Immigration and Minority Nationalism: The Basque Country in Comparative Perspective

by

Sanjay Jeram

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Political Science
University of Toronto

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that ‘nations without states’ are seeking to preserve cultural and linguistic homogeneity within their historic ‘homeland’ by advocating for independence or political autonomy. Accordingly, large-scale immigration has typically been seen as a threat to national minorities because newcomers tend to integrate into the culture of the majority group. In addition, even if immigrants learn the minority’s language, they are unlikely to sympathize with the nationalist movement or vote for nationalist parties. This dissertation seeks to explain why Basque nationalism, despite its historical grounding in racism and exclusivity, developed a group-based multicultural approach in response to foreign immigration.

To account for this unexpected outcome, I develop two interrelated causal arguments that integrate the role of ideas and the imperative of nation building for nationalist elites. Nations are forged by a rich legacy of memories and nationalist history requires both an act of collective remembering and collective amnesia. The ideas that stem from the memories of repression constrained the choices of Basque nationalists, preventing the rise of ideas of racial purity and exclusion in favour of multiculturalism and openness. A second argument that I advance is that changing contexts are motivating nationalist elites to find new policy areas with which to distinguish the values of the majority and minority nation. The emergence of a stricter immigration framework in Spain and a backlash against multiculturalism in Europe provided Basque nationalists with an opportunity to link open citizenship and multiculturalism to the distinctiveness of the Basque nation. I apply the arguments developed through an in-depth study of the Basque case to the nationalist movements in Scotland, Quebec, and Flanders and conclude that diversity is an effective, but risky, new value that minority nationalists are employing to further their case for independence.
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List of Abbreviations

BAC – Basque Autonomous Community
BQ – Bloc Québécois (Quebec Block)
CCRI – Council for Cultural Communities and Immigration
CRI – Council for Intercultural Relations
CSU – Christian Social Union
EA – Basque Solidarity
EC – European Community
EU – European Union
HELDU – Legal Service and Social Care for Immigrants
IU – United Left
LN – Northern League
MRCI – Quebec Ministry for Relations with Citizens and Immigrants
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement
PNV – Basque Nationalist Party
PP – Popular Party
PQ – Parti Québécois (Quebec Party)
PLQ – Quebec Liberal Party
PSOE – Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
PSE – Socialist Party of Euskadi
PVI – Basque Immigration Plan
PV – Basque Popular Party
RCMP – Royal Commissariat for Migrant Policy
RW – Walloon Socialist and Democratic Rally
SNP – Scottish National Party
VB – Flemish Block/Flemish Interest
UPyD – Union, Progress and Democracy
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Immigration-Minority Nationalism Nexus: The Puzzle of the Basque Case

Contemporary immigration presents a significant challenge to the conception of a nation as culturally homogenous. Since 1945, immigration into democratic societies has created policy challenges for states, in particular, the difficult tasks of integrating newcomers economically, politically, and culturally. The policies that states have adopted in response to immigrants have run the gamut from exclusion from the host society to the vigorous promotion of multiculturalism. While it appeared in the 1990s that pluralist understandings of diversity had become the norm in Western Europe and North America, opposition to differentialist stances and support for a “return to assimilation” is becoming apparent in both popular opinion and public policy.¹

At the same time, western states have been facing challenges from ethnonational communities such as the Québécois, Catalans, Scots, Flemish, Bavarians, Sardinians, and Basques over matters of sovereignty and national recognition. Globalization was supposed to wipe away minority national identities based on distinct languages and cultures and replace them with post-national civic identities.² Empirical evidence has invalidated this prediction because, even following accommodative efforts by central governments that include wide-ranging autonomous powers for national minorities in Canada, Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom,

nationalist political parties continue to push for more autonomy, and sometimes independence.\textsuperscript{3} Nationalist political parties argue that their respective nation holds an inherent right to self-government and that only through self-rule can their nation continue to prosper as a modern cultural community.

Globalization has raised new challenges for minority nations: they must contend with the global movement of ideas, goods, and capital that threaten to replace ethnonational identities with supranational or post-national ones.\textsuperscript{4} Immigration is a consequence of globalization that has the potential to disrupt the success of the nation building projects of minority nations, but has so far received very little attention from empirical scholars.\textsuperscript{5} People from developing and developed countries are migrating to the burgeoning cities in the territories of minority nations such as Montréal, Barcelona, Bilbao, Vitoria, and Glasgow to various degrees, but it is increasingly becoming an important reality in all of them. Because most immigrants will not share either the language or cultural traits that make the minority nation distinct from the nation associated with the state, many minority nationalists see immigrants as a potential threat.

While the leaders of nation-states may conceive of minority nationalism and immigrant integration as parallel issues, the political elites who represent minority nations in subnational and national legislatures argue that they intersect in a fundamental way. There has been a trend towards decentralization in all western states facing secessionist movements, and nationalist parties are using their control over regional parliaments to demand more power over immigration.

\textsuperscript{3} Michael Keating, \textit{Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland} (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); André Lecours, "Ethnonationalism in the West: A Theoretical Exploration," \textit{Nationalism and Ethnic Politics} 6, no. 1 (2000): 103-124. The terms minority nationalism and ethnonationalism are used interchangeably to distinguish state-seeking nationalism from the nationalism of already existing states. The terms also imply the nation has an ethnic or cultural basis.


\textsuperscript{5} One exception is Eve Hepburn, "Regionalist Party Mobilization on Immigration," \textit{West European Politics} 32, no. 3 (2009): 514-535.
policy and the policy areas that relate to the integration of immigrants such as education, language, culture, and welfare.

The reasons behind these demands may be different in various cases depending on the goals and ideology that undergird the nationalist movement. A simple classificatory scheme developed by Hans Kohn categorizes nationalism into two basic types: ethnic nationalism that arose in polities that imperfectly coincided with cultural boundaries and civic nationalism that developed where ideas of nations and nationalism arose within pre-existing states that were inspired by Enlightenment ideas to adopt norms of equality and justice.6 Contemporary scholars such Anthony Smith and Michael Ignatieff have employed Kohn’s terminology to make general statements about the fluidity or openness of the boundaries of civic and ethnic nations. Civic nations are presumed to be based on a common civic culture that only requires a potential member to be a willing participant, while ethnic nations are unified by the people’s pre-existing ethnic characteristic and thus excludes ethnic ‘others’ from membership in the nation.7 Based on this proposition, civic minority nationalists want control over the process of immigrant integration to help newcomers adapt to the cultural context while ensuring the pre-eminence of their language and cultural values (e.g., gender equality, democracy), whereas ethnic nationalists seek to use political power to exclude outsiders from membership in the nation and any benefits that such membership entails.

Taking into consideration the expected difference between civic and ethnic minority nationalist projects in terms of their ability to integrate immigrants, the Basque case stands out among the western minority nations as the one most likely to be hostile to immigration. Broadly speaking, the literature has emphasized the comparatively open nature of the Scottish, Catalan,

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and Québécois nations with the exclusionary nature of Basque nationalism. In his seminal work, *The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain*, Daniele Conversi argues that the absence of language as a core value led Basque nationalists to stress factors such as race and violence to induce cohesion whereas the Catalan nationalists could rely on language to act as the ‘glue’ of a Catalan community. Consequently, Conversi claims that Catalan nationalism accepted non-ethnic Catalans who learned the Catalan language as co-nationals whereas the Basque nationalists historically excluded non-ethnic Basques to prevent the denigration of their nation. Gurutz Jáuregui comes to the same conclusion in his comparison of nationalist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia. He says that Catalonia has been a land of passage and has been open to outsiders whereas the Basque Country “has demonstrated an isolationist tendency” and the *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) reigns supreme.

Will Kymlicka has also pointed out the peculiarity of the Basque case. Kymlicka queries the potential conflict between immigrant multiculturalism and minority nationalism; he suggests that while the Catalan and Québécois nations have had little trouble opening their societies to immigrants, “racialism remains a stronger force in Basque nationalism.” Kymlicka states that in the Basque case there has been an ongoing struggle between the “liberal-inclusive conception of nationhood and the racist-exclusive conception that is reflected within both nationalist parties and in popular opinion.” Kymlicka also mentions the case of Flanders in Belgium as an example of a region that has undergone similar struggles.

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8 This characterization of Basque nationalism as ‘different’ and more ‘ethnic’ from other western minority nationalisms has recently been challenged. See André Lecours, *Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2007).
12 Kymlicka, “Immigrant Integration and Minority Nationalism,” 71. Díez-Medrano who takes into consideration socio-economic variables in an effort to explain the “pacific” Catalan outcome compared with the “radical, ethnic
example of a nationalism that is yet unwilling to forego a rigid ethnic definition. This statement affords too much weight to the extreme right-wing separatist party Vlaams Blok (VB) because the other mainstream nationalist parties in control of the Flemish government have opted for policies rooted in the philosophies of multiculturalism and civic integration.13

The most compelling reason why one might expect that Basque nationalism would be hostile to foreign immigration is the tenuous situation of Euskara.14 Only 25% of the population of Basque Country speaks Euskara fluently and the language is difficult to learn for non-native speakers, and is not used anywhere outside of Euskadi and rural areas of Navarre and Iparralde.15 Minority nations demarcate elements that epitomize the intimate essence of a culture. Some of these elements are better suited for projection as core values because they act as “pivots around which the whole social system of the group is organized.”16 Language rather than other values such as race or religion offer better prospects for the development of an open and inclusive nationalism as long as it is not purposely used as a barrier to prevent the integration of outsiders. Yet, even if opportunities to learn the language of the minority nation are present, Kymlicka makes the valid point that the minority language must be one of ‘prestige’ that opens the door to economic success and advancement before immigrants will decide to learn it.17 While the Law of Basque of 1983 created a plethora of opportunities for Euskara speakers to obtain jobs in the
public service, the economic value of knowing Euskara in the business, media, and retail sector is still relatively low and definitely does not parallel the value of learning the Catalan language in Catalonia.\textsuperscript{18} In Catalonia, nationalists have successfully constructed a linguistic-based nationalism that has resulted in stricter laws and regulations to ensure that Catalan is the \textit{lingua franca} in all components of society. Accordingly, it might be expected that Basque nationalists interested in preserving and extending the use of Euskara in Euskadi would be hesitant about encouraging foreign immigration because new residents are likely to choose to learn Spanish because the benefits of learning Euskara may not be perceived as worth the resources language learning requires (e.g., time, money). This is particularly true in the case of Euskara given the difficulty and obscurity of the language in the rest of world.\textsuperscript{19}

Paradoxically, Basque nationalists have responded to the influx of foreign immigrants since 2001 with an approach to integration that is very receptive. Beginning with the establishment of a directorate of immigration in 2001 and approval of the Basque Plan of Immigration in 2003, the Basque government, under the control of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), formulated an approach that encourages the retention of cultural specificity among immigrants and provides special services targeted for newcomers to prevent economic and societal marginalization.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, other nationalist parties have supported this receptive approach and presented discourses that are accepting of immigrants and in favour of ‘multicultural’ policies. The open and supportive nature of the immigrant integration approach


\textsuperscript{19} Latin American immigrants who already know Spanish can (more) easily integrate into the national culture of Spain.

\textsuperscript{20} There have been some policy reverses since 2009 when the PNV lost control over the Basque executive, which will be discussed and explained by the framework of the dissertation.
that has developed generates the following key question: why has Basque nationalism been receptive of immigrants despite its foundation as an ethnic nation?

I argue that ideas about the treatment of minorities generated by historical legacies of repression under the Franco regime altered the understanding of Basque nationhood among elites, and ultimately prevented the development of an assimilationist approach to foreign immigration when it became a contentious issue. In short, the brutal repression that Basques faced during the Franco dictatorship became part of the collective ‘story’ of the nation. Political elites acted as ‘carriers’ of these ideas and translated them into economic support and multiculturalism in response to foreign immigration. A second important factor is that changing contexts are pressing minority nations to find new ways of defining themselves beyond traditional markers such as language and culture. Because of the turn to stricter forms of immigration control and away from multiculturalism in Spain and other European nations, Basque nationalists were provided with an opportunity to show a disjuncture between their values and Spanish ones by developing a multicultural framework of immigrant integration. In other words, Basque nationalists are using rhetoric and policy related to immigration to foster and promote an alternative national solidarity to the Spanish one.

**Situating the Research: Minority Nationalism and Immigration**

Over the last few decades, scholars and policy makers in the West have reached a consensus that nations without states such as the Québécois, Catalans, Scots, and Basques should be accommodated with territorial self-government and encouraged to maintain their distinctive languages and cultures. This represents a shift away from the conception of the world as made up of homogenous nation-states that was prevalent following World War II. In the developed
world, it is commonplace to expect the state to “protect and promote the national cultures and languages of the nations within its border, both the majority nation and the minority nations.”

Beyond minority nations, other types of minorities such as religious minorities, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and ethnocultural minorities have mobilized in favour of more accommodation and recognition from the state. All of these groups have made strides beyond being tolerated in western societies; they receive recognition, representation, and accommodation within the institutions of society. Ethnocultural minorities are significant in number and visibility in many industrialized nations because of mass immigration from developing countries. States have been grappling with the ideas and policies associated with multiculturalism—supporting the maintenance of various cultures—for the past few decades as the number of immigrants that speak different languages, practice different religions, and are of various races has increased rapidly.

For the most part, state accommodation of minority nations and ethnocultural minorities has been treated separately in academic literature. Because more and more immigrants settle in the territories of minority nations, it is no longer possible for minority nationalism and immigration to be analyzed in isolation. If minority nations are anti-liberal projects that seek a return to an ethnically homogeneous ‘golden age,’ then we should expect a backlash in Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country, and Catalonia against immigration policies that mesh with the philosophy of multiculturalism. Since the outcome in a ‘most likely’ case—the Basque Country—has proven to be quite the contrary, it presents itself as an ideal case to connect the two bodies of literature by developing an explanation for this ‘puzzling’ case.

Theoretical Underpinnings and Methodology

This research represents an effort to combine both positivist and constructivist modes of analysis. The theory implies a strong belief that causal relationships exist, but, at the same time, it accepts discourse as a variable and acknowledges that much of this discourse is socially constructed. This combination approach reflects a few theoretical assumptions. First, in explaining that political actions, identities, values, and ideological commitments are accepted as legitimate explanatory variables. Moreover, the assessment of the rationality of nationalist actors requires the observation of fuzzy concepts such as prestige, legitimacy, recognition, and respect. Second, in contrast to explicit positivist assumptions, this framework accepts the role of ideas in explaining and understanding political action. In this research specifically, the intersubjective understanding of the nation comes to play an important role in the formation of rhetoric and policies within the realm of immigration integration.

Given the difficulty of precise variable measurement when using a constructivist framework, qualitative methods are more appropriate than formal modeling or large-N statistical techniques. Moreover, I do not subscribe to the positivist assumption that data speaks for itself; it requires interpretation, especially since the research seeks to understand human action, which cannot be done “without understanding what the participants attribute to those actions—their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, values, and assumptive worlds.”

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Case Selection

Of course, choosing to focus on a single case rather than two or more has its drawbacks, but I contend there are important reasons why a case-study approach is appropriate in this instance. As mentioned earlier, the relationship between minority nationalism and patterns of immigrant integration is a relatively new and understudied phenomenon. Consequently, there is no literature that provides base-level assumptions from which to derive testable theories. When studying new or understudied phenomenon, Mahoney argues that “novel hypothesis formation” is best done through the study of over-time data with “a concern with temporal processes” because it is easy to miss variables and incorrectly diagnose causation when analyzing many cases in less detail.\textsuperscript{24} Munck and Snyder agree that there is utility in case study research because it facilitates creativity and scholarly imagination.\textsuperscript{25} A second reason is that this research fits closely with the ‘deviant case’ study model. Deviant cases are observations with outcomes that do not conform to predictions based on existing theory. As mentioned earlier, the distinction between civic and ethnic nations that appears in the literature on minority nationalism and immigrant integration generates the expectation that the Basque nation should not be immigrant-friendly. The fact that the outcome in the Basque case has been just the opposite provides a good opportunity to understand why it defies theory, and in doing so, discover “novel hypotheses that can be tested more generally.”\textsuperscript{26} Finally, although a case-study method implies that data collection and process tracing focuses on the case under investigation, comparisons will be made to other cases. In particular, I look at the cases of Scotland, Quebec, and Flanders using

\textsuperscript{24} James Mahoney, "Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics," \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 40, no. 2 (2007): 124-126.


\textsuperscript{26} Mahoney, "Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics," 125.
secondary literature and available evidence in a tertiary attempt to check how theoretical innovations that result from studying the Basque case can inform the study of other relevant cases.

Sources and Data

Because this dissertation emphasizes the study of over-time data and temporal processes, I consult a broad range of sources to construct a detailed narrative that allows for an in-depth analysis of the complex relationship between the variables. These sources included relevant books and scholarly articles, parliamentary debates, newspaper reportage, public opinion surveys, party programmes, archival documents, and semi-structured elite interviews. I had the fortune of accessing a plethora of documents that originated from the Basque Directorate of Immigration in the newly opened General Archive of the Basque government in Vitoria. While most documents available were not previously classified, the organization of legislation, directives, and some party memos pertaining to the management of immigration in the Basque Country during the tenure of two PNV-led (nationalist) governments provided me with a good understanding of the nexus between immigration and nationalism as it has developed in this case.

To provide a finer understanding of the motivations behind certain policies and discourses, thirty-five in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with party officials, civil servants, academics, and civil society actors in the Basque Country of Spain between September and December of 2010. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and I worked from a general framework of open-ended questions to allow respondents to guide the interviews

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27 Evidence for comparative discussions of other cases comes primarily from secondary literature.
28 Seven interviewees requested anonymity.
and express their understanding of the issues in their own terms.29 Obviously, first-hand
accounts of processes and events relating to issues as controversial as national identity and
immigration are filtered through the experiences and views of the respondents and may not
reflect objective truths. This made it necessary for me to conceive of interviews as sources of
understanding and look carefully at the transcripts to search for “what sticks in people’s minds,
what they chose to say, when they chose to remain silent, and how they distort what they know
to be their experience.”30

Chapter Summary

Chapter two defines the main concepts and explicates the main argument of the thesis in
relation to the competing explanations. There is minimal empirically driven theory that seeks to
explain why minority nationalists respond to immigration the way they do. The distinct and
voluminous literatures on immigration and minority nationalism provide a starting point from
which I lay out potential explanations.

Chapter three traces the formation and evolution of Basque nationalism to demonstrate
that it was founded as an exclusive nation based on ethno-racial principles. When Basque
nationalism began to fragment into radical and moderate streams, there was much dissent within
the radical nationalist community about defining the Basque nation along ethnic lines. A
minority of PNV members also began to reject ethnic nationalism, arguing that the founder of
Basque nationalism—Sabino Arana—changed his views before his death and supported a more
civic conception of the Basque nation. After the transition to democracy, PNV-led Basque

29 All quotes that appear in English from Spanish-language interviews and texts are my translations. I always
inquired as to whether my respondents would prefer to conduct the interview in Euskara, in which case I would
have brought a translator to the interview. No respondents indicated that this was necessary or preferred.
30 Beth Roy, Some Trouble with Cows: Making Sense of Social Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press,
nationalism did try to reinvent itself as a civic in orientation, identified by territory rather than race. Nevertheless, according to archival and interview data, tensions remained and significant factions within both radical and moderate nationalism were suspicious of allowing non-ethnic Basques into the fore. Moreover, Basque nationalists continued to refer to historical myths and symbols connected with Sabino Arana and his racial definition of Basque nationalism, even following the promulgation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Consequently, it was not a foregone conclusion that Basque nationalists would welcome foreign immigration and legislate in favour of a group-based multicultural policy framework.

Chapter four begins by describing how Spain responded to the fact that by the mid-1980s it was fast becoming a new country of immigration rather than emigration. A highly restrictive policy framework under the conservative government of José María Aznar replaced a liberal one that paid little attention to the integration of immigrants. At the same time, it became noticeable that the multicultural model had exhausted itself in other European countries, leading to a renewed emphasis on integration and assimilation. This shift at the state and European level coincided with the first major influx of immigrants into the Basque Country and this drove the PNV-led autonomous government to take its first steps towards developing its own approach to immigration reception. I argue that the nature of this response—marked by an inclusive notion of citizenship and a desire to build a multicultural society—was conditioned by the fierce cultural repression the Basque nation experienced under the Franco authoritarian regime. The legacy of this period made the reaffirmation of an ethnic Basque nation and a rejection of diversity socially unacceptable. The response was also a product of the need for Basque nationalist parties to distinguish themselves from the state-wide parties on ‘new’ issues such as immigration.
Chapter five recognizes the critical importance of education to nation building and immigrant integration. Education is an important area of observation to help better understand the puzzle of the Basque case and the immigration-minority nationalism nexus more generally. In contrast to the Quebec case, Basque nationalists have not responded to immigration with a ‘Bill 101-style’ policy that forces immigrant children to attend Euskara schools. Rather, the discourse and policies demonstrate a mix of intercultural and multicultural initiatives that place few demands on immigrants in terms of cultural integration and focus more on the responsibility of teachers and the host society to receive students and help them reach their full potential. At the same time, great strides have been made to improve the status of Euskara in the Basque Country and it is now an economically viable language in many occupational fields such as medicine, law, teaching, and government administration.\textsuperscript{31} This is influencing the language model choice of immigrant parents, as more are choosing the bilingual and Euskara streams as opposed to the Spanish stream.\textsuperscript{32} I argue that this long-term strategy of ‘soft’ linguistic nation building is a consequence of contextual factors that rule out a more coercive strategy in the field of education and an attempt by nationalists elites to demonstrate that Basque values are different from Spanish ones.

The sixth and concluding chapter highlights the key findings of the study and applies the argument briefly to the cases of Scotland, Quebec, and Flanders in order to consider the portability of the arguments. The outcomes on the dependent variable vary, to some extent, across these three cases and thus allow for a robustness check of the causal relationships that are derived from the Basque case. To conclude, I acknowledge the limitations of the study and

\textsuperscript{31} Interview 4.  
\textsuperscript{32} Interview 11.
offer possibilities for further research, as well as suggest the potential paths policy-making in western stateless nations might take according to the findings of this study.
Chapter 2

HISTORICAL MEMORY AND NATION BUILDING: THE ARGUMENT

Introduction

There is minimal empirically driven theory that seeks to explain why minority nationalists respond to immigration the way they do. The distinct and voluminous literatures on immigration and minority nationalism provide a starting point from which I lay out potential explanations. In both the immigration and nationalism literatures, there are scholars who argue that ethnic understandings of the nation rooted in objective or subjective historical cultures is the prime variable that explains how nations define their boundaries. The primordialist position is ruled out a priori as an explanation for the main puzzle of this dissertation because it predicts that Basque nationalists would attempt to limit immigration and impose strict assimilating policies. Nevertheless, it is evaluated here given its prominence in the literature and the possibility it may have some relevance comparatively. A second argument in both literatures that has received some support contends that processes of globalization are threatening conventional understandings of the nation, causing a new ‘revolt against modernity’ among nations that translates into a rejection of immigration and multiculturalism. Finally, according to the institutional perspective, the decentralization of power to provide minority nations with a degree of self-governance should result in a more open and multicultural nationalism. All of these perspectives possess limited utility because they cannot explain the development of a receptive approach to immigration within Basque nationalism and across the universe of cases for reasons that will be articulated in this section. Therefore, I build my own approach that emphasizes the importance of past institutional contexts that sensitize minority nations to the consequences of
‘minoritization’ and the fact that minority nations require new ways to nation build. The core objective of this dissertation is theory-building rather than theory-testing and it ascribes to the position held by many historically oriented scholars that the development of mid-range theory that closely examines interaction effects between processes and variables over time is a worthy enterprise. Prior to engaging with the theoretical material relevant to this thesis, it is necessary to define the core concepts that will be deployed.

Concept Formation

Minority Nationalism, Sub-state Mobilization and Stateless Nationalist Parties

The terms minority nationalism, ethnonationalism, stateless nationalism, and sub-state nationalism can be used interchangeably to describe the same phenomenon—“the action of a group that claims some degree of self-government on the grounds that it is united by a special sense of solidarity emanating from one or more shared features and therefore forms a nation.” Ethnonationalism is different from the nationalism of already existing states because some form of statehood is the goal of ethnonationalists. Minority national groups are also different from ethnic groups because the latter is a more general category for groups whose members share one or more objective features such as culture, religion, or race, and have developed a common identity. According to Will Kymlicka, a minority nation is a “historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and

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culture.” Michael Keating, however, argues that having a distinct territory and culture are sufficient grounds to label a grouping a minority nation even if the nation does not use a common language that is different from the larger state. It is obvious that his main point of reference here is Scotland because the normalization of the Scots language in an independent Scotland is not a goal of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Nevertheless, the precise content or core values that a minority nation uses to delineate itself from the larger state is not important so long as a distinct perception of nationhood exists within a defined territory, and this has translated into regional assertiveness against the state.

A seminal debate in the field of nationalism studies centres on the emergence of the modern nation. In his classic book, *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson asserts that the organization of humanity into nations is a modern phenomenon; the advent of print capitalism gave a new fixity to language, encouraging speakers of particular vernaculars to identify with people that they will never meet. Similarly, Ernest Gellner contends that nations are completely modern constructions borne of nationalism that is "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent." Nations are the result of pressures created by the demands of the industrial revolution. The power-holders in agrarian societies are interested in differentiating themselves from the lower classes, so it makes sense to maintain separation by reinforcing the cultural differences between societal segments. This begins to change as the demands of capitalism—specifically the need for constant job retraining to keep up with technological advances—makes a common language and culture a prerequisite for the state to progress. A state meets this demand by monopolizing the education system and

using it to disseminate a ‘high’ state language and culture to replace the myriad of ‘low’ cultures and languages. The result of this process is the marriage of state and culture, fostering loyalty amongst workers—which is the genesis of national solidarity. On the other hand, scholars such as Anthony Smith stress that there is a natural affinity between ethnicities and nations because racial and cultural ties are the only bonds strong enough to cause people to feel solidarity with non-family members and act as a nation. Both approaches are useful to understanding modern feelings of nationhood and solidarity at the state and sub-state levels because political elites stress the continuity and fluid nature of national identities, as well as the importance of cultural artifacts, languages, and history.

A large literature has developed in order to explain the development and behaviour of “stateless nationalist and regionalist parties.” A consensus has not yet developed as to whether there are important differences between what scholars have labelled nationalist parties and regionalist parties. The assumption that nationalist parties are state-seeking while regionalist parties are content with autonomy is incorrect. The PNV, a classic case of a nationalist party, has alternated between goals of independence and autonomy within Spain since its inception in 1895. The same could be said of the Parti Québécois (PQ) and Convergència i Unió (CiU) that have frequently been less than clear about their goals in relation to the status of Quebec in Canada and Catalonia in Spain. On the other hand, the Lega Nord (LN)—a party normally identified as regionalist rather than nationalist—altered its constitution to include secession as

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one of its goals. Furthermore, ‘Padania’ is a construction based on boundaries that demarcate Northern and Southern Italy with an ‘imagined’ cultural basis.\textsuperscript{42}

A second faulty assumption is that nationalist parties are solely concerned with matters of culture whereas regionalist parties have no identity dimension; they are driven solely by economic goals such as to redress socioeconomic disparities or to change policies in order to favour economic development in their region. Clear counterevidence is found in various cases. For example, the PQ and SNP have put pressure on their respective central governments for more control over social policy in order to carry out their goals of developing generous social programs.\textsuperscript{43} On the other hand, scholars of minority nationalism in North America and Western Europe never include Bavaria when constructing their universe of cases.\textsuperscript{44} Yet, the\textit{ Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern}\ (CSU) has held power in Bavaria since 1946 by employing a discourse that presents the party as the defender of the Bavarian land, culture, and traditions.\textsuperscript{45} In official party pamphlets, the CSU uses the term ‘Heimat’ as a way to express its conviction that the Bavarian nation is a community with strong emotional and symbolic content that derives from historical myths of statehood and a shared culture. This sense of difference has often resulted in distinct policy positions by the CSU that challenge the division of authority between the federal government and that of Bavaria. Moreover, the\textit{ Bayernpartei}\ (Bavaria Party) formed in 1946, is

\textsuperscript{42} Margarita Gómez-Reino,\textit{ Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics - Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the Northern Question}\ (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002).
\textsuperscript{44} Keating,\textit{ Nations Against the State}; Montserrat Guibernau,\textit{ Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global Age}\ (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); Alain Gagnon and James Tully, eds.\textit{ Multinational Democracies}, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Kymlicka,\textit{ Multicultural Citizenship}.
a party that advocates independence from Germany and continues to have some success in local elections. 46

The artificial distinctions between regionalism and minority nationalism and regionalist parties and minority nationalist parties have led scholars in both sub-disciplines to “talk past each other.” 47 Although this dissertation focuses on a case of minority nationalism represented by parties that are categorized as stateless nationalist parties, it rejects the analytical separation of the cases of minority nationalism from those of regionalism based on the misconstrued assumptions mentioned above. The hope is, that in doing so it will generate theory that may be applicable to a wider scope of cases. To reiterate, this dissertation defines minority nations as territorially concentrated identity groups that generate political parties or social movement groups that claim to speak on behalf of the nation and project goals relating to autonomy or independence.

*Defining Approaches to Immigrant Integration by Minority Nations*

The dependent variable in this study—immigrant integration approach—is notoriously difficult to define. There is no single meaning of the word integration and various strands of immigration research (e.g., legal studies, refugee integration) import their own assumptions that are laden with value judgements. 48 Moreover, immigrant integration encompasses many concepts such as legal citizenship, labour market incorporation, access to the welfare state, and

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degree and type of cultural inclusion. Various typologies only take into account one or two of these dimensions, which has resulted in diverse understandings of immigrant integration.\textsuperscript{49}

The primary objects of analysis in this study are nationalist political parties; these parties generally do their work through regional institutions rather than at the central state level because the former offers a better opportunity for them to influence policy outcomes. If some degree of self-government does not exist, minority nationalist parties are in the business of trying to obtain institutions that would allow the nation to govern itself (to some degree). Therefore, we cannot assume that minority nationalist parties always have the necessary policy capacity to legislate in the area of immigrant integration that they seek to. Yet, this does not preclude them from attempting to influence policies or practices through the levers of power they have access to, or criticizing state-level policies. Thus it is more useful to speak of an integration approach rather than concrete policy outcomes, which is the focus of most scholarly efforts to categorize approaches to immigrant integration.\textsuperscript{50} For example, formal right of entry and naturalization are always state competencies that cannot be overturned by sub-state governments. It is possible, however, for regional governments empowered to act in policy areas such as welfare, education, and healthcare to help immigrants ‘without papers’ access services that technically should be denied to them as a consequence of their irregular status. At the same time, it is important to recognize that the decentralizing trend among industrialized states has created a situation in which minority nationalist parties can—and do—exert control over significant aspects of integration policy.


According to Entzinger, there are three major domains of the integration process: the “legal-political, the socio-economic, and the cultural dimensions” respectively.\(^{51}\) The classical distinction between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* citizenship generally guides analysis in the legal dimension. *Jus soli* attributes citizenship to everyone who is born in the territory or takes up residence in the country (after a short transition period), regardless of ancestry or length of residence whereas under *jus sanguinis*, full citizenship rights are passed through generations by virtue of ‘blood’ relations. In the real world of citizenship politics, few states fit these ideal types and present a mix of both *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* policies. Germany, the paradigmatic case of *jus sanguinis* citizenship, has introduced reforms that permit non-ethnic Germans to access citizenship. In the often-cited example of *jus soli* citizenship, France, we have witnessed waves of political and popular support for a more restrictive citizenship policy and the subsequent introduction of modest reforms to the *jus soli* model.\(^ {52}\)

While states control access to formal citizenship, ‘denizenship’—a legal status of foreign nationals who are long-term residents and enjoy similar rights as citizens—has made this domain somewhat less important in recent decades. While many countries in Europe have made it increasingly difficult for immigrants to become formal citizens, the rights attached to permanent residency have expanded over the past decade.\(^ {53}\) In other words, it is possible to grant non-citizens all or most rights usually linked to citizenship.\(^ {54}\) Regional governments below the state are important to this process because they have become empowered to establish laws and norms to reduce legal differences between the various residents of a given territory.

\(^{52}\) See Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*.
The socio-economic domain is important to examine because it can be observed whether immigrants are treated as a collective that requires special privileges or according to liberal principles of individualism. Liberals argue that the individual is the basic unit in society and governments should respect this by creating the best possible conditions for each individual—native or immigrant—to realize their goals and ambitions. Immigrant status or ethnic origin should not be an obstacle to access housing, work, or schooling, but nothing should be done to “compensate for deficits in starting positions” between immigrants and the native population.  

Communitarians, on the other hand, argue equal opportunity cannot be achieved through a ‘laissez faire’ approach because institutions, norms, and practices in a society are unintentionally biased by the dominant culture. Access to housing, for example, often depends on whether one is able to produce references. A new immigrant, therefore, is sure to have a much more difficult time accessing housing than a native even if formal equality exists. A communitarian or group approach is defined by an emphasis on equality of outcome rather than equality of opportunity. To achieve this situation, compensatory measures should be developed, such as the creation of institutions and policies that are specifically aimed at helping immigrants overcome social deprivation. Measures that would be indicative of a communitarian approach in the socio-economic domain of integration would be services that help immigrants legalize their status, access the labour market and housing, and combat discrimination.

Empirical work that documents the types of barriers that immigrants face when trying to access legal employment and basic services gives the impression that a ‘liberal’ approach to integration in the legal-political domain is likely to lead to the exclusion and marginalization of

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55 Entzinger, “The Dynamics of Integration Policies,” 111.
immigrants. On the other hand, if extensive benefits and programs make the region an attractive destination for immigrants, minority nationalist parties may face pressures from their constituents to take an increasingly liberal approach in the socio-economic domain as resentment towards immigrants crystallizes. The logic of minority nationalism can be employed to claim that foreigners are ineligible in theory to enjoy the benefits of membership in the nation. This type of approach is akin to exclusion: immigrants are included in the labour market to fill jobs that natives are not willing to do, but are otherwise excluded from society because permanent settlement is a threat to the social cohesion of the host nation.

The cultural domain is also important because it refers to how the minority nation copes with “increased ethnic and cultural diversity that may be seen as a challenge to the nation’s unity.” This dimension of integration approach can be measured by examining how, and to what extent, minority nationalist parties promote linguistic and cultural assimilation or the development of multicultural policies. Because minority nations and the parties that claim to speak on behalf of these nations exist in large part due to the existence of an ‘imagined community’ that is culturally distinct from the state, the impetus towards assimilation should be stronger in minority nations than in sovereign states.

In assessing efforts to achieve cultural or linguistic adaptation, it is important to recognize that approaches to integration in the cultural domain are not easily categorized as assimilationist or multicultural. Analyses of the mix of policies and discourses in the domain of culture put forth by political parties require a continuum that allows the research to recognize the nuances and intricacy of such approaches without oversimplification. First, in defining what

56 A good example is Kitty Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
counts as a multicultural policy or initiative, policies that simply involve non-discriminatory enforcement of the traditional rights of citizenship for individuals who are immigrants may promote multiculturalism in the sociological sense, but do not provide “additional recognition, support or accommodation of ethnic groups, identities, and practices.” A multicultural approach, on the other hand, promotes the retention and celebration of immigrants’ cultures and languages and little or no pressure is applied to assimilate them to into the dominant culture and language. Some examples of a multicultural approach would include the funding of culturally specific immigrant associations, heritage language programs for immigrant children, and permissive laws for displays of cultural difference (e.g., burkas, religious festivals). A core principle of the multicultural approach to integration is that the state should encourage the preservation of minority cultures because it will eventually lead to better opportunities for the participation of minority communities in society. Even a strong commitment to multiculturalism, however, will be tempered by the fact that laws define certain limits to tolerance.60

Banting et al. make an important distinction between multicultural policies per se and multiculturalist discourse. While acknowledging that policies and discourse favouring or opposing multiculturalism often go together, the authors argue that the relationship between policies and rhetoric is complicated. For example, in Germany politicians invoke the rhetoric of multiculturalism in defence of policies designed to enforce non-discrimination and citizenship by birth rather than institutional support for other cultures.61 On the other hand, it is possible to

60 For example, patriarchy or animal sacrifices may be accepted in some cultures, but laws in western societies prohibit such practices.
61 Banting et al., "Do Multicultural Policies Erode the Welfare State?" 52-53.
avoid multiculturalist rhetoric for political reasons while still pursuing multicultural policies. The case of the United Kingdom is instructive here: the major parties have declared that ‘multiculturalism is dead,’ but much of the country’s Race Relations Act that favours multicultural policies remains in effect. For the purposes of this study, the empirical record was scoured for evidence of multicultural policies and rhetoric. Both rhetoric and policy outcomes are worthy of explanation given the theoretical expectation that Basque nationalists would favour rhetoric and policies that reject diversity. Moreover, certain policy areas are outside the scope of a sub-state nationalists government or jurisdiction is shared with the central state. Consequently, rhetoric in favour or against multiculturalism by a sub-state nationalist party can demonstrate its position in relation to that of its respective state and signal how it would act given the capacity to do so.

Some scholars suggest that a midway point on the multiculturalism-assimilation continuum can be identified as the intercultural approach.62 Interculturalism is difficult to pin down, but it is characterized by an effort to achieve a common base for the nation (e.g., language) without asking immigrants to give up their cultural attributes. Cory Blad and Philippe Couton provide a definition of the intercultural approach: “an active strategy designed to combine relative openness to globalizing social forces and foreign cultures while maintaining a coherent national community.”63 Blad and Couton derive their definition from a close examination of the case of Quebec: it transformed itself into an immigrant society after decades of displaying a general suspicion of immigration. According to official documents, the nation-state of Quebec recognizes that to facilitate its increasingly diverse labour force it must adapt its

63 Blad and Couton, ”The Rise of an Intercultural Nation,” 645-646.
national definition to reflect the altered ethnic composition of the nation.\textsuperscript{64} Yet, Quebec nationalists are clear that an intercultural approach is different from a multicultural one because there is some emphasis on ethno-cultural integration due to the need to preserve the French language and the “singular cultural tradition that serves as the official discursive medium.”\textsuperscript{65} The problem with using interculturalism as a concept to measure the cultural domain of immigrant integration is that the rhetoric of interculturalism is often accompanied by policies in line with the standard definition of multiculturalism. For example, as discussed in a later chapter, the Basque government decided to support foreign language classes for primary and secondary students, but marketed this policy as a part of its commitment to interculturalism. Moreover, documents that set guidelines for the implementation of the Basque government’s integration strategy use the terms interculturalism and multiculturalism interchangeably, with later documents preferring interculturalism for political reasons.\textsuperscript{66} While the shift in rhetoric from multiculturalism to interculturalism is interesting in and of itself, the main objective in this study is to track multicultural discourse and policies and provide a satisfying explanation for their adoption in the Basque case. To provide concrete examples of what counts as multicultural policies, the following are the most emblematic from a longer selection provided by Banting et al.\textsuperscript{67}

1) Constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the central and/or regional and municipal levels;

2) the adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum;

\textsuperscript{64} Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities, “Rapport du Groupe de Travail sur la Pleine Participation à la Société Québécoise des Communautés Noires,” (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 2006).


\textsuperscript{66} The so-called ‘failure of multiculturalism’ in the Netherlands and elsewhere rendered the open embrace of multiculturalism less palatable.

\textsuperscript{67} Banting et al., “Do Multicultural Policies Erode the Welfare State?” 56.
3) allowing dual citizenship or conceptualizing citizenship in a manner that decreases legal and cultural distance between immigrants and native-born residents;
4) the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities;
5) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction.

Finally, a one-sided process of adaptation defines the assimilationist model. Immigrants are expected to give up their “distinctive, cultural, or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority national-ethnic group.” The role of the state in a paradigmatic assimilationist model is to use common institutions, such as schools and public television, to transfer the majority culture and values to the immigrant population and create a context that is favourable to individual adaptation (i.e., treating immigrants as individuals rather than as members of ethnic groups). The assimilation approach was utilized by liberal democracies such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom in past decades but fell out of fashion following World War II and the development of a human rights culture. It has seen a recent revival in Europe and academics such as Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska have attempted to define it as an analytically useful term and undermine its negative connotations. A ‘weak’ version of assimilation is practiced in France, a country that retains an assimilationist conception of French republican citizenship. The reason for this designation as a weak variant is that the French state’s policy, until recently, aimed to remove culture from the public sphere rather than compel immigrants to adopt French customs. Nevertheless, as Will Kymlicka has pointed out, most states that claim to be culturally neutral favour the customs, languages, holidays, and religions of the dominant group. To avoid terminological confusion, the absence

of multiculturalism is indicative of an expectation that immigrant groups become more like natives; in other words, a policy or approach akin to assimilation.

In both the socio-economic and cultural (and legal) domains, minority nations could theoretically react to immigration in a hostile manner with an approach of total exclusion. In his survey of nation-state approaches to immigration Steven Castles contends, “no highly-developed country has actually tried to prevent immigration in the post-1945 period.” Yet, this does not mean that minority nationalist parties have not been openly hostile to immigration. Both the Bavarian Christian Social Union and Northern League have stated their desire to prevent the entry of immigrants into their national territories. Moreover, Quebec was not welcoming to immigrants before the Quiet Revolution; its defensive approach towards immigrants during this period has been described as “marked essentially by a refusal.”

In the Basque case, there has been a marked shift in the approach to immigrant integration in both the socioeconomic and cultural domains. During the formative years of Basque nationalism at the end of the 19th century, the movement’s principal architect Sabino Arana defined the nation in terms of ethnicity and, in doing so, articulated an approach towards foreigners that was one of total exclusion. As the Basque nationalist movement grew in strength and diversified, various parties and representatives began to ‘open’ the Basque nation to non-ethnics, but this receptive approach to foreigners was consistently challenged by those wedded to ‘Aranist’ principles until the transition to democracy and beyond. In response to the wave of foreign immigration that began in earnest in 2001, however, Basque nationalist parties have consistently advocated, as well as translated into policies, a communitarian approach in the socio-economic domain of integration and multiculturalism in the cultural domain. Some policy

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initiatives and rhetoric in favour of cultural assimilation have appeared at various times, but have not undermined the development of a strong multicultural approach to cultural integration.

**Alternative Hypotheses and Explanations**

Ethnicity was important to the definition of Basque nationalism during its early stages and consequently immigrants were excluded from membership in the Basque nation on a subjective and political level. Had the Basque nationalist parties espoused discourse and pursued policies aimed at excluding or assimilating immigrants following the wave of immigration that began in the early 21st century, the expectation of the primordialists would have been met. However, the opposite occurred. Due to the poverty of primordialism and in order to explain the outcome under study, this section also comments on the globalization and institutionalist arguments that provide plausible alternative explanations for the outcome in the Basque case.

**Primordialist Argument and National Foundations**

Edward Shils first advanced the primordialist argument that assumes ethnic identity as fixed once it is constructed in 1957. He suggested that modern society is “held together by personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities, and a civil sense.” Shils’ understanding of societal attachments beyond the family is central to primordialism: “attachment is not merely to the family member as a person, but as a possessor of certain relational qualities...it is a function not merely of interaction...it is because of a certain ineffable significance attributed to the tie of

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blood.” Prominent scholars of nationalism, however, observed that the qualitative depiction of deep attachments within kin groups could not explain why nationalisms in Europe extended beyond ethnic groups and eliminated idiosyncrasies in favour of a mass-based nationalism led by the modern state. In the theories of Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, and Anthony Giddens the modern, centralized, and professional state is the central actor in the process of nation-creation, a process directed by elites that have an interest in fostering an attachment to the nation for instrumental purposes. In short, nation-creation is state-driven and concomitant with modernization rather than a mere extension of pre-existing ethnic and cultural homogeneity.

While he is generally associated with the statist/modernization approach to nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm contends that certain nationalisms are not modern; on the contrary, they are “revolts against modernity,” non-dominant minorities that forge their own national project and challenge the hegemony of the national group that controls the state. In other words, these small anti-state nationalisms are anti-liberal and anti-modernist whereas state nationalisms are progressive and forward-looking. A group of scholars argue that such non-state nationalisms draw their boundaries of inclusion and exclusion according to ethnic criteria and are thus unified by primordial rather than political attachments. According to Thomas Franck, minority nationalisms are “forums of romantic tribal nationalism” that are “defensive reactions to modernity.” A similar opinion is espoused by David Hollinger who divides multiculturalism into the ‘pluralist’ variant that defines group membership based on ethnic descent and the ‘cosmopolitan’ model of the United States that is tolerant of various identities and bases membership on voluntary affiliation. He labels cases of minority nationalism, such as Québécois

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75 Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," 142.
nationalism and “other ethnic nationalisms,” as extreme cases of the pluralist variant because they follow closely the logic of racial segregation.  

Anthony Smith and Michael Ignatieff are two contemporary scholars that have accepted that the inherent ethnic characteristics that define non-state nations make them more prone to demonstrate exclusionary tendencies and racist discourse. In *National Identity*, Smith argues that in contrast to the western civic nation, small “ethnic nations are based on descent,” and therefore vernacular culture, especially key traditions and language, define insiders from outsiders.  

Ignatieff defines the civic nation that originated in Great Britain, France, and the United States as a “community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values.” In contrast, Ignatieff claims that understandings of national community for the German Romantics of the 19th century developed from “the people’s pre-existing ethnic characteristics: their language, religion, customs, and traditions.” He adds that this type of ethnic nationalism—more likely to take root among small non-state nations—tells people to “only trust those of your own blood.”

According to this line of theory that non-state nationalisms are more primordial in nature than their state counterparts, one can infer a straightforward hypothesis about the response of minority nationalism to immigration-based diversity: all non-state nationalisms are ethnically-based ‘revolts against modernity’ and will therefore use whatever means necessary to exclude immigrants from membership in the nation. This argument is quickly defeated by a cursory glance at the empirical record. In fact, an important study by Michael Keating suggests that minority nationalists are often more liberal and progressive than state-wide or non-nationalist.

political parties.\textsuperscript{83} Catalan nationalist parties espouse civic principles of inclusion despite facing high levels of immigration and many of the immigrants in Catalonia feel more allegiance to the Catalan nation than the Spanish one.\textsuperscript{84} On the other hand, recent studies that examine Spanish state nationalism have been critical of state-wide parties that are using the rhetoric of ‘hard’ Spanish nationalism in an attempt to galvanize support for the curtailment of the autonomous powers of ‘nationalist’ regions and restrictive immigration and citizenship policies.\textsuperscript{85} A similar observation can be made in the case of the Scots because the SNP’s platform contains a very clear non-racialist conception of ‘Scottishness’ and visible minorities have become active members of the party.\textsuperscript{86}

The ‘national foundations’ tradition started by Rogers Brubaker shares with the literature that contrasts majority and minority nationalism the assumption that the original bases of nations is a determinate factor in how they construct their boundaries of exclusion and inclusion. Yet, it differs from the primordial perspective because Brubaker puts more emphasis on the path-dependent processes that reinforce particular understandings of nationhood rather than the existence of ethnic cores or dominant \textit{ethnicities}. According to Brubaker, citizenship policies are informed by deeply rooted understandings of nationhood because “judgments of what is in the interest of the state are mediated by self-understandings, by cultural idioms, by ways of thinking and talking about nationhood.”\textsuperscript{87} Brubaker selects his two cases—France and Germany—to illustrate how different conceptions of nationhood result in different patterns of citizenship

\textsuperscript{83} Keating, \textit{Nations Against the State}.
\textsuperscript{86} Keating, \textit{Nations against the State}, 220-234.
\textsuperscript{87} Brubaker, \textit{Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany}, 16.
policy. He attributes the exclusionary approach of Germany towards its foreigners to its ethnocultural understanding of the nation and the ease with which France has accepted and integrated its immigrants to its civic conception of nationhood. In doing so, he contends that once deeply rooted understandings of the nation are established they influence citizenship policy in a path-dependent fashion. In short, citizenship policies will not deviate from those that uphold the original principles of nationhood once laid in place.

Brubaker’s argument provides a less rigid hypothesis, as not all minority nationalisms will necessarily project anti-immigrant attitudes, but only those that develop as nations based on ethno-racial principles. Yet, his argument negates the possibility of change once a national model is laid down. This cannot account for the shift from an immigrant phobic version of Basque nationalism to the current version that not only accepts immigration, but actively encourages it with supportive socio-economic policies and multicultural approaches to integration. In short, “it is impossible to explain changes in conceptions of nationhood with reference to their enduring character.”


Globalization is notoriously hard to define because it means “a lot of different things to a lot of different people.” A good definition is provided by Ian Clark who states that

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88 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 14-15.
89 For other scholars that stress the importance of national traditions in the formation of citizenship and immigration policy, see Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (London: Macmillan, 1997); Castles, “How Nation-States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity,” 293-308.
globalization means “greater global closeness, both real and perceived, resulting from the intensification and extension of international interaction.”\textsuperscript{92} Globalization, therefore, is a phenomenon that poses serious challenges to the fundamental principles of nationalism. For example, increasing transborder movements, migration, and the internationalization of economic and social activities can lessen the importance of the bounded ethnic or political community. Even rather innocuous trends, such as rising employment opportunities abroad and the spread of the English language as the dominant mode of communication, can challenge the nationalist worldview.\textsuperscript{93}

The globalization literature characterizes nationalism as a force that stresses fragmentation, particularism, and localism. In the \textit{Power of Identity}, Manuel Castells argues that nationalism has become more prominent in response to globalizing forces and pays close attention to the significance of culture as a catalyst for the resurgence of nationalism.\textsuperscript{94} According to Castells, nationalism has become a reaction against global elites and that contemporary nationalism is cultural rather than political because of its reactive and oppositional character. In his words, “it is more oriented towards the defence of already institutionalized culture than towards a construction or defence of the state.”\textsuperscript{95}

In \textit{Citizenship in a Global Age}, Gerard Delanty echoes the sentiments of Castells, but focuses his attention on nations in search of a state. Nationalism, according to Delanty, “can be seen as a product of the internal crisis of the state in the age of globalization...but it is also a

\textsuperscript{93} Sabanadze, \textit{Globalization and Nationalism}, 21.
\textsuperscript{94} Manuel Castells, \textit{The Power of Identity} (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
\textsuperscript{95} Castells, \textit{The Power of Identity}, 31.
product of the postmodern search for community and identity.” Moreover, the current era of globalization fosters radical right, ethnic, and religious nationalisms that share the following characteristics: “a strong presence of fundamentalist assumptions about group membership and hence a high degree of exclusion, the identity of the self—‘the people’—is predicated on the negation of the other, and an absolute subordination of the individual to the collectivity.” In sum, these prominent works suggest that nationalism in the era of globalization is reactionary and cultural rather than political.

If we accept that “globalization is the reason for the revival of local cultural identities in the different parts of the world,” what does this suggest about the response of minority nationalism to globalizing forces? According to Montserrat Guibernau, the current revival of particular cultures, mostly in the form of minority nationalist movements, is in part the result of the “need for identity of a local, rather than a global, character.” She says that the creation of a global identity via the worldwide flow of images and information is not viable because national identity requires a common past to create solidarity, something that a global identity cannot invent out of thin air. Moreover, globalization brings to the forefront the conflict between languages. Minority cultures cannot avoid exposure to the spread of media and information in other languages, especially English, and this can sharpen the language boundary between their community and the outside world.

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98 Delanty and O’Mahony, *Nationalism and Social Theory*, 148.
According to the literature, globalization generates nationalism because it intensifies the need for localities to defend their culture, language, and sense of community. Increased flows of internal migration and foreign immigration are thought to be consequences of globalization. Because of the ethnic diversity that results from it, immigration can be conceived as destabilizing to the idea of a homogenous culture embedded within the nation-state. According to Andreas Wimmer, even western democratic states such as Switzerland have responded to increasing levels of immigration with policies that exclude and marginalize foreigners because of the threat that cultural fragmentation poses for the nation. Following this logic, immigration is even more threatening to the survival of minority nations because interdependence between markets and the development of a global culture with English as the *lingua franca* makes it less likely that immigrants will see the benefit in learning the minority language and integrating into the minority culture. In other words, globalization makes the mentality of ‘*la survivance*’ that develops within minority nationalist communities appear archaic and anti-modern to immigrants. The conventional argument, then, is that minority nationalists will be hostile to immigration by preventing it, if possible, or employing tactics of assimilation and exclusion.

Other scholars agree that globalization is strengthening the resolve of minority nations, but argue that most are adapting the content of their nationalisms, as well as their political strategies, in order to use new institutions and norms above the state to their advantage. Political leaders in Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country, and Catalonia have responded to the development of continental institutions, such as the European Union and NAFTA, with enthusiasm and a desire

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to participate in them as independent nations. Michael Keating argues that the nationalisms of Scotland, Catalonia, and Quebec are becoming more ‘global’ and no longer need to legitimate their status as nations thus explaining “the paradox that, as these societies have become more similar economically and socially to their respective states, their nationalisms have strengthened.”\textsuperscript{104} Moreover, the fact that states have lost some sovereignty to supranational institutions “permits a rediscovery and modernization of historic identities, and the pursuit of a distinct path to modernization in the global era.”\textsuperscript{105} This translates into a stronger emphasis on the territorial society rather than the cultural or ethnic community. In other words, the elites of minority nations respond to globalization by embracing one of its main consequences, ethnic diversity, by shifting the goal of the national project from protecting the core \textit{ethnie} from outside influences, to one that seeks to include all residents of the territorial ‘homeland’ in the nation. A consequence of this, so the argument goes, is that minority nationalist societies are more open to newcomers, and the elites implement policies to recruit immigrants with the aim of increasing the number of people that identify with the nation.

An examination of some cases does not defend either version of the argument. If the mechanism through which the ‘globalization stokes nationalism’ hypothesis operates is the need to resist homogenizing forces, support for globalization and European integration by a minority nation makes it unlikely that globalization is having its purported influence on the outcome, even if the nationalist movement is clearly anti-immigrant. The LN originally supported European integration as a means towards more regionalism in the Italian state, but now openly rejects ‘Europeanization’ and favours policies that restrict market integration and oppose a European

\textsuperscript{104} Keating, \textit{Nations against the State}, 264.
\textsuperscript{105} Keating, \textit{Nations against the State}, 264.
Constitution.\textsuperscript{106} Even during the period when the party was pro-globalization, however, it presented a strong anti-immigration position in the name of preserving the cultural integrity of Padania and securing jobs for natives. The CSU has consistently supported the principles of European integration, economic openness, and international trade while rejecting immigration because of the cultural threat it poses.\textsuperscript{107} The case of Scotland is also perplexing for both versions of the argument because Scottish nationalism has become decidedly more pro-globalization over time, but its position on immigration has been quite constant. In 1967, the SNP sent out a letter to the European Economic Community (EEC) warning its members that an independent Scotland is unlikely to honour British treaty obligations. A clearer example of the SNP hostility towards European integration comes from a statement made by then leader William Wolfe in 1970:

“The SNP delegation which went to Brussels has confirmed our view that it is the aim of the Common Market to establish political domination of Western Europe and to tolerate no deviation from this line.”\textsuperscript{108}

By the 1990s, however, the SNP was ardently pro-Europe as demonstrated by their campaign slogan ‘Independence in Europe.’ As for the SNP’s position on outsiders, there was a detectable component of anti-English sentiment in the party’s literature and manifestos, but the dominant message was that the nation is not defined by the characteristics of its core ethnic group. The party’s constitution “promised equal rights for all citizens in an independent Scotland” as far back as 1968, following successive waves of

\textsuperscript{106} Gómez-Reino, \textit{Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics}, 140-144.
\textsuperscript{107} James, \textit{The Politics of Bavaria - an Exception to the Rule}; Ford, “Constructing a Regional Identity,” 277-297.
immigration that brought Jews, Italians, East Europeans, and Asians to Scotland. Of course, immigrants were met with racism at a societal level, but the SNP did not express any desire to limit immigrants or restrict their rights because of a perceived threat to Scottish culture. Therefore, the current pro-multiculturalism stance of the SNP cannot be explained as a result of the forces of globalization since the outcome preceded the suggested explanatory variable.

To put it bluntly, both versions of the globalization hypothesis are plagued by their universalism; the applicability of its constitutive arguments across a wide range of cases is questionable. If we turn to its usefulness to understand the puzzle of the Basque case, the relationship between globalization and immigration is also not that clear. The PNV has always been a supporter of European integration and has actively sought to engage in paradiplomacy with other sub-national units and states. After the accession of Spain to the EU, the PNV-led Basque government engaged heavily in European activity, taking a leading role in the Committee of the Regions and the Assembly of European Regions. In other words, Basque nationalists have been open to globalization in the sense that they seek sovereign statehood that is recognized and legitimized by the international system. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that nationalists have linked the desire for statehood and international recognition as such with the espousal of multicultural values in response to immigration. In fact, as will be demonstrated, Basque nationalists situate their position in opposition to the backlash against multiculturalism and assertion of aggressive means of cultural integration that has been occurring in many European countries, including Spain.

110 Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, 113-144.
Institutional Approaches

Nationalism is not a research area where institutionalism has had a major impact. Nevertheless, an ‘institutionalist turn’ is notable in recent studies of nationalism that seek to explain processes of identity construction, mobilization, and the transformation of national identities. Institutionalist research has identified constitutions, party systems, federalism, autonomy, and the military as variables that weigh in on different outcomes associated with nationalism (e.g., violence, mobilization, public policy). Political institutions influence self-identification independent of agency. The construction and maintenance of group boundaries is a process that continually occurs and the observable outcome is that political debates in divided societies are conflict-ridden. It is “political institutions that contribute, independently of agency, in the creation, crystallization, and politicization of territorial identities through the boundaries they set in the subjective and political universe of citizens.” For example, decentralization in the form of federalism or autonomy changes the dynamics of politics in the region, exacerbating a regional-nationalist identity if it already exists, and generating identities that were previously non-existent. In the case of Spain political decentralization was intended to settle the Basque and Catalan nationalist conflicts with the state, but the unintended consequences have been the crystallization of the traditional non-state identities and the creation of new political identities in autonomous communities, such as the Canary Islands, Valencia, and Galicia.

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Political institutions also weigh in on nationalism because they shape agency.\textsuperscript{115} Accepting that institutions affect agency does not contradict basic principles of rationality; rational actors must navigate the institutional context in order to act in their self-interest. Institutions shape the relationship between actors, inevitably favouring some actors at the expense of others, and lay down incentive structures that sometimes favour conflict rather than cooperation, or vice versa. For example, the multi-party system in the Basque Country triggers nationalist outbidding between the PNV and Aralar because the former must carefully balance its position on ‘Basque issues’ to ensure that it does not lose its base of support to Aralar, a party that opposes violence and advocates outright independence from Spain. On the other hand, the fragmentation of the parties along both left/right and nationalist/non-nationalist continuums leads to a more cooperative relationship between the two non-nationalist parties, \textit{Populares Vascos} (PV) and \textit{Partido Socialista de Euskadi} (PSE), than occurs at the state level.

Will Kymlicka provides a straightforward institutional explanation for the position of minority nationalists towards immigration. He believes that “national minorities are capable of including immigrants in their self-conception and thereby becoming multicultural themselves.”\textsuperscript{116} This is conditional, however, on the presence of an institutional context that empowers national minorities to control the volume of immigration into its territory as well as the terms of integration. Once minority nationalist elites have sufficient policy autonomy in areas that are relevant to integration, such as immigrant selection, education, and language policy, they will adopt an inclusive approach to integration that favours multicultural policies. The success of an open and multicultural approach to integration in the context of political autonomy works because minority nationalists are able to increase the economic and societal

\textsuperscript{115} Lecours, “Structuring Nationalism,” 185.
\textsuperscript{116} Kymlicka, \textit{Politics in the Vernacular}, 277.
prestige of the minority language and culture, thereby giving immigrants a reason to learn the language and adopt the culture of the minority rather than the majority nation.\textsuperscript{117} Implicitly, Kymlicka is proposing that an institutional context that provides more political autonomy for the minority nation decreases its fear of minoritization—the perception that the sub-state nation is becoming a minority in its ‘homeland’ territory—paving the way for a more inclusive disposition towards foreigners.

The first shortcoming of Kymlicka’s argument is that he makes an unfounded assumption that a national minority is naturally inclined towards accepting diversity, and that a lack of autonomy suppresses its will to become multicultural. In doing so, he ignores the fact that most minority nations are buttressed by guiding myths that tell of historic periods of dominance within their homeland. At the same time, these myths of dominance and strength are coupled with those of disintegration and conquest. It is not clear, therefore, that a period of dominance ushered in by achieving political autonomy will last forever. Nationalist elites may try to convince the masses that a period of strength is the time to shore up national unity by replicating a past ‘golden age’ of homogeneity and simplicity. Eric Kaufmann argues that dominant nationalities may be expressed in either expansive or restrictive form. Restrictive strategies “focus on purifying the dominant ethnic core of external influences and often involve instruments like immigration restriction, deportation, endogamy, and cultural refinement.”\textsuperscript{118} On the other hand, expansive strategies by a dominant nationality have the goal of including new lands within its territory, and in doing so, “nations may be content to let dominant ethnic particularity lapse in favour of a broader national construct.”\textsuperscript{119} Kymlicka takes for granted that

\textsuperscript{117} Kymlicka, “Immigrant Integration and Minority Nationalism,” 76-77.


\textsuperscript{119} Kaufmann, "Dominant Ethnicity," 8.
emPOWERed minority nations are willing to trade their ‘soul’ and adopt multiculturalism without explaining why political autonomy automatically leads to expansive rather than restrictive expressions of dominant nationality.

A second reason to be skeptical of Kylimcka’s argument comes from the work of Andreas Wimmer. In *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict*, Wimmer makes the case that the modern nation state is rooted in ethnonational dominance. Wimmer contends that alongside the inclusionary trends that have accompanied modernity, such as democracy and popular sovereignty, the state has made possible new forms of domination based on ethnic and national criteria. While the main premises of modernity are equal treatment before the law, access to rights and services are often restricted to a specific national or ethnic group. Nevertheless, Wimmer’s argument is challenged by the so-called “supranational regime of minority rights and multiculturalism” that is supposedly compelling nation-states to de-ethnicise the state. In response, Wimmer points out that the multicultural empires of a prior epoch were tolerant of minorities so long as they accepted the hierarchical structure of the state. In addition, nation-states opened their borders to immigrants and provided them with equal citizenship rights—outside of the political and military realms—prior to the First World War. It was only from the 1870s onward that nation-states started to close their borders and link citizenship to ancestry.

“Rather than a linear trend, we thus have a curvilinear trend starting from inclusive, relatively non-dominant modes of relating ethnicity and statehood, leading to a phase of closure along ethnic lines, and finally the current phase of reopening.”

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120 Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict*.
121 Kaufmann, “Dominant Ethnicity,” 41.
Kymlicka’s argument is linked to his belief that the world is moving towards a post-national age. Consequently, this assumption colours his argument that political autonomy for minority nations will compel these groups to loosen the boundaries of their identity and welcome immigrants. While it is true in the Basque case that an opening of the national identity to allow for multiculturalism and diversity followed institutional empowerment, Kymlicka’s argument cannot tell us why autonomy did not lead the Basques down the path of closure as predicted by Wimmer. As Anthony Smith argues, post-nationalists miss the point that there is no obvious alternative way of providing a sense of dignity and security for core ethnies than a homogenous nation-state.

A cursory glance at the empirical record from the Basque case also calls into question Kymlicka’s argument. Prior to the centralization of the Spanish state, there is evidence that proto-nationalism in the Basque Country was exclusionary in nature despite the de facto autonomy enjoyed by the Basque provinces. The case of Bavaria provides another reason to be skeptical of the utility of Kymlicka’s claim. Despite having autonomy within the context of German federalism, Bavarian nationalism—channeled through the CSU—pursues an anti-immigrant, anti-multiculturalism agenda. It is not obvious, therefore, that the reinstallation of autonomy for Spain’s ‘historic nationalities’ following the end of Franco’s dictatorial regime is the most important factor that explains the Basque nationalists’ progressively more civic expression of nationalism and the adoption of a group-based multicultural approach to immigrant integration. In the following section, I will elaborate upon the main argument of this

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123 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys.
125 This evidence is presented in the second chapter.
127 In his articles on the subject of immigration and minority nationalism, Kymlicka presents the Basque case as ‘different’ even though it is now considered similar to the other cases he analyzes such as Quebec and Catalonia.
dissertation: that ideas and the imperatives of competitive nation building are key variables that help overcome the indeterminacy of straightforward institutional explanations in the Basque case, and hopefully, in the wider universe of cases.

The Argument: Discursive Institutionalism and Nation Building Imperatives

I argue that the newest institutionalism, discursive institutionalism, provides the analytical leverage necessary to explain the outcome in the Basque case. Discursive institutionalism considers the “discourse in which actors engage in the process of generating, deliberating, and/or legitimizing ideas about political action in an institutional context.”\textsuperscript{128} As an explanatory approach, Vivien Schmidt emphasizes that discursive institutionalism is an “umbrella concept for the vast range of works that take account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse that serve to generate those ideas and communicate them to the public.”\textsuperscript{129} Historical and discursive institutionalism can operate in a complimentary fashion; the constraining and channeling effects of formal institutions do not disappear from the analysis. In discursive institutionalist approaches, the focus is on ideas as drivers of change, demonstrating that such ideas cannot be fully explained by structural factors, nor do they necessarily represent a rupture from the previous institutional path.

Political institutions are part of the context that shapes national identities within a bounded state. Jacques Bertrand’s concept of ‘national model’ is a useful analytical tool because it articulates the fact that state institutions are bounded by fundamental principles that define the nation associated with the state.\textsuperscript{130} He argues that whether or not nations accept internal

\textsuperscript{129} Schmidt, “Reconciling Ideas and Institutions through Discursive Institutionalism,” 47.
\textsuperscript{130} Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, 9-27.
differences can be observed by looking at official structures, such as the mandatory curriculum, official languages, official religion, and the extent of decentralized governance. National models change infrequently because of feedback effects, but sometimes do so because of embedded tensions within the institutions themselves or exogenous shocks.\textsuperscript{131} Even after a radical change, legacies from the prior national model influence the relationship between nations and ethnic groups within the state.

In the context of conflicts between minority nations and their respective states, especially in western states, the result of changing national models has been almost exclusively more political decentralization and official recognition of multinationalism. According to Dominique Arel, institutional and policy changes that allow minority nations to control their own destiny and protect their treasured language and culture leads to more stability in the multinational state and a minority nation(s) that is more willing to integrate newcomers.\textsuperscript{132} At the same time, some scholars have observed that minority nations become more aggressive in their demands for independence and more attached to a narrow conception of national identity after institutional changes empower them to act like states.\textsuperscript{133}

I offer a way out of this theoretical impasse by emphasizing the importance of two factors that interact with processes of institutional change that alter the national model to one that is accepting of difference and multinationalism. First, I argue that a prior national model that emphasized the presence of a homogenous nation-state and repressed ethnic difference is not forgotten by minority nations and propels them to treat immigrants differently than they were

\textsuperscript{131} Bertrand, \textit{Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia}, 21.
treated by their respective states. All minority nations look to the past for symbols and stories that help them construct a group narrative through time.\textsuperscript{134} This is particularly evident in the Basque case, as both radical and moderate streams of nationalism honor historical figures with holidays and celebrations and educate newer generations about the traditions and customs that demonstrate the existence of a Basque nation since time immemorial.\textsuperscript{135} Collective memory forces nations to define themselves through an intersubjective lens, using interactions with each other to settle upon shared meanings and understandings of what defines the group. Shaped by past struggles, collective memory is both a common discriminating experience and a ‘factual’ recollection—a seemingly veridical narrative—of the group’s past as it really was.\textsuperscript{136} This means that certain facts, myths, or stories of the nation’s past are forgotten over time as new interpretations of the nation come to the forefront.

Critics of the role of ideas in social science research might argue that such intersubjective understandings of the nation are too vague and too amorphous to be used in rigorous analysis. Neglecting ideas, however, as Philip Converse once noted, “is a primary exhibit for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not important to study.”\textsuperscript{137} Using ideas effectively in a theoretical framework requires a proper definition that allows for a clear identification of them, and the political actors associated with those ideas. If ideas are conceptualized as ideologies, such as liberalism, the concept becomes too broad to be useful. On the other hand, policy positions are too narrow to qualify as ideas in an analytical framework because of the redundancy of explaining, for example, a reduction in

\textsuperscript{134} Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism.
\textsuperscript{135} Interview 17; Diego Muro, "Nationalism and Nostalgia: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism," Nations and Nationalism 11, no. 4 (2005): 571-589.
taxes because the governing elites favour lower taxes. Therefore, I adopt the suggestion of Sheri Berman and concentrate on the middle range of ideas, what she calls ‘programmatic beliefs.’

“Programmatic beliefs provide guidelines for practical activity and for the formulation of solutions to everyday problems. They supply, in other words, the ideational framework within which programs of action are formulated. The defining feature of programmatic beliefs is that they provide a relatively clear and distinctive connection between theory and praxis unlike ideologies that prescribe total visions of the world.”

The core ideas that bind minority nations and give meaning to their members are constantly made and remade as a consequence of dominant themes that emerge at critical junctures that ‘fit’ or produce resonance between group elites and their followers. Critical junctures are periods during which national models are thrown off course by extraneous shocks or inherent tensions within the institutional landscape. During these critical junctures, elites attempt to persuade themselves and others of the aspects of identity that require change and those that must stay the same. In doing so, they are constrained by the discursive structures that “articulate in accessible ways the fundamental notions a group holds intersubjectively about itself in the world and that allows or disallows specific strategies of persuasion.”

When a significant change in the national model creates a context supportive of multinationalism and ethnic difference, however, minority nations face a conundrum because the ‘old story’ or factual recollection of the narrative must be adapted to fit the new situation. At the same time, a completely new perception of the character and boundaries of the national community is not possible, nor is it a given that the new imagining of the national community

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140 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, 23.
141 Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion,” 277.
will necessary lead to more openness to immigrants or multicultural policies.\textsuperscript{142} As John Hutchinson argues, nationalist intellectuals and elites act as moral innovators who introduce new elements into the nationalist ideology in times of crisis to unite internal factions and transform accepted meanings of tradition.\textsuperscript{143} Past institutional contexts, then, affect the self-image and identity of the nation because it must find a way responding to change by “recognizing that the scripts or templates implicit in the institutional world provide the means for accomplishing these tasks.”\textsuperscript{144} When past struggles with repression and efforts by the state nation to eradicate their language and culture are part of the minority nation’s collective memory, the socially appropriate way of expressing its identity under a new national model that transforms the group into an empowered minority is to respect difference and provide accommodation to ethnic minorities. While some nation-states in Europe are pushing back against the tide of multiculturalism and diversity, minority nations can have a more difficult timejustifying ethnic closure because doing so may undermine their grievances with the state. In short, the collective memory of repression creates limits around what is a legitimate approach to immigrant integration policy.

This does not suggest a linear relationship between past repression and the minority nation’s position on immigration. The logic of the argument is simply that the array of imaginable possibilities of how the group can or cannot imagine itself following a critical juncture is limited due to legacies that provide moral templates and provide the frames of meaning that guide action. To understand why certain ideas take hold, it is imperative that we identify the political actors through whom they operate. Ideas cannot influence policy outcomes

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\item \textsuperscript{142} This where my argument diverges from that of Fiona C. Barker, "Redefining the Nation: Substate Nationalism and the Challenge of Immigrant Integration" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2007), 40-50.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44 (1996): 948-949.
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or political platforms as disembodied entities—they must influence particular political actors. Ideational theorists stress the importance of carriers: a person or group that is able to make others listen or be more receptive.\(^{145}\) The status of the carrier is a key determinant of whether or not an idea will gain political salience. In the context of minority nations, nationalist parties, such as the PNV, PQ, and SNP, are strong carriers of ideas because of their symbolic importance and political strength in their respective territories. Carriers with such prominence in a particular context have a good chance of building a consensus around their idea(s), thus ensuring the idea remains a powerful frame that constrains actors in weaker political or social positions from successfully pursuing an alternative path.

At moments of uncertainty, collective identity itself is open to revision and the actions of powerful carriers matter because their interpretation of events sets the reconstruction of identity on one path or another. For instance, it is possible to think of alternative scenarios such as the Jewish majority in Israel, where elites used memories of subjugation and expulsion to elevate the idea that a Jewish state is needed to advance the interests and culture of the Jewish race.\(^{146}\) The point is elites aim to recast the identity of the minority nation as appropriate given new realities in an effort to ensure it appears ‘just’ to non-elite members of the group.\(^{147}\)

The second argument emphasizes that changing national models and subsequent reconfigurations of the identity of a minority nation take place within changing conditions in the world at large and its respective state.\(^{148}\) In his work on Canada’s relationship with its Aboriginal peoples, Alain Cairns argues that international norms have changed after the demise

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\(^{147}\) Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion,” 277-278.

\(^{148}\) The ‘world at large’ in this case is synonymous with Western Europe and North America.
of European colonialism and it is no longer appropriate to respond to ethnic difference with policies and practices that reinforce a “hierarchical view of cultures, religions, and races.”

The Canadian state, therefore, has significantly changed its policies towards Aboriginal Canadians because the old model of Aboriginal-Canada relations no longer fit with worldwide prevailing attitudes towards diversity. Building on the work of Cairns, Triadafilopoulos contends that changing international ‘normative contexts’ have played a significant role in the shifts in dominant modes of immigration politics in Germany, Canada, and the United States. He defines normative contexts as “complex configurations of global structures, processes, and beliefs that serve as broadly encompassing conditions informing domestic policymaking” and argues that state immigration policies in line with the common sense of one era “may be rendered highly problematic in another as a result of changes in what constitutes appropriate conduct.” Fiona Barker applies this argument to explain the stance minority nations take towards immigrants migrating to their designated homeland. She argues that after the institutional power of a minority national group increases, current norms and principles associated with the community of liberal democratic states (e.g., multiculturalism, tolerance) dictate that minority nations will celebrate diversity. In short, minority nations “seek legitimacy at the national and international level by favouring integration policies” in line with

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the approach of dominant nation states, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France.\textsuperscript{153}

I agree that the post-World War II normative context linked to the emergence of a new human rights culture and decolonization is an informal institution that sets limits on what is appropriate behaviour for minority nations. Interview research in the Basque case, however, reveals that recent discourse and policies across Europe and within Spain are more relevant to the position Basque nationalists are adopting towards immigrants. This process is manifesting in the form of opposition to state-wide and European influences, which is contrary to the argument that institutionally empowered minority nations seek legitimacy by matching or fitting their stance on immigration with that of powerful nation states.

Since the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, attitudes towards immigrants have toughened in many countries and this has translated into tougher citizenship laws and policies geared towards the assimilation of immigrants.\textsuperscript{154} This trend is apparent in many countries, such as France, Austria, and Denmark, but it has been most pronounced in the Netherlands. In 2000, a controversial article was published in a leading Dutch newspaper that criticized multicultural policies for creating an ethnic underclass composed of people with no sense of belonging to the Netherlands, leaving them unable to integrate into Dutch society. While many members of the Dutch elite initially dismissed these comments, it is now recognized as the beginning of a significant turnaround in Dutch public opinion and policymaking regarding immigration and integration.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{153} Barker, “Redefining the Nation: Substate Nationalism and the Challenge of Immigrant Integration,” 53.
\textsuperscript{154} Han Entzinger, "Changing the Rules when the Game is on: From Multiculturalism to Assimilation in the Netherlands and Beyond," in Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos: Incorporation Regimes in Germany, Western Europe and North America (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 121-144.
\textsuperscript{155} Han Entzinger, "The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands," in Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigration in Liberal Nation-States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 59-86.
In his study of immigration policy in France, Germany, and the United States, Rogers Brubaker argues that the differentialist or multicultural model of integration has fallen out of favour and we are witnessing a shift towards assimilationist discourses and policies. Brubaker makes it clear that this does not imply that western countries are becoming resistant to foreigners per se, but are becoming more inclined to view too much ‘difference’ as a problem that requires fixing. The main thrust of his article is that the new requirements for immigrants, such as mandatory civics and language courses, that are appearing in many European countries indicate a general acknowledgement that institutionalized difference or separateness does not work and that immigrants must become more like natives to foster societal cohesion.

Attempts to create a common European Union immigration policy have failed because the preferences of many member states are too restrictive and any policy would therefore appear xenophobic and anti-immigrant. The common regulations on non-EU immigration have emphasized the restriction of population flows and security rather than justice and openness. When the internal market was constructed, the free movement of workers from countries outside of the European Union was a marginal issue because the member states had confidence that the guest worker system would eventually push foreign workers to return to their home countries. When immigration became a major concern in the 1970s, it was made clear via Council Regulation 1612/68 that the right of free movement of nationals of Member States did not extend to nationals from third countries. According to Mehmet Ugur, this decision laid down the foundation for a series of policies and regulations that created ‘Fortress Europe.’ Subsequent initiatives emphasizing a ‘secure’ Europe include the Dublin Convention, which produced policy

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aimed at reducing the number of asylum applications and coordinating readmission agreements with neighbouring countries. Martin Schain agrees that while European Union governance in the realm of immigration gives nationals unprecedented rights of free movement, “harmonization has tended to reinforce the capacities of states to exclude immigrants.”

The preceding overview of some recent trends in immigration politics at the level of the European Union and among member states was meant to contextualize the argument that non-state nationalisms can present oppositional stances in policy areas, such as immigration for nation building purposes. The open and multicultural response of Basque nationalism to recent waves of immigration is, in part, a result of strategic efforts by nationalist elites to reinforce feelings of solidarity and nationhood and set it apart from the Spanish state. At first glance, this argument appears surprising because minority nationalism is usually associated with culture rather than substantive policy areas, such as social policy and immigration, that are generally assumed domains of the state. Contextual conditions have changed, however, making it more difficult for elites to reinforce the resilience and dynamism of the nation by way of references to the group’s distinct history, culture, and language. According to Béland and Lecours, the linguistic conflicts in multinational states that had set, at one point, the contours of majority-minority conflict have mostly been settled now. Moreover, global flows of information, culture, media, and people are forcing nationalists to rethink and evaluate how they construct and express national identity because monolithic appeals to a group’s history may

161 A similar argument is made with regards to social policy. See Béland and Lecours, *Nationalism and Social Policy: The Politics of Territorial Solidarity*.
162 The opposite logic can also be applied. In Bavaria, the Christian Social Union condemns the German government for being too lax about immigration and integration. See Hepburn, “Regionalist Party Mobilization on Immigration,” 514-535.
appear stale and anti-modern to younger generations of potential nationalists. Immigration is now relevant to the construction and maintenance of national communities alongside traditional markers of national identity.

Because of the speed and rate at which immigration to western countries has increased, frameworks and policies concerning immigrant integration are now central to how a minority national community defines itself, that is, specifying who is included and excluded. Nationalist elites looking to either remove the tags of racist, xenophobic, and illiberal or reaffirm itself as the protector of indigenous interests can present a distinct approach to immigrant integration as a means to such ends. Much like social policy, immigration policy can be linked with the collective values of the group.164 Minority nationalists can target the actions of the central (and supranational) government in the area of immigration and integration as too restrictive and assimilationist or lax and multicultural and argue that a distinct position is necessary to fit with the objectives of the nationalist community. The development of oppositional positions in policy areas, such as immigration, has not replaced culture and language as the bedrocks of identity construction and reproduction. Rather, I contend that it is simply a new way for nationalist leaders to articulate distinct values and goals that separate the minority nationalist community from the wider state because contextual changes have made traditional appeals lose some of their bite.

Since this argument combines ideational analysis and strategic calculations, ideational factors must have some independent power on the outcome to be a useful aspect of the explanatory framework. A so-called test of the utility of ideas is whether or not the behaviour of political actors is motivated “by an attempt to achieve particular ends posited as paramount by

164 Béland and Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy, 25.
the ideas they hold” rather than self-interest. My position is that such logic is biased against ideational explanations because ideational factors can condition an actor’s cognitive frame or worldview, which is then acted upon through strategic thinking and the utilization of political opportunities.

Nevertheless, the empirical record indicates that the broader issues connected to the nationalist struggle are not always front and centre. Over time, the institutionalization of autonomy for sub-state nationalist regions alters the nature of electoral competition among nationalist and non-nationalist parties. In some contexts, party competition at the sub-state level is affected by the anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric of radical right parties. The broader issues concerning the struggle between competing definitions of the nation can sometimes cede importance to electoral strategy. As such, policy issues become open to partisan debate and electoral competition along ‘normal’ right-left ideological lines. Issues such as immigration or social policy can be debated in the context of political objectives, such as economic growth, which are not central to the traditional understanding of the nation. This is especially true in the case of immigrant integration policy because many single-issue voters choose it as the ‘wedge’ issue that determines their preferred political party.

According to Hepburn, the structure of the sub-state party system weighs in on the trajectory of debates and policy in the ambit of immigration and integration. For example, she suggests that the weakness of the Scottish Conservatives has shifted competition to the left of the

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168 Barker, “Redefining the Nation: Substate Nationalism and the Challenge of Immigrant Integration,” 57.
political spectrum in Scotland.\textsuperscript{170} Because Scottish Labour supports increasing immigration flows—in contrast to the Labour Party competing at the state level—the SNP has moved even further left on immigration issues, claiming that Scottish Labour’s initiatives are ‘minimalist’ and ‘ineffective.’\textsuperscript{171} She comes to the same conclusion about the CSU’s anti-immigrant position: the party has maintained its electoral position by outflanking other parties to the right.\textsuperscript{172} The important role that electoral competition plays in steering actors’ approaches to integration is not, however, definitively distinctive from the second key argument made in this dissertation. Referring again to the Scottish example, the competition between the SNP and Scottish Labour is more than mere electoral maneuvering. The SNP is trying to imagine and re-imagine the nation using a set of distinct values that justify the presence of a nationalist party apart from the Scottish wings of the state-wide parties that also purport to defend Scottish interests.

Because this two-pronged argument was developed inductively through a detailed investigation of a single case, this study cannot offer ready-made explanations for cases other than the Basque one. In the Basque case, ideas concerning the treatment of minorities emanating from a period of repression conditioned the strategic decision by Basque nationalists to add the policy fields of citizenship and immigration to the mix of identity markers that distinguish the Basque nation from the Spanish one. Nevertheless, the argument does not assume that the two factors were both necessary and sufficient in the Basque case to cause the unexpected outcome of a group-based multicultural policy framework. It is simply not possible to create the experimental conditions through case matching needed to test whether the factors are independently necessary, but not sufficient; the idiosyncrasies present in the historical trajectory

\textsuperscript{170} Hepburn, “Regionalist Party Mobilization on Immigration,” 528.
\textsuperscript{171} Hepburn, “Regionalist Party Mobilization on Immigration,” 529.
\textsuperscript{172} Hepburn, "The Neglected Nation," 190-202.
of Basque nationalism prevent such an endeavour.\textsuperscript{173} However, as the concluding chapter will demonstrate the main arguments made in this dissertation do have comparative applications. An analysis of the Scottish, Québécois, and Flemish cases reveal that the two components of the argument can work independently of each other.

**Conclusion**

Because of the dearth of empirical literature that focuses on explaining the responses of minority nationalist movements to immigration, the goal of this chapter has been to glean the main competing propositions from the separate literatures and develop a framework that best explains the Basque case.

I developed two interrelated causal arguments that integrate the role of ideas and the imperative of nation building for nationalist elites. Nations are forged by a rich legacy of memories, yet the cement of their identity is not always found in the past itself, but in “what the community tells one another in the present about what they remember.”\textsuperscript{174} In short, nationalist history requires both an act of collective remembering and collective amnesia. A shared history of repression is a component of the narrative of many minority nations. For example, the narrative of the Basque nation stresses that the Spanish state, especially during the Franco dictatorship, purposefully tried to destroy the Basque nation by banning its language and cultural expressions, as well as depriving it of its natural right to sovereignty. At the same time, institutions weigh in, because without political autonomy, Basque elites would not have had the capability to take ideas that became pervasive through the process of collective remembering and

\textsuperscript{173} In line with other historical-minded scholarship, this study is satisfied with putting forward middle-range theories that are bound by space and time.

turn them into concrete policies. Another factor that shaped the decision-making of Basque nationalist elites is the imperative to nation build. Minority nationalists can target the actions of the central and supranational government in the area of immigration and integration as too restrictive and assimilationist or too lax and multicultural and argue that a distinct position is necessary to fit with the values of the national community. Minority nationalist elites have an interest in perpetuating the struggle for independence or increased autonomy because of rational economic and emotive reasons and thus are constantly in search of new issues that can increase the salience of the nationalist conflict.
Chapter 3

CLOSING THE BOUNDARIES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY

Introduction

The project to transform Spain into a homogenous nation-state by various elites—hereditary, democratic, and despotic—never succeeded: Spain is a multinational state. Basque nationalism emerged early on in the Spanish state building process and the movement sought to preserve the Basque identity based on both linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, and its inherent right to self-governance. Soon after the Basque nationalist movement began to take shape, it confronted a challenge in the form of immigrants coming in droves from the rest of Spain (and elsewhere), a process that was perceived by nationalists as a threat to the maintenance of the Basque race, language, and culture. Initially, Basque nationalists erected a racial barrier that excluded non-ethnic Basques from integration. By the mid 20th century, however, internal schisms within the movement and contextual changes led some nationalists to consider a shift to a civic version of nationalism in order to integrate outsiders into the Basque struggle for democracy and independence.

The moderate stream of nationalism, embodied by the PNV, tried to shed its essentialist character but could never quite rid itself of elements wedded to Sabino Arana’s racialist version of nationalism. For its part, the main pillar of radical nationalism—Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)—tried to replace the previous ethnic definition of belonging to the Basque nation to one that stressed voluntary action and participation in the political struggle. Nevertheless, I argue

175 The Spanish literature tends to prefer the term immigrant rather than migrant to describe ethnic Spaniards that moved to the Basque Country. The majority of immigration to the Basque Country prior to the 1990s was internal (from the rest of Spain), but a significant number of immigrants came from neighbouring countries as well.
that neither radical nor moderate Basque nationalism could completely rid itself of elements that continued to believe in an ideology of racial differentiation.

The chapter includes a brief vignette of the development of civic nationalism in Catalonia. This highlights the fact that the eventual outcome in the Basque case—an integration approach that is equally, if not more open and multicultural than in Catalonia—is an unexpected outcome worthy of in-depth study. The final part of the chapter provides contextual information about the institutional changes that followed the transition to democracy. This would serve as the institutional context that Basque nationalists had to work with when the nation confronted a new wave of foreign immigration in the early 21st century.

**Before 1892: Proto-Nationalism in the Basque Country**

Modern Basque nationalism emerged in late 19th century when Sabino Arana created much of the institutional and symbolic core of the movement. The historical record, however, indicates that the seeds of Basque nationalism were planted much before the publication of Arana’s infamous *Bizkaia por su independencia* in 1892. Pre-historic evidence of who were most likely the ancestors of today’s Basques has been found in several caves and archaeological sites. Historians and geographers recorded their presence with the name ‘Vasconians’ as early as 7CE. The early Basque population was divided into small tribal units scattered around the valleys of the western Pyrenees. The variance between tribal dialects of Euskara was so great that the language was mutually unintelligible. The Romans did not directly occupy most of the Basque region because they were not interested in the territory due to its remoteness and the cultural and linguistic uniqueness of the local population. Moreover, the Basques had cordial

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177 This has persisted to modern day, but the effort of the Basque government to standardize Euskara is working for younger generations.
relations with Rome because they accepted—more easily than other ethnic groups in pre-modern Europe—Roman sovereignty in exchange for local autonomy.\textsuperscript{178} South of the Pyrenees, the Basques of the early Roman period were confined to the areas of modern Nafarroa and parts of Gipuzkoa and Araba, while other ethnic tribes inhabited northern Araba and Bizkaia. It has been said that the instability of the late Roman period allowed the Basques to expand west and north, expelling or assimilating the other groups in what would become the Basque homeland. Some suggest there has been a cultural and political unity among the Basques since time immemorial,\textsuperscript{179} while for others the idea of a historic Basque civilization is nothing more than nationalist folklore.\textsuperscript{180}

Many Basques have long used the term \textit{Euskal Herria} to define their national homeland, an area that includes the three historic provinces of Araba, Gipuzkoa, and Bizkaia, the previously independent kingdom of Nafarroa, and three regions that are part of modern day France. Yet, despite the cultural and linguistic links shared by the Basque territories, heterogeneity and asymmetry are the best descriptors for their historic relationship with one another and the Spanish state. The union of the kingdoms of Aragón and Castile—with the latter incorporating Gipuzkoa (1200), Araba (1332), and Bizkaia (1379) into its holdings—laid the foundation for the creation of the modern Spanish state. Nafarroa was incorporated into Spain much later.\textsuperscript{181} Even though Castile operated with a more centralized format than Aragón, it conceded to agreements—called the \textit{fueros}—with the Basque provinces that gave each the ability to retain a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Stanley G. Payne, \textit{Basque Nationalism} (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1975), 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Francisco Letamendia, \textit{Historia De Euskadi: El Nacionalismo Vasco y ETA} (Barcelona: Ibérica de Ediciones y Publicaciones, 1977).
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Salvador de Madariaga, \textit{España: Ensayo De Historia Contemporanea} (Buenos Aires: Editorial sudamericana, 1974).
  \item \textsuperscript{181} This partly explains why foralism was stronger among Nafarroa who remained committed to the erection of an Autonomous Community of Nafarroa separate from the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country during Spain’s transition to democracy.
\end{itemize}
separate legal system and significant powers of self-government. The key clauses included in the fueros were exemption from military service and taxation, and the right for provincial assemblies to veto royal edicts. Another method of securing Basque loyalty used by the early Spanish state was the allocation of noble status: anyone who could prove Basque descent earned the status and benefits of nobility.\textsuperscript{182} While the Spanish monarchs felt they had no choice but to use this strategy because their state building project was made difficult by internal differentiation, the Basque collective nobility claimed it was an affirmation of their ‘racial purity’ that they maintained it by avoiding the imperial advances of the Moors. The exceptional nature of the provincial fueros in the Basque region served to both strengthen the identity of each province and, to a limited extent, develop a unified identity between them. Moreover, the status of collective nobility gave the Basques a sense that they were a distinct race untarnished by the outside world.

At the same time, the colonial nature of the 16th century Spanish state helped create a Basque capitalist class that was tightly integrated into the Castilian economy and therefore loyal to the Crown. The discovery of the New World and the subsequent expansion of the Spanish Empire had a monumental impact on the differentiation between upper and lower classes in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. Industrious Basques were active in both the North Atlantic and the transatlantic economies. Wool exports from Bilbao to the Low Countries of Northern Europe absorbed almost half of Spain’s export trade by the mid-16\textsuperscript{th} century, which encouraged the shipbuilding industry in the iron and timber rich coastal areas of the Basque provinces. By the late 16\textsuperscript{th} century iron production and export, along with shipbuilding, were the most prosperous

industries in the Basque provinces.\textsuperscript{183} The emerging capitalist class benefitted from the opening of iron and steel plants in the two provinces and expanded their ownership of farmland, forcing the peasants to work the land as tenants or move to the city in search of new opportunities. Moreover, the capitalists pressured the Crown to change its policy on tariffs to protect Basque industries and help them develop. Obviously, the peasants resisted this change because it would restrict their access to cheap foreign products. In 1717, the Crown acquiesced to the demands of the Basque capitalists, which caused a bloody uprising of the Basque peasants.\textsuperscript{184} Consequently, the emerging business and mercantile classes in the modernizing cities of Bilbao and San Sebastián began to see their economic interests as tied to the strength of the Spanish state and in opposition to the peasants of Araba and interior regions of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa.\textsuperscript{185} When Basque nationalist mobilization occurred, the message of Basque ethnic superiority resonated more with peasants and anti-capitalist social conservatives because of their pre-existing enmity towards the Crown.

Because of financial problems resulting from the combination of low levels of effective taxation and political ‘shocks’ caused by the collapse of its empire, the Spanish state made its first steps towards centralization in the 17th century.\textsuperscript{186} Prior to this period, the philosophy of the ruling Habsburg dynasty was to allow for local autonomy because they did not see any potential for cultural homogenization.\textsuperscript{187} During the reign of Philip IV, however, the Crown of Castile attempted to force all of the Spanish territories to contribute equally to the state treasury and

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\textsuperscript{183} Medrano, \textit{Divided Nations}, 27.
\textsuperscript{184} Robert P. Clark, \textit{The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond} (Reno, Nev.: University of Nevada Press, 1979), 22-23.
\textsuperscript{185} See Medrano, \textit{Divided Nations} for more detail on the intersection between class cleavages and the development of Basque nationalism.
\textsuperscript{187} Lecours, \textit{Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State}, 35.
\end{flushright}
provide soldiers for a reserve army that could be called upon in case of foreign invasion. When
the representative assembly of Bizkaia—dominated by large landowners—tried to impose these
directives, a peasant rebellion against the assembly broke out. The provincial assembly did not
oppose the changes because the higher taxes on consumer goods and conscription affected
peasants much more so than the higher classes. The Crown was eventually successful in
imposing a small consumer goods tax, but was not able to reach its goal of equalizing the
financial contribution of the Basque provinces to the Spanish treasury in proportion to their
wealth. It would take Spain another hundred years to integrate the Basque provinces into the
Spanish state.

This attempt at centralization had the effect of spurning a movement in the Basque
provinces in favour of protecting the political and symbolic importance of the fueros known as
foralism. Even though foralism did not employ ideas of nationhood and self-determination,
Basque intellectuals and writers expanded the meaning of the movement to include the
maintenance of Euskara as the *lingua franca* and the unique racial origins of the Basque people.
The literature produced by these intellectuals began to popularize the idea of Basque unity and
instilled in some a profound sense of Basque cultural identity.

After King Philip IV died in 1665 and the mentally and physically unfit Charles II took
the throne, Spain plunged into a chaotic period in which the loose confederal nature of the
Spanish Crown was exploited by foreign powers seeking to seize Spain’s territorial possessions.
It soon became clear Charles II would die without an heir, which set off a battle for the

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188 The infamous *El Motín de la Sal* (Salt Mutiny) rebellion of 1632 was a manifestation of the growing chasm
between the peasants and upper classes because the latter had restricted the former from participation in the
representative assembly of Bizkaia. The Basque uppers classes (especially the business community and nobility)
depended heavily on opportunities offered by the Spanish Crown. See Emilio Fernández de Pinedo, *Crecimiento
inheritance of the Crown between Philip of Anjou and the Archduke Charles.\textsuperscript{190} The resulting War of Succession (1700-1713) that was won by Philip of Anjou—now Philip V of Spain—gave the Bourbon dynasty possession of the Crown. The Bourbons aspired to break away from the confederal style of the Habsburgs to a more a centralized form of governance. The consequences of this transition were felt over time, but by 1720, the Spanish state was much more centralized and only the Basque provinces were able to preserve their autonomy via the fueros.\textsuperscript{191} The transition marked the beginning of the aggressive nation building and modernization projects that the Spanish state carried out in the 18th century, which would stoke nationalist mobilization in the Basque Country, as well as in other culturally distinct regions of Spain.

As social and economic changes brought about by Enlightenment ideals accelerated in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the chasm between liberals in the Basque cities who saw little advantage in local autonomy, and the traditionalists who did, grew wider. When Spain defeated Napoleonic France in the War of Independence, the liberals were able to use the opportunity to create a ‘new’ Spain based on ideas of central rule and individualism against the traditionalists who envisioned a return to royalist Spain. The version of Spain articulated in the Constitution of Cádiz of 1812 and other legislation passed by Spain’s ruling liberals during the war excluded segments of society that enjoyed privileges under the old order. The articles of the Cádiz constitution emphasized both the indivisible Spanish nation and the primacy of individual rights. The first article of the constitution states that the “Spanish nation is to be composed of all Spaniards” and article 371 guaranteed all Spaniards the freedom to write, print, and publish their

\textsuperscript{190} Charles II offered the Crown to Philip Anjou who was challenged by son of the Austrian Emperor the Archduke Charles. The latter had the backing of England and the Netherlands. See Mikel Dorronsoro, Alfredo Herbosa, and Yolanda Orive, Historia De España y Del País Vasco (Zarautz: Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco, 1998).

\textsuperscript{191} Philip V rewarded the Basque capitalists and nobility for their support during the war with autonomy for their provinces because of the privileges it bestowed upon them. Even Catalonia’s autonomy was stripped in 1716.
ideas. Representatives of Gipuzkia, Bizkaia, and Araba supported the Cádiz constitution because they shared the Enlightenment ideals that liberal constitutionalism is synonymous with, such as progress and modernity, but their opinions did not reflect those of most Basques who were more conservative in their orientation. 192

The traditionalists in the Basque provinces and elsewhere opposed the liberal vision of Spain because it embodied democracy, centralization, and capitalism; traditionalists favoured absolutism, local autonomy, an agrarian economy, and a rural lifestyle. A movement known as Carlism emerged when traditionalists across Spain united in defence of absolutism, autonomy, Catholicism, and privileges rather than individual equality. In the Basque provinces, Carlism took on a special meaning because those attached to the fueros viewed the movement as their best hope to restore provincial autonomy. 193 The Carlist movement was able to recruit supporters from across the Basque provinces, but it was notably concentrated in Nafarroa and rural areas of the other provinces because of an alliance that formed between foralists and the clergy, though Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa were less involved at first. 194 The immediate context in which Carlism developed was the struggle for succession between the brother and wife of Ferdinand VII, but throughout the three ensuing wars, the main issue was the struggle between liberalism and traditionalism. In the words of Stanley Payne: “the issue in the Carlist War(s) was the continuation of traditional Spanish institutions—governmental, social, and religious—or their

192 The Nafarroase representatives resisted the changes because Nafarroa had more autonomy in the previous order than the other Basque provinces and modernization had not occurred on a large scale in Nafarroa, and thus there were fewer liberals. See Payne, Basque Nationalism. Most refer to the Basque provinces in the pre-1978 period to signify those provinces that would eventually form the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country: Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, and Araba.
193 The defense of absolutism by the traditionalists was only because the fueros and some version of authoritarian rule had co-existed for so long. Religion was also linked to the fueros and presented as a way to insulate the morally superior Basques from the secular contagion of Spanish society.
194 Dorronsoro, Herbosa, and Orive, Historia De España y Del País Vasco, 52-53; Medrano, Divided Nations, 58-60.
replacement by a centralized parliamentary constitutional monarchy and an individualistic, capitalist society.”

Religion began to overshadow foralism within the Carlist movement by the time of the Second Carlist War because movement leaders became convinced that a more corporatist form of government would be able to preserve the ideals of religious unity and the rural, traditional lifestyle that they cherished. Moreover, support for Carlism had declined significantly in all areas of Spain except the Basque provinces, which is why the second war “took the form of a conflict between the Spanish state and Basque provinces.”

The consequences of the Second Carlist War were very significant for the development of Basque nationalism because when the Carlists were defeated, a law was passed in 1876 to abolish the fueros. For a brief period following 1876, Basque society overcame its internal differences to condemn the abolition of the fueros. The Basque commercial bourgeoisie and industrial classes believed the restoration of the fueros would help them dislodge wealthy Spanish landowners in the Basque provinces, while the petty bourgeoisie and rural nobility saw the fueros as a means to reassert control over Basque society. For the majority of the Basque population, however, the significance of the fueros rested on the fact that it meant low tax contributions and exemption from military service. Not surprisingly then, the provincial assemblies of the three Basque provinces refused to collect the new taxes implemented by the Spanish state to meet the fiscal needs of war and reconstruction. Madrid responded by

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197 The abolition of the fueros meant that “the duties that the Constitution has imposed on all Spaniards to present themselves for military service...to contribute in proportion to their abilities to State expenses, will be extended...to the provinces of Gipuzkoa, Araba, and Bizkaia, in the same way as to the rest of the nation.” Moreover, the *Juntas Generales* were replaced with the *Diputaciones Provinciales*, the latter lost most of its previous powers and its electoral procedures favoured liberals from the urban areas at the expense of traditionalist rural areas. See Clark, *The Basques*, 35.
dismissing the majority of representatives in the three assemblies and replacing them with those who were not foralists.

The Spanish state ameliorated the tension caused by the abolition of the fueros by enacting the *Conciertos Económicos* in 1882. This agreement provided the individual Basque provinces with full powers over tax rates and collection procedures so long as each contributed a yearly amount to the state for ‘national’ programs and services. The establishment of the *Conciertos* was the definitive reason that the majority of the Basque upper classes renounced their support for the restoration of the fueros. At the same time, traditionalist Basques distanced themselves from Carlism because it no longer appeared to offer the remedy to counteract modernization. Traditionalists in the Basque provinces became weary towards the end of the 19th century of the relevance of a movement that had minimal support elsewhere in Spain and was clearly failing to “rescue Spain from the three of evils modernization:” centralization, liberalization, and secularization.\(^\text{199}\) The disenchantment with Carlism felt by various sectors of Basque society provided the context for the emergence of minority nationalism.

**Early Basque Nationalism: Closing the Boundaries**

After the signing of the *Conciertos*, two nationalist movements formed that had different bases of support and varying ideas about what was distinctive about Basque society. A small portion of the Basque bourgeoisie remained in favour of restoring the fueros while embracing capitalist development. The *Sociedad Euskalerría* of Bizkaia emerged as the main association that banded together the liberal strand of nationalism and its eventual leader was a Basque industrialist named Ramón de la Sota. One argument is that De la Sota and his followers were driven by an economic interest to seek the restoration of the fueros. They wanted to limit the

\(^{199}\) Lecours, *Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State*, 80.
control of the bourgeoisie, aligned with the statewide parties, over the Basque economy because they wanted to pursue divergent economic interests. Another possibility is that because Sota’s allies were born outside of Spain, they did not develop an emotional attachment to the Spanish state like the Spanish-born members of the Basque business elite. Support for De la Sota’s bourgeois nationalism garnered weak support from the masses because it could not compete with the traditionalist version articulated by Sabino Arana.

Arana exploited the opening created by the decline of Carlism to define a new path for the Basque provinces. Arana articulated his version of Basque nationalism based on racial purity and independence whereas De la Sota stressed autonomy with a weak agenda of cultural and linguistic revival. It is not evident why Arana’s version of nationalism gained traction rather than De la Sota’s, but at least one account suggests that agency must be factored into the analysis.

A few days after the publication of Arana’s booklet *Bizkaia por su independencia* in 1892, even De la Sota was part of the group of admirers who invited Arana to a luncheon in Larzábal near Bilbao. On this occasion, he proclaimed that independence was the only hope for Bizkaia because the miserable and inferior nation of Spain was trampling upon it. Within a few years, the majority of those in attendance in Larzábal joined the rank-and-file of Arana’s party. Arana’s conception of nationalism became such a dominant force that it changed the course of Basque politics and society forever. In doing so, Arana’s nationalism set up clear

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205 Even though Lecours argues that institutions drove the development Basque nationalism, he acknowledges that the agency and ideas of Arana were also key factors. See Lecours, *Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State*. 

distinctions between insiders and outsiders and ruled out the possibility for migrants of other races to integrate into the Basque national community.

Arana made a strategic decision to underpin nationalism with the conservative values and principles that would resonate with a majority of Basques that feared the transformation of Spain and the Basque Country according to the principles of modernization and liberalism. Furthermore, the absence of another core marker, such as language, that Arana could have utilized to unify the Basque nation during the critical early stage of the nationalist movement may have influenced Arana to use race instead. Both historical institutional forms of the Spanish state and uneven patterns of economic development also played a role in the development of Basque nationalism, but it would be difficult to make a convincing argument that a racialist nationalism would have become such a strong part of the Basque nationalist narrative had it not been for the leadership of Sabino Arana.

Arana and Ethnic Nationalism

Sabino Arana was born in 1865 in Abando, a borough in Bizkaia that was later annexed by the city of Bilbao. His father Santiago Arana was dedicated to the Carlist cause and this meant Sabino and his brother Luis were raised as Carlists. In a story now part of Basque folklore, Sabino and his brother Luis had a long debate during a train ride to Galicia after their father had died during which Luis presented Sabino with an argument that Bizkaia had existed since time immemorial as a distinct society from Spain and therefore should be independent. This conversation had a profound effect on Sabino; he began to study Euskara and the history of

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206 Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain.*
207 Lecours, *Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State.*
208 Medrano, *Divided Nations.*
209 It is uncertain why Luis Arana came to make this argument.
Bizkaia while in Barcelona for law school.\textsuperscript{210} Upon returning to Bilbao, he tried and failed to become the chair of the Euskara department at the Secondary Institute of Bizkaia. It was likely that his failure as a philologist continued to influence him as he transitioned into politics. While still in his twenties, he published a series of articles in the magazine \textit{La Abeja} to define his nationalist ideology and they afforded little importance to Euskara. These articles would form the core of his 1892 book, \textit{Bizkaia por su independencia}, which came to serve as a sort of bible for early Basque nationalists.\textsuperscript{211}

The essentialist character of Arana’s doctrine stemmed from his belief that membership in a nation is based on race, custom, and tradition rather than a conscious choice to join. Accordingly, he elevated the concept of race to be the one true indicator of inclusion in or exclusion from the Basque nation.\textsuperscript{212} Arana often justified his theory of Basque racial superiority with reference to the fact that the Basque provinces were never conquered by Muslims and did not contain any Jewish inhabitants, thus making the Basque race ‘pure’ in comparison to that of the Spanish. Consequently, he was vehemently against the idea that Spaniards could become Basque by learning Euskara and he believed the mere presence of people with Spanish blood would denigrate the high moral status of Basque society. Moreover, Arana said he did not see a difference between ethnic Basques who only spoke Spanish and those who spoke Euskara:

“If we had to choose between Bizkaia populated with Spaniards that only spoke Basque and a Bizkaia populated with Bizkaians that only spoke Spanish, we would without a doubt choose the second because the Bizkaian substance with exotic accidents that can be eliminated and be

\textsuperscript{210} Pablo and Mees, \textit{El Péndulo Patriótico}, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{211} Arana constructed his nationalist program for Bizkaia, but he hoped that Basques in Gipuzkoa, Araba, Nafarroa, and the French Basque territories would hear his message and join the movement.
\textsuperscript{212} Medical surveys during this time confirmed that Basques have a high incidence of Rh negative factor blood. Arana cited this fact in defence of his racist position.
replaced by natural ones is preferable to an exotic substance with properties Bizkaians could never change.”

While agency should not be downplayed as an explanation for Arana’s racist version of nationalism, contextual and structural factors certainly helped to shape Arana’s ideas. As argued by William Douglass, “in situating Arana within fin-de-siècle Europe the issue was not who was racist, the rarity was the non-racist.” European imperial expansion and the successful industrial and scientific revolutions had confirmed to Europeans that Caucasians were the superior racial group in the world. Nevertheless, within the Caucasian category, there were debate as to which ‘races,’ ‘stocks,’ or ‘nationalities’ were superior; the general consensus ranked those groups from the northwest corner of Europe as superior to those from the southern and eastern portions of the continent. In order to substantiate racist thought with ‘science,’ the discipline of physical anthropology turned to measuring and classifying human characteristics, such as cranial shape and stature, to show concrete differences between races. The consequences of European racist discourse were devastating—the Holocaust and the eugenics movement are attributable to its popularity at the time.

European intellectuals of this period took note of the ‘exceptional’ Basque case because it did not fit within the popular paradigm that historical Europe was the “legacy of prehistorical invasions of the continent from the east by related speakers of the Indo-European languages.” By the mid-19th century, the Basques caught the attention of Paul Broca, the founding father of French anthropology.

“The Basques are the only people in Western Europe that still speak a language unrelated to the Indo-European stock. It is therefore natural that they are considered to be the last and

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213 Cited in Pablo and Mees, El Pèndulo Patriòtic, 11-12.
pure representatives of the so-called autochthonous races that occupied the soil of this part of Europe before the era of the Asiatic invasions.\textsuperscript{216}

By the time Sabino Arana emerged as a key figure in the development of Basque nationalism, the discipline of European scientific racism reached a consensus that a pure Basque race existed.\textsuperscript{217} Consequently, the conditions were ripe for Arana to develop a racialist conception of the nation that would strike a chord with his fellow Bizkaians. In one of his many essays, Arana provides an extensive list of individual comparisons between Basques and those of Latin ‘ethnic stock’:

“The physiognomy of the Bizkaian is intelligent and noble; that of the Spaniard inexpressive and gloomy. The Bizkaian walks upright and manly; the Spanish has a feminine air. The Bizkaian is energetic and agile; the Spaniard lax and dull. The Bizkaian is intelligent and capable of any type of task; the Spaniard lacks intelligence and ability for even the simplest of jobs. The Bizkaian’s character denigrates through contact with the outsider; the Spaniard needs from time to time a foreign invasion to civilize him.”\textsuperscript{218}

Arana’s racialist treatises also targeted other groups such as the Jews and Moors (Muslims) that posed a threat to the racial purity of the Basques. In an article entitled “The Law of Race,” he defended the 16th-century restrictions in the fueros that prevented non-Basques from residing in Bizkaia:

“While the Moors and Jews that appear in [16th-century] Spanish legislation should always be understood as expressions of religious profession, their presence in Bizkaian laws, to the contrary, may well flow from the racial spirit, and not the religious one.”\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{216} Quoted in Pablo and Mees, \textit{El Péndulo Patriótico}, 102.
\textsuperscript{219} Arana Goiri, \textit{Obras Escogida}, 200.
Arana’s commitment to the preservation of the Basque race meant that Spaniards born in the Basque provinces had to be segregated. To accomplish this, he suggested that after an independent Basque Country was established, the Bizkaian Provincial Assembly would ensure:

“Spaniards…would be expelled and not authorized to enter Bizkaian territory during the first years of independence to facilitate the eradication of all maketo (Spanish) influence on the customs and language of Bizkaia.”

He did admit, however, that it would eventually be necessary to admit some Spaniards as citizens of Bizkaia, but that their citizenship privileges would not be very expansive.

At first, Arana tried to construct a nationalist discourse that centered on Euskara as the common language of the Basque people. He quickly realized that emphasizing Euskara would not work because the urban centers in the Basque provinces had been Hispanicized by the late 19th century. In the 18th century, more than half of the population of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, and Araba spoke Euskara, but this slowly declined because primary school teaching was provided solely in Spanish. The dominance of Spanish-language education in the 19th century can be traced to the 1856 Public Education Law, which stated that the Ministry of Education would appoint teachers in all parts of Spain from Madrid. Consequently, Arana defined inclusion in the Basque nation only in terms of race but he did still believe Euskara would play an important role in the survival of the Basque race. In particular, he felt that elevating the use of Euskara by prohibiting Spanish in the educational system and literature would prevent Spanish influence from penetrating Basque culture. Arana did not afford Euskara any intrinsic value, for him any

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220 This refers to those born in the Basque Country, but have a Spanish rather than Basque surname.
221 Cited in Pablo and Mees, El Péndulo Patriótico, 12.
223 A Euskara revival did occur in the early decades of the 20th century. There was a flourishing of periodicals and magazines in Euskara and it is estimated that approximately half of the population had a working knowledge of the language by the time of the outbreak of civil war in Spain. Clark, The Basques, 135.
language that could provide an extra barrier between Spanish and Basque societies would suffice. Accordingly, Arana stated:

“The difference of language is the great medium to preserve ourselves against the contagion of the Spanish and the mixing of the two races. If our invaders learn Euskara, we would abandon the language and dedicate ourselves to speaking Russian, Norwegian, or any other language that is foreign to Spaniards.”

In order for Euskara to serve as a marker of difference between Basques and Spaniards, Arana felt that the language needed to be standardized and cleansed of all words derived from Spanish. Consequently, he spent countless hours inventing new terminology and publishing textbooks and history books in Euskara. The decision of Arana and his followers to invest in the development of Euskara played a significant role in reviving the language that was close to extinction in the early 20th century.

The place of religion in Arana’s doctrine was much like that of language: another indicator of the difference between Basques and Spaniards. Arana claimed that the Basques were more devout Catholics than Spaniards and therefore morally superior. Even though Spaniards were also devout followers of the Catholic religion, Arana’s words in *Bizkaia por su independencia* made it clear that their religiosity was disgraceful in comparison to the Catholicism of true Basques and that Spaniards were destined for eternal damnation. Consequently, the clergy—who were of great importance in the devoutly Catholic Basque provinces—used Arana’s vernacular of racial purity in their services and deemed migrant workers as a dangerous threat to Basque society. This led to an even deeper-seated hatred between native Basques and outsiders because the clergy legitimized xenophobia.

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226 Confidential interview, Leioa, 29 September 2010.
Beyond conceptualizing the definition and boundaries of the Basque nation, Arana developed symbols, myths, and a political party to support the nationalist cause. He wrote the anthem “*Gora ta Gora*” to serve as the national anthem for an independent Basque Country, designed a national flag based on the Union Jack, and was responsible for the Basque national holiday *Aberri Eguna* that commemorates Arana’s conversion to nationalism. The most significant contribution of Arana to the nationalist cause was the creation of the political party *Partido Nacionalista Vasco-Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea* (PNV) in 1895. The party can be traced back to a small group of Arana supporters in Bilbao who organized to contest in local elections and then later for the provincial deputation of Bizkaia.\(^{227}\) The party initially called for the expulsion of non-Basques by an independent Basque Country, except for those considered temporary workers who were contributing to the Basque economy. Furthermore, the PNV was firmly against the naturalization of second-generation migrants that did not have two Basque parents.\(^ {228}\) Arana himself acknowledged the xenophobic attitude of the PNV towards outsiders that stood in stark contrast to that of the Catalan nationalists:

> “Catalan politics…consists of attracting other Spaniards, whereas the [Basque] program is to reject from itself all Spaniards as foreigners. In Catalonia every element coming from the rest of Spain is Catalanized…The Catalans want all Spaniards living in their region to speak Catalan; for us it would be ruin if the maketos (Spanish) in our territory spoke Basque. Why? Because purity of race is the basis of the [Basque] banner.”\(^ {229}\)

\(^{227}\) Clark, *The Basques*, 43.


\(^{229}\) Cited in Payne, *Basque Nationalism*, 75.
The party even restricted membership to those who had four grandparents with Basque surnames. In short, the fear of ‘denationalization’ via immigration quickly became a core aspect of the PNV’s political agenda. It is important to acknowledge that Arana began to espouse a different approach to Basque nationalism and the status of non-ethnic Basques in the last few years of his life. He made an announcement in 1902 that he no longer believed in nationalism as a political tool and suggested that the PNV disband and create a party called *Liga de Vascos Españolistas* (League of pro-Spain Basques) in favour of minimalist autonomy for the Basque Country within a united Spain. Arana died in 1903 and so it is uncertain why he changed his views so radically or if he would have continued in a pro-Spanish direction. The core of the PNV elite did not adapt to Arana’s change of heart and continued to conceive of the Basque nation in ethnic terms and pursue an agenda in favour of outright separatism. As the party and the nationalist movement expanded, tensions between those committed to Arana’s original program and others who wanted to project a more civic version of Basque nationalism grew stronger. The material interests of certain classes of Basque nationalists has been suggested as the main factor responsible for the schism, but Arana’s early allusions to the purity of the Basque race strongly influenced subsequent nationalist discourse and led to a hostile approach towards immigrants.

The overwhelming majority of non-ethnic Basques that arrived in the Basque provinces for the first half of the 20th century were internal migrants from other regions of Spain rather than foreign immigrants from other countries. Nevertheless, the overtly hostile approach to these

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230 The PNV soon reduced this restriction from four to one to one grandparent. See John Sullivan, *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi, 1890-1986* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 10.

231 This change in opinion occurred after Arana had been jailed by Spanish authorities. See José Luis Granja Sainz, *El Nacionalismo Vasco: Un Siglo De Historia* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1995), 37.

232 Medrano, *Divided Nations*.

migrants by some nationalists was a reflection of their ethnic conception of the Basque nation rather than a specific response to Castilian newcomers.\textsuperscript{234} The contrast with the openness of early Catalan nationalism and its ability to absorb Castilian migrants and immigrants—that is demonstrated in a subsequent section—illuminates the puzzle that the dissertation explores. The following section will trace the evolution of the approach to immigrants employed by Basque nationalists with an emphasis on the minority nationalism-immigration nexus.

\textbf{Immigration and Nationalism in the Basque Country until 1978}

The Basque racialist discourse started to develop before the articulation of Arana’s nationalism. Integration has historically been difficult for non-Basques in the Basque provinces. Evidence indicates that people coming to Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa who could not prove the purity of their blood and nobility had limited civic rights and duties, and in 1585, the Junta Provincial of Gipuzkoa “forbade residence to all who could not prove their collective nobility.”\textsuperscript{235} The invasions that culminated in Muslim control of most of what is now Spain except the Basque provinces provided the raw material for the invention of the myth that the Basques are the only pure race left in Iberia.\textsuperscript{236} This initial attempt at closure, then, was not so much anti-Spanish as it was a claim that the Basques were the last and most pure race in Spain: “Basque uniqueness was offered, for the greater honour of the Spanish nation, service of its Kings and Lords, and grand estimation of their country.”\textsuperscript{237} In other words, the argument of the Gipuzkoan elites was that as

\textsuperscript{234} After the formation of ETA and separation of Basque nationalism into moderate and radical streams, the latter quickly became more open to immigrants. While retaining significant popular support during the dictatorship, the radical stream of nationalism has never the levers of power since the transition to democracy and has marginal influence in the wider Basque nationalist movement.

\textsuperscript{235} Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain}, 196.

\textsuperscript{236} Douglass, “Sabino’s Sin,” 99.

\textsuperscript{237} Douglass, “Sabino’s Sin,” 100.
the only people that were never sullied by the blood of foreigners, all Basques should have noble status, including peasants and artisans.

The turbulent period of rapid industrialization in Bilbao after the abolition of the fueros meant that migrants from other regions of Spain flocked to the city. Bilbao more than doubled its population from 35,505 in 1877 to 83,306 in 1900.\footnote{Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain, 197.} Net migration to the Basque provinces between 1888 and 1900 totalled 31,237, which is quite remarkable given the level of emigration from Spain to other parts of Europe and Latin America.\footnote{Cristina Valderrama, "Inmigración Extranjera En El País Vasco: Estrategias Políticas Para La Gestión De La Diversidad," Política y Sociedad 45, no. 1 (2008): 189.} Almost half of the migrants to the Basque provinces did not have any Basque ancestry.\footnote{Corcuera, Orígenes, Ideología, y Organización Del Nacionalismo Vasco (1876-1904), 73-75.}

**Figure 3.1** Estimated Net Migration, Basque Autonomous Community: 1888-1981

![Net Migration Change](source: National Statistics Institute of Spain, Registers and Censuses (www.ines.es))

Migrants in the Bilbao area faced horrid living conditions and were generally separated from ethnic Basques. Dolores Ibárruri paints a bleak picture of their life in Bilbao:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain, 197.}
  \item \footnote{Cristina Valderrama, "Inmigración Extranjera En El País Vasco: Estrategias Políticas Para La Gestión De La Diversidad," Política y Sociedad 45, no. 1 (2008): 189.}
  \item \footnote{Corcuera, Orígenes, Ideología, y Organización Del Nacionalismo Vasco (1876-1904), 73-75.}
\end{itemize}
“The miners worked from dawn to dusk with no set hours. They left home before it was light and did not return till well after nightfall…At night the air was filled with the smoke of harsh tobacco and illuminated by a flickering light.

The blurred figures of half-naked men could be seen moving among the cots or seated in their bedrolls in a foul atmosphere…if one of the men contracted smallpox or typhus…he was removed from his cot and taken to a hut where the sick were housed. If he died, his bunk was sprinkled with lime water, and his cot was immediately occupied by someone else.”

The mass arrival of migrants immediately stirred up resentment among the newly minted Basque nationalist movement. Because of the comparable economic well-being of native Basques, however, it was relatively easy for them to isolate the migrant population by forcing them to work in the mining industry and live in remote dwellings away from the residential neighbourhoods of ethnic Basques. Arana convinced his followers that Basque society had nothing to gain from interacting with lazy Spaniards who he said were prone to violence and drunkenness. According to Sullivan:

“Arana’s overriding concern was his belief that the Basque race was in danger of extinction because of an invasion of foreigners whom he considered to be racially degenerate, immoral, non-Catholic and socialist. Basque independence would…make it possible to deny admittance to the Basque Country to Spaniards and restore traditional morality.”

This concern was not limited to Arana as is shown by the stated positions of the PNV discussed in the previous section, expulsion of non-Basques by an independent Euskadi and no opportunity to naturalize for immigrants unless they had Basque parents. This hostility towards migrants was not present in the discourse of Catalan nationalism despite the fact that each region had about the same percentage of immigrants, most of whom were

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242 Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, 5.
culturally and ethnically Spanish. The manner in which the PNV initially responded to immigration, therefore, was largely a result of its ethnic nationalism rather than other factors such as the scale or type of immigration.

Basque nationalism began to change and diversify during the crises that preceded General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s military coup that displaced Spain’s liberal monarchy. The coup represented the emergence of a more concrete form of Spanish nationalism, one that sought national unity through Catholicism and communitarian ideals rather than liberalism. At first, Primo de Rivera did not engage in any significant repression of minority cultures, but Basque nationalists were suspicious of the regime’s intentions and this prompted the Comunión Nacionalista Vasca to merge with the PNV. The terms agreed upon at the Bergara reunification assembly of November 16, 1930 were as follows:

First: Basque nationalism proclaims the Catholic religion as the only true religion…

Second: Euskadi...will be Roman Catholic in all the manifestations of its internal life and in its relations with other nations, peoples and states.

Third: Euskadi is the nation and patria of the Basques.

Fourth: Euskadi, the Basque nation, is in virtue of natural and historical rights...master of its destiny.

Fifth: Basque nationalism...seeks to: a) preserve and strengthen the Basque race, the fundamental basis of nationality b) preserve, spread, and purify the Basque language,

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244 The Comunión Nacionalista Vasca split from the PNV in 1921 because those in control of the latter were tied to Arana’s original writings that emphasized outright independence and a pure Basque race. The Comunión Nacionalista Vasca promulgated views more in line with Arana’s ‘Spanish turn’ that occurred shortly before his death. See Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, 56-57.
clearest marker of our nationality, and c) re-establish traditional customs, and fight exotic ones that contaminate our character and personality. 245

The dictatorship fostered popular support for the PNV and minority nationalism generally because of its adherence to a doctrine of centralizing Spanish nationalism. As is clear from the principles of the Bergara reunification, the new organizationally focused version of Basque nationalism deviated somewhat from the principles laid out by Sabino Arana. The emphasis on the racial basis of the Basque nation was omitted from the Bergara principles in favour of a more ambiguous statement reinforcing that ‘exotic customs’ were contaminants to the Basque nation. Instead, language was identified as the clearest marker of Basque identity, which was a reversal from Arana’s belief that language was only useful as a secondary layer of difference because of the possibility that foreigners would learn Euskara. This official change, however, did not translate into widespread support for a civic linguistic-based nationalism. Most nationalists did not intend to learn Euskara, nor did they believe it was possible for non-Basques to understand what it meant to be Basque. 246

The core ideology guiding the Second Republic, proclaimed in April 1931, was quite different from that of the preceding dictatorship or previous constitutional monarchy. Rather than centralization and national unity, the leaders of the Republic were intent on parliamentary democracy and agreed to provide regional autonomy for the Basques and Catalans. Nevertheless, the Republic remained committed to nation building through an emphasis on a common Spanish culture and history, but this was tempered by a general understanding that both the Basque Country and Catalonia were ‘industrialized’ and

246 Interview 13.
therefore would produce the type of Castilian ‘urban culture’ favoured by the Republican leaders.\footnote{Lecours, \textit{Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State}, 65-66.}

During the Second Republic, the PNV considered making religion the basis of Basque nationalism rather than race or language. The secular threat posed by the Second Republic likely motivated the PNV elite to seek out alliances with the Basque clergy. Religion turned out to be politically useful for the PNV because it provided a source of social cohesion absent in the rest of Spain.\footnote{Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain}, 201.} The PNV’s commitment to a conservative platform delayed the approval of the Basque statute of autonomy until October of 1936, whereas the Catalans received their statute in 1932. In particular, Republican governments found the PNV’s demand that the political and civil rights of Castilian migrants be limited through a strict naturalization process unacceptable.\footnote{Shafir, \textit{Immigrants and Nationalists}, 101.} The only reason that an agreement was finally reached is that the PNV removed itself from negotiations and the secular representatives of Basque nationalism were able to become actively involved in the preparation of the statute.

Despite the fact that religion and nationalism had provided a basis for unity among the Basque provinces, Basques were regionally divided because nationalism remained more popular in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa while Araba and Nafarroa were more devoutly Catholic. It was in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa that nationalists expressed concern that an emphasis on Catholicism as the main pillar of nationalism would encourage even more Spaniards to flood into Basque territories.\footnote{Interview 17.} Consequently, General Franco’s coup split the provinces as Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa sided with the leftist Republic because it had approved the Basque
statute of autonomy whereas Araba, and especially Nafarroa, became strongholds of
Franco’s forces. Many nationalists in all provinces were conflicted because Franco was
supported by the Church, but had a vision of an indivisible Spain based on the Castilian
language and culture. Soon after the civil war began, the PNV was firmly on the republican
side, concentrating on building up attachments to block Franco’s army from taking Basque
cities such San Sebastián and Bilbao.\footnote{Sullivan, \textit{ETA and Basque Nationalism}, 16-17.} The support the Basque nationalists provided for
the Republicans against Franco’s forces was not enough to prevent the (Spanish)
Nationalists from winning the war, and it made them traitors in the eyes of Franco.

\textit{Repression and the Franco Dictatorship}

After Franco’s forces won the civil war, the coalition of traditionalists, monarchists,
agrarians, and Spanish nationalists took aim at what they saw as the fundamental problems
with the Second Republic: the statutes of autonomy and the weakness of the Spanish
identity.\footnote{Lecours, \textit{Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State}, 69.} Franco and his supporters favoured a version of Spain united by political
centralization and cultural homogeneity, and therefore, it came as no surprise that cultural
repression and assimilation were used as tools to achieve the ends of national unity: “Spain
was better red than broken.”\footnote{Paulina Raento and Cameron J. Watson, ”Gernika, Guernica, Guernica? Contested Meanings of a Basque Place,” \textit{Political Geography} 19, no. 6 (August 2000): 75.} Part of the justification provided by Franco for the
establishment of an authoritarian regime was that the democratic Second Republic nearly led
to the disintegration of Spain by providing Basque and Catalan nationalists with the
authority to promote cultural distinctiveness.
From 1939 to 1945, the Basques were subjected to a level of systematic terror that was nothing short of brutal, especially in the provinces of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. After establishing military control over the Basque provinces, Franco’s troops began a campaign of repression against every innocuous sign of Basque identity such as dance, music, and literature. The president of the Basque government-in-exile wrote a message to UNESCO in 1952 in which he denounced the following acts of the Franco regime: closure of the Basque university; occupation by the armed forces of social and cultural associations; mass burning of books in Euskara; banning of all use of Euskara in schools, on radio broadcasts, in public gatherings, and in publications; closure of Basque cultural societies and of all magazines, periodicals and reviews in Euskara; a decree requiring that all Basque names in the public domain be translated into Spanish and the forced removal of all Basque names from tombstones.

A Basque historian remarked to me that much of the repression that occurred was stricken from the official record before the transition to democracy. Some Basque nationalist civic organizations have formed in recent decades with the sole intent of uncovering the atrocities committed by the Franco regime in the Basque Country such as the killing of civilians who were suspected sympathizers of the nationalist cause and torturing children who spoke Basque in schools.

Surviving documents do indicate that Franco’s regime imprisoned and executed many Basques for the crime of promoting ‘separatism.’ It goes without saying that the autonomy statutes approved by the Second Republic were

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254 Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain*, 81.
256 Confidential interview, Leioa, 29 September 2010.
257 Some groups accuse the *Partido Popular* of hiding information about atrocities that occurred, which signifies a potential affiliation with the PNV or Basque-left parties.
revoked.\textsuperscript{259} Fear and persecution caused more than 100,000 Basques to flee Spain for destinations such as France, Latin America, and other western countries. This period also saw the PNV radicalize their agenda. The president of the exiled Basque government spoke of an independent Basque state rather than a return to the autonomy statute of 1936.

Following World War II, the Basque government-in-exile received support from the Allies, particularly the United States, in their fight against the Franco dictatorship. The Americans were interested in an alliance with the Basque nationalists, whom they thought could provide inside information about the Franco regime. In exchange, Basque nationalists hoped that the Americans would exert pressure on the Franco regime, resulting in its dissolution and the establishment of Basque independence, or at least autonomy. This support quickly ended with the onset of the Cold War, however, because the Americans came to view Franco as an ally against communism.\textsuperscript{260} Many Basque nationalists became disillusioned and concluded that they could not depend on outside assistance to achieve their goal. As Conversi puts it, “this is one of the crucial features which helps explain the birth of ETA less than a year later.”\textsuperscript{261}

\textit{The Emergence of Radical Nationalism: Opening the Basque Nation?}

The PNV had been responsible for the emergence and growth of Basque nationalism as a popular movement since the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, but the organization began to pacify its activities in the 1950s because the economic growth in the Basque Country—the result of Francoist policies—was benefitting many of its members. Folkloric and small

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{259} Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga, \textit{The Reinvention of Spain: Nation and Identity since Democracy} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 38.  \\
\textsuperscript{260} Clark, \textit{The Basques}, 93-102.  \\
\textsuperscript{261} Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain}, 83.
\end{flushright}
cultural celebrations were the only manifestations of nationalism on Basque soil at this time. On the other hand, some scholarly interpretations of this period emphasize that Franco’s repressive tactics were responsible for the PNV’s pacification.

A group of university students in Bilbao, frustrated with inactivity and the stale ideology of the PNV, responded by transforming their discussion group into the underground organization *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA). In the 1960s, inspired by the Algerian and Vietnamese guerrilla movements, ETA began a campaign of terrorism against representatives of the Spanish state. By the 1970s, ETA had gained a substantial following in the Basque Country and were seen as a legitimate symbol of the struggle against authoritarianism. It has been argued that the nationalist programme associated with ETA developed a dramatically different position towards migrants than that of the PNV. As was the case with the PNV, ETA was born at a time of rapid change in Basque society, and the topic of who was a Basque, and if foreigners could become Basque, was debated frequently, but never quite solved. The confrontation between factions within ETA over the group’s guiding ideology was the source of debate concerning the ‘immigrant question.’ The revolutionary socialist position, articulated for the Basque public by the journal *Zutik*, was that all left-leaning Spanish and Basque parties should unite in favour of a revolutionary overthrow of Franco and the establishment of a socialist democracy. The conclusion with

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263 For a good example, see Letamendia, *Historia De Euskadi*.
264 This roughly translates to Freedom for the Basque Country.
respect to migrants that the revolutionary socialists came to was that ethnic nationalism or the exclusion of non-Basques would only hinder their progress towards revolution.\textsuperscript{268}

The ‘traditional nationalist’ faction of ETA ruled out cooperation with Spanish parties or organizations and opted for a “Third World-type guerrilla strategy” that negated the need for the masses because attacks could be carried out by a small group of armed insurgents. Some evidence indicates that the traditional wing also rejected ethnic nationalism and favoured the integration of migrants so long as they did not speak Spanish and tried to learn Basque.\textsuperscript{269} On the other hand, a prominent scholar of Basque history has commented that internal documents from the traditional wing of ETA contradict the preceding argument.\textsuperscript{270} Drawing upon these documents, Elorza argues that ETA “appropriated a more extreme version of nationalism than Arana originally did, with all of his dogmas and prejudices…except Catholicism.”\textsuperscript{271} According to this interpretation, prospective members of ETA had to demonstrate their ‘Basqueness’ though their family names and even those born in the Basque Country with Spanish or other family names were considered as outsiders. In 1967, ETA underwent its first of many organizational splits. These splits were endemic as they perpetuated the internal debate over whether nationalism or socialism should be the defining ideology of the organization, resulting in various contradictory statements and ideas about the content of its nationalism. Some founders of ETA went as far as to condemn Arana and the PNV for their racism, and argued that membership in the Basque nation was voluntary: “a Basque is one who, loving his nation,
fights for its liberation: hence a true Basque can only be Basque nationalist.” At the same
time, xenophobia was common among ETA militants who were wedded to the principles of
ethnic nationalism. Jauregui characterizes the situation within ETA as one where
“biological racism and ethnocentric racism were dominant ideas” even though they were
uncomfortable bedfellows of the anti-conservatism doctrine that was an ideological pillar of
ETA. A significant number of ETA members viewed migrants from the rest of Spain as
‘enemies’ who would bring about the cultural genocide of Basque nation, culture, language,
and political ideas. A manifesto released by ETA in the early 1970s provided the
ambiguous message: “the Basque people may encounter allies from the Spanish state, but
they will certainly find 28 million enemies.” Sullivan puts it succinctly by concluding,
“ETA was never to resolve the question of how to absorb immigrants during this
period...because complete acceptance of other ethnicities would have cut the organization
off from the grass roots Basque nationalist feeling.”

PNV Nationalism and the ‘Other’ During the Twilight of Francoism

In the early 1960s, the Franco regime had abandoned autarky and fully embraced
economic liberalization and global trade, which fuelled a massive expansion of the Spanish
economy, especially in urban centres such as Barcelona, Madrid, and Bilbao. Not
surprisingly, immigration to the Basque Country expanded rapidly. Between 1961 and
1970, the Basque Country witnessed a net migration of 256 226, a significant number if one

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273 Jáuregui, Ideología y Estrategia Política De ETA, 134-135.
276 Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, 39.
considers the total population was around two million during this period.\textsuperscript{277} The threat perceived by Basque nationalists was considerable, but some efforts were made to lessen the tensions between migrants and indigenous Basques by creating a new sense of Basque identity that was permeable rather than closed.\textsuperscript{278} Andreños (Basque teachers) assumed an important role in the movement to improve the relations between migrants and natives and build national unity. Schools were created that gave more importance than before to the teaching of Basque history and andreños placed non-Basque children in classes with ethnic Basques. The majority of instruction was in Euskara, but the andreños recognized that some teaching in Spanish was necessary to ensure that Spanish and other foreign-born children did not fall behind or feel marginalized.\textsuperscript{279} The andreño initiative faced severe resistance from villagers who were opposed to their children being educated in classes with Spanish children.\textsuperscript{280} This was indicative of the general milieu in the Basque Country at this time: the more educated classes such as the andreños had a generally positive few of immigration while other Basques wanted to be “kept safe from negative foreign influences.”\textsuperscript{281} It is difficult to say whether such xenophobia was due to a firmly rooted belief in Arana’s version of Basque nationalism or feelings of inferiority among rural Basque speakers. Another fear that rural Basques shared was that Euskara had no chance of becoming the centerpiece of a dominant ‘high culture.’

Efforts to promote a more cultural rather than ethnic version of Basque nationalism went beyond the realm of education. The underground newsletter of the PNV entitled

\textsuperscript{277} Valderrama, “Inmigración Extranjera En El País Vasco,” 189-190.
\textsuperscript{278} Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain}, 201.
\textsuperscript{279} Nicholas Gardner, \textit{Basque in Education in the Basque Autonomous Community} (Vitoria: Department of Culture, Basque government, 2002), 24.
\textsuperscript{280} Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain}, 201.
Alderdi published a manifesto in 1971 called “43 Words for You, Immigrant in Euskadi.” An editorial suggested that “those who came from other lands...to assume fully the duties which the impending crucial situation demands from us all...welcome to our land...this is your land, you are Basque.” This was meant to say to immigrants that to become Basque, “the only requirement is to respect the Basque culture and join the struggle against dictatorship and repression.” Supplementary evidence casts doubt over the proclamation that the moderate nationalists had really moderated their stance towards immigrants. Debates within the PNV concerning the question of “who is a Basque?” at this time were controversial and heated. The more radical sabinianos did soften their views on the importance of family names as a marker of Basqueness, but did not accept a territorial or voluntary concept of the nation. The pervasiveness of terms such as culture, shared history, and ethnic identity were notable in the discourse of the sabianianos even though most official statements from the PNV signalled that the party had moved in a more civic direction.

A potential explanation for the latent xenophobic attitudes among nationalists is that migrants were themselves not trying to integrate into Basque society. This argument cannot be discarded, but an important survey conducted by Francisco Llera and associates in the late 1970s shows that migrants were somewhat willing to adopt a Basque identity during this period. As expected, a greater percentage of second-generation migrants identified as ‘only Basque’ or ‘more Basque than Spanish’ than those born outside the Basque Country.

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282 Cited in Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain, 202.
283 Interview 13.
284 Sabiniano is a term commonly used to describe PNV members whom espouse the principles of the party’s founder Sabino Arana. See Pablo and Mees, El Péndulo Patriótico, 369-370.
Although the vast majority of those who feel ‘only Spanish’ were migrants (80.4%), nearly half of those who considered themselves ‘equally Basque and Spanish’ were migrants and almost a quarter of those who proclaimed to be ‘more Basque than Spanish’ were migrants. Finally, ten percent of those who came to identify themselves as ‘Basque only’ were migrants.

Table 3.1 National Identities by Descent in the Basque Country, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Both Parents Born in the Basque Country</th>
<th>One Parent Born in the Basque Country</th>
<th>Born in the Basque Country of (Im) migrant Parents</th>
<th>(Im)migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Basque</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Spanish and Basque</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Basque than Spanish</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Basque</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>(438)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>(351)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Francisco J. Llera, Los Vascos y La Política (Bilbao, Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco, 1994), 81.

The DATA survey carried out by Richard Gunther and associates (around the same time) allows us to explore whether ethnic Basques and migrants had different understandings of the fundamental question, “who is a Basque?” The respondents were again grouped by how they self-identify and asked whether they believe descending from a Basque family or being born in the Basque Country is a requirement to consider him or herself Basque. The striking fact that appears in the results is that the majority of respondents in all categories responded affirmatively. This means that a primordial rather than a territorial understanding of Basqueness was pervasive among native Basques at this time.
Table 3.2 Proportion saying that a Basque is someone who is “Born in the Country or a Descendant of Basque Parents,” 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Spanish than Basque</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Spanish and Basque</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Basque than Spanish</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Failure of Ethnic Nationalism in Catalonia

In order to provide a better understanding of why the Basque case is ‘exceptional’ in terms of its emphasis on racial boundaries, it is contrasted here with the emergence of Catalan nationalism that occurred during roughly the same period. Catalan nationalists have responded to recent waves of immigration with an emphasis on multiculturalism and wide-ranging social programs to assist undocumented newcomers in overcoming marginalization. Catalonia is sometimes described as a ‘pioneer’ of integration and its proactive approach has been attributed to its civic approach to nation building. When the immigration rate increased in the early 2000s in the Basque Country, the Catalan experience served as a model for Basque nationalists. A former director of immigration in the Basque Department Social Affairs told me that when the PNV government decided it needed to develop a strategy for immigrant integration, “the party was very interested in how Catalonia was able to absorb so many immigrants so quickly while still promoting the Catalan nation and language.” In contrast with the Basque case, however, the civic Catalan nation was in place from the very beginning of the nationalist movement, barriers were never erected

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286 Calavita, *Immigrants at the Margins*, 95.
287 Interview 18.
between natives and newcomers despite facing the same political and cultural repression under the Franco regime as the Basque Country did. When Catalonia was integrated into Spain in the 18th century, it repeatedly rose to defend its medieval fueros against the centralizing tendencies of the Spanish state. This was not an explicitly nationalist movement *per se*, as its bourgeois leaders were more interested in obtaining favourable terms of trade within the Spanish market. The basis for Catalan nationalism was laid down by the *Renaixença*—the output of Catalan literature emphasizing the history of the Catalan people and their language—which provided future nationalists with ready-made materials and ideas to draw upon.288

The first publications that produced an explicitly Catalan nationalist programme were a series of resolutions written by Enric Prat de la Riba beginning in 1892. Known as the Bases of Manresa, Prat de la Riba called for “home rule for a Catalan-speaking state with posts reserved for born or nationalized Catalans.”289 Immediately we can observe a distinct difference in the Catalan nationalist programme from the Basque one: the acceptance of immigrants that are culturally integrated. Catalan nationalism does not have just one prominent historical figure, such as Sabino Arana; there were many early writers, poets, and politicians credited with creating and fostering early Catalan nationalism.

To an even greater extent than the Basque Country, Catalonia has experienced waves of immigration dating back to the 16th century because the region industrialized rapidly and much before the Castilian mainland. In 1887, immigrants represented only 1.25% of the Catalan population, but this slowly increased to 3.33% in 1897 and 14.44% in 1920. Several authors such as Carles Pi-Sunyer, Ferrater i Mora, and Maluquer have written about

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Catalonia’s capacity and willingness to absorb immigrants because of its status as a maritime society. Each of these authors described Catalonia as a place favourable to different ethnicities because its economic success is predicated on the free movement of goods and labour. Industrialization in Basque cities such as Bilbao also created labour shortages that were filled by Spanish migrants and this did not prevent Arana’s ethnic version of Basque nationalism from gaining popularity.

Between the 1950 and 1975, Catalonia experienced a dramatic increase in its population largely due to the arrival of migrants from other parts of Spain as well as neighbouring countries such as France and Italy. The absence of Catalan institutions during the Franco dictatorship meant that immigration was a potential threat to the survival of the Catalan identity. The migrants, for the most part, were uneducated and ignorant of the Catalan language and distinct national character of Catalonia, which led to a lively intellectual debate that addressed the immigration issue from a Catalan nationalist standpoint. In 1958, Jurdi Pujol published *Immigració i integració* that contains the now famous passage “anyone who lives and works in Catalonia and who wants to be Catalan is a Catalan.” Pujol did put forth the caveat that language was the crucible of the nation and therefore ‘true’ Catalans must learn to speak the language and use it in their everyday life: “a man who speaks Catalan and who speaks Catalan to his children is already a Catalan at heart.” Nevertheless, Pujol’s position was well received by the majority of Catalans and did not focus on ethnicity as did Arana. Another writing that is often cited by Catalan nationalists is *Els alters Catalans* by Francesc Candel. A migrant himself, his work

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290 Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain*, 190.
highlighted the fact that many non-ethnic Catalans had grown to love Catalonia: its values, language, and way of life. Catalan nationalists believed that the book represented a sense of hope for a future Catalan community bounded together by common principles and mutual understanding.

Guibernau and Conversi agree that a small undercurrent within the Catalan nationalist community favoured a primordial type of nationalism.\textsuperscript{293} There was a mild backlash against immigration in the 1960s and some Catalans bought into arguments based on scientific racism. One Catalan physician extolled the dangers of ‘de-Catalanization’ and the dire need to increase the numbers of Catalans of pure stock.\textsuperscript{294} The ultra nationalist writer Manuel Cruells responded to Candel’s book and questioned whether the majority of migrants were indeed willing to accept the Catalan culture.\textsuperscript{295} He made the case that the formation of ghettos in Barcelona meant that the Catalan language was not being spoken and consequently the idea of a single Catalan community was fictitious.\textsuperscript{296} These writings, however, never gained much popularity and ideas associated with scientific racism and ethnic nationalism were quickly dismissed by mainstream Catalan nationalists.\textsuperscript{297} The strength of the linguistic identity was too great and many immigrants were willing to accept and embrace the Catalonian culture and language.\textsuperscript{298} The positive attitude of migrants during the Franco dictatorship towards Catalan culture and language has been documented in several studies. Surveys carried out by various sociologists and linguists confirmed that the vast majority of those born outside Catalonia preferred that their children be schooled in

\textsuperscript{293} Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain}, 194-195; Guibernau, \textit{Catalan Nationalism}, 68-69.
\textsuperscript{294} Josep Termes, \textit{La Immigració a Catalunya} (Barcelona: Empúries, 1984), 138.
\textsuperscript{295} Manuel Cruells, \textit{Els no Catalans i Nosaltres} (Barcelona: Edicions de l’Abadia, 1965).
\textsuperscript{296} Cruells, \textit{Els no Catalans i Nosaltres}, 12.
\textsuperscript{297} Hank Johnston, \textit{Tales of Nationalism: Catalonia, 1939-1979} (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, 1991), 45-84.
\textsuperscript{298} Johnson, \textit{Tales of Nationalism}; Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain}, 193-196.
Catalan. One line of reasoning suggests that learning Catalan had already become economically valuable during the dictatorship because Franco’s repressive efforts had failed to contain the spread of Catalan to commercial and industrial sectors. Be that as it may, emotional arguments suggest that migrants wanted their children to learn Catalan because the welcoming disposition of the Catalan people made them feel sentimental towards the cultural and territorial community.

The massive influx of people from other cultures in the formative years of Basque and Catalan nationalism raised the level of consciousness among elites and the public of how national belonging was defined. In the Basque case, Arana successfully constructed a national image that excluded other ethnicities whereas Catalan nationalists adapted to the changing demographic realities by underlying the importance of residence and language. The reasons for this are not particularly clear, but some combination of the fact that Catalan nationalism was imbued with a language that was easier to learn and a diversity of elites rather than one figurehead such as Arana are important explanatory factors. Another plausible explanation is that modernization had spread more evenly throughout the Catalan territory. Nevertheless, the interesting question that comes from this is not why Catalonia has been a pioneer of multiculturalism and integration in Spain—this was expected. The Basque case, on the other hand, had to overcome its ethnic foundations to do so.

The following section provides contextual information about the institutional and sociological changes that followed the transition to democracy in Spain. This is necessary to consider whether the new institutions that restored political autonomy to the Basque Country

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299 Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain, 212-213.
300 Guibernau, Catalan Nationalism, 28-30.
301 Guibernau, Catalan Nationalism, 30-32.
302 Shafir, Immigrants and Nationalists, 50-128.
303 Conservative rural Basques provided the initial support for Arana’s version of Basque nationalism.
are sufficient to explain how Basque nationalists responded to the wave of immigration that began in the 21st century.

**Basque Nationalism, Immigration and the Spanish Transition**

The institutional landscape of the Basque Country, in the context of Spain, radically changed following the transition to democracy. In particular, political autonomy was restored for the Basque Country and the other historic ‘nationalities.’ According to the institutional perspective, autonomy empowers a minority nation to itself become multicultural and thus supportive of immigration. Nevertheless, a brief assessment of the nature and consequences of the revival of political autonomy casts doubt over whether the institutional perspective is a strong explanation for the subsequent group-based multicultural response of Basque nationalism to foreign immigration.

**The 1978 Constitution**

When Franco died in 1975, his inner circle recognized that democratic institutions were needed to adapt to the requirements of a modernizing Spanish society. In spite of various attempts to reinvent it, Francoism was ill suited to a country that was undergoing profound transformations in late 1970s; from an agricultural society to a wealthy industrial one. One of the dangerous legacies of Francoism was the years of repression of the minority nations within Spain. For Spain to become a democracy and not descend into another civil war it was imperative that the state abandon the idea of a homogenous Spain and respond to the demands of the Basque, Catalan, and Galician nations.
The centrepiece of the transition was the 1978 Constitution that was settled upon via intense negotiations between the various political parties representing the conservatives, liberals, and regional nationalists. The final product remained somewhat ambiguous with regards to the recognition of multinationalism because of disagreements that occurred between the more conservative reformers from the Franco regime and the liberal challengers. The well-known controversial Article 2 reveals the tension between those who were intent on defending the unity of Spain and those who wanted more recognition of difference:

“The Constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions forming it and solidarity between all of them.”

Articles 3.2 and 3.3 add substance to the idea of recognizing nations because they acknowledge that other languages are fundamental to the country’s character and therefore deserve protection through official status in the regions where they are spoken. Many Basque, Galician, and Catalan nationalists were unsatisfied with the emphasis on the ‘unity of the Spanish Nation’ whereas the conservative Spanish nationalists argued that the recognition of other ‘nationalities’ in Spain would inevitably lead to state disintegration.

The right to autonomy for the nationalities prompted the creation of the Autonomous Communities System. The Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia were entitled to immediately gain ‘full autonomy’ while other regions without nationalist movements had to undergo a five-year waiting period during which they were entitled to significantly less powers than the ‘historic’ nationalities. According to articles 143 and 144, after full autonomy has been achieved, there would be no distinctions between the historic and
artificially created communities. The latter was a concession to the large sections of the army and civil service that argued against ‘special’ autonomies for so-called historic communities because doing so would endanger the unity of the Spanish nation.

Both the radical and moderate streams of Basque nationalism rejected the legitimacy of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. After having been forced to operate in exile during the Franco dictatorship, the PNV welcomed the transition to democracy that placed the party in a good position to become the premier voice of Basque nationalism. The PNV did feel that the central authorities took some of their demands into account: an amnesty would be declared for all Basque political prisoners, the Basque ikurriña flag would be recognized, and an official status for Euskara provided. The party did not support the constitutional proposal, however, because it did not recognize their main demand of a right to self-determination for the Basques, a nation endowed with ‘original sovereignty.’ The PNV, therefore, called on its supporters to abstain from casting their ballots in the referendum on the constitution. Herri Batasuna (HB)—the political party that formed to act as the political arm of ETA—went a step further and advocated a ‘no’ vote in the referendum. A large majority of Spaniards approved the constitution, but the high abstention rate and comparatively low support for the constitution in the Basque Country signified that it lacked legitimacy there. The referendum results also underlined the fact that the majority of the Basque nationalist community was now behind the PNV rather than ETA because 50% abstained and only 11% voted ‘no’ to the constitutional proposal.

304 Guibernau, Catalan Nationalism, 73.
305 Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, 88.
306 Sabanadze, Globalization and Nationalism, 143.
Despite disapproving of the constitution, the PNV leaders engaged in negotiations with central authorities over the autonomy statute. The radical nationalists associated with HB and ETA, as well as non-nationalists, interpreted the PNV’s participation in the negotiations as a sign of hypocrisy. The PNV leaders contended that the autonomy statute did not flow from the constitution, but rather represented a reaffirmation of the right to self-government for the Basque people that had been recognized during the Second Republic.\(^{309}\) In July of 1979, the negotiations between the government and a majority of the Basque parties ended with the agreement known as *Estatuto de Guernika*.\(^{310}\) The functions delegated to the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) included the administration of justice, police forces, and all the main aspects of economic, cultural, and educational policy. It also restored the *conciertos económicos*, enabling the Basque government to set and retain most of the taxes collected in the BAC. As a result, the Basque government is one of the most powerful non-state governments in the world. Following the signing of the agreement, the head of the PNV Xavier Arzalluz commented that the new statute was better than the one negotiated and enacted during the Second Republic.\(^{311}\)

The management of foreign immigration was not a significant issue during the statute negotiations because Spain was still a country of emigration rather than immigration at the time. Nevertheless, the powers that the Basque autonomous community assumed via the statute would prove valuable a few decades later since most integration policies (e.g., reception, housing, education, welfare) are competencies that are either exclusive to the

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\(^{309}\) For a detailed account of the negotiations regarding the statute, see Carlos Garaikoetxea, *Euskadi: La Transición Inacabada* (Barcelona: Planeta, 2002).

\(^{310}\) HB was not included in the negotiations.

\(^{311}\) Sullivan, *ETA and Basque Nationalism*, 235.
autonomous communities or shared with the central state. The central government retained control over admission flows and naturalization.

Democratic Transition: The End of Ethnic Nationalism?

Some scholars have made the case that the democratic transition and subsequent autonomy statute put an end to the ethnic conception of Basque nationalism. According to Kymlicka’s perspective discussed in the first chapter, “national minorities are capable of including immigrants in their self-conception and thereby becoming themselves multicultural” if political autonomy allows the national minority to control the volume of immigration into its community as well as the terms of integration. While Kymlicka is not explicit about the counterfactual, the implication is that political autonomy that falls short of those requirements (control over volume and integration) would have the opposite effect because the national minority would not be able to overcome its fear of becoming a minority within its own historic territory. As mentioned above, some aspects of integration policy were devolved to the Basque government, but the Spanish government retained firm control over the admissions process. Moreover, the relative wealth of the Basque Country compared with other Autonomous Communities makes it an attractive destination for immigrants who enter Spain through legal (or illegal) means. Accordingly, it is perplexing that Article 7.1 of the Basque Statute of Autonomy reads “the political status of ‘Basque’ is afforded to all those who are officially a resident of the Basque Country.” More broadly, the inclusion of this article gives some credence to the argument that the transition marked the end of ethnic nationalism in the Basque Country.

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313 See Kymlicka, “Immigrant Integration and Minority Nationalism,” 61-83.
Some evidence suggests, however, that the Basque nation still defined itself with ethnic markers to exclude outsiders. For example, Article 7.2 maintains an ethnic dimension to membership in the Basque nation by stating that Basques residing abroad and their descendants enjoy the same political rights as those living in the Basque Country if their last legal residence in Spain was Euskadi. While not explicitly linking the status of being Basque to ethnicity, it was created with the intention of fostering an imagined community that knits together those living in the Basque Country with the diaspora communities scattered throughout the United States and Latin America.\textsuperscript{314}

Rhetoric and debate not found in official sources raise some doubts as to whether the transition to democracy also coincided with a transition to civic nationalism in the Basque Country. Xabier Arzalluz participated in the writing of the Basque autonomy statute and succeeded Carlos Garaikoetxea as leader of the PNV in 1979. He frequently referred to Arana and refused to openly repudiate his racist postulates.\textsuperscript{315} He also openly stated that the Basque blood type “is a sign of distinctiveness between ‘real’ Basques and those ‘from outside’ and those who are not ‘real’ Basques should be treated in Euskadi as ‘Germans in Mallorca,’ with some social but very few political rights.”\textsuperscript{316} Tensions within the PNV organization between those still wedded to Arana’s principles and the more progressive factions within the party were a major source of internal conflict during the transition period, “but it has become somewhat less important over the years as the party has shifted its attention to more pragmatic matters.”\textsuperscript{317}

\textsuperscript{314} Interview 21. The majority of those being courted by the Basque government with this provision are second, third, and fourth generation immigrants that are descendants of ethnic Basques.

\textsuperscript{315} Balfour and Quiroga, \textit{The Reinvention of Spain}, 150.

\textsuperscript{316} Cited in Balfour and Quiroga, \textit{The Reinvention of Spain}, 150-151.

Conclusion

Sabino Arana was the founder of the Basque nationalist movement. By choosing the core value of race to define the nation, he fostered racist attitudes among many Basques and created a highly contentious context in which Basques and non-Basques lived in isolation from each other. His racialist conception of nationalism gained traction in Basque society partly because of the acceptance of scientific racism in Europe as legitimate. Because of his profound contributions to Basque national consciousness, it proved difficult for Basque nationalist organizations to eschew Arana’s principles and encourage the integration of immigrants into the Basque nation by espousing civic rather than ethnic boundaries.

The end of Francoism and transition to democracy culminated in a legitimate attempt by state elites to accommodate multinationalism in Spain. Self-government provided a legitimacy boost for the PNV at the expense of ETA and opened up an opportunity for Basque nationalists to redefine themselves as civic nationalists seeking a nation founded upon a common language and values rather than ethnicity. The Basque Statute of Autonomy composed by the PNV embodied certain aspects of civic nationalism such as an emphasis on territorially-based citizenship, but the legacies of the past were not totally eradicated, however, as factions within both streams of nationalism remained ambiguous when answering the question of “who is a Basque?”

Immigration from other parts of Spain had slowed by this point and foreign immigration had yet to become a significant issue in Spain, let alone in the Basque Country. For this reason, it was easy for the PNV in particular to maintain cohesion despite the fact that significant factions within the party were not ready to adopt a territorial definition of the Basque nation. In the next chapter, we will see how rapid demographic changes in Spain
and the Basque Country forced Basque nationalists to confront the conundrum posed by immigration for its nation building project. The communitarian and multicultural character of the policy documents and initiatives put forth by the PNV with the support of other nationalists defies expectations given the original ethnic basis of the Basque nation. I explain this outcome by emphasizing how past institutional contexts close certain paths and make others more socially appropriate and how contextual changes force nationalist leaders to pursue non-traditional methods of nation building.
CHAPTER 4
FROM THREAT TO NATION BUILDING TOOL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTICULTURAL NATIONALISM IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY

Introduction

This chapter examines developments in immigration politics and policy in Spain and the Basque Country beginning in the late 1980s up until the current period. Since the transition to democracy, the PNV transformed itself into a modern nationalist party focused on pragmatic matters such as the revival of Euskara and obtaining more autonomy for the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (BAC). When Spain was first confronted with the challenge of mass migration in the 1980s and early 1990s, the PNV was able to ignore the issue because the BAC had yet to become a destination for immigrants to Spain. This changed by the early 21st century because the BAC now receives more immigrants per capita than the vast majority of other autonomous communities. The significant influx of immigration to the BAC happened to begin shortly after the conservative reform to Spain’s Ley de Extranjería (immigration law) made by José María Aznar’s government in 2000. This created a unique opportunity for the PNV to define an immigration approach that emphasized the difference between Basque and Spanish values. Traditional elements within the PNV and radical nationalists acknowledged that the increasing diversity of Basque society is a positive trend that should be encouraged.

This chapter also explores how the immigration issue became a new means for Basque nationalists with which to nation build. Anti-immigrant and anti-multiculturalism rhetoric and policy at the international and domestic levels provided Basque nationalists with an opportunity to display the uniqueness of the Basque nation. It also shows that the discourse embedded within documents and
interview data reflects a reconstructed group narrative in which the persecution Basques faced as a minority endows the Basque nation with a collective responsibility to welcome new immigrants and help them overcome adverse conditions.

The chapter is organized into four sections. The first provides data to illustrate that the Basque Country is rapidly becoming an immigrant receiving society in the 21st century, which made it necessary for national elites to articulate a position on the immigration question. The second section provides an overview of the changes to immigration laws in Spain and integration practices in Europe that provided the impetus for a response from Basque nationalists that stressed the different values of the Basque people. The third section examines the jurisdictional tussle between the Spanish state and the Basque Country in the realm of immigration and integration policy through the development of unique policy instruments by the Basque government. The content of the debates surrounding the development of independent policy instruments to manage immigration and the instruments themselves show clear intent by the Basque government to follow a more multicultural and group-based approach than the Spanish state. It also closely examines the Basque Plan of Immigration—the centerpiece of the PNV-directed approach to immigration. These documents articulate a more inclusive form of citizenship than does the Spanish Ley de Extranjería and commits the Basque government to support an extensive network of social programs to assist new immigrants to integrate economically and socially. The fourth section analyzes the changes in immigration policies and frameworks following the formation of a non-nationalist coalition government between the Socialist Party of Euskadi (PSE) and the Basque wing of the conservative Popular Party (Populares Vascos - PV). The cutbacks implemented by the coalition and reaction by the PNV (as well as other nationalist parties) provides further evidence that the path-breaking response of Basque nationalism to the immigration question is, in some respects, a strategic new means of nation building.
The Recent ‘Boom’ of Foreign Immigration to the Basque Country

Foreign immigration to the Basque Country is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1920, only 1.25% of the population was of foreign origin. Nevertheless, this percentage represented the peak of foreign-born residents in the Basque Country until the recent influx of immigration beginning in 2001. Although there was a gradual increase in rates of immigration to the Basque Country in the 1990s, it is only after 2000 that we observe a remarkable increase in immigrant inflows. In 1998, the foreign population in the Basque Country was less than 1% and that percentage had risen to over 7% by 2008.\(^{318}\) While the percentage of immigrants living in the Basque Country is lower than other autonomous communities in Spain, such as Madrid, Catalonia, and Andalucía, yearly growth rates for the entirety of Spain and the Basque Country have been comparable. The rate of growth in the percentage of immigrants in all of Spain was 46% between 2000 and 2001 and 41% in the Basque Country between 2001 and 2002.\(^{319}\) In absolute terms, the greatest number of new migrations to Spain occurred in 2003, with almost 690,000 new foreign residents. In the case of the Basque Country, the peak number was reached in 2005 and the rate of decline in the following years has been slower in the Basque Country than that of the rest of Spain.\(^{320}\)

\(^{318}\) Observatorio Vasco de Inmigración, Población Extranjera En La CAPV (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 2008).


Other statistics highlight the rapid rate at which new immigrants to Spain have left congested zones such as Madrid and Andalucía for new ‘hot spots,’ such as the Basque Country. This reflects both the level of opportunity in the Basque Country in comparison with other autonomous communities as well as the programs and policies put in place by the Basque government to assist immigrants *sin papeles* (without papers). According to a former director of immigration with the Basque government: “word-of-mouth spread throughout immigrant communities that the Basque Country was one of the more immigrant-friendly places in Spain...which, in my opinion, explains the boom that has occurred.”\(^{321}\)

Much like the rest of Spain, the makeup of the immigrant population in the Basque Country is rapidly becoming more diverse. Statistics comparing the nationalities of immigrants in the rest of Spain and the Basque Country indicate that immigration in the latter has a distinct character in terms of

\(^{321}\) Interview 18.
the home countries of its new residents. Only seven years ago, persons originating from countries within the European Union dominated the foreign population of the Basque Country. Since then, many Latin Americans have begun to migrate to the BAC and this has reduced the European percentage of immigrants from 45% to 29%.322

**Figure 4.2** Composition of Immigrant Population by Nationality, Basque Country (2000, 2007) and Spain (2007)

![Bar chart showing the composition of immigrant population by nationality in Basque Country (2000, 2007) and Spain (2007).]


In 2007, more than 50% of the immigrants that arrived in the Basque Country were from Latin America whereas this group only accounted for 35% of immigrants in the rest of Spain. Europeans were the most significant group in the rest of Spain (42%), but a distant second in the Basque Country (28%). Also of interest is the fact that 17% of immigrants that arrived in Spain and the Basque Country in 2007 were of African descent.323

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323 Despite decreases in migrants from other European countries, Romania is an important exception. Romanians are the third largest group of immigrants living in the Basque Country.
The influx of Latin American and African immigrants in the Basque Country may appear surprising to an outside observer because such immigrants face the obstacle of potentially needing to learn Euskara to access specific sectors of employment in the Basque Country. On the other hand, immigrants are unlikely to have the skills or contacts required to compete for jobs in employment sectors, such as education and health, in which a working knowledge of Euskara is a significant asset. Not surprisingly then, patterns of immigration within the Basque Country demonstrate that employment is a key explanatory variable in determining where immigrants decide to eventually reside. One example is the concentration of Bolivian women in the wealthy suburbs of Bilbao who come in search of domestic and childcare work.\(^{324}\) Consequently, various nationalities have established themselves in varying numbers in the three provinces that make up the BAC.\(^{325}\)

In sum, foreign immigration to the Basque Country has risen meteorically in the past years, changing the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural landscape of the territory dramatically. Journalists and academics have begun to debate the question of how Basque society should confront the phenomenon of foreign immigration. The minority opinion at the public and elite levels at the beginning of the boom was that immigration could and would do harm to the Basque language and culture. Some comments harkened back to Sabino Arana’s doctrine for sustaining an ethnic nation to argue against foreign immigration beyond immediate labour market needs.\(^{326}\) As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections, the institutional and policy response of the PNV-led Basque government to the immigration ‘boom’ broke with the conception of an ethnically defined Basque nation.


\(^{325}\) For a detailed overview of the differences and similarities with regards to immigration between the three provinces that makeup the BAC, see Valderrama, “Inmigración Extranjera En El País Vasco,” 194-96.

\(^{326}\) Deia, 19 September 2002; Deia 22 August 2004.
The Backlash against Diversity

Spain’s ‘Tough’ Reforms to Immigration Law

The passing of the 1978 Spanish Constitution laid down the foundation for Spain to become part of the club of western liberal democracies. Immigration was not a domestic political issue at the time, but Spain’s scheduled entry into the European Community (EC) in 1986 meant that the country was under pressure to conform to EC legislation that restricted non-EC immigration. The first immigration law in Spain’s history was passed in 1985 for the sole purpose of assuring the older members of the EC that Spain would not become an entry point for undocumented immigrants. With that in mind, the law contained many restrictive provisions, “establishing mechanisms for imposing sanctions against irregular immigrants, and making it very difficult to get into Spain through legal channels.” For example, family reunification was ruled out and even long-term workers with contracts were not able to obtain the status of permanent resident. These regulations put many immigrants in an illegal situation that was exploited by employers.

Six years following the implementation of the first Ley de Extranjería, the governing Socialists in the Spanish Congress submitted a green paper to show their disapproval of the law. The green paper proposed a new immigration policy founded on the three pillars: the control of flows, the integration of immigrants, and co-operating in the development of the countries sending immigrants to Spain. The proposal passed in an amended form and led to the regularization of an extraordinary number of immigrants in 1991.

The 1991 reform still left immigrants without many basic rights because it was designed to fill labour shortages rather than integrate immigrants. It was only in 1996—after a flurry of dramatic

328 Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (Congreso de los Diputados), 5 May 1985.
329 Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (Congreso de los Diputados), 22 March 1991.
media reports that showed the miserable plight of immigrants in Spain—that another amendment to the 1985 law was enacted. It provided immigrants with a set of rights that included access to education, legal counsel, and an interpreter when dealing with authorities.\textsuperscript{330} The amendment also made allowances for family reunification and permanent residency. Shortly thereafter, in 1998, an initiative put forth by a coalition of non-governing parties, which was passed by the Congress on 12 January 2000 as Law 4/2000 (the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Integration), was thought to represent a turning point in Spanish immigration law. The law extended rights to non-EU foreigners, recognized the permanency of immigration and focused on integration by broadening immigrant access to social services, such as education, health, and social security, regardless of status. It also included another legalization program for immigrants who had resided in Spain continuously for the previous three years and held a work permit at any point during that time. Furthermore, the program helped those who did not meet these requirements get on a path towards naturalization that would last five years.\textsuperscript{331} The PP was highly critical of the Law 4/2000 because of its permissive nature and felt that other countries would perceive Spain as uncooperative and ‘un-European’ because the EU favoured restrictive policies.\textsuperscript{332} The PP leader José María Aznar went as far as to say that Law 4/2000 would be repealed as soon as the PP governed with a majority.\textsuperscript{333}

The PP and Aznar won a majority government in the 2000 General Election and swiftly kept their word. Capitalizing on the high profile anti-immigrant violence in the southern Spanish town of El Ejido, Aznar’s PP submitted and passed a bill in late 2000 that overhauled Law 4/2000. The bill has been called a tough anti-immigration law that seemed like “payback for the humiliation of the

\textsuperscript{331} \textit{Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales}, 12 January 2000.
\textsuperscript{332} \textit{Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales}, 12 January 2000.
\textsuperscript{333} Calavita, \textit{Immigrants at the Margins}, 33.
enactment of a liberal law despite Aznar’s opposition.” The wording of the new law’s preamble implies that the previous law was never valid because it did not conform to the EU agreement at Tampere (Finland) or the Schengen Agreement.

The Statement of Reasons of the new Law 8/2000 makes clear that immigrants only have access to the most ‘fundamental’ human rights. The new law reversed the rights to association, union membership, and demonstration enjoyed by irregular and regular immigrants under the previous Law 4/2000. Law 8/2000 also created important distinctions between regular and irregular aliens in the realms of health care and education. Irregular aliens only have access to public health care in ‘emergency’ situations and the right to education only applies to resident aliens whereas all school-aged immigrants had a right to education under Law 4/2000. Law 8/2000 also made the expulsion of illegal immigrants much more likely:

“being irregularly on Spanish territory due to not having obtained a permit or because the permits have expired and on condition that the party concerned had not duly requested the renewal of the permits or working in Spain without having obtained a work permit or the previous administrative authorization to work when the person does not have valid residence authorization constitute infringements which can give rise to expulsion from Spanish territory.”

To appreciate the severity of this reform, one must understand how difficult it can be for immigrants to keep and maintain permanent residency status. Generally, immigrants must secure a work contract with which to secure a work permit, take this work permit and other documents to the police for a residence permit, and finally secure a residence permit. This process is made difficult because the

334 Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 33.
steps are mutually dependent and immigrants are denied one permit for lacking another. 337 A member of the San Sebastián town council in Gipuzkoa remarked to me about the Law 8/2000: “the process creates a vicious circle because immigrants often need residence before looking for work and a residence permit to find a place to live...and so a sympathetic bureaucrat or employer willing to help them out is their only hope.” 338

A number of changes also affected legal immigrants. Family reunification was modified so that only immediate family members are eligible for entry into Spain. Even reunification for a spouse became subject to a number of exclusions, such as certain types of arranged marriages, polygamy, and de facto or de jure separation. Legal aid and subsidies for housing for legal immigrants was cut off, as well as automatic permanent residency after three years. It is still possible to obtain permanent residency, but doing so requires three successive renewals of a temporary permit, and even then, permanent residency status only lasts five years, at which point it is not necessarily renewed. 339

While Law 4/2000 made it mandatory for the state to provide reasons if a visa request was refused, Law 8/2000 modified this provision to allow all visas to be refused without reason except those falling under the category of family reunification. 340 This means that lodging an appeal is futile. In short, the overall effect of the law has been to restrict the rights of immigrants—both legal and illegal—and place a stronger emphasis on the policing of the ‘immigration problem’ rather than integration. 341 As a scholar of Spanish immigration has argued, “the law and its application represent a progressive hardening of Spanish policy.” 342 This sentiment is echoed by a former immigration

337 Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 41.
338 Interview 1.
339 Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 34.
341 Interview 8.
official who told a scholar working on Spanish immigration issues that the “Ministry for Immigration is really the Ministry against Immigration.”343 At the same time, it is important to recognize that even after the changes, Spain was considered lax on immigration in comparison with other European countries and massive regularization campaigns took place after 2000 helped many immigrants integrate successfully into Spanish society.

The nationalist parties have been able to foster a subjective perception among Basques that the state is too harsh and out of touch with more cosmopolitan Basque values. Moreover, no Basque nationalist parties have tried the opposite strategy of claiming that the state government is too lax about immigration and cultural integration because of the informal constraints that impinge upon how the Basque nation configures its identity.

Rejecting Multiculturalism: The Turn to Cultural Integration in Europe

Since the beginning of the 21st century, attitudes towards immigrants have toughened in many countries, and this has translated into tougher citizenship laws and policies geared towards the assimilation of immigrants.344 The policy instruments that are indicative of this policy shift are mandatory integration courses and citizenship tests that emphasize language acquisition and the inculcation of specific liberal and cultural values. These initiatives have been accompanied by a harsh discourse from the extreme right and mainstream parties that sharpen the boundary that separates liberal-democratic from illiberal conduct.345

Whether or not the turn to civic integrationism is the reassertion of deeply rooted ethnic nationalisms or a new response to unforeseen circumstances is a contested question. Supporting the

343 Cited in Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 34.
344 Entzinger, “Changing the Rules when the Game is on,” 121-144.
former hypothesis, Liz Fekete argues that the events of 9/11 provided a window of opportunity within which extremist parties successfully politicized elite-driven liberal and multicultural understandings of immigrant integration and citizenship.\textsuperscript{346} She also makes the claim that the increasing popularity of anti-immigrant and aggressive integrationist policies have forced parties of the left and centre to advocate for them.\textsuperscript{347} Christian Joppke, on the other hand, argues, “it would be misleading to interpret civic integration policies as a rebirth of ethnic nationalism or racism.”\textsuperscript{348} He contends that the new form of integrationism we are witnessing across Europe is different from assimilation because it only demands that immigrants adopt liberal orientations rather than social customs; in doing so, it rejects \textit{laissez faire} approaches to integration.\textsuperscript{349} Rogers Brubaker argues that the so-called “return of assimilation” does not imply that western countries are becoming resistant to foreigners \textit{per se}, but are becoming more inclined to view too much ‘difference’ as a problem that requires fixing. The main point of his article is that the new requirements for immigrants such as mandatory civics and language courses that are appearing in many European countries indicate a general acknowledgement that institutionalized difference or separateness does not work, and that immigrants must become more like natives to foster societal cohesion. It is not racial characteristics that dictate the (un)suitability of an immigrant for proper integration, but the illiberal conduct associated with his or her religious or cultural values.

The emerging consensus in Europe is that a new model of integration that emphasizes civic acculturation is required differs from older ideas about race and the hierarchical relation of various human types. The former does not assume that certain racial groups are superior, rather, it conceives

\textsuperscript{347} Fekete, "Enlightened Fundamentalism," 2.
\textsuperscript{349} Joppke, "Transformation of Immigrant Integration," 15.
of certain cultures as more difficult to assimilate, but nonetheless argues that active integration policies can fix the problem. These ideas could be employed by minority nationalist elites to support limits on immigration into their homeland and cultural integration policies to force newcomers to adopt particular values and learn the local language. In doing so, nationalist elites would be serving their own interest because a political agenda dominated by nationalist politics tends to ensure that nationalist parties continue to have strong electoral results.\textsuperscript{350}

The opposite has transpired, however, because Basque nationalist elites have pieced together a narrative that presents the Basque nation as both dynamic and welcoming of other cultures. Instead of supporting the notion of a “liberal Europe, Basques favour a multicultural society rather than a monocultural one.”\textsuperscript{351}

\textbf{Breaking with the Past: The Response of Basque Nationalists to Immigration}

Following the 2001 Basque elections, the governing nationalist electoral coalition of the PNV and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) with the support of the left leaning Izquierda Unida (IU) began discussions in cabinet and the parliament about the necessity of Basque institutions and policies in the field of immigration. According to a prominent member of the PNV, a confluence of circumstances made the issue an important one at this time: the “tough” modifications to the \textit{Ley de Extranjería} by the Popular Party (PP) at the national level, the growth rate of immigration in the Basque Country, and the growing concerns within nationalist circles about the “cultural” implications of immigration.\textsuperscript{352} In reference to “cultural” concerns, interviews with immigrant associations and non-government advocacy groups recognized that there was controversy and debate within the PNV itself and its constituent organizations (e.g. nationalist labour groups, community associations) about whether the

\textsuperscript{350} Lecours, “Ethnonationalism in the West,” 117-120.
\textsuperscript{351} Interview 22.
\textsuperscript{352} Interview 20.
Basque Country could absorb foreign immigrants into the national community. Only a small minority of nationalists favoured a more integrationist or liberal approach.\textsuperscript{353} The institutional and policy responses by the nationalist government can be categorized as group-based in the socio-economic domain and multicultural in the cultural domain. The following sections will outline the main aspects of the response, including the Plan Vasco de Inmigración (PVI), and employ both textual analysis and interview data to argue that a rich memory of legacies that forges the national community has connected multiculturalism and open immigration policies with the collective values of the Basque nation. As French historian Ernest Renan famously stated, “the cement of the nation’s identity was not the past itself, but by what the community told one another in the present.”\textsuperscript{354} This intersubjective understanding of the Basque nation has made it possible for elites to favour multiculturalism and social support for immigrants to highlight the disjuncture between Basque and Spanish values, and in doing so, strengthen the case for more autonomy, or even secession.

\textit{Basque Directorate of Immigration}

Basque immigration policy was formally initiated in 2002 after the PNV/EA/IU executive created a new ministry, the Department of Housing and Social Affairs, by decree 19/2001 and installed the Directorate of Immigration within this ministry by decree 40/2002. Debates preceding decree 40/2002 pitted the PV against the nationalist government. The PV argued that the management of immigration did not require a separate institutional basis because the various aspects of integration (e.g. housing, social affairs, language policy) were adequately dealt with by the Basque public administration in its current form. The PNV and IU argued that this was not the case because immigrants had to confront a unique set of circumstances because of the restrictive \textit{Ley de

\textsuperscript{353} Interviews 7 and 19; Valderrama, “Inmigración Extranjera En El País Vasco,” 195.
\textsuperscript{354} Quoted in Muro, \textit{Ethnicity and Violence}, 19.
Extranejería. For example, it proved extremely difficult for new immigrants to find work or housing because employers often required proof that the immigrant had already secured housing and renters required a job contract before offering a place of residence to an immigrant. Spokespersons for the PNV and IU in the area of social policy and immigration argued that racist attitudes could make it even more difficult for immigrants to integrate and that the Spanish government was not doing enough to rectify the issue. The Directorate of Immigration was created by executive decree rather than a plenary vote, but the arguments proved convincing for many members of the PSE who were initially neutral in the debate.

In accordance with the decree that brought about its creation, the directorate is responsible to design and put in place a strategy to achieve the twin goals of boosting immigration and creating an intercultural society. When the first director of immigration took his position, he and the minister of Housing and Social Affairs led a team that produced a document outlining the existing institutions and laws that should guide the development of a strategic plan to manage immigration in the Basque Country:

- The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country (LO 3/1979 18 December): article 9.2 appeals to Basque authorities to guarantee the exercise of the rights and duties of the citizens and facilitate the participation of citizens in political, economic, cultural, and social life of the Basque Country. Moreover, articles 10, 16, and 18 provide exclusive policy competence in fields of social assistance, education, health, housing, and welfare to the Basque government.

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355 Plenary session of the Basque Parliament, 06/08/03/00/0056, 09/06/2000, 55, 4.
356 Muro, Ethnicity and Violence, 19.
357 Interview 15.
358 Dirección de Inmigración, Marcando el Camino: La Acogida de los Inmigrantes, Departamento de Vivienda y Asuntos Sociales, Gobierno Vasco, Vitoria, 2002.
359 Dirección de Inmigración, Marcando el Camino.
• Law 5/1996 of Social Services and Decree 155/2001 of 30 July of the determination of roles in social services: their purpose is to allocate the responsibilities in the area of social services between the Basque government, the provinces (las Diputaciones), and the municipalities introducing a clear system of competencies and defining the work that corresponds to each level of administration.

• Ley 12/1998, against Social Exclusion (modified by Law 4/2003): a law that is not specific to the area of immigration, directed towards all those persons that are at risk of facing social exclusion. The objective is to regularize economic benefits and social programs that prevent social, personal, and labour exclusion, and as such to contribute to the development of independence and dignity for those at risk.

• Ley 10/2000, the Bill of Social Rights: enshrines the right to a basic income and generally ensuring the right of all persons to receive revenues in an amount sufficient to exert their rights of citizenship and prevent exclusion on economic grounds.

The document also emphasized the duties and obligations of Basques to not only accept newcomers, but to actively assist them in their quest to make a new and better life for themselves in the Basque Country. Moreover, it called on Basques to take pride in the fact that many foreign immigrants have chosen to leave other parts of Spain to settle in the Basque Country.³⁶⁰ This passage conjures up the image of the Basque Country as a distinct society and a more appealing place to live than the rest of Spain. Above all else, the very creation of the directorate signaled that the PNV-led government rejected the security-oriented approach towards immigration taken up by the state and other

³⁶⁰ This point was emphasized in many interviews. The immigration boom in the Basque Country was mainly due to immigrants making their way north after entering Spain. The comparative strength of the Basque economy and immigrant friendly policies were consistently cited as the main reasons for this internal migration.
Autonomous Communities.\textsuperscript{361} This first agenda setting document, however, said little about the issues that might arise because of the Basque Country’s status as a linguistically and culturally distinct nation. The first director of immigration remarked:

“When the directorate was created and I was appointed as the first director, I was somewhat concerned that the whole thing was a publicity stunt because I had no resources and no staff and only a vague statement of principles. It quickly became apparent though that the nationalists were genuinely concerned about immigration and the potential that Spanish nationalists in the Basque Country would try to capitalize on images and stories in the media about racial segregation and discrimination...to label the PNV and EA as racist disciples of Arana. Basically, they wanted to make it crystal clear that Basque nationalism is not racist, but open to immigration.”\textsuperscript{362}

Within a few months, the directorate became more professionalized and was given resources and a small staff by the Basque government. The first concrete action of the directorate was the design of a plan focusing on programs and activities associated with immigration. Decree 155/2002 of the Ministry of Housing and Social Affairs provided a guide for future interventions of the Directorate of Immigration. The decree established, not only general principles and objectives that should animate future policies, but also created and funded tools that are intended to support public and private initiatives such as the \textit{Foro para la integración de las ciudadanas y los ciudadanos inmigrantes} (Forum for the integration of citizens and immigrants) and \textit{Ikuspegi Observatorio de Inmigración} (Basque Observatory of Immigration).

The objective of the \textit{Foro} is to constitute a space for reflection and coordination between social actors, organizations, activists, unions, and the Basque administration in the field of immigration. It

\textsuperscript{361} Interviews 18 and 21. There are obvious exceptions such as Catalonia. The Basque Country has been one of the more progressive Autonomous Communities concerning immigration.

\textsuperscript{362} Interview 18.
functions as a non-binding advisory board that gives a voice to immigrants living in the Basque Country, facilitates a deeper understanding of their grievances and concerns by the administration and other stakeholders (e.g., NGO’s, businesses) in order to bring about concrete solutions. Seven commissions comprise the forum, each organized around a specific area: labour, social services and housing, health, education, legal guarantees, human rights and citizenship, and cultural awareness. The cultural awareness function has taken off since its initiation and various immigrants groups have secured funding for multicultural events from the autonomous Basque government, the three provinces, and the various municipalities. In recent years, funding for multicultural events and celebrations have been managed by the provinces and will be explored in a subsequent section with data and interviews from Bizkaia, the province with the highest percentage of immigrants in the Basque Country.

The Basque Observatory of Immigration has a mandate to produce systematic knowledge of migration flows and their characteristics and promote strategic research in this field. The day-to-day operations of the observatory are a joint responsibility of the Department of Housing and Social Affairs and the University of the Basque Country. Involving the university in the project made sense for the nationalist government because of the likelihood that the non-nationalist parties would attempt to politicize or challenge any studies that demonstrated any PNV initiatives were directly responsible for increasing public support for diversity and undercutting racial intolerance.\(^{363}\) Having university researchers take the lead on public opinion studies and other reports have ensured that reputable newspapers and the general public consider the work to be legitimate and unbiased.

Although the creation of the institutions signaled that immigration had become an issue that the PNV-EA-IU government was ready to confront, the establishment of the directorate, the Forum, and Observatory of Immigration did not present a clear ideology or statement of principles of what was the nationalist model of immigrant integration, if there was one at all. In late 2002, the Minister of

\(^{363}\) Interview 27.
Housing and Social Affairs, a member of the IU, in conjunction with the director of immigration approached PNV cabinet members with a proposition to develop a comprehensive set of guidelines for the management of immigration in the Basque Country. This culminated in the passing of the first Basque Immigration Plan in a full session of the Basque parliament on 3 December 2003.

*Basque Immigration Plan I*

The timing and content of the first immigration plan leaves little doubt that it was elaborated in reaction to the restrictive immigration laws put in place by the Spanish government led by Aznar’s PP. One of the main points of discussion in the Basque parliament leading up to the passage of the plan centred on the concept of citizenship and its connection to legal nationality: the PNV-EA-IU government intended to decouple citizenship from nationality and offer the benefits of citizenship to all residents of the Basque Country. Some members of the PV voiced concern that this proposal would violate the Constitution that allocates immigration as a competency of the Spanish state. Javier Medrazo, Minister of Housing and Social Affairs at the time, suggested that this comment was a consequence of the fact that the PP feeds on racist and xenophobic sentiments electorally at all levels of government.\(^{364}\) Moreover, in the draft text of the plan, Medrazo wrote in the preamble: “while it may be common understanding that immigration is a competency of the Spanish state, there are numerous competencies that make Euskadi an important player in the process.”\(^{365}\) After some of the language was altered to inject the document with a stronger acknowledgement of the Spanish state’s

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\(^{364}\) Interview 28.

control over formal citizenship policy, none of the major parties in the Basque parliament opposed the bill and it passed in a full vote by an overwhelming margin.\textsuperscript{366}

Prior to the passing of the legislation, the resolutions put forth by each party were quite revealing in terms of their strategic goals and disagreements with other parties. The PNV-EA-IU coalition released seven proposed resolutions following the first round of parliamentary debates, and the first was very critical of the Spanish government’s immigration law:

“The Basque government urges the Spanish government to immediately repeal the \textit{Ley de Extranjería} because it is discriminatory and impedes both the social integration and legal incorporation of immigrants; the same way it calls for the development of a new law that regularizes the situation of all immigrants that reside in Spain, based on dialogue and consensus between political parties, social agents, and organizations that work in favour of newcomers to our land and their rights.”\textsuperscript{367}

Members of the PV did not look upon this proposition favourably because of its accusatory tone. A former parliamentarian with the nationalist EA said this about the tension between the nationalist parties and the PV concerning the Basque Immigration Plan:

“When we [the PNV-EA-IU coalition] proposed the idea of participatory citizenship that was distinct from the Spanish concept of citizenship and suggested that the Basque Country was in need of distinct policies to ensure immigrants received health care and education even if they were not entitled to these services, on account of their irregular status, the PV began to perceive the immigration issue as intrinsically linked to the independence debate. In their minds, we would

\textsuperscript{366} There were some abstentions by the PV and PSE as well among the radical nationalist parties, but there were no ‘no’ votes. Vote available at http://www.parlamento.euskadi.net/Votaciones/07/071008000008/00/20040402.pdf
soon be suggesting that the Basque Country have its own border regulation and visas, or even passports.”

The resolutions transmitted by the PV did not directly speak to issues of sovereignty, but it does reinforce numerous times that any Basque immigration policy must accept the primacy of the Ley de Extranjería and cooperate with the Spanish government because of its exclusive jurisdiction over matters of entry and naturalization. Nevertheless, the majority of resolutions demonstrate a willingness to both recognize and legislate in favour of an active immigration integration policy with money from the public purse of the Basque government. For example, resolution 3.1 states that the Basque parliament should urge the executive to develop an integration program for immigrants in a vulnerable situation that come to the Basque Country regardless of their legal status. Similarly, resolution 3.2 suggests that the Basque government should guarantee basic accommodation and income maintenance to immigrants in a vulnerable situation. In short, the conflict between the nationalists and the centralist PV concerned the question of whether the PNV was using the Basque Immigration Plan as a means to assert its sovereignty and disregard the supremacy of the Spanish Constitution.

The PSE has historically presented itself as a defender of Basque interests while accepting the legitimacy of the Spanish Constitution and the unity of the Spanish state. In doing so, the party situated itself as the middle ground between the Basque nationalist parties and the centralist PV. It was not surprising, then, that the party’s resolutions to the first Immigration Plan reflected its position as the non-nationalist defender of Basque interests. The first resolution applauded the Basque Immigration Plan as:

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368 Interview 20.
371 Interview 22.
372 This changed after the 2009 Basque elections when the PSE and PV formed a coalition government.
“...within the scope of the Basque government to carry out these actions to develop a comprehensive plan in order to promote immigration in the Basque Country and successfully integrate them. The provinces, municipalities, and civil society all have an important role to play in the process and should be provided with some autonomy carry out various functions. The Socialist Party of Euskadi considers the objectives in the Plan as necessary steps towards the building of diverse and inclusive society.”  

Yet, another resolution that qualified its enthusiasm for the initiative followed this one. The second resolution is less critical than the nationalists are of the Spanish government’s immigration law and, at the same time, less emphatic about the primacy of the federal government in the realm of immigration than the PV. According to the second resolution of the PSE:

“The Basque Immigration Plan does not contemplate the necessary collaboration with the central government in the field of immigration. The PSE urges the Basque government to establish mechanisms and coordination between the two levels of government to ensure that actions are implemented effectively and efficiently.”

The remainder of the resolutions proposed by the PSE fit with the objectives of the nationalists. In particular, many resolutions urged stronger efforts to deal with the consequences of irregularity for the integration of immigrations—which is “one of the driving forces” of the inter-party consensus on the immigration issue according to a PSE parliamentarian. The PSE was less concerned about the constitutional and sovereignty issues that might arise as a consequence of the Basque government legislating in the area of immigration.

Because the PNV-EA-IU coalition formed a majority in the Basque parliament, the final text reflected the position of the nationalists. A good indication that the nationalist coalition was unwilling

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374 Interview 23.
to soften the critical language is found in the preamble of the final document. The PV was in favour of EU legislation in the ambit of immigration that created a so-called ‘fortress Europe’. Another right-leaning party with representation in the Basque parliament, Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD), went as far as to argue that the European Union should have exclusive jurisdiction over immigration policy rather than member states. The PNV-EA-IU outright rejected this proposition: “the guidelines and policies laid down by the EU are restrictive and the vulnerable situation many immigrants find themselves in is because of it.” When questioned about the restrictive EU policies and assimilationist practices occurring in other European countries, a prominent member of the EA caucus had this to say:

“Basque nationalists are against the idea of fortress Europe...in prior epochs, especially during the Franco dictatorship, many Basques left the Basque Country out of fear of repression and other countries, such as the United States and Argentina, were very welcoming of our ancestors. It is now our turn to help others who are coming to our lands in search of a better life...we have the resources to do so, and all we ask in return is a willingness to respect our values and culture, and we will do the same for them.”

The above quote reveals the dominant mode of nationalist collective remembering because it ignores the prominence of racialism and exclusion in 20th century Basque nationalism.

Concerning EU-level immigration policies and guidelines, nationalists from various parties shared the position that they are discordant with Basque values. The common argument heard throughout the interviews was that EU rhetoric about inclusion and multiculturalism is just that: the

376 Interview 8.
378 Interview 20.
379 These sentiments were echoed in interviews 2, 9, 17 and 19 as well.
380 Interviews 2 and 9.
only goal of EU immigration policy is the securitization of the borders and exclusion of unwanted immigrants.

The Basque Immigration Plan defines itself as ‘progressive’ in comparison with European and Spanish standards insofar as it adopts a “full and advanced protection of the cultural rights of all people in the Basque Country regardless of origins.” The protection is built around four major concepts: immigration, integration, citizenship, and the Basque policy of immigration. These four concepts are developed in order to provide government officials and the public with a better sense of the goals and basic ideology of the Basque Immigration Plan.

Immigration is defined in the plan as a phenomenon that is both necessary and positive since it contributes to the cultural and economic enrichment of the Basque Country. Pluralism is a consequence of modernization and the Basque Country considers itself a developed modern society. This definition of immigration as a positive phenomenon is in stark contrast with the character of the modification to the Ley de Extranjería made by the right-wing PP in 2000. The PP government stated that its priority to reduce public spending was one of the main factors that led to the curtailment of social rights for new immigrants. The subsequent PSOE government introduced the centralizing Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración, a plan that aims to coordinate integration policies using a common set of criteria for all Autonomous Communities. The plan gives primacy to some of the “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union,” such as the importance of a basic knowledge of the host society’s history and language(s) by newcomers. In essence, it represented a refusal to provide further recognition that Spain is a state made up of various nations and that immigrants living in distinct territories will potentially confront different dominant values, norms, and cultures. One might expect that the Basque government would have responded

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382 González-Enríquez, “Spain, the Cheap Model,” 139-40.
383 Available at http://www.enaro.eu/dsip/download/eu-Common-Basic-Principles.pdf
with an integration policy that sought to aggressively integrate immigrants into the Basque cultural and social milieu. Nevertheless, the authors of the Basque Immigration Plan purposely stressed the beneficial nature of immigration both culturally and economically to highlight the diametrically opposite orientation of the Basque government than that of the Spanish government.

According to the plan, integration implies a dynamic process of adaptation that requires an effort by both the native population and immigrants. Integration is not a one-way process that has an end goal of sameness; on the contrary, it is a flexible process of adjustment and balance in order to configure a new society. From a cultural perspective, integration as understood by the architects of the Basque Immigration Plan does not imply separate and equal cultures co-existing or the assimilation of other cultures to that of the host society. This suggests the use of a non-traditional tool of nation building by placing less emphasis on the traditional culture or language of the Basque people. The advanced concept of integration used here encourages the free development of different cultures and identities through a process of interrelation and interaction between them. Multiculturalism is acceptable only to the extent that it does not include overt cultural protectionism and separation.\textsuperscript{384} This is an explicit recognition of the so-called failure of multiculturalism in other European countries.

According to a member of the PNV national executive:

“We understand the challenges posed by mass immigration, but the understanding of Basque culture as ethnocentric and static you mentioned no longer exists, if it ever did...our culture is adapting and changing to new realities and the Basque Immigration Plan was meant to confirm that we not only accept, but celebrate diversity and the development of an intercultural society. Through active labour and social integration, we believe we can avoid the ethnic segmentation that has plagued other European countries.”\textsuperscript{385}

\textsuperscript{385} Interview 2.
This response, much like many others from those associated with a nationalist party, compares the Basque Country to other European countries. The obvious implication is that Basque nationalists conceive of the Basque Country as a separate and distinct nation on par with recognized nation-states. Moreover, the manner in which such comments attempt to distinguish the societal values of other nations as incompatible with Basque values is akin to nation building.

The most critical response to the Ley de Extranjería in the Basque Immigration Plan is the redefinition of the concept of citizenship. The Basque Immigration Plan lays down a wide and inclusive definition of citizenship that only requires a person to live in the Basque Country to be considered a citizen. More specifically, citizenship is decoupled from nationality in the legal and cultural sense whereas Spanish citizenship and its associated privileges only accrue from holding a Spanish passport. The Autonomous Community of the Basque Country cannot provide Spanish citizenship to its newcomers, but it can alleviate some of the hardships experienced by illegal immigrants by treating them as citizens of the Basque Country and thus conferring upon them the same rights and privileges as naturalized Spanish citizens living in the Basque territory. The nationalist coalition argued that this concept of citizenship is also a means of deepening democracy because it allows newcomers to participate in society. Without the same guarantees of basic housing, social services, and healthcare an immigrant’s ability to contribute and feel attached to the community is circumscribed.\textsuperscript{386} The application of the concept of inclusive citizenship in the Basque Country has proven difficult because of the will of the Spanish state to prevent the Autonomous Communities from circumventing its nationality laws. Nevertheless, the Basque government has had success in ensuring that illegal immigrants have had complete access to public education and healthcare.\textsuperscript{387} What is clear is that the nationalists are trying to

\textsuperscript{386} Gobierno Vasco, Plan Vasco de Inmigración Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi 2003-2005, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{387} Interview 17.
win the ‘hearts and minds’ of new immigrants and give them a reason to feel more Basque than Spanish.

The final concept, the Basque policy of immigration, stresses the importance of respecting human rights over and above other considerations such as cultural preservation or the labour market. A qualifier follows this point: the Basque policy of immigration does not infringe upon any laws of the Spanish state nor any EU conventions or regulations. According to a PNV member responsible for immigration issues, the inclusion of the preceding passage stirred up controversy during debate in the Basque parliament. The nationalist coalition eventually acquiesced and included it because the PV argued that the language implied that the Basque immigration policy nulls the effect of the Ley de Extranjería in certain respects. Nevertheless, the passage also states that “the Basque immigration policy implies that competencies of the Spanish state in the fields of immigration and nationality need to be re-examined in light of European norms of decentralized governance and the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country.”

The Basque Immigration Plan acknowledges that certain aspects of state regulation impede the social integration of the immigrant community and attempts to mitigate such adverse effects. In particular, “the policy includes strategies to align citizenship for all residents regardless of their administrative status…this policy is associated with the Basque government’s commitment to fight social exclusion and poverty among immigrants.” According to the document, the Basque people accept this approach to the management of immigration because they find the vast difference in wealth between countries of the ‘North’ and countries of the

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388 Interview 17.
389 Interview 17.
‘South’ unacceptable and assume responsibility to do what they can to help immigrants live with dignity in their new home. This passage implies that the deep commitment to social justice and equality held by Basques is substantively different from Spanish values, which are presumed to be more individualist. Yet, historically, Basque nationalism is rooted in conservatism, religiosity, national sovereignty, and the myth of a racially pure Arcadian past. The addition of socialism to the ideology fabric of Basque nationalism only occurred in the mid-20th century and remained more popular among the radical version of nationalism associated with ETA. Nevertheless, as Anthony Smith has argued, the role of elites is fundamental in the choice of which myths or symbols are reproduced, especially those that are meant to spur social change.

Nationalist discourse does not have to be accurate to be accepted and the amount of invention that ends up in the national narrative is determined, of course, by its resonance with the people, but also on the power of elites to impose the discourse.

The initiation of the Basque Immigration Plan laid out the principles and objectives of the nationalist government about immigration. The next step was the translation of these principles into policies to prevent criticism from immigrant associations and non-nationalist parties that the PVI was nothing more than rhetoric. In doing so, the PNV-led Basque government had to cooperate with both the provinces and municipalities because the latter were in a better position to carry out certain objectives such as creating local centers to help new immigrants get settled and supporting multicultural events that showcased the new cultures that have become part of Basque society.

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392 Muro, Ethnicity and Violence, 19-38.
Intervention and Implementation of the Basque Immigration Plan I: Preventing Marginalization and Supporting Interculturalism

On 15 April 2003, the relevant ministers released a calendar of programs and activities to guide the implementation of the main objectives set out in the PVI. The nationalist coalition was content with the ideology and philosophy espoused in the plan, but on the other hand, recognized that simpler objectives easily translated into policies were needed urgently. There was agreement among participating ministers that the first step was to establish practices to prevent the economic marginalization of immigrants in the Basque Country. The second point around which there was consensus was the need to attach meaning to the strategy of interculturalism by promoting events that bring together native Basques and immigrants to celebrate their “unity in difference.”

The program HELDU (Legal Service and Social Care for Immigrants) was developed to provide immigrants with specialized advice on legal procedures and matters concerning the documentation needed to obtain social assistance, employment, and housing. In order to take steps to fulfill their stated goal of fighting poverty and exclusion, the Department of Social Services and Housing called upon the law schools of Bizkaia, Araba, and Gipuzkoa to provide pro bono and paid staff for HELDU. HELDU informs and advises newcomers, as well as processes applications for both residence and work permits, and helps immigrants with other matters related to their permanent settlement in the Basque Country. The employees of HELDU are also trained to provide information about how the Ley de Extranjería operates and interacts with other national legislation. The first HELDU centre opened in Bilbao and new centres followed in San Sebastián, Vitoria, and other smaller towns. Commenting on whether HELDU was able to achieve the stated goals of the PNV and its coalition partners, a HELDU staffer had this to say:

394 Author’s fieldnotes from conference entitled “Inmigración y Nacionalismo: Temas Para La Agenda de Los Partidos,” Sabino Arana Fundazioa (Sabino Arana Foundation), Bilbao, 28 July 2010.
“I don’t think anyone here expected we would be having so many newcomers coming into our office with absolutely no idea how to apply for residency permits and other documents...despite the fact that our funding was not what it could be at the time, we were definitely able to help many immigrants navigate through the legal complexity created by the reforms to the Ley de Extranjería. My opinion is obviously biased, but out of all the discussion and legislation on the immigration issue, HELDU was the most practical and had a clearly beneficial outcome for immigrants.”

Immigrant associations responded positively about the impact of the HELDU. A staffer with SOS Racismo, an organization with branches throughout Spain dedicated to helping immigrants overcome prejudice and mistreatment, recounted numerous experiences with immigrants whom she directed to HELDU because they did not know how to register on the municipal roll (a requisite for eligibility for social benefits). An advocate for the organization Anitzak Ekimen (Basque Diversity Initiative) commented on how important HELDU was to create a point of first contact for new immigrants to the Basque Country to relieve some of their anxieties concerning their legal status and financial situation.

In the area of health care, an exclusive power of the autonomous communities in Spain, the PNV-led government articulated in the PVI that the restricted access to health care in Spain was a problem that required rectification. According to the reforms in Law 4/2000 and 11/2000 and subsequent jurisprudence, the following situations are the only ones in which any hospital or clinic is required to treat a non-status immigrant: health emergencies for those less than eighteen years of age, vital urgent care, and pregnancy including both childbirth and postpartum care. In accordance with its more open and inclusive concept of citizenship, a number of decrees were approved by the Basque

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395 Confidential interview, HELDU legal worker, Bilbao, 29 October 2010.
396 Interview 12.
397 Interview 19.
398 Gobierno Vasco, Plan Vasco de Inmigración Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi, p. 86.
Ministry of Social Services and Health that paved the way for all immigrants regardless of their status to have access to the same standard of public health care that all Spanish citizens living in the Basque Country enjoy.\footnote{Serrano, "La Inmigración y La Salud."} Even though the percentage of immigrants in the Basque Country is considerably lower than that of Madrid or Catalonia, the number of immigrants in an irregular situation has increased significantly over the past few years. It is estimated that of the approximately 200,000 immigrants currently living in the Basque Country, nearly one quarter of them are illegal immigrants.\footnote{Serrano, "La Inmigración y La Salud," 169} This means that despite the extra strain that providing health care to illegal immigrants puts on the BAC’s resources, the nationalist government, remained committed to it. Some observers are sceptical and claim that immigrants face prejudice and racism that prevents them from accessing quality health care.\footnote{Interview 12.} Nevertheless, immigrant associations have professed high satisfaction with the availability and quality of health care and 70% of native Basques believe that legal and illegal immigrants alike deserve access to free health care if living in the Basque Country.\footnote{Observatorio Vasco de Inmigración, \textit{Percepciones y actitudes hacia la inmigración extranjera}, (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 2010).}

Ensuring that immigrants do not fall into poverty requires programs and services to help newcomers find decent employment. The guidelines developed in the PVI were the impetus for decree 200/2003 from the Department of Housing and Social Services that provided funding for a network of community based programs, \textit{la red de acogida a personas inmigrantes de base municipal} (Municipal Network of Assistance for Immigrants), aimed at helping immigrants find employment and settlement in their municipality.\footnote{Departamento de Vivienda y Asuntos Sociales del Gobierno Vasco, Decreto 200/2003, 2 September 2003.} Article 1 of the decree acknowledges that immigrant integration into the workforce is best achieved through local initiatives, but the Basque government will provide broad guidelines and funding. Article 2 obligates the Basque government to fund each local office based on a
formula that considers the concentration of immigrants in the municipality and estimated level of
unemployment. Article 6 sets out further criteria for the staff to be hired by the municipality to work in
local offices: possess knowledge of the immigration issue from a legal and social perspective, know the
types of resources and benefits intended for newcomers, and possess knowledge of French, Arabic, or
Mandarin in addition to Spanish and/or Euskara. Only Madrid and Catalonia have instituted similar
types of programs at the regional level, and each of those Autonomous Communities has a much
higher percentage of immigrants than does the Basque Country. Services such as HELDU and the
Municipal Network of Assistance for Immigrants demonstrate willingness by the nationalist
government to develop and fund programs specifically designed for immigrants rather than taking a
laissé faire position towards immigrant integration.

The surveys conducted by the Basque government in conjunction with the University of the
Basque Country give us an opportunity to examine whether native Basques support social programs for
immigrants. Respondents in a 2009 study that examined perceptions of the economic consequences of
immigration in the Basque Country found that Basques generally believed that there are tangible
economic benefits that accrue from immigration and that some negative consequences are tolerable
because of the social responsibility rich nations must bear in order to receive less fortunate immigrants
from the global south. Moreover, only 19.4% of those surveyed agreed that the arrival of more
immigrants in the Basque Country would negatively affect social services. In other words, there is
no generalized concern that tax dollars spent on programs designed for immigrants inevitably means
less money for public sector jobs and programs for native Basques.

In various sections of the PVI, there is strong emphasis on the cultural aspects of immigrant

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405 Interview 21.
407 Observatorio Vasco de Inmigración, 1º Barómetro: Percepciones y Actitudes Hacia La Inmigración Extranjera.
integration. According to part 3.10, the Basque government is committed to:

• Promoting initiatives for the protection and development of Basque and other cultures simultaneously
• Enhance the interaction between organizations working on behalf of the Basque culture and representatives of other cultures
• The participation of non-nationals in the development of activities related to Basque culture
• Develop informal links or agreements for collaboration between Basque public institutions and those of the countries that are sending immigrants to the Basque Country
• Encourage the learning of both Euskara and Spanish among immigrants and promote the maintenance of foreign languages

These guidelines were not a direct response to any initiatives by the central government because Aznar’s administration had remained relatively silent on matters of cultural integration. When the PSOE came to power in 2004, there were no significant changes to the Ley de Extranjería, but in 2006, it did release the Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración. Despite pressure from Catalan and Basque nationalists in the Spanish House of Deputies, there is no mention in the document of Spain’s multinational character. Ricard Zapata-Barrero argues that beneath the rhetoric of decentralization of the Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración, it has a centralizing character and treats immigrant integration as an exclusive competence of the Spanish government. Catalan and Basque nationalists criticized the plan because it implies that a ‘cultural core’ based on the Spanish language and history informs the integration process and ignores that other national identities require new and

\[^{408}\text{Interview 2.}\]
distinct competencies to manage immigration.\footnote{Interview 9.} Moreover, the *Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración* stresses that the Autonomous Communities have a large role to play in the fields of education, employment, housing, health, and social services, but remains silent on the issue of culture and language, implying that the Autonomous Communities should not implement integration strategies involving those issues.\footnote{Zapata-Barrero, "Catalan Autonomy Building Process in Immigration Policy," 10.} It is not surprising, therefore, that Basque government was critical of the *Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración*: “we didn’t understand why the central government insisted on interfering in a matter immigrant integration that falls under regional jurisdiction... [and] acknowledging it would signify that we are in agreement with the centralizing attitude of the Spanish government.”\footnote{Interview 9.} From this perspective, Decree 61/2007 of the Basque government can be viewed as a response to the *Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración*: it provided funding for multicultural activities in the Basque Country and attached a number of stipulations that must be met by organizers—public or private—to obtain funding. An important stipulation is that the multicultural events be accessible and welcoming to all of the cultures that collectively make up Basque society: “aid will be rendered to public and private entities working in the field of immigration and multiculturalism, promoting coexistence, intercultural communication, and mutual understanding between different communities.”\footnote{Departamento de Vivienda y Asuntos Sociales del Gobierno Vasco, Decreto 61/2007, 2 May 2007.}

Decree 61/2007 also emphasizes the importance of both the provinces and municipalities in the administration of intercultural activities. While the provinces in the Basque Country are quite powerful in comparison with the rest of Spain and still perform tax collection in their respective territories, most policy areas relating to immigrant integration, such a health, work permits, language,
and culture, belong to the BAC.\textsuperscript{414} Nevertheless, “the provinces and municipalities have an important role to play in the integration process because those institutions are more accessible to immigrants and can influence the success of their adaption in a way the Basque Autonomous Community simply cannot.”\textsuperscript{415} Decree 61/2007 was a step towards meeting this objective because it gives the provinces the responsibility to monitor and oversee any multicultural activities in their jurisdiction and make recommendations about funding renewals to the Basque government.\textsuperscript{416} It also contained a number of provisions that sought to strengthen the Municipal Network of Assistance for Immigrants that was previously discussed. Importantly, the Basque Immigration Plan in conjunction with decrees such as 61/2007 spurned the provinces to develop their own plans and devote resources to cultural activities that fall under the ambit of multiculturalism.

Bizkaia is the Basque province with the largest number of immigrants.\textsuperscript{417}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Araba</td>
<td>10,445</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>15,141</td>
<td>16,857</td>
<td>19,392</td>
<td>22,840</td>
<td>26,021</td>
<td>28,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gipuzkoa</td>
<td>14,878</td>
<td>18,232</td>
<td>21,536</td>
<td>25,290</td>
<td>29,040</td>
<td>35,935</td>
<td>40,859</td>
<td>42,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bizkaia</td>
<td>23,908</td>
<td>28,876</td>
<td>36,217</td>
<td>43,395</td>
<td>50,092</td>
<td>58,562</td>
<td>65,859</td>
<td>68,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euskadi</td>
<td>49,231</td>
<td>59,166</td>
<td>72,894</td>
<td>85,542</td>
<td>98,524</td>
<td>117,337</td>
<td>132,865</td>
<td>139,369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ikuspegi (www.ikuspegi.org).

Provincial decree 28/2008 from the cabinet of the Bizkaian government was executed to concede resources to carry out activities in support of “equality, citizenship, interculturalism, and anti-discrimination.”\textsuperscript{418} It also commits the Bizkaian government to promote “intercultural living and a pluri-ethnic identity based on respect between citizens, and the enjoyment of a full set of rights by

\textsuperscript{415} Interview 5.
\textsuperscript{417} For this reason, I chose to focus on collecting data and conducting interviews in this province due to time and resource constraints.
everyone to ensure equal opportunity to participate in social and political life.”

Furthermore, the decree has as an “objective to work towards positive interaction between various cultural groups because diversity is in the best interest of the citizenry and the province.”

According to a Bizkaian bureaucrat responsible for the execution of multicultural activities, this decree dramatically increased the funding for cultural activities of non-Basque or Spanish origin and raised awareness that the PNV and Basque nationalists were not threatened by ethnic and cultural diversity.

Funding awarded by the Directorate of Equality and Citizens’ Rights is either given directly to immigrant associations that are able to present well-documented plans for intercultural activities or used to plan events in conjunctions with specific immigrant communities. In doing so, the Bizkaian government has willingly “identified specific ethnic communities, such as Egyptian, Chinese, and Senegalese, because doing so does not contradict the idea of a Basque citizenship that includes everyone who lives and works on Basque soil.”

The following data is meant to provide an overview of the subsidies awarded to non-governmental organizations in Bizkaia:

Table 4.2 Subsidies for Intercultural Projects by the Provincial Council of Bizkaia, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Amount (Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Association of Euskadi</td>
<td>Intercultural Space for Integration</td>
<td>6,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Hispanic Latin Americans</td>
<td>Communication and Cultural Activities</td>
<td>6,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Moroccan Immigrants</td>
<td>Organizational Strengthening of Azraf</td>
<td>18,224.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Argentines in the Basque Country</td>
<td>Modification and Adaptation of Cultural Event Programs</td>
<td>4,588.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for the Cooperation of Bolivians</td>
<td>Strengthening the integration of Bolivians en the Basque Community</td>
<td>18,270.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

421 Interview 4.
422 Interview 4.
This partial list of subsidies that are regulated by decree 62/2009 is indicative of the commitment by the provincial council to fund cultural activities. When asked about whether nationalists fear a backlash against subsidies for other cultures, a Bizkaian councillor had this to say:

“Listen...we no longer subscribe to the idea of some homogenous Basque culture...I recognize it is easy for outsiders to perceive Basque society as anti-modern and stuck in the past. We are changing just like the rest of the world and the opinion of most nationalists is that we need to keep the boundaries of the community open and adjust to new realities. These subsidies are important in this respect because it signals to new Basque citizens that we welcome them and that we are interested in preserving the characteristics they bring with them from their home cultures.”

The expenditures on multicultural initiatives in Bizkaia reveal continued growth in spending since the installation of the PVI and related decrees. While this may be partly explained by Basque Country’s relative wealth, the per capita spending on immigrant integration services and activities in the Basque Country is among the highest in Spain. There are obvious difficulties in measuring expenditures comparatively because of the diversity of autonomous communities in terms of numbers of immigrants and socio-economic and ethnic diversity of these immigrants.

**Table 4.3 Budgetary Allocations for Intercultural Activities, 2007-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Total (Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Spending</td>
<td>16,643.31</td>
<td>38,349.35</td>
<td>58,902.98</td>
<td>113,895.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies to NGO’s</td>
<td>627,667.00</td>
<td>651,241.90</td>
<td>679,000.00</td>
<td>1,907,908.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventions</td>
<td>54,000.00</td>
<td>54,000.00</td>
<td>60,000.00</td>
<td>168,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Euros)</td>
<td>726,016.35</td>
<td>721,885.21</td>
<td>741,902.98</td>
<td>2,189,804.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

423 Interview 5.  
425 Interview 6.
The response of Basque nationalists to the wave of foreign immigration beginning in 2001 has been contrary to the predictions of the primordial or national foundations approach because they have legislated to encourage immigrants to settle in the Basque Country by providing economic assistance and supporting multiculturalism. Even though policies and programs are sometimes labeled as intercultural, they can be classified as multicultural because they support culturally specific immigrant associations and cultural events without requiring much in the way of Basque cultural content. Moreover, there are no overt attempts to prevent events from being carried out in foreign languages or without participation from the indigenous Basque population.

The first PVI remained in effect until 2005 at which point discussions between relevant ministries took place in an effort to continue with the initiative and improve upon it. The PNV-led government had good reason to be optimistic about their approach to immigrant integration because of the results of public opinion polls. A random sample of non-immigrant Basques found that only 19% agreed with the following statement: “immigrants of various ethnic groups in the Basque Country should abandon their culture and customs.” Furthermore, various immigrants group began to support the nationalist cause due to their perceived inclusion in the Basque community on fair terms.

In other parts of Spain, conflicts between immigrants and indigenous Spaniards were far more intense and protests by anti-immigrants much more frequent.

The second Basque Immigration Plan, then, was approved by a wide majority in the Basque parliament in 2006 and would act as the principle document guiding immigrant integration in the Basque Country until its expiry at the end of 2009. The pillars of the plan were similar to the first one: inclusive citizenship and the eradication of the distinction between regular and irregular immigrants.

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426 Observatorio Vasco de Inmigración, 2ª Percepciones y actitudes hacia la inmigración extranjera, (Zaurautz: Itxaropena, 2009).
427 Interview 7.
428 Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 125-56.
that is a consequence of the Spanish citizenship law.\footnote{Bruna Nunes, “Plan Vasco De Inmigración: Hacia Un Modelo De Gestión De La Diversidad,” Passages De Paris Édition Spéciale (2009): 184-85.} According to the plan itself, “it is based on the recognition that effective integration cannot take into account the legal status [according to Spanish nationality law] of new Basque citizens because doing so would inhibit our collective ability to help newcomers achieve true equality, which is important because immigration contributes to our society both economically and culturally.”\footnote{Gobierno Vasco, Plan Vasco de Inmigración Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi II 2007-2010, Vitoria, 17 July 2006.} Once again, the plan is highly critical of the Spanish state and it stresses that a revised concept of citizenship is a prerequisite to achieve the successful integration of the immigrant population.

On 1 March 2009, regional elections were held in the Basque Country and for the first time since the transition to democracy in Spain, a non-nationalist Basque government was formed. The PNV won the election in terms of the number of seats, however, the PSE and PV formed a coalition government to defeat the nationalists.\footnote{The parties united despite the fact that the Popular Party and Socialists are bitter adversaries in the Spanish Senate and House of Deputies. For more on the 2009 Basque election, see Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, “The End of Three Decades of Nationalist Rule: The 2009 Regional Elections in the Basque Country,” South European Society & Politics 14, no. 2 (June 2009): 211-226.} As will be shown in the next section, the new government has changed course in the field of immigrant integration policy and this has led to much criticism from the nationalists and immigrant associations. This highlights the distinction between the position of the nationalists and non-nationalists and further supports the argument that Basque nationalists are using a supportive and multicultural approach to immigration to illuminate their distinctiveness vis-à-vis the non-nationalist parties.
Immigrant Integration under a Non-Nationalist Government: Individualism or Xenophobia?

Three factors led to the historic outcome in the 2009 Basques elections. The PNV and EA had been coalition partners in many of the previous elections, but the EA chose not to reissue a pre-election coalition because of concerns among some party faithful that the PNV was becoming ‘soft’ on sovereignty. Aralar—another nationalist party that is stronger on the separatist question than the PNV—doubled its support because many voters who had previously voted for Batasuna (the political wing of ETA) decided to support Aralar. Stricter enforcement of the 2002 Political Parties Law prevented Batasuna from participating in the election. The PNV had expected to benefit from the law because of the theory that many ETA-Batasuna supporters were becoming frustrated with the use of violence. Third and most importantly, the majority of Batasuna voters spoiled their ballots rather than choosing another nationalist party and this prevented the nationalist block from holding a majority of seats in the Basque parliament. Consequently, while the PNV was still the clear winner with 34.8% of the total vote and 30 of the 75 parliamentary seats, it was left without sufficient support in the Basque parliament from other nationalist parties to form the government.

Following the announcement of the non-nationalist coalition government, the nationalist community expressed concern that the new government would ignore traditional ‘Basque issues.’ Immigration was not an issue that any party campaigned on, but prominent immigrant associations supported the PNV because of the programs, such as HELDU, that had been set up during the reign of the nationalist government.

The PV-PSE coalition did not take long to reverse some of the policy innovations of the PNV. The justifications for these changes reveal that the non-nationalists were in favour of scaling back on

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432 Many EA voters switched loyalties to Aralar because the latter outflanked the former on the sovereignty issue.
433 This law declared that parties failing to respect democratic of constitutional values are illegal.
436 Interviews 3 and 19.
special programs and assistance for immigrants. The PNV and other nationalist parties seized the opportunity to criticize these changes in an attempt to highlight the distinctiveness of the Basque nation.

*The Closing of HELDU*

A large rally was staged in Bilbao by immigrant associations and Basque nationalists in December of 2009 to protest the *Ley de Extranjería*. The coalition of associations and nationalists stated that the most pressing problem with the law is the process through which immigrants obtain regularization: it is fraught with “restrictions and complications in order to prevent immigrants from integrating into society.” In the Basque Country, the solution to this legal quagmire was HELDU; HELDU staff and lawyers had handled 4,672 cases successfully in 2008 alone. As discussed previously, HELDU was a free legal advisory service for immigrants only initiated by the first Basque Immigration Plan in 2002. Other autonomous communities have services similar to HELDU now, but the Basque Country is considered the ‘pioneer’ because it opened so soon after the reforms to the *Ley de Extranjería* and its stated mission was openly critical of the government in Spain and its policies.438

According to an Argentinean immigrant living in Bilbao: “in 2003 my compatriots in Barcelona were not able to believe that the Basque government was helping us obtain our permits, while they had to return again and again and wait in lines for hours in the offices of immigration.”

Consequently, left-leaning parties and nationalist alike met the announcement that HELDU would be shut down with harsh criticism.440 In various interviews with parliamentarians and ministers from the PSE and PV, I was told that the decision was made because HELDU was duplicating services

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438 Interview 1.
that new immigrants could access through other means.\textsuperscript{441} A member of the PSE executive provided me with a more pointed response when questioned about the reasons behind the closing of HELDU:

“We disagree with the approach taken by the previous government because it created an uneven playing field between immigrants and less fortunate citizens in the Basque Country. Take, for example, a single mother living in a small run-down apartment who runs into financial difficulties and is exploited by her landlord: why is she less deserving than an immigrant to receive free legal services? Our goal is to offer social services that provide the same rights and assistance to everyone who lives in the Basque Country, including both newcomers and natives. Immigrants who come to the Basque Country will be able to access the same assistance to obtain housing and work permits without HELDU.”\textsuperscript{442}

In short, the non-nationalist government has adopted a liberal stance: nothing should be done to compensate for deficits in starting positions between immigrants and the native population.

The PNV and other nationalist parties have appropriated the HELDU affair to nation build and point out that Basque nationalists have more cosmopolitan values than do the Spanish nation-wide parties. During a session of the Basque parliament, various PNV members voiced their disapproval of the government’s plan to replace HELDU with a telephone number and email through which immigrants can solicit advice. The PNV urged the new government to reconsider its decision or develop a new structure to replace HELDU within three months.\textsuperscript{443} Nationalist municipal politicians also involved themselves in the media debates regarding HELDU because they felt it would be the municipalities that would end up bearing the responsibility for assisting immigrants in precarious positions. An interview respondent from the nationalist party Aralar had this to say:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{441} Interviews 22 and 23.
\item \textsuperscript{442} Interview 22.
\item \textsuperscript{443} Parlamento Vasco, \textit{Boletín Oficial}, no. 78, 10 October 2010.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
“The Spanish nationalists [PP and PSOE] have quite successfully disseminated a false discourse among the public in the rest of Spain and internationally. They claim that Basque nationalists are intolerant and anti-modern when the truth is that we have always said we want our own country that is diverse and multicultural to celebrate the Basque heritage without excluding others. It is the Popular Party and the Socialists who are exclusive rather than inclusive...nationalists created HELDU in order to support and welcome immigrants, and only one year after taking office, the Socialist and Popular Party closed it together. So I ask you: who is anti-immigrant and who truly supports diversity?”

For its part, the PNV called upon its supporters to help immigrant associations in the Basque Country by participating in rallies in Vitoria and Bilbao to oppose the cuts to services for immigrants by the non-nationalist government.

*Plan Vasco de Inmigración III*

The second Basque Immigration Plan expired in 2009 after the elections. The responsibility for renewing the plan, therefore, fell with the new PSE-PV government. In December of 2009, Nerea Antia of the PNV raised these questions in a parliamentary session:

- Will the Department of Housing and Social Affairs present a new Basque Plan of Immigration?
- If so, when should we expect this process to culminate?
- What steps have been taken thus far to prepare and develop the third Basque Immigration Plan?

These questions were delivered with a degree of contempt because the PSE and PV had been dragging their feet on this issue. Previously, both parties had been generally supportive of the maintaining an

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444 Interview 1.
overriding framework to guide policy in the field of immigration, but began to express a more indifferent position after taking office. On 24 February 2010, Minster of Housing and Social Affairs Gemma Zabaleta provided a response in parliamentary session to Nerea Antia: the third Basque Immigration Plan would be introduced in early 2011 because the governing parties needed more time to evaluate the successes and failures of the previous plan. In late 2010, Nerea Antia decided to follow up with another initiative in a parliamentary session; her comments were critical of the new government’s inaction in the realm of integration policy and suggested that the non-nationalist coalition had no real intention of continuing the policy initiatives of the prior government.446

She also expressed concern about the consequences of neglecting the plight of immigrants and claimed that the Basque government is alone in its decision to change the model of immigrant integration that had the support of the Basque people.447 The response from Gemma Zabaleta was that the third plan was under preparation and she gave no clear reason for the delay.448 As of April 2011, the non-nationalist government has not implemented a new Basque Immigration Plan. The current director of immigration has stated that the third plan is still under preparation because the current administration is working on changes and additions to address the problem of racial discrimination.449 This demonstrates, to some extent, that the new non-nationalist government favours a more liberal approach to immigrant integration rather a group-centred multicultural approach.

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446 Parlamento Vasco, Boletín Oficial, no. 92, 27 December 2010.
447 “Las Juntas piden a Lakua que revoque su decisión de cerrar Heldu,” Noticias de Gipuzkoa, 12 April 2011.
449 He claimed the recalibration was necessary due to some high-profile incidents of racially motivated violence in the past few months. “El Gobierno Vasco estima que un 20% de los inmigrantes ha sufrido racismo,” Noticias de Gipuzkoa, 18 April 2011. In a personal interview, the director of immigration admitted to me that there was no consensus as to whether a new Basque Immigration Plan would come about while the PSE-PV coalition was in power. Interview 15.
Conclusion

In the period after 2001, Basque nationalists have responded to the immigration boom in the Basque Country with policies and institutions that provide special assistance to immigrants in the form of social welfare and legal assistance, as well as an emphasis on multiculturalism. This represents a dramatic shift away from the ethnic nationalism that marked the earlier periods of the Basque nationalist movement. This chapter has emphasized two dynamics driving this process: the forged collective memory of the Basques as a repressed collectivity and the nation building opportunity that immigration has created for Basque nationalist elites. The restrictive reform of the Spanish *Ley de Extranjería* as well as the shift towards assimilation across Europe provided the context for elites to continue their project of transforming Basque nationalism into a modern and cosmopolitan project. Rather than following the script written by theorists of nationalism who claim that minority nationalists erect barriers around their community by emphasizing ties of blood, Basque nationalists created a concept of citizenship that is more inclusive than that of the Spanish state. Some sectors of the PNV and its constitutive civil society organizations have expressed concerns about the future of Euskara and Basque culture in an increasingly diverse Basque society, but this has remained a minority position at both the elite and societal levels. This inclusive concept of citizenship entails policies and programs that treat immigrants differently to ensure they can access the benefits of citizenship and support for cultural organizations and multicultural events to create the conditions for interaction and mingling between cultures rather than polarization.

The 2009 elections ended 25 years of nationalist rule and resulted in a coalition government composed of the two main state-wide parties in Spain. In less than two years, the new government has altered the course of immigrant integration policy in the Basque Country to a more indifferent approach. This shift highlights that the two parties (especially the PV) are uncomfortable with
intervening in a field many state nationalists consider an exclusive state competency. On the other hand, the PNV and other nationalist parties quickly labeled the changes as racist and xenophobic in order to demonstrate that there is a lack of fit between Spanish and Basque values, furthering the nationalist cause for more autonomy or sovereignty. The discourse also reveals an attempt by nationalists to leave behind the ethnic version of Basque nationalism that existed in prior epochs.
CHAPTER 5
MULTICULTURALISM AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN EDUCATION:
BALANCING UNITY WITH DIVERSITY

Introduction

In his classic work, *From Peasants into Frenchman*, Eugene Weber argues schools are critical sites of individual socialization, identity formation, and nation building.\(^{450}\) It is through the institution of state controlled education that the language and ‘high’ culture associated with the nation-state are transmitted to future generations. As Weber demonstrates in the case of France, local dialects were eliminated in favour of standard French through the school system. Beyond language transmission, an education system is the reproductive organ of culture; a society's culture can survive far longer than the lifespan of any of its members, primarily because its educational system passes down the folkways and knowledge of one generation to subsequent generations. A national minority intent on ensuring that immigrants become indistinguishable from native-born citizens would likely oppose the adoption of multicultural practices or the recognition of cultural differences in the school curriculum. Moreover, the fear of linguistic decline would logically lead a national minority to restrict immigrants from studying in the dominant state language or their mother tongue. Even though the majority of nation-states have shifted away from practices of assimilation in their educational systems, minority nations are in a more precarious situation because of likelihood that newcomers will adopt the culture and language of the majority group.

Nevertheless, the evidence in the Basque case does not fit with these expectations. Since the early 2000s, the Basque government under the leadership of the nationalist PNV has implemented

policies that recognize, support, and accommodate ethnocultural diversity in the school curriculum. Concerning language, the nationalists have favoured a model of parental choice, albeit while encouraging new immigrant pupils to learn Euskara because of the economic and social opportunities it will afford them. Accordingly, this chapter examines the development of two spheres of education policy: language and multiculturalism in the school curriculum.

The chapter is organized into four sections. The first two provide the historical context for the debate about language policy in Basque education. First, the decline of Euskara and its causes prior to the democratic transition, and second, the legal and sociological situation of Euskara in the context of mandatory schooling during the democratic period. The third section shifts to policy initiatives launched by the nationalist coalition since 2001 that amount to ‘soft’ linguistic nationalism, thus encouraging new immigrants to learn Euskara without any real obligation. The final section examines the addition of multiculturalism to the school curriculum. In both of these sections, the narrative highlights the importance of nation building via conflict with the state-wide parties and the narrative of the Basque nation as a repressed minority with a responsibility to accommodate other minority groups.

**Nationalism, Euskara, and Education until the Democratic Transition**

Euskara, a non-Indo European language, has always been spoken as a native language in and around the modern day Basque Country. Various dialects can be traced to areas north and south of the Pyrenees, and records of Basque origin names appear in Latin texts from southwestern France and northeastern Spain. Early records of the number of Euskara speakers are difficult to find, but a reliable study of materials covering the period between 1856 and 1868 suggests that the total number of Euskara speakers varied between 400,000 and 666,000 or 60% of the Basque population in the 19th
century. Beltza has written that there were between 400,000 and 570,000 Euskara speakers at the time of the civil war (1936-39) and the number was rising before the outbreak of the civil war on account of efforts to revitalize the language. During the 1960s, estimates of Euskara speakers ranged from 350,000 to 600,000. What these figures indicate is that the raw number of Euskara speakers did not change very much despite the harsh repression of the language carried out by the Franco regime. Nationalists and Basque intellectuals proclaimed that Euskara was in decline and near death during the dictatorship, but this was mainly because of the migration of many Spanish speakers to the Basque Country. The population of the Basque Country exploded while the number of Euskara speakers remained constant and the consequence was a sharp decline in the proportion of residents of the Basque Country that used Euskara in their daily life.

Table 5.1 Evolution of the Euskara-Speaking Population, 1860-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population of Basque provinces</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Euskara Speakers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>455,000</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The policy of total repression of Euskara by the Franco regime only lasted until the middle of the 1950s. As early as 1949, a book was published in Euskara—the first time this had occurred since well before the civil war. More importantly, urban Euskara-medium schools, the ikastolas, were organized by small groups in private flats and operated clandestinely soon after Franco rose to power.

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452 Beltza, El Nacionalismo Vasco, 220.
454 Clark, "Language and Politics in Spain's Basque Provinces," 93.
Despite loosening its grip on society, the Franco regime’s Department of Education created various obstacles for the *ikastolas* by closing premises suspected of permitting the operation of Euskara classes and confiscating Euskara teaching materials.\(^{455}\) During the twilight of the dictatorship, the *ikastolas* became the site of conflicts between nationalists on the issue of what constituted ‘Basqueness.’ It was the radical nationalists associated with ETA who argued forcefully that the children of Spanish migrants should be encouraged to attend *ikastolas* in order to increase the prevalence of Euskara and shift the definition of Basqueness to one defined by language and voluntarism rather than race.\(^{456}\) As the immigrant population increased, the administrators of the *ikastola* schools had to balance the concerns of traditional Basque families who contended *ikastolas* are for ethnic Basques along with pedagogical ones, such as how to introduce and teach Euskara to students who spoke Spanish at home.\(^{457}\)

Before Franco’s death, the Spanish policy toward Euskara softened and some education in Euskara was begrudgingly permitted. In May 1975, the government issued a decree that altered the legislation regarding regional languages and this allowed Euskara to become the medium of instruction in state-sponsored primary schools on an optional basis at the full discretion of the school principal.\(^{458}\) The decree was silent on the issues of teacher training and recruitment and it was not clear if Euskara teachers were eligible to be paid. A second decree in October of 1975 offered official protection for regional languages, although the decree was quite emphatic that Spanish would continue to be the sole official state language and the only language permitted in government offices, courts, and legislative assemblies.\(^{459}\) Nevertheless, the two decrees represented a change in the policy of Madrid towards

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\(^{455}\) Clark, “Language and Politics in Spain’s Basque Provinces,” 94.


\(^{458}\) Clark, “Language and Politics in Spain’s Basque Provinces,” 94.

\(^{459}\) Clark, “Language and Politics in Spain’s Basque Provinces,” 94.
Euskara and resulted in more opportunities for Basques and immigrants to obtain their education in Euskara.

In 1976, a landmark study was conducted on Euskara-medium education at the request of the Royal Academy of the Basque Language. The main finding of the study was that 95% of state primary school teachers did not have any knowledge of Euskara. The lack of teachers trained to teach in Euskara “resulted from the action of a repressive regime from the time it prohibited the public use of Basque in 1937...it is thus hardly surprising that teacher training colleges were designed to produce only Spanish medium teachers.” The Royal Academy gave praise to the ikastola system for its effort to promote Euskara education in the face of adversity, but concluded that significant changes were needed to keep the language alive because only 10% of the school-aged population in the Basque Country was enrolled in ikastolas. More specifically, the study suggested broad-sweeping institutional reforms to give Euskara an official status in the Basque Country to encourage non-ethnic Basques to learn it. The Academy also requested more state funds to train teachers and create resources such as textbooks and audio tapes.

When Franco died, Basque nationalists began to demand that formal recognition and protection for Euskara be entrenched in the new Constitution. After much backroom debate and controversy, the 1978 Spanish Constitution declared that Spanish is the official language of Spain and all Spaniards have the right to use it, but it added that each autonomous community could declare its local language as co-official with Spanish. Some nationalists had hoped that Euskara would be mentioned in the Constitution as the language of the Basque nation within the Spanish state, but the state-wide parties did not agree to this request because such a declaration would have contradicted Article 2 that

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460 Gardner, Basque in Education in the Basque Autonomous Community, 41.  
461 Gardner, Basque in Education in the Basque Autonomous Community, 42-43.
acknowledges the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish state.” This resulted in Euskara being declared an official language in the BAC in 1979 by the interim government led by the PNV. Article 6 of the autonomy statute declares:

“Euskara, the language of the Basque people, shall, like Spanish, have the status of an official language in the Basque Country. All its inhabitants have the right to know and use both languages.”

Article 6 further states that “responsibility lies with the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country for education in its entirety, regardless of what level, degree, kind, or specialty it may be.”

Following the first Basque Country elections in 1980, the elected PNV government declared its intention to legislate in order to elevate the status of Euskara. The Law for the Normalization of the Use of Euskara (1982) made the right to learn and use Euskara a personal right of all Basque citizens. According to the law, anyone living in the Basque Country has the right to receive cultural products and education in both official languages, and to deal with the courts and administration in both languages as well. The law was passed in the Basque parliament with inter-party consensus, but was immediately challenged by the Spanish state. In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Basque government and the Law of Euskara remains in effect today.

Following the enactment of the constitution, the Spanish state made another conciliatory gesture with the 1979 decree of bilingualism. According to the decree, the Spanish Ministry of Education was responsible for providing financial assistance for Euskara-medium education from preschool to university. The decree also conferred some responsibility to the central government for the funding of the ikastola schools as all instruction in them is conducted in Euskara. This funding had

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462 Interview 2.
463 The text of the decree can be found in Deia, 11 May 1979.
an immediate impact on the number of students that were able to enrol in ikastola schools. During the 1971-72 school year, there were an estimated 18,500 children registered in 67 ikastola schools, of which approximately 20% were of Spanish or other origin.\footnote{This growth only amounted to 10% of the school-age population in the Basque Country studying in the ikastola system and a small percentage of the students with immigrant origins.} In 1980, 54,000 were enrolled in 234 ikastolas and nearly 35% had at least one immigrant parent.\footnote{Shafir, Immigrants and Nationalists, 119-120; Clark, “Language and Politics in Spain's Basque Provinces,” 96.} Euskara instruction in the public and private systems was minimal at this time, which meant that enrolling in the ikastola system was the only way for non-Basque students to gain fluency in Euskara.

The main factor that discouraged the nationalists from definitively promoting Euskara among non-ethnic Basques during this period was the ongoing conflict among the nationalist parties and organizations as to whether Euskara would become the core marker of Basque nationalism.\footnote{Daniele Conversi, "Language or Race?: The Choice of Core Values in the Development of Catalan and Basque Nationalisms," Ethnic and Racial Studies 13, no. 1 (1990): 50-70.} As mentioned in chapter two, andreños (Basque teachers) assumed an important role in the movement to improve the relations between Basques, Spanish migrants, and immigrants, but elements within the PNV, especially in rural areas, had yet to be convinced that outsiders could develop a genuine sense of attachment to the Basque identity. Also important was the fact that migration from other parts of Spain began to slow down during the late 1980s and 1990s and foreign immigration was not yet significant. The issue of promoting Euskara education to immigrants, therefore, became peripheral to ensuring that more Basques were enrolling in the ikastola system.

**Language Models and Immigrants: Initial Steps**

After the first Basque elections took place in 1980, the nationalist government recognized the difficult position it was in. Euskara speakers constituted 25% of the population, but the demand for bilingual education by parents far exceeded this proportion, which left the government without
sufficient resources or Euskara teachers to offer it. The nationalists were also grappling with internal disagreement over the issue of compulsory Euskara education. A faction within the PNV that wanted to see language become the focal point of modern Basque nationalism was keen on an education system that mimicked Quebec’s model with Spanish education only available to students whose parents received a Spanish-language education in the Basque Country.\footnote{The Bill 101 language law in Quebec makes French education mandatory for every student without a parent that received an English-language education in Canada. This was only favoured by a minority of party members and was not considered realistic at the time because of the lack of teachers and limited availability of resources to dedicate to education reform. Interview 11.} The majority within the PNV and the non-nationalist parties were not comfortable with mandatory Euskara-only (or mostly) education, but agreed that students should have some education in Euskara. The initial model was structured as a demand-driven one and a series of decrees made Euskara a compulsory subject for all education levels prior to university.\footnote{Boletín Oficial del País Vasco, 25 June 1981.} Nevertheless, the compulsory nature of the new education policy only amounted to a few hours of Euskara instruction a week for those students enrolled in the Spanish model. Supporters of the so-called ‘Basquisation’ of the education system were skeptical that this approach would yield any significant results in terms of increasing the use of Euskara in the Basque Country, and might even sharpen the divide between ethnic Basques and those with Spanish or other origins.\footnote{Interview 2.} Nevertheless, a consensus developed around the policy of parental choice because the nationalists in favour of ensuring every student graduated with competency in Euskara accepted that the introduction of bilingual and monolingual Euskara streams would serve as a way station to obligatory Euskara education.

The four models were designed:

- Spanish-medium teaching with Euskara taught as a subject three or four hours per week, known as model ‘A’
• Euskara and Spanish medium teaching with Basque and Spanish as subjects, known as model ‘B’
• Euskara-medium teaching with Spanish as a subject, known as model ‘D’
• Spanish only education for those only in the Basque Country temporarily (e.g. diplomat families, travelers), known as model ‘X’

In line with these descriptions, models A and D are diametrically opposed in their use of the two official languages of the Basque Country. Model B, on the other hand, draws upon extensive research from the field of linguistics to design a curriculum tailored mainly at Spanish native speakers wishing to acquire a high level of Euskara fluency. A contentious debate took place within Ministry of Education in the initial period of implementation as to whether the models could coexist within the same schools. One argument that was supported by elements of the nationalist community and Basque linguists was that model A should not coexist with models B and D in order to increase the ‘Basqueness’ of the school atmosphere. A fear that predominated among politicians of all stripes, however, was that isolating model A students could create tensions between the linguistic communities and lead to xenophobia and racism. The combination of models A and D programs only occurred in a few schools because it was rare that there was sufficient demand in the same community for both models.

Since the linguistic models were introduced in the 1980s, the sheer number of non-ethnic Basque parents that have chosen to enroll their children in either model B or model D has surprised many observers. In pre-school and primary grades, model A is slowly disappearing with only 9% of total enrolment whereas model B and D have 30% and 61% respectively. This trend away from model A has continued for a number of reasons. First and foremost, a good knowledge of Euskara is

471 Demand for model A has continually decreased and only is significant in densely concentrated areas of Araba, especially in the capital city of Vitoria.
beneficial in the labour market in the Basque Country, especially in the health and education sectors, as well as the civil service.\textsuperscript{472} Survey research also indicates that “personal motivation and the mere joy” of learning Euskara is motivating first and second generation immigrations to learn the language or at least help their offspring learn it because of their “desire to integrate themselves into the collective of people who speak Euskara.”\textsuperscript{473} The PNV has since used these survey results to argue that the program of non-obligatory promotion of Euskara is working.\textsuperscript{474} In other words, the official policy of the Basque government to promote diversity may be encouraging immigrants to engage with the Basque culture and learn Euskara.

\textbf{Figure 5.1} Total Numbers of Pupils and Immigrant Pupils According to Language Models, 2006-07

According to figure 5.1, immigrants are still disproportionately enrolled in the schools that are categorized as model A, although the trend suggests this will no longer be the case in the relatively near future. The number of live births in the Basque Country has been falling since the early 1980s,

\textsuperscript{473} Etxeberria, "New Challenges for Bilingual Education in the Basque Country,” 97-98.
\textsuperscript{474} Interview 17.
and immigration is rapidly increasing; these statistics have been a cause for concern among PNV supporters and other Basque nationalists who are skeptical about the positive effects of immigration and diversity for Basque society.\textsuperscript{475} Interview respondents from the nationalist parties were not concerned by these statistics because they were encouraged by the growing number of immigrant families that are choosing model B or D (see figure 5.2) without being legally obligated to do so.\textsuperscript{476} Despite the emphasis on choice rather than obligation, the Spanish PP and its Basque affiliate still voice their opposition periodically, arguing that model D schools leave students with a weak capacity to read and write in Spanish. The nationalist media has suggested that this position is concomitant with the PP’s re-emphasis of Spanish nationalism that began in 1996.\textsuperscript{477}

**Figure 5.2** Immigrant Pupils and Language Models, 2003-06

![Graph showing percentage of immigrant pupils in different language models over the years 2003-04 to 2006-07.](source)

Source: Gobierno Vasco, Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación

\textsuperscript{475} On the other hand, nationalists still wedded to an ethnic conception of the Basque nation may be more concerned with shifting demographic situation rather than whether immigrants families are sending their children to Euskara language schools.

\textsuperscript{476} Interviews 1, 2, 9, 10, and 14.

\textsuperscript{477} “El PP Pide a Madrid que Frene el Modelo D,” *Egin*, 16 November 1997.
Initially, the PP argued that the model D option amounts to an “imposition of Euskara inconsistent with the spirit of equality.” The PP has since retracted its opposition to model D and now focuses its attention on preserving and promoting model A because of its continuing decline in the Basque Country. In the following sections, closer attention will be given to the following questions: Why did Basque nationalists refrain from advocating for obligatory ‘Euskara only’ education for immigrants? What policies and programmes have been implemented to encourage immigrant families to enroll their children in models B and D? Were the 2007 reforms an attempt to oblige immigrant pupils to learn Euskara?

A New Linguistic Nationalism? Multilingual Education in the Basque Country

As mentioned previously, schools have long been identified as critical sites of individual socialization, identity formation, and of linguistic nation building; thus it is not surprising that much attention has been given to the development and coordination of a plan to manage the linguistic aspect of education for immigrant pupils. While reflecting on the related issues of multilingual learning and the place of Euskara in the Basque Country, some nationalists were drawn to the ‘Quebec model,’ which would hypothetically restrict immigrants from admission to Spanish-language schools. This option was discarded by the PNV for a few reasons. First, many nationalists had yet to be convinced that one must speak Euskara to be Basque. In fact, a new conception of Basqueness had developed within the PNV and society that took seriously the notion that anyone who lives in the Basque Country is Basque. As discussed in chapter three, the concept of Basque citizenship based on residence alone is a core tenet of the Basque Immigration Plan. Those who forwarded this position were not necessarily anti-Euskara, but simply felt that making Euskara a core symbol of Basqueness would create tensions

480 Interview 21.
within the Basque Country and weaken its position vis-à-vis the Spanish state. More importantly, personal interviews revealed that in party discussions and informal debates, a common argument levied against the Quebec model was that such a policy might not be the most effective way to get immigrants to ‘feel Basque.’\textsuperscript{481} Many nationalists felt such a restrictive policy is too severe and thus incompatible with the values of a tolerant Basque society. To improve the standing of Euskara in the medium to long term, the core strategy of Basque nationalists is to make the language accessible to immigrants, promote it as a useful tool for economic success, and create a sense of community. This sentiment best captures the philosophy of the first comprehensive document that set out the PNV-EA-IU government’s position on language and immigrant education.

Another reason is that such a law would probably not survive the constitutional challenge the Spanish state would almost certainly levy against it. According to Article 3 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, “Spanish is the official language of the state...all Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it.” It is difficult to imagine any justification that would satisfy the Spanish state-wide parties let alone the judiciary of the constitutionality of any legislation that may prevent a Spanish citizen or legal resident from mastering the Spanish language.\textsuperscript{482}

The Basque government released the Immigrant Student Programme (Programa Para La Atención Del Alumnado Inmigrante) in the framework of the first Basque Immigration Plan on 9 December 2003. Section four details how the Basque government conceives of the language requirements of immigrant students enrolled in public or private schools. The mission statement focuses on the social, personal, and educational repercussions of not being able to speak either of the official languages of the BAC. In other words, the first priority of language education for immigrant pupils is to ensure competency in at least one language (usually Spanish) to facilitate integration rather

\textsuperscript{481} Interviews 1,2,10, 11, 14, and 21.
\textsuperscript{482} The counter-argument is that immigrants and Basques who have chosen model D still generally gain fluency in the Spanish language because of its prevalence in society.
than imposing the difficult process of learning both languages on students without a basic knowledge of either Euskara or Spanish. Obviously, this priority reflects the increasing proportion of immigrants coming to the Basque Country from outside of Spain and Latin America. In cases where immigrant students require extra tutoring or different curriculums to help with the ‘catching up’ process in terms of language acquisition, schools will be provided the necessary resources to provide such services.\textsuperscript{483} Moreover, the native culture of students will be taken into account when adjusting the curriculum to meet the special needs of immigrant students.

The Immigrant Student Programme does encourage students to become fluent in both Spanish and Euskara by the time they complete compulsory education. It is noted that the age at which an immigrant student enters the Basque education system and his or her linguistic profile are important factors to take into account when determining which language model is most suitable. The Basque government does not specify a specific age range to determine whether an immigrant student (without Spanish as their mother tongue) should enroll in model B or D because of the myriad of exogenous factors (e.g., family situation, socioeconomic background) that might affect a student’s capacity to learn two languages.\textsuperscript{484} The decision to encourage the learning of Euskara is not justified with reference to the goals of cultural preservation or language revival, rather, it is presented as a responsibility of citizens of the Basque Country to have a working knowledge of both official languages; learning both languages ‘is useful for anyone wishing to feel a member of Basque society.’\textsuperscript{485} This ambiguous nature of this passage is an attempt to appease the minority of PNV supporters who want to see obligatory Euskara education for immigrant children, but while still reflecting the majority opinion that learning both languages is a right rather than an obligation.

\textsuperscript{483} Gobierno Vasco, \textit{Programa Para La Atención Del Alumnado Inmigrante} (Vitoria: Departamento de Educación, Universidades E Investigación, 2003), 7.

\textsuperscript{484} Interview 11.

\textsuperscript{485} Gobierno Vasco, \textit{Programa Para La Atención Del Alumnado Inmigrante}, 7.
In order to facilitate the learning of Euskara among immigrant pupils, especially those entering the Basque school system at a later age, the PNV-led government made a number of policy recommendations. First, the government recognized the tendency of immigrant students to attend public schools whereas natives concentrate in the private system. This separation is deemed problematic for effective language learning because of the likelihood that Euskara (and even Spanish) will be spoken sparingly outside the classroom in schools that are primarily populated by immigrants.\textsuperscript{486} Citing research from sociolinguistics, the special committee responsible for the Immigrant Student Plan argued that fully integrated schools with students from Euskara-speaking homes and immigrant families would provide the best opportunity for late-entry immigrant pupils to become fluent in Euskara.\textsuperscript{487} In late 2003, a decree by the Department of Education stated that all schools receiving state subsidies (public sector schools and private schools) have to maintain a balance of native and immigrant students that closely reflects the percentage of immigrant pupils in all of the Basque Country.\textsuperscript{488}

The tendency for the immigrant student population to receive their education in the Spanish model is driven by three main factors. First, many immigrants come to the Basque Country from Latin America and are therefore more comfortable with their children receiving their education in Spanish. Yet, a large proportion of immigrants come from Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia and these groups disproportionately send their children to model A schools in comparison with the native population. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the proportion of non-Hispanic immigrants enrolling in models B and D has been increasing in the past few years. Second, and more importantly, immigrant families are generally unaware of the social and economic importance of Euskara in the Basque Country.

\textsuperscript{486} Interview 11.
\textsuperscript{487} The committee had members of all three parties in the tripartite nationalist government. Gobierno Vasco, \textit{Programa Para La Atención Del Alumnado Inmigrante}, 9.
Moreover, many immigrant families do not know that Euskara is an official language.\textsuperscript{489} This was the impetus behind the decision of the Basque Department of Education to initiate the Language Reinforcement Project in 2004 (\textit{Proyectos de Refuerzo Lingüístico}). The project called upon the various school districts to distribute information to immigrant families about the different language models, some statistics regarding the growth of Euskara, and the types of careers for which a good knowledge of Euskara is valuable.\textsuperscript{490} The texts that are distributed to immigrant families by the schools and settlement offices are available in Spanish, Euskara, English, French, Portuguese, Arabic, Russian, Mandarin, and Turkish. The pamphlets themselves contain pictures of students with diverse racial origins learning to read and write in Euskara, an obvious attempt to break down the stereotype that Euskara is an “ancient language of the Basque peoples and give credence to it as the \textit{lingua franca} of a racially diverse Basque society.”\textsuperscript{491} The fact that recent waves of immigrants have been informed in their native languages about the language models and the utility of Euskara in the Basque Country is a principal factor that explains the rise in immigrant enrollments in Euskara-medium schools.

Another factor that is responsible for the rise in immigrant enrollment in models B and D is the influence of Basque loyalist organizations. Campaigns have been organized to persuade immigrant and Spanish-origin parents to choose models D or B by citing evidence that these models ensure greater competence in Euskara and that functional bilingualism facilitates entry into the labour market.\textsuperscript{492} While some Basque loyalist organizations in the pre-Franco era advocated for the separation of ethnic Basques from non-Basques in schools, modern loyalist organizations are

\textsuperscript{489} Interview 25.
\textsuperscript{490} Gobierno Vasco, \textit{El Sistema Educativo Vasco}, (Vitoria: Departamento de Educación, Universidades E Investigación, 2007).
\textsuperscript{491} Interview 21.
\textsuperscript{492} Gardner, \textit{Basque in Education in the Basque Autonomous Community}, 36.
committed to pluralism and court immigrants by stressing that the Basque community is more welcoming than the Spanish one.\textsuperscript{493}

Campaigns by loyalist organizations to persuade immigrant families to opt for the models with a stronger Euskara component have been particularly successful in Gipuzkoa where Euskara is more widely spoken, but they are extending their presence into areas where Spanish is still the predominant language, particularly the cities of Bilbao and Vitoria. The activities of these organizations include passing out literature on the Basque educational system in community centres and the popular plazas that serve as neighbourhood meeting spots, as well as fund-raising to provide meals and computers to the \textit{ikastola} schools.\textsuperscript{494}

Despite the emphasis on parental choice, the nationalist government revealed an obvious bias towards routing immigrant pupils into models B and D with the criteria developed for selecting a linguistic model. The recommendations state that models B and D are preferable for all immigrant students regardless of their situation or native tongue, which shifts the conceptualization of bilingualism towards an obligation rather than a right. Between 2003 and 2009, to help immigrant families select a linguistic model as mandated by the Basque Department of Education, school administrators used the following criteria:

- If the immigrant family lives in an Euskara-speaking environment, the student is advised to enroll in model D
- If the environment is primarily Spanish-speaking, model B is recommended; if the native language is also Spanish and the pupil’s scholastic needs are not considerable, then model D is advisable, at least during infant education and the first cycle of primary education.

\textsuperscript{493} Gardner, \textit{Basque in Education in the Basque Autonomous Community}, 36.  
\textsuperscript{494} Gardner, \textit{Basque in Education in the Basque Autonomous Community}, 36.
• For compulsory secondary education (until 16 years of age), model B is appropriate, but if the living environment is clearly Euskara-speaking, model D should be the programme of choice. These guidelines reveal the preference of the nationalist government that immigrants integrate into the Euskara-speaking community through the education system. These criteria were subject to criticism by the non-nationalist parties and were disregarded by certain school boards in Spanish-speaking areas in Araba province, especially in Vitoria. Critics of the criteria contended that the concept of parental choice is fiction because the nationalist government was allowing, if not encouraging, schools to close their model A classes, effectively forcing immigrant families to choose either model D or B. The PV has been the most vocal among the critics, which is not surprising given that it relies on support from Spanish nationalists in the Basque Country. The fact that politics in the Basque Country is always driven by nationalist concerns transforms issues that would be discussed in relation to costs and feasibility elsewhere into a war of rhetoric among the nationalist and non-nationalist parties. In reality, there is no way the PNV or other nationalist parties could have predicted the success of its program of Euskara promotion. The decision to close model A classrooms where numbers do not warrant a program appears, on the surface, to be a rational decision in the name of economic efficiency.

_Euskara as the ‘Principle Language’ of Education_

The notion of parental choice came under serious threat in 2007 when a series of decrees by the Department of Education—under the leadership of Tontxu Campos from the EA, a nationalist governing partner of the PNV—set Euskara as the principal language for primary and secondary education in the Basque Country. The argument made in the decrees is that model A fails to provide students with a basic competency in Euskara by the end of mandatory education (16 years of age). In

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496 Gardner, _Basque in Education in the Basque Autonomous Community_.

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other words, all of the linguistic models should be designed to ensure that all students leave mandatory schooling with a basic competency in both official languages of the Basque Country. This argument is based on what is called a ‘nationalist interpretation’ of the 1982 Law of Euskara, in particular Article 4: “the process of linguistic normalization in the Basque public administration and other institutions will take place through the approval and implementation of plans to make Euskara a normal language in Basque institution and society.” A faction within the PNV and EA contended that preferential treatment for Euskara is justifiable because it is the only path towards normalization given its minority status and the fact that the language was nearly eradicated by Franco’s regime.

Accordingly, decree 175/2007 made substantial changes to the primary and secondary school systems that increased the hours of Euskara instruction in model A, made it easier for schools to refuse to offer a model A education, and introduced some controversial changes to the history curriculum.

Article 13 of decree 175/2007 states: “Euskara is the principle language of instruction in primary and secondary schools.” In addition, the decree sets a requirement that all students be able to pass the same competency test in Euskara at the end of mandatory education. This requirement de facto eliminates the different linguistic models established under the Law of Basque Public Schools because it would be nearly impossible for model A and B students to pass this exam without many extra hours of instruction in Basque. In fact, 32% of students enrolled in the model D system are unable to pass the B2 proficiency exam in Euskara—equivalent to the Cambridge first certification in English—by the end of compulsory schooling. According to the popular daily El País, the tripartite

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500 Interview 26.
government was trying to “replace the existing system with a unique linguistic pattern that elevated Euskara to status of sole official language in the Basque education system.”

Both the PV and PSE argued that the reforms offend the spirit of bilingualism and provided further “preferential treatment for the community of Euskara speakers whom are still a minority in the Basque Country.” The PSE or PV could do little about the changes before 2009 because the nationalist parties controlled both the Basque parliament and education ministry. The official reason why the nationalists breached the prior compromise with the non-nationalist parties that parental choice would dictate the availability of the different models of education is the supposed failure of models A and B to produce students competent in written and spoken Euskara. We can only speculate whether the assertion of Euskara as the primary language of education is related to rising levels of immigration. Yet, one cannot ignore the potential consequences of this policy change given that the percentage of first and second-generation immigrant pupils in the Basque school system is increasing; it could be a subtle way to prevent immigrant pupils from integrating into the Spanish-speaking milieu. In other words, it is suggestive of a shift away from a policy of parental choice to one closer to the Quebec model that restricts the linguistic options for immigrants entering the education system.

The changes put in place by Tontxu Campos created a powerful interest group opposed to the supposed eradication of the choice principle—Platform for Freedom of Linguistic Choice (Plataforma por la Libertad de Elección Lingüística-PLEL). The association, made up of intellectuals, politicians, and ordinary Basque citizens, emerged in 2007 with strong ties to the PV after the approval of decree 175/2007. The manifesto of the PLEL is to defend the liberty and rights of all citizens to receive an

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503 Mezo, Basque Language Policy.
education in Spanish or Euskara because of its belief in the argument that it is critical for a child to receive his or her education in their mother tongue.\footnote{504}{Plataforma por la Libertad de Elección Lingüística, Manifesto available at <http://www.libertaddeeleccion.org/manifiesto.php>}

Because an increasing number of Basque pupils speak neither Spanish nor Euskara at home, the PLEL added a section to their manifesto to recognize the linguistic diversity in the Basque Country: “Basque society is pluralistic with a diverse linguistic reality.”\footnote{505}{Plataforma por la Libertad de Elección Lingüística, Manifesto available at <http://www.libertaddeeleccion.org/manifiesto.php>}

Nevertheless, the position of the PLEL concerning immigrant pupils is that the term “mother tongue does not solely refer to the language spoken at home, but the primary language in one’s daily interactions.”\footnote{506}{Plataforma por la Libertad de Elección Lingüística, Manifesto available at <http://www.libertaddeeleccion.org/manifiesto.php>}

From the PLEL perspective, immigrant pupils should be educated in the language that they interact in outside of school, even if they do not use that language in the home. An education in the language that a pupil does not use in daily interactions may negatively affect the quality of education for immigrant pupils and therefore the government should not be directing these students away from the model best-suited to their needs.

Accordingly, the PLEL defined the core of their mission in 2008 according to these points:

- It is necessary to defend the rights of parents to choose the main language of education for their children
- The current government is attacking the linguistic freedoms of Basque citizens
- The three linguistic models should be maintained and access to them should be enshrined as a right of all Basque citizens

In accordance with these principles, the PLEL requested that the Basque government withdraw decree 175/2007 and affirm their commitment to parental choice.
The PLEL found natural allies in the PV, the party that fiercely opposed decree 175/2007. Using the legal and pedagogical arguments developed by the PLEL, the PV submitted an appeal to the Superior High Court of the Basque Country against decree 175/2007 in February of 2008 on grounds that it violates the Law of Basque Education. According to the parliamentary spokesperson for the PV, Leopoldo Barreda, “the appeal has the objective of upholding the right of choice” in the face of a government keen on “eradicating the Spanish language from the education system.”

A year later, the court suspended decree 175/2007 in a precautionary manner, agreeing with the arguments of the PLEL and PV that parental choice, not bilingualism, is the foundation of the Law of Basque Education.

Prior to the decision of the Basque High Court to suspend the decree, the historic 2009 elections brought down the nationalist government and empowered the PV-PSE non-nationalist government. This new president of the Basque Country, Patxi Lopez, supported the suspension of the decree by the court and declared that the new education minister of the PSE, Isabel Celaá, would be responsible for designing new legislation to ensure that parental choice and equality between Euskara and Spanish would be respected. The new decrees submitted by the education ministry in 2009, totaling more than 1,500 pages, devised a new set of guidelines that cover a range of issues concerning the application of the linguistic models and the content of educational material. The main thrust of the section about the linguistic models states that the changes made under the previous government were ‘clumsy’ and ill-advised because of the clear contradiction with the principle of choice that is the basis of the Law of Basque Education. The new curriculum will ensure that neither Euskara nor Spanish are considered as the principle language of instruction in compulsory schooling and new standards will be enforced.

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509 Please refer to chapter three for an explanation of the PNV’s ‘defeat’ in the 2009 election.
set in terms of language testing; the expectation that students enrolled in models A and B should be fluent in Euskara will be discarded because it is unrealistic and unfair.  

A second major aspect of the changes involve adjusting parts of the curriculum that are, according to Celaá, “instruments of nationalist indoctrination” to ensure that “pluralism, inclusion, and human rights” are emphasized. For instance, teachers cannot infer that Euskal Herria is a sociological reality, but can mention that those in support of uniting the Basque areas of France, Navarra and the BAC territories use the term to refer to this hypothetical country. It will be mandatory to use the term Basque Autonomous Community to refer to the provinces of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, and Araba as a political entity within Spain. Also, the discussion of violence and the Basque resistance movement will be modified to reflect the consensus that terrorist violence is unlawful under any circumstances. This modification was presented in response to concerns that the prior nationalist government was permitting teachers to present viewpoints sympathetic to the radical nationalist movement and ETA. Finally, rules were changed to facilitate the exemption of students from other parts of Spain and late-arriving immigrant pupils from Spanish-speaking countries from any Euskara requirements. According to Celaá, the rules put in place by the prior government were not in the best the interests of students, but rather reflected the goals of the nationalist government to create a unilingual Euskara-speaking society. Representatives of both the PNV and the EA publicly denounced the new decrees of the PV-PSE government, labeling the reforms as a “danger to the advances made by the education ministry towards achieving a genuine bilingual society instead of an official one in which Spanish is the primary language.”

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Even though decree 175/2007 did not explicitly mention immigrant pupils, had they been fully implemented, there would have been obvious implications for the linguistic profile of the education immigrant pupils received. As mentioned earlier, the initial debate surrounding the issue of immigrant pupils and the education models was resolved in favour of parental choice. This decision was surprising given that the PNV had studied the Quebec language laws that prohibit immigrant pupils from enrolling in English schools and were aware of the favourable results in terms of normalizing the French language and building an inclusive Québécois identity. At the same time, the PNV-EA-IU government did objectively try to encourage immigrant families to choose between model B or D as demonstrated by the Language Reinforcement Project in 2004 and the criteria established to assist families choose a linguistic model for their children. The decision to enact reforms and make Euskara the principle language of instruction in compulsory education was not a unanimous one within the tripartite PNV-EA-IU government. Many prominent members of the PNV cabinet opposed the education minister at the time, Tontxu Campos of the EA, but President Juan José Ibarretxe’s support of the reforms enabled Campos to proceed with them. Campos’ critics expressed concern that the initiative would alienate soft nationalists who support more autonomy within the framework of the Spanish Constitution because the PV would be able to construe the reform as anti-Spanish.

On the other hand, Ibarretxe was in a difficult political position following the failure of the so-called Ibarretxe Plan that proposed a radical restructuring of relationship between the Basque Autonomous Community and the Spanish state. The plan narrowly survived a plenary vote in the Basque parliament, but because it entails constitutional change, it was subject to vote in the Spanish Congress of Deputies. The Ibarretxe Plan was rejected by a vote of 313-29 because no members of the

\[514\] Interview 2.
\[515\] 'El Gobierno vasco aprueba el decreto de la Educación Básica que sustituye al currículum de la reforma Campos,’ El País, 31 March 2010.
\[516\] For more detail on the Ibarretxe Plan, see Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, 147-152.
PSOE or PP, the dominant statewide Spanish parties, supported it. The debate surrounding the Ibarretxe Plan polarized an already deeply divided Basque society; 50% of Basques were in favour of it while 50% opposed it. Moreover, intellectuals and civil society organizations such as ¡Basta Ya! (Enough is Enough!) declared the reform proposal was an “antidemocratic, anticonstitutional, divisive, and ethnically driven nationalist machination” that has the potential to permanently fracture Basque society along nationalist and non-nationalist lines. After disenchantment among PNV supporters after the demise of the sovereignty reform proposal, Ibarretxe appeared to be searching for new issues to galvanize Basque nationalists; raising the profile of Euskara in the education system was one of them.

By going ahead with the decree to increase the prominence of Euskara in education, the tripartite government left themselves vulnerable to attacks from the non-nationalist parties that they were harming the socioeconomic prospects of immigrant pupils by coercing them into model D. The nationalist government maintained that its policies were reflective of public opinion that is in favour of a stronger emphasis on achieving true bilingualism through compulsory education.

The conflict over language policy in the context of education between the nationalist and non-nationalist parties reflects the general position of each side about the status of Euskara. Initially, the PNV and EA were careful not to offend the Constitutional principle of equality between Spanish and Euskara, underlining their support for the model of parental choice for all families in the Basque Country, regardless of origin. At the same time, the published guidelines for selecting a linguistic model for immigrant families indicated the nationalists’ desire to socialize immigrants into the

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517 ‘Encuesta del grupo vocento: La mitad de los vascos apoyaría el plan Ibarretxe en un referéndum,’ El Mundo, 30 November 2003.
518 Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, 150.
519 Two years after the proposal was discarded in 2008, Ibarretxe proposed a consultative referendum in the Basque Country on sovereignty and negotiations with ETA. Once again, the Spanish state was able to block Ibarretxe, this time by appealing to Constitutional Court of Spain.
520 Interview 9.
Euskara-speaking milieu. The resistance to the Campos reforms among much of the PNV caucus and nationalist civil society organizations\textsuperscript{521} is consistent with the argument that ideas associated with tolerance and openness have become a part of the Basque nationalist narrative; mandatory Euskara education too closely resembles the type of repression the Basque nation faced in past epochs.

After the 2009 elections that unseated the nationalist government, the PV-PSE coalition quickly moved to dismantle the reforms of the previous administration. It would not be a stretch to argue that the non-nationalist parties reject making Euskara the “principal language of instruction” and continuing closures of model A schools because of the long-term ramifications for their electoral prospects. Kymlicka argues that immigrants willing to learn the language of the minority are still “unlikely to support nationalist mobilizations” by voting for nationalist parties.\textsuperscript{522} Nevertheless, the non-nationalist parties have good reason to believe that if more immigrants integrate into the Euskara-speaking milieu, it will increase the likelihood that they will vote for nationalist parties. In a comprehensive study that spans nearly two decades of Basque elections, Francisco Llera found that the ability to speak Euskara is a strong predictor of the tendency to vote for a nationalist party.\textsuperscript{523} Perhaps the PV-PSE coalition’s defense of model A classes may have more to do with electoral concerns than the rights of Basque citizens to have their children receive a Spanish-medium education.

**Multicultural Education in the Basque Country**

The Basque Public School Act of 1998 states that public education shall be “plural, bilingual, democratic, at the service of Basque society and culturally rooted in the community, participatory, and strive to counterbalance inequality and integrate diversity.”\textsuperscript{524} This law was debated and passed before

\textsuperscript{521} Interview 9.
\textsuperscript{522} Kymlicka, “Immigrant Integration and Minority Nationalism,” 67.
\textsuperscript{523} Llera, *Los Vascos y La Política*.
\textsuperscript{524} Gobierno Vasco, *Programa Para La Atención Del Alumnado Inmigrante*, 1.1.
the immigrant population rose from 2% to 7% within ten years. Consequently, the goal of integrating diversity was in reference to fostering harmonious relations between the Spanish and Euskara speaking communities and satisfying the aspiration of both language groups. The rise in students in Basque public schools in both absolute and relative terms from Latin America, the Maghreb, different parts of Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa inevitably led to a debate over the school curriculum and what needed to be done to prevent the potential corrosive effects of ethnocultural diversity.

In 2002, the Basque Ministry of Education released a report entitled *El Plan de Escolarización del Alumnado Inmigrante* (The Immigrant Student Education Plan) which declared that the challenges of ethnocultural diversity for education in the Basque Country are more profound than ever before. The report cites the cultural distance between students coming from immigrant families, unless managed effectively, could incite problems that make the learning experience less than optimal for both native and immigrant pupils alike. It is imperative, therefore, that the response to diversity is consistent, fair, and cognizant that an excessive emphasis on individualism is not the humanitarian path. In short, the governing nationalist coalition felt that it was necessary to take into account the different cultures and create effective instruments to promote learning and respect for one another.

In the normative debate surrounding multicultural practices in education, scholars such as Brian Barry argue that multiculturalism in schools, in particular when this involves “separate curricula for distinct groups,” discourages the “habits of cooperation or sentiments of trust.” He remains skeptical about multicultural education that involves a common curriculum that includes the histories and culture of all the groups that coexist within the state, but admits that this is better than institutional

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526 Lasarte and Mujika, "Un Proyecto Inclusivo e Intercultural."
separateness.\textsuperscript{528} In the context of a sub-state nationalist culture, Barry’s arguments might resonate even stronger with nationalist elites seeking to nation build because the education system is one of the primary tools of nationalist indoctrination. Nevertheless, the Basque Department of Education did not mince words in its unequivocal rejection of Barry’s position: “multicultural education is necessary to help the socially and economically disadvantaged immigrant student population overcome hurdles...the immigrant student population should feel they are part of the group, but should also feel that their languages and cultures are valued in our society.”\textsuperscript{529}

- Promote success in school and eliminate the barriers that get in the way
- Involve significant individuals from different cultural backgrounds in school organizations
- Encourage dialogue with families from minority cultures
- Include material in the school curriculum that addresses other cultures, focusing on the things that bring us together, not what sets us apart
- Utilize different cultural elements in education activities or conduct them in culturally heterogeneous groups
- Reflect the different cultures and languages in the school environment
- Facilitate access to the literature, language and other facets of minority cultures in the school environment
- Establish a critical dialogue between all cultures

Strategies to implement multiculturalism into the curriculum were developed in a piecemeal manner following the release of the Immigrant Student Programme in 2003. A document released in 2006 highlighted a number of changes that would take effect for the 2007-2008 school-year entitled

\textsuperscript{528} Barry, \textit{Culture and Equality}, 237-8.
\textsuperscript{529} Gobierno Vasco, \textit{Programa Para La Atención Del Alumnado Inmigrante}, 3.2.
Programa de Interculturalidad (Program of Interculturalism). As noted earlier, the use of interculturalism rather than multiculturalism reflects a normative or philosophical principle rather than an empirical one. Policies that would be defined as multicultural by most standards are implemented with the goal of fostering community and togetherness rather than institutional separateness. Another factor that influenced the decision of the Basque government to use the term interculturalism rather than multiculturalism was the negative connotations associated with the retreat from multiculturalism in the Netherlands, and Europe generally.\(^5\)

One of the principle concrete actions outlined in the document is to “recognize and value the mother tongues of students within the school system.”\(^6\) For example, many primary schools in the Basque Country have a welcome message at the school entrance printed in foreign languages that are represented at the school. All correspondence from the school for parents is printed in various languages and translators are hired for parent-teacher interviews in schools where numbers make such a service feasible. Programs that offer mother tongue language classes began in 2008, but were limited to a few schools in Bilbao and Vitoria and lacked adequate funding and resources.\(^7\) Another reason the heritage language program is not yet fully operational is that local school boards were unclear as to the purpose and clientele of the classes. For example, at a primary school in Bilbao, there was an instance of high demand for Mandarin classes at a school by students of different backgrounds. Inevitably, decisions had to be made about how to adjudicate spaces and there was no consensus as to whether the classes were solely meant for children who have ancestry where the language originates or

\(^5\) In particular, concerns were raised that multiculturalism would be associated with the Dutch system of institutional separateness. Interview 11.
\(^6\) Gobierno Vasco, Programa de Interculturalidad y de Inclusión del Alumnado Recién Llegado, (Vitoria: Departamento de Educación, 2007).
\(^7\) Interview 11.
is widely spoken. The development of the heritage language program has slowed considerably because it is not a priority of the new PV-PSE government.533

Another concrete action in the Programa de Interculturalidad is called “adaptable curriculum needs.”534 Because much of the curriculum includes content that is specific to the Basque Country, including geography, history, and culture, the Basque government calls upon decision-makers in the schools to change the curriculum for immigrant pupils when necessary. There are various ways to adapt the curriculum:

- Reduce compulsory content and concentrate on basic subjects studied in each cycle
- Enhance the curriculum to include the students’ own cultural heritage so that educational activities take on more meaning
- Customize learning by incorporating specially designed education activities and monitoring students regularly to be aware of their difficulties and progress

The second suggestion is thought to be a key to promoting effective learning and cohesion in the classroom. The technique of isolating immigrant students by changing their curriculum is only to be used when necessary. Whenever possible, teachers are prompted to increase the presence of students’ native cultures in the curriculum for all students in subjects, such as history, art, and music, to demonstrate the richness and contributions of various cultures to our global (Basque) society.”535

Another concrete action plan developed for the 2007-2008 school year is the new teacher-training program administered by the provinces with funding from the Basque government to raise awareness among teachers about the specificities of the new cultures in Basque schools. In particular,

533 Interview 11.
534 Gobierno Vasco, Programa de Interculturalidad y de Inclusión del Alumnado Recién Llegado.
535 Gobierno Vasco, Programa de Interculturalidad y de Inclusión del Alumnado Recién Llegado.
teachers will attend a series of courses, seminars, and workshops that relate to multicultural diversity and the formal education of the immigrant student population.\(^{536}\)

In order to implement and oversee the aforementioned action points in the realm of multicultural education, the position of \textit{coordinator of interculturalism} was created in various primary and secondary schools. The goal of eventually having one in every primary school with at least a 30\% immigrant population, and one for secondary students that are composed of at least 20\% immigrant pupils, has yet to come to fruition under the new non-nationalist government. The Basque government released the following projection of positions and budgeted €675,000 for the program between 2007 and 2010.\(^{537}\)

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\textbf{Province} & \textbf{Academic Year} & \textbf{Academic Year} & \textbf{Academic Year} \\
Araba & 10 & 58 & 64 \\
Bizkaia & 18 & 154 & 170 \\
Gipuzkoa & 3 & 63 & 69 \\
\textbf{Total} & \textbf{31} & \textbf{275} & \textbf{303} \\
\end{tabular}
\caption{Basque Public Schools, Number of Intercultural Coordinators}
\end{table}

When questioned as to why the nationalist government embraced a policy of multiculturalism in the curriculum, two mains factors permeated the responses of the interview subjects: the turn away from multiculturalism at the state level and the re-emphasis of a ‘hard’ version of Spanish nationalism. As discussed in the previous chapter, the parliamentary majority won by the PP in 2000 empowered Aznar to pursue a conservative political program that emphasized the Spanish identity with the goal of “pushing back against the tide of multiculturalism.”\(^{538}\) In 2003, the Aznar government enacted controversial changes to the educational curriculum to “shape the values of new generations of

\(^{536}\) Gobierno Vasco, \textit{Programa Para La Atención Del Alumnado Inmigrante}, 7.4.
\(^{537}\) Gobierno Vasco, \textit{Programa de Interculturalidad y de Inclusión del Alumnado Recién Llegado}.
Spaniards along traditionalist lines.\textsuperscript{539} The new curriculum made religion a mandatory subject in primary and secondary schools and broke with the consensus to maintain a church-state division in Spain since the transition to democracy. Another key change was the recasting of ideas of Spanish nationalism in the history curriculum in both primary and secondary schools. The new materials emphasize the ancient country of Spain as unified and indivisible, with a strong historically and culturally based identity. The new curriculum also changed the historical discourse of Spain as a decadent and inefficient empire to one that sought to portray Spain as a “modern, civilizing state that has been shaped by great moments such as the conquest of the Americas.”\textsuperscript{540} These changes to the curriculum were part of a project of ‘Constitutional Patriotism’ approved by the PP at its 14\textsuperscript{th} congress in 2002, an attempt to undermine the perception of Spain as becoming a multicultural democracy in reality and practice. Aznar himself did not shy away from objecting to multiculturalism as a sociological reality or official policy: “multiculturalism divides societies; it is not living together, it is not integration.”\textsuperscript{541}

After losing the 2004 election to the PSOE, the PP has continued to stake out a position against official multiculturalism in Spain. The leader who replaced Aznar, Mariano Rajoy, announced that if elected, the PP would implement a program that would force immigrants to sign a ‘contract of integration.’\textsuperscript{542} According to the proposal, immigrants would have to agree to abide by the laws of Spain, respect the customs and culture of the Spanish people, learn the Spanish language, pay taxes, and work diligently to integrate into Spanish society. Failing to find employment within a specified time period, an immigrant would be expected to return to their country of origin. Every other party


\textsuperscript{540} Xose M. Nuñez Seixas, “Conservative Spanish Nationalism since the Early 1990s,” in \textit{The Politics of Contemporary Spain} (London: Routledge, 2005), 134.

\textsuperscript{541} Encarnación, \textit{Spanish Politics}, 64.

\textsuperscript{542} ‘Rajoy quiere obligar a los inmigrantes a firmar un contrato de integración’, \textit{El País}, 7 February 2008.
represented in the Spanish House of Deputies has denounced these proposals. A criticism that came from the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties centered on the issue of whether immigrants should adapt to Spanish customs and culture. The nationalists argued that there is no Spanish nation or culture for immigrants to integrate into because the country of Spain is made up of distinct nations. The nationalists also charged that the idea of a ‘catalogue of Spanish customs’ for immigrants to adopt is akin to xenophobia and another example of exploitative electoral strategizing by the PP.  

Basque nation building weighed in on the PNV-led government’s adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum following the immigration boom. The rejuvenation of hard Spanish nationalism by Aznar’s PP government in 2000 coincided with an outright rejection of multiculturalism in the Spanish curriculum. The BAC has full responsibility for the implementation of education and determines 65% of the curriculum. This high level of responsibility for the educational curriculum provided the opportunity for governing nationalist parties to integrate multiculturalism into the curriculum and distance itself from the controversial anti-multiculturalism stance of the conservative PP government. Since the 2009 elections ended 25 years of nationalist rule, the PV-PSE coalition has not eliminated multiculturalism from the Basque curriculum, but has proven to be less willing to fund multicultural initiatives and is reluctant to use interculturalism or multiculturalism to categorize the Basque curriculum.

Conclusion

The case study of education policy presented in this chapter reveals two interesting developments in the response of Basque nationalists to immigration. First, concerns about the potential

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543 ‘¿Nos van a pasar un catálogo de costumbres españoles?’, El País, 7 February 2008.
544 The so-called ‘fast-track’ autonomies of the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia have assumed more responsibility in education than the other autonomous communities. Nevertheless, the decentralization process in Spain is still under way and the state may continue to lose control of the education policy sector to the autonomous communities.
detrimental effects of foreign migration on the normalization of Euskara have been minimal, if not non-existent. Elites in the nationalist parties have conceived of immigration as an opportunity to further the normalization of Euskara. The strategy of using incentives and appeals to the concept of inclusive Basque citizenship appears to be working as the number of immigrants enrolling in model D and B continue to rise. The decision in 2007 to increase the teaching time in Euskara in models A and B has been interpreted by statewide parties as a move towards assimilation rather multiculturalism. Yet, it did not specifically target foreign immigrants and had more to do with general concerns that models A and B were not meeting stated objectives: a basic competency in Euskara along with fluency in Spanish. More importantly, ideas concerning the treatment of cultural linguistic minorities have come to the forefront of the Basque nationalist narrative through a process of ‘forgetting’ certain aspects of the nationalist history (e.g., racism, ethnic nationalism) and ‘remembering’ others (e.g., the repression of Euskara and Basque cultural symbols). Restricting the choice of immigrant families to send their children to any linguistic model, therefore, was never seriously considered, in part, because the Basque nation understands itself as a repressed cultural minority. Repressive policies against internal minorities, therefore, would undermine the grievances Basque nationalists have with the Spanish state.

Second, the rejuvenation of hard Spanish nationalism by Aznar’s PP government in 2000 provided an opportunity for Basque nationalists to define a different approach that would highlight the difference between Basque and Spanish values. Because multiculturalism fit with the evolved understanding of Basqueness, nationalist elites have been able to pursue this path to pursue their goals of shoring up the sense of distinctiveness and nationhood in the Basque Country.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Introduction

This dissertation began with a straightforward puzzle: why has the Basque nation promoted multiculturalism and offered socio-economic support to new immigrants despite its historical association with racism and exclusivity? Using as its sources elite interviews, parliamentary records, ministerial and party documents, and secondary sources, the study challenged three key explanations gleaned from the literature on minority nationalism and immigration. The primordial and national foundations arguments give primacy to ethnicity as the ‘glue’ that holds the nation together. Consequently, immigration is a threat to the cultural integrity of nations, which is especially true for minority nations because of the added difficulty of protecting a culture without a formal state. The variation over time and across space in the response of minority nations to immigration seriously undermines the usefulness of the primordial approach.

The first variant of the globalization argument is that greater global closeness motivates ethnic groups to seek refuge in the golden age of simplicity and homogeneity, leading minority nations to reject multiculturalism and restrict citizenship according to ethnicity. Much like the primordial position, this argument does not withstand empirical scrutiny because the response of Basque nationalists, as well as other cases, such as Scotland, Quebec, and Catalonia, has not been anti-immigrant or anti-multiculturalist by any means. The second version of the globalization argument, associated with the work of Michael Keating, is that minority nations are acting more like civic states and seek to participate independently in international institutions. According to Keating’s perspective, the adoption of multiculturalism and inclusive citizenship policies are an expression of the desire of
small nations without states to act like nation-states themselves. The shortcomings of this argument that the Basque case brings to light is that minority nations are continuing to frame the nationalist struggle for more autonomy or independence as one driven by conflicting values. Basque nationalists have positioned themselves in opposition to Spain (and the EU) on immigration and multiculturalism, rather than trying to mimic these actors.

Finally, the institutional perspective suggests that political autonomy conditions minority nationalists to adopt a multicultural identity and welcome new immigrants to their territory. An open and multicultural approach to integration in the context of political autonomy works because minority nationalists are able to increase the economic and societal prestige of the minority language and culture, thereby giving immigrants a reason to learn the language and adopt the culture of the minority rather than the majority nation. Although the institutional perspective can provide some insights into the Basque case and others, the framework takes for granted that a national minority is naturally inclined towards accepting diversity and that a lack of autonomy suppresses its will to become multicultural. The institutional perspective does not account for the logical possibility that autonomy would lead a minority nation to shore up its position of dominance and adopt citizenship policies that differentiate between the core ethnicity of the nation and outsiders.

In order to better understand why the outcome in the Basque case confounded expectations, I developed two interrelated causal arguments that integrate the role of ideas and the imperative of nation building for elites. Nations are forged by a rich legacy of memories, but the cement of their identity is not the past itself, but “what the community tells one another in the present about what they remember.”545 In short, nationalist history requires both an act of collective remembering and collective amnesia. A shared history of repression is a component of the narrative of many minority

545 Muro, Ethnicity and Violence, 19.
nations. For example, the narrative of the Basque nation stresses that the Spanish state, especially during the Franco dictatorship, purposefully tried to destroy the Basque nation by banning its language and cultural expressions and depriving it of its natural right to sovereignty. At the same time, Sabino Arana’s racialist discourse is also a part of the Basque nationalist narrative, but it has been marginalized over time as the collective memory of the nation has been reconstructed. Consequently, the ideas that stem from the memories of repression constrained the choices of Basque nationalist elites, preventing the rise to prominence of ideas linked to racial purity and exclusion. This finding is consistent with research on American race relations that suggests oppressed groups are more sympathetic towards immigrants because of the marginalization they themselves experienced.\textsuperscript{546} According to this perspective, historically oppressed statewide majorities such as the Jews in Israel are less inclined to treat minorities sympathetically because the threat of persecution by a dominant group is no longer present.

Another factor that shaped the decision-making of Basque nationalist elites is the imperative to nation build. Minority nationalists can target the actions of the central (and supranational) government in the area of immigration and integration as too restrictive and assimilationist or too lax and multicultural, and argue that a distinct position is necessary to fit with the values of the imagined national community. The emergence of a stricter immigration regime and emphasis on hard nationalism in Spain and a backlash against multiculturalism in Europe provided Basque nationalists with an opportunity to link open citizenship and multiculturalism to the distinctiveness of the Basque nation.

Theory building based on a case study can be problematic because it may bias the researcher to over-fit the argument to the idiosyncrasies of the case under study. The following sections will briefly

examine if the arguments developed in this dissertation can help shed some light on the minority nationalism-immigration nexus in the cases of Scotland, Quebec, and Flanders. The final section will focus on the implications of the research and directions for future study.

Scotland: Diversity as a Marker of Identity in a Nation without a Language

For very different reasons than the Basque case, scholars often identify Scottish nationalism as ‘exceptional.’ When questioned about the difference between the Scottish nation and other comparable cases, a member of the SNP said, “Scots do have a cultural identity though in some ways this is more subtle than for other groups.” While other nationalities rely on a language, religion, or even particular racial features as core markers of the nation, a number of factors have made the demarcation of the national community more complicated for the Scots.

Unlike in the Basque case, language is not a marker used by Scottish nationalists to demonstrate the sociological reality of the nation. Gaelic is in decline and attempts to revive it by academics, writers, and the popular media have failed to reverse the steady decline of the number of its speakers in Scotland. More importantly, the SNP, the main vehicle of modern Scottish nationalism, has been reluctant to connect the Gaelic language with its representations of ‘Scottishness.’ A minority within the family of Scottish nationalist organizations claim that Scots is a separate language rather than a mere dialect of English. Others suggest that the accent with which Scots speak English demarcates the Scottish from the English nation. It is commonplace now for Scottish films and newscasts to prefer actors and journalists that have a distinctive Scottish accent, but the idea of a Scottish dialect of English is compromised by the internal diversity of spoken accents within Scotland.

549 Ichijo, Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe, 16.
It is suffice to say that language or accent has never, and likely will never, function as a core aspect of Scottish identity.

While Basque nationalism may have overcome its reliance on race as a core element of the nation, Scottish nationalists have never referred to race to define Scots from outsiders. The invasions of Spain by outsiders (e.g., Moors) never reached the Basque Country, which buoyed the racialist understanding of Basqueness because nationalist elites could verifiably present the Basque race as pure. In the Scottish case, this was never possible because so many different groups “have left their footprints on Scottish soil,” a fact acknowledged by Scottish historians. The waves of immigrants, the Picts, Romans, Britons, Saxons, Normans, and Norsemen, came to a halt following the medieval period and racist ideologies became popular in Europe in the 19th century, two factors that opened a window of opportunity for a racialist version of Scottish nationalism to take root. Nevertheless, even during the 19th century, the recognition that Scotland was internally diverse and an inability to identify a Scottish race prevented the idea of a Scottish ethnic nation from crystallizing.

If not language or race, what were the factors that preserved and fostered a sense of Scottish nationality? Works on the history of Scottish nationalism agree that the 1707 Act of Union which united the Scottish and English parliaments laid the foundation for a flourishing Scottish identity because it preserved the three pillars of Scottish society: the Church, the legal system, and the education system. Of the three pillars, the idea of Protestant Scotland did at one time appear to function as a core indicator of Scottishness. For a long time following the Reformation, membership in the established Church of Scotland (the Kirk) was nearly universal among Scots, but new historiographies of Scottish nationalism suggest that Scotland was never thoroughly a Protestant

More importantly, membership rates for the Church of Scotland are falling rapidly; secularization has progressed more rapidly in Scotland than in the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom. Despite the fact that many observers perceive Presbyterianism as an important characteristic of Scottish society, religion no longer plays a central role in the Scottish nationalist narrative.

The motivations and consequences of the Act of Union itself remain controversial for Scottish nationalists. Nevertheless, the scholarly consensus is that the UK state had no intention of suppressing Scottish distinctiveness or exploiting the Scottish economy. In fact, Scotland had much to gain from the Union because it was poor and trade opportunities were limited following the Reformation. Moreover, according to Hamilton, the religious persecution suffered by the Scots during the reign of Charles I (1629-40) drove Scottish elites to seek protection for Protestant Scotland through the Union with England.

Nevertheless, as argued in this dissertation, the process of imagining the nation in the present always entails using a selective memory to highlight certain aspects of history and downplay others. Scottish historians writing after political nationalism had taken shape in Scotland, have tended to cast the 1707 Act of Union in a negative light. Paul Henderson Scott, a leading Scottish nationalist historian, conceives of the events of 1707 as the beginning of centuries of foreign domination for the Scottish people. There is no data on the state of Scottish public opinion in 1707, but some historians

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unabashedly argue that class collusion between Scottish and English elites sold out everyday Scots in order to preserve elite privileges.\textsuperscript{558}

For its part, the SNP released manifestos in the 1970s that evoked negative images of Scotland as an “unimportant and underprivileged region of the UK” that needed to regain its glory.\textsuperscript{559} Manifestos from this period also stressed that Scotland is one of Europe’s oldest nations and that all Scots take for granted the existence of a glorious nation with a rich history complete with myths, heroes, and symbols.\textsuperscript{560}

Anti-English sentiments were also a prominent theme in the SNP’s official documents in the 1970s and 1980s. The SNP decried the overcrowding of Scottish universities with English students and the 1974 manifesto also condemned the ‘Anglicization’ of education in Scotland and argued that “Scots children must engage with their own traditions and wider heritage they share.”\textsuperscript{561} In the economic realm, Scotland was referred to as an exploited province and ideological extremism in England was highlighted. While the meaning of extremism is vague, the remainder of the text describes the prevalence of extreme ideologies such as capitalism and liberalism in England, whereas Scotland is more collectivist and egalitarian.\textsuperscript{562}

In the 1980s, the SNP manifestos expressed a deeper sense of cultural identity among Scots, but stopped short of translating the emphasis on culture to define ‘who is a Scot and who is not.’ A section in the 1983 manifesto, entitled ‘Safeguarding Scotland’s Identity,’ focused on the “common heritage, culture, way of life, and thought and expression which are unique to Scotland.”\textsuperscript{563} Many passages

\textsuperscript{558} See Hamilton, “The Limits and Potential of Civic Nationalism,” 84.
\textsuperscript{560} Leith, "Scottish National Party Representations of Scottishness and Scotland,” 86.
\textsuperscript{561} Leith, "Scottish National Party Representations of Scottishness and Scotland,” 86.
\textsuperscript{562} For further development of this point, see Béland and Lecours, \textit{Nationalism and Social Policy}.
portray the English as the ‘other’ and suggest that they are foreigners in Scotland who should have fewer rights than Scots, especially with regards to the ownership of property and capital. The manifesto also attacked England for colonizing the Scots and making Scotland a ‘provincial backwater’ of England.

The Scots did not suffer the kind of political and cultural repression prior to, or after the 1707 Act of Union that the Basques did under Franco. Nevertheless, as I will argue, the imagined narrative of the Scots as a subjugated nation does factor into how modern Scottish nationalists—embodied by SNP—have positioned themselves in the debate on immigration and multiculturalism in the UK.

**Immigrants in Scotland: Racism, Accommodation, and Multiculturalism**

As mentioned previously, historians and nationalists have never tried to conjure up the image of a Golden Age of Scotland replete with ethnic homogeneity. Scots take pride in the apparent absence of racism, but the historical record challenges the myth of a non-racist Scotland. The first documented immigrants to Scotland came from Ireland in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. The economic opportunities in Scotland and the occurrence of natural disasters in Ireland, such as the Potato Blight, led more than 300,000 Irish to migrate to Scotland by the mid-18th century, which amounted to 12\% of the population.\textsuperscript{564}

The immigrants, concentrated in the Glasgow area, were subject to xenophobia and bigotry by the dominant Protestant population. The Church of Scotland went as far as to encourage this hatred and intolerance.\textsuperscript{565} The assimilation of other immigrants from Europe occurred rapidly and visible minorities from the New Commonwealth countries did not arrive en masse until after 1945.

The largest group of immigrants from the New Commonwealth is from Pakistan, but East Asians also formed a significant minority in Scotland shortly after World War II. The majority of

\textsuperscript{564} Mann, *The New Scots*, 17.

\textsuperscript{565} Hamilton, “The Scottish National Paradox,” 25.
Asian Scots worked in low-wage sectors of the economy prior to the 1970s, a product of informal discriminatory hiring practices as well as a generally lower level of education. More recently, Asian Scots have faced racial harassment in the form of verbal, and sometimes physical, intimidation.\textsuperscript{566} A number of Scottish studies in the 1990s found that non-whites suffer from higher rates of unemployment, live in overcrowded housing, and earn less than their white colleagues do.\textsuperscript{567} Also of note is the continuing underrepresentation of visible minorities in both the Scottish police and military forces.

Despite the presence of societal level racism, there is ample evidence that the SNP has gone out if its way to emphasize the civic and multicultural character of the Scottish nation. The party has maintained that the “presence in Scotland of people from diverse origins is a source of enrichment for Scottish society.”\textsuperscript{568} In 1995, the SNP launched ‘New Scots for Independence’ to provide a forum for the views of Scotland’s Asian and other minority communities to voice their opinions on the SNP’s platform. During the party’s annual conference the same year, the founders of the SNP announced that the forum for New Scots within the SNP structure is a means “to achieve our vision of a multi-cultural nation which guarantees the rights and privileges of all citizens.”\textsuperscript{569} Moreover, the SNP Policy Handbook of March 1993 states that diversity is a source of enrichment and deals with such matters as mother-tongue language instruction, religious education, housing, employment targets for minorities, anti-discrimination, and public funding for the Commission for Racial Equity.

The SNP was confident that these initiatives to strengthen the inclusionary nature of the Scottish nation would not alienate its core supporters because of the deeply embedded notion of Scotland as a ‘mongrel nation’ and the popular myth that Scotland ‘is not racist like England.’ In

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{566} Hamilton, “The Scottish National Paradox,” 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{567} Hamilton, “The Limits and Potential of Civic Nationalism,” 230.
  \item \textsuperscript{568} Scottish National Party, \textit{Independence in Europe: Make it Happen Now!} (Edinburgh: SNP, 1992), 13.
  \item \textsuperscript{569} Hamilton, “The Scottish National Paradox,” 27.
\end{itemize}
numerous interviews with SNP members and other nationalists, Atsuko Ichijo found that a widely
accepted answer to the question ‘who are the Scots?’ is that they are a mixture of people with different
ethnic origins which is the strength of modern Scottish nationalism.570 Because Scots are so-called
mongrels, so the argument goes, anyone can become a Scot regardless of his or her ethnicity; the only
requirement is to live in Scotland and actively contribute to the betterment of Scottish society. Her
interview research also uncovers a shared sense of pride among Scots that widespread racism is absent
in their society. The Scottish media depicts incidents of racism as an ‘English problem’ and proclaim
that the British National Party always does very poorly in Scotland in parliamentary elections. A
researcher of UK race relations sums it up as such: “the tendency is to think that there isn’t a problem
with racism in Scotland, the Scots see themselves as victims of English racism.”571 Despite the
intersubjective understanding of Scotland as a multiethnic nation, the Scots have not been known
throughout history for their ethnic tolerance.572 In order to create and sustain the myth of a tolerant
Scotland, facts about both its history and present, such as the mistreatment of Catholics in the 19th
century and racially motivated violence in the 1980s and 1990s, have been collectively forgotten by the
Scottish nation.

Net migration increased under the New Labour government since the late 1990s because of the
active recruitment of highly skilled economic migrants.573 The new direction for immigration and
integration policy included more stringent asylum requirements and ended the access of non-citizens to
non-contributory benefits in 1999.574 The English media and public response to rising immigration

570 These observations are based on in-depth interview research. See Ichijo, Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of
Europe.
572 Ichijo, Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe, 128.
719-740.
574 Don Flynn, "New Borders, New Management: The Dilemmas of Modern Immigration Policies," Ethnic and Racial
Studies 28, no. 3 (2005): 474.
levels has been characterized as xenophobic. One scholar notes the many references to immigrants in a dichotomy of ‘us versus them’ in various English news sources.\textsuperscript{575}

Another trend in UK politics in recent years, supported by British intellectuals and both New Labour and the Conservatives, is the reassertion of ‘Britishness’ and value of the Union. This ideology of Britishness is aimed at both threats to the nation: multiculturalism and multinationalism. British New Labour governments have consistently driven home the message in speeches, manifestos and policies that a strong British identity exists, apart from and above other identities that may persist in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{576} In a speech to the Labour Party Conference, Gordon Brown mentioned Britain 51 times and British 29 times, British people 16 times, and the notorious ‘British jobs for British workers’ ten times.\textsuperscript{577} Moreover, the Green Paper on \textit{The Governance of Britain} released under the New Labour government laid out a new strong British identity, albeit non-ethnic, but one that deviates from the more liberal-multiculturalist position normally upheld in the UK. According to the Green Paper, “there is room to celebrate multiple and different identities, but none of these identities should take precedence over the core democratic values that define what it means to be British.”\textsuperscript{578} The measures the government has developed to combat what it sees as an excess of multiculturalism has not resonated with Scottish nationalists (at the elite or societal level) because the program in general is ignorant of the sociological reality that the UK is a multinational state.\textsuperscript{579}

As matters of immigration and multiculturalism became more contentious in the United Kingdom, the SNP seized upon the opportunity to draw a distinction between Scottish and English values. Both the SNP and Scottish Labour have welcomed immigration as a solution to Scotland’s

\textsuperscript{575} Hepburn, “Regionalist Party Mobilization on Immigration,” 521.
\textsuperscript{577} Keating, \textit{The Independence of Scotland}, 67-68.
\textsuperscript{578} Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, \textit{The Governance of Britain}, (London: CM 7170, 2007), 57.
\textsuperscript{579} Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, \textit{The Governance of Britain}, 67.
long-term demographic problem and for the overall contribution diversity in and of itself makes to Scottish society.\footnote{Heather Rolfe and Hilary Metcalf, Recent Migration in Scotland: The Evidence Base (Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2009).} Public attitudes towards immigration in Scotland have been very positive as well, much more so than in England.\footnote{A. Saeed, N. Blain, and D. Forbes, "New Ethnic and National Questions in Scotland: Post-British Identities among Glasgow Pakistani Teenagers," Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 5 (1999): 821-844.} Not surprisingly, the SNP has cited the greater demand for immigrants as an argument for the devolution of immigration policy to the Scottish parliament.\footnote{Scottish National Party, 'It’s Time for a Scottish Immigration Service,' SNP Press Release, 27 January 2007.} As SNP Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill argued, “our economic needs and social wants are different and distinct to the rest of the UK. As a nation of emigrants, we wish to see immigrants coming to Scotland dealt with kindness and compassion, not brutality and oppression.”\footnote{Hepburn, "Regionalist Party Mobilization on Immigration," 521.} This quote reveals that ideas about the Scottish identity, in particular, the kindness displayed by other countries that have received Scots during hard times, interplay with nation building imperatives to foster a pro-immigration position.

The SNP’s recent arguments in favour of devolving immigration powers to the Scottish parliament include the distinctly Scottish desire to develop a “multicultural society free from racism and intolerance.”\footnote{Scottish National Party, If Scotland Matters to You Make it Matter in May (Edinburgh: SNP, 2005).} There is also evidence that the Scottish parliament is using its powers in the areas of health care and education to build a more inclusive version of citizenship that is compassionate towards newcomers who require access to the full scope of social services upon arrival in Scotland.\footnote{Rolfe and Metcalf, Recent Migration in Scotland.} Because the SNP is also trying to shed its anti-English reputation, the direct comparisons with England or the UK as a whole are not explicit, but the message of SNP’s statements on immigration and multiculturalism are clear: we are different because of our history and values. In Scotland, emphasizing the differences between English and Scottish values and public opinion is a key nation
building strategy for the SNP because it lacks the more traditional core markers of stateless nations such as language.

**Quebec: Interculturalism as a Response to Canadian Multiculturalism**

The tense relationship between the two founding nations of Canada—the French and the English—resulted in the development of a strong sub-state nationalist movement in the province of Quebec, the home of the majority of Francophones in the country. From the mid-19th century onwards, there were concerns in Quebec that the growing Anglophone population would erode the political weight held by Francophones in the federation. Moreover, immigration into Montreal, the largest city in Quebec, illuminated the privileged status of Anglophones in the upper echelons of the economy.586

The arrival of immigrants *en masse* from various countries in the 20th century accentuated the feeling of *la survivance* among Quebec nationalists. Often forgotten is that Quebec’s nationalism was once considered ethnic and its sentiments toward immigrants were exclusionary and hostile until the 1960s. From the 1960s onward, Quebec nationalism—led by the *Parti Québécois* (PQ)—systematically emphasized the more inclusive aspects of its nationalism and began the process of forgetting the racist elements of French-Canadian identity. This shift also entailed the development of multicultural policies that favoured the retention of native cultures by immigrants. The multicultural approach was abandoned, however, in favour of a more liberal-neutral approach that emphasizes a common cultural core based on the French language and democratic values. What emerged to fill this vacuum was the policy of interculturalism, in large part as a rejection of Canadian multiculturalism.

Scholars have labeled French-Canadian nationalism of the late 19th as a ‘pessimistic nationalism’ because its narrative was imbued with the negative emotions associated with the British

Conquest of 1763 and the rapidly declining proportion of French-speakers in Canada. Early French-Canadian national elites shaped a defensive style of nationalism that sought to create a ‘fortress’ of Quebec to allow French-Canadians to maintain their rural Catholic lifestyle. The narrative focused on the collectivity of Francophones fighting against British domination. The French-Canadian nation was defined in culturally static terms, and always referring to a set of common ancestors of French descent. According to Danielle Juteau, “you were born a French-Canadian, you did not become one; the boundaries of the national community were defined as fixed, narrow, and impermeable.”

Independence-seeking Quebec nationalism was politically weak before the 1960s. The Union Nationale government of Maurice Duplessis favoured traditionalist patterns of development and maintained a stranglehold on political power in Quebec via patronage arrangements with Anglophone business elites and the Catholic Church. By leaving economic matters to the Anglophones in Montreal Duplessis and his allies in the Church argued that French-Canadians would be able to protect their language and traditional way of life.

The pessimistic nationalism resulted in an attitude towards immigrants that was “marked essentially by refusal.” In an article in the influential journal L’Action Nationale, Jean-Marc Léger explains why French-Canadians were hostile towards immigrants in the first half of the 20th century:

“The first wave of immigration came from Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and partly Slavic resources. It did not take long for our religious and political leaders to raise the alarm about a process that seemed to them as designed to lessen the French Canadian presence in the confederation as a whole. Thus, our tradition of hostility towards immigration began and, at the level of the population, did not take long to translate into hostility towards the immigrant himself.”

French-Canadians elites accused English Canada of purposefully executing a plan to overrun French Canada with English-speakers in order to make English and Anglo culture dominant. Despite Lord Durham’s famous declaration, “immigration from England should be used so the country would be filled with an English population,” there is little evidence that suggests any deliberate actions were taken by the Anglophone elites to eradicate the French language and culture in Canada. In all likelihood, immigrants in Quebec integrated into the English-speaking milieu because of the economic opportunities and prestige that speaking English afforded them. Scholars documented that the cultural division of labour by language during the mid-20th century in Quebec rendered French the language of the ‘factory floor’ and English the language of upper management.\(^{591}\)

The British North America Act of 1867 made immigration policy a concurrent policy of the federal and provincial governments. The discourse of politicians and elites rejected the idea of Quebec as a society of immigration and there was little interest in using the Quebec provincial state to regulate immigration or influence integration patterns.\(^{592}\) This outcome is problematic for the institutionalist perspective because Quebec had significant autonomy to pursue policies in line with popular opinion or elite interests yet did not do so. Moreover, the province did not attempt to legislate against the use of English language schools among newcomers prior to the 1960s even though the Constitution allocated to Quebec significant powers in the fields of language and culture. At this point, French Canadians were focused on their survival as a race in Canada and did not see immigration as relevant to this project.\(^{593}\)

The 1960s marked the beginning of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, a period during which Quebec rapidly transformed from a rural, Catholic, and traditional society to one characterized by


Accompanying these changes was a territorializaition of the French-Canadian identity, creating two distinct communities called *les Québécois* and *les Francophones hors Québec* (Francophones outside Quebec). Nevertheless, not all citizens of Quebec were imagined as part of the Québécois identity, which was limited to French Canadians who “shared a common history and destiny that was increasingly linked to the political project of sovereignty.” At this stage, the nation was historical and cultural, both *les Anglais* and new immigrants constituted the ‘other.’

Towards the end of 1960s, the *Parti Libéral du Québec* (PLQ) passed Bill 75 in the National Assembly that created the Quebec Ministry of Immigration. The Bill gave the Ministry three functions: a) to encourage immigrants to settle in Quebec who would contribute to its development, b) encourage immigrants to adapt to the French-speaking milieu, and c) to encourage the preservation of ethnic customs. The main factor that led to a consensus among all the major political forces in Quebec on Bill 75 was the emerging linguistic crisis. In debate prior to the Bill, both René Lévesque (PQ) and Jean Lesage (PLQ) emphasized that a *laissez faire* approach to immigration would disrupt the linguistic composition of the province. Their statements in the National Assembly were based on statistics demonstrating that immigration was having an Anglicizing effect on Quebec because immigrants were choosing to learn English as their second language rather than French. Moreover, the consensus among nationalists and federalists was that Quebec needed to adopt a more civic conception of the nation to encourage more immigrants to choose Quebec over other provinces (mainly Ontario) to strengthen the position of Quebec in the Canadian federation. This concern about Quebec’s demographic status in the federation, despite the

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594 Gagnon, *Quebec.*
596 Juteau, "The Citizen Makes an Entrée," 445
597 Barker, "Redefining the Nation," 118-120.
aspirations for independence within the province, suggests that the French Canadian nation still defined itself, at least partly, in opposition to English Canada. This shift from a position of exclusion to openness in the form of recruitment policies and the recognition of cultural differences contradicts both the primordial and institutional perspectives. The adoption of Bill 75 was not the result of constitutional change (more autonomy); political elites in Quebec chose to use existing powers to stake out a new position on immigration.

The third objective of the Ministry of Immigration, to encourage the preservation of ethnic customs, resulted in a number of standard multicultural policies. One of the earliest programs, the Program of Ethnic Languages, encouraged both children and adults to maintain their mother tongues in addition to learning French. The Quebec government was also subsidizing ethnic associations as early as 1970. After the PQ election victory in 1976, the party affirmed its position that ethnic groups or ‘cultural collectivities’ were the unit of integration, and any overarching Quebec identity remained weak. In 1980, the Ministry of Immigration became the ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l’Immigration (Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration - MCCI), which had a mandate to maintain and develop cultural communities and sensitize Quebec Francophones to the contribution of these communities to society. As a corollary of the change, the terms New Quebecker and allophone were discarded in favour of cultural community within Quebec. Another affirmation of Quebec’s policy of multiculturalism came in 1984 with the establishment of the Conseil des Communautés culturelles et de l’Immigration (CCCI), a body of 15 members representing Quebec’s prominent cultural communities with a mandate to provide the minister with policy advice from the perspective of their respective ethnic group. By the mid 1980s, official documents and discourse recognized the presence of cultural communities and their right to cultural

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protection, but a clear distinction still existed between ethnic French Canadians and new immigrants; the latter remained outside the national community. 600

While there were many factors that led to the passing of the controversial Bill 101 language law in 1977 by the PQ, immigration was certainly an impetus for the decision. Increasing ethnic diversity and the anglicization of Montreal brought about the realization that Bill 75 would be insufficient as a means to get newcomers to adopt French as their primary language of communication outside the home. Some implications of Bill 101 were profound: French became the sole official language of Quebec and access to English language schools in the province was restricted to children of parents who themselves received an English language education in Quebec. 601 The latter constituted an attempt to reverse the trend of immigrant students disproportionately entering the English language education system. On one hand, it provides another example of the new conception of the Québécois nation; immigrants who learn French can become full-fledged members. On the other hand, it is reflective of a passive rejection of liberal principles of free choice in favour of a more assimilationist approach. This presents an interesting contrast with the Basque case (chapter 5) in which nationalists opted against a policy to restrict access to Spanish-medium schools for immigrants.

A potential explanation for this difference is the nature and degree of past subjugation that remains a strong part of the national narrative. In the Quebec case, the architects of the Bill 101 argued that the law constituted an important step in valorizing the French language and culture because of the collective suffering endured throughout history by French-speakers in North

600 Juteau, ”The Citizen Makes an Entrée,” 444.
601 The Supreme Court struck down the ‘in Quebec’ portion of the law under the so-called ‘Canada clause.’ The effect was that a parent who had been education in English anywhere in Canada could send their children to English-medium schools in Quebec.
Another possibility to acknowledge in both the Basque and Quebec cases is the structure of party competition. Even though the non-nationalist parties have integrated sensitivity for Basque issues into their political platforms, it remains politically viable to defend the status of the Spanish language in the Basque Country because 50% of those living in the BAC do not speak Euskara. The political dynamics are different in Quebec where more than 80% of Québécois are first language French-speakers. The PQ did not have to worry about potential resistance from the PLQ regarding Bill 101 because rejecting it would have been akin to political suicide. On the other hand, by strongly advocating for a Euskara-only education system, the PNV could jeopardize its position as the largest party in the Basque parliament by alienating parts of its electorate that are first language Spanish-speakers.

In the span of a few decades, the dominant policy framework and societal response shifted from one of hostility and indifference to group-based multiculturalism. The official policy of multiculturalism entailed the allocation of significant amounts of government funds towards heritage language classes, ethnic associations, and settlement, which is indicative of a shift towards a group approach in the socio-economic domain as well. A shift away from multiculturalism towards assimilation on the cultural policy continuum, however, began to occur in the 1990s. Much of the secondary literature on Quebec nationalism suggests this shift constituted a rejection of the development of official multiculturalism in Canada. I agree with this interpretation, but it takes on another dimension when analyzed as a policy shift rather policy development. In short, the overhaul of Quebec’s multicultural policy was not simply a rejection of multiculturalism, but a deliberate attempt to distinguish between Canadian and Québécois values in order to nation build.

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602 L. Ian MacDonald, From Bourassa to Bourassa: A Pivotal Decade in Canadian History (Montréal: Harvest House, 1984), 36.
Multiculturalism as a philosophy and policy emerged in response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism in the 1960s. The so-called ‘third force’—immigrants and ethnocultural communities—felt that the concept of biculturalism did not recognize their contribution to Canada and would relegate them to second-class citizenship in an English and French country. Canada’s Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, also a critic of the concept of Canada as a French-English duality, devised a policy of official multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. This decision reflected his personal belief that individuals should be free to dissociate themselves from their cultural communities. In other words, Trudeau felt that the state should not determine whether its citizens actively preserve their ethnic identities.

Trudeau’s rejection of the B&B commission’s recommendation that Canada recognize Quebec as a nation influenced the official policy of multiculturalism, adopted in 1971. Canadian multiculturalism comprised “an official doctrine and corresponding set of policies and practices in which ethnoracial differences are formally promoted and incorporated as an integral component of the political, social, and symbolic order.” The policy resulted in funding and support for ethnic associations, programs to celebrate foreign cultures, and heritage language classes.

In 1988, Brian Mulroney’s conservative government reiterated the principles of Trudeau’s version of multiculturalism and added a stronger emphasis on counteracting racial discrimination. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act contained a provision “whereby the minister of multiculturalism could assist ethnocultural communities to conduct activities with a view to overcoming any discriminatory barrier, in particular, discrimination based on race, nationality, or ethnic origin.”

604 Gagnon and Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec, 102-103.
606 Gagnon and Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec, 104.
The impetus for the provision was the changing ethnic composition of Canada; more and more immigrants arrived from non-Caucasian parts of the world.

The first cracks in Quebec’s policy of multiculturalism began to appear in 1990. The governing PLQ’s policy on immigrant integration, l’Énoncé de politique en matière d’immigration et d’intégration, stated that the members of cultural communities are also part of the Québécois nation in which French is the common language. After winning control of the National Assembly in 1994, the separatist PQ embraced the PLQ’s amended version of multiculturalism; cultural communities should retain their characteristics while integrating into Quebec society through the adoption of French in the public sphere. One of main factors motivating the PQ to include immigrants in the discourse of the Québécois nation was the looming referendum on sovereignty. Given the demographic weight of non-ethnic French Canadians in Quebec by 1995, it was clear that their votes would weigh in heavily on the referendum results. Nevertheless, the close victory for the ‘No’ side was marred by a number of controversies, one of which was the revelation that 95% of non French-Canadians voted ‘No’ and 65% of Quebeckers with French-Canadian ethnicity voted ‘Yes.’ The strategy to recognize and support ethnic difference, while bringing these communities into an inclusive Québécois identity, did not lead immigrants to support the independence project.

Following the failure of the referendum, the PLQ and non-partisan Quebec intellectuals reached a consensus that a new direction was necessary to foster a more cohesive society. The experience of the referendum was conclusive evidence that multiculturalism could not fill the void of a weak Québécois identity and culture. Canada hedged its bet on the fact that building an identity on the sum of its parts would work, but if the Québécois nation wanted to compete with the

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607 Quebec nationalists rejected Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism when it is was promulgated in 1971, as previously mentioned, but developed a provincial policy framework that drew heavily on multicultural principles for inspiration.


609 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 327.
Canadian nation building project, Quebec would have to strike a balance between the requirements of unity and recognition. Another important consideration was that any new policy direction would have to be broadly inclusive as to avoid the tag of racism in aftermath of Jacques Parizeau’s comments following the referendum on Quebec’s independence in 1995.610

This context led to the development of a Québécois citizenship that discards the previous conception of immigrants as part of cultural communities: the creation of the MRCI (ministère des Relations avec les Citoyens et de l’Immigration) in 1996; the modification of the advisory council’s name from the Council for Cultural Communities and Immigration (CCRI) to the Council for Intercultural Relations (CRI) in 1996; the launching of Quebec citizenship week in 1997; and the organization of the national forum on citizenship in 2000 are all indicative of a shift away from recognizing cultural communities. It is worth noting that so-called Québécois citizenship does not have a legal status internationally because Canadian sovereignty prevents foreign countries from recognizing it. The real value of starting a discourse on citizenship for Quebec nationalists was the need to compete with the aggressive nation building projects of the Canadian government that began before the referendum and continued afterwards.611

Soon after the referendum, the articulation of a new Quebec citizenship that put cultural communities on to the back burner was under way. On 8 March 1996, André Boisclair, the PQ minister of the re-branded CRI, confirmed the new mandate for the council: “the management of cultural diversity must reconcile our core values with the right people have to live out and enrich their cultural heritage.”612 A few months earlier, Premier Lucien Bouchard affirmed that ‘le peuple québécois’ are equal citizens and added that the state (Quebec) was responsible for protecting the fundamental rights of all and for bringing the people together, “over and above differences linked to

610 In his concession speech, he blamed “money and the ethnic vote” for the ‘No’ side’s victory.
611 See McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada.
racial origins.” These statements reveal that the PQ government was beginning to present diversity as a threat to our values rather than a means to societal enrichment as before.

In May of 1996, Boisclair tabled a controversial Bill in the National Assembly that sought to prevent the formation of ethnic associations and institutions, a cornerstone of the previous regime of multiculturalism. The initial draft of the Bill suggested that the linguistic, social, and economic integration of immigrants to Quebec society should take place solely within the institutions of the Francophone majority. Protests came from visible minority communities and Anglophones, but the Bill passed with only slight alterations. Some argued that cultural associations of any kind would no longer be permitted in Quebec because of the vague wording of Bill 18: “cultural diversity must express itself within a system dominated by the Francophone majority.”

Leaders of Quebec’s cultural communities rejected the changes. In a memo to the MRCI in 1997, the leaders of the communities that compose the CRI expressed that the Quebec government needs to recognize multiple forms of belonging and do away with the ethnocentric Québécois identity. The government did not take up this suggestion and continued with its emphasis on unity rather than diversity. In his speech to inaugurate Quebec’s citizenship week in 1997, Premier Bouchard affirmed that “what unites us while distinguishing us from others is our attachment to Quebec” and referred to “our need that they feel attached to Quebec” numerous times. In short, ethnic differentiation was no longer a defining feature of the Québécois nation.

More recently, elements within the sovereignty movement have connected Quebec’s secular identity to its denunciation of multiculturalism. In the wake of controversial debates about how far religious accommodation should go, intellectuals and members of the PQ are arguing that

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secularism in Quebec distinguishes the province from the rest of Canada.\textsuperscript{617} Because of the volatility of Quebec’s political landscape and divisive nature of the multiculturalism debate, an opportunity presents itself for the PQ to pursue an aggressive form of secularism or civic integrationism to galvanize support for independence. Pauline Marois, the current leader of the PQ, has mused openly about pursuing a more aggressive secularism. She has stated that Bill 94, prohibiting the wearing of face coverings of any kind when providing or receiving government services, does not go far enough and instead wants a ban of the *hijab* in public spaces.

Inevitably, any policy changes in this direction will result in legal challenges that will bring to light the contentious issue of the applicability of the Canadian Charter of Rights in Freedoms in Quebec.\textsuperscript{618} Modeled after the American Bill of Rights, the Charter entrenches human rights in Canada such as the freedom of expression, conscience, and peaceful assembly. Quebec nationalists argue that the Charter represents an imposition of Canadian values on Quebec because the Charter consolidated the “preponderance of the central government over the affairs of Canada and ignores that Canada is, after all, a country composed of two distinct societies.” As Patel argues, it is only a matter of time before minorities in Quebec start appealing to the multicultural nature of Canada in order to justify more accommodation for their religious practices.\textsuperscript{619} It is reasonable to speculate that a conflict of values is what the PQ is trying to promote given the current difficulties facing the sovereignty movement after the collapse of the *Bloc Québécois* at the federal level.\textsuperscript{620}

\textsuperscript{618} For more on the anti-Charter movement in Quebec, see McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada*, pp. 137-176.
\textsuperscript{619} Patel, “Religious Accommodation.”
\textsuperscript{620} The *Bloc Québécois* lost its official party status following the 2011 federal election in Canada.
Flanders: Multiculturalism as a Counter to the Extreme Right

Following the Belgian revolution of 1830 that resulted in a unified state, the strategy chosen to unify the French and Dutch-speaking populations of the former Southern Netherlands was linguistic homogenization. In the late-19th century, French was the language of the elites in the territories now known as Flanders and Wallonia, and so French enjoyed a privileged position within state institutions. There is no evidence that a Flemish identity existed prior to the creation of the Belgian state, but following the imposition of French as the lingua franca of state structures, the Flemish lower bourgeoisie began a process of mobilization in favour of protections for Dutch-speakers that “served as the motor for a Flemish identity.” The success of the Flemish nationalists in terms of securing changes to the formal linguistic structure of the state started a pattern of elite competition and mobilization among the French-speaking Walloons in order to defend the status quo favourable to French-speakers.

The first Flemish nationalist party, the Frontpartij, appeared on the Belgian electoral scene in 1919 and won five seats in the Chamber of Representatives. Following World War II, a reconstituted Flemish nationalist party under the moniker Volksunie had much success, winning twenty seats in the 1968 elections. At this point however, Belgium was still a fully-fledged unitary state with a three party system; the three main parties (Christian Democratic, Liberal, and Socialist) accounted for the majority of seats and did not incorporate Volksunie or the first Walloon nationalist-regionalist party, Rassemblement Wallon (RW), into any governing coalitions. Nevertheless, the nationalist parties had a strong influence on the state-wide parties because of their growing popular appeal. This set the stage for a transformation of the unitary state institutions and

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621 Yet, the Belgian Constitution did not specify any official language.
party system. The constitutional reforms in 1970, 1980, and 1988 gradually decentralized the Belgian state and created several subnational institutional levels. The most important phase of the reforms came about in 1993 that officially made Belgium into a federation and devolved an extensive array of powers, including many related to immigrant integration, to the three language communities, and to the three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region).

The three mainstream parties first developed linguistic wings, and then split into distinct parties. The option to vote for a party committed to maintaining a strong Belgian identity in national, regional, and community elections therefore disappeared; all parties transformed into nationalist parties that espouse rhetoric in favour of more decentralization and define the national community as Flemish or Wallonian rather than Belgian.

Amidst the backdrop of rapid decentralization and nationalization of the party system, the percentage of foreigners in Belgium rose to over 10% by 1993. The distribution of immigrants between Flanders and Wallonia also began to change as Flanders started to outpace Wallonia economically and required more immigrant labour. The timing of Flanders’ economic boom resulted in more immigrant labour from outside the EU (e.g., Turkey, Morocco etc.) because the traditional sources of migrant labour such as Spain and Italy had been exhausted by the 1980s. The later migrant flows into Flanders (and Brussels) were therefore more culturally distant and perhaps more difficult to integrate. In the early post World War II period, Belgium fit the pattern of guest worker countries, such as Germany, because the state did not initiate policies relating to integration and settlement. The rudimentary Belgian immigration framework was designed to attract immigrants for specific labour requirements and restrict migrant flows during periods of economic downturn.

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625 Barker, “Redefining the Nation,” 206.
Following the reforms that decentralized the Belgian state in 1970, the first signs of a distinct Flemish migrant policy appeared. In 1975, subsidies were awarded to community centers to help migrants find jobs and settle in Flanders, and this was followed by the creation of an umbrella organization to link these settlement centers together under the auspices of the Flemish Minister of Culture. At this point, cultural integration was not a major issue discussed by any Flemish parties. The dominant Flemish Christian Democrats encouraged social service provision via community organizations and was content that cultural groups preserve their traditions and customs while integrating into Flemish society. Following the 1980 constitutional reforms, the Flemish Community assumed control over most aspects of immigrant reception policy. Policy proposals and debate no longer assumed that all immigration was temporary, but there remained a lack of political will to confront the issue of cultural integration. While Flemish nationalism did mobilize in response to perceived linguistic and cultural repression at the hands of the Belgian elite, it did not project a pessimistic or inwards-looking version of nationalism in its early stages such as in the Quebec and Basque cases. One factor that accounts for this is the majority status of the Flemish within Belgium. In short, the Flemish did not perceive a threat from the nation building project of a majority group as did the Basques, Québécois, and Scots.

The moderate version of Flemish nationalism came under threat in 1978 when the Vlaams Blok (VB) formed as the separatist alternative to Volksunie. Immigration has always been a main issue for VB: the party rejects immigration into Flanders and flagrantly uses racist and xenophobic rhetoric in its campaign materials and official manifestos. The VB’s electoral breakthrough in the 1980s at the municipal and regional levels had an immediate impact on the political and public

627 The Belgian courts found Vlaams Blok in violation of the Law on Racism and Xenophobia in 2004. The Vlaams Blok immediately dissolved and reorganized as the Vlaams Belang.
discussions about integration and immigration. The Belgian government created a national advisory institution to study and report on the integration process in the country called the Royal Commissariat for Migrant Policy (RCMP). The early reports of the RCMP supported “unambiguous respect for the cultural-diversity-as-mutual-enrichment” as a guiding principle for integration policy.\(^{628}\) The RCMP’s recommendation served as a foundation for policy-making by both the Flemish and Wallonian communities, though each developed its own distinctive style. The Flemish approach is akin to group-based multiculturalism whereas Francophone governments have been unwilling to recognize ethnic groups as specific entities in its policies.

The VB electoral victories in Antwerp’s local elections in 1988 and a series of clashes between police and young immigrants in several neighbourhoods of Antwerp prompted the other Flemish parties to develop a more active integration policy.\(^{629}\) To accomplish this, the other Flemish parties agreed to the *cordon sanitaire* that blocked any party from governing in a coalition or cooperating with the VB. Therefore, so long as the VB remained in a minority position in the Flemish parliament, the party would exert no direct influence on the content of legislation and official policy. The first major policy note on migrant policy in Flanders was accepted in 1989. It advocated for a policy framework that is attentive to the lack of opportunities for immigrants as well as cognizant of the need to emancipate immigrants through the recognition of their cultural identities. The timing of this policy note indicates that the Flemish Christian Democrats and Flemish Socialists wanted to distance themselves from the VB. The note resulted in numerous initiatives, such as special subsidies for schools with significant numbers of foreign-origin pupils and experimentation with mother-tongue education programmes for non-Dutch speaking children.


\(^{629}\) Loobuyck and Jacobs, “Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Integration Policy in Belgium and Flanders,” 32.
The next phase of policy-making started in 1995 with the Strategic Plan for Minority Policy. It includes a policy of emancipation to allow for the full participation in society of all immigrant-origin residents of Flanders and seeks to overcome the distinction between nationals and non-nationals in the realms of welfare, education, and healthcare. The Strategic Plan is comparable to the Basque Immigration Plan because it employs similar rhetoric and policy instruments concerning societal inclusion and access to the benefits of citizenship. The Flemish plan lacks, however, an emphasis on Flemish citizenship as distinct from Belgian citizenship in the way that the Basque document juxtaposes Basque and Spanish versions of citizenship. The majority position of the Flemish within the Belgian federation and the lack of state-wide parties competing in Flemish elections make it unnecessary for Flemish parties to engage in competitive nation building with the Belgian state.

In 1998, the Flemish government formalized a multicultural approach to integration with the ‘minorities’ decree’ (*minderhedendecreet*). The Flemish government accepts responsibility for funding and coordinating quangos—official liaisons between the Flemish government and recognized ethnocultural groups—in order to help Flanders’ various ethnic groups preserve their distinctiveness and foster intercultural exchanges with natives. The decree also specifically mentions that even allochthonous citizens (having one parent or grandparent born outside Belgium) are included within the purview of the policy on ethnic minorities. The general framework did not change significantly in the following years, although the decline of the Christian Democrats and rise of the Flemish Greens and Socialists within the coalition government led to an even more liberal interpretation of multiculturalism. The most striking development was the decision to provide state subsidies for mosques and religious festivities for Jews and Muslims in the Flemish education system. Generally, the overarching policy framework has been in line with Anglo-Saxon ideas of...

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group-based multiculturalism as practiced in Canada in Australia. The most significant external influences on the Flemish immigration policy framework, however, have been the Netherlands and Wallonia.\(^{631}\) Because of the cultural ties between Flanders and the Netherlands, Flemish elites from the major parties frequently cited the Dutch model as its prototype. At the same time, the Flemish policy framework developed in opposition to dominant philosophy of republicanism in Wallonia. In Wallonia, there is no specific policy for addressing the problems of integration and the government has been unwilling to commit state subsidies to group-based entities. While the Flemish education system took a pragmatic attitudes towards religious dressings in schools (e.g. headscarves), their Wallonian counterparts actively discouraged or forbade them.\(^{632}\) The competitive nation building dynamic is more subtle in the Flemish case because of its majority status, but it is still an important factor that influenced the decision of Flemish elites to construct a group-based multicultural policy framework.

It is important to recognize that since 2004, the Flemish government has adopted some assimilationist measures such as mandatory civics courses on Flemish values and Dutch language courses. Yet, the emphasis on cultural diversity as a source of enrichment and funding for quangos justifies continuing to label the “Flemish policy as oriented towards multiculturalism.”\(^ {633}\) One reason for this is that moderate Flemish nationalist parties have remained in power and committed to excluding VB through the *cordon sanitaire*. These parties face political competition on the ideological left and therefore are under pressure not to stray too far from the discourses of multiculturalism and diversity. A second reason is that the recognition of ethnic diversity could


\(^{632}\) Loobuyck and Jacobs, “Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Integration Policy in Belgium and Flanders,” 35.

have instrumental value in safeguarding the de facto importance of the Dutch language and increasing the demographic weight of Flanders in the context of the Belgian federation.

For its part, the VB has continued to have electoral success in Flanders while defending an ethnically pure Flemish state; party leader Filip Dewinter asks, “how can a party resist the Francification of Brussels without resisting its Morocanisation?” The presence of VB in Flanders is always palpable in political and public discussions about immigration. Yet, the other Flemish parties have been steadfast in their refusal to move toward the right on immigration and integration in order to capture some of the VB’s electorate. Instead of influencing policy, the VB has solidified the political and societal divide in Flemish society between those in favour of embracing diversity and those seeking the construction of an ethnically pure Flemish state. In the 2009 Flemish elections, the VB won 15% of the popular vote and 21 seats, only the Christian Democrats earned more seats than did the VB. In pre-election debate, the other parties avoided engaging with the VB on the issues of multiculturalism and immigration. The Flemish media interpreted this as a sign that the mainstream Flemish parties and nationalists were afraid to lose voters to the extreme-right. While this may be the case, it does not rule out the possibility that the other parties are firmly rooted in their commitment to diversity and multiculturalism. Otherwise, we might expect to see certain parties, especially the right-leaning Christian Democrat-New-Flemish Alliance coalition, cede more ground to the VB on immigration issues to court its electorate. The moderate Flemish nationalists do not refer to the history of mistreatment by Francophone Belgians as a justification for their support of multiculturalism, but this does not necessarily mean such dynamics are not at play.

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635 The Flemish Liberals also won 21 seats.
636 Loobuyck and Jacobs, “Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Integration Policy in Belgium and Flanders,” 37.
637 Volksunie split into left wing (Spirit) and right wing (New Flemish Alliance) factions in 2001.
Conclusion: Diversity as Core Value of the Minority Nation

Unlike the majority of research on immigration and minority nationalism that examines these issues in isolation, this dissertation contributed to both literatures by studying how they intersect. In doing so, it also adds a new dimension to the substantial literature on Basque nationalism, or more generally, literature that falls under the heading of ‘Basque Studies.’ Much of this research recounts the history of Basque nationalism, rarely using any type of theoretical framework, from a Basque nationalist or Spanish nationalist perspective. There has been strong theoretically driven work as well, but these works have tended to focus on two broad questions: what explains the emergence of Basque nationalism? and what explains the violence in the Basque case? While these questions remain important and ripe for academic study, changes resulting from globalization such as immigration-based diversity present a very different and new challenge for minority nationalists.

In the Basque, Scottish, and Quebec cases, the intersubjective understanding of the nation led to a more group-based multicultural approach because the imagined narratives of these groups tell of a history of repression and subjugation at the hands of the state majority group. Despite the idiosyncrasies of each case, I contend that each group’s refashioned narrative constrained elites at critical choice points after immigration-based diversity became a relevant issue. Even though immigration from a diverse set of countries poses a threat to the distinctiveness of the nation, the tendency in the cases examined in detail (Basque Country) and briefly (Quebec and Scotland) has been for minority nationalists to resist the exclusionary impulse predicted by the primordial perspective. The case of Flanders presents a challenge to this argument given the presence of a

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638 For a typically Basque nationalist perspective, see Granja Sainz, El Nacionalismo Vasco. For a Spanish nationalist or anti-Basque nationalism perspective, see Maximiano García Venero, Historia Del Nacionalismo Vasco (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1968).
639 Muro, Ethnicity and Violence; Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State; Medrano, Divided Nations; Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain.
strong ethnic nationalist party, but the other Flemish nationalist parties have used the *cordon sanitaire* to exclude the HB from power and develop a policy framework for immigrant reception based on multicultural principles. One of the driving forces of this outcome appears to be the ideas elites have about the treatment of minorities and the importance of culture that stems from their own group’s historical experience. Moreover, as demonstrated in the Basque and Quebec cases, the re-imagining of the nation can involve a forgetting of racialist or exclusivist ideologies that were once core aspects of the national identity.

A potential extension of this research would be to explore cases, such as Bavaria and Padania, in which the sub-state nation has pushed for stricter immigration controls and less support for group-based multiculturalism. Germany’s citizenship and immigration law went through a dramatic change as the law of ‘birth’ replaced the law of ‘blood’ in 1998. Despite these change, “leaders of the nationalist Christian Social Union and Bavarian society [continue] to be less sympathetic to foreigners and immigration.” For example, the CSU advocates for a drastic reduction in the number of immigrants and asylum seekers in Bavaria. The party also requested to be excluded from certain EU rules and thus be allowed to require proof of employment and health insurance from each and every immigrant living in Bavaria. Moreover, the CSU opposed the federal law designed to encourage integration into German society and put a restrictive Land-level law in place that ties the granting of residence permits to a particular type of employment contract. The CSU also released an electoral manifesto that Bavaria has a national identity

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strongly wedded to Christianity in order to subtly suggest that immigrants, especially Muslims, are a threat to Bavaria’s cultural uniqueness.\textsuperscript{642}

In Italy, the flow of illegal migrants from North African countries has become a politically charged issue, but the centre-right Berlusconi government ceded to the business community by allowing employers to hire illegal immigrants and regularize their status. The \textit{Lega Nord} threatened to withdraw support for the Berlusconi government following the implementation of this law. The LN advocates for independence, or at least the federalization of Italy, and has made immigration one of its core issues. Because the LN’s \textit{raison d’être} is to preserve the Christian and Calvinist identity of Padania, the lax immigration policy set in Rome is scrutinized and exploited as yet another reason for decentralization or independence. Specifically, the LN has argued in a manifesto that Padania should become independent to halt immigration and prevent more foreigners from stealing local jobs. The xenophobic gestures of the LN seem to have had an influence on Italian politics as the major parties have taken a stronger anti-immigrant stance since 2002.

In-depth research of these two cases would add variation on the dependent variables and allow for a testing of the argument in ‘negative’ cases. In particular, an investigation could follow the construction of the nationalist narrative over time and determine if, and how, it conditions the response to immigration and diversity. Perhaps stateless nations without a history of repression and subjugation do not feel like minorities themselves, and thus do not consider it hypocritical to maintain exclusionary boundaries. Another avenue for exploration would be the role of religion: Basque, Scottish, and Québécois (and even Flemish) nationalisms are more secular than those in Bavaria and Padania. In his classic comparison of Basque and Catalan nationalism, Daniele Conversi argued that the absence of language as a core value of Basque nationalism resulted in a

\textsuperscript{642} Claire Sutherland, "Neo-Nationalist Ideology: A Discourse Theoretical Approach to the SNP and CSU " (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 2000), 206.
more violent and exclusionary nationalism.\textsuperscript{643} It is possible that religion as a core value makes sub-state nations less amenable to diversity and multiculturalism.

A major finding of this project is that Basque nationalism now defines itself as internally diverse, yet still distinct from the Spanish nation. In fact, political representatives of Basque nationalism, especially the PNV, present the Basque nation as more tolerant and compassionate towards immigrants, and more respectful of cultural differences than the Spanish state. We also observe a similar trend in Scotland. Quebec nationalism, on the other hand, has shifted away from multiculturalism towards a framework of assimilation, but this can be attributed to the Canadian state’s staunch commitment to multiculturalism. In the case of Flanders, mainstream Flemish nationalists have favoured a group-based policy of multiculturalism in contrast to the \textit{laissez-faire} approach of Wallonian political elites. In short, minority nations are affected by broader statewide discourses and policies. In the cases examined in this dissertation, this has manifested itself in the form of opposition to central state strategies in order to perpetuate the relevance of the nationalist project and strengthen claims for more autonomy or independence. Perhaps the processes of globalization, such as new communication technologies, the global projection of American culture and the English language, and erosion of traditional state sovereignty, has forced minority nationalists to seek out new ways to define their projects. At some point, nationalists in the Basque Country and elsewhere may exhaust their ability to continue projecting diversity as a core value without diluting the distinctiveness of the nation to the point at which it is no longer clear what the nationalist project is trying to preserve. We then may see Basque and other minority nationalisms start to use aggressive means of integration such as mandatory integration courses and citizenship tests, as well as a stronger re-assertion of the national culture. From an optimistic perspective, the current pro-immigration positions of these nationalist movements may lead more immigrants to

\textsuperscript{643} Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain}. 

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support and join nationalist parties, thus making it less strategically viable for elites to assert a more exclusive version of nationalism.
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*Personal Interviews (Non-Confidential)*

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