Insular Thinking: Ideology and Memory in the Japan-China/Japan-Korea Maritime Territorial Disputes

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Abstract

Territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea (Dokdo/Takeshima) and Japan, Taiwan, and China (the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) are characteristic of post-war East Asian diplomacy. This thesis explores these ongoing territorial disputes, problematizing Realist arguments by which these disputes are analyzed as matters of territorial or resource nationalism, or as the result of legal complications or security concerns. Instead, it is argued that we should look to ideologies of nationalism to understand seemingly extreme emotional reactions over these ‘rocks’ which threaten to destabilize Northeast Asia. These islands are treated as ‘sublime’ symbols of the nation and irredentist arguments which support the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese positions read history through a lens of essentialized notions of ‘a people’ or ‘a nation’, and in the process help define both.
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The sublime object is an object which cannot be approached too closely: if we get too near it, it loses its sublime features and becomes an ordinary vulgar object — it can persist only in an interspace, at an intermediate space, viewed from a certain perspective, half-seen.

— Slavoj Žižek

Introduction

It’s approaching 70 years since the end of the Second World War, and still, decades after formal rapprochement between Japan and the Republic of China (1952; henceforth referred to as ‘Taiwan’), the Republic of Korea (1965; henceforth referred to as ‘South Korea’), and the People’s Republic of China (beginning in 1972; henceforth referred to as ‘China’), relations between Japan and its formerly-colonized neighbours remain strained, at times almost at the breaking point, as clearly visible in disputes between Japan, Taiwan and China over the Senkaku Islands,¹ and between Japan and

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¹ The Senkaku Islands are referred to as ‘Senkaku shotō’ in Japan, ‘Điạoyúdǎo’ in China and or ‘Điạoyútái’ in Taiwan (or the Diaoyu Islands), and, occasionally, the Pinnacle Islands in English. Dokdo is the Korean name for the islands commonly referred to as ‘Takeshima’ in Japanese and neutrally called the Liancourt Rocks in English. While acknowledging that toponymic practice can be by its very nature highly political, and that by simply invoking Senkaku shotō instead of Điạoyúdǎo, or Dokdo instead of Takeshima, one can create a radically different emotional response, my intention in using the Japanese and Korean names for the disputed islands is simply because Japan and Korea respectively maintain de facto sovereignty of the disputed islands.
both North and South Korea over Dokdo in the Sea of Japan. Both contested territories are the controversial legacy of the Japanese colonial period in which these islands were annexed in 1894 and 1905, and of the post-war American occupation and Cold War hegemonic order in Northeast Asia. Through the controversial 1951 Treaty of San Francisco between Japan, the United States, and some (but not all) other Allied powers, and the above mentioned treaties with Taiwan, South Korea and China in 1952, 1965 and 1972, Japan formally met its international legal obligations regarding the colonial period and Second World War with the governments of the signatory nations. However, the status of these contested islands remains a notable lacuna in these treaties, either consciously left ambiguous or simply deferred, and far from being a simple legal dispute, for many in the post-war Japanese, Korean and Chinese states, the rather humble Dokdo and Senkaku islets have become powerful mnemonic symbols of disputed historical memories or ‘sublime’ symbols of popular and state nationalism.

The island disputes follow the complex dissolution of an empire that enveloped the whole of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and large tracts of Northeastern China — in some places, carrying territories and inhabitants directly from the late Qing Sinocentric

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2 Referred to as the ‘East Sea’ in South Korea or ‘Korean East Sea’ in North Korea. Not unlike the toponyms of the disputed islands, ‘Sea of Japan’ or ‘(Korean) East Sea’ both have obvious exclusionary nationalist undertones. Moreover, some Koreans prefer the antiquated spelling ‘Corea’, associating the ‘K’ spelling with the Japanese colonial period.

3 China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea were notably not invited. The Soviet Union attended the conference, but did not sign the treaty and remained technically at war with Japan until 1956, though still does not have a peace treaty.
system to incorporation into burgeoning post-war nation-states — and at a time when China and Korea were in the throes of civil war and the Northeast Asian region was in many ways one large proxy for the American-Soviet conflict. As will be discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, some believe that these disputes are the direct products of Cold War Realpolitik, edited out of, and thereby rendered legally ambiguous by, successive drafts of the San Francisco Peace Treaty because of their strategic value to America’s principal anti-Communist ally in the region, a rehabilitated Japan, when the long-term stability of the pro-US authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea was highly uncertain. Japan’s positioning, as I will argue in the third chapter, in many ways allowed post-war Japanese leaders to disavow wartime atrocities and other crimes during the imperial period, and to a degree, the empire itself. The post-war treaties mentioned above and the controversial International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) left unacknowledged many of the victims of the Empire of Japan, and in some cases, left them without legal recourse.

I will argue that in this context, both Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands have become sites of collective memory for many in the disputant countries, both as what Pierre Nora would call les lieux de mémoire and as powerful collective mnemonic symbols. Lieux de mémoire are official and sublime, ideologically-driven, consciously constructed places “where memory crystallizes and secretes itself,” 4 designed to invoke,

erase or regulate collective memory (such as museums, memorials, etcetera) and arguably necessary in maintaining the stability of nationalist narratives in these post-war nation-states. By collective mnemonic symbols, I refer to places which come to be meaningful in collective memory, places imbued with what Michel Foucault called ‘counter-memories’ which by their nature challenge hegemonic historical narratives. I would suggest that this is perhaps more akin to Nora’s *milieux de mémoire*, however, as is discussed in some detail below, Nora’s clear, unproblematic dichotomy of *les lieux de mémoire* and *les milieux de mémoire* is somewhat dubious. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will rehabilitate Nora’s term *milieux de mémoire* and treat it as a site of unfettered, ‘spontaneous’ collective memory.

For many, these islands represent outposts of empire that Japan has refused to let go of, and thereby have come to act – as is clearly visible in anti-Japanese popular protests which often accompany diplomatic rows – as symbols of immense popular dissatisfaction with post-war Japan by those, both inside and outside of Japan, who wish to challenge often controversial post-war Japanese ‘positivist’ historiography. However, not unlike Japan, I hope to demonstrate that having become icons of nationalism in China, South Korea and Taiwan as well, these islands can destabilize the ‘official’ memory and become symbols of opposition to government, sometimes simultaneous to anti-Japanese opposition.
In other words, while certainly important factors in and of themselves, rather than simply matters of territorial or resource nationalism, or simply byproducts of post-war legal complications or Cold War positioning, these territorial ‘problems’ represent parallax rifts between states in national/ethnic self-perception and historiographical understanding of Northeast Asia’s tumultuous history from late 19th century Japanese domination to the post-war anti-colonialism and de-colonization movements, and as populations have struggled to redefine themselves, oftentimes authoritarian governments with troubled histories of their own have struggled for legitimacy. As such, both Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands have increasingly become battlegrounds in mnemonic struggles within and between Japan and its neighbours which manifest themselves in spontaneous, post-colonial nationalist movements in opposition to rightist Japanese historiography, and pragmatic, organized attempts to redefine and promote particular hegemonic views of national history. These mnemonic conflicts, and by consequence, the island disputes themselves, can serve to obfuscate aporias and lacunas inherent to the creation of a ‘total’ history of a nation-state, between hegemonic ‘official’ and heterogeneous ‘unofficial’ memories, and between hegemonic state ideology and the heterogeneous nature of non-state actors.

In examining these issues, this thesis does not aim to ‘solve’ the problem of the island disputes between Japan, South Korea, and North Korea over Dokdo or Japan, China, and Taiwan over the Senkaku Islands, nor do I specifically intend to provide a ‘balanced’ approach to the respective claims of each state involved, or provide a
structured, diagnostic comparative study of the two island groups. Instead, I am interested in what lies beyond the tangible limits of Realist arguments which frame these disputes primarily through legal, economic or security considerations, and will instead focus on the underlying ideological importance of territoriality and collective memory in the foundation of a nation.
Chapter One

Context

1.1 Overview of Ideology

In *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Slavoj Žižek builds on established critiques of ideology, using Marx’s famous ‘elementary’ definition of ideology from *Das Kapital*, ‘They do not know it, but they are doing it,’ as a base for his Lacanian-Hegelian analysis of the ubiquitous effect of ideological phenomenon. Žižek further elaborates on this Marxian definition, writing that “[w]hat they do not know is that their social reality, their activity, is guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic inversion,” ⁵ or a sort of “constitutive naïveté: the misrecognition of its own presuppositions.”⁶ In other words, it is what you believe but aren’t aware of believing, or what you *don’t know* that you know that controls you.

For the purposes of the analysis of Dokdo and Senkaku Islands territorial disputes as related to state ideology and nationalism, I will be making use of Žižek’s treatment of ideology, and particularly the titular concept of the ‘sublime object’, not simply to make an Lacanian or Marxian analysis of the two disputed islands, but rather, to establish a language in which these disputes can be discussed critically. However, I

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⁶ Ibid., p. 28.
feel it is useful to first split Žižek’s Marxian definition of ideology into two basic categories: ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’. By ‘bottom-up’ ideology I mean the ontological structure: ideology in everyday life by which we define and navigate the world around us and “determines how the subject relates to ... content.”7 By ‘top-down’ ideology, I refer to consciously or unconsciously constructed social ethos: ‘-isms’ in common discourse, or Laclau and Mouffe’s ideological ‘nodal points’ (or the Lacanian point de capiton) which ‘quilt together’ “the multitude of ‘floating signifiers’” and the “proto-ideological elements”8 of what I termed ‘bottom-up’ ideology into a fixed meaning. These two categories are of course not mutually exclusive, and perhaps very basic explanation of ultranationalism is when ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ ideologies become indistinguishable, and imagined membership of an ethnicity or of a nation becomes the singular ‘nodal point’ for individual existence and how one navigates an unstable world. It is also in nationalism and in nation-states that definitions of ideology such as ‘they do not know it, but they are doing it’ and the Rumsfeldian ‘unknown-known’ become so clearly visible and that, as a matter of contingency, anti-nationalists are placed into (or unknowingly place themselves into) national or ethnic schemes, even if to attack them.

It is in this context that I will analyze the island disputes, and in doing so I hope to define the islands themselves as ‘sublime objects’: material objects which, through an

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ideological ‘leap of faith’, are elevated to the status of the sublime. One might think of a material like gold, which is in reality a soft metal of little practical use but nonetheless is treated as, and thus becomes, highly valuable, taking on symbolic weight as “the embodiment of richness.” These sublime objects serve to mask “not some other, more substantial order of objects but simply the emptiness, the void” in the ideology that “they are filling out,” or in other words, they mask the traumatic ‘emptiness’ at the heart of ‘top-down’ ideology and pacify anxiety over uncertain ontological security in ‘bottom-up’ ideology. Here Žižek links the Kantian idea of the sublime to the Lacanian objet petit a, cross-defined by Žižek to the Hitchcockian ‘MacGuffin’: plot devices used in thriller or suspense movies, such as secret plans, processes, physical objects, etcetera, which, in Lacanian language, become the ‘object of desire’ for the protagonist, even if – or perhaps especially if – the protagonist doesn’t know what the MacGuffin they’re after actually is, and this reality being of no consequence to the plot of the film. The MacGuffin is then “a pure nothing” which is “none the less efficient … a pure void which functions as the object cause of desire.”

While Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands are certainly positive material objects, and may very well have strategic importance or quantitative economic value due to their

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9 Ibid., p. 71.
10 Ibid., p. 95.
11 Ibid., p. 194. Emphasis mine.
12 Ibid., p. 163.
positioning, do they not function on the level of ‘competing nationalisms’ as geographic MacGuffins? The islands are in a common, day-to-day sense useless: they are uninhabitable without significant outside support and not accessible to the vast majority of even the most ardent nationalists in the claimant countries and, at least in the case of Senkaku Islands, any sort of development of the islands to exploit strategic or economic potential is impossible due to China’s vocal protests and has been deferred indefinitely, rendering great promises of oil or gas reserves which supposedly drive these disputes empty. Still, Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands are treated as absolutely crucial in state policies of the claimant nations. Why?

While I believe there is certainly some merit in Realist explanations regarding economics, security, etcetera, and acknowledge that such factors are motivators for state actors involved, it is exactly the common opening line in countless articles and essays about Dokdo or the Senkaku Islands asking, ‘why are South Korea and Japan / China and Japan getting so worked up over some rocks?’ that interests me. This naïve question states the obvious: removed from their advantageous positioning, the islands are essentially empty of measurable value in and of themselves, and I will argue here that, originally sparked by deferred justice and competing territorial nationalisms in the unstable post-war/Cold War period and set into a sort of nationalist ‘feedback loop’, these islands have become sublime objects. The founding narratives and national ideologies of the Japanese, Chinese (mainland and Taiwanes), and (North and South) Korean nation-states have progressively imbued these rocks, and, while Dokdo and the
Senkaku Islands in their obscurity are not great spaces of living memory or collective tragedy, the unanswered, often traumatic memories of Japanese colonialism at the very core of these national narratives and state ideologies have become intimately tied to the ongoing disputes, with the islands becoming powerful mnemonic symbols (*lieux de mémoire*, though potentially subversive ones) of collective memory.

Memories, whether collective or individual, are parallax: what we remember is entirely dependent on *how* we remember, or in the optical sense, “the apparent displacement of an object … caused by the change in observational position that provides a new line of sight.” For Žižek, memory in a social context is a highly ideological/ideologized Hobsbawmian process, writing,

> As soon as we enter the symbolic order, the past is always present in the form of historical tradition and the meaning of these traces is not given; it changes continually with the transformations of the signifier’s network. … The past exists as it is included, as it enters (into) the … texture of the historical memory — and that is why we are all the time ‘rewriting history’, retroactively giving the elements their symbolic weight by including them in new textures — it is

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this elaboration which decides retroactively what they ‘will have been’.14

This presents a problem in Nora’s clear conceptual division of memory and history, and with it, the lieux and milieus de mémoire, which is Nora’s assumption that an ‘authentic’ collective memory, even in its traditional ‘peasant’ forms, is somehow essentially different from ideologically-motivated history and vice versa. Nowhere in The Sublime Object of Ideology does Žižek argue, as Nora does, that sublime objects or ideological ‘nodal points’ are the result of some wider historic shift in society, and, critical in the discussion of Dokdo or the Senkaku Islands in his essay, Nora does not consider the idea that the same physical object or space may have a radically different meaning for different subjects. For instance, sites of great suffering dating back to the Second World War which have become thriving thanatological tourist attractions such as Auschwitz or the Hiroshima Peace Park might be thought of as lieux de mémoire. However, these sites presumably have radically different significance for those who suffered there and those who didn’t, not discounting the possibility that these sites – within the fabric of day to day life for those who grow up in the area – may also be less poignantly imbued with traumatic historical memory. For those with living memories of such places, experiences which memory evokes are heterogeneous.

In a very practical sense in our day to day lives, the present always dictates the way in which the past is seen and experienced; the essential meaning of what is important, what is traumatic, or what is forgettable is constantly refreshed and always submissive to the future, and parallax in the sense that how we view the past is entirely determined by our present position. I will argue in the third chapter of this thesis that the distinction between *lieux* and *milieux de mémoire* is not as clear as Nora claims, nor is the ability of the state in moderating or disseminating ideology.

Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands are sublime objects in an explicitly plural form, and far from mutually-understandable resource or territorial nationalisms or security concern, the increasingly divergent views of the islands in different and sometimes oppositional ideological frameworks and national foundational narratives constitute ‘parallax gaps’. As in an optical parallax, the ideological angle from which we view the object, be it a physical object, in history, or in memory, determines the way which the object appears to us. In this sense, Žižek’s work on Karatani Kōjin’s concept of the ‘parallax gap’ provides a useful bridge between Žižek’s sublime objects, Nora’s *lieux de mémoire*, and the disputed islands to which these ideas will be applied in this thesis. Žižek claims that the Lacanian *objet petit a*, which is analogous to the sublime object, is “a pure parallax object: it is not only that its contours change with the shift of the subject; it exists—*its presence can be discerned—only when the landscape is viewed from a certain perspective*.” Žižek elaborates, “[the] *object petit a* is the very cause of the parallax gap, that unfathomable X [the Lacanian Thing to which the sublime object is elevated]
which forever eludes the symbolic grasp, and thus causes the multiplicity of symbolic perspectives.”\textsuperscript{15} Essentially, this means that the sublime object is the cause of the insurmountable, aporic parallax gap between particular views of an object. It is the gap between ideological views of the same positive physical objects which has led to diplomatic standstill, as evidenced by the discrepancy between the naïve view that these islands are, after all, ‘just rocks’ and the degree of anxiety and aggression caused by and contributing to major diplomatic disputes. I would argue the (positive) physical space of Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands have come to play a very role similar to the (negative) imagined space of hotly disputed historical states such as Goguryeo in these national foundation narratives, especially if Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands are considered the last bastions of the Japanese Empire which are doggedly held onto by historical revisionists and unrepentant ultranationalists, often with the implicit support of the Japanese electorate. Indeed, ‘Dokdo’ and ‘Takeshima’, the ‘Senkaku’ and ‘Diaoyu’ Islands should be considered different imagined places which share only the same positive geographic space, and the difference when subtracting one from the other would leave nothing but obscure rocky islets.

\textsuperscript{15} Žižek, \textit{The Parallax View}, 18. Emphasis in original.
1.2 Irredentism and Other Island Disputes

The arguments used by South Korea, North Korea, China, Taiwan, and Japan to demonstrate historical rationale for territorial rights to the islands are what are forms of irredentism, which, as Unryu Suganuma writes, are pseudo-legal arguments based on “collective memories, whether held by the present population or their ancestors centuries ago,” which “help to define and distinguish territories.” Irredentism in turn forms state policies regarding the disputed islands and vague collective memories are ‘secularized’ and mobilized as state propaganda in the competition for territorial space, with ‘history’ in this context serving only to prove “the ownership of the island[s] to one or the other side,” and far from settling the disputes, “can only sharpen the conflict.” Regardless, not at all unlike disputes occurring elsewhere, in the pseudo-legal terrain of irredentism, Japan and its neighbours have amassed and mobilized sometimes centuries-old historical records for the purpose of demonstrating, essentially, that the claimant country (whichever one it may be) legitimately

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18 Koo (2010) notes that South Korean claims to Dokdo islands stretch back to Silla Dynasty records dating back to 512 AD while Japanese claims date back to the 17th century. Chinese and Taiwanese claims to the Senkaku Islands date back to the Ming Dynasty as early as the 15th century while Japanese claims to have surveyed the islands in 1885 and annexed them in 1895 prior to the end of the First Sino-Japanese War. As will be elaborated on later, Suganuma (2000) argues that East Asian irredentist disputes (such as Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands) are further complicated by the fact that pre-modern local conceptions of territory are superimposed on the normative Westphalian territorial system. Japan largely prefers the latter, by which claims of lack of use, or lack of ‘proper’ use (terra nullius), justify incorporation.
‘discovered’ the islands first, has ‘used’ the islands effectively, and, as such, the deserves *de jure* control of the islands at present. Most importantly, the claimant countries must counter or discredit other claims.

Irredentism is of course an ambiguous process and often relies heavily on essentialist notions of ‘a people’ and a ‘nation’, though because of this, by its very nature, the process of irredentism can help define the nation-state itself, not simply the disputed peripheral territory, by anachronistically stretching the territorial jurisdiction of the nation-state into its prehistory. The obvious problem is that if there are overlapping irredentisms which challenge or contradict each other, the larger ideological structure — the nation — is challenged.\(^{19}\)

Before proceeding to begin my discussion of the Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands, I feel it would be helpful in further explaining irredentism to briefly give an overview of six major irredentist maritime territorial disputes in Northeast Asia which are based on many of the same historical and legal ambiguities as the Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands disputes and all of them to some degree interconnected.

\(^{19}\) We see this with Japan today. Japan is regularly confronted with claims to Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands based on memories of the Japanese aggression and atrocities, which scholars and cultural critics such as Sakai (1997), Igarashi (2000), Orr (2001), and Dudden (2008) argue Japanese citizens have been actively encouraged to forget starting from the immediate post-war period at both popular and institutional levels (though, perhaps, not aggression or atrocities against Americans). Passionate and sometimes violent anti-Japanese protests in Beijing, Seoul, Taipei, and elsewhere, represent an insurmountable divide in ideologically-motivated understandings of history.
The Kuril Islands: Dokdo and Senkaku Islands are not the only ongoing territorial disputes involving Japan. There is a third major dispute over the Kuril Islands (Chishima rettō in Japanese), northwest of Hokkaido, between Japan and the Russian Federation. This dispute is notable because it was a populated Japanese territory previously uncontroversially recognized by the Russian Empire and invaded by the Soviet Union shortly after Japan’s declaration of surrender and then was unilaterally annexed.

The Kuril Islands are, arguably, more ‘emotional’ for many Japanese than Dokdo or the Senkaku Islands for the simple fact that they were populated by civilians and the American-approved Soviet invasion of the Kuriles resulted in thousands of displaced refugees and deportees and, as a result of Cold War Realpolitik, a formal peace treaty between Japan and the Russian Federation (as successor states) has yet to be signed. Kimie Hara argues that the United States approved of the Soviet Invasion of the Kuriles and Sakhalin and these islands were treated as a territorial ‘bargaining card’ used by the United States at the end of the Second World War to buy time to establish an American presence in Korea. This is not entirely dissimilar to the manner in which the territorial status of Dokdo as recognized South Korean territory served as a bargaining card when it was omitted, as Hara demonstrates, from the San Francisco Peace Treaty as the Korean War progressed, serving as a potential American military outpost in the event

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that the Republic of Korea would fall. Likewise, Blanchard points to an incident where James Dulles, the architect of American ‘containment’ strategy, warned Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru during the 1951 peace conference in San Francisco, that if Japan, in negotiating a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, “granted sovereignty over the Kuriles to the USSR, that the U.S. would insist on sovereignty over the Ryukyus.”

Tsushima: Perhaps representing the start of a fourth major territorial dispute involving Japan, a recent South Korean claim to the Japanese-populated island Tsushima (Daemado in Korean) in Nagasaki Prefecture counter-claims Shimane Prefecture’s contentious declaration of ‘Takeshima Day’ in February, 2005 with the city of Masan in South Korea claiming that Tsushima was conquered by Korea on June 19th, 1419 and declaring June 19th ‘Daemado Day’. Even if this claim is purely a reaction (albeit a thorny one) to Shimane Prefecture’s controversial announcement — after all, the 1419 invasion was repelled — Tsushima is perhaps an interesting example of ambiguity between the local concepts of sovereignty of Korea and Japan before the establishment of the Westphalian system in Northeast Asia. Tsushima was long the frontier and trading hub between Japan and Korea and like elsewhere in northwest


Kyushu, became something of a hybrid culture, and for a time, the Tsushima fiefdom monopolized Japanese-Korean trade in exchange for becoming a ‘semi-tributary’ to the Korean monarchy and received “official titles or seals from the Korean court.”

**North and South Korea, Socotra Rock:** South Korea is, like Japan, enmeshed in several territorial disputes, the most obvious and serious of which is with North Korea; both of which claim the entirety of the territory of the other, including a North Korean claim to Dokdo in opposition to both South Korea and Japan, though often nominally supportive of the South. Even while the two have pragmatically maintained the demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel as an established, stable border since the end of the Korean War, the 2010 Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island bombardment, often cited as examples of North Korean ‘unpredictability’, ‘craziness’ or ‘evil’, are both linked to a wider dispute not so different from some of the others cited here: over the delimitation of territorial waters between the two states after changes made in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which both North and South Korea are signatories.

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As a result of UNCLOS, South Korea also disputes Socotra Rock in the Yellow Sea with the People’s Republic of China, both of which claim it lies in their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs), though this dispute over what is essentially submerged rock (which itself cannot extend China’s or Korea’s EEZ) has been largely low-key and has not led to major diplomatic rows.

**Parcel and Spratly Islands:** China has notably engaged in a dispute with Taiwan and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, which the People’s Liberation Army has held since South Vietnamese forces were ousted from the islands in 1974, and which all three now vie for. In another bitter and sometimes violent dispute, the above three states as well as Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines claim the Spratly Islands, which, like the Senkaku Islands, have large oil and gas deposits and significant territorial and economic advantages based on UNCLOS and has become a site of ‘contending nationalisms’ between these six states. Both the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands disputes have the added ambiguity of colonial histories, with five of the seven Spratly claimants having been entirely colonized and the Japanese colonial presence ironically playing a positive role in the Chinese and Taiwanese irredentist arguments, as both the Paracel and Spratly Islands were put under Taiwanese jurisdiction by Japanese colonial authorities.26

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1.3 Historical Background

In 1972, shortly after the People’s Republic of China first asserted its claim to the Senkaku Islands, Marxist Japanese historian Inoue Kiyoshi wrote *The ‘Senkaku’ Archipelago — An Historical Clarification of the Diaoyu Islands* (‘Senkaku’ reitō — chōgyo no shiteki kaimei), a book that (in)famously supported the People’s Republic of China’s claims to the islands by analyzing Chinese records of the Senkaku Islands back to the Ming dynasty and the historical context in which the islands were first appropriated by Japan in 1895. In doing so, and we can certainly apply this to Dokdo as well, Inoue links the Japanese irredentist claims and counter-claims to the Senkaku Islands to burgeoning militarism and imperialism in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods in Japan by which the Ryukyu Kingdom was forcibly annexed, and perhaps more importantly, a forced regional shift from a Sinocentric system of sovereignty, which had continued in Northeast Asia well into the end of the 19th century, even after collapsing in the by then mostly colonized Southeast Asian region, to an system based on ‘international’ (European) law. International law, Inoue claims, was used to justify an abortive invasion of Taiwan in 1874 and the coercive establishment of Japanese hegemony in Korea in 1876 — both of which were precursors to formal annexation in 1895 and 1910, respectively. Inoue links Japan’s annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom and Japan’s eventual usurpation of regional Qing suzerainty, writing,
The following year, in [1871], the [Japanese] Emperor used the incident where some Ryukyu people who had drifted ashore on the eastern coast of Taiwan were killed by aborigines (January, ‘71) and feigned taking revenge on behalf of Ryukyuans as Japanese subjects (*nihonjin tami taru ryūkyūjin*) to decide to invade Taiwan — the Qing Empire’s territory. As the single basis to justification the invasion, the Ryukyu Kingdom was by necessity approached as being Japanese territory, those people as Japanese [citizens], and the Ryukyu Kingdom as not being a vassal of the Qing Empire. 27

There are three key points here to consider here. The first is, even after the Ryukyu Kingdom was incorporated into Japan as Ryukyu-han in 1871 and until it was formally annexed by the Japanese government in 1879, the Ryukyu king (Shō Tai), in addition to being a vassal of Shimazu-han (Satsuma), was formally a vassal of the Qing Empire and paid tribute and held titles as such, even when forced into Japanese *kazoku* peerage. 28 The incident described above where a group of Ryukyuan fishermen were killed in Taiwan was used consequentially as a unilateral assertion of Japanese

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sovereignty in the Ryukyu Kingdom. Second, this incident was used as a counter to the Qing ‘customary’ claims to Taiwan, where the Japanese government, under the tutelage of American foreign affairs advisor to Japan Charles Le Gendre and the American Minister to Japan Charles De Long, declared the Taiwanese ‘savage lands’ *terra nullius* (*mushuchi* in Japanese) in accordance with international law, and third, as Shogo Suzuki argues, this served to depressurize tense domestic politics in Japan, where power was rapidly becoming centralized, making the threat of civil war a very real one, and, perhaps more importantly, depressurizing tense international politics, with Japan’s early aggression “an attempt to secure international legitimacy as a ['civilized'] member of the Society.” The doctrine of *terra nullius* would later become Japan’s justification for its annexation of both the Senkaku Islands and Dokdo and today remains Japan’s principal argument in their claim to both. Japan’s declaration of *terra nullius* was, however, by no means unique or controversial in the late 19th century, nor are ongoing assertions of territorial sovereignty based on *terra nullius* today elsewhere, such as claims to aboriginal land in monolithic British settler-states such as Canada, Australia, or the United States.

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29 *Terra nullius*, from the Latin meaning “no man’s land”, or “land belonging to no one” is a term used in international law to refer to land which is not under sovereign control of a state. Historically, this has explicitly been based on normative European conceptions of state, sovereignty, and humanity (to which non-European are in principal excluded). *Terra nullius* was, and continues to be used, in justification of the colonization or annexation of territories as diverse as Greenland and New Zealand and was used actively or retroactively to justify seizure of land from aboriginal populations.

While Wang Hui argues that Charles Le Gendre and Charles De Long promoted the idea of the invasion and annexation of Taiwan as a method of “using Asians to fight Asians,” citing De Long in a 1872 report to the American Department of State as saying, “I have always believed it to be the true policy of the representatives of the Western Powers [to Japan] to ... [ estrange] its court from those of China and Corea [sic] [and] make it an ally of Western powers,”31 Suzuki stresses, however, rather than the result of Japan being a ‘patsy’ to American hegemonic interest, Japan’s aggressive treatment of its neighbours during this time period served as a sort of legal inoculation against encroaching ‘European International Society’, where a ‘civilized’ Japan would be recognized by European powers. Moreover, building on the work of Neumann and Durkheim, Suzuki argues that through the dichotomy of a ‘civilized’ Japan (the ‘in-group’) and an ‘uncivilized’ Asia (the ‘out-group’), this early imperialism reflexively served the ideological purpose of the creation of a collective identity as ‘Japanese’.32 This last point will reoccur in this thesis, as I will argue that if Japan’s early imperial period helped cement a collective ‘Japanese’ identity, resistance to Japanese imperialism was the impetus in the formation of nation-states the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China alike and arguably has become a cornerstone of these nations’ evolving nationalist

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32 Suzuki. Civilization and Empire. 145.
foundational narratives, following, to paraphrase Naoki Sakai, “the thesis that the nation-state essentially is a reaction to imperialism or its historical effect.”

Chapter Two
Overview of Territorial Disputes

2.1: The Senkaku Islands

The Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan, Taiwan, the China, and indirectly, the United States, has resulted in a series of major diplomatic rows in 1978, 1990, 1996, 2004, 2010 and most recently, a still simmering row in 2012. The dispute over the islands dates back to 1894-5, during the Sino-Japanese War and about twenty years after the abovementioned Taiwan expedition. Shortly before the formal end of the conflict with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the islands known as the Diaoyu Islands to the Chinese, lying roughly equal distance between Taiwan, the Okinawan home islands and coastal China, were incorporated into Okinawa Prefecture, which was itself annexed by the Japan just 16 years before. Unlike a multitude of other Chinese territories (or territories widely claimed to be Chinese) which were ceded to, occupied by, or annexed by Japan, the Senkaku Islands alone remain under Japanese sovereignty.

Besides the basic, often overshadowing dispute between Japan and China, Taiwan and the United States have themselves sometimes taken radically different views of the Senkaku Islands’ sovereignty and geography from each other and the former two, and this is an often understated or ignored major contributing factor to the current diplomatic impasse. Before discussing what is ‘sublime’ about the coveted
Senkaku Islands, their symbolic capital in popular nationalism, or their role as a site of collective memory later in this thesis, it is important first to clearly define the divergent views of to which territory the Senkaku Islands are incorporated and provide an overview of the disputes between post-war Japan, China and Taiwan.

While China claims traditional territorial control of the Senkaku Islands based on their use as navigation aids by Ryukyu-bound sailors during the Ming Dynasty\textsuperscript{34} and currently as part of its larger claim to Taiwan, the Republic of China (now limited to Taiwan and surrounding islands) asserted a late Qing territorial claim to the Ryukyu Islands, claiming the entirety of Okinawa Prefecture based on the Qing Empire’s tributary relationship with the nominally sovereign Ryukyu Kingdom and held this position in the post-war period, conflating the Senkaku Islands and Okinawa.

The Republic of China’s rationale for the irredentist claim to Okinawa was that, as a successor state of the Qing Empire, former Qing tributary states such as the Ryukyu Kingdom, which were placed in the hierarchical Sinocentric system, were \textit{de facto} territory of the modern Chinese state, by which we see a convergence of traditional regional forms of sovereignty with the normative structure of sovereignty in the ‘modern’ Westphalian nation-state. One obvious problem with this argument is that the Ryukyu Kingdom had at the same time been a Japanese vassal since the Satsuma-led

\textsuperscript{34} Suganuma. \textit{Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations}. p. 54.
invasion of 1609, and this sort of reasoning by consequence also justifies Japan’s annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879. Another problem is, Japanese was also at different points in history a vassal state and tributary of China, as was most of the Asia Pacific region. We could just as easily argue that according to this historical justification, Thailand, Vietnam, Korea, or other former East Asian tributaries are legitimate Chinese territory, or expand this list ad absurdum and include states as far away as Portugal or the Holy See which have historically given tribute to the China.

Taiwan today nevertheless continues to claim mainland territory formerly controlled by the Republic of China, including the entirety of the territory of the People’s Republic of China, as well as, until quite recently, Mongolia, which, along with the ultimately ill-fated Tibet, declared independence after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, and Mongolia managing to oust Republican Chinese troops with the help of the infamous Japanese-backed White Russian warlord Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg and becoming independent. Though no longer claiming Mongolia or Okinawa, Taiwan as such still maintains other once-extremely volatile territorial disputes since settled by the PRC and its neighbours such as claims to Indian or Russian territory which historically led to the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the so-called Sino-Soviet

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35 Ibid., p. 68. Adding to the ambiguity, the Ryukyu Kingdom was not a 'Japanese' vassal, strictly speaking, but a vassal of Satsuma-han in what is now Kagoshima Prefecture in the south of Kyushu.

‘border conflict’ in 1969, which is partly what led to Chinese rapprochement with the United States.37

The Senkaku Islands as a separate territorial claim did not emerge until after 1968, when three unrelated events triggered the first major diplomatic row regarding the sovereignty of the islands between Japan and China: (1) during this year, a geological survey, conducted by the Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP) under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Fear East (UNECAFE), suggested a “high probability … that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world, with estimates at between 10 and 100 billion barrels.”38 (2) Simultaneous to this discovery, the United States was preparing to return formal sovereignty of Okinawa Prefecture to Japan, having been occupied and governed by the United States military since the end of the Second World War, and (3) the United States was in the process of recognizing the People’s Republic of China and de-recognizing the Republic of China which would culminate in the Nixon visit in 1972.


While Taiwan’s claim to the islands was certainly exacerbated by the discovery of oil, the return of formal sovereignty of both the Ryukyu and Senkaku islands to Japan, and major geopolitical pressures which Taiwan was under after the United States’ and then Japan’s (1974) rapprochement to China, Taiwan merely maintained abovementioned formal claims made earlier when the KMT (Kuomintang) government had lobbied the United States to ‘return’ Okinawa to China during the Second World War. Kimie Hara writes that while

the US … military had a strong interest in obtaining control of Okinawa … [the Republic of] China … showed the most interest in future possession of Okinawa; the KMT government on several occasions indicated its wish to secure the islands’ transfer to China. In a press statement on November 5, 1942, Foreign Minister T.V. Soong included them in the territories that China expected to recover. ... Chiang Kai-shek’s [revised edition of January 1, 1944] China’s Destiny described them as integral parts of China, particularly necessary for its national defense.39

While Taiwan had opposed the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, planned for 1971, Hara notes that there was “no sign that possession of the Senkaku Islands was disputed

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in the early post-war years.”\textsuperscript{40} And while this Okinawa claim appears to have been dropped at a diplomatic level in favour of a position closer to China’s, some Chinese nationalists in Taiwan and on the mainland still occasionally question Japan’s sovereign right to Okinawa based on the same long-standing claims, such as People’s Liberation Army Major General Luo Yuan, who wrote in July, 2012, that “[t]he Ryukyu Kingdom had always been an independent kingdom directly under the Chinese imperial government before it was seized by Japan in 1879.”\textsuperscript{41}

However, the position of the Chinese Communist Party has largely been to recognize Japanese sovereignty of Okinawa, especially when the sovereignty of Okinawa was at stake when the ‘greater of two evils’, the United States, established the islands directly under American control as major part of the US military apparatus in East Asia in the post-war period. In this context, central to the Chinese irredentist argument is to historically separate the Senkaku Islands from Okinawa, regardless of one’s view of the historical status of the Ryukyu Kingdom itself. With this being said, more than historical or legal ambiguity between Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands, it is the ambiguity between the territorial space between of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China which now complicates the Senkaku Islands dispute more than any other factor. While Japan has tied the Senkaku Islands to Okinawa, China has taken the

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 162.

position that the Senkaku Islands are part of the ‘breakaway’ Taiwan Province, and, as Zhongqi Pan writes, “[w]hat puts [the] Chinese government’s domestic legitimacy at real stake is the potential linkage of the dispute to the reunification of Taiwan,” and while Taiwan takes a similar stance to the Senkaku Islands, Pan argues that for China, unlike Taiwan, it is not only “national pride and territorial integrity” that are at stake:

Beijing sees the Diaoyu Islands as part of Taiwan and validates its claim to the islands by its claim to Taiwan. China’s softening of its posture on the dispute over the islands with Japan would not only endanger its claim to the islands itself, but also jeopardize its claim to Taiwan by sending [the] wrong signals towards separatist forces in Taiwan that seek independence.42

Pan argues that not only ‘separatist forces’ in Taiwan, but also the nebulous authority of ‘the Chinese people’ (in the pan-Sinitic sense) would immediately question the legitimacy of the CCP if China were to take a ‘soft stance’ on the Senkaku Islands issue, 43 which is arguably the reason why the Senkaku Islands has become an increasingly volatile issue in the ‘post-communist’ era. Ideologically the Chinese Communist Party, having reformed China as an essentially capitalist state as a but a


43 Ibid.
handful of communist countries collapsed, has struggled to find a raison d’être and maintain legitimacy, and, in this context, the Senkaku Islands, a territory which must be ‘defended’, mask this ideological gap as what a sublime object, having become symbolic of the Chinese polity and elevated, as we shall see, to the sacred.

The anxious position that Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands play for China is an interesting inversion of Taiwan’s position, where if Taiwan were to formally renounce its claims on territory currently controlled by China, it would be tantamount to declaring independence, and indeed, some ‘separatist forces’ in Taiwan have not just taken a stance of neutrality toward the Senkaku Islands, but have gone so far as taking a pro-Japanese stance, such as former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui. Proving that politics really do make strange bedfellows, Lee published a Japanese-language book in 2001 with Japanese bestselling ultranationalist and historical revisionist mangaka Kobayashi Yoshinori, Lessons from Lee Teng-hui’s School (Ri Tōki gakkō no oshie), where Lee, a wartime volunteer in the Japanese Imperial Army, the first democratically elected president, and ardent Taiwanese nationalist, admonishes the Japanese education system where “young Japanese … learn only about Japan’s wickedness and end up feeling that Japan is a wicked country” and, according to Lee, thereby becoming susceptible to juvenile crime, while pointing to himself as an excellent example of the merits of the Imperial Japanese education system. Barak Kushner points elsewhere to Lee’s

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promotion of *bushidō* in Japanese and Chinese language books, his criticism of the post-war Japanese government as having “no balls”, and claims that China ‘uses’ history to extract aid from Japan.⁴⁵ Lee, returning to Pan’s comment about ‘separatist forces’ in Taiwan, has caused a stir recently rejecting Taiwanese claims to the Senkaku Islands, saying, “The Diaoyu islands, no matter whether in the past, … now[,] or in the future, certainly belong to Japan,”⁴⁶ and in April, 2012, ostensibly throwing his support behind Ishihara Shintarō, the then governor of Tokyo who began raising money for the government of Tokyo to buy the Senkaku Islands and singlehandedly setting off the 2012 row, saying, Ishihara was doing this “because Japanese politics (*kuni no seiji*) are not good,” echoing popular sentiment in Japan that the moderate Democratic Party is too ‘soft’ on China, and comparing China’s stance on the Senkaku Islands to a man “seeing a beautiful woman (*bijin*) and saying ‘she’s my wife’.”⁴⁷

While China, unlike Taiwan, had not disputed the possession of the Senkaku Islands until the 1968 UNECAFE survey, the formal return of Okinawa to Japan, which included the Senkaku Islands, had attached to it the condition that the United States be allowed to continue its military presence there past the reversion, which was quickly

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⁴⁵ Ibid.


denounced by the PRC as a “fraud” and a “dirty deal”. The CCP had for obvious reasons long opposed any American activity in Okinawa – basically at their doorstep – and two decades earlier, on August 15th, 1951, Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China, denounced Okinawa being put under American trusteeship when the long-term sovereignty of Okinawa was still undecided. Zhou declared, in opposition to both the United States and Taiwan, “[T]hese islands have never by any international agreement separated from Japan.” Kimie Hara notes, however, that “[t]he PRC’s support for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan was nothing but political propaganda.”

There are essentially two reasons for this reaction, propagandistic or not. First, given the United States’ tenuous hold on Northeast Asia at this time — with the KMT government fleeing to Taiwan after the CCP victory and at the height of the Korean War — a strong military presence in Okinawa was considered essential to US Pacific strategy. As Hara explains, just a few years after World War 2, “[a]lly-enemy relations with the [US] were completely reversed between China and Japan, and accordingly the strategic importance of Okinawa changed from defence ‘from’ Japan to defence ‘of’ Japan.”

Jean-Marc Blanchard elaborates, arguing, “[t]he communist victory in China only

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49 Ibid., p. 176.

50 Ibid.
increased the importance of these islands since they occupied a space along the [US] defence perimeter on which they were ‘important defence points.’”

In both cases, the prospect of returning Okinawa, or even just the Senkaku Islands, to the precarious government in Taiwan become impossible, as a communist takeover would in theory put the islands into the hands of the Soviet Union.

Thus, as a form of Cold War strategic positioning, a disparate group of islands were incorporated into the Ryukyu chain by American planners, and their status was, according to Hara, intentionally left ambiguous in the San Francisco Peace Treaty between the United States and Japan. Both Hara and Blanchard claim that sovereignty of these islands (as Hara argues regarding Dokdo and the Kuriles) was used a ‘bargaining chip’ by the United States. This ambiguity would allow the United States to use the islands as a ‘wedge’ to potentially block rapprochement between Japan and the PRC by removing mention of the Senkaku Islands from successive drafts of the peace treaty while threatening that — depending on the degree that Japan followed American Cold War policy regarding its communist opponents — the return of Okinawa was not guaranteed.

For example, as previously mentioned, US Secretary of State John Dulles warned that if it were to give up two of the four the Kuril Islands, as

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52 Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, pp. 182-3.

53 Ibid., p. 177. Testament to the effectiveness of this strategy, to this day, Japan does not have a peace treaty with Russia and the Kuril Islands Island disputes remains a major strain on Japanese-Russian relations.
Japan considered in negotiations for a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, the US would formally annex Okinawa.

It is in this context that beginning with the UNECAFE survey in 1968, the Senkaku Islands dispute first flared up. After renewed protest from Taiwan and attempts to unilaterally develop oil in the area, in the summer of 1970, Japan proposed to jointly develop the area with Taiwan (presumably as a solution to the Okinawa dispute) and South Korea.\(^\text{54}\) China intervened, claiming the Senkaku Islands “were China’s sacred territory and that exploitation of the area by foreign countries would not be tolerated,”\(^\text{55}\) resulting in cessation of oil development projects and a delay in the Okinawa reversion until 1972.\(^\text{56}\)

While the Senkaku dispute may have initially occurred over the discovery of oil, resource nationalism has played a smaller and smaller role, presumably at least in part because of the quickly growing wider importance of Japan as a trading partner and strategic partner against the Soviet Union after the Sino-Soviet split, evidenced by Japanese ultranationalists in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) attempting to take

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\(^{54}\) Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, 106.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 110. Koo does not provide the a Chinese original of the 1970 statement, but the phrase “shénshèng lǐngtǔ” (sacred territory) is often used in wars of words to describe disputed Chinese territory, such as in an assertion made by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to the Japanese Foreign Minister Genba Kōichirō at the UN General Assembly in September 2012 which made international headlines, leaving many foreign journalists wondering what constitutes ‘sacred’ territory to the officially atheist CCP. I will go into detail into claims of the asserted sanctity of territory later in the next section of this thesis.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 111.
advantage of their relatively strong bargaining position in this context by pushing through a Senkaku Islands resolution favourable to the Japanese in the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. However, this backfired, leading to Deng Xiaoping, who had proposed joint-oil development earlier in the year, risking the treaty for the sake of domestic legitimacy by sending “more than a hundred fishing trawlers bedecked with Chinese national flags … allegedly under the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s command.”  

57 Making matters worse, in August, the Japanese rightist/anti-communist group Seirankai erected a lighthouse on the islands, “apparently without government opposition.” 58 Despite the controversy, both countries agreed to defer the Senkaku Islands dispute to the next generation of leaders who “will certainly be wiser” and “will surely find a solution acceptable to all,” 59 as Deng famously put it, and the treaty was eventually signed in August, 1978, without the Japanese amendments.

After a long reprieve, in 1990, the dispute resurfaced when the Japanese Youth Federation (Nihon Seinensha), having repaired the 1978 lighthouse in 1988, applied to the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency to have it formally recognized. This resulted in official condemnation from China, still somewhat muted internationally after the fallout

57 Ibid., pp. 112, 113.

58 Ibid., pp. 113, 114.

of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Students from a more assertive Taiwan, however, landed on the islands and planted ROC flags,\textsuperscript{60} while another Taiwanese group attempted to land on the islands to plant an Olympic torch “as a symbol of Taiwanese sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{61} Besides these Taiwanese landings and street protests, major anti-Japanese protests also occurred during this time in Hong Kong and China. While certainly both Taiwanese landings intended to express nationalist sentiment rather than unity with the mainland on the Senkaku Islands issue, Suganuma notes that the 1990 protests were “the first time ever that both sides of the Taiwan Strait condemned Japanese activities” at the same time.\textsuperscript{62} The highly emotive anti-Japanese Senkaku Islands protests, Suganuma argues, were directly linked to the widely controversial issue of ‘Japanese militarism’ with the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defence Force soldiers to assist the UN in “safeguarding peace in the Middle East,” constituting the first time Japanese soldiers had gone overseas since the Second World War, and protesters in Hong Kong linking the Senkaku Islands dispute to the history of Japanese imperialism and to the Nanjing Massacre in particular. This was no doubt spurred on by Ishihara Shinatrō’s phenomenally controversial 1989 book \textit{The Japan that Can Say ‘No’} (‘NO’ to \textit{ieru nihon}), in which Ishihara commented that the Nanjing ‘incident’ was “greatly exaggerated,” and infamous 1990 Playboy interview regarding this book, where

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 139
\item \textsuperscript{61} Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 116
\item \textsuperscript{62} Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations, p. 140
\end{itemize}
Ishihara ‘clarified’ that Chinese historiography about the Nanjing Massacre (and presumably the work of such internationally respected Japanese writers such as Honda Katsuichi) are propagandistic anti-Japanese lies.63

Effectively repeating all this, a 1996 row was also set off by the Japanese Youth Federation (Nihon seinensha), which built a new lighthouse in July, again requesting official recognition, and in the midst of controversy, returning in the midst of controversy later in the year to repair the lighthouse, damaged in a summer typhoon.

The circumstances by 1996 were quite different, however, with the introduction of UNCLOS (III) in 1994, extending EEZs and redefining territorial waters, jurisdiction of continental shelves, and other factors which would have a major effect on the sovereignty and potential material value of islands like the Senkaku group. Also in 1996, China performed nuclear tests in and prepared ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait with the aim of intimidating Taiwan during the 1996 election which saw Taiwanese nationalist Lee Teng-hui become president, sparking a major crisis and, as if to underscore the fact that the Cold War had not ended in Asia with the fall of the Soviet Union, drew the United States into a standoff with China (the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis) and reaffirmed Japan as a strategic partner.

After simmering through the summer with a series of on-the-water confrontations between approaching Chinese protesters and the Japanese Marine Safety Agency (JMSA), large-scale anti-Japanese protests in erupted in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and amongst overseas Chinese at the end of September after a protester from Hong Kong drowned while trying to swim to one of the islands after the boat he was on was stopped by a JMSA patrol.

In March 2004, activists from Hong Kong were again arrested after landing on Uotsuri Island, the largest of the Senkaku Islands, and were briefly detained. In China, where large-scale protests had been effectively unheard of since the Tiananmen Square Massacre, unprecedented economic growth and a slow social ‘normalization’ which came along with a disintegration of communist ideology allowed ordinary Chinese “more space for bottom-up emotional venting.” As a result, crowds gathered to burn Japanese flags in front of the Beijing embassy and mass protests criticizing Japanese Prime Minster Koizumi Junichirō’s repeated Yasukuni Shrine visits broke out, with Yasukuni having become something of a pilgrimage site for Liberal Democratic Party politicians and useful way to antagonize Japan’s neighbours, to whom the shrine is highly associated with Japanese war criminals. Protests continued into August, with Japanese soccer players being booed and harassed on and off the field during the 2004 Asian Cup by Chinese fans carrying Senkaku Islands banners, and Beijing riot police

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64 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 129.
being forced to protect the Japanese players from football hooligans following a Japanese victory. Protests continued into 2005 over what many Chinese felt was Japan’s insufficient acknowledgement of wartime atrocities as evidenced by the string of Yasukuni visits and revisionist textbooks being approved. Susan Shirk describes one such violent protest in the up-scale Zhongguancun district of Beijing with Japanese billboards destroyed, cars smashed, and Japanese banks and restaurants attacked by a young university-aged crowd, with the first-time protesters “[s]urging out of Zhongguancun onto the same road that the democracy demonstrators had taken in 1989, [marching] into the heart of Beijing.” The CCP, Shirk claims, was alarmed by the wave of country-wide protests which continued to spread across China despite a media blackout, with the CCP not necessarily trying to suppress the protests because of a fear of angering or offending the Japanese, but because of “the novel way the demonstrators were organized.” Namely, protesters used now commonplace blogs, chain-mail messages and cellular phones to organize the protests and mobilize support. Such tools which were transparent to outsiders while being anonymous and seemingly decentralized, and, as Shrik argues, circumvented the CCP’s tight control of information flows, which included censoring the popular phrase “Defend the Diaoyu Islands”

65 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 131.


67 Ibid., p. 142.
online,\textsuperscript{68} indecently the theme of the first recorded instance of since widespread and generalized ‘online protest’ on China’s internet.\textsuperscript{69}

This mode of mobilization was not reliant on government-controlled lines of communication or, for that matter, on the CCP as a representational body in large-scale, nationalist protests against Japan. These first major protests after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, while ostensibly anti-Japanese, posed a major threat to the Chinese Communist Party both structurally and ideologically, and making matters worse for the party, the CCP couldn’t assertively suppress the protests for fear that such a move would be interpreted as being pro-Japanese. As I will discuss later, this ‘catch-22’ has become an aggravating factor in post-Deng Xiaoping Senkaku Islands rows, and an effective method for both political opponents or anti-government protesters to target members of the Chinese politburo.

The 2010 row was sparked by the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain who entered Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands and was arrested after ramming a Japanese Coast Guard vessel sent to intercept. The captain was released shortly after amidst massive protests, diplomatic and economic pressure from China; most strikingly, reports that rare earth supplies to Japan, essential in the production of consumer electronics and automobiles which the Japanese export economy heavily

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., p. 91.

relies on, were cut, apparently in retaliation for the captain’s arrest and detention.\textsuperscript{70}

Around the same time, a group of Japanese businessmen in China was arrested on suspicion of espionage.\textsuperscript{71} Unfortunately, China’s aggressive stance and Japan’s conceding to Chinese pressure lent legitimacy to often Sinophobic ultranationalists and right-wing pundits and China-watchers in Japan and abroad who wholeheartedly subscribe to the so-called ‘China threat’ theory and saw this aggressive action as confirmation thereof.

One such Sinophobic ultranationalist is former Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō, infamous not only for crude historical revisionism in books like \textit{The Japan that Can Say ‘No’}, but making public statements which are well-publicized but, according to Kang Sang-jung and Morisu Hiroshi, troublingly uncritically-reported by the “obtuse” (\textit{donkan}) Japanese media, ranging from the incitant and obscene, such as calling Chinese and Koreans in Japan “\textit{sangokujin}” (similar to calling someone a ‘third worlder’, though perhaps closer to ‘ex-colonials’) or claiming that Chinese people have “\textit{hanzaisha minzokuteki DNA}” (criminal ethnic DNA) and are everywhere in Tokyo committing “extremely atrocious crimes (\textit{hijōni kyōaku na hanzai})”,\textsuperscript{72} to the absurd, such as


suggesting twin panda cubs in Ueno Zoo be named “Sen-sen” and “Kaku-kaku”. As previously mentioned, a campaign by Ishihara, who is something of a bête noire in Northeast Asia despite inexplicable popularity in Japan, to raise money to purchase the Senkaku Islands on behalf of the government of Tokyo on an anti-Chinese nationalist platform was largely responsible for the major 2012 Senkaku Islands row. The Japanese federal government eventually bought the Senkaku Islands from their private owner as a form of ‘damage control’ by the harshly-criticized moderate Noda Yoshihiko government. All the same, the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands, coming just after major anti-Japanese demonstrations in South Korea, sparked often violent protests in 80 cities across China, including a wave of anti-Japanese protesters carrying portraits of Mao Zedong, widely read as a challenge to the CCP in support of the

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74 Ishihara’s abusive public statements were not limited to foreign nationals. Shortly after the March 11th, 2011 tsunami and on-going nuclear disaster along Japan’s northeast coast, Ishihara referred to the disaster as “divine punishment” (tenbatsu), causing an outcry in Japan, but not stopping Ishihara from winning the April election. The 3/11 tsunami temporarily halted the still-unresolved 2010 Senkaku Islands row as well as a late 2010 controversy over a Russian presidential visit to the Kuril Islands, with both China and Russia quickly offering support to Japan, but climate of uncertainty in post-3/11 Japan combined with a feeling of regional isolation created by these territorial disputes, far-right ultranationalists like Ishihara in Tokyo, Hashimoto Tōru in Osaka, or more recently, Abe Shinzō in federal politics, have easily attracted supporters.

expelled ‘neo-leftist’ Bo Xilai. Other rioters attacked Japanese businesses (or presumably in many cases Chinese businesses branded as Japanese or selling Japanese products), Japanese-made cars on car lots and on the streets, and forcing the closure of Japanese factories with “[t]heft, vandalism and lost trade” reportedly costing Japanese companies 10 billion yen.

The 2012 dispute left the moderate Japanese Democratic Party appearing ineffectual in handling China, unfortunately setting the stage for the Japanese federal elections in December, where the LDP under Abe Shinzō trounced the Democratic Party. Abe was briefly prime minister between 2006 and 2007, with his brief term “marked by denialism (of war responsibility, notably for the comfort women and the Nanjing massacre) and ultra-nationalism (the insistence on the need to rewrite Japan’s history and its textbooks so … fill people with patriotic spirit).” Abe has since written that there is “no room for negotiation” with China, and rather, “[w]hat is called for [with the


Senkaku Islands dispute is not negotiation but physical force incapable of being misunderstood.”\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
2.2 Dokdo

Japan’s claims to Dokdo date back to the mid-Tokugawa period through anecdotal references to fishermen travelling to the islands, and based on this claim, Japan officially considers the February 1905 annexation, when Dokdo was appropriated for military use during the Russo-Japanese War, a ‘reconfirmation’ of long-standing sovereignty.\(^8^0\) The annexation of Dokdo — while five years before Japan’s formal annexation of Korea and 29 years after the signing of the unequal Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity by which Korea was torn away from China and into Japan’s sphere of influence — is a singular event which has since become the symbolic beginning of Korea’s ‘National Shame’ and remains “emblematic of Japan’s 35-year colonization” and is “firmly embedded in the collective memory of the Korean people.”\(^8^1\)

Similar to her work with the Senkaku Islands, Kimie Hara provides a comprehensive account of wartime and post-war agreements between the Allied powers and Japan dating back to the San Francisco conference and subsequent San Francisco Peace Treaty — a process from which South Korea was excluded, but would nonetheless frame South Korea’s relationship between it and Japan, particularly on the issue of Dokdo. According to Hara, agreements such as the Cairo Conference

\(^{8^0}\) Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, p. 17.

(December 1943), the Yalta Conference (February 1945) and the Potsdam Convention (July, August 1945) served to define Japan’s territorial space and role in the international order following the war. Hara is careful to note that the so-called Yalta System, which became the normative structure for the Cold War order in Europe, “never became an actual international order in the Asia-Pacific region,” and instead, it would be the United States which would unilaterally seek early post-war hegemony in a scramble over spheres of influence with the Soviet Union in the closing days of the war. Unlike post-war Europe, Japan was placed under the quasi-dictatorial command of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Douglas MacArthur, whose title would be synonymous with occupation forces until the signing of the San Francisco Treaty. The Soviet Union, previously requested by the US to join the war against Japan, finally declared war on Japan on August 8th, two days after the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima when it was militarily absolutely unnecessary, challenging American hegemony in East Asia and initiating a period of squalid Cold War Realpolitik with the two emerging superpowers scrambling for former Japanese territory in Northeast Asia in the power vacuum created by Japan’s defeat. The Soviet Union quickly invaded the Japanese puppet states Manchukuo (Manchuria) and Mengjiang.

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83 Ronald Takaki argues that the ‘Little Boy’ bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima itself was militarily unnecessary, and suggests that its use in Hiroshima was a show of strength aimed as much at Soviet leadership as it was at the Japanese, with events in Japan portrayed as a ‘sideshow’ in the early days of what would eventually be called the Cold War. See Takaki, Ronald T. Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1995.
(Inner Mongolia) and Imperial Japanese territories in northern Korea, southern Sakhalin (Karafuto Prefecture) and the Kuril (Chishima) Islands, effectively appropriating the northern half of the Japanese Empire.

Bruce Cumings links this scramble the creation of the Republic of Korea, which he characterizes as being more or less a continuation of Japanese Korea under local leadership. This, Cumings argues, was based on “American worry not just about the onrushing Soviet Red Army but about communist and nationalist revolution throughout Asia, and … Anglo-American desire unilaterally to occupy these colonial territories still available to them.”84 For Cumings, historians have “overlooked or at least underemphasized” the possibility that Japan’s surrender was in part a reaction to the Soviet threat, pointing to late August, when

Japanese commanders in Seoul were exchanging numerous messages with American forces in Okinawa, urging them to occupy Korea as rapidly as possible lest ‘communists’ take advantage of the power vacuum. An instant camaraderie between Americans and Japanese led the Americans to reinstate the full government-general apparatus in Seoul, including its Japanese personnel, until Washington over-

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ruled the use of high Japanese officials. But the colonial state structure endured and became the administrative basis for the Republic of Korea.\textsuperscript{85}

It is also in this context — the rush toward Seoul — that the United States had given the Soviet Union the green light to invade the Kuril Islands, essentially using the islands after Japan’s formal surrender as a ‘bargaining card’ to buy time to establish a foothold on the Korean Peninsula,\textsuperscript{86} and American acquiescence to the Soviet Union’s annexation of this territory as a compromise, but stopping short of agreeing to a Soviet invasion or occupation of Hokkaido.\textsuperscript{87}

With Korea being split into Soviet and American zones in this manner, Japan was rehabilitated as part of America’s bulwark against the Soviet Union, and despite being placed under Korea-based US XXIV Corps military command, Dokdo’s explicit status as recognized South Korean territory was omitted in early drafts of what would become the San Francisco Treaty as the Korean War progressed in favour of the islands serving as a potential American military outpost in the then plausible event that the Republic of Korea would fall while avoiding “serious psychological disadvantages” for America’s

\textsuperscript{85} Cumings, Parallax Visions, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{86} Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{87} Schoenbaum, Thomas J. Peace in Northeast Asia: Resolving Japan’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes with China, Korea and the Russian Federation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008. p. 120.
privileged East Asian Cold War ally, Japan. 88 Hara traces this omission to recommendations made by Douglas MacArthur’s political advisor and the American ambassador to Japan between 1947 and 1952, William Sebald.89 After intense lobbying by both South Korea and Japan and further strategic consideration during the Korean War, it became unclear as to who the islands would be ‘returned’ to when the San Francisco Treaty was signed in 1951, and in the end, only the islands Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and Dagelet (or the Jeju, Geomundo, and Ulleungdo islands) were specified in the treaty after Dokdo was dropped during the drafting process. From the South Korean point of view, by being dropped from the treaty, Dokdo merely joined some 3,000 other Korean islands which were left unmentioned, while Japan stakes its claim in part on apparent American acquiescence in favour of Japan. As Koo argues, it was exactly this controversy that “greatly changed the value of territory perceived by the two rival countries,”90 which has progressively snowballed since, and I would point to this competitive resentment between the Republic of Korea and Japan is the origin of Dokdo becoming something of an object cause of desire.

The early Dokdo controversy is to this day often characterized as being a dispute over fishing grounds, with Japan’s irredentist argument being based on use by Japanese

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88 Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, p. 35. The ‘psychological advantage’ of Japan retaining this territory is not clear, though Hara and others interpret this as a sort of geopolitical ‘consolation prize’ to ensure Japan’s post-war cooperation.

89 Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific, p. 31.

90 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 70.
sea lion hunters and fishermen and Shimane Prefecture, through their declaration of ‘Takeshima Day’, claiming to be fighting on behalf of impoverished fishermen who were suddenly denied long used fishing grounds. However, Koo argues that this early fishing dispute was something of a red herring and that fishing disputes in the Sea of Japan, rather than being the result of the Dokdo island claims, in fact stretch back centuries and merely became a “surrogate battlefield” for Dokdo.

During the reign South Korea’s first president, the outwardly anti-Japanese American-backed Syngman Rhee (1948-1960), only limited deconstruction of the Japanese colonial structure took place in South Korea, with “virtual replicas of Japanese forms of industry, state policies toward the economy, education, police, military affairs, the physiognomy of its cities, and its civil culture (such as it was).” Alexis Dudden argues that to gain control of South Korea, Rhee had “hired Korean thugs who had previously worked for the Japanese police” and “intervened in all attempts in the South to hold purge trials or make related policy because the only Koreans he could bribe … were those already most enriched and made powerful by the Japanese,” with public

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92 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building. p. 70.

93 Cumings, Parallax Visions, p. 77.
praise for the United States becoming the “binding denominator” of this ruling clique.\textsuperscript{94} Rhee’s amnesty of these thugs and collaborators not only created a major problem in post-war Korean claims against Japan, as the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ had been blurred at an official level not only in South Korea, but internationally as well. Officials in British Commonwealth countries who had previously opposed the Dokdo obscuration in the San Francisco Treaty\textsuperscript{95} now protested the South Korean state becoming a signatory to the anti-communist peace treaty with Japan. Dudden claims that “British and Commonwealth soldiers’ memories of the brutality of Korean soldiers serving as prison camp guards … [in] Burma or Malaysia powerfully informed this sentiment.”\textsuperscript{96}

Despite the American ambiguity which may or may not be read as tacitly ceding Dokdo to Japan, the island was quickly occupied by South Korea, leading to campaigns of flag-planting and Japanese patrol boats being dispatched to clear South Korean fishermen starting in 1953, which predictably led to small-scale armed conflict beginning in 1954, including one incident between a Japanese patrol and “South Korean maritime paramilitary vigilantes” resulting in the sinking of one of the Japanese patrol

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\textsuperscript{95} Hara, \textit{Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific}, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{96} Dudden, \textit{Troubled Apologies among Japan, Korea, and the United States}, p. 74.
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boats to South Korean mortars and several crew members being killed.\textsuperscript{97} Dokdo’s ‘iconic status’ thusly emerged from Cold War Realpolitik and as a focal point for a larger dispute between South Korea and Japan. Post-war North and South Korean nationalism and, to some extent, identity were based on anti-Japanese sentiment, and Dokdo became a focal point for such ideologies. I would argue that even at this early stage, in the year following the Korean War, Dokdo had already became a sort of sublime object, being made the focus of anti-Japanese Korean nationalism and thereby masking the ideological void caused by the US-backed authoritarian Rhee’s Japanese collaborationist clique. Dokdo’s ‘sublime’ status has only been made more clearly visible with the South Korean economic miracle and democratic movement, and as I will explore later in this chapter, has become increasingly tied to state nationalism, with ideological ‘faith’ in Dokdo as a sublime object being tied to challenges therein.

Following the 1961 \textit{coup d’état}, Park Chung-hee, a former Japanese Imperial Army officer and “noted admirer of the Japanese state” took power and re-formed South Korea as a Japan-style developmental state in an sometimes-adversarial partnership with South Korean \textit{chaebol}, the remnants of colonial-era Japanese \textit{zaibatsu} conglomerates, and from 1972, further consolidated power under the authoritarian \textit{Yushin} (Restoration) Constitution, “a replication of the spirit, if not the letter, of Japan’s

\textsuperscript{97} Koo, \textit{Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia}, p. 71.
Meiji Restoration.”98 It was also a major policy goal during the Park era, under intense US pressure, to normalize relations with Japan, though not easily, as “normaliz[ing] relations with Japan faced a major political obstacle: the memory of Japan’s colonial occupation,”99 and many felt that the “unequal economic ties” with Korea’s former colonizer would cost Korea its “national pride”.100

While there were notable exceptions such as the large, potentially destabilizing protests in 1963 and again in 1964 against the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) head Kim Jong-Pil, who was as a result exiled not once but twice after allegedly giving up South Korean claims to Dokdo and reparations for colonial-era atrocities in exchange for personal gain during normalization talks,101 feelings of resentment toward Japan remained largely muted for much of Park’s rule. This suddenly changed in August 1974 when Yuk Young-soo, Park’s wife, was killed in an attempted assassination of Park in Seoul by Mun Se-gwang, a Zainichi Korean. Questions about Mun’s possible links with North Korea was met with apparent antipathy by Japanese authorities who, reluctant to investigate, responded to accusations of the Japanese government’s responsibility by concluding that Mun was a Korean citizen who

98 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 79. The Yushin Constitution is literally ‘to the letter’ of the Meiji Restoration. The Korean word yushin and Japanese word for ‘restoration’, ishin, are cognates, with Park’s word choice likely being intentional.

99 Hundt and Bleiker, “Reconciling Colonial Memories in Korea and Japan.”

100 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building. p. 78.

101 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 74.
committed a crime in Korea, and therefore was not their responsibility. Outrage over the assassination and the controversy over Mun was only fanned by “Japanese editorials [which] blamed the Park government for inflicting the outrage on itself by suppressing freedom” and comments made shortly after Yuk’s death by Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura who not only downplayed the North Korean threat, but were interpreted as recognizing the North Korean government. This led massive anti-Japanese protests, including the ransacking of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, interpreted as “instigated or tacitly approved by the Korean government.” Only through an eventual US intervention did relations between South Korea and Japan return to relative normalcy, with the Japanese vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party dispatched to Seoul to express regret over the Mun incident. This came just a year after Park’s political nemesis, Kim Dae-jung, was kidnapped in Tokyo by KCIA agents as a result of his criticism of the Yushin Constitution, sparking a major controversy in Japan, where Kim had been in exile. Then in 1977, just two years before Park was assassinated by KCIA director Kim Jae-kyu, Japan would unilaterally announce exclusive fishing rights in the area around Dokdo. Ultimately, economic considerations (and, again, US hegemonic balance) stopped both disputes from fully breaking relations between the two countries, and thereafter, with growing trade and


103 Ibid.
successive loans and direct foreign aid from Japan, South Korean “long-held and long-repressed feelings of resentment” would remain repressed until the democratic movement in South Korea in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{104} The pattern in which the ruling party legitimacy is closely tied to a hard-line stance on Dokdo had began with Rhee and continued into the democratic era, with Dokdo no longer acting simply as a focal point for other political or economic disputes, but increasingly imbued with memories of the colonial era, and, as we have seen in incidents such as the Kim Jong-pil demonstrations, reflexively tied to resentment felt by Koreans to the authoritarian structure put in place by Japanese colonial forces and the American occupation, profound dissatisfaction with American favouritism toward Japan throughout the Cold War, resentment to ongoing Japanese antipathy toward Korea and the Japanese unwillingness to address colonial crimes.

For the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that in South Korean political ideology, Dokdo now acts as a sublime object by which this ‘messy’ post-war history and questions of colonial-era complicity by state and non-state actors in South Korea are neutralized, with Dokdo ‘masking’ this history by acting as a stand-in for Korean sovereignty and the importance of this role solidified by the territorial dispute with Japan, Korea’s former suzerain, and Dokdo becoming an essential anti-Japanese object, and therefore essential ‘Korean’ object.

\textsuperscript{104} Hundt and Bleiker, “Reconciling Colonial Memories in Korea and Japan.”
The first ‘post-Cold War’ row occurred in 1996, two years after the ratification of UNCLOS, when Japanese Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko attacked the South Korean claim to the islands and demanding the South Korean ceased their development of Dokdo, and ‘reminding’ Korea that “Takeshima is [an integral] part of Japanese territory (waga kuni koyū no ryūdo) from the viewpoint of international law and history.”\textsuperscript{105} Ikeda’s statement, while certainly controversial — in fact, leading to his effigy burned in ensuing protests — is in fact using very similar, if not almost identical language to statements made during the 1980s by Ikeda’s predecessors and is almost identical to the wording currently used on the current Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: “Takeshima is according to history and from the viewpoint of international law clearly an integral part of Japanese territory.”\textsuperscript{106} Neither statement deviates a great deal from the position held by Japan since the post-war period, not to mention mirroring Korea’s own claims to Dokdo, such as a multilingual, flashy website run by the Gyeongsangbuk-do Province Dokdo Management Office, which states, “Historically and according to International Law, Dokdo is clearly Territory of


Korea.”\textsuperscript{107} This is also strikingly similar statements made by the governments of Japan\textsuperscript{108} and China\textsuperscript{109} regarding the Senkaku Islands. In both cases, there is an interesting contradiction between the phrase ‘integral territory’ (koyū no ryōdo)\textsuperscript{110} and the invocation of international law, which is, the concept of an ‘integral’ or ‘inalienable’ territory is, according to Gavan McCormack, “unknown in international law and foreign to discourse on national territory in much, if not most, of the world.”\textsuperscript{111}

Likewise, while East Asian states certainly knew how to be territorial before the introduction of the Westphalian system, far from the unalienable space of the Japanese, Korean, or Chinese national territories stretching back to times immemorial, the idea of delineated territory of the nation-state being sacrosanct is a quite recent development in the in East Asian history (or European history, for that matter) and further begs the question of which parts of these territorial spaces is \textit{unintegral}? The very idea of a nation’s territory being integral brings to mind Jean Baudrillard’s famous opening

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\textsuperscript{110} The word ‘koyū’ (固有) is a cognate of the Korean ‘goyu’, and the Chinese ‘gùyǒu’ and collectively, they can be roughly translated as ‘integral’, ‘inalienable’, ‘rightful’, ‘indigenous’, et cetera.

illustration of *Simulacra and Simulation* where Baudrillard describes Jorge Luis Borges’ (very) short story “On Exactitude in Science” in which an Empire’s cartographers draw a map of the territory so detailed that it covers the entirety of the Empire, with the fraying of the map signalling the decline of the Empire. Baudrillard then attempts to reverse this analogy, saying, “the map ... precedes the territory ... [but now] it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map,” before conceding that “only the allegory of Empire, perhaps remains. Because it is with this same imperialism that present-day simulators attempt to make the real, all of the real, coincide with their models of simulations.” 112 In this almost McLuhanian sense, the ‘Empire’ is the map, and the envisioned territory/map is in this sense the ‘nodal point’ which holds together the imagined community, as Benedict Anderson would have it, of the national-state. In the case of China where, like other communist countries, the Party, state, and society are synonymous, the issue of sovereignty “suggests the government’s inherently legitimate (highest, sublime and absolute) right and power to rule the country domestically and to act independently (including in the area of defence) internationally.” 113 I would argue that irredentism is rooted in this phenomenon, where the ‘lost’ or defended territory essentially must be elevated to something of a sublime object to maintain illusion of the


'integral' territory of the nation-state, and perhaps of the contending nation-states themselves. This phenomenon can be seen unambiguously on the Gyeongsangbuk-do Province’s Dokdo website which declares, “We planted the spirit of Korea in Dokdo.”

While it’s easy to mock the rhetoric of politicians (such as the use of ‘integral’, or in China’s case, ‘sacred’), anything less would render these disputes absurd, bringing us back to the notion of vulgar ‘squabbling over rocks’, and in the process, exposing the ‘nakedness’ of the nation behind national ideologies. This is why, not just in China, but in South Korea and Japan, the legitimacy of the ruling party has come to rest precariously on the party’s ability to maintain these territorial disputes (which, if we’re being practical, simply won’t be solved when multiple claimants consider the same territories ‘integral’), and in the case of Taiwan, the survival of the Republic of China as an autonomous entity is at stake: if Taiwan were to break the status quo by renouncing its territorial claims, it would be a de facto declaration of independence from the mainland which, as mentioned above, would likely lead to a Chinese invasion. While, economically, détente is always preferable and proponents of the ‘liberal peace’ theory claim that it is growing economic interdependence which has restrained the claimant countries, as we have seen in both the Dokdo and Senkaku Islands disputes, maintaining the disputes can be a powerful tool for savvy politicians. This is likely a major reason these disputes have become more common in South Korea’s democratic era, flaring up every few years instead of every couple of decades, or for that matter, in

114 “Story of Dokdo.” Dokdo of Korea.
China since the collapse of the communist bloc, and during the era of globalization where national borders are often thought to be disappearing.

We can see this phenomenon at work in the 1996-1998 Dokdo dispute, set off by Ikeda Yukihiro. One of the salient features of this dispute is that it coincided with not just the ratification of UNCLOS and EEZ negotiations (in which Ikeda’s statements can be seen as a ‘pre-emptive strike’), but with elections in both countries: Hashimoto Ryūtarō became Prime Minister in 1996, returning the Liberal Democratic Party to power after a three year gap in an otherwise unbroken line of governments since 1955, and moreover, Hashimoto did so on a platform of nationalism in the midst of a wave of conservative backlash over the Murayama Statement the year before in which then Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi apologized for wartime Japanese atrocities. Not surprisingly, Hashimoto took an aggressive stance to South Korea over Dokdo after the election, unilaterally declaring a 200 nm EEZ, and seizing South Korean fishing boats within those waters.

In South Korea, the February 1996 row took place weeks before the legislative elections where “political parties competed to outbid one another in blaming Tokyo” and during massive anti-Japanese rallies, during which the South Korean government promised “assertive action” against Japan, “demand[ing] the immediate release of the vessels and crew-members, who had allegedly been mistreated by the Japanese
government.”115 Riding a wave of public anger, Kim Young-sam won the election, taking an “abrasive stance towards Japan in general and the territorial issue in particular in order to garner popular support for his increasingly unpopular regime.”116

In 1998, Kim Dae-jung, the dissident who had been kidnapped in Tokyo 25 years before, became president, but was hounded throughout his presidency by his “political rivals [who] constantly manipulated the [Dokdo] controversy to assail his pragmatic and progressive policy toward Japan” and “tainted his nationalist credentials.”117 This pattern was continued into the next major dispute which boiled up in 2004 in the aftermath of Japanese textbook controversies in 2001 with the right-wing New History Textbook which “claimed that Koreans participated in colonial institutions … to further their careers [and that] comfort women … were simply professional prostitutes who chose to work with the Japanese army,”118 and again in 2002 when MEXT (the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) approved textbooks published by Meiseisha explicitly promoting the Japanese position on Dokdo119 and a revisionist

115 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 89.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid., p. 92.

118 Hundt and Bleiker, “Reconciling Colonial Memories in Korea and Japan.”

119 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 92.
view of Japanese imperialism. This was followed in 2004 with South Korea Post and, later, Japan Post printing Dokdo/Takeshima-themed postage stamps, an attempted flag-planting run by Japanese right-wing activists. The following year, the 100th anniversary of the Japanese annexation of Korea and officially the “Year of Korea-Japan Friendship”, relations would be rocked severely by the declassification of documents dating back to the 1965 normalization showing Park Chung-hee had spent large portions of the US$800 million in wartime reparations (“independence celebration funds”) received from Japan and on self-serving public works projects, the declaration of “Takeshima Day” in Shimane Prefecture, yet another revisionist/right-wing textbook approved by MEXT, and Japan announcing it would conduct a survey around Dokdo, a move which was met with 20 South Korean gunboats. While certainly the ‘friendly’ 2004-2006 dispute was leapt upon by the leonine right-wing Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō, whose visits to the Yasukuni Shrine nearly derailed relations irrespective of the above string of controversies, the more liberal South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun struggled with low popularity and was under immense pressure to take a hard-line approach toward Japan.


122 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 95.
Most recently, President Lee Myung-bak made an official visit to Dokdo in August, 2012, a move which was linked directly to previously Japan-friendly Lee’s “increasing distrust of Japan caused by its inaction on historical issues, including that of comfort women” and marking August 15th, which commemorates the end of Japanese colonial rule in South Korea. Referred to by one South Korean analyst as “a bit of shock treatment to drum up popular support,” Lee’s visit was also read by some as a mode of ‘electioneering’ in the face of a domestic scandal and before a federal election where Lee’s successor Park Geun-hye, Park Chung-hee’s daughter, ran. The Japanese media was quick to publish statements made by Lee that the Dokdo visit being three years in the making, and therefore not connected to Lee’s discussion of the comfort women issue with Japanese Prime Minister Noda the previous year. Moreover, Lee’s visit was made with the expectation of Japanese opposition, but that this wasn’t of much concern, as “Japanese influence in international society isn’t what it was before.” Jin Chang-soo, the director of the Sejong Institute’s Japan Centre commented that while Lee’s visit certainly wouldn’t face any opposition with South Koreans, “it’s problematic in terms of diplomatic strategy. … If something like this is necessary, then it should be done as part of an objectively mapped out sequence of responses. Instead, he brought out the big


125 Ibid.
weapon way too early,” and concluding that “[t]he president took out a sword when he needed a scalpel.”

Lee outdid himself just a day later, and clearly and unambiguously tying the Dokdo dispute directly to Japan’s colonial atrocities, Lee declared that Japanese Emperor Akihito is not welcome to visit South Korea without “a direct acknowledgment of guilt for Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945,” and without “[visiting the graves] of those who died in independence movements and apologiz[ing] to them from his heart.”

This declaration makes it politically impossible for Akihito to visit South Korea or make any sort of apology, not to mention that considering it wasn’t possible for Akihito to visit South Korea during the 2002 World Cup for security reasons, it’s absolutely unimaginable now. Lee undoubtedly understood this, even though it was Lee himself who, just three years earlier, had first invited Akihito to make a state visit to South Korea and little having changed in Japanese-South Korean relations in the meantime.

In this sense, by tying historicized ‘Korean’ colonial memories to Dokdo, the islands become a lieu de mémoire par excellence, to paraphrase Nora, ‘negating’ these heterogeneous memories of Japanese colonialism while ‘giving them resonance’, and in the process, Dokdo loses its “referent in reality” and becomes a hyperreal self-

126 “The Aftermath of President Lee’s Sudden Visit to Dokdo.” The Hankyoreh.

referential sign which serves to “anchor, condense, and express the exhausted capital of ... collective memory,” and ultimately, like the process of national history, which Nora claims is the very root of lieux de mémoire, “besiege[s], deform[s] and transform[s]” memory, “penetrating and petrifying it”. The ‘sacred’ space of the lieu de mémoire, like the ‘sacred’ or ‘integral’ space of the national territory, and like the sublime object, to return to Žižek, is “thus first an empty place, a space devoid of all positive content, and only subsequently is this emptiness filled out with some content,” with the sublime, sacred, or holy “changing places” with the positive physical object.

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128 “Between Memory and history: Les Lieux de Mémoire.”

Chapter Three

Memory

3.1: Forgetting the ‘Greater East Asian War’

In the following chapter, I will provide a variety of sometimes-interconnected explanations of Japan’s post-war schism from Asia, which in many ways, has lasted beyond diplomatic rapprochement or economic interdependence. The commonality between these explanations is a sense of collective ‘forgetting’ and to some extent disavowal of the colonial or war-time actions of the Empire of Japan, particularly in the creation of a history for the post-war Japanese nation-state. Thereafter, I hope to build on the previous sections on the ideological nature of Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands by tying the development of collective memory to the establishment of China and South Korea as nation-states, in both of which memories of war and colonization form an essential part of national identity.

Scholars such as Alexis Dudden note that Japan’s ‘forgetting’ has created a fundamental gap between the conservative Japanese historiography and memories of the same historical periods on the mainland. Dudden characterizes the conservative Japanese view as rendering history an “opaque object” rather than a “messy, contentious, never-ending process.”¹³⁰ For Dudden, this view of history is made

¹³⁰ Dudden, Troubled Apologies, p. 6.
manifest in (and no doubt aggravating) Japanese irredentist claims to Dokdo, or for that matter the Senkaku Islands, which rely on a Japanese audience to know “next to nothing about the twentieth century nor have much desire to learn more” and without making any mention that Asia was ever colonized by Japan “nor that this fact might bear on the dispute[s] today.” 131 The spectre of Japanese imperialism becomes something of an as yet unsymbolized, symptomatic trace of this history, repressed in the post-war period and ‘haunting’ both Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands, whereas South Korea and China respectively see these islands as highly symbolic of the same colonial aggression.

Naoki Sakai criticizes the post-war reconceptualization of the multiethnic Japanese Empire, which had at least to some extent recognized colonized groups such as Chinese or Koreans who were incorporated into the Japanese state, into a re-imagined ‘homogenous’ Japanese nation-state under a scheme Sakai terms ‘national humanism’, 132 and in the process — combined with the reality of bipolar Cold War geopolitics and lasting resentment and indignance toward Japan by its neighbours —

131 Ibid., p. 19.


It is worth noting that while Japan views itself as ‘homogeneous’ and nationalists often portray this as a positive feature, this self-image comes at the enormous expense of minorities in Japan. Nanette Gottlieb argues (through Ryang) that the in this scheme the normative ‘typical Japanese’ is “not Burakumin, not Ainu, not of non-Japanese ethnicity, not female, not physically or mentally disabled in any way, and not gay”, excluding the majority of the population of Japan. See Gottlieb, Nanette. *Linguistic Stereotyping and Minority Groups in Japan*. London: Routledge, 2006.
would nearly sever Japan from the continent in the post-war period and sever Japan from its own imperial history. According to Sakai, it was a “sort of conscious forgetfulness” that served to “construct the sense of national fraternity” at the expense of all those who were forgotten and “those who might break an unwritten vow and mention the very existence of such a repression” in the formation (or reformation) of a national identity.\textsuperscript{133} Presumably, every national community must go through this same process of ‘conscious forgetting’: selective memory in the formation of a ‘total’ national history which serves to form or maintain identity, and China, South Korea, etcetera, are no exceptions, though of course under much different circumstances. However, what some identify as Japan’s disavowal of its imperialist past or disavowal of Asia itself, has created tremendous tension with those non-Japanese victimized by the Empire of Japan, many of whom have incorporated narratives of resistance to Japanese imperialism and the suffering under Japanese yoke into the very fabric of the emergent post-war nation-states.

Taking a similar stance to Naoki Sakai in his discussion of ‘national humanism’, Kazuya Fukuoka and Barry Schwartz describe this process as “de-Asianization”, which “involves Japan’s withdrawal of identification with Asia, denial of [Asians’] dignity and to a certain extent [their] humanity.” As such, the “[f]ailure to designate [historical] aggression against Korea or China as sources of shame is part of a broader and

\textsuperscript{133} Sakai, \textit{Translation and Subjectivity}, 133.
invidious distinction involving Japan’s relation to, or, rather, alienation from, Asia.”\textsuperscript{134} Kushner ties this alienation to the ever-controversial (and in Japan, increasingly internationally monitored) process of writing history textbooks, claiming the Japanese government must, again, selectively choose from sometimes highly divergent points of view which may describe the invasions of Japan’s colonialist period as either “just, [having] liberated Asia,” or “act[s] of aggression that merely substituted one colonial overlord for the other.” Kushner describes modern ‘positivist’ revisionists as maintaining claims that Imperial Japan was the “harbinger of the future … a country best suited to bring civilization, along with urbanization … to a backward continent,”\textsuperscript{135} almost exactly echoing expansionist militarism dating to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), such as the writings of Fukuzawa Yuichi, the originator of the “\textit{datsu-ron}” (literally, ‘leave Asia doctrine’), who considered “the war itself not merely a struggle between two countries but a ‘battle for the sake of world culture.’”\textsuperscript{136}


\textsuperscript{135} Kushner, “Nationality and Nostalgia: The Manipulation of Memory in Japan, Taiwan and China since 1990.”

Arif Dirlik provides perhaps a more ‘grassroots’ explanation of the historical acquiescence of Japanese citizens in an amnesiac post-war Japanese development state, claiming that,

in the 1960s … some Japanese, increasingly conscious of the material power of Japan, began to question the prevailing image of World War II Japan as victimizer [as] the leadership in Japan directly contributed to efforts to revise memories of the war.\(^{137}\)

I would elaborate, however, that much like Jeffrey Olick’s critique of the social effects of West Germany’s *Wirtschaftswunder* ‘economic miracle’, the post-war Japanese economic boom, which had sustained itself until the sudden burst of the economic ‘bubble’ at the end of the Cold War, was not only a cause of such willful historical revision, but also a mode of future-oriented self-distraction, perhaps “politically necessary” given the monumental task of self-implication, historical recognition, and redress.\(^{138}\) Similarly, Olick details the immediate post-war focus on the wide-spread physical destruction of Germany during the war, sometimes crushing post-war poverty, and the millions of ethnic Germans who were forcibly expelled from Eastern Europe in


the post-war era, with hundreds of thousands, if not over a million of them dying in the process,\textsuperscript{139} becoming a sort of ethnic-German counterpart to the largely-Jewish victims of the Holocaust in the eyes of many Germans, and to some degree, self-victimization served to neutralize memories of the profound victimization perpetrated by the German state under Hitler.\textsuperscript{140} Some scholars have linked post-war Japanese ‘forgetfulness’ of the crimes of the Japanese Empire to a similar neutralizing self-victimization, such as James Orr, who describes nature of the ideology of ‘the Japanese people as war victims’ as mutually beneficial to both the rightist post-war Japanese regime and American occupiers alike, though also to the Japanese left, which was comparatively anti-American and highly critical of Japanese involvement in the Cold War. According to Orr, this victim ideology played out in the conflict between the Japanese left, which engaged in anti-nuclear campaigning in the 1950s and ‘60s and actively opposed the Japan-US security alliance, and the American-backed conservative governments. During this time, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (which ruled uninterrupted until 1993) increasingly “appropriated the rhetoric of Japanese war victimhood in recognition of electoral pacifist sentiment,” and in doing so, (1) limited the opposition’s use of war victimhood as a form of political capital, (2) “could position themselves apart from the militarist period,” and (3) to some degree even “evade discussion of Japanese


\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
war responsibility.” Orr claims that the Occupation forces in the immediate post-war period were complicit in this, having wanted to alienate the post-war Japanese from the militarist state while ingratiating them to the Americans, and MacArthur’s resulting rhetoric of Japan’s “‘liberation’ from ‘slavery’ not only promoted America’s image as [saviour]; it also suggested that most Japanese need not feel responsible for their own past suffering since they had been victims of the militarists.” Troublingly, to distance the Japanese from the wartime state and, more importantly, legitimize America’s role in postwar Japan, American policy actively encouraging the Japanese to remember the war as a Japan-US conflict, or perhaps more specifically, a war between the US and Japanese militarists, with Emperor Hirohito’s exoneration treated as a given and Douglas MacArthur insisting that the war itself be called the ‘Pacific War’, banning Japanese term ‘Greater East Asia War’, a term which Sharalyn Orbaugh notes “retains a reminder of Japan’s aggressions toward China and other Asian nations … and is implicated in Japan’s long-term colonialist plans for East Asia.” Yoshikuni Igarashi claims that the “[post-war] political order surrounding the United States and Japan necessitated the repression of memories of World War II” which in the post-war era left...

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142 Ibid., p. 19.

143 Ibid., p. 31.

“no way to articulate what ... had [been] repressed.”145 Igarashi ties this repression to Japan’s schism with Asia, arguing that

With its defeat in the war, Japan lost not only its former colonies but also the memories of its colonial enterprises. By displacing Japan’s role as colonizer with that of the United States, the United States-Japan melodrama assisted in concealing Japan's historical connection with Asia in [post-war] Japanese social discourse.146

As the Cold War progressed in East Asia with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, the American ideological imperative of distancing Japan from the wartime state was essentially abandoned and the formation of a strong Japanese state as a Cold War ally became more important than “purging otherwise capable conservative leaders”147, such as Kishi Nobusuke, the so-called shōwa no yōkai (monster of the Showa era). In 1937, before the ‘Pacific War’ had started, Kishi “wrote the first forced [labour] policy in Japan’s imperialism, which authorized one of the most brutal transfers of subject peoples

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146 Ibid., p. 35.

147 Orr, The Victim as Hero, p. 29.
(Korean and Chinese) in the world,” only to be released by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) without trial for Class A war crimes in 1948. Exonerated, Kishi re-entered national politics in the early 1950s, becoming prime minister of Japan in 1957, and signing the Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which locked Japan into the US Cold War structure in 1960, amidst massive protests. While Cold War Realpolitik allowed for ‘monsters’ like Kishi to advance, there are other disturbing instances of unjust exoneration under SCAP, such as the well-documented amnesty of Unit 731, a Japanese biological warfare unit which operated in Manchukuo since 1936, killing at least 3,000 mostly-Chinese subjects (and many thousands more on the field) in research into the spread of anthrax, plague, and other agents of bacterial and chemical warfare, only to be granted amnesty in exchange for surrendering their research data to the United States military, “lest the Soviet Union acquire it and undermine [US] national security.” Lisa Yoneyama argues that the “inability” of the IMTFE “to fully perceive Japanese atrocities committed against tens of millions of people of [colour] as ‘crimes against humanity’,“ of which Unit 731 is merely one example, raises questions about both the value of these trials and specific ethnocentric views of ‘humanity’.

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149 Igarashi. *Bodies of Memory*. p. 199.

Whether one takes the view that Japan’s break from Asia and ‘forgetfulness’ are primarily the result of a conscious reimagining of a homogeneous Japanese nation-state, are driven by the distraction of Japan’s unprecedented economic growth following defeat, or are rooted in post-war American liberator ideology and Cold War Realpolitik, it is my position that both the Dokdo and Senkaku Islands disputes are symptomatic of repressed memories of the Japan’s colonial period and the Greater East Asian War, and for those who accept the long-entwined ‘positivist’ and ‘Pacific War’ doctrines, anti-Japanese protests on the streets of Seoul, Beijing, Hong Kong, or Taipei may seem ridiculous, groundless, or, in the case of ‘Defend the Diaoyu Islands’ protests in China, indicative of aggressive territorial expansionism aimed at Japan. Furthermore, Japanese popular support of high-profile ultranationalists and such noted phenomena as the conflagration of discrimination toward Zainichi Koreans and Dokdo\textsuperscript{151} or Sinophobia and the Senkaku Islands are indicative of a fundamental disconnect between Japan’s legally-based irredentist arguments and the often brutal colonialist period in which these islands were appropriated.

\textsuperscript{151} Koo (2010) notes retaliatory discrimination toward Korean immigrants and Japanese-born Korean citizens in Japan. Though anecdotal, my personal interest in the subject of this thesis was sparked after witnessing Banseikai, an ultranationalist group located in Hiroshima, staging a blisteringly loud Dokdo-focused anti-Korean protest in October 2008, in the aftermath of the summer 2008 row. What was particularly disturbing about this was that the flag-covered, loudspeaker-laden black van was parked directly across from a monument on the fringes of the Hiroshima Peace Park dedicated to the 20,000 Koreans who perished in the Hiroshima atomic bombing.
3.2 The Development of Collective Memory

Prominent Chinese nationalism scholar Suisheng Zhao notes that since the sharp decline of the Qing Empire in the 19th century, Chinese leaders have

[for defensive purposes ... embraced with a vengeance, and depended on, the Western notion of sovereignty. They have not only accepted the norms of the nation-state system and acknowledged the formal equality of other states, but also vigorously asserted China’s own territorial sovereignty and have become very sensitive to foreign interference in ‘domestic affairs’.152

Political scientist Helene Lavoix echoes this in her recent analysis of the September 2012 anti-Japanese protests across China, arguing that the modern Chinese perception of sovereignty is the direct result of European, American, and particularly Japanese colonialism, having come out of “the perceived imperative necessity for survival” as the Sinocentric order collapsed and Qing frontier territories were ceded to foreign powers through coercion and violence, with the empire itself, amongst the most powerful countries in the world just a century before, beginning to resemble Borges’ map. For Lavoix, it was not simply the Sino-Japanese War itself, but China’s long-

dormant eastern neighbour, Japan, asserting dominance over its former hegemon and China’s long-time ally, Korea, ‘lost’, having been pulled into Japan’s sphere of influence as a result of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, that sparked “a long agony” and “deep re-evaluation of its society.” Certainly the severity of this feeling only intensified in the coming decades as China struggled for international support with the loss of Manchuria in 1931, previously the Qing Dynasty’s home territory, and Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which brought total war against an already much-weakened China. Like Zhao, Lavoix connects this ‘survivalist’ sense of sovereignty to “norms of sovereignty, territoriality and independence” established during what both KMT and CCP historiographers commonly refer to as the ‘century of national humiliation’ (bānián guóchǐ in Chinese) and links it directly to the present Senkaku Islands dispute, which have been increasingly characterized by volatile anti-Japanese street protests. Lavoix claims, “the fact that the perceived aggression is done by Japan may only increase this [survivalist] feeling, notably considering the current tense relations between Japan and China and repeated denials of history by some Japanese actors” and, to return to the question of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of sovereignty in irredentist debates, Lavoix points out that Chinese geography was not limited to cartography, but of narratives, such as the notable mention of the Senkaku Islands in the Voyage with a Tail Wind (Shùnfēng xiāngsòng) in 1403. Such narratives, “be they ‘poetic’ or ‘expository’”, are treated as historical records and, even as Chinese concepts of sovereignty and geography were modernized, according to Lavoix, they may “continue to be imbued
with [the] original content” of these narratives, and questions of geography in the Senkaku Islands dispute “will only enhance [this] historical dimension, and immediately be linked to [modern] beliefs related to sovereignty and territoriality. \(^{153}\)

The association between Chinese national sovereignty and anti-Japanese resistance is not uncontroversial within China, however. Important Chinese officials such as Wu Jianmin, a senior Chinese diplomat and, as of 2003, president of China Foreign Affairs University, criticized anti-Japanese nationalism as linked to what he calls ‘weak country mentality’ (ruòguó xīntài), and asked of the common nationalist feeling that China (or the CCP) is ‘too soft on Japan’, “Well, what would they like us to be harder with — shall we battle it out with them then?” \(^{154}\)

The Sinocentric system, occasionally linked to China’s irredentist claims to the Senkaku, Spratly, and Paracel Islands, \(^{155}\) had given China hegemony, albeit at different times in different ways, and a degree of suzerainty over much of Central and East Asia,


\(^{154}\) Kushner, “Nationality and Nostalgia: The Manipulation of Memory in Japan, Taiwan and China Since 1990.”

\(^{155}\) ‘China threat’ theories often depend on the assumption that China will seek to revive, or has never fully abandoned, its hegemonic claims. However, while one might say otherwise of ultranationalists’ occasional claims to Okinawa or other former tributaries, I have found absolutely no indication that China’s irredentist claims to the Senkaku Islands are based an effort to revive the Sinocentric system. For a thorough debunking of ‘Sinocentric’ China threat theories, see Acharya, Amitav. “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?” International Security 28.3 (2004): 149-64.
from Siberia to Indonesia, from Japan to as far west as the Caspian Sea, and even European powers paying tribute to the Qing emperor to secure diplomatic and trade missions. Wang Hui is careful to note, however, that “the tribute system was not a self-sufficient or integral structure, but rather the product of historical interaction among the agents participating in this system,” and reflected ever-changing “core/periphery relations within China,” before being eroded by often violent 19th century European domination of China and China’s integration into international financial systems. However, it was China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War which was most “heart-wrenching for the Chinese elite.” Japan, a traditionally second-tier tributary, defeating the Qing Empire came as a huge shock to the ruling classes in China, and, as the early twentieth century Chinese nationalist Liang Qichao wrote, awoke the Chinese people “from the dream of 4,000 years” and marked the end of the Sinocentric system and birth of Chinese ethnic nationalism. This defeat was indeed a ‘wake-up call’ for reformers and Han Chinese nationalists, many of whom studied in Japan after the war, such as Chiang Kai-shek, who also served in the Japanese Imperial Army. As a result, much like Shin Chae-ho’s later incorporation of Euro-Japanese nationalism into his conception of a ‘Korean nation’, “[b]orrowing from the Japanese notion of minzoku,”


157 Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, p. 17

158 Ibid.
and “locat[ing] the martial roots of the Korean minjok” in the powerful ancient state of Goguryeo, a number of European ideas, including the nation-state itself, were transmitted from Western Europe to China through Meiji Japan and incorporated into anti-Japanese nationalism.

It was during the Second World War, however, that Japan would shift from a model for nationalists to a catalyst for nationalistic war mobilization. CCP leader Mao Zedong claimed the Japanese were “working to destroy the national consciousness of the Chinese people” by “forbidding them to show the slightest trace of Chinese national spirit.” As such, according to Zhao, “Mao believed that true independence would come only when such a national consciousness was successfully cultivated.” Zhao refers to this rallying cry as a sort of ‘mass nationalism’, which he further elaborates on by building on the work of Karl Deutsch and Max Weber, arguing,

The war with Japan was a cataclysm that created social conditions conducive to mass mobilization. Before the

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160 For example, the Euro-Japanese concept of minzoku (a nation, people) which was incorporated by Shin as the Korean word minjok was incorporated into the Chinese language as mínzú. Even today, other evidence of this process can be seen in the loan translation of English political vocabulary into Sino-Japanese compounds, in words like ‘politics’ (Chinese zhèngzhì through the Sino-Japanese seiji), ‘nation’ (guójiā from kokka), etcetera.

161 Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, p. 105.

162 Ibid.
Japanese invasion, the majority of the Chinese, particularly peasants, were largely indifferent to the national politics and loosely absorbed in local affairs. The war ruptured the traditional local order and sensitized the Chinese people to a new identity of the Chinese national as distinguished from both the foreign invaders and one’s own local identities.\(^\text{163}\)

With 10 to 20 million Chinese killed in the Second World War, millions more killed in the Chinese Civil War and, while estimates vary dramatically, some tens of millions more dead in during the Great Leap Forward, the period between the 1930s and early 1960s was a time of intense suffering for ‘the Chinese people’, regardless of ethnicity, dialect or locality. Zhao argues that both organically through these shared experiences of suffering and artificially through the CCP ‘mass nationalist’ campaigns (which continued long after Japan was defeated, relying on mobilization of collective memories of ‘past wrongs’ and arguably influencing anti-Japanese sentiment today), the ethnically and culturally diverse Chinese state developed a strong sense of social lattice and became what Eviatar Zerubavel calls a ‘mnemonic community’, a social unit capable of sustaining collective memories and with a sense of common history.

In coining the phrase mnemonic community, Zerubavel notes that memories, usually considered to be particular to atomized individuals, are in fact social and

\(^{163}\) Ibid., p. 106. Emphasis added.
reflexively define and in turn are defined by the communities through which we ‘vicariously experience the past.’ These communities are sustained through collective memory, and in turn, affect the way in which we remember, ‘filtering’ and “inevitably distort[ing]” our memories and “affect[ing] the actual facts we recall as well as the particular ‘tone’ in which we recall them.” It is through membership of a mnemonic community that one shares vivid sense of a shared history or essential links that one feels they have to others in the same community, alive or long dead. Collective memory helps define one’s identity, hence not only being a cornerstone of the ‘imagined community’ of the nation, but a matter of personal importance. Our social groups, as Zerubavel suggests, may well influence our own individual recollections, however, collective memory itself can be ‘distorted’ and take on the ‘tone’ of larger ideological structures through which the importance or significance of past events can be radically redefined and memories of specific times, people, or places – as Naoki Sakai wrote of in his discussion of ‘conscious forgetting’ – can become unspoken taboos. Likewise, Zerubavel suggests that antagonistic ‘mnemonic battles’ between individuals and between groups in forming unified historical narratives from disparate views of the past.


165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.
If the development of Chinese national ‘memory’ and, indeed, the foundation of the Chinese nation can be read as a reaction of the immense suffering during the ‘100 years of shame’, particularly during the First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars, Naoki Sakai would in turn read the foundation of the post-war Japanese nation as the result of the same imperialist period, and, invoking Carl Schmitt under similar terms to Zhao’s invocation of Deutch and Weber, arguing that the sense of “self-determination” of the nation is made most “explicit … in the extremity of war.”  

Presumably for both attackers and defenders, “one’s belonging to the nation is immediately facilitated by one’s willingness to join in the act of killing a group of people designated as the enemy.” Specifically, Sakai argues that the history of modern Japan is nothing but a history in which a national community is formed as the community of ‘unnatural’ death. ... Through many reforms in the late nineteenth century, the right and/or duty [to kill] was extended to about the half of the adult population. Finally, during the 1930s and early 1940s, it was given to the entire population. Literally, total war became possible.

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167 Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity, p. 99.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.
Certainly this history is not unique to Japan, and one could point to the same sort of patriotic bloodshed elsewhere as having had much the same effect. Benedict Anderson has written extensively on the supposedly noble act of killing and, perhaps more importantly, the “moral grandeur” of dying for the ‘sacred’ national community,\(^{170}\) and how these acts have taken on religious significance with the rise of the nation-state. Similarly, Achille Mbembe, drawing from a similar pool to Sakai and Anderson, argues that a nation-state’s “divine right to exist” is linked to the state’s monopoly on the right to kill, be it through executions, in war, or, as Mbembe adds, institutionalized colonial violence against groups who are deemed ‘stateless’ or ‘savages’, and against whom “violence of the [Schmittian] state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of ‘civilization’.”\(^{171}\) Much like Mbembe’s critique of Euro-American colonialism/post-colonialism, pretensions of ‘civilization’ (bunmei in Japanese) are at the very heart of Japanese colonial violence, such as in violence against the Taiwanese aborigines in the 1874 invasion and after the 1895 annexation, and eventually violence against the Chinese themselves, and even today subtly remains at the heart of Sinophobia.\(^{172}\)


\(^{172}\) Sakai coincidentally uses a Žižekian analysis of Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō’s notable Sinophobia, which Sakai compares to European anti-Semitism. According to Žižek, the figure of ‘the Jew’, a sublime object, serves to “stitch up the inconsistency of our own ideological system” and thereby masking the reality of a heterogeneous, antagonistic culture by rooting that antagonism in an “external
Anderson analyzes war monuments such as cenotaphs or tombs of Unknown Soldiers as a type of nationalist simulacrum, writing that the quasi-religious (though thoroughly secular) ceremonial reverence is “accorded [to] these monuments precisely because they are either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them,” allowing them to function on a purely symbolic level. In Žižekian language, the cenotaphs, literally ‘empty tombs’, are sublime objects par excellence: “a positive, material object elevated to the status of the impossible Thing.” These memorials, in their material positivity, are masking “not some other, more substantial order of objects but simply the emptiness.” In this case, what these memorials mask is the tragic absurdity of the fact that the nation that we are willing to kill and die for is imaginary. Even outside of an explicitly nationalist context, memorials serve to symbolize past traumas, which are arguably unsymbolizable (Žižek’s ‘impossible Thing’), and more than merely masking such absurdity of killing or dying for an ideological construct or a ‘fetishistic inversion’, the experiences of violence and trauma symbolized in monuments become negated or obscured through this symbolic order.


175 Ibid., p. 194.
However, even in attempting to establish a level of hegemonic control of narratives of great sacrifice and memories of the dead by tying them to a physical place administered by the state, as Jenny Edkins demonstrates in her examination of memorials such as the post-First World War Cenotaph in Whitewall, London, ideologies such as ‘glorious sacrifice to the state’ can still be challenged by a spontaneous public outpouring of grief and remembrance, and, Edkins argues, “[t]he power to determine what should happen [is] not entirely possessed by those in authority.”¹⁷⁶ For soldiers who returned from the First World War, sometimes gravely injured, or for families of the dead, the “meaningless … rituals of mourning” which were enacted as part of an official narrative of glorious sacrifice were not enough.¹⁷⁷ In this sense, official narratives can be subverted and inherently empty memorials, whether we choose to call them sublime objects or les lieux de mémoire, can become ‘organic’, heterogeneous sites of collective memory. Perhaps this is because survivors or the bereaved, Edkins argues, experience of grief and trauma in what she calls “trauma time”: a fundamental breaking of a progressive, future-oriented temporarily which is essential to state ideology, through re-emerging or persisting trauma.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, I would claim that Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands themselves function in much the same way as standing monuments, not simply being ‘imbued’ with ideologies of


¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 58.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 16.
nationhood, but as Edkins describes, being imbued with all of the contradictions and conflicts therein, and potentially destabilizing the very ideologies they represent. However, as we have seen with China and Korea, collective memories too can both challenge and redefine national identity, posing a significant challenge to state ideology and historiography.

Zhao would note, for example, following the democratic movement and the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the CCP would revive ‘mass nationalism’ campaigns which “emphasized the need to remember earlier suffering ... to prevent the loss of Chinese identity through foreign cultural and political intrusions, and to accept the need for strong government controls over society.” In reaction to the domestic pressure which led to the democratic movement, finally driven back underground, and immense international pressure that came after the massacre in the form of diplomatic condemnation and heavy economic sanctions, the campaign was an attempt to portray the CCP as being uniquely capable of defending China from future foreign aggression, while serving to “compensate for the all-too-evident weakness of communist ideology in the post-communist era.” In an attempt to reassert the CCP’s ideological importance, the nationalist campaigns in the early 1990s had precisely the same goal as the nationalist campaigns decades earlier: “removing differences within the country and

179 Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, p. 245. Emphasis added.
replacing them with a common, hegemonic order of the Chinese nation-state.”¹⁸⁰ Like the Whitewall Cenotaph, however, the promotion of nationalism in China has not always had the intended result of national homogeneity or subservience to the state, and the same could be said to some degree of rightist nationalism movements in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and in all cases, even if the promotion of ethnic nationalism or state ideology through the disputed islands is a powerful form of political capital for governments seeking legitimacy, the backlash of ‘out of control’ nationalism can be severe.

To return briefly to my earlier discussion of the historical background of Japanese expansionism, Inoue Kiyoshi comments on Japan’s effectiveness in dealing with historical territorial disputes between Japan and the encroaching Russian and American spheres in the late-Edo period, including the Bonin Islands (Ogasawara Guntō), which were uninhabited when the Americans found them in 1830 — hence the English name, which derives from the Japanese bunin, or, ‘uninhabited’. Despite being populated by American settlers by the time Japan made its formal claim in 1862, the islands were ‘restored’ to Japan, likely as a act of good faith. There are important points to be made here which are relevant to the current island disputes. (1) Like North and South Korea’s irredentist claims to Dokdo or China and Taiwan’s claims to the Senkaku Islands, the Bonin Islands were considered historically or culturally tied to the Japanese

¹⁸⁰ Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, p. 245.
state despite a long history of being uninhabited and unused. (2) According to Inoue, Japan’s claims were motivated by a great deal of domestic pressure regarding the territorial integrity of Japan’s northernmost and southernmost frontiers and intense demands for territorial expansion. (3) This pressure included “a loyalist clique [which] did not cease criticizing the then ruling Bakufu for bowing to the ‘barbarians’ (‘iteki’ ni kutsujū suru).”181

I would argue that this reflexive domestic pressure in many ways mirrors the People’s Republic of China’s claims to the Senkaku Islands in the ‘post-communist era’ and South Korea’s claims to Dokdo. Just as acquiescing to so-called ‘barbarians’ (Europeans and Americans) could be mobilized as a political wedge in late Tokugawa Japan — and indeed, confirming this, the same federalist, proto-imperialist ‘loyalist clique’ that would topple the Tokugawa government later initiated the Saga and Satsuma Rebellions against the Meiji government, ostensibly for a soft-line approach to the foreign incursion and rejection of proposals for a full-scale invasion of Korea — what appear simply to be anti-Japanese demonstrations in South Korea both before and after the democratization movement and in China since the mid-1980s are at least in part ‘veiled criticisms’ of the ruling party or government officials, either protesting the perceived ‘pro-Japanese’ stance of moderate officials or as expedient means of attacking politicians in authoritarian regimes, or some combination of both.

In my previous chapter on the ‘sublime’ status of Dokdo in post-colonial South Korea, for example, I discussed KCIA chief Kim Jong-Pil who, during the dictatorial Park Chung-hee regime, was exiled after major protests for appearing to mishandle negotiations with Japan and compromise the status of Dokdo, or the increasing association between Dokdo as a symbol of South Korean sovereignty which left Kim Dae-jung (president between 1998-2003) struggling to appear sufficiently patriotic while taking a ‘progressive’ policy toward Japan and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) using a relatively strong stance against Japan in an attempt to regain popular support. Most recently, Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), starting his presidency with a relatively pro-Japan stance, ended his term with a ‘bang’ by taking an unusually aggressive stance toward Japan and using Dokdo as a trump card during preliminary electioneering for his Grand National Party successor, Park Geun-hye.

David Hundt and Roland Bleiker note that during the democratization movement in the 1980s in South Korea, “long-held and long-repressed feelings of resentment [began] to emerge” resulting “in large-scale demonstrations against Japanese leaders who dared defend their country's wartime record or make statements perceived as slighting Korea,”182 though Koo notes that even before these feelings emerged,

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182 Hundt and Bleiker, “Reconciling Colonial Memories in Korea and Japan.”
For South Koreans political leaders, both ruling and opposition, ‘Japan-bashing’ provided a powerful rhetorical tool with which to manipulate public opinion and undercut political opponents in a fierce struggle for power.\textsuperscript{183}

Cumings argues that this anti-Japanese anger and resentment is reflects Koreans’ “bitter experiences and memories” of the Japanese colonial period and represents a sort of ‘grey zone’ in which the often unspoken, unresolved questions of innocence and guilt of many Koreans in Japanese collaboration or complicity “continue to divide people, even within the same family; it was too painful to confront directly, and so it amounts now to buried history,” forming a lacuna in Korean history, and even for younger generations of Koreans born after liberation, “continues to play upon the national identity,” and shades Koreans nationalism.\textsuperscript{184}

A similar phenomenon to anti-Japanese rhetoric being used as political capital can be observed in China. For example, leading up to and during the 1990-1991 dispute over the Senkaku Islands, university students in China rallied against the ‘revival of Japanese militarism’ after Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visits to the highly contentious Yasukuni Shrine, and condemned what they saw as the aggressive

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.

'dumping' of Japanese goods into the Chinese markets. This came as high-level criticisms specifically targeted a supposed unpatriotic ‘pro-Japanese faction’ inside the CCP. Deans argues that earlier anti-Japanese demonstrations in 1985 and 1986 were not simply an outburst of anti-Japanese sentiment … [but] must be understood in the context of the struggle over reform in the Chinese leadership. The attacks on the ‘pro-Japan faction’ were a veiled criticism of Hu Yaobang, the Secretary-General of the CCP [who famously gave a warm welcome to Prime Minister Nakasone and a 3,000-strong Japanese youth delegation]; the attacks on Japanese economic imperialism were a criticism of the reform process and the speed at which China was opening to foreign investment and influence.186

Regarding the use of anti-Japanese rhetoric as political capital or acquiescing to popular anti-Japanese protests as a form of self-legitimization, the CCP was put into a tenuous position, with China depending on Japan for “urgently needed” trade following sanctions put on China after the Tiananmen Square Massacre concurrently

185 Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia, p. 117.


187 Ibid.
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and so-called ‘fall of Communism’. With China in
this tenuous position and its trade deficit with Japan closing with exports to Japan
firmly overtaking imports by 1988,\(^{188}\) squelching criticisms of Japanese ‘economic
imperialism’ and making Japan an increasingly important market for Chinese goods,
the Senkaku Islands dispute became potentially costly for China. However, Zhao warns
that “once unleashed, nationalism [can] cause a serious backlash, provoking serious
challenges to the communist state and damaging China’s foreign relations,” and a
perceived ‘soft’ stance on Japan, “a country that allegedly failed to provide adequate
compensation for wartime injuries, laid claim to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, and
waged economic imperialism,”\(^ {189} \) could spell disaster for the CCP by appearing to
contradict anti-Japanese nationalist rhetoric that the party itself promoted as part of the
unifying Chinese collective experience. The CCP was put into a sort of ‘mutual hostage’
relationship, relying on Japan economically for a time, while being forced to maintain a
level of anti-Japanese posturing to secure domestic legitimacy, which is how I would
explain China’s seemingly ambivalent approach taken to anti-Japanese Senkaku Islands
protests which have repeatedly sent thousands of youth protestors into the streets of
cities across China.

center.gr.jp/economy_trade/niccyu.html>.

\(^{189}\) Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, p. 33.
Regardless of ‘top-down’ ideological constructs that ‘distort’ historical visions, or for that matter, ‘bottom-up’ factors such as collective memory which greatly complicate any disputes over historical memory, memory itself is parallax and we remember, as groups or as individuals, particular events in different ways based on present circumstance or the influence of those around us, and the act of forgetting can similarly be conscious or unconscious. The object of remembrance can be physically positive (memorials, or the disputed islands) or negative (historical events) and there is no guarantee that others, either individuals or mnemonic communities, share particular understandings or interpretations of the past, despite these interpretations playing a major role in our ontological understanding, and this ambiguity is certainly a source of great tension between Japan and those who were profoundly affected personally or collectively by Japanese imperialism.

As Nora observes, this sort of symbiotic conflict between government and non-government actors can be seen in the promotion of national history, which is dependent on collective memory in the retroactively narrative of the nation while in opposition to it. Writers of national histories, it seems, rarely consider the possibility of other voices in this process, and not surprisingly, one of the phrases which one often hears in irredentist arguments and counter-irredentist arguments between Japan and its neighbours is that one or the other has a ‘distorted view of history’. The striking thing about this phrase — while certainly not out of place when examining revisionist texts — is it implies that there is, somewhere, an undistorted view of history, which presumably,
whoever accuses the other believes they alone possess. Hundt and Bleiker comment on the tension caused by sometimes radically different understandings of “what took place in the past and how politicians in the present should represent and account for those differences.” Invoking Neitzche, they warn that “the past can, of course, never be remembered authentically. A certain selection of facts, perspectives and interpretations shapes all understandings of history.”¹⁹⁰ Not dissimilar to this is Bruce Cumings’ titular Nietzschean argument in *Parallax Visions*. Cumings sees major ideological disparities as potentially creating radically different ‘parallax’ views of the same historical ‘facts’ and ongoing events with, as Henoik Kwon comments, sometimes “large-scale human tragedies” as the result.¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ Hundt and Bleiker, “Reconciling Colonial Memories in Korea and Japan.”

Conclusion

August and September 2012 saw back-to-back disputes in South Korea and then China. While I’ve written about the desirability of maintaining *status quo* from a political perspective and tied the island disputes to party legitimacy in South Korea and China, this is not to discount real, long-standing issues which continue to ‘haunt’ Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands. As I have discussed, sharply disputed historical memory and these island disputes have played a negative role in power politics in Japan as well, recalling the tremendous conservative backlash in 1996 against the Socialist-led ‘eight party alliance’ following major disputes with both South Korea and China and after the Murayama apology which brought the right-wing Hashimoto to power, and during the December 2012 election against the single term Democratic Party of Japan – the first party ever to win a majority against the Liberal Democratic Party – in the anxiety and malaise in Japan following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, major, ongoing and seemingly-intensifying territorial rows with China, South Korea, and Russia, which seemed to again reverse the status of the disputed islands from defense of Japan to the containment of Japan, and failures to solve long-standing problems regarding American bases in Okinawa which culminated in the election of the Liberal Democratic Party under the far-right Abe Shinzō on an

The Dokdo and Senkaku Islands territorial disputes are not simply matters of territorial or resource nationalism, or for that matter, not simply the result of Cold War-era legal complications or security concerns. Instead, I have argued that investigating and analyzing the importance that these islands take beyond potential quantitative material or strategic value is crucial in understanding the Gordian Knot-like irredentist entanglements; namely the manner in which mere ‘rocks’ have become such powerful icons of popular nationalism, and how the ideological importance of both Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands has greatly complicated the process of resolution, bringing negotiations to a standstill and risking armed conflict. In the evolving national ideologies of the pre- and post-war Japanese, Korean and Chinese states, these islands have become highly ideologized spaces reflecting the state and nation, and powerful mnemonic symbols of disputed historical memory. Deep-seeded disputes in history and historical memory, irredentism, and virulent nationalism has turned these islands into what Žižek refers to as ‘sublime objects’ of desire, and by elevating these islands, like the nation, to a level of supreme importance, these disputed rocks mask historiographical or ideological gaps and aporias in narratives of the nation and serve to
maintain the phantasmagoric totalized image of the nation in our so-called ‘post-national’ globalized age.
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