Crisis and Regeneration:
The Conversos of Majorca, 1391-1416

by

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Dissertation Abstract

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In the summer of 1391 anti-Jewish violence spread across the kingdom of Castile and the Crown of Aragon. Unprecedented numbers of Jews were murdered and even more were forcibly converted. These converts, known as *conversos*, formed a new, self-perpetuating social group, which, together with the rest of Spanish society, remained deeply conscious of its distinct ethnicity and culture. A century later, testimonies to the Spanish Inquisition depict a converso community with a continued, if varied, affiliation to Judaism. This dissertation investigates the economic, social and political factors that promoted Jewish identification among the first two generations of conversos in Majorca following their baptism in 1391.

It employs previously unexamined and unpublished archival sources to argue that corporate fiscal obligations had a major impact in shaping the converso community in Majorca, just as they shaped Jewish social and communal life prior to 1391. Conversos organized collectively in order to meet royal fiscal demands, settle their corporate debt and fund social welfare following the disruptions of 1391, adopting administrative models of the former *aljama*. The monarchy continued to relate to the conversos as a distinct corporate entity in the same ways it had dealt with them as Jews. Royal efforts to prevent converso emigration to the Maghreb, where many fled to renge on Catholicism, carried overtones of the same proto-mercantilist policies that motivated its failed attempts to revivify the island’s Jewish *aljama*. Publicized restrictions against conversos, many of whom continued to cultivate prior commercial and family
relationships with Maghrebi Jews, contributed to popular assumptions that Majorcan conversos at sea were Judaizers, spurring targeted anti-converso and anti-Jewish piracy.

Conversos thus remained entrenched in the same socioeconomic structures, and employed the same licit and illicit strategies to cope with royal exploitation, as when they were Jews. This perpetuated a group identity that was unmistakeably anchored in their Jewish past, and which could promote other aspects of Jewish affiliation. In 1404 the conversos established a formal confraternity which replicated the social welfare programs and administrative techniques of the former aljama within the framework of a Catholic pious society, representing one of the first necessary adaptations to Christian life.
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Abbreviations

Archives

ARM: Arxiu del Regne de Mallorca
ACM: Arxiu de la Catedral de Mallorca
ACA: Arxiu de la Corona de Aragón

Journals

BRAH: Boletín de la Real Academia de Historia
BSAL: Boletín de la Societat Arqueologica Lulliana
Introduction

In the summer of 1391, attacks broke out against Jewish communities across the Kingdom of Castile and the Crown of Aragon. A large portion of the Jewish population was killed, and many more were forcibly baptized either during the riots or in the following months. Intensified social and economic pressures resulted in more conversions through the fifteenth century, especially following the promulgation of anti-Jewish legislation in Castile in 1412, the disputation at Tortosa and ensuing anti-Jewish legislation in the Crown of Aragon in 1413-1414, and the edict of Expulsion in 1492. Although conversion as a response to violence was not new to the Jews of the Spanish kingdoms or other areas of Europe, the conversions of 1391 were unprecedented in that they produced such large numbers of converts, and generated a new social group aware of its distinct ethnicity and culture. What was also unprecedented, as Miriam Bodian reminds us, is that “the group was self-perpetuating, since descendants continued to be regarded as conversos, or converts, for many generations. And the ranks of this group grew. […] The status of converso became, curiously, an inherited status — a fateful development.”¹

The subject of converso identity and culture has produced a vast and controverted body of scholarship.² Only a fraction of this work deals with experiences of the first few generations

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¹ Miriam Bodian, “‘Men Of The Nation’: The Shaping of Converso Identity in Early Modern Europe,” Past and Present 1994, 143: 48-76
of post-1391 conversos. This is a critical historiographical gap, considering that these
generations would determine the trajectory of the conversos’ shared identity and culture, setting
influential precedents that would shape patterns of behaviour for centuries to follow. The
present dissertation seeks to address this and other historiographical shortcomings in its study of
the converso community in Majorca as it recuperated from the upheaval of 1391 during the reigns
of Joan I (1387-1396) and Martí I (1396-1410).

**Historiography of 1391**

Within the field of Jewish history, studies of the period following the 1391 riots have been especially interested in assessing the degree to which these communities were able to recover from the violence. Within this historiographical vein, scholars of Jewish history have also sought to identify the *causes* of the 1391 violence, seeing it as a consequence of deteriorating Jewish-Christian relations, and in particular, of increasingly virulent anti-Judaism and conversionist pressure. Whereas most historians generally agree that Christian society was becoming more and more intolerant towards the end of the fourteenth century as it suffered from (and arguably because of) constant economic and social crises, the standard “Jewish studies”

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argument is that this intolerance contributed to a decline of Iberian Jewry that culminated in the cataclysmic revolt of 1391 and then bringing it to an end in 1492.

The question of a “Jewish decline” itself, what it meant and what exactly might have caused it, has inspired various hypotheses and debate among scholars. It has only been within the past two decades that certain historians problematized the accepted view that Sepharad was in a period of decline in the later Middle Ages, treating the fifteenth century as setting the stage for the Expulsion of 1492. Mark Meyerson contested this negative characterization in his study of the Jewish community in Morvedre, in the Kingdom of Valencia, which instead “enjoyed a renaissance after a difficult period of transition (1391-1416).” His findings remind us that the response of Jewish communities to the 1391 violence, and their ability to recover from it, varied locally. The same might be said of conversos. In other words, the ways in which conversos negotiated their newfound Catholic identities, however nominal, varied locally, temporally, individually and collectively. As the present study of Majorcan conversos bears out, the specific challenges this community faced during the “difficult period of transition” after 1391, and how it dealt with them, shaped this group in a particular way, giving rise to a converso society that may have differed from converso society in other places.

The issue of local variation is also relevant to the historiography of the 1391 violence itself. The assault against Jewish communities was sparked and manifested in distinct ways in

different towns. These distinctions had much to do with local politics, economic relations and nuances in religious culture. Again, understanding the divergences requires scholars to conduct more “deep” histories of the events of 1391 for a number of different locations, and then a revisionist synthesis that might also reveal similarities shared between towns in the Crown of Aragon as opposed to Castile. As tedious as it may seem, comprehending the play-by-play of the revolt or even tensions leading up to it can be instructive. Such a project is far beyond the scope of this study, but this study is a contribution insofar as it is a “deep” and “local” analysis of particular historical conditions experienced by Majorcan converts of 1391. The complexities of the 1391 revolt outlined in broad strokes below reveal long-standing relationships, attitudes and tensions that would persist beyond it to shape the experience of conversos, and in turn, the development of their identity as the nucleus of a new ethnic group.

On this point of local differentiation, Mark Meyerson makes a critical point at the beginning of his chapter on fourteenth and fifteenth-century Iberian Jewry in the Cambridge History of Judaism, one worth citing and bearing in mind for the current study:

Simply pointing to the phenomenon of anti-Judaism as the explanation for the expulsions of Iberian Jewry between 1492 and 1498 is inadequate, for religious antagonism was, in one way or another, ever present. The key questions to address are when, where, and how such religious animosity was exacerbated, manipulated, and channeled, and how it affected the Jews in particular moments and places.5

He proceeds to contrast the very different histories of Jewish communities in Castile versus the Crown of Aragon, and thus distinct manifestations of anti-Judaism—a distinction that remains insufficiently addressed by historians. In both realms, the Jews’ intense fiscal servitude was paramount, sparking or exacerbating internal conflict as well as economic hardship. The issue of moneylending, specifically by Jewish creditors to Christian debtors, was also central to shaping Jewish experience in Iberia, as it was elsewhere in Europe. Christian debtors commonly

resented the power that their Jewish creditors held over them, which was even more of an affront given that Jews were supposed to be their social inferiors. In Castile, Jewish “usury” was perceived to be associated with power of Jewish royal officials or courtiers, who were resented all the more by nobles for their loyalty to “a centralizing monarchy.” Perceptions of Jewish usury in the Crown of Aragon were not linked with resentment of Jewish political power as they were in Castile, since King Pere II had banned Jews from officialdom in 1283. Furthermore, with the introduction of the *censal* in the middle of the fourteenth century as a “legal” credit instrument between Christians in the Crown of Aragon, and the concomitant rise of a *censalista* or *rentier* class, the importance of Jewish creditors among upper class merchants and the patriciate diminished dramatically. Whereas in Castile the issue of Jewish usury and office-holding remained a volatile issue before and after 1391, in the Crown of Aragon, indebtedness to Jews was a grievance expressed primarily among agrarian or artisan classes, who needed to borrow money from Jews to make it through low-income seasons. The rebels who attacked the Jewish quarter in 1391 in Majorca, Girona and Barcelona voiced their frustration with the insurmountable debts to local Jewish moneylenders first and foremost; conversion was, quite literally, an afterthought, and one often supported by the clergy, at least in Majorca where the local vicar appears to have prompted the idea. At the same time, the prominence of economic motivations in anti-Jewish violence does not obviate the role of religious motivations. As Meyerson writes, “[i]n the minds of the Christian laity, economic or political concerns about the Jews were never completely separate from religious views about them that the Church inculcated.”

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6 Ibid, 8.
7 The amounts were relatively low (although still burdensome for the debtors) and often secured on pawns. Moneylending will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 1.
8 Meyerson, “Iberian Peninsula,” 9
Earlier studies (particularly in the 1980s and 1990s) argued for deteriorating Jewish-Christian relations on the basis of polemical literature and intensified missionizing campaigns. These arguments are aided by the substantial historiographical literature on Jewish-Christian polemics. David Berger, Robert Chazan and Jeremy Cohen are among the leading scholars who have argued that Christian anti-Jewish polemics became increasingly hostile from the twelfth century and, during the thirteenth century, much more “serious” in their preoccupation with converting Jews.\(^9\) The late thirteenth-century missionizing fervor driven by the Dominicans and Franciscans in the Crown of Aragon was reflected in the refinement, proliferation and dissemination of polemical literature, in such a way that was deliberately filtered down to the Christian masses. These polemics were made accessible through dramatization, in staged public disputation,\(^10\) or through sermons which Jews were forced to attend in their own synagogues and quarters (not coincidentally during the same period when popular theatre, morality plays and sermon literature were flourishing, stimulated by of a clerical concern to inculcate proper Christian observance and belief among the Christian laity). Often Christians would accompany the preachers into the Jewish quarter and harass the Jews, such that in 1309 King Jaume II of Majorca (1276-1311) limited the number of Christians who could enter the call to ten at one time, and required the preacher to obtain a royal license to enter.\(^11\) The antagonisms that sometimes occurred with forced attendance at sermons were contemporaneous with episodes of


\(^10\) For instance, the Disputation of Barcelona in 1263 between Nachmanides and Pablo Christiani. The much harsher conditions of the Jewish disputants at the disputation of Tortosa in 1413-14, followed by another wave of conversions, has been taken as another sign of worsening conditions.

Holy Week violence from the end of the thirteenth century. Typically, altercations were
instigated by Christian youths who shouted insults, threw stones, and in some cases attacked the
walls and gates of the Jewish quarter or Jews themselves.

It is clear that mendicant missionizing campaigns of the later thirteenth through to the
early fourteenth centuries both reflected and played a role in the particular face of anti-Judaism
in the Crown of Aragon. However, it represents just one part of a picture that is more complex.
The problem with attributing intensified anti-Judaism and thus a decline of Spanish Jewry to the
missionizing campaigns is that it does not take into account other historical factors, such as the
fact that the Castilian Crown did not embrace mendicant missions in the same way, or the
relatively “quiet” period under King Pere III of Aragon (1336-87) when conversionist pressure
abated significantly.\(^{12}\) King Pere did not financially support mendicant preaching campaigns
among Jews, but did aid Jewish converts and issued licenses for converts to preach among their
former coreligionists (as well as some unaffiliated clerics).\(^{13}\) Consequently, the organized
missionizing campaigns typical of the late thirteenth century did not continue once Pere III came
to the throne, although arguably local Christian society had already absorbed these more
aggressive conversionist attitudes, which came to the fore during subsequent periods of crisis.

David Nirenberg is another influential critic of the “traditional” historiography of late
medieval Spanish Jewry. In his discussion of fourteenth-century Holy Week violence in the
Crown of Aragon, Nirenberg disputes the view that the increase in anti-Jewish violence during
the fourteenth century was a sign of increasing intolerance and the worsening condition of

Instead, he argues that it was a necessary, ritualized outlet of aggression which actually stabilized relations and allowed for continued coexistence, and was also interrelated with other local conflicts that did not directly involve Jews. The problem, for Nirenberg, is that Jewish historiography has by and large adhered to a post-holocaust teleological model which seeks to establish an evolution of increasingly harsh persecution of Jews, whereby fourteenth century violence culminates in the devastation of 1391, anticipates the persecution of conversos from the mid-fifteenth century, and ends with the expulsion of the Jews in 1492. Furthermore, Nirenberg critiques historians who argue that Europe in general became a more closed, intolerant and “persecuting” society in the high and late Middle Ages, because such a view ignores local particularities, and does not address the reasons why different people at different times and places manifest certain attitudes and behaviours.

Outside of the periodic and sometimes devastating, if encapsulated, eruptions of violence, Jews and Christians continued to relate to one another on a daily basis in ways that ranged from mutual tolerance to amicable. Many Jews had good relationships with their Christian debtors and offered them favourable terms even in situations when it was not required. Jews and Christians entered into fruitful commercial or other kinds of economic relationships with one another, such as in trade partnerships, artisanal confraternities, or joint tax farming. They even attended each other’s family celebrations. It is all too easy to paint a gloomy picture when reading certain royal or ecclesiastical legislation, or literary sources that negatively depict Jews,

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15 See for instance, R. I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance In Western Europe, 950-1250* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). For David Nirenberg’s critique see *Communities of Violence*, Introduction and Chapter 7. Nirenberg also points out that the relative lack of documentation for the earlier Middle Ages may be lead to an erroneous impression that violence increases, since the apparent increase in violence and intolerance of the later Middle Ages may be only a result of its surviving documentation rather than a historical reality. Although this is an important point, I am not convinced that it refutes the theory of greater intolerance and harsher anti-Judaism in the late Middle Ages.
16 Both Nirenberg and Meyerson emphasize this point.
and to underrepresent the fact that Jews and Christians socialized with one another in positive ways in economic, political and domestic spheres. At the same time, as much as it is important not to exaggerate or misinterpret the relevance of fourteenth-century anti-Jewish violence, one ought to be wary of underplaying its significance to social psychology. In addition to reinforcing social boundaries as Nirenberg argues, group violence may have shaped specific attitudes and patterns of behaviour which in turn led to further violence. More to the point, perhaps, is that these anti-Jewish attitudes and behavioural patterns were informed and reinforced by the increasingly virulent anti-Judaism of the Church, evidenced not only in polemics but in ecclesiastical synods and papal inquisitions against Jews for necromancy and sorcery, or against lapsed converts. Accusations of ritual murder, and later, of host desecration, were sometimes promoted by local clerics even if denounced by their ecclesiastical superiors. Although these accusations generally did not give rise to large-scale violence against Jews, they fleshted out the cache of popular religious motifs that Christians could draw upon when they had personal social, political or economic grievances with individual Jews, or which could bolster resentment arising from economic competition.

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18 Later, such anti-Jewish rhetoric was expressed with particular vehemence in the sermons of popular preachers like Ferrant Martinez (who incited 1391 violence in Castile) or Vincent Ferrer (who advocated separation from Jews and conversionist pressures in 1413-1414). For a description of the sermons delivered by Martinez and Ferrer see Baer, History of the Jews, vol 2, Chapter 10.

These and other negative changes in the Jews’ social status during the fourteenth century seem to correlate with a “balancing out” of the relative involvement of Christians and Jews’ in long distance trade and credit markets.\textsuperscript{20} Robert Lopez observed that, by the fourteenth century, Jewish merchants did not engage in long-distance trade to the same extent that they had in earlier centuries, nor did they act as major creditors to merchants and nobles.\textsuperscript{21} This change coincides with the development of credit instruments tolerated by the church during the “commercial revolution” and the “ heyday of medieval trade” in the latter part of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{22} In the Crown of Aragon, it was the emergence and proliferation of the \textit{censal} in the second half of the fourteenth century that forced Jews out of the credit market’s centre among the middle and upper economic strata. The documents consulted for this dissertation suggest that prior to 1391 in Majorca Jews were loaning mostly –thought not exclusively—to the agricultural and artisan classes, but this impression needs to be confirmed by more comprehensive investigation. In terms of trade, the island’s Jews continued to be active despite numerous setbacks in the latter fourteenth century due to war, piracy, and foreign competition.\textsuperscript{23} Whether the Jews’ commercial involvement declined disproportionately in this period, again, requires further investigation. After 1391 it appears that the commercial activity of Majorca’s Jews did decrease, certainly due in part to their emigration and conversion.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{20} On changes in the Jews’ status from the late thirteenth into the first quarter of the fourteenth century see Mark Meyerson, \textit{Jews in an Iberian Frontier Kingdom}, especially Chapter 2, “Putting the Jews in their Place,” and \textit{A Jewish Renaissance}, 14.

\textsuperscript{21} Mark Meyerson finds that some Jews of Morvedre continued to supply loans to the aristocracy. See for example \textit{The Jews in an Iberian Frontier Kingdom}, 187.


\textsuperscript{23} References to the commercial life of the Majorcan Jews are supplied in the \textit{Historical Background} chapter.

\textsuperscript{24} Some Jewish merchants remained active in Majorca but as converso merchants. Two noteworthy observations can be made from a preliminary assessment of the archival evidence, which will be pursued in a future study. The first is that the converso merchants active on the island were not the same Jews who were most active prior to 1391; in fact, many of them were Valencian immigrants. The second point is that the kind of commercial activity they engage in seems to change, at least from the vantage point of the registers kept by the commercial notary Antoní Contestí.
The plague of 1348 is another important marker in the “pre-1391” historical narratives. As scapegoats blamed for bringing on the Black Death through their sins, Catalan Jews were victims of much worse violence than with any of the other the nefarious accusations described above. Some historians of Spanish Jews have viewed these assaults in Catalonia as acute manifestations of the deleterious trends leading up to 1391. Others have argued that the plague precipitated, or “accentuated and perpetuated” a long-term economic depression across Europe (which in some regions had antecedents in the first quarter of the fourteenth century) that in itself was a contributing factor to the 1391 violence, to the degree that it can be viewed as a popular uprising analogous to other conflicts that erupted across Europe from the 1380s. In his 1971 article, “The 1391 Pogrom in Spain: Social Crisis or Not?” Philippe Wolff expressly contextualized the 1391 violence in terms of these “revolutionary crises” (such as the Ciompi in Florence and the Peasants’ Revolt in England) which were rooted in economic pressures experienced by the lower classes during that period. Wolff shows how the revolt in Barcelona, which broke out on August 5 (incidentally, prompted by the news of the August 2nd revolt in Majorca) shared similar characteristics of a “lower-class uprising.” His argument is compelling, and indeed relevant to Majorca, although it runs the risk of simplifying the complexity and convergence of social tensions that erupt in 1391.

which show conversos mostly engaged in commercial brokerage, commenda contracts and societies to ship merchandise to North Africa but rarely travelling there themselves. Chapter 1 will provide more detailed outline of the Majorcan Jews’ economic life in the fourteenth century, a theme that will continue to be addressed – albeit not comprehensively – throughout this dissertation.

25 For instance, one Jewish source claimed that three hundred Jews were killed in Tarrèga (Nirenberg, Communities of Violence, 239). Cf. Meyerson, “Iberian Peninsula,” 13-14.
27 On the plague in Catalonia see Paul Freedman, The Origins of Peasant Servitude in Medieval Catalonia (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. chap. 6, “Effects of the Black Death,” 154-178, and esp.158. In some regions the rural populace, who enjoyed a period of prosperity until around 1380, did not feel the concrete effects of this depression immediately. Catalan lords managed to keep their peasants more oppressed than in other areas, such as England, however.
29 Wolff, 11
In Majorca, the violent outbreaks against Jews that occurred through the fourteenth century, often in the island’s rural towns (and thus, most likely, by agricultural workers) tended to coincide with economic strain as well. Conditions did worsen prior to 1391, notably from the 1370s when increased taxation related to Pere III’s wars exacerbated the hardships of poor harvests, disease and indebtedness to Jews.30 Wolff asked in a footnote, “whether social conflict appears behind the pogrom” in Majorca too.31 A close look at the succession of events leading up to and following the attack on the Jewish quarter in Majorca shows that indeed, social and economic tensions were central to the attacks and forced conversions there. This is not to say that issues of religious identity and difference were absent, or that they could be disentangled from the wider conflicts that propelled the revolt, be they class, political, social or economic—conflicts sometimes involving factions that cut across religious boundaries.

Majorca in 1391

In his seminal work, *Forenses y ciudadanos*, the nineteenth-century Majorcan historian and most commonly cited source for the early modern period, José Maria Quadrado, brought out the consequential city-versus-rural divide that marked the island in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which first erupted in the revolt of 1391. Since then, the socioeconomic underpinnings of the anti-Jewish violence in Majorca have only recently come to the fore of scholarly analysis, owing in particular to the excellent contribution of Josep López Bonet.32 His

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30 I shall discuss Majorcan anti-Jewish violence prior to 1391 in Chapter One. See also Antoni Pons *Los judíos del reino de Mallorca durante los siglos XIII y XIV*, Vol. 2, (Palma de Mallorca: M. Font, 1984), esp. p.159; José Maria Quadrado, *Forenses y ciudadanos: historia de las disensiones civiles de Mallorca en el siglo XV* (Palma: Estevan Trias, 1847), 95-96.

31 Going forward I shall avoid the term “pogrom,” as employed by Wolff, because of its anachronistic associations with the modern Ashkenazi Jewry.

play-by-play account of events between 1391 and 1395 includes critical details that have been omitted from other histories, details that make eminently clear that the Majorcan revolt was rooted in a long-standing social conflict over taxation and legislative representation, between the countryside and the city, and between artisans and the citizens or ciutadans, particularly the urban upper and ruling classes. This assessment was later reinforced by Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, who tracked the development of the conflict between the city and rural areas, known as the part forana, during the decade before the revolt. The rebels—country folk who were later joined by artisans—effectively grouped Jews collectively together with the ciutadans, regardless of individual Jews’ social position, but not because of any alliance between the two groups. On the contrary, there was a history of conflict conflict over taxation between the aljama and the municipality. The rebels’ grievances against the Jews, rather, were debt-related, although the Jews’ association with the Crown probably did not help matters.

Against the backdrop of preceding clashes between the ciutat and part forana, the attack on the call of August 4th, which lasted only a few hours as part of a revolt that spanned over two months, appears almost tangential to the wider agrarian and working class uprising against an urban patriciate—admittedly, with immense repercussions. In Majorca, economic motives stand out sharply in comparison to cities such as Valencia where religious, conversionist and anti-Jewish rhetoric permeated the events and subsequent narratives much more explicitly, and where the influence of preceding anti-Jewish violence in Castile is manifest. 


33 Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, "Conflictes populars a Mallorca a la fi del segle XIV," Estudis Baleàrics (IEB) 84/85 (2006): 87-98.

34 The attack on the Valencian Jewish quarter occurred on July 10, 1391. For more on the violence in Valencia see Meyerson, A Jewish Renaissance, Chapter 1, and references on page 22. The attack began shortly after Christian youths shouted threats outside the Jewish quarter and a number of them were trapped inside when the Jews closed its
For at least a decade prior to 1391, the Crown expressed concerns over the possibility of popular unrest in Majorca. These concerns were distinct from those voiced in royal administrative correspondence from the 1370s, advising officials to take precautionary measures in light of the violence against Jews that was occurring at the same time as the droughts and plagues of this period. In November 1381, news of popular uprisings in England, France, Flanders and Italy prompted Pere III to send a letter to the governor of Majorca, Francesc Sagarriga, warning of the potential for revolt among the island’s rural folk or forans, “la gent menuda i grossera” who, he said, were increasingly falling prey to audacious leaders or “procuradors” who sought to undermine the urban patriciate. Pere was clearly aware that social discontent pervaded the lower classes within his own kingdom, and rather than directly addressing the source of the forans’ discontent, he issued various ordinances to reinforce the authority of the ruling class.  

The governance of the island of Majorca as a whole, and specifically the balance of representational power, was a major cause of social conflict. In 1382 the king reduced the number of members of the island’s governing body, the Consell General, from 100 to 90, and in doing so reduced the representation of the rural towns in relation to the city such that the city’s representation was two and a half times greater than that of the towns.  

The account later provided by the jurats “sacralized the anti-Jewish violence,” claiming that the baptismal font had miraculously refilled itself after the conversion of masses of Jews (Meyerson, Jewish Renaissance, 26).


36 The rural towns were represented by 26 members, versus 64 for the city. In 1371, Pere had reduced the number from 200 to 100 (ibid, 88). The Consell General instituted in 1315 by King Sanç was comprised of the Sindicat de Fora which represented the interests of the rural towns outside of the city, or Part Forana, and the City Council. For more on the Sindicat see Antonio Planas Rosselló, El Sindicat de Fora: corporación representativa de las villas de Mallorca (1315-1834), (Palma de Mallorca: Miquel Font, 1995).

37 Pau Cateura Bennasser observed that the use of the term forans (or forenzes in Spanish) to refer to inhabitants of Majorca who lived outside of the city began to appear in the fourteenth century. Other terms which sometimes appeared in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are “homens vilarum,” “agricultores,” or “pageses,” but in the documentation for this thesis the terms fora or forans are used. For further discussion of the forans and class structures in Majorca see Pau Cateura, Sociedad, jeraerquia y poder en la Mallorca medieval (Palma: Fontes Rerum Balearium / Institut d'Estudis Baleàrics, 1984)
sent a delegate, Ramon Mosqueroles, to present their grievances before King Pere, which mostly centered on the fact that they were not represented fairly in the Consell. Their underrepresentation, together with other “abuses” perpetrated by the City, meant that the forans had not been able to play an effective role in the Consell’s decisions—decisions which affected them directly, and in ways that had made their poor economic situation even worse.

In the same year, Barcelona’s artisans brought their dispute with the city’s administration before the king, who approved certain reforms they proposed, aimed at correcting the current “bad government of the city.” Unfortunately for the artisans, King Pere died in January 1387, before reforms could be implemented either in Barcelona or in Majorca. The Majorcan conflict was not addressed by Pere’s successor, King Joan I until 1390. After much correspondence between all the parties involved, and much evasion on the part of the jurats and ciutadans, King Joan changed the makeup of the Consell to allow for greater representation of the part forana vis à vis the ciutat (36:40), and ordered certain other reforms in the interest of the forans. However, the Majorcan historian Álvaro Santamaría questions whether Joan’s reforms were ever put into effect.

In August 1390, two representatives of Majorca’s artisans or menestrals visited the royal court with their own set of grievances against the ciutat. Their complaints focused largely on municipal fiscal mismanagement and taxation, and in this respect closely resembled the grievances advanced by Barcelona’s artisans to the Consell following the revolt there in 1391. King Joan addressed the complaints of Majorca’s menestrals in an ordinance issued on August 31, 1390, but the reforms were not implemented on account of protests by the jurats.

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38 Wolff, “1391 Pogrom,” 5
39 Ferrer i Mallol, “Conflictes populars,” 91.
40 For a discussion of the demands of Barcelona’s artisan’s following the 1391 violence see Wolff, “1391 Pogrom,” 12.
Ironically, in September 1390—around the same time that the king was hearing the grievances of Majorca’s menestrals and forans concerning the unjust practices and taxation imposed by the jurats—the jurats agreed to loan him 11,500 florins that would require them to impose even more taxes on the island’s inhabitants, in addition to raising the city’s public debt by selling more censals. The jurats would first pay 8,500 and then 3,000 florins to Joan’s chief creditor in this period, the Saragossan merchant Berenguer de Cortilles, who had already supplied the king with the funds. In order to come up with the annuity payments for the censals (which the municipality sold to raise the money to pay Berenguer), the jurats rented Majorca’s mint to Cortilles. This was only one of many transactions, and a fraction of the revenues, that constituted a series of complex fiscal relationships between Majorca’s jurats, King Joan and his creditors. The details of this fiscal relationship have been the subject of investigation and analysis of Majorcan historians in recent years.

What is most relevant for the our purposes here is that the jurats imposed even more taxes without the consent of other classes in the Universitat, despite complaints by the forans and menestrals regarding their underrepresentation, unfair taxation and corruption of the jurats—particularly Antoni Castell, the jurat’s notary and chief representative in the fiscal negotiations with the Crown, who unilaterally procured royal authorization to impose further taxes and increase the public debt in exchange for loans to the king. Meanwhile, Castell continued to act as the emissary of the ciutat and jurats in on-and-off negotiations with representatives of the menestrals and forans at the royal court through 1390 and 1391, which were brought to a halt.

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41 López Bonet, “La revolta de 1391,” 112. For a more detailed account of Joan’s debts and their relation to Majorca see idem, “Els deutes del rei Joan i el regne de Mallorca,” El credit i el sistema financier del regne de Mallorca (segles XIV-XV) (Palma, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Consell de Mallorca: 2009), 101-126.
unresolved, when the revolt, or “avalot” as it is called in the language of the correspondence, broke out in Majorca and other cities on the peninsula.\footnote{Ferrer i Mallol, “Conflictos populares,” 92-93.}

Most modern histories base their accounts of the violence in Majorca on the work of José Maria Quadrado, more so the version in Islas Baleares than in his earlier work, Forenses y ciudadanos.\footnote{Pablo Piferrer y José Maria Quadrado, Islas Baleares (Barcelona: Cortezo, 1888). The work seems to have been written earlier than this publication date. Quadrado is always cited as the author in accounts of the avalot. His sources, although not cited, probably include the Majorcan notary Mateu Salzet, a contemporary of the period who is cited by Jaime Villanueva, Viaje Literario, XXI (1851), 224 and Alvaro Campaner y Fuertes, Cronicon Mayoricense, 126-127; see also D. Juan Dameto, D. Vicente Mut and D. Gerónimo Alemany, Historia general del reino de Mallorca, 2nd ed. (Palma : J. Guasp y Pascual, 1840-1841): 319-321. It is Mut who is credited as the author of the text pertaining to 1391.} What is most problematic about all renditions of the revolt is that Quadrado, and other nineteenth-century historians such as Vicente Mut which Majorcan scholars have had to rely on, cite their sources sparingly if at all. In the past two decades Majorcan scholars have fleshed out the narrative with archival sources that seem more “trustworthy” (one must still filter out the usual institutional biases), and that bring the social elements of the revolt into much sharper focus. All accounts agree that the revolt began in the early morning of August 2, 1391, when a crowd of pagesos hailing from various rural towns converged on the camí d’Inca, outside the city of Majorca.\footnote{Lionel Issacs posits six or seven thousand rebels. He may have gotten this number by misreading Salzet, who writes that many converged upon the city during the third attack, on October 2\textsuperscript{nd} (Campaner, Cronicon, 127). Lopez Bonet, and Ferrer i Mallol after him, suggest they attacked the call of Inca the day before (Lopez Bonet, 113; Ferrer i Mallol, 93), but I have not seen archival references to this yet; nor would it make sense, if the attack on the city was rooted fundamentally in a city-rural conflict. They are probably deducing this from the fact that the rebels approached the city from the road that runs between the city and the town of Inca. Indeed, Inca was attacked, but it is not clear exactly when.} When the governor, Francesc Sagarriga, went out to negotiate with them, they attacked and wounded him, and killed the horse of his counselor, Jaume Llobera, who was among his retinue.

Quadrado’s rendition of the revolt in Forenses y ciudadanos adds the following, critical moment in the sequence of events, one that he did not include in Islas Baleares, and that has been omitted from many other histories subsequently, including Baer’s. After the governor and
his cohort retreated, the mob attempted to attack the royal castle of Bellver, where many citizens had taken refuge, and presumably where the governor had escaped to as well. When they could not breach the castle walls, the mob returned to the city. Quadrado suggests that it was one of the threatened citizens who incited them to attack the Jewish quarter, but a royal accounts register states that the city bailiff, Lluís de Bellviure, brought the forans into the city and provoked them to attack the call. Perhaps he did so initially to save his own skin, but he soon took on a leadership role on behalf of the rebels against the ciutat, for which he was sentenced to death on January 26, 1392. It may have been at this point, too, that the menestrals joined the forans in the uprising. After hours of pillaging and murdering in the call through the early morning hours, the rebels proceeded to attack certain houses of the urban patriciate and the Consell building. Lands surrounding the city were also destroyed; according to Quadrado the extent of the damage in the outskirts alone was 50,000 pounds’ worth.

The reports of casualties vary. Quadrado wrote that 300 Jews were killed, based on the account of Mateu Salzet, a Majorcan notary who lived in that period, who also claimed that only three Christians were killed. Another contemporary notary claimed that 300 Christians and 180 Jews were killed. This number may appear distorted if the revolt is considered to be an isolated attack on the Jewish quarter, but it seems more plausible if the attack on the call was only one

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45 According to Lopez Bonet, the governor went to the royal castle on August 11th (113).
46 José María Quadrado, Forenses y ciudadanos : historia de las disensiones civiles de Mallorca en el siglo XV (Palma: Estevan Trias, 1847). Although this work was published earlier than Islas Baleares it cites the latter, perhaps an earlier version not yet published. Antoni Pons published the text and citation referring to Bellviure in Los judíos, vol.2, 315, No. 138.
47 Bellviure had escaped via Sóller to Menorca where, by September, he was caught attempting to flee on a Venetian ship. He was brought to Barcelona where he was tried and was decapitated (Ferrer i Mallol, 94).
48 Quadrado, Forenses, 97 and Pons, Los judíos de Mallorca , vol. 2, 165. Salzet’s account is cited in Campaner’s Cronicon Mayoricense (Palma, 1881): 126-127; Salzet’s notarial registers are housed at the Arxiu Capitular de Mallorca, which contain notes on certain events that took place at the same time. For more on Salzet see Lopez Bonet, “La revolta de 1391,” 122, ff. 8 and 9.
49 Thankfully, Lopez Bonet provides the original source for this number, which has been cited by Pons and other historians without any documentation: ARM RP 2048 (“La revolta de 1391,” 122). The same notary wrote that the attack on the call lasted from 3am until 10am; Salzet wrote that it began at 2am.
component of a lower class, rural uprising against the city, as Quadrado intimated in Forenses y cuidadanos and as Lopez Bonet more decisively asserted. It makes sense that Salzet would present a higher number of Jews murdered in relation to Christians, considering that the revolt, as he related it, was first and foremost an anti-Jewish attack. As a notary in the service of the ciutat, perhaps Salzet had to shape his rendition in such a way that would minimize the ciutadans’ shame or culpability.\(^5\) Whatever the numbers of casualties were, we know that many more Jews fled to North Africa during the following days. As many as 800 Jews were able to seek refuge in the royal castle, but it is not clear whether they entered together with other Christian citizens just prior to the attack on the call, or afterwards. \(^5\)

Interestingly, there are no estimates regarding the total number of converts, although we might deduce from the existing accounts that the only converts were the 800 refugees in the royal castle. None of the contemporary or nineteenth-century narratives mention any Jews converting during the August 4\(^{th}\) attack (and some omit the topic of conversion altogether). This does not mean they did not. In many peninsular cities, Jews did convert under threat of death in 1391, \(^5\) and the same may have occurred in Majorca—but perhaps this was something, from the perspective of mainstream Old Christian society, better to allow to fade from memory. Forced baptism was never officially endorsed by the Church, and publicizing the fact that the conversos did not voluntarily embrace the Faith threatened to delegitimize later anti-converso attitudes, or

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5 As Lopez Bonet cleverly points out in “La revolta de 1391,” 113. However, one still needs to explain the fact that the rest of Salzet’s account does mention subsequent attacks by the forenses on the city in the following two months (Cronicon, 127).

51 According to Pons, Gabriel Llabres came up with the number 800, which Pons finds exaggerated, from a marginal note in a document referring to the Jews who were in the castle at the time (Pons, judios de Mallorca, vol. 2, 166); Baer cites this number as well in History of the Jews, vol. 2, 102. Interestingly, Salzet does not mention the conversions.

52 In Valencia the Jews converted during the revolt, but from the outset the assailants were allegedly calling for their baptism or death (Baer, 100), and they did not escape to a local stronghold. In Barcelona many Jews fled to the royal fortress at the time of the attack on its Jewish quarter, until the rebels broke into the fortress too and forcing them to choose between baptism or death (Baer, 104).
perhaps tarnish the image of the Church. On the other hand, cities such as Valencia were not ashamed to report the mass conversions, and in fact proudly framed it as a miracle. This curious silence regarding the Jews’ conversion in Majorca may point to the secondary, albeit integral, importance of religious identity per se in the attack against the Jews there, at least from the perspective of the Old Christian population. Perhaps it suggests that the forans simply were not as interested in converting Jews as much as in pillaging and destroying their credit notes. Religious difference and anti-Jewish rhetoric gave them permission, as it were, to do so.

The nineteenth-century historian Vicente Mut painted a very different picture of the avalot in the Historia general del reino de Mallorca, which was published before either of Quadrado’s accounts; in fact, Quadrado explicitly rejected Mut’s version in a footnote to his own account in Forenses y ciudadanos. According to Mut, the 1391 violence was directed, from the outset, specifically against Jews. He weaves the motif of a blood libel into his narrative by framing the mob’s fury as vengeance for the death of a Christian youth in the Jewish quarter, which he suggests occurred when a Jew tried to defend himself against the young Christian assailant. In Mut’s account, the governor only enters the picture in the midst of the revolt, attempting to defend the Jews, at which point the crowd moved on to attack the houses of certain Christian officials—precisely because they were perceived to have attempted to protect the Jews. Mut does not reveal his source for this rendition, but it echoes Salzet’s claim that the “gentes forenses venerant seu aplicaverant camino Inchae, causa invadendi seu alias destruxendi callum Judaicum Maj[oricae]...”

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53 Quadrado, Forenses, 97.
54 Mut et al, Historia general del reino de Mallorca, vol. 3, pp.118-120. Mut is usually cited as the author of this work in other Majorcan histories. Lionel Isaacs’ account appears to combine those of Mut and Quadrado but he does not cite his sources (Jews of Majorca, 84).
55 Campaner, Cronicon, 126.
Even Salzet and Mut, in spite of prioritizing the anti-Jewish element of the revolt, acknowledge that it did not come to an end as the rage in the call died down. With the governor trapped in the palace, the city remained without government for a number of days, while the city’s bailiff Lluís de Bellviure rounded up the bailiffs of various rural towns. By August 14, under pressure from the rebels, the jurats abolished all taxes, announcing that no one should pay any taxes including those on wine, corn, milling of wheat, and cloth: “no sia negú que pach res als colectors per sextè de vin, ajuda de carn, molige de blat, talla de draps ne altres qualsevols ajudes e imposicions.” On August 27, up to four thousand armed forans besieged the city walls once again, and remained there for a week, wreaking havoc and stealing victuals from the surrounding lands and vineyards of the resented ciutadans and merchants like Jaume Canyelles. This second uprising may have been in response to the governor executing two leaders of the revolt, although, conversely, it is possible that the executions were carried out in response to the attack; it is impossible to know for sure, since the documentation only indicates that the executions occurred sometime between August 17 and September 2.

On September 30, the seditious mob returned to the city outskirts, prompting the jurats to concede multiple demands of the forans in order to stave them off. The concessions included banning corrupt officials from holding public office, reorganizing public administration to allow for greater representation of forans, confirming the abolition of taxes, nullifying all usurious debts including debts to Jews, issuing moratoria on other debts past due, allowing censals to be

56 Lopez Bonet, “La revolta de 1391,” 113, 122 (footnote 11); Ferrer i Mallol, 94.
57 They also stole meat, or domesticated animals: “robaren totes quantes viandes”; Campaner (Salzet), 127; Lopez Bonet, 114; Quadrado, Islas Baleares, 215.
58 For the document (the same royal accounts referred to above) see Pons, Los judios, vol. 2, p. 315, No. 138. Most modern accounts intimate that the executions took place after and in response to the August 27th attack.
59 Despite the forans’ uprising, just two weeks after the avalot, King Joan had ordered the governor to allow the Jews reclaim their loans form the forans: “One of the things necessary for the resuscitation of the Jews who remain from the attack on the call is they collect their debts, and that they bring the goods they have in Barbary. Many of the letters of debt were lost in the attack; the governor should find a way for the debtors to recognize their debts and
redeemed for their nominal value, and reducing rents owing in consumables by 8% if rendered in cash.\textsuperscript{60} Over the next few days, the governor endeavoured to further secure and protect the city from the inside, ordering the artisans to serve as the city’s defenders. Meanwhile, rumors circulated among the rebels that the delegates who had gone to the royal court to negotiate on their behalf earlier that year had been executed by the king on account of the revolt. Among these delegates was Ramon Mosqueroles. The news of Ramon’s execution, although—unbeknownst to the rebels—false, incited his son Pere Mosqueroles, to organize another attack in order to avenge his father’s death. Thus on October 2, six to seven thousand armed men besieged the royal castle where many \textit{jurats} and their families had taken refuge.\textsuperscript{61} The unanticipated return of Ramon Mosqueroles to the island the following day, October 3, did not motivate the \textit{forans} to retreat. On October 4\textsuperscript{th}, the governor commissioned the vicar general, Pere Solanes, to negotiate with Pere Mosqueroles inside the castle, together with the \textit{forans}’ counselor Arnau Albertí, and Pere Duran, a wool worker (\textit{paraire}) and head of the artisans.\textsuperscript{62} Pere Mosqueroles agreed to retreat if the \textit{jurats} agreed to the reforms or \textit{capitols} called for by the \textit{forans}. He also demanded hostages, specifically the counselor Llobera and his son, Antoni Castell, the notary and infamous lobbyist on behalf of the \textit{ciutadans} at court, but he was told they were not in the castle. The \textit{jurats} did promulgate the fifty-six \textit{capitols} presented by the \textit{forans} as their condition for a truce, which expanded upon the concessions made on September 30\textsuperscript{th}. It is worth noting that the fifty-six items or \textit{capitols} issued on October 4 referred to Jews only in two respects. The first reiterated the previous demand to abolish usurious debts to Jews, as well as to Christians.

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\textsuperscript{60} López Bonet, “La revolta de 1391,” 114-115; Ferrer i Mallol, 94.
\textsuperscript{61} Including the head of the \textit{jurats}, Pere Safortesa (López Bonet, 115; Ferrer i Mallol, 95).
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
The second was new, and demanded that within eight days, all the Jews who had taken refuge in the royal castle convert or be killed.63

The first reference to the Jews’ conversion in Majorca, then, only occurred two months after the violence in the call, on October 4th, when the forans demanded that the Jews be baptized as one of the conditions for a truce with the ciutadans. The prospect of the Jews’ conversion was not raised earlier, at least not according to any of the existing accounts. It is surely no coincidence that the issue of conversion came up precisely when negotiations between the forans and ciutadans were being mediated by the bishop’s representative, the vicar general.64 The Jews agreed to convert upon the jurats’ promise to pay 20,000 pounds of their collective debt. The jurats must have been desperate to convince the Jews to convert in order to appease the volatile forans, but also they must have had in mind that, as Christians, the baptized Jews would be obligated to pay municipal taxes and thereby contribute to paying off the subsidies which the jurats had granted to King Joan shortly before the avalot, whereas typically Jews would have been exempt from most municipal taxation. Later, the jurats never followed through on their promise to pay the Jews’ debt, and denied that the offer was ever made.65 Without the advantage of this foresight, and with little other choice anyway, the Jews in the castle converted sometime on or before October 21. Interestingly, there is no documentation of the event of the Jews’

63 For a summary of the capitols see Lopez Bonet, 116. For the threat of conversion or death see ARM AH 419:11bis, August 29, 1391.

64 Similarly, in Gerona, Jews were given refuge in the nearby castle of Gironella and in September the pobla menuda, comprised mainly of peasants, lay siege on the castle and demanded that the Jews there be converted. According to Baer, “[a]mong the instigators were the monks” (A History of the Jews, vol. 2, 106-7). On the 1391 violence in Girona see Jaume Riera i Sans, “Els avalots del 1391 a Girona,” Jornades d’història dels jueus a Catalunya (Girona: Ajuntament de Girona, 1987).

65 One wonders how soon the conversos realized this, since a letter dated October 25, 1391, states that the creditors of the former aljama already knew that its houses would not suffice to repay the debt owed to them (ARM AH 419: 68 bis). The conversos later petitioned King Joan claiming that after the attack on the call, the jurats promised the unbaptized Jews who had taken refuge in the royal castle that they would pay 20,000 pounds of the aljama’s debt if they converted. King Joan’s response to the conversos’ petition was to order an enquiry into the veracity of both the jurats’ promise and—curiously—the forans’ demand that the Jews convert or be killed (ACA CR 1995: 66v, March 20, 1392).
conversion (Salzet and Mut omit the theme entirely); Quadrado reports it based upon the series of *pregons* issued by the governor beginning on October 21 regarding conversos and their property, calling for conversos to declare whether they would retain their houses in the *call* or move out.\(^{66}\) It is impossible to tell, from the sources available, whether each and every one of the Jews in the castle were baptized, or if some were able to avoid it. In other words, how do we explain the Jews who survived 1391 without converting? Had those who survived as unbaptized Jews been among those who took shelter behind the castle walls for two months, or had they been able to remain alive in the *call* during all that time?

The *forans* retreated with the concession of the *capitols*, which, owing to royal opposition, were never put into effect except for limited moratoria on their debts, and the conversion of Jews. The king could not annul the effect of baptism, but he ordered the governor to annul the *capitols* and the agreements between the *jurats* and *forans* in November 1391. The governor wisely waited until the following February 1392 to promulgate the royal order, once tensions had somewhat subsided.\(^{67}\) Queen Violant subsequently imposed a fine of 120,000 florins on the entire island for the revolt, intending to use those funds to repay the royal debt to Berenguer de Cortilles.\(^{68}\) The fine led the *jurats*, who also had to contend with paying the cost of the revolt from municipal funds, to re-impose numerous taxes and, later that year, force purchases of public censals. However, in July 1392 the royal couple issued a pardon to the entire island for the revolt and attack on the *call* which released its inhabitants from any litigation or punishments stemming from it, but the populace was nevertheless commanded to surrender

\(^{66}\) Many chose to remain. Quadrado published the lists of conversos and their decision whether to remain in the homes in *BSAL* 8: 441 and *ARM AH* 419: 56 bis (October 21, 1391).

\(^{67}\) Lopez Bonet, “*La revolta de 1391,*” 117.

\(^{68}\) For details on royal exactions from the island, taxation, and their relationship to Cortilles see ibid, 117-120. I will also discuss the role of Cortilles in Chapter Four.
goods stolen from the *call*. In the same month, an accord between the king, the vicar general Pere Solanes, and the delegates of the *menetral*, *forans* and *jurats*, still did not free the island’s inhabitants from paying all the taxes which had driven them to revolt in the first place. When the king finally came to visit the island in 1395 (the populace had implored him to do so since the time of the revolt), new taxes were imposed to pay for the cost of his stay. No wonder, then, that frustration and poverty persisted among the rural classes, which erupted in a wide-scale agrarian revolt again in 1450-52. The ensuing chapters shall suggest, moreover, that tensions among the rural classes cast a shadow over the process of the conversos’ and Jews’ recovery over the next two decades, mitigating the extent to which officials could mediate between them.

**Significance of 1391**

The foregoing overview of the 1391 revolt in Majorca reveals that the attack on the Jewish quarter and forced baptisms were not simply about Jewish-Christian relations; they were not an isolated instance of anti-Judaism, nor did they represent the culmination of conversionist pressure and “decline” in the social status of the Jew, even if these historical trends played a role. The violence and conversions in Majorca were inextricably linked to a much broader and pervasive class conflict that both preceded and succeeded them for at least half a century on either end. Upon further reflection, it behooves us to delve more deeply—or differently—into the ways in which Jews and conversos were woven into the fabric of a wider society, particularly the webs of economic and class relationships, and to think about how these relationships were mediated by forces such as the Crown or the Church. Jews and conversos were not separate from the rest of society in a way that could allow them to remain unaffected by the political and social

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movements of mainstream society. On the contrary, Jews and conversos were enmeshed in Christian society and its history. The historian, then, must tease out the critical relationships that tied Jews and conversos to what previously might have been called “external” historical developments and determine the unique ways in which they were affected.

At risk of being overly simplistic—the reality is of course much more nuanced—it was a natural step for the forans’ aggression to be directed against the Jews because there was already a history of hostility, aggression, and religious rhetoric through which to articulate and justify it. For “Jewish Studies” historians, these precedents had everything to do with worsening conditions for Jews in the fourteenth century as a result of ecclesiastical anti-Jewish programs. Majorcan historians have conveyed a different view, one that all too closely echoed medieval Christian anti-Jewish attitudes. Until quite recently, Majorcan scholars virtually unanimously blamed the “plague” of Jewish “usury” for the 1391 attack, attributing the forans’ hostility to their indebtedness to Jews, and in doing so suggested that the Jews were the cause of their own ruin.71 Both approaches are simplistic, but do point to factors that we might admit to be partially, but not entirely, determinant.

Chapter One shall elucidate various aspects of the forans’ hostility against Jews—although we must bear in mind that relations between Jews and forans were not always hostile and that some archival evidence does point to positive relationships. Nevertheless, economic difficulties, exacerbated by taxes imposed by the jurats (in part to pay subsidies to the Crown) did lead the forans to indebted themselves more and more to Jews. For their part, investing liquid assets in high-interest loans made it easier for Majorcan Jews to fulfill their own tax obligations to the Crown. Jewish moneylending had been a necessary component of the rural economy but in

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71 For a critique of the traditional approach to the 1391 violence by Majorcan historians, and particularly the work of Quadrado, see López Bonet “Consideracions sobre l’assalt al call.”
the late fourteenth century, when economic crises meant that debtors could not extricate
themselves from increasing financial burdens, it led to further problems and tensions. One cannot
underestimate, either, the fundamental humiliation that Christian debtors felt in being obligated
to and dependent upon Jews, who were supposed to be their social inferiors. This humiliation
bred resentment and hostility, which found its outlet in the 1391 revolt. Meanwhile,
ecclesiastical anti-Jewish rhetoric available to the populace offered a framework for their
frustrations, blaming Jews for social evils and proclaiming usury as an immoral and destructive
force against Christians. The social, political and economic dynamics described above governed
relationships between forans, jurats, and Jews; after 1391 these dynamics informed relations
with conversos, as well as the latter’s fiscal situation, and in turn (I shall argue) the formation of
their collective identity.

Factors contributing to the Jews’ conversion

In addition to the “external” causes of the 1391 conversions, historians have also
contemplated what factors might have led Spanish Jews to opt for baptism over death, in
contrast, or so it was thought, to earlier anti-Jewish persecutions in Germany and France at the
time of the first crusade. According to the traditional “Jewish Studies” perspective, following
Baer, most of the victims of these attacks, which were principally carried out by crusaders
passing through the Rhine valley in 1096, were murdered or chose suicide over conversion.
However, recently scholars such as David Malkiel have contested this view, suggesting that in

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fact many more Jews apostatized than scholars traditionally believed. It is nevertheless worth reiterating the various arguments for higher rates of conversion among Spanish as opposed to Ashkenazi Jews, which may or may not have been the case. One explanation has to do with differing traditions of Jewish law, or halacha. Ashkenazi rabbinic texts more strictly advocated choosing death over committing idolatry, whereas Sephardic rabbinic authorities, most notably Maimonides (who had lived through Muslim persecutions) prescribed the opposite, since Jews should “live by the law, not die by it.” Yitzhak Baer and Benzion Netanyahu, typically opposed in their views, agreed that the most important factor influencing Spanish Jews to choose conversion in 1391 was the spread of “Averroism,” a philosophy based on Greek rationalism that bred disdain for the commandments and religion in general. Thus deprived of religious conviction, it was the most “logical” thing for Spanish Jews to convert in order to save their lives. Furthermore, Netanyahu points out that Spanish Christians in 1391 were much more interested in converting Jews than the Germans were in 1096, and had bombarded them with missionizing campaigns for a century prior. Factors such as these are only limited components of a much wider picture that remains to be fleshed out. The very different historical contexts, both geographical and temporal, gave rise to very different responses.

Also other conditions contributed to the mass conversions in 1391. Socioeconomic factors, for instance, are just beginning to be explored more carefully. In her article on converts in the Crown of Aragon before 1391, Alexandra Guerson shows that in the decade prior, Jews

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75 Netanyahu expounds upon the differences in Sephardic and Ashkenazi rabbinic law on the issue of conversion in The Marranos of Spain. On Jewish martyrdom in 1096 and 1391 see, Abraham Gross, Struggling with Tradition: Reservations about Active Martyrdom in the Middle Ages (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004); Ram Ben-Shalom, “On Jewish Martyrology in Spain in the Year 1391 (ha-Kana),” Tarbiz, 70 (2001), 227-282 (Hebrew). Norman Roth also touches upon some of these issues in the Afterword to Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).
76 Baer, History of the Jews, 253-259; Netanyahu, Marranos of Spain, 106-108.
were resorting to baptism as a mechanism to cope with debt and other social or economic problems. She finds examples, for instance, of Jews petitioning the Crown, with varying success, to reduce or annul their debts upon conversion. Her observations lead us to consider whether Jewish victims of the 1391 violence may have been more disposed to choosing baptism because they had seen or heard of others opting for conversion as a viable way out of a bind. Not to overstate this point, nor to underplay the real or perceived threat of death, but the fact that some Jewish converts to Christianity before 1391 enjoyed social and economic advantages, despite being ostracized from their former communities, could have made a difference in individual or collective decisions to undergo baptism.

The conversion of the Jews of Majorca illustrates this mindset most poignantly. Recall that when the rebels, besieging the walls of the castle where the Jews had taken shelter, called for their baptism, the jurats offered to pay the Jews’ collective debt if they agreed to convert. Even though the municipality did not make good on its promise, this alleged negotiation is telling. Arguably, the jurats made this offer because they thought it might be convincing, or because conversion in exchange for fiscal benefits was something that had been done before. No doubt, had the Jews not been trapped in the royal castle with a rabble clamoring for their death outside its walls, the promise of debt relief probably would not have enticed them to convert. But in the heat of the revolt, it may have tipped the balance.

To some degree, the Jews’ conversion represented a change in socioeconomic status in addition to a transformation of faith—a change which may have appealed to each party for different reasons. For the Jews, at least in theory, conversion signaled a transformation of their “status” of constant indebtedness, a condition that was largely a consequence of the Crown’s

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excessive taxation, which they would no longer be subject to as Christians. The Jews’ baptism would have appealed to the vicar, who included it as one of the conditions for the rebels’ capitulation, for obvious reasons; presumably he was steeped in the anti-Jewish and conversionist rhetoric of the past two centuries.

To the rebels, however, so many of whom owed money to Jews, the economic implications of conversion would have been most compelling, since it promised to lift their yoke of indebtedness. If the Jews converted, their loans would be usurious and illegal. Even before the Jews’ baptism, the rebels had already demanded that all their debts to Jews be rendered null. Finally, as I have already suggested, the jurats may have believed that the Jews’ conversion would create an additional source of municipal tax revenue. Because Jews already paid taxes to the Crown or in some cases to their communities, often on the same items that cities taxed (such as wine and bread), they traditionally enjoyed exemptions from paying municipal taxes, exemptions that the jurats typically resented and repeatedly contested. All this is to say that on some level, the Jews’ conversion might have been considered fiscally advantageous, albeit for different reasons, to the jurats, the forans and even to the Jews themselves.

Admittedly, one ought not to underplay the persuasiveness of the sword in effectuating the Jews’ baptism, but we ought neither to dismiss the strata of social and economic motives that reverberated during and after 1391. Situating the 1391 conversions and their aftermath in the ambit of fiscal relations has only been done haphazardly, if at all, in previous scholarship. This dissertation shall prioritize fiscal relations as a key determinant in the identity-formation of the first few generations of converts, as a collective, in an unprecedented way.
The debate over converso identity

And so we return to the burning question of converso identity. If Jews converted through force—or even for economic reasons—how could they possibly have undergone a conversion of faith? Early scholars proceeding from what has been called the “Jerusalem School,” such as Yitzhak Baer and his protégé Haim Beinart, argued that conversos remained steadfast in their faith as Jews. Baer, who conceded that in the fifteenth century there existed some assimilated, faithfully Christian conversos, asserted that the majority tried “with all their might to live as Jews,” and that “the children and the grandchildren of apostates who had forsaken Judaism of their own free will and choice were now inclined to retrace their steps.”78 Haim Beinart similarly considered the true identity of conversos to be Jewish, and supported his views through extensive study of Inquisition records.79 In his recent critique of converso historiography, David Graizbord remarked that even recent histories, which correct the overemphasis on Jewish religious affiliation manifested in, but not limited to Beinart’s scholarship, “still…portray conversos as Jewish heroes.”80

Baer and Beinart represent par excellence one side of a polarized debate that essentialized conversos as either Christian or Jewish with little consideration of the possibility that their identities might lay somewhere between either extreme. Benzion Netanyahu spearheaded the opposing camp. Also a student of Baer, he took a dramatically different approach from his teacher in contending that the majority of conversos were “ardent assimilationists” and, at least by the mid-fifteenth century, genuine Christians. In The Marranos of Spain, this thesis is based on his reading of rabbinic sources as progressively portraying

80 Graizbord, Souls in Dispute, 10.
conversos to be willing renegades or even gentiles in the latter fifteenth century, whereas post-1391 writings tend to depict them as oppressed Jews. However, one of the problems with Netanyahu’s conclusion is that even if conversos eventually failed to meet the rabbinic requirements to be considered as Jews according to halachah, this does not mean that the conversos themselves lacked a sense of Jewish identity, or that other Jews did not have a sense of affiliation with them. How we, as scholars, ought to define the “Jewishness” of conversos is a complicated issue. The present study therefore deliberately choses to employ the term “Jewish affiliation” to refer to aspects of converso identity that correlate with the subject’s (or their ancestors’ and relatives’) former Jewish selves.

In *The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth-Century Spain* Netanyahu relied on Spanish and Latin sources to reinforce his former thesis, and argued, moreover, that since most *conversos* were faithful Christians, the Inquisition, in addition to other forms of anti-converso violence, polemics and legislation, was rooted in racial theory and national separatism. In other words, according to Netanyahu, the claim made by Old Christians that conversos were judaizing heretics was false, since the descendants of converts had “no notion whatever of Judaism,” and the racist, scheming inquisitors knew this to be the case; therefore only a minority who believed the rumors about crypto-Jews could have been religiously motivated. Thus, Netanyahu skeptically dismissed the accounts of judaizing present in the Inquisition records that Beinart employed to demonstrate pervasive crypto-Judaism (even though Beinart did acknowledge the institution’s political motives), and dismissed these accounts without ever analyzing the records himself. While the

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evidence does compel Netanyahu to acknowledge the existence of crypto-Jews, he maintains that their numbers were relatively insignificant, and that they only formed a “movement of return” as a result of anti-converso persecution.

Netanyahu’s skepticism is exaggerated, but not unwarranted, whereas Beinart’s approach was not critical enough. Both sides share a Zionist agenda, as Grazibord noted, and treat the conversos as a subject properly belonging to the realm of Jewish history.\(^{82}\) Both sides also share a hyperbolic and essentialist approach. It seems sensible that there would have been some conversos who were “staunchly” Christian and others “piously” Jewish (I employ these adjectives deliberately to mirror certain biases that underscore much of the scholarship)—indeed the sources support this—but so many more conversos would have been somewhere in between. Fortunately, over the past three decades scholars have increasingly recognized the problems with this polarized scheme of converso identity and adopted more nuanced views.

John Edwards was one of the first to pull the discussion of converso identity out of the Jewish-versus-Christian dichotomy.\(^{83}\) He argued that the blasphemies and other insults against Catholicism that punctuate testimonies to the Inquisition were common among Old Christians as well as New Christians, and therefore not necessarily signs of adherence to Judaism, as they had been interpreted both by contemporaries and modern-day historians. Carlos Carrete Parrondo reminded scholars that conversos, as much as they may have felt an attachment to their ancestors’ tradition, were “authentically Castilian.”\(^ {84}\) This is an important point, one which resists the temptation to see the conversos as exclusively Jewish, or as so distinct that they become something altogether other than Spanish (or more appropriately said: Castilian,

\(^{82}\) Graizbord, Souls, 9.
Aragonese, Catalan, Valencian or Majorcan), even if they did, as a group, possess the quality of social “otherness.” It is clear that the daily lives, motivations and behaviours of conversos were in fact quite similar to those of their Old Christian neighbours. At the same time, as former Jews they had, for generations, engaged in certain customs which were later missed, producing a certain “nostalgia for the past” that could be interpreted by Old Christians as a sign of allegiance to Judaism, and consequent rejection of Catholicism. Carrete Parrondo thus situates converso identity in the realm of a shared culture together with Old Christians, as opposed to the specific religious “sub-culture” that distinguished them. Jews and conversos lived within multiple, if overlapping and interconnected cultural spheres, some of which they shared with Old Christians, and some of which the latter considered to be in opposition to them. Carrete Parrondo also called attention to the conversos’ psychological conflict, a theme that would be pursued more rigorously in discussions of converso identity for the Early Modern period, such as in the works of Miriam Bodian and David Graizbord.

Most studies of conversos have focused on latter part of the fifteenth century and later, beginning with the 1449 anti-converso violence and ordinances in Toledo.85 This outbreak was the first in a series of anti-converso riots in Castilian cities and attempts by those cities to impose anti-converso legislation. From this point on, there was a proliferation of anti-converso polemical literature and pro-converso apologetics surrounding a heated debate over the question of the converso’s true religious identity. Ultimately, the Spanish Inquisition was established in order to

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investigate and punish those conversos who were in fact engaged in Jewish practices and thus believed to be polluting the Catholic faith.\textsuperscript{86}

Drawn by the richness of sources dating from the latter fifteenth through eighteenth centuries for Castilian, as well as Portuguese conversos, scholarship has largely neglected the Crown of Aragon and the early fifteenth century. Not enough attention has been given to the fact that the social, economic and political conditions that shaped the societies within Castile and Aragon were distinct enough to generate different “histories” for the \textit{conversos} in each realm. Mark Meyerson has called attention to important differences between the two kingdoms, particularly as a result of differing royal policies between the Castilian and Aragonese dynasties. Differences in Castilian versus Aragonese (or Catalan) approaches to Jews and conversos might come to light by contrasting earlier royal policy with that of King Fernando de Antequera, who initiated the Castilian Trastámara dynasty as rulers of the Crown of Aragon in 1412, a dynasty that would remain in power until 1516. One might ask whether his new policies towards Jews, as manifested in the anti-Jewish legislation and the Disputation of Tortosa, were more “Castilian” in nature—even if he was influenced by the Aragonese Pope Benedict XIII, and Vincent Ferrer, a Valencian. The differences between Castilian and Aragonese royal policies have not been sufficiently explored, particularly not in terms of their repercussions on the \textit{conversos}.\textsuperscript{87} At this point scholarship is at somewhat of an impasse, because any comparison of the different experiences of \textit{conversos} in the two kingdoms—or before and after the introduction of the

\textsuperscript{86} Norman Roth writes that an Inquisition against conversos was almost established in Castile at the behest of Alvaro de Luna competing against powerful converso clans. He convinced King Juan II to propose it to the pope, who agreed, in 1451 but the initiative was dropped with the execution of Alvaro in 1453. In 1478 Pope Sixtus IV wrote to the Catholic monarchs expressing his concern over conversos relapsing to Judaism, commending the king and queen for their request to act against them, and called for the instatement of Inquisitors—although the Crown did not act on this until 1480 (\textit{Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion}, 223).

\textsuperscript{87} Mark Meyerson has discussed some of the differences in royal policy towards the Jews and \textit{conversos}. One example of how \textit{conversos} would have had different experiences in each realm is that almost all the anti-\textit{converso} violence and polemic during the fifteenth century occurs in the kingdom of Castile, not Aragon.
Castilian dynasty in the Crown of Aragon—necessitates more studies of specific converso communities within the Crown of Aragon which have yet to be carried out.\(^88\)

Another issue in the scholarship stems from the historical sources themselves. Even scholars who are able to bring out the nuances embedded in their sources, and who treat converso identity as less fixed, less categorical, and more complex than formerly portrayed, continue to rely heavily on polemical writings and Inquisition records. These histories, perhaps inevitably, tend to absorb the biases of their sources, reiterating binary narratives and bringing the issue of religious practice much closer to the foreground than it may actually have been for the average converso who was equally, if not more, preoccupied by business, family and honour. This becomes evident when the historian turns to other types of sources, such as royal or notarial registers that offer a wider sample of quotidian (and not so quotidian) issues. Converso history would do well to recast the notion of identity in terms of social and cultural affiliations as a corrective to (but not replacement of) the former emphasis on religious belief or practice.

By the mid-fifteenth century, a number of conversos had achieved positions of high social status and wealth, establishing themselves in commercial networks and marrying into

\(^{88}\) There have been some minor studies of conversos in the Crown of Aragon but nothing on the scope of a comprehensive social study which would provide enough information to be able to conduct any substantial analysis. What little work has been done on the fifteenth-century converso community of Majorca (which formed part of the Crown of Aragon during this period) is relatively superficial. Scholarly interest in the Majorcan conversos generally begins with the first records of reconciliados and relajados of the Inquisition there in 1488. Attempts on the part of local Majorcan historians to trace the origins of the more infamous converso families only go as far back as the mid-fifteenth century; however, my own research suggests that many of these genealogies are either not reliable or clearly erroneous, particularly those attempts to establish earlier generations. This type of weakness is common in what little converso history has been written for the fifteenth-century Majorca, which all too often is based on vaguely referred-to documents that cannot be located in the archives. The interest of local scholars in the 17th, 18th and 19th century descendants of conversos reflects the contemporary Majorcan fascination with the Chuetas, the descendants of the converso victims of the last autos-de-fé at the turn of the eighteenth century who to this day have maintained a distinct socio-ethnic, and perhaps cultural, identity—largely as a result of their being ostracized and discriminated against by greater Majorcan society, at least since the seventeenth century and probably earlier. The social, economic and religious characteristics that typified this group for centuries cannot be said to be the same as those found among Jews and conversos at the turn of the fifteenth century. It is clear that important social changes took place within this group—the question is how and when. In order to establish this, one must begin with the transformative events of 1391.
upper class or aristocratic Old Christian families. Similar observations have been made for Majorca, particularly regarding the Pardo family. The extent and specific patterns of intermarriage between conversos and Old Christians has yet to be analyzed properly, but appears to have been more common among the upper classes in which, one might argue, marriage played a greater role in cementing economic and political alliances. The Majorcan evidence is not alone in suggesting that the majority of conversos tended to marry and socialize amongst themselves. Scholars have postulated various explanations for this, chief among which is the anti-converso sentiment evidenced by the 1449 anti-converso violence in Toledo, as well as a self-imposed group cohesion based on common Jewish ancestry and, in many cases, religious belief. That conversos married one another in the first generation following 1391 comes as no surprise given that most of them were raised together, literally as part of a single community, and shared a common culture that governed their interactions with society; most importantly, they were still enmeshed in familial and commercial networks that predated 1391. In Majorca, Enric Porqueres i Gené found conversos still marrying amongst themselves in the 1420s, and contends that they continued to do so through the eighteenth century. Some converso merchant families indeed may have established marriage alliances with Old Christian elites, but this does not controvert the portrait of an endogamous converso community that is conveyed by the records of the

90 Mariano Gual de Torella questioned the converso lineage of the famous Pardo family in Mariano Gual de Torella, "El supuesto origen judío de los Pardos," BSAL 33(1971). 179-193. There is no doubt from my own research and from the work of Maria Dolores Lopez Perez, that Pere Pardo, a Valencian converso who settled in Majorca at the turn of the fifteenth century, was one of the island’s most prominent merchants by the 1420s.
Inquisition from 1488.\textsuperscript{92} Angela Selke’s study of Inquisition trials against Majorcan conversos in the seventeenth century shows that the Jewish affiliation “uncovered” with the first Edicts of Grace persisted amongst a smaller and tight knight community for two centuries. The fifteen family names of the conversos condemned by the Inquisition in 1691, in a final show of force against crypto Jews, determined the group known as \textit{Xuetas} that would be socially ostracized until the mid-twentieth century.\textsuperscript{93}

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This brings us to the point of departure for this dissertation. At the outset, I had hoped to uncover the roots of converso identity from the moment of its inception, if one could posit such a moment, in the wake of 1391. However, I was initially disappointed to discover that the archival material I collected dealt overwhelmingly with economic matters, and did not offer the vivid and detailed descriptions of relationships and encounters, or the subjectivity, that is revealed in the testimonies to the Inquisition or in other judicial records available for later periods, or for other regions. Such sources allow the historian to hear the (muffled) voices of their subject—even if mediated by an Inquisitorial scribe—and lend themselves to contemplating their psychology.

In the end, my cache of documents dealing with fiscal, commercial and other economic matters turned out to be a blessing in disguise. Had I been distracted by the disputes relayed in judicial records, so palatable to the social historian, I would not have been forced to think more carefully about the impact of any and everything fiscal on daily life that is so clear from the sheer

\textsuperscript{92} On the Inquisition in Majorca see Mateu Colom i Palmer, \textit{La Inquisició a Mallorca (1488-1578)}, vol. 6, Biblioteca d’Història dels Països Catalans (Barcelona: Curial, 1992); Lorenzo Pérez, ed. \textit{Inquisición de Mallorca, Reconciliados y relajados, 1488-1691} (Barcelona: M. Perdigó, 1946); Angela S. Selke, \textit{The conversos of Majorca: life and death in a Crypto-Jewish community in XVII century Spain} (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986).

\textsuperscript{93} Major works on the \textit{Xuetas} include: Baruch Braunstein, \textit{The Chuetas of Majorca: Conversos and the Inquisition of Majorca} (New York: Ktav, 1936 and 1972); Francesc Riera Montserrat, \textit{Lluites antixuetes en el segle XVIII} (Palma de Mallorca: Editorial Moll, 1973); Antoni Picazo Muntaner, \textit{Els Xuetes de Mallorca: grups de poder i criptojudaisme al segle xvii} (Palma de Mallorca: El Tall, 2006); Baltasar Porcel, \textit{Los Chuetas Mallorquines: quince siglos de racismo} (Palma de Mallorca: M. Font, 1986)
volume and variety of economic material. Financial transactions, in many if not most instances, signalled relationships that were meaningful to the individuals involved, and numbered among the many influences shaping their identity. Fiscal realities therefore played a critical role in how individuals viewed themselves and were viewed by others, and how they interacted with the world around them.94

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94 On the significance of economic relationships, and particularly relations of credit and debt, see Smail, The Consumption of Justice, Chapter 3: The Pursuit of Debt, On p. 157 Smail suggests credit relations between Christians and Jews were different, perhaps not as significant—but this view is contradicted by the work of scholars such as Mark Meyerson, William Chester Jordan (The French Monarchy and the Jews and articles collected in Ideology and Royal Power in Medieval France: Kingship, Crusades, and the Jews), or Joseph Shatzmiller (Shylock Reconsidered).
Dissertation Purpose

It is clear that there was some sort of Jewish identification among conversos. One important question that is often overlooked, perhaps because it has been taken for granted, is why this identification—be it religious or more broadly ethnic in nature—continued beyond the first generation of Jews who were forcibly converted in the summer of 1391. The question itself highlights a blind spot among scholars who treat the conversos’ “Jewishness” as something intrinsic, something that could not have been affected by external causes and therefore would not require investigation. However, there would have been a number of factors promoting long-term social cohesion and Jewish affiliation among conversos, besides religious conviction, which surely varied individually, such as social inertia or the “nostalgia” that Carrete Parrondo wrote of. Additionally, my own research in Majorca suggests that royal fiscal policy and collective economic exigencies played a much more significant role than scholarship has thus far considered.

For the Jews of medieval Spain, fiscal realities were especially relevant. Jewish communities, or *aljamas*, had a separate fiscal status according to which they paid taxes directly to the king, who constantly pressed them for extra loans and subsidies. They were assessed and taxed separately from the Christian population at much higher rates *per capita*, but in turn received special protections from the king who had an interest in preserving their economic well-being. Jews developed collective and individual survival strategies to mitigate the intense fiscal pressures associated with their status as “royal treasure” – and capitalized on this particular relationship with the king when they could. Taxation and royal policy played a major role in
shaping Jewish communal politics and identity in the Crown of Aragon. My dissertation shows that all this continued to be true for conversos, too, at least for the first generations. King Joan (1387-1396) continued to relate to the conversos of Majorca in the same ways he had dealt with them as Jews, treating them as a single social unit for financial purposes. In doing so, he established a dynamic between conversos and the Crown which continued under King Martí (1396-1410). This dynamic, coupled with other collective fiscal obligations, forced conversos to remain entrenched in the same socioeconomic structures as when they were Jews, thus perpetuating a group identity that was unmistakeably anchored in their Jewish past—and which therefore could promote other aspects of Jewish affiliation.

The first chapter, *Historical Background: the Jews of Majorca, 1229-1391* provides an overview of the Jewish community from the beginning of Christian rule, with an emphasis on certain patterns and difficulties in the Jews’ relationships with Old Christians and with the Crown—particularly relating to taxation and royal policy—which the conversos continued to experience after 1391. The second chapter, *The treasure across the sea: exile, finances and religious identity in the wake of 1391* frames the converso community as the new “royal treasure,” and deals with the problem of converso exile to North Africa, its association with judaizing, and the restrictions that were placed upon conversos during the chaotic months following the *avalot* limiting their mobility and economic transactions. The third chapter, *The unshakeable bonds of debt: fiscal realities, past identities* provides a detailed explanation of the conversos’ fiscal situation, and particularly their collective debt, a by-product of a long-standing fiscal relationship with the Crown. This chapter presents a central thesis of this dissertation, namely that the collective fiscal predicament of the new converts promoted the formation of a converso *community* and thus, eventually, group identity. The fourth chapter, *Vestiges of the

95 Mark Meyerson demonstrates this particularly in *Iberian Frontier Kingdom*. 
former aljama: royal tenacity, royal support, elucidates other aspects of royal policy vis-à-vis conversos that perpetuated the prior dynamic between the Crown and the Jews, one that had an almost feudal character whereby the Crown both exploited and protected its fiscal serfs, in this case the baptized Jews. The fifth chapter, From comunitas to confraternitas: the converso confraternity of Sent Miquel, discusses the creation of the converso confraternity and its surrounding context, after the dust had settled, at the turn of the fifteenth century; here I argue that ultimately the impulses towards group and Jewish affiliation that were promoted or reinforced by fiscal conditions and royal policies coalesced formally in the corporate institution of the confraternity, which essentially recreated the communal administrative, fiscal and welfare institutions of the former aljama, albeit within the framework of a Catholic pious society.

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Sources

The primary sources employed for this study are primarily unpublished archival records in Latin and Catalan from notarial registers housed in the Arxiu del Regne de Mallorca (ARM) and the Arxiu Capitular de Mallorca (ACM); royal administrative correspondence from the Arxiu de la Corona de Aragó (ACA), Cancellería Real. Other series at the ARM which I have consulted include the Lletres Comunes registers, a collation of letters from the governor to rural bailiffs, and Llicències i guiatges, which record licenses issued by the governor.

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Chapter 1

Historical Precedents: The Jews of Majorca, 1229 to 1391

This chapter provides a selective historical background of Majorcan Jewry, with a general emphasis on economic and fiscal conditions as well as royal policies towards Jews, and the ways in which Jews confronted these conditions as a group. Subsequent chapters will show how fundamentally, the way the Crown dealt with the newly converted Jews perpetuated the same dynamics in the relationship that existed between the Crown and the Jewish community before 1391. The temporal scope of this chapter is from the beginning of Christian rule in 1229 until 1391, but the main focus is on fourteenth-century developments.

The present chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section shall focus on general characteristics of the relationship between the Crown and the Jews with regard to (a) property and residence rights; and (b) anti-Judaism and the late medieval missionizing movement. Both subjects deal with the Crown’s mediation of the Jews’ deteriorating social status in the fourteenth century. The second section shall focus on issues more properly economic, namely (a) taxation and fiscal obligations to the Crown; (b) economic activities such as trade and moneylending; and (c) demographic considerations. While these economic themes pervade the entire dissertation, understanding royal taxation of Jews is critical to analyzing the fiscal predicament of conversos after 1391. Since this is a lengthy chapter, I shall provide a short overview of the topics below, before fleshing out these themes in greater detail.

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Overview of Historical Precedents

Majorcan Jews enjoyed the greatest privileges and independence under King Jaume I, who conquered the island in 1229. The decrease in their status under subsequent monarchs is
noticeable, for example, in their relationship to real estate and their rights of residence, which by the fourteenth century had become more restricted and subject to royal control. The relevance of property rights for conversos becomes especially clear in Chapter Four, which discusses King Joan’s efforts, after 1391, to acquire whatever Jewish or converso property he could claim as his own. The king’s behaviour was not exactly “new”; no doubt, he was following precedents set by previous rulers who treated Jewish property as their own to confiscate when they needed money, often under flimsy pretexts. Moreover, the disputes over real estate between the aljama and Christian institutions that arose at the turn of the fourteenth century with the establishment of the new, walled quarter, or call, in which Jews were compelled to reside, reflect a competition for urban property that continued after 1391, when Christians quickly bought up the vacant houses in the Jewish quarter and its walls were removed.

The anti-Jewish attitudes that were voiced by the Christian parties in these disputes, along with ideas that Jews should be segregated from Christians and their rights circumscribed, were informed by the missionizing movement that was introduced in the Crown of Aragon in the later thirteenth century and spearheaded by the preaching orders. This movement won enthusiastic popular support in Majorca and elsewhere, as is evident, to name one example, in the small crowds accompanying clerics on their preaching and other conversionist incursions into the call. Contemporaneously, fears that Jews sought to undermine Christianity or harm Christians were concentrated on the figure of the moneylender, especially in the minds of rural folk. As economic conditions worsened with the progression of the fourteenth century, anti-Jewish anxieties blended increasingly with the hostility of poor rural debtors against their Jewish creditors. This hostility manifested itself in relatively contained episodes of violence, until running completely unchecked in the summer of 1391.
By far the most salient component of the Jews’ relationship with the king was fiscal, given his incessant financial demands. A key principle that governed relations between the king and “his” Jews was the notion of the Jews as royal treasure. The Crown benefited from their ordinary tax revenues and could demand extraordinary subsidies; in Majorca, the king also maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the Jews, such that he could offer protections in exchange for their fiscal “vassalage” that included, but were far from limited to, municipal tax exemptions. The aljama administration faced many obstacles in its constant task of tax collection; some Jews employed strategies to avoid paying them, while the funds of others were tied up in loans to debtors who had their own tactics to evade repayment. Royal fiscal demands through the fourteenth century left the Majorcan aljama with the burden of a large corporate debt with which the conversos later had to contend.

On the whole, the social and economic life of Majorca’s Jews, as well as their relationship to the king, bore close parallels to the peninsular communities. By virtue of the island’s unique circumstances, however, the Majorcan aljama did have singular aspects which distinguished its relationship with the Crown. This singularity was tied to the Jews’ commercial expertise, particularly in terms of their networks and access to Maghrebi markets, as well as their diplomatic potential, whether commercial or political. The Crown valued and attempted to preserve these attributes—attributes which were reflective of Majorca’s strategic and commercial importance in the medieval Mediterranean as a whole.

At the end of this chapter I have included a short discussion of demography. Before the avalot, there was a substantial presence of Jews outside the limits of the ciutat, in rural areas of the island. Their relations with, and presence among, the forans (rural folk) are an important consideration given that the latter precipitated the 1391 revolt. Moreover, it is useful to have a
notion of the number of Jews on the island, at least in order to assess the size and influence of the community; it would be even more useful if, in the future, I or another scholar would be able to approximate the numbers of conversos in the fifteenth century.

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When Jaume I conquered the City of Majorca on December 30, 1229, 1 he encountered a vibrant Jewish community living in the castle or Almudaina precinct. 2 The nineteenth-century historian of Iberian Jews, Amador de los Ríos, offers a telling, if factually questionable, anecdote that captures the early dynamic between the Catalan king and local Jews. When Jaume’s armies—having just broken through the city gate—were approached by a crowd of Jewish women, children and elders begging for mercy, the king responded with “evangelical piety,” placing their persons and their goods under royal protection. 3 The Majorcan Jews thus found themselves in the same position as the majority of peninsular aljamas that were also under royal jurisdiction. These aljamas depended upon the monarchy to ensure their physical safety and promote their commercial interests. The monarchy also granted them a degree of legal

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1 Ricard Soto i Company dates the siege of Madina Mayurqa from October 1229 to January 1st, 1230. Although the three-month siege of the city ended with its conquest (with the help of a coalition of crusading armies), the conquest of the island was not complete until the surrender of Muslim inhabitants who had fled to the mountains, around 1232. See Ricard Soto Company, ed., Còdex Català del Llibre del Repartiment de Mallorca (Palma de Mallorca: Conselleria d'Educació i Cultura del Govern Balear, 1984), 7.

2 Antoni Pons cites Amador de los Ríos in claiming that the preconquest community numbered between 350 and 400 individuals. Unfortunately, no comprehensive historical studies exist regarding the community which lived under Muslim rule, before the conquest. According to Lionel Issacs, the seventeenth-century Majorcan historian Vicenç Mut (Historia general del reino de Mallorca) posited the origins of this community back to the time of the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem towards the end of the first century. This is not an unlikely assumption, since the Romans had established a presence in Majorca at the time, and after the conquest of Jerusalem, Jewish exiles settled throughout the Roman Empire. See Lionel Issacs, The Jews of Majorca (London: Methuen, 1936), 14.

3 Isaacs, The Jews of Majorca, 16. Although Issacs does not cite his source, it is clearly Amador de los Ríos, whom he paraphrases very closely (José Amador de los Ríos, Historia social, política y religiosa de los judíos de España y Portugal, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Madrid: Ediciones Turner, 1984; 1st edition published in 1960), 397-98.). The latter does not cite a source either, and this account is not told by the chronicles of Jaume I, Desclot or Muntaner. Nor does David Abulafia cite a source where he writes that the Jews of the city “welcomed” Jaume I “probably out of impatience at the ungenerous attitude of the Almohads to non-Muslims.” This seems like a different interpretation of Amador de los Ríos (Abulafia, A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca, 78.). Ricard Soto confirms that Jews encountered difficulties under Almohad rule (“Algunes consideracions,” 19).
autonomy, as well as their own social and fiscal administration, separate from Christian society. In return, the kings expected to receive the financial support they demanded from what they considered their “royal treasure.” As Jaume’s armies were about to massacre or enslave the inhabitants of Madina Mayurqa, the king understood that the local Jews who approached him would be a reliable source of revenue, and could maintain the coveted commercial links which Majorca possessed with North Africa, albeit in the service of the Crown of Aragon. They would also prove useful as a result of their linguistic and cultural ties to the preceding Muslim regime. Moreover, unlike the rest of the island’s inhabitants, the Jews’ loyalties did not necessarily lie with their Muslim rulers, but with whomever could offer them protection and guarantee their religious freedom and limited judicial autonomy.

After the conquest, King Jaume I encouraged Jewish immigration from other parts of the kingdom and from North Africa to help foster this trade-centered community. Whereas the pre-conquest Jews were valued for their existing access to Maghriban markets, new Jewish immigrants from the peninsula, Southern France and North Africa brought their own commercial networks that were similarly buttressed by ties of kinship. One way in which Jaume encouraged settlement of foreign Jews in Majorca was by exempting the new aljama from paying taxes until 1263, in addition to other economic and judicial privileges—many of which were not upheld by

4 Given the fine line between commerce and diplomacy, it was common in the thirteenth century for the Crown to use the Jews’ relations with North Africa to further its diplomatic relations, as with Tlemcen. The close relations between Majorcan and North African Jews has been addressed by many scholars. See for example, Yom Tov Assis, "Diplomàtics jueus de la corona catalanoaragonesa en terres musulmanes (1213-1327)," Tamid 1 (1997): 33. It was in the interest of the kingdom’s commercial success that Jaume issued letters of safe-conduct to specific families to settle in his kingdom, such as to the household of Salamon Benammar of Sijilmassa. Sigilmassa was the final city of the western trans-Saharan trade route that brought gold, slaves and other luxury commodities from beyond the desert closer to the Mediterranean ports where European merchants were eager to obtain them. Antonio Pons, Los judíos del reino de mallorca durante los siglos xiii y xiv, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Palma de Mallorca: M. Font, 1984), 203, No. 2.
5 Isaacs pp.17-18
subsequent monarchs. After 1391, King Joan would follow Jaume’s example by offering trade and other privileges to attract Jews and boost the island’s trade.

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6 Compared to later kings, Jaume I displayed the most favourable attitude towards the Jews of Majorca, and employed members of their elite in his administration and as tax collectors. Ricard Soto discusses the role of Jews in royal administration (especially as tax farmers) and in particular the role of the Amocatil (also Almocatil or Mocatil) family, who received land at the time of the conquest from Nuño Sanç, continued to acquire properties and held administrative positions through Jaume’s reign. Jorge Maíz Chacón also refers to this family in “Política, economía y fiscalización de un espacio urbano. El establecimiento de la aljama de los judíos en la Majorca cristiana,” Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie III, Historia Medieval, vol. 17 (2004): 381-397. Soto argues that the role of Majorcan Jews in the royal administration was minimal to begin with, and came to an end with the end of the thirteenth century as a result of the following combination of factors: (1) the political role of Jews decreased with the rise of economic power of Christian groups; (2) the loss of the kingdom’s direct contact with Muslims undermined many of their traditional roles; (3) typically Jewish economic roles were being taken up by Christians; (4) in the kingdom of Majorca, royal revenues were being sold in larger blocks which individual Jews could no longer afford to purchase; they were instead being purchased by groups of Christian nobles and merchants which Jews would likely have not been able to infiltrate; (5) noble and ecclesiastical opposition to Jews in administrative positions Ricard Soto Company refers to the period in which trade with Muslim North Africa was outlawed: “es prohibí als comerciants, tant cristians com jueus, negocias en terra de moros, citant expressament les ciutats d’Argell, Sersell i Bugia.” See “Algunes consideracions sobre el paper dels jueus en la colonització de Mallorca durant el segle xiii,” Sobre jueus i conversos de les Balears (Palma de Mallorca: Leonard Muntaner, 1999), 2; 26-28.

Historians have offered various explanations concerning the better conditions of Spanish Jews in this period, as opposed to the late thirteenth century onwards, not the least of which was the Crown’s costly expansionist endeavours. As we will see shortly, the larger and wealthier the kingdom’s Jewish communities, the more the kings could collect in taxes and subsidies to fund their expeditions. This has been noted by scholars such as Ricard Soto (“Algunes consideracions,” 19). Conditions improved somewhat under Pere III, who also led numerous, expensive military campaigns.
Part One: Royal Policy and Jewish Social Status

Property and residence rights

The deterioration of royal favour toward the Majorcan Jews in the fourteenth century can be seen through the lens of property and residence rights, which become increasingly restricted after Jaume I’s reign. Following the conquest, Jaume granted the Jews extensive privileges and real estate. In a royal charter of July 1231, he granted them urban parcels of land in free allod, together with other lands in rural areas. Within the city, Jaume ceded to the Jews all the houses located in the almudaina district, including workshops and gardens, and a “palace” to use as a synagogue. He also granted them the former Christian merchant enclave or alfondega, an enclosed space located outside of the city, to use as a cemetery. The charter’s rural land grants were reiterated the following year in the Llibre del repartiment de Mallorca, redacted in 1232, which records Jaume’s redistribution of confiscated lands throughout the island and Ciutat to the various parties that aided militarily or otherwise in the conquest. Catalan Jews who were

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7 The same charter listed other privileges such as tax exemptions, the right to slaughter their own meat, and protections for moneylenders and merchants.

8 The king specified that he was not granting to the Jews the “palace” in which he resided, his chapel, and the houses of the clerics who served that chapel (Fontes Rerum Balearium, vol. I (Palma de Mallorca: Biblioteca Bartolomé March, 1977), 83).

9 Contrary to what previous historians have written, the repartiment text of 1232 did not allocate land to Jews within the confines of the city. Antoni Pons states that that Jaume granted the Jews land within the city of Majorca, citing Isaacs’ and Régné’s summaries - not transcriptions - of original documents as his source (Judíos del reino de Mallorca, 17-18). Isaacs, too, cites No.7 of Régné’s collection. In other words, both Isaacs and Pons reiterate Régné’s statement that Jews were allocated land within the city of Majorca in addition to other rural towns: “Jaume Ier...concède à certains Juifs des “alquerias” … d’autres reçoivent des terres à Almudayna...” See Jean Régné, Yom Tov Assis, and Adam Gruzman, eds. History of the Jews in Aragon: Regesta and Documents, 1213-1327 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1978), 3, No.7. Régné bases this assertion on Bofarull’s publication of the Latin text of the repartiment of Mallorca, but not one of the pages which he cites include land allocations to Jews within the city, and no such clause can be found in either the Latin or Catalan text of the repartiment. Régné may have misinterpreted a clause that donates land to the Jews of the almudayna, for example in Montuiri (Bofarull y Mascaró, Repartimientos de los Reinos de Mallorca, Valencia y Cerdeña, 29). It is also possible that he made this claim based on a footnote text he cites from Amador de los Ríos’ Historia (399, n.1), which does not actually state that land within the city was given to Jews in the repartiment, but does state that the king was allocated half of the city including the area of the Almudaina, where the Jews were living, and granted them the right to retain their possessions there: “La Almudaina, al apoderarse don Jaime de Palma, encerraba muy considerable población
involved in the conquest as financiers and translators numbered among the recipients, along with *magnats* who belonged to the ruling aristocracy, military orders, the Bishop of Barcelona, lesser *porcioners* comprised of the lower nobility, and merchants (including French and Italian merchants). The *repartiment* also allocated lands outside of the city to “the Jews” as a corporate body.\(^{11}\)

\[^{10}\text{hebrea, segun queda consignado”}(Amador de los Rios, *Historia de los judíos*, 401). While Amador de los Rios does not provide a source for this claim, it may have been the same document of 1236 cited by Pons in his appendix (202, No.1) which refers to a donation of houses the Jews received from Jaume located in the area of the Almudayna – not the *repartiment*.\]

Pons writes that that in 1230, even before the *repartiment* was redacted, King Jaume granted the Jews ownership of their quarter in the area of the *almudaina*, but the source he cites does not support this conclusion. Pons write that, “[Jaume I] concede taxativamente a los israelitis “castellum videlicit quod vulgo apellatur castrum sive almudaina judeorum contiguum muro ciutatis a parte meridiana pro statica vestra propia ut ibi perpetuo habiteitis”” (Pons, *Los Judíos Del Reino De Mallorca Durante Los Siglos xiii y xiv*, 13-14.). However, the text he cites, Miret i Sans’ summary of the document recording Jaume’s donation to the Templars of the “*castellum videlicit quo vulgo apellatur castrum sive almudaina judeorum...*” does not mention giving any of this property to Jews. The reference to Jews occurs only in the phrase, “*castellum...almudaina judeorum...*” (“the castle which is commonly called ‘of the Jews’”). Here the word “almudaina” refers to a particular, fortified edifice, named after the Jews because of its pre-conquest proximity to (or perhaps possession by) the Jewish community. In other words, the Templars were given possession of a fortification along the wall of the city adjacent to what, and continued to be, part of the Jewish quarter. See Joaquim Miret i Sans, *Itinerari de Jaume I, ”El Conqueridor”* (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1918), 85. Pons does indicate that the *almudaina* was also given to the Templars, and it is not clear where he got the idea that it was also given to the Jews. He attempts to resolve the confusion temporally by suggesting that Jaume was alluding to a future Jewish quarter. He moreover mentions that certain properties belonging to Jews living in Majorca before the conquest were given to other vassals who had aided the king, such as the Templars (*Judios del reino*, vol. 2, 18).-\]

For an example of Jews in royal service see the chronicle of Jaume I: “I then sent thither Don Nuño, with ten of his own retainers on horseback, and a Jew of Saragossa, who knew Arabic, as interpreter; the name of this latter was Don Bahiheh” See *The Chronicle of James I of Aragon*. Translated by John Forster (London: Chapman and Hall, 1883), 150; for other examples see pp. 212, 441, 559, 560, 562, 563. There are many other examples of Jews active in royal service, and of Majorcan Jews in particular, especially in connection to newly conquered lands. See for instance Yitzhak Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1971), Vol. I, 188; Isaacs, *The Jews of Majorca*. 17-18; Bofarull, *Repartimientos* vol. 11; Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca*, 78; Jocelyn Hillgarth also discusses the role of Jewish translators and diplomats in *The Spanish Kingsdoms*. Nunó Sanç, count of Rousillon and uncle to Jaume also granted lands from his allotment to various parties including Jews, of whom Gabriel Cortès i Cortés provides a list. See, *Historia de los judíos Mallorquines y de sus descendientes cristianos* (Palma de Mallorca: Miquel Font, Editor, 1985 & 2000), 40. Similarly, King Jaume granted lands to Jews individually and collectively in Valencia after its conquest (Baer, *History of the Jews I*, 139-41; Régné, *History of the Jews*, 165-166). Curiously, Pons lists *alquerias* (manors) which, it would seem, belonged to Jews before the conquest, and were granted to the Templars and men of Apiera, without citing a source (Pons, *judios del reino de Mallorca*, 17-18). If indeed Jews with estates under Muslim rule were dispossessed of them at the time of conquest, it deserves scholarly attention beyond Pons’ cryptic reference. Jews in King Jaume’s service subsequently employed their linguistic and administrative skills in the conquest of Valencia, as well as negotiating terms after the Muslim revolt there in 1276 (Assis, “Diplomàtics jueus de la corona catalanaaragonesa en terres musulmanes (1213-1327),” 16).

\[^{11}\text{In some instances the grants are specifically to the “Jews of the Almudayna.” possibly distinguishing this group from the island’s Jews as a whole, and referring to those who resided in the city. The term almudaina, derived from}\]
Five years later, in 1236, the aljama mysteriously relinquished its urban properties in the almudaina district to the infante Pere of Portugal, whom Jaume had appointed as royal lieutenant. The reason for this donation is not stated, but must be connected to Jaume’s grant of Majorca and Menorca to the infante Pere as life fiefs in exchange for the county of Urgell upon the death of the latter’s wife, the Countess of Urgell, in September 1231. Two days afterwards, the infante granted a portion of this land to the Dominican order, probably in anticipation of its building a convent in the area. No doubt, the Dominicans had been coveting this property for some time, since Jaume had already granted them land adjacent to it in May 1231, for the purpose of building their convent. Its construction was not complete until the end of the century, however. There is no indication (in published archival references to date) that the Jews living in the almudaina area actually left their homes as a result of the donation to Pere in 1236, as opposed to paying him rents. In any case, the alienation of this property was short-lived; Pere died in 1244 and Jaume restored the area to the Jews in 1250. Through the thirteenth century, the Arabic mudaina, a diminutive form of medina meaning “city” or “citadel,” denoted the fortified royal palace in Islamic Majorca. It was used more generally after the conquest by the Catalans to denote either a fortified building like a castle or citadel, or the larger area adjacent to the royal palace within the city. For instance, the repartiment designates for the king the section of the city referred to as the “almudayna,” which clearly refers to a neighbourhood because the text specifies the number of houses, workshops [and gardens] that pertain to him within it, and differentiates this area from the palacii domini: “Item in Almudayna ista et tot sunt hospitia regis de porta Ferrea scilicet palacii domini versus as portam Cathenarum sunt XXI hospitia.” (Bofarull y Mascaró, Repartimientos de los reinos de Mallorca, Valencia Y Cerdena, 64). Thus “almudaina” could refer to a single fortification, or a neighbourhood containing multiple buildings. The pre-conquest Jewish quarter of Majorca was located adjacent to the royal palace, and both sites were called the almudaina. Hence the Jews dwelling in that quarter were referred to as “judeorum almudaynae”—a term which probably referred to the urban Jews as a whole.

11 David Abulafia, Mediterranean Emporium, 42.
12 Miret i Sans, 205, Régné 9, Pons 16, all cite as their source the royal letter published in Villanueva XXII, 328: “…reddentes ac restituentes vobis placiam quae est ante realulum nostrum Maioric. Ut habeatis eam de cetero vos et vestri.” If the Jews had also regained direct dominion over the land, the letter probably would have specified it. I have not seen evidence explaining how the king regained this land from the infante Pere by this date; the infante Pere lands in Majorca (Soto Company, ed., Còdex català del llibre del repartiment de Mallorca, 22, 35.)
then, the Jewish quarter was situated in the almudaina district, but Jaume did not limit the Jews to residing there exclusively. As the Jewish community expanded, some lived in other, nearby areas of the city as well, such as an area slightly further north known as the call menor, near the Templar fortification where a new call would be established at the turn of the fourteenth century, and southwards near the port and drassanes.15

Existing scholarship does not clearly explain the relationship Majorcan Jews had to the land they possessed within the emphyteutic system at the time, that is to say, whether they had independent control over their landed property or had to pay rents on it.16 In some documents Jews appear to be “direct” or “allodial” lords over their property, without fiscal obligations to a higher landlord, not even to the king. The lands parceled out in the repartiment, for instance, were considered to be held in free allod, with the typical rights of direct dominion; the king died in 1256 and bequeathed all his lands back to the king, but this is after the king had restored the almudaina quarter to the Jews. (See Ricard Soto i Company’s Introduction to his edition of the Codex Catala, 22).

15 That the Jews continued to live not only in the almudaina area, but also in some other parts of the city throughout the thirteenth century is indicated in a letter of 1299 from Jaume II in which he writes that “attendentes quod Judeis ciuitatis Maioricarum qui consueverunt morari et suas domos et habitationes habere intus almudaynam et in aliis locis ciuitatis Maioricarum…” (published in Villanueva, Viage literario 22, 332). This quarter was essentially the same as before the conquest; in terms of modern-day topography, it was located by the street called “Polls” which is now “de la Victoria,” adjacent to the royal castle also known as the Almudaina (Josep Masacré Pasarius, Judíos y descendientes de judíos conver sos de Mallorca (Palma de Mallorca: Gráfica Miramar, 1970), 642; Pons, “Los judíos del reino de Mallorca,” Hispania, 1960 separata num. 63-65 (later published as vol. 1), 15, 63-4).

16 In a typical emphyteutic contract, the primary owner held the perpetual rights of “direct dominion” on a piece of land, but he could grant or sell the long-term or perpetual right of “utile dominion” or usufruct, usually for the price of an annual rent. The utile lord or “emphyteuta” could either use the property himself or rent it out. The direct lord was also referred to as the allodial lord, and land held in free allod or “alou” was free of any seigniorial obligations. In Majorca, the allodial right or “dret d’alou” could refer to the titular rights of the direct lord to collect rents as well as the “fadiga” and “lluisme” (Ubaldó De Casanova y Todolí and Josep Francesc López Bonet, Diccionario de términos históricos del reino de Mallorca (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d’Estudis Baleàrics, 1986), 17).

The emphyteuta had the right to bequeath or sell his (or her) land with the provision that, upon transfer, he pay the direct lord a “lluisme” (laudemium in Latin), namely a percentage of the sale value. In cases of forced appropriation or inheritance the lluisme was customarily waived in Majorca. Varying percentages have been documented for the lluisme, such as 1/6 to 1/5 or 1/50 of the sale price of the land. I have not identified a specific price for Mallorca. The fadiga referred to the right of the direct lord to re-appropriate an estate when the emphyteuta intended to alienate it, usually within a period of 30 days and upon returning of the purchase price. (De Casanova y Todolí and López Bonet, Diccionario, 60, 75; A. M. Alcover and F. de B. Moll, Diccionari Català-Valencià-Balear (Instit d'Estudis Catalans, 2001-2002 <http://dcvb.iecat.net/>).
maintained only the right of political sovereignty. However, that Alfons III was collecting a *lluisme* of 2% from the Jews indicates that, by the end of the thirteenth century, the allodial property rights granted to them in 1231 had changed in the direction of less control. This change may be linked to the transfer of *almudaina* properties to Pere of Portugal and then back to them by Jaume in 1250. When King Jaume restored to the Jews the property in the *almudaina* district, there is no indication whether they had also regained the status of direct dominion over it. The fact that the document does not stipulate free allod in the way the original documents do suggests that it no longer applied. Over the next two centuries, individual Jews certainly acquired and possessed land in free allod, but other records indicate that Jews held property in emphyteusis from the Crown. By 1391, however, Kings Joan and Martí asserted their ultimate right to real estate that had been occupied by Jews as incontestable.

**Establishment of the call nou**

The reign of King Alfons III (1285-1291) marked a juncture after which the rights of Majorcan Jews became more circumscribed than they had been under previous Christian rulers, during the reigns of Jaume I and II. Although this “decline” may not have been apparent in all facets of Jewish life, it is certainly noticeable in royal policies concerning lands that Jews could

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17 Such would have been the entitlement of Jews granted estates in the rural districts of Inca (where a sizeable Jewish community existed throughout the Christian period), Petra, Sineu and Montuiri. These parcels were specifically designated for the urban collective “judeorum Amodayne” (Bofarull y Mascaro, *Repartimientos*, 29).

18 In 1285, Alfons III established the *lluisme* rate at 2% (one-fiftieth) of the value of transactions involving property which the Crown had granted to Jews in Majorca, but exempted them from the obligation of the *fadiga*, which would allow the direct lord to re-appropriate land at any point of ownership transference. (Isaacs, p. 230, No. 27; Regné 1479, p.438). It was likely not a coincidence that the king issued this ruling around the same time he caused many Jews to sell their properties; the *lluisme* revenues from properties pertaining to him could have constituted significant revenue for him. The *Diccionari català-valencià-balear* cites the following example for the use of the term *lluisme*, showing that the rate was still 2% in 1415: “Que done lo cinquantè al senyor per luysme,” doc. a. 1415 (BSAL 11 318) [http://dcvb.iecat.net/].

19 For example, the Ses Portes family held property in free allod (*ACM Protocols Notarials*, 14666, Juan Clavell: May 8, 1393).

20 Jewish property ownership and taxes will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter, and in Chapter Four, with respect to conversos.
own or occupy. The prerogative Alfons, and later Sanç, asserted over Jewish real estate set precedents that Joan would continue to follow vis-à-vis conversos. Once Alfons annexed the kingdom of Majorca to the Crown of Aragon when he took the throne in 1285, he proceeded, as most kings did at the onset of their reign, to issue a number of ordinances regarding Jews.\footnote{When a new king came into power the Jews usually approached him to confirm the previous privileges they had been granted by his predecessor, and perhaps to request new ones. These series of ordinances issued at the beginning of a king’s reign vis-à-vis his kingdom’s Jewish communities (and how they differ from his predecessors’) can be a good marker of his particular attitudes toward them. Régné, History of the Jews, 270, No. 1483. In 1286 the king allowed for a Jewish slaughterhouse within the call, the exclusive right to which he sold to Juceff Coffe. Previously the Jews would slaughter their meat in the Christian abattoir, but the creation of a walled quarter in which Jews were forced to live would have required its own amenities, and mixing with Christians at the slaughterhouse might have undermined the purpose of keeping the two groups separate. Moreover, this way the king would be able to collect a separate tax on Jewish meat; the carnage was instituted in 1309 (Jorge Maíz Chacón, “La fiscalidad indirecta en el seno de la comunidad judía del reino de Mallorca (siglos xiii-xiv),” Congrès d’historia Medieval: Comprar, vendre i pagar al rei (Palma de Mallorca: El Tall Editorial, 2006), 117-127, also <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/maizchacon_fiscalitat.pdf>, 11). Maíz Chacon writes that he could not find much information about this tax, other than it instigated a confrontation between royal and municipal authority; this was probably because the city could collect taxes from Jews slaughtering at Christian slaughterhouses, but not if they were restricted to their own in the call, which was royal jurisdiction. Larry Simon points this out in “Mendicant-Jewish Interaction in Mediterranean Spain,” in Friars and Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Medieval Franciscans, vol. 2, ed. Susan E. Myers, and Steven J. McMichael (Boston: Brill, 2004), 56; see also Régné, History of the Jews, Nos. 433, 1483 and Isaacs, The Jews of Majorca, Nos. 12, 18)\footnote{Isaacs, Jews of Majorca, 31, citing Cronicon Majoricense, 35; For the archival source (from the ARM, Llibre de Rosselló Nou) see Enrique Fajarnés, “Disposiciones de Alfonso III de Aragón sobre los judíos de Mallorca (1288),” BSAL 1899, Vol. 8, No. 226 (January 1899): 6. Jorge Maís Chacón points out that legislation restricting the involvement of Jews in public office (“en la política”) was imposed in Barcelona at this time too. In an effort to secure support in the Kingdom of Majorca, recently annexed by the Crown of Aragon, its king, Alfons, garnered support among the local Christian urban classes, most notably merchants, by limiting Jewish political power in order to open up those positions for Christians. Nevertheless, Jewish merchants remained active and successful in the commercial sphere, such as in Maghreban trade. See “Política, economía y fiscalización de un espacio urbano. El establecimiento de la aljama de los judíos en la Mallorca cristiana,” Espacio, tiempo y forma, serie III, historia medieval 17 (2004), 388.} Among these ordinances was a new edict that all the Jews of the city be living in a single quarter within a period of five years.\footnote{Régné, History of the Jews, 270, No. 1483. In 1286 the king allowed for a Jewish slaughterhouse within the call, the exclusive right to which he sold to Juceff Coffe. Previously the Jews would slaughter their meat in the Christian abattoir, but the creation of a walled quarter in which Jews were forced to live would have required its own amenities, and mixing with Christians at the slaughterhouse might have undermined the purpose of keeping the two groups separate. Moreover, this way the king would be able to collect a separate tax on Jewish meat; the carnage was instituted in 1309 (Jorge Maíz Chacón, “La fiscalidad indirecta en el seno de la comunidad judía del reino de Mallorca (siglos xiii-xiv),” Congrès d’historia Medieval: Comprar, vendre i pagar al rei (Palma de Mallorca: El Tall Editorial, 2006), 117-127, also <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/maizchacon_fiscalitat.pdf>, 11). Maíz Chacon writes that he could not find much information about this tax, other than it instigated a confrontation between royal and municipal authority; this was probably because the city could collect taxes from Jews slaughtering at Christian slaughterhouses, but not if they were restricted to their own in the call, which was royal jurisdiction. Larry Simon points this out in “Mendicant-Jewish Interaction in Mediterranean Spain,” in Friars and Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Medieval Franciscans, vol. 2, ed. Susan E. Myers, and Steven J. McMichael (Boston: Brill, 2004), 56; see also Régné, History of the Jews, Nos. 433, 1483 and Isaacs, The Jews of Majorca, Nos. 12, 18) This went against Jaume I’s privileges of 1269 and 1273 allowing Jews to purchase or rent landed property anywhere within or outside of the city, and to inhabit the houses they bought or leased.\footnote{Régné, History of the Jews, 270, No. 1483. In 1286 the king allowed for a Jewish slaughterhouse within the call, the exclusive right to which he sold to Juceff Coffe. Previously the Jews would slaughter their meat in the Christian abattoir, but the creation of a walled quarter in which Jews were forced to live would have required its own amenities, and mixing with Christians at the slaughterhouse might have undermined the purpose of keeping the two groups separate. Moreover, this way the king would be able to collect a separate tax on Jewish meat; the carnage was instituted in 1309 (Jorge Maíz Chacón, “La fiscalidad indirecta en el seno de la comunidad judía del reino de Mallorca (siglos xiii-xiv),” Congrès d’historia Medieval: Comprar, vendre i pagar al rei (Palma de Mallorca: El Tall Editorial, 2006), 117-127, also <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/maizchacon_fiscalitat.pdf>, 11). 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In 1286 the king allowed for a Jewish slaughterhouse within the call, the exclusive right to which he sold to Juceff Coffe. Previously the Jews would slaughter their meat in the Christian abattoir, but the creation of a walled quarter in which Jews were forced to live would have required its own amenities, and mixing with Christians at the slaughterhouse might have undermined the purpose of keeping the two groups separate. Moreover, this way the king would be able to collect a separate tax on Jewish meat; the carnage was instituted in 1309 (Jorge Maíz Chacón, “La fiscalidad indirecta en el seno de la comunidad judía del reino de Mallorca (siglos xiii-xiv),” Congrès d’historia Medieval: Comprar, vendre i pagar al rei (Palma de Mallorca: El Tall Editorial, 2006), 117-127, also <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/maizchacon_fiscalitat.pdf>, 11). 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In late 1290 King Alfons confirmed the location of the new call along the streets of El Temple and La Calatrava. He instructed the bailiff to force Jews to set up residence in this area, which would be enclosed with gates, and include a synagogue and a communal oven. In the same year, Alfons had already ordered that certain Jews be compelled to live within the precinct of the call, “between the friars minor and the sisters of Santa Clara.” This would remain the area of the Jewish residence until 1435, one notably bounded by Christian religious institutions.

That the aljama paid 12,000 sous for royal authorization to enclose the Jewish quarter raises the question of whether Jews actually desired enclosure (as opposed to Christian advocates of separation), perhaps as a defense against Christian hostility, or whether the king forced them to pay for the project which they themselves did not desire.

Between 1285 and the late 1290s many Jews moved from the almudaina and other parts of the city into the area of the new call, a project which was pursued with new vigour by Jaume

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25 Régné p. 399, Nos. 2267, 2268, 2271. The area was bound by the Franciscan and Clarissan convents on the western side, and on the eastern side by the same Templar compound that was referred to as the “castrum sive almudaina judeorum” when Jaume I granted it to the Templars in 1230, by the Eastern gate of the city. The order of Calatrava arrived in Majorca just after the conquest, having received a donation of land in the city from Nuño Sanç. The order had abandoned the island in less than two decades however, as the sale of all its properties there in 1247 indicates. According to Jaume Sastre i Barceló, Jews started to move into the former houses of Calatrava from late 1283. They also built houses in vacant plots or gardens in that area; for names of individual Jews who purchased houses along with alodial rights there, see Joan Carles Sastre i Barceló, “Que va ser de l'ordre de calatrava a Mallorca? Una aproximació a la trajectòria dels seus béns, segles xiii-xiv,” Randa 23 (1988): 5-10; and “L'acció urbanitzadora del monestir Santa Clara sobre el barri de la Calatrava com a model d'urbanisme medieval,” in El regne de Mallorca a l'època de la dinastia privativa : xvi jornades d'estudis històrics locals: Palma, del 10 al 12 de desembre de 1997, ed. Pau Cateura Bennässer (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d'Estudis Baleàrics, 1998), 349-63. Maís Chacón has published a summary table of documents recording transfers of houses from Jews to Christians between 1285 and 1288 (Maíz Chacón, “Política, economía y fiscalización de un espacio urbano,” 395-397). The documents indicate that Jews were selling their houses in the Almudaina district and purchasing houses near the Templars (see also p. 391).

26 For instance, in November 1290 king Alfons ordered that Maymo Bennono, Çulema Bondia and Ysac Braanam reside in the new call (Régné 396, No. 2252).

27 Among the various repercussions of the 1391 violence was that Christians acquired many of buildings in what was then referred to as the former call, as I will discuss further ahead. Although not all of the owners lived in the houses they owned, the sources point to a demographic change. Nevertheless, when Martí sought to re-establish the aljama, it was to be in the same area of La Calatrava, suggesting that the Jews who remained or immigrated after 1391 lived in the same area as the pre-1391 Jewish quarter.

28 Régné, Nos. 2269, 2270.
II. He sought the bishop’s approval before confirming that the Jews could build a new synagogue and other buildings within the call “alongside and towards” the house of the Templars, which was at that point possessed by the bishop. Developing the call nou was part and parcel of the urban restructuring projects that Jaume undertook upon his return to the Majorcan throne at the end of the century after a period of exile, but the main goal was to separate Jewish from Christian residents in the city. Thus the king ordered his lieutenant, in 1303, to ensure that all Jews living outside the boundaries of the new quarter be forced to relocate their homes within it; many, in fact, were still living in their former enclaves. He allowed Jews to retain their workshops outside of the call as long as they did not sleep there – a concession which King Sanc confirmed in 1320, mentioning specific workshops on the street.

29 In 1299 Jaume II of Majorca confirmed this area as the aljama’s new quarter or “call,” promising that, given the expense and difficulties involved, he would not ask the Jews to move again. Jaume II of Majorca was educated by Ramon de Penyafort and possibly Ramon Lull, who no doubt shaped his affinity for Franciscanism. In 1279 Jaume II was forced to declare himself a vassal of the king of Aragon, and of France with respect to Montpellier. In 1285 Pere of Aragon invaded Majorca; Pere died in 1285 and was succeeded by his son, Alfons III who annexed the kingdom of Majorca from Jaume II shortly after assuming the throne. Alfons died in 1291 and was succeeded by his son, Jaume II of Aragon, who was bound by the treaty of Anagni in 1295 to restore the kingdom to Jaume II of Majorca. The latter returned to the throne in 1298, albeit still as a vassal to the king of Aragon, and began to implement various reforms aimed at promoting royal power and revenues (some of which were reallocated to municipal projects) as well as stimulating the economy. The undertaking to delineate the call might be seen as part of this attempt to reorganize his kingdom more effectively. Bernat i Roca also situates the establishment of the call nou in the context of Jaume II’s urban reforms (54).

30 Pons, judíos del Reino de Mallorca, 213.; Isaacs No. 78; Villanueva XXII, 332. Jews started to move into this area and started to build a synagogue before Jaume confirmed the area as a Jewish quarter; although they likely did so with royal approbation. According to Llabrés, by this time part of the compounds ceded to the Order of the Templars and Calatrava had been abandoned, but I have not seen an explanation as to why; Alan Forey mentions that tensions between the Crown and the Templars became particularly apparent from the time of Jaume II’s accession to the throne in 1291 (Gabriel Llabrés and Fidel Fita, “Privilegios De Los judíos Mallorquines en el Códice Pueyo,” Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 36 (1900): 31.; Alan Forey, The Fall of the Templars in the Crown of Aragon (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), xiii.. It is possible that not only the royal appropriation of Templar properties in Majorca, but also their cessation to the bishop, predated the official proceedings against the order; this would explain why the king included the approval of the bishop in order to grant property in the Templar compound to the Jews (See Maís Chacón, [p., 12 electronic source]).

31 Pons, judíos del Reino de Mallorca, 215, No. 17; 216-217, No.19 also published in BSAL 7:34.
known as the *Bosseria*. This street, where many Jews had workshops outside the precinct of the *call*, is also where conversos eventually settled in the sixteenth century.\(^{32}\)

The foregoing illustrates the Majorcan expression of a concern, throughout the Crown of Aragon, to segregate Jews from Christians in this period, a concern generally instigated by the Church but supported by the Crown and local populations, often even *aljamas* whose members felt safer living behind walls, as I shall discuss later in this chapter. In addition to anti-Jewish attitudes combined with an ecclesiastical fear of pollution of the *Corpus Christianorum* through mixing and miscegenation, there were practical considerations that also drove this trend. In Majorca, one might argue that the convents truly did require more space; needless to say, it would have been rather insulting, even dishonouring, that Jews were essentially blocking the Church from expansion. Another reason for moving the Jewish quarter from its pre-conquest location next to the the *almudaina* may have been the construction of the Dominican convent near the gate “*dels jueus*” in 1296. Unfortunately the new quarter did not offer much respite from meddlesome mendicants either. It was during this time of the move into the new quarter that the Franciscans were busy building their monastery next door. They were not to be so accommodating of their Jewish neighbours.\(^{33}\) Once the *aljama* began to build and make use of a new synagogue in the new quarter, the Franciscans complained that the sounds emanating from it were disturbing their prayer in their newly constructed church of *San Ffrancesch*. After a legal investigation ordered by the king from 1297 to 1298, it was judged that there would not be any

\(^{32}\) Bernat i Roca, 55-56 [cites Llibre del Mostassaf, 257-8]. This street where mostly conversos lived became known as the “*carrer*” by the sixteenth century.

\(^{33}\) It was not uncommon, in various regions, for mendicants to situate their houses close to Jews, which was strategic considering their missionizing priorities in the later thirteenth-century. Larry Simon points out the Dominican convent in Barcelona was also close to the Jewish quarter there in, “Mendicant-Jewish Interaction.” 55. Jeremy Cohen cites Cecil Roth when he writes that “[a]s soon as the Dominicans entered England, they opened a priory in the heart of the Jewish quarter in Oxford” in *The Friars and the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 43.
audible disturbance, and in 1300 Jaume II, despite his concern over the proximity of the two buildings, confirmed the Jews’ right, in perpetuity, to maintain the location of the new synagogue and call.\textsuperscript{34}

In 1308, once again, Jaume II assigned a judge to mediate in the case raised by the rector of the church of Santa Eulalia against the Jews, protesting their right to purchase houses adjacent to the church or its cemetery.\textsuperscript{35} The new call bordered Santa Eulalia on the western side, at the opposite end from the Templar house, and the growing Jewish community probably wanted to purchase houses next to it. The king requested the rector’s compliance in allowing for the

\textsuperscript{34} See royal letter of Jaume II, dated March 18, 1300 (1299 “of the Incarnation” according to Llabrés), published in Villanueva, \textit{Viaje Literario}, XXII, p.332 and Pons, Vol. II, p.213. For an excellent discussion of this case and the physical location of the \textit{judería}, see Simon, “Mendicant-Jewish Interaction.” Simon notes the curious lack of documentation of any relationship between Dominicans and Jews especially considering that the original call, which was located next to and in the area of the \textit{almudaina}, also bordered the Dominican house. In fact the older synagogue, located in a palace granted by Jaume I in the \textit{almudaina}, was also close to the Dominican convent, although Simon suggests that the \textit{almudaina} wall would have insulated against any noise. Gabriel Llompart also published the royal letters pertaining to this case and provides a clear picture (surprisingly, given the tone of other Majorcan scholarship) of the location of the old and new calls (Gabriel Llompart, “Un incidente urbanístico entre iglesia y sinagoga en la ciudad de Mallorca (1298),” \textit{Jornades d’estudis històrics locals de l’institut d’estudis baleàrics xvi} (1998)). Pons (and Pasarius, \textit{Judíos y descendientes}, mostly citing Pons) gives a detailed yet confusing description of the toponomy of the call. Margalida Bernat i Roça’s study is most recent and readable. The main points which Pons makes are as follows: the \textit{sinagoga mayor} or main synagogue which was being built was on the site of what is currently the church of \textit{Montesión}. There was also a synagogue in a smaller quarter called the \textit{“call menor”} (located in the modern area of \textit{Nunyo Sanç}, between the streets of \textit{San Bartolomé} and \textit{Escursach}). The entrance or gate to the \textit{call mayor} was at the “\textit{plaza del call}” a short block away from the churches of Santa Eulalia and of \textit{San Francesch}, where five streets meet: \textit{Sol, Montesión, Pont y Vich, Call}, and \textit{Pere Nadal}. The two main streets of the \textit{call} were \textit{Sol} and \textit{Montesión}, which ran from the main gate to the \textit{plaza del Temple}, where the Templars’ edifice and city gate was located. Another gate to the \textit{call} opened onto the street \textit{Borne de Santa Clara}, which continues from \textit{Montserrat} street, by the convent of \textit{Santa Clara}, also called the \textit{calle mayor} of the \textit{call}. Connected to this was another street called \textit{“Torre d’Amor”} (Pons, “Judíos del reino,” 21, Pasarius, \textit{Judíos y descendientes}, 642).

\textsuperscript{35} Regarding the cemetery, the Latin text reads: “Cum rector sancte Eulalie Majoricarum asserat se habere aliquas questiones et demandas contra judeos nostros civitatis eiisdem super cimiterio et rebus aliis…” (Pons, \textit{Judíos del reino de Mallorca}, 222). Although it is not clearly indicated whether the text is referring to a Jewish or Christian cemetery and precisely what the dispute was about, it was not likely a Jewish one since they tended to be located outside the confines of the city, whereas churches might have cemeteries as part of their land, connected to the chapel. From the context it appears that the dispute may have had to do with land that had been part of the cemetery of Santa Eulalia.
purchase of those houses, and it appears that the parties came to an arrangement, since by 1318 Jews owned houses in this location.  

The administration of the convent of Santa Clara, too, protested against Jews possessing property beyond the walls of the Jewish quarter, in the vicinity of their convent, which bordered the call on the south side. In 1309 the abbess, Blanca de Vilanova, complained to Jaume II that there were Jews who possessed plots of land or gardens near their convent, outside of (albeit adjacent to) the call. Acquiescing to the abbess’ petitions, Jaume ordered that these Jews, too, must live within the call, and could not make use of these properties other than to sell or rent them to Christians. The Jewish defendants later appealed this decision before king Sanç (1311-1324), but to no avail. The abbess petitioned the king again in 1311, this time concerning the Jewish dyers Jucef Quartot and Sahadon, alleging that their work disturbed the nuns’ prayers and, moreover, they “were outside the call.” The following year she succeeded in having the Jewish dyer, Josep Guarrat, forced out of his home and workshop near the convent, also complaining of bad smells; not only were the nuns disturbed by smells emanating from the dyes, 

36 Pons, Judíos del reino de Mallorca, 222-223, No.28; 244-245, No.55. As I will discuss shortly, a royal letter of 1318 dealing with the Jews’ payment of a large fine to the king states that 680 pounds were deducted from the total of 65,000 pounds as per the value of “quaedam hospicia quorundam ex dictis judeis, que sunt iu[ris] capelle sancte Eulalie…”. (The term “iu[ris]” here could mean that the houses legally pertained to the church somehow; alternatively Pons might have interpreted the abbreviation incorrectly, and the word could actually be “iuxta” used with a dative of place. The latter makes more sense if one takes into account the fact that the king appropriated the rights to these houses, and would not have done so if they pertained to the church.)

37 Regarding the anxiety over Jews occupying real estate outside of the call and next to the convent, Margalida Bernat i Roca suggests that even if the Jews did not live there, the nuns were concerned that they would build houses and live more permanently in those spaces. See El call de ciutat de Mallorca a l’entorn de 1350 (Palma de Mallorca: Lleonard Muntaner, 2005), 36. The document regarding the dyers is also published in BSAL 31: 309 (AHM, Litt. Regairum, 1311-1316, fol.45v. July 7 1312). Sastre Barcelo cites a portion of this document – albeit from a different source – in two articles (“L’acció urbanitzadora del monestir Santa Clara,” 362, in Latin; and in Catalan in “Santa Clara de Palma: vida quotidiana en un monestir medieval” (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d’Estudis Baleàrics, 1993), 52). The text in Catalan reads as follows: “això és que quan aquestes jueus a causa de la pèrdua dels amics han de plorar o a causa del goig s’alegren, criden i fan tant de renou que turben les senyores a l’ofici de l’esglesia de l’avantdid monestir fent-ho, i també com siguin seders i els sigui necessari en raó del seu ofici… fer decocció i fer tintes, a les quals posen i mesclen vinagre, […] i moltes altres coses de les quals procediex, salv el favor reial, un gran pudor […] i a la més d’això en les seves festes sonen tambors i aldufs […] per causa de la qual l’ofici diví es perturbat moltes vegades a la dita esglesia…”
but also by the crowds of Jews who gathered there for mourning or for celebrations, “sounding drums and tambourines.”

The king ruled that no other Jew could live in Josep’s house, which he would have to rent or sell to a Christian. In 1315, the convent acquired another adjacent house belonging to another Jewish dyer, Jucef ben Abraffim ben Tectu. This area adjacent to Santa Clara must have been an enclave of Jewish textile workshops.

It was no coincidence that the protests against Jewish neighbours, voiced especially by the abbess of Santa Clara, came at a time when she and her predecessors were striving to consolidate and expand the property of the convent (1306-1329). To promote this goal of expanding the convent, the abbesses evoked the Church view, by now virtually axiomatic, that Jews ought to be segregated within a walled quarter, and called upon the Crown to enforce the new boundaries it had established, delimiting the city space within which Jews could live in such a way that made room for the growing monastic orders to expand. It was the purchase of houses and a garden belonging to the Jews Solimà and Magaluf ben Farroch in 1315 that completed the convent’s appropriation of the former possessions of the order of Calatrava in the city, maintaining direct dominion over all of them even if they rented out some of the houses to other Christians.

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38 “in dicta domo dictus judeus utebatur oficio tintorerie, ex quo provinebat fetor ad ecclesiam monasterii supradicti et ipse judeus cum aliiis ratione subtiarum vel ratione funeris judeorum merientium, faciebant tumultum in dicta domo frequenter, quod erat valde cediosum monasterio anedicto et in eo divinum ofitcium turbabatur...” (Pons, Judíos del reino de Mallorca, 232-33, No.43).
39 Bernat i Roca, El call de ciutat de Mallorca, 37.
40 Bernat i Roca, El call de ciutat de Mallorca, 64.
41 A royal letter from 1320 mentions Jewish producers and vendors of silk living on the Carrer de la Bosseria, outside and significantly north of the Jewish quarter (Bernat i Roca, El call de ciutat de Mallorca, 64).
42 Moreover, in the early part of this expansion, in 1306, the sisters sought counsel of certain Franciscans (the Guardian, his confessor and his procurator). Advice coming from an order that spearheaded anti-Jewish programmes of the thirteenth century may have influenced the sisters’ efforts to keep Jews within the bounds of the call and remove them from the convent’s immediate surroundings, which began in this year with prohibitions against allowing Jews use of their property, even in the form of rental. Sastre further suggests that the Jews had lost a protector with the dissolution of the Templars, who are known to have had close relations with Jewish kabbalists, catographers, and intellectuals (Sastre Barceló, “L’acció urbanitzadora del monestir Santa Clara,” 354-6).
influence in the city. The concern over having Jewish neighbours spilling out of the call also threatened the “spiritual space” or modesty of religious women. After the dissolution of the Templars (1307-8) and disappearance of the Order of Calatrava half a century earlier, there was no Christian “buffer zone” around the area of the new call to deter the potential expansion of the Jewish community. In order to establish such a buffer zone, convent regulations from 1306 state that none of its properties could be rented out to Jews. One of abbess Blanca de Villanova’s goals in demanding that the Crown enforce the limits of the Jewish quarter – in addition to securing property for the convent – was most likely to ensure a Christian demographic in its surrounding area.\(^{44}\)

To say the least, it was common enough for neighbours to irritate one another and bring their squabbles before legal authorities for mediation. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly common in this period for Jews and friars to be at close quarters, a phenomenon which, arguably, tied into the spread of mendicant anti-Jewish activity and missionizing in this period. The repeated instances in which friars or clerics in general contested Jewish assets in the city of Majorca in this period were informed by existing campaigns to keep Jews at arm’s length from Christians, both physically and figuratively, by keeping them contained quite literally behind walls and by undermining their potential to wield any economic or political power over Christians.

It was not only ecclesiastical bodies that employed this anti-Judaism in ways that were economically beneficial. King Sanç, who exhibited a less favourable attitude towards the Majorcan Jews than his predecessor, together with the bishop of Majorca, condemned the entire

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\(^{44}\) Sastre Barceló, *Santa Clara De Palma*, 41, 42, 45, 47; "L’acció urbanitzadora del monestir Santa Clara," 359.
aljama in 1314 for allegedly converting two German Christians to Judaism.\footnote{The only indication as to the reason for this condemnation comes to us from Vicenç Mut, Historia general.} It shall become clear later in this dissertation that, despite the very different contexts, the actions of King Sanç and their repercussions bear a number of close parallels to King Joan’s treatment of conversos, and its impact on their financial situation, after 1391.\footnote{That King Joan I looked to ordinances of King Sanç is clearly shown when, in 1390, he explicitly referred to the latter’s judgement regarding messengers of the Consell General de Mallorca as a precedent to follow in judging a dispute between the rural and city syndicates. See Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Conflictes populars a Mallorca a la fi del segle XIV.” Estudis Balears (IEB) 84/85 (2006): 87-98.} Sanç first punished the Jews, collectively, with the seizure of all their goods, but subsequently settled “graciously” for the payment of 95,000 Majorcan pounds instead. The total cost to the aljama, at the bishop’s order, was 150,000 pounds: 100,000 payable to the Crown, 5,000 to the bishop and the remaining 45,000 for the conversion of their synagogue into the Church of Santa Fe.\footnote{Pons relies on Mut but does not know what his source for this was—in other words he did not find an archival record to support this, other than various references to the “condempnatio” in royal correspondence (see, judíos del reino, 238, No. 50). In his Historia general, Mut posits the date as 1344 instead of 1314 but Pons points out this error. Margalida Bernat i Roca (pp.22) sets the dates of this episode from 1313-1315, and writes that in 1315 the Jews requested a license to establish a place for communal prayer. Mut suggests that the main synagogue was destroyed at this point, although Pons, from his reading of the documents, claims it went through various alterations but did not disappear. Maís Chacón argues that this was a pretext to achieve more control over the aljama’s finances (Maíz Chacón, "La fiscalidad indirecta." <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/maizchacon_fiscalitat.pdf>, 8.}

In 1318 the aljama secretaries presented King Sanç with a partial payment of 65,000 pounds, collected by means of various taxes imposed on the community in response to the condemnation. Part of this payment was comprised of the value of certain houses adjacent to the church of Santa Eulalia (680 pounds), the rights to which would be transferred to the king, and the value of all the interest which Jews...
expected from loans to Christian debtors. The interest on loans was divided into two categories: loans contracted through notaries with formal instruments of debt (4,589 pounds, 4 sous and 6 denari); and loans guaranteed through pawns (859 pounds, 11 sous and 3 denari).\(^{48}\)

As per the bishop’s request, the main synagogue was converted into a church for a short period—a rather imprudent move considering the aforementioned problems with having Jewish residents near churches. Within a decade of its establishment in the call, the church of Santa Fe was moved to another location outside of it, at the petition and expense of the aljama. This did not entail the resurrection of the former synagogue though, since the bishop insisted that the site of the chapel never again be used as a synagogue or by Jews at all, but rather in the service and ownership of Christians only.\(^{49}\) Once Santa Fe had been moved, the king approved the creation of an aperture in the wall in order to build the gate or porta de Santa Clara.\(^{50}\) This required some convincing of the nuns of Santa Clara, who in 1315 had purchased a house of a Jew in that spot, but ultimately they agreed to it.\(^{51}\) The prerogative King Sanç asserted over Jewish property did

\(^{48}\) Pons, judíos del reino, 244-245, No.55. These figures are a useful indicator of the relative value of pawn broking versus direct loans carried out by the Jewish community. Here, straight loans represented over five times the amount of pawn broking. The houses near Santa Eulalia may have been outside the gate of the call. These must be the same houses that the rector did not want inhabited or owned by Jews, which may be why Sanç decided to appropriate them. Pawns would not have been as well documented and therefore easier to hide, such that the true value of pawn-brokling among Jews may have been higher. In this context, the Jewish creditors likely would have sought to declare less than the actual amount they were owed in interest so that they could collect some of it themselves instead of transferring it to collectors for the royal treasury.

\(^{49}\) Jaime Villanueva, Viage literario a las iglesias de España (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1852), XXI, 302-03.

\(^{50}\) Pons, judíos del reino, vol. II, 41-43; 249-250, No. 61(June 7, 1323); 258-259, No.72 (March 2, 1327); 298-230, Nos. 123 (September 4, 1348), 124 (August 6, 1351). The entrance had been created by 1327. As a result of the many inconveniences posed by its location, Sanç conceded, in 1323, that the church of Santa Fe be moved to a plot of land that belonged to “en Cassa,” near the Temple gate, though not within the call. The aljama contributed two thousand pounds to the relocation and building of the new church. The king maintained ownership over the old building in the call, which was the former synagogue. In 1348 King Pere ceded to his creditor Bernat de Vallflor the buildings “in quibus fuit antiquitus singagoga,” where the chapel of Santa Fe had been constructed, and which generated an annual rent of 4 sous. Three years later, Pere wrote that in the entrance to the former chapel there was an “androna” or passage, at the head of which was built a small gate in the wall, in order to allow passage in and out of the call. He writes further that not only had Bernat lived there, but he also rented out part of the plot to certain Jews. The secretaries therefore requested permission to close up that door, and open up another one in the place where the opening was initially located, which the king granted them.

\(^{51}\) Bernat i Roca, El call de ciutat de Mallorca, 37
not stop with the synagogue. In 1319 he donated the Jewish cemetery which lay outside the gate of Porto Pi to the city’s jurats, in order to build a shipyard there.\(^{52}\)

Sanç’s son, Jaume III, assumed the throne in 1324 with a somewhat milder attitude towards the Jews—at least when it came to their property in the call—even if he still made financial demands. In 1331, despite ecclesiastical opposition, Jaume III confirmed the aljama’s right to construct a new building in which they could pray, with the condition that it would be called a “scola” and not be too ornate. By substituting the term “sinagoga” with “scola” in the language of his privilege, Jaume circumvented the bishop’s assertion that, according to the earlier decree issued by Sanç, Jews were prohibited from building a synagogue.\(^{53}\) According to Margalida Bernat i Roca, this “scola” was the sinagoga major at the time of the avalot, and the

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\(^{52}\) Antonio Ortega suggests that Sanç was attempting to curry favour among his subjects while Pere III was threatening to annex the kingdom to the Crown of Aragon. This particular gesture would have been intended to contribute to the kingdom’s burgeoning maritime commerce (not to mention gain support of the jurats). Mid-fourteenth century documents suggest that this area was indeed used as a shipyard, and that there were at least two in use at the time: one in Porto Pi and another by the Llotja (hence the name of the adjacent plaza, Plaça Drassana). A proclamation dating 1401 shows that the area was still remembered as the former Jewish cemetery and also used as a dock: “null hom no degués posar ne descarregar lenya en tota la ribera del Moll, sinó en lo loch antigament apellat `Fossar del jueus,’ e ara es appellada la `plassa de santa Caterina’” (Antoni Pons Pastor, Llibre del Mostassaf de Mallorca (Palma de Mallorca: C.S.I.C. Escuela de Estudios Medievales, 1949), 251, No.114). Today, the Plaça Porta de Santa Catalina is located at the site of the former gate of Portopi. There were two other Jewish cemeteries: one by the gate of Santa Margarita, and a third by the no longer extant gate “del Camp.” See Antonio Ortega Villoslada, “Donació de Sancho I de Mallorca de un antiguo cementerio judío a la ciudad de Mallorca,” Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie III, Historia Medieval 14 (2001). In his Historia de Mallorca, Pons cites documents which he interprets as referring to a Jewish cemetery outside the Porta del Camp, otherwise known as the portal de Santa Fe (Antoni Pons Pastor, Historia de Mallorca: instituciones, cultura y costumbres del reino, siglo xii-xvii (Palma de Mallorca: [s.n.], 1963), 190). Porto Pi may also have been the site of the former Christian alfondega that lay outside the city limits, which Jaume I granted to the Jews in 1231 to use as a cemetery; the alfondega would have been located near the sea, at a port where ships could anchor. Moreover, Porto Pi was where Jaume I first arrived and encamped with his army at the time of conquest; it would have also made sense for the invading army to set up where they had friendly connections and could store necessities, namely at the Christian enclave.

\(^{53}\) Pons Vol. II, No. 88, p.271 (Cf. Bernat i Roca, El call de ciutat de Mallorca, 24). In this letter Jaume III writes that the Jews had been deprived of their old synagogue by his father, king Sanç. He uses the term “scola” here in order to circumvent episcopal allegations that Jews could not legally build a synagogue, given Sanç’s previous ruling: “Nec istud proprie dicitur nove erectio, sed potius antique reparatio et refectio, quam non sinagogam sed scolam aut domum ad orandum permittimus nuncupari. Nec sententia prefata regia potest premisiss obstaculum aliquod generare, cum in eadem sententia memoratus dominus rex…permisist quod, ex quo locum et domum ubi prima sinagoga fuerat confiscabat, alibi, infra civitatem eadem sinagogam decentem habere possent…” In the same letter he states that the aljama could build a scola: “scholam permittatis habere, non tamen excessivam in opibus vel ornatu…” Ultimately Jaume’s letter does not specify or rule out any location for the new house of prayer. Sanç had given the aljama license to create a gate by the former chapel of Santa Fide, and this would have been the porta de Santa Clara which has since closed up along with the street that led to it.
private space which the *aljama* had been using for prayer since 1315 (with royal license) evolved into the *sinagoga nova*.\(^{54}\)

**Anti-Judaism at the turn of the fourteenth century**

The physical and legal definition of Jewish space that we see expressed in the establishment of the *call nou*, and the anxiety surrounding the potential for Jews to spill out of their defined boundaries, are posited by scholars to be expressions of the increasing anti-Judaism that evolved during this period. In his seminal work, *The Friars and the Jews*, Jeremy Cohen argues that the thirteenth century marked a change in the Church’s treatment of Jews to one that was less tolerant, more hostile, and focused more aggressively on eliminating Jews from Christian society through conversion or physical separation.\(^{55}\) These changes in ecclesiastical and, subsequently, popular perceptions of the Jew began in Southern France and Catalonia in the latter part of the thirteenth century. The dissemination of such attitudes in Majorca is evident in the series of royal ordinances restricting Jews beginning under King Alfons. They are also

\(^{54}\) Bernat i Roca, *El call de ciutat de Mallorca*, 22-35. Each of these synagogues continued to be in use until the violence of 1391. Bernat i Roca cites fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth-century sources that locate the *sinagoga nova* on the modern street “del Pelletèria” as formerly called “carrer de la sinagoga nova.” As for the *sinagoga major*, at times she implies that it was re-established in the same area where the *sinagoga vella* and then chapel of *Santa Fe* were located; it is not clear whether Jaume III would have overlooked Sanç’s 1323 decree that acceded to the bishop’s demand that no Jews use the building which housed the original Santa Fe. It is possible that they used an adjacent building. Moreover, one needs to take into account that in 1327 there was deliberation among the communal leaders as to whether the Jews should move their *monederia* to the site where the chapel had been. I have not seen a resolution in the published documents. Bernat i Roca suggests that it did not materialize because of a seniorial rent which the king would have charged them on the new site. Unfortunately, neither she nor other scholars are clear regarding the ultimate fate of the building that housed the synagogue which was converted into the chapel of *Santa Fe*.

\(^{55}\) Jeremy Cohen writes that thirteenth-century emphasis on the idea of a centralized, unified Church “made the climate ripe” for the exclusion of Jews and infidels (*Friars and the Jews*, 254-255, 262), although Robert Chazan contests such possibly exaggerated claims in *Daggers of Faith*. In Cohen’s view, anti-Jewish hostility could be seen as part and parcel of the ideal of a greater Christian social unity (this is suggested in the Fourth Lateran Council canon that Jews and Muslims need to be separated with a badge), one which friars strove to achieve in their attention to the laity, in particular middle or merchant classes. Given the friars’ connections to the merchant classes, their attack on Jews, who played such an important role in the credit and commercial markets (and therefore possibly considered by Christian merchants to be competitors), is not insignificant, although one must exercise caution in making claims of direct and exclusive causation.
evident in a disputation narrative penned by a Genoese Franciscan around the same time, set in Majorca, between a Genoese merchant and a local Jew who ultimately converted to Catholicism as a result of his opponent’s savvy arguments. The merchant’s arguments were so convincing that another Jew requested to convert. The mercantile backdrop of the disputation text, which is essentially an anti-Jewish invective and conversionist handbook, gives it a distinctly Majorcan character. Even though the protagonist is a layman, the disputation nevertheless illustrates the role of Franciscans in educating new converts when it tells of the convert being ushered to the Franciscans to be educated in the Catholic faith. Larry Simon observed that this was in accordance with a constitution of Jaume II regarding the instruction and treatment of Muslim and Jewish converts. The constitution stipulated that the converts should be indoctrinated by the friars, and that they should not suffer as a result of their conversion but rather should “retain their property freely, should enjoy the same status and liberty as other Christians, [and] no one was to criticize their conversions or refer to them as renegades.”

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57 “…duxit eum ad locum Fratrum Minorum et tradidit eum guardiano et fratribus suis, dicens eis: Docete eum in Testamento Novo et in fide catholica…” (Dahan, 268). Larry Simon also points to a very noteworthy comment that Inghetto makes before the Jew converts: “O Iudee, vos nescitis quid dicatis, quoniam, si baptismum accipietis, vocabimini ‘canis filius canis’ tam a Christianis quam a Iudeis, et in pauperitate eritis, et qui hodie vobis dabit oboun, in toto uno anno non dabit alium, et sic multam necessitatem habebitis et forsitan in desperationem cito cadere possis. Et ideo vobis consulo quod stetis sicut iam steistis, quia ut appareat, bene estis quinquagenarius, et notum facio vobis quod minus pene passus erit falsus iudeus quam falsus Christianus” (Simon, “Mendicant-Jewish Interaction,” 65, citing Dahan’s edition, 260).

58 Simon, ibid, 65-66, citing ARM: Llibre d’en Sent-Pere, fol.114, which is also published in Régné, No.2427. The date provided by Régné is “1291-1327”; presumably this is the date of the register, and the entry itself is not dated. This document also stipulates that friars are permitted to dispute with Jews or Muslims and that the latter are obligated to respond. The constitution echoes that issued in 1243 by Jaume I, which protects the goods of converts, prohibits anyone from insulting them, and rules out mass conversions. This ordinance was the first to order Jews and Muslims to attend sermons delivered by Franciscans or Dominicans, as well as the archbishop of Tarragona, and was likely composed under the auspices or at the urging of Ramon de Penyafort.
The Franciscan and Dominican orders were forerunners in the movement to evangelize among Jews.\textsuperscript{59} Throughout the Crown of Aragon as well as the Kingdom of Majorca, Jews were forced to attend the friars’ conversionist sermons as well as the friars’ public, rather theatrical disputations with Jewish scholars.\textsuperscript{60} The success of the friars’ campaigns was owed to support from the Crown, the pope, and their popularity among the Christian laity. From the mid-thirteenth through the fourteenth century, the Crown issued numerous licenses to the Franciscan and Dominican orders, as well as to unaffiliated clerics, to deliver sermons in Jewish quarters or in synagogues, which Jews were compelled to attend.\textsuperscript{61} In the fourteenth century, the individuals

\textsuperscript{59} See Jill Webster, “Conversion and Co-existence: The Franciscan Mission and the Crown of Aragon,” in \textit{Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages} (Vol. II, p. 163-177). According to Webster, the Franciscans actively engaged in preaching to Jews in late fourteenth century Iberia, although Jaume Riera claims that he did not find any licenses issued specifically to Franciscans in that period (Jaume Riera i Sans, “Les llicències reials per predicar als jueus i als sarràins (segles XIII-XIV),” \textit{Calls} 2: 113-143). That is not to say, however, that the individuals who requested licenses to preach among Jews in the fourteenth century were not associated in some way with Franciscans, although thus far I have not been able to establish any links. I am wary of Webster’s contention that the preoccupation with Jews only became significant in the fourteenth century; I think that the specifically Catalan anti-Talmud and missionizing campaigns of the thirteenth century sparked a zeal for converting Jews that spread quickly in that region, and which was more intense and perhaps earlier than elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{60} In order for friars to be able to read the rabbinic literature, there was a movement to learn Hebrew, which should also be understood within the context of their wider programme to learn the languages of the foreigners they wanted to convert. The Majorcan intellectual and mystic Ramon Lull, a Franciscan tertiary, was a great enthusiast of this movement. He learned Arabic and made several trips to North Africa with the (unsuccessful) goal of evangelizing among Muslims. It was at his behest that Jaume II founded the monastery of Miramar on the island in 1276, to house a school for training friars in Arabic and probably Hebrew as well. Jill Webster notes that Miramar was a “short-lived experiment” and “never a part of the Franciscan structure” (“Conversion and Coexistence,”175). However, Lull’s vision of Miramar was part of a larger Catalan movement, particularly among Dominicans to establish \textit{studia linguarum} from the mid-thirteenth century, many of schools of which did not much more than 30 years (Miramar lasted seventeen years). These schools focused primarily on Arabic, with the goal of missionizing in North Africa, Valencia and Majorca. Important proponents of such schools were Ramon de Penyafort and Ramon Martí; it was Martí who especially advocated the study of Hebrew and examination of the Talmud. In the thirteenth century, Majorca had two linguistic schools: one run by the Dominicans in the city (which taught Arabic and Hebrew), and the other by Franciscans at Miramar. On Ramón Lull and related conversionist movements or schools see, Harvey J.Hames, \textit{The Art of Conversion: Christianity and Kabbalah in the Thirteenth Century} (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000); Sebastián Garcías Palou, \textit{El Miramar de Ramón Llull} (Palma de Mallorca: Diputación Provincial de Baleares 1977). The Dominican school in Majorca was one of the first to provide Hebrew instruction, from 1230 (Garcías Palou, 127). Webster notes that King Martí’s nostalgic reference in a letter of 1398 to a previous plan to enlarge Miramar’s capacity, in order to promote the education of friars in the service of conversion of the infidels (“Conversion and Co-existence,”175). Even if Lull’s project never really succeeded, and the Dominican \textit{studia} only lasted about 30 years (Garcías Palou, 131), the impetus among Dominicans and Franciscans to learn foreign tongues and live among infidels in order to convert them was entirely forgotten, and indeed flourished in the sixteenth century with their experiments in the New World.

\textsuperscript{61} Jaume Riera has found that in the thirteenth century, the friars frequently solicited and were the exclusive recipients of such licenses. In fact he could not find archival evidence of any other monastic order evangelizing
preaching to Majorcan Jews, often converts from Judaism, were usually not linked to a specific order and were sometimes laymen. There are documentary references through the 1300s to Jewish and Christian laymen disputing informally. As late as July 1391 the governor issued a ban on Jews and Christians disputing in or around the call of Majorca. By then, the missionizing movement had taken on a strong popular following in Majorca, and had spread beyond the confines of the city to rural communities like Inca, where Jews and Christians likewise engaged in “theological” disputations.

The popular attraction to mendicant missionizing and anti-Jewish polemic did not bode well for the Jews’ physical security. In principle, the Crown supported only peaceful

among Jews in the Crown of Aragon during this period. (Riera i Sans, “licitències reials per predicar,” 116, 119). King Jaume’s statute of 1243 which legislates the possibility of forced attendance of sermons among Jews and Muslims specifies Dominicans and Franciscans but no other order. Interestingly, the friars did not number among the fourteenth century solicitors of individual (versus collective) preaching licenses. That is not to say that the individuals, often converts, who sought licenses to preach to Jews in the kingdom were not linked in some way to Franciscan or Dominican order, but this is not mentioned in the royal documents.

Simon, “Mendicant-Jewish Interaction,” 61. Jaume Riera has found that, in contradistinction to the thirteenth century, fourteenth-century licenses to preach to Jews do not seem to specify Franciscans or friars in particular (Riera i Sans, “licitències reials per predicar,”, 119). I have not seen references to preaching licences for Franciscans in Majorca either, but this does not mean they were not involved in evangelizing, as the disputation of Majorca confirms. Although no concrete evidence has surfaced at this point which would demonstrate that the same links existing between Franciscans and Jews in the thirteenth century continued through to the last decade of the fourteenth, it is likely that some kind of relationship persisted, if only as a continued interest on the part of the friars in converting the Jews, or polemicizing against them in sermons. The lower profile of Franciscans in the fourteenth century may well be tied to what Hillgarth notes as declining popular opinion of friars, who were the brunt of satirical attacks, and as their intellectual vigour weakened (J. N. Hillgarth, The Spanish kingdoms, 1250-1516, 2 vols. Oxford, 1976); it may also explain the curious absence of friars in the archival documentation concerning evangelizing of Jews in this period. This “decline” led to reforms which prevail later on in the fifteenth century. The Jews portrayed in the Disputation of Majorca may have been voicing popular Christian disillusionment with the friars when they mock mendicant preachers for presenting themselves as saintly yet living base lives (Simon, ibid, 62).

At least two Catalan Jewish converts—not associated with a particular order—travelled to Majorca to preach. Pere Serra arrived in Majorca in 1350 with permission to enter the call as well as villages to preach and dispute with Jews (Antoni Pons, “El converso aragonés Nicolau de Gracia, en Mallorca (1361),” Argensola 13 (1953): 45). In 1361, the Aragonese convert Nicolau de Gracia was also in Majorca to deliver sermons to the Jews. Evidently the protest of the aljama secretaries had some effect, since the governor made attendance voluntary (Pons, “El converso aragonés,” 46). Cf. Riera i Sans, “Les llicitències reials,” 123-124; 141-143.

Cohen (in Friars and the Jews) argues that the later fourteenth century was a high point in mendicant anti-Jewish polemic and missionizing, often coupled with campaigns for limiting the influence of Jews over Christians throughout the Crown of Aragon.

In Inca, the sermons of the convert Pere de Grau caused altercations between Jews and Christians there (Mais Chacon, “Actividades economicas,” 344).
evangelization of Jews, while it endorsed forced attendance at sermons and disputations between Jews and clerics in the synagogues of the call. It should come as no surprise that kings faced the problem of hostilities that erupted in this climate. As early as 1302 the king outlawed priests from entering the Majorcan call unless accompanied by the royal lieutenant or bailiff of the city. Preachers brought rowdy bands of Christians with them into the Jewish quarter, which caused tensions to escalate to such a point that the king had to impose further limits: in 1309 Jaume II ruled that clerics could not enter the call to preach without a royal license, nor could they come with more than ten Christian companions at once, who had to be approved by the lieutenant as well. Moreover, they could not enter the call “in order to seek eggs and other things that they do on the vigil of Easter,” carrying baptismal water with them, because it was “dishonest to sprinkle baptismal water in the houses of Jews who do not have faith in it.” These ordinances were issued largely in response to complaints by the aljama of hostilities against its members earlier in that year, when a local priest named Galceran incited a crowd of Christians to attack the Jewish quarter over a rumour that some Jews had murdered a Christian boy and thrown him into a well. Eventually, the Crown had to forbid popular preaching in the Jewish quarter because of its potential to incite violence, particularly during Holy Week.

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68 Document published in BSAL 6: 335-336 with vague citation, “Llibre de Reales Cedulas 1301-1309” – the register is probably the same as above. The priest Galceran claimed to have the dead child’s clothing as evidence. The royal letter which reports of this case refers to similar accusations at this time in Gerona. While the motif of Jews killing Christian children begins in late antiquity, it does not begin in medieval Europe until the twelfth century, and becomes more popular in the thirteenth. However, Pope Gregory X denounced it. On the early development of ritual murder and its significance see Gavin Languir, Toward a Definition of Antisemitism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), esp. "Thomas of Monmouth, Detector of Ritual Murder," 209-36, which first appeared in Speculum, 59:4 (1984): 820-846.
69 In 1359 the governor advised the bailiff of Inca to prevent a group of converts from realizing their plans of preaching to and disputing with the local Jews during Holy Week, since it could spark social unrest (Pons, “judios del reino de Mallorca,” Hispania, 1960 separata num. 63-65 (later published as vol. 1): 352; 552-553, No.46 (for transcription of archival document: Lletres communes, 159-60, fol. 45: April 17, 1359).
Violence against Jews was endemic, if sporadic. It erupted not only out of ritual murder accusations or conversionist fervour, but also as a result of social tensions tied to economic difficulties. Lionel Isaacs argues, in company with other scholars, that the Church, as part of a power struggle with the royal court, raised anti-Jewish sentiment among the populace, stressing the Jews’ alliance with the Crown, or rather the king’s financial dependence on them. Such rhetoric left local royal officials in a bind: if they followed their king’s instructions and protected the Jews, they ran the risk of being assailed together with the Jews and losing control of the people; on the other hand, failing to protect the Jews meant being reprimanded by the king, which could entail hefty fines or worse, not to mention the likelihood of violent outbreaks that could have more serious financial repercussions. That royal letters granting protection and other concessions to Jews typically reiterated the obligation of officials to enforce royal protection may not have been solely formulaic; in this situation, the officials may well have needed reminding.

Evidence of rural tensions supports the hypothesis that, if the royal officials did not always protect the island’s Jews as instructed, it was out of fear for their own safety. In addition to economic burdens resulting from the war with Castile, poor harvests and famine in 1370 and 1374, followed by plague in 1375, made for a volatile situation. Typically, farmers borrowed money from Jews at high interest rates to pay for seed, taxes, or other necessities until after the harvest, when ideally they would be able to repay the loan. Low yields meant inability to repay loans, and therefore increasing resentment against their Jewish creditors who, in principle, would collect the accumulating interest (occasionally creditors would forgive part of the interest). In 1370 King Pere demanded that his officials restore order in the city and protect the Jews from the

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70 Isaacs, Jews of Majorca, 70.
slanderous denouncements and assaults of their debtors. Not only had royal officials ignored the king’s directions, but they were also taking the side of the assailant-debtors and imprisoning Jewish creditors. In 1374 there was another famine and Prince Joan, anticipating popular violence as a result, instructed officials to protect the Jews of the ciutat of Majorca. In 1376 the viceroy took measures to protect the Jews of the island’s rural village of Porreras. While municipal authorities may have managed to curb violence against the Jews, it was more difficult to get impecunious debtors – including the municipality itself – to pay their debts to Jews over the next few years. Debtors used every tactic to avoid payment, especially when they were, as Isaacs put it, “feeling supported by civil as well as ecclesiastical authorities.”

This volatile situation continued and worsened through to 1391 and even afterwards; we shall see that royal officials were at times hesitant to enforce royal “protection” of Jews and conversos when it entailed confrontation with forans.

The rulers of the Crown of Aragon were in a predicament. Indeed, as Catholic monarchs, they supported the Church and its missionizing programmes among Jews. At the same time, the revenue generated by Jewish aljamas represented a significant contribution to the royal patrimony, and their conversion entailed the end of that revenue. Jews were economically valuable to the king as unbaptized Jews, but perhaps not so valuable (as confessional Jews) to the ecclesiastical authorities who sought to convert them. Moreover, considering that municipal councillors were constantly at odds with aljamas over taxation, since Jews paid taxes separately and often exclusively to the king as the royal treasure, they might also have wished the Jews to convert. The Jews’ debtors would have welcomed their conversion, too, especially if it meant that, as baptized Jews—that is, as Christians—they could no longer charge interest to other

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71 Isaacs, The Jews of Majorca, 72; Nos. 184, 194, 195, 202
72 Jaume II, for instance, had strong Franciscan sympathies, and his eldest son, Jaume, joined the order (Larry Simon, “Jaume II, King of Majorca,” in Encyclopedia of Medieval Iberia, 437).
“fellow” Christians. The Crown thus found itself constantly faced with the challenge of negotiating competing interests: safeguarding, in order to exploit, its Jewish *aljamas*, its “treasure,” while at the same time duly setting a pious example by maintaining allegiances with both clerical and secular parties who resented and sought to undermine that very treasure. This conflict of interest stands out especially in the realm of the fiscal relations between the Crown and its *aljamas*. 
Part Two: Economic Activities and Fiscal Obligations

Taxes and Fiscal obligations to the Crown

The Crown received revenue from Jewish aljamas generally in the form of loans, subsidies, fines and taxes. “Ordinary” taxes, which were standardised and paid at regular intervals, tended to amount to less than “extraordinary” fiscal demands, which for the most part took the form of subsidy requests and were made on an ad hoc basis as urgent needs for funds arose.73 Through the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Crown relied heavily on its Jewish “treasure” to fund its expansionist policies, placing intense financial strain on its aljamas.74 At the same time, the kings had to promote the economic interests of Jewish communities to ensure that the well did not run totally dry. Consequently, the king may have had to refrain from pressing for further contributions, and often shielded aljamas from other pressures such as municipal taxes, or from officials who attempted to collect dues on contestable grounds. These doses of royal protection were not always enough to prevent aljamas from going into debt. On the contrary, it became increasingly common for struggling communities to indebt themselves to Christian creditors in order to meet the kings’ constant demands for financial assistance.75 In essence, the Crown treated Jewish communities as a virtual bank account, with a large overdraft, from which it could withdraw and transfer funds when necessary. Kings directed revenues from

73 Cf. Mark Meyerson, "The Economic Life of the Jews of Murviedro in the Fifteenth Century," in In Iberia and Beyond: Hispanic Jews between Cultures, ed. Bernard Dov Cooperman (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1998), 102. There were various kinds of “ordinary” taxes, that is to say, established taxes that were imposed on a regular and more predictable basis, directly or indirectly. Direct taxes were essentially tributary payments, collected directly from members of the community at a given time. Indirect taxes normally took the form of a sales tax on commodities like wine, wheat and clothing, or percentage of the value of particular mercantile transactions.

74 The term “treasure” is used repeatedly in reference to the Jews in the Majorcan royal correspondence. Meyerson discusses the concept of Jews as “serfs of the royal treasury” in Frontier Kingdom esp. Chapter Three, “Fiscal Servitude.”

the *aljama* of Majorca (as with other *aljamas*), and later from conversos, to repay or secure loans, or to pay officials and men in their service who, presumably, were present at some point on the island, such as ship captains travelling to and from Sardinia. Understanding the nature of royal fiscal policy and the concomitant pressures on the Majorcan *aljama* in the decades leading up to the revolt is critical to understanding the royal policies towards conversos after 1391; it is such royal fiscal policies that serve as one of the anchors of this dissertation.

**Ordinary royal taxes**

Until very recently, little study had been carried out on taxation of the Jews in Majorca. Even recent work pales in comparison to the analyses that exist for other parts of the Crown of Aragon, and on the whole, the published information seems to conflict rather than fill in pieces of a coherent picture. One root of this problem is the sources themselves, which are fragmentary just as they are in other areas. Still, the studies available for Jews in other regions of the Crown of Aragon, particularly the work of Yom Tov Assis, offer an outline of the standard ordinary taxes, and provide a framework in which to situate the information available for Majorca.

Since the time of Jaume I the *aljama* had been obligated to pay at least one or more ordinary taxes, which took distinct forms in different periods: there was the annual “*tributum*” sometimes simply called a “*talla,*” or taxes with more specific characteristics such as the *peyta,* *questia,* *morabatí* or *cabeçatge.* Some of these terms were used interchangeably, but could

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77 Recently Jorge Mais Chacon has published very informative material on the fiscal and economic life of Majorcan Jews. See esp. *Los judíos de baleares en la baja edad media. Economía y política* (Netbiblo, La Coruña, 2010).
78 A useful study is Jaume Riera i Sans and Ramon Rosselló i Vaquer, "Deutes fiscals dels jueus de Mallorca (1339)," *Calls* 3 (1988-1989).
79 No historian has compiled a list of all the kinds of taxes which Majorcan Jews paid. In terms of tributary payments, a few early examples are as follows: In 1297 Jaume II reduced the tribute owed to him by the *aljama* of
also refer to very specific kinds of taxes which were imposed in certain years upon both the 
*aljama* and the rest of the island, albeit separately.\(^{80}\) Notwithstanding royal ordinances asserting 
that Jews paid taxes independently from the rest of the population, the *jurats* repeatedly made 
 attempts to include Jews in their collection of taxes, which the latter protested before the royal 
court, usually successfully.\(^{81}\) Commercial taxes, particularly import-export duties, were collected 
by royal officials directly from merchants at the port, in which case Majorcan Jewish and 
Christian merchants were not taxed separately. Throughout the Crown of Aragon, individual 
Jews also paid what Assis refers to as a “property” tax to the royal treasury, based on a 
declaration made every five years and levied through the *aljama*.\(^{82}\) This tax appears to be distinct 
from the king’s allodial right to collect the *lluisme* on land held in emphyteusis from the Crown.

The *monedatge de morabatí* was a head tax of 8 *sous* payable every seven years by 
residents with assets amounting to 10 pounds or more.\(^{83}\) Both Christians and Jews were equally

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\(^{80}\) These terms are sometimes used to signify taxes levied from *all* inhabitants of the island, not just Jews, like the *morabati*. The *morabati* was a tax of 8 *sous* (the equivalent of one *morabati* per household, established by Jaume II and collected every 7 years.

\(^{81}\) For example, in 1288 Alfons III stressed to the jurats of Majorca that they should not tax the Jews in royal or municipal collections since they would be taxed separately (Isaacs No. 52, Régné No. 1915). This type of reprimand was repeated in later reigns.

\(^{82}\) Assis, *Golden Age, 1213-1327*, 178-79. Assis does not list any examples of property taxes for Majorca. His examples begin from the latter thirteenth century (1285 or 1286) and his study end with the first quarter of the fourteenth century. I have not seen any references to a particular property tax collected in Majorca separate from the *lluisme*, but it is probable that if the Crown was collecting this tax from other *aljamas* in the thirteenth century, it was also demanding it from the Majorcan *aljama*. Assis cites examples of tax exemption in the thirteenth century for community buildings or to individuals who had served the royal court. Moreover, he finds that communities paid a “*pro convivo*” tax for residence rights but does not know how often or the rate.

\(^{83}\) The tax was introduced in the Crown of Aragon by Pere I prior to its establishment in the kingdom of Majorca by Jaume II in 1300 (Miralles, *Corpus d'antropònims*, 18; Mais Chacon, “La fiscalidad indirecta,” <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/maizchacon_fiscalitat.pdf> 9). Nobility, priests, minors, slaves, or residents of less than ten years were not required to pay the *monedatge* tax. Those whose patrimony, according to the testimony of two witnesses, amounted to less than ten Majorcan pounds were also exempt. In addition, anyone who could not be located, that is was absent, or had separated from their spouse, or had paid in another jurisdiction, were exempt. Studies which address the *morabati* in Majorca, particularly in the fourteenth century, include: Joan Miralles i Monserrat, *Corpus d'antropònims Mallorquins del segle xiv* (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1997); Bernat i
obligated to pay this tax, although it was administered separately for the \textit{aljama}.\footnote{Roca, \textit{El call}; Onofre Vaquer, "Població i economia a la Mallorca de la primera meitat del segle xiv," in \textit{El Regne de Mallorca a l’època de la dinastia privativa; xvi jornades d’estudis històrics locals}, ed. Pau Cateura Bennaser (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d’Estudis Balears, 1998). Maíz Chacón, "La fiscalidad indirecta en el seno de la comunidad judía del reino de Mallorca (siglos xiii-xiv)."} The \textit{cabeçatge} was an annual tax specific to the Jews of Majorca that combined two taxation methods: (a) a head-tax, namely a set payment per person, which in the case of the \textit{cabeçatge} was 20 \textit{sous}, and (b) a percentage of both “moveable goods” like rents or annuities, and “immoveable goods” such as real estate, in this case one \textit{sous} per \textit{lliura}, or 5\% of the total value of each individual’s assets.\footnote{The \textit{monedatge del call dels jueus} of 1350 is among the few extant tax registers for the Jews of Mallorca. Joan Miralles published these lists in Miralles, \textit{Corpus d’antropònims Mallorquins del segle xiv}. This register has been gleaned by Margalida Bernat i Roca for the information it offers about the \textit{call}’s physical layout (by listing residents according to the blocks they lived on), its demography and the occupations as well as income level of its residents.} Established by Jaume I, it appears to have stopped being collected for a while before it was reinstituted by Jaume III in 1333, when he condemned the Jews of Majorca to a fine of 12 \textit{sous} per \textit{lliura}, or 60\% of their assets. He rationalized this fine by contending that the \textit{aljama} had not paid the \textit{cabeçatge} for many years. Jaume’s pretext appears spurious given that his predecessor had, in fact, exempted the \textit{aljama} from paying the \textit{cabeçatge}.\footnote{Pons, "Los judíos del reino," 371. In “Deutes fiscals,” Jaume Riera notes some of the errors Antoni Pons made with respect to his account of the \textit{cabeçatge} tax, although like most other historians of Majorcan Jews who complain of the difficulties with Pons’ writing, given the paucity of extant sources and Pons’ failure to cite most sources for his book, Riera is nevertheless compelled to rely on other aspects of Pons’ account (84). For a brief definition of the \textit{cabessatge} tax see also J. Llobet, \textit{Les mots de l’impôt dans l’occident méditerranéen}. (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005 <http://www.mailxxi.com/fiscalitat/index.htm>.} An ordinance issued by regent Felip in 1327, after the \textit{aljama} had paid off the fine imposed by King Sanç in 1314 (for allegedly converting two Christians), stipulated that the “\textit{aljama} need not pay to the king any tribute other than that which was customary before the condemnation, that is 165 pounds according to the books of the treasury.”\footnote{The text reads, “…que la dita aljama no dega pagar al senyor rey alter traut sino aquell que por ella era acostumat de pagar ans de la dita condemnation, ço es, cent sexanta sinch liures segons que havem trobat en los libres de la tesaularia…” The original text is cited in: Pons, \textit{Los judíos del reino de Mallorca}, 261-62, No.77; Alvaro Santamaría Arández, "Sobre la aljama de Mallorca: El impuesto "Size del vin juheuesch". 1400-1435," \textit{En la España Medieval I} (1981): 473. Jaume Riera suggests that the \textit{aljama} had not paid the tax since 1328 or even 1315;}
accusations in order to obtain Jewish revenues was not unprecedented: recall the condemnation
and fine of King Sanç in 1315. In Jaume’s defense, it was not unheard of to fine communities for
defaulting on tax payments. Nor was it uncommon for kings to fine aljamas for other kinds of
legal infringements, such as exceeding the legal rate of interest on loans.

Following Jaume’s condemnation, aljama administrators calculated how much each
individual owed, and the king authorized a payment schedule of installments spanning seven and
a half years, such that the total fine would be paid by 1341, during which period they would not
have to pay any other cabeçatge tax. In a sense, Jaume was forcing the aljama to give him an
advance on future taxes. It would have seemed fortunate for the aljama when Pere III abolished
the cabeçatge upon usurping the Majorcan throne in 1343, and reduced the aljama’s entire fiscal
obligation to the customary “tributum” of 165 pounds annually. This concession was deceptive,
however, when one considers the extraordinary demands he would make through his reign. The
new monarch likely intended to allow the Jews a period of recuperation by reducing the total
payments owing to the Crown, as they recovered financially from the blow of Jaume’s fine and
various costs arising from wars with Genoa or the conflict over the Majorcan throne that ensued

the latter case would mean that Felip’s ordinance was issued even though the aljama had not been paid for 13 years
(Riera i Sans and Rosselló i Vaquer, "Deutes fiscals," 86).
Bennässer, "La contribución confesional: musulmanes y judíos en el reino de Mallorca," Acta Historica et
The initial amounts owed by individuals were recorded in an account book which is no longer extant. However, the
records of what remained to be paid by individuals in 1339 are extant and its contents have been published by Jaume
Riera. In that year king Jaume relinquished the rights to these debts to his creditor, a Genoese merchant named Pere
Bossa, after having previously consigned some of them to Bernat de Freixanet, probably to repay another loan or as
compensation for services to the Crown. The 1339 register lists what remained to be paid by whom, after previous
payments to the royal procurators and Bernat de Freixanet had been deducted. It suggests that in 1339, over eight
thousand pounds still remained to be paid (Bernat i Roca, El call, 91.). This list is missing names of certain
individuals possessing status and wealth who appeared on earlier registers of the morabati or in Pons’ sources. Riera
concludes that these names did not appear because they had received exemptions from the king, as per certain
privileges cited in Pons’ history. It is also possible that the missing individuals had already paid their share. One
dispute arose when aljama secretaries attempted to collect, as his share of the fine, 18,000 pounds from Juceff
Faquin, a Jew from Barcelona who had settled on Majorca one and half years before the time the fine was imposed
(Isaacs, 249, No.131).
89 Pons, Los judíos del reino, 279-80, No.98 (June 6, 1343).
between Kings Jaume and Pere (such as taxes and interruptions to trade). King Pere’s more favourable policy towards the Jews in a sense legitimated his demands, within a few years of his accession to the throne, of numerous subsidies and other extraordinary taxes in addition to the regular tribute.  

**Internal taxes and taxation procedures**

In addition to the taxes collected directly for the royal treasury, such as the *monedatge*, *aljama* members were obligated to contribute to communal expenses as well. The methods included a head tax, taxes on consumables, or taxes on economic transactions. Internal taxes would have been directed to pay for the cost of purchasing or repairing communal buildings like a synagogue, for instance. More frequently, however, these taxes were imposed to raise funds for royal subsidies, or to pay back loans taken by the *aljama* to provide the king with immediate cash. In order to have quick access to cash, the secretaries frequently farmed out these taxes,

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90 For example, in 1350 he collected 750 pounds from the *aljama* by virtue of the *questia* (Pons, *Los judíos del reino*, 393.). The *questia* was a kind of seigneurial tax which Catalan kings collected from residents of royal estates, which in the mid-fourteenth century evolved into a kind of tributary tax in certain communities (Llobet, *Les mots de l’impôt*, <http://www.mailxxi.com/fiscalitat/index.htm>). According to Miret i Sans, however, in 1231 Jaume I issued a privilege exempting Majorcans from paying the *questia*; in order to encourage immigration he had also exempted Jewish inhabitants from paying taxes for the first decade after the conquest (Miret i Sans, *Itinerari de Jaume I, "El Conqueridor"*, 91); In 1244 the *aljama* also began to pay the *questia* (or at least this is the first documentation of it), around 3,300 *sous* at the time (Maíz Chacón, "Política, economía y fiscalización," (386) and "La fiscalidad indirecta," <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/maizchacon_fiscalitat.pdf>, 2. Ricard Soto argues that the *questia* was important regular revenue for the kings of Majorca, being much more reliable than agricultural taxes (*Algunes consideracions*, 22). Pons also writes that that the Jews of Majorca were regularly paying 3000 pounds to the royal treasury in 1349. Although this seems like a plausible amount, he does not publish the archival document from which he derived this amount; his source is not cited in more recent scholarship and I have not seen it myself.

91 The *aljama* borrowed money to pay off fines as well, which were tantamount to forced subsidies. In Majorca, historians associate the beginning of internal *aljama* taxation with King Sanç. When he condemned the Majorcan *aljama* to pay 95,000 pounds in 1315, he authorized its secretaries to establish additional taxes in order to raise money to repay the loan it was forced to take in order to pay the fine. They established a direct head tax to be collected from all Jews over 15 who owned a house and more than 10 pounds of wealth. This was in addition to indirect taxes on consumables such as meat, bread, wine, and clothing, and taxes on economic transactions like loans, trade of merchandise, rents, and property transfers. Although at the time these taxes were intended to be temporary, and solely for the purpose of paying the fine, once the debt had been paid, *aljama* secretaries continued to impose many of these taxes, particularly those on commodities, with the required royal approbation, to meet community needs or to be able to accommodate royal subsidy requests. (Santamaría Arández, "Sobre la *aljama* de Mallorca: el impuesto "size del vin juheuesch": 1400-1435," 473). Neither Santamaría nor Pons clarify how the *aljama* paid for community needs before this. It seems doubtful that the *aljama* did not collect any taxes before the
usually to Jews, although sometimes to Christians or a combination of the two. For example, Isach Vidal and Simon Johan jointly purchased the meat tax for the years 1377 and 1378. Occasionally a group of tax farmers would pool their resources and purchase a tax together, the same way censalistas might collectively purchase a censal or annuity from the aljama.

These taxation practices are relevant to the study of post-1391 conversos because, as we shall see, conversos leaders would employ the same methods, collecting a head tax and taxing economic transactions, in order to repay creditors who had jointly invested in the aljama. It is important, moreover, to bear in mind that one component of this taxation system was the Jewish and Christian investors who faced major financial losses as a result of the 1391 violence and dissolution of aljamas. These investors were not limited to creditors of the aljama but also included the tax farmers who advanced funds either to the aljama or king directly. For instance, just prior to the violence of 1391, the Christian Gerau Tarragona purchased the Jewish wine tax.

1315. Although it is possible that community needs were met through donations, it seems more likely that these historians simply have not yet found evidence of earlier taxes. In 1344, the year Pere III deposed Jaume III and took over the Majorcan throne, he empowered the secretaries of the aljama to collect tallas and questias for the sake of communal expenses. In 1362 he reiterated his authorization of five years prior for the aljama to impose a sisa on bread, wine and other consumables, merchandise, clothing and certain kinds of contracts, so that they could raise money to pay the debts they had incurred on his behalf to finance the war (Pons, “judios del reino,” 393). For further discussion of internal taxes in Majorca see ibid, 373-89, where he lists a few instances of internal tax impositions, such as in 1327, 1347, 1362 and farmers of taxes on particular commodities (e.g. Isaac Mahahuch purchasing the wine tax in 1357, Abrafim Gatzas purchasing the mercantile tax in 1361, Maymon ben Jacob of Muntuiri purchasing the rural wheat tax in the same year).

92 When Santamaría cites the example of a Jewish-Christian partnership purchasing the taulatge or meat tax in 1377-1378 (Isach Vidal and Simon Johan) he assumes that the Christian name would have referred to a converso. Although it is possible that there were converts before 1391 who engaged in this business activity, it is just as likely that this was an old Christian who simply had a business relationship with a Jew that theoretically was mutually beneficial. However, the partnership he lists between Abram Sacalli, Pere and Jacme Ribes in 1403 is in fact a Jewish - converso one, since according to my own research Jacme Ribes is the Christian name taken by Jaffuda Cresques, mapmaker and son of Abraham Cresques who produced – with the help of his son – the Catalan Atlas of 1375; he was also a familiar of the royal court and procurador of the conversos. The three of them had collectively paid 60 pounds to the royal treasury for the wine tax that year. In some cases the purchaser of an internal tax was a Jew living in one of the rural parishes. For example, in 1341 Salamón Sussen, inhabitant of Manacor, had purchased the tax on merchandise imposed on all Jews of the island. For this and other examples of Jewish associations see Pons, ibid, 375. Santamaría Arández, “Sobre la aljama de Mallorca,” 479-80. Note that Jews did not form associations exclusively with Jews and conversos; there are many instances of Jewish-Christian (and converso) commercial partnerships in Majorca (see the following discussion of trade and cited work of Maria Dolores Lopez Perez); there were tax farming partnerships between Jews and Christians on the peninsula, such as in Morvedre (Meyerson, Frontier Kingdom, 50).
from the aljama for 1,560 pounds. Needless to say, he took a financial hit when the aljama was subsequently dissolved; it was in order to compensate for his impending loss that Gerau justified his theft of goods from the call in the midst of the revolt. Interestingly, despite the dramatic case which ensued between Gerau and the conversos (he was subsequently accused of murdering the former aljama’s treasurer) and the fact that there was no aljama administration to organize a tax collection, the wine tax or “size del vi juheuesch” did not disappear with the aljama. On the contrary, it achieved the status of an ordinary tax to be paid to the Crown through to the cessation of a Jewish community on the island in 1435. It was farmed out directly by the royal treasury for the much-reduced price of 100 pounds annually. That the Crown took over control of this tax comes as no surprise considering that prior to 1391 commodity taxes collected by the aljama often ended up, de facto, as another royal exaction, since these revenues were often used to pay annuities the aljama had sold in order to pay subsidies to the Crown.

Taxation was a major focus of conflict between the aljama and the municipality. Jews, who were continually paying taxes to the Crown and their own community, were often granted royal exemptions from paying municipal taxes, which piqued city leaders who were under pressure to manage the city’s ever growing public debt, and who felt that, as citizens, Jews

93 ACA CR 1995: 152r (October 1, 1392). The document does not indicate whether this price was for one or two years. Pons offers another example of the wine tax being farmed out to a Christian stonemason, P. Mates, in 1358 (Pons, “judios del reino,” 382.).
94 On the legal dispute and royal appeals that ensued between the conversos and Gerau Tarragona see for instance: ACA CR 1995: 153r-v (July 29, 1392)
95 Royal administration of the tax would have made more practical sense after 1391 anyway, given that there was no longer the same Jewish institutional and administrative framework in place to effectively collect taxes. It was first collected annually and then biannually. For a more focused investigation of the wine tax see Santamaría, “size del vin juheuesch.” Pons cites instances of the aljama of Majorca collecting a wine tax through the fourteenth century, but Santamaria argues that it was not an ordinary tax until the beginning of the fifteenth century, and previously collected very irregularly. He also observed that while the royal patrimony accounts record the sale price of 100 pounds each year, the actual amount collected was far below that (ranging between 38 and 86 pounds), which he takes as a sign of the aljama’s weakness after 1391. Santamaria’s argument is supported by the fact that just before the violence of 1391, Gerau Tarragona had purchased the wine tax from the aljama for 1,560 pounds (even if this amount was a biannual rate) – an amount which he could not entirely recuperate afterwards. Jews from the city extended credit to rural inhabitants in exchange for the promise of future payment in wine which, presumably, they intended to sell in the city (Pons, ibid, 381).
should be equally responsible to bear the financial burdens of their city. The jurats had, on various occasions, attempted to collect the municipal wine tax from the city’s Jews even though they already paid a separate wine tax to the aljama, such that they would have had to pay twice – once to the aljama and once to the city.\(^9^6\) Repeatedly, throughout the fourteenth century, Majorca’s jurats attempted to tax Jews illicitly, imposing taxes from which the latter were exempt or which they had already paid to their aljama. Aljama secretaries usually responded to such impositions with protests to the king and obtained judgement in their favour.\(^9^7\) The Crown could not afford to overburden its aljamas with taxes that were not destined for the royal treasury, and this, of course, sparked resentment among the jurats. Tensions were more pronounced during periods of financial strain, such as during the war with Castile when Pere III made exorbitant demands upon the island to help pay for his military expenses. Although the king had taxed both the island of Majorca and its aljama separately, the jurats nevertheless endeavoured to include the Jews in the island’s 7,500 pound burden. In this case, as in others, Pere III stepped in and insisted that the Jews should only pay one tax, and not pay to the city.\(^9^8\)

Taxes took the form of a percentage of commercial transactions or commodity sales, a head tax, or a percentage of household assets as declared, on oath, by the head of the household.

\(^9^6\) Another example: in 1355 the bailiff of Inca attempted to enforce the payment of the meat tax claiming the Jews could not take meat from the butcher without first paying the tax; the governor ordered him to retract any proclamations regarding that tax since it was exclusively under royal jurisdiction (Pons, “Los judios,” Hispania (1965): 382).

There were other instances in which Jews found themselves slapped with the same tax twice. Sometimes a given commodity could legitimately incur more than one tax. A Jew purchasing cloth, for instance, might have to pay a tax on cloth purchases as well as a tax on merchant sales (ibid., 384).

\(^9^7\) Santamaría cites letters of 1315 and 1327 stating that Jews only had to pay their wine tax and not the one imposed by the city (“size del vin juheuesch,” 474-75). Pons also mentions that Jews were exempt from municipal taxes (Pons, “judios del reino,”79, 37). This policy of the Catalan kings applied to many communities throughout the kingdom, including Perpignan (ibid, 379).

\(^9^8\) This is regarding the royal subsidies promised in 1358. The jurats eventually chose a more feasible course of action familiar to the aljama, namely to borrow the funds in the form of a public debt rather than “destroy” the island through another tax (ibid, 388). In 1362 Pere III issued a privilege exempting Jews from paying the sales tax imposed on the island to raise further subsidies for his campaigns, since the Jews were already paying their own taxes for the same purpose (ibid, 396).
The standard form for collecting subsidies and debt payments (as well as tributary taxes) was the latter, also known as the “per sous et lliura” system, in which the total debt was divided among community members according to their means; in the Catalan documents, this process of assessment and collection was referred to as a “talla”.  

Aljama secretaries established separate tax assessors, or taxadors, who were responsible for assessments and collection, to keep detailed accounts, and to audit them afterwards. The aljama representatives negotiated various kinds of arrangements with creditors or kings to pay them, establishing instalment schedules, and breaking down the amount to be paid in cash, or by transferring rights to collect loan payments, or sometimes by ceding real estate or rents. The king usually instructed the governor of Majorca and his royal officials to aid the taxadors in their collections, enforcing payment by arresting, imprisoning or impounding goods of uncooperative taxpayers. In the case of commodity taxes that were farmed out, the tax farmer took responsibility for collecting the tax, but might also call upon the royal administration for enforcement.

Aside from those who simply refused to pay, collectors faced more subtle forms of tax evasion that constantly made them fall short of the amount owed to kings and creditors.

Taxpayers sought ways to conceal their assets in order to reduce the amount of their tax lien.

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100 For example, the fine imposed on the aljama by Jaume III was, in typical fashion, distributed among the community by the secretaries according to a talla or “per sous et lliura system.” In that instance, each household was obligated to pay twelve sous per pound, or fifty percent of its assets. Jaume III typically granted exemptions to some of the elite, which was surely resented by others in the community. Furthermore, the arrangement between the king and the aljama allowed individuals to cede, as their payment, redeemable debts owed to Jews by Christian debtors. This facilitated the collection of these debts since royal administrators could more easily track down rural debtors and enforce payment. Over the next few years Jaume III ceded to his creditors the rights to collect these debts (Miralles, *Corpus d’antropònims*, 18; Riera i Sans and Rosselló i Vaquer, “Deutes fiscals”). In 1335, not two years after Jaume III condemned the aljama to paying the fine, the aljama’s creditors asked to be repaid. This must have added a great strain on the economic situation of the Jews, who were already being taxed to pay the fine. At that time the secretaries entrusted five prohomens to organize, with the support of the governor, a collection plan. The governor named two special treasurers responsible specifically for the collection and rendering of the funds to the creditors. (see Pons, *Los judios del reino*, 47-50)

assessments. For Majorcan Jews with family and business connections in North Africa or the peninsula, “donating” their assets was a particularly viable tactic. The most common way of doing this was through a “donatio inter vivos,” a transaction recorded by a notary whereby an individual gave something (moveable or immovable property) to a donee, legally transferring the title of ownership of that item to the donee. This would be done ahead of tax collection time, and the gift was usually donated to a relative who could be trusted to return it afterwards, or may have secretly paid the giver for the property in cash, or perhaps the giver benefited in some other indirect way. Furthermore, when times were tough, it was common for debtors or taxpayers to simply “disappear,” or for merchants to take their business abroad for a while, which made it difficult for collectors to track and tax business transactions, or even locate the taxpayer. Some Jews moved from one aljama to the next, claiming to the taxadors of the community in which they resided that they had already paid taxes to the collecta in which they formerly lived, managing in this way to avoid paying taxes anywhere. On the other hand, Jews who conducted business or owned properties in two or more localities could end up being taxed twice in the general tallas, once by the town in which they lived and again by the town in which they were trading or held other possessions; but in such cases they usually succeeded, through protests, in exempting themselves from paying taxes to one side or the other.\footnote{Such as Vidal Sagrassa who lived in the ciutat but did business in Inca (Pons, "Los judíos," 185). The same kinds of problems with fiscal collection plagued royal officials and the converso taxadors, who would look to the past for solutions.}
Royal Subsidies

By the mid to late fourteenth century, the monarchy received more revenues from its *aljamas* in the form of subsidies and loans than it did from ordinary taxes. In the Crown of Aragon, loans usually took the form of requesting advances on taxes, sometimes up to two years in advance, in exchange for which the king might promise not to collect taxes for a certain time, or reduce the amount of tax owed to compensate for the amount which was advanced. It appears that the Crown requested more subsidies which did *not* require repayment than *loans* from the Majorcan *aljama*. This was especially the case after Pere III had incorporated the kingdom of Majorca into the Crown of Aragon. Although kings requested subsidies from the Christian population as well, these had to be approved by the *Corts*, and the amounts obtained from Jews were greater, per capita, than from Christians. Kings often expected subsidy payments in return for privileges they granted to an *aljama*, effectively selling them privileges. These privileges frequently included certain tax exemptions (for example, from municipal taxes) to help the community bear the financial burden of the subsidy requested. Sometimes the king might only reconfirm a privilege that had been granted by a predecessor on condition of

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103 For an overall explanation of taxation and the revenues Jews provided the Crown see Assis, *Jewish Economy*, Chapter 5; see also Mark Meyerson’s description for Valencia and Morvedre in his chapter “Fiscal Servitude.” Assis uses the term loan whereas Meyerson seems to avoid this term, putting it as fiscal demands of the king.

104 I could not find any published references to loans extended by the *aljama* to the Crown, but this may be a product of lack of extant documentation or insufficient research into the fiscal history of the Majorcan *aljama*. For more on subsidies and loans extended by peninsular *aljamas*, see Assis, *Jewish Economy*, 72, 166. Theoretically, subsidies were demanded for specific, extraordinary purposes, such as a military expedition or a royal marriage. Although the royal letters requesting these subsidies do not always indicate what that purpose was, a number of them do. In the fourteenth century heavy subsidies were collected from Jewish communities throughout the Crown of Aragon to fund the conquest of Sardinia (Assis, “Jewish Capital and the Conquest of Sardinia by the Catalans,” *Italia* 9: 1-2 (1990). Meyerson also mentions the tendency for kings to turn to the Jewish communities in the kingdom of Valencia for aid in their political and military campaigns.

105 In 1275 the Jewish community of Majorca paid ten percent of the subsidies collected from the island (Maís Chacón, “La fiscalidad indirecta,” 3). In 1286 King Jaume requested a subsidy of 100,000 *sous* from the population of Majorca, and another 10,000 from its *aljama*. In other words, while the Jews made up an estimated 2% of the island’s population, they were collectively responsible for paying ten percent of the amount the rest of the population would pay. On top of that, the *aljama* was asked to pay another 30,000 *sous* the following year (Assis, *Jewish Economy*, 165).
receiving a subsidy. This expectation is clearly laid out in a letter to the governor of Majorca stressing Jaume III’s urgent need for cash to fund his military campaigns in France in 1338. The king’s treasurer instructed the governor to force the Jews—through imprisonment or confiscation and sale of their possessions—to pay the outstanding debt owed to the king on account of a privilege he had granted. The letter offers no further detail regarding the amount or nature of the privilege, but shortly thereafter the *aljama* took a loan of one thousand florins to forward to the king, and set up a *talla* or collection reaching as far as Menorca to repay its creditors.

In order to cope with subsidy requests which it could not readily meet, *aljamas* were increasingly forced to go into debt. From the mid-fourteenth century, *aljamas* obtained credit through the sale of *censals*, a kind of annuity, usually to a Christian creditor or association of creditors. The *censal* was a credit mechanism which circumvented definitions of usury, by

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106 Assis observes, for instance, that in the Crown of Aragon, *aljamas* had to pay Alfons IV for the confirmation of privileges granted by his predecessor (172). It was customary for a new king to confirm the Jews’ previous privileges—or at least be requested to do so by each *aljama*.

107 Pons, “judíos del reino,” 390-91; *Judíos del reino*, vol. II, 153-154; 277-278, No. 95. Pons does not cite his source for the loan of 1,000 florins.


The principle of the *censal* is based on emphyteutic land rental (Garcia Sanz, 286-289). The Latin legal term “*emphyteosis*” occurs repeatedly in late medieval notarial registers, and denotes a land rental whereby the owner sells the right of possession to the lessee, who is then required to pay an annual rent (*census*) to the owner. The contract was hereditary, although the lessee could sell the *emphyteosis* whenever he wished, provided he had the consent of the owner, who had the option of buying it back. All the while, the owner, or lessor, remained the lord (*dominus*) of the land (Pryor, 93). In effect, the lessee buys the rights to the produce and/or revenues of the land—though he must continue to pay an annual rent—with the option of selling those rights when he wishes. Similarly, the *censal* is essentially a right to receive revenues. Theoretically these revenues derive from land possessed by the one who sells the *censal*, land which serves as a guarantee to secure these revenues. In other words, the “*censalista*” or “*rentier*” “buys” the right to receive annual or semi-annual payments, also referred to as “*rents*” or “*pensions*,” from the one who sells the *censal*, or “*censatario*.” The purchase of the *censal* is equivalent to a loan; the one who sells the *censal* is the debtor, and the pensions themselves form the interest. The key and innovative characteristic of the *censal* is that the one who buys it, the creditor, cannot sell it back, though he or she continues to receive pensions. Yet the one who sells it, the debtor, maintains the right to buy back the *censal* for the same price it was sold—that is to say, the debtor may repay the loan whenever he or she
which the creditor or *censaler* “purchased” the annuity or *censal* from the debtor, who promised the creditor regular annual payments that in effect amounted to interest. *Censals* carried an interest rate of between 7 and 14 percent that was much lower than direct loans (the legal rate for Jews was 20%), which also made them less “usurious.” Depending on the restrictions and type of *censal* contracted, the debtor could cease making annuity payments when he “bought back” the *censal* from the creditor for its original price.

As the fourteenth century progressed, the *aljamas’* sense of security depended increasingly on being able to meet royal fiscal demands, which also were becoming more difficult to bear.\(^\text{109}\) As cities were developing public debt, so too were the *aljamas*, choosing to sell annuities rather than impose supplementary taxes on community members who were already heavily burdened. Even so, at various moments in the history of the Majorcan *aljama*, its members were paying at least half of their assets in taxes, directly or indirectly, to the royal treasury, or to creditors who had already advanced them funds. Furthermore, the development of the *censal* and public debt generated a dynamic *censalista* or *rentier* class, which also came to play a central role in the fiscal relationship between Crown and Jews, as we shall see further ahead.

Occasionally the Crown secured its own debts by allocating tax revenues from *aljamas* as the annuity payments to be made to the creditor, or as loan collateral. Monarchs also used Jewish communities to obtain credit indirectly, by ordering them to sell *censals* and forward the proceeds to the royal treasury, promising tax exemptions in place of annuity payments, or provisionally ceding to the *aljama* the rights to collect particular royal revenues. In this respect, a forced subsidy was really an indirect loan. There is at least one instance in which King Joan appears to have employed this manoeuvre (which shall be discussed in chapter four), but otherwise it seems that Joan and his father, King Pere, forced the *aljama* to sell *censals* on behalf of the Crown and deal with the debt on its own, without the Crown supplying the annuity payments. Once Pere III exiled Jaume III and incorporated the kingdom of Majorca into the Crown of Aragon in 1343, *aljama* secretaries were quick to inform him regarding the poor financial situation of their community. Pere garnered Jewish support with a more favourable policy than Jaume’s, issuing privileges to the *aljama* that offered legal and economic advantages, among which included his reduction of its annual tributary payment to the “customary” 165 pounds.  

110 He issued a general immunity from all legal proceedings against Jews or their possessions, 111 and forgave any outstanding amounts owed to the Crown under Jaume III, including what remained of the 1333 fine for not paying the *cabeçatge*. 112

Pere allowed for a period of economic recuperation over five years, until 1349 when he was confronted with Sardinian rebellions and Jaume III’s invasion and after his treasury had

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110 Pons, *judíos del reino*, 279-280, No. 98. (June 6, 1343). Curiously, Pons states, at another point in his book, (392) that the tribute which the *aljama* of Majorca paid was 3,000 Majorcan pounds, based on a 1349 document which he does not include in his appendix of documents to consult. The inconsistency probably has to do with Pons’ rendition of the original document; this amount may not have referred to tribute payments *per se* but included other taxes or subsidies.

111 ibid, 280-282, document No. 99 (June 18, 1343)

112 ibid, 282, document No. 100. (June 23, 1343). If Pere released them from paying what remained from the 1333 fine, it suggests that the *aljama* still had not finished paying it, even though their agreement with Jaume was to finish paying by 1341.
been emptied by the war with the Genoese.\textsuperscript{113} He requested a 20,000 pound subsidy from the jurats of Majorca, 60,000 sous of which they borrowed from the aljama. In 1351 the king requested further subsidies from the municipality of Majorca to deal with the Genoese problem. The jurats had to institute taxes to pay for these subsidies, the burden of which fell heavily on the rural inhabitants of the island or forense, who were already suffering from plague and drought, and had indebted themselves to Jews to be able to make ends meet, let alone pay taxes. As it became increasingly difficult for the forense to repay these loans, Pere had to negotiate between demands for moratoria and the Jews’ need to collect these loans so that they could subsidize his military expenses. In order to lessen escalating tensions between forense debtors and their Jewish creditors, Pere was forced to grant collective moratoria for limited periods (as his sons would after him) and he overturned Jaume III’s prohibition against collecting debts older than five years, to allow Jews to collect after the moratoria.

In 1352 Pere increased the aljama’s tributary obligations in order to pay for the armada against the Genoese. Two years later, he forbade Jewish merchants to leave the island until they paid further subsidies. The incessant taxes, on top of the risk of losing merchandise at sea to Genoese piracy (the export of certain merchandise to the Maghreb being critical to their livelihood), led some of the island’s Jews to leave the kingdom. When Pere requested further subsidies in 1357 to finance the war against Castile, the aljama notified him that more than forty Jews had emigrated and relocated to the Maghreb.\textsuperscript{114} These were probably wealthier merchants who had the contacts to facilitate their departure, and who managed to leave the kingdom despite


\textsuperscript{114} Chacón and Tudela, “Els mercaders jueus mallorquins,” 1142, 1148 (ff. 52), and Maíz Chacón, “ fiscalidad indirecta,” <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/maizchacon_fiscalitat.pdf>, 12, citing ARM AH 4380: 100r-v (1354). Maíz Chacón argues that around the middle of the fourteenth century the Jewish community in Majorca began to shrink partly as a result of the emigration of Jewish merchants.
Pere’s earlier prohibition against it. Since wealthier members of the community would have made larger tax contributions, barring individual tax exemptions, their departure left the rest of the community to deal with a heavier tax burden *per capita*. After a short reprieve, Pere continued to make further subsidy requests: one thousand *reales* (equivalent to 750 pounds or 15,000 *sous*) in 1362, and in 1365 another 30,000 *sous*.

The Majorcan *aljama* continued to advance extraordinary revenues through the 1380s to the end of Pere’s reign. Upon receiving 700 gold florins of Aragon in 1383, he confirmed certain privileges requested by the *aljama* which, according to its representatives, would help it continue to provide financial assistance to the Crown. In the same year, Pere solicited the assistance of other *aljamas* as well, but not all in the same way. For instance, the 35,000 *sous* he demanded from the *aljama* of Barcelona was not in the form of a subsidy, but rather a loan, and partly as an advance on future taxes. Admittedly, this amount was at least four to five times greater than the subsidy provided by the Majorcan *aljama*, but it is worth noting that all the published references to financial requests from Majorca during this period are for subsidies, not loans.

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115 Chacón and Tudela, "Els mercaders jueus mallorquins " 1134-1140 or <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/jueus_mercaders.pdf > 6-12. Jews who remained in Majorca still had no choice but to pay up, and continued to do so through Pere’s reign. Jewish merchants benefited from Pere’s policies, while the community needed his protection to survive; their hands were tied.

116 Published in Baer, *Die Juden*, 536-537; ACA 1446: 38r-41v (April 25, 1383). Isaacs provides a document summary of a listing of the privileges: *The Jews of Majorca*, 265, No.223. The value of one florin in 1392 was 11 Barcelonan *sous*; in 1404 one florin was worth just over 15 Majorcan *sous* (these values are taken from ACA 1995: fol. 92r-94r, May 8, 1392; ACM Prot. Not. 14676, Juan Clavell: May 31, 1404).

117 ACA CR 1687: 227v-228v (December 29, 1383), published in Baer, *Die Juden*, No.363, p. 552-553. The money would be raised through a combination of (1) a *censal mort*, which the king had ordered the *aljama* to sell and secure on its own assets; and (2) an advance of the *aljama*’s annual tribute for 1384 and 1385 to be paid together in 1384. The king would provide the Barcelonan *aljama* with the funds to repay the *censal* by allowing it to retain the tribute of 1386 and 1387, and promised not to demand further subsidies from them until the *censal* was paid off.

118 Further study is required to determine if the Crown regularly requested subsidies, as opposed to loans, from Majorcan Jews in this period. There is one post-1391 source indicating that King Pere, probably late in his reign, transferred his right to collect certain royal rents in Majorca to the *aljama*, from which they would pay the annuities for a *censal* sold on his behalf (I will discuss this particular case in Chapter Three).
Even though Pere maintained favourable policies towards the Jews, his incessant requests for financial assistance placed them in a more vulnerable position. His son and successor, Joan I, continued in this vein, forcing the Majorcan *aljama* further and further into debt prior to the attacks against the Jewish quarter in 1391. Thus, after decades of intense pressure from a king desperate for funds, the economic hardships that followed the violence of 1391 dealt a particularly hard blow to an already wearied Jewish community. A closer look at King Joan’s correspondence with *aljama* secretaries during the two years preceding the violence reflects his seemingly impulsive, disorganized and frequent requests for quick cash from the Majorcan *aljama*. Even if the *aljama*, in reality, forwarded less cash than Joan’s letters would suggest, the letters alone created a constant pressure, and served as a reminder that the Jews’ survival hinged on satisfying him financially. On March 22\(^{nd}\), 1389, King Joan ordered Maymo Faraig and Magaluff Natjar to come to his court urgently, but on April 10th excused them from the visit because they had already arranged for the sale of *censals* he had wanted.\(^{119}\) The urgent summons to visit the royal court, bearing account books which demonstrated the finances of the *aljama*, was a common initial step when the Crown sought extra funding from its Jews. Joan’s 1389 letters indicate that the sale of *censals* was made according to a particular agreement between Joan and the *aljama* secretaries, as is suggested when he wrote, “*que us lo fet de la venda de censal o censals per la dita aljama dels jueus de la dita ciutat faedora es concordat et per nos ja approvat sots la forma per lo qual fet haviem vosaltres aci necessarie volem*”.\(^{120}\) It is not clear, in this specific case, whether the *aljama* would have been bearing the burden of the annuity payments itself, or if the Crown offered some form of compensation, as with the Barcelonan

\(^{119}\) Although elite, influential members of the community, they are not named as secretaries *per se* at this time. For instance, a document published by Pons names different individuals as the secretaries in May 1389 (*Judios del reino de Mallorca*, vol. II, 311-312, No. 135).

\(^{120}\) ACA CR 1873:23v (April 10, 1389)
example above, such that the request would be ultimately for a loan rather than a subsidy. However, litigation pursued by the Crown against the conversos and Jews of Majorca after 1391 reveals that both kings Pere and Joan had, at some point, helped the aljama make annuity payments on forced sales of censals by assigning to it certain royal rents designated to pay the creditors or censalers.\footnote{ACA CR 2000: 181v-184r (November 18, 1395)}

On May 9\textsuperscript{th} Joan wrote again to the Majorcan aljama saying that he urgently needed its help, together with the kingdom’s other aljamas who were his “special treasure,” to meet expenses related to the Corts Generals which were being held at the time.\footnote{ACA CR 1873: 33r; May 20, 1389 (citing letter dated May 9, 1389)} He therefore ordered that one or two aljama secretaries go to the royal court immediately, with the authority to secure 1000 florins that would be imposed on their community as a tax in the manner which they would negotiate with his treasurer and “the one making the loan.” Once again, the king intended to obtain funds immediately from a Christian creditor, who unlike the aljamas had the capacity to provide the cash quickly, while placing the burden of the debt on his aljamas, which would have to collect an extra tax to repay it. On May 20\textsuperscript{th}, eleven days after making this demand from the Jews of Majorca, Joan issued another letter excusing them from fulfilling this order “because you are presently serving notably and according to our wishes in the affairs of the island of Sardinia such that we ought to favour you.”\footnote{ACA CR 1873: 33r; May 20, 1389} Despite the proximity in time between these two letters, it is possible that the second was responding to a protest made on behalf of the Majorcan aljama, claiming that it had just sold censals earlier that year, which were being used to fund the king’s Sardinian affairs. In a letter of September 1389 Joan instructed his treasurer to

\footnote{\textquotedblleft Empero car de present nos servits notablement [e] a nostre voler en [e] per los affers dela isla de Cerdenya [e] tant queus en som tenguts de favorejar vos tots temps.” [ACA CR 1873: 33r; May 20, 1389] Pere used this term previously, for example in 1356 when stressing that the Jews were under his royal protection, and that bailiffs had to protect them from Christian aggression of any kind while they conducted their business or solicited payment of debts (Maís Chacón, “Els mercaders,” 12, and Pons, judíos del reino, vol. 2, 98).}
pay the lieutenant governor of Sardinia, who was then visiting Majorca, 300 florins “from the money received through sales [of censals] by the Jews of the aljama of Majorca [which were] made at the king's request in order to help the said kingdom.” In 1390 Joan once again ordered the aljama secretaries, Aaron Abdalach, Juceff Alatzar, Astruch Duran and Muça Faquim, to pay him a visit carrying with them “various instruments and other writings in their possession” along with copies, in order to deal with “various urgent matters” relating to the royal court. He must have intended to see how much more money he could squeeze out of the aljama, but so far no further documentation has surfaced that reveals the outcome of this meeting, or whether or not it ever took place.

The ways in which Jewish communities secured royal protection changed from the reign of Jaume II of Aragon, around the turn of the fourteenth century. Whereas previously the survival of Jewish communities depended on a few influential Jews to garner favour and privileges from the king on their community’s behalf, later it was more important for the community to be able to fulfil the financial needs of the king. Meyerson illustrates this change for the aljama of Morvedre, where being able to provide subsidies often hinged on one or a few wealthy individuals who advanced the funds. Consequently, among the elite, the measure of individual power and prestige until the late thirteenth century had been derived from one’s connection to the royal court, but in the fourteenth century, honour derived more often from

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124 ACA CR 1872: 175r-v (n.d., 1389). The lieutenant governor or Sardinia was Galceran de Villa Nova.
125 ACA CR 1873: 124r (October 24, 1390). Joan may have been alluding to account books here, considering that previous kings had demanded the presence of aljama secretaries or representatives at court along with account books, in order to negotiate subsidies. Understandably, this seems to have been a sensitive issue for the aljama. In 1359 Pere III promised that he would respect the secretaries’ privilege not to show account books, and ordered all proceedings against Majorcan Jews based on these account books to be suspended (Isaacs, p.255, docs 167, 168; also Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia, vol.36, documents no. 73 and 74).
126 Meyerson, Jews in an Iberian Frontier, Chapter Three, “Fiscal Servitude.”
being able to fill royal coffers through the intermediary of the *aljama*.\(^{127}\) If the conversos’ post-1391 experience is any indication, this was probably also the case for Majorca. We shall see that for the conversos, too, granting funds to the king was deemed necessary in order to obtain royal protection.

**Economic Activities: trade and moneylending**

**Commercial importance, North African trade networks**

There was a particular kind of prestige and importance to which Majorcan Jews had access, and which set them apart from most other communities on the peninsula, founded upon their prominence in maritime trade and commercial liaising with North Africa.\(^ {128}\) King Pere and his sons protected the interests of Jewish merchants who afforded the Majorcan community its often exaggerated reputation for wealth. Peninsular Jews, too, perceived Majorcan Jews as wealthy, as is reflected in a responsum of the Valencian Rabbi Isaac ben Sheshet Perfet who fled to Algiers after 1391:

> You are thinking of Majorca, where the rich possessed large fortunes, had houses stored with gold and silver, and pearls and caves full of gold *denarii*; those who were denied such great wealth were classed with the poor, though they had precious stones and a good trade which yielded them a comfortable living. Think, however, of the Jews of this country [peninsular Crown of Aragon], who have not the wherewithal to satisfy the very necessities of life—their hunger and their thirst—who sleep upon the bare ground, using their wearing apparel for covering, whose clothes are full of patches and who are compelled to walk barefoot.\(^ {129}\)

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\(^{127}\) In Majorca, families like the Cresques certainly acquired prestige and wealth through their royal service as mapmakers, but the extent to which, and in what capacity other families directly served the king is not clear, although archival material seems to suggest that particular individuals were indeed royal familiars. At the same time, at least in the late fourteenth century, the *aljama*’s ability to meet fiscal demands was critical to obtaining royal privileges.

\(^{128}\) Soto, citing Dufourq, notes that Jaume I imposed higher taxes upon the communities outside Catalonia, including Majorca. The Majorcan community may have had a higher tax burden since it was reputed to be a community of wealthy merchants, and they did not share the same privileges as the Barcelonan community.

\(^{129}\) Abraham Moses Herschman, *Rabbi Isaac Ben Sheshet and His Times* (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1943) 35; Responsa No. 153.
Notarial records lend support to Jaume III’s claim that “the majority of the Jews of the said aljama [of Majorca] live through trade.”\(^\text{130}\) This is not a surprising comment considering the island’s commercial importance as a base for numerous foreign and local merchants, particularly as a Mediterranean way-station for long-distance traffic of merchandise. Although the proportion of Jews who identified themselves as merchants \textit{per se} probably amounted to no more than ten percent,\(^\text{131}\) the number becomes much higher when one takes into account the Jews who traded on a part-time basis, middlemen who seasonally brought commodities like wine,\(^\text{132}\) oil, and wool from the rural areas to the city, and others who were involved in the commercial sector indirectly, such as those who worked with the textiles and leather that were traded with the Maghreb. In a letter to Pere III in 1357, the aljama stressed its dependence on commerce for survival, claiming that its Jews could only make a living through trade because they did not own estates or other rent-generating properties.\(^\text{133}\) Over two and a half decades later, Pere III wrote that the Majorcan aljama “stands out among the other [aljamas], and in fact prevails over the rest in condition and regimen, because its majority is occupied with trade rather than usury…”\(^\text{134}\) The negative light Christian doctrine cast on moneylending led Pere to consider Jews who engaged in mercantile activities rather than lending money to be of a higher calibre.

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\(^{131}\) This number is derived from Bernat i Roca’s table of occupations represented in the 1350 \textit{monedatge del call}, which lists 39 merchants out of 435 occupations (Bernat i Roca, \textit{El call}, 50-60). Even taking into account the fact that not all merchants would have been recorded in this tax register this number is still lower than one would expect given royal attestations of the majority of Majorcan Jews surving on trade.


\(^{133}\) The original reads, “els jueus només havien pogut sobreviure a Mallorca sobre la base de les mercaderies, ja que no tenien possessions ni altres rendes.” Cited in Maíz Chacón and Tudela i Villalonga, "Els mercaders jueus,” 1129. Notwithstanding this statement, evidence from after 1391 suggests that the aljama and individual Jews did own landed property, although perhaps not as much as they would have needed to be wealthy enough to meet all the financial demands Pere had been making of them at the time.

\(^{134}\) Baer, \textit{Die Juden}, 535, No. 355 (1383).
The Crown also would have valued Jewish merchants for their North African trade connections and the tax revenue it generated. Scholars have argued that Majorcan Jews were critical in facilitating the Catalans’ access to Maghrebi markets. Documents from the late thirteenth century onwards show that their commercial links with Valencia and the Maghreb were reinforced by family ties. Majorcan Jews formed partnerships with Maghrebi Jews, and in some cases Maghrebi Jewish merchants who frequented the island were able to acquire Majorcan citizenship. For Maghrebi Jews, the association with a Majorcan or citizenship status offered certain tax exemptions. Specific ports in which Majorcan Jewish merchants focused their trade included Tlemcen, Tenes, Honein, Mostagenem, Algiers and Tunis. Merchants sailed to these ports in order to accompany the merchandise they exported, and to obtain goods for import to Majorca. They also engaged in North African trade without leaving the island, investing in commenda contracts or acting as middlemen, contracting ships to import goods from the Maghreb which they then sold to, for instance, Italian merchants who sometimes then exported the merchandise to ports further out west in the Atlantic.

Some Jewish merchants cultivated relationships with one city in particular, probably because they had relatives or business partners there. The connections between Majorcan and North African Jewish families were maintained from one generation to the next, even after the

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136 Shortly after the conquest of Valencia, documents show common family names and travel between three cities. In *Diplomatics jueus*, Assis refers to thirteenth-century royal administrators in Valencia with the surnames De Portella and Alfaquim (p.16); the same names (among others, such as Natjar) appear in Majorca, and probably represent branches of these elite families.

137 Certain individuals, including Jews and conversos, bore the title “civis” which afforded certain privileges. On citizenship and tax exemptions see, Maria Dolores López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 362-69.


139 Ibid.
conversions of 1391. For example, at the time of Pere III’s reign, Abraham Amlili traded specifically in Mostagenem. Later, the converso Huguet Gilabert, previously named Ayon Melili, probably a younger relative of Abraham Amlili, also maintained connections in that city. In 1396 the converso Huguet appeared as an executor of the will of the Jew Samuel Fazuati, who instructed his uncle to donate money to the synagogue of Mostagenem, as well as to its poor Jews and for the dowries of poor girls.\(^{140}\) Both Ayon Melili and Samuel Fazuati belonged to the wealthier merchant class of Majorca’s Jews, whose members often appeared as *aljama* (and later, converso) representatives.\(^{141}\)

**Policies of Pere III after annexation of Majorcan throne**

With his seizure of the Majorcan throne from Jaume III in 1343, Pere III endeavoured to revive the island’s maritime trade, and particularly the North African trade conducted by Jewish merchants.\(^{142}\) His policies towards trade suggest an understanding that the Jews’ commercial success enabled them to pay taxes, loans and subsidies. As an incentive to North African merchants to trade in Majorca, Pere lowered the import tax from ten to five percent. In 1344, at the *aljama*’s petition, he abolished Jaume III’s requirement for Jewish merchants to obtain royal permits each time they wanted to leave the island with merchandise. During periods of conflict it was not uncommon for the Crown to require *all* merchants to obtain travel licenses, but these could create various setbacks to maritime trade, on top of the additional cost of the license to the

\(^{140}\) In 1399, Huguet acted as a representative of the converso merchants, petitioning to Martí to abolish the requirement for conversos to obtain licenses in order to leave the island, since it had been hindering their trade (*ACM Protocols Notarials*, Pere Giges, 14751, July 23, 1396). See also Maíz Chacón and Tudela i Villalonga, "mercaders jueus," 7. Samuel Fazuati’s uncle was Barahon, son of Samuel Nahamie. In 1373 there is a record of a Samuel Namia who acted as a representative for an unnamed North African merchant (*López Pérez, La Corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 363.). Barahon likely maintained the same networks as his father Samuel. Gracia Bonsenyor was another merchant who maintained relations with Mostaganem in the mid fourteenth century. Bonsenyor Gracia, probably the son of Gracia Bonsenyor, is mentioned in a royal letter dated August 19, 1391, just two weeks after the riot, in which king Joan orders the governor of Majorca to compel the *aljama* to pay Bonsenyor for messages he delivered on its behalf. Bonsenyor had informed the king that he fled “almost naked” from the island, probably to some other location within the kingdom (or he would not have petitioned the king for his help).

\(^{141}\) *ACA CR 2263: 194 r-v* (July 14, 1399)

\(^{142}\) Maíz Chacón and Tudela i Villalonga, "mercaders jueus," 3-6.; *Cf. Abulafia, Mediterranean Emporium*, 221-22.
merchant. For instance, the time it took to obtain the license could delay the departure of the
merchant’s ship, or the license itself might set limitations on the number of shipments a merchant
could accompany to foreign regions.\textsuperscript{143} Needless to say, violence at sea, which was worse during
times of war, was another significant trade deterrent. Hence the presence of Majorcan Jewish
merchants in the Maghreb intensified once the conflict between Pere III and Jaume III was
conclusively settled in the former’s favour with the death of Jaume in 1349.\textsuperscript{144}

While Majorcan commerce did benefit from the supportive concessions Pere enacted
after his accession, commercial relations with other Mediterranean ports and access to Maghrebi
markets continued to suffer periodic setbacks as a result of growing competition from the
Genoese, as well as from the many other political conflicts during his reign, such as rebellions in
Sardinia, war with Genoa, war with Castile and vacillating tensions with Morocco. Growing
hostilities in Mediterranean waters and ports posed a serious threat to Majorcan and other
Catalan merchants, who were still expected to contribute towards the exorbitant costs of the
kingdom’s military defence and campaigns. The king’s diplomatic efforts to secure better trade
conditions for merchants may have reduced, but certainly did not eliminate, the risks of shipping
merchandise by sea.\textsuperscript{145} In that climate, even those who ostensibly fought for the same side could
be potential antagonists. For instance, during the famine year of 1370, Pere ordered his treasurer
to repay Juceff Faquim for a shipment of wheat destined for Majorca that his own vice admiral
of Sardinia had seized (at sea) in order to feed his troops.\textsuperscript{146} The high risk of piracy resulted in
limited investment in maritime trade, a fact which underscores the argument made by some

\textsuperscript{143} Maíz Chacón and Tudela i Villalonga, ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{145} In the first half of the fourteenth century it was Genoese pirates that presented the greatest threat (see Maíz
Chacón and Tudela i Villalonga, ibid, for an example of Genoese pirates in Tunisian waters, p.6).
\textsuperscript{146} Isaacs, No. 185; Baer, \textit{Die Juden}, No. 301. Jewish merchants actively aided the island during the famine years of
the early 1370s, shipping wheat from North Africa and other regions to the island, sometimes at their own expense,
sometimes expecting repayment from the municipality, which subsequently proved difficult to obtain (Isaacs, 68-69).
historians that the economic decline at the end of the fourteenth century had its roots earlier, in the conflicts of Pere III’s reign.\footnote{Gutwirth, “El comercio,” 199-200}

**Main commodities of trade**

Grain imports were especially important to Majorca with its frequent droughts, and there are examples of Jewish merchants transporting large amounts of grain to the Balearics. As late as 1407, Magaluf ben Atlon (or Ayon), and Ayon Sussen, Jews of Majorca, received 300 pounds for grain from Felip and Batomeu Fuster, Majorcan citizens representing the jurats of Menorca.\footnote{ACM 14767, *Protocolos Notarials, Tomas Clavell*: February 23, 1407. Note also the earlier reference to Juceff Faquim’s botched attempt to import wheat to Majorca in 1370.} North African wool was the commodity most frequently imported, for use in local as well as Italian textile production. Majorcan and Italian agents purchased local, Menorcan and North African wool in Majorca to send back to Italy.\footnote{López Pérez, *corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 49-50, 524. Other commodities commonly imported through Majorca to the Crown of Aragon from North Africa included linen, leather and hides, primary materials for dyes such as indigo or lichen, spices, wax, and gold.} Majorca also served as a centre for re-export of goods from the Crown of Aragon to the Maghreb. Majorca’s primary export, however, was cloth that had been produced first and foremost locally, but also in Florence, Malines, Castellón and Perpignan.\footnote{The focus on textiles on the part of Jewish merchants reflects the overwhelming emphasis among Majorcan merchants as a whole on cloth exports. On Majorcan commerce with the Magreb in the early fifteenth century, including the involvement of Jews and conversos, see Pierre Macaire, "Majorque et le commerce international (1400-1450 Environ),” Thesis, Université de Lille III, Paris, 1983, 1986. Majorcan cloth was low-grade, and its quality deteriorated further towards the end of the fourteenth century as a result of attempts to increase production, which gave rise to numerous ordinances reiterating quality standards. Agricultural exports included Valencian saffron, figs and raisins from Denia, Morvedre, Alicante and Majorca, wine and oil from Majorca, and salt from Ibiza (*La corona de Aragón y el Magreb*, 570-72). According to Ricard Soto’s study of later thirteenth-century documents Jews did trade in slaves but not regularly: out of 254 people selling slaves, 11 or 4.33\% were Jews, but double this percentage, 8 out of 43, purchased slaves. It was much more common for Jews to have slaves in their possession as a security for a loan they had extended (Soto Company, "Algunes consideraciones sobre el paper dels jueus en la colonització de Mallorca durant el segle xiii,” 28-29). Lopez Perez suggests that it is difficult to study the late fourteenth century slave trade since the slaves were commonly purchased at the Majorcan port but not represented in official documentation; she suggests that this was because they were usually obtained through piracy.} At the end of the fourteenth century the most common export to North Africa by Majorcan Jewish, and later converso, merchants was textiles.\footnote{This is reflected in *guiatge* registers of the ARM recording cloth to be exported, for instance.} In fact, after...
1391, royal proclamations specifically mention “merchandise and textiles” as goods that had been stolen from the call, and also as goods of conversos which were to be confiscated by the Crown or prohibited from leaving them island. Furthermore, rabbinic responsa refer to exports of Majorcan kosher wine to North African Jewish communities, first by Jews, and after 1391, by conversos as well, which introduced various concerns over its kashrut or ritual purity.

Commercial Taxes: the lleuda.

Given the prominence of Majorca in maritime trade, the commercial duties collected at its ports were an important source of revenue for the Crown. The tax with which kings Joan and Martí were most concerned, when it came to Jewish and converso merchants, was the lleuda, an import-export tax that, in Majorca, was typically paid only by foreign merchants. North African Jews and Muslims, paid the dée, or ten percent on imports, but at certain times under kings Pere III, Joan and Martí this rate was reduced to the vintée or five percent, in order to encourage them to trade in Majorca.

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152 The taxes collected at the ports of Majorca at turn of the fifteenth century were the ancoratge (levied from foreigners only), entrada i exida de navilis, diner del Moll or mollatge, the victigal or diner de la mercadería and most importantly, the lleuda (Macaire, 305-306; Cateura, 218-219; Maíz Chacón and Tudela Vilalonga, “mercaders jueus,” 1136 or <http://www.medievalismo.org/pdf/jueus_mercaders.pdf> 8. For discussion of this tax in the thirteenth century see Assis, Golden Age, 181 and Isaacs, Jews of Majorca, 27, 29. According to Yom Tov Assis, the lleuda was a duty paid on imports or exports between different territories of the kingdom. The peatge was a road or bridge tax. In the thirteenth century the Jews of Majorca were not required to pay the lleuda or peatge for trade within the Crown of Aragon, like other Majorcan traders who did not have to pay these dues. Considering the body of literature that exists on maritime commerce in medieval Majorca, what has been written about commercial taxation is sparse and unclear compared to the information available for the other main ports of the kingdom, Barcelona and Valencia, which is to a large extent a result of gaps in the archival sources. Thus one has to turn to the literature for the other port cities to shed some light on this area of study.

153 Different versions of the lleuda were levied at different ports throughout the Crown of Aragon. The rate fixed in 1327 was 2 diners per pound or 0.83%. Genoese and Pisan merchants paid their own separate rates, which fluctuated at different times, on both imports and exports. In his study of population and taxes during the first half of the fourteenth century, Vaquer writes that the Pisans paid between 4-8 diners per pound, while the Genoese paid between 1-2 diners per pound (“Població i economia a la Mallorca,” 258-259).

154 For example, Pere III in 1343: “…concedimus, universis et singulis judeis et sarracenis extraenis, ad ciutatem Majoricarum de partibus sarracenorum venientibus, quod non solvant nisi vicesimam partem illarum mercium seu bonorum, que portabant seu portari facient ad ciutatem et regnum Majoricarum seu insulas adjacentes eidem, quam vicesimam partem loco [decem] partis, per eos solvi solite…”(Pons, Judíos del reino, 283-84, vol. II, No.103). When he granted all North African Jews safe-conduct to enter and leave the island’s ports freely, in 1359, he set the import-export tax at one eighth (Isaacs, 255, No. 166; also published in BSAL 22: 390-91).
the *quarantée*, or 2.5%. Merchandise that had been brought to Majorca by the Maghrebi merchants who dealt with local Jews or conversos would have been subject to these taxes, except in certain cases where the Maghrebis belonged to a commercial partnership together with Majorcan citizens that had been registered with the governor.

Citizens of the Crown of Aragon (except Montpellier) and kingdom of Majorca were exempt from paying any form of *lleuda*. When King Martí attempted to impose it on citizens early in the fifteenth century, Majorcans protested vehemently, and successfully. Local Jews, like other merchants of the kingdom, were also exempt, at least until the turn of the fifteenth century when the *lleuda* registers show payments by Jews and conversos resident in Majorca, at a rate of 1 to 2 diners per pound, or 0.42% to 0.83%. It is not clear whether they paid the tax as

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156 In 1399 Martí complained that conversos and old Christians were not paying the taxes they owed when dealing with Jewish and Muslim merchants from North Africa. The *lleuda* certainly would have applied to products brought to Majorca by North Africans, but Martí’s letter seems to suggest (the language is not very clear) that it was payable on *any* goods imported from North Africa, even if shipped by Majorcans (ACA CR 2264: 142r-v).

157 Pierre Macaire, ”Majorque et le commerce international” 307-10; Vaquer, ”Població i economia,” 259 (for the Crown of Aragon in first half of fourteenth century).

158 This is specified in a privilege granted by Alfons III in 1285. In the same privilege Jews were also exempted from paying other royal taxes on merchandise transported within the Crown of Aragon. (Isaacs, 230, No.27; Régné, No. 1479).

159 López Pérez, _corona de Aragón_, 343-44. See p. 344 for a list of Majorcan Jews and conversos who paid the *lleuda* between 1407-1413. So far there is no conclusive evidence to explain exactly why and when they started paying the tax. She suggests that the Crown required them to pay the tax in exchange for the special protections it issued after 1391 (342), but does not seem to be aware that it would have been in addition to the “donation” the conversos were already paying the king, specifically 20% of the loans owed to them as I will discuss in Chapter Three. In terms of timing, they may have become subject to the *lleuda* early in Martí’s reign, considering that he had attempted to impose it on all Majorcan citizens, but was prevented from doing so by the *jurats*. More importantly, Martí had expressed concern that the *lleuda* was not being collected as required on goods sold by Jews who had immigrated to the island from North Africa under Joan’s privilege of 1395, which included former Majorcan exiles; according to the privilege these immigrants were still obligated to pay the *vinté* and *quaranté*. Pierre Macaire writes that the registers list Jews who had fled to the Maghréb, returning to the island for trade, implying that they would have owed the tax according to this privilege (Maire, ”Majorque et le commerce international,” 311). However, it does not appear, from my own research, that the names in the registers (as published by López Pérez) were those of returnees—although further study is required to make a conclusive statement here. It would have been risky for *conversos* (as opposed to Jews) who were known to have fled to the Maghréb to return to Majorca; the 1395 privilege inviting all exiled *Jews* to return under royal protection does not mention conversos (ACA CR 2264: 7r-8v; 122r-v). A possibility, in my view, is either that these conversos and Jews were paying the *lleuda* based on their transactions with Maghrebi Jews or Jewish returnees, as Martí required; moreover, once Martí stipulated in 1399
a result of the kingdom-wide imposition by Marti, however short-lived, or for a separate reason connected to their North African trade or assumed origins. The relevance of the *lleuda*, particularly in connection to this imposition, shall be revisited later in this dissertation.

**Local economy and occupations**

Not surprisingly, there was a direct relationship between the most popular commodities traded at the Majorcan port—namely wool, dyes, cloth and leather—and the most common trades among Jews. These equally reflect the strongest industries on the island as a whole: textiles and leather. Jews worked in these industries, manufacturing goods as artisans, and marketing them as merchants and brokers. They rarely laboured, if at all, in the production of raw materials, which remained exclusively in the hands of Christians. The 1350 tax register, *monedatge del call de la ciutat de Mallorca*, is currently the best source to provide a sense of the distribution of trades among the Jews of Majorca prior to 1391. According to this register, the most common occupations among Jews (in descending order) were those of tailor (*sastre*), merchant (*mercader*), broker (*corredor*), shoemaker (*sabater*) and silk worker (*seder*).

About one third of the city’s population was involved in textile production, a proportion mirrored among the Jewish population. Of the Jews for whom an occupation was recorded, over 34% worked in the textile industry, which included tailors (*sastres - 69%*), producers or merchants of silk (*seders - 13%*), dyers (*tintorers - 7%*) and mattress makers (*matalassers - 7%*). There were no instances of Jewish weavers (*teixidors*) or wool dressers (*paraires*), a trend that all Jews and Muslims living in Majorca since the time of the “destruction of the juderia” had to pay *lleuda* taxes, royal officials widened the scope of trade which required tax payments, so that conversos trading even with Jews who resided in Majorca for some time, could have been subjected to the *lleuda*. It is not an ideal source in that it appears to omit the very wealthy and very poor, and only specifies the occupation for about 40% of the names listed. Nevertheless, Margalida Bernat i Roca published a useful analysis of this register in *El call*, which includes a statistical breakdown of the occupations that are listed.

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162 They would have worked with imported silk. (Bernat i Roca, *El call*, 64)
which Bernat i Roca claims to have continued among the conversos for the first two generations. However, there is at least one reference to a converso linen weaver in 1404. The absence of weavers among Jews might be explained by the weavers’ guild statute, confirmed in 1391, that forbade instructing any unbaptized Jew, and forbade membership in the guild of any “infidel” – a term which included Jews.

Almost 29% of the individuals for whom an occupation was identified in the monedatge worked in the commercial sector, which encompassed various types of brokers, merchants, and shopkeepers. While there was no specific designation to identify middlemen trading in wine, wheat or oil, prior to 1391 many Jews extended credit to rural farmers to be repaid in large quantities of these agricultural commodities. Transporting commodities from the countryside to the city or off the island by ship may have been a side business for some Jews, or one aspect of brokerage.

The next most common sector was the leather industry, consisting mostly of shoemakers and a few skinners, and comprising close to 9% of the occupations listed. Many of the workshops (adobaries) were located in the area of Sa Calatrava, at the southeast corner of the

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163 ACM Protocols Notarials 14676, Juan Clavell: July 23, 1404 (Doc 763).
164 Antoni Pons Pastor, Ordinacions gremials i altres capítols a Mallorca: segles xiv-xv. (Palma de Mallorca: Estampa de'n Guasp, 1930) 77-78; Cortès i Cortès, Historia de los judíos mallorquines, 190-91; Álvaro Santamaría claims that this statute (of the weavers) was initially promulgated in 1384. The guild of cloak makers also permitted conversos in the trade, according to its 1391 statutes. See Santamaría Arández, “Sobre la condición de los conversos y chuetas de Mallorca,” Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie III, Historia Medieval 10 (1997): 233.
165 Bernat i Roca finds three kinds of brokers: corredors de besties, corredors de coll, and corredors de llevant. (66). I have seen the latter two denominations associated with conversos for the early fifteenth century. Many of the debts owed to Jews by rural Christians were on account of a mule or donkey which they had purchased on credit from a Jew. The Jews in question might be considered corredors de besties. Asunció Blasco Martínez discusses the different kinds of brokers or “correderes” in “Correderes de comercio judíos en Zaragoza (1300-1425),” Anuario de Estudios Medievales 29 (1999), 141-173.
166 This is evident from the lettres comunes in 1392 and 1393 which indicate Jews and conversos attempting to recover their debts after the violence. Many had extended credit to farmers who were expected to repay them in large quantities of these commodities. Jews expecting such payments from multiple debtors were likely intending them for resale.
call. One of the more common trades among conversos appearing in documents after 1391 was that of shoemaker, or sabater.

The register of the monedatge del call lists only one carpenter, or fuster, and I found no conversos specifically identified as fuster. This is noteworthy because a common Chueta surname is Fuster and it has been assumed by local scholars to be an indication that conversos bearing this name came from families of carpenters. However, this was the surname of an elite Christian family – Bartomeu Fuster, for example, was a lawyer – and many converted members of the prominent Natjar family took on this surname at baptism. It was common for conversos to adopt the surnames of elite Old Christians with whom they had relationships, and who likely served as godparents. The profession of silversmith is also popularly associated with the Chuetas, since a great number of them lived on the street Argenteria by the seventeenth century. However, among the Jewish tradesmen listed in the 1350 register, only 1% were silversmiths, and no converso silversmiths appear among my documents for the 1390s. There may well have been a shift in the trades predominant among conversos in periods later than the one with which this dissertation is concerned. It is also possible that we have a distorted view as a result of the famous seventeenth-century Inquisition trials, where the network of converso families implicated included a greater proportion of silversmiths.

A notably high proportion of Jews appearing in the 1350 monedatge del call, almost one third, claimed that they could not afford to pay the 8 sous head tax. Residents declaring themselves “insolvent”—indicated by the phrase “no a valent” written next to their name—had

167 Bernat i Roca, El call, 68.
168 I have identified at least 9 sabaters between 1391-1416 among my documents, which represent only a portion of the converso population at the time. The incidence of shoemakers among conversos is quite common in relation to other occupations identified among the documents.
169 See for instance the community depicted in Angela Selke, The Conversos of Majorca. See also Santamaría, Sobre la condición de los conversos, 221, 244, 253.
to provide witnesses to testify that they did not have as much as ten pounds to their name, which made them exempt from paying the tax. In cases of people who refused to pay, a collector was sent to seize the equivalent value from their possessions. As Bernat i Roca observes, this high rate of poverty belies the reputation of the community as being one of the wealthiest. She argues that the widespread poverty suggested by this monedatge was the result of the previous two decades of financial blows from which the aljama was still suffering. Nevertheless, a high percentage of poor residents recorded in the register does not take into account the underrepresented, yet conspicuous, wealthy class, or that some middling constituents may have convincingly hidden their assets such that they qualified as “no a valent.” Moreover, the data could present a skewed picture in that almost a quarter of the taxpayers were women, 78% of whom were widows, and 93% of these widows were insolvent. Even if we account for these factors, it is not unlikely that the community as a whole was still composed of many poor people, which would have made communal welfare all the more necessary. By the late fourteenth century the aljama had a number of confraternities that administered to the needs of the poor.

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170 Bernat i Roca, 97. The witnesses were Jewish. Some of these witnesses declared themselves insolvent as well, indicating that wealth was not one of the requirements to be an acceptable witness, though presumably they would have been considered men of good character. Over half of the witnesses did not appear in the monedatge list, possibly because they had connections to the royal court which afforded them tax exemptions, or because they did not qualify as residents. If they were required to pay but could not afford it, they would have been listed as “insolvent,” so those not listed probably were not considered to owe the monedatge tax.

171 For instance, they may still have been suffering from the blow of Jaume III’s fine in 1333, which seems to have not been entirely paid when Pere III came to the throne; there were also the costs (foremost in royal exactions) of the war with Pere III. In 1336 the aljama had a floating debt of 60,000 lbs dating back 12 years. In 1337 there was an episode of fraud where 2,000 pounds had been siphoned from aljama funds. In 1338, the royal treasurer demanded that the aljama pay any arrears (as I mentioned earlier) owing to the Crown. In 1344 the king ordered the secretaries of the aljama to pressure Jews who claimed insolvency to pay the royal taxes they had been attempting to avoid (Bernat 92, citing Pons 155). Although there does seem to be intense fiscal pressure on the aljama in the two decades preceding this tax register, it also seems that these pressures barely abate before 1391; perhaps there was a short hiatus in the earlier part of Pere’s reign, when he attempted to stimulate Majorca’s commerce, but the pressure certainly returned in the latter part of his reign and continues with Joan I. The only way to confirm whether the community as a whole was unusually poor at this time would be to compare this tax register with other years, but historians have not unearthed the data required to conduct such a study properly.

172 Bernat i Roca, El call, 44, 87, 96.

173 The aljama would have had some institutionalized welfare system in place; minimally, people could give alms at the synagogue which would be distributed to the poor. Later in the fourteenth century the aljama had four
Moneylending

One “occupation” which Bernat i Roca does not address is moneylending – which makes sense considering that this was, for the most part, a common way for Jews to invest liquid assets, but generally not pursued as a main occupation. Petitions for debt repayments from rural debtors between January and June 1392 alone (for debts contracted as far back as the early 1380s) record 63 individual Jewish creditors, which is more than the number of Jews identified with any given trade as recorded in 1350. \(^{174}\) Pawnbroking—lending money secured on a pawn which the creditor held until repayment—was, generally speaking, not recorded in notarial records, so it is more difficult to trace. The majority of archival records that mention Jews refer to moneylending in some respect. Still, if pawn broking transactions were not recorded, one cannot guarantee an accurate picture of the extent and ways in which Jews, of different social levels, were loaning money. Notarial records show clearly that it was common for upper class Jews, who appear elsewhere as community leaders, to invest in moneylending; they certainly would have had more of a cash flow to do so. In addition, it appears that members of what could be a middle class made a few loans of small amounts, or even just one. The amounts and frequency varied, anywhere from one loan for a few pounds to many loans totalling a few hundred. \(^{175}\) Jewish merchants, like other merchants, sought ways to diversify risk, distributing their investments among a few distinct enterprises. Moneylending was one way to diversify risk. The same

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\(^{175}\) These hypotheses are based primarily on the *lletres comunes* for the first half of 1392. Since so many conversos had to call in their loans immediately in order to make payments to the Crown, and the royal administration was more involved, the loans referred to in this sample should be quite representative of rural lending patterns prior to 1391. Nevertheless, this sample does not take into account urban loans which, comparatively speaking, appear much less frequently in the notarial records of this period. It is difficult to say what proportion of rural loans this sample represents; surely there was a large body of loans that are not captured in these letters.
merchants who invested large amounts in shipping merchandise from North African ports sometimes also made loans of smaller amounts to inhabitants of rural parishes.\textsuperscript{176}

While both Christians and Jews extended credit in various indirect ways through mechanisms like the \textit{censal} or commercial investments such as \textit{commenda} and letters of exchange (Jews rarely \textit{extended} credit using the \textit{censal} but often borrowed using this mechanism),\textsuperscript{177} directly loaning money on interest was considered “usury” and prohibited among Christians under ecclesiastical and royal legislation. Accusations of usury among Christians suggest that, despite these prohibitions, they did engage in directly loaning money on occasion. Jews, on the other hand, could legally loan money to Christians and openly collect interest as long as it did not exceed the capital and remained within the legal rate, which Jaume I had set at twenty percent monthly or four \textit{diners} per pound.\textsuperscript{178} It was not uncommon for kings to fine \textit{aljamas} for “usury” on the pretext of Jews charging more than the legal interest rate on loans. In such cases the fine often amounted to 20\% or the equivalent of the interest on their loans. Although Jaume I decreed, in 1254, that individual Jews, as opposed to entire communities, should be punished for committing usury, this was not upheld by all subsequent monarchs.\textsuperscript{179} For instance, in 1290, King Alfons effectively took a bribe of 37,000 \textit{sous} from the Majorcan \textit{aljama} for his abandonment of proceedings against them for usury.\textsuperscript{180} A century later, King Joan must

\textsuperscript{176} Maís Chacón cites a different example of diversification in which the creditor finances both military expeditions and small farmers: In the 1350s Mosse Almaciri loaned money both to ship owners who organized expeditions to North Africa, and to inhabitants of Manacor, though it seems he lent the latter money in the earlier part of the decade, before he financed expeditions (\textit{Els mercaders}, 11). Mosse may only have had the means to finance military expeditions after having built up capital through loan investments.


\textsuperscript{178} Isaacs, 226, citing Villanueva XXII, 301, dates this document to 1249. However Miret i Sans refers to a document regarding interest charged by Jews written in 1230.

\textsuperscript{179} Isaacs 227 citing Villanueva 331 but this doesn’t seem to be the right reference.

\textsuperscript{180} Isaacs 31; Cf. Meyerson, \textit{Jewish Frontier Kingdom}, 188 for the 20,000 \textit{sous compositio} paid to King Jaume by Valencian \textit{aljamas} in order to stop investigations of usury among them.
have had these precedents in mind when he collected a “gift” from the newly baptized Jews based upon their loans, as I shall elaborate in Chapter Three.

Numerous letters sent by the royal governor to rural bailiffs regarding loans owed to conversos and Jews in the wake of the 1391 violence shed light on the moneylending activities of Jews in previous years. For at least a year following the anti-Jewish violence, this body of correspondence, known as the *lletres comunes*, is almost exclusively concerned with overdue debts initially contracted between *forans* and Jews, many of whom had converted by then. The Christian debtors were comprised to a large extent of inhabitants from the rural parishes throughout the island (probably farmers), who borrowed mostly small amounts of money, sometimes secured on pawns. Most rural loans were under 30 pounds, and usually between 10 and 20 pounds.\(^{181}\) Brokers trading in agricultural products or pack animals also acted as creditors. Jews often paid for products such as oil, wool, grain or wine up to six months in advance, and in doing so provided a *de facto* loan.\(^{182}\) They also sold items to rural Christians on credit, most often mules, which would be paid for after a certain period of time.\(^{183}\)

The *lletres* from the governor instruct rural bailiffs to compel debtors in their jurisdiction to pay their Jewish (and after 1391, converso) creditors immediately “*en dineres o en penyores*” — where “penyora” refers to any object that might be taken instead of coin. If the debtors did not have cash, they were obligated to render a possession of equivalent or greater value within three days. Once the debtor designated an object, it would be taken to the bailiff’s

\(^{181}\) Soto also finds that Jews lent small amounts, between 22 and 170 *sous*. He found one case with a much larger amount involved, where Ammar Abenjacob lent 30 Valencian pounds to the *aljama* representatives (*Algunes consideracions* 25, citing himself in “la aljama judaica…” 159-162)

\(^{182}\) See Pons 90-99 for brief citations of documentation of various kinds of credit extended by Jews to Christain debtors. For instance: Ayon Natjar, guardian of the sons and heirs of Mardufay Cohen Bacari, sought repayment of 30 **Mallo**rcan pounds and 100 *cuarterans* of oil from the bailiff of Sóller and his wife. There are numerous examples of rural bailiffs similarly indebted to Jews through the fourteenth century. Instances of Jews collecting wine from Christians are interesting; given the prohibition against Christians handling kosher wine, presumably such wine was intended for resale to Christians (Pons, “judios del reino,” 93; No. 381).

\(^{183}\) Ibid.
court by the “saig” (sheriff) or “capdeguaiete” (head guard)—both royal officials who executed penalties determined by the bailiff’s court—until it could be auctioned at a local market, and the required funds delivered to the creditor (usually in the city) by the royal porter. The more commonly confiscated objects were beasts of burden (i.e. donkeys and mules) and sickles. The fact that a pawn had not already been left with the creditor at the time the debt was contracted indicates that the creditors in these records were, strictly speaking, not pawnbrokers but moneylenders.

Loans had to be paid within five years; if unpaid loans were not brought before a civil court by the sixth year, the contract was nullified. This also prevented unmanageable amounts of interest from building up on loans that had not been paid for years—although debtors often could not manage repaying their debts even within the legal amount of time. Pere III, in 1351, added the provision that the five-year limit would not apply if it had not been publicized, if the Jewish creditors had not been made aware of it, or in exceptional situations, such as if the Jew did not approach the debtor for fear of his safety. It was in the king’s interest to ensure loans were paid back to the Jews if he wanted subsidies from them. When debtors neglected to repay...
their debts within the acceptable time frame, their Jewish creditors could press charges against them in a royal court.\textsuperscript{189} If the debtor did not have the means to repay his or her debt, usually the court would seize possessions or land of equivalent value. Presumably, if the loan had been secured on a pawn, the creditor could simply sell it in order to collect his or her money; in other words, with a pawn in hand, the creditor did not need to incur the expense of drafting a legal document as a safeguard to recover his or her capital should the debtor default. This would explain why pawnbroking is not accurately represented in the notarial registers.\textsuperscript{190}

During periods of economic strain exacerbated by droughts, plagues, war and excessive taxation, the rural syndicate (\textit{sindicat de fora}) or city \textit{jurats} pressured the Crown to grant general moratoria on loans owed to Jews and Christians alike.\textsuperscript{191} These moratoria were especially valuable for Christian rural debtors who suffered in particular during the frequent droughts; but they were equally detrimental for their Jewish creditors, who needed to obtain the cash they had invested in order to pay royal and communal taxes. When moratoria were not enough, \textit{forans} might seek other ways to extricate themselves from their financial straits, even on a collective level. For instance, in 1331 the Jews were expelled from the town of Alcudia because “the town

\textsuperscript{189} In the 1392 \textit{lletres comunes} this was usually at the governor’s court.

\textsuperscript{190} I have not seen loan contracts that refer specifically to pawns, perhaps because there was no need to hire a notary to guarantee repayment of the loan once the creditor had the security in his or her possession. Pons, vol. II, (94), however, cites examples of pawns deposited by two Jews of Manacor with the local court, and of two Christian debtors who, in 1365, provided slaves to secure a debt for 150 pounds. These citations do not seem to be letters of debt, but stem from complaints to the governor’s court (reflected in \textit{Lletres comunes} registers). He also supplies an interesting example from 1339 of a Jewish woman living in Ibiza who had received as a security a copper pot, which she could not return because it was stolen from her and she was imprisoned as a result. She claimed she should be freed by virtue of a 1250 privilege that exempted Jews from responsibility for stolen pawns.

\textsuperscript{191} In 1349 the rural syndics successfully petitioned Pere III for a moratorium since the inhabitants of the island were in a desperate situation as a result of a combination of factors: the drought and poor harvests over the past few years, recent mortalities, damages resulting from the war against Jaume III – a situation which both gave rise to, and was made worse by, their debts to the Jews. \textit{Forenses} would have also suffered under the burden of royal taxes, though not surprisingly, this was not mentioned in the petition to the Crown. Similar petitions were made just after the violence of 1391. Moratorium requests might also be made on behalf of a particular locale. In 1316, on behalf of the town of Sóller, Bernat Jaubert requested an extra four months to repay debts owed to Jews and drapers, to allow residents to sell their immobile goods first. At other times moratoria were requested specifically to allow debtors more time to collect and sell their harvests (Pons, vol. II, 80-81). During poor harvests or dearth, the king might also request agricultural rent collectors to postpone their collection or accept it in specie instead of grain. Sometimes harvests did not satisfy local needs and arrangements had to be made for grain to be imported (Pons, vol. II, 95-96).
and parish are impoverished by the loans of the Jews, who act with much astuteness and cleverness.” The expulsion was decreed close to the time that their loans to Jews would have been called in after a three-year moratorium obtained in 1329. Despite suffering a plague that year, the residents of Alcúdia protested that their Jewish creditors continued to pressure them for repayment. There is no evidence so far to confirm that the expulsion of 1331 was enforced, but there is an absence of references to Jews there until 1355, after which there are numerous references to Jews threatened by Christian violence. In 1357, for instance, a number of Jewish workers fled Alcúdia just before Easter because of such threats.

The aljama frequently protested moratoria on the basis of their fiscal commitments to the Crown and the need for income from interest on loans to meet those commitments, occasionally bribing kings not to issue them. In order to “protect” Jewish moneylenders, Pere III ruled that moratoria could not be extended past five years, although at different times this period was shortened at the behest of Jews, or mitigated in some other way. Tensions between creditors and debtors, and more specifically Jews and forenses, forced the Crown to navigate between its fiscal interests and the need to maintain social stability. Granting moratoria meant that Jews would not be able to fill the king’s coffers to the extent he had hoped, but not granting some respite to his impoverished subjects could lead to social unrest, as it did in 1391. In fact, prior to

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194 See documents published in this text for further references to harassment of Jews, and fear or perpetration of violence against them.
195 King Sanç for example ruled in 1312 that no moratoria could be issued except to Majorcan merchants; in 1327, Jaume III’s regent Felipe ruled that debtors could not benefit from more than one moratorium (Pons, judíos del reino, vol. II, 80).
196 See for instance in 1312 when syndicate pressured king for moratorium as a result of drought and aljama secretaries complained that it would be too economically damaging for them. In this case the king tried to find a middle ground, and ordered the governor to make a judgment on a case-by-case basis. Thus we find examples of moratoria granted to individuals, but not general ones (Pons, ibid, 89).
1391 there had already been isolated instances of Jews threatened with violence by their Christian debtors.\textsuperscript{197}

Without moratoria, debtors resorted to other tactics in order to delay payment, which paralleled the strategies of tax evasion employed by Jews and other taxpayers.\textsuperscript{198} Debtors might absent themselves from their home for a period so that collectors could not find them, or nominally transfer their possessions to another person’s name so that they could not be seized. Although in 1380 Pere III attempted to protect moneylenders from this ruse, his attempts were not particularly successful in the long term.\textsuperscript{199} Some debtors opted for more legitimate channels, seeking royal privileges to avoid paying debts, an option which Pere III barred in 1379 at the request of the Jews. Among the many privileges granted to the Jews of Majorca by the regent Felip in 1327 was that any Jew or Christian indebted to a Jew could be incarcerated for default in payment, but this privilege was revoked a year later at the insistence of the municipal \textit{jurats}.\textsuperscript{200} Such decisions on the part of the Crown illustrate how royal policies constantly fluctuated between competing demands and entitlements. When there was no moratorium in effect, Jewish creditors took insolvent or resistant debtors to court, where they were usually sentenced with more fines or by impounding of their goods. There was of course resistance to this during more desperate times; for example, during a period of plague rural syndicates in 1362 obtained the provision from the royal governor that personal properties could not be seized for debts.\textsuperscript{201}

From the mid-fourteenth century, with the development of credit mechanisms and public debt that facilitated the growth of a Christian \textit{rentier} class and commercial investment among

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid, 90.
\textsuperscript{198} On moneylending, evasion tactics of debtors and issues of usury, see Meyerson, \textit{Iberian Frontier Kingdom}, Chapter 4, “The Yoke of Usury.”
\textsuperscript{199} Pons, ibid, 79, 80. On royal assistance to Jewish moneylenders see Assis, \textit{Jewish Economy}, 60-62.
\textsuperscript{200} Pons, ibid, 82.
\textsuperscript{201} Pons ibid, 86; “judíos del reino,” (vol.1), 396
Christians, Jews gradually lost their virtual monopoly of the credit market, less and less frequently providing large loans to members of the nobility and ecclesiastical institutions. Over the course of the fourteenth century, Christian merchants and *rentiers* came to dominate much of the credit market, but there was still a need for Jews to loan smaller amounts of money, mainly to peasants.

We have already seen that Jews, as a corporate *aljama*, borrowed money from Christians, particularly in the form of *censals*, in order to pay royal taxes or deal with communal expenses. Needless to say, individual Jews frequently indebted themselves to Christian creditors as well, through *censals* or other forms of credit. They also petitioned the Crown for moratoria, usually on an individual basis. Sometimes they left the island to escape debts they could not pay, leaving wives or other representatives to petition the Crown on their behalf for some form of respite.

### Demographic considerations

**Rural enclaves**

The post-1391 *llettres communes* registers, which informed much of the foregoing discussion about moneylending, present a picture of urban Jewish creditors versus rural Christian debtors, as if the island’s Jewish population was primarily urban. Prior to 1391, the situation was in fact quite otherwise. There were numerous Jewish rural enclaves that were commercially and fiscally vibrant, even if the urban community served as the epicentre of the *aljama*, housing the

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202 On Jews and censals, see Meyerson, *Jewish Renaissance*, and Alexandra Guerson’s forthcoming thesis

203 Pons, *judíos del reino*, vol. 2, 101-103. As I shall explain in Chapter Four, after 1391 there was a high incidence of converted Jews petitioning the king for assistance with debt troubles, claiming to have lost fortunes and fallen into dire straits as a result of the violence. It is difficult to determine whether their situation was much worse than prior to the 1391 *avalot*, or whether they merely used that event to frame their petition in such a way that was more likely to solicit a favourable response. Both cases are not mutually exclusive. The letters state either that the converso debtors had been incarcerated by their creditors for not repaying their debts, or that they feared as much. The king usually judged that they should not be imprisoned and their creditors allow them more time to raise the money to repay their debts.
greatest numbers and wealth within the walls of its call.\textsuperscript{204} Dating from the first half of the fourteenth century, there are numerous archival references to Jews living in towns throughout the island, such as Inca, Sóller, Sineu, Felanix, Montuiri, Alcúdia, Artà, Lluchmajor, Manacor, Pollença, Petra, Valldemossa, and Bunyola. In terms of taxation and their relationship to the Crown, all the Jewish communities outside of Majorca’s \textit{ciutat}, including those on the other Balearic islands of Ibiza and Menorca, comprised a single administrative unit—together with the city community—known as a the \textit{collecta} of Majorca.\textsuperscript{206} This meant that the \textit{aljama} secretaries based in the city lobbied before the Crown on behalf of the smaller communities, and also counted them as contributors to communal taxes and royal subsidies or fines.\textsuperscript{207}

The border between city and countryside was permeable. There was a high degree of mobility among Jews (as well as Christians) between the \textit{ciutat} and the towns.\textsuperscript{208} Jews from the

\textsuperscript{204} The rural Jewish presence predates the Christian conquest. The \textit{repartiment} shows that some of the \textit{alqueries} appropriated by Jaume had belonged to Jews. While these native Jews were dispossessed of their rural estates, Jaume granted other lands to individual Jewish aides from the peninsula, in addition to urban and rural properties given to the collective of Jews “now living in Majorca” that included \textit{alqueries} in Inca, Sineu, Petra and Montuiri. In the text of the \textit{repartiment} lands are given either to “Jews” or “Jews of the Almudayna.” This differentiation might be simply a product of scribal inconsistency, but it could also suggest that there were rural “satellite” communities. The urban community exhibits a much more prominent role in the documentation following the conquest, and a closer relationship to the king—not surprising given its population size, commercial importance and wealth.


\textsuperscript{206} Still, the smaller communities maintained a separate identity; they brought their own unique issues before \textit{aljama} secretaries or the Crown. Certain larger communities within the \textit{collecta}, such as Inca, could establish their own tax for specific community expenses. For discussion of Jewish \textit{collectas} see Assis, \textit{Golden Age}. On Menorcan Jewish communities see Josep Masacró Pasarius, "Los judíos de Menorca en la baja edad media," Revista de Menorca 74 (1983), 241-81; Ramon Roselló Vaquer and Andreu Murillo i Tudurí, \textit{Els jueus dins la societat menorquina del segle xiv} (Mahón: Institut d’Estudis Baleàrics, 1990), 58.

\textsuperscript{207} For a document citing the collection of taxes from Jews living in rural towns by \textit{aljama} secretaries see Pons, \textit{judios del reino}, vol. 2, 238-39; No. 47. On Jews of Inca owing taxes to the \textit{aljama} of Majorca see Pere Joan Llabrés i Martorell and Ramon Rosselló i Vaquer, \textit{Inca en la historia}, 237. Names of Jews from various towns appear in the 1339 list of debtors still owing their share of the fine imposed by Jaume III in 1333, which was discussed earlier in this chapter (Riera i Sans and Rosselló i Vaquer, "Deutes fiscals," 85-86.). Note references to this list also in: Llabrés i Martorell and Rosselló i Vaquer, \textit{Inca en la historia}, 240; Bartomeu Mulet, Ramon Rosselló Vaquer, and Josep M. Salom, \textit{La capitalitat de Sineu, segles xiii i xiv} (Sineu: Ajuntament de Sineu, 1994), 101.

\textsuperscript{208} For discussion of Jewish \textit{collectas} see Assis, \textit{Golden Age}. On Menorcan Jewish communities see Josep Masacró Pasarius, "Los judíos de Menorca en la baja edad media," Revista de Menorca 74 (1983), 241-81; Ramon Roselló Vaquer and Andreu Murillo i Tudurí, \textit{Els jueus dins la societat menorquina del segle xiv} (Mahón: Institut d’Estudis Baleàrics, 1990), 58.

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ciutat came to trade at Inca’s market, for instance, or, along with Jews from other towns, to work as day labourers on the construction of the wall in Alcúdia. They also came to ship merchandise such as textiles from Alcúdia’s port, or travelled from there to places like Sardinia. 209 Jews from various towns and especially from the city also visited rural towns in search of moneylending clients. Additionally, they invested in rural properties: for example, in 1378 Jucef Faquim sold to Gabriel Fabregat “a large house with an archway and a corral” he held in Muro, which was under allodial ownership of Ramon de Sant Marti. 210 Jews who resided outside of the city were often involved in the trade, or brokerage, of agricultural produce, such as wheat, oil and wine (kosher as well as non-kosher), paying for the produce months ahead of time, and in this way extending credit to the farmers. 211

Local histories of Majorcan towns all claim, incorrectly, that the Jewish inhabitants lived primarily off moneylending, despite the archival references to rural Jewish doctors, artisans or brokers. The historians assume that the Jewish creditors who dominate rural notarial records engaged in moneylending as a full-time occupation, and that they lived in same town as their Christian debtors, when in fact many of them were inhabitants of the ciutat who extended credit to inhabitants of multiple towns. A much smaller proportion of these moneylenders are specifically identified as inhabitants of the same town as the debtor.

The picture painted by Majorcan historians of Jews as moneylenders reflects a modern-day local prejudice, which fundamentally reiterates the medieval forans’ perception of Jews as

209 Mas i Forners, Roselló Bordoy, and Roselló Vaquer, Historia d’Alcúdia, 153 notes 14, 16; 409, 411, 419 re wine; 408, 412
210 Gabriel Alomar i Esteve and Ramon Rosselló i Vaquer, Historia de Muro, vol. III (Muro: Ajuntament de Muro, 1990), 451. The Faquim were a prominent merchant family based in the city.
211 Viticulture was prevalent in the area surrounding Inca, and local Jews commonly purchased large quantities of wine from Christians (Llabrés i Martorell and Rosselló i Vaquer, Inca en la historia, especially pages 237-239). In Alcúdia it was also common for Jews to purchase wine from Christians and store it in their cellars before shipping it to the city or elsewhere (Antoni Mas i Forners, Guillem Roselló Bordoy, and Ramon Roselló Vaquer, Historia d’Alcúdia:, 153 notes 14, 16; 409, 411, 419).
preying upon them through usury. Notwithstanding this bias, local historians correctly attribute
the forans anti-Jewish aggression to economic difficulties compounded by royal taxation,
drought and epidemic, all of which compelled them to become increasingly indebted to, and
resentful of, their Jewish creditors. Despite positive relations that existed between Jewish and
Christian neighbours in the countryside, both sides were clearly frustrated by the creditor-debtor
relationship. The forans’ frustration found an occasional outlet in hostilities against rural Jewish
communities during the fourteenth century, particularly during Holy Week.212 Jews residing in
towns, often living adjacent to Christians and not segregated in a walled quarter, may in fact
have been more vulnerable to assaults than the Jews in the city, where the walls of the call
offered some degree of protection against potential aggressors. Tensions increased with the
troubles of the early 1370s. According to Baer, when some of the forans attacked Jewish
communities in 1374, they also advocated the expulsion of Jews from the island.213

Inca, with the largest and possibly the oldest Jewish community outside of the ciutat, was
the only town that possessed a walled call. It was completed less than twenty years before the
1391 revolt, when it was destroyed, after many years’ delay, as a result of local disputes.
According to royal correspondence, the Jews of Inca were interested in having walls built in
order to minimize violence against them. Although in principle the town’s jurats agreed that it
would be better not to mix with Jews, they resisted the idea of granting Jews exclusive access to
certain parts of the town, let alone contributing to the cost of the walls. Meanwhile, Inca’s Jews
continued to suffer attacks through the later fourteenth century.214

212 Alomar i Esteve and Rosselló i Vaquer, Historia de Muro, 207; Mulet, Rosselló Vaquer, and Salom, capitalitat
de Sineu, 110-11; Llabrés i Martorell and Rosselló i Vaquer, Inca en la historia, 243.
213 Baer, History of the Jews, 48.
214 In 1342 king Pere III advised the jurats of Inca to begin negotiations with the Jewish community and the royal
administration to create a walled quarter, to prevent them from mixing with Christians, and protect them from the
assaults they suffered at the hands of the latter. However, the plans were not actualized and the Jews continued to
The 1391 revolt affected Jews residing in rural areas as well, to the extent that it altered their demographic distribution on the island. Alcudia, for instance, ceased to have a Jewish population entirely.\textsuperscript{215} There are much fewer archival references to Jews or conversos living in other rural towns after 1391, when they may have shifted their residence to the city where there was a more substantial community, which may have offered them a greater sense of security. The drop in the rural Jewish population was not without its effects for Christians, either: in 1395 the notary Pere Salt requested that the king reduce the rate he paid annually for the scribania of Inca, since his income had dropped dramatically as a result of the destruction of both the city and Inca’s \textit{call} whence the majority of his earnings came.\textsuperscript{216}

Shortly after the \textit{avalot}, proclamations were made in each town ordering residents to denounce anyone they had seen with goods stolen from Jews or the \textit{call} of the city. Many reported having seen their neighbours carrying various items, most of which originated in the city’s \textit{call}.\textsuperscript{217} Property also was stolen from Jewish residents of towns, some of whom had deposited valuables for safekeeping with the local bailiff or with other Christians at the time of live dispersed among the Christian population until 1372. At first plans appear to have been suspended due to the plague in 1348, but were resurrected in 1353; another delay of about twenty years after that resulted from disputes between the jurats and Jewish community regarding the location and cost. In 1372 the secretaries of the \textit{aljama} of Majorca complained to the governor that the jurats of Inca were not upholding their obligations with regard to building the walled \textit{call}, ignoring an agreement of nine years prior. The lack of a wall allowed the daily harassment by Christians to continue, which had already led many Jews to leave the town. Rosseló Vaquer claims that population decline among Jews was the first cause of delaying construction of the \textit{call}. Ultimately the \textit{call} was located in the central and oldest part of Inca; as in the \textit{ciutat}, it was adjacent to the Franciscan monastery. Máñez Chacon refers to attacks against Inca’s Jews in 1351, 1373, 1388 and the spring of 1391 in his thesis (\textit{Actividades económicas}, 344-345).

On the building of the \textit{call} of Inca and related legal disputes see Antoni Pons Pastor, "Erección del call de Inca de Mallorca: su lenta y fatigosa gestación (siglo xiv)," \textsl{Sefarad} 15, no. 1 (1955), and especially p.81, Document No. III, p.84 -85, Document No. 5; see also Llabrés i Martorell and Rosselló i Vaquer, \textit{Inca en la historia}, 243-245. \textsuperscript{215} Mas i Forners, Roselló Bordoy, and Roselló Vaquer, \textit{Historia d'Alcúdia}: 135.

\textsuperscript{216} ACA 1999: 155r-156r (November 4, 1395).

\textsuperscript{217} See for example, Mulet, Rosselló Vaquer, and Salom, \textit{La capitalitat de Sineu}, 111-13.; Mas i Forners, Roselló Bordoy, and Roselló Vaquer, \textit{Historia d'Alcúdia}, 426.
Unfortunately for their Jewish owners, even those goods that had been stored with Christians for protection at the time of the revolt disappeared after the fact.

The class tensions between the countryside and city that erupted in 1391 and again in 1450 with the revolt of the foranéas do not appear to have been reflected within the Jewish population, among which divisions existed more noticeably between different ethnicities or competing family factions. Scholarship on intra-communal dispute and violence among

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218 Mas writes that Jews and their property were attacked in Alcúdia. For references to Jews depositing valuables with the bailiff in 1391, see ibid p. 135, 425; for difficulties reclaiming the goods they deposited for safekeeping, see p.135, 426.

219 The Jewish community was comprised of multiple ethnic or cultural backgrounds. The pre-conquest Jewish population was linguistically and culturally tied to the Arab culture of Al-Andalus and North Africa. After the conquest, during the thirteenth century, immigrants came from the Crown of Aragon and southern France who were affiliated with Catalan or Provençal culture. According to Charles-Emmanuel Dufourcq, Jews coming from the peninsular cities such as Barcelona, Gerona, Lérida and Tortosa tended to settle on the island together with others from their home communities; Jews of Lérida settled in Petra, for example. Jews from North Africa, especially Sijilmassa, also continued to settle in Majorca, bringing with them different customs and language from the European Jews (Soto Company, "Algunes consideracions," 16, 23). Jewish immigration continued into the fourteenth century; Amador de los Rios claims that sixty families arrived from France after the expulsion in 1311, while more Jews continued to come from the Maghreb, as well as the peninsular kingdoms (See Bernat i Roca, El call p.46; she cites Amador de los Rios, Historia Social, 151, and Rosselló, El rei Jaume II de Mallorca i el seu temps (2001), 13 on French and North African immigrants). Bernat i Roca also shows that some of the names listed in the 1350 monedatge suggest French or North African provenance (such as Yecob de Paris, Abrafim Francés, or Abet Berberí and Fesuati). Names which indicate peninsular origin include Tortoxi, Malaquí, Osqa, de Xativa, Navaro and Castelà. She also writes that there was an influx of Jews from Inca to the city between 1300-1349 but doesn’t explain why (47).

That tensions within the Jewish community were defined along ethnic lines has been suggested by Majorcan scholars based on vague references; it is believable, but so far no conclusive details have surfaced among the documents. Intra-communal conflicts would have been rooted in ethnic divisions during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, when there were greater numbers of Jews from different regions immigrating to the island. Ricard Soto cites a document of 1268 from the Escrivania de Cartes Reals in which the bailiff gives permission to representatives of the aljama to divide the synagogue among the Jews living in Majorca, but does not indicate a reason for which the representatives would have solicited this license. Soto writes that the “instruments de franquesa” demonstrate a greater degree of immigration during the 1260s and suggests that the synagogue divide was a related to demographic growth. Soto suggests that the synagogue’s division was either a result of competing factions or because the community outgrew its capacity. The latter does not make sense as an explanation for division of the synagogue. It is quite possible that the synagogue would have been divided to accommodate the different customs of Jews from different regions. Such ethnic differences may have given rise to wider social conflicts as well. For instance, in 1319, the secretaries of the aljama petitioned King Sanç concerning foreign “vagabond” Jews who were causing scandals, antagonisms and disputes among the local community. In response, he ordered his lieutenant to punish and expel these Jews from the kingdom with the next disruption they caused (BRAH 36, No. 25, July 21, 1319; Isaacs, 56 and 244, No. 99). Apparently this did not put an end to the troubles, since five years later, in 1324, King Sanç had to order his viceroy to stop trials against prominent and “honourable” Jews that has been instigated by other Jews of “bad repute.” (Isaacs 56 and 245, No. 108; BRAH 36, No.33). Although the latter instance does not necessarily suggest ethnic divisions, it reflects tensions and enmities between factions within the aljama that were endemic, just as they were among the Christian population. Another example is the ongoing
Jewish communities in Spain is still a young field but there is much to excavate. In Majorca, it is clear that the *aljama* was plagued by factionalism, as so many other *aljamas* were, but investigating this intriguing theme here would be a digression. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is useful to bear in mind simply that rivalry and dispute were endemic within the *aljama*, both on an individual and group level, and that the same tensions persisted beyond the ruptures and baptisms of 1391.

**Demography**

A factor which should not be overlooked when considering the foregoing themes of royal policies, taxation and economic roles of Majorcan Jews is their population. Larger communities were more important to the treasury for their ability to provide revenues, which afforded them an advantage when lobbying the king. Moreover, the larger the Jewish population, the more resentment local Christians would have had against the fact that they were not paying the same taxes, or had received special privileges.

Scholars of medieval Majorca have offered a wide range of estimates for its Jewish population during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, ranging from Amador De los Rios’ estimate of 350-400 at the time of conquest, to 5,000 inhabitants at the end of the thirteenth century.\(^{220}\) Hillgarth and many other scholars believe the Jewish population reached its peak at

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\(^{220}\) Pasarius cites a few scholars who suggest varying population numbers: Sobrequés writes that at the end of the thirteenth century, there were 4,000 to 5,000 Jews in Majorca, or 6.5% of the population, which seems excessive; for the first part of the fourteenth century, Font Obrador sets the population of the *call* at 2,227 inhabitants, while Marcel Durliat refers to a royal head tax list of 259 heads of families in the *aljama* of Majorca, and 26 for the rest of the island, but notes that the actual number would have exceeded the list; Santamaria writes that according to the *morabatí* of 1343, the *aljama* had 1,700 inhabitants, yet curiously finds 2,600 in 1350, which he explains in terms of immigration to the city from rural areas after the plague. He calculates about 2,227 living in the *call* based on the 1329 *morabatí* register ("Demografía de Mallorca. análisis del morabatín de 1329," *Mayurqa* 20 (1980/1984): 198). See also Pasarius, *Judíos y descendientes*, 638-39.
the end of the thirteenth century at about 2,000-2,500. So far, not enough archival evidence has been unearthed to ascertain Jewish population numbers immediately before and after the violence of 1391, in order to estimate what portion of the community was killed or fled the island. The best source for a demographic portrait of the call before 1391 is the register of the monedatge del call de la ciutat de Mallorca of 1350. In her analysis of the monedatge, which lists 735 names, Bernat i Roca estimates the Jewish population to have been around three thousand. Compared with figures yielded by studies for the Christian population at this time, this would be about twenty percent – a rather high proportion which Benat i Roca suspects results from the monedatge encompassing a wider geographical scope, probably including households actually located outside of the city limits.

Extant registers for the morabatí tax from 1329, 1336, 1343, and 1349 show a continuous decline in the Jewish population beginning in 1329, with a recovery only in 1349. This

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221 In his Corpus d’antropònims mallorquins Joan Miralles defines the monedatge de morabatí as a tax of 8 sous exacted every 7 years from residents with a patrimony of over 10 pounds (p.18). In their Diccionario de terminos historicos, Todoli and Bonet state that, in Majorca the terms monedatge and morabati were used interchangeably to refer to this same tax, which was paid per household, not individual. Note that in the Crown of Aragon these terms could refer to distinct taxes (See Alcover, Diccionari català-valencià-balear). Margalida Bernat i Roca follows Todoli and others in considering the 735 entries to represent heads of households (Cf. Vaquer, "Població i economia," 243).

222 Assuming each household consisted of four to five people, Bernat i Roca calculates a population of 2,940 to 3,670, with a mean of 3,307 (El call, 38-40). She cites Sevillano Colom who finds 3,692 households for this year in the city (“La demografía de Mallorca a través del impuesto del morabatí: siglos XIV, XV, XVI,” BSAL 34, 233-273:247) and multiplies that number by the coefficient (number of people per household) of 4, 4.5 or 5 to get population numbers for the city: between 16,614 and 18,460.

223 Given these numbers Bernat i Roca calculated the density of the call at 1000 people per square kilometre, which is also high. To account for what she interprets as disproportionately high ratios, she suggests that one ought to view residence as indicated in the tax registers as a kind of “fiscal” residence as opposed to an actual one; since people were required to live in the call, those who did not might have falsely claimed they did to royal tax collectors, even if they lived in rural villages (50).

224 These figures are based on urban population. There is a problem in the scholarship which I have not yet been able to resolve. If the monedatge or morabatí tax was collected every seven years, then the next one after 1343 should have been 1350. However, figures provided by scholars such as Vaquer (Població i economia) and Sastre Moll (El impuesto del morabatí) for Jews are based on a 1349 morabatí. They do not refer to the 1350 monedatge that Miralles published, and Miralles makes not mention of any 1349 register in his Corpus. Moreover, the number of households provided by Vaquer and Sastre is much lower than in the register Miralles published and which Bernat i Roca uses. For example, for the years 1329, 1336, 1343, and 1349, the numbers of Jewish households published by Sastre are 495, 371, 333, and 465 respectively. The difference between the number of Jewish households recorded in
population decline in the first half of the century can be linked to deteriorating conditions for Jews, mostly as a result of royal financial exactions. Intense financial pressure tended to compel Jews to leave their communities in order to avoid paying taxes. With an economy so dependent on maritime commerce, the aljama, and thus its numbers, also suffered when war disrupted trade. The war with Genoa (1329-1336), followed by the war between Jaume III and Pere III

the 1349 morabatí (465) and the 1350 monedatge (735) is too great for the two taxes to be referring to exactly the same group of taxpayers; the 1350 monedatge does appear to include a much wider scope, but there is no conclusive evidence indicating its parameters. To some extent, the difference in population between the 1349 and 1350 registers may have been partly due to some immigration of Jews from rural areas to the city, and is also in keeping with an upward demographic trend that occurs after Pere III annexed the kingdom of Majorca in 1343. Another possibility for the inconsistency in numbers is that the register Bernat i Roca uses lists names of individuals even if they were too poor to pay; it is possible that Sastre’s registers do not and simply omit the names of the poor— but he does not indicate either way.

What we can ascertain, despite these analytical issues, is that there was a decline in the Jewish population until the early 1340s, and a recovery around the middle of the century. In his analysis for the Jewish population of Inca, Vaquer notes a pattern similar to that of the ciutat: from the 1329 to 1336 morabatí it decreases dramatically, then gradually increases in 1343 and again in 1350, but does not return to the level of 1329 (Vaquer, "Població i economia," 248).

The mid-century increase in the Jewish population contrasts notably with the demographic pattern for the island’s Christian population, which reaches a peak in the period around 1336 – 1343, and then drops in 1349, likely as a result of plague. Why the Jewish population does not drop with the plague is a question that remains unsatisfactorily answered to this point. Bernat i Roca discounts the possibility that the plague did not quite penetrate the call, citing documentary evidence showing that urban Jews did die from the plague at this time. If, for whatever reason, there was in fact a lower rate of mortality among the Jews, we might question whether it signalled a somewhat limited contact between them and the rest of the population, notwithstanding recent studies that show a significant amount of interaction between Christians, Jews and Muslims at least, but not exclusively, on an economic level. The period of 1343-1349 is also the time in which Pere III was consolidating his power over Majorca. While his war with Jaume III would have had a negative impact, generally speaking, on the island’s economy and population, Pere III’s efforts to strengthen the economy and trade of its Jewish population, through privileges and tax exemptions, could have stimulated Jewish demographic growth and immigration to the call.

Bernat i Roca suggests that the population decline beginning in 1329 (while the Christian population began to increase) could have resulted from the heavy fiscal burdens imposed with Jaume III’s condemnation of 1333. She does not stress this factor strongly enough, especially considering that historically, Jews sometimes changed residence from one jurisdiction to another in order to escape financial obligations, especially taxes collected by the aljama. Theoretically, if a Jew could keep moving between jurisdictions undetected, they could keep avoiding taxes, since new immigrants were usually exempt for a few years.

Additional fiscal pressures in this period include a series of bankruptcies following the death of King Sanç; in 1331 the jurats refused Jaume II’s request for subsidies because the municipality was financially depleted. Ortega Villoslada, “Donación de Sancho I de Mallorca de un antiguo cementerio judioa la ciudad de Mallorca,” 152ff, citing Cateura, “Las instalaciones portuarias de la ciudad de Mallorca (1300-1350),” XIII Congrés d’Història de la Corona d’Aragó, Palma de Mallorca, 27 setembre - 1 octubre 1987 (Palma de Mallorca: 1989), 50.

225 Santamaría argues that other scholars overlook the effect that the war between Pere III and Jaume III over the Majorcan throne would have had on the island’s population, which would partly explain the demographic drop among the Christian population of the ciutat; factors include Pere’s occupation from 1343, the political repression which ensued over the next few years, and the devastating after-effects of Jaume’s failed campaign in 1349 (Santamaría Arández, “Demografia de Mallorca,” 209. Bernat i Roca (relying on Sastre’s morabatí figures) shows the city’s population peak in 1336 between 21,776 and 27,220, dropping in 1343 and again in 1349 (Bernat i Roca, El call, 40). To calculate population figures, she multiplies the number of payments by coefficients ranging from 4
over the throne (1341-1343), caused greater taxes to be imposed on the Jewish community, while at the same time causing setbacks to the very trade that, for many, enabled them to raise the necessary funds. This recipe for emigration most likely led a number of able Jews to leave the island at least for a period of time, seeking refuge among their business or familial relations (which often coincided) in North Africa or other parts of the peninsula. The situation improved after Pere III consolidated his power, but in the 1350s the aljama still complained of Jews leaving the kingdom to escape the constant taxation to meet his subsidy demands, as discussed above.  

The war between Pere III of Aragon and Pere I of Castile from 1356-1369 was yet another incentive to leave for safer havens. Population numbers have not yet been published for the 1370s. Baer argued that the number of Jews would have dropped as a result of the epidemics of 1348 and the 1370s. To show that the economic challenges of the 1370s affected Jews and not just Christians, Baer cited a rabbinic responsum of Rabbi Sheshet Perfet, which mentions that many Jews were in such dire straits that they wished to sell their land.

Ultimately, demographic levels among the island’s Jewish population fluctuated; population changes often correlated with the Jews’ economic situation, and were affected particularly by taxation and conditions of trade. When their income was being siphoned away

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227 Isaacs, 68.
228 In this case, Sheshet Perfet advised modifying Jewish law prohibiting interest charged to fellow Jews, in order to facilitate Jews borrowing money from their coreligionists, so that they could get through what was perceived as a temporary period of difficulty (Baer, vol. II, 48-49).
through royal fiscal demands, and when commercial investments were at greater risk, some Jews left the island for North Africa, where they already had established contacts. Jews and conversos responded to the violence and upheaval of 1391 in the same way, and the king responded in ways that were not new either. What changed, and what complicated matters after 1391, was the fact that many of the Jewish exiles had been baptised, and that their exile became synonymous with heresy, as we will see in the following chapter.
Significance of this historical overview for the study post-1391 conversos

The preceding chapter has outlined several themes of Majorcan Jewish history that impacted the experience of the first two generations of conversos. A salient theme is the centrality of fiscal concerns, and the constant need for the aljama to meet the Crown’s financial demands. A primary concern for the Crown was the ability to collect Jewish revenues, which sometimes meant offering privileges that would enable the aljama to come up with the money. For the aljama, economic survival came with its own costs, such as purchasing certain privileges and protections, or collectively borrowing money to be able to meet royal fiscal demands without impoverishing the community. The protections granted to the aljama often met with resistance from other groups, such as local jurats who competed for taxes, or forans who were indebted to the Jews. The king frequently had to navigate between his own fiscal interests as they related to the Jews, and conflicting demands from local government or ecclesiastical institutions to which he also had obligations. Against this backdrop, royal policies depended upon many factors, such as the temperament of the king, his Christian piety, threats of social unrest, specific economic circumstances, and current political priorities. The Crown also tended to protect Jewish merchants and their trade interests, while Jewish merchants made a point of asserting their needs—a pattern which also continued among conversos. Many of the same dynamics illustrated in this chapter, between the Jews, the Crown, and other social entities such as Christian creditors or the forans, would arise again among the first two generations of conversos, during the aftermath of 1391.
Chapter 2
The treasure across the sea:
Exile, finances and religious identity in the wake of 1391

Exile as heresy

As important as it is to avoid entrenched categories of analysing converso society and identity, it would be frivolous to circumvent entirely the question of religious affiliation. Modern academe has not shifted far from thinking about conversos in the same way as the Spanish Inquisition: every new study, with its distinct historical focus, must nonetheless pay homage to the existing scholarship and address the purportedly burning question, “How Jewish were the New Christians?” More importantly, one must address the palpable anxiety over conversos returning to Judaism that is so prevalent in the royal correspondence of the period. Kings Joan and Martí complained of conversos leaving Majorca and returning to Judaism in North Africa, and occasionally of individuals practising Judaism on the island itself.¹ Proclamations instructing conversos to kneel at certain times during mass or prohibiting them, together with Old Christians, from buying kosher wine, are other potential signs of the conversos’ adherence to Jewish tradition, but could also be formulaic legal repetitions.² Prior to the establishment of the Spanish Inquisition on the island of Majorca in 1488, there is little explicit documentation of the religious behaviour or beliefs of conversos. For Valencia, in contrast, we have a clearer picture of conversos “Judaizing” from royal correspondence that reflects the activities of episcopal inquisitors against conversos. There, conversos were sentenced for Judaizing as early as August 1391.³ In these documents we see more clearly how King Joan struggled to retain control of

¹ See, for example, ARM AH 64: 37r (March 11, 1392); ACA 1995: 191v (February 26, 1393); 2266: 109v (June 17, 1402), 162v-163r (January 23, 1403); 2269: 151v-152r (June 30, 1407).
² See, for example, the documents published in BSAL 9: 243 (1399) and BSAL 6: 343 (1400).
³ See, for example, Hinojosa Montalvo, Jews of the Kingdom of Valencia, 350-351, Nos. 49, 50.
judicial proceedings against conversos. One of his motives, no doubt, was that the royal fisc stood to benefit from monetary punishments. Valencian conversos were condemned and fined by the Crown, for instance, for attending a Passover Seder with their un-baptised family and friends, or for sending their children to the Barbary Coast where they might live openly as Jews. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to describe King Joan’s motives as purely fiscal when it came to retaining jurisdiction over conversos; in his eyes, they were still his Jews, as Jews had been his fiscal serfs, even if he could no longer articulate that lordship as explicitly as he could before their conversion.

The episcopal inquisition in Majorca, which was a branch of the Roussillon tribunal until 1413, did proceed against conversos, but no records exist to provide details. There is minimal correspondence addressing the inquisition from the reign of King Joan, but there is evidence that King Martí attempted to curb investigations of the episcopal inquisition. In 1402 Martí wrote to the Majorcan inquisitor, Pere Tur, requesting that he drop his inquiry against the conversos Miguel Maxella and Antoni Fontcuberta who had been “unfairly accused” by other converso rivals who concocted stories about them, “not only to their injury but that of the royal court, which requires their presence for certain matters.” As familiars of the court, Maxella and Fontcuberta surely benefitted from royal protection, but there were additional factors at play in

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5 On Jews as fiscal serfs, see Meyerson, Iberian Frontier Kingdom, Chapter Three, “Fiscal Servitude.”
6 Pope Benedict XIII established an independent Majorcan tribunal in 1413, partly in response to the growing number of conversos there, and no doubt in connection to the work of Ferrer and the anti-Jewish legislation promulgated by Ferdinand, the Majorcan version of which targets conversos for Judaizing and orders royal officials to aid the local Inquisitor in separating them from Jews and Judaism (for the 1413 ordinances see BSAL 24:421-424). Before then, the inquisitor acting in Majorca was a lieutenant of the tribunal of Roussillon. Little documentation has surfaced about the Majorcan inquisitorial arm before 1413; we do know that consistent with the medieval inquisition, its inquisitors (e.g. Pere Tur) were Dominican (Colom i Palmer, inquisició a Mallorca, 18). See Mateu Colom i Palmer, La inquisició a Mallorca (1488-1578) (Barcelona: Curial, 1992), 18; Salo W. Baron, Social and Religious History of the Jews, vol. 13: Late Middle Ages and Era of European Expansion (1200-1650): Inquisition, Renaissance, and Reformation, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 309 n.12.
7 ACA CR 2266: 134v (October 22, 1402).
King Martí’s defence of them. That fact that the king had ordered the inquisitor to hand the case over to his governor shows the king’s desire to maintain jurisdiction over it. In 1410, the king again chastised the inquisitor, Pere Tur, along with lesser clerics, for investigating conversos for Judaizing. His letter does not, however, indicate what the conversos were doing that was deemed “Jewish,” and it is impossible to say how many cases there actually were. Despite this royal protection of conversos from the inquisition’s “harassment,” in other letters Martí ordered the investigation and punishment of certain conversos by royal officials, based on reports he had received of those conversos Judaizing. On the whole, Martí seems to have given conversos benefit of the doubt when it came to the question of Judaizing; given Martí’s more pragmatic temperament than Joan’s, surely he understood that Jews could not be expected to change their habits overnight. Yet, when he was convinced of blatant irreverence against Catholicism by conversos reported to be publicly observing Jewish practices, Martí was much less forgiving; this would have been the case with the converso Joan Lobera who reportedly Judaized in Majorca subsequent to being absolved of such accusations by the royal governor—an episode on which I elaborate below. Ultimately, neither King Joan nor King Martí initiated large-scale investigations into the private lives of newly converted residents, and in particular discouraged their pursuit by ecclesiastical officials. Even when Martí was convinced of the heretical guilt of certain other conversos, it was to his governor that he referred the case for legal investigation and punishment. It is a consequence, therefore, of institutional development, the availability of archival material, and royal policies that we have so little detail about the religious lives of the first generation of the 1391 Majorcan converts.

8 ACA 2266:134v-135r (October 22, 1402).
What is unique about the extant Majorcan documentation is that all existing references to Judaizing are connected to exile. This may be either a product of, or a rationale behind, the fact that the Crown was especially careful to regulate the conversos’ overseas travel. According to royal policy, a converso’s unlicensed or prolonged absence, particularly if the converso was known to have gone to a Muslim territory, was tantamount to Judaizing, and grounds for confiscation of all assets to the royal fisc. Any discussion of the Majorcan conversos’ religious identity in the wake of the 1391 violence must therefore highlight the flight of conversos, primarily to Muslim territories in North Africa where they could live openly as Jews, and where commercial and familial ties could help them settle into local communities. Following the 1391 revolt, Joan issued a ban on Jews or conversos leaving the island, but it was not entirely effective. Although determining the exact number of exiles is impossible, it is safe to conclude—even if we allow for hyperbole in Joan’s correspondence—that a large number of conversos fled Majorca not only in the first few months following the violence, but for up to two decades afterwards, albeit likely at a declining rate.

**Partners in crime: useful connections**

The phenomenon of exile was a greater issue for a port city such as Majorca, where Jews and new converts had the advantage of well-established, and well-placed, relationships to facilitate their move. Merchants, foreign agents, ship captains, port officials, relatives and trusted

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9 See ACA CR 1995: 139r-v (September 5, 1392) where Joan forbids conversos to leave the kingdom because he hears they have been going to Barbary claiming they never were baptised.

10 Lionel Isaacs argues that the actual number of exiles from Majorca is exaggerated, as a result of the numerous orders the king made concerning them (*Jews of Majorca*, 26). At this stage it is difficult to discern exactly how many Jews and conversos actually managed to leave the island, and thus whether historians, basing their conclusions on the documentary evidence, have exaggerated the significance of the exiles. If Joan’s conspicuous anxiety over the extent of exile was indeed misrepresentative, it may have been more representative of his fears: fears of conversos going to Muslim kingdoms (and investing their wealth in the hands of the infidel, with whom they might even conspire against him) or the heresy of Judaizing among conversos—fears that were in keeping with the superstitious attitude he demonstrated towards Jews as a prince.
friends all had the capacity to render the difficult escape more feasible. In addition to making their travel and settlement in new communities physically possible, trusted connections could “look the other way” when witnessing shady transactions and help Jews and conversos evade the watchful eye of royal officials commissioned to prevent them, and their wealth, from leaving the island. It was not only other Jews and other conversos, but also Old Christian friends and colleagues who helped conversos and Jews escape, and they often stood to profit from it. For instance, Old Christians purchased converso and Jewish assets at heavily discounted rates, such as houses and other landed properties, or the rights to loan investments and annuities, so that the exiles might carry even a fraction of their wealth abroad with them.\footnote{Jaume des Puig, a royal scribe in Majorca, is one example \textit{par excellence}: he drafted a number of fraudulent records that rendered him the proprietor of numerous houses in the \textit{call} valued at two or three thousand florins, but paid only a tenth of their worth for them, and transmitted the payments to conversos in “Saracen parts.”\footnote{By purchasing their houses in this way, des Puig enabled converso exiles to have some cash once they reached their destination.\footnote{Meanwhile, he profited significantly from buying coveted real estate for much less than it was worth, at least until he was denounced to King Joan, who suspended him from office and had all the houses seized while legal proceedings against him ensued. In the end, it seems, des Puig was able to retain many of the properties and even converted one into a chapel, but was compelled to turn over a portion of the rents they received.}}\footnote{See for example, ACA CR 1996:152r-v (August 21, 1393) where King Joan complains that exiles have been selling their houses, \textit{censals}, credits and other possessions at very low prices, “committing fraud against the royal fisc to which these goods pertain.” \textit{Cf.} ARM AH 419:124 \textit{bis}.} by purchasing their houses in this way, des Puig enabled converso exiles to have some cash once they reached their destination.\footnote{The Crown may have been particularly concerned about coinage leaving the kingdom, given shortages in this period. Besides the royal proscriptions, notarial records that show, for instance, payments made through transfers of collectible debts suggest that it was especially difficult to be paid in cash, such that if conversos could obtain even one-tenth of the value of their assets in coin it was worth it.}
generated to the royal fisc.\textsuperscript{14} That his primary motive was personal gain rather than sympathy for his converso colleagues is suggested by his silence when the community of conversos needed him to produce a copy of an agreement he had drafted at the time of the revolt, namely the agreement that transferred the burden of the Jews’ collective debt onto the city’s jurats. He did not deliver, and predictably so: it would have made little sense for him to antagonize the jurats who held the balance of power in that case.\textsuperscript{15}

The alleged actions of Guillelm Albiol, the “guardian of the port of Majorca” at the time of the revolt, offer us a different kind of example of how Old Christians profited from helping conversos. Albiol was denounced for illegally appropriating possessions of “various people and castellanis [royal officials] fleeing the Jewish quarter,” and for allowing conversos to leave the island and “return to Judaism” overseas.\textsuperscript{16} It is difficult to know exactly what was going on at the city’s port while the revolt was under way, but the royal fiscal prosecutor suggested that Albiol was taking bribes in exchange for overlooking any restrictions against them leaving the island. Although the prosecutor proposed corporal punishment, King Joan was not sufficiently convinced by the evidence, and absolved Albiol.\textsuperscript{17}

Conversos who helped their families and friends escape the island may also have gained personally from doing so. Lluís Vidal, a converso with social clout who served as an intermediary representing the community in various fiscal negotiations,\textsuperscript{18} was denounced to the

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\textsuperscript{14} Re: rents see, ACA 2000: 142r-143v (December 20, 1395); re: chapel see, ACA 1997: 25v-26r (August 5, 1392); 55v-56r (March 12, 1394); 1999: 101v-102r (November 23, 1395).

\textsuperscript{15} ARM Suplicacions, March 14, 1392, published in Pons, 323; ACA 1995: 66v (March 20, 1392)

\textsuperscript{16} ACA CR 1998: 63v-64r (June 3, 1395).

\textsuperscript{17} ACA CR 2000: 164v-165r (February 5, 1396).

\textsuperscript{18} Vidal expected—and must have negotiated—compensation for his services as a mediator, and later requested the king’s intervention when, after many years, he still had not received any payment from the community. Various documents attest to his leadership role. Vidal’s former Jewish name is indicated as “Bellshom Efraim” in his 1395 petition to the king. He complained that he had not been paid by the community for work he had done as an intermediary between the conversos and their creditors, or between the conversos and the king regarding debts the community had “donated” to him (ACA CR 1997: 176v-177r, February 15, 1395). I shall explain these debts in
\end{flushright}
king for illegally handling “various goods, debts and revenues of certain conversos in the city who have been newly baptized and afterwards leave the island for Saracen lands.” It would have been easy for him to profit from such transactions. King Martí’s main concern, however, was that Vidal and others like him were diverting funds that should have been going to the royal fisc; he did not call Vidal an “accomplice” to renegades, the way Joan had done a decade prior with Christians who purchased property from conversos before they fled, but perhaps he should have. Irrespective of Vidal’s personal benefit, his handling of their affairs would have facilitated their exile. The blurry picture offered by these records makes one thing clear: Jews and conversos were able to leave Majorca thanks to the help of others, including Old Christians, but usually paid for it. As late as 1398 Martí expressed concerns that “interested” individuals were still helping conversos emigrate. The system of advantageous connections worked especially well when there was something to gain for everyone.

The likes of Guillelm Albiol and Lluís Vidal were lucky enough to convince Martí of their innocence without paying a hefty fine for a pardon, unlike others—including Old Christians—who were punished for aiding conversos who fled the island, usually by fines that contributed

Chapter Three. His 1393 testimony regarding his involvement in brokering the payment schedule between the conversos and their Barcelonan creditors is documented in ARM AH S-31: 52r-v (where his Jewish name is transcribed as “Homs Affrahim”).

19 ACA CR 2266: 162v (January 18, 1403). On March 7 of the same year he was granted a guiatge to travel (ACA CR 2169: 176v-177r). Vidal had petitioned the king regarding 260 pounds worth of debts owed to a converso, Pere Salvador—formerly Maymo Faraig, another name of local pedigree—which Mateu de Lloschos had seized on account of Salvador’s exile; Vidal claimed that this money was actually owed to him by virtue of a donation, and Joan granted him the right to it, mentioning the good services he had performed for him (ACA CR 1997: 179r-v, February 16, 1395). One might suspect here that Pere and Luis had made some arrangement before the former left, whereby he transferred the rights to debts owed to him to Vidal, who either forwarded him cash at the time, or promised to collect the money and send it to him at a later date, charging a fee for his service. Vidal’s leadership role connotes a certain degree of wealth, which of course made it easier to perform such “services” for exiles, while being in a position of influence might have afforded him a greater sense of protection.

20 ACA CR 2229: 82r (May 13, 1398), cited by Maria Dolores López Pérez in La Corona de Aragón, 338.
much-needed revenues to the royal fisc. For instance, in 1393 the ship captain Pere Fuster had to pay 20 florins for allegedly planning to take three Majorcan conversos in his ship to Barbary.\(^{21}\)

**Property of exiles: the new royal treasure?**

Immediately after the violence, an equal amount, if not more, of King Joan’s attention was devoted to identifying converso exiles and punishing them by confiscating all their assets, under the pretext that they had left the kingdom to revert to Judaism. The gravity of Judaizing provided the perfect justification for his relentless efforts to confiscate the possessions of any converso who was assumed to have gone to Barbary to live as a Jew, starting, revealingly, with the wealthiest ones.\(^{22}\) In order to identify individual heretics (and thus sources of income), enquiries were carried out as far as the Barbary coast: in March 1392 the governor of Majorca wrote to the “consul of the Christians in Algiers” (probably a Catalan merchant)—where most Majorcan Jews and conversos fled—asking for the names of all Majorcan conversos who had returned to Judaism, “keeping the Sabbath, doing work on Sunday, entering into the synagogue and [doing] other things pertaining to Judaism.”\(^{23}\) Indeed, it was the obligation of a Catholic king to quell heresy, and even before taking the throne Joan was a particularly ardent defender of his faith against Jewish “threats.” In 1377, against the wishes of his father (King Pere), Joan ordered

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\(^{21}\) Meyerson, *Jewish Renaissance*, 37, n.74.

\(^{22}\) For example, ACA CR 1995: 191v (February 26, 1393): King Joan ordered that all houses and any goods belonging to any conversos who had gone to North Africa to live as Jews, or to any other conversos who helped them, should be confiscated; all donations, transfers and alienations by those conversos should be appropriated as well. *Cf.* ARM AH 64: 111v-112r (May 1392) re: the announcement made all over the island requesting information dating after August 2\(^{nd}\), 1391, about the properties of certain conversos, formerly prominent Jews, who seem to have fled the island, namely Miguel Fuster / Magaluff Natjar and his wife, Pere Fuster / Ayon Natjar, his grandmother Anna / Seccum, who was the wife of Ayon Natjar, deceased; and of Anthoni de Jovals / Struch ben Hanini and his wife. Note that Magaluff Natjar’s son who stayed on the island was his “donatarius” – in other words his father left everything to him probably when he left. See ACM 14666 Prot. Not. Joan Clavell: September 2, 1392, loose folio between 186v-167r.

\(^{23}\) ARM AH 64: 37r (March 1\(^{st}\), 1392). The governor also requested that the consul provide two or three Christian witnesses.
the inquisitor of Roussillon and Cerdagne to investigate an alleged host desecration. Yet his correspondence following the violence and through to the end of his reign suggests that, once he was king, King Joan took a more pragmatic approach towards the kingdom’s Jews, both baptized and not; given their revenue-generating capabilities, Joan’s chief concerns were those that had an impact on the royal fisc.

Joan’s reign was notoriously fraught with financial troubles, and the cataclysmic events of 1391 threatened to make matters worse. Rebellions against Catalan rule in Sardinia in the early 1390s required costly military reinforcements, and the subsidies promised by the Corts to pay for them did not always materialize. His rather expensive penchant for courtly music and dining, and above all the hunt, often distracted him from his administrative duties, as did his preoccupation with the health of his family. Even as the Crown’s aljamas were being sacked, he put off the requests of municipal officials to reassert royal authority in their towns, occupying himself instead with the deteriorating health of his queen or with plans for his next hunting excursion. Later, when King Joan did show an interest in reviving some of the kingdom’s major aljamas, Majorca was not at the top of his list, perhaps because of its physical distance, or because the remaining Jewish community lacked advocates to remind him of its importance and persuade him to take actions on its behalf. Furthermore, the attention Joan devoted to the island’s Jews and conversos often lacked consistency and foresight—an approach not unlike his father’s but seemingly more erratic and self-indulgent. More often than not, he responded to petitions


\[25\] Benjamin Gampel discussed King Joan’s response to the 1391 anti-Jewish violence in a paper delivered at the Association for Jewish Studies conference in December 2007 and forthcoming article in a festschrift for David Berger entitled, “Unless the Lord watches over the city…” Joan of Aragon and his Jews: June 27 - October 26, 1391.” For a more detailed history of Joan’s rein see Rafael Tasis i Marca, Joan I, el rei caçador i music (Barcelona: Editorial Adeos, 1959), especially pp.195-209.
with rather short-sighted solutions that frequently conflicted with promises he had made to other parties in prior correspondence.  

If one could blame King Joan for not doing all he could to suppress the 1391 revolts, he was certainly more scrupulous in capitalizing on them after the fact. His understandable concerns about financial losses resulting from the revolts stand out in many of his letters. Rather than investing in the longer-term goal of reviving the kingdom’s *aljamas*, or of educating and integrating the new converts, the king’s initial responses to the violence focused notably on its revenue potential, not only by punishing reneging conversos, but also through fines levied on Old Christians who participated in the assaults. As early as August 1391 he promised one quarter of the revenues from punishments related to the *avalots* throughout the kingdom as his daughter’s dowry for her marriage to King Louis of Sicily and Jerusalem. Similarly, in February 1392 he ordered his officials to repay a loan of 500 florins to his butler Pere Marató through fines stemming from the *avalot*, and in July, he ordered another 10,000 florins to be paid to Francesc Morat, also a familiar of the court, from the same revenues. In May 1392 he secured a loan of 1,300 gold florins from Berenguer Luppeti, a royal procurator in Mallorca, specifically on revenues proceeding from the punishments of those involved in the revolt there. In essence, throughout his kingdoms, King Joan capitalized on the revolts and anti-Jewish violence in order to meet his financial obligations and, perhaps in his mind, to compensate for the various damages it caused to his treasury.

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29 ACA CR 1979: 181r-v (July 7, 1392).
The “dissolution and destruction of the *aljama*”—as the royal letters phrase it—meant that Joan could no longer collect taxes from the formerly sizeable and wealthy Jewish community in Majorca, certainly nowhere near to the extent that he could previously. Without the institution of the *aljama*, there was no longer an organizational structure in place to administer the collection of royal taxes among the remaining Jews, whose revenue-generating capacity was in any case dramatically reduced after the revolts. Still, Joan was not ready to relinquish entirely the notion of Jews as his royal “treasure,” and his treatment of Mallorcan *conversos* suggests that he simply substituted lost Jewish revenue with revenue derived from *conversos*. We can see this, for instance, in the way Joan used the assets confiscated from baptized Jewish exiles to pay for the costs of the royal armada to Sardinia, similar to the way in which he had forced the Mallorcan *aljama*, in 1389, to borrow money in order to subsidize his administration there.\(^{31}\) In other words, he grafted onto *conversos* the royal custom of using “Jewish” money to fund the occupation of Sardinia.\(^{32}\) Perhaps the most overt indication of the fiscal continuity between Jews and *conversos* was a large “donation” which the new *converso* community curiously offered to the king in the wake of the violence. Although always referred to as the “*donatio*,” this was essentially a tax of 20% to be levied on the goods of every *converso* household—although ultimately it was skimmed off all their loan investments, the returns from

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\(^{31}\) In June 1389 King Joan excused the *aljama* from additional subsidies since they were already helping in the affairs of Sardinia (ARM AH LR 37: 162r-v, June 2, 1389). In the same year, King Joan requested that Galceran de Villa Nova, lieutenant governor of Sardinia, be paid 300 florins from “the money received through sales [i.e. of *censals*] by the Jews of the *aljama* of Majorca” when he passed through the island (ACA CR 1872: 175r-v, 1389, day and month not specified).

\(^{32}\) For example, in late 1391 King Joan allocated 1000 gold florins from the confiscations of properties of exiles to pay his debt to his councillor, Omberto de Fornalarrio (ARM AH LR 39: 65r-v, April 18, 1392; this letter refers to an earlier one written in December of 1391). Revenues from confiscated debts owed to *conversos* were transferred to the noble Fransech Sa Garriga who was in Majorca but on the way to Sicily in the company of the captain of the royal armada (ACA CR 1997: 169v-170r, January 28, 1395).
which conversos were anticipating. I will return to the theme of the donatio in depth in the following chapter.

Royal confiscations, which began shortly after the violence, did not go uncontested. Enough complaints arose to warrant a royal proclamation, in October 1391, directing conversos who wished to petition against the seizure of their property to bring their cases before the governor at a specified time. The Majorcan governor, Francesch Sa Garriga, and Joan’s royal procurator, Mateu de Llosch, struggled to make sense of who actually remained on the island, and what properties pertained to them. This information enabled royal officials to determine which assets could be “legally” confiscated from conversos whom they discovered to be absent without a valid royal license, since these were considered by the Crown to be renegade heretics.

In June 1392, the governor ordered all Majorcan Jews or conversos absent from the island who possessed any property or assets there to return and appear at the governor’s court within thirty days. If any property remained “ownerless” after that period—in other words, without a legal claimant physically residing on the island—it would be confiscated. A large proportion of the assets sequestered consisted of loan investments, owed mostly by inhabitants of outlying rural parishes to converso exiles, contracted before the latter’s baptism. Royal officials were instructed to call in these loans from debtors living as far away as Ibiza. Joan was especially diligent in

33 ACA CR 1995: 138v-139r (August 9 1392); 1996: 40v-41r.
34 ARM AH 419: 57bis r-v (October 21, 1391), also published in BSAL 8:441 and Quadrado, La judería en Mallorca en el siglo XIV (Palma de Mallorca: Panorama Balear, Imprenta Mossén Alcover, 1967), 53.
35 ARM AH 419: 84v (June 6, 1392), also published in BSAL 8:56. See also Quadrado, Islas Baleares, 228-229 where he mentions that those absent were given 30 days to return under pain of sequestration of their goods.
36 Thus, the Crown did not restrict its collection of the donatio to Majorcan debtors. For instance, King Joan ordered the collection of debts amounting to 130 pounds owed by inhabitants of Ibiza to the exiled converso Rafael Abu, previously Abram Abu (ACA CR 1996: 68r; Feb 26, 1393). Although his letter does not indicate whether Abram Abu had been an inhabitant of Majorca or Ibiza, the name Abram Abbó appears as a witness in the 1350 monedatge tax register of the call of Majorca, suggesting his father or grandfather may have lived there. What is curious is that his name does not appear as a taxpayer, though this could be a result of a privilege (Mirailles, Corpus d’antropònims, 323).
pursuing wealthier exiles who, for instance, owned the principal houses of the *call*. These large houses, coveted by Old Christian elite, were quickly appropriated by the royal fisc and either auctioned off, ceded as royal gifts, or sold directly by Joan to interested familiars. Joan also used the confiscated properties as collateral for loans, or directed the proceeds of their sale to pay debts to his officials or merchant creditors.

**Limiting mobility of conversos**

The effects of the anti-Jewish violence and exodus of Jews and conversos in 1391 on the overall economy of the Spanish kingdoms have been a topic of some debate among historians of Majorca. Despite the view of some historians that the violence and aftermath of 1391 did not have an especially deleterious effect on the kingdom’s economy independent of the crisis of the late fourteenth century, Kings Joan and Martí appear to have been anxious that it would. Aside from religious implications, the subtext in many of their letters is that the unchecked emigration

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37 Quadrado refers to the confiscation of goods of Ayon Natjar and Struch Benini (*Islas Baleares*, 229). The governor writes to the bailiffs to order the declaration of any property known to belong to, or owing to, these conversos (ARM AH 64: 11v-112r; May 11, 1392).

38 The large size of some houses is suggested by the number of other houses that border it. The former house of Maymo Natjar was flanked by the residences of many other people, and included a garden as well as its own water channel (ACA CR 1999: 55v-; November 3, 1395). The fact that a number of Old Christians of notable status endeavoured to acquire these houses suggests they were desirable. The fate of houses within the former call will be discussed in Chapter Four.

39 ACA CR 1996:121v-124v (April 10, 1393). “Berenguer de Cortilles procurator of the king and queen sells to venerable Anthonius de Rexach of the royal treasury son of the venerable Guillelm de Rexach merchant and citizen of Majorca a house [hospicium] of the said principal houses [domorum principaliwm] in the Jewish call of Majorca…which had been the home of Blanca daughter of Magister Salamon de Parlida deceased, Jew of Majorca.” Blanca, conversa, formerly called Astruga, had fled to Barbary with her sons, where she lived with her husband, Samuel Faquim.

40 It had been common for kings to secure loans on revenues from *aljamas* throughout the kingdom. King Joan and Queen Yolanda did so in 1393 when they sold a censal mort worth 87,000 sous to Luquino Starapi, merchant of Asti, and another worth 43,000 sous to Francisc Dende, merchant of San Mateu (ACA CR 1998: 15v-20v; December 12, 1393). In 1392 Joan paid his treasurer Guilelm Joncar 400 florins from various revenues proceeding from Majorca, including a payment (or *compositio*) of the *aljama* to the treasury (ACA CR 1995:181r-182r; November 27, 1392). In the same year he paid one of his councillors, Umbert de Forneraler, from revenues proceeding from the confiscation of goods of exiles (ARM AH LR 39: 65r-; May 18, 1392). Interestingly, in 1395, as a security for *censals* that had previously been secured on revenues from Majorca, King Joan pledged revenues from the Jewish *aljamas* of Tortosa, Albarracín, Huesca and [Fraga], in addition to revenues from other Muslim *aljamas* (ACA CR 1997 8v, date not specified). Did this change indicate dwindling revenues from Majorca, to the extent that they were no longer valuable as securities?
of Majorca’s Jews and conversos entailed a reduction of commercial revenues for the island and for the royal fisc.\footnote{Recall that the Crown viewed the Majorcan *aljama* as distinctly mercantile, as King Pere III wrote in 1383 (and as I mentioned in Chapter One): “que iter ceteras notabilis est, imo pre ceteris condicione ac regimine pollet, cum non in actibus usurarum, sed arte quidem mercandi suas plurimum dirigant acciones…” (ACA CR 1446: 38r-41v, April 23, 1383), also published in Baer, *Die Juden*, 535-541, No. 356). It is noteworthy here that Pere states that, in contrast to other *aljamas* of the kingdom, the economy of the Majorcan *aljama* was driven more by commerce than money-lending. The same document refers to a subsidy granted to the king of 700 gold florins, in exchange for which he granted the *aljama* of Majorca various privileges.} It threatened a loss of the customs tax revenue that North African Jews or Muslims—potential clients of the exiles—had to pay when they traded in Majorca,\footnote{This is suggested by the concerns with taxation that we see under Martí, or even the attempts of Joan to invite Jews back to Majorca for the purposes of trade, as I will discuss further ahead.} and there were potential repercussions for the island’s vibrant maritime trade as a whole. Perhaps more disconcerting from the Crown’s perspective was that the exodus meant a loss of subjects who could be taxed (not just for trade), which was all the more worrisome considering that it was often the wealthier families who had the resources to leave. Moreover, when the new converts left the island, they took some of their wealth and commercial expertise and networks with them. They also skirted their financial obligations to their own creditors or those of the former *aljama*. Even worse, from the Crown’s perspective, they could benefit the economies and rulers of the Muslim territories to which they fled, or “send arms and other things forbidden by law to Saracen lands.”\footnote{ACA CR 2266: 109v (June 17, 1402). See also Meyerson, *Jewish Renaissance* 36.} In this light, it is no wonder Joan appears obsessed with the exiles and limiting both the physical and financial mobility of conversos.

**Freezing assets**

Travel restrictions, then, were also a way to freeze assets, in order to stop the king’s “treasure” from slipping out of his grasp. In the chaotic climate that followed the *avalot*, there were a number of reasons to freeze assets of conversos and Jews. It was a way to discourage further exiles who, in abandoning the island with their wealth, did damage not only to the royal
treasury and creditors of the former *aljama*, but ultimately to the sizeable converso community that remained on the island.⁴⁴ Numerous proclamations were issued following the attacks, particularly in 1392, prohibiting the sale, alienation (which included transferring of legal title), or transportation of converso property in any form.⁴⁵ These prohibitions did not stop conversos from seeking the assistance of Old Christians to be able to flee with cash in hand – as explained above—offering such incentives as selling their assets at very low prices.⁴⁶ Whether conversos transferred the rights to their debts or collected them directly, receiving payment provided them with cash that they could smuggle off the island. However, identifying the rightful owner of those debts, or any converso property for that matter, was not a straightforward matter after the *avalot*. Not only were converso owners, their relatives, or Christian buyers claiming these assets, but they were also being claimed by the Crown, and by the creditors of the former *aljama* who were intent on regaining their capital investments. This confusion presented yet another reason to temporarily freeze assets: to stop the liquidation of debts. Thus, in October 1391 the governor specifically prohibited the export of any textiles by conversos since these might have to be used to pay their collective debt.⁴⁷ Moreover, for a limited period following the *avalot*, beginning no later than February 1392, notaries were prohibited from cancelling any letters of debt or issuing payment receipts for loans owed to conversos. Without the security of a receipt, debtors would

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⁴⁴ Much of converso wealth was in the form of landed property, merchandise, or debts. Given coin shortages in this period, it was common for rulers to ban the export of coin, as well as gold from their territories. Although this chapter outlines multiple factors that fueled Joan’s anxiety over the fact that exiles were liquidating at least some of their assets before they left, it also may be helpful to understand it in light of monetary deflation and the beginnings of the European bullion famine in the next century. See John H. Munro, “Patterns of Trade, Money and Credit,” in the *Handbook of European History, 1400-1600*, vol. 1, 150. This could also help explain why the heirs of the converso Antoni Agost resisted attempts to render the taxes he collected on behalf of the community in the form of transferred debts (ACA CR 1996: 179v; December 2, 1393).

⁴⁵ For the prohibition against any kind of alienation of converso-owned properties see, for example, ARM AH 419:104 *bis* (October 10, 1392), 117 (July 2, 1392), also published in *BSAL* 8:443; 117 *bis* (January 31, 1393); for the royal letter ordering the latter public announcement see ACA CR 1996: 39v (November 23, 1392).


⁴⁷ AH 419:68 *bis* (October 25, 1391). Earlier in the month he prohibited conversos from leaving the island altogether. ARM AH 419: 104bis (October 7, 1392).
be unwise, and therefore unwilling, to repay their creditors.⁴⁸ Still, some conversos procured special royal licenses that enabled them to collect their loans.⁴⁹ In July 1392, King Joan allowed conversos to collect loans owed to them, provided they paid the four sous per pound to the treasury first.⁵⁰ After writing, in September 1392, that Majorcan conversos were claiming to have never been baptised and then going to Barbary where they returned to Judaism, Joan stipulated that converso creditors would have to leave a pledge with the governor in order to collect their loans. This demand may have been too burdensome, and there is no evidence that it was put into practice, but theoretically it was a requirement that would dissuade conversos from flight, compel them to pay their share of the promised donation to the royal treasury, and allow for greater royal control over converso assets.⁵¹ In the following month, however, Joan once again prohibited all loan payments to conversos, unless of course the loan in question had been confiscated by the Crown.⁵² The fluctuations in his attitude towards converso property suggests that multiple contenders were asserting their claims over these assets.⁵³ Tight control had to be imposed over them until negotiations with creditors and Crown were ironed out.

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⁴⁸ ARM AH 64: 22V (February 7, 1392); ACA CR 1995: 152v-153r (October 1, 1392); ARM LR 39: 125r- (September 4, 1392) – where the king forbids debtors to repay converso creditors “money, oil or wheat.” In Lionel Isaacs’ view, these prohibitions were intended to be provisional until order was re-established, since such chaos ensued after the revolt (Jews of Majorca, 84).
⁴⁹ Letters of the governor mention conversos who solicited and received individual royal licenses to collect debts owing to them, and include instructions for notaries to cancel the corresponding records in their registers. See, for example, *Lletres comunes* ARM AH 64 39r-v (March 5, 1392); 56v-57r (March 28, 1392); 76v-77r (April 3, 1392). For royal letters indicating that conversos may collect debts see: ACA CR 1995: 139v-139r (September 5, 1392); 152v-153r (October 1, 1392); ARM AH LR 39: 125r-v (September 4, 1392).
⁵⁰ ARM AH 419 Liber precon. 1385-1392: 92 (July 2, 1392), published in BSAL 8:443. On the same date another royal proclamation was made stating that no one could purchase or acquire any goods from conversos who had gone to Barbary and reneged on Catholicism; all such goods would be confiscated by the royal fisc (AH 419: 117). On July 7, 1392, on behalf of the conversos, Antoni Portes, converso, presented a royal letter to the governor stating that, “Since the conversos, on the pretext of the attacks on the [then] Jews and that they were robbed of almost everything, and because the king wants to preserve and protect them, those who had debts taken away may still collect them; with the present letter the king constitutes the conversos of the city and kingdom of Mallorca under his special protection…” (ARM LR 39: 103r-v).
⁵¹ ACA AH 419: 92, published also in BSAL 8:443; ACA CR 1995: 139 r-v (September 5, 1392).
⁵² ACA 1995: 152r-153r (October 1, 1392).
⁵³ Chapters Three and Four will elaborate upon the various contenders and their rationales to converso property.
Travel licenses

Joan’s initial decision to stop all maritime traffic to and from the island applied not only to Jews and conversos, but also to Old Christians. These restrictions were gradually relaxed, allowing for controlled mobility pending royal licenses, although the restrictions applying to conversos were more extensive. One rationale for including Old Christians in the initial travel bans was to prevent the flight of those implicated in the unrest while accusations, arrests and trials were still under way.54 Old Christians, too, sought to bypass the red tape during this time, with varying degrees of success. Two noble brothers, Joan and Arnau de Santacília, were probably hoping to avoid prosecution at the hands of royal authorities for their alleged involvement in the violence when they left Majorca without a license and headed for lands outside of the king’s dominion. They were lucky to have a well-placed connection in the cardinal of Valencia, King Joan’s cousin, who procured their pardon two years later for their alleged “insults or crimes against the Jews and their goods.”55

For Jews and conversos involved in maritime commerce, not being able to leave the island meant not being able to make commercial trips to other port cities or North Africa, which could result in a significant loss of income. Shortly after the attack on the call, King Joan expressed plans to re-establish the aljama. In order to realize this plan, though, the king had to make certain overtures to prevent Majorca’s Jews from emigrating. Often this meant offering incentives to stay, particularly since legal impediments were proving less than effective. On August 19, 1391 Joan wrote to the governor of Majorca that, for the sake of reviving the aljama, it would be necessary to issue licences to Jews permitting them to go to North Africa to collect

54 For example, ARM AH 419: 73v (January 2, 1392), published in BSAL 8:56. A separate letter to the bailiff of Alcudia, in which the governor instructs him to allow Majorcans to come and leave from the island notwithstanding a previous letter of November 26, 1391, suggests that there was a period immediately after the attacks when no one was allowed off the island (Lletres Comunes, January 3, 1392, published in BSAL 8:55-56; call number not cited).
the merchandise they had there, which meant modifying the complete ban on travel.\textsuperscript{56} This permission was not unprecedented. In 1389 King Joan had made special provision for Majorca’s Jews to “recover their merchandise” from the Kingdom of Tlemcen, or in essence to continue trading there despite an embargo he had imposed on the island’s inhabitants, in order to prevent the “destruction of your \textit{aljama} of Jews, who are our property and treasure.”\textsuperscript{57} Rabbinic responsa, as well as archival records, testify that even after 1391, Majorcan Jews did continue to travel to, and trade in, North Africa.\textsuperscript{58} The same responsa confirm that commercial relationships often involved family members, and that marriage alliances continued to be made between the two continents.\textsuperscript{59} Jews from the peninsula were also able to travel overseas, as long as they obtained royal licenses. In June 1392, for instance, Daviu Bonin, a Jewish tailor from Barcelona, presented a royal license before the Majorcan governor’s court, asserting his liberty to sail to Sicily and “other parts of the world.”\textsuperscript{60}

In July 1395, Joan, in order to escape the plague epidemic in Catalonia, finally acceded to years of requests from Majorcans to visit the island for his first time. The royal family and its entourage remained until late October when he decided to leave for Perpignan, because the plague was now arriving in Majorca and because they were bored in the castle of Bellver where

\textsuperscript{56} ACA CR 1995: 3r (August 19, 1391). In the same letter where Joan orders such travel licenses to be issued once again to Jews, he offers further economic support when he orders that although many letters of debt owed to Jews had been destroyed in the attack on the call, the governor should find a way to have those debts recognised and collected.
\textsuperscript{57} LR 37: 172r-173v (July 9, 1389).
\textsuperscript{58} See for instance Eleazar Gutwirth, "comercio hispano-magrebí" and Maria Dolores Lopez Perez, \textit{Corona de Aragón y el Magreb}, 342-344.
\textsuperscript{59} For instance, Rabbi Simon ben Zemah Duran received an inquiry from a Jew in Bugia about the exchange rate between local \textit{dinares} and \textit{reales} from the Crown of Aragon in order to figure out the worth of a dowry stipulated in a marriage contract that was written in Majorca. Duran responded that gold was worth more in Christian countries than in North Africa, since “gold leaves from here for the Christian land,” and that, when sending the dowry payment to Majorca, one had to factor in the cost of maritime insurance (Gurwirth, "Comercio hispano-magrebí," 202).
\textsuperscript{60} ARM LR 39: 92r-v (June 18, 1392).
there was little hunting to be done. During this period, numerous petitions were brought before the king from local inhabitants of upper and middling social ranks, and from representatives of the Jewish and converso communities. In October, Joan issued a *guiatge* inviting all Jews living in his own or any other kingdom, including former subjects who had fled to Muslim lands after the violence of 1391, to make their residence in Majorca, and encouraged them to come for the purpose of trade. As an incentive, he promised them immunity from any pending litigation or financial obligations, and stipulated that they could travel freely to and from Muslim lands.

Joan may not have been willing to make such a “liberal” concession immediately after 1391, but the fact that Jews still continued to emigrate year after year must have made him more willing to offer royal support, in the form of legal and economic incentives, to stimulate the renewal of an *aljama* in Majorca. Still, Joan made it clear that Jewish immigrants (even native Majorcans who had fled in 1391) would have to pay the customary import-export taxes, even if exempting them altogether from those taxes would have made his invitation all the more alluring.

Travel restrictions imposed upon conversos were generally more stringent than those imposed on Jews. It is also more difficult to discern a particular royal policy towards converso mobility given King Joan’s back-and-forth approach, similar to the way he wavered concerning the “mobility” of their debts and other assets. Early in 1392 Joan issued a permit or *guiatge* that allowed conversos a little more freedom of travel with the procurement of licenses, as long as

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61 Tasis, Joan I, 264-266.

62 ACA 1910: 151v. (October 17, 1395); Published in Baer, Die Juden, 724-726, No. 461. In his transcription, Baer omits the clause stipulating that the *guiatge* would be in effect for five years. This *guiatge* is reproduced in Martí’s letter reconfirming it (ACA CR 2264: 7r-8v (July 19, 1397)). Hinojosa Montalvo observed that King Joan issued a similar *guiatge* in conjunction with his failed attempt to revivify the *aljama* of Valencia, which Martí confirmed in August 1397 (“Judíos extranjeros en el reino de Valencia durante la Baja Edad Media,” Sefarad 70:1 (2010): 78). As we shall see in Chapter Four, the Majorcan *guiatge* was also linked to efforts to resurrect the *aljama* there.

Joan’s October 1395 letter (published in Baer) refers to an earlier *guiatge* issued by the governor of Majorca on July 27, 1395, to a similar effect, which had been requested by the conversos and their creditors. I have not yet found this document. It is intriguing that the creditors of the former *aljama* would press for such a license to be granted to Jews, or that conversos would press for it. It is possible that the converso *taxadors* expected the returning Jewish exiles to contribute to the debt-tax, although the major assessments already had been made in 1393.
they remained within his kingdom, and at the same time provided legal immunities for a period of one year. Still—and here we see another example of the Crown’s inconsistency—in October of the same year the governor issued a proclamation prohibiting any conversos from leaving the island whatsoever. Nevertheless, at least by September 1393, some individual conversos were able to obtain licenses for mercantile trips to North Africa, but the majority of travel licenses issued to Majorcan conversos in the 1390s appear to have been for travel within the kingdom.

Most travel licenses were issued through the governor’s court, although Joan did issue some letters of safe-conduct to individual converso supplicants, which essentially served the same purpose. It is not clear exactly why conversos would seek a license from the royal court when they should have been able to obtain them locally, presumably at a lower cost and in less time, from the governor’s court. Some conversos may have chosen to appeal to the royal court if refused a license from the governor’s court or, more likely, because the licenses issued by the king did not usually contain as many restrictions, and may have stipulated additional legal immunities. Licenses issued by the governor usually stipulated that the traveller return to Majorca within a given period of time, usually within three or four months, and pledge all his possessions as a security that he would return in time. In addition, the traveller was obliged to

63 ARM LR 39: 39r–v (March 13, 1392), citing a royal letter of February 13, 1392. On this date the royal letter, dated February 13, 1392, was presented to the governor of Majorca by Antoni Agost, converso, formerly Moxi ben Magaluff Natjar, of one of the leading families of the aljama. Given that his father had fled the island and his properties were likely confiscated, it is noteworthy that Agost was still able to function as a representative of the conversos. See also ARM AH LR 39: 104r–v (March 1, 1392) for essentially the same letter. See also ACA CR 1995: 139r–v (September 5, 1392).

64 ARM AH 419: 104bis (October 7, 1392).

65 The registers of llicencies i guiatges at the ARM, which record licenses issued by the Majorcan governor’s court, are not extant for the years 1391 and 1392. See AH G5: 29r (September 10, 1393) as an example of a license issued through the governor’s court for the converso Luis de Requesens, formerly Samuel Fazuati and a prominent member of the community, to travel to Algiers. Cf. ACA CR 2000: 5v–6r (October 14, 1395), a royal license, issued by King Joan, permitting the converso merchant Francesch Sa Garriga, formerly Isaac Mandil, to travel to Barbary on the condition that he pledge all his goods and leave his wife and children in Majorca.
provide a guarantor.\(^6^6\) In contrast, most of Joan’s letters of safe-conduct simply granted his permission and protection for the converso to “safely travel and dwell anywhere in the kingdom,” and thus left open more possibilities for the converso supplicant.\(^6^7\) Unlike the licenses issued from the governor’s court, however, almost \textit{all} the safe-conducts Joan issued to conversos limited travel to within his kingdom. When he did permit the converso merchant, Francesch Sa Garriga, formerly Isaac Mandil, to go to North Africa in 1395, he seemed particularly wary: it was conditional upon Sa Garriga pledging his possessions as a security that he would return within two years, and that he promise to leave his wife and children in Majorca (if he had any). If he breached the agreement, the fine would be five hundred gold florins.\(^6^8\) Given reports of conversos committing heresy by returning to Judaism in the Maghreb, it is not surprising that Joan was more cautious concerning conversos travelling there than he was with Jews.

The use of licenses to control maritime traffic during times of political or social unrest was not unprecedented, as discussed in Chapter One (Historical Background). Majorcan \textit{licenies i guiatges} registers dating before 1391 show that Jews were required to obtain travel and export licenses that stipulated their destination and merchandise, but these were not as restrictive as those later required for conversos (who had to return to Majorca within a limited time, and provide a guarantor who would be charged a fine if they failed to comply).\(^6^9\) There were repeated

\(^6^6\) During the reign of Martí, converso merchants complained that the time-consuming and costly process of obtaining a license and security every time they wanted to travel was impeding their commerce. King Martí therefore granted them and their employees permission to travel anywhere freely (ACA CR 2263: 194r-v; July 14, 1399). I will discuss this case further in Chapter Four.

\(^6^7\) The majority of royal safe-conducts were issued for travel within the kingdom, though a few were issued for North Africa. Examples of licenses issued by Joan are as follows: ACA CR 1999: 1r-v (September 27, 1395), 86r-87r (September 15, 1395)—this letter refers to a safe-conduct granted on May 26, 1393; 2000: 54r (November 18, 1395)—license conferred to two “new” conversos to go anywhere in the Christian world; 2000: 57r-v (November 22, 1395). Note that many licenses were issued in 1395, the year king Joan visited the island and when he also issued the guiatge to the Jews allowing them greater freedom of travel.

\(^6^8\) 2000: 5v-6r (October 14, 1395).

\(^6^9\) Prior to 1391, Jewish and Christian merchants obtained licenses to travel to, and trade in, various Mediterranean cities within and outside of the kingdom, which usually specified the merchandise they wished to export. The
local announcements that proscribed unlicensed converso travel throughout 1392, yet judging from royal correspondence and the frequency of these announcements (and one must allow for hyperbole in both), conversos still continued to leave the island and evade the license restrictions. Some conversos did obtain licenses to go to North Africa, but did not return, leaving their guarantors, usually conversos as well, to pay heavy fines. It is conceivable that some left deposits with friends or family that stood as guarantors, knowing that they would not return, but the fact that eventually it became almost impossible for conversos to find guarantors suggests that most were left to pay the fines out of their own pockets. It was more than just the guarantors who suffered when royal officials identified, and seized, all the assets of exiles. Those indebted to the exiles were also vulnerable. A particular concern expressed by converso representatives to the king, besides the problem of guarantors, involved dowries that had been

registers of licencies i guiatges at the ARM record such licenses dating before and after 1391. I have not seen safe-conducts issued by the Crown to go to the Maghreb until 1395, whereas the extant local licenses to that region begin from 1393 (years 1391 and 1392 are missing). Arguably, the local officials who issued those licenses did not have to worry as much about maintaining an image of Catholic piety, whereas if Joan too easily granted licenses to conversos who then reneged on the faith, it might have damaged his honour as a Catholic king.

Travel licenses issued to conversos after 1391 differed from those issued before the attack in that they specified a period within which they had to return home, or register themselves before the court of another city within the Crown of Aragon. For instance, conversos travelling to travel to Valencia, as many did, had to present themselves at the bailiff’s court usually within 2 months from the date the license was issued. In some cases they stayed in Valencia, and this was recorded in the license (see addendum to ARM AH G5: 51v, 1394). Furthermore, these licenses stipulated a heavy fine to be paid if the conditions were breached, or required them to pledge all their property as a surety (e.g. ARM AH G5: 51v, 1394). The latter condition was later amended such that they were required to name a guarantor who would pay the fine if they did not return. Ship owners also had to get a license for their ships to travel. If they were transporting conversos, the owner had to swear that he would take them to the specified city and nowhere else. Otherwise the license usually stipulated that they were prohibited from carrying any conversos without a license. For just a few examples of licences to ship captains to allow conversos on their ships, see ARM AH G5: 86r, 88v, 89v (1395).

The announcements were especially frequent in 1392 but did continue afterwards. ARM AH 419: 77v (May 31, 1392), 99v (June 7, 1392), both of these documents are published in BSAL 8:56-57; 104bis (October 7, 1392) states that no conversos may leave the island but does not provide the option of a license. The implication of this announcement is that some conversos were in fact leaving without a license, perhaps even bribing ship owners to allow them on their ship illegally. The punishments threatened against anyone found with conversos aboard their ships without a license were meant to curb this, of course. The fact that ship owners were repeatedly threatened raises the question of to what extent they knowingly participated in carrying conversos illegally, and if so, what were their motivations—good will, or financial profit?

ACA CR 1998: 118v-120r (October 11, 1395). Sometimes the guarantors were Old Christians. For example, the notary Vincenç Abaxar stood as surety for Antoni Mas, converso, who went to Barbary with a license but did not return within the prescribed time.
confiscated from conversas accused of relapsing, either on or off the island. Dowries were often comprised, if only in part, of loan investments or legally binding promises of monetary gifts, and royal officials pursued the individuals “indebted” to confiscated dowries of relapsed conversas. Many of those debtors were also conversos. With so many financial pressures at this time, it was difficult for many conversos to repay their debts—including those debts owed to relapsed conversas as part of their dowries. Converso exiles themselves also left the island without paying off their debts, to the detriment of their creditors, whether these were converso, Old Christian or Jewish. Furthermore, when no one could be found to legally represent the exiles, their creditors could not initiate judicial proceedings against them.

Converso representatives voiced these complaints before the king during his stay in Majorca in the summer of 1395. To ease the situation, Joan established two defendants for the absent exiles so that others might take action against them in court: one royal representative, Bernat de Puig Gros, and one converso, Julia Doscha. At the end of his stay, he issued a general pardon which released those conversos who continued to reside on the island from paying fines incurred by exiles, namely conversos who had gone to Barbary “secretly or openly” and not returned within the prescribed time. The guiatge specifically applied to guarantors of exiles and those indebted to confiscated dowries of relapsed conversas. Furthermore, he granted legal immunities even to those conversos who had left the island illegally but returned and were resident there at the time of the guiatge. In this case, as in others, Joan’s support was not without a price: the converso community paid 460 gold florins to the royal treasury for this

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72 ACA CR 1998: 118v-120r (October 11, 1395); 1999: 151v-152r (October 15, 1395). The fact that these letters mention women returning to Judaism while living in Majorca—and not men—is noteworthy and suggests that it may have been a more common occurrence, although I have not found other records that specifically attest to women Judaizing in this period.
74 ACA CR 1998: 118v-120r (October 11, 1395); 1999: 151v-152r (October 15, 1395); 2000: 124r-v (December 18, 1395). He absolved the conversos of “all cases held against them.”
pardon, and its leaders instituted a tax to be collected from the community in order to raise the money. The pardon did not apply to anyone who refused to pay the tax, or who reneged on Catholicism, whether by remaining in Muslim lands without a license, or by explicitly observing Jewish customs.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Martí and licenses}

Despite these modifications, King Joan never removed the requirement to procure licenses or to provide guarantors, which continued into Martí’s reign.\textsuperscript{76} Shortly after his accession to the throne, converso merchants petitioned Martí claiming that the license and guarantor requirements caused their business to suffer, while overly stringent officials caused further setbacks to their commercial ventures. For instance, in 1397 the converso merchant society comprised of Bernat de Castell Calli, Dalmaci de Montagut, Lluis de Portans, Jacob Cap, and Pere Pardo complained that they were being prevented from chartering certain ships to transport their merchandise unless they first provided a guarantor, which went beyond royal regulations and impeded their trade. In a typically Catalan fashion, the merchants evoked the importance of established customs, the transgression of which Martí took seriously. “These merchants have been accustomed to do business and trade and invest in ships and other vessels of navigation in various parts of the world, paying taxes to the king and his officials as is customary and according as other merchants customarily pay; however, against the said

\textsuperscript{75} ACA CR 2000: 124r-v (December 18, 1395) specifies names of individuals from Menorca who were to be excluded from the pardon until they paid the tax. This also suggests that the converso representatives from Majorca may have lobbied for those in Menorca. This would be continuous with the situation prior to 1391, when the \textit{aljamas} of all the Balearic islands belonged to one \textit{colecta} and were treated as a single fiscal and administrative entity vis-a-vis the Crown. Sometimes, for instance, the secretaries of the \textit{aljama} of Majorca petitioned the king on behalf of Jews living on the other Balearic islands (as mentioned in Chapter One)].

\textsuperscript{76} Like King Joan, King Martí occasionally issued individual licenses for travel within the kingdom that did not stipulate a guarantor, and sometimes these were accompanied by provisions for legal immunity. See, for example, ACA CR 2171: 68v-69r (January 9, 1399) issued to the converso Jacob Ribes, formerly Jaffuda Cresques, and his mother Cetadar—son and wife of the famous mapmaker Abraham Cresques. Jacob was also a “master of navigational maps” and considered a familiar of the royal house.
custom...[they were required to provide guarantors when they wished to charter ships] even though this custom had never existed previously [my italics].” Merchants may have been expected, in recent years, to procure licenses for their own travel, but chartering a ship should not have been subject to that requirement. Martí instructed his officials not to “aggravate” the supplicants or “create any new [rules] without just cause.”

It is difficult to discern whether there could have been any ulterior motives on the part of officials who, as it seems from this example, took it upon themselves to add extra rules. It may well have been the ship captains who pressured officials to take the extra precaution of compelling converso merchants to supply guarantors in order to charter a ship for the purpose of transporting merchandise (when the rule was that conversos only needed to secure their own travel); captains may have done so out of fear of royal reprisal, should the merchandise be associated with, or accompanied by, conversos who turned out to be renegades. It is also conceivable that the impetus came from other merchants who exploited the climate of suspicion, engendered by the continuous stream of royal proclamations, in order to gain the upper hand over their converso competitors—although I have not found evidence to substantiate this yet. Alternatively, it may have simply been a pragmatic or precautionary measure. King Joan’s numerous threats to punish local Old Christians who facilitated any illegal departure of conversos or their goods from Majorca, and repeated decrees requiring guarantors for those wishing to leave the island in order to secure their return, may have made some Old Christians genuinely fearful of incurring any losses as a result of their dealings with conversos at the port. In a sense, the port had taken on an exaggerated significance in the popular psyche, as the proverbial gate through which treasonous conversos abandoned their kingdom and faith.

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77 ACA CR 2263: 76r (November 15, 1397).
By the reign of Martí, having to provide guarantors was extremely frustrating to converso merchants, especially considering that many years had already passed since the 1391 crisis. It may have been King Martí’s reputation as “humane” that inspired converso merchants to voice their complaints to him about the travel restrictions, something they did not do with King Joan. In 1399, the converso merchants Huguet Gilabert and Pere Manresa petitioned King Martí regarding specific problems that arose from having to provide guarantors. Like many other Jewish, now converso, merchants, they travelled by sea “continuously, to diverse parts,” but had to renew the surety for each trip. They claimed that often they were held back from returning to Majorca within the assigned period of time because of “rough seas, storms, or business.” In order to avoid fines when they found themselves in such a predicament, they had to request special extensions that entailed tedious bureaucratic processes and required them to impose upon friends to plead on their behalf. All this came at a cost to the supplicants. Taking into consideration the fact that they were citizens of Majorca, where they lived “as good Christians, with their wives, children and families,” King Martí exempted these merchants and their agents from providing sureties in the future, allowing them, along with their merchandise, to go, come, or remain wherever and whenever they wished. In other words, he completely revoked any travel restrictions that had been placed on them as conversos, writing that the requirement for guarantors to secure the return of travelling conversos had been issued by King Joan for the following reasons: (a) because many conversos were, at the time, stealthily emigrating to the Maghrib and returning to Judaism, and (b) as a measure to protect the “call and aljama” that had

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78 ACA CR 2263: 194 r-v (July 14, 1399). Some further notes on these two merchants: Huguet Gilabert, formerly Ayon Almehlli (/Mellili) is mentioned as an executor in the 1396 will of the Jew Samuel Fazuati, who bequeathed money to his maternal uncle in Mostaganem to be distributed among the poor in that community (ACM Prot. Not. 14751, July 23, 1396). Pere Manresa, formerly Aaron Sussen, is also mentioned in the same will as owing Fazuati 44 pounds for some wax that he purchased. Pere also obtained a travel license from the governor’s court in 1394, together with his brother, also named Pere Manresa, formerly Jacob Sussen, but the register does not indicate his destination (ARM AH G5: 38v, February 5, 1394).

79 ACA CR 2263: 194r-v (July 14, 1399). Cf. López Pérez, La corona de Aragón y el Magreb, 332).
been falling into “dilapidation.” The association of exiles with the deterioration of the Jewish quarter—which Martí does not elaborate upon in his letter—underscores the inseparability of the two communities at this stage. They were intertwined through family as well as economic networks, not to mention collective fiscal obligations incurred by the *aljama* prior to 1391, which continued to burden both Jews and conversos as a single unit. Given such interconnectedness, the economic repercussions of one converso exile could easily extend through multiple Jewish families and affect the demographic, or physical, composition of the *call*, particularly when the houses of exiles were one of the first assets to be confiscated. In the case of Gilabert and Manresa, then, Martí felt that the travel restrictions had no grounds, since he believed that they would not abandon the kingdom and revert to Judaism. Indeed, the royal register of royal licenses showed that Manresa had obtained at least one travel license in the past, and had returned to the island.

Martí’s reference to the former *call* and *aljama* in his response to Gilabert’s and Manresa’s supplication seems to suggest that he was already thinking about actively reviving them – and indeed, it was only one month later that he directed the governor and his royal procurator, Mateu de Llosch, to “re-establish anew the *aljama* in the City of Majorca,” centred, preferably, where the old Jewish quarter used to be. Facilitating converso trade also stood to benefit many local Jews whose economic activities and assets were still intertwined with those of their converted kin and trade associates. It was no coincidence, then, that on the same day Martí wrote to the Majorcan governor and royal procurator about re-establishing the *aljama*, he also abolished the guarantor requirement for *all* conversos, permitting them to “go and come freely

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80 ACA CR 2263: 194 r-v (July 14, 1399).
81 AH G5: 86r (September 23, 1395).
82 ACA CR 2264: 138v-139r (August 20, 1399).
This concession was prompted by a collective supplication on the part of the converso community as a whole, which cited various problems that had already arisen during Joan’s reign. The guarantor requirement did not simply slow down the process of trade or travel, but for many made it entirely impossible, since it had become so difficult to find willing and able guarantors. Joan’s letters make clear that this reluctance on the part of guarantors arose as a result of the continuing incidences of conversos not returning to the island within the prescribed amount of time and consequently leaving their guarantors with huge fines. It was these reports of reneging conversos that, according to Martí, convinced the lieutenant governor to propose banning conversos from leaving the island altogether. The effects of all this were economically debilitating for the conversos who, Martí reiterated, “in particular, exercise the mercantile art”—a phrase which echoes his father’s characterization of Majorca’s Jews. Maintaining the guarantor requirement was simply incompatible with his goal of stimulating Jewish and converso trade. At least at this point in time, it was more effective to maintain a Jewish-converso community on the island through economic incentives as opposed to oppressive restrictions that were detrimental to the conversos and the royal fisc alike.

Lifting the guarantor requirement still did not exempt conversos from other travel restrictions such as licenses and time limits. When Martí was informed, in 1402, that Majorcan conversos were still returning to Judaism in the Maghrib, and some of them allegedly exporting “arms and other things forbidden by law,” he instructed the governor to investigate and confiscate the goods of renegades, and collect fines from anyone who had not returned within the time stipulated in their license. Presumably, if there were no longer guarantors from whom to collect punitive fines, more effort had to be put into pursing the actual culprits and their property.

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83 Ibid.
The obvious financial benefits of condemning exiles did not necessarily mean that Kings Martí and Joan were not genuinely concerned about the religious implications. On the contrary; Martí, who generally took a favourable stance towards conversos and even intervened when they complained of the inquisitor’s harassment, showed no sympathy when he was convinced that one of them was, indeed, a heretic: “such a crime should not go unpunished,” he wrote, “especially since it deals with irreverence for God.”\(^{84}\) Still, the criteria for heresy had widened to include unexplained absences, failing to return Majorca before the expiration of a license, or if the converso was known to be in North Africa without a license at all.

**Independent actions of Old Christians against perceived exiles**

It was probably the threat and gravity of heresy that stood out in the popular psyche. Despite the Crown’s recognition that many converso merchants did return to Majorca after mercantile visits to North Africa (implicit in the continued granting of licenses), frequent public announcements denouncing “conversos who have gone to Barbary to renounce Catholicism”\(^{85}\) seem to have encouraged some Old Christians to take independent action against conversos whom they perceived as renegades. Whether the perpetrators genuinely believed their actions to be in defence of the Catholic faith, they employed that rhetoric, with varying degrees of success, to legitimate assaults at sea that were tantamount to piracy. This problem was more pronounced in the chaotic months during and following the anti-Jewish violence.

The convergence of anti-converso rhetoric and the growing culture of piracy in the Mediterranean is well illustrated in the example of Jordi de Sant Joan. Sometime after the 1391 violence, this knight was leading his galley back to Majorca after serving the Infante Martí for six months in Sardinia, when he seized a ship commanded by a Majorcan merchant named

\(^{84}\) ACA CR 2266: 109v (June 17, 1402).
\(^{85}\) AH 419: 117 bis (January 31, 1393).
Francesch Lana, allegedly because it was illegally heading for North Africa with conversos on board who did not possess royal licenses to travel. Through use of torture, de Sant Joan discovered which goods on the ship belonged to the conversos, and confiscated them to later hand over to royal officials. His motives were likely self-serving: he could stealthily pocket some of the cash or valuables the conversos were carrying with them, yet at the same time win royal favour. Subsequently, Jordi was denounced to the king for torturing subjects of the Crown without authorization, but the king absolved him since he had shown himself to be a man of “good behaviour” in detaining conversos who were on their way to Barbary to “reject Christianity.” Nevertheless, as we shall soon see, the Crown could not always legitimize the kind of autonomous actions against conversos demonstrated by Jordi. King Joan’s approving attitude in this case was governed by a number of mitigating factors: Jordi was a knight in royal service, and he handed over the conversos’ valuables to the king—although probably not without pocketing some for himself. Most importantly, he paid the royal treasurer 200 gold florins for the pardon, which was issued while Joan was visiting Majorca in 1395. Jordi probably appeared directly before the king to plead his case, likely with cash in hand. Meanwhile, the ship’s captain, Francesch Lana, who was being prosecuted for helping conversos escape to Saracen lands, also appealed to the king during his stay in Majorca, and was absolved of those allegations. Francesch was fortunate, since the owner of a ship carrying conversos without a license, particularly if headed for North Africa, would have been considered by the Crown as an accomplice to the converso renegades, and liable to harsh punishments or a large fine.

86 ACA CR 1998: 117r-v (October 1, 1395). The incident occurred a few years before this letter: “his annis non longe preteritis...” The king wrote of Jordi: “dignaremur erga vos dictum Georgium nos ostendere more solito mansuetos favorabiles et benignos.”
87 ACA CR 1998: 94r-95r (September 2, 1395).
No further mention is made, in Joan’s correspondence, of the conversos on Lana’s ship, but if he believed they were headed for North Africa without licenses, or without influential connections for that matter, they would have been apprehended and, at the very least, heavily fined. Even conversos who did procure licenses were sometimes accosted by overly “zealous” officials at the ports who sequestered their goods on questionable grounds. In 1394, Joan ordered the governor of Majorca to reprimand the bailiff of Portopí, who captured a ship along the coast carrying the converso Guillelm Dolms, and compel the bailiff to return the various cloths, arms, silver and other goods aboard which he had seized.\(^{88}\) In the following year, the king ordered his governor and officials to stop harassing the converso Roger de Moncada whose goods and merchandise had been confiscated despite a royal letter of safe-conduct issued in 1393 that permitted his family to travel and dwell anywhere in the kingdom.\(^{89}\) Considering the opportunities for extortion that were open to royal officials who had been directed to rein in delinquent conversos, it is difficult to know whether or not these overzealous officials truly believed they were following royal orders.\(^{90}\) Some local officials may have been confused by the barrage of administrative correspondence concerning maritime traffic, not to mention the rumours that must have been circulating. Misinformation may have affected their behaviour even when it came to restrictions applying to Old Christians. In January 1392, for instance, the bailiff of Alcudia was unnecessarily blocking all traffic into and out of his port (which would have been

\(^{88}\) ARM AA 49 s.f. (July 24, 1394).

\(^{89}\) ACA CR 1999: 86r-87r (September 15, 1395). Note that Roger de Moncada was also the name of the governor of Majorca at this time (and governor of the Kingdom of Valencia in 1393). In 1396, the converso acted as a guarantor for his partner Francesch Moliner, converso, whom he commissioned to conduct business in Tunis on his behalf; de Moncada promised that Moliner would return within six months (ARM G5: 103v, March 17, 1396). De Moncada may have been a native of Valencia; a royal safe-conduct issued in 1393 to a Roger de Moncada, converso of Valencia, is published in Hinojosa Montalvo, *The Jews of the Kingdom of Valencia*, 429, No. 170. He was also a community leader, representing Valencia’s conversos in their settlement with the creditors of the former *aljama*, and formerly called Içach Abdolazia (ibid, 393, No. 123).

\(^{90}\) See footnote [33] where the bailiff of Alcudia is reprimanded for being overzealous in his control of maritime traffic at the port.
mostly between Majorca and Menorca), based on earlier instructions from the governor that were no longer in effect.\footnote{ARM Lletres comunes, January 3, 1392; published in BSAL 8:55-56.}

Equally, if not more frequently, documented were the instances of armed ships without any tie to (or fear of) royal authority, which attacked and looted other ships “known” to be heading for North Africa with Jews or conversos on board. How, exactly, the assailants knew in advance where their victims were headed, and who they were, remains a mystery. The Crown wished to prevent such unsanctioned, piratical attacks; not only did these attacks further compromise the safety of the kingdom’s seas, but the theft of a condemned exile’s goods was tantamount to theft from the royal treasury. King Joan thus demanded public punishment of the “pernicious example” set by “wicked men both in the city of Mallorca and on the island of Ibiza” who participated in the 1391 revolt and then with “an armed ship” pursued and captured another ship heading for North Africa that was carrying Jews and conversos attempting to escape the violence by sea. The assailants then “robbed these Jews and conversos of the goods they were carrying with them.”\footnote{ACA CR 1996: 183r-v (November 16, 1393); A few months later Joan rescinded his decision, suspending any investigations or trials relating to the case, but did not explain why. See ACA CR 1997: 56v-57v (March 26, 1394). Although these letters were written in 1393 and 1394, the content make explicit that the assault took place at the time of the revolt.} It is noteworthy that in this case Joan was less concerned with the flight of Jews and conversos than with restraining the unruly characters that attacked them. His silence on this front suggests an attitude of understanding, given the context of the 1391 violence, although the intent of this correspondence was to punish rebels involved in the 1391 revolts and, more generally, to curb maritime violence against Jews and conversos, as opposed to capturing converso exiles at sea. Such maritime attacks would nevertheless continue well into the reign of Martí.
While King Joan demanded the cooperation of his subjects in observing the various restrictions applicable to conversos, unintentionally inciting anti-converso sentiment in the process, at the same time he condemned undue aggression and excesses against them. This policy sometimes required the king to pursue offenders outside of his dominions. Given their mobility, the converso “problem” was not limited to the Crown of Aragon or the Kingdom of Castile, but stretched across the Mediterranean, especially to the south, and occasionally required the cooperation of other Christian or Muslim rulers. One illustrative case involved a Sevillian ship captain named Zorzo who, some time before the spring of 1392, was forced by bad weather to bring his ship (nau) into the port of Algiers—a particularly common destination for Majorcan Jewish and converso emigrants as well as merchants. There, with the help of his armed crew, he seized the ship (panfill) of a Barcelonan named Bernat de Oliva carrying Majorcan conversos along with their merchandise. Among the conversos captured by Zorzo were two youths: Jaume Galiana—an apprentice to his merchant brother, Joan Lobera, who also had been captured but managed to escape—and sixteen-year old Antoni Boffy. Their fathers, Antoni Galiana and Antoni Boffy senior, separately petitioned the Majorcan governor concerning the rescue of their sons, and requested that Zorzo be brought to justice. Later detained in Seville, Zorzo attempted to vindicate himself suggesting that he was acting in the interest of the Crown, because “some New Christians who leave Majorca and go to Barbary return to Judaism.” Zorzo’s main intention was probably to steal the conversos’ merchandise, but he may well have considered his

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91 Joan Lobera was called Maymo Malieni before his baptism.
94 ARM AH64: 81r-82r (April 8, 1392), also published in BSAL 7:446 and cited in Pons, Los judíos de Mallorca, p.184; ARM AH64: 133r-v. The documents mention that Antoni also had a New Christian wife, infants and brothers, but it is not entirely clear if they were with him on the ship—it certainly does not specify that they were in Majorca. The fact that they were mentioned repeatedly may suggest that they were indeed with him on the ship, which would cast suspicion on the claim that his trip was merely for purpose of trade. On the other hand, if they were in Majorca, this may have been a way of demonstrating that he did not intend to make his home in Algiers.
95 Antoni Galiana was called Abraffim Malieni before baptism.
96 ARM AH64: 81r-82r (April 8, 1392), also published in BSAL 7:446; ARM AH64: 133r-v.
actions justifiable to royal authorities, just as corsairs who “legally” attacked and looted enemy ships in times of war, acting in the interest of the Crown for their own material benefit.

The governor of Majorca could not so easily justify Zorzo’s actions, however. Unlike Jordi de Sant Joan, who had seized conversos as a knight in the king’s service, Zorzo did not hold any such office, and was not even a subject of the Crown of Aragon. The petitions of Galiana and Boffy to the governor of Majorca, insisting on their sons’ innocence, thus met with a favourable response: he issued letters to the king of Granada and “other Moorish officials” as well as to the king and officials of Castile requesting that they arrest Zorzo and aid the conversos in recovering their sons and their merchandise. “Such things are a bad example,” wrote the governor regarding Zorzo’s impetuous behaviour, “and should be punished accordingly.” Echoing royal policy, he stated moreover, “the conversos should be defended and not mistreated.”

In these letters the governor asserted that, although it was true that many conversos did go to Barbary in order to renege on the Catholic faith and return to Judaism, many did not. Based on reports from other Catalan merchants in Algiers, he concluded that these conversos had gone to Barbary with their merchandise to trade and return home as Christians. Nonetheless, the governor’s letter was directed at a small, administrative audience. Public announcements that tarnished the conversos’ reputation, especially by casting those who travelled to North Africa as Judaizers, reached a much wider audience and therefore were more influential in terms of shaping popular, Old Christian, perceptions. Royal policy, then, inadvertently lent substance to the notion that conversos could not be trusted to be faithful Catholics. Such anti-converso attitudes were likely already brewing among Old Christians, who witnessed conversos continue to live their lives much as before their baptism in virtually all respects. Anti-converso attitudes
also found fertile ground in age-old images of Jews as deceivers and enemies of the Faith; realistically, it would have been difficult for Old Christians to shed these and other anti-Jewish attitudes when confronted by such masses of converts. The reverberations of royal “anti-converso” rhetoric therefore spread quickly on land and water, and introduced a new component to, or even exacerbated, existing problems of violence in the Mediterranean.

Episodes such as Zorzo’s capture of conversos at the port of Algiers, which occurred during Joan’s rule, continued under Martí, despite royal protections and letters of safe-conduct that the victims possessed. In 1399, for instance, the ships of Diego Gonsalves de Barassa attempted to capture another ship carrying mainly Majorcan Jews and conversos bound for Algiers.\(^\text{97}\) Later that year, in an effort to curb such attacks, Martí began to require assurances from the solicitors of piracy licenses that the latter would not in any way harm Jews travelling to the Maghrib or their goods.\(^\text{98}\) As López Pérez has observed, the continuation of such aggression demonstrates that this legal stipulation was not entirely effective either. In 1405, for example, the governor had to order Joan Eximenis to stop preying upon Jews and conversos at sea.\(^\text{99}\) The question remains whether the perpetrators of this new brand of piracy truly believed their actions to be “legitimate” or whether they were simply employing the new justification to expand their opportunities for loot. The idea that Jews, travelling in the Mediterranean between the Crown of Aragon and North Africa, were viable targets for piratic attacks appears to have been well communicated to merchants coming as far as Northern Europe. In 1412 a Flemish ship that was docked in the port of Ibiza seized the cargo of two Majorcan ships on the pretext that those ships


\(^{98}\) Ibid. cites ACA CR 2264: 143v-144r (August 20, 1399).

\(^{99}\) Ibid. cites ARM LLC 84: 104v (July 6, 1405).
were headed for Barbary, and were carrying merchandise of Jews and Muslims.\textsuperscript{100} While the ships were indeed headed for the Maghreb, the stolen cargo belonged to the well-known converso merchants, Pere Pardo, Julia Vidal and Galceran Martí, who often employed Jews and Muslims as their agents. It is not clear if Jews or Muslims were actually on the ship, which would not have been a crime in itself, but the Flemish excuse is nevertheless telling. Even if there was a popular image of conversos as being tantamount to Jews or “infidels”—and it is not clear to what extent this image had taken hold by this point—evidently foreigners not well acquainted with Catalan or Mediterranean merchant culture came to understand, or misunderstand, that a ship was eligible for piratical attack simply by virtue of carrying “Jewish” or “Muslim” cargo.

Piracy between Majorca and Barbary had been on the rise, and was a problem that Jews certainly had been contending with since the reign of Pere III, but it became worse at the turn of the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{101} Jews sailing out of Maghribi ports also suffered attacks. One of Rabbi Simon ben Zemach Duran’s letters refers to two Jews who travelled from Bugia to Algazir (Algeciras?) aboard a ship with Muslims. When Majorcan Christians attacked their ship not far from the port of Algazir, one of the Jews jumped into the sea to escape, but his body was discovered later along the shore.\textsuperscript{102} Duran does not indicate whether the Majorcans attacked the ship because they thought it carried exiles, or whether it was a less targeted piratical attack.

The foregoing examples almost certainly represent but a small fraction of the attacks committed against Jews and conversos at sea. The Crown could only respond to those cases that

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, 335. The Flemish ship had permission to dock at the Ibizan port until it filled its cargo of salt. Although Lópz Pérez claims that the ships were Majorcan, she states that they belonged to Tomàs Prats, of Tortosa, and Bartomeu Ferrer, of Menorca. She cites this example from M.J. Albadaleo, \textit{El comerç alternatiu}.

\textsuperscript{101} Gutwirth, “Comercio hispano-magrebi,” 199-200.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid, 205.
were brought to its attention. Presumably, there were other maritime attacks both during and after the violence that were not reported to authorities and therefore not recorded. No doubt, many attacks would have been carried out upon conversos who were, indeed, fleeing illegally to North Africa, and who consequently would not have had any recourse to royal justice, unless they could come up with a credible alibi. It is questionable, as well, whether attacks against Jews who were not subjects of the Crown of Aragon would have reached royal registers.

Majorcan Jews and conversos trading in North Africa thus had to contend with a number of obstacles that negatively affected their trade as a result of the 1391 violence for many years afterwards. The problem of piracy in the Mediterranean only added to the various setbacks caused by royal restrictions on travel, not to mention that many Jewish and converso merchants suffered the disadvantage of having their merchandise stolen or destroyed during the attack on the Jewish quarter, or subsequently extorted by royal officials.

**Parents sending children to into exile**

When Zorzo justified his seizure of converso youths as an act in defence of the Christian faith, he was probably being opportunistic, but he also voiced popular perceptions—perceptions that were not entirely unfounded either. Many Jewish and converso parents, unable or unwilling to abandon their wealth and homes themselves, sent their baptised children to live in North African Jewish communities. The Crown investigated such allegations and punished those cases that they deemed sufficiently confirmed (evidently, Zorzo’s allegations did not hold enough water for the governor). We know, for instance, that Joan collected a hefty sum in pardoning two Jews of Morvedre for sending their converso children to Barbary.\(^\text{103}\) Although contemporaneous examples surely exist for Majorca, they only surface in later royal chancery records. For

\(^{103}\) For examples in Morvedre see Meyerson, *Jewish Renaissance*, 39.
instance, King Martí was furious when he learned, in 1407, that the Majorcan converso Pere Morro had sent his granddaughter to Algiers where she could return to Judaism.\(^{104}\) Pere himself remained in Majorca along with his widowed daughter, the girl’s mother, who resided in his house. Moreover, Pere had been accused of “other various crimes,” probably related to his refusal to pay taxes to the converso community. Pere’s delinquencies tried Martí’s patience and led him to take a more severe approach than usual. He ordered the royal procurator, Mateu de Llosch, to employ torture and the assistance of any royal official in order to facilitate his investigation of these allegations.\(^{105}\) Martí further condemned Pere to pay 500 florins to the converso procuradors and even threatened to inflict the fine on the procuradors themselves if they did not collect the money from him immediately.

**Returning exiles**

In light of such examples, it is difficult to know whether the sons of Antoni Galiana and Antoni Boffy were truly on a short-term mercantile visit to North Africa, or whether they successfully, yet dishonestly, made this claim in order to save their sons and themselves from royal prosecution. That the governor responded favourably to their petitions could also be understood in light of another aspect of royal policy, espoused both by Joan and Martí, which encouraged the return of Jews and repentant conversos, and advocated benevolence towards converso supplicants who sought royal protection to return to the kingdom and live as faithful Catholics. This attitude is reflected in Joan’s 1395 pardon to conversos who had fled to Barbary illegally (either without a license or by staying longer than they were allowed) but had returned to reside in Majorca. Some of those conversos had gone to Muslim regions to live freely as Jews,

\(^{104}\) ACA CR 2269: 151v-152r (June 30, 1407).

\(^{105}\) I have not encountered further documentation on this case so do not know whether the torture was carried out or what the final sentence was. Pere’s crime fits the typology of parents sending their children away to live as Jews while they remained behind—in this case an extra generation removed.
but for whatever reason had a change of heart and decided to return home, even if it meant living
as Christians, at least overtly.

In a similar vein, in 1395 King Joan, together with Queen Violant, issued a letter granting
permission and immunity from arrest to the converso Joan Riera to go to Algiers to fetch his
conversa daughters Elionor and Antonia, who had fled there after converting and had been living
there with their three sons. The Crown’s forgiving stance towards Riera was in fact quite typical
of royal policy towards “repentant” or returning conversos over the next century. Particularly in
this early period, the Crown was quite willing to show leniency and grant privileges to conversos
in an attempt to encourage their faith in Catholicism. King Martí would later state in no uncertain
terms that inquisitorial harassment and popular antagonism only drove conversos away and led
them to renege on their baptism.106 Interestingly, the king’s 1395 letter makes no mention of the
husbands of Riera’s daughters, who had been divorced or widowed (their husbands possibly
killed in the 1391 violence, or disappeared at sea). The royal letter simply states that Riera
wanted to bring his daughters back to Majorca “in order to preserve their Catholic faith,” and
notably omits any reference to Judaism.107 That Joan Riera’s wife, Marquesa,108 presented this
letter before the lieutenant-governor of Majorca in 1401, six years after it had been issued, and
without any overt acknowledgement or explanation of her husband’s delay, is also curious. By
presenting the royal letter that granted her husband, daughters, and grandchildren immunity from
any prosecution upon their return, Marquesa took measures to protect her family from the
harassment of royal officials who might consider them renegades and seize their property.

106 ACA CR 2271: 15v-16r (November 2, 1409). This royal letter was presented by the conversos’ procurador to the
Majorcan governor on October 30, 1410, the record of which is published in BSAL 24: 402, 420.
107 The Latin text reads, “audimus alienoram et anthoniam supradictas pro conservandam Christianam fidem
adferrasse et adferrare ad has partes redire” (ARM AH G6: 24r-v, January 21, 1401). The original royal letter is
dated October 11, 1395.
108 Spelled “Marg <e>sia” in the document.
There are other examples of Jews and conversos who, like Antonia and Eleanor, left shortly after 1391 for Muslim kingdoms only later to return to the Christian kingdom from which they fled, and we find references to them in archival records as well as rabbinic responsa. Rabbi Simon Duran complained about Majorcan conversos who returned to the island they had fled after spending some time in North Africa.\(^{109}\) The phenomenon of the “returnee” post 1492 has been a recent topic of historical analysis.\(^{110}\) Many Jews and conversos abandoned the Spanish kingdoms seeking to live as Jews in foreign communities, but soon afterwards returned to their native lands where they would be forced to live, at least externally, as Catholics. In both periods, a century apart, the reasons that underlay their decisions to return were probably similar: it may have been difficult to integrate into new communities—in this case, mostly in North Africa—economically, culturally or psychologically, or they may have been simply homesick. Jaume Galiana’s brother, Joan Lobera, may have been one such returnee: after he managed to escape captivity under Zorzo and flee to Málaga,\(^{111}\) “a Moorish land,” he went to Valencia where, according to merchant reports, he lived and conducted business as a Christian. In other words, Joan Lobera forfeited his opportunity to live as a Jew in Muslim territory, preferring to live—or at least perform—as a Christian in the Crown of Aragon. His residence in Valencia would not have been unusual given the frequent traffic between the two former Jewish, and subsequently converso, communities that were united by family and commercial networks; he may well have had relatives or close business contacts in Valencia.\(^{112}\) Eventually, it seems, Joan made his way

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\(^{111}\) The Latin place name here is “Malicha.”

\(^{112}\) Joan Lobera may also have gone to Valencia in an attempt to avoid paying the various taxes that were being levied on conversos after the *avalot*. See discussion ahead re: evasion of the debt-tax. License registers show that many Majorcans acquired licenses to go to Valencia and some decided to settle there. It is likely that many of these
back to Majorca, where he appears to have acted less convincingly as a Christian. In 1403 King Martí wrote of a Joan Lobera who, “led by a diabolical spirit,” spirited off his whole family to North Africa to live as Jews, “as dogs returning to their own vomit,” and then returned to Majorca with his wife where they lived “superficially” as Christians—a crime which he ordered investigated and punished. He was likely relaxed to the secular arm for crimes of heresy in 1407.

Both Pere Morro and Joan Lobera, in different ways, were the kind of converso who chose the rather risky route of maintaining their fidelity to Judaism while resident in Majorca, rather than returning openly to Judaism outside the kingdom. From the tone of his responses, it seems that King Martí perceived this as an even worse affront than exile, and understandably so: it was tantamount to a public insult to the Catholic faith, and set a bad example to New and Old Christians alike. Ultimately, though, Majorcan documentation does not provide further details regarding the nature of their “Jewishness.” We do not know if Pere also observed Jewish customs himself, or what exactly were the offending behaviours of Joan Lobera. What is noteworthy in both cases is that exile, or perhaps better said, travel to nearby Muslim domains, was a key component in defining their heresy. What is also significant not just about these two cases but in much of the foregoing discussion, is that conversos were mobile, and that their mobility was not just geographical. Geographical mobility was often tied to crossing religious boundaries, at least in the eyes of Old Christians, and even in the eyes of some rabbinic authorities. There are also intimations in archival records, such as in the case of Joan Lobera, that

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113 ACA CR 2266: 162v-163r (January 23, 1403).
114 Given that Joan Lobera’s father was Antoni Galiana and his brother was Jaume Galiana, this may be the same converso as the “Joan Galiana” who, according to Cortès (he does not provide a source), was relaxed to the secular arm and sentenced to be burned for apostasy in 1407 (Historia de los judíos mallorquines, 107).
conversos on the island could be “religiously mobile” without physically going anywhere. Whether conversos understood *themselves* to be moving in and out of religious identities, as opposed to simply continuing to do what they had always done, with the occasional nod to their new Catholic obligations, is an important question that I will return to at the end of this dissertation. It is a question, however, that cannot be answered adequately solely based on the documentation employed in this study. The next chapters will focus on what is more properly the topic of this dissertation, namely the collective economic and institutional life of conversos, and their relations with the Crown following 1391.
Chapter 3

The unshakeable bonds of debt: Fiscal realities, past identities

Kings Joan and Martí’s preoccupation with preventing converso exile had much to do with its connection to heresy, but, arguably, it had more to do with its fiscal implications. This chapter will discuss in detail the Majorcan conversos’ fiscal situation following 1391, and the role of royal policy in perpetuating the certain economic relationships (especially between the monarchy and the Jews) and social organization that characterized the Jewish *aljama* prior to 1391. These themes shall be explored by focusing on the two major collective debts the conversos had to bear as a result of the 1391 violence: one to the king, and one to the creditors of the former *aljama*. The ensuing discussion serves as the foundation for my later argument that fiscal realities, royal policies and economic relationships had a significant impact on the development of converso group identity.

Group Organization

Immediately after the 1391 violence, conversos began to organize themselves as a distinct group, independent of their brethren who had managed to avoid baptism. Such developments are documented for Valencia as well as Majorca,¹ and further studies would likely bear out that other large converso communities did the same. Group organization and representation were essential to deal with the numerous issues, primarily economic, which they faced after the 1391 violence. The conversos adopted the same administrative organization and practices to which they had been accustomed as part of a Jewish *aljama*. They elected four procuradors who carried out the same role as the former secretaries or adelantats, defending the conversos’ interests before royal

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¹ See for example the documents published in Hinojosa Montalvo, *The Jews of the Kingdom of Valencia* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1993).
and municipal authorities, representing them in negotiations with creditors, and overseeing communal finances, most importantly tax assessment and collection.²

**Donation to the Crown**

Shortly after the *avalot*, the converso procuradors, on behalf of the community, gave a gift or “*donatio*” to King Joan.³ The value originally promised was 4 *sous* per pound to be collected from all their goods (a rate of 20%),⁴ although all subsequent royal correspondence suggests that what was really “taxed” was their loan investments. In either case, this was a curiously large gift to be giving in the wake of so much destruction and financial loss, and one that may have been made under pressure to compensate the king for the immense loss of revenue as a consequence of their baptism.⁵ At the same time, the conversos would have had their own reasons for extending this offer: it could serve as a *de facto* bribe to ensure them certain legal immunities, or as compensation for certain royal protections, as was a typical practice of *aljamas* in the past. Moreover, the *donatio* was not made uniquely by the converso community of Majorca: the communities of Valencia and Barcelona also offered similar grants, although at a lower rate of 17.5 %—perhaps a testament to the wealth of the Majorcan Jews, or at least the king’s perception of such wealth.⁶

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² The documents consulted for this dissertation do not indicate how the procuradors were elected or who elected them, but their names suggest that they came from the same, or comparable, elite families as the *aljama*’s secretaries before 1391. For names of procuradors see notes 56 in this chapter, and 60 in Chapter Five.

³ The term *donatio* had specific legal implications. See for example the entry in Adolf Berger’s *Encyclopaedia of Roman Law* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953).

⁴ ACA CR 1995: 138v-139r (August 9, 1392). This letter refers to the prior concession of the *donatio*. The date of the original concession is not indicated, just that it was made “after the destruction of the *call*.”

⁵ One amount of annual tribute referred to is for 3,000 sous: ACA CR 1996 161r; ARM LR 37:217r-218r (October 26, 1391) also refers to annual tributes (*peita*) paid by the *aljama* to the king.

⁶ At the time of the dissolution of the *aljama* of Valencia, the conversos made a donation to Queen Violant of 3 *sous*, 6 *diners* per pound (or 17.5 %) on the goods which they possessed at the time: ACA CR 2001:27r. The conversos and Jews of Barcelona made a donation of the same amount to the king and queen: ACA Cartas Reales, Joan I, c.6, n. 689, published in, Régné, *Jews in the Crown of Aragon*: 250.
That the rate of the donation was equivalent to the legal rate of interest a Jew could charge to a Christian debtor may not have been a coincidence. Given that baptism technically undermined the legality of directly charging interest on a loan, the Majorcan conversos effectively transferred to the Crown the interest on outstanding loans which they had made prior to their conversion, perhaps in order to avoid potential allegations of usury, which could result in heavy fines, trials, or confiscation of their loans. It was not uncommon throughout the medieval period for *aljamas* to purchase royal pardons to free them from charges of demanding illegal rates of interest.

Another reason for making the donation, from the conversos’ point of view, would have been to purchase the assistance of the royal administration in recovering loan investments as well as some of the property that was stolen from Jews during the revolt. Indeed, Joan later directed his procurador Mateu the Llosch to use the “four sous per pound” to pay expenses relating to recovering goods stolen from the former *call*, and the conversos themselves later claimed that they made the donation “so that their debts might be collected.” There was indeed historical precedent for this: Jewish *aljamas* had not hesitated to enlist the help of royal officials in enforcing the payment of debts and taxes. Baptism did not change the fact that a large proportion of the capital of Majorcan Jews was tied up in loans, mostly for small to medium amounts, extended to rural borrowers. Considering the likelihood that many of these debtors had been involved in the 1391 revolt, and that indebtedness to Jews had been a major grievance among the

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7 Such is the opinion of Josep Francesc López Bonet, “Consideracions sobre l’assalt al call de ciutat de 1391,” *Sobre jueus i conversos de les Balears* (Palma de Mallorca: Lleonard Muntaner, 1999), 41-60. López Bonet writes that the donation was made in July 1392.

8 ACA CR 1998: 57v (March 20, 1395). Royal administrative correspondence intimates that the stolen goods were to be returned to their original owners, Jews as well as conversos, but I have not seen any explicit documentation of this. For instance, after the governor instructed the bailiff of Inca to announce that any information regarding goods stolen from the *call* had to be denounced within ten days, he stated that “conversos cannot receive these goods without the consent of the governor” (ARM AH 64: 15r-16r, January 27, 1392).

9 ACA CR 1997: 176v-177r (February 15, 1395); see also 1996: 40v-41r (November 23, 1392).
rebels, it was only prudent for conversos to commission royal authorities to take over the tedious, frustrating, and possibly dangerous task of reclaiming their loan investments.

**Debt of the former *aljama***

The conversos’ particular situation presented an extenuating circumstance that rendered the assistance of royal officials in debt collection all the more critical. This was the collective debt of the former *aljama*, for which the conversos were collectively held responsible, and which was to be repaid, to a large extent, by transferring to the creditors the rights to call in the loans made by Jews prior to the *avalot*.\(^{10}\) Chapter One explained how the Jewish *aljama* of Majorca had greatly indebted itself, like other *aljamas* or municipalities in the kingdom, through the sale of annuities or *censals*. Rather than place the entire burden immediately on a community which was already suffering financially, a number of *aljamas* under Kings Pere and Joan sold *censals* to meet royal fiscal demands (or for the needs of the community), and then taxed their members in order to make pay the annual pensions.\(^{11}\) As recently as 1389, King Joan had ordered the secretaries of the Majorcan *aljama* to sell *censals* to provide funds for the governor of Sardinia as well as for expenses associated with the general Cortes.\(^{12}\) By August 1391, the Majorcan *aljama* had accrued a total debt of 24,000 pounds in *censals*, paying 1,500 pounds in annuities to creditors—by and large *rentiers* or *censalers*—resident in Majorca as well as in Barcelona.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{10}\) The conversos seem to have claimed that they granted a portion of their loans to the king in order that the 24,000 pounds which they owed to the creditors of the former *aljama* be “collected more easily” (1996: 40v-41r, November 23, 1392).

\(^{11}\) The pensions were the equivalent of interest payments, and so much lighter than paying off the entire subsidy at once. For the example of Morvedre see Meyerson, *Jews in an Iberian Frontier*, 125.

\(^{12}\) ACA CR 1872: 175r-v (n.d., 1389); 1873: 23v (May 10, 1389); 1873: 33r (May 20, 1389) 2000: 181v-184r (November 18, 1395) mentions that Joan’s father, Pere III, ordered the *aljama* to sell *censals* to provide him with subsidies; ARM LR 37: 162r-v (June 2, 1389).

\(^{13}\) ACA CR 1995: 138v-139r (August 9, 1392): “The conversos are greatly indebted to creditors of Barcelona and Majorca…debts which the conversos incurred, in part, for the king’s own necessities.”
Shortly after the attack of 1391 and consequent dissolution of the former aljama, its creditors petitioned King Joan for his assistance. The creditors were justifiably concerned about repayment, since the dissolution of the aljama meant that there was no longer a corporate legal entity that could continue to make annuity payments. They needed to recover their capital investments immediately, but it would have been impossible for the island’s remaining Jews, drastically diminished in number, to bear the entire burden themselves after the conversion and exodus of so many. Moreover, the communal assets of the former aljama, which appear to have been substantial, could not serve to repay its debt since they had been appropriated by the Crown shortly after the revolt. Conversos, as constituents of the former aljama, were thus obligated to repay the debt together with the surviving Jews, and in fact it was conversos who took the reins of managing the complex and tedious process of debt settlement.

A repayment agreement had to be reached quickly, and a collection plan executed before the aljama’s former constituents, baptised or not, could no longer be located, whether because they had integrated into the Old Christian population (less likely) or physically left the island. The more imminent and realistic threat was the latter, since the constant bans on travel were not entirely effective. Furthermore, we must understand that those bans, at least in part, were aimed at preventing conversos from evading their obligation to the collective debt and the donatio. Meanwhile, Joan did grant the conversos a year’s respite from having to pay back any debts.

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14 The creditors petitioned the king regarding these concerns: see ACA CR 1995: 61r (March 7, 1392), 62r-v (March 8, 1392).
15 I shall discuss in detail King Joan’s appropriation of communal assets and other property in the call in the following chapter. King Joan also appropriated the assets of the Valencian aljama and explicitly forbade these from being used to repay its own creditors since aljama assets, “com aquelles son dels dits senyor e senyora e’ls pertanguen en plen dret e senyoria e proprietat” (Hinojosa Montalvo, Jews of the Kingdom of Valencia, 394, No. 123).
16 Almost all documents dealing with the collective debt refer exclusively to conversos and do not mention Jews. Because there are no royal documents whatsoever in this period which mention a separate effort among Jews at repaying the debt, I am assuming that the exclusive use of the term conversos indicates that they were the overwhelming majority, and that the administration of this debt was handled solely by converso representatives, not by conversos and Jews together. This may also indicate that the boundaries between the two groups, especially in this early period and in economic respects, were not clearly established, if at all.
It is possible that the converso procuradors were not fully aware of the extent of the communal debt when they “offered” the gift of four sous per pound to King Joan (assuming they had any real choice in the matter). They may still have believed that the ciutat would pay the bulk of the former aljama’s debt in exchange for their conversion, as the jurats had promised at the time of the revolt. The royal scribe Jacme des Puig ignored repeated requests made by the conversos and King Joan to turn over his transcript of this agreement, and it appears never to have surfaced, judging from the absence of any further documentation concerning this matter following his inquiry of March 1392. The expectation that the jurats would contribute to their debt seems more plausible in light of the fact that, in 1394, the king had asked the jurats of Valencia to contribute 500 pounds of municipal taxes to the conversos’ collective debt there. However, the conversos of Majorca never received any assistance towards their own debt repayment.

Attempts to mitigate the burden of the donatio

Once it became clear to the conversos that they were not going to receive any assistance in repaying the aljama’s 24,000 pound debt, in the summer of 1392 the procuradors asked King Joan whether he would consider allowing them to back out of their commitment to the donatio. The king responded with a compromise, writing that he would delay the donatio collections until the conversos had paid off their debt. He instructed his officials a number of times, in the fall of 1392, to “hold firm and observe the relaxation made of the four sous per pound.” However, in a later letter the king indicated that, although he had exempted the conversos from paying the four

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17 The jurats’ promise is discussed in the Introduction.
19 Hinojosa Montalvo, Jews of the Kingdom of Valencia, No. 238.
20 ARM AH 419: 92v (July 2, 1392); Cf. another version of this document published in BSAL 8: 443. For the governor’s letters to rural bailiffs see the Lletres Comunes series at the ARM, especially AH 64 and 65 for 1392. (There are close to two hundred letters from the governor to rural bailiffs re: debt collection in AH 64 alone.)
21 ACA CR 1995: 138v-139r (August 9, 1392); 1996: 38v (November 11, 1392).
sous per pound until after they had collected 24,000 pounds to repay their communal debt, they nevertheless had committed to giving him an unspecified percentage of those 24,000 pounds in exchange for royal assistance in collecting it. Presumably, then, the conversos were paying the king for the help of royal officials in taxing members of their community, calling in loans owed to them, and transferring funds to their creditors. The conversos indicated that they would pay for this assistance with “goods and recoverable debts [lit: bona et debita recuperabili];” in reality, the payment was made by transferring to the Crown the rights to collect some anticipated loan payments. Even this turned out to be economically debilitating, and the conversos petitioned the king once again, in the fall of 1392, claiming that if they ceded their “recoverable” loans to the king, “they would come to nothing, and consequently cause damage to the royal court.”

Based on other documentation, we can safely assume that the conversos needed every cent they could collect to be able to repay the creditors of the former aljama. To make their burden slightly more bearable, King Joan conceded that half of the payment they owed him (i.e., half of the unspecified portion of the 24,000 pounds) could be based on “irrecoverable debts.” What this really meant, in practice, is not indicated in the sources, but we can guess that “irrecoverable debts” were those that had expired, or were impossible to collect as a result of insolvency or absence of the debtor. Either Joan believed that the royal treasury would eventually see these debt payments through the coercion of royal officials or he was effectively reducing the donatio by half.

Documentation concerning the donatio is elliptical and confusing at best, but the main point here can be summed up as follows: in order to protect various interests of the new converso community, its procuradors were compelled to make financial commitments to the Crown which they subsequently realized would be impossible to fulfill. On the one hand, they desperately

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22 ACA CR 1996: 40v-41r (November 23, 1392).
needed the king’s support, for which they would have to pay, just as aljamas always had in the past. On the other hand, given their obligation to repay the former aljama’s debt (an obligation which they may not have anticipated initially), the converso community was not quite capable of making the payments they had promised to the Crown, nor did they have recourse to further credit. In the past, aljamas could use future tax collections or other communal assets as collateral to borrow money to pay for the royal subsidies that afforded them the king’s protection, but the new converso community had no such collateral. The procuradors asked Joan for financial respite given their debt burden, which they did get, but ultimately not enough. Notwithstanding Joan’s concession to postpone collecting the donatio (by appropriating debts owed to conversos) until they had settled their collective debt, later both he and King Martí ordered their officials to step up their efforts to collect the donatio from rural debtors even though the conversos’ creditors had not fully been paid. The reasons for this are not explicitly laid out. Perhaps the debts in question were “irrecoverable,” or perhaps the kings were merely trying to gather enough revenue to pay the officials involved in the conversos’ affairs, or perhaps there was a subsequent agreement to begin collecting the donatio immediately. As we shall see in the ensuing discussions, the Crown’s competing claims to converso assets, in terms of not only loans, but also houses and pensions, only added further hindrances, for everyone, to the seemingly unending payment process. That said, it is concerns over the conversos’ loans, and in particular, the problems with collecting them, that are the most prominent in royal correspondence. That archival sources address these loans so frequently is further indication of the degree to which pre-1391 Jews had invested their capital in them. For instance, between January and July 1392 alone, letters from the governor to rural bailiffs refer to 322 loans contracted prior to 1391 by 63 Jewish creditors. 23

23 This data is based on the first 150 folios of the Lletres Comunes register ARM AH 64. There are two registers of
The role of loans in paying the *donatio* and collective debt

Proclamations or letters issued by the governor regarding loan collection, usually related to the *donatio* or collective debt, do not seamlessly concur with the royal correspondence, and on the whole give the impression of fluctuating policies and contradictory messages. *Lletres Comunes* registers from January 1392 are filled with letters from Governor Sa Garriga to bailiffs of rural parishes requesting them to enforce repayment of debts owed to conversos by individuals in their jurisdictions, or regarding other disputes surrounding such loans that had been brought before the governor’s court. If debtors could or would not pay, the governor ordered seizure of their goods, offering the opportunity for debtors to contest it in court, and demanded the arrest of those who were persistently defiant.

It appears that within a few months after the violence, conversos were able to collect their loans, at least at certain times, but not easily, and not without the involvement—or interference—of the royal administration. At other times, it seems, conversos were entirely prohibited from recalling their loans. I have already discussed this aspect of royal policy in Chapter Two with respect to King Joan’s attempts to freeze, or minimally establish tight controls over, Jewish and converso assets for about a year following the 1391 revolt. In February 1392, the governor issued a general order to rural bailiffs that, “in the interest of the royal fisc,” they prohibit notaries from cancelling any letters of debt owed to Jews or conversos.\(^2^4\) Since any record of debt was “cancelled” in a notarial register once the debt was repaid, prohibiting its cancellation was tantamount to banning repayment of the loans. Following this prohibition, the governor still (and confusingly) issued letters to rural bailiffs on behalf of *individual* conversos that they be repaid by *specific* debtors in the bailiff’s jurisdiction. In other words, despite this prohibition *against*

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200 folios each for the year 1392 in total (ARM AH 64 and 65), most of which are concerning debts.

24 ARM AH 64: 22v (February 7, 1392).
cancelling letters of debt, orders for debt collection were nevertheless consistently streaming out of the governor’s court throughout 1392. In some cases, the governor specified that the notary could cancel the letter of debt, while in other cases he was silent on the issue.

Sa Garriga’s first explicit reference to the donatio appeared in July 1392 when he ordered a public announcement allowing notaries to cancel letters of debt owing to conversos only after conversos had paid the “dret” of four sous per pound.²⁵ Notarial records attest to this, and offer some examples of conversos negotiating with their debtors to recover their capital, yet paying the donatio right away as the Crown had demanded. For instance, in August 1392 the converso Gabriel Fuster, formerly called Moxi Natjar, agreed upon a payment scheme with one of his debtors: Gabriel remitted 7 of the 32 pounds owed to him by Jaume Joan of Manachor, who then paid 4 pounds immediately “to those delegated by the king to receive four sous per pound from the debts of the conversos,” and agreed to repay the remaining 21 pounds in two installments over the next year.²⁶

Another interesting case may shed light on how the donatio was collected. In 1396 the converso brothers Antoni and Lleonard Carbó had a representative plead their case before the

²⁵ The governor also stipulated that debtors must repay their debts “until the dret [i.e. four sous per pound] was paid” (ARM AH 419: 92r, July 2, 1392; also published in BSAL 8:443). This probably means that even if a debtor obtained a moratorium, he had to pay the four sous per pound—i.e. twenty percent value of the debt—right away. The reference to “conversos or Jews” indicates that although the donatio arrangement was made by the procuradors of the conversos, they acted on behalf of both conversos and Jews. On the same day, it was announced that no one could purchase or receive in any manner property belonging to conversos, since all property of conversos who had gone to “Barbary” and rejected Catholicism had been confiscated. Even conversos who had not fled were prohibited from alienating any of their goods (ARM AH 419: 117r, July 2, 1392, also published in BSAL 8:443). Joan ordered the same announcement to be made in November 1392, this time specifying a fine of 1000 reals if transgressed (ACA CR 1996: 39v, November 23, 1392).

²⁶ ACM 14666 (Juan Clavell): 40r (August 6, 1392). The math does not quite add up, since 20% of 21 pounds should be 4 pounds and 4 sous; however, there is a clause about paying 5 sous for expenses, so perhaps Gabriel deducted that from the total. The agreement more specifically was as follows, and seems to correspond to harvest seasons: 4 pounds to be paid on August 6th, the document’s date, 11 pounds to be paid before the Feast of All Saints (November 1st) and the remaining 10 pounds before the feasts of St. Peter and St. Felix (i.e. the following summer, since these feasts would have been observed on June 29 and Aug 1st).
royal court. They had recorded all the debts owed to them in a book, which they handed over to
Jaume Pastor, the royal official in charge of collecting the donatio at that time, so that he could
collect four hundred gold florins for the royal fisc. Despite repeated requests, Pastor had not
returned the book to the Carbó brothers, nor did he give them the remainder of the value of the
debts (i.e. whatever royal officials collected beyond the four hundred florins which they owed),
which rightfully belonged to them. In 1392, the governor had ordered the collection of debts
owing to one Antoni Carbó, since they had been confiscated by the royal fisc, most likely
because he was considered to have fled Majorca illegally. It is possible that this Antoni was not
the same brother of Lleonard, but it is also possible that Antoni Carbo had fled Majorca and
returned in 1395 when Joan issued a guiatge granting immunity to conversos who had left the
island illegally. That guiatge should have protected his goods from being confiscated, however.
The 400 florins, then, were probably a payment of the donatio. This case suggests that at least
some conversos handed over their accounts to officials of the royal treasury who then had the
debts and donatio collected themselves. Furthermore, both of the two cases above portray royal
officials collecting the donatio directly from the debtors, not from the converso creditors.
Perhaps royal officials had been commissioned to collect the conversos’ debts.

The problem of royal moratoria

The problem of debt collection was further complicated in the fall of 1392 when King
Joan issued a series of moratoria on all debts owed to conversos and Jews. The moratoria came

27 ACA CR 2264: 171r-v (July 27, 1400).
28 Jaume Pastor was also in charge of collecting confiscated assets of exiles and overseeing the payment of the
former aljama’s debts. The responsibility for collecting the donatio was later transferred to the royal lieutenant,
Mateu de Llosch.
29 Cited in Chapter Two: ACA CR 1998: 118v-120r (October 11, 1395); 1999: 151v-152r (October 15, 1395); 2000:
124r-v (December 18, 1395).
30 The equivalent of 400 florins would be 4,400 Barcelonan sous (for this exchange value see ACA CR 1995 92r-
94r, May 8, 1392). If the brothers were paying 4 sous per pound, that would suggest they jointly had 1,100
Barcelonan pounds (Barcelonan pounds were valued about 25% higher value than Majorcan pounds) in debts owed
to them.
part-and-parcel with the general remission, issued in July 1392 but publicly announced only in October, which absolved Majorcans of crimes committed in relation to the 1391 revolt, and lifted the fine that had been imposed on all inhabitants of the island as a punishment. Joan stated that he offered the remission at the insistence of Queen Violant, who was concerned that the island, “already diminished and vacated because of depopulation,” was on the brink of ruin. The royal couple made similar pardons to other cities, such as Valencia. In a letter issuing a year-long moratorium on all debts owed to conversos, written a few days prior to the general remission, Joan acknowledged that the burdens of the Majorcan populace were in part a result of the financial “assistance” they had many times granted to him and his father, Pere III. In September 1392 Joan extended the moratorium on those debts to three years, with the caveat that a third of the debts had to be paid each year, this time attributing Majorca’s dire state to the “abyss of usury and fines.” Then, two weeks later, the king ordered that no one should repay any debts owed to Jews or conversos, and that notaries should not cancel letters of debt, with the exception of debts that had been confiscated by the royal fisc, which still had to be repaid. In sum, unlucky debtors owing money to converso creditors who had fled the island (and hence had their assets confiscated as heretics) had to repay those debts immediately to royal officials. The donatio was never subject to any of the moratoria either, and in November Joan reiterated that royal officials should proceed in its collection. Notwithstanding these exceptions, Joan promised to observe the moratoria since, he wrote, although he granted them of his own volition,
“as it is a Christian matter,” he was at the same time bound by “pact” between himself, a canon of Majorca, and certain municipal councillors who served as sindics for the City and Kingdom of Majorca.38

It was a year before converso representatives had the opportunity to contest these moratoria at King Joan’s court. In September 1393, they complained that he had issued moratoria despite his prior agreement when the conversos granted him the donatio that he would not do so.39 In a particularly illustrative example of how Joan’s policies could change instantly depending on who was making demands before him at court, he responded by rescinding the three-year moratorium at the behest of his converso supplicants, and instructed his officials to enforce payment of debts owed to conversos.40 Local officials were not so quick to comply, however, and these debts were not collected very effectively. Two years later King Joan was forced to reiterate the same order, claiming that officials had neglected to carry it out fully.41 Conveniently, Joan only put the pressure on his officials when the moratoria would have been coming to an end anyway.

As with the debts owed to Jews and conversos, local officials were not particularly effective at (or intent upon) collecting the king’s donatio either. Despite Joan’s multiple orders to collect the four sous per pound and his incessant reminders to confiscate the debts of exiles over a number of years, in 1395 he was informed that the donatio still had not been paid, and few of

38 ACA CR 1996:35v-36v. The pact was between himself and Pere Solanes, canon of Majorca, Andrea Rossinyol, Jordi Roig, Ramon Moscaroles, Galceran Malferit, Bartomeu Roger, and Laurent Mager, "nuncios" or "sindicos" of the city and kingdom of Mallorca.
39 ACA CR 1996: 169r (September 16, 1393). The earliest reference I have to the donatio dates August 9, 1392, and refers to the donatio as being conceded prior to that date, “after the destruction of the call.” Thus it is likely that the concession of the donatio preceded Joan’s granting of the first, year-long moratorium. He certainly had accepted the donatio before his grant of the second, three-year moratorium, and therefore would—or should—have been aware that he was going against his agreement with the conversos.
40 ACA 1996: 169r (September 16, 1393).
41 CR 2000 fol.135v-136r (November 18, 1395). This letter refers to an earlier one, dated September 16, 1393 (ACA VR 1996: 169r), in which King Joan rescinds his grant of the three-year moratorium so that the conversos might collect their debts in order to pay their own creditors. In this letter, two years later, he chastises his officials because those debts still had not been collected.
the debts confiscated to the royal fisc had been collected. According to reports, debtors alleged that they had already paid or that they were totally destitute, or so much time had passed that no one who might be held responsible for the debt could be found. For their part, rural bailiffs, fearful of provoking further unrest among the still-disgruntled inhabitants of their districts, may have tacitly observed the moratoria and even dodged royal orders to collect even the *donatio* portion of their debts to Jews and conversos (i.e. four *sous* per pound or twenty percent).

Concern for the rural debtors—whether for their poverty or the threat of another revolt—is not expressed in the royal correspondence other than at the time of the general remission that allegedly was issued at the behest of Queen Violant. On the contrary, Joan more than once castigated his officials for lack of exigency in collecting his due, insisting that they work with greater diligence—though he did seem to wait a few years before pressing them.

One royal official who *did* work with notable diligence was Mateu de Llosch, the lieutenant royal procurator commissioned with collecting all the revenues proceeding from the Majorcan conversos or former *aljama* that pertained to the royal treasury. De Llosch frequently entered into disputes with the conversos and their creditors, claiming, for instance, that certain properties that the conversos had ceded to their creditors pertained instead to the royal fisc.

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42 ACA CR 1998: 38v-39r (March 20, 1395). Interestingly, the documentation points to a greater concern over recovering confiscated assets than the *donatio*, probably for their greater revenue potential.


44 Formally speaking, Mateu de Losch was a lieutenant of Jaume Pastor, Joan’s treasurer who had been assigned along with Guillelm de Monbru of Queen Yolanda’s treasury to deal with the repercussions of the *avalots* in Majorca, especially to administer communal goods: ARM AH 419: 92r (July 2 1392), ACA CR 1997:170v (January 28, 1395), 1995: 35r-35r (January 7, 1392). Ultimately, Jaume focused on working with the converso secretaries to administer payment of the communal debt, while Mateu seems to have focused on collection of revenues for the king, especially converso property confiscated to the Crown. For other records indicating Mateu’s responsibilities see e.g.: ACA CR 1996: 127r (June 12, 1393); 1997: 137v-138r (September 24, 1394); 1998: 38v-39r (March 20, 1395) – where King Joan entrusts De Llosch with collecting outstanding debts to the Crown since he is so “apt at collecting.”
Ultimately, the determination and repeated attempts of the Crown, through agents like de Llosch, to absorb any Jewish or converso assets to which it could justifiably lay claim only rendered the task of settling the conversos’ communal debt a longer and more painstaking process. The extent and duration of their collective indebtedness is significant because it anchored the conversos, as a community, in a dynamic of financial relations that was all too reminiscent of their Jewish identity: economically vulnerable, dependent upon and yet threatened by the king, and most importantly, as a separate group with its own administration, fiscally distinct from the rest of Christian society.

**Paying the aljama's former debt: procedures and challenges**

*The debt tax*

No study thus far has devoted attention to the conversos’ collective debt and its implications following 1391. The amount each household had to contribute is, of itself, noteworthy. Together with the king’s treasurer, Jaume Pastor, the *procuradors* determined that every converso and Jewish household had to surrender 10 *sous*, 6 *diners* per pound of the total value of their assets to pay off the aljama’s debt.⁴⁵ Conversos therefore had to relinquish 52.5% of their assets to creditors, at the same time that they had committed to pay another 20% to the king; whether they ultimately were exempted from paying the 20% is unclear, but the documentation suggests that they were not, despite Joan’s concession. By way of comparison, the Valencian conversos were taxed 7 *sous*, 6 *diners* per pound, or 37.5%, to pay off their former aljama’s debt, possibly in addition to 3 *sous*, 6 *diners* per pound, or 17.5% for their own *donatio* to the king. Whereas the Majorcan conversos had to surrender a total of 72.5% of their assets,

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⁴⁵ ARM AH S-31: 46r-59r (January 30, 1393). This document is not an actual contract between conversos and their creditors but is rather the record of a judicial investigation, the testimonies of which mention the tax and remission rates. I will discuss this case later in this chapter.
Valencian conversos had to pay 55% —a sizeable difference, but both rates, even without the *donatio*, were very high given that many were still suffering economically from the blow of 1391. The difference also suggests not only that the Majorcan *aljama* was carrying a larger debt, but also that the Crown expected greater fiscal returns from that community, even after 1391, perhaps because of its reputation for mercantile prosperity.

Tax assessors (*taxadors*) and auditors (*impugnadors*) were established to oversee the collection and management of the debt-tax.\(^{46}\) In 1393, the assets of every converso household were meticulously appraised in at least three successive tax assessments, coordinated by the *procuradors*, to determine exactly who owed what, under the watchful eye of Jaume Pastor, who recorded everything in notebooks that, although repeatedly referenced, have not appeared in the archives.\(^{47}\) The property assessed included real estate, commercial investments, merchandise, and, most notably, loans. In order to facilitate the assessments, the king ordered all notaries to provide the converso *procuradors* with an account of all commercial transactions, including any kind of investment or partnership, and debt contracts that any Jew or converso was involved in whether or not they were currently resident on the island.\(^{48}\) This was one way of tracking undeclared assets, particularly those that had been “hidden” through commercial investments. The entire process of collecting the debt-tax followed *aljama* models: for instance, in its employment of the *per sou i lliura* method of assessment, the collaboration of the *procuradors*

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\(^{46}\) For reference to auditors and *impugnadors* see ACA CR 2266: 161v-162r (January 18, 1403).
\(^{47}\) ARM AH S-31:46r-59r (January 30, 1393). The initial agreement on the rate of taxation must have occurred in 1392. For a reference to the books recording tax assessments see ACA CR 160v-161r (September 16, 1393).
\(^{48}\) ACA CR 1996: 160v. The *procuradors* who conducted the third tax assessment were Bernat de Requesens, Antoni Portes, Jaume Portell and Antoni Agost (ACA CR 1996: 160v-161r, September 16, 1393). Those in charge of administering the tax varied though the years. The first *talla* was conducted by Pere Manresa, Jaume Portell and Antoni Agost. Jaume Portell and Antoni Agost were also involved in the second *talla*, and chose two others to help them with it (ACA CR 1996: 163v-164r, September 16, 1393). It is not clear if tax administrators were always *procuradors*, as opposed to *taxadors* and *impugnadors*, since another record of 1393 identifies the following, different converso *procuradors*, who “have served for a long time”: Pere Unis, Berenguer de Cortilles (named after the royal councillor, a merchant of Saragossa, who had been assigned to deal with finances of the former *aljama*), Antoni de Requesens, Jaume Portell and Daniel de Requesens (ACA CR 1996: 164v, September 16, 1393).
with royal officials, and the disclosure (or surrender) of records indicating the assets of the community and its members to agents of the royal fisc.\textsuperscript{49}

Even women’s dowries could be subject to the debt-tax. The mapmaker Jaume Ribes, called Jaffuda Creques before he converted, and member of the king’s household, solicited the help of the king in staving off the \textit{taxadors} from seizing part of his sister Francisca’s dowry. In an effort to protect her dowry, he had offered to pay the \textit{taxadors} its value on her behalf, but apparently they had refused to cooperate.\textsuperscript{50} The \textit{taxadors} based their claim to her dowry on the fact that her still Jewish husband, Marzoch Madini, possessed assets off the island. Because they could not get to the property he possessed outside of Majorca, they went after his wife’s dowry, which was more accessible.\textsuperscript{51} Not anticipating this move on the part of the \textit{taxadors}, Marzoch may have hoped that by maintaining foreign assets he could avoid having to pay tax on them.

\textit{Tax evasion}

Given the extent of the conversos’ debt, and the continuity with pre-1391 patterns in their collective fiscal organization, it should come as no surprise that converso \textit{procuradors} and \textit{taxadors} faced the same internal challenges that \textit{aljama} secretaries notoriously had to contend with: haggling over rates of taxation, outright refusals to pay, and—the most pronounced issue according to royal records—various forms of tax evasion. To deal with such issues, the converso \textit{procuradors}, like \textit{aljama} secretaries, relied heavily on the support of the Crown in the process of tax collection, which often meant royal officials coercing the more recalcitrant constituents. Such

\textsuperscript{49} The “\textit{per sou i lliura}” system is described in Meyerson, \textit{Jews in an Iberian Frontier Kingdom}, “Fiscal Servitude”, according to which individuals declared their assets on oath and the \textit{adelantats} (a position assumed in this case by the \textit{procuradors}) decided upon the rate they should pay according to their capability. In contrast to Majorca where the \textit{procuradors} appear to have relied exclusively on the assistance of royal officials (probably given age-old tensions over taxation between the Jewish and then converso community, and the \textit{jurats}), in Morvedre, the \textit{aljama’s adelantats} sought the assistance of municipal officials (Meyerson, \textit{Jews in an Iberian Frontier Kingdom}, 120).

\textsuperscript{50} ACA CR 1997: 59r-v (March 22, 1394).

\textsuperscript{51} Marzoch seems curiously silent here. He may have fled Majorca, but the document makes no mention of his exile which, if known, would be highly unusual. He may have temporarily absented himself to avoid the tax collection.
royal involvement was especially advantageous to the king, both before and after 1391, since it afforded greater control over Jewish and converso finances.

Evasion tactics were one of the main reasons behind the repeated tax assessments. When the procuradors visited King Joan’s court in September 1393 to solicit permission for a third talla, they explained that after each of the first two, certain conversos were “discovered” to have been left out, who in fact were obligated to contribute.\(^{52}\) It is likely that some individuals “disappeared” or managed to leave the island while the tallas were being carried out in the hope of avoiding assessment.\(^{53}\) No doubt, conversos employed the same manoeuvres as pre-1391 Jews, or even Christians for that matter. One tax evasion strategy among Jews prior to 1391 was to shift from one jurisdiction (or aljama) to another, claiming to each side that they already paid taxes in the other location.\(^{54}\) Another involved keeping some assets in a different jurisdiction from the one in which a person resided. Similarly, converso procuradors complained of conversos concealing their possessions in various ways so that they could not be assessed, including “money, silver, gold and jewels,” keeping their merchandise in North Africa, or exporting some of their assets through commercial or other means in order to avoid paying the tax.\(^{55}\)

The notable number of licenses issued to conversos for travel between Majorca and Valencia during the 1390s, precisely when they were being assessed and taxed, also suggests the

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\(^{52}\) ACA CR 1996: 161v, 164r-v (September 16, 1393). The term “talla” has two meanings in the documents: (a) the act of taking a census for tax purposes, i.e. an assessment of the assets of each individual in the community to determine how much tax they owe; (b) the tax levied itself. Deducing from references in ARM AH S-31: 46r-59r (January 30, 1393), at least one of the censuses must have been carried out before January 1393, possibly some time in 1392. These censuses had been recorded in a book by the procurador Antoni Agost formerly Moxi Natjar.

\(^{53}\) In 1394 the lieutenant governor Berenguer de Montagut chastised the bailiffs of rural parishes who allowed conversos to leave the kingdom through their districts, to the injury of those conversos who remained and had to pay the communal debt (ARM AH 66: 168v, March 28?, 1394): “Entes havem que alscons conversos se recuylle en vestres batlius per axir del dit Regne pertal com no han satisfet ne pagar ço que a ells re es pertany pagar en los taylls e carrechs universals del Call olim de Mallorques. Per que suplicat a nos per part dels Sindichs e procuradors dels dits conversos...”

\(^{54}\) On Jewish tax evasion see the brief discussion and citations in Chapter One.

\(^{55}\) ACA CR 1996: 161v, 171r-v (September 16, 1393).
traditional (pre-1391) use of mobility as a form of tax evasion. Some conversos of Valencia were attempting similar tactics, moving their residence to Majorca without contributing to the *donatio* or debt-tax owed to their community.\textsuperscript{56} The large number of Majorcan conversos who obtained licenses to go to Valencia in the summer of 1394, shortly after the collection of the debt-tax and *donatio* would have been initiated,\textsuperscript{57} may then be connected to tax evasion: Majorcan conversos may have been moving their residence to Valencia in order to circumvent local tax demands.\textsuperscript{58}

We might also reconsider the meaning behind what royal letters present as a virtual exodus of Jews and conversos to North Africa in the years following 1391, which, in some cases, may have been economically rather than religiously motivated. After all, it would not have been without precedent: when King Pere requested further subsidies from the Mallorcan *aljama* in 1357 to finance the war against Castile, its representatives responded that more than forty Jews had emigrated to the Maghreb as a result of his constant exactions. Many Mallorcan conversos, particularly merchants, had family and commercial connections both in Valencia and in North Africa which facilitated their mobility overseas; they could also employ the financial mechanisms typically used in long distance trade in order to make their assets difficult for *taxadors* to track, for instance, by shifting their location or titular ownership. All this is to say that baptism did not stop conversos from exploiting the same established relationships and

\textsuperscript{56} ACA CR 2001: 27r (November 24, 1395).
\textsuperscript{57} It is likely that the collection began late in 1393 or early 1394 based on the fact that: (a) Joan granted a year long moratorium on conversos’ debts at the end of May 1392, which meant collection of the debt-tax would not have commenced before the summer of 1393; (b) the *procuradors* begin their third (and final) assessment of the tax distribution after September 1393; (c) complaints of individuals indicating attempts at tax collection surface early in 1394 (see for instance ACA CR 1997: 59r-v, March 22, 1394).
\textsuperscript{58} See ARM AH G5 for licenses to go to Valencia. These continue to be issued with frequency in subsequent years. It is not always clear to what degree this represents commercial travel or change of residence. In any case, there is clearly a lot of movement of Valencian and Majorcan conversos between the two cities, and examples of Valencian converso merchants who settle permanently in Majorca and ascend to a position of social and commercial prominence, such as the Pardos and Bellviures.
strategies that had been available to them as Jews as they struggled, under the weight of heavy tax burdens, to keep their head above water.\textsuperscript{59}

The travel licenses and sureties required from conversos, too, may have stayed in place for so long because of these tax evasions. The situation was reminiscent of the travel restrictions Jaume III imposed on Jews after he levied a hefty fine on the \textit{aljama} in 1333, leading its administration to collect a 60\% tax from its members. In order to prevent tax evasion through geographical movement, the king required that Jews wishing to leave the island pay half of their tax obligation beforehand, and provide guarantors to secure the second half, which they were expected to pay upon their return.\textsuperscript{60}

The various attempts at evading the debt-tax after 1393 were thus a major impetus behind the numerous decrees, following the revolt, that restricted the movement of conversos and their property. Bans against conversos alienating their goods were thus not entirely related to exiles, but also aimed at preventing their evasion of the debt-tax by selling landed property or valuable objects in order to obtain money that might then be more easily concealed, clandestinely invested in overseas enterprises, or “donated” to relatives outside the kingdom. Judging from complaints iterated by the king and verso \textit{procuradors}, there were nevertheless conversos who managed to alienate some of their property, frustrating their creditors and those who had to ensure their payment.

\textsuperscript{59} See Meyerson, \textit{Iberian Frontier Kingdom}, Chapter 3, “Fiscal Servitude,” especially pages 121 ff.41, 128, 146, where he discusses the various forms of tax evasion employed by Jews belonging to the \textit{aljama} of Morvedre—in particular mobility and dispersal of assets.

\textsuperscript{60} Pons, \textit{judios de Mallorca}, vol. 2, 47-50. With some encouragement on the part of Vidal Cresques acting as intermediary between the \textit{aljama} and the Crown, Jaume III reduced the debt for certain individuals from 12 \textit{sous} per pound to 10 \textit{sous}, i.e. from 60\% to 50\% of their income.
The role of real estate

Second to capital investments, real estate also played an important role in repaying the former aljama’s debt, and introduced its own set of challenges. In Barcelona and Valencia, too, the Crown permitted the alienation of houses in the Jewish quarter to repay the former aljama’s debt. In fact, real estate may have been the first resource to which conversos turned when initially confronted with the debt they collectively inherited, and it may have been after it became apparent houses alone would not satisfy the debt that the creditors then petitioned for royal involvement. In October 1391 the governor announced that he had been informed by their creditors that the houses of conversos would not suffice to pay back their debts, and that therefore no merchandise or other goods belonging to conversos could leave the island. In all likelihood, the houses did not suffice because of competing claims from the Crown. The theme of landed property in the call looms large in the archival documentation especially because it was such a locus of dispute.

In February 1393 the royal guiatge granting conversos legal immunity from any litigation or prosecution, which had stayed their creditors for one year, came to an end. This marked the beginning of a period of intense activity (particularly over the next eight months or so) regarding the debt settlement and alienation of Jewish- or converso-owned houses. It is also, therefore, the period in which more clashes over property ownership erupted between creditors and the Crown. As I discussed in the first chapter, the Jewish quarter was prime real estate, and prior to 1391 the Jews’ right to it was often contested by covetous Old Christians (particularly the patrician class

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61 See for example Hinojosa Montalvo, p. 394, No. 124.
63 For the guiatge see ARM AH LR 39: 39r-v (March 13, 1392, citing an original royal letter dated February 13, 1392); also 104r-v. On May 30, 1392, Joan granted another year-long moratorium specifically on the conversos’ debts (96r-v).
and religious orders). After 1391, houses in the call were still a valuable commodity to which both creditors and the Crown laid claims, each contesting the other’s potential ownership. In order to pay the taxes owed by the many conversos who had fled the island, the converso tax administrators hoped to transfer the exiles’ houses to the creditors of the former aljama. However, according to royal policy, all houses of exiles pertained to the royal fisc. Thus, in the summer of 1393, creditors of the former aljama entered into a legal dispute with the royal procurator, Mateu de Llosch, when he appropriated houses of exiles that, they argued, should pertain to them as part of the debt payment. King Joan’s compromise was to allow the creditors to receive, from the sale of those houses, whatever portion their converso owners would have owed to the debt-tax, whereas the remaining proceeds would go to the Crown.64

De Llosch caused problems for other creditors, too. In addition to collectively sharing the burden of the former aljama’s debt, many Jews and conversos owed personal debts that they could not repay after 1391, some of which were secured on their houses. Even if the debts had not explicitly been secured on houses, creditors had the right to collect payment by requesting the auction, through the governor’s court, of the possessions of debtors who did not repay their debts in time. In the case of conversos and Jews who had disappeared or fled, the sale of their “moveable” goods was not always sufficient to cover their debts, so creditors petitioned the governor to have their houses auctioned as well. At this point, De Llosch stepped in with the caveat that the auctions could be held only if the creditors paid ten percent (or two sous per pound) of the proceeds to the Crown, under the pretext that property of exiles should go to the

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64 ACA CR 1996: 127r (June 12, 1393), 153v-154r (August 22, 1393). King Joan ordered that from the proceeds of the sale of exiles’ houses should be deducted any debts or pensions tied to them, then a portion given to the converso procuradors for the debt settlement (this would have been in accordance with the tax assessments) and the remainder to the royal treasury (ACA CR 1996: 129v, June 12, 1393). A few months later the king instructed Mateu de Llosch to return all the houses he confiscated to the converso procuradors so that they might be factored into the tax assessment, while presumably the Crown would collect the remainder of proceeds from their sale (ACA CR 1996: 163v-164r, September 16, 1393).
royal treasury. Ultimately, King Joan permitted these houses to be sold, as long as the revenues were divided between the creditors and De Llosch.65

The Crown was not the only impediment to allocating real estate as part of the debt settlement. As the converso tax administrators proceeded to transfer certain houses in the *call* to the creditors, it was discovered that some of those houses had already been mortgaged or alienated in some way to Old Christians. The houses were most likely sold or mortgaged by conversos needing to liquidate assets before they fled the island, or in order to pay off personal debts. Given the desirability of real estate in the *call*, it was easy to find Old Christian buyers who would illicitly purchase property there, to the detriment of the *aljama*’s creditors and the king alike. Sometimes it was only after officials confiscated houses of exiles and put them up for auction that they learned that the previous owners had sold their houses secretly before they fled.66 Those property transfers held some legal standing; at the very least, it meant that the houses could not so easily be auctioned off without further judicial investigations to determine the rightful owners. No doubt this significantly delayed, or prevented entirely, the use of these houses to repay the communal debt or even to be appropriated by the Crown. Furthermore, such confusion over the true ownership of converso and Jewish property further undermined the tax assessments conducted by the *procuradors* and was one reason why these assessments had to be redone. They had to determine exactly who owned what, what pensions were secured on which houses, and which Old Christians owned property in the *call*. This is reflected in several proclamations aimed at determining precisely what happened to the assets of Jews and conversos after 1391. In February 1392, for instance, the governor proclaimed that “anyone who possesses houses, gardens, rents, titles, credits and other rights which belonged to the Jews of Majorca,

66 I discuss the example of Jaume des Puig, who fraudulently purchased many properties in the *call*, in Chapter Four.
now conversos, must declare them within 20 days...” Later, he demanded that Old Christian buyers come clean regarding the true value of assets they had recently purchased from Jews or conversos, since there had been so much fraud.

Different creditors and payment arrangements

Proper distribution of the debt burden through multiple tax assessments, or talles, proved difficult enough, but collecting and reallocating those amounts presented their own problems as well. As we have seen, the creditors were to be paid in forms other than simple cash, such as loans, rents or real estate. This was partly a result of coin shortages symptomatic of an economic trend beginning in this period, but also because the conversos had much of their capital tied up in loans or commercial investments. In many cases, houses were the only available assets from which certain conversos could pay their debt-tax. The logistics of the debt settlement were further complicated by the fact that there were two distinct groups of creditors, or censalistas, with whom different agreements were reached: one composed of citizens of Majorca, the other

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67 ARM AH 419: 118bis r-v (February 21, 1392). A more abbreviated form of this announcement was made on June 30, 1392 (ARM AH 419: 91v, also published in BSAL 8:443).

68 An announcement made over a year later, in May 1393, bore a harsher tone, conveying a sense that the governor was fed up with the continual administrative mess resulting from such problems of ownership. It stated that in flagrant disregard of royal prohibitions, people “have purchased and occupied various properties both inside and outside of the call, [purchased] annuities, and [rights to collect] debts or taxes pertaining to Jews and conversos of the kingdom, having letters of sale made which indicate a greater price than was actually paid, and concealing the low price by [rendering the transfer as] donations and gifts, in [potential] fraud of the king, creditors, and owners [lit. alore, i.e. those possessing property in freehold] of these possessions and rents/annuities.” Once again, the lieutenant-governor Berenguer de Montagut required people to declare any property they had acquired from Jews or conversos since the time of the attack, specifying the actual price they had paid and submitting original records to a specified notary of his court. This was his last call; after 10 days another tally would be conducted and houses would be sold, taking into account or compensating for what had been demonstrated to be legitimately transferred. Anyone who did not make a declaration in this period risked losing their rights to the property altogether, as it would likely be reallocated to pay the debt. Montagut further specified that no one could physically take possession of the houses or collect the revenues in question until the debt-tax had been fully calculated: “…haien comprades e assi occupades diverses possessions axi dins lo call com fora aquell censals deutes e drets diverses axi de mostones com de d’altres pertanyents als jueus o conversos del dit Regne faents se fer axi cartes de vendes ab majors preus que no han pagat com donacions e cessions per callar los pochs preus que dien haver pagat/en frau aytant com poden/axi del dit senyor Rey com de creadors e aloers deles dits possessions e censals” (ARM AH 419:124bis, May 20, 1393).
composed of citizens of Barcelona, who held the greater share of the debt. In 1392 Joan des Valls, a delegate of the Barcelonan creditors, came to Majorca to negotiate a payment plan with the converso procuradors, while Jaume Pastor of the royal treasury mediated. The amount owed to this group was around 15,000 pounds.

Individual creditors may have invested different amounts, acting independently or in association with others or at different times, but in terms of the post 1391 repayment, they acted collectively for the sake of recovering their investments. The negotiations between Joan des Valls and the procuradors resulted in the agreement that the Barcelonan creditors would remit three sous per pound (or 15%) of the principal in addition to the interest—a testament to the financial strain the community was undergoing. Payment would be made through a combination of cash and transferred titles to debts owed to conversos or Jews.

A few months after this agreement, there was a legal investigation into the comportment of Joan des Valls, who was implicated for making an illicit deal with the procuradors. According to the procuradors’ testimonies in this investigation, Joan des Valls offered them a reduction in the total amount the conversos would have to repay the Barcelonan creditors if they paid him, and him alone, the full principal of the censal he had purchased from the Majorcan aljama, which was worth 1000 sous or 50 pounds. This dynamic echoes the kind of fiscal relationship Jews and conversos had with the king: Joan des Valls gave the conversos the break they so

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69 The aljama’s public debt mimicked the municipal debt in this respect, since Barcelonan citizens held a major share of the municipal debt, too. See Jordi Morellí i Biaget. “Mallorca i la seva dependència financiera del principat (segles XIV-XV). Estudi dels censalistes catalans,” Anuario de estudios medievales 33, no. 1 (2003): 119-69.

70 ARM AH S-31: 52r. It is not clear if this was the amount of the principal alone or included interest. See testimony of Lluis Vidal: “… the converso procuradors together with Jacob Pastor of the royal treasury taxed the conversos...10 sous 6 diners per pound; after which money was handed to Joan but I can't remember the amount, along with debts, to repay the debt owed to him and the [52v] others whom he represented, from fourteen to fifteen thousand Majorcan pounds.”

71 ARM S-31: 52r, testimony of Lluis Vidal, claiming that the Barcelonan delegate, Joan des Valls, was paid in cash and debts. However, five years later, Bernat Buçot, representing the Barcelonan creditors in 1398, complained that 3,000 pounds worth of transferred debts still remained to be collected (ACA CR 2263:106v-107r, September 3, 1398).

72 ARM AH S-31: 46r-59r (January 30, 1393). This is a record of an investigation that lasted a few months.
desperately needed as long as he could financially profit from it. Admittedly, this particular aspect is not necessarily unique to “Jewish” economic relationships, but could simply be a sort of realpolitik. What the testimonies in this investigation illustrate so well is how the relationships cultivated by converso leaders, and their political manoeuvres, had important economic implications for the entire community. Like all economic relationships, they “worked” because there were advantages for everyone, and yet were ever-fraught with opportunities for fraud and intrigue.

Less information is available regarding the former aljama’s Majorcan creditors, who also acted as an association for the purpose of negotiating repayment. The total amount owing to the Majorcan contingent was 9,500 pounds. Like their Barcelonan counterparts, they offered a remittance, albeit at a higher rate of four sous, six diners per pound, or 22.5% of the principal. An agreement of September 1393 between the converso procuradors and the Majorcan creditors specified a threefold payment plan consisting of the transfer of recoverable debts as well as rent payments of oil, grain and money, and the transfer of certain “houses” in the Jewish quarter. Given that the aljama’s communal buildings and most of the properties of exiles had been appropriated by the king, some of the houses belonged to individuals who had to sell their homes in order to make their debt-tax payment. The agreement refers specifically to the auction of

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73 As no mention is made of the interest, the conversos were probably expected to pay it. That the Majorcan creditors appear to grant a larger remittance than those of Barcelona may in part be due to the discrepancy in the two currencies. In 1395, one sou of Barcelona was worth about 1.25 sous of Majorca (ACA CR 1997: 169v-170r, January 28, 1395).
74 AHN Carpeta 70, No. 4 (September 1, 1393) published in Joan Rosselló Lliteras, Els Pergamins de la Cartoixa de Valldemossa (Palma de Mallorca: Consell de Mallorca, 2000):137-138. The “recoverable” debts here also figure in Joan’s letter of November 23, 1392, in which he restores 24,000 pounds worth of recoverable debts to the conversos from the donatio, in exchange for irrecoverable debts, so that they could transfer the recoverable ones to their creditors.
75 See for example ACM Protocols Notarials, 14666, Joan Clavell, loose folio (September 2, 1393), where Francesc Fuster, formerly Samuel Natjar, mentions houses he allocated to the creditors of the aljama. The transfer of various houses to repay the debt can be detected in various later documents that refer to Old Christian owners of houses located in the call, where the previous owner is usually identified as an individual Jew or converso.
certain houses that belonged to the deceased Jew, Magaluf Doscha, possibly ceded by his heirs.\footnote{AHN Carpeta 70, No.3 September 1, 1393, published in Rosselló Lliteras, Pergamens de la Cartoixa de Valldemossa, 138. Magaluf Doscha, like Samuel Natjar (in previous footnote), appears to come from one of the principal families of the aljama.}

This was not the first time in the history of Aragonese Jewry that Jews (and now conversos) would have resorted to selling their homes or other buildings to be able to fulfil their tax obligations to their aljama, whether intended for the royal fisc or requiting public debts.

Once the terms of the debt settlement had been determined, the governor wrote to rural bailiffs with exceptional frequency during the years 1393 and 1394 directing them to compel debtors in their jurisdictions to repay debts originally owed to conversos, but which had been ceded to various Old Christian creditors. Most of these debts were incurred by directly borrowing money but some were owed as rent, and in either case, some were to be repaid with agricultural produce.\footnote{It is possible that individual conversos had ceded some of these debts to Old Christians directly, as repayment for personal debts. Still, given the timing, and that some of the Old Christian cessionaries were also local creditors of the former aljama, many if not the majority of these debts would have been assigned to the creditors by the converso tax administrators as part of the collective debt settlement. The total value of transferred debts for each converso likely would have been determined by how much the individual had been assessed to owe in the talles.}

For example, the conversos procuradors determined that Pere Onis, called Jacob de Manacor before he converted, had to pay 99 pounds, 18 sous and 6 diners to Pere and Felip Serra, two brothers who numbered among the Majorcan creditors named in the payment agreement of September 1393. As part of this payment, and with the explicit consent of the lieutenant royal procurator, Mateu de Llosch, the governor ordered the bailiff of Montuiri to have certain inhabitants of his district pay annual rents to the Serra brothers, rents which they had regularly paid to Pere Onis in the past.\footnote{ARM AH 66: 112r-v (January 8, 1394). The document in which the procuradors assigned Pere Onis his payment due was dated January 9, 1393.} We do not know if the Serra brothers encountered the same difficulties in collecting these rents as officials encountered in collecting debts owed to Jews and conversos. What we can discern with more certainty is the logistics of the repayment process: the example of Pere Onis, together with that of Magaluf Doscha’s houses, suggests that...
discrete assets (e.g. individual houses, debts and rents) were transferred directly to individual creditors, as opposed to the entire debt-tax being collected and then reallocated as a lump cash sum to the association of creditors. At the same time, other documents indicate that some of the debt-tax was collected in the form of coin, which was guarded in a safe box, presumably to be paid to the creditors.

The dispute over notarial rents

There was one more component to the repayment scheme arranged between conversos and their Majorcan creditors that does not appear in the aforementioned contracts, but that is alluded to in a legal dispute that arose between the Crown, the former aljama’s creditors, and the converso procuradors on behalf of their community. This dispute was yet another impediment to the repayment process, one that could be grouped together with other royal interventions, in which King Joan asserted his prerogative over certain annuities, or censals, that had been administered by the aljama. On October 31, 1392, Joan wrote to his Majorcan officials concerning royal revenues which his father Pere had pledged to the former aljama as a security for a loan it granted him, and which it had been collecting by virtue of that agreement. Apparently, converso procuradors had been transferring the rights to those revenues to the aljama’s creditors despite the fact that the revenues, as King Joan put it, “in no way pertain to them.”79 The letter is vague, but more details are offered in later correspondence regarding a rather complex legal controversy that was not resolved until November 1395. The case is difficult to follow, and involved a number of different allegations.

79 ACA CR 1996: 37r (October 31, 1392).
First, both the royal prosecutor and the procuradors of the conversos launched a case against the Majorcan creditors of the former aljama. The plaintiffs claimed that the value of certain censals that had been purchased by the creditors from the aljama—that is, both the sale price (capital) and annuities (interest)—should be restored to the royal fisc and the conversos, since the censals had been purchased without a royal license and were therefore illegal. If this was an attempt by the conversos to get out of paying part of their debt, it was unsuccessful; the judicial decision was that the annuities sold by the aljama were in fact legal. The Crown had a separate interest in nullifying the sale of these annuities: the aljama—or later the converso community—had transferred to its creditors the right to collect royal revenues, namely annual rents owed to the Crown for various notarial offices in the city and villages. King Joan’s father, Pere III, had assigned these rights to the aljama to pay the annuities owed on a censal it had been forced to sell in order to provide him with a subsidy. As a result of that censal sale, the aljama was committed to pay 443 pounds, 2 sous and 8 diners “of perpetual annual rent” [lit. “censualium annualium perpetualium et rendalium”] to Francesc Carbonell, a Majorcan merchant who represented a larger group of local investors. The original contract between the aljama and Carbonell is not reproduced in this trial, so we cannot know for sure if the censal was explicitly secured on the notarial rents. It probably was not, but it would have been a convenient association for the conversos, or their creditors, to make. We might also hypothesize that the king

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80 Although the document itself does not indicate whether these were the creditors from Barcelona or Majorca, contextual evidence supports the conclusion that it was the latter. The creditors in this case had granted the conversos a remittance of 4 sous, 6 diners per pound, the equivalent of what the Majorcan creditors had conceded. Other documents indicate that the Barcelonan creditors remitted only 3 sous per pound, which would exclude them from being the creditors in question here.

81 ACA CR 2000: 181v-184r (November 18, 1395). There is at least one example, and probably more existed, of a notary suffering financially as a result of the 1391 attack on the call. Pere Salt rented the scribania or office of scribe and notary for the parish of Inca for 100 pounds which he paid annually to the king. His business suffered such a loss after 1391 that, upon his plea, the king provisionally reduced his rent to 50 pounds (ACA CR 1999:155r-166r, November 4, 1395). There is no mention in this case of the amounts of the notarial rents in question or if they had been reduced after 1391, though it is a possibility.
did not directly borrow the money from Carbonell precisely in order to avoid having to provide a surety that would be forfeited should he not make the payments. In the text of the trial, King Joan claimed that his father had only temporarily assigned the notarial rents to the *aljama* to supply the annuity payments, but that the rents were never intended to be forfeited permanently. Nevertheless, when the *aljama’s* creditors demanded repayment after 1391, the conversos could circumvent repaying the capital, or purchase price, of this particular *censal* by transferring the rights to the notarial rents, thereby guaranteeing perpetual annuities. In the end, King Joan permitted the creditors to collect these rents, but retained the right to purchase them back in the future. Joan did not make this concession before the royal prosecutor made one more attempt to reclaim the rents, by levying a second charge, this time against both the creditors and the *procuradors* of the conversos.

The second charge concerned a remittance which this group of creditors (represented by Carbonell) ostensibly made to the conversos of four *sous*, six *diners* per pound of their debts—an amount curiously analogous to the *donatio*. The royal prosecutor alleged that the remittance had been made for debts that included the *censal* associated with the aforementioned notarial rents that, he claimed, rightfully pertained to the king. Consequently, he argued, the remittance should be applied entirely to those notarial rents—which supplied the annuity payments—such that they would be returned to the king. The court ruled against him, concluding that the remittance was made in general “for all the debts which [the conversos] owed,” not specifically

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82 The remission of 4 *sous* 6 *diners* per pound “*respectu destructionis dicti calli*” is mentioned in the payment arrangement of September 1, 1393 between the converso *procuradors* and the Majorcan creditors of the former *aljama*: AHN *Carpeta* 70, No.4, in *Els pergamins de la Cartoixa de Valldemossa*, p.137-138.

83 In other words, now that the *aljama* no longer existed, the creditors represented by Carbonell were demanding repayment of the purchase price (i.e. the capital) of the *censal*. Prior to this time, the annuity payments were probably being made to the creditors by transferring to them the rights to the notarial rents, such that the creditors would collect those rents directly.
for those associated with the notarial rents, and that no mention had been made of the king in any of the transaction records.

After long and complicated legal proceedings, Joan allowed the prior agreements between the conversos and their creditors in this case to remain firm: the conversos used the remittance as they wished, and the creditors continued to collect the notarial rents. In exchange, Joan received 200 gold florins of Aragon. The record does not tell us who made the payment, but it was likely a bribe from the conversos, or perhaps jointly with their creditors, both of whom desperately needed to achieve some form of closure after so many obstacles had been placed in the way of the debt settlement. Compensating the king in this manner also may have been the most prudent solution from a financial perspective, since prolonging the case also meant more legal fees. The case was resolved just six months before Joan’s death in May 1396, and to some extent marks an end to royal interference in the repayment of the former aljama’s debt. Although King Martí was just as invested in overseeing the process, his approach was less aggressive and more organized—partly due to his personality but, in all fairness to King Joan, partly because Joan had already dealt with the most difficult issues.

King Martí I: continuing challenges and fiscal reform

The donatio

Many of the impediments to debt and donatio collection under Joan continued under Martí, although the new king made noticeably greater, or at least more organized, efforts towards cleaning up the chaotic state of these finances. Neither the donatio nor the collective debt was

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84 ACA CR 2000: 181v-184r (November 18, 1395).
85 It is not apparent from the royal chancery record who exactly paid the 200 florins. The text reads “exsoluistis” but the person whom Joan is addressing is not clearly indicated. However, an addendum to the document indicates that certain converso procuradors were present at the time, so it is likely that they were the ones who paid him, especially given the Jews’ history of bribing the king to make judgments in their favour, or at least soften his judgments against them, as discussed earlier.
fully repaid before the end of Martí’s reign. Investigating later sources, beyond the scope of this thesis, may indicate if and when these were ever fully paid, although it seems doubtful when we consider that in 1422 Alfonso the Magnanimous was still making efforts to collect the donatio made by Valencia’s conversos.\textsuperscript{86} The same problems with collecting the conversos’ loans that existed during Joan’s reign persisted under Martí, and officials continued to cite the same excuses for not delivering the donatio revenue: namely, that debtors claimed they had already paid, were too poor to pay, or that some debts were so old that no one could be found who could be held legally responsible for payment.\textsuperscript{87} King Martí, like Joan, issued several rebukes against his officials with minimal results. Calling in the conversos’ loans was not the only front on which royal officials fell short. For instance, revenues expected from the alienation of houses in the juderia to “free persons,” or from the various confiscations of the properties of converso exiles were not all making it to the treasury either. In July 1397 Martí ordered Mateu de Lloschos to investigate and collect the missing revenues, and to negotiate with debtors to recover as much as he could get with respect to the donatio.\textsuperscript{88} Displaying a realism or practicality that was not quite characteristic of Joan, Martí appeared to be resigned to the fact that he would not be able to collect his full due, and to recognise that the longer payments were delayed, the less chance there was of receiving any payments at all. Moreover, he needed to collect cash as soon as possible in order to repay debts inherited from Joan, who had promised revenues from the donatio or confiscated converso assets as payment for services from various familiars. For example, Francesc Vinyoles petitioned Martí in 1398 because he still had not received 2,000 florins which were owed to him from the “debts confiscated from conversos who went to Barbary and also the

\textsuperscript{87} ACA CR 2264: 11v-12r (July 19, 1397).
\textsuperscript{88} ACA 2264: 1v, 11v-12r (July 19, 1397).
*donatio* of four *sous* per pound,” according to an agreement he had with Berenguer de Cortilles.\(^8^9\)

**Collective debt**

Martí had to follow up on the collection of the conversos’ loans not only for the purpose of the *donatio* but also for the repayment of the former *aljama’s* debt. In 1398 he received a petition from Bernat Buçot, on behalf of the Barcelonan creditors, regarding 3,000 pounds worth of transferred debts that still had not been rendered to him. This was especially outrageous considering the agreement he had made with the conversos stipulating that payment would be made within a year and a half from April 1\(^{st}\), 1394. Moreover, Buçot had done his “due diligence” together with Antoni des Pachs to ensure that these debts were in fact recoverable. Buçot insinuated his frustration at the fact that even after the creditors were gracious enough to grant a remittance of three *sous* per pound, lowering the total amount due, they still had not seen full payment. The fault did not lie so much with the conversos, however, given that once a debt title had been transferred to a creditor for the most part it was the responsibility of local officials to collect and render those amounts. Martí outrightly blamed the lieutenant governor for not “maintaining justice” by putting off confiscations of the debtors’ goods when they did or could not pay these debts, or by allowing sluggishness among his officials, thereby causing the “vexations” and “miserable” state of the creditors among whom numbered “orphans and widows.”\(^9^0\) Martí reiterated his concern for the creditors in a subsequent letter, in which he ordered the lieutenant governor to work with Antoni des Pachs to recover the debts. It was

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\(^8^9\) ACA 2264: 56v-57r (October 8, 1398).
\(^9^0\) ACA CR 2263: 105v-106v (September 3, 1398). It is interesting that he refers to the creditors, presumably from the well-to-do *rentier* class, as “miserable.” The point is that their ability to maintain a lifestyle in accordance with their status was threatened. Chapter Four will briefly address potentially similar uses of the term “miserable” and “poor” among conversos after 1391. This said, if a large portion of the creditors’ investments had been in the Majorcan *aljama*, they would have suffered a major financial loss after 1391.
important for the Crown to protect the interests of the _censalista_ class whence the creditors came, considering that they represented new and emerging sources of future credit; at the same time, Martí’s actions on their behalf may have been driven by the “affection” he declared for Bernat on account of “the good services he had done for the king and his brother.”

Jaume des Puig, the scribe of the governor’s court in Majorca, demonstrated a more explicit reluctance to cooperate with the Barcelonan creditors. This was the same Des Puig who, many years earlier, fraudulently made cash purchases of real estate from conversos planning to leave the island, and who would not produce his copy of the agreement in which the _jurats_ promised to repay the _aljama_ ’s debt. This time, it was the creditors’ requests that he ignored. They had unsuccessfully commissioned a local notary to solicit copies of their agreements with the conversos regarding repayment of the former _aljama_’s debt. In response to the creditors’ supplication in 1400, Martí ordered Des Puig to provide them with a copy of these documents, and that he be paid accordingly, but there is no further archival record to tell us what ultimately transpired.

Evasion of the debt-tax continued to be an impediment to settling the former _aljama_’s debt through the reign of Martí as well. Some conversos managed to avoid paying it longer than a decade after the _talles_ had been conducted. When Martí was informed by converso representatives in 1402 that some still refused to pay the debt, he ordered Governor Roger de Moncada to “compel” them to pay, seizing goods if necessary. Evidently some were crafty enough, or simply lucky, to evade royal enforcement a while longer, since in 1407 Pere Morro

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91 ACA CR 2263: 106v (September 3, 1398).
92 ACA CR 2265: 54v (July 30, 1400). The local procurator for the conversos was Joan Cama. Jacme des Puig was a character who did not seem to consider himself particularly bound by the rules, and got himself into quite a bit of trouble with the Crown after 1391, as I will discuss in Chapter Four.
93 ACA CR 2266: 109r (July 18, 1402).
still owed “various quantities of money up to great amounts,” to the community of conversos. Martí threatened the “deputies of the community of conversos” that if they did not promptly compel Pere to pay what he owed to the community in addition to a royal fine of 500 gold florins, he would seize the equivalent value from the deputies themselves. It may have been virtually impossible for them to collect the fine though, since Pere may have managed to leave the island by this time—especially considering that he had already sent his granddaughter to live in Algiers.

**Misappropriations and collusions**

Notwithstanding the implications that coin shortages had for the debt repayment, the tax administrators did collect some cash payments of the debt-tax. However, mismanagement, or simply inertia, seems to have prevented it from reaching the creditors. In addition to the taxadors responsible for collecting the debt-tax, the conversos had elected a few deputies—one Jew among them—responsible for auditing the accounts, as well as paying back the creditors from the money which had been collected. From among these deputies, three were elected with the power to “impugn” or ratify the accounts before the auditors. Despite these administrative measures, the auditors had not actually done anything with the money collected, which they continued to hold in their possession a decade after the tax assessments had been completed. This situation probably raised suspicions of fraud in the king’s mind, especially after the shady deals between Joan des Valls and the converso procuradors at the time of negotiations with the

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94 ACA CR 2269: 152r-v July 1, 1407).
95 Martí was already furious upon hearing allegations that Pere Morro has been involved in “various crimes” including sending his granddaughter to return to Judaism in Algiers. [ACA CR 2269: 151v-152r (June 30, 1407). The use of the term “deputies” as opposed to “procuradors” to address the converso leaders is noteworthy and may be a reference to the leaders of the new converso confraternity, since confraternity leaders were sometimes called deputies.
96 ACA CR 2266: 161v-162r (January 18, 1403) Alcover defines the term “diffinicio” as “pagar el que resta a satisfier d'un compte, d'un deute.”
97 The term used is “impugner.” The definition employed here is from Alcover’s Diccionari: “Refutar, combatre amb raonaments.”
Barcelonan creditors. Once apprised of the situation, Martí firmly stated that he did not want the auditors to make any final decisions regarding those accounts without the intervention of the governor and Mateu de Llosch. But there was also an element of self-interest in assigning royal intervention here. Even though the king explicitly recognized that the “talles” had been conducted “to repay creditors of the aljama in Majorca and in Barcelona,” he instructed the governor and Mateu to review the accounts, single out what they believed should pertain to the royal treasury, and submit those funds to the treasurer, Guillem Urgelles.⁹⁸ It is not clear exactly what Martí was expecting his officials to find—though he was quite explicit that he expected them to find something which could be claimed by the Crown.⁹⁹ Once again, lack of further evidence leaves us wondering what ensued, and what the king claimed for the royal fisc. Curiously, even though the auditors appear to have been hoarding the cash, I have not found any complaints from the Barcelonan or Majorcan creditors that they had not been paid the cash portion of the capital. When Bernat Buçot complained to Martí in 1398, he referred strictly to the transferred debt titles, not to any other sources of repayment (recall that a portion of the repayment to the Barcelonan creditors was to be made in cash).¹⁰⁰ Ultimately, what the foregoing does make clear is that as late as 1403 debt-tax revenues still had not been fully collected or paid out.

⁹⁸ Later Martí specified that if Guillem could not be present to personally intervene, they should proceed without him; Mateu should collect any money destined for the royal fisc and report to Guillem (ACA CR 2266: 166r-v, January 30, 1403).
⁹⁹ Martí reported that some conversos still had not paid any of the various talles “to the damage of the king” as well as the conversos who complained about it (ACA 2266: 109r, July 18, 1402). This suggests he expected some benefit from those collections.
¹⁰⁰ It is possible that money had been advanced by wealthier members of the community who were expecting repayment from the debt-tax collections later on, although this seems unlikely, considering the air of economic instability among Jews and conversos after 1391, let alone the fact that it is not at all documented. Another possibility is that the cash remaining was intended for the Majorcan creditors, but then we still must ask why no complaints by them appear in the royal correspondence either—of course, the absence of extant documentation does not necessarily mean that none existed.
The reasons behind the failure of the taxadors to produce accounts in a timely manner are not stated, but we might suspect some combination of disorganization and fraud—or at least manoeuvres that the Crown or community might have perceived as illicit. Given the aforementioned coin shortages in this period, and that many conversos faced debts they could not repay after 1391, it is possible the conversos handling the tax funds “borrowed” some of the cash for personal use. The actions of the heirs of Antoni Agost are a case in point. Called Moxi Natjar before his conversion, this former aljama secretary and member of a wealthy and influential Majorcan Jewish family served as one of the converso procuradors in 1393 and was deeply involved in negotiating, assessing and collecting the debt-tax. Before Antoni was murdered sometime between September and December 1393, he was in possession of some of the cash collected for the debt-tax. When the community of conversos requested this cash from his heirs after his death, the heirs would not relinquish it, offering instead to pay the equivalent value in debts that were owed to his inheritance. The case went to the king, who ordered that Antoni’s heirs surrender any cash that pertained to the debt-tax. Indeed, Antoni’s family may have resisted handing over the cash because they had spent it. It may not have been the additional wealth that his heirs were after per se, though, but rather the coin itself, which was so hard to come by. They may have been after the portable wealth to carry with them in possible exile, or

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101 Antoni Agost appeared at the royal court requesting permission for a third census according to a letter dated September 16, 1393, and the dispute with his heirs is recorded in a letter dated December 2 (ACA CR 1996: 179v). In 1395, Martí ordered an inquisition against the Old Christian Gerau Tarragona who had been accused of attempting to murder Antoni Agost (ACA CR 1997: 165r-v, January 1, 1395). Gerau had lost money as a result of his farming the wine tax or sise just before 1391, and been embroiled in a dispute with the community of conversos over accusations of stealing goods from the call during the revolt, which he rationalized on account of his lost investment.

102 ACA CR 1996: 179v (December 2, 1393).
wished to send it to their relatives who had already fled the island and were now living in the Maghreb.\textsuperscript{103}

Debt-tax revenues were not the only communal funds, or cash, that were being hoarded by their converso administrators. In 1402 converso leaders complained to King Martí that the individuals who had administered the Majorcan \textit{aljama}'s taxes prior to the 1391 conversions (i.e. former \textit{aljama} secretaries) never submitted accounts—the implication being that these people may still have been holding cash that pertained to the former \textit{aljama}. Martí ordered that those individuals be compelled to submit the accounts to the royal treasurer, Guillelm Urgell, and deposit any funds in their possession with a banker.\textsuperscript{104} A few months later Martí ordered Guillelm to go in person to Majorca to examine these accounts, stressing their importance because the conversos in question had “administered large amounts of money and other goods pertaining to the former \textit{aljama}.”\textsuperscript{105} Martí’s concern was likely beyond simply getting account books and the conversos’ communal funds sorted out. In all likelihood, he also harboured hopes that some, if not all of these assets could be said to pertain to the Crown. At the same time, he may have suspected foul play among the converso administrators, considering that just two days before ordering Guillelm to go to Majorca he had instructed the governor’s legal counsel to proceed against certain unnamed conversos guilty of the crime, “\textit{manipoli seu gabelle}”—Latin and

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\textsuperscript{103} The responsa of Simon ben Zemach Duran show that he corresponded a number of times with Mordechai Natjar, both of whom seem to have lived in Algiers (see for example vol. II, responsum No. 225). Miguel Fuster / Magaluff Natjar and his wife, Pere Fuster / Ayon Natjar, his grandmother Anna / Seccum, who was the wife of Ayon Natjar, deceased appear to have left the island shortly after the \textit{avalot} (ARM AH 64: 111v-112r, May 1392).
\textsuperscript{104} ACA CR 2266: 110r (June 17, 1402) “Pecuniam vero ex predictis proventuram poni seu recondi faciatis in tabulam aliquiis trapazeti dicte Ciutatis ut inde satisfieri valeat illis quorum fuerit interesse.”
\textsuperscript{105} ACA CR 2266: 134r-v (October 22, 1402). The addressee of this letter is not specified. Although the preceding letter is directed to King Martí’s legal counsel, the reference in this letter to an order that the \textit{talla} accounts be submitted to the addressee, as well as the reference to his letter of June 17, suggests that this letter was written to his treasurer, Guillem Urgell.
\end{flushright}
Catalan terms, respectively, generally referring to some kind of conspiracy. The conversos accused here may be the same as the aljama leaders whom King Joan had pursued under the same vague allegation in 1389 and 1391. Records do not indicate what precisely the crime entailed. Conceivably, it referred to embezzlement or misappropriation of communal funds, such as those of the former aljama.

It is clear that communal funds were being misappropriated by converso leaders. The lines distinguishing revenues pertaining to the former aljama from those pertaining to the converso community were easily blurred, just as they were in so many other respects, such as leadership. Naturally, many of the individuals who had been elected to manage fiscal matters of the converso collective were the same individuals who had served as aljama secretaries. One such individual was the converso Bartomeu Marti, formerly known as Abrafim Luquial. The same Bartomeu had been a treasurer of the aljama, and still possessed the Torah scrolls and other

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106 ACA CR 2266: 134r (October 20, 1402). Du Cange defines “manipolium” as “conventus ad illicitum aliquod volenter perpetrandum” (Du Cange, Charles Du Fresne. Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae Latinitatis. Venice: S.Coleti, 1736); Alcover defines “gabella” as “aplec de dues o més persones que s'entenen per a un fi determinat; Conjuració, aplec d'algunes persones per a fins delictius o subversiu.” (Alcover, "Diccionari Català-Valencià-Balear").

107 Interestingly, this case of gabella was associated with the accusation of being an informer or malsin. On December 5, 1391, Joan ordered an inquiry, trial and sentence against Magaluf Natjar, Maymo Faraig, Abram Ses Portes and Juceff Ben Barahon, and others of their “sequaces” or followers who had transgressed [lit. “delati”] against the king “de gabella seu maniploio … inter eos quoque sunt aliorum accusatores seu malsini” (ACA CR 1847: 91v). Natjar, Faraig and Ses Portes appear in other letters as fiscal administrators for the aljama. For instance, in January 1390 King Joan referred to Magaluff Natjar and Magaluf Faraig as nuncios of the aljama (ACA CR 1890: 16r-v). In March 1389, the king summoned Magaluff and Maymo Faraig to court because he needed funds, and referred to them as familiares whom he considered essential to royal “affairs” in Sardinia—probably because they raised subsidies for him (ACA CR 1847: 91v; ARM AH LR 37: 71r-v, March 21, 1389). In 1389 Abram Ses Portes was an aljama secretary also involved in the king’s affairs in Sardinia, probably in a fiscal respect (ARM AH LR37: 162r-v).

108 Abrafim Luquial was one of the “sindics” of the aljama before 1391. See Pons, Judíos del reino, vol. II, 311, No. 135; Mais Chacón, Actividades económicas, 535, 540. The last document shows him in the capacity of someone who would be receiving aljama revenues, being paid the notarial rent that the aljama collected for the rights to its Latin scribania. A reference to Bartomeu/Abrafim collecting a debt is in ARM AH 64: 101v (May 6, 1392). There is another Bartomeu Marti, converso, formerly Salamon Ayon, but this does not seem to be the same person; he appears in a notarial record which documents a transfer of debt title in 1393 by him to another converso, Bartomeu Ripoll, also called Salamon Hayon as a Jew (ACM 14667: May 23, 1393).
silver ritual items as late as 1402. ¹⁰⁹ He had also served as one of the *impugnadors* of accounts for *aljama* funds prior to 1391 as well as for the converso debt-tax (though he had trouble getting his pay for this).¹¹⁰ According to reports which reached Martí by early 1403, he had still not “made an account” of 870 pounds of *aljama* funds, “to the detriment of the royal court.”¹¹¹ Was Bartomeu still sitting on money which the king considered his? It is not clear whether he even had the cash in his possession anymore. Perhaps he was holding on to that money for himself, or, less selfishly, trying to keep those funds out of the king’s hands in the interest of the converso community. It seems he was wont to shady behaviour though: even as an *aljama* secretary, he allegedly falsified receipts for the receivers of *censal mort* annuities paid out by the *aljama*. He may have done this so that the annuitants could claim a lower value of assets than they actually possessed when they were assessed for their taxes. One wonders if he had a particularly vocal enemy who voiced all these allegations. It may well have been the soap maker Miguell Maxella, who was accused in 1407 of having effected the royal censure of certain converso leaders and debt-tax administrators by accusing them of fraud, when it was he who actually pilfered “large amounts of money” himself.¹¹² While it would seem that he denounced the others to deflect attention from himself, it is not clear whether or not the others were innocent, or whether they, too, were implicated in the embezzlement.¹¹³ Despite these allegations, ultimately Bartomeu did not lose clout with the royal administration or his community, since he appeared in 1410 as a

¹⁰⁹ ACA CR 2265: 178v-170r (July 12, 1402). I shall return to the subject of the Torah scrolls in Chapter Four. Note that only a month before King Martí ordered the Torah and silver seized from him, he had granted Bartomeu a moratorium on his debts of thirty pounds—a curiously low amount (ACA 2266:100v, June 3, 1402).
¹¹⁰ In 1405 Bartomeu Martí, together with Pere SaForteza, petitioned Martí because they had been elected “ad impugnandum” the accounts which the *procuradors* of the conversos had been rendering (“reddébant”) for over five years, and had not been paid for the work they had done in that regard. Martí ordered that they be paid accordingly. ACA CR 2268: 97v (October 15, 1405).
¹¹¹ ACA CR 2266:163r (January 23, 1403).
¹¹² ACA CR 2269: 177r-178r (August 30, 1407). It is not clear whether this is the same Miguell Maxella who was a royal familiar, and whom Martí defended against the Inquisition in 1402. See ACA 2266: 134v-135r and also 100v.
¹¹³ Martí’s letter suggests that he might have conspired with others to embezzle some of the funds, when he writes that Miguel “composuit cum dictis conversis in magna peccuniae quantitate quam sibi asservavit.”
representative of the conversos before the royal procurator, Mateu de Llosch, when he presented a royal letter ordering local and ecclesiastical officials to stop harassing the conversos on the pretence of committing heresy.\textsuperscript{114}

What do all these allegations of fraud tell us? One observation doubles as a disclaimer regarding my use of the term “fraud.” Thus far, I have pointed out different ways in which Jews and subsequently conversos developed strategies to cope with the Crown’s fiscal exploitation through taxation. We might also understand certain manoeuvres, on the part of communal leadership, that circumvented established rules, customs or legality, as fitting under the umbrella of such coping strategies, strategies which were ultimately critical to the survival and integrity of either—or both—the community and the individuals that performed them.\textsuperscript{115}

The allegations also reinforce a key theme of the forgoing discussions: before 1391, \textit{aljama} leaders had relationships with each other, or other Jews, Old Christians or the Crown that could have a significant impact on the state of collective finances, and such relationship dynamics continued after 1391, essentially unchanged by conversion. This is most obvious with respect to royal policy and the conversos’ relationship to the Crown, but is also very much true on a local level. Speaking in broad strokes, we can also say that the same kinds of fraudulent activities and “collusions” that occurred among the \textit{aljama} leadership before 1391 continued among the converso leadership after 1391, sometimes with far-reaching effects. The dynamics governing such relationships were centered on mutual financial benefit, sometimes to the detriment of the larger Jewish or converso community, but so metimes to its advantage. For

\textsuperscript{114} ACA CR 2271 fol. 15v-16r (October 30, 1410). Although the text does not indicate him explicitly as a representative, it is safe to assume that since he functioned as one in this case, and is named as a deputy of the converso confraternity elsewhere. However, despite his implication in illicit management of the aljama accounts, his reputation must have remained sufficiently intact to allow him to serve as a converso representative. His continued leadership is also a testament to his social and political influence.

\textsuperscript{115} On strategies of resistance and the internal politics of subordinate groups see, James C Scott, \textit{Domination and the Arts of Resistance} (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), especially Chapter Seven, “The Infrapolitics of Subordinate Groups.”
instance, converso *procuradors* were able to strike a repayment deal with Barcelonan creditors that was more manageable for the entire community precisely because they had a mutual understanding with the creditors’ representative, Joan des Valls—even though their agreement with him was fraudulent, and potentially damaging to his fellow creditors.

At the same time, recent studies of *aljama* leadership suggest that those in power often used their position or influence to achieve fiscal advantages that were deemed unjust or damaging to other factions within the community.\(^{116}\) The prime arena in which these kinds of politics were carried out was that of taxation and its connection to the Crown, and all the preferential relationships involved. The same political and social dynamics continued after 1391. Of course, one could argue that such tendencies apply to wider society in general (for instance, collusion among leaders for embezzlement of tax funds, or using familiarity with the royal court to one’s advantage). This may be true, but it still does not undermine the arguments concerning the effect such dynamics had specifically in the post-1391 context, in relation to the development of converso identity, mainly because Jewish society had its own dynamic that was separate from, even if analogous to, Christian society’s. Ultimately, for better or for worse, converso *procuradors* acted like *aljama* secretaries or *adelantats*, and, in the years immediately following their conversion, were often the same individuals or came from the same families as those who comprised the *aljama* leadership just prior to 1391.

On the whole, this chapter argues that fiscal relationships did not change significantly with the mass conversions, and therefore the aspects of identity linked to those relationships did not fundamentally change either. Here we are dealing with the collective, but the same principle could be applied to the individual – albeit in another study. What may appear obvious, but is

\(^{116}\) Such conflicts have been addressed in the work of Mark Meyerson, as well as Alexandra Guerson’s forthcoming thesis on Jewish converts in the Crown of Aragon prior to 1391.
important to highlight, is that Jews did not simply convert and become Christians. They could not, even if they so desired, because the elements that defined their pre-baptismal lives and, in this case, the economic relationships that structured them, did not change significantly, and in some cases, did not change at all. With a focus on the fiscal, this chapter has shown how vestiges of the former *aljama*—human, physical, and psychological—continued to determine the workings of the converso community through Martí’s reign. Such vestiges existed not only in the spheres of the conversos community’s debt or its unique relationship with the king, but were also present in concrete items such as crowns for Torah scrolls and *aljama* tax revenues, more behavioural aspects like continuity of leadership and class structures, or collusions and vendettas rooted in pre-1391 *aljama* politics.

The foregoing paints a picture of a royal administration which aggressively claimed any assets connected to Jews or conversos that could be justified as royal patrimony after 1391, seeming to prioritize this above all else. At the same time, the king had to ensure that the creditors of the Jews and conversos were repaid without fatally crippling the latter. Both groups were important figures in the economy, and while the Jews certainly represented a potential source of royal revenues (and in a more complex way, conversos too), their *censalista* creditors were part of a class that was growing in numbers as well as importance, and represented greater possibilities for credit in the future. Neither group achieved an ideal outcome. The conversos suffered immense economic loss; and their creditors, although they fared better on the whole, did not recover all their due either.
Chapter 4

Vestiges of the former aljama – royal tenacity, royal support

The cultural and legal codes governing the distinctive relationship that had existed, for centuries, between the Crown and the Jews, persisted beyond the latter’s baptism. The king and conversos were both habituated to, and invested in dealing with one another in specific ways. Royal incentives for perpetuating this exploitative relationship are obvious, but even conversos, as Jews, had found ways to make that relationship work for them. Perpetuating this dynamic, and continuing to treat conversos as well as Jews as a “royal treasure,” clearly had negative consequences for both conversos and Jews, but there were positive aspects, too. The relationship was essentially feudal, and therefore predicated on a principle of mutual benefit whereby the king offered Jews various protections in exchange for their financial fealty and service. Kings Joan and Martí “protected” Jews and conversos not simply by employing royal guards to stave off physical attacks but also by issuing letters of safe conduct, keeping creditors at bay, granting tax exemptions, and various other provisions aimed at easing the post-1391 recovery. For instance, Joan allowed Jews to reconstruct, on the basis of witnesses, letters of debt or ketubot (marriage contracts) that were destroyed in the violence.¹ Such protection offered much-needed support to Jews and conversos that made it possible, for some, to pull through tough times. Royal administrative officials also played a role in extending royal support or protection by mediating negotiations for repayment of the former aljama’s debt, collecting the debt-tax or loans owed to conversos, enforcing the decisions of converso procuradors, and (in theory) recovering goods stolen from the call. Furthermore, the involvement of the royal administration in the fiscal affairs of the converso community afforded greater surveillance and control to ensure that the monarchy

¹ ACA CR 1996: 163r (September 16, 1393).
collect its “due” from various converso sources such as the _donatio_, payment for _guiatges_, confiscation of exiles’ assets, or a percentage of real estate sales.  

The dynamics of this relationship informed virtually all royal involvement with conversos, not simply with respect to the mobility and finances discussed in the preceding chapters. The Crown asserted control, even ownership, over virtually any property that could be linked to the former _aljama_ or _call_, including real estate, rents or ritual items of value, and in doing so, weakened the economic standing of both the Jewish and converso communities. Incongruously, none of this signified King Joan’s deliberate abandonment of the surviving, shrunken Jewish community, which he avowed to “resurrect” at different points in his correspondence, even shortly after the 1391 violence. He must have understood that reestablishing an economically secure _aljama_ held greater promise for future revenues, and therefore offered economic incentives for Jews to establish themselves on the island, overtures which King Martí subsequently built upon with greater practicality. Ultimately, royal plans to resurrect an _aljama_ on the island were not successful because they were undermined, paradoxically, by other policies responding to the 1391 crisis.

Although the Majorcan _aljama_ was never reestablished, its “vestiges” served as nodal points around which salient issues of the post-1391 recovery period converge. Some of these vestiges were concrete, such as buildings in the Jewish quarter or ritual items from the synagogue, while others were figurative, such as the legacy of the Majorcan Jewish merchant, or even the concept of an _aljama_ itself. To varying extents, the Crown had enjoyed dominion over these objects or ideas in as much as they were inextricably linked to the _aljama_. Logically, the

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2 For instance, the converso Julià Doscha, previously named Samuel Doscha before his baptism, had to get permission from Mateu de Losch, “collector of the dues [drets] of the king,” in order to transfer the right to collect debts (owed to Julià by debtors in rural parishes) to the surgeon Francesch Parera, who was likely a creditor (ACM _Protocols Notarials_, Joan Clavell, 14666: February 21, 1393, loose folio inserted between folios167v-168r).
Crown continued to assert its dominance over these vestiges of the former *aljama* in the same way it perpetuated its power over Jews and conversos.

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it shall elucidate the Crown’s approach to what I have defined as “vestiges” of the former *aljama*. Second, this chapter shall outline the different kinds of support that the Crown provided to conversos and Jews after 1391, which in many ways paralleled the royal “protection” typically bestowed upon *aljamas* prior to 1391. Arguably, one purpose of this support was to foster communities which could generate tax revenue for the royal fisc by stimulating demographic growth and promoting trade with North Africa, and to some degree, by sheltering individuals worried about being attacked, incarcerated or becoming miserably poor. Ironically, while the royal support extended to Jews and conversos was intended to help them recover from the devastation of 1391, many of the hardships they suffered in this period were a result of post-1391 royal policies that included appropriation of their assets or fiscal demands. We see this most clearly with respect to “Jewish” real estate, over which the Crown continued to assert its prerogative, even when it was owned by converts. The king essentially dismantled the *call* and *aljama* only to attempt, soon after, to put it back together again.

**The Crown and “Jewish” real estate**

It was difficult for Joan to let go of the long-standing revenue potential of the Jewish quarter itself. Chapter One outlined the allodial rights the Crown exerted over Jewish real estate, collecting payments such as the *lluisme* owed on transfers of indirect ownership. Prior to 1391, the royal right to collect the *lluisme* or property taxes had been zealously protected by King Joan’s predecessors. For instance, in early fourteenth-century Valencia, King Jaume II endeavoured to prevent Jews from selling their homes to Christians, even if they needed to do so
in order to meet royal tax demands, since the transfer of ownership from Jews to Christians entailed a loss of royal revenue. King Joan had similar concerns after 1391. Once the call’s real estate slipped out of Jewish hands, the king might not have been able to demand the lluisme, other rents, or taxes assessed on real estate that he would have been able to collect when it was possessed by Jews. However, in the post-1391 context, and given the reduction in the number of Jewish households, the king had no choice but to let the houses in the call be sold to Old Christians—or, as he put it, to “free persons.” He sought compensation for the loss of revenue entailed by such transfers of ownership by requiring that licenses be purchased for the legal sale of property in the call to Old Christians. In some cases, moreover, a portion of the sale price had to be paid to the royal treasury.

**Dissolution of the aljama and royal appropriation of its collective assets**

It took a few years for Joan’s policies regarding the Jewish quarter to solidify, but his possessiveness over its real estate stands out from the beginning. Many buildings were damaged, to varying degrees, but more significantly, their ownership status changed as a result of emigration and deaths, as well as the licit and illicit property transfers through sales, donations, and inheritances, not simply to Old Christians, but also to other Jews or conversos. The attacks on the call left its real estate in a virtual state of chaos and, regardless of Joan’s self-interest, royal authority was necessary to mediate disputes between competing claimants and to broker the reapportioning of properties. The job of appropriating the assets of all dissolved aljamas also required royal administrators. Thus, in January 1392 Joan appointed Bernat Calopa, his treasurer

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4 ACA CR 1997: 81r (April 3, 1394); for references to transfer of houses in the Jewish quarter to “free persons” see ACA 1997: 170v (January 28, 1395) and 1998: 38v-39r (March 20, 1395)
5 Particularly in the case of exiles’ houses that were transferred to the former aljama’s creditors as part of the debt payment, as explained in the preceding chapter. Joan wrote that the licenses for selling houses, opening up the streets of the Jewish quarter, and confiscated rents or rentable properties yielded a “magnum commodum” for the royal fisc (ACA 1997: 170v, January 28, 1395).
Jaume Pastor, and Violant’s treasurer Guillem de Monbru to supervise the “administration and recovery of the goods of the aljama, namely to reclaim debts to the aljama, its communal accounts, synagogues, charities and confraternities, and all the goods of each and every Jew, and to deal with any lawsuits if necessary.”

The “recovery of….all the goods of each and every Jew” presumably refers to goods stolen from individuals during the violence, the administration of which was distinct from dealing with the collective “goods of the aljama.” Numerous administrative letters and public announcements between 1391 and 1395 call for goods that had been stolen from the call during the revolt to be deposited with royal officials. The items would include “objects or containers of gold and silver, precious stones, jewellery, material of gold, silver, silk, wool, camellot [sp. Xamelot, i.e. a coarse textile made from wool and camel or horse hair], arms, linens, books, clothing, corals, silks, and other merchandise […]” Joan probably paid the administrators out of these valuables themselves, and perhaps kept some of them for his treasury, but there is at least one sign, if indirect, that he intended to have them returned to their rightful owners: after the governor ordered the bailiff of Inca to announce that the town’s residents must declare any information they had regarding goods stolen from the call there, he added that conversos could not receive any of those goods without the consent of the governor.

6 ACA 1995: 35r-36r (January 7, 1392). Later Jacob Pastor focuses more on mediating the negotiations surrounding payment of the conversos’ debt. Berenguer de Cortilles and Mateu de Lloscos deal with the collection of revenues claimed for the royal fisc. Guillem de Monbru’s involvement is minimal compared to these three. Bernat Calopa is rarely mentioned in subsequent correspondence.

7 Orders to return the goods of the call may be found in the following documents: ARM AH 419: 75v (March 1, 1392), referring to an announcement ordered on January 18 (both versions are published in BSAL 8:442); ACA CR 1995: 153r-v (October 1, 1392), specifying that the stolen goods should be deposited with Mateu de Lloscos or Pere Vinyoles; 1996: 127v (June 12, 1393), 152v-153r (August 21, 1393); ARM AH 64: 24v (February 7, 1392), 15r-16r (January 27, 1392) and 22v (February 7, 1392) re: call of Inca. See also ACA CR 2263: 188r (July 1, 1399) where Mateu de Llosch refers to his work in recovering some goods stolen from the call.

8 ARM AH 64: 15r-16r (January 27, 1392). Another sign of Joan’s will to help conversos and Jews recover their valuables, albeit an example that does not quite fall within the general project of ordering the recovery of goods stolen from the Jewish quarters, is when the king ordered 500 florins “violently extorted” from the converso
documentation regarding the redistribution of stolen goods suggests that the amount which conversos and Jews were able to recover was probably negligible. In fact, King Joan complained in 1395 that very little had been returned over the past few years. Surely the challenge of recovering stolen valuables was difficult for royal officials having to search for, and identify, these items among disaffected forans who were unlikely to denounce the thieves. The real fault, however, possibly lay with the king, who was more preoccupied with recovering property that he could justifiably lay claim to for himself, such as property that had been owned by converso exiles, or that had been corporately owned by the aljama.

With the dissolution of the aljama, the king appropriated all corporate assets under the pretext that “ownerless” Jewish property (i.e. not legally belonging to an heir) reverted to the Crown. This principle applied to aljamas outside Majorca as well, like Barcelona and Valencia. When Joan and Violant brokered the repayment plan between the conversos of Valencia and the creditors of its former aljama, permitting the allocation of houses in the call to repay the debt, the royal couple unequivocally stated that “communal goods” belonged to the royal treasury and could not be alienated. This included anything considered former aljama property, such as “synagogues, cemeteries, confraternities, charities and butcheries,” as well as “houses, rents and

Magaluff Benassaya, formerly a Jew of Menorca, to be restored by his noble assailant, the “domicellus” Pelegri de Lossano. See ACA 1996: 38v (November 23, 1392).

9 ACA CR 1998: 35v-36v (March 20, 1395). If the goods were to be returned to their rightful Jewish or converso owners, officials may not have had the same sense of urgency in collecting them as confiscating and selling property.

10 For instance, when Joan wrote to Jaume Pastor and Guillem de Monbru in the following year there was no mention of restoring stolen goods to their former Jewish owners, but rather “exacting [demanar] the communal properties that belonged to the aljama, and the vacant possessions of its individuals…” See ACA CR 1995: 78r (no date given, but it judging from surrounding documents it would have been in March or April 1393). This letter instructs them only to appropriate goods owned by Jews, not Christians. Presumably they were also trying to appropriate property in the call that had already been sold to Christians, not houses still inhabited by Jews or conversos.
written things [lit. *coses scrites*, i.e. manuscripts, scrolls, contracts, etc.], mobile or immobile
[goods], books, jewels [...]]^11

The management of all revenues derived from Jews and conversos was entrusted to
Berenguer de Cortilles, a merchant of Saragossa who became one of Joan’s councillors and was
also treasurer to Queen Violant.^12 The revenues were anticipated not only from the *donatio* or
confiscated property of exiles, but also from “vacant properties” and assets that had been more
properly communal and therefore pertained to the Crown, such as schools, charitable funds,
censal annuities or property rents which the *aljama* had been collecting.^13 Joan redistributed
most of these communal assets to pay off his debts, just as he did with the anticipated revenues
from the *donatio* and confiscated property of exiles. The administrative role of Berenguer de
Cortilles offers a case in point: in order to pay their debts to him and as a salary for his services,
too, Joan and Violant allowed him to keep for himself any “communal goods” which he was able
to collect.^14 However, with so many royal confiscations and reallocations of Jewish property
following 1391, the situation was destined for confusion and conflict—all the more so
considering Joan’s administrative negligence. Berenguer later complained to the king that Jaume
Pastor and Guillelm de Monbru, “commissioners of the attacks against the *aljama* of Majorca,”
repaid one of the king’s debts to the royal scribe Jaume des Puig from the same communal assets

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^12 ACA CR 1980: 80v-82r (October 1, 1394). See also ACA CR 1996: 36v-37r (November 8, 1392) where *donatio*
collections are directed to Berenguer de Cortilles; 40r (November 23, 1392) instructing properties that belonged to
exiles to be handed over to Berenguer; 121v-124v (April 10, 1393) where Berenguer sells a house confiscated from
a wealthy conversa who fled to Barbary to Antoni Rexach, another royal treasurer.

^13 Other documents that show Berenguer de Cortilles in this capacity (i.e. receiver of converso revenues) include:
ACA 1996: 40 v-v (November 23, 1392) where the king tells Berenguer to collect 475 pounds, 5 *sous*, 6 *diners* from
certain conversos by virtue of 6000 pounds held by the former *aljama* on account of “*bonis vacantibus*.” In other
words, Joan appropriated unoccupied properties. See also 1996: 37r (October 31, 1392) where Joan orders certain
pensions that were being collected by the conversos to be transferred to Berenguer. This appears to refer to the
disputed *censals* discussed below.

^14 ACA CR 1997: 139v-140v (October 1, 1394). This letter records a dispute which arose when Berenguer de
Cortilles attempted to appropriate certain rents and revenues which royal administrators had given to Jaume des
Puig, a notary and scribe of the governor’s court who managed to accumulate an impressive amount of the former
*aljama*’s properties.
that, according to Berenguer, should have gone to him. To complicate matters further, Joan occasionally made grants of former aljama properties to reward other officials, too. For instance, he conferred the butchery to his own treasurer, Antoni Rexach, and planned to sell the cemetery in order to pay the salary of a galley captain, Pere Fluniani.

**Dismantling the former call**

Joan’s appropriation of communal real estate assets such as synagogues or cemeteries, so central to any Jewish aljama or call, seems directly opposed to the desire he professed, in other letters, to reestablish an aljama on the island. Once again, conflicting pressures led to conflicting policies. His chief priority was to compensate for his own financial losses stemming from 1391 and the dissolution of the aljama. He also needed to facilitate the conversos’ collective debt settlement. Moreover, certain repercussions of the violence irrevocably altered the demographic and urban structure of the Jewish quarter in ways that later made it difficult to reestablish a call or aljama as it was before. First, there was a dramatic reduction in the Jewish population (including the baptized population) as a result of death and flight. Second, the conversos’ collective debt obligations led to the alienation of properties in the call to Old Christians. Third, the king appropriated Jewish properties connected to the former aljama or exiles, and either sold or ceded them to Old Christians. These factors converged to effectively dismantle the pre-1391 call.

Once the year-long legal immunities and moratoria which the king had granted to the converso community had expired, in February 1393 King Joan directed his officials to effectuate

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15 Ibid., See also ACA 2000: 142r-143v (December 20, 1395) where King Joan rules in Berenguer’s favour, and orders Jaume to pay Berenguer a total of 52 pounds to compensate for the lost rents.
16 ACA CR 1996: 149r-v (August 1, 1393). The relevant part of the text reads, “...The house which the king now gives him [Antoni Rexach] used to be the carniceria; in it there are two portals, one of which opens onto the street called ”den Miffre” and the other opens onto the street which runs from the gate of the call to the gate of the Temple.”
17 ACA CR 1996: 116v-117r (June 8, 1393); 137v-138r (August 15, 1393).
the sale of houses which had been confiscated to the royal fisc. When these confiscated properties were sold, officials were directed to pay off any debts owed by the properties’ owners in addition to their contribution to the debt-tax before depositing the rest of the profit into royal coffers. At the same time, at least one-third of the houses in the call had been promised as part of the debt settlement to the Majorcan creditors, many of whom put them up for auction. Individual Jews and conversos, too, may have decided to sell their homes privately in order to meet other financial obligations or be able to pay their share of the debt tax. Yet, as Chapter Three indicated, sometimes the same houses that had been allocated by the procuradors to the creditors had already been sold, at deflated prices, to Old Christians. The governor reiterated announcements requiring people to declare any properties they possessed in the call, as well as any debts or rents related to them, presumably in the hopes of clarifying true ownership. Nevertheless, disputes over titulary rights continued to surface for a number of years.

In order to make houses in the call more palatable to Old Christian buyers, Joan ordered that the streets of the call be “opened up” by tearing down any enclosures or homes blocking streets, and that its streets be made continuous with “Christian” streets. Houses would fetch a better price in auctions if they were in a neighborhood that was perceived to be appropriate for

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18 Recall the examples of houses transferred to creditors mentioned in Chapter Three: (1) Francesc Fuster, formerly Samuel Natjar, allocated houses to the creditors of the aljama (ACM Protocols Notarials, 14666, Joan Clavell, loose folio, September 2, 1393); (2) the procuradors granted the house of Magaluff Doscha to the creditors (AHN Carpeta 70, No.3, in Rosselló Lliteras, Pergamins de la cartoixa de Valldemossa, 120-121).

19 See for instance the pregons in ARM AH 419: 91v (June 30, 1392) and 119 (February 21, 1393) also published in BSAL 8:443.

20 Joan explicitly writes that this should be done so that the houses of the call could be “better sold” and made “more comfortable,” and also because he wished to facilitate repayment of the former aljama’s debt to its creditors. See ACA CR 1995: 191v-192r (February 26, 1393); 1996: 129v (June 12, 1393), 151r-v (August 21, 1393). The latter document contains the same contents as same as 129v. This letter also refers to the Jewish houses in “villages”; in other words, Jewish or converso-owned houses were not only being appropriated and sold in the city of Majorca but also in the rural areas. Joan ordered the closures of the call of Valencia to be torn down in December 1392, also in connection with selling its houses in order to satisfy the former aljama’s debt (Hinojosa Montalvo, Jews of the Kingdom of Valencia, 395, No. 124).
Old Christians and no longer identified as a “Jewish” quarter.\(^{21}\) The houses also needed to be kept in good shape, which was a problem in light of continuing vandalism. Proclamations issued more than a year and a half after the revolt still prohibited people from damaging buildings, gardens or terraces in the call, or from removing items such as “gates, tiles, lintels, beams, rails, widows, door hinges, trees, wood or rocks[…]” and confirm that a number of the properties in the area had indeed become “vacant.”\(^{22}\) This must have been the image King Martí had in mind when, in 1399, he wrote that the aljama and call of Majorca already had fallen into “dilapidation.”\(^{23}\) Within a relatively short period of time, the composition, and probably the appearance, of the former call had changed significantly. Numerous houses came to be possessed by Old Christians, including communal sites which had marked Jewish life, such as the butchery, synagogues and schools.\(^{24}\) According to reports that reached King Joan in 1394, the call of Majorca was allegedly “populated by an Old Christian majority.”\(^{25}\)

The transfer of ownership did not necessarily entail the eviction of a house’s tenants, and sometimes Jewish or converso residents paid rent to a Christian landlord. For instance, Jaume des Puig collected over twenty rents in the Jewish quarter, some of them paid [facit] by Jewish or converso tenants.\(^{26}\) Among these properties was the corall den Boniach, a terrace which in 1396

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\(^{21}\) The governor had already encountered problems as a result of a house in the Jewish quarter of Inca that fetched such a low price at auction that it caused a loss to the creditors of its landlord as well as the royal fisc, “from which the home is rented” (ARM AH 64: 130r-v, June 10, 1392).

\(^{22}\) ARM AH 419: 123bis r-v (May 20, 1393), also published in BSAL 8:381. Earlier proclamations allude to various items being taken from the call, particularly during the attacks. Even the gates to the call had been stolen (ARM AH 419: 57bis, October 21, 1391), also published in BSAL 8:441.

\(^{23}\) ACA CR 2263: 194 r-v (July 14, 1399).

\(^{24}\) For the butchery see ACA CR 1996: 149r-v (August 1, 1393); ACA CR 1999: 98r-v (October 30, 1395) re: synagogue; ACA CR 1997: 139v-140v (October 1, 1394) referring to the grant to Berenguer de Cortilles of the former aljama’s communal assets, including schools.


\(^{26}\) ACA CR 2000: 142r-143v (December 20, 1395). A point of confusion here is as follows: the royal letter states that Berenguer de Cortilles received “rents and revenues” of the former aljama which were then given to Jaume des Puig. This document lists those rents, but most of them were associated with the houses of individual Jews and conversos, some of whom were still residing and active in Majorca at the time. This last point negates the possibility that the houses had come into royal possession (the king gave the houses to Berenguer de Cortilles who gave them
was being used by the Jews as a synagogue, and for which Des Puig collected a rent of four pounds. In 1392, Des Puig received permission from the king to transform some properties he possessed in the call into a chapel, located in the same place where the chapel of Santa Fe used to be. Almost two years later, he received a dispensation to install, “for the salvation of his soul,” a beneficed priest with an annual stipend of fifty-five Majorcan morabitins payable from rents associated with other properties he owned in the city. The (former) tenants of the properties in question were Gabriel Fuster, converso, formerly Moxi Natjar, and Francesch Lana, converso, formerly Samuel Juceff. Des Puig must have acquired this property right after the attacks, before it was assigned by taxadors to be auctioned off as part of the debt repayment, and before his other, fraudulent acquisitions were discovered by the king. Even before Joan had granted the license to institute a priestly benefice, Joan de Moya, an apothecary who was also

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27 ACA CR 1997: 52v-53r and 55r-56r (same text and date for both sets of folios: March 12, 1394) and ACA 1997: 25v-26r (August 5, 1392). In the first case, King Jaume granted Des Puig "alodio" [freehold] and "amortizatio" [amortization] of the house on the condition that he build the chapel in it within a year. The subsequent document, dating a year and a half later, is more specifically the royal license to institute a priestly benefice in perpetuity. The document states that the dispensation was necessary to overturn a royal edict that royal property could not be alienated to the Church.

28 ACM: 14706 (November 23, 1405) refers to a house formerly owned by Des Puig but inhabited at the time by a priest.

29 ACA 1997: 25v-26r (August 5, 1392). The 10 pounds rent he claimed to have collected from Gabriel Fuster / Moxi Natjar number among those he had to surrender to Berenguer de Cortilles in ACA CR 2000: 142r-143v (December 20, 1395). Although Gabriel Fuster remained active on the island, other members of the prominent Natjar family fled to Algiers (Mordechai Natjar is correspondent of Rabbi Simon ben Zemah Duran); for instance, a public announcement was made requiring people to declare property obtained from Miguel Fuster, convers / Magaluf Doscha and his wife, and of Pere Fuster / Ayon Natjar and of Anna / Seccum, who was the wife of Ayon Natjar, deceased, grandmother of the said Ayon, and of Anthoni de Jovals / Struch ben Hanini and his wife (AH 64: 111v-112r, May 11, 1392). Perhaps he ultimately had to surrender any rent collected from Gabriel because the house actually belonged to his exiled relatives.

30 Note that Francesc Lana is the same name as the ship captain accused of helping conversos escape, mentioned in Chapter Two.
one of the Majorcan creditors of the former aljama, brought legal charges against Des Puig. As one of the creditors, De Moya had been given rights to the very houses which Des Puig had “destroyed” by converting them (back) to the chapel of Santa Fe, and demanded that the property be restored to its former state and that past rents be paid to him. The lawsuit continued for over two years until King Joan imposed a final decision, dictating that Des Puig should pay De Moya the value of the property, assessed at 50 pounds, plus past rents, but that the chapel should remain “in the use of the Church and not return to secular use.” The priest associated with the chapel may well have been Joan Fabregues, one of the executors of Des Puig’s will in 1406 who was also “beneficed in the chapel of Blessed Maria, constructed where the former Jewish call was.” Only a few months after the judgement was issued in the case with De Moya, in December 1395 Joan Des Puig was compelled to pay 52 pounds to Berenguer de Cortilles, who had successfully claimed that certain rents Des Puig was collecting in the call really belonged to him. The disputed rents were, in 1395, paid by Jews or conversos, but when Des Puig died a decade later, the few properties which he still possessed in the call were inhabited by Old Christians.

Des Puig’s activities are especially illustrative of various kinds of issues that arose in the call after 1391: the fraudulent acquisition of extensive properties in the Jewish quarter, the new relationships between Old Christian landlords and Jewish or converso tenants, the disputes and litigation that arose out of the confusion over real estate ownership, and finally, the demographic evolution of the call.

31 ACA CR 1999: 101v-102r (November 23, 1395); AA 49: July 4, 1394; 2000: 185v-186r (February 16, 1392).
32 ACM Protocols Notarials 14767 (Tomas Clavell): June 28, 1406. Fabregues was beneficed in the former call (the document doesn’t clarify whether he resided there too), and there was at least one other cleric who lived there. King Joan granted a license to Pere Canta allowing him to possess a “certain hospice and garden, contiguous with a water channel from the city’s sequia, all of which had pertained to the former Jew Maymo Natjar,” which the merchant Guilelm Falgueres purchased from the converso procuradors in Pere’s name. At this time the house was bordered by houses of other Jews (ACA CR 1999: 55r, November 3, 1395). Pere needed a special license to live there because of a royal edict that prohibited clerics and knights from purchasing houses from the king.
33 ACA CR 2000: 142r-143v (December 20, 1395).
34 ACM Protocols Notarials 14767 (Tomas Clavell): June 28, 1406.
In the midst of this upheaval and confusion, King Joan still harbored hopes of renewing an *aljama* on the island. His hopes waned, however, with the physical and demographic changes within the Jewish quarter after 1391. His treatment of the Jewish cemetery (which did not number among the assets ceded to Berenguer de Cortilles) over the remainder of his reign reflects his conflicting interests and ultimate discouragement. During the same period that the Jewish quarter was being dismantled, Joan ordered the cemetery to be sold, allocating revenues from its sale to pay for the services of a galley captain, Pere Fluniani.\(^{35}\) Although Joan promised, in September 1392, not to alienate the cemetery, by June 1393 he had changed his mind, claiming that he had given up his hopes of building a new *aljama*, since so many Jews had left the island.\(^{36}\) That Joan wrote this at around the same time he expected to lead a naval expedition to Sardinia may not have been a coincidence, although surely he was also enticed by the revenues that were being generated from auctions and other properties in the *call* at that time. Shortly thereafter the conversos protested the sale of the cemetery on the grounds that, being too poor to purchase their own cemetery, they had been using that of the former *aljama*. Joan did not seem to be concerned by the religious implications of conversos being buried in a Jewish cemetery, as the Spanish Inquisition would be a century later. On the contrary, he revoked the order to sell the Jewish cemetery so that the conversos might continue using it.\(^{37}\) Curiously, though, this was not the cemetery conversos were using a few years later. The 1399 will of the converso Gerau Tarragona indicated that he wished to be buried in a separate section of the Franciscan monastery’s cemetery, “where the conversos of Majorca are buried.”\(^{38}\) The monastery itself was conveniently located adjacent to the *call*, and also became a provisional site

\(^{35}\) ACA CR 1996: 116v-117r (June 8, 1393); 137v-138r (August 15, 1393).
\(^{36}\) ACA CR 1995: 135v (September 2, 1392); 1996: 116v-117r (June 8, 1393).
\(^{37}\) ACA CR 1996: 163r-v (September 16, 1393).
\(^{38}\) ACM *Protocols Notarials*, Pere Guiges, 14751: April 9, 1399.
for conversos to congregate after 1391 (formerly, they would have held community meetings in the synagogue). Meanwhile, it appears that Jews continued to be buried in the old cemetery at least until 1396, judging from Samuel Fazuati’s request, in his will, to be buried in the Jewish cemetery near the “torres llavaneres”—the same area as the main pre-1391 cemetery.\textsuperscript{39} We cannot know, based on the extant evidence, exactly when or why conversos began to use a separate cemetery, or for how long the Jews continued to use the old cemetery once the conversos stopped using it. Nevertheless, we can make some critical observations from this episode. First, that King Joan treated Jews and conversos as belonging to the same community for some time after 1391, baptisms notwithstanding, but that within five years there was an impetus for conversos to separate and publicly mark themselves as Christian. Secondly, we can discern how King Joan’s willingness to support Jews and conversos came into conflict with his own financial needs. In this case, he would have used the cemetery to pay Pere Fluniani, the captain of a royal galley that probably was part of the expedition intended to depart in June 1393 for Sardinia in order to quell the rebellions that broke out there the previous year. The expedition did not depart that summer, and one wonders if this played a role in Joan’s decision to allow the conversos to keep the cemetery.\textsuperscript{40}

**Comparisons with Barcelona and Valencia**

The dispossessing of the former *aljama* in Majorca and the dissolution of its *call* were paralleled, and preceded, in Barcelona and Valencia. Joan’s treatment of the Jewish quarters and

\textsuperscript{39} ACM Protocols Notarials, Pere Guiges, 14751: July 23, 1396. Chapter One includes a more extensive discussion of the location of the Jewish cemetery prior to 1391. King Joan’s letters demonstrate only that the conversos were still using the old Jewish cemetery in 1392-1393, and were using the Franciscan monastery in 1399, but we do not have information for the period in between. A few possible scenarios are that: conversos wanted, or needed, to distance themselves from Jews; there was some other impetus, any time between 1393 and 1399, to have conversos and Jews buried separately; King Joan or Martí decided to sell the Jewish cemetery between 1396 and 1399, and the documentation for this has not yet been found. It is also possible that Jews continued to use the old cemetery until 1435, when the entire Jewish community allegedly converted and Jews were banned from residing on the island.

\textsuperscript{40} Meyerson, *Jewish Renaissance*, 32-33.
aljamas in those cities, which were comparable to Majorca, provide some useful context. In all three cities he appropriated communal properties and ordered walls torn down to make the area continuous with the rest of the city. Even after these maneuvers, he continued to express a desire to reestablish an aljama in all these cities. His attempt at resurrecting the Barcelonan aljama was much more energetic than his efforts in Majorca, but in both cases, his overtures proved futile. Confiscating aljama assets was like pulling the rug out from under the feet of the remaining Jewish community, and with such weak foundations, his initiatives towards reestablishing a Jewish presence and aljama in these cities were not enough. The king did not realize how grave the situation was, or the repercussions that appropriating all the collective properties would have, and rather naively endeavored to reestablish the aljamas not long after dispossessing them.

In September 1392, Joan ordered the formal dissolution of the aljama of Barcelona. The walls of the call had already been dismantled and Christians were settling there. Only a few weeks later, however, he ordered the aljama to be re-established, albeit in a separate vicinity, returned to the Jews the cemetery which had been previously confiscated, and offered them various privileges and moratoria on their debts. A few months after that, in May 1393, he entrusted Hasdai Crescas with the settlement of sixty families from Saragossa and Calatayud in

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41 Joan ordered Valencia’s call closed in October 1392 (Hinojosa Montalvo, Jews of Valencia, No. 88). Some of the royal officials who participated in, and benefited from, the alienation of former aljama or Jewish property in Barcelona were the same officials who came to administer and appropriate aljama property in Majorca. For instance, Joan’s treasurer Jaume Pastor had been assigned to sell the houses of the call of Barcelona, and to ensure that Berenguer de Cortilles received the due that the king owed him from the Barcelonan aljama’s communal assets. Both of these officials were active in Majorca. Jaume Pastor was assigned to work with two other members of the royal treasury, Felip de Ferrera and Guillem de Busquets. Busquets had also been assigned to work in Majorca, but his absence from other documentation would suggest that he was not very active on a local level. In Barcelona, King Joan ceded two synagogues (the sinagoga mayor and a smaller one) to other royal councillors, a move that the three treasurers (Pastor, Busquets and Ferrera) initially had opposed—either because they thought the properties should go to the royal fisc, or because they wanted them for themselves. See María Cinta Mañé and Gemma Escribà, eds. The Jews in the Crown of Aragon: Regesta of the Cartas Reales in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón. Sources for the History of the Jews in Spain, vol. 5. (Jerusalem: Ginzei Am Olam Hispania Judaica, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1993), 251, No. 1224: ACA Cartas Reales, Juan I c.6 No.690 (January 17, 1393).
Barcelona, in the new, smaller, Jewish quarter, and authorized him to tax all the *aljamas* of the kingdom in order to raise 1,500 gold florins for reestablishing the *aljamas* of Barcelona and Valencia. The project was ultimately a failure. By 1395 the *aljama* of Barcelona was nonexistent, thanks in part to Christian opposition, and in 1401 Martí officially prohibited the existence of one in that city. King Joan’s plans to re-establish the *aljama* of Valencia were opposed by municipal councilors, who finally succeeded in having the existence of an *aljama* formally prohibited by Martí in 1397. Of the kingdom’s three major port cities, then, Majorca was the only one that retained a significant Jewish community into the fifteenth century, although it never regained its former institutional status as an *aljama*. The Crown managed to keep local Old Christian opposition at bay for some time after 1391, nullifying most of the concessions Majorca’s *jurats* had made to the *forans* in the wake of the revolt, including the latter’s demand that all Jews convert or die, which obviously would have precluded the existence of an *aljama* there. Ultimately, the *jurats* may have had a hand in orchestrating the conversion of the entire Jewish community in 1435, as it would have been advantageous for the municipality from a fiscal perspective. The curious absence of archival documentation about this event, however, leaves us only to imagine possible scenarios.

44 The sequence of events leading up to the mass conversions of 1435 is related in some detail by Vicenç Mut, in the *Historia General de Mallorca* (p. 384-390). Mut does not cite sources, but Gabriel Cortes believes that the story comes from a “memòria” of the period that had been kept in the episcopal court, subsequently copied by Benet Espanyol in his *Historia de la Santa Fide Catholica*, and which eventually reached the oratory of *Santa Fe* and the guild of skinners (*Historia de los judíos*, 95-96). Cortes may have been referring to the same account copied in the *Cronicon Mayoricense* (156-58), written by a contemporary of these events. Regarding the involvement of the jurats in Queen Maria’s 1436 ordinance against Jews living permanently on the island: Alvaro Santamaria writes that some time before 1416, the Consell sent an emissary to Queen Maria (who was King Alfonso’s lieutenant), who requested (and obtained) that she issue an ordinance forbidding any foreign Jews to settle on the island (i.e. who were not already living there). However, it is not clear if the ordinance was ever publicised. It was not totally observed, in any case, since in 1416 the Consell gave permission to a group of Jews from the kingdom of Tremecen, where they were persecuted, to settle in Majorca because it would serve the public good. In 1436, following the conversion of the Jewish community the previous year, the Consell successfully requested that the queen prohibit Jews from residing
The survival of a Jewish community in Majorca meant that Jews and conversos continued to live side by side, but neither King Joan nor King Martí seem to have been concerned about the opportunities these circumstances presented for conversos to Judaize. The monarchy’s understanding of Judaizing among Majorcan conversos thus differed from its approach in other peninsular cities such as Valencia, where, to cite one example, royal officials fined conversos for having Passover meals with their Jewish relatives. In Majorca, however, concerns about conversos associating with Jews and therefore being tempted to Judaize did not surface in royal correspondence until the reign of King Ferdnando I. Before then, anxieties about converso Judaizing almost always arose in connection to the phenomenon of emigration to North Africa. Majorca’s unique geography and the particularly close ties between its Jewish community and those of North Africa created a distinctive set of conditions for Judaizing, at least in the mind of the monarchy, but perhaps in the minds of all the parties concerned. Furthermore, in Majorca, whence Jews and conversos more commonly travelled across the Mediterranean than from other cities in the kingdom, the link between converso emigration and Judaizing provided a convenient justification for the Crown to confiscate the goods of conversos whose absences were prolonged or unlicensed.

King Joan’s intense drive to acquire converso and Jewish property was a product of his own indebtedness, and may have come at a much greater cost than he could have anticipated. The sources collected for this dissertation do not reveal much about how exiled conversos or their families still resident on the island were affected by the confiscation of their goods, but it would be worthwhile to investigate this theme in a subsequent study. The sources do afford us a deeper sense of the effect of the Crown’s confiscation of the aljama’s communal assets, which it

in Majorca for more than 15 days, or for any Jewish community or synagogue to exist there (Sobre la condicion de los conversos, 230-31).

45 Meyerson, Jewish Renaissance, 38.
justified by the “dissolution” of the *aljama*—in other words, because the former semi-autonomous institution and administrative framework ceased to exist, notwithstanding that Jews were still living on the island. The royal confiscation of collective assets that had been owned by the *aljamas* of Majorca, Barcelona and Valencia had a major impact on the fate of their Jewish communities, much more so than has thus far been acknowledged by historians.
Royal financiers and appropriation of aljama assets

In the aftermath of 1391, King Joan granted jurisdiction over collecting Jewish assets to certain financiers or counselors who were also his creditors, possibly, but not necessarily, as repayment for loans that were secured, directly or indirectly, on taxes anticipated from aljamas such as Barcelona and Majorca. The violence of 1391 would have dramatically reduced the amount of tax revenue which the remaining Jews could provide, and therefore invalidated the promise of such taxes as collateral. King Joan gave former aljama assets to these creditors either as a substitution for lost tax revenues, or simply to repay his debts to them. Placing these assets in the hands of his creditors, however, meant relinquishing much of his control and influence over the aljamas’ ability to recover from the devastation of 1391.

Berenguer de Cortilles, the Saragossan merchant and royal treasurer whom the king had commissioned to manage Jewish and converso revenues, was one such financier who also played a key role in Majorca’s political economy. Cortilles was deeply enmeshed in royal finances during the reigns of Joan and Martí. In September 1390, in two separate transactions, the jurats

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46 It was a common practice for the Crown to secure loans on revenues from aljamas. For instance, in 1393 Joan and Violant sold a censal mort of 87,000 Barcelonan sous to “Luquino Scarampi, merchant of Asti,” and of 34,000 sous to Fransisco Dende, merchant of San Mateu, "ad rationem 11,000 solidos pro millenario" to be collected annually for the next three years in Barcelona, three times a year: on the feast of St. John in June, on the feast of All Saints and on the feast of Mary in February. The money was to be collected from the revenues from the kingdom of Majorca, while the censals were secured against various aljamas on the peninsula, including Morvedre, outside Valencia (ACA CR 1998: 15v-20v, December 12, 1393).

47 By 1390, Berenguer de Cortilles is cited as Queen Violant’s treasurer (Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, “Un aragonés consejero de Juan I y de Martín el Humano: Francisco de Aranda,” Aragón en la Edad Media 14-15 (1999): 531-562). In a royal letter instructing the sale of the Jewish cemetery to be supervised by Berenguer, King Joan refers to him as “of the queen’s treasury” as well as a royal administrator of the aljama (ACA CR 1996: 116v-117r, June 8, 1393).


In “Els deutes del rei Joan I,” Lopez claims that Berenguer de Cortilles was a converso, formerly called Bellshoms Caracosa. He bases this claim on a pregón published in BSAL XI: 294 calling for the declaration of all goods owned by Violant, conversa, who had been the wife [lit. “muller que fon’”] of Berenguer de Cortilles, converso, formerly Bellshoms Caracosa. The text does not indicate why the past tense is used and neither she nor he
of Majorca loaned King Joan a total of 11,500 florins payable to Berenguer, who must have already advanced the money to the king. In order to raise the funds to pay Berenguer, the municipality sold censals and imposed new taxes. Berenguer also rented, or farmed, the royal mint in Majorca from 1390 to 1395; the jurats used his payments for the mint to cover the annuities of the public censals issued in 1390. Majorca’s indebtedness to Cortilles at this point was only part of a worsening situation. Within two years, anticipating a Sardinian expedition in 1393, the king requested additional funds from the procurador reial and the jurats. These funds would have been in addition, it seems, to the 100,000 pounds Cortilles had committed to raise, also in 1392, for the projected expedition. The municipality had to sell more censals in 1392 to pay annuities owing on the existing public debt, and obtained royal permission to impose new taxes; by 1394 the jurats had to send a delegation to Barcelona to sell another fifteen thousand pounds’ worth of censals. Needless to say, the 1391 revolt held negative repercussions for the city’s and island’s financial situation, even though the king forced the jurats to reinstate the taxes they had abolished as one of the conditions of their truce with the rebels. The revolt possibly had

49 Lopez i Bonet, “Els deutes del rei Joan I,” and “La revolta de 1391. Efectivament, crisi social,” XIII congrès d’historia de la Corona d’Aragó: I, Comunicacions (Palma de Mallorca, 1989): 111-23, esp. p.112. The exact amount was 15,353.55 Majorcan pounds or 11,544.02 Barcelona pounds (“Els deutes del rei Joan I,” 106). I am giving the reader only a fraction of the picture of the public debt Majorca incurred on behalf of Joan I. López i Bonet offers a very useful outline of this in "Els deutes del rei Joan I.”
a negative impact, too, on the jurats’ ability to repay Cortilles. Whether it was to compensate Cortilles for losses incurred as a result of the revolt, or because the monarchy was so deeply indebted to him, King Joan virtually had no choice but to transfer to Cortilles, and to other creditors, whatever revenue he could get a hold of after 1391. This included valuable real estate as well as other assets that had been corporately owned by former aljamas. No wonder, then, that King Joan granted Cortilles much of the royal revenues coming from the island’s Jews and conversos (through the donatio or confiscations of exiles’ assets), as well as revenues from the fines levied from rebels for their participation in the 1391 violence.

The primary motive of tax farmers, or “councilor-creditors” such as Cortilles after 1391 was to recover their investments and reap the profits. They did not share the royal interest in reestablishing an aljama. By virtue of his debt to them, however, Joan’s hands were tied in terms of what he could do, fiscally, to promote a new aljama. One might go so far as to conjecture that Joan’s primary motive in dissolving the aljamas so soon after the revolts was precisely to be able to use their assets to pay his debts. Dissolving certain aljamas was therefore critical to the liquidation of royal debts, and the declining Jewish population, together with the opposition of local old Christians to the existence of an aljama in their cities, only added justification to his actions. He especially needed to preserve the loyalties of municipal councilors and creditors. Nevertheless, after these debts were settled and the initial shock of the revolt was absorbed, Joan could return his attention to recreating the aljama – but it was too late. It was too difficult once

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51 ACA CR 1996: 36v-37r (November 8, 1392).
52 In the years following the violence, Berenguer de Cortilles, together with Jaume Pastor – the officials in control of the converso and Jewish property which pertained to the Crown— were both identified as royal treasurers. and service to the royal treasury often went hand in hand with tax farming.
53 I have not yet encountered documents that explicitly confirm this hypothesis. To do so I would need to investigate registers at the ACA outside of the Maioricarum series, which I did not do for this dissertation (other than published works), to see if there is any documentation of loans made to Joan by Jaume Pastor or Berenguer de Cortilles that he promised to repay by transferring the rights to revenues of Jewish aljamas as annuity payments.
the community had been stripped of its former communal institutions and lost its most powerful families to conversion or exile.

**Joan’s support of the Jews of Majorca**

It was only after his failed attempts to restore the *aljamas* of Barcelona and Valencia that Joan turned his attention to Majorca. In comparison, his efforts seem muted, since they were primarily aimed at boosting the Jewish population as opposed to reestablishing the organizational structure of an *aljama* per se. It did not help that Majorca’s Jews lacked the kind of influence at the royal court possessed by the likes of Hasdai Crescas, of Saragossa. In Majorca, most of the Jews who had been familiars of the king, if they had not fled the island, converted, and thus lobbied first and foremost in the interest of the conversos, such as the renowned mapmaker Jafuda Creques who took the Christian name Jaume Ribes after his baptism. In his defense, King Joan may have learned from his unsuccessful efforts in the peninsula that building a strong demographic foundation was a critical first step. Thus, in 1394, Joan facilitated the immigration of 150 Portuguese Jews. Two representatives of these Jews appeared before the governor in the spring of 1395, presenting a royal letter which stated that they should be treated well and be given a separate place in the city to live, and requested permission to build a synagogue.\(^{54}\)

Curiously, the Portuguese Jews disappear from official correspondence after this, so it is not clear if they remained in the *Ciutat*, or if they ever built themselves a synagogue.\(^ {55}\) If they did,

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\(^{54}\) ARM AH G5: 69r (March 26, 1395).

\(^{55}\) One other reference to Portuguese Jews appears in a licence issued by the governor on November 9, 1394 to Carla and Menahem Uxqui, Portuguese Jews, to go to Venice on a Venetian ship (ARM AH G5: 57v). They seem to share the same surname as Samuel Usque, the Portuguese converso poet who resided in Ferrara before he moved to Safed, who was known for his work, “*Consolaçam as Tribulaçoes de Ysrael*” (Ferrara, 1553). Given the virtual absence of documentary references to Portuguese Jews in Majorca during this period, perhaps they only used the island as a stopover from which to immigrate to Italy. On Portuguese Jewry in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see Maria Pimenta Ferro Tavares, *Os judeus em Portugal no século XIV* (Lisboa: Guimarães, 1979); ibid. *Os judeus em Portugal no século XV* (Lisboa: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, 1982); François Soyer, *The Persecution of the Jews and Muslims of Portugal: King Manuel I and the End of Religious Tolerance (1496-7)* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007). Mark Meyerson portrays Portuguese Jews dealing with Jews and
either it was not completed, or it was not shared by native Majorcan Jews at the time that Samuel Fazuati bequeathed 20 sous to “the synagogue of the Jews of Majorca, located in the corral d’en Bonaich,” in 1396.56

**King Joan’s Guiatge of 1395**

Joan endeavored to lure additional Jewish immigrants to the island by offering commercial and legal incentives. The five-year *guiatge* he issued at the end of his Majorcan visit in 1395 granted immunity from any litigation or financial obligations to Jews who came “to live and trade” in Majorca from other parts of the Crown of Aragon, or from any other kingdom, and it encouraged Jews to import any kinds of goods, money or merchandise.57 It even welcomed the return of Jews who had fled to Muslim lands after the violence. The relevance of this *guiatge* is apparent from subsequent letters of appeal to the king, in which Jews successfully cited it as grounds for discounting various financial claims levied against them. In addition to increasing the island’s Jewish population, presumably for the sake of reestablishing an *aljama*, this *guiatge* also was meant to stimulate the North African trade in which Jews had been so prominent.

Whether or not this trade actually suffered as a result of the emigration of Jewish and converso merchants has been a subject of modern scholarly debate, but at the time, both Kings Joan and Martí expressed anxiety over the possibility that it would. Given the importance of mobility to maritime trade, King Joan made this provision for Jewish residents to travel freely. In a sense, it

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56 ACM Protocols Notarials, Pere Guiges, 14751: July 23, 1396 (Testament of Samuel Fazuati).
57 ACA 1910: 151v. (October 17, 1395); Published in Baer, *Die Juden*, 724-726, No. 461. In his transcription, Baer omits the clause stipulating that the *guiatge* would be in effect for five years. This letter is reproduced *verbatim* in Martí’s confirmation of it: ACA CR 2264: 7r-8v (July 19, 1397). Joan’s October letter refers to an earlier *guiatge* with similar contents that was issued by the governor of Majorca on July 27, 1395, and mentions that a copy of it had been requested by the conversos and their creditors but does not state why. Perhaps Jews, or those who had recently immigrated, were citing these *guiatges* to exempt themselves from having to pay the debt-tax.
was a risky concession, since there was little effective impediment to their emigration, but Joan had already made similar concessions to Jews following the revolt, and could do so more easily since their potential exile did not carry the same implications of heresy as the conversos’ did. The risk was therefore a calculated one, especially when attracting foreign merchants and merchandise promised additional revenues from import-export duties, and the guiatge stated unequivocally that all imports and exports would be subject to the customary taxes.

**King Martí’s support of Jews and conversos**

King Joan died the year after he issued the guiatge, but Martí continued to promote a Jewish presence on the island, confirming and defending Joan’s protections and the 1395 guiatge. The legal immunity granted to Jewish residents of Majorca by the guiatge meant that they could put off repaying their debts for at least five years or, if litigation ensued, even longer, which probably came at a great cost to some of their creditors. For instance, in 1397 the heirs of the draper Ramon Colom petitioned the bailiff of the Ciutat to seize textiles and other merchandise that certain Jews had imported from the Maghreb as payment for debts which those Jews owed them from certain rental properties. The royal fiscal procurator intervened, however, and annulled the sequestration because the goods had been imported “under the safeguard of the guiatge conceded to the Jews by King Joan.” When Ramon’s heirs appealed to the king, they must have been disappointed with his response that the “freedoms, privileges and provisions” which they had cited in their defense would not counteract the guiatge, which was conceded “for the conservation of royal revenues which have suffered a great deterioration on

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58 Martí confirmed the guiatge on July 19, 1397 according to ACA CR 2264: 135v-136v (August 20, 1397).
59 ACA CR 2264: 135v-136v (August 20, 1397). The meaning of this clause in the Latin text is not clear: “…ratione certe quantitatis pecuniae quam dicti heredes pretendunt eis fore debitam nedum ratione census sed etiam ratione proprietatis ipsius census…” I have interpreted this as, “on account of certain amounts of money which the heirs claim to be owed to them not so much from rent but also because of the property of that rent…”. Perhaps the Jews had defaulted in past rent payments, and possibly also damaged, altered, or even alienated the property in such a way that its owners were seeking compensation related to the property itself.
account of the most savage destruction of the aljama…as everyone knows.” Martí reiterated to his officials that they must strictly observe the guiatge, issued for the protection of the Jews “and their merchandise or textiles,” and that they should not allow their trade to be threatened in any way.

While royal aspirations to reestablish the aljamas of all three port cities cannot be separated from their potentiality as a dependable source of tax revenue, the unique commercial potential of Majorcan Jews was another key consideration. The theme of trade looms large in the royal correspondence regarding Majorca’s Jews and conversos, just as it had with its aljama before 1391, in part because trade was considered to be so vital to the economic well-being of these communities, as well as the city, the island, and the Crown of Aragon. Even if popular perceptions exaggerated the extent to which the two communities were composed of maritime merchants, promoting the North African trade would have stimulated other corollary sectors. For instance, some Majorcan Jews (and later conversos) collected oil, wine, or wool from rural areas, and then sold these products to urban merchants who exported them to the Maghreb. Jewish, converso and Christian tailors might have benefited from the international textile trade, and shoemakers benefited from the trade in leather. No doubt, Old Christian merchants benefited, too, from mercantile associations forged by Jews and conversos across the Mediterranean, although surely there were others who resented the competition.

There were other reasons to promote these commercial relations with the Maghreb, which extended beyond local concerns. Majorca’s economy was, like the rest of the Crown of Aragon, suffering a decline during this period. Preserving the island’s commercial relationship with North

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60 “…declaramus dictas franquesias privilegia seu provisiones per dictos iurator<es> producta et specialter atque signanter capitulum(?) curiarum Montessioni locum non habere adversus guidaticum supradictum seu concessione ipsius quod factum et concessum dictis Judeis extitit proprio quidem motu principis et pro conservatione regaliarum et iurium regiorum que propter destructionem sevissimam aljamarum judeorum ciutatis et insule predictarum deteriorationem susceperunt enormem…” (ACA CR 2264: 135v-136v, August 20, 1397).
Africa meant preserving the commercial networks of Jews and conversos who were major players in this trade. Modern historians, too, have argued that the Majorcan economy suffered a downturn immediately after, and as a result of, the 1391 revolt, and see royal efforts to revive a Jewish presence on the island and to prevent the exodus of Jews and conversos as a response to this problem in particular. López Pérez suggests, on the contrary—and quite rightly—that Majorca’s economic downturn was part of a more widespread, secular economic decline. According to Álvaro Santamaría, this crisis culminated around 1387-1405, and was not a direct consequence of the emigrations and other interruptions in trade resulting from the revolt. Even so, it would be difficult to imagine how these factors would not have aggravated the situation. Jewish and convoerso merchants suffered setbacks as a result of the restrictions on maritime travel, not to mention thefts of merchandise during the revolt itself or as a result of the piracy at sea which continued for many years afterwards. Restrictive royal policies and piracy would have also affected Maghrebi Jews, and the unstable situation in Majorca likely deterred them from trading there for some time. Rabbinic responsa allude to the increasing piracy carried out by Catalans at Maghrebi ports (Chapter Two cited one example of Maghrebi Jews attacked by Majorcan pirates), and other commercial losses due to early travel restrictions. Rabbi Simon ben Zemah Duran wrote of a Jew from Mostaganem who lost money because he had sent merchandise to his salaried agent to sell in Spain, but since the latter could not travel there, he had to sell the goods at a loss in North Africa. The Crown would have suffered a loss as well, since fewer imports meant less customs duties. Kings Joan and Martí sought to obviate such losses with the guiatge, and it may have been partly owing to their concessions and safe-

61 For instance, Pièrre Macaire, Majorque et le commerce internationale, 73-75.
62 Lópe Pérez, Corona de Aragón, 336-337. She also discusses the centrality of Majorcan and Maghriban Jews to Majorca’s trade in the early fifteenth century, p. 368.
63 Eleazar Gutwirth, “comercio hispano-magrebi,” 205.
conducts that Jews and conversos continued to be actively involved in trade between North Africa, Majorca and Valencia, as Duran’s responsa ultimately demonstrate.\(^{64}\)

In light of the continuing participation of Jews and conversos in the Maghrebian trade, López Pérez claims that in the long term the conversions and emigrations of 1391 “no implicaron la desaparición de la comunidad hebraica mallorquina.”\(^{65}\) Elsewhere, she and other scholars hastily equate the presence of a commercially active Jewish “community” on the island with an *aljama*. Scholars seem to interpret royal initiatives to re-establish the *aljama* as a fait accompli based on the various protections and privileges extended to Jews who resided in Majorca, as well as the two known references to Portuguese Jewish immigrants, although there is no evidence to suggest that the latter settled on the island in the long term. Macaire writes that even though “le ghetto de Barcelone disparaît totalement, celui de Majorque renaît de ses cendres.”\(^{66}\) Contrary to Macaire’s assertion, none of the aforementioned factors necessarily entail the resurrection of an *aljama per se*. Royal concessions may have indeed attracted Jews to remain in, or immigrate to Majorca for the economic advantages they offered, but the presence of a somewhat itinerant group of successful Jewish merchants does not mean they organized themselves to form a single political body which the Crown could tax as an *aljama*.\(^{67}\)

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\(^{64}\) This picture is confirmed by the unpublished work of Martin Elbl, who has argued, based upon the Datini archives, that Jews and conversos continued to trade just as frequently after 1391. An interesting reference in one of Duran’s responsa which touches upon the connection between Majorca, the Magreb and Valencia is to Jewish women who immigrated to the Magreb from Majorca and used a certain substance called “*calida*” in their hair (this may refer to the warm colours of henna) which was imported from Valencia (Gutwirth, 206).

\(^{65}\) López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón*, 345. Cf. Ibid, “El pogrom de 1391 en Mallorca y su repercusión en los intercambios comerciales con el Magreb,” *Actes: I colloqui d’història dels jueus a la Corona d’Aragó* (Leida, 1991), 239-60. Based on his impressive study of evidence from the Datini archive, Martin Elbl has argued similarly that the sustained commercial activity of a number of Majorcan Jews in the early fifteenth century attests to a thriving Jewish community at this time.

\(^{66}\) Macaire, *Majorque et le commerce internationale*, 74

\(^{67}\) The surest way to resolve this argument is to look for tax revenues coming from Jews of Majorca and in what form, but I have not been able to conduct this research yet. Another important factor is that in my research I found much fewer references to Jews in notarial documents than conversos. This could be a result of a lacuna in the sources, but could also point to a significant reduction in the Jewish population, one which did not support the creation of an *aljama*. In fact Jews are much less frequently mentioned in the royal correspondence as well.
International trade presented alternative opportunities for taxing Jews and conversos, however. The royal fisc collected customs duties on foreign imports. Registers of the *lleuda*, an import-export tax levied on the merchandise of foreign merchants, confirm that Majorcan Jewish and converso merchants did in fact pay substantial commercial taxes to the Crown at the beginning of the fifteenth century.\(^{68}\) Considering that prior to 1391 Jewish residents of Majorca were exempt from paying the *lleuda*, this data calls for further explanation. López Pérez speculates that the Crown began to charge this tax in exchange for its protection, analogous, we might say, to Joan collecting the *donatio* in order to compensate for lost revenues. Although this hypothesis is sensible, it is undermined by the fact that some Jews and conversos contested being charged the *lleuda* on the basis of past custom, and were successful. The ensuing discussion shall suggest instead that the *lleuda* tax began to be collected from local Jews and conversos as a result of the way in which Joan’s 1395 *guiatge* was interpreted, as opposed to any new royal directive. In any event, ironing out the details of commercial taxation lies outside the scope of this dissertation, but Martí’s correspondence regarding the *lleuda* is pertinent because it reflects his defense and support of Jewish and converso merchants.

In keeping with his policy of encouraging maritime trade, King Marti demonstrated a keen interest in the efficient collection of commercial taxes, much more so than King Joan did (or could afford). Promoting trade was more directly profitable for the Crown if commercial taxes were collected efficiently. This meant working on two fronts, suppressing tax fraud against the Crown at the same time as curbing the unjust taxation or harassment of merchants. Indeed, tax evasion among merchants engaged in foreign trade was, and always had been, a concern. In

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\(^{68}\) The extant *lleuda* registers date from 1407 (López Pérez, *La Corona de Aragón*, 342-44; for the taxes imposed on North African Jews and Muslims see 357-384). Chapter One provides a more in-depth discussion of commercial taxes before 1391. The Majorcan *lleuda* registers are only extant for certain periods in the fourteenth century, and the very beginning of the fifteenth. López Pérez found that occasionally the *lleuda* was levied on exports, but mostly on imports. The rate of the *lleuda* generally went up to 1 or 2 diners per pound of cargo.
1399 Martí sent a stern letter to Majorca complaining that Old Christians as well as conversos were committing tax fraud by exporting, for personal profit, merchandise which Jews and Muslims had sent to them from the Maghreb without paying the applicable taxes.⁶⁹ He ordered that “all natural Christian and converso merchants who deal in any way with Saracens or Jews dwelling in Majorca now, or around the time when the juderia was destroyed, commending to them their merchandise or anything else, must fully pay the tax which the Saracens or Jews from Barbary were accustomed to pay before the destruction of the juderias.”⁷⁰ He was only reiterating standard requirements, which were also stipulated by King Joan when he invited Maghrebi Jews to live in Majorca under the protection of his guiatge in 1395, namely that they had to pay the customary “vicesimum” or “quadragesimum” (versions of the lleuda) on certain imports and exports.⁷¹ Jews who had immigrated to Majorca around the time of Joan’s guiatge were considering themselves to be exempt from the lleuda as other locals always had been.⁷²

While fraud had always been a common occurrence, it is possible that after residing in Majorca for some time, locals came to view (or could rationalize) those Jews as being exempt from these taxes, as normal citizens would have been.⁷³ Clearly, Martí did not intend for “recent” immigrants to the island to be exempt from commercial taxes. In some cases, Maghrebi Jews and Muslims would have acted as middlemen, transporting merchandise on behalf of Old and New Christian merchants to and from their contacts in North Africa, and the Majorcan merchants who

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⁶⁹ ACA CR 2264:142r-v (August 20, 1399). In other words, Majorca functioned as an entrepot where local Christian and converso merchants were distributing goods across the Mediterranean that they imported from North Africa without paying the taxes owed on their importation. For instance, based on extensive research in the Datini archives, Martin Elbl has shown that conversos were very active in importing goods from Barbary and sending them to various agents across the Mediterranean.

⁷⁰ Ibid.


⁷² López Pérez cites a 1325 royal privilege that granted aljama members rights to citizenship, by virtue of which they would have been exempt from paying the lleuda (La Corona de Aragón, 342).

⁷³ López Pérez discusses different forms of tax evasion.
conducted these transactions likely did not consider them subject to the *lleuda*. Martí thus added the provision that the Christian merchants would be exempt from this tax if they had been formally associated with their Jewish and Muslim partners through companies that had been approved by the royal procurator and recorded in the *lleuda* register or *tabula lezdo*.

Subsequently, royal officials may have interpreted Joan’s 1395 *guiatge* to mean that no Jews residing in Majorca would be exempt from these taxes, even though prior to 1391 Majorcan Jews indeed *had* been. Although it may not have been the king’s initial intention, long-term Jewish residents of Majorca got lumped in with those required by the *guiatge* to pay the tax—an outcome which they were quick to contest. When petitioned regarding this matter, Martí did distinguish between recent Jewish immigrants and local families who had been residents of Majorca long before 1391. Martí received complaints from the heirs of the Jewish merchant, Issac Cofen, because they were being charged the *vintè* and *quarantè* on merchandise which they held in the city of Majorca or in the Maghreb, where they conducted much of their trade. They claimed that this was unjust since the king’s subjects, including Jews, traditionally had been

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74 ACA CR 2264:142r-v (August 20, 1399). Martí was referring to the *lleuda* which, as López Pérez explains, was a customs tax traditionally levied on the merchandise of foreign merchants, including Maghriban Jews, valued at 1 to 2 *diners* per pound. She also writes that Maghriban Jews and Muslims were required to pay the *deè*, *vintè* and *quarantè* taxes, but does not indicate the relationship of these taxes to the *lleuda*. It is not clear whether the latter taxes were alternate forms of the *lleuda*, in which case the *lleuda* would have been a general term used for different kinds of customs dues, or whether Maghriban merchants were charged *deè*, *vintè* or *quarantè* on specific items *in addition to the lleuda*. Only one of these was charged on any given item. Whether the merchant paid the *deè*, *vintè* or *quarantè* depended on specific type of goods they were transporting, and also varied with the time period. López Pérez writes that the *lleuda* which Jews and conversos would have been paying in the early fifteenth century (Majorcan Jews would have been exempt prior to 1391) in Majorca would have been the equivalent of between 1 to 2 *diners* per pound (4 to 8% of the cargo’s value (*La Corona de Aragón*, 343). This is clearly distinct from the *deè*, *vintè* and *quarantè* (between 2.5% and 10%) (Ibid., 355-367). When listing the commercial taxes of Valencia in *Les finances de la corona d’Aragó al segle XV*, Winfried Küchler distinguishes between the “*lleuda*” as an import-export tax, and the “*dret appelat vinte de les mercaderies que porten los juheus qui venen de altres parts fora la senyoria del senyor rey ...” (Ibid., 47-48). In other words, according to Küchler, Jewish subjects of the Crown of Aragon would not have been required to pay the *lleuda* or *vintè*. That Jews were exempt from the *vicesimum* and *quadragesimum* prior to 1391 is assuming that the *vicesimum* and *quadragesimum* were comparable to, or subsets of the *lleuda*, which is suggested by reference to the *lleuda* accounts (Ibid., 342-44).

75 López Pérez cites a 1325 royal privilege that granted *aljama* members rights to citizenship, by virtue of which they would have been exempt from paying the *lleuda* (Ibid., 342).

76 ACA CR 2266:104v-105v (July 12, 1402; cites letter of May 26, 1399). The document does not indicate whether or not the heirs had converted. It most likely would have indicated if they had.
exempt from paying these taxes, and that their family had never paid them because they had always been residents of either Majorca or Valencia. Martí ruled in their favour, instructing his officials not to tax them for the *vicesimum* and *quadresimum* required of North African merchants, or of Jews who had returned to Majorca after living for a while in North Africa after 1391, as per Joan’s 1395 privilege.

The members of the Cofen family were not the only ones who protested unfair or illegal tax demands from royal officials. In 1405 Pere Pardo, an upwardly mobile converso merchant who would come to dominate the Majorcan commercial scene in the coming decades, petitioned the king regarding lleuda officials who regularly attempted to collect the “*decimam*” on cloth and other merchandise which he had acquired through his agents or other contacts in the Maghreb. Although the majority of his contacts were Maghrebi Jews and Muslims from whom he had purchased or to whom he had entrusted merchandise, the implication here is that they were associated with his company and therefore he should not have been paying tax on goods acquired from them. Pere thus argued that this was an unjust tax demand, “since the king’s subjects should not pay the *decimam*,” the payment of which resulted in “a great expense” to him. Martí conceded that neither Pere nor his associates would have to pay the *deè*, but made clear that if any fraud were to be discovered in his business dealings he would not only have to

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77 For a discussion of the background of the Pardo family see Mariano Gual de Torella, “El supuesto origen judío de los Pardos,” *BSAL* 33 (1971): 179-193. He suggests that at the turn of the fifteenth century, Pere Pardo was in fact of noble Aragonese descent, and that the famous converso merchant who dominates the notarial registers of Antoni Contesti was Perot Pardo, simply a “*coredor d’orella*.” I disagree with his conclusions, and would argue on the basis of various documents that the Pere Pardo who became one of the leading merchants in the Maghrebi trade was in fact a converso who immigrated from Valencia at the end of the fourteenth century. See ACM Prot. Not. Juan Clavell 14670: 148r-v (August 17, 1397), which identifies him as a Valencian converso merchant previously named Astruch Passarell; ARM AH G5: 89v (November 29, 1395) is a license for Pere Pardo, converso of Valencia; formerly Bon*astruch* Pa*ssarell* to go to Oran (it is difficult to determine whether the Jewish name is the same as in the previous document); ARM AH G5: 112r, May 17, 1395, is a license for a ship captain to take the converso Pere Pardo to Valencia; ACA CR 2263: 76r, November 15, 1397 identifies Pere Pardo as one of the Majorcan converso merchant partners petitioning the king about demands for guarantors when they wanted to charter ships for their merchandise.

78 ACA CR 2267:155 r-v (October 2, 1405).
pay the tax but also a fine. An addendum to this letter in the register indicates that a similar judgment was issued for another converso merchant, Ferrar Bertran, of Barcelona.

King Martí’s 1399 letter concerning tax fraud appears to have achieved greater, or even excessive, diligence in tax collection. Yet the complaints voiced by prominent merchants such as Pere Pardo, or the Cofens, raise the question of whether royal officials were deliberately “harassing” Jews and conversos with illicit tax demands, trying to extort money from them, or whether these cases were a product of “reasonable” human error. In defense of the tax collectors, there were enough reasons to believe that the supplicants did in fact legitimately owe taxes. First, these merchants regularly traded in North Africa with partners who were Jewish or Muslim, and information about the origins of their business contacts would have been communicated among the local merchant community. Second, given Joan’s 1395 privilege, confirmed by Martí in 1397, there could have been native Majorcan Jewish merchants who fled the kingdom after 1391, lived in North Africa, and only recently returned to live in Majorca under the protection of Joan’s guiatge. It may have been difficult for royal officials to distinguish between these Jews, who were required by Joan’s 1395 stipulation to pay the quarantè and vintè, and other Jews who had lived as residents in the Crown of Aragon without interruption, especially if the latter had been moving back and forth between Majorca and other cities like Valencia, as many did. Furthermore, given the reports of fraud circulating amongst royal officials, any Majorcan Jew or converso trading in North Africa could have set off a red flag. Notwithstanding this understandable potential for officials to confuse those subject to customs taxes with those exempt, if taxes like the vintè and quarantè were farmed out, as taxes often were, it might have been tempting for the tax farmers to extract what they could from merchants who merely “fit the bill” under any of these pretexts, even if in reality those merchants should have been exempt.
Alternatively, corrupt officials might have imposed taxes where none were owed in order to pocket them.

For his part, King Martí was quick to condemn any unfair behaviour of officials that could discourage Jews or conversos from trading in his kingdom. He made this concern explicit in a letter condemning unfair tax demands by the bailiff general of the kingdom of Valencia, when he wrote to him that, “if the Jewish merchants sending their merchandise to the said kingdom suffer vexations from [the bailiff] or other officials, they might cease from transporting this merchandise altogether.” The king was referring to reports from Mateu de Llosch that, “some Jews dwelling in Barbary, under the guiatge conceded by Joan…have been sending merchandise… from Barbary to some merchants trading in the city of Valencia, who [in turn] send them to certain Jewish merchants living in the city of Majorca, in order to be sold there by them.” In one case, when the bailiff of Valencia realized this merchandise had not been declared to him, he confiscated it and demanded eighty florins for its redemption. Martí condemned the bailiff’s actions and reminded him that the guiatge granted these Jewish merchants the freedom to sell the goods wherever and to whomever they wished, and could not be forced to sell their merchandise within the kingdom. Merchants had to declare their shipment to the bailiff, but the tax only had to be paid in the place where, and by those to whom, the merchandise was sold.

79 Ibid. “Cum si judeis mercatoribus ad predictum regnum suas merces et res deferentibus seu transmitentibus hiisdem inferantur per vos ac alios nostros oficiales vexationes ab ipsis transmittendis mercibus cessabunt omnino.”
80 ACA CR 2264: 139v-140r (August 20, 1399).
81 Ibid. I am including part of the Latin text here for further detail: “Est tamen noster intentio atque volumus quod illi quibus dirigentur raupe merces res et bona predicta vobis teneantur et habeant denuntiare eidem sed quod tantummodo in loco seu locis ubi vendetur ius inde debitum atque pertinens persolvatur [...] Propterea predictis et aliis quibusvis vexationibus dictorum Judeorum obviare et utilitati dicte Regie procurationis Maioricarum consulere salubriter cupientes presenti serie declaramus nostram intentione existere quod per vos dictum baiulum generalem Regni Valentie aut alios nostri oficiales de suo per aliquibus mercibus rebus seu bonis que per dictos Judeos de partibus barbarie per viam Valentie aut alios partes nostri domini ad predictum Maioricarum Regnum deferentur
Martí’s categorical defense of the Jewish merchants in this case is noteworthy, considering that their actions do resemble a tactic to avoid paying the *lleuda*: when the Valencian merchants sold the merchandise in Majorca, they might have claimed exemption from the *lleuda* as citizens of the kingdom, without declaring that the merchandise was originally imported by North African Jews, who *would* have been subject to the customs tax. No wonder, then, that on the same day he reprimanded the bailiff—August 20, 1399—the king also wrote the aforementioned letter in which he reiterated the tax obligations of Majorcan Christian merchants trading with Maghrebi Jews and Muslims, condemning the fraud that allegedly had been going on in this regard.\(^{82}\) The two letters can be viewed as complementary components of the same policy. Martí wanted to make sure taxes were being collected efficiently and in accordance with the laws and customs of the Crown of Aragon, but simultaneously wanted to avoid any excesses that might deter Jewish or converso merchants from trading in his kingdom. He understood that their presence in his kingdom, and therefore their economic contribution, was more precarious in the post-1391 context. He also understood that economic well-being was key to their continued presence in Majorca. What often kept them there was their livelihood; the more they had invested in business and properties on the island, the less likely they were to leave. Conversely, they would have had little incentive to stay if flight seemed a viable solution to economic troubles, and if there was little hope for future financial success. This sort of mercantilist policy is reflected in another letter, where Martí made the telling comment that he wished to protect the converso Pere Segura, whom “fortune had treated harshly,” from being incarcerated on account

\[^{82}\text{That the two letters appear together in the register suggests the matters were dealt with together.}\]
of his debts, “lest otherwise it suit him to leave the kingdom of Majorca and lament his life elsewhere in misery.”

**Poverty of conversos and fiscal protections**

The example of Pere Segura brings us to another way in which the monarchy could mitigate certain hardships arising from the financial difficulties conversos suffered after 1391. Segura had solicited the king’s protection against being thrown into jail on account of his debts; and he expressed concern, too, that should he be imprisoned, he would not be released until all his debts were paid off (presumably he could not afford to liquidate them all). King Martí, like King Joan in such cases, granted Segura royal protection on the condition that he first cede his goods to pay back what debts he could.

Both kings granted protections to individual converso supplicants fearing incarceration as a result of debts they had trouble paying as a result of the “destruction of the call of Majorca.” Individually and collectively, conversos pleaded with the king to prevent them from being jailed, and requested extra time to sell their possessions in order to repay their debts. Most of these petitions occur in the first years after the revolt, during the reign of King Joan, who was more restrained in his responses than Martí was towards Segura. King Joan did not technically protect the debtors from ending up in jail, but did ensure that they would not be detained further once they had sold their possessions.

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83 ACA CR Carpeta 5, No.520 (January 4, 1403): “…sibi novercante fortuna…Dignaremur eidem super hoc subvenire de remedio condecenti ne aliter ipsum oppor teat predictum Maioricarum deferere Regnum et alibi querere miserabiliter vitam suam.”
84 Ibid.
85 ACA CR 1996: 172r (October 28, 1393). The text may be summarized as follows: “The messengers of the conversos beseech the king, explaining that because of the attack on the call they have been brought to such poverty that they cannot pay their creditors, and must resort to the lamentable remedy of ceding their goods. They fear lest the governor imprison them before they get a chance to cede their goods. The king therefore orders that once the conversos cede their goods to pay back their creditors, they cannot be seized or incarcerated in any way.”
Some conversos who had been wealthy Jews before the attack were, indeed, jailed by their creditors. The converso Master Pere Moya, formerly Mosse bon Juha, a physician, was jailed for not paying his debts to Joan de Moya, the same apothecary and aljama creditor who, around the same time, levied charges against Jaume des Puig. As a physician, Master Mosse probably had a close business relationship with Joan De Moya, who might have supplied him with the remedies he used for his patients. Their relationship may have been personal too, considering their common Christian surname; Joan de Moya may have been present as a godfather at Mosse’s conversion. Having the apothecary as his godfather would be a plausible scenario if Mosse had been one of the Jews who took shelter in the royal castle during the revolt and subsequently converted there, and if Joan de Moya was one of the citizens besieged in the castle during that time, too. Pere Moya claimed that “he had become a debtor…owing great amounts of money” to Joan and others “since he was brought to poverty by misfortunes on account of the destruction of the call which was once opulent […]” Pere may have purchased remedies from Joan on credit, or borrowed money from him and others, and was forced to sell his possessions to pay back his debts. He petitioned King Joan because he was worried that the governor would keep him in jail even after he did so. The king therefore ordered that Pere De Moya be released from jail once he had ceded his possessions.86 The fear, expressed by various converso debtors, that they would remain incarcerated even after they sold their possessions is striking. It suggests that they were so deeply indebted that they feared that the sale of their possessions would not yield enough funds to fully repay their creditors, who would insist that they remain in jail until full payment was made. Thus the converso Nicholau de Pachs, formerly Samuel Cohen, who claimed to have lost almost all his goods during the attack and had to sell his remaining possessions to pay back creditors, was concerned that even afterwards some

86 ACA CR 1996: 147r-v (July 10, 1393).
creditors would call in debts related to business he had conducted before his conversion, and keep him in jail. The king responded that Nicholau should not be apprehended once he ceded his goods, and that no debts could be claimed based on business dealings before his conversion.

How destitute were the conversos who solicited royal protection? The term “poverty” as it appears in the documents does not necessarily have the same meaning it would in a modern-day context. Mark Meyerson observed that when Jewish elites in Morvedre described themselves as “poor,” it was not reflective of an indigent state but rather an attempt to avoid being taxed to the point where they might really become poor and therefore suffer a loss of honour and status. To what extent can we apply this observation to conversos like Pere Moya or Nicolau de Pachs? These conversos were in dire straits. Whereas the Morvedre Jews were seeking relief from taxation, these conversos sought royal protection from incarceration by creditors whom they could not fully repay. Many Majorcan conversos—unlike the Morvedre Jews—had lost most of their wealth in the violent plunder of 1391; and the fact that Pere Moya ended up behind bars suggests that he had, indeed, already reached a point of insolvency by the time he petitioned the king. However, both in Majorca and Morvedre, the supplicants would have been worried about their social status—since being thrown into jail certainly damaged one’s honour. King Joan did not seem too concerned about the shame formerly well-to-do conversos would have incurred as a result of their incarceration, or even that they were reduced

87 ACA CR 1997: 180r–v (February 23, 1395). In this letter King Joan extended his judgement regarding the case of Nicholau de Pachs, to conversos in general, stating that they may cede their goods to pay off their debts, and should not be apprehended and incarcerated because of this.
88 See Richard Trexler, “Charity and the Defence of Urban Elites,” *Dependence in Context in Renaissance Florence* (Binghamton: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1994), 70. In late medieval and Renaissance Italy, for example, the term “poor” applied to someone who lacked “those things required to live rightly.” This meant that elites who had lost their ability to maintain the attributes of their status and honour, even if they had the means to subsist, could be considered “poor”, and thus eligible—indeed in need of—charity to maintain the lifestyle appropriate to their class. Because of the shame that would be suffered by any member of the elite as a result of begging in public or openly accepting charity, it was expected that their more fortunate social peers, particularly family, would discreetly seek them out and grant them alms.
89 *Iberian Frontier Kingdom*, 128-129.
to real poverty. His judgment was that the conversos should not be jailed if they had sold all their property, which in itself effected a loss of prestige. Meanwhile, some conversos would have been sitting in jail until all their property had been sold. Given the choice between protecting the honour of former Jews or their Old Christian creditors, King Joan favored the latter. More to the point, as much as Joan was willing to support conversos, he was not willing to risk angering Old Christian creditors, some of whom may have still come out at a loss after appropriating the debtor’s goods.

**Concluding remarks: royal protection of Jews and conversos after 1391**

Let us reframe this discussion in terms of the observations set out at the beginning of this chapter, and the thesis that the relationship between conversos and the Crown continued largely unchanged from before the former’s baptism. When it came to supporting or “protecting” (with all the feudal implications of the term) Jews and conversos after 1391, the Crown relied on earlier precedents, just as it had in so many other respects. In the past, the royal privileges granted to aljamas often related to fiscal matters or to the aljama’s jurisdictional autonomy. We have seen how the converso community retained elements of this autonomy in the fiscal and administrative realms, and the subsequent chapter will discuss its social and religious separateness. In tandem with the perpetuation of this autonomy given, as if by default, to the converso community (albeit a more circumscribed autonomy), the Crown continued to provide fiscal protections as it had before 1391, when it was necessary to create conditions that enabled Jews to prosper so that they could supply the king with subsidies. Commitments by Jewish aljamas to provide funds to the Crown were, in the past, reciprocated with royal favours that ranged from moratoria on their debts to exemptions from municipal taxes, and included other legal immunities that would enable them to raise the cash. In the same vein, once the conversos
committed to provide King Joan the donatio, shortly after the revolt, he made various concessions “considering the destruction and poverty of the conversos of Majorca.” First, he issued a general guiatge granting conversos immunity from any litigation for one year, and then another year-long moratorium on all the conversos’ debt payments, including the collective debt of the former aljama. After the guiatge and moratorium expired, King Joan issued an exemption to all conversos from having to pay municipal taxes for nine years (between 1393 and 1402), around the same time they began to pay the debt-tax. He also ordered the royal treasurer, Joan Gallard, to stop harassing the converso community to pay the 3000 sous in annual tribute which the aljama used to pay. Furthermore, despite their restrictions, royal licenses permitting Jews and conversos to trade or to recover merchandise from North Africa recognized the importance of maritime commerce to their economic survival.

There were, moreover, repeated declarations that no one should dare to assault Jews or conversos in any way since they were under special royal protection. The Crown reiterated protections typically issued to Jews before 1391, but also included new clauses about conversos such as, “…since the conversos, as a result of the attacks against the Jews, when they were robbed of almost everything, and because [the king] wants to preserve and protect them, those

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90 ARM LR 39: 39r-v (March 13, 1392).
91 ARM LR 39: 39r-v (March 13, 1392). This letter cites another an earlier version dated February 13, 1392. See also ACA 1995: 99r-v (May 30, 1392) and ARM LR 39: 96r-v (June 22, 1392). The year-long moratorium granted in 1392 explains why there are not many documents regarding the collection of the talla before May 1393. Furthermore, this moratorium ought to be contextualized in light of the various concessions the king made to the rest of the island’s inhabitants in that year, such as the moratorium he issued on debts owed to Jews and conversos (ACA CR 1996: 35v-36v, October 16 and 17, 1392; 39, November 23, 1392), and the general absolution for those implicated in the revolt and attack on the Jewish quarter in 1391 (ACA CR 2041:75v-77v, July 16, 1392; 1996: 1r-2v, July 16, 1392; ARM Pergamins reals Joan I No.41, November 2, 1395, refers to the remission of July 16, 1392).
93 ACA CR 1996: 161r (September 16, 1393). Before the attack on the call, the king may have farmed out the Majorcan aljama’s tribute to his treasurer Joan Gallard, who was after the conversos for payment. Considering that the aljama no longer existed, it would have been difficult to justify this tribute, especially when the conversos were already paying King Joan the donatio.
94 ARM AH 419: 116v (January 21, 1393).
who had [letters of] debts taken away may still collect them.”

In order to protect the rights of conversas and female Jews, dowry contracts which were destroyed in the violence could be reconstructed on the basis of witnesses. Notwithstanding royal limitations on their mobility, which continued to pose problems for well over a decade, these kinds of privileges helped mitigate the intense financial pressures on Jews and conversos after 1391, and, critically, left them with more resources to pay the donatio and the debt-tax.

When he acceded to the throne, as we have seen, King Martí upheld Joan’s concessions to the Jewish and converso communities. He also assisted individual supplicants on the basis of their alleged poverty by granting moratoria on debts up to specific amounts, or other legal immunities for limited periods, such as safe-conducts which absolved the supplicant of various crimes or prevented anyone from harassing or taking legal action against him for a period of time. In keeping with the standard practice of new kings, he reiterated that all Jews residing in Majorca and their goods were under his protection. He also granted them immunity from legal prosecution for another five years, for the sake of their “preservation,” confirming the guiatge

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95 ARM AH LR 39: 103r-v (July 7, 1392).
96 ACA CR 1996: 163r (September 16, 1393).
97 For examples of moratoria see: ACA CR 2266: 100rv (June 14, 1402) for 30 and 40 pounds to Bartomeu Martí and Antoni de Foncuberta, conversos, respectively; 2269: 98v (February 15, 1407) for 100 pounds to Pere Rubí, converso; 2269: 139v-140r (May 23, 1407) for 100 pounds to Pere Moya converso—possibly the same Pere Moya who had beseeched King Joan for help when he was imprisoned for debts he could not pay off entirely.
98 For example, ACA CR 2281: 70r (June 21, 1401): Marti grants a moratorium of 40 florins to Pere Sala, converso dyer, and his mother, widow of Jacme Sala, “having compassion on [their] poverty.” Another instance in which the poverty of a supplicant to the king is emphasized is the strange case in which the governor’s court would not enforce payments of grain owed to the converso Manuel Scriva (by virtue of an inheritance) without him supplying a “cautivo” or security. Manuel pleaded successfully that as a result of his poverty he could not supply one; the king ordered due payments to be made to him without a security. This is a curious requirement in the first place that I have not seen reference to elsewhere (ACA CR 2269:163r-v , July 14, 1407). It is noteworthy that the amount of concessions appears to decrease during Martí’s reign, suggesting perhaps a minor yet significant economic improvement.
99 See for example, ACA CR 2171: 68v-69r (January 1, 1399), where King Martí grants a year-long supersedimentum on any legal proceedings against his familiar and mapmaker, Jaume Ribes, formerly Jaffuda Creques, and his mother, as well as Luís Sa Granada, formerly Jaffie (? ) Natjar, and Pere Mercader, formerly Jucef Azbili.
and immunities granted by Joan in 1395. Martí had the advantage of coming into power five years after the revolt, after Joan had set in motion the processes to deal with the social and economic ruptures it had caused. This allowed Martí to focus on “cleaning up” the disorganization left by his predecessor, and to extend his protection of Jews and conversos into the realm of trade by establishing more favourable conditions for maritime commerce. This characterization of Martí’s support is well represented in a series of letters he wrote to his Majorcan officials on August 20, 1399. Each of these letters either reinforces or changes policies and practices established during Joan’s reign, and each carries the tone of reform. Martí reconfirmed Joan’s exemption to conversos from paying municipal taxes, likening them, by virtue of their baptism, to new immigrants who could legally benefit from tax exemptions for a limited time. He ordered that conversos who had served as procuradors during the first years after the revolt finally receive the salaries that had been promised by King Joan, but which had not been paid. He took a particularly reformist approach to trade, abolishing Joan’s requirement of sureties and guarantors to allow converso merchants to travel more freely, and

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100 ACA CR 2264: 8r-9r (July 19, 1397).
101 ACA 2264: 135v (August 20, 1399). In this letter King Martí confirms a letter of King Joan dated September 16, 1393 which exempted conversos from paying municipal taxes for the next nine years. It is Martí, not Joan, who likened the conversos to new inhabitants of a city. It was of course easier for the Crown to grant such exemptions since it was not the royal treasury which suffered; the Crown did not exempt them from paying royal taxes.
102 During his reign, Martí received a number of petitions from former converso representatives and royal officials who had performed services related to the post-1391 recovery, but had not yet been paid. He responded by ordering the governor to ensure they received the appropriate salary. For example, in 1399 former converso procuradors complained to the king that they still had not been compensated by the community for their labours, despite the fact that Joan had already ordered their salaries paid in 1393, in response to their petition at that time (ACA CR 2264: 134r, August 20, 1399). In 1405 the king received another petition from the conversos Pere Sa Forretza and Bartomeu Martí who had not yet been paid for their work as impugnadors in the administration of the debt-tax (ACA CR 2268: 97v, October 15, 1405). In 1410 there was still a legal dispute between the converso Gabriel Gatzas and the majority of the community over payment for “certain labours and expenses carried out in the service of the conversos” which required him to go to the Maghrib (ACA CR 2270: 194v, February 18, 1410). Even Mateu de Llosch informed the king, in 1399 and again in 1409, that he had not been paid for all the work he did “to collect various debts of Jews and conversos confiscated to the royal court…and also in collecting the 4 sous per pound of converso debts…” (ACA CR 2263: 188r, July 1, 1399; ACA CR 2261: 76v, July 23, 1409). The 1409 letter also refers to de Llosch’s work in recovering some goods stolen from the call. Although it was common enough for kings to receive requests for salaries, what is noteworthy here is the length of time which had passed before these individuals were paid, assuming they were eventually paid, and the sheer number of complaints that Martí received regarding payments that should have been made years earlier.
addressed abuses among royal officials, especially when it came to unjust commercial taxation; but on the other hand, he had zero tolerance for tax evasion.\textsuperscript{103} It seems fitting that on the same day he wrote these letters, Martí made one final attempt at reviving the Majorcan \textit{aljama}.\textsuperscript{104} Jews and an \textit{aljama}, conversos, trade and taxes: this convergence of themes in his letter-writing was no coincidence, but reveals, rather, their interconnectedness in actuality.

**Martí’s final attempt to rebuild the call and aljama of Majorca**

When he instructed the governor and Mateu de Llosch to reestablish the \textit{aljama} of the \textit{Ciutat}, along with all the privileges it traditionally enjoyed, Martí explained in no uncertain terms that he was distressed over the patrimonial rights (i.e. taxes) that he had lost as a result of the dissolution of the \textit{judería}.\textsuperscript{105} He ordered the governor to license Jews to build new synagogues and “establish a council, elect syndics, constitute and ordain procurators,” in order to rebuild the administrative structure that had fallen apart as a result of the 1391 revolt. However, without financial assistance, Jews would have been required to raise money on their own to purchase or construct a new synagogue, which meant more taxes. The silence of royal correspondence on this front suggests that they may not have ventured to do so. The former \textit{sinagoga mayor}, which in 1409 was owned by the notary Joan Martí, might not have been available for them to purchase or rent.\textsuperscript{106} Even if it were, after the plunder of 1391 and subsequent tax burdens, the community probably would not have been able to afford such an expense.

\textsuperscript{103} ACA CR 2264: 138v-140r; 142r-v.
\textsuperscript{104} ACA CR 2264: 140r-v (August 20, 1399).
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} ACA CR 2271: 19v-20r (April 12, 1409). This building still had access to running water from a fountain right by it, which was fed by a channel or \textit{sequia} that ran from the city fountain to the royal castle (probably the \textit{almudaina}). In 1409 Abraham Sarell was granted the privilege of access to water from this \textit{sequia} in his home, providing it did not diminish the water flow to the royal castle. Access to running water in a building, particularly a private building, was a costly privilege and difficult to obtain.
Martí instructed that the new aljama be located in the area called “La Calatrava, where the old call used to be.”

Since this area was not close to the port, Martí made an extra provision, typical of his trade-centered policies, for Jewish merchants and their families to live and trade freely outside of the call, inside or near the port or “vico maris, where they conduct their business.” To what extent the king was successful in promoting a thriving Jewish and converso merchant class centered in the island of Majorca is difficult to say without further investigation outside the scope of this dissertation, but a cursory assessment suggests that he was. Reestablishing a taxable aljama was yet another matter, and the documentation from his reign suggests that he did not achieve this goal.

**Confiscation of Jewish ritual items: a sign of the ultimate failure to reestablish an aljama?**

The greatest indication that the aljama was not recreated under King Martí is the conspicuous absence of documentary references to an aljama or to Jewish representatives in his correspondence. The king’s comportment in the following case is equally suggestive. In 1402 it came to the king’s attention that the converso Bartomeu Martí, the treasurer of the former aljama who was also accused of hoarding some of its money, still possessed its Torah scrolls and other silver items which were likely ceremonial in nature. In response to the complaints of other conversos “alleging interest in some of these things,” the king ordered the valuables

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107 ACA CR 2264: 140r-v (August 20, 1399).
108 Ibid., 140v: “Ceterus si et quotiens contigat Judeos mercatores presentes et futuros predicte aljame sive Ciutatis nole habitare in dicta judaria sive callo per vos noviter ordinando ex quo locus ille est distans non parum a vico maris Ciutatis predicte. In quo siquidem vico maris negotia mercantilia contractari habent ac etiam exerceri possitis conducti seu locari facere dictis Judeis mercatoribus et eorum singulis alfondechs hospicia domos atque boticas sistentia et sistentes intus seu prope predictum vicum maris preciis sive logeriis competentibus atque rationalibus in quibus prefati mercatores Judei cum eorum uxoris filiis familiae et bonis et mercibus conmorari valeant et sua mercantilia negotia libere exercere.”
109 There is one reference to a Jewish auditor of the debt-tax accounts, possibly to ensure Jewish representation in the taxation process, since Jews were also obligated to contribute to the settlement of the former aljama’s debt (ACA CR 2266:161v-162r , January 18, 1403).
110 The case of Bartomeu retaining aljama funds is discussed at the end of Chapter Three.
deposited in the city treasury or “**tabula deponitorum**.” Curiously, a month earlier, the king had granted Bartomeu a moratorium on his debts for the relatively small sum of thirty pounds, and we might wonder if Bartomeu was sitting on the cash and ritual items in the hope that he could use them to liquidate his debts if he could not otherwise come up with the funds. Martí’s letter does not offer any clues regarding the motivations of the conversos who denounced Bartomeu, which are even harder to guess in the absence of the plaintiff’s names, but there are a few possible scenarios. First, it is possible that the converso plaintiffs had a religious interest in these items, or simply an emotional attachment to them without any intention to Judaize—as Bartomeu himself may have had. Perhaps the plaintiffs were the original donors of the scrolls and silver items, and now that there was no longer an **aljama** to protect these items, they wanted to reclaim them. Alternatively, the plaintiff’s interests may have been worldlier. There may have been influential conversos who wanted to put the valuables towards the repayment of the corporate debt, which the entire community was still struggling with at the time. Another, quite likely possibility is that personal rivalries were involved, or that other conversos simply considered it unfair, even suspicious, that Bartomeu should retain these valuables in his possession along with a hefty amount of the former **aljama**’s cash. In any event, Bartomeu’s denouncers likely did not anticipate the king’s response, which denied possession of the Torah scrolls to all parties, even the Jews. Although there was no **aljama**, formally speaking, it seems strange that the king did not simply give them to the existing Jewish community to use. He may

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111 ACA CR 2265:178v-179r (July 12, 1402). There was a certain historical precedent to Martí’s actions: when King Sanç fined the **aljama** in 1315, he also confiscated their Torah scrolls and silver crowns (Pons, vol. 2, 252, doc. 64). The silver items Martí had seized were probably also the crowns (**rimonim**), breast-plate and pointer. The fate of the rimonim, currently on display at the Cathedral and believed to have belonged the former **aljama**, have been an issue of popular local interest and some scholarly dispute. On the rimonim see Francisco Planas, “Los rimmonim de la Catedral de Mallorca,” *Panorama Balear* 79 (Palma: Imprenta Mossèn Alcover, 1960); "La fecha y circunstancias del arribo de los ‘rimonim’ de la catedral de Mallorca” *Sefarad* 30 (1970): 48-51; David Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium*, 88, note 69.

112 ACA CR 2266: 100 r-v (June 14, 1402).
have intended for the scrolls and other items to be put away for safe keeping until a decision about them could be made through a proper legal process, or he may have wanted to keep them away from conversos who might be tempted to Judaize, but he does not explicitly raise either concern. If an _aljama_ was never formally reestablished, and there is no evidence to confirm that it was, then these items, along with the _aljama_ funds, were probably appropriated for the royal treasury under the same pretext that allowed the Crown to seize other collective Jewish “ownerless” assets.\(^{113}\) It is significant, too, that this episode occurred the year after Martí outlawed the existence of an _aljama_ in Barcelona.

\(^{113}\) For instance, “_libres_” and “_joyes_” numbered among the items possessed by the former _aljama_ of Valencia, which the royal couple asserted as theirs (Hinojosa Montalvo, _Jews of the Kingdom of Valencia_, 394, No. 123).
Chapter 5

From comunitas to confraternitas:
The converso confraternity of Sant Miquel

One Sunday in February 1401, prominent members of the Majorcan community of conversos gathered in the city’s Franciscan monastery, in the presence of a notary, in order to discuss “certain matters affecting the conversos.” During this meeting they elected four deputies to guide conversos in “the rule and way of orthodox faith.” In April of the following year, Julià Doscha, “collector of alms of the conversos,” obtained another license for conversos to congregate, this time for the purpose of arranging “good works for the community of conversos,” particularly for care of the sick and the burial of the dead.

The collection of “alms” administered by Julià Doscha may have been part of a wider program to raise funds for establishing a separate meeting venue or place of worship. A few months later, King Martí wrote that “recently” conversos had elected four individuals to collect a tax from the community in order to raise the funds required to build a “temple for the cult and reverence of God.” However, word reached the king that the collected funds were not spent on the pious project as intended, but rather, “against the goal and wishes of others… put to vile and sensual uses.” In spite of his frustration, Martí did not give up on the prospect of a distinctively converso church. In addition to an investigation and punishment of the culprits, Martí ordered

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1 This chapter is based on my article, ”A Converso Confraternity in Majorca: La Novella Confraria de Sant Miquel,” Jewish History 24, no.1 (2010): 53-85. The final publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/k114w20653757674/.
2 ARM AH G6 (Llicències i guiatges): 26r (February 11, 1401).
3 The deputies were Bartomeu Martí, Gabriel de Lossano, Jaume Portells and Manuel Martorell.
4 ARM AH G6:53v (April 4, 1402).
5 The election the king refers to must be the one indicated in the license mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, where four taxadors were elected together with Julia Doscha to collect alms. It is interesting, moreover, that Martí does not say “worship of Jesus” but rather “reverence of God.” Perhaps he was trying not to put off the converts.
6 ACA CR 2266: 109v-110r (June 17, 1402)
that they be forced to come up with the misappropriated funds, and reignite the original project. Although the “temple” as such was not built, a converso confraternity was established, perhaps thanks to Marti’s continued support of the idea. Two years later, in 1404, converso representatives published statutes that defined the confraternity’s membership and governance, but only gave it the name of Confraria Novella de Sant Miquel with the revision and expansion of its statutes in 1410. By that time the confraternity had also moved out of the local Franciscan monastery, possessing its own separate meeting and burial space.

Confraternities were important purveyors of social welfare in the late medieval period. In Majorca, trade-based confraternities or guilds were notably active from the late fourteenth century, complementing the municipal almoinas that were funded by individual charitable bequests and administered by urban authorities. At least four Jewish confraternities operated in the aljama of Majorca in the late fourteenth century, devoted to the sick, the poor, burial of the dead, and education of young boys. Before 1391, Jewish confraternities and aljama charities provided a welfare support system that looked after the needs and needy of their community. As Christians, the new converts could no longer legitimately utilize Jewish support systems.

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7 A transcription of the 1404 statutes has been published in BSAL 7: 408-410. The 1410 statutes are found in ACA CR 2271: 54r-57r (January 8, 1410), and are also published in BSAL 21: 361-364 and 380-382, albeit from a different source: the document published in BSAL, dated July 15, 1415, exists in the ARM collection of Lletres Reials and records the recitation, before the governor, of the royal letter confirming the statutes that is currently housed in the ACA. Thus far there is no record of the confraternity formally taking on the name of Sant Miquel until 1410.

8 ACA CR 2271: 59r-60r (February 12, 1410).

9 These almoinas were typically administered by “worthy” individuals, in effect treasurers, selected by the local councils of the city or rural villages. Majorca was constantly suffering from poor harvests or dry spells and thus had a constant need for donations of food and other relief to the poor. See James William Brodman, Charity and Welfare: Hospitals and the Poor in Medieval Catalonia (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press), 31; For a more detailed discussion of poor relief in Majorca see Alvaro Santamaria, “La asistencia a los pobres en Mallorca en el Bajomedievo,” Anuario de estudios medievales 13 (1983): 381-406.

10 We know this from the testament of the Majorcan Jew Sayt Mili, who in 1377 established a hospital to be funded by perpetual rents, and also bequeathed six pounds and ten sous to each of the following confraternities: Kabbarim (burial society), Sobreolim (society for care of the sick), dels Mesquins (for the poor) and Talmut Thora (for education of young boys). See Estanislau Aguiló, “Testament de Sayt Mili, juheu fundador d'un hospital en el call de Mallorca (1377),” BSAL 9 (1901-1902): 203-04; Álvaro Santamaría Arández, "La asistencia a los pobres en Mallorca en el bajomedievo," Anuario de Estudios Medievales 13 (1983): 381-406.
Besides, even if Christian and Jewish authorities would have turned a blind eye, conversos could not have resorted to Jewish charities, which ceased, at least officially, when King Joan appropriated all communal assets of the *aljama*.\(^{11}\) Conversos, and Jews for that matter, may have also felt anxieties about where they could be buried, given that their use of the former Jewish cemetery, and later the Franciscan monastery, was only a provisional solution. Ironically, it was precisely at a time when they most needed it that Jews and conversos were deprived of their former charities and welfare institutions.

In theory, conversos could have had access to social support by joining the Old Christian confraternities that already existed in the city, but, instead, at least a sizeable portion of the converso community felt that it was necessary to create its own separate welfare institution and pious community. Converso leaders would have seen a number of advantages in proposing that their community establish a confraternity. In the face of Old Christian antipathy, it appeared that in order truly to benefit from a confraternity, conversos would have to have an organization of their own. It also enabled better defense of their distinctive, collective interests, so much of which were bound up with fiscal matters. Ultimately, a confraternal body seems to have been a natural progression to institutionalizing the separateness that had already been moulded by royal policy and the conversos’ post-1391 fiscal situation.

We ought not to dismiss, either, the purported goal of the conversos who took the first steps to found Sant Miquel in 1401, which was to facilitate “proper” Catholic worship among their community. There is no evidence to indicate whether or not the confraternity ultimately succeeded in this goal. Nor is there any indication of assistance it might have received from Old Christians. On the whole, as we have seen, the Church and the Crown were much less concerned about instructing New Christians than preventing them from, or punishing them for, reverting to

\(^{11}\) ACA 1997: 139v-140v (October 1, 1394).
Jewish practise. Thus far there appears to be only one other reference to conversos receiving instruction in Catholicism: in 1393, the bishop ordered all conversos to attend mass, and issued ordinances intended to draw them away from the Jewish practices “in which they persist,” to “instruct” them in orthodox observance, and to stop “natural” Christians from aiding conversos to continue their old ways.12 The reference to continuing Jewish practise here is intriguing, but again, there are no further documents to complete the picture. Neither Crown nor Church expressed anxieties about Sant Miquel as a locus of Judaizing, but one wonders whether they should have. Could the creation of Sant Miquel indicate a reluctance, on the part of conversos, to assimilate or be Christianized? Indeed, an exclusive confraternity offered conversos a safe place to continue certain Jewish customs under the smokescreen of a Catholic pious society. At the same time, even if belonging to a separate confraternity on some level inhibited their assimilation, on another level it brought conversos (or their offspring) closer to Christianity—regardless of whether this was their real intention—simply by situating them within a Christian context.

This chapter will pursue the discussion of converso collective identity by examining the confraternity of Sant Miquel specifically, first by looking at the context within which it was created and then through the lens of its governing statutes. In many ways, Sant Miquel was emblematic of and anticipated the particular social separateness of conversos—one which both eluded and embraced mainstream Christian society. As a collective, the confraternity also manifested a distinctiveness which grew out of, and was continuous with, the former Jewish aljama, and which was strongly reinforced by the group’s shared fiscal commitments. The experiences of the first and second generations of the converts of 1391 who founded and participated in Sant Miquel are especially relevant because the social dynamics that materialized

12 AH 419: 121 bis.
during their time had a decisive bearing on the trajectory, and identity, of what essentially became a new ethnic group through the fifteenth century.

**Confraternities in late medieval Majorca**

The confraternity of Sant Miquel shared many common features with the numerous Old Christian confraternities in the city of Majorca at the time of its creation. Most of them were trade-based associations, or guilds, open only to members of a given occupation and which regulated labour in addition to providing social support. Sant Miquel was one of the first confraternities (if not the first) in Majorca whose members came from various occupations and classes, and in this respect it anticipated the devotional confraternities that became more prominent towards the end of the fifteenth century. However, whereas devotional confraternities emphasized prayer and other liturgical practices, Sant Miquel, to the contrary, omitted them, more in the vein of trade confraternities.

All confraternities laid out their administrative framework, charitable activities and members’ obligations in statutes. Responsibilities typically included assisting the sick and poor, burying and praying for the dead, paying fees, and showing deference to the annually elected leaders. Some confraternities also offered legal assistance for those who could not afford it, dowries for poor young women to marry, or ransom for captives. Support was extended

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14 This assertion is based on the existing (and relatively thin) scholarship on charitable associations in late medieval Majorca, which focuses on guilds (most of which might be properly called trade confraternities). Judging from the statutes that have been published in early issues of the *BSAL* (1889-1933) and in Antoni Pons’ *Ordinacions gremials i altres capitols a Majorca* (1930), Sant Miquel appears to be the first non-trade-based association. The first statutes for a number of devotional confraternities in Majorca are confirmed during the last quarter of the fifteenth century; unlike the guilds that preceded them, these confraternities were largely focused on religious observance, and were circumscribed by a particular devotion (to a saint, for instance), or a parish, rather than a trade. For published statutes of devotional confraternities in Majorca see *BSAL* 24 (1932-33). On the differences between guilds and trade confraternities, and the movement towards devotional confraternities in the late middle ages, see Gregoria Cavero Domínguez, *Las cofradías en Astorga durante la edad media* (Universidad de Leon, 1992): 35-59; 289.
primarily to members in need, and in some cases to “deserving” poor non-members, and was administered either directly by members of the society or bestowed as cash, using confraternal funds.\textsuperscript{15} Members might also be obligated to attend each other’s weddings and, more commonly, funerals. Furthermore, confraternal statutes detailed various religious obligations; standard practise included celebrating the feast day of the society’s patron saint(s), collectively marching in citywide processions, or reciting masses for deceased members. Devotional confraternities usually specified additional religious observances, whereas trade confraternities prescribed few of them, focusing instead on trade regulations and welfare support for its members. Some confraternities possessed their own buildings, even churches, in which they held meetings, and, if it was part of their mandate, celebrated religious rites; others simply used the space of churches or monasteries with which they were loosely affiliated.\textsuperscript{16} As we have seen, the incipient converso confraternity congregated in the Franciscan monastery before it was able to acquire its own meeting house. That conversos chose to meet in a monastery may simply have been a matter of following existing precedent, but that they chose the Franciscans deserves particular mention. Not only was it located adjacent to the former Jewish quarter, but the Franciscans had played a central role in missionizing among Jews in the Crown of Aragon since the thirteenth century. Moreover, if anyone had been considered responsible for educating new converts in the past, it was the Franciscans, as formally stipulated in a constitution of Jaume II.\textsuperscript{17} However, the absence of post-1391 archival references to Franciscans educating converts— if not a result of lost or

\textsuperscript{15} Alvaro Santamaria, “La asistencia a los pobres,” 393-394, 400.
\textsuperscript{16} For instance, according to the statutes confirmed in 1312, the Majorcan tailors met in the church of Santa Margalida, and said prayers in the chapel of the Blessed Virgins of the Madonna Santa Maria del Carmen (Pons, Ordinacions, 102).
\textsuperscript{17} Majorcan converts to Catholicism had been instructed to go immediately to the Franciscans for education in the Catholic faith, as we see depicted in the Disputation of Majorca of 1286. See Larry Simon, “Mendicant-Jewish Interaction in Mediterranean Spain,” The Friars and the Jews in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. Steven J McMichael and Susan E. Meyers (Leiden: Brill, 2004): 65-66, citing ARM: Libre d’en Sent-Pere, fol.114, also published in Régné, No.2427. For more discussion of missionizing among Jews and the Disputation of Majorca see Chapter One.
undiscovered documentation—would suggest that the friars’ relationship to the new mass of converts was relatively limited in this period.

Sant Miquel’s resemblance to contemporary, local Old Christian confraternities, at least from the standpoint of its statutes, is indisputable. At the same time, its statutes share much common ground with the Jewish confraternities that existed on the peninsula and in Majorca prior to 1391. This presents no mystery, however, for the latter were devoted to the same types of causes and were administered in similar ways as their Old Christian counterparts.\textsuperscript{18} Throughout the fourteenth century, newly established Jewish confraternities or havurot took on the role of distributing charity, with specific aims such as raising money for ransoming Jewish captives, providing dowries for poor girls and the religious instruction of children.\textsuperscript{19} Sant Miquel adopted the same roles, except for children’s religious education – again, roles which were typical of both Jewish and Christian confraternities. Its leaders could draw from a charity fund comprised of membership fees, fines, and weekly alms to help any poor converso in Majorca, even if they were not a member of the confraternity. These funds could also be used to pay the redemption fee of up to five pounds for any converso captive or provide dowries to poor female relatives of members who would otherwise not be able to find a husband.

Attending to the deceased was a basic service provided by almost all Jewish and Christian confraternities. Jews and Christians harboured anxieties about the spiritual repercussions of improper treatment and burial of their corpses or insufficient prayer for their souls. Confraternities could guarantee that deceased members would be treated according to


\textsuperscript{19} Epstein, \textit{The Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adreth}, 69-70.
religious custom and – just as importantly - be shown respect in public. Many Jewish confraternities followed the precedents set much earlier, by Jewish burial societies, which ensured proper burial for their members as well as for poor non-members. These societies were governed by officers who selected a treasurer to administer and invest their funds, which were comprised of mostly membership fees and bequests; members had to pay entry fees and make promises of loyalty; mutual aid was formally organized through regulations which obligated members to perform pious tasks such as accompanying a body to its grave or visiting the house of mourners and attending the prayer services held at their home for the week of mourning. Jews typically made charitable donations at the time of prayers for the dead and in their own wills, echoing the link between charity and death that was so prominent in Christian culture.

Majorcan Christian confraternities similarly required members to show due respect for the remains of members by accompanying them to the cemetery, and sometimes specified masses for their souls. Sant Miquel likewise made provisions for the deceased, regardless of whether they were members of the confraternity or even lived in Majorca, but did not specify any kind of prayers, nor alms to be donated in connection with the deceased. Members had to “do honour” to deceased fellows or their relatives by accompanying their bodies from the home to the church and from the church to the cemetery, until burial was complete. That any converso could be buried in the confraternity’s cemetery is a distinctive characteristic of Sant Miquel, and

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is one example to show how the confraternity was initially set up to serve the needs of the community as a whole.

Fraternities also cared for the sick. Jewish communities traditionally had a *Bikur Holim* society devoted to this purpose, and occasionally they possessed a hospital. At the time of the 1391 revolt, Majorca’s *aljama* possessed both, thanks to the wealthy Majorcan merchant Sayt Mili, who bequeathed annuities to found and fund a hospital there in his will of 1377. The existing *Bikur Holim* society may have offered different kinds of, or perhaps more extensive care. If *Bikur Holim* societies elsewhere in the kingdom are any indication, the one in Majorca, too, would have organized constant vigil in the cases deemed more serious, to be administered by its members on a rotating basis. In contrast, the regulations of Majorcan trade associations usually contained as little as one clause pertaining to care of the sick. Sant Miquel’s statutes include a number of clauses dealing with sickness, in which the Jewish precedent is most visible, certainly more than in the rules of trade associations. If a member of Sant Miquel or anyone in his immediate family was sick, the officers would visit that person and arrange for constant vigils through a rotation of confraternity fellows if necessary. They would also ensure providing an interest–free loan secured on a pawn; in the event that the sick person recovered and was deemed solvent enough to repay the loan, the officers would have him redeem the pledge, or they would auction it off, should the person refuse.

The extent of religious obligations Jewish confraternities imposed upon their members varied. Some Jewish confraternities possessed their own synagogue, in which they held regular

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23 For an example of a Jewish confraternity that administered care to the sick see Perani and Rivlin, 105.
prayer services limited to their community.26 By 1410, members of Sant Miguel had obtained their own “casa” in which to congregate, although the statutes make no mention of religious practices to be held there, or anywhere. Still, even if religious worship was not explicitly directed in Sant Miquel’s statutes—if we accept the report that conversos intended to build their own “temple” in 1402—it appears that having their own space was a priority for conversos from early on, possibly to escape the gaze of Franciscan monks or the need constantly to request licenses from royal administrators to permit meetings. It is nevertheless noteworthy that the term used to designate the confraternal space, “casa,” is one devoid of religious connotation, as opposed to “temple” or “church.”

Anti-converso sentiment

In essence, Sant Miquel offered conversos the social support and welfare that had previously been available to them as Jews through the aljama or other Jewish organizations. The specific ways in which the confraternity was administered were, as we shall soon see, also consonant with Jewish custom. Sant Miquel thus provided its members with a sense of continuity with their Jewish past, even while, because of archetypal similarities, its activities replicated those of the Christian confraternity. Yet, maintaining old ways was not the only reason for a separate confraternity. There was also, and notably, the reluctance of Christian bodies to fully accept the former Jews.

When King Martí chastised the local inquisitor for harassing conversos in 1409, he also complained that Old Christians were insulting them, calling them “cans retallats,” meaning

26 For instance, the Jewish confraternities of Bicorolim and of the tanners in Zaragoza. See Blasco Martinez, “Instituciones socioreligiosas,” 9.
“circumcised dogs.” Such attitudes were likely brewing at the time of Sant Miquel’s inception eight years earlier, and, regardless of the willingness of Old Christians to accept conversos into their fraternities, these attitudes must have put conversos off, imagining the Old Christians would abandon them in times of need.

The eventual ostracism of conversos, whether socially or in such areas as the holding of public office, is well known, as is also their exclusion, arguably at the instigation of the Inquisition, from certain Majorcan confraternities. However, the early development of anti-converso attitudes during the decades following 1391, both in Majorca and on the peninsula, remains mostly uncharted. In Majorca, at least, the attitude of trade confraternities, as expressed in their statutes, was ambivalent: some societies specifically included conversos, a few excluded them, but in most cases their status was unclear.

The problem was lineage, and the question was whether conversos had indeed shed the “dishonour” they bore as Jews. The confraternity of weavers clarified this ambiguity in 1391 by

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27 ACA CR 2271: 15v-16r (November 2, 1409); the presentation of this letter by converso representatives before the regent governor in October 1410 is published in BSAL 24: 402, 420.
28 For a discussion of anti-converso legislation specifically in Majorca, see Gabriel Cortés i Cortés, Historia de los judíos mallorquines y de sus descendientes cristianos, 2nd ed. (Palma de Majorca: Miquel Font, 2000), 116-117 and Chapter 14. The majority of anti-converso statutes that Cortés cites in this chapter date from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, since he did not find many for the fifteenth century. For a more comprehensive history of the purity of blood statutes and anti-converso attitudes in Spain see Albert A. Sicroff, Les controverses des statuts de "pureté de sang" en Espagne du XVe au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Didier, 1960).
29 The scholarly literature dealing with popular anti-converso attitudes more or less starts with the mid-fifteenth-century episodes of violence in Castile. There have been few attempts to study the period before that, or to look at how these attitudes developed differently in the Crown of Aragon. Mark Meyerson points out that anti-converso violence and the obsession with purity of blood in the Crown of Aragon was virtually non-existent compared with Castile in, "Aragonese and Catalan Jewish Converts at the Time of the Expulsion," The Frank Talmage Memorial Volume (1992), 141-142. He also examines attitudes towards conversos exhibited shortly after 1391, particularly through the lens of royal policy and the activities of the Episcopal Inquisition, in A Jewish Renaissance. King Fernando I (1412-1416) exhibited a harsher stance against Jews and a greater suspicion of conversos.
30 I have not found statutes for any devotional confraternities in Majorca during the period with which this thesis is concerned. The present discussion of anti-converso sentiment expressed by Majorcan Old Christian (trade) confraternities, in the first few decades of the fifteenth century, is largely based on the statutes published in Antoni Pons, Ordinacions gremials i altres capítols a Majorca: segles XIV-XV (Palma de Mallorca, 1930), which includes most of the statutes of trade confraternities published in BSAL, and from the summaries of statutes provided by Cortés in his Historia de los judíos mallorquines. I am not convinced that either of these sources is exhaustive, however, and so my conclusions in this section ought to be considered as tentative.
explicitly ruling that “all converts to the Christian faith from the lineage of Jews may be admitted to the trade,” and thus the confraternity, “notwithstanding that they are from a lineage of infidels.”\(^{31}\) There was also fear of contamination on a professional level. The regulations of the carders’ guild, for instance, state that if infidels or their descendants were included, “the said trade would deteriorate and be damaged.”\(^{32}\) This proscription may have been an attempt on the part of Christian carders to limit competition, to prevent oversaturation, or to exclude social classes deemed professionally inept. More vaguely, it was feared that should the association accept those lacking honour, which potentially meant former Jews, the confraternity as a whole would lose respect in the public eye.

On the other hand, when the confraternity was more exclusively focused on labour regulation, certain trade confraternities did include non-Christians, or even made membership mandatory. This was so with tailors, a trade in which Jews, as well as conversos, were prominent.\(^{33}\) The statutes of the confraternity of tailors stipulated that any tailor in the city of Majorca, regardless of class or religion – “*de qualsevol ley estament o condicio*” – must pay two diners to the confraternity every Saturday.\(^{34}\) The statutes did, at some point, permit members to

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\(^{31}\) Although the term “infidel” might not always have been that common to refer to “Jews,” the 1391 statutes of the weavers’ guild confirm that, at least in this context, a Jew was an infidel: “Primerament que alcun taxidor laner o flassader no dege daqui avant ensenyar, o mostrar lo dit office de taxidor ne enson teller meta alcun sarrayn catiu, o franch ne alcun bort, o fill de catiu grech, o de tarter ne de torch ne de altra linatge de infels per los quals lo dit offici seria en deterioracio o menyspreu […] Etots los convertits e tornats a la fe xristiana del linatge dels juheus sien e puxen esser admeses a rebuts al dit offici e aquell los puxa esser ensenyat e mostrat no contrastant sien de lintage de infels” (Pons, *Ordinacions*, 77-78). Another identification of Jews as infidels can be found in one of Vicente Ferrer’s sermons, in which he analogized the two: “es necessari al preycador de publicar les veritats a fels e infels…e per ço… yo complint aquell manament… aixi ho faré. E veus per ço vosaltres, juheus, veniu a preycacio…” Cited in Francisca Vendrell, “La activitat proselitista de San Vicente Ferrer durante el reinado de Fernando I de Aragón,” *Sefarad*, 13:1 (1953), 94.

\(^{32}\) Cortès cites the statutes for the carders’ guild, confirmed in 1391, but does not cite a source: “…sarrains catius o francs, borts o fills de catius, grech o tarter, ne de altre llinatge de infels, per los quals lo dit offici seria en deterioració o menys preu” (*Historia de los judíos mallorquines*, 191).


\(^{34}\) Pons, *Ordinacions*, 98 (dated 1428). The term “ley” was used in this period to refer to religion; see entry in Alcover i Moll’s *Diccionari català-valencià-balear*
opt instead for one larger annual payment, which would have allowed Jews to avoid handling money on the Sabbath, when it was forbidden. Judaizing conversos may have taken advantage of this provision for a while, at least until a revised version of the statutes reiterated simply that all “natural Christian as well as converso” tailors had to make Saturday payments. Jewish tailors were no doubt exempt, if not prohibited, from undertaking religious Christian obligations such as burial, prayer or marching in processions on feast days. For their part, and for obvious reasons of a similar lifestyle and practices, Jews apprenticed with other Jews. After 1391, there is the atypical instance of a Jew apprenticing with a converso, or of a converso apprenticing with an Old Christian. Typically, however, conversos apprenticed among themselves too. The degree to which Old Christians in the tailor’s confraternity encouraged this arrangement cannot

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35 The full text is as follows: “…tothom de qualsevol ley estament o condicio sia que dins la ciutat de Mallorques viura de custures, o obredor tendra del offici de sastre que aquest aytal pach ala confraria dels sastres dos diners cascun dissapte. E si aquest esta quatre dissaptes de no pagar que noli sie res demanat fins al cap del any e al cap del any lo maneфа haia carrech ab un saig dela cort de fer li pagar los VIII sous IIII diners.”

36 Pons, Ordinacions, 107. In the published text of the statutes, this stipulation appears later than the stipulation allowing alternate forms of payment, and which applied to “tothom de qualsevol ley estament o condicio.” However, and what is most confusing, is that the stipulation referring to “tot mestre … xristia de natura com convers” appears to be from 1408, but the one referring to “tothom de qualsevol ley” appears to be from 1428. It seems counterintuitive that Jews would not be mentioned in 1408, but indirectly alluded to later, in 1428, and that the statutes would progress towards inclusion when one would expect exclusion. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make sense of the dating in Pons’ edition; the tailors’ statutes begin with the date 1428, then 1437, 1312, 1408 and 1420. It would appear that his source text was a continuous document of statutes that had been compiled together, probably in the fifteenth century, without much attention to chronological order. Given that one of the introductory lines sets the date at 1437, we can assume, minimally, that all the statutes included in the text were considered valid in 1437.

37 In most of the contracts I studied, Jewish or converso parents made the contract on behalf of their son, usually around 14 years old (it was common for apprenticeships to begin in early adolescence). For exclusively Jewish apprenticeship contracts see ACM Protocols Notarials 14662: October 19, 1390 (sastre/tailor); 14669: May 18, 1396 (juponer/tunic maker); 14674: April 21, 1400 (juponer/tunic maker); 14676: September 5, 1403 (seder/silk merchant).

38 A converso from Lleida (Bonanat Loberola, formerly Jacob Zi) entered into an apprenticeship contract with a Christian tanner (Pere Coch) in Majorca. See ACM Protocols Notarials 14666: 160v (1394). The tanner is not identified as a converso, but it is possible that he was, and that the notary omitted the term; such appears to be the case with a converso (Pere Salt, son of Joan Cunillers) who apprenticed with the tailor, Jaume Garriga: Jaume was not identified as a converso in one contract (ACM Prot. Not. 14676: July 23, 1404 (textor lini/linen weaver), October 22, 1404 (textor lini/linen weaver), January 7, 1408 (sastre/tailor), August 9, 1408, August 14, 1408 (sastre/tailor); 14747: August 17, 1407 (sabater/shoemaker).

39 For exclusively converso apprenticeship contracts see ACM Protocols Notarials 14666: 60r (December 10, 1392); 14670: February 21, 1397 (sastre/tailor); 14674: September 9, 1400 (sutor/shoemaker), October 11, 1400 (sastre/tailor); 14676: July 23, 1404 (textor lini/linen weaver), October 22, 1404 (textor lini/linen weaver), January 7, 1408 (sastre/tailor), August 9, 1408, August 14, 1408 (sastre/tailor); 14747: August 17, 1407 (sabater/shoemaker).
be determined with a certainty, but all other evidence would indicate they were pleased to keep conversos at a distance, whose new Christian identity and honour were always in some doubt. Close association with them might put the Old Christians’ own honour at risk.

Tensions between converso and Old Christian tailors at the beginning of the fifteenth century reveal the interplay of old honour codes and anti-Jewish attitudes, which baptism was not persuasively held to wash away, regardless of theological teachings. A letter from the lieutenant governor of Majorca to the bailiffs of rural parishes in 1416 requested all tailors except conversos to come to the city and march in the procession of the Festa de L’Estandart.\(^{40}\) The governor was likely writing at the request of the confraternity of tailors, whose members may have felt they would be dishonoured were they seen marching alongside individuals whom their audience still viewed as Jews or “cans retallats.”

Given the indelible taint of Jewish ancestry, increasing anti-Judaism as manifested in preceding historical developments may have fuelled this exclusion of conversos. By this point, news of the disputation of Tortosa (1413-14) and the resulting conversions would have reached the island.\(^{41}\) Even more poignant would have been Vincent Ferrer’s visit to Majorca in 1413-14, and although we do not know exactly what he preached there, the pervasive anti-Judaism of his sermons could have easily turned popular ambivalence towards conversos into suspicion.\(^{42}\) At the same time, and also at the behest of Ferrer, King Fernando I promulgated anti-Jewish legislation aimed at separating Christians and especially conversos from Jews, who were defiling the Catholic Faith. If popular elements still considered conversos to be Jews, all the more reason

\(^{40}\) _BSAL_ 7: 333 (September 12, 1416). The archival source is not provided in the journal, but the format of the letter appears typical of the _Lletres Comunes_ series at the ARM.

\(^{41}\) On the Disputation of Tortosa see Baer, _History of the Jews_, 170-243

\(^{42}\) Vincent Ferrer visited Majorca in 1413-14; The disputation of Tortosa took place from January 1413 to December 1414. See also Vendrell, “La actividad proselitista de San Vicente Ferrer,” and José Sanchis y Sivera, _Historia de San Vicente Ferrer_ (1930; Valencia: Librerías “París-Valencia”, 1993).
to keep them separate from Old Christians, even in the context of a trade confraternity. Furthermore, the Majorcan version of this legislation added a number of clauses that malign conversos for Judaizing, cohabiting with Jews, and reneging on Catholicism in Barbary where they bore children who later returned to the island, contaminating Christians by living among them as Jews. Ultimately, and most significantly, the ordinances instruct royal officials to assist the local Inquisitor in his work of eliminating heretical threats to Catholicism, that is, from Judaizing conversos. Fernando’s support of the episcopal inquisition here is a notable departure from the policies of Martí, who attempted, quite to the contrary, to protect conversos from inquisitorial harassment, and refrained from condemning conversos, as a whole, for Judaizing. Fernando’s legislation and patronage of Ferrer endorsed negative views of conversos, perhaps to the extent that associating with conversos in the context of a public ritual threatened to bring corporate disgrace upon the Old Christian tailors in 1416.

The resulting ostracism, however, did not altogether dissuade conversos from taking part in the processions, but rather led them to do so on their own terms. In 1425, Old Christian tailors petitioned against the desire of the conversos to march in the city-wide processions of Corpus Christi and Festa de L’Estendard as a separate branch under their own banner. Perhaps the

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43 For the published text of this legislation in Majorca see BSAL 24 (1932-33): 424. On the legislation in the peninsula see Baer, A History of the Jews, 166-169. Interestingly, the legislation was publicized in Majorca in 1413, two years before it was issued in the Crown of Aragon, and the year after anti-Jewish laws were issued in Castile.

44 For a discussion of shared corporate honour and disgrace see Ronald Weissman, Ritual Brotherhood in Renaissance Florence (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 76-77, where he writes that “[m]embers of a corporation shared the benefits of membership, as well as a common sense of shame at corporate disgrace…” Whereas the exclusion of Muslims and Jews from public ritual performances such as a procession would have been assumed, this was not the case with conversos, who were Christians. However, if the Majorcan populace was beginning to question the honour and piety of conversos, public association of the latter with Old Christian tailors threatened to bring disgrace upon the whole confraternity.

45 Cortès i Cortès, 187. The “banner festival” or “la Festa de l’Estendard” is celebrated in Majorca on December 31 and commemorates the conquest of the island by Jaume I on that date in 1229. For a detailed history of this festival in Majorca see Antoni Quintana i Torres, La festa de l’Estendard: cultura i ceremonial a Mallorca (segles XIV-XX) (Barcelona, 1998). This monograph is also useful for understanding medieval festivals in Majorca in general. Regarding the festa de l’estendard, Quintana explains that at the beginning of the fifteenth century the central ceremony seems to have revolved around the jurats at the plaça de cort, accompanied by musicians and the royal
pomp of the converso contingent threatened to outshine the Old Christian one, or the segregation of the two contingents was not enough to shield the latter from shame. Whether the petition succeeded is not known, but its existence reveals the conversos’ determination – resented by their Old Christian counterparts – to participate in the Christian competition for honour that underlay civic processions, even if it was not as part of the tailors’ collective together with Old Christians. In a similar way, conversos had already established their own society, Sant Miquel, in the ambit of Christian confraternal culture and all the pride that came with it.

For their part, conversos may well have preferred to be separate, seeking a collective prestige that was distinctly New Christian. Later in the fifteenth century, Castilian conversos wrote *apologetica* not only defending themselves as honourable Christians, but arguing that, on account of their Jewish lineage, they were inherently and ethnically superior to Old Christians. The episode of 1425 may have been an early version of this attitude and pride. The same pride was possibly an impetus for the conversos to establish their own confraternity, regardless of their level of Christian belief or their personal lifestyles that retained a strong Jewish imprint. This converso attitude was not missed. In the years following the dispute of 1425, other

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standard (Quintana 150-1). Trade confraternities were active participants in this festival; the tailors were one of the oldest participants, and obligated their members to accompany the banner on that day (Quintana 86). Furthermore, the confraternal banner in itself was a typical source of pride for its members, and its use was guarded through the regulations of various confraternities. It was typically used to cover the coffin of deceased members during burial processions, according them honour and prestige.

On development of the Corpus Christi festival in the late Middle Ages see Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: the Eucharist in late medieval culture*, (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Mark Meyerson alluded to the association between Corpus Christi and worsening perceptions of Jews (*Jews in an Iberian Frontier Kingdom*, 80). Although some useful work has been done on the celebration of the Corpus Christi feast in the middle ages, there is little specifically for Majorca, and nothing discussing the participation of Majorcan confraternities there. Gabriel Llompart has written two articles in which he cites documents listing payments for various items, or for actors, involved in the festivities. Such lists demonstrate for example that individuals were hired to represent biblical figures like Adam and Eve or the Maji (“La fiesta del corpus christi y representaciones religiosas en Barcelona y Mallorca (siglos xiv-xviii),” *Analecta sacra Tarraconensia* xxxix (1966): 25-45; “La fiesta del corpus christi y representaciones religiosas en Zaragoza y Mallorca.” *Analecta sacra Tarraconensia* XLII (1969): 181-209). Villanueva writes that the feast was celebrated in Majorca from the middle of the fourteenth century, citing a sacristy inventory that includes a custodial designated for the “feast of Corpus Christi” (*Viaje Literario*, 198).

confraternities excluded conversos from membership. Nonetheless, when all is said and done, few confraternities established specifically anti-converso statutes until the end of the fifteenth century, at the time of the first wave of Spanish Inquisition trials. At the time Sant Miquel was established, conversos did have the option of joining Old Christian confraternities, especially when they worked in a trade that was regulated through one. Yet wary of an unwelcoming Old Christian attitude, the conversos felt more secure in keeping themselves distinct.

**Psychological Factors**

As tricky as it is to make psychological conjectures concerning the observations I have made thus far, let us pause to reiterate what a confraternity may have offered to conversos on an emotional level. After the trauma of 1391 and when confronted with Old Christian antagonism, most conversos probably sought the comfort and reliability of familiar, habitual relationships, with people they knew and could trust to help them in times of need. Entrenched loyalties were difficult to break. Although some conversos who had been disenchanted Jews must have hoped to use their baptism as an opportunity for a new start, conversos and Jews were bound to one another by economic ties that were not so easily severed, such as common business investments, or financial obligations related to debts and inheritances, not to mention ties of family, or even

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47 Descendants of conversos were explicitly prohibited from joining the guild of tanners according to their statutes confirmed in 1431 (Cortès, *Historia de los judíos mallorquines*, 188). This rule must have been instituted some time between 1420 and 1431, since their 1420 statutes make no mention of “infidels” or conversos (Pons, *Ordinacions*, 90). The regulations of the confraternity of skinners, confirmed shortly after the alleged conversion of the remainder of Majorcan Jews in 1435, stipulate that no skinner should instruct any converso in their trade (Pons, *Ordinacions*, 132). Neither of these trades were popular among Jews or conversos, however Bernat i Roca found no record of Jewish tanners in her study of the 1350 *monetadge* tax register, and found just a few instances of Jewish skinners (*El call de ciutat de Mallorca*, 59-60). During this period, I have only found one peninsular converso apprenticing with an Old Christian tanner, and no instances of converso skinners.

48 Álvaro Santamaría argues that Old Christian hostility was a major impetus, together with a fidelity to ancestral tradition, in founding Sant Miquel (*"En torno a la situación de los judíos conversos de Mallorca en el siglo XV," BSAL* 31 (1953-1960): 189.)
Archival evidence shows that conversos continued, after 1391, to forge alliances with one another through marriage, trade and apprenticeship. Confraternal bonds cemented already existing networks, and reinforced a sense of group responsibility. For the first generation of converts and their children, baptism administered under threat of death would not have changed the way they thought, behaved and related with their neighbours, whether they were Jewish, converso or Old Christian. For the most part, as we have seen, baptism did not significantly alter the way Old Christians approached them either. From the outset, moreover, conversos were treated by both Crown and creditors as a single collective entity, continuous with the former *aljama*, particularly for purposes of fiscal administration.

The *donatio* and debt-tax served to define, and bind, the conversos as a single collective in much the same way as taxation had been one of the central threads defining separate Jewish communities prior to 1391—and in both cases, at the same time as that taxation bound individuals together, it also created conflict and tensions within these communities. Collecting the donation and repaying the *aljama*’s creditors required the conversos to organize themselves as a group time and time again for well over two decades, to elect leaders who would represent them in negotiations with royal officials and with creditors, and to manage the difficult and complicated task of assessing, collecting and redistributing funds. The donation and debt-tax proved so hard to collect as a result of evasion, fraud and royal intervention, that collection was still not complete at the time Sant Miquel was founded in 1404. One cannot over-emphasize the weight of these financial burdens upon conversos, particularly at this vulnerable juncture, when

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50 On difficulties collecting the donation (of four sous per pound of all loans owing to conversos) and the tax levied directly on converso and Jewish assets to repay *aljama* creditors, see: ACA CR 1997: 137v-138r (September 24, 1394); 1998: 36v-37r (March 20, 1395), 38v-39r (March 20, 1395); 1999: 105v-106r (November 16, 1395); 2263: 105v-106v (September 3, 1398); 2264: 11v-12r (July 19, 1397); 2266: 109r (July 18, 1402); ACA CR 2269: 152r-v (July 1, 1407).
they lacked a social support net to catch those who could not keep their head above water. There is a somewhat tragic irony in the fact that the very burdens which exacerbated the conversos’ vulnerability and made mutual welfare all the more necessary were the impetus behind their social organization which, later, facilitated the foundation of a welfare institution.

By the time of the first meeting to establish a converso confraternity, the conversos already had been grouped together and treated as a single fiscal and social entity for a decade, in particular by the Crown and by creditors of the former aljama. A collective approach to conversos is evident in royal ordinances as well, which were aimed specifically at conversos as a group, and dealt with special protection, exemptions, tax obligations, licenses required for maritime travel, and other matters that had been affected by the events of 1391. Royal letters even go so far as to refer to or address the comunitas of conversos. Creating a converso confraternity simply gave formal shape and rules to the existing converso community.

Conversos, from their point of view, had reason to favour this distinct, collective status. Possessing their own cemetery and being buried separately from Old Christians had been a concern from the moment they had been baptised. Their own forced conversion, anxiety over their own “salvation,” and persisting beliefs that encouraged burial together with their community must have persuaded many to avoid Christian cemeteries—albeit, on the other hand Old Christians were probably reluctant to risk contaminating their cemeteries with bodies they still considered to be Jewish. At this early stage, it was also natural for conversos to consider themselves a single community, and one very much still entwined with the Jewish community.

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51 Nirenberg refers to this phenomenon of being treated as a separate group for fiscal purposes in various converso communities in the Crown of Aragon, thus setting the stage for separate confraternities in Barcelona and Valencia, in addition to Majorca (”Mass Conversion,” 14-15).
52 For example, ACA CR 2269: 152r-v (July 1, 1407)
53 The conversos of Valencia also planned to establish their own cemetery as early as 1397 and made it a priority for their confraternity, Sant Cristòfol, once its statutes were approved in 1399 (Jaime Castillo-Sainz, ”De solidaritats jueves a confraries de conversos: entre la fossilització i la integració d'una minoria religiosa,” Revista d'història Medieval 4 (1993): 197-99.)
Recall that the conversos continued to use the Jewish cemetery for a few years after 1391, a situation which King Joan permitted, perhaps in part, because he understood that burial in the same space was too much to ask from both conversos and Old Christians at that early stage. Moreover, burial in a Christian cemetery traditionally required pre-existing affiliation with its institutional owner, and conversos were not yet formally affiliated with any Christian confraternities or churches. By 1399, the situation had changed, but still not toward inclusion, as conversos were using only “that section” of the cemetery of the Franciscan monastery “in which the bodies of conversos are buried.” If by the turn of the fifteenth century, conversos were using the Franciscan monastery as a communal space, not only to hold meetings but also for burial, they were doing it as a separate converso body, not as one integrated into the overall Corpus Christianorum.

A critical advantage to establishing a confraternity was that while the conversos were already organized as a community de facto, the recognition of the confraternity provided conversos with the corporate, legal standing, de iure, comparable to that once possessed by the Jewish aljama. Among other things, it made the confraternity eligible for the credit necessary to purchase a distinct cemetery and meeting place. In addition, as the confraternity collected and invested membership dues, it would have acquired assets with which to secure loans, the way the aljama could secure loans on the taxes it collected, or other properties and investments. The confraternity was also made up of members who could be identified and collectively held responsible for payments. However, while the legal responsibility for the loan was carried by the confraternity’s members, it was borrowing money to serve the larger converso community, thus blurring the line between the normal activities of a confraternity and a community. Even as the confraternity bore the legal responsibilities, it could legitimately expect the community to share

54 ACM Protocols Notarials 14751 (Pere Giges): April 9, 1399.
in the cost of its expenses since, presumably, the community as a whole benefitted. Just as the procuradors lobbied on behalf of the conversos and organized the debt-tax, so too, the confraternal officers had the power to impose a tax on all conversos, beyond the confines of the confraternity, and control how these funds were spent. A royal letter issued just after the confirmation of the confraternity’s statutes, in February 1410, instructs the governor to support its officers in their collection of a tax from all members of the confraternity, as well as from all conversos. This tax was intended to pay for various expenditures made by the confraternity for the “public benefit and good” of conversos, including the purchase of land for a cemetery.  

Statutes of Sant Miquel

Connecting Precedents: aljama, Jewish and Christian confraternities

It is in this context, of Sant Miquel assuming the place of the comunitas conversorum, that the Majorcan historian Álvaro Santamaría refers to the confraternity as “a society within another society,” yet modelled on the former Jewish aljama. He highlights the parallels between the responsibilities of the confraternity’s officers, as defined in its statutes, and the former aljama’s secretaries, especially with reference to their judicial and peace-making responsibilities, as well as their fiscal capacities, including their authority to tax members in order to cover extraordinary costs. On this basis, Santamaría concludes that the founders of Sant Miquel were harking back, trying to recreate their former aljama inasmuch as they could within the confines of a Christian confraternity. He neglects to mention, however, that its leadership operated in ways that reflected the more likely precedent of pre-existing Christian, as well as

55 ACA 2271: 59r-60r (February 12, 1410). Similarly, as soon as the Valencian converso confraternity was established, procuring a cemetery was one of the first projects that its sobreposats took on (Castillo, “Solidaritats jueves,” 196).

56 Santamaría Arández, "En torno a la situación," 189.
Jewish, confraternities. In fact, there was much common ground between the governance of confraternities, be they Jewish or Christian, and the former *aljama*, as the 1410 statutes make eminently clear. To understand how Sant Miquel stands out, we must first establish its parallels to these analogous institutions, beginning with its governance.

The statutes of Sant Miquel stipulate that four officers, called *sobreposats*, be elected annually on the day after the feast of Saint Michael, which was on the 29th of September. As the governing body they made most decisions, such as how much and to whom charity or other services would be distributed, while certain issues required the input of six additional advisors, for instance, when approving new members. Confraternal funds were stored in a cash box which remained with one of the *sobreposats*. Each of the others guarded one of the three keys used to unlock it. Account books detailing how funds were administered were to be reconciled and transferred annually to the newly elected leaders. The *sobreposats* also were expected to enforce the rule of peace among members and mediate disputes between them. Members who did not comply with judgements of the *sobreposats* or showed them disrespect were fined. The penalty was harsher if the disrespect occurred in public. In extreme cases where members “falsely accused” or “dealt badly” with other members, or with the *sobreposats* themselves, the latter could expel them from the confraternity with the approval of six advisors.

It would have been difficult for Santamaría or any scholar to ignore the resemblance to the former *aljama*’s secretariats, which, too, numbered four, and were elected annually at the time of the Jewish New Year – which fell more or less around the same time as the feast of Saint Michael. The connection to the *aljama* is underscored by the fact that two of the first four “deputies” elected in 1401, before the confraternity was formally established, had been leading

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57 In *History of the Jews*, Baer writes that there were six secretaries during the independent kingdom of Majorca, but according to Antoni Pons there were four during the reign of Pere IV (*judios del reino de Mallorca*, vol. I, 17-25).
members of the former aljama\(^{58}\): Bartomeu Martí, formerly called Abrafim Luquial, had been an aljama secretary and treasurer,\(^{59}\) and Jaume des Portells had sat on the aljama council as Salamó Bactan.\(^{60}\) Like the sobreposats, aljama secretaries had also been responsible for distributing charity, judging disputes, and keeping accounts, which were then presented publicly to successors at the end of the year-long term.\(^{61}\) Like the sobreposats, aljama secretaries, too, lacked the authority to make decisions in difficult cases without the collaboration and vote of supplementary councillors. Moreover, the deference owed to the sobreposats is reminiscent of the treatment accorded to the secretaries, and the seriousness with which false accusations were dealt recalls the aljama’s stance against malshinim, or informers.\(^{62}\) Of special note is the preoccupation in both the confraternity and the aljama with avoiding intra-communal conflict. Here, the continuity with the Jewish past stands out sharply. Whereas most confraternities often had one statute devoted to this problem, Sant Miquel had six, including numerous rules pertaining to respect of leaders and other members during meetings. The memory of bad blood within the community and its destructive potential was especially strong for Rabbi Simon ben Zemah Duran (the “Rashbaz”), who himself had fled Majorca in 1391. A responsum he wrote

\(^{58}\) The other two deputies may also have held leadership roles in the pre-1391 aljama, but I have not found references to them yet.

\(^{59}\) See references to Bartomeu Martí in Chapters Three and Four.

\(^{60}\) Pons, _Judíos del reino de Mallorca_, vol.2, .311, No. 135. Jaume des Portells also acted as a converso procurador (ACA CR 1998: 106v-107r , August 10, 1395; 2000: 181v-184r, (November 18, 1395). Official sobreposats are not named in the 1404 or 1410 statutes, but the latter version is presented to the governor by Gabriel Gatzas and Julià Doscha, who are referred to as sobreposats of the conversos: it is not clear whether this was considered to be a separate role from the sobreposats of the confraternity. The language of the 1410 document suggests that they may have formally served as confraternal sobreposats since pre-confraternity letters refer to converso representatives as procuradors. Both Julià Doscha (ACA CR 1998: 106v-107r) and Gabriel Gatzas (ACA CR 2270:194v, as curator) had previously served the community, though not specifically as the procuradors. Moreover, Julià had been the “collector of alms of the conversos” in 1402, mentioned above.

\(^{61}\) Epstein’s exposition of ibn Adret’s responsa provides a more comprehensive description of the same responsibilities (Studies in the Communal Life of the Jews of Spain: The Responsa of Rabbi Solomon ben Adret, 32-39).

from his exile in North Africa, shortly before the conversion of the entire community in 1435, blames communal feuds and factionalism for the disaster of 1391. Continual wrangling and recrimination, he said, made the island’s Jews more vulnerable. This assertion, to be sure, was not new—to some extent, it was traditional rabbinic moralizing—but it was clearly an issue that concerned Majorca’s conversos in their confraternity as much, if not more, than it had concerned the *aljama* in the past.

However, none of this should obscure the fact that much of the material in Sant Miquel’s statutes, while indeed reminiscent of *aljama* governance, is also common to that found in both Jewish and Christian confraternities, particularly trade confraternities which stipulated few liturgical obligations. For instance, having four leaders with financial and accounting responsibilities was standard, as was the requirement of additional councillors for certain

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63 Epstein, *Responsa of Rabbi Simon Duran*, 42-43. Duran wrote that the violence and destruction were brought upon the community as a result of internal conflicts. He warned the community against its false sense of security, as well as the internal dissent and dispute that, in his opinion, made it more vulnerable in the face of Christian authorities. In a postscript to that responsum, which must have been added just after 1435, he attributed the conversion of the entire community and subsequent ban against Jews residing on the island to such conflicts (III: 227). The rivalries that existed among conversos were probably rooted in tensions that existed between Jewish families or factions prior to 1391. In the early fifteenth century, King Marti came to the defence of converso familiares who claimed their enemies had falsely accused them of Judaizing before the episcopal inquisition (ACA CR 2266: 134v-135r, October 22, 1402).

64 The obligation for members to love and honour one another, and for officers to mediate in resolving disputes, was standard in Jewish, Christian and converso confraternities. For examples in Christian confraternities (prior to the establishment of Sant Miquel) see the statutes of Santa Luzia in Valencia or the sandal-makers and cuirass-makers (*patiners et cuyrassers*) of Barcelona, published in Manuel de Bofarull y de Sartorio, *Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo de la Corona de Aragón*, vol. 41: *Gremios y cofradías de la Corona de Aragón*, vol. 2 (Barcelona: Archivo General de la corona de Aragón, 1975): 21, 261; for trade confraternities in Majorca (few of which included clauses dealing with discord) see the statutes of gardeners (*hortolans*) and of tailors in Pons, *Ordinacions*, 71, 116); for Jewish shoemakers of Zaragoza see Bofarull, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 40: 132; for the converso confraternities of Sent Christòfol in Valencia, Santa Maria in Denia, Santa Trinitat in Barcelona and Sent Christòfol in Gandía (the latter two were mixed New and Old Christian), see Bofarull, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 41: 125, 135 and Ángeles Cuenca Adam, "Dos cofradías medievales: Sant Cristòbal de Gandía y Santa María de Denia," *Saitabi* XXXV (1985): 23-37, esp. 26, 31. For a discussion of these features in Valencian and Catalan trade confraternities, see Paulino Iradiel, “Corporaciones de oficio, acción política y sociedad civil en Valencia,” *Cofradías, gremios, solidaridades en la Europa Medieval* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 1993), 270. With respect to administrative framework, Sant Miquel’s was almost identical to that of the following confraternities, to name just a few examples: the dyers, and Santa Luzia, in Valencia, the sandal-makers and cuirass-makers in Barcelona, the mixed converso-Old Christian confraternities of Sent Christòfol in Valencia and in Gandía, and the Jewish burial society of “*Cabarim*” in Zaragoza (Bofarull, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 41: 18-19, 39-40, 122-123, 259-260; Cuenca Adam, "Dos cofradías medievales," 30; Blasco Martínez, “Instituciones socioreligiosas,” 33."
decisions.\textsuperscript{65} It was also common for confraternal leaders to judge disputes or broker peace between quarrelling members, or to expel members for disobedience or disrespect.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{65} A few examples from Jewish, Christian and conversos follow the sake of comparison:
(1) The sixteenth-century Bolognese Jewish confraternity, “Hevrat Nizahim,” had four directors among whom its cash box and keys were distributed, and who also were required to keep account books to be displayed publicly every Sabbath. These directors, two depositaries (who held the keys to the cash box) and two trustees, rotated monthly. Specific kinds of decisions affecting the Nizahim had to be made together with four elected leaders who acted as councilors or judges (Mauro Perani and Bracha Rivlin, eds., \textit{Vita religiosa ebraica a Bologna nel cinquecento: gli statuti della confraternità dei solerti} (Florence: Giuntina, 2000), 79, 98, 100-104).
(2) The Jewish burial confraternity of “Cabarin” in Zaragoza had up to four \textit{adelantats} at the end of the fourteenth century, who also administered confraternal assets (Blasco Martínez, 33).
(3) The converso confraternity of Valencia, Sant Christofol, elected four \textit{majorals} annually, on the day of the feast of St. Christopher, requiring the agreement of eight councilors for certain decisions. One of those majorals was designated to deal with financial matters and keep accounts (Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, vol. 41, 117-140). Unfortunately these volumes do not included any documents for Majorcan confraternities or guilds, probably because they would be extant in the \textit{Majoricarum} series which it seems the author did not examine.
(4) The confraternity of Santa Trinitat in Barcelona, established for both conversos and Christians “de natura”, elected two \textit{majordomens} two times per year on the feasts of the Trinity and St. Nicholas, who were required to keep account books which were to be transferred to the new leaders upon their election, and who required the counsel six additional members to make certain decisions.
(5) The confraternity of San Cristófol in Gandia, which also comprised conversos and Old Christians, annually elected four new \textit{maiorals} and eight \textit{consellers}; the \textit{maiorals} were responsible for managing the organization’s finances and at the end of their term had to provide the year’s accounts to their successors. (Ángeles Cuenca Adam, “Dos confradías medievales: San Cristóbal de Gandía y Santa Marta de Denia,” \textit{Saitabi XXXV} (1985): 23-37).
(6) The confraternity of Santa Lucia in Valencia likewise elected four \textit{maiorals} annually, whose obligations included guarding the confraternity’s cash box and providing accounts upon termination of office (Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, vol. 41, 18-19).
(7) The confraternity of shoemakers in Barcelona stipulated that four \textit{prohomens} and four \textit{administradors} be elected annually, and that they submit accounts to their replacements (Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, vol. 41, 259-260; document dated 1405). Regulatory issues had to be discussed with another 10 \textit{prohomens} (266). The \textit{sobreposats} could also kick out a member for disobedience (265).
(8) The confraternity of dyers in Valencia stipulated four \textit{maiorals} with four councilors to assist them (Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, vol. 41, 39-40; 1393).
(9) In Majorca, the Christian charitable bequests to municipal \textit{almoynas} were from the 1300s administered by four \textit{jurats} that rotated annually, with the aid of 10 councilors (Santamaría, “La asistencia a los pobres,” 391).

\textsuperscript{66} For example:
(1) Members of \textit{Hevrat Nizahim} were expected to maintain peace, avoid speaking badly about each other and were forbidden to bring any disputes before a Gentile court, while their officers had to negotiate peace between disputants (Perani and Rivlin, \textit{Vita religiosa ebraica}, 80, 86).
(2) The confraternity of shoemakers of Barcelona, for instance, prescribed love and friendship among members and enjoined its leaders to resolve disputes, but does not seem to expel them for not reaching an agreement (Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, vol. 41, 261; confirmed 1391).
(3) The confraternity of Santa Lucia did not regulate “friendship” among members in the same way, but disrespect of confraternity leaders was taken seriously: members could be expelled for disobeying the \textit{maiorals} (Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, vol. 41, 21; confirmed 1392).
(4) According to the statutes of the Jewish shoemakers of Zaragoza, confirmed in 1336, any member who dishonoured another was suspended for one month in addition to a fine (Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, vol. 40, 132).
(5) Curiously, the only regulations for trade confraternities in Majorca that instruct leaders to resolve disputes were those of the agricultural workers or \textit{hortolans}, confirmed in 1361 (Pons, \textit{Ordinacions}, 71). Only one other set of
Integrative Function

It is difficult to know if the confraternal founders were deliberately imitating a specific Jewish or Christian model, or if they were simply following more general guidelines of what any confraternity would look like. The models they chose are significant, because they reflect what the members of Sant Miguel considered acceptable and how they wished to be perceived or identified. The most significant factor here, though, is that the common ground shared by these models created a level field of play on which conversos could retain elements of Jewish customs while still changing their institutional referent from a Jewish to a Christian one. It was a locus for linking the past to the present, and even the future, and in which conversos could take a subtle yet critical step on the path towards Christianization without being forced into a traumatic break with their habitual way of life. They could, while retaining a group identity as conversos, or rather baptized Jews, nonetheless be part of an institution that was identifiably Christian, anchored, furthermore, firmly within the ambit of Christian culture. Indeed, the confraternity was named after a Christian “saint,” even if—and notably so—the angel Michael was also part of Jewish tradition.

At the same time, the 1410 statutes invoked the Virgin Mary and Holy Trinity, and members took oaths on the New Testament, revealing that the present, though possessing ties to the past, was no longer the past itself. These cues signalled a certain resignation to accept religious change. No doubt, individual conversos passed through the stages of transition each in their own way and speed, but members of the first generation—that of 1391—did lay the groundwork, in spite of themselves perhaps, for assimilation to Christianity in coming regulations in this collection approaches the issue of conflict: those of the confraternity of tailors state that leaders would be elected in order to prevent discord (ibid., 116).
generations, to the extent, that is, that the unending tension between Old and New Christians would permit it.67

In his study of the Sant Cristòfol confraternity in the city of Valencia, also composed of conversos, Jaime Castillo-Sainz reaches similar conclusions.68 Castillo puts forward a more nuanced version of Santamaría’s claim that Sant Miquel was established as a reaction to both Old Christian hostility and the “intense calling of atavism,” when he writes that in addition to providing welfare, the converso confraternity adopted the former aljama’s role of defending group interests against a dominant, and often hostile culture, which threatened to assimilate them.69 Since Sant Cristòfol looked like any other Christian confraternity, theoretically it could serve as a protective curtain behind which conversos could maintain pre-baptismal social structures and celebrate life-cycle events together, preserving some semblance of Jewish tradition.70 While it was necessary for their survival to show an authentic Christian face, Castillo writes, for the most part the first generation of converts could not separate themselves from their former community, a “failure” he attributes, to a large extent, to economic exigencies carried over from the former aljama, as well as new, collective fiscal obligations to the king (in other words, repaying the former Valencian aljama’s debt, and the Valencian conversos’ own donatio to King Joan). In essence, this dissertation makes the same argument, but considers the conversos’ segregation to have had an impact far beyond the bounds of a confraternity. Castillo also feels that the existence and sentiment of belonging to a converso community eroded with time, and that its members, especially in succeeding generations, were brought together only

67 The logic of this mode of transition would not be lost on Christians, at least not in Rome in the sixteenth century. The convert, Hebraist, and Lector at the Roman Casa dei catecumeni, Fabiano Fioghi went so far as to translate basic Christian prayers—and even a mass—into Hebrew, so that neofiti could continue praying in the language of prayer they knew and felt comfortable in (Kenneth Stow, “Conversion, Christian Hebraism and Hebrew Prayer in the Sixteenth Century,” Hebrew Union College Annual 47 [1976]: 217-36.)
69 ibid., 186.
70 ibid., 199.
when there was a need to address lingering economic problems. By the 1420s, he claims, Valencia’s converso confraternity represented a fraction of the converso population, which was by then dispersed across the city; by then, some conversos may have viewed association with the confraternity as a social hindrance. It was only at the start of their experience that a specifically converso confraternity was justified, at least in the sense that it provided a “mechanism by which to restructure according to Christian parameters” without the need to renounce social and cultural roots.\(^71\) According to Castillo’s logic, then, the converso confraternity of Valencia performed a certain Christianizing function, but only for the first generation or two after 1391. What is not entirely convincing is his hypothesis, however, that conversos seamlessly integrated socially with Old Christians.

Sant Miquel, too, may have faded in a short time. At the very least, we know that its fiscal consonance with the rest of the ciutat’s converso population was diminished by 1416. The confraternity was carrying a twenty pound annuity, and in that year fifty members confessing to be “collectively and individually” responsible for the debt, who had committed their personal assets as a surety for it, instituted a tax to be collected from the rest of its membership in order to pay off the capital of the censal entirely.\(^72\) What is of particular note, here, is that only the members of Sant Miquel, and not the whole “community” of conversos, were taxed. In fact, there is a conspicuous absence in this text of any reference to a larger community. Perhaps at that time there was no need to differentiate between confraternity and community since the two were, in effect, one. But this may in fact point to greater integration, on the part of some conversos,

\(^{71}\) ibid., 203-205. There is a weakness in Castillo’s argument here. I do not think the confraternity accomplished much in the way of social restructuring; on the contrary, it would have allowed social networks to continue largely unchanged, and in fact Castillo suggests as much. It did, however, set the stage for institutional restructuring, and realigning of certain welfare traditions to fit into a Christian framework.

\(^{72}\) ACM Protocols Notarials, 14768, Tomas Clavell: May 28, 1416. This is the latest document I have found, so far, for the converso confraternity; see note below.
into mainstream Christian society, such that they could not be easily sought out or legitimately taxed for the expenses of a confraternity to which they no longer were affiliated. Furthermore, one wonders why there was a desire to pay off this particular debt. If the confraternity was, in effect, paying off the entirety of its liabilities, then it could have been because the confraternity was about to dissolve in the way that the aljama was “dissolved” twenty years prior. The confluence of certain other events raises further questions about what motivated the decision to liquidate this debt, possibly the confraternity’s last liability, and possibly signalling the confraternity’s closure, in 1416: this decision was reached one month after the death of Fernando I, and a few months prior to the governor’s summoning of Old Christian tailors to march in a public procession without their converso counterparts. It was also two and a half years after King Fernando’s anti-converso legislation was promulgated in Majorca. At this stage, we can only surmise the significance of these events for Sant Miquel and the conversos. Although royal policy towards Jews generally improved under Fernando’s successor, King Alfonso, perhaps the social reverberations of Fernando’s anti-converso legislation were, nevertheless, solidifying on the island. Growing popular suspicion of the conversos’ true religious allegiance may have put pressure on the latter to participate in existing Catholic institutions and discouraged belonging to an exclusive confraternity, at the same time as it made Old Christians reluctant to associate with them.

The document states that the fifty conversos named as responsible for the debt wish to be “freed” of the debt, which was probably worth between 200 to 285 pounds (assuming the interest rate of the censal was between 7 and 10 percent). The question is whether this amount represented the confraternity’s total remaining debt. Although this amount is relatively low, it is possible that it was. There is no other mention in the 1416 document about additional debts. Moreover, if the confraternity had purchased its meeting house and cemetery for a relatively cheap price in 1410, the total cost could have amounted to around 285 pounds. In fact they could have spent more, if we consider that in 1410 the sobreposats collected a tax from all conversos to pay for Sant Miquel’s cemetery “and other expenses for the public benefit and good of the confraternity” (ACA CR 2271: 59r-60r, December 2, 1410). I am basing this real estate estimate on the fact that Berenguer de Cortilles sold to Antoni Rexach a “principal” house of the Jewish quarter for 300 pounds in 1393 (ACA 1996: 121v-124v, April 10, 1393).
Since no further documentation has surfaced from after 1416, we cannot say exactly how long Sant Miquel lasted, or whether it gradually became more and more “truly Catholic,” or to what extent its members wished to ally themselves more strongly with mainstream Christian culture.\textsuperscript{74} Hence, to gauge the extent to which this confraternity played, or even fulfilled, a transitional role in Christianizing conversos and for how long it continued to do this is difficult to determine.\textsuperscript{75} Besides, and to complicate matters, integrating into mainstream society did not

\textsuperscript{74} There are statutes for a confraternity of Sant Miquel confirmed in 1479 (published in BSAL 24: 237-238), but all indications (particularly the members’ names and artisanal occupations, as well as its former appellation “dels tandes”) suggest that this is not the same as the converso confraternity, which had officially called itself the “Novella” Confraria de Sant Miquell in its 1410 statutes in order to distinguish itself from another, pre-existing one with the same name. While there is no indication in the novella confaria’s statutes that the other, Old Christian confraternity was trade-based, confraternities did not always signal themselves as such in their name. For instance, Catherine Vincent points out that certain trades had patron saints after which the guild or confraternity was named (Des charities, 37). Indeed, the 1479 statutes of a confraternity which named Sent Miquell as its patron—likely the one which predated the “novella” confaria—state that it was “formerly called the confraternity of shopkeepers.” The text itself reads: “En lo nom de nostre Señor Deu sia ede la humil verge Maria e del benuirat Archangell mossenyer sent Miquell, advocat dela confraria antiga appelada dels tandes” (BSAL 24: 237). The term “tandes” would be an alternate medieval spelling of “tenders,” or shopkeepers. If this confraternity was originally trade based, by 1479 it did include a strong liturgical component; the ordinacions presented before the bishop of Majorca for approval to be added to a pre-existing set of regulations are strictly concerned with religious matters, especially masses. The liturgical emphasis reflects what has been referred to in modern scholarship as a fifteenth-century preference for devotional confraternities, as well as a growing preoccupation with masses to be said for the dead in order to expedite the salvation of their soul. That this document was intended as an addition to pre-existing statutes which remained in effect can be inferred from the short length of the document, and that it includes only liturgical stipulations. Moreover, the 1479 text refers to an existing “libra dels capitols dela dita confaria” (BSAL 24: 237). These statutes do not restrict membership to particular trades, but such a stipulation could have been present in the libra dels capitols. My suspicion is in the late fourteenth century the confraternity was trade based, but by 1479 it had lost this focus.

Another tangential yet related note: Jaime Castillo suggests that Jewish artisans established trade confraternities that imitated Christian ones, in order to be competitive in the broader market. He hypothesizes that the converso confraternities in Valencia were vestiges of pre-existing Jewish trade confraternities, based on the artisanal occupations of the members of the confraternity of Sant Amador which king Alfons closed in 1420. If one wished to apply Castillo’s hypothesis to the early converso confraternity of Sant Miquel, then one might possibly conclude that the 1479 statutes do in fact pertain to a converso confraternity. However, this hypothesis is undermined by the fact that the first procuradors of Majorca’s converso confraternity were not artisans or shopkeepers (Castillo, “Solidaritats jueves,” 190-192).

\textsuperscript{75} The extent of integration among Old Christians would have varied as well depending on individual families as well as social status. For instance, modern scholars have alleged marriage alliances between elite converso and Old Christian families later in the fifteenth century—although this phenomenon was disputed by Mariano Gual de Torella in "El supuesto origen judío de los Pardos," BSAL (1971) 179-193; at the same time, numerous condemnations of Judaizers by the Inquisition, shortly after its establishment in Majorca in 1488, suggests a continuity of former Jewish networks and customs; see Colom i Palmer, La Inquisició a Mallorca (Barcelona: Curial, 1992); Lorenzo Pérez, ed., Inquisición de Mallorca, reconciliados y relajados, 1488-1691 (Barcelona: M. Perdigó, 1946); Angela S. Selke, The Conversos of Majorca : Life and Death in a Crypto-Jewish Community in XVII Century Spain (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986).
necessarily prevent conversos from retaining a sense of Jewish identity, maintaining Jewish customs or old social networks. Preliminary evidence suggests that they did.

**Distinctiveness of Sant Miquel**

That the confraternities had their unique aspects must also be realized. Castillo’s analysis of the statutes of converso confraternities of Valencia, as well as in Gandia and Barcelona, which led him to conclude that they were fundamentally the same in form as Old Christian confraternities, seems to be going too far. Still, they did resemble exclusively Old Christian confraternities more closely than Sant Miquel, perhaps because of regional particularities, and partly because, out of the four of the confraternities he evaluated, only that of Valencia City did not include Old Christians among its membership. Sant Miquel’s subtle yet significant divergences from that norm make clear the need to search out nuance, even uniqueness. As Santamaría noted, members of Sant Miquel were expected to pay weekly alms on Fridays, in contrast to the practise of most Christian confraternities to pay on Saturdays, known as *sabatizar*: a practise adhered to by Santa Trinitat in Barcelona, some of whose members—perhaps the decisive factor—were Old Christians. Was this Friday contribution intended to replicate the custom, documented at least for Jews in Muslim countries, to give alms before the Sabbath? We cannot know. But we do know that the exclusively converso confraternities of Sant Christòfol

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76 The fact that the confraternities in Barcelona and Gandia included both old Christians and new Christians among their membership could account for their greater liturgical component. Interestingly enough, the statutes of Denia state that the leadership could not consist solely of new Christians, in order to prevent any suspicion of Judaizing: “Item, que per tobre tota la suspexció e increpació de cirimonies iudayques, en la dita confraria cascuns any hia e sien algú o alguns bons e honests hòmens christiaus de natura qui sien en lo regiment de maiorals e alters oficis de la dita confraria, ensens ab los christains novells” (Cuenca Adam, 32).

77 Santamaría, “Sobre la condición de los conversos y chuetas de Mallorca,” *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, Serie III, vol. 10 (1997): 229. Note that there were some Old Christian confraternities which collected alms on Sundays, although more so later in the century; see for example the statutes of the Sant Bartomeu in the parish of Arta (1479) published in *BSAL* 24: 235.

78 Mark Cohen discusses expectations of the poor in North African Jewish communities to receive charity before the Sabbath in order to buy food to celebrate it with, in “Feeding the Poor and Clothing the Naked: The Cairo Geniza,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35: 3 (2005), 407-21.
in Valencia and Sant Christòfol in Gandia appear to have circumvented the practise of sabatizar by requiring payment at quarterly meetings rather than weekly ones.\textsuperscript{79}

A second and more critical feature that distinguishes Sant Miquel from any other of the confraternities discussed until now is the absence of explicitly religious directives in its statutes,\textsuperscript{80} which do not include, for instance, the typical regulations for masses or other religious celebrations to be held on the feast day of the patron saint.\textsuperscript{81} Absent as well are standard instructions to recite prayers for the dead at the time of a member’s interment or at other auspicious times, and the somewhat less pervasive injunction to carry candles marked with a cross during funerary processions.\textsuperscript{82} Even the aforementioned “converso” confraternities of Barcelona, Valencia and Gandia had lengthy instructions regarding burial of members, along with accompanying prayers and rituals. In Valencia, members were required to attend the burial, and recite fifty Paternosters and Ave Marias for the soul of the deceased at the time of the burial or within eight days of it, as well as a Requiem mass; there were also specific instructions for the funeral procession which included carrying wax candles with the symbol of a cross on it. In contrast, the only Christian referent in Sant Miquel’s statutes, when it came to burial, was the clause that “it should please the king to have the bishop of Majorca or the pope order blessed and consecrated—as is necessary—the . . . place which the members purchased . . . as a cemetery.”

Of course, it is tempting to attribute this lack of Christian ritual in Sant Miquel’s statutes to a

\textsuperscript{79} For Valencia see Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, vol. 41: 120; \textit{Cf.} statutes of the Old Christian confraternity of Santa Lucia in Valencia (confirmed 1392) which did specify alms on Saturday (Bofarull,19). For Gandia, see Cuenca Adam, “Dos cofradías medievales,” 29.

\textsuperscript{80} Castillo writes that Jewish confraternities focused on social activities and emphasized devotional aspects less than Christian confraternities did (“Solidaritats jueves,” 188-192). The regulations of Sant Miquel could be said to deal entirely with the social realm, but it is not clear if this is in imitation of guilds or Jewish precedents, or both.

\textsuperscript{81} For instance the confraternity of tailors carried candles marked with a cross during the Corpus Christi procession (Pons, \textit{Ordinacions}, 96). \textit{Cf.} the converso confraternity of Gandia in Cuenca Adam, “Dos cofradías medievales,” 30, and also below.

\textsuperscript{82} Bofarull, \textit{Colección de documentos inéditos}, 41: 120, 126. For statutes concerning burial processions with confraternal candles and robes, and obligations for saying prayers and masses in Gandia, see Cuenca Adam, “Dos cofradías medievales,” 29-30.
reticence, on the part of Majorcan conversos, to engage in explicitly Christian worship. But potentially just as determinant were the statutes of local Christian trade confraternities that would have served as models for Sant Miquel; and these generally had little religious content, save for the celebration of feast days, compared to that prescribed in the statutes of the devotional confraternities that became popular later in the fifteenth century. One might say that Sant Miquel represented the “lowest common denominator” of confraternal statutes, statutes which were consonant with Jewish and Christian precedents without adopting referents that could be identified with either.

**Wider significance of Sant Miquel**

What does all this say about converso identity, or more precisely, collective converso identity? Conversos desired to achieve a degree of honour and respect among Old Christians, in order finally to possess the honour and prestige that Christian society had denied them as Jews. Possessing honour, however, entailed conformity, at least in public, to Christian practice. Hence, conversos organized themselves as Christians, as a confraternity, which paradoxically reinforced a distinct social and collective identity whose structures rested largely on those of a shared Jewish past. By keeping ritual in Sant Miquel at a low pitch—which might not have been such cause for suspicion in Majorca given the example set by trade confraternities—the Majorcan conversos could, collectively, avoid confronting the full consequences of conversion. Along with their fellows, in a setting of this kind, former Jews would not be left alone to harbour their religious doubt, and perhaps, too, their sense of having betrayed their past.

Still, this point may be overplayed. It is, and has been, all too easily romanticized, and to be content with it alone is also to simplify that which was, as we know from other places, highly
one thinks of reactions to exile, in which the exiled simultaneously cherish the old, yet distance themselves from it, and pursue integration at some level with the new. Thus as much as religious concerns may have motivated the confraternity’s conversos, or pushed them to distance themselves from Old Christians in the more intimate aspects of their lives, such as marriage, apprenticeship, burial or social welfare—the fact is that “old habits” are not easily broken. Within and beyond the confines of the confraternity, conversos continued to associate with, and rely upon, the same people they had trusted as Jews.

Santamaría posited a sense of obligation to ancestral traditions behind the conversos’ reluctance to assimilate, but we must also keep in mind that there were, in addition, powerful motivations which were less explicitly religious, and possibly less conscious. Indeed, it would have been difficult for many forcibly baptized Jews to embrace defining aspects of Catholic theology such as the Trinity, Jesus’ messiahship, or the Eucharist, to name just a few concepts that were not simply foreign to Jews and Judaism, but which Jews had, for centuries, been socialized to reject, even scorn, as absurdities of Catholicism. Furthermore, the horror of 1391 inevitably caused profound psychological trauma among its victims, and surely deepened any distrust of Christian society that already existed among Jews, spilling into repulsion for many. Nevertheless, what historians have interpreted as religious resistance or “atavism” may have represented, instead or in addition, an adherence to familiar patterns of relationship that existed before conversion that was reinforced both within and without the community. Among the first generation of conversos who faced relatively little pressure to behave demonstrably as Christians, and who were given virtually no instruction of what was permissible and what was not, it was natural to keep attending Sabbath meals, for example, as one always had. The extent

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83 For discussion of similar nuances in the attitudes of sixteenth-century conversos in Rome see Kenneth Stow, “A Tale of Uncertainties: Converts in the Roman Ghetto,” Shlomo Simonsohn Jubilee Volume: Studies on the History of the Jews in the Middle Ages and Renaissance Period (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1993).
of conscious deliberation, and hence resistance, that such an act involved was more pronounced when it entailed a greater risk of being apprehended by Christian authorities, or of being denigrated by Old Christian society. At the outset, however, it might have been simply a question of doing what one always did. Another way of viewing it is that, as Carlos Carrete Parrondo has written, conversos felt “nostalgia for the past,” which somehow needed to be acted out.⁸⁴

Conclusion

The confraternity of Sant Miquel serves as a fitting close to this study, as it was most active, it would seem, at the end of our period of focus, with its last discovered record dated May 1416. The death of King Fernando I in April of that year marked the beginning of a period of “security and optimism” for some of the peninsular Jewish communities, but whether it brought positive change among the Jews of Majorca, or its conversos, is questionable. It was in the same year, 1416, that the Consell requested a royal ban against new Jewish immigrants to the island, and also when the governor summoned all tailors except conversos to march in the city’s procession on the occasion of the Festa de l’Estendart.

According to seventeenth and eighteenth-century Majorcan histoires claiming to be based on contemporary documents, the island’s entire surviving Jewish community converted in 1435, under duress following a ritual murder trial, marking the “official” end of Jewish communal life in Majorca. After the conversions, allegedly at the request of the city’s jurats, Queen Maria issued a ban against Jews residing on the island for longer than fifteen days, though they could visit for a short time, to trade, for instance. It was shortly before these conversions the first formal signs of anti-converso attitudes appear in Old Christian confraternal statutes. In Majorca, attitudes and policies towards Jews and conversos were congealing in a new way; differently, it would seem, from the rest of the kingdom. The developments between 1416 and 1435 demand further investigation, albeit elsewhere, given the limits of the present study.

1 Meyerson, Jewish Renaissance, 65.
2 Cortes, Historia de los judíos, 95-96.
3 Campaner, Cronicon Mayoricense, 156-158; Mut, Historia general, vol. III, 384.
4 Cortes, 96.
For baptized and unbaptized Jews alike, the preceding period of 1391 to 1416 was, without doubt, a wearisome period of recuperation from a cataclysmic disruption of communal and economic life. And yet, despite the numerous hardships they suffered, this period was not all doom, at least not for the conversos who managed to pick themselves up after the devastation and build upon the vestiges of the Jewish alfama. The creation of Sant Miquel in 1404 signals the culmination of a decade-long process in which the 1391 conversos were compelled to re-organize themselves in order to respond to urgent matters arising from the destruction of the alfama and other repercussions of the avalot. The nascent community, anchored by fiscal imperatives, had to be separate from Old Christian society and also from its Jewish brethren. Meanwhile, it retained defining ties that extended “backwards” in time to the former alfama and “horizontally” in the present to members of existing Jewish communities in Majorca or North Africa, and also to Old Christians (as Jews always had, especially in the realm of trade).

Sant Miquel therefore represents a collective re-generation after a period of crisis-negotiation. The Latin roots of the term “regeneration” capture the essence of the social process under study: genero—to beget or engender—reminds us that its founders were the “parent” generation of conversos, the founders of a new community. The second generation, their children, was born into an incipient converso community, culture, and ways of mediating dualities. Regenero—to bring forth again—reminds us that the “new” community was in many ways a recasting of the old Jewish community, the alfama. This dissertation deals especially with the recasting of alfama precedents in terms of the converso collective’s relationship with the monarchy and fiscal administration, as well as institutional welfare, but there was also a recasting of its relationship with Old Christian society, a topic that begs further study. Even though the converso community’s organizational structures dissolved over time with changing
fiscal necessities, the sense of Jewish fraternitas—or ethnicity—did not. The definition of “ethnicity” I am working with here is that adopted by David Graizbord, namely “the social organization of cultural difference” (words he borrowed from Frederick Barth), predicated in part on “a perception of common descent and familial kinship.” Furthermore, he writes, “ethnic identification is the outcome of interaction between and within groups, as well as between the individuals who constitute them.”

That conversos should remain separate from Old Christians in this period was never questioned by kings Joan or Martí, or the conversos themselves, or their creditors. Royal letters that address the communitatem conversorum reveal no expectation that the new converts would or could integrate seamlessly into the existing Corpus Christianorum. However, the king’s role was not merely one of a passive authority who chose to “look the other way.” Because integration was not in his immediate interest, he actively, if unwittingly, cemented a pattern of separateness. Innumerable public announcements and extensive royal administrative correspondence—and the gossip they engendered—singled out conversos, reaching wide audiences as they reinforced popular perceptions of the conversos’ separateness. Furthermore, that conversos relied upon the same administrative structures set in place by the Jewish aljama appears to have gone unnoticed too, or at least uncontested. Indeed, the king himself perpetuated the old dynamics. Neither the king nor the conversos, struggling to recover from the multiple dislocations of 1391, thought much about the implications of these “Jewish” continuities. It was simply the way things had to be, at least in the interest of administrative efficiency and financial recovery. In a situation requiring urgent responses, it was easiest to do things the way one always had.

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This is not to say that the monarchy was not concerned about the conversos’ religious faith and practice. On the contrary, this dissertation has shown that it was. However, the religious concerns appearing in royal letters, at least for Majorca, were about obvious signs of heresy, such as conversos reverting to Judaism in the Maghreb; they did not address, nor could they afford to address, the social structures or institutional dynamics that remained largely unchanged. Nevertheless, one wonders whether the fact that not much changed after baptism raised eyebrows among members of the Church, who had their own agenda, and were distanced enough to watch with a more critical eye.\(^6\)

During the decade between the 1391 conversions and the beginnings of Sant Miquel in 1402, then, the conversos’ collective continuity with the former aljama was reinforced by their relations with its creditors and with the Crown. Since the continuities with the aljama were fundamentally fiscal and administrative, and because conversos belonged to neither the Jewish nor the Christian communities, they lacked access to the welfare and communal institutions that were typically religion-based. Trade confraternities might have offered some support to a just a few converso families, and may not have been reliable. Providing such services for themselves entailed additional taxation to raise communal funds. Sant Miquel thus institutionalized the ad hoc administrative framework that had been used in the wake of 1391 for the purposes of taxation and communal representation—an administration that, admittedly, would be incorrectly described as “makeshift” since it largely replicated aljama governance. Moreover, as a corporate entity with juridical status, the confraternity was able to obtain credit on behalf of the community, thereby bringing conversos into new debt relationships, which once again bound

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\(^6\) As in Valencia, where Vicent Ferrer prompted the city council to decree, in April 1413, that conversos could no longer live in the former Jewish quarter and had to live among Old Christians (Meyerson, *Jewish Renaissance*, 61).
more or less the same families together that had been bound together as part of the *aljama*. Debt, then, linked conversos to one another and reinforced their collective identity. For a many years, too, debt was an indelible stigma of their former Jewish status.

It is somewhat ironic that this dissertation, predicated in part on a rejection of the religious essentialism that has dominated discussions of converso identity, and committed to demonstrating the role of economic pressures in identity-formation, would end by showcasing the converso community as a pious society. Their religious identity, while not something I have delved into deeply here, deserves some comment in this conclusion. However, since the sources used for this dissertation reveal little on the subject, these comments are to be read as preliminary considerations, or directions for future study.

Given that their conversion was forced, it is likely that most conversos had little natural inclination to become practising Catholics. Many, most, perhaps, continued Jewish religious observance more or less secretly, depending on their audience. It is also probable that the first generation(s) of conversos—especially before the Spanish Inquisition publicized edicts of grace in the 1480s that identified certain acts as Judaizing—did not deliberate as carefully as later generations would have when they engaged in certain customs that were considered ritually “Jewish” by outsiders, especially customs surrounding food and domestic life. The varying motivations of conversos to behave in ways that were considered heretical, such as celebrating Passover with Jewish family members, and how the meaning of these practices changed over time, are worth exploring more carefully. Although one risks anachronistic hypotheses, it is at the same time conceivable that simply spending time with family in traditional ways was a central motive to attend a *seder*, not to be dismissed. At the same time, the meaning of the *seder*

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7 A thought-provoking aside: in Latin, to bind again is *religo*.
8 Graizbord raised this issue in his discussions of the problematics of Inquisition records, and of religion versus ethnicity as “categories of analysis” of converso identity (“Religion and Ethnicity”).
and Hagaddah must have been more charged for the generation that lived through 1391. As suspicions about Judaizing spread and the risk of being apprehended became more prevalent, and fatal, the significance of acts such as attending a *seder* altered accordingly. Modern scholars would do well, therefore, to question the meaning of persistence in Jewish customs among the first generation of *conversos*. It may not have necessarily, or exclusively, signalled a resistance to Catholicism, but may have also been a product, as often as not, of persisting relationships, customs, and community—and perhaps even a matter of psychological survival. The nuances are subtle. In any event, and regardless of internal convictions or whether they continued to practice Jewish customs, conversos did endeavour to participate in Christian society. They sought public recognition as equal players in the competition for status with Old Christians, and that was obtained through “Catholic” performances rather than spiritual authenticity. In other words, one needed to be visibly associated with what was already considered honourable and properly Catholic, such as belonging to a confraternity.

If conversos displayed a range of continued fidelity to their former Jewish identity, it would be equally anachronistic—projecting from conclusions more applicable to conversos elsewhere and in later periods—to attribute this fidelity, *as a whole*, to an intellectual, theological, self-conscious decision made by individuals to remain faithful to Judaism as a religion. In addition, one must consider the interplay of other factors promoting Jewish affiliation that were not strictly religious, such as the institutional and economic dynamics, as well as royal policies on which this dissertation focuses. One cannot discount, either, the conversos’ anger and repulsion towards Old Christians following 1391 violence. And yet, as much as the violence and conversions signalled a decisive and traumatic break with their past, once the dust settled, daily life fell swiftly back into earlier patterns, and conversos remained entrenched in the same
behavioural dynamics and relationships as when they were Jews. Both conversos and the Old Christians with whom they interacted observed these patterns, and the latter did not always conform to official policies that prescribed a welcoming attitude towards new converts to enable their transition into the Catholic fold. Nevertheless, despite, and as a result of, Old Chiristians’ apparent ambivalence towards conversos, the latter, as a community, created their own avenue of transition from the old to the new, from Jewish to Catholic communal and insititutional life, through the creation of San Miguel, and quite possibly through other institutions that scholars have not yet become aware of. The story of the conversos in the fifteenth century is not only about the connections to their Jewish past that I have emphasized in this dissertation; it is also about their Christianization, if we can call it that, or perhaps better said, Catholic acculturation, however partial or fragmented it may have been over the first generations.

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