properly equipped, and ventilated. Records were to be kept of the number of pilgrims of each class that the ships were to carry and they were to be fitted with "food, fuel and pure water over and above what is necessary for the crew." Rules about space focused on the extent of which was to be given to each Haji. Government, under the Act, had the ability to set space prescriptions about the ship. It did so by requiring each pilgrim over the age of twelve to have access to no less than six superficial feet of upper deck space, and sixteen cubic feet tween decks. As well, ships had to have medical officers, a hospital, and a dispensary. The Act laid out further abilities of the government to make rules concerning a number of facets on board. These highlight the extent the state was expected to intervene in the Haj under the international regime. Rules could be made concerning issues such as life boats, navigation instruments, and fire extinguishers. At the same time, they could also be made about how baggage and food would be distributed to pilgrims along with the space to be given over for each task on board. Even the ways in which women were to be inspected was made open to regulation under the Act.

The Pilgrim Ships Act sparked considerable controversy in Bombay from an elite who contested the notion of the city as a site of disease. Muslim groups in particular objected to the rise of fares they were sure would accompany the increased space allotment for Hajis on board pilgrim ships. Colonial officials in Bombay were likewise concerned. To interfere with the Haj in such a widely publicized and obvious way was politically unpalatable. Moreover, it posed a potential hindrance to the free flow of traffic through city. For Indian elites and officials alike, it threatened their power and Bombay's ability to function as transit space. The Anjuman-i-Islam, Bombay's most prominent Muslim organization, wrote about their concerns in a lengthy memorial to the Secretary to the Government of India. After discussions with ship owners, they had determined that increasing space allotment to each Haji would lead to rising passage costs. In the Anjuman's opinion, the act could "be misconstrued as an unnecessary interference with the

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46 The unavailability of shipping company records to me for this research limits the amount of analysis around the actual spaces on board the pilgrim ships. What is missing in particular are records around the difference in accommodation, physical, sanitary and otherwise, between the different classes of berths.
47 "Pilgrim Ships Act."
48 General Instructions, p.18.
religious rights and liberties of the people." The contestation of the act's implementation in the city fell within the realm of political and economic concerns.

Indian elites were concerned about the ways that the Act would lead to criticism of obstructing Indian religious life. This was, as discussed above, a guiding rule of colonial governance in the Raj. Though the Act was required under international law, and Britain had opposed it in Paris, it would still be construed as a British effort. As an editor worried in The Times of India, the Act would "give rise to the belief in the minds of the less instructed Mahomedan population that the British Government is dealing hardly with its subjects." Moreover, the imposition of the Bill from abroad was seen as an unwanted intrusion into Bombay's business affairs. The pilgrim traffic was big business for Bombay and the role of shipping capital in it drew the Haj closer into the notion of the city as transit space. The objections to the international aspects of the bill were summed up neatly by the Anjuman Khair Khwahe Kown, another Muslim organization. They questioned the Raj's dedication to its subjects. They were "at a loss to comprehend as to why the British Government should displease its Mohammedan subjects simply to please the sentimental theorists in France." The threat to the city's trade through the imposition of international regulation on all ships though forced the passage of the Pilgrim Ships Act. Its implementation would lead to the creation of a not insubstantial institutional framework for the regulation of Hajis in Bombay as transit space.

Under the Pilgrim Ships Act, Bombay's officials were forced to construct a regulatory framework through which to intervene in the Haj under the international regime in the city as transit space. The first aspect of this was making the new rule known to the rest of India. The regulation of the Haj was well in place by 1895. However, the scale and scope of the powers and responsibilities given to local officials under the Act required a number of changes. In an attempt to inform pilgrims of the new policies, a number of official informational tracts were published; chief amongst them was the General Instructions to Pilgrims to the Hedjaz. In this, guidelines were established so that pilgrims knew what to expect. Published first in 1897 by the Government of India, the Instructions contained the full text of the Pilgrim Ships Act. Bombay officials took it upon themselves to inform Hajis and others involved in the trade about the new rule by printing 160 copies of the bill in French and German, 620 in Urdu, and 300 in Persian.

51 "Letter from the Anjuman Khair Khwahe Kown, August 7, 1895," PJAR 1895: p.1, BLAPAC.
These would be mostly handed out to the literate pilgrim guides who led poor Hajis into Bombay. Preparing for the annual influx of Hajis from all over India, the Government had even prepared to furnish upon request additional copies in Marathi, Gujarati, and Kanarese.\textsuperscript{52} The measures gone to publicize the nature of the new Act's requirements demonstrate how interventionist it was.

One of the key components of the Pilgrim Ships Act was the movement of Haji medical inspection into Bombay itself. Previously, inspections had taken place on board ships in the harbour. Under the new rules, Bombay's material transit space was implicated in the Haj regulation. The Paris Convention required medical doctors to carry out their duties beforehand. The management of Hajis within Bombay's urban space was now a key role of city officials. The city hired new interpreters while extra police were employed for the season.\textsuperscript{53} This highlighted the significance of controlling the problematic pilgrims in the city. It soon became clear that this was not enough. More interpreters and assistants were hired to inspect Hajis on shore. In deference to the religious requirements of pilgrims, and after protests from Muslim groups, the government hired a "lady doctor," to complete the medical inspection of women.\textsuperscript{54} These assistants, doctors, and others all formed the bureaucratic foundation of the regulation of Hajis.

The construction of a new personnel-based regulatory infrastructure was accompanied by a physical one as well. The extension of the material regulation of Hajis into the city's transit infrastructure shows how the elite conceptions of Bombay as transit space was actualized through the local implementation of the international Haji regime. In implementing the Pilgrim Ships Act, Bombay's officials were forced to alter the built form of the city as transit space. What had before been an ad hoc set of regulatory mechanisms was now permanent. These infrastructural changes were put into place in ways which reflected the geographic understandings of Hajis as part of Bombay as transit space. The creation of new physical structures within which to regulate Hajis brought more officials into the effort. The Engineer of the Bombay Port Trust, for instance, joined the doctors, coolies, assistants, and interpreters in constructing and operating Bombay's Haji regulatory infrastructure. In 1895, following the passage of the Act, the Engineer made a number of changes to Malet Bandar, the dock area

\textsuperscript{52} "Question of the Distribution of Copies of the Act and Rules in English and Other Languages," \textit{GPBP 1897}: p.23, BLAPAC.
\textsuperscript{53} "Arrangements for the Medical Inspection of Pilgrims on Shore Before Their Embarkation," \textit{GPBP 1895}: p.225, BLAPAC.
\textsuperscript{54} "Arrangements," p.225.
where most Hajis embarked. A medical inspection shed was created by altering the Dhall Market godown, a dockside warehouse.

The Haji medical inspection shed would be the first physical and permanent piece of the regulatory infrastructure of the international Haji regime in Bombay. The Dhall Market godown had its north and south walls altered through the construction of two new doorways in each. The microgeographic focus of the regulations is clear in the report given to the Bombay Government. The doorways, as the Port Trust Engineer wrote, were 20 feet wide and "fitted with old wooden sliding shutters and wooden barriers made of teak wood railing 111 feet long by four feet six inches high from the ground."55 These physical changes reflected the problematization of Hajis as fanatical and unruly. The barriers themselves were erected within the shed to "keep off the rush of pilgrims,"56 as well as facilitate their examinations. The discourses of the regime which problematized Hajis had material outcomes in Bombay's pilgrim regulation. Fences joined barriers around the inspection shed to demarcate the area as clearly Haji transit space. By 1897, even this first structure had to be expanded.

The rules required Hajis to register their heavy baggage a day before leaving port. Unwilling to part with their belongings, the mostly poor pilgrims remained in and around the Malet Bandar inspection shed. As a result, the structure was opened at sunset the day before the medical inspection.57 Where formerly commercial activities had taken place, the area around the shed was now permanently a space of Haji transit and regulation. The Health Officer reported that the constant "presence of the pilgrims in an around the shed creates of course considerable nuisance, and the shed was clearly not intended as a sleeping place."58 In response to this, the shed was made even more permanent. Pilgrims were not only allowed to shelter within the shed, but the surrounding area was altered as well. The city's elites increased latrine accommodation in the neighbourhood and installed lighting. As well, a "considerable force of police" was put into place.59 These changes in themselves were part of the expansion of the regulatory infrastructure of the Haj. I argue that regulations put in place in the transit infrastructure which shaped the conception of Bombay demonstrates the role of transit space as a framework through which Hajis were regulated. The willingness of city officials to make alterations to the built form

57 "Letter from the Health Officer of the Port of Bombay, January 7, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.43, BLAPAC.
58 "Letter from the Health Officer," p.43.
59 "Letter from the Health Officer," p.43.
suggests that by 1897 the need of regulating Hajis in transit space had become part of Bombay's administrative logic.

The changes associated with the development and implementation of the Pilgrim Ships Act highlight the links between Bombay as transit space and the international Haji regime. The crisis of the 1893 epidemic sparked intense international pressure on Bombay as a site of mobility. The city's elites were eager to protect the free flow of goods and passengers through the city. The requirements of the Pilgrim Ships Act led to the creation of a permanent and extensive regulatory infrastructure targeting Hajis in Bombay as transit space. The hiring of a body of personnel to carry out medical inspections led to the creation of an extensive bureaucratic apparatus dealing with Hajis. Materially, discourse of the problematic Haj and the conception of the city as transit space were reflected in the alteration of the built form of the city's transit infrastructure. Medical inspection sheds were constructed on one of Bombay's most significant transit sites, the Malet Bandar. Requiring the efforts of a number of official and elite actors, from members of the Police, Port Trust and Customs to Muslim elites and shipowners, the regulation of Hajis in transit became a regular facet of the city's administrative responsibilities through which the conception of Bombay as transit space were actualized.

**The Plague Measures and the Haj, 1896-1902**

The measures instituted to deal with Hajis during the plague crisis reflected both the Hajis' problematization as medical threats as well as elite conceptions of Bombay as transit space. The plague hit Bombay in the fall of 1896. It was both deadly and chaotic, throwing the administration into a panic and threatening the city's commercial and political well-being. It also impacted the Haj in a number of ways. From 1897 until roughly 1902 a series of regulations which targeted the movement of Hajis through the city were enacted. These ranged from a complete ban on the pilgrimage to setting up new medical inspection procedures. These plague measures which specifically targeted Hajis were constructed within the administrative and physical infrastructure put in place under the Pilgrim Ships Act. I argue that the plague sparked a crisis which threatened Bombay as transit space. The material reality of the plague mobilized an older set of medical discourses which problematized Hajis as epidemic threats. This problematization, as part of the international Haji regime, had a set of material outcomes in the spatial regulation implemented around Hajis during the crisis. Pilgrims were targeted for spatial
exclusion and regulation by officials with new powers of control over Haji mobility granted at the height of the plague. The measures instituted were key moments under the international Haji regime when Bombay as transit space was actualized around the figure of the problematic pilgrim.

The plague was a deadly event. For two decades from 1896 onwards, bubonic plague was the leading cause of death in Bombay. The plague itself was thought to have come from Hong Kong. The main reservoir of the disease, the flea carrying black rat, was common throughout India. In Bombay the disease struck along class lines; deaths from the disease were synergistic with poor living conditions. Observers noted that the plague was most prevalent in the so-called "Native Town," with its insanitary chawls and tenements. Those living in elite areas on the other hand fared much better. Exposed to less contagions and with less contaminated food and water, their death rates were more than half those of non-elite Hindus or Muslims. With its scale and differential effects, the plague represented a crisis for the colonial government. Crises, such as the plague, were occasions for experimentation. This was especially true in colonial settings, which allowed for new scientific and administrative efforts. The regulation of Hajis in Bombay as transit space under the plague was one which built off the pre-existing regulatory infrastructure. The outbreak of the plague offered an opportunity for increased regulation of the pilgrimage in Bombay which would prove permanent.

The plague's epidemicity mobilized an already existing discourse of Hajis as medical threats. In the face of the plague, the government was forced to respond to criticisms of not safeguarding India's health. The very legitimacy of the colonial government was tied to the way in which officials controlled the epidemic. These efforts did not come out of nowhere. Rather, they utilized the discourses of medicalized Hajis which had already been established under the international Haji regime. The Pilgrim Ships Act in particular had made the notion that to effectively deal with an epidemic, pilgrims had to be targeted, a part of the city's governing logic. The management of the plague epidemic in Bombay can be seen as part of the colonial management of epidemics more generally. Rather than creating an abnormal situation, the plague

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sharpened and emphasized existing behavioural patterns.\textsuperscript{65}

Hajis in Bombay were regulated as part of the wider effort to control the plague in the city. The management of the disease was based on the then current medical understandings of it. For officials, the disease was obviously one of locality. This was proven time and again by the confluence of death from plague with the poorest living conditions. In service of this idea, the first efforts against the plague carried out have been described as an offensive against the urban built environment.\textsuperscript{66} The disease's association with Hajis was furthered by its initial appearance in Mandvi, not just one of the most insanitary areas of the city, but also home to the main Haji transit spaces at Malet Bandar. Initial efforts at fighting the disease focused on eliminating the harmful pieces of the built environment. Lime washing houses, targeting those structures built with such 'porous' woods as bamboo were all done in service of this. By 1898 however, officials had deemed these to be lost causes and had begun forcefully evicting plague victims from the most infected areas.\textsuperscript{67} It was this schema of removal which would prove to be the most significant aspect of the regulation of Hajis under the plague.

The outbreak of plague in Bombay caused an immediate response from the rest of the world. Exports from the city were banned in parts of Europe and the fear of restrictions against Bombay's commerce loomed large. In 1897, international attention turned once again to the Hajis. To stop the export of the plague to Europe, Turkey instituted a new rigorous, fifteen day disinfection on all pilgrim ships coming from India.\textsuperscript{68} Already epidemic threats, Hajis were considered especially dangerous during the plague crisis. Wary of the international attention focused on them during the cholera epidemics of previous years, Bombay's officials singled out Hajis more than other travellers. In 1897, the Health Officer of the Port of Bombay wrote to the Government of India urging it to ban pilgrims from embarking from Bombay altogether. He voiced the already common opinion that Hajis represented a danger to themselves, the city, and the rest of the world. Arriving weeks before they left, and living in overcrowded conditions, they were "exposed to all the chances of infection by the plague epidemic which prevails so severely in the city, and no system of medical inspection, short of detaining pilgrims" could keep the


\textsuperscript{67} Kidambi, "Infection," p.258–60.

\textsuperscript{68} "Bubonic Plague in Bombay: Imposition of Quarantine at Turkish Ports," \textit{GPBP 1897}: p.10, BLAPAC.
plague from spreading. The focus of plague prevention was on protecting space and limiting mobility.

With no legal way of banning pilgrims altogether initially, city officials set out on an informational campaign to discourage Hajis from coming to Bombay. Highlighting the confluence of opinion amongst elites and officials, this was done through cooperative efforts between colonial officials and elite Muslims, who tended to support British plague efforts. Officials mobilized the bureaucratic apparatus of Haji regulation to protect the city as transit space. The Commissioner of Customs, Salt, Opium, and Abkari was of the opinion that to try and stop the Hajis from departing for Jeddah once in Bombay would be disastrous. The discursive production of the problematic pilgrim had material results in the regulation of Hajis as medical and political threats during the plague crisis which excluded them from the city. According to the Commissioner, the best method would be to warn pilgrims in their homes elsewhere "of the delays, dangers and difficulties they are likely to experience if they attempt to proceed on the Haj via Bombay." The danger of having them in the city was increased by their supposed fanaticism. The commissioner warned the Government that "any attempt to run them back, once they have reached Bombay, might very possibly lead to a local riot, and would be certain to be resented by Mahomedans generally as a grave interference with the religious practises and obligations of the faithful." It was obvious then that the understanding of Hajis as medical threats was part of the knowledge of them as epidemic threats more generally. Moreover, this fear produced spatial effects through the official regulation of Hajis.

The colonial government soon decided that the only way to effectively put a halt to the threat of pilgrims spreading the plague was to ban the Haj's departure from Bombay. The informational campaigns had failed to put a stop to the annual influx of Hajis. Seeing no other options, the Government of India announced a total ban on pilgrims leaving from the city. In January of 1897, the Government announced that from the first of February onwards, no pilgrim traffic would be allowed through Bombay. This was explicitly done in response to concerns from Europe over the health threat of trade originating in Bombay as a means to protect general

69 "Letter from the Health Officer of the Port of Bombay, January 13, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.33, BLAPAC.
70 See I.J. Catanach, "South Asian Muslims and the Plague, 1896-c.1914," South Asia, 22 (1999): pp.87–107, for a more detailed overview of the reaction by Muslim elites in India to plague eradication efforts by the colonial administration.
71 "Letter from the Commissioner of Customs, Salt, Opium and Abkari, January 13, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.97, BLAPAC.
mobility through the city. The ban was widely circulated throughout India. Translations were posted in railway stations and newspapers in towns leading to the city. The ban was, however, contested by elites. Particularly vocal opponents of the ban emerged from those with investments in the pilgrim shipment business. Following the announcement, an agent of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, one of the most prominent firms involved in the trade, wrote to the Government of India pleading that pilgrims be "detained at some fitting place outside of Bombay until they could be brought to Bombay solely for the purposes of embarking immediately on board the company's ships." This was summarily denied by the Commissioner of Police in Bombay. These contestations focused on the importance of the Hajis to the city's trade. One pilgrim broker, Haji Kasam Jusab, petitioned the government in January of 1897. He informed them that he had "already engaged about 800 pilgrims, and most of these are already in Bombay" and their ship would not leave for another month. The Haj ban was an unprecedented move on behalf of Bombay's administrators. The threat to the overall mobility through the city as transit space however outweighed the damage the ban would do to the pilgrim trade itself.

Officials soon stepped in directly to spatially regulate the Haj through Bombay. In so doing they mobilized the resources already assembled for the regulation of Hajis under the international Haji regime. I argue that regulating Hajis' mobility through the city as transit space had become normalized through the localization of the international regime and informed by the material and administrative regulations put in place under the Pilgrim Ships Act. At the same time, they also reflected official anxieties over the city as transit space. The bulk of the Haji management under the plague fell to the police commissioner, R.H. Vincent. He took it upon himself to write to his superiors to enquire as to what could be done to "remove certain pilgrims who may become troublesome if left in the City." In response, the Government authorized him to purchase third class rail tickets to send the remaining pilgrims to either Calcutta or Madras. These policies demonstrate the actualization of the elite concept of Bombay as transit space.

73 "Telegram from the Government of India, Home Department [HD], January 20, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.89, BLAPAC.
74 "Telegram from the Commissioner of Sind, February 24th 1897," GPBP 1897: p.89, BLAPAC.
75 "Letter from Agent, Bombay & Persia Steam Navigation Company, January 23, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.21, BLAPAC.
76 "Letter from Mr. Haji Kasam Jusab, January 25, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.24, BLAPAC.
77 "Letter from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay to the Government of Bombay, and Response, January 30, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.30, BLAPAC.
through Haji regulation. The presence of allegedly medically dangerous pilgrims in the city represented, for elites, a threat to Bombay's commercial and political well-being. In order to better protect the city as port and commercial exchange centre the Bombay Presidency passed Act III of 1897. This act prohibited any Muslim travelling towards Bombay en route to the Hedjaz from entering the city itself; it was a spatial, material result of the Hajis' medicalization. While it was unclear how officials were to determine which Muslim travellers were Haj bound or not, the intent of the act was clear. Bombay as transit space would be protected through the spatial exclusion of dangerous Hajis from the city.

In service of keeping Bombay as transit space safe, Vincent began outreach across India. He sent letters to administrators across the Raj, hoping that this would stop the annual influx of Hajis from reaching the city. Vincent requested that they "warn all pilgrims to return home immediately," and inform him of each train, including the numbers of pilgrims and their destinations. He concluded that he trusted that "the authorities concerned will give prompt effect to the orders of Government not to allow any more pilgrims to depart for Bombay, and to stop those already en route to this City." By February 12th, 1897, eleven days had passed since the ban on pilgrimage from Bombay had gone into effect. There were still however, an estimated 600 pilgrims left in the city. The panic over their presence contrasted to official views of other travellers and highlights the way knowledge of Hajis' informed Bombay's spatial regulation as transit space. Their very presence was deemed a threat to Bombay's ability to function as a space of mobility. Hajis were singled out, as was clear from orders sent to the Port Commissioner of Sind to "stop all Mahomedans proceeding [to] Bombay unless satisfied they are not pilgrims." The crisis of the plague extended the regulation of Hajis from surveillance to spatial exclusion as threats to the city as transit space.

After considerable international pressure the Government of India placed a total ban on the Haj from the subcontinent. As part of the 1897 Epidemic Disease Act, the Government issued an order stating that "in consequence of the strong opinions of all European Governments including Turkey regarding the danger of plague it is impossible to meet their demands by any

79 "Letter from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, February 9th, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.64, BLAPAC.
80 "Letter from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, February 1st, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.71, BLAPAC.
82 "Telegram from the Commissioner in Sind, February 8th, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.115, BLAPAC.
measures short of the suspension of the pilgrimage." Under the Epidemics Disease Act, police in Bombay were given the power to remove pilgrims from the city, coercively if necessary. In the service of securing the city as transit space, an isolation camp for the erstwhile pilgrims was set up. The camp was located at Nasik, in the interior of the Presidency, at a presumably safe distance from the city. Pilgrims were to be expelled from Bombay and sent there for some days before being sent home. The isolation camp was used primarily as a tool to protect traffic moving through Bombay. It was created and run by municipal officials rather than those from the Presidency. The camp was run by the Chief European Police Officer of the Bombay City Police. The importance to Bombay of being pilgrim free, and thus less of an epidemic threat, was clear. The Government warned police that if any pilgrims did make their way to Mecca from Bombay, the effect on the city's trade would be disastrous. To avoid this, they ordered Vincent to detain all Hajis in Bombay "who have not abandoned the idea of pilgrimage." Under the plague, the regulation of the Haji traffic through the city was made more coercive and powerful than before.

The police expanded their role in the regulation of Hajis during the plague crisis. The duty of protecting Bombay from epidemiologically dangerous pilgrims extended even outside of the city. As pilgrims were expelled, Vincent found it necessary to raise a military guard to watch the Hajis on the train to Nasik. The spectre of the fanatical Muslim had material results in the regulatory responses to the Haj during this period. Vincent, writing to the Government of Bombay on February 18th of 1896 expressed the need for a full complement of troops to deal with the pilgrims. In his opinion they were necessary to control the 36 Sindhis, 74 Hindustanis, 31 Punjabis, 69 Bengalis, 89 Afghanis and 174 Central Asians who had been sent to Nasik. The twenty armed European soldiers already at the camp would have sufficed before. Now that the Haj had been banned completely, however, the pilgrims were likely to become "more obstreperous" and a danger to themselves and the city. Haji mobility was managed down to the smallest detail by officials eager to avoid the spread of the plague outside of the city. In organizing the final train to Nasik, Vincent ensured that it would leave at 8:30 exactly, and would be drawn up to the horse entraining platform using the back entrance to the Victoria Terminal on

83 "Telegram from the Government of India, HD, Sanitary, February 20, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.87, BLAPAC.
84 "Resolution No. 968, February 23, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.87-8, BLAPAC.
85 "Telegram from the Government of India, HD, February 6, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.129, BLAPAC.
86 "Telegram from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, February 9, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.130, BLAPAC.
87 "Demi Official Letter from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, February 18, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.136, BLAPAC.
Hornby Road. Every detail of the Hajis presence and expulsion from Bombay was to be under police management and surveillance. Utilizing the infrastructure constructed under the international Haji regime the management of the Hajis was made ever more interventionist.

By 1901 the plague measures in place across India had abated, despite the fact that the disease had not decreased in virulence. The direct and unprecedented level of intervention in the Haji traffic would permanently shape the Bombay elites' regulation of Hajis. When the ban on the Haj was partially lifted in 1901, it was done under the strict confines of the regime. The ban on pilgrims leaving from Bombay remained in effect. Indeed, the entire Haj from India would be "subject to certain precautions and restrictions which were imposed regarding the danger of plague being communicated to Europe and in view of the danger of it being spread by intending pilgrims from infected to non-infected portions of India." In Bombay, the ban still held for all residents. It would be Chittagong in the East and Karachi in the west which would serve as the only two official pilgrim ports. Hajis would be dispatched through a series of observation camps to the ports. By 1902 however, the government reopened Bombay as pilgrim port. While pilgrims would no longer be expelled from the city, the intensity of surveillance and control over Hajis in Bombay remained. Pilgrims arriving in Bombay thereafter were taken to be disinfected on Frere Road in central Bombay by the police. Once there, Hajis were disinfected in a shed made of corrugated metal, a new material actualization of Bombay as transit space. Again, the city extended the physical infrastructure of Hajis regulation. From a single inspection shed in 1895, the city now played host to a separation camp, disinfection station, and inspection shed.

The plague sparked an administrative crisis in Bombay over the question of securing the city as transit space. Already buffeted by international attention for its role in the pilgrim trade and its link to cholera, officials in Bombay took immediate action to monitor and control Hajis. To protect the interests of the commercial elite, police officials were given more power over the Hajis than ever before. Pilgrims were excluded from Bombay, and were expelled under India-wide and Bombay specific bans on the Haj. The new regulations built off the already established regulatory infrastructure implemented under the international Haji regime mandated Pilgrim

88 "Letter from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, February 20, 1897," GPBP 1897: p.140, BLAPAC.
89 "Notification by the Government of India, HD, October 26, 1900," General Proceedings of the Bengal Presidency 1901: p.74, BLAPAC.
90 "Letter from Hewitt, Secretary to the Government of India, HD, to Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Medical Department, January 12, 1901," General Proceedings of the Bengal Presidency 1901: p.93, BLAPAC.
Ships Act. Moreover, the administrative response to the plague would lay the foundation for an even more regulated Haj in Bombay as transit space. By extending their powers under the crisis, the surveillance and management of Hajis in the city was made a commonsensical component of the city's administrative logic.

Conclusion

The policies and efforts of officials carried out under the Pilgrim Ships Act of 1895 and during the Plague Crisis of 1897 to 1902 laid down the administrative and physical framework of Haji regulation in Bombay as transit space. These new laws and policies were laid out in accordance with the interventionist logic and imperative of the international Haji regime. At the same time, they were carried out within the paradigm of Bombay as transit space. The city's elite and officials acted to safeguard the commercial wealth tied to Bombay as both port and trading centre. In reacting to concerns from Europe over the medical security of Bombay, officials constructed both a physical and bureaucratic infrastructure through which regulation of Hajis was carried out. From medical inspection sheds at Malet Bandar to the hiring of new doctors and interpreters to work there, Bombay as transit space was actualized through elite efforts at regulating Hajis. Moreover, I argue that the physical facets of regulation were material results of an entrenchment of discourse which medicalized Hajis as epidemic threats. Under the plague crisis, this knowledge became part of the administrative logic used to intervene in the Haj in more coercive and intensive ways than before. These two events were intimately related to discourses occurring elsewhere while at the same time responded to the local desires of elites and officials. At the outbreak of the First World War the Haj traffic dwindled to an insignificant number. By this time however the imperative of regulating Hajis in Bombay in transit space had been made commonsensical. Another set of discourses around the city's role not just as commercial power, but as an imperial and Indian prestige centre was related to another set of interventions in the Haj. These dealt with Bombay's social and economic spaces.
Chapter Four
Regulating Hajis in the Urbs Prima: Bombay as Urban Space

Introduction

The growth of the pilgrim traffic through Bombay was, for elite, a threat to the city's spatial order. In response, the elite intervened in the Haj in Bombay in increasingly intensive ways which targeted pilgrims in Bombay's social spaces. The Haji regulation reflected the interplay between elite imaginations of Bombay as an imperial prestige and power centre and understandings of the spatial order of the city. The creation and management of Haji space within Bombay was a crucial component of the localization of the international Haji regime. By 1907, according to former Commissioner of Police S.M. Edwardes, it was common for "more than 20,000 pilgrims from all parts of India, Bokhara, Turkestan and other parts of Central Asia, Ceylon and Java to be shepherded" about the city over the course of the pilgrim season.\(^1\) For Edwardes, this was a matter of concern because "the majority of these people were wholly uneducated; the existing musafirkhanas (rest-houses) provided for them in the city were quite inadequate for their proper accommodation."\(^2\)

Edwardes' recounting of the period reflects elite understandings of Hajis as threats to the city's social and economic spaces. The lack of proper accommodation, which would force the Hajis to sleep rough in the streets or in overcrowded, rented rooms, constituted a problem by upsetting the city's predetermined spatial order. Edwardes' comment about the ignorance of pilgrims highlights one of the key understandings of Hajis by the city's elite. The poor pilgrims who made up a considerable percentage of the annual Haj traffic embodied a backwardness within colonial knowledge of class which problematized them as medical and communal threats to the city.\(^3\) This class and communal knowledge of Hajis and elites' perceptions of their role in

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3 It is important to note here that neither archival nor manuscript sources give an accurate or detailed description of the so-called 'poor' Haji's social and class condition. Throughout the discourse around the Haj the 'poor' Haji was a discursive creation as much as it was a material reality. Many pilgrims appear to have saved their entire lives to make Haj, yet were only able to pay their way Mecca. Once in the Hejaz, a considerable number of Hajis were stranded and had to be brought home through charitable donations or government assistance. At the same time however, as M.B. Miller, in "Pilgrims' Progress: The Business of the Hajj," *Past & Present*, 191 (2006): pp.189-228, makes clear, performing the Haj granted pilgrims a not inconsiderable amount of social capital and
Bombay's governance produced both a material and administrative framework of Haji regulation in Bombay.

This chapter explores the creation of a bureaucratic and physical infrastructure of regulation which targeted pilgrims in Bombay's social and economic spaces. I ask how imaginations of Bombay, discourses around the problematic pilgrim, and elites' roles in urban governance shaped the regulatory mechanisms which were put in place around the Haj. I argue that the city's elite imagination of Bombay as a centre of imperial and Indian prestige shaped the way urban space was constructed and regulated as Haji space. This knowledge of the city was informed by the material facts of elite wealth and profit in the city. Moreover, within the colonial power structure, Muslim elites understood their own role to be protectors of Hajis, as mediators between the colonial state's regulatory efforts under the international Haji regime and Muslim religious duties. I argue that this was tied to understandings of Hajis as medically and politically dangerous bodies unable to protect themselves or act in a putatively modern fashion. The problematic Haji constituted a threat to Bombay's political, economic and social order. City officials and Indian elites created a set of spatial regulations to put the Haji in place and to maintain urban order.

In this chapter I consider the active construction of the elite imaginary of Bombay. I argue that within this urban imaginary the city was a modern, imperial, prestige centre which showcased the best of colonial and elite progress. Elites who took part in the Haji regulation utilized facets of this discourse in shaping the material aspects of Haji space. The construction of Haji social space within the larger urban order was carried out through a bureaucratic regulatory infrastructure which resulted from negotiations between Muslim elites and colonial officials. I argue that the Protector of Pilgrims and the Haj Committee demonstrate the results of power negotiations by Muslim elites within a larger framework of colonial control and urban spatial order to regulate those spaces they saw as being within the realm of the Islamic community. These power negotiations, bureaucratic structures, and the imaginary of Bombay informed the material construction of Haji space, specifically the new musafirkhana. In particular, I consider

prestige in their home communities. Amongst other things it allowed returning pilgrims to append the honorific ‘Haji’ in front of their names. Without ships’ passenger manifests or individual passport records it is impossible to ascertain the make-up of these ‘poor’ Hajis. However, we can assume that a large number of them were men of some standing, such as rural merchants or land holders, for whom the Haj was a significant investment in their own financial and social futures.
the debates over the need for a musafirkhana, where it was to be located, and its physical characteristics. I argue that the administrative logic put in place through the Protector and the Haj Committee demonstrates the materialization of discourses around imperial order and hierarchy which were strongly linked to a division of governance along religious lines of difference within Bombay. This logic implicates the musafirkhana in these larger structures of empire and class. The regulation of Hajis in Bombay shows how the international Haji regime was implemented through the prism of local desires, interests and negotiations.

**Urbs Prima in Indis: Bombay as a Centre of Imperial Prestige**

Bombay was seen as more than just the great centre of trade and commerce for India and the Indian Ocean region. Along with these commercial assets, the city was imagined by its elites and officials as being a centre of prestige throughout the British Empire and the rest of the world. In these imaginations, the city was both the metaphorical and physical link between East and West, between tradition and modernity. This understanding of Bombay was an active construction by a coalition of elite Indians, Europeans and officials. I argue that the city's material status as the metropolis of Western India influenced the construction of Bombay as an imperial showcase; an example of how British colonial rule could uplift the material progress of India. It was this status, and the need for the joint enterprise of elites and officials to constantly promote and defend their city's place as the urbs prima in Indis, which influenced the regulation of Haji space in Bombay. The materiality of the city's commerce, wealth, and development would shape the discourses of the city as urbs prima. The descriptions of the city by officials and elites constructed the image of a cosmopolitan, modern, and prestigious Bombay. In this imagination, the city was the result of a joint project of imperial rule by colonial officials and urban elites.

The same commercial and political imperatives which were part of the regulation of Hajis in Bombay as transit space formed the basis of the elite imaginations of Bombay. From the middle of the 1800s onwards, Bombay became central to imperial and Indian networks of communication and transportation. The city was, from its beginnings as a small fishing village, the product of a concerted effort on behalf of the colonial power to utilize Indian merchants to...

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gain control over indigenous networks of trade. As the British asserted their control over Western India, the city was developed as an administrative centre. Its commercial growth was based off its export trade, especially opium and cotton. This growth was accompanied by the concentration of regional imperial administration within the city. By the 1860s, Bombay was the educational and judicial centre of Bombay Presidency. At the same time, a nascent industrial sector increased the ranks of Indian elites in the city. Working together, elites from all religious communities established a powerful hold over the municipality and its local policy.\(^5\) The city's rapid growth throughout the 19th century firmly entrenched its position as a judicial, educational, cultural, political, and commercial centre. The city was the cosmopolis of the Indian Ocean. From 1840 to the outbreak of the First World War, Bombay wielded commercial, industrial, and administrative dominance over its hinterlands, both maritime and continental.\(^6\)

In 1872, the more than 600,000 people living in Bombay made it the largest city in India, and the second largest in the empire, exceeded only by London. Soon afterwards, the city's ruling class began referring to Bombay as the *urbs prima in Indis*, the first city in India.\(^7\) It was this idea, more than any other, which encapsulated the elite imagination of the city. First, it set up Bombay above its Indian urban rivals. Calcutta, Madras, even New Delhi, the late capital of the Raj, would always be at best, in second place. Second, the motto also implied Bombay's role as Western Gateway to India. It was, after all, literally the first entry point into the subcontinent for most arrivals from Europe. This motto implicitly called out to other parts of the empire while highlighting the sense of importance felt by Bombay's elites around their role in the colonial project. No other cities outside of India or the metropole could compare in size to Bombay. If London was first city of the empire, then Bombay was first city of the jewel in its crown.

Bombay was a centre of imperial prestige. Within urban imaginations, it was an influential, intellectual, political, and above all, cosmopolitan city. Its public architecture, printing presses, educational institutions, municipal offices, and so on all spoke to the idea that the city was a successful project of British rule. Its boosters, ignoring the communal and labour


riots which became increasingly common in the city throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, wrote of a Bombay where various ethnic and caste communities, races and religions, lived together under the benevolence of elite rule. Hajis, it was argued, were amongst the largest beneficiaries of that rule. From rural back roads, the narrative went, Hajis were able to fulfil their religious obligations with the aid of the city's modern transit facilities, the protection of the crown, and the city's elite Muslims. This was part of a dominant narrative which actively constructed Bombay as *urbs prima* through the city's perceived importance to the British Empire. This reflected the interurban competition in which the city's industrialists and merchants saw themselves as engaged in with not just Calcutta and Madras, but also places as far away as Sydney or Manchester. I argue that engaging in active measures of discursive boosterism was a project which joined local elites and colonial officials across religious and racial lines.

City boosterism within the imperial context was closely related to the presence and strength of colonial institutions. For Bombay's elites, prominence in the empire was linked to their business and political fortunes. This was especially true of those elites whose livelihoods, such as the British trained lawyers and civil servants, depended on the colonial state. From the self-governing dominions like Canada and South Africa to the crown colonies of Singapore and India, elites worked to showcase their loyalty and utility to the greater project of empire building. Events like wars and royal visits were particularly useful for displays of loyalty, urban progress, and modernity. Many cities used the occasion of a royal visit to showcase their industrial, commercial and urban assets. Moreover, visiting royalty brought with them large press contingents from around the world. These visits were taken as an opportunity to propagate elite imaginations of the city.\(^8\) This was especially true of the 1911 royal visit by King George V, as part of the Imperial Durbar in Delhi. During this trip, Bombay was to be the first city the royals encountered, the opening engagement of the royal visit. A coalition of local citizens from a number of the city's religious and ethnic communities welcomed the king to Bombay with a formal message. In their address to the royals they situated their city as a product and integral component of the imperial project. Moreover, this group of citizens placed themselves, the elites, as the actors who drove and sustained the city's success:

\(^8\) See Bonnie Huskins, ""Tale of Two Cities": Boosterism and the Imagination of Community During the Visit of the Prince of Wales to Saint John and Halifax in 1860," *Urban History Review*, 28 (1999): pp.31-46, for a Canadian example of imperial urban boosterism which is quite revelatory.
We proudly claim that the high hopes entertained by the statesmen who acquired the Island [of Bombay] and by the Governors who founded and administered the City have met with rich fulfilment, and that this city constitutes the strongest link between the civilizations of the East and of the West, which it has ever been the aim of the British Government to wield into one harmonious system.  

The allusion to the connection between East and West was crucial to elite narratives of the city's role in the imperial world. In response to the citizens' address, George V praised the elite for their role in the city's profitable commercial and social development. He told them that when his ancestor, Charles II, had taken control of Bombay from the Portuguese, it was a mere fishing village. But thanks to their work, he exclaimed, the inhabitants of the city have "made it the jewel of the British crown. I recognize with pride your efforts to heighten what must always be the supreme lustre of such a jewel as this, the peace, happiness, and prosperity of all classes of citizens." The project of maintaining the peace and prosperity of all citizens included the patronizing protection of elites which was crucial to the local Haji regulation. Elites saw in themselves the power to protect those poor pilgrims unable to do so on their own. In doing so they would add to their own and Bombay's prestige. The narrative embraced by elites was one that portrayed them as linking the Hajis with the modern steamships of Bombay and thus to Mecca while watching over the poor pilgrims through regulation. Within this imagination, elite and official actions around the Haj could only add to the 'lustre' of Bombay. Elites understood their own role in Bombay's governance as integral to the city's ability to function.

The importance of Bombay to the empire was a crucial theme in the rhetoric of city boosters. One piece written by Philip Anderson, for instance, was entitled, "Bombay Essential to the Empire." Anderson compared Australia, its cities, and by extension the rest of the empire, unfavourably with the urbs prima. For Anderson, it was clear that "amongst the foreign dependencies of the British Crown none is greater and more increasing in importance than Bombay." In popular, elite, and colonial imaginations Bombay was quite clearly a place to be emulated. Its position as bridge between East and West and its status as Asia's modern, cosmopolitan city were tied to elite understandings of Hajis' place within Bombay's social

spaces. Always conscious of the perception of themselves and the city outside of their borders, elites worked to actively promote their own imagination of Bombay. The idea was that it was through the work of the elites that Bombay reigned as urbs prima. As one booster noted, Bombay was to be sure "the finest modern city in Asia, and the noblest monument to British enterprise in the world." These discourses, and the imagination they promoted, were crucial to the role Muslim elites took in the material regulation of Hajis in Bombay. Tied to their own understandings of the city, the construction of an infrastructure of control within Bombay would reflect this imagination. It was through these local geographies of power and social space that the international Haji regime was localized in Bombay.

The Protection of Pilgrims in Bombay: Constructing an Infrastructure of Regulation

In elite understandings, pilgrims were as much a class issue as they were medical and political threats. In a class-based perspective, Bombay's leaders viewed poor Hajis as pauper pilgrims in need of the protection of the city's elites and officials. Their poverty was part of an embodied protectionlessness which made them a danger to themselves and the spatial order of the city. Insanitary behaviour and the inability to function within modern industrial society were both part of this. The regulation of pilgrims through the paternalistic offices of the Protector of Pilgrims and the Haj Committee were a way for elites to govern Hajis while preserving Bombay's prestige status. I argue that within the framework of the larger goal of city boosterism, Muslim elites governed locally within their own religious communities through a division of elite local power along lines of religious difference. The local governance over those spheres which were determined to be Muslim, like the Haj, were part of a negotiation between Indian elites and colonial officials to ensure that local, communal power was part of the larger structure of colonial governance. At the same time, these regulatory practises occurred under the framework and as a localized implementation of the international Haji regime. This section explores the ways Hajis were problematized as pauper pilgrims in need of protection. I argue that this understanding was reinforced and expanded through the establishment of the Protector of Pilgrims in the early 1880s and the Haj Committee in the first decade of the 20th century. Through these offices, the discourse of the problematic pilgrim would be actualized through their

regulation in Bombay's social and economic space. Both of these occurred within the context of an elite eager to protect their status. At the same time they allowed for the exercise of control over problematic pilgrims in Bombay's strictly defined social spaces.

Bombay had significant power to make its own local policies. Importantly, the actions of officials in the day to day governance of the city reflected local desires and conditions. This was common in India. Local governments, run by a mixture of elite Indians and colonial officials, were able to define local policy as long as this was part of common colonial objectives established by officials higher up in the Presidency, colony, and empire. Urban governance was carried out through negotiated alliances between Indian elites and British officials, who operated at various spatial scales. The class-based interests and ideology of the two groups often intersected. At the same time though, elites were concerned about their ability to govern and wield power over the social and religious practises which took place within their own ethnic, caste, or religious communities. In particular, communal groups were extremely diverse. Within the group of Muslim elites, for instance, was a constant competition for influence, resources, and power within the city. These internal dynamics influenced the way individuals interacted not just with colonial officials but with one another as well. This influenced the way they would approach the completion of colonial projects, ensuring the expression of their own local control and power. It was through these negotiations that colonial and international projects were pursued. This was particularly true of the management of Hajis under the international Haji regime. In many respects this urban elite and official alliance was a reflection of the larger context of emerging urban civic society in the imperial world of the 19th and 20th centuries. Elites grouped together in a number of configurations to pursue multiple and common goals. In Bombay, the common elite imagination of the Hajis as poor and defenceless met their understandings of the city as centre of prestige in need of defence.

Elites actively constructed Hajis as defenceless pauper pilgrims in a popular discourse which was materialized and entrenched in Haji spatial regulation. The discursive representation

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14 My analysis of these internal divisions and conflicts amongst the elites was hampered by the lack of material from within these communities themselves. Once again, this is a place where access to local newspapers and in particular the records of correspondence and minutes of meetings amongst various advocacy groups such as the Anjumans would be helpful expanding and strengthening my analysis.
of the majority of pilgrims as simply poor Hajis effectively homogenized the differences in status, gender, sect, and place of origin amongst the Hajis in the minds of Bombay’s elites. In large part this was a factor of the city’s Muslim communities make up, which led by high status Ismaili groups like the Bohras and others hailing from Western India. These groups had little exposure to or contact with the at times very different social and religious practises of the North and East Indian, Afghani and Central Asian Muslims who made up the bulk of the Hajis. The construction of pilgrim space within Bombay was influenced by the elite imagination of the city and their own power within the structure of local governance. By constructing them as poor and in need of protection, their narrative framed the regulation of pilgrims as acts of elite benevolence, part of the project of colonial rule, rather than protection of the city. This reflected the elites' political situation. For Muslims in particular, the defence of the Hajis was a political imperative within their own communal power structure. As highly visible mobile bodies, Hajis in the city were under worldwide scrutiny. This relationship between the regulation of Hajis in Bombay as urban space and elite imaginations of the city becomes abundantly clear in the description of the pilgrims in local discourses. I argue that the intertwining of these discourses of the problematic Haji and Bombay as prestige centre shaped the regulations put in place. Calls for regulation were couched within a language which referred to the city's status and elites' duty to protect it. In 1908, writing about the lack of pilgrim accommodation in Bombay, an editor of the Rast Goftar made it clear that this reflected poorly on the city. The widespread consensus that the pilgrim question was one which had a bearing on Bombay's overall reputation is clear from that paper, considered a mouthpiece of the Parsi elite.16 The editor wrote that the sight of pilgrims camping outside in tents around the city was "very unedifying to a city that arrogates to itself the title of urbs prima in Indis."17

The Times of India went even further. One writer opined that "the condition of affairs during the pilgrim season is a disgrace to everyone concerned. The fact that year after year thousands of Hajis are compelled to lie about the streets is an annual scandal of the gravest

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dimensions. The sentiment expressed in these pieces reveal much about elite understandings of Hajis in Bombay's social spaces. The notion of the city as transit space was tied almost solely to the city's economic strength. This carried less political and social implications than the issue of Bombay as urban space. The simple presence of Hajis within Bombay's public spaces was considered a threat to the city. Reflecting understandings of the Hajis as problematic, it was clear that pilgrims had to be regulated spatially within municipal boundaries. Moreover, their presence elicited elite responses which were all couched in the language of protection and urban prestige. It was through these lenses that elites understood the city, as a prestigious centre of empire and commerce, and as a city with its own spatial order. The regulation of Hajis in Bombay had become part of the administrative and elite logic of the city under the international Haji regime. The bureaucratic infrastructure of regulation would reflect these understandings of both the Hajis and Bombay's social space.

The rapid growth in number of poor Hajis travelling through Bombay led to concerns over their presence within the city's social and economic spaces. Pilgrims, through their very presence, were in need of regulation within Bombay's urban spatial order. The regulatory response to this was the establishment of a local Protector of Pilgrims from the early 1880s. As the name itself suggests, this office was created as a response to the idea of the defenceless pauper pilgrim. The city, as a modern and rational place, was one which was dangerous for the poor, rural pilgrims. The pilgrim trades' unhealthiness entrenched the class-based discourse of the problematic pilgrim. In 1910, Captain Greenhorn of the ss City of Vienna wrote to government officials in both Britain and India to complain about the behaviour of pilgrims and the conditions on board his ship. In response, the Government of India dismissed his concerns. They asserted that it was common knowledge that "among the pilgrims who annually leave India are to be found many persons of the most backward class. They are insanitary in their habits; many are far advanced in age, and many are poverty stricken." Poor Hajis, in the eyes of elites, embodied a backwardness which made them unable to behave according to modern norms and requirements. The material degradation the Hajis' lived in while on the pilgrim ships informed local discourses which constructed pilgrims as a threat to Bombay's modern urban order.

18 "Shelter for Pilgrims," The Times of India (July 1, 1907): p.6.
In the cosmopolitan city of Bombay, the naiveté of the Hajis, compounded by their class and communal problematizations made them into objects in need of protection. This was a theme routinely expressed in newspapers of the day. In an 1886 editorial, *The Times of India* expressed dismay over the influx of pilgrims. Rather than target the Hajis as dangers to the city, the article dealt with the threat the city itself posed to Hajis. *The Times* was especially concerned with those foreign pilgrims who "arrive here footsore, travel-stained and almost disheartened; they fall into the hands of one or other of the four hundred pilgrim brokers, many of whom are little better than crimps."²⁰ This need for Hajis to be protected from the problems of the modern metropolis centred on the naiveté of the pilgrims themselves. Unlike the labour migrants who flowed into Bombay every day, the pilgrims were perceived as lacking the ability to take part in modern systems of exchange. Engaged in a religious ceremony, Hajis were essentialized as religious and communal. This religiosity was enhanced by their class status to problematize them in elite eyes as fanatical, backward, and protectionless threats to themselves and the city. The Haji's perceived lack of wits and familiarity with capital systems of exchange in the *urbs prima* was entrenched in elite minds by the cases of pilgrim fraud which occurred throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Stories of defrauding pilgrims abounded in Bombay from the 1880s onwards. For elite audiences these acted as proof of the danger Hajis put themselves in and posed a threat to Bombay's reputation. Time and again it would seem, the villains of the modern city preyed on pilgrims who were too poor and too religious to act rationally. Non-elite Hajis embodied a backwardness which opened them to threats from the modern city. In 1880, for instance, a short notice appeared in *The Times of India*. It informed readers about the arrest of Abdool Bhai, a pilgrim broker. He was charged with defrauding Mahomed Bin Hajee Hamed, a foreign pilgrim, out of Rs.15. Having been found guilty, the court sentenced Bhai to three months of rigorous imprisonment.²¹ In October of 1881 the city saw one of its most elaborate pilgrim fraud cases. Ebrahim Soomar was charged at the Fort Police Court with forging steamship tickets and selling them to unwitting Hajis. Soomar printed off more than 2,600 false tickets to the *ss Empress of India*. After the ship's owners became suspicious of the number of fraudulent tickets, inspector

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²⁰ A crimp was someone who conscripted sailors on board to ships using coercive measures. Known colloquially as 'shanghaing,' the practise was particularly common on British and American merchant ships until after the First World War; "Editorial," *The Times of India* (July 21, 1886): p.4.
Morar Rao of the Bombay Police was sent to apprehend the accused. Catching wind of the scheme, and fearful of being caught red handed, Soomar threw all his remaining tickets into the sea at Mahalaxmi, a western neighbourhood of the city. The next day however, three hundred tickets washed on the shore and were collected by the police. They were later used as evidence to convict Soomar.  

The official attention given to these cases highlights the importance placed on protecting pilgrims from their own embodied naiveté. Just as significant, however, is the manner in which the cases were reported. Rather than targeting the accused criminals in their reports, these articles tacitly placed the blame on the pilgrims’ inability to function within the modern city. This was particularly clear in the writing about the case of Syed Mahomed Bahuadin ten years later. Bahaudin had cheated Hajee Syed Mirza out of Rs.44 by claiming to collect a subscription to build a mosque in Mecca. The article was concisely titled, tellingly, "Simple Pilgrims." These types of incidents only served to make the idea of Hajis as backwards, poor and in need of protection more concrete. Hajis' experience in Bombay, their encounter with fraud, overcrowding, and other unsavoury aspects of the urbs prima all served to solidify and expand a discourse which linked class and religion together within colonial knowledge to construct the problematic pilgrim. The figure of the Haji as medical, class and political threat constructed within the international Haji regime, was in Bombay, a threat to the city's spatial and social order. Within the city however, this knowledge was influenced by a local division of governance responsibility to place poor protectionless Hajis into the realm of elite Muslim regulation.

The Protector of Pilgrims was the central component of the regulation of Haji space in Bombay. It was the first permanent bureaucratic component of the Haji regulatory infrastructure in the city. The Protector's office was a mechanism which came out of a negotiated division of power between Muslim elites and colonial officials. While regulations concerning Bombay as transit space focused on the mobility of pilgrims through the city, the Protector was more focused on surveilling and regulating Hajis within Bombay's social spaces, as well as the provision of Haji space within the city's larger spatial order. The position of Protector, as the name suggests, highlighted an understanding of poor pilgrims as defenceless. I argue that the Protector was an elite position which targeted non-elite Hajis for special control and surveillance.

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22 "Forging Tickets for Pilgrim Ships," *The Times of India* (October 17, 1881): p.3.
based off of knowledge which linked lower class status with medical and political problematization.

The structure of the office within the municipal administrative hierarchy reflects how these regulations were a product of cooperation and negotiation between elites and officials. The larger imperial imperative of complying with the international Haji regime was followed through in Bombay and the Protector of Pilgrims was part of its general implementation. Elite Muslims worked with the Commissioner of Police and other officials to defend elite interests in the city's spatial order. The manner in which it was carried out, however, through the Protector, was also used as a demonstration of elite leadership within the community. I argue that the Protector reflected a larger pattern of colonial urban governance by placing Haji regulation indirectly under the control of the police through a Muslim intermediary. The position of Protector was used to propagate and protect an elite imaginary of Bombay as prestige centre while regulating the city's spatial order through lines of power which reflected local governance along colonial lines of difference.

The office of the Protector was created by the Government of Bombay to deal with the internationally mandated introduction of the Pilgrim Passport. While the Protector was to be a civilian, he would work directly under the Commissioner of Police. When the position was created, Bombay's officials announced that the Protector was to be a Muslim man whose main duty would be to issue passports. Quickly though, the position was extended to encompass aiding Hajis in "procuring all the necessary equipment," and to "generally give them all the information and assistance within his power in respect of every matter connected with their pilgrimage."24 From the very beginning, the Protector was a component of the local implementation of the international Haji regime. His position demonstrates how international and larger colonial objectives were localized in Bombay's institutions, administration, and in the material effects on the city's social and economic spaces. One of the Protector's main duties soon became the registration and licensing of pilgrim brokers as part of his role of patronizing protection. The Haji interaction with the brokers, as demonstrated above in the cases of pilgrim fraud, represented the inability of the pilgrim to function in the modern world. The office of the Protector, moreover, demonstrated how much the regulation of Hajis was a part of the city's

administrative logic. The office was to be a permanent, annual position within the administrative hierarchy, subordinate to the Commissioner of Police, which reflected the fundamental goal of controlling and policing pilgrims in Bombay. The Protector was the administrative point through which Hajis, while staying in the city, were to be regulated.

The establishment of the Protector of Pilgrims made the knowledge of the protectionless Haji a part of administrative logic. The office was representative of the Muslim elite's role in the colonial governance of Bombay. Elites, through religious lines of difference, were given power over social space and the religious use of public space. The lines between communal use of space and its public use, as with the case of the Hajis, were unclear at best. Muslim elites, through the Protector, regulated Hajis in Bombay's social space with power given them by and accordance with the desires of the colonial government. The debates around who the Commissioner of Police should nominate as the Protector demonstrates the position's connection to wider imaginations of the city. The Protector was to be representative of the best qualities of the city itself. He was to be cosmopolitan, straddling both the world of Indian Islam and commercial, imperial Bombay. Moreover, he was to be non-problematic, loyal, and behaving in a manner consistent with the expectations within the imperial hierarchy. To ensure their interests were upheld in the regulation of Hajis, elites proposed a number of characteristics as prerequisites for the Protector. He should be a knowledgeable Muslim, one letter writer wrote, who spoke several languages, including Persian, Urdu, and of course, English.25 Another writer, agreeing with the above sentiment took it a step further. He maintained an educated person was so essential for the position that "the Government cannot do better than consult the University Registrar or the Principal of one of the Colleges before nominating a person to the post."26 One writer urged that the man chosen should be one "who can inspire confidence by his obliging manners and hard-working habits."27 The first Protector of Pilgrims, chosen in September of 1882, reflected these desires. The appointee, Mr. Shaik Nur Kassim, was a "prominent" Muslim, with knowledge of Persian, English and a number of Western Indian languages.28

The position of Protector as official and permanent was a part of the general extension in scope of the regulation of pilgrims in Bombay. In 1886, the Government of India made the

Protector of Pilgrims at Bombay an official title. The immediate need of a Protector in the eyes of the Government, was due to the increasing numbers of Hajis present in the city each year. Moreover, the position was to be permanent and necessary due to the inability of non-elite pilgrims to protect themselves. As the Bill stated, "the pilgrims, many of whom are poor ignorant persons, are often exposed in Bombay to unscrupulous treatment." By the 1900s, the number of pilgrims continued to increase. The presence of pilgrims who were poor, religiously problematic within Bombay's social and economic spaces threatened the spatial order of the city. As regulation was extended, so were the duties falling under the Protector's mandate. As concern over the Hajis' presence in Bombay's streets grew so did the bureaucratic infrastructure meant to control and surveil pilgrims.

In 1908, the Government established the Haj Committee, consisting of a group of elite Muslims, to assist the Protector. More specifically though, the Haj Committee would deal with the accommodation of Hajis in Bombay as urban space. The establishment of the Committee was part of the broadening of the regulatory infrastructure of the Haj in Bombay. The perceived need for the Committee came out of increasing calls for the management of pilgrims within the city. Unlike the office of the Protector of Pilgrims, which was created out of the need to implement the internationally mandated pilgrim passport, the Haj Committee was a local creation. Its implementation from 1908 onwards demonstrates how fully the international Haji regime had been absorbed into Bombay's local administrative logic. Within the framework of the regime, the Haj Committee would act to safeguard the city's elite interests in urban space. The body would be made up of "leading Mahomedan gentlemen, representative of the different sections of the Mahomedan population of Bombay." Its elite status ensured that the wealthy Hajis who travelled through the city as separate from the larger pilgrim traffic would remain free as the Haj Committee would target those Hajis made problematic through their embodiment of poverty, disease and religious fanaticism.

The Committee's creation met with widespread support within Bombay's various elite communities. This support represented elite concerns not just with their city's status, but with the problematic nature of the pauper pilgrims. In the eyes of non-Muslims, the Committee would

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29 "Measures for the Conveyance of Pilgrims Between India and the Hedjaz, Government of India, Home Department," *Political and Judicial Annual Files (PJAF) 1886*: p.140-1, BLAPAC.
30 "A Bill to Provide for the Protection of Pilgrim at the Port of Bombay," *PJAF 1886*: p.247, BLAPAC.
work to protect the functioning of Bombay as urban space. An editorial published in the *Jam-e-Jamshed*, a Parsi paper published in Gujarati, proclaimed its support for the Committee. As the editor wrote, the Government could never reach the Hajis and thus control them, as well as members of the Muslim community could.\(^{32}\) This reinforces the notion of a religious division of governance, where elite Muslims were responsible for those phenomena which fell into the sphere of Islamic religious and social practise. Many in the city felt that the poor conditions Hajis lived in while waiting in Bombay were a threat to the communal peace of the city. The editors of the *Rast Goftar* expressed their opinion that the Committee "would go a great way to supply a long-felt desideratum and to remove a palpable cause of complaint and much heart-burning."\(^{33}\)

The Committee was created through a partnership between elites and police. Through negotiation, elite Muslims were able to create a body reflecting the various Muslim communities in the city. It was in this way as well that it differed from the Protector of Pilgrims. That office was held by a single person chosen from a single one of Bombay's many Muslim communities. The creation of the Committee allowed a broader group of Muslim elites to regulate Hajis and demonstrate their power within the larger community. This cooperation amongst the various Muslim factions of the city’s elite also highlights the nature of the Haj as one of the few Islamic practises shared amongst virtually all of the religion’s branches. That it was an elite organization, serving elite, mainly commercial interests, was clear from its initial membership. The first Committee, which served from 1908 to 1911 was made up of a number of influential Muslims. These included Mahomedbhai Currimbhai, a merchant, Suleman Kassim Haji Mitha, a manager at the firm of Khao Bahadur Kassum Mitha, Yusuf Haji Ismael Subhani, Nur Mahomed Dada, both merchants, and Kazi Kabiruddin, a prominent barrister.\(^{34}\) The Committee, along with the Protector of Pilgrims, formed a bureaucratic structure of Haji regulation which reflected local knowledge of Hajis as well as the local power structure. Influenced by the larger discourse of the international Haji regime and their own imaginary of the city, elites would localize Haji regulation in Bombay in ways which would have material effects. Through the construction of

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32 "Comments on the Proposed Committee of Leading Muhammadans to Deal with the Hajis in Bombay from the *Jam-e-Jamshed*, July 13, 1908," *BNNR 1908*: p.27, BLAPAC.
33 "Comments on the Proposed Committee of Leading Muhammadans to Deal with the Hajis in Bombay from the *Rast Goftar*, July 19, 1908," *BNNR 1908*: p.27, BLAPAC.
34 "Vaccination of Pardanashin Women, October 6, 1910," *GPBP 1910*: p.803, BLAPAC.; *The Times of India Calendar and Directory for 1900* (Bombay: The Times of India Steam Press, 1900).
new Haji space, and the surveillance of Hajis within Bombay's social and economic spaces, Muslim elites and officials worked to control and monitor the city's spatial order.

Creating Haji Spaces and Preserving Spatial Order: The Musafirkhana

The name musafirkhana means simply, in both Urdu and Hindi, pilgrim's hostel.35 While we know very little about their history, we do know that by 1884, two musafirkhanas operated in Bombay. The first, on Frere Road near the docks, close to where Hajis embarked for Mecca, could accommodate 500 pilgrims (Figure 4). The other, on Packmodia Street in a Muslim neighbourhood near the Grant Road Railway Station, held even fewer, up to 400 pilgrims.36 While these may have held the relatively small number of Hajis that passed through Bombay before 1880, by the end of the 19th century they were unable to hold the increasing number of pilgrims that used Bombay to get to Mecca. As temporary accommodation became increasingly scarce, more and more poor Hajis were forced to live in the streets for the weeks they were in the city. For the elites and officials given the task of managing Hajis in Bombay, the presence of these problematic pilgrims threatened Bombay's urban spatial order. The construction of a new musafirkhana in the first decade of the 20th century had two important impacts. First, it redefined Haji space in the city by delimiting the appropriate boundaries within which Hajis could stay. Second, it established new forms of regulation, which had the effect of confining Hajis to a small number of locations under strict supervision and surveillance. Moreover, like the Haj Committee and the Protector of Pilgrims, the musafirkhana was an elite Muslim effort of power and control within the larger framework of colonial governance.

I argue that the construction of the Haji Sabu Sidick Musafirkhana from 1909 to 1914 was a material component of the infrastructure of regulation of Bombay's Haji space. By tracing the debates about the site for a new musafirkhana beginning in the 1880s through to the process of construction, I demonstrate how elites and officials worked together to create an institutional building through which to regulate Hajis. A large building constructed in the Indo-Saracenic style, the Haji Sabu Sidick Musafirkhana reflected the Bombay elites' urge to showcase their

35 Musafir means generally traveller, but in Urdu is often used to mean pilgrim, while khana translates simply as hostel in both languages. This is due to the fact that Hindi and Urdu are two registers of a single dialect continuum formerly known as Hindustani. Urdu, considered the Muslim register of the language, is written in Arabic script derived from Persian and contains a number of Persian, Turkic, and Arabic loan words, while Hindi, the Hindu register, is written in Devanagari script based off classical Sanskrit. The languages are spoken throughout present day Pakistan, Northern India and by many groups throughout the subcontinent and the world. 36 “Letter from the Commissioner of Police,” GPBP 1894: p.138, BLAPAC.
Figure 4: Haji Space in Bombay, 1880-1914

Legend
- Railway Lines
- Mosques
- Musafirkhana
- Potential Musafirkhana Site
- Temporary Haji Accommodation
- Areas of Muslim Concentration

Source: 1901 Census of India; General Proceedings of the Bombay Presidency.
philanthropic and prestige efforts through monumental architecture. I argue that the
musafirkhana represented Bombay's elite concerns over their control over the city's social and
public space. The musafirkhana was an effort by elites to actively construct in material form, the
imagination of Bombay as prestige centre through the regulation of Hajis.

Hajis' inability to protect themselves and interact with the form of urban modernity
constructed by the Haj Committee and the Protector of Pilgrims created a rationale for how Hajis
were to be spatially regulated. As the annual number of Hajis staying temporarily in Bombay
increased, the absence of suitable accommodation in the city pushed many into the streets. Cast
as disruptions to the city's spatial order, Hajis were targeted as problematic and in need of
control. Writing in 1894, Bombay's Commissioner of Police reported that the pilgrim season put
the city in a very serious state. The danger stemmed from that fact that "hundreds of thousands of
these mendicant pilgrims for want of accommodation occupy day and night foot-paths in the
town, and commit nuisances of a more or less graver nature in the vicinity." In the eyes of
Bombay's elite, Hajis embodied an insanitariness and irrationality which was linked to their class
status and threatened the order of Bombay's social spaces. Not only were they health risks, they
were also a danger to the orderly functioning of the industrial metropolis.

The precise nature of these disturbances were never reported. No records exist of riots or
criimes committed by the Hajis themselves. Rather, what comes through in the official reports
and in elite discourses is a sense of unease over the spatial transgressions committed by the
pilgrims. As noted above, Hajis were seen as transitory bodies. Their presence outside of the
transit spaces of the city, its bandars, and railway stations marked a clear crossing of religious
and class based spatial boundaries. Only within those areas deemed specifically for Hajis use
were the pilgrims considered spatially appropriate. To exist outside of these areas, in the public
spaces of the industrial city for instance, was to transgress the spatial norms constructed through
elite knowledge and enforced by their power. The musafirkhana was the foremost example of
this. For elites, the sight of so many pilgrims living in the streets was a reminder of their duty as
guardians of the imperial prestige centre to protect their city's status. The unruly, dirty,
dangerous, and diseased Hajis threatened Bombay's place as urbs prima in Indis, as the jewel in
the imperial crown. The presence of so many poor Hajis "lying around in the streets for days, in

37 "Letter from the Commissioner of Police," GPBP 1894: p.138, BLAPAC.
most miserable and insanitary surroundings," a *Times of India* editor noted, "is a thoroughly melancholy spectacle." It was a spectacle that demanded the regulation of Haji bodies by colonial officials and Muslim elites.

The scope of the spatial transgression of Hajis in the city's urban spaces was extensive. Their simple presence in the city was considered problematic. Much of this anxiety reflected concerns over elite and official control of the use of public space, especially Bombay's streets. Non-elite neighbourhoods were, as mentioned above regarding the plague, often insanitary and overcrowded. The inability or lack of desire on the part of elites and officials to address the concerns about Bombay's residents contrasts with their show of patronizing concern for the Hajis. Pilgrims were forced to enter the larger urban housing market by the lack of temporary accommodation. This was in a city which was already unable to house many of its permanent inhabitants. Just as their naiveté exposed them to threats from fraudulent pilgrim brokers, Hajis were seen by elites as unable to live within urban accommodation in a rational or healthy way. More than this inability, as medicalized bodies, Hajis living in the general non-elite social spaces of the city posed a threat to Bombay's overall health. In 1894, for instance, Bombay hosted roughly 1,100 pilgrims at the same time. Of these, the city's two musafirkhanas were able to hold only 700 (Figure 4). Having been in the city for well over a month while waiting for steamships to the Hedjaz, the poor Hajis, wrote the Commissioner of Police ominously, were "distributed all over town." This was viewed as a problem for the pilgrims as well as the health of the city. This is highlighted by the Commissioner's experience with a group of Bengali Hajis who he found renting severely overcrowded rooms in town. In one case, twenty of these pilgrims were found in a room not large enough for ten. The Commissioner had no choice, he reported, but to remove half of them.

Concern over the state of the pilgrims living within the city temporarily was linked to class based knowledge of poor Hajis which understood them as threats to themselves as well as

41 "Letter from the Commissioner of Police," *GPBP 1894*: p.138, BLAPAC.
Bombay’s spatial order. In 1909, the same year construction was begun on the Haji Sabu Sidick Musafirkhana, an exposé ran in The Times of India. The correspondent went throughout the city, especially to Muslim neighbourhoods. The writer reported that in those areas one would "find a state of affairs which ought not to be allowed to continue in any civilized city. Wretched Hajis are huddled together literally by scores into small rooms. Men, women, and children have to live in the streets."43 The writer also visited a house in Old Nagpada Cross Lane at Parel Road, in a Muslim neighbourhood. The four-storey building had four rooms on each floor all rented to Hajis who were "packed in just like sardines in a tin," claimed the correspondent, "one room about fifteen feet square contains forty people and their belongings."44 As the number of Hajis living on the streets grew, the Government working through the Protector of Pilgrims and the Haj Committee stepped in to regulate Hajis' presence within the city. An increasing amount of money went into finding suitable accommodation for the Hajis. These efforts of the officials and elites assembled around the regulation of the Hajis highlight the importance of accommodation as a spatial fix to the problematic presence of pilgrims in Bombay.

The creation of space within the city which was specifically for Hajis' use gave them a position within the city's spatial order. The concentration of Hajis in a single space accomplished several regulatory goals for officials. First, it made them easily surveillable. Hajis in a single space or set of spaces could be more easily monitored and inspected by health and police officials. They could also be spatially controlled. Police could keep Hajis in one place while monitoring them at the same time. Second, the accommodation separated Hajis from the general population. This allowed officials to contain them as medical and political threats. Finally, the provision of temporary accommodation for Hajis allowed elites and officials to demonstrate their ability to govern colonial subjects within the urbs prima. Within elite discourses, homeless pilgrims were considered not only an immediate problem that had to be solved, they also posed a threat to the city's imperial and global prestige. The accommodation of pilgrims was a politically palatable means of controlling urban space and defending elite interests.

For elites and officials, it was imperative that they separate Hajis from the rest of the city's population. This is clear in the locations chosen for the temporary accommodations. In 1906, after the two musafirkhanas had once again been filled, the government accommodated a

number of pilgrims on empty land just south-east of the Elphinstone Bridge. These spaces were not voluntary for poor pilgrims. Rather, they were enforced by officers of the Bombay police force. In 1909, for instance, when more than 9,000 Hajis awaited steamships at the one time, elite Muslims loaned for their use a "commodious set of buildings at Foras Road." This enabled officials to keep pilgrims "off the public streets" and corralled in a Muslim area. To ensure that pilgrims remained at the buildings, twenty five extra police were hired to guard the Hajis. In that same year, between August 18th and November 30th, a total of 21,000 pilgrims moved through Bombay. The substantial numbers of them remaining in the city before departing was clear by the official response. In addition to the buildings at Foras Road, the Government spent Rs.10,000 to rent houses for the pilgrims, such as a three storey house in Bhendi Bazaar (Figure 4). Leased by the Government for Rs. 300 a month, it housed over 400 pilgrims. To ensure that the pilgrims would not rent houses on their own or stay in the streets, special police officers were hired to attend the railway stations and bandars. Their instructions were to escort any incoming pilgrims to the rented houses.

After years of these temporary fixes, city elites began to put pressure on the Commissioner of Police, the Protector of Pilgrims, and the Haj Committee to build a new musafirkhana. This was to be a permanent, physical extension of the pre-existing infrastructure of Haji regulation. Prior to the construction of the new musafirkhana, the city had only two dedicated pilgrim rest houses. Calls for the new musafirkhana increased after the plague crisis had pushed the idea of Haji regulation into the realm of the commonsensical. One Times of India editorial appealed to the "leaders of the Musalman community in Bombay to bring this matter again prominently to the front, and not to rest until decent accommodation is found." Muslim elites were considered responsible for an issue which affected their religious community within Bombay's local division of power. When the Haj Committee was introduced in 1908, many across the city saw it as a perfect opportunity for elite Muslims to "help government and their own co-religionists in the provision of a rest-house." Kazi Kabiruddin, himself a member of

45 "Letter from the Commissioner of Police, March 8, 1906," GPBP 1906: p.127, BLAPAC.
46 "Letter from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, March 11, 1910," GPBP 1910: p.201, BLAPAC.
48 "Letter from the Protector of Pilgrims, Bombay to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, March 12, 1910," GPBP 1910: p.205, BLAPAC.
50 "Comments on the Proposed Committee of Leading Muhammadans to Deal with the Hajis in Bombay from the
the Haj Committee, saw the musafirkhana as the best means of regulating and protecting pilgrims. He wrote that they "come into this city as mere strangers and allow themselves to be carried always as waifs and strays in the flood of the teeming populations of Bombay."\textsuperscript{51} Pilgrims' protectionlessness as poor Indians would serve as the rationale for the spatial regulation of the musafirkhana.

The need for a new musafirkhana met with common consensus amongst both elites and officials as early as the 1890s. Before it could be built however, a site had to be chosen. The musafirkhana, as pilgrim space, would have to be situated in a site separate from the general population. In addition, it would have to be near those spaces marked as appropriate for pilgrims, namely those involving transit and the city's Muslim communities. The debates over the proper site for the building exposed the attributes of what elites and officials viewed as spatially appropriate for Hajis. In 1894, the Municipal Commissioner suggested a number of places which he viewed as spatially appropriate. For him, these were outside the then built up city, near transit space and easily controlled. In his opinion the best spot would be in the "vicinity of Byculla lying off Ripon Road and Haines Road, the area now being laid out in roads. It lies conveniently between the Grant Road and Byculla Stations and is within easy reach of the Foras Road and Erskine Road markets."\textsuperscript{52} Despite the consensus about the need for a new musafirkhana, nothing was done until the first decade of the 20th century.

In 1906, Haji Sabu Sidick offered to erect a musafirkhana with his own money. In return, Bombay's Government would have to grant him a piece of land free of cost.\textsuperscript{53} This kicked off a new round of speculative siting of the new building. Whereas before, the construction was never certain, the Government had accepted Sidick's offer. Moreover, the new musafirkhana was to be the product of negotiations between the Government and Muslim elites, who would assist in providing the funds for its construction. The first choice chosen by the city was a plot of land in Mazagaon.\textsuperscript{54} This district, to the north of the city's financial and administrative centre was home

\textsuperscript{52} "The Municipal Commissioner in Suggesting Places for a New Musafirkhana," \textit{GPBP 1894}: pp.138-9, BLAPAC.
\textsuperscript{53} "Letter from Mr. Haji Sabu Sidick to Khan Bahadur Hakeem Mahomed Dyam, January 4, 1906," \textit{GPBP 1906}: p.2, BLAPAC.
\textsuperscript{54} "Letter from the Secretary to the Government, General Department to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay," \textit{GPBP 1906}: p.2, BLAPAC.
to a significant amount of transit infrastructure, including docks and bandars. Just north of the Prince's Dock, it was in fact in one of the city's prime transit spaces. This was rejected by Sidick and his trustees. It was, in their opinion, much too small. After this, the Government and Sidick began negotiating in earnest around what constituted an appropriate site. While the parties agreed on the need for a musafirkhana, they differed in particulars. It is in these particulars that we see how the building was to serve the various interests of those involved, from Muslim elites to colonial officials.

The Government was not overly eager to give over a large plot of potentially profitable land for the annual use as musafirkhana. To minimize their loss, they attempted to limit the size of the plot considerably. In their annual report of 1908, the city's Municipal Committee recommended that a site be chosen on Palton Road. This land, within the Esplanade, one of the central districts of the city, was the home of the old Native Infantry Lines. These lines, which were owned by the Government and the former home of imperial army barracks were considered the best choice of location. According to the Municipal Committee, this land could easily be converted into a musafirkhana. Having no power to force the decision however, they urged Sidick to ensure that whichever site he chose would be "in the vicinity of the docks."\(^{(55)}\) The Government agreed with the Municipal Committee, and chose the site on Palton Road, between the Durgha and Grant's House. According to a trustee, however, the plot, was, at 1,500 square yards, again, too small. The Government then increased their land grant to a much larger 2,400 square yards. Again, Sidick and his trustees rejected the offer. The trustees informed the Government that they would need at absolute minimum 4,000 square yards. This was due to the fact that the building was to house tanks for water storage, clean rooms, and kitchens all of which had to be big enough to serve 1,500 pilgrims at any one time.\(^{(56)}\) It was clear then that Muslim elites intended the building as a visible demonstration of their commitment to the well-being of their community. The construction of the musafirkhana was a political act which was informed by the need to control pilgrims while expressing Muslim elite power.

After several years of wrangling, the final decision for the site was eventually made. It would be on Palton Road, at the site of the former infantry lines, and would cover the full 4,000 square yards Muslim elites claimed was required. The choice of the site is illustrative of the

multiple roles the building was to play. As a regulatory mechanism, it was separated from the rest of the city by the railway tracks and docks to its east, and the back of the Crawford Market to its west. Moreover, it was an easily surveillable location near not just to the Malet Bandar, but also to the main railway station, the Victoria Terminal. Elites in Bombay approved wholeheartedly of the site. An editorial appearing in the *Rast Goftar* in 1908 proclaimed that "the site the Government have selected for a Hajis' musafirkhana has everything to recommend it as a place adjacent to the docks and in the vicinity of the Muhammadan quarters and has the additional advantage of being near the bandar."57 The site accommodated Hajis into the spatial order of Bombay. At the same time though, the musafirkhana was to be a public building to add to the city's, and especially Muslim elite's prestige. For the elite Muslim community, the building was to be one which proclaimed their role in the development and governance of Bombay as a modern city.

The Haji Sabu Sidick musafirkhana was a spectacular monument to the elite and colonial joint project of regulating Hajis. Beyond its purpose as a regulatory mechanism of surveillance and spatial control it was to add material weight to the elite imagination of Bombay as imperial prestige centre. The building's architectural style and location highlight its role as prestige building (Figure 5). The musafirkhana was to fit into the process of developing Bombay's built form to serve the goals of promoting the city as imperial centre. As the Municipal Commissioner wrote of the effort to construct a new musafirkhana, "the object was rather imperial than municipal."58 The construction of the musafirkhana in the Esplanade district was part of this effort. Esplanade was part of the city's administrative and commercial centre. After the walls of the old fort were torn down in the 1860s, the district became the site for the construction of a number of buildings which demonstrated the imperial presence and the city's prestige. Moreover, the era between 1907 and 1925 was an especially prodigious period of prestige urban development in that area, including the construction of the General Post Office, the Customs House and the Prince of Wales Museum.59 The musafirkhana, begun in 1909, was clearly part of

57 "Approval for the Site for a Musafirkhana for Hajis to be Erected in Bombay, from the *Rast Goftar*, September 27, 1908," *BNNR 1908*: p.27, BLAPAC.
this building boom. This was highlighted by the architectural motif chosen for the new building, the Indo-Saracenic style.

The musafirkhana was to be a spectacular building. Designed by the Bombay architectural firm of Chambers and Fritchly in the "modernized Saracenic style," (See Figure 5), it was to have a fountain in the centre, a mosque on the main quadrangle and shops on the ground floor.60 The "modernized Saracenic style," more commonly known as Indo-Saracenic, was perhaps the most popular architectural theme of the era of colonial rule. It is this architectural design which, more than any other, represented British colonial rule over India.61 Part of a larger architectural vernacular of colonial control, it was a style held in common between official buildings not just in Bombay but across India. The Indo-Saracenic style was born as a way to give expression to colonial power and triumph over Indian art forms. As such it operated as an integral part of the Raj’s building regime.62 In Bombay, the style entered the city with the

Figure 5: The Haji Sabu Sidick Musafirkhana, 1909 (The Times of India)

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61 To see an expansive history of the role of architecture and colonial power in India, with special reference to the Indo-Saracenic style, see Thomas Metcalf, *An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain’s Raj* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
construction of the General Post Office and was a large part of the early 1900s prestige architecture boom. While not an official government building, the musafirkhana's design, location, and purpose were all part of the furthering of imperial goals. Part of the international Haji regime, it was a particular local response to larger currents. In a 1914 report of the Bombay Development Committee public buildings were defined as "institutions of a public or a quasi-public character." While the musafirkhana is not listed by name in the report, it is featured on the map of public buildings accompanying it, along with hospitals, the university and an assortment of public offices. Moreover, the area the musafirkhana was in, colloquially known as "Modern Town," was, as the Development Committee noted, the centre of the Bombay: "No defined area in any capital could more truly be described as the heart of the city."

The Haji Sabu Sidick musafirkhana was officially opened on July 23rd, 1914. Assembled at the opening were a veritable who's who of Bombay's elites and officials from a number of communities. S.M. Edwardes, the Commissioner of Police, was in charge of proclaiming the building open. His presence there and the rhetoric of his speech highlight the musafirkhana's role as regulatory mechanism and prestige booster. As Commissioner of Police, Edwardes was ultimately responsible for the regulation of pilgrims through the Protector and the Haj Committee. After thanking Haji Sabu Sidick and the trustees for the musafirkhana, Edwardes proclaimed that it was through elite efforts that the city could "offer material assistance to the "Guests of God," on their long journey by land and sea." The nature of the project as serving both local and colonial interest was clear in Edwardes' eyes. Elites and officials worked together to boost the city's status, while at the same time spatially regulating Hajis within Bombay under the framework of the international Haji regime. As Edwardes continued, this was all done for the protection of those poor Hajis unable to protect themselves: "In spite of occasional shortcomings, in spite of mistakes here and there, the Pilgrim authorities, as also the Government whom they serve, are actuated by no other desire than to do the best they possibly can for the thousands of

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devout Mahomedans who set forth annually."67 His speech finished, the crowd broke out with three cheers for the commissioner, and the new musafirkhana was declared open.

Conclusion

The new musafirkhana, built on government land through the donations of Muslim elites, was representative of the way that Hajis were regulated in Bombay's urban space. The city was, for elites, a prestigious centre of imperial and elite control to be protected from the various threats embodied by the problematic pilgrims. The presence of Hajis in Bombay's streets represented a threat to the spatial order of the city. From 1880 to the outbreak of the First World War, elites and officials worked together to construct an infrastructure of regulation which targeted Hajis in Bombay's social and economic spaces. The Protector of Pilgrims and the Haj Committee, the bureaucratic basis for the Haji regulation in the city, resulted from negotiations between both elites and officials over the division of local power. The logic of regulation which was made a part of the city's administrative knowledge was played out in space through the regulatory efforts of elite Muslims and officials. It reflected elite concerns over the city's status as imperial centre of prestige and their own power within it to act as protectors of poor Hajis. The construction of the new musafirkhana acted as both a means of regulating Hajis in space and a way to promote the city's and its elites' prestige.

The themes exposed in this chapter highlight the way that urban space in the colonial context functioned within the larger framework of empire. Bombay's elites at first were reacting to the need for regulation imposed by the international Haji regime. The resulting infrastructure of regulation, both the physical and bureaucratic aspects, reflected local concerns, power structures and desires. The regulation of Hajis in Bombay as urban space was done through the imposition of strictly defined spatial boundaries on the Hajis themselves. This was accomplished through the patronizing institution of the musafirkhana, carried out by the elite offices of the Protector of Pilgrims and the Haj Committee. The structures of regulation were a reflection of the power structures of the city itself. Colonial officials, responsible for the imperial project and the implementation of the international Haji regime, worked through subordinate elites. These elites, though, were not without local power. As merchants, industrialists, and legal

professionals, wealthy city Muslims were able to utilize the colonial project to reinforce and extend their own local power over Hajis in Bombay's social space. These power structures were highlighted by the consent producing nature of the regulation itself. In the end, it was the interests of a moneyed elite in the spatial ordering of the city which determined the means of regulation in Bombay.
Chapter Five

Conclusion

Introduction

The outbreak of the First World War in the summer of 1914 brought the Haj traffic through Bombay to almost a complete halt. The war pitted the British against the Ottoman Empire and led to heavy fighting in the Red Sea region. At the beginning of hostilities, more than 12,000 British Indian Hajis were stranded in enemy territory at Mecca. The British response to this was indicative of just how much a part of the imperial governance of India the Haj had become. Stranded in enemy territory, and with many of the pilgrim ships pressed into war by the Imperial Government, British Hajis faced a troublesome route home to say the least. The Indian Government, at the urging of Muslim elites throughout the Raj, hired several ships to carry the pilgrims back to India. Aiding them was a complement of war ships from the British navy which imperial officials had detached from regular war duty to patrol the maritime route between Jeddah and Bombay. This act constituted the largest intervention in the Haj by imperial officials. By 1914, the international Haji regime's logic of interventionism and the rationale of patronizing protection had become permanent and influential aspects of colonial decision making regarding the pilgrimage.

While the Haj would resume again after the war, it would be within a different international framework. Mecca, for instance, was no longer controlled by the Ottoman Empire, which had ceased to exist. British and other Western European imperial powers now had almost exclusive domination over the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions. This put the Haj traffic between Bombay and Jeddah into the hands of British authorities and the early Saudi government they had assisted in overthrowing the Ottomans. This however, did not change the level of intervention in the Haj by the colonial government. From 1914 onwards, regulating Hajis and intervening in the Haj traffic through the rationale of patronizing protection was so firmly entrenched as to be considered amongst the basic tenets of the state's administrative duty.

Governmental involvement with the Haj through regulation and intervention in India not only continued, but was extended to include more duties and personnel. After Indian independence in 1947, the national government took over the role of patronizing protector of pilgrims. The national Haj Committee, an agency of the Indian Government, continues to function as the framework through which the majority of India's Muslims perform Haj today.

The modern Haj Committee's duties not only echo those of its predecessor, they extend them. Today's Committee arranges virtually every aspect of the Haj for Indian citizens, from administering vaccinations and obtaining visas from the Saudi embassy in India, chartering flights and allocating seats and departure times by cities, to providing rental accommodation in Mecca and Medina. Today's Haji infrastructure in India is a direct descendant of the bureaucratic and material framework of Haj regulation constructed beginning in 1881 with the Pilgrim Passport. The administrative rationale of regulating pilgrims too poor to protect themselves while sustaining elite prestige and power had by 1914 become firmly embedded in the reproduction of Indian administrative logic. The modern Haj regulation's links to the past are clear. The Haj Committee is headquartered in the nineteen-storey Haj House, in the heart of Mumbai. The Haj House, on Dr. Dadbhai Naoroji Road, formerly Palton Road, is a monumental piece of architecture, built not only to contain the administrative offices of the Indian government's Haj Committee, but to serve as a musafirkhana for pilgrims awaiting flights to Jeddah. In both function and in magnitude, the building, built in 1992, evokes the themes explored in discussions of the Haji Sabu Sidick Musafirkhana. Haj House, like the earlier musafirkhana, was built through a subscription fund by Muslim charity, and is built in an eye catching monumental style, towering over nearby buildings. Its link to the physical apparatus of colonial regulation of the Haj is even clearer when one notices that Haj House is located less than 400 metres south of the Haji Sabu Sidick Musafirkhana, on the same side of the same street.

Themes

While the modern regulation of the Haj by the Government of India is outside the purview of this thesis, it illustrates one of the key themes of my study, the linkage between

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colonial knowledge creation and governance. The continuation of Haji regulation in India, and its expansion from the First World War to the present day demonstrate the impact that the officials, elites, scientists, and others who constructed and implemented the international Haji Regime had on colonial India's administrative structure. The problematization of Hajis as pauper pilgrims in need of protection, as potential medical and political threats to imperial and urban order was made commonsensical through its inclusion in the logic of British Indian administration. Through the construction of local Haji regulatory mechanisms from the plague measures to the Haj Committee, civil servants and elites who held offices dealing with the Haj from the 1880s to 1914 extended and solidified problematic knowledge of Hajis. Establishing a permanent regulatory infrastructure in the Haj Committee, Pilgrim Ships Bill, and the musafirkhana embedded the notion of the pilgrim threat in the spaces of Bombay as much as in the bodies of the Hajis. Through the conscious creation of a set of material practises, these problematizations became an unconscious part of administrative logics. The basis of administrative and physical regulation of bodies in space, I have argued throughout this thesis, is the knowledge created in service of maintaining both British and Indian elite power. In the case of the Hajis, this link between knowledge and governance is clear from the creation of colonial categories of difference in service of constructing a class and race based imperial hierarchy.

At their very core, the interlinked discourses, institutions, and regulations which were developed to target Hajis from the 1880s to 1914 were about the control of non-elite bodies in space. The conclusions drawn from the experience of the Hajis has implications about the way we can understand the construction of knowledge, both within and outside the realm of the colonial. The problematization of Hajis illuminates the way individuals and groups were problematized through the interweaving of different types of knowledge. It involved the creation and expansion of many different categories of knowledge created by a wide but select range of individuals and institutions. From the social to the scientific, from communalism to cholera, a range of knowledges which were problematic in nature and required regulation was written on to Haji bodies. The regulatory infrastructure which the Bombay elites developed however did not isolate each of these individual problematizations. Rather, administrative regulatory logic in the city wove together each of these various problematic characterizations of the Hajis to create the single figure of the problematic pilgrim.
This thesis has built off of a number of scholars’ work around imperial circulation, control and the Haj. These works are valuable for understanding the large scale processes inherent in the way that this pilgrimage and other non-elite movements were understood and governed across space. In this thesis though I have differed in my focus on Bombay and extended these scholars’ work to examine the spatiality of these circulations, and the material effects on place which the knowledge and governance of the Haj within the imperial world produced. Low, for instance, examines the Haj within the context of inter-imperial competition in the Red Sea and Middle East. Similarly, Miller’s examination of the Haj is within the context of larger networks of the shipping trade in the Indian Ocean. Mishra, who looks at the medicalization of the Haj itself, does so within the framework of South Asia. These works all lack an acknowledgement of the significance of space and place in the production and circulation of ideas around the Haj. They take the idea of South Asia, or the Red Sea Region, or the Indian Ocean not as productions of these same discourses, but as essentialized spaces, pre-existing and finite. In this thesis I have looked at the importance of the various nodes within these larger networks in constructing a knowledge and regulatory regime around the Haj from India. From the International Sanitary Conferences in Vienna, Paris or Constantinople, the legislative debates out of Delhi to the construction of musafirkhanas in Bombay, I argue that the local material realities of place are an integral component in understanding the circulation and materialization of knowledge and governance of the Haj. This thesis has extended the ideas around the Haj to show the material, place-based realities of knowledge production and regulation.

The problematization of Hajis demonstrates the crucial role that religious knowledge played in the governance of colonial India. The religious knowledge utilized to make Hajis problematic was the specific product of the colonial encounter in India. More than just part of a specific understanding of Islam, Hajis were implicated in a wider colonial knowledge of religion which reflects the context within which they were regulated in Bombay. Hajis were just one of countless colonial groups whose boundaries and characteristics were made problematic by

colonial officials and elites from all communities in the service of the preservation of order. A foundational aspect of this knowledge was that Indian religion was irrational, unmodern, and therefore problematic. Moreover, religion was seen as the basic organizational paradigm of Indian society. In British eyes Indian religion's irrationality and backwardness made it, and the society which was built around it, fundamentally dangerous. Indians, in this understanding, were volatile, irrational, and in need of control. It was through the categories of religion, created within the colonial knowledge production process, that the British governed Indian subjects. This division of Indian society into distinct religious communities and its use as a governing paradigm inflected virtually every aspect of life with religious implications. More than this, by privileging religion over other aspects of Indian society, the British actually attached further importance to religious ceremonies like the Haj. In particular, religious ceremonies became a means of political expression for subaltern Indians.

Indian religions stood in inherent opposition to the perceived modernity of the colonial state's putatively rationalized and reformed Protestantism. This thesis has demonstrated the role of perceived levels of embodied modernity as a marker of social and political status for the colonial power. By tying the Haj and Hajis so closely to religion, the Bombay's officials and elites constructed an understanding of them as the embodiment of backwardness. This intermingling of religion and communal politics by the British constructed religious ceremonies themselves as political events. Moreover, for the British, these political-religious occurrences carried an anti-colonial threat. It was within this context that the Haj was understood by colonial officials. Religious, political and communal knowledge were all intertwined within the official and elite discourses. When one knowledge was imposed on understandings of the Hajis the others necessarily followed. Hajis were problematized in way which extended past this more India specific knowledge of the interwoven nature of religion, communalism and politics. The figure of the problematic pilgrim was the result of larger scale discourses which problematized non-elites across space.8 By using the concept of problematization analytically in this thesis, I have shown how a single body or group without power, could be constructed from multiple

angles. This is demonstrative of larger processes of problematization along lines of difference. The knowledge never represents a single threat; they are always linked together to reflect a broader threat to the powers in place.

Official and elite problematization of Hajis demonstrated the way that discourses and practises of difference making which were so integral to the project of colonial rule informed one another. While some lines of knowledge, such as those around Indian religiosity were unique in their specificities, they all worked to increase distance between rulers and the ruled. This is most clearly demonstrated when discussing the wider knowledge of race and class which informed understandings of Hajis. Official knowledge intertwined class and race together across space to socially distance and problematize non-elites from those in power. Moreover, these were constantly changing lines of difference which were spatially and temporally variable. The problematic Haji was a poor Haji. Elite Muslims travelling to Mecca not only escaped problematization, they also escaped the bulk of the regulations by travelling on normal steamships or by rail to the Hedjaz. Hajis embodied all of the problematic knowledge of poor Indians as a whole. They were racially different in ways which have been explored throughout colonial settings, and moreover, they were not elites. These discourses around race and class were part of wider global knowledge production which worked to problematize poor subjects in a variety of contexts. The local knowledge of place, such as developed in India around religion, for example, was influenced by these larger discursive currents.

Hajis' mobility, in colonial eyes, exacerbated their threat to the colonial project which was based on their class and racial status as poor non-whites in British colonial imaginations. The figure of the problematic pilgrim was especially alarming for those in the higher rungs of the imperial administrative hierarchy. As mobile bodies, Hajis were one of the few groups of non-elites to travel for reasons other than labour. No other subaltern group in the entire empire travelled in such large numbers outside of imperial boundaries.9 White labour migrants moved from Britain to Australia, Canada, or elsewhere at the same time that Indians migrated as free or indentured labour to South and East Africa amongst other colonial locations. Haji mobility was,

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in terms of both class and race, disruptive to the colonial order of things from Bombay to Toronto, or London to Melbourne. This was a world, after all, where Canada could practise what was seen as a "very remarkable form of Imperialism," by excluding Indian migrants from settling there on racial grounds.\textsuperscript{10} This was even though those born in Winnipeg or Calcutta, or Bombay or Perth, were equal subjects under the British Crown. The local regulation of pilgrims in Bombay was part of a larger empire wide effort to proscribe the mobility of non-whites as a means of minimizing their danger to the imperial order. Mobility was regulated in part on the basis of Hajis' epidemic threat to the rest of the world.

The medicalization of Hajis is just one of the innumerable historical cases that links scientific medical knowledge with non-elite social and class status. The links between the Hajis' medicalization and the regulations developed around them demonstrate the integral role of western medicine in the colonial project. The development of the international Haji regime shows how it operated not only on bodies materially, but also as an intervening logic through which to rationalize spatial regulation of Hajis. The musafirkhanas or inspection sheds of Bombay's Haji regulation were the material result of a larger logic responsible for the sewer systems or public housing super blocks built to deal with the embodied insanitariness of poor people around the world. The elite knowledge of Hajis as inherently dangerous carriers of cholera and other epidemic diseases, tied to notions of class, race, and religion, offered a scientifically sanctioned line of regulatory rationale. Not only was the intervention in the Haj medically necessary, as elites claimed, it was for the Hajis' own good.

\textbf{Connections}

The implementation of the international Haji regime in Bombay demonstrates the way flows of knowledge and discourse functioned in the day-to-day governance of colonial life. Though this thesis has focused on the Hajis, the conclusions I have drawn could be applied across a range of historical landscapes. The role of knowledge was integral to colonial control. It stood at the very core of the colonial project. The uniformity of the logic which underpinned the problematization of Hajis crossed regional and imperial borders as well as linguistic and cultural boundaries, but never those of class. At its core, this logic was one which was based on the

\footnote{10 "Indian Immigration to Canada," \textit{The Times of India} (January 19, 1914): p.6.}
maintenance of elites on top of the hierarchy and poor subjects at the bottom. The way these knowledges were transferred give an insight into the functioning of imperial networks as multidimensional, overlapping, and contentious.

The international Haji regime's localization in Bombay by local elites is a window into the inter- and intra-imperial flows which made up the colonial world. Connections across the empire existed in more ways than just the hierarchy of the colonial offices. The decisions which ultimately became imperial policy were informed by a wide range of actors with oftentimes contesting and differing desires and knowledge across space. The regulation of Hajis in Bombay was not solely the result of an order given at the India Office in London that filtered down through the Indian Government to Bombay's municipal officials. Rather, the implementation of the apparatus composing the international Haji regime in Bombay demonstrates just how much power was held by elites and officials in imperial cities. The decisions which made up the city's day-to-day governance were made in large part by both local elites and colonial officials. Elite knowledge about pilgrims flowed both upwards within the official imperial hierarchy and downwards from international decision-making bodies. Relationships between those responsible for producing the various knowledges which problematized Hajis occurred at both the personal and institutional level. Doctors from different countries working together on commissions at the conferences informed each-others' opinions. Members of geographic, anthropological, medical, epidemic, and a number of other societies dedicated to knowledge production transmitted ideas across space through publications, personal letters, and speaking tours. At the same time, the vast majority of knowledge produced in the colonial context both implicitly and explicitly supported the racial and class based imperial hierarchy.

Local knowledge was created within the overarching framework of the imperial hierarchy. Local officials, from the municipal commissioner or the commissioner of police to the doctors and health inspection clerks who worked for the Customs and Sanitation Departments, made decisions based on their own individual, local knowledge and desires. These were, however, informed by an administrative logic which was part of events and discourses occurring elsewhere. These officials were part of informal and formal networks of colonial power. From their educations at certain schools, to their acculturation within the imperial civil service, the logic of rule was a part of everything. The result of the always present imperial logic was to
influence the way that local knowledge was received. This turned understandings of locally problematic phenomena into larger imperial problems as well, and vice versa. Importantly though, these local officials wielded large amounts of power over Bombay. This in and of itself is a reflection of the multicentred nature of imperial power. I argue that cities like London, Bombay, Delhi, and others can be understood as linked both horizontally and vertically to one another.

The regulation of Hajis in Bombay demonstrates the impact knowledge flows from elsewhere had on imperial governance. While local officials were required to follow the policies set out in Delhi or London, they had a large amount of leeway within which to localize these policies in ways which reflected Bombay's local conditions. The response to the Haj traffic in Bombay demonstrates the need to look closely at the local conditions within which decisions were made. The musafirkhana for instance, came out of local power relationships and concern over the proper use of urban space. While larger imperial projects of control and exploitation formed the logical foundation of the colonial administration, this was only part of the process of governance. In many ways, the Haji regulation in Bombay contested the specifics of the larger discourse. In particular, elites contested the notion of Bombay as problematic Indian space in global discourses. Local regulations and governance in the imperial city reflected the power dynamics, local knowledge, and the multitudinous, overlapping and contesting desires of those in power.

Local governance was a reflection of individual and group desires and understandings. The chapters within which I explored Bombay as both transit space and urban space are reflections on the elite and official understandings of the city. Both of these imaginations were based off of a need to produce wealth and sustain power for a small group at the top of the local class and racial hierarchy. The limited knowledge of these actors who were responsible for implementing Haji regulation policies is reflected in the limited scope of these understandings. Both Bombay as transit space and Bombay as urban space focus on the city as the site of wealth and power generation. As transit space, Bombay's docks, bandars, and railway stations connected its industrial and mercantile classes to the hinterland sources of labour and commodities, and imperial and international markets. The targeting of the shipborne problematic Haji by European scientists and others threatened to curtail the use of Bombay's transit spaces to construct that
wealth. As urban space, Bombay was a centre for colonial and local prestige. Its monumental architecture, its Esplanade, its hotels, and cultural institutions were part of its role as a showcase city. For both the elites who donated to the construction of such buildings as the musafirkhana or the Prince of Wales Museum, and the officials who financed and facilitated these efforts, Bombay's status elevated their own power. The city was a tool of control and advancement as much as the actions undertaken within it. The pilgrimage regulation in Bombay demonstrates the city's elites' and officials' exclusive power over the physical shaping of the colonial city.

More than anything, the governance of the colonial city was one which benefited it's official and elite rulers. What both the conceptions of the city as urban and transit space ignore of course, was the life of the majority of Bombay's inhabitants. The city was populated in large part by migrant labourers in overcrowded one room chawls outside of Modern Town, or in huts on polluted grounds amidst the belching smoke stacks of the textile mills in the northern areas of Parel or Warli. These urban spaces made up the bulk of the city's landmass, yet escaped official attention throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries. The imagination of Bombay which formed the basis of local decisions around the Haj did not include the knowledge of this other Bombay. Rather the policies implemented around the Haj, including the Protector of Pilgrims, the Pilgrim Ships Bill, and the construction of the new musafirkhana, were indicative of a larger trend in imperial urban regulation to maintain urban order through the protection and extension of elite space. At its core, the regulation of Hajis in Bombay was spatial. Even those efforts such as medical inspection as part of the Pilgrim Ships Bill involved the construction of Haji space as separate from Bombay's existing social and economic spaces. The experience of the Haj in Bombay's regulation is one which demonstrates the writing of social and medical knowledge onto the physical form of the city. Space was a valuable commodity through which elites in the imperial city expressed their power and wealth.

The creation of the bureaucratic and physical components of regulation of the Haj in Bombay was part of a wider set of collaborations between elites and colonial officials based on shared class interests. This was seen on the local scale in Bombay itself. Europeans and Indians of all religions lived near one another in Bombay. The imperial city was, even in the face of such strict discursive racial boundaries, still a site of urban social and spatial diversity. Conviviality was part of the joint elite and official imaginations of Bombay shared by both Indians and
Europeans. Indeed elite spaces in the city, from the residential area of Malabar Hill to the commercial centre of the Fort were occupied by both groups. Bombay was still, however, inherently imperial. The symbolic use of space by imperial institutions such as the high courts, statues of Queen Victoria, military garrisons, even the nomenclature of the roads and buildings themselves, all spoke of an enduring and overpowering British dominance over India. It was only within these strict confines that elites were able to grab what local power they had. The physical and administrative logic of colonial rule made even the Indian elites who wielded power as the Protector of Pilgrims less powerful than their official counterparts.

Regulating Hajis in Bombay can be best understood as a joint project between officials and elites who were unequal to one another in terms of power to varying degrees. Officials had the ultimate power to take or give rights, privileges and power itself to elite colonial subjects. Indeed, as I have pointed out, the Protector of Pilgrims and the Haj Committee both reported to the, always European, Commissioner of Police. Within these structures however, elites were able to negotiate for their own power over local issues. In return for tacitly or implicitly supporting the colonial regime, elites gained wealth and power within their local communities. What occurred in Bombay can be seen on the one hand as demonstrative of larger patterns of consent production amongst elites within colonial governance. On the other hand, it showcases how the very local concerns, for instance around Bombay as a centre of not just imperial commerce but also of native mercantile networks, were able to shape imperial policies. The Haj regulation needs to be understood as the negotiated outcome of contestations over the expression of power between elites and officials in the broader colonial context.

**Conclusion**

In numerous ways, the Haj through Bombay exposes the very foundations of imperial urban rule. The story I have told is one which is both fundamentally urban and imperial. Local politics of place were informed by and in turn had their own effect on the larger discourses, knowledges and logics of colonial rule. Colonial populations such as the Hajis were problematized in a number of ways. Moreover, what occurred outside of the empire was as crucial to that taking place within it to shape the functioning of the state. The construction of a Haji regulatory regime in Bombay from 1880 to 1914 demonstrates the spatial interconnections.
between decision-making processes and the regulation of day-to-day life. The discursive production of problematic subjects utilized knowledges which could be formed in very different spaces. Knowledge was combined, expanded on, created, and written onto bodies and space through both the discourses which formed them and the regulations and material efforts which made them concrete.
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