Seeing Like a Racial State:

The Census and the Politics of Race
in the United States, Great Britain and Canada

By

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

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Abstract

This thesis compares the political development of racial categories employed by the United States, Canada and Great Britain on their national censuses, particularly focusing on the enumeration of mixed-race individuals in the late 20th century. Though literature on race and the U.S. census often stresses the causal influence of social mobilization, this analysis reveals that the common explanations for the development of racial classifications such as interest group mobilization, demography and civil rights legislation are not viable in comparative context.

To explore and explain how the racial state sees, this thesis conceptualizes race as a system of power relations and develops a framework of the schematic state, which operates concurrently as both an actor responsible for putting the underlying organizational pattern of race into place, solidifying a particular set of racial meanings, and implementing a scheme for the racial configuration of society, and an arena in which policy alternatives are contested and where the state itself participates among other actors. This characterization demonstrates that the schematizing impetus of the census is not an exemplar of a dichotomous relationship between an all-powerful state and powerless racial subjects; instead, the power and meaning of race exist well beyond the control of the fragmented and sometimes contradictory schematic state, from the transnational realm to the level of the group or individual.
Contrary to the majority of the literature on race, this thesis demonstrates that state institutions do not act for purely domestic reasons; rather, institutions mediate between national nuances and transnational ideas about race that exist in excess of national boundaries. Thus, while the decision to count mixed-race can be explained by a crystallization of transnational ideational trends that are mediated by national politics, the domestic arena of policy making – or the policy network itself – emerges as a key factor that determines the method of multiracial enumeration. However, these domestic political and policy outcomes are not contained by borders. Once a policy is in place, it has the potential to reinforce domestic policy and contribute to the global discourse of race itself – and in its travels among these levels of abstraction, race transforms.
Acknowledgements

You can never see the end from the beginning. And from the beginning through to the bitter end, this project was formed and shaped with the help of those whose mention here is really nothing compared to the footprints they’ve left in the pages that follow.

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I am a work in progress. Onwards.
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<td>AMEA</td>
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<td>BSO</td>
<td>Business Statistics Office, Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACPA</td>
<td>Census Advisory Committee of Professional Associations, United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRE</td>
<td>Commission for Racial Equality, Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistical Office, Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRO(S)</td>
<td>General Registrar’s Office, Scotland</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>Government Statistical Service, Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIRSA</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office for Management and Budget, United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics, Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCS</td>
<td>Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project RACE</td>
<td>Reclassify All Children Equally</td>
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<td>RAETT</td>
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Chapter 1

Invitation

Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.

-- Albert Einstein

The very notion of race is inextricably political. Yet, invoking the phraseology of so-called “politics of race” begs two often inadvertently conflated but separate questions. First, in what ways is politics racial? And second, in what ways is race political?

Politics is concerned with the relationship between state and society and racial politics has historically involved efforts of the state to manage and control racial populations. Thus, the first question immediately brings to mind the histories of politics in white settler societies, imperial powers and the colonies they controlled, which have been saturated with racial anxieties. Policies, laws and regulations designed to maintain a racialized social, political, and economic order permeated the lives of those whose superficial morphological and phenological characteristics betrayed a status of privilege or subjugation. These regulations were often explicitly racial in nature; for example, Jim Crow segregation and anti-miscegenation laws in the

---

1 This dissertation’s use of the terminology of “race” in comparative context (versus, for example, “ethnicity”) is a tricky business. My definition of race will be more fully described and defended later in this chapter and in Chapter 2. For now, it will suffice to say that I am hesitant and often unwilling to use the language of ethnicity in my analysis. Like race, ethnicity is a social signifier of identity, but it is also fundamentally different. Ethnicity, which can overlap and intersect with race, often describes a collectivity with common ancestry, a shared past, culture and language, and a sense of peoplehood or community (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007: 16-20). The importance of race or ethnicity in a given society is context-specific. However, the origins of race are in assignment and categorization, and while ethnicity can have similar beginnings it is more often associated with the assertions of group members (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007: 28). Race is not simply about skin colour and morphological characteristics, but rather should be understood as the signifier of a complex set of power relations: “power is almost invariably an aspect of race; it may or may not be an aspect of ethnicity” (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007: 31). In conducting this research, it seems to me that the use of the language of ethnicity by elites, policy-makers and academics is often used to disguise these power relations and I am wary of furthering this problematic tendency.
United States, the *Indian Act* and racially restrictive immigration policies in Canada, Britain’s colonial enterprise in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, and South African apartheid. Moreover, in these racially stratified societies even those policies that were perhaps superficially neutral in content and purpose were likely to have disparate impacts on different racial populations.

The racialization of politics continues in contemporary times. The transnational flows of people and ideas have created multiracial and multicultural societies around the world. The pervasive transnational norm of human rights, the end of *de jure* discrimination in the United States and elsewhere, and the widespread implementation of anti-discrimination protections in both domestic and international realms have largely failed to eradicate racism and racial disadvantage. Laws and policies continue to invoke race or racial classifications in human rights codes, government programming, and diversity governance, and the redistributive function of the welfare state can work to solidify or erode racial stratification through either government action or inaction. The invocation or avoidance of race can alter voting behaviour or electoral patterns, and the recent Obamafication of the American political landscape has made race an obvious element of elite politics. Politics is also racial for the ways in which society uses, challenges, transforms race to converse with the state. Race informs how participants form preferences, articulate interests and build coalitions. More importantly, as one of the most powerful social signifiers of identity and difference, race works to connect and divide the lives of individuals, encompassing fundamental experiences of self and belonging, consciousness and recognition.

If the first question concerns the role of race in the manifestation of the political, the second challenges us to query the role of politics in constructing race itself. This line of inquiry

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2 Race has always been an obvious element of elite politics. The astronomical rise of Barak Obama has simply made racial politics *painfully and unavoidably* obvious.
is, to my mind, far more interesting, particularly because it may seem somewhat counter-intuitive. Race is usually conceptualized as an apolitical force (McRae, 1979; Wilson, 1993). Though the idea that discrete, separate, and hierarchically-ordered races exist as a matter of biological fact was the dominant ideology in the not-so-distant past, it is now generally acknowledged that race is a social construction – though it has undoubtedly been constructed with incredible permeating power and longevity. However, ample evidence points not just to the social construction of race, but to the instrumental role the state itself has played in the creation of racial identities (King, 1995; Nobles, 2000; Vickers, 2002a; Goldberg, 2002, 2009). For example, Anthony Marx’s (1998) comparative analysis of the United States, Brazil, and South Africa demonstrates that nation-building practices have shaped and been shaped by the construction of race and Ian Haney Lopez’s book *White By Law* (1996) examines the central role played by law in the construction of race and white privilege in the United States. However, race is far from a stable mode of categorization: it has changed through time and space, and though racial identity exists outside of state institutions, racial categories are heavily dependent on official recognition (or lack thereof) by the state. As Rogers Smith (2004) argues, we must examine “how elite political actors, institutions and public politics have not simply been reflecting, expressing, or ‘enacting’ racial identities through much of US history, but instead have been creating and transforming them,” in order to illuminate how strongly race is tied to other manifestations of political power, including divisions and structures of government, the construction of criminal justice systems, education, and the welfare state (Smith, 2004: 45). Race is therefore more than an amorphous social construction: it is fundamentally a political one.

Within this political construction, the categorization of (seemingly distinct) races has invariably played a significant role in the state regulation of racialized individuals and groups.
over time and between contexts. The consequences of the racially-directed state policy that rely on such classifications are undeniable. From the disastrous impacts of apartheid in South Africa to the marginalization of First Nations women in Canada, to race riots in Great Britain and on the beaches of Australia, and the creation of an almost unique sub-class in the urban United States, state-endorsed racial classification schema have been instrumental in shaping political, legal, and vernacular conceptualizations of race and racial difference. Given these lessons of history, the enormous and universally negative consequences of these kinds of policies are clear – what we do not know is why, how, and for what purposes states have created, manipulated, and redefined racial categories over time.

Understanding the political processes involved in the creation of racial categories is particularly important given the increasingly flexible and porous boundaries between racial groups. Increasing immigration and intermarriage rates in most advanced industrialized countries suggest that the mixed-race population is likely to grow exponentially in the coming decades. For example, in Canada alone the mixed-race population increased from 1.2 to 1.5 percent of the population between 2001 and 2006, a growth of 25 percent in just five years (Statistics Canada 2001; 2006). Similarly, multiracial Americans have become the fastest growing demographic group according to the latest census estimates, with Americans who check more than one box on census surveys jumping by 33 percent since the last census (Yen, 2009). How these individuals are defined, categorized, and incorporated within or excluded from racial classificatory schema, civil rights legislation, and policies aimed at alleviating racial discrimination and disadvantage is an unavoidable policy question. Moreover, liberal democratic conceptualizations of equality, social justice and citizenship demand that the superficial phenological and morphological characteristics used to distinguish supposedly distinct races matter not; the self-evident truth of the liberal ideal is that all are created equal.
and should be treated as such. Yet, both the historical legacy and contemporary politics of Western societies are plagued by massive racial inequalities. We now face an unavoidable paradox: on the one hand, classifying and counting by race runs contrary to dominant norms of liberal democracies; on the other, racial statistics provide the sole means of ascertaining and remedying the extent of racial disadvantage.

This dissertation examines these questions and controversies using two focal points to explore/explode the role of race in politics and politics in the construction of race. Examining the political development of racial classifications in national censuses and the enumeration of mixed-race populations therein, this research considers questions that remain unasked and unanswered in both literature and practice: how and why do states define, engineer and manipulate racial categories and classification schema and with what effects?

This study is an invitation to reconsider our understandings of the complex relationship between race and politics. It has four goals, which are introduced briefly below, described more fully in Chapter 2 and demonstrated in the research that follows. First, it seeks to reconceptualize race as a transnational phenomenon that exists in excess of national boundaries. Second, by using mixed-race as a path into the politics of race, it demonstrates that race and mixed-race are integral, rather than incidental, to politics and each other. Thirdly, it explores the census as one site among others in which state action and societal reaction have redefined the meaning of race and varied ways of organizing societies in accordance with these shifting meanings over time. In doing so, the research that follows tests the validity of three commonly posited explanations of census politics – demography, social mobilization, and civil rights legislation. Finally, it develops a model of the schematic state, demonstrating that shifting meanings of race that are fundamentally transnational in nature are filtered through domestic institutions and then rearticulated in the transnational realm.
These goals serve to animate the central thesis of this dissertation. Using a comparative approach to investigate the political development of the racial categories and approaches to the enumeration of mixed-race people employed by the United States, Canada and Great Britain on their national censuses over the past three decades, I argue that transnational ideas about race, the structure of the census policy network and the interaction of agents therein are key factors that determine a state’s decision to count the mixed-race population and its specific approach to multiracial enumeration. In effect, this research emphasizes the linkages between domestic and international contexts, demonstrating that in procuring census policy outcomes state institutions mediate between national nuances and networks on one hand and transnational ideas on the other.

The study stands to make significant theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on race in political science and beyond. It challenges conventional understandings of race and mixed-race in a number of ways: its specific focus on mixed-race as a symptom of the greater illness of the regulation of racial categories is both timely and original, given the growing multiracial population in these diverse societies. Further, it will lead to new insights about the constructed nature of racial categories exactly at the points where classification schema collapse and racial categorizations prove to be insufficient. It also challenges domestic explanations for institutional racial categorizations, rejecting American exceptionalism in the sphere of problematic race relations and exemplifying the ways in which race can be studied in comparative context. By focusing on the census as a policy sphere, it adds significantly more detail and insight to the political processes involved in the creation of racial policies and makes original claims about both the causes and effects of these processes. This research ultimately demonstrates that racial discourses exist in excess of national boundaries, making no state
immune to the global processes by which ideas about race and mixed-race manifest, shape and are shaped by domestic practices.

The Nature of Race

For most of its history since the inception of the term in the West, race has been understood as being rooted in biology. Phenological and morphological characteristics such as skin colour, eye shape and size, nose width, and hair texture were the tell-tale signs that distinguished races from one another. Far from innocuous, race was perceived as determinative – one’s moral worth and human potential was a corollary of his or her racial identity. The calamitous history of race is one of assignment and hierarchization. F. James Davis (1991) argues that the ideology of biological racialism consists of five key beliefs, all of which scientists now generally agree to be false: (1) some races are physically superior to others and can be ranked from strongest to weakest based on differences in longevity and rates of selected diseases; (2) some races are mentally superior to others and can be ranked from most to least intelligent; (3) race causes culture, to the extent that each race’s distinct culture is genetically transmitted along with physical traits; (4) race determines temperamental dispositions and behaviours of individuals within racial groups; and (5) racial mixing lowers the biological quality of all (Davis, 1991: 23-25). Mixed-race is simultaneously fundamental to but problematic within this paradigm. In the age of scientific racism, the fertility and longevity of mixed-race progeny were critical for assessing the validity of doctrines of racial superiority and inferiority (Young, 1995). But the many forms of racial transgressions were discursively disruptive to the gendered and racial

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3 This is not to suggest that the biological construction of race was or is a coherent paradigm or ideology. It certainly has morphed over time, varied between places and often relied on principles and belief systems that were far more inconsistent than this general label suggests. See Stanton (1960), Jordan (1968), Gossett (1970), Frederickson (1971; 2002), Gould (1981), Stepan (1982), Barkan (1992), Young (1995), Hannaford (1996), Baum (2006), Smedley (2007).
configurations that relied on the coherence of racial and colonial regimes – concubinage, prostitution, rape, love and/or marriage across colour lines, "going native," and non-white inheritance rights (Winant, 2001: 115; see also McClintock, 1995; Stoler 1995, 2002; Hodes, 1997; Levine, 2003; Pascoe, 2009). Just as the content of racial categories constantly defies its assigned boundaries, the legal and political racial order was and is continually being challenged and traversed. Multiraciality itself is also highly problematic for unfettered beliefs in racial hierarchies, as the most important thing about races was the boundaries between them – those on top of the hierarchy had to work actively to keep those on the lower rungs from surreptitiously advancing (Spickhard, 1992: 15).

Most in the social sciences agree that race exists as a powerful social phenomenon – in other words, as a social construction. Lopez (1994) argues that there are four important facets to the social construction of race: humans rather than abstract social forces produce races; as human constructs, race is an integral part of a wider social fabric that includes gender and class relations; the meaning-systems surrounding race change quickly rather than slowly; and races are constituted relationally, by comparison to one another, rather than in isolation (1994: 28). Within this construction, race has become common sense, though only insofar as we continue to invest morphology with meaning (Fields, 1990). Regardless of its constructed nature, race is commonly perceived as a "lived experience" – while the concept itself may refer to a path-dependent illusion, racial identities carry discursive value and determine material advantage and limitations. To this end, it is necessary to take heed W.I Thomas's famous dictum that if people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences (Winant, 1994: 16).

4 Some also reject this position because arguing that race is a social construction still, to some extent, invokes its biological roots. For example, Appiah suggests that to subscribe to the socio-historical conceptualization of race "is simply to bury the biological conception of race below the surface, not to transcend it" (Appiah, 1986: 34).
Two modifications of this brief conceptualization of race, more fully explained in Chapter 2 and demonstrated throughout this study, are central to all that follows. First, I contend that race is a set of power relations and practices, animated by social actors and the state. This is a marked departure from, for example, Winant’s (2000; 2001) often cited definition, which posits race as “a concept that signifies and symbolizes socio-political conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race appeals to biologically based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for the purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process. There is no biological basis for distinguishing human groups along the lines of ‘race’...” (Winant, 2001: 317. n.1; emphasis in original). Similarly, I contend that the concept of race is neither objective nor neutral and absolutely nothing about race is biological. The reference to corporeal differences within its construction – as exemplified above by Winant – is part and parcel of the social construction of race. Not only are skin colour and other morphological characteristics insufficient to delineate between different races, but their invocation is fundamentally part of the construct itself.

There is power in naming and in making and manipulating meanings; embedded in multiple practices of state and society, race is under constant (re)articulation and (re)negotiation. For example, Thomas Holt offers an anecdote in the introduction of his book, *The Problem of Race in the 21st Century*, in which he describes the family of his paternal grandmother as possessing “white” phenotypes and argues that it took all the king’s horses and all the king’s men – anti-miscegenation laws, census takers, a vigilant Bureau of Vital Statistics that enforced racial boundaries in issuing birth certificates and marriage licenses, job discrimination, legal segregation in housing and education, and if all else failed, lynch mobs, to make – and keep – the white-skinned Waltons black (Holt, 2000: 11-12). The extraordinary
regulation of race and the system of control invoked in the name of race are indicative of the repressive power relations that have often characterized its manifestations. Race is, in many ways, similar to the disciplining power Foucault so often wrote of:

The bourgeoisie is not interested in the mad, but is interested in power over the mad; the bourgeoisie is not interested in the sexuality of children, but is interested in the system of power that controls the sexuality of children. The bourgeoisie does not give a damn about delinquents, or about how they are punished or rehabilitated, as that is of no great economic interest. On the other hand, the set of mechanisms whereby delinquents are controlled, kept track of, punished and reformed does generate a bourgeoisie interest that functions within the economic-political system as a whole (Foucault, 2003: 33).

However, in Foucault’s formulation, power is never wholly negative or a completely dominating force; it instead permeates social interaction and produces subjects, meanings and discourse. It creates knowledge and attempts to create and maintain a monopoly over truth, making the very process in which meanings and labels are fixed in discursive formulations or vernacular understandings a powerful tool in the demarcation of racial others. For example, in Ariela Gross’s (2009) analysis of trials of racial identity in American history, she argues that racial categories were created and enforced in a range of ways throughout the legal system, with racial boundaries and the determination of racial identity being far less decisive than the often-assumed universal application of the “one-drop rule” (2009: 297). Her focus on changing evidentiary standards in the determination of racial identity demonstrates that “race was created and re-created every day though the workings of community institutions and individuals in daily life” (2009: 10). For example, she demonstrates that in the colonial period

5 “If power were never anything but repressive, if it never had anything to do but say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t weigh on us as a force that says no, but it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge and produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression” (Foucault, 1980: 119).
racial identity relied on documented ancestry; this would change as the institution of slavery became more contested, with courts increasingly scrutinizing how individuals “performed”. Civic participation and property ownership could determine white racial identity for men, while sexual virtue set the standards for whiteness for women. Race is clearly more than supposed biological differences or state-derived modes of classification. It is encompassed in ideas and ideologies about how society should operate how social order should be maintained, animated through many and varied practices and relationships of power.

Secondly, race is a global phenomenon that exceeds national boundaries. Race was born in the transnational realm, linked with and rearticulated by the major transnational movements of the modern era – the global slave trade, abolitionism, Social Darwinism, eugenics, suffrage, Keynesianism, human rights, the anti-apartheid movement, and the new politics of terrorism of the 21st century, to name but a few. Hesse (2007) argues that it was “between the modern regulatory vectors of structural administration within the colonies and discursive authorizations from the metropoles that the category of race becomes instituted and naturalized around the boundaries between colour coded European sameness and non-European otherness” (2007: 652). Smith’s (2004) contention that race has been politically constructed so as to naturalize and legitimate inequalities and hierarchy can be applied on an imagined global scale. When W.E.B. Du Bois predicted that the problem of the 20th century would be the problem of the colour line, he was actually referring to a global colour line, “the relations of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea” (Du Bois, 1903: 13). In contemporary times, multiracial and multicultural movements are simultaneously local and global, taking on a “characteristic specificity in the context of local, national, and state conditions, globally influenced and textured” (Goldberg, 2009: 15). Chapter 6 will explore several mechanisms, such as the manifestation of race-encompassing norms in international organizations and more ubiquitously in the transnational
sphere, modifications to the incentive structures for state action or inaction because of changing perceptions of legitimacy, transnational awareness among decision-makers in epistemic communities, and the proliferation of diasporic identities, in which the transnational idea of race subsists and works to alter nationally-specific interpretations of the meaning of race and the organization of societies in accordance with these changing meanings.

**Race/Mixed-Race**

This dissertation explores the political development of race and racial categories; I understand this endeavour to necessarily involve considering those who have historically crossed, transgressed, straddled, and disrupted racial boundaries. As Balibar (1991) has noted, boundaries and frontiers are sites of both enclosure and contact, and racial boundaries are no exception. However, using the terminology of “mixed-race” carries dangerous potential, as much of the literature has illustrated; that is, even self-identifying oneself as mixed-race does, to a certain extent, essentialize and reify the idea of race as a biological truism. Ann Laura Stoler (2002), for example, calls the mixed-race offspring of Dutch colonialists and Indonesian natives the *métissage* while Jayne Ifekwunigwe (1997) uses *métis(se)*, both of which are attempts to demonstrate the fluidity of hybridized racial identities and to resist essentialist frameworks. The vernacular designation of mixed-race is contingent on location: in the contemporary United States and Canada, “mixed-race,” “biracial,” or “multiracial” are often used while “hybrid,” “dual heritage,” or “mixed parentage” are more likely to appear in the British context. The application of mixed-race to Aboriginal peoples is usually avoided. In Canada, for example, mixed-race Aboriginal people are identified as “non-status” Indians in accordance with the regulatory regime designed to manage and control the indigenous population of that country. There are also terms which refer to specific groups that identify as “mixed”; for example, the Coloureds in
South Africa and the Métis of Canada are both groups that find their origins in white/non-white intermixture, but have since become recognized (racial) groups. This project will use “mixed-race” to describe identity categories, choices, individuals and groups that are derived from relationships between two or more racial groups in either the biological or social construction of race. I acknowledge the semantic difficulties of so doing and aim to avoid essentialist language. However, a paramount aim for this project is to confer the centrality of race – a focus that becomes blurred and often ignored when terminologies such as métissage or dual heritage are employed.

This project began with mixed-race as a focal point. Throughout the research process, however, I increasingly came to realize that mixed-race is not unique or different from race, but integral to it. This lens simply brings into sharper focus the contradictory nature of category-making. Just as Stoler (2002) examines the making of implicit and explicit colonial categories that were “fixed and fluid, precise and protean, received and malleable, all at the same time,” this research also interrogates the juxtaposition between the “fixity of categories and the fluidity of their content” (2002: 8) by examining how racial boundaries and categories become fixed, standardized, and normalized through state action.

The institutional regulation of mixed-race is a striking example of the state’s power in shaping racial classifications for several reasons. First, documented historical evidence demonstrates an institutional concern with the existence of mixed-race progeny in varied contexts throughout the world, including but not limited to Indonesia (Stoler, 2002), Australia (Wolfe, 2001), Canada (Van Kirk, 2002; Freeman, 2003), the United States (Williamson, 1980; Davis, 1991; Root, 1996; Spencer, 2006), Great Britain and her colonies in Africa (Young, 1995; Hall, 2002; Bland, 2005), the Caribbean (Heuman, 1981; Hall, 2002), Germany (Adams, 1990; Weikart, 2004), India (Ballhatchet, 1980; Ghosh, 2006), South Africa (McClintock, 1995) and
Brazil (Marx, 1998; Daniel, 2006). In fact, it seems that in any country where supposedly distinct races live in close proximity, there has been concern (mostly espoused by the dominant group) about racial intermixing. Secondly, this concern has sometimes, but not always, led to state regulation of mixed-race identities – whether it be the preventing the potential for mixed-race progeny by prohibiting interracial sex and marriage, or by designating mixed-race offspring in a particular (mono-racial) way so as to keep the boundary lines separating the races clear. Thirdly, since most racially diverse countries suffer from institutionalized racial inequality, the state's classification of mixed-race implicates the exercise of state power in the maintenance or elimination of hierarchies based on race. Fourth, gender, the family, class relations, and the regulation of intimate life are heavily connected with the classification of racial identities. This is the case not simply because anti-miscegenation laws were a purposeful state regulation of intimate affairs, but also because patriarchy, capitalism and white supremacy are interlocking and mutually reinforcing systems of domination and as such the categorization of mixed-race implicates not just race relations, but gender and class relations as well. And finally, the regulation of mixed-race is a striking example of the state’s power in shaping racial classificatory regimes particularly because racial intermixture represents the points at which categories come undone and race is most clearly illustrated as a social and political construction.

**Race and the Census in the United States, Great Britain and Canada**

In the history of race relations, censuses are perhaps one of the least coercive instruments of state control. This does not mean, however, that censuses are the neutral data-collecting instruments that demographers purport them to be. Rather, as numerous scholars have demonstrated (Nobles, 2000; Mezey, 2003; Hodes, 2006; Hochschild and Powell, 2008)
Censuses have historically contributed to the determination of institutional boundaries around races. Races are defined in national censuses according to rules and directives made by the state, even in an era of self-identification. How, and whether or not, mixed-race people are enumerated in national censuses, therefore, is a striking example of the state's power in shaping racial classificatory regimes particularly because racial intermixture is consistently perceived as problematic in the eyes of the state, going against “neat” classificatory schema and illustrating in unequivocal terms the unavoidable and irreducible complexities of identity.

Neither race nor census politics are often studied in comparative context. Rather, each is perceived as a solely domestic concern, whose political development can be attributed to history, social mobilization, demography, and the specific circumstances surrounding race relations in a particular country. However, the political development of racial classifications on national censuses in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain in the last decades of the 20th century confers an interesting puzzle. Canada included a question on race on its census in for the first time in 1996, adopting the same multiple-response approach that had been in effect for its question on ethnicity. Great Britain implemented three stand-alone mixed-race categories on its census in 2001 – an approach the US rejected – after including a question on ethnicity for the first time in 1991. The United States adopted a “multiple response” approach to racial classification, thus allowing for the enumeration of mixed-race for the first time in 2000. In short, all three cases converged on two fronts: all implemented a direct question on race by the mid-1990s, and all made efforts to “count” mixed-race on their censuses as never before. However, there is also policy variation: though there is a broad convergence in the decision to enumerate the mixed-race population, the cases diverged in their distinctive approaches to

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doing so. Though the shift to a “mark one or more” approach in the United States is largely attributed to the actions of a social movement that pushed Congress for the change (Nobles, 2000; Williams, 2006), parallel developments occurred in both Canada and the UK without the presence of a politically active civil society devoted to multiracial incorporation in the census.

These circumstances invigorate five research questions: (1) What drives state-based racial classifications and categorizations? (2) What factors were involved in the decision to implement the direct questions on race? (3) Why count mixed-race at this point in time? (4) What explains the implementation of the case’s particular approach in the enumeration of mixed-race? (5) What explains the broad convergence of a) asking a direct question on race and b) the decision to enumerate mixed-race, but the divergent approaches utilized in these cases in the classification and categorization of the mixed-race population?

This research seeks to explore and explain three dependent variables. The first is the political development of a direct question on race. Here, I make an analytical distinction between census questions that identify populations according to race and those that focus on ethnic origin, ancestry or identity. This differentiation is particularly justified given that two of the three cases – Canada and the US – have distinct questions on race and ethnicity in their censuses. Britain’s “ethnic question” conflates racial and ethnic signifiers, but as the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys itself has noted, “the census ethnic categories are essentially racial” (OPCS, 1996: 40; emphasis added). Table 1.1 demonstrates that in spite of initial variation, by 1996 all three cases had implemented a direct question on race in their national censuses.
Table 1.1 – Direct question on race in national census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Round</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>No (1991)/Yes (1996)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second and third dependent variables, the decision to enumerate the mixed-race population and the approaches used for doing so, are closely related. However, there are distinct processes involved in a state’s decision to count the mixed-race as mixed-race and its discussion of which is the most viable alternative for the multiracial population’s enumeration.

The approach used to count mixed-race may take several forms: imposed mono-classification (whereby a mixed-race person is designated as a particular racial group by an external observer); self-identified mono-classification (whereby a mixed-race person designates him/herself as a particular racial group using a “single response,” whether by choice or in accordance with the rules of census classifications); self-identified mixed classification (whereby census classifications allow a mixed-race person to identify as “mixed,” “biracial,” or “multiracial”) or self-identified multiple classification (whereby a mixed-race person may designate himself as belonging to more than one racial group, currently known as the “multiple response” or “mark one or more” approach). Imposed mono-classification was used in the censuses of Canada and the US during the first half of the 20th century, before the principle of racial self-identification was normalized in census-taking processes in the 1970s. The

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7 For example, the variation in racial categorizations in the US census is paralleled by the astounding variation in the enumeration of mixed-race people. Mixed-race people have been classified: (a) as a separate and distinct racial group such as “mulatto,” “quadroon,” “octoroon,” and “part Hawaiian”; (b) by equating their race to that of the subordinate (non-white) group; (c) in accordance with the rule of hypodescent (also known as the “one drop” rule), in which the racial designation of mixed-race people is equated with that of the subordinate (non-white) racial group for potentially infinite generations; (d) according to matrilineal or patrilineal descent; (e) designated as an “other race”; (f) through self-identification with only one prescribed racial designation; and (g) most recently, through the self-identification with more than one prescribed racial designation.
fundamental distinction between self-identified mono-classification (the “single response” approach) and self-identified mixed or multiple classifications is a matter of choice: can mixed-race people identify as mixed-race if they so choose?\(^8\) Table 1.2 illustrates the variation and convergence over time in the three cases on these terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Round</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Single response</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple response (1996)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Multiple response</td>
<td>Multiple response</td>
<td>Mixed-race categories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These approaches to multiracial enumeration clearly have different statistical consequences. However, a discussion of the efficacy of various questions on race or a measurement of the efficiency of each approach is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nor is the study a systematic analysis of why particular groups are included or excluded on censuses at a given point in time. I instead analyze the decision to include a direct question on race, the political development of racial categories broadly speaking and the enumeration of multiraciality as aspects of the schematizing imperative of the state.

**The Schematic State**

This research agenda involves bringing together many disparate strands of academic scholarship, some of which rarely speak the same language. In Chapter 2, I engage with

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\(^8\) Each of the censuses of this study – over time and between contexts – incorporates a free-text field (or mark-in space) labeled “Other” in which respondents could describe their race as they see fit. Because these options are common among the cases, and because they are not specifically designed to illicit responses from mixed-race respondents, I have largely excluded them as elements of the dependent variables.
dominant theoretical paradigms of political science that seek to explain the causal roles of institutions and ideas. Briefly, historical institutionalism provides a useful rubric for studying race, which has largely been (re)produced through extraordinary state regulation. The ideational literature of political science is also helpful for conceptualizing race, which is one of modernity's most tenacious, powerful, and influential ideas. The analysis in Chapter 6 employs Omi and Winant's (1994) notion of racial projects to uncover the ways in which macro shifts in the meanings of race are connected to various ways of organizing societies and I also utilize the literature on policy-making in Chapter 7 to disaggregate the state and examine more micro-level processes involved in the determination of policy alternatives and outcomes. These components are housed together under a theoretical framework that I have called the schematic state.

This framework is derived primarily from the work of Benedict Anderson (1991), David Theo Goldberg (2002), James Scott (1998), and Peggy Pascoe (2009). Benedict Anderson (1991) suggests that the imaginings of the confusedly classifying mind of the colonial state relied on the census, map and museum as totalizing classificatory grids that enabled the state “to say of anything that it was this, not that; it belonged here, not there,” thus making fluctuating and transgressive identities that rarely fit their imposed labels bound, determinate, and therefore countable (1991: 184). James Scott (1998) also emphasizes the importance of state projects of simplification and legibility, arguing that typologies themselves are indispensable to statecraft, driven by political motives of appropriation, control, and manipulation: “the modern state, through its officials, attempts with varying success to create a terrain and a population with precisely those standardized characteristics that will be easiest to monitor, count, assess, and manage” (1998: 81-82).

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Interested in the development of the modern state and techniques of statecraft, Scott and Anderson do not account for the contemporary state. Similarly, Goldberg (2002) and Pascoe (2009) are concerned with the state’s creation of racial categories and its enforcement of racial oppression. Their analyses are concerned with the racial state as a distinctively modern social formation (Goldberg, 2002: 148) or of the bureaucratization of racial categories during the era of *de jure* racial discrimination (Pascoe, 2009). Yet, when compared to the inception of the nation-state or the era of Jim Crow, racial politics at the end of the 20th century are markedly different in some ways and disturbingly similar in others. Explicitly racist laws and policies are now widely perceived as illegitimate state action, but the state’s reliance on the racial categories it developed in order to demarcate, exclude and control remains. The framework of the schematic state seeks to understand and explain this paradox of the liberal state, asking why the state has historically involved itself in the creation of racial taxonomies and why it continues their proliferation. In other words, how does the racial state see its subjects?

I posit that state is fundamentally *schematic*. Race exists beyond the reach of the state, both in terms of its transnational nature and its activation through everyday practices and individuals’ subjectivities. The meaning of race is fluid and often in flux, and state fictions backed by bureaucratic administration, jurisprudence, laws, and policies transform the reality they claim to simply observe, “although never so thoroughly as to precisely fit the grid” (Scott, 1998: 24). A primary goal of the schematic state is to make the population legible – whether or not this function later serves to exclude, manage, control and oppress depends on timing and context. However, in its schematizing the state determines spaces of legality and illegality, acceptability and abnormality. In implicating the root-word “scheme,” I suggest that at times the state may be duplicitous or act in insidious ways. The racial project of the census quantifies
race in order to justify positive action designed to eradicate circumstances of racial disadvantage, but in doing so the state effectively absolves itself of any responsibility for creating and maintaining conditions of racial inequality and is comfortable in its contradictory role of combating racism in some ways while supporting it in others.

The schematic state operates concurrently on two fronts, explored further in Chapter 2. Invoking "schematic" as an adjective, I contend that the state is an actor responsible for putting the underlying organizational pattern of race into place, solidifying a particular set of racial meanings and developing and implementing a scheme for the racial configuration of society. Race, however, exists beyond the reach of the schematic state, which cannot fully contain or control its actualization. Using “schematic” as a noun, I conceptualize the schematic state as a site where policy alternatives are contested and where the state itself participates among other actors. However, I do not consider the state to be a monolithic entity. It is comprised of many different moving parts that have varying priorities and agendas and the boundaries of state and society, particularly in the age of governance and deliberative democracy, are rarely clearly delineated. This framework permits a more nuanced analysis of the dual role of the state as both an arena and a (potentially fragmented set of) actor(s) within that arena. Applied to census policies, this characterization demonstrates that the schematizing impetus of the census is not an exemplar of a dichotomous relationship between an all-powerful state and powerless racial subjects; instead, the power and meaning of race exist well beyond the control of the schematic state, from the transnational realm to the level of the group or individual. And in its travels among these levels of abstraction, race transforms.
Argument and Organization of Dissertation

This dissertation will argue and demonstrate that census categories are not the neutral tools of demographers and racial categories are neither obvious nor innocently demarcated. Rather, racial categorizations in national censuses can be considered a racial project, informed by a labyrinth of ideas and interests that often collide with the attempts of the schematic state to simplify and classify according to race. Three commonly-assumed drivers of census categorizations – demography, social mobilization, and civil rights legislation – help to inform debates and outcomes in census politics, but as causal variables in parsimonious relationships they tell a partial and incomplete story. They rarely speak to the state's role in making race, and their narrowed focus as purely domestic drivers overlooks the complexities of race.

Race is a transnational phenomenon. Ideas about race exist in excess of national boundaries and there is a dynamic relationship between global and domestic realms. Transnational norms are constantly evolving and morphing precisely because of the ways in which they are adopted and institutionalized in national contexts. The post-World War II era has witnessed two distinct “moments” in which the meaning of race and the way in which societies organize themselves in accordance with this established meaning have shifted. The effects of schematic state's reaction to this change, interceded by nationally-specific circumstances, do not stay bound by national borders; there is a reciprocal relationship between the domestic and transnational, in which both continually influence the other in constitutive ways. More specifically, changing transnational norms in the post-war era shifted the normative context surrounding the meaning of race, changing the terms of the debate in such a way that perceptions of democratic legitimacy in the Anglophone West depended in part on the state’s acknowledgement and attempt to rectify circumstances of racial disadvantage. This shift was mediated by schematic state and domestic nuances, which together produced a
change in governmental approaches to racial enumeration in the United States, from *counting to dominate and control* to *counting to justify positive action*. The successes of the US civil rights movement and the new use of census data to monitor and combat racial discrimination in turn influenced the transnational norm itself, which contributed to a shift in the approaches to racial enumeration in Canada and the UK by the 1980s, to that of *not counting in the name of multiculturalism*. These circumstances feed into second repetition of this pattern, in which the last decades of the 20th century were marked by another transnational shift. Though it is not as clear or well-defined as the post-war era, the multicultural moment is characterized by new models and paradigms of diversity governance, which, again, refocused the meaning of race and the ways in which societies organize themselves along racial lines. When mediated by the schematic state and domestic politics, this shift aligned the approach to racial enumeration in all three cases to one of *counting to justify positive action*. These cases also converged in their use of racial enumeration to promote a diverse national identity, *counting in the name of multiculturalism*, featuring a discursive construction of *multiracial multiculturalism*, in which powerful norms around the “problem” mixed-race, miscegenation, and rules of hypodescent begin to disintegrate and are replaced by alternative rearticulations of multiraciality.

A state’s decision to count its multiracial population does not determine what method it will employ for doing so. In order to examine how policy-makers propose and evaluate alternatives and come to decisions about the approaches will be employed in the enumeration of mixed-race, the census is conceptualized as a policy sphere inhabited by elites, bureaucrats, “experts,” data users, academics, interest groups, and members of the public. Who gets a seat at the table within this policy universe, the relative power or influence of its denizens and how they connect ideas about race to their preferred method of organization are at the crux of the production of the racial project of the census. Using Marsh and Smith’s (2000) dialectical
approach to policy networks, I argue that macro-level structures such as ideas and institutions shape the scope and power of policy networks and that processes of network policy formation institutionalize path-dependencies and access points for network participants. This network structure combines with the interaction of agents within the policy network – their skills, bargaining and resources – to lead to the various policy outcomes of these cases. In short, path dependencies arising from previous modes of racial enumeration constrain the Canadian and American states in particular ways and the relatively closed nature of British and Canadian policy networks limit societal involvement while the open structure of the classification review process of the 1990s in the United States allowed far more interest group participation.

The dissertation is organized as follows. The second chapter of the study introduces the theoretical frameworks used to orient its questions and findings. It situates this research in a number of different strands of literature, including historical institutionalism, ideational scholarship, and the array of research on race, mixed-race and the state. It introduces two conceptual lenses for exploring the census as both a racial project and a policy sphere and further develops the framework of the schematic state. The chapter concludes with a discussion of case selection and methodology.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide detailed within-case analyses of each of three countries of this study. Beginning with the United States (Chapter 3), and then moving on to Great Britain (Chapter 4), and Canada (Chapter 5), these empirical chapters demonstrate that a reliance on commonly-held domestic drivers of census politics – demography, civil rights legislation, and social mobilization – provides a partial and incomplete account of the complicated nuances of census politics.
Chapter 6 argues that since World War II two distinct transnational “moments” have worked to shift the meaning of race and have informed the ways in which states racially organize their societies. It traces evolving approaches to racial enumeration in the three cases, demonstrating that while the US shifted from counting to dominate and control to counting to justify positive action, Canada and the UK implemented an approach that can best be described as not counting in the name of multiculturalism. By the 2000 census round, all three converged in their use of racial enumeration to justify positive action and to promote a diverse national identity, featuring a discursive construction of multiracial multiculturalism, in which powerful norms around the “problem” of mixed-race begin to disintegrate and are replaced by alternative rearticulations of multiraciality. It provides a more dynamic telling of both the changing meaning of race and the aftermath thereof, revealing that transnational norms are constantly evolving and morphing precisely because of the ways in which they are adopted and institutionalized in national contexts.

Finally, Chapter 7 considers the processes that inform policy alternatives and outcomes. It argues that macro-level structures such as transnational ideas and domestic institutions shape the scope and power of policy networks, processes of network formation institutionalized path-dependencies and access points for actors, and that these network structures, when combined with agent interactions therein, are key factors that lead to the policy outcomes of these cases.
This dissertation seeks to both question and explore the role of race in politics and the role of politics in the construction of race. It is unabashedly inductive in nature, with the intention of contributing to theorizations of the multifaceted relationship between race and the state. There are two implications of using an inductive, puzzle-and surprise-driven logic of inquiry. First, the aforementioned theorizations of race and the state exist in the plural. The interdisciplinary literature on race politics does not have one coherent theory or model that can be applied and tested through deductive analysis or reshaped and refined through inductive approaches. Rather, insights about the nature of race and racial difference have been incremental and cumulative, with a vast array of empirically- and theoretically-driven work from anthropology, law, sociology, history, geography, English, political science, cultural studies and a host of other academic disciplines forming a body of knowledge that defies disciplinary xenophobia. This interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary thrust is a step in the right direction in my opinion, but carries with it the serious cost that an organized, well-defined, or dominant theoretical framework is infeasible. The second implication of the inductive nature of this study is that the starting point of this dissertation has always been the empirical data. Based on my preliminary empirical research, I began this study with a few assumptions and expectations (though I will not go so far as to call them hypotheses), which have shaped how this research has unfolded; four bear mentioning here.

First, I began this project without a definition of race. Though I, like other academics committed to antiracist principles and scholarship, clearly do not adhere to the argument that race is inherently biological – and thus, biologically determinative – I find uncritical references
to the “social construction of race” amorphous – and therefore troubling. What do we mean by “the social”? Who is doing the constructing, and is he/she/it/they doing so intentionally or accidentally? Is this construction an edifice of brick or sand? I started this dissertation with the intention of seeking out answers – or beginnings of answers – to these questions. I also began with the belief that exploring the state as a site (to be sure, among many others) in which the definition of race is manipulated and moulded was an important contribution to unpacking this notion of the “social construction” of race. I recognize that for a dissertation that is fundamentally about race, my lack of a clear definition from the outset may seem odd. On the other hand, the fact that I began without a definition speaks to my suspicions about the very nature of race, which will be discussed further below.

Second, I view the notion of mixed-race as integral, rather than incidental, to race. The history of mixed-race is not unique, different or a corollary of the history of racial ideas. Rather, they are one and the same. Indeed, the history of race has been marked by the multiple ways in which mixed-race – as an idea and a population – has at times challenged and at other times supported and reified classification schema, discrete racial categories, biological determinism and the surveillance and policing of racial boundaries. Mixed-race provides a telling path into the study of race. Using mixed-race as a vantage point to question, explore, interrogate and analyze the meaning of race will also uncover some problematic normalities inherent in contemporary conceptualizations of race and racialism, including the unrepentant belief in racial categories, assumptions about where racial boundaries lie and who controls their location, whether these defining lines are porous or rigid, and issues surrounding who resides in which categories and with what consequences.

To empirically ground the first and second points, I turn to my third: the examination of race as substantiated through national censuses. Like other scholars before me (Nobles, 2000;
question the assumption that censuses are simply the neutral tools of data collection and
demographers. From the outset, I understood censuses as clear examples of the purposeful
construction of racial boundaries in particulars ways and the manipulation of these boundaries
to suit particular interests. Just precisely what these “particulars” were, however, was
something I intended to explore. I sought to understand the census as an area of state and
societal (inter)action, not dissimilar from other, more hotly contested policy areas. And yet, the
language of public policy is not often used to describe the census. In this chapter, I will make the
case to call the census a policy sphere or subsystem and will examine it as a site where race is
made and manipulated. This focus depends on a nuanced understanding of the difference
between race and racialism.¹ I am less concerned, for example, with who counts as Asian in
Canada versus the United States or Great Britain, than I am with the question of why the state
views Asian as a category to be counted and the political battles over the power to define the
Asian population.

Fourth, my preliminary research suggested that ideas and institutions somehow
mattered in race politics (Bleich, 2002, 2003; Lieberman, 2002; 2005; King and Smith, 2005) –
the real question is how. Political scientists have recently afforded more attention to the causal
role of ideational variables in explaining political outcomes (Hall, 1989; Goldstein and Keohane,
1993; Berman, 1998; McNamera, 1998; Walsh, 2000; Lieberman, 2002; Steinmo, 2003; Hay,
2004). Often using historical institutionalism as its theoretical foundations (Hall, 1989; Sikkink,
1991; Hansen and King, 2001), the core of this theory is that ideas infiltrate institutions, help

¹ I use the word “racialism” to describe the tendency to categorize peoples according to generalizable “racial” traits (Appiah,
1990; Goldberg, 2009). This term is important in distinguishing, for example, antiracism from antiracialism. While antiracism
has been defined as a stance against the imposed conditions or set of conditions that occur as the result of racism,
antiracialism involves taking a stance against the act of categorizing populations into racial groups (Goldberg, 2009: 10-17).
Antiracialism may or may not be antiracist (and, in some cases, may be operationalized to achieve racist goals), just as
antiracism may or may not be antiracial.
shape actors’ interests and preferences and have a causal influence on political outcomes.² The insights of this literature can be readily applied to the study of race, a concept that can be considered one of modernity's longest lasting, most powerful and most influential ideas (Jordan, 1968; Frederickson, 1971; Goldberg, 1993; Gilroy, 2000; Baum, 2006; Smedley, 2007). The major eras that have shaped our world have also coincided with shifting ideas and norms about how society should be divided and organized, and which populations should rule and be ruled. Modern thought, the age of empire and imperialism, the global slave trade, colonization and conquest, industrialization, the rise of scientific racism, the abolitionist movement, the US Civil War, Darwin's theory of evolution, the competing nationalisms of the First World War, the eugenics movement, the Great Depression, the Holocaust, decolonization, the civil rights movement, globalization, neo-liberalism, the end of apartheid, the emergence of and retreat from multiculturalism, and the politics of terrorism of the 21st century have all created, utilized and changed ideas about race. In particular, the transnational discourses of decolonization and human rights that emerged from the aftermath of the Second World War and especially the civil rights movement of the United States and its international reverberations certainly disrupted (though did not fundamentally change or disintegrate) the racial politics of old. Democratic societies found themselves in a position where their legitimacy on the international stage and their claims about the virtues of democracy in the global struggle between ideological systems depended in part on the state’s acknowledgement and attempt to rectify circumstances of racial disadvantage. This change precipitated a major shift in a number of policy arenas, including the census.

² Berman (2001) states that ideational literature concerns itself with three distinct theoretical questions: (1) how do new ideas rise to political prominence, and why do individuals or groups trade old beliefs for new ones?; (2) how do ideas become embedded in organizations, patterns of discourse, and collective identities, thereby taking on a life of their own separate from the original conditions that gave rise to them?; and (3) what specific causal pathways connect ideational variables to particular political outcomes? (2001: 233). The challenge of this literature, readily acknowledged by most scholars of the field, is to find methods by which ideas can be isolated as analytically consequential for political structures and outcomes.
Race is more than an idea; the extraordinary state involvement in the regulation and management of race points to its intrinsic connection to institutions. Institutions are broadly defined as “the rules of the game,” that structure relationships between the state and society (Hall, 1986; March and Olsen, 1989; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Historical institutionalism is concerned with discovering the ways in which institutions shape power relations and inequalities among groups in society by focussing on processes of politics and policy-making (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 7). This literature is helpful for studying race, which has largely been (re)produced through a labyrinth of state action and societal reaction. The state creation and imposition of racial classifications is a project of institutional simplification and legibility. As Scott (1998) points out, typologies are indispensable to statecraft, and in turn shape the social understandings of political actors and social groups. Thelen (1999) notes that we cannot take the interests of political actors as a given; instead we should ask “how groups originally got constituted in the particular ways they did [and] how this affects the groups’ understandings and pursuit of their own interests” (1999: 395). Identities become entrenched through the state and state and society become intertwined in mutually constitutive and fragmenting ways (Cairns, 1986). The influence of state-derived racial categorizations is a prime example of this

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3 Hall and Taylor (1996) review three strands of new institutionalism: historical, rational choice, and sociological. Generally speaking, new institutionalism argues that institutions shape outcomes, contending that institutions should be treated as independent, or key intervening, variables in analyses. Historical institutionalism often seeks to explain change and/or stability in policy outcomes and institutional structures. To explain institutional continuity, theories implicitly (and, at times, explicitly) follow a model of punctuated equilibrium, in which institutions are characterized by long periods of stasis periodically interrupted by crises that instigate institutional change before institutional stasis again becomes the norm (Krasner, 1984). Such stability is possible because institutions are largely path dependent (Pierson, 1994; 2000) – that is, once formed they take on independent value and drive political processes. Though institutions can evolve (often incrementally) in response to changing societal conditions, they are constrained by developmental pathways that arise from previous trajectories. “Policy feedback” occurs when “path dependent patterns are characterized by self-reinforcing positive feedback” (Krasner, 1988: 83). Institutional change is rare and historical institutionalists have largely characterized it as sporadic, episodic and interruptive, spurred by “critical junctures” (Collier and Collier, 1991; Thelen, 1999) which open windows of opportunity that provide policy officials with the potential to transform existing institutions (Cortell and Peterson, 1999: 179).
relationship, whereby societal and political actors have adopted, and at times challenged, the institutional regulation of race.

However, I do not perceive the state to be a monolithic entity. In much of the new institutionalist literature, the state is personified as a singular policy-making actor. Like Mitchell (1991), I believe the interpretation of the monolithic state is overly simplistic, missing important nuances of political struggle over policy outcomes. Political decisions about race are always contested ground in multiple policy-making arenas and the meaning of race has rarely been monopolized by state power. This dissertation seeks to disaggregate the state by examining these conflicts. In viewing the state as a dynamic entity and policy outcomes as victories on a political battlefield, this project will trace the interactions informing the policy-making process, which involves a multitude of state and non-state actors with various goals, interests, and agendas. It will reveal that the state is more than a system of decision-making; fundamentally implicated in structures of meaning-making, the edges that supposedly separate state from society are never certain or easily determined (Mitchell, 1991: 88). Importantly, this will involve asking the unavoidable million-dollar question of race politics: what kind of state are we dealing with? State action is indeed a crucial element in this story; but is it rational? contradictory? sinister? benign? racist? all or none of the above? Exploring the role of the state in regards to race necessarily must negotiate the minefield of intentionality and a goal of this dissertation is to avoid the far easier route of side-stepping this issue altogether.

In sum, these four empirical activations are not hypotheses to be tested, but rather are starting points of a project of complication. In interrogating the role of race in politics/politics in the construction of race, I think more complexity, not less, is required.\footnote{I acknowledge that this assertion stands in stark contrast to some of the principles of (positivist) social scientific research, particularly those surrounding the goals of causal and parsimonious inferences (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). By these
chapter will be dedicated to the task of complicating and unpacking the relationship(s) among race, mixed-race, the census, the state. The first section will outline definitional issues with using the terminology of ‘race’ and ‘mixed-race’ and my own conceptualization of race as a set of practices and power relations. The second section interrogates the relationship between race and the state. Building on the brief review of historical institutionalism and ideational literature above, it outlines Omi and Winant’s (1994) theory of racial formation and suggests that their conception of racial projects is an effective way to understand how institutions and ideas combine to produce outcomes in the politics of race. The third section narrows to focus on race and the census, outlining the main governmental approaches to racial enumeration and identifying commonly-assumed and domestically-orientated drivers of census politics. It posits that much analytical leverage can be gained by conceptualizing the census as a racial project and a policy sphere. Building upon the three previous sections, the fourth section develops a theory of the schematic state, which, I contend, is an accurate framework for explaining the complicated role of the state in the construction of race and mixed-race. The final section details methodological issues surrounding the inductive, historical, longitudinal, and qualitative analysis in the chapters that follow.

**Race/Mixed-Race**

What do I mean by the terms ‘race’ and ‘mixed-race’? The invocation of these terms necessitates some epistemological and conceptual untangling. From its historical conceptualization in the same terms, however, race is a conceptually fuzzy variable and difficult to explore using the dominant methods and analytical frames of political science. Rogers Smith (2004) argues that because race has been politically constructed so as to naturalize and legitimate racial inequalities, it is usually conceptualized as existing outside of politics (2004: 44). Similarly, Rupert Taylor (1996) argues that the real problem lies in the discipline itself: “political science’s specific commitment to the scientific method has dictated that ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ be taken as ‘things’ in themselves that we encounter, rather than prompting the need to see ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ as being problematic in themselves” (1996: 892).
anthropology, ethnology and the pseudo-sciences, both academic and popular interpretations of race have shifted over time, making it both a worthy and challenging subject of study. In the United States, race has been a paramount sociological divider. In Great Britain, ‘colour’ (a metonym for race) has retained significance, while Canadian discourse is more likely to conflate race with paradigms of culture or ethnicity. Generally speaking, however, race has a history in the Anglophone West of constructed biological racialism, classification, categorization and hierarchization based on visible physical attributes. References to race most often invoke some visual form of embodiment, though Hesse (2007) illustrates that an unwarranted emphasis on corporeality is just one symptom larger political processes of racialization through which the European/non-European distinction became embedded in modernity. Scholars have generally distinguished between race as a biological construction, a belief-system dominant from the 19th century until the mid-20th century, and race as a social construction, which is widely accepted in the social sciences today. While some scholars put the term “race” in scare-quotes to indicate its socially-constructed nature, other sociologists advocate the use of the term ‘racialization’ to demonstrate that social processes are the means by which certain groups are singled out for unequal treatments on the basis of real or imagined phenological differences (Li, 1999: 8).

5 Like race, ethnicity is a social signifier of identity, but it is also fundamentally different. Ethnicity, which can overlap and intersect with race, often describes a collectivity with common ancestry, a shared past, culture and language, and a sense of peoplehood or community (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007: 16-20). The importance of race or ethnicity in a given society is context-specific. Though race has played a key role in the organization of most colonial societies, ethnicity has also played a critical role in Canada by facilitating what is considered to be far more than a linguistic divide between French and English Canada. However, the origins of race are in assignment and categorization, and while ethnicity can have similar beginnings it is more often associated with the assertions of group members (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007: 28). Race, it will be argued, is not simply about skin colour and morphological characteristics, but rather should be understood as the signifier of a complex set of power relations. The most important distinction between race and ethnicity is their different relationships to power: “power is almost invariably an aspect of race; it may or may not be an aspect of ethnicity” (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007: 31).

6 The belief in biological differences among races is still proposed by some scholars; see Rushton (1994), Herrnstein and Murray (1994) and even the recent comments of DNA co-discoverer and Nobel Prize recipient James Watson, who have appealed to genetics to explain racial superiority and inferiority of intellect. See also the critiques of their theories in Fischer et al. (1996) and Flynn (2007).
Important assertions have been made in the study of race across many academic disciplines, making the literature difficult to summarize here. Generally, it can be said that race emerged as a concept not simply from modernity, but as a critical element of Western thought, philosophy and practice, a revelation largely masked by race-neutral (or "colour-blind") modern social and political thought (Hesse, 2007: 644; see also Gilroy, 1993, 2000; Goldberg, 1993; Outlaw, 1996; Mills, 1997; Winant, 2001). As the echoes of modern thought resonate today, so too do the racial consequences of the modern project. Race and identity politics are not monopolized by any one discipline, though the critical fields such as cultural studies and legal studies have been far more successful at analyzing the social and political productions and consequences of race than the social sciences (Smith, 2003). Coinciding with the emergence of these fields as unique modes of academic inquiry in the 1980s and 1990s was the rise of "identity politics". Relatedly, during the third wave of feminism, black feminist theorists in Britain and the United States pushed conventional understandings of feminist thought by conceiving white supremacy and patriarchy as interlocking systems of oppression and began to incorporate intersectional analyses which could differentiate women's experiences on the basis of class, gender and race (Crenshaw, 1991; hooks, 1992; Roberts, 1997; Razack, 1998; Harris, 2000; Hill Collins, 2000).

The rise of critical mixed-race studies occurred during the tail end of the identity politics era and was largely a literature driven by cultural studies and the humanities and

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7 Influenced by post-structuralist and postmodern thought, studies involving race, gender, culture, and sexuality generally fall under one of two models concerning the production of identities and differences (Grossberg, 1996; see also Nayak, 2006). The first model is widely known as “essentialism,” strategic or otherwise, as it perceives that identities contain some intrinsic or essential element defined through common origin and/or common experience. In contrast, the second model emphasizes the multiplicity of identities within a single agent and the constant and unavoidable interaction amongst them. Signifiers of identity such as race, gender or class are also antagonisms that refuse to be neatly aligned; as Stuart Hall states, "The point is not simply that, since our racial differences do not constitute all of us, we are always different, negotiating different kinds of differences - of gender, of sexuality, of class...We are always in negotiation, not with a single set of oppositions that place us always in the same relation to others, but with a series of different positionalities” (Hall, 1996: 473).
remains heavily influenced by critical theory.\(^8\) Much like the literature on race, there is no consensus on the precise definition of mixed-race, though the term is generally used to refer to categories, ideas, individuals and groups that identify or are identified as the product of two ‘distinct’ races. Much of the literature on mixed-race has illustrated the dangerous potential of this terminology; that is, even self-identifying oneself as mixed-race does, to a certain extent, essentialize and reify the idea of race as a biological truism. For example, while multiracial advocates in the United States reject census classification schema that force mixed-race people to select one and only one racial category, their arguments during the review of federal classification standards in the 1990s selectively employed the rule of hypodescent. Spencer (2004) points out that these advocates and others engaged in mixed-race scholarship support the racial paradigm they set out to dismantle by grounding their understandings of mixed-race in the idea the parents of a mixed-race child are, themselves, monoracial in spite of the multigenerational racial mixing that has occurred in the US. In the social sciences and law, more systematic inquiries of the emergence and circumstances of mixed-race have occurred sporadically,\(^9\) though efforts have increased in recent years and have largely focused on the rule

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\(^8\) Critical mixed-race theory has a number of key strands: the philosophy-driven contention that mixed-race is a viable and legitimate social and psychological identity choice (Zack, 1995; Root, 1992; 1996) and political category (DeBose and Winters, 2003); theoretical work that considers the complexities of mixed-race and its relationship to the politics of identity (Goldberg, 1995; Christian, 2000; Alibhai-Brown, 2001; Parker and Song, 2001; Ali 2003) the negotiations of identity that mixed-race people – especially mixed-race women, undertake (Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Mahtani, 2002); the composition and impact of the multiracial social movement in the United States (Dalmage, 2004); and, recently, criticisms of the theoretical assumptions this literature relies on (Spencer, 2004; 2006).

\(^9\) After Reuter’s landmark study on the mulatto in the United States (1931), lines of inquiry about racial intermixing disappeared for nearly half a century, until Joel Williamson’s (1980) seminal work on miscegenation and its consequences in the United States in 1980. Therein, Williamson traces the lines of colour and caste that have separated blacks, whites and mulattoes, arguing that anti-miscegenation laws aligned mulattoes with blacks in the Reconstruction era and were largely responsible for the emergence of contemporary African-American culture in the United States by the 1920s.
of hypodescent and the regulation of interracial intimacy as key elements to the discursive construction of mixed-race.\textsuperscript{10}

Three conceptual issues arise from my focus on race and mixed-race. First, this is a study of the politics of race, as opposed to a more specific focus on population subsets. This should not be taken as a presumption that all racial groups are racialized in the same ways. On the contrary, recent research in the United States on “skin tonism” and “light-skinned privilege” has demonstrated that experiences within and between racial groups are mediated by a host of nuances that we do not yet understand (Hochschild, 2006; Hochschild and Weaver, 2007). However, I contend that it is important to use this broader focus on race because of the clear evidence that dictates there is something racial about, for example, racial disadvantage – that is, a broadly, very generalized common cause, consequence or experience among non-white groups, precipitated by a broad, generalized phenomenon of white privilege. Second, the same logic holds for my use of the terminology of mixed-race: I recognize that there are conceptual problems in using mixed-race as a category. These are particularly prominent around issues of identification, as evidence from the United States and Britain has demonstrated that the ways that mixed-race people identify is mitigated by a host of other signifiers: class, gender, region, religion, which parent is the minority, whether that parent was or is active in the multiracial person’s life, who fills out the census form, and education (Jones and Smith, 2001).\textsuperscript{11} However, I contend that examining the categorizations formed by these broad strokes is necessary, particularly in order to think beyond the binary of black/white, which dominates the literature.

\textsuperscript{10} For example, studies of anti-miscegenation laws in the United States detail the substance and application of these laws (Davis, 1991; Pascoe, 1991, 1996, 2009; Moran, 2001; Wallenstein, 2002), the causal factors relating to their emergence (Fowler, 1987; Wolfe, 2001), and jurisdictional specificities of the laws (Lombardo, 1987; Brattain, 2005). There is also a growing literature on the ethics of transracial adoption (Fogg-Davis, 2002; Kennedy, 2003).

\textsuperscript{11} On mixed-race identity in the UK, see the forthcoming work tentatively titled “Ethnic Options of Mixed Race People in Britain,” by Miri Song and Peter Aspinall.
on mixed-race in the United States (Mahtani and Moreno, 2001). Finally, my use of the notion of race is not meant to imply that national contexts do not matter, for they certainly do. This project uses a comparative approach to the study of race precisely to explore rather than soft-pedal national nuances.

My own conceptualization of the meaning of race bears these definitional issues in mind and builds on the voluminous body of literature on the politics of race, in which the meaning of race remains largely unresolved. Omi and Winant’s oft-cited definition emphasizes that race is a complex of social meanings under constant reconstruction through processes in which the selection of biologically based human characteristics is highly social and historical (1994: 55). Their definition – and Winant’s (2001) later definition that conceives race as a concept clothed in (false) biological terms\textsuperscript{12} – hinges on the idea that there are, in fact, corporeal differences among different types of bodies. Hesse (2007) warns that this reliance on corporeal differences is insufficient; the bodily identification of race is a privileged metonym for a larger idea of the (constructed) differences between Europeans and non-Europeans, intimately tied to both modernity and colonial rule.

Following Hesse (2007), I contend that race is best understood as a discursive set of power relations and practices. The concept is neither objective nor neutral; rather, it is a socio-historical construct that is riddled with the exertion of power. The emphasis on corporeal differences such as skin color or eye shape is therefore part and parcel of the social construction of race. This conceptualization aligns well with the argument that race was and is performative – not only are skin color and other morphological characteristics insufficient to

\textsuperscript{12} Winant (2000; 2001) defines race as “a concept that signifies and symbolizes socio-political conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race appeals to biologically based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for the purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process. There is no biological basis for distinguishing human groups along the lines of ‘race’...” (Winant, 2001: 317. n.1; emphasis in original).
delineate between different races, they are fundamentally part of the construct itself. But there is power involved in constructing race. This power is not monopolized by the state; race is both embedded in and created by numerous practices of the state and society, however defined, and is under constant (re)articulation and (re)negotiation. The meaning of race is both discursive and instrumental, existing within, through and beyond the reach of the state and the influence of domestic politics. As such, race is a global phenomenon that exceeds historical, national and corporeal boundaries. As Goldberg (2009) argues, race is heavy. It is layer upon layer, strata upon strata of volumes of history, discourse, and substance laid down. The burden – not just of the white man, but of us all – is a heavy one to bear, though the weight is borne differentially (Goldberg, 2009: 9). This conceptualization of race thus necessitates that we consider race as more than supposed biological differences or modes or institutional categories, but rather as being encompassed in ideas and ideologies about how society should operate and the role of government in maintaining a particular social order.

To this end, this project explores the role of the state in operationalizing race by manipulating the boundaries that divide racial categories. The comparison in the chapters that follow will reveal less about the demographic composition of American, British and Canadian society than about the politics of race, social classification, and the relationship between the state and the society it simultaneously regulates, counts, controls and protects. Though race exists beyond the state, this dissertation will reveal the state as an important site where race is

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13 On performances of race in court cases, see Gross (2008) and for similar arguments regarding gender, Butler (1990).

14 Race was born in the transnational realm. From Hesse (2007): “Within that framework European coloniality can be read as symptomatic of modern hegemonic formulations, processes, knowledges and identities (e.g. capitalism, secularism, civilization, rationality), which congealed from the social transformation of particular cultural differences into ‘non-Europeanness’ (e.g. ‘histories,’ ‘religions,’ ‘bodies,’ ‘cultures,’ ‘territories’). It is between these modern regulatory vectors of structural administration within the colonies and discursive authorizations from the metropoles that the category of race becomes instituted and naturalized around the boundaries between colour coded European sameness and non-European otherness” (2007: 652).
animated and the socially constructed racial categories are made and unmade and boundaries hardened, bent or broken. Taking this theoretical position in a study of mixed-race is particularly poignant, as this research will demonstrate the arbitrary and constructed nature of racial categories upon which the theoretical concept of race finds its foundations. Who constructs these boundaries and the purposes they serve thus become important questions that will be posed throughout this dissertation.

**Race and the State**

The state has been characterized in numerous ways. In political science, pluralist theory contends that all interests, represented by elites or groups, are free to compete against one another for power (perceived as causal influence) in the government. Because of the nature of the competition, outcomes are generally compromises around different interests (Truman 1951; Dahl, 1961; see also McFarland, 2007). In this approach, the state is generally conceived as an impartial arena in which competing interests combat; in other words, *the neutral state*. Similarly, historical institutionalism posits that institutions are “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall, 1986: 19). March and Olsen (1989) broaden this definition by linking institutions with the production of societal norms and values, positing that institutions are collections of interrelated routines and rules (1989: 21). However, in both definitions, the institutions themselves are colour-blind: actors may have biases, social groups organized around race may participate in state-driven processes and race may be involved in the definition of policy goals or outcomes, but institutions such as

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15 Some do note, however, that non-whites often have differential and limited access to decision-makers compared to other societal interests (McAdam, 1982; Weir, 1992).
federalism or the presidential system of government are neither implicitly nor explicitly racial in and of themselves: in other words, the colour-blind state.

Critical legal scholarship and critical race theory characterize the state as the willing promoter of laws and regulations that, for all appearances to the contrary and claims to being neutral or value-free, are heavily laden with racial and gendered norms (Fitzpatrick, 1987; Outlaw, 1990; Backhouse, 1991, 1999; Crenshaw et al., 1995). In some versions of this scholarship, the state controls non-white populations through state mechanisms of social management and observation (Foucault, 1977) – the surveillance state. In other versions, the state is portrayed as somewhat deceitful, with the rules of the game continually biased against racial minorities and designed to maintain white hegemony (Mills, 1997; Marx, 1998; Razack, 1998) – the sinister state. And given the state’s more recent role of procuring deliberative ameliorative measures to combat racial discrimination, government documents will often portray the state as the defender of liberal principles of social justice and equality – the benign state.

Each of these conceptualizations seems insufficient for explaining the politics of race over time and space. While the state has certainly never been benign or colour-blind, neither is it wholly sinister, continually interested in population surveillance and control, or the monolithic entity each of these theories presume. Yet, there is a clear connection between race and nation-building (Goldberg, 1993; 2002; McClintock, 1995; Jhappan and Stasiulius, 1995; Smith, 1997; Stoler, 2002); for example, Marx (1997) argues that rivalling elites relied on consensus over the legal exclusion of subordinate groups in order to consolidate national power in the US and South Africa. There is also a clear influence of transnational racial ideas in the emergence of a number of national policy spheres – eugenics, women’s (reproductive) rights, employment and labour laws, citizenship, immigration, multiculturalism, and human
rights. There has been indisputable state involvement in the creation of a system of racial stratification in housing, employment and social welfare; it is implicated not simply in making and implementing racist laws and policies, but also of creating the (arbitrary) boundaries around races, and especially around whiteness (Lopez, 1996; Backhouse, 1999; Ngai, 2004; Gross, 2008; Pascoe, 2009). And yet, the state has also assumed a relatively new role in recent decades, working to remedy instances of racial discrimination through civil rights legislation and affirmative action programs (Skrentny, 2002; Simon, 2005). How might we explain these seemingly contradictory faces of the state, some of which occur simultaneously?

One of the most influential works in recent decades to explore the implications of this relationship in the 20th century is Omi and Winant’s (1994) *Racial Formation in the United States*. They define racial formation as “a sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed...racial formation is a process of historically situated *projects* in which human bodies and social structures are represented and organized. [Racial formation] is linked to the evolution of hegemony, the way in which society is organized and ruled” (1994: 55-56; emphasis in original). By analyzing race and racial identity in this manner, Omi and Winant link race to law, the state and society - the crucial sites where the power and existence of race is operationalized.

One of the particularly useful elements of this theory is Omi and Winant's notion of *racial projects*. A racial project is "*simultaneously an interpretation, representation or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines*” (Omi and Winant, 1994: 56; emphasis in original). Racial projects link together social structures and experiences that are racially organized with the meaning of race in a particular discursive practice. For example, the politically organized racial projects of the New Right claim to hold colour-blind views but covertly manipulate racial threats and fears in
order to achieve political power (1994: 58). For example, the New Right’s opposition to busing children across racially segregated school districts has been articulated not as an overt effort to maintain residential or school segregation, but on the grounds that state-mandated busing is an assault on “the community” and “the family”. New Right activists argue that school integration “means that the state usurps the decision-making powers which should be vested in parents: deciding in what kind of communities their children will be raised and what kind of education their children will receive” (Omi and Winant, 1994: 127). Another example of a racial project is nationalist projects, which stress the extent to which racial identity is incompatible with the production of a homogenous nation and demand the separation of the two (1994: 59). These exemplify macro-level, sometimes state-driven projects in which very particular discursive meanings of race are connected with ideas about or attempts to organize institutions, policies and other social structures in accordance with the discursive meanings. Racial projects exist within multiple analytical dimensions: macro-level mainstream and radical racial projects along the political spectrum; micro-level racial projects of everyday experience; and racial projects across historical time.

In sum, the theory of racial formation: (a) views the meaning of race and the content of racial identities as unstable and politically contested; (b) conceptualizes racial formation as the conflict of various racial projects that combine representational/discursive elements with structural/institutional ones; and (c) sees these conflicts as continuing articulations of the meaning of race that are open on multiple analytical planes, from the individual to the global (Winant, 2000: 182). For my purposes, racial formation is a very useful way of linking together the role of ideas, interests and institutions in the construction of race. However, three problems remain. First, as Hesse (2007) points out, Omi and Winant’s (1994) definition of race is still reliant on corporeality as a signifier of race. Second, the multiple analytical frames employed by
the theory are helpful for analyzing both the macro- and micro-levels of racial formation, but cannot be used to disaggregate the state, which is considered to be a macro-level monolith that is completely separate from society. Third, the theory of racial formation does not help explain how the (disaggregated) state acts in a given situation. If, for example, we perceive the census as a racial project, this theory cannot tell us which discursive or representational and structural or institutional elements are likely to matter at what points in time. The theory of racial formation is thus useful, but limited in details and explanatory power. Below, I consider the analytical leverage gained by modifying the theory of racial formation in order to, first, conceptualize the census as a racial project and a policy subsystem, and second, examine the role of the schematic state in the deployment of this racial project.

Race and the Census

In her analysis of a global data set compiled by the United Nations Statistical Division to survey the approaches to ethnic enumeration, Ann Morning (2008) finds that of the 141 countries under study, 63 percent incorporate some form of ethnic enumeration though question and answer schema vary along dimensions that suggest diverse conceptualizations of race/ethnicity/indigeneity/nationality. Given the substantial number of countries that enumerate identity, it is no surprise that the academic scholarship envisions the census in a variety of ways. One of the first analytical treatments of the census appeared in Benedict Anderson’s seminal work on nationalism, Imagined Communities. The census, Anderson argues, is one of the three institutions (alongside maps and museums) that states use to create a common imagination for their subjects (Anderson, 1991: 163-164). In this sense, and as we shall see in subsequent chapters, the census is important for nation-building projects. James Scott’s understanding of the census is similar – it is part of the state’s ongoing “project of
legibility” in which instruments of statecraft such as the census, the map, surnames, the centralization of traffic patterns, the creation of official languages, and even scientific forestry are used to create both a geographical terrain and population with standardized characteristics that will be most efficiently monitored, counted, assessed and managed (Scott, 1998: 81-82).

Statistics are indeed the science of the state, as Foucault points out in his essay on governmentality. The production of statistics leads to the “emergence of population,” an outcome that relies on the will of the population to itself be managed (Foucault, 1991).

However, the most common interpretation by policymakers and political elites is to think of the census as an instrument of governance rather than a potentially insidious instrument of statecraft. The data produced by the census is a crucial source of information that allows governments to make policies; the census is the supposedly objective tool of demographers that provides a wealth of statistical data for various government sectors, like health and education (Aspinall, 2000, 2003; Simon, 2005; Potvin, 2005). Here, and in the majority of literature on the census and racial categorization, the census is conceptualized as a purely domestic affair. The three most dominant explanations claim census politics are driven by demography, civil rights legislation, social mobilization, or some combination thereof. Official government documents are most likely to give causal weight to demography and the need to make the census institutionally consistent with civil rights legislation. Censuses, governments claim, need to reflect and measure the growing diversity of Society X. The purpose of a question on race, census guides instruct, is to produce data that will help everyone participate equally in X society economically, socially and culturally in support of our already-legislated commitments to these principles.16 In the United States, explanations of census

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16 All three cases under study have legislation in place that relies on statistical data produced from the census in order to monitor the extent of racial discrimination in employment, housing, and other areas of social life. In the United States, the relevant legislation is the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Voting Rights Act (1965), compared with Great Britain’s Race
politics also emphasize the causal role of social mobilization. These accounts have been particularly dominant in explaining the adoption of a “mark one or more” approach on the 2000 census, which scholars claim can be attributed to the actions of a very vocal mixed-race social movement that pushed Congress for the change to its classification standards (Nobles, 2000; Aspinall, 2003; Williams, 2006; DaCosta, 2007). My analysis of census-making in Canada, the United States and Great Britain will demonstrate that these explanations tell a partial and incomplete story. They rarely speak to the state’s role in making race and their narrowed focus on purely domestic drivers overlooks the transnational complexities of race.

In order to explore and understand the complex political processes involved in the politics of racial enumeration, I propose a two-fold strategy of (re)conceptualizing the census as: a) a racial project; and b) a policy sphere. To begin, I will demonstrate throughout this dissertation that the census is a racial project. The census does not simply reflect objective social reality, but rather plays a constitutive role in the construction of that reality (Kertzer and Arel, 2002: 2). The idea of race is given administrative life and scientific legitimacy through the forum of the census. The racial categories created by the census and other parts of the state become solidified through law and policy: “The census reflects the racializing categories of social formation that it nevertheless at once reifies, which it reproduces as it creates and cements as it naturalizes. The process of objectified nomination thus fixes (at least temporarily and tenuously) what are at best racial fabrications” (Goldberg, 1997: 34). The census is a contributing (though not a monopolizing creational) factor in the proliferation of racial taxonomies. In turn, censuses help to constitute racial discourse, which itself helps to shape

Relations Act (1976; 2000) and Canada’s Employment Equity Act (1986; 1995). All three countries also use census data to fund a wide array of social programs. However, it must be emphasized that this argument has perilous potential to slip into spurious territory; that is, the subsequent use to which racial census data is put should not be equated with the cause of implementing a direct question on race.

17 On the census as a causal factor that affects national identity, see Miller (2007).
and explain policy outcomes (Nobles, 2002: 43). This is the racial project of the census. Governmental conceptions of the meaning of race are developed (Where do the dividing lines between races lie? Who should count as white/non-white? What racial labels are appropriate for which groups?) and connected with a means of organizing society (Are racial classifications discrete or multiple? Which racial groups should have access to government programming?). The census categories themselves are less important than the fact of social differentiation (Brown, 2009: 15) and the role of the state in promoting and reifying it.

Importantly, the census as a racial project is not constant over time or space. In their analysis of racial enumeration throughout the world, Rallu et al. (2004) identify four main government approaches to racial enumeration. The first, *counting to dominate*, characterizes the colonial situation and other cases such as the Soviet Union and early 20th century North America, whereby censuses were politically important tools for collectively identifying Others. Second, *not counting in the name of national integration* occurs when race or ethnicity is rejected either in the name of national integration, as is presently the case in many African countries, or in the name of the republican principle of national unity as occurs in Western Europe. The third approach, *counting or not counting in the name of multiculturalism*, refers to Latin America's tendency to valorize racial mixing through the distinct practices of either not counting by race, which emphasizes racial hybridity beyond counting, or to count by race, which promotes harmonious race relations by measuring the country's degree of whitening. Finally, *counting to justify positive action* invokes the pluralist models of Canada, the United States and Great Britain, all of which view racial enumeration as tools in the fight against discrimination (Rallu et al., 2004: 534-536). Rallu et al. (2004) use this typology to describe the different approaches to the enumeration of race currently in place in a variety of countries. Working from the empirical premise that governments have changed their approaches to
counting race over time, I will examine the factors involved in how, for example, the Canadian state transitioned from counting to manage and control racial populations in the early 20th century to not counting in the name of multiculturalism in the decades following the Second World War to counting in the name of multiculturalism and to justify positive action after the introduction of a direct question on race in 1996.

My analysis will concern these macro changes in the *racial project of the census* (Chapter 6) alongside more micro shifts in policy *content* and *outcome* (Chapter 7). For example, an analysis of why, for example, the British state moved from a stance of not counting in the name of multiculturalism to counting in the name of multiculturalism does not speak to the how or why the Office for National Statistics decided to count mixed-race using three stand-alone categories in its 2001 census. To draw out the internal political processes involved in census outcomes, it is useful to theorize the census as a distinct arena where actors discuss, persuade and bargain policy issues and options in the pursuit of their own interests – in other words, a policy sphere or subsystem. This specified policy universe is inhabited by specific actors with some degree of influence over the decision-making process (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). For example, though the entire population of a given country can potentially participate in the census, only a minute proportion of that population – what Pross (1995) refers to as the “attentive public” – is concerned with it more than once a decade and an even smaller proportion has any influence over the politics involved in its creation and dissemination. It is argued here that the interactions of actors, institutions and interests within this policy subsystem are the key determinants of policy content and outcomes.

The identification of various components and interactions within a policy subsystem is “an empirical question” (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 54); however, discussions of the nature and impact of policy networks have become increasingly commonplace in public policy analysis
(Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Marsh and Smith, 2000; Skogstad, 2008). Though a number of different strands of the literature exist, policy networks are generally defined as the linkages joining state and societal actors together in a policy process. Rhodes (1990) contends that networks entail an exchange of resources between groups and a part of government. The exchange can vary – from providing information to a group being consulted to delivering a particular policy in exchange for support from a group. This concept is similar to, though not as rigid as, the notion of iron triangles, which characterized the power of congressional committees, interest groups and an administrative agency of government in controlling a policy area and limiting access of other social actors or potential participants. Policy networks exist along a continuum from a closed policy network to an open issue network (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Rhodes and Marsh (1992) characterize policy networks along four dimensions: membership (number of participants and type of interests), integration (frequency of interaction, degree of continuity, degree of value consensus), resources (distribution of resources within network, distribution of resources within participating organizations) and power (nature of bargaining) (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 251). Smith (1993; 1994) also emphasizes the importance of state autonomy within this typology, noting that state actors have their own interests and will work to achieve their preferences. It is argued that these structural elements of policy networks vary and different combinations of network characteristics lead to different political outcomes. For example, a

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18 Many authors distinguish Dutch, German, American and British variants of the literature on policy networks (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Marsh, 1998; Marsh and Smith, 2000; Skogstad, 2008).

19 There are varying terminologies concerning policy communities and policy networks. For example, Canadian analysts used “policy community” to refer to the set of actors that shares a common interest in developing a particular issue area. The “policy network” encapsulates the power relationships among actors in the part of the policy community involved in policy design and implementation (Coleman and Skogstad, 1990). The typologies of policy networks and communities in the Canadian literature vary along the axes of state autonomy and organizational development of societal actors but have generally not been used outside Canada (Skogstad, 2008: 209).
“tight” policy network may favour the maintenance of the status quo and breed inertia because interests are entrenched and reinforced by the structure of the network.

These two conceptual lenses for exploring the census as a simultaneous racial project and policy sphere align and complement one another in important respects. Both promote mid-range analyses and combined will be poised to uncover the relationships among discursive, ideational, structural, and institutional elements as well as the causal mechanisms through which networks exert influence over outcomes. Both can be used to illuminate factors that influence census politics on multiple analytical planes, from the transnational to the individual or group level and will be useful for evaluating the interactions between the state and society. Finally, conceptualizing the census as both a policy sphere and racial project will aid in our endeavour to disaggregate the state in order to identify the political battles and competing interests that singular and seemingly coherent policy outcomes often mask.

The Schematic State

Whether analyzing macro shifts in the transnational normative context surrounding race and the subsequent changes in governmental approaches to the census, or the implementation of various policy alternatives for the enumeration of mixed-race, the role of the state in the construction of race remains as the focus of this dissertation. To understand how the racial state sees, I have developed a framework that conceptualizes the state as neither completely benign nor sinister, but as fundamentally schematic.

By referencing the root-word “schema” I pay homage to Scott (1998) and contend that a primary goal of the schematic state is to make the population legible, with the intent of turning the unstable and politically contested meaning of race into stable, identifiable racial categories.
to be used as the basis for law and policy. In so doing, the schematic state determines spaces of legality and illegality and normatively defines what is socially, legally, politically acceptable and what is not. “Schematic” as an adjective implies that the state is an actor responsible for putting the underlying organizational pattern of the racial project into place. This pattern channels subsequent initiatives and makes their terms and conditions knowable; but as an underlying pattern or structure, the schematic is something of a plan that has yet to come to fruition. Though the schematic state maintains control over the original design of the schematic, it cannot predetermine the final outcome. In invoking “the schematic state” as a noun, this framework implies that the state is an arena or a site where policy alternatives are contested and where the state itself participates among other actors. The schematic state is comprised of many different moving parts, each with its own drumbeat. There are three implications of this reality: first, the different agencies of the disaggregated state are likely to have varying policy goals and interests; second, distinctions between state and society are difficult to make, as the state is revealed as more porous and fuzzily-bounded than typically assumed; and third, as a result of the plethora of policies that implicitly or explicitly invoke race, the state’s involvement in race-making is a more contradictory than coherent process. By implicating the root-word “scheme,” I suggest that at times the state may be duplicitous or may act in insidious ways. The racial project of the census quantifies race in order to justify positive action in the realm of racial disadvantage; but in doing so, the state effectively absolves itself of its responsibility for creating and maintaining the conditions of racial inequality and is comfortable in its duplicitous role of combating racism in some ways while supporting it in others.20

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20 As Brown (2009: 32) argues, the collection of racial statistics allows the state to present itself as the solution rather than part of the problem.
The framework of the schematic state ultimately will permit a more nuanced analysis of the dual role of the state as both an arena and a (potentially fragmented set of) actor(s) within that arena. Because the success of a census is measured by high response rates and the quality of data produced, it is important that the public—which largely self-administers the census—understands and accepts the question, instructions and categorical options provided. Public input into the census design process has become common since the late 1970s, through state-led consultations, focus group testing, and in lobby activities. The schematic state organizes the policy-making arena where various interests battle over the design of the census.

As an actor within this forum, the schematic state retains its autonomy. It has its own interests in census policy outcomes. These include, first and foremost, getting high response rates and accurate, high quality data from the census. Different governmental departments and agencies will also have different interests: to make a particular policy or policy area more or less relevant; to find data to support new initiatives or policy goals; to garner data that will aid in program implementation or evaluation, and the like. But these interests may also not be benign. The census is both a constitutive force and a reflection of the national community and the state plays an active role in promoting nation-building (racial) projects through the census. For example, the enumeration of mixed-race can discursively portray harmonious race relations, eluding that increased rates of racial intermarriage are evidence of a population’s assimilation into the nation (Rallu et al., 2004). At times, the census as a racial project has been used to manage and control racial populations, to create the racial categories used to restrict undesirable immigration, to compound the effects of the one-drop rule, to promote a national image of a racially-invisible multiculturalism, and to diminish the claims of racial minorities to citizenship and belonging. Yet, the data produced from the census has also been critical to the implementation of policies and programs designed to combat racial discrimination and to
promote a hybrid, multiracial identity of the nation-state. And at times these seemingly contradictory state impulses have coexisted unproblematically in the same time and space.

In sum, the schematic state provides a more nuanced framework for examining how the state mitigates the formation and implementation of the census as a racial project and policy sphere. Chapter 6 will use this framework to examine the racial project of the census, arguing that shifts in transnational norms in the post-war era were mitigated through the schematic state, which altered its approach to racial enumeration from the counting to manage and control (US) or not counting in the name of multiculturalism (Canada and Great Britain) to a comparative convergence in which all three countries now count in the name of multiculturalism and to justify positive action. Throughout this process, the primary goal of the schematic state was to make the population legible, with the intent of turning the unstable, transnational and politically contested meaning of race into stable, identifiable categories. Chapter 7 will demonstrate how the schematic state attempts to achieve this goal by putting an underlying organizational pattern of the racial project into place, only to find that it cannot control the final outcome of its own scheme. At the analytical level of policy making, this inability is derived from the state’s other capacity as an arena where policy alternatives are contested and where the (disaggregated) state itself participates among other actors. This characterization demonstrates that the census is not an exemplar of a dichotomous relationship between an all-powerful state and subjugated, powerless racial subjects (Brown, 2009: 17). Rather, the power and meaning of race exist well beyond the control of the schematic state, from the transnational realm to the level of the group and individual.
**Methodology**

This is a comparative, longitudinal and qualitative dissertation. It compares the political development of a direct question on race and the enumeration of mixed-race on the national censuses of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. In so doing its research design is neither wholly interpretive nor positivist in nature and instead inhabits the simultaneously liminal and interconnected space where methodology is driven by the research questions and not the other way around.

In accordance with the positivist tradition, this dissertation employs the “most similar systems” approach to research design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970), which allows for the development of theory by comparing units with many similar features, while allowing for variation on the dependent variable. Though the problem of unit homogeneity cannot be fully resolved through this approach (King *et al.*, 1994: 201), comparing “like” cases are particularly important for small-N studies, which need shared attributes such as common challenges, common actor orientations, and common institutional settings to explain variation on the dependent variable (Lijphart, 1971). The cases of this study meet this requirement: they are similar in terms of language, level of development and industrialization, legal tradition based on Anglo common law, democratic regime, and similarities in social values, political culture, and ideological commitments to the principles of individual rights, rule of law, equality and

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21 Strictly speaking, there are currently three censuses in the UK – England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Beginning in 2001 final decision-making power on the questions to be included in the census was devolved to the legislatures of Scotland and Northern Ireland. This dissertation focuses on the census in England and Wales because of the institutional prominence of OPCS and its path-breaking decisions on whether or not (and the extent to which) a direct question on race should be included.

22 Note, however, that Collier and Mahoney (1996) argue that small-N case study designs with no variation on the dependent variable do not inherently pose the problem of selection bias. As they and George and Bennett (2005: 84) point out, qualitative researchers doing case studies rarely overgeneralize their findings and are careful to provide only “contingent” generalizations.

23 Quebec and French Canada is an obvious exception. However, the census is a national, rather than sub-national or provincial, enterprise and is therefore available in both English and French.
universal citizenship. Moreover, these three cases share contemporary challenges of race relations and diversity governance: struggles to address increased immigration from non-European source countries; challenges to decades-old approaches to race relations, particularly from the political right and national minorities; and the continued existence of racial disadvantage in spite of legislation designed to eradicate it. Significantly, each of these countries is increasingly racially diverse yet remains plagued by racial inequality in social and economic factors such as housing, employment and education (Dawson, 1994; Henry, 1995; Solomos, 2003; Henry, 2004; Reitz and Banerjee, 2007). Demography and particularly the racial composition of the population are important, but not necessarily determinative. However, it is relevant to note that all three cases are increasingly multiracial societies in which similar proportions of the population identify as mixed-race:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mixed-race population counts</strong></td>
<td>360,085 (2001)</td>
<td>6,826,228</td>
<td>677,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>474,193 (2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of total population</strong></td>
<td>1.2% (2001)</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5% (2006)</td>
<td></td>
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This project will also feature longitudinal within-case analyses. It will seek to explain, for example, why state-driven attempts to implement a direct question on race in Great Britain failed in 1981 but were successful a decade later. My analysis pays careful attention to the sequencing of events, using the qualitative research tools of process tracing and pattern matching (Mahoney, 2003), while also taking into account the potential effects of long causal processes (even from the distant past) that shape the viable alternatives of the present (Pierson, 2000). When longitudinal and comparative methods are combined there is both
convergence and variation on the two dependent variables of this project: the existence of a
direct question on race in the national census and an established approach for enumerating the
mixed-race population within this direct question on race. In the 1970s only the United States
had a direct question on race and by 1996 such a question appeared on the Canadian and
British censuses. During the 1990 census round, Britain and the US employed a single response
approach to racial enumeration, instructing respondents to check only one category that best
described their race. A decade later, Canada and the US used a multiple response approach in
which the population could mark one or more racial categories, while Great Britain provided
descriptions of three mixed-race “combinations” and required respondents to choose among
them.

While the commonalities of these three cases make them comparable, their differences
make the comparison worthwhile. King et al. (1994) admit that comparing both across nations
and within a single nation at different points in time will not necessarily alleviate all problems
of small-N research – for example, variables will still be difficult to control for – but also note
that this combined method is stronger than either method invoked alone (1994: 201-202). The
key, they argue, is to produce data that are relevant to the research questions. However, like
most political science research, the conclusions reached by this project will only be
probabilistic, since it is impossible to know how events and outcomes would have unfolded if
the circumstances were different.

At the same time, these cases were selected with prominent methodological and
theoretical considerations in mind, many of which challenge the logic of a blind adherence to
positivist principles. First and again, this is a project of complication. Though it does seek to
identify and establish the causal factors involved in the political development of census
classifications, it does not adhere to a strict interpretation of linear causality or the necessity of
parsimonious relationships. Rather, this research suggests a *constitutive causality*, in which causes and effects are tied together in compounded and iterative ways. While positivism views this suggestion as the problem of endogeneity – where causes cannot be isolated from their effects (King *et al.*, 1994: 185-195) – this project takes the interpretivist position that this is the basic reality of the complex subject matter with which it engages (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006).

Secondly, longitudinal analysis inevitably raises the question of how much history matters to contemporary politics. In scholarship on the politics of race, assumptions about the extent to which history determines the political present have contributed to both notions of American exceptionalism – the academically prominent idea that the United States is a unique case – and orthodoxies that compare the United States to only to other overtly racialized societies with historical legacies of slavery and/or legalized segregation such as Latin America (especially Brazil) and South Africa. Though American exceptionalism is omnipresent in a number of research areas (Tyrell, 1991), it has a particular stranglehold on the study of racial politics.\(^\text{24}\) This is likely because, simply put, the idea that the United States is unique in terms of historical racial politics and contemporary racial challenges is always a compelling comparative explanation that makes a good deal of intuitive, real-world sense. However, the US can only be considered exceptional if it is contrasted with other circumstances of racial politics that themselves conform to fixed patterns. On the contrary, my research will demonstrate that the racial projects of Canada, the US and Great Britain are more accurately characterized as variants of the same type rather than the dichotomous extremes of unique circumstances or established norms. There is a logic of global interaction among these countries, and though American exceptionalism is “revealed, disturbingly, to be not too exceptional,” the politics of

\(^{24}\text{Some notable exceptions are Marx (1998), Nobles (2000), Bleich (2002; 2005), and Lieberman (2005).}\)
race in the United States is also “the model, the one to be emulated, the failure of which bears more significant costs than in each of the other, if related, instances” (Goldberg, 2009: 68). Canada and Great Britain bear witness to the US's successes and failures, as both countries seek to avoid or replicate race relations paradigms produced in America.

This is not to suggest that history does not matter – for it surely does. The more important question to ask is how much history matters and in what ways. In the chapters that follow, instead of determining whether racial enumeration was similar across contexts at particular points in time, I interrogate what distinctive work these processes do, how they contribute to and constitute race itself and how these practices make such comparisons both necessary and important. As Stoler (2001) argues, we must avoid flattening the complicated sets of racialized practices and representations: for example, “claiming to be of ‘mixed’ origin at one historical moment and being designated as ‘mixed’ by those who ruled at another moment produced a range of different political practices. In those [colonial] histories mixedness itself was a moving and strategic category” (2001: 836). My dissertation takes this challenge to heart by asking what politics the various categories of mixed-race and the notion of mixedness imply and invoke at the end of the 20th century.

Third, this dissertation challenges the dominant trend of using the nation-state as the unit of comparative analysis. I define and conceptualize race as being fundamentally transnational in origins and contemporary manifestations. This is, to some extent, captured in the connotations of diaspora and, to a far more intellectually satisfying extent, in Iton’s (2008) “culture of dislocation,” which has the implication “that in recognizing the flows and interactions of sepia nationalisms we should not lose sight of the way diaspora also works
across, within, and against, states” (2008: 201). Political science is largely methodologically statist by nature and the frameworks of the state as a bound entity and the nation as an imagined community are inherently limiting. Thus, the critical absence is not the lack of comparative studies of race (though this is indeed the case), but, more to the point, is the failure of comparative scholarship to transcend the nationally-bound imaginaries. This stance may seem ironic (at best – at worst, academically schizophrenic) for a dissertation premised on the framework of the schematic state. However, I consider the transnational underpinnings of race and the imperatives of the schematic state to be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. The schematic state puts organizational patterns into place in order to manipulate and bind a phenomenon that exists beyond its view and control; I contend that the schematizing impetus is, in part, a reaction to the transnational, intranational, diasporic nature of race. To this end, I do not question the importance of the state – just its primacy. The challenge, as Stoler (2001) puts it, is to use comparison “as a window into specific exchanges, interactions, and connections that cut across national borders without ignoring what state actors do and what matters about what they say” (2001: 847). The evidence provided in this dissertation will demonstrate similarities in racial projects in seemingly distant sites, which could imply similar strategies of the schematic state and its logic, the idea of race as a rich set of variations and connections along transnational themes, or both.

Finally, this is a qualitative dissertation that uses secondary research, census data, transcripts and records of political debates, government documents, court cases, legislation, and archival research. In addition, I conducted seventeen interviews with government officials

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25 From Iton (2008): “Accordingly, beyond doubtful, we might assert that for nonwhites – and for all others, nous sommes tous des sans-papiers – nationality is not only doubtful and improbable but indeed impossible and, furthermore, that these impossibilities themselves might be seen as desirable and appealing” (2008: 195). Sorry Richard, it’s too good not to quote.

26 For a call-to-arms against this occurrence in history, see Tyrrell (1991).
in all three countries.27 These interviews were helpful for gaining insight into government rationalities and processes not otherwise documented, but perhaps even more so for the information gained in the process of doing the interview itself. For example, during my discussions with (white) Canadian officials respondents often began the interview by lecturing/admonishing me on my use of the term “race”. Was I aware that race is a social construction? Did I understand that race is not as salient here in Canada as it is in the United States? Shall we just refer to population groups or ethnicities instead, then? By the third interview, this ritual had become more comical than curious. Interestingly, one of my final interviews in Ottawa with a non-white civil servant broke this tradition and the terminology of race became comfortably uttered once more. I use my experience interviewing in Canada as an example because it is the most obvious, though I could very well have mentioned other instances of this type in every single one of my interviews, regardless of location; that is, the points at which I realized how very much my positionality as a PhD student (rather than a far-more-impressive Professor of Something Important), a young woman, a young woman of colour, a young woman of colour who is often asked “who are you, what are you, where are you from, no, where are you really from?”, a Canadian, *ad infinitum*, affected the information I could access and receive. This works both ways, of course: I expect that the information I received was affected and interpreted no less because of my own subjectivity as all of the above, as well. Throughout this dissertation, I take these circumstances not as biases to be controlled, but as further evidence to be discussed and analyzed.

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27 I had originally hoped to conduct more interviews, but soon learned that the census policy sphere is only inhabited by a few people.
Conclusion

It is to the evidence that I now turn. The next three chapters present detailed within-case analyses of the political development of the direct question on race and the decision to enumerate the multiracial population in the national censuses of the United States, Great Britain and Canada.
Chapter 3

Mark One or More: Census Politics in the United States

Unlike Canada and Great Britain, the United States has always and consistently asked a question on race in its national census. Though it is seldom considered to be a substantive contributing factor to the evolution of racial discourse in the United States, the census has not simply echoed racial taxonomies but has been instrumental in the creation, control and manipulation of racial boundaries, determining who and what does – and does not – count. This chapter explores the political development of the question on race in the US census. The first section examines the evolution of racial categories in the US census between 1790 and 1970, highlighting the role of dominant racial ideas and their intersection with census politics. The second section considers the impact of Statistical Directive 15 and the standardization of federal racial classifications between 1970 and the 1990s. The third and fourth sections explore the comprehensive review of Statistical Directive 15 that began in 1993 and the 1997 decision to utilize a “mark one or more” approach to racial enumeration. The section entitled “Change, Alternatives and Outcomes” provides a preliminary analysis of the three research questions of this chapter:

a) What explains the political development of racial classifications on the United States census?

b) Why did the U.S. decide to “count” mixed-race in 2000 (and not earlier)?

c) Why did the U.S. adopt a “mark one or more” approach to doing so?

These questions will be answered more completely in Chapters 6 and 7. The preliminary analysis presented in this section of this chapter demonstrates that the oft-posed drivers of census politics – social mobilization, demography, and institutional consistency with civil rights legislation – tell an overly simplified and incomplete story of the push-and-pull politics of the
US census. In this section, I contend that the decision to count mixed-race people in the United States via the mark one or more approach to racial enumeration is ultimately a story of ideas about race, institutions and their interactions with the American political imagination: in other words, a racial project.

The Evolution of Racial Categories in the US Census, 1790-1970

In recent years scholars have become increasingly concerned with the history of racial classification through decennial censuses in the United States, positing that the census is a political arena through which American racial discourse has flourished. The evolution of racial categories has been described elsewhere more extensively by others (Lee, 1993; Bennett, 2000; Nobles, 2000).¹ Several elements of the political development of racial categories in the US census, described below, are relevant for the analysis that follows.

The importance of the census can be traced back to the Constitution, which required a counting of the population for the purposes of congressional apportionment. Census categories between 1790 and 1840 were largely concerned with distinguishing between free persons (including free colored persons and all other free persons except Indians not taxed) and slaves because of the infamous 3/5 Compromise in the American Constitution². The early censuses, therefore, not only made a distinction between those free and those enslaved, but also differentiated on the basis of race. The 3/5 compromise, however, did not require this second distinction – whether one was free or slave was salient for congressional apportionment, and

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¹ See Appendix B.

² This Compromise was an agreement reached at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which stipulated that for purposes of the apportionment of congressional seats, each slave would be counted as three-fifths of a person. James Madison noted that the inherent contradiction of the 3/5 Compromise was that slaves were considered property in some contexts but as persons in others: "The Federal Constitution therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixt character of persons and property. This is in fact their true character" (cited in Jordon, 1968: 323).
though slavery was increasingly linked to race by the early 19th century\(^3\) counting by race in the census was not mandated by the same constitutional logic. Nobles (2000) contends that the census contained racial distinctions because in 18th century America race was a salient political and social category (2000: 26). Further, racial identification mattered because citizenship status often depended on it – to be free and white and to be free and black were two entirely different political experiences (Nobles, 2000: 28; see also Smith, 1997). This is most clearly evidenced by the US Supreme Court’s decision in the mid-19th century case of \textit{Dred Scott},\(^4\) in which the court declared that no person of African ancestry could claim citizenship rights in the United States.

The censuses of the mid-19th century must be examined in the context of that era’s prevailing notions of biological racialism. For example, Nobles (2000) argues that the 1840 census marked one of the first examples in which the emerging sciences of race and statistics converged to shape public debate and political manoeuvring over slavery. The results of the 1840 census showed that there was a higher rate of insanity amongst free blacks than those who were enslaved: “the rate of insanity among free blacks in northern states was one in every 144.5, while the rate of insanity among slaves in the southern states was one in every 1,558” (2000: 32). Southern representatives in Congress used this data to speak of the clear evidence of the benefits of slavery; however, the census results were soon questioned by the American Statistical Association, physicians and politicians once it was revealed that on some census returns, the number of insane black people equalled the number of townspeople and in other cases insane black people were counted in towns where no black people lived. Controversy

\(^3\) It was not until the late 18th century that slavery became equated with blackness; the labour pool in British colonies of North America was originally comprised of both slaves imported from Africa and white indentured servants, often from the Great Britain. The long process by which slavery became exclusively black is explored in Jordan (1968), Gossett (1970), Smith (1997) and Smedley (2007).

ensued, and despite several attempts led by John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts to determine the validity of the census, the results of the 1840 census stood (Nobles, 2000: 33-35).

Thus, even from the early years of census-taking, the American census was a racial project that connected dominant ideas of race with an institutionalized means of organizing society through racial enumeration, playing an integral role in reinforcing the scientific validity and social saliency of race. The prevailing dominant discourse of environmentalism and monogenesis, the belief that all races of man were members of the same species, had a common historical ancestry, and differences in skin colour, anatomy, temperament, intelligence and morality could be attributed to different physical and social environments was challenged by a new strand of thought by the 1850s. The theory of polygenesis – the contention that different races were, in fact, different species – rose to prominence around 1850. Despite its controversial nature (for it explicitly challenged the Biblical account of humanity as the descendants of Adam and Eve), its appeal to science in order to propagate racial hierarchies gave a justification to slavery, racial discrimination and racism and made the theory both respectable and transportable in a way that was previously impossible. Science is undeniably political – the rise of abolitionism and its appeals to Christian morality and humanitarianism

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5 In the late 18th and early 19th century environmentalism and monogenesis were respectable and complementary (rather than competing) doctrines whose dominance lasted at least until 1840 (Frederickson, 1971: 72). Its two major proponents were Britain’s J. F Blumenbach and America’s Samuel Stanhope Smith. In 1770 Blumenbach’s classification of human races into 28 variants used the 18th century thesis of “degeneration” to explain racial differences. That is, all races descended from a “pure type,” and variations in racial stock could be attributed to other factors, such as environment or climate. The “pure origin” of man was, of course, the white male (Young, 1995: 65). Smith’s 1787 Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species presented a defence of “monogenesis”.

6 This debate also represented a serious division amongst the most well-respected scientists of the day, culminating when James Hunt abandoned the British Ethnological Society, home of monogenists such as Huxley, Prichard and Darwin to form the polygenist Anthropological Society of London in the 1860s (Stepan, 1982: 45). The new doctrine of polygenesis also became a widely popularized worldview in the 1850s when the American School of Ethnology emerged and presented data on the separately created species that, the claimed, comprised the races of humanity. For a fuller account, see Stanton (1960) and Gould (1981).
needed to be countered with a powerful, scientifically-based argument that Negroes were not ‘human’ in the same way as whites.

The classification of persons of mixed racial ancestry within racial hierarchies was critical in both social and scientific debates over the nature of racial difference in the United States. The scientific validity of polygenesis hinged on the question of whether or not mixed-race progeny were fertile (and hence, Negroes and whites could be traced to a common ancestry) or infertile (inconclusive proof that the two races were actually separate species and differential treatment could be justified on this basis). The work of biologist Louis Agassiz (1854), for example, which theorized that “the boundaries, within which the different natural combinations of animals are known to be circumscribed upon the surface of our earth, coincide with the natural ranges of distinct types of man” (1854: lvii), required a contingent theorization that all hybrids were sterile and, therefore, the “types of man” were truly “distinct”. The belief that mulattoes were infertile and would eventually die out is present in most polygenesist arguments, such as Morton (1839), Nott (1851), Nott and Gliddon (1854), and de Gobineau (1856). Robert Young (1995) points out that the dominant view of hybridity from 1850 to 1930 was the argument that “hybridity varies between ‘proximate’ and ‘distant’ species – unions between allied races are fertile, those between distant are either infertile or tend to degeneration” (Young, 1995: 18).

It is in this context that the 1850 census was the first to enumerate mulattoes as a separate racial category.\(^7\) Historians have largely assumed that this inclusion can be attributed

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\(^7\) The 1850 census is considered a watershed for other reasons, apart from the development of mulatto as a new nationally institutionalized racial category: a Census Board was created by Congress, allowing the census to be developed in a greater institutional context with input from social scientists and more financial resources than previously; the scope of the census was much larger than previous censuses and included six separate schedules on the free population, slave population, mortality, agriculture, manufacture, and social statistics; a special enumeration of all Native Americans (and not
to the desire of the Census Bureau to better measure racial intermixture and demographic composition (Williamson, 1980); however, Nobles (2000) argues that “the mulatto category was added and other race queries debated because of the lobbying efforts of race scientists and the willingness of certain legislators to do their bidding. The mulatto category signalled the ascendance of race science” (2000: 36). Indeed, the first draft schedule of the census contained an inquiry on the respondent’s “degree of removal from pure white and black races”. Though enumerators were to count the mulatto population, Morning (2003) notes that they were not given any instructions as to how to determine who, exactly, was a mulatto. Forbes (1993) contends that in 19th century United States the word mulatto denoted all people of any mixed background, not just those of black/white origins. If this is true, “1850 census takers might have assigned people to this all-purpose category without being overly concerned about precisely what type of mixture they represented” (Morning, 2003: 45). This may be an accurate assessment, particularly in the context of other ambiguous enumerator instructions; for example, though the enumerator instructions stated that it was “very desirable” that persons of color such as Indians and Asians be “carefully regarded,” there were not any specific directions on how to count such individuals (Bennett, 2000: 163).

Enumeration instructions on how to categorize mixed-race people eventually appeared in time for the 1870 census. Not all mixes were to be classified in the same way: while enumerators were told that the category “mulatto” was to include “quadroons, octoroons, and all persons having any perceptible trace of African blood” (Nobles, 2000: 187), the classification of Indian “half-breeds” required more detail:

simply “Indians Taxed”) was also included (Nobles, 2000: 36); and this was the first census where the individual, rather than the household, was the unit of analysis (Bennett, 2000: 163).
Where persons reported as ‘half-breeds’ are found residing with whites, adopting their
habits of life and methods of industry, such persons are to be treated as belonging to the
white population. Where, on the other hand, they are found in communities composed
wholly of mainly of Indians, the opposite construction is taken. In a word, in the
equilibrium produced by the equal division of blood, the habits, tastes, and associations
of the half-breed are allowed to determine his gravitation to the one class or the other
(U.S. Census Office, 1872, p. xiii).

Note, however, that these careful instructions on how to classify half-breeds appeared in the
1870 census though the category itself would not be included until 1880. The 1870 census was
also the first to include another non-white category: the enumeration of the (relatively
speaking) minuscule Chinese population of the United States resulted from policy concerns
over their increasing immigration on the west coast (Bennett, 2000: 164).

Racial taxonomy again expanded in 1890 with the inclusion of the categories “white,”
“black,” “mulatto,” “quadroon,” “octoroon,” “Chinese,” “Japanese,” and “Indian”. Again, the
enumeration of the numerically insignificant Chinese and Japanese populations must be
interpreted in the context of the prevailing anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiment in an era
were to be classified involved quite specific fractionalized instructions to enumerators: “black”
described those with three-fourths or more black blood; “mulatto” those with three-eighths to
five-eighths; “quadroon” one-fourth; and “octoroon” those who have one-eighth or any trace of
black blood. The historical record is unclear as to why the categories “quadroon” and
“octoroon” were added to the census. However, Commissioner of Labor Caroll D. Wright argued
at the time that “comprehensive information relating to the negro is absolutely demanded by
the present condition of affairs” (Congressional Record, 1889, p. 2246, cited in Nobles, 2000:
57). As Nobles (2000) points out, the size and growth of the black population was indeed
critical to how individual states justified their policies towards blacks: if the black population
was outgrowing the white, or reverting back to its “dominant form” (i.e. mulattoes were dying
out), then white southerners who would soon be outnumbered by blacks could justify their repressive laws. If, however, the data demonstrated that black population growth was declining, then such measures could be challenged as unnecessary (Nobles, 2000: 57). Lee (1993) suggests that the preoccupation with defining the black and partially black population can be explained against the prevailing racial climate of the United States, particularly in the Southern states (1993: 77). Indeed, numerous authors (Williamson, 1980; Davis, 1991; Pascoe, 1996; 2009; Wallenstein, 2002) have demonstrated the proliferation of miscegenation laws during this time period, which, rather than entrenching mixed-race as distinct from parent racial groups, worked to reinforce the conception of a hierarchy in which mixed-race status was encompassed within the same racialized social status as non-white groups.

The “mulatto,” “quadroon,” and “octoroon” categories were dropped from the US census in 1900, though “mulatto” would reappear in 1910 and 1920 before disappearing completely from the list of enumerated racial categories. During these last two appearances, “mulatto” was defined as including “all persons with some proportion or perceptible trace of Negro blood” (Nobles, 2000: 188). Official reports of the Census Bureau imply that the validity of data gathered in previous censuses was increasingly questioned; in a 1918 report, the Census Bureau admitted “It is probably true that a much greater population than 20.9 per cent of the Negro population in 1910 were of mixed parentage. The proportion more or less affected by the dissemination has been estimated as high as three-fourths, and although no adequate data are available to substantiate such an estimate, the estimate itself is not in itself improbable” (US Census Bureau, 1918: 209). Variation in the proportion of respondents counted as mulatto was attributed by the Census Bureau to the employment of black enumerators in 1910 and white enumerators in 1920; the former tended to assign more people to the mulatto category than the latter (Schor, 2005: 91).
A more plausible explanation for the contraction of the “black” census category should consider the changing impact of the Census Bureau on social, political, and legal definitions of race in early 20th century America. Not only did racial and scientific thought settle into a set of ideas that would dominate for nearly 40 years, but racial segregation, sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1896 case of *Plessy v. Ferguson*,\(^8\) hardened as the South largely accepted the policy of the one-drop rule (Nobles, 2000: 64). Further, the establishment of a permanent Census Bureau in 1902 made the enumeration of race a more administrative process, out of the reach of Congress and those who could lobby its representatives. This did not, however, make the Bureau immune to the social and political climate of the time. Given the anxiety over immigration generally, and non-white immigration in particular, the state’s need to control both the external boundaries of the nation and the internal population manifested through the expansion of census categories, which included “Filipino,” “Hindu,” “Korean,” and “Other” (with a write-in space) in 1920 and “Mexican” in 1930.\(^9\) While it is true that immigration concerns extended to white ethnicities (Irish, Italian, Greek) as well, it is telling that only non-white categories were included in the census, in spite of relatively small populations. As Lopez (1996) has demonstrated, whiteness in the United States has long been defined by a process of negation – that is, through a delineation of what whiteness is not, rather than what it is (1996: 27).

The schematic state’s strategies and practices of race-making were not limited to the census; other areas of law, policy, jurisprudence and social regulation culminated and

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\(^8\) *Plessy v. Ferguson* [1896] 163 U.S. 537

\(^9\) The Mexican category was dropped in 1936 following mass mobilization in opposition of Mexicans being classified as non-white. The Bureau, before agreeing to reclassify all Mexicans as white under intense political pressure, attempted to convince prominent Mexicans to participate because “greater visibility, via the census, would be a source of pride” (Schor, 2005: 93). However, protests against the classification ensued because Mexicans were concerned over the risk of being categorized as “colored” and subsumed under Jim Crow segregation.
combined in sometimes contradictory ways. Smith (1997) demonstrates that while Congressional signals on questions of race, ethnicity and access to citizenship were confused during the Progressive Era, the exclusionary thrust was clear. Courts found themselves deliberating over the meaning of whiteness in attempts to abide by and modify American naturalization laws (1997: 446-448). For example, in the 1920s the Supreme Court relied on popular, rather than ethnographic, views to exclude the Japanese and Indian Hindus from naturalization, though these groups were already schematically separated in the census.

The extraordinary degree of variation in the racial taxonomies of the census between 1850 and 1930 was followed by relatively stable classification schema (Hochschild and Powell, 2008). After the elimination of the mulatto category, mixed-race people of various ancestries were classified in accordance with rather complicated equations:

- black + white = Negro ("no matter how small the percentage of Negro blood")
- black + Indian = Negro (in most cases – unless the person was regarded as an Indian in the community)
- white + Indian = Indian (in 1930; the 1940 census reverted back to the “full-blood/mixed-blood” dichotomy of classifying Indian identity and in 1950 blood quantum was reintroduced with “full blood,” “half to full” “quarter to half” and “less than one quarter” options)
- white + non-white = non-white
- nonwhite + nonwhite = race of the father

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11 Hochschild and Powell (2008) argue that during this anomalous period of instability between 1850 and 1930 racial taxonomies in the census were driven by three motivations: a) the political desire for partisan advantage and the desire of one institution (Congress or the Census Bureau) to control or be autonomous of the other; b) the scientific efforts of agency analysts to produce results acceptable to their professional peers; and c) the ideological push for the census to reinforce or act upon normative beliefs about the racial order of U.S. society (Hochschild and Powell, 2008: 65).
What is undoubtedly clear from this evolution is the extent to which race and the census are embedded in the politics of the day. Demography has never been the sole driver of census categories; rather, racial classifications have served political purposes, working to reinforce dominant political, legal and social discourses of racial identity and difference.

From the beginnings of racial enumeration until the 1960s, the American (schematic) state employed an approach premised on the management and control of racial populations. At times this control was literal, when census counts were used to control the movement of populations and to validate, implement and justify other exclusionary laws. For example, the 1921 *Emergency Quota Act* restricted immigration to 3 percent of foreign-born persons of each nationality resident in the United States according to 1910 census data. The *National Origins Act* of 1924 increased the restriction to 2 percent (based on the census of 1890) and after 30 June 1927 limited total immigration from all countries to 150,000 based upon national origins of inhabitants demonstrated by census data from 1920. These provisions only applied to white potential immigrants, since the 1924 *Immigration Act* also excluded all immigration from Asia. An important aspect of counting to dominate and control, however, was the state’s attempts to solidify the boundaries of whiteness, often through extraordinary regulation.

During the 19th, and early 20th centuries the census was an evolving racial project, shaping and being shaped by dominant ideas of race and racial difference of the time. Within the schematic state it worked to deploy changing racial grids on a society that constantly defied the pattern set out by elites and policy makers. New racial categories were consistently added while others were discarded, disaggregated, or modified. The schematic state possessed significant autonomy over racial definitions in all areas of law and policy, shared among its legislative, bureaucratic, and judicial branches, which often offered competing definitions of whiteness, blackness, and who should count as what. These boundary-making practices helped
to shape the meaning of racial difference: the Irish became white, mulattoes became black, and while the Courts eventually acknowledged that the scientific racialism of the 19th century had little credit, questionable popular vestiges of the meaning of race were enshrined in law nonetheless.


The legal developments of the 1960s and 1970s proved to be a watershed for the politics of the census. The introduction and implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, critical successes of the civil rights movement in their own rights, spurred further legislation aimed at the eradication of racial discrimination, including the Fair Housing Act (1968), the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (1972) and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (1974). When the equal opportunity discourse of the 1960s had little effect on alleviating entrenched patterns of discrimination, President Nixon instituted the use of numerical quotas in construction industry hiring practices as a part of the Philadelphia Plan. This protocol was emulated throughout the 1970s in regulations applied to all private contractors and evolved into minority “set-aside” programs that required government contractors to allocate funds to minority firms (Sabbagh and Morning, 2004: 6). Race data was critical to the implementation of these goals and the census became the main source for statistical information on the labour force availability, used to determine the underemployment of minorities, and the demographic distribution of racial populations, which the Census Bureau is legally required to provide for the determination of voting districts. The purpose of the direct question on race in the US census was fundamentally altered – though some argue that the census remains an instrument of government control, the use of racial data to combat
discrimination gave the census a powerful new role, providing minority groups with more incentive to be counted and heightening the stakes of racial enumeration.

Another change to census politics was the use of self-identification, which was adopted as a limited approach for the first time in the 1960 census in place of enumerator observation. It was expanded in each subsequent census until it was used throughout the United States by 1980. (McKenney and Cresce, 1993: 200). The Census Bureau hoped that self-identification would result in better data and more consistent reporting of race; Bureau officials in the 1990s confirm that persons of mixed racial parentage were a particular concern at the time (McKenney and Cresce, 1993: 175). However, where the race question had not been answered when the enumerator arrived at the residence, the enumerator was instructed to determine the race of the respondent and others in the household by observation. Further, these observations were to be recorded in accordance with the same rules of racial classification that had been in effect for decades: mixed-race persons (black/white) were to be classified as black; Indian/black classified as black unless the person was regarded in the community as an Indian; other mixtures with white as the non-white parent race; and mixes of races other than white were recorded as the race of the father (Bennett, 2000: 172-174).

In the past 40 years, one of the most significant events to shape the politics of census-taking in the United States was the development and implementation of Statistical Directive 15 in 1977. A more thorough account of the political development of and amendments to Statistical Directive 15 can be found in the Office for Management and Budget’s Federal Register notice of 9 June 1994 (OMB, 1994) and Robbin (2000a; 2000b). The Directive has its origins in a federal interagency report on minority education, which deplored the lack of useful data on
racial and ethnic groups and recommended the government implement standardized classifications in 1973. The Federal Interagency Committee on Education (FICE) created an ad-hoc committee on racial and ethnic definitions, whose 1975 report recommended that four racial categories (American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black/Negro and Caucasian/White) and one ethnic category (Hispanic) be created. Spencer (1999) contends that “the necessity for standardized racial categories was an inevitable outgrowth of the fact that each federal agency was fully responsible for promulgating its own civil rights compliance policy. Working independently and having various goals and priorities, different agencies developed different categories for their own particular use” (1999: 65).

Seldom emphasized in the literature is the institutional origin of Statistical Directive 15: in October, 1977, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12013, transferring responsibility for statistical policy from Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to the Department of Commerce. The Secretary of Commerce then established the Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards (OFSPS). As a result of the administrative change, the Secretary of Commerce issued the Statistical Policy Handbook, which included federal standards for the collection of data (also called Statistical Directives). The 15th of these directives (commonly called Statistical Directive No. 15) mandated the use of four standardized racial categories in the official reporting of all statistical data pertaining to race by the federal government. Note that Hispanic is considered an ethnic category, not a racial category. The four categories are as follows:

13 Administrative control again changed hands in 1980 because of the Paperwork Reduction Act, which assigned OMB responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the federal statistical system.

14 In 1976 Congress passed Public Law 94-311, which required all federal agencies to provide separate counts of the Hispanic population, a development largely attributed to the lobby efforts of Hispanic organizations. See Choldin (1986), Rodriguez (2000) and Hattam (2005).
• **American Indian or Alaskan Native**: a person having origins in any of the original peoples of North America and who maintains cultural identification through tribal affiliations or community recognition.

• **Asian or Pacific Islander**: a person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands. This area includes, for example, China, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippine Islands, and Samoa.

• **Black**: a person having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa.

• **Hispanic**: a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race.

• **White**: a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East.

The resulting classificatory framework is what Hollinger (1995) has referred to as “the ethnoracial pentagon,” extended to all federal agencies.\(^{15}\) The Directive specifically noted that the mandated categories were not scientific or anthropological in nature, but rather were necessary in order to ascertain accurate statistical counts of the population. People of multiracial descent were asked to select one category “which most closely reflects the individual’s recognition in his community” (OMB, 1977). The Directive recommended, but did not require, that self-identification be the preferred manner of data collection, although it had been standard operating practice for agencies to assign racial and ethnic group identity by observation rather than by respondent self-identification (Robbin, 2000a: 134). Though other agencies could collect information on ethnic subgroups, this information had to be aggregated into the main categories outlined in the Directive (i.e. Korean, Chinese, Japanese into the “Asian” category).\(^{16}\) At this point it is important to note the subtle differences between census categories and federal classification schemes. Though these two classification schema are

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\(^{15}\) Though the Directive was created for government agencies, it became the standard classification scheme for state and local agencies, the private sector, the non-profit sector, and the academic research community (Sabbagh and Morning, 2004: 3).

\(^{16}\) See Appendix C.
obviously related, neither is reducible to the other. As Rainier Spencer (1999) points out, the modern census is merely a part of federal racial categorization, since “the very point of establishing a federal system of racial classification was to allow federal agencies at all levels to compare, combine, and otherwise integrate racial data so that a particular racial statistic could have meaning outside of the agency that collected it” (Spencer, 1999: 60).

Throughout the 25 years the Directive was in effect it is clear there was opposition to the Directive from both within and outside the government. The many moving parts of the schematic state were not unified in their data requirements or conceptions of how race should be enumerated; within the federal government, “data collection by respondent self-identification appears to have been opposed strongly by various by unidentified agencies” (Robbin, 2000a: 135). Interest groups also lobbied the government to add, alter, or maintain the racial categories:

For example, Mexican American groups successfully lobbied to add the ‘Hispanic origins question’ to the 1980 census, and several Asian categories were added to the 1980 and 1990 censuses in response to pressure exerted by Asian American organizations. At the other end of the spectrum, the Arab American Institute has worked (in vain) to reassign persons of Middle Eastern origin from ‘white’ to a new ‘Middle Eastern’ category. Meanwhile, and from a different angle, other groups (Celtic Coalition, Society for German American Studies) have also been trying to disaggregate the white category (Williams, 2003: 89).

The altered stakes of racial enumeration, brought about by civil rights legislation that attached material benefits to being counted and the era of self-enumeration, which made counting by race personalized and politicized, heightened incentives for minority groups to mobilize their constituents around their racial identities. The meaning of race within the racial project of the census was increasingly contested by social actors; the schematic state no longer monopolized control over how the racial project of the census would unfold.
In response to concerns over the growing measurement error with racial and ethnic statistics, in 1988 the OMB issued a draft Statistical Policy Circular in the *Federal Register* that sought public comment on a comprehensive review of Statistical Directive 15 and proposed a catch-all “Other” category (OMB, 1988). Though multiracial and multiethnic groups supported the measure, the proposal faced strong internal opposition from within the federal government. According to Sally Katzen, an administrator in the OMB, “those who opposed the change asserted that the present system provided adequate data, an issue we could discuss; that any changes would disrupt historical continuity, a very important consideration; and that the proposed changes could be expensive and potentially divisive...” (United States, 1993). Significantly, several chairs of congressional committees strongly opposed the proposal and in a letter to the Chief Statistician chastised the OMB for its failure to coordinate the proposal with other government agencies (United States, 1993). In retrospect, members of OMB’s Statistical Policy Branch confirmed that the proposal came “out of the blue,” and was put in the *Federal Register* by then Chief Statistician Dorothy Tella without any prior consultation. This violation of established consultation processes at OMB and the Census Bureau resulted in a policy failure – OMB received over 1000 letters concerning its proposal, it alienated other government agencies and congressional committees and drew the battle lines that would latter characterize the review of the 1990s – civil rights organizations and Congress on one side, concerned about the effect that changes to the census would have on racial counts and multiracial organizations on the other, claiming that the mandated racial categories no longer represented American demographic reality.

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17 OMB granted the Census Bureau a special exemption from Directive 15 that permitted the collection of data using an “Other race” category in the 1980 and 1990 censuses. In the 1990 census, over 250,000 Americans wrote in a combination of racial categories or used a term such as “Eurasian” using this designation. The majority of this population is Hispanic and OMB has considered this phenomenon to be indicative of respondent confusion about the nature of the separate questions on race and ethnicity.

18 Interview with OMB representatives, Washington D.C., February 2009.
Dissatisfaction with Statistical Directive No. 15 grew throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Grassroots organizations formed to lobby local school districts and state legislatures for the addition of a multiracial category on administrative forms and were successful in a few cases (Williams, 2006). As they turned their efforts towards the national stage, the Directive had become implicated in a "historical and increasingly strident debate about the census as an accurate representation of the demographic composition of the United States and its role in legislative apportionment and redistricting and the distribution of federal government revenues to states and municipalities" (Robbin, 2000a: 136).

It is generally agreed among scholars that the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel in 1993 and the subsequent review of the directive in 1994 were a result of both lobbying by interested parties and the increased questioning of the conceptual basis of the basic categories in Directive 15 (Anderson and Fienberg, 1999; Nobles, 2000; Robbin, 2000a; Graham, 2002; Williams, 2003). For example, there have been numerous controversies surrounding decennial censuses over the past few decades:

1970:
- New administration by mail, new system using self-identification;
- Response problems from those who may not speak English (Choldin, 1994: 30);
- Huge undercount, especially of the black and Hispanic populations.

1980
- Continued undercount and non-response;
- Lawsuits brought by mayors of cities with demands for adjustment;
- Pressure from experts regarding census adjustment (Anderson and Feinberg, 1999: 53).
1990

- A nationwide undercount of 2.1 percent was reported, but the figures were much higher than this national average for blacks (4.8 percent), Hispanics (5.2 percent), American Indians (5 percent) and Asians (3.1 percent) (Williams, 2006: 19);
- Twenty-one suits were filed relating to the US census, though the Bureau won in the Supreme Court ruling that stipulated that adjustment was not mandatory (Williams, 2006: 19).

The review of Statistical Directive 15 was clearly prompted by growing public criticism that new immigration patterns and racial intermarriage had made the original categories outdated (Wallman, 1998), but why did it begin in 1993 and not some other point in time? According to OMB representatives, constituents dissatisfied with the 1990 census categories wrote letters to their Member of Congress. Their concerns eventually found their way to Representative Tom Sawyer (D-OH) because he was the Chair of the congressional subcommittee that considered issues relating to the census. Sawyer confirmed in an interview that it was not a “wave of people” that approached him; nor was the 1990 census count any less transparent or less accurate than in previous years. Rather, Sawyer argues that the primary drivers of congressional hearings were the massive demographic change stemming from immigration and intermarriage patterns and the shifting perceptions about the validity of Statistical Directive 15 for measuring American demographics at the dawn of the 21st century. A review of Directive 15 was not, however, inevitable. Sawyer’s institutional position as the Chair of the Subcommittee with oversight for the census and his desire to initiate a “big project” provided the leverage

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19 Interview with OMB representatives, Washington D.C., February 2009. Interviewees also noted that the Education Department had received a number of comments from parents who did not know how to fill out the mandatory administrative forms for their mixed-race children.
required to instigate the review. As he stated in an interview, "I had the opportunity to deal with a big question – and so I did it."20

Sawyer initiated four congressional hearings on federal classification standards for race and ethnicity on April 14, June 30, July 29 and November 3, 1993 and a number of organizations appealed to participate. In addition, the OMB, Census Bureau and some Members of Congress appeared before the committee. It was at the hearing on July 29, 1993 that Sally Katzen, the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the OMB proposed a comprehensive review of Directive 15. She suggested the review begin by asking the Committee on National Statistics of the National Academy of Sciences to convene a workshop to bring together key stakeholders and discuss how the review should proceed. The timing of events is important; though subsequent hearings and OMB’s review were parallel processes designed to reconsider state-driven racial classification standards, the OMB officially started its review after the hearing, which was a major motivating factor in the decision to initiate the process.21

The review of Statistical Directive 15 in the 1990s exemplifies the schematic state in action. The review occurred within two interrelated arenas, driven by the bureaucracy and Congress, respectively. The schematic state puts the underlying organizational structure of the review process into place, but is constrained by its own institutions and bound by ideas about race that are transnational in nature and nationally-specific in application. At the bureaucratic level, the OMB initiated its own internal review comprising several elements. First, the workshop of the Committee on National Statistics of the National Research Council was held in

20 Interview with Senator Tom Sawyer, Columbus, Ohio, February 2009.

21 Interview with OMB representatives, Washington, D.C., February 2009. When asked “What was the procedural relationship between the congressional hearings and OMB’s review? Did one lead to the other?” one representative responded that though it was clear a review was warranted, the congressional hearings were a catalyst in the process and that “when one is called before a congressional committee, it is important to not go empty-handed”.
February 1994 and culminated in the 1996 report, *Spotlight on Heterogeneity: the Federal Standards for Racial and Ethnic Classification*. The Committee considered the four major options for change that had been proposed by OMB: eliminate the two-question format that covered the four designated racial categories and the ethnic classification of Hispanic or non-Hispanic so there would be a single question with five categories; add new race and ethnicity categories to the current set of questions, for specific groups or for a multiracial identity; collect multiple responses, which would necessitate new procedures for reporting responses, or; use open-ended questions, which would similarly require new procedures for reporting (Edmonston et al., 1996: 3).

The purpose of the workshop was not to recommend the best course of action, but rather to determine the most important objectives of federal classification standards and the most feasible means of reaching them. To this end, the Committee emphasized the need for substantial research and testing and workshop participants identified eight major objectives for a federal standard of racial and ethnic classifications: (1) fostering the exchange of statistical reports between agencies; (2) ensuring the availability of data for the monitoring of discrimination against minority groups; (3) designating the system for administrative and statistical records so that the data are reliable even when disaggregated by race and ethnicity; (4) ensuring that the categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and that the number of categories be manageable in size; (5) incorporating flexibility so that the standard can be adapted to the context of its use; (6) promoting longitudinal consistency for categories over time; (7) producing relevant and meaningful categories for federal policy purposes; and (8) producing categories that are relevant and applicable to individual respondents (Edmonston et al., 1996: 49-50). The Committee recognized that some of these objectives would undoubtedly conflict.
Second, the OMB established an interagency committee in 1994, co-chaired by the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics and comprising representatives from thirty government agencies, to review the racial and ethnic standards and make recommendations to OMB for any revisions. Unlike Canada, which has a centralized statistical system spearheaded by Statistics Canada, the responsibility for the collection of statistical data is dispersed among some 70 federal agencies, eleven of which have the production of statistics as their primary mission (United States GAO, 1996: 1). The role of the OMB within this system is to coordinate, rather than manage or control, the U.S. statistical system. In preparation for the National Statistical Committee’s workshop, several federal agencies provided information on: (1) the use of Directive 15 for federal data collection; (2) data collection beyond the directive’s classifications; (3) the utility and adequacy of the directive; and (4) possible revisions of current categories (Edmonston et al., 1996: 10-11). The Committee’s report confirmed that at the time, most federal agencies reported favourably on the directive, though reactions to the potential modifications of the directive were mixed: some agencies hoped for more flexibility while others had strong reservations about the proposals (Edmonston et al., 1996: 11). The interagency committee took these concerns as well as the public input stemming from the congressional hearings and Federal Register notices into consideration when drafting the principles that would guide its work. These principles in some cases represent competing goals for the standard but also demonstrate the plethora of ideas about race and race-making practices of US census politics. They are as follows:

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22 The complete list of federal agencies that provided information to the workshop is: Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), Commission on Civil Rights, Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, National Center for Education Statistics, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Federal Reserve Board, Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics, Office of Minority Health, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, Office of Program Evaluation and Standards, Department of the Interior (Bureau of Indian Affairs), Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Rights Division, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Office of Personnel Management, Small Business Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs (National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics).
1. The racial and ethnic categories set forth in the standard should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature.

2. Respect for individual dignity should guide the process and methods for collecting data on race and ethnicity; respondent self-identification should be facilitated to the greatest extent possible.

3. To the extent practicable, the concepts and terminology should reflect clear and generally understood definitions that can achieve broad public acceptance.

4. The racial and ethnic categories should be comprehensive in coverage and produce compatible, nonduplicated, exchangeable data across Federal agencies.

5. Foremost consideration should be given to data aggregations by race and ethnicity that are useful for statistical analysis, program administration and assessment, and enforcement of existing laws and judicial decisions, bearing in mind that the standards are not intended to be used to establish eligibility for participation in any Federal program.

6. While Federal data needs for racial and ethnic data are of primary importance, consideration should also be given to needs at the State and local government levels, including American Indian tribal and Alaska Native village governments, as well as to general societal needs for these data.

7. The categories should set forth a minimum standard; additional categories should be permitted provided they can be aggregated to the standard categories. The number of standard categories should be kept to a manageable size, as determined by statistical concerns and data needs.

8. A revised set of categories should be operationally feasible in terms of the burden placed upon respondents and the cost to agencies and respondents to implement the revisions.

9. Any changes in the categories should include evaluations of the impact of any changes not only on the usefulness of the resulting data but also on the comparability of any new categories with existing ones.

10. Any revision to the categories should provide for a crosswalk at the time of adoption between the old and new categories so that historical data series can be statistically adjusted and comparisons can be made.

11. Because of the many and varied needs and strong interdependence of Federal agencies for ethnic and racial data, any changes to the existing categories should be the product of interagency collaborative effort (OMB, 1994: 29834).
Data needs, technical issues of statistical analysis and social concerns are clearly identified as simultaneously competing and complimentary issues. Moreover, different agencies within the schematic state had different priorities and preferences that influenced their participation in the interagency committee. For example, agencies with statutory responsibility for policy development, program evaluation and civil rights monitoring were concerned about the historical continuity of the data in light of the proposed changes and generally opposed the implementation of a stand-alone “multiracial” category because the persons seeking this category were already covered within the existing framework (OMB, 1995: 44677). Data collection agencies, which use racial and ethnic data for federal programming, redistricting, and for the analysis of social, economic and health trends of the population, were also concerned with the historical continuity of data, but felt that the categories used in Directive 15 were confusing to respondents, overly broad and inconsistent. They too opposed a multiracial category on the grounds that it would be too heterogeneous and could affect the counts of other racial groups in unknown ways. The data collection agencies were also concerned about the significant technical, operational and cost issues implied if a “mark one or more” approach was to be adopted (OMB, 1994: 44677). Though divided initially, the interagency committee had both a mandate and desire to reach a consensus on these issues by the 1997 deadline. There was also clear incentive to do so; as the agency responsible for coordinating the federal statistical system, OMB enjoys a large amount of power. The incentives for other government agencies to participate in the process and reach consensus were not simply monetary, but also professional, giving line departments the opportunity to help shape OMB policy directions.23

Third, OMB sought public comment through notices published in the *Federal Register* in 1994, 1995 and 1997 (OMB 1994; 1995; 1997) and at four public hearings, held in Boston, 23

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23 Interview with OMB representatives, Washington D.C., February 2009.
Denver, San Francisco and Honolulu in 1994. By mid-1995 OMB had received nearly 800 letters from the public responding to the 1994 *Federal Register* notice and had heard the testimony of 94 witnesses during the four public hearings (OMB, 1995; Evinger, 1996). While it is not uncommon for OMB to have multiple iterations of public comment, the public hearings held across the country went beyond standard consultation exercises. The OMB desired a strong outreach program and there is every indication that OMB took the public's input seriously. For example, its 1995 *Federal Register* notice provided a detailed discussion of the issues and suggestions offered by the public. The OMB also synthesized policy options suggested by the public, identified the pros and cons of the proposed alternatives and solicited further comment from the public. The requests received by OMB take four major forms: first, the request for a specific "multiracial" category. Second, a number of comments sought the expansion of the minimum set of categories by adding others, such as Arabs/Middle Easterners, Cape Verdans, Creoles, European-Americans and German-Americans. Third, Native Hawaiians conceptualizing themselves as an indigenous group asked to be included in the same category as American Indians and Alaskan Natives while other Native Hawaiians requested a stand-alone category. Finally, the OMB received a number of requests for the elimination of racial categories altogether from those who contend that the collection of racial data serves to perpetuate the myth of race (United States, 1997: 46-47).

Finally, and importantly, the OMB initiated a comprehensive testing program. Cognitive interviews and testing was conducted to guide the phrasing of questions. The research agenda also included several national tests. In May 1995, the Bureau of Labor Statistics added a Supplement on Race and Ethnicity to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Bureau of the Census tested alternative approaches to collecting data on race and ethnicity in the March 24

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1996 National Content Survey (NCS) and the June 1996 Race and Ethnic Targeted Test (RAETT), which was specifically intended to test the impact of question and category design on smaller racial and ethnic populations not captured by larger national surveys. The National Center for Education Statistics and the Office for Civil Rights also conducted a survey of 1,000 public schools to determine the means and manner in which schools collect racial data. Finally, studies were also conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to evaluate the use of racial and ethnic classifications on birth and death certificates and the measurement of the health and well-being of major population groups. The research program designed in support of OMB's review was robust, to say the least.

In the congressional arena, subcommittee hearings were held in 1993 and 1997. As previously mentioned, the first round in 1993, were organized by Representative Thomas Sawyer (D-OH), chair of the Subcommittee on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel. The second round was held in May 1997 and was organized by Congressman Stephen Horn (R-CA), chair of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, with a final hearing held in July 1997 (United States, 1993; 1997). Though a number of issues were under consideration with regards to the federal classification of race and ethnicity, the proposed addition of a multiracial category soon rose to the front of the battle lines, with the schematic state transforming into an arena where various interests compete over political outcomes. In retrospect, Census Bureau Director Kenneth Prewitt would comment that the multiple-race option was the most historically significant aspect of the 2000 census (Prewitt, 2002: 354). The major players advocating for multiracial inclusion in the census were Project RACE (Reclassify all Children Equally)\textsuperscript{25} and the Association of Multiethnic Americans

\textsuperscript{25} http://www.projectrace.com
Founder Susan Graham of Project RACE was highly visible in the media and claimed that the organization was national in scope (DaCosta, 2003: 71). Targeting the national census proved to be a culmination of a longer strategy that involved putting pressure on states to change their racial classification schema and incorporate a “multiracial” category. AMEA presented itself as an umbrella organization representing numerous local multiracial organizations. The respective positions of these multiracial groups have been analyzed well in other scholarship (Spencer, 1999; Nobles, 2000; Daniel, 2002; DaCosta, 2003; Williams, 2006); and while the positions of both groups evolved over time through coalition agreements and political decisions, the major distinction was that Project RACE was unrepentant in advocating a stand-alone multiracial category, whereas AMEA endorsed a multiracial category that was followed by a listing of racial and/or ethnic groups duplicated from the main classifications.

The multiracial movement changed the discourse of the census. Previously concerned with the enforcement of civil rights legislation, funding allocations and congressional redistricting, multiracial organizations introduced the idea that the census was a vehicle for the recognition of identities in and of themselves, separate from the incentives associated with identifying as one race or another. Contending that appropriate labels are crucial for the positive self-development of children, Graham testified:

When I received my 1990 census form, I realized there was no race category for my children. I called the Census Bureau. After checking with supervisors, the Bureau finally gave me their answer, the children should take the race of the mother. When I objected and asked why my children should be classified as their mother’s race only, the Census Bureau representative said to me, in a very hushed voice, ‘Because in cases like these, we always know who the mother is and not the father’. I could not make a race choice from the five basic categories when I enrolled my son in kindergarten in Georgia. The only choice I had, like most other parents of multiracial children, was to leave race blank. I later found that my child’s teacher was instructed to choose for him based on her knowledge and observation of my child. Ironically, my child has been White on the
Carlos Fernandez, the President of AMEA, testified that his organization sought “a government-wide reform to accommodate and acknowledge the particular identity of people whose racial or ethnic identification encompasses more than one of the designated classifications currently in use” (United States, 1993: 128). When asked about whether “multiracial” would or should be a protected minority category, Fernandez noted that the purpose of the proposal was about accuracy and self-esteem; they were “not asking for Congress...to create a category where a slew of programs is going to ensue. That is certainly is not what we have in mind. We’re not discounting it” (1993: 169). Susan Graham concurred, saying “And as Carlos said, you know, we’re not looking to create a new category for entitlements. That is not what we are doing at all” (1993: 170).

On the other side of the debate, civil rights organizations were strongly opposed to the addition of a multiracial category. Henry Der, of the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders, questioned the point of having a multiracial category, contending that “unless there is adequate testing or sufficient evidence is provided about the experiences of biracial or multiracial persons that are unique to their being biracial or multiracial, the National Coalition asks the Census Bureau not to create a biracial or multiracial category at this time. It is not clear at this time what is the salience of knowing how many biracial or multiracial persons there are. For example, the Census Bureau collects data on ancestry and releases data about the number of persons of Swedish origin in the United States. In terms of our nation’s civil rights laws and programs, the number of self-identified Swedes may be interesting, but not salient” (1993: 101). Representatives from the National Urban League, the National Congress of American Indians, and the US Commission on Civil Rights also came out against the proposal to
add a multiracial category. In 1994, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the NAACP, the National Urban League and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies issued a coalition statement on the issue:

Concerned that the addition of a multiracial category may have unanticipated adverse consequences, resulting in Blacks being placed even lower in the existing American hierarchy....[The multiracial initiative has] potential disorganizing and negative effects on Black Americans [and would] distort public understanding of their condition...Directive 15 is appropriately viewed as part of the judicial, legislative, and administrative machinery that has been constructed over time to combat and eradicate racial discrimination. It is important to remind ourselves that this anti-discrimination capability was achieved at great cost. The sacrifices of the Civil Rights Movement...were not in vain...We are opposed to any action by the OMB which will result in the disaggregation of the current Black population (cited in Williams, 2006: 47-48).

AMEA and Project RACE responded angrily, again stressing the multiracial community’s right to racial classification. The politics concerning the 2000 census continued between the hearings of 1994 and 1997. The OMB issued an Interim Progress Report in 1995, which summarized the results of the public hearings, research activities and interagency deliberations since 1993. This report is significant because it was “the first organized official articulation outside congressional hearings of support and opposition to the Directive by federal agencies and other

27 The NAACP was conspicuously absent during the 1993 hearings, though the organization was scheduled to testify numerous times.

28 The joint response of AMEA and Project RACE reads, in part: “This statement is alarmist in tone, and implies that a multiracial category, in and of itself, has the ‘power’ to upset the racial/ethnic status quo....Civil rights gains sought by any minority group in the history of the United States have never been without risk, and have been well worth changes in existing policies. The multiracial community is no less discriminated against and no less deserving of its rights than any other racial or ethnic community. The interracial community sees the rigidity of these existing categories as a means of shutting out its people from receiving the same benefits, protections, and considerations under the law as the representatives of the ‘coalition’ wish to retain....[Your] stance merely perpetuates the myth that races and ethnic groups cannot mix. It encourages a continued atmosphere of antagonism, elitism, and suspicion which allowed anti-miscegenation laws to stay on record in sixteen states up until 1967....Let there be no doubt, this issue is as much an economic numbers game to the groups resisting the addition of a new category as it is a discussion of lofty socio-political ideals. How are the civil rights of the interracial community being properly served if you continue to ignore these families and their offspring?” (quoted in Williams, 2006: 49).
administrative units involved in implementing the Directive” (Robbin, 2000a: 140). Many government agencies clearly positioned themselves against changes to Statistical Directive No. 15 because of their statutory and administrative responsibilities. However, the Interim Report also demonstrates that the public strongly desired classificatory changes on the grounds that new groups should be represented and the political environment required an expansion of minority protections, which could be attained through an alteration in the state’s classification schema.

The 1997 congressional hearings were influenced by three major changes. First, the partisan politics and the political venue of census changed. Congressional oversight of the census was previously housed in the Subcommittee on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, an obscure subcommittee that few strived to participate in. Its inconspicuousness is evident in the fact that the 1993 hearings were rarely attended even by those assigned to serve on the committee along with Sawyer (Wright, 1994). Before 1997, the jurisdiction changed and the census fell under the responsibility of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform and Management. This Committee is the main investigative committee in the US House of Representatives, with the power to investigate any program or matter with federal policy implications. This venue was undoubtedly of a higher profile and more politicized than its predecessor, altering the political playing field and stakes for those involved in facilitating the hearings.

Another related change was institutional: though Democrats had won the presidential election, Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives and Senate, and therefore composition of the committee changed to reflect the distribution of Republican and Democrat seats in the House of Representatives. Though the American Constitution mandates the
congressional oversight of the census, a number of developments in the 1990s led to an unprecedented layer of scrutiny of the Census Bureau that often took partisan form. The most consequential of these was the debate over census adjustment to account for undercounted populations: the Congressional Black Caucus – all Democrats – took up the census as the civil rights issue of the decade while the Republicans were concerned about the negative effect of the partisan makeup of congressional and state senate seats if the Census Bureau’s proposed adjustment methodology was incorporated (Hillygus et al., 2006: 36-37). Consequently, congressional oversight of the 2000 census rose to unprecedented levels. The review of Statistical Directive 15 was one among seventeen formal hearings on census plans in which “Republican members challenged the bureau’s sampling strategies and the Democratic members just as vigorously defended it” (Hillygus et al., 2006: 37). Partisan politics reached new heights during this cycle when one political party controlled Congress and the other controlled the White House and both parties continued to jockey for advantage in census politics.

Second, the 1997 hearings witnessed an increase in the lobbying and coalition-building efforts of both those opposed to and in favour of the addition of a multiracial category. The NAACP and a number of members of the Black Caucus of Congress became involved (neither the NAACP nor Democratic members of Congress had testified in the 1993 hearings) and joined with other civil rights organizations to create a “Coalition of Groups Opposed to the Proposed Modification of OMB Directive No. 15”. Harold McDougall, the Director of the Washington Bureau of the NAACP, told the subcommittee that the introduction of new categories had the potential for data corruption. In the NAACP’s view, this danger outweighed the benefits of recognition: “...we respect people’s rights to make a self-identification. We just question whether the census is necessarily the best place to do that” (United States, 1997: 302).
Similarly, Eric Rodriguez of the National Council of La Raza argued that “the addition of a multiracial category undermines prudent public policy, and may inadvertently subvert the Nation’s ability to ensure the protection of civil rights for all groups. The drive for a new census category has on the surface been fuelled almost exclusively by emotional concerns related to identity” (United States, 1997: 318-319). The National Asian Pacific Legal Consortium and the National Congress of American Indians also opposed a multiracial category because it would weaken the ability of civil rights agencies to effectively monitor discrimination (United States, 1997: 412-427).

Between the hearings multiracial organizations had continued to lobby at the state-level and gained important support from Republicans in Congress. Though the attempt to gain support for the initiative at the state-level was driven by the same concerns for multiracial self-identification presented at the hearings, it was likely also a strategic move that manipulated the federalist system to put pressure on the centre from below. As Graham stated in her testimony, “I think that part of the problem that we have at this point is that multiracial people can be multiracial people in one State and not multiracial in another State. In one State, they might be considered white or black. And if you go to different States across borders, you have that problem” (United States, 1997: 339). The entire creation of this “problem,” however, was a result of Project RACE’s lobbying efforts. The basic thrust of the multiracial movement’s arguments continued to rest on the paradigm of recognition: Susan Graham’s son, Ryan, testified that the fact that government forms made him choose one race made him “sad,” and Ramona Douglass of the AMEA begged of the government: “Please count us, track us, begin the process of including us in the American framework that has monitored the evolution and growth of other racial/ethnic populations throughout our history...Asking us to endure another decade or another census unacknowledged, discounted or ignored isn’t an option any of us can
afford to live with any longer. If one member of our society is without freedom then none of us are truly free” (United States, 1997: 387).

Though multiracial organizations also argued that mixed-race people did face discrimination by virtue of being mixed-race, they more often clothed their arguments in this language of recognition, contending that the absence of a census category was a denial of the validity and worth of their identities. This strategy, however, was not well aligned with the purpose of census policy, which was not about recognition but rather concerned the collection of accurate data in order to fulfil the state’s legal obligations. The potential choice between recognition on one hand and civil rights on the other was not a risk civil rights organizations were willing to take; before welcoming mixed-race people to “join the fight,” McDougall argued, “One of the things that I think it is important to remember is that there is no legal record of discrimination against a person because they are multiracial. A multiracial person is part of a protected category, I would think, or the argument will be made. Because some part of the multiracial person’s ancestry correlates with a historically oppressed group, a group that has historically suffered segregation or discrimination” (United States, 1997: 340).

The coalition forged between Project RACE and the political right further alienated the multiracial movement and undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of civil rights organizations and Democrats in Congress. Republicans superficially supported the idea of recognition, at least on paper. In 1996, Republican Representative Thomas Petri introduced H.R. 3920 as an amendment to the Paperwork Reduction Act in the 104th Congress, which would have required that respondents be permitted to "specify, respectively, 'multiracial' or 'multiethnic' in the
collection of information”.²⁹ He reintroduced this bill as H.R. 830 in the 105th Congress, dubbing it the “Tiger Woods Bill”.³⁰ At the hearings, he testified that “in the case of multiracial individuals, we are asking them to choose between one part of their heritage and another, between one parent and the other, or possibly between four different grandparents. When Tiger Woods fills out his census form, why should he have to choose between his African-American father and Asian-American mother? I am sure he is proud of both parents and both heritages. The current categories force him to deny half of his heritage” (United States, 1997: 223). The most notable figure on the political right to come openly and overwhelmingly in support of a mixed-race category on the census during the 1997 hearings was Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, who made the link between an anti-civil rights agenda and a multiracial category on the census clear when his “ten practical steps for building a better America” included both adding a multiracial category to the census and doing away with affirmative action.³¹

The third major difference between 1993 and 1997 hearings was the information the OMB was able to access: the 1996 National Content Survey (the test for the 2000 census) demonstrated that of the 94,500 households surveyed, approximately 1% responded as multiracial in versions of the race question that included such a response category (US Bureau of Census, 1996). The Race and Ethnic Targeted Test of 1996, whose findings became available during the 1997 hearings, tested the viability of two approaches to enumerating mixed-race people, the mark one more approach (the wording “mark all that apply” was also tested) and a


³⁰ This bill was not endorsed by Tiger Woods. Petri later withdrew his support and there was no vote.

stand-alone multiracial category as well as testing the sequence of the questions on race and ethnicity and a potential question that combined racial categories and the issue of Hispanic origin. The results of RAETT demonstrated that only the Asian and Pacific Islander category would be statistically affected by the inclusion of this category – the percentage of person reporting white, black, and American Indian/Alaskan Native remained largely the same (US Bureau of the Census, 1997). Of the three options tested (a stand-alone multiracial category, a question with instructions to “mark one or more” and a question with instructions to “mark all that apply”) the mark one or more approach had no effect on the total reporting of any group, including the Asian and Pacific Islander category. The RAETT concluded that “this option may be the one least likely to affect the historical continuity of data on race and ethnicity that some federal agencies use to monitor and enforce civil rights” (US Bureau of the Census, 1997).

The Interagency Committee completed its work in 1997 and issued its findings in the Federal Register in July 1997. The participants of the Committee unanimously recommended that the method for enumerating the mixed-race population take the form of multiple responses to a single question and not a stand-alone “multiracial” category. The Committee gave a number of reasons for its decision. First, it emphasized that the mixed-race population was likely to grow and that adopting a means for measuring this demographic trend now would enable the government to do so more precisely with less discontinuity in historical data series in the future. Second, though certain population groups were more likely to be affected than others by permitting multiple responses, the mark one or more approach would allow data to be recovered through tabulation procedures. Third, the proposal for a stand-alone multiracial category was problematic in several respects. One of the most pressing was the lack of consensus on the terminology to describe mixed-race, which was demonstrated in the May 1995 CPS Supplement on Race and Ethnicity:
Table 3.1: Preferred label for the mixed-race population, 1995 CPS Supplement on Race and Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiracial</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No preference</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-Race</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than one race</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biracial</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because respondent confusion has the potential to decrease response rates, providing a clear question is a priority in census policy. As the Interagency Committee wrote, “absent a generally accepted understanding of the term, confusion could be expected if a ‘multiracial’ category were to be listed among the response options. Most Americans are probably of mixed ancestry, depending on how ancestry is defined, and could confuse ancestry or ethnicity with race” (OMB, 1997a: 36906). Other problems with a stand-alone multiracial category included the lack of legislative need for a specific count of the multiracial population, the evidence that a multiracial category is most likely to be misunderstood by respondents and the cost-related concern that using a follow-up question with write-in spaces or further categories after a multiracial category would take either more space or more coding. Rather than being the lesser of all evils, the Interagency Committee clearly recognized the necessity of counting the mixed-race population and sought the most effective means for doing so, given its priorities involving satisfying statutory and program needs, dealing with voting rights issues, and taking into account data continuity concerns, financial costs and public sentiment.

The report was undeniably influential. During the final congressional hearings in July 1997 the public positions of nearly all major stakeholders were altered, with both federal agencies and all minority population interest groups and AMEA expressing unanimous support for the Interagency Committee’s recommendations. Project RACE stood alone in its one-track
support of a multiracial category, though it did find an ally in Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, who testified in the July hearing that all federal forms should simply have one box with the label “American,” but in the meantime, a “multiracial” box was an important step towards “transcending racial division” (United States, 1997: 662).

Mark One or More – Census Politics in the 21st Century

In October 1997 the OMB publicized its decision to allow respondents to ‘mark one or more’, while recommending against the adoption of a singular “multiracial” category. The actual implementation of the multiple response approach was left up to the Tabulation Working Group to determine. Weeks before the 2000 census, the OMB issued guidelines that detailed how multiple-response racial data would be used for anti-discrimination policy: for the monitoring and enforcement of civil and voting rights, respondents that marked white and a non-white race would be considered members of the non-white group (OMB 2000). The guideline reads (in part):

Federal agencies will use the following rules to allocate multiple race responses for use in civil rights monitoring and enforcement.

- Responses in the five single race categories are not allocated.

- Responses that combine one minority race and white are allocated to the minority race.

- Responses that include two or more minority races are allocated as follows:
  - If the enforcement action is in response to a complaint, allocate to the race that the complainant alleges the discrimination was based on.

32 The decision also slightly modified various other racial definitions (see OMB 1997b and Robbin, 2000: tables 1 and 2). The major change was that the OMB rejected the Interagency Committee’s recommendation not to alter the category of “Asian and Pacific Islander” and instead split the categories into two – “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander”. The official justification for the split was that the Asian population had exhibited the largest growth in the US. See Appendix D.
If the enforcement action requires assessing disparate impact or discriminatory patterns, analyze the patterns based on alternative allocations to each of the minority groups.

A multiple response approach results in a total of 57 possible multiple-race combinations; added to the five single-race categories and the sixth “some other race” option, this increased the tally to 63 potential racial categories or combinations. Further, because each category could be considered in the context of the Hispanic ethnicity, there are 126 total possible responses to the race/ethnic question.

While this strategy may have practical merit, Goldstein and Morning (2002) note there are several controversial elements to the OMB’s approach: first, it is, in effect, a revival of the one-drop rule, a historical legacy that necessitates persons with any traceable amount of non-white ancestry be counted – in both law and society – as non-white. While the rule of hypodescent is now used in order to redress discrimination rather than enforce segregation, it is “still open to the criticism that it repeats the mistakes of the past, further institutionalizing the divide between the white and nonwhite populations” (2002: 120). Secondly, the strategy violates the principle of self-identification: “Now that many multiracial individuals are finally permitted to ‘mark one or more’ races, many expect to be treated as such without being put back in a single checkbox” (Goldstein and Morning, 2002: 120). Thirdly, this strategy may make race-based policies more controversial than they already are. Further, there is evidence that this application of a modernized one-drop rule runs counter to how mixed-race people actually identify. Goldstein and Morning (2002) find that among people of white/American Indian background, the vast majority identify “white” as their single race and among white/Asian mixes, more than two-thirds identify as white. The one-drop rule, in effect, only properly applies to the African American/white mix, where the majority identify their single responses
as black (but where nearly 40% of mixed-race respondents would choose white if given the opportunity) (Goldstein and Morning, 2002: 128-129). Finally, there is evidence that mixed-race identification in the United States is highly unstable: results from a 2001 survey of census respondents revealed that 40 percent of those who had marked more than one race on their census forms in 2000 chose a single race in 2001, and there was a correspondingly large percentage that did the exact opposite (Bennett, 2003). Suffice to say, many of the political and policy contingencies of the multiracial turn in census politics have yet to play out (Hochschild and Burch, 2007).

**Change, Alternatives, Outcomes**

The political development of racial categories in the US census reveals both a historic obsession with miscegenation and racial mixture and a contemporary difficulty conceptualizing how mixed-race people fit into American racial taxonomies, both of which signify the changing nature and role of the census throughout American history. The census of the 19th and early to mid-20th centuries was embedded in state-driven racial projects intent on making the population legible in accordance with dominant (state-supported) norms and practices. Making populations “legible” in the American context has worked to solidify racial discourse and the imposition of a racialized social order; in other words, counting by race in order to dominate and control racial populations, including the management of the boundaries of whiteness. The instability of census categories, particularly in the period between 1850 and 1920, is marked by numerous state strategies and practices of race-making, reflecting dominant ideational and political discourses of the day. The classification schema crystallized after 1930; it is no coincidence that Jim Crow segregation, miscegenation regimes and the rule of hypodescent
became solidified around the same time. The census and other related social, political and legal forces coalesced in support of the principles and ethos of the racial state. In the contemporary era, the nature and role of the census changed as a direct result of civil rights legislation. What was once an instrument of regulation and control now possessed a new emancipatory power to combat, rather than reinforce, racial discrimination and disadvantage. Census data and racial statistics found a powerful new purpose by the mid-1960s and it took very little time for those both inside and outside the state to recognize the importance of being counted and seize opportunities to push for the alteration or maintenance of the status quo. Unlike Britain's policy makers, who recognized that mixed-race people posed a problem for their classificatory schemes in the late 1960s, discussions of multiraciality did not figure prominently into the discussions of Directive 15 in the late 1970s in part because of the legacy of Jim Crow and anti-miscegenation laws, which acted to reinforce social and political perceptions about discrete racial boundaries and intra-racial homogeneity.

Why, then, did the United States decide to change its standards of racial classification in the late 20th century? The secondary literature identifies and (at times) triangulates three critical factors: social mobilization, demography and civil rights legislation. Each has been demonstrably important to the evolution of American census categorizations since 1970, though none alone or in tandem can claim to have actually “driven” census policy. Though civil rights legislation gave the census a new purpose and role in American politics as it did in both Canada and Great Britain, unlike these latter cases the American census has consistently asked a question on race. Rather than shaping the decision to ask a question on race, which is a foregone conclusion, it seems that institutional consistency with civil rights legislation plays an important role in the determination of which racial categorizations should be counted. As demonstrated above, a good deal of the discussion in the congressional committee concerned
the extent to which mixed-race people could claim they were victims of discrimination because
of their multiracial identities. However, evidence that points to a group’s circumstances of
racial disadvantage may be a necessary but insufficient cause. For example, in spite of
persuasive data that people of Arab or Middle Eastern descent faced discrimination even in the
pre-9/11 context, the OMB recommended against adding a separate Arab/Middle Eastern
ethnic category because of conceptual issues surrounding whether this category would be
based on geographic, religious or linguistic determinants, the limited space on federal forms
and the lack of federal requirements for information on this population group (OMB, 1997a:
36940). Furthermore, many argued that the evidence demonstrating that mixed-race people
were discriminated against by virtue of their multiraciality – as opposed to their ancestral
linkages with historically disadvantaged groups – was far from concrete. Race is indeed a set of
practices, as these circumstances speak to the ways in which signifiers such as “Arab” and
“mixed-race” did and did not align with the schematic state’s conception of what race and racial
disadvantage meant in the American context.

Most of the secondary literature on the political development of American census
categories posits a combination of demography and social mobilization as key drivers. These
explanations make intuitive sense, particularly after controversy emerged over the significant
undercounts of racial minority populations in the 1970 census (Choldin, 1994). Minority groups
mobilized and the Census Bureau became an “embattled organization,” (Robbin, 2000b: 444)
subject to and greatly criticized through congressional oversight. From the 1970s onwards,
minority groups have lobbied for additions or changes to the American racial classification
system. For example, the lobby efforts to include a means of enumerating America’s Hispanic
population began while the census form was being printed in 1968 and lasted until the newly
formed and institutionalized Census Advisory Committee on the Spanish Origin Population was
successful in getting a specific question on Hispanic identity on the 1980 census (Choldin, 1986).

However, attributing a policy change to social mobilization misses significant aspects of the push-and-pull politics of the American political system. Lobby efforts in the 1970s were marked by conflict and significant resistance on the part of the Census Bureau, which did not want to allow minority populations to participate in the decision-making process. The eventual formalization of minority census advisory committees in the 1970s occurred because of sustained political action, increased lawsuits over undercounts, and congressional hearings in which the Census Bureau was continually put on the defensive (Robbin, 2000b: 444). These committees were a radical departure from the Census Bureau’s older advisory committees, which represented academic disciplines such as economics, demography and marketing and gave technical and user-based consultative advice to census administrators. The minority advisory committees, however, mixed together social scientists and officers of minority group organizations who – though perhaps lacking in statistical expertise – were important in forging links between the census and the populations it purported to count (Choldin, 1986: 410). These census advisory committees became an institutionalized part of the census policy network, significantly altering the political discourse between the state and minority interest groups at multiple points. Rather than being a simple story of social mobilization and institutional response, census politics is characterized by a schematic state that is fragmented, comprised of varied and competing state and society interests and multiple linkages between the two.

Skerry (2002) has called the success of the multiracial movement “stunning”. However, the claim that the recent decision to provide a means of enumerating mixed-race people is a

33 These minority advisory committees were chartered by the US Department of Commerce for the black population in 1974, the Spanish-origin population in 1975, and Asian and Pacific American population in 1976. The American Indian advisory committee was not created until the late 1980s in spite of requests in the 1970s (Robbin, 2000b: en. 84).
direct result of the mobilization of the multiracial movement presents an overly simplified account of a complex process. It also misses a number of key points, highlighted in the preceding chronology: though interest groups did participate in the congressional hearings, they did not cause them since their involvement occurred after the decision to initiate congressional hearings on the matter; multiple interest groups, some of which had significantly more power and influence than the multiracial movement, participated in the congressional hearings alongside mixed-race organizations; the hearings were one aspect of a comprehensive review process occurring simultaneously at congressional and bureaucratic levels of government; interest group participation was less relevant in the bureaucratic review process because organized groups had less public access to policymakers; and, importantly, the actual outcome of a mark one or more approach to racial enumeration was not what any group – including the mixed-race movement – had suggested. In short, the details, sequence of events and multiple players involved in this process imply that the story is far more complex that an explanation based on social mobilization alone suggests.

Why did the United States decide to “count” mixed-race? The interests that informed the activities of societal actors were important, but not wholly determinative. In US census politics as elsewhere, “issues of both money and identity are at stake” (Wright, 1994.) Though interest groups helped to frame the terms of the debate, drawing battle lines and forming coalitions to advance their own interests, the decisions to review the federal classification standards and incorporate some manner of counting mixed-race people is a ultimately a story of the changing nature of the census as a racial project and its interactions with the American political imagination. The evolution of racial classification standards from 1790 to the present illustrates a number of elements fundamental to the resilience of racial taxonomies in the United States. First, unlike Canada and Great Britain, which, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters,
are both demonstrably uncomfortable with the language of race, race has always been a meaningful social, legal and political category in the United States. This has a number of implications: first, race matters not simply once every decade in the census, but through a host of other institutional imperatives, legal structures, social norms and vernacular discourse. It is the preeminent social signifier of identity and difference in the United States, compounded by others such as ethnicity, class, gender, ability and sexuality, but prominent in its own right. Though a number of theoretical paradigms have, in recent years, denounced the conceptualization of race even as a social construct (Webster, 1992; Gilroy, 2000), its existence and consequences remain omnipresent in American society. For example, during the review process OMB reported on some correspondence it received that proposed eliminating racial classifications on the census, promoting the view that “we are all a part of the human race”. And while bureaucrats and political elites alike acknowledged the problematic, convoluted and contradictory nature of race, the validity of race as a social signifier of identity and its place on the census was never truly questioned. Subsequently, the United States goes to great lengths to distinguish between what it considers to be the separate concepts of race and ethnicity and is unique in its explicit efforts of doing so, taking identities that are multiple, shifting, intersecting and organic and organizing them according to a pre-established grid. As Morning notes, this view is extremely unusual in international perspective and implies that “ethnic groups are different from races because they are rooted in sociohistorical contexts; races thus appear to be grounded in something other than social processes” (Morning, 2008: 255).

Secondly, the meaningfulness of race as a social category in the United States can partially be attributed to the actions of the schematic state, which has imbued it with social substance through laws, institutions and regulations that create, rationalize, and formalize the boundaries separating races that are presumed to be distinct. The process of racial demarcation
can privilege as well as subjugate; scholars such as Harris (1993), Lopez (1996), Gross (2008), and Pascoe (2009) remind us that the boundaries of whiteness have been heavily policed, with the law working to construct whiteness, defining and affirming “critical aspects of identity (who is white); of privilege (what benefits accrue to that status); and of property (what legal entitlements arise from that status)” (Harris, 1993: 1725). The state and its varied institutions are fundamentally embroiled in racial naming and the creation of racial meanings, responding to external forces but also shaping the terms by which these forces come to understand the essence of race in America. Such actions may not be wholly intentional; Lopez (1996) notes that the methods by which law constructs races are complex, encompassing both coercion and ideology, “with legal actors as both conscious and unwitting participants” (1996: 13). The purpose of federal classification standards are to establish racial categories, but the OMB viewed the exercise as “purely statistical, not programmatic – purely for the purpose of data gathering, not for defining or protecting different categories. It was certainly never meant to define a race.”

Thirdly, intentional or not, the determination of federal classification schema defines boundaries and categories, dictating who and what does – and does not – count. Yet, racial meanings are not stable; they evolve over time, influencing and being influenced by a wide array of social forces. In this context, the meaning of mixed-race in America has yet to be settled (and may indeed be unsettled) but census politics have been an integral aspect of the debate over the substance and significance of multiracial identification in the late 20th century. To this end, dispute over the multifaceted and at times contradictory terms of the racial debate over census classification schema and the racial identities and meanings associated with them

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34 Wright (1994), quoting Sally Katzen, the Director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at OMB, responsible for making the final recommendation on the revision of federal classification standards.
surfaced during the review process. The fact that the debate could even occur exemplifies significant changes in perceptions of race and mixed-race in America. In Chapter 6, I will argue that these debates are indicative of a transnational normative shift to multiracial multiculturalism, in which older norms of the discreteness of racial categories begin to disintegrate and are replaced by new articulations of race and mixed-race. Many discussions highlighted the view that racial distinctions are arbitrary and ridiculous, articulating a growing unease with the imposition of racial classifications and a general acknowledgement that demographic reality will continue to defy categorical imperatives. As Tom Sawyer confessed, “At this point, my purpose is not so much to alter the laws that underlie these kinds of questions as to raise the question of whether or not the way in which we currently define who we are reflects the reality of the nation we are and who we are becoming. If it does not, then the policies underlying the terms of measurement are doomed to be flawed. What you measure is what you get” (quoted in Wright, 1994).

Whether or not the US’s changing understanding of race was brought about by a burgeoning mixed-race population is relatively unimportant compared to the conceptual problems that arise when mixed-race people are positioned (or position themselves) as evidence of a post-racial America. The rhetoric of post-race that so prominently featured in the recent election of Barack Obama often rests its case on the very existence of mixed-race people. As an influential 1994 article in the New Yorker noted, “Multiracial people, because they

35 There is a clear distinction that must be made between the notion of “post-race” as used by the post-modernist school and those who consider “post-race” to represent the state of political affairs or race relations in the United States. While the former adopt “an anti-foundational perspective which claims that race is a fiction only ever given substance to through the illusion of performance, action and utterance, where repetition makes it appear as-if-real,” (Nayak, 2006: 416) the latter often use changing demographics, the existence of mixed-race people and even the recent electoral success of Barack Obama to claim that race no longer matters or has any social significance in American politics and life.

36 Of course, this post-race rhetoric was a political strategy that Obama was often happy to employ, particularly when reaching out to white voters.
are now both unwilling to be ignored, and because many of them refuse to be confined to racial
categories, inevitably undermine the entire concept of race as an irreducible difference
between peoples” (Wright, 1994). Yet, positioning mixed-race people as either liminal or as
representative of a post-racial world, though intuitively appealing and intellectually convenient,
is problematic in a number of ways. The theoretical positioning of multiraciality as liminal –
that is, neither here nor there – assumes that the positionalities of “here” and “there” actually
exist, do so in opposition to one another and are non-negotiable. Similarly, the
conceptualization of multiracial people as a new race\(^{37}\) negates the significant history and
regulation of racial mixing in the United States, including the white/Indian relations in the early
Chesapeake colonies, the short-lived existence of maroon communities along the east coast
(Forbes, 1993), over three hundred years of anti-miscegenation laws, administrative
surveillance, informal regulatory regimes and jurisprudence (Fowler, 1987; Moran, 2001;
Pascoe, 2009), and, particularly interesting for our purposes, the extent to which miscegenation
regulations were compounded by other modes of surveillance and management, including
racial classification schema on official records and the national census, all of which present
irrefutable evidence that there is nothing particularly new about race mixing itself.

What is different, rather than new, is the shift in dominant conceptualizations of mixed-
race in the late 20\(^{th}\) century. Discourses relying on the politics of recognition, engineering
multiracials as a new race or claiming that mixed-race people are exemplars of a post-racial
world are a significant departure from the centuries-old metaphor of the “tragic mulatto”;\(^{38}\)
however, rather than strategically subverting racial formulations, these discourses simply
replace older paradigms with other, perhaps more insidious stereotypes of the mixed-race

\(^{37}\) See, for example, the testimony of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (United States, 1997: 514-515).

\(^{38}\) See, for example, Lydia Maria Child’s short story “The Quadroons” and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin
(1852) (Raimon, 2004).
model minority, or worse, a post-racial subject with the power to liaise between disparate racial groups by existing atop a pedestal of racial apathy and non-commitment. Alterations in (multi)racial discourses do not necessarily mean that the revisionist stereotypes are inherently progressive.

Consider two overly publicized examples. First, in November 1993 *Time Magazine*’s special issue cover featured the image of a woman, with text alongside declaring “Take a good look at this woman. She was created by a computer from a mix of several races”. The cover claimed that she represented a remarkable preview of “the New Face of America” and claimed that immigration was shaping the America as “the world’s first multicultural society”. It was clearly no coincidence that *Time* used the image of a woman rather than a man; dubbed inside the magazine as “the new Eve,” she reincarnated the gendered purview that women serve as the vessels through which the race can be continued, guarded or diluted. The editors commented: “[L]ittle did we know what we had wrought. As onlookers watched the image of our new Eve begin to appear on the computer screen, several staff members promptly fell in love” (*Time*, 1993: 2). Rather than subverting racial discourse, the editors of *Time* reinforced the complex of gendered and raced paradigms inherent in discussions of multiraciality:

On the one hand, then, the special issue celebrated multiraciality by claiming that that the country was becoming multiracial, that multiracial people were among us and that the melting pot was simmering. On the other, the image on the cover showcased not only the woman’s multiraciality but also her sex, and was cast(e) as exotic, impossible to acheive and therefore all the more desirable. Moreover, the essays that followed anxiously forecasted the eventual minoritization of ‘whites,’ highlighted the need to reinforce ‘American’ moralities and eroticized otherness. *Time* publicly attempted to celebrate assimilation and calm fears about difference, and yet its articles also reflected persistent private ambivalences regarding multiraicality and racially inflected social change (Wright et al., 2003: 459).

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39 Similar conceptions of raced and gendered intimacies featured prominently in miscegenation discourses where the micromanagement of women’s sexuality and particularly the control of white women’s sexual behaviour were integral to the regulation of interracial intimacies (Thompson, 2009).
The second overtly publicized example of new multiracial stereotypes came with invocation of Tiger Woods and his position as a mixed-race model minority. Appearing on the Oprah Winfrey show in April 1997, Woods declared that he was "Cablinasian" – that is, a mixture of Caucasian, black, Indian, and Asian and quickly became the mascot for the mixed-race movement. Though he himself has never participated in the public debates on the census or mixed-race America in general, Woods’ athletic achievements and notoriety were heralded as further evidence of the existence and potential of what the New York Times dubbed Generation E.A. – ethnically ambiguous (DaCosta, 2007). Participants in the 1997 congressional hearings frequently used Woods’ name – a metonym for both his success and public image – as indisputable proof of the necessity of somehow dealing with the burgeoning mixed-race population. Indeed, his name was invoked no less than twenty times by numerous participants of the 1997 hearing. It is not simply the case, as one participant observed, that “Tiger Woods has helped personalize this issue for everyone, and had pushed it to the forefront of people’s consciousness,” (United States, 1997: 412) but rather that Woods, who was perceived in press and elsewhere as representative of a successful, well-adjusted multiracial, was heralded as the new model minority. In her analysis of the print media’s spin on mixed-race before and after the 2000 census, Squires (2007) points out two elements of the model minority stereotype: “first, multiracial individuals are seen as model in their (assumed) attitudes about racial difference. Second, they and their families are presented as models for the future of race relations” (2007: 167). 40 While superficially progressive, the ultimate problem with these

40 Yet another instrumental exploit of the multiracial model minority stereotype, explored further by DaCosta (2007) and Squires (2007), is the extent to which multiraciality has been adopted for marketing purposes. As Squires writes, “...the dominant reporter’s uncritical view of Tiger Woods’s global popularity is partly a function of the desire of consumers to buy into diversity for personal satisfaction rather than embracing multiracial identity as a vehicle for interracial understanding and justice’ (2007: 136).
elements of a model is that they are formed with in opposition to identified “undesirable” racial behaviour of other minority groups. Consistently constructed as the discursive norm, white racial behaviour is rarely questioned or criticized.

At the same time these discourses of multiraciality in some ways challenged and in other ways confirmed the prominence of race in the United States during the review of racial classification standards in the 1990s there was also a tightening of the definitional hold of racial categories on the part of those with significant investments in the status quo. The stakes were high for civil rights organizations and the communities they represented and while their concerns were primarily about the potential loss of numbers, community coherence, and funding as well as the impact a stand-alone multiracial category would have on civil rights monitoring efforts, the darker side of politics of recognition featured prominently as well. The proposed changes to racial classification scheme brought forward by multiracial activists (many of whom were perceived as the stereotypical and literal “white mothers” of the movement) awakened wounds, particularly within the black community, of race traitors and the potential mixed-race exodus from the disadvantaged status wrought from association with non-white races (Daniel, 2002). Clearly, racial classifications in the US census meant more than a simple head-count of the population; in this context, Sawyer’s words regarding the review in the 1990s seem more poignant than perhaps even he originally intended: “We act as if we knew what we’re talking about when we talk about race, and we don’t” (Wright, 1994, emphasis added).

This chapter has also demonstrated the significant role that American political institutions have played in the evolution of census politics between 1970 and 2001. The congressional hearings were highly publicized, sensationalized and have been at the forefront of the analysis of US census politics at the turn of the century. Congressional involvement in the
matter was clearly influential, particularly after the Republicans gained control of the House. Sawyer's decision to initiate the hearings was a catalyst that led to the bureaucratic review of Directive 15, according to senior civil servants called to testify before the committee. The change of institutional venue between the 1993 and 1997 hearings, from an obscure committee in 1993 to one that was more publicized and powerful in 1997 encouraged the participation of more actors, groups and interests. In fact, the political venue itself – the congressional hearings – in some ways worked to breed conflict and dispute, giving external interests and stakeholders far more access to decision-makers than is normally possible in the development of census classifications.

However, the bureaucracy-driven review process was a critical, and often under-stated, aspect of what transpired in the 1990s. The Census Bureau always holds public consultations before the decennial census to determine the public acceptability of its questions and the reliability of respondent answers. While more consultations were originally planned for the 2000 census as of 1992 (United States GAO, 1993), only the OMB had the institutional power and jurisdiction to reconsider federal classification standards. In this context, the 1988 proposal to add an “Other” category to racial classifications was truly anomalous – not only did it run contrary to standard consultation channels and practices, but it also contravened the established bureaucratic norm of employing a cooperative intra-governmental deliberation to determine government-wide standards. The data and public input compiled during the review was undoubtedly instrumental in the final decision to adopt a mark one or more approach in the 2000 census. Though multiracial activists could argue about the need for recognition through a stand-alone multiracial category, it was far more difficult for them to challenge the fact that the term “multiracial” was not widely understood and had the potential to corrupt census data outputs.
The dual-track institutional review occurring simultaneously in both Congress and the bureaucracy undoubtedly influenced the final policy outcome. Indeed, the institutions involved were mutually dependent. It is unlikely that administrative agencies would undertake a review of Directive 15 on their own because of the powerful opposition with stakes in the status quo and the strategically positioned political forces, particularly on the political right, that sought to blur racial distinctions. The highly public nature of the census meant that it was bound to be a topic of political contention because of the stakes involved in and the legacy of census politics in the US. But by deciding to launch hearings on the issue, Sawyer created a congressional constituency that would support the objectives of reviewing the classification standards of OMB. This move opened a window of opportunity that allowed OMB to complete its work, keeping the spectacle of the highly politicized hearings in a completely different arena than the bureaucracy-driven process, where the substantive work was done. At the time of the first set of hearings in 1997 OMB had not made any final decisions on the issue (United States, 1997: 58) and representatives told the congressional committee that it retained the right to keep the categories the same. Though OMB was the hub through which multiple interests made themselves known, the agency itself had no position; rather, its purpose was to conduct an open review using a process driven by the need for federal data (United States, 1997: 80-82). Though the federal statistical bureaucracy proved itself to be less conservative than one might think – it was, in the end, at least partially influenced by outside forces and demonstrated its ability to compromise despite the potential of disrupting historic data comparability (Skerry, 2000) – the debate over changes to the 2000 census was politicized in the congressional hearings in a very different way than they would have been if the entirety of the process was initiated and driven by OMB. Similarly, the symbiotic relationship worked both ways: OMB was able to provide the congressional committee and its participants with data, evidence, federal government position and public comment it could not have attained on its own.
In Chapter 7, I will argue that the structure and interaction within this complex relationship points to more complete explanation of why the US decided to enumerate multiracial people using a “mark one or more” approach rather than other options, such as the status quo, single response with a write-in space or a separate multiracial category. Accounts which only focus on demographic change or the effects of social mobilization implicitly discount the comprehensive review process undertaken by OMB and the work of the interagency committee, whose preferred policy option was ultimately implemented in time for the 2000 census. The resulting policy was not simply a compromise among parties and Sally Katzen of the OMB made this explicit during her testimony to the congressional committee in 1997: “Indeed, over the 4-year period, we have had very little comment, and certainly very little negative comment about the process that we have used...The objective was not to read the tea leaves or figure out what might be a politically attractive solution, but actually to try to come up with the best policy for the government for statistical purposes. Therefore, rather than viewing this as a compromise, I believe they believe it is a principled accommodation of the legitimate interests that have been presented” (United States, 1997: 591-592; emphasis added).

Contingencies, Consequences, and Conclusions

Data from the 2000 census showed that approximately 6.8 million people, or 2.4 percent of the American population reported more than one race (Jones and Smith, 2001). Of these responses, the majority (32.3 percent) checked both “white” and “some other race”.

The next three largest combinations were white and American Indian or Alaskan Native (17 percent), white and Asian (12 percent) and white and black (11 percent). Taken together, these four

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41 Census data also demonstrates that individuals who reported a race combination involving “some other race” were more likely to be foreign born (Jones, 2005: 10).
combinations made up more than 70 percent of the total respondent population that marked more than one racial category (Jones, 2005: 4). Of the 6.8 million who chose more than one race, 93 percent reported exactly two (Grieco and Cassidy, 2001).

The debates that ensued over American racial classification standards in the 1990s seem incredibly politicized and contentious over what turned out to be such a small population. However, as the political development of racial census categories has demonstrated, demography has never been a salient indicator of census politics; rather, changes in the meaning of race and the schematized organization of society in accordance with these shifting meanings have been prominent in US census politics.
Chapter 4

The Ethnic Question: Census Politics in Great Britain

In studies of racial census classifications Great Britain is often compared alongside Canada and the United States. Indeed, its decision to ask a direct question on race for the first time on its national census in 1991 made it the only member state of the European Union to do so and aligned it more closely with the racial classification schema in North American (Coleman and Salt, 1996; Simon, 2004; Stavo-Debauge and Scott, 2004). This chapter examines the political development of the ethnic question on the UK census. The first section examines census politics in the UK, taking note of major milestones between the emergence of demand for racial statistics in the mid-1960s and the implementation of stand-alone mixed-race categories in the 2001 census. The second section will consider the three research questions of this chapter:

(a) Why did Great Britain fail to introduce a direct question on race in the 1971 and 1981 censuses in spite of a clear demand for racial statistics? Why was Great Britain able to introduce the question in 1991 – what had changed from previous decades?

(b) Why was there a change in the enumeration of mixed-race, from an indirect approach using a single response and a free-text field in 1991 to the adoption of three stand-alone mixed-race categories in 2001?

(c) Why did Great Britain use stand-alone categories to identify mixed-race individuals, rather than other approaches such as a mark one or more approach?

These questions will be answered more completely in Chapters 6 and 7. The preliminary analysis presented in the second section of this chapter will evaluate the explanatory power of demography, social mobilization, institutional consistency with civil rights legislation, respectively. It will reveal that none of these explanations can alone or in tandem explain the political development of census politics in Great Britain. The final section highlights the complex relationships among ideas, institutions and interests, which permeate the racial
project of the census in the British context: the struggle to define race and the nature of
citizenship and belonging in Britain; the disjuncture between state attempts to classify by race
and the often hostile reactions of racial minorities; the material and discursive benefits at stake
in determining census categories; the multiple and diverse interests that seek to invoke or
avoid race and racial categorization; and the ramifications of the membership, autonomy and
decision-making power within the census policy network.

“The Ethnic Question”: Census Politics in the UK

The tradition of counting censuses of the population in Great Britain dates back over two
hundred years; however, census question on ethnic identity only appeared on the decennial
census in 1991. This inclusion effectively aligns Great Britain more closely immigration-based
countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand than with other
Western European states, which do not have census questions on race or ethnicity (Coleman

Though blacks and Asians have a long history in Britain (Fryer, 1984; Ramdin, 1999),
the majority of the non-white population derives from the arrival of immigrants from the

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1 The terminology in this chapter will most often refer to the question on the census as an “ethnic question,” because this is
the terminology used on the census, in archival records, and by those in Britain. However, as the Office of Population
Censuses and Surveys itself has noted, “the census ethnic categories are essentially racial” (OPCS, 1996: 40, emphasis
added).

2 Strictly speaking, there are currently three censuses in the UK – England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Beginning in 2001 final decision-making power on the questions to be included in the census was devolved to the
legislatures of Scotland and Northern Ireland. Although the census content of these three endeavours is closely related, the
specific wording of the question on ethnicity and even the timing of its introduction have been known to vary; for example, a
question on ethnicity appeared for the first time in Northern Ireland in 2001, ten years after its introduction in other parts
of Britain. This dissertation focuses on the census in England and Wales because of the institutional prominence of OPCS
and its path-breaking decisions on whether or not (and the extent to which) a question on ethnicity should be included.

3 Between 1841 and 1961 (excluding 1941, in which Great Britain did not conduct a decennial census) the census included
a question on nationality. In 1841 this question pertained only to persons born in Scotland or Ireland, while the years
between 1851 and 1891 contained a question as to whether or not the respondent was a British subject. A complete list of
Commonwealth in the post-World War II era, when debates over immigration became increasingly racialized in spite of the fact that the majority of immigrants to Britain during this time came from European countries and Ireland (Solomos, 2003). The history of British immigration control has been documented more extensively elsewhere; for our purposes, however, the political responses to increased non-white immigration are of interest. Linking the seemingly contradictory elements of state imposition of racially specific immigration controls and measures to prevent racial discrimination towards the non-white population already residing in Britain, the *Race Relations Acts* of 1965 and 1968 sought to end discrimination based on race. As Labour MP Roy Hattersley famously stated, “Integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible.” The concept of integration was wrought with an air of prevention; at the time it was believed that without political institutions to address the social problems of immigrants, Britain would soon be facing the prospect of US-style racial tension and violence (Solomos, 2003: 81). The tasks of the *Race Relations Acts* of 1965 and 1968 were therefore to set up special bodies to deal with problems faced by immigrants in relation to discrimination, social welfare and integration and to educate the population as a whole about race relations in an attempt to minimize the potential for racial conflict.

Though the census was the most obvious vehicle to gather information on both the extent of racial discrimination and the effectiveness of the *Race Relations Acts* of the 1960s, it was not considered feasible to ask a question on race or ethnic identity in preparation for the

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4 See, for example, Paul (1997), Spencer (1997) Joppke (1998); see also Hansen (1999) for a different view. Though the British government did not restrict immigration by legislative action until the *Commonwealth Immigrants Act* of 1962, a study by Carter et al. (1987) concluded that between 1948 and 1962 the state was involved in a complex political and ideological racialization of British immigration policy, in which covert and sometimes illegal administrative measures were implemented by both Labour and Conservative Governments to discourage Black immigration.

1971 census. The assertion of Dale and Holdsworth (1997) that the General Register Office (the predecessor of the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys) was adamant that such a question be neither asked nor answered (1997: 161) is not entirely correct. The decision to include a question on parents’ country of birth – rather than the previously asked question about the respondents’ “country of origin” or a direct question on race or ethnicity – reveals the internal politicking at work within the schematic state. Bureaucrats discussed the possibility of including a question on ethnic origin in the census as early as 1966.\(^6\) When plans for the 1971 census took more definite shape in 1967, the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Health suggested there should be a question on ethnic origin, but the Home Office could not initially agree to support this proposal because of the “considerable political implications” of asking the question, even in the context of a test survey. However, the need for racial data was acknowledged by senior Home Office bureaucrat Jack Howard-Drake, who wrote in a memo that his initial concern surrounded “the impossibility of defining immigrant or colour in precise terms,” but that he was “now not so sure that this view is correct,” noting that “[with] the emergence of the second generation it will become increasingly important for us to have as much statistical information as we can about the coloured minority in the United Kingdom”.\(^7\) In early 1968 the matter was referred to the Statistical Policy Committee for Ministers to decide. Therein, the majority of the Committee were clearly in favour of collecting information about racial origin and decided to make the suggestion at the upcoming Home Affairs Committee meeting.\(^8\) At this meeting the Minister of Health proposed that a question on ethnic origin be included on the census, but the Secretary of State recorded his concern about the “political

\(^6\) PRO HO 376/175, Letter by J.T.A. Howard-Drake to Miss Hornsby, 14 November 1966.

\(^7\) PRO HO 376/175, Minute by J.T.A Howard-Drake 17 November 1967.

\(^8\) PRO HO 376/175, letter from J.T.A Howard-Drake to Mr. Weiler, 19 January 1968. There were also substantial discussions at the meetings of the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration in 1968 and 1969, but these took place after the decision to not include a direct question on ethnicity had already been made (PRO HO 376/123).
difficulties” that would result, and the decision to include a question on “parents’ country of origin” rather than a direct question on race was decided at the Ministerial level though Cabinet acknowledged that using this proxy would not provide accurate information on ethnic origin.

This initial call for a direct question on ethnicity therefore originated with bureaucrats in line departments and central agencies, who had discussed the issue internally for two years before it was proposed to Ministers. At the ministerial level the proposal was met with hesitance and caution, as political considerations (that had indeed been acknowledged by bureaucrats) played a much larger role in the decision-making process. These “considerable political implications” were many: first, British bureaucrats and Ministers alike felt that it was impossible to define race or colour in the precise terms required for a statistical exercise such as the census. The classification of mixed-race people who blurred racial boundaries was an explicit concern; as noted in a 1969 draft memorandum from the Home Office to the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, “the impracticability stems from the impossibility of defining what is meant by ‘colour’ in the instructions which would have to go out to those making returns...” The final draft of the memorandum confirms this justification for avoiding a direct question on race or colour:

No doubt many people could be identified by inspection as broadly falling within the definition of white or coloured, but this is a different matter from providing precise guidance on how any doubts should be resolved (persons of mixed blood would be an

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9 PRO HO 376/175, Note on the Home Affairs Committee meeting, n.a., 6 February 1968.


11 PRO HO 376/124, Cabinet documented dated 6 February 1968. The original wording of the question on parents’ country of origin stated: “Was your father/mother of African, Asian or West Indian origin? If ‘yes’ state the country (for example, Pakistan, Nigeria, Jamaica, etc.).” This was later changed to a more generic question about parents’ country of origin because this original version was too explicit in its focus on the non-white population (PRO HO 376/175, Paper to Statistical Policy Committee, January 1968).
obvious example) and it would be necessary to rely on subjective judgements which would obviously vary – as would the willingness of people completing the questionnaire to identify.¹²

The link between categorizing mixed-race and the practicability of a direct question on ethnicity was recorded as a concern at every stage of the policy-making process. In 1966, the categorization of those of “mixed origins” in the census was described as “technically difficulty” and contributed to the Home Office’s initial scepticism on the topic.¹³ Later, when Ministers of the Statistical Policy Committee endorsed the proposal in 1968, they also acknowledged that “a question specifically about ‘race’ would be difficult for persons of mixed race to answer.”¹⁴

Second, there was a clear concern that asking a direct question on race or colour would be perceived as offensive to both “coloured” and white respondents. The proposal to instead ask the country of origin of the respondent’s parents was more familiar, and thus less controversial, since the 1961 census asked for country of birth with the intention of identifying immigrants to the United Kingdom. The 1971 question, designed to identify the children of these immigrants, was not the extreme break from tradition that a direct question on ethnicity represented. Third, the government could not ignore the political implications that arose from its own policies. The Race Relations Act of 1968 was on the table during this decision-making process and given the Labour government’s “acknowledged as accepted policy to promote the integration of the immigrant population,” a memo to the Prime Minister on the issue stated that it was “undeniably important that the Departments concerned should have particulars of [the immigrant population’s] numbers, whereabouts, employment, housing circumstances,

¹² PRO HO 376/123, Memorandum submitted by the Home Office to the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, 23 April 1969, emphasis added.

¹³ PRO HO 376/175, memo by Miss M. Hornsby, 11 November 1966.

¹⁴ PRO HO 376/175, Statistical Policy Committee, 3rd Meeting Minutes, 30 January 1968.
Finally, and likely most relevant, were the implications of the politics of numbers, which became a salient issue in Britain for a variety of reasons. In a time of restrictionist immigration policy, anti-immigration agitators claimed that the actual size of the black population in Britain was considerably larger than official estimates (Bulmer, 1986: 472). For example, in 1964 the Conservative MP Peter Griffiths ran in the general election in the constituency of Smethwick under the infamous anti-immigration slogan, “If you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour” – and won. Four years later, coinciding with the decision to avoid a direct question on race in the 1971 census, Enoch Powell made his famous speech to the West Midlands Conservative Political Centre in Birmingham, declaring Britons “must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents who are for the most part the material of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre...As I look ahead I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood!”}. Any statistics concerning the actual size of the non-white population Britain could serve multiple politically instrumental purposes: on the one hand, the forthcoming census data could be used to, as bureaucrats hoped, establish the true facts and “disprove wild estimates of the future coloured population”; on the other hand, Conservatives sought the same “facts” to call for more restrictive immigration policies.

15 PRO PREM 13/2703, Memo to Prime Minister, subsection “Country of origin of the respondent’s parents, 5 February 1968.

16 Id.

17 PRO HO 376/175, memo by Miss M. Hornsby, 11 November 1966.
For example, between 1967 and 1972 Enoch Powell made frequent speeches in the House of Commons and elsewhere on the subject of the number of “coloured” immigrants in the UK, often using the 1967 statistical prediction (invalidated shortly thereafter) that the non-white population of Great Britain would reach 3.5 million by 1986.\textsuperscript{18} The seminal study of race in Britain, \textit{Colour and Citizenship}, noted that fears of being “swamped” by the incoming “flood” of immigrants was a key element to the formation of racist attitudes and that these fears were largely derived from exaggerated notions about the size of the coloured population, which, the study notes, were compounded by the absence of reliable statistics on the subject (Rose \textit{et al.}, 1969: 551-605). The connection between immigration and race relations was as much numerical as political – would the natural increase of the second and third generations of non-white Britons make immigration restrictions less salient, or would it give further reason to restrict the flow?

These political considerations inhibited the government’s willingness to directly enumerate race; as such, the 1971 census collected information on both the respondent’s country of birth (as in the 1961 census) and his or her parent’s country of birth in order to gauge the approximate size of the racial population. It was acknowledged at the time – and indeed, throughout the policy-making process – that this method would be inaccurate for enumerating those white Britons who happened to be born in colonies overseas, pockets of the historic (and indigenous) black British population, in, for example, Cardiff and Liverpool, and people of mixed-race. There were also concerns regarding the extent to which mixed-race people should be “counted” as part of the New Commonwealth immigrant population.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{19} PRO HO 332/58, Report of the Working Party on Departmental Statistics for Commonwealth Immigrants, April 1970. On this issue, the report recommends: “We do not think that it is possible to recommend any hard and fast rule be followed. But it seems likely that we are moving to a stage when it will often at least be necessary to make available figures for children with one parent born in a new Commonwealth country at the same time as figures for those with both parents so born. In
Generated indirectly using country of birth, parents’ country of birth, nationality and surnames, the subsequent census data was flawed and proved inaccurate (Sillitoe and White, 1992: 142; Ballard, 1996: 10), but nevertheless estimated that 36.5 percent of the non-white British population was born in the UK (OPCS, 1975).

Thus, in spite of over a decade of legislation on racial integration in the UK, the state did not address the need for explicit racial census data until the mid-1970s. Though the proposal was still controversial at the time, there was a growing number of public bodies that advocated for the collection of racial statistics, including the Race Relations Board (1975: 9), the Community Relations Commission (1975: 10), and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (1975: 20-22). A series of field trials between 1975 and 1979 were instigated by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) in order to develop a direct question on race/ethnicity that would be both acceptable to the public and would generate more reliable and accurate than the indirect question in 1971. A number of alternative designs and question wordings were tested in three separate field trials. In general, however, there were two main difficulties recorded by OPCS bureaucrat Ken Sillitoe (1978). First, West Indians were suspicious of the motives behind the data collection. Response rates were generally low and this group was among the most likely to object to the ethnicity question on some instances however knowledge of the local situation might indicate whether children born to parents whose country of birth differs could properly be excluded from the "immigrant group." It was eventually decided to include mixed-race persons as part of the New Commonwealth population; a “statistical difficulty” resolved in this manner “partly due to the political climate and to Mr. [Enoch] Powell’s influence on the terms of the discussion” (PRO RG 26/436).

20 However, as Erik Bleich points out, the continued tension surrounding the collection of racial data was epitomized by the Home Office’s White Paper on race relations, which stated that “the Government considers that a vital ingredient of equal opportunities policy is a regular system of monitoring,” but failed to recommend the collection of the racial data that would support these activities (Bleich, 2006: 228).

21 The OPCS merged with the Central Statistical Office in 1996 and is now called the Office for National Statistics.

22 A list of the proposed UK census classifications of race/ethnicity used during field tests between 1975 and 1989 can be found in Appendix E.
principle. However, Sillitoe notes that the hostility could be avoided if they were able to design some form of category “to record that although of non-U.K. descent he is nevertheless a U.K. citizen...because asking about ethnic origins only...can be taken to imply that anyone who is not of U.K. origin continues to be in some sense different, or alien to our society, no matter how long he or his forebears have been in Britain” (Sillitoe, 1978a: 46). Throughout the trials, and indeed, in the debates preceding the 1981, 1991 and 2001 UK censuses, many West Indian respondents felt that while the choice of “West Indian” on the census form may have described their forebears’ geographic origins, it failed to adequately classify the ethno-racial identity of those born and bred in Britain.

The second difficulty that arose in the field trials was the classification of mixed-race. During the first field trials in June and July 1975 mixed-race respondents presented a problem to the question designers, with 20 percent having provided “ambiguous” answers and 15 percent providing “no answer,” likely because respondents were unclear which box to check (Sillitoe, 1978a: 15). The second field trial in July 1976 experimented with two alternative designs: on one test version, mixed-race respondents were instructed to “tick all boxes that were applicable,” and on the second version they were provided with a separate box, but without a request for actual ancestry to be described (Sillitoe, 1978b: 3). Though, in the words of Sillitoe (1978b), neither method “proved to be very good,” there was a problem with the multiple response option that may, in retrospect, have proven to be specific to this particular test. This particular test design also employed “European descent” rather than “white,” and many respondents, especially among West Indians, checked both the “European descent” box as well as their own racial category to indicate their nationality alongside their race. This confusion led the OPCS to conclude that “to ask form fillers to indicate mixed ancestry by ticking all boxes that apply is too unreliable” (Sillitoe, 1978b: 18). The third test of autumn
1977 combined the box for “Other” and “Mixed descent,” effectively alleviating “the problem of people being recorded as being of mixed descent when they were not” (Sillitoe, 1978c: 9). However, Sillitoe (1978c) also recorded that in many cases mixed-race respondents continued to give either single or multiple responses rather than be counted as “Other” (Sillitoe, 1978c: 19).

The testing of an ethnic question did not guarantee its implementation on the 1981 census. The 1978 report of the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration recommended including an ethnic question and Ministers with responsibilities for social services felt that better information about ethnic minorities was required. However, some central agencies, including the Lord President of the (Privy) Council, Michael Foot, felt that the adoption of such a question would be “ill-advised” given the recent focusing of the public’s attention on immigration issues in the pre-election period.23 Specifically, the Cabinet felt that “the category ‘white’ in particular would be open to sensational and damaging treatment in the popular Press.”24 However, the political considerations of the previous decade remained salient; Cabinet concluded that a reintroduction of the 1971 question on parents’ country of origin would not only be ineffective, but would also be interpreted as a sign of weakness, showing a lack of resolve to tackle the problems of racial disadvantage. The final decision, summed up by Prime Minister James Callaghan, recognized the need for the racial data that could be provided by a direct question on the census, but noted that Cabinet “rejected the form of the question proposed for the census test, in particular the inclusion of the category ‘white’.”25

23 PRO CAB 128/63/14, Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 13 April 1978.
24 Id.
25 Id.
OPCS heeded the Cabinet order to find alternative system of classification couched exclusively in ethnic terms and in the Census Test in the London borough of Haringey in 1979 the ethnic designations “English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish” were used as well as a further category, “Other European,” alongside the ‘non-white’ ethno-national-geographical categories of “West Indian or Guyanese,” “African,” “Indian,” “Pakistani,” “Bangladeshi,” “Arab,” “Chinese,” and “Any other racial or ethnic group, or if of mixed racial or ethnic descent”. However, the results of this test were greatly affected by a campaign by local organizations and the media which urged people not to answer the question on race or ethnicity; 25,000 pamphlets were purportedly distributed to residents, linking these questions to the proposed nationality laws that “would make nationality dependent on your parents’ nationality, not where you were born...If we say now who is and who is not of British descent, we may one day asked to ‘go home’ if we were born here or not” (cited in OPCS, 1990: 9). In this pre-election climate of 1979, the connection between race and immigration was explicit: legitimate anxiety was caused by statements by William Whitelaw, the Conservative spokesman on Home Affairs who would become the Home Secretary in Thatcher’s first Cabinet, who outlined the Conservative platform for “racial harmony” as including a new British Nationality Act, restrictions on the entry of parents, grandparents and children over 18, immigration quotas, and the promise to “severely restrict conditions under which anyone from overseas can come to work here.”26 The politics of numbers was perhaps more (in)famously reinforced by the future Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, when asked about Tory policy on immigration in a January 1979 television interview for Granada World in Action stated:

26 PRO PREM 16/1689, Extract from a speech by the Rt. Hon William Whitelaw, the Opposition Spokesman on Home Affairs, replying to the Debate on Immigration and Race Relations at the Central Council Annual Meeting at the Centre Hotel, Leicester, 7 April 1978.
Well, now, look, let us try and start with a few figures as far as we know them...if we went on as we are then by the end of the century there would be four million people of the new Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy for law and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in.27

The concern of racial minorities in Haringey was clearly related to these proposed immigration controls and *Nationality Act*, the latter of which was passed by Thatcher’s government in 1981 and divided the category of citizen of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth into three categories: British Citizen, British Dependent Territories Citizen and British Overseas Citizen. Bearing in mind Britain’s already restricted immigration controls, this Act was criticized for reinforcing discriminatory immigration policies: “Indeed, the category of British Overseas Citizen effectively deprived British citizens of (mostly) Asian origin of the right to live in Britain” (Solomos, 2003: 65). Two years before this Act saw the light of day, campaigners believed that the reformed nationality law would jeopardize the status of racial minorities in Britain. The local campaign against the 1979 census test was therefore based on false but understandable concerns. Regardless, the number of people who objected in principle to the questions on ethnicity rose dramatically, with only 54 percent of households returning their census test forms and as many as 32 percent of both the West Indian and Asian respondents expressing views that they thought the inclusion of such a question was wrong. Even greater objections were expressed in regards to the parents’ country of birth question (OPCS, 1980).

27 [http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=103485](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=103485), site viewed 6 June 2009. Note that the BBC transcript is slightly different that this, the Granada transcript, recording that Thatcher commented that people are afraid of being swamped by people of a different culture (emphasis added).
After consultations with ethnic organizations following the Haringey affair, the government decided in November 1979 to not include a question on ethnicity in the 1981 census. At the time, the government presented the decision as a matter of technicality; the official justification provided to the House of Commons by Patrick Jenkin, the Secretary of State for Social Services, emphasized that the high non-response rates to the ethnic question could jeopardize the census as a whole and concluded that “the census simply is not the right means for obtaining proper information about ethnic origin.”

During the same parliamentary session a proposed amendment to add an ethnic question to the Census Order by Labour MP Alexander Lyon failed to pass by a vote of 14 to 116. However, when reporting on this chronology of events in 1990, OPCS noted that the elimination of the ethnic question was because of the low response in Haringey and because of the lack of agreement among “various interested parties” about whether such a question should be asked and the form the question would take (OPCS, 1990: 2).

Archival research reveals that Haringey was indeed an important factor that led to the exclusion of the ethnic question; however, other mitigating circumstances played important and often overlooked roles in the government decision-making process. The position that a potentially offensive ethnic question would jeopardize the entire census project was taken by the Registrar General (the head of OPCS); however, it is likely that the same line departments responsible for social services that had argued for racial data since the 1960s continued to do so. In post-Haringey consultations with the ethnic minority organizations and the public, opinion was split. Some powerful organizations, such as university departments, census users, and the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), argued that an ethnic question was necessary to

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monitor and combat racial disadvantage and that the incident in Haringey was largely caused by inadequate public relations (CRE, 1980). Others, including the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science, the Haringey Community Relations Council and numerous ethnic organizations, vehemently opposed the inclusion of a question for a variety of reasons, ranging from the contention that the collection of racial data indicate that non-whites – rather than institutional racism – were the problem\textsuperscript{30} to the “uncertainty of the Government’s intention on the nationality law.”\textsuperscript{31} In the end, the decision to present the government’s conclusion as a technical one was partially a matter of political spin. An internal memo to Home Secretary William Whitelaw and Minister of State Tim Raison noted that the use of the “technical” justification was the lesser of all evils:

\begin{quote}
The least unsatisfactory course would seem to be to try to present the decision as essentially a technical one; namely, that the Haringey test has shown that the Census is not a way of getting this information and that the Government will employ other and more acceptable techniques. It will be particularly important, therefore, that any announcement of the decision should be framed in as positive a way as possible, both to emphasise the Government’s continuing commitment to obtaining information designed to be used for the benefit of the ethnic minority communities and to indicate that positive steps are being taken to find alternative sources of data.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

Again, the government was aware that the exclusion of the ethnic question from the census would leave it open to criticism about its commitment to race relations. Accepting the Registrar General’s concern about the ethnic question’s potentially damaging effect to the census project as a whole was a convenient way to quash the initiative while minimizing the damage to the new government’s credibility in the politics of race relations. Moreover, the “technicality”

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} PRO HO 376/223, Haringey Community Relations Council – Response to 1981 Census Test, July 1979.
\item \textsuperscript{32} PRO HO 376/223, Memo from G.I. de Deney to Raison (Minister of State) and Whitelaw (Secretary of State), 2 November 1979.
\end{itemize}
justification also permitted the government to mask the true weight that organized opposition had in determining the outcome of the Haringey test and the subsequent policy decision to drop the question, a revelation which government officials believed “could be seriously damaging to race relations.”\[^{33}\] It is also likely that the mobilizing power and impact of ethnic organizations were deeply troubling to government officials – it was therefore necessary to belay any public insinuations that local organizations could so deeply sway the course of politics in Britain.

Another mitigating factor beyond the Haringey test that led to the exclusion of the ethnic question was the role of political climate and ideology. If Haringey had never happened, would the newly instated Conservative government have approved a direct question on race for the 1981 census? It is likely not, because an important aspect of the political climate of the late 1970s and early 1980s was the dawn of Thatcherism. The ramifications for race relations were many and were either directly related to Thatcher’s neo-conservative platform or were inflamed by it. For example, this era was marked by hostile, tense and often violent race relations. There were increased clashes between blacks and the police, culminating in the Brixton race riots in 1981. As previously stated, the Conservative government’s proposals to increase immigration restrictions and to introduce a *Nationality Act* furthered racial minorities’ suspicions of state intentions. And though Enoch Powell is often portrayed as being unrepresentative of the British public writ large (as evidenced through his dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet following his “Rivers of Blood” speech), it is important to note that the late 1970s were also marked by the rise of extreme racist and right wing political parties in Britain. The National Front, for example, was quite vocal on the issue of the census; a member of the House of Lords reported that the National Front’s newspaper, *Spearhead*, argued “...the 1981 Census MUST ask the vital question ‘What is your ethnic origin?’ Only then can we get an idea of

\[^{33}\] *Id.*
the true size of the coloured population...Our repatriation policy demands we have accurate figures of the number of people who, sooner or later, are going home.”34 In this political climate, it is highly unlikely that a direct question asking minorities to identify their race would not be met with suspicion and hostility, particularly if this question was proposed by Thatcher’s government. Though one Conservative Member of Parliament relied on the “race is offensive” argument in a speech in the House of Commons, contending that “the truth is that in this world at this time people do not like being asked a question of that kind, that is the sole reason [for the Haringey test results]. They will not like it being asked whichever Government are in power,”35 the response rates of the pre-Haringey field trials would indicate that either political climate, who asked the questions, or both, in fact mattered a great deal. As a member of the Opposition noted, “there was legitimate anxiety among black people about the possibility of a Conservative Government dedicated to discriminating against them taking office...In the couple of months after the Prime Minister’s speech about swamping, it was no surprise to me that many black people were anxious about the contents of the census.”36

The dominant political ideology and climate of the time indicates that it is unlikely such a question on the census would have been successful at receiving acceptable response rates from the British population. But would the Conservative government have included an ethnic question at all? Again, the evidence suggests that it is not likely. In a letter from Patrick Jenkin, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, to Home Secretary William Whitelaw Jenkin conveyed that in a meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher, she suggested that much of the information gained from the Census was unnecessary because it duplicated data available


elsewhere. In a testament to the principles of neo-conservative thought, Thatcher was "very concerned about the intrusion into the private affairs of individuals and feels strongly that Government will lay itself open to justifiable criticism unless it can be shown that these questions are really necessary for policy analysis and decisions."37 Indeed, upon further inspection Thatcher found many of the questions (i.e. whether working, retired, housewife, etc.) to be "completely unnecessary".38 The state’s incursion into the private lives of individuals was a compelling concern of the New Right, complemented well in this circumstance by another tenet of the Conservative platform – cost-cutting. The introductory speech on the 1980 Census Order in the House of Lords ended with the proclamation that the census budget of £44 million was a 17.5 percent decrease in the cost projected by the previous Labour administration’s White Paper.39 To be clear, the decision to drop the ethnic question from the Census had been made in early November 1979, over a month before Thatcher culled other census questions from the final product. However, as noted by government officials at the time, “[Thatcher’s] concern to avoid complexity and unnecessary intervention into privacy seems to be to have been likely to lead her to challenge the ethnic question on these grounds had the decision not already been taken to abandon them.”40 Haringey or not, the proposed ethnic question would not likely have resurfaced until the 1991 census, when its implementation was unavoidable.

The unavoidability of the direct question on race was partially due to the fact that disparate arms of state authority had begun to publically recognize the need for racial data.

37 PRO 376/223, Letter from Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Social Services, to William Whitelaw, Secretary of State for Home Department, 13 December 1979.

38 Id.


Vocal support for the question had been unwaveringly provided by the CRE (CRE, 1980) and this call for change was augmented by several prominent governmental bodies. Calls for a direct question on ethnicity were made by the 1981 report of the Home Affairs Committee on Racial Disadvantage and Lord Scarman’s Report on the Brixton riots (Leech, 1989: 9), but the most influential call for action was to come from the Sub-Committee on Race Relations and Immigration. The Sub-Committee began its enquiry into whether or not an ethnic or racial question should be asked on the national census in 1982, inviting evidence from a variety of external stakeholders, including Local Authorities, other public bodies (i.e. Health Authorities) and ethnic minority organizations. Its members also traveled to Canada and the United States to familiarize themselves with the collection of ethnic and racial data in other countries. In its parliamentary report issued in May 1983, the multi-party Sub-Committee41 publicly regretted the decision to not include a question on ethnicity in the 1981 census. The report reviewed the need for information on ethnic groups in order to monitor the effectiveness of anti-discrimination policy and proposed that the OPCS carry out a further series of field tests to develop an improved design of question on race and/or ethnicity for possible inclusion in the 1991 census. The report accepted that the racial terms ‘white’ and ‘black’ would need to be employed and went so far as to suggest a design for the ethnic question.42 In its reply the following year, the government accepted many of these recommendations in principle, noting that further tests needed to be carried out in order to create a reliable and publicly acceptable question for the 1991 census (HM Government, 1984). Thus the decision to once again address the issue of race and the census was not exactly coming from within the depths of the state

41 The Sub-Committee was chaired by the Conservative MP John Wheeler and was comprised of one other Conservative MP (John Hunt) and two Labour MPs (Alexander Lyon and Alf Dubs). Interestingly, the members’ dedication to their task transcended party lines; Leech (1989) writes that “the members of this committee were strongly committed to the question” and were often hostile to those who expressed doubts (1989: 10).

42 In the question recommended by the Home Affairs Sub-Committee, “mixed-race” appeared as a closed option (i.e. a box that respondents could check) under the “Other groups” heading (Her Majesty’s Government, 1983).
itself, but nor did the driver of change derive from a completely external force, such as interest
groups, social mobilization or an exogenous shock. Though Scarman’s inquiry and the various
committees of Parliament were arms of the state, the common thread amongst these disparate
promoters of an ethnic question on the census was their simultaneous connection to and
autonomy from the state, which allowed greater manoeuvrability in the interpretation of
contentious political issues.

The next series of field tests, held between 1985 and 1989, demonstrated that the
categories of “Black British” and “British Asian” were demanded by respondents but were
nevertheless fraught with complexities, since some members of racial minorities born in British
colonies overseas considered themselves to be “British Asian,” though the use of that label was
intended to appeal to second-generation British-born Asians. When the field trials explicitly
tested the reliability of data that allowed everyone to classify themselves as British, the finding
was that respondents found the format confusing and the data was compromised. When the
question eliminated the qualifier “British” from the racial category descriptors in subsequent
field trials, West Indians continued to express their wish for a Black British category or
something similar. During the field-trial stage, OPCS abandoned its attempts to classify mixed-
race people, claiming that the variety of methods used in the field trials of the 1970s had little
success and because “the main difficulty is that many people in this situation prefer to identify
with the ethnic group of one of their parents – generally the father” (Sillitoe, 1987: 3-5).43 The
accuracy of this statement is unclear, particularly because reported field trials throughout the

43 As noted in an internal OPCS memo, the racial identification of mixed-race children was often determined by the census
form-filler. If mixed-race people – usually the form-filler’s children – most often identify with the race of the father (who at
this point in time would likely have been non-white), then it is at least a possibility the dynamics involved in this identity
choice are far more complex than a matter of “preference” (PRO RG 40/397, Memo by Ken Sillitoe – “Notes on Alternative
designs for questions on ethnicity, religion and language – for the 1991 census,” 29 May 1985). As the Canadian chapter
will further illustrate, the invocation of the “one-drop rule” to assign non-white racial identities to mixed-race people is not a
uniquely American phenomenon.
1970s and 1980s rarely provided mixed-race people the opportunity to identify differently. In the field test in 1977 Sillitoe (1978c) reports that two major difficulties of enumerating the mixed-race population had not been resolved: “some form-fillers still persist in ticking two boxes and others record them as being of one ethnic group only – most commonly the father’s” (Sillitoe, 1978c: 19). Though Sillitoe does not provide statistics on how many respondents ticked two boxes compared with how many only recorded one race, the fact that both are mentioned as “difficulties” suggests that they were equally prevalent. The suggestion that multiracial people prefer to identify with only one ethnic group is not supported by the field trial evidence. Nevertheless, in each of the tests in the 1980s, an instruction was added to the question which read, “If the person is descended from more than one group, please tick the box to which the person considers he or she belongs, or...describe the person’s ancestry in the space provided” (Sillitoe, 1987: 5).

The terms of the test were determined by government officials, with an internal working group created in 1985 to consider the design of the question. Consultations were part of the group’s terms of reference, but the list of stakeholders the working group was to consult throughout the design process were mainly internal, with the sole exception being the CRE, an organization that was created and funded by the state but was also autonomous from it. The group appears to have understood the necessity of consulting with ethnic minority organizations to prevent the disastrous Haringey results. However, the members were undecided on the crucial question of when to consult. The group recognized that if ethnic minorities were consulted before field trials, there was a strong possibility they would object to the designs being tested, but if they were not consulted in advance, “there might be complaints that we are failing to take heed to the SCORRI [Sub-Committee on Race Relations and

44 See Appendix E.
Immigration emphasis on the need for better public relations/publicity...”

There is little evidence that consultations with minority groups took place during the early field trials. According to the OPCS and General Register Office for Scotland (GRO(S)), the OPCS and CRE began a series of meetings with Community Relations Officers and representatives of ethnic minority organizations in England and Wales in late 1987 when a recommended question had already been decided. The purpose of the meetings was to discuss acceptability and “to try to find out what doubts or fears, if any, people might have” rather than a deliberative democratic policy-making process. Consultation, in this sense, can be likened to a public relations campaign.

The official justification for including an ethnic question on the 1991 Census was delivered by the 1988 Census White Paper. The White Paper noted that the rectification of economic disadvantage in minority populations was a matter of general public welfare and was additionally important for the maintenance of favourable race relations. It also said that the information collected on housing, employment, educational qualifications and age-structure of each group would help the government carry out its responsibilities under the 1976 Race Relations Act and serve as benchmarks to monitor the implementation of equal opportunities policies (HM Government, 1988). The proposed question read: “Please tick the appropriate box. If the person is descended from more than one group, please tick the one to which the person considers he or she belongs, or tick box 7 and describe the person’s ancestry in the space provided.” The categories included (numbered 1-7) were: White; Black; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Chinese; Any other ethnic group (and a mark-in space).

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At this stage, the government invited further comment from members of the public and from ethnic/racial organizations on whether they would answer the question. Comments from black groups continued to request more detail on the ethnic origins of black people in Britain (Sillitoe and White, 1992: 155). It was eventually decided, therefore, that the question on the census test of April 1989 should incorporate the following categories (numbered 1-9): White; Black-Caribbean; Black-African; Black-Other (and a mark-in space); Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Chinese; Any other ethnic group (and a mark-in space). Using this question design, less than one half of one percent of respondents declined to cooperate because of the question and the proportion of black respondents who objected to the question in the 1989 census test was 19 percent – close to the lowest level of objection recorded amongst black informants since 1979 (White and Pearce, 1993: 295). The same design was implemented on the 1991 census.47

Provisions for counting the mixed-race population remained the same as had been tested throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s, with instructions suggesting respondents choose “the group to which the person considers he/she belongs” or to tick the “Any other ethnic group” category and write in a response in the space provided on the form. The results of the 1991 census seemed to contradict the assertions espoused by OPCS, that “people of mixed descent often preferred not to be distinguished as a separate group,” (Sillitoe and White, 1992: 149) since approximately one of four members of minority ethnic groups wrote in descriptions in the available free-text fields, and of the 740,000 persons who gave a description nearly one-third, or 240,000 people, wrote in mixed-origins descriptions (Aspinall, 2003: 278). These numbers are particularly significant as they outnumbered the population for three groups counted separately on the 1991 Census (Chinese, Bangladeshi and Black-African). While some respondents identified with one of the main groups, comparing the count of those mixed-race

47 See Appendix F.
persons with individuals checking the “mixed” box in the Labour Force Survey suggests that around two-thirds of the mixed-race population chose to write in a description rather than select one of the designated categories (Aspinall, 2003: 278). The need to find more accurate methods to collect meaningful data on mixed-race people, who were considered a growing population, was generally acknowledged (Bulmer, 1996; Owen, 1996; Aspinall, 2000).

Though internal working groups comprised of representatives from different departments and levels of government are the norm for many areas of policy making, the OPCS decided to “build on the experience in 1991 by involving users in an active role for planning the 2001 Census…” (OPCS and GRO(S), 1995a). This active consultation was to occur through six advisory groups representing interests from: 1) the health sector (Health Service Advisory Group); 2) Local Authorities (Information Development and Liaison Group); 3) academia (Demographic Liaison Group); 4) central government (Departmental Working Group); 5) the private sector (Business Advisory Group); and 6) devolved territories (Scottish Statistical Liaison Group) – in short, the main users of census data (OPCS and GRO(S), 1995a). Members from each of these groups were represented on the subsequent Working Group on Content, Question Testing and Classification and subgroups were formed to discuss particular questions for consideration on the 2001 census (OPCS and GRO(S), 1995b). The ethnic question, along with other questions concerning income and benefits, language, disability, careers, relationship within household, migration, labour market, qualifications and housing, were identified as high priority for testing (OPCS and GRO(S), 1995c). A subgroup on the ethnicity question was then tasked in April 1995 with determining what changes should be made to the 1991 format, to be

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48 Ethnicity data in Great Britain are also available from two other surveys: the Labour Force Survey and the General Household Survey. However, both these surveys are too small to give estimates at a local level, nor is their coverage as encompassing as in the Census (Ni Bhrolchain, 1990: 556). It is also interesting to note that the collection of ethnic data was introduced in these surveys in the early 1980s without any public or political debate.
presented in a business case to the newly renamed Office for National Statistics (ONS). The core membership of the ethnic question subgroup was comprised of members from all five of the main Advisory Groups, but the working group itself was not large.49

Neither the Content, Question Testing and Classification Working Group nor the ethnic question subgroup began their work from scratch. Prior to 1995 the Census Offices (OPCS, GRO(S) and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA)) developed a substantial list of potential census topics and revisions based on the experience in 1991. This list was then considered by the Working Group on Content, Question Testing and Classification, which pared down the list to 62 topics which met the criteria set out by the Census Offices (Moss, 1999).50 At this point OPCS provided the ethnic question subgroup with a proposal for questions on ethnic group and ethnic origin and the subgroup was required to complete a business case that would be used to assess any proposed changes to the census. The subgroup considered a number of issues: the OPCS proposal to split the ethnic group question into two separate questions about ethnic group and ethnic origin; comparability with 1991 categories; the number of ethnic groups presented on the census form; and the additions of Irish and Vietnamese categories. For our purposes, however, the most relevant discussion within the ethnic subgroup pertained to the question of whether or not to count mixed-race on the 2001 census.

49 Peter Aspinall of the Health Service Advisory Group chaired the Ethnic Question Working Group. Other initial members included one business representative, two academic representatives, two representatives from the central government (Welsh Office and Home Office), one health representative, and two local authorities representatives.

50 The criteria were: a) there is a demonstrated need; b) users’ requirements cannot be adequately met by information from other sources; c) a question can be devised which will produce data that is sufficiently accurate to meet users’ requirements; and d) the topic is acceptable to the public and will not have an adverse effect on overall response (HM Government, 1999).
Interestingly, and in stark contrast to the United States, there was near unanimous support for the proposal to enumerate mixed-race on the 2001 census from government departments, the CRE, and within the ethnic question subgroup and the Content, Question Testing and Classification Working Group. Aspinall’s (1996) report on the ethnic subgroup consultation makes the case for inclusion based on demand from within the group, the increasing size of the group, and the need for analytical clarity, particularly when the data is being used for service provision. The ONS immediately accepted the subgroup’s business case and recommendation to count mixed-race. With the substantive question of whether or not to include some provision to classify multiracials largely decided, the subgroup discussions focused on more semantic issues, such as whether the label should read “mixed-race” when the question itself referred to ethnicity, the order of labels within the category (i.e. whether the category should read “White and Black Caribbean” or “Black Caribbean and White”), the placement of the larger mixed category within the ethnic question, and the use of the generic label of “Asian” when the Black subgroups were divided into Black-Caribbean and Black-African (Caballero, 2004: 121). A multiple response approach to enumerating mixed-race was never seriously considered. One ONS representative suggested this was because multi-ticking represented “a failure of the question” – respondents tick more than one box when they are

51 Of the three arguments, “demand from within the group” is clearly the weakest. Aspinall’s (1996) report relies heavily on evidence from the United States, where multiracial organizations were lobbying the federal government for classificatory changes to the 2000 census. Aspinall notes that the evidence of a similar consciousness or demand in Britain was “piecemeal”.

52 This was not true of all the subgroup’s recommendations; in particular, it took some convincing for ONS to accept the proposal to include an Irish category in 2001 (Interview with member of ethnic subgroup, April 2009; Interview with ONS representative, April 2009).

53 Note that the label in the 2001 census simply reads “Mixed” with no further qualifier – see Appendix G.

54 The category was eventually placed second, after “White,” to ensure that respondents did not overlook the category (Moss, 1999), though some argue that this position is also an effort to avoid the historical stigma of the “half-caste” (Kosmin, 1999).
confused or when instructions are unclear. A member of the ethnicity question subgroup noted that when a two-tier question on ethnic ancestry and ethnic group that required multi-ticking was tested, “people were very confused by multi-ticking”. A multiple-response approach to the mixed-race question, however, was never proposed or tested and it was ultimately the ONS that designed the 2001 mixed-race census categories: White and Black-Caribbean, White and Black-African, White and Asian and a free-text “any other mixed background”. The inclusion of mixed-race categories in the 2001 census simply was not a contentious issue. The census testing program demonstrated that the question was acceptable to the mixed-race people themselves (Aspinall, 2003). Neither the House of Commons nor the House of Lords witnessed any substantial debate over the changes to the ethnic question. In short, there were few objections to the decision to count mixed-race – from within the government, the media or the public at large. In fact, the only concerns recorded were by census users who were apprehensive about the effects on the quality and comparability of the ethnic group data brought about by the inclusion of a mixed-race category.

The 2001 Census for England and Wales thus asked a direct question on race, in which mixed-race was offered as a viable identity choice. However, in contrast to the “mark one or

55 Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.

56 Interview with member of ethnic question subgroup, April 2009.

57 Interviews with members of ethnic question subgroup, April 2009. Note the specific concern with individuals of white/non-white racial backgrounds. According to ONS representatives, the number of non-white mixes (i.e. Black-African and Asian) simply did not warrant specific categories; however, one cannot help but notice the continued lack of consideration of mixes that do not involve the white majority. On this topic, see Mahtani and Moreno (2001).

58 The forthcoming (and still untitled) research by Miri Song and Peter Aspinall contradicts some assumptions of how mixed-race people prefer to identify. According to their preliminary data, the majority of their mixed-race respondents preferred to identify their particular “mix” using two or more racial group labels rather than a generalized label such as “mixed-race” or “multi-racial”. In particular, mixed-race interviewees often provided “fractionalizations” (i.e. one-quarter white, one-eighth Indian, etc.) of their identities without being prompted by examples or instructions.

more” approach utilized to enumerate mixed-race in Canada and the United States, Great Britain provided its respondents with a stand-alone “mixed” ethnic designation as one of five “coarse” classifications – White, Mixed, Asian or Asian British, Black or Black British, and Chinese or Other Ethnic Group. These coarse classifications were further divided into more specific ethnic groups; for example, the “mixed” category consisted of four options: “White and Black Caribbean,” “White and Black African,” “White and Asian,” and a free-text space for “Any other Mixed Background”. In 2001, over 670,000 people in the UK chose to identify as “Mixed”. The largest mixed-race demographic was White and Black Caribbean (237,420) followed by White and Asian (189,015), Other mixed (155,688) and White and Black African (78,911) (HM Government, 2001). This represents a dramatic increase from the previous count of 240,000 based on write-in descriptions from the 1991 census.

Change, Alternatives, and Outcomes

Why did Great Britain introduce a direct question on race in 1991, and not earlier? As demonstrated above, the central government recognized the need for racial data in order to monitor the prevalence of racial discrimination and disadvantage in Britain as early as 1966. It also made substantial efforts towards designing and testing such a question in time for the 1981 census – and yet its implementation was delayed until 1991. The secondary literature on this policy development offers only partial and unsatisfactory explanations. Authors have largely failed to engage with archival research and thus incorrectly purport that rumblings for a direct question on race began with the field tests of the 1970s. The development of census politics in Britain is most often portrayed as incremental decision-making driven by the need

60 In Scotland, the census offered a box to check for “Any Mixed Background” with an additional write-in space and in Northern Ireland the category was labeled “Mixed ethnic group” also with an additional free-text space.
for more accurate data. The causal story repeated time again by scholars and the official record is one in which the government found the data derived from the indirect racial proxies on the 1971 census to be insufficient and attempted to implement a more direct measure in the 1981 census. This attempt was met with public opposition and disagreement about the question design and as such was abandoned. In the years that followed, the government realized that it needed racial data and was able to succeed in 1991 where it had previously failed.

The most instrumental explanation for the success of the 1991 iteration of the ethnic question is that OPCS had come up with a reliable and publicly acceptable question – a feat unaccomplished in the late 1970s. During the 1989 census test, less than 0.5 percent of the sample refused to take part because of the ethnic question. A number of respondents voiced objections to the question when prompted, but these numbers were also very low: 1 in 5 black respondents, and 1 in 20 white and Asian respondents (Sillitoe and White, 1992: 158). The answers provided by the sample were also relatively reliable, with 90 percent accuracy for whites, 86 percent for blacks, 89 percent for Asians, and 82 percent for “other and not determined” (Sillitoe and White, 1992: 160). As Table 1 illustrates, the refusal rates (in percentages) in the 1989 census test were the lowest since 1979:

Table 4.1: Refusal Rates (in percentages) of census field tests between 1979 and 1989 (Sillitoe and White, 1992: 161)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>1979 V(B)</th>
<th>1985 V1(a)</th>
<th>1985 V1(b)</th>
<th>Jan. 1986 V2(a)</th>
<th>Jan. 1986 V2(b)</th>
<th>Oct. 1986 V3(b)</th>
<th>Oct. 1986 V3(c)</th>
<th>1989 V3(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Refusal rates in the field tests between 1975 and 1979 (excluding Haringey) were generally low as well. In the 1975 tests, a total of 7 households (out of 450) objected to the race/ethnic origins question. In subsequent tests the refusal rate increased slightly, though Sillitoe (1978b, 1978c) argues that refusal rates are correlated to the length of the form.
According to White and Pearce (1993) the reduction in objections from blacks – the group most likely to object to the ethnic question – in 1989 could be attributed to broad consultations or to the fact that in previous years ethnic monitoring had become much more widespread (1993: 295). However, this assertion must be tempered with Sillitoe and White’s (1992) statement that “there is no obvious explanation for why the 1989 question did not give rise to the same level of objections from blacks as other questions tested since January 1986” (1992: 162).

This functionalist interpretation suggests once an ethnic question was designed and could produce reliable data and would not evoke high refusal rates the decision to include the question on the census would immediately follow, assuming that the government was intent on asking an ethnic question. However, there is not much evidence to confirm that the central government was decisive on this issue. Rather, as Bhrolcháin (1990) points out, the various stages of the decision-making process were marked by extreme caution. The Home Affairs Committee’s report was highly critical of several departments’ lack of awareness of the need for racial data and their indifference to its value (HM Government, 1983). The Government’s reply to the Committee’s report accepted the idea of gathering racial data in principle, but was still very cautious – the testing of the question would still be dependent on the strength of the case put forward by users (HM Government, 1984). Both the Sillitoe study (1987) and the White Paper in 1988 failed to guarantee that a question would be included. Though a strong lobby emerged from within the government itself – the line departments that had argued for an ethnic question in the 1970s continued to do so and were joined by the local authorities that were

62 Though some question designs clearly produced more reliable results than others, the form of the question itself was likely not a factor in the reduction of objections, particularly in light of the OPCS’s failure to address the continued demand for a “Black British” category.
formally involved in the consultation process for the first time – a member of the local authority consultation group at the time reported that some within the OPCS were still very hesitant.63

Thus, this causal story assumes much and leaves a number of unanswered questions. It offers no explanation for why an ethnic question was both viable and publicly acceptable in 1991, nor an account of how it became so. It also assumes that the state fully intended to implement the question in 1991, though the evidence instead points to extreme caution and hesitancy on the part of the central government throughout the field tests of the 1980s and the even in the 1988 White Paper. This story also fails to answer important questions regarding the enumeration of mixed-race: why was a direct method for enumerating mixed-race not included in the first racial census of 1991? Why did the British state decide to count mixed-race in 2001? What accounts for the decision to count mixed-race using stand-alone categories as opposed to other approaches?

Other commonly provided explanations – both in Great Britain and elsewhere – for census policy changes of these kinds rely on three strains of causal logic. First, it is argued that direct questions on race in national censuses are derived from the state’s need to maintain institutional consistency with its civil rights legislation. That is, if a state has legislation that prohibits racial discrimination, the existence of these laws and policies will drive the government to adopt a direct census question on race in order to monitor the existence and extent of racial disadvantage. In the UK the need to comply with the spirit and intent of the Race Relations Acts was given as the de facto justification for the collection of racial data. In an international conference in 1992 with representatives from Canadian, American and British census offices, the British representatives from the OPCS noted that ethnic data on the census

63 Personal communication, April 2009.
was collected because of the need for reliable information about unemployment levels, pay equity, housing conditions and educational attainment of blacks and Asians in Britain and also “because of the need to know the extent to which equal opportunity programs are succeeding in reducing the inequalities resulting from discriminatory practices” (White and Pearce, 1993: 271). This rationale was also repeated in the census White Papers of 1988 and 1999. Though census data has clearly been used to provide evidence of racial discrimination and to monitor the effectiveness of government programs (Coombes and Hubbuck, 1992; Stavo-Debauge and Scott, 2004; Stavo-Debauge, 2005) whether this argument is spurious or explanatory remains to be seen.

Secondly, demography is largely assumed to be an implicit driver of census categories. This intuitive argument contends that as the racial minority population increases, the state will become more interested in determining the approximate size of this population. It also follows that relatively homogenous countries with negligible racial minority populations would have no reason to count by race in their national censuses. In the British case, the innate reasoning that the size of the non-white population had some effect on the state’s initiative to count by race was confirmed by the prominent place of the politics of numbers – clearly and continually linked to immigration concerns – throughout the 1960s, 1970s and leading up to the Haringey incident.

Third, scholars – particularly in the United States, but also in Britain and Canada as well – imply that changes to census categories are often the result of social mobilization. Groups seeking material benefits or symbolic recognition lobby government officials for inclusion on the census. Whether or not the group is successful often depends on the strength and organization of the lobby as well as the coalitions the group is able to form. ONS representatives and members of the census advisory groups confirm that lobby groups often push for
recognition in the census – the Cornish lobby, for example, has spent nearly three decades pressuring ONS for a separate ethnic category for the 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses.\textsuperscript{64} In 1999, the Secretary of State for the Home Office reported that ONS received a total of 154 submissions calling for the inclusion of additional categories on the 2001 census: 108 from Members of Parliament and 31 from Members of European Parliament on behalf for the British Sikh Federation, the Kashmiri Workers Association, the Federation of Irish Societies, Cornwall 2000, and Cornish Solidarity, as well as 15 from individual members of the public.\textsuperscript{65} In short, ethnic interest groups are certainly interested in the census.

How accurate are these theories of institutional consistency, demography, and social mobilization at explaining why Britain adopted its ethnic question in 1991 rather than in 1971 or 1981 – or why it adopted ethnic categorization at all? Can these factors explain the decision to directly count mixed-race in 2001? While these explanatory factors provide partial answers, none can account for the nuances of the British census as a racial project. First, though the institutional mandate provided by the British state’s civil rights legislation is used in official justifications for the collection of racial census data, this explanation fails to explain the timing and sequence of events preceding the policy change in 1991. The early \textit{Race Relations Acts} of 1965 and 1968, though quite revolutionary at the time, did not necessitate ethnic monitoring. The 1965 Act prohibited discrimination in hotels, public transportation, restaurants, and theatres and its original punishment as a criminal act with fines attached was met with such opposition that its criminal sanctions were replaced with a conciliatory process, to be overseen by the Race Relations Board (Fiddick and Hicks, 2000: 7). The subsequent Act of 1968 went further, making it unlawful to discriminate by race in employment, housing, and the provision

\textsuperscript{64} Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.

of commercial or other services. However, these anti-discrimination policies relied on the principle of colour-blindness; races were not recognized and neither ethnic monitoring nor positive measures such as affirmative action were employed. This changed with the 1976 Race Relations Act, which invoked a number of race-conscious elements into British institutions by permitting positive action in order to increase the number of qualified racial or ethnic minority applicants for jobs and using the concept of indirect discrimination to protect members of racial groups from policies that (unintentionally) disadvantaged them (Bleich, 2006: 220). It also required local authorities to make arrangements to ensure their various functions were carried out with due regard to the need: a) to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination; and b) to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons of different racial groups. Further, as Bhrolcháin points out, the statutory mandate for local authorities included not only the allocation of central government funding for the provision of services specifically geared towards ethnic minority groups, but also required that social programming be sensitive to the needs of the demographic population of a given area (i.e. offering information in different languages) (Bhrolcháin, 1990: 546). However, the 1976 Act itself did not specifically require racial monitoring, though British policy experts were aware of the effectiveness of the American system of doing so and the necessity of racial data to determine when and where indirect discrimination occurs (Bleich, 2006).

The beginning of field trials to test an ethnic question for the 1981 census was an acknowledgement that the state would require racial statistics to properly fulfil its obligations under the 1976 Race Relations Act. Indeed, in justifying the ethnic question on the censuses of 1991 and 2001, the state pointed to the legislation and its duty to address racial discrimination as the sole justification. However, as is clear from the events preceding the abandonment of the ethnic question in the 1981 census, an indirect institutional mandate was not enough to trump
concerns over the ethnic question in the face of massive public opposition. The British case suggests that: (1) unless provisions for ethnic monitoring are expressly stated in legislation, an institutional mandate does not necessarily lead to the implementation of a direct census question on race; and (2) the content of civil rights legislation matters a great deal. If simply the existence of civil rights legislation – or even an acceptance of the legal concept of indirect discrimination – mattered, then Britain would have seen the emergence of an ethnic question far sooner than it did. If the legislation does not require some form of ethnic monitoring, states are under no obligation to count by race in their censuses. Civil rights legislation is likely a necessary though insufficient condition for the collection of racial data; race relations legislation in Great Britain does not, for example, actually identify any particular racial groups. The legislation and its surrounding jurisprudence have factored little into the specific racial categories employed in the census – the law cannot tell us why some groups are included, others not and gives no direction on whether or not mixed-race should be considered a racial minority group under the definition of the Act. Thus, the argument that institutional consistency with civil rights legislation explains the development of an ethnic question in the 1991 census tells only an incomplete story.

The same must be said of demography as a compelling explanatory variable in British census politics. Surely demography matters – like institutional consistency, a racially heterogeneous population is undoubtedly a necessary factor in the development of a direct question on race. To argue that demography is an unhindered cause, however, would be somewhat paradoxical in the British context particularly given that the accurate counts of the non-white population of the United Kingdom did not exist until the publication of census data in the mid-1990s. If the need for more accurate demographic data was a driver of policy change, then surely the prominence of the ‘politics of numbers’ discourses of the 1960s and 1970s
would have spurned a direct question on race in either the 1971 or 1981 censuses and yet the policy change did not occur at those times. Arguably, the politics of numbers had become even less salient leading up to the inaugural ethnic question in the 1991 census. Demography is also put forward as a driver of the 2001 change to enumerate mixed-race. The fact that one-third, or 240,000, of the 1991 census responses in the free-text field were mixed-origin descriptions was hailed as particularly significant and likely an undercount because write-in responses are a larger burden on respondents (Aspinall, 2003: 278). However, the “demography” argument leaves much to be desired; for example, if demography is a driver, it is unclear what a ‘tipping point’ of the non-white population would be, or if one exists at all. Also, as previously stated, counting by race in Great Britain was always concerned the non-white population – though the Irish have always been the numerically largest immigrant group in the UK. These inconsistencies indicate that demography alone is not a sufficient explanatory variable. Indeed, a central theme of this dissertation is that demography unhindered has never been a driver of census categories. A more accurate assessment would perhaps claim that the need to know about demography was a driver of policy change, but numerous questions would remain about who wanted to know what, and why.

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, social mobilization has been tagged as a key driver of census politics in the United States. Does the same hold true for Britain? Though lobby groups concerned with the ethnic question have become more vocal with each census since 1991, it is unlikely that external pressure on the state was a factor in the development of a direct question on race. Groups that pushed for the inclusion of this question in the late 1970s and 1980s were largely arms of the state – for example, the CRE, community relations councils and local authorities. Racial minorities themselves were not involved in census consultations preceding Haringey and were consulted on the acceptability of an ethnic question prior to the 1991
census only after much testing and development had been completed. In the late 1970s, when the state first took seriously the proposal to enumerate by race, non-white residents of Britain largely viewed government attempts to do so with suspicion and hostility. The lack of social mobilization on this issue during the two phases when the policy change was proposed (1975-1979) and when it was implemented (1985-1991) precludes social mobilization as an explanatory factor in the decision to include a direct question on race in the national census. Though mixed-race organizations do exist in the UK, neither these organizations nor the British academics most well-known for their scholarship on mixed-race identity or mixed-race and statistics were invited to participate in the process or contacted for their views (Caballero, 2004: 120). Multiracial recognition via the census did not become the rallying cry as it did in the United States and interviews with ONS representatives and working group members confirm quite clearly that there was no mixed-race lobby during the 2001 census consultation process. Other groups did lobby the government, with mixed success; for example, an Irish category was included on the 2001 census form while a Cornish category was not, though both groups lobbied the ONS and the working group. According to ONS representatives, the whether or not interest groups were successful depended not on the strength of the lobby, but on the extent to which they were able to demonstrate group-based discrimination and disadvantage. These circumstances are particularly interesting given that the existence or extent of mixed-race disadvantage was never discussed in the working group. Indeed, one

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66 For example, InterMix http://www.intermix.org.uk/homepages/homepage_default.asp and People in Harmony http://www.pih.org.uk/.

67 Tizard and Phoenix’s (1993; 2002) studies of mixed-race identity in Britain remains some of the largest to date and Charlie Owen (2001) has written extensively on the issue of mixed-race and official statistics.

68 Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.
working group member stated that it was still unclear to her, nearly a decade after the initial enumeration, what policy purpose was served by having mixed-race data.69

Common explanations of census politics clearly only get us so far. Institutional consistency and demography are likely necessary but insufficient conditions for the collection of racial census data. Britain’s race relations legislation cannot explain timing or the sequence of events and in particular leaves the inclusion of mixed-race categories in 2001 a mystery. Demography is better able to explain the 2001 provisions for counting mixed-race, but leaves much unclear. It is more likely that the need to know about demography is a driver of census politics, but questions remain about who wants to know what, and why. Social mobilization has undoubtedly helped some groups (i.e. the Irish) attain recognition in the census but the implementation of a direct question on race in 1991 largely occurred without (and at times, in spite of) civil society and there has never been an active mixed-race lobby dedicated to altering census categorizations in the UK. These factors are important aspects of census politics in Great Britain and North American and clearly hold some explanatory power. But they also overlook other, potentially important aspects of the relationship between race and the census in this context which, as demonstrated briefly below, exemplify the activation of a racial project that connects fluctuating meanings of race together with the schematic state’s imperative of organizing society.

Changing ideas about race, racial minorities and their place in British society over a thirty-year time period have influenced and been influenced by governmental action. Ideas about race can manifest in a number of ways and encompasses a wealth of indicators; as such, the nature and scope of such ideas are difficult to define and operationalize. And yet, a constant

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69 Interview with ethnicity question subgroup member, April 2009.
feature of interviews with government officials and participants in census consultations on Great Britain was the contention that in the late 1980s and early 1990s “things had changed,” and that shifts in norms/discourse, public attitudes, the attitudes of racial minority groups towards ethnic enumeration and political will were fundamental to the decline in refusal rates and the generation of an acceptable and reliable question on the census test, and therefore the subsequent decision to adopt a direct question on race in the 1991 census.

In contrast to other ideational accounts (Berman, 2001; Hansen and King, 2001; Bleich, 2003) which emphasize that the role of policy entrepreneurs in turning ideas into outcomes, this case suggests that broad shifts in racial norms and/or discourse do not necessarily require a “champion” to link together ideas and action; though the substance of racial norms and discourses are difficult to pinpoint precisely there is little doubt as to their influence on public attitudes, behaviours and political outcomes. In Chapter 6 I will argue that nationally-specific nuances affect the schematic state's reaction to changing transnational norms surrounding race and mixed-race; as Lieberman (2002) argues, “national cultural repertoires are undoubtedly important in framing the ways in which citizens and policymakers in each country understand race as a political category and conceive of rational and sensible solutions to problems of racial conflict and inequality” (2002: 156). In Britain, prominent elements of racial discourse include a commitment to liberal democratic ideals, race relations legislation that acknowledges the need to go beyond the principle of colour-blindness and an acceptance that race must be understood as a political category in order to manage race relations in a multicultural context (Joppke, 1999; Favell, 2001; Bleich, 2003). These more prominent ideological strands align Great Britain with other liberal democratic societies such as the United States and Canada;

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70 This last point is most easily contrasted with race politics in France, where race is not accepted as a political category and the policy emphasis is on immigrant and minority absorption and assimilation (Lieberman, 2002; 2005; Bleich, 2002).
however, more nuanced aspects of the discursive constructions of race in Britain are nationally specific and shaped by political outcomes both domestic and transnational in scope. By the 1970s a number of themes stood out: the politics of numbers, with its underlying premise that Britain is an overcrowded country and the number of non-white immigrants should be restricted; the equation of Britishness with whiteness; the perception that structural or institutional racism does not exist in Britain, that racial minorities need to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps and that class is a better indicator of disadvantage in Britain than race; the conceptualization of mixed-race as problematic and the corollary classification of mixed-race people in accordance with the one-drop rule; and the declaration that race relations in Britain are a success story, particularly when compared to the track record of the United States (Santamaria and Couper, 1985; Gilroy, 1987; Alibhai-Brown, 2000; Small and Solomos, 2006). As such, ideas about race are ephemeral in nature, constantly shifting with changing times and reflecting racial discourse within and beyond national borders.

Just thirty years later the Parekh Report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain controversially declared that Britain was at a “turning point” in race relations, marked by “the recognition that England, Scotland and Wales are multi-ethnic, multi-faith, multicultural and multi-community societies” (Parekh, 2000b: 2). This shift from the denial that race was relevant in British society to the recognition of the UK as a multi-ethnic nation happened gradually and undoubtedly with the help of advocates. In the arena of census politics, this shift in discourse helped to alleviate public concern over the state’s reasons for collecting racial data and made the ethnic question on the census less controversial and revolutionary. The transcripts of parliamentary debates are a testament to the changing terms of debate: whereas the ethnic question was the cause of substantial discussion in 1980, the 1989 Census Order
passed through both Houses easily. One member of the House of Commons noted the shift on the public record:

    It is interesting to note how attitudes have changed over the years. Even 10 years ago, when I was Secretary of State for Social Services and was preparing from the previous census, it was difficult to reach an agreement on questions such as the ethnic question...It used to be the case...that this [ethnic question] was the most difficult one of all because of all the sensitivities.\(^{71}\)

Attitudes on the parts of the public and the government had changed – the public was less likely to refuse to answer the question on principle and the government no longer considered the ethnic question an offensive intrusion of privacy. There was also a less legible change in perceptions of mixed-race between 1991 and 2001, which mirrors transnational shifts in conceptualizations of multiracialism, more fully explored in Chapter 6. In the preparation of the 1991 ethnic question mixed-race did not feature prominently. When concerns did surface, the issue of how to count multiracial people was a problem the bureaucracy shied away from. For example, during the Standing Committee’s review of the 1989 Draft Census Order Roger Freeman, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Health, responded to a Member’s concern about the enumeration of mixed-race people by arguing “It would be too complicated – and unnecessary – to include it as a question to which we need a specific answer.”\(^{72}\) In 2001, however, there was no lobby to adjust the census to count mixed-race and the various working groups and ONS agreed to the multiracial amendments quickly and smoothly. No champion for the cause emerged – the shift from mixed-race as a problem to an acknowledgement of the multiracial population of Britain was, in the words of one working group member, a matter of


common sense. Rather than a policy entrepreneur bringing a new idea to the fore, census politics in the Britain demonstrates that evolving ideational frames shift perceptions on the part of both policy makers and the public.

This chapter has also demonstrated the prominence of the different institutional components of the schematic state in the political development of the ethnic question. By any standard, the attempt to include an ethnic question in 1981 was a policy failure of mammoth proportions. The difficulties encountered by the British state in this circumstance affirm the theories of historical institutionalism, which emphasize that policy change is rather unlikely. Policy legacies and path dependent processes reproduce and magnify power distributions in politics, thus limiting opportunities for policy innovation and advantaging the status quo (Pierson, 2000). This predisposition against policy change, combined with the fact that the British state was fundamentally inexperienced in matters relating to the collection of racial data despite visits to both Canada and the United States to learn about their race policies and monitoring systems, helps to explain why Haringey was such a disaster.

The state is far from a unitary actor (Hall and Ikenberry, 1990) – census politics in the UK illustrates well that different elements of the schematic state have different interests and policy outcomes are often the result of internal political battles. It is in this sense that the schematic state is both an arena and an autonomous but fragmented actor therein. These conflicting interests of the state are particularly relevant in the policy network concerned with census categories, since the state has a monopoly on setting the rules of the debate and the players permitted at the table. Census data is, first and foremost, a product designed for government use in creating policies and programming (Statistics Canada and United States

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73 Interview with ethnicity question subgroup member, April 2009.
Bureau of the Census, 1993). Though the issue network is large, the policy network itself is small and elite-driven, comprised mostly of representation from state representatives and other more autonomous arms of the state (i.e. the CRE). The state decides what outside groups are consulted; it also decides the timing and purpose of the consultations, which matter a great deal for policy outcomes. Are outside groups consulted before the decision-makers have made up their minds? What is the purpose of consultations with ethnic minority groups: for publicity, to gain approval, to ensure the question is acceptable, or to gather substantive input into the policy-making process? Recall that the timing and intent of consultations were critical to the failure of Haringey; though given the importance of public acceptability it is rather surprising that the government did not consult the racial minorities it intended to enumerate at an earlier stage. The Home Affairs Committee’s 1982 Report was particularly scathing, arguing that Haringey was “a flop” because “in its form of questions and presentation to the public the Test asked or did everything our inquiry has suggested should not be asked or done, and because in its presentation little was done to provide assurances on confidentiality and the value of questions to ethnic minority groups themselves” (HM Government, 1983: vi-vii). The Report also condemns the OPCS for the lack of publicity before and during the test, noting that the few public meetings that were held prior to the census rehearsal were poorly attended.74

Britain’s parliamentary system ensures that policy agendas are kept secret and decisions are elite-driven. Opportunities for interest groups to access decision-makers are limited and lobby efforts are stymied by party discipline (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992b; Smith 1993). Thus, rather than identify social mobilization as a factor in census policy outcomes,

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74 The Home Affairs Committee’s report also recommends that OPCS establish an institutionalized consultation process with ethnic minorities based on the model provided by the U.S Census Bureau’s advisory committees, but in its reply the government noted its “reservations” about setting up such a structure because of the costs involved (HM Government, 1984).
Chapter 7 will expand the argument that the nature and scope of the census policy network is important in the determination of which groups are considered legitimate by the government and are therefore invited to consultations and which are unable to gain access. In contrast to the power-interest model of policy development, census policy outcomes do not seem to be correlated to the relative power of interest groups. These groups – if they mobilize at all – are limited in power because census politics is a circumstance where the state has retained a great deal of control over the decision-making process with one caveat: state autonomy is constrained because the success of the policy is highly dependent upon the public acceptability of census questions. Lobbying efforts are clearly secondary to the ideational and functional frames of policy makers: decisions are based on which groups are considered as legitimate racial groups and which can lay adequate claim to racial disadvantage. Here, ideas and institutions collide – questions of what race is, who is racialized and to what effect are both institutional and ideational in nature.

Finally, this chapter evaluated the application of dominant explanations for outcomes in census politics – institutional consistency with civil rights legislation, demography, and social mobilization – to the British case and found that they gave an incomplete retelling of the failure of the 1981 question, the success of the 1991 question, and the inclusion of mixed-race categorizations in 2001. The causal mechanisms through which these purported drivers beget political outcomes are somewhat unclear. Furthermore, none speaks to policy content; institutional consistency, demography, social mobilization and political climate cannot explain why Britain chose to use three stand-alone mixed-race categories rather than the multiple response approach used in North America.

This chapter has also sought to illustrate a number of themes that permeate census politics in the United Kingdom, and, as other chapters will demonstrate, are not necessarily
unique thereto. First and foremost is the struggle to define race and make racialized bodies legible according to pre-determined classificatory systems, which is problematic for a number of reasons. Race is a slippery concept that defies imposed order. The messy, porous, ambiguous nature of race is exemplified by the British interpretation of mixed-race, which has featured as a prominent concern to policy makers interested in ethnic enumeration since 1966. Since that time, there had always been an acknowledgement that the mixed-race population of the United Kingdom did exist and was likely to grow, but multiraciality was consistently perceived by policy makers as problematic – mixed-race individuals simply did not fit within conceptualizations of the established racial structure. This difficulty can be at least partially attributed to the evolution of the concept of race. What was once presumed to be a biological truism – an incorrect assumption, but one that allowed racial subjects to be easily classified by both state and society – is actually a discursive and socio-historical construct with artificial and arbitrarily placed boundaries. We remain unsure of the precise definition of race, which has a muddled relationship with other indicators of identity, particularly ethnicity, culture, religion and nationality, but also class, gender, ability and sexuality. The conflation of race and ethnicity on the British census affirms that these inherent uncertainties of race are reified rather than solved by simplifications of the schematic state.

In Britain, another related difficulty with the idea of race is contrived from the nature of citizenship and belonging in that country. Like Canada, Britain experiences a national discomfort with the concept of race. In the late 1970s this anxiety was so great that when minorities requested a category synonymous to “Black British” the government found the label unacceptable because it placed too much emphasis on differences of race and/or colour. OPCS was instead instructed to find an alternative system of classification couched exclusively in ethnic terms, avoiding the use of the words “black” and “white”. This unease with the concept of
race is not an indication of its non-existence, but rather its omnipresence. In Britain, discourses of race and national are articulated with the same breath, meaning that “statements about national are invariably also statements about ‘race’” (Gilroy, 1987: 57). History dictates that black and Asian people have been “described, discussed and legislated for on the basis that they were a ‘problem’ for the nation, not an intrinsic part of nor an asset to it. Their presence has been deemed to be temporary and conditional” (Alibhai-Brown, 1999: 3). Attempts to promote racial equality are often perceived as threatening to national unity and British identity remains strongly raced and classed (Gilroy, 1987; Alibhai-Brown, 2000; Neal, 2003; Solomos 2003; Worley, 2005; Pilkington, 2008).

Take the demand for a “Black British” category as an example. As Ballard (1996) notes, unlike the white majority this population had no objection to a public testament that Britain had become a diverse society, but “what they did find deeply offensive – understandably enough – was any indication that their distinctiveness might be read as an indication that they were in some sense non-British” (Ballard, 1996: 12). Great Britain in the 1980s experienced a more prominent disconnect between discourses of race relations and immigrations than ever before, as second and third generation blacks and Asians lay claim to being just as British as anyone else, thus challenging the dominant paradigm that Britishness was equated with whiteness. In previous decades, blackness was perceived by the majority population as being synonymous with ‘immigrant’ (Gilroy, 1987: 46; Ballard, 1997) but the growth of a politically active generation of British born and bred racial minorities not willing to settle as anything but full citizenship (complete with a sense of belonging as part of the nation) helped to make race relations and immigration increasingly separate discourses. This disjuncture is critical: for example, though there was an increased understanding of race relations and more positive attitudes towards racial minorities in the 1980s and 1990s, this period was also marked by
tense political debates about immigration and asylum and increased controls in British immigration policy (Alibhai-Brown, 1999: 71). The issues of the nature of race and conceptions of citizenship and belonging are far from settled. They are instead pulled in different directions because of new political developments, such as Britain's membership in the European Union and its implications for immigration controls, Scottish and Welsh devolution, New Labour's discourse on "community cohesion," and new paradigms of race relations concerned with the threat of "home-grown terror" and the integration of Muslim populations.

The second theme concerns the disjuncture between the schematic state's imperative attempts to order and categorize the messy reality of race into neat rows of self-contained boxes and the racialized subjects who either refuse to conform to these simplifications or who are suspicious of state intentions in doing so. The British exemplar illustrates that though material benefits may be tied to the collection of government statistics, for their part racial minorities have not always welcomed enumeration with open arms. When governments have failed to adequately inform minorities of the rationale for their tabulations the results have been disastrous, as occurred during Britain's census test in Haringey in 1979. As we shall see in Chapter 5, both Canadian and British bureaucracies have attempted to counter the fears of racial minorities suspicious of the uses to which racial data would be put. While these fears have so far proved to be unfounded, the reality remains that the census and its categorizing tendencies were once and still have the potential to be used as instruments of government control. And it is little wonder that racial minorities have had their doubts about government intentions, as they are the ones who have most often felt the brunt of state power. For example, one London police officer explained the climate under Thatcher as follows:

"Thatcher let it be known to us, the police, that we could do anything to keep in control the enemy within. They were blacks, trade unionists, and people who did not agree with her views. I know that when I was on duty in Notting Hill Gate, I would go for the blacks..."
more than I should have done, but you get into a kind of sate, like you are in the army and the enemy is the enemy. No wonder the blacks never trusted us. They would be idiots to (cited in Alibhai-Brown, 2000: 81).

Combined with the above discussion regarding the relationship between race and citizenship in Britain, it is rather logical for non-white Britons to be sceptical of the state's purpose for collection racial data, particularly when they are not consulted beforehand, the rationale goes unpUBLICIZED, and any emphasis of difference – even something as superficially neutral as counting those who are racially different from the white majority – is a reminder that of who does and does not really belong in Britain.

Thirdly, the political development of the question on race and the categorization of mixed race in the UK census demonstrate that there are both material and discursive benefits at stake in racial categorization. The material benefits derive from the Race Relations Acts, which provide for protection from racial discrimination and impose a positive duty on the state to eradicate racial disadvantage. Census data is critical in order for the state to ascertain the extent of racial disadvantage, to monitor the effectiveness of race relations policies and to help the central government and local authorities make better programming that addresses the need of an increasingly diverse society. There are clearly benefits to being included under this rubric, no matter how weak the legislation may be; why else would the Irish fight for decades to be formally recognized as a group that suffers from discrimination? The direct enumeration of mixed race using the stand-alone categories raise interesting questions about whether or not mixed-race people are considered a racial group under the application of the Race Relations Acts, or, for that matter, if one can really consider mixed-race a group at all. It is also unclear what other unintended consequences exist because of the manner in which Britain has decided to count mixed-race, since the 677,000 people that identified using the stand-alone mixed-race categories in 2001 may have identified previously in the tallies for other racial designations.
Using this approach could potentially lower the counts for other disadvantaged groups and make it harder to prove indirect discrimination, a concept that relies on labour force data.

The discursive benefits of recognition can be just as important. The census is a reflection of a national community and when states use ethnic enumeration to promote a discourse of national hybridity, multiculturalism and integration – in Rallu et al.’s (2004) formulation, counting in the name of multiculturalism – public recognition through the census becomes a means for groups to seek and attain a sense of belonging. Though the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994) is undoubtedly as important in Britain as it is elsewhere, the use of the census as a mechanism of attaining public recognition of “legitimate” racial identities is not as public or prominent in this context as it is in the United States. A British corollary does, however exist: classification standards in the census can reflect and contribute to struggles for recognition in other policy venues. For example, 2011 round of censuses in the United Kingdom will have a new question on national identity, which will precede the question on ethnicity. In England and Wales, respondents will be able to choose from six options: English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, British, or Other with a write-in space. This new question is not a response to the demands for a means of allowing racial minorities to identify themselves without feeling as though such an identification would detract from their sense of belonging in the national community (i.e. Black British or Asian British), but rather is a byproduct of processes of devolution in Great Britain, a growing sense of national identity in Scotland and Wales, the thrust to keep British nationalism intact through policies emphasizing “community cohesion,” and a domestic concern about increasing immigration from Eastern European countries of the EU. Whether this resurgence of nationalism in Britain is a cause or effect of devolution remains to be empirically tested. Nevertheless, the consequences for the census are real. It is also worthy of noting that while a multiple response approach was determined to be
“too complicated” to elicit proper responses to the ethnic question, the question on nationality in the October 2009 Census Test asks “How would you describe your national identity?” and instructs the respondent to “tick all that apply” (ONS, 2009). Once again, the census proves itself to be a fundamentally political entity situated within broader domestic and international policy debates.

Fourth, census politics in Great Britain illustrate that the invocation of race and racial data can be mobilized to serve a variety of interests. This is most clearly evident in the call for racial statistics in the late 1970s by those on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. Enoch Powell, the National Front and others of the extreme right argued for the implementation of a direct question on race so the non-white population of Britain would be known. In the extreme case of the National Front, the knowledge would inform a political platform premised on the mandatory repatriation of non-white Britons and the call for this knowledge served to keep this fringe party in the public eye. In the case of Powell, racial data could be used to confirm his conceptualization of the relationship between race, immigration and citizenship in the UK; namely, Powell sought to prove that Britain was becoming overcrowded (indeed, “swamped”) by a non-white populace that could only increase over time, fundamentally changing the character and identity of the nation – with the implication that this change was for the worse. In either situation, enumeration is designed for purposes of political control, surveillance, and population management (Foucault, 1977; Scott, 1998: 81-82).

Though the political left did not necessarily seek to survey or control the racial minority population of Britain, organizations such as the CRE fought for the inclusion of a direct question on race to promote and serve their own interests. Established by the Race Relations Act of 1976, the dual mandate of the CRE was to work towards the elimination of racial discrimination and to promote good race relations and equality of opportunity between persons of different racial
backgrounds more generally. Access to racial data would certainly help the CRE fulfil the first mandate, with statistical evidence supporting the CRE’s powers of formal investigation into claims of racial discrimination. Moreover, the CRE’s constant call for racial statistics also contributed to its promotional work. Both the enforcement and promotional functions of the Commission were subject to criticism, which ultimately questioned the validity of the organization itself. For example, a lead article in the *Times* argued that the enforcement and promotional functions of the Commission were incompatible while the *Guardian* branded the CRE as incompetent and ineffective. Given its struggle for credibility amidst numerous condemnations from politicians, the press and the public during the late 1970s and 1980s (Layton-Henry, 1980: 441), the CRE’s support of an ethnic question on the census was a strategic justification of its own existence.

While the invocation of race and the call for racial statistics may serve a particular set of interests, their avoidance may serve others. While vying to increase their appeal to the black electorate in the 1984 election, the Tories released a campaign poster which featured a well-dressed black professional under the words “Labour says he is black. Tories say he is British,” (Gilroy, 1987) implying, of course, that one cannot possibly be both black and British simultaneously. The Tory promise of belonging through assimilation illuminates another set of interests served by a specific approach to racial discourse and enumeration: the avoidance of race in the name of national integration. In the racial project of the census this translates into the governmental approach to racial enumeration of not counting in the name of multiculturalism. This idea is implicit in the British discomfort with the notion of race; a

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75 *The Times*, 11 April 1980.

manifestation of the perception that group-based racial identities are fundamentally opposed to
the promotion of a national identity.

Clearly, these interests do not exist in a vacuum but rather have a mutually constitutive relationship with ideas and racial discourses. And therefore, the final theme illuminated by the case of census politics in the UK is the point that the participants with access to institutional decision-making processes, their interests and intentions matter a great deal for political outcomes. The limited points of access in the British parliamentary system, the elite-driven decision-making process, and the monopolistic control that the bureaucracy retains over which interests and groups are invited to participate in policy-making as well as the timing and content of census consultations contribute to a relatively closed census policy network. Though the network’s composition and policy-making process have evolved over time – one ONS representative blatantly stated that the department was simply “not good” at talking to stakeholders in the 1980s and 1990s77 – it still remains far more tightly controlled than the census policy network in the United States. The ramifications of restricted membership, autonomy and decision-making power within census policy networks in Great Britain and the other cases of this study exemplify the complex relationships and will be explored further in the analytical sections of this dissertation.

**Contingencies, Consequences, and Conclusions**

This chapter has explored the political development of a direct question on race in the UK census from the late 1960s to its implementation in 1991 and creation of mixed-race categories in 2001. The British racial project of the census is far more implicit than its American

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77 Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.
counterpart; one civil servant remarked that census politics are traditionally British – that is, evolutionary rather than revolutionary.\textsuperscript{78} Indeed, the racial project has evolved over time: though policy-makers and elites in Britain were once vocal about their fears of being swamped by racial minorities and conceptualized multiraciality as a problem for their attempts to schematize the population, the UK is now an undeniably racially diverse society. Despite a relatively new use of the ethnic question to promote a positive national discourse of multiracialism and multiculturalism, the country continues to struggle with diversity governance.

\textsuperscript{78} Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.
Like the United States and Great Britain, census data in Canada is important for a number of public policy areas, playing a particularly vital role in the implementation of anti-discrimination policies (Potvin, 2005: 28). However, unlike the United States, which has always had a question on race, and Great Britain, which introduced a question for the first time in 1991, Canada has an erratic history of enumerating not simply mixed-race but race itself. Racial origins became an explicit mode of categorization between 1901 and 1941, after which references to race were dropped – never to return. The censuses taking place between 1951 and 1991 focused on ethnic origins. Over the 20th century the lone source of stability in census categorizations was the descent lines of the European/white category, leading Boyd et al. to assert that though the racial/ethnic categories in Canadian censuses changed over time, “the emphasis was on demarcating a ‘white’ population from groups which are today considered African, Asian or Aboriginal” (Boyd et al, 2000: 36). It was not until 1996 that a direct question on race, or “visible minorities,” was reincorporated into the Canadian census, using a “mark one or more” approach to racial enumeration similar to the US.

This chapter explores the political development of the direct question on race in the Canadian census. The first section details the history of the origin question on the census, demonstrating the extent to which racial classifications on the census have supported the biological racialism inherent in Canada’s nation-building and colonial projects. The second section explores the abandonment of the terminology of race in the aftermath of the Second World War and the multicultural turn in Canadian politics. The evolution of the origin question on the census during this time period demonstrates the willingness of the Canadian state to change its use of racial discourse and language and the same time it proved hesitant to make
substantive legal or policy change in other political realms, such as immigration law or Aboriginal affairs, which featured rampant and virulent racial discrimination. The third section examines the numerous calls for racial statistics beginning in the 1980s and the politics of the eventual adoption of the question on visible minorities in the 1996 census. The section entitled “Change, Alternatives and Outcomes” provides a preliminary analysis of the three research questions of this chapter:

a) Why did Canada implement a direct question on race in 1996 (and not earlier)?

b) Why did Canada decide to “count” mixed-race in at the same time (and not later)?

c) Why did Canada adopt a “multiple response” approach for the enumeration of mixed-race?

These questions will be answered more completely in Chapters 6 and 7. The preliminary analysis presented in this section traces the shift in the census as a racial project, and more specifically the evolution of Canada’s approach to racial enumeration from one of not counting in the name of multiculturalism to counting in the name of multiculturalism and to justify positive action, demonstrating the institutional and ideational elements required for this change. It also examines how the census has reflected and contributed to the (re)imagining of the Canadian community as multiracial, multicultural and premised on the liberal democratic ideals of social justice and equality.

The Founding Races...and Others: the “Origins” Question, 1867-1951

The first census to take place in what would eventually become Canada occurred well before Confederation; in 1767 both Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island (then called “St. John Island”) enumerated the ethnic and racial origins of their populations. The identity choices for ethnic origins were English, Irish, Scotch, American, German, Acadian and “not given” while the
race question provided three options: White, Indian or Negro.\(^1\) The next pre-Confederation census, held in New Brunswick, classified the population only according to race using the options of “White” or “Coloured”. The 1851 and 1861 censuses of Upper and Lower Canada used a combination of birthplace and origin data to identify the population, publishing over 25 countries, regions and origins.\(^2\) Section 91(6) of the *British North America Act* of 1867 identifies “the census and statistics” as being under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government; shortly after Confederation, the federal *Census Act* of 1870 provided the legislative basis for the first official census of Canada to occur in 1871 in order to “ascertain and show, with the utmost accuracy possible...all statistical information which can conveniently be obtained and stated in tabular form touching [the] population and the classification thereof, as regards age, sex, social condition, religion, education, race, occupation and otherwise.”\(^3\) The first post-Confederation censuses of 1871 and 1881 largely followed the established practice of the pre-Confederation censuses of gathering origin data, though the 1891 census broke with tradition and omitted the origin question, instead asking a question on the French Canadian population.

In 1871 and 1881, census enumerators were instructed to enter information on origin “scrupulously,” using the words “English, Irish, Scotch, African, Indian, German, French and so forth” (Canada, 1871). Noting that the that the French translation of this question used the term “nationalité,” Ryder (1955) argues that Canadian origin statistics have historically been concerned with two different threads of meaning – birthplace, in the sense of political or

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\(^1\) Census of Nova Scotia (1767), Census of St. John Island (P.E.I.) (1767).

\(^2\) According to these censuses, the ethnic origins/birth place of the Canadian population fell into the following categories: England and Wales; Scotland; Ireland; Canada, French origin; Canada, not of French origin; United States; Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island; New Brunswick; Newfoundland; West Indies; East Indies; Germany and Holland; France; Italy and Greece; Spain and Portugal; Sweden and Norway; Russia, Poland and Prussia; Switzerland; Austria and Hungary; Guernsey; Jersey and Other British Isles; Coloured persons; Indians; Other places; Born at sea; Birth place not known.

\(^3\) 1941 Census, Administrative Report of the Dominion Statistician, 10.

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geographic roots, and ethnic backgrounds, specifically manifested through linguistic ancestry (1955: 467). Similarly, Kralt (1990) suggests that the 1871 marked the beginning of the Canadian state’s desire to draw distinctions between place of birth and citizenship/origins (1990: 14). These understandings of the evolution of census categorizations pertaining to origin are devoid of any reference to the state’s intentions or attempts to count by race; in fact, Ryder contends that the origins question is "clearly cultural rather than biological in intent" (1955: 478).

A more careful examination of the history of Canadian census categories suggests that while the English/French divide in Canada was a paramount issue for the new nation, determining the racial demographics of the growing population was also an omnipresent concern. The contentious relationship between English and French Canada is well-documented. From Lord Durham’s 1839 report, which identified Canada as “two nations warring within the bosom of a single state,” and recommended increased immigration from Britain to aid in the assimilation of (the purportedly inferior) French culture, to the Confederation debates and beyond, the major cleavage throughout Canadian society and history has been the ethnic, cultural and linguistic differentiation between its French- and English-speaking elements.\(^4\) In this context, the language of race has at times been used to characterize this conflict, most notably in Siegfried’s 1907 treatise, *The Race Question in Canada*.\(^5\) Beyond the instrumental use of the terminology of race to signify francophone difference, the historic discrimination and disadvantage experienced by *les Canadiens* vis-à-vis the Anglophone majority is reminiscent in some ways of the processes of racialization experienced by non-white subjects.

\(^4\) This divide has sometimes, though not always, taken a distinctly territorial form, with the linguistic cleavage manifesting in conflicts between Quebec and other provinces.

\(^5\) See also Henri Bourassa (1913) “Le langue française et l’avenir de notre race” (the French language and the future of our race).
The historic use of racial language to describe the English/French cleavage has resulted in nationally-specific semantic and discursive conceptualizations of race in Canada that manifest through ethnic or linguistic divisions rather than referring to the range of discursive, biological, cultural and performative signifiers associated with the conceptualization of race and racial difference in the United States and elsewhere. In other words, the English/French cleavage has dominated and consumed the history of Canadian politics. The implications of this dominant conceptualization are embedded in the characterization of Canada as a so-called “white settler society,” with few racial populations, no race-related problems, and no place for race generally speaking (Jhappan and Stasiulis, 1995, Vickers, 2002a; 2002b; Razack, 2002). Problematically, the idea of Canada’s ‘two founding races’ “obliterate[s] the history, role and claims of Aboriginal peoples,” (Jhappan and Stasiulis, 1995: 110) and has served to “exclude other identities and trivialize their contributions to the development of the country” (127). It discursively constructs a raceless Canada, while at the same time using the language of race in reference to French Canada.

Are these understandings accurate? In one sense, the terminology of race during the late 19th and early 20th centuries was used to differentiate between white ethnic groups; British was more than a nationality or birthplace, but was considered a race and civilization apart. On the other hand, and perhaps more to the point, the meaning of race and its relationship to nationalism at this juncture in history reveals that Canada’s dual racial projects of nation-building and colonialism were, in fact, infused with discourses of biological racialism and were premised on a belief that only a racially homogenous community could produce the nationalism required to build the country demographically, economically, politically and morally. Though the terminology of race was used to speak about French Canada and other white ethnic groups, it is unclear whether or not Quebeckers were ever considered to be non-white in any consistent
manner. In fact, the historic record points towards an entirely different conclusion. The French-speaking population of Canada has enjoyed political, territorial and economic rights associated with being a “founding race” as well as privileges associated with whiteness, such as the right to vote and retain legal counsel, which were denied to non-whites well into the 20th century. Though French Canadians and continental and eastern Europeans faced prejudice and discrimination during this time period and were racialized in particular ways by reference to a shifting set of factors that have defined whiteness in Canada, these groups have also had access to white privilege in ways that other non-white populations have not. In short, being politically and economically disadvantaged, as many French-speaking Quebeckers were before the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, does not a non-white make.

The specific ways in which the application of discourses of racial difference were applied to non-whites, such as the Chinese, Japanese, black and Aboriginal populations of Canada, suggests that similar to the United States, Canada was not immune to the transnational notions of biological racialism of the 19th and 20th centuries. The differentiation, management and control of racial populations was a social and political concern. Canadian policy-makers, elites, and the population at large were active participants in the debates surrounding race and the nature of racial difference. As Triadafilopoulos (2004) notes, discourses of scientific racism and homogenous nationalism created a global-level cultural code. While states were not compelled to abide by the terms of this code, they were provided with palette of ideas that helped to shape the nationally-specific ways that elites, policy-makers and the public at large thought about and participated in nation-building and colonial projects of the state. Racial ideologies of the 19th and early 20th century were incredibly complex, encompassing beliefs in the determinative nature of immutable biological differences among and between races alongside conceptualizations of the nature of civilization, democracy, capitalism, morality and
the natural social order, all masked by a language that equated scientific rationalism with truth. Far from being a coherent or systematic body of thought, racial ideologies were often contradictory, fluctuating and ephemeral, both reflected by and constitutive of the plethora of social norms and dominant politics at any given point in time.

Two manifestations of these racial ideas in the Canadian context at the turn of the century point to the integral contribution of racial ideologies in the shaping of Canada’s nation-building and colonial racial projects: the building of a white settler society and the internal colonization of Canada’s Aboriginal population. As will be demonstrated below, the census was not a separate entity from these endeavours. Rather, the principles of racial classification employed in the census as its own distinct racial project by the early 20th century worked to crystallize and support these other racialized projects of the state. First, the creation of a white settler society was more than a matter of demographic composition. It required purposeful state action in order to create and maintain a specific conceptualization of Canadian nationalism, identity and manifest destiny. Nation-building requires instruments of statecraft, not simply to (in this case) reproduce British institutions and forms of governance and to build transnational railways, develop staples and industrialize the economy, but also to clone British identity, ideologies and citizenry (Stasiulis and Jhappan, 1995: 97). Though still on the periphery of the international political economy of the day, Canada and other white settler colonies such as Australia and New Zealand were privileged with the “gifts” of liberal democracy, responsible government and self-government, in stark contrast to other British colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean (Lake and Reynolds, 2008). However, the process of reproducing British values, ideologies and institutions came with both opportunities and constraints – the newly born state was susceptible to racial ideologies of the late 19th century and an active participant in their promulgation within the country’s expanding borders.
Uninhibited by Britain’s concern with maintaining imperial stability, racial politics in Canada was free to take more virulent forms than in its motherland. Historically, Canadian racial politics have concerned the regulation of non-white subjects inside Canada through formal and informal mechanisms of segregation and social stratification, and the control of non-white subjects outside Canada through discriminatory immigration policies. These two priorities were, of course, closely related to each other and to the establishment of hierarchical racial classification schema.

The history of Canadian immigration policy is well-documented⁶ and for the most part the literature has presumed a close relationship between immigration and economic factors. For example, Kelley and Trebilcock (1998) argue that material and economic interests, racist ideas and ideological values and parliamentary institutions interacted in complex ways in the production of Canadian immigration policy, though their analysis focuses a great deal on economic determinism. Linking this analysis to more normative debates surrounding the nature of Canadian nationalism, Triadafilopoulos (2004) argues that economic factors were quite important to the maintenance of a period of relatively open borders at the end of the 19th century, but contends that race and national identity were two other central preoccupations that shaped incipient immigration and citizenship policies (2004: 390). The first Immigration Act of 1869 lacked controls, although the federal government retained the right to deny entry to paupers, the mentally ill and the physically disabled. The most pressing issue for Canada at this time was immigrant retention: it is estimated that one-quarter of those who crossed the Atlantic to Canada stopped only briefly on their way to the United States (Thompson and Weinfeld, 1995: 186). In an era of relatively open borders (with some notable race-based exceptions, discussed further below), the Canadian government’s policy of actively recruiting

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immigrants to settle the West and populate the country involved political decisions about distinguishing “desirable” and “undesirable” immigrants.

Between 1867 and 1896 Canada embarked upon promotional activities designed to attract its ideal immigrant: of British, American or northern European “stock” and with agricultural experience. Both the promotional activities and incentives for emigration at the time exhibited strong racial preferences (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998: 107), though an official immigration hierarchy had not yet been formalized in law. The definition of desirable immigrants was expanded after 1896, when Sir Wilfred Laurier’s Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton, committed to the rapid settlement of the West. His recruitment policy originally preferred and actively recruiting immigrants from Britain, the United States, Germany and other northern European countries and when these numbers proved insufficient the range of preferred source countries was expanded to include Central and Eastern Europeans. In particular, Sifton sought those with farming experience or those who were willing to work the land. This land, it must be remembered, was not *terra nullius*, but was appropriated from the original indigenous inhabitants of North America. The fundamental connection between nation-building and colonialism is all too apparent.

The definition of a “desirable” immigrant was not stable. Rather, it was linked to prominent ideas of race and gender at the time, which were imbued with material interests and the struggle to maintain economic privilege. Though immigrants from eastern and continental Europe were deemed necessary to settle the prairie provinces, at the beginning of the 20th century until the First World War these immigrants were considered to be impediments to

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7 Canadian promotional activities also took place across Europe at this time but were stymied European governments that were opposed to the emigration of their nationals. For example, Russia forbade the emigration of its citizenry and emigration propaganda was prohibited in Germany, Austro-Hungary, Switzerland, Italy, the Scandinavian countries and was restricted in Belgium and France (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998: 80).
nation-building efforts forged primarily (it was perceived) by those of British descent (Triadafilopoulous, 2004: 396). This shift was not only tied to a change in economic interests – western expansion was progressing and the need for inhabitants was no longer dire – but also to the rise of the global eugenics movement and the crystallization of discourses of racial superiority and inferiority.

For non-white immigrants, the belief in a racial hierarchy justified on the basis of the intrinsic biological differences between races had been in effect for some time. During the period of immigrant-recruitment, non-white immigrants were considered “undesirable” permanent participants in the new nation, though their labour was required for nation-building projects such as the construction of the trans-Canadian railroad. The influx of an estimated 15,000 Chinese labourers to western Canada in the 1880s was advocated by political and business elites as necessary and, importantly, temporary. As Prime Minister John A. MacDonald assured the House of Commons in 1882, once the CPR was completed he would “join to a reasonable extent in preventing a permanent settlement in this country of Mongolian or Chinese immigrants.” It has been argued that the eventual restriction of Chinese immigration beginning with the imposition of a head tax in 1885 is evidence of shifting compromises between competing economic interests in a cheap source of labour and racist sentiments (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998: 94-98). However, these two discourses – racist and capitalist – are mutually constitutive and contingent. For example, anti-Asian sentiment in British Columbia constructed Chinese immigrants as competitive and cheap labour and strike

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8 The bias against Central and Eastern Europeans is illustrated in the words of Frank Oliver, Sifton’s successor as Minister of the Interior: “[T]here is nothing we more earnestly resent than the idea of settling up the country with people who will be a drag on our civilization and progress. We did not go out to that country simply to produce wheat. We went to build up a nation, a civilization a social system that we could enjoy, be proud of and transmit to our children; and we resent the idea of having the millstone of this Slav population hung around our necks in our efforts to build up, beautify and improve this country, and so improve the whole of Canada” (cited in Hawkins, 1989: 8).

9 House of Commons, Debates, 12 May 1882, 1477.
breakers, but also provoked nativist fears of miscegenation, immorality and the “Yellow Peril,” to the point that Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Ontario enacted laws in the early 20th century prohibiting Chinese men from employing white women (Ward, 1990; Backhouse, 1994; 1996). Thus, it is not that economic interests sometimes “won” over racist and xenophobic sentiments, but rather that capitalist principles of property and economic competition manifest within and through racial discourses and vice versa.

State strategies for preventing non-white immigration to Canada became increasingly stringent over time, aided and abetted by informal mechanisms of controlling the activities and movement of non-white populations already inside the country. Formal policies of the state, such as the Chinese head tax of 1885, the 1910 Immigration Act’s “continuous journey” clause and the total exclusion of Chinese immigration in 1923 were compounded by regulatory policies, such as the 1919 amendment to section 38(c) of the 1910 Immigration Act, which allowed Canada to prohibit the entry of any immigrants belonging to any race or nationality deemed unsuitable to the climate, industrial, social, educational, labour, or other conditions of Canada or deemed undesirable due to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of life, and methods of holding property, or because of the strong likelihood such immigrants would be inassimilable (Hawkins, 1989: 17). Informal mechanisms were also important in excluding potential non-white immigrants. For example, when black farmers from Oklahoma sought to settle in Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Interior Department rigorously implemented a regulation that had been in place since 1908 permitting the formal inspection of all immigrants crossing the US-Canadian border in order to ascertain which prospective candidates were desirable. The use of immigrant inspection as an informal mechanism of prohibiting black

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immigration worked quite well; in contrast to the 136 blacks who entered Canada in 1907-08, only seven entered in 1909-10 and twelve the following year (Troper, 1972: 287). In sum, Canada’s quest to build a white settler society in the image of British institutions, society, and morality relied on racial conceptions of desirable/undesirable immigrants. The racial hierarchy contained gradients of desirability: northern European “stocks” were preferred over southern or eastern; Protestants preferred to Catholics; those from a tradition of liberal democracy were considered more easily assimilated than others; and all of the above were preferred to non-white immigrants, who were admitted entrance to Canada under the assumption that their presence was temporary and wholly driven by the need for their (cheap) labour. The notion of Canada as a white settler society was not simply a demographic fact; it was also a policy goal.

Biological conceptions of race and racial difference were also fundamental to the crafting and implementation of Canada’s colonial project. Colonialism, as an initial project of imperialism, is most often associated with European powers’ attempts to exploit and appropriate the resources and manage the populations and economies of their colonies in Asia, South America, the Caribbean and Africa, using the capital from these endeavours to develop industry in the metropole. Like other white settler societies, the Canadian state gained control of the territories claimed by the British Crown and accepted the transferred responsibility of maintaining the colonial relationship with the indigenous population. Scholars have recently begun to refer to the historical and contemporary relationship between indigenous people and the Canadian state as one of “internal colonialism,” whereby colonialist principles and policies are employed and imposed by the state power of the colony rather than the imperial power (Razack, 1998; Tully, 2000; Alfred, 2005; Green, 2007). Internal colonialism also invokes a clear difference between the processes of racialization targeting Aboriginal people and other racial minorities. While both are subjugated (albeit in distinctive ways and by invoking a
number of discourses that vary over time, space, and in application among different racial groups), the notion of colonization also encompasses territorial dispossession. Colonization is thus an ongoing exploitative relationship consisting of a combination of the physical occupation of indigenous lands, the appropriation of traditional power structures, political authority and forms of governance, and the negation of aboriginal cultural self-determination, economic capacity and strategic location (Green, 2003: 52).

The Indian Act remains one of the most all-encompassing colonial instruments at the disposal of the state. Though the first incarnation of the Indian Act was passed in 1876, the use of similar legal instruments designed to regulate the classification of Aboriginal peoples can be dated to 1850 when the legislatures of Upper and Lower Canada passed parallel acts that provided the first definition of who was an Indian. This early legislation, which formed the template for all future manifestations of the federal Indian Act, provided a characterization of “Indian and none other” based on having Indian blood, descent from Indians, and women married to those who met the first two criteria (Leslie, 1978: 23). This definition of “Indian,” with an emphasis on “Indian blood” that would last until 1951, strongly resembles anti-miscegenation regimes in the United States which were always enacted and enforced in tandem with classificatory rules principled on the fractionalization of racial identities – that is, the determination of legal racial identity based on the amount of non-white blood a person has as represented by a fraction (1/4, 1/8, 1/16) (Davis, 1991; Pascoe, 1996, 2009; Wallenstein, 2002).

Designed to manage Indian lives literally from cradle (i.e. determining who was and who was not a status Indian) to grave (i.e. governing inheritance rights), the Indian Act was a particularly insidious colonial instrument because of its assimilative intentions. Between the first Indian Act and the amendments in 1985, revisions were attempted or made every decade
since the 1850s, often with increasingly stringent requirements on the definition of who was entitled to Indian status. Over the years losing one’s Indian status actually became quite easy: an Indian woman who married a non-Indian lost status and the children of that marriage were not entitled to status (1869); Indian status became contingent on male lineage (1876); obtaining a university degree (1876); living away from Indian communities (1918); being deemed ‘fit for enfranchisement’ by a board of examiners (1920); and the Indian Registrar could add – but more importantly delete – names from either General Lists (of status Indians) or Band Membership Lists (1951) (Canada, 1991: 7-19).

In contrast to the anti-miscegenation laws in the United States, which worked in tandem with segregation policies to prevent interracial sex and marriage and the existence of mixed-race progeny, the Indian Acts were designed to remove Indian status (called ‘enfranchisement’ by the legislation itself). However, much like the United States, this was not an attempt by the state to ensure the equal treatment of Aboriginal people in Canadian society. Rather, the federal government was compelled by legal precedent, constitutional convention and colonial legacy to administer “Indians and lands reserved for Indians,” as per section 91(24) of the Constitution Act of 1867. The legal category of ‘status Indian,’ after all, “is the only category to whom a historic nation-to-nation relationship between the Canadian and Indigenous people is recognized” (Lawrence, 2003: 6). The removal of Indian status, therefore, was a two-fold strategy: it removed the constitutional Indian status of individuals, and therefore diminished the collective claim of underlying Aboriginal title to the land, and simultaneously alleviated the burden of Indian administration on the Crown. Several provisions of the Indian Act also reveal the gendered nature of the retention or loss of Indian status. Under what would become the infamous section 12.1.b of the 1876 Indian Act, Indian women who married non-Indian men

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11 For a further discussion of both the gendered and raced content and consequences of the Indian Act as compared to American anti-miscegenation laws, see Thompson (2009).
would lose status, as would their offspring. Indian men who married non-Indian women, however, would not only retain status for himself and his progeny, but his wife would gain status as well.\footnote{12}

Canada’s program of assimilation towards Aboriginal peoples employs a different (yet interrelated) set of ideas about race than its policies towards “undesirable” non-white immigrants. From the historical legacy as a colony of Great Britain, Canada’s Indian policy has shown a consistent uniformity during the 19th and 20th centuries, that of “civilizing the Indian” (Bartlett, 1978: 582). Natives were not threatening in the same way as other non-white races, which were often depicted in rhetoric of peril or pestilence; rather, they were considered wards of the state in need of government protection. At its core, the discourse of North American conquest “regards tribal peoples as normatively deficient and culturally, politically, and morally inferior” (Williams, 1990: 326). This discourse was purposefully adopted in Canada, where political elites of the newly born state hoped to avoid the expensive and disastrous “Indian Wars” that plagued the United States. Constructing Natives as dependent and primitive served this purpose well. Note, however, that interracial relationships were still conceived as problematic by the colonizers because they “symbolized the mixing of irreconcilable dichotomies: civilized versus primitive and Christian versus heathen” (Van Kirk, 2002: 1).

Given their inherent reliance on biological conceptions of race and racial difference in the 19th and early 20th centuries, these nation-building and colonial racial projects necessitated a complex racial classification system to legitimate the belief in distinct races. Thus, while Ryder

\footnote{12 The retention or loss of Indian status was deeply gendered. Racial hierarchies are usually gendered as well, though this is especially so in the case of status Indians in Canada; as Bonita Lawrence writes, “Clearly, if the mixed-race offspring of white men who married Native women were to inherit property, they had to be legally classified as white....Because of the racist patriarchal framework governing white identities, European women who married Native men were considered to have stepped outside the social boundaries of whiteness. They became, officially, status Indians” (Lawrence, 2003: 8-9).}
(1955) and Kralt (1990) minimize the extent to which the Canadian census distinguished the white and non-white citizenry, the categories and enumerator instructions in the early 20th century suggest that Canadian racial beliefs relied on similar principles of biological racialism as those in the United States. Further, as Ryder (1955) admits, the usefulness of the statistics derived from the origins question between 1871 and 1941 served only to distinguish between four groups: British, French, other whites and non-whites (1955: 476).

Canadian census-taking began the dawn of a new century by explicitly focusing on the racial origins of the population, with the schematic state mandating the alignment of census categories with the dominant conceptions of race and racial difference of the day. Census enumerators in 1901 were instructed that the categories “Japanese,” “Chinese,” and “Negro” were proper racial terms (whereas “American” and “Canadian” were not, as “there are no races of men so called”) and that “among whites the racial or tribal origin is traced through the father, as in English, Scotch, Irish, Welsh, French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, etc.” Mixed-race people of white/non-white origin were relegated to the category of whichever parent or ancestor was non-white, a practice that would continue until 1941. Complex instructions were provided for the enumeration of the Aboriginal population; enumerators were required to write the names of “tribes” (e.g. Chippewa and Cree) and were instructed to carefully record white/Indian “mixes”:

...persons of mixed white and red blood – commonly known as “breeds” will be described by the initial letters “fb” for French breed, “e.b.” for English breed, “s.b” for Scotch breed, and “i.b” for Irish breed. For example: “Cree f.b.” denotes that the person is racially a mixture of Cree and French; and “Chippewa s.b.” denotes that the person is Chippewa and Scotch. Other mixtures of Indians besides the four above specified are rare, and may be described by the letters “o.b.” for other breed. If several races are combined with the red, such as English and Scotch, Irish and French, or any others, they should also be described by the initials “o.b.” (Canada, 1901)
Why these complex instructions for Aboriginal “mixtures”? The act of recognizing and recording such an elaborate taxonomy of Aboriginal and French/English/Scotch/Irish offspring suggests that the Canadian state was interested in two distinct sets of information: first, the number of mixed-race persons with Aboriginal ancestry and second, specific details about the composition of these racial or cultural amalgamations. The first type of information was necessary to determine the progress of the assimilative goals of the Indian Act, which used intermarriage as a means of reducing the legal ability of Aboriginal women and their children to claim Indian status and, hence, Aboriginal title to the land. The number of “half-breeds” could be correlated to the success of reducing what Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent for the Department of Indian Affairs, called “the Indian problem” – that is, the simultaneous existence of a non-white, “uncivilized” and “inassimilable” population with legal claims to Canadian land and the Crown’s fiduciary obligations towards Aboriginal peoples. Information on the precise composition of these “mixes” is likely related to the history of disputes and violent clashes between the Canadian government and the Métis population of the prairie provinces during the Red River Rebellion of 1869-1870 and the Battle of Batoche in 1885. Legally designated as “half-breeds” by the federal government, the Métis were never seriously considered by the state to be either within the definition of Indian or a distinct segment of the Aboriginal population. To acknowledge either of these scenarios would contradict the purpose of the Indian Act regime, which was to remove all legal distinctions between the Native population and other Canadians while maintaining hierarchical race relations and social

13 The application of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 has historically excluded Métis as Parliament has narrowed its interpretation of legislative jurisdiction and responsibility over “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” to only Indians on lands reserved for Indians and those who the law has defined as Indian: that is, status Indians and members of recognized Inuit communities. As a state policy, “Canada resists acceptance of constitutional jurisdiction over Métis, non-status Indians and persons of Inuit descent who are not accepted as members by Inuit communities” (Giokas and Groves, 2002: 42).
stratification. The census provided a means of counting the Métis; though the census is a type of legal recognition, it cannot and does not confer rights or responsibilities. Rather, this complex enumeration of the Métis and other mixed-race people with Aboriginal heritage enabled the government to keep tabs on a population which, in its view, threatened the security of the still unstable, still largely unsettled, western provinces.

The early decades of the 20th century were characterized by an immigration boom that exploded the Canadian population. Between 1901 and 1911, the population grew by over 1.8 million people – particularly significant given that the Canadian population in 1911 was a mere 7.2 million. The censuses of 1911, 1921, 1931 and 1941 were similarly concerned with the determination of the racial origins of the population, with the conceptualization of the term “race” as a signifying “a subgroup of the human species related by ties of physical kinship. Scientists have attempted to divide and subdivide the human species into groups on the basis of biological traits, such as the shape of the head, stature, colour of skin, etc.” (Canada, 1921). The notion of racial origins as rooted in biology was common sense at the time, aided by a growing global discourse on eugenics. The origins of the global movement is attributed to British naturalist Sir Francis Galton, who was not only the cousin of Charles Darwin and but is also widely recognized as the first statistician, who argued in Hereditary Genius (1869) that cognitive ability was hereditary and could be transferred from generation to generation. He invented the term “eugenics” in Inquiries in Human Faculty and its Development (1883), wherein he argued that since human traits – both good and evil – were inherited the regulation of

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14 Eugenics was truly a global movement both in terms of the proliferation of the discourse and its political consequences. Though the most violent and coercive implementation of eugenicist policies occurred in Nazi Germany preceding and during the Second World War, at the turn of the century eugenics received wide and popular support. Varying eugenic policies were proposed or implemented in Canada, the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Germany, Australia, Norway, France, Finland, Denmark, Japan, Iceland and Switzerland (Kevles, 1985; Spektorowski, 2004). The transnationalism of eugenicist ideas is also evidenced by the three International Eugenics Conferences organized by the British Eugenics Education Society and the United States Department of State, held in London in 1912, New York in 1921, and New York in 1932 with participants from around the world.
human breeding could be utilized to create genetically superior human groups. Conversely, those humans considered “defective” should be discouraged from procreation so as to limit the transfer of undesirable characteristics. The means through which eugenic goals could be met varied from selective breeding to coercive sterilization. “Positive eugenics” refers to the breeding of superior citizens by encouraging the “fittest” to form the most desirable unions and procreate. The natural progression could also be helped by “negative eugenics,” which sought to limit the breeding of “undesirable” traits by preventing the “socially inadequate” from procreating.

Though Canada did not have a highly visible eugenics champion, such as Britain’s Galton or the US’s Charles Davenport, eugenic ideas were supported by the major political elites of the early 20th century, including Tommy Douglas, Nellie McClung, Judge Emily Murphy, J.S. Woodsworth as well as Quebec scholars at McGill and Ontarian medical professionals (McLaren, 1990: 24). Woodsworth’s 1909 book warning of the impending dangers of immigration, Strangers at our Gates, speaks to the close relationship between eugenic discourse and biological racialism in the Canadian imagination. While immigrants from central and eastern Europe could be transformed to assimilate successfully into the national character of Canada through vigorous and targeted government programming, those “distant stocks” deemed too far removed from the Anglo-Saxon ideal – Orientals and Africans – needed to be vehemently excluded (Woodsworth, 1909). As Kelley and Trebilcock (1998) note, the relevance of Woodsworth’s book lies in its representation of mainstream (educated, progressive) sentiment of the time, revealing the substantial degree of acceptability and transportability that discourses of scientific racialism held (1998: 134-135). Ideas about eugenics, morality and religion collided to produce a distinct brand of Canadian nativism that was explicitly racist and

The language and discourse of racial categorizations in the census compounded eugenic conceptions of desirable and undesirable components of the Canadian nation, which were widely understood to be biological – and hence, immutable – in nature. Between 1911 and 1941, five major characteristics of the racial origins schema and questions were consistent and notable. First, census monographs and instructions to enumerators provide examples of different races, including English, Scotch, Irish, Welsh, French, German, Italian, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Bohemian, Ruthenian, Bukovinian, Galician, Bulgarian, Chinese, Japanese, Polish, Jewish, etc. Second, the census warns that the terms “American” or “Canadian” should not be used as racial origins, as they express nationality or citizenship, but not a race or people. Third, the question relies on patrilineal descent; that is, the understanding that racial origin is to be traced through the father. Thus, a person whose father is English but whose mother is Scotch, Irish, French or any other race would be considered English for the purposes of the census. However, the fourth and fifth characteristics of the racial origins question are clear exceptions to this rule and provide further evidence that non-white races were viewed in a substantially different manner as the white races listed above.

In the case of Aboriginals, the census requires the names of “tribes” to be recorded and that the racial origin to be traced through the mother’s side. This requirement of matrilineal descent is particularly interesting given that the progeny of Aboriginal women and non-Aboriginal men would be considered to be “Indian” in the census and yet would be denied Indian status by the Indian Act. Why this inconsistency? On the one hand, it is likely that the newly formed Bureau of Statistics was not overly concerned with promoting a standardized racial classification system throughout the federal government. The fact that two distinct arms
of the state would categorize the same population in different ways was simply another example of the contradictory rationality of the schematic state apparatus. The Indian Act, whose unabashed goal was to, as Deputy Superintendent Duncan Campbell Scott put it, “get rid of the Indian problem...to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian department,” (Titley, 1986) had a different function and purpose – and therefore, different policy and political consequences – than the census, which was designed to count the population. On the other hand, however, both the census and Indian Act were historically, and remain today, legal instruments through which racial categories are made and manipulated. They do not simply reflect racial reality, but rather are fundamental to its very existence. As such, discourses of race and gender collide through the state’s classifying impetus: there were legal sanctions for Aboriginal women who married non-Aboriginals through the Indian Act regime, once again affirming the stereotype that Aboriginal women were far more likely to “marry out” than the unfathomable circumstance that white women would “marry in” (Van Kirk, 2002). At the same time, the rationale of the census required Aboriginal ancestry be traced through matrilineal descent since women were perceived as the vessels of (un)civilization, culture and morality (Valverde, 1991; Roberts, 1997), juxtaposed with the patrilineal tracing of white descent, since men were the conveyors of the privilege of property and citizenship rights.

Finally, patrilineal or matrilineal descent mattered not for mixed white and non-white progeny, as “the children begotten of marriages between white and black or yellow races will be classed as Negro or Mongolian (Chinese or Japanese) as the case may be” (Canada, 1921; 1931). In the 1931 and 1941 censuses, eugenicist discourse permeated the wording of the question, referring to “the distant coloured stocks ...involving differences in colour (i.e. the black, red, yellow or brown races)” (Canada, 1941). In other words, any mixed-race progeny
whose parental or ancestral lineage was comprised of European and non-white components would be legally counted by the census as non-white. This concern about the classification of mixed-race offspring aligns with eugenicist anxiety not simply about the immigration of non-whites to Canada, but also regarding the reproduction of “degenerates” and the so-called “unfit” already in the country (McLaren, 1991: 46). Notions of biological racialism, which caution against the mixing of irreconcilable racial stocks, construct mixed-race people as contamination and subsequently question the role of mixed-race people in the future of the society. For example, a 1941 article in the *Journal of Negro Education* attempts to determine the intelligence of “negroes of mixed blood in Canada,” by testing the relationship between the standardized test scores and Negro groups comprising “full-bloods,” “¾ bloods,” “½ bloods” and “¼ bloods” – in other words, “the correlation between intelligence and degree of White blood” (Tanser, 1941). In the eyes of those who dominated society, “the fine distinction of mixed-race formation scarcely hid the fear of sanguinary pollution...‘mixed bloods’ were considered as potentially polluting of the body politic as ‘full blooded blacks’” (Goldberg, 1995: 241). This idea was also promoted by political elites in Canada. In 1922, William Lyon Mackenzie King argued in the House of Commons that Gresham’s Law of Precious Metals applied to the races of men as well; just as base metals tended to overwhelm finer metals, King cautioned that the presence of “lower” races in Canada would lead to the dilution of the Anglo-Saxon population. Those with such inherently degenerate characteristics could never be considered potential members of the dominant race; in the words of Ann Laura Stoler, white is a colour that is easily stained (2002: 15). Hence, white/non-white mixes were classified as non-white on the census.

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15 The results of the test were inconclusive.

16 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 8 May 1922, 1555.
This mode of classification is also strongly reminiscent of the one-drop rule, or the rule of hypodescent, which dominated American racial consciousness during the early 20th century. With only “one drop” of non-white blood, a mixed-race person was socially, and at times, legally, considered to be non-white, yet no amount of ‘white blood’ would ever allow the multiracial person to attain the privileges and persona of whiteness. The operation of the rule of hypodescent in early 20th century America was compounded by other facets of the network of laws that regulated racial identity, including anti-miscegenation laws, Jim Crow segregation, and census categories. However, unlike the United States, Canadian provinces implemented neither anti-miscegenation laws that directly prohibited interracial relationships, nor official policies of racial segregation. Instead, Canadian law and society relied on informal mechanisms of managing and controlling the racial population. For example, rather than making interracial marriage illegal, interracial couples were, in some cases, simply denied marriage rites (Backhouse, 1999: 146). The assignment of mixed-race offspring – which could have been classified in a number of ways – to the same racial classification as their non-white parent represents a quiet hardening of the boundaries separating supposedly distinct racial groups in true Canadian fashion.

The identification and classification of the non-white population of Canada was clearly an explicit concern which manifested through the census. Part of a complex of laws and regulations that promoted Canadian nativism and nationalism and maintained Canada’s nation-building and colonial projects, the categories employed within the census both contributed to and (re)inscribed dominant perceptions of the “truth” or “reality” of race as a biological

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17 Though some have mistakenly assumed that the one-drop rule dominated American law as well as its consciousness, Davis (1991), Fowler (1987) and Pascoe (2009) have demonstrated that the rule of hypodescent did not exist at all times and in all places. In fact, there was complex variation in determining who was black (and, to a lesser extent, Asian and American Indian) among states, which was also highly inconsistent: at times, states had definitions of black in their constitutions that were dramatically different from who was considered to be black for purposes of enforcing anti-miscegenation legislation.
concept. Note, however, that these projects of (schematic) statecraft, as well as the legal instruments that brought them into being, such as the census, immigration laws, and the Indian Act regimes, are messy, complicated and at times contradictory, but at the same time, clearly calculated and insidious. Rather than being evidence of an objective state innocently reflecting social racial reality, the complexities of defining and classifying by race in the early 20th century are a consequence of the murky nature of racial discourse and the schematic state’s attempts to make the population legible in accordance with convoluted and constantly changing meanings of race. For example, during this time period anthropologists were far more concerned with classifying races than defining what, precisely, the concept of race was referring to (Barkan, 1992: 137). In spite of a great deal of academic debate about the precise nature of ‘races,’ there was no real consensus (Barkan, 1992; Stepan, 1982) and by the mid-1940s a new paradigm would emerge in both the academy and the Western world.

**Ethnicity and the Multicultural Turn, 1951-1981**

The aftermath of the Second World War witnessed the proliferation of a transnational discourse of human rights (Donnelly, 1989: 210-211) and with it came a marked global shift in the conceptualization and invocation of race, explored more fully in Chapter 6. The extreme racism of the Nazi regime tore at biological racialism’s already crumbling structure, thanks in part to the necessity of drawing clear distinctions between “us” and the “enemy”: “the uniqueness of Nazism underscored the immanent wickedness of racism, crystallizing the dichotomy between respectable bigotry within middle class circles and the evilness of the enemy. Once racism was rejected, the edifice was shaken” (Barkan, 1992: 345). Other changes in world politics, such as the emerging discourse of human rights, struggles for decolonization
in Asia and Africa, the birth of apartheid in South Africa, and the civil rights movement in the United States contributed to a transnational moment in which dominant discourses of race were fundamentally altered. This period was one of rapid change. Before the Second World War, notions of a natural racial hierarchy were dominant throughout Europe and North America. In contrast, the post-World War II era witnessed a clear shift in normative contexts that was fundamentally transnational in nature (Sikkink, 1993; Lake and Reynolds, 2008; Triadafilopoulos, forthcoming).

The discursive disconnect with international discourses of human rights poked and prodded at the racial paradigms Canadian state and society had bred since the nation’s inception between 1950 and 1980. This “lack of fit” opened a theoretical space for policy change in the realm of Canadian human rights. That is, the two elements that had comprised racial projects of the early 20th century shifted. New meanings of race in which biological racialism was invalidated necessitated a shift in the schematic state’s racial organization of Canadian society. In typical Canadian fashion, the strategy of the Canadian state was to implement halting, discursive, and incremental policy shifts while keeping substantive policy stakes firmly intact. In policy areas with high political and legal consequences such as conferring equal social and economic rights to racial minorities or implementing a non-discriminatory immigration policy, the decades following the Second World War espoused little

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18 This is a similar argument to the one made by Triadafilopoulos’s forthcoming book, *Becoming Multicultural: Immigration and the Transformation of Citizenship in Canada and Germany*. Comparing the development of immigration policy in Germany and Canada, Triadafilopoulos argues that the postwar period was characterized by a markedly different normative context in which exclusionary immigration policies in Germany and Canada were misaligned with international norms of human rights and the commitments of these countries to principles of liberal democracy. The governments’ sensitivity to charges of hypocrisy created conditions for policy change, which were characterized by processes of policy stretching and shifting. Canada and Germany made incremental changes to “stretch” their immigration policies to address inconsistencies without abandoning core principles; eventually, this incoherent patchwork of contradictory policy goals and principles unravelled (due, presumably, to excessive stretching) and created space for the formulation of new approaches to immigration better aligned with dominant transnational norms.
substantive change. For example, though Mackenzie King’s Liberal government repealed the ban on Chinese immigration in 1947, discrimination against the Chinese still existed in Canadian immigration policy, with limits on both family reunification and the immigration of Chinese nationals.

Unlike human rights laws or immigration policies, there was little at stake by changing the discursive content of the origin question in the census. The notion of race was banished from the census, with the question on the 1951 census requesting details on the “origin” of the population. The eradication of race was most apparent in the 1951 instructions to census enumerators, which relayed the importance of carefully distinguishing between “citizenship” and ‘nationality’ on the one hand, and ‘origin’ on the other,” admonishing that “[o]rigin refers to the cultural group, sometimes erroneously called ‘racial’ group, from which the person is descended; citizenship (nationality) refers to the country to which the person owes allegiance” (Canada, 1951; emphasis added). Mixed-race offspring of white/non-white marriages or relationships were to be classified according to the same principles of patrilineal descent as other white ethnic “mixes”. This should not be taken as evidence that the social construction of race appeared overnight. Rather, the idea of race was not fully eradicated from social thought or the theoretical foundations of the census, as evidenced by the introduction to the origin question in the General Review of the 1951 Census, which refers to the data as “partly cultural,

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19 There are numerous examples that suggest this argument is an accurate assessment. Consider, for example, Parliament’s repeal of the sections of the Indian Act prohibiting traditional activities such as the potlatch and making it illegal for Aboriginals to hire lawyers in 1951, but its unwillingness to address the discriminatory provisions of section 12.1.b even after the United Nations ruled it in contravention of the human rights of Aboriginal women until 1985. Consider also the numerous failures of Diefenbaker’s 1960 Bill of Rights, which was a largely a symbolic piece of legislation that could do fairly little in practice (Hogg, 1989).

20 This change in classification principles had statistical consequences noted in the General Review of the 1951 Census: “The change in 1951 in the method of determining the origin of mixed white and coloured groups...partially accounts for the declines in 1951 for the various Asiatic origins, although the high death rate among the Chinese population and the repatriation to Japan of considerable numbers of Japanese during the decade are the principle causes. However, the factor of change of definition applies more particularly to persons of Negro origin, and explains in large part the drop in the number of Negroes from 22,174 in 1941 to 18,020 in 1951” (Canada, 1956: 138).
partly biological, and partly geographical” in nature (Canada, 1956: 132). The schematic state also maintained its interest in the precise categorization of those of Aboriginal descent. Enumerators were instructed that those living on Indian reserves were to be recorded as “Native Indian,” while the origin of those not living on reserve would be traced through the line of the father. In the case of Aboriginals the change from a designation of “half-breed” in the 1941 census to a complex interplay between place of residence and state-imposed designation is significant. The administrative distinction found in the census between those identified as “Native Indian” based on whether or not respondents live on a reserve and regardless of parentage and those who live off-reserve carries consequences for the rights and privileges assigned to each. As previously stated, the Canadian state’s constitutional responsibility for “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” has often been interpreted by the government as a fiduciary duty for only Indians on land reserved for Indians.

The 1951 census also made the linkage between ethnic origin and language more explicit. Instructions to enumerators read: “you will first attempt to establish a person’s origin by asking the language spoken by the person (if he is an immigrant), or by his paternal ancestor when he first came to this continent” (Canada, 1951: 44). However, in some cases the focus on language was insufficient to garner the information the census was actually after. If origin could not be established via linguistic difference, enumerators were instructed to ask, “Is your origin in the male line English, Scottish, Ukrainian, Jewish, Norwegian, North American Indian, Negro, etc.?” Though the General Review of the 1951 Census notes that at varying times throughout previous censuses the origin question had been qualified by racial or ethnic attributes, the purpose of the inquiry remained the same: “Fundamentally, it is an attempt to distinguish groups in the population having similar cultural characteristics, based on a common heritage” (Canada, 1956: 131).
The censuses of 1961 and 1971 generally repeated the approach adopted in the 1951 census, though the question itself explicitly asked each person to report the ethnic or cultural group that he or his\textsuperscript{21} ancestor (on the male side) belonged to on coming to the North American continent. One major difference was in the approach used by enumerators – language was used as a primary signifier in the determination of ethnic origin in the 1951 census, but only referenced as a secondary approach in 1961 if the respondent did not understand the original question (Canada, 1966). Another significant change was that the 1971 census moved from using trained enumerators to self-enumeration, with the vast bulk of census questionnaires filled in by individual respondents (Kralt, 1990: 16). The form instructed respondents to report only one ethnic group from the choice of thirteen provided and listed in alphabetical order. “Jewish” was included in this list of mark-in entries, and Native respondents were asked to indicate if they were a member of a band. No other non-white group was listed, but a space was provided for respondents to indicate a group not included with those previously listed (White et al., 1993).

Thus, over a relatively short period of time the categories used in the origin question had shifted from using direct reference to race as a biological fact to a nearly complete erasure of non-white groups. However, neither discourse nor demography could sustain this trend amid constitutional debates, a proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms, newly instated provincial human rights legislation, the Supreme Court’s recognition of Aboriginal title, the implementation an immigration system that did not (overtly) discriminate on the basis of race and Trudeau’s statement about Canada’s multicultural character in the House of Commons. Though the 1981 census was not a radical departure from its most recent predecessors, three

\textsuperscript{21} This gendered language is used in the original question.
significant changes therein worked to reify the multicultural turn that had been present in other areas of Canadian law and policy.

First, though Canada’s experiment with self-enumeration was deemed a success, it nonetheless posed problems in terms of data quality. There was an estimated undercount of about ten percent between the number of Band or Treaty Indians enumerated in the 1971 census when compared with the number of Band Indians in Canada according to the Indian Register (Kralt, 1990: 18). Dissatisfaction with the quality of data led to a review of the ethnic concepts proposed for the 1981 census. John Kralt, an employee of Statistics Canada22 at the time, notes that the state was interested in obtaining an official estimate on the number of Métis and non-status Indians. This is undoubtedly a result of the proposed policy alternatives for the section of the repatriated Constitution pertaining to Aboriginal rights. What would eventually become section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 guarantees the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Canada’s indigenous populations, a legal designation which includes Indians, Métis, and Inuit. It is also probable that policymakers were aware that section 12.1.b of the Indian Act could not withstand judicial review given the gender equity provisions in the proposed Charter of Rights. Unofficial estimates of these populations towards the end of the 1970s varied anywhere from 350,000 to 1.5 million persons (Kralt, 1990: 19); if Indian status was to be reinstated for the women who fell victim of the discriminatory provisions of the Indian Act, the state needed to know how large a population would suddenly shift from non-status to status designations.

On the 1981 census, therefore, Aboriginal respondents were provided with four choices on the ethnic question under the heading “Native Peoples”: Inuit, status or registered Indian, non-status Indian, or Métis. The conceptual implications of including these categories on the

22 In 1971 the Statistics Act created Statistics Canada (previously known as the Dominion Bureau of Statistics), providing it with a mandate as the central statistical agency in government.
census and, importantly, implying that all were equally *Aboriginal*, should not be underestimated. As Andersen (2008) notes, the categorical instability used by instruments of governance – of which the census is but one example – to define, manage and control the Métis population over the course of Canadian history has often worked to ensure the Métis were not recognized as a cultural or legal indigenous group. In this sense, the administrative recognition of the Métis and non-status Indians as Aboriginal groups in the 1981 census was important, particularly in its feedback effects in the struggles of these groups for solidarity, legal recognition in constitutional debates, political activism, and court challenges. The increased political awareness and activism within First Nations communities between the 1971 and 1981 censuses also posed a problem for Statistics Canada: a small number of Indian bands refused to cooperate with the 1981 Census. In particular, the use of the phrase “on coming to this continent” in the wording of the ethnic origin question was considered offensive. Again, this activism is likely linked to the constitutional debates occurring during the same time period. Though the census both is and is not linked to other areas of law and policy, it remains an apparatus of state power. It is one means (among others) that the schematic state connects meanings of race with mechanisms of imposing a legible racial scheme on its society. As such, targeted protest against the discursive connotation in the census that Canadians are all immigrants served an important symbolic purpose in reaffirming Aboriginal claims as *First Peoples*.  

The second major change in the 1981 census that worked to reaffirm the multicultural turn was a change in the wording of the question with significant discursive and statistical consequences. Instead of asking for the respondent’s lineage on the male side, the question

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23 In response, Statistics Canada arbitrarily assigned data for all records. For example, all respondents from the Kahnawake reserve in Montreal were assigned Iroquois as mother tongue, Quebec as place of birth and status Indian as ethnic origin (Kraft, 1990: 23).
instead was ambilineal: “To which ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestors belong on first coming to this continent?” More than ten years since the publication of the Royal Commission’s Report on the Status of Women and during a time of increasing emphasis on women’s rights, those within and outside the government viewed the census’s previous insinuation that ethnic identity was inherited from the paternal ancestor to be sexist. This “biased view of ethnic heritage was no longer socially or politically acceptable, nor could it be defended on the basis of sociological knowledge. Certainly the emerging emphasis on gender studies in the social sciences also contributed to this change in definition” (White et al. 1993: 233). Given that ethnic and, to a lesser extent, racial intermarriage had been on the rise throughout the 20th century, this new emphasis on the ethnic origins of both parental ancestors would have an important impact on the data produced. In short, it was far more likely that Canadians would record two or more ethnic groups if asked to trace their heritages.

This leads to the final change on the 1981 census: the ordering of ethnic groups on the census form according to population size and the allowance of multiple responses. Again, because of the desire to have census categories reflect the actual origins of Canadians rather than just paternal ancestry, two new policy problems arose. First, there was an increased likelihood that respondents would report multiple responses, which would require new and potentially costly methods of tabulation. Second, there was a related fear that “if multiple origins were not permitted in 1981, a significant proportion of the population would report Canadian or American thereby defeating the purpose of the question” (Kralt, 1990: 20). While it was generally recognized that Canadian social reality had evolved to the point where mixed ethnic marriages were practically the norm and increased ethnic and racial diversity was inevitable due to immigration (White et al., 1993: 233), multiple responses were not encouraged in the wording of the question, which referred to “ethnic or cultural group” in the
singular. Nonetheless, multiple responses were accepted and tabulated in data capture procedures when approximately 11 percent of the Canadian population reported an ancestry comprised of more than one ethnic group. Given that over one-tenth of the Canadian population gave multiple responses \textit{even without prompting}, multiple responses would become an integral aspect of the ethnic origin question – and, eventually, the race question – in every subsequent census. The ordering of these ethnic groups had also changed. In the 1971 census, which was the first in which the respondent could view and fill out the census form him or herself, thirteen (white) ethnic groups were listed in alphabetical order. In 1981, the designers of the census used the official counts produced in the 1971 census to determine the eleven most populous ethnic groups,\textsuperscript{24} which were then listed on the form in alphabetical order, alongside one blank mark-in space labelled “Other”. The only non-white group included was “Chinese”. This ordering according to population count rather than other criteria is important because evidence has long demonstrated that the power of suggestion has a tremendous impact on responses to questions of this type (Kelly, 1995). Respondents are far more likely to check a box listed than to take the time and effort required to fill in a mark-in space.

These changes to the ethnic origins question on the census between 1951 and 1981 both reflected and contributed to the multicultural turn in Canadian society. Tracing this shift through the origin question on the census would reveal the abandonment of race and racialist tendencies (for example, eugenicist language and assignment of mixed-race people to non-white origin) in the immediate post-war era, a shift towards the more politically-correct notion of ethnicity during the next few decades, and by 1981, a clear traction of ambilineal ethnic identity and the entrenchment of Aboriginal categories as designations that are quite distinct

\textsuperscript{24} The groups listed were: French, English, Irish, Scottish, German, Italian, Ukrainian, Dutch (Netherlands), Polish, Jewish, and Chinese.
from other ethnic groups. Rather than simply reflecting these changes, the census, as a legal and political instrument and as a racial project, has been a critical contributor to these developments. Alone, the census has been at the forefront of the multicultural turn, changing its language well in advance of other policy spheres and dominant social norms. In tandem with other policy and legal arenas, the evolution of the origin question on the census demonstrates the willingness of the Canadian state to change its use of racial discourse and language and the same time it proved hesitant to make substantive legal or policy change in other political realms, such as immigration law or Aboriginal affairs, that featured rampant and virulent racial discrimination.

What is clear from the evolution of this exemplar of the politics of race is that Canada's nation-building efforts were a continuing project of statecraft throughout the 20th century. This project is far from static; while the 19th century version was obsessed with mimicking British institutions, demography and national character, ongoing efforts of the state and its interactions with society morphed and shifted Canadian nation-building in accordance with dominant transnational ideas and national interests of the time. National interests involve security and prosperity of the nation, to be sure, but also include the moulding of the nation's imagined community, which is simultaneously the specific type of community that the state chooses to promote and the nation obliges to adopt. At the turn of the century, it was assumed that a national character must be racially and ethnically homogenous to ensure the success of democratic institutions and to maintain national unity (Vickers, 2002b; Lake and Reynolds, 2008: 49-74). This assumption was challenged by the mid-20th century when the transnational post-war discourse of human rights and the subsequent multicultural turn in Canada became just as integral to building a specifically Canadian nationalism as earlier projects of internal colonialism and settling the west. However, one should not mistake the multicultural turn for
an enlightened attempt at creating an equitable society. Some have argued that Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism in the 1970s was an attempt to minimize the potential political impact of Quebecois claims to sovereignty – rather than adhering to myth of the two founding nations, English Canada could now rejoice in its multicultural nationalism (McRoberts, 1997). Others have demonstrated that Canada was (Porter, 1965; Walker, 1997; Backhouse, 1999) and remains (Banting et al., 2007; Reitz and Banerjee, 2007) a racially-stratified society and have questioned the extent to which the discourse of Canadian multiculturalism has addressed issues of racism and racial discrimination, finding that more often than not, Canadian multiculturalism has simply masked racial reality (Stasiulis, 1991; Bannerji, 2000; Thompson, 2008). As Dhamoon and Abu-Laban (2009) argue, foreigners are still and often constructed as threatening to the nation, but internal foreigners – those who are legally citizens of the state but who are simultaneously deemed as outsiders/Others who do not substantively belong within the nation – are often necessary for (re)imagining the nation as multicultural, even as racism continues to be pervasive (2009: 178-179).

(In)Visible Minorities, 1986-2001

The last two decades of the 20th century put Canadian nationhood in question as never before. A time period that began with the repatriation of the Constitution was marked by a number of turbulent political circumstances, many of which directly shaped the politics of race: the emergence of third-wave feminism and its challenge to white liberal feminists in national women’s organizations and the academy; increased immigration from non-European countries and changing racial demographics, especially in urban centres; growing hostility towards racial
and ethnic diversity; the resurgence of Aboriginal and French-Canadian nationalism and their challenges not only to national myths but also to the nation-state itself; the rise of the New Right and the dominance of conservative political parties in Parliament and provincial governments; the implementation of program review in both the 1980s and 1990s, the cutting of government spending and the streamlining of budgets; and the successful use of the Charter and the judicial system to challenge discriminatory government action, to name but a few. Globalization was the quintessential buzz-word of the 1990s. While this meant increased economic liberalization and free trade, advanced communication technologies made a shrinking world and enabled diasporic imagined communities to link together and foster a sense of transnational belonging amongst disparate racial groups in different countries.

Amid these developments, the Canadian state became increasingly aware of the need to address racial discrimination. Though a Minister of State for Multiculturalism and a Multiculturalism Directorate were established in the Secretary of State Department in 1972 as a result of the formal multiculturalism policy of 1971, it was not until a decade later that the federal government announced a national program to combat racism. Thus, in 1981, the Race Relations Unit within the Multiculturalism Directorate was established and undertook a number of initiatives, which ultimately led to the formation of the House of Common’s Special Committee on the Participation of Visible Minorities in Canadian Society in 1983 (Canada, 26

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25 For example, a Decima research poll in late 1993 found that 3 of every 4 Canadians rejected the notion of cultural diversity and felt that racial minorities should try harder to fit into mainstream society. It also found that: 54 percent of respondents felt that Canada’s immigration policy allowed “too many people of difference races and cultures” into the country; 50 percent agreed with the statement “I am sick and tired of some groups complaining about racism being directed at them”; and 41 percent agreed that they were “sick and tired of ethnic minorities being given special treatment”. Ironically, perhaps, the same survey also found that two-thirds of respondents believed one of the best things about Canada is its acceptance of people from different races and ethnic backgrounds (Ottawa Citizen, 31 December, 1993: B1; Maclean’s, 27 December 1993: 42).

26 According to the Employment Equity Act (1995) visible minorities are “persons, other than aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race and non-white in colour”. Aboriginal peoples are not included in this definition, as they are defined separately in both the census and for employment equity purposes. However, the “visible minority” designation is clearly race-based and critics charge that the avoidance of racial language is an avoidance of issues of racism (Stasiulis, 1991).
Submissions to the Committee by non-governmental organizations, including the Canadian Ethnocultural Council, the Centre for Research-Action on Race Relations and provincial Human Rights Commissions, emphasized the under-representation of racial minorities in virtually all major public institutions. In its 1984 report, the Committee recommended the government pursue affirmative action programs but was “struck by the absence of hard data or official statistics on the work force profile of visible minorities,” data that was necessary in order to determine reasonable goals and the size of the potential pool qualified workers (Canada, 1984a: 54). Noting that “the importance of compiling such data should not be minimized,” and that several of the groups representing racial minorities who testified in Committee hearings had already given their public support for the collection of racial statistics, the Committee recommended that Statistics Canada include the “requisite additional questions to elicit accurate data on visible minorities” in the 1986 minicensus and the 1991 decennial census (Canada, 1984a: 54). Calls for more accurate statistical data on racial minorities were echoed by Judge Rosalie Abella in the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment. The Commission, whose 1984 report led to the implementation of the Employment Equity Act in 1986, outlined the substantial statistical data required to determine the situation of visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples, women, and persons with disabilities in the working environment, including longitudinal studies to measure progress over time (Canada, 1984b).

In short, there was a recognized lack of data on the situations of racial minorities in Canada and government commissions and committees agreed the best way to elicit better data was through the census. Statistics Canada recognized in the early 1980s the multiple and

Race scholars have generally not adopted this terminology of “visible minorities,” instead using terms such as “racialized” to make clear that the racism and discrimination faced by racial minorities is part of a process that encompasses individual, structural and macro-societal levels (Essed, 1991: 36-37).
substantial problems with using the ethnic origin question to enumerate racial minorities. These issues are laid out by Wally Boxhill, an employee of Statistics Canada, in his 1984 report, *Limitations to the Use of Ethnic Origin data to Quantify Visible Minorities in Canada*. First, the 1981 question on ethnic origin was simply not designed to capture data on race. The references to language and cultural group in the ethnic origin question and instructions may have actually discouraged respondents from reporting their race (Boxhill, 1984: 7). Second, ethnicity and race do not necessarily line up: Haitians may give their ethnic origin as French, while many persons born in Jamaica may have theirs as British (Boxhill, 1984: 10). Third, while place of birth can often provide clues as to a respondent’s racial identity, there is no way of knowing, for example, how many of the immigrants from the United States or Great Britain are of non-European descent (Boxhill, 1984: 12-13). Fourth, there were issues regarding how to enumerate mixed-race people. When 181,565 people recorded multiple responses to the ethnic question involving a European and non-European origin, Statistics Canada was concerned that “attempts to make them ‘visible’ in a statistical sense are tantamount to the ascription of visible or of quasi-racial characteristics which may be non-existent” (Boxhill, 1984: 17-18). Self-identification as a racial minority was replaced by complex data capture procedures that would assign racial identity based on both deduction and conjecture.

In the 1986 census, however, the relevant question centred on ethnicity, with fifteen groups and three write-in spaces provided. The major change was that the question now asked “to which ethnic or cultural group(s) do you or did your ancestors belong?” dropping the reference “on first coming to this continent” because of Aboriginal protests, and instructing that respondents “mark or specify as many as applicable” (Canada, 1986). The Aboriginal

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27 The 1986 census was originally cancelled by the Conservative government due to “fiscal constraints,” and was later reinstated because of constitutional provisions dating back to when the prairie provinces joined Confederation that require a mid-decade census occur.
designations “Inuit,” “North American Indian,” and “Métis” were included at the bottom of the list of choices.\textsuperscript{28} A list of non-European ethnic groups was used as examples of the write-in space, including “Indian (India),” “Filipino,” “Japanese,” and “Vietnamese”. Two non-European groups were shown on the list of fifteen: “Chinese” and “Black”. “Chinese” had appeared on the list in 1981 because the categories are listed on the basis of population counts from previous censuses. The category of “Black,” however, was specifically added to improve reporting by Canada’s African-origin population (White \textit{et al.}, 1993: 230)\textsuperscript{29} and to meet the need for data to implement the \textit{Employment Equity Act} (Potvin, 2005: 35). Rather than adding a direct question on race as recommended by political elites and other interested parties, policymakers incrementally adjusted their existing approach. Estimates of the non-white population were derived from indirect measures, though it was understood that the use of racial proxies at this conjecture would be inadequate\textsuperscript{30} and would not address the acute need for accurate racial statistics in order to properly implement and monitor the 1986 the \textit{Employment Equity Act}.

The possibility of including an explicit question on race in the 1991 census was discussed and tested at Statistics Canada. Advisory Committees to the government department, such as the National Statistics Council, the Advisory Committee on Demography and the Advisory Committee on Social Conditions were asked to consider possible wording for a question on race. Between 1987 and 1989 extensive consultations were conducted, a major

\textsuperscript{28} The use of “status Indian” and “non-status Indian” in the 1981 census led to misreporting by persons born in India or with origins in the Indian sub-continent, who thought that the reference to “status” referred to whether or not they were permanent residents or citizens of Canada. In 1986 the reference to status was replaced by “North American Indian” (Kelly, 1995: 24).

\textsuperscript{29} This strategy was successful. According to census data, Canada’s black population increased from 30,975 in 1981 to 260,335 in 1986 (Kelly, 1995: 37). While some of this increase is a result of immigration, the majority can be attributed to adding “Black” as a choice on the census form.

\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, the new data provided by the visible minority question on the 1996 census proved that previous classifications were inadequate: only 72 percent of black respondents gave “compatible” ethnic origins when compared to their responses to the visible minority question (Potvin, 2005: 39), making previous census counts unrepresentative of the demographic reality of Canadian society.
departure from consultations done for previous censuses, which had focused primarily on major data users in the government and private sector (Pryor et al., 1992: 222). Testing was also undertaken in a number of forums. In the 1986 Census overcoverage study, respondents were asked “Do you consider yourself to belong to Canada’s visible or racial minority population?” The analysis of responses indicated that there was considerable confusion pertaining to the term “visible minorities”. In 1988, two National Census Tests (in preparation for the 1991 census) asked respondents to indicate which pre-coded category best described their race or colour. There was a low level of non-response and few backlash or nonsense responses (Boxhill, 1990; White, 1992: 170; Boyd et al., 2000: Table 3.3) – in effect, the question tested well. In spite of these positive results, a direct question on race did not appear on the 1991 census for reasons that will be discussed further in the following section of this chapter. Instead, 1991 census question mirrored the 1986 question.31

The political circumstances surrounding the ethnicity question, however, were unprecedented. Since the multicultural turn, the purpose of the question was to uncover ethnic origins or ancestry of the population rather than ethnic identity. For example, responses of “Canadian” or “American” were strongly discouraged in the censuses of 1951, 1961 and 1971 (Canada, 1956; Canada, 1966; Statistics Canada, 1977). This decision was not uncontroversial; the refusal to accept these responses as valid was the subject of numerous debates in the House of Commons in the 1960s. Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker made passionate declarations against the notion of “hyphenated Canadians,” at one point criticizing the census because “regardless of the number of generations that have elapsed or the admixtures of nationality that have taken place during the 40, 50, 75 or 125 years, so long as persons must register under the nationality of their paternal ancestor, there will never be that Canadianism

31 A relatively minor change between the 1986 and 1991 questions was the number of mark-in spaces provided for respondents to identify as an ethnic group not listed in the question, which decreased from three in 1986 to two in 1991.
which we wish to establish". Regardless, the ethnic question unproblematically focused on ancestry until the wording to the 1986 question erased the phrase "on coming to this continent" and encouraged multiple responses, which conflated ethnic ancestry with ethnic identity and caused considerable respondent confusion in regards to what, exactly, the question was referring to (Pryor et al., 1992: 221-222). Though a person’s ethnic ancestry may be similar to his or her ethnic identity, one does not automatically follow the other. In order to clarify that the question was designed to elicit information on ancestry rather than identity, the instructions on the 1991 question included a note specifically stating that “this question refers to the origins of a person’s ancestors”.

However, the issue was about more than a distinction between ancestry and identity; the census and shifting conceptualizations of racial politics became embroiled in the national identity crisis that would characterize the early to mid-1990s. Shortly before the 1991 census, media outlets in Toronto and its surrounding areas, including the Toronto Sun, began a campaign entitled “count me Canadian!” Strongly related to constitutional and national concerns following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, campaigners and their allies in the Reform Party of Canada decried the lack of a “Canadian” category on the ethnic origin question and urged followers to declare themselves “Canadian” on their census forms using the mark-in spaces. Facing a disastrous situation in which the ethnic origin question could potentially produce useless information on Canada’s racial and ethnic diversity, Statistics Canada included instructions on the census form that read: “While most people of Canada view themselves as Canadian, information about their ancestral origins has been collected since the 1901 Census to

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reflect the changing composition of the Canadian population and is needed to ensure that everyone, regardless of his/her ethnic or cultural background, has equal opportunity to share fully in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada” (Statistics Canada, 1991). After the 1991 census, however, “Canadian” became the fastest growing ethnic group: whereas only 130,000 people gave “Canadian” responses in 1986, that number jumped to just over one million in 1991. “Canadian” became the fourth largest single response answer, following French, British and German.

The substantial responses of “Canadian” to the ethnic origin question had massive implications not only for 1991 census data but also for the future of the question itself. As Boyd (1999) points out, because of the internal protocol at Statistics Canada to rank-order ethnic categories in terms of representative population size, “Canadian” would appear as one of the listed choices in the 1996 census. This automatically stimulated increased responses because respondents are more likely to check the box next to one of the listed options than write in their own response in the free-text field, and also led to increased responses because the French translation of “Canadian” is “Canadien,” which has a historic and symbolic importance in French Canada. More importantly for our purposes, the increased responses of “Canadian” on the 1991 made it impossible for Statistics Canada to determine who was and who was not a racial minority using its standard approach of cross-tabulating racial proxies. This development, which was ironically spurred by a backlash to multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism, made the need for a direct question on race even more acute.

During the planning stages of the 1996 census there was both continued interest in eliciting more accurate data on racial minorities, and in turn, renewed support for a direct question on race (Boyd et al., 2000: 51). The extensive consultation efforts that had been
undertaken prior to the 1991 census were repeated, though cross-country town hall meetings were not conducted because only limited content change was expected for 1996 census (Statistics Canada, 1996a: 3). These consultations involved stakeholders both within and outside the government. However, no actual lobbying took place; much like the development of the ethnic question on the UK census, targeted public consultations and focus groups were concerned with developing terminology that respondents would understand. A number of government committees provided input, including intergovernmental committees with representatives from the provinces, the advisory committee for social statistics, consisting of academics, non-governmental organizations, and other data users and “experts”. Government departments were consulted on the issue of adding a direct question on race and according to the 1996 Census Consultation Report, five departments came out in support of the question and two were against its inclusion. Which departments stood in opposition to the addition of the question is not known, though the government departments responsible for implementing policies and programs pertaining to employment equity – Human Resources Development Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada – were strongly in support of the proposal and went so far as to suggest a “direct question on race” (Statistics Canada, 1996b: 50). Inside the government, much of the conceptual work was done by the Interdepartmental Employment Equity Working Group, which was long-standing, having been set up in the 1980s to operationalize employment equity data and was comprised of representatives from the Departments of Immigration and Citizenship, Statistics Canada, Human Rights Commission, 

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34 According to the 1996 Census Consultation Report, measures included conferences and public meetings held in Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina and Edmonton at the request of regional offices. In addition, Statistics Canada received more than 1500 comments from more than 990 organizations, about 15 percent of which were made as a result of the public meetings. Not all comments, of course, concerned the ethnic origin or proposed visible minority question; indeed, only slightly more than 50 of the 226 comments received on the ethno-cultural questions pertained to the topic of race, with the vast majority of comments concerning the ethnic origins question (Statistics Canada, 1996a: 24).

35 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
Human Resources and Development, the Public Service Commission and the Treasury Board Secretariat. For further information on the enumeration of race Statistics Canada looked to the international arena and drew lessons from the experiences of census designs in Britain, the US and elsewhere (Pryor et al., 1991: 172; Statistics Canada, 1992). The entire process was unequivocally driven by bureaucrats within Statistics Canada.

Three rationales, likely provided to Cabinet when census questions were ready for their approval, were provided by Statistics Canada to include a direct question on race: low levels of non-response, high quality data generated from the question, and legislative requirement to provide data on racial minorities (Boyd et al., 2000: 52). The government announced its intention to include a question on race in the summer of 1995 and a public debate over the nature and effectiveness of Canada’s multiculturalism and employment equity policies ensued (Boyd et al. 2000: 52-53). Some argued that the inclusion of the question on race was “a step backward” (Gwyn, 1996), based on ideas from the 19th century (Gardner, 1995). For example, Dr. Yehudi Webster, author of The Racialization of America, called Canada’s decision to add a question on race to the census “an act of promiscuous stupidity,” arguing that by putting race in the census, the Canadian government is “helping to create the race consciousness that is the bane of American society. They are putting the stamp of officialdom on race consciousness. Canada will pay a heavy price down the road” (Gardner, 1995). In response to these debates, Canada’s Chief Statistician, Dr. Ivan Fellegi, published a statement on the Statistics Canada website and in major newspapers throughout the country, explaining that the question was designed to elicit information necessary for the implementation and evaluation of the Employment Equity Act (Fellegi, 1996).

36 Interview with Statistics Canada Representative, October 2009.

37 Interview with Statistics Canada Representative, October 2009.
The census form featured a similar explanation for the rationale behind the question (Q.19), noting that “this information is collected to support programs which promote equal opportunity for everyone to share in the social, cultural and economic life of Canada.” Ten options were provided, in order of demographic prevalence as determined from the 1991 census: White, Chinese, South Asian (e.g. East Indian, Pakistani, Punjabi, Sri Lankan), Black (e.g. African, Jamaican, Haitian, Somali), Arab/West Asian (e.g. Armenian, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Moroccan), Filipino, South East Asian (e.g. Cambodian, Indonesian, Laotian, Vietnamese), Latin American, Japanese and Korean. One mark-in space was provided for “Other” designations. In contrast, the ethnic origin question (Q.17) abandoned its pre-designated list of options and instead featured four mark-in spaces, though the instructions provided a list of examples derived from ethnic origin responses on the previous census, including Canadian. The ten categories defined as “visible minority,” came directly from the 1995 Employment Equity Act, which defines visible minority as “persons, other than aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race and non-white in colour.” Aboriginal identities were now enumerated separately in the immediately preceding question (Q.18), which asked “Is this person an Aboriginal person, that is, North American Indian, Métis, or Inuit (Eskimo)?” and instructed those who responded positively to specify either North American Indian, Métis or Inuit (Eskimo) and to not answer Question 19 and to go on to two additional questions (Q.20 and Q.21), which asked respondents to name the Indian Band or First Nation they belonged to and to identify whether or not they were Treaty or Registered Indians. Importantly, neither the title of Question 19 nor the explanation thereof dared to use the word ‘race’; rather, the question referred to “population group”. Much like the use of the term “visible minority,” whose definition is explicitly race- and colour-based, the reference to population group avoids

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38 See Appendix H.
reference to the four-letter word; critics charge that this avoidance of racial language is also an avoidance of issues of racism (Stasiulis, 1991).

Those involved in the design of the question revealed that numerous discussions were held about how to enumerate mixed-race people. This issue had arisen in previous censuses as well. Since the 1986 and 1991 ethnic origins questions specifically requested respondents to mark as many groups as applicable, Statistics Canada developed a strategy to handle cases of multiple reporting for those designated as visible minority. In situations where the respondent identified him or herself as a constituent of one visible minority group and one white group (for example, Chinese and English), Statistics Canada would assign the individual to the visible minority group, somewhat ironically echoing the same protocol used to designate mixed-race people as non-white in the censuses of the early 20th century. To deal with multiple responses that involved two or more visible minority groups, a category designated “multiple visible minority responses” was created (Kelly, 1995: 14). Consultations with all three levels of government, multicultural organizations, private industry and other stakeholders revealed a demand for information on mixed-race children (Canada, 1996a: 26). For the 1996 census, the Interdepartmental Working Group made three decisions that suggest the enumeration of the mixed-race population was on their radar: first, the question focused on population group and included the racial designation of white; second, respondents were instructed to mark more than one category, if applicable; and third, respondents were instructed to not print “mixed-race” or “biracial” in the free-text field (Statistics Canada, 1996c). These policy options were not inevitable. Rather, they were put into place as a result of deliberative processes. Importantly, all three decisions aligned well with the Canadian schematic state’s means of organizing race and addressing racial issues indirectly. Prohibiting “biracial” or “mixed-race” as a response

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39 Interviews with Statistics Canada representatives, October 2009.
provided Statistics Canada with more sensitive data, but simultaneously ensured that census responses, like the question instructions, avoided the terminology of race. The inclusion of white made the question about population group rather than visible minority status and gave everyone a box to check, thus avoiding (some) of the inevitable allegations that racial minorities were getting “special treatment”. Furthermore, algorithms were already in place to compute multiple responses. Using the same approach for the population group question that had been in place for over a decade to tabulate multiple ethnic origin responses was a policy option with very low costs associated with it. More to the point, Statistics Canada could yet again dodge a controversial bullet: the idea that one could have multiple ethnic allegiances but only one racial identity would have been perceived as both problematic and unpalatable.

The inclusion of the direct question on race was deemed a success, with low non-response rates and high quality data produced. In fact, the publication of data using this direct question demonstrated exactly how inadequate the use of racial proxies had been in previous censuses. For example, only 72 percent of black respondents gave “compatible” ethnic origins when compared to their responses to the race question (Potvin, 2005: 39). Like the United States, the availability of more sensitive data about the mixed-race population necessitated that the state make decisions regarding who was to count as a visible minority for employment equity purposes. Unlike the United States, which decided that all respondents who identified as both white and non-white would count as non-white for purposes of affirmation action programming, Canada used racial visibility as a primary determinant. Thus, the current Canadian practice is to count those who fall under a visible minority designation for the implementation and evaluation of employment equity goals, but to only count certain mixed-
race identities. The “borderline groups” – Latin Americans and Arabs – when “mixed” with white, no longer count as visible minorities.\textsuperscript{40}

Interestingly, one of the unintended consequences of the success of the question on race was to make the ethnic origins question seem obsolete. Some within Statistics Canada preferred to drop the ethnic origins question because its free-text form meant high tabulation and coding costs that could not be justified by reference to legislation necessitating the information. The high prevalence of “Canadian” responses also made the data produced relatively useless.\textsuperscript{41}

Other civil servants in the Department of Canadian Heritage fought to keep the ethnic origin question alive, arguing that it was necessary in order to track the socio-economic status of third-generation white ethnic groups (Bourhis, 2003: 16-17; Jedwab, 2003). So far, Parliament has insisted on keeping both questions.

**Change, Alternatives, Outcomes**

The political development of racial categories in the Canadian census reveals the extent to which the census has simultaneously reflected and participated in the evolving nation-building racial projects of the Canadian state. Strongly tied to conceptualizations of the Canadian nation and its boundaries, these projects exist in the multiple and remain incomplete, evolutionary and ephemeral. This historical overview has also demonstrated that, in stark contrast to the prevailing belief that there is “no place for race” in Canada (Vickers, 2002b), the state has maintained a vested interest in managing and controlling racialized populations. It has also spent a considerable amount of time avoiding the notion of race. Given that proactive state policies are necessary to remedy the structural racism that characterizes Canada’s colour-coded

\textsuperscript{40} Interviews with Statistics Canada representatives, October 2009.

\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
institutions and social life, this avoidance of race has also resulted in a form of racial management that ensures the status quo is maintained.

The preceding pages have also demonstrated that the commonly assumed drivers of census politics – demography, social mobilization, and institutional consistency with human rights legislation – fail to illuminate the complex dynamics of the politics of race and the census in Canada. First, though the changing composition of Canadian population certainly has made issues of race and racism more salient in the late 20th century (Bourhis, 2003), this in and of itself accounts for neither policy consistency nor change. In fact, this chapter has demonstrated the extent to which racial categories in the census have themselves exerted an influence over official demographic counts. Secondly, unlike the United States Census Bureau, which has become an embattled organization since the civil rights legislation of the 1960s changed the stakes of racial enumeration, employees of Statistics Canada confirmed that there were no lobbies per se whose goal it was to add, change or alter census categorizations and absolutely no lobby surrounding the issue of how to enumerate mixed-race people. Controversy over the census was far more likely to come from the media. In general, Canada’s parliamentary system of government, which has until quite recently featured majority governments, diminishes the effect of interest group lobbying. During the 1980s and 1990s interest groups were managed and facilitated by the consultative protocols of the federal government (Phillips, 1991). As will be argued in Chapter 7, the input of groups or individuals interested in a question on race (among others) is highly mitigated by and through the state apparatus, which is far more interested in public input insofar as it pertains to ensuring that census questions use inoffensive language and understandable terminology than substantive practices of deliberative policy-making. Finally, the perception that Canada adopted a direct question on race in 1996 in

42 Interviews with Statistics Canada representatives, October 2009.
order to ensure institutional consistency with human rights legislation (the Employment Equity Act) is certainly the most dominant story in the secondary literature, according to official government documents, and relayed in interviews with civil servants. But if institutional consistency was really a driver of census categorizations, we would have seen the implementation of a direct question on race earlier – either in the 1986 or 1991 censuses – particularly because at this time there was a general acknowledgement within Statistics Canada that the ethnic origins question could not provide accurate assessments of the racial demography of the population. Yet, a ten year gap exists between the Employment Equity Act in 1986 and the “population group” question in 1996 for reasons that this argument cannot explain.

Demography, social mobilization and institutional consistency are certainly contributing factors to the politics of the census in Canada. However, as with the cases of the United States and Great Britain, census categorizations in Canada are not simply neutral tools of demographers or benign instruments of the state. A more compelling and accurate explanation of census politics in Canada must conceptualize the census as an instrument of statecraft used by the schematic state, continually implicated in nation-building efforts and serving to construct, reflect and reify the evolving ways the Canadian state has (re)imagined its community. The census question concerning racial origins between 1901 and 1941 was an integral part of the classificatory machinery of the schematic state, which, among other things, promoted Canadian nativism and nationalism and maintained Canada’s nation-building and colonial projects by (re)inscribing dominant perceptions of the “truth” or “reality” of race as a biological concept. Much like other instruments of the racial state, such as immigration laws and Indian Act regimes, the census was an integral part of visceral and simultaneously calculated racial projects, drawn from and contributing to transnational ideas about the nature
of race and racial difference. Here, census categorizations were used to manage and control racial populations. This did not occur in the same extremes as in Nazi Germany, when census data was used to find and exterminate the Jewish population, or in the United States during the Second World War when the census provided information on the whereabouts of the Japanese-descended population that would later be forced into internment camps. Instead, the management and control of racial populations occurred through the legal demarcation of racial boundaries. Intent on constructing a racially (and linguistically) homogenous nationalism, the Canadian state reinforced the boundaries of whiteness to ensure mixed-race people were relegated to their non-white ancestry and to serve the interests of the state in the program of eradicating Aboriginal identities, cultures, and claims to the land.

Linkages between transnational discourses of race and Canadian policy were clearly present in the early 20th century as evidenced by, for example, the use of eugenicist language in instructions to census enumerators in the 1931 and 1941 censuses. The influence of rapidly changing transnational norms about the validity of the concept of race and the evils of scientific racism were explicit in the aftermath of the Second World War. However, Canada's willingness to abandon references to race in the census can be juxtaposed with its hesitance to make more decisive changes in policy areas that featured blatant racial discrimination where the stakes were substantially higher. Though Canada eventually moved towards an immigration policy without explicitly racial criteria and attempted to repeal the *Indian Act* toward the end of the

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43 Though a thorough examination of the introduction and withdrawal of Trudeau's 1969 White Paper, which proposed the repeal of the *Indian Act* and the eradication of all legal distinctions between Aboriginal and other Canadian citizens, is beyond the scope of this chapter, it represents an intriguing and understudied instance whereby the Canadian state has relied on a discourse of civil rights developed in the United States. As Weaver (1981) notes, this radical departure in 1969 was the culmination of changes that had occurred in the definition of the "Indian Problem" throughout the 1960s, which were driven by three factors: (1) centennial celebrations created a "national curiosity" about Canada's past, including the treatment of the Native population; (2) the strengthening of Canadian identity at the same time as news of the US civil rights movement dominated the press, allowing liberal-minded people to develop a concern for minority groups and their rights to linguistic and cultural expression; and (3) the dominance of discussions of national unity (Weaver, 1981: 13; emphasis added). Furthermore, the language of the White Paper itself at certain parts mirrors the logic and phrasing of the United
1960s, these changes were heavily influenced by the changing discourse on race and were at the same time tempered by the expression of national interests. One set of such interests concerned the promotion of a changed conceptualization of Canadian nationalism and identity. The multicultural turn was a marked difference from the state’s deliberate attempts to ensure Canada remained a white settler society and was better aligned with the global discourse of human rights, but also relied on highly racialized and linguistic understandings of the meaning of Canadian “multiculturalism”.

By the 1980s, changing racial demographics combined with third-wave feminism, resurgent French-Canadian and indigenous nationalisms, anti-racist discourses, an economic recession, the rise of the New Right, a new Charter entrenched in the Constitution that prohibited racial discrimination and transnational networks of diasporic communities to make the politics of race more salient in Canadian politics. The state acknowledged a growing disconnect between its commitments to the principles of equality, multiculturalism and social justice and the widespread prevalence of racial disadvantage in Canadian society and undertook a series of initiatives to address it. These included more symbolic actions such as the formation of a parliamentary committee and a royal commission, as well as more substantive legislative developments such as Bill C-31 in 1985, the Employment Equity Act of 1986 and the Multiculturalism Act of 1988. Yet amidst these developments and calls for a direct question on

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States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board (1954). For example: “For many Indian people, one road does exist, the only road that has existed since Confederation and before, the road of different status, a road which has led to a blind alley of deprivation and frustration. This road, because it is a separate road, cannot lead to full participation, to equality in practice as well as in theory. In the pages which follow, the Government has outlined a number of measures and a policy which it is convinced will offer another road for Indians, a road that would lead gradually away from different status to full social, economic and political participation in Canadian life. This is the choice” (Canada, 1969).

Bill C-31 repealed section 12.1.b of the Indian Act and provided the terms by which thousands of women and their children could have their Indian status reinstated.

Note, however, that whether or not these laws were substantive in terms of impact is highly debatable.
race from within and outside the government, the state resisted implementing a direct question on race on its census.

Why did Canada implement a direct question on race in 1996 and not earlier? Why did the census decide to implement some means of enumerating mixed-race at this point in time, and why did it adopt a “multiple response” approach instead of another alternative? I focus on the puzzle of why Canada did not implement a question in the 1991 census (rather than the 1986 census or earlier) for two valid reasons. First, I work under the assumption that civil rights legislation, whose implementation or effectiveness depends on statistical data, is a necessary but insufficient cause of a direct question on race in a national census, at least in the cases under consideration in this study. Without a legislative imperative it is unlikely that Canada or the UK would have implemented a direct question on race. However, the existence of such legislation alone is insufficient to explain the presence of a direct question on race (as demonstrated by both the Canadian and British cases). Second, I accept the contention that designing and testing census questions is a multi-year process. It would have been improbable (though not impossible, per se) for the Canadian government to implement a direct question on race in the same year that it passed its employment equity legislation, thus ruling out the possibility that a question would appear on the 1986 census.

Probable explanations for non-inclusion of question on race in 1991 provided by official government documents and civil servants of Statistics Canada emphasize institutional constraints. With the knowledge that the data derived from the ethnic origin question would not be as accurate as a direct question on race, as well as support for a direct question from within Statistics Canada and from other government departments represented on the interdepartmental working group, there was a strong contingent who felt that a race question would work and would be supported by a majority of stakeholders within the federal
bureaucracy. However, ultimate decision-making power on the questions included in a census lies with Cabinet. Pamela White, a senior bureaucrat at Statistics Canada at the time, argues that though a direct question on race was tested in time for the 1991 census, it was dropped from the final version because of fiscal constraints (White, 1992). Multiple civil servants at Statistics Canada confirmed that the non-inclusion of the question was likely linked to money; in one bureaucrat’s words, “adding a question to the census could cost, literally, a million dollars”. Reusing the same question from census to census not only keeps the data produced comparable, but is also low cost. Statistics Canada representatives also emphasized the longevity of the census-making process. When asked about the non-inclusion of the direct question on race in 1991 in spite of positive test results, one civil servant told me, “there’s no conspiracy, you know. These things just take time.” However, in contrast to those insiders who claimed Canada’s failure to include a direct question on race in 1991 was because of fiscal constraints or the length of time required to add a question, a different civil servant said that the upper echelons of Statistics Canada “never wanted to have a question on race,” and when the deed was finally cemented in 1995, “they went kicking and screaming the entire way.”

The evidence suggests that these various inhibitors of a direct question on race compounded each other. Nonetheless, a fuller explanation must engage with both the nature of Canadian institutions and discourses of race in Canada at the end of the 20th century, which reveal that Canada’s nation-building project is far from over. Canadian identity is continually

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46 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.

47 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009. Note that the extraordinary cost of adding an additional census question was in part because of the particular census form used. According to bureaucrats, Canada’s shift to an “Australian form” in 1996 streamlined the census form, reducing cost and respondent burden.

48 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.

49 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
being (re)made and (re)imagined by purposeful state action, though it is also quite clear that its
discursive and ideational content is not entirely under the state's control. In particular, during
the last two decades of the 20th century there was a decisive shift in the conceptualization of
race as problematic and divisive to the acknowledgement of racial identities as part of the
multicultural, nation-building racial project.

For example, there was widespread belief on the part of the media and government
bureaucrats that the inclusion of a direct question on race would be controversial. Yet, this
notion of race as controversial has both institutional and ideational elements. Similar to
circumstances in Britain when a question was first proposed for the 1981 census, Statistics
Canada was highly concerned about including a question that would affect response rates; “we
cannot put a question on that will jeopardize the census,” said one bureaucrat. The overall
success of the census as a policy-making enterprise is measured by response rates and the
quality of data produced. Statistics Canada has an extensive pre-census testing program and
takes its consultations with the public very seriously, much like its counterparts Great Britain
and the United States. Multicultural organizations, such as the Canadian Race Relations
Foundation and the Ethnocultural Council of Canada are active participants in these processes,
but only insofar as required to fine-tune the terminology of the question so it is acceptable to
respondents. The proposal and design of census questions are, in short, bureaucracy-driven.
Statistics Canada does not view itself as a policy-making arm of the state and is fiercely
protective of its autonomy from political and ideological influences; however, as part of the
state apparatus, Statistics Canada can never be entirely politics-free. Its power to determine

50 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.

51 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009. Interestingly (and perhaps ironically), in the same
correction in which this interviewee corrected me when I called census-making a policy area, s/he also said, “I mean, the
census is really something. What else does the government do that touches every single person?”
who participates in the census-making process and in what capacity is unmatched and undeniably political. Nor is it immune from program review or budget cuts: recall, for example, the attempted cancellation of the 1986 census, a decision that was surely made in the Prime Minister’s Office. Further, Statistics Canada must adhere to the established lines of accountability within the federal government, as final decision-making power regarding the inclusion, exclusion or alteration of census questions lies with Cabinet.

These institutional aspects – a semi-autonomous department and policy success evaluated by public participation – do not define what is and is not perceived as controversial on their own. There are also ideational elements at play. It bears asking, for example, who exactly found the direct question on race to be controversial in the years preceding the 1991 census. Unlike Great Britain, which saw massive public protest when a direct question on race was proposed for the 1981 census, neither public protests nor lobbies from racial groups were a dominant feature in Canada before the census in 1991 (when a direct question on race was proposed and tested) or in 1996 (when a question was included). In fact, representatives of Statistics Canada did not recall any lobbies surrounding the race question at all.52 Issues pertaining to the race question were debated during public consultations on the 1991 census, when the Ethnocultural Council of Canada (ECC), an umbrella group representing nearly 40 national organizations, felt that a question on race could be perceived as offensive. However, what the organization actually found offensive was the notion of race itself and its ability to circumvent the ethnic imperative: its major concern was that strong ‘Canadian’ responses to an ancestry question had the potential to reduce counts for many of the long-standing member groups such as Ukrainian, German, and Dutch. Its lobbying activities led to a response by

52 Interviews with Statistics Canada representatives, 19 and 20 October 2009. It is quite interesting to note, however, that there was intense lobbying in the early 1990s by academics and parts of the gay and lesbian community for the inclusion of a question on sexual orientation, but this question was not included (Mitchell, 1995).
Statistics Canada to the Parliamentary Committee on Multiculturalism and Citizenship, but both the lines of questioning and the answer provided by the state focused on the dilemma of ‘Canadian’ origin, identity and citizenship and not on issues of race, colour, or equity legislation (Boyd et al., 2000: 49-50). In this context, the offensiveness of race may have been in its ability to diminish the claims of and to the benefits of multicultural policies and programming.

Canadians have, at times, mobilized around census issues. The “count me Canadian” campaign that took place before the 1991 census was certainly a lobby of sorts, though it was driven largely by the media and political elites and occurred after the questions had already been set. Here, the push for “Canadian” responses was inextricably tied to the perception that an emphasis on racial or ethnic identities was divisive. This is not the case because of the political orientation of the participants of the campaign, nor is it to imply that all those who responded “Canadian” on the 1991 census necessarily agreed with the Reform Party’s stance on race or were hypnotized by some form of racist false consciousness. The campaign itself and its resounding success do, however, speak to the proliferation and legitimization of normative claims about the creation of a Canadian identity above and beyond racial distinctions during a time when identity politics were quite prominent in the academy, state and society writ large. On the one hand, this could be an anti-racist goal: a call to move beyond arbitrary racial distinctions and develop a multiracial and multicultural Canadian identity. On the other hand, Canadians’ tendency to avoid issues of race and racism, combined with the linguistic, multicultural, identity and constitutional politics of the day, would suggest that promoting a Canadian identity came at the cost of abandoning the hyphenated Canadianism at the heart of metaphors about the Canadian mosaic.

Given the positive test results, high response rates and the lack of lobbies protesting the proposed question, the perception that race is controversial and its non-inclusion on the 1991
census may be indicative of a certain anxiety on the part of the state. At an international conference of Census Bureau employees on the measurement of ethnicity and race in 1992, Canadian participants confirmed that race has been a four-letter word in Canada and an issue not to be raised in the census (Statistics Canada, 1992: 86). With the clear acknowledgement that the use of racial proxies to enumerate the non-white population was insufficient well before the 1991 census, the bureaucracy set out to assess potential policy options to be presented to the Ministerial level of government. We know the question on race was tested, but whether or not the race question made it on the list of questions proposed to Cabinet cannot be confirmed because of the Security of Information Act (formerly the Official Secrets Act). However, it seems highly likely given the initial investment to develop the question and conduct the necessary consultations, the high quality data produced and the low non-response rates in the National Census Tests, that the question was indeed put to the Cabinet of Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.

Whether or not the decision not to include the question on race was a result of the neo-conservative principles of the Tory government can only be left in the realm of conjecture and speculation at this point. However, it is relatively clear that in the 1980s and early 1990s Canada’s strategic approach to racial enumeration was one of not counting in the name of multiculturalism. In the ideal type of this approach identified by Rallu et al. (2004) non-enumeration has little to do with racist views or national unification under a single civic identity, but rather can be used as a state strategy of promoting a national discourse of hybridity and an increased appreciation of cultural mixing. In the Canadian context the logic is slightly different, premised above all else on the perception that an invocation of the idea of race or of racial categories themselves runs counter to the multicultural claims of the state and

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53 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
the multicultural discourse of the nation. This should come as no surprise: anti-racism and multiculturalism have often been different discourses in Canada with competing goals. Multiculturalism is an official policy and part of Canadian identity, even when it encompasses contradictory ideas about the nature of national cohesion and the best way to achieve it.

But if the nation is indeed an imagined (multicultural) community, as Anderson (1991) and others suggest, then race reveals the limits of the Canadian imagination. In the face of evidence that Canada's social, economic and political environments are highly racialized (Banting et al., 2007), the dominant narrative of Canadian identity presupposes Canada as a raceless society; that is, the dominant understanding of the nature of Canadian society and politics is one in which there are no major racial problems (Wilson, 1993; Vickers, 2002b). The ideational power of this narrative manifests not simply in the dearth of academic literature on race in Canada (Thompson, 2008), but also in prevailing attitudes of the population. Reitz and Banerjee (2007) demonstrate that there is a “prevailing view that racism is marginal in Canada,” and that “only a minority of the White population think that prejudice is something that the Canadian government should address with more determination,” (2007: 11) (mis)perceptions that are unlikely to change given the elevated mythological status of multiculturalism and its solidified place in the narrative of Canadian identity. These discourses of multiculturalism perpetuate the myth that race does not matter in Canada. For example, in her assessment of the discursive impact of multiculturalism on women of colour Bannerji (2000) questions the extent to which multiculturalism actually makes a difference in the lives of racial minorities who suffer from racism and systemic discrimination. Taylor's (1994) central

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54 Examples include the continuation of immigrant ‘entrant status’ in the labour market, gang-related violence in urban centres, second-generation immigrants arrested on terrorism charges in Toronto, the sharp debate about the role of Sharia law in Ontario, and the pervasive nature of racial discrimination, with 35.9 percent of racial minorities continuing to report experiences of discrimination (Reitz and Banerjee, 2007).
claims of the paramountcy of the “recognition” of identities “speaks to nothing like class formation or class struggle, the existence of active and deep racism, or of a social organization entailing racialized class productions of gender” (Bannerji, 2000: 554). Discourses of multiculturalism and diversity, Bannerji argues, simultaneously hide and enshrine power relations (2000: 555). Uncomfortable or controversial issues or not, race and racism have been, and still remain, undeniable elements of Canadian society.

What changed to make it possible for the direct question on race to be implemented in 1996? Statistics Canada argued that three factors led to the decision: low levels of non-response, high quality data generated from the question, and a legislated requirement to provide data on racial minorities (Boyd et al., 2000: 52). Note, however, that these three criteria were also present in 1991. Nor was 1996 necessarily any kind of “tipping point” when Canadians and political elites suddenly became more comfortable with the language of race or changed their opinions about the severity of racial discrimination in Canada and the most appropriate state practices to remedy it. Rather, changes between the 1991 census, in which race was deemed too controversial a topic for the question to make the cut, and the 1996 census, which featured a direct question on race masked as a “population group,” were institutional and ideational in nature. In terms of institutional drivers, Statistics Canada had already invested heavily in the design and testing of the question, so putting the question on the 1996 census did not represent a new financial burden. The more important institutional driver was the policy feedback that came as a consequence of the data produced from the 1991 census. As previously mentioned, the rise in Canadian responses in 1991 led to degraded data and in particular made it impossible for Statistics Canada to determine who was and was not a racial minority. Moreover, the established practice of using the most populous groups from the most recent census as examples or boxes to check meant that “Canadian” would appear as one
of the listed options in the 1996 ethnic origins question. Having “Canadian” listed as an example on the form would undoubtedly increase responses, simply through the power of suggestion. Institutional feedback and constraints made the direct question on race an unavoidable policy alternative.

However, some important ideational elements were also at play. First, as previously mentioned, the “Count Me Canadian” campaign that set some of these institutional elements in motion was certainly implicitly, if not explicitly, racial in nature. Quite distinct from the types of American lobby efforts that seek to add or alter racial categories, or privacy crusades in Britain which question the state’s intrusion in to the private affairs of citizens, this campaign was essentially a popular resistance to ethnic enumeration. Boyd (1999) argues that the dramatic increase in “Canadian” responses can be attributed to four cumulative and interactive factors which, I contend, suggest the campaign and its success were premised on a deep-rooted ideological concern about the divisive nature of ethnic or racial “hyphenated Canadianism” and its impact on Canadian national identity. First, by the 1990s there was a substantial presence of a group with a long history of settlement that had low costs associating with a “Canadian” ethnic categorization. The success of this campaign among those who had identified in previous censuses of French and British descent (Boyd and Norris, 2001) and in parts of the Greater Toronto Area, such as Oshawa, Kitchener-Waterloo, and Niagara Falls, which were staunchly Conservative throughout the 1990s, point to more fundamental issues concerning who does and does not belong in this conception of nationhood. This is compounded by the second factor: as previously mentioned, the last two decades of the 20th century were marked by the increased strength of neo-conservative parties that downplayed multiculturalism. As a matter of ideology, the New Right opposes any expansion of government intervention into society and the economy, but more fundamentally has contested mainstream understandings of the role of the
state, the family, gender issues, organized labour sexuality, race, and national identity (Gunn, 1989). In particular, the Reform Party of Canada’s meteoric rise from a newly formed party in the late 1980s to the Loyal Opposition in the 1990s featured a platform of covert, or “new” racism, in which the party stood firmly against, for example, selective immigration based on racial criteria, but simultaneously argued that immigration should not “be explicitly designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada, as it increasingly seems to be.”

The Reform Party were primary agitators in the “count me Canadian” campaign, which bolstered their antagonism towards multiculturalism as an official state policy and the notion of “hyphenated Canadianism”. In numerous statements by party representatives throughout the 1990s, Reformers lament the fact that Canada has French-Canadians, Native-Canadians, Chinese-Canadians, but apparently no plain, ordinary Canadians (Kirkham, 1998: 255-257). The third factor that contributed to the dramatic increase in “Canadian” responses was the continuation of substantial immigration to Canada during a time of economic recession, which sparked nationalist and xenophobic sentiment, at times targeting non-white immigrants for coming to “our” country and taking “our” jobs. Finally, as previously mentioned, responses to the ethnic question were likely influenced by a highly visible and successful media campaign aimed at promoting Canadian responses. Note, however, that the notoriously right-winged Sun Media outlets were the primary venues for this type of nationalist sentiment. In addition, the success of “count me Canadian” was likely a response to rising sovereigntist sentiment in

55 New racism, as described by Barker (1983), emerged in the 1960s, and, I argue in Chapter 6, was a transnational shift in the meaning of race. Rather than adhering to a biological construction of race that relied on hierarchical orderings of distinct races as occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries, this new form of racism centres on the belief that it is natural for those of a particular culture or nationality to form a bounded community and be aware of its difference from other communities and subsequently be wary or antagonistic towards outsiders. As such, those who are simply recognizing difference cannot be racist (so the new racism school goes) and “naturally” feel, for example, “swamped” by immigrants of a different race. See also Ansell (1997).

Quebec, the crisis of national identity after the failure of Meech Lake, the Oka Crisis, and the general political climate of the 1990s and its implications for language politics in Canada.57

The second element involved in framing the circumstances that enabled the implementation of the race question in 1996 was the ideational shift from ‘not counting in the name of multiculturalism’ to ‘counting in the name of multiculturalism’ and ‘counting to justify positive action’. This shift was not driven by any substantial change in public opinion or vernacular discourse; the Canadian state did not suddenly become comfortable with the notion of race between 1991 and 1996. In fact, many of the interviews I conducted with former employees of Statistics Canada in 2009 began with my interviewees expressing concern over my use of the word ‘race’. One respondent spent a considerable amount of time ensuring that I understood that race was a social construction, finally telling me “we just don’t use that word here.” (S)he drew my attention to the fact the what I had been calling the “question on racial or visible minorities” was in fact labelled the “population group” question on the census form; nowhere in the census form, instructions or guide did the word “race” appear. During another interview the respondent said, “The census is a statement about what countries view to be important about themselves. In the US, it’s race. Here it’s language. That’s what’s salient.”

With these kinds of views still prevalent in the bureaucracy thirteen years after the fact, it is clear that 1996 was not necessarily any kind of ‘tipping point’ when the politics of race suddenly increased in saliency and decreased in controversy. As previously noted, Statistics Canada did face criticism for its decision. In his response to critics of Question 19, Chief Statistician Ivan Fellegi fervently disassociated the question from the notion of race:

In fact, this question (Question 19) is not designed to provide information on race or racial origins of the population of Canada. Rather, it is intended to produce statistics on

57 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
the visible minority population – statistics which are needed by both governments and employers to administer and assess the impact of the employment-equity legislation passed by Parliament in 1986...I appreciate the concerns of individuals who are offended by Question 19, and who fear that it will be divisive and that the data may be misused. I would assure them that the information they provide will be used only for statistical purposes, and that the resulting statistics will be in the interests of all Canadians (Fellegi, 1996).

Whereas race was avoided on the censuses of the 1980s and 1991 because of concerns over its controversial nature – and hence the threat it posed to data quality and its potential for further fractiousness in an era of rampant identity politics – the justification for Question 19 in 1996 relied on the established normative principles of equality and social justice. The rationale provided on the census form relayed to Canadians that the information would support programs that promote “equal opportunity for everyone to share in the social, cultural and economic life of Canada.” Similarly noting that “much of the criticism of Question 19 appears to be directed more at the idea of employment equity than at the collection of statistics,” the Chief Statistician encouraged Canadians to accept that “employment-equity legislation has been the law of the land since 1986,” and recognize the value in using the census to collect this data, as “the census is the only possible source of the objective information which is needed to administer the act and to evaluate its impact” (Fellegi, 1996). Invoking the necessity of fair and informed debate on these issues, Fellegi argues that “it is in everyone’s interest that debate on issues related to employment equity, and the many other issues illuminated by census data on the composition and characteristics of our population, be supported by objective, impartial and reliable data, rather than by impressions, unfounded opinion or stereotypes” (Fellegi, 1996). Canadians may not have liked employment equity and were likely still uncomfortable with a question that walked and talked like race, but the invocation of these principles – equality, fairness, and full participation in Canada’s social, cultural and economic life – were at least familiar. These were normative and ideational signals that the Canadian state and its public
believed in, even if they were still uncomfortable with the notion of race. Framing the census question as an issue of social justice and equality made it possible for the multicultural nation-building project to be reimagined in multiracial terms. Counting by race (while still never using the phrase) became a means of evaluating the demographic fact of multiculturalism and of hopefully achieving the social ideal of multiculturalism as well (Day, 2000).

Both ideational and institutional elements suggest a particular logic in the provision of a means to enumerate mixed-race people at the same time as the implementation of the race question in 1996 and the use of the multiple response approach for doing so. Because the implementation of Question 19 was controversial enough on its own, the state made attempts to minimize the potential criticisms that would undoubtedly arise if respondents were forced to choose only one racial affiliation. As Dr. Fellegi (1996) argued, respondents “are encouraged to mark as many categories as apply, or they can write their own response in the space provided. No one is asked to fit him or herself into a single category.” In light of Canada’s established policy of allowing multiple responses to the ethnic question, necessitating a single answer for the race question would have been highly problematic, to say the least. In normative terms, permitting multiple responses and the enumeration of mixed-race people in 1996 made multicultural sense; in other words, the practice aligned well with the (re)conceptualized ideal of a Canadian multiculturalism that acknowledged and endorsed racial diversity.

Importantly, the use of a multiple response approach to enumerate mixed-race was also institutionally path dependent. Multiple responses had been permitted and analyzed for the ethnic question since 1981. Unlike the United States, which was unfamiliar with tabulation procedures required to analyze multiple responses to a single question, the algorithm needed to tabulate multiple responses was already well-established in Statistics Canada. Rather than discussing whether or not to count mixed-race identities or the best-suited approach for doing
so, which was somewhat of a foregone conclusion given normative concerns about single responses and institutional path-dependencies, the Interdepartmental Working Group were far more concerned with the question of which ‘mixes’ should count for employment equity purposes. The answer is an interesting and understudied aspect of the employment equity policy. The practice to only count certain racial ‘mixes’ for employment equity purposes gives all the appearances of being a rather controversial decision. The same issue of how mixed-race people would be counted in terms of affirmative action was a hotly debated topic in the American context. But this policy nuance is not well-known in Canada; there is very little documentation of this practice and it does not feature in the secondary literature on employment equity. Equally interesting are the ideational implications of the racial assignment of these ‘borderline mixes’. The decision in Canada to accept those with white/black or white/Asian heritages as visible minorities but white/Arab or white/Latin American lineage as non-visible minority (the visible majority, perhaps?) reveals assumptions about the nature of racial discrimination in Canada, which is based on very particular interpretations of visibility and skin tonism rather than culture, language or dress.

**Contingencies, Consequences and Conclusions**

Canada is undoubtedly racially diverse. Projections indicate that one in five Canadians could be a visible minority by 2017 (Bélanger and Malenfant, 2005) and recent census data demonstrate that both mixed-race unions and the mixed-race population are on the rise. In 2001 3.2 percent of the Canadian population, or 452,000 people, were in mixed unions, an increase of 35 percent from 1991 (Milan and Hamm, 2004).\(^{58}\) The mixed-race population increased from 1.2 to 1.5

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\(^{58}\) This is notable, given the increase of 10 percent for all persons in couples during the same time period.
percent of the population between 2001 and 2006, a growth of 25 percent in just five years (Statistics Canada 2001; 2006). In spite of a growing racial and multiracial population, issues of race and the census have failed to achieve the same amount of academic or public attention as they have in the United States and Great Britain. Is this simply because, as so many suggest, race is not a salient issue in Canada? On the contrary, the political development of questions designed to count by race and ethnicity suggest that the schematic state has been very concerned with assessing the size and composition of the racial population, even when it has been hesitant to confront the terminology of race head-on. After finishing an interview with a former Statistics Canada employee, I asked him, simply out of curiosity, why Canada was so hesitant around issues of race. I end this chapter with his take on the situation:

We’re gun shy. No, seriously. We probably look to the history south of the border and figure that we don’t want to go through that. We’ve also got the multicultural model that’s kinda soft...we never wanted to take the issue on head-on. Minorities are small, they don’t have a strong collective voice, but things are changing dramatically....there’s always the suspicion that the concept would precipitate racism rather than the other way around. That’s the way I think. We’re gun shy. It’s like signing a donor card. You know?

Q – [laughter] How is it like signing a donor card?

Well, because some people believe signing a donor card will lead to their untimely death.59

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59 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
Chapter 6

Seeing Like a Racial State

The previous three chapters on the political development of a direct question on race and the inaugural enumeration of the multiracial population in the United States, Great Britain and Canada have demonstrated that three commonly assumed drivers of census politics – demography, civil rights legislation, and social mobilization – tell part of the story, but are insufficient to describe the contextualized nuances of census and racial politics during the last three decades of the 20th century. In order to complicate the tenor and substance of what has transpired in these three cases, the analysis must consider change and stability over time as well as comparison between places. In the first instance, it is indisputable that the meaning of race and its interpretation within and relationship to liberal democracies have changed dramatically over time. It was not that long ago that all three countries of this study featured explicitly racist laws and policies, designed to identify, manage and control racialized populations, all the while espousing democratic rhetoric of equal citizenship and individual rights. While substantive racial equality is certainly not a feature of social, political, or economic life in the 21st century, nor are circumstances the same as they were in the 1950s and 1960s. Canada, the US and the UK all have policies of multiculturalism (however defined) and have implemented legislative measures prohibiting discrimination in housing, education, and employment (however (in)effective). This disjuncture between the not-so-distant past and the not-so-different present raises important questions about the nature of the shift and its causes, content, and consequences.

This title, and the title of this dissertation, is borrowed from a chapter in Peggy Pascoe’s (2009) book, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Laws and the Making of Race in America, with her written consent and the permission of her publisher, Oxford University Press. Our analyses are both based on the work of Goldberg (2002) and Scott (1998) (see Chapter 2), though our interpretations and utilizations of these texts differ significantly.
In the second instance, comparison between places demands an explanation of how and why all three cases moved towards the implementation of a direct question on race and the enumeration of the mixed-race population within that census question. In explaining these trends, evidence of some traditional causes of policy convergence, transfer and diffusion, such as emulation, imposition, international harmonization, or regulatory competition (Bennett, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Heichel et al., 2005; Holzinger and Knill, 2005), are difficult to find.\(^2\) A much more convincing account must consider the broader dynamics that inform how states mediate between the transnational and domestic impulses of the very concept of race, both of which inform how a given state reacts to and participates in racial politics. Thus, it is not that social mobilization, civil rights legislation and demography do not matter, because they obviously do – in important and contextualized ways. Rather, the question of how these drivers interact with other ideational and institutional variables through the schematic state to produce comparable political outcomes must be examined.

But how do transnational norms or ideas influence domestic politics? Though ideas and norms are more often the reasons for actions rather than direct causes in the positivist sense (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 890), a major concern of the literature has involved identifying the causal mechanisms involved in the transfer between international and domestic realms (Blyth, 1997; Berman, 2001). This is difficult to identify and measure, for ideas may influence outcomes directly, by affecting the political behaviour of actors, or indirectly, by shaping the incentive structures surrounding different courses of action. Regardless, the majority of the literature on the influence of norms, ideas and culture is premised on the notion that carriers or entrepreneurs capable of persuading others to reconsider the status quo must champion the

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\(^2\) Two other causal mechanisms of policy convergence, transnational communication and independent problem-solving (Holzinger and Knill, 2005), are a better fit with the evidence of these cases, discussed further below.
new paradigm (Berman, 2001: 235). For example, Hansen and King (2001) contend that the influence of ideas is more likely when there is a synergy between interests and ideas, but go on to argue that two further conditions are actors who possess requisite enthusiasm for the idea and have the institutional position to influence policy and timing which contributes to a broad constellation of preferences that reinforces the idea, whether through political crisis or an undermining of previous policies (2001: 239). This emphasis on individual or group actors alleviates the problem of epiphenomenality, whereby ideas are considered a secondary rather than primary or singular cause.

The so-called "life-cycle" of a norm is also an important consideration. If a key question, as Kingdon (2003) argues, is asking when an idea’s time has come, it is equally important to determine when a norm’s time has passed. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that there is a standard life-cycle of a norm, consisting of its emergence via entrepreneurs, “norm cascade” through dynamic imitation, whereby norm leaders socialize others, and norm internalization, when norms attain a “taken for granted” quality. Problematically, the life-cycle ends there; scholars imply that the norm either becomes immortal in its relegated position as common sense, or dies quietly, presumably when alternative norms are championed by new entrepreneurs and replace their predecessors through another iteration of this process.

By examining the changes to the transnational and domestic extrapolations of race over time and between places, this research tests and challenges these two tenets of the theoretical literature on the political influence of transnational norms and ideas. First, this research reveals that the primacy and singularity of the agent as a necessary causal connector is misplaced. Ideas alone do nothing, so the argument goes; they only become causally important by influencing their human hosts and therefore it is necessary to clearly delineate the connection between norms, ideas and the political actors embodying them (Berman, 2001: 235). For example, Hansen and King (2001) contend that the influence of ideas is more likely when there is a synergy between interests and ideas, but go on to argue that two further conditions are actors who possess requisite enthusiasm for the idea and have the institutional position to influence policy and timing which contributes to a broad constellation of preferences that reinforces the idea, whether through political crisis or an undermining of previous policies (2001: 239). This emphasis on individual or group actors alleviates the problem of epiphenomenality, whereby ideas are considered a secondary rather than primary or singular cause.
241). Though this is the dominant interpretation of how norms work to produce outcomes, other frameworks construct ideas as “road maps” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993) or flashlights (McNamara, 1998). These accounts navigate between the presumed necessity that new ideas require a champion and the contention that an idea’s “fit” with existing paradigms may be equally important (Sikkink, 1991: 2). For example, Lieberman (2002) argues that political change emerges from friction between contesting political orders, which may comprise institutional and/or ideational patterns of politics. Bleich (2002) also moves away from the necessity of identifying a policy entrepreneur by referencing policy frames, which are sets of cognitive and moral maps that orient actors within a policy sphere and serve to organize information, empower certain actors while constraining others and define goals (2002: 1063-1064). The research presented here demonstrates that while entrepreneurs can play important roles, it is far more important to discover the ways in which norms alter incentive structures – which may be normative or ideological, legislative, or socio-political in nature – around political action and inaction. This research also demonstrates that norms are not nearly as rigid as presumed. Though norms exert a continuing influence on politics over extended periods of time, scholars have generally ignored the dynamism of norms that allow them to change. Once norms have reached the point of internalization and attained a taken-for-granted quality they are still susceptible to change through both domestic and transnational action. Simply put, norms are not static.

I will suggest a more dynamic relationship between transnational norms about race and domestic state (re)actions throughout this chapter. My research indicates that policy

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3 The precise distinction between that which constitutes an “idea” and that which can be considered a “norm” is unclear in the literature. Berman (2001) suggests that a key distinction is its tenacity or hold: “While an idea can have a fleeting hold over political actors, it seems nonsensical to talk about norms or culture that do not have staying power. Indeed, norms and culture should be thought of as ideas or beliefs that are institutionalized, persist over time, and, at least in the case of culture, are associated with particular communities” (2001: 248, fn.17).
entrepreneurs that fought for new norms of racial enumeration did not exist in the traditional sense. Individuals and groups did on occasion mobilize around and voice their interest in census policy debates, but were not the “carriers” of new ideas which challenged stagnant paradigms. Nor were policymakers ever compelled to count by race at any point simply because of new norms or ideas. Instead, I analyze how actors within the state apparatus, including bureaucrats and political elites, were influenced by a congruence of ideational (both transnational and domestic in origin and scope) and institutional factors, which together led to a shift in language and discourse that cumulatively and iteratively changed the landscape of possibilities in racial politics. This account will provide a more dynamic telling of both the changing meaning of race and the aftermath thereof, revealing that transnational norms are constantly evolving and morphing precisely because of the ways in which they are adopted and institutionalized in national contexts.

This chapter will draw connections between the domestic enterprise of the census and the transnational complexities of race (as manifested through censuses, among other social phenomena) as comparable racial projects of the United States, Great Britain and Canada. It posits three general arguments. First, changes in particular transnational norms have resulted in shifts in the meaning of race and the way in which societies organize themselves in accordance with this established meaning. In short, the world-historical racial projects have been disrupted and rearticulated over time. Second, transnational shifts have numerous effects on domestic racial projects, which are mitigated through the schematic state. The schematic state mediates between new transnational norms surrounding race and domestic

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4 This is relatively uncharted theoretical territory; as Berman writes: “The process by which ideational variables become embedded in patterns of discourse, social norms and collective identities is especially difficult to trace and therefore to theorize about, especially for political scientists, who often feel uncomfortable studying subjects they cannot see, hear, or touch” (Berman, 2001: 238-239).
circumstances such as national politics, path dependencies and other racial projects in place, but retains its goal of making the population legible. Third, these domestic political outcomes do not stay bounded by national borders; there is a reciprocal relationship between the domestic and transnational, in which both continually influence the other in constitutive ways. 

This general pattern occurs twice in the time period under study, once palpably and the second time with more subtlety.

In the first circumstance, changing transnational norms in the post-war era shifted the normative context surrounding the meaning of race, changing the terms of the debate in such a way that perceptions of democratic legitimacy in the Anglophone West depended in part on the state’s acknowledgement and attempt to rectify circumstances of racial disadvantage. This shift was mediated by schematic state and domestic nuances, which together produced a change in governmental approaches to racial enumeration, from counting to dominate and control to counting to justify positive action in the United States. The successes of the US civil rights movement and the new use of census data to monitor and combat racial discrimination in turn influenced the transnational norm itself, which contributed to a shift in the approaches to racial enumeration in Canada and the UK by the 1980s, to that of not counting in the name of multiculturalism. These circumstances feed into second repetition of this pattern, in which the last decades of the 20th century were marked by another transnational shift. Though it is not as clear or well-defined as the post-war era, the multicultural moment is characterized by new models and paradigms of diversity governance, which, again, refocused the meaning of race and the ways in which societies organize themselves along racial lines. When mediated by the schematic state and domestic politics, this shift aligned the approach to racial enumeration in all three cases to one of counting to justify positive action. These cases also converged in their use of racial enumeration to promote a diverse national identity (i.e. counting in the name of
multiculturalism) featuring a discursive construction of multiracial multiculturalism, in which powerful norms around the “problem” mixed-race, miscegenation, and rules of hypodescent begin to disintegrate and are replaced by alternative rearticulations of multiraciality.

The Moment of Human Rights (and its Discontents), 1950-1980

There is a history to be told of the evolution of the concept of race. Though public, elite and governmental attitudes towards those marked as racial Others have surely evolved over the decades of the 20th century, these changes were more often than not the lagging echoes of tectonic disruptions in world-historical racial projects. From 19th century debates over monogenesis and polygenesis through social Darwinism and eugenics, for nearly three hundred years race was interpreted as and believed to be wholly biological in nature. Importantly, biology was unavoidably determinative, though it was always unclear how, exactly, somatic differences such as skin colour, body and eye shape and size, hair texture and skull shape, determined the nature of those so marked (Miles and Torres, 1996: 27). The various components of biological racialism,5 premised on the hierarchical ordering of distinct races according to physical and cognitive ability, cultural prowess, behavioural traits and temperamental disposition (Davis, 1991: 23-25), constructed mixed-race as simultaneously fundamental to but problematic within this paradigm. In particular, racial mixing was believed to lower the biological quality of all, though there were many forms of racial transgressions – concubinage, prostitution, rape, love and/or marriage across colour lines, “going native,” non-white inheritance rights, and so on (Winant, 2001: 115; see also McClintock, 1995; Stoler 1995,

5 This is not to suggest that the biological construction of race was or is a coherent paradigm or ideology. It certainly has morphed over time, varied between places and often relied on principles and belief systems that were far more inconsistent than this general label suggests. See Stanton (1960), Jordan (1968), Gossett (1970), Frederickson (1971; 2002), Gould (1981), Stepan (1982), Barkan (1992), Young (1995), Baum (2006), Smedley (2007).
that were more troubling for their tendency to be discursively disruptive to the varied gendered and racial configurations of colonial regimes. Multiraciality itself was also highly problematic for unfettered beliefs in racial hierarchies, as the most important thing about races was the boundaries between them – those on top of the hierarchy had to work actively to maintain the boundaries that defined their superiority (Spickhard, 1992: 15).

This history is global, in the words of Howard Winant (2001), a world-historical racial project. Race was born in the transnational realm, and bred to be central to the discourses and realities of nation-building, empire and imperialism, and the evolution of the global capital system. For much of this transnational history, the state has animated race in order to dominate, banish, manage, control, expunge, segregate, eliminate and exclude non-white populations from the social fabric of Western societies. In census politics, this has amounted to the first of Rallu et al.’s (2004) four governmental approaches to ethnic enumeration, whereby counting by race is used to dominate and/or maintain control over racial populations.

This approach was clearly the case in both Canada and the United States at in the censuses of the 19th and early 20th centuries, discussed further below. But first, why was this not the case in Great Britain? In Canada and the US this approach coincided with the height of discourses of biological racialism, social Darwinism and eugenics, an era during which both countries featured laws, policies, and social norms designed to regulate the racial populations within the nation’s borders and restrictive immigration laws designed to first limit, then prevent and prohibit, non-white immigration. As white settler societies, immigration has been the primary means through which Canada and the US have populated their territories and worked to replicate and reproduce a distinct national identity. The same does not hold true for Great Britain, which during this same time period was one of the world’s most powerful
imperial powers. There are two implications of this power and position. First, though blacks and Asians have a long history in Britain (Fryer, 1984; Ramdin, 1999), the watershed in non-white immigration to Britain began after the Second World War, with the pinnacle event in both history and historiography being when the Empire Windrush brought over 400 Caribbean settlers to the shores of Britain in 1948 (Fryer, 1984; Rich, 1986; Paul, 1997; Francis, 1998; Wambu, 1998; Phillips, 1998). Thus, the most obvious reason why Great Britain did not seek to monitor and dominate racial populations through the census is because during the time period when this approach was predominant in Canada and the US the non-white population of Britain was comparatively minuscule. These small numbers meant that the omnipresent demographic anxiety surrounding the non-white populace of settler societies was lacking or less severe in the British context. By the time non-white immigration to Britain became a public concern the moment the Empire Windrush docked, the post-war era – and the new normative context surrounding race and rights it carried in its wake – had already changed perceptions around the legitimacy of explicit racial monitoring, surveillance and discrimination.

Secondly, though Britain did not count by race in an attempt to monitor and control the non-white population of the British Isles, the same does not hold true for its colonies. The same European imperial powers (France, Britain, Belgium) that rejected the proposition to enumerate their populations by reference to ‘cultural nationalism’ in sessions of the International Statistical Congress as their counterparts in Eastern Europe were already doing (Kertzer and Arel, 2002: 9) acted without hesitation in using the census and other administrative means to categorize their colonial subjects (Appadurai, 1993: 317-18). I argued in Chapter 2 that rather than being a reference to arbitrary physiological markers, race is a set of practices and power relations: the colonial imperative of enumerating the African and Asian subjects in the colonies while failing to implement the same mechanisms of surveillance in the
motherland is one example of these race-making practices. It worked to reinforce distinctions between the colony and metropole, simultaneously negating and enshrining the mutually constitutive relationship between the two, demonstrating as Jacqueline Nassy Brown (2005) writes of Liverpool, how place produces race. This denial – the idea that non-whites live, are from, belong over there, and not here – was crucial to empire and the development of the undeniably, inextricably racial conceptualization of “Englishness” (Cooper and Stoler, 1997; Hall, 2002). When non-whites in Britain were the subject of monitoring, surveillance and discrimination, it was far more likely to be implemented and enforced through informal means. For example, Bland (2005) and Rowe (2000) demonstrate that though Britain did not enact miscegenation laws per se, in the aftermath of the Liverpool race riots of 1919 extreme hostility and antagonism towards those involved in interracial relationships led the state to adopt a policy of voluntary repatriation. This strategy was implemented with much greater effectiveness when accompanied by police techniques of “persuasion” that deprived a non-white man of economic relief through the 1920s and 1930s if he refused to repatriate (Bland, 2005: 39). Other informal techniques that functioned to condemn miscegenation included state and societal hostility, the discursive construction of white women as race traitors, prostitutes and “of a very low type” for their interracial transgressions, and racial regulation through administrative mechanisms of the state such as social workers and agencies set up to monitor and ‘protect’ the unfortunate and undesirable mixed-race progeny of these relationships (Bland, 2005; Tabili, 1996). Direct regulation through prohibitive laws were rare since they

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6 David Theo Goldberg (2002) makes the distinction between “naturalist” and “historicist” forms of racial rule and traditions of state formation. Naturalist states in Europe and their satellites that tended to emphasize coercion in their emergence and national unification – Germany, apartheid South Africa, and presumably the US – adopted doctrines of natural racial superiority and inferiority that necessitated state action in order to impose racial order and maintain racial control. By contrast, historicist states growing out of financial centres such as England and France emphasized racial inferiority and superiority as evidence of the “fact” of historically produced progress and civilization. While the former tended to use overt mechanisms of racial control (segregation, Black Codes, etc.) the latter were more likely to use informal or administrative mechanisms, such as the unequal application of laws.
always had to be balanced against the interest of empire; as Tabili writes, "metropolitan social relations themselves were shaped by imperial ambitions" (1996: 173).

As white settler societies, Canada and the US did not share Britain's concern for maintaining distinctions between itself and its colonies or imperial stability. In both these cases, biological racialism was animated and rearticulated through the census, which became a means through which these states could maintain control over their non-white populations, or at the very least, one among many means through which these states organized and instituted schemes intended to solidify the boundaries of whiteness. In spite of differences between the precise content of racial classifications used on the censuses of the United States and Canada, this shared approach to racial enumeration during the 19th and 20th centuries nonetheless possesses some identifiable common denominators. First, the racial project of the census represented an effort on behalf of the state to police whiteness, racial boundaries, and biological racialism with a classification schema designed to maintain racial hierarchies. Second, this effort coincided with and was compounded by racial projects of the state housed in other areas of law and policy; as such, the classifications used in the census were closely related to debates surrounding slavery, reconstruction, colonialism, nation-building, eugenics, progressivism, and the like. Third, in the racial project of the census and its counterparts, mixed-race was constructed as inherently and fundamentally problematic, necessitating even further management above and beyond that provided for "pure" races. Finally, these multiple racial projects were not necessarily a coherent or rational body of governmentality but were instead messy, contradictory and extraordinarily regulated aspects of the many different moving parts of the schematic state.

It is generally acknowledged that the Second World War marked a break or disruption of the logic of race and its many manifestations. The post-war era represents a transnational
moment—a brief period of transition, both temporal and temporary—when the normative context surrounding the previously dominant conceptions of race as irrefutably biological, determinative, and hierarchically ordered fundamentally shifted. Though the belief in the validity of race as a biological concept was seriously undermined during the interwar years (Stepan, 1982: 141-143; Barkan, 1992: 1-3), the Holocaust and the demise of Nazi Germany shook the already crumbling foundations of biological racialism. In the academy, the biological construction of race— and the naturalized racial hierarchies the concept relied upon—was already under attack in other spheres. In anthropology, Franz Boas and his students were redefining understandings of race and racial difference in both the discipline and the academy. Expressing antagonism to all forms of racism, Boas’s own early work, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911), disputed the notion of hereditary racial purity and argued that races are not immutable entities but rather are influenced by environmental and other factors, and that race itself is not determinative of behaviour, morality, or civilization (Smedley, 2007: 312). Cracks turned to chasms in other academic disciplines, which had never been entirely unanimous in their support of the discourse of race before the Second World War and which now explicitly challenged some of the principles of biological racialism (Barkan, 1992).

Other developments in global politics helped cause and constitute the emerging discourse of human rights. The United Nations and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights

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7 Winant (2001) claims that this moment, when more progressive racial politics demanded amendments to the global socio-political forms of racialized rule, lasted until around 1970 (though he admits his choice of dates is somewhat arbitrary) (2001: 32). Regardless, the point is that this period was a moment, now long past.

8 However, the different aspects of biological racism were not successfully challenged at the same time or in the same ways. Schaffer’s (2008) recent study of racial science in Great Britain between 1930 and 1962 reveals that politics played a key role in moving science from its conceptualization of race as a permanent biological category almost equivalent to species to race-less explanations of human difference, and, importantly, that the abandonment of the idea of mental racial difference occurred at a faster pace than that of the conceptualization of physical racial difference.
made it clear that racial discrimination was morally indefensible. In December 1949, UNESCO invited prominent anthropologists and sociologists of the day to form an expert committee on the notion of race. The committee, which included Claude Levi-Strauss, Ashley Montagu, Julian S. Huxley and Gunnar Myrdal, published “The Race Question” in 1950. The statement condemns the human and social damage done by the myth of race and suggests dropping references to the term “race” altogether in favour of the phrase “ethnic groups” (UNESCO, 1950). Other international developments, such as decolonization in Asia and Africa, the demands of these newly sovereign nations that international organizations tackle issues of racial discrimination and the emerging foreign policy debates of the Cold War era, in which democracies claimed a superior system of governance based on principles of liberalism and equality and were forced to confront their hypocrisy (though at times only doing so in order to gain strategic leverage in Cold War politics) (Bell, 1980; Dudziak, 1988; 2000; Klinkner and Smith, 1999; Borstelmann, 2002), contributed to the emerging transnational discourse of human rights. Domestic developments also contributed to the proliferation of these norms, the most obvious being the civil rights movement in the United States and the struggles of indigenous peoples in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States for the right to self-determination (Cairns, 1999; Anderson, 2003). By the time of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the United Nations in 1966 and ratified in 1969, the idea of universal human rights was indisputable (Sikkink, 1993). This period was one of rapid change; before the Second World War, notions of a natural racial hierarchy were dominant throughout

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9 See Arendt (1951).

10 And on the issue of race-mixing: “With respect to race-mixture, the evidence points unequivocally to the fact that this has been going on from the earliest times. Indeed, one of the chief processes of race-formation and race-extinction or absorption is by means of hybridization between races or ethnic groups. Furthermore, no convincing evidence has been adduced that race-mixture of itself produces biologically bad effects. Statements that human hybrids frequently show undesirable traits, both physically and mentally, physically disharmonies and mental degeneracies, are not supported by the facts. There is, therefore, no biological justification for prohibiting intermarriage between persons of different ethnic groups” (UNESCO, 1950; emphasis in original).
Europe and North America. In contrast, the post-World War II era witnessed a clear shift in normative contexts that was fundamentally transnational in nature (Sikkink, 1993; Risse et al., 1999; Lake and Reynolds, 2008; Triadafilopoulos, forthcoming).

This transnational moment changed the meaning of race. Nazism brought the practices of genocide, previously applied only to non-white populations, to Europe's doorstep. It was also critical in the emergence of a Eurocentric notion of racism, which was concerned with confronting the excesses of race-thinking, though not with the formation of white supremacy in European and American colonialism (Hesse, 2004: 21). This is what Hesse (2004) calls the double-bind of racism: racism features a “constitutively antagonistic conceptual dialogue” that allows it to coexists with(in) its condemnation. The discrediting of biological racialism also led to a new academic emphasis on ethnicity rather than race and a general acknowledgement that race is best conceptualized as a social construction. What is important to note is that this shift was not simply in the operation of racial politics or the way that race was operationalized therein, though these changes did eventually occur in, for example, the delegitimizing of race as a criteria for exclusion in immigration policies (Joppke, 2005). Rather, there was also a fundamental shift in the transnational idea of race itself. Though the two are often conflated, it is necessary to separate the specific conceptualization of race at a given point in time from the institutional or behavioural changes that occur because of it (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). As demonstrated below, the substantive stakes of domestic racial politics did not immediately change; however, the world-historical racial project became destabilized when the support structure offered by the paradigm of biological racialism was challenged.

This is not to say that (scientific) racism was dead. Indeed, the historical record indicates the exact opposite. For example, Kohn (1995) and Tucker's (2002) studies of the scientific study of race have demonstrated funding and scholarship on race as a biological
concept continued long after the Second World War and many eugenics programs throughout the world lasted well into the 1970s (McLaren 1990; Roberts, 1997; Kevles, 1995). Even the UNESCO statement had its limits. Though the authors berated the unscientific and irresponsible use of the notion of race, their comments were not entirely revolutionary. For example, on the issue of race-mixing, the authors state that “there is no evidence that race mixture as such produces bad results from the biological point of view. The social results of race mixture whether for good or ill are to be traced to social factors” (UNESCO, 1950). Though this statement is clearly an evolution from the eugenicist position of the irreconcilable mixing of distant racial stocks, the language is relatively ambiguous in its position on interracial sex (and presumably marriage). This general circumstance is indicative of a larger trend within Western societies at this point in time; though racism and racial discrimination were still propagated by law and policy, a new tension existed between domestic racism and international norms, language and discourse, which, though cautionary and incremental, was progress nonetheless.

The general point being made here is that a number of key factors animating racial discourse during this transitory moment were located beyond the nation-state, and that this global culture was an independent force that shaped the altered conception of race that the schematic state drew upon when reforming its approaches to racial enumeration. These insights build upon the work of the “Stanford School” of sociological institutionalism. Rather than minimizing the causal significance of culture, conceptualizing culture as a product of hegemony, or identifying only national cultural or interpretive systems, this framework posits that culture is substantially organized on a worldwide basis and the nation-state is culturally constructed by and embedded within this world culture. For example, Soysal’s (1994) work

on guest workers in Europe demonstrates how global human rights norms have constrained European states’ abilities to send foreign guest workers back to their home countries in times of high unemployment. Similarly, I contend that the new norms emerging from this transnational moment changed incentive structures – primarily around perceptions of legitimacy – that constrained state action and inaction with regards to racial discrimination. As democracies, Canada, the United States and Great Britain found themselves in a position where their legitimacy on the international stage and to their citizens, as well as their claims about the virtues of *democracy* in the global struggle between ideological systems, depended in part on how they addressed the tension between shifting transnational norms and racism in their domestic spheres of influence.

In the United States, a number of political developments precipitated the moment’s impact on census politics. The most significant broad changes were spurred by the civil rights movement, which created and seized the political opportunities that presented themselves in post-war America (McAdam, 1982; Omi and Winant, 1994; Dudziak, 2000; Borstelmann, 2002; Newman, 2004). The introduction of the *Civil Rights Act* of 1964, the *Voting Rights Act* of 1965, legislation of the 1970s aimed at eliminating racial discrimination, and the Philadelphia Plan cumulatively changed the stakes of racial enumeration. Racial data was critical to the implementation of these laws and policies and the census became the major source for statistical information on labour force availability, the socio-economic status of racial groups, and the demographic distribution of racial populations, which the Census Bureau is legally required to provide for the determination of voting districts. Federal grants-in-aid compounded the necessity for accurate urban counts, at the same time as the known undercount of racialized populations skyrocketed. The acknowledgement and attempt to rectify circumstances of racial disadvantage became an enshrined aspect of American institutional business (Skrentny, 2002);
therefore, *who counted* and *who counted as what* mattered in politics more at this point than they had ever before.

This change in the stakes of racial enumeration had important implications for the census, which was undergoing its own revolution of sorts. After an eighty year period of considerable instability in racial taxonomies (Hochschild and Powell, 2008), the racial categories in the US census stabilized after 1930. Having come to reflect and reinforce racial segregation and the rule of hypodescent, the process of racial counting remained a palpable circumstance of the schematic state’s management and control of its population. This would all change with the introduction of mail-in questionnaires, used as an approach for the first time in 1960 and expanded in each subsequent census until it was used throughout the US by 1980 (McKenney and Cresce, 1980: 200). Using selfenumeration instead of hired enumerators was cost-effective but also heightened public awareness of racial categories in the census in unexpected ways. Though there had always been a question on race in the US census, in prior censuses the enumerator would “eye-ball” the respondent and record his or her race based on visual identification. Questions of clarification were only asked in cases where the race was not corporeally obvious. Allowing respondents to peruse their racial choices and pick among them personalized the census and led to demands that census categories reflect the increasing diversity of the American population (Bennett, 200: 174).

By the 1970s, the census had become both personalized and politicized as never before, with three major consequences that would shape all future statistical policy. First, established institutional path dependencies proved insufficient to cope with the changes. Creating a standard racial classifications system across all federal agencies – a direct result of the dispersed and decentralized responsibility for statistics in the American political system (United States GAO, 1996) – was perceived as necessary (Sabbagh and Morning, 2005: 65).
Statistical Directive 15 mandated the use of four standardized racial categories in all federal statistics and labelled Hispanic as an ethnic origin. Second, the victories of the civil rights movement reconstituted the various sectors of the movement into fragmented constituencies, locked in diatribe with the institutions whose new programming they demanded. In census politics, the heightened stakes and increased public awareness drove these constituencies to lobby the government to add or alter categories on the census, which in turn solidified the strategy of using racial statistics to make the case for better social policies. Thirdly, minority groups sought larger roles in census politics. Before the 1970s, minority organizations were “nonparticipants” in the decision-making processes concerning national statistics (Robbin, 2000b: 433). After the 1970 census the Census Bureau was put on the defensive for its massive racial undercounts by lobby groups, congressional committees, the courts, and the media. This sustained pressure made it clear that the legitimacy of the census was at stake and as the effectiveness of the policy is tied to response rates, the Bureau had to ensure its classification system was understandable and would produce reliable data. Reluctantly, the Bureau permitted more public input into its policy-making process, creating minority advisory committees on the black, Spanish-origin and Asian/Pacific American populations in the mid-1970s (Robbin, 2000b: 444) and turning representatives of minority groups into institutional insiders.

Put another way, this chronology demonstrates the changing character of the census as a racial project. Its two primary components – the meaning of race and the racial organization of society – were changing dramatically in some ways while remaining stagnant in others. The notion of race itself began to take on a new meaning as the turbulent 1960s ended and paved the way for new conceptions of racial difference rooted in social characteristics and culture rather than inherent biological inferiority. Slowly but surely, these changing conceptualizations
married new trends of the primacy of self-identification and the state’s ability to directly impose its racial schematic on the populace was eroded. The racial organization of society was also changing in big, important ways – the administrative categories that had worked in tandem with Jim Crow were destabilized when schools, buses, and public spaces were desegregated and were deemed insufficient when the face of American morphed to represent those immigrants who had been historically excluded. Statistical Directive 15 professed the arrival of the social construction of race to American racial taxonomies when it cautioned that the standardized categories were not scientific or anthropological in nature but instead represented “community belonging” (OMB, 1977). However, the implementation of the four standardized racial groups stayed true to American ideas about the impermeable nature of racial boundaries as well the difference between race and ethnicity, while at the same time allowing for the possibility that the pentagon could be disaggregated (though not disassembled) to allow for specificity in ethno-racial enumeration. No matter how many times the precise nature of racial difference is questioned in the United States, race remains a meaningful and salient social category. Even in controversies about the use of racial statistics for anti-discrimination measures, debates have centred on the validity, efficacy and morality of the civil rights legislation and not the racial classification system (Morning and Sabbagh, 2005: 57). In the shift from counting to control racial boundaries and populations to counting to justify positive action, the schematic state continued to make the population legible the only way it knew how – via discrete racial categories.

The accrued developments and changes to the various American racial projects in place at this point – of which the census was but one aspect – had their own ramifications. I contend that domestic politics do not just stay isolated in the domestic realm; rather, the ways in which the schematic state reacted to the changed normative context of the post-war era, in turn,
altered the transnational (re)conceptualizations of race. One of the most significant examples is the US civil rights movement, which elicited changes that would heighten the stakes of racial enumeration in the United States, but which also contributed to a reconceptualization of the transnational norm surrounding the legitimacy of state action and inaction with regards to racial discrimination in numerous related ways. First, racial politics in the United States made acute to other nations the need to avoid US-style racial tension, conflict and violence. Though the goal of avoiding conflict was replicated, the cause of racial tension was clearly interpreted differently by British and Canadian governments. The British state viewed circumstances of racial discrimination and disadvantage as being the spark for potential conflict similar to the US (Solomos, 2003: 81), as noted by Home Secretary Frank Soskice during the introduction of the 1965 Race Relations Act when he said, “it is far better to put this Bill on the Statute Book now, before social stresses and ill-will have the change of corrupting and distorting our relationships.”

The American model of course did not transfer across the Atlantic perfectly, nor did elites desire to mimic it. Specific British concerns, such as the protection of public order rather than the proclamation of individual rights and a deliberate aversion to explicit colour-consciousness and affirmative action have shaped policy outcomes (Joppke, 1999: 226). Unlike the United States, race relations and immigration policies in the UK are inextricably tied together. One strategy of the British government for avoiding racial conflict was to simultaneously restrict non-white immigration, assuming that the very presence of non-white people would be a source of conflict, and to link this external control to an internal policy of racial integration, since, in the words of Labour MP Roy Hattersley, “Integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible” (Miles and Phizacklea, 1984: 57).

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The Canadian state also sought to promote integration, but viewed *racialism* as the culprit and cause of racial tension and eradicated references to race in a number of policy areas. On the one hand, this was a promising development: race-based immigration restrictions were replaced, human rights legislation was passed at federal and provincial levels and the state endorsed an ethos of (racially ambivalent) Canadian multiculturalism. On the other hand, the state was willing to take its avoidance of race to the liberal extreme: in, for example, removing the distinction between status and non-status Indians in the White Paper of 1969, which used language strikingly similar to the US Supreme Court’s ruling in *Brown vs. Board of Education*, the government proposed to absolve itself of its historic relationship with Aboriginal peoples and its responsibility for providing services on reserve (Canada, 1969). When Aboriginal peoples angrily responded through mass mobilization, the government quickly withdrew its proposal (Weaver, 1981). In short, racial politics in the United States worked to alter incentive structures elsewhere, demonstrating to watchful governments in Canada and the UK the potential for violence if circumstances of racial difference and discrimination went unaddressed.

Secondly, the movement and the state’s concessions in the US opened the possibility for similar types of legislation in other countries that prohibited racial discrimination in public interactions. In the 1960s and 1970s, Canada had its own “rights revolution,” witnessing the proliferation of human rights organizations, activists and legislation at both provincial and federal levels (Clément, 2008). In Great Britain the *Race Relations Acts* of 1965 and 1968 established institutional bodies to address socio-economic discrimination faced by the non-white population and banned discrimination based on race. Substantial parts of the legal and institutional framework of British race relations have been, as Small writes, "begged, borrowed, or stolen from the United States" (Small, 1994; see also Glazer and Young, 1983 and Banton,
The 1976 version of the Act, which introduced the concept of indirect discrimination, was significantly inspired by the US experience of affirmative action against institutionalized forms of racism (Joppke, 1999: 225; Solomos, 2003: 84). The Race Relations Acts are prime examples of the schematic state in action. Simultaneously rational, duplicitous and concerned with the legibility of the population, in the 1960s and 1970s there was a consensus in policy agendas, regardless of party in power, on the necessity of limiting and controlling non-white immigration at the same time as legislation was implemented to promote the integration of racial minorities into British society. For example, in the same year that the Labour government introduced the 1968 Race Relations Act, which outlawed racial discrimination in public places, it also introduced the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which, being “even more explicitly racist than its predecessor,” (Miles and Phizacklea, 1984: 61) removed the right of British passport-holders in East Africa to enter Britain (Small and Solomos, 2006: 243). This Janus-like pattern was repeated in the 1970s, when the 1976 Race Relations Act, which established the Commission for Racial Equality to monitor racial discrimination and promote good race relations, was sandwiched by stronger immigration controls in 1971 and the racially charged 1981 Nationality Act.

Third, images of the mass mobilization against racial discrimination in the United States were transmitted worldwide and ripples of diasporic awareness spread north of the 49th parallel and across the Atlantic. Identities and ideas from the civil rights movement and other anti-racist and anti-colonial movements once again reframed racial struggles in an international context. To demonstrate this transnational connectivity, Gilroy (1993) rejects methodological statism in favour of the Black Atlantic as the unit of analysis, a modern political and cultural

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13 Curiously, interestingly, tellingly, Gilroy’s original formulation of the Black Atlantic includes Britain, Europe, the US, the Caribbean, but not Canada.
concept that transcends the structures of the nation-state and the constraining particularities of ethnicity and nationality (1993: 19). He argues that Britain’s black communities have forged a culture from disparate sources, fundamentally based in the transnational movement of bodies and ideas:

The history of the black Atlantic...continually crisscrossed by the movements of black people – not only as commodities but engaged in various struggles towards emancipation, autonomy and citizenship – provides a means to re-examine the problems of nationality, location, identity and historical memory (Gilroy, 1993: 16).

Racial minorities in Britain, Canada and elsewhere identified with the civil rights movement, though their targets differed and were tempered by national politics. On-the-ground challenges to state-based discrimination were abetted – neither for the first nor last time – by transnational popular culture, music, folklore, hero-worship, potential, and symbolism that imagined racial communities as interconnected and struggling together in multiple places at once. For example, though the authoritative text on blacks in Canada suggests that the African-Canadian story of social mobilization was an insignificant failure, Winks (1971) “did not consider the fact that African Canadians may not have needed a Canadian Martin Luther King Jr.: there was no information blackout along the 49th parallel that prevented them from looking to the American Martin Luther King Jr. for leadership and inspiration” (Thompson, J. 2008: 48).

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14 As Winks (1971) writes, “There is, as yet, little Canadian Negro unity, for the black men of Nova Scotia and those of British Columbia have never been brought together in common cause through an organization or leader... There has been no Canadian Martin Luther King, no national figure to whom Negroes can turn” (1970: 473-474). In a critique of the historiography of black Canadians, which places Winks’ book The Blacks in Canada as the seminal text, Walker (2006) writes that ‘Many of Winks’ conclusions suggest that the African-Canadian ‘story’ was insignificant – a failure – because of African-Canadians’ internal divisions, their dearth of charismatic leaders, their small numbers, and their political timidity and ignorance” (2006: 85).

15 Indeed, as Singh (2004: 2) notes, even when King was censored by a number of media outlets in the United States because of his anti-war stance, his words were still being broadcast widely in Canada by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).
In 1969 African-Canadian newspapers in Toronto and Montreal\textsuperscript{16} spread the message that “we are all black,” making explicit linkages between the plights of black Canadians, other racialized populations in Canada, and the transnational contexts of the African diaspora, the American Black Power movement, anti-colonialism in African, and the first years of Caribbean independence (Thompson, J., 2008). Similarly, though the 1969 White Paper relied on the colour-blind rhetoric of the US Supreme Court taken to the extreme, the mobilization of Aboriginal peoples and their non-indigenous allies was catalyzed by the actions of the US civil rights movement, which dominated the Canadian press and allowed liberal-minded people to make the connection between various forms of racial oppression (Weaver, 1981: 13).

These constitutive relationships between developments in the United States and the politics of race worldwide speak to a more dynamic correlation than models of linear causality suggest. Indeed, the commonly assumed drivers of concessions in US racial politics were largely missing elsewhere: neither Canada nor the UK experienced massive activist mobilization; politicians did not seek to appeal to a potential pool of recently enfranchised voters; there was no “black analogy” that other racialized groups used to achieve comparable political ends (Skrenty, 1996; 2002). There was also no active policy emulation where elites from Canada and the UK explicitly sought to mimic the US’s policies and no imposition of policy direction by an international body. On the contrary, what did matter was changing norms around perceptions of legitimacy, both in terms of international legitimacy in the Cold War and what the domestic

\textsuperscript{16} Montreal’s short-lived \textit{Uhuru} newspaper emerged from the Sir George Williams Affair of 1969, when six black students (of what would later become Concordia University) accused biology professor Perry Anderson of discriminatory grading. Inadequate responses by the administration and dissatisfaction with the committee that was eventually formed to address the accusations of discrimination prompted a series of protests and sit-ins, culminating in over 200 students (both black and white) occupying the university’s computer centre on 29 January 1969. When negotiations failed and students barricaded themselves in the computer centre on 10 February 1969, the police were called in forcibly to remove students. A fire broke out, causing approximately two million dollars in damage; 97 students were arrested while Montreal crowds chanted “let the niggers burn!” The Affair was a crucial, though now often forgotten, event in the history of black people in Montreal. See Eber (1969), Forsythe (1971) and Williams (1997).
public – including minorities with diasporic connections and white majorities empathetic to the civil rights struggles - would view as meaningful and necessary state action in addressing circumstances of racial disadvantage. The US became the tell-tale heart under the floorboards of other nations, making clear the explosive potential should discrimination go unaddressed and demonstrating the necessity of positive action as a preventative measure. Influences across national borders, including impressions and images from the civil rights movement transferred worldwide, systemic evidence gathered from those such as, for example, the Commission for Racial Equality, who went on exchange to the US with the explicit purpose of gathering information, and the academics who drew their theories and concepts concerning race relations from the growing body of literature in the United States (Small and Solomos, 2006: 237) contributed to rearticulations of the meaning of race and perceptions of legitimate ways to address racial discrimination that were domestic in application but transnational in scope.

Circumstances in the US also demonstrated to policy makers in other countries how census data could serve as a critical tool to monitor and combat racial discrimination. As the assumption that all non-white people in Great Britain were new immigrants began to erode when the second-generation of black and Asian people born in the UK emerged, policymakers responded by including a question on parents’ country of birth on the 1971 census, rather than the previously asked question about respondents’ country of origin. Bureaucrats and elites alike recognized that the legitimacy of the government’s policy of promoting immigrant integration depended in part on gathering information to measure and monitor the extent of racial disadvantage.17 Questions were raised at the Ministerial level about the possibility of this policy development based the American experience in racial enumeration: “...are Ministers

17 PRO PREM 13/2703, Memo to Prime Minister, subsection “Country of origin of the respondent’s parents,” 5 February 1968. The memo also states that a failure to take the opportunity to gather this information in the census would leave the government open to criticism about the seriousness of their commitment to ending racial discrimination in Britain.
prepared to see racial questions included in the census? American experience, which began by thinking it would be discriminatory to keep records of race, has come to see that discrimination can be combated more effectively if reliable data is available. For this reason you may find it possible to agree to the inclusion of racial questions.”¹⁸ Internal government memos and meeting notes reveal that the implementation of a direct question on race was discussed and rejected because of the “considerable political implications” involved, though a decade later these considerations did not prevent the extensive testing of such a question.

Though Canada and the UK made headway by passing legislation to combat racial discrimination, the windows of opportunity for these nations to begin to count by race were tempered by national politics, the racial projects already in place and path dependencies, which cumulatively prevented them from emulating the American response to the shifting transnational norm. In Canada, the language of race was jettisoned from the census in the post-war era. Obsessively concerned with setting itself culturally and ideologically apart from its southern neighbour, Canada generally refused to think or imagine itself in racial terms, even as the schematic state first protected, then developed amnesia and aphasia about, its nation-building and colonial racial projects. Previous policy trajectories in racial politics relied heavily on unofficial modes of regulation and back-door tactics for controlling the racial populations inside and seeking entry to the nation. For example, though there was no castle to smash with regards to legal segregation, Ontario closed its last racially segregated school a decade after Brown in 1965 and grudgingly opened up the franchise to Chinese, Japanese and South Asians in British Columbia (Winks, 1969; Henry et al., 2000: 69-77). And while many consider the removal of references to race in Canada's immigration policy in the 1960s as watershed that ended Canada's white immigration policy (Avery, 1995; Knowles, 1997; Kelley and Trebilcock,

¹⁸ HO 376/175, Note to Mr. Ennals, 27 November 1967.
1998], Satzewich (1989) demonstrates that even after the deracialization of Canadian immigration policy in 1962 the Department of Manpower and Immigration was reluctant to open visa offices in the Caribbean.\(^19\) In fact, by 1970, three years after the points system was introduced, there were more visa offices the UK than in the whole of Asia and the Caribbean combined (Hawkins, 1972: 379-382). Though the transnational normative context was shifting, Canada’s compliance with its tradition of the informal, but nevertheless successful, regulation of race while simultaneously denying the existence of racial problems continued.

In the 1970s while Britain and the US entered into the second rounds of anti-discrimination legislation, Canada became embroiled in national circumstances that disguised and hid problems of racial discrimination and disadvantage. The largely ineffective 1960 Bill of Rights, the October Crisis of 1970, Trudeau’s 1971 multiculturalism statement, the volatile nature of language politics after the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, a Supreme Court still reluctant to recognize Aboriginal rights, and slow-changing immigration practices (and therefore demographic patterns), all worked to keep race off the country’s radar. In particular, discursive friction between the rise of the sovereigntist movement in Quebec and the purposeful introduction of multiculturalism as more pluralistic alternative to bilingualism and biculturalism was important.\(^20\) The original multiculturalism policy was far more discursive and symbolic than substantive. It was not until the early 1980s that the policy shifted from an emphasis on ethnocultural artistic expression to incorporate greater support for anti-racist strategies (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992: 367). The multicultural turn in Canadian politics

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\(^19\) Satzewich also suggests that when visa posts were finally opened in the Caribbean, their intended purpose was to stem the flow of illegal migration rather than facilitate the entry of potential immigrants (1989: 89).

\(^20\) According to one prominent account, Trudeau’s liberal vision of a pluralistic Canada whereby language was an individual (rather than collective or cultural) right was institutionalized by his many reforms, from multiculturalism through official bilingualism and the repatriated Constitution. These reforms resonated with English Canada, which became more unwilling to recognize the “dualist” understanding of the Canadian compact (McRoberts, 1997).
featured a schematic state willing to make symbolic and rhetorical changes that, at least superficially, disrupted racial path dependencies, but which initially refused to adopt policy changes that would change the substantive stakes of the virulent racial discrimination in socio-economic conditions, immigrant policy and integration, and Aboriginal affairs.\textsuperscript{21}

Elites and bureaucrats in the UK acknowledged the "political difficulties" of asking a direct question on race in the late 1960s. Their apprehension stemmed from three related concerns: first, the perceived difficulty of defining colour in terms that would be precise enough to produce meaningful census data, including the more specific apprehension about mixed-race people and how they would identify. Second, even if an appropriate metonym for colour could be defined and used in the census there was a risk that asking such a question would be perceived as offensive to both white and non-white respondents, thus putting the entire enterprise of the census at risk. Finally, policymakers were aware that if they failed to enumerate race, the governing party would be open to criticism about the seriousness of their commitment to racial integration. Most importantly, these concerns were exacerbated by a climate in which the politics of numbers were being used by nationalist and extreme right-wing parties in Britain for goals that were very different than measuring the pervasiveness of racial discrimination. The most obvious champion of this cause was Enoch Powell, who sought more accurate racial statistics to confirm the wild estimates about the future size of the non-white population of Britain and subsequently call for more restrictive immigration policies (Rose et al., 1969: 551-605; Bulmer, 1986: 472).

In the 1970s national politics continued to stymie Britain's opportunities to count by race, in spite of a growing awareness of racial disadvantage, fears of the transatlantic emulation

\textsuperscript{21} As discussed further below, these policy stakes would be substantively altered by the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution, which included the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in 1982.
of US racial tension, and the passing of more effective race relations legislation. The potential for change was stronger than ever. Recent institutional developments in the UK created a stronger lobby intent on combating racial discrimination and willing to push for the collection of racial statistics. These public advocates included the Race Relations Board (1975: 9), the Community Relations Commission (1975: 10) and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (1975: 20-22). The continued tension surrounding the collection of racial data, however, was epitomized by the Home Office’s White Paper on race relations, which stated that “the Government considers that a vital ingredient of equal opportunities policy is a regular system of monitoring,” but which failed to recommend the collection of racial data as a means of supporting these activities (Bleich, 2006: 228). Though change was likely in time for the 1981 census, it was not inevitable; the political climate of the late 1970s interceded. In particular, the ideologically charged pre-election period in 1979, the rise of Britain’s New Right and Thatcher’s neoconservative platform regarding race relations, immigration, and revamping citizenship laws intersected field trials on the proposed question on race at the worst possible moment. Racial minorities, unsure of their future status in Britain in terms of either legal or discursive belonging, mobilized to resist racial enumeration. The trade-off between transnational norms surrounding legitimate state action to effectively implement race relations policy and national politics translates, in the British case, to a window of opportunity to alter the established approach to racial (non-)enumeration that can best be described as fleeting.

Comparatively speaking, while the US shifted from its previous approach of counting to manage or control racial populations to counting to justify positive action, the approach adopted in Canada and Great Britain is one of *not counting in the name of multiculturalism*. According to Rallu et al.’s (2004) typology, this approach refers to the unique cases of Latin America, in which “racial mixing is acknowledged in political and ideological views as a positive
value” and therefore the countries do not enumerate according to race or colour (2004: 536). The thrust of this approach lies in the tendency to valorize racial mixing by not counting race, which emphasizes racial hybridity beyond the necessity of counting, contrasted with those countries that count by race in the name of multiculturalism, which promotes harmonious race relations by measuring the country’s degree of whitening. As outlined in Chapter 2, I argue that Rallu et al.’s (2004) typology is useful, but narrowly defined. The label of the approach – not counting in the name of multiculturalism – suggests circumstances when the state intentionally does not count by race in spite of a host of characteristics that imply it would or should, but the defined dimensions of this category provided by Rallu et al. are limited in application. Given the empirical evidence presented here, it is possible to identify a number of more specific idiosyncrasies that characterize the gradients of this approach.

First, states that do not enumerate by race in the name of multiculturalism have a legislative, political or symbolic commitment to multiculturalism, however defined.\textsuperscript{22} Second, quite aside from this commitment to multiculturalism, there will also often be legislation that prohibits discriminatory state action and condemns racial discrimination in housing, employment, and other areas of social life. This legislation, however ineffectively designed or implemented, has the goal of alleviating or eradicating racial disadvantage in social, political and economic life. Third, \textit{in spite of} both commitments to multiculturalism and legislation that may require racial statistics to be properly implemented or to create a more effective system of monitoring, there is still controversy or general discomfort around the very notion of race. In the upper echelons of government, this controversy or discomfort translates into the general

\textsuperscript{22} Multicultural regimes are defined differently in various national contexts, but ultimately speak to similar principles. For example, paradigms of multiculturalism, racial equality and racial integration are not the same, and yet all employ similar principles of non-assimilation and respect for racial and/or cultural difference, and are enshrined in other political or discursive attempts to create a national community based on these principles.

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idea that counting by race will negatively affect national and social cohesion. Fourth, the aversion of race and racialism is specific to counting by race and is not necessarily an opposition to colour-consciousness. In other areas of law and policy, colour-consciousness may feature predominately or may appear in other political commitments to racial equality. In short, states do not wholly or explicitly adhere to the republican principle of colour-blindness, and therefore not counting by race in the census is not because the state itself ignores race in all avenues. And finally, this refusal to count often occurs in spite of calls for the collection of racial data or an acknowledged need for racial statistics from within the state.

**Multicultural Multiracialism, 1981-2001**

Though these ramifications stem from the different normative context that emerged in the post-war era, it is painfully clear that we no longer inhabit that particular transnational moment. As windows of opportunity for political change firmly closed in the 1970s, the domestic developments in the politics of race described above contributed to another transnational shift in the last decades of the 20th century. This multicultural moment, spurred by the schematic state’s reaction to its predecessor, is fundamentally a rearticulation of racial formation in the Anglophone West and is a moment that we have yet to exit. It is neither as clear nor as well-defined as the first, but nonetheless is marked shift in both the meaning of race and the racial organization of societies.

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23 This is the crucial distinction between two approaches to racial enumeration: not counting in the name of multiculturalism and not counting in the name of national integration, the latter of which occurs when race or ethnicity is rejected in the name of national integration, as is presently the case in many African nations, or in the name of the republican principle of national unity as occurs in Western Europe.

24 The dates used to distinguish the first transnational shift from the second are somewhat arbitrary, as are periodization techniques generally speaking.
The meaning of race is not a shift of the same form or magnitude as occurred in the previous transnational moment, which witnessed the invalidation of the enterprise of biological racism. The ejection of the biological construction of race from political and vernacular discourse in the postwar period cannot be undone and has dictated, to a certain extent, the socially constructed framework under which all future incarnations of race will manifest. The racial reaction to the racial minority movements of the 1960s, which grew and developed in the 1970s and matured in the 1980s (Omi and Winant, 1994: 117), was a shift in the framing of race rather than its meaning; a shift in understandings of “race and” – race and equality, race and social justice, race and liberalism, race and democracy. In the 1970s, these frames were in flux; the meaning of equality and (importantly) racism were still up for debate (Omi and Winant, 1994: 117).

Stimulated as much by the consequences of the civil rights movement as by the white supremacist and nationalist factions of the far right and solidified by the rise of the New Right and its elite advocates (Reagan, Thatcher, and to a lesser extent in terms of transnational impact, Mulroney), the tension between colour-blindness and colour-consciousness characterizes this transition in the framing of race. A number of trends speak to this change. First is the idea that the civil rights movement was successful and racism no longer exists (in the US), had only existed in the US (in Canada) or is of little consequence (in Britain). The end of de jure segregation in the US and the decline in white prejudice against blacks and other minorities are deemed to be sufficient evidence of this assertion. Concepts like equality, liberalism and individual choice replaced explicit racism, though in this rearticulated racial

\[25\] See Themstrom (1997).
ideology “code words” are used to refer indirectly to racial themes,26 discrimination is emphasized only for its adverse effects on the individual, and equality of opportunity and equality before the law are given primacy over equality of outcome and equality under the law. If racial inequalities persist, it is because of moral or cultural failings on the part of individuals or groups.27 Based on liberal values of individualism, state non-intervention and market-based opportunity, this framing rejects racialism or state policies that engage in “race thinking”; as such, race-conscious policies like affirmative action simply continue an unwarranted emphasis on the saliency of race.28 The propagation of race thinking - and civil rights political failures – are believed to be caused by militants who have a vested interest in maintaining racial difference and hence the saliency of race (Brown et al., 2003).

This framework translates into the so-called “neo-racisms,” racism without races, racism without racists, competitive racism, laissez-faire racism, and/or colour-blind racism (Barker, 1981; Balibar, 1991; Omi and Winant, 1994; Essed, 1996; Ansell, 1997; Carr, 1997; Bobo and Smith, 1998; Brown et al., 2003; Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2010), which, as Balibar (1991) notes, have been developed and applied most successfully in Anglo-Saxon countries. Based on Bonilla-Silva’s (2010) analysis of the 1997 Survey of Social Attitudes of College Students29 and the 1998 Detroit Area Study,30 colour-blind racism/neo-racism has four central tenets: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and the minimization of racism. Abstract liberalism

26 For example, code words were used throughout the Southern Strategy of the late 1960s and early 1970s. See Phillips (1969).


28 From Glazer (1975): “[Affirmative action] has meant that we abandon the first principle of a liberal society, that the individual’s interests and good and welfare are the test of a good society, for we now attach benefits and penalties to individuals simply on the basis of their race, color and national origins” (1975: 220).

29 Based on a sample of 627 students at a large Midwestern university, a large southern university and a medium-sized West Coast university.

30 A probabilistic survey of 400 black and white Detroit metropolitan area residents.
refers to the use of political and economic liberalism in an abstract manner to explain race matters; for example, when the liberal principle of “equal opportunity” is juxtaposed with the “preferential treatment” of affirmative action policies. Naturalization is a discursive consequence of abstract liberalism, in the sense that it combines individual choice with the existence of “natural” racial aversion. Here, racial disadvantage is seen as the result of individual choices, and segregation is naturalized because “it’s just the way things are”. Cultural racism creates crude stereotypes and generalizations about particular racial groups, replacing biologically deterministic behaviour (i.e. race causes culture) with arguments about cultural determinism (i.e. “Mexicans don’t put much emphasis on education”). Finally, the minimization of racism is a frame that suggests that racial discrimination is no longer a central factor affecting the life chances or socio-economic wellbeing of minorities (Bonilla-Silva, 2010: 28-30).

This understanding of racial ideology in the late 20th century has been examined by a long line of sociologists who define racism as polite, implicit, and sometimes completely normal(ized) in economically and culturally produced systems of privilege and exclusion (Blumer, 1958; Blauner, 1972; Roediger, 1991; Wellman, 1993; Bonilla-Silva, 2001). The dominant theme of neo-racism is not the biological determinism of the past, but the insurmountability of cultural differences (Balibar, 1991a: 21). Contemporary racial inequalities are reproduced through practices that are institutional and, on their surfaces, non-racial. Over the past 30 years, this dominant racial ideology has converged in nearly all Western nations (Bonilla-Silva, 2000) and though national variants emerge from the examination of Canada, the US and Britain, this framework is relatively consistent in all three cases. It does not, however, have a monopoly on the conceptualization of race, which can be given life through any number of practices and power relations.
How did this new framework of race manifest in the racial organization of societies? Scholars have generally juxtaposed frameworks that rely on either colour-blindness or colour-consciousness in race policies (Favell, 2001; Bleich, 2003; Lieberman, 2005), though this is somewhat of a false dichotomy. Rather than serving as ideological frames that influence all policy decisions, colour-blindness and colour-consciousness are ideas, practices, and strategies that can be invoked or dismissed (with limitations, of course) depending on the issue at hand. The US, its institutions, policies and political parties are neither wholly color-conscious nor colour-blind (though they are all consistently colour-coded). The schematic state has been quite successful at insisting on the use of colour-conscious racial categories in the census, while eroding colour-consciousness in favour of colour-blind approaches in other areas of law and policy – particularly those pertaining to affirmative action claims. At the end of the 20th century, these two dominant strategies have simultaneously been employed – at times, colliding – under the (relatively new) organizing structure of liberal multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism is a widely accepted liberal framework that encompasses a wide range of laws, policies and discourses “designed to provide some level of public recognition, support or accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural groups, whether these groups are ‘new’ minorities (e.g. immigrant and refugees) or ‘old’ minorities (e.g. historically settled national minorities and indigenous peoples)” (Kymlicka, 2007: 16). Though often perceived as arising from endogenous developments in domestic politics, the norm of multiculturalism has become transnationally pervasive because of the global diffusion of the political discourse of multiculturalism as a set of ideas and practices surrounding diversity governance and because of the codification of ideas in quasi-legal international norms, particularly as they manifest in

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31 For example, Omi and Winant (1994) posit that Clinton’s electoral success was based on a colour-blind platform and one could certainly make arguments regarding the extent to which Obama has recently perfected invoking colour-blindness as an electoral strategy, even in this explicit speeches and statements on race.
UN declarations of minority rights (Kymlicka, 2007). The debate in Western nations is now not whether or not to adopt multiculturalism, but rather is about what kind of multicultural policy to adopt (Glazer, 1997; Kymlicka, 2000; 2007). Multiculturalism is the main organizing feature of the liberal racial project, rearticulating the racial projects of the New Right into a centrist framework of moderate redistribution and cultural universalism.

As an organizing framework – a schematic – multiculturalism features a degree of flexibility that can be used to support multiple framings of race at the same time. This is possible because multiculturalism, as Hesse (2000) writes, is a “contested frame of reference for thinking about the quotidian cohesion of western civil societies uncertain about their national and ethnic futures” (2000: 1). Three framings feature prominently in all three cases: (1) multiculturalism as racial aversion; (2) multiculturalism as the foundation for minority rights and anti-discrimination measures; and (3) multiculturalism as a form of nationalism. First, multicultural principles have been used to deliberately avoid racial themes both because of a fear of the divisiveness that comes with racial reaction and because of a general mistrust of “identity politics” (Omi and Winant, 1994: 147). The schematic functions by deeming race as overly divisive, controversial or “ungovernable,” or by reducing racial difference to the other signifiers such as ethnicity or class. For example, Essed (1996) argues that multicultural

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32 There is a well-established and voluminous body of literature that extensively examines the various normative implications of multiculturalism, citizenship, diversity and difference. These are important debates that I respectfully decline to participate in. See Young (1990), Taylor (1994), Hollinger (1995), Kymlicka (1995), Carens (2000), Day (2000), Parekh (2000a), Shachar (2001), and Modood (2005).

33 As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) remind us, new norms do not enter a normative vacuum. They instead emerge in a normative space that is highly contested, filled with other norms and perceptions of interest (1998: 897).

34 For some of the prominent examples of the moral panic about the continuing disruptive effects of racial, gendered, and sexual divisions, see Bloom (1987), D’Souza (1991) and Schlesinger (1992).


paradigms promote the notion that cultural intolerance, and not racism, is at the heart of social ills; she argues that this problematically reinforces a cultural deterministic notion of difference and hides the tendency of multiculturalism policy to manage difference, regulate diversity and preserve the racial status quo. Secondly, the multicultural schematic can also (simultaneously) function to support minority rights and to combat racial discrimination. Kymlicka (1995), Joppke (1999) and others have viewed minority rights protections and anti-discrimination measures as the outcome of (liberal) multicultural norms. Multiculturalism goes hand and hand with the “politics of recognition” (Taylor, 1994), in which racial and ethnic differences are recognized in the public sphere. Third, multiculturalism can also be a form of nationalism in the sense that it relies on and espouses a particular understanding of the national community. This includes nationalist reactions to multiculturalism on the far right – as Balibar (1991b) argues, nationalism and racism are never very far apart since both presuppose boundaries of internality and externality as well as homogeneity. But multiculturalism as nationalism does not invariably invoke racist goals; it can also be used to promote a positive image of the nation, to animate what Day (2000) refers to as the social ideal of multiculturalism.

Though this transnational shift is not as clear or well-defined as the post-war era, the multicultural moment and its new models and paradigms of diversity governance have refocused the meaning of race and the ways in which societies organize themselves along racial lines. I argue below that when mediated by the schematic state and domestic nuances, such as legislation, path dependencies and demographic trends, this shift aligned the approach to racial enumeration in all three cases to one of counting to justify positive action. The contradictory elements of this transnational moment are held together by the schematic state, with the disparate arms of the state working to both deny race/racialism/racism and affirm that racial statistics produced by the state are required to combat racial disadvantage. Over time, these
three cases also converged in their use of racial enumeration to promote a diverse national identity (i.e. counting in the name of multiculturalism) featuring a discursive construction of multiracial multiculturalism, in which powerful norms around the “problem” mixed-race, miscegenation, and rules of hypodescent begin to disintegrate and are replaced by alternative rearticulations of multiraciality. In either circumstance, the primary goal of the schematic state remains to make the population legible, with the intent of turning the debated, transnational and politically contested meaning of race into stable, identifiable categories.

Canada

In Canada, the 1980s began with constitutional debates that would fundamentally change a number of institutional realms and importantly, would leave issues of Canadian identity and the (continued) nation-building projects largely unresolved. The larger politics of race in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s was being shaped by domestic and transnational forces of the multicultural moment: fifteen years of constitutional debates from the Charter to Charlottetown; third-wave feminism; increased immigration from non-traditional source countries and changing demographics; increasing diasporic connections enabled by an increasingly globalized world; growing hostility towards racial minorities; resurgence of French-Canadian and Aboriginal nationalisms – the former continually threatening to tear the compact apart if not “brought in” to Confederation, the latter taking the newly enshrined section 35 of the Constitution to courts and gaining limited legal victories in terms of the recognition of Aboriginal rights and title; the rise of the New Right and the dominance of Conservative parties in provincial and federal governments; and government downsizing,

37 Though the implementation of the Charter is largely perceived as a watershed in minority rights that created and/or institutionalized ethnic minority groups as self-interested actors now able to use new constitutional and judicial avenues to push their agendas, Abu-Laban and Nieguth (2000) argue that rather than being a decisive factor in itself, constitutional politics of the 1980s and 1990s are a reflection of the broader ongoing development of conflict and forms of recognition between ethnic minorities, other social groups and the state (Abu-Laban and Nieguth, 2000: 493).
program review, streamlining of budgets in 1980s and 1990s. The multicultural turn during these turbulent decades was characterized as much by the symbolic promotion of multiculturalism as the backlash against it.

At the same time, the greater saturation of transnational racial trends led the Canadian state to acknowledge and seek policy avenues to address circumstances of racial disadvantage and discrimination in a more proactive way. In particular, the recommendations of the Abella Commission on Equality in Employment in 1984 led to the *Employment Equity Act* of 1986 and aligned Canada with the United States and Britain in terms of “positive action” legislation. Though circumstances of systemic discrimination in Canada were clearly a driver, the incentives for Canada to engage in this policy-making enterprise were also transnational. For example, the Commission recommended the use of the term “employment equity” because of the negative reaction to the notion of “affirmative action,” the phraseology dominant in the United States (Canada, 1984b).

Domestic institutions, nuances and politics intertwined with transnational trends to shape the schematic state's response to new racial formations at the end of the 20th century. First, the structure of Canadian institutions is an important factor that contributes to census politics in that country. Statistics Canada is an arms-length agency within the state in a centralized statistical system where policy success in the census is defined by high response rates and the production of quality data. Laws and policies derived in other government departments, such as the *Employment Equity Act*, also matter, not simply for their existence but also for their content. One civil servant emphasized how categories created in one political forum are transferred into others:

To a large extent, we were really looking at the legislation for employment equity. That was the driving force. So which categories we had there, which categories we included, was very much based on the Act. And on [the Royal Commission on Equality in
Employment, chaired by Judge Rosalie Abella]. Because Abella is what led to the Employment Equity Act. The Act itself was not very specific about which groups to be included as such but the understanding was that they were the groups from Abella. Abella had identified most of those groups. And from Abella, when I worked at Employment and Immigration, we had used those 10 groups, and gathered the data from ethnic origin. So there was no desire, no reason to go back and say well these groups aren’t any good – it was very much from the legislation and what we called operationalizing the legislation.38

Second, path dependent policy decisions also have important effects. Between 1981 and 1986 the multicultural moment solidified four institutional changes to the administration of the ethnic question: self-enumeration, the acceptance of ambilineal ancestry, the ordering of ethnic groups according to the previous census’ population counts and the acceptance – and later, the encouragement – of multiple responses for the ethnicity question. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, these changes to the administration of the data had unforeseen consequences when, for example, a large percentage of the population identified as “Canadian” in 1991, leading to the inclusion of a “Canadian” category on the list of examples for the question in 1996, which, in turn, increased the number of 1996 “Canadian” responses.

The third domestic factor that intertwined with transnational trends to shape the schematic state’s reaction was the extent to which shifting conceptualizations of racial politics became embroiled in the constitutional politics and national identity crisis of the 1980s and especially the early 1990s. For example, the Charlottetown Accord was marked, far more than Meech Lake, by more overt opposition to multiculturalism. This is evidenced in the release of the report of the Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future (the Spicer Commission) in June 1991, in which the Commission argued that “federal government funding for multiculturalism activities other than those serving immigrant orientation, reduction of racial discrimination and the promotion of equality should be eliminated, and the public funds saved applied to these areas”

38 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
Vocal opposition to the policy and symbolism of multiculturalism led to shifts in state policy that reduced the emphasis on multiculturalism and focused instead on principles of immigrant “self-sufficiency” and “integration” into Canadian society (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992; Abu-Laban, 1998). The Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship was disbanded in 1993 by the outgoing Conservative government and responsibility for multicultural policies and programming became subsumed under the Department of Canadian Heritage while citizenship was housed together with immigration in a separate department. As elsewhere, race was linked to the promotion of homogenous nationalism (Balibar, 1991a) as the New Right led the campaign against hyphenated Canadianism, which had tangible effects on census politics in both 1991 and 1996. Given the initial phase of the retreat from the multicultural ideal (Joppke, 2004), one would expect the state to be even more reluctant to reinforce racial or ethnic divisions through the census. Yet, the schematic state is able to hold together contradictory impulses within the same rubric – in this case, the erosion of multiculturalism policies and principles in certain policy spheres were in some ways isolated from the trajectory of the census, which one former employee of Statistics Canada labelled as being on a “collision course” with race.

Given the characteristics of the transnational and domestic racial projects of the day, Canada’s approach to census politics of not counting in the name of multiculturalism was unsustainable. In the early 1980s there was a recognized need inside the state apparatus for more accurate racial statistics than the ethnic question could provide, but this was tempered by a risk-averse bureaucracy:

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39 Through his comparison of multiculturalism in Britain, Australia and the Netherlands, Joppke (2004) demonstrates that there has been a transnational retreat from official multiculturalism policies in most Western societies, which are now being replaced (in Europe, at least) by centrist policies of civic integration. Like its predecessor, the multicultural moment is indeed both temporal and temporary.

40 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
I think there was no real driver for them to put [the question] in in 1991. Because by then, and using the algorithm we had invented, we were getting numbers that were robust enough to pass the test. So Fellegi [the Chief Statistician] didn’t want to “jeopardize” the census by having a race-like question.\footnote{Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.}

It was in 1996, after extensive consultations, testing, and international lesson-drawing that Canada implemented a direct question on race (while still avoiding the terminology of race). Policy contingencies from the “Count me Canadian” episode in 1991 clearly contributed to forcing the state’s hand; the plethora of Canadian responses in the ethnic question made it impossible for Statistics Canada to tell which “Canadians” were visible minorities and which were not. In interviews Statistics Canada representatives often emphasized that the shift in 1996 was about getting higher quality data – but within this policy goal there are a number of premises that speak to how multiracial multiculturalism took hold in the Canadian context and was filtered through the schematic state. Consider this statement by a former Statistics Canada employee:

Getting better data. I mean, it’s all about data quality. Getting better data was important. And if it could be achieved by a separate question, that wasn’t so muddy with the ethnic origin; so, I mean, you still have instances where someone could say ‘I’m British’ but for employment equity purposes I self-identity as black. Or, I’m Canadian, but I self-identify as Chinese. So it allowed for that nesting and multiple notions of identity and employment equity and ancestry, just as there is with language...I think it was clear recognition that the ethnic origin side and the ethnicity was just as complex and so that the questionnaire had to give room up for that. I think that technology changes with the way the question worked made it possible to add more questions...There was clearly a cost in terms of response burden, here. But I think it was reflecting the incredible changes in the country.\footnote{Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.}

In the Canadian context multiracial multiculturalism comprised the view that multiple racial responses were necessary and desirable in part because of a recognition that the massive
demographic changes in the country had contributed to complicated identities and in part because allowing only single responses on the direct question on race would be incredibly controversial. Though the language of recognition was not used by multiracial social activists, as was the case in the US, the recognition of the diversity of the nation as a positive value preconditioned census categories, even while (as this interviewee admitted) race was still considered somewhat controversial:

I would imagine that the testing showed the need – the desire on the part of the Canadian population to provide multiple responses. The multiple responses were very small, though, they were not a large proportion of people providing the multiple responses. I think it was a recognition, as we've always had in Canada, or at least in the census, that there is diversity. And there's racial diversity as well, it's not just ethnic diversity. And wanting to allow people to provide those responses; it wouldn't be something that would affect the quality of the question. So that's why, given that, I mean, why not allow it?^{43}

This balancing act between attaining quality data and recognizing/showcasing racial diversity is achieved through the schematic state's imperative of turning complex, nested and multiple identities into something identifiable. In this sense, the race question itself was a means of streamlining, standardizing, and making the population legible.

It is precisely because of the complexity of racial identities that it was deemed necessary and critical to give respondents the opportunity to choose for themselves. The Canadian state had become uncomfortable with explicitly assigning identities, even though doing so would be (and, in the not-so-distant past, had been) within the very nature of the schematic state. As one public servant put it, “The idea was to give people the opportunity. Because again, we didn’t want to be the ones to decide who exactly was a visible minority. So when in doubt, allow them to respond and then if necessary look at the response patterns and

^{43} Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
make sense of those.” The shifting of responsibility for the classification of racial identity from the state to the respondent was, according to another public servant, one of the driving forces behind the 1996 question on race:

Q – That was my next question. So if as you said in 1991 the algorithm you had created was sufficient to get a robust understanding of the demographics of Canada in that sense, then why bother with a question in 1996?

I didn't say that it was robust enough to survive. It resulted in improvements in the information that was collected. But there was a very strong feeling that we needed to get away from these decisions that were being made by bureaucrats. We needed to get people closer to the measure that they would see themselves in. Because we were still making decisions and we were assigning people. We needed to give them the choice to say yes, I belong to this group. And that's what they got to do.

Finally, though the state tried to minimize the extent to which it arbitrarily assigned mixed-race and other respondents to racial categories, the benefits associated with employment equity policies meant that decisions had to be made with regards to the circumstances under which multiracial people would count as visible minorities. The dilemma was two-fold. First, the very notion of visible minority is based on broad generalizations about the relationships between race, racial visibility and racial disadvantage. As in Britain and the US, the civil rights legislation in Canada references race rather than referencing a particular set of racial groups, which is problematic when not all racial groups are disadvantaged equally. This leads into the second dilemma, about whether or not, in a schematic premised on racial

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44 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.

45 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.

46 As one public servant put it: “We’ve always had challenges with some categories, particularly with the Middle East. They aren't very vocal or strong advocates, but from time to time you get this signal that the programs – the people for whom these programs are designed are not benefiting because everybody else is in there. You know, Japanese. Do the Japanese need any support, any kind of government recognition of their issues? Some folks that always have challenges – blacks, Filipinos, they’re the ones if you look at socio-economic aspects, who are always at the bottom of the totem pole. So these people who on a good day could pass for Greek or French, you know, there’s discussion sometimes, should they be included as visible minorities?”
visibility, mixed-race people should count as visible minorities. Not all groupings of “white and” counted for employment equity purposes:

...there was concern for example, that some of what we call the borderline groups – the ones where there are boundary questions as to whether or not they are visible minorities. Latin American and white – was that person telling us that there were of mixed Latin American and white background, in other words one parent was white and one was Latin American, or were they telling us that they were in fact white from Latin America? So it was those types of ambiguities. So, for the boundary questions, Latin American and also West Asian and Arab. The other groups when the response was ‘white and black’ or ‘white and Chinese’, they were counted as visible minorities for employment equity purposes. And only for that variable. But for employment equity, that decision was made by the interdepartmental working group.47

The borderline groups complicated the already convoluted relationship between mixed-race and employment equity categories premised on racial visibility. In the Canadian scheme, being a racial minority depended on corporeal visibility in a multicultural framing in which “race” is consistently equated with “not white”. Though the schematic was less rigid in some ways than the American ethno-racial pentagon in, for example, its inclusion of Latin American as a visible minority group, its organizational pattern provided no clear answer about mixed-race and the so-called “borderline groups,” which posed challenges to state projects of legibility.

**Great Britain**

New framings of transnational framings of race played an undeniable role in preventing a direct question on race from appearing on Britain’s 1981 census. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) argue that by the 1970s, “multiculturalism emerged as a result of the realization originally in the USA, and then in Britain, that the melting pot doesn’t melt, and that ethnic and racial divisions get reproduced from generation to generation. Multiculturalism constructs society as composed of a hegemonic homogenous majority, and small unmeltable minorities with their

47 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
own essentially different communities and cultures which have to be understood, accepted and basically left alone..." (1992: 158). In the British context, five related aspects of neo-racisms emerged in the 1970s and became part of the mainstream framing of race in the 1980s (Ansell, 1997: 165-190). First, that it is human nature to feel solidarity with ‘one’s own kind’ and animosity towards those who are racially different, with culture being used as a kinder, politer metonym for race. As Conservative MP Ivor Stanbrook put it:

Let there be no beating around the bush. The average coloured immigrant has a different culture, a different religion and a different language. This is what creates the problem. It’s not just because of race. The people in our cities feel strongly about immigrants. I believe that a preference for one’s own race is as natural as a preference for one’s own family. Therefore, it is not racialism...it is simply human nature (cited in Barker, 1981: 75).

The second tenet of the New Right’s neo-racist discourse in Britain is the contention that the “British way of life” was at the heart of British nationhood and was under constant threat from Others. For example, the Swann Report of 1985, officially titled Education for All, uncovered a link between racism and the educational attainment of black children. However, its recommendations for multicultural education were largely ignored by the government and were attacked for trying to remould British culture (Ansell, 1997: 171). The third aspect is the definition of a racialized “enemy within” via a colour-coded definition of nationhood and citizenship, as manifested within the 1981 Nationality Act. Fourth, racial social consciousness and mobilization are perceived as threatening; Enoch Powell, for example, would claim the “real enemy” was the race relations industry that ‘created’ racism in order to preserve and secure its own political power (Ansell, 1997: 177). Finally, the New Right defines racism as being individualized behaviours or prejudices rather than structural or ideological. These new framings of race and racial difference played an important role in census politics well before the implementation of the ethnic question of 1991, when the Census Test of 1979 coincided with a
pre-election period in which Thatcher professed her fears of Britain being “swamped by people with a different culture,” and ran on a platform that claimed the avenues to achieving “racial harmony” lay in increased immigration/nationality restrictions. Racial minorities, ill-informed by an insular state about the purpose of the question and greatly concerned for their legal and substantive belonging in the nation, mobilized and refused on mass to answer the ethnic question. The question was left off the census for fear that such the controversy would jeopardize the census in its entirety, though it likely would have been excluded regardless as Thatcher jettisoned other questions from the census for being too expensive and an unwarranted intrusion into citizens’ private lives.

However, as with the case of Canada, the government’s approach of not counting in the name of multiculturalism was unsustainable. In contrast to Canada, where multiracial framings of multiculturalism and census policy contingencies caused concern about the quality of data and forced the government’s hand, in Britain other factors contributed to keeping the government’s commitment to eliminating racial disadvantage a topic of (limited) political debate and shaped the schematic state’s reaction to the transnational norm. First, the 1980s began with often-violent clashes between 2nd generation black Britons and the police. The Brixton riots of April 1981 and the nationwide riots in July garnered significant media and political attention. Lord Scarman’s inquiry published its final report in November 1981 and concluded that there was no institutional racism in Britain, though racial disadvantage existed and was widespread (Scarman, 1981). The report called for more efforts to tackle racial discrimination, though Thatcher paid little attention to Scarman’s recommendations and consequently few initiatives were forthcoming during the 1980s (Small and Solomos, 2006: 245). Regardless, when the race riots of 1985 disproved the theory that the Brixton riots were an uncharacteristic blip in otherwise tolerant and peaceful race relations, urban unrest became
systemically linked to race and served as a constant reminder that the fear of social disorder and violent potential of racial disadvantage was, in Britain, a reality.

Second, there was a constant push from anti-racism advocates and urban local governments for political movement on race relations. These organizations understood liberal multiculturalism, which perceived racial antagonism as deriving from individual prejudice or the maladjustment of racial minorities to British life, as not addressing more substantive issues of racism. Local authorities were particularly active on a number of fronts, with good incentives to be so. The Local Government Act of 1966 and the Local Government Grants (Social Needs) Act of 1969 gave local authorities with substantial numbers of Commonwealth immigrants the opportunity to obtain funding for special projects designed to meet the needs of minority populations. In the early 1980s a number of local authorities and city councils began to establish Race Relations Units and some adopted, quite separate from the national government, a system of racial classification based exclusively on skin colour (Santamaria and Couper, 1985: 153-154). Local governments also provided a more palatable and mainstream version of anti-racism. For example, the Greater London Council when led by Ken Livingstone from 1981-1986 declared 1984 a year in which London was to be made an anti-racist zone. This reconfiguration of multiculturalism in urban governance was tied to the liberal discourse of equal opportunity, allowing it to be perceived as both an adjunct to and autonomous from the more critical and leftist anti-racist projects (Santamaria and Couper, 1985: 153; Hesse, 2000: 9; Small and Solomos, 2006: 245).

The third and perhaps most important domestic factor that shaped the schematic state’s reaction to the proliferating transnational norm of multiculturalism was the structure of British institutions and the recognition within the disparate parts of the state apparatus of the necessity of racial enumeration. The consistently vocal support for the question by the CRE was
augmented by other arms of the state that explicitly called for an improvement in racial data and/or a direct question on race in the census, such as Local Authorities, the 1981 report of the Home Affairs Committee on Racial Disadvantage, Lord Scarman’s report and, most especially, the 1983 Report of the Sub-Committee on Race Relations and Immigration. In its parliamentary report, the Sub-Committee publicly regretted the decision to not include a question on ethnicity on the 1981 census, reviewed the need for this information in order to monitor the effectiveness of anti-discrimination policies and programming, and proposed that OPCS conduct further testing in order to develop a design of a question on race and/or ethnicity for possible inclusion on the 1991 census. In its reply the following year, the government accepted many of these proposals in principle, noting that it would be necessary for OPCS to conduct further tests to create a reliable and publicly acceptable question for the 1991 census (HM Government, 1984). In a Westminster system of government where policy proposals are often elite- or bureaucracy-driven, this endorsement from a parliamentary committee was a critical catalyst in putting the ethnic question back on the political agenda. At the same time, the various arms of the state that had called for the collection of racial statistics were simultaneously connected to the schematic state but independent of the “political considerations” surrounding the controversial issues of race that had previously plagued the governing parties.

The shift in governmental approaches to racial enumeration from not counting in the name of multiculturalism to counting to justify positive action became clear with the 1988 Census White Paper, which linked the rectification of economic disadvantage in minority populations with the promotion of positive race relations and the general welfare of the public. It also said that the information collected on housing, employment, educational qualifications and age-structure of each group would help the government carry out its responsibilities under
the 1976 *Race Relations Act* and serve as benchmarks to monitor the implementation of equal opportunities policies (HM Government, 1988). A testament to the ability of the schematic state to hold contradictory impulses together, the years when the state was most willing to make strides in racial enumeration were also marked, from the late 1980s until the election of New Labour and the inquiry into police investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence was launched in 1997, by the disappearance of diversity models that stressed the need to address structural and substantive racism from British political discourse, though multiculturalism was still valorized in political rhetoric (Hesse, 2000: 9-10).

Though the inaugural appearance of the ethnic question in the 1991 census was heralded as a resounding success (Coleman and Salt, 1996), the next decennial census in 2001 included several important changes to the format of the question, one of which was the inclusion of stand-alone categories designed to enumerate the mixed-race population. But if the original format of the question was indeed a success, why go through the cost of changing the policy content? I contend that the 2001 modifications to the ethnic question reflect a different approach to racial enumeration employed by the UK: counting in the name of multiculturalism. Similar to Canada and the US, in the British context this approach acknowledges rather than problematizes the existence of mixed-race identities, recognizes the diversity of the nation as a positive value and seeks to use the racial project of the census to promote this multiracial, multicultural, vision of nationhood.

This shift coincided with the brief, short-lived “radical turn” in government policy on race relations, as New Labour attempted to separate itself from its Conservative predecessors by emphasizing its commitment to social justice for racial minorities (Back et al., 2002; Small and Solomos, 2006; Pilkington, 2008). Back et al. (2002) argue that during its first term in office, Tony Blair’s New Labour embraced, or at least tried to manage, cultural diversity (2002: 283).
It introduced important initiatives, including the Lawrence Inquiry and the subsequent Macpherson Report, the 2000 *Race Relations (Amendment) Act*, and also appeared to respond (at least, initially, though perhaps not positively) to the recommendations of the independent Parekh report on *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* (Parekh, 2000b). This shift, both discursive and legal in nature, was reflected and compounded through census politics. When asked about what had changed between the 1991 and 2001 censuses, one interviewee commented on the connection between social changes and the acceptability of asking a question on ethnicity:

> We made the brace that in 1991 that we included an ethnic question. We had sort of tried it out and not gone ahead with it in 1981. In 1991 it had been an undoubted success and perhaps we felt that this was now a much more acceptable – you know, it’s part of society, I don’t think anybody would argue now, you know, that we are a multicultural society, that we are mixed in many ways, and that this question is a very important measure of that variation. So I think it’s acceptability, where as in the past – I think that’s really very important, I think the acceptability of the question, I think it was probably very brave in 1991 – although I wasn’t here – you know, society was very different nearly 20 years ago from the way it is today, and I think that’s a very important factor to take into account. I mean, at one time, people referred to Negroes – I don’t think we could do that! So the acceptability, the terminology, the whole thing has changed! I mean, nigger is even worse! But that did happen...That would not be acceptable today. 48

A different interviewee made strikingly similar comments about the extent to which British society had “changed,” also drawing out the connection between legislative change and commitments to the recognition of diversity:

> I think it’s a change in society as well. It’s a change that’s reflected in the change in government. In this government we have now all these protections for different groups; very powerful legislation protecting against discrimination. I think there’s much stronger movement to recognize diversity in different societies. There’s been a form of identity politics if you like. Britain has been a bit slower than the United States and Canada. I think now there’s just so much interest in ethnicity and race in this country; communities are organizing themselves a lot more effectively, being involved in

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48 Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.
consultations and participation and all sorts of government bodies. I think these two things are entrapped with each other. Identity politics and these new legal protections.\textsuperscript{49}

To be clear, the impetus of enumerating by race in order to meet legislative requirements set out in the \textit{Race Relations Act} was still an important factor that contributed to the initial and subsequent appearances of the ethnic question. However, several modifications to the design and content of the ethnic question speak to its reflection of, as stated above, the recognition of diversity in Britain.

First, the 2001 census disaggregated the “white” category and provided the options of “British,” “Irish,” and “Any other White background” with a write-in space. These options stem from the efforts of a surprisingly vocal lobby that persuaded members of the Working Group and ONS to add an Irish category. Unlike the US, lobbies are fairly unusual in the British context – the Westminster system of government and relatively closed policy networks make it far more difficult for interest groups to access decision-makers (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). However, the Irish lobby used the notion of disadvantage to make their case (Aspinall, 1996) in multiple institutional access points, targeting both the Working Group and the state and finding a particularly powerful ally in the Department of Health.\textsuperscript{50} This was a necessary step; as one ONS representative noted, lobby pressure from other white ethnic groups, such as the Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots, the Cornish and the Welsh were not persuasive because they could not demonstrate their groups had experienced disadvantages in health, education and the social realm.\textsuperscript{51} When the Working Group recommended the inclusion of an Irish category on the 2001

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with ethnicity question subgroup member, April 2009.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.

\textsuperscript{51} In his/her words: “So, in the Irish case, you could argue that there have been discrimination, and if you wanted to overcome that discrimination – one of the key drivers behind this question, that resource allocation needed to be redirected
census, the ONS was hesitant: "ONS was reluctant to have it at all...maybe because it wasn't
driven by colour. ONS didn't really have a strong appreciation of the nature and scale of the
disadvantage. Although evidence was beginning to be published then...The Irish group was a
tougher sell – it was about 1997 when they came around. There was quite a lot of resistance".52
Though the lobby eventually achieved their goal, ONS's unease with counting Irish was partially
because the category did not align well with the state's conceptualization of what racial
disadvantage is, and therefore, what the ethnic question was designed to measure.

The second modification is the addition of the headings “Black or Black British” and
“Asian or Asian British” in the ethnic question. The demand for a “Black British” category dates
back to the early field trials of the 1970s and its continued presence in British census politics
over the decades speaks to the discursive connections between race and citizenship. As the
1980s and 1990s wore on, Great Britain experienced a more prominent disconnect between
discourses of race relations and immigration than ever before, as second and third generation
blacks and Asians lay claim to being just as British as anyone else. In previous decades,
blackness was perceived by the majority population as being synonymous with ‘immigrant’
(Gilroy, 1987: 46; Ballard, 1997) but the growth of a politically active generation of British born
and bred racial minorities not willing to settle as anything but full citizenship (complete with a
sense of belonging as part of the nation) helped to challenge the unspoken, but dominant,
paradigm that Britishness was equated with whiteness.53

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52 Interview with Working Group member, April 2009.
The policy proposal to include the "Black British" and "Asian British" as headings rather than categories in the 2001 census came from ONS. Working group members had struggled with the issue of retaining high-quality and comparable data that detailed ancestry while allowing respondents to identify as British, since there was still such demand from the public.

On this topic, one working group member commented:

I’ve got to give credit to the ONS – I couldn’t sort out in my head, retaining the data about Black-African or Black-Caribbean ancestry and having Black British as a tick box. Because we knew young people born in Britain, brought up in Britain, identified as Black British, they weren’t fussed about ancestry from the Caribbean. Even their parents might have been born in Britain. And, you know, they just felt British. So why not give them a tick box so they can say what they are? And that appealed to a lot of us in the working group...but ONS wanted to know whether in ancestry terms whether people were from the Caribbean or Africa...ONS came up with this inspired solution of putting Black British and Asian British in the group label. Ok, you lost the facility to tick Black British as a tick box, but you got reference to national origins. I just thought that was inspired.54

The inclusion of some way of recognizing Black British or Asian British identities, according to this working group member “had been a sticking point for a long time”. This solution, which acknowledges both race and British nationality and/or citizenship, suggests a symbolic function of the census beyond the task of counting the population. The more intangible elements of census politics, where the census collides with ideas of citizenship and belonging, demand that policy-makers negotiate between technical requirements and the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994).

The third major discussion that led to a modification of the 1991 census design concerned the enumeration of mixed-race people. The 240,000 respondents who had written in mixed-race origins in the free-text field in the 1991 census demonstrated to policy-makers that

54 Interview with Working Group member, April 2009.
the OPCS’s previous assertions that “people of mixed descent often preferred not to be distinguished as a separate group” (Sillitoe and White, 1992: 149) were incorrect and providing some means of enumerating the multiracial population was a worthwhile venture. In stark contrast to the United States, there was near unanimous support for the proposal to enumerate mixed-race on the 2001 census from government departments, the CRE, and within the ethnic question subgroup and the Content, Question Testing and Classification Working Group. Aspinall’s (1996) report on the ethnic subgroup consultation makes the case for inclusion based on demand from within the group, the increasing size of the group, and the need for analytical clarity, particularly when the data is being used for service provision. The ONS immediately accepted the subgroup’s business case and recommendation to count mixed-race. The inclusion of mixed-race categories in the 2001 census simply was not a contentious issue — though it was a significant development in and of itself. This state of affairs is very different from previous policy discussions, which designated the enumeration of multiracial people as a “problem”. In contrast, the only concerns recorded in this instance were by census users who were apprehensive about the effects on the quality and comparability of the ethnic group data brought about by the inclusion of a mixed-race category.

At the same time, the addition of the mixed-race categories were viewed by many to be the most important and significant modification to the 2001 ethnic question, one which “largely reflected the change in society between 1991 and 2001...what had largely not been acceptable in 1991 was now seen as being a very important issue.”55 Again, this social change was not linked to social mobilization on the part of the multiracial population of Britain, but instead was considered by policy-makers as a matter of common sense. As one ONS representative put it, “it was broadly accepted I think that there had been an underlying change in the structure of

55 Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.
society and that the mixed group was necessary. And it was very broadly supported. I can't recall any opposition to the inclusion of a mixed race category at all.” The inclusion of multiracial categories aligned well with the state's promotion of multiracial multiculturalism; in contrast to the conceptualization of mixed-race as a “problem” of racial enumeration, the inclusion of mixed-race categories on the census was considered an uncontroversial addition that reflected changing societal norms.

United States

The United States is perhaps the clearest example of how multiple meanings of race connected with liberal multiculturalism to produce the racial project of the census. On one hand, the maturation of the so-called Reagan Revolution in the 1980s gave neoconservative framings of race and race politics in the US a permanent place in the American political landscape. As Omi and Winant (1994) note, the emergence of the New Right in the United States was not simply a backlash against the civil rights gains of the 1960s, but was also an innovative political project of authoritarian populism (1994: 123), in which the Reagan administration consistently opposed civil rights measures proposed and already in place. Validating and utilizing a number of the key tenets of transnational neo-racism, Reagan and his administration denounced affirmative action as “reverse racism,” undermined federal enforcement efforts, slowed the pace of school desegregation and eliminated many social welfare programs which disproportionately supported the non-white underclass (Ansell, 1997: 195). Even the courts, the branch of government most insulated from political and popular opposition to affirmative

56 Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.

57 The Reagan administration even tried to eliminate racial record-keeping in the Department of Housing and Urban Affairs and the Veterans Administration to stop tracking the racial characteristics of beneficiaries. Jerry McMurry, staff director for the housing subcommittee of the House Banking Committee, said the Reagan administration ‘would rather not know’ the racial composition of its programs so it cannot be challenged on its civil rights record (Omi and Winant, 1994: 209, fn. 73).
action, issued rulings in 1989 that undermined the policy. In *Ward’s Cove Packing v. Antonio*, the US Supreme Court ruled that in job discrimination cases, it is insufficient for plaintiffs to only demonstrate a statistical disparity in minority employment; they also must connect the disparity to the specific employment practices alleged to have caused the discrimination. In *Richmond v. Croson*, the Supreme Court ruled that a city’s “set-aside” contracts for minority-owned firms must be narrowly defined, temporary, and linked to established prior discrimination. Both of these cases feature a greater burden of proof on the plaintiffs to prove the extent of racial discrimination beyond statistical evidence (McClain and Stewart, 2010: 182).

On the other hand, the colour-conscious notion of race continued to be salient both in the practice of politics and in the politics of the everyday. The unity of civil rights movement eroded after the mid-1960s and, as in Britain and Canada, anti-racist advocates emphasized the significance of racial identity and continued to expand and deepen understandings of the centrality of race in the construction of US culture and society (Winant, 2001: 166-167). Minorities continued to emphasize that the elimination of *de jure* racial segregation and the endorsement of positive state action to end racial discrimination failed to substantively alter circumstances of racial inequality. Moreover, race was not simply going to *go away*. For example, the proposed “rainbow coalition,” Jesse Jackson’s 1984 presidential campaign theme, signified both the importance of the minority vote to the Democratic Party and the campaign strategy of appealing to various racial groups neglected under Reaganomics; a strategy still and fundamentally based on race as a primary signifier (Omi and Winant, 1994: 142). Unlike Canada and Great Britain, whose history of the avoidance of racial enumeration demonstrate a national discomfort with the language of race, US politics and society have always produced and reified race as a meaningful social, legal and political category. Even throughout the review of
federal classifications of race and ethnicity during the 1990s, race was acknowledged as socially constructed, problematic and convoluted, but nevertheless undeniably salient in the American political imaginary.

In this stalemate and contradictory oscillation between neo-conservative strategies of colour-blindness and leftist, diasporic, and social insistences that colour-consciousness was the reality of American political life, America's national identity continued to be premised and promoted as a melting pot of identities and cultures (however sociologically inaccurate the notion may be). The potential and promise of US diversity was a constant feature during the 1993 and 1997 hearings on the revisions to federal classification standards of race; as Senator John Sununu (R-NH) stated in 1997:

Americans are very proud of our reputation as a melting pot country, where people of many faiths, backgrounds, and different cultural heritages come together. But even as those different cultures and ethnicities blend together, we continue and should continue to celebrate the cultural heritage that makes us unique. It is a celebration that strengthens our families and our communities. And that makes us ultimately stronger as a Nation. I believe that we need to maintain a system within the census that enables us to understand who we are as a country, what the variety of backgrounds and heritages are that make up the United States of America, the citizens of the United States. I think that it is of great value to have this type of a hearing which enables us to better understand the value and the importance to maintain just such a system (United States, 1997: 255).

This American version of multiculturalism, perhaps more explicitly than its British or Canadian parallels, has struggled to make sense of its historic aggrandizing of ethnic identities and immigrant assimilation at the same time it excluded and oppressed racial minorities, especially once immigration patterns changed and America became more racially diverse than ever before (Lieberson and Waters, 1988). For example, though the designers of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts clearly had the descendants of black slaves in mind with the intention of remedying past injustices of discrimination, the legislation itself spoke in the abstract of individuals, citizens, and persons who were protected from discrimination based on race. This gave other
minority groups in an increasingly diverse country powerful incentive to organize around their racial identities. The instrumental use of race-based identities, however, was not limited to non-white groups; with the help of the courts, the ideational logic of affirmative action changed. In *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978), a rejected white applicant for medical school claimed the University of California had discriminated against him on the basis of race. A divided Court decided that the program was discriminatory and ordered Bakke to be admitted. However, the swing opinion of Justice Powell also argued that the use of race as a criterion for admission was justified if promoting diversity in education was one factor (among others) to be considered. The reference to diversity in this precedent-setting case suggested that the purpose of affirmative action was not remedial, but rather forward-looking. However, as Joppke (1999) notes, the diversity rationale had a catch: “in removing the sting of past discrimination it robbed affirmative action of its moral force. In the diversity paradigm, whites figured just as a group competing with other groups. The diversity paradigm thus espoused a dangerous relativism that might become an inroad for doing away with affirmative action *in toto*” (1999: 161).

The changing paradigm of American multiculturalism also encompassed shifting legal and social norms about interracial intimacy and multiraciality. In 1967, over a decade after the Supreme Court demanded the end of *de jure* Jim Crow, it struck down the remaining anti-miscegenation laws in 17 states of the South. These laws, which had existed at one point or another in 41 of the 50 states, invariably prohibited interracial sex and/or marriage between

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58 Anti-miscegenation laws are a significant but often overlooked aspect of American race relations. In fact, in C. Vann Woodward’s (1974) study of Jim Crow, anti-miscegenation laws are not considered an aspect of the system of legal and extra-legal segregation in the U.S. South between the 1890s and 1960s (Woodward, 1974). Yet the multiple regimes of interracial intimacy regulation both pre- and post-dated Jim Crow segregation and represented a violation of, in Hannah Arendt’s words, “an elementary human right compared to which the right to attend an integrated school, the right to sit where one pleases on a bus, the right to go into any hotel or recreation or place of amusement, regardless of one’s skin or color or race are minor indeed” (Arendt, 1959: 49).
blacks and whites, though some were expanded to include Asians, Filipinos, Native Americans, and in the extreme cases of Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia, all non-whites.\footnote{Recall, however, that race the reference to morphological or physiological characteristics is part and parcel of the concept of race itself, which is better understood as sets of practices and power relations. In this sense, this designation of “non-white” should not be mistaken for a reference to bodily appearance. Though the rule of hypodescent – or the “one-drop” rule – did not hold at all times and in all places, it was codified in legislation in states such as Virginia and Louisiana and dictated that any person who had any trace of African blood would be considered non-white. Though anti-miscegenation laws were declared unconstitutional in 1967, policies of racial designation in accordance with the one-drop rule continued well into the late 20th century.} Though history has demonstrated there have always been those willing to transgress social and legal boundaries (Wallenstein, 2002; Pascoe 2009), an increasingly diverse US population with the newly guaranteed right to marry across racial lines helped to vastly increase the number of interracial marriages from less than 400,000 interracial couples according to the 1970 census to over 1.5 million of them in 1990 (Joppke, 1999: 168). Variations in rates of intermarriage within racial and ethnic groups exist,\footnote{Wright et al. (2003) note that between 1980 and 1990, the percentage of non-Hispanic whites involved in interracial marriages tripled. Blacks had a similar rate of change, from 2.2% to 5.5%, with 17.6% of all unions involving blacks occurring with whites and black men being more likely to marry white women than black women were to marry white men. In 1990 almost 60% of American Indians and 52.4% of Hawaiians were involved in interracial marriages. The only group whose rates of out-marriage declined in this decade were Asians, from 25% of marriages to 15%. Gender dynamics are also at play here, with the majority of out-marriages occurring between Asian women and white men and with variation among Asian ethnic subgroups – out-marriage rates declined for Koreans, Vietnamese and Filipinos though pan-Asian marriages (e.g. Korean-Chinese) increased from 11% to 21% (2003: 463-465).} as do significant regional patterns in occurrences of interracial marriage;\footnote{For example, racially mixed marriages today are twice as likely to occur in California as anywhere else in the US (Wright et al., 2003: 465).} however, the rate of mixed-race partnerships has risen consistently for almost all groups (Wright et al., 2003; Fryer, 2007). The lessening of social and legal stigmatization surrounding interracial marriages have had demographic consequences in the form of mixed-race offspring, with some arguing that America witnessed a “biracial baby boom” after \textit{Loving v. Virginia} (Korgen, 1998; Brown, 2001).

Demographic pressures, spurred by legal reform, are an important part of the resulting paradigm of multiracial multiculturalism in the United States. However, demographic changes
were only important because they occurred in an era in which diversity and multiculturalism were recognized and promoted by the state as positive values of the American imagined community. For example, the argument that the end of anti-miscegenation laws in 1967 caused a biracial baby boom has been widely criticized for being ahistoric (Rockquemore, 1998; Dalmage, 2000; Daniel, 2002; Spencer, 2004). As Williamson (1980) demonstrates, the real biracial baby boom occurred over 300 years ago in the colony of Virginia and has been constantly recurring ever since, with particularly prominent surges in the “mulatto” population between 1850 and 1880, when over half a million were recorded in the census. Simply put, the existence of mixed-race people is nothing new, though its construction as a relatively recent phenomenon demonstrates how deeply ingrained the rule of hypodescent is in American racial projects and formations. The assumed distinctions between, for example, the “new” multiracial population and the general African-American population can only exist through racial formations premised on discrete racial categories, since even conservative estimates suggest that approximately three-quarters of the African-American population have some white ancestry (Davis, 1991: 21). Morning (2000) notes that conceptualizations of multiraciality at the end of the 20th century are normatively and temporally specific: “despite the fact that racial intermixing has taken place for centuries in the United States, today the biracial, genealogically-immediate experience seems to be our normative multiracial status, and Americans whose mixed-race ancestry is more distant do not fit our image of the multiracial population” (2000: 214). The presumed emergence of a perhaps more populous, but also somehow different multiracial constituency in the US also demonstrates a trend that is transnational in scope, having occurred in Canada and Great Britain during the last decades of the 20th century as well. This trend suggests that what is new or different may not be the mixed-race population itself.

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62 It should be so obvious that it goes unsaid, that in this dissertation the use of racial census data should be taken with several grains of very critical salt.
but rather is the recognition of multiraciality as a viable identity choice after decades of unchallenged belief in discrete racial categories.

Similar to Canada and Britain, American political institutions and politics intertwined with the transnational trend of multiracial multiculturalism and shaped the unfolding of the racial project of the census in the arena of the schematic state. As previously mentioned, institutional path dependencies that necessitated the creation of a standardized federal classification system, the creation of constituencies that lobbied the state to add or alter categories on the census, and the newly institutionalized role of minority advisory committees, when combined with the continued controversies over the census undercount, made the infiltration of new ideas and the potential for policy change possible. Equally important, however, was the emerging discourse of multiracial multiculturalism and, consequently, the extent to which various constituencies were able to mould it to suit their needs. According to Representative Tom Sawyer, by the 1990s the United States was undergoing a deep and historic diversification that, at the very least, necessitated that questions be asked regarding “whether or not the way in which we currently define who we are reflects the reality of the nation we are and who we are becoming” (cited in Wright, 1994). The Los Angeles riots of 1992 had put this clearly in perspective for Sawyer, who saw the basic question arising from both the riots and the federal review of Statistical Directive 15 as the same phenomenon other countries also faced: how can we deal with one another and live together? In an interview Sawyer argued that “for most of American history, counting race in the census has reflected biases and bigotries that define our worst nature – those with power forcing it upon those without power. In the
1970s we did better, but the categories were frozen. In 1993, we started the process of unfreezing them.⁶³

Multiracial multiculturalism helped to unsettle perceptions about the validity of Directive 15 and did so in a dramatically different way than would have occurred 30 years earlier during the first transnational moment. The tension between the colour-conscious and colour-blind variants of this norm demonstrates the multiple ways it could be employed strategically to serve a variety of actors and interests. First, the bureaucratic arms of the schematic state were concerned with policy-making and program delivery. The objectives outlined by the Committee on National Statistics of the National Research Council at the beginning of the bureaucracy-led review process determined that the most important objectives of federal classification standards were largely administrative in nature in order to foster statistical exchange within the state apparatus, ensure data consistency, meet program and monitoring requirements, and produce categories that were meaningful and relevant for policy purposes (Edmonston et al., 1996: 49-50). Most federal agencies favoured the status quo, though reactions to the potential modifications of the Directive were mixed: some agencies hoped for more flexibility while others had strong objections to some proposals put forward (Edmonston et al., 1996: 11). These administrative concerns were also important to the OMB and the interagency committee, though their guiding principles also warned that census categories were not scientific or anthropological in nature and that respect for individual dignity should guide the process and methods for collecting data on race and ethnicity (OMB, 1994: 29834). Further, the OMB held multiple public hearings in order to ensure that the census categories would “reflect the community”; partially to ensure quality data by producing categories that are “relevant and applicable to individual respondents” (Edmonston et al.,

⁶³ Interview with Senator Tom Sawyer, Columbus, OH, February 2009.
but also because the legitimacy of the review process depended on societal participation and the extent to which census categories aligned with changing conceptions of race in America was crucial to the success and effectiveness of the policy. As one civil servant put it, "We knew that the categories of Directive 15 wouldn't last forever, they weren't intended to. Times had changed – the review was an opportunity to rethink the way we think about race in this country. We didn't know what we'd end up with when we started the process, but we had to try to adjust to the changing times." During the process of adjusting, however, colour-blindness was not an option for policymakers who existed within a schematic state premised on the existence of racial categories in a variety of areas of law and policy. The legibility, transportability and standardization of race remained top schematic state priorities.

Civil rights organizations and their elite allies in the Democratic Party invoked a colour-conscious version of multiracial multiculturalism fundamentally premised on the importance of maintaining the existing racial categories in order to protect and maintain the legislative gains of the civil rights movement. In the summation of Representative Meek (D-FL):

There's no court or any legislative or legal record of discrimination against multiracials. So it's going to be, perhaps, prohibitive for multiracials to get the advantage of the discrimination which black citizens of this country have faced. Without such a record of discrimination, courts will have a hard time claiming discrimination against multiracials....The multiracial category will just make it more difficult to identify where discrimination has taken place and where it has not taken place, because it will cloud census counts of discrete minorities who have been restricted to certain neighborhoods and, as a consequence, to certain schools. It will cloud the census count of these discrete minorities who are assigned to lower tracks in public schools, and you know that they are. It will cloud the census count of discrete minorities kept out of certain occupations or whose progress toward seniority or promotion had been skewed. The list goes on and on, Mr. Chairman, to include civil rights reporting in the arenas of lending practices and the provision of health services, and beyond (United States, 1997: 231).

These sentiments were also echoed by other Democrats who testified before the Subcommittee, including Congressman Davis (D-IL), who felt that “the multiracial category could

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64 Interview with OMB representative, February 2009.
jeopardize the civil rights of many minorities as well as may provide inconsistent and damaging effects on overall racial counts" (United States, 1997: 252). Importantly, these arguments were clothed in a colour-conscious version of multiculturalism, in which the value of counting by race in the census was connected to the liberal goals of promoting racial harmony and diversity through the monitoring of circumstances of racial inequality and disadvantage. Civil rights organizations took the analogy one step further, emphasizing that attaining substantive equality would require constant vigilance; the NAACP noted its “concern” with the proposals to add a multiracial category stemmed from its belief that “segregation and discrimination in this country has to be battled with deeds, not just with words,” inviting “all multiracial people who so identify themselves, to join us in that struggle” (United States, 1997: 302-306).

Within these paradigms of multiculturalism and diversity, however, were deeper indications of the nature of citizenship and belonging in the United States. In spite of its long history of “illiberal” discrimination based on ascriptive characteristics like race and gender (Smith, 1997; King, 1999), the United States has always revered its liberal democratic values. Racial classifications in the census, though important for the achievement of liberal ideals of equality and social justice, still run counter to dominant norms of liberal democracies, which demand that the superficial morphological characteristics used to distinguish supposedly distinct races matter not. This tension was illuminated during the hearings when participants compared the American context to the only regime more explicitly racialized than the United States: South Africa. The accusation surfaced that a multiracial category could have the consequence of replicating the “caste system” that had been reinforced so fervently in apartheid South Africa. The mixed-race movement’s argument that individuals of racially diverse backgrounds were somehow a “new race” was also slightly too reminiscent of South Africa’s “coloured” category and the apartheid regime that kept racial boundaries clear. The extraordinary nature of racial classification under the apartheid government served as
warnings to a watchful American public about giving the state the power to determine when somebody is black, white or multiracial. To make this point, the representative from NAACP told an anecdote about the infamous South African “hair test,” which was used to determine one’s racial identity, rhetorically asking the Sub-Committee “do you really want to go there, do you really want to get involved in those kinds of determinations?” (United States, 1997: 302).

Even those traditionally on the opposite end of the political spectrum found this to be an ominous comparison; Republican Stephen Horn (CA) called South Africa’s racial taxonomies “a sickening commentary on the human condition,” going on to state that “I do not think that we want to get into it” (United States, 1997: 330). Civil rights organizations and their elite allies strategically used colour-consciousness within a multicultural paradigm to, on the one hand, emphasize the importance maintaining the status quo to ensure the hard-fought victories of the civil rights movement remained intact, and on the other hand, to accuse the mixed-race movement of the same type of extreme colour-consciousness as existed in apartheid South Africa.

Thirdly, the mixed-race social movement also summoned the norm of multiracial multiculturalism, though in a very different way than either the bureaucracy or civil rights organizations. Project RACE, AMEA and the Interracial Family Circle premised their arguments on the language of recognition, arguing that the right of self-identification and recognition of what people “really are” is not just a matter of civil rights, but is something more fundamental to the ethos of liberalism and democracy. DaCosta (2007) argues that the mixed-race movement used very individualistic terms to make this point, contending that the interests of the state, schools, or other officially recognized racial groups were secondary to those of the individual checking the box (2007: 30). Using this perspective, Nathan Douglas of Interracial Family Circle challenged the claims of civil rights advocates that a multiracial category would threaten the civil rights establishment: “how can you suggest that a group of your fellow human
beings, no matter how large or small, must be denied their right to identify accurately in order to accommodate the status quo? How hypocritical. The violation of multiracials’ right to self-determination should ring loud warning bells for every believer in civil rights” (United States, 1997: 428-429). The language of recognition was used most often and most potently to refer to the plight of mixed-race children. The acronym of Project RACE stands for Reclassify All Children Equally, and founder Susan Graham used the data collected in one school district in Georgia where students could identify as multiracial to make dual points about the 835 “real actual children, who consider themselves to be multiracial...835 real actual children, not government projections” and the necessity of allowing them to “embrace all of their heritage” (United States, 1997: 283).

Finally, a colour-blind variant of multiracial multiculturalism was employed during the hearings by Republican Party elites, who viewed the addition of a multiracial category on the census as a means of blurring racial distinctions. Newt Gingrich, the most prominent Republican proponent of the proposal to add a multiracial category, argued that multiracialism was a positive social and demographic development because it would inevitably lead to an American identity without race:

I think we need to be prepared to say, the truth is we want all Americans to be, quite simply, Americans. That doesn’t deprive anyone of the right to further define their heritage...It doesn’t deprive us of the right to ethnic pride, to have some sense of our origins. But it is wrong for some Americans to begin to creating subgroups to which they have a higher loyalty than to America at large (United States, 1997: 659).

65 The mixed-race movement’s emphasis on children deserves more theoretical attention that this dissertation can provide. I find the constant reference to plight of mixed-race children throughout the discourse of multiracial multiculturalism – not just in the United States, but in Canada and Britain as well – curious. This could be an innocuous reference to demography, for data has demonstrated that the mixed-race population of these countries that self-identify as such is fairly young. It could also be more normatively embedded in discourses of the innocence of children – an innocence that should (normatively) delay their entrance into colour-coded societies that were not of their making. Alternatively, its use within this context could be strategic or sinister; an attempt to gain the sympathy of political elites while ultimately championing the alternative that would allow Susan Graham to officially pass her white privilege onto her children.
Gingrich ends his statement with the premonition that the multiracial category would be a first step towards the ideal of having “one box on all Federal forms that simply reads: ‘American’” (United States, 1997: 660). The Right also employed a different version of multiracial multiculturalism. In Republicans’ interpretation, multiculturalism and diversity remain positive values to be promoted by the state and as such mixed-race people deserved to be recognized, though the classification systems that these notions were built upon are conceptualized as fundamentally divisive. Representative Petri suggested that being on the census was a marker of Americanism: “…from the point of view of the individual citizen who is being asked to fill this form out, to give them the feeling either that somehow they are not fully American, and therefore they are in some other category, psychologically, I think is a mistake” (United States, 1997: 241). However, the strategic employment of multiracial multiculturalism in this way was also a clear political agenda that sought to erode civil rights legacies, which the New Right views as unwarranted, intrusive state action into the private and commercial spheres. This use of multiracial multiculturalism to promote a colour-blind version of American diversity is not limited to census debates; Sundstrom (2008) argues that this colour-blind, multiracial-conscious agenda also characterizes the efforts of University of California Regent Ward Connerly to ban affirmative action via California Proposition 209 (1996) as well as the failed California Proposition 54 (2003), which would have prohibited state and local governments from classifying by race, full stop, and his attempts to add “multiracial” to University of California administrative forms (2008: 122-125).
Comparatively speaking, the current transnational moment – the one which we have yet to exit – has been characterized by racial projects in which the approaches to racial enumeration in the national censuses under study have converged both in terms of counting to justify positive action and counting in the name of multiculturalism. In Rallu, Simon and Piché’s (2004) original formulation, the approach of *counting to justify positive action* describes the circumstances of Canada, the United States and Great Britain, in which a direct question on race is justified by reference to a legislated need for the data in order to properly enforce or monitor civil rights legislation. Though this argument is often used by governments to justify their decision to collect racial data, our cases suggest that: (1) unless provisions for ethnic monitoring are expressly stated in legislation, or are absolutely necessitated for the implementation of the legislation (as is the case with the US *Voting Rights Act*), an institutional mandate does not necessarily lead to the implementation of a direct census question on race; and (2) the content of civil rights legislation matters a great deal. If simply the existence of civil rights legislation – or even an acceptance of the legal concept of indirect discrimination – mattered, then both Britain and Canada would have seen the emergence of a direct question on race far sooner than they did. Civil rights legislation is likely a necessary and certainly important, but insufficient cause for the collection of racial data.

Over time, I contend that these three cases also converged in the approach to racial enumeration Rallu *et al.* (2004) label as *counting in the name of multiculturalism*. The use of this approach is clearly connected to the census designers’ efforts to develop a question that would be publicly acceptable and would garner high response rates and high quality data, but there are also symbolic or discursive issues at play in the determination of census categories and classifications. Self-identification is the unequivocally preferred approach; allowing
respondents to identify with the group(s) they feel they belong to in spite of acknowledgement within the state that racial self-identification may not align with the external assignment of race most often linked to discrimination. Policy-makers were very concerned with providing options that allowed respondents to identify as what they “really are” and were willing to adjust census categories (even ones that had previously been successful at attaining high quality data) in order to accommodate these issues of identity and recognition. This became particularly relevant as all three countries made efforts to count the mixed-race population, with each expressing concern about giving multiracial respondents options to identify as mixed-race if they so desired. This shift stands in stark contrast to previous modes of racial classification in which the mixed-race population could identify with one and only one race, or was reassigned as the minority designation by tabulation procedures. Also, discourses of race, citizenship and belonging are linked together through the census; the census has become an instrument of diversity governance, used by the state to promote multiculturalism and national diversity as a positive value. This use of the census is particularly potent when combined with the approach of counting to justify positive action, sending signals within the state and to the public-at-large that equality and diversity are important state priorities.

It has been argued that this current moment of multiracial multiculturalism is fundamentally transnational in scope, its collision with domestic institutions and national nuances being the critical factors that produce the racial project of the census. Existing in the realm of norms, discourse and ideas makes the definition of concrete mechanisms through which the transnational impacts the domestic difficult. However, based on the evidence presented in this chapter and its predecessors, it is possible to make some reasoned speculation about the mediums through which the transnational moment subsists. First, norms do exist in the transnational realm. They proliferate through international organizations like the UN,
UNESCO, and the European Union and are solidified in their declarations of human rights, minority rights, the right to self-declaration and international human rights law (Banton, 2002; Kymlicka, 2007). In more recent years there has also been a push within the transnational sphere for the collection of more accurate statistical information on racial discrimination. The European Commission, which supervises the implementation of the 2000 Directive prohibiting racial discrimination in employment, housing, and education, the UN Committee on the elimination on all forms of racial discrimination, the Council of Europe Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, the Advisory Committee on the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, the Durban Declaration and Plan of Action adopted by the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance of September 2001, and the International Labour Organisation have all urged states to collect and analyze reliable statistical data that will allow for the proper assessment of the extent of racial discrimination in order to better enable states to produce effective anti-discrimination measures (Ringelheim, 2009: 41-42). These norms are also promoted by the United Nations Statistical Commission, which produces international statistics and is the highest decision making body for international statistical activities, and especially the setting of international statistical standards.66

The operation of this norm does not simply occur through institutional imperatives that “encourage” states to comply with various declarations. Rather, the more potent transnational mechanism is in the multiracial multicultural norm’s ability to alter incentive structures for states to act or not act by changing both citizenry and the international community’s perceptions of legitimacy. For example, it would be difficult, though not impossible, for a

democratic state to implement an approach to racial enumeration that involved counting to manage and control at the end of the 20th century; not because such an action would be in contravention of international human rights law, but because it would be viewed as illegitimate state action by those within and beyond the schematic state’s reach. This chapter has argued that the two moments have existed within the transnational realm but were influenced by developments in domestic racial projects and formations, but it is relatively clear that not all events and all places have the same influence on transnational norms that define the meaning of race. Some circumstances have caught the world’s attention – the US civil rights movement, the end of apartheid in South Africa – and worked to shape domestically specific racial projects elsewhere through lesson-drawing. These incentives can be either negative, as occurred during the first transnational moment when Canada and the UK sought to avoid the racial tension and violence that plagued the US, or positive, exemplified by the convergence of using the census to promote or showcase racial diversity. Goldberg (2009) suggests that the US has been highly influential in shaping the transnational norm, more so than any other nation. This has, in the literature, at times been mistaken for American exceptionalism. This chapter has demonstrated that rather than being exceptional, the American experience is a set of well-observed variations that have often worked to set the standard or norm against which all other racial projects and racialized occurrences are measured.

Second, the mechanisms through which the transnational norm filters down exist at the schematic state-level. Elites and bureaucrats involved in the design of census questions are an “epistemic community” (Haas, 1992) with an acute transnational awareness of the state of race questions in other countries. The exchange of ideas and information is helped by the UN Statistical Commission, which brings together Chief Statisticians from around the world, information-gathering trips taken by political elites and bureaucrats, and international
conferences, as occurred in 1992 when policy-makers from Canada, the United States, Great Britain, the former Soviet Union, and Australia gathered to discuss the enumeration of race and ethnicity in their national censuses. Lesson-drawing, to a certain extent, has become part of the policy-making process; as one Canadian bureaucrat told me, “we always look to others”. Interviews revealed that civil servants involved in racial enumeration were quite knowledgeable about the state of affairs in other countries: Canadian policymakers referenced developments in Australia, and called the use of the Black British label in the census of England and Wales “an odd way of putting it, but whatever”; the Americans said that “other countries think we’re quite brave” for their extensive involvement of the public during the review of OMB’s classification standards in the 1990s; members of the ethnic question working group looked to the US while searching for evidence to put a mixed-race option on the census; and policy-makers in all three countries were aware (and eager to talk) about the recent proposals to add a direct question on race to the census of France. Furthermore, the census “experts” and data users that now participate in the design of census questionnaires are also aware of practices in other countries and many of the academics involved in these processes do comparative research on the topic. For example, the coalition of groups opposed to modification of Directive 15 referenced the experiences of other nations with multiracial categories, such as Brazil and South Africa, nothing that the experience “has been that such

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67 For example, from an interview with a representative of Statistics Canada: “Sometimes governments have an indirect way of doing things. I mean, this is standard everywhere. And, they hold the purse strings. There again, where we’ve been successful is that we’ve been able to find alternate sources of funding. In the US, I mean, I know some of the stories in the US, and I don’t think I could work there. The Deputy Director is appointed by the government in power; the apportionment bills can drive whether or not they do something in the census. From the 2000 census there was this debate about whether or not they would do adjustments. And the arguments for doing adjustments was about getting more exact counts in areas that were underenumerated. But if you looked at the political distribution, the areas that were underenumerated they were primarily Democrat and you had a Republican government in power. And that would have led directly to the reapportionment of seats, of electoral boundaries, which would have favoured the Democrats [laughter]. That was a fascinating debate to follow.”

68 See, for example, Aspinall (2003) and Simon (2004; 2005).
categories increase rather than decrease social stratification on the basis of race” (United States, 1997: 232).

This transnational awareness manifests in a number of ways. It works to alter states’ incentive structures for action or inaction, based on what approaches have been successful or have failed in other countries. It has helped the schematic state determine what kind of data could be gathered, how it could be gathered, what publics would accept or revile, and how the data could be effectively analyzed and used. The (reluctant) inclusion of minority advisory committees in the United States in the late 1970s demonstrated to policy-makers in Canada and the UK that involving minority representatives, “experts” and data users in the decision-making process would increase, rather than threaten, the public’s perceived legitimacy of the census. The further away (temporally speaking) these states moved from the era when counting by race in order to control and manage non-white populations, the more they all became concerned with promoting self-identification as the most legitimate and appropriate method for racial enumeration. Premised on individual choice, the emphasis on self-identification and the politics of recognition helped to maintain the delicate balance between the unease with racial classifications and the liberal (racial) projects of multicultural citizenship, equality and social justice.

And finally, transnational norms also exist at the societal level (though, of course, the boundaries that separate state and society are never clearly defined). Diasporic identities defy boundaries, providing the context for imagined communities well beyond the nation-state. State policies of multiculturalism were driven by massive (transnational, involving the movement of people across space) demographic changes, but were also the result of the social activation of racial identities, which stood in opposition to maturation of neo-racism in the 1980s and demanded a politics of recognition that liberal democracies had never before
encountered. This form of politics was played out in the arena of the census. Tom Sawyer argues that after 1993 the congressional hearings began to “provoke underground conversations - in spite of no formal media coverage of the hearings, people across the country knew what was going on and wanted to talk about it.” Minorities wanted to be counted in the census – in part because of the state-specific incentives attached to being counted, but also because, as an American policy-maker told me, “The census is a national celebration...To be in the census is to be recognized as part of the nation.” Racial minorities, for whom a sense of national belonging may be elusive in other respects, have gone from having their racial identities imposed by agents of the state, to being highly suspicious of the state’s intentions in counting them, to seeking recognition of their unique racial identities through the census. This transition was taken to the extreme in the American case, when mixed-race advocates sought recognition through the census purely for the sake of recognition.

Of course, the transnational does not affect the domestic realm without some modifications. The major argument being made in this chapter is that rather than understanding census politics as occurring in similar ways in different contexts because of similar patterns of demography, social mobilization or civil rights legacies, we should conceptualize norms and ideas about race as being fundamentally transnational in nature. These norms are filtered or mediated through domestic institutions, reshaped by the schematic state, and in their application to the practice of racial politics often contribute to the redefinition of the transnational norm itself. The institutions of the state and politics of the day certainly matter; federalism, system of government, the size and scope of the policy network, path dependencies from previous or existing policies, are particularly important in the determination of the schematic state’s approach to multiracial enumeration, as will be discussed further in the next chapter. Similarly, domestic politics and national culture are
crucial: for example, a nation’s aversion to race or acknowledgment of race as a salient social signifier fundamentally shapes how the schematic state can respond to the transnational moment. The point, however, is that shifting norms and ideas about the meaning of race and how societies should organize themselves racially are ultimately transnational in scope and *have changed the conditions of possibility* in terms of the decision of why and when to count by race in national censuses.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has analyzed the evidence presented in previous chapters, arguing that we have witnessed two transnational moments in which meanings of race and the ways in which societies have been organized in accordance with these meanings have shifted over time. These transnational moments have been mediated by the schematic state, which, in tandem with other intervening effects such as national politics and other domestically-oriented racial projects already in place, has retained its impetus of making populations and their racial identities legible and governable. Nationally-specific interpretations of the meaning of race are still important for political outcomes; as Finnemore (1996) argues, isomorphism is not the same as homogeneity (1996: 342). The dynamic interplay between transnational and domestic spheres has also contributed to shifts in the approaches to racial enumeration employed by the schematic state. During the first transnational moment and its subsequent redefinition, the United States moved from counting to dominate and control to counting to justify positive action, while Canada and the UK adopted an approach of not counting in the name of multiculturalism. At the end of the 20th century, all three countries converged to approaches of counting to justify positive action and counting in the name of multiculturalism, featuring a rearticulation of multiculturalism as *multiracial*. 
Chapter 7
Alternatives and Outcomes in the Census Policy Sphere

The desire to shift the direction of a particular policy, the alternatives proposed and debated by policy-makers, and the final policy outcomes are closely related, though not necessarily reducible to each other. The previous chapter employed a comparative, wide angle lens and argued that shifting transnational norms around the meaning of race and the racial organization of societies has recently translated into a temporal moment of multiracial multiculturalism, which altered racial projects in Canada, the US and the UK. In the racial project of the census, multiracial multiculturalism helped these countries become more amenable to enumerating race in order to justify positive action and to promote a multicultural, multiracial vision of their imagined communities. How states decided upon their particular approach to racial enumeration used to achieve this goal, however, is another story.

Though these states converged in their respective decisions to employ a direct question on race and to provide some means of counting the mixed-race population, they used different approaches for doing so.69 Before 2000, the American census required that respondents provide a single response to the race question, instructing them to “fill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be” (United States, 1990). In the 2000 census, respondents were permitted to “mark one or more races” for the first time.70 This multiple response approach was also employed in Canada, whose inaugural “population group” question in 1996 emulated the question on ethnic origin by instructing that people “mark or specify more than one, if applicable” (Canada, 1996). Great Britain provides an interesting divergence

69 See table 1.2.
70 This approach was recently repeated in the 2010 census.
from this pattern. In its inaugural “ethnic question” in 1991, the census required a single response, asking respondents to “tick the appropriate box” (HM Government, 1991).\textsuperscript{71} This approach changed in the next iteration in 2001, when the census form featured a “Mixed” heading, under which respondents could choose from three stand-alone categories – “White and Black Caribbean,” “White and Black African,” or “White and Asian” – or could describe “Any other Mixed background” in the space provided (HM Government, 2001). Britain's decision is particularly interesting since this approach to enumerating the multiracial population was debated extensively in the United States before it was rejected in favour of a multiple response method. Why did Great Britain implement mixed-race categories while Canada and the United States adhered to a multiple response approach?

A more focused lens is necessary in order to examine how policy-makers propose and evaluate alternatives and come to decisions about the methods that will be employed in the enumeration of the multiracial population. Though the census is a racial project, it is also a policy sphere, inhabited by elites, bureaucrats, “experts,” data users, academics, interest groups, and members of the public. These conceptualizations of the census are not mutually exclusive. As a racial project the census connects meanings of race – meanings which, I have argued, often exist beyond national boundaries – with different means of (racially) organizing societies. I contend that the organization of race occurs through census policy schema in the creation of aggregate or dispersed racial taxonomies, the standardization of racial classifications, the conceptualization of racial categories as discrete or multiple, and the determination of which groups can access government programming. Moreover, who gets a seat at the table within this policy universe, the relative power or influence of its denizens and how they connect ideas

\textsuperscript{71} It should be noted that in all three censuses in the 1990s, the census form did provide a mark-in space for “Any other group” (Britain), “Other” (Canada), or “Other race” (US).
about race to their preferred method of organization are at the crux of the production of this racial project.

The first section of this chapter establishes a conceptual framework that identifies important characteristics of policy networks and demonstrates their congruency with this dissertation’s overarching exploration of the schematic state. It details Marsh and Smith’s (2000) dialectical approach to policy networks, which will be used in subsequent sections to examine the ways in which: 1) macro-level structures such as ideas and institutions shape the scope and power of policy networks; 2) processes of network policy formation institutionalize path-dependencies and access points for network participants; and 3) network structure dovetails with network interactions – that is, agent skills, bargaining and resources – and leads to the policy outcomes of these cases.

**Networking the Schematic State**

In order to gain further insight into the organizational element of national censuses as racial projects, it is useful to theorize the census as a policy subsystem where actors discuss, persuade and bargain policy issues and options in the pursuit of their own interests. An established body of literature on public policy analysis has defined policy networks as the informal and formal linkages joining interdependent state and societal actors together in a policy process (Coleman and Skogstad, 1990; Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Marsh and Smith, 2000; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003; Skogstad, 2008). Unsurprisingly, much debate remains as to the nature of these networks.
and the best way to study their existence.\textsuperscript{72} Regardless, scholars have settled on several main variants of policy networks. The early American literature on subgovernments emphasized iron triangles, which are used to describe the relationship between the bureaucracy, congressional subunits, and interest groups in a particular policy area,\textsuperscript{73} until Heclo (1978) challenged the concept’s hold on the field by arguing that it was far too rigid. He argued that Washington is characterized by a more open policy process comprised of “issue networks,” which is more flexible and allows for the adoption of more innovative policy outcomes. The study of transnational networks has also become more commonplace in recent years. Haas (1992) coined the term “epistemic communities” to refer to transnational networks of knowledge-based experts with a claim to policy-relevant knowledge in their particular areas of expertise, while Sikkink and her colleagues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999) have argued that transnational advocacy networks play an important role in producing policy outcomes in the international sphere. In general, policy networks involve a range of interactions varying by the closeness of the relationships within the network. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest a continuum from policy communities with close relationships (i.e. limited number of participants, frequent and high-quality interaction, consensus with ideology and policy preferences, etc.) on one end, and issue networks with loose relationships (i.e. many participants with fluctuating membership, unequal power relationships among participants, absence of consensus and presence of conflict) on the other.

\textsuperscript{72} The debate in the British literature concerning whether policy networks are a “model” or a “metaphor” has been ongoing for nigh on a decade; see Mills and Saward (1994), Kassim (1994), Dowding (1995; 2001), Pappi and Henning (1998), Peters (1998), and Marsh and Smith (2001). Rhodes (2008) notes that these debates and the direction of the literature generally speaking may be a product of major trends and epistemological repositioning in political science; for example, in recent years there has been an attempt in both political science and the policy network literature to uncover the impact of ideas on policymaking (2008: 438).

\textsuperscript{73} See Freeman and Stevens (1987) for a discussion of the origins and application of iron triangles.
Though network analysis has become ubiquitous in the study of public policy (Rhodes, 2008), the structure, composition and impact of census policy networks have yet to be examined. This disregard is likely because the census is rarely considered a matter of public policy, even by those involved in the decision-making process. But just what is public policy? Thomas Dye (1995) cuts through the endless definitional debates (or, as he puts it, “word games”) by providing a simple definition: public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do (1995: 2). Birkland (2005) suggests that public policy, true to its name, must somehow be public. He argues that public policy must affect a greater variety of people and interests than, for example, private decisions, and because the public is the source of political authority governments must be at the centre of the process of making public policies (1995: 18). Schneider and Ingram (1997) add that “policies are revealed through texts, practices, symbols, and discourses that define and deliver values including goods and services as well as regulations, income, status and other positively or negatively valued attributes” (1997: 2).

Combined, these definitions highlight three important characteristics of public policy, which indicate that the decisions pertaining to the census fit this definition. First, policy is government action – and the census is certainly that – but importantly can also be government inaction. A government’s refusal to act in a given circumstance or upon a certain issue is always a viable and often instinctual and less expensive policy response and can have just as great an impact on society as government action. For example, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, a number of political and institutional circumstances in the late 1970s and 1980s suggested that the Canadian and British censuses would include a direct question on race, and yet both states intentionally chose to not count by race in the name of multiculturalism and social

74 A Canadian civil servant made this point clear: “We don’t make policy. Ok? We’re not a policy department.” S/he justified this position by referencing Statistics Canada’s autonomy from the political whims of the government as an “arms-length agency”. Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
cohesion. Second, the idea that public policy must have widespread effects that ripple through society or designated sectors thereof fits well with the very nature of the census, which is literally to count every person – not every citizen or every person of a particular race/gender/class, but every person – inhabiting a geographical and political terrain. In this sense, its reach is almost unparalleled; as one civil servant (rhetorically) asked during an interview, "What else does the government do that touches every person in the country?" Finally, policies are not simply contained in written laws or regulations. Those who implement policies often make decisions that become part of the policy itself. Consider the important historic role of census agents, who determined a respondent's racial identity and often did so without asking any questions on race. Moreover, Schneider and Ingram’s reference to positively or negatively valued attributes defined and delivered by policy is important – laws and policies are not always circumstances of negative power, in which the state regulates individual and group behaviours by punishing nonconformity. It also provides positive incentives for compliance, which can be highly symbolic in nature, as demonstrated by the multiracial movement's emphasis on the census as vehicle of recognition.

As in other policy spheres, census politics has undergone an evolution in terms of who participates in the policy-making process. In the 1970s, census politics was dominated by government bureaucrats and elites, who only consulted with the public in order to ensure that the questions to be included on the census would garner accurate data. Just thirty years later, advisory groups, public consultations and targeted societal engagement have become institutionalized aspects of the census design process. In short, the participants and the process have both changed substantially, even though, as Ford (1994) astutely points out, “race classification is a type of necessary decisionmaking that is most conveniently done in the

75 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
shadows, so as to allow us more easily to pretend it really isn’t happening” (1994: 1283-1284; emphasis in original). Older conceptualizations of an all-powerful state that unilaterally imposes its will on powerless social groups have been eroded in recent decades, as the state has made more effort to bring society in. Peters (2001) argues that the “participatory state” is an emerging model of governance in Anglo-American democracies. At a conceptual level, this model emphasizes a “discursive” or “deliberative” democracy (Dryzek, 1990) in which the assumption is that more direct democracy is desirable, more transparent and legitimate, and can work through increased public participation in decision-making processes. The editors of _The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy_ concur with this identified trajectory, stating in their introduction that the replacement of government with the notion of ‘governance’ suggests “that governing is less and less a matter of ruling through hierarchical authority structures, and more and more a matter of negotiating through a decentralized series of floating alliances,” with the dominant image being that of “networked governance” (Goodin, Moran, and Rein, 1998: 12). The common denominator in this trend is the state-society relationships have become increasingly and more obviously blurred.

This chapter’s focus on policy networks is a meso-level, or mid-range, level of analysis. Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998) point out that both macro and micro variables must be considered as well. Macro variables include the structural foundations of state-society relations, including institutions, socio-economic environment, ideological climate, history, and culture. For example, the nature of a state’s system of government is an important determinant of the structure of policy networks, as presidential, parliamentary, centralized or federal states have varying dispersions of power and thus offer different access points to the policy-making process for interest groups or other non-state actors. However, because there are an indefinite number of macro-level variables that could potentially matter, Rhodes (1990) suggests that
network analyses begin with the meso-level and from there determine the characteristics of the macro level that seem to influence these meso-processes (see also Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 166; Daugbjerg and Marsh, 1998: 61).

Micro-level analyses provide a greater focus on an identification of the mechanisms through which networks exert causal influence over political outcomes. Several competing approaches have developed over the past two decades and while all conceptualize policy networks as a relevant explanatory variable, there is disagreement over what the precise causal processes may be. Prominent early research on policy networks by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) assumes that the structure of policy networks themselves influences policy outcomes. This structural approach downplays the role of agents and posits that the characteristics of the networks, rather than the behaviour of individual actors or organizations within the networks, are primary explanatory elements of political phenomena. Policy change is thus explicable by reference to factors exogenous to the network itself, such as economic, ideological, political or knowledge-based change. Marsh and Rhodes’s overemphasis on structure is criticized by Dowding (1995), whose own rational choice approach to policy networks highlights patterns of actor interaction and resource exchange between agents. Dowding claims that policy networks on their own explain little. Rather, policy outcomes are the result of bargaining among actors in the network. Policy change occurs when patterns of resource dependencies within the network shift. This second approach to the study of policy networks uses game theoretical models to illuminate the processes through which policy networks influence outcomes.

The third approach, which is adopted in this chapter, attempts to strike a balance between these endless debates over the primacy of structure or agency. Marsh and Smith’s (2000) “dialectical approach” emphasizes an interactive relationship between variables in which one (the structured context in which the policy network functions) affects an other (for
example, an actor, her interests and ideas) in processes of strategic learning, constant iterations and compounded causality (2000: 5). This approach builds upon earlier work by Hay (1998), who argues for a conceptualization of policy networks as sites of strategic action, in which actors form their intentions and preferences based on an assessment of their particular context/situation. The dialectical model conceptualizes networks as structures that are embedded in political and cultural contexts. Networks themselves do not predetermine outcomes, but rather work to constrain or facilitate agents, who interpret and use opportunities or negotiate constraints. Change in the network may come about because of exogenous factors (such as new knowledge or a change in political authority) but this change is mediated through the interpretations of agents. Finally, the structures of and interactions within networks affect policy outcomes, but these outcomes also feed back and can reshape network membership, the balance of resources, and interpersonal relationships within the network as agents learn from their experiences or even the broader social structure. The dialectical approach is intuitively appealing. It suggests that causal relationships are not unidirectional and conceptualizes a reciprocal relationship between network and macro-level variables (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 167) without compromising the search for the processes and mechanisms through which interactive independent variables exert force over policy outcomes.

The focus on policy networks can be situated within this dissertation’s larger theoretical framework of the schematic state. As I outlined in Chapter 2, the schematic state is simultaneously an arena and an actor within that arena. As an actor, the state operationalizes racial projects by putting an underlying racial organizational pattern into place, but cannot control the policy contingencies that arise from it. The schematic is constantly challenged, for example, from (multi)racial identities that refuse to fit neatly into predetermined taxonomies, or by unforeseen policy legacies that change institutional imperatives, as occurred after the
massive increase of "Canadian" responses to the 1991 ethnic question on the Canadian census corrupted the (already inaccurate) data on visible minorities collected through proximate indicators. As an arena, the schematic state is a site where policy alternatives are debated and where the state itself participates among other interested parties. These debates and those who partake in them are critical to the emergence and implementation of racial projects, ultimately demonstrating that while race is not a biological fact or corporeally self-evident, racial boundaries and legal designations are created, maintained and manipulated through the decisions made by people sitting, debating, deciding classification standards in a room in Washington, London or Ottawa. However, the state is not monolithic: as demonstrated below, the composite parts of the schematic state have different priorities and agendas, and state/society boundaries are increasingly obscured in an era of deliberative democracy. In applying Marsh and Smith's (2000) dialectical approach to policy networks, this chapter seeks to answer the two most fundamental questions of policy analysis (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 158): who participates and who wields power?

Macro-Structures: Institutions, Ideas and Political Context

Macro structures in a given society help to determine both network membership and the distribution of power within the network. Important examples of such macro structures can be institutional or ideational in nature, which may vary case by case. The most significant commonality in all three cases is the nature of the census. The census in Canada and the US are mandated by constitutional provision. Article 1, section 2 of the American constitution states that “The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct.” Section 8 of the Constitution Act of 1867 (formerly the British North
America Act) likewise mandates that a census occur in 1871 and every ten years thereafter. Beginning in 1906 a separate census of agriculture was conducted in the prairie provinces every five years and the tradition of quinquennial national censuses has been in place since 1956. In Great Britain, the first Census Act was passed in 1800 and until 1911 the government was required to introduce a new Act for each census held. This was changed with the 1920 Census Act, which gave the government the ability to hold a census at any time once the secondary legislation that details the content of a given census has been approved by Parliament.

There are high political stakes of census-taking in all three countries, linked to the two fundamental government modalities: money and representation. Census counts are used to determine voting districts and other political boundaries and as the basis for the redistribution of government funding to sub-national governments. Census data can be used to justify, modify or eliminate government policies and programming and the census is the main source of information for government, the private sector, universities, non-governmental organizations and other interested parties. Since the 1970s census questionnaires have been self-administered – census forms are mailed to households, to be completed and mailed back. The majority of respondents participate in this way. However, when households do not return census forms trained enumerators are sent door-to-door. All three countries struggle to count populations that are transient (travellers and the young and mobile), difficult to count (the homeless), resistant to being counted (illegal aliens and asylum seekers), have been historically undercounted (racial and ethnic minorities in urban areas), or which are often double-counted (college/university students, persons with two homes, children in joint-custody arrangements). The question of census adjustments – whether or not the bureaucracy should adjust the raw data to align them with a more accurate estimation of different population groups – has become
a political hotbed, leading to legal and political disputes in the US (Anderson and Fienberg, 1999; Prewitt, 2005).

Census policy effectiveness or success is therefore measured by the quality of the data produced and response rates. Both can vary. The self-administered census approach inevitably encounters problems with those who simply choose not to mail back their forms. For example, initial mail-back response rates in the United States declined significantly from 78 percent in 1970 to 75 percent in 1980, 65 percent in 1990 and the Census Bureau’s target for the 2001 census was 61 percent (Hillygus et al., 2006). Previous chapters have demonstrated that census response rates can vary because of what those in the census policy sphere call “high response burden” – the length and design of the census form, the wording of questions and even the list of examples and options provided can dramatically change responses and response rates. The census itself is a huge undertaking that directly or indirectly touches every inhabitant and costs millions of dollars: in the United States, a common tag-line is that the census represents the largest peacetime mobilization in US history.

Though the measures of a successful census are common to the US, Great Britain and Canada, there are important differences among these cases in terms of political institutions. Institutions clearly impact the nature of policy networks, dictating how power is dispersed throughout the levels and branches of a political system. Below, I discuss four institutional arrangements that are particularly relevant: a) system of government; b) federal or unitary character of the distribution of power; c) relationship of the office responsible for the census to the rest of the government; and d) institutional imperatives arising from civil rights legislation.

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76 The initial mail-back response rate for the 2000 census was 66 percent, exceeding the rate of 61 percent in 1990. The final return rate, once quality checks for, for example, unoccupied houses and apartments, were completed, was 78 percent, well over three percentage points for the comparable number in 1990. Hillygus et al. (2006) contend this improvement was the result of a massive media and civil mobilization campaign designed to improve response rates, especially of historically undercounted populations.
First, Canada and Britain employ variants of the Westminster model of government. According to Rhodes, Wanna and Weller (2009), the commonalities of these systems are: 1) centralization of power in responsible cabinet government, in which prime ministers are seen as dominant, and even ‘presidential’ in terms of their power; 2) the core convention of ‘ministerial responsibility’ and the concept that principal officers of the executive are accountable to and must have the confidence of the legislature; 3) the notion of a professional, non-partisan public service; and 4) the fusion of executive and legislative branches of government and adherence to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty (2009: 10). The parliamentary systems of government of Canada and Britain are executive-dominated with strict party discipline and a highly secretive state dominated by Ministers and high-level civil servants. In contrast, the presidential political system of the United States fragments power between the executive, legislature and judiciary and the weakness of party discipline facilitates pressure group politics (Smith, 1993: 9). In effect, interest groups have a far easier time gaining access to decision-makers in the United States than in Canada or Great Britain. For example, minority groups lobbied to participate in the determination of census categories in the United States after the massive undercounts of the 1970 census and were able to gain the support of powerful political elites in administrative agencies and Congress, which was instrumental to the success of their efforts (Robbin, 2000b: 437). In Canada and the UK, however, the parliamentary system embodies constraints on interest group participation and it is largely up to political elites to decide whether or not allow interest groups to participate in the policy-making process or to hold meaningful consultations (Phillips, 1991). This is not to say interest groups do not lobby in parliamentary systems, for they obviously do, but rather is to emphasize that these macro-institutional structures help to determine the policy network’s access points. As Coleman and Skogstad (2000) write, “the preferences and rules of policy actors are shaped
fundamentally by their structural position. Institutions are conceived as structuring political
reality and as defining the terms and nature of political discourse” (2000: 2).

Secondly, the degree of centralization in a polity contributes to policy network
characteristics. Great Britain is a centralized unitary state, though Rhodes (1988; 1997) argues
that in recent years it has become a ‘differentiated’ or decentralized polity characterized by the
transition from government by a unitary state to governance through policy networks. Local
authorities, often the bodies responsible for delivering government programming, are key
participants within the core network. Further, the recent devolution of power to sub-national
governments has a direct impact on the administration of the census. The Office for National
Statistics is only responsible for the census in England and Wales. The jurisdiction for Northern
Ireland and Scotland falls to the Northern Irish Statistics and Research Agency and the General
Register Office for Scotland, respectively. In fact, the 2001 censuses of Northern Ireland and
Scotland feature different “ethnic questions” from the census of England and Wales.77
Furthermore, Local Authorities charged with program delivery are key players included in the
policy-making process. Conversely, in the federalist systems of Canada and the United States
census politics is reserved as a federal power, with little or no provincial or state involvement
other than through consultations with regional or intergovernmental affairs offices.

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77 The 2001 census form for Scotland features the five “coarse” classifications, with several options listed under each. The
classification “White” provides options for Scottish, Other British, Irish, or any other White background (with a mark-in
space). Unlike the census in England and Wales, the second coarse classification, “Mixed” does not offer any options but
instead gives respondents a mark-in space to identify “any Mixed background”. The label “Asian, Asian Scottish or Asian
British” is followed by the choices of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese and any other Asian background (with a mark-
in space). The “Black, Black Scottish or Black British” classification lists Black-Caribbean, Black-African and any other Black
background (with a mark-in space). The final coarse classification is entitled “any other ethnic background” and gives
informants a space to write their responses. The Northern Ireland census form detractions from the model used in England,
Wales and Scotland and lists 11 categories for respondents to choose from: White, Chinese, Irish Traveller, Indian,
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African, Black-Other, Mixed ethnic group (and a mark-in space) and Any
other ethnic group (and a mark-in space).
Thirdly, it is important to note the different relationships the agencies responsible for the census have with other political institutions in a polity. The United States has a highly decentralized statistical system. Norwood (1995) points out that while most other countries have moved towards centralization in their statistical systems in order to reduce duplication of effort among statistical agencies and cost, the US has moved in the opposite direction (1995: 25). There are statistical activities in approximately 70 different government agencies, eleven of which have the collection, analysis and dissemination of statistics as their primary mission (US GAO, 1996: 1). All statistical work is coordinated by a small group of people in the Statistical Policy Branch in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, which is also responsible for establishing standards, classifications and other guidelines for the administration and operation of statistical activities. In the Bureau of the Census the Census Director is appointed by the President and routinely resigns with the election of a new executive. The Director reports to two other presidential appointees: the Secretary of Commerce and the Deputy Secretary of Commerce via the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs (Norwood, 1995: 28). In 1973 the Secretary of Commerce established the Census Advisory Committee of Professional Associations (CACPA) as an advisory body to the Director of the Census Bureau. CACPA provides recommendations on major programs, such as the decennial census of population and housing, other survey research, and marketing analysis in relation to its areas of expertise and currently comprises four member organizations: the American Economic Association, the American Marketing Association, the American Statistical Association, and the Population Association of America. In addition, five separate race and ethnic committees advise the Census Bureau on issues pertaining to the decennial census, representing the ethno-racial pentagon of the American classification system: the African

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78 At the beginning of 1995, smack in the middle of the review of Statistical Directive 15, the Statistical Policy Branch was headed by a Chief Statistician who had a staff of four professionals (Norwood, 1995: 53).
Skerry (2000) argues that from its inception after World War I until the 1980s, the Census Bureau enjoyed a significant amount of autonomy and isolation from congressional involvement, pointing out that the even the highly contentious decision not to adjust the census in 1980 was made exclusively by the Census Bureau (2000: 22). However, the agency’s position within the Department of Commerce and the application of congressional oversight within the American political system have been used to erode this autonomy in recent decades. Former census director Barbara Bryant complained that the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a bureaucratic “takeover” of the Census Bureau by the Department of Commerce:

The cities in suing the secretary of commerce, the Department of Commerce, and the Census Bureau in 1980 and 1990, precipitated the department’s ‘takeover’ of the Census Bureau. Once the secretary of commerce was sued, the General Counsel’s Office at the department had to take on the secretary’s defense. The Census Bureau was no longer a quiet statistical agency out in Maryland, but a problem for the department and its secretary. The lawsuits have diminished the bureau’s autonomy, moving adjustment decisions away from the purely statistical arena (Bryant and Dunn, 1995: 158-159).

At the same time as the Department of Commerce increased its involvement in the Bureau’s affairs, congressional involvement began to reach new heights. Congressional oversight of the census is mandated by the Constitution; a number of committees and subcommittees have jurisdiction over one aspect or another of the census and hold hearings to that effect (Hillygus et al., 2006: 37). However, when polarization reached new heights after the 1994 election, the census became the target of partisan animosities (Hillygus et al., 2006: 36). Congressional involvement in and oversight of the 2000 census was unprecedented, related to the debates
over census adjustment after 1991 and the political climate of the 1990s. For example, starting two years before the 2000 census, the Director of the Census Bureau, political scientist Kenneth Prewitt, “testified before Congress 23 times, responded to over 150 letters from the House Subcommittee on the Census (which itself held 17 hearings on Census 2000 design issues), and cooperated with 522 field visits by the US General Accounting Office, the Congressional Monitoring Board, and the Commerce Department inspector general” (Hillygus et al., 2006: 1-2). Though British, Canadian and American statistical agencies all consider the census to be a non-partisan undertaking, actions in developing or outcomes of the census may have consequences for partisan politics. In the US, the debates over census adjustment have taken a particularly partisan tenor, as the populations that have historically been missed by the census are disproportionately racial and ethnic minorities living in urban areas and are far more likely to vote Democrat than Republican. Many in the legislative and executive branches of government had strong and often partisan views about how the census should be conducted. This also makes the review of census policy in the US a very public affair, forcing the agency to respond to criticisms stemming from Congress, the press, and public and the courts, on the occasions when census results have been challenged (Choldin, 1986: 403).

The major differences between the statistical systems in the United States as compared to Canada and the UK are the degrees of centralization and autonomy. Great Britain has a

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79 In a strongly partisan environment, the Census Bureau announced in the mid-1980s that it would include a post-enumeration survey to determine, minimize and then adjust the census undercount. The Commerce Department rejected the Bureau’s plan and was then taken to court by a coalition of local governments and advocacy groups. The out-of-court settlement directed that the Census Bureau could include a post-census survey and was to decide if adjustment would improve the data, but its decision would be recommended to the Secretary of Commerce (the very same who had opposed the proposal to begin with). The Director of the Census Bureau, Barbara Bryant (a Republican appointee) recommended statistical adjustment to Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher, who rejected the recommendation, implying that adjustment “would open the door to political tampering with the census in the future” (Mosbacher, 1991; see also Bryant’s side in Bryant and Dunn, 1995).

80 See Anderson and Fineberg, 1999.
history of decentralization of statistics, which has slowly been moving towards the creation of a centralized (though devolved) statistical system. Since World War II there have been four major organizational changes to Britain's statistical system (Pullinger, 1997). First, the Central Statistical Office (CSO) was created in 1941 by Winston Churchill, charged with collecting and publishing economic statistics (at the time, strongly correlated to the war effort). Second, the Government Statistical Service (GSS) was established in the late 1960s, a government-wide umbrella body that brings together professional statisticians across the government, including those in what was then the recently-established Business Statistics Office (BSO), which collected statistics from businesses regardless of the department requiring the information, and the OPCS, which managed the census and other surveys aimed at individuals and households. The third development in Britain's statistical system arose after several government reviews questioned the quality of the statistics being produced by the GSS. The Royal Statistical Society (1990) also noted that there was a serious erosion of public confidence in UK official statistics. The Pickford review of the late 1980s recommended further centralization of work on business statistics and responsibility for collecting business statistics (previously with the BSO), and the compilation of other business-related statistics, such as trade and financial statistics (previously with the Department of Trade and Industry) and for the retail price index (previously with the Employment Department) was consolidated in an expanded CSO. The final development was the merger of CSO and OPCS into the new Office for National Statistics in 1996 (Pullinger, 1997), which is headed by the National Statistician (a senior civil servant who is also the head of GSS).

The development of ONS was an attempt to increase efficiency through centralization but also to improve the autonomy of Britain's statistical system. The quality of the economic statistics being produced was of particular concern. In November 1991 (before the merger) the CSO was given the status of an executive agency in order to improve the quality of service
provided to customers inside and outside the government and to publicly restate the arrangements within the agency and in relation to the government structure to ensure the integrity and validity of UK official statistics (Central Statistical Office, 1991). The new arrangement in 1996 ensured that data collection processes would be centralized in ONS, which, as an executive agency is independent of other government departments and is thus able to protect data from outside influences, but that the policy-advice function of GSS would remain decentralized in the statistical units that already existed in government departments. Since this development the British government has furthered its pursuit of an autonomous statistical agency. The 1998 Green Paper sought to stimulate public debate on future arrangements for the UK’s statistical system (HM Government, 1998). After consultations, the government published its White Paper in 1999, which outlines new accountability and governance arrangements for the ONS, including the creation of the UK Statistics Authority, a body independent of both Ministers and the producers of national statistics (HM Government, 1999b). The origins of the position of National Statistician are in this reorganization. S/he is appointed by the government and is responsible for preparing an annual report on the performance of national statistics for Ministers and the UK Statistical Authority.

In Canada, responsibility for the decennial census and all statistical activities of the state is a federal power that falls to Statistics Canada, commonly known as StatsCan. The work of the agency is governed by a single piece of legislation, the 1971 Statistics Act, which mandates Statistics Canada to be the centralized statistical agency that produces statistics and data for all levels of government. By operating under a single law, Statistics Canada is able to share data with other government agencies. By contrast, in the United States confidentiality and disclosure provisions sometimes preclude the ability of statistical agencies to access data. Each of the ten provinces has a statistical office that works closely with Statistics Canada and
interdepartmental coordination is often conducted through project teams with specific data collection or analytical tasks (US GAO, 1996: 10).

Though StatsCan is, of course, still embedded in the Canadian system of government, the agency exhibits and protects its autonomy from political influences. The Chief Statistician of Canada is a senior civil servant who holds the rank of Deputy Minister and reports to the Minister of Industry. Deputy Ministers serve at the pleasure of the government and can be replaced if there is a change of the party in power (Jackson and Jackson, 2006: 355). However, there is a long-standing tradition that Deputy Ministers, including the Chief Statistician, are retained through changes in government. For example, Dr. Ivan Fellegi held his position as the Chief Statistician in Canada from 1985 to 2008, through numerous changes of government and party in power. Accountability and responsibility mechanisms in the Canadian political system work to protect the autonomy of Statistics Canada. The Minister of Industry is directed by the Prime Minister to maintain an arms-length relationship to StatsCan. For example, the Minister cannot overrule the Chief Statistician on issues of confidentiality. Another example is that the Chief Statistician will defend the budget for Statistics Canada before Parliament while in other government agencies Deputy Ministers will accompany the responsible minister rather than appearing alone (US GAO, 1996: 22). Governments have, on occasion, attempted to influence Statistics Canada indirectly, by limiting budgets or, in the extreme case of the Conservative government in the 1980s, by attempting (unsuccessfully) to cancel the mid-year census. When asked about these circumstances, one Statistics Canada employee was quite adamant in his/her response:

Q – Clearly [the proposal to cancel the 1986 census] is something that’s never happened since and probably had never happened before; but do things like that happen often or at all – where you get these top-down commands that influence policy decisions here?
In sum, these three cases represent varying degrees of autonomy and centralization. While the Canadian case is highly centralized and StatsCan values its arms-length relationship from the government, the US Census Bureau and the OMB are embedded in a highly decentralized structure and a system of governance that constantly challenges the non-partisan mandate of the collection of official statistics. The British case is somewhat of a hybrid, having moved in recent years towards greater centralization and autonomy in order to increase public confidence in collection and dissemination of official statistics.

Finally, the institutional imperatives arising from civil rights legislation are important factors that shape the structure and interactions within policy networks. All three cases have legislation in place that relies on statistical data produced in order to monitor the extent of racial discrimination in employment, housing and other areas of social life. In Britain, the first Race Relations Act was passed in 1965 and prohibited discrimination in public places on the basis of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins. The Race Relations Act of 1968 expanded the legislation’s application to also cover discrimination in employment and housing. These Acts were repealed by the passage of the 1976 Race Relations Act, which sanctioned both direct and

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81 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
Statistics became crucial to establishing indirect discrimination: “Such a concept, which requires the investigation of the effects and consequences of an act, procedure or judgement, and not only the determination of discriminatory intent, cannot go without the ability to prove the fact which is made possible through statistical reasoning since it allows for an objective view of inequalities arising from an observable event. It is on this basis that ‘adverse impact’ can be analysed” (Stavo-Debauge and Scott, 2004: 54, emphasis in original).

Though racial monitoring was a critical element of British race institutions, it was not mandated by the 1976 legislation (Bleich, 2003: 108). The Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000 followed the publication of the MacPherson report and imposed a “general duty” on public authorities to eliminate racial discrimination, to promote equality of opportunity and to encourage positive relations amongst different racial groups (Bleich, 2003; Solomos, 2003).

Canada also created its own version of “indirect discrimination,” led by the judiciary’s interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 15(1) of the Charter protects equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law and prohibits discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, gender, age, or mental or physical disabilities. Section 15(2) makes an exception affirmative action programs from section 15(1). In *Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian National Railways* (1987) the Supreme Court defined systemic discrimination:

> Systemic discrimination in the field of employment is the form of discrimination that simply results from the enforcement of the established methods of recruitment,

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82 Indirect discrimination is defined in the 1976 Race Relations Act as follows: “A person discriminates another if he applies to that other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to a person not of the same racial group as that other but which is such that the proportion of persons of the same racial group as that other who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who can comply with it; and which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins of a person to whom it is applied; and which is to the detriment of that other because he cannot comply with it.”

83 The timing is interesting given that the Charter was passed with the Constitution Act in 1982 and the Employment Equity Act did not come into being until 1986.
enrolment and promotion, neither of which being specifically designed to promote discrimination. Discrimination is then reinforced by the very exclusion of the disadvantaged group, as exclusion promotes the belief, both inside and outside the group, that it is produced by ‘natural’ forces, for instance that women ‘simply can’t do the work’.

The precedent set by this decision, compounded by other decisions that emphasized the role of statistics in establishing proof of discrimination, necessitated the use of statistical evidence to demonstrate prejudicial outcomes and “adverse effects,” becoming “a major piece of evidence” in cases of these types (Potvin and Latraverse, 2004: 8; Potvin, 2005). Landmark decisions by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in the 1990s also required statistical evidence to explain observed unequal effects and statistics were particularly important to demonstrate the under-utilization of the relevant labour force pool (Potvin, 2005: 31-32).

In the legislative arena, the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment made statistics central to its proposals and its final report, *Equality Now*, outlined the substantial statistical data required to determine the situation of visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples, women, and persons with disabilities in the working environment, including longitudinal studies to measure progress over time (Canada, 1984b). The *Employment Equity Act*, passed in 1986, works under the assumption that the best evidence that a work environment does not feature systemic discrimination is that the representation of the four disadvantaged groups in a given workforce reflects their distribution in the available labour pool (Potvin, 2005: 32). The Act required Statistics Canada to provide the relevant data so public bodies could determine their numerical targets. There are also a number of employment equity policies in place in different provinces during the 1980s and 1990s, though there is significant variation in terms of whether programs are legislated or encouraged through policy (Bakan and Kobayashi, 2000).

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Government departments, academics, and non-governmental organizations published numerous statistical studies during the 1980s and 1990s based indirectly derived data from the ethnic origins question on the census (Potvin, 2005: 38).

In the United States, statistical data has played an important role in the implementation and enforcement of antidiscrimination laws since the 1960s, most commonly in employment, education and voting (Sabbagh and Morning, 2004: 2). For example, Nixon’s Philadelphia Plan formed the model of affirmative action and required numerical evidence of minority representation. (Skretney, 1996; McClain and Stewart, 2010). There are currently between 150 and 200 federal laws and regulations that concern affirmative action (Dale, 1995), compounded by an increasingly complex body of jurisprudence that has expanded then contracted the scope and application of affirmative action programs.

However, compared with Canada and the UK, in which statistics are required primarily for ethnic monitoring, the Voting Rights Act’s statistical requirements make US case asymmetrical. The Act, first passed in 1965 and amended in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006:

1. prohibits ‘tests or devices’ that had been used in the past to dilute racial minorities – for example, literacy tests, education requirements, tests of good character, racial gerrymandering, and English-only elections in jurisdictions in which a single linguistic minority constitutes more than 5 percent of the voting-age population;
2. makes clear that if the effect of a practice is discriminatory, it is unlawful, regardless of the intent of its originator; and
3. requires that ‘covered’ jurisdictions gain federal permission to implement any changes in election laws or procedures to assure that such changes are not ‘retrogressive,’ i.e., do not make it more difficult for protected minorities to elect representatives of their choice86 (McClain and Stewart, 2010: 58-59).

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86 This ‘pre-clearance’ provision applies only in those jurisdictions in which fewer than ½ of those who were eligible to vote were registered or voted in the 1964, 1968 or 1972 presidential elections and in which a discriminatory test or device had been used to restrict minority voting. Covered jurisdictions currently include the states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, as well as five counties in California, five counties in Florida, two towns in Michigan, ten towns in New Hampshire, three counties in New York, forty counties in North Carolina, and two counties in South Dakota (McClain and Stewart, 2010: 59).
Importantly the Voting Rights Act is the only domain — either in the United States or compared with Canada and Great Britain — in which census data on race and (Hispanic) ethnicity are legally required. The principle of non-discriminatory results in redistricting is assessed by “the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction”\textsuperscript{87} and the potential existence of a significant discrepancy between the black and Hispanic proportions of a district’s population and their percentage among elected representative (Sabbagh and Morning, 2004: 21). Census data is critical to this assessment and the determination of vote dilution, which is “the impairment of the equal opportunity of minority voters to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice” (McDonald and Powell, 1993: 27). The Supreme Court’s logic of “one person, one vote,” that voting power must be proportional to population size, was extended to situations in which racial gerrymandering and the unnecessary concentration or fragmentation of racial minorities created an unequal opportunity for minority or white voters to elect their preferred candidate. This legislation significantly raises the stakes of racial enumeration and the classifications employed in the census. As Eugene Ericksen, a sociologist who served as an advisor to the Secretary of Commerce on the issue of census adjustment, observed during his congressional testimony on the 1991 census, “were it not for the civil rights aspects of this issue, it would not be something we would be focusing on so much” (cited in Skerry, 2000: 4). Comparatively speaking, the point is that legislation and the rights and obligations arising from it help to shape the stakes of racial enumeration, creating incentives for state and societal action as well as inaction.

Ideational variables also influence the nature of a particular policy network, though scholars debate the precise causal mechanisms through which ideas influence policy

\textsuperscript{87} Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), at 36-37.
outcomes. At the macro-level, it is clear that ideas, ideologies and world-views interact with both the institutional context and the policy network structure and act as filters, determining which topics and possibilities are open for discussion, which will be taken as assumptions and those which define the parameters of possibility. Berman (1998) argues that the level of the idea itself determines the type of influence it will have. She distinguishes macro ideas, such as ideologies and worldviews, from micro-level policy positions and meso-level programmatic beliefs, the latter of which provide “the ideational framework within which programs of action are formulated” (1998: 21 emphasis in original). These are likely to be specific to a particular policy network and while programmatic beliefs are not necessarily always vitally important to all policy areas, “where particular programmatic beliefs have taken on a life of their own their possible influence on policy outcomes, through being taken up by members of a policy network, should be analysed empirically” (Kisby, 2007: 83).

As seen in Chapter 6, race operates on all three levels of ideational influence. Race manifests as a macro worldview, which sets the conditions of possibility for state action and inaction towards race relations. For example, the previous chapter extensively analysed the ways in which the post-World War II moment changed conceptualizations of legitimate state action in race politics. Meso-level programmatic beliefs coincide with the level of the racial project, creating circumstances when transnational worldviews about the meaning of race are connected with the (schematic) state’s preferred means of racially organizing its society. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, these programmatic beliefs are flexible; transnational worldviews can shift and racial organizations will change accordingly, mediated by domestic filters that

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88 Compare, for example, Hall’s (1989) conceptualization of the role of institutions in promoting ideas with Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) advocacy-coalition framework, which contends that individuals have perceptual filters that not only limit their information-processing capabilities but that also define preferences, core values, and beliefs. Other models include Haas (1992) notion of “epistemic communities,” Bleich’s (2003) use of “ideational frames,” and Hansen and King’s (2001) contention that policy entrepreneurs in an advantageous institutional position must champion a new idea.
provide more nationally-nuanced conceptualizations of racial difference and the place of race in a given society. In short, transnational worldviews provide the schematic state with a range of ideas that can be moulded and manipulated to fit national circumstances. For example, recall that both Canada and the UK have been demonstrably hesitant to overtly address issues of race and racism. In Great Britain, the government originally felt that the requested label of “Black British” placed too much emphasis on differences of race and/or colour. Canada’s ten-year gap between the Employment Equity Act (1986) and the inaugural race question in 1996 and the ensuing public debate during its implementation suggest that the real difficulty with the question on race lay with the Canadian state, whose agenda for national unity includes an emphasis on the (colour-blind) paradigm of multiculturalism, and the public-at-large, all too willing to maintain “a stupefying innocence...about the enormity of racial oppression” in Canada (Backhouse, 1999: 278). These ideas about race, which are culturally, historically and nationally-specific, are factors that contribute to the “strategically selective context” (Hay, 1998) through which policy options are formulated and the boundaries of the political imagination defined.

In the census policy sphere, meso-level, programmatic beliefs also involve ideas about who should participate in census debates; that is, who has a legitimate claim to decision-making power and which individuals or groups have worthwhile contributions to make to policy-making processes. Consider the difference, for example, between the US’s institutionalized minority participation in census politics with Canada and Britain’s tendency to endorse the participation of the same umbrella organizations they themselves have created and funded. The structure of the policy network will be partially informed by these programmatic beliefs, just as the interactions within the network will reflect the micro-level ideas, beliefs, preferences, and
priorities of an individual agent, as well as his or her understandings of what race is, how societies should be racially organized, and what role the census has to play in these issues.

Other macro-level variables that influence the structure, power and influence of policy networks are malleable and more difficult to predict. Census politics are no more immune to changes in political climate or the political context of the day than are other policy areas. For example, a controlling party's ideological stance can shift governmental priorities, particularly in parliamentary systems when the controlling party has a majority government. Thus, in a climate defined by the introduction of neoconservative principles to British government and society, the decision not to include a direct question on ethnicity or parents' country of birth can be linked (albeit spuriously) to Thatcherite Britain's reluctance to address issues of racial disadvantage. As Ballard (1996) muses about the situation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, "If reliable statistics on a given issue are unavailable, the government is better placed to resist pressure to take positive steps to address it, on the grounds that this would be unwise in the absence of adequate statistical data" (1996: 12). The attentive public's reaction to these shifts in political climate may be equally relevant, as demonstrated in Britain's Haringey incident and its aftermath. Another example would be a political context of fiscal constraint, which White (1992) indicates as the main reason Statistics Canada chose not to implement a direct question on race on the 1991 census. Circumstances may be ambiguously defined, malleable and changing, and yet have a demonstrable impact on network formation, institutionalization, reconstitution and reinvigoration as strategic resources and actors' positions are altered in response to shifts in political context. Networks are rarely formed with unmovable boundaries once and for all.

In general, policy is created within these larger macro-structures, which work to restrict or promote viable alternatives and innovations. Their effects permeate every stage of the policy-making process, from how problems are defined, deemed worthwhile and given political
support (or, conversely, kept or left off the radar), to the determination of which policy alternatives are considered viable, feasible, or even desirable, and the establishment of rules or procedures through which various alternatives are considered, given political leverage or dismissed altogether. Simeon’s (1976) “funnel of causality” suggests that “the policy process itself – the interaction of formal and informal actors such as politicians, bureaucrats, pressure groups, and the media bargaining with each other – reflects and is shaped by this broader framework, and by the pattern of problems, precedents, and politics received from the past” (Simeon, 1976: 556). While these variables can have independent effect on policy outcomes, they are also mediated by other factors, including processes of network formation, the structure of a given network and the interactions therein.

**Processes of Network Formation**

The processes through which networks are formed are an overlooked, but important point of analysis because of the vast amount of evidence that indicates the evolution of networks is path-dependent. In historical institutionalism, theories of path dependency (Pierson, 2000) and critical junctures (Collier and Collier, 1991) suggest that formal and informal institutional arrangements can be rather rigid and once initial paths are selected, there are self-reinforcing institutional configurations that make change difficult once a policy or pattern has been established. Network formation is thus significant in “establishing network traits, characteristics and properties which may prove hard to shed, and may decisively influence subsequent evolitional trajectories” (Hay, 1998: 45). The question of who should participate in this race-making endeavour is as much an ideational query as institutional and both intersect to produce the network structure and its membership.
With no previous experience in asking racial or ethnic questions on its census, British bureaucrats were less constrained in network formation than their counterparts in the United States and Canada. When the OPCS began testing an ethnic question for inclusion in the 1981 census, there was no network in the traditional sense – the state was concerned only with gathering acceptable and reliable data and societal actors were only involved in the census so far as participation in focus groups or cognitive tests. Ethnic groups were only consulted after the Haringey incident, when the question content had already been decided. When testing for an ethnic question resumed in the mid-1980s, the terms of the test were determined by government officials, specifically an internal working group that was created in 1985 to consider the design of the question. Consultations were part of the group’s terms of reference, but the list of stakeholders the working group was to consult throughout the design process were mainly internal to the schematic state. The sole exception to this was that consultations were also to be held with the CRE. However, the extent to which the CRE should be considered external to the schematic state is questionable. Created by the 1976 Race Relations Act and funded by the central government, the CRE was responsible for reviewing the work of the Act and, when necessary, presenting proposals to the Secretary of State for amending it. It was also responsible for funding local Community Relations Councils jointly with local authorities (Layton-Henry, 1980). Though the CRE did at times criticize the government for its stance on race relations, its own close ties with state authority suggest that it operates as an integral part of the schematic state.

Though the internal working group acknowledged the necessity of consulting with ethnic minority organizations in order to prevent the disastrous Haringey results from occurring once more, the members were undecided on the crucial question of when to consult. If ethnic minorities were consulted before field trials, the working group feared the strong
possibility those consulted would object to the designs being tested and poor response rates could again derail the entire enterprise. However, if ethnic minority groups were not consulted in advance, the government would be left open to criticism that it was not taking the recommendations for better publicity and public relations on the ethnic question made by the Sub-Committee on Race Relations and Immigration seriously enough. According to the OPCS and General Register Office for Scotland (GRO(S)), the OPCS and CRE decided to risk criticism rather than jeopardize the census-making process, beginning a series of meetings with Community Relations Officers and representatives of ethnic minority organizations in England and Wales in late 1987 when a recommended question had already been decided upon. The purpose of the meetings was to discuss acceptability and “to try to find out what doubts or fears, if any, people might have” rather than a deliberative democratic policy-making process. Consultation, in this sense, can be likened to a public relations campaign. Though minorities did not participate in the policy-making process directly, their limited participation could still affect change: after the Census White Paper was published in 1988, black groups continued to request details on the ethnic origins of the black population (Sillitoe and White, 1992), leading to the disaggregation of the original “Black” category into “Black-Caribbean” and “Black-African”.

As the trend of participatory government became more normalized in the 1990s, the OPCS decided to learn from and build on its experience in designing the 1991 census by involving the main users of census data from the health sector, local authorities, academia, and the private sector alongside its renewed interdepartmental working group in an expanded policy network (OPCS and GRO(S), 1995a). In 1995 a subgroup on the ethnicity question was tasked with determining what changes, if any, should be made to the ethnic question, to be

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presented in a business case to the Office for National Statistics. The feasibility of proposals would be determined by four criteria set out by the Census Offices, that: a) there is a demonstrated need; b) users’ requirements cannot be adequately met by information from other sources; c) a question can be devised which will produce data that is sufficiently accurate to meet users’ requirements; and d) the topic is acceptable to the public and will not have an adverse effect on overall response rates (HM Government, 1999). Though this evolution of the British policy network featured an expanded membership, the schematic state clearly retained final decision-making power, a good deal of autonomy to direct the debates, and the power to decide which participants would become “insiders” and which would have to find other avenues to access decision-makers.

The formation of the British policy network occurred with an eye towards the past, driven by experiences, social learning and previous policy failures. Past experiences and previous policy trajectories were also important to network formation in Canada and the United States, however in these cases the state had a longer history of enumerating race and/or ethnicity and thus was more constrained by its previous network formations. In Canada, self-reporting replaced enumerators after 1971 and the state’s consequent reliance on ethnic self-identification necessitated extensive testing programs and nation-wide public consultations in order to derive publicly acceptable census questions. One Statistics Canada representative indicated that the consultative process for the 1991 census involved four levels of engagement: internal partners, such as other federal departments, intergovernmental affairs branches in the provinces, and census advisory committees; non-governmental organizations and ethnocultural groups; public meetings; and a consideration of written submissions.91 Of these levels, the most significant is undoubtedly the interdepartmental collaboration via tasked or already existing

91 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
working groups. Several interviewees mentioned that the work of the interdepartmental employment equity working group, which arose in the 1980s after the Abella Commission, was particularly important in deciding which categories would “count” as visible minorities, which would not, and how to count mixed-race people for the purposes of employment equity. However, these working groups were likely difficult to access directly:

Q – Before 1996, before the question was actually implemented, if I was an interest group or even an individual who was interested in talking to the bureaucracy about the way in which race was tabulated or counted, how would I access the decision makers?

Committees.

Q – Committees? Did you get a lot of correspondence? I don’t know how it would manifest. For example, in question period, what briefing notes or whatever you had to do, or letters coming to MPs from people in the community and they would be passed down to you?

There wasn’t a lot of that. StatsCan, when it did its consultations and tests, it kept track of all the submissions made as to why is this question asked, why isn’t my group on there, why are you using terminology that appears to be pejorative. But largely the decision was driven by bureaucrats, who were informed by the correspondence we received.92

Consultations with stakeholders outside the government did occur and as in Great Britain the primary focus of these consultations was to gain access to census data users (White, 1992: 166). Racial minorities were important for focus group testing on the wording of the questionnaire and in the determination of a publicly acceptable response options, but unlike the United States, advisory committees were not struck to liaise with racial minorities:

Q – In terms of the process and the consultations, are there institutionalized census advisory committees in Canada as there are elsewhere?

Not census committees. We have them based more on subject matter. So there’s a federal-provincial committee on social conditions; there’s an advisory committee for

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92 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
social statistics that consists of academics and representatives from some NGOs. Data users, primarily. And people who are considered to be experts in the area or the field. And the overarching committee of all of this is the National Statistics Council. This is the non-public servant Council that advises the Chief Statistician. So that’s the – I’ll call it the layering of advisory committees. In addition, we always do consultations. We never – we don’t like to surprise our respondents. And we want to make sure they understand what goal we have to achieve. And we need their cooperation and quite often NGOs are a good vehicle for getting a sense of what the community would be telling us.

Q – And NGOs, you’re talking in this context about multicultural groups?

Yes, Canadian Ethnocultural Council, all that.93

Another similarity between Canada and the UK is that in both countries the state remained fairly autonomous, retaining the power to determine when and how the network was formed, what issues were on the table for discussion and final decision-making power. When asked at what point minority groups such as the Canadian Ethnocultural Council94 and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation95 participate in the process, a Statistics Canada employee responded, “We drive the process, though, that has to be quite clear. We don’t react to – I don’t even think there is an official lobby in this country, but we don’t react to that.”96

Census policy network formation has been an evolutionary process in the United States. Though racial categories in decennial censuses historically have served the instrumental purpose of promoting a particular racial discourse (Nobles, 2000; Hochschild and Powell, 2008), the potential usefulness of racial statistics to the promotion of civil rights goals became apparent in the 1960s. The first records of minority involvement in political debates over the enumeration of race and ethnicity emerged during the controversy over the significant

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93 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
94 http://www.ethnocultural.ca/about_cec.html
95 http://www.crr.ca/content/section/12/243/lang,english/
96 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
undercounts of racial minority populations in the 1970 census (Choldin, 1994). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and federal grant-in-aid programs designed to redistribute funds to urban centres significantly changed the stakes of racial enumeration. Minority groups mobilized and the Census Bureau became subject to and greatly criticized through congressional oversight. From the 1970s onwards, minority groups have lobbied for additions or changes to the American racial classification system. For example, the lobby efforts to include a means of enumerating America’s Hispanic population began while the census form was being printed in 1968 and lasted until the newly formed and institutionalized Census Advisory Committee on the Spanish Origin Population was successful in getting a specific question on Hispanic identity on the 1980 census (Choldin, 1986). These lobby efforts were marked by conflict and significant resistance on the part of the Census Bureau, which did not want to allow minority populations to participate in the decision-making process. The eventual formalization of minority census advisory committees in the 1970s occurred because sustained political action, increased lawsuits over undercounts, and congressional hearings in which the Census Bureau was continually put on the defensive (Robbin, 2000b: 444) created a situation in which the Bureau needed some means of increasing its public legitimacy.97 The newly formed census advisory committees became an institutionalized part of the census policy network, significantly altering the political discourse between the state and minority interest groups at precisely the same time the census itself transformed from an tool of governance and control to a critical instrument in the monitoring of racial disadvantage and the promotion of a discourse of national diversity and integration.

97 These minority advisory committees were chartered by the US Department of Commerce for the black population in 1974, the Spanish-origin population in 1975, and Asian and Pacific American population in 1976. The American Indian advisory committee was not created until the late 1980s in spite of requests in the 1970s (Robbin, 2000b: en. 84).
Around the same time, the implementation of racial classification standards through Statistical Directive 15 in 1977 was an outgrowth institutional change in a decentralized, federal system of government. The perceived necessity of unified federal standards for racial classification is a clear projection of the schematic state, which concocted a configuration of race and ethnicity that would be magnified at the various sites of their operationalization and would spread throughout the government and society as the standard classification scheme for state and local agencies, the private sector, the non-profit sector, and the academic research community (Sabbagh and Morning, 2004: 3). Yet, this schematic is not neutral or benign. Rather, the ethno-racial pentagon that emerged from Statistical Directive 15 (Hollinger, 1995) was brought about partially as a result of the dominant racial ideas of the time. For example, the Directive instructed that those of mixed-race select one category that “most closely reflects the individual's recognition in his community,” (OMB, 1977) adhering to the prevailing perception in the United States and beyond that racial categories are singular and definitive.

However, the normalization of minority participation in the census policy network is an important contributor to the perceived legitimacy of racial and ethnic questions on the census. Accordingly, when the OMB issued a draft Statistical Policy Circular in the Federal Register that sought public comment on a comprehensive review of Statistical Directive 15 and proposed a catch-all “Other” category without consultation in 1988, the proposal aroused significant protests on behalf of minority groups, parts of the US Senate, other federal agencies and large corporations (United States, 1993). Policymakers learned from past experiences and the mistake would not be repeated: when a review of Statistical Directive 15 was initiated in the 1990s, the dual-track review process at both the congressional and bureaucratic levels multiplied access points for public input into the policy network but was, as one OMB
representative put it, "a one-time deal". The policy network was reconstituted by the political authority of the congressional sub-committee, whose chair Tom Sawyer felt that the changing demographics and ideas about race in the United States necessitated a rethinking of the standardized racial classification schema. The reformulated policy network was far more accessible than any of its predecessors: interest groups were able to directly access political elites in congressional hearings and individuals of the attentive public could contribute to the bureaucracy-driven review through multiple venues (public meetings, letters, conferences, etc.).

It is also important to emphasize that the political venue of census politics changed between 1993 and 1997, altering a number of structural and interactive variables within the policy network. The jurisdictional shift from the obscure Subcommittee on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service to the higher profile Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform Management provided a far more politicized playing field, altering the stakes for those involved in facilitating the hearings. Also, the Republicans gained Senate and House majorities, gaining control of both Houses for the first time since the 1950s. This venue change was likely a contributing factor to the increase in lobbying and coalition-building in the 1997 hearings. Ideational elements were also at play. The political right was far more likely to promote colour-blindness as a political strategy, and significant media attention was given to the very notion of mixed-race the during the four short years between the sets of hearings, thanks to the astronomical rise of Tiger Woods, Wright’s influential article in the New Yorker, Time Magazine’s profile of America as the world’s first multicultural (read: multiracial) society,

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98 Interview with OMB representative, February 2009

99 Interview with Senator Tom Sawyer, 25 February 2009.
and, as argued in the previous chapter, the re-envisioning and application of the transnational norm of multiracial multiculturalism.

In all three cases, the interaction between ideas and institutions helped to produce the structure of the network and its entitled membership. Ideational elements, such as social learning from previous experiences and ideas about who should be consulted – that is, not simply who has a stake in the outcomes, but who should wield decision-making power – helped to define the normative boundaries of the notion of participation in the census policy-making. As an actor, the schematic state possesses some degree of control over those it allows access to its arena and understands that, as Ford (1994) noted, racial classification is most conveniently done behind closed doors. Who is consulted, when and in what capacity are crucial issues that have the potential to influence final policy outcomes. And yet, the trend towards participative government, combined with past experiences and lessons drawn from other countries created an environment in which the schematic state valued consultations with racial minorities. In the task of making effective policy and giving the impression of a legitimate policy-making process, including minorities within the schematic was acknowledged as prudent, and, at times, necessary.

Institutional elements also provided the context for schematic state action. The processes of census design in Canada, the US and the UK are all very bureaucratic in nature, largely driven by the imperatives and priorities of the schematic state. Interdepartmental cooperation was crucial to this method and consensus among different departments with distinct (though overlapping) priorities and responsibilities was not only a compulsory mandate, but was also necessary in order to ensure the population’s legibility, and in some cases standardization, through the schematic state apparatus. In Canada and Britain, the bureaucratic nature of the parliamentary system of government ensured that the state remained fairly autonomous, deciding when and how the network was formed and what issues
were on the table for discussion. In the US, heightened stakes arising from the saliency of race in the American cultural context and more aggressive anti-discrimination legislation created incentives for political action. Including minority groups became part of the institutionalized census-making process. In the 1990s the American case featured an additional layer of the schematic state: though the congressional oversight of the census is a function of the US political system, the congressional committee’s review of OMB racial and ethnic classification standards was not a decennial routine.

**Network Interaction**

How, exactly, do policy networks shape policy outcomes? Marsh and Smith’s (2000) dialectical model suggests that the policy outcome reflects the interaction between the network structure (shaped by the broader structural context, discussed above) and network interaction, which is a combination of bargaining between network agents, the skill and resources an actor has at his or her disposal, and the policy interaction or type of policy under discussion. At the same time, actor preferences are formed through macro-, meso-, and micro-level ideas about the meaning of race, how society should be racially organized, who has a stake in census politics, and which stakes are legitimate. Agents also do not operate in a networked vacuum and instead learn from past experiences and the broader social structure. The network itself does not predetermine outcomes, but rather constrains or facilitates agents, who interpret both opportunities and limitations. These interactions occur within the arena of the schematic state, where the state itself participates among other groups and interests. The state is neither benign nor sinister, but rather is fundamentally schematic, concerned with imposing a grid of legibility onto complex and category-defying identities. Yet the interactions within the policy network exist beyond the purview of the state – though the schematic state is partially responsible for the
network structure, the amount of power it has within the network itself varies. In an age of participatory governance where state/society boundaries are increasingly blurred, the state cannot control the evolution of the scheme it puts into place. Together, these factors provide a more complete explanation of why Canada and the US adopted a multiple response approach to the enumeration of mixed-race while Britain implemented three stand-alone mixed-race categories.

As argued above, the policy type – that is, census policy – is relatively standard among these cases. All three countries strive to design census questions that will produce reliable and publicly acceptable data and all rely on extensive testing programs comprised of focus groups, cognitive evaluations and national tests before each census in order to ensure the question design is appropriate. This political purpose is a critical contributing factor to the dynamics of network interaction because the legitimacy of the policy is dependent upon its public acceptability. High response rates and the production of accurate and reliable data are the standards for evaluating the policy's effectiveness. As such, it is in the state's best interest to involve societal actors in the policy-making process to ensure that the race question is properly worded and will be understood by respondents. The United States recognized this in the 1970s through its census advisory committees, as did Britain and Canada with their user consultation programs.

These characteristics of census policy interact with ideational and institutional elements of the network structure. In the census policy networks of Canada and Great Britain the state retains a great deal of autonomy over the network structure; that is, the state decides which groups should participate in the decision-making process and excludes certain groups altogether. In spite of an institutional bias towards a more closed policy network in Canada and the UK, public consultation was deemed to be necessary in order to ensure that the questionnaire design would produce accurate and quality data. Institutionalized state/society
relations occurred not simply because of the policy type, but also because an emerging trend of dominant national cultures and ideologies in these countries conceptualize the notion of race itself as contentious, problematic and existing in opposition to state-promoted discourses of multiculturalism and national integration. As such, policy-makers often worried about the ways in which a question about race could be perceived as “offensive” to the public, leading both to adopt an approach of intentional inaction in the 1970s and 1980s – that is, not counting in the name of multiculturalism. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, this approach proved to be unsustainable in both countries, though for different reasons. In Canada, the consequences for census policy arising from a campaign against multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism somewhat ironically made a direct question on race necessary since the plethora of “Canadian” responses to the 1991 ethnic origin question stymied Statistics Canada's ability to tabulate racial data by proxy. In Great Britain, the endorsement of a direct question on race from a multi-party parliamentary committee was a critical catalyst in putting the issue back on the political agenda. When Canada and the UK shifted to an approach of counting in the name of multiculturalism and counting to justify positive action, however, both chose to give primacy to consultations with census users and “experts” rather than minority groups.

Why, then, did the similar ideational and institutional structures of Canada and the UK not lead to the same policy outcome? The answer is threefold. First, policy legacies matter. Canada and the United States have longer histories of enumerating race and ethnicity than Britain, which was fundamentally inexperienced in these matters before 1991. As a result, Britain did not face the same constraints emerging from its past policies as Canada. For example, since Canada had already accepted multiple responses to its ethnicity question since 1981 it was predisposed to utilizing the same approach for its question on race. Multiracial multiculturalism in the Canadian context meant giving respondents the ability to report what they “really are”. From one Canadian bureaucrat's perspective, “You would not want people
who are of mixed origin to not have a chance to report the full extent of their background. That was the discussion. You've got to let people report themselves." Constraints also arose from the legacies of employment equity regulations. Though the legislation itself defines visible minorities as a designated group, it does not identify which racial groups are to count as such. These decisions were handed down within the schematic state from department to department, from the categories used in the Department of Citizenship and the Abella Report in the 1980s through to the tabulation of visible minority status for employment equity purposes in the 1990s. The use of the ten designated visible minority groups, standardized by and throughout the schematic state, also made the state less likely to adopt the British model of using stand-alone multiracial categories. Asking why Canada opted for a multiple response approach instead of stand-alone categories, I was told:

No, I don't think that decision was ever really considered because it would be too restrictive here. First of all, in terms of employment equity, there are many different groups. So it's not as if we had just black and Chinese and South Asian, we had a whole bunch of groups to consider; a larger number, and so then you get into which ones do you put down, which ones do you not, and then people are upset if their group isn't shown. Even which examples you show beside the box becomes a major, major consideration. So, there was never any discussion about having a certain number of mixed groups shown in the question itself.101

Canada's previous acceptance of multiple responses on the ethnic question was also a constraint on the policy alternatives that would be considered viable. The state already considered the question to be controversial. The Chief Statistician was forced to publish a statement on the Statistics Canada website and with major media outlets throughout the country in order to explain the purpose of the question (Fellegi, 1996). Because the success of

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100 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
101 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
the policy depended on public acceptance, the Canadian state simply could not implement a single response approach to the race question while it continued to allow multiple responses to the question on ethnic origin. Though this policy option was, as one civil servant implied, a recognition that Canadians were multiracial as well as multiethnic, it was also an adherence to a well-established schematic approach that enumerated race directly, but grouped, classified, ordered and categorized by race in the process of doing so.

Secondly, the relatively closed structure of the policy network influenced two things: a) combined with an already conservative statistical system, it prevented the emergence of new ideas in Canada that would radically alter the path-dependencies emerging from previous policy trajectories; and b) it ensured that both Canada and the UK would grant minority groups limited access to the policy-making process.\(^\text{102}\) Policy networks are rather path-dependent in the sense that the composition of their original formation informs all subsequent evolutions. Statistical systems themselves, however, are even “stickier”. As Starr (1987) puts it, “Statistical systems are conservative in an institutional rather than political sense” (1987: 50). Speaking at an international conference of census policy-makers in Ottawa in 1992, renown sociologist Stanley Lieberson observed that the risk-averse nature of censuses was one of the “devilish principles” of the enumeration of race and ethnicity:

Census-taking organizations are cautious and not readily inclined towards making changes either in the questions or their coded responses. The organization in each country is likely to be conservative; there will be a preference, when in doubt, to use the existing question. When there is unavoidable doubt or pressure about the existing procedure, then the tendency will be to modify (if at all possible) an existing question. If

\(^{102}\) This is not to assume that minority groups would mobilize around census politics if given the chance. However, it has been argued that the multiracial movement in the United States was created as “a movement in search of bodies,” (Nobles, 2000) mobilizing for the sole purpose of participation in the debates surrounding the 2000 census and dissipating soon after census policy decisions were formalized (Farley, 2004). Given that the literature on social movements emphasizes the necessity of political opportunity structures (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994), it seems likely that the limited access of closed policy networks influences the mobilization potential and efforts of racial minorities.
this is impossible and no recourse is available, a new question is introduced (Lieberson, 1993: 26-27).

Policy change is not only costly, but in census politics brings with it the additional concern about the comparability of data over time. Policies and questions obviously can and do change. The point, however, is that both policy networks and the statistical systems they maintain are predisposed towards the status-quo.

The closed nature of the policy network also affects how the public can access decision-makers. For example, in Britain, minority group representation was not included on the advisory committees, and as one working group member put it, "there was no systemic process of taking some measure of the opinion of ethnic communities." S/he went on to state:

...I've always been much more sympathetic to the process in the United States by the Census Bureau, where they do these big surveys and find out what peoples preferences are, they've got the technology; and it's so important. They labels you use, which groups you represent. To my mind, Britain has always had a much more reactive process. These committees derive classifications by – quite literally by processes. By looking at the previous census, finding out who used the free text fields versus the pre-designated categories, looking at how well the data worked, and then developing new classifications and taking them for testing, and then modifying them, the process goes on for about 5 or 6 years repeatedly, designing questionnaires and taking them to the community, modifying them, redesigning them and taking them back again. In my view, the process should be much more sympathetic to building in the views of the different communities at a very early stage, through taking some measure of how people would like to be represented in terms of group labels and categories, but that doesn't happen.

Without being incorporated into the process itself, the only access minority groups had to decision-makers were through traditional channels of lobbying – which, in a parliamentary system of government, are somewhat limited. An ONS representative relayed that there are several channels for interest group lobbies, with varying effectiveness: support from the

103 Interview with Working Group Member, April 2009. Note that ONS did implement this kind of process for the development of the 2011 census.
Commission for Racial Equality, getting “direct roots” into Parliament by lobbying an MP, or writing directly to the ONS. However, as this government insider confirmed, the schematic state determines the membership of its arena and the actors it will converse with:

...at the end of the day, ONS will look across the board, and it will try and make a balanced decision which reflects not a specific need but a range of needs...So you might argue in typical British fashion, that what we are doing is – we are not responding to pressure at a particular point in time, we are responding to a sustained underlying interest, which is continuing, and it is an evolution rather than a revolution. I mean, I think that’s probably true. So, you know, society changes and pressures change. But certainly lobbying, I suppose, is very much here; it’s not perhaps directed in a particularly – how can I say – coherent way... Now, obviously, the office is open to consultation, so at every stage of the process we would encourage people to write in. And they would write. We’d get letters from most of the groups I’ve talked to you about. But one or two letters does not a category make. And, as I say, independent evidence of discrimination and of the impact, which is what the Irish brought to the table very effectively, would be a much more meaningful thing than a person or a group even writing and saying “we are x, y or z and we want a category on the census.” That would not do it.104

In Canada, the tight policy network also limited minority group participation. Statistics Canada sought out “target populations” for focus group and survey testing and invited public comment at every stage of the census development program.105 These consultations with racial minorities were particularly important during the testing phase of census development, but the groups were not included in any substantial way as part of the deliberations over questionnaire design or the preferred approach to counting race or mixed-race. Policy-makers were very clear that “we drive the process,” and though consultations with the Canadian Ethnocultural Council and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation106 did occur, the purpose was so as to “not

104 Interview with ONS representative, April 2009.

105 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.

106 This organization features similar circumstances as the CRE in Britain in that the Canadian Race Relations Foundation was created and is funded by the state. However, it is significantly less politicized than Britain’s Commission for Racial Equality, does not have state-devolved responsibility for monitoring circumstances of racial discrimination and does not report to the government.
surprise our respondents” with unfamiliar terminology, inaccurate group labels or offensive language. Maintaining a certain distance from political demands from above (Members of Parliament) and below (interest groups or ethnoracial organizations) was perceived as important “to allow Statistics Canada to maintain its political objectivity – this has become part of our culture of impartiality.”

Third, network structure dovetails with network interactions – that is, agent skills, bargaining and resources – and leads to policy outcomes. As previously mentioned, in Canada and the UK the schematic state retained a great deal of autonomy and control within the bargaining process. As one civil servant told me in an interview, in spite of extensive consultations and numerous advisory groups, there was never any doubt that ONS had monopolized control over the entire process. Pressure from agents within the network, however, could be successful at altering outcomes, for example, when certain members of the British sub-working group convinced the ONS to include an Irish category on the 2001 census. In fact, though the relatively closed policy network limited and constrained interest group participation in the policy-making process, the Irish lobby formed loose coalitions with members of the ethnic question working group who supported the inclusion of an Irish category. The proposal also met the business case criteria set out by the ONS. Together, the positions as working group “insiders,” bargaining skills, and information resources of these advocates allowed them to persuade a reluctant ONS to include the category. The same cannot be said of other white ethnic lobby groups, such as the Welsh, Cornish, Kurds, and Greek Cypriots, which lacked both working group allies as well as evidence of discrimination. In stark contrast, however, the proposal to include a mixed-race category had no lobby whatsoever, and

107 Interview with Statistics Canada representative, October 2009.
108 Interview with Working Group Member, April 2009.
though a case was made by members of the Health Sector Advisory Group about the need for data on mixed-race children, data requirements on the mixed-race population in order, for example, to alleviate racial discrimination or disadvantage were not well articulated. Thus, in Great Britain the adoption of stand-alone mixed-race categories in the 2001 census occurred because this approach was not a contentious issue among users or the state. The interest groups that featured so prominently in the US policy network were simply not invited to participate. Even if they had been present, the structure of the policy network and the strength of state autonomy therein would likely have guaranteed the same outcome as occurred in the 2001 census. Moreover, the stand-alone categories required less tabulation – and therefore less human resources of the state – than the complicated analyses required when multiple responses are permitted.

In Canada resources were already in place to analyze multiple responses and previous policy trajectories from within the schematic state ensured the network – comprising both the state, which sought policy continuity and users, who sought comparable data – was predisposed towards this approach. Implementing a “mark one or more” approach to the direct question on race also had the benefit of being less controversial than other alternatives, such as requesting that respondents identify by patrilineal racial descent or forcing respondents to check one and only one option, since the very idea of permitting multiple responses aligned with the Canadian version of multiracial multiculturalism and conformed with the racial project of promoting national diversity through the census. This policy option faced no opposition from racial minority groups because, as in Britain, interest groups were not invited to participate in the policy network. Non-governmental organizations and members of the general public were consulted only after the substantive policy decision had been made and the questionnaire had already been designed. This insularity of the schematic state is not necessarily insidious. Racial
minorities in Canada have rarely mobilized in the same way or to the same effect as their southern neighbours,109 and the employment equity policy in Canada is relatively weak, making the stakes involved in racial enumeration significantly lower than in the US. This is clearly demonstrated by the lack of public discussion or debate about whether or not mixed-race people would be included under the rubric of employment equity. Compared to the US, where this was a prominent concern and highly politicized issue, in Canada the decision was easily made behind-the-scenes by bureaucrats and internal working groups. Consequently, in the 1996 census Canada enumerated the mixed-race population by adopting the same multiple-response approach to its question as was in effect for its question on ethnicity, specifically instructing respondents not to print "biracial" or “multiracial” in the space provided.

The fact that the United States also adopted a multiple response approach to racial census classifications in 2000 was not a result of policy emulation, but rather reflected the network structure and network interaction specific to census politics in that country. The network structure reflected ideational and cultural values, which, in contrast to Canada and the

109 The lack of social mobilization around racial politics in Canada is an empirical question that deserves further analysis. The distinct literatures on new social movements and the politics of race in Canada point to two potential explanations, though, to my knowledge, no empirical testing has been done. The first is institutional: Canada’s political institutions present a hostile environment for interest group lobbying. Strict party discipline, a politically neutral but secretive bureaucracy, and, until very recently, majority governments made it very difficult for “outsiders” with few resources and little political leverage to access, let alone influence, political elites and decision-makers. For example, Lisa Young’s (2000) comparative analysis of feminist movements in Canada and the United States demonstrates that different political institutions in Canada and the US – especially the electoral and party systems – have shaped feminist organization’s strategies for lobbying political parties and the parties’ responses to them by, she argues, establishing limits on available benefits and potential costs in an exchange-based relationship. Similarly, the literature on new social movements and the politics of contention posit that institutions help shape mobilizing structures that shape the political opportunities for social action (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001). The second explanation delves into the more complicated territory of culture and identity politics. Sociologists have long emphasized Canada’s counter-revolutionary heritage and affinity for deference (Lipset, 1970). More specifically, racial minorities in Canada are divided by generation (immigrant versus second generation) and ethno-racial group, lacking a similar “national minority” status (reluctantly) afforded to African-Americans. Though many minorities report experiences of racial discrimination (Reitz and Banerjee, 2007), experimental data has demonstrated that visible minorities generally have a low level of awareness of discrimination when they experience it (Breton, 1983; Reitz, 1988). This situation is likely also compounded by Canada’s tendency to use informal social and legal regulations, rather than de jure discrimination, in the creation and maintenance of systems of racial privilege, leaving “no castle to smash, no laws to fight against, no cry to rally around” (Thompson and Thompson, 2008: 46).
UK, never questioned the validity of race as a meaningful social category. As previously stated, the network structure is far more open because of institutions in the American presidential system. During the review in the 1990s, the network was blown wide open, so to speak. Baumgartner and Jones (1991) argue that the designated arena in which policy-making occurs, or the policy venue, is important because “each venue carries with it a decisional bias, because both participants and decision-making routines differ. When the venue of a public policy changes, as often occurs over time, those who previously dominated the policy process may find themselves in the minority, and erstwhile losers may be transformed into winners” (1991: 1047). Such a venue change occurred during the review of Statistical Directive 15, when two distinct but overlapping policy venues emerged, each with different network purposes and participants. On one hand, the bureaucracy-led review had a mandate and desire to reach a consensus and propose a viable policy alternative to the congressional committee. On the other hand, the purpose of the congressional hearings was to discuss and debate – and, it could be argued, sensationalize – alternatives and the review process. These venues were not mutually exclusive. For example, testing programs were developed by OMB to address concerns voiced in the hearings and the information attained during OMB’s review was used in hearing deliberations.

The dual-track review at congressional and bureaucratic levels multiplied potential access points for interested parties. And indeed, multiple groups did participate in the debates surrounding the classification of multiracial people, including civil rights organizations, multiracial organizations, members of Congress, academics, and members of the public. The impact of actors’ skills and resources were mitigated by the openness of the policy networks. OMB’s review was equally open to everyone, whether the public’s input came in the form of letters, town hall meetings or through interest group representation. Though the state enjoyed
autonomy, power was dispersed throughout the census policy subsystem between: (1) the political authority of Congress; (2) the OMB’s control over federal standards of classification; and (3) the Census Bureau’s mandate concerning the census. The decision-making power of the schematic state was also limited by the concurrent congressional hearings, which ensured its bureaucratic arm could not unilaterally come to a decision, and the desire for an open, transparent process, which became particularly acute because of the policy failure of 1988.

The review process also highlighted the varying agendas and priorities of different moving parts of the schematic state. Some departments on the Interdepartmental Working Group were invested in the status quo and hesitant to make any changes to the federal classification standards, while others were more flexible. However, participants in this bureaucracy-driven policy networks had a mandate and a desire to reach consensus, with strong incentives for doing so. As an OMB official relayed in an interview these incentives were monetary and professional: the OMB held the purse-strings of “policy” departments and also rarely provided them with the opportunity to help shape OMB policy directions. Participants in this policy network came to the decision that a multiple response approach was the most effective and efficient policy alternative, in line with schematic state priorities of securing the population’s legibility. The undeniable influence of the interdepartmental working group’s report on the congressional venue is likely a result of this rare exemplar of state consensus in a highly contentious realm.

In the congressional venue, network structure again conflated with network interaction and led to the adoption of a “mark one or more” approach to racial enumeration. Interest groups, politicians and academics were vocal during the congressional hearings of 1993 and 1997. However, neither resources nor political experience could dictate who was able to present their case before the sub-committee. As Williams (2006) notes, the multiracial
movement was relatively new, tiny, unrepresentative, and operated on shoe-string budgets. Nonetheless, Project RACE and AMEA certainly held their own against long-established, better organized and more powerful organizations such as NAACP and the National Urban League while testifying before Congress. The strategies and bargaining techniques employed by these groups were also different, with varying effects. Civil rights organizations were concerned about the tangible impact that stand-alone mixed-race categories would have on their constituent numbers and the ability of the state to adhere to its obligations under civil rights legislation. Also, organizations representing minority groups had a vested interest in preserving the boundaries of their racial categories, which they had been using for decades to converse with the state. The implication is that these organizations represented well-defined, recognizable constituencies, able and prepared to parley with the schematic state on its own terms. Though multiracial organizations argued that mixed-race people did face discrimination by virtue of being mixed-race, they more often clothed their arguments in a language of “recognition,” contending that the absence of a census category was a denial of the validity and worth of their identities. This strategy, however, was not well aligned with the purpose of the policy, which was not about recognition but rather concerned the collection of accurate data in order to fulfil the state’s legal obligations and justify positive action. Moreover, the mixed-race movement was fragmented even in its appearances in the congressional committee, with Project RACE and AMEA presenting different and changing proposals for Directive 15 revisions. This partiality also materialized in the OMB’s testing program, which demonstrated that the term “multiracial” was not well understood by respondents.

The American institutional structure and, more specifically, this policy venue, create more opportunities for coalition formation than exist in the Canadian or British systems of
Two coalitions emerged during the hearings. First, various civil rights organizations, including the National Urban League, the National Congress of American Indians, and the US Commission on Civil Rights, collectively argued against the proposal to add a multiracial category to the census. In 1994 the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the NAACP, the National Urban League and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies circulated a “Coalition Statement” on the issue, arguing that the multiracial initiative would have unanticipated adverse consequences on Black Americans, and would negatively affect the ability of the judicial, legislative and administrative machinery to combat racial discrimination (Williams, 2006: 47-48). A number of Democrats, especially from the Congressional Black Caucus, allied with these organizations during the hearings, giving testimony and asking pointed questions about potential negative effects a multiracial category would have on the legacy the civil rights movement had struggled for. Secondly, mixed-race organizations banded together to demand the recognition of multiracial identities on the census, though AMEA and Project RACE presented different proposals on how this policy goal could be achieved. During the second set of hearings in 1997, the multiracial cause was championed by prominent Republicans, including Newt Gingrich and Thomas Petri. Williams (2006) indicates that Susan Graham, the founder of Project RACE, lived in Gingrich’s district and recounted that during her first meeting with the Speaker of the House she had “waited two years [for the opportunity to meet him]. I was told I had TEN MINUTES to talk with him. I quickly outlined the problem....I handed Newt a bound report with the history of the movement and statistics. He quickly flipped through the report, put it aside and said ‘This is the right thing to do for the children’”

\[110\] Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1988; 1993) advocacy-coalition framework is, in some ways, an alternative to the theory of policy networks. It asserts that rather than being comprised of integrated networks, policy-making is characterized by a political terrain in which different coalitions linked together by ideas, values, or interests bargain and persuade in order to achieve their preferred policy outcome. However, the pluralist nature of this framework has led some to question its transportability outside the American context (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003).
Williams, 2006: 54-55). However, given the Republican’s stance on American race relations and Gingrich’s anti-affirmative action beliefs, the coalition forged between Project RACE and the political right further alienated the multiracial movement and undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of civil rights organizations and Democrats in Congress.

In July 1997 the interdepartmental working group suggested the adoption of a multiple response approach to racial enumeration and almost all participants of the Congressional hearings agreed to the compromise, with the exception of Republicans and Project RACE. Rather than being caused by the effective lobby efforts of the multiracial movement, the policy outcome was the result of both the policy network and the interaction within it. Actors and networks cannot be considered independently – the network shaped who was allowed at table and what was under consideration while the actors’ strategies and bargaining efforts shaped the possible coalitions among participants and subsequently reinforced nature of network. Though interest groups play an important role in census politics, the ways in which these groups and other stakeholders have access to the policy-making process is fundamental to the formulation of policy alternatives and outcomes. The variance between census policy approaches in the United States, Canada and Great Britain demonstrates that standard variables such as institutions, history, culture, ideas, and social mobilization do matter. The point, however, is that the impact of these variables are mediated by policy networks.

Conclusion

The application of a dialectical conceptualization of census policy networks in comparative context has illustrated that macro-level structures such as ideas and institutions shape the scope and power of policy networks, processes of network policy formation institutionalize
path-dependencies and access points and network structure dovetails with agent bargaining and resources to produce the various policy outcomes of these cases. These outcomes can also feed back and reshape the structure of the network and actors’ preferences therein. For example, the Office for National Statistics has decided to build on its 2001 program experience and has made more of an effort to liaise with community organizations and local authorities in the development of its 2011 census program. Though censuses are often perceived to be neutral instruments of data collection, the preceding analysis of the political development of a direct question on race and the inaugural enumeration of mixed-race people in Canada, the UK and the United States demonstrates that policy is often the outcome of political battles. Census policy is no exception. As both an arena and an actor within that arena, the state must provide a venue for groups to propose and debate policy options while acting to protect its own interests. In so doing the state is not implicitly neutral, racist or sinister, but is fundamentally schematic. It is concerned, above even the determination of policy outcomes, with maintaining the ability to direct the racial circuitry of its nation.
Chapter 8

Conclusions

Who in the world am I?
Ah, that’s the great puzzle.

-- Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass

Let us return to the beginning. What can be said of the role of the census politics in the construction of race and of the role of race in census politics? The census appears innocuous. For most of us, it is yet another government form that appears once every five or ten years and is easily dismissed into the nether regions of our conscious minds – until we realize, a day past its due date, that it is mandated by law to complete (and free to mail in, anyway). And yet as innocent as this may seem, the racial classifications used in the census are highly revealing about these dual dimensions of the relationship between politics and race.

The census is indicative of the state-driven classification schemes that permeate the social realm. Categories and classifications featured on the census are also used by hospitals, schools, universities, the police, the private sector, and everything the arms of the state touch. While contemporary society may now accept that claims of racial belonging are better measured by self-identification, community acceptance or cultural idioms (such as Barack Obama’s ability to dance), the fact remains that the state is still very much involved in making racial categories and classification schema in civil rights legislation, affirmative action policies, multiculturalism programs, and even nationally contextualized vernacular discourse.

To query the role of census politics in the construction of race, as this research has attempted to do, leads directly to the doorstep of the state. Given the extraordinary role of the state in defining and manipulating racial categorizations and classification schema, a central question of this dissertation examined what it means to see like a racial state. In an age when
the normative imperative of human rights is long established in the international sphere and states take pride in their legislated prohibitions of racial discrimination, do we believe in the benign state – the last great hope that non-whites have against a racially stratified society – that now protects its citizenry from the social injustices of racial prejudice and disadvantage? Or are we still faced with the sinister state of old, which actively ascribes the racial characteristics it then uses to hierarchically order society and maintain a national, if not global, system of white supremacy? Is the state a monolith with well-defined interests, or fragmented collection of autonomous entities that fight political battles over policy outcomes?

The framework of the schematic state employed throughout this research has identified the state as both an actor with a schematizing imperative and a schematic arena in which other interests decide and debate alongside the state, which itself is comprised of many different moving parts with differing goals and agendas. The primary goal of the schematic state is to make the population legible, turning the unstable and politically contested meaning of race into identifiable, bound racial categories to be used as the basis for law and policy. As an actor, the schematic state is responsible for putting an organizational pattern into place. In census politics this pattern takes the form of a racial project, which connects changing and often transnational substance of race with a means of organizing society, solidifying both the meaning of race and the racial grid imposed on society in the process of so doing. Though this pattern channels subsequent initiatives and makes their terms and conditions knowable, the very nature of racial meanings exist beyond the schematic state’s control, existing in the transnational realm and rearticulated by the social identities of those it seeks to label. As such, the underlying pattern imposed by the schematic state is something of a plan that has yet to come to fruition. Though the schematic state maintains control over the original design of the schematic, it cannot predetermine the final outcome.
The findings of this research suggest that part of the reason why race so often frustrates the schematic state – and thus is extraordinarily regulated in retaliation – is because it is a transnational phenomenon that exists in excess of national boundaries. Race is more than the ascriptive characteristics often associated with it. The references to superficial morphological and phenological characteristics are part of the social construction of race, which I have understood as sets of practices and power relations that determine where racial boundaries lie and what signifiers can be attached to racial categories. The history of census categories demonstrates the extent to which these boundaries and the meanings associated with the very notion of race can shift, rearticulated and renegotiated by the state and forces beyond its purview, including its manifestations in the social identities of individuals and groups.

Two distinct transnational shifts in the meaning of race have occurred in the post-World War II era, leading the schematic state to alter the ways it organizes its society to align with the rearticulated meaning – though this alignment is tempered by national circumstances and path dependencies arising from racial projects already in place. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, race was conceptualized as inherently biological in nature and schematic states sought to manage and control racial populations in accordance with dominant world-historical racial projects of the time. In Canada and the United States biological racialism was animated and rearticulated through the census, which became a means through which these states organized and inputted schemes intended to solidify racial boundaries. Several common denominators characterized their approaches to racial enumeration. First, the racial project of the census represented an effort on behalf of the state to police whiteness, racial boundaries, and biological racialism with a classification schema designed to maintain racial hierarchies. Second, this effort coincided with and was compounded by racial projects of the state housed in other areas of law and policy. As such, the classifications used in the census were closely related
to debates surrounding slavery, reconstruction, colonialism, nation-building, eugenics, progressivism, and the like. Third, in the racial project of the census and its counterparts, mixed-race was constructed as inherently and fundamentally problematic, necessitating even further management above and beyond that provided for “pure” races. Finally, these multiple racial projects were not necessarily a coherent or rational body of governmentality but were instead messy, contradictory and extraordinarily regulated aspects of the many different moving parts of the schematic state. In Great Britain, national nuances such as the imperative of maintaining colonial stability and the comparatively minuscule size of the non-white population mitigated the state's unfettered adherence to this transnational norm.

Changing transnational norms in the post-war era shifted the normative context surrounding the meaning of race, changing the terms of the debate in such a way that perceptions of democratic legitimacy in the Anglophone West depended in part on the state's acknowledgement and attempt to rectify circumstances of racial disadvantage. The key factors animating racial discourse during this transitory moment were located beyond the nation-state and this newly disrupted global culture was an independent force that shaped the altered conception of race that the schematic state drew upon when reforming its approach to racial enumeration. When mediated by the schematic state and domestic nuances, this shift produced a change in governmental approaches to racial enumeration in the United States, from counting to dominate and control to counting to justify positive action.

By the 1970s, the US census had become both personalized and politicized as never before. Political consequences arising from the standardization of the racial classification system, the heightened stakes and increased public awareness of racial categories that drove minority constituencies to lobby the government to add or alter categories on the census, the institutionalized roles for minority groups in census politics, and the new emphasis on the
primacy of self-identification eroded the ability of the state to directly impose its racial schematic on the populace. However, the implementation of the four standardized racial groups stayed true to American ideas about the impermeable nature of racial boundaries as well the difference between race and ethnicity, while at the same time allowing for the possibility that the pentagon could be disaggregated (though not disassembled) to allow for specificity in ethno-racial enumeration. In the shift from counting to control racial boundaries and populations to counting to justify positive action, the schematic state continued to make the population legible the only way it knew how – via discrete racial categories.

The effects of the newly inscribed racial project of the census do not stay bound by national borders. Changes in the domestic spheres feed back into the transnational realm and help to reconstitute the meaning of race and perceptions of the legitimacy of state action with regards to racial discrimination. The US became the tell-tale heart under the floorboards of other nations, making clear the explosive potential should discrimination go unaddressed and demonstrating the necessity of positive action as a preventative measure. Influences across national borders, including impressions and images from the civil rights movement transferred worldwide, systemic evidence gathered from those such as, for example, the Commission for Racial Equality, who went on exchange to the US with the explicit purpose of gathering information, and the academics who drew their theories and concepts concerning race relations from the growing body of literature in the United States contributed to rearticulations of the meaning of race and perceptions of legitimate ways to address racial discrimination that were domestic in application but transnational in scope.

However, the effects of this transnational norm were tempered by national politics, racial projects already in place and path dependencies, which cumulatively prevented Canada and the UK from emulating the American response in census politics. In Canada, the language of
race was jettisoned from the census in the post-war era. Obsessively concerned with setting itself culturally and ideologically apart from its southern neighbour, Canada generally refused to think or imagine itself in racial terms, even as the schematic state first protected, then developed amnesia and aphasia about its nation-building and colonial racial projects. The multicultural turn in Canadian politics featured a schematic state willing to make symbolic and rhetorical changes that superficially disrupted racial path dependencies, but which initially refused to adopt policy changes that would alter the substantive stakes of virulent racial discrimination. In Britain, national politics stymied the state’s opportunities to begin to count by race. In particular, the ideologically- and racially-charged political climate of the late 1970s interceded, as racial minorities suspected that racial enumeration could be linked to the duplicitous intentions of the sinister state.

The successes of the US civil rights movement and the new use of census data to monitor and combat racial discrimination in turn influenced the transnational norm itself, which, when mediated by these national nuances contributed to a shift in the approaches to racial enumeration in Canada and the UK by the 1980s, to that of *not counting in the name of multiculturalism*. My research suggests five idiosyncrasies of this approach. First, states that do not enumerate by race in the name of multiculturalism have a legislative, political or symbolic commitment to multiculturalism, however defined. Second, quite aside from this commitment to multiculturalism, there will also often be legislation that prohibits discriminatory state action and condemns racial discrimination in housing, employment, and other areas of social life. This legislation, however ineffectively designed or implemented, has the goal of alleviating or eradicating racial disadvantage in social, political and economic life. Third, *in spite of* both commitments to multiculturalism and legislation that may require racial statistics to be properly implemented or to create a more effective system of monitoring, there is still
controversy or general discomfort around the very notion of race. In the upper echelons of government, this controversy or discomfort translates into the general idea that counting by race will negatively affect national and social cohesion. Fourth, the aversion of race and racialism is specific to counting by race and is not necessarily an opposition to colour-consciousness. In other areas of law and policy, colour-consciousness may feature predominately or may appear in other political commitments to racial equality. In short, states do not wholly or explicitly adhere to the republican principle of colour-blindness, and therefore not counting by race in the census is not because the state itself ignores race in all venues. And finally, this refusal to count often occurs in spite of calls for the collection of racial data or an acknowledged need for racial statistics from within the state.

These circumstances feed into second repetition of this pattern, in which the last decades of the 20th century were marked by another transnational shift. Though it is not as clear or well-defined as the post-war era, the multicultural moment is characterized by new models and paradigms of diversity governance, which, again, refocused the meaning of race and the ways in which societies organize themselves along racial lines. This moment is characterized by neo-racisms, the tense oscillation between colour-blindness and colour-consciousness, and the transnational multicultural schematics of diversity governance, which can be used to support multiple framings of race at the same time. When mediated by the schematic state and domestic nuances, such as legislation, path dependencies and demographic trends, this shift aligned the approach to racial enumeration in all three cases to one of counting to justify positive action. In Canada, Statistics Canada’s autonomy, the centralized nature of the system of government, path dependent effects arising from previous census outcomes, and the entanglement of census politics with constitutional politics and a national identity crisis intertwined with transnational trends to shape the schematic state’s reaction to this
transnational moment. In Great Britain, racial tension and violence, anti-racist advocacy in urban governance regimes, and recognition for the need for racial statistics from within the state apparatus catalyzed the imperative to count by race. In these circumstances, as well as in the United States, which adopted an approach of *counting to justify positive action* far earlier, the contradictory elements of this transnational moment are held together by the schematic state, with the disparate arms of the state working to both deny race/racialism/racism and affirm that racial statistics produced by the state are required to combat racial disadvantage.

Over time, these three cases also converged in their use of racial enumeration to promote a diverse national identity (i.e. counting in the name of multiculturalism) featuring a discursive construction of *multiracial multiculturalism*, in which powerful norms around the “problem” mixed-race, miscegenation, and rules of hypodescent begin to disintegrate and are replaced by alternative rearticulations of multiraciality. In either circumstance, the primary goal of the schematic state remains to make the population legible, with the intent of turning the debated, transnational and politically contested meaning of race into stable, identifiable categories.

This approach, counting in the name of multiculturalism, is clearly connected to the desire of census designers to develop a question that would be publicly acceptable and would garner high response rates, but also to allow respondents to identify as what they “really are”. In Canada, permitting single responses to the question on race, when multiple responses were encouraged for the ethnic origins question, would have made an already controversial political decision even more so. Policy-makers were also preoccupied with moving respondents closer to the measure and promoting the diversity of the nation as a positive value. The recognition of mixed-race was part of this formulation, but the schematic equated race with corporeal visibility in a multicultural framework and forced the bureaucracy to make decisions about
which mixes would “count” as visible minorities for employment equity purposes. Social and legislative developments in Britain were connected with the schematic state's commitment to recognizing diversity through the census. This recognition manifested through the addition of the Irish category to the ethnic question, the adoption of the labels “Black British” and “Asian British” and the institutional acknowledgement of mixed-race as a viable identity choice rather than its previous conceptualization as highly problematic to classification schemes. In the United States demographic pressures were only significant because they occurred in an era in which diversity and multiculturalism were recognized and promoted as positive values of the American imagined community. However, the tension between colour-blind and colour-conscious variants of multiracial multiculturalism during the review of Directive 15 demonstrates the multiple ways race can be invoked or avoided to serve a variety of interests.

As an arena, the schematic state is a site where policy alternatives are contested and where the state itself participates among other actors. Rather than being a monolithic entity, the schematic state is comprised of different departments, agencies, and actors, who may have varying priorities and preferences. Further, the boundaries that separate state and society are rarely clearly demarcated and have become increasingly porous in an age defined by deliberative democracy and governance. The schematic state retains its focus on creating and maintaining a racial ledger, and while it possesses a great deal of autonomy in controlling the process in which external stakeholders participate in policy debates the extent to which it boasts power over the procurement of its preferred outcome can vary.

To examine how policy-makers propose and evaluate alternatives and come to decisions about the approaches will be employed in the enumeration of mixed-race, I made the case to conceptualize the census as a policy sphere inhabited by elites, bureaucrats, “experts,” data users, academics, interest groups, and members of the public. Who gets a seat at the table
within this policy universe, the relative power or influence of its denizens and how they connect ideas about race to their preferred method of organization are at the crux of the production of the racial project of the census. Macro-level structures such as ideas and institutions shape the scope and power of policy networks and processes of network policy formation institutionalize path-dependencies and access points for network participants.

Institutions dictate how power is dispersed throughout levels and branches of government. Chapter 7 began with a discussion of four institutional structures that shaped network structures and state incentives: the system of government, the federal or unitary character of the state, the place of the census office within the government structure and institutional imperatives arising from civil rights legislation. Ideas can also shape the structure of the policy network. Tectonic shifts in racial worldviews have altered the meaning of race and changed transnational conceptions of legitimate state action in diversity governance. Mid-range programmatic beliefs inform the state’s conception of who has a legitimate claim to participate in the network, while micro-level beliefs and preferences are reflected in how agents within the network interact with one another. In general, policy is created in accordance with these macro-level structures, which work to restrict or promote viable policy alternatives and innovations. Their effects permeate every stage of the policy-making process, from how problems are defined, deemed worthwhile and given political support (or, conversely, kept or left off the radar), to the determination of which policy alternatives are considered viable, feasible, or even desirable, and the establishment of rules or procedures through which various alternatives are considered, given political leverage or dismissed altogether.

In all three cases, the interaction between ideas and institutions helped to produce the structure of the network and its entitled membership. Ideational elements, such as social learning from previous experiences and ideas about who should be consulted – that is, not
simply who has a stake in the outcomes, but who should wield decision-making power – helped to define the normative boundaries of participation in census policy-making. As an actor, the schematic state possesses some degree of control over those it allows access to its arena and understands that racial classification is most conveniently done behind closed doors. Who is consulted, when and in what capacity are crucial issues that have the potential to influence final policy outcomes. And yet, the trend towards participative government, combined with past experiences and lessons drawn from other countries created an environment in which the schematic state valued consultations with racial minorities.

Institutional elements also provided the context for schematic state action. The processes of census design in Canada, the US and the UK are all very bureaucratic in nature, largely driven by the imperatives and priorities of the schematic state. Interdepartmental cooperation was crucial to this method and consensus among different departments with distinct (though overlapping) priorities and responsibilities was not only a compulsory mandate, but was also necessary in order to ensure the population’s legibility, and in some cases standardization, through the schematic state apparatus. In Canada and Britain, the bureaucratic nature of the parliamentary system of government ensured that the state remained fairly autonomous, deciding when and how the network was formed and what issues were on the table for discussion. In the US, heightened stakes arising from the saliency of race in the American cultural context and more aggressive anti-discrimination legislation created incentives for political action. Including minority groups became part of the institutionalized census-making process by the late 1970s. In the 1990s the American case featured an additional layer of the schematic state: though the congressional oversight of the census is a function of the US political system, the congressional committee’s review of OMB racial and ethnic classification standards was not a decennial routine.
The policy outcomes of these cases reflects the interaction between the network structure and network interaction, which is a combination of bargaining between network agents, the skill and resources an actor has at his or her disposal, and the policy interaction or type of policy under discussion. In the census policy networks of Canada and Great Britain the state retains a great deal of autonomy over the network structure; that is, the state decides which groups should participate in the decision-making process and excludes certain groups altogether. In spite of an institutional bias towards a more closed policy network in Canada and the UK, public consultation was deemed to be necessary in order to ensure that the questionnaire design would produce accurate and quality data. Institutionalized state/society relations occurred not simply because of the policy type, but also because an emerging trend of dominant national cultures and ideologies in these countries conceptualize the notion of race itself as contentious, problematic and existing in opposition to state-promoted discourses of multiculturalism and national integration. When Canada and the UK shifted to an approach of counting in the name of multiculturalism and counting to justify positive action, however, both chose to give primacy to consultations with census users and “experts” rather than minority groups. In spite of similar ideational and institutional structures, the policy outcomes were divergent because of the policy legacies arising from Canada’s multiple response approach to its question on ethnic origins, the closed nature of the network in Canada which limited minority group participation and prohibited the emergence of new ideas that would change the status quo, and the lack of controversy around Britain’s approach to multiracial enumeration.

The US’s adoption of a multiple response approach was not a result of policy emulation, but instead reflected the network structure and interaction in that country. The network structure reflected ideational and cultural values, which never questioned the validity of race as a meaningful social category and was far more open because of institutions in the American
presidential system. The review of Statistical Directive 15 took place in two distinct but overlapping policy venues: the bureaucracy-led review had a mandate and desire to reach a consensus and propose a viable policy alternative to the congressional committee, while the purpose of the congressional hearings was to discuss, debate, and sensationalize the proposed alternatives and the review process.

The dual-track review at congressional and bureaucratic levels multiplied potential access points for interested parties. Though the state enjoyed autonomy, power was dispersed throughout the census policy subsystem between: (1) the political authority of Congress; (2) the OMB’s control over federal standards of classification; and (3) the Census Bureau’s mandate concerning the census. The decision-making power of the schematic state was also limited by the concurrent congressional hearings, which ensured its bureaucratic arm could not unilaterally come to a decision, and the desire for an open, transparent process, which became particularly acute because of the policy failure of 1988.

The American institutional structure and, more specifically, this policy venue, create more opportunities for coalition formation than exist in the Canadian or British systems of government. Two coalitions emerged during the hearings. First, various civil rights organizations, including the National Urban League, the National Congress of American Indians, the NAACP, and the US Commission on Civil Rights, collectively argued against the proposal to add a multiracial category to the census and were allied by a number of Democrats, especially from the Congressional Black Caucus. Secondly, mixed-race organizations banded together to demand the recognition of multiracial identities on the census and were joined by several prominent Republicans during the second set of hearings in 1997.
Rather than being caused by the effective lobby efforts of the multiracial movement, the adoption of a multiple response approach to racial enumeration was the result of both the policy network and the interaction within it. Actors and networks cannot be considered independently – the network shaped who was allowed at table and what was under consideration while the actors’ strategies and bargaining efforts shaped the possible coalitions among participants and subsequently reinforced nature of network. Though interest groups play an important role in census politics, the ways in which these groups and other stakeholders have access to the policy-making process is fundamental to the formulation of policy alternatives and outcomes. The variance between census policy approaches in the United States, Canada and Great Britain demonstrates that standard variables such as institutions, history, culture, ideas, and social mobilization do matter. The point, however, is that the impact of these variables are mediated by policy networks.

This research has a number of theoretical implications. First, it has reconceptualized race as a transnational phenomenon that exists in excess of national boundaries. This assertion is only controversial in the present. When we glance quickly over our shoulders at the not-so-distant past, the deeply entrenched coloniality and biological racialism of old were clearly transnational in origin and scope. The discourse of race was born in the transnational realm and the proliferation of norms of race as a biological truism connected metropoles to colonies, enabled the enslavement and trade of human bodies in a global capitalist system and were debated among the international epistemic communities of the day. Yet, in the attempt to move away from the biological construction of race through rearticulation, emancipatory action, denial, negation and aphasia, the transnationalism of race has been obscured and concealed.

Substantial evidence in the preceding pages has demonstrated that racial anxieties of the past and challenges of the present are common to these three countries of the Anglophone
West. This reframing of race is made possible in part because of the disassociation of race with biological traits. If we no longer accept that race inheres in biology, if skin colour cannot adequately describe who belongs in which racial designation, if individuals do not carry their races alongside them like swords in some cases and ploughs in others, then what explains the power and permanency of race? I have argued, and my discussion of the creation and manipulation of racial categorizations of time has demonstrated, that race is a set of power relations and practices under constant (re)articulation and (re)negotiation, often occurring through the excessive regulation of the state. But its origin lies in the transnational realm, and though its manifestations may most obviously and perhaps prominently be domestic in application, they are simultaneously globally textured.

Reasoned speculation suggests a number of mediums through which the transnational flow of ideas about race subsists. First, norms do exist rather ubiquitously in the transnational realm, made more finite by the acknowledgement of international organizations like the UN, UNESCO, and the European Union. These international organizations, however, do not bring norms into being – they institutionalize norms that have already been incubated elsewhere. Similarly, the meaning of race does not simply solidify through institutional imperatives that “encourage” states to comply with various declarations. Rather, the more potent transnational mechanism is in the idea’s ability to alter incentive structures for states to act or not act by changing both the citizenry and international community’s perceptions of legitimacy. The meaning of race is influenced by developments in domestic racial projects and formations, but not all events and all places have the same influence on transnational norms that define the meaning of race. Some circumstances have caught the world’s attention – decolonization, the US civil rights movement, the end of apartheid in South Africa – and worked to shape domestically specific racial projects elsewhere. The US has been highly influential in shaping the
transnational norm, more so than any other nation, but itself has consumed racial information from South Africa. Incentives for action can thus be either positive, through social learning and lesson-drawing from developments in the politics of race in other places, or negative, as states make efforts to avoid racial violence and tension.

Second, the mechanisms through which the transnational norm filters down exist at the schematic state-level. Elites and bureaucrats involved in the design of census questions are an “epistemic community” (Haas, 1992) with an acute transnational awareness of the state of race questions in other countries. The exchange of ideas and information is helped by the UN Statistical Commission, which brings together Chief Statisticians from around the world, information-gathering trips taken by political elites and bureaucrats, and international conferences, as occurred in 1992 when policy-makers from Canada, the United States, Great Britain, the former Soviet Union, and Australia gathered to discuss the enumeration of race and ethnicity in their national censuses. Lesson-drawing also figures in this formulation, as bureaucrats seek common solutions to similar racial problems. Furthermore, the census “experts” and data users that now participate in the design of census questionnaires are also aware of practices in other countries and many of the academics involved in these processes do comparative research on the topic.

And finally, and most difficult to articulate, transnational norms exist at the societal level. Diasporic identities defy boundaries, providing the context for imagined communities well beyond the nation-state. The nation as a framework and the nation-state as a methodological priority cannot explain or sustain the destabilized and debstabilizing subjectivities of racial identities. Membership in a nation-state in the legal sense – citizenship – is a necessity, but often elusive; meaningful membership in the nation in the substantive sense – belonging – is often unrealized. Racial membership can be just as evanescent. However, the
language of race, diaspora, the cultures of dislocations succeed where the concept of the nation-state and transnationality (which, problematically, admittedly, still inscribes the national as the boundaries being exceeded) fail in their ability to explain circumstances and identities beyond artificially constructed geographical constraints.

The second theoretical contribution of this research is its focus on mixed-race as a means of exploding racial processes and practices. It has demonstrated the extent to which multiraciality – as a population and as an idea – has at times challenged, and at other times supported and reified classification schema, perceptions of the discreteness of racial categories, biological determinism and the surveillance and policing of racial boundaries. The focus of mixed-race as a path into the politics of race has illuminated the contradictory nature of category-making and has made explicit the state’s role in creating, manipulating and maintaining racial boundaries over time. The theoretical insights of this project are particularly useful for studies of racial borders as both meeting places and dividing lines. How does the state define those who do not fit neatly into its conceptualization of what is same, different, or threatening? We, the straddlers, transgressors, fence-sitters, disruptors, undefined and perhaps indefinable, who challenge classificatory schemes but simultaneously provide more of an imperative for categorization in our contraventions. What might be said of borderline identities, those who are, in Bhabha’s (1994) formulation, “white but not quite”? These are questions for the immediate future, and those who are interested in the concerns of the security state over religious-based identities in a post 9/11 world should take note: the history of racial classifications has indicated that the state increases its schematizing tendencies when faced with those who defy its logic.

Finally, the framework of the schematic state helps to explain the complex relationship between race and the state in historic and contemporary contexts. The preceding pages have
chronicled an incredible transition in racial politics over time. Racial minorities have gone from having their racial identities imposed by agents of the state, to being highly suspicious of the state's intentions in counting them, to seeking recognition of their unique racial identities through the census. What began as an oppositional story has become emancipatory. This transition implies an anatomic metamorphosis of state-societal relations. What would make a racial population want to be counted in the census? Scott's (1998) original formulation in *Seeing Like a State* contends that the state creates typologies in order to manage, appropriate and control populations. Similarly, Anderson (1991) identifies the census as an institution of a colonial state long gone.

New distinctions between paradigms of citizenship and racial subjectivities are at work here. Racial minorities, for whom belonging in an imagined national community may be elusive in other respects, have found reverence in the census. In its acknowledgement of these complex, messy and ephemeral identities, the state is neither wholly sinister nor benign. But nor is it the neutral arena that pluralists have implied. Applied to census politics, the framework of the schematic state demonstrates that the schematizing impetus of the census does not exemplify a dichotomous relationship between an all-powerful state and powerless racial subjects. Rather, the power and meaning of race exist well beyond the control of the schematic state, from the transnational realm to policy networks and the level of the group or individual. And in its circumnavigation amongst these levels of abstraction, race morphs and transforms.
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**CASES**

**United States:**


*Plessy v. Ferguson* [1896] 163 U.S. 537

*Ozawa v. United States* [1922] 260 U.S. 178

*United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind* [1923] 261 U.S. 204

*Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* [1978], 438 U.S. 265


Canada:

*O’Malley v. Simpson-Sears* [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536


*Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian National Railways* [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114


Appendix A – List of Interviews

NOTE: I have classified all interviews with civil servants as anonymous, regardless of whether anonymity was requested by the interviewee. All interviews were conducted in-person by Debra Thompson unless otherwise indicated.

United States

Representative of Office for Management and Budget, Washington D.C., 13 February 2009
Representative of Office for Management and Budget, Washington D.C., 13 February 2009
Representative of Office for Management and Budget, Washington D.C., 13 February 2009
Representative of the Census Bureau, Washington D.C., 13 February 2009
Representative of the Census Bureau, Washington D.C., 13 February 2009
Representative of the Census Bureau, Washington D.C., 19 February 2009 (follow-up)
Tom Sawyer, Former Chair, Subcommittee on Census, Statistics, and Postal Personnel, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives, Columbus OH, 23 February 2009

Great Britain

Ethnic Question Working Group member, Canterbury, England, 6 April 2009

Canada

Representative of Statistics Canada, Ottawa, ON, 19 October 2009
Former employee of Statistics Canada, Ottawa, ON, 20 October 2009
Former employee of Statistics Canada, Ottawa, ON, 21 October 2009
Representative of Statistics Canada, Ottawa, ON, 21 October 2009
Former employee of Statistics Canada, Ottawa, ON, 21 October 2009
Former employee of Statistics Canada, Toronto, ON, 28 October 2009 (follow-up)
Appendix B - Racial Terms Used in US Census Enumeration Schedules, 1850 to 2000

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</table>


2 Census 2000 was the only census in which respondents could mark one or more ‘race’.

3 The category reads “Black or African-American” rather than “Black or Negro”.

4 “Other” has sometimes taken the form of “some Other Race” on the census. This category has included groups that have varied greatly over time.

5 Asian/Pacific Islander.
Appendix C – US Census, 1990

4. Race
Fill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be.

   If Indian (Amer.), print the name of the enrolled or principal tribe.

   If Other Asian or Pacific Islander (API), print one group, for example: Hmong, Fijian, Laotian, Thai, Tongan, Pakistani, Cambodian, and so on.

   If Other race, print race.

   - White
   - Black or Negro
   - Indian (Amer.) (Print the name of the enrolled or principal tribe)

   - Eskimo
   - Aleut

   Asian or Pacific Islander (API)

   - Chinese
   - Filipino
   - Hawaiian
   - Korean
   - Vietnamese
   - Other API

   - Other race (Print race)
What is this person’s race? **Mark one or more races** to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be.

- [ ] White
- [ ] Black, African Am., or Negro
- [ ] American Indian or Alaska Native — **Print name of enrolled or principal tribe.**

- [ ] Asian Indian
- [ ] Chinese
- [ ] Filipino
- [ ] Japanese
- [ ] Korean
- [ ] Vietnamese
- [ ] Other Asian — **Print race.**

- [ ] Native Hawaiian
- [ ] Guamanian or Chamorro
- [ ] Samoan
- [ ] Other Pacific Islander — **Print race.**

- [ ] Some other race — **Print race.**

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<td>White (English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish)</td>
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<td>White (White)</td>
<td>White (White) (British)</td>
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<td>Black* (Black British)</td>
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**SOURCE:** adapted from Leech (1989)  
* multi-ticking necessary
Appendix F – Census of England and Wales, 1991

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<td>Black-Other</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
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<td>Any other group</td>
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</table>

If the person is descended from more than one ethnic or racial group, please tick the group to which the person considers he/she belongs, or tick the 'Any other ethnic group' box and describe the person's ancestry in the space provided.
Appendix G – Census of England and Wales, 2001

**What is your ethnic group?**

Choose ONE section from A to E, then tick the appropriate box to indicate your cultural background.

A  White
   - British
   - Irish
   - Any other White background, please write in

B  Mixed
   - White and Black Caribbean
   - White and Black African
   - White and Asian
   - Any other Mixed background, please write in

C  Asian or Asian British
   - Indian
   - Pakistani
   - Bangladeshi
   - Any other Asian background, please write in

D  Black or Black British
   - Caribbean
   - African
   - Any other Black background, please write in

E  Chinese or other ethnic group
   - Chinese
   - Any other, please write in
19. Is this person:
- Mark or specify more than one, if applicable.

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<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
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<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>☐ Chinese</td>
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<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>☐ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Punjabi, Sri Lankan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>☐ Black (e.g., African, Haitian, Jamaican, Somali)</td>
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<td>09</td>
<td>☐ Arab/West Asian (e.g., Armenian, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Moroccan)</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>☐ Filipino</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>☐ South East Asian (e.g., Cambodian, Indonesian, Laotian, Vietnamese)</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>☐ Korean</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>☐ Other — Specify</td>
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</table>

**Note:**
This information is collected to support programs which promote equal opportunity for everyone to share in the social, cultural and economic life of Canada.