CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT: A MORAL PRACTICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF CRISIS AND COLONIZATION IN THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY.

By

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This study argues that the Sierra Leone Conflict arose from the society’s failure to institutionalize the post-conventional moral learning organizing principle for collective will formation and for conflict resolution. In this post-traditional society - one artificially constructed from diverse political and cultural groups, without a shared ethos – only mutual (communicative) understanding is appropriate to resolve differences and ensure solidarity. The society’s lack of mutual understanding created crisis tendencies that overburdened her adaptive capacity. By concealing crises tendencies through repression, the state caused their intensification, and eventual explosion into the catastrophic civil conflict.

The study aims to illustrate that citizen’s capacity to practice social (communicative) interaction enables them realize the requisite reflexive post conventional moral learning i.e. the social intelligence or problem-solving capacity to effectively resolve conflict and coordinate society. This capacity enables the society decolonize itself, neutralize normative power, dogmatic consciousness, oppressive conventions, influential customs, and systemic imperatives. Thus, the study promotes the cultivation of civic virtues of post conventional morality (justice,
truthfulness, moral rightness in interaction) as the key to liberate the society from its persistent crisis-inducing colonial organizing principle.

As the theory of social evolution is the basis of sociology, which remains the only discipline focusing on society-wide problems, this study has uses it to understand the disruption of Sierra Leone’s constitutional democratic development. Using the rational reconstructive method, the study explicates the problematic validity of reasons adduced to ground norms, principles, policy decisions, and social interactions. Reasons constitute the axis around which processes of reaching understanding revolve; they serve as the foundation or basis for social integration or for constituting a legitimate social order (society). This means that lack of solidarity or social disintegration exemplifies a deficiency in the logic of social interaction, one that is short of the requisite categorical or species-wide moral cognitive consciousness.

Finally, for this research, colonization is not necessarily externally induced, but possible in the daily politico-legal, social, and educational domains of the society. This study’s key point is that today’s Sierra Leone can achieve solidarity, and decolonize itself from self-imposed its conventional (authoritarian) organizing principle, only insofar as the state, economy, and civil society can find their limits in the socio-cultural domain of communication.
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DEDICATION

The thesis is in memory of those that lost their lives, and became victims of misconceptions of freedom, revolution, and of human arrogance. I also dedicate this work to all those well meaning souls that daily reflect on Africa’s quagmire, and strive to wrest the Continent from its ideological entrapments, and crisis-inducing logics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Critical theory is not intended to replace existing approaches to social science inquiry, but to provide a context for assessment of their contributions and limitations. It can be vital for making sense of such bodies of knowledge by liberating them from self-understanding. From the perspective of critical theory, the key here is bringing instrumental rationality under the control of communicative rationality. This is not just a matter of advocating communicative rationality as a normative principle, but also of empirical investigation to reveal how such control already occurs (Dryzek, J. (1995). Critical Theory as a Research Program In Stephen White (Ed.) Cambridge Companion to Habermas. New York: Cambridge University Press).

1.0 - Statement of the Problem: Unlike other studies, this research considers the 11 years Sierra Leone civil war as a crisis of social integration. The latter represents a stage in process of crises transpositions that continually threatened the society’s stability since it gained independence in 1961. By quickly reverting to an even severer form of authoritarian (colonizing) organizing principle, the state caused the society to spiral into a constitutional/administrative crisis exemplified by military interventions. The almost three decades of one party dictatorship into which this administrative crisis terminated established the precondition for the states adoption of an exploitative and destabilizing neoliberal economic and political order. The latter was accompanied by acute socio-economically devastating structural adjustment conditionalities that constitute an

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3 Drawing on Durkheim, we understand the term social integration here as securing the unity of the social lifeworld through values and norms. If the society’s problems cannot be solved with the dominant form of social integration, then the identity or integration of that society is in danger. See Habermas, J. (1987). Chapter 1. The Theory of Communicative Action Vol II: Life world and System: A Critique of functionalist reason. Cambridge: MIT Press.

4 See Habermas Jurgen. (1970). “A social scientific concept of crisis” In Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press. p. 1. Drawn from medical parlance, crisis often refers to a critical stage in an illness in which one’s self-healing powers become ineffective as the patient’s body degenerate. In the case of the society, the healing powers refer to the adaptive capacity or social organizing principle that enable the society deal with evolutionary challenges or problems that threaten its identity, stability or unity.

5 The social organizing principle establishes the subsystem that assumes the functional primacy and
economic crisis. State repression and fear depoliticized the society, forcing it to comply with decades of this blatant economic exploitation and violence. The neoliberal conditionalities produced social discontents - dispossessed adults, marginalized youths, and radical university students - who became determined to overthrow the regime by participating in a rebel army, the RUF (Revolutionary United Front). At this point, the crisis centered more strongly on legitimation questions – hence a crisis of legitimation, identity crisis, or the crisis of social integration.

The bloody civil war that ensued triggered intense international political discourse, scholarly research, and even Hollywood motion pictures. These discourses, researches and media representations did not undertake a critical sociological investigation that accounts for the historical formative process of the Conflict. Arguing that the Sierra Leone Conflict was caused by the moral depravity of the society, and the State’s eventual loss of monopoly control over coercive force, Kaplan (1994) recommended strengthening the State’s coercive power against every other force - Hobbesian (State) domination – as solution. Smillie et al (2001) argue that the civil war was fueled by the rebels’ diamond greed, and hence they recommended an international diamond certification scheme to manage the nation’s diamond resources. Based on his contention that the peculiar brutal nature of the civil war was due to the rebels’ inadequate grasp of the Marxist guerilla strategy or revolutionary praxis, Abdullah (1998) seem to imply that the pursuit of a Marxist-socialist strategy of change in Sierra Leone would bring stability and emancipation for the society. These recommendations, international control of the society’s mineral resources, strengthening the state’s guides social evolution. McCarthy, T. (1984). *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*. MIT Press.
authoritarian tendencies, and pursuing a Marxist revolutionary strategy or model of change, are not necessarily different from the very conditions that led to the civil war: external control of the society’s resources, and despotism. These researches tend to be mainly empirical analytic, which mainly focus on recommending policy solutions that could recreate the very conditions that triggered the Conflict in the first place.

The recommendations of the above scholarly researches manifest what Claus Offe (1984) calls a crisis of crises management. By not adequately investigating the historical formative process of the Conflict, they could not explicate the connection between decades of authoritarian organizing principle, exploitation, and repression that caused the war or the disruption of the society’s evolution. These studies conceal an important element in the genesis of the civil war: the political question of decades of authoritarianism immediately after Independence. By ignoring the historical formation of the Conflict, these expert analyses and their recommended solutions detracts from what is

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6 The society’s had many discontents opposed to the international exploitation of their natural resources made possible by three decades of dictatorship. The invasion response by rebel with some fragments of Marxist socialist influences resulted in the inhumane bloody civil war. In implementing their revolutionary principles, RUF adopted a politics strikingly similar to those associated with Marxist revolutionary praxis e.g. the use of violence as the means to transfer power or bring about social transformation. In Capital Marx wrote: that ‘Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with the old,’ hence demonstrating that violence has an immanent historical function. See Karl Marx, (1967). *Essential Writings of Marx*: 1818-1883. In David Caute (Ed.) London: MacGibbon & Kee., p. 205.

7 As empirical analytic researches, they are far less rigorous and systematic. Often emotional, these analyses tend to focus mainly on policy recommendations. In these approaches, the war is not seen as a disruption of the society’s evolution fomented over time by crisis tendencies that were concealed and repressed, hence causing their violent explosion in the 1990’s as the bloody civil war. For an explanation of empirical analytic researches see Habermas, J. (1988). *The logic of the social sciences*. Boston: Beacon Press.

8 Habermas, (1979). *Chapter 4: Toward Reconstruction of Historical Materialism in Communication and the Evolution of Society*. Trans. By Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press. Here, the term social evolution implies a cumulative process in which we perceive a direction in the development of productive forces and in the maturation of forms of social intercourse that is not necessarily irreversible. The process of social evolution is bi-dimensional; we cannot analyze it in exclusively in terms of economic structure. “The equation of the base and the economic structure could lead to the [incorrect] view that the basic domain always coincides with the economic system. But this is true only of capitalist societies …theories of post industrial society even envisage a state in which evolutionary primacy would pass from the economic system to the educational and scientific system (p. 144).”
key or at the heart of the Sierra Leone: the chronic problem of undemocratic governance and problems of changing this traditional organizing principle. Deflecting attention from this key political democratic problem in the genesis of the Sierra Leone Conflict potentially traps the society in an ongoing cycle of colonial domination and crises tendencies it produces.

By failing to critically examine the society’s traditional (authoritarian) organizing principle that facilitated colonial repression and economic exploitation, these studies conceal the political genesis of crisis tendencies in Sierra Leone. The lack of fit or congruence between the society’s developmental stage - as a post-traditional, and as a constitutional democracy governed by a lower traditional authoritarian organizing principle – and post-conventional moral and cognitive consciousness of its citizens rendered the society crisis-ridden. This crisis-riddeness manifests as the incapacity of the society to realize its new formal post-traditional social status, and constitutional democratic political status through mutual (communicative) understanding.

Political decisions that reflect the existing organizing principle of [the] society (dictatorship) *ipso facto* do not admit of rational consensus. They could not be justified in a general discussion of what, in the light of present and possible circumstances [repression and economic exploitation] is in the best interest of all affected by them. *The problem is how to distribute socially produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately* (Habermas, *Legitimation crisis*, 1971: 113).

A post-traditional society with an acute unfair distribution of wealth cannot be a legitimate social order, one citizens would find worthy or justified to gain their recognition. Denial of rational democratic opinion and will formation rendered the society incapable of genuinely addressing its crisis tendencies. The tough impediments to democracy posed by the society’s authoritarian organizing principle overloads the
society’s adaptive capacity, disrupting her stable evolution.\textsuperscript{9} The society’s inability or failure to meet its evolutionary challenges of altering the extant potentially dysfunctional authoritarian organizing principle also hinders its capacity to employ and develop its human, natural, nature, and technical resources. The persistence of its colonizing traditional organizing principle induced crisis in the society’s integration. Thus, this study recognizes an urgent problem of understanding the genesis of the Conflict as arising from the misfit between the society’s authoritarian developmental dynamics and the developmental stage or logic of the society.\textsuperscript{12}

To gain such an understanding, this study draws on the critical theory of society, whose central task is to make sense of bodies of knowledge and to liberate them from self-understanding (Dryzek, 1995: 111). To understand the crisis tendencies or disruptions in the society’s evolution induced by its pervasive authoritarian organizing principle, this study adopts the critical theory of society. The society’s persistent failure to realize its formal status as constitutional democracy is directly connected to its failure to nurture a post-traditional consciousness, where only principle or post-conventional morality, rather than traditional or conventional morality, can establish mutual understanding.

\textsuperscript{9} Gramsci, A. (1992). \textit{Prison Notebook}. Translated by Bullgieg and Callari. New York: Columbia. In the words of Gramsci, crisis is a point of disruption, in which the old is passing away but the new cannot be born. This disruption of the society’s evolutionary process shows that the extant organizing principle of the society for coordinating the society is untenable and has weak adaptive capacity, hence the need for a new one.

\textsuperscript{12} The developmental logic represents reconstructible patterns of normative structures (values and institutions) inherent in cultural traditions and institutional change. It tells us the range within which values and norms can be altered or can be expressed. Developmental mechanisms are the actual processes of interactions, which depend on evolutionary challenges - economically conditioned systemic imperatives and learning processes that respond to these challenges (Habermas, J. (1979). Development of normative structures In \textit{Communication and the Evolution of society}. Boston. p. 98
The problem this study hopes to resolve is to illustrate: a) how social actors can become agents of social change by adopting and introducing the requisite post-traditional consciousness in their daily interaction in the moral practical (moral and legal) domain; b) to show how the constitution or the system of rights (subjective liberties or legal equality) can be interpreted to yield democratic rights (political participation or factual equality) to ensure citizens’ reflexive or evolutionary learning that enable the society realize democratic constitutionalism; and c) demonstrate how the practice of democratic will and opinion formation by citizens can enlighten, emancipate or free society from its crisis inducing colonizing authoritarian principle of organization.

In using the perspective of critical social theory, and its specific rendition in the discourse theory or paradigm of law and democracy, this study considers the cultural knowledge (including political culture) and legitimate orders as crucial lifeworld components shaped in communicative socialization processes (McCarthy, 1985). In a post-traditional society, where cultural traditions have become relativized, and the shared ethos has shattered, only the valid reasons interacting subjects present to and redeem for each other can establish mutual understanding. The latter is what confers the stability-guaranteeing legitimacy of the social order, and stabilize cultural knowledge, hence serves to reproduce the society’s identity. By analyzing the intersubjective communicative interaction among social actors or citizens in the politico-legal or the socio-legal system, this study captures the deficiencies in their moral, cognitive and developmental consciousness. These deficiencies exemplify colonial authoritarian

14 The preservation of the society’s identity is possible through socially integrative means of communicative action - communicative competence or freedom, which is internally connected to the
principles that put human rights and democracy in competition, and engender crisis tendencies in the society. Since the denial of discursive freedoms or opinion and will formation (political autonomy or the right to meaningful political participation) seem conceptually connected to a thriving authoritarian (colonizing) organizing principle, this study investigates colonization and crisis from the perspective of communicative action.

1.1 - Research Questions of the Study. The study tries to meet its research objectives by responding to the following research questions that explicates colonization and crisis:

a) Why does colonial domination in post-traditionally conscious Sierra Leone have to do with linguistic communication in the legal, political and social domain?

b) Why is the communicative competence or freedoms of social actors internally or conceptually connected to the integration (or stability) of the social, economic and political domain of Sierra Leone?

c) Why is the justice of the law and social integration in the post-traditional society of Sierra Leone internally or conceptually connected?

1.2 – The Purpose of Study. The study critically investigates the Sierra Leone Conflict to show that unless social actors can muster the will to alter the society’s authoritarian (colonial) organizing principle, threat to its social disintegration will continue. To liberate the society from the extant colonizing organizing principle that induce crisis, social actors must adopt the correct knowledge or learning capacity, which can ensure mutual understanding, and hence can produce a legitimate social order with guarantees of formation of legitimate social orders, or a society whose identity is preserved. See Habermas, J. (1979).
stability. By showing that social disintegration in Sierra Leone originated from subjects’ use of deficient cognitive moral developmental logic in their social (linguistic) interaction, this study hopes to enlighten and motivate social actors to adopt the requisite post-conventional moral consciousness in their interaction with one another.

This research aims to enlighten, and hopefully motivate social actors to adopt the post conventional - intersubjective reciprocal reason-given and response - logic by which they can impartially justify norms of action in their legal, social or political interactions. It aims to enlighten citizens regarding the correct or requisite moral intuitive consciousness they ought to adopt to appropriately interact in a post-traditional society such as Sierra Leone. The legitimation of social orders that guarantee stability in the society (Habermas, 1979) represents a way the society can free itself from the trappings of the extant authoritarian (colonial) principle of social organization.

By showing that the pursuit of self-interest is inimical to the shared interest of society by creating social conflicts, this study hopes to motivate social actors-however weak- to pursue the shared interest, if only to avoid conflict or crisis in which almost everyone loses (Mathews, 2008: 519; Nelson, 1947). By advocating rational dialogue as the way to promote critical consciousness and laws reflecting rational will, this study hopes to provide insights to motivate citizens to insists on dialogic rights that can challenge authoritarian domination. Such discursive possibilities free social actors by bolstering their capacity for self realization and self determination, which is possible in modern society through ethical and moral discourses (Habermas, 1996).

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*Communication and the evolution society.* Boston. p. 183
Citizens’ power to check crisis tendencies engendered by colonial domination depends on the extent they can become “agential persons” i.e. persons free to choose and effect limited changes in their world, or to transform their society through their “agential accomplishments” (Sztompka, 1988: 52 & 54).” Social actors can use their communicative competence or capacity to rationalize (thematize and critically examine) their social orders, hence to unleash the critical potential built into communicative action (rational discourse). The latter makes the unmasking of ideological colonial domination possible, and so determines the “agential coefficient” i.e. citizens’ capacity to engage and “reshape” their social structures. In this study, the ‘agential coefficient’ is conceived in terms of communicative competence or the capacity of citizens to situate their sentences or utterances in relation to their normative, subjective and objective reality (McCarthy, 1979). This study aims to enlighten social actors of the critical potential in the practice of their communicative freedoms, which the political constitution legally guarantees. By using their discursive abilities, freedoms or rights to form their opinion and will in the society, citizens make credible the claim that that the social order (including the rights or the laws they obey) and normative mechanisms for coordinating their collective life is authored by them. In short, this research aims to show that democracy is impossible without citizens’ exercise of their political autonomy, their right of political participation or communicative freedoms.
1.3 - The Historical and Theoretical Context of the Study.  

A) Since gaining Independence in 1961, the status or logical space for a constitutional democracy was established in Sierra Leone. This means that by 1961 social actors were already aware that democratic opinion and will formation was the only appropriate logic social actors should adopt if they are to interact without crisis tendencies or build solidarity. In this historical context, the study highlights the possibility of some level of post conventional moral consciousness in political and social actors’ worldviews as this point of political transition to democratic constitutionalism, and the society’s transformation to the post traditional stage. Insofar as the tension between the faciticity or enforceability of law and its validity or legitimacy was already evident in this period of gradual decolonization, the society was already entering a post-traditional stage, where social and political orders are legitimated only through valid pragmatic, ethical and moral reasons. The formation of the Nation State of Sierra Leone at Independence out of different cultural, ideological, political, and linguistic constellations means the society conceived would have to be post-traditional. Bringing together ideologically, culturally and politically different peoples of the colony and the protectorate, for instance, means this new society can achieve stability-guaranteeing legitimate social order only through mutual (dialogic) understanding.

As a post-traditional society or macro-community, Sierra Leone can achieve stable coordination, and resolve its sociopolitical or socio-legal problems only through the post-conventional morality or rational discourse, in which impartial judgment of action norms is possible. The impartial judgment made possible under post conventional morality requires post-metaphysical thinking or cognitive attitude, in which citizens
assume non-partisanship on reasons. In this thinking, the only authority is the force of the better argument, where the truth, moral rightness, validity or legitimacy claims for an order or claim is proven or redeemed in theoretical or practical discourse. This culturally non-partisan position in communicative interaction also expresses the performative attitude by which one demands that others fulfill their moral and democratic obligation to provide mutually acceptable (valid) reasons to redeem the claims they raise in discourse. Kinship and traditional values have already shattered, and are, therefore, not appropriate to draw on to constitute moral and ethical-political coordination of this post traditional society. In this historical context, this study highlights the tension between facticity and validity in the political processes - as evidence of the society’s possible formal status as a constitutional democracy. The discussion below partially simultaneously reconstructs the level of normative consciousness of social and political actors.

The historical context involves important events that reflected the society’s move immediately prior to independence in 1961 towards a constitutional democratic status or decolonization. In these epochal historical events and interactions, we see a society learning to balance democracy and constitutionalism as the way to maintain solidarity or further decolonize itself. The idea of post conventional morality, (impartial or rational discourse) was already becoming evident in the world view or species wide competence of social and political actors. The historical context helps the study reconstruct the initial steps in the historical development of the constitutional state in Sierra Leone, and its social (post-traditional) basis. The insights gained from this critical discussion of earlier political processes helps the study capture the moral and cognitive consciousness that would continue to influence their actions in Sierra Leone politics after Independence.
The study uses events during decolonization to reconstruct initial steps in the society’s moral practical evolutionary advancement. Thus, this discussion of the historical context aims to show that the society was already moving from a conventional authoritarian traditional organizing principle to a post-conventional (rational discursive) one.

This initial condition of the society’s evolutionary advance is reflected in the political logic of gradualism or ‘decolonization’ of the society from traditional to post-traditional status, to a constitutional democratic state. This logic was evidenced by the learning to balance democracy and constitutionalism. That such learning was occasionally disrupted, preventing its institutionalization (the possibility of frequently realizing it in political discourse), does not mean the society was not moving in that developmental direction. The historical events discussed reveal impediments to the practice of the requisite post conventional morality, hence the inadequate institutionalization of the socio-cultural learning that would balance human rights and democracy.

From the following isolated issues and events constituting the historical context of this study, we glean the stage of the society’s initial evolutionary advance: the 1955 workers strike; the fear of the Krios losing their hegemony in post Independent Sierra Leone; regional political party divisions; tensions in the United Front for Independence; the APC and Siaka Stevens’ threat to invade Sierra Leone at Independence; possible British colonial interest, including its promotion of the liberal paradigm of law in Sierra Leone. Discussion of these events serves to reconstruct the requisite developmental logic already present in the worldviews of social and political actors at this time, even though such worldviews were yet institutionalized or made practically possible regularly.
a) The Workers Strike of 1955 and the United Front for Independence. During British colonization, Sierra Leone workers were exploited. This was reflected in the steady decline in their real wages at that time.\textsuperscript{20} The matter reached its climax in 1955, when workers intensified their agitation, demanding higher wages and better standard of living. Their civil disobedience campaigns for higher wages also led to intensified calls for self-rule or decolonization. The colonial government’s handling of the 1955 workers strike led by Marcus Grant and H. M. Georgestone reflected a dominating response (Luke, 1984, Wyse, 1990). Siaka Stevens, the cabinet member for the Labor, Mines and Works Department for SLPP (the party that co-governed with Britain) negotiated with the labor leaders to call off the strike. Stevens set up a Board of Inquiry to investigate the cause of the deadlock. However, before the Board of Inquiry could release its finding, Stevens went ahead to appoint a parallel Commission of Inquiry to investigate the same matter. Since the Board of Inquiry was still conducting investigations, the new Commission prejudiced the Board’s deliberations. The government’s intentions became clear when it blocked the release or publication of the Board’s findings, the Marke Report, but went ahead to publish the findings of the Commission of Inquiry contained in the Shaw Report. Why were the findings of the Board of inquiry not published, and why did the government treat the Board of inquiry with contempt, but never officially suspended it?

The published findings of the Commission of Inquiry give us clues to the answer. The Shaw Report of the Commission acknowledged that the widespread dissatisfaction among workers was due to the increase in the cost of living (p. 4 of the Shaw Report.

cited in Luke, 1984). Part of the Shaw Report gave clues into the possible intent of the colonial government in setting up the ‘parallel investigation.’ The pro-government Shaw Report marginalized labor leaders, attacking Marcus Grant, the Union Leader this way:

It is tragic that so much authority should be concentrated in the hands of a man as ambitious, as unscrupulous and worthless as Marcus Grant. So long as he remains where he is, the interests of the community at large will not be well served. No doubt... there are good leaders in Sierra Leone...While we do not exonerate Georgestone, altogether, we do not attribute to him a major share of the responsibility for the strike and its consequences. Indeed, we do not exclude him from the number of potentially good trade union leaders.22

In these words, we see the colonial strategy of state marginalization and repression of a legitimate labor dissent, rather than a democratic response to workers’ genuine concerns. In the Commission’s findings, we see a sophisticated public relations work.

Notwithstanding these colonial manipulations, the regime’s recognition of the need for mutual understanding with subjects underscores the idea of democratic constitutionalism i.e. that social and political orders are legitimated only insofar as they gain citizens’ assent. The democratic principle of publicity exemplified by the Commission or Board of Inquiry was supposed to demonstrate this point. But, the colonial state’s negative tactic of dividing the leadership of the labor movement instead created a competition between a low political culture of democracy (state marginalization and political corruption), and the private and political rights it professed to promote in Sierra Leoneans at the time.23 The state’s commission politics aimed at ‘normalizing’ the

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23 See Thomas S. Cox, (1976). Civil military relations in Sierra Leone: a case of Africa soldiers in politics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University press. 30-37. He talks about the low political culture in Sierra Leone politics during gradualism or decolonization, the period immediately prior to Independence in 1961. Political culture consists of the basic attitudes mediated by tradition and socialization that shape the manner a society resolves its governance problems. An egalitarian political culture is the
situation was a fake democratic response. In reality, it merely tried to achieve its particular systemic interest through the biased Commission of Inquiry, while passing it off as a democratic public forum. The pro-government Commission of Inquiry more or less replaced or marginalized the original Board of Inquiry without making this position official, hence subverting the principle of publicity. State manipulation reflected deception, marginalization, systematic deformation and distortion of discourse.

By using the arbitrary Shaw Report of the Commission, the colonial government tried to legitimize its arbitrary response. Though this Commission was constituted through the legal powers of the State, its democratic legitimacy was in question because those affected were not represented and their issues were not genuinely addressed in it. Violating the democracy principle this way, reflects how the colonial government made arbitrariness an institution (McCarthy, 1985). In this deformation of political discourse, we see the manifestation of the dangerous colonial ideology that the state can subsume the interest of society or stand above society with impunity (Habermas, 1996). Thus, Britain’s corrupt use of democratic instruments of society (deliberative commissions) to effect colonial domination partly shaped the corrupt tone, strategy and consciousness of political actors in Sierra Leone after Independence.

As expected, the workers strongly opposed the government’s parallel propaganda or public relations campaign in the Shaw Report, publicly detesting its contents, recommendations and criticism of their leader, Marcus Grant. To show their support for him, the labor movement passed a vote of confidence in him. The 1955 strike exposed institutionalization of a rule necessary for the democratic practice of social rights or entitlements and for the realization of popular sovereignty. J. Habermas, (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge., pp. 88-90.
the conservatism and detachment of some union leaders from their base, the workers. Luke (1984) claimed that the cooperative posture of some of the labor leaders with the colonial State was born out of the need to preserve their newfound respectability. This caused them to negotiate irresponsibly with firms so that workers’ wages failed to keep up with their cost of living (Luke, p. 51). One can argue that the colonial manipulation of the government occasioned the disunity and civil privatism of some labor leaders.

Workers and their supporters vandalized houses belonging to SLPP Ministers (the majority party co-governing with Britain at this time), such as Siaka Stevens (Labor, Mines and Works); Albert (Education) and; Sanusi Mustapha (Transportation). The violence showed the manner colonized subjects used to register their resentment against the colonial order or its internal collaborative elite (Luke, 1984). Amidst the poverty of ordinary citizens, the elite flagrantly displayed their ill-gotten wealth, making them targets for mob action. Ironically, these very same leaders the youths and workers resented became the prominent political leaders of the post-1961 period. Rallying behind these politicians in the post-Independence period, after showing so much rage against them, underscores Hannah Arendt’s (1962) point that citizens’ lack of discerning judgment arises from their being unaccustomed to a liberal political culture of public discourse and rationalization. In the absence of a sustained liberal democratic political culture, citizens’ sporadic critical reactive response or spurts of moral consciousness and learning cannot be sustained. This shows that violent change in society does not necessarily provide the insights that can enable a society effectively realize and autonomously determine itself.
The low colonial political culture the society was accustomed to at this time reflects a colonial totalitarian social organizing principle. The colonial government used brutal military means to quell the labor protests (Cox, 1976; Wyse, 1990; and Cartwright, 1987). The commission of inquiry was an ideological (inconspicuous) tool of colonial domination that subverted genuine political economic discourse. It constitutes the means by which the colonial system imposed its imperatives on the socio-cultural domain. The Commission of Inquiry, which was supposed to deliberate and investigate the legitimate demands of the workers and resolve it, served instead to redefine the problem situation: it privatized the matter, making it one about the over-ambition and public incitement by labor leaders. To divide and marginalize the labor movement and suppress legitimate dissent, the colonial government used media propaganda and shaming. Techniques of depoliticizing the public sphere, marginalizing radical leaders, co-opting moderates, and subverting supposed democratic public forums characterize the colonizing logic of the society before 1961.

b) Low Political Culture (Constitutionalism without democracy and vice versa). In 1953, a significant episode in parliament with destabilizing effect on the future of Sierra Leone politics occurred. That year Bankole Bright, the eloquent Opposition leader, questioned the Governor General’s interference in Sierra Leone politics. The Attorney General (Albert Margai at the time) rebuked him by saying that “the honorable speaker (Bright) seeks to apply to Sierra Leone certain practices which are appropriate to a colony with a more advanced constitution…My submission is that the rules which are applicable to the Governor General of a dominion are not applicable to the Governor General of this
Colony …The Governor is both in form and in fact, the Executive (Wyse, 1990: 184).” Clearly, Sir Albert’s (the Attorney General at the time) response seemed to defend the exemption of the Governor General’s from critique or parliamentary discourses of justification. This rebuke simultaneously stifled the democratic point Bright was trying to make. By rebuking Mr. Bright for questioning the Governor General’s interference in Sierra Leone politics, we see how native Sierra Leonean politicians were complicit in placing colonial impediments to democratic opinion and will formation during what was supposed to be the gradual learning in democratic self rule or self determination. For a Colony that was supposed to be training for democratic constitutionalism, such rebuke represents a paradox. The colonial government claimed to train Sierra Leoneans in modern democratic constitutionalism, yet discouraged their practice of democratic will and opinion formation, a reflexive learning vital to realize democratic constitutionalism. This discursive constraint denies the mutual supposition of constitutionalism and democratic practice (Habermas, 1996).

Wyse’s (1990) endorses Sir Albert’s position by arguing that Bright failed to understand the fine points of colonial politics or rule as it applied to a colonial dependency: “Africans do not think like Europeans - no amount of education could make them understand European civilization - it is not a matter of intelligence, they are intelligent, it is just that they do not think as the European does (p. 184).” He continued by saying that Europeans believe “Africans could not be assimilated, and so, therefore, they could not expect to have the same rights and privileges as obtained in Britain (Wyse, 1990, p. 184).” Wyse seem to posit a metaphysical or ontological claim for the possibility of political acculturation and world view of the African, their incapacity to
adopt constitutional democratic attitudinal change. Amilca Cabral has warned against such ontological positions by arguing that in discussing our (African) history, it is always important to draw on lessons of the epochal revolutions that gave birth to democratic constitutionalism such as the French revolution. The exemption of the Governor General issue from political discourse was also taken for granted by Wyse. This differential access to rights and privileges of communicative freedoms or political autonomy stifled the requisite post-conventional moral learning capacity necessary to nurture democratic constitutionalism after Independence.

While Wyse was right in gathering that the form of parliamentary exchange illustrated that the colony was still far from the center of decision making (Wyse, 1990: 170), he ignored the fact that democratic will formation or rational discourse in parliament is what brings decision making home to Sierra Leone. Of course, when the seat of power is spatially and temporally removed from the representatives of the society or parliament, that society is not Independent. The rash rebuttal of Bright ominously hinted at the very first constitutional crisis that would end in decades of dictatorship. Bright’s concern about the Governor General’s participation in parliamentary deliberations as a non-democratic representative was stifled. The logic of this political culture that impedes rational political discourse during the gradualist training for self rule constitutes colonial domination. Denying a legislator unconstrained discursive capacity to question the Governor General’s status as the Executive, ‘in form and in fact,’ makes a mockery of Britain’s experiment in preparing its colony for gradual constitutional democratic learning. This political practice hindered the institutionalization of democratic will and opinion formation.
c) The Liberal Paradigm of Law - Another important historical background element is Britain’s promotion of a liberal legal paradigm almost empty of moral principles in Sierra Leone, and its other African colonies. Britain abandoned its initial attempt to systemize and develop customary and indigenous law in favor of an “applied science” approach to law. It promoted this paradigm in the London Conference of 1959 by recommending that legal education in Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ghana and Botswana, and Lesotho focus more on “practical training,” where “law degree would be neither necessary nor sufficient for admission to the profession,” even endorsing “articled clerkship as complete alternative to formal legal education.”

Anthony Allot, among others, warned that this “applied science” approach would create a generation of lawyers, judges and politicians who cared little for legal principles at a time when these newly independent African states needed to be consciously responsible for the ordered evolution and adaptation of existing legal principles. Most African leaders endorsed the unprincipled practical approach, and contested the need to systematize and develop customary and indigenous law, while supporting the (economic) development approach to law. Earlier universities in Nigeria and Makarere came to be known as “Development Universities,” abandoning legal principles and professionalism for an economic approach to development (p. 127).

This unprincipled legal education in essence denied the moral substance of law, betraying a conscious colonial policy of nurturing a low political culture of colonial

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governance in the post Independence period. Such orientation informed political leaders of the post Independent period - Siaka Stevens, Albert Margai, Lightfoot Boston, the Governor General, and Chief Justice COE Cole. This approach to legal education made them conceive law as a means for the strategic pursuit of self interests or the strategic deployment of political power, hence making politics a strategic game of end and scarce means that strategically use law. It created or encouraged an orientation to privatize political power, an attitude that quickly trapped the Nation state in a moral practical quagmire, causing her to quickly lose the limited autonomy she gained at Independence. Again, we see the loss of the internal connection between the fact of political power and democratic legitimation in modern society.

The applied science approach to law, which reflects a heightened privatistic orientation to the law, is perceived within the liberal paradigm that does not seriously focus on public reason or the shared interest of society. Rather, such a legal approach seems more apt to facilitate the technical mastery of society (Habermas, 1974). Reflecting a modern natural law orientation, the liberal paradigm of law is generally divested of the catalogue of duties, allowing only for a “private sphere of personal choice, in which every citizen, as private person can egoistically follow goals of maximizing his own needs.”28 This conception of formal law frees persons within “a morally neutral domain” to “look after their own interests” with the only limitation resulting from one that is imposed externally (p. 85).” However, this “law of freedom” becomes “a law of coercion,” as it is solely sanctioned by physically effective force that fundamentally

27 Ibid, Harrington and Manji.
divorces legality from morality. Britain’s deliberate promotion of unprincipled liberal legal approach in Sierra Leone made its claim to support constitutional democracy questionable. Moral and justice questions are difficult to enter political discourses conducted within the applied science legal approach.

d) The Colony Krio Fear Factor - Another issue that greatly influenced politics immediately before Independence was the Krio’s fear of losing their hegemony after Independence. As Independence drew near, the Krios became increasingly anxious concerning their role in post Independent Sierra Leone. They had been very influential and close to the British colonial administration due to the ‘undeniable fact of a much longer association with western education, which meant an ability to use a major world language… and had the education that enabled them play a role disproportionate to their share of the population (Wyse, 1990).’ They enjoyed a privileged position for most of the colonial period, until they were challenged by the protectorate majority (p. 185). As Sierra Leone moved towards self rule, it became clear that the protectorate majority will assume control of political power in the future.

In preparing for Independence, Britain began excluding the Krios from posts of power and influence. The Krios believed Britain had abandoned them by the turn of the century. “Given the imponderables of a developing democracy such as existed in Sierra Leone...Bright could not have become the leader of autonomous Sierra Leone (p.183).” The only institution left to them, the City council, had also already been taken from them in 1926 (Wyse, 1990: 188). With this loss of prominence, “their self-esteem and society

Under this approach, formal rights are seen as rights of freedom because they must set free all acts which
suffered a major decline (Wyse, 1990: 185).” The prospect of playing a subordinate role was unsettling for them since they could no longer expect special consideration in Independent Sierra Leone as under British domination. Wyse admitted that there was an element of false reality in their [Krios] hopes, but it was a feeling based on visible evidence of the commanding positions the Krios seemed to hold – the illusion of power – in the colonial setting. And they were too British to disbelieve the promises of their benefactors. Yet the signs were there; they failed to recognize the evidence that they have been disinherited. And when it finally dawned on them that they would not succeed the British Raj, they were shocked out of their dreamland (Wyse, 1990, p. 190).

Apart from what he called the ‘et tu brute’ syndrome, Wyse claimed that the Krios had real fears about their future position in an Independent Sierra Leone. Attempts by Sir Milton Margai to allay their fears amounted to stopgap policies, according to Wyse.

The Krio’s desire to protect their former prominence and privilege position has implications for the strategic deployment of law in the post Independence period. Due to their closeness to the British and being too British (Wyse, 1990), they had commanding control of the bureaucracy, especially the judiciary. As the only institution left in which they had influence, one would expect them to use it to their advantage. The applied science orientation to the law can enable those controlling the judiciary to engineer specific political realities. On account of the principle of separation of powers, Krios could realize such a strategic feat of continuing domination in post Independent democratic conditions only if they can influence or build alliance with another arm of government, namely the Executive. Since their dominance of the judiciary at the time only gives them power to interpret and apply law, they would require alliance with the executive or legislative branches of government, which are strictly majoritarian

are not explicitly prohibited according to externally specified criteria.
institutions. To protect their interests, the Krio dominated Western area formed alliances with Siaka Stevens’ APC party, against the incumbent SLPP. APC’s alliance with the Krio enabled the party seize political power almost immediately after Independence.

f) Radical (Marxist) Party Politics before Independence also significantly influenced the social and political development of post Independent Sierra Leone. As shown earlier, Siaka Stevens was well practiced in the colonial tactics of public propaganda and inconspicuous violence. As Minister of Lands, Mines, Works, he was charged with manipulating public opinion through public commissions to marginalize some Krio labor leaders and to brutally suppress the labor demonstrations of 1955 (Wyse, 1990; Luke, 1988). Britain’s deliberate policy of encouraging the applied science orientation to the legal system informed the politics of Stevens and Albert. As beneficiaries of British colonial education, these politicians were trained in this strategic colonial orientation to politics.

The colonial political culture perceived governance as a strategic game. In the words of Wyse (1990: 178), Sir Milton Margai became Prime Minister after “narrowly surviving a palace coup in the same year,” and after dodging the “vicious swipes and blows Siaka Stevens aimed at him with his PNP (Peoples National Party, co-founded with Sir Albert Margai), EBIM (Election Before Independence Movement) and his APC party.” His loss of influence at Independence was a scary specter for him, so that he began a public relations campaign to discredit SLPP. He argued that the party does not merit taken Sierra Leone to Independence because there was no elections before Independence (Wyse, 1990). His EBIM intensified the flames of opposition especially in
the North, which believed ‘they got the short end of the stick’ in Sierra Leone politics before and at Independence (Wyse, 1990). It was little surprising, therefore, that Stevens and his supporters would plan to invade Sierra Leone from their Guerilla base in Guinea (Daramy, 1993; Kallon, 1994; Cox, 1976).

To repackage himself as a populist leader, Stevens adopted a radical Marxist ideological posture. With this posture, his APC party was able to form alliance with the Labor Party and Labor Movement, and Sekou Toure. Steven’s brutal handling of the Krio dominated labor unions was quickly forgotten as soon as he declared himself a Marxist populist and married a Krio. The presence of militant socialist Sekou Toure as immediate neighbor raised the stakes. In October of 1960, there were rumors of troop movements on both sides of the border (Cox, 1976, p. 36). As the SLPP, which co-governed with the British was set to gain power at Independence, Stevens felt he would be marginalized. This party has its base in the Southern and Eastern Provinces, which makes them less likely to accommodate Stevens, a Northerner, as their leader. Stevens’ APC party quickly became bitterly opposed to the post Independence arrangements. The London Constitutional Conference of April and May 1961 recommended that a joint British Sierra Leone military defense pact be concluded because of revelations of “a growing prospect of an opposition group that might not be willing to play the game of politics according to the rules (Cox, 1976: 36).” Advocating “more violent means of persuasion,” an APC leader, M.O. Bash Taqi, urged APC supporters to attack SLPP ministers, stop traffic, sink launches, stop trains, and break meetings of SLPP supporters (Cartwright, 1970: 135).
APC’s radical posture was endorsed by revolutionary Sekou Toure, who had undertaken similar militant action against those he called pro-French reactionary forces in Guinea. Increasing APC militancy and rumors of invasion should have made the SLPP uncomfortable, and suspicious of the intentions behind APC’s vehement opposition to a British/Sierra Leone Defense pact and the presence of the British Naval fleet in Sierra Leone. The growing militancy of the APC opposition consolidated by the party’s alliance with the radical Guinean leader, Sekou Toure, emboldened Stevens to refuse signing the Independence Bill. These events prior to 1961 were clear signs that APC would resort to force to gain power. Daramy (1994) believed APC’s plan to invade Sierra Leone from Guinea was actually carried out by proxy infiltration and control of the army.

g) Strategic Politics and Divided Sovereignty - Cox (1976: 37) argued that the SLPP did not pay particular close attention to the military threat posed to it because of the ‘absence of parliamentary discussion on military affairs during this period.’ He showed that Albert like Stevens learned the same strategic colonial logic of governance. Albert responded to the APC military threat by disproportionately recruiting Mendes in the commission ranks of the army. Like the Governor General issue, the military question was exempted from rationalization – thematization and critical examination. “The acquisition and maintenance of political power and not the rather mundane affairs of the military - the connection between the two was as yet unperceived – became the prime focus of concern of the elites (Cox, 1976, p. 37).” No one challenged the view of the army as a selfless servant as long as the British were in control; they were seen along non partisan lines.
On the contrary, this study argues that even Cox’s narrative cannot support the conclusion that the parties did not question the neutrality of the military because they saw it as non-partisan. This study maintains that the strategic colonial logic of discursive closure and behind the scene operations made open questioning of army neutrality difficult. Albert responded to allegations of an APC invasion plan and infiltration of the army by mendelizing the army (Cox, 1976). The very military and the Governor General institutions that were exempted from serious open political discourse during the gradualist constitutional development became the institutions that would significantly shape the immediate post–Independent politics of Sierra Leone. Imperial domino policy was more or less hinged on superior military power (Keane, 2002). Colonial domination in post-independent Sierra Leone was based on military control and dictatorship.

The governor and the military represent key institutions of colonial domination, which were based initially on physical subjugation, and then later justified or given *de facto* legitimation through legality. The true assent of those governed is lacking for a colonial regime. The legal coding of the British colonial power merely served to reduce the cost of its domination by giving it a semblance of *(de facto)* legitimacy. According to Reno (1995: 29), “colonial authorities recognized the authority of indigenous chiefs to carry out local tasks that the colonial state could not perform…Despite the risk of subordination, the cost of imposing direct rule ensured that this alternative intermediary system would not be scrapped.” The compliance of Sierra Leoneans to British colonial law was not due to its legitimacy, but to the military subjugation or fear. It was the reserve of force in the last analysis that made colonial domination to thrive: Whosoever controls the reserve of power can make laws (Habermas, 1996). By ignoring this lesson
of colonial domination, SLPP left itself vulnerable to Stevens’ Machiavellian strategies that enabled him seize power almost immediately after Independence.

According to Keene (2002), the principle of dual sovereignty was conducted through paramountcy or the indirect rule system, which accorded a central place to the Governor General. In the dual sovereignty strategy of colonization, the Governor General played so central a role that the institution had to be kept sacrosanct, insulated from critique or rationalization. To question this institution was more or less to present a radical democratic affront to the core of British colonial design itself. Impediments to parliamentary discourse on the Governor General represented failure at constitutional democratic experiment.

By their closeness to the British as the co-governing political party, SLPP was likely to adopt the same colonial consciousness since they were disposed to go along with the British colonial regime, if they were to survive politically. The party was ill-equipped to tease out – critically examine - the disruptive potential the military and the Governor General institutions embody. The neutrality of this democratically unrepresentative and strategically oriented institution was not questioned. The failure to take up rational discourse on these institutions infers a failure of the society in realizing itself as a constitutional democracy. This learning failure constitutes the basis for potential future political crisis. The granting of the Independence Constitution – constitutionalism - without the scope for rational discursive democracy or moral practical learning to sustain this newly conferred democratic constitutional status, created a crisis ridden Nation State.
h) Tensions in the United Front for Independence – reflects major unresolved differences in the society that conditioned the post-Independent politics of Sierra Leone. The United Front was a coalition of different political parties and stakeholders organized in Sierra Leone to advocate for Independence from Britain. Though these groups united to agitate for self rule, they remained mutually distrustful and suspicious of each other. Britain’s gradual handing over of constitutional right of self rule was done amidst serious political divisions among the indigenous politicians. The opposition viewed the co-governing SLPP party as a proxy for Britain, arguing that when Britain leaves, the Incumbent would continue to be Britain’s puppet.

The pervasiveness of this strategic colonial orientation (low political culture) in immediate pre-Independent Sierra Leone means the United Front for Independence was anything but united. The United Front of Sierra Leoneans put together to bid for Independence or self rule was a loose adhesion of cultural, political, and social groups. Like many other newly Independent African states, the Nation State of Sierra Leone that resulted from the advocacy of the United Front was an artificial construct without any guarantee of stable identity.

African countries are artificial, too, in the related sense that few of them constitute nation states. A nation, on the one hand, is a social group that develops solidarity on the basis of shared customs and institutions; on the other hand, a state is a political organization laying claim to power in a particular territory.  

29 Sanbrook, R. (1985), Chapter 3: Colonial Roots of the Contemporary Crisis In The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, p. 49. For the distinction between nation and state see Connor, W. (1972). “Nation-building or nation destroying?” In World Politics. p. xxiv, 3, pp. 333-5. Where nation and state are coterminous, ethnic loyalty (nationalism) fuses with state loyalty (patriotism). The state acquires legitimacy and internal cohesion that permits it to override personal and sectional preoccupations with the vision of a greater good. Sandbrook argues that the nation state is a rarity in Africa since citizens’ loyalty extends no further than their own ethnic group. Thus, the African state is fragile, and African political life is fraught with potential instability.
Sierra Leone was, strictly speaking, not a Nation state as the groups brought together in this geopolitical territory on which the state political organization was imposed did not share the same customs, tradition, or language. It was constituted into a post-traditional society, without allowing for a social organization principle to nurture this consciousness among the different cultural, religious, political, and traditional groups. Independence was granted to a bitterly divided Nation held together by an artificial national bond or political constitution, which was so fragile that it began to unravel within three years of Independence. A society merely conceived by an Independent Constitution without the requisite democratic political culture to properly nurture such a new status was prone to failure. The new democratic constitutional state at 1961 was, therefore, highly prone to disintegration because fledgling democratic institutions would have to disintegrate without the initiatives of a population accustomed to political freedoms (Habermas, 1996: 130-131).

The foregoing historical background discussion serves to partially account for the developmental dynamics or crisis-ridden political governance that plagued Sierra Leone since Independence. The dictatorial tendencies of party leaders after Independence; the inauguration of Marxist revolutionary project in the 1990’s; the manipulative use of Commissions and public relations propaganda by Stevens and the APC could be partly traced to the political culture nurtured during British colonial politics of gradual decolonization.

From the relevant speech and action norms or norms of political interaction constituting the historical context, this study reconstructs the developmental logic or level of species wide moral cognitive consciousness already possible in worldview, but was
not yet institutionalized or made regularly practicable. The events cited in the historical context - such as the colonial governments’ preference for deliberative forums or commissions of inquiry to deal with labor conflicts; Siaka Stevens’ radical EBIM (election Before Independence Movement); the Krio’s fear of the incompatibility of their privileges (or social power) in a democratic dispensation of Independent Sierra Leone; and Bankole Bright’s strong opposition to an unelected official (the Governor General)’s – heavily influence the capacity of Sierra Leoneans to institutionalize democratic opinion and will formation or post-traditional consciousness. The events of this period had far reaching impact on the attitudes, values and beliefs of social actors. Events of this period continue to influence the moral cognitive consciousness of social actors.

The general principles of democratic will formation to which discourse ethics points does not necessarily give a blueprint as to how to organize it. The debates in parliament and in the commission shows that discourse ethics (as political rights) were already stipulated in the gradually transforming system of rights in Sierra Leone even before Independence. These rights presuppose the possibility of a cooperative societal search for truth, the moral and a just social order in Sierra Leone. Only with the possibility for democratic opinion and will formation can the society cooperatively search for ways to make practical improvements in the political system with its subtle authoritarian colonial trappings. Because it allows for emancipation, guarantees stability, and allows for levels of learning or problems solving (intelligence), rational discourse or communicative action reflects the best intuitive moral cognitive consciousness for a post-traditional society such as Sierra Leone. The agitation against colonial economic exploitation using the civil disobedience campaigns or labor strikes, and APC’s moral
justification to threaten a civil war because elections were not to be held before independence already demonstrates a post-conventional moral intuitive consciousness as the only legitimate way to coordinate and resolve conflict in the society.

Two issues stand out in the foregoing historical background discussion: a) the systemic subversion or impediments to rational discourse or deliberative democracy, even though the colonial system recognizes that only democracy can produce the stability-guaranteeing legitimacy of the social order; and b) an increasing tendency towards radical politics from the Opposition pursued in the framework of Marxism politics of societal change. Considering Stevens’ role as enforcer for the British Colonial administration, it is unsettling that mere self declaration as a Marxist populist revolutionary was enough to transform his image as key cog in the British colonial machinery. By adopting this radical brand of politics, by assuming the posture of Marxist revolutionary politician, Stevens now quickly rebranded himself as the champion of the further decolonization of the newly Independent State from the Bourgeois SLPP state.

Considering the colonial impediments and manipulation to democratic development, the young constitutional democracy that was to emerge in Sierra Leone would have to be vulnerable to potential crisis. It is understandable that such frustrations of democratic development would make the Marxist option an attractive panacea. Pitting the latter idea with the democratic path to further societal rationalization is, however, problematic. Only the actual practice of political rights of participation according to constitutional state principles could ensure self-determination, without which the claim to Independence remains bogus. For this reason, this study finds the
‘attractiveness’ or the melancholy for Marxism as panacea unsettling. This theory has not theoretically worked out scope for democratic self determination, since it has empirically failed to facilitate a politics of true emancipation. Thus, while each nation seems to posses a claim to political Independence as its birth right, ‘normatively, it is only a people’s desire for self-determination that can legitimize the demand for political independence, as the “ethical, free, political moment in the existence of a people is freely chosen fellowship.”31 The foregoing discussions of the historical context points to two competing modes of maintaining social integration or bringing about social transformation in the society: democracy and Marxist socialism.

B) Theoretical Context – Colonial hindrances to social actors’ practice of democratic constitutionalism during gradualism made the adoption of unprincipled radical politics by politicians almost predictable. By adopting Marxist ideology in Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens set the developmental course of the society on a ‘radical revolutionary’ path, the logic of politics as war. His adoption of the radical brand of Marxism means the ‘materialist’ conception of the dialectic would have to be conceived in terms of wage relations, the opposition between labor and capital. From this perspective, Stevens could not effectively or seriously consider the tensions or contradiction that obtains in the political culture of democracy. One oriented by central economic orientation of Marxism, is incapable of properly understanding and resolving conflicts or overcoming crises tendencies that lie beyond the productivist realm (Habermas, 1974).

As a critical investigation of crisis and conflict - disruptions in the development or evolution of the society - this research engages the Marxist theory of social evolution, historical materialism. Since the discourse of societal evolution or social change is basically a discourse of societal rationalization (or modernity), this study is situated in the theory-practice problematic of reason or rationality (Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 1991). Scholars continue to argue that practical application of Marxism in Africa and other socialist states led to totalitarianism, because only aberrant forms of Marxist socialism were adopted. This study goes beyond these excuses to demonstrate that basic philosophical, scientific, and scientific misconceptions of Marxist philosophy of history are largely responsible for the moral practical quagmire of concrete societies that adopt the theory.

This research critically analyzes the ideological core values of Marxist theory by asking questions such as: Can a theory whose goal or end is establishing a dictatorship empower citizens to make their own history or guarantee self-determination? Can a pre-politically determined metaphysical conception of the dialectic (as cosmic law) provide adequate orientation for citizens to coordinate their society, to form their will and resolve conflicts in the here and now, in contingent historical situation? Can such a despotically and teleologically oriented ideology (Habermas, 1974) ensure mutual understanding or solidarity in a post-traditional society (pluralism)? Can a theory or ideology that reduces social interaction or relations to labor (Giddens, 1994) provide scope to resolve developmental challenges beyond labor politics?

Within this economistic orientation, understanding the reproduction of political culture, which requires socialization by way of communication is difficult (McCarthy,
1985). Strictly speaking, the productivist paradigm of social relations cannot provide citizens’ with the appropriate orientation to deliberate on constitutional norms and laws, to refine them to meet developmental challenges of the society, since it does not focus on the moral language game in which we resolve action conflicts or coordinate our social life (Habermas, 1974; 1998). The moral practical domain (the realm of law and morality) marks core domain of the structures of interaction or communication that social actors draw on to make judgment and resolve conflicts in modern society. As embodiments of the conscious structures subjects’ use in moral judgments or conflict resolution, institutions of law and morality mark core domains of interaction specialized in maintaining the endangered intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, or the identity of the society (Habermas, *Inclusion of the Other*, 1998: 99). Linguistically established intersubjectivity of understanding marks the innovation in the history of the species that opens up possibilities to achieve new levels of socio-cultural learning.

Problems of political governance in Sierra Leone reflect disturbances in the reproduction of the society’s identity, which is normatively fixed. Stabilizing the society’s identity has to do with symbolic reproduction or social interaction. As a post-traditionally conscious society, Sierra Leone can fulfill the moral practical task of identity formation, social integration or legitimation of political authority only through mutual (dialogic) understanding or rational deliberative politics among citizens. In this society, legitimating orders are possible only through citizens’ assent, which reflects their political autonomy or capacity for communicative freedoms or political participation.

Since communicative processes and forms of life have certain structural features in common, they [citizens] could ask themselves whether these features harbor normative contents that could provide a basis for shared orientations…A prospect of finding an equivalent
for the traditional, substantive grounding of a normative consensus would exist if the form of communication [my emphasis] in which joint practical deliberation takes place were such that it makes possible a justification of moral norms convincing to all participants because of its impartiality.32

Denying citizens their political autonomy (right of political participation) and private autonomy (subjective liberties of speech, association etc) constitute repression that merely drives crisis tendencies underground, into the psychological and socio-cultural domain, manifesting as pathological communication.33 Displacing these crises tendencies into the psychological domain to conceal them only intensifies such tendencies over time (Koselleck, 1988). Once concealed, these latent but chronic crises tendencies tend to eventually explode in catastrophic proportions, such as the eleven years Sierra Leone civil war.

The forgoing discussion serves to define the parameters of the theoretical context of the study. As a critical investigation aimed at discovering insights to resolve persistent disruption or crisis in the evolution of Sierra Leone society, this study would have to engage the major competing theory of social evolution, the Marxist productivist or economically oriented paradigm of historical materialism. This study uses a reconstruction of historical materialism, the theory of communicative action that is oriented to the practice of discursive democracy, as a more rational way to resolve conflict and coordinate the society. This inquiry transcends Marxist historical

33 These forms of communication impede the learning of attitudes of openness towards the perspective of the other that promote social integration and the development of the moral/democratic consciousness necessary to overcome crisis tendencies. P. Livesay, J. (1985). Habermas, Narcissm and Status, in Telos. 18 (2): 75-90; Also see McCarthy, (1984). The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. MIT Press Cambridge: Mass. p. 86. This research investigates how intrigues, misconceptions and deception in political system served to transpose crisis tendency into the psychological and socio-cultural domains as deformations of communicative action, the paradigm case of social (inter)action; Habermas, 1989: 59.
materialism, which restricts evolutionary learning processes to objectivating thought, technical knowledge, and the instrumental rationality of productive forces.

By downplaying the significance of culture (superstructure) or the socio-political dimension, historical materialism becomes reductive (Shapiro, 1970). Jurgen Habermas argues that:

The application of the Marxian theory of crisis to the altered reality of “advanced capitalism” leads to difficulties. This fact has given rise to the interesting attempt to conceive of old theorems in new ways, or alternatively, to develop new crisis theorems in their place… (The) book [Legitimation Crisis] makes clear that a theory of social evolution, although it must be the foundation of social theory is today still scarcely at all developed … [This] shows the close connection between material questions of theory of contemporary social formation and foundational problems that I hope to show soon – can be clarified within the framework of a theory of communicative action.34

Offshoots of Marxism, developmental theories of neo-Marxism (dependency and World systems) are mainly functionalist, and so we cannot consider them improvements on Marxism. To engage the cultural or socio-political domain, this study would have to go beyond historical materialism, and its offshoots.

The theory of communicative action adopted here reconstructs the Marxist theory of social evolution in terms of the Piagetian tradition.35 Here crises or problems of societal development are conceived as bundles of crises tendencies that are transposed

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35 See Jean Piaget, (1965). Moral judgment of the child. Cognitive developmental psychology has shown that stages of moral consciousness described as preconventional, postconventional patterns of problems solving; also see J. Habermas (1981). “Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism” in Knorr–Cetina and Cicourel A. V. (Eds.) Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an integration of micro and macro sociologies. Boston: Mass.: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 269-270. At the preconventional level, actors merge actions and motives on a single plane of reality, with a focus on the manifest consequences of action in times of conflict. At the conventional level, actors assess motives independently of concrete consequences of action. Here, the intentional conformity with social expectations and extant norms are decisive. At the postconventional level, these norms lose their traditional authority and require justification through recourse to universal criteria. Here, “social evolutionary learning processes in the domain of moral practical consciousness” refers to the use of
from one period to another (overtime), starting in the system domain (state and economy) and terminating in the societal realm as legitimation problems or as the crisis of identity or social disintegration. It replaces Marxist “dialectical theory” with psychological, social and cultural dimensions of social inquiry (Shapiro, J. (1973). Introduction. In Legitimation Crisis. p. XXI). The reconstruction here considers social transformation as neither deterministic nor as an irreversible teleology. In this reconstruction, social evolution is conceived in terms of the theory of communicative action, as a process of rationalization in the dimension of social interaction that signifies the extension of communication free from domination (pp. XXII-IV). This reconstruction transcends the productivist paradigm of social change to include dimensions such as the development of organizational forms; techniques that enhance the steering capacity of society; and the development and critical dissolution of legitimating interpretive systems. The comprehensive nature of this reconstructed social evolutionary framework is reflected in the systematic integration of economic, political, and socio-cultural dimensions of phenomena in analyzing society.

The discourse-theoretic reconstruction of social evolution in terms of the theory of communicative action makes the crisis of social integration central. Jurgen Habermas argues that

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36 Reconstruction means to take apart a theory and to put it back together in a new form to enable it fully attain its goals. The reconstructed version here overcomes the limits of the physics or natural model of society that blurs the normative foundations of Marxist social theory. Marx tried to avoid the naturalistic fallacies with a coup de main, namely, by declaring his claim to have achieved a materialistic appropriation of the Hegelian logic. J. Habermas, (1979). Communication and the evolution of society, Trans. By Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, p. 95. Bourgeois consciousness has become cynical; as the social sciences (legal positivism, neoclassical economics, and recent political theory) has been thoroughly emptied of binding normative contents and ‘Bourgeois ideal have gone into retirement,’ so that immanent critique has no norms or values to which it might appeal with agreement in the community of investigators and in the larger society (p. 97).
Rationality structures are embodied not only in amplifications of purposive-rational action – that is, in technologies, strategies, organizations, and qualifications - but also in mediations of communicative action – in the mechanisms for regulating conflict, in world views, and in identity formations. I would even defend the thesis that the development of normative structures (values and institutions) is the pacemaker of social evolution, for new principles of social organization mean new forms of social integration; and the latter, in turn, make it possible to implement available productive forces or to generate new ones, as well as making possible a heightening of social complexity (Habermas, 1976). *Communication and the evolution of society.* Boston, p. 120).

The reconstruction of historical materialism holds that ‘institutional embodiment of structures of rationality” is no longer a question of making orienting contents binding but of opening structural possibilities for the rationalization of action. Only by striving to realize rational discourse in communicative interaction can social actors open structural possibilities for rationalizing action, hence to enable them overcome problems of steering, societal coordination, and conflict resolution. The scope for opening structural possibilities of rationalization is more or less to realize conditions of rational intersubjective reciprocal understanding, communicative action or rational discourse.

A philosophical ethics for resolving societal conflicts not restricted to metaethical statements (like those of the philosophy of the subject, Marxist determinism) is possible today only by reconstructing it in terms of the general presuppositions of communication and procedures for justifying norms and values (Habermas, 1979). The connection between the theory of communicative action and historical materialism is based on the assumption that learning processes relevant for social evolution occur in societal structures that are not exclusively technical or productivist, but also include moral
practical insight, practical knowledge embodied and transmitted in communication. By studying structural patterns in the moral practical development of cultural traditions and institutional change in Sierra Leone, this study explicates the origins of crises ridden dynamics and processes that culminated in the eleven years Conflict in Sierra Leone.

This investigation of crisis breaks from naïve and mythic views that the Sierra Leone Conflict is a manifestation of fate – or the dialectics of enlightenment (Habermas, 1992). The latter holds that every step towards progress or modernization must necessarily lead to setback or crisis. The discourse-theoretic reconstruction conceives the Sierra Leone Conflict as originating from impaired intersubjectivity or problems of mutual understanding that is not necessarily inevitable. The Conflict seems to arise from problems in the material and symbolic reproduction of the society. The problem of recognizing the transformative potential of democratic constitutionalism, which could partly account for the attractiveness of the Marxist path, is due to the static reading given to the political constitution of modern or post-traditional societies.

The character of constitutional founding, which often seal the success of political revolutions, deceptively suggest that norms outside of time and resistant to historical change are simply “stated.” The technical priority of the constitution to ordinary laws belongs to the systematic elucidation of the rule of law, but it only means that the content of constitutional norms is relatively fixed. As we will see every constitution is a living project that can endure only as long as an ongoing interpretation continually carried forward at all levels of the production of law (Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, 1996: 129).

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37 See Habermas, (1979). *Communication and the evolution of society*. Boston: Beacon. Habermas illustrates why learning in the moral practical dimension of social evolution are deposited in more mature forms of social integration or new productive relations that first makes possible the introduction of new productive forces in society. Rationality structures that manifests in world views, moral representations, and identity formations become practically effective in social movements, hence they gain a strategically important position from a theoretical point of view.
This background discussions illustrate the institutionalization of the requisite post-conventional morality (democratic practice of rational discourse) to bolster the fledgling constitutional democracy since 1961 is an unfinished business. The requisite post-traditional consciousness that the Independent Constitution is a living project to be repealed, amended or modified to reflect new social and political realities is a dynamic social transformative idea presupposed by democratic constitutionalism, according to the discourse paradigm of law and democracy.

1. 4 - Personal Location. This research arose from a moral responsibility to decolonize myself from the ideological interpretations about what went wrong in Sierra Leone and how it should be fixed. The reductionist approach of some scholars in explaining the Conflict motivated me to embark on this research.

I adopted the theory of communicative action – the critical theory of society – as methodology because of my undergraduate academic focus, linguistics major. In my graduate studies in Canada, I discovered that the linguistic turn has occurred in the social sciences, which my undergraduate degree help me understand. John Dryzek’s *Toward a Rational Ecology and Discursive Democracy* texts triggered my original curiosity in the area of communication theory of action. I was motivated to read Thomas McCarthy and David Held later on. The latter texts provided my first encounter with Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of communicative action, a sociological elaboration of linguistic concepts in reconstructing historical materialism, the Marxist theory of social evolution.

A second impetuous for choosing the critical social theory approach for this study stems from a strong hunch that the Marxist panacea for social instability in Sierra Leone
is counterproductive. Critical social theory reveals the limits of Marxist theory, and this convinced me of the possibility of doing a more comprehensive critical social research, beyond the exclusive productivist Marxist approach. The latter conceives the dialectic in terms of wage relations exclusively, and reduces social interaction to labor. It does not systematically engage non-labor related (political and cultural) issues pertinent to understanding the Sierra Leone Conflict. Habermas announced in *Legitimation Crisis* that Marxist historical materialism is reductionist because it only developed the productivist side of the theory of social evolution. He argued that the theory is *scarcely developed*. In particular, the revolutionary variant of Marxism that prescribes violent struggle as the means to social change does not clarify the logic a society requires for stable evolution.

Habermas’ theory of communicative action seems to provide the possibility for a historical and material analysis of change in cultural traditions, the social order and personality formation, hence to understand how crisis tendencies are engendered today in the society. His magnum opus, *Between Facts and Norms* (1996), a legal rendition of the theory of communicative action is a moral practical critique that enables systematic analysis of institutionalized political corruption. The explication of the conceptual connection between law, politics or morality in this text convinced me that with it, I can understand the impediments to moral practical life that continue to threaten social integration in Sierra Leone.

Finally, working with Professor Dei as his assistant for the graduate course on Anti-colonial Thought and Pedagogical Challenges convinced me of the need to investigate the Sierra Leone Conflict. Popular discourses on the Conflict seem at best
emotive, based on the pressure of reality, such as the immediate brutality and violence of the civil war. At worst, they seem misleading, because they uncritically endorse the economic or productivist paradigm as the exclusive key for understanding the Conflict. Anti-colonial thought and Critical Theory confirm that decolonization begins when subjects can find the words or poets to name their own reality. I see the research as an exercise in decolonization. This research holds that the public sphere and the scientific discourse of epistemic communities, including the academy, is now the new battleground for (de)colonization. By adopting critical social theory as methodology, this study aims to introduce a cutting edge perspective to the discourse on the Sierra Leone Conflict.

About critical social theory, the journal Philosophy and Social Criticism claims that since its inception, “social theory and philosophy will never be the same again;” while Antony Giddens (1994) considers the theory to be “extraordinary in scope.” This work was undertaken in order to appropriate insights of the theory to understand the Sierra Leone Conflict.

1.5 - Learning Objectives and the Significance of the Study. A) Learning Objectives.

i) Reconstructing the concept and practice of colonization in terms of social (linguistic) interaction, hence to make the ongoing daily practice of colonization more clearly identifiable. Understanding processes of ongoing colonization in terms of structures of interaction better positions scholars and ordinary citizens to recognize, engage and overcome them. Some African scholars still believe modern African societies (now formally constitutional democracies) should revert to the traditional or kinship organizing principles. By explicating the origins of crisis tendencies in structures of interaction, we
can properly understand processes of colonial domination. This clarity can motivate one to work towards resolving social conflicts, rather than fatalistically advocate reversion to traditional or kinship organizing principles that are impotent to coordinate and resolve conflict in a modern or post-traditional society.

ii) By understanding the critical potential already inherent in ordinary human communication, this study provides the tools or knowledge social actors can use to transform or overcome crisis-ridden social organizing principle. Demonstrating that the real agents of change can only be ordinary citizens, the study advocates that citizens develop or appropriate the critical reflexive learning capacity inherent in ordinary linguistic interaction. By promoting reflexive (evolutionary) learning this way, this study enables societal actors to constructively break the vicious cycle of crisis ridden tendencies of their society.

iii) By explicating the relationship between social integration and communicative freedoms, this study hopes to contribute new ways to understand why and how African societies can evolve toward rational higher levels. It highlights the insight that rational discourse or mutual understanding is the key to stability in contemporary African societies. The study clarifies communicative rationalization as the only way to build true consensus vital for stable coordination and conflict resolution in modern Africa, including Sierra Leone. Citizens’ education that building consensus is the way to overcome the pervasive anomie or crisis tendencies in these societies can serve as a powerful anti-imperialist strategy that thrives on group divisions in these societies.
**B) Significance of the Study.** a) Unlike other representative studies of the Conflict, this research explicates the correct form of legitimacy post-traditional societies of Africa ought to adopt. Lacking understanding of the correct form of legitimacy - as one based on communicative ethics or freedoms in political and legal discourse - other studies cannot systematically clarify the moral practical origins of the Conflict. Communicative legitimation is a stability-guaranteeing element or force of every contemporary social order, including modern societies of Africa (Habermas, 1979). The insight that instability arises from illegitimate orders or norms, which lack social validity can contribute to promoting stability in Sierra Leone, and in Africa. Insight or knowledge of the correct form of legitimacy in modern Africa as communicative understanding can be a valuable moral knowledge for promoting conflict resolution and social integration.

ii) This research reconstructs a major problem of sociology today, the central issue of agency/structure problematic. The methodology of communicative action integrates basic categories of action theory (the lifeworld) with elements of system theory (structure and functions) systematically by demonstrating how social agents can transform the organizing principle of their society.

iii) This study provides answers as to why developing societies have failed to improve socially, economically, and politically despite enormous economic resources supposedly channeled into such efforts. Pursuing development based exclusively on the economic

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40 The problem of agency and structure is the central problem of sociology today. See Archer, M.S. (1988) *Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University
paradigm has been counterproductive since the economic domain by its very form constitutes egotistical complexes of interaction, the pursuit of self interest. For a rational, legitimate and, therefore, stable social development to occur, adopting an approach capable of reflecting on the shared interest is vital. The logic of economic efficiency must be balanced or complemented by political autonomy, democratic legitimation or civil oversight. Thus, the study provides the urgently needed insight of how to ensure the social success of development projects.

iv) **The reconstruction of historical materialism in this study eschews determinism, which often leads to historicism.** The study does not see social evolution as an irreversible teleology, one that is always progressive; it could be regressive as well. Here, dialectical theory is imbued with psychological, social and cultural dimensions, and given concrete historical basis – it is reconstructed as the *dialectics of morality.* The latter refers to the fact that any denial of rational discourse does not nullify it. Rather the denial of this very basis of our cultural existence is almost always followed by the need to reconstitute it or compensate for such denial. Such an insight can serve to dispel confusion and the fear of disagreement often associated with deliberation or human social intercourse. The knowledge that resolving conflict or overcoming colonizing domination requires communicative understanding can be a powerful motivating force for the oppressed as well as the powerful to embrace deliberative understanding.

Press. p. ix. The agency/structure problematic is sometimes roughly equivalent to micro and macro levels of analysis, lifeworld and system problem in this study.
v) The study demystifies colonization by showing that it is not necessarily externally imposed, but can operate in particular structures of social interaction of even non-European societies. A society is colonized when its members lose their social, private and political autonomy, the capacity for political participation, autonomy or self-legislation. The insight that state repression or depoliticization of citizens constitutes colonization dispels the ideology that the colonial authority is necessarily the former European occupiers of Africa. By focusing on the dynamics of day to day structures of interaction among individuals, and between the state and society, this study shows that colonial domination can be ongoing within contemporary African society. Challenging it requires close daily critical engagement in structures of interaction or discourse in politics, law and society.

1.6 - Limitations of the Study. a) One limitation of the study is that it focuses mainly on internal forces even though ‘external’ systemic forces (world capitalist economy or globalization) do exercise tremendous influence on the society and also contributes to fomenting crisis tendencies. As Wolcott (1999) makes clear, space and time cannot allow for the investigation of every factor having a bearing on the research situation. While this limits the study, the influence of external forces is nevertheless taken up to some extent. Furthermore, considering that external or systemic agents benefit from their domination of the society, this study does not realistically expect them to initiate change. Those affected, the ordinary citizens, are the ones this study tries to enlighten in their will and consciousness to take up the initiative, hence to become agents of change.
b) Another limitation is that the study does not extend too far before 1961 save the historical context - to analyze how the period of British colonialism conditioned post 1961 politics of Sierra Leone. This temporal scoping from 1961 to 2002 may exclude valuable data. Yet, it is consistent with the study’s objective of analyzing communicative agency in Sierra Leone to explicate colonization in this contemporary post Independence Society. Using the critical analytic standard of communicative action or rational discourse can make sense only if it is applied to a constitutional democracy, the formal or logical status Sierra Leone acquired only at Independence in 1961.

c) This research does not extensively engage writings of other African scholars on the African condition that uses contemporary social theories such as deconstruction, post-structuralism or Gramsci. Such engagement could heighten the level of critical discourse on the subject. As this study’s task is to reconstruct historical materialism, it is centrally engaged with this task. More intense engagement with other contemporary African perspectives would have to be taken up later. Deepening understanding of the African crisis from the perspective of competing contemporary social theory is definitely relevant. These contemporary approaches are only starting to enter the discourse in African studies. Postmodern inspired concepts such as necropolitics (Mbembe), and the archaeology of invention (Mudimbe) could not be effectively taken up on account of this research’s adoption of the methodology of social evolution.

d) Though the study recognizes the incompleteness of the theory of social evolution, it is only mainly concerned with the moral practical side of the theory. Achieving a
comprehensive theory of social evolution would require more intense engagement with extant theories of societal evolution and neo Marxist development theories. Such a task is urgently required to help provide the insights social and political actors can use to orient themselves as they try to resolve persistent social crisis in the continent.

e) The study did not engage the policy side more intensely because this study is guided mainly by the human emancipatory interest, which is a dialectical synthesis of the technical interest of empirical analytic-policy oriented sciences and the practical interest of hermeneutic sciences. While the findings and implications section (Chapter 7) deals with policy oriented matters, the research focuses mainly on critical interpretation as key task, and derives rational policy alternatives from this critical analysis that can liberate the society from its crisis inducing colonial organizing principle. The study aims to enlighten subjects of the value of choosing dialogue as rational approach to societal liberation or revolution.

1.7 Definition of Major Terms and the Organization of the Study. Here, the main concepts are subjected to a discourse-theoretic reconstruction. This linguistic or communicative reconstruction of concepts draws on post-metaphysical thought or the philosophy of language. This discourse theoretic redefinition of these concepts presents further advantages for the analysis in the study.

The study explicates major concepts from the vantage point of discourse theory because a legitimate order is constituted in modern societies only through discourse. From this vantage point, the study clarifies concepts such as the constitutional state.
principles, the system of rights, popular sovereignty, democracy, and autonomy (social, private and public) and the proper relationship between law and politics and legitimation crisis.

According to discourse theory, the constitutional state principle rests on the idea that the constitutional state is organized exclusively to serve the politically autonomous self-organization of the community, which has constituted itself through the system of rights as an association of free and legal consociates under the law (Habermas, 1996: 175-6). The institutions of the constitutional state should ensure that socially autonomous citizens: a) effectively exercise political authority through their communicative power; b) rationally form their will and can find binding expression in political and legal programs, and; c) communicative power circulate throughout society via reasonable application and implementation of legal programs to foster social integration through the stabilization of expectations and the realization of collective goals. In short, the principle of the constitutional state - government by law - institutionalizes the public use of communicative freedom and regulates the conversion of communicative power into administrative power to facilitate the achievement of social autonomy.

In this perspective, rights have intersubjective character. They are based on the recognition of cooperating legal persons: they are relations of recognition or expressions of connectedness. A right is not a natural law, moral idea, a gun or a one man show but a relationship and a social practice. Rights are public propositions, involving obligations to others as well as entitlements against them. They are a form of social cooperation, that are not spontaneous, but highly organized cooperation (Habermas, 1996: 88).
To understand the concept of autonomy, we draw on the system of rights (the constitution) that allows for private autonomy—subjective liberties of freedom of association and speech, and political autonomy, which emerges through the exercise of one’s right of political participation. Legal subjects achieve autonomy by understanding themselves as well as acting as the authors of laws to which they submit as addressees. The legal code becomes the language in which they can express their autonomy; self-legislation must be realized in the medium of law itself. Political rights of equal participation for each person result from symmetrical juridification of the communicative freedom of all citizens, a freedom that requires discursive opinion and will formation that enables subjects exercise their political autonomy in accordance with political rights (Habermas, 1996: 126-127). Nothing is given prior to citizens’ practice of self determination other than the discourse principle, which is built into the conditions of communicative sociation in general and in the legal medium as such (pp. 127-8). Conversely, every exercise of political autonomy signifies both the interpretation and specific elaboration of these fundamentally “unsaturated” rights of the constitution, subjective liberties or negative rights.

The principle of popular sovereignty according to which all governmental authority is derived from the people, combines the individual’s rights to equal opportunity to participate in democratic will formation with the legally institutionalized practice of self determination. Parliamentary will formation must be connected to the opinion formation of citizens. The principle serves as the connection or hinge between the system of rights and the construction of a constitutional democracy (Habermas, 1996: 165). Its realization solves the democratic problem of how citizen’s discursive opinion
and will formation should orient and legitimate the exercise of public authority. From the perspective of power, popular sovereignty demands the transfer of legislative power to the totality of citizens, who alone can generate communicative power among themselves. As parliamentary bodies are to represent the views of citizens in deliberation and decision making, they must adhere to legal principle, which specify their assigned constitutional responsibilities (Habermas, 1996: 170). Popular sovereignty as a procedure consist of those communicative processes that regulate the flow of discursive opinion and will formation that terminates in outcomes that have a presumption of practical reasons or validity. Set a flow communicatively, popular sovereignty makes itself felt in the power of public discourses.

A popular sovereignty of this sought cannot operate without the support of an accommodating political culture, without the basic attitudes mediated by traditional socialization, of a population accustomed to political freedom. Rational political will formation cannot occur unless a rationalize life world meets it half way (Habermas, 1996: 487). Without a supporting social and political culture, which we cannot produce on demand or engineer administratively, communicative forms adequate to practical rationality (pragmatic, ethical, and moral reasons and discourses) cannot emerge. This culturalistic understanding of constitutional dynamics reconstructs the sovereignty of the people as communicative processes, relocating sovereignty in the cultural dynamics of opinion and will formation. This constitutional state principle takes shape in social practices and become a social force for the dynamic process of creating the association of free and equal persons in the historical context of citizens’ practices.
Another relevant principle of the constitutional state discussed in this study is *separation of powers*. While separating judiciary and legislative functions arise from pragmatic reasons such as jurisprudence and doctrinal refinements, a more decisive, systematic and normative reason is that legislative functions of norm justification, and norm application (assumed by the judiciary) involves different logics of argumentation (Habermas, 1996, pp. 171-2). This institutional differentiation serves to ensure that the administration uses powers democratically in enacting law, that it regenerates itself solely from the communicative power of citizens (p. 173).

In this study, *revolution* is considered as the accelerated rationalization of society. It is a concept of modernity that involves the concepts of reason and rationalization, and their relationship to practice. As a project of accelerated rational transformation of society, the end as well as the means of the revolutionary project is subjected to critical analysis. We consider revolution under three headings, by which we assess such a project: a) in terms of the extent the emancipatory (or critical) theory can stand up to scientific discourse; b) the extent the theory provides self-reflection and actual consciousness of the target group of the revolution; and c) the extent it supports the effective agency (the capacity to speak and act) of citizens who struggle to make history by their conscious will. In short, revolution is considered in terms of the extent it enlightens its addresses about their position in the antagonistic system, and about the extent to which they make conscious their interest as objectively their own in the revolutionary situation. Only when the revolution can organize enlightenment and
counsel to enable the target group to recognize itself in the proffered interpretations does the revolution’s interpretation become actual consciousness.\(^{42}\)

Here denial of communicative competence of citizens constitutes *colonization*. “Silence is the special fate of colonial societies;” a society is “ruled by silence so long as they lacked political poets to give names to the things and relations that rule their lives,” “and do not have a name even for themselves but speak of themselves as others speak of them.”\(^{43}\) Colonization is reformulated here as systemic constraints on the socio-cultural domain of communication so that decolonization becomes a matter of citizens capacity for communicative freedom to realize and determine their life.

In *traditional society*, unlike post-traditional or modern society, the state controls production relations, and incorporates this in the general political order, while religious worldviews take on ideological functions. In such a society, the state assumes the collectivity’s capacity for action, without separating market and state functions. Here, *conventional* (authoritarian) consciousness is evident.

In this study, *colonization* is conceived as the *internal colonization of the lifeworld by system*.\(^{44}\) This process occurs when systemic imperatives make their way into the lifeworld (the socio-cultural domain of communication) from the outside – like colonial masters coming into a native society, and forcing processes of assimilation upon

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it (Ibid, p. 355). Through the media of power and money, the system (economy and state) impose inconspicuous and conspicuous constraints on citizens’ capacity to rationalize or use their communicative competence or freedoms.

In this study, the concept of legitimacy is central. It is “one of the most fundamental of all social processes,” since its absence often leads to instrumental (goal or success oriented) approach in social interaction – the latter is “an insecure basis of social order (John T. Jost and Brenda Major, 2001, p. 41). Since legitimacy is central to maintaining the stability of social order (Habermas, 1979), explicating it is vital for any inquiry aimed at developing knowledge for emancipating a society with a crisis-ridden developmental dynamics. Misconceptions of legitimacy have often translated into instability in the social order. Referring to political legitimacy as a “justificatory framework,” Reus-Smith argues that, “differences in how sovereignty has been justified, and differences in how social actors believe they should legitimately solve their cooperative problems, have led these societies to develop specific developmental patterns (1999: 10).

Scholars misunderstand the persistence of crises tendencies of regimes and societies in contemporary Africa because they misconceive their legitimacy as legality or as based merely on legal procedures. This research attributes the tensions and crises that continue to plague these societies to misconceptions of legitimacy (Reus Smith, 1990). Habermas argues that

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The fundamental misconception of decisionistic legal theory – which is itself subject to the suspicion of ideology – is that the validity of legal norms [or policies or orders] can be grounded on decisions and only decisions. But the naïve validity claims of norms refer (in each case) at least implicitly to the possibility of discursive foundation. This normative validity is based on the supposition that norms could, if necessary, be justified and defended against critique (Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, 1970, p. 101).

The legitimacy of a norm or order is not gained by merely enacting it through correct legal procedures that can admit of instrumental or strategic action or interest. Any norm or order would have to command the genuine recognition of citizens to make it legitimate (Habermas, 1979: 179).

Moris Zelditch (2001:56) argues that legitimacy is the central feature we commonly associate with rights and obligations rather than with interests and preferences in social behavior and structure. “Politics must see to it that the social conditions for public and private autonomy or rights are met. Otherwise an essential condition for the legitimacy of democracy is endangered (Habermas J. 2001. *The Postnational Constellation*, p. 65).” The state cannot simply arbitrarily make policies, laws, or decisions, ignore the opinion and will of those affected, yet expect to gain their genuine recognition. To believe so betrays the ignorance of state officials of the serious damage caused to society when they neglect the will and interests of those their policies affect.

Durkheim’s anthropologically informed view that society is a moral reality or a legitimate social order has been confirmed by previous course of history. Classical sociology holds that subjects capable of speaking and acting could develop unity only in connection with identity-securing world views and moral systems. The unity of the person (identity) requires the unity enhancing perspective of the lifeworld – the socio-
cultural domain of communication - that guarantees order (Habermas, 1970: 117-8.). In the tradition of sociology, society is defined as a legitimate or rational social order (Merton, Durkheim, Mead, Marx, Weber, Parsons, Marshall (Habermas, 1984), hence the study of the crisis of legitimacy (or rationality), also called the crisis of identity. How can we prevent the crisis of identity, the integration or legitimacy in modern society?

Today, the justice, the moral validity or legitimacy of an order is not derived through religious views - a trend Max Weber discussed in his Protestant Ethic idea - but from rationally motivated agreements or consensus based on reasons (Habermas, 1970, p. 105). The expressed conviction is what accords an order its stability. The modern Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone embodies provisions by which the State can legitimately govern the society to enable citizens realize their political or private autonomy. Citizens’ challenge to political orders reflects their unacceptability of such regimes or the fact that does not enjoy their consent. Subjects’ ability to speak and act, their agency or communicative competence is, therefore, crucial for legitimating political orders in contemporary Sierra Leone. The capacity of societal actors to participate freely in discourses in parliament, the civil society and the public sphere is vital to the constitution of the society as a legitimate order.
C) The Organization of Study Organization of Study. The study is organized to capture the historical formation of the catastrophic Sierra Leone Conflict from the early 1960s to the 1990’s. Chapter 1 deals with the Introduction, Chapter 2 is the review of related literature or representative studies on the Sierra Leone Conflict, and Chapter 3 is the Methodology. The next three analytic chapters, 4, 5, and 6, are organized in historical sequence to track the transposition of crisis tendencies over time that culminated in the devastating 11 years civil war in Sierra Leone. These three analytic chapters track the extent social actors exemplified the requisite moral developmental logic (rational dialogue) in their surface symbolic structures – utterances, gestures or applied theory since Independence. Chapter 7 critically discusses the findings on colonization and crises, and draws on insights in the discussions or analysis to sketch a critical pedagogy and concludes with a few recommendations.

In Chapter 4, Sir Albert started a one party move, which he tried to justify by using economic development and unity as reasons. Though these reasons were in vogue at the time or common in the decolonization period, they did not sit well with the opposition, and roughly half the population. A constitutional crisis emerged because the incumbent SLPP leader, Sir Albert, failed to impartially justify his one party bill under conditions of unconstrained discourse or post-conventional morality in parliament. Though there were threats of civil war at the time, its possibility was eliminated by scores of military interventions, public relations work or ideological manipulation that eventually terminated in the de facto seizure of power by Siaka Stevens.

Chapter 5 demonstrates the effective concealment (repression) and, therefore, intensification of crisis tendencies. Civil war or instability was inhibited in the society...
because of almost three decades of APC dictatorship. The dictatorship denied post-conventional morality or rational democratic will or opinion formation in the society. This depoliticization of the society served as the precondition for establishing the acutely exploitative neoliberal regime. To hold this regime in place, the APC government had to manufacture legitimacy for itself by brute force, rather than through dialogic or mutual understanding. State repression facilitated the establishment of an acute economic exploitation and misery, fomenting an economic crisis, while repressing or technically mastering the society. This created social discontents determined to overthrow the regime, hence the RUF rebel incursion in 1991.

*Chapter 6* discusses the rebel incursion as the catastrophic explosion of crisis tendencies and conflict that APC tried to master and conceal by decades of repression. The so called ‘revolution’ or *bushpath to democracy* had to fail because the ‘revolutionaries’ denied what they professed immediately triggered them to fight: the state’s denial of democratic will and opinion formation of citizens or mutual (communicative) understanding. By denying the political autonomy or the democratic rights of ordinary citizens, who initially supported them, the RUF rebels lost the mass political support of citizens. This loss of support translated into a counter revolution that eventually broke the back of their so-called revolution or liberation project.

Though citizens supported a revolutionary change of regime because of repression and economic repression, they however did not believe these reasons should warrant or give RUF the unmediated right to deny them their political autonomy, to brutalize or abuse them with impunity. Again, we see the failure of a revolutionary project that was anything but revolutionary: it failed to establish the requisite specie-wide post-
conventional morality or communicative understanding already evident in the society’s worldview, lifeworld or cultural knowledge as the appropriate moral logic, though never institutionalized. Even though the rebels used this denial of communicative freedoms as their immediate motivation to fight successive regimes, they failed to maintain these freedoms in their revolutionary project. Thus, the ordinary citizens wreaked vengeance on RUF through nation-wide civil disobedience and counter revolution.

*Chapter 7* is the conclusion. It brings together the findings of the earlier three analytic chapters. It highlights the practical implications of the study for popular political education and contributes insights for developing an evolutionary or reflexive learning capacity in the society, for the educational system, including classroom interactions. The study draws on insights from critical social theory and other variants of the critical pedagogic project (George Dei, Edward O’Sullivan, and Roger Simon), and the critical theory of society. This critical pedagogic project provides an example of the institutionalization – making possible the practical application - of reflexive learning and the requisite post-conventional morality. The chapter ends with a summary of insights from the analysis and discourse theory for improving the complementary connection between popular sovereignty and human rights, rather than setting them in competition.
2.0- Cognitive Research Interests and the Emancipation Question. Since Independence, political parties and citizens in Sierra Leone have failed to institutionalize ways of reaching mutual (communicative) understanding over policies, decisions, norms of action in resolving conflict and coordinating the society. Often dictatorships, different controllers of the state have often used subtle and overt coercion to ensure that citizens comply with illegitimate undemocratic policy decisions and laws.\(^{46}\) By stifling citizens’ democratic right to question policies, these successive authoritarian regimes lost their legitimacy or worthiness of recognition in the eyes of citizens. The history of Sierra Leone is replete with dictatorships and corresponding tensions such as student protests, labor union strikes, invasion threats, military coups, and a civil war (Daramy, 1993; Foray, 1988; Reno, 1995). Scholars studying the social, political, and economic crisis conditions of Sierra Leone have not systematically rationally reconstructed\(^ {47}\) these phenomena to explicate the interaction between the developmental logic or stage of social development and the developmental dynamics or actual contingent processes in the society.\(^ {49}\) Without the latter approach, it becomes difficult to perceive an emancipatory

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\(^{46}\) Albert Margai, for instance, started pushing for a one party system by using legality – constitutional amendments and parliamentary legislation - even though it was very clear that the majority of the citizens and even his own party members were against the idea. Siaka Stevens used blatant and overt intimidation – forcing opponents into exile or convicting them of treason in dubious legal proceedings or kangaroo courts. See Daramy, S. B. (1993). *Constitutional developments in the post-colonial state of Sierra-Leone, 1961-1984*. Edwin Mellen Press, and C.P. Foray. (1988). *The Road to One Party State: the Sierra Leone Experience*. Center for African Studies: University of Edinburgh Press.

\(^{47}\) The reconstructive approach is different from ordinary interpretation, by focusing on the moral cognitive consciousness of actors, and systematically explains social action or speech in terms of the consciousness of social actors. See Simon Chamber, (1996). *Reasonable Democracy*. Cornell University Press.

\(^{49}\) Developmental logic refers to the pattern of development normative structures (values and institutions) assume, which one can reconstruct by explicating processes in cultural traditions and institutional change. Developmental dynamics refer to those evolutionary challenges that unresolved, economically conditioned, system problems pose for the changes in normative structures and the learning
interest in these studies, since the self imposed constraints on consciousness that impedes social integration or social development cannot systematically enter these analyses.

This chapter reviews major literature representative of major works on the Sierra Leone Conflict in terms of the cognitive interest guiding these studies. From a critical perspective, which considers the human interest of emancipation central, we review related literature on the Conflict. In this transformative perspective, we go beyond mere criticism to assess or gauge the extent these representative works provide insight for stability and change. These works are classified according to the possible interests guiding their generation of knowledge. These non-reducible “quasi-transcendental” cognitive interests are distinguished as technical, practical, and the emancipatory (Habermas, 1972). As knowledge constitutive interests, they guide or serve as the basis in the formation of knowledge or disciplines, defining a distinct methodology, object domain, and aim of knowledge pursuit. These knowledge constitutive interests are rooted in the dimensions of human social existence: power, work, and symbolic interaction.

Technical interest guides researches we call empirical–analytic sciences, which isolate or constitute objects and events into dependent and independent variables and investigate nomological regularities. They are based on the model of negative feedback, where prediction plays a central role; they establish procedures for confirming and falsifying empirical hypothesis and theories. In empirical analytic sciences technical application of knowledge is central. Though this form of knowledge continues to be dominant in researches oriented to policy formation, it is not the basic logic of the social

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sciences, or the appropriate mode for all legitimate knowledge because of its “false objectivism,” and scientism or positivism (Bernstein, 1995).

The second type, practical interest, guides historical hermeneutic sciences, which gain knowledge or access to facts by interpretive understanding. They do not focus on the verification of law-like hypothesis as empirical analytic sciences do, but focus on the interpretation of texts to determine the possible meaning of the validity of statements of the cultural sciences (Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, 1972, p. 307). Like empirical-analytic sciences, hermeneutic sciences are also subject to hidden positivism because they claim that interpreting forms of life is possible by bracketing out critical rational evaluation (Bernstein, 1995: 10). We cannot understand and interpret the meaning of life without rationally evaluating the validity claims they always presuppose. This means the interpreter must always discriminate reasons with reference to a rational standard of judgment basic to society - the interpreter must adopt a performative attitude. Scholars in the historical-hermeneutic sciences are also guilty of false universalism because they claim that their knowledge is a fundamental type.

Generally, critical social science is guided by an interest in emancipation, and consists of a dialectical synthesis of empirical analytic and historical hermeneutic disciplines. It incorporates nomological regularities and the interpretation of meaning in symbolic interaction in its framework (Bernstein, 1995: 10). It goes beyond the one-sidedness of both empirical analytic and the historical hermeneutic sciences to focus on the fundamental human interest in emancipation. The interest in emancipation is implicit in the empirical analytic sciences through their need to test, challenge, and rationally evaluate knowledge, and also in historical hermeneutic sciences’ focus on ongoing
dialogue. We derive the emancipatory interest in the quest to rationalize discourse, to further conditions that promote the full development of reason, or to fully meet the demand for non-distorted communication, hence in the rationalization of society (p. 11).

Unlike the approaches of the related literature reviewed here, only contemporary critical social theory - the theory of communicative action – can systematically isolate, identify, and clarify the conditions required for human communication to further the full development of undistorted communication and reason (Bernstein, 1995: 16). The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas represents the most developed form of the critical tradition today (Seyla Benhabib, McCarthy, Claus Offe, Bernstein, Giddens). Unlike Marxism, it perceives the historical material from the perspective of communicative action, rather than from a productivist paradigm. 50 In what follows, the study reviews representative studies on the Sierra Leone Conflict from the perspective of the extent they pursue the fundamental human interest of emancipation.

The study organizes the review of related literature on the basis of the subjects or topics they cover, the paradigm of social evolution they espouse, the cognitive interest that guides them, and they are juxtaposed on the basis of their connection to each other. The views of researches that consider wellbeing or economics as proper orientation in maintaining social stability and informing societal values are contrasted with those like

this study that support the idea of autonomy as the key that can open up possibilities for social integration or order, and social change.

A core literature directly related to the Conflict is the Partnership Africa Canada Report, *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamond, and Human Security* (2001) by Ian Smillie and others. The Report rejects the argument that the Conflict is a “crisis of modernity,” because they argue that similar events in Sierra Leone have occurred in other places without the same problem. They argue that “only the economic opportunity presented by the breakdown in law and order could sustain violence at the levels that have plagued Sierra Leone (2001).” They see the motivation for those fighting the war as selfish economic interest, arguing that the rebels’ “point of the war may not actually have been to win it, but to engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare.” They see the War simply as “organized crime” or “transnational smuggling” (p. 2).

First, to say that the event is not a crisis of modernity is to ignore the narrow subjectivist principle inherent in the origins of the idea of modernity (Habermas, *Philosophical discourse of modernity*, 1991). This subjectivist principle manifests as individualism and the pursuit of particular interests of economic efficiency or gain. This logic is clearly inherent in structural adjustment neoliberal policies, foisted on Sierra Leone. They were concluded behind close doors, and benefited only few elite or particular interests rather than the general public. This neoliberal order caused massive discontent amongst citizens, motivating them to form a rebel army to overthrow the APC regime (Reno 1995; Francis, 2001). Richards (1995) argued that the failure of neoliberal policies, informed by the subjectivist or individualistic principle of modernity to meet the socio-economic welfare of Sierra Leoneans triggered crisis, class segregation, and created
discontents willing to militarily challenged the state. A crisis of modernity is evident in a model of modern socioeconomic development that cannot mediate the tension between the private accumulation of wealth and the general welfare of the society.

According to critical theory, whenever there is a conflict over action norms and between subsystems (the economy, the civil society, and the state) there is always good reason to suspect a crisis of modernization (Habermas, 1987). Modernization refers to cultural differentiation, exemplified by subjects capacity to use their communicative competence to rationalize (thematize and critically examine) their cultural value spheres. The modern constitution of Sierra Leone, which was modeled after the Westminster system, stipulated a system of rights, whose presupposition of political autonomy (or the exercise of the right of political participation) does not come to consciousness effectively without interpreting basic rights from the procedural perspective. Without such consciousness and political guarantees to ensure the practice of political autonomy, a crisis in constitutional democratic development becomes evident. To the extent that citizens can discursively engage the truth claims of their empirical reality, social world or normative reality or test the sincerity of their leaders as well truthfully say what they believe, differentiation of the cultural spheres is possible. A crisis of a modern constitutional democracy was evident in Sierra Leone, since citizens cannot realize the right of political participation presupposed in basic rights of the constitution. By failing to guarantee the political autonomy of citizens, to deliver on rational policy formation through unconstrained political discourse, the state eroded its own legitimacy, and hence, citizens’ quest to topple it through war.
Also, the economic argument of Smillie et al (2001) does not seriously consider how a crisis of democratic legitimation motivated the war, how the illegitimacy of the state, including neo-patrimony, mismanagement, and neoliberal corruption served as motivated to change the regime through civil war. They did not systematically analyze the legitimacy problems at the heart of state corruption, how this caused the state to lose the loyalty of citizens, triggering the need to topple it. Their analysis does not systematically investigate the society within an evolutionary framework, hence they can not clearly determine ‘when the War became mere organized crime’ or ‘whether the motivation of those who willingly engage in the Conflict was simply diamonds,’ or whether it was due to citizens’ rational moral repulsion against the excesses of the APC dictatorship.’ The Report reduced the motivation of actors in the Conflict to mere greed, hence failed to analyze legitimation problems caused by exploitation and repression.

The motivations of actors in the War changed at different stages of the War. Diamonds became fuel for war long after the war started. Diamonds was part of the strategic calculation of every party in the Conflict because it is easy to conceal and exchange for arms and ammunition. As strategic calculation, every party to the conflict needed diamonds to sustain their war effort or hold their ground. This strategic consideration should not muddle the need for comprehensive analysis of how state corruption and mismanagement created and motivated discontents to challenge the state.

To be sure, the selective pursuit of the war path was problematic, considering the destruction of life and property. Yet, evaluating the action and motivation of the warring parties is only possible through critical comprehensive examination of the state of affairs or objective reality, the subjective world of the combatants, and the normative questions
related to their war conduct. The exclusive focus on diamond greed serves to redefine the problem situation, detracting from the tensions created by the state’s internal colonization or repressive constrains on the socio-cultural domain, its depoliticization of society. By denying citizens’ right of political participation amidst this economic exploitation, the state intensified citizens’ discontent, leaving war as the only option. State exploitation and repression motivated radical students and economically disenfranchised youths to willingly raise a rebel army to topple the regime.

The failure to explore comprehensive reasons that motivated actors in the war indicates the technical constitutive interest guiding the Report: It became clear by its recommendations that it was not concern with rigorous systematic analysis of the Conflict, but with policy formulation centrally. Its selective take on the objective reality, the rebel greed and atrocities for diamond, means the Reports conclusions or policy recommendations would have to focus exclusively on these issues. Arguing selectively that Sierra Leoneans have an irrational greed for diamonds, the Report recommended establishing an international surveillance system of certification to manage the Country’s diamonds. In war situation, this recommendation may make sense as it can cut the lifeblood factions use to amass arms and ammunition that fuels the Conflict. In the medium and long term, however, this recommendation guided by technical interest in control, or the imperatives of the capitalist system only serves the technical mastery or social engineering of the society. This policy does not seriously address the key related crisis-inducing problem of inequitable distribution of wealth in diamond certification.

Any approach aimed at transforming the State’s corrupt values and institutions, would not only mention the logic of corrupt governance and avoid it. It would have to
address ways to change these normative structures to enable the society develop the capacity or learn to overcome its crisis-ridden logic of governance. Rather than condemning the society as incapable of managing its own resources, it would be more beneficial to work out a transformative solution that would make the state a more responsible and rational agent for social change or social integration. Without scope for learning to be agents of change, the Report hinders the society’s development as reflected in their support for the continuation of external administrative dependency and control – *peripheralization* (Wallerstein cited in Alvin So, 1990). The society’s vulnerability to colonization increases when we put its resources under international management, a logic that does not necessarily resonate with the mass of Sierra Leoneans. This recommendation does not give chance to the society to learn to develop its own human capacity for rational resource management. The proposal defers such learning. In short, the Report encouraged and reasserts a colonial logic and orientation in its policy recommendation – the external control or management of the Nation’s resources. Ironically, such external control is one reason, the RUF gave as motivation to invade Sierra Leone: to end the exploitation of the Nations resources for the benefit of colluding internal and external elites. As the Report’s recommendation went tangential to the need for positive moral transformation of state institutions, it exemplifies a technical interest.

Richard Fanthorpe & Maconadie, R. (2010). Beyond the ‘Crisis of Youth’? Mining, Farming, and Civil Society in Postwar Sierra Leone. In *African Affairs. Vol. 109, no. 435*. This is a recent article that argues for a different, even diametrically opposed position as Smillie *et al*. Unlike the latter, Fanthorpe and Maconadie see diamonds as possible driver of cultural modernization in Sierra Leone. In their analysis
of post war associations and large scale mining endeavors that have now taken over artisan approaches in Mining Kono District, they argued that renewed interest in farming as reaction to the new dynamics would lead to long lasting basis for cultural democratic transformation in Sierra Leone. While Smillie et al emphasized diamond greed, and logically recommended systemic control of the diamonds, Fanthorpe and Maconadie saw expert systemic control of the diamonds as occasioning structural exploitation in Sierra Leone, with the immediate Kono communities not very enriched or economically developed under these regimes or external administration. In the absence of distribution justice considerations in external certification schemes, citizens have been moving in agriculture and farming, which in the long run would translate into questions of land ownership and use, or to questions of distributive justice ignored by Smillie et al.

Another relevant literature reviewed is the periodic Human Rights Watch Reports, “Sowing the seeds of terror” and “Getting away with murder.” These Reports contain anecdotal accounts of serious human rights abuses against civilians by mainly rebels and pro-government forces in the Conflict: sexual slavery, mutilations, forced labor, forced recruitment, recruitment of child soldiers, and killings. They catalogued violations of international law, particularly humanitarian law. The Reports contain primary information or accounts of the atrocities victims suffered in their brutal campaigns, ‘Operation No Living Thing’ and ‘Operation Pay Yourself.’ In 1996, the rebels unleashed these campaigns of terror of civilians, amputating, mutilating, and lacerating them as a way to discourage their participation in the general elections. Their behavior may tempt one to believe that they never wanted to win the war or never cared about the political backlash of their conduct. These Reports did not properly explicate the
connection between the rebels’ revolutionary strategy and the frustration the 1996 elections posed for them. Citizens’ positive respond to international calls for general elections frustrated the rebels, whose strategy was to gain power through military victory. The rebels’ atrocities were aimed at intimidating and discouraging citizens’ participation in the 1996 elections. Citizens’ participation in the elections means their lack of support or identification with the rebels’ strategy, hence questioning the legitimacy of the latter’s strategy and cause.

RUF’s victimization of civilians was a serious blunder, since it alienated and cost them political support and survival. Their atrocities were calculated acts born out of their frustration at what they deemed a “democratic coup” or move that offset their plan of winning the Conflict through arms struggle. The rebels wanted election after the final winning the war. This strategy worked in Liberia, where rebels ceased hostilities, only after Charles Taylor, the NPFL leader with the support of RUF, became Vice President. The Human Rights Watch Reports did not systematically analyze the connection between the rebels’ revolutionary ideology as espoused in their Green Book and Manifesto, the *Bushpath to Democracy*, and the brutal vicious strategy to gain political power.

Informed by Green book and Pan-African Marxist revolutionary ideas, the rebels would have to win the war to realize the goals of their so called ‘peoples revolution.’ Their atrocities were calculated to force citizens to comply with their war strategy, to technically master them to achieve their revolution. Here lies the fundamental problem of their Marxist-type ideology: its inability to determine the significance of true volition. To the extent that the rebels believed the war path was the only revolutionary means to achieve the society’s “objective universal human interest,” pre-politically determined by
them, anyone opposed to their revolutionary project of mobilization to this so-called universal interest is deemed a reactionary force, hence considered a candidate for elimination. Understanding the conduct of the rebels, therefore, requires explicating their conception of pragmatic, ethical, and moral norms, underlying their ‘revolutionary’ attitude, and conception.

Ordinary citizens’ favored the proposed 1996 general elections, a choice that ran counter to the revolutionary strategy of the RUF, sowing the seeds of enmity between citizens and the rebels, the self-proposed champion to liberate citizens. They became obstacles to the rebels’ goal of ‘democracy’ through Guerilla warfare or the ‘bushpath’ (Abdullah, 1998). Considering their affinities to Marxism or praxis philosophy (variants of Marxism), the rebels’ disrespectful treatment of ordinary Sierra Leoneans seem strikingly similar to the typical disdain Marxist revolutionary ideology and praxis philosophy have for ordinary citizens (Habermas, 1990 Ake, 1989).

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the Bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product. The lower middle class… the artisan, the peasant, all fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary but conservative. Nay more they are reactionary (Marx and Engels, 1955: 20). Abdullah (1995) argued that the people who mainly made up the rebel army – students, the jobless, and peasants – were the lumpen proletariat. That the RUF was made up of marginalized and dispossessed youths and students of Sierra Leone, who had good reason or motivation to throw off the burden of their APC oppressors, does not mean ordinary citizens should accept any treatment meted out to them in the name of revolution. This seems to be a basic assumption of the rebels. Once it became clear that war-weary
citizens supported elections to start rebuilding the war–torn country, they clashed with the revolutionary logic or ideology guiding the RUF movement, becoming their enemies.

Kosselleck’s (1988), comment on the French Revolutionaries is instructive here: “The totality of the politically neutral claim of fixed, eternally valid morality necessarily turns political acts and attitudes, once they are subjected to a moral test they cannot pass, into total injustice. Moral totality deprives all who do not subject themselves to it of their right to exist (p.152).” Anyone opposed to the rebels’ strategy of taking over political power by force, which they believe citizens ought to support, is considered an enemy, and candidate for elimination or demoralization. In the totality of the Greenbook ideology informing RUF training in Beghazi and Tripoli (Richards, 1995; Abdullah, 1995), we begin to understand the danger of ideological determinism. The rebels’ Marxist or praxis philosophy, like the neoliberal adjustment policies, made them subject to a historicism, which rendered them incapable of systematically relating to contingent historical situations – namely citizens desire for a democratic resolution to the Conflict.

For a study that claims to contribute insights to stabilize Sierra Leone, the Human Rights Watch Reports are not emancipatory enough. They focused on explaining or describing the atrocities without properly interpreting the events, issues that are possible to take up even in a legal discourse, such as the Reports. The Reports do not provide convincing understanding of the rebels’ conduct. The narratives of victims or descriptions do not show or explicate possible reasons that motivated the rebels. Without engaging the rebels’ ideological orientation, or philosophy of change informing their project, the Reports can only contribute temporarily to stability, but leave concealed the key elements that shaped the rebels behavior and attitude.
The crime and punishment-retributive justice- approach of Human Rights Watch Reports cannot admit of comprehensive analysis that can explicate the issues and processes of contingent social reality, the brutality directed at civilians. Its binary coding of the situation into legal and illegal acts that must accompany sanctions reveals the if-then conditional structure of the law and order approach. *If crimes are committed, then there must be punishment* is ‘foreign’ to the logic of social relations. The latter considers the possibility of understanding the breakdown of law and socio-political order as a matter of legitimation, which we can get at only by considering the reasons constituting the basis of social integration. The if-then conditional structure of legal discourse denies the emergence of reasons with context altering learning effects.

Explicating comprehensively the reasons for RUF conduct and evaluating them would require investigating the misunderstanding between the people and the rebels emerged in the first place. This valid explication will entail understanding the psychological impetus or motivation (RUF’s belief that gaining control of territory gives them legitimate right to govern); the revolutionary ideology guiding them; and the rebels’ need to intimidate civilians to build or support their army. The retributive justice approach of Human Rights Watch did not effectively engage the social, psychological, and empirical dimensions of the rebels’ actions. Thus, the Reports are not comprehensive in accounting for the violence and the crisis of social integration.

By failing to connect the normative, psychological, and objective reality of the Conflict, the Report concealed and left unaddressed major aspects of the war reality. We again see the prominence of the technical interest in mastering society, in ensuring that citizens learn to comply with law exclusively out of fear of sanctions. Stable
reintegration of the society is difficult without the basic understanding that expert solutions do not necessarily ensure the stability or are identical with citizens’ interests. This legalistic approach poses serious challenges for those working in post war reconstruction, the problems of how to mediate the normative aspects of presuppositions of the law (its validity or legitimacy as also key to complying with it) and its facticity or positivity or enforceability that remains unresolved. This approach of Human Rights Watch keeps society in the dark about the danger of willful blindness. The Reports highlighted the gruesome crimes and connects them to violated international humanitarian law to determine the appropriate legal prosecution. To be transformative, legal discourse must address comprehensively what motivated citizens to endanger social integration. If the legal discourse can engage the cultural knowledge from which the personality or identity of rebels had been disassociated from, then it can be insightful and serve as a guide to resolve future conflict and promote stability.

This review does not downplay the legal approach, generally, since the key point of this study is that the law is a powerful tool of stabilizing behavioral expectation in the society that in turn supports social integration. Belonging to the legitimate social orders, the societal component of the lifeworld of society, the law can comprehensively and critically interpret the context for the violation of social and legal norms to promote the emancipation and stability of the society.

“Footpaths to Democracy (1995),” the RUF (Revolutionary United Front’s) Manifesto, outlined the rebels’ mission in Sierra Leone. The rebels claimed to carry out a guerilla warfare aimed at decolonizing Sierra Leone from exploitation and repression. They saw this possibility for change exclusively through the gun or through military
victory rather than through democratic elections. They continued fighting even after the APC government they initially targeted lost their hold on power. Their revolution was incomplete or ran into crisis, because they could not establish the dictatorship of the proletariat or socialist order, their professed goal. Their persistence on arms struggle to meet their goal caused observers to dismiss them as simply motivated by diamond greed.

RUF’s inability to calculate the strategic cost of their terror campaign against civilians aimed at discouraging their participation in the democratic elections, led us to fundamentally question their approach to societal transformation. Key questions that come to mind regarding their project are these: “Can we find the key to progressive social evolution in revolutionary struggle, or in democratic opinion and will formation?” As alternative ways to coordinate social life, “Can we order the two approaches in such a way so to complement each other properly?” “Were the RUF capable of effectively balancing the strategic orientation (military struggle) and intersubjective understanding with citizens properly? Citizens’ negative reaction to RUF’s brutality shows the deficiency of the Movement’s strategic instrumental approach to transform the social order. In denying the right of political participation of citizens, who initially supported them, RUF was more or less forcing citizens to “make” history according to their (RUF) blueprint. The rebels hindered citizens’ attempts to use their communicative competence or agency to make or determine their history by themselves. Their participation in the 1996 general elections caused the RUF to intensify their wanton violence against them, cutting their limbs, and killing many. Citizens’ communicative freedom or competence was shown as mutually exclusive with the rebels’ despotically and teleologically oriented guerilla movement. Today, true emancipation is possible only through clinical or ethical
political discourses of self realization, and moral discourses of self determination (Habermas, 1993).

Ibrahim Abdullah’s study, “Footpath to Destruction (1998),” is more or less a parody of the RUF Manifesto, *Bushpath to Democracy*. In this scathing critique of the rebels, he argues that the rebels committed the atrocities because they lacked adequate grounding in Marxist revolutionary ideas. This argument is problematic because it sees the practical manifestation of Marxist politics as devoid of violence. As said earlier, RUF directed violence against citizens because the latter opposed their military strategy of taking power by democratic elections.

The argument that the rebels’ violence was due to their lack of correct Marxist grounding or leadership is problematic. This study holds that the rebels’ attempts to technically master the society or bend it to their will arose from the Marxist type project of the rebels. This was what caused civil militia counterrevolution and the mass civil disobedience campaigns, which citizens organized against their self appointed liberators. In this study, the rebels’ violence against citizens is directly attributed to their praxis philosophical orientation, a variant of Marxism.

Clausewitz’s text *On War* questioned the logic of pursuing war exclusively from a strategic perspective. In his book, he advocated the need for mutual understanding over an orientation to win a war at any cost. He helps us see that war is not exclusively a strategic matter, because it can hardly transcend questions of politics or the human interest of mutual understanding. According to him, war cannot follow its own logic of strategic brutality if it is to be meaningful, but should delicately balance the pursuit of military goals with the quest to win the heart and minds of those affected. Volume one of
Clausewitz’s Book 1, *On War*, stresses the centrality of policy and political consideration in any act of War. In all its instrumental zest, even Machiavelli emphasized the need to win the hearts and minds of those one claims to fight for. Clausewitz’s old text opened up areas for thinking about the legitimacy question. Although, it does not systematically engage the concept of legitimacy at the core of the text, he illustrated that winning over civilian hearts and minds is key to ultimate political victory.

This study also reviewed two widely known accounts of the Conflict, Paul Richard’s *Fighting for the Rainforest*, (1995) and Robert Kaplan’s “*The Coming Anarchy*” in *Atlantic Monthly* (1994). Kaplan saw the atrocities in the war as an example of the incapacity of African culture for civilize mores and modern attitude of reason. He conveys a tragic picture of the society’s tendency towards barbarism by using wild speculations based on limited observation of different conditions around the world. His presentation gives the image of a scenario found in Hollywood thrillers. Kaplan labels the rebel violence in Sierra Leone as manifestation of innate barbarism.

However, Kaplan did not examine how capitalist exploitation and its attended hardship contributed to the socio-psychological dysfunction in the developing societies. For example, the IMF and IBRC (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) or the World Bank concluded neoliberal deals with the dictatorial APC regime in Sierra Leone, forcing irrational policies on the society that created so much misery that only state repression could sustain them. The IMF/Bank funded the APC dictatorship, bolstering its repressive power to ensure that citizens’ comply with their socioeconomically devastating neoliberal prescriptions. The multilateral institutions created a crisis by disrupting health, socioeconomic and educational development
programs and funding the State’s repressive agenda. Through this repression, the state tended to conceal and hence intensify the crisis tendency the neoliberal arrangement caused. This led the crises tendencies intensify and explode in catastrophic proportions.

Citizens could not voice their discontent over the IMF/Bank induced misery. By strengthening the APC dictatorship through their funds, the IMF/Bank colluded with the state in denying the society’s critical agency – citizens’ capacity to speak and act to change their reality. Blaming these societies as incapable of civilize mores seem like an attempt by Kaplan to conceal or hold a ‘willful blindness’ to the culpability of external forces. The Bank/IMF financial aid packages ‘giving to Sierra Leone’ were hidden in the personal foreign bank accounts of state officials of Sierra Leone. This neoliberal arrangement also crowded out indigenous development initiatives. In short, the loan conditionality and support for dictators created discontents of desperate suffering masses and paranoid corrupt state officials.

In his selective postmodern pessimism, Kaplan failed to pose the question of who propped up the dictatorships to oppress citizens, or who bought RUF diamonds to provide them continuously with arms, logistics and training. Kaplan’s sweeping condemnation of the society clearly puts him in the category of empirical analytic frameworks that succumb easily to the pressure of objective or empirical reality (the wanton brutality of the RUF), impeding rational comprehensive analysis. It is barbarism to dubiously supply arms to dictators and rebels who kill innocent civilians: such people are called ‘merchants of death.’ Insofar as Kaplan is discussing society, he is interpreting and should, therefore, avoid overgeneralizations that lack truth-validity or comprehensive rationality.
Contrary to Kaplan (2004), Richards (1995) argues that the Sierra Leone Conflict was not a random thoughtless barbarism but an innovative technique of warfare that used terror to compensate for the Movement’s lack of adequate military capacity or arms and ammunition. Using Marxist analysis, he argued that the war was a crisis of State governance, which led citizens influenced by Rambo style adventurism and other violent pop cultural icons to form a rebel army to topple the dictatorship. This way of explaining the situation conceals how systemic exploitation and repression motivated citizens to rebellion.

Like Kaplan, Richards did not effectively examine the serious part international actors played in fomenting the Conflict, apart from the influence of Hollywood Rambo type movies on the psyche of disenfranchised and marginalized Sierra Leoneans. Pervasive international involvement in the Sierra Leone Conflict even put to question the use of the term “civil war” to refer to the Sierra Leone Conflict. The neoliberal arrangement sustained the dictatorship, which in turn created the precondition for establishing the neoliberal order, which intensified poverty and despair in Sierra Leone, even as it claimed to develop it (Weekes, 1992; Cleave, 1988). Richards does not critically evaluate the rebel approach beyond strategic considerations i.e. beyond the expedient adoption of Rambo style strategy, without systematically engaging the normative dimension of the Conflict, questions such as justice or legitimacy.

An interesting take on this brutality and violence of the RUF rebels is presented by Augustine Park, (2007). Making Sense of Amputations in Sierra Leone In Peace Review. Vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 579-578. This recent article explains RUF brutality in a more convincing way. Unlike Kaplan, but like Richard, Park argues that while this barbaric
idea may have been imported, and therefore not a unique mark of barbarian tendency of Sierra Leoneans, he makes a point that resonates with this thesis: that the tactic was a conscious decision designed to attract the attention of the global community. As shown in this study (chapter 6), the tactic was designed to discourage citizens from participating in the 1995 general elections, or to discourage their support for a democratic resolution of the conflict, which was supported by the international community. The key point of this thesis is that while this violent practice lacks any justification, making sense of it is important to ensure stable and durable peace in the society. This is what makes the Human Rights Watch Reports as legal discourses designed to get at the bottom of things (Habermas, 1996), not very effective. Though, the Reports are only written documents rather than the hearings, it is still vital that they made serious effort at understanding or making sense of the amputations beyond an if–then conditional legal approach.

Murana Kallon’s Political Economy of Corruption (2004) is an interesting analysis that straddles effectively the language of economics and the political philosophy of justice. The book spends substantial time on the law, straddling it with the language of economics. Kallon draws on Richard Dworkin’s concept of law to explicate the illegality and undemocratic use to strategically deploy political power by the state. He showed in some detail how state officials, jurists and other elite constituting social power in Sierra Leone subverted the constitution and established a dictatorship.

In reading Kallon, one becomes unsettle because of the problem of using the technical language of law and economics to explain the formative process of the Conflict. The discourse in the text may ill-position an ordinary citizen or potential agent of change to effectively understand the issues at stake. In restricting his analysis within the
language of economics, reformulating his explanations in terms of economic parameters, matrices and graphs, Kallon diminished the criticalness of his analysis. The languages of economics and law can be institutionally coded, limiting these media’s effectiveness to critique the mismanagement and mis-governance of the society.

If change or the emancipatory interest presupposed by his analysis is to become authentic, then he must translate the expert language of economics to ordinary communication to enable the addressees of his project (the citizens) appropriate his insights for change. Change can come when critical understanding informs practice or serve as orientation of those agents undertaking processes of transformation. The agents of change, speaking and acting subjects, must understand the critical insights to appropriate or apply them. As citizens lack clear understanding of corruption ‘explicated’ in technical economic language, we are left with expert recommendations that only the experts can understand. This way to defend the collective interest of citizens may not be effective. Kallons book is admirable, however, in its effort to critique economic, legal and political corruption in Sierra Leone.

Kallon’s analysis of the legal and political issues to facilitate social transformation is admirable, but the technical economic form of his discourse hinders the critical transformative consciousness he intends. In particular, for an economist taking pins to engage or appropriate the ideas of key legal minds such as Dworkins is indeed commendable.

Weeke’s Development Strategy and the Economy of Sierra Leone (1992), on the other hand, successfully straddles the connection between expert language and the analysis of economics in clear ordinary language. He ‘translated’ the complex
technicalities of economic analysis into ordinary language to expose the limited rationality of economic policies that caused citizens discontent, and their determination to overthrow the APC regime. Weekes argues that international institutions are mainly responsible for Sierra Leone’s economic and political quagmire by exposing what he calls their false, insincere, inconsistent, and immoral economic prescriptions for Sierra Leone. He argued that the economic crisis arose from years of state implementation of inconsistent, irrational, and misleading economic policies prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF.

While the imperatives of external capital conditioned the Conflict, to consider the neoliberal institutions solely responsible is to deny the role the political elite played in making the crisis. The state was culpable insofar as the state and its coercive instruments implemented prescriptions that facilitated the external exploitation of the society, contrary to their sworn duty to properly manage the national wealth for the benefit of its citizens (Cleave, 1988). By glossing over the responsibility of Sierra Leoneans in making the Conflict, Weekes’ impeded a comprehensive analysis of the Conflict. This limitation can hinder Sierra Leoneans from undertaken effective self-examination of their role in creating the crisis. Communicative self reflection can serve as a basic condition for attitudinal scrutiny and alteration, a necessary initial step to successful social transformation. Without acknowledging or understanding how the collusion of state officials and economy, the fusion of power and money, created the Sierra Leone Conflict, comprehensive analysis is impossible.

Weekes argued that Asian countries, who were also formerly colonized societies, were able to attain slightly higher levels of economic development because they allowed
only limited openness of their economies. Despite this insight, there seem to be other geopolitical, demographic, historical and linguistic factors that could have accounted for differences in Asian and African development since decolonization.

Emmanuel Cleave’s *Multinational Enterprises in Development: the Mining Industry of Sierra Leone*. (1988), is an insightful analysis of the internal economic strategy of state exploitation. He clearly explicates the collusion between internal state elite and external capitalist elite or foreign direct investment in the mining industry of Sierra Leone as joint exploitation. State officials sell national companies to their friends or proxies as part of the IMF/Bank dictated privatization prescription using the argument that this would bring about efficient resource management. Under this program, Jamil Sahid, a Lebanese/Sierra Leonean businessman bought the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) of Sierra Leone to create PMMC (Precious Minerals and Marketing Company). The only outcome of this privatization, however, was that diamond proceeds ended up in Biblios Bank in Lebanon, from which the state officials got loans.

Also, state officials not only relaxed export taxes on mining companies but allowed these companies the right to retain up to 50% to 60% of untaxed income, causing massive foreign exchange leakage. These revenues were used to entertain state officials abroad or give them loans under dubious and non-transparent arrangements, considering the one party dictatorship at the time. Through these loans, the credit system, and privatization scheme, the resources of Sierra Leone were ‘legally’ exploited. Cleave lays out how state officials enabled external capital and private bodies appropriate the natural resources of Sierra Leone. His analysis highlights the contemporary fusion of state and market (McCarthy, 1985; Habermas, 1991).
Cleave does not however see this dubious state and market fusion as a regression in modern state development or systemic differentiation. To him, it appears as more or less an unsystematic corrupt practice of the APC dictatorship. A critical reading of the text reveals a systematic pattern of blatant state misappropriation or exploitation that only a dictatorship or totalitarianism can make possible. Only under dictatorship can such processes of blatant economic exploitation thrive. Since the State cannot gain mutual understanding with its citizens for this exploitative order or mismanagement, it must force their compliance. Cleave does not connect how this systemic imperative constrained the freedom of citizens, making discontents of citizens.

Within the dynamics of this State/Market collusion, we see why the legality of the State cannot be a sufficient condition for its legitimacy. A state that loses its claim to legitimacy or worthiness of recognition creates legitimate grounds for its citizens to overthrow it (Marcuse, 1969). In reality, the APC came to power through intrigues, threatening a civil war, which some believed actually occurred through their infiltration of the national army (Daramy, 1993). APC dictatorship denied press freedom and brutally repressed civilians, creating the conditions for the civil war. Understanding the tension between legality and legitimacy is central for differentiating the appearance and reality of the social order’s stability. Cleave only lays out the basic empirical structure of the corrupt economic/political arrangements, which nonetheless provides a starting point for investigating the Conflict. His critique of these institutions does not verge on their lack of legitimacy, a reality that destroyed the loyalty the society once had for the APC.

The legitimacy question is a bit more pervasive in the analysis of David Francis, *The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS* (2001). Francis argued
that the model of development the IMF/Bank fostered in Sierra Leone and the sub-region of West Africa was inappropriate. He sees the neoliberal development model as the genesis of the West African crisis or the civil wars because it neglected the welfare of citizens. Since this development model was implemented right across the West African sub-region, it was bound to create tensions of a sub-regional magnitude. The similar nature of the economic, social, and political problems and crisis tendencies associated with the neoliberal ideology in various states in the West Africa sub-region means the Conflict would have to assume a regional dimension.

The economic misery Sierra Leonians suffered in the 1980s’ did not only cause discontent among ordinary citizens who formed the RUF, it also caused the state army to withdraw its loyalty from it, to later turn on the regime, and overthrew it. The APC was overthrown by junior officers of the Sierra Leone army under the leadership of 27 year old Captain Valentine Strasser of NPRC (National Patriotic Revolutionary Front. These officers returned from the war front to demand that the government better support their effort at the warfront. The misery induced by the APC neoliberal regime was what eventually cost them the loyalty of national army, which they had controlled for so many years. Motivation crisis or the withdrawal of mass loyalty of citizens (including the army) from the State is the flipside of the crisis of legitimation (Habermas, 1970). The loss of legitimacy and citizens mass support did not come as a surprise to APC, since as early as the 1970s and the 1980’s the party was already frantically promoting regional defense pacts with Guinea, and in ECOWAS and in the OAU. Its regional strategy was, according to Francis, nothing other than an attempt to manufacture legitimacy through regional military, monetary, and trade cooperation and public relations work. Realizing
that their power was already under threat by the RUF, and had lost the loyalty of its citizens, the APC regime was quick to offer Sierra Leone to ECOMOG (the ECOWAS military monitoring group) as launching pad for its operations against Charles Taylor’s NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia).

Francis’ analysis explained these regional defense arrangements mainly from a strategic perspective, focusing on the connection between the Liberian rebels, ECOMOG campaigns, and the RUF connection. He does not clarify the qualitative difference between legitimacy based on democratic politics or mutual understanding, and legitimacy manufactured through internal repression, sub-regional trade, military and international political agreements or regimes, and international public relations work. The APC’s regional defense initiatives in the OAU and ECOWAS, its willingness to host these costly regional summits, and offer Sierra Leone as launching pad for ECOMOG operations were APC’s attempts to manufacture legitimacy for a party that was already under threat of national instability and external rebel invasion. This de facto manner of manufacturing legitimacy cannot ensure the internal stability of Sierra Leone as they do not positively affect the economic, political and social life of the mass of Sierra Leone to motivate social integration. Genuine legitimacy arises from the recognition citizens give to a political order. Francis does not clearly explicate the correct form legitimacy should take in a post-traditional society such as Sierra Leone.

Francis conducted his brilliant discussions in the book from the perspective of political economy. This approach however seems to have limited the criticalness of his analysis as it does not systematically take up normative question of the “ought.” The
latter question is central to any inquiry aimed at the emancipation of society or concerned with the stability of the normatively fixed identity or integration of the society.

Kamara’s *Sustainable Rural Development* (2001) sees economic corruption as centrally a Sierra Leone problem. By focusing exclusively on internal forces, he stands on the opposite side of Weekes (1992). In his discussion of nepotism and corruption of agricultural extension workers, Kamara showed how the rural development strategy implemented in Sierra Leone created social tensions by intensifying rural poverty. Unlike Weekes, he blamed the economic mismanagement mainly on Sierra Leone institutions, rather than external capital. His analysis is one-sided as it did not properly connect the collusion between external and internal elite in the exploitation of the society.

Daramy’s *Constitutional Developments in the post colonial state of Sierra Leone, 1961-1984* (1993) is more elaborate in tracking the subversion of democracy and the constitution of Sierra Leone since Independence than Cyril Foray’s (1988) more cogent and incisive text, *The Road to the One Party State: the Sierra Leone Experience* (1988). Both deal with the same subject, the lack of mutual understanding among politicians during the decolonization period as bearing the seeds of social disintegration in Sierra Leone. Daramy’s analysis showed how Siaka Stevens made elections into ‘general selections,’ and subverted the independence of the judiciary to falsely convict opponents with treason, hence subverting the rule of law.

Daramy’s exclusive focus on the internal developmental dynamics becomes particularly unsettling. As the former financial secretary during the SLPP regime of Sir Albert, who started the road to one party dictatorship, Daramy could hardly have missed the connection between the imperatives of the capitalist system, the former colonial
power, and the negative manipulations this could have posed for the young constitutional democracy of Sierra Leone. Though his study focused on constitutional development, the latter politics was more or less conditioned by capitalist economic considerations. For example, Britain’s attempt to make the Governor General and the Privy Council in England its political and judicial proxy in its former colony, now a newly Independent Constitutional democracy, was tantamount to its refusal to truly confer the capacity of self determination on its richly endowed Colony. Could Britain’s concern of losing influence over its former colonial power have led her to promote unprincipled legal approach in the society (Harrington and Manji, 2003)? Daramy does not connect how external (capitalist) system conditioned the internal politics of Sierra Leone.

In his short and incisive treatise, *The Road to the One Party State: the Sierra Leone Experience* (1988), CP Foray focused more cogently on parliamentary discourses that subverted the constitutional democratic principles stipulated and presupposed by the Independent constitution of Sierra Leone. He makes a similar argument like Daramy, criticizing the representative of the British Crown, Governor Lightfoot Boston, for subverting the executive authority of the Prime Minister in Sierra Leone. Foray, however, seem to blame Sir Albert’s one party quest as the main origin of the constitutional crisis that beset the society immediately after Independence. Albert Margai and Stevens by this one party quest destroyed the legitimacy of their political power State, intensified hostility, intrigues, repression and manipulation that culminated in the first constitutional crisis and military intervention.

Foray and Daramy engaged the social evolution of Sierra Leone from the moral practical point of view, but did not connect how the imperatives of the world capitalist
system conditioned the internal political playing fields of Sierra Leone. While touching on the inconspicuous external colonial presence in the office of the Governor General, Foray did not systematically tease out how this constitutional stipulation reflected a colonial policy of imperialism. As the representative of Britain, the Governor General was supposed to be a titular head legally, yet factually he was so powerful that his actions decided the political future of Sierra Leone by subverting the democratic will of voters in the 1967 elections. Many believed the Governor General was pressurized to declare Siaka Stevens Prime Minister before the parliamentary elections were completed.

Without delving into the interaction of north/south elite interests, on the one hand, and its connection to internal elite power struggle, on the other, Foray and Daramy could only partially explicate how systemic imperatives constrained the lifeworld, the legal, political or parliamentary discourses in Sierra Leone. Their discussions, nevertheless, exposed how external systematic constraints (of the former colonial state) shaped the internal political discourse in Sierra Leone. Despite some few limitations, these authors provided valuable insights into the persistent colonial type manipulations in politics after 1961.

William Reno’s *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (1995) is very insightful, especially with regards to explanation of state corruption and the national political culture of corruption. He provides elaborate discussion of contemporary and past colonial history, clarifying the connection between the internal political structures of Sierra Leone and imperial economic interest. Comparing the APC comprador elite to the paramount Chiefs of the pre-colonial period, he argued that these groups are the functional cogs in the agenda of colonial exploitation. Reno’s particularly illuminating point is that the state’s dependency on market forces such as the Lebanese enabled the
latter hold the state hostage, determining its political survival as well. He provides a convincing and elaborate narrative or description of political corruption in the society, with emphasis on the resource extraction industry, particularly diamonds, and how this led discontents to form a rebel army to fight a civil war in Sierra Leone.

Reno exposed the illegitimacy of the political sovereign Stevens, but did not effectively explicate the connection between the idea of legitimacy of the law through which political power is deployed and the statutory authorization of the state to exercise monopoly over violence. He argues that state monopoly over the means of coercion is justified solely on the basis of the internal protection and the external defense the state provides society. This argument is problematic. It is little surprising that he should take this position as he draws on the (in)famous legal thinker, Carl Schmitt. Schmitt, like other legal philosophers, shun the liberal political culture of democratic opinion and will formation of the public (Habermas, *Autonomy, and solidarity*). Schmitt, whom Reno refers to as his “guide,” considers democracy an unnecessary burden (Habermas, 1998).

Reno did not deal with the tension between validity (legitimacy) and the facticity of law, the tension between legitimacy and the positivity of law. This question is concealed in the legal theory of Carl Schmitt (Habermas, 1996) from whom Reno takes his politico-legal orientation. Questions of the ‘ought,’ morality or justice constitutive of the normative dimension of social reality, as well as the need for the political autonomy of citizens, do not gain serious treatment in Schmitt’s politico-legal theory. Thus, for all his elaborate description of the massive political corruption in Sierra Leone, Reno could not seriously reflect on how citizens can be empowered or how the State’s legitimacy can be conceived beyond its administrative function of implementing law to ensure social
stability. Reno’s critique of the social and political order does not embody transformative insights. To critique a political and social order more or less implies possible ways and means such orders can be made or rendered legitimate. Reno’s descriptive approach did not present us with such transformative remedial insights of the political order in Sierra Leone.

Notwithstanding this, however, Reno’s text is similar with this study in the belief that the political and economic corruption that disrupted the society’s evolution or integration has to with the practical problem of political culture. This study considers the latter the pacemaker of social change.

The book *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of the Military and Security* (2002) by Luckman and Cawthra carries interesting introductory and concluding chapters that try to capture the relationship between democratic legitimacy and conflicts in Africa. This book made some progress in explicating this connection but was limited because it did not systematically explicate the connection between democracy and War. For a study in governing insecurity, they did not conceptualize any rational standard for analyzing governance, generally. Such a standard is vital to produce a convincing critique of how developing societies fail to become secure or stable. A rational standard for governing security should engage the question of legitimacy since that is what guarantees stability of a social order (Habermas, 1979). Any study with interest in promoting stable democratic governance would have to explicate a rational standard for legitimate governance.

In Joseph Hanlon’s (2005) article, Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Preconditions for War in Sierra Leone? In *The Round Table, vol.9, no.381,*
pp. 459-472, we see real concern or interest in the survival of the people of Sierra Leone. Hanlon argues that the conditions that led to the crisis and civil war in Sierra Leone have not gone away, but rather seem to have been recreated by the international community’s ‘helping hand.’ The same old men responsible for the war were left in power both at the state and chieftaincy levels, corruption remained pervasive, young people are still jobless and largely uneducated. Thus, the policies recommended by the international community may inadvertently promote a return to chaos.

Hanlon’s point triggered the original hunch of this study, realizing the urgent need to embark on this critical investigation. The international recommendations to resolve the crisis may serve to recreate similar conditions for a recurrence of the crisis or war in Sierra Leone. For instance, the diamond certification recommendation without an effective distributive justice component may only serve to make the wealth or capital accumulation process more efficient to benefit internal and external elite at the detriment of ordinary citizens and impoverished youths. This paradox of recreating the war preconditions under the guise of resolving it shows the sophistication of systemic ideological manipulation, which Foucault called the *discourse of institutions* (See Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality*. vol. 1).

Involvement of the international community in studying and making recommendations regarding Third World conflicts needs to be examined critically by those who stand to suffer when all is said and done about those conflicts. In the event of recurrence of war, ordinary Sierra Leoneans will be the ones that would not be evacuated abroad on short notice, or automatically gain visas to stable countries. Thus, Hanlon and this study show an urgent need for a research that is critical, one with an interest is
emancipating the society from the vicious cycle of war-international policy rhetoric, and evacuation of foreign nationals, often implicated in fomenting such conflicts.

Unlike the above studies, this critical sociological study reconstructs the formative process of the crisis in the society overtime, demonstrating the emancipatory interest of the study. The study draws on important literature set in immediate pre-independence and immediate post independence period by Cox (1976), Cartwright (1970) and Wyse (1990). These works are pivotal for understanding the modern origins politico-legal origins of the conflict or imply its starting formations.

Wyse (1990) went as far back as the 1920s when the Krios where gradually losing prominence as the decolonization fervor became stronger. He believed that the Krios were betrayed by the British, and that they harbored a false hope of becoming heirs of the British Raj. They were in the state of denial; they could not fathom not becoming the leaders of Independent Sierra Leone. Yet, dreaded such a reality since in the post-Independence period political power would have to be based on democratic dynamics and majoritarian institutions. To a large extent, Wyse analysis is realistic and non partisan.

Wyse book tracks the portrait of one the great democrats in Sierra Leone politics, Bankole Bright. Bright was a democrat who believed and tried to practice or learn democratic politics in the period of decolonization, or during the gradualist constitutional change in the dying days of British colonialism. He met with series of frustrations from politicians such as the Attorney General, Sir Albert, who questioned his democratic leanings and posturing in the decolonization period. Ironically, as this research would show, the failure and hindrance to democratic learning or discursive opinion and will
formation in parliament during gradualism would have devastating effect on the very future survival of the society decades later. Wyse (1990) gave a very realistic picture of the tensions in Sierra Leone’s democratic politics in the period leading to Independence, which could serve as basis for understanding the hindrances to reflexive democratic learning that ought to have laid the foundations for the successful realization of democratic constitutionalism, a status conferred on the society at the 1961 Independence.

Thomas S. Cox (1976), *Civil-military Relations in Sierra Leone*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, is a detailed discussion of the origin and structure formation in civil-military relations in Sierra Leone. Cox’s key argument is that in the pre-Independence era, the military was seen as a non–partisan element and a mundane aspect of politics. This erroneous view cost the SLPP its political existence and prominence for almost three decades. As part of the colonial administration, Stevens had tasted the power of the military as Labor Work and Mines Minister of the colonial government, charged with quelling protests and labor strikes. The APC, the Northerners, and Krios, who felt increasingly marginalized during decolonization already knew the decisive power of the military in colonial domination, and were to use it effectively to seize power.

Cox showed how Stevens’ use of tribalism corrupted and fragmented the army, and put Sierra Leone on the deplorable course of colonial dictatorship. Stevens’ Machiavellian manipulation of the army enabled him, a member of the Limba ethnic group, to play one group against the other, and to dominate first his arch-rivals the people of the South and East, and then to dominate his main supporters, the Temne, the largest group of the Northern Province. In this text, we see how the Temne were vanquished by
Stevens, even executing their leader, Brigadier Bangura (a Temne), who orchestrated his rise to power. Cox’s excellent critical narrative provided lots of insights into the Machiavellian politics of Stevens: his inconspicuous infiltration of the army, and fomenting of violence in national politics, orchestrating commotion, distrust, suspicion, coups, and countercoups in the army. On the whole, the text shows that the modern origins of the Sierra Leone Conflict can be found in the undemocratic control of the military in Sierra Leone. The text is key to the analytical chapters, especially in explicating the emergence of the constitutional administrative crisis (Chapter 4), and in the establishment of APC dictatorship in Sierra Leone (Chapter 5).

J. R. Cartwright, (1970). *Politics of Sierra Leone: 1947-67*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, is set in the same time period as Cox. Cartwright is more concerned with the overall political games played by the politicians, particularly Siaka Stevens. He, unlike Cox, is less hesitant in making clear normative judgments regarding the conduct of politicians. He blamed Siaka Stevens’ evil Machiavellian tricks as the source of the deformation of civil politics in Sierra Leone.

Even at this point, Cartwright clearly rose above the confusion of theory and appearance to show that in reality Stevens actually never got power by any civilize or constitutional means, but by naked military domination. He was not under any delusion as some critics of Stevens, who debated the symbolic political games he used to conceal and manufacture legitimacy for his covert military takeover and governance of Sierra Leone. Cartwright, unlike Daramy, Foray, and Reno, showed that Stevens regime was more or less a military regime. He argued that Stevens took power and established a military dictatorship, while still wearing civilian clothes, and then went on to stage a fake
referendum on the one party dictatorship, he had already de facto virtually established in Sierra Leone.

On the whole, this text showed the rise of Stevens, as simultaneously the destruction of any miniscule gain in democratic constitutionalism before Independence. Reading the text, one clearly see a society that was already at civil war, but with an opposition (SLPP and other parties) still playing catch up to this fact, trying to understand the reality of military domination that was firmly rapidly gripping Sierra Leone in the very belly of constitutional democratic framework. It would take almost three decades before the main opposition SLPP demised by APC politics as war strategy to find its direction again in Sierra Leone politics. SLPP’s faith in democratic politics and the demise of its leadership by the Machiavellian onslaught of Stevens and his APC seem responsible for their defeat and slow recovery.

Kallon (2004), Cleave (1984), Kamara (2001), Francis (2001), and Weekes (1992) see the Conflict as arising mainly from problems of economic corruption or mismanagement. Daramy (1993) and Foray (1988) consider political corruption as the main cause of the Conflict. Richards (1995) and Abdullah (1990) trace the Conflict to strains in moral and ethical relations between elites and elders, on one hand, and youths and the masses, on the other. These critics hold a Marxist orientation. Smillie et al (1991), like Kaplan (1994), view the Conflict as the brainchild of mafia-type international/national corruption schemes. The explication of tensions during the gradualist political period by Wyse, Cox and Cartwright show a society that was pregnant with tendency to civil war right at the time of independence. Such tensions were not dealt with by the British for possible reasons such as their own concern of losing a richly
endowed colony they had owned and exploited for over 100 years, and therefore, unwilling to genuinely make Independent, and possibly secretly wished this new nations state would disintegrate in to anomie. Considering Britains’ desire to maintain its hold on the former Colony, even if inconspicuously, one would understand why Britain did not do much to prevent Stevens and APC plan to orchestrate violence and chaos at Independence, since they correctly knew of such plans. Pearce (1989) draws on lessons of world wars to argue that imperial interest thrives in conditions of chaos.

On the whole the above representative studies only imply the problem of legitimacy by explaining the mismanagement of resources, bureaucratic misappropriation, and political corruption. They do not stipulate a clear standard for judging the acceptability or legitimacy of political orders. A systematic explication of legitimacy is vital to distinguish the appearance of the political and social order from the reality. Without such standard one cannot rationally – without bias or arbitrariness – assess damages in the social, economic, and political life of the society. Without specifying the constitutive elements of legitimacy in the post-traditional society of Sierra Leone, one could not provide the critical insights to advocate for a social organizing principle that would facilitate moral practical learning, social integration, and a rational and stable transformation of the society.
2.1 - The Philosophy of Language Paradigm and Emancipatory Interest of the Study.

The studies discussed above face the difficulty of conceptualizing legitimacy in post-traditional society because they are situated in the philosophy of consciousness paradigm. The philosophy of consciousness assumes the form of theories of subjectivity, characterized by idealism, transcendentalism and perception of reality in terms of subject–object relations (Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, 1992). Methodologically, they exemplify a type of introspection, and epistemologically, a type of intuitionism that ill-position them to avoid and overcome misconceptions of mutual understanding or intersubjective reciprocal understanding, the basis of legitimacy in post traditional societies (p. 96). By their situatedness in the philosophy of consciousness, they are denied the critical tools to systematically engage social reality comprehensively i.e. to systematically engage the objective, normative and subjective reality in society.

Within the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness, the truth of a judgment is based on the certainty that the mental representation corresponds to the object. After the pragmatic turn, however, the truth of a sentence-sign must be measured both against its object relation and against the reasons for its validity that could be accepted by an interpretive community. Thus, in the new paradigm [which this study adopts] the role of the subject is assumed not by language *per se* but by communication among those who demand explanations from each other about something in the world. The place of subjectivity is assumed by an intersubjectivity practice of reaching understanding (Habermas, (1993). *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, p.96).

In particular, the representatives studies reviewed do not address the central question of legitimacy always already implicit in their discussions. The limited subject-object orientation of their frameworks means they cannot systematically engage the normative dimension of ‘ought’ questions that embody the emancipatory interest of society. This
limitation hinders the chance for comprehensive and systematic explication of issues critical for the society’s transformation.

Another problem of the representative studies on the Sierra Leone Conflict is their ineffective explication of a normative standard for analyzing the legitimacy of the social order, which they more or less engaged. Without such a standard, these studies remain fraught with bias. In this post-traditional society, where a shared ethos has shattered, only mutual communicative understanding can ensure the enduring resolution of morally-defined action conflict and makes possible the pursuit of collective goals without crisis (Habermas, 1996). Without a post-metaphysical (non partisan use of reason), and a post-conventional morality (the impartial judgment possible in rational discourse) a rational universal standard for regulating and coordinating society will remain illusive.

Most of the representative studies reviewed tends to presuppose a uni-dimensional view of societal evolution that privileges economic issues or production over political culture, even when this is not explicitly stated. Even when the legitimacy of the political order features mainly in their analysis, these studies do not properly explicate the relationship between the economic and the political cultural side of social integration or social evolution.

Finally, the key difference between this study and the reviewed representative studies lies in the fact that the latter do not make attempts to appropriate the recent methodological advances in the social sciences, namely the linguistic turn and the moral practical reconstruction of historical materialism, the Marxist theory of social evolution. New critical insights, comprehensivity and the analytical clarity gained with the explication of the moral practical side of social evolution and the methodological
advantage and analytical rigor produced by the linguistic turn do not enter the discourses in these studies. The methodology of communicative action uses publicly accessible data of linguistic symbols or elements of structures of interaction as object of reconstructive analysis or science. The reconstructive method examines the intersubjective reciprocal action of interlocutors or subjects capable of speech and action to get at the extent their symbolic structures deviates from well-formed, and morally correct species-wide intuitive rule consciousness to understand disagreements. The reconstructive analysis has the advantage of clarifying the correct or requisite level of moral cognitive rule consciousness social actors must adopt to resolve action conflict and pursue collective goals in a stable manner. This approach considers the standard for stable social coordination identical with the standard of critique of contemporary social reality (post conventional morality), hence its capacity to avoid bias.
Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY

Any methodology that systematically neglects the interpretive schemata through which social action is itself mediated [communication], that pursues the task of concept and theory formation in abstraction from the categorical formation of social reality is doomed to failure (Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and the evolution of society. Boston Beacon Press, p. xi-xvi).

3.0. Reconstruction of Historical Materialism. Since the founding or so-called discovery of Sierra Leone in 1462 by the Portuguese sailor Pedro da Centra, the society has undergone various structural changes in its social formations, from pre-modern or pre-capitalist social formation to one appended more recently to the modern world capitalist system as a British colonized society. Since these structural changes have continued to impact the society since Independence in 1961, the theory of social evolution is useful for this study. The key task of the theory of social evolution is to understand variations of structural change in society. Since political culture, including the socio-cultural domain of communication, is central to this thesis, and considered key and pacemaker in social evolution, the Marxist theory of social evolution (historical materialism) is not adopted here because of its exclusive productivist orientation.

Historical materialism considers social evolution a cumulative process indicating a direction in the development of productive forces, and considers the economic structure the pure form of society’s mode of production. Because it analyzes the anatomy of bourgeois capitalist society to show the incompatibility of universal value structures with class structures, historical materialism can be instructive for understanding early (pre-
capitalist) stages of social formations. Historical materialism is only partially useful for understanding the anatomy of Sierra Leone, even though its mode of production schema provides an excellent entry point into the theory of social evolution.

Furthermore, it is problematic for historical materialism to simply generalize and transpose disturbances in the reproduction process that appear in the capitalist economic system to other social formations, as the theory conceives the economic structure as the pure form of the mode of production. Equating the base and the economic structure leads to the wrong view that the basic domain always coincides with the economic system. The theory’s social formation concept is economically biased, and cannot effectively explain super-structural processes of culture vital to social transformation.

The theory’s mode of production schema allows for only two levels of comparison: the regulation of access to the means of production, and the structural compatibility of these rules with a given level of development of productive forces. These comparisons do not sufficiently account for the differentiations that appear in the historical material, and for important universal categories, such as normative structures (values and institutions). Its relation of production concept does not seriously consider law or the ethical category. By modeling itself on the natural sciences, the theory also becomes subject to historicism, determinism, and positivism. Thus, historical materialism’s claim to being a comprehensive theory of social evolution is untenable.

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Habermas (1979) argues that social evolution is a combination of several modes, which makes the view of a pure economic mode of production questionable. As ‘the logic of capital’ is not the key to the logic of social evolution, it is inadequate for analyzing social development or social transformation. To make fundamental adjustments on the theory to compensate for explanatory deficiency or its incomprehensive form only serve to weaken the theory’s analytical power (Habermas, 1976: 153; McCarthy, 1984: 241). The theory’s exclusive focus on the technical (productivist) side of social evolution creates a need to reconstruct historical materialism i.e. to break it up and put it together again in a new way.\textsuperscript{53} Reconstruction is the usual approach to a theory that still embodies great potential for stimulation but which requires revision in many respects.\textsuperscript{54}

Reconstruction is the usual manner of dealing with a theory such as historical materialism that has not yet exhausted its analytical possibilities. Though historical materialism grounds the practical necessity to change a society’s social formation by identifying and explaining the development of structural limitations of capitalism’s adaptive capacity, the theory cannot effectively contribute to the practical question it identified (Habermas 1979:126). “We cannot find in the logic of the rise of system problems the logic that the social system will follow if it responds to such an evolutionary challenge [my emphasis].”\textsuperscript{55} If a socialist organization of society were the adequate response to crisis-ridden developments in capitalist society, we could not deduce from it

\textsuperscript{53} For instance, the idea of social formation is reconstructed on account of its economic bias, hence its ineffectiveness for explaining super-structural processes of culture, or other non-technical knowledge vital to social transformation. As well, Marx did not effectively elaborate the relations of production concept to effectively consider the concept of law or the ethical category, which he eschews. Historicism, determinism, and positivism arise in his theory because he modeled it on the natural sciences.

any ‘determinations of the form’ of the reproductive process (Habermas, 1979: 124). The productivist paradigm of historical materialism cannot provide the insight to resolve the breakdown of background consensus (cultural lifeworld or knowledge) in contemporary or post-traditional society. Though Marx correctly argues that any society subjected to the imperatives of the self evaluation of capital carried the seeds of its own destruction from within, he was blinded to relevant practical factors that could not be expressed in terms of price. Furthermore, he could not see the potential for self-transformation in the capacity for democratic counter steering in the legal system.

Material practical questions would have to be explained in terms of democratization processes as the latter concern the extent universalistic structures penetrate into the practical action domain. Rationality structures are not only found in the amplifications of purposive-rational action i.e. in technologies, strategies, organizations, and qualifications. They are also embodied in the mediation of communicative action – in mechanisms for regulating conflict, in world views, and in identity formations. Critical social theory or the theory of communicative action reconstructs historical materialism by defending the argument that the development of values and institutions is the pacemaker of social evolution, not production (Habermas, 1979). A new principle of social organization leads to a new form of social integration,

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56 Democratic life is more rational since it makes for levels of learning potential denied in authoritarian (traditional) societies Habermas, 1979, p. 108. An idealization of social intercourse that is nonetheless a “social fact” is discourse ethics, which does not make the argument that people would “want to” to acknowledge this ethic, but that they “have to,” if communication is their paradigm (pattern) of interaction i.e. if they want to actually achieve consensus by coordinating their practical life in a civilized manner.
58 The values and institutions constitute the society’s organizing principle, the forms of social integration that first makes the society able to implement available or new productive forces and heighten social complexity. Habermas, (1979). Development of Normative Structures In Communication and the evolution of society. Boston, p. 120; also see McCarthy, 1984, p. 248.
which first makes a society capable of implementing its available productive forces, or to generate new ones, and hence, to heighten its social complexity.

The critical theory of society brings normative structures into the developmental-logical problematic of social evolution by drawing on Jean Piaget’s genetic structuralism. The latter theory accommodates evolutionism and has assimilated motifs of epistemology (Habermas, 1979). By reconstructing the developmental pattern of normative structures inherent in cultural traditions and institutions, one can indicate the range within which subjects can express and alter the values and norms of their society. The learning capacities institutionalized in new forms of social organization constitute the basic equipment societal members can exploit to create the relevant evolutionary variety in their society (McCarthy, 1984: 255). These learning capacities reflect stages of intuitive moral or cognitive developmental consciousness already available in world views, but which are not yet institutionalized in the society.

As a reconstruction of historical materialism, the theory of communicative action (critical social theory) is situated in the paradigm of the critical social sciences, which are guided by the cognitive interest of emancipation (Neuman, 1994: 50). The critical theory of society argues that social evolution depends on reflexive learning capacities of a moral practical kind that the social scientist can reconstruct in stages of pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional levels of cognitive and moral development. In this approach, social evolution does not follow the logic of the expansion of system autonomy (power), but transpires within the logic of structures determined by intersubjectivity.

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produced through linguistic communication, and based on criticizable validity claims (Habermas, 1970: 14).

To explicate the developmental pattern or logic of the society, we direct attention to symbolic objects characterized as well-formed by competent subjects themselves e.g. well-formed sentences, correctly fashioned propositions, well corroborated theories, and *morally unobjectionable resolution of conflict (my emphasis)* (Habermas, 1979: 14). Developmental pattern or logic represent stages of intelligence or *rules for possible problem-solving* i.e. the formal levels of learning acquired or latently available in worldviews, but not yet incorporated into action systems, hence they remain inoperative in social institutions (Habermas, 1979:121-3). Symbolic or surface structures (applied theories, gestures, moral resolution of conflicts) are well formed when members of the society collectively find or consider them acceptable. This usually reflects the requisite pre-categorical knowledge or acceptable species-wide competence of the society.

The categorical pre-theoretical knowledge of the species refers to the intersubjectively shared meanings that make human social intercourse possible i.e. that can establish mutual understanding, agreement or consensus. If the shared moral understanding on the basis of which societal members resolve misunderstanding “is not to disintegrate, this potential must be mastered anew by every generation. Each must be able to recognize him or herself in all that wears a human face (Habermas, 1993: 15).” Thus, this study considers mutual understanding key to enlightenment or emancipation of the society as it provides the means by which societal actors can meet the evolutionary challenges that threaten the normatively-fixed identity or reproduction of their society.
That Sierra Leone continues to experience problems in achieving mutual understanding since Independence indicates the society’s failure to meet its evolutionary challenge of altering the problematic extant principle of social integration. This failure also hinders the society’s ability to employ and develop her resources, hence the persistent crises she experiences. To meet the evolutionary challenge of their society, social actors in Sierra Leone would have to master or gain access to this new learning level, the requisite post-conventional moral intuitive consciousness. The resulting higher moral cognitive consciousness reflects a new level of universal competences constituting the deep structures citizens ought to draw on to establish mutual understanding in the society. Their failure to bring about agreement or mutual understanding in their interaction means the moral intuitive cognitive consciousness they exemplified in their interaction is deficient, as it cannot bring about solidarity. This deficiency indicates that social actors have not applied the appropriate level of species-wide (universal) moral cognitive competence in their interaction. As a post-traditional society or macro community, the society can achieve a legitimate social order – one based on agreement or mutual understanding, and hence guarantees stability - only if its members can approximate the requisite moral practical framework of rational dialogue or post-conventional principle in interaction.

With this introduction, the rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: (3.1) outlines basic assumptions of the methodology and the typology of speech, action or theories; section (3.2) discusses the sources and collection technique of data; (3.3) discusses the approach to data analysis; section (3.4) is the framework for analysis; and (3.5) discusses issues of the reliability and validity of the study.
3.1 - Basic Assumptions of the methodology and Action Typologies. A) Basic Assumptions of the Study. As a system of reference, the methodology provides assumptions, categories of action and concepts from the theory on which it is based. The methodology partly anticipates the general learning objectives, prescribes the data collection technique and analysis. The theory of communicative action used in this study conceives society as a web of linguistic interaction into which we gain access through communicative experience. The latter experience is possible for the social scientist when he assumes the position of virtual participant in interaction to decode colonizing relations and explicate crises tendencies. As a web of social (linguistic) interactions that mirror or represent regions of reality (the social, psychological, empirical), intersubjective (communicative) exchanges or social interaction among citizens can be analyzed to reveal domination or degree of solidarity in the society.

The above claims would be arbitrary unless we systematically tie these considerations to methodological and empirical assumptions. To validate the conflict cum discourse position of the theory of communicative action, we start with conflict theory assumption, which holds that societal conflicts emerge when normative structures become problematic i.e. when they can no longer ensure fair distribution or the satisfaction of needs (Habermas, Legitimation crisis, 1970: 113).

By connecting the basic assumption of conflict theory to methodological and empirical assumptions of discourse theory, we dispel arbitrariness in this critical investigation of society. The methodological assumption states that hidden interests explicated in discourse are the same interest that would manifest in the event of actual

action conflict (Habermas, 1970:114). Discourse reflects on the cultural spheres – the normative, objective and subjective worlds or regions of reality – which social actors articulate in their social interaction. This study assumes that it is methodologically possible to reconstruct the hidden opposing interests constituting a conflict by analyzing social (linguistic) interaction.

The empirical assumption states that the interests that actually emerge in a conflict situation can sufficiently coincide with the interest social actors would express in discourse or social (linguistic) interaction. Even when conflict does not manifest, we can reconstruct its possibility by analyzing tensions in discourse. Drawing on these assumptions, this study can identify conflicts in the categories of the interpretive system obtaining at a specific historical time (which also reflects the learning capacity or potential of social actors). It shows whether social actors selected or decided to pursue action oriented to norms or gave way to particular interest (Held, 1980: 346).

This study can only hypothetically project the ascription of interests, since direct confirmation of particular interest is possible only in practical discourse, where conflicting interests arise over the resolution of moral questions of justice - what is equally acceptable to every one. Tensions in discourse that arise from conflicts over interest positions confirm rational communicative action or moral intuitive consciousness as a basic unavoidable presupposition in dialogue. As ‘counterfactual idealization,’ the practical application of post-conventional moral intuitive consciousness (rational unconstrained dialogue) is often difficult. Even though such consciousness may not yet be institutionalized, they already exist in worldviews so that disregarding the basic

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normative presuppositions of discourse or social interaction (namely failing to justify ones claim with valid reasons) sets down the original conditions of conflict. Indirectly, we can confirm observable conflicts by connecting the ascribed interest positions with predictions about possible motivations (Habermas, 1970: 113).

Social relations or orders that are morally objectionable to those affected induces crisis tendency. This study tries to understand the basis of societal conflict by going beyond the surface symbolic structures to get at the deep structures or species-wide moral cognitive consciousness subjects ought to draw on to produce socially acceptable surface or symbolic structures. Problematic legal or social orders or policy decisions tend to deviate or regress from the requisite moral cognitive consciousness or logic of the society. To properly measure deviations or retrogressions from the universal and appropriate level of moral cognitive consciousness, this methodology makes use of action typologies.
3.1b) Action Typologies. By explicating the semantic meaning or propositional content of action or utterance, and the aspect of reality to which they refer, we derive categories of action types. The three categories of speech, action, or theories are: a) teleological action (or overt strategic action); b) normatively regulated action; and c) dramaturgical action (or covert strategic action). Categorizing social interaction into these three action typologies has to do with the observable semantic features or propositions these action types embody, and the specific world or reality (normative, subjective or objective reality) to which they refer and the reasons and validity claims connected with them.

*Teleological action* refers to instrumental action by which an actor aims to bring about states of affairs by some means. The goal to which such an action aims may be particular, and can clash with or violate the shared or generalizable interest or the interests of others. It becomes strategic action, when the actors’ central orientation is to maximize utility unfairly at the detriment of others. *Normatively regulated action* refers to action oriented to common values or norms, which as general knowledge may be problematic and incapable of bringing about freedom, equality, and solidarity. *Dramaturgical action* refers to action by which an actor presents images or impressions of themselves by disclosing their subjectivity or psychological world to the public or hearers (Habermas, 1984: 85-86). A person who declares his intentions publicly may be doing so falsely i.e. deceiving his audience.

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63 Categorizing action according to inner states, facts, and norms helps us classify our independent variable (social interaction) to fulfill the basic classificatory condition of our action types by being distinct, mutually exclusive and exhaustive. See Kenneth Bailey, (1994). *Methods of social research*. Free press. p. 52.
The three categories of actions establish interpersonal relations and mutual understanding to limited degrees. None of these action types can ensure consensus in a modern society, or reflect the shared interest of the modern social order, the morally unobjectionable or morally correct logic that reflect the shared interests, fairness, justice, and impartiality in the society. Methodologically, therefore, they cannot serve as standard to analyze speech or action.

(3.2) – **Data sources, access and collection technique.** Here, the data are drawn from real historical records of epochal interactions in social, political or legal domain that are meaningful or mean “something” for this research i.e. the texts or discourses that constitute *contexts of relevance*, such as inter-actions that reflect crisis tendencies that threaten to disrupt the integration of the society or its smooth transformation. Conflicts arising from speeches or utterances, revolutionary gestures or praxis, and applied neoliberal theory show that the logic underlying them is morally objectionable or incorrect, questionable, false, untruthful or insincere. As these actions are incapable of bringing about agreement or understanding in the society, they reflect *negative cases*, derivatives or deviations from the morally unobjectionable action norms or policy decisions. Morally unobjectionable or morally correct action emerges out of rationally unconstrained discourse or post-conventional morality (Lecompte 1993: 250; Habermas 1984). The specific negative cases selected in this study represent epochal social

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interaction, orders or policies that trigger crises tendencies, which serve as turning points in the trajectory of the society’s development between 1961 and 2002.

Historical documents or records of debates that induced crises tendencies in the society serve as the sources of the data. The data sources include official running or periodic documents (Bailey: 267; Webbs et al; 1981) such as the Reports of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Partnership Africa Canada, United Nations, World Bank and IMF Reports, and the Sierra Leone government reports. The data sources also include library databases, textbooks and periodicals, such as African journals, such as the Review of African Political Economy, Africa Confidential, and magazines such as Africa Report, and West Africa.

From these historical documentary sources, this study select contexts of relevance or the data, those discourses, policies, orders and legal interactions that show clear cases of conflict. We focus on cases of conflict in policy decisions, revolutionary practice, and legal debates to explicate crisis tendencies, contradictions and colonial domination over time in the society. As sources of the data, these historical documents bear records of policies, gestures, laws, or ideological practices that reflect clear cases of conflict.

Using the indicators of potential conflict as discrepancies between levels of claims and politically permitted level of satisfaction, or differences between legal norms and legal reality, or codified rules of exclusion, which distinguish one political system from another, a result could be obtained which would indicate the nature of ideological repression and the level of generalizable [shared] interests possible at a given historical point. Social orders, policies, norms or rules fraught with or indicating conflict mean the claims they imply cannot be defended with socially acceptable – legitimate or valid reasons.

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This means under conditions of rational unconstrained discourse, such orders or norms cannot be justified. They existed or thrived only because of political domination or ideological repression, where the addressees’ or those affected lack the capacity to express their yes/no response or assent according to their will and consciousness.

Examples of the norms of action examined here are: the one party law immediately after Independence in 1961 (Chapter 4); the applied neoliberal economic policies in the late 1970’s and 1980’s (Chapter 5); and the ‘revolutionary’ praxis and liberation politics in the 1990’s (Chapter 6).

3.3) - The Data Analysis: rational reconstruction. Reconstruction refers to interpretation that uses formal analysis or the hermeneutic process of universal pragmatics (Carspenker, 1996: 102). Universal pragmatics is a procedure used to identify the extent communicative experiences fall short of producing mutual understanding or agreement. It reconstructs whether facts are represented truly, whether inner states (or intentions) are expressed sincerely, and whether the normative order constitutes or reflects acceptable or legitimate interpersonal relations (Habermas, 1984: 26- 32). Analyzing the truth-validity of action norms or statements enable us sort or categorize data into action types by making inferences based on their objective features, their reference to empirical, normative or psychological worlds (p. 147). Categorizing action according to themes – thematization - proceeds by evaluating their semantic properties or propositional content of action or speech for truth, moral rightness, justice, sincerity and

legitimacy. This is the first step in the method or procedure of formal analysis or rational reconstruction. We elaborate this step below.

**Step I - Reconstruction as validation of reasons adduced for claims:** This first step in the method requires encountering the implicit validity claims of speech, action, policy decision “frontally” i.e. assessing whether the claims made in speech or action were redeemed through their validity conditions or the reasons adduced to support them. The evaluation involved in this first step revolves around the phenomenological context of action. The process requires that the researcher take a performative attitude i.e. assumes the position of a virtual participant in the past communication or dialogue that is analyzed. This posture helps the researcher to impartially analyze the reasons social actors adduced to support the claims they make in action, speech or policies, hence to gain the communicative experience of a virtual participant. In this step, agreement and disagreements are viewed in terms of whether the reciprocally raised validity claims are redeemed with valid reasons.

Thematizing problematic claims in actions or speech according to the world or reality they focus on and the reasons adduced to ground or redeem claims does not go far,

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68 See Habermas, 1984. Reasons constitute the axis around which processes of reaching understanding revolve. To understand an expression (speech, neoliberal ideology, a legal perspective or gesture), the researcher must “bring to mind the reasons with which a speaker or actor would, if necessary and under suitable conditions, defend its validity. As soon as we try to interpret behavior in terms of communicative action, our own ontological presuppositions are no longer more complex than those we ascribe to the actors themselves. We relinquish our immunity or protective filter that is methodologically guaranteed since we and the actors we try to understand now share the same judgmental competence (p. 119). We are forced to assume the performative attitude, to virtually participate (although without our own action intentions) in the process of reaching understanding of the action we want to interpret. Thus, our interpretation is exposed to the same critique as those of the original communicating agents, who must mutually expose their interpretations (p.119).

69 Ibid. Reasons are such that they cannot be described in the attitude of a third person (p.115). One evaluates or understands reasons only to the extent that one understands why they are or are not sound, or
or not critical enough. To fully understand why an action, speech or policy failed to bring about understanding or represents disturbed communication between the author, his contemporaries and us, we must ‘measure’ the extent such action or speech deviates from communicative action, the species wide moral competence. This leads to the main task of rational reconstruction: analyzing how an action or speech deviates from the pre-theoretical knowledge or appropriate species wide, intuitive moral rule consciousness.

We explicate the meaning of speech and action - symbolic formations, gestures or applied theories or policies - in terms of the cognitive and moral rule consciousness by which their authors must have brought them forth.

Concepts such as morally unobjectionable or moral right, beauty, truth, or justice are conventions shaped by our human condition, conduct and form of life. This raises the question as to whether conventions can guarantee that our grammar of life not only regulates customs, but gives expressions to reasons (Habermas, 1979). Thus, Step I merely reconstructs a given legitimation system. This consist in discovering the justificationary system ‘S’ that enable us evaluate the given legitimation as valid or

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70 To understand why this approach is not critical or enlightened enough, we consider how leaders such as Stevens and Babangida of Nigeria (419) are believed to have ‘normalized’ corruption so that by getting the mass of citizens participating in it, these leaders can potentially get away with moral condemnation. Without subjecting Stevens’ regime to high reconstructive analysis, the misconception of his regime as ‘popular’ has lingered on over the years.

71 Measurement is to determine qualitatively or quantitatively the level of a particular attribute for a particular unit of analysis. Bailey, (1994). Methods of social research. Free Press. p. 51; Here, measurements is the essence of procedures that allows us to symbolically order objects of (communicative) experience according to a rule.” Counting is only one kind of measurement. “For measurement to occur, it suffices that each element of (communicative) experience corresponds unambiguously and irreversibly to a symbol, such as communicative action or the ideal speech situation. Habermas, J. (1988). Methodology of the Social Sciences, in The logic of the social sciences Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press, p. 96 The measuring scale of the ideal speech situation rest on theoretical assumptions based on a “a proven law-like hypothesis” that holds for every modern human communication.

72 In this research, communicative action is the paradigm case or exemplar of human interaction, which actual human (inter)action can approximate only to different degrees. We reveal inconspicuous (ideological) domination by comparing actual social action to this paradigm case. Habermas, (1984).
invalid based on reasons. The statement “valid is S” means only that anyone who accept ‘S’ – a myth, cosmology or a political theory of unmediated rightness of state decisions – must also necessary accept the grounds given in valid legitimations. This necessity merely expresses the consistency connection that arises from the internal relation of the justificationary system. The analysis in Step I is not critical of the belief in legitimacy; it does not query the fact that at this level social actors’ reasons might only be found acceptable because it is consistent with the conventions or the extant cultural tradition. The validity/facticity tension does not fully enter this level of analysis

This level of analysis does not enable one to judge the legitimation system believed in. It takes it for granted. This low reconstruction is still not critical. The very reasons participants adduce for their claims may be deemed acceptable only because they reflect consistency with the extant ethical reality or social facticity, which may be based on colonial domination, subjugation, or manipulation, but which may not actually lead to solidary bonds. These reasons may not reflect a morally correct moral point of view or justice, what is equally acceptable, just or fair to everyone.73 The object of rational reconstruction then is to further try to get at the categorical knowledge or knowledge of the deep structure of the reality that is accessible to understanding. In this further step the aim is to understand the basis of true justification that produces unforced stability in a

73 See Habermas, 1979. To avoid taking recourse to problematic customs or ethical self understanding of the society in analyzing the rightness of reasons, this study starts with the proposition that the statement “recommendation X [say policy, law, speech or action] is legitimate” has the meaning that “recommendation X is in the general (public) interest.” “X is in the general interest means that the normative validity claim connected with X counts as justified.” We decide the justifiability of competing validity claims by using a system of possible justifications; a single justification is called a legitimation. Correctly formed and morally unobjectionable policy decisions, legal and social orders, or laws are believed to have been produced according to certain basic rules or certain structures that are acceptable to the interlocutors, a reflection of the shared moral cognitive rule consciousness.
post-traditional social order. Thus the next and key step in the method moves from the concrete to the abstract, to justify the value or legitimation system itself.

**Step II - Vindicating the system of legitimation: beyond social faciticity.** Evaluating the justificatory system itself is a fundamental problem of practical philosophy that involves questions of procedure and presuppositions under which justifications have the power to produce consensus. In Step II, we examine the consequences – concealed crisis tendencies and conflict – that arise from interactions. It goes beyond reasons adduced for claims that may seem valid only because they are consistent with the ethical political framework, which may be a corrupt national culture to which social actors have become accustomed. Though general theories of justifications remain peculiarly abstract in relation to historical forms of legitimate domination, a justificationary system must be appropriate for application to a society.

This study would be historically “unjust” to simply arbitrarily use discursive justification as normative standard for judging Sierra Leone at the traditional developmental level. From the subsection of Chapter one, the historical - political context of Sierra Leone, this study reconstructed the society as post-traditional and as a constitutional democracy, where consensus or mutual understanding is possible only through the logic of post-conventional justification.74 We therefore move beyond **Step I**, to explicate the meanings, concepts and presuppositions of speech or action (the surface

74 See elements of the historical context discussed in Chapter 1. The colonial government’s use of deliberative forums or commissions of inquiry to resolve conflicts; Siaka Stevens’ radical EBIM (election Before Independence Movement); the Krio’s genuine fear of losing their privileges (or social power) under the democratically Independent Sierra Leone; Bankole Bright’s strong opposition to the Governor General’s controlling interference in Sierra Leone politics because he was not an elected official points to a constitutional democratic worldview and a post-conventional moral consciousness.
structures) to systematically by getting at the requisite intuitive knowledge, or moral rule consciousness competent actors ought to have drawn on, but fell short of doing so as evidenced from their surface symbolic structures of interaction. The surface structures, utterances, action or speech reflect a deficient developmental moral and cognitive consciousness that is socially problematic insofar as they failed to resolve conflict, triggered disagreement, or pose threat to social integration. This indicates that the social actors failed to sufficiently draw on the requisite moral knowledge, also a reflection of the level of social intelligence, learning, or problem solving capacity exemplified. This means that even when the reasons an actor adduced were consistent with a national corrupt order, they were not in the general interest as they manifest particular interest, hence inhibiting consensus.

To fully measure, understand, or rationally reconstruct what the author meant and intended by his action, applied theory, or gesture, we must consider the context of which he was not conscious: his failure to draw on the morally correct or right, true, and sincere intuitive moral cognitive consciousness, which reflect alone is capable of reflecting the shared interest or the moral point of view. By first reconstructing the justificationary system appropriate for a post-traditional society such as Sierra Leone, the stage of the society’s moral consciousness, we are better positioned to show why the justification social actors provided for their claims fell below of what was required i.e. capture the developmental logic that can reflect the shared interest.

The reconstructive approach in Step II uses the heuristic guide or model of the suppression of the generalizable interest by treating it as particular. As a post-traditional
society and constitutional democratic state, we can derive the requisite post-conventional morality or communicative action appropriate for the society by means of a counterfactually projected reconstruction guided by the following question:

How would the members of a social system at a given stage in the development of productive forces have collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which norms would they have accepted as justified), if they could and would have decided on the organizations of social intercourse through discursive will formation,[capable for resolving conflict and coordinating a post traditional society] with adequate knowledge of limiting conditions and functional imperatives of their society.75

This counterfactual condition of the generalizable or shared interest reflects the collective interpretation of needs and organization of social intercourse which cognitively requires that citizens take the moral point of view or be impartial in their social interaction. This heuristic guide or guiding question reconstructs “domination-free communication’ or communicative action, which serves as the regulative principle for rational democratic will formation, which leads to legitimate orders or norms that reflect the shared interest.

Against this reconstructed counterfactual, we critically evaluate the extant normative structures of the social system itself. This approach involves pure critique76 i.e. a comparison of actual or extant normative structures, procedures and presuppositions in interaction in post Independent Sierra Leone against the hypothetical system of norms formed, ceteris paribus, discursively (Habermas, 1984: 113). With this model of the suppression of generalizable interest (the counterfactual of communicative action), this study analyzes or critique contemporary policies, action, speech or norms to expose

75 Habermas, (1970). Legitimation Crisis. Boston. p. 113
76 See Max Weber also used pure critique approach by formulating an ideal organization, “bureaucracy,” as model to compare and reveal the deficiencies of actual organizations. Neuman, W.L.
normative power, illegitimate (colonial) domination and crisis potential in Sierra Leone. As our paradigm case of social action, the reconstructed counterfactual - communicative action (or post-conventional morality) - serves as our ‘critical instrument’ or standard against which we compare actual social intercourse, the ‘derivatives’ of communicative action, to reveal institutional systemic distortions or colonizing manipulations, and identify the origin of and perpetrator of unconscious constraints that render the society crisis ridden. Deviations from this reconstructed counterfactual (communicative action) that reflects the requisite post conventional morality reveals domination and the source of social conflict or dissensus.

The counterfactual or paradigm case of communicative action is not idealism because interacting citizens are forced to anticipate it as a practice that reduces conflict in post –traditional society. This so called ‘idealizing counterfactual’ is nevertheless an unavoidable presupposition of communicative practice. This study shows that crisis tendencies are engendered in the society, when interacting subjects in a post traditional Sierra Leone ignore dialogical understanding in political, legal and social intercations. The material practical consequence of ignoring communicative understanding shows that this so called counterfactual – communicative action or post conventional morality - is a social fact. It possesses a normative content that carries the tension between the intelligible and the empirical into the sphere of appearance itself (my emphasis). To avoid communicative action in the constituting social and political orders is to threaten stability or the social integration of the society.

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(3.4) The Framework for Analysis used here enables the study investigates deception, manipulation, and colonizing domination in structures of interaction that engender crises tendencies in the society. It enables the research critically examine epistemological and conceptual assumptions underlying orders and ideological positions, and to draw on ideas that may seem to go beyond the strict bounds of the methodology. This framework as such reflects the emancipatory interest of the study i.e. the discourse undertaken here is not strictly constrained by the specific methodology of this study.

As a critical investigation, this study does draw on interdisciplinary knowledge not restricted to purely sociology discipline. For instance, the study takes up concepts such as social formation or the dialectic to discuss their ideological and philosophical underpinnings and their relation to the methodological technique of this study. Also, this emancipatory or critical framework of analysis draws on political theories of Hobbes and Machiavelli to demonstrate differences between covert and overt techniques of colonial domination, and their relationship to law. Through this radicalization of discourse, the study gains the freedom to generate critical insights about how the society evolved and can be stabilized.

The framework for analysis also takes up the anti-colonial discourse from the perspective of law and morality as they manifest in structures of interaction. Since law and morality exemplify the concentration or the nucleus of the society, they constitute aspects of the framework for analyzing the reproduction of colonial domination in the society. Law, which stabilizes general expectations of behavior, embodies morality, as part of the developmental or evolutionary logic of society. This makes the analysis of colonization of law as a matter of law’s dissociation from morality, which in modern
society refers to communication action interpenetrating with the legal form of interaction. Communicative freedom is not only advocated by the study, it is practiced by the study by way of this analytical framework. This freedom is also reflected in the double structure of communication i.e. that reflects a critique that must transcend mere criticism or contestation as in the politics of representation or truth to engage the normative world, where the pace of society’s evolution is shaped.

In relation to the question of law, the philosophy of Hobbes and Machiavelli are used as framework. Sir Albert as we will see adopts a Hobbesian political approach for a matter that required a Machiavellian one, the one party law. Steven’s on the other hand, adopted a purely Machiavellian approach, but made false concession to the Hobbesian way, to deceive other that he cared about law. For Machiavelli, argues that “whoever becomes the ruler of a free city and does not destroy it, can expect to be destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive for rebellion in the name of liberty.” A combination of force and cunning or deception is used to win opponents, making them slow to rise against him, the Leviathan. Stevens showed these qualities by damaging political and social life, enticing all to adopt a corrupt worldview so that rebellion in Sierra Leone almost seemed impossible for a time.

Machiavelli admonished men who will seek power to trod the path of great men, to imitate them, for that is prudence (p.48). Stevens opposed Sir Albert’s one party bill, but used the same exact bill to set up his one party state. Sir Albert had to fail because he initiated this totalitarian one party bill: “It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to

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initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those, who would profit by the new order (Machiavelli, 1952: 50).” Sir Albert showed no appreciation of these insights, which would have made him to realize the need to use force to achieve his despotic goal. He had to fail because he believed that legality or lawful coding of the one party bill was enough to defuse the danger of this new reform: “all armed prophets have conquered and unnamed ones failed (p.50).”

Sir Albert was deserted by the nobles he depended on, mainly the elites or commissioned ranks of the army (Cox, 1976). The non commission ranks of the army, and the elites switched sides of APC opposition, as he was unwilling to use force from the start to gain power to establish and secure a despotic one party state.

While the Hobbesian approach tended to a similar goal of domination, the Prince or the sovereign or Leviathan who glues together the Commonwealth also feigns respect for law, only to use the law or contract entered into by society to effect domination. The logic is not different from the Machiavellian kind, whose only difference is the fake respect he sovereign pretends for the contact or law, which does not admit of citizens’ opposition or question of the latter’s conduct. To ensure peace and destroy the greedy competition or the state of nature, Hobbes advocates a covenant that will bring about the commonwealth or civitas of citizens, ‘for whose protection and defense it was intended”82 Ones the covenant is made one is bound by it. Once ‘covenant entered into by fear,’ one is ‘bound by it.”

82 Hobbes, T. (1997). *Leviathan* (revised edition) by Richard Tuck (Ed.). Cambridge, p. 9. While the covenant is supposed to emerge from deliberation (p. 97), the specific discursive forms are not explicated clearly. Yet, once this covenant is made or concluded, “performance is the natural end of
Stevens entered the neoliberal deals, but tried as a typical Machiavellian to avoid the conditionalities for the loan, which strained the relationship between the multilateral institutions and him. Yet, because he entered into the covenant to finance the building of his army to ensure his survival, he had to unwillingly go along with the terms of the arrangement or neoliberal deals. Likewise, Albert using this strategy of lawful deception had hoped that once he can outvote the APC in parliament to set up a one party state, everyone will be bound by it. This was why the APC and their surrogates had to sabotage the democratic elections, and ‘inconspicuously’ impose Stevens in power. Once in power, Stevens’ wasted no time in using his Machiavellian intuition to embody the will of the society in himself, and to keep all in awe.

For Hobbes power acquired by force and power acquired by institutions out of fear of death in a state of nature, renders automatically powerless all who agreed to the covenant. In this thesis, we will see in Chapters 4 and 5, how Stevens, the Machiavellian used law in a Hobbesian manner to conceal his naked domination of the society.

As analytical framework of the discussions, the Hobbesian/Machiavellian distinction is used to illuminate the strategic games of the two major politicians in Sierra Leone, and to account for their success or failure. This discussion helps highlight the major problems of the relationship between law and morality, on the one hand, and that between the constitution (law, the system of rights,) and their presupposed complements, democracy, political autonomy, and popular sovereignty, on the other hand. Hobbes, whose ideas somewhat influenced the liberal paradigm of law, does not nullify but obligation.” Also see Habermas, J. (1974). cites C. Schmitt’s Der Leviathan, In Theory and Practice. Boston., p. 289. He shows that the question of legitimation is absent in Hobbes Theory, a point Carl Schmitt supports, because the sovereign or state apparatus guarantees the security of his personal existence;
engender competition between democracy and human rights. The Hobbesian sovereign or Leviathan, who has gained unlimited power by the covenant that exempts him from societal check, will naturally tend to suppress the voice and mobilization of the society. Thus, this study uses these theories of power as analytical framework to resolve the enduring problem of social and political philosophy: to analyze the tension between legitimacy and legality, facticity and validity in the law, as reflected in the interaction of politics and social interaction in Sierra Leone.
3.5. -The Reliability and Validity of the Study. The study counteracts possible sources of error or confounding factors that may affect the assumptions, the consistency of the procedure or tools used (reliability); and how accurately or correctly they measure the variable or construct (validity) (Manheim and Simon, 1977:148-150). If some concept of rationality is unavoidably built into the action –theoretic foundations of sociology, then theory formation is in danger of being limited from the start to a particular, culturally or historically bound perspective, unless fundamental concepts are constructed in such a way that the concept of rationality they implicitly posit is encompassing and general, that is, satisfies universal claims (Habermas, 1984: 137).

The representative studies reviewed face the difficulty of conceptualizing legitimacy in post-traditional society such as Sierra Leone because they are situated in the philosophy of consciousness paradigm. The philosophy of consciousness assumes the form of theories of subjectivity, characterized by idealism, transcendentalism and perception of reality in terms of subject – object relations (Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking). They are introspective and situated in a subjectivist philosophy that is unable to effectively reflect on bias. With these limitations, they cannot provide the insights necessary to meet critical challenges to transform the organizing principle of the society.

Unlike the reviewed representative studies, this study is situated in the linguistic turn, in the philosophy of language paradigm. According to this paradigm,

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90 Validity deals with the truth or falsity of a research hypothesis, and the extent a study measures what it sets out to do (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 37; Smith, 1981: 333). Reliability concerns the question, Will the same method used at different times by researchers produce the same result (Smith, 1981: 328). It refers to the consistency of results between independent measurements of the same phenomenon. Any claim to doing research in the sociological tradition of rationality would have to dispel charges of provinciality or bias.

communication is the organizing principle of society and the basic pacemaker of social evolution. The species maintains itself through socially coordinated activities established through communication, and in certain spheres of life through communication aimed at reaching agreement. To reproduce the species requires satisfying the conditions of rationality inherent in communicative action.

How reliable is the linguistic measuring scale of this study? The approach of this inquiry on the Sierra Leone Conflict is from the perspective of communicative action, which situates it in the paradigm of the philosophy of language. This results in advantages from the standpoint of method and content (Habermas, 1992: 44). By using linguistic data, we overcome subjectivism because language, which ‘raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know.’\(^{92}\) Since communicative experiences constitute “publicly accessible” unambiguous data, it is possible to interpret them without being subjective or introspective (Habermas, 1984: 45). We can analyze this “publicly accessible” data anytime to make a consistent assessment of the capability of knowing and speaking subjects, hence to evaluate their communicative and moral development.\(^{93}\) This consistency constitutes the feature of a reliable scale (Neuman, 1994).

Furthermore, the approach is also consistent with the history of social research, which aims at understanding the connection between social integration and rationality (Habermas 1984:137). Communicative rationality aims to explicate the one-sided rationality of modernization (p. 140), the source of crises tendencies in the Sierra Leone.


Communicative rationality has proven useful as universal criteria for research in medicine, psycholinguistics, computer linguistics and the social sciences to: a) demonstrate how speech can be rational or complete; b) explicate pathological patterns of communication; c) trace the development of higher adult autonomy in the course of hominization (Habermas, 1984). This tradition of sociology is preserved more effectively in the theory of communicative rationality, which aims at developing a rational universal framework of inquiry that transcends positivism, dogmatism and historicism. The reliability of the study’s approach is found in its capacity to avoid bias, hence in upholding the rational tradition of sociological research.

**Validity:** The method reflects *logical or face validity,* a consensus method of measuring validity in a scientific community (Neuman, 1994; Mann, 1985; Manheim and Simon, 1977:151). Scientists and free ordinary people would agree that, based on logical intuition, any claim not backed by valid facts or norm is bound to be unacceptable or seen as irrational. This study demonstrates face validity by showing that the policies or orders that fail to pass the test of truth, sincerity and moral rightness reflects elements of irrationality or crisis of legitimacy.

The study achieves *criterion related validity* by showing that the irrationality of communication on which political orders are based will illustrate their reduced level of acceptability (or legitimacy), hence in promoting solidarity. Predictive validity is one kind of criterion related validity. Another criterion-related validity is *concurrent validity,* which illustrates the association between irrational communication and preexisting
rational values used in Conflict theory. A social order mediated by irrational communication or irrational values – or domination or colonial imposition on the lifeworld - reflects social tension or lacks genuine solidarity.

The study’s *content validity* is illustrated by measuring the independent variable (communicative rationality) in political discourse to represent the dependent variable - the degree of acceptability (or legitimacy) of the political orders and the extent of social integration. By reading “structures off from” communicative experiences to show how they deviate from ideal communicative action, we reveal the extent mutual understanding in social interaction substantively exists.

The study also cautions against external validity problems, such as *history, mortality, maturation and instrumentation*. History refers to the possibility that other events other than the independent variable (of irrational communication) determined the dependent variable (social disintegration) (Smith, 1981: 334; Neuman 1994: 44).

This study tries to eliminate the problem of other plausible alternative variables by showing that other seemingly plausible independent variables such as mismanagement of diamonds, economic and political corruption involve immorality, falsity and insincerity of state officials (in communicating with the people). Stevens’ neoliberal dictatorship, the RUF and AFRC regimes denied scope for communicative interaction, creating the crisis of identity and their loss of the mass loyalty of citizens.

Second, the study undertakes systematic explication of crisis tendencies as they change from one form to another over time. Tracking the metamorphosis of crisis

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potential or tendency from the systemic realm (state and economy) to the social realm dispels confusion regarding other plausible alternatives. This study shows crisis transposition in constitutional quagmire of the late 1960s and early 1970s to the economic domain in the 1980s reflects a moral dialectical process i.e. the crisis potential tended to crisis of legitimacy, which pose threat to the society’s integration. Thus, the more rational, unconstrained or open communication exist within the public sphere and between the state and citizens, the more the society will enjoy solidarity and stability. This association establishes the validity of the hypothesis that irrationality of social communicative interaction determined social disintegration in Sierra Leone.

The documentary approach of the study also guards against the problem of instrumentation (testing) such as reactivity or guinea pig effect, since the researcher makes less direct contact with human subjects.\(^{95}\) Also, the interpretive standard or ideal speech situation is a measuring scale not subject to problems of instrument decay or faults, for it holds true for human communication every modern society.

The study also caution against maturation problem, which concerns changes in the internal condition of the objects or situations studied that can affect collected data that spans over long periods (Smith, 1981: 335). Changes in Sierra Leone politics from multiparty to one party neoliberal state, the NPRC, and RUF/AFRC dictatorship did not change the basic hypothesis of the study. The illegitimate (immoral and insincere) character of totalitarian orders hinders communicative ethics that causes crisis tendency.

This research avoids *selection* problem, which arise when nonrandom selection of objects, situations or unit of analysis cause spurious interpretations of findings, raising questions about access to real historical environments (Smith, 1981: 336; Bailey: 271). The selected situations here represent ‘relevant’ communicative experiences or data necessary to further the inquiry. For example, political discourses on problematic legal proceedings and discourses of economic development programs hold data which indicates irrational communication, and reflect epochal significance because the fundamentally influence the trajectory of the society’s evolution. The selection criteria are valid for this research purpose.

Mortality, another validity problem occurs when a non random subset of units or participants drop out of a study, which might seem to determine the dependent variable rather than the independent variable (Smith, 1981: 336). For instance, critics might see the death of Siaka Steven, who institutionalized corruption in Sierra Leone (Clapman, 1998; Reno, 1995) as a plausible independent variable determining the Conflict. In fact, scholars such as Kaplan, and others argue that the violence was possible only because the state lost its monopoly on coercive force.

However, the problem of legitimation, the denial of communicative freedom did not begin or end with Siaka Stevens. To the extent that this is so, the mortality of major actors, such as Sir Albert and Siaka Steven may have influence the situation but are not crucial enough to falsify the hypothesis or the findings.

Without rational arguments for policy claims, or where constrains are put on communication, no mutual understanding will exist, only a damaged social life that
reflects false, immoral and inauthentic social interaction. Serious consequences result when people avoid the goal of reaching understanding – the goal of realizing the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation is an indispensable supposition in any social interaction that has communication as its paradigm. It is a “social fact” because tensions and crisis are bound to arise whenever we avoid this supposition impose constrains on the socio-cultural domain of communication.

Thwarting communicative ethics or rationality in social interaction creates social relations that are “foreign” to the nature of human interaction as they betray deception, duress, force or colonization. To the extent that external capitalist interest is a social fact, its external systemic imperatives would tend to constrain the socio-cultural domain since this domain tends to put moral constraints or limits on its operations. Only an analysis within the paradigm of communicative action can precisely capture the systemically-induced constraints on the socio-cultural domain of communication, since the categorical formation of society or the interpretive schema within which social action (including this imperatives) is mediated is communication (Habermas, 1979).

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Chapter 4
Colonization of Political Discourse and Rationality Crisis.

Differences in how actors have thought legitimate states should solve their cooperation problems, have led these states to evolve very different basic institutional practices (Reus Smit (1999). The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social identity, Institutional Rationality in International relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p. 10).

4.0. Moral Practical Reconstruction of Rationality (Administrative) Crisis. This chapter begins the moral practical reconstruction of colonization and crisis of social evolution. Sierra Leone became quickly entrapped in a colonizing logic of governance immediately after Independence, which immersed the society into a constitutional (administrative) crisis. The crisis, which represents a defining moment in the trajectory of the social evolution of Sierra Leone, is discussed here in three sections, section 4.1, 4.2, and the conclusion, 4.3.

The first part (4.1) analyzes the first of two major epochal discourses – the one party issue - that triggered the political/constitutional crisis in immediate post-Independent Sierra Leone. In this section, we show why the subversion of stipulated principles of the constitution created crisis potential in Sierra Leone after Independence in 1961. In trying to consolidate its power, the governing SLPP party tried to adopt a republican one party constitution in a manner that denied impartial communicative justification, hence triggering a constitutional crisis.

Section (4.2) examines the further degeneration of political discourse as a reaction to the SLPP attempt to adopt a one party constitution. Reacting to the incumbent’s

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(SLPP’s) one party dictatorship, the main opposition (APC) and their surrogates began acting or interacting in the political realm in ways that blatantly subverted *constitutional state principles*. They disrupted the 1967 election, which the Independent Constitution stipulates as the basis for assuming political power. Governor General Lightfoot Boston disrupted the 1967 elections by his questionable appointment of Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister before the paramount chief elections, which are stipulated by the constitution, were completed. Chief Justice COE Cole, other jurists and members of the Dove Edwin Commission appointed by a military Junta headed by Juxon Smith endorsed the Governor’s actions. Political elite’s of the newly Independent State deliberately subverted the constitution, which recognized paramount chiefs as members of parliament, with the right to even become Prime Minister (Daramy, 1993). This second defining epochal moment facilitated the transformation of social power to political power, setting the stage for almost three decades of dictatorship of Siaka Stevens and the APC. The one party debate and the crisis that stemmed from it, the disruption of the 1967 election, illustrated the crisis-ridden trajectory of social evolution of Sierra Leone since Independence. The conclusion, section (4.3), explicates the constitutional/administrative crisis in Sierra Leone as manifestation of the limits of the moral practical consciousness or intuitive knowledge of political actors in the coordination of the society. Historically, this conclusion shows that the constitutional/administrative crisis reflects stagnation or even retrogression in the society’s developmental logic or learning capacity.

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98 Constitutional state principles refer to the idea of government by law, by which state orders are to follow legal procedures stipulated by the constitution to enable the society autonomously organize itself according to the system of rights. Examples of these principles are popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. See Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms. MIT Press. pp. 162-3 &176
This chapter uses the 1961 Independence period and the emergence of constitutional crisis immediately after Independence, as starting point in the reconstruction of the society’s moral practical evolution. The 1961 independence period is chosen because at this time the society became officially a democratic constitutional state. Only after assuming such constitutional democratic political status will it make sense to talk of or analyzing political governance and coordination of the social order in terms of democratic will and opinion formation, and the legitimacy of legal or constitutional norms. Its official status as a democratic constitutional state since 1961 corresponds to a social structure that refers to a post-traditional society, one politically constituted from varied social, political, regional, and cultural constellations. In a post-traditional society, conflict resolution or collective will formation is possible only at the level of post-conventional morality or rational discourse, the only medium in which the pursuit of the shared societal interest is possible. The constitutional/administrative crisis examined shortly in the post-traditional and democratic constitutional nation state of Sierra Leone can be viewed as a failure to institutionalize moral (democratic) consciousness or development at the post conventional level.

To thrive, a constitutional democracy must realize the *co-originality principle* i.e. must balance democracy and the constitution or law making process to realize a stability-

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99 Ibid, Habermas, J. (1996). *Between Facts and Norms*. MIT Press, p. 230. In rational discourse, we assume that communicative conditions: a) prevent a rationally unmotivated termination of argumentation, b) secures both freedom in the choice of topics and inclusion of the best information and reasons through universal and equal access to, as well as equal and symmetrical participation in argumentation, c) exclude every kind of coercion outside or within the assembly other than the better argument, so that all motives other than the cooperative search for truth are neutralized.

100 Traditional society can not be subjected to this type of analytical framework since their corresponding developmental stage is conventional or authoritarian morality, where myth or conventions supply authority in the use of power and for values. See Habermas, J. (1987). *Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. II.*
guaranteeing legitimate social order (Habermas, 1996). 1961 marks the year the nation state was officially accorded the logical space or a potential learning capacity to practice democratic constitutionalism to coordinate the society and resolve morally-defined conflicts. Parliamentary deliberation in legislative reform of the constitution shows that the constitution provided for the practice or discursive will and opinion formation, or for a democratic learning potential to morally transform the society to reflect its new formal logical political status as a constitutional democracy. The society’s tendency to revert to authoritarianism or the conventional organizing principle triggered the constitutional/administrative crisis examined in this chapter. This crisis created an interregnum or power vacuum, which served as precondition for the emergence of an exploitative neoliberal dictatorship (Chapter 5).

In the historical context (Chapter 1), the study isolated factors that conditioned structures of interaction in the social and political domain of Sierra Leone since Independence. One such important factor was the APC threat to invade Sierra Leone, to start a civil war in the 1960s. This threat conditioned political discourse by introducing elements of fear and intrigue in politics, making the latter more or less a strategic game. At this initial stage of Sierra Leone’s socio-political formative process, structures of interaction were characterized by deception and force. Most African politicians at the time of Independence desired the absolute control of political power, such as adopting the one party system of government (Fanon, 1963; Sandbrook, 1994). State actors saw politics more or less as a strategic game of power and intrigues, which may involve the strategic deployment of law to dominate and manipulate.
By pursuing the one party system in a manipulative manner, the leader of the ruling SLPP (Sierra Leone People’s Party) at the time, Sir Albert Margai, triggered crisis in the constitution making process immediately after Independence, 1961. After 1961, the SLPP leader quickly began pursuing a one party law, but faced stiff opposition. He tried to first adopt a republican constitution that would free him from British colonial institutions, such as the Governor General and the Privy Council in England. With powers of an executive president under a republican constitution, Sir Albert would be able to then adopt a one party constitution with little resistance. Franz Fanon (1969) argued the one party quest was almost a natural tendency for politicians immediately after independence due to their lack of clear knowledge to better ensure social integration, considering their immaturity in democratic constitutionalism.

The one party quest reflects an *aporia so that* any attempt to adopt it is bound to create a crisis in the society. As a *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie* (Fanon, 1969), one party threatens the survival of other parties, and so it cannot admit of rational discourse or mutual agreement or genuine consensus. Adopting one party in the constitution stipulated legal parliamentary procedures would have to involve domination and manipulation. SLPP soon realized that success in such a quest would depend on the extent they can make inconspicuous their intention. Since one party dictatorship threatens the very survival of the opposition parties, they cannot endorse it as legitimate or worthy of recognition.

However, because the Independence constitution somewhat reflected the immanent imperial imprint of Britain, the Governor General and the Privy Council institutions, Sierra Leone must eliminate trappings of this colonial imprint to be truly
autonomous. To break the political dependency on the former colonial power and make 
Sierra Leone’s autonomy real, the newly Independent State must eliminate all colonial 
trappings. A republican constitution was required to eliminate the institutions of the 
Governor General and Privy Council, which were directly responsible to the former 
colonial power, Britain. These externally oriented institutions somewhat created the 
suspicion of continuing British colonial interest in Sierra Leone. The presence of these 
British colonial institutions in post-Independence Sierra Leone could render the society 
and the state vulnerable to potential external subversion. Their continuing presence in the 
Independent constitution of Sierra Leone put to question Britain’s sincerity in promoting 
autonomy, self-determination or democratic constitutionalism in her former Colony.

APC used the suspicion of a possible immanent British imperial interest as pretext 
to threaten the invasion of Sierra Leone. Siaka Stevens, its leader, argued that SLPP was 
proxy of British, and that the one party quest of Sir Albert was a strategy to ensure British 
colonial dominance. What was definitely true, however, was that the SLPP one party 
quest in post Independent Sierra Leone threatened APC survival, and the bureaucratic 
and economic power of the Krios.

Further complicating the matter were the real evolutionary learning challenges 
this young constitutional democracy was to meet. Amidst the web of conditioning initial 
factors (those discussed in the historical context), political actors in Sierra Leone were to 
further develop the knowledge or learn to balance constitutionalism and democracy to 
realize and maintain their new found autonomy or Independence. This chapter analyzes

Sierra Leone’s formative process to show the extent the society learnt (or met its evolutionary challenges) in the moral practical domain i.e. in the spheres of law and morality. It critically examines the possibility of moral-practical development in the society since 1961. Like Daramy (1993), Kallon (2004), Collier (1970), Cartwright (1978), Wyse (1990) and Thompson (1997), this study tracks the institutionalization of a low political culture in Sierra Leone (Cox, 1979). Unlike these other studies, the moral practical (legal and moral) reconstructive approach to the evolution of Sierra Leone is done from the perspective of procedural paradigm or the discourse theory of law and democracy (Habermas, 1996).

This chapter examines the legal/political or constitutional crisis in immediate post-Independent Sierra Leone, by arguing that this constitutional crisis was an incipient civil war. At its core, the crisis demonstrates the moral indictment of the State as was the Prince in 1789 France. As moral indictment, a ‘civil war’ was already in motion in Sierra Leone by the mid 1960’s as evidenced in the constitutional administrative crisis. Why did the constitutional crisis not lead immediately to outright armed civil war or conflict in 1960’s? Was it due to successful moral practical learning on the part of social and political actors? Was the society able to successfully meet its moral–practical developmental challenges of democratic constitutionalism? Were citizens able to resolve disagreements according to principled morality i.e. through rational discourse, the moral language game appropriate for conflict resolution in the new constitutional democracy?

Answering these questions will enable us identify whether the society took an evolutionary step, whether it adopted a new level or principle of social organization suitable for resolving conflicts in this post traditionally conscious society, one constituted
out of diverse cultural, linguistic, regional and ideological constellations. One cannot answer whether the society developed appropriate structures of interaction to meet its evolutionary challenges by merely observing events or occurrences as in a narrative.\footnote{A narrative or descriptive recounts an event without adequate analysis, often presenting the development of a society in a teleological form, often aimed at some utopia or ideal. Habermas, (1979). Historical Materialism. In \textit{Communication and the evolution of society}. Boston: Beacon, p. 147.}

Such a task requires an analytic (abstract) answer that must show how social actors approximate or draw on the requisite or appropriate categorical intuitive post-conventional developmental logic or consciousness to resolve conflict in the society. Analytically, we glean the level of moral practical developmental consciousness or intuition of social and political actors by examining their social innovation as manifested in structures of interaction \textit{i.e.} the rules of communicative action social actors develop as they interact with one another in pursuing their interests.\footnote{This analysis approaches the functions of legislation, application, and the implementation of law from \textit{an abstract level} \textit{i.e.} in terms of the disposition over different kinds of admissible arguments and corresponding forms of communication. Explicate structures of interaction enables us assess the extent social and political actors adhered to constitutional norms or principles of fair representation through unconstrained discourse (Habermas, 1996: 193).}

Moral practical learning focuses on structures of interaction, which conceives social evolution in terms of developmental approaches in the Piagetian tradition, such as that developed by Kohlberg. This tradition distinguishes the developmental logic of society in terms of formally characterized levels of learning and learning processes (social interaction) possible at a given stage of development of society (McCarthy, 1985: 246). Structures of interaction reflect levels of moral practical learning, development or...
consciousness. While learning can occur in the dimension of technical instrumental knowledge (decisive for productive forces), the discourse-theoretic reconstruction of historical materialism focuses on learning as socio-cultural innovation, which is reflected in the organizational principle of society (p. 246). The organizing principle refers to socio-cultural innovations that institutionalize developmental levels of learning and establish the structural conditions for technical and practical processes at a particular stage of development.\textsuperscript{104}

From the perspective of social evolution as socio-cultural innovation, this chapter examines the constitutional/political crisis immediately following the Independence of Sierra Leone as a problem of moral-practical learning. Socio-cultural innovations that signify moral practical learning depends on the communicative competence or interaction of political actors, which they acquire not as isolated monads, but by growing into the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. Methodologically, one cannot explicate a society’s evolution into symbolic structures of the lifeworld by merely observing structures of interaction. Such task requires explicating these structures and assessing their quality in terms of moral–practical learning. The analysis requires a performative attitude by which we approach the process from the abstract and vantage point of discourse.

Discourse theoretic analysis involves abstract qualitative assessments that critically examine societal coordination in terms of arguments, forms of communication

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, p. 148
\textsuperscript{104} Habermas, (1979). Historical Materialism In Communication and the evolution of society. Boston: Beacon, p. 154. Concrete embodiments of these abstract principles of organization are the “institutional nuclei” that serve as the relations of production and determine the dominant form of social integration or conflict resolution. Social evolution is a bi-dimensional process, technical cognitive and the moral-practical. Their stages can be described structurally and ordered in developmental logical terms.
or structures of interaction. In this analysis, we conceive the society as a system of linguistically coordinated actions, which appropriate outer nature in productive processes and inner nature in socialization process. This study uses the discourse principle as standard for assessing the linguistic coordination of the society. This standard helps us assess whether societal members justified norms impartially in communicative forms of life to reflect symmetrical relations of recognition (Habermas, 1996: 109). The principle takes the form of a universalization principle, a moral principle of symmetrical argumentation that expresses a post-conventional requirement of justification appropriate to a post-traditional status or modern society.

The discourse principle has a normative content to the extent that it explicates the meaning of impartiality in practical judgment (Habermas, 1996: 107). Referred to as (D), the discourse principle lies at the level of abstraction that is neutral with respect to morality and law, for it refers to action norms in general: “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses (p. 107).” “Those affected” refers to those whose interests are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a general practice regulated by the norms at issue. “Rational discourse” refers to attempts at reaching understanding over problematic claims under conditions of communication constituted by illocutionary obligations, which enables free processing of topics, contributions, information and reasons in the public sphere or social space. This expression also refers to bargaining insofar as it is regulated by discursively grounded procedures (p.107).

106 Habermas, J. (1979). Development of Normative Structures In Communication and the evolution
This chapter uses (D) to analyze politico-legal interactions in Sierra Leone, in order to explicate the emergence of the constitutional (administrative) crisis that serve as the beginning of the Conflict that reached its culmination as the eleven years civil war, from 1991-2002. The constitutional/political crisis is examined from the perspective of rational communicative action or discourse. As the cooperative search for truth and the moral or general will, discourse is the site where rational will take shape, so that a law that emerges through such rational discursive process is legitimate. Legitimate law therefore depends on communicative arrangements where participants in rational discourse regard each other as equal consociates under the law, and where each participant or actor is able to examine whether a norm meet or could meet with the agreement of all those possibly affected (Habermas, 1996: 104). This cooperative search for the truth and moral rightness constitutive of discourse ensures both a rational means and a rational end or will formation in the coordination of society. Because our paradigm case of communicative action reflects the discourse principle or intersubjective reciprocal understanding (mutual understanding), this study uses it to assess concrete constitutional/political debates or interactive structures to explicate the level of intuitive moral practical consciousness of social actors, hence to account for the society’s evolutionary learning. Thus, the discourse principle (D) can be used to test for the colonization of the socio-cultural domain of communication.

The moral practical reconstruction of historical materialism (or the theory of communicative action) conceives law and morality or the cultural superstructure as *the*
pacemaker of social evolution. From this perspective, the constitutional/political crisis is understood not only as a problem of legitimate law but as a failure to meet an evolutionary challenge i.e. as a post-traditional society’s failure to resolve morally-defined conflicts at the post-conventional developmental level. Conceived as a problem of learning to develop legitimate law, the constitutional political crisis is analyzed here to show how misconception in law and constitution making caused instability in the politico-legal order. Legitimacy functions as a “stability-guaranteeing” force of social orders (Habermas, 1970). In a post-traditionally conscious society or constitutional democratic state, legitimating law requires the delicate balancing of democracy and constitutionalism (we elaborate shortly).

Following in the tradition of sociology, the moral practical reconstruction approach adopted here conceives society as a legitimate social order. Since Durkheim and Weber, the development of law had come under the undisputed, classical research areas of sociology. “The social relations we call ‘formally organized’ are those that are first constituted in forms of modern law” so that the “predicted reification effects [of the legal formalization of social relations] would have to be demonstrated at the analytical level and indeed, as being the symptomatic consequence of a specific kind of juridification (Habermas, 1987: 317).” Juridification requires a high degree of value generalization that extensively loosens social action from its normative contexts, splitting up concrete ethical life into morality and legality (p. 317). In the politico-administrative (constitutional) crisis analyzed here, the separation of morality and legality in political discourse created a norm-free sociality, a “reification” or social pathology. To the extent

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that political actors coordinated governance or exercised legal political authority without
cognizance of the moral point of view (what is equally acceptable to everyone) or
impartial justification, the ethical-political order was rendered crisis-ridden.

The constitutional crisis provides us an opportunity to test the thesis of internal
colonization of the lifeworld or socio-cultural domain of communication, specifically the
juridification of communicatively structured areas of the politico-legal domain
(Habermas, 1987: 356). In explicating this juridification process, this study hopes to
show how systemic imperatives constrained the lifeworld or the socio-cultural domain of
communication in Sierra Leone politics. Systematically induced reification and cultural
impoverishment deformed structures of interaction to various degrees, from rigidification
to their desolation.108

Rigidification manifests as a one-sided rationalization of the lifeworld (the socio-
cultural domain of communication), which stems from the growing autonomy of media
steered system (the State), objectifying itself into a norm-free reality that stands above
and beyond the horizon of the lifeworld, while its imperatives penetrate deep into the
lifeworld.109 Desolation manifests as the dying out of vital traditions, which continue
only as second nature that have lost their force, whilst the system increasingly becomes
autonomous of the lifeworld, and increasingly dealt with by experts. The further
degeneration of juridified social relations (desolation) is treated in the next chapter (in
connection with Siaka Stevens’ one party dictatorship). These negative juridification
processes – legal formalization of social relations that keep the moral point of view out of

sight reflect colonial tendencies, which manifest as systemic impositions or imperatives on the socio-cultural domain of communication.

Insofar as the constitutional crisis arose from the inability to apply post conventional principled morality, impartial justification in the law making process, morality is central to politics. This crisis of governance reflects the dialectic of moral life, which refers not to class antagonism as linked to the development of social labor. Conceived in terms of the mode of production, the meaning of the dialectic must remain obscure as long as the materialist conception of the synthesis of man is restricted to the categorical framework of production. By understanding the dialectic of moral life in terms of communication and the intersubjectivity that emerges among actors on the risky basis of mutual understanding, we see clearly the difficulty of separating moral principles of communicative justification from modern politics. Moral actions are essentially communicative relations between subjects in a complex of interaction that constitutes their formative process – social interaction is eo ipso moral interaction (McCarthy, 1985: 36). It is at least potentially a dialogic relationship that emerges on the precarious basis of mutual understanding (pp. 36-37).

Historically, the organization of social relations has reflected institutionalized power relations rather than public and general communication free from domination. Thus, interaction as a category for comprehending processes of social evolution does not refer immediately to unconstrained intersubjectivity but to the history of its repression and reconstitution: the dialectic of moral life (McCarthy, 1985: 36).

As a law of motion of society, the dialectic reveals itself here as the repression and reconstitution of linguistic communication in the socio-cultural domain: the repression of

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110 Habermas, (1972). Knowledge and Human Interest. Boston: Beacon, p.55; Also see McCarthy, 1985, p. 34
communicative understanding only displaces rather than annuls this fundamental condition of our cultural existence – language or more precisely, socialization and individuation determined by communication in ordinary language. Systemic actors would have to compensate for the repression of communicative understanding by aberrant forms, systematic distortions (covert strategic) and systematic deformations (overtly strategic) of discourse. These deformations and distortions constitute the *internal colonization of the socio-cultural domain or the lifeworld.*

Hitherto, scholars discussing colonial domination in Sierra Leone perceived the matter mainly as a process by which a “foreign” law giver like Britain established dominion over native societies. On the contrary, Dei (1999) has argued that colonial domination is not marked exclusively by external imposition in social life. “Foreign” colonial element can also manifest in juridified social relations when an indigenous lawgiver assumes decisionistic (autopoietic) orientation. A colonial legal system is characterized by a “recursively closed circuit of communication that self referentially delimits itself from its environment (society), with which it has contact only through observations (Habermas, 1996: 49).” As law, communicative relations constitute the object domain of our model. In it, we isolate indicators or surface symbolic structures of interaction to comprehend processes of social evolution. The autopoietic character of the legal system (which refers to the political system as well) in Sierra Leone means this system is constituted and reproduced exclusively by its own means or legal procedures, which detach itself from any internal relation between morality and politics. This approach to law *reduces law to the special function of the administration of law.* This

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111 Habermas, J. (1971). Technology and Science as Ideology In *Towards a Rational Society: Student*
form of law neutralizes legal validity, describes things objectivisitically, and authorizes political power on the basis of objective exigencies and expediency, hence making *arbitrariness an institution* (McCarthy, 1985). Whether the law giver is European or African, political orders become “colonial” or “foreign” when they “lose sight of the internal connection between law and the constitutional organization of the origin, acquisition and use of political power (Habermas, 1996: 50).” The manner by which political orders or law originates is crucial for understanding its colonial aspects; this relates to the extent it commands the recognition or acceptance of those it affects, its addressees. A social order unworthy of recognition (legitimacy) tends to be colonial.
4.1 Misconception of Legitimacy and the Emergence of Administrative Crisis.

Immediately after Independence in 1961, the ruling SLPP party stirred already existing political and regional tensions because its leader Sir Albert Margai started pushing for a one party constitution through republicanism. He argued that one party republican constitution would unite Sierra Leoneans and bring about development (Foray, 1988; Daramy, 1993). Development and unity served as the pre-political reasons or goal values the incumbent SLPP posited to justify a one party constitution for Sierra Leone.

It is important to understand the context for Sir Albert’s pursuit of a republican constitution after colonialism.\textsuperscript{112} Amidst the euphoria of decolonization and an APC invasion threat, the Privy Council in England remained the ‘highest court of appeal of the Land.’ As both institutions were answerable to the British Crown, and not the people of Sierra Leone, they represented potential violation or subversion of the principle of popular sovereignty and the autonomy of Sierra Leone. Under this condition, leaders of this new Independent African State felt the need to consolidate the Independence of the State, to realize full or substantive autonomy. The need to consolidate Sierra Leone’s Independence by way of republican constitution was, therefore, a legitimate aspiration.

To consolidate Sierra Leone’s autonomy or Independence, political actors in this newly Independent African State would have to make new laws or amend those inherited in the Independent Constitution to better reflect its autonomy. This reasoning means the

\textsuperscript{112} See Wyse, (1990). H C. Bankole Bright and the politics of colonial Sierra Leone 1919 – 1958, 1990, p. 184. The constraints put on debates on the Governor General’s office betrays the ‘decolonization’ process or gradualisms as a one sided process of constitutional transformation, without adequate democratic debates. Britain gave ‘independence’ to a society that was unaccustomed to the practice of democratic freedoms. During gradualism politicians seem to have been mere symbolic legislators insofar as constraints were placed on the topics they could discuss. The Governor’s executive powers were off limit to parliamentary debate during gradualism. At Independence, therefore, Sierra Leone was democratically ill equipped to actualize the latent and requisite moral-practical consciousness to enable it
political constitution should be viewed as an ongoing process of self-correction, especially as “the legitimation basis of traditional administrative structures [those bequeathed by the Independence Constitution could] no longer suffices (Habermas, 1996: 193).” Societal members and the political system must realize their full autonomy or capacity of self determination in the legislative process. The task of self-determination involves socio-cultural innovations in communicative interaction, which actors should employ to implement programmatic goals required for the “further development of law (p.193).” This moral practical process of learning or innovation involves dialogue or rational communicative relations. Insofar as political actors can successfully muster the necessary socio-cultural innovation in law and constitution-making as a self-correcting process, moral practical evolutionary learning is believed to have occurred.

On the contrary, politicians pursued the republican constitutional order in Sierra Leone in a democratically problematic way. Prime Minister, Sir Albert Margai could not find the right balance between constitutionalism and rational discourse (or democracy) in the parliamentary discourse to justify his republican one party quest. The process denied rational discourse or communicative action in the constitutional framework of the legal medium. To achieve republicanism legitimately, the process must reflect the principle of universalization or symmetry in deliberation. Such a pursuit should give due regard to the expressed general will and opinion of those affected. Sir Milton Margai, the first Prime Minister and elder brother of Sir Albert cautioned politicians, whose tendency to

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Sir Milton Margai, first Prime Minister cited in S.B. Daramy, (1993). Constitutional Development in the post colonial state of Sierra Leone, 1961-1984. Legitimacy is given to a legal constitutional process when it upholds the constitutional state principles such as popular sovereignty. Citizens should be able to assert claims to their rights of questioning law or legislation, hence to exercise their capacity as authors of the law to which they submit as addressees. See J. Habermas, (1996). A Reconstructive Approach to Law:
republicanism and one party government was evident. He advised them to respect “public opinion” and to carefully consider citizens’ views in their pursuit of any kind of united front (Daramy, 1993). Constitutional amendment, he cautioned, must reflect the wish of the majority of citizens of the Country. His younger brother, Sir Albert Margai, who succeeded him as Prime Minister, did not heed this advice. Once in power, he wasted no time in moving towards a Republican constitution, by which government would not seek the Queen’s approval in affairs of governance (Foray, 1988). His failure to conceal his goal of establishing one party made the opposition to begin to resist his pursuit of republicanism, viewing it as a necessarily path to totalitarian one party state.

To be sure, Sir Albert’s one party quest intensified the tension between the dual sovereigns or executive powers inscribed in the Independent Constitution: the Governor General and the Prime Minister. The failure to specify the titular nature of the Governor’s powers in the Independent Constitution pits the Governor General as ‘titular’ executive in competition with the Chief or Prime Minister’s position as substantive head of the Cabinet or the administration. This inconspicuous constitutional stipulation of dual executive powers betrays Britain’s attempt at subverting popular sovereignty in Sierra Leone.114 Within this context of competition, the Governor’s ‘reminder’ to Sir Albert that his capacity to realize a republican bill would entail fundamental constitutional amendment has a covert meaning. It portended imminent danger for the Prime Minister. Reminding Sir Albert, a lawyer by profession, that passing the Republican Bill requires a

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1 See Wyse, (1990). H C. Bankole Bright and the politics of colonial Sierra Leone 1919 – 1958, 1990. In fact, during gradualism, Britain meticulously insulated the institution of the Governor General from review or critique. Before Independence, the status and legitimacy of the Governor General was challenged by the leader of the Opposition, Bankole Bright. Bright was severely rebuked by Albert Margai, the then Attorney General on the grounds that Sierra Leone was still not a constitutional
2/3 majority vote in two consecutive parliamentary sessions (Daramy, 1993; Kallon 2004) has more to it than meets the eye.

Failure to subject the Governor General’s powers to parliamentary debate during gradualism means the manipulative colonial element it embodied was never rationalized (thematized and critically examined). Because the possibility to articulate concerns about the Governor’s office was denied during gradualism, the potential destabilizing colonizing effects and anomie the office posed for the new nation state eluded the society.115 It seems the Governor’s ill defined discretionary powers were deliberately glossed over during the gradualist deliberations for self rule. Through this Office that was answerable to the British Crown, the latter could continue to influence politics inside Sierra Leone, and check possible republican ambitions of the Prime Minister. Since Sir Albert’s pursuit of a republican constitution meant annulling the Governor’s office, the latter was bound to do everything in its power to preserve itself. The imperial provisions of dual executive powers in the Independent Constitution portended crisis potential.

Sir Albert felt he can only respond effectively to this constitutional imperialism, by wresting full control of the State. Many at the time believed this would require a powerful executive and less division or a one party, hence a benevolent dictator (Fanon, 1963; Nkrumah). Albert’s one party goal made him many enemies and cost him friends even in his own party (Daramy, 1993). He neglected the need for mutual understanding or impartial justification in realizing this republican one party dream even within his own party. This quest opened up the old enmity between the regions of the South/East (the SLPP sit of power), and the North/Western area (APC stronghold).
The SLPP was in a double bind. On the one hand, the pursuit of one party via republicanism meant incurring the displeasure of the former colonial power. On the other hand, realizing this dream met with serious opposition from other parties, as their survival was under threat. On both counts, the SLPP leader, a lawyer by training, was unwilling to adopt a purely Machiavellian approach to governance. Sir Albert, the SLPP leader, experienced a personal crisis because he could not fully face up to the evident paradox that adopting what was essentially a totalitarian order – the one party law - cannot admit of rational discourse. Thus, crisis is not simply imposed from outside i.e. as physical or external domination. We can infer it from unresolved tension in an actor’s subjective or psychological world.

Can the pursuit of totalitarian order, the dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie or the one party order admit conditions of symmetrical interaction? We respond to this question by illustrating why the pursuit of one party republican constitution had to internally colonize structures of interaction, triggering a politico-administrative crisis. The form of understanding employed to resolve the matter or the adoption of the one party bill was colonizing rather than mutual. To be mutual, members of a political community should appeal to a post-conventional principled morality that enables the impartial justification of norms for coordinating the society. Actors in society must present prima

116 See Habermas, (1996). Between Fact as and Norms. Cambridge, Mass. p. 138. Machiavelli conceives state power in naturalistic terms, as one in the process of breaking away from contexts shaped by sacred traditions. The power holder sees power as a potential to be calculated from a strategic point of view and deployed in purposive rational manner. Hobbes, on the other hand, operates with the rule structure of contractual relationships, laws, and with the de facto power of command enjoyed by the sovereign, whose will defeats every other will on earth. A state is then established on the basis of a civil contract, according to which the sovereign takes on the functions of legislation and casts his imperatives in the form of general laws. The procedures are different but their logical end of domination is the same.
117 Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and the evolution of society. Boston: Beacon. Post conventional morality has to do with universalist orientations and impartiality, which is achieved through
facie convincing reasons for their claims and critical positions to resolve disputes. The morality of a community “lays down how its members should act” and “provides the grounds for the consensual regulation of relevant conflicts (Habermas, 1998: 4).”

To the moral language game belong the disagreements that can be resolved convincingly from the perspective of participants on the basis of potential justifications that are equally accessible to all. Sociologically speaking, moral obligations recommend themselves by their internal relation to the gentle, persuasive force of reasons as an alternative to strategic that is, coercive or manipulative forms of conflict resolution (Habermas, J. (1998). Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press, p. 4).

The question we need to answer then is this: which form of moral justification or intuition is appropriate for coordinating or resolving conflict in the Independent democratic constitutional state or post-traditional society of Sierra Leone? We proceed from the abstract discourse theoretic approach to reconstruct the appropriate moral intuition that politicians exemplified in resolving the one party dispute.

Amidst the opposition of members of his own party members and the Opposition, SLPP prevailed upon Paramount Chief, Bai Bairoh for Tonkolili District of the Northern Province to introduce “a private members motion,” the One Party Bill, with the following rationale: “to ensure the solidarity and rapid development,” of the Country (Foray, 1988: 14). This rationale was based on the appeal to values of economic development and unity. Sam Goba, MP for Bonthe North, in the Southern Province, seconded the Motion. The value orientation in this rationale reflects an ethical existential reference point, which presupposes pre-political agreement among Sierra Leoneans that development and unity are their universal value preferences. Insofar as no rational standard exists for grounding unconstrained discourse or dialogue.

such a value preference (Habermas, 1996; 1992), and did not get the assent of citizens, SLPP’s positing of such rationale for one party is problematic, even paternalistic. The implicit validity claim it embodies cannot admit of justification in rational discourse. To the extent that those affected (the Opposition and their constituents) are unlikely to agree under conditions of symmetrical argumentation, SLPP’s one party paternalistic value claims cannot be grounded, and therefore, lack truth-validity (truth, sincerity, and moral correctness).

Siaka Stevens, the APC leader and candidate for Freetown West II, immediately challenged the SLPP one party argument. He argued that the APC “is opposed to any kind of one party system of governance,” in that “it would not be in the interest of the people of this Country, having taken into account the historical, cultural background of Sierra Leone.” 119 In this initial reason-given and response of Stevens, we capture the intuition of the moral language game we deem appropriate for resolving conflict in a democratic constitutional State of Sierra Leone. 120 Stevens’ reference to the post-traditional consciousness of the society, its historical, linguistic and cultural differences, illustrates the need for a post conventional morality as the appropriate logic to resolve the one party quagmire. Stevens’ challenge debunks the ethical-existential claim of the SLPP, which posits a united cultural self-understanding or a national culture as reference point to justify their one party pursuit. His question was a call to subject SLPP’s

120 As an analytic concept, the Democratic constitutional state represents a wave of juridification in which the idea of freedom already incipient in the concept of law as developed in natural law tradition was given constitutional force. With the constitutionalization of state power, citizens were provided rights of political participation. See Habermas, (1986) Marx and the Thesis of the internal colonization of the lifeworld in The theory of communicative action: Vol. II: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of functionalist reason. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 360-1.
paternalistic argument to *theoretical discourse* (to test it for truth) and *practical discourse* (to test it for moral rightness). This testing as such is intended to reveal whether the *posited claims* for one party constitutes overgeneralization or falsity. The debate reveals the moral intuition of the political actors in post-traditional Sierra Leone by rationalizing (thematizing and critically examining) their reason and response in conflict resolution.

We turn to the discourse principle, which provides the basis for achieving post-conventional justification of norms appropriate in a post-traditional society, to further explicate the genesis of the constitutional administrative crisis.

The discourse principle provides an answer to the predicament in which the members of any moral community find themselves when, in making the transition to a modern, pluralistic society, they find themselves faced with the dilemma that though they still argue with reasons about moral judgments and beliefs, their substantive background consensus on the underlying moral norms has been shattered (Habermas, 1998). *Inclusion of the other. MIT, p. 39*.

The opposition’s arguments imply the need for a moral intuition that requires valid reasons to impartially ground moral judgments and beliefs in this pluralistic society, where the cultural ethos has been shattered or was an illusion from the start, 1961.

The moral intuition Stevens reflected in his challenge points to the need for the ‘moral point of view’ – “what is equally acceptable to everyone-” in the SLPP justification. Against this position, Sir Albert’s paternalistically posited shared ethical self-understanding of the society, that economic development and unity reflect value-generality, became untenable. Justifying norms on the basis of the moral point of view in a post-traditional society would have to use the post-conventional intuitive consciousness, the only level at which it is possible to impartially justify a norm whose background consensus has shattered. Fanon has argued that “it is not to try and disengage ourselves by accumulating proclamations and denials. It is not enough to reunite with the people in
a past where they no longer exist. We must rather reunite with them in their recent counter move which will suddenly call everything into question.” Only by drawing on such post conventional moral intuition, can political actors at the time realize the discourse principle (D), which states that only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of all concerned in practical discourse (p. 41).

Grounding the one party law or norm impartially i.e. from the moral point of view would have meant justifying it from the perspective of the principle of universalization (U). (U) States that a norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion (p. 42). “Interests” and “value orientation” means that pragmatic and ethical reasons play a significant role in practical reasons for coordinating or governing the society. These clauses or considerations prevent the marginalization of participants, and promote sensitivity to a broad spectrum, hence further considering the moral point of view. The phrases “of each” and “jointly by all,” reflects generalized reciprocal perspective taking that requires empathy as well as interpretive intervention by participants. W can operationalize (D) with respect to morality generally, while (U) can be operationalized for deliberations of political legislators and for legal discourses (p. 46). As morality and legality represent the

121 See Fanon, F. (1963). On National Culture In Wretched of the earth. p. 163. Contrary to the simply pre-politically positing a cultural national unity against the colonialist, Fanon argued for the discovery of a true national culture, by focusing on “that zone of hidden fluctuation where the people can be found, for let there be no mistake, it is here that their souls are crystallized and their perception and respiration transfigured (p.163).” Without their political autonomy – their political participation in which they ensure their practice of reason-given and response ability, the authentic unity of society is impossible.

122 The deliberation and justification, we call argumentation is found in all modern cultures and societies. In view of this universality and non-substitutability of the practice of argumentation, it would be difficult to dispute the neutrality of the discourse principle (D). Habermas, (1998). Inclusion of the other. p. 46
validity and facticity intertwined aspects of modern law, impartial (moral) justification of
the one party law would require realizing (U) in the legal form or medium.

In March of 1966, Stevens again challenged the one party move, this time by
asking this question: “how would government reconcile the introduction of one party
system of government with the provisions of one of the entrenched clauses of the
constitution which guarantees freedom of association among other things?” He added
that “it would be contrary to the entrenched clauses of the constitution (Daramy, 1993).”
In this second leg of questioning, Stevens was appealing to a further requirement of
impartial justification, the principle of appropriateness central to the discourse of
application. The latter discourse embodies a second constitutive principle of post
conventional justification, the principle of appropriateness. This additional principle is
necessary for completing the impartial justification of norms in a post traditional society.

Impartiality or the moral point of view, which expresses and gives determinate
meaning to the validity of moral judgments, demands that we consider a norm rationally
acceptable among all those possibly affected with reference to all the situations of
application appropriate to it.\(^{123}\) The principle of appropriateness required for realizing
impartiality in concrete practice is expressed this way: “A norm is valid and appropriate
whenever the consequences of and side effects of its general observance for the interest
of each individual in every particular situation can be accepted by all (p. 36).”

Considering their colonial attitude or mentality to politics, which they acquired
while serving in the British colonial government, the capacity of Sierra Leone politicians
to impartially justify norms would be difficult. Granting of the Independence

\(^{123}\) Klaus Gunther cited in Habermas, (1993). Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse
Constitution does not necessarily automatically change state actors colonial attitude for democratic ones.\textsuperscript{124} The gradualist training in constitution making was democratically unproductive as evident from the insulation of the Governor General’s position from critique. Denying articulation of concerns on the Governor’s powers represented a lost opportunity for understanding how to balance constitutionalism and democracy. The appropriate balancing of constitutionalism and democracy - the co-originality thesis - is a central preoccupation of the discourse paradigm of law. The thrust of the co-originality thesis is that constitutionalism and democracy both enable each other so that without constitutionalism democracy is impossible, and \textit{vice versa}.\textsuperscript{125} With their colonial mindset, it was difficult for politicians to learn to do such balancing act in a short time.

In light of the acculturation of politicians in colonial attitude of domination and intrigues, even Steven believed and supposed that technically (legally) speaking SLPP could realize its one party quest, even with the opposition of other parties and their constituents.\textsuperscript{126} Given this attitude, the incumbent can with impunity shunt aside the principle of appropriateness, which requires that they consider the “consequences” and “side effects” for the “interest of each individual in every particular situation” in the adoption of the one party republican bill. Realizing this principle is possible only if the incumbent was willing to allow communicative freedom or rational discursive will

\textit{Ethics}. MIT Press, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{126} In our historical background discussion on Sierra Leone, we saw how Stevens as enforcer for the colonial government subverted and repressed the legitimate demands of workers in the 1955 strike with impunity, hence, silencing them.
formation. The basic injustice of a totalitarian one party state – its obliteration of other parties – means its pursuit cannot admit of rational discursive justification. To realize its one party dream, the SLPP would have to deny the political autonomy or discursive political participation of the opposition and ordinary citizens. This hindrance to democracy denies constitutionally stipulated “unsaturated rights” (those demarcating private autonomy) as well. Thus, we see the subversion of the co-originality thesis, which holds that citizens can realize their private autonomy (demarcated by freedoms of association, speech and movement entrenched in the constitution), only if they can practice their political autonomy, their right of unconstrained political participation (Habermas, 1996).

The added “time and knowledge index” that further refines the appropriateness principle or formula i.e. “a norm is valid if the consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interest of each individual under unaltered circumstances can be accepted by all (Gunther cited in Habermas, 1993: 37)” – cannot even enter the discourse on the one party constitution. The one party law should not only be impartially justified from the perspective of everyone, it must be justified in terms of its impacts on addressees in the “here and now.” The principle of appropriateness plays the role in discourses of application that the principle of universalization plays in justification discourses. Only the dual application of the principles of appropriateness and universalization exhausts the idea of impartiality. The burden of post conventional morality or impartial justification requires not only a focus on the relevance of the norm in question, but the negative impact of the norm’s application in concrete situation.
Since the adoption of one party automatically obliterates other parties in the “here and now,” its adoption is fraught with a high potential or risk of dissensus. Considering this, the incumbent’s switch to a strategic mode of discourse by bracketing out the principled moral approach was a matter of course. A. H. Kande’s strategic response to Stevens’ concern that one party “would be contrary to the entrenched clauses of the Constitution” signals the incumbent’s turning point or switch to strategic action from a democratic attitude. Kande’s way of justifying the matter was to debunk Stevens’s concerns by introducing an element of relativism in the deliberation. Kande argued that Stevens’ concern that one party violates the entrenched clauses was alarmist, and that the issue “is purely a question of interpretation of the Constitution (Foray, 1988: 25).” To deny that the adoption of a one party bill violates entrenched clauses of subjective liberties or freedoms is to deny the truth that one party does eliminate other parties. The incumbent’s switch to strategic mode of action indicates that this ‘dictatorship of the bourgeoisie’ (Fanon, Wretched of the Earth),” or the one party order cannot admit of rational (unconstrained) discourse. Kande’s response sets a damaging precedence for how post-Independent Sierra Leone would institutionalize democratic constitutionalism.

By evoking the indeterminacy of legal interpretation, Kande hindered reflexive political learning in the interpretation of constitutional history and constitution making. The intuitive meaning of democratic constitution making ultimately refers to the “epistemic promise of an unrestricted exchange of a sufficiently wide range of relevant reasons.”127 Kande’s response indicates less concern for rational interpretation by failing to adduce wide range of valid reasons to justify SLPP’s adoption of one party law. By

this failure, SLPP hindered the possibility of realizing the required post-conventional mode of justifying norms. Only the discourse principle expresses the meaning of the post-conventional requirement of justification, whose normative content is expressed insofar as it explicates the meaning of impartiality in practical judgment.128

These distortions or deformations of communication by the SLPP are impossible attempts to deny the requisite post conventional moral justification for positive law in a post traditional society such as Sierra Leone.

The positivization, legalization and formalization of law mean the validity of law can no longer feed off the taken for granted authority of moral traditions but requires autonomous foundation that is not relative to given ends. Moral consciousness can satisfy such a requirement only at the post-conventional level. It is here that there first emerges the idea that legal norms are in principle open to criticism and in need of justification...The separation of morality and legality effected in modern law brings with it the problem that the domain of legality as a whole stands in need of practical justification (Habermas, (1984). The Theory of Communicative action vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. MIT, pp. 260-1).

Today, the law’s demand for subjects’ compliance requires that this law must emerge through impartial justification of post-conventional morality possible in rational discourse. The legal order’s accomplishments of positivization merely displaced problems of justification, but this positivization or the technical administration of law as such does not do away with justification demands. The post-traditional structure of consciousness, which the moral intuition in Steven’s questions exemplify only “sharpens the problem of justification into a question of principle that is shifted to the foundations but not thereby made to disappear (p. 261).”

Considering their simple majority at the time, the SLPP possessed the requisite constitutional votes to realize the one party law: “Only in modernity can political

domination develop into legal authority (Habermas, 1996: 140).” Yet by becoming an organizational means for political domination or “legitimate domination,” modern law has to depend on the supply of legitimation that requires impartial justification (Habermas, 1984: 262). In a post-traditionally conscious society such as Sierra Leone, we cannot dismiss the principled requirements of communicative rationalization of law without engendering a crisis (p. 261) – hence the dialectic of moral life. In this light, the incumbent’s constraints on political discourse constitute initial steps in the crystallization of a low political culture of colonial domination in post Independence Sierra Leone.

The low political culture of law and constitution making in Sierra Leone as exemplified by political actors fell below the requisite post conventional mode of justification, reflecting a semantic approach to law or narrow subjectivist standpoints or self understanding of the legal system - (autopoiesis). Autopoiesis entails the belief that mere legality is legitimacy, the core of Hobbesian logic of legal domination. Sir Albert’s pursuit of one party constitution exclusively through legality does not essentially alter the substantial nature of a sovereign will grounded on naked decision. In this Hobbesian logic, the lawgiver submits to reasons sublimated in the abstract form of legal statutes only so that he can use it for his sovereign purpose (Habermas, 1996: 138). One party privatizes political power by employing the legal form as a charade.

SLPP’s switch to power-steered mode of talk was seen as an attempt by Kande to constrain political structures of interaction so that the resulting form of understanding

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129 The semantic approach to law emphasizes the facticity or positivity of the law, where mere decision of the sovereign or law giver confers validity. The sense of the “ought” or pragmatic considerations is that we insist on rational reasons to ground a decision are absent in this approach to law. See Habermas, (1970). *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 98-99.
130 In the Hobbesian approach law plays a powerful role in domination in modern political interaction; obedience to law is considered justice or morality. See Habermas, (1974). *Theory and practice*. 
only feeds on language parasitically (Habermas, 1996). The belief that interpretation is indeterminate illustrates that communication was not the paradigm or form of SLPP interaction. Interpretation involves adducing truth-valid (sincere, true, and morally correct) reasons with which the majority of Sierra Leoneans at the time, including their representatives in parliament, could identify (Habemas, 1984). In the politico-legal domain, interpretation must draw on pragmatic, ethical-political and morally reasons to legitimize a law. Basic rights and the principle of popular sovereignty tie competent law making to democratic will formation, and express the structural necessity of post-conventional justification, which must draw on wide range of reasons (Habermas, 1984: 261). The denial of rational political discourse (democratic will formation) stipulated by the system of rights or the constitution accounts for the progressive formation of the constitutional crisis immediately after 1961.

Below, the study clarifies how the interpenetration of the discourse principle and the democracy principle required in law making was denied, causing the emergence of the constitutional crisis. The democracy principle, which refers to action norms that appear in legal form states that “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted (Habermas 1996: 108).” It explains the performative meaning of self

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In moral questions, world citizens and humanity constitute our reference system for justifying regulations that lie in the equal interest of all. The decisive reason must be acceptable to each and everyone. In ethical—political questions, on the other hand, the form of life of the political community that is “our own” constitutes the reference system for justifying decisions that are supposed to express an authentic, collective self understanding. In principle, the decisive reasons must be acceptable to all members sharing “our” traditions and strong evaluation. This opposition of interest requires balancing preferences. See Habermas, 1996, p.108. In ethical political discourses, elites can make compromises on their interests by balancing competing value orientations. In the case of Sierra Leone such balancing of orientations created problems.
determination by legal consociates who recognize one another as free and equal members of an association they have joined voluntarily (p. 110). It requires that those participating have the scope to give pragmatic, moral and ethical political reasons. While application of the democracy principle serves to ensure that all those affected, including the opposition parties, participate in the legislative process, the discourse (moral) principle serves to ensure that such participation is in fact meaningful.

Institutionalizing or realizing the discourse principle in the legal system causes the latter principle to take the form of the democracy principle. The principle of democracy confers legitimating force on the legislative process (p. 121). We derive the democracy principle from the interpenetration of the discourse principle and the legal form of interaction. To argue that those affected actually participated in legislation, involves making the claim that their involvement was not merely symbolic but meaningful i.e. they were able to realize the discourse principle. A simple look at the form of a law cannot enable us determine its legitimacy. Democratic procedures that institutionalize the forms of communication necessary for rational political will formation must take various conditions of communication into account at the same time to make a law legitimate.

Only by bringing in the discourse principle can one show that each person is owed a right to the greatest possible measure of equal liberties that are mutually compatible. Neither the discourse principle nor the legal form (of interactive relationships) suffices to ground any right. The principle of discourse takes democratic shape through the medium of law to the extent that the discourse principle and the legal medium interpenetrate and develop a system rights that brings private and public autonomy in mutual supposition.
Only through political autonomy – the actual political participation of those affected in the formation of law, can ensure the realization of popular sovereignty.

The principle by which “governmental authority derives from the people” must be specified according to circumstances in the form of opinion and will formation; the freedom of assembly; the freedom of beliefs, conscience, and religious confession; entitlement to participate in political elections and voting processes; entitlements to work in political parties or citizens’ movements and so forth (Habermas, 1996: 128).

As a complex network of processes of reaching understanding and bargaining, legislation can actualize the entrenched constitutional rights and freedoms only if political actors can exercise their right of participation in a substantive manner, hence the co-originality principle by which we balance the system of right (constitutionalism) and popular sovereignty (democracy) (Thomassen, 2006; Habermas, 1996). The co-originality thesis, which requires the interpenetration of the legal form and discourse principles, stipulates that institutionalized democratic procedures must uno acto consider various conditions of discursive will formation.

By evoking the indeterminacy of legal interpretation as response to the opposition’s concerns over the one party bill, the SLPP constrained or colonized the debate by making the issue a matter of legal expertise or specialized knowledge. There answer implied that only technical legal expertise can adduce the right reasons and engage in the pragmatic, ethical-existential and moral discourses necessary to legitimize the law or resolve the problem of legal indeterminacy. This strategy denies rational discourse, hence denies those represented their political autonomy or scope for self determination. Without their adequate participation, those affected and represented by their legislators cannot understand themselves as authors of the laws to which they submit as addressees (Habermas, 1996). Representatives can realize their political
autonomy only if they can exercise their right of political participation in the legal form of parliamentary interaction, as the legal medium is the domain in which the society realizes its autonomy or self determination. The rational character of parliamentary debates can be realized through the discursive inputs and processes of legislation to fairly balance interests, to clarify ethical self-understanding, and morally justify norms (p. 180). To the extent that the one party deliberation constrained or stifled discursive will formation, the requisite constitutive practical, ethical and moral discourses for justifying it could not emerge, and hence, the political discourse was internally colonized.

We further analyze the conditions of communication or the form of interaction politicians used to resolve the one party issue to get at the extent of colonization of the socio-cultural domain. The degree of colonization of the lifeworld reflects the extent subjects were denied scope to discursively determine their will autonomously. Legitimizing a law requires that subjects enjoy their communicative freedoms or competence to articulate wide range of reasons or to participate in pragmatic, ethical-existential and moral discourses (Habermas 1996).

Pragmatic discourse equates politics with the balancing of current interests represented by elected officials. As applied in Sierra Leone at this time, this discourse involved the choice of whether the single party system of governance should or should not be adopted. Pursuing the one party law without allowing for scope to differentiate whether this pursuit was based on an imperative or a free mandate can only lead to an aggregated will (pp. 180-181). Kande’s response to APC’s seem to imply that the one party preference entered the political process as a given, rather than as input for rational discourse. Like the British colonial system that insulated the Governor’s position from
political discourse, SLPP inconspicuously denied rational discourse on the one party bill and hence any valid reason to support or justify the cultural unity claim implied in it.

To subject the posited hypothetical cultural oneness claim of SLPP to ethical existential discourse, involves testing whether one party represented the *authentic will* of the society. This discourse helps determine whether the one party preference reflected the shared value orientation of citizens. If the basic requirements for ethical-existential discourses were met i.e. systematically undistorted communication free of anxiety, free of power effects, close to the grassroots and the impulses of the public sphere, the society would have realized its *authentic will* in the one party law. Since the cultural nation claim was contested under conditions of communicative distortions, asymmetry, and under an APC threat of invasion or external violence, the claim that the one party represented the society’s authentic will is untenable. Without the capacity of representatives to realize their communicative freedoms of reason-giving and response in deciding whether Sierra Leoneans want to become a single party dictatorship or not, the conditions for ethical existential discourse were denied, and with it the possibility of the society achieving this law as the society’s authentic will.

The antiquarian conception of the organic spirit of the people posited in the cultural self-understanding premise of SLPP one party argument denies the reality of linguistic, ideological and cultural particularities in Sierra Leone. If giving their communicative competence and freedoms to defer, the repressed linguistic, regional and cultural communities or the opposition would not voluntarily agree to a one party law.

Each nation, it seemed, possessed a claim to political Independence as its birthright. But in choosing to interpret this principle through the doctrine of the spirit of the people [exemplified in the cultural ones claim of one party argument presented by the SLPP] deceived
themselves about the specifically modern aspect of their program. Because they assumed that the nation state has already developed into maturity along with the cultural nation, they failed to recognize the *constructive character* of their own project (Habermas, J. (2001). What is a People? in *The Postnational Constellations: Political Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press*, p. 9).

This static conception of national culture exemplified in the parliamentary debates denies national culture: “The atrophy of national reality [the denial of the right to contest the cultural oneness claim] and the death those of national culture feed on one another (Fanon, 1963: 172).” The incumbent’s resistance to open dialogue on their republican one party bill negated the *dynamic modern constructive character* of constitutional reform or law making, which includes the reproduction of the national culture. National culture is the total of first and foremost the expression of a nation, its preferences, its taboos, and its models; the outcome of tensions in and external to society as whole and at all levels (Fanon, 1963: 177). To deny discourse on national culture makes culture the inauthentic will of the society.

By its very form, manufacturing legitimacy (Allaha, 1991) or manufacturing consent (Chomsky, 1998) for one party law by paternalistically positing a ‘truth’ such as united cultural self understanding would require colonial domination. “The richness of a national culture is also based on values that inspired the struggle for freedom (Fanon, 1963: 178).” To deny self-determination, conceived here in terms of communicative freedoms, is to manufacture a pseudo-national culture: “A nation born of the actual concerted action of the people, which embodies the actual aspirations of the people and transforms the state, depends on exceptionally inventive cultural manifestations for its existence (179).” To rely on a “single principle” such as a universal culture to justify the
one party argument is to deny self determination, which is possible when citizens can actualize their political autonomy to decide using various reasons and arguments. SLPP’s attempt to use the legal medium or constitutionalism to engineer *de facto agreement* on the cultural nation claim (implied in its one party quest) ‘does not essentially alter the substantial nature of a will grounded in naked decision.’ The Hobessian logic of its leader Sir Albert is that of a ruler merely pretending to submit to the stipulated legal procedures of law making only so that he can privatize political power (Habermas, 1996: 138). AS said earlier, such a paternalistic approach to reform betrays a Hobbesian respect for natural facts of power, the impenetrable decisionistic core of politics that separates law and morality (Hobbes, (1997) *Leviathan*, p.100).

The incumbent was unwilling to accommodate the objective reality or truth that large constituents were opposed to the cultural unity claim of the one party that posits a false organic unity, and the promise of economic development. “What presents itself from the perspective of system as an integration of society at the level of expanded material reproduction means, from the perspective of social integration, an increase in social inequality,” because such systemic or state approach involves “juridically cloaked repression (Habermas, 1987: 188).” Since the cultural nation argument cannot admit of rational discourse, the premise *ipso facto* presupposes violence or domination of the structural kind. For this ‘truth’ to thrive, those positing it would have to internally colonize the socio-cultural sphere by technically mastering structures of interaction to hinder rational discursive will formation or critique. Internal communicative constraints (*structural violence*) and physical violence would have to complement each other,

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132 Structural violence is the systematic distortion of communication anchored in the formal [legal]
hence they are mutually implicative. Thus, not only would the pursuit of the one party order deny moral discourse and the *autonomous will* that should emerge from it, maintaining such totalitarian order would require ongoing physical domination.

The illusion that the State can get away with such *de-moralized* legal approach, that it can manufacture consent for its law by mere *decision*, turned out to be costly for the society, and for political careers in Sierra Leone. The consolidation of State power through one party puts the solidarity or integration of the society in crisis because the process lacked justice, the *cement of society* (Jon Elster, 1989). A totalitarian order is incipient ‘civil war,’ *an aporia* or irreconcilable opposition of interests that defies resolution.

Reflecting on the French revolution, Koselleck (1988) illustrates how a similar attempt by the Monarchy to technically master or stand above society engendered a crisis or civil war. The State or the Prince cannot depend exclusively on legality to ensure compliance to orders. “From the vantage point of moral-social totality, absolute rule [which one party instantiates] is civil war’: the legitimation of revolution or the conjuration of civil war is found in the Prince overstepping the limits imposed by the will of the people, in subjugating ‘morality’ to the power of the sovereign so that “sovereign power bases itself on the sovereign freedom of decision in itself (Koselleck, 1988: 156).” The immoral basis of sovereign power that conceives legitimacy as legality is at the *heart of the matter*. The pursuit of this unjust political orders or illegitimate law by successive regimes constitutes the gradual formation and origins of the Sierra Leone Conflict.
The emergence of legitimacy from legality admittedly appears as a paradox only on the premise that the legal system must be imagined as a circular process that recursively feeds back into and legitimates itself. This is already contradicted by the evidence that democratic institutions of freedom disintegrate without the initiatives of a population accustomed to freedom (Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 1996: 130-131).

Mere decision or law cannot simply compel the spontaneity of interlocutors to participate in political discourse or ensure citizens’ compliance; rather such spontaneity is regenerated from traditions and preserved in the associations of a liberal political culture (p. 131). The anomie and political chaos that rapidly beset Sierra Leone at the time stems from the misconception or ideology that the State can simply use legality, legal procedures and decisions, to legitimately establish a one party system of governance. Such view misconceives possible citizens’ compliance with such a totalitarian order as reflection of their autonomous or authentic will.

In fact, the one party move violated constitutionalism in the name of democracy, and violates democracy in the name of constitutionalism. SLPP tried to annul the existence of other parties (a violation of the entrenched clauses of the constitution) by using their simple electoral majority or constitutional voting power to establish the one party order. In doing so, however, the incumbent tried to deny discursive democracy or the possibility for rational discourse, hence stifling adequate democratic representation or popular sovereignty. The political opposition cannot adequately exercise their right of discursive opinion and will formation to realize the democracy principle i.e. allow the discourse principle and the legal form to interpenetrate. Impeding the interpenetration of the discourse principle and the legal form subverted the popular sovereignty by which domination that emerges either through electoral victory or de facto control of power. The latter is possible at a conventional or pre-conventional level of morality.
citizens through their representatives become authors of the laws to which they submit. The foregoing discussion illustrates the validity of the co-originality thesis: without guarantee of democracy, the constitution and law making processes remain meaningless, and vice versa. The failure of politicians to balance constitutionalism and democracy properly reflects their failure to successfully learn in the moral practical domain of the society.

Insofar as the Incumbent SLPP colonized the socio-cultural domain of communication or the lifeworld, those dominated (including the opposition) are likely to perceive politics as a matter of liberation. The rapid degeneration of structures of interaction in the political domain - the rigidification or crystallization of a “low political culture”133 began to manifest. It marked the starting point of an aberrant form of liberation politics. With Sekou Toure supporting the APC, and the incumbent’s moral incapacity to adequately defend its totalitarian quest, the opposition assumed the ‘moral high ground.’ APC claimed to adopt a Marxist revolutionary politics to justify a ‘second liberation struggle’ against what it now deemed the SLPP Bourgeois State. At this point, the opposition no longer pretended to play by the rules of democratic constitutionalism. Like the Bourgeoisie in 1789 France, the opposition acted in quite determined assurance amidst the threatening uncertainty of the political crisis that things will be resolved in their favor or interest (Kosselleck, 1988: 180). APC showed a determined assurance of

133 There were signs of their growing confidence in violating the rules as was evident in the conduct of one APC leader, M O Bash Taqi. He urged APC supporters to attack SLPP Ministers, stop traffic, sink launches, stop trains, and break SLPP meetings Cartwright, Politics of Sierra Leone, p. 135. The growing confidence of the opposition can be attributed to some strategic forces and powers that are not directly evident in the deliberative process itself. Here, we see the numerically small but vastly influential Capital city population’s unwillingness to play by democratic rules. Furthermore, Cox (p.1976: 36) also argues that with support of Sekou Toure and the Krios, it became increasingly clear that there was a growing prospect of the opposition party [APC] was not willing to play the game of politics according to the
victory, as was evident in their motto “APC, Now or Never (Daramy, 1993).” This phrase indicates their determination to take over power at all cost or be exterminated into oblivion by an SLPP one party totalitarian dictatorship. The next subsection illustrates how social power seized political power by refusing to play by constitutional rules, hence producing chaos.

4.2. Forms of Understanding in the Transformation of Social into Political Power. As the one party was bound to destroy social, private and political autonomy of those affected, its proponents could hardly justify it in rational discourse. This gave the opposition the moral ammunition to attack the idea with assurance or confidence of success. Like in 1789 France, the Prince’s restrictions on the freedom of society and the opposition made him a ‘victim of its own restrictions’ (Kosselleck, 1988: 183). Once the moral basis of the SLPP one party quest was exposed as illegitimate, or its justified overthrow became imminent.

The moral indictment of the state, its identification with naked power inherent in the dualistic approach to reality, its characterization as slave master, turns a revolt against such a rule into a moral tribunal. Civil war means a crisis of the State, but for the ‘citizen’ the crisis represents a judgment. The political innocence of a philosophy of history that invokes this crisis not as a civil war, but civil war as a moral tribunal, carries within it the assurance that the political crisis will be resolved favorably amidst the threatening uncertainty.134

With his subversion of subjective liberties or the entrenched constitutional clauses (private autonomy) and his hindrance to rights of political participation (political autonomy), Sir Albert was unable to communicatively defend or rationalize his one party

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quest, making him vulnerable to the opposition’s moral indictment. The growing confidence of the opposition stems from the incumbent’s inability to justify its obliteration of social, political, and private autonomy associated with a one party order. Thus, the SLPP one party quest was viewed as naked domination without moral basis.

The following section below critically examines the growing confidence of the opposition in their eventual success, as illustrated by their increasingly blatant disregard for reason or constitutional principles. After all, they were now armed with the ‘moral’ excuse or pretext that the incumbent SLPP was the first to start down the immoral path. The *rigidification* of structures of interaction illustrated by this attitude of unreason reflects a *form of understanding*.

A form of mutual understanding represents a compromise between the general structures of communicative action and reproductive constraints unavailable as themes within a given lifeworld. Historically, viable forms of understanding are, as it were, the sectional planes that result when systemic constraints of material reproduction inconspicuously intervene in forms of social integration and thereby *mediatize* the lifeworld. Mediatization of the lifeworld is a selective process that reflects inconspicuous interference phenomenon that takes effect on and with the structures of the lifeworld or the socio-cultural domain of communication. This phenomenon is not a process available as a theme within the lifeworld; one cannot read such interference from the intuitive knowledge of the politicians. SLPP’s ulterior goal of establishing a dictatorship or one party state could not enter parliamentary deliberations directly. The one party move involves *selectivity* or simple selective viewpoint that places peculiar restrictions upon communicative rationalization - inconspicuous impositions of systemic imperatives on

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the lifeworld (Bernstein, 1995: 23). SLPP inconspicuously blocked the opposition’s call for rationale discourse to rationalize the urgent ethical existential question underlying the one party issue, to decide “according to which rules Sierra Leoneans should live together” or “who Sierra Leoneans want to become?” By manipulating the political debates, they denied scope to others to effectively challenge their totalitarian move. To the extent that the legal medium denied rational regulation of the Conflict, the breakdown of communication became inevitable, leaving bargaining as the only other possible option.

When applied to a shared interest, bargaining can constitute an inconspicuous colonizing form of understanding since it conditions structures of interaction on the basis of influence, power, and prestige. Involving strategic calculations, this type of politics proceeds on the illusion, delusion or self-deception that it is possible to fairly balance societal interests through the negotiations and reach settlement by compensating for disadvantages on the basis of factual power positions and corresponding threat potentials. Since power and threat circumscribe the bargaining process, the authentic will which this ethical political discourse was supposed to achieve remained elusive.

Bargaining process requires a mediator, who is supposed to move negotiations in a fair way, though he cannot make binding decisions because he does not stand above the parties (Habermas, 1996: 140). By requiring a mediator, bargaining seem to be

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136 Cox (1976) argues that SLPP was bent on using simple majority or voting power and its influence in the commissioned ranks of the army to get its way, while the APC opposition enlisted the support of its surrogates in the bureaucracy, particularly the judiciary. With the support of Sekou Toure, APC began to threaten an invasion of Sierra Leone (Kallon, 2004; Daramy, 1993, Wyse, 1990). The political condition created depended on the factual power positions and corresponding threat potentials of the participants, hence constituting politics as bargaining. This situation became as a matter of course a stalemate, with the Governor General acting as mediator, and later using this position he sabotaged the 1967 general elections.

adversarial, whose orientation and disposition is not mutual understanding. In what follows, we will show how the Governor used his position as mediator to blatantly disregard constitutional provisions for the election of paramount chiefs. Once accepted as mediator, the Governor went on to renege on his promise to fairly mediate the constitutional matter. The following is a discourse-theoretic analysis of the meticulous manner APC used to orchestrate their masterful plan to take power in Sierra Leone (Collier 1970; Daramy, 1993). Here, we examine Stevens’ concealed declaration of war

i) Stevens’ ‘concealed’ declaration of war is considered a major stage in the transformation of social power to political power. We begin our investigation of the second major epochal moment constitutive of the political crisis with a question by the leader of the APC opposition party, Siaka Stevens: “Who should form the one Party (Daramy, 1993)?” Siaka Stevens’ question to the SLPP betrays the mind of Sir Albert’s diabolical competitor, who felt beaten at the race for one party. Though an interrogative, his question presupposes the possibility that legally (technically) speaking the incumbent could adopt the one party Bill. Stevens question at this time did not amount to a condemnation of the idea;\(^{138}\) he seemed to be challenging it not on the basis of moral principle. He was now concern with who should lead the one party state. Employing

\(^{138}\) Stevens’ question presupposes that one party is possible even if substantial part of the society opposed it. He no longer questioned the ideas’ immorality. With this question, we reconstruct the moral-practical consciousness of Stevens as one in regress. Further, his question betrays a Machiavellian sensibility, namely his following in the footstep of Albert’s desire for the one party: “Let no one marvel, if in speaking of new dominion both as to prince and state, I bring forward very exalted instances, for men walk almost always in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in their actions by imitation. Not being always able to follow others exactly, nor attain to the excellence of those he imitates, a prudent man should always follow in the path trodden by great men and imitate those who are most excellent, so that if he does not attain to their greatness, at any rate he will get some tinge of it. Machiavelli, N. (1952). The Prince. New York, p. 48).”
formal pragmatic analysis, we get at the function of his question by focusing on what he was actually doing in making the statement. With this analysis, we hope to get at the level, and shifts in moral intuitive consciousness Stevens manifested in the debates.

Stevens’ interrogative constitutes the strategic action of perlocution, a speech act aimed at perlocutionary effect. Perlocutionary effects ensue whenever a speaker acts with an orientation to success, but instrumentalizes speech for purposes that are contingently related to the meaning of what is said. In perlocution, a speaker aims to bring about something through acting in saying something, a powerful move in the context of strategic interaction. Unlike illocutionary acts, where the speaker wants the hearer to understand the manifest content of his speech act (Ibid, 290), with perlocution, the speaker aims to conceal the manifest content of his speech act so that identifying his aim can only be possible through his intention, to which only he has privilege access.

Why should Stevens ask “Who should form the one party,” if he knew the Constitution’s stipulation that such a Bill can become law when it meets the required majority vote in two successive parliamentary sessions? To get at his concealed intention and understand his perlocution, we must “go beyond the meaning of what is said, and thus beyond what an addressee could directly understand,” to “refer to a context of teleological action that goes beyond the speech act;” a context that “remain external to the meaning of what is said (Habermas, 1984: 290-291).” The life world or historical background context politicians exemplified during gradualism or decolonization (Chapter 1), more or less conditioned their world view and orientation to politics in the post

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139 With a perlocutionary speech act, a speaker intends to have an effect upon the hearer in order to bring about something in the world in a deceptive manner. Habermas, (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action* vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. MIT press, p. 289
Independence period. Their orientation to politics was heavily slanted to authoritarianism and deception – to conventional or traditional moral intuitive consciousness. This historical background context involves the broader subjective, objective political and social world of politicians that lie beyond the immediate discourse, but which indirectly condition the political interactions, including their specific utterances or speech acts. Thus, to understand Stevens’ question that registers his immediate moral practical contestation, we must understand his strategic posturing by examining the background historical context.

The adoption of the Republican Bill, which the opposition considers synonymous with Sir Allbert’s one party quest, requires a 2/3rds majority support in two consecutive parliamentary sessions (Kallon, 2004). It was hardly a coincidence that the 1967 election that would have bridged the two parliamentary sessions was violently disrupted. For the opposition to allow the election for paramount chiefs (who traditionally supported the SLPP) to run its full course would have meant a possible SLPP majority. This means that the SLPP would be able to easily adopt a republican constitution and an executive presidency, making it easy for Sir Albert to establish a one party dictatorship. The opposition and their supporters were not ready to take such a chance, to allow an election that could lead to a more dominant SLPP and their possible annihilation. To transform

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In Daramy, S. B. (1993). *Constitutional development in Sierra Leone*. p. 98, he claimed that the APC fulfilled its threat of civil war by proxy infiltration of the national army. The background factors conditioning the political discourse are the Krio’s quest to regain their social power based on their influence, prestige and the control of the bureaucracy, particularly the judiciary; In the threatening specter of Independence, they were bent on regaining their lost glory (Wyse, 1990; Cox, 1976; Kallon, 2004; Daramy, 1993). Other factors are Stevens’ refusal to sign the Independence Bill; and his logical the plan to invade Sierra Leone, and his adamancy to have the British move their naval fleet from the Country, and alliance with radical Sekou Toure. Knowledge of this background context enables us to gain insight into Stevens’ concealed aim. If the SLPP can pass such a law without rational discursive justification, then the opposition could use any arsenal in its control (civil war, judicial influence, and propaganda) to thwart the SLPP quest to absolutism.
constitutional politics into a politics of factual power games and threat potentials (bargaining), the opposition disrupted the constitutionally stipulated democratic elections, creating crisis. At the time, the general election results were APC 32, SLPP 28, and 6 undeclared Independents (Kallon, 2004; Daramy, 1993; Cartwright, 1978).

During this deadlock it was revealed by the secretary of the Governor General that some ‘prominent’ Freetown elite paid the Governor General a ‘social visit’ and ‘pressured’ him to appoint Siaka Stevens Prime minister, disrupting the remaining election of the 12 paramount chiefs that was still going on. For the prominent Freetown elite and the opposition to have allowed completion of the elections of paramount chiefs, who traditionally supported the SLPP, they would have given a chance to the incumbent to gain a simple parliamentary majority. Thus, the opposition and their surrogates could not allow the possibility of a second parliamentary session where paramount chiefs and Independents would formally declare for their party of choice, and where open tally of final results would occur.

The disruption of the elections facilitated a politics of bargaining that enabled the Governor General transform his ceremonial executive role of simply appointing an executive that voters elect to become an administrator with substantive executive authority. Governor Sir Lightfoot Boston usurped and subverted the political power of the chief executive, Sir Albert, who was likely to command the majority support of the parliament. He and other western area elite supported the sabotage of the constitutionally stipulated paramount chief elections. In this way, the opposition made the necessary intervention in the world, the complementary action required for achieving
Commenting on the intrigues, Gershon Collier argued that this disruption forced events to their dramatic climax, “when on March 21 1967, the Governor-General yielded to pressures from the Colony Creole elements and appointed Siaka Stevens Prime Minister (Daramy, 1993: 9; Collier, 1970).” At this point a latent or cold ‘civil war as moral indictment of the SLPP’ was already in motion; the disruption represented a tactical victory for APC’s urgent plan of taking power, an urgency captured in their motto: “APC Now or Never.”

ii) Further Rigidification of Structures of Interaction – A politics of bargaining based on ‘relief mechanisms’ of influence and prestige\footnote{Habermas, (1987). \textit{The theory of communicative action II}. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Prestige and influence are relief mechanisms that emerge in the form of communication media, which either condense or replace mutual understanding in language. They are interdependent variables. Prestige enhances influence and influence enhances prestige, though they both analytically emerge from different sources. Prestige is based on personal attributes, and is reflected in qualities such as physical strength and attractiveness, technical-practical skills, intellectual abilities. Influence is based on the disposition over} began assuming blatant or more naked manifestation in politics. After disrupting the elections, the Governor called the two party leaders to State House, promising to mediate the matter by a possible coalition government. He later reneged on this plan by appointing Stevens as Prime Minister. Under the influence of the Freetown elite and their technical semantic legal orientation, the Governor was able to transform his ceremonial functions to substantive executive powers. This opened up the possibility of transforming social power to political power.

\footnote{Habermas, (1984). \textit{The theory of communicative action.} vol. I. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press: 289-293. We conceive perlocutions as a class of strategic interactions in which illocutions are employed as a means in teleological contexts of action…A teleologically acting speaker, nevertheless, has to achieve his illocutionary aim - that the hearer understand what is said and undertake the obligations connected with the offer contained in speech act – without betraying his perlocutionary aim. This proviso lends perlocutions the peculiarly asymmetrical character of concealed strategic actions. These are interactions in which at least one of the participants is acting strategically, while he deceives other participants regarding the fact that he is not satisfying the presuppositions under which illocutionary aims can normally be achieved.}
Notwithstanding this, the Governor can rightly appoint a Prime Minister only on the basis of voting results and in a parliamentary session as stipulated in the laws of Sierra Leone. Without statutory authorization, which should emerge from the expressed voting will of the electorates, the Governor’s appointment of Stevens as Prime Minister before the completion of elections was unconstitutional and anti-democratic (Kallon, 1994; Habermas, 1996: 173).

The priority of laws legitimated in democratic procedures has the cognitive meaning that the administration does not have its own access to the normative premises underlying decisions. In practical terms, this means that administrative power may not be used to intervene in, or substitute for processes of legislation and adjudication (Habermas, 1996, p.173). Had the Governor not disrupted the parliamentary elections, or had he subjected the matter to constitutional adjudication (legal discourse) – since at the constitutional level the matter clearly involved a controversy over constitutional interpretation - he would have provided enabling conditions. By violating the electoral laws of the Independent Constitution to appoint Stevens Prime Minister, the Governor subjected the legislative and adjudication processes to restricting conditions, disturbing the argumentation-guided processes of reaching understanding, which alone can ground the rational acceptability of laws and court decisions in a state juridified as a constitutional democracy (Habermas, 1996: 173).

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143 The 1967 Independent Constitution empowered the Governor General under section 58 (2) and 58 (8) of the Independence constitution of Sierra Leone to appoint a Prime Minister. Section 58 (2) of the Independence Constitution states that “whenever the Governor General has occasion [my emphasis] to appoint the Prime Minister he shall appoint a member of the house of representatives who appears to him likely to command the support of the majority of the members of the House.” Section 58(8) stipulates that the Governor General “shall not dismiss the Prime Minister unless it appears to him that the Prime Minister no longer commands the support of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives.” See S B Daramy, (1993). Constitutional Development in the Post-colonial state of Sierra Leone. 1961-1984, p. 72
The elite’s structural violence or public relations campaign, which followed the Governor’s disruption of elections aimed at justifying this disruption. This shows that the elite can merely displace the moral (discourse) principle, but not totally eliminate the need for this requisite post conventional (impartial) mode of justification. Chief justice C.O.E. Cole publicly endorsed the Governor General’s appointment of Stevens by arguing that he was *merely exercising his administrative function* under Sections 58 (2) and 58(8) of the constitution (Kallon, 2004; Daramy, 1993, Foray, 1988). To justify a legal decision or law merely by decision is to reduce law to the “special function of administrative law,” hence to miss the conceptual connection between law and the constitutional organization of the origin, acquisition and exercise of political power (Habermas, 1996: 50). This semantic approach to law misconstrues the internal or conceptual relationship between law and politics, which is reflected in the implications subjective rights have for objective law.\(^{144}\) By ignoring the election of paramount chiefs to appoint Stevens as Prime Minister, the Governor did not only violate the constitution, he also subverted democracy or popular sovereignty. He violated his constitutional obligation ‘to interpret the wishes of the elected House, to act according to them (Kallon, 2004: 98).’ Insofar as the decision had the effect of forcing a particular political

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\(^{144}\) Habermas, (1996). *Between Facts and Norms*. Boston. pp. 133-135. The rights to equal liberties take concrete shape as basic rights, which as positive law, are backed by the threat of sanctions that political power or executive authority must enforce against norm violations or opposing interests. To this extent, positive law or basic right presupposes the sanctioning power of an organization that possesses the legitimate means to ensure the observance of legal norms. A community can delimit itself in space and time as a geopolitical entity or legal community only if it possesses a central authority that can act on behalf of its members. The state must not only keep a force in reserve to back its commands, it must also have a protective capacity to preserve itself against external threat and internal disorder. Merely couching law in legal form does not legitimate the exercise of governmental power. Only the bond such power makes with legitimately enacted law can make it legitimate. In a post-traditional society such as Sierra Leone, where diverse cultural and historical constellations or groups exist, the only law that counts as legitimate is one that citizens can rationally accept as emerging through rational opinion and will formation.
outcome, it was not merely administrative, it was political. It was less about a misapplication or use of the Governor’s discretionary power, and more about the capacity of social power to *engineer chaos to produce* a particular political outcome, the bringing to power of APC and their supporters or surrogates.

In reaction to this unconstitutional subversion of popular sovereignty, the army commander, Brigadier David Lansana, intervened in the political process declaring Marshall Law, suspending the constitution. The opposition saw this move as proxy action, carried out at the behest of Sir Albert.145 Shortly after Brigadier David Lansana’s intervention, officers led by Brigadier Juxon Smith and other soldiers overthrew him and established the National Reformation Council (NRC), which set up the Dove Edwin Commission. The NRC mandated this Commission to inquire into the conduct of the 1967 General Elections with regards to issues such as “the compilation and operation of the voter register, the custody of ballot papers, the conduct of political parties and the result of the aforesaid General Elections.”146 Considering the intent and purposes of the mandate the NRC gave the Commission, the question of normative rightness and justification of the Governor’s decision was reduced to a peripheral status, simultaneously eliminating the need for constitutional adjudication (legal discourse), the right constitutionally stipulated course of action in the matter at stake.

The Dove Edwin Commission set up to deal with the question turned out to be a public relations campaign or symbolic politics designed to eliminate the possibility of a thorough legal discourse or constitutional adjudication as a stipulated constitutional state

145 See Thomas Cox, (1976). *Civil Military relations*. He argued that there was frantic tribalization of the army by Sir Albert, who gave most of the commission ranks to Mendes. Brigadier Lansana, the head of the army was an in-law of Sir Albert, the Prime Minister.
principle. This manipulation also has the effect of simultaneously redefining the problem-situation or reality. Its purpose seems like the manufacturing of legitimacy or citizens’ consent for the Governor’s action. The NRC did more with its Commission than mere public relations work, which the quasi (technical) legal proceedings of the Commission signify. A possible constitutional adjudication, which was displaced by this commission politics is democratically more appropriate in such a controversy over constitutional interpretation since the latter can enable the interpenetration of ordinary language and the scope for a wide variety of reasons to enter legal discourse. By selecting the route of commission politics in the matter, NRC betrayed insincerity in resolving the crisis to set the Country back on the right moral-practical course of evolution, to fully realize its constitutional democratic status. In the last analysis, the Dove Edwin Commission merely formalized the politics of bargaining and the status quo.

Despite their mandate of compiling and operating the voter register, discussing the custody of ballot papers, conducting political parties and considering the election result, the Dove Edwin Commissioners, like the chief Justice and the Governor General before them, tended to justify the Governor’s appointment of Siaka Stevens. In blatant disregard for the normative context of the Independent Constitution, the Commission interpreted the phrase “appear to the Governor likely to command a majority support” to mean an unchecked discretionary power of the Governor. They argued that the Governor could appoint whosoever he wishes, without adhering to the state of affairs or objective

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147 The merit of a legal discourse is the possibility or potential to allow for reasons to be couched in ordinary language, and for a wide range of reasons to enter this discourse. See Habermas, 1996, p. 230.
reality, the election results. They argued that the Governor was not “bound by figures” i.e. the election results, in appointing a Prime Minister. Like the chief justice, they believed the Governor was right in ignoring the election results of the paramount chiefs, as these results “would not have helped him [the Governor] in coming to his decision” because the Governor’s discretion could not be questioned (Daramy, 1993: 56-58).

Kallon’s (2004) reference to a similar abuse of gubernatorial discretion in Nigeria that was overturned by the courts did not focus much on the ulterior motive or possible intended effects the elite aimed to produce anomie so as to realize their will to power. The elite or surrogates of the opposition saw the taking over of power as an alternative of survival or self preservation over their obliteration by a possible SLPP dictatorship. This same reasoning underlay NRC’s choice of commission politics that fell short of rigorous legal discourse or constitutional adjudication. By favoring a commission characterized by deliberate arbitrary reasoning, NRC left little doubt as regards their agenda of taking power. The Commission merely echoed the Chief Justice’s opinion that endorsed the Governor’s action.

The *iteration*[^149] of elite technical legal defense by which they tried to manufacture truth, legitimacy and consent for the Governor’s decision is problematic. By adopting a common line of interpretation of the situation, APC and their surrogate jurists tried to make their questionable pervasive legal self-understanding the ‘legitimate’ worldview,

[^149]: For the postmodern concept of *iteration* in the production of truth see Nikolas Coupland, *Styles of discourse*, New York: Croom, p. 12. Iterating exemplifies a discourse style, which uses “the frequency of corresponding items in a contextually-related norm.” This deviant formulation of discourse parasitically uses structures of interaction to perpetuate a dominating worldview. The autopoeitic legal self-understanding demonstrated by members of the legal system – the commissioners, the chief justice, and legislators – illustrates the logic of iteration by which the ‘ought’ was reduced to the ‘is,’ legitimacy was reduced to legal facticity or positivity.
hence to give this interpretation *de facto* truth-validity (truthfulness, rightness, and truth). The only thing brutally true about the Governor’s action and those pretending legal opinion to justify it is the *Hobbesian face put on the archaic regressive Machiavellian* tactic. By blatantly disregarding constitutional norms (a Machiavellian logic), the elite were able to produce chaos and a power vacuum that favored their plans of setting up a bogus and arbitrary Commission, whose findings served to manufacture legitimacy or consent. The Commission constructed or produced a finding that did not fundamentally challenge the legality and democratic legitimacy of the Governor’s decision. Thus, the Commission was a public relations work to stabilize the status quo by failing to challenge the Governor’s action, hence producing a slanted political outcome that would, nevertheless, legally bind the society.

The Hobbesian logic emphasizes the obedience of laws over and against its validity, which determines the extent of the laws’ democratic emergence. For Hobbes, justice is simply obedience of the law: “the definition of justice is no other than the not Performance of Covenant (Hobbes, 1997: 100).” This approach to law exemplifies the basic core of colonial domination *a la* Hobbes, where obedience to the law irrespective of its rightness or legitimacy is simply conceived as justice. The strategic motivation behind the Commission’s blatant disregard for reason exposes their unreasonableness, unconstitutionality, bias and the unfair nature of their actions (Kallon, 2004). The opposition and their surrogates combined Machiavellian and Hobbesian strategies of deception and force to fragment societal consciousness, hence to create an unstable order that would enable them assert their will. The perpetrators of the anomie seemed well organized strategically unlike the incumbent. The latter’s belief that the legality of one
party amounts to its legitimacy betrays their indecisiveness as to the use of force to establish what its core nothing other than ‘forceful’ legal domination, the one party state.

We analyze the motivation behind the elite’s normatively regulated action, by asking the question: Why did the Commission, the NRC, and the chief Justice deliberately ignore the constitutional provisions for paramount chief elections? Why did the commission ignore the crucial evidence of arbitrariness of the Governor’s action? Hinga Norman revealed before the Commission’s Chairman, Justice Dove Edwin, was in fact among the “high-ranking judicial officers, the clergy and commercial people” “present at the material time” that paid the Governor a ‘social visit’ at State House to pressure him to appoint Stevens Prime Minister, but the NRC and their Commission ignored this crucial evidence. By ignoring this evidence, the NRC, the Commission and the chief justice betrayed their motivations as simply the will to power. These political calculations of the opposition and their surrogates show their determination to subvert or obliterate the incumbent. The Commission was, therefore, unconstitutional since it was subject to a conflict of interest, a political corruption that automatically compromised its proceedings or investigation. We answer the above question by evaluating the action of the elite according to the “direction of fit:”

In one direction, the question is whether the motives and actions of an agent [the elite] are in accord with existing norms or deviate from these. In the other direction the question is whether the existing norms themselves embody values that, in a particular problem situation, give expression to generalizable interest of those affected and thus deserve the assent of those to whom they are addressed. In

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150 In this mode of action, the “individual actor complies with (or violates) a norm when in a given situation the conditions are present to which the norm has application...complying with a norm means fulfilling a generalized expectation of behavior (Habermas, 1986, p. 85). In a way, these bureaucrats were expected to more or less orient their action to common values of constitutional democracy (Ibid, p.85).

the other case, actions are judged according to whether they are in accord with or deviate from an existing normative context, that is, whether or not they are right with respect to a normative context, recognized as legitimate. In the other case, norms are judged according to whether they can be justified, that is, whether they deserved to be recognized as legitimate (Habermas, 1984: 89).

While Kallon, Daramy and many others analyzed the Governor’s action, mainly with reference to the first direction, this study focuses on the second direction, which deals with the question of whether the election laws for paramount chiefs ‘deserved to be recognized as legitimate.’ Legally, resolving this second question on the legitimacy of the election for paramount chiefs, and therefore, the legitimacy of the Governor’s actions, should have been determined by constitutional adjudication or in a legal discourse. The matter was not even part of the substantive mandate the NRC gave the Commission. The task of determining the legitimacy of the Governor’s action was muffled and substituted by the public relations work of the Dove Edwin Commission and the chief justice.

Politically, the question of recognizing the electoral laws for paramount chiefs presented a serious threat to the will to power of the opposition and their surrogates since paramount chiefs traditionally supported the SLPP. The western area elite were traditional enemies of paramount chiefs, an institution that serve as a source of frustration for them during British colonization.152 Paramount chiefs, a mainly protectorate

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152 Edward Keane, (2002). *Beyond the anarchical society: Grotius, colonialism and order in world politics.* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. The imperial policy of colonialism gave privileged position to paramount chiefs in the colonial capital accumulation process. On the other hand, paramount chiefs were vehemently opposed by the Krios of the Colony of Freetown. They argued that the chiefs were illiterate members of the Protectorate who should not be allowed to be members of the same legislature as colony members, so that they do not use their majority to legislate for the Colony Krios. In a spirited dispatch to the secretary of State for the colonies, following a public meeting in Freetown in 1948, the Creoles disparaged the people of the Protectorate as foreigners. See Daramy (1993). Wyse (1990) similarly argued that paramount chiefs played a significant part in the indirect rule colonial system, and as such, were a thorn in the side of the educated western area elites, the Krios, who thought they would be heir to or succeed the British Raj. The Krios held a condescending attitude to the customary rulers, the paramount chiefs, and the SLPP, which often commanded their support. The APC/Krio alliance believed that it was their turn to take power.
institution competed with educated elites of the Colony for influence during the British colonial indirect rule system. By refusing to recognize the laws legitimating the institution of paramount chiefs, the APC and the Western area elite hindered any chance of SLPP regaining political power, and establishing a one-party dictatorship. The Governors action amounted to the refusal to recognize paramount chiefs as bona fide members of parliament. Doing so would bolster SLPP’s power base, and their chance of retaining power. Disrupting the parliamentary elections illustrates their determination to take power by any means necessary, even if this means blatant subversion of the constitution. Insofar as paramount chiefs remain valuable and effective for mediating local cultural matters and customary law, they have pragmatic, ethical-political validity, hence their existence as a reflection of the authentic will of the society.

The public relations campaign which the Dove Edwin Commission represents demonstrates the dialectic of morality (McCarthy, 1985: 36). After scuttling the elections, by hindering rational discursive opinion formation or the electoral campaigns for paramount chiefs, they had to compensate for this repression of dialogue. The public relations work of the Commission and the public pronouncements of Chief Justice Lightfoot Boston were compensations aimed at reconstituting structures of interaction as forms of understanding. While the NRC pretended to be shock at this crucial and damaging evidence, they nevertheless treated the evidence as immaterial. The NRC did not insist that Justice Dove Edwin resign from the Commission, nor did they altogether nullify the Commission’s findings on grounds of conflict of interests of its chairman.

In fact, by setting up a Commission that was not charged with addressing the core controversial issue - the legitimacy or moral rightness of the Governor’s action in
appointing Stevens - the NRC exemplified a legal self-understanding that detached law from its internal relations to morality,\(^\text{153}\) hence detaching constitutionalism from democracy. As demonstrated from the legal opinion volunteered by the Chief Justice, other jurists and elite supporting the Governor’s action, NRC’s *selective mandate* to the Commission deformed political discourse from the start to produce an unacceptable compromise on the *universal interest of just governance*.\(^\text{154}\) Bargain or compromise is unacceptable as a means for resolving conflict over such a shared or generalizable interest, the democratic transfer of power.\(^\text{155}\)

**Conclusion: The Failure of Moral Practical Learning as Rationality Crisis.** In concluding this section, we again consider the historical context to highlight the invisible forces that were influencing divisions and the quest of absolute power by different groups and major political actors in the immediate post independent politics of Sierra Leone. Britain’s ill-definition of the Governor General’s executive powers *vis à vis* the Prime Minister, and the lack of proper democratic orientation of the military could be seen as contributing factors to the difficulty of institutionalizing post conventional morality after 1961. The SLPP leader wanted to adopt a one party system of Government, which he could not justify in a free and open democratic debate. The Dove Edwin Commission, the NRC, and Siaka Steven’s emergence to power, all show authoritarian tendencies that blatantly subverted the principles of the constitutional state.


\(^{154}\) Albretch Wellmer cited in Bernstein, (1994). Introduction in *Habermas and Modernity*, p. 23. A compromise in bargaining is fair only when the matter does not have to do with universal or a shared interest; also see Habermas, J. *Legitimation crisis*.

The SLPP Prime Minister, Sir Albert’s, manipulation of parliamentary deliberation showed authoritarian tendencies that threatened a crisis of social integration or identity, as Siaka Stevens used it as pretext to threatened guerilla warfare. Stevens and the APC threat of civil war threatened the social integration or the “normatively fixed” identity of the society. This threat marked the opposition’s decision to not abide by constitutional norms. We see, therefore, how manipulative parliamentary constitutional and law making discourse almost immediately after political Independence threatened a crisis of social integration in Sierra Leone, a civil war. In these very first few years of Sierra Leone formally becoming a constitutional democracy, its politicians failed woefully to appropriate the basic post-conventional moral logic in political discourse, one they knew was commensurate and appropriate to resolve conflict in the new post traditional society, where constellation of different ideological, linguistic, political, and cultural groups constituted as a democratic constitutional state. This chapter demonstrates the direct relationship between colonizing – manipulative and dominating – modes of interaction and the threat to social disintegration.

In relation to the theoretical context, it is clear that the arguments of economic development and unity Sir Albert and SLPP posited as pre-politically (non-discursive) ‘justification’ for a one party law failed to resolve disagreement among political groups as valid reason to establish consensus or stability. The economic argument did not reflect a shared interest. Rather, what Stevens clearly demanded and utilized was the communicative medium, to deny participation and highlight the immoral conduct of the regime. By adopting a Marxist posture, he ensured that the form of interaction would from then on only assume systematic distortions and deformations of discourse, hence the
possibility of producing lawlessness or a situation conducive to Machiavellian politics of seizing power. Sir Albert’s could not “justify” or show why one party law constitute a “shared interest.” He had to back down later, a move that led to Steven’s growing strength and popularity as a Marxist revolutionary leader seeking a second “revolution” or independence from what they tagged a bourgeois SLPP state and Britain’s proxy.

The post conventional intuitive moral consciousness Steven exemplified in demanding valid reasons, reminded the SLPP that its proposed one party bill denies the private autonomy or entrenched subjective liberties such as the freedom of association, freedom of speech, and movement. Steven’s success had to do with a combination of deceptions that demonized SLPP as well as providing forum to display a revolutionary and moral image. In his confrontation with the SLPP, his demand for moral communicative action put him on a moral high ground. This shows that the only acceptable or legitimate morality in a post traditional society is the post conventional, rational dialogue, or communicative understanding. This chapter demonstrates that cultural reproduction through communication makes the pace of the society’s evolution; it is the only morality deemed unobjectionable or logically appropriate to resolve conflict in a democratic constitutional state or a post traditional society such as Sierra Leone.

With his grasp of absolute power, and his posture as a Marxist liberator, we turn to the question or possibility of the society’s evolution or moral practical development under Stevens’ dictatorship. The next chapter examines the connection or clash between the pursuit of economic efficiency or development and democratic development. In this Chapter, we see clearly that SLPP’s use of economic development argument did not support the argument that economic development is a valid basis to support the one party
regime pursuit. Stevens’ defense of private autonomy or subjective liberties, and exercise of his political autonomy by lending his voice to oppose the incumbent’s authoritarian one party plan, showed a post conventional intuition, albeit, momentarily. This attitude and posture motivated many to identify or see him as a critic, revolutionary, or populist.


Chapter 5
Between System and Social Integration: Politico-Legal Domination and Crisis Transposition to the Social Domain.

An economy organized in the form of markets is functionally intermeshed with a state that has a monopoly on power…it (shows) how it (the system) gains autonomy as a piece of norm-free sociality over against the lifeworld…Money makes possible not only deworlded forms of interaction [without reference to the objective (truth), normative (rightness) and subjective (sincerity) reality or worlds], but the formation of functionally specialized subsystem that articulates its relationships to the environment [the socio-cultural domain] through money…It conditions decisions for action on the basis of ‘demand and supply’ effective for coordination without recourse to the lifeworld …Power is assimilated to money (Habermas, 1991). Normative Content of Modernity In Philosophical Discourse of Modernity; Twelve Lectures. MIT Press, pp. 349-350).

5.0. Fusion of State and Market Interests. Chapter 4 illustrated an administrative (rationality) crisis in Sierra Leone following the failure of state actors to adopt the appropriate post-conventional moral principle in governance. Rather than institutionalize i.e. open up possibilities for the practice of communicative ethics and impartial justification in political discourse, political actors manifested conventional morality, one reflective of traditional authoritarian social organizing principle (i.e. power driven, dominating or manipulative). Mutual understanding eluded political actors because of their failure to impartially justify political orders in rational discourse. This persistent failure stifled the liberal political culture required to nurture democratic constitutionalism.

For the discussion here, the Marxist concept of social formation is considered a rough equivalent of the concept organizing principle of society. The latter, however, is not reduced to Marxist economic concept of the mode of production. See Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 1970.
This chapter further tracks the trajectory of the society’s evolution by illustrating how and why it became engulfed in an economic crisis. Here, we focus on the structural fusion of the authoritarian one party State and the market - Lebanese businessmen, national mining companies, and the multinational institutions (the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World Bank). The fusion of the State and the market interests led to the irresponsible exploitation of the society, and its colonial domination by imposing constraints on the public sphere. This created an economic crisis for the society, which in turn threatened a crisis of social integration or crisis of legitimation. This chapter continues the moral practical reconstruction of the society’s evolution. It explains how the structural fusion of the subsystems of state and the market (system integration) triggered social disintegration.

The study also investigates what seems like the contradictory logics of system integration – the tension between state privatization and market privatization. Functionally specialized for attaining collective goals via binding decisions or power, the state serves to complement the market by filling the ‘gaps’ of market dysfunctions, while preserving the primacy of private investment and the dynamics of capital accumulation. The state’s protection of the capital accumulation process tended to run counter to the principle of democracy, whose normative sense entails that system integration (state and market fusion) ‘find its limits in the integrity of the lifeworld,’ or the socio-cultural domain of communication (Habermas, 1970).

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On the other hand, capitalist growth dynamics can be preserved only if the mechanisms of the economic system are kept free as possible from lifeworld restrictions as well as from the demands of legitimation directed at the State (McCarthy, 1984: 162-163). In this ‘indissoluble tension’ between capitalism and democracy, a crisis results that has led to varied perspectives. We situate the discussions in this chapter in the tension within system (state and market) integration, on the one hand, and between system integration and social integration, on the other. This discussion tracks the transposition of the constitutional crisis potential (Chapter 4) into an economic crisis (Chapter 5) that later became transposed into the social domain (Chapter 6).

To explicate the clash between the requisite coordinating mechanisms of the society (communication action or post-conventional morality) and the subsystems of state and economy (power and money), we use arguments of Kimfe Abraham and Franz Fanon as points of entry. Abraham emphasizes the role of ordinary societal actors, while Fanon focused mainly on systemic actors or the elite in explaining Africa’s crisis–ridden situation. Abraham (1969) argues that the passive and unresponsive attitude of ordinary citizens in politics is responsible for the slow pace of positive change on the African continent. In this “attitude of apathy,” they simply sit back without engaging in civic affairs. Abraham concludes that Africa has become a continent without participation, where people do not use their voice to register their opinion. People prefer instead to use the “exit” option i.e. to withdraw from public affairs. According to Abraham, this

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negative state of affairs arises from citizens’ *unwillingness* to use their communicative competence or freedoms, rather than from external systemic constraints.

By failing to consider systemic repression and manipulation that stifles a liberal political culture of public opinion and will formation, Abraham’s argument lacks comprehensivity.\(^{161}\) In the case of Sierra Leone, citizens’ failure to exercise their communicative agency or competence arises from repression, rather than from the self-induced fatalism of citizens. Repression, *ipso facto*, denies civility in conflict resolution, leaving the society only one choice in the exercise of their agency: violent rebellion or revolutionary action (Chapter 6).

Fanon, on the other hand, situates the problem of Africa’s crisis and integration in the state’s failure to control economic power and its administrative machine. He observed that most African elite, who controlled the state immediately after Independence pushed for one party rule, the ‘dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.’ According to his conception of national culture, Fanon opposes this one party idea that presupposes cultural unity or a national culture that is static and mechanistic. For him, national culture must be the outcome of the internal and external tensions at various levels of the society (Fanon, 1963: 177).” To posit or more or less impose such a culture pre-politically within ‘the context of colonial domination,’ i.e. within the context of systematically deformed political discourse or socio-cultural domain (as shown in Chapter 4), is a ‘common mistake’ that is ‘hardly defensible.’ We have already seen how

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161 To be comprehensive, Abraham would have to consider how the facticity of power – dictatorial repression - in Africa depoliticizes the public, creating psychopathologies or apathy in the public. We consider this negative state of affairs – the repression and inaction of the public as socio-pathologies constituting the low political culture that has rigidified over time. For further elaboration of comprehensivity in analysis. See Habermas, J. (1974). Rationality Divided in Two In Antony Giddens (Ed.) *Positivism and Society*. pp. 195-223.
such an inconspicuous colonizing practice led to the constitutional crisis examined in chapter 4.

In a certain number of underdeveloped countries, the parliamentary game is faked from the beginning...the bourgeoisie choose the solution that seem to it the easiest, that of the single party....It [the bourgeoisie] does not yet have the quite conscience and calm that economic power and the control of the state machinery can give [my emphasis]. It does not create a state that reassures the ordinary citizen, but one that arouses its anxiety...The single party is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (Fanon, 1968: 227).

Fanon correctly argues that the elite of newly Independent African countries were insincere or ‘fake’ in their parliamentary dealings, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.

The only issue we have with Fanon’s brilliant argument, however, is his assumption that the national elite’s control of the state machinery and economic power will bring calm or stability to the society. Wright (1986), argues that this argument reflects a partisan tendency to lapse into a mystique of determinism, subsuming what will be, or what ought to be, into what actually is or the empirical reality. Such deterministic tendencies are common with Marxist predictions of the emergence of crisis from the contradictions of labor and capital. Wright’s argument that Fanon subsumes the ‘ought’ (normative reality) into the ‘is’ or the objective reality takes issue with the way Fanon engaged the practical dimension. African elite’s mere wrestling of control over the economy and the state does not necessarily translate into stable social order, one reflective of economic and political justice, egalitarianism, and autonomy.

The SLPP governance, and certainly the APC totalitarian regime that eventually assumed effective control of the State machinery and the economy, did not translate into unity and stability, quite conscience or calm. Siaka Stevens’ successful establishment of

the one party law, his personal control of the nation’s mineral resources and the entire economy did not translate into stability and calm in the society. After 1967, Stevens ‘effectively’ took absolute control of the State of Sierra Leone to establish a one party dictatorship. His APC party effectively controlled the state, and prevented the SLPP and other major political parties from nominating candidates for a series of by-elections in 1972 in their strongholds. In the 1973 general elections, APC prevented the SLPP from contesting a single seat (Cartwright, 1978: 83). In barely three years after becoming prime minister Stevens made Sierra Leone a *de facto* one party republic. He passed ‘the Albert republican bill, literally,’ and then promptly amended it to make himself executive President. What Sir Albert failed to do because of Stevens’ vehement opposition, the latter did with Machiavellian resolve. Stevens established a *de facto* one party State in Sierra Leone even before his 1978 referendum, by which he pretended to seek public assent for a totalitarian regime he had virtually established.

However, Stevens’ control of the state machinery did not produce calm for him or the society, as Fanon would expect. Fanon (1963), Daramy (1993), and Reno (1995) do not effectively explain why elite control of economic power and the state machinery do not necessarily lead to ‘quite conscience and calm.’ Like Fanon, Stevens favored a Marxist (second) revolution against what he termed the bourgeois SLPP party that assumed power at Independence. What resulted from his adoption of this Marxist revolutionary logic of politics was a communist-type totalitarian regime in Sierra Leone (Daramy, 1993), which failed to produce ‘quite conscience and calm’ for him or for the society (Collier, 1970; Reno, 1995; Kallon, 2004).
Far from reassuring ordinary citizens, the totalitarian privatization of economic power and the state machinery only arouse citizens’ anxiety and agitation. Since the emergence of democratic constitutionalism in 1789, the criterion of right and wrong no longer resides in the absolute power or command of the Prince or the State. Since that time, ‘conscience, moral authority rather than the power that rule as such is the source of law;’ ‘moral legitimacy is what makes a ruler,’ so that ‘obedience is paid not to power, which offers protection, but to a ruler who obeys the dictates of morality (Koselleck, 1988: 144-5).’ Reno (1995), who followed Carl Schmitt, the infamous legal theorist, believe that the State’s protective capacity or monopoly over the means of coercion can simply translate into its ‘worthiness of recognition’ or legitimacy (Habermas, 1992). The State’s power to command and control does not necessarily translate into the stability-guaranteeing legitimacy of the social order (Habermas, 1979):

Rationalization [in the instrumental or purposive rational sense] is not emancipation. The growth of productive forces and administrative efficiency does not itself lead to the replacement of institutions of force by an organization of social relations bound to communication free of domination. The ideals of technical mastery of history and the quasi-natural forces of social and political domination, as well as the means for their realization are different.

Instead of creating a “quite conscience and calm” for him and the society, Stevens’ totalitarian control of Sierra Leone produced extreme paranoia for him, and great anxiety for the society (Daramy, 1993). African elite’s wrestling control of the state and the economy do not necessarily lead to a higher quality of moral order. To be sure, Fanon (1963) does acknowledge this fact in his conception of a valid national culture as the

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outcome of rational intersubjective contestations (internal and external tensions). Detailed explication of these contradictions is not undertaken by Fanon. To do so, he would have had to systematically account for the interest or intentions of actions, and refer to a normative or social standard of legitimacy, which leads to these contradictions. The democratic legitimacy of the social order is what guarantees its stability (Habermas, 1979).

Abraham’s blame-the-victim argument that the apathy of ordinary citizens accounts for the failure of African societies to develop or advance does not also consider the moral democratic quality of the social order and political repression. The failure to realize the requisite moral practical level of intuition or consciousness in a post-traditional society such as Sierra Leone can help us understand the origins of crisis or instability in such society. The so-called African socialist dictatorships, like the one Stevens claimed to pursue in Sierra Leone created serious crisis in these societies. To understand why the African elite’s control over the social, political and economic domain of society does not necessarily translate into stability, this chapter explicates the tension between system integration and social integration. This tension emerges because the state elite uncoupled system integration from the socio-cultural domain of the lifeworld or communication.

This chapter investigates the following questions: Why did the fusion of money and power, or APC dictatorship and the market, occur? In his earlier challenges to

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165 In Habermas’ philosophy of history the systematic explication of action is possible only by clearly accounting for intentionality. This matter is not systematically taken up in the critical theoretic orientation of Fanon’s Praxis philosophy (or variant of Marxism), as the latter tends to impose roles or static view of those subjects affected by state action. Thus, the reaction or agency of subjects affected by state action is not effectively enter analysis in praxis philosophy. See Habermas, J. (1974). Between philosophy and
SLPP’s one party pursuit, Stevens exemplified a post-traditional consciousness in demanding that SLPP justify its one party quest with valid reasons rather than by simply positing a cultural unity and economic efficiency argument. Even Albert realized the need for mutual understanding in establishing the one party law by trying to use legal procedures to adopt it, albeit with the systematic deformations of discourse inevitable in the pursuit of what is essentially naked domination. In this chapter, we will examine why the requisite post-conventional moral consciousness could not be institutionalized i.e. made possible in practice in the neoliberal order under the APC.

Why did this state and market fusion or system integration fail to create stability? How successful was APC’s attempt to insulate or uncouple its governance from the demands of communicative justification or public reason? Was the system able to deform the public sphere and the civil society in Sierra Leone? Why is the illusion that the State can stand above the society dangerous? Why is it particularly important that we debunk such ideology in a democratic constitutional state such as Sierra Leone? Why does system integration tend to constrain the socio-cultural domain, a move that often serves to transpose crisis tendency from the system to the social domain? In a constitutional democracy such as Sierra Leone, there are legal stipulations of what is already true of the internal logic and history of hominization: the society rationalizes itself through communicative socialization, the basis of its cultural existence (McCarthy, 1985). As a system of rights, the Independent constitution of Sierra Leone specifically stipulates the right of discursive justification for political and social orders, hence creating the logical space or potential learning capacity for the society by which to
rationally resolve its moral-defined conflicts. In the latter society, which consists of different cultural, regional and linguistic groups organized into one nation state, only post-conventional moral approach is appropriate to resolve conflict and coordinate the society.

The chapter is divided into three sections. In section (5.1), we examine an elusive form of strategic action, *the dramaturgic mode of action*, a parasitic communicative technique systemic actors use to promote system integration through inconspicuous domination. This strategic mode of action, which proceeds by deceptive manipulation of perception, played a crucial role in establishing the neoliberal one party state in Sierra Leone. Section (5.2) shows why the one party state served as the precondition for establishing the neoliberal privatization of the economy. The fusion of money and power is born out of the interest in mutual self-preservation and survival of the state and the economy. This functionalist logic of system integration tends to reflect a particular interest - the privatization of political power and the privatization of the economy, which stifles the shared interest of society. By ignoring the shared interest of the society, system integration tends to create the conditions for establishing a deranged or corrupt principle of organizing the capitalist accumulation process. By neglecting the society’s interest, the State more or less became the enemy of the society. It had to depend on market institutions to ensure its successful governance, a process that simultaneously jeopardized its political sovereignty. Section (5.3) is a moral-practical reconstruction of colonization, crisis and evolution of the society in terms of the contradictory logics of
system integration and social integration. This concluding section connects crisis, divided sovereignty and social integration.

5.1-Dramaturgic Action and the Desolation of Structures of Interaction

Dramaturgic Action. In what follows, we examine how the functionalist reason of the system contradicts the logic of social integration, how the material reproduction of society tended to clash with the symbolic reproduction of society. Generally, the strategic approach of the system aims at getting its way, to enable it function successfully. This section focuses on the strategic action of dramaturgy, by which an actor presents a false image of himself. Dramaturgic action is one in which the actor makes false self presentation, which does not match his psychological world or truthful intentions. By adopting this mode of action, an actor deceives others with regards to his intention or psychological or subjective world. We examine how APC used the dramaturgic strategy to establish a dictatorship in Sierra Leone.

Steven’s dramaturgic mode of action proved elusive for his critics because this socially concealed mode of action is still poorly understood in the social sciences, and more so in society. Daramy (1993) explains the possible motivation of Stevens this

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166 Dramaturgical action refers to action by which an actor presents images or impressions of themselves that may not be sincere. See Habermas, (1984). Theory of communicative action vol.I, Cambridge, Mass. pp. 85-86; also Erving Goffman (1959), The Presentation of Everyday life. New York: Doubleday, defines this type of action as performance, the activity of an individual that occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular observers that aims at influencing these observers (p. 22).
168 It was first developed in the 1959 by Goffman. see Habermas, (1984). Theory of communicative action: Vol.I, Cambridge, Mass., p. 90. The dramaturgical action is a parasitic mode of action, in which social action is understood as an encounter in which participants form a visible public for each other and perform for one another. As strategic action, it rests on a goal-directed action fraught with stylistic features, filled with so much dramatic self expression that exemplary practitioners become famous and given special place in the organized fantasies of the society.
way: realizing the seriousness of his crime in instigating prominent citizens of Sierra Leone to pressurize the Governor-General to appoint him as Prime Minister prematurely in 1968, Stevens knew that only absolute control of power could save him. Every move of Stevens, his planned invasion of Sierra Leone between the late 1950’s and early 1960’s; his adoption of a fake radical Marxist ‘populism’; his pact with socialist Sekou Toure; his refusal to play by constitutional rules; his refusal to sign the Independence Bill and; his frequent boycott of parliamentary debates (participating only to embarrass the incumbent SLPP (Luke, 1984) - constitute elements or tactics in a grand strategy of deception aimed at fomenting instability and producing disorder. It is within such disorder, instability, lawlessness or anomie that the strategic mode of action finds its ultimate expression or realization of the goal of colonial domination (Pearce, 1982: 209).

In dramaturgic strategic action, an actor presents an image opposite of their true nature, intent or will that renders the enemy correspondingly unprepared, hence giving the dramaturgic actor the strategic advantage of surprise. It is like ‘guerilla’ warfare in parliamentary politics.

The peculiar deceptive and misleading nature of dramaturgic action that characterized the immediate post-Independent politics of Sierra Leone, accounts for the difficulty of most critics in understanding the politics of this period. To understand dramaturgic action by which actors deceive their audience or hearers to effectively conceal their intentions, “it would be advisable to select for this purpose a type of interaction that is not burdened with the asymmetries and provisos of perlocutions [intentional concealments]”: communicative action (Habermas, 1984: 294). By

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conceiving strategic action as deviation from or a derivative of illocutionary acts or communicative action, we better position ourselves to appropriately analyze this elusive strategic mode of action. This deviation is also a measurement of the reflexive learning capacity of the society or the moral practical intuitive consciousness it can make possible (institutionalize) at a given time.

As the paradigm case of modes of action, communicative action is beneficial to use as a standard against which to understand forms of human interaction, including dramaturgic strategic action. Habermas (1979: 8-14), argues that only a societal coordination through communicative action can lead to a morally unobjectionable outcome in a post-traditional society: “I have called the type of interaction in which all participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation – communicative action (p. 294).” Against the perspective of communicative action or rational discourse, this chapter explicates the dramaturgic action used by the APC and Siaka Stevens to establish a one party dictatorship. This approach enable us explicate how APC internally colonized the socio-cultural domain.

We start by outlining the basic or general characteristics of strategic action by isolating its four constitutive elements: a set of self interested actors; a system of rules; the end results of the game; and the strategies or alternative plans of action.170 Strategies

170 Habermas (1986) cites Ottfried Hoffe in Habermas, J. (1984). Theory of communicative action vol.I, pp. 89-91. Cambridge, Mass. Four features of strategic action are outlined: a) the players, who pursue their ends and act according to their deliberations and guiding principles; the rules that fix the variables that each player can control: information conditions, resources and other relevant aspects of the environment; b) the system of rules fix the type of game, the totality of behavior possibilities, and then the end, the gains or losses of every player; a change in the rules creates new game; c) The end results or payoffs is the utility or value correlated with the alternative results of plays (in chess: win, lose, draw; in politics: public prestige, power and money, for instance); d) the strategies, the encompassing, alternative possible plan of
are systems of instructions that determine in advance and globally, how one chooses a move from the set of rules allowed in the game situation. While certain strategies are favorable for one segment of a contest, others are not. New strategies have to be developed for other segments. Individual strategies may have sub-strategies in the overall grand strategy. In game theory, rationality refers not to the individual move chosen by an actor, but to the choice of strategies. As a maxim for decision, the basic pattern or logic of game theory is this: “one chooses a strategy which, in the framework of the rules of the game and in view of your opponents, promises to bring the greatest success.”

Every stage of the game of politics could require a different strategy. With this general outline of strategic action, we proceed to further explicate the specific use of dramaturgy, the deceptive self-presentation by Stevens.

Drawing on Goffman (19590, Habermas defines dramaturgic action as one in which an individual presents himself and his activity to his audience in ways by which he guides and controls the impression they form of him, and the kinds of things he may and may not do while sustaining his performance before them (Goffman cited in Habermas, 1984). In light of these basic features of strategic action derived from game theory and the specific deceptive component explicated in Goffman’s theory of self presentation, we analyze the dynamics of APC dramaturgy in the establishment of a one party totalitarian order in Sierra Leone (5.1), which served as the precondition for establishing a neoliberal economy as well (5.2).

171 Ibid.

Discussions in this subsection focuses on why Stevens was able to establish the one party state, which served as a precondition for establishing the neoliberal capitalist economy in Sierra Leone. Posing as the moral voice of the people while in the opposition, Stevens maligned the incumbent SLPP as a puppet of the British colonial regime, in which he ironically played a pivotal role as colonial Minister for Mines, Labor and Works. As former Minister holding these important portfolios, Stevens gained the prestige and influence\textsuperscript{172} that made citizens easily believe his allegation of a British-SLPP neocolonial plot. With his Marxist pretensions, he was able to build alliance with the Western area Marxist controlled labor movement, who were willing to gloss over his role in the brutal repression of the 1955 workers strike. The public could not sustain critical judgment of Stevens’ radical revolutionary posture because the newly Independent society was as yet unaccustomed to a liberal political culture of discursive opinion and will formation in a vibrant public sphere and civil society. Britain’s formal granting of Independence Constitution to Sierra Leone did not automatically bring with it a liberal political culture of public democratic contestation that is necessary as its complement.

Stevens’ initial challenge of Sir Albert’s one party reflected a post-conventional moral intuition and populist pretensions, it exemplified the \textit{dialectic of progress}.\textsuperscript{173} This dialectic manifests in the fact that, with the society’s acquisition of new problem solving abilities by a society comes the consciousness of new set of problems See Habermas, (1979).

\textsuperscript{172} Habermas, (1986). \textit{The theory of communicative action II}. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Prestige and influence are relief mechanisms, they are forms of communication media, which either condense or replace mutual understanding in language. They are interdependent variables: Prestige enhances influence and influence enhances prestige. Prestige is based on personal attributes, such as physical strength and attractiveness, technical-practical skills, and intellectual abilities. Influence is based on the disposition over resources, and its sources are property and knowledge.

\textsuperscript{173} The \textit{dialectic of progress} holds that that with every progress or acquisition of problem solving abilities by a society comes the consciousness of new set of problems See Habermas, (1979).
capacities (such as the acquisition of an Independent constitution that stipulates rational discourse to resolve moral conflicts), the new problem of impartially resolving political orders in a modern society emerges or becomes obvious. Initially, the APC leader (Stevens) demonstrated a post-traditional consciousness by demanding communicative understanding or agreement on the one party matter. Unlike the period of gradualism, political actors under the Independent Constitution of Sierra Leone are supposed to resolve differences on matters of law and the constitution in rational political discourse. Members of the society could now legally demand the right to interrogate or discursively scrutinize the governing party’s policies or orders. The APC questioned the SLPP one party route to unity and economic development. The latter’s failure to open possibilities for rational discourse on the issue armed the opposition with the justification for a Marxist revolutionary response, a plan to invade Sierra Leone. Within this growing radical tendency of the opposition, the SLPP, which more or less represented paramountcy, was demonized as a reactionary Bourgeoisie or neocolonial elite to be eliminated.

Claiming knowledge of the inner workings of the SLST diamond network as former SLPP Mines, Lands and Works Minister, Stevens refused to sign the Independence Bill in Britain. He argued that it contained a clause that allowed Britain to maintain a naval base in Sierra Leone (Daramy, 1993: 5), which he argues subverts Sierra Leone’s Independence. This gave him the further moral ammunition to allege SLPP neocolonial collaboration with British colonialism. As the British Navy was leaving the shores of Sierra Leone under his pressure, Stevens was simultaneously orchestrating a
plan to invade the Country. In the absence of British military presence in Sierra Leone, his plan to takeover power by force became easy. Only in retrospect could those involved at the time understand the ulterior motive behind Stevens’ insistence that the British Naval fleet be removed from Sierra Leone. His aim to takeover power by force was concealed by his deception and misrepresentation of himself. His posture as a moral populist, professing deep knowledge of his alleged neocolonial SLPP/British collusion; his assumption of a radical Marxist populist defending the objective universal interest of the society, are aspects of dramaturgic action.

As former Minister for Mines, Works and Labor, Stevens’ supposed inner circle knowledge of the British colonial capitalist accumulation process went unquestioned. His position in the former colonial inner circle – or the collusion of external and internal elite gave him influence. “Influence feeds on the resources of mutual understanding, but it is based on advancing trusts in beliefs that are not currently tested (Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, 1996: 363).” Influence can assume the form of a media that facilitates interactions in virtue of conviction and persuasion so that the one having such reputation can influence others’ beliefs without having to demonstrate authority or give explanation in the situation. In a society still unaccustomed to democratic will and opinion formation, APC and their surrogates increased their chances of converting social power (influence and prestige) to political power. Steven’s deceptive presentation of himself as radical populist defending the society against a neocolonial elite exemplifies dramaturgic action.

While the SLPP failed to adopt one party through the parliamentary constitutional process, APC was able to make Sierra Leone *a de facto* one party state by 1978, even before introducing the Bill in parliament and subjecting the issue to a plebiscite. APC
was so effective in its use of “government powers of coercion” that they could deny SLPP the chance to nominate candidates in their strongholds in 1972, and in 1973, virtually obliterating them (Cartwright, 1978: 83). Had SLPP deciphered the APC approach as brutally Machiavellian, whose leader would immorally adopt the exact same republican one party bill of Sir Albert he had initially vehemently opposed, SLPP could have possibly adopted a similar logic of politics as war. Stevens’ actions as enforcer of the British colonial authorities as shown in the 1955 workers strike exposed him as an opportunist and dramaturgical actor par excellence.174

Below, we explicate the difference between Sir Albert and Stevens, both of whom were operating in a strategic mode, to show why Stevens was successful in his strategic pursuit. Differences between the two leaders reflect their Machiavellian and Hobbesian strategic approaches to law. Both approaches represent degeneration of structures of interaction in the legal system, from rigidification (Chapter 4) to the stage of desolation (examined in this Chapter). The instrumental oriented success or failure of these leaders in achieving their goal had to do with the manner they related to law. Cartwright (1978) shows APC’s exclusive operation within this logic of strategic action (Machiavellian effectiveness) to obliterate the SLPP, which still believed in using legal procedures to legitimize naked domination or the one party law, even before administering a fake referendum pretending to seek citizens’ consent.

Stevens’ deception made Daramy (1993) to argue that he was one of most shameless and diabolical Machiavellians in the history of politics. He used the support of

174 Considering the fact that the type of legal training the colonial regime encouraged in the newly Independent African countries was empty of moral principles (Anthony Allot and Manji), Stevens short diploma course at Ruskin College, Oxford (See Daramy 1993), could have possibly enabled him learn the
Sekou Toure, who saw the politics of decolonization as a politics of war against the French and reactionary forces in Guinea,\textsuperscript{175} to reconstruct his image from that of former enforcer of the British colonial administration. He broke away from Sekou Toure once he realized he no longer needed Guinean body guards, after effectively asserting monopoly on political power and creating his own private army in Sierra Leone. By marrying a Krio, Stevens was able to gain the support of this ethnic group that was seriously concerned about their future position in post Independence Sierra Leone. He contested in the Freetown West II constituency, a typical Krio riding. Stevens’ success in gaining influence and support in Freetown, the Capital city, reflected an aspect of his Machiavellian strategy:\textsuperscript{176}

On the narrow basis of the city-state Machiavelli could still disregard the organization of the society and concentrate his attention exclusively on the technique of maintaining and acquiring power. A state of war, universal and in principle irremovable, is recognized from now on as the fundamental presupposition of politics. The state is a state in the fullest sense under the conditions of conflicts. Politics is the art, practiced internally as well as externally, of the permanent strategies for asserting one’s own power, an art that can be studied and learned.\textsuperscript{177}

Even today, the control of the capital city in Africa is often a critical determinant of who loses or controls power in the state.\textsuperscript{178} With the threat of invasion, carried out by proxy...
infiltration of the national army and his control of the Capital city population, Stevens increased his chances of later controlling the whole country. With the immediate support of the Western area population and elite, and the external support of radical Sekou Toure, Steven and his APC party could refuse to play by the rules, even vandalizing SLPP rallies in Freetown (Cox, 1976). APC counted on Krio support in the Capital and the sit of government to make politics war. As war, politics becomes a condition of chaos or anomie, where actors can disregard the institutional normative framework or the legal constitution of society with impunity.

While Albert deluded himself that he can use the normative framework of the constitution to establish one party dictatorship, Stevens operated in Machiavellian oblivion of the legal constitution of the society. In the Machiavellian approach, ‘political action is absolved from traditional and moral bonds,’ to view all humans as ‘fickle, hypocritical, cowardly and selfish’ (Habermas, 1973: 55). Stevens’ adoption of this sixteenth century logic of politics constitutes extreme regression in the organizing principle of the society, even by comparison to the British colonial regime of the 1950s, which showed a modicum of respect for law. Rather than consider the newly Independent State a constitutional democracy, Stevens’ Machiavellian approach reflected a traditional organizing principle by which he concentrated in himself the collectivity’s capacity, professing to act on behalf of society as a whole (Habermas, 1987: 171). Under this principle, other depoliticized functions relevant to the whole of society are

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stagnation. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, pp. 74 -5. Notwithstanding the weak numerical strength of the labor movement, the political impact of workers strikes in Africa’s Capital cities for instance is disproportionate to the relatively small number of workers involved. As these workers are concentrated in the urban seats of power, they have catalytic effect on disaffected urban poor, who are likely to swell their ranks during disturbances.

distributed among different non-governmental subsystems, while the State controls the administration, military, and judiciary through binding decisions (p. 171). This regressive traditional organizing principle is exemplified in Stevens’ privatization of political power or the state. William Reno (1995) explained this phenomenon with his concept of the *shadow state*. Under Stevens’ privatization of power, he formulated edicts and decrees that were perceived ‘legitimate’ simply by claiming that they were in the interest of the society, and were legally coded.

On the other hand, the lawyer Sir Albert deluded himself that parliamentary procedures to one party dictatorship would make such pursuit legitimate, hence reducing legitimacy to legality. In trying to bring about a one party order, he used the Hobbesian strategy. Here, the power of the sovereign to bear the sword is justified in order to eliminate the *state of nature* (the war of all against all), to pacify and to neutralize political struggle and rationalize (in the instrumental sense) the organization of society. Hobbes was the first to ‘study the laws of social life’ in order to scientifically regulate the affairs of men. Sir Albert’s operation in the Hobbesian logic meant he would have to respect law or legality, unlike the Machiavellian, Siaka Stevens.

One operating in a Machiavellian logic conceives society on the model of physics or nature, which social or political actors can technically manipulate or master to *produce* a totalitarian order. In Chapter 4, we saw APC and their surrogates’ blatant disregard for the normative framework (the constitutional organization of the society), disrupting the 1967 paramount chief elections. The chaos or lawlessness they created culminated in the

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180 See William Reno (1995). *Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone* for his description of the shadow state network, a corrupt ‘government’ network consisting of state officials and their business proxy partners, which constitute the privatization of the political economy.
imposition of Stevens as Prime Minister that later led to the preconditions for establishing the totalitarian one party State. APC used a Machiavellian strategy to illegally disrupt every possibility of SLPP assuming sovereign power, a basic precondition for applying the Hobbesian strategy. Hobbes operates from the basis of contract, “the instrument that obligates the state to perform its dual task of legally using monopoly power to ensure peace for common welfare (Habermas, 1974: 62 - 63).” Without the chance to first attain monopoly on power or the means of legitimate domination, which Sir Albert hoped for through the 1963 elections, he could not successfully apply the Hobbesian strategy.

This study further explicates Stevens’s Machiavellian strategy in light of the theory of games and self-presentation. He established or produced a *de facto* one party state that reduced the SLPP to a ghost of its former self through deceptive self presentation. In his rendition of Machiavelli, Pareto argues that political actors can use intellectual theories as charade or cover for their mere instincts.\(^{181}\) To gain the support of the Krio control labor movement, Sekou Toure, and even Fidel Castro, Stevens began to assume the position of a Marxist socialist. With this Marxist socialist posture, he found his ‘intellectual justification’ or rather pretext for a Marxist ‘revolution’ that aims at brutally exterminating the opposition, to clear the way for a dictatorship.

Using this Marxist socialist perspective, Stevens effected his moral indictment of the SLPP as proxy for the colonial capitalist exploitation, as a Bourgeois comprador state (Gunder Frank, Amin, Shanin), or as conveyor belt (Leys, O’Connor,) for the former British colonial master. He justified his strategy of eliminating the SLPP by drawing on Marxism, which is fundamentally suspicious of a State deemed Bourgeois:

Due to the emancipation of private property from the commonwealth, the state gained a separate existence beside and external to bourgeois society; it is nothing else than the form of organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily accord themselves, externally as well as internally, for the mutual guarantee of their property and their interest.\footnote{Karl Marx cited in Habermas, (1974). Natural Law and Revolution In Theory and practice, Boston: Beacon, p. 110.}

As soon as Stevens could tout this Marxist line that the interest of the SLPP regime - he being a key party member, leaving the party only a few years after Independence - was no longer identical with the interests of citizens, Steven manufactured ‘justification’ to revolt against the incumbent. From this so called Marxist revolutionary position, APC justified their disregard for the normative framework of society or the rules of constitutional democracy (Cox, 1970: 36). Using this so called ‘populist’ position, the APC discredited the SLPP Bourgeois state as self serving, with interest opposite to citizens. By constructing the image of the SLPP as self-interested and as proxy for colonial Britain, the APC justified the need for a second ‘Marxist’ revolution.\footnote{Ibid, Habermas, Theory and practice, p. 112. The APC used Marxist ideas in formulating their populist strategy and opposition to the SLPP. Marx interpreted the Paris revolt of June 25, 1848, as an indication of such a proletarian revolution and compared it with the outbreak of the February revolution of the same year in terms of the formula: “After June revolution means: the overthrow of bourgeois society, while prior to February it meant: the overthrow of the [monarchical] political form of the state. Stevens and the APC and SLPP had worked prior to 1961 to overthrow the colonial political form of government, but now the APC posited new reasons and case to mobilize the masses to justify a revolution that will overthrow what they demonized as the SLPP bourgeois state.}

But such Marxist ‘justice extracted dialectically from natural history,’ represents abstract thought rather than concrete comprehension of absolute truth (Habermas, 1974: 112-3).”

To be sure, the SLPP leader was working along similar lines as Nkrumah, to eliminate the neocolonial designs of the former British colonial power through the constitutional strategy of republicanism.\footnote{The Troure/ Stevens radical violent revolutionary approach, and Sir Albert/Nkrumah approach legalistic –civil revolution were variants of Marxism. Nkrumah like Albert wanted a one party democracy} This revolutionary variant of Marxism...
constitutes a critique of the bourgeois constitutional state and a sociological resolution on the basis of natural rights that went far beyond Hegel to discredit so enduringly for Marxism the idea of legality itself (Habermas, 1974: 113). In principle, Stevens’ Marxist orientation also means he would potentially disregard the ethical category, the system of rights or the constitution, which is founded on the guarantee of fundamental rights that can legitimize the exercise of political authority, the use of force, and distribution of power. Habermas (1974) argues that in the framework of Marxism

Political revolution dissolves bourgeois life into its component parts without revolutionizing these parts themselves and subjecting them to critique. This revolution is related to the bourgeois society, to the world of needs, of labor, of private interests and private law, as the basis of existence, as to a precondition which requires no further justification (my emphasis) – therefore as to its natural basis (Habermas, (1974). Natural Law and Revolution In Theory and Practice. Boston. p. 111).

By adopting the revolutionary Marxist brand of struggle, the APC was able to mask its ulterior goal of establishing a totalitarian state as a project of political emancipation of the society from the bourgeois SLPP. Once armed with the Marxist ideological hammer, the incumbent became a Bourgeois nail. In this interpretation APC found the ‘justification’ or cover to ignore the constitution with impunity.

Revolutionary Marxist tenet turns critically against the central presupposition of the natural law tradition, which fails to separate human rights (fundamental rights prior to the state) from citizens’ rights (those conferred by the State) (Habermas, 1974: 112). By operating in this orientation, APC could claim to liberate or free citizens, while denying them democratic equality to decide the ethical political question of which government or society they want. This disregard for basic rights justified by a Marxist liberal

construction of natural law becomes a convenient tool for those espousing Stevens’ strategic Machiavellian logic or will to power. APC used Marxist ideology as their pretext or fake intellectual justification for their Machiavellian overthrow of SLPP, to produce a dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie or a one party state. By taking a Marxist revolutionary posture in politics, the APC and Stevens could contravene the constitutional circulation of power in the society, with impunity, and deny Sierra Leoneans their right of democratic equality, even as they claim to liberate them from an alleged SLPP neocolonial plot.

Notwithstanding this, the APC strategic game of faking revolutionary Marxism, hence professing to aim at egalitarianism, was not totally lost to the SLPP leader. According to Cox (1976), Albert’s strategic response to rumors of APC invasion was to ‘mendelize’ the army i.e. recruit increasing members of the Mende linguistic group in the commissioned ranks of the army. The decisive reason for Sir Albert’s failure lies in his strategic miscalculation and psychological crisis or self-delusion that he can justify the one party system merely through legal decisions arising from parliamentary procedures.

The fundamental misconception of decisionistic legal theory – which is itself subject to the suspicion of ideology – is that the validity of legal norms [or policies or orders] can be grounded on decisions and only decisions. But the naïve validity claims of norms refer (in each case) at least implicitly to the possibility of discursive foundation. This normative validity is based on the supposition that norms could, if necessary, be justified and defended against critique (Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation Crisis, Boston. p. 101). The ideological self deception of the decisionistic legal paradigm informing Sir Albert’s approach caused his failure to grasp the moral and revolutionary civil war already

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incipient in his quest. His retraction from the one party quest was too late, betraying his failure to properly read the ‘the pulse of the nation (Foray, 1988).’

In addition to Foray’s (1988) correct analysis, the complex strategic game of Stevens, which involves his Marxist posturing as representative of the society’s will and interest provided ideological cover for his naked ambition to grab power, hence the public and external support he initially gained. Marxist revolutions claim to pursue the universal interest of society – it considers the interest of the proletariat as the universal class, hence it’s interest as reflective of the universal interest (the proletariat). By adopting radical Marxism, APC justified the elimination of SLPP on the false claim that the latter was bourgeois proxy for Britain. From the perspective of discourse theory, Stevens’ success was due to his deceptive self-presentation, his dramaturgic action. By faking involvement in parliamentary talks, Stevens caused the SLPP to misread his parasitic involvement in parliamentary debates to mean the opposition was operating in the paradigm of communication. To the extent that APC could successfully fake moral conscience as a party interested in parliamentary debates, the exact nature and implication of their revolutionary strategy (their politics as war approach) remained effectively concealed, eluding the SLPP. “Even the strategic model of action can be understood in such a way that participant’s actions, directed through egocentric calculations of utility and coordinated through interest positions, are mediated through

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186 Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto.
187 Fashule Luke (1984). Labor and Parastatal Politics. showed that before they took power, the APC and Siaka Stevens participated in parliamentary debates parasitically, to embarrass the Incumbent SLPP or use these debates as forum or public relations work to discredit and incense the public against the SLPP. Stevens refused to sign the Independence Bill, yet continued to sit in parliament. His presence and action were dramaturgical. The parasitic use of language entails the use of deception as regards a speaker’s truthful intentions. The speaker uses illocutionary act i.e. give reasons for his claims, only to cover up his actual intentions. See Uwe Steinhoff, (2009). The Philosophy of Jurgen Habermas: A Critical
SLPP’s commitment to constitutionalism made them vulnerable to APC Machiavellian deception and politics as war. They misread APC’s intentions and strategy of revolutionary politics, causing their obliteration for almost three decades. The weakening of SLPP through APC’s systematic distortions of discourse or manipulation (structural violence) paved the way for the latter to assume monopoly on political power (physical violence).  

Characteristic of dramaturgic strategic action is Stevens’ fake subscription to the Hobbesian framework or minimal respect for law. In his typical dramaturgic self presentation, he reintroduced the exact same SLPP One Party Bill in parliament, the one he had opposed only a few years earlier, and which he had used as pretext to threaten invasion:

We have maintained parliamentary democracy with an official opposition. We have even increased the emoluments of the leader of the opposition. Even though the performance of his duties has shown no corresponding increase... This does not mean that we have not been following with interest the many advantages gained by our sister states (my emphasis) who have adopted a One Party System of Government. We have already provoked public discussion of this issue (Daramy, 1993: 22).

From this statement, we see that the moral intuition of Stevens has shifted into dramatic regress. He no longer discussed the one party issue in terms of constitutionally entrenched rights, or exemplified a post-traditional moral consciousness as he did when...
he was in the opposition. The post conventional morality, which Stevens demanded constitutes the requisite moral approach for Sierra Leone. This process involves the use of the *principle of appropriateness* to gauge the real, concrete, and immediate effect in the ‘here and the now’ of adopting one party law on Sierra Leone. Instead Stevens at this time now ‘justified the application of one party law on the basis of the political cultural value preferences of neighboring states.'

Having made Sierra Leone a *de facto* one party State at this time (Cartwright, 1977), Siaka Stevens now turned to parliament, creating the impression of seeking the accent of the people to authorize his one party law, one he had virtually already established *de facto*. It seems this deceptive presentation of the one party bill was aimed at manipulating his image in the international and sub-regional mass media and political powers, who were closely watching the evolving totalitarian State in Sierra Leone. He seems to be *manufacturing consent by necessary illusions* (Herman and Chomsky, 1988), and to be ‘manufacturing’ legitimacy (Allaha, 1991) by brute force for his *de facto* one party dictatorship. From the perspective of game theory, this strategy of pretending to seek the accent of the people for a *de facto* one party order he had already virtually established, aims at colonizing future risk to his dictatorship.

With monopoly over the means of coercion, the APC could structure talks on the one party law without considering principles of *universalization and appropriateness* as required by the constitution of Sierra Leone (see chapter 4, section 4.1). Stevens at this time

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190 See Fanon, F. (1963) *Wretched of the earth.* pp.153-4. He condemned such comparison, regional cultural sameness logic, or uniformity presupposed in Stevens’ argument for one party: “The only common denomination between the Black from Chicago and the Nigerians or Tanganyikans was that they defined themselves in relation to the Whites. But once the initial comparison had been made and subjective feelings had settled down, the Black Americans realized that the objective problems were fundamentally different…culture is first and foremost national.”
time simply tried to ‘justify’ the one party idea by arguing that other newly independent nation-states in the sub-region were anticipating or experimenting with the idea. The negative situation or concrete effects the one party law will have on citizens and other parties were ignored. By using the reality and interest of other states in the sub-region in one party as basis to justify its adoption in Sierra Leone, Stevens shifted the problem situation of the one party discourse in space and time. This spatio-temporal displacement or shift of the reference point beyond Sierra Leone to neighboring countries serves to connect parliamentary will formation to “interactions in space and time into more and more complex networks that no one has to comprehend or be responsible for (Habermas, 1987: 184).” Insofar as justification of the one party order was now simply based on foreign situations and preferences, the problem was displaced to a distant ‘situation,’ making Stevens’ claim to provoke discussions on the matter bogus and irresponsible.

“The situation – a segment of lifeworld context of relevance thrown into relief by themes and articulated through goals and plans of action – is concentrically ordered and become increasingly anonymous and diffused as the spatio-temporal and social distance grows (Habermas, 1987: 123).” Stevens’ ‘justification’ of the one party law was now partly based on the political cultural preferences of neighboring states uncouples the political debate from the socio-cultural domain of communication – hence internally colonizing political discourse.

Under APC dictatorship, political discourse for justifying one party was impossible because the subjects were denied their private as well as political autonomy. In the absence of scope for rational discourse, no one can challenge Stevens’ pretense to provoke public discussion as false, since under his dictatorship, brute force constitutes the
form of understanding, rather than communicative action. According to Daramy (1993),
under the scary specter of his Cuban trained private forces and Guinean bodyguards,
Stevens contravened the Electoral Provisions Act No. 14 of the 1962 constitution to rig
the 1978 referendum to launch the one-party republican Constitution. With the one party
law, Stevens officially eliminated other parties, ‘legalizing’ a totalitarian one party State
in Sierra Leone. Thus, as the bonding force of communicative action wanes in private
life and the embers of communicate freedom fades out, tyrants find it easier to
monopolize control of the public sphere, to align the mutually dissociated, estranged and
isolated actors into a mass that they can direct and mobilize in a plebiscitarian manner.191

According to Reno (1995), Kallon (2004), and Daramy (1993), Stevens met with
stiff public moral condemnation for adopting the exact same one party bill of Sir Albert.
He faced a declining popularity even among his own party because of the shameless way
he adopted the exact same SLPP one party republican bill he had vehemently opposed
only a few years earlier. With this increasing condemnation and public opposition,
Stevens’ paranoia intensified. He tended to be suspicious of anyone making the slightest
criticism of him, perceiving any negative comment by a politician as threat on his life.192
By its very form, the logic that “all human beings are ungrateful, fickle, hypocritical,
cowardly and selfish (Machiavelli, 1952),” can only create deep mistrust. Can someone
who operates by deception and brute force expect trust and honesty from others?

As Sir Albert lost mass support for toying with the one party idea, Stevens felt
real danger to his life for adopting it. Africa Confidential claimed that Stevens’ problem

that the totalitarian state and the public sphere or the social spaces are mutually exclusive.
192 When the governor general, Sir Banja Tejansie, opposed the Prime Minster, Siaka Stevens’ one
became less his opponents and more, the members of his own party. His paranoia seemed to increase especially after a series of coups were aborted with the help of Guinean bodyguards that formed his security detail (Reno, 1995; Cartwright, 1977; Cox, 1976). Being the Machiavellian he is, Stevens realized that a power taken by force can be maintained only by force. Stevens actively embarked on the task of building a private loyal army trained by Cubans and the Chinese – the Special Security Division (SSD), and the Internal Security Unit (ISU). With these forces, which were better armed than the national army, Stevens tried to ensure his personal security and survival (Kallon, 2004; Reno, 1995; Daramy, 1993).

According to Amnesty International, by 1976 Sierra Leone had 500 political prisoners, the majority of whom were never formerly indicted, making Sierra Leone a laughing stock in international circles. From 1968 to 1976, APC carried out six treason trials, executing Paramount Chiefs, Brigadier John Bangura, who trained the APC guerrillas; Brigadier David Lansana, who intervened after Steven’s was appointed Prime Minister; Dr. Mohammed Fornah, the APC physician of the Guerrilla Army and Finance Minister; Ibrahim Taqi, his Minister of Information and Broadcasting, known as the architect of SLPP’s ‘overthrow;’ Colonel Farrar Jawara, Major Korlu Gbonda and others. Treason, which is the most heinous crime on the statute books, “was prostituted to satiate the sadistic motives” of Siaka Stevens (Daramy, 1993: 119). In party quest as a violation of the Constitution, he saw it as a threat on his life. Banja Tejansie. (April, 1984). West Africa.

193 Stevens had to execute many of his staunch supporters that help bring him to power because they opposed his one party move. Daramy, (1993). Constitutional development of Sierra Leone.


moral practical terms, this approach of force in the coordination of society constitutes the *desolation* of vital political cultural traditions and constitutional state principles.

When the Supreme Court (initially partly constituted by foreign nationals) freed political prisoners Stevens had accused of treason, because the APC government failed to properly indict them, the government responded by decreeing Public Emergency Regulations Order, re-arresting them. This is an example of the use of legality to strategically deploy power. Stevens’ rationale for this decree was that: “it is necessary to make an order directing that the said persons be detained in order to prevent such persons acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety.”\(^{196}\) By evoking the State’s duty to protect the public, Stevens’ action had the effect of building up and arming the constitutional state to become a *security state*.\(^{197}\) By governing according to the preemptive logic of risk aversion, the APC created a security state, which transformed the boundary conditions of constitutional freedoms to produce so many security risks that they can deal with by considerably expanding the surveillance apparatus. This political approach that threatens constitutional values is exclusively designed for survival. Stevens used it to eliminate, subdue, or force into exile those he considered his potential enemies. As a security state, Sierra Leone was more or less constructed as a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992), which * uno acto* enable Stevens to ‘justify’ his discretionary or ‘extra’ judicial powers to deny basic rights and freedoms in the name of security or public safety. Shifting the accent of the legal system from the certainty of law to security modifies and dissolves individual legal protection (Habermas, 1996: 433). The pretext of

\(^{196}\) Ibid, p. 134-5.  
surmounting potentially risky events and elements constructs the society as a category of risk that must be colonized in the present and in the future.

To be sure, this ideological construction of political opponents as a category of risk implies the need for preemptive risk averting strategy that nullifies the possibility of the requisite post-conventional morality or rational public discourse, hence such act is a regression in evolutionary learning or development when compared to the immediate past, British colonialism.\(^{198}\) This preemptive politics of risk aversion represents a critical moment in the evolutionary trajectory of Sierra Leone, as it represented APC’s attempt to solidify its technical mastery of the society. This agenda was cogently reflected in the change of its motto, from “APC: Now or Never” to “APC: Live for Forever.”

To prevent further embarrassment to his schemes of legally entrapping opposition members, Stevens orchestrated a plan to absolutely control the judicial service commission by giving himself the power to “dismiss or exercise disciplinary control” over members of the Commission.\(^{199}\) This action destroyed the constitutional state principle of separation of powers. Since then, he could now sack paramount chiefs, his traditional enemies, if “after a public enquiry conducted under the chairmanship of a judge of the High Court or a Justice of Appeal,” which he appointed and therefore controlled - he “the President is of the opinion that it is in the public interest that the Paramount Chief should be removed.”\(^{200}\)

His control of the judicial service commission

\(^{198}\) Albert Memmi (2006). in *Decolonization and the colonized* argued that colonization after the Europeans in the Third World has become even more retrogressive.  
\(^{199}\) By taking away the power to remove members of the Judicial Service Commission from the Commission itself, President Stevens dismantled the principles of separation of powers, and the Independence of the Judiciary. By usurping this power, Siaka Stevens made himself the lawgiver, the law enforcer or executive and the law interpreter in Sierra Leone.  
\(^{200}\) The power to remove paramount chiefs was also usurped by President Stevens by amending section 44 of the Independence constitution. *Ibid, Daramy, 1993, p. 166*
enabled Stevens further his plan of absolute control over state and society, already manifesting in his quest to establish a private loyal army and police force, which came to be known as the Special Security Division (tagged Siaka Stevens Dogs), and the Internal Security Unit (ISU). With his security apparatus and control of the judiciary, he could suppress every political opposition and protests, and force his logic on the society, hence privatizing the State. Stevens’ governance of Sierra Leone according to his whims and caprices caused Dr. John Akar, his US Ambassador to resign, expressing his alarm this way: “Our leader has gone Communist, dictatorial.”

Contrary to Fanon, Stevens’ control of the state machinery did not lead to quite conscience and calm. His brutal subjugation of opponents, his abuse of the Constitution and basic rights made him many enemies, which intensified his personal experience of extreme paranoia. He expelled tens of thousands of Ghanaian fishermen, who have for years supplied Sierra Leone with cheap fish (Daramy, 1993). He feared that they were on Sierra Leone beaches to facilitate an invasion plan to restore Sir Albert to power. This is a natural reaction for one with a litany of abuse of power. Arendt (1973) argues that someone like Stevens, who pretends to be a genius, holding opinions and presenting them with unshakable faith, would not necessarily lose his credibility even if he is proven wrong many times. Members of the newly Independent society lack the requisite moral practical consciousness to nurture democratic constitutionalism. As they were unaccustomed to public contestation and communicative freedoms, they could not critique or challenge Stevens’ ideological posturing, though they could definitely feel the hurt and betrayal of his deceptive politics. According to Arendt, a person continuing in

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such irrational conduct would begin to manifest a psychological crisis (‘a crackpot’). Stevens became very paranoid, always suspicious of possible reprisals for his false treason accusations and executions (Daramy, 1993). He considers anyone with the slightest difference of opinion as an enemy plotting to kill him; he saw himself as potential target of revenge.

Only a socio-pathological communication, where people do not believe what they say or say what they do not believe was possible, since under the APC dictatorship all right to criticize the state was driven underground. Not only was institutionalizing (making practically possible) the post-conventional moral intuition or consciousness in the society was blocked by the APC dictatorship, Stevens political conduct represented a regression below the conventional (traditional) authoritarian moral level of consciousness. We see in Stevens’ dictatorship the abuse of conscience and irrationality intrinsic to the privatization of political power. By repressing a vibrant public sphere and a liberal political culture, and by his ideological manipulation of public consciousness through Marxist revolutionary propaganda, Stevens rendered subjects incapable of challenging his dictatorship. The denial of citizens’ capacity for critical agency or scope to exercise their communicative competence or freedoms accounts for their lack of discerning judgment. Discontents could not articulate their private experiences in public or in the social space, hence only allowed to manifest their opposition as pathological communication i.e. in symbolic politics, deception and self-deception in the civil society and in the public sphere. For a time, it seems the resulting civil and familial privatisms\(^\text{203}\) of societal members had successfully sealed APC’s technical mastery of the society.

\(^{203}\) Under the brutal dictatorship, citizens’ tended to adopt these privatisms, which refer to political
Notwithstanding this, the toll and pressure of immorally acquiring power impacted the psychological world of Stevens as increasing paranoia. Paranoia arises from a moral feeling and self evaluation that translates into fear, which stems from violating one’s conscience. His blatant disregard for law and morality rendered Stevens’ own socialization or self formative process dysfunctional, becoming a psychological victim of his own Machiavellian cunning. It became increasingly clear to him that to overcome his paranoia, he would have to consolidate absolute control over the society he had betrayed. He faked a revolutionary posture to ‘manufacture’ consent for his anti-democratic tactics, which enabled him to eventually seize and privatize political power.

In Stevens, we see one who actualizes the Machiavellian logic, to never forget the desire for revenge for those he had betrayed and ruined in his quest for power, hence his continuous restlessness in using force to maintain the institutions he had established by force and intrigues.

Stevens’ need for funds to create a powerful loyal army to protect him mainly used him to the neoliberal deals, whilst he needed to host the OAU summit to ‘manufacture’ his regional credibility or legitimacy (Francis, 2001). Stevens had to approach the only financial institution that could provide him the level of funds. It was not economic development considerations, but his quest for political and physical abstinence combined with the orientation to career, leisure, consumption and family. See McCarthy, T. (1984). The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. MIT Press, p. 369.

S B Daramy, (1993). Constitutional Development. He believed Stevens began suffering from “margaiphobia,” his fear that Sir Albert was always planning an external invasion to take power by force and intrigues as he did. For further discussion of the connection between violations of moral action norms and psychological crisis, see Habermas, (1997). Genealogy of Morals In Inclusion of the other: Studies in Political Theory. MIT Press.

survival that informed his decision to approach the IMF/Bank for funds (Reno, 1995). His dictatorial politics would enable him pursue and establish the neoliberal privatization of the economy, which these lending institutions would demand of Sierra Leone in exchange.

5.2. System Integration and the Emergence of Economic Crisis. We explicate the connection or fusion between the state and market this way: to maintain its dictatorship, the APC needed funds that economic institutions, firms and businessmen were in position to provide. Since the APC regime could no longer depend on the national army. The project of building a loyal private army required new sources of funds. The multilateral institutions, on the other hand, needed the State to secure for them a ‘viable investment environment’ to realize their interest of gaining access to the resources of the Country. The three main agents of the economic system of Sierra Leone were the Lebanese businessmen, joint mining ventures or companies, and multinational institutions (the IMF and the World Bank). The fusion of state and market interests is a regression in the evolution of modern society takes this form: “The economy steered by money depends on being functional supplemented by an administrative system differentiated out via the medium of power. Thus, formally organized domains of action are able to absorb communicative contexts of life through both media –money and power (Habermas, 1987: 342).” To secure the ‘appropriate’ - meaning depoliticized - investment environment for the market, the state must impose strict control on the socio-cultural domain. APC

needed a loyal army as repressive tool, and so embarked on dubious covert or overt means to build a security apparatus to meet his need for self-preservation.

In 1970, Stevens was implicated in a highway robbery style theft of State diamonds by Henneh Shamel, a Lebanese diamond businessman (Daramy, 1993; 111; Reno, 1995). However, his security forces allowed Henneh to escape before the State could bring him to trial. At the start of the 1970s, Stevens and the APC were still trying to consolidate their *de facto* one party establishment under the cover of their populist rhetoric. Their corrupt designs could have been exposed had the State brought Henneh Shamel to trial. It became clear that such a strategy to amass funds for a party still trying to consolidate its power beyond the Capital was risky.

To amass the kind of wealth necessary to maintain a dictatorship, the APC began systematically colluding with mining companies, the Lebanese, and local loyal party stalwarts. By dealing with these economic agents primarily with the objective of siphoning wealth into its private coffers, Stevens and the APC government failed to honor the avowed promise to conduct the national mining policy to ensure “the exploration and exploitation of the Country’s mineral regime in such a way as to maximize the *long term benefit* to the Country.” Contrary to Smillie *et al* (1991), Cleave showed that in all areas of mining, not just diamonds, the government performed very irresponsibly and unaccountably. Joint ventures such as Sierra Rutile, (titanium), Diminco (diamond), and Sieromco (bauxite) mining companies enjoyed excessive retention facilities, which “constitute the major sources of foreign exchange leakages in

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the economy,” since the mining companies were the most important foreign exchange earners (Cleave, 1988: 75). In relaxing export orders on the companies, the government discouraged them to surrender export proceeds for official record purposes. Despite the exchange control order of 1972, only a third of remittances reached the Central Bank.

In 1981, Sieromco requested an increase in the retention of funds to 58% for 1982 and 1983, and 51.5% thereafter (Foreign Department, Bank of Sierra Leone, 1985; Cleave, 1988: 77). From 1984 to 1985, the State granted the company permission to retain 43% of its export proceeds to purchase spear parts duty free. As regards Diminco, the National Diamond Mining Company, the government approved the retention of its accounts unofficially, “according to its chief accountant (Cleave p. 80).” The Finance Minister granted Diminco 33% retention facility to offset $5.5 million bridging loans from Biblos Bank in Lebanon and from first Phoenician Bank, also of Lebanon. The government gave Sierra Rutile a blank cheque to hold and transfer funds abroad to meet the company’s foreign exchange requirement. Between 1986 and 1992, the Company retained $70.4 million abroad (Cleave p. 83). Between 3% and 4% of their remittances of exports were used to extent loans to the government. These unaccounted-for funds and undeclared tax breaks were more or less paid to APC coffers. Unofficially, these funds “were used to entertain top government officials visiting the Capital and also to ‘grant loans’ to government (Cleave p. 81).”

The Lebanese Banks in which Stevens’ and his Lebanese allies had ‘good connection’ were part of a network that benefited Stevens, his Lebanese counterparts, and

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207 Bank of Sierra Leone, Foreign Department cited in Cleave, 1988, p. 81.
his favored politicians. Stevens’ personal interests also extended to state property. After building the National Presidential lodge (Kabasa Lodge), he sold it to the government, who later gave it back to him as a gift (Reno, 1995). These gift-giving practices and irresponsible retention facilities accorded mining companies were the corrupt means Stevens used to unofficially transfer funds to his personal coffers, and consolidate his privatization of the State.

APC colluding with mining companies and some dubious Lebanese businessmen reflected an aberrant strategy of system integration, where the money and power media enabled both the firms and the State to mutually bolster each other at the detriment of citizens’ wellbeing and autonomy. With these funds, the dictator Siaka Stevens could fund his repressive private army as joint venture mining firms increased their profit, hence a win/win situation for the state and the market subsystems. His rule quickly resembled British colonialism, with the only difference being that the former was characterized by intensified and irresponsible super-exploitation (neocolonialism).

This functionalist logic of system integration runs counter to the logic of the lifeworld, which reproduces itself not only through work or the external nature of production, but through interaction or social relations among individuals capable of communication (McCarthy, 1984: 34). Problems of morality arise solely in the latter domain, in the symbolic reproduction of the society. The blatant corruption or collusion of the State with companies represents a covert and dense network of subsystem interactions that unfolds without direct normative steering (Habermas, 1987: 181). In

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such conditions of operation a growing need for coordination arises, which the State tries to meet by using relief mechanisms of prestige or influence to reduce the expenditure of communication and risk of disagreement. Prestige or influence causes readiness to believe or blind faith (p. 181). By virtue of their powerful base of intellectuals, multilateral institutions of the IMF and the World Bank command the influence and prestige to enable the corrupt State address the growing need to coordinate the society, and meet the challenges of steering the economy, and preserving the state (personified in Stevens.)

The technical skills and intellectual capacity of the IMF and World Bank experts (prestige) and their ownership of capital to lend (influence) made ordinary citizens to initially readily trust the multilateral institutions and their neoliberal ideology of development. Citizens’ readiness to accept the multilateral institutions over the more blatant and corrupt colluding practices of the State and the mining companies was due to the formers’ influence and prestige. The neoliberal institutions were more ‘sophisticated’ or technically more powerful in ensuring system preservation than the more crude dealings between the APC and the joint mining ventures or dubious Lebanese network.

Although, state and market fusion under the neoliberal arrangements was more formalized than the crude corrupt practices between companies and the State, they both tended to the same goal and logic: to maintain willful blindness to the economic misery of the society, and ensure continuous blatant exploitation.\(^{210}\) The legal formality or


technical approach of the IMF/World Bank did not translate into increased standard of living or economic advancement of the society. The technically advanced capacity of the Twins concealed colonial exploitation. Repressing questions of ethics regarding the austerity measures associated with the expert neoliberal prescriptions for economic development constitutes colonial domination by way of inconspicuous ideological manipulation.\textsuperscript{211} The goal and effects of the IMF/Bank arrangements seem no different from the colluding corrupt practices between the state and the mining companies or the Lebanese businessmen. While the latter has Stevens’ Machiavellian imprint of primitive disregard for law, the neoliberal approach of exploitation reflected Hobbesian contractualism.\textsuperscript{212} In the last analysis, both economic strategies served to siphon away the Nation’s wealth.

Contrary to the reality, the IMF and World Bank were supposedly designed to assist Developing countries stabilize their economies in today’s financially turbulent world.\textsuperscript{213} Colonial agenda of the institutions became evident when they started stringing devastating socio-economic conditionality to loans barely six months after their inauguration at New Hampshire.\textsuperscript{214} The socially devastating structural adjustment conditionality associated with the neoliberal arrangements posed questions about the sincerity of the neoliberal deal and the theory informing it.


\textsuperscript{212} Machiavelli views politics as a power holder’s potential to calculate and deploy power from a strategic point of view or in a purposive rational manner. Hobbes, on the other hand, operates with the rule structure of contractual relationships, but only to give the sovereign a \textit{de facto} power of command to defeat every other will on earth. The legal contract enabled the IMF/Bank to bind the State and society to its imperatives. Like the Hobbesian state, the multilateral institutions were able to bind the society to their will or purposes due to contract. See Habermas (1996). \textit{Between Facts and Norms}. p. 138.


\textsuperscript{214} Jamie Swift, (1991). The Debt Crisis In Swift and Tomlinson (Eds.) \textit{Conflict of Interests: Canada}}
The next subsection examines the fusion of state market interaction as a tension between competing and overlapping organizing principles of society, the traditional authoritarian and the corrupt liberal *lassez faire* capitalist one. Here, this study analyzes the dramaturgic mode of action or deceptive self-presentation of the neoliberal multilateral institutions as evident in their interaction with the state in Sierra Leone.

### 5.3. Indissoluble Tension between Democracy and Capitalism: Neoliberalism

Up until the 1970’s, mining had been providing dynamism for the economy, but the declining yield of diamond and the constriction of the iron ore market sent the Country into recession, hence a severe balance of payment deficit (Weekes, 1992: 29). This is the official reason APC gave for approaching the IMF/Bank arrangements. Starting in 1967, Sierra Leone had five agreements with the IMF, beginning with a three-tier arrangement, in which the IMF imposed conditionality (Weekes, p. 29). After a small borrowing agreement in 1977, the IMF concluded a three tier program in 1981, 1983, and 1986 with the State, but unilaterally cancelled the program after the first tranche (p. 30) because Stevens was unwilling to operate according to their dictates. Given his manipulative ways, he would have preferred a less formal or legal contract approach like that with mining companies. Of the total of $260 million the IMF promised, only $60 million was disbursed, because of the lack of Stevens’ full cooperation. Yet, the government operated under the constraints imposed or dictated by the multilateral institutions.

Despite the legal formalization and so called transparency of the neoliberal arrangements, the economic arguments and prescriptions of the multinational institutions...
did not sit well with economists at the Central Bank of Sierra Leone, who became the *de facto* opposition to deal (Cleave, 1988; Weekes, 1992). Stevens’ fear of public knowledge of his immorality and deception caused him to drive underground his corrupt arrangements. As the Central Bank becoming increasingly opposed to the IMF/Bank prescriptions, it was hardly surprising that the Central Bank Governor, Sam Bangura, was mysteriously assassinated around this same time (Kallon, 2004; Reno, 1995; Daramy, 1993).

In typical deceptive self presentation, the IMF/Bank began by lauding the government’s kerosene policy in the 1980s. They endorsed this policy of poverty by encouraging the government to import and refine crude oil to get kerosene for household use, rather than develop the Bumbuna hydroelectric project.215 This project, which was already under construction, could supply the whole Country and even export electricity to neighboring countries. The World Bank praised the government’s kerosine policy, claiming that it mitigated inequalities (World Bank Report, 1981, p. VII; Weekes, 1992). During this initial period, the Bank gave blanket approval to whatever economic policy the State adopted, irrespective of its long term economic rationality.

By early 1980s, the World Bank’s tone and strategy began to change, from negotiation to command and ultimatums. In terms of the logic of game theory, the Bank’s strategy of shifting position now manifested in its direct attack on state subsidies as “ad hoc” and “counterproductive,” referring to the Sierra Leone economy as a “victim of serious mismanagement,” and insisted that the State reduce spending in real terms

215 The Bumbuna hydroelectric project, started over thirty years ago is now close to completion. Ghananian technical support has been secured to help run the plant, which has faced technical operational problems. See www.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?newpk
(Weekes, 1992: 36). It demanded that the government cut public expenditure and eliminate subsidies as condition for lending the 1985 loans. Arguing that the government was causing market distortions, the Bank recommended that the State curtail drastically its market interventions (Weekes, p. 36). The Sierra Leone government behaved more like an administrative machine of implementing the directives of the market rather than pursuing the interests of its citizens. This new dynamics of governance, by which the State had to implement Bank/IMF dictates re-institutionalize the colonial policy of divided sovereignty in Sierra Leone. Divided sovereignty is ‘a form of decentralized system of colonial governance’ or semi-sovereignty (Keene, 2002: 69). The IMF/Bank governed economically; while the State governed politically (but only minimally).

By 1985, the Bank’s tone had become even more directly adversarial, moving from a more friendly tone as in 1981 to more overt demand for foreign control of the economy. They argue that comparing Sierra Leone to most mineral economies in Africa: “there is less foreign domination of the sector.” This is contrary to its approach in its 1981 Report, where they argued that less foreign ownership was a good thing (Weekes, 1992). In its expenditure review of 1985, the Bank counseled the government that the attraction of Sierra Leone for foreign investors, especially in gold mining, should be improved, and that too much regulation was self-defeating (World Bank Report, 1985a, p. XI; Weekes, 1992). From the perspective of dramaturgic action, these shifts in the position of the multilateral institutions represent their instrumental selection of strategies appropriate to given stages in institutionalizing neoliberalism in Sierra Leone.

In 1986, under intense IMF pressure, the government devalued the national currency (the Leone), with the World Bank concluding that the Sierra Leone economy
was sick due to the State’s mismanagement (Weekes, p. 37). By 1989, the World Bank required what it called a “clean float” as conditionality for lending to the government (Weekes, p. 108). The Leone’s devaluation actually had the negative effect of depressing domestic urban market prices. This made the Central Bank of Sierra Leone even more skeptical of the advice of the institutions. The Central Bank continually pointed out that, combined with liberalizations of the foreign exchange, the huge devaluation of the Leone after 1982 would result in massive capital outflows. In fact, this neoliberal policy resulted in legalized capital flight and speculation on the national currency (Weekes, 1992).

Weekes questioned the scientific rationality of IMF advice by asking: “why a Country would be suffering from chronic balance of payment pressure when the trade balance was improving (Weekes, 1992: 112)?”

If experts from the same organization could reverse themselves in a few short years, one could not be confident that the multilateral policy advice in the 1990’s will be the same as in the mid 1980’s. It is open to question whether government should be held culpable by the Bank for pursuing policies endorsed by the Bank itself (Weekes, 1992). Development strategy and the economy of Sierra Leone.

In questioning the ‘scientific’ basis or truth of the World Bank/IMF prescriptions, Weekes was expressing a suspicion of their ideological manipulation.

Weekes’ thoughtful conclusion, however, did not capture the reality comprehensively, because he blamed the multilateral institutions exclusively. If the State was willing to take orders from these Institutions at the opposition of its own national Central Bank, then the State was culpable. This state conduct constitutes the image of a neocolonial agent. If the latter’s legitimacy is not determined by the World Bank but

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by its citizens, at whose behest it claimed to enter into the loan contracts in the first place, then could we declare the State innocent? If the State was so innocent, why did it conduct the deals in “secrecy” or deformed discourses of the deals right from the start? Concluding the neoliberal arrangements and talks in “virtual secrecy” means the World Bank and the State could not publicly justify their deals, as they do not reflect the shared interests of Sierra Leoneans.

The Jasper Report of ILO (International Labor Organization) attributes the failure of the neoliberal agenda in Sierra Leone to the “unduly limited” democratic participation of citizens in the arrangements. From the perspective of the society, the reform programs could have been successful if their design ensured the participation of various socio-economic groups in Sierra Leone (ILO/Jasper Report, p. XVI cited in Weekes, 1992). Impediments to democratic debate caused the failure of the policies, since the perspective of citizens, which only could provide the rationalizing orientation and normative reasons for state policies were missing (Habermas, 1996). Widespread poverty and distress caused by the policies led to protests and tensions (Kallon, 2004; Reno, 1995).

The response of the World Bank and the IMF was to point finger at the State, its partner in the secret deals. If the World Bank and the IMF were so innocent, why did they conduct the deals in secrecy? By pointing finger at the State, they were suggesting that discontents of the neoliberal order should hold the State culpable. IMF/Bank’s finger pointing at the State serves not only to incite citizens’ against the State. It also exemplifies the strategic game of misrepresentation by which they try to secure for themselves the image of honest and legitimate business ventures. Their finger pointing serves to “conceal as well as legitimate the very distortions” they help constitute through
their misleading prescriptions, deceptive self presentations and secrecy. By blaming the State exclusively, IMF/Bank attempted to detract public consciousness of their culpability in providing funds to the irresponsible dictatorial State, the precondition for ensuring the neoliberal economic privatization or exploitation of the society.

Of course, this blame game strategy of the multilateral institutions counts on the basic logic of constitutional democracy i.e. only political orders require legitimation, and not economic agents (Habermas, 1979). “Politics must see to it that the social conditions for public and private autonomy or rights are met. Otherwise an essential condition for the legitimacy of democracy is endangered.” Even though we can trace persistent class conflicts – riots, labor strikes, and radical student protests in Sierra Leone (Reno, 1995) to the “fundamental contradiction” between wage labor and capital as spin offs of IMF/Bank structural adjustment policies, these processes of reification need not appear only in the sphere of social labor in which they were caused (Habermas, 1996: 342). Personal life experiences of reification in the private domain can be transferred to the public domain, where they can be publicly voiced to gain more visibility (p. 365). Thus, the denial of the public sphere or social space to articulate the negative impacts of neoliberal order means the actions of economic agents could not be thematized and critically examined, hence the concealment of economic crisis already affecting the society.

The State’s inability to steer the economy in the interest of society had to do partly with the misleading advice of the IMF and World Bank, and also because of its

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primary goal or focus on survival. By consciously ignoring the advice of its own Central Bank to apply prescriptions that were deliberately designed to mislead (Weekes, 1992), the State helped to create the economic crisis. The institutions’ directives to dictates that the State float the Leone turned out to be the most important case of macroeconomic mismanagement in Sierra Leone (Weekes, 1992: 108). For these institutions to then turn around and blame the State exclusively for the failure of their policy prescriptions betrays a game theoretic approach, where another tool or strategy was now applied to fragment the society’s consciousness about who to blame for the world Bank dictates - this is structural violence. By this misleading presentation of the situation, the Institutions tried to detract from the fact that their funds bolstered the repressive State, and enabled it implement misery inducing policies. Without a repressive state, APC would have found it difficult if not impossible to implement and maintain the neoliberal arrangements. A truly democratic condition of a vibrant public sphere and rational deliberative parliament and extreme neoliberal privatization of the economy are mutually exclusive. Thus, APC’s initial domination of the society through the proxy infiltration of the army (a disguised coup) was now maintained by full fledge neoliberal privatization of the state and the economy.

Without understanding their capitalist profit motivation, the colonizing tendencies of the institutions cannot enter public consciousness. The funds provided by these institutions help eliminate the public sphere, making it impossible to expose the neoliberal ideology. The violence (physical and structural) directed at citizens help conceal their role in externally conditioning the society: “The diffused perspectives of the local culture cannot be sufficiently coordinated [due to systemic repression and
elimination of a vibrant public sphere] to permit the play of the metropolis and the world market to be grasped from the periphery.”

Without the social space or public sphere where citizens can communicate or articulate their experiences (their critical agency), they can neither gain the advantage of greater sensitivity in detecting and identifying new problem situations, nor catalyze the growth of critically conscious social movements (Habermas, 1996: 381). Thus, contrary to Kimfe Abraham, it is repression that hindered citizens’ capacity for communicative competence (agency) and rendered them fatalistic, rather than their voluntary unwillingness to act as agents of change.

The expert economic language of the arrangements made it impossible for ordinary citizens to understand this neoclassical technical economic rationality, whose implementation was causing them misery. This technicization of economic development put the matter above the comprehension of ordinary citizens, who become effectively dispossessed of the power to exercise control over their lives. The neoliberal regime constitutes a technocratic consciousness that serves the ideological function of providing de facto legitimation for APC domination of the society. Citizens’ incapacity to comprehend the technical economic arrangement created a blind readiness to trust them, so that the society was ready to bear this clearly unethical situation for sometime. In addition to the repression and the apathy it induced, the incomprehensibility of the expert economic arrangements made ordinary citizens more ready to accept their present miserable condition for a future or promise of economic benefits trickling down.

The technocratic consciousness associated with the technical economic reason constitutes ideology, of which the neoliberal agenda is suspect, served to repress ethics as

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a category of life.

The ideological nucleus of this [technocratic] consciousness is the elimination of the distinction between the practical and the technical ...The new ideology consequently violates an interest grounded in one of two fundamental conditions of our cultural existence: in language, or more precisely, in the form of socialization and individuation determined by communication in ordinary language. This interest extends to the maintenance of intersubjectivity of mutual understanding as well as to the creation of communication without domination. Technocratic consciousness makes this interest disappear behind the interest in the expansion of the power of technical control (Habermas, J. (1971). Technology and Science as Ideology In Towards a Rational Society. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 112-3).

This financial-intellectual complex, 220 where expert research, legal contracts and funding converge to define economic governance, veils practical problems of misery as necessary austerity measures that will translate in the future to economic utopia. The neoliberal expert arrangement that displaced the society’s welfare to the future is an ideology that serves to justify a particular class interest in domination [APC totalitarian domination], while repressing another class’ partial need for emancipation, hence citizens’ incapacity to participate in deciding how their society should economically organize itself.

Despite the sophistication and technicization of the economic arrangement, the logic of their project remained the same – to legitimize or make acceptable the inequitable distribution of Sierra Leone’s wealth, a process of colonial domination that cannot admit of rational discourse or public reason in the society. Fanon (1963: 180) believes that the ‘most urgent thing today for the African intellectual [such as Stevens] is the building of his nation.’ State officials can prove such a goal is their intention [my

II, MIT Press., p. 355

emphasis] when their policies or orders expresses the manifest will of the people, and when it reflects the restlessness of citizens (their questioning or problematizing of state policies or orders), and then necessarily lead to the *discovery and advancement* of universalizing values. Premised on the denial of ethical-political and moral discourses in the society, the neoliberal order cannot reflect the authentic and autonomous will of citizens or society’s shared interest. The deals on the contrary reflected the particular interests of mutual self-preservation of the system (state and capitalist economy). The concluding section explicates the internal connection between colonization and crisis from a moral practical perspective.

In concluding this chapter, we highlight the new form of the divided sovereignty like that inscribed in the Independent constitution that pitted the executive powers of the Prime Minister against the Governor General’s powers. Under the neoliberal arrangement, the market (IMF/and the World Bank) prescribed economic policy, while the State implemented them because of the neoliberal legal contract. Economic and political governance was divided between the firms and the State. Under this arrangement, the State became more responsible to the institutions than to its citizens, failing to pursue social integration – education and health infrastructures, economic wellbeing, and human rights protection. The neoliberal arrangement deformed the socio-cultural domain of communication in the public sphere and ignored citizens’ economic wellbeing simply because of the ‘justice of the legal contract,’ which in Hobbesian contractual terms simply means the obedience of a law i.e. the neoliberal contract (Habermas, 1974).
Under the neoliberal arrangement, the goals of system integration or the survival imperative of the system (state and market) became incompatible with the democratic logic of social integration, hence intensified Hobbesian state of nature (of all against all). The Hobbesian type argument underlying the deal implies the claim that by entering the neoliberal legal contract the state can ensure an organized and egalitarian pursuit of economic development. This proved to be false as the system (state and economy) no longer cared for the society or the misery their policy was causing citizens. The state and the society became estranged, intensifying the state of nature as they both existed in a ‘mutual opacity,’ as the state conducted its exchange relations exclusively in the media of power and money that the citizens cannot relate to.

The emergence of economic crisis in the society remained unchallenged because of state repression, hence the latter’s attempt to manufacture legitimacy for itself. At this point, the mass of citizens had to withdraw their loyalty from the state. A condition that forced the state to undertake piecemeal public relations campaign under the guise of quasi legal discourses, the *squandagate* and *vouchergate*, anti-corruption tribunals (Reno, 1995). These so called state anti-corruption commissions exemplified the dialectic of morality. With them the state attempted to compensate, reconstitute or manufacture mutual understanding with the society to ensure the stability of the neoliberal regime. This aberrant ‘discursive’ form of understanding had to fail as the state could neither genuinely investigate corruption without implicating itself, nor be selective in the ‘investigations’ without losing the credibility they intended to manufacture through the commissions of inquiry. As these public relations campaigns cannot provide value they
merely accelerated the economic crisis, transposing the crisis potential into the domain of society, as identity crisis or crisis of social integration.

In terms of the theory of social evolution, the state’s attempt to pursue system integration in opposition to the socio-cultural domain or social integration disrupted state economic institutions such as the Central Bank, whose functional significance declined under the APC regime. The aberrant form of system integration, the fusion of state market interests, propelled the society forward into a crisis of social integration. The state’s economic logic of self preservation clashed with the social integrative logic of the society, democracy. In the last analysis, even the legitimacy of system integration would have to respect social integration, the legitimation of law and social welfare concerns of the society. The clash of economic efficiency and democratic will formation led the society to demand and prepare to fight the state for these denied rights. This shows once again the centrality of democratic will formation for the stable evolution of the society.

The denial of post conventional morality by the APC repression was an attempt to conceal the economic crisis it created. But this repression took a personal toll on Stevens. It made him insecure and paranoid. Stevens’ paranoia reflected a disruption or crisis in his personality. He felt insecure with anyone holding an opposing viewpoint. Stevens exemplified a post conventional moral intuition and a post traditional consciousness in his engagement with Sir Albert over the one party issue. By the 1980s, however, Stevens’ had become clearly a colonial power. As colonial dictator, he regressed into a conventional traditional authoritarian consciousness. Insofar as Stevens personalized the state, his influence shaped social structures in Sierra Leone so that his corrupt ‘logic’ gained social prominence. He reversed the minimal evolutionary moral
From the perspective of the theory of social evolution, we see that Stevens and APC pursuit of social change along Marxist lines only increased violence that destroyed democratic values and institutions. Their pretext of pursuing a ‘second revolution against the so-called SLPP bourgeois state’ terminated in a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (Fanon, 1963). Under Stevens’ political machinations, we saw the failure of a Marxist political orientation and practice that consider violent struggle as the key to social change. Since Marxist theory which Stevens claimed guided his political action, moves in a despotic teleological logic that ends in dictatorship or despotism, it reflects a traditional authoritarian consciousness, which is colonial. Stevens’ earlier exemplification of post conventional moral consciousness gave him a credible moral standing. But after this cover was removed, the structural differentiation of the state and the economy that could have represented an evolutionary advance became impossible. Such differentiation could only assume an aberrant form - the fusion of the state and market based on their interest in self-preservation. System integration and social integration, both of which should find their limit in the life world were subjected to crisis or disruption, even retrogression.

The economic crisis or socio-economic misery of the society led to discontents, who became convinced that the dictatorial state was incapable of serving no other purpose but societal exploitation, self preservation, and colonial domination. The next chapter examines the transposition of economic crisis tendency from the economic
domain to the social domain as the society reached the stage where it began experiencing a crisis of identity and a crisis of motivation. In the latter crises, the mass of citizens consider the state as so illegitimate that they had to withdraw their loyalty from the APC, militarily challenging the regime in a civil war.
Chapter 6
Domination as ‘Liberation’: *Between Reason and Will Formation In a Revolutionary Project.*

Imagination, as knowledge, retains the insoluble tension between idea and reality, the potential and the actual. *This is the idealistic core of dialectical materialism: the transcendence of freedom beyond the given forms (my emphasis).* In this sense too, Marxism is the historical heir of German Idealism. Freedom thus becomes a regulative concept of reason guiding the practice of changing reality in accordance with its idea i.e. its own potentialities – to make reality free for its truth. Dialectical materialism understands freedom as historical, empirical transcendence...This is the philosophical core of the theory of permanent revolution (Marcuse, 1972). *Counter-Revolution and Revolt.*

6.0 Reconstructing the Dialectic and Crisis Transposition to Society. This chapter reconstructs the logic of the dialectic\(^{221}\) by interpreting the Sierra Leone Conflict as a problem of morality. The opposition of political groups in Sierra Leone and between the society and the state exemplify *dialectic of morality.* *This view of the dialectic* involves the problem of realizing the moral point of view (what is equally acceptable to every one) or justice in social life. To deny the moral viewpoint in societal coordination creates tension as was evident in the emergence of the French revolution. With its outcome as constitutional democracy, the French revolution was an expression of a historical movement involving the dialectics of politics and law that continues to serve as model of

\(^{221}\) The dialectic comes form a Greek word *dialogo*, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times it was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming contradictions. The dialectical method of thought was later extended to the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature. See J. V. Stalin (September 1938, Dialectical and Historical materialism in http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/1938/09.htm p.1 Drawing on Hegel, 1892: 148 & Marx, Habermas, 1974: 203 define the dialectic as specific tendencies of conflict or oppositions and tensions in thought and practice that drives forward to produce one (new) situation out of the other.
the dualism in modern politics i.e. morality as constitutive element of politics.\textsuperscript{222} This study heeds Amilcar Cabral’s advice that in “speaking of our struggle we should not isolate it from the totality of phenomena which have characterised the life of humanity.”\textsuperscript{223} This chapter draws insights from the French revolution to understand the civil war that occurred in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002.

This chapter critically examines the RUF incursion into Sierra Leone as the climactic explosion of tensions arising from a moral question, the dialectic of popular sovereignty versus a dictatorial order, democratic (moral) legitimation versus a \textit{de facto} legally constituted order.\textsuperscript{225} This moral question of justice inheres in political tensions in the society since decolonization, intensified during the APC dictatorship, whose quest for survival caused her to adopt an exploitative neoliberal order. Many Sierra Leoneans became discontents determined to overthrow the regime because it privatized the state and the economy, and denied post-conventional morality. The resulting civil war represents a stage at which the intensified crisis tendencies were transposed from the system domain – as constitutional/administrative crisis and a neoliberal economic crisis - to the socio-cultural realm as problems of state legitimacy, and as a motivation crisis, citizen’s mass withdrawal of loyalty to the state.\textsuperscript{226} The RUF rebellion represents a

\textsuperscript{222} Even the inauguration of the scientific approach to the discipline and practice of modern politics – the technical mastery of society – could not nullify the classical doctrine of politics, \textit{the promotion of civic virtues} in the \textit{polis}. See Habermas, (1974). Classical Doctrine of Politics in \textit{Theory and Practice Boston}.

\textsuperscript{223} Amilcar Cabral, (1965). \textit{The nationalist movement of the Portuguese Colonies: Opening address at the CONCP Conference} held in Dar Es-Salaam.

\textsuperscript{225} The RUF (Revolutionary United Front) is the rebel movement that first started as a Marxist Greenbook study group among radical students of the University of Sierra Leone. These students recruited the mass of disaffected and marginalized youths in Sierra Leone, who for most of the time hung out in marijuana ghettos. According to Abdullah (1998), recruitment of the group started full fledged in 1989 only after Ali Kabba graduated from Legon (Ghana) in 1989. RUF attacked Sierra Leone in 1990, through Liberia, where they were part of the NPFL rebel forces of Charles Taylor. It’s believed they were trained in Tripoli and Benghazi. Richards, (1995). \textit{Fighting for The Rainforest}.

\textsuperscript{226} See Jurgen Habermas, (1970). \textit{Legitimation Crisis}. Boston: Beacon. Conceived as a crisis of
climactic stage in crises transposition in space and over time. This transposition of crisis tendency tends to conceal its changing forms, and also intensifies them with time (Koselleck, 1988).

The RUF rebellion also ran into crisis because citizens could not endorse their brutal immoral revolutionary politics of ‘change;’ so that they began to question the momentary dictatorial rebel government set up in Freetown as emancipation. In failing to seriously reflect on the idea that their civil war or rebellion constituted a moral indictment of illegitimate authority, the RUF revolutionary project had to run into crisis. Initially, their rebellion was supported by the society, who saw their project as one that will relieve them from decades of state oppression. The civil war escalated and was prolonged to 11 years because RUF failed in the moral learning that continuous citizens’ consent is the only correct route to legitimacy that could have guaranteed their regime’s stability. Only such a mode of legitimation can guarantee true stability of a post traditional social order (Habermas, 1976). In unleashing wanton violence on citizens to stifle their democratic aspirations, the RUF rebels unlearned a key moral insight that stability of the order is guaranteed by the legitimacy or worthiness of recognition citizens accord it. In a post-traditional society such as Sierra Leone, legitimacy is possible only

social integration or of the society’s identity, the civil war in Sierra Leone is viewed as the final stage in the transposition of crises tendencies over time. We saw in chapter 4 how a rationality (administrative or constitutional) crisis led to APC dictatorship, which served as precondition for the establishment of an exploitative neoliberal order (economic crisis). The latter order created social discontents, who could not consider the political order worthy of recognition (legitimate crisis), the flipside of which is the withdrawal of their loyalty from the political order (motivation crisis).

227 Despite contentions that the RUF rebellion was not Marxist, one can see traces of the ideology and logic in its violent revolutionary method and dictatorial logic (Kautsky, Habermas, 1990; Ake, 1989).

228 The immediate reason RUF (Sierra Leone rebels) gave for embarking on civil war in Sierra Leone is to restore democratic constitutionalism through the enabling citizens’ capacity for political autonomy, or their ability to articulate their private experience of socio-economic problems in the public domain.
through the exercise of political autonomy and communicative freedoms that enables their self-realization and self-determination (emancipation)(Habermas, 1993).

Despite their imprudent strategy of brutality to citizens, it is problematic to say that the RUF did not have a revolutionary consciousness.\(^{230}\) Totally dismissing RUF’s possible revolutionary consciousness may lead one to illogical contradictions,\(^{231}\) for such a position denies the reality of citizens’ subjection to decades of state exploitation and repression. RUF claimed to challenge the APC dictatorship because the latter regime oppressed, exploited, and subjugated the society for almost three decades. Similarly, citizens’ similar challenge or counterrevolution against RUF exemplifies their dialectical negation of the brutality and repression RUF directed at them. Both the RUF challenge to the APC oppressive regime and citizens’ counterrevolutionary challenge to RUF brutality reflect a revolutionary consciousness of these challengers.

At any rate, insofar as consciousness is a subjective psychological phenomenon, making an argument that ones conduct stems from their ideological consciousness cannot be rationally conclusive. For a similar reason, it is problematic to simply attribute the

\(^{230}\) Revolutionary consciousness manifests in the realization of the need to push for the accelerated rationalization of society. It is expressed in the conviction that free individuals are jointly called to be authors of their history, believing that in their hands lies the power to decide the rules and manner of living together. It involves citizens’ need for the freedom to realize and determine their life. This consciousness is also reflected in the conviction that political domination is legitimized only on the basis of reason, through orders that have rational or legitimate basis. See J. Habermas, (1996). Postscript: Popular Sovereignty as Procedure In Between facts and norms. MIT Press, pp. 467 - 470.

\(^{231}\) Smillie et al (1991); Kaplan (1994); and Abdullah (1998) run into inconsistencies. Smillie argues that the war is not a crisis of modernization, but in doing so they had to acknowledge the privatistic (subjectivist) tendencies and principle fundamentally plagues the theory of modernization: the tendency of market and state fusion, and also the privatization of state security functions. Kaplan acknowledges how state failure emerged due to the state’s loss of monopoly control over coercive force, while ignoring normative questions at the origins of the crisis. He seems to hold a Hobbesian concept of state legitimacy, as the necessity of the state to dominate every other force, irrespective of legitimacy questions. Abdullah (1998) acknowledges the possibility of Marxist oriented intellectuals in and influences on the Movement up until the time they entered Sierra Leone in 1991. Though he knew of self-confessed Marxist student leader, Ali Kabba, who spearheaded the recruitment drive for the RUF, yet Abdullah dismissed any possible Marxist influence on the rebels.
moral failure of the RUF project to the lack of their correct Marxist orientation or consciousness. The study explicates RUF’s practical failure mainly in terms of the scientism or positivism, historicism and philosophical inconsistencies of their praxis philosophy,\(^{232}\) that possibly informed them. This chapter critically reflects on RUF’s wanton violence to get at or to understand their possible intuitive consciousness. While Marxism conceives the dialectic in terms of production or economic relations,\(^{233}\) some variations of the theory - namely praxis philosophy - pursue less production-centered analysis. Arguably, one latest version of praxis philosophy is Ghadaffi’s Third Universal Theory, espoused in the Greenbook, a pamphlet whose ideas partly informed some radical university students of Sierra Leone, who initiated the recruitment drive for the RUF army.\(^{234}\) While the Third Universal Theory questioned some tenets of Marxism, it retained some of its key logic and premises.\(^{235}\) The theory holds that the exploitation of

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\(^{232}\) Here, praxis philosophy refers to Marxism and its versions that retain fundamental core principles or arguments of Marxism, from Gramsci to Lukacs (the Budapest School), the existentialism of Sartre, Marleau Ponty, Castoriadis etc. Praxis philosophy does not clearly differentiate social power and political power. See J. Habermas, (1990), Left Hegelian in The Philosophical Discourse of modernity. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. The Third Universal Theory espoused in the Greenbook of Muamar Ghaddaffi is the latest in these variants of Marxism. The RUF rebels were closer to this praxis philosophy than any other ideology or philosophy (Abdullah, 1998).

\(^{233}\) K. Marx, The Communist Manifesto cited by Franz Marek, (1969). Philosophy of World Revolution: A Contribution to an Anthology of Theories of Revolution. New York: International publishers, p. 20. “Private property too drives itself in its national economic movement towards its own dissolution but only through a development which does not depend on it, of which it is unconscious and which takes place against its will, though, only as much as it produces the proletariat, the misery, which is conscious of its dehumanization will abolish it. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounces on itself by producing the proletariat…It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in conformity with that being, it will be historically compelled to do…” Drawing on Hegel’s refinement of the theological conception of the philosophy of history, Marx gave a materialist rendition of the dialectic as the law of motion of societal history, as the opposition in wage relations, between labor and capital. With this materialist conception of the dialectic, Marx clamed to have discovered the key to socialist revolution: social development happens of necessity, a necessity realized through social force.

\(^{234}\) Abdullah argued that recruitment of the rebel army effective started after the graduation from Legon University in Ghana of its original leader, Ali Kabba, a self confessed Marxist (Abdullah, 1998). \(^{235}\) “Part 2: the Solution of the economic problem” of the Green Book has a sub-section, The Economic Basis of the Third Universal Theory, which argues that “the ultimate solution [to the economic problem] lies in abolishing the wage-system, emancipating people from its bondage and reverting to the
man by man and the possession of more by some individuals of the general wealth is a
departure from the natural rule, the beginning of distortion and corruption in the life of
the human community (p. 2). The Third Universal Theory also retained idealism of the
philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of the subject.236

From the language in its Manifesto, its PANAFU history237 and formative
process, RUF seem to have been influenced by the Third Universal Theory, which
originated in Libyan political government that trained RUF combatants in Benghazi and
Tripoli, where RUF could have partly formed their ideological consciousness.238 Despite
the sloppy scientific reasoning of the Third Universal Theory (Abdullah, 1998), one can
hardly deny this ideology’s influence on the RUF.239 Any revolutionary action taking its
orientation from such an inconsistent theory or problematic philosophy is bound to
demonstrate or manifest these inconsistencies in praxis.240 That RUF’s immoral action or
wanton violence arguably stems from a deficient theory should not make us dismiss the

natural laws which defined relationship before the emergence of classes, forms of governments and man
made laws. These natural rules are only measures that ought to govern human relations.” See The Green

236 The philosophy of consciousness refers to the conception of philosophy as first philosophy, the philosophy of reflection or philosophy of origins like that in Kantian apperception. It is basically metaphysical, often a presuppositionless mode of thought that provides its own foundations. The philosophy of the subject refers to a philosophy that tends to generalize in its analysis. For instance, Marxism tends to understand every contradiction in any part of the world or in any society as exclusively one dealing with wage relations or the dialectic between labor and capital. See J. Habermas, Between Philosophy and Science in Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon Press; Also see J. Habermas, (1993). Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. MIT Press; Habermas, (1991). Philosophical discourse of modernity. MIT Press.

237 See Ali and Ibrahim Abdullah, See Leonenet discussions (Leonenet is the main Sierra Leone scholarly discourse on the Web).


importance of seriously reflecting on their so-called ‘revolution’ or rebellion. Resisting blandishment of a problematic philosophy does not mean we should altogether renounce the application of philosophical principles (Nelson, 1949: 95). Making far-reaching empirical conclusions require the use of correct scientifically established philosophy that can also inform or ensure acceptable practice.\(^{241}\)

The reconstructive analysis in this Chapter draws on the dialectic, without strictly operating along the lines of dialectical thought, because of the latter’s weak analytical power (Habermas, 1993; Nelson, 1949). In this study, the moral practical reconstruction of the Sierra Leone civil war entails viewing the Conflict as a manifestation of contradictions reflecting the \textit{dialectic of moral life}: While an authority can displace the moral question or even temporally master the effects of denying moral responsibility in governance, it can by no means annul the moral question. To displace the moral question by ideology or repression is to intensify it.

Historically, the organization of social relations has reflected institutionalized power relations rather than public and general communication free from domination. Thus, \textit{interaction as a category for comprehending processes of social evolution} does not refer immediately to unconstrained intersubjectivity but to the history of its \textit{repression and reconstitution: the dialectic of moral life} (McCarthy, 1985: 36).

RUF’s wanton brutality to citizens aimed at intimidating them to prevent their participation in the UN brokered democratic elections was tantamount to an attempt at \textit{making reality free for their truth} (Marcuse, 1972: 36). This action aimed at denying the

\(^{241}\) To avoid common sense assessment of RUF, we need philosophical reflection such as communicative reason. Simplistic common sense explanation of RUF conduct analytically unproblematic and taken for granted. “In an awkward way, philosophy has always been closely affiliated with the latter (common sense). Like commonsense, philosophy moves within the vicinity of the lifeworld; its relation to the totality of this receding horizon of everyday knowledge is similar to that of common sense. And yet, through the subversive power of reflection and of illuminating, critical and dissecting analysis, philosophy is completely opposed to common sense (Habermas (1993) \textit{Postmetaphysical Thinking}, p.38).”
moral question of citizens’ self determination of their destiny by democratic means. The RUF wanted to obliterate the possibility that citizens desired change by democracy rather than by violence. In making excuses and apologies for the wanting brutality they directed at civilians, even the RUF seem to realize the reality of the dialectic of morality. Even after repressing citizens’ chance of discursive opinion formation or public reason in the democratic campaigns, RUF had to pursue a compensatory form of understanding aimed at reconstituting the moral category of social interaction they tried to deny citizens.

After the RUF-AFRC took over Freetown, the Capital city in 1998, they announced that they had achieved the ‘genuine brotherhood’ the society had been searching for. RUF argued that their takeover (which was done with the help of mutinying soldiers) reflected brotherhood or solidarity. This need to fabricate legitimacy by ideology or propaganda is indicative of dialectic of morality, and that legitimacy is a key element in the constitution of stable social and political orders.

RUF atrocities to citizens triggered the latter’s revolutionary consciousness, forcing citizens to challenge the RUF through civil disobedience and counter revolutionary guerilla movement. A moral paradox of liberation beset the RUF i.e. they failed to learn that they were contravening the very moral basis of their indictment of the corrupt APC regime. The moral force that sustained the power of their rebellion waned as soon as they ignored or contravened this moral basis and justification by physically abusing the citizens they claimed to fight for. RUF’s wanton violence against citizens created moral doubt regarding their revolutionary claim that their project aimed at liberating society from corrupt governance. The society’s moral condemnation or indictment of RUF took the form of civil militia counter-revolution guerrilla warfare, and
national civil disobedience campaigns. Labour unions, offices and schools went on strike throughout the duration of the rebel/Junta regime. Total societal opposition to the Junta gave moral muscle to regional and international sanctions and military engagements aimed at toppling them. In these events, we see the dialectical movement of the society’s history, but one shaped by questions of justice or morality. In their determined opposition to citizens’ democratic aspirations, the RUF tried to deny the moral core of modern politics, the communicative power or reason of citizens. By physically abusing ordinary civilians, RUF showed their woeful incapacity to comprehend the nature and challenge of politics i.e. that to be legitimate and therefore stable, a political authority must be morally responsible.

The explosive form the Conflict assumed in the 1990s illustrates the concept that to conceal crisis tendency only serves to intensify it (Koselleck, 1988). Commenting on the French revolution, Koselleck argued that the moralization of politics arises from the critique of immoral absolutism that caused the civil war in France, making the revolution the quest to fulfil moral postulates. To conceal the moral basis of civil war is to intensify it; to cover the moral core of such a project only serves to intensify it (Koselleck, 1988: 185).

For example, SLPP’s unwillingness to genuinely dialogue on its one party cultural unity claims enhanced APCs successful moral indictment, eventually overthrowing SLPP in the 1960s. Similarly, APC’s fall in the 1990s at the hands of the national army was due to its repressive dictatorship. A similar lesson can be gleaned from failure of APC’s so called revolution in the 1960s. APC morally pressured the SLPP leader, Sir Albert, to rationalize their one party quest, who later seemed to have abandoned the issue. Yet, the
opposition (APC) could not respond in kind, because even when the SLPP dropped the quest, APC failed to uphold the moral spirit of democratic constitutional politics or continue in the logic of *government by law*. APC pressed ahead with a ‘revolutionary’ politics, it framed as a *second revolution* to overthrow the SLPP Bourgeois State. They blatantly disregarded the institutional framework of the society by operating in the logic of revolutionary politics, which logically brought them to uncheck political power (dictatorship) that denied moral discourse of justice.

Like the APC dictatorship, the RUF revolutionary project moved in a similar deficient moral logic (despotism) that cannot admit of communicative action. Though the political actors (Sir Albert, Siaka Stevens, NPRC, and the RUF) lived in different temporal stages of history, they all more or less manifested the conventional (traditional authoritarian) moral intuitive consciousness. RUF failed to transcend this conventional moral intuition. Their failure to practically realize the more appropriate moral intuition commensurate to the post-traditional conscious society (post-conventional developmental logic), caused the crisis of their so called ‘revolution.’ In pursuing their project by brutalizing civilians, RUF made their project the pursuit of particular interest, rather than generalizable or shared interest of the society. By using a means that demoralized ordinary citizens in whose name they claimed to revolt, RUF showed that normative considerations of justice, equality and fraternity were not serious goals of their project. Like previous regimes before them, the RUF did not to fully appreciate the enlarged conception of *the political* as inclusive of the moral category, the socio-cultural domain (Habermas, 1974).

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245 The government by law refers to the constitutional state principles that can support democratic
Today, moral problems arise solely in the context of an intervening communicative intersubjectivity among actors on the always precarious basis of mutual understanding. Even RUF argued that the immediate justification for their rebellion was the denial of communicative freedoms - post-conventional morality – (RUF Manifesto: Bushpath to democracy). As a reflection of the dialectic of moral life, the civil war represents the predictable and inevitable end of a moral process beyond politics. This moralization of politics does not make civil war simply a ‘revolution,’ but rather the quest to fulfill moral postulates (Koselleck, 1988: 184-5). It was APC authoritarianism or dictatorship that convinced the RUF of its ‘moral superiority’ and eventual success.  

Having successfully captured the Capital in 1998, RUF like Stevens after overthrowing the SLPP, showed ‘despair over its inability to recognize the nature of power.’ They took refuge in naked force, reflecting the bad conscience of a moralist who usurped power and then claims that history’s intention is to make power superfluous (Koselleck, 1988: 184). By ignoring justice or morality as the correct constitutive element of legitimate political power, the RUF project like the APC before them, established the conditions for the society’s opposition to them. To the degree that the RUF maintained only indirect relation to the moral point of view, they remained blinded to the challenge and risk of political action and decisions (p. 184) i.e. to the logic of balancing normative considerations with the administrative steering of society.

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246 J. Habermas, (1971). Labor and Interaction In Toward a Rational Society. Boston: Beacon Press, p. 151. Habermas argues that moral action is essentially communicative. As the subjects of Praxis, the moral subject is inconceivable in abstraction from communicative relations with others. Morality is not to be conceived in individualistic terms.

247 Similarly, in the 1960s, the APC Opposition’s confidence in gaining power was based on their conviction that their cause was morally just and superior, while the Incumbent SLPP’s absolutist quest was morally indefensible. See Thomas Cox, (1976). Civil military relations in Sierra Leone: A case study of
RUF’s violence against citizens led to moral criticisms by scholars such as Kaplan (1994), Smillie et al. (1991), Abdullah (1998), and ordinary societal members. They saw the paradoxical behaviour of the RUF as incapacity for civilize mores or innate barbaric tendency (Kaplan), or as resulting from unrestrained diamond greed (Smillie). Abdullah (1998) attributes RUF’s immoral conduct to the lumpen character of their rebel army, dismissing them as dispossessed ignorant bunch of lumpen or raray boys,\(^{249}\) who could not provide valid reasons for their so-called revolution. These dismissals seem to deny RUF’s formative process: three decades of reification, oppression, marginalization, exploitation, and dispossession that led to lumpen discontents in Sierra Leone.

The APC exploitation and repression of dispossessed youths, not only provided a potential reserve of ‘lumpen’ for a rebel army, it also served as major constitutive elements of their possible revolutionary consciousness and situation. APC exploitation and repression served as the very grounds the rebels’ claimed as responsible for their decision to fight, to shed their historical consciousness and aspire to change their society (The RUF Manifesto). The dehumanized, unemployed school dropouts, and impoverished youths became discontents, who already felt morally justified to challenge a ruthless dictatorship, and therefore, were easily enticed and motivated to pursue a revolution. To proceed, this study first provides its conception of revolution.

The Marxist conception of revolution is a rebellion aimed at the transfer of the means of production to social ownership (Marek, 1969: 59). Marxism does not exhaust the meaning of social revolution and does not clearly specify the constructive moment of

\(^{249}\) See Ibrahim Abdullah, (2003). Bush Path to Destruction: the Origins and Character of the RUF/SL in Between Democracy and Terror Dakar: CODESERIA. Raray boys refer to area boys as they are called...
socialism itself as end of such revolution. Lenin recognized that while a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation, not every revolutionary situation leads to a revolution (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21; Marek, 1969: 106). In particular, Marek (1969: 58) highlights determinism as a major philosophical problem in the Marxist conception of history. He argues that this problem involves “how to understand the relationship between social development which conforms to certain laws and the decisions which men choose to make, the relation of objective inner laws to subjective possibilities and capabilities – and then, having understood this, how to act upon it.”

This deterministic conception tends to subsume every societal opposition under an economic orientation as cosmic law. Such deterministic conception of history raises the paradoxical question of how human beings can become subjects or makers of their history, while simultaneously adhering to a predetermined universal cosmic law according which every history is believed to unfold. This deterministic orientation can impede one’s rational engagement to contingent historical reality – it leads to historicism.

This study proceeds by outlining its view of revolution. Here, revolution means accelerated rationalization (or modernization), which involves the mediation of theory and practice - the mediation of history and reason remains constitutive for the discourse of modernity (Habermas, 1990: 52). The *critical framework for revolutionary praxis* dissects the concept of *revolution* under three headings or functions or stages with

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different criteria of measurement (McCarthy, 1984: 207) that reflects a theory/practice connection.

The first stage is the formation and extension of critical theorems that can stand up to scientific discourse or the discourse of truth i.e. the revolutionaries’ representation of actual exploitation and colonial domination should pass the test of theoretical discourse.\(^{252}\) If the revolutionary theory cannot survive critical discursive examination, it must be rejected. Since RUF emancipatory project was informed by praxis philosophy, which is a critical theory in the general sense - we cannot confirm it this way (p. 208).

For a critical theoretically informed revolution, the final test is in the successful application of the theory by objects of enlightenment. Thus, in assessing RUF’s revolutionary project, the theoretical discourse must refer to the second stage, the organization of enlightenment. We must examine the interface of the theory informing a revolutionary project and the resulting practice arising from it.

As regards the organization of processes of enlightenment, the appropriate model is therapeutic discourse, which proposes or presupposes a subject or ‘patient’ – the ignorant, oppressed, the alienated, the exploited, the repressed, those denied dialogue and political autonomy, and those with colonial dominating consciousness. As part of organizational means, the therapeutic model of discourse involves a dialogue that aims to remove barriers to liberty, freedom, and autonomy by creating symmetry in relations and shedding deception. If the targets of enlightenment - the ignorant and oppressed societal members - can successfully appropriate these critical interpretations or enlightenment -

then we can confirm their successful revolutionary reflection. Thus, the ‘patient,’ the 
oppressed, or those dogmatically conscious subjects, are the final authority (p. 208).

The theory should enlighten those to whom it is addressed about their position in an 
antagonistic social system. Only when the process of organized enlightenment and 
counsel translate into the target group recognizing itself in the revolutionary 
interpretation, can the revolutionaries make a credible claim to have transformed the 
target group from historical beings to dialectical subjects of history. The organization of 
enlightenment becomes actual consciousness when the objectively attributed interest 
situation becomes the real interest of the targeted group capable of action (McCarthy, 
1985: 32). Which groups actually become enlightened is largely an empirical question, a 
matter that depends on the dynamics of the historical situation.

At the level of the conduct of political struggle, there is no single model 
appropriate for all situations. Some revolutionary situations require radical reform and 
others fundamental revolutionary transformation. In some, the weapons of critique are 
more effective than the critique of weapons; discourse may be more expedient than 
military engagement in some situations. In others, total revolution is absurd. In Critical 
Social Theory a project worthy of the label revolution should fulfill moral postulates, 
manifests justice, equality, and solidarity in its means and as well as its end (Marcuse, 
1969).

The foregoing basic outline of the revolution idea and practice into three stages 
serves to remove confusion as to whether the RUF was ‘a military organization with a 
political agenda’ or ‘a political movement with an armed wing.’ Based on the three

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254 Olu Gordon, (11 June, 1997). ‘Hostage to the gun’ in For Di People Newspaper. (Freetown); also
functional distinct stages, a project claiming to be a revolution as its end may emphasize organizational matters over social movement politics or vice versa, depending on the stage and the tasks or strategy appropriate to a given stage. We analyze the RUF revolutionary project as social processes or dynamics of an actual historical condition, a thing in itself - an empirical state of affairs, which we can analyze in a valid manner in theoretical discourse. Insofar as actual oppressive state of affairs or conditions can serve to partly constitute a revolutionary consciousness, which arises out of a revolutionary situation, it is problematic to totally deny the possibility of RUF’s revolutionary consciousness. We rationalize (thematize and critically examine) problems of RUF’s project in terms of actual contingent situation and in terms of their possible praxis philosophical orientation to understand their ‘revolutionary’ violence to citizens.

This Chapter is divided into three sections – (6.1), (6.2), (6.3) and the Conclusion. In section 6.1, the chapter explicates the possibility of RUF’s dialectical consciousness by drawing on the history of exploitation and repression in Sierra Leone prior to the rebel incursion. As members of the society that APC exploited and repressed, RUF’s claim to revolutionary consciousness and intentions may have some truth-validity. The dehumanizing and depoliticizing strategy of APC denied the society scope to articulate and resolve problems, leaving discontents rebellion and radical change as the only option.

Section 6.2 engages a Marxist critique of the RUF that totally disassociates them from Marxism. This critique holds that the rebels committed wanton violence against
civilians because their leadership and bulk lumpen composition lacked correct Marxist grounding (Abdullah, 1998). It implies that correct Marxist grounding of the rebels would have guaranteed a morally sensitive rebellion respectful of human rights and international morality or humanitarian law. Only if Marxist ideology itself can admit of dialogical (moral) relations or post-conventional morality, could one make a valid argument that a Marxist oriented rebellion will produce a moral outcome. Here, we analyze RUF’s revolutionary praxis by explicating their possible moral cognitive consciousness in terms of possible ideological influences on them, such as the Third Universal Theory, PANAFU Marxist-Leninism and other contingent situation. The question we investigate here is whether proper grounding in praxis philosophy, which possibly shaped RUF’s ideological orientation, could have enabled them to pursue a morally sensitive campaign. We examine whether the revolutionary praxis defined by the Greenbook and to some extent PANAFU Marxism could have rendered the RUF capable of moral practical action at the post-conventional level.

Section (6.3) examines why the RUF ‘revolutionary’ paradox – RUF’s domination and demoralization of citizens as ‘liberation’ – occurred. We do not misconceive this paradox as manifestation of the dialectic of enlightenment, which considers modernity or societal rationalization in purposive instrumental terms, and crisis

257 J. Habermas, (1974). Between Philosophy and Science in Theory and Practice. Boston. p. 150. The basic presuppositions of the philosophy of history are: a) the unity of the world, and b) that history can be made. Human beings can appropriate their history rationally to the extent that they can make it. We examine the RUF revolution in terms of this irony: they want citizens to make their history, but with a consciousness that is not their own, a ready made one the revolutionaries tried to impose on them through forceful mobilization. Within this irony, we try to understand the paradox of the RUF liberation project. Usually, this forceful mobilization and violence against civilians stems from the revolutionaries rising power of the masses. The revolutionaries feared the alternative power and orientation of the social classes or peasants groups. This did not exactly fit into the role demarcated for the peasants by the revolutionaries. See Ray Wylie, (1972). Mao and the Peasants: The Formative Years in Ray Wylie (Ed.) China: The Peasant Revolution. Geneva: World Student Christian Federation Press., p. 11.; also see Habermas, (1996).
as the indispensible cost of modernization from which there is no escape. The *dialectic of enlightenment* holds that we cannot escape this negative fate of modernity.

On the contrary, the study explains the RUF revolutionary paradox as a *selective tendency* of a militarily powerful group of citizens, who believed they could brutally subjugate their compatriots with impunity. The paradox of RUF liberation arises from their use of military superiority to silence the society they claimed to liberate. RUF seemed to reduce the idea of legitimacy to political sovereignty or monopoly over coercive force, in believing they could get away with systematic wanton violence against fellow citizens in the name of liberation.

Their project ran into moral crisis when citizens found their violence unacceptable, finding the moral justification, conviction and determination to challenge them, hence the counter-revolution. In analyzing RUF action, we ask the following questions: Was RUF determination to deny citizens scope to pursue the democratic alternative path to the transfer of political power or social change related or due to the ideology that informed them? What caused them to mutilate, rape, and kill the civilians they claimed to fight for? How was their immoral action shaped by their quest for power? Are there similarities between the conduct of RUF’s revolutionary praxis and the Marxist conception of revolutionary struggle? We discuss these questions below.

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Poscript, *Between Facts and Norms*.

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The chapter reconstructs the dialectic – the law of motion of society – in terms of the transposition of bundles of crisis tendencies, from the system domain (the administration and economy) to the socio-cultural domain. At the core of these crises tendencies is the problem of post conventional morality, communicative freedom or the political autonomy of citizens. Crisis in the latter domain manifests as the crisis of social integration, identity, or legitimation. The flipside of this latter crisis is motivation crisis, which involves the State’s loss of the mass loyalty of its citizens.

At this latter stage, crisis is a problem of the grammar of social life, the urgent problem of how to employ practical reason through communicative interaction to resolve problems of societal coordination. RUF argued that “human beings go to war when they feel they can no longer get action to be taken on their grievances by verbal articulation.” They opened their justificationary discourse (Bushpath to Democracy: RUF Manifesto) by stressing the denial of rational discourse, post-conventional morality. Rational communicative understanding is the only means through which a post traditional society can resolve evolutionary problems arising from rigidified structures of exploitation and authoritarian repression. Today, the legitimation of orders is possible only through post-conventional morality.

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260 Practical reason involves taking up pragmatic questions such as what strategies are expedient or chose to resolve a problem, what a society want to be or become, and as to what is equally acceptable or just to each one in the society. See Habermas, J. (1992). On the Employment of practical Reason In Justification and Application. MIT Press.

261 Omrie Golley, (January, 1999). RUF Calls for Independent Investigation by RUF Political Leadership in Kailahun District, in Peter Anderson (Ed.) Sierra Leone News in Sierra Leone Web. While the second statement serves as justification of their end or objective of the revolution, RUF cannot excuse their atrocities by their arguing that they “unleashed negative emotions by committing atrocities” because “it is very difficult to control fighters in war situation (Ibid, p.3).”
RUF claimed to undertake a revolution to restore the political autonomy of citizens (their right of discursive political participation) (Manifesto, p. 5). By exercising their political autonomy or communicative freedoms, citizens can simultaneously realize their inalienable subjective liberties (private autonomy). RUF called for the political participation and will formation of citizens that the APC regime had denied in Sierra Leone for decades. By denying the society scope for dialogue or post conventional morality, APC created the justification and right of citizens to challenge them. RUF claimed to embark on war because the State was unwilling to communicatively reason with society. Consistent with this study’s position that economic crisis is not the prelude to the seizure of power by revolutionaries; Kautsky also argues that the immediate issue in the inauguration of revolutionary project is legitimation (Marek, 1969: 27).

Similarly, Marcuse (1969) dialectically conceives the right of civil war or revolution in *An Essay on Liberalism* as the moral indictment of an unjust political order:

Over and above their legitimacy in constitutional terms, the extent to which established law and order can legitimately demand (and command) obedience and compliance largely depends (or ought to depend) on the extent to which this law and this order obey and comply with their own standards and values. These may be ideological (like the ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity advanced by the revolutionary Bourgeoisie), but the ideology can become a material political force [my emphasis] in the armor of the opposition as these values are betrayed, compromised, denied in the social reality. Then the betrayed promises are, as it were, taken over by the opposition and with them, the claim for legitimacy (Marcuse, H. (1969). Part 3: Subverting Forces –Transition in *An Essay on Liberation. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 77-78*).

Revolutionaries may attempt to establish a new law and order against the established law and order because the extant social order has become illegitimate and unlawful - it has invalidated its own laws (p. 78). This basic truth is reflected in RUF’s justification for a revolution or civil war, as it partly was for Stevens and the APC against the SLPP
government in the early 1960’s. This dialectical consciousness constitutive of rebellion or revolt brings up this old controversy of right against right - the right to offend and remove an exploitative absolutist political order. By its very form and conduct, a totalitarian authority denies itself worthiness of recognition (legitimacy) or the right to obedience as outlined in its positive, codified and enforceable laws (Marcuse, 1969: 71).

Certainly, the substantial initial support RUF had from citizens shows that a good part of the society corroborated their claim that APC had established “a pattern of raping the countryside to feed the greed and caprice of the Freetown elite, and their masters abroad (RUF Manifesto, p. 5).” Citizens’ private domain or personal experiences of exploitation corroborates RUF statements. The reality of exploitation warranted RUF’s moral condemnation of the APC regime. The repression and exploitation carried out by the regime was, in fact, what triggered the critical (dialectical) consciousness of those affected to revolt against the oppressive regime. RUF justified their rebellion by pointing to the “exploitative measures instituted by the central (APC) government.” Without scope for resolving these problems by moral means i.e. through communicative or intersubjective reciprocal understanding, RUF argued that the APC dictatorship created “the conditions for resistance and civil uprising” against it, hence the revolutionary situation and dialectical consciousness. By dehumanizing the society, APC pronounced its own moral sentence: its denial of dialogue on its exploitation and repression compelled discontents, or rather left them no alternative but revolt to change their dehumanized condition.262

262 The above passage of the RUF Manifesto expressed a similar automaticity, necessity or compulsion – a cosmic law or determination- regarding the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and action as in Marx’s Communist Manifesto. Marx expressed necessity or compulsion in his Communist
RUF vowed to “no longer live the destiny of our Country in the hands of generation of crooked politicians and military adventurists (NPRC),” but to assert their “right and duty to change the present political system in the name of national salvation and liberation,” hence their revolutionary goal or end. They were “prepared to struggle until the decadent backward and oppressive regime is thrown to the dustbin of history.” RUF was determined to free the society from the APC regime, whom they called “crooked politicians” and “military adventurists,” the NPRC, soldiers of the national army that overthrew the APC.

Despite their Manifesto, which constitutes their representation of the truth of the historical exploitation, RUF lacked clear plans for establishing political autonomy (or democratic equality) and solidarity (or brotherhood) in the society. The RUF Manifesto did not specify the form their revolutionary end would take. Their mere recognition that communicative understanding was denied, and required restoration to resolve societal problems, does not transform this dialectical insight into clear practical program of governance or how to build communicative understanding. Beyond dialectical insight, serious reflective effort and practical action is necessary to raise critical consciousness to actual qualitative practical transformation.

Even if one were to dismiss RUF’s revolutionary consciousness as rhetoric, we cannot deny the truth of the revolutionary situation constituted through APC exploitation and repression, which created discontents seriously desiring a total radical change, and

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*Manifesto* regarding the proletariats’ call to action. His prospective outlook or prediction was that the exploitation of the suffering workers will compel them to seek radical change: “The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounces on itself by producing the proletariat...It is not a question a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole of the proletariat at the moment, considers as its aim. It is a question what the proletariat is, and what, in conformity with that being, it will be historically
hence, potentially receptive to a revolutionary ideology. Even if RUF used the revolutionary situation as mere pretext for a self-interested revolt or as a politics of convenience, Marcuse argues that such rhetoric can ‘become a material political force in the armor of the opposition’ when the reality of unmet needs corroborates it (Marcuse, 1969: 77-8).’ Insofar as the extant empirical or objective, subjective and normative reality in the society corroborated RUF’s interpretation of the socio-political situation that ‘values are betrayed, compromised, denied in the social reality,’ the rebels were merely champions of the society, articulating citizens’ private experiences of exploitation and desire for change.263

The issues of political governance, the lack of political autonomy (APC’s denial of dialogue with citizens) to which RUF pointed in their Manifesto was the immediate reason they gave for embarking on a revolution. Since establishing a *de facto dictatorship* in the 1970s (Cartwright, 1977), the APC had subverted the constitution, substituting *general selections* for democratic elections (Daramy, 1993), and institutionalizing corruption in the political economy (Kallon, 2004; Reno, 1995; Kpundeh, 1995). With their total control of society, APC embarked on unrestrained “exploitation” and “degradation” of citizens, a misrule that created discontents, some of whom were motivated to join or form a rebel Movement to end their “marginalized, neglected, and excluded” status (*RUF Manifesto*).
The reasons RUF gave for pursuing revolutionary change can be disputed only on pain of discounting citizens’ private and public experiences of serious injustice under the corrupt APC regime. RUF’s initial support among substantial number of Sierra Leoneans show corroboration for their revolutionary interpretation of the reality: “Moral judgments must meet with agreement from the perspective of those affected and not, as with ethical questions, merely from the perspective of some individuals or groups self-understanding or worldview.” To deny that the rebels embody revolutionary consciousness is to deny the initial support they enjoyed in the population. This initial popular support reflected the truth of the injustice RUF articulated, the historical fact of repression and exploitation.

At any rate, sufficient to constitute a revolutionary consciousness is a change in historical consciousness that breaks with tradition, a reflexive encounter with cultural traditions and social institutions, hence a rationalizing (modernizing) experience that points to the need for rational accelerated change of conditions through collective social intervention (Habermas, 1996: 466). Revolutionary consciousness is expressed in the conviction that emancipated citizens are jointly called upon to be authors of their destiny (p. 469). There is little doubt that three decades of dictatorship in Sierra Leone left citizens with the desire to make their own history, to gain the power to decide the rules and manner of living together. Finally, considering the society’s post-traditional consciousness, where myriad religious and cultural constellations were fused together under a democratic constitutional state, one can hardly deny that APC dictatorship could have triggered citizens’ revolutionary consciousness.

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264 Habermas, (1993). *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*. Cambridge,
Stevens’ challenge to SLPP one party quest and RUF’s challenge to APC dictatorship exemplify the expressed conviction that members of a post-traditionally conscious society such as Sierra Leone should always legitimate legal or political orders not by religion, the appeal to divine authority, or metaphysics or the appeal to natural law, but only through mutual understanding (p. 469). Insofar as this conviction was expressed in anti-APC agitation in the mass media, the Labor Congress, high schools and university student protests, revolutionary consciousness was shared by a substantial number of Sierra Leoneans. Even without the Third Universal Theory - a theory so fraught with logical synthetic inconsistencies, scientific trappings, and Islamic fundamentalism, the repressive reality in Sierra Leone in itself was sufficient to constitute the revolutionary consciousness and situation. There already existed a revolutionary consciousness, one in which citizens’ aspired to change a dictatorship to democratic constitutionalism or government by law, even before Greenbook influences on the radical student body of Sierra Leone. The possible determinism and historicist trappings of the Third Universal Theory or ideology could have even introduced distortions in the revolutionary consciousness of the RUF. The predictive science based on a law-like determinism marks a point in the modern understanding of politics over the last two hundred years that removed politics from its rational intellectual and cultural origins, making revolutionary consciousness irrelevant. Critical Theory and this study argues that the workers social utopia embodied in Marxist ideology is exhausted, and

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267 Ibid, Habermas, 1996, p.467. For a discussion of erosion of the intellectual origin of politics see The Classical Doctrine of Politics and its Relation to Philosophy In Theory and Practice. Culturally, the revolutionary consciousness embodied in the 1789 and 1794 revolutions has faded away. In its place, the economically defined revolutionary has emerged, which cannot adequately provide or clarify the
argues that exploring the possibility of a revolution based on the ideas of 1789 might still provide appropriate revolutionary orientation in today’s politics or societal coordination.

By advocating for “verbal articulation” in their Manifesto, RUF professed democracy and basic rights (political autonomy or the right of political participation) as their revolutionary aspiration – this is an initial illustration of a post-conventional intuitive consciousness. Their expressed aspiration for political autonomy and post-conventional morality, rather than for a religious state as advocated by the Greenbook or Third Universal Theory, is at the core of the constitutional state as exemplified by the American and French Revolutions (p. 465). In taking up the revolutionary project, RUF was more or less drawing on “the historical perspectives of major [revolutionary] events in the life of humanity,” which Cabral advises the anti-colonial project not to forget (Cabral, 1965). The basis of RUF indictment of the APC regime and their promise of revolutionary change imply a claim to actualize core principles of the constitutional state, self-determination and self-realization, democratic equality and human rights.

In their Manifesto, the RUF also argued for the need to continue their revolution against the NPRC (the National Patriotic Revolutionary Council), the regime that overthrew the APC, the main target of the RUF (the National Patriotic Revolutionary
Council) because its leader Valentine Strasser contracted mercenaries to fight them (the RUF). NPRC frustrated the rebels’ plan of securing power through military victory, by concluding military mercenary contract to fight RUF. The latter viewed the NPRC as “military adventurists,” and as agents of the APC neocolonial state. Because of NPRC’s “continuation of the policy of war (Footpath to Democracy: RUF Manifesto, p. 5)” against them, RUF labeled them APC watchdogs. The NPRC were part of the National army that overthrew APC because they claimed the regime failed to adequately meet their basic needs at the warfront. By hiring PMCs (private military companies) using diamond-mining concessions to pay them, the NPRC gave the RUF reason to call them military adventurist and watchdogs of the APC system of irresponsible exploitation.

Choosing Guerilla warfare as their war strategy, RUF set up their operational base in the Zogoda, in the thick rainforest on the outskirts of Kenema, the headquarter town of the Eastern Province, and later in Makeni town, the headquarter of the Northern Province. To establish their affiliation with Marxist revolutionary praxis, RUF lifted quotes and statements from the writings of Great former Marxist Guerillas in their Manifesto and communiqués. Marxist tradition is very much part of Sierra Leone’s political history, since Wallace Johnson, and the labor movement in the 1940s and 1950s, and arguably Siaka Stevens (Abdullah, 1998). Most radical students of the Greenbook study group and PANAFU leaders share Marxist Leninist views. RUF’s appropriation of Marxist quotations could have been intended to merely underscore traces of scattered Marxist

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270 See Lance Gberie, (2005). Chapter 5: Not Just a Coup: The AFRC takeover of 1997, in A Dirty war in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. London: Hurst and company. The NPRC emerged as from an incipient instability, and unprofessionalism of the Sierra Leone, trend that was institutionalized by Siaka Stevens, worsened by the NPRC, and during the war manifested as a motivation crisis (the lack of loyalty to the state), a phenomenon called sobelism, soldiers by day and rebel or brigand by night.
influences of the students who originally put the movement together.\textsuperscript{271} Insofar as extreme exploitative dominating regime continued in Sierra Leone, it is unreasonable to expect that a moral indictment of the state or citizens’ radical revolutionary spirit or consciousness could be indefinitely arrested (Habermas, 1996; Marcuse, 1969). To the extent that state exploitation triggered the rebels’ claim to strive for equality, liberty and fraternity (or solidarity), their rebellion was bound to gain explosive power and substantial support of a society suffering the same condition. The violent form the RUF project took is commonly reflected in a Marxist revolutionary struggle. Such a correlation, however, does not mean we must necessarily conclusively explain RUF violence as stemming from Marxism. Social action can be explained more effectively only by clarifying intentions, which we can approximate by understanding the normative, objective and subjective context of such action (Habermas, 1984; 1987).

Quite apart from some of its leaders declaring themselves Marxists, and the Movement’s association with the Marxist-Leninist oriented PANAFU (Pan-African Student Movement), the RUF ‘revolution’ has striking features with Marxism. The Marxist concept of revolution, which is more or less the sociological conception, considers violent struggle the key character of revolution (Habermas, 1974). Rader (1979:179) argues that Marx himself was the personification of revolution. “After his early conversion to communism, he never swerved from his devotion to the revolutionary cause. At times he edged toward the idea of peaceful revolution, but he was \textit{committed to violence} if peaceful means failed. Because of his \textit{intransigent attitude and unrivaled}

\footnote{Ali Kabba, the student leader directly recruited by Libya, claimed to have written the RUF manuscript, which seemed to have been adapted from the PANAFU document. See \textit{Leonenet Discussions} on the Internet.}
influence, he was the preeminent revolutionist. Only Lenin rivals him in this respect.”

The teleological approach by which revolutionary action must pursue change along a predetermined blueprint tends to presuppose violent action to achieve its end.

The RUF revolutionary praxis (fraught with PANAFU Marxist influences and the praxis philosophy of the Third Universal Theory) manifested a deterministic ethical orientation. Their deterministic oriented action reflected an imperativist ethics, one that cannot admit of moral arguments, but permits only deductive arguments that reconstitute moral problems as theoretical testing of the extent value premises underlying their action are consistent with such ethics or philosophical orientation (Habermas, 1970:106). By ignoring the contingent historical reality of citizens’ democratic aspirations, RUF exemplified a conduct reflective of an imperative ethic – one that privileges the revolutionary guerilla strategy, the “bush-path to democracy,” rather than the discursive democratic path to societal change. RUF directed wanton violence to civilians to force them to behave in a manner consistent with their selected goal of taking power through violent revolutionary struggle, rather than through democratic elections.

The question, therefore, is not whether the RUF revolution would run into moral-practical limits or a legitimation crisis in contingent historical reality, but when and why. One could also argue that perhaps Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, was not very shrewd in using common sense, to consider the contingent historical situation, namely the society’s adamant desire for democracy and cessation of the war. He could not adapt his technical interest of domination inherent in his military orientation to revolutionary change to the emancipatory interest in democratic transition.
Alternatively, Sankoh and RUF failure seemed to be due to the strategic learning of their adversaries. International mediators learnt that they could not dissuade the determined Liberian rebel leader, Charles Taylor to disarm even for general elections in Liberia. Taylor’s determination to become President of Liberia meant that his involvement in the peace and disarmament negotiations was a mere farce. With this learning, international mediators (ECOWAS, UN and AU) realized that RUF involvement in the peace negotiations constitute a necessary perlocution – deceptive self presentation – a strategy designed to bolster chances of surprise military advantage. By the time the rebel war moved from Liberia to Sierra Leone, the mediators and pro-government forces had correctly understood the intransigence and determined goal of the RUF rebellion: the seizure of political power through military victory. The international mediators and pro-government forces were therefore better prepared to counter the perlocutions of Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, denying him scope for guerilla surprises.

However, because of the exclusive strategic orientation of Marxist revolution as teleological action, it is ill suited as framework for analyzing the RUF Movement or revolution. To analyze the RUF revolution, we proceed from a model of a revolution that has democratic constitutionalism or post-conventional morality as its aim, to secure not only the private autonomy, but the political autonomy of citizens as well. Certainly, the principles which refer to the *citoyen*, civil rights, fraternity, solidarity and political participation fits the constitutional democratic model of the French revolution more than the economically oriented Marxist revolutionary praxis or mode of production schema.272

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272 See T. McCarthy, (1984. *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 33-35. He argues that the category of production is incapable of holding up to the moral point of view, since preferential goal values define this category. There is no credible standard of measurement in value
RUF claimed to strive for a new societal consciousness that breaks with the corrupt status quo - *Usai Den Tai Cow Na de I De Eat* [where a cow is tied that’s where it eats]. In claiming to fight to remove the corrupt or illegitimate political and social order, the RUF implied trust in rational discursive politics through which political authority and a modern social order are legitimated (Habermas, 1996: 467-9). Pointing to the legitimation deficit of the State as justification for their rebellion, the RUF appointed themselves moral champions of discontented citizens, a position that implied *identity claim* that requires social mediation i.e. the communicative or expressed endorsement of society (Habermas, 1992).

The forgoing section discusses the possible revolutionary consciousness of the RUF, which this study argues was possibly influenced by the praxis philosophy of the Greenbook and PANAFU Marxist Leninism. As a discourse of justification, their Manifesto tried to ground truth and moral claims to justify a rebellion. They argued that APC exploitation and repression led to the indignation and discontent of citizens, who found the State morally repulsive, and hence the justification to ‘throw it to the dustbin of history.’ The dialectic manifests in situations of exploitation and repression that lead to crisis because systemic forces were incapable of resolving these problems through the moral language game or dialogic understanding. The new situation – not necessarily progressive – was dialectically produced, or arose from crisis ridden developmental orientation, which are more or less based on personal preferences and self understanding.

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273 This adage refers to the pervasive illegal or corrupt use of one’s office, station or position to benefit the self (Reno, 1995, Kpundeh, 1995; and Kallon, 1994).
processes of exploitation, repression, and the denial of political autonomy. A crisis of identity or legitimation or social disintegration marked the revolutionary situation.

We reiterate that while a ‘revolutionary situation’ can be the immediate trigger of rebellion, the claim to pursue a revolution does not necessarily end in radical accelerated change, social integration or redress for the ills of society. The RUF Manifesto was vague about how their new order would carry out actual transformation and conflict resolution after taking power from the APC or their so-called watchdogs, the NPRC. To be truly critical, the RUF project should not rest content with an ideology that serves to develop critical reflection in its addressees or the citizens. In addition to providing critical consciousness of their problems, the revolutionary project must point to ways for adequate relief (Dryzek, 1995: 99). We, therefore, continue our discussion by assessing the RUF project in terms of its emancipatory potential or capacity for self-realization and self-determination.

6.2. Rationalizing a Marxist Critique of Revolutionary Paradox: Domination as Liberation. Some scholars deny RUF any connection to Marxism because of the atrocities they directed at the civilians they were supposed to defend. According to Abdullah (1998), the bulk of marginalized and dispossessed youths in the RUF were *raray boys* or *lumpen*, who were recruited from ‘potes’ or marijuana ghettos. He admits that the first contact this lumpen had with Marxist Leninist ideas through University students of PANAFU and Greenbook Study Group at the University of Sierra Leone. Abdullah suggested that the clandestine recruitment of citizens for the RUF started full fledge only after one of its leaders Ali Kabba graduated from Legon in 1989. Radical
university students - Kanu and Mohamed Mansaray - remained in the vanguard and intelligence wing of the RUF until 1991, when they entered Sierra Leone (Abdullah, 1998). Arguably, the ideological training of the RUF would have to be based on the Third Universal Theory of the Greenbook (Richards, 1995), a praxis philosophy or ideology developed by the Libyan government.

Notwithstanding this, it is possible that RUF leaders could have appropriated intellectual theories as mere pretext or cover for their instincts or self-interested political pursuits (Pareto in Zeitlin, 1987). Recognizing this possibility, we can explicate the conduct of the RUF not only on the basis of the possible ideology, theory or philosophy they professed, or that could have influenced them. We analyse RUF conduct not in terms of the theory of their politics but in terms of the politics of their theory, i.e. the conduct, orientation, policies, programs and effects the theory informs. This approach makes sense because, in the last analysis, RUF individuals have exclusive privilege access to their own subjective world, their consciousness or intention. We can only reasonably assess their possible psychological world by assessing their conduct or action in the objective, practical or social life. Thus, this study does not use Marxist or praxis philosophical principles to understand RUF conduct, but rather it partly explicates the extent their conduct approximates Marxist ideology or orientation in theoretical discourse.

At the outset of entering Sierra Leone in 1991 through Bomaru in the Kailahun District, on the eastern border with Liberia, RUF generated mixed reactions (Abdullah, 1998). Large segments of the population endorsed them, while some could only secretly, or indirectly identified with their professed aspirations and intentions for fear of State reprisal. Some were skeptical, considering the rebel brutality in the Liberian civil war as witnessed on film and the media. Like a typical guerilla strategy, RUF built its strength in numbers by conscripting people in villages or towns they captured in their advance on provincial headquarter towns and the Capital, Freetown. Some of their conscripts were under-aged children. After five years of war and virtual stalemate, the war-weary population and the international community pressed the NPRC, the military junta that overthrew the APC, to return the Country to civilian rule. The UN, ECOWAS and the AU backed a plan to organize general elections in February of 1996.

The RUF was unanimously opposed to the 1996 elections, vowing to disrupt it through terror tactics, indicative of their determination to capture state power through violence (Abdullah, 1998: 227; Bangura, 2002). In their resolve to disrupt the elections, they began targeting the mass of war-weary citizens who supported the democratic elections. RUF’s systematic brutality against civilians was organized into two dreadful campaigns - *Operation No Living Thing* and *Operation Pay Yourself.* These

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campaigns subjected civilians to amputations, lacerations, mutilations, rape and sexual enslavement. Their terror aimed to “send messages” to opponents, pro-government forces, ECOMOG and the UN forces (UNOMSIL) of their opposition to the democratic elections scheduled for 1996. This terror aimed at inducing fear. Typically, they would instruct amputees to take their amputated limbs with verbal or written messages including the demand that ECOMOG “leave the Country to Sierra Leoneans” or that President Kabbah replace their severed limbs (p. 1). Many ordinary civilians died of complications related to their wounds before they could tell others their messages of horror. RUF used these atrocities to discourage civilian participation in the 1996 elections.

The February 1996 elections returned the SLPP victorious, but the violence did not end there. In 1997, RUF infiltrated the Capital Freetown with the help of mutinying soldiers, the AFRC. AFRC overthrew the SLPP regime through a coup, which was followed by intense violence against civilians.\textsuperscript{280} The coup opened the gates of Freetown to the rebels, some of whom had already infiltrated the Capital by then.\textsuperscript{281} The SLPP government had to go in exile in neighboring Guinea as the war raged on between the


RUF/AFRC Junta and soldiers loyal to the government, ECOMOG (ECOWAS troops), and civil militias (the largest group were the Kamajors – or local hunters).  

Apart from the loss of electoral and popular support, RUF’s violence against citizens raised serious moral questions about the Movement. Their atrocities contravened international humanitarian law. Article 3 of the Geneva Convention stipulates that no active participant to a conflict shall wound, detain, and treat any person inhumanely. Article 4 of the 1977 Protocol II of the Geneva Convention prohibits violence to life, health, physical and mental well-being of persons, in particular, murder as well as cruelty such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment. RUF violation of international and national moral and legal principles was ironical, since it was such human rights violations that they used to justify their rebellion. As RUF’s fight against the APC was because of injustice, they too became caught in the dialectic. By their injustice to civilians, RUF created the basis for citizens’ moral indictment of them. RUF violence and injustice against civilians created the basis for the latter to challenge them. It is, therefore, not surprising that civil militias turned up en masse to fight the RUF/AFRC Junta.

The wanton brutality and indiscriminate killing of civilians intensified after the RUF and AFRC seized the Capital, Freetown in January 1998. Their intensified violence convinced critics that RUF’s claim of liberation was a mere propaganda, planned ideology or mass deception. After taking over the Capital, RUF referred to their Pact with the mutinying soldiers (AFRC) as a “miracle” that “demonstrates the genuine

283 See article 2 of the UN Special court Document, Statutes of the Special court of Sierra
feeling of brotherhood." Arguably, there was *self-delusion* in this public relations campaign because the rebel/military Junta believed that the society would willingly excuse their atrocities when they apologize. Their lawyer, Omrie Golley, apologized on their behalf, by arguing that “one cannot control what happens in war.”

Even Sankoh believed that ‘later’ on – referring to when they would have taking power – they would apologize and the people would consider their ‘position.’ That RUF even saw the need to apologize underscores the *dialectic of moral life* i.e. that one cannot totally nullify the need to morally justify ones political conduct. We can only momentarily displace this need.

It seems the instrumental orientation of the rebels denied them the capacity to differentiate actual volition from covert force. As subjects under RUF dictatorship, victimized citizens’ acceptance of RUF apology can only be out of fear or force, rather than sincere volition. Only under unconstrained discourse or non-repressive conditions can we consider citizens’ acceptance of RUF apology or pardon genuine, true, and morally right. Without normal conditions of civility or the possibility for post-conventional morality (unconstrained communication), without their political autonomy, or practice of their communicative freedoms, citizens ‘yes,’ or their pardon or ‘acceptance’ of RUF apology remains bogus.

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AFRC leadership on invading and taking over Freetown made this apology. (Sierra Leone News Archives In *Sierra Leone Web*.)

Omrie Golley, RUF Calls for Independent Investigation by RUF political leadership in Kailahun District” in *Sierra Leone News Web, January*, 1999, p.1 in (Sierra Leone News Archives.).

Not surprising, the RUF/AFRC Junta regime met outright global and national condemnation as disruptive opportunists, who opposed the peaceful resolution of the Conflict because of diamond greed (Smillie et al, 1991) or because of their incapacity for civilize mores (Kaplan, 1994). The RUF/AFRC Junta could not find national and international support for their rhetoric of liberation, solidarity claim and overthrow of the democratically elected SLPP regime. Abdullah’s (1998) critique that AFRC/RUF “dictatorship of the lumpen-proletariat” starved of correct Marxist ideas is responsible for their atrocious conduct. This latter argument has specific significance for this study, since the research methodology here is a reconstruction of Marxist historical materialism. In the discourse that follows, we examine whether correct Marxist orientation of the rebels could not have stemmed RUF violence.

Could correct grounding in Marxism have enabled the RUF become morally sensitive? Why did RUF believe they could deny citizens’ their democratic rights and, break international humanitarian law with impunity? Why did they try to forcefully discourage citizens’ participation in the 1996 general elections? Why did RUF manifest such moral practical amnesia or systematic intentional violence in their ‘liberation’ project? Why could RUF not understand that citizens’ ‘acceptance’ of their apology was bogus as long as they have total control of the Society? Can the conscious systematic violence RUF directed at ordinary civilians, which was aimed at inducing fear and terror be ‘accidents of war?’ Under the Junta domination citizens were denied their political autonomy, and were subjected to psychological and social pathologies, as they cannot say what they truly believe or believe what they say (Habermas, 1979).
The discourse that follows in this section rationalizes – thematizes and critically examines – the argument that RUF’s lack of effective grounding in Marxism led to their violence and failure (Abdullah, 1998). Taking aim at Richards (1995), who argue that the rebels were indeed influenced by the Marxist Greenbook, Abdullah explained the failure of RUF’s so called revolution as a failure in proper grounding in Marxist revolutionary ideas: “If the RUF had any ideology, it was definitely not shaped by the Greenbook…Green book signs were markedly absent in the RUF. Ironically, none of the student radicals whom Richards claimed were influenced by the Green book, joined the RUF (p. 225).”

Abdullah’s critique is problematic since the University students, who started the Greenbook Movement on college campuses not only controlled the initial recruitment drive of the RUF Movement, but were also self-confessed Marxist.287 These students championed the Greenbook study group on college campuses, marijuana ghettos or ‘potes’ (Abdullah, 1998). Abdullah acknowledged that even after their expulsion from the University of Sierra Leone, these student leaders continue to influence the Movement, up to a year to launching the campaign. When these students, who championed the Greenbook movement, were expelled from the University of Sierra Leone, the Libyan People’s Bureau (Embassy) helped sponsor their studies in the University of Legon, Ghana (Abdullah, 1998). It is little doubt that the Third Universal Theory or the

287To be sure, radical student activities at the University of Sierra Leone accounts for the origins of the RUF rebellion. However, after the students were expelled and went to Legon University in Ghana, their influence on the Movement continued through the recruitment of its members. Abu Kana and Rashid Mansaray, who stayed with the Movement were vanguard members executed in 1992. Philip Palmer, and other intellectuals joined the Movement, according to Abdullah. Gibril Massaquoi, who stayed with the Movement till the end, shw that there were enough ideologues in the Movement. The inconsistencies of Abdullah’s argument seem to stem from his aim to rid the RUF of any Marxist or intellectual influence.
Greenbook guided RUF’s *organization of enlightenment* or ideological indoctrination in their Libyan training camps of Benghazi and Tripoli (Richards, 1995).

Notwithstanding this, Abdullah (1998) dismisses any Marxist or Greenbook signs in the RUF Manifesto, and considers their lifting of passages of Cabral, Fanon, and Che Guevara in their Manifesto as plagiarism. He saw RUF’s use of Marxist guerilla arguments and quotes as plagiarism because the RUF failed to relate to the people as true *Marxist guerillas* should. One could ask whether the Russian Communist Revolution and the Cultural Revolution of China were free of violence. The depth of the extreme cruelty committed during the Cultural Revolution has come to light (BBC, 2009). Considering the history of systematic violence in Marxist ‘revolutions,’ one senses in Abdullah’s critique of RUF a *melancholy*, which stems from the failure of a revered revolutionary ideology (Marxism) that is nonetheless still adhered to steadfastly by many (Habermas, 1996).

While this study does not use Marxism to explain RUF conduct, we should note that RUF “rhetoric” was corroborated by the ‘revolutionary situation’ i.e. the exploitative conditions that gave the Movement its material force, motivating discontents to willingly join the rebel Movement. RUF may have lifted fragments of Marxist ideology as pretext, but the exploitative material and historical conditions corroborated their revolutionary claim of exploitation, repression and marginalization in the society. This reality was laid out in RUF’s Manifesto. In the last analysis, Abdullah’s attempt to disassociate RUF from Marxist or Greenbook ideology implies an attempt to show that Marxism stands above the kind of wanton violence perpetrated by RUF against civilians. This attempt
contradicts the empirical evidence of even what one could consider a model of ‘successful’ Marxist revolution, the cultural revolution of China.  

Notwithstanding the problematic conduct of the RUF, we should also note that ‘not every revolutionary situation leads to a revolution.’ To contest RUF’s Marxist revolutionary consciousness because of their violence against civilians is problematic. To be sure, the means the RUF adopted was not revolutionary i.e. it did not lead to a change or reflect a new, radical and rational departure from the previous systemic political corruption and domination of society. By maiming citizens to discourage their participation in the 1996 democratic elections, RUF ‘revolution’ seems more like repression rather than liberation. Making a Pact with coup plotters does not amount to miraculous ‘brotherhood’ or solidarity,’ but a treasonable crime.

However, we cannot use these moral failings of RUF as basis to totally deny their Marxist orientation, since this requires getting at their psychological world, their mind or subjective reality, to which only have privilege access. We can more certainly connect their subjective orientation, world or consciousness to their objective reality or empirical evidence, or to their practical action, their agency, speech and action (or their normative world). RUF may have started with genuine revolutionary intentions to establish a socialist egalitarian regime, but quickly confronted by an objectives reality or contingent

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289 Recent revelations show the extent of the atrocities committed by the Maoist during the Cultural Revolution (BBC January, 2009).
historical dynamic processes to which they could not relate properly. Despite their lofty ideals of regime change, RUF proved itself incapable of relating to the wind of moral practical (democratic) change that swept Sierra Leone from mid 1990s onward. For the RUF, the democratic discourse of 1995 to resolve the Conflict seem to sabotage their revolutionary project, which aims at change through violent struggle.

   Viewed here as the accelerated rationalization towards a just social order, a revolution clearly betrays a moral crisis if it must realize itself by brutalizing those it claims to liberate, rather than promote self-determination or political autonomy realized through the communicative freedoms.

   Someone who has acquired the interactive competence of a certain level will form a moral consciousness of the same level to the extent that his motivational structure does not hinder him from holding to the structures of every day action under stress as well in the consensual resolution of action conflict.293 The morally developed subject is placed under the imperative of consciously processing conflicts, which indicates the degree of stability of the general competence of such a subject. A person qualified as morally “good” is one who holds on to his acquired interactive competence for normal conflict-poor situations even under stress i.e. they continue the efforts to reach understanding in morally-relevant conflicts of action, rather than consciously avoid such situation by resorting to force or strategic action. Thus, RUF’s wanton violence against civilians to discourage their exercise of political autonomy or democratic opinion and will formation reflects a moral intuitive consciousness below the requisite post conventional level appropriate for the society.

   RUF’s motivational structure can help us explain why they turned away from the

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path of principled morality (post-conventional communicative rationality) or from establishing mutual understanding with citizens on the democratic question. While the RUF could have been initially motivated by the need to seize political power in order to end the systemic exploitation in the society, the possible ideas informing them (such as the Third Universal Theory and the PANAFU Marxist Leninism) were so mainly economic and have only a negligible normative or democratic content. From a secular perspective, praxis philosophy reduces morality (exemplified in post-conventional consciousness or rational dialogue) to social labor (McCarthy, 1985). Marxist orientation is essentially informed by value preferences and instrumental egocentric orientation that does not amount to contemporary secular morality. The rebel’s determination to forcefully take power in opposition to the society’s democratic aspiration shows their rigidity and determination to realize their goal through revolutionary struggle or labor. RUF were unwilling to give citizens the power to make the final decision to decide who gets power or not. Their conduct illustrated a lack of what entails the moral regulation of action conflict (dialogue). Despite their lip service to democracy in their Manifesto, RUF seem ill prepared and unwilling to accommodate the democratic turn in the Conflict. In the words of Marcuse, RUF’s recourse to brutality seemed to aim at concealing the conflict between them and the society - who desired democratic elections as the way to end the war. For the RUF its seems “Freedom thus becomes a regulative concept of

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294 See Habermas, (1973). Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique In Theory and Practice. Translated by John Viertel. Boston: Beacon, p. 222 “The analysis of this [capitalist] relationship does not, as the term ‘exploitation’ might suggest, have the character of a moral judgment. (The behavior of capitalist is not in any way to be attributed to individual persons, but is objectively determined by their position in the process of production.”; also see Habermas, (1990). Excursus on the Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm In Philosophical Discourse on Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Trans. by Federick Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
reason guiding the practice of changing reality in accordance with its idea i.e. its own potentialities – to make reality free for its truth [its revolutionary blueprint](Marcuse, H. (1972), *Counterrevolution and Revolt*).”

By their unanimous violent opposition to the democratic elections, RUF conjured up the dialectic of liberal freedom and radical democratic equality. In trying to subjugate or intimidate citizens to ‘manufacture’ their consent, the Junta triggered a dialectical tension between the society’s support for democratic equality and against the revolutionary freedom the rebels professed to bring. RUF found itself in a quagmire of how to unite the democratic right of citizens with their strategy of imposing their own version of *freedom*. This disputation between the democratic desire of citizens and the despotic revolutionary project of freedom -as ‘historical, empirical transcendence (1972)’- also characterized the debates during the French Revolution (Habermas, 1996: 472). This phenomenon is reminiscent of the situation in the French Revolution by which the Bourgeoisie feared being overpowered by the *citoyen* (p. 474). In trying to set *boundaries* on the principle of democratic equality of citizens, the RUF limited the subjective liberties or negative freedoms (private autonomy) of citizens. The *freedom* RUF pursued cannot admit of democratic equality or self-determination because it moved within and tended towards despotism. Thus, RUF’s so-called ‘revolution’ or accelerated societal rationalization had to fail.

The issue of democratic rights is central to a modern revolutionary project. This *right over right* – the right to change a repressive regime – is a moral constitutional right of citizens to overthrow an unjust regime (Marcuse, 1969). Despite his materialist reformulation, Marx in his little speech in English to assembled working class recognized
this dialectical right: “History is the judge – its executioner, the proletarian (Marx cited in Rader, 1979: 199).” In their Manifesto, the RUF also talked about their right and duty to change the APC and what they called their ‘watch dogs,’ NPRC.

This same right over right led citizens to organize civil militias to confront the RUF/AFRC Junta. The latter came into direct conflict with the sovereign will of the masses, whose consciousness of their democratic right to oppose an unjust regime was already practically demonstrated by the RUF rebellion. In light of their brutal mistreatment of citizens, RUF/AFRC can only posit or make a bogus claim to liberate citizens by overthrowing the regime. Their claim of brutalizing citizens to liberate them cannot find support in the broader world society; and lacked objective or empirical validity (truth) and normative validity (moral rightness). Thus, RUF cannot gain citizens’ support for its solidarity claim or forced stability in the social order. “The normative meaning of the validity of laws that deserve general assent cannot be explained by the semantic properties of abstract and general laws (Habermas, 1996: 474).” RUF’s wanton brutality of ordinary civilians produced a social order based on force or fear, a situation they rhetorically redefined as liberation and solidarity. This rhetoric played itself out quickly as citizens’ began a massive counter-revolution and civil disobedience campaigns against the RUF.

RUF violence impeded citizens’ genuine support for them because the kind of public discourse of solidarity they professed must mediate between reason and will, between the opinion formation of all and the majoritarian will-formation of the self-appointed representatives (Habermas, 1996: 475). By denying the public scope for dialogue (post conventional morality), the RUF/AFRC Junta made their posited solidarity
claim untenable. “To the moral language game belong the disagreements that can be resolve convincingly from the perspective of participants on the basis of potential justifications that are equally accessible to all.”\textsuperscript{295} The sociological merit of principled (post-conventional) morality for resolving disagreement – that was denied through the Juntas RUF bogus solidarity claim – is in its internal connection to the gentle persuasive force of reason. The RUF/AFRC junta could not adduce valid reasons to justify their wanton violence to civilians; hence their claim of solidarity with citizens cannot find support in the larger society. The crisis of legitimation, or its flip side, motivation crisis (the loss of the mass of society’s loyalty) both manifest as the counterrevolution Movement. RUF’s posited claim of having the society’s support for the solidarity they claim to bring was bogus.

While we cannot state that RUF violence was categorically informed by Marxism, its manner of pursuing change by military struggle is strikingly consistent with Marxist revolutionary praxis. Marxists tend to consider praxis a “critical revolutionary activity” i.e. they consider revolt a self-conscious political action born from a revolutionary situation of exploitation (Habermas, Left Hegelians, 1990, p. 65). Emancipation, which is supposed to originate in one’s capacity for autonomy - self determination and self realization - is muddled when shunted exclusively into the economic domain, which is characterized by egotistical complexes of interaction:

If the ruptured totality is thought of as alienated labor, and if the latter is supposed to overcome its alienation from itself, then emancipatory praxis can proceed from labor or revolutionary praxis itself …But in this world of perceptible and manipulable objects,

which constitutes the realm of production, only cognitive instrumental rationality can come to its own (p. 65). Justice or ‘morality’ in Marxist revolutionary praxis is located in the purposive instrumental rationality of the laboring subject instead of in communicative reflection. Communicative reason is strange to praxis philosophy because the latter often presents ready-made reason (dialectical materialism) simply as the key to emancipation, nothing beyond that. Its vagueness on how revolutionary praxis can proceed morally to create a just or egalitarian end shows a Marxian tendency to gloss over the despotism and oppression associated with its method or means, or even end (technological military strategy) (Ake, 1989; Habermas, 1990: 66). RUF exemplified a similar tendency to ignore the immorality and despotism of its wanton violence to citizens in its ‘revolution.’

Markus (1982), argued that Marxism (and its praxis philosophy offshoots) are incapable of building genuine solidarity as they lack correct insight about dialogue.

Life is rational when people, in awareness of the constraints and restrictions of their life-situation, determine the collective social goals, and values of their action through the articulation and dialogical confrontation of their needs (Markus cited in J. Habermas, 1990: 82). Praxis philosophy such as the Third Universal Theory can say nothing about reason built into communicative relations or how subjects can appropriate it. RUF’s failure to grasp the importance of dialogue as the way to establish legitimacy or rational solidarity bonds with citizens stem from their despotic logic exemplified by their determination to achieve military victory at all cost. Their piecemeal praxis philosophical orientation (Marxist-Leninist PANFU, and the Greenbook influences) to which they were exposed poorly conditioned them to relate appropriately to the contingent historical reality – the democratic call of the society between 1996 and 2000.
RUF’s wanton brutality and historicism manifested in its inability to entertain the stark reality that citizens favored the democratic elections. We again see a striking similarity between RUF behavior and Marxist materialist dialectic that berates citizens, Marxism takes its orientation from absolute relation-to-self, which devalues and strips conscious reflection of all seriousness (Habermas, 1990; 1974). The RUF exemplified similar Marxist historicism and positivism, as shown by the Marxist materialist conception of the dialectical project as captured in the Communist Manifesto:

All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they ossify. All that is solid melts into air; all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.²⁹⁷

Praxis philosophy assumes that dialectical consciousness, which breaks with historical consciousness behind the achievements and contradiction of modern society, also explains the social transformation that would release the society’s rational potential (Habermas Left Hegelian, 1990, p. 63). Without clearly working out the constitutive elements of such rational potential, the idea simply rest content with the assumption that accelerated societal rationalization or modernization – revolution- would gain its furthest advancement where life conditions are mobilized and revolutionized the farthest [my emphasis](p. 60). A society or person that fails to mobilize and revolutionize is deemed backward, hence the need to modernize (mobilize and revolutionize) such society or person. Once again, we see an identical logic reflected in RUF’s ‘revolution,’ one in which they systematically brutalized civilians with the aim of forcefully mobilizing them to the guerilla war or bush path to democracy. Thus, RUF demonstrates a similar

Marxists’ fundamental suspicion of democracy and typical disdain for societies they consider backward (Ake 1989; Habermas, 1990).

The moral depravity RUF showed by its wanton violence to civilians betrays a similar Marxist type violence that stems from the ideology’s historicism, scientistic (positivistic) and philosophical misconceptions of emancipation, rather than autonomous self-determination for social change. RUF’s struggle to achieve power or change by brutally mobilizing and ‘revolutionizing’ the society makes their revolutionary praxis, a teleological instrumental action with a fixed goal and method that denied citizens scope to consciously determine their history. Initially, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh could not even see the need to apologize for RUF violence against civilians. From their perspective, citizens’ resistance to mobilize and revolutionize in the war path constitutes backward historical consciousness from which they are to be liberated. Sankoh coldly admitted that they violated ordinary citizens as all the other combatants did (“Who is Foday Sankoh,” Youtube, 2009). He took their violence for granted, as a given, or as par for the revolutionary cause: “How can you approve that the combatants, the RUF are responsible. Everybody who took part in the war are responsible, starting from those we call intervention force, the Kamajors, government soldiers, and even the RUF.” By taking their wanton violence for granted, as a given in the war, RUF made their subsequent plea or apology that their amputations, mutilations, lacerations, sexual enslavement and rape of citizens were mere ‘accidents’ of war, false and untruthful.

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298 Rader, (1979). Crisis and Revolution in Marx’s Interpretation of History talked about the failure of Marxist vanguards to recognize that they need to be educated on reality even as they claim to embody the exclusive knowledge about society’s evolution, which they conceive as a totality.

Their cold moral detachment to the brutality of citizens betrays an incapacity to recognize the moral limits of whatever ‘orientation’ informed and motivated their ‘revolution.’

Marcuse (1972) argue that such a cold detachment shows how imagination conceived as realistic knowledge can perpetrate an insoluble tension between idea and reality, the potential and the actual. Sankoh’s idea of pursuing the ‘progress of the people’ and ‘salvation,’³⁰⁰ translated into or practically manifested as the destruction of citizens. RUF’s ideological orientation led to the historicism, which rendered them incapable of

…the faintest inkling that hatred of the decent and admiration for the depraved are inverted impulses not just before the tribunal of custom, but of truth, and that they are not merely reprehensible in an ideological sense, but are objectively debased experiences and reactions (Horkheima (1974: 102) cited in Habermas, J. (1993). Justification and Application: Remarks on discourse ethics, Trans. Ciaran Cronin. Mass.: MIT Press, p. 135).

As far as the rebels were concern, their wanton violence constitutes rational (instrumental) action, one carried out in the name of revolutionary mobilization for change. The RUF violence to ordinary civilians was systematic, calculated, a necessary constitutive element of their revolutionary project just as violence is key to Marxist strategy to gain political power.³⁰¹ For the RUF, forced mobilization of the society by wanton violence is consistent with the teleological action or the despotic logic of their

³⁰⁰ Ibid, Sankoh, 2009
project. In praxis philosophy, democracy, legalism, or ethical political concerns, rather than war, is often considered false consciousness.\(^{302}\)

It seems the rebels did not want to tailor their teleological revolutionary praxis to the demands of the specific historical contingent situation, namely the democratic dispensation of the day. To do so would have caused their ideology to lose its practical relevance.\(^{303}\) Their “abstraction from the particular constellation of the individual case also has the effect of excluding the consequences of action from normative consideration (p. 120).” In subsuming the specific historical reality of Sierra Leone under the instrumental reading that revolutionary social transformation must thrive always through the labor of military struggle, the RUF could demonstrate a moral practical amnesia or willful blindness to the real suffering they were unleashing on civilians in the name of liberation or revolutionary mobilization.

Like Sankoh the RUF leader, Charles Taylor the NPFL leader was so determined to take power that even international moral pressure could not sway him to disarm for democratic elections. The Liberian elections had to be conducted under the dreadful specter of Taylor’s rebel army. The slogan of the election ‘campaigns’ that brought Taylor to power was: “You kill my pa, you kill my ma, but I will vote for you” [\textit{you kill my father and you kill my mother, but I will vote for you}].\(^{304}\) These are words of an intimidated population, a technically mastered or subjugated society. The RUF leader,

\(^{302}\) In the Green book this idea is propogagated.; . (Habermas, 1974; Marcuse, 1969).

\(^{303}\) Habermas, J. (1993). Lawrence Kolberg and neo-Aristotelianism In \textit{Justification and Application}. Trans. Ciaran Cronin, MIT p. 120

\(^{304}\) This researcher spent about 6 months in Liberia interacting with the local community, university forums and the administration. The impression from the slogan was that the society was resigned to its fate, as Taylor held all the cards, not even ECOMOG (the ECOWAS force) could coerce or cajole Taylor to lay down his weapons, especially after the President Samuel Doe saga.
Foday Sankoh, who was bankrolled by the Libyan government like Taylor, demonstrated similar rigid adherence or determination to gain power through military victory.

RUF’s determination to realize their goal of taking power by brutal means makes untenable Zainab Bangura’s claim that Sankoh’s unyielding attitude in peace democratic talks was due to his low education:

Sankoh is a very difficult man, who is very determined to be president, who feels he can be president…he was not interested in a negotiable end…He does not know how to deal with this. He is afraid to let go. He believes that if he let go he will lose everything he worked for (Zainab Bangura, Who is Foday Sankoh? in Youtube, 2009).

To be sure, Sankoh feared the peace and disarmament talks that aimed to clear the way for democratic elections. His fear seemed to stem from his lack of proper democratic orientation. As the leader of a Movement that believes in achieving their goal through the guerilla bush path to democracy’ or violent military struggle, democratic considerations are of the least concern. Sankoh’s statement “I want to be the leader of the people of Sierra Leone…I am going to be the leader of the revolution (Who is Foday Sankoh? YouTube Video Clip, 2009),” reveals the instrumental or teleological action of one motivated by a revolutionary struggle aimed at military seizure of power. Insofar as Sankoh’s certainty of becoming leader of Sierra Leone is contingent upon his remaining the leader of a ‘successful’ revolution, he would have do all he can ensure that their rebellion successfully run its full course. Discouraging the democratic mode of change is therefore perfectly rational for one acting from such instrumental teleological orientation. Only with military victory can Sankoh realize his dream of becoming President, which is automatic because he is leader of the successful revolution. Taylor, Castro, Gadaffi, and Mao became heads of state because they were leaders of a successful revolution or civil
war. Taylor became the Liberian President after successfully gaining military victory over the Doe regime. Sankoh’s chance of becoming President of Sierra Leone directly depended on whether he achieves military victory against his opponents. Again, we see that RUF’s manner or logic of selecting political leaders and change of regime bears striking resemblance to Marxist revolutionary politics. Thus, Sankoh’s unwillingness to sincerely participate in democratic talks was, therefore, not due less to his low education, but mainly due to his desire to become President, which depends on the successful conclusion of military campaigns.

In the forgoing discussions, we have explained the conduct of the RUF as bearing striking affinities to Marxist revolutionary politics. This study showed that RUF was somewhat oriented by Marxist ideas, but that would lead us to deterministic explanations of their conduct, which detracts from rigorous psychological, objective and normative considerations. This study explicates RUF’s paradoxical conduct by examining its possible subjective reality (or desire or intention to gain power), the objective reality (the actual democratic challenge citizens posed to their desire of forcefully seizing of power), and their normative reality (their rational instrumental judgment that they must forcefully mobilize citizens to realize their desire). Their view that their revolution ought to proceed and be realized by violence bears another striking similarity to Marxist revolutionary praxis. Only after critically examining the normative, empirical and psychological aspect of the war reality, can one then illustrate possible affinities between the RUF ‘revolution’ and Marxist politics.

RUF’s determination to gain power at all cost, hence to paradoxically carry out its project of ‘freedom’ by violence that denied citizens’ private liberties and democratic
right of franchise reflects a Marxist ideology that eschews democracy, the ethical political category or legalism (Marcuse, 1969; Habermas, 1974). Marxist revolutionaries often presuppose that their interest is the same as that of society. This revolutionary ideology simply clamps the lifeworld or society’s interest and the interest of the proletariat (including those laboring in the military sense) as one; they posit that the interest of the proletariat reflects the universal interest of society. In contradiction, Marxism claims to uncover the *dialectic of concealment* - to expose the fact that the interest of the ruling class is different from the society’s interest, on the one hand. On the other hand, Marxists conceal the *dialectic of morality* by their tactic of propaganda (systemic distortions of discourse) and repression of public reason as a way to reconstitute or redefine reality to make their project the ‘people’s revolution,’ hence guilty of the *dialectic of concealment*.

In many areas of their so called ‘revolutionary’ project, the RUF exemplified the Marxist-type assumption that their ‘revolutionary’ interest in freedom (as they conceive it) is shared by the rest of the society. They tried to deny citizens’ their right to campaign (democratic opinion formation) and to vote (democratic will formation) in the elections. This action betrayed their revolutionary claim of promoting the society’s self-determination or capacity to consciously make history by their autonomous will as bogus. By operating in the ideology that *they can stand above society*, RUF stifled democracy.

Habermas (1990: 54-5) argues that Marxist positivism is reflected in their despotic and blind adherence to the *principle of taking power* by violent struggle, which cause them to sacrifice contemporary history to historicism, an approach that severs revolutionary (modern) consciousness from its distinctive tie to rationality. Relating to
contingent historical reality in this historicist manner can deliver one over to historical thinking in an *unphilosophical* (illogical) way: “To want to be oriented by history while standing in its midst would be like wanting to hold on to the waves during a shipwreck (Lowith cited Habermas, 1990: 55).” Those manifesting such dogmatic and historicist consciousness cannot practically discover what they should want and do in the collective interest (Habermas, 1990: 82).

Since, we cannot categorically say whether RUF’s claim to be Marxist guerillas is authentic (it may well be a Machiavellian pretext or ploy), the study tries to understand the reasons and possible intentions underlying RUF’s action. This analysis focus on the dynamics of the contingent historical situation and the moral practical deficiency of their moral intuitive consciousness as reflected in their wanton brutality to civilians. We now turn to the second aspect of the Marxist critique of RUF, which uses the guerilla as standard to assess their moral failing. In what follows, this study argues that guerilla is a strategic concept, and as such, it is inadequate as a moral standard to critique or assess RUF’s violent conduct or moral failing (Habermas, 1987; see chapter 4).
(6.2b) Rationalizing the Guerilla as Moral Actor. Abdullah (1998: 223) used RUF’s wanton violence against civilians to deny their claim of being Marxist guerillas. As guerilla movements were instrumental in throwing off foreign yoke since World War II, they have assumed normative significance and have even become synonymous with liberation. RUF tried to identify themselves as guerillas this way: We ‘moved deeper into the comforting bosom of our mother earth – the forest’ because the ‘forest welcomes us and gave us succor and sustenance.’ By appropriating passages of guerillas such as Mao, Che Guevara and Cabral, RUF tried to identify themselves as Marxist guerillas, hence to gain the prestige such identification or association brings.

RUF’s violence and demoralization of citizens caused critics such as Abdullah (1998) to dismiss their claim of being Marxist Guerillas: “If the RUF leadership was immersed in any revolutionary theory and practice, it would have come to grips with the basics in guerilla warfare, and thus avoid a suicidal ‘semi-conventional warfare (Abdullah, 1998: 224).’ He argued that RUF failed to politically organize the people, relate to them, and to implement a revolutionary program; instead they “embarked on a campaign of terror in the countryside.” Abdullah’s use of terms such as relate to, politically organize, and implement refer to a Marxist guerilla strategy or revolutionary project. He believed that the rebels’ failure to apply the guerilla method caused them to unleash wanton violence on civilians. Abdullah believed that, if the rebels had implemented a Marxist program in relating to citizens, and politically organizing their rebellion according to Marxist guerilla blueprint, they would not have terrorized civilians.

306 Carleton Beal, “Big Little Wars” in Great Guerilla warriors). New York: Prentice Hall, 1971 (p. 12). A critical analysis of colonization and ‘foreign’ does not necessarily refer to external but to domination (George, 2002), and colonized social relations (Habermas, 1987).
The argument advocates a Marxist conception of the philosophy of history i.e. relating to politics from an imagined Marxist blueprint, rather than according to the contingent historical reality (Habermas, 1974; Marcuse, 1972).

Beal (1971) isolated some features of the guerilla, which Abdullah (1998) also imply in his critique. He argues that without the spirit of classic guerillas such as Castro, Mao or Cabral, the guerilla is bound to be immoral. In light of their wanton violence against citizens, RUF would certainly appear to Beal not as true guerillas but as ‘new guerilla’ movements, whose officials and elites manipulate society instead of promoting or defending oppressed peoples (Beal, 1971: 16). This new breed of guerillas often find that the ‘foreigner is not so bad;’ they even plot to restore oppressive forms of government to protect elite privileges. But by what specific moral criteria, other than the guerilla strategy do the Marxist critic distinguish dictatorships of the true guerillas (Mao and Castro) and ‘new’ guerillas, especially as both tends to restore or create elite privileges?

Once their leader, Foday Sankoh, became Vice President in charge of strategic minerals, under the 1999 Lome Agreement, he began traveling abroad to make dubious investment connections in South Africa and other places. Another contradiction of RUF comes to mind: though the RUF rebels had opposed capitalism, they quickly realized that they would have to seek after capital to ensure their survival. Does capitalist

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investment necessarily create elite privilege, or is capitalism at home necessarily colonialism? 

Citing Fidel Castro, Beal (1971:19) argues that the guerilla must seek local support for their method, solutions and aims. Military victory without political support is useless (p. 24). The guerilla must never fight a popular regime, since its justifiable target must be a dictatorship, a government that is an enemy of the people. A dictatorship is already at civil war with the people, even if as moral indictment (Koselleck, 1988). Based on this standard, one could say that the RUF revolt against the APC prior to 1995 seems justified. By their campaign of intimidating civilians to disrupt the scheduled 1996 general elections, and then to overthrow the democratically elected SLPP regime in 1997, RUF failed to give heed to this guerilla principle cited by Beal.

Notwithstanding this, to assess the moral competence of the rebels in terms of the extent they approximate the conduct of exemplary Marxist guerillas such as Castro, Mao, and Cabral is to morally inflate the guerilla strategy. As a military method, the guerilla strategy cannot serve as moral standard. The basic question one needs to ask is whether adopting a moral (democratic) principle is possible in guerilla warfare. Conceived in the logic of game theory, guerilla is essentially a strategic action, with its method and logic defined solely by the need to gain military success. ‘Guerilla’ is a Spanish word for ‘small or little war.’ Usually called the ‘peoples war,’ the guerilla approach has the following characteristics: organization of small groups; elements of surprise, infiltration, and deception to gain intelligence; propaganda; ‘social’ reform (Che Guevara); directing

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310 Kwame Nkrumah, (1964). *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization*. London, Heinemann. This question involves a central theoretical question of system differentiation that has to do with science and philosophy, which this study partially addressed at the end of chapter 5.
terror at enemy leaders or civilians to provoke the big power to overreact, hence to alienate it from the people [RUF atrocities against civilians caused President Kabbah to order the aerial bombing of Freetown in 1998, alienating him from the Capital population]; reactive tactics of elusions and withdrawal –the enemy advances we retreat, the enemy camps we harass, the enemy tires we attack (Mao); and avoidance of fixed bases or depots; and the preference for thick forest cover and mountainous regions (p. 7-10). Thus, guerilla warfare is a strategic action built on deception, misrepresentation, and surprise attacks.

Guerilla is a strategic and tactical military action usually adopted in revolt or revolutionary struggle. It is not a moral action, but a technical, strategic (success oriented) action. To use guerilla as standard for criticizing RUF’s moral failings is to impute or posit moral and ethical content for an action that is mainly military or strategic. This strategic approach of military struggle may emphasize any of the above features differently depending on the contingency of the war situation. In referring to a guerilla such as Che Guevara as social reformer, one could only refer to the end stage of his revolutionary military struggle, under which social reform can be systematically pursued. If one is referring to the means or rebellion, the strategic and tactical conduct of the military struggle itself (the guerilla warfare), then one would be advocating a more humane (moral) conduct in the military campaign, to support the revolutionary goal.

Unlike the strategic (success-oriented) action of the guerilla, a social reform along moral-practical lines, one reflective of the moral point of view (of what is equally

312 Works by Mao; Mini-manual of the Urban Guerilla by Carlos Marighella; Che Guevara, Guerilla warfare, and; Haris Nasuta Abdulla, Fundamentals of Guerilla warfare are few outstanding or seminal
acceptable or just to everyone) must detach itself from the primary orientation to personal success and one’s own life, since both pragmatic and ethical reflection remain inextricably linked in discourses of equality and justice. Moral-practical discourse requires that subjects break with all unquestioned truths (p. 12), such as those revolutionary principles predetermined by a Marxist dialectical blueprint. Stipulating military labor as the primary approach to revolutionary transformation makes Marxist guerilla strategy to stifle communicative freedoms, ill-positioning it to meet today’s moral-practical requirement of social interaction.

The higher-level intersubjectivity characterized by an intermeshing of the perspective of each with the perspective of all [the moral point of view] is constituted only under the communicative presuppositions of a universal discourse in which all those affected could take part and could adopt a hypothetical, argumentative stance towards validity claims of norms and modes of action that have become problematic…In this forum, only those norms proposed that express a common interest of all affected can win justified assent (Habermas, 1993). Justification and Application. MIT Press, pp. 12-13).

Unlike the moral actor, the strategic actor or guerilla can assume the role of social reformer only as part of his strategic calculation or success orientation. Today, the ‘moral’ consideration of a Marxist guerilla would have to be socially deficient as it cannot admit of the complex rational discursive requirement of principled morality in a post-traditional society. Even if the guerilla aims at social reform by showing moral sensitivity to those affected, this military strategy cannot fully admit of the complex demands of post-conventional (communicative) reason. The moral practical demands of

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actual social interaction necessary for legitimate social reform would burst the guerilla framework.

As empirical strategy, guerilla warfare is centrally a *teleological action* by which an actor tries to bring about a desired end state – a guerilla controlled regime - by means of this strategic means or method that holds the greatest promise of success in the given situation, when applied in a suitable manner (Habermas, 1987: 85). The central logic of teleological action, such as guerilla warfare, is a decision among alternative courses of action that aims to realize an end while guided by maxims (such as Marxist revolutionary interpretation of a historical situation. The guerilla method is a teleological strategic action based on surprise and propaganda to achieve military victory. Its propaganda consists of elements of *dramaturgic action, covert strategy of communicative distortion* characterized by deception, *perlocution*, or false self presentation (Habermas, 1987: 85-95). As demonstrated by Taylor, Sankoh, and Stevens, the involvement of the guerilla in a democratic or peace talks only served as means to gain strategic advantage of time or to deceive opponents. Thus, to use guerilla as moral standard reflects misconception or confusion about this teleological action typology.

Abdullah’s argument seems to morally overrate the guerilla as a fighter, strategy and tactic. To use the Marxist guerilla strategy as a moral standard to explain or evaluate RUF’s immoral conduct is problematic. Habermas (1990) claimed that generally, Marxism has a diminutive ‘normative’ or moral-practical orientation or content. This is evident in their goal of brutally seizing power:

In every struggle of class against class the immediate goal that is being struggled for is political power. The ruling class is defending its political supremacy…The lower class fight in the first place, for a share in this power and subsequently for complete power, in order to
arrive at a position where they can alter existing laws to suit their own needs and interests.\textsuperscript{314} A Marxist revolutionary project pursues an end that does not necessarily aim at the shared interest, but to satisfy the need and particular interest of the proletariat or the revolutionary bourgeoisie, who are by no means the entire population. The socialist or collective ownership of the means of production requires the communicative freedoms or competence of citizens in order to establish such collective ownership. The goal of military victory for a Marxist revolutionary is to devolve the extant order and establish a dictatorship to suit their needs and interests. Such dictatorship or new order is merely passed off through propaganda as defender of or reflection of the universal interest.

Without clear specifics on democratic opinion and will formation in deciding the collective ownership of the means of production (socialist-communist mode of production), Marxist elite tend to end up as dictators controlling the means of production by their whim. Due to organizational constraints of governance, the proletariat or every member of the rebel army cannot all govern at the same time. They must choose a few individuals, who would become their leaders, to govern on their behalf. Since the exact form the emergent Marxist socialist order would take remains fuzzy or ill-defined (Ake, 1991), the new order or elite would end up getting a free hand to govern, to direct and determine the new order more or less according to their whims. The lack of democratic orientation in Marxism means it can only bestow authority on individuals without clear principles of justice and legitimate governance. This failure can lead to powerful elite, with despotic tendencies, who stand above the society. Old ways become re-

institutionalized in new forms so that Marxist ‘revolutions’ usually fail to rationally transform the society in terms of democracy equality and justice. Marxist revolutions often tend to ensure the emergence of a sect.\textsuperscript{315}

The party wants to validate its separate aims in the state; the sect wants to use its separate aims to overcome the state. The party seeks to come to power in the state; the sect seeks to impose its own form of existence on the state. By coming to power in the state, the party seeks to dissolve it, where as the sect, by dissolving the state into itself, seeks to come to power (J. Frobel, (1847), \textit{Systems of social politics}, cited in Habermas, (1996). Popular Sovereignty as Procedure. In \textit{Between Facts and Norms. MIT Press, p. 476}).

Frobel’s conception of a sect fits Beal’s description of ‘new guerillas,’ a description that may well fit the RUF/AFRC Junta. The foregoing discussion highlights the weak moral content or moral orientation of the Marxist guerilla, which makes using it as standard or basis to critique RUF’s wanton violence problematic. Marxist guerilla strategy or ideology cannot serve as an adequate standard for analyzing the moral deficiencies of the RUF revolutionary project, as the latter shares striking deterministic, historicist and strategic affinities with the former.

\textit{Conclusion:} This conclusion draws on the discussions above of RUF teleological action and its link to the crisis of their revolutionary project to reflect on the question of social evolution. We begin this concluding comment by asking the question, “Was there a revolutionary consequence of the Sierra Leone civil war?” This question aims to assess whether any evolutionary learning did occur from the so-called RUF revolutionary project. Drawing on Cabral’s advice to connect our struggle with past historical

movements like the French revolution, we respond to this question by examining whether the civil conflict yielded democratic consciousness, put constitutional liberties on a sound footing, or led to solidarity.

Realizing that the ideals of socialist revolution requires democracy, Marcuse (1969: 87-88) argued that socialist solidarity must reflect political autonomy; self determination should begin at home. The end of the revolution must indeed appear in the means if the socialist end is to be a new way of life. The revolutionary struggle must demonstrate ingression of the future in the present, the feeling and joy of freedom must precede liberation (p. 89). Revolution must reject the logic of domination, and reflect democracy as the most favorable ground to develop and organize dissent. Thus, freedom and solidarity can only be realized under democratic equality, which makes possible the governance of free people, with justice for all (pp. 64-5).

Unlike Marcuse’s problematic reference to Bourgeois democracy as key to realizing socialism, this study draws on procedural democracy.\textsuperscript{316} As self-appointed champions of freedom, equality, and solidarity, the RUF project implies moral and ethical suppositions of self-determination and self-realization.\textsuperscript{317} Today, these suppositions retain a rigorously intersubjective sense in communicative action because whosoever judges and acts morally must be capable of anticipating the agreement of an unlimited communicating (moral) community (Habermas, 1993). A person who wants to

\textsuperscript{316} MIT Press, p. 476.

\textsuperscript{317} In the Youtube video, “Who is Foday Sankoh?” we see Sankoh’s supporters calling him “savior” and him arguing that the “revolution is the progress of our people.” In Krio, we hear him say that “the level of organization wey we de organize we set, na im go mek we build the party for mek we strong” [our level of organization is what will make us (RUF) party strong].
realize himself in a responsibly accepted life history must be capable of anticipating recognition from this unlimited community.

RUF’s implied identity claim as moral champion of the people requires the recognition, agreement or acceptance of the moral community of citizens. Its identity claim must be stabilized in the moral (communicative) community because “an identity that remains mine, namely my self-understanding as an autonomously acting and individuated person, can stabilize itself only if I find recognition as a person, and this person (p.192).” By denying the communicative competence of citizens, RUF blocked redemption of its identity claim, uno acto sabotaging the legitimacy it claimed for its liberation project. A Marxist revolution, which aims at replacing capitalist institutions with socialist ones (Marcuse, 1972: 74) is impossible without respecting the assent of the affected communication community. Thus, RUF revolution was rejected by citizens, who refused to mobilize under their dialectical materialist logic. The citizens rather insisted on interpreting their historical reality frontally i.e. to disagree with RUF liberation strategy that de-moralized them.

In asserting their agency by organizing massive nationwide civil disobedience and counter revolutionary guerilla warfare, citizens destroyed RUF’s possibility of manufacturing legitimacy for themselves. This resilience of the political civil society and public sphere averted a possible vicious cycle. Without citizen’s resistance, the situation could have deteriorated into a “legitimation dilemma,” which can combine with a steering trilemma to pull the political system into a whirlpool of legitimating and steering deficits that reinforce each another.\(^\text{318}\) This vicious cycle manifested in the Liberian civil

\(^{318}\) Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*. p. 386. It this similar attitude – that ignores the
war, causing it to escalate and last longer. In their desperation to end hostilities in Liberia, the international community failed to properly establish the conditions for a genuine democratic transfer of power. This resulted in a Taylor’s ascendency despite his regime’s legitimation deficit. This made the regime to be subsequently subjected to international sanctions that impaired its capacity to effectively steer the state and economy - a steering deficit. Taylor could not steer the economy effectively since he was for the most part under international sanctions; while his regime’s legitimacy was constantly internally challenged by rebel factions. The Taylor Presidency was rocked by intensified and prolonged civil war, social and economically crippling international sanctions.

In Sierra Leone, the democratic implications of the civil war did not emerge through citizens’ endorsement of the RUF revolution, but from their resistance to it. Citizens’ moral practical (democratic) development is reflected in their insistence on participating in the democratic electoral campaigns and dialogue to choose their political leaders, an option that caused RUF to terrorize and victimize them. Taylor’s forceful self-imposition on Liberia concealed the legitimation crisis at the core of the Liberian Conflict, a concealment that served to intensify or escalate the Liberian civil war. In Sierra Leone, the civil society organized effective counter-revolutionary response a lot

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legitimation question - that was evident in the Western-brokered Lome Accord in which the Western countries pressured the Kabbah government to recognize the RUF, and to form a coalition government with the rebels that made Sankoh Vice President, only serving to intensify and prolong the Conflict. See David Francis, (2001). *The politics of regionalism.*; Also the Human Rights Watch Report, *Getting Away with Murder*. The very practice of pressure politics was *uno acto an* attempt to re-institutionalize a conception of legitimacy based on power or control. This compromise, as such, is illegitimate to the extent that it ignores the central question of legitimacy at the core of the Conflict. Habermas argues in *Legitimation Crisis* that a generalizable interest, such as that desire for legitimate governance, cannot be subjected to elite compromise.
earlier that jeopardized the RUF/AFRC Junta’s chances to bolster their regime. The regime’s weakness enabled the society gain a stability-guaranteeing legitimate order through free and fair democratic elections, more quickly than in Liberia.

Putting the matter in its historical context -Marcuse (1969: 70) asked the question, “But who has the right to set himself up as judge of an established society, who other than the legally constituted agencies or agents, and the majority of the people?” This statement question or interrogative assertion makes the point that the RUF cannot stand above the society it claims to fight for. Their revolutionary project would have to be subjected to the people’s judgment in a moral language game. Ordinary citizens can draw on core domains of morality and law to make judgments only when they can practice their political autonomy or communicative competence to determine their reality, becoming true liberated subjects of their history.

Citizens drew on their lifeworld or the cultural stock of knowledge, their psychological world (their moral repulsion over RUF’ demoralizing violence), their empirical world and marks of physical abuse (amputations, lacerations, mutilations), and judged the RUF violation of their legal personhood as morally indecent and unacceptable. In the 2000 general elections the citizens gave RUF 3% of their votes, showing their condemnation of the rebels and their associates in the court of public reason. Calls for their criminal indictment for crimes against humanity have led to the trial and conviction many of the rebel leaders in the UN Special Court and in the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone.

Clearly, RUF’s Marxist type approach or theory of social change through violence had to fail, because it denied post conventional morality or voice of those it professed to
liberate. By denying communicative competence of their addressees, RUF’s revolutionary approach denied emancipation, which is possible today only through self realization and self determination achieved through ethical political and moral discourses. While this study does not totally deny the need for violent struggle against a colonial order, it does show that eliminating such an order through violence does not necessarily provide the basic problem solving equipment or intelligence to orient practical life in a crisis-free manner (see the Introduction section of the methodology Chapter 3.).
Chapter 7
Conclusion: Law and Morality as Pacemaker of Societal Transformation.

The root of irrationality of history is that we make it without, however, having been able until now to make it consciously. A rationalization of history cannot therefore be furthered by an extended power of control on the part of manipulative human beings, but only by a higher stage of reflection, a consciousness of acting human beings moving forward in the direction of emancipation (Habermas, (1974). Chapter 7: On Theory and Practice on Our Scientific Civilization in *Theory and Practice*).

7.0 – The Search for Practical Reason: In this introduction to the conclusion, this study argues that the foregoing discussion in earlier chapters show that crises tendencies, which continually riddled Sierra Leone since Independence reflect the persistent failure of the society in its search for practical reason. The persistent authoritarianism - traditional organizing principle – shown by the successive regimes of Sir Albert’s SLPP, Stevens’ APC, the NPRC and the RUF/AFRC juntas reflects the paradox of rationalization. For the most part since Independence, Sierra Leone has been subjected to colonizing totalitarian regimes, characterized by a virtual desolation of the legal order, hence a moral practical regression in the society’s evolution and organizing principle since Independence. The total disrespect for legitimate law that these regimes exemplify makes them worst than the latter days of British colonization:

319 The paradox of rationalization states that the rationalization of the lifeworld is the precondition and starting point for systemic rationalization and differentiation, which tends to become more and more autonomous vis-a-vis the normative constraints of the society, until finally systematic imperatives begin to instrumentalize the lifeworld, threatening to destroy it.” Richard J. Bernstein. (1995). Introduction In *Habermas and Modernity*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, p. 22. All these regimes challenge their predecessors for failing to respect the lifeworld or socio-cultural domain of democratic interactions, and promise to restore these democratic normative structures (values and institutions). Once they are in power, they tend behave the same or worst than their predecessors by colonizing the public sphere and denying democratic possibilities.
The absence of laws is worse than an unjust law. An unjust law is a reparable disorder; absence of law implies the rule of an arbitrary system, where anything can happen to anyone...there are few criticisms of ongoing corruption, the control of those close to the leaders of various economic sectors [as Jamil Sahid takeover of national industries and the diamond mines under Stevens]...there are so few inquiries concerning the abuse of power...[non-occurred under Stevens, who once organized such inquiries for the British colonial government]...democracy remains foreign to the political leaders...Even during period of colonization, when the law was on the side of the colonizer, there were limits to illegality. The colonizer was forced, although unwillingly, to consider the citizens back home...(Memmi, 2006: 59).

Like the dictatorship of Siaka Stevens, the NPRC, and the tyrannical RUF/AFRC junta reflected regressive traditional modes of governance. Memmi argued that “once colonial law was abolished, it was never really replaced. The ruler owes nothing to anyone (p. 59).” The egoism of leaders of the newly Independent nations was a costly mistake, for in the quest for enlightenment that makes emancipation possible, there are only participants. This study agrees with Memmi’s argument that post-traditional societies such as Sierra Leone, after gaining Independence failed to realize and conceived the democratic orders hoped for at Independence, because the legal democratic idea of the citizen never took hold.

The roles of agent and participant in discourse overlap in such processes of self-clarification [or enlightenment]. Someone who wishes to attain clarity about their life as a whole – justify important value decisions and to gain assurance concerning his identity – cannot allow himself to be represented by someone else in ethical existential discourse, whether in his capacity as the one involved or as the one who must weigh competing claims...participants in processes of self clarification cannot distance themselves from the life histories and forms of life in which they actually find themselves.

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320 See Memmi, A. (2006). The New Citizens In Decolonization and the Colonized. Trans. by Robert Bonono. London: University of Minnesota Press, p. 44. He makes the point that the moral-practical progress in knowledge by the West is more appropriate than the traditional solution some African scholars support to deal with today’s problems in African society. He even questions there sincerity in ‘claiming to defend values that have become increasingly unsustainable.’

By imposing constraints on public reason, rational discourse, or the political autonomy of citizens, authoritarian regimes in Sierra Leone deny the society’s enlightenment. The basic contradiction these regimes demonstrated is this: they collectivize the public in their quest for political power, but privatized their consciousness after taking political power.³²²

Memmi asks the question: how can these 50 years old Independent nations ‘avoid examining their mistakes?’ Realizing his mistake, Sir Albert retracted rather late from his one party quest (Foray, 1988). Stevens realized his mistake in the cost of maintaining his one party dictatorship by the need to use foreign bodyguards, a loyal private army and police force, a shadow state network, a perpetual state of emergency, privatizing the economy, and manufacturing regional and international legitimacy by sponsoring ECOWAS and OAU summits, staging fake treason trials, and, becoming extremely paranoid. On realizing their mistake of trying to brutally mobilize citizens to their bush-path or guerrilla war path, RUF had to apologize to the nation. Political actors in Sierra Leone failed to institutionalize the requisite attitudinal change that makes practicing the post-conventional moral organizing principle possible. They failed to learn and develop mutual understanding or rational discourse due to their instrumental despotic tendencies in governance. These regimes colonized the social order by disrupting the possibility for reflexive evolutionary learning possible through a post conventional or the organizing principle of constitutional democracy.

³²² The basic contradiction today according to critical theory is this: the collectivization of the public in the quest for power, followed by the privatization of their consciousness after assumption of power. See William Rehg, (1994). Insight and Solidarity: A study in the Discourse Ethics of Jurgen Habermas.
While these past regimes acknowledged more rational democratic alternative possibilities of action, they nonetheless suppressed or ignored them. These suppressed or denied alternatives are not merely imagined rationalities, but real elements of communicative rationalization institutionalized in the universal principles of Independent constitutions and in democratic political organizations, in self-interpretation and in the goals of social movements that fight for basic rights, in the integrity of the lifeworld, or the democratic organization of collective will formation (Habermas, 1996).

The society’s failure to institutionalize the requisite democratic constitutional state principle as the proper framework of governance wrecked vengeance on the society. Sierra Leone remained haunted by the dilemma that besets traditional societies in transition: how to move from a lower traditional mode of governance to a democratic constitutional state principle of organization, by institutionalizing the requisite moral practical approach for this post-traditional society – a macro community constituted from diverse religions, ideological, political and cultural traditions. According to Nkrumah, the disequilibrium such societies encounter disrupts their evolutionary trajectory; they find it difficult to revert comfortably to earlier traditional mode of governance, or to effectively learn to implement and institutionalize the requisite post-traditional democratic consciousness, already embodied in their worldviews.

Like this study, Memmi (2006: 30) attributes the governance failure of the new African societies’ to the incapacity of their political orders to admit democratic

‘criticism,’ fair ‘evaluation’ and ‘critical thinking that frees society.’ Social transformation requires change in attitude and thinking, a reflexive learning process. Steve Biko argues that the greatest weapon in the hand of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed. This study talks about the need to change dysfunctional attitudes and thinking that underlie social and political behavior or conduct, which continue to engender crises in the society.

A devaluation of the explanatory and justificatory potentials of entire traditions took place in the great civilizations with the dissolution of mythological-narrative figures of thought, in the modern age with the dissolution of religious, cosmological, and metaphysical figures of thought. These devaluative shifts appear to be connected with socio-evolutionary transitions to new levels of learning, with which the conditions of possible learning processes in the dimension of objectivating thought, moral-practical insight, and aesthetic expressive capacity are altered (Habermas, 1984: 68).

In Stevens’ Sierra Leone, for instance, anyone attempting to shift away political discourse from the devalued traditional (authoritarian) organizing principle of social organization carried the risk of treason.

The requisite critical thinking process that frees society involves a cooperative search for truth and morality; not restricted to the extant cultural systems of interpretation, for that would remove the burden of interpretation from individual members, as well as the chance to bring about agreements open to criticism (Memmi, 2006: 69). An appropriate practical rationality would consider the historical condition, concrete facts and knowledge of the society’s history and national orientation. As societal members are destined to live together, it is only rational and reasonable that they

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326 Ekennia, 2000: 175; Also see Tu Nwala, Philosophy and its relevance to Africa In Nigerian Journal of philosophy. Lagos, p. 15
search for what unites them - only a cooperative search can enable them see or realize their own (collective) interest (Memmi, 2006: 141). They can discover their authentic and autonomous will in a practical rationality that is neither based on egocentric logic, or on mythical socio-centric worldview. To Fanon (1963), it should coalesce in a national culture, which arises from external as well as internal interactive tensions among citizens. Memmi (2006: 41) sees its possibility in a living culture of ‘ongoing questioning of traditional beliefs - testing and adapting them to the inevitable transformation all societies undergo.’

Like these thinkers, this study shows that a constellation of regional, cultural political and ideological divergent groups or communities like Sierra Leone can produce a stability-guaranteeing legitimate social order only if its members can coordinate their collective life by their common interpretive effort or cooperatively negotiate situation-definitions (Habermas, 1984). Without the cooperative mode of reaching understanding, this society cannot solidify or stabilize its normatively fixed identity. To realize their authentic will, the society’s organizing principle must admit of ethical political discourses specialized for answering the question: “Who are we and who do we want to become?” Without the liberal political culture of rational public discourse, the society cannot as well determine its autonomous will, which emerges in moral discourses that answer the justice question: “What is equally acceptable or justified to everyone?” Relative stability returned to the society, as soon as moral and ethical-political discourses became possible in Sierra Leone. The 1996 and 2002 election campaigns reduced crisis tendencies in the society to a large extent. The primacy of post-conventional moral principle for organizing post-traditional Sierra Leone manifested its value in the stability produced for
the society as soon as a liberal political culture of public reason-giving and response – that allows for common situation-definition - was realized or became possible.

With these introductory words, we now highlight or outline the findings or insights gained from discussions in the study. This critical discourse of the Sierra Leone Conflict demonstrated that only the possibility of institutionalizing (i.e. opening up possibilities for realizing) the democratic organizing principle for conflict resolution, the cooperative search for truth, and the pursuit of collective goals can ensure a legitimate social order that can guarantee stability or ensure social integration. This organizing principle can emerge when ethical-political and moral discourses can penetrate the legal form, and in the public sphere, which acts as sounding for the political decision making structures.

In this concluding chapter, **section (7.1)** cogently captures the moral practical reconstruction of colonization, crises and social evolution. The section directly responds to the research questions by conceiving colonization, crisis and social evolution in contemporary Sierra Leone from the perspective of discourse theory. **Section (7.2)** presents some major insights discovered in the analysis of social evolution of Sierra Leone that bears on the issues of crisis, colonization and ideological misconceptions that produce these issues. These insights are presented in the form of propositions or statements that are elaborated. **Section (7.3)** is a preliminary sketch of a discourse theoretic conception of critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy has been conceived as a critical project of political education. Here the reconstructive approach draws on the classical doctrine of politics, whose goal of disseminating and transmitting civic virtues

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(such as post conventional moral cognitive intuition) had always proceeded pedagogically. This section also draws on practical and social philosophy by reconnecting with their original intentions from which they had been disconnected to formulate the political education project, the critical pedagogy model of this study.

The section is followed by the concluding comments that recommend jurisgenerative politics and insights on how to develop democratic constitutionalism in Sierra Leone, of how to balance democracy and the constitution - the co-originality principle.

7.1 - Reconstructing colonization and crisis in discourse – theoretic terms. The pervasive norm-free sociality that characterized politico-legal structures of interaction immediately after Independence set Sierra Leone on a crisis ridden trajectory of social evolution. This problem, which stems from the colonization of the socio-cultural domain of communication, also reflects the actors’ level of moral learning or development at the time. In the subsection below, this study clarifies the connection between colonization and the politico-administrative crisis in the moral-practical development of Sierra Leone discussed in Chapter 4.

Colonization as seen from the foregoing discourse theoretic explication is conceived in terms of the systematic distortion (unconscious deception or self deception) and systematic deformation (manipulation of others) in the socio-cultural domain of communication. “Stripped of their ideological veils,” constraints on the socio-cultural domain of communication are colonization processes by which imperatives of the autonomous system penetrate the lifeworld from the outside – “like colonial masters
coming into a native society, and forcefully assimilating it (my emphasis) (Habermas, 1987: 355).” As seen in Chapter 4, the political elite shunted aside the lifeworld or the socio-cultural domain, merely pretended to communicate while in reality they only parasitically use political/legal forms of interaction and their influence to impose their pre-political or predetermined will, legal professional views, and individual semantic interpretations of law in the society. By legally technicizing the discourse on these issues, legislators, legal experts or jurists in immediately post - Independence political interaction removed the issues from space and time to ‘confuse internal relations of meaning with external relations among things (Habermas, 1986, p.193).’

Resorting to technical [legal] language means you are determined to treat the masses as uninitiated…to deceive the people and leave them on the sidelines. Language’s endeavor to confuse is a mask behind which looms a greater undertaking to dispossess. The intention is to strip the people of their possessions as well as their sovereignty.333 Through these technical discursive manipulations, the political elite stripped ordinary social actors of scope to participate in making the legal order, hence denying them their political autonomy, and subverting popular sovereignty. The latter is tantamount to colonization of societal members.

SLPP’s evocation of legal indeterminacy, APC’s anti-corruption tribunals, NRC’s Dove Edwin Commission constitute attempts at legally technicizing or scientizing constitutional democratic politics that put the issues beyond the reach or comprehension

332 Communicative action can be steered through specialized influence, such as professional reputation and value commitment, only to the extent that communicative utterances are, in their original appearance, already embedded in a virtually present web of communicative contents far removed in space and time but accessible in principle. Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action. II. pp. 183 - 4.

333 Fanon, (1963). The Wretched of the earth analyzes this technicization of the lifeworld, the socio-cultural domain of communication, to show that its aim is to dispossess citizens. Fanon view of technicization of discourse as colonization is consistent with the discourse theoretic paradigm of this study.
of the public of ordinary citizens, hence subverting the equilibrium in the normative structure of the constitutional state at the cost of the society’s autonomy (Habermas (1996: 246). This legal technicization as such ‘justifies’ the need to ‘increase the distance’ between subjects and the issues (the Governor’s abuse of discretion or the adoption of the totalitarian one party bill), by couching it in technical legal language that subjects’ cannot effectively comprehend.  

The technical framing of matters relevant to society redefines the moral and ethical issues in such matters as negotiable questions open to compromise, making it ‘easy to prove that the masses need to have their life run for them (Fanon, 1963).’ By resolving these issues in exclusively technical legal terms, the elite relieved the administration of the immediate pressure of ‘legitimation,’ a situation not unlike that under British colonialism. Thus, without the possibility for communicative rationalization in political opinion and will formation, a society could not fully realize its autonomy and stability as a legitimate order (McCarthy, 1985: 352).

Crisis – From the discussion in the earlier Chapters, we see how discursive colonizing manipulation engendered a constitutional crisis, because politicians used the legal form of interaction to subvert the requisite post conventional morality in the democratic constitutional state of Sierra Leone. At this stage of social evolution, the

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336 As an analytic concept, the Democratic constitutional state represents a wave of juridification in which the idea of freedom already incipient in the concept of law was given sanction by the political constitution of the state. The constitutionalization of state power provided citizens the rights of political participation. See ‘Tendencies toward Juridification’ in Habermas, (1987) “Marx and the Thesis of the internal colonization of the lifeworld” in The theory of communicative action: Vol. II: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of functionalist reason.” pp. 360-1. The democratic constitutional state represents the Third wave of juridification in the moral practical evolution of the modern state. With this juridification or moral practical evolution, there emerged a splitting of concrete ethical life into morality and legality; Henceforth, society can rationalize the lifeworld to a point where ethically neutral spheres of action can be only legitimately regulated by formal processes for enacting and justifying norms. p. 317
“basic justice of decision making institutions must be assessed in terms of whether all affected are treated with what philosophers call moral universalizability or reciprocity.”

As social power, the elites used their bureaucratic influence or power to assert their will and blatantly disregard the will of electorates and the election laws stipulated in the constitution. Their blatant disregard for constitutional state principles or democratic accountability to parliament that manifest in the subversion of the will of the electorates is tantamount to a seizure power. The elite’s irresponsible legal conduct reflects an attempt to establish the ideology that the state can rise above the pluralism of civil society.

When state or political actors make decisions without democratic accountability or proper justification they create potential for a crisis (Kosselleck, 1988).

Political decisions that reflect the existing [colonial] organizational principle of society [of Sierra Leone] \textit{ipso facto} do not admit of rational consensus. They could not be justified in a general and unrestricted discussion of what, in the light of present and possible circumstances, is in the best interests of all affected by them.

The crisis emerged because in a constitutional democracy such as Sierra Leone, “laws come into force only when there is a democratically backed presumption that they express a general interest and that all those affected could agree to them (Habermas, 1987: 360).” Failing this, laws and decisions become mere immoral impositions or immoral impositions or

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337 Habermas, 1987, p. 266.
338 Habermas, 1996. Chapter 6: The Judiciary and the Legislature. In \textit{Between Facts and Norms}. p. 241; Also see Weber cited in Habermas. Weber justifies this paradigm by arguing that legal experts operating from technical approach, which leads to their ‘increasing distancing’ of the reality on the ground reflects a ‘progress of law;’ he also assumes that ‘experts alone would be able to give good reasons for its existence, whereas juristic laymen would not be in position to do so \textit{ad hoc} (Weber cited in Habermas, 1984, p. 267).’
normative force or colonial instruments that disrupt the constitutional democratic developmental path of the state or the moral practical development of the society.

Concealing the subversion of the socio-cultural domain by public relations campaign can succeed only for a limited time, hence underscoring the centrality for communicative rationalization or mutual understanding in post-traditionally conscious society. The social tension resulting from such concealment shows that “communicative reason operates in history as an avenging force.”

In trying to defend the Governor, the very arguments the Chief Justice and the Commissioners…asserted as valid transcends, according to the sense of the claim, all context-dependent, merely local standards of validity. These and similar idealizing yet unavoidable presuppositions for actual communicative practices possess a normative content that carries the tension between the intelligible and the empirical into the sphere of appearances itself. Counterfactual presuppositions become social facts. This critical thorn sticks in the flesh of any social reality that has to reproduce itself via action oriented towards reaching understanding (Habermas, (1992). Postmetaphysical thinking: Philosophical Essays. London, p. 47).

It is problematic to say that the Governor was acting purely administratively in appointing Siaka Stevens prime minister without the election results because such a view ignores the universal moral reading of his action. Similar gubernatorial abuse of discretion in Nigeria around the same time was overturned by the courts. By denying legal discourse or judicial review, the NRC Junta colonized the socio-cultural domain of

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342 See Murana Kallon, (2004). The political economy of corruption. p. 84. cites the case in Nigeria between the Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil service Act 374. This case established that the discretionary powers of even a head of state are not entirely unfettered. In another case in Nigeria, Adegbero vs Akintola and Aderemi, the very formulation of the constitution was found to be problematic. Sir Aderemi claiming that Akintola “appeared to have lost the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly,” removed him “without a vote of non-confidence.” Though the dismissal of Akintola was disallowed, the privy council which heard the appeal could not eliminate the element of “uncertainty” of this rash discretionary action and the fact that only the majority members in the legislature, by their clear expressed consent should determine the Prime Minister. This similar conflict in
communication or uncoupled the system from the lifeworld, hence their failure to meet the challenge of moral practical learning at the core of the controversy. The administration’s inability to muster the ‘requisite quantity’ of rational administrative decisions to properly steer the society led to a *rationality crisis* (Thompson & Held, 1982: 183; Habermas, 1976: 49). These retrogressive democratic attitudes and practices disrupted the development of democratic constitutionalism in Sierra Leone.

*Moral–practical learning or development*, political actor’s failure to muster the requisite rational (administrative) capacity indicates a deficiency in moral practical learning. They failed to understand the constitution and law making process as a self correcting moral learning process.\(^{343}\) Realizing this self-correcting learning process requires that actors properly balance democratic intuitions with constitutionalism. They should allow for democratic will formation to actualize the right of participation (political autonomy), rationalize law through impartial justification and application using the principles of *universalization and appropriateness* in the legal medium. The use of the principle of appropriateness in the discourse of application could have enabled political actors interpret the context dependent readings of the 1961 Independence Constitution to properly reflect the extant reality, hence to bring to life the ‘unsaturated’ system of rights.

This requisite moral practical learning can occur only when interlocutors can admit of the moral principle of discourse or post-conventional morality. The discourse principle becomes the democracy principle as soon as the former interpenetrates with the

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legal form of interaction in the constitution or law making process. Only then can we resolve the crucial moral practical learning test or the “alleged paradoxical relation between democracy and the rule of law (constitutionalism) in historical time.”\textsuperscript{344} “Only in a particular constitutional interpretation do these rights first enter into consciousness at all,” so that “when citizens interpret the system of rights in a manner congruent with their situation, they merely explicate the performative meaning of precisely the [political/constitutional] enterprise they took up as soon as they decided to legitimately regulate their common life through positive law (Habermas, 1996: 128-9).” The capacity for communicative competence or freedoms or rational interpretation reflects the moral learning or development in the society.

Someone who has acquired the interactive competence of a certain level will form a moral consciousness of the same level to the extent that his motivational structure does not hinder him from holding to the structures of every day action under stress as well, in the consensual resolution of action conflicts….because it places the acting subject under the imperative of a conscious processing of conflicts, moral consciousness is an indicator of the degree of stability of general competence…we qualify those persons as morally “good” who hold on to the interactive competence acquired for normal conflict-poor situations even under stress, i.e. in morally relevant conflict action…instead of consciously avoiding them (Habermas, 1979: 91).

The political elite’s failure to conceive the constitution as ‘a living project’ of ‘ongoing interpretation carried out at all levels of the production of law,’ rendered the constitution meaningless and impossible to ‘endure’ (Habermas, 1996: 129).

\textit{Colonization under neoliberalism}. Drawing on the discussions on system integration and system differentiation in chapter 5, we see that an aberrant form of
colonization informed system differentiation, the fusion of the state and market interests in self preservation. System integration in Sierra Leone under neoliberal regime was colonizing because what was supposed to ensure its rational evolution, the communicative rationalization of the citizenry, was denied. The lassez faire economic model dictated by the liberal capitalist organizing principle or logic and the state’s lack of transparent economic management were both anti-democratic. They required the depoliticization of the public. The market viewed the society as a system of needs, constituted by private law and steered through markets in labor, capital and commodities (Habermas, 1970). In the neoliberal deal, the system saw social actors as consumers, denying them their democratic opinion and will formation, or the political autonomy of citizens. Both subsystems of state and market, in the interest of their self preservation had to coordinate society in the media of power and money, rather than by communicative reason. Their mutual effort at depoliticizing citizens was designed to force their compliance with self preserving and exploitative logic or organizing principle, liberal capitalist accumulation logic. Such a principle is linked to the level of learning that must manifest in world views of subjects. The repression of citizens built into the operation of the neoliberal order served to de-politicize citizens, hence to freeze or colonize citizens’ moral consciousness at the conventional moral cognitive level.

*The economic crisis* emerged because both the economic organizational principle and the privatistic world views forced on citizens limited the conditions under which ‘the society can transform the institutional and interpretive system to enable it produce the

principles. In *Political theory* 29: 6, p. 768

‘evolutionary thrust’ (p. 168). From the perspective of developmental logic (the observed stages of development), a rational ‘evolutionary thrust’ is denied when society is denied scope to use rational moral cognitive capacity that could have ensured the rational differentiation of the state and the economy. The rational differentiation of economy and state did not occur because the covert and dubious discourses by which the neoliberal regime was established reflected colonial domination or were anti-democratic. The system could not salvage the society from the economic crisis system it created because it became entrenched in anti democratic colonial logic, which quickly intensified, and became a crisis of legitimation, where the social consciousness reflected the need to overthrow or change the regime at any opportunity. The state of nature intensified because under this condition, the society and the subsystem could not ‘communicate’ with each other. The state existed for itself, rather than to serve the society, thus the intensification of economic misery that triggered the idea of forcefully changing the state.

We proceed now to succinctly capture the insights gathered in the earlier chapters that showed that culture is the pacemaker of social evolution. This study adopted a reconstructed version of historical materialism, the theory of communicative action, which performed major revisions of the theory. Historical materialism argues that the productivist paradigm of social evolution is deficient because it holds the view that social transformation or evolution unfolds exclusively in the logic of production, and that it is necessarily unilinear, continuous, and irreversible (McCarthy, 1984: 239). But the theory of communicative action, which this study elaborates see social evolution as a cumulative
process that reflects a direction in a society’s transformation, but which is neither
necessarily irreversible nor exclusively an economic matter.

Using the theory of communicative action, the development of normative
structures in Sierra Leone are explained as a combination of several modes of production,
and definitely a bi-dimensional process, involving technically useful knowledge and
socio-cultural innovations. The universal basis of social evolution is elaborated in this
study in terms of ordering principles of developmental logic at an abstract level to avoid
historical and social specificity, while simultaneously accounting for empirical
developmental mechanisms or processes. The introduction of genetic-structural level and
at empirical–historical level enables this study analyze the social order and change to
meet both empirical condition and the developmental–logical condition of adequacy
(McCarthy, 1984: 242). This approach enabled the study respond to a major theoretical
question in the theory of social evolution: Did post traditional Sierra Leone take an
evolutionary step or institutionalize a new form of social integration with the crisis?

The Marxist conception of history seemed identical to the RUF project as both
stressed military struggle as the answer to the above question. The ‘revolution’ of the
RUF and Stevens used violent struggle to change the society, an approach that failed to
move the society to a higher evolutionary level or development, a quanlitative cognitive
and moral attitude transformation. Critical insights did not find their way into the
objective domain of the social order or in developmental processes with this violent
struggle (chapter 6), hence no accelerated rationalization of society arose from it.

The Marxist liberation blueprint hindered communicative reason or the rational
discourse constitutive for evolutionary learning, societal renewal or social change. Its
predetermined conception of life deny the capacity of societal members to critically (communicatively) reflect on their contingent social and cultural life frontally or consciously, by taken a yes/ no stance. The critical reflection possible through cooperative and free dialogue was denied by these violent approaches. Holding a universal deterministic conception of violent struggle as the approach to social change, proponents denied citizens’ attempt to undertake critical interpretation of the contingent historical conflict situation e.g. they denied free and fair elections that can make possible discursive will and opinion formation. By such discursive constraints on the society, the RUF and Stevens denied the only means by which they could have learned or critically reflected on their revolution as a misguided process of self-formation. Thus, their approach or preference for violent struggle as the way to change the society, or enable it take an evolutionary step proved morally and ethically retrogressive, proving to be stifling the society’s intelligence, evolutionary learning or problem solving capacity that can secure the society’s normatively fixed identity or integration.

Ironically, the ordinary citizens, who through their struggle for democracy resisted the rebels, manifested a higher moral cognitive intuitive consciousness by opting for democratic will and opinion formation in electoral campaigns. Through the democratic practice of critique, the politico-legal and socio-legal orders were subjected to the process of ongoing self-correction. Citizens’ democratic approach to social change exemplifies the correct dynamic view of the constitutional state as never a final product, but an unfinished structure that is delicate, sensitive, fallible and a revisable enterprise, whose purpose is to realize the system of rights anew in changing circumstances.
(Habermas, 1996: 384). This approach to the constitutional state implies the reconstruction of the philosophy of permanent revolution in moral practical terms.

By their civil militia counterrevolution and mass civil disobedience, the citizens showed a superior moral developmental consciousness in their quest to establish the enabling conditions for democratic constitutionalism i.e. to realize free and fair debates in the democratic elections, hence to rationalize their political and social systems. Under democratic conditions, they can interpret, appropriately institutionalize, and radically appropriate contents of the constitution to reflect the interest of the existing social order.

Presently, the explosion of critical reflection through popular culture, in songs, poetry and media critique following the civil war showed a decolonized public sphere, one manifesting a developed moral cognitive development required for the ongoing rationalization of the society. This higher intelligence or moral cognitive learning exemplified by citizens reflects a social organizing principle that can make it possible to differentiate questions of truth and morality, and cognitively to move increasingly away from non-reflexive (pre-scientific) to reflexive mode of learning. The reflexive or evolutionary learning capacity illustrated in the public sphere and by the political civil society’ served not only to ensure ongoing societal rationalization or self correction, it serves as a means to decipher inconspicuous systemic manipulations and state colonizing tendencies that led to the Sierra Leone Conflict.

Unlike the approach of historical materialism, this study takes an analytic response to the question, how the society takes an evolutionary step. To the extent that a society can institutionalize or realize rational discourse in the system (polito-legal
administration and the economy) and in the social space, that society can take an evolutionary step or bring about evolutionary self transformation or renewal. Social actors should be capable of realizing practical and theoretical discourses to rationalize the society’s organizing principle. This rationalization requires the communicative competence of citizens to enable them thematize and critically examine the social order or its implicit claims to moral rightness, legitimacy or worthiness of recognition. Political actors should be able to adopt ethical–existential discourses of self-clarification or self realization about who they are and what they want to become as a society. They must be able to adopt moral discourses of self determination in which they can jointly decide what is equally acceptable to each person.

Even a socialist order or collective ownership of the means of production implies popular sovereignty. If the collectivity of citizens is to become authors of the emergent socialist order, to become owners of the means of production, then democracy is vital for the realization of socialism (Habermas, 1996; Marcuse, 1969). Only through rational democratic opinion and will formation or political autonomy can the society establish the conditions for socio-cultural innovations or learning necessary to normatively reflect on itself and overcome the extant crisis-ridden organizing principle. A legitimate social order is constituted when its members can confront each other in suitable institutional forums and normatively guided processes of adjustments, resistance and self correction. Only under the social conditions that admit of such reflexive learning can social praxis realize popular sovereignty or the general will, which only can ground the claim that the public of citizens collectively direct, and therefore truly collectively own the means of production.
The foregoing section is a rational reconstruction of colonization, crisis, and social evolution in this study, which demonstrates that core domains of communication (law and morality) make the pace of social evolution. The foregoing discourse serves to specify that the key to socio-cultural learning or innovation for evolutionary transformation is the society’s self-correcting moral learning process that involves the knowledge to properly balance democracy and constitutionalism.346

Citizens’ capacity or competence for democratic will formation or rational interpretation reflects their moral practical level of learning or development. Politically, this reflexive learning capacity is realized when the discourse principle can manifest in the legal form (in parliamentary and court discourses, in law making and in the public sphere. The society must institutionalize the critical transformative consciousness that views the political constitution as ‘a living project’ of ‘ongoing interpretation carried out at all levels of the production of law (p. 129).’ By failing to recognize and institutionalize education and learning in post conventional morality, political and social actors rendered the political constitution of Sierra Leone meaningless and impossible to ‘endure,’ hence putting the society on a crisis ridden evolutionary course that culminated in the catastrophic explosion of 11 years of arms conflict.

Below, this chapter state some of the insights discovered that bear on the idea of colonization and crisis in contemporary society. They are presented in propositional form and then elaborated. These propositions are intended to understand colonization and crisis from different angles of perception as they manifest in Sierra Leone in particular. These propositions, however, are general statements since they are intended to

346 Habermas, J. (2003). On Law and Disagreement: Some comments on Interpretive Pluralism In
serve as a preliminary attempt in furthering the theory of contemporary colonization and crises, and their possible conceptual connection.

7.2 Findings: core problems and insights discovered by the research. a) The historical and dialectical materialist logic is socially dangerous and colonizing rather than lead to an egalitarian order. RUF’s Marxist type - determination to carry through their so called revolutionary project in a despotically oriented teleological action caused a dangerous historicism. This predetermination enables social actors to manipulate social life as an object, hence to technically master society. Determinism arises from the fact that Marxist “critique of political economy did not recognize itself as critique in distinction to the positive sciences, among which it counted itself (Habermas, 1974: 238-9).” The RUF rebellion was also carried out as if social change and citizens would ‘naturally’ behave according to their blueprint. They were poised to force things, situations and persons to behave according to how they believe they ought to by nature. This paternalism is colonizing.

However, in using the critique of political economy as his point of departure, Marx was referring to not just the State, but to society as well, whose logic is constituted by morality. Revolutionary action, like any other action, should always consider the morality of the social order or the shared interest otherwise it will perpetrate rather than resolve conflict, create rather than eliminate crisis. Like Marxist critique, the RUF failed to understand the expanded concept of the ‘political,’ as having to do with the moral category of society.

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Furthermore, Marxism removed revolutionary consciousness from its intellectual philosophical origins and from the specific historical cultural milieu out of which it arose. It ignored the specific modern understanding of the revolutionary political project of emancipation in terms of self-determination and self-realization. Its dialectical materialist view that predetermines how social life will and ought to move and end cannot correctly grasp the moral-practical basis of politics at specific contingent historical moments in Sierra Leone. Like Marxism, RUF rebels quickly forgot their intellectual origin in the radical student movement, PANAFU, and even as reflected in their Manifesto. Their teleological action denied scope for post-conventional morality or rational discourse in the citizenry, which would have enhanced their sensitivity to the contingent historical reality. Their brutalization of civilians aimed at ‘concealing’ or rendering the interest of the society insignificant. This conduct has to do with their teleological orientation.

The RUF exemplified deterministic attitude similar to Marxism, which assumes positive status of natural sciences, hence removing revolution from its revolutionary situational origins, its true exploitative and unjust historical condition, hence they became metaphysical.

As long as historical materialism no longer saw itself as involved in the objective crisis complex, as soon as it understood its critique exclusively as the law of the world, then the ideological character of consciousness had to take on a metaphysical quality. Spirit then was considered simply and always ideology and this included socialism. Within this superficial understanding, the correct ideology was distinguished from the false solely according to the criteria of a realistic theory of knowledge [Marxism] (Habermas, (1974). Between Philosophy and Science In Theory and Practice. Boston, p. 238).
Such ideology–type determinism caused RUF’s willful blindness to the suffering their wanton violence was causing civilians. Their metaphysical attitude was illustrated by their incapacity to properly anticipate the political (moral) cost of their willful blindness. Like Marxists, the rebels behaved as if only they have knowledge of the correct ideology for societal transformation. Any idea that contravenes RUF ‘revolution’ by violent change, such as democratic elections was deemed false ideology. RUF’s brutalization of civilians as revolutionary labor of mobilization bears resemblance to a typical Marxist approach to social transformation. Thus, like Marxism, RUF seemed interested in the unity of their theory (or orientation) and practice, rather than in recreating their theory (to consider contingent democratic aspirations of citizens) to change society (Ake, 1987: 110).

Even when the contingent historical reality (the democratic idea entered the conflict management discourse) unambiguously demanding that the RUF reconsider their original view of how to change the society, their historicism prevented them from doing so. Likewise, the dialectical materialist law of nature that makes engagement with a social situation deterministic and historicist can block a realistic penetration of contingent historical reality. To adopt such a type of orientation to social situation denies adequate orientation to the reality of political life. Lang and Cooper (1996) argue that by pretending to establish a dialectic of nature, dialectical materialism does not reveal itself as an attempt to establish a general synthesis of human knowledge, but as a simple organization of facts.” Dialectical materialism, like the RUF approach, betrays a transcendental consciousness, which pretends to be occupied with the “facts” or state of affairs in Sierra Leone, such as citizens’ position in the war situation and their desire for
peace. In reality, the rebels project unfolded as if the reality revealed itself to no one else (Lang and Cooper, 1964: 96). RUF’s intimidation of citizens was to deny them scope to conceive the contingent historical reality in Sierra Leone differently, hence to define the problem-situation exclusively according to their own understanding. Their actions implied monopoly over correct knowledge of reality, social laws and interpretation. They tried to manufacture the world according to their vision, which was at variance with that on the ground, hence it violence to force civilians to comply with their definition of the problem situation.

Notwithstanding this, only citizens’ conscious action can guarantee their understanding of their own reality. A theoretical revelation of history’s meaning is possible as a whole to the degree that those involved can undertake to make it with their will and consciousness, that history which they have always made anyhow (Habermas, 1974: 248). In so doing, critique must comprehend itself as a moment within the situation it seeks to supersede (sublate). Only after the fact can a philosophy of history with materialistic self involvement finds its presupposition, as consequences that substitute the contradiction in history itself. In considering its consequences as its presuppositions, such philosophy tends to manufacture historical reality – this is an inversion. The RUF manifested this approach when it referred to its brutal capture of Freetown, done with the help of mutinying soldiers, as achieving the ‘brotherhood’ or solidarity that has eluded the society.
b) Misconceptions of the idea of emancipation leads to revolutionary paradox – The French revolutionaries had the declared objective of promoting ‘brotherhood,’ fraternity or solidarity. Solidarity emerged through the equality of treatment for all and the liberty to realize one’s capacity. By stifling citizens’ discursive opinion and will formation, RUF denied citizens their democratic equality, hindering their freedom to decide the society they want. In claiming to pursue a revolution, an accelerated rationalization or modernization of society, they should have encouraged citizens’ democratic opinion and will formation, which is vital to such a rationalization process. “Ongoing modernity must be carried on with political will and awareness. And for this form of democratic self-direction, the construction of procedures of discursive opinion and will formation are crucial (Habermas, 2001: p. 150).” In violating the democracy principle, the RUF (like Stevens before them) denied itself the chance to gain the society’s commitment and assent for their posited solidarity.

The political will formation of citizens…depend on the source of discursively generated solidarity…liberated subjects, no longer bound and directed by traditional roles [such as proletariat, peasants, or lumpen, serfs or subjects] have to fashion new commitments by the force of their communicative effort alone (Habermas, J. (2001). Conceptions of Modernity in The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Translated and edited by Max Pensky (Cambridge, MIT Press, pp. 155-156).

If the guerilla warfare was to merit the term emancipation, then its means and end should have reflected social interactive conditions rationally superior to those the rebels or guerillas professed to change (Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, 1972). RUF should have respected the democratic equality and the freedom of citizens to decide the society of their choice. By failing to do this, the RUF and the so called Marxist ‘populist’
Stevens betrayed misunderstanding of the true meaning of emancipation. Today, emancipation has to do with moral discourses of self-determination and ethical political discourses of self-realization, hence has its key in democratic opinion and will formation (Habermas, 1996; 1993). Even the collective ownership of the means of production – socialism, must presuppose popular sovereignty to be meaningful, successful or enduring.

c) Experts solutions reflect a crisis of crisis mismanagement: Standing with David Francis (2001), this study argues that the focus on conflict diamonds is potentially unhelpful in understanding the Sierra Leone Conflict. While diamonds fuelled and prolonged the war, it was not the primary cause of the War. Francis asked, “Why is it the case that though diamonds were discovered in Sierra Leone since 1930’s, the Country did not degenerate into civil war in the pre-1990’s era due to ‘greed’?” He considers such simplistic interpretation of the Conflict as yet another demonstration of the failure of the international scholars to address fundamental causes of African conflicts: the “multi-billion dollar trade business” in resources and arms industry that bolster illegitimate regimes with serious implication for national economies. Francis (2001: 143) argues that this “simplistic entry-point” i.e. conflict diamonds that produced the diamond certification scheme, failed to address the fundamental causes of the Conflict, leaving “potential for relapse into war and political instability.”

By focusing on blood diamonds as the heart of the matter, experts contained the discourse of conflict management and resolution within the domain of economic production. Reducing the Conflict to “simply diamonds” was a “donor driven approach,” the government adopted “to dance to the tune of donor driven analysis of the war in
Sierra Leone” (Francis, 2001: 143). The government was forced to say what the donors wanted to hear, considering the key role Western governments played in leading the campaign against ‘conflict diamonds,’ and the key dependence of war-torn Sierra Leone on donor funding (p. 143). This simplistic discourse deflects attention from the dynamics of the world political economy in helping to foment the Conflict.

To the extent that the tension between the stability and integration of the Core is often at the cost of the disintegration of Peripheral society, the Conflict diamond analysis remains suspect, and its findings questionable. By concealing the dynamics and processes of underdevelopment, such approach impedes effective solutions, hence the heavy criticism directed at the diamond certification scheme (Bangura et al, 2004; Francis 2001). By failing to consider problems of practical rationality and governance, the expert analysis and their recommended solutions proved at best to be cosmetic reforms, and at worst, misleading. By concealing key issues in the formative processes of the crises, the expert solution perpetrated a crisis of crisis management - the innovative solution they recommended to resolve the crises could further perpetuate and perpetrate crises tendencies.

Expert solutions such as diamond certification are based on presentist analysis or empirical analytic research,\(^\text{347}\) which are guided by the technical interest in the integration of the economic system, rather than the human interest in freedom from socio-economic misery and oppression. The history of Sierra Leone is replete with expert

\(^{347}\) Empirical analytic research is guided by a technical interest, which investigate nomological regularities by isolating or constituting their objects and events into dependent and independent variables. It is based on negative feedback, and uses prediction centrally and other procedures for confirming and falsifying hypothesis. Centrally focused on the application of knowledge, this approach is affected by “false objectivism, scientism and positivism. See Richard J. Bernstein, (1995). Introduction In Berstein, R. J. (Ed.) Habermas and Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
solutions that reflect a *crisis of crisis management*. The neoliberal agenda is another example of neocolonialism. What was billed as good for Sierra Leone’s economic development led to its socio-economic crisis. The neoliberal advice of the Breton Wood Twins fomented the economic crisis. The Central Bank opposed the advice the IMF/Bank gave the government, but the latter went ahead to implement the IMF/Bank prescriptions. The government’s conduct gives credence to Memmi (2006)’s point that European “colonization has committed enough crimes of its own; it would be pointless to attribute to it those it did not commit (p.22).”

The mercenary for diamond deals concluded by the NPRC is another instance of solutions reflecting the crisis of crisis management in Sierra Leone. Smillie *et al* (2001) claimed that the mercenary–conflict-resources complex is a positive development for African security: “a brash certainty on the part of the mercenary that its services are needed, and that its members will continue to be lucratively employed around the world;” that the mercenary “faustian bargains” have found “a new public acceptance of the role that mercenaries are suppose to play,” and that they will “continue to be lucratively employed” and have a “profitable future” in Africa (Smillie *et al*, 2001: 63 - 64). This discourse presupposes that citizens will always support the mercenary-for-resources deals. The assumption presupposes an Africa that will remain politically and socially unstable. The NPRC hired mercenaries to meet the security needs of the country at the cost of the irresponsible mortgaging or long term exploitation of the society’s natural resources. Memmi (2006) condemned such neocolonial type attitude exemplified by the NPRC: “Black Africa continues to solicit the intervention of foreign troops to control internal dissent…Why didn’t they request assistance from another country? (p. 22).”

Similarly, after Independence some nations tried to make pacts with their former colonial powers for external defense and internal security (Nkrumah, 1966: xiii). Nkrumah warned against such defense and security arrangements as this seemed to effectively place the destiny of these societies in the hands of external forces, whose interest runs tangential to their own. Luring newly independent states into such security pacts with capital-driven former colonial masters could sound the death knell of the African State. NPRC’s neo-colonial mercenary-for-diamond deal rendered the successive regime of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah vulnerable causing its overthrow in 1997 because of the President was initially unwilling to recognize the security-for-diamond deals.

\[d\] Experts can create a crisis rather than resolve it. The change to Keynesian economic paradigm that emerged in Breton Woods in 1944, which justified structural adjustment conditionalities, is questionable. The neoclassical economic theory of Jevons and Menger, which was adopted at New Hampshire had been already discredited a century earlier. The theory was not applied to the Third World because of its rationality, but because of the power of those propagating it (Swift and Tomlinson, 1991). Kuhn remains doubtful that scientific progress is always triggered by anomalies of extant paradigms. He thinks ‘a prevalent epistemological theory’ tends to create crisis or more accurately, to

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348 The development/underdevelopment discourse already shows why the immutable imperial interest of capitalist system integration makes this suggestion a danger to the survival of African societies. Discourses from the Dependency theorists such Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Colin Leys, O’Donell, have shown the operational unchanging tendency of the Core or the West to pursue or secure its development at the negative cost or underdevelopment of the Third World; Also see Canada and the Third World: Conflict of Interests. Toronto: Between the lines.
reinforce one that is already very much in existence. If in the application of the theory, social actors in practical reality experience a “fundamental anomaly in theory,” the scientist’s first effort is to isolate the structure of this anomaly precisely (Kuhn, 1964: 98). Though the IMF/Bank policies were suspect, and found socio-economically dysfunctional, the experts did not surrender them with relative ease as they should (Kuhn, p. 87).

Scandinavian citizens, unlike Sierra Leoneans, resisted these policies because they could assert their right of civil disobedience. Decades of state repression, on the contrary, denied Sierra Leone citizens this right, a move that served to conceal the crisis these policies induced. Even though the policies created misery, APC refused to abandon them, making the ‘scientific’ basis they claimed for them questionable. For the Sierra Leone government (personified in Stevens), the ‘success’ of the neoliberal policies had to do with system integration or the regime’s self-preservation or survival, rather than the wellbeing of citizens or social integration.

e) The discourse of colonialism serves as justification for physical domination. The discourse of colonialism - structural violence or discursive manipulation - which colonizes the socio-cultural domain tends to physical violence. The ‘discourse of colonialism,’ which involves the blaming of victims tends to translate into willful blindness of the physical violence directed at victims. Smillie et al (2001) argue that greed caused the rebels to embark on the war; they believe the security-for-profit deals

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are good for Africa. Kaplan as well blamed tribalism, and barbarism as the cause of the brutal civil war. Like Smillie et al, Kaplan recommended further bolstering the State’s coercive forces. But, was it not the State itself that triggered, tried to conceal, and so intensified the legitimation crisis for over 40 years in Sierra Leone?

These discursive distortions facilitate inconspicuous domination, serving as the precondition for subsequent physical domination. Kaplan’s recommendation to bolster the coercive force of a repressive undemocratic state is a recipe for anomie or social disintegration. His ‘failed states’ discourse ends on the premise that such states must seek the help of more civilize states – hence the new benevolent imperialism discourse.\(^\text{351}\) In concealing the origins of institutional crisis in Sierra Leone, Kaplan’s ‘analysis’ detracts from the correct origins of the state’s vulnerability and state violence. This discourse also conceals the hand of contemporary imperial machinations in the making of the so called ‘failed states.’ Thus, these logical distortions in the expert discourses tend to legitimize the very distortions they conceal (Wellmer, 1976: 256).

Francis (2001) argued that these simplistic ideological ‘analyses’ of the Sierra Leone Conflict lack rigorous scientific basis. The words of the British Labor leader, Wilson reflected similar colonizing discourse in 1953: “the most urgent problem [in Africa] is not war or communism or the cost of living. It is hunger…hunger is at the same time the effect and the cause of the poverty, squalor and misery in which they


\(^{351}\) Chomsky considers the concept of Failed State an ideology. He defines the term in the Preface of his *Failed States* as “a currently fashionable notion that is conventionally applied to states regarded as potential threats to our (the West’s) security (like Iraq) or as needing our intervention to rescue the population from severe threats (like Haiti) (p.1 ).” See Norm Chomsky, (2006). *Failed State: The Abuse of Power and The assault on Democracy.* New York: Metropolitan Books.
live.” Nkrumah argued that “lacking [in such discourses] are any positive proposals for dealing with the situation (Nkrumah, 1966: xix).” “The scientific analysis of the relationship of life, objectified as an object, informs us about cause and lawfulness according to which existing states reproduce themselves, it is less interested in the factual history of the origins of specific institutions.” The repressive and exploitative state, whose interest is fused with the market, hardly enters their expert ‘analyses’ of failed states.

Kaplan’s recommendation to militarily bolster the undemocratic regime is flawed and suspect. Years of APC dictatorship made the regime paranoid or afraid to even enlist its own citizens to defend it, since the latter withdrew its loyalty to the regime. When the regime was attacked by a handful of national army soldiers– the NPRC- the regime had no nerve left to defend itself. It fell at the hands of a handful of soldiers in a palace coup more or less. The regime’s loss of power did not originate in its loss of coercive capacity necessarily, but from citizens’ mass withdrawal of loyalty from it. This withdrawal represents the flipside of the regime’s loss of legitimacy. The social order’s stability does not necessarily result from the state’s coercive force or the positivity of the legal order (or the Hobbesian fear of death), but from the recognition citizens accord it (its legitimacy), which in turn guarantees its stability.

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354 Hobbes’ constitution of the philosophy of history trivializes the stability-guaranteeing force of legitimacy, which he simply consders as legality or as arising from the at of the legal contract or covenant. See Jürgen Habermas, (1974). The Classical Doctrine of Politics In Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon Press.
f) System manufactured chaos and exploitation complex constitutes colonial strategy. In the 1960s, the lack of rational discourse on the Governor General’s powers and the military during gradualism concealed the future chaotic and crisis potential of these institutions. This rendered the society ill-prepared to deal with the explosive and devastating disruptions these institutions would unleash on the society later on. After almost half a century since African societies were declared politically independent, many still lacked the capacity to effectively manage their resources or coordinate their security apparatus or the army in a stable environment.

Though sounding paradoxical, the production of chaos seems somewhat like a fundamental necessity of systemic imperatives in times when threat is posed to system integration. In his analysis of gradualism in Ghana, Pearce (1982) argues that British imperialism reached its penultimate fruition during the interwar years. The latter was characterized by massive chaos, lawlessness and disorder. In these conditions of anomie and chaos,

Britain was acting more imperialistically than ever before, in the sense that this was the heydays of the empire. During the war, the British Empire really existed for the first time! Imperial control at last became a reality…. Colonial production increased and used to Britain’s best advantage without payment being made. Forced labor becomes a common feature during the war in Africa and elsewhere. Discontent in the colony produced no redress for grievances: instead all agitators where summarily imprisoned. Britain tightened her grip on the dependent territories and used them remorselessly to win the war against the axial forces (Pearce, 1982: 209).

Likewise, since the 11 year war in Sierra Leone, illegal mining and smuggling burgeoned, ending in the mushrooming of relatively unknown mining establishments in the Country (Smillie et al 2001; Francis, 2001). In the chaos or anomie of war, basic
rights and the legal regulation of society were obliterated, creating a state of war or state of emergency. Under such war conditions, societal coordination unfolds exclusively via the systemic media of money and power, freeing the political sovereign from moral practical constrains, hence the states capacity to unlawfully limit or impede the socio-cultural domain of communication or public reason with impunity. When sovereign political power becomes deregulated, it tends to manifest excesses and corruption.

g) Dividing sovereignty is a colonial domination strategy. British colonial indirect rule system used local chiefs or kinship principles to govern their immediate subjects, while the colonial state remained the institutional nucleus of the social organizing principle. This strategy or expediency made British imperialism less costly by charging Africa Kings with the task of administering taxes and adjudication. These Kings took on the lower status of paramount chiefs, relinquishing the power to decide foreign relations and defense to colonial Britain. They became intermediaries between the British imperial state and subjects, which enabled the colonial power contain insurgency at low cost.

The Independence constitution also divided the sovereignty of the nation state by assigning poorly defined executive powers to a Governor General and judicial powers to the Privy Council of England. These institutions were answerable only to the British crown. Sir Albert’s challenge to the Governor’s position partly led to the constitutional crisis discussed in Chapter 4. Though considered a (non-political) titular administrator, the unelected office of the Governor General was able to decisively exercise executive powers that changed the democratic destiny of the nation for about half a century.
Another example is the neoliberal economic interdependence between the World Bank/the IMF and the APC dictatorship, whereby the multilateral institutions dictated economic directives, which the State was legally bound to implement. Like the case of paramount chiefs during indirect rule, the state was subordinated to the external multilateral institutions. Under this division of sovereignty, the will and interest of the society was subordinated to the will and interest of external capital or the imperial system, creating the economic crisis that intensified the crisis tendencies toward a legitimation crisis (the 11 year civil war.)

Again, the NPRC leader Valentine Strasser reproduced instability and crisis associated with his policy of divided sovereignty. As chief executive, he ceded his key function of national security to mercenaries, hence reproducing the neocolonial entrapment of the state apparatus, and society. The privatization of defense is a dangerous division of sovereignty that rendered the subsequent regime (Kabbah’s SLPP) vulnerable to external military manipulations. The security-for-diamond contract reproduced the very original conditions that triggered the civil war (the collusion of state and external capital in the exploitation of the nation’s natural resources). The deal put the state under duress by limiting its capacity or scope for rational steering capacity, to seek its own interest in self preservation, and that means the interest of diamond-driven security providers, against that of the society. This study wonders why NPRC adopted their imperialist policy with potential destabilization effect.

355 By ceding these central political functions of defense and internal security to an external power, the state becomes neocolonial. See Nkrumah, K. Neocolonialism, the Lasts Stage of imperialism, p. xiii.
h) Problematic liberal paradigm of law facilitates colonial domination - Political and social actors in Sierra Leone seem to approach issues from the perspective of the liberal paradigm of law, which does not emphasize political challenge to the State. The liberal paradigm of law conceives society as an economic institution, one established and coordinated centrally through private law, mainly through property rights, and contractual freedoms, negative rights or subjective liberties and driven by the spontaneous workings of the market (Habermas, 1998; 1996). This paradigm defines civil society in economic terms, and recommends the pursuit of social justice through guarantees of negative legal status, private autonomy or subjective rights i.e. by delimiting individual freedoms to have and acquire. This paradigm limits citizens’ legal consciousness to engage the state, as democratic equality or political autonomy is not emphasized. Growing inequalities in economic power, assets, and living conditions make the liberal paradigm incapable of furthering the stability-guaranteeing phenomenon of legitimacy of the social order. Citizens must transcend the liberal paradigm to become constitutional interpreters. By drawing on the intuitions of the procedural paradigm of law, which insists on realizing political autonomy (the right of political participation), citizens can develop the necessary democratic learning capacities to engage the political order and to refine the political constitution of the society.

The privatistic orientation is evident in the neoliberal economic arrangement and even the Marxist-type revolutionary strategy for change denies citizens’ “right of veto” or the political right to question their extant order. The ideology of cultural oneness (or ultra nationalism) also betrays over-generalization, which turned out to be thinly concealed Bourgeois interest. Insofar as the universal interest RUF posited in their
strategies were not opened to question, the generality they posited for it is false. Thus, the society must find its normative key in political autonomy, rather than in the privatistically oriented economic discourse of wellbeing (Habermas, 1996; 1994).

i) Selectivity rather than a dialectical logic defines systemic imperatives or colonization of the society. While the dialectic as the law of motion of society is important for understanding social evolution, the dialectic cannot enable us adequately explicate the moral practical paradox exemplified in RUF’s revolutionary project. The dialectic may simply explain the public’s opposition to RUF brutality, but cannot systematically explicate the interaction of the social, psychological and empirical reality underlying RUF’s immoral conduct.

…whosoever thinks that philosophical knowledge can and should be produced by way of dialectics is simply deceived by the original obscurity of philosophical knowledge... Because this knowledge becomes clear only through thinking, he is of the opinion that its source, too, can lie in thinking. And through this misconception of the real nature of philosophical knowledge he is driven to seek the secret of philosophy in the invention of a dialectics that artificially generates philosophical knowledge, an external fruitless exertion (Nelson, 1946: 103). The paradox of RUF revolutionary praxis is reflected in this contradiction: the collectivization of the public as shown by their initial universalist arguments in their Manifesto, which they later abandoned as soon as they seized political power – they privatized the public’s consciousness (McCarthy, 1985). This turn of events had nothing to do with the laws of the dialectic, but an irresponsible choice – selectivity - base on their self-delusion and greed for power. Sir Albert, RUF, like Stevens and the NPRC chose to pursue their particular (despotic) interests, which clashed with the shared interest of the society. This conduct was not determined by a cosmic dialectical law, but an
immoral choice aimed at seeking political power for oneself. To take one’s orientation from a dialectical law is to deceive oneself that his conduct had nothing to do with self interest, and this tends to deliver one up to dangerous anti-societal conduct. This study analyzed social tension or crisis that disrupted the evolution of the society stems from the private orientation of political actors that led to their historicism or willful blindness.

j) Repression hinders critical consciousness. People groomed in a low political culture of repression cannot sufficiently grasp the play between the modern exploitative strategy of the metropolis and the periphery (Habermas, 1987: 355). State repression hinders citizens’ ability to articulate their private experiences or reality in the public sphere. Without scope for rational discourse in the public sphere, or public reason, citizens cannot nurture or develop the consciousness of how external systemic imperatives constrain their daily local life. The low political culture perpetrated by the authoritarian (colonial) organizing principle hindered the possibility for reflexive or evolutionary learning. This inability exemplifies the irrationality of history, which becomes visible with citizens’ incapacity for reflexive learning i.e. in the capacity to overcome repression-induced socio-psychological pathology to not believe what they say, and say what they believe. The fundamental problems of social evolution in general are to be found in a society’s inability to learn (Habermas, 1970: 15). When societal members are denied a social environment that makes possible the scope to question problematic truth and moral claims of their social order, cultural differentiation, transformation or

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357 The organizational principle of a society determines the learning capacity of a society. Jurgen
rationalization is denied as well. In the next section is an attempt at a discourse-theoretic formulation of critical pedagogy.

7.3 Critical Pedagogy as embodiment of the Emancipatory Interest. In the analytical chapters, the research showed that politics in Sierra Leone was oriented to the science of control, or the technical mastery of society,\(^{358}\) rather than the nurturing of civic virtue in social life. Since British colonization, Sierra Leone politics had been characterized as a “norm-free” sociality, where state and economic institutions were uncoupled from the socio-cultural domain of the society.\(^{359}\) This low political culture (Cox, 1970) hindered social autonomy of the society by denying political discourse in the public sphere. After independence, this de-moralized political culture quickly rigidified (Chapter 4), rapidly degenerating into full fledged APC dictatorship – desolation - (Chapter 5). The inherited logic of British colonial politics, ‘existential self assertion,’\(^{360}\) intensified since Independence, from SLPP’s brief post Independence governance, through three decades of APC dictatorship to the ‘revolutionary’ mayhem of the RUF in the 1990s. The dialectic of morality – denial and reconstitution of moral discourse – manifested in the different regimes denying communicative rationalization, while compensating for this denial through public relations or propaganda.\(^{361}\) By hindering public dialogue, these

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\(^{358}\) The technically oriented governance of society –control- impedes social learning, and exemplifies a tacit philosophy of history, which states that human beings control destinies rationally to the extent they apply social techniques, and that rational guidance of ones destiny is proportionate to the extent of cybernetic control and application of these techniques (Habermas, 1974: 275).


\(^{360}\) Sir Albert allowed debate but like a Hobbesian, within a framework that does not make the sovereign obligated to justify its claims (Chapter 4). Stevens allowed only one directional communication like a Machiavellian, denying others the right to honestly communicate their beliefs (Chapter 5). The RUF
regimes simultaneously *unlearned* the use of their reflexive (communicative) capacity or developmental logic necessary to rationalize the society and move towards adult autonomy. Technical interest in control, rather than mutual understanding, defined post-Independence politics in Sierra Leone. Thus, the practical implication of the study is that the society needs to be put back on track or on the path of rationalization (not in the technical, but communicative sense) as communicative or intersubjective reciprocal reflection of social actors.

Since the war, this need has become even more urgent. After the War, a radical popular culture (particularly in music) has blossomed in Sierra Leone. While this research commends this ‘revolutionary awakening,’ it raises the concern that this radical popular culture is quickly stultifying, losing its critical edge, and degenerating to taking sides. As such, the public sphere is quickly losing its legitimate claim to being a ‘stand in’ for the society. With such a logic, public sphere or popular culture in post-civil war Sierra Leone cannot assume the position of ‘revolutionary,’ of being a radical widespread rationalizing force in the society, or an extension of the public’s use of reason. They now simply transmit consumer culture and consumption, a reversion to internal colonization. This study responded to the need to relearn the critical potential required to rationalize the society by proposing a critical pedagogical project modeled after the communicative theory of action.

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held the society hostage, and then made the ethical-political claim that their ‘revolutionary’ project represents society’s best interest. Een by its propaganda efforts, the regime recognized communication as inevitable to social coordination, even as if deny antauthentic or genuine form of it.

364 A look at some new songs by artist, who use to be united against the previous regime shows that these public artists and the public sphere sound like surrogates for political parties. Patronage continues to affect postwar Sierra Leone. See Richard Fanthorpe, and RoyMacondie, (2010). Beyond the ‘Crisis of Youth?’:Mining, Farming, and Civil Society in Post-War Sierra Leone. in *African Affairs*, vol.109, no. 435.
This critical pedagogical project, which constitutes the practical implications of this research, is informed by critical social theory that is often charged as Eurocentric, falsely universal, and idealistic. We argue here that the theory is universal or non-particularistic, and practical, rather than idealistic (a). Methodologically, the Critical Theory of society and the critical pedagogical project proposed here converge. Like critical theory, which conceive the rationalization of the society in terms of dialogue, the critical pedagogy here unfolds through the communicative art of public philosophizing. They both consider communicative rationalization an act that can emancipate societal members from their self imposed limitations and dogma, hence its transformative potential. Critical Theory’s rationalization concept involves a reflexive (evolutionary) learning process that students and other societal members can appropriate in the classroom and in their day to day adult conversation (b). This subsection outlines the basic features of the critical pedagogical project. In making the emancipation of society (self-determination) through practical reason the goal of our critical pedagogy, it is political (c). This political project reflects the logic and goal of the classical doctrine of politics, which harbors the original intentions of practical and social philosophy (Habermas, 1979). This partly explains the supra-disciplinary nature of this study’s critical investigation and the pedagogical project it practically implies. To proceed, we first dispel misconceptions associated with the critical investigation or the Critical theory of society i.e. that it is Eurocentric, idealistic, and an overgeneralization. Doing so prevents critics directing similar charges at the critical pedagogy proposed here.

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a) On idealism – Communicative action carries the idealization that normative presuppositions of implicit claims ought to be redeemed. Actual practice in society does not reflect communicative action, hence a counterfactual. As we have shown throughout this study, Sierra Leoneans can only stably coordinate their society, collectively form their will, regulate or resolve morally-defined conflicts through consensus. Such consensus in post-traditional or democratic constitutional Sierra Leone depend on the extent social actors can approximate communicative action. Communicative action is, therefore, a social fact, since only it can produce the consensus vital to avert crisis-tendency in the society.

The material nature of our critical investigation is evident in its reference to crisis-producing system problems in the domain of reproduction and production (Habermas, 1976: 122). The failure to take seriously the need to validate or redeem the problematic claims of political and social orders has direct practical implication for crisis or solidarity of the society. The formation of genuine solidary bonds is impossible without the consensus that only the goal and attitude of communicative action makes possible. This critical investigation, and indeed the critical theory of society never argues that ‘people want to act communicatively, but that they have to,’ if they are to avoid the ‘costly recourse to violence.’ This problem solving focus of Critical Theory of society as reflected in its agency–structure dialectic underscores the practical necessity of citizens in transforming crisis-inducing colonizing principle of social organization. The practical effect of the so-called idealizations is evident in the fact that failure to take them

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368 Habermas, Post-metaphysical Thinking. MIT Press. p. 47
seriously has direct implication for trust, morality, and truthfulness, and solidarity vital to social integration.

This research method of critical social theory is *historical* insofar as it inquires after the causes of evolutionary change in the whole range of contingent circumstances under which: a) new cognitive and moral structures enter evolutionary consciousness and are transposed in structures of world views; b) system problems that overload the society’s steering capacity arise; c) institutional embodiments of new rationality structures can be tried and stabilized; and d) new latitude is utilized in mobilizing resources.\(^{370}\) Citizens ability to resolve morally-defined conflicts, to alter, or overthrow crisis-ridden relations of production or colonizing organizing principle, depends on access to and commitment to use ‘new’ learning potential or developmental logic already available in worldviews, but which are not-yet-institutionalized (p. 122). This interaction between the material (economically conditioned) historical contingent dynamics or processes of social actors, and their need to appropriate the requisite developmental logic or learning capacities constitutes the *dialectic of progress*.\(^{371}\) This unique methodological (developmental logic/dynamic) strategy of critical theory captures the agency-structure dialectic that drives societal change (p. 228).

The *Eurocentric* charge of false universalism directed at the critical theory of society holds that it is a European view of modernity or rationality that passes itself off as a universal. Conceived as a theory of modernity, Critical Theory (the Theory of

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371 The dialectic of progress has to do with the emergences of new contingencies in society after the attainment of a new developmental level. For instance, with the attainment of formal status of constitutional democracy in 1961, Sierra Leone laws sine then must fulfill the added edition of bein legitimate.
Communicative Action) is closely related to the theory of modernization as both presuppose the normative and historical background of each other.\textsuperscript{372} As a theory of modernization, the critical theory of society would have to imply universalism, which all modernization theories require. The theory of communicative action argues that the universal presuppositions for communicative action apply to all languages and cultures (p. 11). The awareness of universal presuppositions and the self-conscious adoption of universal position towards norms and principles in moral judgment is a post-conventional moral consciousness, one appropriate for any modern or post-traditional society as illustrated in this study. Communicative reason (constitutive of post-conventional morality) makes possible the higher level moral orientation in social interaction, the mature cognitive moral developmental consciousness required in a modern society.

Only a reason which is fully aware of the interest in the progress of reflection toward adult autonomy, which is indestructibly at work in every rational discussion, will be able to gain transcendent power from the awareness of its own materialistic involvements. It alone will be able to begin reflecting on the positivistic domination of the technical interest of knowledge…Only it [communicative reason] can seriously intervene in the complex of compulsive interrelations of history, which remain dialectical as long as it is not liberated so that the dialogue of mature, autonomous human beings can take place.\textsuperscript{373}

Citizens of any post-traditional society would have to adopt this post-conventional moral consciousness to coordinate the society, if they want to avert crisis.

\textsuperscript{372} Ton Shijin, (2000). “Chapter 1: Major Characteristics of Habermas’ Theory of Modernization In The Dialectics of Modernization: Habermas and the Chinese Discourse of Modernity. Sydney: Wild Perry publication, p. 10. Ton Shijin argues the theory is more one of modernization than modernity since it has to do with unfinished processes – such as emancipation and reconstruction. It is not only oriented to the present (modernity), but to modernization, the ongoing processes oriented to the past and the future (p.11).

A post-traditional society does not imply that traditional (conventional), or even pre-traditional modes of thought (pre-conventional and primordial modes of thought) do not or cannot simultaneously exist. Designating a society as post traditional only means that the central nucleus of such a society is a state constituted by modern law, which must balance validity and facticity or legality and legitimacy (Habermas, 1996). The communicative rationalization of legal norms lends them their validity in modern society. Modern law must demonstrate not only facticity (enforceability or positivity) in resolving conflict or in coordinating society, it must also be legitimate. The latter is what guarantees the stability of the legal order.

Universal pragmatics identifies and reconstructs the universal property or condition of possible understanding, which every linguistic culture can demonstrate, even though they may radically differ in their cultural content. Cultural properties of all societies remain the same (Shijin, 2000: 11). Habermas (1984) demonstrates this point by drawing on Weber’s analysis of the rationalization of modern law. Weber showed that legal rationalization reflects series of stages of pre-conventional, conventional, and post conventional basic concepts that obtain in ontogenesis (p. 258). Using the concepts of positivization, legalization and formalization, he showed that any society at higher

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375 Weber argues that “the primitive legal process does not yet recognize any “objective” law; independent of actions,” action and norms are interwoven...For action is not yet oriented to legal duties recognized as “binding” by groups of men. This first takes place in the traditional legal process, where actions are now judged in the light of given norms. Of course, the latter remain particularistic; they are not yet based on universalistic legal principles. This is the achievement of natural law, which presupposes that such principles can be rationally derived. With this, law is giving not only a principled basis but at the same time a meta-juristic basis. …To be sure, law still held fast to the idea of the giveness of legal principles. Only when this idea was shattered, when the principles themselves became reflexive, could law become positive in the strict sense. This was achieved in the modern legal process (cited in Habermas, 1984: 259). However, Habermas argues that Max Weber’s distinguishing of legal properties such as positivism (positive enactment), legalism (sanctioning deviant behavior), formality (acting from internalized principles), as the institutionalization of purposive rational (strategic action) does not properly explain the structural properties in virtue of which law can fulfill these functions. Habermas contends that
the post-traditional stage requires rationalized law that can no longer feed off the taken-for-granted authority of moral traditions. At such a stage, law requires an autonomous foundation, rather than one based on instrumental or purposive rational logic. Law in modern or post traditional society satisfies this condition of post conventional morality only when legal norms are in principle open to criticism and in need of justification. This autonomous justification of norms is uncoerced agreement, arrived at by those affected, in the role of contractual partners, who are in principle free and equal. This form of justification constitutes a legal validity based on rational consensus rather than traditional consensus. To the extent that every modern society must share these formal properties of modern understanding to reach a degree of “conscious awareness” and “sublimation (Shijin, 2000),” the charge that the theory of communicative action reflects today’s Eurocentric cultural prejudices is untenable. The formal properties (demonstrated above in the field of law) are potentially shared by every culture.

The idea of the “dynamics” and the “logic” of social evolution or development further clarify the difference between culture-specific content and universal cultural properties or logic that can universally apply depending on the stage of organizing principle or social integration. The “dynamics” of social evolution or development refers to those specific contingent external factors specific to a society, while the “logic” of social evolution, on the other hand, refers to the internal structural constraints, patterns, and competences a society exemplify, which can or may enter contingent historical social interaction. Successful application of this moral cognitive intuition exemplifies a society or person’s social learning capacity (Shijin, p. 12).

we can rather explain the form of modern law in terms of post-traditional structures of moral consciousness
The application of the appropriate or requisite developmental logic constitutes the *art of philosophizing*, a science or interpretative capacity available in every culture. This art, which is key to this study’s critical pedagogical project, cannot exist without a linguistic philosophizing subject (critical students and post-traditionally conscious subjects), since language is the privilege receptacle of this philosophy. While cultures may be different only in their content, they are similar in the key property of rational capacity for abstraction inherent in every human species. A traditionalist, who argues that primordial thinking is natural to the cultural understanding of a specific society, denies the correct view of culture on the model of discontinuous evolution, with the possibility of regression. Thus, scientific rationality is not peculiar to European culture, nor is the ‘traditional’ thought specific to African cultures. With this rationalization (thematization and critical examination) and excursus on the Eurocentric, idealism, and universalistic charges against critical social theory, including this study, we now turn to the conceptual connection between critical social theory and the critical pedagogy of this study.

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376 See Nelson, (1947). *The Socratic method and critical philosophy*. Thought patterns of abstraction and conceptualization are identical in all society. Proverbs is an African example, where through the interpretive act of abstracting or reduction the many is transformed into a single lesson or epigram. *philosophy*.

377 Ambe J. Njoh. (2006). *Tradition, culture and development in Africa: historical lessons for modern development planning*. See Burlington, VA : Ashgate; The tendency of primordial mentality, which is transmitted from generation to generation, and which remains magical and ritualistic attaches to the occult i.e. it grasp experience as pregnant with something that goes beyond objectivity. Also see Habermas, Communication and the evolution of society. 1976.
b) Critical (Transformative) Pedagogy as rationalization of knowledge. Both the critical pedagogical project and communicative action aim at emancipation. Communicative action can enable us employ practical reason in a radical way, to go beyond pragmatic questions to examine ethical existential questions and moral questions. Pragmatic discourses decide the choice of strategy and aggregated will; while ethical political discourses establish the authentic will of a group or the society. The latter serves to decide the question of what societal members or a person wants to be or become. Moral discourses move further to decide autonomous will and decide what is equally acceptable to everyone. Citizens, who can effectively assert claims to their subjective liberties freedoms or legal equality as espoused in the ethical political order or the constitution, can also take up democratic opinion and will formation to debate moral or justice questions, and vice versa. The latter characterize moral discourses, which only can establish true united bonds in society: Abstract solidarity, mediated by law, arises among citizens only when they allow principles of justice that penetrate more deeply into the complex of ethical orientations in the given culture. Since mutual understanding or solidarity requires intersubjective reciprocal reason-given and response that leads to cooperatively established shared interest, emancipation is constituted in terms of mutual understanding.

381 Emancipation is defined as a reflex of self experience in the course of learning that liberates one from their confinement, such as their ethical self understanding. We learn who we are by simultaneously learning to see differently in relationship with others. Emancipation is the discontinuous transformation in the practical relations of person. See Habermas, J. (1994). What Theories can Accomplish In The past as future. Translated by Max Pensky. University of Nebraska Press., pp. 103-4
Accordingly, to posit a common tradition or value for a post traditional society, including the constitution, implies the claim that the constitutional state can renew itself from the normative presuppositions of its existence, from its own resources (Ratzinger and Habermas, 2006, p. 21). As a system of rights, the constitution more or less only demarcates the private autonomy of the citizen. To reproduce the stability-guaranteeing legitimacy of the social order, the society requires justice or moral discourse – democratic will and opinion formation, hence the co-originality principle. It is doubtful whether the legitimation based only on constitutional procedures and principles in a society “with a plurality of worldviews can achieve normative stabilization through the assumption of background understanding that will at best remain on the formal level, limited to questions of procedures and principles (p. 22).” The fact of pluralism means modern citizens must see societal secularization as double learning processes that compel everyone to reflect on their own respective limits (p. 22-3). Even when such reflection may take monadic forms, subject would have to take an intersubjective or communicative cognitive attitude, if the are to take seriously the normative expectations they raise in dialogue with each other. Each must take the other’s contributions in public debate seriously (p. 47). This cognitive attitude annuls violence, and serves to institutionalize the unforced force of the better argument or communicative reason in the society.

Similarly, the critical pedagogical project here is dialogic and sensitive to inclusion. It transcends the subjective identification that ignores “the fact of pluralism.” The practical orientation guiding the methodology of our critical pedagogy is succinctly captured in Dewey’s question: “How shall we employ what we know to direct our
practical behavior so as to test our beliefs and make possible better ones?"382 In public conversation and in classroom debates, adult citizens and students can connect up with the knowledge they already know [their lifeworld] to revise them when they become problematic, only if they can realize the conditions of communicative rationalization. In this way, the knowledge pursued in any academic discipline or in the larger society is rationalized insofar as the responsibility and commitment to ensure reason-given and response is possible in these domains.

The critical pedagogy advocated here emphasizes questioning and counter-questioning as a way to reflect on the validity of the social order, the cultural knowledge, lifeworld or pre-theoretic (intuitive) knowledge.383 The communicative competence of students and ordinary citizens enables them to draw on their species-wide competence or potential to test their social order and knowledge for truth-validity (truth, morality, truthfulness) when they appear questionable. The critical pedagogy here aims to unleash the potential for critique in ordinary language (the meta-language) so as to expose knowledge that can potentially induce crisis tendencies in the society.384 Since every consensus rests on intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims; it is thereby presupposed that those acting communicatively are capable of mutual criticism. Acting communicatively, that is through the open process of reason-given and response in the public and in the classroom is advocated in this critical pedagogy. Only this interactive

383 From the very start, communicative acts are located within the horizon shared, unproblematic beliefs; at the same time they are nourished by these resources of the always already familiar. With the constant upset of disappointments and contradiction, contingency and critique of every day life crashes against a sprawling, deeply set, and unshakable rock of background assumptions, loyalties, and skills. See Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms, MIT Press, p. 22
mode can enable students and adult citizens discover the truth, and morally acceptable norms, and help in the construction of rational and valid knowledge capable of producing stability. The true and valid knowledge or understanding arising from critical dialogic activity in the public sphere and in the classroom, demonstrates the practical orientation of this critical pedagogical project. The adoption of the hypothetical attitude to problematic statements or knowledge, hence the need to question their rationality, puts knowledge interrogated in the critical pedagogic classroom under pressure to prove, ground or redeem itself.

In addition to interrogating what theory, law, or world view, warrants and backing supports a problematic knowledge claim, the critical pedagogy here also evaluates the practical consequences such as crisis inducing and colonizing effects that arises from the continuing existence, legitmation, or application of problematic knowledge. With the outline of similarities between communicative rationalization and our critical pedagogical project, we now further elaborate more specific features of our critical pedagogy.

c) Critical Pedagogy as Critique: Between Social and Practical Philosophy. As shown above, this study appropriates insights of communicative action to define the conditions under which we can realize the transformative potential of critical pedagogy. The political task of our critical pedagogical project is captured in the task of practical philosophy: “How to redeem the promise of practical politics, of providing practical orientation about what is right and just in a given situation, without relinquishing the
rigor of scientific knowledge demanded by social philosophy.

Our critical pedagogy realizes the scientific quest of modern social philosophy, by emphasizing critical interpretation, mutual criticism or critique in classroom or public debate. It advocates the radicalization of discourse by always demanding the redemption of truth, normative and subjective claims implied by knowledge or orders or norms. Conducting academic and public discourse this way reflects the practical orientation of classical politics, the promotion of civic virtues in society (p. 44).

Conducting education (in the public sphere and in the classroom) through this scientific (rational critical interpretive) framework that brackets and rationalizes problematic knowledge, with the goal of promoting truth, morality, and goodness reestablishes the correct purpose of public discourse, to engage power relationships (Roger Simon, 1992). Classroom and public academic interactions that terminate in or produce civic virtues reflect successful critical pedagogic exercises with emancipatory effects: the transcendence of dogmatic consciousness or enlightenment. In being guided by the question, “how can we at one and the same time belong wholly to ourselves and just as completely to others (108),” our critical pedagogic method holds central the need for mutual understanding.

The practical effect of this critical pedagogy is the unity of the one and the many – solidarity and valid knowledge arises because interlocutors

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386 Social philosophy was forced to conceal its normative implications due to its modern scientific grounding of this science. Notwithstanding this, the basic question of social philosophy, “How is knowledge of the social relationships of life with a view to political action possible?”, and “How can we gain clarification of what is practically necessary and objectively possible in a political situation?” is still relevant. Today, politics has become the philosophy of the regulation of social intercourse, due largely to this aberration in scientization of modern social philosophy. On the road to science, social philosophy lost the prudence politics was formerly capable of providing. This loss of hermeneutic power (science as critical interpretation) required for the theoretical penetration of situations has affected the social sciences. See Habermas, J. (1974). The Classical doctrine of politics. In Theory and Practice. Boston.

387 Mutual understanding, which emerges with the possibility of citizens’ self realization and self-determination, is conceived here as true emancipation. See Habermas, J. (1992). Postmetaphysical
interact on the communicative model of cognition and moral reason (Allen, p. 106). The social solidarity, stability and valid knowledge derived through this higher cognitive moral attitude neutralizes dogmatic consciousness, which is based on the pressure of reality, or one's subjective perception of the world.

The political nature of our critical pedagogy is not only in its public collective, orientation and goal of conflict resolution, but in its purpose of exposing the falsity, ideology or inconspicuous techniques of domination. The “factual unity of theoretical and practical reason that till now has been expressed in some individual thinking requires communication, not just on the level of propositional content but also on the meta-communicative level of interpersonal relations (p. 3).” The concept of critical pedagogy here shows a credible purpose as critical philosophy, insofar as the science (interpretative reasoning) it advocates is not scientistic (positivistic), self-obsessed, monadic, or reflects technocratic consciousness that is detached from public discursive will and opinion formation in the classroom or in social space or the public sphere. The critical pedagogy here assumes the form of critique, a sense in which philosophy has become political practice. Thus, this approach reflects the classical doctrine of politics, which had always proceeded pedagogically, by ‘instructing’ society in prudence and civic virtues.

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389 Jurgen Habermas, (1983). Does Philosophy still has a Purpose? In Political philosophical profiles in Federick G. Lawrence (Ed). MIT Press. Habermas has claimed that philosophy’s purpose must be political, that stage in which it has become critique, such as communicative reason.

390 In this regard, it draws on the old doctrine of politics referred to as critique, which is directed towards the formation and cultivation of virtuous character that always proceeded pedagogically. It must guide against effective History such as Marxism that models itself after physics or the natural sciences. The just and the excellent in the contexts of a variable and contingent praxis lacks ontological constancy as well as logical necessity. The capacity of practical philosophy is phronesis, a prudent understanding of the situation. Since Hobbes, the scientific grounding of social philosophy technicized the idea of social order, as one that needs to be engineered or manufactured on the model of biology. It ignored ethical social intercourse. Thus, social philosophy and the social sciences have been separated from their sources, the classical doctrine of politics, an heritage now quite forgotten. Ibid., See the Classical doctrine of politics.
The method of our critical educational project is not however instruction in the normal sense, but the stimulation of students and citizens to enable them tap into their latent cognitive and moral consciousness or potential in social inter-action.\textsuperscript{391} As the art of cooperative (mutual) philosophizing (or critique), our pedagogy presupposes the abstracting capacity of every adult or mature student. The method aims to bring these awareness to students and the adult public that they always already embody a know that, a developmental potential or capacity to undertake the rational art of philosophical abstraction.\textsuperscript{392} Proverbs derived from Ananse or Bra Spider stories in West Africa are classic examples of such abstracting capacities in African culture. This capacity also implies citizens or students becoming effective constitution interpreters.\textsuperscript{393} As dialogue is the only path along which the truth or the right moral course might be found (Nelson, 1947: 5), the political critique of our critical pedagogy is modeled on the cooperative search for legitimate knowledge.

This discursive pursuit of legitimate knowledge, as civic virtue destroys the aberrant scientification of modern social philosophy. The modern study of society lost its focus on civic virtues, or prudent dialogue as motivation in engaging in social life (phronesis), which this concept of critical pedagogy aims to restore. This political goal

\textsuperscript{391} See Nelson, 1947, pp. 18-19. The only ‘compulsion’ is to bring to citizens realization that they actually already know what they did not know they knew (p. 18). The critical pedagogic (dialogic) method excludes didactic judgment from instruction. This critical pedagogic problem involves the problem of “How to make instruction possible without instructive judgment.” If education is self determination, a condition in which individual behavior is to be determined not by outside influences, but according to ones own insights becomes the major concern for critical pedagogy. How can we resolve the seeming paradox, of “How to affect a person by outside influences so he is not affected by outside influences (p.19).” This understanding of ‘outside influence’ as the external stimulation necessary to awaken truth help us partly resolve this quagmire, hence to further illuminate parameters of our critical pedagogy.

\textsuperscript{392} The object of this pedagogical practice is to trigger philosophical reflection and consciousness that kindles the light of philosophical cognition (Nelson, 1947, p.1).
of social interaction, which always proceeded pedagogically, is established once again in
this study. The critical pedagogy here, therefore, holds that civic virtues of truth and
morality should arise from mutual self-discovery rather from instructional didactic
practice.396 This logical process of abstraction is vital to secure the most fundamental
propositions and general principles.397 It is an indispensible precondition of science or
interpretive accomplishment that does not reflect self understanding as goal or paradigm
in interaction, but uses cooperative validation to ensure a truly rational knowledge.398

Critical pedagogy must sound like actual talk or the familiar to serve as guide or
model (Nelson, 1947), hence the need to avoid the unrealistic burden on social actors and
students. Its civility (non-violence) and practical problem-solving efficacy means social
actors are likely to show commitment to this higher cognitive moral attitude in classroom
conversation or in public discourse. Only an interactive consciousness that takes
judgments or claims seriously, and makes mutual demands for valid grounds can
overcome systematic deformations and distortions of discourse, hence can weaken
dogma, naiveté, fear, or the power of ideological manipulation. The required attitude of
our critical pedagogy is one that is possible, though not always encouraged.

Since critical pedagogy must test will and opinion formation or judgments in a
definite and clear manner, it must proceed through ordinary (non-technical) language, the

393 Ibid, Nelson, pp. 91-2. What distinguishes a philosopher or sharpest thinker is the grounds of the
truth of their thought. What philosophy teaches must be truth and the form it teaches must be science. To
teach truth, philosophy must be free from tradition, or any sort of authority (p. 92).
396 The internal history or developmental logic of specie demonstrates that subjects always already
have the know-that or pre-theoretical knowledge within them of these concepts
397 Nelson, 1947, p.7; Also discourse theory describes this process in relations to the reproduction of
our lifeworld. The theory of communicative action uses the lifeworld, the consensual knowledge, to which
interlocutors must connect up in order to undertake interpretation, or meet their reality frontally.
398 Ibid, Nelson, P. 10. To philosophize is to isolate rational truths with our intellect and express
them in general judgments.
only meta-language available. Only in such a medium can interlocutors clearly elaborate concepts, rational will and knowledge formation, clearly rationalize (thematize and critically examine) the presuppositions of a cultural knowledge, including moral or legal norms, or the lifeworld. To dialogue or rationally engage a problem, interlocutors (publically deliberating adults and students) must at least agree on the basis of their disagreement, the contested norm or problematic knowledge. Thus, linguistic clarity or mutual intelligibility is vital as the basis for critical pedagogic contestation.

The frequent practice of conscious and mutual dialogic reflection on socially significant matters can serve to institutionalize a high political culture in the society, a democratic practice vital to averting social disintegration. As shown in this study, a society unaccustomed to a liberal political culture of communicative freedom will soon disintegrate or become crisis ridden. By understanding this critical pedagogy as a strategy of social integration or mutual understanding, post-traditionally conscious Sierra Leoneans could be motivated adopt the attitude of civility it requires as a tool of conflict resolution, and for the cooperative search for truth and morality.

The emancipation potential of critical dialogic pedagogy occurs when social actors and learners in the public sphere and in the classroom can: a) draw on new rationality structures or species-wide moral intuitive consciousness already latent in world views to change the problematic knowledge of their life or society; and b) the public sphere or learning environment or classroom provides a milieu favorable to stabilizing successful transformations of the form of social integration i.e. protect this accomplishment from regression. The input of the public actors, teachers, journalists,
students and other citizens, in discourse or occasional review of curriculum, education and cultural policy should be encouraged.

In concluding, this study makes the argument that the society can establish the appropriate social organizing principle commensurate to its formal status as a constitutional democracy only if it learns to balance constitutionalism and democracy. To achieve this balance between the system of rights and popular sovereignty, the society should institutionalize or make possible governance in the *procedural paradigm* and institutionalize *jurisgenerative politics*.

From the perspective of procedural paradigm, equal treatment of legal persons refers to the possibility of each person simultaneously protected in their integrity. Any decision or order affecting them count as “relevant” only insofar as it institutionalizes the possibility of rational discursive capacity to challenge such order when the need arises. The equality principle in this paradigm assigns the burden of argument such as discourses of justification and application that serves to actualize the impartiality *principles of universalization and appropriateness* in policy formation or the law making process. Legitimate law or decision, therefore, presupposes the possibility of communicative freedoms, which makes possible the emergence of pragmatic, ethical-existential, and moral reasons. These reasons and their associated discourses serve as constitutive elements of the law’s rational normative basis. Only with such a basis can a law claim to be just and equitable, hence capable of serving as the *cement of society* (Elster, 1989).

Legitimate law closes the circle between the private autonomy of its addressees, who are treated equally, and the public autonomy of enfranchised citizens. Only citizens
who can enjoy both private and public autonomy (who are capable of self realization and self determination) can decide whether, and in which respects, they require factual or material equality to enable them realize their legal equality as citizens. The procedural paradigm of law and democracy gives normative emphasis precisely to this double reference the relation between legal and factual equality have to private and public autonomy. Only in the exercise of their communicative freedoms can citizens determine whether the conditions of factual equality are real enough to make their legal equality meaningful.

According to the procedural paradigm of law and democracy, positive law must split up the autonomy of legal persons into the complementary relation between the private and the public. Addressees of enacted law must at the same time understand themselves as authors of the laws to which they submit, hence they must be able to realize their authentic will and autonomously determine their will in the legislative process which must start in the social domain. Private and public autonomy represents incomplete elements of autonomy that refer to each other as their respective complements. By this reciprocal reference of private and public autonomy to each other, the procedural paradigm provides an intuitive standard for judging whether a policy or regulation promotes or reduces autonomy. According to this standard, enfranchised citizens must exercise their public autonomy by drawing the boundaries of private autonomy – their negative rights of speech, movement, and association – sufficiently enough to qualify them for the role of citizen.

The procedural paradigm counteracts colonizing paternalism as it focuses on the legal person’s realization of their equally distributed liberties and the factual use of their
political autonomy or right of political participation. The idea of a just society is connected with the promise of human dignity and emancipation (self realization and self determination). This legal paradigm considers the normative key to be autonomy rather than wellbeing, for the legal community of persons is not free as long as the freedom of one person is to be purchased at the cost of another’s misery or oppression.

A second element of political learning advocated here draws on the idea of *jurisgenerative politics*. This aspect speaks to another major problem of this study: how the individual opinion and will of citizens connects up to the general will, which emerges out of the politico-administrative machinery or legislative processes of the state as law. How can the citizens know when and how their inner self is absorbed by the general will? How can ordinary citizens become executors of the general will or realize popular sovereignty? How do we make the shared interest claimed for state policy truly generalizable? Resolving this dilemma depends on explicating the internal relationship or connection between the opinion formation of the public and will formation or decision making in parliament or in the government.

The public sphere and civil society in which ordinary citizens articulate their private experiences publicly and undertake opinion formation is vital in the process of legislation. For the democratic opinions formed by citizens (the *weak public*) must serve as input, the basis and sounding board for parliamentary will formation or law making process (the *strong public*). This legitimate and correct division of sovereignty between the *weak public* of citizens and the *strong public* of the politico-administrative machinery constitutes *jurisgenerative politics*. When citizens can learn to talk or communicatively reflect on their daily life, and problems arising from state economic and political steering,
and have their views and desires enter policy formation through the conscious enabling
effort of politicians, citizens as well as the politico-administrative machinery would have
learnt to realize popular sovereignty, and to balance constitutionalism and democracy.

Institutionalizing such a consciousness in the public sphere would enable ordinary
citizens’ (the weak public) to function as the sounding board or attentive public that
gather and transmit intelligence or problem solving innovations to the strong public that
decides and makes laws on their behalf and in their interests. Their contributions, thus,
can serve as input or the normative reasons in parliamentary discourses of justification,
and discourses of application in the judiciary and in the implementation of policy
decisions by the administration. A strong democratic network and organizations of
similar political learning and education strategy at the regional level (of West Africa for
instance) would help in establishing or institutionalizing and monitoring jurisgenerative
politics in that sub-regional sphere: there is power in acting together.
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Appendix: Map of Sierra Leone

Map of Sierra Leone culled from the site, www.lonelyplanet.com