The Evolution of the Hellenistic Polis: Case Studies in Politics and Political Culture

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Abstract
The following dissertation sets out to explore the evolution of a handful of civic institutions in the Hellenistic era. The first chapter focuses on the institution of the ephebeia and citizen-training. It centres on three documents: the gymnasiarchic law of Beroea (I. Beroeae 1 [ca. 167 BCE]), the oath of the agelai of Dreros (I. Cret. 1.9.1 [ca. 200 BCE]) and the honorary decree for Menas of Sestos. It argues first that citizen training programs of the Hellenistic period had higher rates of participation than the Athenian evidence seems to suggest, and second that three virtues of gymnastic training, euexia, eutaxia and philoponia, were also political and social virtues. The second chapter focuses on Zosimos of Priene (I. Priene 113 [ca. 100 BCE]) and the connection between his two most important reforms: instituting a system of duplicate record-keeping and funding rhetorical training for ephebes. It argues that the speeches of envoys and ambassadors (presbeuteic rhetoric) constituted the dominant mode of Hellenistic rhetoric; within that genre, arguments based on history and on official records were considered the most effective. The third chapter focuses on Fabius' letter to Dyme (Syll. 3 684 [144 BCE]). It argues that the destruction of Dyme's public archives was not part of a 'socialist' revolution, but rather was a means of rejecting changes to the citizen body forced on the city by Rome. The final chapter turns to the island of Kos. It explores Diokles' decree (IG XII.4.1 75 [ca. 200 BCE]) as an example of how the balance between self-interest and communal interests were negotiated.
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Introduction

The Hellenistic Greeks lived in a world far different from that of their Classical or Archaic ancestors. The world of the Hellenistic Greeks was much larger; Alexander the Great and his successors had carried the Greek language, customs and culture far beyond the rim of the Aegean sea. In this larger world, the *poleis*\(^1\) were correspondingly smaller. Some were smaller in literal an absolute terms, as years of constant warfare and economic difficulty left the citizen populations of Athens and Sparta far smaller than in their fifth-century heyday. All were smaller in relative terms; even the largest and most powerful polis was dwarfed in terms of wealth, might and influence by the major Hellenistic kingdoms and, eventually, by the Roman Republic. Rather than being the central actors in the history of the Balkan peninsula and the Aegean, Hellenistic Greeks were reduced to being relatively minor players in a world dominated by great powers.

Even in the face of such momentous changes, the conquests of Alexander did not result either in a clear and uniform break in the history of the Greek *poleis* at large or in their descent into decadence and irrelevance. That the Greek city-states remained vibrant and vital institutions and that there are substantial institutional, historical and cultural continuities between one era and the next is well established.\(^2\) This serves as the starting point for the present study. It is more concerned with questions of how and why the Greek city states remained vital and thriving communities in the face of these changes to the broader political and economic system into which they were integrated. If nothing else, the rise of the successor kingdoms and the expansion of the Greek world brought the Greeks into close

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1 On the question of whether to retain Greek spellings of nouns or to use Latinized/Anglicized spellings I have adopted a hybrid policy. Those that are sufficiently common retain their familiar spellings and are not italicized (hence readers will see Polybius and Antiochus the Great with Latinized spelling and 'polis' without italics). Greek words that have been made into English adjectives—even when this was done on a Greek model—are also not italicized (hence 'ephebic' and 'presbeotic', but *ephebia*). This policy, like any other, will inevitably result in some apparent absurdities (e.g. that the familiar singular form 'polis' is treated as an English word, while the much-less common plural 'poleis' is italicized) but is logically consistent and more intuitive than the other options.

2 Here the work of Ph. Gauthier is essential (e.g. Gauthier 1987-1989, 1990, or 1993).
contact with several different models of political organization (beyond the city-state): personal monarchies, ethnic and federal leagues and temple-states, to name a few. The goal of this study is to explore some aspects of the complex web of thought, meaning and ideology that convinced the Hellenistic Greeks that the life of a citizen in a Greek polis was best, that their institutions should have the forms that they did, and that citizens should relate to those institutions, and one another, in the ways that they did.\(^3\)

As a concrete example, we can look to Aristodikes of Assos, a friend of the Seleucid King Antiochus I.\(^4\) Aristodikes was well aware that there were systems of political organization other than the city-state: he had spent some time serving one in the form of the Seleucid kingdom, and that service had been very profitable to him personally. And yet, the ideological hold that the Seleucid kingdom had on Aristodikes seems to have been relatively weak; rather than focus his efforts on remaining part of the Seleucid bureaucracy, he was happy to trade some of the economic rewards of royal service for citizenship in a Greek polis, in this case Ilium. What convinced Aristodikes that the life of a citizen of Ilium was preferable to life at court? By extension, what convinced Antiochus I that Ilium should remain a polis, rather than becoming the fiefdom of Aristodikes?\(^5\) These are the types of questions that we will work toward answering.

Any exploration of Hellenistic culture, in this sense, will face some practical difficulties. The first is that it is a subject far too vast to be covered in any one volume. The polis existed in hundreds of incarnations in the Hellenistic world, each with its own different institutions and practices (even if these only varied subtly from city to city). The second, and even more intractable difficulty, is posed

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\(^3\) The ‘web of meaning’ metaphor was, of course, made famous by Geertz 1973: 5 (explicitly aligning himself with Weber).

\(^4\) Aristodikes is known to us from a famous series of royal letters (RC 10-13 = I. Ilion 33) and will be invoked as an example again below.

\(^5\) As other, non-polis communities were treated by the kings, e.g. Antiochus III's treatment of Sardis (Sardis 7.1).
by the word 'Hellenistic.' It promises shifts, changes and developments that are, strictly speaking, products of the Hellenistic age. Drawing a rigid chronological boundary around any institution or practice will almost inevitably prove to be impossible; there are few phenomena, no matter how definitively Hellenistic, that do not have roots reaching back to an earlier age.

Rather than attempting to present a comprehensive account, or to argue for the primacy or universality of any one element of Greek political culture, we will approach the question from several directions. Each chapter is focused on one or more epigraphic documents which present questions of interpretation: questions that have some bearing on our understanding of specific political institutions and phenomena as they existed in the cities which produced the documents. These questions are frequently answered with comparisons to similar material from other times and places; they have been chosen in the hopes that their answers can inform our understanding of other cities, but I am not building a universal model of Hellenistic culture or politics. The institutions and practices under consideration are: 1) citizen-training, in particular the moral and ethical foundations of citizen-training; 2) embassies, and in particular the dominant mode of rhetoric in what we might call international relations; 3) the public archives, their place in the idea of the polis and in perpetuating political (in)stability; and finally 4) the ekkleisia, specifically its use as a locus for presenting and evaluating civic engagement for individual citizens. These institutions are studied not as they appear across the Greek world as a whole, but rather as they relate to specific documents from specific cities. Sestos, Priene, Dyme and Kos will each in turn serve as our primary focus. Temporally, we will be focused on the roughly one hundred and fifty years between the end of the third century BCE and the first half of the first century BCE, though the limitations inherent in our evidence will occasionally carry us backwards and forwards in time as we look for suitable comparanda.

The methodology I propose to adopt is not the most common approach to the Hellenistic city-
states.\textsuperscript{6} Three relatively recent works on the Greek city-states of the Hellenistic world call for special
comment here: Dmitriev 2005, Grieb 2008 and Carlsson 2010.\textsuperscript{7} I list the three together, because they are, to a certain degree, similar.\textsuperscript{8} Dmitriev (in general and over a longer time-period), Carlsson and
Grieb all focus specifically on the nature of democratic government.\textsuperscript{9} All three works are founded on a
very similar methodology: they focus exclusively (or nearly so) on epigraphic evidence, and deal with it in large quantities.\textsuperscript{10} All three isolate a handful of cities for which they can then conduct a full
epigraphic survey, and there is much overlap between them.\textsuperscript{11} More importantly, at least in terms of
defining this dissertation's place in the field, they all share an identical model of Greek citizenship and politics.

All three are working from a legalist paradigm of citizenship and political life. That is, they all
define citizenship as a set of legal requirements, privileges and responsibilities, chief among which are qualifications of parentage and the right and duty to participate in civic government. By extension,
government is best defined as a set of institutions or organs of state, all of which in turn have their own legal requirements, duties and competencies. The model is not without merit. It has been the dominant model for classical scholarship, and is, fairly explicitly, the one pursued by the most prolific student of

\textsuperscript{6} Though I would argue that it has much in common with the work of Lape 2004 (on early Hellenistic Athens) and Ma 1999, the latter of which was hailed as a new way forward (Shipley 2006: 228).

\textsuperscript{7} To these three we could also add O'Sullivan 2009, which deals exclusively with Athens under Demetrius of Phalerum.

\textsuperscript{8} For a review which highlights the differences between the three and points out some of their weaknesses, see Hamon 2009.

\textsuperscript{9} The study of 'democracy' in the Hellenistic world has its own peculiar set of issues, not least that it is frequently assumed, but never explicitly argued, that democracy cannot exist if there is even the potential for compulsion from external powers (cf. Runciman 1994: 248 and Carlsson 2010: 161; for a more nuanced approach to that particular issue, see Granjean 2008: 71).

\textsuperscript{10} Carlsson 2010: 277 explicitly acknowledges that much of what she presents is a catalogue, rather than narrative or analysis. This is, it must be said, a very common approach to other aspects of Hellenistic history. Compare Paschadis 2008, Kennell 2006, or Perrin-Saminadayar 2008. It is tempting to suggest that the success of Ma 1999 inspired this approach, but much of this book's value is derived from Ma's skillful synthesis of Polybius' text and the epigraphic material. The success of Ager 1995, and Welles 1934, will have done little to discourage the approach.

\textsuperscript{11} The overlap is not total, but Kos and Miletus figure heavily in all three. Miletus is also covered in much the same fashion and to much the same ends by Nawotka 1999.
the Greek polis, Mogens Hansen. But over the past two decades, historians, primarily those working on classical Athens, have accepted that this model has limitations and have approached the question of citizenship from other directions. The movement is inflected by literary and cultural theory and has proposed different models, which ideally should be complementary to the legalist paradigm. Recent work has offered models of Greek citizenship as a “cultural identity”, as a way of thinking and relating to the world around you, and as a kind of activity.

At the risk of oversimplifying, proponents of the latter models take a more 'literary' approach to their evidence, and, in fact, are drawn to evidence of a more literary character. These models are as likely to inform work on philosophical treatises or Athenian drama, and their proponents are more likely to be looking for evidence of how the Athenians conceptualized their place in the state than for historical realia of democratic procedure. This, at least in part, explains why the legal and institutional model dominates discussion of the Hellenistic poleis. We have precious little Hellenistic literature and even less that invites reading for the Greek citizen mindset. It may be fair to say that fifth- and fourth-century Athens is the only polis for which we have the kind of evidence necessary to pursue the latter model as effectively as we might like.

Imperfect, of course, is not the same as hopeless, especially when these models are deployed in

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12 For instance: Hansen 1997 and 1991. Hansen 2006: 132 aligns himself with those who believe that the mere existence of the great Hellenistic kingdoms made democracy impossible. The legalist model of citizenship is, of course, much older than Hansen and has frequently yielded impressive results, at least for Athens.

13 See especially Manville 1994: 21-24 and Connor 1994: 34; see Goldhill 1999 for citizenship as an activity or performance, and Farenga 2007: 32-37 for citizenship as a way of thinking and deliberating. It is worth noting that these models of citizenship and political activity have been developed in other disciplines and applied to Classical Athens, not designed exclusively for use with Athens.

14 It is no coincidence that the two works that come closest to applying this model to the Hellenistic world are both dealing with late fourth-century Athens, and both choose a corpus of literature as the foundation of their approach. O'Sullivan 2009 is focused primarily on the speeches of Demetrius of Phalerum, and Lape 2004, while centred on the fragments of Menander's text, very ably incorporates a wealth of epigraphic material. Shipley 2006: 320 suggests that Polybius' text is sufficient for the task, but to date no one has made the attempt. Eckstein 1995 deals with the subject of morality in Polybius, but is far more interested in Greek morality and paideia as it compares to the habits of barbarians (possibly including Rome) than as it dictates the proper way to live in a polis. Champion 2004 is primarily concerned with Polybius' thoughts on Rome. In both works poleis emerge only tangentially.
a limited way. This dissertation is not an attempt to argue for the primacy of these 'cultural' models, or
to offer a complete model of Hellenistic citizenship in general. It aims only to apply some insights
from these newer models to the study of a handful of the documents produced by Hellenistic poleis. At
the most basic level this means directing our attention not to the technical legal procedures by which
these documents were produced, but rather to the shared mental and conceptual framework that made
their production seem necessary or desirable. The goal is to use them as heuristic tools to explore
some of the ways that Hellenistic city-states maintained their “ideological” hold over their citizens.15

The chapters that follow all begin from individual documents—most of them well known—about
which there are unresolved or unasked questions: why did the assembly adopt this wording, why was
this their primary concern, and what did this document mean for the community that created it? These
are not questions that have obvious answers, at least in the contents of the documents themselves, or
even in the epigraphic record of the cities that produced them. In general, the methodology pursued
here is to expand the pool of available evidence by introducing similar or related documents from
neighbouring times and places, and, most importantly, by reference to our literary sources. In doing
this, preference is given, naturally enough, to those documents and texts produced closest in time to the
inscription being studied, but above all preference is given to evidence that has the most to offer in
answering the question at hand. In practice this means that Polybius, whose work is nearest in time to
many of the documents under consideration, is given pride of place, but when his text offers no useful
comparanda, the net is widened. Readers will frequently see references to literature that falls outside of
the Hellenistic era, at least as it is most narrowly defined. The working theory here is that while

15 Runciman 1990: 348-9 offers a handy definition of political adaptation as “no more than an increase, or at least
retention, of economic, ideological and/or coercive power by a society relative to others with which it is in contact and
competition.” It is worth noting that Runciman sees no sign of this in the Hellenistic poleis, and declares them to be a
dead end as a species of community.
evidence from the fourth century BCE or the first century AD is not ideal, it is preferable to silence.\textsuperscript{16}

The documents, and the questions that we will be asking of them, have been chosen because they also shed some light on a specific cultural institution or practice of a Hellenistic polis. I say 'a' Hellenistic polis because we must always be aware of the primary danger inherent in cultural analysis: that we inevitably posit a totalizing and universal interpretation where there was surely much diversity. The hope is that the findings produced can be extended to other poleis of the same time period, but it is best not to insist that they are universal. Just as there were surely differences between Classical Athens and Classical Sparta, there were undoubtedly important differences between Sestos of the first century BCE and contemporary Beroea. But in both cases there were surely as many similarities as differences, especially if our comparisons are limited in scope.

The first and longest chapter explores one of the most common cultural institutions of the Hellenistic world: the ephebeia.\textsuperscript{17} The chapter focuses on three individual documents, all of which involve unresolved questions. It first looks at the gymnasiarchic law of Beroea, and more specifically the 'exclusion clause' (\textit{I. Beroea} 1.b. 26-9 [ca. 167 BCE]). This clause makes it the duty of the gymnasiarch to keep slaves, freedmen and their descendants, prostitutes, traders, drunks, madmen and the apalaistroi away from the gymnasium. The rule has been taken, along with declining rates of participation in the city of Athens, as proof that the ephebeia became an institution given over strictly to the education (and socializing) of the political elite. I offer a new interpretation of that clause, arguing that it is an attempt to maintain order in a crowded gymnasium, rather than an ideological

\textsuperscript{16} This will, perhaps controversially, include material from Athens. In my view, the fear of 'Athenocentrism' can be taken too far. No one would deny that Classical Athens was unique, and even atypical, and that simply mapping what we know of Athens onto evidence from other cities is misleading. Nevertheless, as the Greek city we know best, comparisons to it, especially those that highlight differences, are useful. What is history, after all, if not an attempt to explain the differences between one point in space and time and another? The Greeks did share a common language and culture. Literature from one city (perhaps especially Athens) was comprehensible in another, and for all of the differences between cities, there were surely just as many similarities and continuities.

\textsuperscript{17} And citizen-training programs under other names, like the Spartan \textit{agoge}, or more importantly for us, the \textit{agelai} of the Cretan poleis.
statement of who is and is not allowed to train. A brief survey of the qualitative evidence for participation in the *ephebeia* suggests that Athens was the outlier, and broad participation in the institution was the norm.

The second document under consideration is the ephebic oath of Dreros, in particular the striking prohibition against ephbes swearing common oaths ([*I. Cret.* 1.9.1 [ca. 200 BCE]]). I suggest that this clause was motivated by the inherent tensions that existed between the older men of the polis and the younger, specifically those who had recently graduated from the *ephebeia* and were tied to one another by especially strong bonds of friendship. The older men of Dreros feared that such a group would actively enter into politics, a circumstance that had resulted in age-class warfare in the neighboring city of Gortyn. Finally, we examine a decree of Sestos in praise of their gymnasiarch, Menas ([*OGIS* 339 = [*I. Sestos* 1 [ca. 125 BCE]]). Menas won accolades for, inter alia, awarding prizes for *eutaxia*, *euexia* and *philoponia*. The final section of the chapter asks how those virtues were defined, and why the people of Sestos (and other cities) sought to encourage them in young men. The answer suggested is that these were virtues that mitigated some of the tensions and fears between young and old, and helped the polis to survive in the changed circumstances of the Hellenistic world.

The second chapter also begins from an honorary decree for a gymnasiarch, in this case Zosimos, who served as both gymnasiarch and secretary of the *boule* in Priene ([*I. Priene* 112-114 [1st C BCE]]). Zosimos undertook to add training in rhetoric to the standard education, and also made substantial reforms to the record-keeping system of Priene, for which he was said to have saved the city as a whole and preserved the property of each citizen individually. The chapter posits a relationship between Zosimos' two great reforms, primarily by reference to Polybius' rhetorical theory. Polybius privileges presbeutic rhetoric as a distinctly Hellenistic form, and the speeches preserved in his text suggest that appeals to history were the dominant currency in diplomacy. In both Polybius' speeches
and the negotiations that have left some trace in the epigraphic record, documents preserved in city archives are cited as effective evidence. The contemporary epigraphic material supports that model, and Priene employed it with substantial success.

The third chapter approaches the concept of archives from a different direction. Instead of focusing on how they were successfully preserved and deployed, it looks at a city in which the archives were destroyed as part of a revolution. The chapter focuses primarily on a fragmentary letter of the Roman consul to the city of Dyme (Syll.3 684 [144 BCE]). In Dyme, the archives had been destroyed in a stasis. The chapter sets out to answer the question of what the aims of the revolutionaries in Dyme were, and how destroying the archives helped them to achieve it. The incident has usually been taken to be an instance of “the class struggle in Greece” and the destruction of the archives seen as a permanent means of cancelling all private debts. I suggest, by analogy to Philip V’s correspondence with Larisa, that it was actually a conservative rejection of changes the Romans had made to the roll of Dymeans citizens. The archives were attacked because they housed a physical list of citizens, or at least new citizens, and because archives in general came to represent the stability and authority of the current political order.

The final chapter focuses on a pair of documents from the island polis of Kos, primarily what has been called the great subscription. In particular, it focuses on a peculiar clause of that open call for donations, one that forces all donors to come forward and make their offer in the assembly, and reserves for the assembly the right of accepting or declining the proffered donation (IG XII.4.1 75 [ca. 200 BCE]). The chapter focuses on asking questions about what a meeting of the popular assembly looked like, and what the people of Kos expected from those who would speak in the assembly and be active participants in city politics. Read in comparison to Aeschines' speech Against Timarchus and Dio's Euboicus, Diokles' call for donations suggests that meetings of the assembly were still highly
charged, high-stakes competitions for status within the community. The Koan *ekklesia* had several levers for compelling citizens to set aside their self-interest for the good of the community in times of crisis, some official and legal, and some more informal.

As suggested above, these four chapters do not cover the whole spectrum of Greek political life in the Hellenistic era, and this dissertation is by no means intended to be the final word on the subject. It sets out to answer a limited set of questions about documents produced in various cities and at various times. There is no epistemologically certain basis for assuming that the conclusions drawn here can be applied to all cities, or even that the answers we find for Sestos are applicable to Kos as well. We do find several suggestive themes, though. At the root of all of the institutions we have studied we can find attempts by the *poleis* to assert their political primacy and legitimacy. Contests in civic virtues instilled in young men the belief that orderly life within and service to the polis were the essential criteria of the good life. On Kos, we find the assembly taking an active and aggressive role in insisting that rigid self-interest should be sublimated to service to the community. In Priene and Dyme, we find the polis positioning itself as the sole legitimate keeper of records, while at the same time tying the stability and composition of the polis to its history and archives. These cities were also able to position that history and those archives as the dominant mode of currency in international relations, thereby making their friendship as useful to the great powers as the great powers' friendship was to the *poleis*. 
Chapter 1: The Hellenistic *Ephebeia* and Training for Virtue

1.1 Introduction

The search for an exclusively Hellenistic institution is a fool's errand, but the same can be said of the search for an institution that is exclusively and universally Archaic, Classical or Byzantine. Few institutions or practices exist strictly in a vacuum, without roots or offshoots trailing into earlier or later epochs. Thus, the first institution we will be studying, and the one that with the most justice could be called the Hellenistic political institution—the *ephebeia*—is far more famous for its Archaic and Classical forebears. Education and citizen training in the Greek polis have been a topic for scholarly debate since the time of Plato at the latest. Modern studies of citizen training have, in general, been focused on the systems employed by the two great *poleis* of the classical world: the Athenian *ephebeia* and the Spartan *agoge*. Those systems have obvious attractions. The Spartan system, which for us exists mostly as a caricature in non-Spartan writers like Xenophon and Plutarch, is striking and ripe for social and political commentary. The Athenian system has the attraction of offering far and away the most evidence for scholarly analysis.

While Archaic and Classical Sparta, and fourth-century Athens may dominate the discussion, they do so out of all proportion to our evidence for the spread of the institution. Sparta's system of military training is more famous, but, so far as we can tell, the Cretan version of the institution developed earlier and endured longer, remaining largely recognizable throughout the Hellenistic era. Likewise, it may be that fourth-century Athens was the first democratic polis to thoroughly and extensively organize a state-sponsored military education called the *ephebeia* for its young citizens, but

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1. The religious and cultural dimensions of youth, education and training have also been a favourite, particularly among French scholars. See, for example, Vidal-Naquet 1981; Jeanmaire 1939; Breligh 1969 and, much more recently Perrin-Saminadayar 2007.
the franchise expanded quickly. Kennell's survey of the epigraphic evidence for the spread of the institution found traces of it in nearly two hundred individual poleis of the Hellenistic era, making it one of the most common political institutions in the whole of the Greek world.

The Athenian institution of the ephebeia was a response to specific historical circumstances and pressures of the fourth century. Primarily, we see it as an attempt to restore the power and prestige of Athens' democratic citizen army in the wake of several humbling defeats, with the ultimate goal of returning the city to its rightful place as the leader of the Greek world. Those unique circumstances can hardly have actuated the hundreds of other cities that would later adopt a version of the institution, but, because of the uneven distribution of our evidence, fourth-century Athens has largely dominated the discussion. The classical Athenian version of the institution has been the subject of several book-length treatments, and much of the work on subsequent versions of the institution has been chiefly concerned with searching for signs of incipient (and later, endemic) political decadence. Those signs are chiefly found in the declining numbers of participants, a shift of focus to philosophical training at the expense of gymnastic and military training and the admission of young men who were not qualified (either because of their young age or because they were not citizens).

The ephebeia, as it existed in cities outside of Athens, has been studied only very infrequently. Kennell laments the stunted state of the bibliography in his book on the ephebeia, but does little to

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2 Such is the argument advanced by Chankowski 2010: passim and especially 232-237. Chankowski's reasoning is sound, and offers the best explanation for the many similarities (in both name and structure) of the program from city to city. Chankowski's book, although nominally published in 2010, was not actually available until 2012, after the final version of this dissertation had been submitted for defence (see Kennel's review in the BMCR). I have only been able to partially integrate his work.

3 It trails such obvious outliers as popular assemblies and councils, but few others. Kennell 2006: vii-x.

4 Pélékidis 1962; Perrin-Saminadayar 2007; Friend 2009, as well as the lion's share of Forbes 1929 and earlier studies.

5 As Pélékidis 1962: 167 phrases it.

6 Perrin-Saminadayar 2007: 50 is less alarmed by these changes than Pélékidis, but does still think the ephebeia lost its military character and became a day-care for the sons of the wealthy. Kennell 2006: XIII and Chankowski, 2004: 66 argue that military training was still central.
rectify the situation; he offers only a register of inscriptions which relate to it, not deep analysis. Some related topics, such as gymnasia and gymnastic training, have seen book-length treatments, but work on the cultural or ethical aspects of the *ephebeia*, at least outside of classical Athens, is almost non-existent. The most recent work on the *ephebeia* outside of Athens, by Hin, is concerned largely with what we might call practical or legal questions: rates of participation in these training programs (were they for all young citizens, or only for the sons of the wealthy and important?), at what age could young men enroll, and whether it was real military training or a token gesture. Questions of what values and ideology these training programs tried to instill (what Dynneson calls 'civism') are left without concrete answers.

What follows seeks to address the questions of what these cities sought to teach their young men through ephebic training and why, and to answer several specific questions raised by three disparate documents. It is primarily focused on three issues. The first section sets out to test the validity of what we might call the day-care hypothesis. That is, declining participation rates in Athens and a shift away from military training are taken as evidence that the *ephebeia* became a day-care program for the sons of the wealthy, rather than a more democratic form of military training. The validity of that hypothesis will be tested by reference to the gymnasiarchic law of Beroea (*I. Beroea* 1 [ca. 167 BCE])11. Specifically, we will be looking at the list of those excluded from gymnastic training, and looking to answer the question of who the “apalaistroi” were. The second issue to be tackled will

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7 His planned follow up book (2006: ix), which would contain the actual analysis of the documents, never appeared.
9 Dynneson 2008: xii: "Civism is defined according to the same principles that define the citizen and the characteristics of citizenship. It is expressed in the virtues of what is considered an ideal citizen," quoting from his own earlier work (Dynneson 2001: 7). Dynneson's study is (by admission and design, p.5) cursory, and he has no interest in anything later than the fourth century. Farenga 2006 is focused almost exclusively on the fifth century.
10 The phrase is intentionally dismissive. Discussions of the lapse of rigorous military training sometimes have a moralizing undercurrent. So Pélékidès 1962: 167 speaks of the “décadence d l'institution,” which was a sign that Athens' political health “était nettement inférieure.”
11 On the date see Gioannini 2004: 480-489.
be the tensions between the young citizens in training (and briefly removed from it) and the polis as a whole. In this we will primarily be seeking to understand certain terms of the oath of the agelaoi of Dreros (I. Cret. 1.9.1 [ca. 200 BCE]) With those issues as a foundation, we will move on to the question of which specific values and virtues the poleis wanted to encourage in their epheses. Here we will be looking at the decree in honour of Menas, the gymnasiarch of Sestos (OGIS 339 = I. Sestos 1 [ca. 125 BC]). In particular, we will examine why he chose the virtues of eutaxia, euexia and philoponia as those for which he would hold contests for epheses at his city's annual gymnastic festival.

1.2 Broad Appeal or the Preserve of Aristocrats? The Gymnasiarchic Law of Beroea

The gymnasiarchic law of Beroea is a historian's best friend. Its preamble virtually invites us to generalize about other cities based on its contents. The law, which codifies the duties of the city's gymnasiarch, was passed with the stated purpose of keeping up with the Joneses.\(^{12}\) That is, all of the other cities have such laws in place and on display, so the people of Beroea felt that they should as well. The law itself is highly instructive. In it, we find that epheses were required to practice with weapons on a daily basis.\(^{13}\) That law also devotes circa 40 lines (roughly one-quarter of the entire inscription) to the rules governing the annual festival of the Hermaia, a gymnastic festival of a very common and popular type in the Hellenistic world.\(^{14}\) Broadly speaking, the Hermaia was a celebration of all things related to the gymnasion, and in particular it offered contests and other opportunities for

\(^{12}\) I. Beroea 1.A5-11: έπει καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἄρχαι πᾶσαι κατὰ νόμον άρχουσιν καὶ ἐν αἷς πόλεσιν γυμνάσια ἔστιν καὶ ἄλλημα συνεστηκεν οἱ γυμνασιαρχοὶ νόμοι κείται ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις, καλώς ἔχει καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν τό αὐτό συντελεσθήναι καὶ τεθῆναι δν δεδόκαμεν τοὺς ἔξτασιας ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίωι ἀναγραφέντα εἰς στήλην, ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ δημόσιον.

\(^{13}\) I. Beroea 1.B10-11: ἄκοντιζεν δὲ καὶ τοξεύον μελετάτοσαν οἱ τε ἐφηβοὶ καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ τὰ δύο καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν.

\(^{14}\) Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993: 95; J. and L. Robert 1962: no. 248; Crowther 1991: 301-304 lists 18 cities which celebrated the Hermaia in a manner very similar to Beroea. There were certainly many more cities which did so, but did not record the details.
young men to display the results of their training. In Samos, Tralles, Sestos and many other cities (though not, so far as we know, Beroea), these included displays of explicitly martial training, such as use of siege weaponry (*lithobolos* and *katapaltes*), javelin-throwing, archery and fighting with both the *hoplon* shield and the *thurios*.  

These were all at least superficially practical skills, or at least that is how they were meant to be understood: as practical skills. Training in them, to say nothing of awarding prizes for excellence in those fields, was a normative activity and a declaration of identity.  

Mandatory military training tells the young men and any outside observers that the polis is an independent community and its citizens are responsible for defending it. This, it is almost universally agreed, was the message that Athens' great (re)organization of the *ephebeia* in the fourth century was intended to send. The Athenians of that era had every intention of re-building a strong citizen-army and using it to defend Attica, and to project Athenian prestige and power throughout the Greek world. Apart from going on a tour of all the major sanctuaries, the whole of ephebic training was of a military character. The cadets ate in common messes and spent the first year of their training on guard duty in the Piraeus, while receiving military training. After the first year of service, their progress in military manoeuvres was reviewed in the assembly; cadets were then given weapons and shields at state expense, after which they were sent to the borders of Attica for another year of garrison and patrol duty. The obvious goal of all of this was to train better soldiers, and, perhaps to train more soldiers, since the state undertook to maintain the young sons of citizen parents for two years, and to provide them with the necessary tools for hoplite fighting.

15 Samos: *Syll.3* 1061 (2nd C. BCE); Tralles: *Syll.3* 1060 (3rd C. BCE); Sestos: *OGIS* 339. For a more complete list, see Crowther 1991: 302ff.  
16 Chankowski 2004: 68.  
17 [Aristotle], *Athenian Constitution*, 42.  
After the fourth century, particularly in the second and first centuries BCE, when rates of participation in Athens declined, and two years of military training was replaced with one year that included lectures in philosophy, the goal of the program was no longer so clear. That obscurity is the source of what I call the 'day-care hypothesis.' If the ephebeia of Athens was no longer broadly inclusive, and was no longer meant to build a strong citizen-army, then the institution can be little more than a day-care program for the sons of the wealthy. That may be overstating the case, but it is the notion that underlies much recent work on the Hellenistic ephebeia.\textsuperscript{19} This brings the ugly spectre of “decadence” into the discussion. It is true that for many years the poleis of the Hellenistic world were considered decadent, ossified and debased; it is true that a narrative of political and cultural decadence makes for a far-too-easy explanation for any differences between the Hellenistic era and the Classical, but it is also true that reliance on that narrative is a far-too-easy criticism to level at one's opponents. For our purposes, this means that we are under no compulsion to accept that the ephebeia became a marginal and sparsely inhabited institution, but we should not simply assume that it remained a vital and undiminished element of the polis. A change in one institution, after all, need not spell decline for the whole. It is worth our effort to consider the hypothesis of decline seriously. It has a bipartite foundation. In the first place, it assumes that military training was only a token effort, because citizen armies had been rendered irrelevant by the massive professional/mercenary armies deployed by the great powers. The second assumption is that participation in the ephebeia declined to the point that it included only the sons of the wealthiest men, rather than all those who would become citizens.

The first issue, that of the irrelevance of citizen armies, need not detain us very long. The second, we will consider more thoroughly. It is true that the major kingdoms had forces at their disposal that were far too great for any polis to resist with only its citizen army, but this does not mean

\textsuperscript{19} Hin 2007; Perrin-Saminadayar 2007.
that those armies were, therefore, useless.20 This simplistic view of military and political affairs in the Hellenistic period has rightfully been challenged by recent scholarship. Ma, among others, has pointed out the most obvious flaw: massive royal armies were not the only opponents available. The poleis of mainland Greece, Asia Minor and especially Crete continued to fight their own local wars and undertake regional military campaigns despite being dwarfed by the power of the major royal armies.21 Smaller-scale local campaigns, and perhaps even more importantly the cities' need to patrol their chora and borders, meant that citizen militias were still necessary and that military training still served a practical purpose.22

Even in the second and first centuries BCE, military training was still front and centre in the daily lives of ephebes. In Beroea, and other cities, young men were required to participate in weapons training every day.23 We have relatively few details about the daily training regimen of ephebes, but we do know that both gymnastic training and weapon training were daily activities. In Athens, even at the height of the institution's supposed decadence, training in hand-to-hand combat and siege weapons was still part of the curriculum. The real crux of the matter has to do with rates of participation, and there too the Athenian evidence has set the terms of the debate.

In fourth-century Athens, all young citizens were required to enroll and train as ephebes, but our evidence points to a steadily declining rate of participation throughout the third, second and first centuries BCE. Athens regularly produced honorary decrees for its ephebes in any given year, and those decrees usually list all of that year's recruits. A substantial number of those decrees have survived, at least in fragmentary form. Those fragments show that numbers declined as Athens came

20 Forbes 1929.
21 E.g. Ma 2004: passim; or earlier Baker 1995 and 2000. This position is now so well-entrenched that few would dare challenge it.
22 Chankowski 2004: 68.
under direct Macedonian control, and by the late second and early first centuries the numbers were
dismal indeed, falling as low as 18 at one point.24 Communis opinio holds that as participation rates
declined and a city strapped for funds ceased to support young men during training, the ephbeia
became an institution populated strictly by the sons of the elite and those who would court their
favour.25

We cannot challenge the fact of declining rates of participation in citizen training in Athens, but
whether we should extrapolate from Athens to the rest of the Greek world is an open question. While
things in Athens seem grim, we can find counterexamples in several contemporary cities. The most
elegant of these is the Boeotian city of Thisbe. Pélékidis, in her study of the Athenian ephbeia,
invokes Thisbe to illustrate just how far Athens had fallen, saying, with mild hyperbole, that in the
second century the smallest town in the Boeotian confederacy (Thisbe) reported more ephbes in
training than the city of Athens.26 This is a two-edged sword; if both towns had ephbes numbering in
the teens, it is terrible for Athens, but potentially wonderful for Thisbe (and by extension for the other
cities of the Boeotian confederacy).27 That they were able to push their rates of participation as high as
Athens must mean that a large proportion of, if not all, eligible young men participated.28

Our evidence only reaches so far. Even including the Boeotian examples, there are no more
than a handful of cities for which we have anything like a head count for ephbes. An accurate head-

24 IG II¹ 944, from near the beginning of the second century BCE.
25 Indeed, many of the young men listed can be directly connected to the major players in Athenian politics and public life.
The families of archons, other magistrates and priests are vastly over-represented. Perrin-Samindayar 2007: 84 and
passim suggests that the corps of ephbes was made up of the sons of the elite, and the sons of men who wanted the elite
to be their customers.
26 Pélékidis 1962: 164. In reality the lowest number for Athenian Ehebes (18) is still greater than Thisbe's biggest class
(17).
28 Pélékidis 1962: 162ff quotes the numbers for the sake of illustrating the decline and decadence of Athens in the
Hellenistic period, a trend associated with a lack of engagement and participation and a shift to more intellectual training
for young men, rather than military training. Those secondary symptoms may be visible in Athens, but not in Boeotia.
The region's reputation for being too enamoured of gymnastic training persisted into the Roman era (see Nepos' Life of
Epaminondas).
count of ephebes is of limited value even in those few cases where we can find one. Without an accurate total number or eligible young men, or reasonably reliable total number of citizens–neither of which is really possible–we would still be left with no more than a vague impression of whether participation rates were high or low. Returning to our earlier comparison, if the tiny city of Thisbe produced nine ephebes in one year, while Athens produced only eighteen, we are probably safe in saying that the youth of Thisbe participated at a much higher rate than the youth of Athens, but we will never be in a position to say much more than that. This is not the counsel of despair. Our impression of participation rates is the estimation of the poleis themselves, and our evidence suggests that they thought–or at least wanted others to think–that the majority of their young citizens underwent official training. That is the qualitative picture that emerges from these documents, even in the late third and second centuries BCE, when in Athens the hard numbers were moving in the opposite direction.

The city of Eretria on Euboea had called its young men ephebes and offered them state-sponsored and funded training for as long as Athens. Honorary inscriptions for two gymnasiarchs from the first century BCE give what might well be the vaguest information possible, praising both for the diligence that they exercised while supervising "rather a lot" of boys and ephebes. "A lot" is obviously a very subjective judgment, but it was enough young men that both the gymnasiarchs and the probouloi of Eretria saw fit to comment on their number, and enough that the honorands had to spend the entire year in the gymnasium to make sure that the boys and ephebes were able to train properly.  

29 To take the issue a step further, even if we had perfect and complete numbers we are still left with only a subjective impression. Without some agreed upon threshold below which the ephebeia became a mere playground of the wealthy, and a detailed socioeconomic background for each named participant against which we could test that hypothesis, a precise rate would tell us little.

30 IG XII.9 234.4-7 and 235.4-6, for Elpinikos and Mantidoros respectively, use a nearly identical phrase: συνελθόντων διὰ τῆς φιλοτημίας αὐτοῦ πλείον παιδών τε καὶ ἐρήμων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὕπο τῆν ἀρχήν παιτῶν, προενοιήθη τῆς εὔπταξίας αὐτών (the only difference between the two is that in Mantidoros' inscription there is an extra τε following συνελθόντων. One document from Eretria (IG XII.9 240) does seem to list some thirty-seven ephebes, but it is from the fourth century, and there is no way to know if it was considered "a lot" or even how much the demographics of the city may have changed over the intervening three hundred years.

31 This might be a hint that not all citizens officially took part in the ephebeia, but that all were able to partake of some
A contract between the city and a certain Chairephanes offers (albeit much earlier) evidence that substantial numbers of Eretria's future citizens underwent ephebic training.\textsuperscript{32} For its end of the bargain, Eretria swears to leave Chairephanes and his workers unmolested (and untaxed) as they come and go, importing materials and working to drain the marshes near the city. They swear the oath, seemingly, in two instalments. The \textit{probouloi} administer the oath to the whole of the citizen body, while the \textit{strategoi} for each year administer the oath to the ephebes.\textsuperscript{33} The implication would seem to be that all the citizens of Eretria had to swear the oath, but since Chairephanes had a lease for ten years, there would be new citizens who came of age over the duration of the contract. Having the \textit{strategoi} administer the oath to each year's class of ephebes ensured that by year nine, all citizens were still bound by that oath.\textsuperscript{34} The people of Miletus used a similar system to keep their oath of friendship and alliance with the Ptolemies up-to-date. They first had all of the citizens swear the oath of alliance, then added a clause that required "those who are ephebes in any given year, when the usual festivals are held and celebrated and when they finish their training... to swear to remain loyal to the leaders of the people and to maintain the friendship and alliance with Ptolemy and his descendants."\textsuperscript{35}

Incorporating the key pieces of foreign policy into ephebic and citizen oaths was not unusual. It was, in many cases, a symbolic honour for important allies, but it still rests on the idea that all citizens

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\footnote{\textit{IG XII.9} 235: έπειδή Μαντίδορος Καλλικράτο[ς] απείρεθες υπὸ τοῦ δήμου γυμνασίαρχος ἐμ πᾶσι τοῖς κατά τὴν ἱδρύην ἐνδόξος ἀναστρέψθη καὶ ἀξίως ἐστιν οἱ καὶ τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῆς ἐγχειρισθείς αὐτοὶ υπὸ τοῦ δήμου πίστεως, συ[ν]ελθόντον τε διὰ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν αὐτοῦ πλείονοι παῖδες τοι οἱ ἐφ[ή]βουν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ἱδρύην πειστόντον, προέστη τῆς εὐταξίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς τόποις διὰ πάντος τοῦ χρόνου τῆς ἱδρύης, ἐμμονεύοντος ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίωι δι᾽ ἐνναυ[τοῖο] (\textit{IG XII.9} 234 uses identical language to praise Elpinikos).}

\footnote{\textit{IG XII.9} 191. On this document see the work of Knoepfler 2001; Bresson 2007: 173-4 or Chankowski 2010: 152-7.}

\footnote{\textit{IG XII.9} 191: ἐδοξ[ε]ν τε βουλεῖ καὶ τοῦ δήμου ὑμόσχει τοὺς πολῖτας πλέον τα Ἀξιωματικὰς Ἀρχιερατεῖς ἐν Ἀπολλόνου Δαφνιδοῦ ὡς δ᾽ ἐν μή ὑμόσχει, ἄτομος ἐστοῦ...ca 8... εξορκοὐντες δὲ οἱ πρόβουλοι, εξορ[κ]ούντας δὲ καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ ἔτος τοὺς ἐφήβους.}

\footnote{Such is the conclusion of Knoepfler 2001: 73-5.}

\footnote{\textit{I. Miler} 1.3.139c.47-51: ὡμόψειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐφήβους τοὺς ἅπι γινομένους, ἑπιτάγῳ ἐπ[ί][κ]ρη[σθή]σετες καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα συντελέσαντες ἀπολύονται ἐκ τοῦ γυμν[α]ράσιον ἔμμενεν τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου κυρωθέσιν καὶ διατηρήσατε τὴν φιλίαν [κ]αὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ βασιλεία Ἔπολεματος καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους α]ὐτοῦ.}
\end{footnotesize}
had come through the ranks of epheses.\textsuperscript{36} That idea is what is important for us to bear in mind: that regardless of their raw number, both insiders and outsiders were willing to believe that all citizens had taken part in ephebic training. This brings us back to our initial question and to the gymnasiarchic law of Beroea. For Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, among others, this document offers an explicit rebuttal of the image that Eretria and Miletus project, when it enjoins the gymnasiarch to exclude certain classes of socially undesirable people, including some who were full citizens, from the gymnasium. Since the law also tells us that the epheses were expected to practice archery and javelin-throwing in the city gymnasium every day, once the \textit{paides} had anointed themselves, exclusion from the gymnasium necessarily entailed exclusion from training.\textsuperscript{37} Those to be excluded were: slaves, freedmen and their children, \textit{apalaistroi}, prostitutes, those engaging in a trade of the agora, those who were drunk and those who were mad.\textsuperscript{38} This clause, and how we interpret it, will be of vital importance to how we understand the \textit{ephebeia} in Beroea. If the interpretation of Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, which has not seen a serious challenge to date, is correct, then the gymnasium may indeed have been closed to some citizens, and gymnastic and ephebic training may have been the preserve of only a small portion of the community.\textsuperscript{39} It is a difficult proposition to argue against, since it agrees with much of what we think we know of class prejudice in the ancient world. Several of the groups listed, are clearly “not our kind”: slaves and freedmen are obviously socially undesirable, as are prostitutes. Those who practice “a trade of the agora” are a little less obvious, but we could still explain their inclusion by an appeal to

\footnotesize 36 The other explanation, that the epheses were strictly a symbolic representative of the community, one that was particularly easy to organize and muster, still relies on both parties accepting the fiction that the epheses were a meaningful proportion of the citizen body.

\footnotesize 37 \textit{I. Beroea} 1.B10-11.


\footnotesize 39 Though in this case, we would have to question whether perhaps the people of Beroea simply did not recognize tradesmen as citizens (or at least wanted to convince their neighbours that they did not).
the aristocratic prejudice against banausic trades.40 Drunks are more difficult yet. We could invoke the Delphic maxim *meden agan*, and suggest an aristocratic distaste for those who overindulge, but it is difficult. We would need to assume that “the drunk” was a recognizable socioeconomic status, and one that was not welcome among the aristocracy. It would be a difficult case to make. So with two that fit the model, and two that, to some extent, do not, the current reading of the document is vulnerable.

There is an alternative mode of understanding the document, as motivated by practical, rather than ideological, moral or class concerns. It hinges on the identity of the final excluded group: the *apalaistoi*. Just who the *apalaistoi* are is a difficult, but necessary, question. Gauthier and Hatzopoulos, following Robert, argue that the *apalaistoi* are citizens who, while technically and legally eligible to participate in gymnastic training, are not physically able to do so.41 As a comparandum they offer an ephebic inscription from second-century CE Memphis, which lists the victors in athletic competitions, followed by a list of nineteen "young men who were in the group of young men who were too big or otherwise deficient in appearance and were received by the strongest *epistrategos*."42 The underlying theory is that participation in the *ephebeia* was a prerequisite for citizenship in Memphis, so something had to be done to allow children whose appearance did not match the stature of their families to participate.

It is an interesting analogy, but one that seems misplaced here, if for no other reason than that the unfortunate young men of Memphis are not called *apalaistoi*.43 Given the context, one has to

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40 Those who practice a trade of the agora are, in essence, an invitation to circular logic. If we believe the law is a manifestation of aristocratic prejudice, then this clause is an extension of Plato’s distaste for banausic trades. It can fit just as well with the counter-argument I will present here, so it is better not to invoke it as the deciding factor.
42 SEG 40.1568.50-52: οἱ ἐν τάξει ξυψωμένοι καὶ ἄλλοι κατάδεικται τήν ὅψιν παραδεχόμεντες ύπὸ τοῦ κρατιστοῦ ἐπιστρατηγοῦ.
43 There is some danger of circularity here: that is, of deciding who/what the *apalaistoi* are, then of finding similar groups by other names and invoking them as proof that we are right about the meaning of the word ’*apalaistoi*.’
wonder why, if those not suited to gymnastic exercise could be called *apalaistroi*, the people of Memphis choose the much more cumbersome, and frankly impolitic, description that they did. The word *apalaistroi* is, admitttedly, very rarely attested, but two other examples suggest a slightly different meaning. The only other instance of the word which leaves us anything to be deciphered comes from Magnesia on Sipylos. The people of that city honoured their gymnasiarch for a generous gift of oil for anointing, which he gave for the use of "the *neoi*, the *gerontes*, the *paides* and the *apalaistroi." The first three of those are obviously age-groups; the most natural default assumption is that the *apalaistroi* are as well. Even if that is incorrect, this text still poses difficulties for Gauthier and Hatzopoulos' overall interpretation. In Magnesia, so far from being unwelcome and excluded, the *apalaistroi* were invited to the gymnasium with a gift of oil. Another attestation of the word, nearer in time and place to the law of Beroea is from Demetrias in Thessaly, ca. 100 BCE. Here we find a gymnasiarch being honoured by "those from the gymnasium" for providing large basins of oil for anointing to "those who use the gymnasium as well as the *paides* and the *apalaistroi." Again, these three groups are most easily understood as age divisions. "Those who use the gymnasium" may be a cohort that is somehow obligated to exercise there regularly, much like the ephebes and those under twenty-two from Beroea. The *paides* are those below that age, who may still exercise there, which we also see in Beroea. The *apalaistroi* then, could be an age cohort that is beyond the years of mandatory exercise, but who still periodically used the gymnasium. Assuming that we are correct in this, we can find an age-group in Beroea that would correspond to the *apalaistroi*. In Beroea they were probably those above the age of twenty-two but younger than thirty. Men below that age were required to practice daily, and those

44 ΤΙΜ V.2 1367. 5-7: θέντα τά ἀξείματα ἐξ ὀλυκέων μεστὸν τοῖς νέοις καὶ γέρουσι καὶ παισὶ καὶ ἀπαλαίστρον<ρ> δι' ὀλικε'> ἡμέ<ρ>ας ἀξ<ρ>ον νυκτός.
45 Αρβάνιτοπούλος, *Polémon* I (1929), 126: οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου Φύλων Αλεξάνδρου Αμφαναίη, γυμνασιαρχήσαντα ἑκ τοῦ ἱδίου καὶ ἀλείσαντα ἐξ ὀλικέων τοὺς μετέχοντας τοῦ γυμνασίου καὶ τοὺς παιδίς καὶ τοὺς ἀπαλαίστρον<ς> ἀρετής ἐνεκέν καὶ μεγαλοψυχίας τῆς εἰς ἔκαστον.
between twenty-two and thirty were still allowed to use the gymnasium, and may even have been expected to, while those over thirty needed special permission from the gymnasiarch.\footnote{1. Beroea 1.B47 and 1-2.}

There is much at stake in the question of who the *apalaistroi* were, because so much rides on the correct interpretation of this clause of the law. Without this clause of the law of Beroea, we lose our best, and perhaps only, direct evidence that the gymnasium and the *ephebeia* were the preserve of the rich and powerful. In what follows, I will offer a different, more practical reading of this clause, to counter the 'elitist' version of Gauthier and Hatzopoulos. All told, seven classes of people are to be excluded from the Gymnasium of Beroea; slaves, freedmen, their descendants, prostitutes, those who practice a trade, the *apalaistroi*, drunks and madmen. Gauthier and Hatzopolous' case rests on the well-known and undoubtedly real Greek prejudice against men of servile descent and prostitutes, as well as those who ply a trade rather than farm. It is fitting that our rival interpretation should be able to account for two groups that they ignore: the drunks and the madmen. We will find that the *apalaistroi* fit quite well with them.

If the *apalaistroi* are, as the two other attestations of the word suggest, a group of men who are beyond the age of required gymnastic training, which in Beroea meant that they were normally not allowed to use the gymnasium, then this rule may have a much more practical intent: to keep the gymnasium from becoming too crowded and chaotic. Keeping order in the gymnasium is the theme of the first section of the law dealing with the gymnasiarch's responsibilities, and was, as a rule, the primary responsibility of gymnasiarchs everywhere. In Beroea, the gymnasiarch had absolute power to mete out fines and corporal punishment to those who disobeyed him or ignored the rules governing who could exercise and when. Those under thirty years of age are not allowed to use the gymnasium while "the sign is down" without special permission, and when the sign is raised, it is not open to
anyone else. 47 A little later, we find the rule that ephebes and men under twenty-two must train every
day, but they must wait until the paides have already anointed themselves. Likewise, the neaniskoi, a
group that is otherwise undefined but possibly refers to the ephebes and those under twenty-two
together, are forbidden from approaching the paides or engaging them in conversation. 48 The strict
(and published) schedule calls our attention to an issue we rarely consider: maybe Beroea's gymnasium
was too small. It was too small to accommodate those over thirty at the same time as those under
thirty, so a system of signals needed to be devised. It was too small to allow the ephebes to practice
fighting while the paides were exercising, so the ephebes waited until the paides were done, and were
forbidden from loitering about during their lessons.

Beroea's gymnasium may have been too small to accommodate every man in the city coming to
exercise at the same time. 49 To prevent undue congestion, and the chaos it would cause, they instituted
a schedule and a few simple rules. The rule about who is excluded (or has no share in) the gymnasium
may be directed toward the same end. Setting aside the slaves and freedmen for a moment, the
gymnasiarch is required to keep five kinds of people away from the gymnasium: prostitutes, those who
practice a trade, the apalaistroi, the mad and the drunk. The apalaistroi are above the age of regular
training, and kept out so that there is sufficient space for others (this clause in the law follows several
regulating the paides' use of the gymnasium). The final category, drunks, also suggests an effort to
keep order more than to erect barriers between social strata. 50 The Greek disdain for those who

48 Davidson 2007: 71, thinks this rule is intended to prevent sexual relationships from developing between young children
and men around thirty (as he sees the neaniskoi), but he offers no argument or analysis to support his case, and his
assumptions have not met with much support.
49 The site of Beroea's gymnasium has been tentatively identified (just outside the walls in the south-east of the ancient
city), but not explored, so we cannot speak to its size in absolute terms. Even that would avail us little without accurate
demographic information for the city, which we also lack. We are speaking in terms of perception. Whatever its size,
the people of Beroea seem to have thought that it could not accommodate everyone, and instituted a rotating schedule to
address the problem. It is, after all, the perception of a problem, rather than some objective absolute, that leads a city to
50 As recognized by Kobes 2004: 240.
overindulge in wine (as well as anything else) is well-known, but nowhere, even in the utopia of Plato, is a predilection for drinking considered grounds to deny someone citizen rights.\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, while the Greeks realized that some people enjoyed drinking more than others, "drunks" does not seem to be a recognized category of citizen. Even Theophrastus, who wrote a lost treatise on drunkenness, does not include a "drunk" among the various unsavoury types of citizen in his characters, and instead merely includes drinking too-strong wine as a symptom of boorishness.\textsuperscript{52} Perhaps most damaging of all for the elitist interpretation of the rule is the absence of any hint that some political disability was attached to excessive drinking in Aeschines' speech \textit{Against Timarchus}, which otherwise stands as the best evidence in favour of the common interpretation.

Aeschines prosecutes his enemy under a law which purportedly forbade those who had made their living as prostitutes from speaking in, or even attending, the assembly.\textsuperscript{53} That neatly matches the exclusion of prostitutes from the gymnasium in Beroea. Better still, Aeschines notes with approval that the same restrictions do not apply to those "whose ancestors were never generals, or those who make their living by some trade."\textsuperscript{54} Rightly or wrongly, this has been taken to imply that cities less democratic than Athens did exclude such people from politics, though there is no positive reason to draw that conclusion. Aeschines' case hinges on proving that Timarchus spoke in the assembly, when he should have lost that right for selling himself as a prostitute. It would be very strange for him not to mention a similar disability that attached to habitual drunks while he revels in the detail of Timarchus' binge drinking. For Aeschines, drunkenness offers only another avenue of character assassination, it says nothing about his legal status.\textsuperscript{55} Thus the best parallel for the exclusivity of the Beroean

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\textsuperscript{51} Plato instead recommends promoting moderation in drink (\textit{Laws} 640 D-E).
\textsuperscript{52} Athenaeus 10.22.22 and Theophrastus, \textit{Characters} 4.9.
\textsuperscript{53} The law, as quoted in the text of the speech, has long been considered a late interpolation.
\textsuperscript{54} Aeschines, \textit{Against Timarchus}, 27.
\textsuperscript{55} Aeschines, \textit{Against Timarchus}, 26.
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gymnasium at no point suggests that anyone known to drink to excess should be at a political
disadvantage. It may be best to take ho methuron literally. That is, the law does not envision a
substratum of society characterized by drunkenness and who are disenfranchised because of it, but
rather the very real possibility that a man might try to enter the gymnasium while currently drunk. For
obvious reasons, impaired motor skills and javelins (or bows) do not mix well. There is no reason to
believe that a man barred from the gymnasium while drunk would not be admitted to the gymnasium
the next day, once he had slept it off.

Forbidding those who were currently intoxicated from taking part in gymnastic training is a
perfectly rational choice. The Greek dismay at drinking to excess was that it led to chaos and violence.
In light of that, madmen, or literally "one who is raving" may have been excluded for much the same
reason: in an environment stocked with weapons and excitable teenagers, he was dangerously
disruptive. The exclusion of prostitutes and those who ply a trade makes sense in this context as well.
It may be less about forbidding prostitutes in general from exercising, and more about keeping them
from plying their trade while children and young men exercise. Those who work at a trade may have
been excluded for a similar reason, because a crowd of hawkers made an already difficult-to-control
group of young men even more distracted. Put another way, it may be less a matter of disliking the
idea of peddlers exercising than it is of not wanting peddlers trying to sell you things while you
exercise. Likewise, one can easily imagine how allowing a horde of merchants (those who practice a
trade) to loiter about in the gymnasium and try to drum up business while the young men practice
throwing javelins changes what was an already crowded place into one that was dangerously chaotic.\(^{56}\)
The system can also account for the exclusion of slaves, freedmen and their descendants: if they were

\(^{56}\) This runs counter to Perrin-Saminadayar 2007: 84. On the need for keeping order in the gymnasium while boys practice
javelin throwing, see Antiphon's second tetralogy.
never going to be allowed to become full citizens or serve in the regular infantry, why allow them a share of the limited space in the gymnasium, or the trainers' limited time?\footnote{This need not be the only reason why slaves, freedmen and prostitutes were excluded from the gymnasium: they almost certainly were still considered socially undesirable, and it is difficult to see why any city would want to sponsor combat training for its slaves.} This is a very fine distinction, but it still serves to highlight the advantages of the practical interpretation over the ideological: the practical interpretation can account for all of those to be excluded from the gymnasium and allows for a meaning of apalaistroi that is in keeping with the other attestations of the word.

One other peculiarity in the law seems to support my interpretation. In the clauses immediately above this, which deal with who is to use the gymnasium when, it is those who try to exercise out of turn who are considered to have violated the rules and who are subject to penalties imposed by the gymnasiarch. With this list of those who are to be excluded, it is the gymnasiarch who is subject to punishment if such people are actually found in the gymnasium, and the rules governing how he is to be prosecuted consume five times more space than does the list of those who are verboten.\footnote{\textit{I. Beroea} 1.B27-29 and 29-39 respectively.} The final clause of this section, before the rules governing the Hermaia begin, is one protecting the gymnasiarch from being physically assaulted in the gymnasium, and setting penalties for such infractions.\footnote{\textit{I. Beroea} 1.B39-45.} All of these clauses, including the exclusion clause, share the theme of maintaining an orderly space for training.

With this, the best and most direct evidence that the \textit{ephebeia} became the preserve strictly of the sons of the local elite seems to vanish. There is no other Hellenistic city of which we could say: “they explicitly reserved the gymnasium for the sons of the wealthy.” In the absence of that, and given the impossibility of an argument based on hard numbers, we are free to return to the general impression created by our evidence: that all, or at least a convincingly large proportion of all young citizens
participated in state-sponsored training. This is certainly the impression created by the oaths of Karystos and Miletus, as well as by numerous other cities outside of Attica. On the new reading, Beroea itself seems to have a thriving *ephebeia*; they had so many recruits and other young men crowding the gymnasium that they outstripped the building’s capacity.⁶⁰ They were forced to institute a scheduling system to avoid overcrowding and allow their young men to have space to train.

### 1.3 The Oath of the Agelaoi of Dreros

There are consequences to having a broadly inclusive *ephebeia*. If a polis required all young citizens of a certain age to come together as ephebes for a year or more of intensive training, that means that they also had to recognize “ephebes” as a distinct and significant component of the polis. The role of ephebes in state religion, and especially public displays of state religion like festivals and funerals, speaks to their prominent place in the city. It may be more to the point to say that, in their corps of ephebes, cities had to recognize a significant portion of their citizen body that was self-cohesive and highly militarized. In addition to the time spent together training, they were all members of a clearly defined age-cohort or age-class. Even after their official time of service was up, in many cities they would continue to be organized and treated as such.⁶¹ Cities may have been proud of the size and quality of their ephabetic corps, but we should not be be surprised if we can also detect a note of fear. Through a different lens, a discrete portion of the population bound together by friendship and loyalty and going about the city armed looks like nothing so much as a stasis and a prelude to revolution.

The cities of Hellenistic Crete had a long and vibrant tradition of especially rigorous citizen-training; it was a reputation that made Cretan youths highly sought-after as mercenaries.⁶² It may not

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⁶⁰ Whether they were coming for the training and camaraderie or for the (previously) ready access to prostitutes and shopping may be an open question.

⁶¹ This will be explored more fully immediately below. As an example, we can look to Beroea, where even after they ceased to be ephebes, men under twenty-two still had to meet at the gymnasium every day for military exercises.

⁶² Chaniotis 1991: 97.
be strictly a coincidence that Crete also furnishes some of our most interesting evidence for tensions between the community as a whole and its young men in training. In particular, we will be turning our attention to the oath of the agelaoi of Dreros (I. Cret. I 9.1). Some of the terms of this oath are entirely unsurprising, in that they seem to have much in common with similar oaths. The young men of Dreros swear that they will defend the territory of their city, and, among the gods invoked as witnesses are personified elements of the city's chora, features shared with the much more famous ephebic oath of Athens.63 Such a clause, and the invocation of such deities is probably to be expected from men who would be patrolling and defending the borders of their cities.64 Also un-exceptional is the fact that the people of Dreros used the oath as an extension of their foreign policy. The agelaoi must swear to maintain alliances with both Knossos and Miletus,65 the people of Miletus also used their ephebic oath to pledge eternal alliance to the Ptolemaic dynasty.66 The clauses that require each year's group of agelaoi to ensure that their future counterparts swear the same oath have a parallel in the (extremely fragmentary) ephebic oath of Ephesus.67

In addition to these usual features, though, the oath of the agelaoi of Dreros has features that seem entirely out of keeping with ephebic oaths, or epigraphically attested oaths more generally. Two clauses in particular are striking. In addition to pledging to uphold the city's current alliances, the

63 In the oath of Dreros, along with the usual Olympian gods and Titans, we find (I. Cret. I. 9.1.33-5) “all the heroes (male and female) and all the rivers and springs” ἥρωις καὶ ἣρωϊσσασας καὶ κράνας καὶ ποταμοῖς. In Athens the ephebes swore by (Rhodes and Osborne: #88.19-20 [338 BCE]): “the boundaries of the fatherland, the wheat, the barley the olives and the fig trees” ὁριοὶ τῆς πατρίδος, ποροί, κρῆται, ἀμπελοῦ, ἠλάατ, συκαῖ. The Ephebic oath of Athens is a document that comes loaded with its own share of questions. For a brief introduction to the issues see the commentary of Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 445 and following. On the date of the oath, which may be different from the date of the inscription, see Stewart 1977. Chankowski 2010: 310-17 has a brief discussion of the known ephebic oaths from cities other than Athens, including a discussion of the oath of Dreros (311-12) which, strangely, does not explore the issue of tensions between young men and old.
64 On this element of the Athenian oath, see Ma 2004.
65 I.Cret. I.9.1.46-49 and 144.152. These treaties are the focus of Chaniotis 1996: #7.
66 I. Milet 1.3.139c.47-51 (ca. 130 BCE). This is similar in principal to including a clause about perpetual alliance to the Ptolemies in the oath of homopoliteia between Kos and Kalymna ( IG XII.4.1 152.19 [ca. 200 BCE])
67 I.Cret. I.9.1.96-103. I. Ephesus 1382 (date uncertain, because the stone has been lost), following the interpretation of Chankowski 2010: 311.
young men must swear to maintain a perpetual enmity toward the city of Lyttos, and never to be well disposed to them “either by trick or by plan.” Each young man of Dreros must also swear that he will not betray the city, borders or 'men' of Knossos or Dreros to their enemies; pursuant to that, they must also swear that they will not begin a stasis, and will not swear any joint oath, either in the city or outside of it, and will report those who do swear such an oath to the authorities. These last terms may be taken to suggest that the older men of Dreros were deeply suspicious the youth of their city. In what follows we will explore the roots of that suspicion, and the tensions between older men and men in (and just graduated from) citizen-training programs.

The clauses of the oath that pledge young men to eternal hostility toward Lyttos and those that forbid them from betraying the men of their city or swearing common oaths are connected. The hostility to Lyttos can be traced to a war between that city and Knossos in 220 BCE. According to Polybius (4.53), Knossos held all the Greek cities of Crete under her sway, with the exception of Lyttos, which resisted stubbornly. The Knossians resolved to make an example of the smaller city, but their position was weakened by the defection of several of their allies to the Lyttian side. With the balance of power on the island destabilized, we can see the oath of Dreros as a means of re-assuring their powerful ally and neighbour that they have no intention of changing their allegiance. On a superficial level, that is surely what is happening, but it is not the whole story. Having the ephesbes of a

68 I. Cret I 9.1, 36-75: μή μὴν ἔγγο | ποικα τοῖς Λυττίοις | καλὸς φρονησεῖν | μήτε τέχνη | μήτε μαχανά | μήτε ἐν νυκτὶ | μήτε πεδὶ ἀμείραν | καὶ | σπευσίᾳ ὅτι καὶ δύναμι | κακὸν τάπόλε τά τῶν Λυττίων. | δικὴν δὲ καὶ πραξὶν μὴθέν ἐνορκον | ἤμην. καὶ τέλομαι | φιλοδήμοι καὶ | φιλοκνώσεσι | καὶ μήτε τάμ πόλιν προδοσεῖν ὅτα τὰ τῶν Δρηνίων.| μήτε σύρεία τά | τῶν Δρηνίων | μήτε τά τῶν Κνωσίων. | μήτε ἀνήδρας τοῖς πολλαί | πολίβοις προδοσοῦσεν | μήτε Δρηνίως | μήτε Κνωσίως | μήθε συνυστητικώς | συνεξειν | μήτε ἐν πόλει | μήτε ἐξοί τάς | πόλεως. | μήτε | ἀλλοις συντάκτες | εἰ δὲ τῶν | καὶ πόλιμι συνομονώντας | ἐξαργυρών τοῦ | σώμαζον τοῖς πλάσασιν. "I will never think well of the Lyttians, either by trick or plan, either during the night or the day, and I will always be zealous that I do what harm I can to the city of the Lyttians. And no legal action comes about from deeds related to this oath. And I shall remain friendly to Dreros and Knossos. And I will never betray the city of the Drerians, nor the borders of the Drerians nor the Knossians, nor will I betray the men of Dreros or Knossos to the enemies. Nor will I ever begin a faction and will remain hostile to those who do start a faction, and I will not take part in any conspiracy/joint swearing of oaths either in the city or outside of it, and will not allow it in others. And if I learn that some have sworn a joint oath, I will make a proclamation to the court(?) of the Kosmos."
city swear a formal oath of alliance (or anything else) each year was not uncommon in the Greek world, and may have been especially popular on the island of Crete. Such oaths served the obvious practical purpose of making sure that all citizens were bound by the same treaties, and, as Xenophon's Socrates says (Memorabilia, 4.4.16), encouraged unity among the citizen body. What is unparalleled, in Crete or anywhere else, is an oath that demands not only eternal friendship toward an ally, but also eternal hostility toward an enemy.

The explanation for this is to be found not in Lyttos, but rather in Gortyn. Polybius tells us that, while some of Knossos' erstwhile allies defected unanimously, the city of Gortyn lapsed into civil war. The younger men (neoteroi) took the part of Lyttos, while the older men favoured remaining in alliance with Knossos. The political dispute quickly became a true stasis, and the older men, at least, resorted to violence. They prevailed in the end and killed or exiled all of the younger men. The intergenerational civil war that plagued Gortyn is a tempting explanation for why the andres of Dreros were so suspicious of the younger men who made up the agelai, but we may need further details: most importantly, precisely who were the neoteroi of Gortyn? It seems unlikely that they were simply the agelaioi of that city. Rather, they were most likely men who had recently passed from their period of training among the agelaioi into (more or less) full citizenship and their prime years of military service. In many cities, such men formed an official and distinct segment of the population. They are most

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70 The closest we come is the so-called oath of Plataea, inscribed on the same stele as the Athenian Ephebic oath mentioned above (Rhodes and Osborne 2003: #88). If (and there is some doubt) the oath is genuine, the Greeks pledged to raze the city of Thebes, but there is no indication that this was to be a perpetual hostility.
71 Polybius, 4.53.6-8: καὶ Πολυρρήνης ἐν καὶ Κερατία καὶ Λαππάοι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ὀριοι μετ᾽ Ἀρκάδων, ὀμοθυμαδὸν ἀποστάντες τῆς τῶν Κνωσίων φιλίας, ἔγνωσαν τοῖς Λυτίοις συμμαχεῖν, τῶν δὲ Γορτυνίων οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτεροι τὰ τῶν Κνωσίων, οἱ δὲ νεότεροι τὰ τῶν Λυτίων αὐρώμενοι, διεστάσασαν πρὸς ἄλληλοις.
72 There seems to be no reason to assume with Spyridakis 1970: 95-6 that at its heart the dispute was about Ptolemaic influence in the city, with young men favouring the Egyptian and old men the Macedonian monarchies.
73 Polybius 4.53.
74 They would hardly have been numerous enough to cause a serious stasis on their own.
commonly called *neoi*, though in some cities they were called *exepheboi, neaniskoi*, or *neoteroi.* In many if not most cities, these men continued to exercise frequently in the gymnasium, either by choice or by compulsion, and are frequently under the authority of the gymasiarch, just like ephubes (or *agelaoi*). Also like ephubes, they frequently appear as a corporate body in religious and funeral processions, suggesting that they maintained a tight structure. They had a corporate identity in politics and law, comprised their own distinct groups in community activities, particularly processions. In some cities their corporate identity was so well-established that they owned property collectively, and in one instance they are even included in the preamble of decrees alongside the *boule* and *demos.*

We know very little about them in Crete and almost nothing in Dreros, but we may have some evidence for a similar group in Gortyn. A decree from that city in the third century BCE, before the outbreak of its civil war, forbids the use of silver obols in trade of any sort in Gortyn, insisting that only the city's new bronze coinage can be used instead. Violators of this statute were to be reported to, and tried before, the members of a body known as the *neotas*, and the seven men appointed as guardians of the market-place would give judgment. The name 'neotas' suggests an etymological link with youth, and it is probable that this was an assembly of the young men of Gortyn, much like the 'synod of the *neoi* in Pergamum.* This level of organization is not altogether unusual for associations of young men, but what is wholly unheard of is them taking such a direct role in civic politics and government.

75 Even in the 1930s Forbes 1933: 6-10 was able to list some seventy poleis in which such young men formed a discrete group: in Miletus, they were ἑξορίσται (I. Milet I 7.203 [ca. 130 BCE]), in Delos they were νεώτεροι (ID 1501 [148/7 BCE]) and on Amorgos they were called νεώτεροι (IG XII.7 515 [ca. 100 BCE]). See also Dreyer 2004: 213-216, who covers the same ground.
76 Forbes 1933: 8. This seems to be regular practice for some Carian cities in the Roman era. e.g. Iassos (I. Iasos 23 and 85) and Aphrodisias (SEG 26.1219).
77 I.Cret. IV.162 (250-200 BCE). This was probably an attempt by the city to raise money by auctioning off the exclusive right to change silver coinage to the new bronze coins which must now be used for all trade in the agora.
78 I. Pergamum 274.7 (117 CE). Willetts 1976: 231-233 advanced additional arguments in support of this identification, but their logic is, at times, strained. His case centres on the preamble of the decree, in which we find that it was voted on with "the three hundred present," which he connects to several other groups of that number mentioned in literary sources to suggest that this was the traditional number for groups of young men.
In most other cases where they exist, they limit themselves to matters that touch on their own sphere, such as rules and financing for the gymnasium and festivals.

Tensions between older, established citizens and the young men in a community are not unique to Gortyn. There are several other examples from the Greek world, and it is a phenomenon that has been very thoroughly explored by anthropologists. Given the paucity of direct evidence, it may be worth our time to explore parallels from modern anthropology. Social systems in which older men jealously guard economic and political privileges are far from unusual. All societies, at least to a certain extent, assign different roles to people on the basis of age; that is not in question. The more important question is, are those roles fairly distributed and compensated, or does the system unfairly reward a given age stratum? By 'fairly' we mean, not in accordance with some principal of objective justice, but rather in a way that all members of a community are willing to accept. Conflict between age cohorts arises when the distribution of goods and privileges becomes unacceptable to the younger men, or when the older men feel that their position is threatened.

Although some inequalities and tensions between age groups are normal and inevitable, outright breaks are the exception rather than the rule. But the thin evidence we do have suggests that the distinctive Cretan system of public training would be exceptionally good at exacerbating those tensions. Crete's system of public training was much more rigorous and severe than the Greek norm. Plato compares the Cretan *agelai* to packs of wild horses. Their training was almost entirely

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79 Thucydides' comment that the young men of Athens were more eager for war than the old men may be the earliest historical notice of such tension. In the Hellenistic period, the revolutions of Agis and Cleomenes in Sparta are the best examples. For anthropological work on the phenomenon, Bernardi 1985 is perhaps the most thorough and the most frequently cited, but Foner 1984 is far more useful for the topic at hand. Sallares 1991: 160 ff. (and especially 170, in which he discusses Crete) and Davidson 2006 are far better at arguing that ancient Greece was an age-class society and showing which of the known quirks of Greek society are best explained as part of an age-class system than explaining why such discoveries are important.

80 Foner 1984: IX.

81 *Laws* 666e. Strabo's account (10.4) of the Cretan training program suggests that these traditions continued throughout the Hellenistic era.
military; they had few opportunities for social contacts outside their troops, and they spent the majority of their time outside of the city, living in the mountains and defending the city's territory. The military responsibilities that kept the agelaoi out of the city continued in the years after graduation. Men of an age to be neoi or perhaps members of the neotas continued to spend most of their time exclusively in each other's company, and to bear the majority of the burden of defending the city, instead of being reintegrated into the community as a whole. The practice of isolating young men on the outskirts of the community is common in communities plagued by age-class tensions.

Parallels to Cretan practice are not difficult to find elsewhere in the anthropological literature. In Foner's sweeping study of age-class conflict, she finds that restricted economic and sexual opportunities are a more common cause for complaint among young men than a lack of political power. Evidence for the former in Gortyn is difficult to find. The neotas has asserted, or perhaps been assigned, a role in supervising economic affairs in the city, but that tells us little. It may mean that the shift to token coinage was done at the urging of the neotas, or that they were profiting directly from whatever civic revenues accrued from money-changing. If so, it could be an attempt to redress the economic imbalance between young men and old, but it may also have been instituted as a way to finance their gymnastic training. It is equally, if not more, possible that the young men of the neotas, as a kind of standing paramilitary force, were simply the logical choice to take on the job of policing the agora, and were assigned that duty by the older citizens. Little can be made of this decree either way, but we can find better, if much earlier, evidence in Gortyn's famous law code. Whether or how much the laws of Gortyn may have changed in the centuries between the inscribing of the code and the

83 Plutarch, Philopoemen 13.6. Philopoemen's second campaign in Crete was one of constant ambushes and stolen marches, i.e. fighting adapted to a mountainous region, not pitched battles between phalanges.
84 Foner 1984:IX.
85 Perhaps they did not have so generous a patron as Menas of Sestos, discussed further below.
stasis of the third century is a question we cannot hope to answer, but we can say that the Gortyn in which the code had force was one in which older men monopolized economic opportunity. In the fourth column of the law we find a clause regulating inheritance. It states that a man cannot be pressured to make a division of his property to his children before death. That implies two things: first, that most property was kept in the hands of old men until death, and that there was some worry that sons might try to change that arrangement, so that the status quo needed to be enshrined in law. In column six, we find a similar clause on a similar theme. A son is forbidden from entering into negotiations about his share of the family property while his father is still alive. A young man cannot even raise immediate capital by trading on his future inheritance. The only instance in which a son could gain control of part of the family kleros before the death of his father was when the son incurred a fine, in which case, we must imagine, the property would simply pass from one older man to another, and the young man would still have no access. Such an economic regime may not always have been oppressive to young men. Some fathers may have been permissive, and some may have died leaving young men as heirs, but that it must be legislated implies some degree of tension, or at least fears of tension.

Economic restrictions are only part of the story. Foner found the most extreme tensions between age classes among the Sumburu of Kenya. The age-set structure of their society was such that men were not allowed to marry until after they had graduated from the warrior caste (roughly equivalent to being one of the neoi) in which they spent their prime. The chief results of this were simmering resentments on the part of the youth against the older men who had their pick of women in their reproductive prime, and from the other side, a growing loathing and distrust of young men whom the

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86 Willetts 1967: 4.2ff. A secondary clause does forbid a father from selling any property that his children have inherited or acquired from other sources.
elders saw as a threat to their marriages. While conditions were probably not nearly so extreme in Gortyn, young men of that city may have been frustrated by the monopoly old men held on legitimate avenues of (hetero)sexual pleasure. Turning our attention to the code again, the second column is given over to an extensive survey of the penalties for illicit sex. In addition to rules against rape, we find an exhaustive list of fines for adultery, covering numerous permutations of social class (free, _apetairos_) and where the adultery occurs (father or brother's house, husband's house or elsewhere). The code closes off other avenues of gratification as well; sex with another man's wife, another man's slave or any free women under another man's guardianship are all punishable by fine. Paying those fines likely meant transferring a portion of their inheritance to the guardian of their girlfriend.

We also have some curious evidence from Strabo. He tells us that the young men of Crete were all expected to marry at the same time. That is, those who served together in the _agela_ all married at the same time (γαμεῖν μὲν ἀμα πάντες ἀναγκάζονται παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς οἱ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐκ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν ἀγέλης ἐκκριθέντες). Willetts takes this to mean that a mass wedding ceremony was part of the rite of passage from being one of the _agelaoi_ to being a full citizen. That is possible, but it need not be the case. Strabo merely says that they all marry at the same time, not that they all marry immediately upon graduation. It is equally possible that there was a uniform lapse of time between their graduation and their being allowed or forced to marry, which may be contemporaneous with their time among the _neoteroi/neotai_. Either way, even after marriage their access to these women is strictly curtailed, since the new husbands do not bring their wives home immediately, but leave them in the house of their guardian for an unspecified time, "until the woman is ready to run a household." This practice of forcing young men to leave their wives in the homes of their guardians may have been more

87 Strabo 10.4.20.
89 Strabo 10.4.20: οὐκ εὐθὺς δ᾿ ἄγονται παρ᾿ ἑαυτοῖς τὰς γαμηθείσας παῖδας, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπάν ἡδὴ διοικεῖν ἰκαναὶ ὡσι τὰ περὶ τοὺς οἴκους.
frustrating than it would seem. The code of Gortyn also sets out fines for non-adulterous sexual contact with a woman living in the house of her guardian, which may mean that young men were forced to forgo sexual activity even after they were married.90

Gortynian society offered many plausible sources of age-class conflict, but our best evidence is from much earlier than the civil war of the third century. Why did the break come in the third century, and why did it not come in the fifth? There is substantial overlap between the two answers. Several factors tend toward keeping the peace in age-class societies. The obvious is the prospect of advancement to the more privileged age classes in time; the prospect of enjoying similar privileges offsets current disappointment.91 Tensions can also be mitigated by social and familial bonds between men of different ages. The younger Sumburu of Foner's study did not hate all old men uniformly; they were usually on good terms with their fathers and uncles, who acted as their advocates in conflicts with the community as a whole. The Sumburu system also worked to discourage solidarity between the members of the younger age-class. Some young men were closer to graduation into adulthood than others, and were often charged with policing the behaviour of the youngest men. This gave them a greater interest in maintaining the current social order than in subverting it. They were often among the most vocal advocates of the system.92 The final buttress for age-class systems is also the simplest: distance. Young men of the Sumburu tribe were charged with protecting the community; as such, they spent the majority of their time at the periphery of the community, away from their older tormentors and sources of friction.

This final safety valve is the easiest to identify in the Cretan system. Cretan young men, like

90 The supposed Spartan practice of forcing young couples to use stealth to be together may echo the Cretan practice, or it may simply mean that this is Greek shorthand for “those guys are weird.”
91 This is essentially the solution advocated by Aristotle (Politics, 1329a).
92 Foner 1984: xx.
those of most Greek *poleis*, spent most of their time on the outskirts of their city's territory, either stationed in border forts or actively patrolling.\textsuperscript{93} We are surely also safe in assuming that Cretan sons still loved their fathers. In other ways, Crete may have been less successful in dissipating tensions. The Cretan system of education also served as a program of indoctrination. Children were supposed to internalize the system from a very young age. Boys were brought to the *andreion* to act as servants for the communal meals. Also from a very early age, children were expected to memorize the laws of the city and recite them together in song, and, of course, they were bound to the system by oaths.\textsuperscript{94} Other aspects of the Cretan education and training regime may have served to increase the likelihood of a severe break between young and old. Rather than creating divisions, training in the *agela* was calibrated to generate solidarity among the participants.\textsuperscript{95} Beyond more tangible unifying forces such as having a distinct corporate identity, spending the majority of their waking hours together and taking their meals in common messes, their actual training regimen generated strong bonds on a more primal level. For this, we will turn to another historian with anthropological interests, McNeill and his theory of "muscular bonding."

McNeill's theory is essentially that moving large muscles rhythmically and giving voice in unison has a subliminal psychological impact on human beings. It produces a "generalized emotional exaltation" and "consolidate[s] group solidarity by altering human feelings."\textsuperscript{96} In addition to generating

\textsuperscript{93} There is also the evidence of Strabo (10.4.21), who, apparently quoting Ephorus, tells us of another traditional Cretan way of keeping young men out of the city: a Cretan man would, in essence, kidnap the young object of his affection, then spend several months with him and his friends (possibly the same as his cohorts in the *agela*) somewhere in the countryside, hunting and feasting.

\textsuperscript{94} On these customs too, see Strabo, 10.4.20-21.

\textsuperscript{95} Strabo, 10.4.20, tells us that there were several troops, each headed by a boy of outstanding wealth or influence.

\textsuperscript{96} McNeill 1995: viii. His main interest in the phenomenon was initially as a military historian investigating the history of close-order drill, and also, more retrospectively, as a former soldier who enjoyed close-order marching. The project shifted toward religion and the roots of human culture when it was brought to his attention just how closely his model reflected Durkheim's theory of religion. Durkheim says that the religious rituals of the Australian aboriginal communities were characterized by an "exaltation," which resulted from gathering together as a group, and that a community in this excited state exhibits "harmony and unison of movement" and cries and gestures which "fall into rhythm and regularity" (Durkheim 1976: 216). Without explicitly addressing Durkheim, McNeill (6ff.) argues for an
feelings of excitement, rhythmic movement also brings about "a blurring of self-awareness and the heightening of fellow feeling with all who share the dance." More strenuous movement, or movement combined with crying out in unison, can produce a stronger effect and even lead to a trance-like state. Music is, of course, very useful in this, both for maintaining the rhythm and for the added emotional charge it can provide.

The Cretan system of military training maps on to McNeill's requirements almost perfectly. From a very young age, children in Crete were, according to Strabo, expected to learn and perform a legislated group of songs, presumably together. Once they joined the agela, their rhythmic practices began in earnest. They were expected to learn to march in battle formation to the music of the lyre, which is, per Strabo, the Cretan custom. Nor is this merely practice; on set days, the different troops of boys would in this way march into a "mock" battle against one another, which often resulted in serious wounds. Forging bonds between fighting men was surely one of the goals of the training. One need only reflect on the Sacred Band of Thebes to see that the Greeks thought men so attached to one another were more effective in battle—but it came with risk. It created a communal identity for young men who were, at least in their own minds, oppressed by their elders, and long periods away from the city, with only themselves for company, no doubt reinforced it.

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inversion of the causal relationship, one in which the acts of moving and crying out in rhythm cause the brain to release natural opiates and produce a state of exaltation, rather than merely being a manifestation of that state. The science behind McNeill's argument was unproven when he wrote, and has advanced little in the years since, though he does seem to be in step with those who study the psychology of ritual and religion (cf. Marshall 2002: 360-380).

97 Here McNeill seems to be on much firmer ground, working with reports from ethnologists and anthropologists. As quoted by McNeill 1995: 8. Radcliffe-Brown 1933: 15 says of the Andaman Islanders: "As the dancer loses himself in the dance, as he becomes absorbed in the unified community, he reaches a state of elation." Also apud McNeill 1995: 8 Hanna 1977: 119 says that group dance produces "boundary loss, the submergence of self in the flow," and Kuper 1947: 247 says of an annual dance ritual among the Swazi, "When they dance, they feel they are one and can praise each other."

98 A useful, if not exhaustive, discussion of some ancient evidence for this can be found in West 1992: 13ff.

99 In this context, it is worth noting that in the Cretan city of Itanos, the oath of the agelaoi took the form of a hymn to Zeus which was performed with song and dance (Ryan 1999)

100 Strabo, 10.4.20.

101 Strabo, 10.4.20.
Where does this anthropological digression leave us with respect to the *neotas* of Gortyn, and, more importantly, the oath of Dreros? It is not a smoking gun, but it does offer some instructive parallels as to how the tensions between age-classes in Gortyn erupted into civil war. In turn, the course suggested by that war offers a better explanation for the terms of the Drerian oath than does simple hostility to Lyttos.\(^{102}\) If, as seems likely, the *neotas* of Gortyn was made up of young men who had graduated from the *agelai*, but had not yet achieved full economic and political rights, we can find signs of increasing tension. Gathering themselves together in an official body, or perhaps seizing an official role in the community could be construed as a challenge to the current regime: it allowed young men to control the economic transactions of their elders. To make matters worse, the supervision of the agora will have kept the young men who made up the *neotas* in the city proper rather than on the borders. As an organization for young men that met regularly, it also will have perpetuated the social bonds they formed in training and extended the range of ages who were united in opposition to the older men. Without such an organization, young men who had gone through the *agelai* one, or two, or five years apart would have no evident cause or opportunity to unite. The *neotas* probably was not a politically homogeneous group, or even an overtly political group under normal circumstances. In times of stress, it could become a locus of resistance to the current regime, and the pressures of a protracted war with Lyttos would match that description.

In the absence of further evidence, this account of the Gortynian *neotas* must remain hypothetical, but it is consistent with the more curious sections of the Drerian oath: provisions against "betraying the men of Dreros," joining in a *stasis*, or even swearing common oaths. This last seems especially odd in the text of a common oath.\(^{103}\) It is not difficult to read a certain degree of mistrust or

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\(^{102}\) Or that they preferred the Ptolemies to the Antigonids (as Spyridakis 1970: 95-6 argues).

\(^{103}\) It can be inferred that Chaniotis also found these unusual, or at least out of place in the normal exchange of oaths to secure a treaty, since his edition of the inscription breaks off just before these clauses, only to resume for the end of the document (1996: 196-200).
even paranoia into the terms of this oath. Forbidding the formation of a *stasis* or other challenges to the established system is normal; an explicit promise not to betray the older men of the city and a prohibition against swearing oaths are extreme and unparalleled. Common oaths were an almost quotidian event in most Greek *poleis*. They were the primary means of establishing a corporate identity for a subset of the population, whether a political club or an exclusive military unit.¹⁰⁴ Most relevant here is that a group like the *neoi* of Pergamum, or the *neotas* of Gortyn, an association of young men with their own institutions, must also have been bound together by common oaths. The *neotas* in particular, since it served as a jury, must have taken the traditional oath of impartiality each time they heard a case. By forbidding common oaths, the people of Dreros forbade the formation (or caused the dissolution) of a collective body of young men in their city.¹⁰⁵ Understood in this way, all of the clauses (hostility to Lyttos, friendship to Knossos, loyalty to the *andres*, no *staseis* or common oaths) are related to the same theme: preventing a civil war like Gortyn's.

While we can explain the peculiarities of the Drerian oath, we have no reason to assume that it was typical of the rest of the Greek world. Gortyn remains the only example of a Greek city in which tensions between young and old escalated to a full-blown civil war,¹⁰⁶ but the sources of tension were not unique. Rules about inheritance were broadly the same throughout the Greek world, and restricted political rights were such an accepted part of the norm that Aristotle made them one of the foundational principles of his ideal polis.¹⁰⁷ In Athens, to take our readiest example, risks and rewards were

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¹⁰⁴ Plescia 1970: 77.
¹⁰⁵ The fear of young men taking common oaths was deep enough that they added a clause forbidding it both inside the city and out. The first may be directed at an organization like the *neotas*; the second, at young men forming associations or clubs that would last beyond their time on garrison duty.
¹⁰⁶ Though the turmoil occasioned by Agis of Sparta, who championed the cause of young men against the old, is very close: Plutarch, *Life of Agis*, passim and especially 6.1 (young men eager for reform), 9.1 (chiefly opposed by the *gerontes*), 12.3 (the king forces older men to comply with his policy by arming a body of *neoi*) etc. Agis' successor, Cleomenes, seems to have pursued much the same policy. He devoted much attention to the training of young men and Plutarch calls attention to the king's own youth (*Life of Cleomenes*, 11.2 and 22.2 respectively).
¹⁰⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1328b. For Aristotle, military affairs and politics are the two most important aspects of the state, but they cannot be undertaken by exactly the same people, since military affairs require young men, and deliberation on
unevenly distributed as well. Older men maintained control of most real property and wealth, while the burden of defending that property fell more heavily on young men. In Athens, young men were allowed to attend and vote in the assembly immediately after they completed their ephebic training, but other political rights were reserved for older men. Men younger than thirty were not allowed to serve as jurors. Deliberation, if not voting, in the assembly was dominated by older men. 

Training for young citizens, then, was a fine thing, and surely a source of pride for many cities, but it was not without risks. Collecting a large cohort of well-trained and well-armed soldiers who were also politically and economically disenfranchised could be dangerous. In dealing with these tensions, most cities were more successful than Gortyn and more subtle than Dreros. One of the most widespread responses was to make moral education a component of ephebic training, as we shall see below.

1.4 Menas of Sestos and Training for Virtue

Menas of Sestos was a remarkable man. He served his city as an ambassador, dealing with both kings and Roman officials, as a warrior, as a priest, and as a gymnasiarch of noteworthy generosity and zeal. The inscription with which his fellow citizens honoured him is of impressive length, and offers us a wealth of (admittedly superficial) information about citizen training in Sestos. We know that they divided their young citizens into two groups, ephebes and neoi, and that both were expected to attend
the gymnasium for regular instruction.\textsuperscript{113} Menas was praised by his fellow citizens for lavishing much thought and expense on improving this training regime. He inspired the young men to exercise greater diligence in their training and spurred them on to courage and virtue.\textsuperscript{114} How he did this and which virtues he encouraged are the focus of our investigation here. The virtues which Menas and the people of Sestos thought it most important to cultivate will be the same as those virtues they thought made for an ideal, or at least a good, citizen.

The decree which has come down to us was neither the first nor the only public honour accorded to Menas. The inscription mentions other decrees and crowns awarded to him by the ephes of and neoi of the city. His services as a gymnasiarch, which included keeping his charges in line, funding sacrifices, instituting contests in archery and javelin throwing, and encouraging zeal in training and hard work, won Menas accolades on several occasions.\textsuperscript{115} As part of this program, he funded the local festival of Hermes and Heracles and offered decorated shields as prizes for the winners and runners-up in various contests. The games acted as a review of sorts, something like the review that Athenian ephes had after their first year of training, and as a means of generating enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{116}

Alongside contests of martial and athletic skill, we find three (judged) contests in more abstract virtues: eutaxia, euexia and philoponia.\textsuperscript{117} The precise nature of these three virtues, and what they meant to the people of Sestos, will be the focus of what follows.

Sestos will serve as our primary example, but it is by no means unique; many cities held similar

\textsuperscript{113} Menas is praised for ensuring the good behaviour of both groups while he was gymnasiarch (\textit{OGIS} 339 = \textit{I. Sestos} 1.31-32) and the two groups jointly thanked him by presenting him with a crown (42).

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{OGIS} 339 = \textit{I. Sestos} 1.39-40: προτερήματος εἰς ἀσκησιν καὶ ψυχομοιοί τοὺς νέους and 71-3: προτερήματος δὲ διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοδοξίας πρὸς ἀσκησιν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς νέους, ἔτι ἢ τὸν νεώτερον ψυχάν πρός ἀνδρείαν ἀμιλλώμεναι καλῶς ἄγοντας τοῖς ἡθεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{OGIS} 339 = \textit{I. Sestos} 1.35-40.

\textsuperscript{116} The Achaean statesman Philopoemen used the same tactic to great success (Plutarch, \textit{Philopoemen} 20).

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{OGIS} 339 = \textit{I. Sestos} 1.79-83.
gymnastic festivals and included similar contests. Tests of martial skill were common for young men, and had a place in the sacred calendar of many cities throughout the Hellenistic period. Some, like Samos and Tralles among others, were even more decidedly practical and included contests in the use of siege weaponry (lithobolos and katapaltes), hand-to-hand combat, javelin-throwing and races. The people of Sestos had better reason than most to do all in their power to encourage military training. Earlier in his career, Menas had been called upon to serve his city as an ambassador to the Roman governor when it was threatened by the Thracians and other enemies. He also distributed food to each citizen when constant raids and incursions had forced his fellow citizens to leave their land unsown for six years. It may have been during these six years that Menas, as gymnasiarch, first paid from his own funds for the sacrifices which began the festival of Heracles and Hermes and sponsored contests in martial skill along with a footrace. His attempts to engage the agonistic spirit of his charges were successful enough that his fellow citizens said he filled their younger citizens with courage.

Menas used contests as a way of encouraging young men to develop practical military skills for reasons which are obvious, given the turbulent history at which the decree hints. Sestos was surrounded by enemies, and needed its young citizens to be able to fight. Why Menas should have thought that contests in three less practical virtues, eutaxia, euexia and philoponia, were equally

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118 Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993: 97, and Robert 1962: 248 have argued for the universality of gymnastic festivals in honour of Heracles or Hermes in the Hellenistic world. Crowther 1991: 301-2, lists 18 cities in which the Hermaia included these three “beauty” contests. There were surely many more cities which did so, but did not record the details. 119 That these were tests of practical martial skills, and that the gymnasion offered real military training to (at least some) citizens is no longer a contentious idea (see, e.g., Launey 1949-50: 825ff, or most recently, Chankowski 2010: 322-330) though it was once assumed that citizen soldiers were obsolete by the fourth century (see, e.g., Vidal-Naquet 1981: 92). 120 Samos recorded the victors in a wide array of contests including all those listed, and musical competitions (playing the diatōs) (Syll. 1061 [2nd C. BCE]); Tralles staged contests in javelin-throwing (ἀκοντισμός) and archery (τοξική) along with races (Syll. 1062 [2nd - 1st C. BCE]). For a list of other cities, see Crowther 1991. 121 OGIS 339 = I. Sestos 1.53-7. 122 OGIS 339 = I. Sestos 1.17-20. 123 OGIS 339 = I. Sestos 1.54-59. 124 The only indication of the relative time of these two events is "ἐν δύο".
important requires a longer answer. These three contests are common enough to have attracted some scholarly attention. All three are judged contests; they are awards for those who make the best display of certain desirable traits, rather than direct competitions. Even with our limited evidence, we can say that the judging was contentious at times. The gymnasiarchic law from Beroea devotes circa 40 lines (roughly one-quarter of the whole inscription) to the rules governing the annual festival of the Hermaia in that city; twelve lines of that is given over to the rules for the annual contests in these three virtues. For the eutaxia and philoponia, the gymnasiarch simply names the young man who best personifies that quality, after swearing by Hermes that he will judge honestly. The winner of the euexia was decided in much the same way, but it required a decision by a democratically selected panel of judges (including the gymnasiarch), all of whom had to swear to judge honestly. Evidently the gymnasiarch's verdict alone was insufficient or not to be trusted.

Why these three virtues should have been so important in Sestos and in other cities of the Hellenistic world is an intriguing question, and one which has never had a satisfactory answer. Crowther, in his brief study, is more interested in understanding how the contests were judged than why cities made them into contests at all. Hin, who noted the prevalence of these contests and reasoned (plausibly) that ephebic training was meant to instill these virtues in young citizens, went no further than to say that they were desirable. This void is understandable. A cursory examination of the literary evidence reveals three qualities which, while noble, are decidedly bland. In classical Greek, eutaxia seems to carry little more semiological weight than a literal English translation of the word

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126 Hin 2007: 289 calls them both values and respected accomplishments.
127 In this city too the prizes for these contests are shields (I. Beroea 1. B46-7)
128 Crowther 1985: 289-91. Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993:102-105 take the same approach in their commentary on the relevant sections of the gymnasiarchic law of Beroea.
129 Hin 2007: 165 refers to φιλοποιία, εὐεξία and εὐταξία as both values and accomplishments, and says that they were "highly respected."
suggests. It means 'well-ordered', both in the sense of well laid out or organized, and in the sense of well-behaved. Euexia is perhaps a little more complicated, if for no other reason than that it does not have quite such an elegant literal translation. Rather than simply meaning good habits, classical authors use euexia to mean bodily health and vigour. Philoponia (and its cognates), which will prove the most interesting virtue, seems to mean industriousness or diligence in classical authors, in particular diligence in training.

The documentary sources on their own are no better. Euexia (and its cognates) appears very rarely in the epigraphic record, and almost exclusively refers to the same kind of competition that Menas founds. Eutaxia and philoponia are much more frequently attested; in addition to appearing as contests in other places, they are common in honorary inscriptions. The largest body of inscriptions which mention eutaxia are those passed in Athens in praise of that city's ephebes. On its own, that tells us little more than that Athens too considered this an important quality for citizens in training. To understand why such virtues were especially desirable, we have little alternative but to turn to our literary sources, which, in this case, are less than perfect. We have very little that is contemporary, and nothing produced in Sestos, Beroea or the other cities where these contests are documented. The best option is to turn to the two Hellenistic historians whose works survive in some volume, Polybius and Diodorus. Using natives of Megalopolis and Sicily to elucidate the values of people in northern Greece and Asia Minor is inherently dangerous, but this approach does have a point in its favour. These

130 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 3.3.14: Οὐκούν οίκει, ἐφη, καὶ τοῦ ἱππικοῦ τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶ τις ἐπιμεληθησίν, ὡς πολὺ ἂν καὶ τούτῳ διενέγκουσιν τὸν ἄλλων ὀπλών τε καὶ ἱππῶν παρασκευή καὶ εὐταξία καὶ τῷ ἐτοίμως κινδυνεύειν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰνομίσσειν ταῦτα ποιοῦντες ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς τεύχεσθαι.
131 The author of the Hippocratic Aphorismi uses euexia in the sense of general health and a strength of constitution that contributes to quick recovery from illness (1.3); Plato uses it to mean a kind of strength or vigour, the opposite of asthenia (Republic, 444d).
132 Xenophon, Oeconomicus, 21.6 uses it of soldiers under a good commander being more willing to work than those under a bad general; Plato (Republic, 535d) uses it of diligence in studying philosophy (as well as gymnastic training).
133 One of the few exceptions is a decree of the kosmoi of Knossos praising a certain Dioskourides, who displayed both philoponia and euexia (I. Cret 1.8.12).
134 e.g. IG II² 1006, 1008(118/7 BCE), 1009 (116/5 BCE), etc.
contests, or at least some of them, are known from a very wide geographic area. Asia Minor offers the most examples, but they are also known from Chalcis, Eretria, Tanagra, and possibly Oropus and Athens. That suggests that these were, if not universal concepts, at least not something entirely peculiar to a single city or region.\textsuperscript{135}

Awards for \textit{eutaxia} make a natural starting point for this study since that virtue is probably both the easiest to define and the one most frequently associated with ephebes. Forbes suggests that the contest was a matter of judging the general comportment and orderly behaviour of young men in the gymnasium over the course of the year, and there is little to contradict that.\textsuperscript{136} The behaviour of young men was a matter of great concern in many cities. Athens had magistrates (the \textit{sophronistae}) whose primary function seems to have been ensuring the good behaviour of ephebes. In other cities, such as Beroea and Amorgos, gymnasarchs were given broad powers to enforce order in the gymnasium, including the authority to levy fines and to inflict corporal punishment on their charges. Keeping young men in line was one of the gymnasarch's primary responsibilities; countless gymnasarchs were praised for the effort and attention they devoted to ensuring good order among those in training, including Menas.\textsuperscript{137} Concern was not limited to ensuring orderly behaviour in the gymnasium itself, but was for wherever and whenever the young men in training appeared in public. On Amorgos, the gymnasarch was empowered to inflict both corporal and monetary punishment on young men who did not properly assemble and march in a procession.\textsuperscript{138}

The contests in \textit{eutaxia} may have been little more than awards for the teacher's pet (in Beroea,

\textsuperscript{135} The spread of Athenian-style ephebic training systems in and of itself suggests that Greeks in far-flung places could agree in principle on what they wanted from their young men. The most practical and universal desideratum was, of course, martial skill and the ability to defend the polis. See Chankowski 2010 and 2004, Hin 2007, Launey 1949-50 etc.)

\textsuperscript{136} Forbes 1929: 48.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{OGIS} 339 = I. Sestos 1.31-2. \textit{IG} XII.9 234 and 5 (both ca. 100 BCE) honour two gymnasarchs from Karystos (where an award for \textit{eutaxia} is known), who are praised for maintaining order.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{IG} XII.7 515. 46-8 (ca. 100 BCE)
the only rule for the competition was that the gymnasiarch should choose the young man who seemed the best behaved (eutaktotatos) from those under thirty years of age\textsuperscript{139}, but the quality itself and what made it especially desirable may be more complex. It may have been the single most desirable quality for ephesians and young citizens. Even in Athens, which seemingly gave no individual awards for it, it is perennially included in decrees praising ephesians, including our earliest.\textsuperscript{140} 

\textit{Eutaxia} is emphasized, at least in part, because it is not a quality normally associated with young men. As Vidal-Naquet argues, young men are usually associated with wildness, something manifested in their association with hunting, and the habit of stationing them on the frontiers of the polis. For Vidal-Naquet, the citizen in training is the polar opposite of a hoplite, an adult citizen soldier. If \textit{eutaxia} is the defining characteristic of the hoplite, then we should not expect to find it in men framed as a hoplite's opposite number.\textsuperscript{141}

That military aspect of \textit{eutaxia} can be pushed a little further. Everyone's favourite Hellenistic armchair general, Diodorus Siculus, often uses \textit{eutaxia} as an explanation for military success, and its lack as a reason for failure.\textsuperscript{142} Looking back to the fourth century, the association has already formed. To Isocrates, good order, moderation and the willingness to obey orders were the chief virtues of Athens when it was still a land power and relied on its hoplite army. Those virtues declined as the city came to rely on its navy. Between them, Diodorus and Isocrates show us that the necessity of good order in battle was a functioning cliche throughout the whole of the Hellenistic period. Since \textit{eutaxia} can be a martial virtue, and is frequently tested in contests alongside obviously martial skills, it seems

\textsuperscript{139} I. Beroea 1. B55.

\textsuperscript{140} Rhodes and Osborne 2003: \#89 = IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1156 (334/3 BCE).

\textsuperscript{141} Vidal-Naquet 1981: 93 and 113; Isocrates, \textit{Panathenaicus} 116. Krauss 1980: 29 argues that this military aspect of \textit{eutaxia}—maintaining proper military discipline—was foremost in the minds of the people of Sestos.

\textsuperscript{142} Diodorus, 1.86.5 explicitly states that a lack of good order (\textit{ataxia}) led to several defeats, but that once this problem was resolved, the same army was able to win a great victory. For a collection of the Hellenistic evidence for \textit{ataxia} as a breach of military discipline, see J. and L. Robert 1976: 216-218.
safe to conclude that attempts to instill this quality in young citizens were at least as much about preparing them for battle and their future role as soldiers as about making the gymnasium a calm and ordered place.

Diodorus is certain that eutaxia is vital to the success of an army, but it has never been suggested that he was especially knowledgeable about military matters. The military man among the Hellenistic historians is Polybius, and he is far less apt to explain victory as simply a matter of well-ordered troops prevailing over confused ranks, or at least, less apt to explain it by this alone. His far greater interest in the details of combat (however genuine we want to assume they were) means that he often treats his reader to reasons why the enemy ranks were in disarray. Hannibal, while crossing the Alps, is able to defeat a band of Celts because he throws them into disarray by sending troops to burn their camp while attacking their army in the field at the same time.\footnote{143}{Polybius, 3.43.} Here, disordered ranks are the result of successful action, not the factor that allows an action to be successful. Polybius, in fact, is much more sparing in his praise of armies for maintaining order; it is probably something that he simply assumed of any competent army. In one of the few places that he bothers to tell us that an army was maintaining good order, it is all for show. The army in question retreats because they do not think they can win the battle, and do it in good order in hopes that this will convince their enemies not to attack them.\footnote{144}{Polybius, 4.11.}

Polybius is less apt to consider good order as a ready explanation for why battles are won than some other writers, but he also applies the concept more widely. For him, it is not only armies that must be kept in good order, but subject communities as well. In the third book of Polybius' history, Hannibal lays siege to Saguntum because he thinks that taking this city will strike fear into all of the
Iberians, thereby making those who have already submitted to Carthaginian rule more orderly (eutaktoterous). That is, they were less likely to be disruptive and to hinder his plans. More to the point, eutaxia was also a quality that Polybius thought desirable in a citizen. In a fragment of his brief biography of Scipio Aemilianus, Polybius proudly points out that his Roman friend earned a reputation for moderation and good order (sophrosune and eutaxia) among his fellow citizens. This, we are told, was the first great achievement in his quest to become known as the most virtuous man in Rome, and it was accomplished while he was still a very young man. The young Scipio's reputation for orderliness is made both a rarer and easier achievement by the way the rest of the young men of Rome had abandoned pursuit of such virtues in favour of luxurious living and expensive love affairs.

For Polybius, orderly behaviour was a political virtue, and one especially noteworthy in a young man. That is, while young men and ephebes may have been associated with wildness, rowdiness and excess in the popular imagination, such behaviour was neither happily accepted nor considered good for the community. It would be all too easy to reduce this to the conservatism of a (by the time he wrote the thirty-first book of his history) aged and curmudgeonly historian who prides himself on his practicality, but this is not the only point at which Polybius links decadence to political degeneration, and the historian is not alone in his opinion. If we look back to the late fourth century in Athens, Demosthenes' speech Against Conon spells out all the dangers that attend on youth who have no thought for eutaxia. The speaker here, Ariston, is at pains to cast himself as a dutiful and well-behaved citizen, and his opponents as the opposite. Most important for our purposes, time spent on garrison duty as ephebes is at the heart of the quarrel between Ariston and the family of Conon. While

145 Polybius, 3.17.
146 Polybius, 31.25 says it was within five years of his first entry into public life. The phrase is frustratingly vague, since we have no way of knowing what Polybius thought marked the beginning of public life. Probably the latest life event that could mark that point would be standing for the quaestorship, which, before Sulla's reforms and for a man of such an illustrious family, would have been in his early or mid-twenties.
147 See the case of Thebes below.
encamped at Panactum, according to our speaker, the sons of Conon gave themselves over entirely to
drinking and were frequently disruptive and abusive. 148 Ariston, of course, acted as a good citizen
should; he did not change his manner of living just because he was out of the city, but behaved in an
orderly fashion. The entire mess at first tried to reason with the rowdy young men, and when that
failed they complained to the general. 149 After being sternly admonished for their drunken behaviour,
the sons of Conon got even more drunk and caused a major disturbance, attacking Ariston with
violence and threats, until the whole camp, the generals and the taxiarachs interceded to restore order. 150
If the story ended here, it would be interesting in and of itself.

The world-view that Ariston puts forth is one in which disorderly behaviour meets with
universal censure (he stresses that it was the entire mess and all of the officers that took issue with the
rowdiness, not him alone) and one which can lead to tensions and even outright breaches in a small
community, such as the one the young men on garrison duty formed. The case goes further, though.
Once back in Athens, the sons of Conon pick up right where they left off, in drunkenness and anti-
social behaviour. According to the speaker, they were so far from ashamed of their rowdiness, that
they intended to use it as a defence: they were going to say that, as was common for young men, they
were members of drinking clubs, and were infatuated with mistresses, and quite frequently this
behaviour ended in quarrels and blows. 151 What is interesting to us is how Ariston takes umbrage at the
insinuation that he too behaved in this way, even though he was equally young. He angrily insists that
neither he nor his brothers have ever been seen acting like these men, and says that he would consider
it a fresh outrage if the jury believed it. Setting aside the usual hyperbole, and allowing that Ariston
may well be lying through his teeth, his efforts at self-presentation match what Polybius does for

148 Demosthenes, 54.3-4.
149 Eating in common messes by tribe was part of ephebic training in Athens.
150 Demosthenes, 54.5.
Scipio: both assume that playing the part of the orderly young man while those around you indulge themselves is key to maintaining a good reputation. Later, Ariston laments the possibility that those who live with moderation should derive no benefit from their way of life.\textsuperscript{152} In Demosthenes, we find the kind of drinking and love affairs which Scipio wins praise for avoiding equated with ever-escalating anti-social behaviour, including assault, house-breaking, oath-breaking and impiety.\textsuperscript{153} Menas and the people of Sestos probably shared that prejudice.

Though the award for \textit{eutaxia} may have gone to the teacher's pet, the virtue has broader implications. Cities rewarded the quality because they thought it was vital for everyone, even young men whose wild behaviour might otherwise be excused. A reputation for \textit{eutaxia} made up a large part of a reputation for being a virtuous and useful citizen, and one who, in Scipio's case, could succeed in politics. The second of what we might call the non-practical contests held in Sestos, the award for \textit{philoponia}, was equally ideologically charged. Awards for \textit{philoponia} have been thought of simply as recognizing proper diligence and effort in gymnastic training, and this is probably how they were judged.\textsuperscript{154} One of the few appearances of the concept in Diodorus' text actually covers precisely this sense. In talking about the future Macedonian king's time as a hostage in Thebes, he tells us that both Philip II and Epaminondas showed great \textit{philoponia} in their study of Pythagorean philosophy.\textsuperscript{155} It is strongly implied that it was their diligence in study and their natural ability which led them both to distinguished careers. For Philip, this meant becoming the most powerful man of his day and laying the groundwork for his son's conquest of the world. For Epaminondas, this meant that he was, contrary

\textsuperscript{152} Demosthenes, 54.15.
\textsuperscript{153} Ariston alleges that Conon, too, lived a life like this in his youth, and that he and his companions broke into houses and committed assault (54.37), committed sacrilege by eating the beans left out for Hecate and the testicles of pigs sacrificed to purify the assembly (54.39) and arranged to give false testimony for each other (54.35), which is directly linked to their penchant for drunken revelry together (54.33), and why they are not to be trusted under oath (54.40).
\textsuperscript{154} Forbes 1991: 48; Crowther 1985.
\textsuperscript{155} Diodorus, 16.2.
to expectation, able to take his polis from being a third-rate power to the most powerful in Greece, and it allowed him to do so despite facing even more difficult and dangerous obstacles and battles than Philip.

Polybius, too, was impressed by the *philoponia* of Philip II and is much more direct in pointing to it as one of the qualities that allowed the Macedonians to conquer the world. Polybius takes Theopompus to task for his outrageous criticism of the Macedonian king. Theopompus, apparently, accused Philip and his court of *μαλακία, ἀνανδρία* and *ἀναισχυντία*. To Polybius, this is absurd, since words are hardly adequate to describe the *ἀνδρεία, φιλοπονία* and *συλλήβδην τῆς ἀρετῆς* of these men. The oppositions here are interesting. Logically, *andreia* must be contrasted with *anandria*, and *anaischuntia* with general virtue, which means that for Polybius, the opposite of *philoponia* was *malakia*. Some of the known meanings of *malakia* make it a little strange that 'diligence' would be considered its opposite, but this usage is echoed in the Suda's entry for the word. There is no need to assume that *philoponia* was the opposite of all senses of *malakia*. It is much more likely that Polybius is engaged in a little sophistry here. Theopompus would have used the word in its sexual sense, while Polybius tries to make it seem as though Philip was accused of shunning labour and hardship.

To Polybius, *philoponia* is a concept closely associated with courage and daring. One sentence after opposing it to *malakia*, Polybius tells us that it was the combination of daring and *philoponia* that allowed Philip and the Macedonians to conquer the world. Philip II is not the only king who succeeded through his diligence. Antiochus the Great secured his kingdom by relying on the same two

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156 Polybius, 8.10.5.
157 Polybius, 8.10.5.
158 Suda s.v. *μαλακία*.
159 Virtue, it seems, had less to do with it.
virtues (daring and diligence); a third king, Eumenes, secured his diadem through a combination of cunning and philoponia. To Polybius' eyes, philoponia is a characteristic not only of effective kings, but of an even more important demographic as well: historians. In one of his attacks on Timaeus of Tauromenium, Polybius seizes on the Sicilian's claim that history, as a discipline, requires much greater philoponia than rhetoric. Polybius, of course, agrees with the sentiment, but he sneeringly questions whether Timaeus really knows what labours to undertake. Timaeus used the greatest diligence in collecting and collating obscure documents. Polybius does not call this a complete waste of time and effort, but neither does he think it is any substitute for the experience gained by being an active man of affairs. This, it would seem, is the proper arena for a historian—or a king—to display his philoponia.

One final passage in Polybius will bring us back to the young men of Sestos. In discussing the early career of Scipio Africanus, Polybius tells us that his finest qualities were his cleverness and his philoponia. Somewhat oddly, the story to which this judgment is attached has little to do with diligence. As proof that Scipio succeeded not by divine favour, but by his cleverness and philoponia, Scipio tricks his mother into allowing him to stand for the office of aedile, which Polybius helpfully defines as the most important office at Rome for the neoi. Once he has decided to stand, the good reputation that he has among the people of Rome, not least for the bravery he displayed as a cavalry commander under his father, is enough to carry the day. The content of that story does not seem to perfectly match its intended moral. Polybius offers it as a rebuttal to those who say that Scipio enjoyed great success because he was favoured by the gods; Polybius uses this story to prove that Scipio's greatest qualities were cleverness and philoponia, not luck. The story does put Scipio's cleverness on display. He wins his mother's permission to stand for office, despite being extremely young, through a

160 Polybius, 11.39.16.
161 Polybius, 10.5.10. These are the same two attributes that made Eumenes a successful king.
162 Polybius, 10.4.1. It is the neoi of Sestos who were spurred on to philoponia by Menas.
clever ruse. However, diligence plays no role in his election; it is his reputation, for courage in particular, which carries the day. We can either assume that Polybius was not fully in control of his anecdote, perhaps forgetting what he said from one sentence to the next, or there may be something more to the concept of philoponia. If we briefly turn our attention back to Menas, the people of Sestos offer us a hint.

The people of Sestos twice praised Menas for turning their neoi toward training and philoponia. The first time (OGIS 339 = I. Sestos 1.39-40) it seems to be part of the summary of honours which had already been accorded to him prior to the current inscription. The first thirty-five lines of the decree are given over to listing Menas’ good qualities, and summarizing all of the offices and duties he undertook for his native city. The final items in the list are his taking the office of gymasiarch, and the generous way in which he fulfilled his duties. Following this, the decree tells us that he turned the attention of the neoi εἰς ἀσκησιν καὶ φιλοπονίαν, and then gives a list of what honours the city as a whole, and the ephebes and neoi, granted him. This first set of honours is followed by telling us about Menas’ seemingly extraordinary willingness to take on the post of gymasiarch a second time, and how he was even more generous than the first time, even though the city was impoverished by constant warfare. In so doing, he again turned the neoi [π]ρὸς ἀσκησιν καὶ φιλοπονίαν. This can be taken in two ways. The first is that Menas’ gifts of oil for anointing (which in both cases is the clause immediately prior) made the gymnasium a much nicer place to be, and encouraged the neoi to come and train, and to do so more diligently, meaning perhaps more vigorously or more regularly—though if this is what is meant, the construction is somewhat odd. It seems more likely that it was the example

163 Scipio tells his mother about a dream in which he and his brother were both elected as aediles, and when she says that sounds nice, he takes that as permission.
164 OGIS 339 = I. Sestos 1.72.
165 For that meaning, ἀσκησιν φιλοπονίαν would seem more natural than two nouns separated by καὶ.
Menas set, rather than the specific gift of oil, that inspired the *neoi*. In both cases, the example that Menas sets is one of using his time to hold important magistracies in his home city, and of performing his duties well. This inspired the *neoi* to pursue their gymnastic training, especially of military skills, which was one of their chief occupations as a group, and to be involved in city government, as Menas was. If we allow that this is what the people of Sestos meant in praising Menas, then Polybius' anecdote about Scipio no longer seems so misplaced. Young Scipio tricking his mother into allowing him to stand for aedile at a young age would, in fact, be an example of both cleverness and *philoponia*.

Thus *philoponia* could be associated with active involvement in city government, and with a willingness to hold expensive or time-consuming magistracies. It is surely this increased civic involvement which Menas and the people of numerous other *poleis* were trying to encourage by awarding prizes for *philoponia*. Menas' inscription, as well as virtually every other honorary inscription, served the same purpose: to encourage engagement. Menas' career as it is recounted in the decree of Sestos also shows why this was a matter of concern to many cities. In the earlier part of his career, Menas seems to have turned his attentions away from Sestos itself. He acted as an ambassador to kings for his city, but also seems to have worked in their administration. The decree tells us that he had business with Strato, the governor of the Chersonese and the Thracian territories. It is not stressed, but the dealings must have been substantial, since Menas was able to win the governor's favour by proving trustworthy. Menas is praised for winning the governor's support in unspecified matters, and the framers of the decree quickly moved on to other offices Menas took on for his city. The point that is of interest to us is that, as a young man, Menas had options when it came to deciding where to direct his energies. He could have, and perhaps did, for a time, become a part of one of the royal

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166 Priene's gymnasarch Zosimos was also praised for inspiring his students to imitate his example (*I. Priene* 113.26-7), and is a common feature of honorary decrees in general.
bureaucracies. Those were not his only options, either. Well-trained young soldiers, such as those Menas was hoping to produce, always had opportunities for service as mercenaries. Philopoemen offers an extreme example of this. Even after he had achieved prominence in the Achaean League, he left them to fight a war at home while he served as a mercenary in Crete.167 His fellow citizens, needless to say, thought little of his decision. The poleis of the Hellenistic world had to compete for the services of their prominent citizens, and this is why participation in local government was preached as a virtue.

The inscription from Sestos honouring Menas has one final contest that falls outside the boundaries of practical skills: the euexia. This one too was a judged event, and here, at least, we are better informed about the criteria for judgment. In Beroea, where the annual Hermaia included the same three contests that we have been discussing, the euexia had the most complex judging system. For that contest, the gymnasiarch was obliged to choose seven citizens, of whom three were selected by lot to act as judges; for the other two prizes, the decision of the gymnasiarch himself was sufficient.168 The three semi-randomly chosen judges were also compelled to swear an oath to Hermes that they would judge fairly. The extra judges were perhaps needed because the criteria for judgment were even more subjective. They were expected to decide who among the men under thirty years of age seemed ἄριστα τὸ σῶμα διάκεσθαι.169 In this contest, too, the prize in both Sestos and Beroea was a shield, and, just as with eutaxia, euexia is a quality that can be used as a (somewhat banal) explanation for military success.

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167 Plutarch, Philopoemen, 13.1. This was actually Philopoemen's second term of service in Crete. The first had seen him choose service there over service to the Macedonian crown, and came before he had achieved prominence in local politics. Choosing mercenary service over becoming an officer in the royal army was acceptable, choosing it over a place of honour (though not of the highest authority) in local politics was not.


169 I. Beroea 1. B50. Both Crowther 1985: 290 and Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993: 105 interpret this as a kind of beauty contest, judged on the basis of who maintains the best and healthiest physique. Both are careful to note that this should not be construed as similar to a modern body-building contest, in which size is the most important criterion.
Diodorus (16.44) tells us that the Sidonians prepared their city for siege by strengthening the defences, stocking up on food and missiles, and collecting "a sufficiently large army of citizen soldiers, trained in the exercises of the gymnasium and in labours, so that they excelled in both the strength and fitness of their bodies." This seems to be one of the pillars of the ideological program of both Sestos and Beroea: that training in the gymnasium, and training as many young men as possible, is the best way to build an army. In most cases Polybius only benefits from being compared to Diodorus, but in his use of *euexia* to explain success in battle, it is Polybius who is guilty of the ultimate banality; he makes the *euexia* of good armies the central conceit of an extended sports metaphor. During the first Punic War, the Carthaginian forces under Hamilcar and the Roman army under Brutus spent several months camped in close proximity to one another, manoeuvring, skirmishing and ambushing one another on a daily basis. But the war ended before either side could strike a decisive blow. Polybius recuses himself from describing their conflict in detail, saying that, just as when "two boxers who are distinguished for their nobility and training (*gennaiotes* and *euexia*)" compete for the crown, no one can see or describe every blow, he cannot adequately describe the campaign.\(^{170}\) The boxing metaphor continues, as fortune provides a good referee for the combatants, and eventually parts the two as invincible champions.

When Polybius had to rely on the work of previous historians, as he did for the first Punic War, he was just as susceptible to offering generic explanations for military success as Diodorus. Physical strength and fitness makes sense as a conventional explanation for why one side prevails in hand-to-hand combat. Slightly more interesting is the way that Polybius uses *euexia* to mean 'well-trained' in the sense of 'skilled', a sense that is also implied in the story of Hamilcar.\(^{171}\) At a later stage of the first

\(^{170}\) Polybius, 1.57.1.
\(^{171}\) Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993: 104.
Punic War, Roman sailors have a chance to display their great *euexia*. The Roman admiral Lutatius decides to engage the Carthaginian fleet despite high winds and heavy seas. His plan succeeds because the excellent training (*euexia*) of his men allows them to execute their manoeuvres quickly and efficiently, despite unfavourable weather conditions.\(^{172}\) We see the same meaning of training specifically for the task at hand in Polybius' discussion of historical causation. He says that Xenophon's retreat through Persia and Agesilaus' later campaign in Asia Minor were the causes of Philip II's decision to make war on the Persians, since it showed him that the cowardice and indolence of the Persians would be no match for Macedonian military training.\(^{173}\)

The contrast that Polybius makes between *euexia* on the one hand, and a socially destructive trait like indolence on the other, can be found elsewhere in his work. Like *philoponia*, *euexia* is one of the qualities that distinguishes a young Scipio from his peers, and it seems to have little to do with his athletic ability. Scipio Aemilianus built a reputation for exceptional temperance (among other qualities) in his youth by abstaining from the many and varied pleasures that Rome provided in his day, temptations his cohorts heartily enjoyed.\(^{174}\) His abstinence not only earned him a reputation, but gave him bodily health and *euexia*, which he enjoyed for his whole life. Polybius then drives the point home by reiterating that this was all achieved solely by abstaining from the base and readily available pleasures of urban life.

Polybius repeats himself on that point because he has strong feelings on the subject. In his twentieth book, when he discusses the decline of Boeotia both politically and morally, he explains it by saying that they lost the *euxía* καὶ ὀὔξα which had formerly prevailed in their πολιτεία.\(^{175}\) After the

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172 Polybius, 1.60.10.
173 Polybius, 3.6.12.
174 Polybius, 31.28.12.
175 Polybius, 20.4.
battle of Leuctra, the Boeotians were outstanding for both their power and reputation, but they quickly frittered both away until a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Aetolians caused them to withdraw from affairs of Greece entirely. From that point on, they refused to take the part of the Greeks in any action or struggle, either by deed or even by issuing a public decree of support.\textsuperscript{176} For a federalist like Polybius, this is a damning charge indeed; coupled with a string of military defeats, it was surely enough to constitute a complete loss of power and reputation. What Polybius meant when he said that they lost their \( \epsilon\upsilon\omicron\varepsilon\gamma\iota\alpha \) is less clear. He may be referring to the steep decline in Boeotian military prowess, but it may also be a comment on the decadence into which the cities of the Boeotian league, and Thebes in particular, lapsed.

The symptoms of the Thebans' internal decline were drastic.\textsuperscript{177} Their justice system, both that for strictly Theban affairs and for disputes within their federation, ceased to function. Magistrates courted the favour of the people by offering them handouts from public funds, a strategy that eventually led to the ruin of the state. More directly relevant, they began to ruin their private estates through excessive indulgence in food and drink. Men who were without children left their estates to their eating clubs to be spent on lavish banquets, rather than leaving it to their nearest kin. As the practice became popular, even men who had children of their own started to leave the larger part of their estate to their clubs. In the end, many Boeotians attended more lavish dinners than there were days in the month, and their allies, like Megara, seeing the deplorable state of their community, defected from the confederacy.\textsuperscript{178} All of this happens when the Thebans give themselves over to the pleasures which a Scipio shunned.

Though what survives of Polybius makes no mention of it, the Boeotians had a reputation for

\textsuperscript{176} Polybius, 20.4.6.
\textsuperscript{177} Polybius, 20.6.1-7 is given over to the subject.
\textsuperscript{178} Polybius, 20.6.7.
exceptional, perhaps even excessive, training. Their collective predilection for exercise during their period of ascendancy was noted with approval by Ephorus and Xenophon.\textsuperscript{179} Plato too was aware of it, but was less approving. He thought their focus on gymnastics made them (along with the Milesians and the Thurians) more prone to fighting.\textsuperscript{180} Among later writers, Nepos is fully aware of the Boeotians' enthusiasm for training, but is even less approving than Plato. In his \textit{Life} of Epaminondas, he says plainly that their eagerness for physical training came at the price of stunting their intellect.\textsuperscript{181} The decline in Boeotian \textit{euexia}, from being the best in all Hellas to among the worst, mirrors the steep decline in their political power and prestige.

The Boeotians gave themselves over to gluttony and easy pleasures at the same time that they began to neglect their civic duties and international obligations; the two combined to make them an object of scorn to their allies, who soon deserted them. Polybius does not explicitly say that the Boeotians' loss of \textit{euexia} was the initial cause of their loss of prestige; he merely tells us that the two were co-incident. What Polybius does say is that the people of Megara found the Boeotians' loss of \textit{euexia} (as manifested by excessive banqueting) despicable, and upon seeing it they transferred their allegiance to the Achaean league. They are bold enough to do so because, like Philip II, they refuse to believe that people who choose indolence and cowardice over \textit{euexia} present a military threat. The Megarians go so far as to completely ignore the Boeotian army when it marches out against them, apparently even as they began assaulting the city. In the end, the people of Megara are proven to be correct in their disinterest, since the merest rumour that Philopoemen and the Achaean army are on the way is enough to send the Boeotians scurrying home so quickly that they leave their ladders still

\textsuperscript{179} Ephorus (\textit{FGrHist.} 70, F97) says only that the Boeotians were zealous about gymnastics; Xenophon (6.5.23) says that all the Boeotians eagerly trained with weapons.
\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Laws}, 636b.
\textsuperscript{181} Nepos, \textit{Epaminondas}, 2.
leaning against Megara's walls.\textsuperscript{182}

There is other evidence that Polybius assumed a causal link between Thebes' lapse of \emph{euexia} and its political breakdown. Polybius' theory of the \emph{anakyklosis} of constitutions (6.3-10) leans heavily on gluttony and hedonism, in particular among young men, as both signs and causes of imminent political collapse. The collapse of monarchic constitutions is brought on by young men, the descendants of kings who were chosen for wisdom, strength and virtue. The kings themselves were not an object of jealousy to their subjects, since they worked for the benefit of the community and made no effort to distinguish themselves either by finer clothing or with their food and drink.\textsuperscript{183} Their descendants, though, since they gained the diadem by heredity rather than merit, strove to set themselves apart by peculiar dress, by the luxury and variety of their food and by their at times lawless sexual appetites.\textsuperscript{184} For Polybius, it is this which marks the degeneration from kingship to tyranny, and it is also this outrageous behaviour which provides the impetus for the overthrow of tyrants and the emergence of an aristocracy. The same pattern marks the degeneration and overthrow of aristocratic regimes. The generation of \emph{aristoi} who led the revolution against the tyrants rule with wisdom and virtue; their children, being accustomed to position and wealth from birth, give themselves over to indulgence in food, drink and sex, and the constitution degenerates into an oligarchy which is soon overthrown.\textsuperscript{185} In these two instances, Polybius' political theory matches his analysis of Thebes' decline perfectly. Loss of \emph{euexia}, which to Polybius seems to be the same as overindulgence and overspending on food, is socially disruptive to a fatal degree in both theory and practice. Thebes, in fact, has all the

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{182} Polybius, 20.6.12.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Polybius, 6.7.5.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Polybius, 6.7.7: ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκ διαδοχῆς καὶ κατὰ γένος τὰς ἀρχὰς παραλαμβάνοντες ἐτοιμα μὲν εἶχον ἥδη τά πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἔτοιμα δὲ καὶ πλείον τῶν ἱκανῶν τά πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν, τότε δὴ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἐπόμενοι διὰ τὴν περιουσίαν ἐξάλλους μὲν ἐσθήτας ὑπέλαβον δεῖν ἔχειν τοὺς ἥγουμένους τῶν ὑποταττομένων, ἐξάλλους δὲ καὶ ποικίλας τάς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἀπολαύσεις καὶ παρασκευάς, ἀναντιρήτους δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων τάς τῶν ἄφοροις χρείας καὶ συνουσίας.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Polybius, 6.8.5.
\end{itemize}
symptoms of political degeneration that Polybius' theory predicts. Monarchy and aristocracy are done in by gluttony, democracy fails when demagogues begin offering bribes to the masses as a means of achieving preeminence, and Thebes suffers from this fault too.186 Such a perfect match between theory and reality is unlikely to be an accident, and we are left to conclude that Polybius thought proper euexia, at least in one sense, was universally necessary for a well-ordered city. This is also surely why Sestos and numerous other cities encouraged young men to excel in this quality in particular.187

1.5 Conclusion

Menas of Sestos was an excellent gymnasiarch by any measure. He kept his students in order, and he took on the financial burden of providing for their training graciously. Better still, he sponsored games and contests, and used his charges' agonistic spirit to encourage zealous training. That training, if Sestos was anything like contemporary Beroea, was offered to all potential citizens, and not reserved for a small class of leisured aristocrats who were being groomed to be leaders of the city. Menas and his fellow citizens had two goals for the young men of their city: to teach them the practical skills they needed to defend their city in a time of war, and to instill in them the values that were most crucial for a stable and smoothly-run polis. He trained his charges to shun the kinds of excessive indulgence and disorderly behaviour that could prove corrosive to political and social relations. Perhaps even more importantly, he spurred his students on to be 'lovers of labour' in the service of their polis, that is, to be eager to hold important magistracies and expensive liturgies. Encouraging these social and political

186 Polybius, 6.9.7-8 and 20.6.1-5.
187 This is, quite possibly, intended to apply to Rome as well. If Polybius was still working on his history at a point when he could have seen the constitutional crisis spawned by the Gracchi and the impoverished and restless mob filling Rome that set the stage for it, the story of Thebes' decline could be read as a cautionary example. It suffered a complete political breakdown as its citizens came to spend their time and money on feasting and indulgence. Polybius may be hinting at the beginnings of a similar situation in Rome when he tells us that Scipio easily won a reputation for eutaxia by living an orderly and modest life while all the young men around him indulged, and when he twice tells us that another Scipio preserved his euexia by shunning pleasures that were flooding the city. A comment on contemporary Rome has often been suspected in the anakylasis, but has never been suggested for the Boeotian decadence (cf. especially Walbank 1979: 66ff or the silence of Eckstein 1995).
virtues may have been as important to the people of Sestos as the ephebes' martial skills because they helped to mitigate the dangers inherent training and deploying an armed corps of young men. Instilling an ethic of obedience and service could help Sestos avoid the disastrous age-class warfare that enveloped the Cretan city of Gortyn a generation earlier, and which the city of Dreros sought to avoid by having their young men swear such a curious oath. For all his good works, Menas was not a perfect gymnasiarch. There was one skill vital to the success of the polis in which he made no effort to train his charges: *philologia*. Menas himself seems to have excelled in it; his fellow citizens employed him as an ambassador. In the city of Priene, lessons in philology and rhetoric were a valued part of the official curriculum, and we will turn our attention to the nature of Prieneian philological training in the following chapter.\(^{188}\)

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\(^{188}\) *Priene* 112 and 113 (early 1\(^{st}\) C. BCE).
Chapter 2: History, Rhetoric and the Power of the Past: How Zosimos Saved Priene

2.1 Introduction: the Decree for Zosimos

From Sestos, we will now be shifting our attention to the city of Priene, long a favourite of Hellenistic historians. In addition to an unusually rich epigraphic record, there are abundant physical remains from the late Hellenistic period. Most of its important public buildings took shape in the century following 150 BCE. One of those buildings, the sacred stoa on the north side of the agora, was decorated with twenty-four honorary decrees spanning that same time-frame. Three of those decrees, and far from the shortest ones, are devoted to praising one remarkable citizen: Aulus Aemilius Sextus Zosimos, who was active in the middle decades of the first century BCE. Zosimos, as we might expect, was prodigal of both his money and his time in service to his city. He took on several of the most expensive liturgical magistracies and seems to have been instrumental in the city's political and religious revival during the unsettled years after the defeat of Mithridates.

Two of Zosimos' achievements call for our attention here. Like Menas of Sestos a generation or two earlier, Zosimos took the post of gymnasiarch and spared no expense in making his charges into good young citizens. Alongside his contributions of time, money, oil, building projects, and prizes for social virtues, Zosimos began training his charges in the art of rhetoric. To that end, he introduced

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1 Fröhlich 2005: 225 calls it a city "practically frozen in the late Hellenistic period."
2 A serious fire in the first century BCE destroyed part of the city, and it was never reclaimed or repaired. It was left largely undisturbed before it was excavated.
3 I. Priene 107-130.
4 See Fröhlich 2002: 78-9 on whether Zosimos was a native Roman who was granted Prienean citizenship or vice-versa. For our purposes, the most important point is that, whatever his place of origin, he was a citizen of both cities.
5 We are told that he alone, after the war, held the usual banquet for all of the citizens when he was stephanophoros (I. Priene 113.60-61).
6 Zosimos' service as gymnasiarch is mentioned in both the second and third decrees in his honour (I. Priene 112.74: έτι δὲ σφαίρας καὶ ὅπλα καὶ τὸν ἑπιστάμενον τὴν τόγον τῶν ἐφήθη τοῖς ἐκ φιλολογίας γραμματικῶν, δι’ ἅν μὲν τὸ σώμα βουλώμενος ἄοκον[γ]ι δυνάμενον, δι’ ὅν δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ πάθος ἀνθρώπινον προάγοντα, and I. Priene 113.28: έθηκεν δὲ καὶ άμιλλής ἁγίας τῶν τε ἐκ φιλολογίας μαθημάτων καὶ γυμνησίας ἐνεργείας, λαβὼν μὲν παρὰ τῶν παλιότερον τὰς ἐννόμος τούτων ἀποδείξεις, δοῦσ τὸ ἐκάστω καὶ τὸ ἀ[περ] ἡς φιλολογίας ἐπαθλοῦν).
contests in philology to be held alongside those for *euexia, eutaxia* and *philoponia*. Zosimos' second great achievement was done while he was "secretary of the council and assembly." He overhauled Priene's system of public record-keeping and, at considerable expense, instituted a policy of keeping duplicate copies on parchment for all the documents which were normally recorded only on papyrus. His honorary decree positively gushes that his new policy "saved the property of each man and the life of the city." The premise of the current chapter is that these two civic improvements have more in common than just their author. In exploring that connection, the argument will follow a somewhat serpentine path. In the first section, we will look at what Zosimos was teaching his students and why: that is, we will try to identify a dominant mode of Hellenistic rhetoric and examine how it was deployed. A close reading of Polybius will show that "presbeutic rhetoric," (i.e. the speeches of ambassadors) was the quintessentially Hellenistic sub-genre of rhetoric, and that appealing to history was the most common means of persuasion. We will then return to the epigraphic material from Priene, in which we see that Zosimos' fellow citizens were far more likely to be honoured for work as ambassadors--that is for their presbeutic rhetoric--than for using their rhetorical gifts at home. The second section will make the case that the importance of history in Hellenistic diplomatic rhetoric explains why Zosimos' improvements in record-keeping could earn such seemingly hyperbolic praise. The final section will explore Priene's civic identity in light of their fascination with history.

### 2.2 Polybius and Hellenistic Rhetoric

In outfitting Priene's gymnasium, Zosimos spared no expense. He extended the hours for exercise from sunrise to the first hour of the night, and he seems to have made certain that any and all necessary equipment was available, from oil and weapons to balls, leather sacks and fibulae. He

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8 *I. Priene* 112.60-75. The section is unfortunately quite fragmentary, but the sense of much of it is clear.
funded sacrifices and prizes for gymnastic games, as all good gymnasiarchs were expected to do.\(^9\) What is of interest to us is that he also hired a language teacher for his ephes, judging the candidates for the position on the basis of their learning.\(^{10}\) In all likelihood, this means that he sought out an itinerant scholar to serve as an instructor, rather than just selecting a capable citizen.\(^{11}\) All of this we are told, he did so that his charges could develop bodies that were free from hesitation and turn their minds toward, in the somewhat curious language of the decree, πάθος ἀνθρώπινον, "human feeling" or perhaps "the human experience".\(^{12}\) The phrase is more than simply unusual; it is unattested elsewhere either in the literary record or epigraphically. Similar phrases can be found, but not this specific formulation. Ἀνθρώπειον πάθος can refer to the suffering inherent in the human condition. πάθειν τί ἀνθρώπινον is quite common in the genre of biography, where it is used to refer to those changes or reversals of fortune that are characteristic of human life and especially to death—the one experience that all humans share.\(^{13}\) It is, needless to say, unlikely that Zosimos should be praised for hardening the bodies of Priene's young men and turning their minds to thoughts of suicide. A more likely parallel to the phrase can be found in Polybius; he tells us that when Scipio Aemilianus mentioned a favourable omen to his mother, she was beside herself, παθοῦσι τὸ γνωσκέαν πάθος, which we can take to mean something along the lines of "experiencing the emotion typical of women."\(^{14}\) That would mean that the young men of Priene were pointed towards those emotions or experiences that are typical of human beings. There may be one other possibility worth considering in this context. Zosimos' name—Aulus Aemilius Sextus Zosimos—implies that he was a Roman citizen as well as a citizen of Priene, and as

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\(^9\) The gymnasiarchy was widely regarded as one of the most expensive liturgies, so much so that many citizens could only afford to hold it for part of the year. See Strubbe 2005: 93 and Schuler 2004.

\(^{10}\) I. Priene 112. 73-4. So I interpret ἐκ φιλολογίας.

\(^{11}\) While not a common Hellenistic practice, it has precedents. Mantidoros and Elpinikos, who were both gymnasiarchs in Eretria, hired scholars to train the ephes and neoi in philology (IG XII.9 234 and 235, respectively).

\(^{12}\) I. Priene 112.74-6.

\(^{13}\) e.g. Diogenes Laertius, 1.5, Plutarch, Life of Pericles, 37.5 and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 4.9.1.

\(^{14}\) Which in this case would seem to be maternal pride? Polybius may also simply mean that she was overcome with emotion, in a way that was typical of women.
such, it is possible that this strange phrase is a translation of a Latin concept. In this context, the most likely candidate would be the virtue of *humanitas*. As a virtue associated with study, learning and maturity it would be a fine goal for a gymnasiarch.\(^\text{15}\)

Returning to the main thrust of our argument, like Menas of Sestos, Zosimos kept his charges motivated in their pursuit by holding appropriate contests, in this case for both gymnastic activities and philology.\(^\text{16}\) The contest helps to clarify what Zosimos (or the people of Priene) thought was the goal of teaching 'philology'. It may be that Zosimos sought out a man of philosophy or a man of literature for his schoolmaster,\(^\text{17}\) but it is hard to imagine that the contest was anything other than a rhetorical competition. The speeches may have been on mythological or philosophical topics, but it was a contest of persuasion.

There is nothing uniquely Hellenistic in a community wanting its young men to have some practice and training in public speaking. Rhetorical ability was always a prized asset. Rather, the question is, was there some definitely Hellenistic mode of rhetoric that Zosimos wanted his charges to learn? If we wish to answer that question, we will first need a classical baseline and in rhetoric, as in so many other things, the classical baseline is set by Aristotle. Aristotle divides rhetoric into the three familiar genres of bouleutic, epideictic and forensic rhetoric: speeches of deliberation, display pieces and those used for trials.\(^\text{18}\) His system of classification is, as usual, perfectly logical and sensible, and

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15 See Cicero, *Pro Flacco*, 62, where it is also a virtue of the Greek world: *adsunt Athenienses unde humanitas, doctrina, religio, frugeres, iura, leges ortae atque in omnes terras distribuetae putantur.*

16 *I. Priene* 113.28-9.

17 Mantidoros hired an expert on Homeric literature to train his charges (*IG* XII.9 235.10-13): ὑλοσχερέστερόν τε βουλώμενος τοὺς νέους ὕφελεν παρὰσειγὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἱδίου Ὀμηρίκων φιλόλογον Διονύσιον Φιλόπωτον Αθηναίον, [ὡς τε ἑσχόλαζον ἐν τόι[ι] γυμνασίῳ τοὺς τε ἐφήβους καὶ [νέοις καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις πάσι τοῖς [ο]μηρίξις διακειμένοις πρὸς παιδί[ε]ισαν] Wishing to benefit the neoi more generally, he provided from his own funds a Homeric scholar, Dionysios son of Philotos, an Athenian, who gave lectures in the gymnasium for the benefit of the epheses, neoi and everyone else normally organized for education.

18 Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica*, 1.3.1(= 1358b): ἔστιν δ’ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνον περὶ ἰκλήσιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων ἰκλησίας, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός, ὡστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀν εἰπ τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικῶν, δικανικῶν, ἐπειδεικτικῶν. For example, the assemblyman decides about things in the future, the juror about things in the past and the spectator about the ability (of the speaker), so that there are necessarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, forensic and display-pieces.
all of the surviving speeches of the Athenian orators can easily be slotted into this framework. That is why it is so noteworthy that the Hellenistic era produced a different taxonomy of rhetoric, as we shall see in Polybius.

Enough fragments survive from the twelfth book of Polybius' histories for us to say that it was decidedly odd. It seems to have been devoted to attacks (some of dubious merit) on earlier historians, especially on his famous predecessor as a historian of Roman expansion, Timaeus of Tauromenium.¹⁹ Timaeus, we are told, badly mishandled the speeches in his history—he fails to live up to the standard of accuracy set by Thucydides.²⁰ The Athenian historian's policy was to try to recall the actual words, or at least the sense of what was said, before resorting to his own imagination, but Timaeus skipped directly to writing what he thought ought to have been said (ὁς δὲ ἡθήνα). Even more damning for Timaeus, but more interesting for us, Polybius says that his rival followed this practice in all his speeches: τὰς δημηγορίας καὶ τὰς παρακλήσεις, ἢτι δὲ τοὺς πρεσβευτικοὺς λόγους, καὶ συλλήβδην πάν τὸ τοιοῦτο γένος (“The public addresses, the exhortations, even the speeches of ambassadors, and in general everything of this sort”).²¹ That reads very much as though Polybius had his own tripartite division of rhetoric, which was similar, but not identical, to Aristotle's. Demegoriai map onto Aristotle's bouleutic genre quite well²²; by either name, they are political speeches before councils and assemblies.²³ Likewise, there are strong similarities between parakleiseis and epideictic rhetoric. This is the realm of speeches to large gatherings and speeches that focus on an emotional appeal or moral lesson, rather than being strictly argumentative.²⁴ But presbeutikoi logoi and forensic rhetoric do not match nearly so

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¹⁹ Even Walbank 1969: 317, usually an ardent admirer, admits that it digresses far from the historian's stated theme.
²⁰ This is hardly Polybius' finest moment from the standpoint of formal logic. The Megalopolitan says that, just as a single drop of liquid from an amphora is enough to tell us the nature of all of its contents, even a few words or phrases are enough to judge the whole of a historian's work. Timaeus, predictably, fails that litmus test; there are places where he is intentionally inaccurate, and, as such, the whole of his work must be treated as suspect (12.25a).
²¹ 12.25a.3.
²² In fact, Aristotle once refers to this genre as δημηγορικά.
well. Some embassies, such as those that argue a case before an arbitrator, might have something in common with forensic rhetoric, but that would seem to be the only point of similarity. The speech of an ambassador sent to a king or to an ally would not comfortably fit into any of Aristotle's categories, and by the same token none of the surviving speeches of the Attic orators could be called presbeutic.\footnote{The most obvious potential exception is Isocrates' \textit{Plataicus}, but it defies easy categorization. The speech is ostensibly that of a Plataian citizen addressing the Athenian assembly to ask for their help in the wake of Plataia's destruction by Thebes in 373 BCE. The biggest part of the problem is that it seems unlikely that the speech actually is what it purports to be (contra Jebb 1962: 177-8, who says only that "there is nothing in the matter or form of the speech to make it improbable that it was actually delivered."). Mathieu 1928: 69 argues that the speech was never intended to actually be delivered, and that, in fact, an orator like Isocrates would not willingly compose a political speech for someone else, especially not for an envoy from another state. Rather the speech was intended to be a political pamphlet, one that agitated in support of Isocrates' friend Timotheus. In this case, the speech would be less an example of presbeutic rhetoric than a simple bouleutic speech. It is possible, if not verifiable, that, even if it is fictional, the speech preserves something of the form of presbeutic rhetoric from the fourth century. The similarities (and differences) to Hellenistic presbeutic rhetoric will be discussed below.}

The difference is intriguing, but there is reason to be cautious. We have no guarantee that Aristotle is representative of classical, or even fourth century, thinking on the subject. His typology of rhetoric could be an outlier, and driven more by a desire to have his division of genres align neatly with his classification of audiences. Aristotle breaks the hearers of a speech down into categories: jurors, who are judges of things in the past, members of the assembly, who are judges of what will be, and simple spectators, who are judges only of the ability of the speaker. These three kinds of audience naturally align with forensic, bouleutic and epideictic oratory. Presbeutic rhetoric does not fit neatly into such a system. An embassy, after all, asks an audience to decide on things in several times: past events (treaties, alliances) the present situation (the relative strength of the parties) and the future (what course of action will yield the best results). The lack of presbeutic speeches in our surviving corpus of classical rhetoric may well have less to do with how many were originally than with the tastes of later copyists and other accidents of survival.

These are all reasons for caution in positing a clear break with the classical period, but not for doubting that presbeutic rhetoric was central to Hellenistic thought. To Polybius' theorizing, we can
add Diodorus Siculus. In the preface to the twentieth book of his history, Diodorus laments that too many historians fill their work with long speeches; if a writer wishes to show off his rhetorical ability, he should compose self-contained *demegoriai* and *presbeutikoi logoi*, as well as speeches of praise and blame, rather than burden a work of history with them.\(^{26}\) In other words he recognizes the same three sub-genres of rhetoric that Polybius does. The epigraphic record, unrepresentative though it might be, seems to support the historians. The number of honorary decrees which praise a man for acting as an ambassador, envoy, or advocate of his city can only be described as overwhelming.\(^{27}\) The numbers are so vast that no complete catalogue or even authoritative total number for the Hellenistic period is practical.\(^{28}\) For an example specific to the case at hand, the north sta of Priene was inscribed with twenty-one honorary decrees for nineteen different men.\(^{29}\) Ten of those men are known to have acted as ambassadors in secular affairs—meaning they would have been expected to speak persuasively on their city's behalf.\(^{30}\) Of the remainder, two (*I. Priene* 106 and 110) praise their subjects only in very

\(^{26}\) Diodorus 20.1.2.

\(^{27}\) The word *presbus* (or close cognate) appears in over 4500 documents, for instance.

\(^{28}\) Neither Gauthier 1985 nor Quass 1993 even attempts such a thing.

\(^{29}\) *I. Priene* 107-130. Zosimos has three decrees (112-114), number 116 comprises three inscribed wreaths with names but no details, 126 is a list of names without even wreaths for context. So little remains of *I. Priene* 127 and 128 that it is impossible to say with certainty what they are. I exclude them with the honorary decrees because it is clear enough that they are not lists of names, which seems to be the only other kind of document inscribed on the sta. If they are omitted, then we would have 19 decrees that are certainly honorary decrees, for (probably) 17 different men.

\(^{30}\) Moschion acted as an ambassador to Ephesus and king Demetrias (*I. Priene* 108, 143 and 153-4). Herodes served as an ambassador to Elaea (which took precedence over concurrent responsibilities at home) and to Ariarathes (*I. Priene* 109, 59-60 and 172-5). Krates undertook numerous embassies, including to the governor of Asia, the city of Erythrae and Ephesus (*I. Priene* 111. 22, 125-7 and 149-50). Herakleitos also travelled to Ephesus as an ambassador (*I. Priene* 117, 20-21 and 47). Theon travelled to an unknown city to act as his city's advocate (*ekdikos*, rather than *presbus*; *I. Priene* 119, 6). The honorand of *I. Priene* 120 served as an ambassador to Miletus and Sardis (13-17 and 21-24). The honorand of *I. Priene* 121's public career was strictly as an ambassador to multiple Roman officials, Greek cities and kings. The honorand of *I. Priene* 124 travelled to Ephesus as an ambassador (l.6). All we know of the career of the honorand of *I. Priene* 129 is that he was part of an embassy to Rhodes (l.3). To this we can add, with near-certainty, the honorand of *I. Priene* 125. His decree is extremely fragmentary, but contains the phrase “[κ]αύτας πᾶσας ἐκλέξεον χορίς ὁμοιού [...]. Compare the praise for Herodes who “[ἄ]πο[δ]ιστοτης] πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν Μάρκαρου Περεπέραν Μαρκου στρατηγῆς] ἀνθόποι[ον εἰς Πέργαμον ἄτερ ὁμοιοῦ] καὶ [τὸν συμπερασμένον] ([I. Priene 109, 92-94 and 106-7], or Krates, who, while travelling extensively as an advocate for his city “[κ]α[ταστήσας] δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀδάπασον” (*I. Priene* 111, 133-4). This seems to be a kind of praise that, at least within the documents inscribed on the sacred sta, is reserved for ambassadors who pay their own way. These ten all served as ambassadors for secular affairs. If we expanded the list to include those who were sacred envoy (*theoroi*) we would include Zosimos and, the honorand of *I. Priene* 118, and Athenopolis, the honorand of *I. Priene* 106 (Athenopolis' own honorary decree is silent on this front, but the decree for his brother Moschion says he was: ἱεροτονηθεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου θεωρός
general terms for their general moral quality, rather than for specific services of any kind, and three (I. Priene 127, 128 and 130) are so fragmentary that virtually nothing can be said of their contents. At the very minimum, more than half of Priene's most prominent citizens were praised (usually inter alia) for their service as ambassadors, and more than seventy percent (10 of 14) of those about whose public careers we can say anything served as ambassadors. It is in this environment that Zosimos, who, admittedly, acted only as a theoros, representing his city at festivals, not an ambassador proper, (re)introduced rigorous philological training for hopeful statesmen.

Within this group of Priene's most prominent citizens it is much easier to find men honoured for service as ambassadors than those honoured for deploying their rhetorical gifts at home. Of the men honoured on the walls of the sacred stoa, only one seems to receive praise explicitly for the act of addressing the council and assembly persuasively and effectively. Fittingly, the man praised for what Polybius would call demegoric rhetoric is a certain Krates, honorand of I. Priene 111, who also had a full career as a diplomat. Krates seems to have been praised for addressing the council and assembly in on a religious matter. Unfortunately, this section of the stone is very fragmentary and we have only the end of the sentence: αὐτοῖς καὶ[θῶς ἔδοξεν ἐν νο[μαί [ἐκκ]λησίαι [τῇ] βου[λή καὶ τῶι δῆμωι]. What, precisely the council and assembly may have resolved on, we do not know, but this section seems to deal with Krates' service to the state as a religious official. This does not seem to have been part of the usual duties of a priest or an agonothetes (no such clause appears in any of the other decrees), and is most likely related to the special arrangements that Krates made for sacred revenues--an
affair in which his countrymen praised him for 'always doing and saying what was advantageous for the city.'\textsuperscript{34} Fittingly, these special arrangements were only necessary because the diplomatic disputes in which Krates was a central actor threatened Athena Polias' income.\textsuperscript{35}

One other citizen of Priene, one of the two sons of Kydimos is praised for coming forward in the assembly to offer money and resources at a time of need.\textsuperscript{36} The praise he earned was surely for his generosity, and not his eloquence or the act of speaking to the assembly itself. To these two and Krates we could possibly add the honorand of \textit{I. Priene} 106, who, much like Krates, was praised for 'doing and saying what was best.' Even if these three somewhat problematic examples are included, only four of Priene's nineteen most famous citizens are praised for eloquence displayed at home, less than half the number who are praised for their work as ambassadors. We should be careful of extending our conclusions too far, but in Priene, at least, presbeutic rhetoric may have deserved to be treated as its own genre.

What this all suggests is that the Hellenistic Greeks paid more attention to rhetoric when it was addressed to foreign powers than when it was deployed at home, or at least thought it more worthy of praise. The question before us is what, if anything, set presbeutic rhetoric apart from other speeches in terms of style, form and content? The speeches in Polybius' own work are a natural starting point for answering that question, and they are few enough in number to allow for easy study.\textsuperscript{37} The longest and

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{I. Priene} 111.209: λέγων καὶ πράσσων τὸ [τῆι πόλει εἰ]ν[φέρον]. His efforts on behalf of Athena's treasury are summarized in ll. 203-212.


\textsuperscript{36} \textit{I. Priene} 107.33-4 (gift of money) and 41ff (a gift of two thousand medimnoi of grain, to be sold at four drachmas per medimnos, in a time of famine). Moschion offered both gifts in conjunction with his brother, Athenopolis, son of Kydimos, the honorand of \textit{I. Priene} 106 though they are only described in Moschion's decree.

\textsuperscript{37} Hence Champion 2000 and Wooten 1974. Wooten isolated twenty-nine Greek "speeches" in Polybius, but that number is a little misleading. Only four of the total are complete speeches given entirely in direct speech; the rest are partially or wholly given in indirect speech. He also consciously excluded speeches by Romans or other barbarians. The question of whether the speeches that find their way into Polybius are, either in whole or in part, transcripts of speeches that were actually delivered need not detain us here. Even if we assume that Polybius freely composed his own speeches without any reference to transcripts or witnesses, the speeches are unlikely to be cutting works of satire. They surely still reflect what a man with some experience in politics thought ought to be said, and are still examples of Hellenistic rhetoric.
perhaps the most famous speeches in Polybius' history are the matched pair of presbeutic speeches in the fragments of book nine. The setting, reminiscent of Thucydides, is a congress at Sparta. Instead of a debate about declaring war on Athens, ambassadors from the Aetolians and Acarnanians plead for Sparta's assistance in the First Macedonian War. One of the most striking features of these speeches is that both spend far more time on discussions of history than on the present or the potential future. The Aetolian envoy, Chlaines, speaks first, and begins with an extended history lesson. His first words are "No one will dare to deny, men of Sparta, that the power of the Macedonian kingdom has been the cause of slavery for the Greeks, of that I am sure," and he then traces their misdeeds all the way back to Philip II's attack on Olynthus. He carries the history of Macedon down through Alexander and his successors to Antigonus Gonatas' defeat of Cleomenes, finishing with a few words about Philip V's personal history of perfidy. This history lesson is not a preface; it comprises roughly two-thirds of Chlaines' entire speech.

Chlaines' speech is not only about the past, of course. He offers some brief remarks on the present and future, the upshot of which is that the Spartans would be wise to side with Rome and the Aetolians because they will be the eventual winners, "a future circumstance that is very easy to predict based on what has already happened." After this, though, Chlaines returns to the past for the conclusion of his speech, and this time his argument is far more specific. The finale takes on the thorny question of the Spartans' diplomatic obligations. They are already bound to the Aetolians by a treaty of

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38 Their only real rival is the (largely indirect) speech of Agelaus at Naupactus (5.104). See Champion 1997.
39 This is the largest difference between our Hellenistic examples of presbeutic rhetoric and Isocrates' Plataicus. Isocrates' envoy makes brief appeals to history, calling on the Athenians to remember unspecified oaths and treaties, but spends the majority of his speech discussing the future: first in convincing the Athenians that the growth of the Thessalian power will be dangerous (17-32) and then in assuring the Aetolians that they will be safe from Thessalian reprisal (33-45).
40 9.28.1: Ὄτι μὲν οὖν, ὃ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὴν Μακεδόναν δυναστείαν ἁρχὴν συνέβη γεγονέναι τοῖς Ἑλληστήσι δουλείαι, οὐδὲ ἄλλος εἰπεὶν οὐδένα πέπεισμα τολμήσα.
41 From 9.28 to 9.30.4.
42 9.30.8: λέαν δὲ τούτων ἐτησ θυλλογισσασθαι τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τῶν ἡδή γεγονότων. The contrast with Isocrates' attention to such subjects is striking.
alliance, but they are also bound to the Macedonians by a history of benefactions that they are reluctant to ignore. Chlaineas' (somewhat misguided) strategy is to say that, if Sparta had accepted any great favours from Macedon after making a treaty with Aetolia, they might justifiably ignore that treaty. On the other hand, if the Macedonians have done nothing more recent to earn their goodwill, the Spartans must honour the treaty: "It remains necessary for you either to point out some injustice of the Aetolians which happened subsequently (to the treaty) or to some benefaction of the Macedonians, or if neither has happened, how... can you intend to break treaties, oaths and the most solemn pledges of mankind?"43

Such was Chlaineas' speech, and, according to Polybius, it was very difficult to argue against.44 Despite that praise, we would need to be cautious in making conclusions based only on Chlaineas' speech. He was an Aetolian speaking for the Aetolian league, and it has long been accepted that they are the villains in Polybius' story.45 A less-ardent admirer of Polybius than Walbank might even go so far as to suggest that Polybius crafted a speech that had no hope of success as an example of Aetolian stupidity and hubris, or even merely of the type of arguments that are "suited to Aetolians."46 Painting the Aetolian ambassador as a fool for lecturing the Spartans on history and obligations when he should be pleading for help fits Polybius' Tendenz. That may even be the case; for all that Polybius says it was

43 9.31.6: λοιπὸν ἢ διὰ Αἰτωλῶν ἀδικημάτι τι δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα γεγονός εἰς ὑμᾶς δεικνύειν ἢ διὰ Μακεδόνων ἐνέργειαν ἢ μηδετέρου τούτων ἐπιγεγονότος, πῶς, αἰς πρότερον ἐξ ἁλετραίου βουλευόμενοι δικαίως οὐ προσέχετε, τούτων νῦν ἐντραπέντες ἀνασκειώμεν μέλλετε συνθήκας ἄρκον, τὰς μεγίστας πίστες παρ᾽ ἄνθρωποις. Isocrates' Plataean envoy calls upon the Athenians to abide by their oaths and treaties. This was almost certainly a much older trope of diplomacy.
44 Whether Polybius meant to praise his own work (or Chlaineas', if we think he had notes) or simply to magnify Lykioskos' achievement must remain an open question.
45 See the bibliography collected by Walbank 1967: 163 and Sacks 1975: 92. Even Sacks, who argues that Polybius is more even-handed in his treatment of the Aetolian league for events in the second century, acknowledges that the historian is overtly hostile to the Aetolians of the third century BCE. The case may be made most eloquently by the relative length of the speeches. The Aetolian gets roughly half the space to make his case that the Acarnanian does (Walbank 1967: 163).
46 Another of Timaeus' faults is that his imagination is too fertile. He offers every possible argument and does not realize that "some are appropriate for contemporaries, others for men of former times, some are appropriate to Aetolians, others to Peloponnesians and still others to Athenians" (Polybius, 12.25.i.4).
difficult to refute, the Acarnanian envoy, Lykiskos, has little trouble doing so. But even if Chlaineas' speech was designed be a loser, it is not his reliance on history as a means of persuasion that makes it so. Lykiskos' speech follows the Aetolian's in both structure and content.

Lykiskos neither ignores nor downplays the claims that history has on the Spartans; he just presents a different version of history. Lykiskos' opening history lesson presents Philip II as the great benefactor of the Greeks, not least because he took up the cause of justice in the Sacred War. Alexander and his successors also worked for the good of all the Greeks while the Aetolians were the authors of many ills. Lykiskos' historical summary is every bit as long as Chlaineas', and he is not simply following the lead of the first speaker. At one point, Lykiskos claims to be moving on from the theme of history, although there are "many more things from the past" that he could say, only to immediately return to the (undoubtedly sensitive) subject of Antigonos Gonatas, whom the Spartans have publicly proclaimed their saviour and benefactor for his humane treatment of the city.

The idea that past actions and relationships should constrain the Spartans as they make diplomatic choices in the present is the foundation of Lykiskos' most compelling argument. He acknowledges that the Spartans will be breaking a treaty if they side with the Acarnanians and Macedonians, but they will be if they side against them, too. The moral calculus is typical of Polybius. The Spartans already have a treaty with the Macedonians from the time of their defeat by Antigonos Gonatas. Lykiskos argues that this treaty should take precedence, because it was "made in front of all the Greeks, inscribed on a column and sanctified." Moreover, Lykiskos makes the argument that in the case of conflicting obligations, the deciding factor should not be which treaty was made more recently, but from which party the Spartans have received greater benefits. In this case, the Aetolians

47 Polybius, 9.31.7.
48 Polybius, 9.34.
49 Polybius, 9.36.5.
50 Polybius, 9.36.9.
have never done them a good turn, whereas they once hailed the Macedonians as their benefactors and
preservers: "It is not so pious to hold to the terms of a written treaty as it is impious to make war on
your saviour."\footnote{9.36.12: καὶ μὴν οὐχ οὕτως ὄσιν ἔστι τὸ τάς ἐγκράτεις πίστεις βεβαιών, ὡς ἀνόσιον τὸ τοῖς σώσασι πολεμεῖν: ὤ νῦν Ἀττωλοὶ πάρεισιν ώμᾶς ἀξιοῦντες}

At this point, Lykiskos' speech is perhaps only two-thirds over. After the appeal to piety, he
launches into his famous call for Greco-Macedonian unity and cooperation in the face of the gathering
storm of Roman intervention. In this, Lykiskos appeals to Spartan history, in a different, and perhaps
more familiar (to students of classical rhetoric) way: how can those who threw Xerxes' envoys into the
well contemplate making a treaty with barbarians and march with them against Greeks?\footnote{Polybius, 9.38.4.}
Classical Athenian rhetoric is littered with patriotic allusions to the Persian wars. Those allusions are deployed
to different ends than Lykiskos' history lesson.

In classical rhetoric, allusions to history are most often used to stir the emotions of their
audience.\footnote{On the use of history by the Attic orators, see Worthington 1994, Pownall 2004: 38ff., Perlman 1961; Pearson 1941 or Nouhaud 1982.}
Rather than discussing treaties or past obligations as factors that should determine future
policy, Athenian orators invoked well-known events or persons as a form of short-hand for evoking a
set range of emotional responses.\footnote{Worthington 1994: 109; Pownall 2004: 38.}
The majority of historical allusions are drawn from three set
themes: the Persian Wars, the Peisistratid tyranny and the time of Solon.\footnote{Worthington 1994: 110-11.}
Historical allusions from
these sources offered an easy way to stir feelings of patriotism and nostalgia for the old-fashioned
democratic spirit. This is why funeral orations and most panegyrics recall either Marathon, Salamis or
both, even when the present crisis has little to do with the Persians.

The finale of Lykiskos' speech to the Spartans is a fine example of this difference between
Classical and Hellenistic practice: “It is fine and fitting for you, men of Sparta, to remember your ancestors... but above all that you should bear in mind the favours conferred on you by Antigonos...”

Lykiskos too makes an emotional appeal to former glories, but he presents the details of past diplomacy as the basis for a sound judgement. The emotional appeal has little to do with the actual choice the Spartans face, and says almost nothing about the Romans. That makes it unique within the context of this debate. Neither Chlaineas' history of Macedonian imperialism, nor Lykiskos' alternate version, in which the Macedonians repeatedly save the Greeks from barbarian invasion, aim to stir the Spartans' pride, and Lykiskos' lecture on how the Spartans should be grateful that Antigonos Gonatas was merciful after Sparta's abject defeat can only do the opposite.

Perhaps the strangest aspect of Polybius' backward-looking rhetoric, at least for a reader more accustomed to Thucydides, is just how concerned these speakers are with what we might call justice, or doing what is right. Speakers in Thucydides famously dismiss these as reasonable criteria in the decision-making process, and those who do rely on justice and morality inevitably fail to persuade. In the speeches of these two ambassadors, less time is spent on what is advantageous for Sparta than on a moral calculation of treaty obligations, any history of benefactions (or ill treatment) and the general character of the parties involved. I am not here proposing any kind of totalizing or rigidly enforced system of international law, but rather a less formal set of norms.

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57 The Mytilene Debate and Melian dialogue are the two most famous examples of explicitly eschewing justice. The Corinthian envoys to Athens in book one claim to be eschewing considerations of justice, though this could easily be read as a praeteritio. For a contrary reading of Thucydides, see Orwin 1994 or any of his other work on the subject.
58 Whether the Greeks of the Hellenistic, or any other age had a working system of international law is a tortured question. See most recently Eckstein 2006: 80ff., who makes a somewhat hyperbolic case against a system of international law and for one in which the only constants were the unlimited (and almost unthinking) use of force and a pursuit of self-interest limited only by paranoia. On the other side, see Klose 1982 or Low 2007. There is no scholarly consensus on this issue and, as Low has rightly pointed out, there was no consensus on the subject in Classical Athenian thought either. Even Eckstein's 'a-moral' system (17, 38 and 79) allows some role for diplomacy, and he acknowledges that states were reluctant to be seen acting hubristically, duplicitously or in violation of sworn oaths and treaties, and were often guided by "informal norms." For Low 2007, the most important of those norms was strict reciprocity (both of aid received and damage suffered).
mechanism for compelling obedience to these rules or punishing offences, but breaking them was shameful and best avoided. Neither of Polybius' ambassadors threatens the Spartans with grave consequences if they make the wrong choice; they merely offer competing versions of history which make one course of action more honourable, or perhaps more shameful. With no truly clear path, the Spartan assembly eventually decided that it was more shameful to ignore the history of benefactions by the Macedonian crown, rather than be seen ignoring their treaty obligations to the Aetolians.

Ties between benefactor and recipient are the most familiar aspect of Hellenistic diplomacy.⁵⁹ It is widely accepted that these were the means by which the Hellenistic kings legitimated their rule and made it palatable to Greek poleis.⁶⁰ The kings granted boons to the cities, and in return the cities granted the kings (sometimes divine) honours and promised their loyalty. In practice we tend to think of it as little more than a polite way to disguise a fundamentally unequal power relationship. The speeches of Lykiskos and Chlaineas can add some much-needed context. They imply both that international relations were, at least in practice, guided if not governed by agreed-upon rules, and that, for the Greek poleis, debts of gratitude to the kings were more than just polite fictions.⁶¹ Both envoys begin from the premise that past favours, even if they are only the mercy of a victor, should be enough to earn loyalty. Lykiskos lists the reasons the Spartans have to be grateful to the Macedonians, then, strikingly, he says that it is less important to honour a treaty than it is to avoid betraying a benefactor. Clearly the ideal is to honour both treaties and benefactors, but when they conflict, the benefactor should take precedence. This does not seem to be something unique to Lykiskos. The Aetolian ambassador Chlaineas seems to be under the same assumption. He never (though perhaps we should allow for the fact that he spoke first) actually makes the argument that a treaty should constrain Sparta's

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⁵⁹ See especially Low 2007: passim and 36ff.
⁶⁰ See, for instance, Lund 1992 or Ma 1999.
⁶¹ As, in Eckstein's view, were all matters of diplomacy (2006: passim, and clearly stated on pages 82, 94).
actions more than gratitude to a benefactor, even though it would make his case much easier to support. Instead, he resorts to a somewhat sophistic argument with two main premises. The weaker one is that, since the Aetolians are the traditional enemies of the Macedonians, in making a treaty with them, the Spartans have already declared their ties of gratitude null and void. The treaty even implicated the Spartans in hostilities against their proclaimed saviours and benefactors, so honouring their debt now would be hypocritical.\textsuperscript{62} That is, the Spartans should not feel obliged to side with Macedon, because they have already shown themselves ungrateful.\textsuperscript{63} The stronger side of Chlaineas' argument is his attempt to prove that the Antigonids were never true benefactors, hence the extended lesson about the historical crimes of the Macedonians in general and Antigonus Gonatas in specific. The conclusion of Chlaineas' speech sees him explicitly accept that ties of gratitude may be more potent than a treaty. He is willing to admit that, even though the Spartans have ignored that bond once, if the Macedonians had done the Spartans any good service in the interim, then they would be justified in breaking the treaty.

Other ambassadors in Polybius work from the same basic set of principles as Lykiskos and Chlaineas: that the best way of persuading is by reference to history, ties of gratitude or treaty obligations rather than by offering potential future advantages. In the fragments of Book 21, Polybius presents a scene in which Eumenes acts as his own advocate in addressing the Roman senate when he is given a chance to argue against the Rhodian plan to declare the Greek cities of Asia Minor free and independent. In the first place, he restates the power that bonds of gratitude can exert. He says that, if the cities of Asia are freed at the Rhodians' request, it will mean handing them an empire: "thinking they were freed by (Rhodes), they will be allies of Rhodes in name, but in truth they will happily do everything that Rhodes commands, for they will feel indebted to them for the greatest of favours."\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{62} Polybius, 9.31.2.
\textsuperscript{63} This seems like a remarkably ill-considered argument. It has never been adduced as proof that this speech was fictitious, but it seems like a suspiciously bold gambit. See Low 2007: 111.
\textsuperscript{64} Polybius, 21.19.9.
Eumenes himself is relying on precisely this kind of debt of gratitude to prevent that from ever coming to pass. He builds his case around all of the aid he has rendered to Rome in various wars, in light of which he says: "For you to take thought for my affairs is only just."65 His speech was very well received by the senate, but the Rhodian envoys were prepared to play the same game. Polybius glosses over their history lesson, simply saying that they reminded the Senate of all their services, but they take the history lesson in a different direction. They decide to recall Rome's own record, specifically that they fought a war with Philip V "for the sake of the freedom of the Greeks."66 Fighting a war for that object alone won them great glory among men, and if they wished to keep that glory, they would need to continue that policy by freeing the Greeks of Asia. The underlying idea is that what is right and honourable is a consistency of policy, and it must direct policy in the same way that gratitude for a benefactor does.

We began from the generally accepted premise that, even if the Hellenistic Greeks did not have a proper system of international law and, at least in theory, recognized no constraints on their behaviour and self-interest but force, there was still some room for an informal code of behaviour and some room for diplomacy. If Polybius' ambassadors focus on history, obligations and generally what is right, that must mean that obligations, history and notions of justice exerted some influence over foreign policy. This may seem obvious, but it runs almost entirely contrary to recent scholarship. Drawing on realist political theory, Eckstein has declared that, in terms of international relations, the Hellenistic world was a "multipolar anarchy."67 In essence, he argues that the foreign policy of any given state was really only limited by its military strength, and that, as a rule, they were extremely aggressive and engaged in constant warfare. This was not a uniquely Hellenistic development, but was instead merely a

66 Polybius, 23.3.7.
67 Eckstein 2006:1, 78-9 and passim.
continuation of the anarchic foreign relations of the classical age.\textsuperscript{68} Interstate relations in the Hellenistic world were not completely uncontrolled, only almost completely uncontrolled. The behaviour of states was moderated by four informal norms which had developed and solidified in the Archaic and Classical periods.\textsuperscript{69} Eckstein is eager to remind his readers that these fell far short of the authority of a proper system of international law, that they were frequently transgressed and that there was no mechanism for punishing transgressions.\textsuperscript{70} The four norms were fairly simple: respect for heralds and emissaries; not attacking neutral states; offering limited protection to enemy civilians; and abiding by sworn treaties. To that list, we can add a fifth, related norm: an entrenched respect for history in diplomatic relations. This innate respect for history, in remaining loyal to a benefactor or in maintaining a consistent policy, is the hallmark of presbeutic rhetoric in Polybius and, as a brief survey of the epigraphic record will show, in the Hellenistic era in general.

\subsection*{2.3 The Epigraphic Evidence}

Polybius' taxonomy of rhetoric elevates diplomacy to being one of the chief genres of oratory for the Hellenistic period. A brief survey of the epigraphic evidence is enough to show that, on this point, the evidence from inscriptions lines up quite well with the historian's theorizing. Polybius' diplomatic speeches often operate under the assumption that history is a guiding principle in international affairs because consistency of policy, respect for treaties and prior relationships seem to be the components of acting justly or rightly. Chlaineas said that it is right for Sparta to align itself with the Aetolian league because the Macedonian kings, historically, worked mischief on the Greeks, and they had a treaty with the Aetolians. Lykiskos said that they should fight at the side of the Macedonians because they were actually the common benefactors of all the Greeks. But both

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{68} Eckstein 2006: 78.
\bibitem{69} Eckstein 2006: 78.
\bibitem{70} Eckstein 2006: 38.
\end{thebibliography}
ambassadors assume that citing historical ties is the best way to persuade their audience. The question of whether Polybius is in any way representative, or if his interests as an historian shaped the arguments that his speakers make, remains. In what follows, we will explore a handful of the thousands of Hellenistic documents which attest to some form of diplomatic activity. We will begin with relations between cities and kings, and move on to interactions between cities. What we will find is that appeals to history are as prominent in these exchanges as they seem to be in Polybius and, in the later case-studies, that a secure documentary record was a valuable resource for a city in pursuing its foreign-policy. It is this connection between diplomatic rhetoric and documents that makes Zosimos' two reforms a coherent whole.

Studying presbeutic rhetoric in inscriptions is much more difficult than dealing with Polybius. Although we have a great many honorary decrees in praise of ambassadors, most of these offer little more than the man's name and perhaps some indication of where his diplomatic mission took him.71 Others offer only the briefest of explanations, like the decree for an unknown citizen of Priene who travelled to Miletus and other cities "on the city's business."72 Neither is sufficient for our purposes, but the situation is less grim when we turn our attention to the unfortunately far less numerous records of diplomatic exchanges. When Greek cities sent envoys to one of the kings, it was often with a specific request or question, and it was normal practice for the king to respond with a letter that outlined (and therefore enacted) the royal decision.73 Such letters almost always include a clause explaining the reasons for the king's decision, and often a summary of the case presented by the ambassadors embedded therein.

71 The honorary decree for Moschion of Priene (I. Priene 108.164-5) is a good example; it merely says that he "acted as the people's ambassador, to both kings and cities, on many occasions," and does not bother with the specifics of which kings and cities or why.
72 I. Priene 121. 9.
73 Ma 2000e.
In dealing with the kings, history was one of the ambassador's favourite tools.\textsuperscript{74} A history of good relations, benefactions or favourable decisions was invoked by envoys to (or from) kings representing five different dynasties and over the whole course of the Hellenistic era.\textsuperscript{75} The letter of Antiochus II to the Erythrae (RC 15) is one of the clearest examples and worth examining in a little more detail. Both the envoys of the city and the king in his response cite the force of history as a governing principle in their relationship. Antiochus, in typical fashion for a royal letter, summarizes the meeting he had with the envoys from Erythrae (Pythes, Bottas and Thrasyron) before passing on his decision. The three ambassadors presented Antiochus with a wreath and an honorary decree passed by the city before making their pitch. They told the king about "the good will which (they) have always had for his house and the gratitude that the city shows to all of their benefactors as a whole."\textsuperscript{76} There is something like what Aristotle might call an argument from ethos in this part of the envoys' appeal (or Antiochus' summary thereof). Their record shows that the people of Erythrae are habitually loyal and grateful to those who treat them well. Of more interest to us, they invoke the gratitude their city always had for the Seleucid house in particular, and, in the words of the king, they also reminded him of "the esteem in which the former kings held the city."\textsuperscript{77} Much like Eumenes on the floor of the Senate, Erythrae's ambassadors trade on the notion that changing an established historical relationship or violating precedent is undesirable and even shameful.

The people of Erythrae offer a far less ambitious history lesson than some of Polybius' speakers. They merely remind the king that there is a historical connection between his house and their city and

\textsuperscript{74} Far and away the best work on the subject remains Ma 1999. That book (in particular chapters one and four, "Constructing a Seleucid Past" and "Empire as Interaction", respectively) laid the foundation for much that is to follow.\textsuperscript{75} The trend runs from Lysimachus' letter to Priene (RC 6) to Antiochus VIII's patronage of Seleukia in Pieria (RC 71, 109 BCE). Taking only those examples that are fairly explicit, history is invoked in letters 4, 6, 14, 15, 22, 25, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 42, 44, 54, 64, 68 and 71.\textsuperscript{76} RC 15.6-10: αὐτοὶ ἀπολογισάμενοι περὶ τῆς εὔνοιας ἢ διὰ παντὸς εἰσήκυκτοι τις τὴν ἡμετέραν οίκιαν, καὶ καθόλου περὶ τῆς εὐχαριστίας τοῦ πλῆθους ἢ χρήσει πρὸς ἅπαντας τοῦς εὐεργέτας... .\textsuperscript{77} RC 15.9.
expect that this will be enough to win his goodwill. Antiochus was convinced and promised to do all that he could to augment the prestige of Erythrae. After the preliminary exchanges of goodwill, the envoys move on to more tangible requests. The envoys reminded him that the city of Erythrae had, historically, enjoyed certain privileges. Under Alexander the Great and Antigonus, they had been autonomous and exempt from tribute, and Antiochus' own ancestors had always been eager to help the city. If the people of Erythrae thought that their history was an argument sufficient in itself, Antiochus agreed. That Erythrae had been granted privileges in the past, and that this had been done justly, and his fear that he might "lag behind in conferring favours" are his stated reasons for granting their requests, and all three are variations on the same theme. Concessions which have the aura of antiquity are just, and failing to honour them is somehow shameful.

If we turn our attention to a different dynasty and a different century, Ptolemy II was even more emphatic in his endorsement of the authority of history. The people of Soli in Cilicia apparently sent envoys to Ptolemy IV to complain about the billeting of soldiers in their city. Most of Ptolemy's response, which seems to have been sent directly to his provincial governor, but which was inscribed and displayed in Soli, has been lost. What remains is a stern and direct reprimand of his commander for not strictly adhering to precedent. Envoys from Soli have told the king that, even in the time of Alexander, only half of the city had soldiers billeted on them. Houses in the outer city were fair game, but those of the inner city were left alone. Ptolemy's general has billeted soldiers everywhere in the city, and the king seems very annoyed that he "did not even make an enquiry" into the facts, but foisted soldiers upon both the inner and outer city.78 Though fragmentary, the subtext of the letter seems to be that Ptolemy was embarrassed and a little angry that his commander made him "lag behind in the conferring of favours", as his rival Antiochus would have said.

78 RC 30. 1-2: ὁ γὰρ ἐσχολακένα ὁδεγμέαν ἐπίσκεψιν ποιήσασθαι...
Hellenistic diplomacy was not confined to relations between the major kings and the poleis under their sway. There was a great deal of ambassadorial traffic between cities. Much of that has left little trace in the historical record, but the practice of using third-party arbitrators to settle disputes is very well represented. Most cases involved disputed ownership of some parcel or parcels of land, and by the nature of Greek legal principles, history–of prior possession, of treaty arrangements and of previous arbitral decisions–necessarily figured prominently in many cases. Examples are numerous, and Zosimos' own city, Priene, was as active on this front as any other city. Perhaps a generation before Zosimos, the people of Priene honoured their fellow citizen Krates for successfully defending their rights to own and operate the local salt-works by presenting a better version of their history than his opponents could. Priene was also involved in one of the most extreme, if incomplete, examples of relying on ancient history to win a case. In 283/2 BCE, Lysimachus was approached by ambassadors from Priene who were trying to recover a stretch of land near Cape Mykale from the people of Samos, who were currently in possession. Lysimachus then summoned envoys from Samos as well, and allowed them to make their case. Both cities justified their claim to the land on the grounds of more or less distant history. The envoys from Priene began their case for ownership of the land four centuries in the past, and the Samians seem to have been willing and able to do the same. Whoever owned the region, known as the Batinetis, before the semi-mythical invasion of Lygdamis and the Cimmerians, both sides agreed that after that war it was entirely occupied by Prieneans, except for one or two native Samians who then resided in Priene as metics. Both sides also agreed that some time shortly thereafter, the Samians returned and expelled the people of Priene by force, but that a treaty, concluded by Bias of Priene (some three hundred years before the case came before Lysimachus) left the Samians in

79 See Ager 1996: 327.
80 Krates' decree is fragmentary, but one of the more complete sections traces the history of the property in question back at least fifty years (I. Priene 111.112).
81 The resulting letter from Lysimachus is RC 7.
possess of the Batinetis.\textsuperscript{82}

Lysimachus, of course, was far less impressed by the envoys' mastery of ancient history than he might have been. As a preface to his decision, he tells the Samians that if he had known how far in the past the claims of Priene were based, he would never have agreed to hear the case in the first place, since he was under the impression that Samian possession of the Batinetis was a recent development.\textsuperscript{83} Even so, he respected the authority of history enough to continue listening to the envoys once the truth of the matter had become clear, and enough to summarize both sides' arguments and include them in his decision. Perhaps he respected the effort that the Prienians expended in marshaling evidence from the "histories, other witnesses and documents."\textsuperscript{84} Or perhaps he was aware of how much weight such matters carried with the Hellenistic Greeks. Generations after Lysimachus' decision, the Rhodians were called in to arbitrate a related, if not precisely the same, case, and envoys from both cities offered the works of historians as evidence.\textsuperscript{85} They, in fact, listened to envoys cite half a dozen historians whose work traced the issue back even further than the invasion of the Cimmerians, all the way to what seems to have been the initial war to conquer the area for the Ionians.\textsuperscript{86} One side or the other, or perhaps both sets of envoys, also presented the Rhodian judges with the whole history of prior decisions on this subject, and the Rhodians were impressed enough with this argument to summarize it in their decision.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{82} RC 7, 25-30.
\textsuperscript{83} Welles 1934:48 assumed that the Prieneans were hoping that Lysimachus' recent show of goodwill toward their city (\textit{I. Priene} 14 and 15; see also Sherwin-White 1985: 80) would be enough to compensate for a relatively weak case. It is possible that they were also encouraged by getting a favourable verdict from Lysimachus in a similar case against Magnesia (Ager 1996: #25), but it is far from certain that the document in question has anything to do with Lysimachus or is even an arbitration.
\textsuperscript{84} RC 7.13.
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{I. Priene} 37, 54 and 101-2. Both Welles 1934: 48 and Ager 1996: 327 are keen to note that this was not precisely the same issue. It was not a question of the whole of the territory called the Batinetis, but only of a single fortress within that territory.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{I. Priene} 37.54-56 and 100-120.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{I. Priene} 37. 76-7 and, perhaps at greater length in the largely fragmentary section following I. 125.
Priene's centuries-long campaign to reacquire territory around Cape Mykale through arbitration was fairly typical of the Hellenistic world. While far from unique, it is something of an extreme example because of the way it focused on truly ancient history (though it can hardly hold a candle to the dispute between Messene and Sparta settled by the Senate under Tiberius\textsuperscript{88}). Why do Priene and other states think that the best way to persuade an arbiter that their case is just is by reference to ancient history? Our answer to that will inevitably be unsatisfying. The Greeks themselves do not seem to have seriously questioned the idea. To them, deciding these matters like court cases on the basis of some historical right of possession was self-evidently just. And of course, it seems self-evidently just to us as well, so any explanation must seem redundant. It is not, however, the only system by which these disputes could be decided, nor even the only one known to the Greeks. The Roman senate, when invoked as an arbitrator, made its decision not by reference to historical right and wrong, but by reference to the status quo on entry into Roman amicitia. The Greeks were familiar with Rome's way of deciding disputes, but preferred to use their own. A longstanding dispute between the people of Meletaia and Narthakion went through several courts before finally being referred to the Roman senate in 140 BCE.\textsuperscript{89} The advocates of both cities were well aware of how the senate made its decisions, and came prepared to make arguments about who held the territory when they first contracted the friendship and alliance of Rome.\textsuperscript{90} Of course, they also came prepared with a detailed history of who had won the territory in a series of arbitral decisions reaching back centuries, as well as arguments about who had been a more loyal and useful ally. A better question than why the Greeks used history as their preferred means of persuasion is how this system shaped the evolution of the Hellenistic polis, and that brings us back to Zosimos, the secretary who saved his city. A few case studies should be

\textsuperscript{88} Tacitus, Ann. 4.43.
\textsuperscript{89} Ager 1996: #156 = Sherk 1969: #38. 20-1. Also discussed by Baker 2000.
\textsuperscript{90} Ager 1996: #156.21.
sufficient to put Zosimos’ improvements in record-keeping into their proper context.

If we briefly leave Priene for the islands, an arbitral settlement of a dispute between Kos and Kalymna offers specific details about how public records were handled in these cases. The case in question, which may be earlier even than Lysimachus' decision in favour of Samos, began as a strictly private dispute about (un)paid debts, but expanded to involve the communities as a whole. As a case about bad debts, it left a paper trail. That trail became even longer because the case was being heard in Knidos, and some important witnesses would be unable to attend. Their depositions had to be recorded, then sealed and counter-sealed by the interested parties so as to prevent any tampering or forgery, and were to be given to the Knidian strategoi, who would break the seals and enter them into evidence with all parties present to witness it. The same procedure was to be followed for any documents (decrees, proposals, receipts or anything else necessary) of interest in the public archives. They were to be sealed with the official state seal and handed over to the Knidian strategoi, who would then break the seal and make copies for all involved.91 What is striking is that in these documents are treated with far less suspicion than the depositions of witnesses. For the depositions, both sides are to have observers present for the questioning, and both sides have the right to seal the transcripts. The cities are trusted not to tamper with or falsify documents from their own records; only the seal of the city is needed and their opponents are offered no opportunity to challenge them. We can assume that the process was similar in other cases.

If we return to Priene, their long-running fight for control of the land near Cape Mykale is worth a second glance. In the 280s BCE, Priene suffered a significant loss in their case against Samos. The ambassadors whom the former city sent to Lysimachus seem to have done everything right. Using the work of ancient historians, and some (seemingly dubious) documents, they presented the king with

91 Ager 1996: #21, A 33-38.
their version of the history of the region. Despite the affection he felt for Priene, Lysimachus did not find their case compelling. We might reasonably surmise that he had reservations about the veracity of what the ancient historians had to say and perhaps harboured doubts about the authenticity of the centuries-old treaty that Priene offered as evidence.  

It might be more generous to say rather that the king simply found this document less compelling than the fact that Samian citizens had occupied, bequeathed and inherited this land for generations. How, precisely, the people of Samos proved those things has been lost to a break in the inscription, if it was ever recorded in the first place. In all likelihood, it was not difficult. A simple inspection would prove that they were on the land, and there were surely lease agreements, wills, court records or some other still existing documents which could prove that they had been there for generations.

Almost two centuries later, Priene would have better luck in defending their rights to a fortress called Karion, which was either in or contiguous with the land known as the Batinetis. In this round of arbitration, the case was judged by the people of Rhodes, who seem to have far more patience for these catalogues of historical claims than Lysimachus. In this case, both sides seem to have appealed to the historians of Magnesia on the Maeander (either because their historians were assumed to be impartial or because of the reputation enjoyed by Herakleides of Magnesia) to establish the early history of the region. The people of Samos seem to have offered little evidence about the legal history of the fortress known as Karion, relying on the histories and the record of decisions handed down by various kings and arbitrators. Meanwhile, the Prieneans came prepared with reams of

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92 RC 7.13. The treaty was from the late seventh century BCE (that is, from the time of the Kimmerian invasion of Ionia).
93 The case was about a single fortress, Karion, and its surrounding territory. It seems to have been part of the same broader dispute as the Batinetis, but it was decided on its own terms (though reference is made to the prior judgments).
94 For the attitude of the diadochs toward the business of ruling a kingdom, cf. Lund 1990.
95 I. Priene 37.53-4 and 104.
96 I. Priene 37.103. It seems that the case may also have been heard by Seleucid and Antigonid kings, but the passage (II. 132ff.) is fragmentary.
documentation to support their claim. They adduced multiple civic decrees which came from an era when a portion of their population retreated to the fortress of Karion to escape the local tyrant, as well as the text of decisions in their favour by both Demetrius and Lysimachus (presumably a different letter than the one he sent to the Samians). Their trump card was a pair of documents from their temple of Athena Polias that provided for the division of the land around the fortress of Karion into thirty-seven kleroi and distributing them to citizens. In a probable mirror image of the earlier case, documents that showed recent and continuous possession of the land in question carried more weight for Priene than the Samians' appeals to the ancient historians.

Two of Priene's leading citizens of the generation before Zosimos, Krates and Herakleitos, were active in disputes in which civic documents proved vital. The most noteworthy example was their campaign to prove that the city's salt-pans were the property of Athena Polias, and not available for exploitation by the Roman publicani. The only evidence for this round of legal wrangling comes from two extremely fragmentary honorary inscriptions. Even if they survived intact, they would surely offer only a bare summary of the case, since they were meant to magnify the contribution each man made to the public good, not serve as the official record of the victory. What evidence they offered to prove their claims is lost to us, but we have several suggestive comparanda. Among the earliest honorary decrees inscribed on the wall of the sacred stoa is one for Moschion, son of Kydimos. Among his other benefactions is a fairly detailed register of the gifts, monetary and otherwise, that Moschion and his brother made to his city. These included at least two separate gifts of grain, for one of which the framers of the decree saw fit to include the price at which the grain was to be re-sold (either to raise money or alleviate price pressures during a famine). He also made numerous contributions of money,
and for all of these his honorary decree supplies dates, amounts (including the weight-standard of the currency) and reasons for the gift. We also learn that, during a time of crisis (most likely the Attalid and Cappadocian attacks on the city), he subsidized Priene's citizen infantry for two months, while also paying for a band of private mercenaries out of pocket.\textsuperscript{100} If we judge by the language of Moschion's initial donation of grain, that he "willingly came forward in the assembly and gave" it should be taken as a sign that these gifts were offered publicly during meetings of the assembly, and were accepted by a decree of the same body.\textsuperscript{101} In fact, almost every praiseworthy deed in Moschion's life involved the popular assembly. When he is not coming forward to address them and offer relief from a grain shortage, he is being "selected" as an ambassador to sundry kings and cities.\textsuperscript{102} The man or men who framed his honorary decree probably relied on the minutes of the assembly in creating their summary of Moschion's career.

In the case of Krates and his dispute with the publicani, he may have been able to draw on similar records in the city archives to prove when and by whom the property was given or sold to Athena.\textsuperscript{103} The best comparandum in this case would be a cache of documents from Mylasa, which seem to form a large archive recording the details of several large gifts of land to the temple of Apollo and Artemis, and the terms of the leases on which those estates were to be leased.\textsuperscript{104} In Priene, if we can extrapolate from Moschion's career, the initial gift of the saltworks to Athena would have been recorded in the public archives, as would the details of Krates' renovation of the facilities. His fragmentary inscription seems to imply that his victory in the case hinged on being able to prove that,

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whatever their provenance, Priene had owned and enjoyed the property for some time. A copy of a
decree of the assembly which showed Priene doing just that may have carried as much weight with the
senate as it did with Rhodes in the case of Karion.

Our best evidence for Hellenistic diplomacy suggests that history, whether of alliances,
beneftions or possession, was the dominant currency. Priene, along with some other cities, seems to
have realized that a reliable (or at least plausible) archive of documents was a valuable asset in
establishing a historical claim. It may even have been valuable enough that Zosimos' improvements in
record-keeping gave Priene an advantage in their dealings with others. In this case, and in others closer
to Zosimos' own age, a thorough and reliable collection of public documents was vital to advancing
Prienian interests.\footnote{The disputes with the Publicani and Miletus which are mentioned in \textit{I. Priene} 111 and 117 surely fit into this category.} That the people of Priene were able to provide a provenance for the documents
they introduced into evidence, and one that was easily verifiable, may not have been the only reason
they won their case, but it did impress the Rhodians enough that they mentioned it in their decision.
Additionally, instituting a system of duplicate record-keeping, even for private business, could prove as
useful in interstate legal wrangling as Zosimos' efforts to raise a generation of orators.

The Prienean epigraphic habit has long made that city a favourite of Hellenistic historians. The
decision of the Rhodians in the case of Karion suggests that it was of significant advantage to them as
well. Their habit of displaying important public documents, including decrees of friendship, treaties
and favourable verdicts, in the temple of Athena Polias both preserved those records for later use and,
by lending them a more august air, made them more convincing as evidence.\footnote{\textit{I. Priene} 37.87.} This kind of
deliberately ostentatious record-keeping is a sensible response to the rise of history and precedent as
the primary diplomatic currency, but we may be wrong to study it in complete isolation. From very
eyearly in the Hellenistic period, the people of Priene made a conscious effort to turn the most important
public monument in the city, the temple of Athena Polias, into both record-house and record. This surely meant more than merely a slight advantage in lawsuits with other cities. Even if it had no other effect, it meant that by the time Zosimos became secretary, the people of Priene were well accustomed to thinking of the city's protector and chief record keeper as one in the same.\footnote{Athena is never referred to by any epithets that can be connected to ἀσφαλίζω (which is used of Zosimos at \textit{I. Priene} 112, 22) in any of the Prienean documents, but she is referred to as both the “champion” (προστάτις, \textit{I. Priene} 112.106) and the "protector" (πολιορκός, \textit{I.Priene} 45.11 [2nd C BCE]) of the city.}

Their fastidiousness when it came to preserving (at least some) public documents may have given Priene an advantage in international courts, but it surely affected its citizens in other ways, too. These documents were, even in their own time, artefacts from and monuments to the city's past. If we look at what remains of Priene's monuments through this lens, we can find ample evidence that the diplomatic history of the city was central to its identity.\footnote{"Monumentality," and "cultural memory" have been popular in history at large for some time, and have had an increasing impact on classical history over the past decade. Among the pioneers, Assman (1988) was one of the first to apply it to ancient history (Egypt), while Hölscher 1993 and Hölkeskamp 2005 wrote on the Roman republic.}

If we were to look for the most important sacred space in all of Priene, the precinct of Athena Polias is the obvious candidate, and within it, we could point either to the \textit{naos} of her temple or her altar as the holiest of the holy. Both of these stand as monuments to Priene's diplomatic triumphs. At the top of the southern wall of the \textit{naos} was a centuries-old inscription proclaiming that the temple had been dedicated by none other than Alexander the Great himself.\footnote{\textit{I. Priene} 156.} That is, the very walls that housed the cult statue of the city's tutelary divinity were put there by the greatest champion of Hellenism, and stood as a reminder that Priene was one of his favoured cities. Sometime after Alexander's death, probably within the first few decades of the third century BCE, the people of Priene turned the walls of Athena's naos into a public archive of their diplomatic successes.\footnote{Sherwin-White 1985: passim.} These included an abridged version of another letter of Alexander the Great, as well as a civic decree for and a letter from their current
patron, Lysimachus.\textsuperscript{111} Over time, more decrees, often recording victories in diplomatic disputes (e.g., arbitrations by Rhodes and Rome) were added.

Perhaps even more interesting than the letter of Alexander to Priene is the earliest preserved decree of Priene itself (\textit{I. Priene} 2), an honorary inscription for Antigonus Monophthalmus, passed by the assembly while he was still only one of Alexander's generals. The wording of the decree itself is fascinating. To the usual prefatory material and dating formula has been added \textit{αὐτογόμογον Ἰπτέῳ} (either “when the people of Priene were autonomous”, or an assembly "of the people of Priene, who are autonomous").\textsuperscript{112} As an autonomous city, they name Antigonus their \textit{proxenos} and grant him the right of settling and owning land in their city. The Macedonian was to be exempt from taxation and when he wished to address the assembly or magistrates, he was given priority over all business but religious matters, that is, the business of Athena, whose sacred precinct was to house the decree.\textsuperscript{113} This decree, and the choice to preserve it in a public place of honour along with Alexander's letter, not only may have given Priene a tangible advantage when dealing with later kings, but to a Prienean of Zosimos' or Krates' era, it was also a sign of Priene's power and importance. It reminded them that there was once a time when their city offered a home to the best general among Alexander's successors, and therefore was a city worthy of respect.

Those outside the temple of Athena Polias were reminded that their ancestors had been the benefactors of a mighty king. Those actually entering the naos and looking at Athena's cult statue would be reminded of another bold service performed for a great man. Orophernes, the unpopular king of Cappadocia, entrusted four hundred talents from his treasury to the people of Priene, hoping to use this sum as a reserve in case he should be pushed from his throne. In the event, he was, and the people

\textsuperscript{111} Sherwin-White 1985: 70-73.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{I. Priene} 2. 4.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{I. Priene} 2.13-15.
of Priene guarded his deposit faithfully, even when threatened by his successor. In return, Orophernes' descendant is supposed to have donated the cult statue of Athena Polias.\textsuperscript{114} He also saw to the construction of the sacred stoa, which would become the other monumental archive of the city.

These monuments and the inscriptions on them are more than a simple record of the past. For Priene, the history that they construct is vital both to the identity of the polis and the nature of participation in it. If we consider this from the perspective of one of Priene's most prominent citizens, the omnipresence of the city's history in public life is readily apparent. Let us assume that our ideal citizen is Krates, the honorand of \textit{I. Priene} 111. By the time he has come to the end of his career, perhaps in the 80s CE, he has led a long and eventful life. For all of that time, the spiritual heart of the city, and the place where he, in his time as \textit{stephanophoros}, "offered fitting sacrifices to the most revered goddess" once each month was Athena's temple.\textsuperscript{115} In that temple with inscriptions linking Priene to Alexander the Great, Antigonus Monophthalmus and other champions of Hellenism and Greek freedom, he presided over his city's most sacred rites.\textsuperscript{116} He offered prayers while the blood of sacrificial victims stained Athena's altar, the same altar on which, according to a generations-old decree of the assembly, his ancestors had sworn an oath of alliance with Miletus.\textsuperscript{117} When it was Krates' turn to act as his city's advocate in a dispute with its larger neighbour, he surely had occasion to come to Athena's temple and read the text of that old treaty as part of his preparations.

Local history was more than a passive presence in Krates' life as a citizen. For perhaps his

\textsuperscript{114} Evidence for this is very thin. All that speaks in favour of the interpretation is the discovery under the remains of the base of the statue of several coins minted by Orophernes. Making the matter still murkier, they were discovered during a picnic in 1870, and only later reported to the excavators, who, at the time, expressed some scepticism about the story. See C.T. Newton, \textit{Antiquities of Ionia} IV (London 1881) as quoted by Carter 1983: 231: "Whether the coins or any other object found with them were deposited under the pedestal in commemoration of the dedication or as an offering to the goddess, as her due for custody of the treasure, is a question on which we should better be able to form an opinion if we knew the exact position in which the other three coins mentioned in in Mr. Clarke's [the leader of the picnic party] letter were found, and, also, if we could be sure that no others were found either before or after his visit."

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{I. Priene} 111.180. For the monthly sacrifices \textit{I. Priene} 46.19.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{I. Priene} 246, of relatively late date (3\textsuperscript{rd} C. CE).

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{I. Priene} 28. 27 (ca. 200 BCE).
greatest service to his community, he had set out to learn the history of the disused and abandoned salt-works near his city. On finding that they were the property of the city's tutelary divinity and record-keeper, he restored them to service, and eventually had to test his research in a case argued before the Roman Senate to prevent the publicani from seizing them. Krates' life as a citizen was bookended by personal experience with Priene's monumental histories. Priene, like all other Greek poleis of the Hellenistic era, frequently passed on honorary decrees for its leading citizens. They may have researched theirs more diligently than was the norm; the framers of the decrees seem to have pored through the minutes of the assembly and offered a detailed curriculum vitae for their subjects. They also, in many cases (Zosimos himself may be an exception), seem to have waited until the very end of a man's public career, and possibly the end of his life, to pass their decrees of praise. When they did, the usual honours bestowed by the city were a crown to be proclaimed for him at the coming gymnastic games for boys, and another to be granted him at his eventual burial. That burial would include the gymnasarch marshaling the city's ephebes to lead his burial procession.\textsuperscript{118} Some of Krates' earliest memories of civic life may have been of heralds remembering the service of prominent citizens, and of walking in funeral processions for the same, perhaps marching by stelae which so accurately recorded the deeds of the worthy men.\textsuperscript{119} And the capstone of Krates' career was being on the receiving end of these same honours. One of his fellow citizens combed the archives to research his career, and his decree was inscribed on the north face of the sacred stoa, in the middle of the agora.

2.4 Conclusion

So what was the civic identity that all of these monuments aimed to construct? The question is more difficult to answer in the absence of anything like Prienean literature, but we can make a few

\textsuperscript{118} For instance, \textit{I. Priene} 108.333ff.; 109.257 ff.; Krates' own decree (111.305ff.) and numerous others. The gymnasarch Thrasybulous (\textit{I. Priene} 99) had such a procession, but Krates was most likely too old to still be an ephebe for this.

\textsuperscript{119} Or the statue bases, which offered the abridged version.
attempts. They really do seem to have heavily identified themselves with their diplomatic successes. They wanted to be the city with close ties to the most powerful champions of Hellenism and Greek freedom in any age, whether that should be Rome (*I. Priene* 39), the successors of Alexander (*I. Priene* 2, 14 and 15), Alexander the Great himself (*I. Priene* 156.1), or, moving even further back in time, the Athenians (*I. Priene* 6). In the most distant reaches of history, they posited themselves as the champions of the Greeks, and especially the Ionians; they were proud to point to their role in conquering and defending the land around their city and making it a place for Greeks.\(^{120}\)

They also liked to think of themselves as loyal and trustworthy. Among the first documents to be given a place of honour in Athena's shrine are a decree for and a letter from Lysimachus, which records the loyalty they showed that king when he assisted them in their conflict with their neighbours, the Pedieis.\(^{121}\) Much more recently and famously, they had taken the field against two kings, rather than betray the man who entrusted a deposit to them. A letter from Rome acknowledging this deed of bravery was inscribed in a place of honour on the wall of Athena's *naos*, not far from Alexander the Great's dedication. It was also monumentalized by the sacred stoa. The earliest decree of praise inscribed on the walls of the stoa, perhaps not long after the dedication, honoured a man who had himself been active in the conflict, and, in so doing, served as a reminder for why the monument was there at all.\(^{122}\)

Even more than being a city that stood among the defenders of Hellenism, and even more than being the city that was loyal, Priene consciously presented itself to both citizens and foreigners as the city that remembered, and, perhaps more to the point, the city that kept records. They projected that identity to others when they produced reams of documents to bear on any territorial dispute, and they

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120 *I. Priene* 37.108. This war of conquest was happily invoked by both Samos and Priene in their territorial disputes.  
121 *I. Priene* 14, and especially 15.11.  
122 Orophernes' dedicatory inscription on the stoa (*I. Priene* 204) contains only his name.
underlined their point by saying that these were all preserved on their most famous monument and under the watchful gaze of their patron deity. That practice may have been adopted and continued because it offered them an advantage, whether real or perceived, in their diplomatic efforts. But this was not strictly for external consumption. In purely domestic matters Prieneans were just as scrupulous about remembering and recording, if not more so. If the length and the level of detail on display in their most visible honorary decrees (in particular, those on the sacred stoa) were not enough to advertise that remembering was both the duty and the function of the city, the actual honours they accorded to their leading citizens would be. Men like Moschion, Krates and Zosimos were honoured with decrees, statues and proclamations while they were alive, but also made certain that they received their due portion of honour after their death.123 In the decree for Moschion, continuing to remember, and hence to repay, his benefactions is explicitly linked to justice: ἵνα δὲμόνον ζῶντα φαίνται τιμῶν ὁ δήμος Μοσχίωνα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ χρεώ μεταστάσεως τυχόντα τῶν καθηκόντων ἄξιων δικαίως (so that we seem to honour him justly not only while he is alive, but also after his death).124

This notion that remembering is one of the core components of justice is not limited to Priene. Their neighbours Miletus and Magnesia both worked to present themselves as cities that remembered their history and commitments. Seleucus II praised Miletus for remembering the favours they received, and Attalus I offers much the same praise for Magnesia.125 What we may have here is a slight evolution in the definition of justice for the Hellenistic Greeks which favours history and memory. In this context, Zosimos saved his city and its citizens by making justice a more secure thing. In the next chapter, we will explore more fully the effect of record-keeping on domestic politics, and, more specifically, what happens when citizens of a polis wish to obliterate part of the city's past.

123 I. Priene 108.344-5 and 373-4; I. Priene 111.307; I. Priene 113.111.
124 I. Priene 108.344-7.
125 RC 22 and 34 respectively.
Chapter 3: Dyme, Fabius' Letter (Syll. \(^3\) 684) and the Power of the Archives

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we focused on Zosimos of Priene and his city's successful use of its history as a tool of diplomacy. What brought Zosimos to our attention was the seemingly hyperbolic level of praise heaped on his investment in the city's archives, and the juxtaposition of those reforms with his program of rhetorical education. Hyperbole aside, his initiatives in making duplicate copies of all documents and insisting that the young men of the city be trained in rhetoric can be seen as part of a consistent policy. There is no doubt that accidents of survival have made Priene a more important place to historians than it would have been to its contemporaries, but it is clear that it was a successful polis. The ability to deploy the history of the polis (and its citizens) in international affairs, a reputation for fair dealing and good relations with both Rome and the kings allowed the Prieneans to press their territorial claims. More specifically, their trained advocates and ostentatiously reliable documentary record often convinced arbitrators and foreign powers to uphold their claims. In exploring the link between history and diplomatic rhetoric in the Hellenistic world, the previous chapter left two important questions unanswered. First, if archives and documentation were of such vital importance in international relations, what was their place in domestic politics? Second, if Priene is an example of a successful polis for its diligent record-keeping, what would an unsuccessful polis look like?

To answer those questions, we will shift our focus to the Greek mainland, and the relatively small city of Dyme. In 144 BCE\(^1\) the Roman proconsul Quintus Fabius Maximus sent the city a letter

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\(^1\) For many years the inscription was dated much later, to 115 BCE, as it was thought that Quintus Fabius Maximus Eburnus (cos. 116 BCE) was the most likely author of the letter. Ferrary 1988: 189-90 argued that it must be Quintus Fabius Maximus Servilianus (cos. 145 BCE) because a governor of the same name wrote another letter (eventually forwarded to Sicyon) that can be independently dated to 144 BCE. Kallet-Marx 1995a: 141-143 adds several independent arguments in favour of the earlier date, and the issue seems to be settled. See also the bibliography in Sherk 1969: 243.
(Syll. 3 684) announcing the steps he had taken in response to political turmoil in that city. Where Zosimos kept his city safe by making their archives more secure, a Dymeian named Sosos had plunged his city into chaos by setting fire to their archives and in some way undermining their politeia. \(^3\) The Roman proconsul decided to intervene in what he declared to be “the worst of all disturbances.” \(^4\) In the end, Sosos’ ‘revolutionary’ activities brought the wrath of Rome down on his head, and the proconsul sentenced him to death. \(^5\) This is the rough outline of what we know about the disturbance in Dyme, but further details remain elusive and subject to dispute. What follows will focus on two primary questions: what was the cultural and political significance of ‘the archives’ as an institution of the Greek polis, and, in light of the answer to that, what was happening in Dyme? To offer an answer to the first will require us to appeal to our relatively sparse evidence for archives in the literary record, as well as to the roughly contemporary proposal to reform archival practice in Paros. To suggest an answer to the second, we will turn to a potential parallel for trouble in Dyme: the somewhat earlier dossier of correspondence between Philip V and the city of Larisa. \(^6\)

### 3.2 Dyme in 144 BCE

The polis of Dyme was, at one time, a relatively prominent member of the Achaean confederacy. They, perhaps more than any other Greek city, were very tightly allied with Philip V of Macedon in the late third and early second centuries. \(^7\) That loyalty was mutual. When Dyme was captured in the first Macedonian war, the Roman commander Sulpicius Galba sold the inhabitants of the city into slavery; they were rescued and restored to their city by the intercession of the Macedonian king. Later, when the Achaean League was on the verge of abandoning alliance with Philip in favour

\(^3\) Syll. 3 684.8-11.  
\(^4\) Syll. 3 684.9.  
\(^5\) Syll. 3 684.12.  
\(^6\) The Paros inscription was first published by Lambrinudakis and Wörrle 1983 (= SEG 33.679).  
\(^7\) Pausanias, 7.17.5 goes so far as to say that they were directly dependent on Macedon.
of a treaty with Rome, the delegates from Dyme were among the handful of those who stormed out of the meeting in protest. Eventually the people of Dyme returned to active participation in the Achaean League, even supplying one of the more prominent generals. A citizen of Dyme, Aristainos, is mentioned in the surviving text of Polybius as one the the generals of the Achaean League and the opponent of Philopoemen in a debate about how best to deal with Roman power. Aristainos serves as a foil in the debate, but he is generally treated as an intelligent and upstanding statesman. His only fault is that he is too willing to bend to the will of Rome in all things—a clear break from their earlier opposition to Roman advances. Beyond a prominent role in the administration of the Achaean League, Dyme rarely appears in the history of the Hellenistic world. Were it not for a letter to that city from the Roman consul, it would be unlikely to attract scholarly attention or comment. Even when discussing the letter, affairs in the city of Dyme are only a secondary concern. Most commentators on the letter are far more interested in what it tells us about the nature of Roman provincial administration: did the governor of Macedon have direct supervision over affairs in Greece, and does that, by extension, mean that the whole of Greece was administered as a province in the wake of the Achaean war? This chapter sets out to correct that balance. For the sake of ease, we will reproduce the text of the letter here:

Επὶ θεοκόλου Λέονος, γραμματέ

8 Livy, 32.22.8.
9 Cf. Gruen 1976: 32-3. This passage will be discussed in greater detail below.
10 Polybius, 24.11.
11 See the bibliography collected by Kallet-Marx 1995a: notes 3-5 and, more recently, Champion 2007. Even Champion 2007, which at least ostensibly is focused on Dyme, is still a study of how that city (and other contemporary cities) contributed to the expansion of Roman imperium. Kallet-Marx, even in a section devoted to the causes and course of the unrest in Dyme, lavishes more attention on the Roman settlement of Greece after 146 than on the history of Dyme itself.
12 The text here is that of Kallet-Marx 1995a: 131. His text was, self-consciously, very conservative (for reasons that we will touch on below). The more recent edition of Rizakis 2008: #5 (pp. 55-6) is much less conservative. Rizakis restores “καὶ ταραχὴς καὶ τασκασίων” in l. 13. The supplement does not significantly impact our understanding (Fabius' remarks in l. 15 also hint at broader implications for the stasis in Dyme), but there are other, equally plausible options for both gaps. The point that is important, and which we will discuss further below, is that Rizakis accepts Beasley's restoration of “καὶ χρε[οκοπίας οἰκεία]” in ll. 14-5. Rizakis offers no positive arguments for preferring this restoration, nor any counter-argument to Kallet-Marx 's extensive case against it.
When Leon was *theokolos* and Stratokles was the secretary of the synod. Quintus Fabius Maximus, son of Quintus and the Roman proconsul to the magistrates, council and city of the Dymaiians, greetings. Kyllanios and the councillors with him have appeared before me and informed me of the wrongs that have been committed in your city—I am speaking here about the burning and destruction of the *archeon* and the public records, in which Sosos, the son of Tauroomenes, seems to have been the leader of the whole disturbance, and also to have drafted the laws which are contrary to the *politeiai* restored to the Achaeans by Rome. I have gone through these matters individually with my *concilium* in Patrai. Since the people doing these things seem to me to cause the worst kind of chaos... and lack of relations with each other... but also contrary to the freedom returned to all the Greeks and our own preference. Since the accusers have presented verifiable evidence that Sosos was the instigator of these deeds, and drafted legislation that undermined the *politeia*, I judge him to be liable to the death penalty, and the same with [...]*miskos*, the son of Echisthenes, one of the *damiourgoi* involved in the burning of the *archeon* and the public records, which he himself admitted. Timotheos, the son of Nikeas, who was a drafter of laws along with Sosos, since he seems to have committed a lesser wrong... to be taken to Rome as a hostage, with an oath that he will appear there by the first day of the ninth month, and will present himself to the peregrine
praetor, and not return home until...

We know very little about the disturbance in Dyme, other than how it ended. On the one hand, this does not seem to have been a true revolution or civil war. The proconsul does not refer to a _stasis_ (civil war) or a _neoterismos_ (revolution); instead, he speaks of a great _synchusis_ (a disruption or disturbance).13 On the other hand, lest we think this was a minor matter going no further than limited destruction of public property and some grandstanding in the assembly, the proconsul treated it very seriously, calling it the worst state of affairs and sentencing the ringleader to death.14 We must be cautious about drawing conclusions about what happened in Dyme based solely on the proconsul's response. As Champion has shown, we should not underestimate the ability of Kyllanios, the citizen of Dyme who appealed to Fabius, and his allies to use Roman power as a weapon in local politics.15 In the end, even Fabius' severity in dealing with Sosos and the son of Echesthenes can be balanced by his (seemingly) lenient treatment of Timotheos, who was deeply involved in the political movement.16 On the question of how serious the trouble in Dyme was, almost all of our evidence can be made to cut both ways.

The proconsul's outrage and the difference in the sentences handed down to Sosos and Timotheos raise an interesting question. Why should Rome think that the destruction of public property (in all probability without serious violence or resistance, else we could expect to hear of it)

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13 Though see Fuks 1984: 284-5, who considered Sosos a successful revolutionary who was even able to establish an interim government in his city before being ousted by Roman intervention.
14 Syll. 3 684.23.
15 Champion 2007a. In re-reading this document a final time before officially submitting this dissertation, I was struck by the realization that I (and all other commentators on this text) had made an unfounded assumption about this text: that Kyllanios and the councillors with him were Sosos' enemies, and had appealed to the proconsul for help in putting an end to his machinations. Nothing in Fabius' letter demands this conclusion. It is entirely possible (if less plausible) that Fabius was informed of events in Dyme by another source, and that he summoned Kyllanios and the councillors to answer for events in their city. If this were the case, it would change our picture of the relationship between the principals in this affair, and of the character of Kyllanios. Rather than being a conservative opponent of a disruptive political movement, he (and the councillors with him) may simply be men ready to offer one of their fellows as a scapegoat to save their own skin and prevent Roman reprisal against their city.
16 The first two are to be executed, seemingly for their role in destroying the archives, while Timotheos is spared because all he did was draft laws that overturned the Roman-approved _politeia_.


was a far greater crime than drafting laws in opposition to the stated will of Rome a mere two years
after the Achaean war? Our working hypothesis will be that there was some reason for the proconsul's
harshness on the one hand, and leniency on the other, and that it may have been driven by the nature of
the buildings destroyed. That is, there may be some reason why the destruction of the public archives
was considered a terribly heinous act.\textsuperscript{17} The two questions that we will focus on here are: what was
Sosos' goal, and how was the destruction of the archives supposed to help him achieve it? The
currently accepted answers to these questions, that Sosos' goal was to overthrow an oligarchic
constitution imposed on his city by Rome, and that he attacked the archives (which were chiefly a
repository of loan agreements, contracts and mortgages) as part of a program of cancelling debts and
redistributing wealth, seem to be founded on insufficient evidence.\textsuperscript{18}

For both questions, our most important evidence falls right before the lacuna at the end of line
14 of Fabius' letter. The Roman governor seems to be summarizing the deleterious effects of Sosos'
activities and of the burning of the archives in particular. Speaking generally, it seems to have plunged
the city into the worst kind of chaos (ll.12-13). The specific impact(s) of the disturbance are
unfortunately lost, and the traces that remain are open to multiple interpretations. None dispute that the
more complete portion of l. 14 should be restored as: “της πρότις έλληλου[ς] ἀλλήλα[λω]άν[α]ίτα[ς] καὶ,”
though what that phrase means is less clear. The next sequence begins with “καὶ XPE” but what (if
anything) should be restored between that and ἀλλὰ in the following line (15) is subject to dispute.
Before Kallet-Marx 1995a, most had accepted Beasley's proposed restoration of “χρεωκοπίας οἰκεία,”
meaning “suited to the cancellation of debts/mortgages.”\textsuperscript{19} Once that has been introduced, πρότις

\textsuperscript{17} The vandals destroyed the \textit{archeion} and the \textit{demosion grammata}. Theoretically this could refer to two separate acts.
The \textit{archeion} is simply the building where the archons conduct their business, but it was commonly adopted as a place to
store and preserve public documents and came to be synonymous with the archives themselves at an early date (Dareste
1882), so it is equally likely that there was only a single act of destruction.
\textsuperscript{18} The bibliography of the question is discussed immediately below.
\textsuperscript{19} Kallet-Marx 1995a: 133 traces this interpretation of the document back to the early edition of Beasley 1900.
ἀλλήλου[ς] ἀσυναλλαξία[ς] is interpreted as meaning a similar cancellation or voiding of contracts, and Sosos' movement quickly becomes a kind of proto-socialist uprising in which he led the dispossessed of his city to overturn the oligarchic constitution forced on them by Rome.20

This interpretation of the affair in Dyme is problematic in two ways. The first, and ultimately intractable, problem is that we have no way of knowing how closely Fabius' summary of events, even if it were undamaged, matched the reality in Dyme. We have to allow for the possibility that either Kylianios and his fellows stretched the truth to win the governor's favour, or that Fabius has chosen to misrepresent events for reasons of his own. The second problem is that χρε[οκοπίας οἰκ[εία]α may not be the best choice to fill this gap. Kallet-Marx argued against this restoration. More recently Rizakis has returned to printing χρε[οκοπίας οἰκ[εία]α, but without addressing any of the arguments against it raised by Kallet-Marx in 1995.21 Kallet-Marx' primary objection to this restoration was that it was not based on any evidence internal to the stone: nothing in the remaining letter forms required it (and in fact there are some factors which tell against it), nor did anything in the rest of the document imply that this is what we should find here. The supplement was offered and adopted primarily because it fit with what we assumed to be the historical reality: that is, we assume that internal turmoil was a matter of the poor rising up against the rich, and that the abolition of debts is suited to that agenda, therefore we restore the inscription according to those assumptions. Those restorations, though, become the only evidence in support of the thesis that there was a “class struggle” playing out in Dyme, which makes the argument circular. It is precisely this kind of potentially circular argument that Rizakis invokes to

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20 Again, see the bibliography collected in Kallet-Marx 1995a. To that can be added Brodersen 1999, Davies 2003, Champion 2007a and Rizakis 2008. It is worth noting that the extent of our evidence for Roman-imposed oligarchy at this date is Pausanias (7.16.9), who tells us that the Romans imposed a property census requirement for holding magistracies.

21 Rizakis 2008: 56-9 is aware of Kallet-Marx, but is content with an appeal to collective authority, saying that χρεοκοπίας οἰκεία is the restoration chosen by “l'ensemble des commentateurs” (56), or “la majorité des savants” (59).
dismiss Kallet-Marx. In what follows, we will briefly rehearse the arguments against restoring
\( \chi\rho\epsilon[\omega\kappa\omicron\pi\alpha\zeta \, \text{o}i|\kappa\varepsilon|\alpha] \) here, and will go through the external evidence in favour of seeing Dyme's civil strife as a question of debt-relief. What we will ultimately find is that neither the restoration, nor such an interpretation of Dyme's troubles, is likely to be correct.

Taking the question of the restoration first, even if we set aside any concerns about circularity, restoring \( \chi\rho\epsilon[\omega\kappa\omicron\pi\alpha\zeta \, \text{o}i|\kappa\varepsilon|\alpha] \) is problematic. The first and perhaps most serious problem with this restoration is that the word \( \chi\rho\epsilon\omega\kappa\omicron\pi\alpha\iota \) is otherwise unattested in Greek until the Augustan age, a full century after Fabius sent his letter to Dyme. A further, though somewhat weaker, objection to this restoration is that it introduces a certain degree of awkwardness to the syntax of Fabius' letter. \( \dot{\alpha}\sigma\nu\alpha\lambda\lambda[\alpha]\xi[\iota] \) is a noun denoting a condition or state of affairs, while \( \chi\rho\epsilon\omega\kappa\omicron\pi\alpha\iota \) is an action or event.

Beasley's supplement forces us to construe them in parallel, and have them dependent on the same adjective (\( \text{oik\varepsilon}i\alpha) \). The construction is, perhaps, unusual, but could be forgiven in a Roman proconsul for whom Greek is a second language. Kallet-Marx prefers (for reasons we will discuss immediately below) a phrase beginning with \( \chi\rho\epsilon\iota\alpha \), meaning 'business', which also fits the letters remaining on the stone. Looking only at the lacuna itself, the arguments against restoring \( \chi\rho\epsilon[\omega\kappa\omicron\pi\alpha\zeta \, \text{o}i|\kappa\varepsilon|\alpha] \) are that it centres on a word that does not otherwise appear in Greek for another hundred years, and that it creates some syntactical difficulty. The only argument in its favour is that it would fit. If we expand to consider the rest of the line, Kallet-Marx' case only becomes stronger.

The closest thing to internal evidence for the cancellation of debts in Dyme (and hence for the supplement) is the phrase immediately preceding the lacuna, \( \pi\rho[\dot{\alpha}]\xi \, \dot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\iota\lambda\omega[\varsigma] \, \dot{\alpha}\sigma\nu\alpha\lambda\lambda[\alpha]\xi[\iota] \).

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22 Rizakis 2008: 59: “Cette analyse... va contre le bon sens et aussi à l'encontre d'une pratique révolutionnaire courante qui trouve des parallèles en Achaïe même.” Those parallels, or other examples of this revolutionary practice are not cited, but the most likely candidates will be discussed below.
which, speaking broadly, has been taken to refer to a general voiding of contracts.\(^\text{26}\) In translating the phrase this way, there is an even greater danger of circularity; there is little reason, outside of association with an assumed cancellation of debts, to believe that it refers to any such thing.\(^\text{27}\) The word \(\acute{\sigma}ναλλαξία\) is very rare indeed. In fact, it appears only twice in the whole of the literary and documentary record: here and in Stobaeus' Anthology. In Stobaeus, \(\acute{\sigma}ναλλαξία\) is a vice, one that is the opposite of \(eυσυναλλαξία\), which can mean both adhering to the terms of contracts, and, in a more general sense, adhering to the norms of social interaction.\(^\text{28}\) Close cognates of \(\acute{\sigma}ναλλαξία\) appear in several other equally ambiguous contexts, and a few of them seem particularly relevant to the case at hand. One is a Cretan decree in honour of foreign judges (\(I.\ Cret.\ 1.19.3\ [ca.\ 100\ BCE]\)). The people of Malla honoured judges sent to them by Knossos and Lyttos, who ended a particularly acute civil disturbance: οἶτινες παραγενόμενοι καὶ ἀναλαβόντες τὰ ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων διεφθαρμένα, τὰν τε κτησίων καὶ τῶν ποτ’ ἀλλάλος συναλλαγμάτων πάντων ἐν ταραχῇ τε και διχοστασίαι ταί μεγίσται κειμένων ("they arrived and restored the whole of our affairs, which had been corrupted, when all of our possessions and contracts/relations with each other were in chaos and there were the most serious divisions [between our citizens]"").\(^\text{29}\) In this example, we certainly have evidence for economic troubles, but we also have a polis that is suffering from the "the most serious divisions." The construction suggests that \(συναλλαγμάτων\) should be connected to κτησίων, which could imply that in this case we are dealing with some mass cancellation of contracts or financial agreements. Even so, in

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26 Those taking this to imply the voiding of contracts include Ferrary 1988: 188 and n. 222, Asheri 1969: 97, Fuks 1970: 287, Rizakis 2008 and a few others. Kallet-Marx 1995a: 134-7 and Bagnall and Derow 2004: 94 come down on the other side. Garlan 1978 explores Thucydides' use of \(eυσυναλλαξία\) and its cognates to signify reconciliation between warring (or merely hostile) cities through treaties. This is unlikely to be the meaning here, unless we wish to believe that Fabius' letter is obscuring a Dymeian civil war, which was subsequently settled by a truce, and that Sosos' activities now threatened that truce.

27 In this we might be able to detect the influence of Cicero's political thought, i.e. that the cancellation of debts would lead to a complete breakdown of \(fīdes\) (\(De\ Officiis,\ 2.72-85\)).

28 Kallet-Marx 1995a: 135, working from Stobaeus, 2.7.25.

29 \(I.\ Cret. 1.19.3.16-19\).
the Cretan example we seem to hear nothing of a cancellation of debts that we could associate with this
nullification of contracts and agreements. We must face the possibility that the “most serious
divisions/insurrections” the city suffered were actually the cause of economic turmoil, rather than vice-
versa.

If we turn to the literary sources, two passages call for comment here, since Kallet-Marx
adduced them in support of his interpretation of the inscription.\textsuperscript{30} The first comes from Aristotle's
\textit{Rhetoric}, and is an example of an argument that can deployed in forensic speech for a case involving
contracts. If one's opponent seeks to break a contract, Aristotle advises his reader to argue that ignoring
one contract undermines the authority of all contracts, and that since the law is a kind of contract, it
undermines the laws of the state as well.\textsuperscript{31} This can be augmented by pointing out that ἐὰν ἰὲ πράττεται
tὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὡστε ἀκόρον γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ
πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων (“and the majority of interactions, and even the voluntary ones,
are conducted according to contracts, so that if the authority of contracts is undermined, it eliminates
mankind's normal interactions with one another”).\textsuperscript{32} In this example, συναλλαγμάτα are not contracts,
but the kind of normal interactions and transactions that are often regulated by contracts. Following
this usage, ἀσυναλλαξία would be a symptom of nullifying contracts, not that nullification itself. It is
also worth noting that, for Aristotle, this state of affairs is connected to undermining the laws of the
polis (of which Sosos stands accused [II.8-10]), and not to the cancellation of debts (which does not
appear in Fabius' letter).

In Dionysius of Halicarnassus' \textit{Roman Antiquities}, a state of ἀσυναλλαξία is associated with
debt-relief. During the first flare-up of the struggle of the orders (494 BCE) the indebtedness of many

\textsuperscript{30} Kallet-Marx 1995a: 135.
\textsuperscript{31} Aristotle, \textit{Rhetoric}, 1376b.
\textsuperscript{32} Aristotle, \textit{Rhetoric}, 1376b.
plebeians became a serious issue, as those who were most deeply in debt refused to perform military service. This state of affairs sparked a debate in the senate over whether the state should intervene to nullify those debts. Appius Claudius Sabinus spoke against a remission of debts (χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς), calling it an ill-considered gift to the poor: δι’ ἣν ἀσυναλλακτος ὁ κοινὸς ἔσται βίος καὶ μισάλληλος καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων χρεῶν, ὅν χωρίς οὐκ ἐνεστὶν οἰκείσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἐνδεής (“through which communal life becomes devoid of intercourse, full of hatred for one another and comes to lack those necessary functions (those that meet the requirements of nature), without which is is not possible to live in poleis”).

In this example, ἀσυναλλαξία is a condition that may follow upon the cancellation of debts, but is still merely a breakdown in the normal interactions between citizens, not the kind of formal nullification of contracts that would be part of a redistribution of wealth. Using the phrase πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀσυναλλαξίας as evidence that Sosos' movement had a socio-economic agenda, or as an argument that the lacuna in II.14-5 should be filled with χρ[ε[οκοπίας ο[ι[κε[ία] is ultimately misguided.

A nullification of contracts is only one of the possible meanings for the phrase, and one that finds no support elsewhere in the document. If anything, the similarity in wording between Fabius' letter, Aristotle's advice for orators, and Dionysius' dramatic debate would seem to be an argument in favour of restoring some form of the word χρεία (meaning relationships, business, affairs or interactions) at the beginning of the gap, since a breakdown of this seems to be closely associated with a state of ἀσυναλλαξία.

There is no evidence internal to Fabius' letter that suggests Dyme's troubles were connected to a

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33 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 5.66.3. The speeches of Claudius, and his opponent Valerius must be treated even more carefully than usual. The normal defence in these matters, that what they say should at least plausibly reflect what the author thinks is normal and reasonable, may not apply. The Claudian gens was famously hostile to the common people, and the man pushing for debt forgiveness was Marcus Valerius, whom Dionysius further identifies by saying: "he was the son of Publius Valerius, one of those who had overthrown the tyranny (of Tarquin) and had been given the name 'Publicola' because of his good will to the people (τὸ δήμοικόν)." We may be in the realm of caricature, or ideal types, rather than reasonable debate.
program of debt-relief, but even those who accept that find it difficult to believe that private debts were not the real issue.\textsuperscript{34} In terms of evidence that is external to Fabius' letter, there are two primary comparanda that might lead us to see a kind of 'socialist' movement in Dyme: the reforms of Agis and Cleomenes of Sparta and our extremely fragmentary evidence for the Achaean general Kritolaos' efforts to finance the war against Rome. Plutarch's \textit{Life of Agis} seems, at least superficially, to align with what little we know of Dyme. The core of Agis' supporters were the young men of Sparta. They were eager for revolution primarily because they were economically and politically marginalized. Years of systemic abuse of Sparta's inheritance laws had left many nominally freeborn men completely landless and burdened with debts they could never repay. The centrepiece of Agis' reforms was a radical redistribution of landed wealth to both the young Spartiates and a large number of \textit{perioikoi} who would also be enrolled as citizens. The latter portion of the king's plan never came to fruition. To accomplish it, we are told, he thought he needed the support of the wealthy, or at least a significant portion thereof. He planned to win that support by a complete cancellation of debts, since many of the largest landholders were also deeply indebted.\textsuperscript{35} The debts were cancelled in spectacular fashion. When the day came, the Spartans "brought together all of the loan contracts in Sparta, which are traditionally called 'klaria', and piling them up in the agora, they burned them all in a single bonfire."

\textsuperscript{36} The lenders watched this sullenly, while one man, who had just borrowed an enormous sum of money, gloated that it was the purest and brightest flame that he had ever laid eyes on.\textsuperscript{37} Agis was deposed and executed before he finished the task of redistributing landed wealth.

\textsuperscript{34} E.g. Davies 2003: 330.
\textsuperscript{35} He was counselled to take this course by Agesilaos, a wolf in sheep's clothing. Agesilaos led the king to believe that this move would win him support, and that his program would cause less upheaval if it was carried out in parts. In truth, Agesilaos was hoping to profit himself.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Agis}, 13.4: καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρεώστων γραμματεῖα συνενέγκαντες εἰς ἁγοράν, ἀ κλάρια καλοῦσι, καὶ πάντα συνθέντες εἰς ἐν συνέπηραν.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Agis}, 13.4. Agesilaos prevents Agis from carrying through the redistribution of wealth and the young king is deposed and executed before he is ever able to achieve his ultimate goal. A generation later, when Cleomenes actually does undertake a redistribution of landed wealth, he has no need for a public and cathartic cancellation of debts.
The similarities between Sosos’ activities in Dyme and Agis’ program in Sparta, so far as we know, are superficial at best: in both cities there was turmoil, and records were burned. The case is hardly conclusive, but it does also fit with Greek (and more modern, Marxist-influenced) ideas about the kind of things that revolutionaries do. The most apt example of this can be found in the fragments of Polybius’ thirteenth book. According to Polybius, in 206 BCE, many Aetolians found themselves heavily indebted because of constant warfare and luxurious living.\(^\text{38}\) This, combined with their natural bent toward innovation, led them to choose legislators who were themselves in some financial distress.\(^\text{39}\) In discussing the incident, Polybius associates debts with a desire to change τῆς οἰκείας πολιτείας. How we should interpret that phrase or the incident as a whole is unclear.\(^\text{40}\) We have no real evidence here for the content of the proposed innovations in legislation. There is no mention of them proposing a program of debt-relief; all we know is that a certain Alexander ‘the Aetolian’ argued that their plan could be dangerous, and that they should not make light of their current agreements/relationships (τῶν ἐνεστῶτων συναλλαγμάτων).\(^\text{41}\)

What emerges most clearly from these fragments are Polybius’ own ethnic and class prejudices. The Aetolians attempt such a course because they are naturally predisposed to revolution, and because they have (apparently all) bankrupted themselves by living beyond their means. We have no real evidence that they actually implemented such a course of action; we have only a fragment that suggests

\(^{38}\) On the date see Walbank 1967: 20 and 413. Polybius, 13.1.2: Ὅτι Λιτωλοὶ διὰ τῇ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν πολέμων καὶ διὰ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τῶν βιων ἔλαθον οὐ μόνον ἄλλους, ἄλλα καὶ σφάς αὐτοὺς κατάρχοις γενηθέντες. διόπερ οἰκείως διακείμενοι πρὸς καινοτομίαν τῆς οἰκείας πολιτείας εἶλοντο νομογράφους Δωρίμαχον καὶ Σκόπαν, θεωροῦντες τούτους κατὰ τέ τὰς προαίρεσις κινητικώς υπάρχοντας καὶ κατὰ τὰς οὐσίας ἐνδεδειμένους εἰς πολλὰ τῶν βιωτικῶν συναλλαγμάτων.

\(^{39}\) Walbank 1967: 418 construes οἰκείως διακείμενοι πρὸς καινοτομίαν as indicating a general disposition, rather than something provoked by the current situation.

\(^{40}\) We must use even greater care because we may be dealing with an example of Polybius’ more generalized prejudices against the Aetolians. On Polybius’ well-known disdain for the Aetolians, see the bibliography collected by Sacks 1975: 92 n. 1 or Champion 2007b: 362. Neither Sacks nor Champion, who are both arguing that Polybius is less hostile to the Aetolians than is usually thought, doubts that he is still generally hostile to them.

\(^{41}\) Polybius, 13.1a. On the possibility that this Alexander is actually Alexander ‘the equal,’ and the richest man in Aetolia, see Walbank 1967: 418.
they wanted to and were met with counter-arguments from their wiser citizens.\textsuperscript{42} Even if Polybius' text were complete at this point, we might well have reservations about the motives and habits that he assigns to the Aetolians from the end of the third century.\textsuperscript{43} Those who sought to change the laws were men who were themselves compromised because of their luxurious lifestyle and because they were naturally predisposed to being troublemakers—qualities they apparently share with all of their countrymen. If this is what Polybius thinks of Aetolians, he is hardly likely to be offering us an objective account of their domestic troubles.

Our evidence that debts and economic inequality were a problem in Dyme is even more tenuous, and dates to the end of the Achaean War. Polybius says that once the war began in earnest, the Achaean general Kritolaos went from city to city urging the magistrates not to act against any debtors or to take someone to prison on account of debts, and to make all contributions permanent until the end of the war.\textsuperscript{44} Likewise, Pausanias tells us that after the war, the Romans put an end to democratic government by establishing a minimum property requirement for magistrates.\textsuperscript{45} If we take both at face value, although there are reasons why we should not, we could see Sosos' movement as a rejection of Roman interference: a return to the earlier policy of cancelling debts and a restoration of democracy. This is almost certainly far too hopeful a reading. Even if we close our eyes to the fact that Polybius is actively invested in blackening Kritolaos' name, he does not say that there was actually a league-wide policy of cancelling debts. In the first place, this was not an official policy. It was not formally

\textsuperscript{42} Walbank 1967: 418.
\textsuperscript{43} And of course there is always the possibility that Polybius' text is influenced by tensions in Rome, depending on what we assume to be the date of its composition, and how frequently he revised it. On Polybius' potentially evolving view of Rome, see Walbank 2002: 193ff; on the chronology of Polybius composition, see Walbank 1957: 292-7.
\textsuperscript{44} Polybius, 38.11.10. Kritolaos' proposed program of debt-relief would not be entirely unique. Ephesus passed a similar measure when threatened by Mithridates (\textit{Syll.} \textsuperscript{2} 742). The Ephesians took care to avoid any appearance of the kind of demagoguery that Kritolaos was (according to Polybius) engaged in. The demos first called on their senior magistrates (the generals, the secretary of the council and the \textit{proedroi}) to draft legislation in response to the emergency, and the magistrates introduced the legislation collectively, which lends it an air of consensus.
\textsuperscript{45} On the problems with taking Pausanias' evidence at face value, see Kallet-Marx 1995b: 68ff.
adopted or even discussed by the League assembly, nor was it presented as an order from the strategos. Kritolaos merely visited several cities on a campaign to whip up anti-Roman sentiment—we do not know how many or if Dyme was one of them—and as part of his stump speech he recommended that no one be imprisoned for debts until the war was over. We do not know if any cities actually adopted that as policy, only that Kritolaos agitated for it. It is also worth noting that Kritolaos, even though Polybius paints him as the worst of demagogues,\textsuperscript{46} does not advocate an outright cancellation of debts, only that demands for payment of loans should be stayed until the conclusion of the war. In other words, if we think Sosos was trying to abolish all debts and contracts, that would mean that he enacted a plan far more revolutionary than the worst slander that Polybius can dredge up against one of the villains of his history.

To suggest that Sosos' activities are the result of tensions that Kritolaos first exploited would be a very great stretch. We would have to assume that Polybius has accurately and dispassionately described the Achaean general's actions, even though it is his belief that it was Kritolaos' own duplicity which led the Achaean s to disaster.\textsuperscript{47} We must further assume that Kritolaos was actually responding to incipient tensions, rather than simply making generic promises, and finally that the catastrophic war and subsequent political re-organization that Dyme and other Achaean cities underwent (assuming, of course, that Dyme was one of the cities Kritolaos visited) did little to alter the city's economic circumstances. That is a large leap of faith, and it seems preferable to treat the story of Kritolaos' economic policy with the same caution as the story of the Aetolians in book 13. It is most valuable as

\textsuperscript{46} Polybius (38.11.1-6) is actively trying to shift blame away from the majority of Greeks. He tells us that Kritolaos was able to convert his post as general of the Achaean League into something more like a tyranny, that he intentionally provoked the war with Rome for no reason and that he sought to violate the laws of gods and men.

\textsuperscript{47} Polybius 38.5 argues that the Greeks as a whole were guilty only of ignorance, while their leaders deceived them into committing grave injustices. Polybius does explicitly swear off any attempt at offering an apology, or 'casting a veil' over the wrongs committed by the Greeks (38.6.2), but this is easily reconciled with his program of blaming Kritolaos and Diaios.
evidence that this was a common way to slander one's political enemies. As such it was the sort of thing Kyllanios might have said to the proconsul, even if it were not strictly true.

Invoking Pausanias as evidence that the people of Dyme (along with the rest Achean cities) had a new, oligarchic constitution thrust on them by Rome after the war is equally problematic. The geographer says that in the wake of the Achaean war, Rome altered the constitutions of the cities of mainland Greece, putting an end to democracy and enforcing a property census for magistrates.\(^4^8\) There are two major problems with taking this as an explanation for why Sosos may have undermined or altered Dyme's *politeia*. The more substantial problem is that it does not seem to match with the evidence of the letter itself. Fabius does not say that Sosos undermined a *politeia* that was established, or granted to Dyme by Rome, but rather one that had been restored (*apodidomi*) to them and the rest of the Achaean cities. There have been several attempts to reconcile this with Pausanias. The most common is to suggest that Rome imposed an oligarchic system of government on the Greeks in 146 BCE, but that their traditional democratic systems had been restored by 144 BCE.\(^4^9\) This would be a very rapid reversal of policy on the part of the Romans, if less than two years after introducing changes so extreme that they had to rely on Polybius himself to remain behind in Greece and help the Achaean cities accustom themselves to their new *politeia*, they undid all of his work by restoring the old system.\(^5^0\) It stretches credulity far less to resign ourselves to the possibility that one (or both) of Pausanias and Fabius is not telling the complete truth: Pausanias' one-sentence comment may be ill-informed or tendentious, and Fabius may be diplomatically obscuring the truth of Roman intervention. Once we accept that Pausanias may be unreliable, we have little reason to believe that undermining a *politeia* restored by Rome' would have been part of a 'populist' or 'socialist' program that centred on

\(^4^8\) Kallet-Marx 1995a: 143 seems to accept Pausanias' statement as possible, but acknowledges that it is both tendentious and unreliable. Kallet-Marx 1995b: 69ff is more sceptical.

\(^4^9\) Ferrary 1988: 190 with notes.

\(^5^0\) Polybius, 39.5.2.
cancelling debts and contracts.

All of this returns us to where we began. We have no compelling evidence, either internal to the document or external, that suggests Sosos was leading any kind of socialist revolution. Attempts to find evidence for it in the text of Fabius' letter are almost inevitably circular: the evidence for it can only exist if we already assume it to be true. Our external evidence is no more promising. Our only evidence for Dyme even having an oligarchic constitution to overthrow is in apparent conflict with what we read in Fabius' letter, and any hint that the citizens of Dyme had a problem with personal debts is tangential and tendentious at best. We have only a passage in Polybius saying that one Achaean politician recommended a temporary moratorium of legal action to collect debts during war time, and an extremely superficial similarity to the reforms of Agis in Sparta (both involved burning records of some kind). None of this, of course, makes it impossible that Sosos' program involved debt relief in some way, much less that Kyllanios could have accused him of such ambitions to alarm the proconsul, but it should mean that we remain open to other possibilities. In particular, we will focus on offering an alternative reason why Sosos might wish to set fire to the public archives (beyond destroying mortgages), and an alternative explanation for his attempts to alter Dyme's politeia.

3.3 The Archives of Paros

When Sosos and his comrades fired the public archives in Dyme, they almost certainly did destroy some mortgages, loan agreements and private contracts. Depositing copies of such documents in the public archives had been a common practice since at least the end of the fourth century BCE.51

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51 From the fourth century onwards, storing private financial documents was one of the most common functions of the public archives; they were especially useful for storing documents that could become the subject of legal dispute, and therefore required some form of third-party validation. We know the most about this practice in Athens thanks to our relatively abundant supply of forensic rhetoric. By the mid-fourth century, storing private contracts in the public archives was accepted practice, and was thought to imbue them with greater authority. See Posner 1972, Rhodes 2001a and b, Davies 2003 or, at greater length, Faraguna 2000.
We must bear in mind, though, that other types of documents will have been lost as well. Copies of laws, motions of the assembly and treaties will also have been lost in the fire, and we would do well to consider the possibility that such documents may have been his primary target. We have no specifics for Dyme, but fourth-century Athens had a very robust system of public archives. Our evidence is limited to the orators, but Aeschines, for example, has much to say on the issue. In his speech against Timarchos, Aeschines calls for the reading of a decree of the assembly, complete with the record of who moved the vote and the rest of the normal preamble, an impossibility if the city did not also keep records of public, rather than merely private business. Aeschines praises the practice of keeping such records for the same reason that storing official copies of private documents is useful, because it means there is a verifiable and accurate version—one that cannot be ignored or changed when politically advantageous. These records are a big part of what makes Athenian democracy stable and functional. They took the security of those documents rather seriously as well. Let us turn our attention to Lycurgus' prosecution of Leokrates. In discussing the need for severe punishments as a form of deterrence from crime, he invokes the spectre of someone erasing the laws stored in the public archives (the Metron):

φέρε γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες, εἶ τις ἔνα νόμον εἰς τὸ Μητρῷον ἐλθὼν ἐξαλείψεις, εἰτ’ ἀπολογοῖτο ὡς οὕτων παρὰ τούτων τῇ πόλει ἑστὶν, ἄρ’ οὐκ ἄν ἀπεκτείνατ’ αὐτὸν; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι δικαίως, εἶπερ ἐμέλλετε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους σῷζειν.

Consider, men of the jury, if someone went into the Metron and erased even a single law, what if he defended himself by saying that the city was not harmed (by the loss of just one law), would you not sentence him to death? I think you would, and justly so if you plan to preserve the other laws.

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52 The bibliography on public archives is vast.
53 Aeschines, 3.75 (as well as 3.68 and other points within the speech). See also Gwatkin 1957: 139.
54 Aeschines, 3.75. It is universally accepted that not all such decrees were published on stone; some were kept on less durable materials and stored in the Metron. See, e.g., Rhodes 2001a: 38 or West 1989, which is primarily concerned with the dating formulae applied to archival copies of decrees.
55 Lycurgus, Against Leokrates, 66.
For the orators, the archives are more than a repository of mortgages; they are where the laws, and hence the stability, of the state are preserved. That message matches our meagre evidence for the trouble in Dyme. When the archives were destroyed, the city fell into a state of turmoil. Unfortunately, if we look to our literary sources for a parallel to Fabius' horror at the destruction of Dyme's archive, we find very little that post-dates the fourth century. Aristotle's *Politics*, separated from the affair at Dyme by a full century and a half, is perhaps our most explicit source. He includes a record office as one of the essential and indispensable institutions of the polis, though without really explaining why, at least at that point.\(^5^6\) Elsewhere, he points to the need for written laws and decrees. In discussing Sparta, he prophetically suggests that the ephorate has two serious problems. The first is that those chosen to be ephors were often poor men, whose venality would bring ruin on their state.\(^5^7\) The second problem, which contributes to the first, is more practical. The ephors had authority over the most important legal disputes, but in deciding them they relied on nothing more than their own judgment. That practice led to venality and errors of ignorance. It would be better, Aristotle says, if they were guided in their decisions by written laws and customs (βέλτιον κρίνειν ἄλλα κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους).\(^5^8\) The explanation for why the ephors in particular would be better judges if they acted according to laws, especially written laws, is expounded later. Aristotle tells us that, in general, when a man seeks justice, he is looking for what is impartial, and it is written laws, not personal judgements, that are impartial.\(^5^9\) No code of laws can really account for every possible eventuality; the law can be expanded as circumstance requires, but will always be insufficient in itself.\(^6^0\) The practical use that he envisions for law lies in guiding kings and magistrates to better decisions. Having a written code

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57 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1270b30. It is hard not to see the tremendous similarity between this generalizing statement and the ephor who sabotaged Agis' program of reform.
60 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1278b.
available in the archives would not make the ephors of Sparta obsolete, but would make them more efficient.

The law acts as a teacher and guide to officials in their decision making, and in typical Aristotelian fashion, he points out that while a king can only read the law with two eyes and one mind, a multitude can apply many to the task, and hence learn more.\(^\text{61}\) That it is better to trust the combined judgement of many is the basis of Aristotle's theoretical preference for democracy. We can, perhaps, see the same approach in practice in the way the people of Paros supervised their public archives. The document seems to be the response to some threat or scandal, but we have no evidence to say more than that. The city elected a commission of three men to completely overhaul its public records office. It is the text of those recommendations, not, for whatever reason, a decree adopting them, that has survived on stone.\(^\text{62}\) The proposed reforms are extensive and costly and they also give the community as whole the responsibility to supervise access to archives. The archives had been and would continue to be the responsibility of the mnemones, but the revisions would make them the responsibility of the archons too, as well as giving the assembly final say on some questions.\(^\text{63}\)

The commissioners recommended a complete overhaul that would see all documents kept in duplicate in the future, and copies made of all documents currently in the archives.\(^\text{64}\) Those copies were then to be alphabetized and stored in two different record-halls, and every year there was to be a

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\(\text{61}\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1287b.

\(\text{62}\) Lambrinudakis and Wörrle 1983: 296. The inscription, as we have it, is only a copy of their recommendation. There is no enactment formula, mention of a decree of the assembly or any of the other usual trappings of a law. It is unclear how much should be made of this omission.

\(\text{63}\) The *mnemones* are responsible for storing all original documents and for making copies, which they must present to the archons of Paros for safe-keeping (Lambrinudakis and Wörrle 1983 = *SEG* 33.679.34-40): τοὺς μνήμονας τοὺς ἐπί Νικησιφῶντος ἄρχοντας ἀναγράφαι εἰς βιβλία ἀντίγραφα πάντων τῶν μνημονικῶν γραμμάτων ἵνα ἀναφέροσιν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος καὶ τῆς Λητοῦς καὶ παραδῦναι αὕτως τοῖς ἄρχοσιν... (Those who are *Mnemones* in the archonship of Nikesipho shall make copies on papyrus of all of the Mnemetic records, which they will return to the temple of Apollo, Artemis and Leto and they will present the copies to the Archons).

\(\text{64}\) Lambrinudakis and Wörrle 1983 = *SEG* 33.679.32-38.
public ceremony to mark the chain of custody, as one year's magistrates pass them on to the next.65
Investing the chief magistrates of the city with responsibility for safeguarding the archives and
reaffirming that stewardship each year was symbolic of the interest the community as a whole took in
the security of their documents, but their interest went beyond the symbolic. One of the first of the
commission's recommendations is that all citizens of Paros make the community as a whole responsible
for restricting access to the archives. The whole of the citizen body is enjoined to help the magistrates
prevent illicit tampering. Any citizen who sees or hears about such a crime must report it immediately,
or be subject to the same penalties as the forger.66 The assembly was also put in charge, or at least
given supervision, of legal access to the archives. Any man who wished to enter the hall of records to
examine the documents himself had to officially inform the archons of his wish during a sovereign
meeting of the assembly. It is not explicitly stated whether the decision was to rest with the archons or
the assembly—it may be that they did not envision putting the matter to an official vote—but there is little
doubt that in extreme cases the demos could make its wishes understood. Without the permission of
the archons and the tacit acceptance of the assembly, no one was to be allowed access.67

That final rule seems exceptionally strict, to the point where enforcing it rigorously could be a
cause of inconvenience. The population of Paros was not large, but if all wills, mortgages, loans and
contracts made by anyone in the city (and by the city itself) found their way into the archives, the
volume of documents could become very large. The number of people asking to see those documents
would have been proportionally large. With only one day per month when requests to visit the archives

65 Lambrinudakis and Wörle 1983 = SEG 33.679.52-57: εἰς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον τοῦμετὰΝικησιφόνταἀρχοντατοὺς
μνήμοναςτουςγινομένουςτὰμὲνἄλλαγράμματαδιαοναράλβωσινπαρὰτῶνπρότερονμνημόνωνἀναγράφαντας
παραδίδοναττόιαποδέκταιεἰςτὸΠύθιονκατὰτὸννόμον·(And for the rest of time, after the archonship of Nikesiphon,
those who happen to be mnemonic, having made copies the other documents that they received from the previous
mnemone, they will turn them over to the chief receiver to be stored in the Python, according to the law).
67 Lambrinudakis and Wörle 1983 = SEG 33.679.69-75.
could be made, we should expect a very large line of men waiting to see the archon at each one. As a side-effect, the restriction of access to contracts or agreements would create a severe bottleneck for any litigation. Trials, and perhaps even arbitration hearings, could not be scheduled until after all parties had received permission to enter the archives and retrieve copies of any contracts.

We cannot say whether these recommendations were ever officially adopted, or if they were rigorously enforced. Even so, the expense envisioned for the reforms and the severe punishments for tampering with the documents leave no doubt as to how seriously the Parians took the matter. It may even be fair to say that the Parians treated their documents with a kind of religious awe. The original copies of documents were stored in one of the city's most important temples. Breaking in to the archives or tampering with the documents could, and based on the strictures of their reform bill, would be treated much the same as temple robbery or destruction of sacred property. If we want to push the comparison further, we can point to something like a religious conservatism in the way records were kept. The officials who took primary responsibility for the archives are called the *mnemones*: rememberers. The name for the office recalls a time before the popular adoption of writing when important documents had to remembered, and when this was a quasi-religious role in the polis. In second-century Paros the most important function of the *mnemones*—to watch over and maintain things stored in the temple—is analogous to that of a purely religious official. Administratively, the archives

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68 The ancient Greeks, lacking our modern electronic tools for record keeping, generally chose to manually change the amount owing on a loan agreement or mortgage any time the debtor made payment. Even those loans and mortgages that never became the subject of a dispute would need to be consulted at regular intervals. The originals of all of the documents were not housed in a centrally located building. The Python, a complex that housed the temples of Apollo, Artemis and Leto (ll. 57, 61, 68, 72, and 83) was about three hundred metres outside the city walls of Paros, on the side of a mountain (Lambrinudakis and Wörle 1983: 299).

69 Given the costs involved, and the supervision of the whole of the community, we might conclude these archives were primarily meant to cover matters of interest to the state: leases of public lands, debts owed to the treasury and public contracts, as well as laws, treaties and decrees. Of course, it is also possible that causing a certain degree of inconvenience was intentional and was part of making a very visible effort at making the archives secure and reliable.

70 Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.7.22 uses laws against temple-robbery (which in Athens was the same as the law used to prosecute traitors) as an example of the extremes of legal severity.
were accorded something like the privileged status that religious matters and questions about the food supply were accorded. All three matters were to be dealt with by specific meetings of the sovereign assembly once per month, and all three were given priority. As with temple robbing or other forms of sacrilege, the community and the magistrates called the most dire curses down on the heads of anyone who would dare to illicitly tamper with the public records.71

We don't know where the archives of Dyme were stored, or whether the people of Dyme treated them with the same reverence shown by their contemporaries in Paros. That reverence would go some way toward explaining why Sosos' destruction of the archives merited the death penalty, while his collaborator Timotheos, who was responsible for drafting the laws that undermined the politeia, was merely sent to Rome, perhaps for trial.72 It is possible that destroying the archeion and demosia grammata was akin to destroying sacred property. Put another way, if Kyllanios and his friends could plausibly tell the governor that Sosos had destroyed sacred property, he could use the famous Roman desidaimonia to persecute his enemy. It would make Sosos' crime seem more worthy of death, and it would serve to convince the governor that, even after his execution, the two sides could easily be reconciled. No one would step forward to avenge the temple-robber. By the terms of the Parian recommendations, Sosos would not have been allowed any right or opportunity to defend himself, either in Dyme or before the proconsul. It may seem a minor point, but it meant that the governor could put him to death without appearing to act tyrannically. Timotheos, the nomographos, even though he

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71 For other contemporary examples of religious awe being attached to administrative matters, see Sokolowski 1980: 105 or Graham 1992: 57, both talking about the curses called down on the heads of anyone who violates the rules for appointing a phourarchos, as laid out in the terms of the sympoliteia between Teos and Abdera. Damaging or destroying sacred property was, of course, reprehensible in and of itself, and considered a breach even of the “laws of war.” See Polybius, 5.9.1, relating the story of Philip V's destruction of temples and sacred property at Thermos. See also Polybius, 16.1, for the same king's ‘outrages' against the temples of Pergamum. Thomas 1989, and Boffo 1995 both tackle the question of the authority of the documentary record from a different direction: those records and documents that were inscribed and set up for public display.

72 Syll.3 684.20-24. Logic suggests that the new constitution was equally responsible of the continued “lack of intercourse/business transactions” between citizens.
subverted Roman will, was still due a trial, so he was sent to Rome. We can make a case for taking Fabius at his (surviving) word. The destruction of the archives itself was a terrible crime, no matter the political program attached to it. By the same token, he could argue that it merited death on its own, not simply as an addendum to a charge of treason or revolution.

3.4 Literary Sources

In Paros the destruction of the public archives would have been a crisis, a political and religious failure in which the whole city was implicated. Fabius' letter may imply that the same was true in Dyme: destruction of the archives is correlated with crisis at least. Searching for a parallel example in our Hellenistic literary sources is difficult. The rules of genre keep public archives from playing a prominent role in any of the works that survive. There is little or no place for something as pedestrian as record-keeping in epic, bucolic, or poetry of any kind, even in the explicitly minor poetry of Callimachus. Greek historians traditionally focus more on great deeds, wars and the rise of empires than on the kind of quotidian events that involve a trip to the archive. The corpus of forensic rhetoric, where the archives do appear, is all fourth-century or earlier. Nonetheless, a brief survey of records and record-keeping in our surviving Hellenistic historians can offer some suggestive comparanda.

Polybius is even less interested in the public archives as an institution than our other historians. His focus, at least in those books that survive, is almost exclusively on what we might call “international” concerns: wars, treaties, alliances and the rise of empires. On those occasions when he does discuss domestic politics, it is usually with an eye to their impact on these primary concerns. That program rarely offers him an occasion to mention archives or public documents, but there are a few exceptions. The most famous is his claim to have inspected the texts of three treaties between

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73 His sixth book is the most obvious example of shifting his focus to internal concerns. Even here, though, his goal is to explain how it was that Rome could weather the disasters of the second Punic war and continue to fight (Polybius, 6.2).
Rome and Carthage, which were housed in the treasury of the quaestors in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus.\textsuperscript{74}

Polybius' interest in these documents is largely antiquarian. He provides texts of them for the sake of interest when their existence is raised in later negotiations between Rome and Carthage, and also because they offer him the opportunity to attack his literary rival, the historian Philinos. Polybius claims that the treaties are there for anyone to see, but Philinos erroneously added a fourth treaty.\textsuperscript{75} Speaking generally, it may be fair to say that when Polybius is acting strictly as a narrator of events, he has little interest in archives and documents, but when he shifts his focus to rhetoric, they reappear. We have already explored an example of this phenomenon in chapter two. The Acarnanian envoy Lykiskos urged the Spartans the keep true to their vows of friendship and alliance to the Antigonid dynasty, not least because they were publicly proclaimed and had been inscribed on stone before the eyes of all. There may be some danger here of sliding definitions, or of placing apples in the same category as oranges. The treaty is not a document on papyrus, stored safely away in the town hall; this is a visible and prominently displayed monument. That it is in the open for all to see, we must assume, is a large part of what makes it so shameful to ignore. The question we must grapple with, is whether Polybius really sees a difference between documents in archives and those which are on stone. The answer advanced here is a qualified 'no,' largely based on the Polybius' own investigations. Here we are referring to his comments about the treaties between Rome and Carthage. The treaties are stored in the treasury of the quaestors in the temple of Capitoline Jupiter; similarly, documents in Paros and Priene were archived in temples. Polybius seems to accept that these are diplomatic documents of the same

\textsuperscript{74} Polybius, 3.26.1: Τούτον δὲ τοιούτων ύπαρχόντως, καὶ τηρομένων τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν χαλκόμασι παρὰ τῶν Δία τῶν Καπετάλλων ἐν τῷ τῶν ἄγορανόμων ταμείῳ... (These (treaties) being such, and preserved even now on bronze tablets in the treasury of the quaestors, which is in the temple of Capitoline Zeus...).

\textsuperscript{75} This is precisely the kind of methodology for which Polybius censures his other rival, Timaeus, in book twelve (12.10). Polybius says that the proper training for a historian is practice and travel, not poring over documents and books.
stripe as those that the Spartans used to commemorate their alliance with the Macedonians. Likewise, Timaeus is censured for spending too much time loitering about in Athens, reading the works of previous historians and discovering stelae and proxeny decrees at the back of buildings, rather than actively travelling and questioning witnesses.\textsuperscript{76} Polybius never refers to these documents, of which Timaeus is so fond, as part of the demosion grammata, or any of the other words usually translated as 'archives'; instead he merely describes them as 'treaties' (synthekai), copies (anagraphai) or stelae. In fact, none of the words commonly translated as 'archives' appears anywhere in Polybius' text.\textsuperscript{77} It may be that Polybius simply has no concept of 'the archives' as a whole, or as a public institution. A more likely explanation for the silence though, is that Polybius simply has no interest in the contents of the archives as a whole, and instead focuses on specific documents that are relevant to his history. We are surely safe to assume that Polybius would feel the same horror at seeing a collection of laws on papyrus immolated that he expresses when laws inscribed on stone are ignored or destroyed.

There are hints of Polybius' respect for the written record in his musings on the downfall of the Achaean League.\textsuperscript{78} The League, his fragments say, waned in both power and moral rectitude because of a precipitous drop in the quality of its leaders.\textsuperscript{79} The episode is chiefly known for featuring some of the most famous and artful rhetorical set-pieces in the whole of Polybius' work. At its heart is an Achaean debate about how best to deal with the reality of Roman power. The heroes argue that it is better for the Achaeans to pursue the honourable course, so far as they can, even if it runs counter to the stated will of Rome. Those words are put into the mouth of no less a figure than Philopoemen (and elsewhere, Polybius' own father Lykortas), who argues his case with the famous wrestling simile: the Achaeans may be no match for Rome, but like a wrestler matched against a stronger opponent, they

\textsuperscript{76} Polybius, 12.10-11, and 12.25d-e.
\textsuperscript{77} At least not in a context where they clearly mean 'archives'.
\textsuperscript{78} These are primarily to be found in the fragments of book 24.
\textsuperscript{79} Polybius, 24.10.8.
should continue to resist for as long as they are able, rather than hastening their defeat by capitulating.  

On the other side of the debate, the Dyme politician Aristainos bases his argument on the famous division of policy aims into the honourable and the advantageous (to kalon kai to sumpheron). He argues that since the Achaeans do not have the strength to achieve what is honourable, they should aim at what is advantageous.  

The extremely fragmentary state of book 24 means that analyzing separate incidents side by side is dangerous, but there are obvious connections between the debate of Philopoemen and Aristainos on the one hand, and the debate between Lykortas and Kallikrates over what to do about certain Messenian exiles on the other. In 180 BCE, the Achaean League, led by Polybius' father Lykortas, brought the city of Sparta into the fold. The alliance was made possible when the Spartans themselves chose to send the faction of their populace most hostile to the Achaeans into exile. The terms of their alliance, which were inscribed on a stele and displayed, barred those exiles who were hostile to the Achaean League from ever returning to their city. Undaunted, these men then appealed to Rome and won its support for their return. When notified of the senate's will, the Achaean assembly was divided on how to proceed. Lykortas argued that they should refuse, at least temporarily, and send an embassy to Rome to point out that their order asked them to violate their “oaths, laws and the stelae by which our League is held together.” Lykortas' rival, Kallikrates, argued that they should do whatever Rome asked immediately, regardless of the laws, and when his proposal is voted down, he conspires to get himself elected as one of the envoys to the senate.

80 Polybius, 24.13.3.
81 Champion 2004: 155 sees the mere fact that the issue is being debated as a sign of the Achaean confederacy's moral collapse. In earlier times they would never have entertained the notion of ignoring their laws and treaties for the sake of expediency (cf. Polybius' digression on the virtues of the League in book 2).
82 Which leads directly to the decline in Achaean leadership.
83 Polybius, 22.17-18.
84 Polybius, 24.8. Foremost in Lykortas' mind was surely the treaty with Messene, which had very recently been inscribed on a stele (24.2). He expands the field to include other oaths and laws, all of which will have been held in written copies in various archives, either on stone or some less durable material.
Kallikrates had instructions to inform the Roman senate that their most recent decision would inevitably disgrace their allies by forcing them to renege on their obligations. Instead of making that case, he launched into a bitter and vindictive harangue of the senators.85 The heart of his speech is that there are always two parties in every democratic citizen body (demokratikais politeiais): there are those who are eager to do Rome's bidding, and those unwilling to violate their laws, oaths or stelae to do so.86 Kallikrates complained to the senate that men like himself, who are the true friends of Rome and always urge the people to act in accordance with Roman wishes, are undercut by Roman indifference. Kallikrates and his fellows are mocked and scorned, while those who oppose Rome's will by an ostentatious respect for laws and treaties are hailed as noble because Rome does nothing to intervene or demand compliance.87 Kallikrates' speech, even though Polybius prefaces it by saying that it was savage and offensive, carried the day. The senate decided to commend Kallikrates to the rest of the Greeks, urging them to emulate his (in Polybius' view) sycophantic behaviour. The senate also began to insist on strict compliance with their decisions and requests, regardless of circumstances. The result, so Polybius says, was disastrous both for the Greeks and the Romans, who thereafter had “many flatterers, but no true friends.”88

Even without attaching that coda to the incident, Polybius leaves no room for doubt as to who is the villain of the story. By extension, it is fair to assume that Polybius himself favoured the policy of his father, which was to respect the written decrees and treaties that made up the documentary record of the Achaean League. Making records and obeying their precedents was the foundation of the Achaean confederacy. The League was administered by only two kinds of magistrates, strategoi for handling

85 Polybius, 24.8.9.
86 Polybius, 24.9. Polybius' use of politeia to denote citizen bodies should be noted; it is in accordance with the new interpretation of the word in Fabius' letter which will be put forward below.
87 Polybius, 24.9.2-3.
88 Polybius, 24.10.5.
most executive responsibilities and a *grammateus*; both types of magistrate were elected annually. Like Flavius Zosimos in Priene, the *grammateus* of the Achaean League was elected to pay for, organize and preserve copies of important documents. We know little about them, but they must have been men of some account because they, along with those who had served as generals of the League, were exempted from being chosen as hostages for good behaviour. The documents the *grammateis* of the confederacy produced “held the Achaean League together.” Adhering to them was one of the foundational principles of Achaean policy. The case made by Kallikrates only calls attention to that: the people of the various cities in Greece intrinsically disliked anyone who did not pay them their due respect. When they are deprived of that option, and those documents and oaths are ignored, the result is moral and political decadence. The subtext is clear: disrespect for the documentary record correlates very strongly with political disintegration.

This implicit connection between ignoring your documentary record and political decadence is as close as we can come to understanding Polybius' thought on the subject of archives. We might expect to find more success if we turn to Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus is much more conscious of his own act of writing—he explicitly adopts the persona of a writer and completely abandons the illusion that he is a speaker. As a self-proclaimed writer, he has more interest in the moral value of 'reading' than does Polybius, or even Dionysius of Halicarnassus. At several points he offers facts and anecdotes that he thinks will be of interest to “lovers of reading” (*philanagnostai*). Among the more interesting of these is his encomium of the customs of Pharonic Egypt.

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89 Polybius, 2.43.1, as part of his encomium of the Achaean League and its constitution.
90 Polybius, 21.32.10.
91 Polybius 2.43.
92 Polybius 24.9.3.
93 Though Dionysius' history of Rome does feature one of the only seemingly explicit references to public archives (*Roman Antiquities*, 2.26).
94 Diodorus begins explicitly talking about those laws which are of interest to lovers of reading at 1.77, but the excursus begins at 1.70.
In Diodorus' Egypt, the stability of the political system is inextricably linked to their written archives. This custom also helps them to excel in war and diplomacy. Everything in the king's life, we are told, from politics to when he bathes, is governed by comprehensive laws, and every morning the royal scribes retrieve certain law scrolls to read to him in a public ceremony. This salutary practice encourages both Pharaoh and the citizens gathered to listen to act virtuously. Elsewhere, he says that their legal system functioned perfectly because everything was done in writing. Both sides of a lawsuit could present only a written brief to a judge who made his decision based on his written copy of all the laws, which were before him in eight books. Since in writing they could not be deceived, their judgements were always both just and accurate. Diodorus' Egyptians took the sanctity of written contracts and agreements even more seriously than the people of Paros did. Those caught forging or falsifying documents were punished by the loss of both of their hands. Like Polybius, Diodorus saw respect of the documentary record as a key element of a functioning polity.

3.5 Dionysius, Larisa and a Different Meaning for Politeia

Dionysius of Halicarnassus is the only Greek historian of the Hellenistic era who explicitly refers to the public archives. Much like the more oblique cases in Polybius and Diodorus, it comes in a brief discussion of what makes for a healthy and stable polity. Dionysius praises Romulus for the institution of patria potestas. By keeping young men under the control of their fathers, the Romans forced them to behave moderately and modestly in their private lives, and thus limited the opportunities for civil discord. This Roman institution, he tells us, was far better than what any of the Greek lawgivers had devised, as they variously allowed a boy to be free of his father's authority when he

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95 Diodorus, 1.71.
96 Diodorus, 1.70.
97 Diodorus, 1.75.5. They decided cases the way Aristotle thought the ephors of Sparta should do.
98 Diodorus, 1.78.5. Diodorus may even be implying that this last law was also the custom of the more Hellenized Egypt of his own day. It is connected to at least two anecdotes illustrating Egyptian ways and culture that Diodorus explicitly says he witnessed (1.83 and 1.84).
reached a certain age, when he married, or, as Solon and Charondas had done, when he went to the magistrates and had his name entered on the list in the public archive (to demesion). We need not entertain the notion that this law can be traced back to Solon, but it does not seem to match Athenian practice as we know it. Young men entered their names with the magistrates when they began their ephoric training, and only seem to have become fully independent once it was finished. We are going to focus on the assumption that underlies Dionysius’ criticism of Greek practice: that a complete and written list of all citizens was kept in the city archives.

This is what makes Dionysius valuable: he reminds us that among the more important documents kept in the archives was an official list of citizens. This bring us to a very close, but to date unexplored, comparandum for the affair in Dyme: the dossier of correspondence between Philip V and the people of Larisa. Much as Rome had (apparently) done with Dyme, Philip V suggested changes to the Larisaean politeia; the Larisaeans were initially receptive, but after some five years, a faction of their citizens rejected some of the changes. Rejecting the new politeia entailed damaging and altering the public documents that first enacted it. Philip was not pleased that his orders were being ignored, and he intervened again to insist that they be honoured. The parallel to the situation in Dyme seems quite clear, but why should this be reminiscent of Dionysius of Halicarnassus? Because here, politeia is being used in the (very common in the Hellenistic era) sense of ‘citizen body.’ The document

100 We can also leave aside questions of age-class tensions, which were discussed in the first chapter.
101 Dionysius implies that this was common practice. The most famous example are the lexiarchika grammateia of Athens, on which see, e.g., Whitehead 1986: 97ff.
102 IG IX.2 517 (214 BCE). The document seems to attract equal attention for its historical significance (cf. Brodersen 1992: #422, Bagnall and Derow 2004: #32 or Burstein 1985: #65 etc.) and as an example of the Thessalian dialect (Buck 1955: #32 and Bottin 2000: #38).
103 IG IX.2 517.26-29: πυθάνομαι τοὺς ποιητικαφηθέντας κατὰ τὴν παρ’ ἐμοῦ ἐπιστολὴν καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ ὑμέτερον καὶ ἀναγραφέντας εἰς τὰς στήλες ἐκκεκαλᾶθαι: ἔπερ ὁνὶ ἔγεγόνει τούτῳ, ἠσθοχήκειαν οἱ συνβουλεύσαντες ὑμῖν καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς κρίσεως.
104 Aristotle’s classification of constitutions (Politics 1278b) has conditioned us to translate politeia as ‘constitution’, but the word has a broader range of meanings, and, in fact, ‘constitution’ is probably not the most common one. The (or at least one of the) core meanings is ‘citizenship’ and by extension ‘citizen body’. The latter usage is, in fact, echoed in Aristotle (1274b) when he defines a defines politeia thusly: ἢ δε politeia τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκονόμων ἕστι τάξις (the politeia is the
which has been damaged is actually a list of those citizens who were enfranchised at Philip's request.

Philip's two letters and the first decree of the assembly are quoted here:

[taq]εισιώντος Ἀναγκιότοι Πεθαλείοι, Αριστονόι Εὐνομεῖοι, Ἐπιγένεος Ἰασονείοι, Εὐδίκοι[1] [Ἀδαμαντεῖοι, Ἀλέξια Κλεαρχείοι, γυμνασιαρχέντος Ἀλέξια Δαμοθενείον Φιλίπποι τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιστολὰν ἀ- [πιστεύξαντον τὸ γύρος καὶ τὸν πόλιν τὰν ὑπογεγραμμέναν· βασιλέως Φιλίππος Λαρσάι-
ον τοῖς γυμνασίοι καὶ τῇ πόλει χαιρεῖν Πετραῖος καὶ Ἀνέγκιππος καὶ Ἀριστόνος ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πρεσβείας ἐγένοντο, ἐνεργάνιζον μοι ὅτι καὶ ἡ ὑμετέρα πόλις δία τοῦς πολέμους προσδέπται πλεόνεαν οἰκεῖρον· ἐκ δὲ νῦν καὶ ἐτέ-
rους ἐπενοήσαμεν ἀξίους τοῦ παρ’ ὑμῖν πολιτείας, ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος κρίνῃ ψηφισθήσαθα ὑμῖς ὡς τοῖς κατοι-
κοῦσιν παρ’ ὑμῖν Θεσσαλῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων δοθήκει πολιτεία. τούτοις γὰρ συντελεσθέντος καὶ συμμενίπ-
tον πάντων διὰ τὰ φιλάνθρωπα πέπεισαμεν ἑτέρα τε πολλὰ τῶν χρησίμων ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τὴν
χώραν μάλλον εξεργασθήσαθαι. ἦσος ε’105 ὁ πόλις ψάφιμα τὸ ὑπογεγραμμένον. Πανάμοιο τὰ ἐκτὰ ἐπ’ ἱκάδι συνκλειστὸς γεγονέμενα, ἀγορανομένων τοὺς γυμνασίους πάν-
tον τοῖς Φιλίπποι τοῦ βασιλέως γράμματα πέμψαντο πότῳ τοῦς ταξίδων καὶ τὸν πόλιν δεκα Πετραῖος καὶ Ἀνέγκιππος καὶ Αριστόνος, ὡς ἃ τὰς πρεσβείας ἐγένονθα, ἐνεργάνιζον μοι, πόκ καὶ ἡ ἁμέμα ύμεας διὰ τὸ πολέμους πο-
tελεῖτα πλεόνεαν τῶν κατοικοῦσιν· μέσα κα ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐτέρος ἐπινοεῖσαν μέγας τοῦ πάρ ἀμι
pολιτείας, ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος κρίνῃ ψηφισθήσαθα ὑμῖς ὡς τοῖς κατοικοῦσίς πάρ ἀμι[1-]
λον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων δοθήκει ἑτέρα πολιτεία· τοῖσοι γὰρ συντελεσθέντος καὶ συμμενίπτον πά

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organization of those inhabiting the city). Politiea is also one of the most common words used to denote a grant of
citizenship. Examples are too numerous to list. For the largest collection of these documents (the ones from Athens) see
Osbourne 1981-84. For a single example close to Larisa in time and space, see IG IX.2 62 (Lamia, ca. 217 BCE), or for
one from Dyme about a century before Fabius' letter, see Syll. 531. Two other specific examples of this usage are
especially apt in this case. The first comes from Polybius, in a passage we discussed above (24.9.2). Kallikrates
complains to the senate that there are “two parties in all democratic states, those who think... nothing should take
precedence over the will of Rome, and those who apply to treaties, etc.” The Greek begins “διδυμοί γὰρ πολείτας ἔχουσιν
κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς πολιτείαις...” We can hardly assume that there are two alternative attitudes to
Rome built into each city’s ‘constitution’; rather we must be dealing with opposed factions withing the citizen body.
The second is Poltemy's letter to Cyrene (Bencivenni 2003: #5 (p. 105ff) = SEG 38.1881), in which he gives that city a
new politiea by expanding the number of citizens. This example in particular cuts to the heart of the matter. In
this case, Poltemy not only adds new citizens, but in so doing may be changing the ‘constitution’ from a narrow oligarchy to
something more democratic. In Hellenistic Greek, ‘constitution’ and the makeup and extent of the citizen body were
not separate or separable issues, which is why they both seem to be covered under the same word.

105 IG IX.2 517. The second decree of the assembly (which also parrots Philip's letter) and the list of new citizens appear
on the same stele, but need not be quoted here.

106 Habicht 1970: 277-8 noted that, although this is normally printed as a β (without even an underdot to suggest hesitation)
the letter is actually quite plainly an epsilon (the top and bottom horizontals survive, and are inconsistent with any of the
other betas on the stone).
When Anankippos son of Pethalos, Aristonous son of Eunomeios, Epigenes son of Iason, Eudikos son of Adams and Alexias son of Klearchos were the tagoi and Aleuas son of Damosthenes was the gymnasarch. The letter King Philip sent to the tagoi is copied below. King Philip to the tagoi and the city of the Larisaians, greetings. Petraios, Anankippos and Aristonous, who were sent as ambassadors, spoke with me and told me that your city was greatly lacking in inhabitants because of the wars. Until I decide that others are also worthy of your citizenship, I recommend that at the present time you pass a decree extending your citizenship (politeia) to those Thessalians and Greeks who are settled in your vicinity. When this is done and when you have been integrated by displays of good will, I believe there will be many other benefits both for me and for your city, and your territory will be more productive. Year 5, the 21st of Hyperberaitos. The decree ratified by the people is copied below. On the twenty-sixth of Panammos, when the assembly was convened under the direction of the tagoi, Since King Philip sent a letter to the tagoi and the people saying that Petraios, Anankippos and Aristonous, who were our ambassadors, met with him and told him that our city was greatly lacking in inhabitants because of the war, until he decides that others are also worthy of our citizenship, for the present he recommends that we should pass a decree extending citizen rights to those Thessalians and the other Greeks settled in the vicinity. He says that when we have done this, and we have all been integrated by displays of good will there will be many other benefits both for the city and for him, and our land will be more productive. So in this matter the citizen body (politeia) resolved to do as the king wrote and to grant citizen rights to our neighbours, the Thessalians and the other Greeks, both them and their descendants, and to extend to them all of the other rights, just as the Larisaeans enjoy, and to allow them to enrol in whichever tribe they wish. This law is to have force for all time, and the treasurers shall have it inscribed on two stone steiae, along with the names of those who have been granted citizenship, and to display one in the temple of Apollo Kerdoios, and the other on the acropolis, and the treasurers will cover the cost. And a later letter sent by King Philip to the tagoi and the polis, when Aristonous son of Eunomos, Eudikos son of Adamantos, Alexippos son of Hippolochos, Epigenes son of Jason and Nymeonios son of Mnasias were tagoi, and when Timounidas son of Timounidas was gymnasarch. King Philip to the tagoi and city, greetings. I have learned that the names of those who were enrolled as citizens according to my letter and according to your decree and inscribed on the steiae have been obliterated (chiseled out). If this is the case, those who counselled you to do it are mistaken as to what is advantageous for the city and my own preference. It would be the best thing of all if the city were to have the largest possible number of people with a share in the citizenship, and the city would be strong and the land would not be shamefully abandoned. This is how I see it and I do not think you can argue against it. You can see that other people treat newly enrolled citizens equally, and the Romans even are among these. For they even receive freed slaves into their citizen body, and allow them to hold magistracies, and in this way they have not only strengthened their own city, but have sent out colonies to nearly seventy places. And so I now ask that you come to this matter reasonably, and return those who have been excluded to the citizen body, and if someone has committed some unendurable wrong either against my kingdom or against the city, or for any other reason is not worthy of having part of this stele (i.e. of being a citizen), postpone their cases until I am able to hear them upon my return from campaign. However, those who plan to make allegations should see to it that they do not seem to act out of rivalry. Year 7, 13th of Gorpiaios.
party has anything to gain from offering too explicit an account of this affair. Nonetheless, some things are certain. The turmoil of the late third and early second centuries saw Larisa suffer some military disaster. The setback was severe enough that they found themselves with a much reduced citizen population due to either casualties or citizens emigrating to safer places. In their current state, they were no longer a viable community and did not have a population sufficient to keep their chora under cultivation (ll.5-7). In making their request for aid they may not have anticipated being asked to share their citizenship with their neighbours or local rivals. Rather than a de-facto synoikism, they may have hoped for a small number of troops, perhaps even demobilized troops who would be settled in the vicinity to help them defend themselves.108

If this was their plan, the king disappointed them. Rather than immediately bringing in new settlers from elsewhere within his realm to act as their guardians, he ordered the Larisaeans to extend their citizenship (politeia) to any and all worthy men among the other Greeks and Thessalians who lived in and around the city (ll. 6-7). He implies that new settlers will eventually be forthcoming, but two years later, at the time of the second letter, those settlers still have not arrived. Philip may even have suggested that, if they followed this course, they could expect some material aid from him in re-establishing themselves. It was a common practice for kings to offer new settlers farming equipment, specifically tools and seed-corn to help them establish themselves on their new homesteads.109 Philip makes no specific promises on this score, but only says that he believes they will enjoy many tangible benefits if they follow his plan.

107 Katoikountes is usually taken to mean military settlers, i.e. veterans from the royal army, and this may be what the Larisaeans actually wanted. It does not seem to be what they received.
109 Compare the practice of Philip's contemporary Antiochus III in settling Jews in Lydia and Phrygia (Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 14.142-153) and in refounding Lysimacheia (Appian, Syraica, 3). For further examples, see those collected by Cohen 1995: 26-7.
The people of Larisa initially complied with Philip's suggestion. The decree they passed actually made that obedience plain. Their decree begins with a reading of his letter and then goes on to tell us that they voted to adopt his suggestion, filling in extra details as needed (ll. 15-23). The overt (though by no means unusual) show of fealty to the king may be merely that—a show—or it could signal that some of the people of Larisa had mixed feelings about the plan, and only adopted it because it was the king's will. This kind of passive-aggressive protest against the arrangement may be inherently unlikely, but the sequel makes it clear that certain elements were not happy with the arrangement. They would have preferred not to extend their politeia, or at least not to men who may have been local rivals.\textsuperscript{110} The new citizens and their descendants enjoyed (however briefly) all the same rights as the native population and were enrolled in the tribe of their choice, so that they could enjoy the full share of Larisaean political and religious life.\textsuperscript{111} The document preserves the publication clause, which calls for two copies of the decree to be made on stone, both of which are to include a list of all of the new citizens (ll. 21-2).

To make what I propose to be the parallel with Dyme explicit, a major power has intervened to expand the citizen body (politeia) of Larisa, and those changes were enshrined in the documentary record. The change was not well received: after only two years, the people of Larisa seem to have rejected some of the new citizens. They manifested that rejection by attacking the new list of citizens physically: they defaced the monument by chiselling out certain offending names (ll.24-6).\textsuperscript{112} The king was not impressed and took steps to call Larisa back into compliance with his wishes.

\textsuperscript{110} It is possible that their hope was that Philip would settle some veterans in the vicinity, but not insist that they be granted citizenship. That would give the people of Larisa the protection they needed, without having to overcome their xenophobia. The colonies planted by Antiochus III in Lydia and Phrygia were intended to make the area more secure, but would not, seemingly, enrolling the colonists as citizens of pre-existing cities (they were granted the use of their own laws [Josephus, \textit{Jewish Antiquities}, 14.142-153])
\textsuperscript{111} On enrolling new citizens in tribes, and on Larisa in particular, see Jones 1991: 82 and 87ff.
\textsuperscript{112} On ἐκκλῄσκωλάφθαι, see Rhodes 2001b: 138.
The tone of Philip's second letter falls somewhere between pedantic and threatening. He makes the obvious point that the city is better off when it has a larger citizen body, and reminds them that it was his will that they reach out to their neighbours. Extending their politeia would make the city more secure and keep their chora from becoming a wasteland, something even they cannot deny. He even goes so far as to tell the people of Larisa that they should look to Rome as an example. The Romans were willing to share their politeia even with freed slaves and their descendants, and they prospered because of it (ll.27-38). 113 The king also raises the spectre of direct intervention. He demands that those men who had been disenfranchised be restored to their rights, and that, in the future, should they find someone who is unworthy of citizenship, they defer judgment in the case until he can deal with the matter himself, which he will be happy to take in hand once he returns from campaign (ll. 35-38).

Why did the people of Larisa turn against some of the new citizens? When Philip asks that the cases of those who were accused of crimes against either the Macedonian kingdom or the city of Larisa should be stayed until he can deal with them personally, he implies that these were the reasons alleged for removing names from the citizen role (ll. 36-39). His final warning, though, makes it clear that he suspects this may be nothing more than a convenient pretext for some men to persecute their local rivals, since he cautions those who would make such accusations against appearing to act in a spirit of rivalry. 114 Having a criminal past seems to have been a common prejudice against colonists installed by the Macedonian kings. In speaking about one of Philip II's first major settlement initiatives, Theopompus says that he populated it entirely with the lowest of the low: temple-robbers, murderers and sycophants. So notorious was the new population that the city itself came to be known as

113 Whether we should see this as genuine praise, or some kind of slight against his opponents (that they were led by slaves) is unclear. Given the context, it would seem likely that it was sincere.
114 Brodersen 1992: #422 translates philotimia as 'party-spirit'. Using erasure from the citizen-list as the ultimate weapon in local politics has an excellent pedigree. The most famous example is Critias 'rubbing out' Theramenes (Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.3.51).
poneropolis.\textsuperscript{115} The king's lecture on Roman history, depending on how well-informed we imagine him to be, seems to support that. The Romans may enfranchise their manumitted slaves, but they even more famously filled out their population with a cadre of vagabonds, fugitives and exiles. These are the sort of people that the Larisaeans did not deem worthy of “having a share of the stele” and whose names they obliterated.

To return to our original point, the parallels between Dyme and Larisa are suggestive, if not entirely conclusive. In both cities, it would seem that dissatisfaction with the city's politeia, possibly motivated by factional politics, spiralled out of control, and led to attacks on the city's records. In both cases, the dispute was referred to the major external power of the day, which attempted to restore the status quo. Superficially, these similarities are at least as compelling as the parallel with Agis' reforms in Sparta, where debts were cancelled by burning certain financial documents. This theory is better able to account for some of the perceived inconsistencies in Fabius' letter to Dyme. New laws which challenged the current composition of the politeia would go hand-in-hand with attacking the archives to symbolically destroy both the decree by which new citizens were inducted and the list of their names. The sudden disenfranchisement of a number of citizens–especially if, as in Larisa, this was being used as a weapon in factional politics–could easily bring about a state of asynallaxia. That is, the city may have splintered into rival factions who refused to have anything to do with one another, bringing all normal political and religious business to a standstill, rather than simply the enforcement of contracts and financial obligations. That would certainly qualify as “the worst kind of disturbance,” and would quickly draw the attention of the Roman proconsul. If we use Larisa as a model, we can also at least begin to explain one other curious feature of Fabius' letter: that Sosos' goals ran contrary not only to the politeia of Dyme, but rather to the politeiai, plural, which had been restored to the Achaeans as a

\textsuperscript{115} See Suda s.v. doulon polis = FGrH 115, f. 110.
whole.\textsuperscript{116} If the Romans had made a sweeping ruling on who was to be included as a full citizen in the cities of the Achaean league, and that ruling was now being ignored in Dyme, then Fabius' phrase would be accurate: Sosos would be acting contrary to the \textit{politeiai} imposed on the Achaeans in general.

Our interpretation of the affair at Dyme still faces one major hurdle: we will need to find at least some hint that Rome may have altered the composition of the citizen body in Dyme and other Achaean cities in the wake of the war. We have no direct evidence for this, but there are two intriguing possibilities. What little evidence we have for Mummius' settlement of Greece tells us nothing clear about any changes regarding who would be counted as a citizen of an individual city. We know that Mummius left Polybius in Greece to settle disputes and ease the transition to the new \textit{politeia} and laws (\tau\iota \pi\omicron\upsilon\tau\iota\epsilon\omicron\iota\sigma \varsigma \kappa\iota \tau\iota\omicron\zeta \nu\omicron\omicron\mu\omicron\omicron\varsigma) that he and his commissioners established.\textsuperscript{117} Since part of the argument presented in this chapter is that, in cases such as this, \textit{politeia} can be taken to mean something like 'citizen body', rather than 'constitution', relying on this passage as proof that Rome altered the rules for citizenship would invite circularity. It behoves us then to examine the issue in more depth, or at least to propose a segment of the population whose inclusion in the citizen body could be subject to dispute in Dyme (and potentially other Achaean cities). For this, there are two primary options: freed slaves and men who had been exiled from their cities before or during the war.

The freed slaves are perhaps the more likely option. After the death of Kritolaos, the Achaean general who had provoked the war, command fell to his immediate predecessor Diaios. Since the situation was desperate and the Achaean forces were outnumbered, Diaios apparently sent letters to all of the cities in the Achaean League demanding that they liberate and arm any and all 'home-bred' slaves.\textsuperscript{118} This act of desperation was a source of tension even before the end of the war. Polybius tells

\textsuperscript{116} Otherwise we would need to assume that Fabius feared the revolution in Dyme would be exported to other Achaean cities.

\textsuperscript{117} Polybius, 39.5.2.

\textsuperscript{118} Polybius, 38.15.3. Not all of the slaves freed were actually \textit{oikogenoi}. We are told that in many cases he demanded a
us that even in the depths of their misery, as Achaeans looked forward to a hopeless war and the living began to envy the dead, they still spared a thought to resent the airs put on by their slaves. Those who had recently been liberated were insufferable, while those who were still slaves became arrogant because they believed that they would soon be freed.119

The fate of these freed slaves after the war is somewhat unclear. Pausanias tells us that Mummius, after sacking Corinth, killed the men he found in the city, and sold all of the women and children into slavery, and that he “also sold all the slaves who had been set free, had fought on the side of the Achaeans and had not fallen in battle immediately.”120 In all likelihood, this statement is not intended to apply to all of the freed slaves who had served with the Achaeans, only to those captured in the city of Corinth, and that was probably only a fraction of their total number. The majority of Achaean forces, along with the majority of Corinth's population, had fled during the night, and Mummius captured a city that was largely abandoned. Under those circumstances, and given the difficulty of differentiating between different grades of prisoner, it seems safe to assume that following the war, there were a good number of men of dubious legal status residing in Achaean cities. Whether the Roman commissioners would have cared enough to issue some sweeping decision about them, or whether the cities were left to decide the matter for themselves, we cannot say. If their status was a source of political tension before the war, that is unlikely to have changed if they were granted citizenship after the war. However the decision was made, alleging servile origins or a spurious entry into the list of citizens could be used as a convenient political weapon, as alleged former crimes were

119 Polybius, 38.15.10.
120 Pausanias, 7.16.8.
used in Larisa.

A second possible source of tension over who should be included in the list of citizens would be exiles who may have been restored to their homes following the war. We have even less evidence for this than for the enfranchisement of slaves: neither Polybius nor Pausanias, nor indeed any other source, tells us that the Romans undertook a universal restoration of exiles. There is, however, an array of circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Romans may have been forced to make a decision on the subject. Our strongest evidence comes from Pausanias' unusually thorough history of the Achaean war. The war was, of course, not originally a war of the Achaean League against Rome. The primary cause of the war was actually the cupiditas and corruption of the Spartan general of the Achaean League, Menalchidas, and his successor Diaios of Megalopolis. To escape the scrutiny of their countrymen, Menalchidas and Diaios escalated a small territorial dispute between Sparta and her neighbours. The case was referred to Rome for arbitration, but the senate deferred responsibility to the Achaean League, saying that all except capital cases should be handled by them.\textsuperscript{121} A dispute over how to apply Rome's response brought the two parties to the point of armed hostility. The Spartans, seeing that they would be overcome, sent envoys to negotiate with the Achaeans. Diaios demanded that 24 leading men of Sparta, whom he considered responsible for the dispute, should be turned over to him. These men instead voluntarily went into exile at Rome, on the assumption that they “would soon be restored to their country by the Romans.”\textsuperscript{122}

The last that we hear of these exiles is when their presence in the city of Rome was used as an excuse for both sides to send embassies to the senate, which only amplified tensions. Those tensions between Sparta and the Achaean League spiral out of control, eventually leading to Roman intervention under Metellus and Mummius, but nothing more is heard of the Spartan exiles. To their number we

\textsuperscript{121} Pausanias, 7.12.5.
\textsuperscript{122} Pausanias, 7.12.7.
could add the Achaean general Damokritos, who was driven into exile in essence for showing mercy on the Spartans and not sacking their city when he had the opportunity. \textsuperscript{123} We have no more specifics, but Pausanias tells us of convulsions within the citizen body of Corinth, where anyone even suspected of a connection to Sparta was harassed or arrested without charge. Many of those accused of Spartan sympathies undoubtedly took themselves into voluntary exile to escape the chaos, and it is certainly within the realm of possibility that anyone thought to be a Spartan sympathizer was driven from their homes in other cities as well.

The restoration of men who were exiled during the conflict or some sort of ruling on the citizen status of men thought to be freed slaves must remain hypothetical. \textsuperscript{124} Neither of our two main informants, Polybius and Pausanias, has anything to say about what happened either to these exiled men or to the slaves who were freed after the sack of Corinth. We can say only that the latter were likely to remain an issue, while it would be consistent with Roman practice to insist that the former should be restored to their homes. The Roman habit of favouring the cases of men who were exiled, even if it was likely to be met with resistance, had been a cause of tension long before the war. \textsuperscript{125} It is also worth noting that a sweeping decision on either point could be termed a 'restoration' of the Achaeans' original politeiai, and would leave sufficient scope for a violent dispute.

\textbf{3.6 Conclusion}

In the final analysis, the case presented here must remain subject to some doubt. The loss of much of Polybius' text for the course and aftermath of the Achaean war leaves us with little hope of proving anything beyond the shadow of a doubt. The parallels with the case of Larisa are certainly intriguing, though. Philip V tried to alter the politeia of Larisa, by which he meant changing the

\textsuperscript{123} Pausanias, 7.13.5.
\textsuperscript{124} Though no more so than rampant debt or resentment of an oligarchic regime.
\textsuperscript{125} Polybius, 24.2.
composition of the citizen body. A mere two years later, certain Larisaeans rejected some of the new citizens and symbolically damaged the inscribed list of citizens. This was part of a broader attempt to revise the *politeia* and disenfranchise some of the new citizens, perhaps because they were thought to be traitors or otherwise of undesirable origin. When the news reached Philip, he was unimpressed, and took steps to correct the wayward city. In Dyme, an outside power had altered the city's (along with the rest of the Achaeans') *politeia*, and Sosos and his company rejected the changes by turning their outrage against the archives, and presumably the documents stored therein. In the case of Dyme, we have no direct evidence that this was a response to a change in the composition of the citizen-body that was occasioned by the Achaean War; we can say only that the issue of citizen rights was a source of stress before the war, that after the war there would have been many similar cases, and that it was common Roman practice to insist on restoring exiles to their cities. The most obvious parallel is one we have already mentioned, Kallikrates' embassy to Rome, which was the occasion for the great debate about Achaean policy. The incident itself was driven by Roman intervention in the *politeia* of Sparta. The Spartans (and Achaeans) decided that certain men should be exiled (and thus removed from the citizen body); the Romans insisted that they be restored to their rights, and that decision met with resistance.

Setting aside these uncertainties, we have been able to at least propose answers to our initial questions. Sosos was punished more severely than Timotheos because the destruction of the archives was considered an especially heinous and politically loaded act. In Paros, the archives were treated with religious awe, to the point that those tampering with them, let alone destroying them, would meet with the same penalty that we might expect for a temple-robber. In Larisa, damaging or altering a document set up at the king's suggestion was not tolerated.\textsuperscript{126} Regardless of the goals of Sosos' political program, destruction of the archives, inasmuch as they were taken as an emblem of political stability,
was a crime that warranted death in its own right. As to Sosos' aims, we need not imagine a socialist uprising or any economic program at all. Fabius' letter offers no certain evidence for such a goal, and the external evidence is limited at best. Pausanias and the fragments of Polybius seem to agree that the end of the Achaean war brought political change of some variety (new politeiai and new laws). That it brought a widespread shift from democracy to oligarchy, which could be undermined by a cancellation of debts, is far less likely.\(^\text{127}\) If we account for the full range of meaning of 'politeia', it is equally, if not more, probable that Sosos was rejecting a Roman decision regarding who was to be counted as a citizen of his polis, perhaps an amnesty for all men who had once been exiled, or a ruling in support of the rights of freed slaves. Either policy would be both a contentious issue, and could be taken as undermining the politeiai restored to the Achaeans as a whole.\(^\text{128}\)

Absolute certainty may be impossible, but the process has led to some interesting conclusions. On the one hand, we have augmented the findings of the previous chapter: just as appeals to history and to the documentary record could exert a stabilizing influence on diplomatic relations, they were also a stabilizing influence on the internal politics of a city. Not only did keeping accurate records ensure that men could be honoured according to their due; they were also the key to securing legal rights and privileges. This political and symbolic function of the archives is often overlooked, but all three of the documents studied here serve to highlight it. In Dyme, destruction of the archives was a harbinger of social breakdown and “the worst state of affairs.” In Larisa, damage to public documents was a sign of civic discord and the splintering of the citizen body (to say nothing of potentially damaging their diplomatic relations with the Macedonian King). In Paros, the archives were placed under the more or less direct supervision of the community as a whole because they were vital to the proper functioning

\(^{128}\) If Kyllanios himself had been an exile in Rome, or exiled for being a partisan of Rome (or Sparta) in the war, this would also explain Fabius' vigorous intervention on his behalf.
of the city. That association between archives, the documentary record, and political stability is also apparent in the meagre remains of our Hellenistic literary sources.

Comparing Dyme to Larisa has focused our attention on one other aspect of polis life: that even in the presence of major powers, the Hellenistic poleis still jealously guarded the right to decide who was a member of the demos.129 Speaking generally, many Greek poleis were very liberal in granting citizenship to outsiders. Athens' grants of citizenship were sufficiently numerous to support a four-volume study of the phenomenon by Osbourne, and our evidence for the practice in the rest of the Greek world is clustered between the fourth and second centuries BCE.130 The trouble in Dyme and Larisa though, seems to imply that while cities were willing to grant citizenship as a favour, an honour, or even a commodity to be purchased, they were not willing to surrender control of the process.131 The Hellenistic kings, in many cases, seem to have been willing to respect that privilege.132 If we look back to one of the more famous cases, the enrolment of Aristodikes of Assos as a citizen of Ilium, we may see the ideal form of this interaction. It is the will of Antiochus II that Aristodikes should become a citizen of one of the poleis within his kingdom, and his general Meleager communicates that message to the people of Ilium. But Meleager also quite explicitly does not set terms for this. Rather, he enjoins the people of Ilium to open negotiations with Aristodikes on the subject, and suggests that once they have made an agreement, it should be inscribed on stone and preserved.133 In his dealings with Larisa, Philip may have taken direct interference as far as he could politely: he essentially issued an order to Larisa. Even so, his order was not to 'extend citizenship to your neighbours', but rather 'pass a

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129 Grie2008: introduction, notes the phenomenon, but does not explore how this affected relations between cities and the major powers.
131 On the notion that Athens intentionally granted citizen rights to those they thought unlikely to ever use them, see Osbourne 1984: 149.
132 The Kings were not so generous in all cases, though, and there were obvious limits to resistance, as the failure of both Larisa and Dyme makes clear.
133 RC 13.
decree extending citizenship to your neighbours.' It still allowed some illusion of local control. It would seem that, after the Achaean war, the Romans neglected even this thin veneer of diplomacy. Under those circumstances, we should hardly be surprised if it took years of effort from Polybius to “accustom them to their new politeia and laws.” Nor should it surprise us if, in at least one city, there was a backlash against that new politeia, and the institution most crucial for securing it.
Chapter 4: Managing Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice: Performing Citizenship in Hellenistic Kos

4.1 Introduction: The Task before Us

In the years around the end of the second century, a certain Diokles, one of the leading citizens of Kos, called on his fellow inhabitants of the island to make contributions to the common safety. In Athenian terms, he called for an impromptu and voluntary collection of the eisphora, the special wartime property tax. Diokles' proposal was adopted by the Koan assembly and was enthusiastically received. Those who chose to contribute were duly honoured, and there is a list of donors, along with the amount they offered, appended to the surviving copy of the original call for donations. Diokles' motion has particularly arresting features which will be the focus of the current chapter. First, rather than simply accepting any gift gratefully, Diokles and the people of Kos demand that prospective donors come forward in the assembly and state what they are willing to offer. The assembly will then publicly vote on whether this gift is “worthy” of being accepted or if it should be rejected. In this, Diokles' attempt to raise money differs significantly from the classical Athenian model, in which contributions were determined and ordained by law, and the details of offering the money were dealt with out of the public eye. Was Koan practice more or less 'democratic', and was it more or less likely to result in a healthy political community?

Our line of inquiry will be to ask what, precisely, the damos of Kos demanded from its constituent members, and how they evaluated each other. This point must be stressed because, in general, prior scholarship has been content to establish where the legal boundary between citizen and

1 IG XII.4.1 75 (ca. 200 BCE).
2 There is a substantial difference between the way I will approach these questions, and Grieb 2008's study of the makeup of the Koan damos and Koan democratic practice. I am less interested in procedure and legal definitions than in how a community under stress maintained cohesion.
non-citizen was drawn.\textsuperscript{3} Diokles’ call for contributions was open to all (citizens, non-citizen residents and women) which implies that this legal boundary was less important in Kos than we might assume. Our goal will be to use Diokles’ decree to say something about what it meant to act or behave like a citizen of Kos, and of how the institutions of Hellenistic Kos evolved to reflect that.\textsuperscript{4} Even more specifically, our focus will be the overt subordination of strict self-interest for the good of the community and how such displays were structured and encouraged.

The same current of altruism that runs through Diokles’ call for donations is apparent in several other contemporary Koan documents. A decree for a certain Theukles (\textit{IG XII.4.1} 99 [ca. 200 BCE]) shows him prosecuting fellow citizens who failed to display a proper degree of community spirit and pioneering a reform to the system for garrisoning important forts on the island that gave all citizens a public opportunity to show themselves ready to fight for the city, while also allowing them to defend their estates, families and outlying demes. A list of participants in the cult of Apollo and Herakles from the deme of Halasarna and a sacred law governing the sale of the priesthood of Aphrodite Pandamos (\textit{IG XII.4.1} 103 and 302 [ca. 200 BCE]) suggest something similar in the religious sphere. Even the legal definition of citizenship could be dependent on (in this case a woman's) willingness to sacrifice strict self-interest by offering public sacrifices at the temple of Aphrodite Pandamos. In that and Theukles' reforms, we may also be able to detect some tension between the authority of the polis as a whole and loyalty to the older outlying communities of the island.

\textbf{4.2 Kos at the End of the Third Century}

We know as much about Kos at the end of the third century BCE as we do about any city other than Athens. Like Miletus and Priene, Kos comes to the fore in histories of the Hellenistic world

\textsuperscript{3} This dividing line has been drawn (quite consistently) by Sherwin-White 1978, Papazoglou 1997, Grie 2008 and Carlsson 2010. It is in keeping with the pattern proposed for Delos by Vial 1984.

\textsuperscript{4} “Evolution” is used even more misleadingly here than elsewhere. Since we know little about Classical or Archaic Koan institutions, we will largely be working from a comparison to Athens.
because of its unusually extensive epigraphic record. The island was unified into a single polis by a synoikism at some point in the fourth century, but some of the demes, particularly Halasarna, remained important religious and administrative centres in their own right. Two of the documents with which we will be concerned in this chapter are the products of the deme of Halasarna, rather than the Koan polis as a whole. The honorary decree for Theukles was moved and published by the demotai of Halasarna, and it was the deme of Halasarna, with its temples of Apollo and Herakles, that undertook a revision of the list of citizens who had some share in those cults. The organizational strength of the demes is reminiscent of classical Athens, and the polis of Kos was quite thoroughly democratic. The ekklesia was open to all citizens and remained sovereign in all important matters. In fact, the Koan ekklesia may have been rather healthier than its counterparts in other cities. In the plentiful Koan documentary evidence, we can find no hint that the ekklesia surrendered its deliberative functions or right to initiate legislation to the magistrates or council. Koan government was based on what Grieb calls “democratic praxis.” The ekklesia was open to all citizens, and was the sovereign decision-making body in the state. It was also an active deliberative body. In some cities, the council and the magistrates dominated the legislative process: almost all decrees of the assembly were actually framed and moved by the council (or magistrates) and then presented to the assembly for ratification. Our surviving

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6 LSGC 173.
7 On the role of the demes in Koan political life, see Carlsson 2010: 236-7. On the relative strength of Koan democracy, see Carlsson 2010: 184ff, or any of the works listed above in note 5.
8 Grieb 2008:16-18. For Grieb 2008:18, democratic praxis is linked to the epigraphic habit. Decrees that proclaim themselves to be a decision of the people, taken in accordance with the constitution, are the primary examples of that praxis. They demonstrate the proper functioning of the various institutions of the state.
9 Grieb 2008; Sherwin-White 1976: 178ff. We actually have little to support this directly. The closest to direct confirmation is Diokles' decree, which seems to assume that all citizens would be present and ready to speak either in the current meeting of the assembly or in the next. Of course, it also seems to assume that all of the non-citizens in the city would do the same, so it is not especially strong evidence. There is no compelling reason to doubt either point.
10 The process is called proboleutis, and is taken to be a sign that a constitution is oligarchic, at least in practice. For a discussion of the practice and its implications, see Nawotka 1999. For its absence in Kos, see Sherwin-White 1978 and Grieb 2008: 139ff. The process is only detectable in the preamble of decrees of the assembly. Who proposed the motion? Was it a private citizen (and if so does a small group dominate the process?), a magistrate, the council? Is it a decision of the council and the assembly, or just a decree of the assembly? As a methodology, it is far from flawless.
Koan decrees suggest a very strong *ekklesia*. Some motions were brought forward by magistrates or the council, but others were introduced by private citizens, and no one man or family seems to have unduly dominated the process.\footnote{Carlsson 2010: 234ff.}

At the end of the third century BCE, Kos seems to be a stable, democratic and reasonably prosperous island polity. They maintained good relations with the Ptolemies and Rhodes for the majority of the Hellenistic period and those alliances protected them from serious military threats. Toward the end of the second century BCE, when Ptolemaic power in the Aegean basin was at its lowest ebb, the Koans were left vulnerable. The era that produced Diokles' subscription list was unusually turbulent, at least for the island of Kos. The Cretan war first brought privateers landing on the island and ravaging its territory. Soon after that, Philip V of Macedon, with the blessings of the Seleucid king, launched a more direct campaign to assert his authority in the Aegean. The burdens of defending the island against hostile forces for so long were substantial, but Kos weathered the storm and may have emerged stronger.\footnote{On the defence of Kos in these years, see Baker 1991.} In the wake of those conflicts, they seem to have begun (or resumed) asserting their influence over the smaller islands in their immediate vicinity, a process which culminated in an oath of *homopoliteia* with Kalymna. It is these events that form much of the backdrop for the current study.

### 4.3 Aeschines and the Performance Model of Citizenship

The ultimate goal of this chapter is to explain one key feature of Diokles' call for contributions: the stipulation the donors must come forward in the assembly and make their offer, which the assembly will then immediately vote to either accept or reject. The process, at least to modern eyes, is quite

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\footnotetext{11}{There is no way to control for unseen variables, such as including the council in the decision as a formality or a matter of habit, or whether robust debate, and even changes to the original motion were simply passed over in silence. It is worth noting that some degree of *proboulēsis* is entirely in keeping with classical Athenian democracy, so any conclusions based on this should be taken with hefty grain of salt.}
\footnotetext{12}{On the defence of Kos in these years, see Baker 1991.}
striking. We are unaccustomed to the possibility that a charitable donation might be rejected out of hand, much less to the potential for public shaming if we are judged to be offering too little. We will proceed initially by seeking parallels for that process of winning public approval elsewhere in our surviving evidence.

The nature of Greek “citizenship” is arguably the central question in Greek history. We cannot possibly deal with all of its nuances here or the whole of its bibliography.\(^\text{13}\) Instead we will focus on one recent development: the advent of "performance theory" as a heuristic tool. In broad outline, looking at Greek citizenship as a matter of performance is a response to the more common "legalistic" interpretation, which conceives of citizenship as a collection of rights, responsibilities and privileges.\(^\text{14}\) Mogens Hansen is one of the more prolific proponents of the latter system. Much of his work has been directed at questions of official procedure and rules of order for the assembly, defining the competencies of various magistrates and the most important legal rights and obligations that were attendant on citizenship.\(^\text{15}\) As with most things, Classical Athens has been the primary subject of these studies, but this is also the model that has been universally adopted for the study of the Hellenistic poleis. There have been several studies that look to define the roles of magistrates or the council, to elucidate the legislative process, or to define the legal requirements for citizenship (or other legal statuses).\(^\text{16}\) In large part, this approach is driven by the availability of evidence. We have a multiplicity of state or civic inscriptions, almost all of which at some point bear the imprimatur of one of these institutions of the state, but little or no contemporary local literature of the sort to which cultural

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13 Manville 1994: 21-24 offers a good, if at times strained, summary of the state of the question at the end of the 20th century. The introduction to Farenga 2006 shows how little movement there has been from that time.

14 On different models of Greek citizenship, see Manville 1994: 22-26 or Connor 1994: 34-37.

15 So, for instance, Hansen 1987, 1991 or 2006; for Hellenistic scholarship following that pattern, see especially Grieb 2008, Nawotka 1999 or, on the subject of Delos, Vial 1984 and numerous others.

One of the alternatives to this legalist/constitutionalist approach is to conceive of citizenship as a kind of activity or identity.\textsuperscript{17} That is, rather than defining citizenship as the right to attend the \textit{ekklesia}, we can define it as the act of attending the \textit{ekklesia}: citizens are people who attend and participate in the \textit{ekklesia}, not just those who have the right to do so. There would of course be many facets to this identity; citizenship would also consist of performing military service, participating in state religion, holding magistracies et cetera. The identity-based approach would see citizenship as something that exists primarily in the mind of the individual. That is, a citizen is not so much someone who was born of citizen parents, in accordance with the law of Pericles, but someone who identifies themselves first, foremost and exclusively as an Athenian citizen. Citizenship consists of claiming that identity, and convincing other members of the community of it. The attraction of performance theory is that it can accommodate both approaches.

Our foray into this will, hopefully, be brief and a path for applying performance theory to Greek citizenship has already been cleared.\textsuperscript{18} As with any new model, performance theory comes with its own vocabulary, much of which describes concepts that are already familiar; in this case, the new vocabulary is borrowed from theatre studies.\textsuperscript{19} Citizenship is treated as 'role' that must be actively performed, rather than a legal definition or a static identity. A man who would play the role of “citizen” does so by performing its 'script.'\textsuperscript{20} Citizenship is conceived of as a kind 'master script', which incorporates all of the other discrete parts that make up life in the community. Speaking in the assembly, participating in the religious life of the city, undergoing scrutiny as a prospective magistrate:

\textsuperscript{17} The underlying tone of Manville 1994 and Connor 1994, that this new way of looking at citizenship is more apt, and will now replace an older, focus on rights and responsibilities, seems unnecessary.
\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Goldhill and Osborne 1999, or the much longer Farenga 2006.
\textsuperscript{19} Which is, of course, where it originated.
\textsuperscript{20} Farenga 2006; Goldhill 1999.
all of these public acts can be considered performances and part of playing the role of citizen, and each one is done according to its own script. One must wear a certain costume and speak a certain way when addressing the assembly in order to play that role well. When playing the part of a soldier one must not stray from the script by leaving one's place in the formation or behaving in a disorderly fashion. What is novel about performance as a way to approach this is the vital role that the audience plays in watching—and evaluating—any given actor's performance of those scripts. To wit, if we think that delivering a speech in the law courts or the assembly is one of the key components of citizenship, the ability to speak to an an empty Pnyx, to prepare a speech for court on paper for another to use, or even to deliver it to a client or a group of acquaintances is not enough. In order to be a successful performance, it must be properly staged (in the right location) and it must win the approval of the proper audience—the ekklesia must recognize the man as a citizen and let him speak.

Status, including citizen status, is thus not strictly the result of legal definitions, but rather the product of a performance/evaluation dynamic that is inherent in political activity. There is still, of course, a legal element in these negotiations of status, but in Athens and other democracies, any legal issues were themselves determined by performance. One must be the child of citizen parents to be an Athenian citizen, but that parentage was decided not by an appeal to some objective and all-knowing birth registry, but by a series of performances. Presenting the child to the phratry, being enrolled among the ephes and undergoing public scrutiny as an outgoing magistrate are all public performances that rely on positive evaluation by an audience made up of fellow citizens in order to be successful. The

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21 See, for example, the dress rehearsal of the women at the beginning of Aristophanes' Assemblywomen (especially 60-78 where they prepare to look the part with the right clothes and grooming, and 89-279 where they discuss the right way to comport themselves in the assembly and the proper way to speak) and Demosthenes' speech Against Conon (in particular 34-38 and 39-40 where Ariston argues that the behaviour and comportment of Conon and his witnesses is so far below an acceptable Athenian standard that their testimony—even on oath—should be dismissed).
23 In this it has much in common with the rules for "felicitous" speech acts in Austin 1975: 14 and throughout.
success or failure of those performances determines legal status, not vice-versa. In many cases, the stakes would have been quite low and audience approval would be a rubber-stamp. When performances were rejected and status was challenged, these disputes were resolved by the courts, which in Athens and other democracies meant trial by jury—the example par excellence of the spectator's power to judge a performance, and in so doing define the performer's status.

The life of a citizen, or at least the life of a prominent citizen, is a role that never ends. Rank and status are not only contested in the law courts; the community is always watching and evaluating. Put another way, the role extends well beyond what we would consider the realm of politics and into a man's private life. For classical Athens, there is no better example of this than Aeschines' prosecution of Timarchus. If, for the moment, we set aside Aeschines' personal reasons for prosecuting Timarchus, what he holds forth as the substance of his case is most enlightening. Aeschines' charge is, in essence, that the way Timarchus carries on in his private life is so infamous that it should bar him from speaking in the assembly, or from holding any magistracy with religious duties, that is, from the core components of citizenship.

Most of Aeschines' case relies on slander, rumor and character assassination instead of evidence and witnesses, but the law he does cite is illustrative on several points. The charge, or, more accurately the legal justification for his personal attacks, is a law of Solon that established the rules of order for debate in the assembly: who can address it and who is to be called to speak first. The law forbade four kinds of men from addressing the assembly, and only one of the four was is defined by his actions in

24 That is, while there were official records of a kind, it was not those records that decided cases of disputed status, it was a public performance—trial by jury in the last extreme. A sufficiently compelling, or disastrous performance could result in a verdict at odds with the records.
25 Strangely, this example was not seriously pursued by either Farenga 2006 or Goldhill 1999.
26 The idea is that Timarchus can never be properly purified and therefore cannot wear a garland, which is necessary for some sacrifices. Equally interesting is the law Aeschines quotes in his prosecution of Ctesiphon which says that a man who has not properly performed his military service (i.e. deserted his post) may not even enter into the purified areas of the Agora (Against Ctesiphon, 176).
the “public” sphere. Men who have failed to perform all of their required military service were barred from the speaker's platform.\textsuperscript{27} That category includes both those who had not served when called upon and those who abandoned the phalanx and threw away their shield. A reputation for doing either was sufficient to prejudice the audience against any future performances the man might attempt. Also excluded were those who mistreated their parents or failed to provide a home for them in their old age.\textsuperscript{28} One of the scripts a citizen had to perform—and be seen to perform—was respecting and caring for his parents. The final two kinds of men excluded from speaking in the assembly call for more attention, both because they are more relevant to our documents from Kos and because they put Aeschines' version of Athenian society at odds with the one in the funeral oration of Pericles. Pericles famously claimed that Athenians did not concern themselves with whether and how their neighbour enjoyed himself in his private life, but Aeschines' law of Solon disagrees.\textsuperscript{29} It made a man's private and financial affairs an official subject of public interest by banning from the speaker's platform those who had squandered their inheritance and men who had prostituted themselves.\textsuperscript{30}

Some of the performances that were required to assert one's citizen status were perpetual and ongoing. To speak in the assembly, a man had to show himself to be financially responsible. For Aeschines, the core components of this script seem to be maintaining ownership of any family houses in the city or estates and parcels of land in the \textit{chora}, while living an acceptably frugal lifestyle. Timarchus runs into trouble not because he runs out of money, but because he sells real estate without buying more to replace it. Aeschines offers no concrete evidence that Timarchus is broke. In fact he

\textsuperscript{27} Aeschines, \textit{Against Timarchus}, 28.
\textsuperscript{28} Aeschines, \textit{Against Timarchus}, 28.
\textsuperscript{29} Thucydides, 2.34. The two obvious explanations are that Thucydides was engaging in some hyperbole, and that there was, of course, a point at which Athenians of his age looked askance at the private affairs of their neighbours (as his disapproval of the way people carried on during the plague suggests) or that the law (assuming Aeschines even gives an accurate representation of it) was spuriously attributed to Solon during the overhaul of the Athenian constitution in the early fourth century.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Against Timarchus}, 29.
frequently censures him for his free-spending ways. What he offers is evidence (witnesses to the fact) that Timarchus has sold some of the houses and estates that he inherited, but no one saw him buy more. Aeschines challenges Timarchus to proffer witnesses who will say that he either bought more real estate or loaned money at interest, which are apparently the only two acceptably visible forms of economic activity.\(^31\) Timarchus has failed economically, perhaps not in reality but in the public perception, and in so doing he loses status.

This is interesting for two reasons: the first is that it implies that in Aeschines' Athens, citizens at least thought that they were relatively well informed about the finances of their fellows; the second is that they seem to have expected to be able to exert at least some control over how their fellow citizens' property was used. It was unacceptable that Timarchus devoted the whole, or even a large part, of his fortune to his own enjoyment; his inheritance was so large that it would have allowed another man to take on liturgies in service of the state, and Timarchus could be expected to preserve it for that reason (οὐσίαν ἀφ’ ἔτερος μὲν ἄν καὶ ἐλητούργει).\(^32\)

Timarchus' financial dealings were open to public scrutiny, and if he wished to be allowed to address the assembly, he had to be mindful of acting the part of a dignified Athenian statesman. That was true of the rest of his life as well. The law that Aeschines uses to attack Timarchus was inscribed on the base of a statue of Solon. The statue itself serves as a model for the proper comportment of a rhetor, standing, as it does, with its hand modestly tucked inside its cloak. This is the dignified and restrained bearing that a man who wishes to speak in the assembly must mimic.\(^33\) Timarchus fails disastrously in this performance. While addressing the assembly, he fidgets and thrashes around like a pancratiaist and completely throws back his cloak, generally carrying on in a manner that Athenians (so

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31 Aeschines, Against Timarchus, 96.
32 Aeschines, Against Timarchus, 97.
33 Compare the comic business at the start of Aristophanes' Assemblywomen, where the women coach each other on how to convincingly take on the role of a speaker in the assembly (see above, note 21).
says Aeschines) are unwilling to accept from their leaders. What is more, in throwing back his cloak, Timarchus fails in yet another performance. He reveals a body that is “poorly and shamefully kept and left in an appalling state from drunkenness and lewdness.”34 Here physical fitness is linked to morality, restraint and civic virtue in a way very much in keeping with that explored in the first chapter.35 The important point is that the approval of the audience was central to the dispute. When Timarchus’ behaviour offends the sensibilities of his fellow citizens, even though it is not strictly illegal, he still suffers a loss of status and at least a partial loss of citizen rights.36 The audience was also ready to demand that, when disposing of his property, Timarchus should consider the needs of the state, and not merely his own appetites and desires.

4.4 Diokles’ Decree

The Cretan war and Philip V’s intervention in the southern Aegean ended what had been a long period of relative security for the island of Kos. Indeed, the decree in honour of Theukles suggests that in previous decades the Koans had felt so secure that they allowed their fortifications to crumble into uselessness.37 In what seems to have been a brief lull between piratical incursions against the island, one of their leading citizens came forward and urged the people of Kos to continue and even improve their readiness for war. Diokles son of Leodamas was one of the leading citizens of Kos. A doer of deeds and a speaker of words in the Homeric model, he was both a fixture in the assembly and a leader in the war against the pirates. On this occasion, he came before his fellow citizens and other residents of Kos to ask that they all contribute to what would become, seemingly, a reserve fund “for the common safety,” likely a war-chest of sorts.38

34 Aeschines, Against Timarchus 26.
35 The gymnasiarch of Beroea awarded the prize for euexia on the basis of schema.
36 Most notably, the right to speak in the assembly.
37 IG XII.4.1 99, discussed further below.
38 IG XII.4.1 75.
ἐπὶ Νικομήδεως
[.....] ου νομηνίαι. Διοκ[λῆς
Λεο]δάμαντος ἐπε· ὅπως
[εφ᾽ ἐκά]στου καιροῦ φαινον-
[tαι τ]οι πολίται συναντι-
[λα]νβανόμενοι τάς κοινᾶς
[ά]σφαλείας, δεδόχθαι ἐ-
[π]αγέλλεσθαι τῶς δήλο-
μένως τῶν τε πολιτῶν καὶ
πολιτίδων καὶ νόθων καὶ πα-
ροίκων καὶ ξένων, τὸν δὲ ἐπαγ-
γειλαμένωντά ὀνόματα
ἀναγενισάντω παρα-
χῆμα ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ὁ δὲ
δάμος διαχειροτονεῖτο
τὰς ἀξίας τὰς δωρεὰς
καὶ εἰ κα δοκή λαμβ[ανέ-
το· ὅποις δὲ υπόμνημα
ὑπάρχη τὸν ἡς τάς σω[τη]-
[πρ]αν τὰς πατρίδος καὶ
τὸν συμμάχουν συνεπιδόν-
τον ἔστιν, τοι πολιταὶ
ἐγκυντω στάλας ἐργάζον-
θαι τρεῖς καὶ ἀναθέντῳ μί-
αυ μὲν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ[ι, τὰς δ]ὲ
ἀλλὰν ἐν τῷ Ἀσκλαπι-
είω, τὸν δὲ τρίτων ἐν τῇ ἄγο-
ράι παρά τὸν βωμόν τὸν τοῦ
Διονύσου, τὸν δὲ χειροτο-
νθέντων τὰ ὀνόματα ἀνα-
γραφάντω ἐς τὰς στάλας,
καταχρησμ[α]σάντω δὲ κα[ι]
eί κ[ά] τινον ἀποχειροτο-
θῆι ἀ ἐπαγγελία κτλ.

When Nicodemus was... on the first of the month; on the motion of Diokles son of Laodamas: so that the citizens should be seen to take thought for the common safety in every instance, be it resolved that those who so desire from the ranks of citizens, citizen women, half-breeds, resident aliens or foreigners, let those who are willing to contribute announce their names straightway in the assembly, and let the people vote on the worthiness of the gifts, and if it so chooses, let it accept them. And also to begin a monument of those who devoted themselves to the saving of the city and of the allies, and let the poletai pay to make three stelae and let them display one in the theatre, another in the Asclepeion
and the third in the agora next to the altar of Dionysus. And let the names of those whose offers are accepted be written on the stelae, and, if what some people offer is rejected, let the poletai deal (or negotiate?) with them.

The call for contributions is far from unusual. In Athens, the eisphora, a special tax paid by the wealthy to support war efforts, was levied frequently.\textsuperscript{39} In Priene, the sons of Kydimos made special contributions to a similar fund when their city was threatened.\textsuperscript{40} It is the process that sets Diokles' motion apart. In Athens, those who had to pay the eisphora were chosen by the magistrates, and they actually made their payments outside of the public eye.\textsuperscript{41} In Priene, these gifts seem to have been made in the assembly, but it was done on their own initiative, and the inscriptions reveal no sense of danger, no hint that the assembly needed to debate the worthiness of their gift. It may be no coincidence that the sons of Moschion actually made relatively small donations, at least when compared to some of the wealthier Koans.\textsuperscript{42} Diokles made donating to the common safety a performance with much higher stakes performance, and one essential for maintaining status within the community. Any man who wished to be counted among the leaders of the community and a man of public spirit must come forward immediately (or at the next meeting of the assembly, if he was currently unavailable) and perform a very specific script, before an audience that was conceived of as the whole of the damos; they would make their response unmistakably and irrevocably clear by voting on it with a show of hands.

Some have taken this as proof that the Koan democracy was peculiarly strong or radical.\textsuperscript{43} The power of the damos as a whole to compel its wealthy to contribute according to their abilities appeals to a Marxist sensibility. The issue may be slightly more complex. We have no evidence that any of the

\textsuperscript{39} Wallace 1989; Christ, 2006: 146-151 and the bibliography collected there.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{I. Priene} 108.50-57.
\textsuperscript{41} Christ 2006: 147; Ste. Croix 1953: 34.
\textsuperscript{42} In Priene, a gift of 1000 dr. was considerable (\textit{I.Priene} 108.34) Diokles' contribution was 7000 dr (\textit{IG} XII.4.1 75.36-7).
\textsuperscript{43} Sherwin-White 1978: 180.
donations was rejected. As such, Migeotte has suggested that the vote in the assembly may have been nothing but a formality and there was no real threat of humiliation.\footnote{Migeotte 1992: 152. This may be stating Migeotte's case somewhat more strongly than he would. To him the notion that the approval process compelled people to donate in proportion to their wealth "contient sans doute une partie de vérité." He may simply be reacting against Sherwin-White's (1978: 179-80) notion that those whose gifts were rejected were threatened with prosecution. The process here was clearly unusual, and more than merely a formal way of accepting and recording the offers made. The wording of the decree explicitly enjoins the damos to "vote on the worthiness of each offer, and if they decide it is worthy (αἱ καὶ δοκή), accept it" (ll.14-18). Compare the similar decree of Kolophon (SEG 19.698.31-33 [between 311 and 306 BCE]), calling for donations to a fund for the reconstruction of the city's walls, which also asks that gifts be made at the next meeting of the assembly, not so that their worthiness can be judged, but rather "So that the each (offer) can be honoured in a manner worthy of it's generosity" (περὶ δὲ τῶν ὑποδεξαμένων βουλεύσαι τὸν δήμον τοῦ Λησταυόνος μηνός ἐν τῇ κυρίᾳ ἐκκλησία ὡς τιμηθήσεται ἐκαστός τῶν ὑποδεξαμένων ἄξιος τῆς προθυμίας καθότι ἂν τοῦ δήμου δοκῇ).} The floor for monetary donations seems to have been exceptionally low; there are numerous offers of only fifty drachmas alongside the other, much larger, donations. There are also, seemingly, offers of donations in kind, as two men offered to supply rations for mercenary soldiers, a choice that might have carried a much higher risk of rejection (ll. 64ff.). By far Migeotte's strongest evidence is that the assembly accepted a donation of only five hundred drachmas from Theukles. We will discuss his career in more detail below, but we know that Theukles' wealth was substantial; he was able to personally fund much of the defence of his deme during the wars against the Cretan pirates and Philip V.\footnote{Migeotte 1992: 152.} If the assembly was willing to accept as little as 500 drachmas from such a man, surely other men of means would not have felt that their arms were being twisted, or so the argument might go. The problem is that we know Theukles was wealthy because we have a decree honouring him for being prodigal of his funds in the defence of the community. Theukles' exertions on behalf of his deme were surely at least as well known to his peers as they are to us, and the damos would know if he had temporarily drained his coffers. Under those circumstances, it is easy to imagine the assembly allowing Theukles to offer a smaller gift at this time. In other words, Theukles' example is no reason to believe that Koans felt no compulsion to donate according to their means. Theukles was already known as a man who put the needs of the community
before the health of his estate; he had no need to prove it in this venue.

The remarkably low “floor” for acceptable donations may have a different meaning. There are no monetary donations of less than fifty drachmas, a sum offered by twenty residents of the city.\(^46\) That fifty drachmas was enthusiastically accepted as a donation may show that standards were not relaxed to benefit the rich, but rather to benefit men of only moderate means. It allowed them to participate alongside their wealthier compatriots. They too could use the assembly as a stage for showing their devotion to the state rather than being limited to serving the state as soldiers. Allowing citizens to make modest donations to the cause in the same forum as those wealthy men who could offer more may have been an effective strategy for managing diversity. While the magnitude of donations and applause may change, all members of the community shared the same opportunities and burdens.

The assembly meeting accepting donations was probably a nerve-wracking affair.\(^47\) No matter how friendly the mood, or what assurances were given, it may have seen men offering sums so great they risked ruin in a bid to claim a more prominent place in the community. Unfortunately, we have no real contemporary evidence that that can reveal anything of the dynamics of such a meeting, either in Kos or elsewhere in the Greek world. What we do have are one or two relatively late parallels in the work of Dio Chrysostom. Dio's orations, although they are frequently hyperbolic, are also overtly normative. That is, they consciously set out to construct an accepted, or at least acceptable, version of the polis and how its citizens behave.\(^48\) Such is the case with Dio's seventh oration, *The Euboicus* or *The Hunter*.\(^49\) Dio sends clear signals that this oration is largely a fable: it begins with a shipwreck and

\(^{46}\) Migeotte 1992: 155.

\(^{47}\) Migeotte 1992: 150 imagines there being room for arguments about status and precedence, as well as haggling.

\(^{48}\) This is the avowed point of the *Alexandrian Oration* (Dio 32), for example. The Alexandrians are unbecomingly interested in musical theatre, and carry on like a disordered mob during and after performances (32.5ff). Their comportment falls so far short of that expected of orderly citizens that they have lapsed from the status of Greeks and begun acting like the barbarians from whom they should try to distinguish themselves (32.39ff).

\(^{49}\) The nearly unique character of the speech makes it a frequent subject of study. More than half of the contributions to Swain 2000 are devoted, at least in part, to the *Euboicus*. The consensus seems to be that, while everything about it is obviously artificial, reproducing a typical meeting of the assembly, with an idealized speaker, is a part of that
a chance encounter with a noble savage, it has a nested narrative structure that distances the action from
reality and features cartoonishly two-dimensional characters. Like any good fable, it also has a clear
moral lesson, one about what it should mean to be the citizen of a Greek polis. The speech begins with
Dio telling us about the time he was shipwrecked on the coast of Euboea and fell in with a local hunter.
The hunter, a noble rustic who lives in the wilderness but is proud of being a free man and citizen of
(presumably) Karystos, tells the story (which Dio passes on word for word) of the one and only time he
spoke in his polis' ekklesia. At the heart of that episode, which in turn is at the heart of the entire
oration, is an exchange much like the one that seems to be happening in Kos. The hunter (followed
later by another good citizen) addresses the assembly and puts his private wealth at the disposal of the
community. As perhaps the best literary parallel for Diokles' subscription, the oration is worth looking
at in more detail.

The story begins with washing up on the shore of Euboea with nothing but the rags on his back.
He meets a hunter, who is as cash-poor as Dio looks. The hunter, despite his limited means, offers to
give Dio shelter for the night and to send him on his way to the city once he has recovered from his
ordeal. While leading Dio to his homestead, the hunter tells the story of how he and his family came to
live in the mountains and survive by hunting and gardening. The circumstances of the hunter's life
are meant to be simple and pleasant. He is a model of a peasant who bears his poverty nobly and well:
hale and hearty, eking out a livelihood by hard work and satisfied with what he has. The hunter, for

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50 Not only the hunter, but also the polis and the assembly meeting, are more ideal types than accurate portrayals. Cf. Ma
51 On the simple but surprisingly refined rhetoric of the hunter's speech, see Anderson 2000: 148.
52 Dio, 7.10 ff.
53 If nothing else in the story does, this should give us great reason to be wary. We are dealing here with what Dio and his
peers, the wealthy and urbane, thought was the ideal for people who were not them: that they be content with their lot
and live far away from the polis, leaving politics to men like Dio and keeping cities peacefully free of an under-
employed mob. That subtext does not seem to have coloured the way that Dio presents the hunter's interaction with the
assembly once he arrives, though. In that he seems, as Anderson 2000 argues, to play the role of a Sophist consciously
adopting a simple and rustic rhetorical style.
most of his life, was content to live in the hinterland, and actually has only visited the civic centre of his polis once in his adult life.\textsuperscript{54} The circumstances and events of that trip are what concern us (and what concerned Dio). One day the happy life our rustics enjoyed was interrupted by a visitor from the city: a magistrate summoning them to the city to answer for their illegal occupation of public land.\textsuperscript{55} This part of the story is very difficult to take seriously. Our hero is a noble savage, a man who does not even know what towers, walls and civic buildings look like, and who comes before the assembly to defend himself wearing animal skins rather than proper clothes.\textsuperscript{56} The assembly and its crowd of men he can only understand by analogy to natural phenomena, but for all that he shows himself to be a talented orator.\textsuperscript{57} His opponent in the assembly is a caricature of the unscrupulous demagogue; he makes wild accusations and extravagant promises, and even the hunter, who has never been to an assembly before, marks him as an obvious villain. The contrast with the hunter, who shows himself to be an ideal citizen in everything but his dress, could not be more stark.\textsuperscript{58}

What are the important components of being a good citizen like the hunter? Some of them are more relevant to our investigation than others. That the hunter keeps to himself and does not instigate nuisance lawsuits has much in common with Classical Athens, but does not speak to Hellenistic Kos.\textsuperscript{59} When he is compelled to appear in the city and address the assembly, he does so simply and plainly, with no attempt to mislead or unduly stir the anger of his listeners; while his opponent does the opposite.\textsuperscript{60} Most importantly, although his means are not vast, the hunter puts the whole of his (and his neighbour's!) property at the disposal of the community, should they want it, and has the opportunity to

\textsuperscript{54} As a child he visited the city in the company of his father.
\textsuperscript{55} Dio, 7.21.
\textsuperscript{56} Which becomes a joke when he is to be feasted in the Prytaneion (7.62).
\textsuperscript{57} Dio, 7.24.
\textsuperscript{58} Manner of dress, while important, was recognized as a superficial marker of citizen status (Aristophanes, \textit{Assemblywomen} 40ff).
\textsuperscript{59} A claim familiar from of Athenian forensic rhetoric, perhaps most famously in Lysias 12.3.
\textsuperscript{60} His prosecutor speaks in anger and makes wild promises about how much money the community could exact from the hunter and his family.
bask in the applause of his fellow citizens.\footnote{This is after he has proven that he is a citizen.}

The parallel with Diokles' motion is not so much the mere fact that he is willing to offer his property for the common good, but how he does it. He, like the men of Kos, comes before a full and highly charged meeting of the assembly and his offer is greeted with cheers of approval. The fact that no one in the city (immediately) recognizes the hunter, and as such they do not know the extent of his property, complicates the process somewhat, though not for long. To dispel any confusion about his wealth, the hunter offers the assembly a detailed inventory of all of his meagre possessions.\footnote{Cf. Christ 2006: chapter 3 on the meaning of being honest about your property; for the applicability of that sentiment to this speech, see Dio's joke in his own voice at 7.64, and the hunter's joke at 7.48.} The hunter is so poor that he barely even understands the notion of currency. When his opponent speaks of drachmas and talents, the hunter thinks he is talking about weighing out foodstuffs. Even so, he proudly declares that he is willing to put everything he has to the use of the state, even to give up his home and the land he cultivates so long as his fellow citizens give him a place to live in the city, that is, so long as they agree to consider him one of their own.

He actually makes that offer twice. The first time it is followed immediately by hearty applause and sounds of approval from the men sitting in the assembly. It is less formal than the vote by show of hands that signalled approval in Kos, but this is also not a formal motion, and there is no call for a vote.\footnote{On the vitality of the assembly as deliberative body in this oration, see Ma 2000a: 110ff.} And even with a formal vote, the approval of the audience could not be more clear. It may well be safe to assume that the spontaneous cheers and adulation of the audience were an even greater spur to generosity for a man like Diokles than was having his name published in triplicate, and we should surely imagine that his sizable gift (7000 dr.) was greeted by hearty applause.\footnote{Diokles put his money where his mouth was and made the largest donation by far, though it was in his and his son's name.} The hunter's second, more detailed offer of all his wealth goes straight to the heart of the issue. Offering of all he has, so
long as the community will give him a house, is directly connected to the hunter's asserting his citizen status: Ταῦτα ἢστιν ἡμῖν· εἰ οὖν καὶ πάντα θέλετε, ἡμεῖς ἐκόντες υἱῶν χαρίζομέθα, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς ἀφαίρεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς βιάν ὅσπερ ἀλλοτρίων ἢ πονηρῶν· ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ πολίται τῆς πόλεως ἔσμεν, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦ πατρὸς ἥκονον. The hunter makes this link between supporting the city financially and being a citizen almost as explicit as possible. He says, in essence, 'what we have is yours, since we are citizens'. He offers only one proof of citizenship, and it centres on his link to civic finances as well.

The only other time in his life that he has come to town was when he came with his father when there was a distribution of money, and his father received his share "among the citizens" (ἐν τοῖς πολίταις). The hunter adds that he is raising his children to be citizens, too. If we are to construe this as part of the master script of citizenship, being a willing contributor to civic finances and raising children who will do the same, then we must think more highly still of Diokles. He, and numerous other wealthy Koans, pledged money to the cause not only in their own names, but in those of their sons (and daughters and wives) as well.

We must bear in mind that Dio did not set out to comment on the nature of citizenship. The oration is about the connection between poverty and virtue, and how much better it is to be a poor peasant in the countryside than a poor beggar in the city. But this only strengthens the argument. When Dio needed to construct the ethos of a noble, if poor, citizen in a short time, he approached it from two directions. The first was a brief biographical notice to show that he was a free man and descended from a citizen father. The second is a performance before the whole assembly. The heart of

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65 Dio, 7.48-9. "That is what we have. And if you want it you can take it with our blessing, and there is no need to seize it by force as though we were criminals or foreigners, since, indeed, we are citizens of this city, as my father used to say."
66 Why there was a distribution is unclear. It may have been a clause in the will of a wealthy man (or emperor?), or it may have been from some other civic windfall.
68 This seems to match certain contemporary imperial policies as set out by the leges Manciana and Hadriana de rudibus agris. Those laws seem to have been designed to encourage tenants to bring marginal or underused land under cultivation. The bibliography on the subject of these laws and the North African inscriptions which preserve them is vast. Kehoe 1988 is the best starting point.
citizenship, as Dio imagined it, was standing in the assembly, offering to put your property at the
service of the state and having that offer met with cheers of approval and congratulations. The hunter's
offer of his property is not the end of the scene. The greatest cheers and marks of distinction are
reserved for when he provides evidence that he has saved other citizens from starvation when they were
shipwrecked. This service to the state, which he likens to serving the city in combat, earns him effusive
praise and acceptance as one of the good and respectable citizens of the polis. They even give him the
outward signs of that status: they treat him to a meal in the pnytaneion, and, more immediately, they
compel him to accept a proper mantle in place of his animal skins.\textsuperscript{69} The moment seems to be played
as comedy, but it has much in common with Aeschines. If the hunter is to be accepted into the ranks of
respectable men, he must be made to look the part.

It is as part of this celebration at the climax of the episode that we find a man most like Diokles.
Three men besides the hunter speak in this fictitious meeting of the assembly. There is a witness who
speaks only to verify the hunter's claim that he has saved the lives of citizens, a clear villain, and
likewise an obvious "good man." Our good man is, like Diokles, a man of means; he intervenes to
restrain the wild promises of the villain, and in the end, he proposes the measure that the assembly
eventually adopts. Like Diokles, he too puts his money where his mouth is and offers his own funds
for the city to use in carrying out his policy. The promise to serve the city in arms in the event of war
or incursions by pirates, while it seems somewhat misplaced in the age of the \textit{pax romana}, maps very
well onto Diokles' career as well. Years before his most generous gift of money was accepted by the
Koan assembly, he had devoted his person and property to protecting his deme from incursions by
pirates.\textsuperscript{70}

We can find more in the assembly scene than just the story of how the hunter establishes
\textsuperscript{69} This is a symbolic shedding of his identity as a hermit for a new one as respected citizen.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{IG XII}.4.1 98 (ca. 200 BCE).
himself as a respected citizen. There is also a brief morality play on how to be a good citizen within the context of an assembly meeting. The hunter's nemesis, obviously, shows us the kind of behavior that we should avoid. Specifically, he threatens and harasses poorer citizens, making extravagant claims about what they should be contributing to the public coffers.\textsuperscript{71} For Dio, it is the mark of a bad citizen to spend too much time second-guessing or making unreasonable demands of your fellow citizens—something his speech to Prusa suggests he may have experienced firsthand.\textsuperscript{72} The hunter's ally in the assembly, a man as clearly marked as a hero as the other is a villain, shows us the right way to behave. He addresses the assembly in calm and moderate tones, rather than shouting like his opponent does, and, more to the point, when he suggests that the city offer a reward to the hunter for the rescue of two citizens, he offers to pay for it himself. That is, the other good citizen in Dio's brief tableau also comes forward in the assembly to put his wealth at the service of the state, though he offers only a small portion. In his turn, he, like the hunter, is greeted by applause from the assembly.

In this we seem to have come full circle to one of the issues discussed in the first chapter. We suggested that Menas, in offering prizes for \textit{philoponia}, was actually trying to encourage an ethic of civic engagement in young men, particularly a desire to hold—and thus finance—important public offices. In Kos, we may see in Diokles' call for contributions, open to all and done in full view of the assembly, an attempt to encourage the same behaviour through social pressure—in the most extreme circumstances possible—rather than through ideological training. The end result, causing citizens to put their private wealth at the disposal of the community as a whole is not exclusively Koan or Hellenistic.\textsuperscript{73} The majority of the documents studied in this dissertation, and certainly one of the most common genres of document produced by the Hellenistic Greeks, are decrees of thanks for similar

\textsuperscript{71} He vastly overestimates the wealth of the hunter, and demands contributions both in cash and in kind (27-30).
\textsuperscript{72} Or some other member of Prusa's wealthy elite, if it is not about Dio's own experience.
\textsuperscript{73} Cf. in particular Quass 1993 and Gauthier 1985.
actions, and there is little doubt that such contributions were expected from citizens of classical *poleis* as well. In the literary sphere, the reformer kings of Sparta, Agis and Cleomenes, both demanded that citizens be willing to sacrifice their wealth for the good of the community. Their sweeping policies and overt demands engendered resistance, while Philopoemen (after a fashion) won over his fellows by inspiring them to spend money on arms of their own volition. In classical Athens at the very least, this was a live issue, and one that was vital to the survival of the community.

Common as the practice was, we may still be able to point to a major structural difference between Hellenistic Koan democracy and the Classical Athenian model. In Kos, the manner (or script) by which funds were extracted from individuals for collective use was quite different; it may have gone far to defuse what Christ calls the "extreme tension" that could arise between a wealthy individual and the community as a whole in Classical Athens.74 In Athens, the most onerous financial burdens were those related to national defence: the trierarchy and the *eisphora*. Undertaking either or both of those burdens, especially in the fourth century, was substantially less glamorous than what we see in Kos (and in Dio's Karystos). In Athens, contribution was explicitly demanded by law: a man who was counted among the liturgical class would be called upon to pay for them as a matter of course. The second major difference is that the details of each man's contribution were not necessarily known to one and all. From at least 357 BCE in the case of the trierarchy, and 378 BCE in the case of the *eisphora*, payments were organized through symmories.75 What each man eventually contributed to the total owed by the symmory was not necessarily public knowledge. Those making disproportionately large contributions could expect only the same degree of generalized gratitude that was extended to other men of wealth. In Kos, having such donations be individual and be made in the assembly may have pressured some men to give more, but it also made the connection between service and public

74 Christ 2006: passim and especially 143-5.
75 Christ 2006: 147.
gratitude much clearer and more immediate. In Dio's assembly, such an offer was met with immediate applause and an almost embarrassing outpouring of gratitude.\textsuperscript{76}

The way the Koans handled this process may have been less objectionable for all involved. Diokles' call for contributions is both voluntary and open to all. Rich men can decide whether they can bear the shame of being left off of the list of generous citizens and how much of their fortune they are willing to sacrifice in the name of \textit{philotimia}. Put another way, they have the freedom to decide how much the applause and adulation of their peers was worth to them.\textsuperscript{77} They also had every opportunity to bask in that adulation, to know that their contribution has been recognized and to enjoy the increase in status and cachet that it buys. In this, Kos offered its wealthy citizens a much better opportunity for self-aggrandizement than did Classical Athens, which kept the process hidden. We might assume that Athens chose to keep these extraordinary contributions secret as part of their culture of levelling the differences between citizens. That is, the wealthy did not regularly put their wealth at the disposal of the state in broad view of the public because to do so would call attention to how far their wealth set them apart from the rest of the community. Kos had a different mechanism for disguising those disparities in wealth: they made them irrelevant to participating in this most public and important display of civic spirit. Rather than allowing the wealthy to believe, as the Old Oligarch did, that the common people wanted no part of paying for the war effort, Diokles' appeal for funds was heard by both those of wealth and those of modest means.\textsuperscript{78} The list records multiple donations of only fifty

\textsuperscript{76} Dio's villain complicates matters nicely. His unfounded raging in the assembly suggests that the audience had a script it must perform as well. A good assembly should not demand more than a citizen was capable of offering, or at least there should be limits to how they showed their displeasure.

\textsuperscript{77} Our meager evidence for Hellenistic politics suggests that voluntary contributions were more palatable. Compare the resistance that the Spartan King Agis met when he forced men to put their property at the disposal of the state (Plutarch, \textit{Life of Agis}, 10 and passim) with the rousing success enjoyed by Philopoemen when he, by encouraging a spirit of emulation, convinced the Achaeans to spend lavishly on military equipment (\textit{Life of Philopoemen}, 9).

\textsuperscript{78} Old Oligarch, 13. As with the discussion of Aeschines above, I am not referring to Classical Athens in order to stress the similarities between it and Kos of two-centuries later, but rather to highlight important differences. The Koans could have organized financial contributions in a different way; their reasons for choosing the system they did are worth exploring.
drachmas, and in two instances, offers of payment in kind by those without liquid assets to pledge.79

There are at least two potential explanations for the differences between Athenian and Koan practice. We could say that, from an Athenian perspective, to do as Diokles did would only undermine the democracy in two ways. The assembly most likely would not trust its wealthiest members to contribute according to their abilities, nor could it trust a man who sought to achieve preeminence in the city through ostentatious generosity.80 The city would be, either by turns or simultaneously, starved of funds and threatened by a potential tyrant. From the Koan perspective, setting aside any notions of fairness or freedom we might be tempted to superimpose onto it, their open call for donations would actually ease tensions between the rich and poor (and possibly between residents of the city centre and outlying demes).81 The disparity between the magnitude of donations may have created some tension, but making everyone follow the same script on the same stage surely offered benefits as well. The Koan approach may well have netted the state less money than Athens' strict legal regime, which often forced wealthy men to take out loans to meet their obligations, but this may not have been a fatal flaw. Kos did, after all, weather the storm.

The mere fact that Kos survived the chaos of Philip V's campaign in the Aegean should not blind us to the fact that we face a very serious problem here. We can read the differences between Athenian and Koan practice in two different ways. On the one hand, we could say that the Koan assembly had lost the ability to overrule the self-interest of individual citizens by law. They could only hope to wield social pressures, and in return for what (relatively modest) help they received, they were bound to exalt their benefactors beyond anything an Athenian could bear. If this is our understanding

79 These offers of food for supplying mercenary troops suggest that the fund was to be used to hire a private army to aid in the defence of the polis and chora.
80 Kimon's son Miltiades' exceptional generosity was surely at least partially responsible for his ostracism.
81 They did, after all, have their names and the details of their gifts inscribed in triplicate and displayed in the most visible parts of the city.
of the difference, we could even suggest that this was a symptom of that creeping increase in the power of the individual relative to the community that we see elsewhere in the Hellenistic world. Only a few men were capable of contributing to the public welfare on a grand scale, and the poleis came to be dominated by them, in some fashion. Even if we divorce this from questions of modern ideology, we must admit that the legal constraints which bound the wealthy men in Kos were weaker than those that bound the men of fourth-century Athens. The question before us is, does that necessarily mean that Kos itself was a weaker polis? If they were able to survive the loss of legal constraints, having substituted them for a much stronger socially- and culturally-driven demand that individuals sacrifice their self-interest for the good of the state, should that not mean that the pull of the community was stronger, and that their efforts at socialization and indoctrination were highly effective? This would seem to be the crux of the matter: the public nature of contributing monetarily to the Koan state gave that script as much authority, and greater universality, than its enshrinement in law gave to the Athenian eisphora. Diokles and the Koans, even if we assumed the worst, responded to the rise of self-interest by denying bad citizens a place to hide.\textsuperscript{82} They were confident that without such a cloak, they would adhere to the script.

\textbf{4.5 Theukles and the Oath of Homopoliteia}

I have argued that Diokles' call for donations should be seen as a successful drive to use social pressure, amplified by the kind of cultural conditioning that Menas of Sestos strove for, to force citizens to offer their property for the good of the state. We must be wary, though. Kos was no utopia, and there was more to the island polis' ability to engage its citizens than the threat of public shaming. We will now be turning our attention to two roughly contemporary documents that also have something to say about the performative quality of Koan citizenship: the oath of homopoliteia with Kalymna, and

\textsuperscript{82} According to Christ 2006: introduction and passim, excessive self-interest is the defining characteristic of a bad citizen.
the honorary decree for Theukles. Much of the oath is fairly straightforward and actually quite similar to other 'citizenship oaths'.  

For the most part, our discussion will focus on one or two clauses that seem slightly less traditional, and which seem to reflect concerns that are also present in the honorary decree for Theukles, a leading citizen from the deme of Halasarna. The text of the oath is presented here for the sake of ease:

83 See, e.g., the oath of sympolitieia between Smyrna and Magnesia (I. Smyrna 573), or the two ephebic oaths discussed in the first chapter (Rhodes and Osbourne 2003: #88 and I. Cret. 1.9.1). All three have similar promises to respect and maintain the current laws and political system.

84 IG XII.4.1 152.

Στασίλας Λυκόφρονος εἶπε· ἔλεσθαι ὁρκοτάς δύο ἐξ ἐκάστας φυλὰς, οἵτινες ὁρκίζεσθαι τοὺς πολίτας ἐν ταῖ ἀγοραῖ πρὸ τῶν ἀρχείων, καὶ γραμματῇ ἐς ἐκάσταμ φυλὰν καὶ τὸν ὑπαγορεύοντα τὸν ὀρκον· ἔλεσθαι δὲ καὶ εἰς Κάλυμναν ἕνα ἐξ ἐκάστας φυλὰς καὶ γραμματῇ τούτοις· ὁρκίζοντο δὲ τούτοι εἶ καὶ ὁ στραταγὸς ὁ ἀποσταλεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ δάμου ποιτίσσῃ τοι δὲ πολῖται μισθωσάντω ἢ ἔδη διέ ὁρκωμόσια παρασχέσαι τοῖς πολίταις αὐτεὶ τε καὶ εἰς Κάλυμναν· τὰ δὲ ὁρκομόσια ἐστὸ ταῦτα κάπρος κριός, τέλεια πάντα· τοὶ δὲ πολῖται πάντες ἤβαδὸν ὀμνυόντω, πράττοι τοῖς προστάται καὶ τοῖς στραταγοί· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ὅσοι μὲν ὅδε ἐπιδίδεσθαι, ποτὶ τοὺς ὁρκοτάς τοὺς ἄφεβόντας ὅδε, τοὶ δὲ λοιποὶ ποτὶ τοὺς εἰς Κάλυμναν ἀποστελλομένους· ὁρκίζοντο δὲ τοῖς ἀνήρες τὸν ὀρκον τόνδε· ἐμενὸ τὰ καθεστάκια δαμοκρατία καὶ τὰ ἀποκαταστάσει τὰς ὁμοπολειτείας καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοῖς ᾽Κῶ πατρίοις ὑπάρχουσι καὶ τοῖς δόγμαις τὰς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τὰς διαγραφὰς ταῖς ὑπὲρ τὰς ὁμοπολειτείας· ἐμενὸ δὲ καὶ τάτι ποτὶ βασιλῆ Πτολεμαίων φιλίας καὶ συμμαχία καὶ ταῖς συνθήκαις τὰς ποτὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοῖς δάμοι κεκυρομέναις· ὁλιγαρχίαν δὲ οὐδὲ τῆρανον οὐδὲ ἄλλο πολίτεια ἐξο δαμοκρατίας οὐ καταστάσω παρευρέσει οὐδεμαί, οὐδ’ εἰ τίς καὶ ἄλλος καθιστᾷ ἐπιτραγι, ἄλλα καλοῦσα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, οὐδὲ τὸν φρουρίων οὔθεν οὐδὲ ἄκραν καταλαμβάνει οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐξαιδιαζόμενος οὔτε ἄλλοις συνεργῶν παρευρέσει οὐδεμαί, οὐδὲ τάν Κῶιαν ἐλάσσο γινομένων περιουρεῖμαι, ἄλλ’ αὐξήσω κατὰ δύομεν τάν αὐτοῦ· ἐσσεῖμαι δὲ καὶ δικαστὰς δίκαιος καὶ πολίτας Ἰςος χειροτόνουν καὶ ψαρίζομενος ἂνευ χάριτος ο κα μοι δοκῆ συμψέρον ἤμεν τοῖς δάμοι· ἀλαθή ταῦτα καὶ τὸν Δίᾳ καὶ τὰν Ἰραν καὶ τὸν Ποτείδα· ευορκεῦντι μὲ μ[οι εṽ] ἤμεν, ἐπιορκεῦντι δὲ τὰ ἑναντία. τοὶ δὲ ὁρκο[ταὶ ὀμνυόντοι]
The motion of Stasilas, son of Lycophron. Two overseers of the oath are to be chosen from each tribe and they are to administer the oath in the agora in front of the Archeion, and for each tribe a secretary and a man to read the oath. And choose one (overseer) from each tribe to go to Kalymna and a secretary for them. And let them administer the oath wherever the general sent out by the people arranges for it. And let the poletai contract out sacrificial victims for the oath and provide one set of victims to the citizens here and one to Kalymna. And the victims should be a bull, goat and ram, and all of them perfect. And that all of the citizens swear by age and the prostatai and the generals shall do so first. And of the rest, whoever is in town when the overseers are chosen here should swear here, and the rest when they are sent to Kalymna. And let the men swear this oath: I will abide by the established democracy and the rules of the homopoliteia and the laws which have endured from our fathers' time in Kos and to the decrees of the assembly and the written agreements about the homopoliteia. I will abide by the friendship and alliance with King Ptolemy and the solemn treaties which the damos has with its allies. I will not set up an oligarchy or a tyrant or any other regime outside of the democracy on any pretense, and I will not turn a blind eye if another man tries to establish a new constitution, but I will hinder him to the best of my ability. Nor will I seize any of the fortresses or citadels or make them my own private property, I will not do this on my own initiative, nor in concert with another on any pretence. I will not allow Kos to be diminished, but will make it greater to the best of my ability. I will be a just judge and an equal citizen, and will raise my hand and cast my vote for whatever seems best for the damos without favour. This is true by Zeus and Hera and Poseidon. If I swear truly may things go well for me, and if I violate the oath the opposite...

Most of the terms of the oath are fairly typical. The citizens of Kos and Kalymna swear to preserve the democracy and to abide by the terms of the renewed homopoliteia agreement between them, as well as the ancestral laws of Kos and any decrees of the assembly.\textsuperscript{85} The declaration of loyalty to the Ptolemies and to their other allies (chiefly Rhodes, one assumes) is hardly without precedent, either. The next clause, a pledge not to undermine the current constitution or to allow a revolution to move forward without opposition, is only slightly more interesting. The fourth and final clause, in which citizens declare that they will not interfere with the city's fortifications, is only very slightly more unusual. The primary reason that our attention is drawn to it is the overlap between this and the

\textsuperscript{85} These clauses are entirely in line with the citizenship oath of Miletus (\textit{I. Milet.} 1.3.139), the ephic oath of Athens (Rhodes and Osborne 2003: #88) and the oath of the agelai of Dreros (\textit{I. Cret.} I.9.1), all discussed in chapter one.
praises lavished on a certain Theukles of Halasarna in a contemporary decree.

The people of Kos and Kalymna swear that they will not seize any border forts or high places for themselves, either alone or acting in concert with others. Speaking generally, this should not be alarming. They have just sworn off attempting any kind of insurrection that would change the constitution or overturn their most important alliances. Seizing control of fortresses and commanding defensive positions is a natural opening gambit for anything of the sort.⁸⁶ There is an extra verb in that part of the oath, though: not only do the islanders have to swear off seizing military installations, they also swear not to make them their own private property (exidiazesthai [Il.24-5]).⁸⁷ Worry that individual citizens would simply lay claim to forts and use them for their own ends seems to be unique to Kos. A nearly contemporary decree in honour of a certain Theukles adds some context, and helps to reveal one potential fault-line within the island polity.⁸⁸ During the Cretan war, a Koan and resident of Halasarna, Theukles, saw that his deme was largely without defences against sudden attacks by pirates.⁸⁹ To rectify the situation, he convinced the assembly (of Halasarna, not Kos) to vote in favour of building new fortifications, and provided the funds needed for their construction himself.⁹⁰ Later he organized further funds to build and restore still more defensive works (walls and peripolia) in the

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⁸⁶ The people of Priene resorting to the fortress of Karion while they attempted to subvert a tyrannical government is a good Hellenistic example (I. Priene 37.65ff). Virtually any event from Classical Athenian history (Peisistratus’ first tyranny, Hippias fortifying Munichia, the 400 doing the same, or the returning democrats seizing Phyle) follows the same pattern.

⁸⁷ Εξοδιάζομαι is relatively rare in epigraphy and seemingly a Hellenistic coinage. It first appears in literature in Polybius, and Diodorus Siculus uses it more frequently (four times) than any other single author. Its literal meaning seems to be roughly what one would expect from a verb built on the adjective idios: it means “claim for one’s own.” See, e.g., Diodorus, 19.61.1 where Antigonus accuses Cassander of claiming the kingship of Macedon for himself (φανερῶς δ’ ἐξοδιάζεται τῆς Μακεδόνος βασιλείας).

⁸⁸ Given that Kos was a naval power, and that certain leading citizens contributed to its defence by supporting mercenary troops, it is possible that they used publicly owned fortresses to billet their private armies (of privateers, most likely).

⁸⁹ IG XII.4.1 99.7 ff and 17. The incursions were made by lemboi: small ships of Illyrian design which were virtually synonymous with piracy (cf. Baker 1991: 43, Holleaux 1985: 23, or, for a locus classicus, the Bacchides of Plautus, II. 279 following).

⁹⁰ IG XII.4.1 99.8. Baker 1991: 44 takes kata gramma to mean that the rotation was somehow arranged alphabetically. For a warm fuzzy feeling, the new forts offered security to women and children.
territory of his deme.\textsuperscript{91} As the conflict wore on, Theukles saw to other fortification-related expenses as well, such as making necessary repairs to the walls and augmenting their garrison. So seriously did his fellow citizens of Halasarna take the issue of the local forts that they considered even writing a letter to the central Koan assembly asking for funds to make repairs a praiseworthy deed.

We cannot doubt the patriotism of Theukles, but not all of his fellow citizens held themselves to the same high standard. Theukles had the opportunity to be a hero because Halasarna lacked adequate fortifications to protect their women and children. By Theukles' time, it had been a full century and half since the synoikism (and establishment of Kos town as the capital) removed the major impetus for Halasarna to build its own fortifications, and almost a full century since Kos' external policy (alliances with the Ptolemies and Rhodes) had rendered the island relatively safe. We should not be alarmed if over that time they had built no new forts, and had allowed those they had to fall into disrepair. It is somewhat surprising that they seem to have been completely without fortifications situated in “the most appropriate locations” (τὸς ἐπικαιροτάτος τῶν τόπων ἀνοιχτος ἐόντας).\textsuperscript{92} Nor does it seem likely that this was merely a hyperbole: during the same conflict, Theukles is credited with repairing the wall surrounding the urban centre of Halasarna, not creating one where there was none before, and a little later he is praised for replacing damaged equipment.\textsuperscript{93} That suggests that the deme had no installations whatsoever in the most important places, a strange situation to say the least. In this context, it might be tempting to conclude that the most appropriate locations did actually have some buildings which had formerly been forts but that, much as the oath forbid, they had been taken over for private use at some point during Halasarna's sustained peace. Two other features of his decree may offer circumstantial

\textsuperscript{91} IG XII.4.1 99.15-17. There is some debate about the precise nature of the defensive works build under the watch of Theukles. Baker 1991: 40-43 offers an adequate summary. See also Robert 1970: 598 on the importance of such defensive works.

\textsuperscript{92} IG XII.4.1 99.7.

\textsuperscript{93} IG XII.4.1 99.31-34.
support for this hypothesis. The first, which will be taken up more fully below, is that Theukles freed his demesmen of the duty of guarding Kos town so that they could guard their own private property. It is hard to imagine what they might expect to accomplish if they did not possess some form of private stronghold, either individually or in conjunction with others. The second is that Theukles was praised for being a vigorous prosecutor of those men who, even during the present crisis, did not obey the decrees of the assembly. The tempting conclusion might be that the assembly had ordered men to vacate some former forts that they had been treating as their own property and that some had refused, but this must remain a matter of speculation.

Theukles, in his great zeal for fortifying the deme of Halasarna, showed remarkable devotion to the common good. He was lavish not only of his time, but also of his funds, as he undertook to fund several of the projects himself. If Theukles is to be praised for this, we must accept the possibility that some of his fellow citizens failed to match his sterling example. During a long interlude of peace, they may have claimed some public property as their own, or, at the very least, they were not so swift as he when it came to building new forts. We can find that same subtext in Theukles' other great service: freeing his fellows from the need to serve as guards. He did not leave the city undefended; rather he set up a system of rotation for duty based on an alphabetical list of all those liable for service, and hired a force of mercenaries to guard the walls of the urban centre of Halasarna. He did this so that the rest of the citizens would be free "to remain on their own estates and guard the forts (there)" (ἀπέλυσε τός δαμότας τάς κατά πόλιν φυλακάς, νομίζων δείν μένοντας ἐπί τῶν ἰδίων τόπων συνδιατηρήσαι τὰ φρούρια). There are two possible ways to interpret Theukles' policy, but both seem to imply that he

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94 Individual citizens would be unlikely to make a serious effort to defend their homesteads if they were faced with a significant number of pirates.
95 Which is itself a violation of the oath of homoliteia.
96 I take this to mean the urban centre of the deme of Halasarna, though it may mean Kos itself. It is not entirely clear to me which of these two options should be preferred (though Baker 1991: 44 assumes it is the latter). Comparison to Athenian usage suggests the latter, as might the fact that, in the inscription itself, we only find references to the deme or
saw a need to balance the interest of the polis as a whole with individual concerns. The key is the meaning of 'polis' in the quote above. We should perhaps assume that 'polis' here refers to the city of Kos itself, in which case, idioi topoi would most likely refer to the deme of Halasarna, and the forts would be those which Theukles had built to protect the area. That is surely the safe interpretation. It is also possible that, in this context, 'polis' refers to the urban centre of Halasarna itself, and idioi topoi is actually referring to private holdings in the hinterland of the deme. Using the word polis to refer to anything other than the central settlement of a polity would be rare, but perhaps less shocking for a community that had been incorporated into another by synoikism. No other example of this can be found in the inscriptions from Halasarna, but in a very fragmentary inscription they refer to their urban centre by the very closely related polisma (to polisma en Halasarnai), and the walls built about their urban centre and chora are called a peripolion: a fort to house those patrolling or guarding a polis. Also for the sake of comparison, a short distance over the sea, the people of Kalymna, we know, continued to refer to their city as a polis even after being more or less incorporated into the city of Kos. There were several demesmen of Halasarna, then, who would be happy to be let off duty guarding the city so that they could stand watch in the fortresses in their own localities.

Both interpretations lead to the same general conclusion: that the Koans could not assume that, even in time of war, self-interest at the local level would be sublimated to the good of the polis as a whole. The men of Halasarna preferred to spend their time and resources keeping watch over their
own neighbourhood, rather than ensuring the security of the community as a whole.\textsuperscript{100} At the very least, they were more concerned with their own rural district than with the survival of the polis proper, as was Theukles. If this were all, that they preferred to defend their deme than to man the walls of the city, we might think it a worrisome lack of altruism, but not anything alarming.\textsuperscript{101} But we know that there was much more to this story. In addition to his program of building fortifications and hiring mercenaries to defend the city, Theukles was praised for prosecuting those who failed to conform to the decisions of the assembly.\textsuperscript{102} Given the context, he is almost certainly prosecuting those who in some way interfered with measures for the defence of the deme. This interference could take the form of men who either men who had appropriated fortifications (or even just defensible positions) and were hesitant, or too slow to vacate them for state use, men who insisted on defending their own lands rather than going on guard duty when it was their turn in the rotation.\textsuperscript{103} Here, unlike with Diokles' decree, the people of Kos had legal levers available to force compliance.

Theukles' career seems to perfectly balance the needs of the polis, the deme and individuals. He gave freely of his own funds in order to build much-needed fortifications, and of course spared no effort in his service of the community. But he did not sacrifice all in the name of the polis. He was sensitive to the fact that Kos was a composite state, and sought a way to balance the desire to defend local demes with the need to maintain a guard around the administrative centre of the polis proper. The innovation that is of most interest to us is his institution of a rotation for guard duty. It allowed his demesmen (and men from other outlying demes) to defend their homes against incursions from the sea,

\textsuperscript{100} Or, at the very least, they were grateful enough that Theukles allowed them to do so that they saw fit to include this measure in their decree of praise.
\textsuperscript{101} According to Thucydides, the Athenians consented to leave their demes for the city only grudgingly, and Aristophanes' \textit{Acharnians} speaks for itself.
\textsuperscript{102} This too was demanded by the oath of \textit{homopoliteia}.
\textsuperscript{103} There are other options as well. The most likely of which would be some refusal by the owners of trading of fishing boats to use their vessels as a kind of coast-guard.
while still serving the community as a whole. Perhaps as importantly, much like Diokles' decree, it
established the parameters in which that service would be performed. Inclusion in the public list of
guards, much like inclusion on the list of benefactors, offered a set opportunity to perform one of the
core duties of a citizen and to have that performance witnessed by one's peers.

The oath established the minimum degree of selflessness, or community spirit, that the polis
demanded: citizens must accept and protect the current regime and endorse their traditional foreign
policy. They were also expected to put the needs of the community ahead of their own self-interest, at
least to some extent. Citizens must resist the temptation to appropriate the city's fortifications for their
own use, and must defend the polis as a whole when it was threatened, not merely look after their
own.104 During the Cretan war and the conflict with Philip V, some Koans seem to have been tempted
to opt out of their duties to the polis as a whole, not necessarily from cowardice or malice, but rather
from a natural desire to defend their own homes, demes and families. It is here that Theukles did signal
service. He took the lead in prosecuting those who were not sufficiently invested in the safety of the
community as a whole,105 while at the same time addressing their concerns by reducing the burden of
defending the polis proper. By hiring mercenaries to augment the citizen guards, he made it possible
for everyone in the city to display their devotion to the common cause by taking their turn on garrison
duty, while freeing them to spend the remainder of their time defending their own lands and families.106

We must be aware of the danger of pushing the case too far, but we could say that both Diokles and
Theukles were involved in negotiating the balance between communal and self-interest. Diokles
allowed citizens to donate as much as they felt they could spare, using only the (very powerful) threat

104 Compare the ephelic oath of Athens (Rhodes and Osborne 2003: # 88).
105 Which again, is the most likely context for his prosecution of those who failed to comply with the decrees of the
Halisarmanian assembly.
106 IG XII.4.1 99.21.
of potential embarrassment and the loss of status to spur them on to generosity,\textsuperscript{107} while Theukles allowed men to contribute directly to the defence of the community as a whole without having to completely abandon their own households.

\textbf{4.6 Koan Religion}

We began this chapter by attempting to articulate some of the advantages inherent in thinking of Koan citizenship as being defined by performance, rather than law. This offered perhaps the easiest model for interpreting Diokles’ call for contributions, which in turn can be reconciled with the career of his contemporary, Theukles. In this context, it would be inexcusable to pass over two of the numerous sacred laws of Kos in silence. The first of those two, the revision made to the roster of participants in the deme of Halasarna’s cult of Apollo and Herakles, has greatly influenced prior studies of Koan citizenship.\textsuperscript{108} The original list of participants was so old that it was no longer easily read, so the people of Halasarna undertook to make a new one. Those who have a share in the cult are supposed to report their name, the name of their father, the name of their mother and the name of her father.\textsuperscript{109} It is from this requirement for full participation in state religion that we have been able to posit that Koan citizenship was dependent on being able to prove that three generations of your ancestors were citizens as well.\textsuperscript{110} As in Athens and most other cities, the native citizen body was supplemented by grants made to individual outsiders, but the core of the damos had been Koan for three generations.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{107} The threat of public scorn may seem strange in a situation that we would think calls for unity, but it is a very common means of pressuring citizens to contribute to a war-effort. In Greek culture it is at least as old as Homer (e.g. Hector’s farewell to Andromache [Iliad, 6.440ff]: “I have considered all these things as well, but I would be greatly shamed before the men of Troy, and the women trailing their long robes, if, like a wretched coward, I shrank from battle” ἦ καὶ ἐμοὶ τάδε πάντα μέλει γόνατι· ἄλλα μᾶλ’ αἰνύσαι αἰδέσσαι Τρώας καὶ Τρομάδας ἑλκεπέπλους, αἱ κε κακὸς ὃς νόσφιν ἄλυσκάζει πολέμου). For a Canadian, the most ready comparison is to the First World War, where a common recruiting poster showed a troubled-looking middle-aged man speaking to his children with the caption: “What will you tell them you did during the war?” Or see Robert Graves’ frank discussion of the BEF’s method of shaming “conscientious objectors” into agreeing to active service (Graves 1957: 206).

\textsuperscript{108} IG XII.4.1 103. This decree is also roughly contemporary with the Cretan war and the war against Philip.

\textsuperscript{109} IG XII.4.1 103.30-37.

\textsuperscript{110} Sherwin-White 1978; see also Vial 1985.

\textsuperscript{111} IG XII.4.1 103. 38.
related conclusion, one supported by Koan practice in other decrees, is that women enjoyed a much more prominent place in the damos of Kos than they did in, for instance, democratic Athens.\textsuperscript{112} Maternal ancestors were even more important than paternal ancestors for establishing citizenship, and in several decrees, including Diokles' subscription, female citizens, \textit{politides}, are recognized as an important part of the community.\textsuperscript{113}

The second document, one long known but only relatively recently published, is a sacred law from the third century which, inter alia, prescribed mandatory nuptial sacrifices to Aphrodite Pandamos. The law actually establishes the conditions for the sale of the priesthood of Aphrodite Pandamos, and introduces the requirement for brides to make a sacrifice in the temple as a means of magnifying the honours enjoyed by the goddess: ἵνα δὲ ἐπαύξηται τὰ τίμα τὰς θεοὺς, φαίνονται τε ταῖς γαμοθσαὶ πᾶσαι τὰν τε πολιτίδων καὶ νό[θ]ων καὶ παροίκων κατὰ δύναμιν τάν αὐτῶν τιμῶσαι τάν θεόν, ὃσαι καὶ γαμῶνται, χρηματισθείσας εἰσωμοσίας, θυόντω πᾶσαι ταὶ θεοὶ ἱερήν μετὰ τὸν γάμον ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ. \textsuperscript{114} Whether this was a new policy or the framers of the decree simply wanted to reaffirm traditional practice must remain uncertain. The end of the third century, a time of peace following a decade of instability and warfare, would be a fine time for a general review and renewal of religious practice, but the rule would also seem to bear on an issue raised by Theukles' decree.

Theukles' policies suggest that under the stress of war, tensions between individual and local interests and the interests of the island polis as a whole emerged. He worked to create a compromise position, one that required all men to serve, at least for a time, as guards over the polis itself, while still

\textsuperscript{112} Cf. Grieb 2008
\textsuperscript{113} On the basis of their position in the list, Grieb assumes that they were a more important component of the damos than all but male citizens, outranking the nothoi, paroikoi and xenoi. Whether women were invited to join because they were considered a (somewhat) important part of the community or because, as in Hellenistic Sparta, they were thought to have amassed substantial fortunes is an open question.
\textsuperscript{114} IG XII.4.1 302.15. “In order to magnify the honours of the goddess, let all the new brides appear at the temple to honour the goddess according to their ability, the citizen women, the nothai and the paroikai, as many of them as marry, and after paying and swearing the oath, let them all sacrifice to the goddess at the temple within a year of their marriage.”
allowing them to spend the majority of their time defending their demes. This law required all women to visit the temple of Aphrodite Pandamos in the civic centre of Kos within a year of their marriage. It reaffirmed the supremacy of the polis in religious matters, and offered the women a prescribed time and venue for performing their civic and religious duty. The former may have been more of a concern than we might think at a time when the deme of Halasarna began drawing up a new list of those eligible to participate in its traditional cult of Apollo. The latter gave the women of Kos an official forum and an official script for asserting their status within community. Again, like Diokles' decree, it allows for differences of wealth while preventing the duty from becoming unnecessarily or unfairly burdensome, since the women are to sacrifice kata dunamin.

4.7 Conclusions

While Athens may not have been typical of Classical Greek democracy, as the Greek city we know best it makes a useful foil for comparison. In this chapter we have explored a major difference between Hellenistic Koan democracy and the Classical Athenian versions, one best articulated by looking at citizenship as a collection of performances. The people of Kos seem to have been more confident in their ability, as an audience, to compel their members to perform according to a script of their choosing. Neither Diokles nor those who framed the rules for marital sacrifices saw any need to specify how much each citizen needed to spend. They were confident that the populace, gathered to observe the performance, was sufficiently formidable to ensure proper behaviour. Avoiding such regulation may also have served to increase participation rates; with no minimum for donations, they were able to maintain the illusion that all citizens enjoyed the same opportunities and duty to serve the state. In this way it can be seen as an extension of the program of moral training that Menas instituted in Sestos, which was discussed in the first chapter. Theukles' efforts to defend Halasarna from pirates
and raiders speak to a similar sensibility, but a slightly different approach. He recognized that, given the composite nature of the island polity, many citizens resented guarding the polis proper while leaving their demes and estates undefended. By introducing a system of rotation for guard duty in Kos proper, one based on an inscribed list, he allowed all men the public opportunity to do their part for the defence of the city, while still leaving some manpower free to defend their demes. The innovations (or renewal of prior tradition) introduced into the cult of Aphrodite Pandamos ensured that every woman had at least one opportunity in her lifetime to assert her status with a similar performance. In this case, the evolution that allowed Kos to survive and thrive as a polis was that they began offering more opportunities to more members of the community, to establish their place in the polis with displays of altruism and civic dedication. The end result, as suggested by Theukles' decree and Dio's Euboicus, was that they were able to make such displays of service to the state synonymous with citizenship.
Conclusion

The preceding study has been, for all it may seem otherwise, too brief to draw sweeping conclusions about an institution as widespread and disparate as the Hellenistic polis. Across four chapters we have primarily engaged with seven or eight of the thousands of public inscriptions produced by the Hellenistic Greeks. The geographic and temporal spread of those documents has been, in practice if not by design, rather limited. The earliest among them are those from Kos (IG XII.4.1 75 and IG XII.4.1 99) and Dreros (I. Cret. I.9.1), which date to the last years of the third century BCE, while the latest are the honorary decrees for Zosimos of Priene (I. Priene 112 and 113), who flourished in the first decades of the first century BCE—a spread of a little more than a century. Geographically, the states that produced these documents are united more by what they are not than what they are. None of them is part of what we would normally consider to be the classical centre of Greece, nor were they ever major powers. When Athens, Sparta, and even Thebes were the dominant Hellenic powers, Kos, Thessaly, Sestos, Crete and even Priene (for all it could wish otherwise, as the home of the Ionian Koinon) were peripheral players at best. It may be that this experience made them uniquely well-prepared for a world dominated by kings and the Roman Republic: they had long practice at making their way in the world as lesser powers.

Within those geographic and temporal boundaries, we have essentially focused on four phenomena: citizen training, rhetoric, the public archives and the social pressures that drive civic engagement. While at first glance these may seem unconnected, they actually revolve around two general themes: indoctrination and history. In the first and fourth chapters, we explored what amounted to two different systems of indoctrination—one directed at young men, the other at adults—that aimed to keep citizens active in local government. In Sestos, young men (ephebes and neo[i]) were encouraged to
pursue social and political virtues through prizes awarded for gymnastic training. Whether by design or through an undirected process of evolution, three gymnastic virtues (eutaxia, euexia and philoponia) became synonymous with the qualities that led to a stable and healthy polis. Eutaxia and euexia could describe a model citizen both in the gymnasia and in the polis: a man who restrains his appetites and is not disruptive to the community. Even more importantly, philoponia was assimilated to active involvement in local government and politics, and especially the practice of taking on expensive magistracies and liturgies. Encouraging these qualities through contests and prizes cultivated an ethic of putting the good of the community before personal gain or pleasure.

On the island of Kos, we can see social pressures being exerted to the same ends, but in a different venue and on a different demographic. Diokles' call for donations to the common good and the decree in honour of Theukles are products of a period of instability. When it was vulnerable, the polis of Kos seems to have increased the pressure on adult citizens to put the good of the community before self-interest. In this case, rather than offering prizes for devotion to such virtues, they use a combination of social pressure and measured expectations. Diokles' call for donations was an opportunity to use overt social pressures to bring about the desired behaviours. It pressured citizens to donate by setting aside a specific meeting of the assembly for offering such donations and pressured citizens to make donations according to their means by invoking the possibility of rejecting any unsuitable donations. In doing so, it brought pressure to bear on both the wealthy and the relatively humble; the assembly accepted donations ranging from thousands of drachmas down to only fifty, as well as offers of payment in kind from those with no cash to spare. Theukles' honorary decree suggests that such a spirit actuated other parts of Koan policy. He actively prosecuted men who put self-interest ahead of obedience to the communal will, using the law to do what unofficial social pressures could not, and instituted an official rotation for guard duty so that everyone had a clearly defined role.
The other two chapters explore the value of history, and, more specifically, the documentary record, to a Hellenistic polis. The honorary decree for Zosimos (*I. Priene* 112) suggests that the ideal education for a young man included training in rhetoric alongside political ethics (and practical military training). In Hellenistic Priene, rhetorical education likely focused on deploying the city's history in diplomatic negotiations. That program of education fit in well with Zosimos' other major achievement, providing endowment funds to allow the city to begin keeping duplicate copies of all official documents. A secure and reliable archive of public documents was treated as the most compelling form of evidence in diplomatic exchanges, and Priene proved more adept than most cities at deploying those documents.

In Dyme and Paros, we can see the value of such a documentary record for internal political affairs. In these *poleis*, the archives were treated as the bulwark of political stability. In Paros, they were treated with something approaching religious awe, and the whole community was implicated in defending their sanctity. In Dyme, the loss of the collected documentary history of the polis, along with the building that housed them, was enough to plunge the city into chaos. Such records could also become a nexus of factional strife. For example, in Larisa and Dyme, erasing an enemy's name from the public records, and by extension from citizenship, became a form of political attack.

These two themes are themselves tightly linked. This is most readily apparent in the case of the Koan documents. Diokles' call for donations offers in exchange the promise that any such donations will be commemorated on stone in the most visible areas of the city—a promise that seems to stir the ambitions even of those who lack sufficient cash to donate.\(^1\) From the other direction, Theukles' system of rotation for guard duty relies on an inscribed catalogue of all citizens fit to serve. It is implied that before the publication of the catalogue, many citizens preferred to guard their own demes or estates.

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\(^1\) As suggested by the large number of relatively small donations: even men of modest means wanted the chance to participate.
rather than to defend the polis itself, while no one cared to defy a written and publicly displayed
catalogue. The same undercurrent can be detected in the career of Menas of Sestos. As a
gymnasiarch, Menas encouraged an ethic of participation in his young charges, specifically a desire to
hold expensive magistracies like the gymnasiarchy. In turn, his service to the community was officially
commemorated on stone, and became part of the documentary record. It may even be fair to say that
his honorary decree was set up to encourage young men to follow his example and reap the same
reward. The young men who won prizes for philoponia, eutaxia and euexia were often honoured in the
same fashion. In Samos, the victors in these competitions were displayed on a public inscription. In
Sestos, they were awarded inscribed shields that served the same function. In Athens, it was common
practice to publish decrees of the assembly commending all of the ephebes for these qualities. We
could see this as a matter of offering the young men a taste of the ultimate rewards of a life of public
service.

The public records of the polis were an integral element in a stable and functional local political
system. It was the archives that preserved the list all citizens, which was the ultimate proof of status,
and it was the archives that preserved the record of a citizen's public deeds. We could, perhaps, detect a
similar dynamic at play in international relations. The major powers were happy to negotiate with
Greek cities in the language of past benefactions (the 'language of euergetism') not only because such a
system reduced the need for armed conflict, but also because the poleis were particularly adept at
preserving a record of their deeds and decisions. Antiochus II was happy to exchange the slight loss in
potential income that granting tax exemptions to Erythrae entailed for a guarantee of a permanent
record of his generosity. Antiochus III restored the kingdom of his ancestors by explicitly drawing on

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2 And we must not forget the Koans' efforts to update their citizen lists as the previous copies became faded with age.
3 Or Zosimos of Priene, or nearly any other subject of an honorary decree (cf. Gauthier 1985 or Quass 1993).
4 RC 15.
the memory of their victories, treaties, alliances and grants. The special reliability of the *poleis* in this may also explain one other seemingly curious phenomenon of the epigraphic record: the kings' desire to reward loyal officers with citizenship in a Greek polis. If we consider, for example, the cases of Seleukos IV's minister Aristolochos, and Aristodikes of Assos, it seems clear that the kings have already given them many material rewards. Aristodikes especially has been granted massive tracts of land, which seem to include entire villages and their inhabitants. And yet he is willing and eager to sacrifice some of his wealth in exchange for citizenship (and an honoured place) in even the relatively small polis of Ilium. Why was he willing to do so? The obvious answer would be that citizenship in a polis offered him (and Aristolochos, and others) something they could not find on their own estates. This was surely not the esteem, admiration or gratitude of their fellow men; for a man who owned an entire village, complete with its inhabitants, this could be had at no cost. It may be that Aristodikes sought the same thing from Ilium that the kings wanted from the *poleis* under their sway: a guarantee that they and their achievements would not be forgotten. An enduring record of a man's generosity was a prize that the Hellenistic *poleis* were uniquely situated to offer.

To our eyes, the *poleis*' willingness to provide this service makes a poor impression. It smacks of flattery and the worst kind of obsequiousness. If we look to what such men could actually hope for from their newly adopted *poleis*, we may grow even more concerned. The wealthy citizens (either native or new) of a polis could expect a level of honour that makes us uncomfortable. In life, leading men could be offered multiple decrees of praise, crowns, prominent seats in the theatre, the right to address the assembly before anyone else, the right to be feasted in the council hall and other marks of

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5 Cf. Ma 1999 passim, and especially document 28 (=OGIS 237).
6 *RC* 45 and 10-13
7 *RC* 10-12.
8 Thus the Seleucid general Meleager commands the people of Ilium to inscribe the terms of Aristodikes' agreement with them on stone, so that they will remain secure for all time (*RC* 13).
distinction. In death they could expect lavish public monuments, perpetual honours for their
descendants and a state funeral in which the young men of the city would lead their burial procession as
though leading a public sacrifice to the altar. It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that such
treatment was analogous to the divine honours accorded to the kings.9 Such honours were not, of
course, limited to outsiders or even to those rich men who died after a career of long and generous
public service.

The connection between the rise of (to us) excessive honours for wealthy and powerful
citizens, the poleis' unique ability to ensure that such honours would be remembered in perpetuity and
an apparent eagerness on the part of outsiders to buy admission into the community of citizens is
superficial but tempting. Exploring that connection more fully will be the next stage of research. The
history of the polis and its religious practice were inextricably linked. In Priene, the city's patron deity
Athena Polias was the first and most important protector of the city's archives, while in Paros that duty
fell to Apollo. The city of Ephesus provides what may be the most singular meeting of three of these
trends. The foundation of Salutaris, known to us from a decree some four hundred lines long, records
the details of a donation of cult statues, including statues representing the eponymous heroes of the
Ephesian tribes, which were to be carried in processions. In accepting the gift, the people of Ephesus
make it clear that they remember all of their past benefactors, and choose to honour Salutaris in
particular by setting up statues of him in the temple of Artemis, which they will carry in procession
from the temple to the theatre and back once each year.10 While not carried in the same procession, or
by the same route, statues of Salutaris are accorded honours similar to the statues he donates and that
represent the various parts of the polis, gods and important figures from the city's mythical history.

And these latter statues were carried in procession by the ephebes and young men of the city. In

9 Compare the honours awarded to Antiochus III and his wife by the Teians (Ma 1999: #18).
Ephesus, preserving the memory of benefactors became a religious duty and a means of encouraging young men to aspire to a similar life of service.

It may be fitting to close with a brief warning, or at least an acknowledgement of the dangers inherent in this line of investigation. We should not be surprised that our evidence suggests a deep concern with the permanence of memory and the poleis' ability to preserve their history, because our evidence consists almost entirely of records that were deemed worthy for permanent preservation on stone. In other words, there is a certain danger of circularity here, because our evidence is, almost by definition, selected to fit such a conclusion. The ability to preserve the history of citizens, cities, and kings may have been one of the primary assets of the Hellenistic poleis, but it was not their only sphere of activity or their only reason for existing. In a predominantly agrarian economy, small nucleated settlements were an efficient form of population distribution. In an era of frequent warfare and significant piratical activity, fortified cities defended by the collected efforts of the inhabitants were more secure (and economical) than other systems of organization. It may also be that, in addition to serving as record keepers, independent poleis offered the kings (and Rome) an efficient system for organizing and controlling their spheres of influence. The major powers may have been willing to trade some loss of revenue for being free from having to administer so large a number of cities directly, especially since, as Philip V's letters to Larisa show, their ability to influence local affairs was only very slightly impaired.

The nature of our evidence is reason for caution, but also reason for confidence. The poleis' interest in expending funds to create an enduring image of themselves may leave us evidence that does not perfectly reflect historical realia, but it has also left us evidence of the image that they spared little expense in projecting. If, by the conscious process of preserving documents in perpetuity as inscriptions on stone, they have left us with the impression that they were communities very interested
in protecting their history, this is surely the impression that they wished to convey—a point sometimes made very explicitly, as when they say that decrees were moved so that none should ever doubt that they remembered those who did them a good turn or when they summarize the historical arguments they presented in a successful arbitration. Sometimes it is more implicit, as when Paros boasted of their irreproachable methods in keeping records, or when Zosimos preserved his city by paying for duplicate copies. These cities made a conscious and successful effort to present themselves as loci of memory. Their success is a testament to the power of their rhetoric.
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Unless otherwise noted, all citations to literary sources are to the texts available through the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. Abbreviations for standard epigraphic corpora are those used by *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*. Abbreviations for scholarly journals are those used by *L'Année philologique*.


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